

# **Rethinking Global Security: An African Perspective?**

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# Preface

The concept of global security has greatly evolved from what we knew it to be for a long time in the past. The old bi-polar international system that regulated relations between states has drastically restructured itself against the changing threats, needs and requirements of states, but has nevertheless remained an inadequate barrier for international peace and security. Today, the main threats to international peace and security are rooted in situations within states rather than between states, as is especially prevalent in the African context. Environmental degradation, social conflict and social strife, poverty, HIV/AIDS, etc are all projections of bad governance that have become more of a security concern than the traditional military antagonism that pitted nations against each other.

The expanded definition of security inadvertently created tension between on the one hand, security structures and institutions that had largely remained static; and on the other hand, the dynamic evolution of international processes with a bearing on security. The need for such structures and institutions to reinvent themselves became both evident and compelling and thus a rethinking was required not only in identifying new threats to security, but also in the reformulation of new security strategies, military doctrines, and programs of action. This was the backdrop to the conceptualization of the Conference on Rethinking Global Security from an African Perspective held in February 2006 under the auspices of the Foundation.

The conference, that is the precursor to this publication, had the foregoing assumption that Africa was absent in the global security setting agenda, and that it required to infuse its lenses to the debate, in essence, "colouring it African". However, three days of deliberation shed light to the fact that Africa has indeed contributed to the expanded definition of global security especially in the area of human and development security. The conference was a milestone event that gathered a microcosm of the integrative global, regional and national efforts needed to address the ever growing challenges of global security. It brought together representation from a wide range of the expanded fields of security, certifying the requirement that any attempt at rethinking security phenomena today must appropriately begin with the actors, who must similarly recognize the interdisciplinary and evolutionary nature of security.

The conference and this subsequent publication are in line with the Foundation's work which takes due cognisance of the fact that foreign, security, and development policies have become increasingly intertwined. These activities similarly form part of the continuing partnership between the Heinrich Böll Founda-

tion and the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies of the University of Nairobi, building on earlier work by the two institutions, and in particular their collaboration on *African Regional Security Issues in the Age of Globalisation* (2004) that sought to examine how the processes of globalisation have affected the African regional security agenda. While that work was inward looking in that it examined security from within-Africa (and specifically from within the IGAD region) perspectives, this conference took a larger view by examining the role of Africa from the wider perspective of global security and the other forces and perspectives that are shaping it. Thus, our initiatives, as well as those in collaboration with partners such as the WorldWatch Institute and the University of Nairobi among others, are fast charting the way in facilitating discourse, as in this case, on the multifaceted nature of global security.

Last but not least, it is heartening to realize that this book is a manifestation of multi-directional input, reflecting the combined efforts of a number of individuals and organizations. The Heinrich Böll Foundation would like to acknowledge the contribution of the University of Nairobi's Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, represented by its Director, Prof. Makumi Mwangi for the conceptual input in the formulation of the antecedent conference, and the co-editing of its emergent publication in collaboration with Prof. Okello Oculi who similarly receives our warmest regards. Our thanks also go to all the resource persons who contributed to the academic papers that form the content discussion of this publication, but also to those resource persons who contributed to the publication after the conference, as well as Dr. Cheryl Hendricks for her foreword to the book. Our gratitude also goes to all participants from the civil society, academia, student and government constituencies who not only attended, but contributed to the success of the Conference on Rethinking Global Security through inspirational contributions and deliberations. Special recognition to our Foundation's co-president, Ralf Fücks and Antonie Nord, Head of Africa Department for enhancing the quality of discourse and outcome.

Last but not least, the achievements as set out above would not have been possible without the support, reviews and contributions of the staff of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, in particular Wanjiku Wakogi to whom my final gratitude is bestowed.

*Aseghedech Ghirmazion*  
*Director*  
*Heinrich Böll Foundation*

# Global Security Agenda Setting





# State of the World 2005: Redefining security<sup>1</sup>

*Michael Renner*

## Introduction

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States and the subsequent “war on terrorism”, the global security debate has become fixated on a narrow slice of security concerns and remains steeped in traditional understandings of security. This is in contrast to the post-Cold War, pre-9/11 era, during which a broader definition of security had slowly gained recognition in policy-making circles – even if translating these insights into actual policies was still quite limited.

The Bush administration has embraced the return to a security policy centered on the use of force with a relish—as manifested in its invasion of Iraq and its posture in favor of pre-emptive war. But it is true that the reaction by other governments has been more nuanced and ambiguous. For instance, although the European Security Strategy declaration adopted by the European Council in December 2003 acknowledges that “none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means,” the document endorses more resources for defense and the transformation of European armies “into more flexible, mobile forces.” Ultimately, it gives priority to military intervention and relatively short shrift to nonmilitary ways of dealing with security challenges.

Traditionally, security has been seen as closely related to the threat or use of violence, and military means are regarded as central to the provision of security. This may once have made sense, when conflicts took place predominantly between different countries, when territorial control was a key objective, and when uniformed soldiers were the combatants. But over the last several decades, this type of conflict has become more the exception than the norm.

This paper discusses the shortcomings of traditional security policy and the efforts to arrive at new conceptions of security. It provides a brief overview of some of the major factors and dynamics that affect more security in a more

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<sup>1</sup> This paper is based on and adapted from material in various chapters in Worldwatch Institute, *State of the World 2005: Redefining Global Security* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2005), and from Michael Renner and Zoi Chafe, “Turning Disasters Into Peacemaking Opportunities,” in Worldwatch Institute, *State of the World 2006* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006). These volumes provide far greater detail of the arguments presented here, plus extensive documentation of source materials.

broadly-defined context. And it suggests three major dimensions of an alternative approach to security policy – changed budget and policy priorities, the need for cross-cutting policies, and opportunities for cooperation and peacemaking that emerge from shared interests and vulnerabilities.

### **Challenging traditional security policy precepts**

Traditional, military-focused, approaches are often inappropriate to the global challenges at hand. This is the case for a number of reasons:

- Weapons do not necessarily provide security. This is true for adversarial states armed with weapons of such destructive power that no defense is possible. It is true in civil wars, where the easy availability of weapons empowers the ruthless but offers little defense for civilians. And it was true on September 11th, when a determined group of terrorists struck with impunity against the world's most militarily powerful country. Proliferation of weapons and military technologies is being recognized as a growing concern for global security.
- Real security in a globalizing world cannot be provided on a purely national basis (or even on the basis of limited alliances). A multilateral and even global approach is needed to deal effectively with a multitude of transboundary challenges.
- The traditional focus on state (or regime) security is inadequate and needs to encompass safety and well-being of the state's population. If individuals and communities are insecure, state security itself can be extremely fragile. Security without justice will not produce a stable peace. Democratic governance and a vibrant civil society may ultimately be more imperative for security than an army.
- Non-military dimensions have an important influence on security and stability. Nations around the world, but particularly the weakest countries and communities, confront a multitude of pressures. They face a debilitating combination of rising competition for resources, severe environmental breakdown, the resurgence of infectious diseases, poverty and growing wealth disparities, demographic pressures, and joblessness and livelihood insecurity.

Many of today's challenges cannot be resolved by traditional (i.e., military-focused) security policies. Unlike traditional military threats emanating from a determined adversary, many of today's security challenges are risks and vulnerabilities shared across borders. While the poorest countries are most directly affected, none of these issues respect human-drawn borders, and we might think of them as "problems without passports."

The pressures facing societies and people everywhere do not automatically or

necessarily trigger violence. But they can translate into political dynamics that lead to rising polarization and radicalization. Worst-case outcomes are more likely where grievances are left to fester, where people are struggling with mass unemployment or chronic poverty, where state institutions are weak or corrupt, where arms are easily available, and where political humiliation or despair over the lack of hope for a better future may drive people into the arms of extremist movements. Insecurity can manifest itself in ways other than violent conflict. The litmus test is whether the well-being and integrity of society are so compromised that they lead to possibly prolonged periods of instability and mass suffering.

As early as the 1970s and 1980s, a number of efforts were launched to challenge the dominant narrow approach to security. They gained particular traction after the end of the Cold War. Several high-profile international commissions, NGOs, and academics developed a range of innovative concepts refining and redefining security – by including social, economic, and environmental dimensions. These became known under headings such as *common security*, *comprehensive security*, and *environmental security*.<sup>2</sup> *Human security*, the most encompassing of these concepts, was first spelled out in detail in the 1994 edition of the *Human Development Report*.<sup>3</sup> The gathering discourse raised a number of critical questions:

- What is the object of security?
- Who is to be protected?
- What are the “threats”?
- Who is to provide security?
- And by what means?

The unfolding discourse challenged orthodox assumptions about national security, deepening it “upwards” (from national to global security) and “downwards” (from territorial security focused on states and governments to people security – individuals and communities), and widening it by arguing that non-military dimensions, such as social wellbeing and environmental integrity, are important prerequisites for ensuring security.

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<sup>2</sup> These included the Brandt Commission on North-South issues (1980), the Palme Commission on disarmament and security (1982), the Brundtland Commission on environment and development (1987), and the Commission on Global Governance (1995).

<sup>3</sup> The 1994 *Human Development Report* defined human security as entailing seven distinct categories: 1) economic security (assured and adequate basic incomes); 2) food security (physical and affordable access to food); 3) health security; 4) environmental security (access to safe water, clean air and non-degraded land); 5) personal security (physical violence); 6) community security (ethnic violence); and 7) political security (basic human rights and freedoms). United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 24.

## Dimensions of concern

In the framework of a broader conception of security, a range of factors, dynamics, and interactions are of concern. The following discussion provides a brief summary of key issues and challenges, but is not meant to be exhaustive:

### *Struggles over oil and other resources*

Natural resources are at the core of a number of security issues. Resource wealth has fueled a series of civil wars, with governments, rebels, and warlords in Latin America, Africa, and Asia clamoring over resources such as oil, metals and minerals, gemstones, and timber.

Oil is the most strategic and lucrative commodity in the world economy. Struggles over access and control have long fueled geopolitical maneuvering, civil wars, and human rights violations. Major powers have repeatedly intervened in resource-rich countries, militarily and by other means, in order to control lucrative resources. The result has often been enduring political instability. Against the backdrop of surging demand for oil, geopolitical rivalries for preferential access are today again intensifying among major importers.

Economic and environmental dimensions are also of growing concern. The economic security of both supplier and buyer nations is potentially compromised by severe price swings, particularly as ever-growing demand bumps up against limited supplies. And as the dominant fossil fuel, oil of course plays a central role with regard to carbon emissions and thus climate stability, an issue that poses grave threats to human safety everywhere on the planet.

### *Water scarcity*

Disputes also arise over access to renewable natural resources such as water, arable land, forests, and fisheries. This is particularly the case among groups—such as farmers, nomadic pastoralists, ranchers, and resource extractors—that depend directly on the health and productivity of the resource base but often have incompatible or directly conflicting needs.

Water is the most precious resource. Both the quantity and quality are crucial for such fundamental human needs as food and health. Worldwide, more than 430 million people currently face water scarcity, and the numbers are set to rise sharply. Given population growth, nearly 3 billion (3,000 million) people—40 percent of the projected world population—will likely live in water-stressed countries by 2015.

Growing scarcity may invite increased conflict. To date, water coopera-

tion, rather than conflict, has been the norm among riparian states. But this will not necessarily be so in the future, and there will be a growing need to engage in skilled water diplomacy and to pursue technologies and methods to use water far more efficiently. Meanwhile, intra-state (local and regional) disputes and clashes over water are already far more common and may well further proliferate.

### *Food security*

A reliable supply of food is one of the most basic determinants of how secure or insecure people are. Food security is at the intersection of poverty, water availability, land distribution, and environmental degradation. But war and social disruptions also play an important role in some cases. And the proliferation of factory farming and the promotion of monocultures have triggered growing worries about the safety and quality of food supplies.

Worldwide, nearly 2 billion people suffer from hunger and chronic nutrient deficiencies. About 1.4 billion people, almost all of them in developing countries, confront environmental fragility. Of these, more than 500 million people live in arid regions, more than 400 million people eke out a meager living on soils of very poor quality, some 200 million small-scale and landless farmers are compelled to cultivate steep slopes, and 130 million people live in areas cleared from rainforests and other fragile forest ecosystems.

### *Infectious disease*

Disease burdens can in some cases be sufficiently severe to undermine economies and threaten social stability. Although the poor are most vulnerable, societies across the planet are now confronting a resurgence of infectious diseases. Some 20 known diseases have re-emerged or spread geographically, and many new ones, such as SARS and avian flu, have been identified. Pathogens are crossing borders with increasing ease, facilitated by growing international travel and trade, migration, and the social upheaval inherent in war and refugee movements. Logging, road-building, dam construction, and climate change enable diseases like malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis to spread to previously unaffected areas or bring people into closer proximity with new disease vectors.

In the poorest developing countries, infectious diseases are weakening and impoverishing families and communities, deepening poverty and widening inequality, drastically reducing life expectancy, and severely taxing overall economic health.

The AIDS epidemic has a particularly devastating impact on farm production and food security because it incapacitates and kills primarily young adults during their peak productive years. AIDS is projected to claim a fifth or more of the agricultural labor force in most southern African countries by 2020, heightening the risk of famine. AIDS not only decimates farmers, it strikes many others in the prime years of life—including soldiers, teachers, health practitioners, and other professionals. The disease cripples societies at all levels, undermining a state's overall resilience and its ability to govern and provide for basic human needs.

### *Environmental decline and natural disasters*

A combination of resource depletion, ecosystem destruction, population growth, and economic marginalization of poor people has set the stage for more frequent and more devastating “unnatural” disasters—natural disturbances made worse by human actions. The number of disasters has risen from about 750 in 1980-84 to almost 2,000 in 2000-2004; the number of people affected has risen from about 500 million to 1,400 million during the same period of time.

The pace is likely to accelerate as climate change translates into more intense storms, flooding, heat waves, and droughts.

In addition to sudden disasters, there is also the “slow-onset” degradation of ecosystems, in some cases sufficiently extreme to undermine the habitability of a given area. This is most calamitous for the poor because they tend to be far more directly exposed, have inadequate protection, and have little in the way of resources and wherewithal to cope with the consequences. Although there are no reliable data for the numbers of such “environmental refugees,” it is clear that many millions are affected and that their ranks are likely to skyrocket in the years ahead. Desertification alone, for example, puts an estimated 135 million people worldwide at risk of being driven from their lands. The displaced may not be welcome elsewhere, causing tensions over access to land, jobs, and social services.

### *Unemployment*

Lack of employment, uncertain economic prospects, and rapid population growth make for a potentially volatile mix. A 2004 report from the International Labour Organization found that three quarters of the world's workers live in circumstances of economic insecurity. Most worrisome in some ways is the vast reservoir of unemployed young people in many developing countries. Youth

unemployment is skyrocketing to record levels, with the highest rates found in the Middle East and North Africa (26 percent) and in sub-Saharan Africa (21 percent). At least 60 million people aged 15–24 worldwide cannot find work, and twice as many – some 130 million – are among the planet’s 550 million working poor who cannot lift their families out of poverty.

When large numbers of young men feel frustrated in their search for status and livelihood, they can be a destabilizing force. Their uncertain prospects may cause criminal behavior, feed discontent that could burst open in street riots, or foment political extremism. Particularly if political grievances linger, the malcontented may be easy to recruit into insurgent groups, militias, or organized crime – as experiences in places like Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor have shown in recent years.

Alone or in combination, these pressures threaten to undermine the livelihoods of communities and nations, compromising their viability in fundamental ways. But they could also lead the world into a dangerous spiral in which political and ethnic fault lines deepen, radicalization grows, and more violence ensues. Worst-case outcomes are more likely where political grievances are left to fester, where public institutions are weak or corrupt, and where weapons (particularly small arms) are easily available.

These challenges cannot be resolved by resorting to traditional security tools – such as raising military expenditures, dispatching troops, sealing borders or, for that matter, maintaining the status quo in a highly unequal world. What does an alternative approach to security policy entail? This paper discusses three major dimensions: changed budget and policy priorities; developing cross-cutting policies; and promoting new avenues of peacemaking.

## **New budget priorities**

Military priorities threaten to sideline the struggle against poverty, health epidemics, and environmental degradation, by draining scarce resources away from the root causes of insecurity. On paper at least, the world’s governments are supporting policies that seek to bring about fundamental improvement in these areas. In 2000, UN member states agreed on the Millennium Development Goals, and in 2002 they complemented them with additional (and partially overlapping) targets at the World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg. But actual progress toward these goals has been excruciatingly slow and quite uneven across different regions. In part, that is because of a lack of available resources.

Yet, surprisingly modest investments in health, education, and environmental protection could tap the vast human potential now shackled by poverty and break the vicious circles that are destabilizing large areas of our planet. Estimates suggest that programs to provide clean water and sewage systems would cost roughly \$37 billion annually; to cut world hunger in half, \$24 billion; to prevent soil erosion, another \$24 billion; to provide reproductive health care for all women, \$12 billion; to undertake an adequate global HIV/AIDS program, \$10 billion; to eradicate illiteracy, \$5 billion; to provide immunization for every child in the developing world, \$3 billion; and to control malaria in sub-Saharan Africa, another \$3 billion.

Together these programs might thus cost on the order of about \$120 billion per year, investments needed for a number of years. Clearly, this is a substantial sum (and it does not include other needs, such as education and job training and creation).

But it is important to put this sum in the context of existing priorities. For instance, the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan alone will, according to official estimates, absorb about \$120 billion in 2006 – roughly the same amount the programs mentioned above would cost. In 2004, industrial countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) spent \$811 billion on military programs – more than 10 times the \$79.5 billion they made available for development assistance.

Security spending is terribly misdirected today. World military expenditures run to about \$1,000 billion a year. They keep rising even as many other needs go unfunded or underfunded.

Compared with global military budgets, investments in health, education, and environmental protection are modest.

### **The need for cross-cutting policies**

A new security policy would de-emphasize military aspects and elevate a broad range of non-military components. Among other goals, a new policy agenda would likely include measures to:

- promote renewable energy and energy efficiency for climate stability
- safeguard critical ecosystems
- reduce population growth, in part by encouraging girls' education and empowering women
- strengthen public health systems
- and undertake critical investments in education and job training.



The point, however, is not to draw up a lengthy wish-list, and to run the inherent risk of endless debates about the relative merit of one or the other program. Rather, it is critical that national and global policies be made more cross-cutting and better integrated. This demand grows out of a recognition that security, development, and sustainability are intricately linked. The absence of beneficial economic development breeds insecurity. But for development to take place requires peace and political stability. And development needs to be sustainable and equitable to bring about stable outcomes.

Developing more effective policies requires bringing together the strengths and insights of different disciplines, policy communities, and bureaucratic turfs – including the fields of security, development, environment, public health, and others. This is a matter not only of promoting interdisciplinary thinking, but also encouraging the development of a “shared language” and trying to surmount competing agendas and time horizons of different actors involved.

Encouragingly, the Swedish government decided in 2003 to align its trade, agriculture, environmental and defense policies around the guiding principle of equitable and sustainable global development. Other governments would do well to emulate Sweden’s efforts.

But beyond the national realm, there is also a need for stepped-up and improved coordination along the global-national-local spectrum, among governments, civil society groups, and business. While easy to formulate in the abstract, translating this into actual practice no doubt poses an extremely difficult challenge.

## Promoting new ways of peacemaking

### *Promoting peace through environmental cooperation*

There is general recognition that humanity has reached an era of globalization and interdependence. Often, this recognition is rendered in a plaintive tone – shrugging one’s shoulders at links and connections that are beyond the control of any one country or community. Yet, interdependence also offers opportunities to develop new ways of cooperation, including among actors that are locked into relationships marked by mutual suspicion and hostility. One way to do so is to act on the basis of shared environmental needs and interests.

Environmental challenges ignore political boundaries, require a long-term perspective, and encourage and necessitate participation by civil society. The environment thus offers some useful qualities that lend themselves to transforming conflict and building peace.

Environmental cooperation can enhance mutual trust (by establishing pragmatic, working-level contacts across political divides); establish cooperative habits (among governments as well as at the society-to-society level); create common regional identities around shared resources; and thus over time helping to generate a new dynamic that could sustain broader peacemaking efforts.

There is indeed a growing array of initiatives worldwide that seek to promote “environmental peacemaking.” They include peace parks straddling international borders, shared river basin management plans, regional seas agreements, and joint environmental monitoring programs.

Experience shows that in some instances (such as among the countries in the Caucasus, India and Pakistan (Kashmir), Peru and Ecuador, and to some extent between Israelis and Palestinians), environmental issues are one of the few topics around which ongoing dialogue can be maintained among adversaries. This is not to say that environmental cooperation will easily or automatically translate into broader cooperation and peacemaking; tremendous political courage, vision, and leadership are essential for progress to be achieved.

### *Promoting peace through joint humanitarian action*

Environmental protection is ultimately in everyone’s interest, but this is a realization that is all too often concealed by short-term interests. As mentioned earlier, environmental degradation is increasingly translating into more frequent and more devastating natural disasters such as storms, floods, and droughts. In other cases, it weakens the integrity of ecosystems that provide protection against the impact of disasters.

Although disaster prevention is of course the preferable course, disasters sometimes do entail a silver lining. A disaster may inflict suffering that cuts across the divides of conflict, prompting common relief needs and making protagonists realize that reconciliation is essential for reconstruction and recovery. A prominent example is Indonesia’s Aceh province after the December 2004 tsunami. It triggered a new mood of reconciliation that allowed the 29-year conflict there to be brought to an end.

As is the case with environmental cooperation and peacemaking, disasters do not automatically translate into cooperation, for a number of reasons.

- Smaller-scale disasters or slow-onset disasters may not generate the sudden jolt necessary to transform conflict dynamics.
- Political leaders may not possess the courage or wisdom to break with deeply-ingrained conflict patterns.

- Quarrels could even sharpen in the wake of disasters, particularly over the distribution of relief aid.
- Finally, some types of disasters, such as droughts, exhibit characteristics that are less conducive to peacemaking (disputes over scarce land and water between different communities may gain precedence over common interests).

There is thus a need for humanitarian peacemaking initiatives or, as it is sometimes called, disaster diplomacy. In order for these to succeed – and even to take place at all – far-sighted political leadership and courageous action are required. In other words, while traditional security policy tools are often inappropriate and counter-productive, an alternative approach does not entail any miracle tools.

# Security in our one world<sup>1</sup>

*Ralf Fücks*<sup>2</sup>

“Security” – no other political term has experienced such an international career since September 11, 2001. In the name of security, wars have been waged to topple the Taliban and the Iraqi dictatorship; the “war against terror” has been declared; the EU has resolved to set up intervention troops with a global scope of action; border controls have been tightened; and the powers of the security apparatus have been expanded. Have all of these actions resulted in more security? And whose security are we talking about?

Clearly, the responses to these questions will be very different depending on who is answering. It inevitably becomes a matter of power (i.e. who is able) to define security on a global scale, and obviously that hand of power is distributed quite unequally based on one’s capacity to set the agenda.

For the U.S. Secretary of Defense, “security” means something different from what it does to a rice farmer in India, an African market woman, or a Muslim teenager in Europe. Security can mean the defense against terrorist attacks, or preventing extremist states from coming into possession of nuclear weapons. In Sudan, it means the protection against genocide, while the populations of the world’s poor-houses are threatened primarily with hunger, lack of water and epidemics. Violence has many faces. It can be clothed as social squalor, or in the uniform of a paramilitary soldier; it can have the face of a torturer, or that of a fanatic who is prepared to leave corpses in his wake. And its causes are as manifold as its forms of expression.

The results of this are as follows: firstly, we must not make the mistake of defining security as exclusively the security of the wealthy world. This does not do justice to the multitude of threats to human security, and it divides the peoples instead of looking for a common denominator. In the age of globalization, there cannot be security only for the prosperous minority of the world’s population.

Secondly, we must not define security primarily in military terms. This does not do justice to the many causes that lead to violent conflicts. Military force can be necessary to stop wars and genocide. This was the case on the Balkans; and the opportunity was lost in Rwanda. Military intervention can also become necessary

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<sup>1</sup>This paper is based on and adapted from material in the preface to the German Edition of World Watch Report 2005.

<sup>2</sup> Ralf Fücks is co-president of the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation, a German-based body for political education and international cooperation affiliated with the Green Party.

to topple a terrorist regime such as in Afghanistan, which had become a danger to international security. But peace cannot be waged with war. It is possible only with intelligent policies that do away with the breeding ground for violence.

Preventive wars cannot replace preventive policies. A visionary security policy must pay attention to education and work for the billions of young people in the “so called Third World,” who are threatening to drift into a life devoid of perspectives and dominated by ideological extremism. It must at last take up the fight against epidemics such as malaria and AIDS. It must address the human right to clean water, and act against the desertification of fertile soil. It must do everything possible to keep climate change and its effects within tolerable limits. It must serve to lessen the pressure of the rich countries to acquire finite raw materials, and must overcome their dependency on oil in order to prevent a struggle of all against all over ever scarcer resources. And it must work sincerely for democracy and human rights – in the end, democracy is the best insurance against war and violence, both internal and external.

In my view, the support of democratic “regime change” in authoritarian states is not a neo-colonial project of the West – free elections and a free press, rule of law and freedom of association, are rights held by all peoples. And a key aspect of social and civil-society development is strengthening the rights of women. There is nothing wrong with “democracy promotion” in itself but there are poor policies and counterproductive strategies like the US intervention in Iraq, and there are double standards especially in the “war on terror” which are undermining the political credibility of the West. There has to be a convergence between aims and means and if you are fighting for democracy you have to respect human rights and the rule of law. Extra legal practices as evidenced in Guantanamo Bay or the brutal and humiliating treatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib are unacceptable.

Combating poverty, protecting the environment and democracy are the “Big Three” of a visionary security policy. And they must be accompanied by global economic reforms which provide poor societies with better opportunities for development. At the same time, funds from military budgets must be redirected into programs for education, health care and environmental protection. This applies to the wealthy states, especially the U.S, but also to many developing countries, whose governments invest in weapons rather than in the welfare of their people.

Priorities are clearly misplaced when the U.S. administration is able to mobilize 300 billion dollars for the Iraq war, but the wealthy world cannot raise even a tenth of that sum to secure fresh water supplies in the poverty-stricken regions of the South. Not least, when demands for disarmament apply only to the “others,” this undermines the West’s credibility in terms of security policy.

Visionary security policy may be realized only within a multilateral framework of balanced interests and cooperation. It must build upon the supremacy of international law rather than on the rights of the strongest. This must also include the capability of the international community to put despots in their place and to defend human rights across the borders. Claiming “national sovereignty” cannot constitute free reign for unscrupulous governments to declare parts of their population as free game without being hampered by international sanctions, as is currently happening in Sudan.

*And what is Africa's role in the global security setting?*

The security interests of Africa and those of Africans should and have become a political subject in world politics. Africa's geopolitical setting has made it a viable arena for the playing out of emergent global security dimensions such as terrorism, climatic catastrophes, and the manipulation of weak despotic states. It is now paramount to identify the common security interests between Africa and the west, which by and large have turned out to be interconnected, affecting all of us around the world to at least some extent, even if their resonance, or impact, does vary.

It is similarly important to resolve who is to speak for Africa and act as trustee for Africa's interests once articulated. This could be the regional and sub-regional institutions as suggested in previous fora. Also important is to determine what the design or blueprint of this integrated global security policy should be, taking into consideration that these emerging threats by their very nature are beyond the capacity and sometimes the will of any one state acting alone – i.e., a shared responsibility.

One way to go about this would be to learn through both the positive example and negative lessons of the Transatlantic Alliance of the US and Europe, but replicated in a more global setting.

### **Alliance of the democracies**

The transatlantic conflict over the Iraq War marked a turning point in Europe's relationship to the US. The current strains in the transatlantic relationship reflect a deep-seated political and cultural estrangement between the societies on either side of the Atlantic. By a decade's delay, they still followed the political eruption of 1989/90 which collapsed the old, bi-polar world system and left the US as the sole world power.

Up until September 11, 2001, it was far from certain how the United States would interpret her new role. George Bush began his presidency professing

skepticism about the US function as the global keeper-of-order and about the policy of “nation building” in those crisis regions on the periphery of the world market.

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon altered this attitude from one moment to the next and the new fall 2002 National Security Strategy codified this turnaround. Retreating to Fortress America was no longer an option. Instead, the doctrine of forward defense reigned worldwide and with shifting alliances. One would not have read it as demagogic window-dressing when Bush declared in front of a group of veterans at the White House, “America has no territorial ambitions. We don’t want to become an empire,” but one would nevertheless add to that – not an old-style empire anyway.

The key concept for the strategists in the Administration and in the conservative think tanks is “national security” – with a very broadly defined concept of security. It encompasses security in the supply of raw materials – on which it is not just the American economy that is dependent – as well as combating terrorist networks worldwide and an aggressive policy to prevent despotic regimes from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction.

The US has de facto bound itself to a policy of maintaining worldwide stability and order. Therein lies simultaneously the realization of global responsibility as well as the danger of hubris: failing to recognize that even the US is taking on too much with this task and that as it raises its interests to the standard of world order, it is mobilizing opposing forces that are even stronger.

September 11 deepened the latent but already-existent ‘*security-psychology* discrepancy’ between the US and Western Europe. In Western Europe, the shock over the attacks in New York and Washington were quickly supplanted again. It didn’t upset our prevailing world-view that ever since the implosion of the Soviet empire, we were “surrounded by friends” and that the world was ripe for a period of peaceful cooperation that, at the most, might be disturbed by anachronistic-seeming localized outbreaks of violence.

In the US, on the other hand, September 11 spurred on the perception that the world out there, now as before, was a dangerous place, pregnant with violent conflicts that can only be kept in check by superior military might: Hobbes rather than Kant. In the US, a repeat of the 9/11 attacks only with weapons of mass destruction that time was a nightmare that was very much alive – it appeared on that very day and has been defining security policy thinking ever since.

### *Oil and Policy*

In Europe, many saw this as mere trumped-up allegations, behind which is hidden the “real” driving force of America’s show-of-strength. From the prominent

news magazine *Der Spiegel* to MTV, unanimity reigned that “in reality” it’s about one thing and one thing only: Oil. It would be awfully naïve to claim that this natural resource had nothing to do with the intervention in Iraq. But the connections are somewhat more complex than “no blood for oil” would contend.

For one thing, Japanese and European dependence on oil imports from the Middle East is clearly greater than that of the US. Secondly, it was the Russian and French oil industries that concluded lucrative contracts with Saddam Hussein’s regime, a situation which presumably was not without influence on the attitudes of their governments and which also once again plays a role today as Russia and France again seek to secure their influence on post-war Iraq through the Security Council.

Finally, those days are long gone when individual nations, with the help of their militaries, ensure their exclusive grip on the raw materials and markets of other countries; imperialism has been superseded by globalization, which is based on the principle of open markets. Iraqi oil will not be monopolized by Exxon and Texaco, nor will it be reserved to feed the energy appetite of American air conditioners and SUVs.

To what extent then was it about oil? Preventing the oil states of the Persian Gulf from being taken over by anti-western movements that could turn oil into a weapon is at the core of the American security doctrine. At the same time, it has to do with the legitimate danger that income from oil exports will be put toward developing weapons of mass destruction.

The prospect that despotic, radical anti-Israeli regimes like the Iraq of Saddam Hussein or the Iran of the fundamentalist mullahs would be equipped with medium-range missiles with nuclear or biological warheads should not just make only the US uneasy. While it is certainly true that the answer to this threat does not lie in a series of “disarmament” wars, it is all the more urgent that Europe and the US should set in motion a concerted initiative toward an effective arms control policy in the Near- and Middle-East. Both sides should at least have learned this lesson from the diplomatic disaster of the Iraq War.

### **What role can the UN play?**

One prerequisite for resuscitating the transatlantic alliance was therefore a serious dialogue about security, one in which both sides came to an understanding about trouble spots and potential threats in the coming decades and about an appropriate civil and military strategy to contain these risks.

A second precondition lay in sorting out the future role of the United Nations. Here too there was a need for compromise on both sides. It’s obvious that



France's and Russia's new-found burning love for the UN Security Council was motivated by power politics: They can thus upgrade their own global political status and rein in the US. It is a somewhat different case with Germany: Here one believes much more than in Paris and Moscow in the "supremacy of law" and of a supranational regime that, following the example of the EU, increasingly constrains and replaces the sovereignty of nation states – an idea that may be rather foreign to Chirac and Putin aside from tactical games.

In Germany, we have a tendency to idealize the role of the Security Council. It is, however, not an impartial advocate of international law and humanitarian interests but rather a body in which the self-interests of great and regional powers define the course of decisions. When it comes to conflicts of interest between states holding veto-power, the Security Council is incapacitated.

This was the case for long stretches of the Balkans war as well as the Soviet war in Afghanistan, and the Russian campaign in Chechnya – defying all legal norms – is not even a topic for the Council because under international law, it is a "domestic situation within a sovereign state," and one that in any case commands a veto. True as it is that there is no alternative to the Security Council as an organ of global crisis- and conflict-management, it is equally questionable to make it the sole source of legitimacy for military crisis-intervention:

Was the intervention in Kosovo that put an end to large-scale "ethnic cleansing" somehow contrary to international law because it took place without an explicit UN mandate? In the UN, all states count equally. In actual fact, their democratic legitimacy and devotion to the rule of law is extremely varied. That applies even to the Security Council. Reliance on the UN does not therefore replace an autonomous political and legal determination of right and wrong, legitimate and illegitimate.

## **European unity and Transatlantic Alliance**

It is crucial to convince the US to pursue her interests within the confines of the Security Council and not to pull back into a "selective" multilateralism. But it won't work for the "Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis" to attempt through the Security Council to tie the giant US by its hands and feet.

The consequence of any such containment strategy vis-à-vis the US would be to paralyze the UN, not to mention the collateral damage for NATO and the EU itself. One of the central lessons of the Iraq conflict is that any attempt to transform Europe into the US' geopolitical opposite number leads directly to the division of Europe itself. Great Britain will never be persuaded to pursue such a

policy and neither will the eastern- and central-European states, which become suspicious in the face of new French-German-Russian hegemonic aspirations.

Aside from that, they remember the dangers of totalitarianism far too well to succumb to the illusion that they can do without the transatlantic alliance. He who wants to keep Europe together politically can not erect European unity as a strategic decoupling from the US.

On the other hand, the transatlantic alliance cannot be a relationship where Europeans are just followers. When the will to cooperate is there, all conflicts can in fact be settled without provoking crises every time. In any case, it doesn't help much to demand an equal partnership if Europe does not carry a correspondingly equal political – although not necessarily military – weight. That is already the case economically.

Thus, the EU, to the extent that it is united, is today given great weight in trade policy questions. Without progress in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the transatlantic alliance has no future. Europe must not only be in a position to ensure peace and security at home. It must turn its gaze more fixedly on the world – not just on the world market. As part of that, the EU should not leave it to the US alone to occupy itself with the conflict-laden themes of international security policy: international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the promotion of democratic regime-change in despotic states.

Previously, “democracy” and “stability” in the foreign policy of the US as well as of the European states proved again and again to be contradictory terms. It wasn't just the United States that supported authoritarian governments in the interest of putative stability.

And there have always been two lines in American foreign policy: The conviction that ultimately the spread of pluralist democracy and market economics best corresponds to the US's global interests and the “realpolitical” assessment of governments solely on the basis of their usefulness to the economic and military interests of the western hegemony. Now, for perhaps the first time, a transatlantic consensus is possible by which *global stability* can best be achieved through the *globalization of democracy*. It is on this basis that a new transatlantic partnership might be built.

## Conclusion

Peace and security are pre-conditions for other essential political goals and at the same time they are dependent upon other developments and achievements such

that in essence, global security in fact deals with a triangle, a three fold inter-dependence between security, democratization and development. We should not take it for granted that we are meaning the same when we use such fundamental terms. But I have some optimism, that we are approaching a common understanding.

Firstly, security is not only about states (we have to put human security in the center of the security agenda). It's extremely important who is able to define the global security agenda, who is heard and who is sidelined. It is thus one task to strengthen the African voice in the international security debate.

Secondly, there is a broad consensus that democracy is not only about elections, it is about the rule of law, transparency, balance of powers, independent media, and a democratic political culture with active civil societies. Saying this, I don't want to belittle the importance of free and fair elections; it is a fundamental progress when government change can happen through elections instead of civil war or a *coup d'état*.

Thirdly, development is not only about economic growth. It is about sustainable development, a balanced combination of economic growth, protection of the environment and social justice. We urgently have to work for a more inclusive model of globalization, empowering the poor and creating opportunities for the broad masses, not only for the happy few.

How critical one may be about all that freedom or democracy rhetoric from the US or the EU. But I would like to insist that there is no fundamental contradiction between security, democracy and open markets – on the contrary, these are mutually supportive tasks. Social participation and political parties are at least only two sides of the same coin.

Let me add another remark reflecting this discussion: it is about peace building through institution building and peace building through regional integration. To keep it short: if we want to have sustainable peace and security, we have to root them in sustainable political structures and institutions both on the national as well as the supranational level. That's again about democracy and the rule of law (democracies don't wage war against each other). And its about strengthening supranational institutions to enhance international cooperation and non-violent conflict resolution. That leads to the issue of regional integration as a key to peace and security. It is worth to study the example of the EU which is in spite of all setbacks and critical moments an astonishing success story.

Regional integration is a very complex undertaking; creating a common market which forms a solid base; enhancing scientific and culture cooperation; and developing common political institutions. Regional integration demands the will to share power not only between states involved but between the national states

and regional institutions. I have my doubts whether African governments are ready for that. Maybe it would be a useful step to have a more intensive and specific look on regional integration in a comparative approach between the EU and African institutions.

We should join forces to develop the transnational public sphere. Strong civil societies and transnational information, communication and action are very much needed as:

- An early warning system for upcoming conflicts
- As a counterweight to transnational companies
- To raise public awareness and to influence public opinion.
- To enfold pressure on national governments and international organizations
- And to develop a network of transnational solidarity

Government policy and interaction of states are key to promote peace and security. But the experience of the last decades shows very clearly, that civil society has to be the driving force. That is what we are working for. Let us stop the blame game and let us not waste our time and energy with lamentations. Let us take the challenges and act together to make the world a better place.

# African thinkers and the global security agenda

*Professor Samuel M. Makinda*

## Introduction

The aim in this chapter is to explore how African intellectuals or thinkers might contribute to the setting of the global security agenda. The essay is not about a distinctive African view of security as opposed to the views of other peoples. It is, to a large extent, about the *politics* of defining, popularising and promoting a particular type of knowledge, namely, a perspective of security, at the global level. Those who set the global security agenda include politicians, national and international civil servants, academics (mainly Westerners), journalists and civil society leaders, among others. In doing so, they often consider a number of variables, including, but not limited to, the following: current and projected global security threats; the physical, financial and human resources with which to address specific threats; and the language, idioms and paradigms within which the security threats and the means to address them are debated and formulated. Africa is clearly disadvantaged when it comes to these variables. Due to Africa's precarious financial, scientific and technological base, it does not have the capacity to monitor effectively the current global security problems and make reliable predictions about future threats. In terms of natural resources, Africa is enormously rich; but it lacks the science and technology needed to turn these resources into useable items or sources of global influence. As a result, Africans would find it hard to determine the objects and subjects of security and prescribe the means that are needed to address them.

Africa's deepening poverty and lack of global influence stem from its weak technological and knowledge bases. It is generally acknowledged that it is the states and peoples who control the fountains of knowledge that often exercise preponderant influence in international society. As Ali Mazrui (2000: 275) has pointed out: 'The entire international system of stratification has come to be based not on "who owns what" but on "who knows what"'. Similarly, Calestous Juma (2000: 49) has argued: 'Much of the reference to Africa in international forums has focused on the continent's natural wealth. However, natural resource endowment is not a sufficient ba-

sis for economic growth; it must be accompanied by investments in science and technology'. Investment in science and technology implies establishing the foundation for knowledge production. For purposes of this chapter, the term knowledge includes, but is not limited to, formal and informal education and scientific know-how. This knowledge may be acquired through books, journals, the internet, educational institutions, research centres, internships, workshops and conferences. In general terms, knowledge may be regarded as a double-edged sword that can be used for destruction or for construction.

African thinkers, like other scholars worldwide, have the potential to contribute to global security agenda setting if they can influence the language, idioms, concepts and paradigms that underpin and constitute the global security debates. This is largely because the global security agenda has to be conceived, justified, propagated and understood in terms of certain idioms, concepts and paradigms. Those who construct security idioms, concepts and paradigms inevitably exercise influence in setting the boundaries within which the global security agenda is promoted. Unfortunately, many African intellectuals and academic institutions are net consumers, rather than producers, of knowledge in many disciplines, including International Relations, Strategic Studies, and Peace and Conflict Studies. However, this drawback does not mean that Africans will always remain net consumers of knowledge about security.

In his book, *I Speak of Freedom*, Kwame Nkrumah (1973: 125) said 'let the world know [Africa] through the voices of Africa's own sons'. This statement could be interpreted as implying various things, including the need for Africans to participate in the formulation of security paradigms. My contention that Africans could make a recognizable contribution to the setting of the global security agenda is based on three claims. The first is that African thinkers have the capacity to view the issue of global security agenda setting in terms of the international distribution of knowledge. Unless the desire to influence the global security agenda is addressed in terms of global knowledge flows, African thinkers would have a very limited chance of success. My second claim is that while the argument that African intellectuals should espouse a distinctive African voice in global security debates has merit, this attempt to project an 'African personality' in the global village may undermine the desire to have an impact on the global security agenda. The promotion of a distinctive 'African' perspective might set Africa apart instead of giving it leadership of the global agenda. Indeed, one reason why American thinkers have been very successful in influencing global security debates is because they are very good at portraying their national concerns as global interests. As Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry (1999: 192) have observed, the US became dominant and re-

mained so 'by providing the language, ideas and institutional frameworks around which much of the world turns'. By redefining the boundaries of security, African intellectuals might help establish the parameters within which the global security agenda is formulated. The third claim is that as security is embedded in international institutions, the attempt to influence the global security agenda should be seen, in part, as a struggle to recast these institutions.

The remaining part of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first briefly looks at the global structure of knowledge and Africa's position in it. The second explores institutions, which have been constructed largely by a 'global interpretive community', and suggests that African thinkers could have an impact on the global security agenda if they drew on insights from African values and norms to enrich the 'global interpretive community'. The third section explores different meanings of security and suggests that African thinkers should utilise insights from the African experience to make a compelling case that international society should view all security as people-centred. The conclusion is that if African thinkers were to influence the global security agenda, they would need to aim at speaking for humankind as a whole. It would be possible, albeit demanding, for them to speak for the global human family while at the same time remaining faithful to the aspirations, dreams and needs of Africa.

### The structure of knowledge

One of the starting points for a discussion of the possible role of African intellectuals in the setting of the global security agenda is the structure of knowledge, which is a major determinant of Africa's share of knowledge. The Western world dominates the global structure of knowledge through various means, including journals, books, conferences and seminars that promote Western-generated knowledge. For example, the refereeing process in journals is a policing exercise that ensures that only knowledge framed in ways that reflect American or Western standards is accepted for publication. Domination is also achieved through citations, which are considered a measure of the impact of publications. Whereas African scholars often cite sources from all parts of the world, Westerners mainly cite fellow Westerners even on African security issues where credible African sources exist. Even textbooks written by Africans for Africans rely heavily on Western-generated epistemological and methodological perspectives and fail to question the normative and political dimensions of the paradigms that they utilise. A good example is *Power, Wealth and Global Order: An International Relations Textbook for Africa* (Nel and McGowan 1999). This is a very good book from the

point of view of orthodox International Relations theories. However, it makes no effort to explore the perceptions of us/them, self/other and outside/inside in African traditions. Its bibliography includes one item by Kwame Nkrumah, but it lists no publication by other African thinkers who played important roles in shaping Africa's perceptions of its relations with the rest of the world, such as Julius Nyerere, Frantz Fanon and Leopold Senghor.

Another disappointing feature regarding knowledge production in Africa is that few social science journals, outside South Africa, are published regularly. For example, my first refereed article was accepted by an African journal in 1976, but it was not published until 1982. African scholars have no prospect of influencing the global security agenda if they do not engage in rigorous debates among themselves and with outsiders. Rigorous security debates can be sustained only where refereed journals are published regularly, and where the scholars interact frequently through conferences, seminars and other forums.

As a net consumer, rather than a producer, of knowledge, Africa suffers several disadvantages. First, Africa applies knowledge that was shaped by non-African contexts that might have little or no relevance for African conditions. Knowledge production is a social and political process that reflects the historical, cultural and institutional milieu of its producers. Knowledge is constructed for a social, scientific or political purpose and for a community of scholars or policy makers. In interpreting data, researchers are often influenced by their cultural, ideological or racial values. In disseminating the findings of research, scholars emphasise some facts and ignore others, depending on their audience and preferences. What Robert Cox said about theory equally applies to knowledge. In Cox's words: 'Theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space' (Cox 1986: 207).

Moreover, when researchers convey their findings, they do so in language, which cannot be value-neutral. In sub-Saharan Africa, this linguistic factor assumes an extra dimension because the language of transmission of ideas is often a borrowed one: English, French and Portuguese. As knowledge construction is a social and political process, it has to be recognised that while scholars may engage in serious research and may treat all evidence consistently, they cannot provide value-free knowledge (Liftin 1994). The debate in early 2006 on whether Iran should engage in uranium enrichment or not is a clear example. While I am an opponent of nuclear proliferation and I believe that some of Iran's activities have raised legitimate suspicions, I cannot help but point out that the global interpretive community has cleverly shifted the focus from Iran's *legal* obliga-



tions under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to the UN Security Council, which is a *political* mechanism. In other words, opponents of Iran's nuclear programme, which is currently peaceful and legal, do not have to prove that Iran has violated the terms of the NPT. What is needed to punish, or impose sanctions on, Iran is proof that it has defied a UN Security Council resolution. It is this sort of value-laden knowledge that Africans consume.

Second, all knowledge is contestable and, in some cases, transient, and Africa is disadvantaged because it plays no role in the adjudication of knowledge claims. The transient character of knowledge suggests that while society may accept today's scientific findings, it should not lose sight of the possibility that these findings may be challenged tomorrow. A good example of a recent successful contestation of established knowledge was the challenge to the claim by medical science that peptic ulcer was caused by excessive acidity in the stomach. For many years, antacids were prescribed, and are still prescribed in many African countries, but in the early 1980s, a study in Western Australia found that the cause of stomach ulcer was not acidity, but a bacteria called *helicobacter pylori*. Excessive acidity was the symptom, not the cause. The study established that '100% of patients with duodenal ulcer and 80% of those with gastric ulcer' had *helicobacter pylori* (Goodwin 1993: 293). This was a big threat to the pharmaceutical companies, which manufactured antacids, and they initially challenged this finding, using other gastroenterologists and histopathologists to try to discredit the two medical researchers – B. J. Marshall and J. R. Warren – who had discovered *helicobacter pylori*. However, it is now generally accepted that *helicobacter pylori* 'is the cause of most gastric and duodenal ulcers, with elimination of the organism leading to healing of the ulcers and a significant reduction in the incidence of recurrence' (Murray, et. al 1998: 256). (On the basis of their discovery, Marshall and Warren won the Nobel Prize for medicine in 2005). The implication of knowledge contestations is that Africa, as a net consumer, receives only that knowledge, which the knowledge brokers in the developed world consider to be socially and politically palatable.

To participate effectively in the contestation of knowledge, researchers need excellent facilities for investigation and experimentation. Unfortunately, African countries have few research facilities and centres, which can challenge Western intellectual dominance in security matters. The South African-based Institute of Security Studies (ISS), with branches in various African states, is the only outfit with a continental outlook. However, the dominance of the ISS by policy-oriented analysts has meant that it utilises mainly the problem-solving approach to research. Robert Cox (1986: 208) has argued that a problem-solving formula 'takes the world

as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action'. This approach can be useful in some circumstances, especially because it can 'fix limits or parameters to a problem area' (Cox 1986: 208), but it would not be appropriate for critiquing the Western dominance of the global security agenda. To help advance their quest for setting the global security agenda, African researchers would need to combine insights from problem-solving and critical approaches. A critical approach, according to Cox (1986: 208), 'does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing'.

Third, Africa's marginal socio-economic position vis-à-vis other parts of the world is, in large part, due to the fact that it is a net consumer of knowledge and technology. More than 150 years ago, Karl Marx argued that it was the economic base that determined the prevalent ideas and institutions. If this was the case during his time, it is no longer so. The global structure of knowledge and ideas plays a very important role in determining the structure of political and economic power and influence. Societies that are rich in natural resources, but poor in knowledge and modern technology, like many African states, may not succeed as well as those which have both knowledge and resources. Indeed, the states that are rich in knowledge and modern technology are likely to have greater global influence, even if they are poor in natural resources. This is one of the reasons why a natural-resource poor country like Japan is richer and globally more influential than a natural-resource rich country like the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is poor in knowledge.

The current global structure of knowledge disadvantages Africa and demands that African researchers should endeavour to produce knowledge that has the potential for global application. The most effective way for Africans to contribute to global security agenda setting is to focus on widening and deepening their knowledge base. This knowledge should also be geared towards deconstructing the institutions in which security is embedded.

## **Institutions and the Africans**

Many people, including journalists, academics and policy makers use the term 'institution' frequently, but they often refer to different phenomena. Some people even use this term in different senses in the same speech or piece of writing without acknowledging it. As we shall see below, institutions can be interpreted in various ways. What makes one interpretation dominant at a particular time is

the power of the 'global interpretive community'. It is the interpretive community that determines the dominant meanings of terms such as globalisation, security, sovereignty, democratisation, development, international law and even such things as civil war. For example, what has taken place in Iraq between late 2003 and 2006 could be described as a civil war, but the global interpretive community has persisted in referring to it as an insurgency, not a civil war. Moreover, I first used the term globalisation in my B.A. thesis at the University of Nairobi in 1976 (I had learnt the term from a conversation with Professor Ali Mazrui earlier that year), but the interpretive community insists that this term was invented in the mid-1980s. So, what is the global interpretive community?

I have previously defined an interpretive community as any group of people who are committed to providing justification and legitimating principles for particular norms, principles and institutions (Makinda 2001: 352-355). Members of an interpretive community may be politicians, scholars, journalists, international civil servants, or NGO workers. An interpretive community has some similarities with an epistemic community. However, as a "network of specialists with recognized expertise in policy-relevant knowledge areas," an epistemic community implies a degree of formality, reciprocity, and consciousness of group identity that is absent in an interpretive community (Evans & Newnhan, 1998, 150). Members of an interpretive community may not even be aware that they operate as a part of such a community. There may be several epistemic communities within an interpretive community. For example, international commissions, such as the Independent Commission on Kosovo, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), and the Commission on Global Governance may serve as parts of both epistemic and interpretive communities. What the members of an interpretive community have in common is a conviction that they are interpreting reality, when in fact they may be only expressing aspirations. Depending on the nature of publicity a community generates and the level of dissatisfaction with the existing system and norms, the ideas of an interpretive community may be adopted by governments and other international actors. There are several Africans in the global interpretive community, such as UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, but many of them do not deal with security issues. African researchers will play important roles in setting the global security agenda only if they succeed in establishing strategic partnerships with other scholars around the world and utilise these networks to self-consciously act as members of the global interpretive community.

According to Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975), interpretation performs various functions. First, it helps to shape the identity of an object, such as security, globalisation or sovereignty. Second, it re-creates or re-presents the object. Third,

because it re-presents the object, interpretation becomes reality. Thus, there is no security or global governance except in the form in which it has been interpreted or re-presented. There is no globalisation or sovereignty except as we have described it. In other words, our social world exists only as we have interpreted and represented it. By arguing for particular interpretations of international phenomena, the interpretive community promotes a particular view of them. Interpretation of global phenomena, including institutions, is, therefore, vitally important.

As it was indicated above, institutions can be interpreted in various ways. For example, Robert Keohane (1988: 383) defines institutions as 'related complexes of rules and norms, identifiable in space and time'. He argues that institutions are 'persistent sets of rules that constrain activity, shape expectations, and prescribe roles' (Keohane 1988: 384). Similarly, Hedley Bull (1977: 71) defines an institution as 'a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals'. He views institutions as 'an expression of the element of collaboration among states in discharging their political functions – and at the same time a means of sustaining this collaboration' (Bull 1977: 71). According to Bull, institutions include the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and the managerial system of the great powers. John Mearsheimer (1994/95: 8) offers a similar perspective when he claims that an institution is 'a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate or compete with each other'. However, he differs with Bull when he argues that '[t]hese rules are typically formalised in international agreements, and are usually embodied in organizations with their own personnel and budgets' (Mearsheimer 1994/95: 8).

The above authors define institutions in two senses. In the first, institutions are 'stable sets of norms, rules, and principles' that 'constitute actors as knowledgeable social agents' and 'regulate behavior' (Reus-Smit 1999: 12-13). Thus, several variables that underpin security, such as sovereignty, diplomacy, anarchy, self-help, international law and multilateralism, are institutions. This is consistent with Bull's and one of Keohane's definitions. I have previously described these habits and practices as *primary* institutions (Makinda 2002a; 2002b; see also Buzan 2004: 167). In the second sense, institutions are formal organizations. Mearsheimer's definition applies to such organizations. Keohane also calls such organizations institutions. However, Bull (1977) excludes them, arguing that by institution he does 'not imply an organization or administrative machinery'. I have previously described these organizations as *secondary* institutions (Makinda 2002a; 2002b; see also Buzan 2004: 167). Primary institutions underpin secondary institutions. Thus, we attach meaning and significance to international organiza-

tions because we accept the primary institutions on which they are constructed. In this chapter, I refer to primary institutions as 'institutions' and to secondary institutions as 'international organizations'.

Most accounts of institutions suggest that they 'are made of rules and norms' (Wendt 1999: 96). Moreover, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink claim that the difference between norms and institutions lies in aggregation. They argue that 'the norm definition isolates single standards of behavior, whereas institutions emphasize the way in which behavioral rules are structured together and interrelate' (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). So, what are norms and rules? Norms are historically contingent and shared understandings about appropriate behaviour and practices. They are 'collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity' (Katzenstein 1996: 5; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 891; Hurrell 2002: 143). African researchers need to enter this debate on norms and institutions. For example, using the above definitions, it is plausible to argue that in the present world, norms include the expectation that rich countries will provide development assistance to poorer ones, that international society will offer humanitarian assistance under certain conditions, and that states will help their people enjoy certain levels of freedom, education, shelter, food and affordable health. The promotion of this re-interpretation of norms would advance the Africans' quest to influence the global security agenda.

Unlike norms, rules are prescriptive and more specific. As Bull (1977: 6) argues, rules are 'general imperative principles of conduct'. These rules 'require or authorize prescribed classes of persons or groups to behave in prescribed ways'. Bull (1977: 52) claims that these 'rules may have the status of law, of morality, of custom or etiquette, or simply of operating procedures or "rules of the game"'. Similarly, Stephen Krasner (1983: 2) defines rules as 'specific prescriptions or proscriptions for actions'. It is plausible to argue that in the present world, global rules include the requirement that states adhere to the United Nations (UN) Charter, respect each other's sovereignty, and undertake to treat prisoners of war humanely under the Geneva Conventions.

The claim that norms, rules and institutions are shared understandings requires at least three qualifications. First, various theories interpret institutions differently. For instance, while realists believe that institutions are an appendage of power politics (Mearsheimer 1994/95), constructivists aver that it is institutions that constitute the identity and interests of states (Reus-Smit 1999). Second, there is no unanimity in the way that international actors interpret institutions. Instead, there is continuous contestation about the status and roles of norms, rules and institutions. This contestation should provide space for creative and

entrepreneurial African minds to step in and play a role in the re-interpretation. Third, power and interests play an important role in generating, shaping and implementing norms, rules and institutions. While it is plausible to argue that 'the meaning of power and the content of interests are largely a function of ideas' (Wendt 1999: 96), it is the interests and preferences of hegemonic states that determine the shape of norms, rules and institutions. This implies that existing institutions may not reflect the values, preferences and standards of the African states and disadvantaged social groups. Even international law appears to be culturally biased. Both the structures of international law making and the content of the rules of international law privilege Westerners and reflect the interests and preferences of Western societies. The challenge for African researchers is to deconstruct institutions so that they, in part, reflect the interests, aspirations and preferences of Africans. This should be a matter of knowledge production and distribution. It is a vital aspect of knowledge production because without institutions, there would be no sense of order, security and justice. Even the 'war on terror' is intelligible only because international society has constructed norms, rules and institutions. Therefore, African researchers need to work out a formula for deconstructing the norms, rules and institutions that underpin order and security if they seek to contribute to the setting of the global security agenda.

### **Reconfiguring security**

What perspectives should African intellectuals bring to the global understanding of security? To address this question, we need to start by explaining what security is all about. In other words, we need to answer first the question: What is security? Following Arnold Wolfers (1952 [1962]), many analysts these days start by proclaiming that security is a contested concept (Dalby 1997). This could be true for those who start from the premise that security is an objective condition and that there should be just one meaning of it for everybody. Moreover, security is contested if one International Relations perspective seeks to impose its meaning of the concept on others. From the start, African researchers need to acknowledge that security is a political construction, which can be understood differently in various theoretical frameworks. Indeed, even using Western-generated paradigms, such as realism, liberalism and constructivism, one can come to different understandings of security. Below, I will show how realists, liberals and constructivists conceive security. In so doing, I also demonstrate that security is embedded in institutions. I will then go beyond both traditional security and human security and posit that all security ought to be viewed as people-

centred. Although I do not demonstrate it in this chapter, my claim that all security ought to be viewed as people-centred is partly derived from my reading of African political thought.

### *Three Security perspectives*

Security is viewed through many paradigms: realism, liberalism, neorealism, neoliberalism, constructivism, feminism, social critical theory, Marxism, the English School, post-structuralism and post-modernism, among others. One common thread among these paradigms is that they were generated in the West and predominantly reflect Western thinking about International Relations. The contests and inter-paradigm debates that take place in security studies stem largely from the desire for intellectual hegemony by various groups in the West. Thus inter-paradigm exchanges have become platforms on which social group in the West compete with a view to dominating global thinking about International Relations and security studies. None of the adherents to these paradigms has been concerned with the need to incorporate African or non-Western epistemological perspectives into the theorising of International Relations. Indeed, International Relations paradigms reflect different normative, political and social objectives and agendas. For this reason, they should be seen as socio-mental constructions that contribute to the marginalisation of African interests, norms and institutions. The task ahead for African researchers is to deconstruct these paradigms, expose their weaknesses and incorporate into them insights derived from African epistemology. This will be the start of African intellectuals' efforts to contribute to the setting of the global security agenda. As we shall see below, the West does not speak with one voice on security matters, and African thinkers should exploit this fact to their advantage.

Realists have differences among themselves, but they have constructed security utilising war, the balance of power and the use of military force in settling international conflicts. In their view, security is concerned with state survival in an international system that is characterised by anarchy and self-help (Mearsheimer, 1994/95; Walt, 1991; Mastanduno 1997). However, realists regard anarchy and self-help as givens and do not problematise them. While realist analyses may differ in emphasis, their view of security is not contested within their own circles. For example, Stephen Walt's (1991: 212) claim that security studies is 'the study of the threat, use, and control of military force' is not contested by realists. Similarly, Sean Lynn-Jones's (1992: 74) argument that the 'questions that form the central focus of [security studies] are concerned with international violence and external threats to the security of the state', is uncontested in realism. If

war, anarchy, the balance of power and self-help are institutions, as it was stated above, then it could be argued that institutions underpin the realist view of security. A major weakness in realist accounts is that they regard the use of military force and state survival, rather than the protection of people, as ends in themselves. Perhaps realists would benefit from the claim by a former US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott (1995: 7), that the Cold War was a conflict 'between competing concepts of how to organise the political and economic lives of individual human beings'. The logic of Talbott's claim is that while the Cold War was characterised by arms acquisitions and nuclear competition, it was essentially about the protection of people. If African intellectuals were to influence the setting of the global security agenda, they would need to deconstruct realism in order to create an opening for African values, norms and institutions.

Unlike realists, liberals view security in terms of, *inter alia*, the enforcement of international law, the triumph of diplomacy and the promotion of global norms. They prescribe international cooperation, multilateralism and diplomatic negotiations as antidotes against international anarchy, war, the balance of power and self-help (Doyle 1997: 210). As with realists, there are differences in emphasis among liberals, but most agree that people should be at the centre of security policies. The Commission on Global Governance (Report 1995: 81) was expressing a liberal perspective when it argued that 'the security of people must be regarded as a goal as important as the security of states'. Indeed, liberals believe that human security ought to be on the global security agenda (Nef 1999; Suhrke 1999; McRae and Hubert 2001). This is because the proponents of human security often call for the promotion of various norms that are at the heart of the liberal programme: poverty alleviation, democratic governance and social justice. To the extent that liberals construct security with insights derived from norms, international law and multilateralism, among others, their approach to security can be said to be steeped in institutions. As a paradigm that was developed in the West, liberalism reflects the significance of norms and institutions as understood and appreciated by Westerners. The task of African intellectuals is to deconstruct it and enrich it with insights derived from African values, norms and institutions.

Like realists and liberals, constructivists acknowledge the dangers of war, the existence of anarchy and self-help, and the significance of military force. However, unlike realists and liberals, they regard these institutions as primarily ideas and only secondarily as material forces (Wendt 1999; Reus-Smit 1999; Ruggie 1998). While individual constructivists may have different emphases, they generally define security in terms of ideas, culture and social institutions. Constructivists, like critical security theorists, are concerned with how purpose-



ful agents construct anarchy and how these actors create security threats and responses to them (Krause 1998). They show why security is essentially dependent on the meanings we attach to social phenomena. To the extent that constructivists view security in terms of ideas and culture, it can be argued that they concede that security is embedded in culture, particularly Western culture. As with realism and liberalism, African scholars need to deconstruct the ideas, culture and institutions that underpin constructivism in its current form.

The recognition that security is embedded in norms and institutions should provide African researchers with space to explore how the African people - the creators of their norms and institutions - can be reflected in the global security agenda. The claim that security is embedded in norms and institutions opens up space for the deepening and widening the global security agenda. However, as it is the human beings that construct and re-construct norms and institutions, the survival of norms and institutions, in part, depend on the protection of the people. Hence, the need for people-centred security.

### *People-centric security*

The founding President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, was one of the earliest people in Africa to define security in terms of a people's freedom. In attempt to globalise peace, freedom and security, Nkrumah argued that freedom for the African people was meaningful only to the extent that the whole world enjoyed peace and security. He claimed that without peace and security, there could be no meaningful freedom, and that peace and security were meaningful only to the extent that they were enjoyed by all. He asserted that this 'indivisibility of peace is staked on the indivisibility of freedom' in the global arena (Nkrumah 1972: 106).

Using insights from Nkrumah's political thought, as well as the writings of other African thinkers such as Edward Blyden, Leopold Senghor, Albert Luthuli, Nelson Mandela, Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere, Tom Mboya, Sekou Toure, Frantz Fanon, and Gamal Abdel Nasser (see Mutiso and Rohio, 1975), among others, African researchers could come out with a view that security should be concerned with the welfare, emancipation, dignity and protection of the people. This would imply that whether states achieve, undermine, or are irrelevant to security is an open question. I have argued elsewhere that security implies the protection of the people and the preservation of their norms, rules and institutions, in the face of military and non-military threats (Makinda 2005: 285). The latter may include natural disasters, ecological and environmental degradation, poverty, severe economic problems, human rights abuses and the erosion of democracy. This definition includes the preservation of states and the structures,

principles and institutions on which states are anchored, but only to the extent that protection of state boundaries and the governing structures and elites is not privileged over people. This construction of security is based on the assumption that people are the foundations of political communities and states. Therefore, the security of states is derived from that of the people. I have posited that this view of security, like that of any concept, is not fixed (Makinda 2005). As people's norms, rules and institutions evolve, the definition of security also has to evolve.

How does the above view of security differ from human security? Addressing this question requires an explanation of what human security represents. The forum in the September 2004 issue of the journal *Security Dialogue* 35(3) illustrates the extent of divisions among scholars about what human security represents. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which invented the term 'human security', has argued: 'For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime, these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world' (UNDP 1994: 3). Similarly, the Commission on Human Security defines human security as the protection of 'the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment' (Commission 2003: 4). It states that 'human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life' (2003: 4). The Commission on Human Security also claims that human security entails the protection of people from critical and pervasive threats, and the use of 'processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations' (Commission 2003: 4). Moreover, it argues that human security 'means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity' (Commission 2003: 4).

In addition, Caroline Thomas (1999: 3) posits that human security 'has both qualitative and quantitative aspects', and that it is 'pursued for the majority of humankind as part of a collective, most commonly the household, sometimes the village or the community defined along other criteria such as religion or caste'. She argues: 'At one level [human security] is about the fulfillment of basic material needs, and at another it is about the achievement of human dignity, which incorporates personal autonomy, control over one's life, and unhindered participation in the life of the community' (Thomas 1999: 3). Thomas (1999: 3-4) further observes that human security is 'engaged directly with discussions of democracy at all levels, from the local to the global'. She argues that the achievement of human security goes beyond basic needs and requires emancipation from oppressive structures. Explaining human security in relation to the state, Neil MacFarlane (2004:368) argues that 'state sover-

eignty and the primacy of the state are justified only to the extent that the state's claim to protect the people within its boundaries is credible, since the only irreducible locus of sovereignty is the individual human being'.

Critics of the human-security agenda have argued that it generates false hopes and priorities and proceeds on false causal assumptions. Yuen Foong Khong's (2001: 233) claim that 'in making all individuals a priority, none actually benefits' is unsustainable. Treating people as referent points of security has the same weakness as treating states as referent points. If, as Khong claims, making human beings the referents of security would be 'like the airline company giving a priority tag to everyone's luggage', then privileging all sovereign states would be the same. What matters is the recognition of a principle that Bull (1977 [1995]: 79) discussed in the 1970s, namely that 'states and nations were originally thought to have rights and duties because individual persons had rights and duties'. The logic of Bull's argument is that the security of persons is prior to that of states or political communities. One could also consider Nkrumah's claim that the conscience of humankind was progressively moving towards a new horizon of knowledge where due respect for human dignity and the idea of international peace were intertwined. Condemning nuclear weapons, Nkrumah (1973: 216) argued: 'We do not threaten anyone and we renounce the foul weapons that threaten the very existence of life on this planet. Rather, we put our trust in the awakening conscience of mankind which rejects this barbarism and believe firmly in positive action.'

While I agree that the issues raised by the UNDP, the Commission on Human Security and Thomas, among others, should be part of security, I am sceptical about the term 'human security'. My scepticism is based on several factors, two of which I will discuss here. The first is that we live in an era in which democracy is regarded as a global entitlement (Franck 1992). Democracy entails popular consent, popular participation and public accountability. Therefore, in this era, security, like other public policies, has to reflect the interests, aspirations and needs of the people. If the security policies of democratic, open and accountable governments are not people-centred, they should be regarded as misguided and efforts made to reform them. However, the conceptualisation of human security indirectly detracts attention from the goal of demanding that all security policies be people-centred. Indeed, the popularisation of human security could imply that there might be other legitimate approaches to security that do not take into account people's interests, needs and aspirations.

The second reason for my scepticism about the use of the term 'human security' stems from the fact that the various definitions of human security suggest that it is embedded in norms and institutions. The legitimacy of human security

is derived from the fact that the issues that it canvasses - democratic governance, development, emancipation, empowerment, human rights, clean water, food, health care, job opportunities, shelter and education - are accepted as global norms. If human security is embedded in the global normative structure, it should be regarded as the only legitimate form of security. As the only legitimate form of security, it does not need to be qualified by the term 'human'. Once security is conceived as being embedded in norms and institutions, the word 'human', qualifying security, becomes redundant. Thus, I accept the ideas, principles and issues that underpin human security, but I reject the label 'human security'.

There is a possibility of critics accusing me of 'pinching' assumptions, ideas and principles from human security to construct and advocate the people-centred approach to security. The answer to such charges is that the issues that are promoted under 'human security' have been discussed under the label 'security' for decades. Third World security scholars claimed that security in developing countries needed to be viewed in relation to efforts to meet the basic needs: food, shelter, clothing, clean water and health. For example, Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat (1985: 50) constructed security in terms of 'tranquility and well-being', while Caroline Thomas (1987: 1), in her earlier incarnation, argued that Third World security included the 'internal security of the state through nation-building' and 'secure systems of food, health, money and trade'. A little earlier, I (Makinda 1982: 93) had argued that security ought to take account of 'the concrete local situation and the real needs of the people' as well as 'the production and distribution of wealth'.

Moreover, scholars championing alternative perspectives redefined security in terms of human rights, poverty alleviation and environmental protection long before the 1994 UNDP report. For example, Richard Ullman (1983: 130-131) argued: 'In virtually every society, individuals and groups seek security against the state, just as they ask the state to protect them against harm from other states. Human rights and state security are thus intimately related.' Particularly poignant in Ullman's (1983: 133) argument was his observation that:

We are... accustomed to thinking of national security in terms of military threats arising from beyond the borders of one's own country. But that emphasis is... misleading. It draws attention away from the non-military threats that promise to undermine the stability of many nations...

Defining security in terms of people, Ullman (1983: 133) postulated that 'a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that ... threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of

a state'. Following Ullman, Gwyn Prins (1984: xiii) argued that '[s]ecurity is produced by general social well-being'. He defined social well-being as 'the sum of individual fulfilment, which depends upon the civilized arbitration of conflicts of interest in society, which in turn depends upon a just provision of goods, services and opportunities for all' (Prins 1984: xiii). Echoing Nkrumah, Prins claimed that security was 'intimately bound up with... freedom. Freedom from want, freedom of thought [and] freedom from fear: life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.' Thus, before the UNDP came up with the term 'human security', some analysts were making efforts to define all security as people-centred.

African intellectuals could utilise insights from these different approaches to security, in addition to insights from African values, norms and institutions, to design a creative, compelling and all-encompassing approach to security. Their chances of influencing the global security agenda will, in part, depend on this.

## Conclusion

Seeking to participate in the setting of the global security agenda requires deconstructing existing paradigms and promoting a new approach to knowledge creation in security studies. African intellectuals may in future play important roles in setting the global security agenda, but to do so they will need to overcome one major obstacle: they have to participate meaningfully in global knowledge construction. While the suggestion that African thinkers should assert a distinctive voice on global security has merit, this voice has to be creative, innovative and compelling. Indeed, it is important for African thinkers to project a distinctive view of security. However, it has to be a distinctive voice with which the rest of the world identifies. An emphasis on difference rather than similarity with the rest of the world is likely to make it difficult for African thinkers to assume leadership in the global security agenda setting forums.

An important factor to consider is that the ability to influence the global security agenda setting requires that African thinkers speak for the rest of the world. They have to deconstruct the language, idioms and paradigms through which the global security debate is carried out. In this manner, the African voice on security becomes the voice of the rest of the world. This is possible mainly through the context of knowledge production and distribution. Thus, the challenge for African thinkers is to draw insights from the African experience and find ways of combining them with world debates to make an original contribution to knowledge about security.



# Human Rights and Democracy in Contemporary Global Security

# Promotion of democracy as a goal of US foreign policy: African responses

*Professor Macharia Munene*

## **Abstract**

The United States is a country of contradictions, espousing ideals only to negate them in practice. While expecting other countries to accept its dictates, it ignores other people's interests. Its ideal of the 'promotion of democracy' is questionable because it has recently appeared like an ideological instrument of *post-modern colonialism*, an elaborate indirect system of controlling Third World countries using various 'democracy' agents. As a result, true democracy appears to be limited to the well born, who happen to be white, in line with the ideals of the founders of the United States who wanted equality among white men of substance but not for blacks who were meant to be slaves. Woodrow Wilson believed he had a right to use force to 'teach' the Mexicans how to elect 'good men' as he condoned racial discrimination, and loudly talked of making the world 'safe for democracy.' Ronald Reagan spoke of freedom for Russians and virtually ignored 'apartheid' South Africa that was an 'ally' of the United States. After the Cold War, the United States pressured its client states whose leaders had outlived their usefulness to 'democratise' and at the same time praised people who shot their way to power as 'new leaders' of Africa to be emulated, as long as they serve American interests. And when democratic elections appeared to produce 'unwanted' results, as in Algeria, the United States had no problem endorsing military intervention to stop winning by the wrong people. The 'promotion of democracy', it turns out, is a nice sounding expression designed to serve American interests but not necessarily to promote democracy and subsequently the receiving countries should take it with a grain of salt.

## **Introduction**

Ideally, democracy is power sharing among citizens who have sovereignty over their territory or the place in which they live. The sharing of power is mainly at the political level and is premised on agreements on what is fair and applicable to all citizens in that place. Agreed principles of justice and fairness are the ones



that govern the relationship amongst the citizens as they go about deciding how to exercise the sharing of political power which underlies practicing democracy. To ensure that all citizens have access to power sharing, governing structures are created that define who undertakes what function and for how long. In this, government organs become agents or instruments of practicing democracy or power sharing as determined by citizens. Governments, to paraphrase Abraham Lincoln of the United States, are therefore expected to be of the people, by the people, and for the people. The people concerned, however, are the citizens of a given place but not foreigners who seek to impose their will on a different people.

The concept of democracy is often associated with two powers that are more than two thousand years apart in which *democracy* evolved and became widely acceptable after protracted struggles; namely: Athens (in ancient Greece) and the modern day United States of America. In both places, the word "democracy" was initially a dirty word and the emphasis was put on participation being limited to citizens with substantial material stake in the state; and to the neglect of the poor. In Athens, feuds among the nobility and fears of class wars had produced a series of "tyrants" who sought to undermine their aristocratic competitors by empowering the poor politically and materially at the expense of the elite, on condition that they remained loyal to the tyrant. In the United States, the word "democracy" acquired respectability in the Age of Andrew Jackson but it was not until the volatile 1960s that all black American citizens were allowed to participate in the political power sharing in the form of voting.

Athens and the United States are also similar in their imperialistic self-promotion in the name of "democracy". Athenians had become over confident and, believing that they were superior to others, did not believe in freedom for other states to decide their own fate. As a result, Athenians tried to impose themselves on their neighbours. This had led to the Peloponnesian War with Sparta in which Athens lost and gladly agreed to disband its 'democracy'. Two thousand years later, the United States looks like a modern day Athens and full of self-righteousness. While strutting upon the world stage like a colossus ordering countries to be "democratic", it then tries to limit the practice of that democracy to a point in which little countries do what the United States wants. Like Athens before it, the United States seemingly does not believe in freedom for others, and uses the concept of "democracy" as an ideological tool for its imperialistic designs.

The promotion of democracy, therefore, is an ingrained self-righteous ideology that tends to elevate the United States above all others and to cloud American thinking when dealing with other countries. Starting with the Pilgrims in the Mayflower in 1620, they developed a belief that they were special and had divine blessings even

as they killed Native Americans and enslaved Africans.<sup>1</sup> The Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the debates in the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were contradictions between the ideals of liberty and the practice of slavery and disdain for democracy. The Constitution was a master piece on how to protect elite interests<sup>2</sup> in the guise of popular will and the American drafters were so fortunate that they did not have big powers hovering over them in Philadelphia with unsolicited advice and sponsorship of some factions in the debates. And they produced what William Lloyd Garrison termed “a covenant with death and an agreement with hell”<sup>3</sup> because it protected slavery in the form of the three-fifth clause

It is slavery, both physical and mental, that has over the centuries defined the relations between Africa and the United States in which Americans treat Africans either as slaves or as perpetual children to be ordered around. When Africans refuse, or fail to behave like happy slaves or perpetual children, American officials get angry and start looking for ways of getting rid of the ‘ungrateful’ Africans. This is the line that runs from the days of slavery with effort to send ‘free’ blacks out of the United States into a dumping place called Liberia, to the current orchestrated talk of ‘regime change’ in some African countries whose leaders think they can think for themselves and are too nationalistic to understand instructions from the *master state*. And the process of getting rid of such leaders is sugar-coated as ‘promotion of democracy’ that is an appropriate camouflage for promoting all types of American interests as defined by the political class.

Analysis of ‘promotion of democracy’ as an ideological goal of US foreign policy can be presented in three chronological segments. First is the Pre-Independence period in Africa that ended in the early 1960s. Second is the sector of the Cold War period which ran from 1960 to 1990. Third is the Post-Cold War period from 1990 to 2006. In all these periods, there were times when Africans looked up to the United States for ideals but many were the times when they viewed the United States as an embodiment of different types of colonial exploi-

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<sup>1</sup> Louis B. Wright, *The Atlantic Frontier: Colonial American Civilization, 1607-1763* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974 printing), pp.123-125, 140-141; Carl N. Degler, *Out of Our Past: The Forces that Shaped Modern America*, revised edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp.29-30; Oscar Handlin, “The Significance of the Seventeenth Century,” in James Morton Smith, editor, *Seventeenth-Century America: Essays in Colonial History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), pp.11-12.

<sup>2</sup> Winton U. Solberg, “Editor’s Introduction: The Genesis of American Constitutionalism,” in *The Federal Convention and the Formation of the Union of American States* (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1958), pp. xciv-xcv; Richard Kluger, *Simple Justice: The History of the Brown V. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality* (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), pp. 31-35.

<sup>3</sup> Quote in Elbert B. Smith, *The Death of Slavery, the United States, 1837-65* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p.6, 38.

tation, whether it was *classical colonialism*, *neo-colonialism*, or the present *postmodern colonialism*. Currently, the United States seems to be simply an insensitive bully who, despite its claims, does not to many Africans, emerge as a “promoter of democracy”.

### *African Pre-Independence Period and Classical Colonialism*

In pre-independence days for the African continent, relations between the Africans and the Americans were primarily negative characterized by two systems of exploitation, slavery and *classical colonialism*. The period before World War I was marked by the slave legacy whose lasting scar from that relationship is Liberia that had been created as a dumping ground for unwanted black people who happened to be “free”.<sup>4</sup> Americans were also champions of the imperialistic Social Darwinist campaign that encouraged the imposition of *classical colonialism* on Africa. *Classical colonialism* was official territorial control and exploitation of African lands and peoples by European powers in all ways. The symbol of American belief in the right of white men to take African lands and rule the Africans was President Theodore Roosevelt. He visited Nairobi in 1909, after leaving the White House, believing that black people “have not governed themselves and never could,” and argued that “it would be a crime to the white races to fail to” turn Kenya into a white man’s country,<sup>5</sup> and called for the mounting of “every effort ... to favor the growth of a large and prosperous white population.” He wanted missionaries and colonial officials to “work hand in hand” in ruling Africans “with wisdom and firmness and when necessary with severity”<sup>6</sup> And collectively, colonialists ruled with severity.

The severity forced some Africans, after World War I, to draw inspiration from those black Americans who appeared to deal with white atrocities in the Americas. Amongst those who inspired Africans were Booker T. Washington with his Tuskegee Institute, Marcus Garvey with his Negro World publication, and W.E.B DuBois with his crusades for Civil Rights and Pan-Africanism. Those who were inspired included such political adventurers as Jomo Kenyatta and Mbiyu Koinange in Kenya, Kwame Nkrumah of the Gold Coast, and Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria. Azikiwe, Nkrumah, and Koinange found their way into American

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<sup>4</sup> Macharia Munene, *The Truman Administration and the Decolonisation of Sub-Saharan Africa, 1945-1952* (Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, 1995), pp. 5-6.

<sup>5</sup> Theodore Roosevelt, “The Prospect of British East Africa”, Speech made at a dinner in Nairobi on August 3rd, 1909, as reprinted in *Kenya Weekly News*, August 14, 1959, pp. 44, 46.

<sup>6</sup> Quote in Munene, *The Truman Administration*, pp.16-17.

colleges where they sharpened their political skills and later became thorns in the flesh of colonial states. They imported into the colonies the essence of Abraham Lincoln's 1863 Gettysburg Address about governments being of the people, for the people, and by the people. Kenyatta ended up in England where he linked up with Paul Robeson and DuBois in Pan-Africanist crusades<sup>7</sup> that questioned the sincerity of American claims on democracy.

This questioning was particularly pronounced after World War II and led to the dismantling of *classical colonialism*. Starting with the 1945 Pan-Africanist Congress at Manchester where participants vowed to dismantle colonialism even if it meant plunging the world into bloodshed, the questioning intensified with the rise of the Cold War that tended to downplay the importance of anti-colonialism. The Cold War, argues John B. Judis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "shaped and distorted the United States reaction to the powerful movements against imperialism."<sup>8</sup> Subsequently, the United States was caught up in a bind between condoning colonialism to please the Europeans and projecting itself as a champion of anti-colonialism. Its best effort was Harry S. Truman's 1949 Point Four program that was well intentioned but poorly implemented.<sup>9</sup> It was, Tom Mboya of Kenya noted in 1956, perceived as "aid to colonial powers to ensure their continued ability to run colonies."<sup>10</sup> There was nothing democratic about aiding colonial powers to rule Africans with severity.

The commitment to dismantle *classical colonialism* was implemented in different ways but the most dramatic were the two anti-colonial wars of the 1950s that captured global attention, forced the Europeans out politically, and made the Americans to 'rethink' on how to befriend Africans. These were the Algerian War against the French and the Mau Mau War in Kenya against the British. The Mau Mau War, as British historian Kenneth Kirkwood pointed out, made it impossible to continue ruling in Africa politically.<sup>11</sup> In both wars, the Americans initially sided with the colonialists but the longevity of wars and the fear that

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<sup>7</sup> Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide*, revised edition (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 26-32; Tony Martin, *The Pan-African Connection: From Slavery to Garvey and Beyond* (Dover, Massachusetts: The Majority Press, 1983), p. 18; Ras Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism From Within* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1973), passim.; Macharia Munene, "The United States and Anti-Colonialism in Kenya," *African Review of Foreign Policy*, March 1999, Volume 1 Number 1, pp. 5-6.

<sup>8</sup> John B. Judis, "Imperial Amnesia," *Foreign Policy*, July/August, 2004, p. 55.

<sup>9</sup> Munene, *The Truman Administration*, pp. 154-155.

<sup>10</sup> Tom Mboya, "Our Revolutionary Tradition: An African View," *Current History*, December 1956, Vol. 31, No. 184, p. 345.

<sup>11</sup> Kenneth K. Kirkwood, *Britain and Africa* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 184-185.

communists might actually make inroad forced a rethinking on the part of some American officials who started distancing themselves from European colonialism. Responding to a suggestion from British Prime Minister Winston Churchill for an Anglo-American unity on issues ranging from “Korea to Kikuyu and from Kikuyu to Calais”,<sup>12</sup> President D. Eisenhower advised Churchill to think of an honourable way out of colonialism because, Eisenhower wrote, “Colonialism is on the way out as a relationship among peoples. The sole question is one of time and method. I think we should handle it so as to win adherents to Western aims” and to diffuse the colonial debate in which “we are falsely pictured as exploiters of people, the Soviets as their champion.”<sup>13</sup> Churchill rejected the advise on “bringing forward the backward races and opening up the jungles”<sup>14</sup> but the Americans proceeded to rethink their position.

The strategy adopted was the one articulated by US Consul General Edmund J. Dorsz in Nairobi who, claiming that Africans were vulnerable to communist penetration because of “their naivete and desire to get more and more rights by whatever means offered,” wanted the United States to adopt policies that “win and keep the African in the western camp” by ensuring that men on the spot are able “to know the Africans and to take action in time to mould their attitudes towards the United States and things we firmly believe in.” Noting that Africans were increasingly looking to the United States for opportunities denied by Britain, his objective was “to cultivate Africans of the type we believe may become leaders in the next 10 to 20 years. If we pursue these efforts assiduously and can still keep to a minimum British suspicion of our motives, we should be able gradually to develop a good leader program for this area.”<sup>15</sup> Among the Africans identified and cultivated was Tom Mboya whom the British had groomed because, as Mergery Perham observed, “he was not a Kikuyu.”<sup>16</sup> Americans stole Mboya from the British, which irritated

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<sup>12</sup> John Colville, *The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street Diaries, 1939-1955* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985), pp.657-658; see also Martin Gilbert, *‘Never Despair’: Winston S. Churchill, 1945-1965* (London: Stoddart, 1988), p. 788.

<sup>13</sup> Eisenhower to Churchill, July 22, 1954, in Peter G. Boyle, editor, *The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953-1955* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1990.), pp. 162-165.

<sup>14</sup> Churchill to Eisenhower, August 8, 1954, in *Ibid.*, pp.166-168; The exchange between Eisenhower and Churchill on colonialism can also be found in *Foreign Relations of the United States, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume VI, Western Europe and Canada*, pp. 1045-1048, 1050-1052.

<sup>15</sup> Edmund J. Dorsz to the State Department, Despatch No. 347, May 27, 1957, *FRUS, 1955-1957, Volume XVIII, Africa*, pp..201-207.

<sup>16</sup> Mergery Perham, “Foreword”, in Tom Mboya, *The Kenya Question: An African Answer* (London: Fabian Colonial Bureau, 1956), pp. 1-3; Macharia Munene, “The Colonial Policies of Segregating the Kikuyu, 1920-1964,” *Chem Chemi: International Journal of the School of Social Sciences*, Volume II, No.1, 2002, p. 40.

Perham,<sup>17</sup> and this was not the best way of upholding Churchill's Anglo-American unity from "Korea to Kikuyu and from Kikuyu to Calais."

Mboya was admired by a growing number of prominent Americans in the second half of the 1950s who sought to discard the image of the United States as a supporter of colonialism and the most important of these was Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts. Kennedy emerged as a symbol of American empathy with colonized Africans and attracted attention by condemning French colonialism in Algeria<sup>18</sup> and by helping to fund the 1959 and 1960 East African student airlift to the United States; one of the by-products of the airlifts was Barack Obama, currently the Junior Senator from Illinois whose father was in the 1959 airlift. On becoming president, Kennedy not only continued with the student airlifts, he also mounted the peace corps program whose graduates today run many activities as experts, academics, diplomats, and heads of organizations dealing with Africa. He, therefore, helped to give the United States the desired image of being a promoter of democracy.

Kennedy's image as a man of democracy, however, was tarnished by lack of democracy for black Americans and Africans forced him to try and do something about it. When he sent a goodwill message to the founders of the Organisation of African Unity, OAU, at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May 1963, he was rebuked by being reminded that there was no democracy in Alabama where black Americans were being mistreated. 1963, racism in the United States had been an issue. The rebuke was from Prime Minister Milton Obote of Uganda<sup>19</sup> whose open letter to Kennedy recited the "most inhuman treatment" visited on "our own kith and kin... in the United States... at a time when that country is anxious to project its image before the world screen as the archetype of democracy and the champion of freedom." He reminded Kennedy that "the ears and eyes of the world are concentrated on events in Alabama."<sup>20</sup>

To his credit, Kennedy reacted to the rebuke by taking steps to help remove the blot on American claim to be leader of the "free world". He, on June 11, 1963,

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<sup>17</sup> Information on Perham's belief that Americans had snatched Mboya from the Britons was made available to this writer in 1996 by Eduard Bourstin of Boston University. Bourstin was one of Perham's students at Oxford and remembers her anger when Mboya shifted to the American camp.

<sup>18</sup> Daniel Spikes, *Angola and the Politics of Intervention* (London: McFarland, 1993), pp.16-18.

<sup>19</sup> C.K. (Aysen) at the White House, Memorandum for the President on "Addis Ababa Meeting and Related African Development", June 1, 1963, "Africa-General, 6/63", Box 3, Countries, National Security Files, The Papers of JFK.

<sup>20</sup> Ambassador Korry in Addis Ababa telegram to Secretary of State, transmitting Obote's letter to Kennedy, May 23, 1963, *Ibid.*

issued "Proclamation 3542: Unlawful Obstructions of Justice and Combinations in Alabama" ordering Wallace "to cease and desist" from obstructing justice, federalized the national guard in Alabama, and then went on national radio and television to explain to the American people what he was doing."<sup>21</sup> Kennedy submitted a comprehensive civil rights program to Congress on June 19, 1963 calling its enactment "imperative."<sup>22</sup> Kennedy, however, never lived to see it through because he was assassinated in November 1963. The assassination of this symbol of American support for anti-colonialism and civil rights appeared as if it was evidence of American commitment to frustrate African democratic aspirations.

### *The Cold War period and neo-colonialism*

In the post-colonial period, the one sticking issue that made the United States appear not to be a promoter of democracy was its identification with the remaining racist colonies in Southern Africa. The racist colonies understood US weakness and played up their claims to be bastions of Western civilization against 'communist' inspired 'hordes' who happened to be black. This impression was personified by Ronald Reagan's claim that South Africa's apartheid system was similar to racism in the United States and that South Africa had been on the same side with the United States in the World Wars.<sup>23</sup> Speaking of South Africa in 1981 he reportedly said, "Can we abandon a country that has stood by us in every war we've ever fought, a country that strategically is essential to the free world in its production of minerals we all must have and so forth?"<sup>24</sup> and in 1985 he said "They have eliminated the segregation that we once had in our own country."<sup>25</sup> With such a defense of apartheid South Africa, Americans portrayed themselves as promoters of racial atrocities instead of democracy.

When not condoning racial atrocities, Americans appeared to be obsessed with the Cold War and African countries were unfortunate to attain independ-

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<sup>21</sup> John F. Kennedy, "Proclamation 3542: Unlawful Obstructions of Justice and Combinations in Alabama", and "Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights", June 11, 1963, *Ibid.*, pp. 467-471.

<sup>22</sup> John F. Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities", June 19, 1963, *Ibid.*, pp. 483-494.

<sup>23</sup> Peter J. Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.220; Allister Sparks, *The Mind of South Africa: The Story of the Rise and Fall of Apartheid* (Reading, United Kingdom, 1990), pp. 348-349

<sup>24</sup> Quote in Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa*, p.220.

<sup>25</sup> Quote in Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman, "Remembering Reagan," *Common Dreams*, Friday, June 11, 2004.

ence at the height of that Cold War. Africans tried to deal with the Cold War by claiming to be non-aligned but despite effort to remain non-aligned, they tended to gravitate from one side to the other in a new type of master-state/client-state relationship called *neo-colonialism*. Neo-colonialism had a symbiotic relationship between individual leaders in a client-state protecting the interests of the master-state and the leaders of the master-state who in turn often protected those leaders from their own people. Neo-colonial masters that propped up various regimes in client states included the United States and the Soviet Union, along with Britain, France, Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries. Each of the African countries found itself under the sway and influence of these master states, some by choice and others by coercion or by a combination of the two factors. There was little promotion of democracy in neo-colonial relationships.

Right from the start of the post-colonial period for Africans, the Americans gave the impression that “democracy” was not meant to be enjoyed by Africans and that a neo-colonial condition would be imposed. Whether elected or not, African leaders were not supposed to be free to decide what was in the best interests of their countries. This fact was vividly brought up in Congo where Patrice Lumumba, properly elected by the Congolese as their Prime Minister, made it clear that he wanted to put Congo’s interests at the top. Americans and Belgians did not like that decision and so they plotted and organized the ouster and subsequent killing of Lumumba. They replaced him with their choice of an African leader, Joseph Mobutu who proceeded to plunder the country, increase the level of poverty and dependency, and destroy Congo with the support of the *master states* until he outlived his usefulness.<sup>26</sup> In Congo, neo-colonialism was not by choice; it was by imposition.

*Neo-colonialism* by choice was of two types. First were those leaders who chose one side and stuck with it and there those who kept changing their *neo-colonial* masters depending on the prevailing international political climate. In the first group were those countries that had strong and popular leaders who knew what they wanted out of the master/client relationship. Such leaders claimed to be

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<sup>26</sup> Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 301-304; Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila: A People's History*. (New York: Zed Books, 2002) pp. 99-101, 107; Indarjit Rikhye, *Military Adviser to the Secretary-General: U.N. Peacekeeping and the Congo Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 1-2, 318; Michela Wrong, *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in the Congo* (London: Fourth Estate Ltd., 2000), 63-65, 76-79; Peter Lyon, *Eisenhower, Portrait of the Hero* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1974), p.840; Marq de Villiers and Sheila Hirtle, *Into Africa: A Journey Through the Ancient Empires* (New York: Phoenix Giant, 1997), p.186; Martin Ewans, *European Atrocity, African Catastrophe: Leopold II, the Congo Free State and Its Aftermath*. London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), pp.243-245, 250-251.



“independent” and seemingly acted so. In the 1960s, for instance, leaders of Kenya and Ivory Coast chose to be in the Western camp and did not mind the epithet of being called “neo-colonial”. Tanzania, by contrast, was representative of those that tried to distance themselves from capitalism but not necessarily from the West. The result was an ideological and social hybrid that was dependent on the leader, Julius Nyerere, and a lot of support from ‘socialistic’ Scandinavian countries. Similarly Guinea, under Sekou Toure, rejected French paternalism but not necessarily France and this rejection gave both the Soviet Union and then the Americans opportunity to “help”. Though with a modicum of “independence”, they all ended up as *client states* of one force or another, but it was their choice.

*Neo-colonialism* by choice took a sharp Marxist turn in the 1970s when Americans appeared to be losing in the competition for acquiring client states and blundered into supporting racist South Africa and prove it could stand up to the Soviets in Africa. It was trying to counter the emergence of leaders who considered Marxism as an ideology for countering American supported tyrannies. Such leaders overthrew a pro-American regime in Ethiopia and invited the Cubans and the Soviets to help them stay in power. Marxists defeated Portuguese colonialism in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau. In the case of Angola, it became necessary for the Cubans with Soviet logistical support to counter South Africa’s invasion that had American blessings in efforts to promote Jonas Savimbi as a serious leader of Angola.<sup>27</sup> Subsequently, Angola became a prolonged ideological battlefield that deteriorated into a looting civil war with no ideological validity.<sup>28</sup> In supporting South Africa’s invasion of Angola, the United States was not being very “democratic.” But the behaviour fitted well into Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s belief that the United States should not “let a country go Marxist just because its people are irresponsible.”<sup>29</sup> Democracy was to be limited, by force if necessary.

*Neo-colonialism* by choice also enabled a number of leaders to play the Cold War game to get what they wanted. They tended to have been coup organisers

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<sup>27</sup> Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy*, pp. 138-142, 211-214; Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (New York, 1992), pp. 675-678, 682-683; Noam Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance* (London: Penguin Books, 2003), pp. 93-94; Gilbert M. Khadiagala, *Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security, 1975-1993* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1994), pp. 36-45; Andreas Wenger and Doron Zimmermann, *International Relations: From the Cold War to the Globalized World* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 136-139.

<sup>28</sup> Jackie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich, editors, *Angola’s War Economy The Role of Oil and Diamonds* (Pretoria: Security Studies, 2000), passim; William Reno, *Warlord Politics and the African States* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp.61-68; Victoria Brittain, *Death of Dignity: Angola’s Civil War* (London: Pluto Press, 1998), passim; Tony Hodges, *Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State*, Second Edition (Oxford: James Currey, 2004), passim.

<sup>29</sup> Quote in Isaacson, *Kissinger*, p. 290.

and flirted with either Washington or Moscow or Beijing and easily switched sides whenever it suited their purpose. Those leaders that were particularly good at this game included Gaafar el Numeiri of Sudan and Somali's Mohammed Siad Barre. Both had grabbed power in 1969, had initially claimed to be some sort of Marxist or Socialist, and had expected and had received support from the Eastern Bloc. They later changed sides and invited the Americans to be their patrons and the Americans had responded positively. Democracy was not an issue.

Whether the leaders of countries espoused capitalism, socialism, or Marxism as a way of ensuring their survival through external support, they tended to plunge their countries into deep dependency at a time that *neo-colonialism* as a doctrine of control was systematically losing value. In the West, the failures of *neo-colonialism* became apparent with the humiliation of the United States in Vietnam and Iran and with the victory of Marxists in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau. As a result, Americans concluded that relying on individual leaders in a symbiotic relationship to protect American interests was unreliable and were thus forced to start shifting positions and to abandon what Kissinger later termed "the essence of postwar American foreign policy."<sup>30</sup>

In rejecting the essence of postwar foreign policy, the United States reviewed its position and looked for a way out of its predicament in order to restore a sense of self-worth and purpose. It decided to be critical of leaders who, as John Lewis Gaddis argued, had outlived their usefulness. It wanted to be seen to identify with the aspirations of the ordinary people instead of the wishes of the ruling elites<sup>31</sup> and subsequently developed two strategies. First was to reduce or minimize bilateral dealings with leaders of Third World countries and to emphasise the value of multilateralism and second was to adopt new rhetoric in international discourse targeting particularly Third World countries. The rhetoric blamed the Africans for everything and exonerated the *master states*. Both strategies had the effect of reducing visible United States involvement with leaders who had outlived their usefulness and to make *neo-colonialism* irrelevant. The irrelevancy of *neo-colonialism* gave way to the emergence of a new type of colonialism in the form of *globalisation* or *postmodern colonialism*,<sup>32</sup> that ignores borders and govern-

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<sup>30</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p. 29.

<sup>31</sup> G. Macharia Munene, "Cold War Disillusionment and Africa," in Macharia Munene, J. Olewe-Nyunya, and Korwa Adar, editors, *The United States and Africa: From Independence to the End of the Cold War* (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1995), pp.25-49.

<sup>32</sup> Susan S. Silby, "'Let Them Eat Cake': Globalisation, Postmodern Colonialism, and the Possibilities of Justice," *Law and Society Review*, Volume 31, Number 2, 1997, pp. 219-220.

ments and uses an assortment of agencies to control people and places intellectually, politically, culturally and economically.

### *Post modern colonialism*

In *postmodern colonialism*, people are encouraged to be irresponsible and to destroy their own state in the interest of the *master state*. The role of states and particular regimes are devalued as manipulators in the *master states* claim to understand the victim of the manipulation, meaning the African, in his own context. The claim of understanding of the victim in his own context is a palliative to the victim who should not complain since his concerns are reasonably accommodated. Those who do the understanding are the manipulators in the *master states* and tend to that believe they have a right to tell Africans what to do,<sup>33</sup> which means that Africans should not think for themselves. Thinking, therefore, becomes a preserve of the manipulators in *master states* who then *advise, guide, and instruct* Africans to downsize states, institutions, and services and to open up the country to international operators, in the name of liberalization and privatization and yet they do not assume responsibility for their exploitative behavior.<sup>34</sup>

There arose international bureaucrats, a 'new aristocracy' having dictatorial powers to erode national sovereignty<sup>35</sup> as they propagated the gospel of globalisation that was a cover and a political tool for ideological rationalization for controlling other peoples and territories.<sup>36</sup> They behave like 'missionaries' for the gospel of liberalization in small and weak countries and behind such missionaries is the military might of the *master states* who do not need good reasons to flex their muscles and the most important of these is the United States of America.<sup>37</sup> The 'missionaries', vocal in blaming the victims, then make it their business to reorganize the African states and resources in such a way that it hurts the African. They emphasise the failure of states to provide those services which in turn justifies calling for privatization of services within the state, meaning denying the state the right and ability to provide services. They also mean that foreigners should have a right to expropriate and con-

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<sup>33</sup> Robert Pinkney, *The International Politics of East Africa* (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 2001), p. 75.

<sup>34</sup> Oswaldo de Rivero, *The Myth of Development: The Non-Viable Economies of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (London: Zed Books, 2001), pp. 51-54.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 52-56.

<sup>36</sup> James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, *Globalization Unmasked* (London: Zed Books, 2001), pp. 27, 55, 58, 62.

<sup>37</sup> Eric George, "Private Security Companies and Postmodern Colonialism in Africa," M.A Thesis, 2003, Peace and Development Program, Universitat Jaume I, Castellon, Spain; James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, *Globalization Unmasked* (London: Zed Books, 2001), pp. 27, 55, 58, 62.

trol a country's institutions. This way, the master states remain officially invisible as they enjoy the fruits of global exploitation without getting the blame because the blame has been shifted to the victim.<sup>38</sup>

The strategy of blaming the victim has the effect of undermining the victim's ability to demand redress, by removing the basis of demanding redress. The logic of blame shifting is initially orchestrated at the intellectual level before being imposed on the ground by various agents and functionaries of *postmodern colonialism* which include diplomats from the master states, IMF and World Bank officials, and local NGOs and *civil society* operatives. Blaming the victims lays the groundwork first for the intellectual rationalisation of denying assistance to the victims and second for providing the appropriate leverage to dictate laws to the victim countries. This way, control is tightened as the victim is made to take responsibility for whatever may go wrong. In this way, functionaries and officials on the ground become instruments of blame shifting and *post-modern colonialism*.

The instruments of control were supplemented by a new political rhetoric that promoted NGOs and *civil society* in a process of making the United States to appear to be on the side of the people. One of the ways it did this was to create a bipartisan organ, the National Endowment for Democracy whose mission was to promote American values on free press, civil society, trade unionism, and political activism. It also entailed the support for NGOs and most important, the promotion of *civil society*, media, and labour unions that were critical of their governments.<sup>39</sup> These then made a lot of noise about political pluralism and the shortcomings of their own states. They noisily repeated the political rhetoric of *human rights, democracy, conditionalities* as they went on to urge "donors" to withhold "aid". It is this development that explains the pressure that the United States started putting on the leaders of its client states such as Moi of Kenya and Mobutu of Zaire in the 1980s, long before the end of the Cold War. These had outlived their usefulness.

### *Post Cold War Africa*

The end of the Cold War simply reinforced a trend that appeared fresh because the first President George Bush proclaimed a New World Order that, unhampered by

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<sup>38</sup> David Williams, "Aid and Sovereignty: Quasi-states and the International Financial Institutions," *Review of International Studies*, 2000, 26, pp. 557-558, 567.

<sup>39</sup> Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy in Africa: United States and International Policies in Transition," in Macharia Munene, Korwa Adar, and Olewe Nyunya, editors, *The United States and Africa: From Independence to the End of the Cold War* (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1995), pp. 206-209.

the Cold war, would promote American values by force if necessary. There are four things that can be said about Africa and this New World Order. First, a number of African leaders were caught unawares despite numerous signposts in the 1980s. In the process, they tended to be surprised with American behavior when they should not have been. Second, Africans noticed that Americans had double standards in the application of the American values to African countries. Third, there is growing African effort to adjust to the new realities of American unilateralism in global activities. This adjustment has been in one of two ways, to play up to the United States in some areas and to mount reasoned resistance to the imposition. Fourth, is the realization that the United States, despite its preponderous military power has been losing power particularly with the Bush “grand strategy” of invading countries and instead appears like a “monster”.<sup>40</sup>

One of the things about the New World Order was the number of regimes that were destabilized in Africa and instead of getting the support they used to get, they found themselves at the receiving end of American hostility. Siad Barre had received a lot of American aid but was left to his own fate when rebels intensified their attacks. As Somalia disintegrated into a human disaster, the United States helped to mobilize the United Nations and led the intervention through Operation Restore Hope. This humanitarian coalition became a fiasco as Somali warriors dragged American soldiers in the streets of Mogadishu which forced the new Clinton administration to cut losses and quit. Somalia was a disaster for Africa and for future US involvement in other parts of Africa.

Americans helped to get rid of “friends” who became victims of the reassessment by the United States of its dealings with leaders in client states who had outlived usefulness and were considered as liabilities.<sup>41</sup> Samuel K. Doe had grabbed power in Liberia in 1980 and liked to portray himself as America’s best friend in Africa, and was well received in the White House. Charles Taylor, an escapee from a Massachusetts prison, ousted him and plunged Liberia into protracted chaos.<sup>42</sup> Liberia became an international embarrassment for the Americans that eased with the election and inauguration of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as president. In Zaire, turned against Mobutu and helped to sponsor anti-Mobutu forces that succeeded in 1996. Leading

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<sup>40</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, “Grand Strategy in the Second Term,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February, 2005, pp. 6-7; Judis, “Imperial Amnesia,” pp. 55-59.

<sup>41</sup> Munene, “Cold War Disillusionment and Africa,” p. 39.

<sup>42</sup> Adekeye Adebajo, “Liberia: A Warlord’s Peace,” in Stephen John Sredman, Donald Rothchild, Elizabeth M. Cousens, editors, *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 599-630.

these forces were what were called the “new leaders” of Africa whose common attribute was that they appeared fresh, untainted with old political baggage, and had grabbed power through the gun rather the ballot.

The leader of this “new leaders” group was Yoweri Kaguta Museveni who shot his way to office in 1986, and is now under pressure from the same Americans who had been singing his praises. He had helped Paul Kagame to take power in Rwanda in 1994 and in turn Kagame helped Laurent Kabila to oust Mobutu in Congo in 1996. Africans noticed American double standards in that while initially pressuring other countries to be “democratic,” “transparent,” and “accountable,” the United States was relatively silent on Uganda whose activities raised questions. The reason, it appeared was that Museveni was ready to go along with whatever Washington said, and what Washington wanted had little to do with democracy. The tragedy for Museveni is that having given in to almost anything the Americans demanded,<sup>43</sup> he appears to have outlived his usefulness and there is currently a lot of pressure to cut “aid” to him.<sup>44</sup>

Uganda’s neighbor to the East, Kenya, received different treatment which in turn raised the issue of hypocrisy in promoting democracy. Daniel arap Moi of Kenya was one of those leaders who were caught flatfooted by the new global changes and it was on Kenya that experiments on how to fix Africans were conducted and are still conducted; the experiments have very little to do with promoting democracy. It was in Kenya where Americans first mooted the idea of *conditionalities* in the 1980s and where the United States inaugurated *diplomatic noise making* as a public way of pressuring African leaders to do the bidding of the *master state*. It started with Smith Hempstone, in 1990 whose initial *noise making* appeared crude but then other Western countries followed the American example. As a result *diplomatic noise making* became so common that neither the political class nor the ordinary Kenyan is anymore shocked when a representative of a donor country or institution engages in *diplomatic noise making*. It is actually expected as local agents of *postmodern colonialism* beg “donors” or “development partners” to withhold “aid”.

### *Master States and Kibaki Bashing*

The hypocrisy of the American promotion of democracy is glaring when Kenya and the United States are compared in the last three years. The two countries, in

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<sup>43</sup> Pinkney, *The International Politics of East Africa*, pp. 182-184; Nzomba Kitonga, “International Criminal Court: Immunity for US Soldiers: Kenya Must ‘Unsign’ Now,” *The East African*, Opinion, April 25-May 1, 2005, p. 15.

<sup>44</sup> A. David Kaiza, “FSC Calls For Aid Freeze,” *The East African*, April 25-May 1, 2005, p. 5; A. Mutumba Lule, “Uganda Faces Aid Cuts Over Graft,” *The East African*, June 27-July 3, 2005, p.3.

theory, should be on the best of terms because they have some things in common. The political class in both countries subscribes to some kind of nationalistic liberal economics but not necessarily international liberal economics. Both countries can claim to have successfully fought for independence against the British. Both countries hold regular elections in which candidates win and lose and both have, at times, conducted elections in a manner to suggest they were not sure of how to count votes or whether the votes cast were the votes counted and announced. Both countries have over time experienced bouts of perceived corruption, petty and grand. The administrations in both places have appointed what appeared like cronies in high places who turned out to be detrimental to national interests and to those who appointed them. Both countries have been victims of international terrorism; victims of Al Qaeda. Both Kenyans and Americans are proud and occasionally arrogant people who like to guard jealously what they consider to be of their interest. Yet despite such similarities, there have been serious disputes.

The explanation, with all those things in common, for the friction between the two countries, can be due to factors pertaining to the perceptions of interests and how to advance and protect those interests. While the *master states* would like to advise and instruct Kenya on what its interests should be, President Mwai Kibaki angered them by not playing the expected role of a leader of a Third World *client state*. The *Master states* then undertook to contain his regime because it had problems understanding instructions, appeared determined to break from its condition of over-dependency, and wanted to reserve the right to make its own decision as to what was in the best interests of Kenya.<sup>45</sup> They mounted pressure using NGOs and "civil society" organs in the name of good governance and democracy, and also raised the pitch in their *diplomatic noise making*, both orally and in print. As a result, a number of "ambassadors" became regular "columnists" in the local papers on how Kenyans should run their country, fight corruption, draft a constitution, and behave when relating to the *master states* called "donors" or "development partners." In their verbal *noise making*, which bordered on racism, some of them hurled insults at the country in the belief that they had a natural right to do so and that, more than Kenyans, they knew best what was best for Kenyans.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Jean Kamau, "Let's Do Not As Donors Say, But as They Did in The Past," *The Sunday Standard*, April 3, 2005; Wanjohi Kabukuru, "Kenya: Sir Edward's Crusade Has Clay Feet", *New African*, May 2005, pp. 32-34; David Musila, "US Must Stop Piling Pressure on Kenya," *Daily Nation*, opinion page, May 11, 2005; Fred Oluoch, "Will Kenyan MPs Bow to US Pressure or People's Will?" *The East African*, July 4-10, 2005; Macharia Munene, "Expectations and Disappointments in Africa-US Relations," Revised Obafame Awolowo University AAU Staff Exchange Fellowship Lecture, July 7, 2005; Ile Ife, Nigeria.

<sup>46</sup> Gitau Warigi, "Western Envoys are on Ego Trips," *Sunday Nation*, November 6, 2005.

Americans appeared to be incensed with Kenya, a *client state*, for setting a bad example to other *client states* of trying to act independently. It had problems understanding instructions from its *master states* to support the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, to close the Iraq embassy and seize Iraqi assets in Kenya,<sup>47</sup> to exempt Americans from criminal prosecution, and to pass an anti-terrorist bill even if Kenyans did not like it.<sup>48</sup> What was even more annoying to the *master states*, Kenya deliberately joined a Third World rebellion in the WTO Conference at Cancun. For all these, Kenya incurred the wrath of the *master states*, who then became openly hostile to Kibaki's regime<sup>49</sup> which had to be punished.

Part of the punishment was to spread rumours that things in Kenya "could get really bad" and that Kibaki did not seem to "realize that people are fed up"<sup>50</sup> as part of their design to manufacture consensus on Kenya. "Public opinion can be mobilized ... through the media and motivation of influential groups," wrote England based *Sunday Standard* Columnist Fred Mudhai, in order to "stir a revolution against the government."<sup>51</sup> Subsequently, there was effort to portray Kenya as collapsing, as being responsible for international terrorism,<sup>52</sup> and that the Kibaki regime was more corrupt than the Moi regime with which the British had had a "valuable and civilized relations"<sup>53</sup> In the process, agents of *postmodern colonialism* produced "objective" studies that conveyed the expected message and justified the *diplomatic noise making* as a pressure. One such study was produced by the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, an American think tank with capacity to engineer consensus<sup>54</sup> that, in its July/ August 2005 issue of *Foreign Policy*, declared Kenya to be a failed state, a claim that Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Moses Wetangula dismissed as "balderdash and ridiculous".<sup>55</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Julius Bosire, "US Wants Iraq Envoy Kicked Out of Kenya," *Saturday Nation*, April 5, 2003.

<sup>48</sup> Editorial, "What More Must Kenya Do?" *The Kenya Times*, June 21, 2003; J. Harrison Kinyanjui, "Anti-Terror Law Will Roll Back Kenya's Civil Liberties," *The East African*, June 30- July 6, 2003, pp. 4-5,17. Kevin Kelley, "Watch Out, US Rights Groups Tell Kenyans," *The East African*, June 30-July 6, 2003, p. 5; Mwangi, "The Nationalisation of Terrorism."

<sup>49</sup> Macharia Munene, "Africa and Shifting Global Power Relationships," *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Summer 2005, Volume 29, Number 2, pp. 120-121.

<sup>50</sup> Fred Mudhai, "Where Negotiations Fail 'Public Diplomacy' Works," *Sunday Standard*, October 26, 2005.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> Mwangi, Makumi, "The Nationalisation of Terrorism: National Response to Terrorism Through National Legislation," in Makumi Mwangi and Maria Nzomo, editors, *International Responses to Terrorism*(Nairobi: Heinrich-Boll/IDS, forthcoming).

<sup>53</sup> See Clay Interview with Nation TV's Louis Otieno, in *Sunday Nation*, June 29, 2003.

<sup>54</sup> Inderjeet Parmar, "Engineering Consent: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and American Public Opinion 1939-45," *Review of International Studies*, Volume 26, Number 1, January 2000, pp. 35-48.

<sup>55</sup> Mwangi Githahu, "Report: Why Kenya is a failed State: US organization underrate its Economic, Political and Social Performance," *Sunday Nation*, October 2, 2005.



In effort to “mobilize opinion” against the government, as *Sunday Nation* Columnist Gitau Warigi noted, diplomats from *master states* believed that “their criticism should be treated as more sacrosanct than cabinet deliberations.”<sup>56</sup> The local media helped them to feel “sacrosanct” and seemingly distorted stories to make the Kibaki regime look weak and not acceptable.<sup>57</sup> In Kenya, veteran journalist Joe Kadhi observed, there emerged “a peculiar kind of journalistic liberty which has given way to writing commentaries that are not only partisan but whose ‘facts’ could be challenged. Hiding behind powerful godfathers, such writers seem to be able to get away with murder.”<sup>58</sup> And there were times when they committed journalistic fraud by deliberately twisting stories to give the wrong impression.<sup>59</sup> Thus the local media played right into the hands of the *master states* and became instruments of turning low level diplomats posted in Kenya into local celebrities.<sup>60</sup>

In the process of turning foreign diplomats into local celebrities, the British, the American, and the Germans acquired notoriety, excelled in the art of *diplomatic noise making*, and tended to miss the irony of their own positions. One of those who became a celebrity was British High Commissioner Edward Clay who took part in a questionable and corrupt Journalist of the Year Award (JOYA) function at the Hotel Intercontinental in Nairobi and then accused Kenyans of being corrupt gluttons who vomited on his shoes.<sup>61</sup> He was supported by his American counterpart, William Bellamy who, while addressing a “private luncheon of the British Business Association” praised Clay<sup>62</sup> and later promised to fund and encourage Kenyans “with the courage to stand up” to agitate against the Kibaki government and probably create, as Minister Raphael Tuju wondered, an environment for “regime change.”<sup>63</sup> Within three weeks of Bellamy’s declaration, there appeared to be an

<sup>56</sup> Gitau Warigi, “Western Envoys are on Ego Trips,” *Sunday Nation*, November 6, 2005.

<sup>57</sup> Daniel Branch and Nic Cheeseman, “Briefing: Using Opinion Polls to Evaluate Kenyan Politics, March 2004-January 2005,” *African Affairs*, April 2005, pp.332-335.

<sup>58</sup> Kadhi, “Anglophone Africa: Journalists- Puppets of the Proprietors?,” p.90.

<sup>59</sup> Kodi Barth, “State House Needs Media Expert Advise, But Media is Courting Trouble,” *The Sunday Standard*, May 15, 2005

<sup>60</sup> Warigi, “Western Envoys are on Ego Trips”

<sup>61</sup> Kipkoech Tanui and Argwings Odera, “You are not Serious About Corruption,” *The Standard*, February 3, 2005; Editorial, “KUJ’s Night of Graft,” *The Standard*, February 4, 2005; Kwendo Opanga, “Rejected Trophy, Missing TV Sets, and Saga of KUJ’s Shameful Night,” *The Sunday Standard*, February 6, 2005; Mugo Njeru, “Police Probe Journalists’ Awards,” *Daily Nation*, February 4, 2005.

<sup>62</sup> Patrick Mathangani and Andrew Teyie, “US Freezes Aid,” *The Standard*, February 9, 2005

<sup>63</sup> William M. Bellamy, “Kenyans Must Step Up Fight Against Graft,” *Daily Nation*, Opinion page, July 5, 2005; Odhiambo Orlale, “US Envoy Hits Out at NARC Over Corruption But Tuju Warns Him Bluntly: Don’t Mix Politics With Aid,” *Daily Nation*, Front Page Story, July 5, 2005; Francis Openda, “You are not Fair to Kenya, Tuju Tells US,” *The Standard*, back page story, July 5, 2005.

upsurge of, as a *Daily Nation* editorial noted, “presumably well funded civil societies types”<sup>64</sup> demonstrating on the streets of Nairobi. There was even a spectacle, captured by the media, of one of the globe trotting professional demonstration organizers unsuccessfully pleading with the police to shoot him.<sup>65</sup>

It appeared that the demonstrations were part of the scheme by the *master states* to create the impression that Kenyans were “fed up” with the government. They were seemingly fuelled by what Peter Mwaura of the *Nation*, termed “a rogue superpower seeking a regime change”.<sup>66</sup> And the “rogue superpower” was part of what *The Leader* called “self-appointed democracy watchdogs” led by “our colonial master, Britain ... of course with a helping hand from the Americans.”<sup>67</sup> These watchdogs became, Mutuma Mathiu of *Sunday Standard*, observed, “factional warriors in the Narc wars ... taking sides in the power struggle” because the power struggle gave them “an opportunity to project more influence through them.”<sup>68</sup> As warriors against the Kibaki regime, they funded political factions “under the name of civic education”<sup>69</sup> and were receptive to requests for “help in persuading Kenyans” to see things the expected way.<sup>70</sup> Such activities were not a good way of “promoting democracy” and what is more, the Kibaki regime had been elected very democratically.

### Conclusion

To Africans, the image of the United States as a promoter of democracy is dented because of the contradictions inherent in its stated ideals and its behaviour. It continuously espouses high moral positions only to ditch them in practice. For instance, the spread of Jacksonian democracy for white men before the Civil War was accompanied by a war to grab Mexican lands in the name of ‘democracy’ and manifest destiny. And Woodrow Wilson could believe that he had a right to use force to ‘teach’ the Mexicans how to elect ‘good men’, condone

<sup>64</sup> Editorial, “Demos a Curse of Business,” *Daily Nation*, July 27, 2005.

<sup>65</sup> Oscar Obonyo, “One Man’s Obsession With Street Protests,” *Sunday Nation*, July 31, 2005.

<sup>66</sup> Peter Mwaura, “Military Coups no Longer Tenable,” *Saturday Nation*, November 5, 2005.

<sup>67</sup> Editor’s Word, “Foreign Funding Claims a Threat to Our Sovereignty,” *The Leader*, October 7-October 13, 2005; Kiruri Kamau, “Britain, Moi Strike Back by Funding the No Team,” *The Leader*, October 7-October 13, 2005.

<sup>68</sup> Mutuma Mathiu, “Many Confusing Signals From Donors,” *Sunday Standard*, September 26, 2004.

<sup>69</sup> Editor’s Word, “Foreign Funding Claims a Threat to Our Sovereignty,” *The Leader*, October 7-October 13, 2005; Kiruri Kamau, “Britain, Moi Strike Back by Funding the No Team,” *The Leader*, October 7-October 13, 2005.

<sup>70</sup> David Mugonyi, “Uhuru, Raila Meet US Envoy in Bid to Block Wako Draft: Six Other Countries Joined Two Hour Talks With MPs,” *Daily Nation*, Friday, August 26, 2005.

racial discrimination within the United States and in the world, and at the same time loudly talk of making the world 'safe for democracy.'<sup>71</sup> It is a country that is looked upon to offer moral leadership because it has more of the military, technological, and economic might than any other country, but it disappoints many people when all it can project is the image of an intolerant bully.

There continues to be a lot of admiration for things and developments American and this is apparent in the electronic and print media, educational and other institutions, and in music and the cinemas. Africans closely follow events and elections in the United States and are amused when Americans blunder on basic things mainly because Americans have a habit of pointing to the shortcomings of others. It becomes increasingly interesting when the blunders appear to occur where black Americans are involved and thus raise doubts about 'democracy' for African Americans in the United States. Americans had problems counting ballots in Florida in 2000 and providing relief in New Orleans in 2005; in both places, there were a lot of black people.

Such blunders on 'democracy' at the domestic front, when internationalized portray the United States as hypocritical and a country that thrives on contradictions and double standards. Africans hear Americans talk of freedom of movement of people and goods only to see the same Americans closing their doors to everyone else. The idea of "open doors", it becomes clear, is for others to open theirs for Americans to come in freely but not for others to enter their market or country. The United States presses Africans to liberalize internally and at the same time to accept American global 'uniformity'.<sup>72</sup> It piously talks of democracy and then ignores the democratic wishes of the others. It seemingly pursues its interests vigorously and would not allow anyone else to tell it what those interests are, and yet it thinks it has a right to tell other countries what their interests should be or how they should pursue them. It is this arrogance that blinds the Americans in such a way that they are surprised when other countries, particularly small countries like Kenya, decide to pursue their own interests just as vigorously.

Instead of a promoter of democracy, therefore, Africans see the United States as a bully, mean, and a country that arrogantly ignores international laws that it expects others to follow. In part, this is because the United States appears to be-

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<sup>71</sup> Hubert Herring, *A History of Latin America From the Beginning to the Present*, Third Edition (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1968), pp. 342-344; Kluger, *Simple Justice*, pp. 90-91; Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 174; Daniel M. Smith, *The Great Departure: The United States and World War I, 1914-1920* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp.88-89.

<sup>72</sup> Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, *Manufacturing African Studies and Crises* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1997), p.40

lieve, as P. Godfrey Okoth argued, that “International Relations are relations of power [and that] legality and legitimacy are mere decorations.”<sup>73</sup> This belief that legality and legitimacy are mere decorations intensifies the contradictions that end up manifesting themselves in the strange American expectation that other countries should, almost blindly, follow the United States. In that expectation, the United States appears to ignore the essence of freedom and democracy and the importance of that essence especially to a people barely coming out of tyranny. That essence is the right to say “no” to things that do not make sense and to say “no” especially to a perceived bully ganging up with a colonial exploiter. If that right to refuse is taken away, then the people and their countries are not free. By appearing to deny people in African countries the right to say “no”, or to disagree with its policies, the United States implies that it does not believe in democracy for all.

This then is the perceived hypocrisy and contradictions that have made the United States to lose influence. Disappointed Africans have, in turn, become very vocal in pointing to the hypocrisy, contradictions, and as Nelson Mandela noted, possible application of international racism. Because of this, Africans are increasingly resisting pressure on things that do not make sense, as a way of safeguarding African interests. American threats and inability to make sense and persuade through reason, while probably in their short term interest, have the long term shortcoming of losing credibility and influence in the democratic front. By failing to make sense, Americans have been losing influence.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Pontian Godfrey Okoth, “The Dishonest Broker in America: A Diplomatic Historians Tour of US-African Relations Since 1945,” Inaugural Lecture Series No. 1, September 17, 2003, Maseno University, Maseno Kenya, p. 20.

<sup>74</sup> Munene, “Africa and Shifting Global Power Relationships,” pp. 117-124.

# Promotion of democracy as a goal of US foreign policy in Africa

*Professor Anyang' Nyong'o*

## **Enemy of the people: Communism or US imperialism?**

Were we to be living in the sixties in Africa today, and faced with the Congo crisis, or were we to be in South Africa in the seventies, and noting that President Richard Nixon of the USA was heavily involved in defending Portuguese colonialism in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, we would hardly talk of the US promoting democracy in Africa. But even then the US government insisted that what it was doing was in furtherance of the interests of the “free world”. At that point in time Radio Free Europe was busy broadcasting the evils of communism to the peoples of Europe while Radio Voice of the Gospel from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, was doing the same in Eastern Africa.

To the US government at that point in time fighting communism was the same as advancing the cause of freedom and hence of democracy. Yet there was a contradiction in this mission when it came to Portuguese Africa: here the oppressed people of Africa could only access freedom and democracy by getting rid of the Portuguese colonialism which US imperialism was defending. In this regard, the pursuit of the interests of US imperialism was definitely antithetical to the cause of democracy in Africa.

The Vietnamese have said the same. While Johnson and Nixon after him were convinced that communism was an enemy to both the Vietnamese as well as the US government, the people of South Vietnam did not think so. The real enemy was French imperialism and its backers, which included the Americans. It took Nixon long to realize that the resolve of the Vietnamese people was firm, and nothing short of the success of the revolution would satisfy them. Henry Kissinger understood the historical importance of the struggle of the Vietnamese people, something which went beyond their alliance with communism and hit the very heart of Vietnamese and Asian nationalism.

Kissinger's offer to intercede on behalf of Nixon and negotiate with Lee Doc Tho so as to bring about a rapprochement with the Saigon authorities was the outcome of cold hearted pragmatic politics; the US government was facing a military defeat that would have tarnished her image as a world power.

In the same mode Nixon proposed the policy of constructive engagement as a way of negotiating a settlement between the African nationalists in South Africa, led by the African National Congress (ANC) and the apartheid regime of South Africa. But before doing so, the “little insurgents” in Portuguese colonies had to be taught a lesson. Thus, although Portugal had been forced to opt out of her colonies in 1974/75, the US government continued to support pro-imperialist insurgents that fought against the independent governments of Mozambique and Angola for most of the seventies and eighties.

In the case of Angola it was Jonas Savimbi leading the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) and in Mozambique it was the National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) led by Afonso Dhlakama. In both cases the US and South Africa worked hand in hand, and attempts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to intercede so as to achieve settlements in the interest of both Angola and Mozambique quite often came to naught.

The scorched earth policy that the US adopted towards both Angola and Mozambique had two disastrous consequences. In the case of Mozambique, it led to the liquidation of a whole generation of leadership when the plane carrying President Samora Machel and Frelimo cadres were brought down in a plane crash that was well planned from South Africa and executed by a South African military force operating from within the territory of Mozambique. Following that incident, Frelimo leadership became too weak to hold out on its own: it was forced to negotiate with Renamo and to usher in an era of development in which the flame of national development that Frelimo had lit was quickly extinguished in favor of the hegemony of South African and imperialist capital. The saving grace for Frelimo was the triumph of the ANC in South Africa in the early nineties.

In the case of Angola, the struggle became long drawn and protracted. The support that the US and apartheid South Africa had given to Savimbi was not easy to withdraw when the West needed a peaceful settlement to the conflict so as to facilitate oil exploitation by western multinationals in the petroleum business. Having taken hold of the diamond producing fields, Savimbi was able to buy military equipment and to keep a mercenary army that became a nuisance both to the government of Angola as well as his external backers.

Attempts to carry out elections in which UNITA and MPLA were both participants could not produce any new peaceful pact. In the end, MPLA had to physically eliminate Savimbi so as to pave the way for a new nationalist political and economic dispensation.

## In Support of knowledge: US contribution to African scholarship

Well before the independence of many African countries, there had been a long tradition of US scholarly interest in Africa that sought to understand how the new nations in Africa were emerging out of colonialism. This scholarship, enshrined within the Committee for the Study of New Nations of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) based in New York financed many studies, writings and research that became very influential in the academic as well as policy making world, not only in the US but elsewhere as well. In particular, the Joint Committee on African Studies of the SSRC played a very important role, originally dealing mainly with American academics but subsequently bringing US and other foreign scholars, including Africans, to set the agenda for research and policy dialogue in Africa.

In the sixties, plenty of empirical work from anthropologists, sociologists, economists and political scientists came out of these scholarly endeavors mainly within the tradition of modernization and nation-building theories. Subsequently, particularly through the efforts of the Rockefeller Foundation, agriculture, earth sciences and other physical sciences including mathematics emerged as areas of concern in promoting knowledge in Africa through graduate scholarships meant to produce African university lecturers from US graduate schools.

One cannot ignore the positive impact of US contribution to the development of higher education and scholarship in Africa. Many academic treatises have written regarding the ideological biases of American scholarship in African studies. That notwithstanding, it is also true that it is this tradition that also produced many who have contributed immensely to progressive scholarship in Africa, and even many more who have taught in African universities and whose students have gone ahead to play key roles, for the better or for the worse, in African political economies of today.

The African Studies community in the US became very important in the struggle against apartheid as well as in the support of the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau – the so-called “the process of late decolonization in Africa.” Very often, the writings, lectures and political activities of US academics and professional associations conflicted with the interests of both the White House and the State Department.

The African Studies Association at its annual conferences very often invited the leaders of the liberation movements to address its audiences and enlighten the US public on the vicissitudes of US imperialism in Africa. Such scholars as William Minter, Emmanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi, and many others con-

tributed immensely to the critique of US imperialism in Africa during this period. Political activists like Prexy Nesbitt, the New World Resource Center Group in Chicago, Operation PUSH led by the Rev. Jesse Jackson, the Black Panthers, Malcolm X and his students and many others in the African-American community were key in the campaign to dismantle the vestiges of colonialism in Africa supported by US imperialism at this time.

The documentary that had tremendous impact on American understanding of the ties that bound American imperialism to Portuguese colonialism and apartheid South Africa was Bob van Lierop's *A Luta Continua*, Portuguese for "the Struggle Continues." This was the slogan of Frelimo as it fought Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique. The hero of the documentary that was based on the real experience of Frelimo in the bush and the liberated areas was Samora Machel himself. The high light of the documentary is when Samora says, at the opening of the Josina Machel nursery school in the liberated zone, that "the children are the real *continuadores*". In other words, Samora was saying that the revolution would only succeed if it was internalized and carried on by the children.

In other words, two processes went hand in hand to bring down Portuguese colonialism, supported by Nixonian type US imperialism, in Africa. These processes were the resistance to US imperialism within the US by progressive Africanists and popular movement in the African-American community, and the popular struggle for liberation in Africa itself. While Kennedy had supported Africa's anti-colonial struggle in an earlier era so as to advance enlightened US imperialist interests, Nixon had been more backward to resist late de-colonization in the Portuguese colonies and apartheid South Africa. The latter met with stiff resistance from within the US by progressive pro-Africa forces while the former was hailed by African-Americans who gave Kennedy's Democratic Party overwhelming support.

### **Kennedy and the making of the modern state in Africa**

It needs to be remembered that in the case of Kenya, President Kennedy, in collaboration with Tom Mboya, had organized student air lifts from Kenya to the USA in early sixties that created a whole generation of graduates who came back to Kenya to help run the new government. This advancing US interests through education had a major positive impact on the attitude of Kenyans towards the USA.

While Tom Mboya and other nationalists never wavered on their condemnation of imperialism wherever it hurt the interests of the developing world, the US



appeared to be a partner in fighting the vestiges of European colonialism in Africa during the time that the Democrats occupied the White House in the sixties. Nixon's blatant support of Portuguese colonialism in the seventies, like his support for the Viet Nam war, alienated this positive attitude, and even led to demonstrations and riots in African University campuses against US imperialism.

But Kennedy's record in the Congo crisis that led to the assassination of Patrice Lumumba tarnished his image with African nationalists and left the US Central Intelligence Agency a major suspect in the heinous act. It has to be remembered that though Kennedy was by and large supportive of African nationalism, he was fiercely anti-communist and hence would have easily been an accomplice in the assassination of Lumumba, painted as the arch-angel of communism in the Congo by the CIA.

### **A Shift in mood**

There was therefore a clear change in mood towards the US from the sixties to the seventies: a much more positive mood in the sixties that shifted to hostility and open disapproval by the popular masses in the seventies as the wars of national liberation intensified in the Portuguese colonies and the Republic of South Africa in the seventies. The so-called policy of "Positive Engagement" that Nixon crafted to rationalize US dealing with apartheid South Africa never really gained support in Sub-Saharan Africa: it was seen as a skeptical way of appearing to make legitimate US imperialist interests in alliance with the apartheid regime.

President Jimmy Carter tried to revive the spirit of the Kennedy era, and in many ways Carter was seen as bringing in a much more friendly approach to US-African relations. But Carter's impact was seen more at the level of positive talk rather than positive action, and Bill Clinton also followed in the same tradition. Very little could be seen in the change in US ODA to Africa either under Carter or under Clinton.

### **After the fall of the Berlin Wall**

But the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked a major shift in US policy towards Africa. What compelled Nixon to support apartheid South Africa as well as the Mobutu regime in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo – DRC) was that these were "friendly regimes to the US" in her fight against communism. This, of course, was a central plank in US foreign policy towards Africa whether under the Republicans or the Democrats. With the collapse of communism, the importance of these so-called friendly regimes disappeared, and the

need to prop them up through expensive military and other logistical support also disappeared.

US foreign policy shifted from the fight against communism and support for friendly regimes to the fight for democracy and the promotion of what became as “good governance” on a global scale. Yesterday’s anti-imperialist movements in Africa that were regarded as enemies of US imperialism became to-day’s partners in the quest for democracy and good governance. It was not that US imperialist interests had changed but that these interests could now be pursued at a cheaper price: with popularly elected governments bearing the costs rather than unpopular military dictators being maintained in power at the cost of the US tax payer.

This phenomenon was very well demonstrated when the Clinton administration tried to intervene militarily in Somalia in the context of the UN Peace Keeping forces there. Following the killing of a few US soldiers by the Somali militias, Clinton quickly withdrew the US presence and left Somalia to her own devices. Critics observed that the US could perhaps not have done that were Somalia an oil-rich nation in which the US had substantial economic interests.

When President George Bush (senior) appointed Smith Hempstone as his ambassador to Kenya in early nineties, he did not know that the conservative Hempstone would turn out to be a crusader for democracy in Kenya, much to the dismay of both the White House in Washington and State House in Nairobi. But Hempstone was more accurate in reading the long term interests of the US than the foreign policy mandarins in Washington. Time was gone for the Big Man politics in Africa, and thinking that President Moi needed to be baby sat in political power could obviously prove a much more expensive exercise than giving vocal support for the pro-democracy movements which could, sooner rather than later, run the government in a much more transparent and democratic manner without jeopardizing any US interests.

The US had military interests in Kenya; the pro democracy movements had raised little objection to this. The US further has about one billion dollars worth of investments in Kenya: democracy would safeguard these investments better than the intrusive authoritarian regime. The US had missionaries and other private sector individuals in Kenya: it was unlikely that there would be more insecurity under a popularly elected government than under the one-man rule that the country had known for about two decades.

Hempstone supported democracy in Kenya, quoting extensively from the Federalist Papers, more out of logic and good reason rather than a deep conviction that it was a value cardinal to US foreign policy that was part of his brief.

Once he pronounced himself committed to this cause, it would have been self-defeating if an alternative voice came from Washington reprimanding him for being too vocal on the issue. In the end, Washington got more than it bargained for in the work of Hempstone; rightly or wrongly, the US was seen as having contributed to the support of democratization in Kenya.

### **Strategic and economic interests call the shots**

There is plenty of evidence to demonstrate that US foreign policy in Africa, in the post communism period, is driven more by her economic and strategic interests rather than the altruistic pursuit of democracy and good governance. While these two values are obviously regarded by the White House and Congress as important, they definitely do not dictate where the dollars and cents are spent either in terms of development aid or support of particular governments. Egypt is not the most democratic country in Africa, yet the US dollar assistance to Egypt is much higher per capita compared to what democratic Botswana could deserve. The difference between Botswana and Egypt is that the latter is much more strategically placed in US Middle East politics than Botswana is geopolitically, either globally or even with the context of Southern Africa.

In the case of Sudan, the US became more interested in seeking an end to the conflicts under the present Bush administration given the strategic importance on this country in Africa with regard to the relationship with the Arab-Moslem world and her oil resources. Indeed, US interests in China, Israel and Iran, three countries with very different political systems, obey the same "economic determinism" that we cite in what guides US foreign policy in Africa. When one talks of the importance of "strategic interests", one must not forget that behind every strategic interest is the dollar reward!

In 1994, when there was genocide in Rwanda, and in the midst of the Clinton administration clamoring for global peace and democratization, the US did not lift a finger to intervene in the tragedy. The reason was simple: Rwanda registered rather lowly on the scale of US military, economic and strategic interests in Africa. The same can be said of the fate of the people of northern Uganda where civil war of genocidal proportions has been raging for close to two decades. It is worth noting that Darfur has generated more of US interest in a much shorter time than northern Uganda has done for a much longer time. The difference is very simple: Darfur is in Sudan where conflicts over valued resources directly affect US foreign interests.

## So where do we go from here?

The US government, like any other government, will take part in global politics to promote her national interests first and foremost. But the US is not any other government; she is a global power. She is only one of the very few nations sitting in the Security Council of the United Nations Organization. The US also happens to be one of the richest countries – if not the richest country – in the world today. Another interest aspect of the US is that it is a nation of immigrants: all nations of the world are represented in the population of the US. Apart from the native Americans who are quite often referred to as the American Indians, all others are immigrants and have their ancestry elsewhere.

African Americans, being a significant part of the US population, also happen to have contributed more than their fair share of the population in terms of creating the wealth on which the US is built. Yet the US government has rarely acknowledged this in its foreign policy towards Africa. The continent that was underdeveloped so that the US could be developed continues to be underdeveloped so that the US can continue developing other parts of the world.

Looking at the figures objectively and dispassionately, what makes the US give 100 million times more aid to Israel than she does to the whole of Africa minus Egypt, for example? What makes the US spend more in Iraq to establish democracy there than she has ever spent in Africa to fight HIV/Aids?

For quite some time African scholars and statesmen have discussed the issue of reparation with regard to slavery and the slave trade, and have engaged the US peoples and government in this discourse. It is necessary to note that this discourse, so far unconcluded, must be continued as it is an issue that is pertinent and that needs to inform genuine US-African relations. In the era of the quest for good governance at the global level, past cases of global injustice need to be settled in favor of good governance, and the US has a genuine case to respond to with reference to reparations which remains a black spot in her foreign policy as long as the issue is not properly settled.

What has been advanced as global partnership in the quest for democracy will be nurtured in a global political culture that accepts past mistakes and seeks to enhance confidence of the partners in each other. The US, as a global power, is in a much better position to lead by example. In doing so, she will not only increase her power, but will exercise it in the context of political hegemony rather than political domination, the latter always bringing with it feelings of resentment that could be expressed in the form of anti-Americanism.

# African human rights, democracy and the global security agenda

*Maina Kiai<sup>a</sup> and Anthony Kuria<sup>b</sup>*

## Abstract

### Background

1. The crimes suffered by Africa during the period of colonization were never remedied with the attainment of independence; which for ordinary Africans has meant a life of even more flagrant human rights violations perpetrated by our supposed liberators.
2. The creation of the OAU by default became the means of perpetuating African misery through the principle of non-interference and fraternal solidarity which became the overriding considerations in inter-African Affairs. From a human rights perspective, this meant that the abuses which occurred in the immediate post independence period received the approval of the organization. To be sure, the OAU Charter did mention human rights concerns and included into its text, principles contained in the UDHR; in practice however, there was no illusion that any reference to international human rights norms were hollow proclamations. Our contention is that the OAU maintained an indifferent attitude towards the suppression of human rights by unduly emphasizing on the principle of non-interference.
3. From this history, Africa is caught in a tragic paradox; we were liberated from the yoke of colonial exploitation only to become trapped in a web of tyrannical misrule, systematic impoverishment and merciless exploitation by our own rulers

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*The African human rights system*

4. The mechanisms created by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in 1981 made a distinctive contribution to the regional human rights system—the break through to resistance of African countries to supra-national human rights oversight, albeit through the creation of a quasi-judicial regional human rights commission. The human rights protection system in Africa is a complex and often confusing network of overlapping and interconnected national, regional and international laws.
5. Major problems afflict human rights protection in the continent, mainly the multiplicity of and overlaps between regional institutions with actual or potential human rights oversight responsibilities combined with the perennial problems of the systems being under-funded, under-resourced and poorly regarded; which has therefore made them ineffective.

*Democracy and the global security agenda in Africa*

6. Corruption and bad governance are doing ever greater damage to economies—sucking out resources meant for health, education and clean water. Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds intended for development, undermining a government's ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign investment and aid.
7. Grand corruption is responsible for the difficult social economic conditions we find ourselves in. It has bred violent conflict because ordinary people are exploited and desperate. Corrupt opportunistic elites have mobilized ensuing frustration into violence for their own political ends. From Nigeria to Congo, Sudan to Angola, ethnic violence and nationalist bloodletting have flowed from a context of corrupt, cynical and exploitative governance.
8. Corruption on its own is the single most contributory factor to insecurity in Africa. Corruption is rife at the bottom of the governance system because that is the climate set at the top and because government workers cannot live on the meagre salaries they are paid. The police do not enforce the law, because they are among the major perpetrators of crime. Judges do not decide the law. Customs officials do not inspect goods. Immigration officials do not issue passports without bribes.
9. This is how failed states are created and how they become havens for terrorist activity because the rule of law does not exist. Robber barons seize the lacuna in law enforcement to traffic in drugs and smuggle

weapons, to launder the proceeds, to finance terrorist activity, to traffic in human beings; with utmost impunity. At its most extreme, the state becomes a criminal racket and there is no distinction between the police and organized crime. In the context of the war on terrorism, such a country is a terrorist's paradise.

10. And the North and West are to blame too for this cycle. African robber-barons prefer to take their booty to Europe or the United States, far away from prying eyes. It is impossible to combat corruption without unmasking the complex network of international crooks involved corrupt bankers who launder money, equally corrupt lawyers who set up dummy companies, rotten accountants who collect the bribes, contract-hungry directors, local middlemen and the corrupt officials in Africa.

### *Conclusions and recommendations*

11. Corruption and bad governance have been at the center of human tragedies which have defined much of Africa. There can be no solution without the West being made to account for the role their banks have played in stashing fortunes amassed by a thieving African elite to our detriment. But any permanent solution to Africa's problems can only come from within Africa, through more open and transparent governance to deter corruption; this if nothing else is the very essence of self-determination.
12. However, given how disempowered we are as a continent this cannot be a practical possibility in the short term without the international community acknowledging its contribution to this scenario. When the West refuses to acknowledge the destructive activities of their bankers and other players in this web, this directly translates to abandoning millions of helpless people to the whims of rulers so contemptuous to our basic needs and totally insensitive to the suffering of millions.

### **A timeline on human rights in Africa**

1. In spite of the two international conferences held by the major European powers in Berlin and Brussels in 1885 and 1890 respectively passing anti-slavery acts, the real impact of the conferences was the effective appropriation of the continent. They also marked the start of a conscious desecration of traditional societal arrangements that culminated in a systematic process of economic underdevelopment.

2. The crimes that were committed against the people of Africa during the period of colonization are of course a matter of record. The appropriation of Africa and the commission of serious atrocities such as the massacre of millions of Congolese people under Belgian King Leopold's rubber regime<sup>1</sup>, the genocide against the Herero people in Namibia by the Germans at the turn of the twentieth century or the brutal savagery of British colonial rule in Kenya were crimes in themselves sufficiently serious to warrant a struggle for independence and self-determination. Regrettably, independence for many African countries has meant a life of maybe even more flagrant human rights violations perpetrated by the supposed liberators.
3. In May 1963, thirty-two independent African States, who harboured hopes and visions for the continent of Africa, came together in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to create the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The move towards the union was pushed by such luminaries as President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana who strongly believed that the continent needed to be united in order to make it less vulnerable to outside influence. Dr. Nkrumah had in the late 1950s started a movement, which stressed the immediate unity of the African continent. When he introduced the concept of African unity to the continent, a division, which was based on the implementation of this new concept, was created at the onset.
4. On one hand there were those countries which believed in the immediate unity of Africa which came to be referred to as the Casablanca Group; while on the other hand a more conservative group dubbed the Monrovia Group believed in a much more gradual approach to the question of African Unity. There were fears that the rift between the two groups would become permanent and thus end the hopes and dreams of African Unity.
5. Yet, in May 1963, these two opposing groups were able to come together to form the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Ethiopia, the country that was the beacon for the rest of the continent played a key role in bringing the two opposing camps together<sup>2</sup>. Ethiopia with bit-

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<sup>1</sup> See A. HOSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA (1999). According to this book, over 10 million Congolese were killed

<sup>2</sup> See the account by ATO KETEMA YIRFU, Ethiopian Foreign Minister (1961-1971)



terness recalled the way in which it had been abandoned by the League of Nations, during its hour of need upon invasion by Italy in 1935. Having been abandoned by the same organization that was created to protect its members from external aggression, Ethiopia obviously felt that its future national interest would be better served if it aligned itself with its fellow African countries. This need thus pushed Ethiopia to embrace its African identity as a more willing participant in the continent's upcoming political affairs.

6. From the very beginning, the creation of the Organization of African Unity heralded the birth of an organization which was to become whether by design or not, a legal framework for the perpetuation and in many cases the aggravation of the people's misery<sup>3</sup>. The principles of non-interference and fraternal solidarity became the overriding considerations in African relations. From a human rights perspective, this meant that the abuses of the immediate post-independence period received approval of the organization in so far as the OAU discouraged any external inquiry<sup>4</sup>.
7. This resistance to scrutiny is well illustrated by the African opposition of the attempt to include some of Amin's excesses in the agenda of the UN Commission on Human Rights for consideration. This proposal met with stiff opposition from the African delegates supposedly because Amin was Chairman of the OAU<sup>5</sup>. This culture continues with the most recent example being the continued protection of former Liberian President Charles Taylor by Olusegun Obasanjo despite an indictment by the UN backed Special Court for Sierra Leone for his role in fanning the violence that defined the civil war in Sierra Leone.<sup>6</sup>
8. To be sure, the OAU Charter did mention human rights concerns and included in its text principles of the UN Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in practice however, there was no illu-

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<sup>3</sup> See DR. UBONG E. EFFEH: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY ON HOW NOT TO REALIZE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, AND A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE

<sup>4</sup> The grisly violations under Idi Amin in Uganda, Marcias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea and Jean Bokassa in the Central African Republic attracted little criticism from African rulers. For the record, Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda did speak out

<sup>5</sup> THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 149 (Philip Alston ed, Clarendon Press, 1992)

<sup>6</sup> For the text of the indictment, see Spec CT. for Sierra Leone, Case No. SCSL-03-1 (Mar.3, 2003) available at <http://www.sc-sl.org/taylorindictment.html>.

sion that any references to international human rights norms were hollow proclamations. Events on the ground proved that the unity, solidarity of African states, defense of their sovereignty and territorial integrity and independence were the cornerstone of the Charter. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states clearly over-rode the welfare and well being of the people<sup>7</sup>.

9. The OAU maintained an indifferent attitude to the suppression of human rights in many countries by unduly emphasizing the principle of non-interference. The rights of the individual were usurped by the State in the name of collective rights often in support of some perverse notion of some ideologies that African rulers were fond of at the time. It became standard practice for most violations of human rights to occur against those who spoke out against the corrupt use of state resources. The OAU therefore entrenched a system where the struggle for power became so absorbing that everything else including development was sacrificed<sup>8</sup>.
10. From this history, the people of Africa became trapped in a tragic paradox: they were liberated from the yoke of colonial servitude and all that went with it, only to become caught in decades of tyrannical misrule, systematic impoverishment and merciless exploitation by their own rulers. Is it a surprise therefore that 85% of the world's poorest countries in terms of human development are from sub-Saharan Africa?<sup>9</sup>

### *The African human rights system*

11. A complex and often confusing network of overlapping and interconnected national, regional and international laws establish the regional human rights protection in Africa<sup>10</sup>. A major feature of this proliferation is unwillingness by African countries to subject themselves to the supervision of regional courts and tribunals.
12. There are seven existing or contemplated regional courts of justice such as the Courts of Justice of the Common Market of East and Southern

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<sup>7</sup> For a critique of this topic, see J. OLOKA ONYANGO: BEYOND THE RHETORIC: REINVIGORATING THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN AFRICA 26 CAL (1995)

<sup>8</sup> See Claude Ake, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 7 (1996)

<sup>9</sup> See Human Development Report 1999: GLOBALIZATION WITH A HUMAN FACE, U.N.D.P (1999) computed figures

<sup>10</sup> CHIDI ANSELM ODINKALU: THE AFRICAN REGIONAL SYSTEM ON HUMAN RIGHTS & THE AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A paper presented at a conference organized by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights in Nanyuki in October 2004 on the International Criminal Court and the African Court on Human Rights

Africa (COMESA Court); East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest-Africaine (UEMOA); and the Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The Court of Justice of Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA Court of Justice) may be listed here although the institutions of UMA are at present comatose. Each of these courts has at least partial oversight of human rights issues<sup>11</sup>.

13. The expression “African human rights system” has usually been used to describe the mechanisms created by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights founded in 1981, when the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unit adopted the African Charter. Chidi Odinkalu has argued that the African regional human rights system in actual fact predates the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The distinctive contribution of the African Charter to the African regional human rights system was for the first time to break through the resistance of African countries to supra-national human rights oversight, albeit through the creation of a quasi-judicial regional human rights Commission<sup>12</sup>.
14. One major problem that calls for urgent attention to the system is the multiplicity of and overlaps between regional institutions with actual or potential human rights oversight responsibilities in Africa. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights is inadequately funded. This problem of severe under funding afflicts all existing regional inter-governmental bodies. Clearly, Africa’s regional human rights system is grossly under-funded, under-resourced, poorly regarded, and consequently, ineffective. Typically, it is unable to afford effective protection at any level. These failings reflect a failure of political will at the level of the leadership, resource and skill constraints, and a failure of civic vigilance in defense of the institutions of the judicial system.
15. The search for a more effective regional human rights system must therefore begin with a shared commitment to strengthening national recourse and remedial institutions and procedures as well as establishing a culture of governmental respect for the outcomes of recourse processes. The inability of African states to guarantee effective recourse in turn

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<sup>11</sup> See Odinkalu pg 89

<sup>12</sup> See Odinkalu above

undermines its legitimacy and, consequently, the authority of its government and agencies. Herein lies the crisis of the African regional human rights system, and of the African state.

16. African lawyers have not sufficiently made use of regional courts to combat human rights violations. Kenya for example has only lodged four cases in the African Court, two of which were dismissed on grounds of non-ratification of the Protocol. Regional institutions can offer a mechanism of engagement with governments on compliance with obligations under the African Charter and Protocol on the African Court. The political value of African condemnation of African misconduct cannot be overstated. Whilst the condemnation of other States from the North can be disregarded as being racist, it would be difficult to ignore that of fellow African States.

## Implications of the global security agenda on human rights enforcement in Africa

### *The Cold War*

17. The Cold War provided a convenient excuse for many of Africa's conflicts though it would seem that African rulers do not seem to need any such excuse<sup>13</sup>. Some of Africa's rulers became embroiled in the Cold War game plan apparently unable to appreciate that save for the evident bluffs such as the Cuban Missile crisis; the main protagonists never considered engaging each other in direct armed conflict.
18. Yet Africans became victims of supposed ideological wars<sup>14</sup>. The irony was such that the warring factions in Angola oblivious of the catastrophic impact of the conflict continued with hostilities even as Russia by the 1990s became a member of the G-7. In neighbouring Zaire, Mobutu's role as a supposed bulwark against communism became a license to oppress, brutalize and impoverish his people in a way that had few parallels, just as the Belgian colonizers had done before him.

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<sup>13</sup> Ethiopia and Eritrea were until recently enmeshed in what was widely described as one of the most senseless wars in history. Indeed, Africa managed to create its own "World War" in the former Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo.

<sup>14</sup> See BASIL DAVIDSON, *THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN: AFRICA AND THE CURSE OF THE NATION STATE* at pg 253 (1992)

*The scourge of incessant wars*

19. The British Department of Defense and the Commonwealth Foreign Office have argued that armed conflicts have become something that ordinary Africans must learn to live with<sup>15</sup>. In his report to the UN Security Council in 1998, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan observed that since 1970, more than 30 wars had been fought in Africa, the vast majority of them being civil in origin. In 1996 he stated, 14 African countries were afflicted by wars which accounted for over half of all war related deaths worldwide and giving rise to more than 8 million refugees and internally displaced persons<sup>16</sup>.
20. All these wars emerged from a clear pattern of a leadership designed to secure the narrow interests of Africa's ruling elites who continue to exhibit a contemptuous disregard for the basic needs and interests of their countrymen. Cote d'Ivoire long regarded as the ideal African model has descended into anarchy due to in no small measure, decades of tribal marginalization. The black super power of Africa, Nigeria, for the time being appears united probably because its plundering ruling elite has a common interest in its oil resources. Even here in Kenya, stability cannot be taken for granted with past rulers excluded from the current plunder of state resources determined to exploit and accentuate ethnic differences to their own ends.

*The curse of Kleptocratic Rule*

21. Mobutu Sese Seko remains the eternal embodiment of "rule by theft" on the continent. But Mobutu was not alone and so many other African leaders have in the same fashion secreted the contents of their country's treasuries to bank accounts abroad which insidious ethos has seeped into all levels of government.
22. President Teodoro Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea has gone several steps further. He admitted on international television that the new found oil wealth of his country was a state secret the proceeds of which were kept in his private bank account in Washington<sup>17</sup>. The only beneficiaries so far remain his immediate family shamelessly exhibiting expen-

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<sup>15</sup> DFID, THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

<sup>16</sup> Report of the Secretary General, UN. SCOR, 52<sup>nd</sup> Session, UN Doc. A/52/871-S/1998/318 (1998)

<sup>17</sup> See Lindsay Hilsum, OIL AT ANY COST? Channel 4 News Broadcast available at <http://www.channel4.com/news/2003/11week-3/18-guinea.html>

sive cars while the only hospital in the capital city of Malabo is overwhelmed by victims of malnutrition. The State Radio even broadcast a message that the President could decide to kill anyone without being called to account because it is God himself, with who he remains in permanent contact, who gives him his strength<sup>18</sup>.

*The charade of "democratic" governance*

23. The multitude of democratic openings that began in Zambia and Malawi in the early 1990s before spreading to the rest of the continent marked the start of the second liberation of sub Saharan Africa after the initial struggle for independence.
24. Despite the catechism of madness that overtook a number of African countries in the last half of the twentieth century, good news about democracy around the continent can still be found. South Africans recently celebrated the tenth anniversary of their post apartheid democracy- a democracy that still holds together despite a myriad of titanic challenges. Over a dozen African countries have held peaceful elections in the past three years, in spite of certain misgivings, mainly the entrenchment of powerful and dominant ruling parties. Only in Kenya did the opposition manage to dislodge a previously dominant ruling party<sup>19</sup>.
25. Some of the continent's longest running conflicts are coming to an end. Still, the grand hopes that energized some of democracy's most ardent optimists in Africa in the heady peak years of the second liberation have not been realized. Dozens of African countries have seen once promising democratic openings deliver only weak pluralism at best and at worst, destructive civil conflict. Behind these signs of trouble, a diverse set of factors have coalesced to blunt democracy's advance with no one of the factors being determinative in and of itself; but when combined, they serve to present a daunting new context:

The authoritarian rebound

26. The persistence and rejuvenation of authoritarian forces and structures in many African countries has been a huge factor in inhibiting democratization in some countries that appeared for a while to be experiencing demo-

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<sup>18</sup> Broadcast on BBC News July 26<sup>th</sup> 2003

<sup>19</sup> See ANTHONY KURIA: DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA BY TACKLING DEMOCRATIC DEFICITS, A proposal by the Africa Democracy Forum April 2005.

- cratic openings. Authoritarian forces were able to lie low and become dormant during the initial stage of political change as dictatorial regimes fell. The apparent democratic transitions often turned out to be relatively shallow, despite their grand early moments and the high hopes they spawned.
27. After dramatic first time elections were held, new constitutions written, civil society unleashed and government reforms announced; the process of change in many cases did not penetrate the resilient adaptable institutions behind the day to day screen of pluralistic politics - institutions that often harboured authoritarian mindsets, legacies and actors such as domestic security services, militaries and crony dominated State owned businesses.
  28. In many cases, non democratic forces have been able to reassert themselves taking advantage of the often fractious character of fledgling democratic governments. Nascent democracies in Africa have thus ended up producing difficult economic and social conditions upon the average citizen. The end result is that this has made it easy for the resurgence of authoritarian forces, as citizens become susceptible to the argument that only a strong hand can set back daily life on track.
  29. Although sub-Saharan Africa generally has made substantial progress toward greater political pluralism and openness in the past 15 years, a discouraging number of countries continue to suffer persistent authoritarian rule while in other countries, authoritarian rule has returned after what looked like an encouraging political opening. In many other countries, authoritarian leaders or parties that may have learnt to say a few of the right things about democracy in the early 1990s have reverted fully to type

#### The problem of democratic performance

30. For the countries which have managed to go from initial democratic openings to the establishment of reasonably open pluralistic systems, they are facing a different challenge to the consolidation of democracy; they are not succeeding in providing better lives for their citizens socially or economically.
31. The economic reform measures that many new democracies adopted though helping to reduce government spending and stabilize currencies, often produced tepid growth. Citizens of these countries face higher prices for basic goods, an increased threat of unemployment coupled

with stagnant incomes. Further, they are beset with heightened social problems, especially rising crime and a breakdown of the traditional social safety net.

32. This problem of democratic performance has been debilitating to struggling democracies. Democracy may not on its own provide answers to economic and social problems, yet this is what citizens expect. The poor performance has over time made citizens become seriously disenchanted with their governments. This disillusionment has quickly turned into a larger loss of belief in democracy itself and in some aggravated cases, into instability and political conflict.
33. The democratic crisis in Africa is discouraging precisely because it highlights that democracy can corrode in so many different ways. The problem of democratic performance-rooted in weak state institutions, entrenched corrupted political elites and poor systems of political representation and accountability is wreaking havoc across much of Africa. Well over a decade since the second liberation in Africa, many African citizens do not feel that greater political freedom and choice have improved their lives at all, especially in terms of economic well being and personal security.
34. Given the high expectations for what the end of dictatorial regimes would bring, frustration over poor democratic performance has turned into bitterness and the result is a rising tide of cynicism, anger and hostile actions.

#### Doing well under dictators

35. The sense that quite a few authoritarian countries have been doing well economically in recent years has given life to the old idea that dictatorship is better than democracy at producing socioeconomic development. It was a convenient excuse by diplomats for supporting friendly tyrants who were useful on security issues while ruling elites found it a handy justification for their repressive grip on power
36. The end of the Cold War in the 1990s saw a new thinking where democracy and economic development went hand in hand in international development circles. Be that as it may, China's extra ordinary economic success has presented a serious problem for those arguing that democracy is necessary for development or that dictatorial regimes cannot produce sustained economic development. In the current context where



many African citizens are dissatisfied with the socioeconomic performance of their new democratic regimes, China's continued very rapid growth and its increasing economic muscle on the world stage have made it an increasingly powerful example.

#### The war on terrorism

37. Today's international context on the United States war on terrorism has been an extremely complicating element for democracy. In as much as the ouster of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and that of Saddam Hussein in Iraq have opened the possibility of establishing stable, peaceful and democratic rule in those countries, many of the elements on this war on terrorism have hurt democracy's cause.
38. The US government's need for closer counter terrorism cooperation with governments in many parts of the world has led to its warm relations with various autocratic regimes and seen her go easy on the democratic backsliding of others. This war on terrorism has hurt America's status as a model of democracy and weakened her credibility as a pro democracy actor. Mirroring American efforts to balance heightened law enforcement concerns with domestic political and civil rights, is the push by several African governments to use the anti terrorism banner as an excuse to crack down on political opponents.
39. There has been the Western view that democratic change is the necessary tool to combat Islamic fundamentalism. In fact, ruling elites for instance in most north African countries hold a totally different view; that democracy in the Arab countries of north Africa would most likely unleash radical forces that could be harmful both to the region and to the west. Despite the rhetoric coming from the White House, in practice, most U.S and Western policy makers doubt whether opening up Arab political systems to popular choice would actually serve their economic and security interests. It is feared that dangerous instability would result and nowhere is the gap more manifest between the soaring rhetoric about freedom and the reality of western policy.

#### **Bad governance and grand corruption as the agents of insecurity in Africa**

40. The deepest root cause of development failure and insecurity in Africa has been a lack of good governance as some of the foregoing episodes

demonstrate. Africa has failed to realize its potential in the past half century through yawning deficits of good governance<sup>20</sup>. Corruption and bad governance are doing ever greater damage to African economies by sucking out resources meant for health, education and clean water. Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds intended for development therefore undermining a government's ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice and discouraging foreign investment and aid.

41. Corruption is a serious human rights violation and it seriously undermines the effective protection and promotion of human rights. Corruption causes massive violations of fundamental human rights—roads are not built because corrupt engineers took bribes, bridges and buildings collapse because corrupt officials did not enforce construction codes, the terrorist threat is augmented because immigration officials took bribes to issue passports or looked the other way at border points, the citizens are insecure and paralyzed by fear because the police fail to enforce the law and there is little difference between the police and organized crime. Criminal activity becomes a way of life and insecurity is expected as a matter of course.
42. In a nutshell, corruption constitutes an egregious violation of human rights by:
  - i) Preventing the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights as well as political and civil rights by sucking out public resources into private hands
  - ii) Perpetuating discrimination against the poorest class of society<sup>21</sup>
43. Grand corruption, the looting of state treasuries and the appropriation of public resources to private use have been responsible for the difficult social economic conditions many Africans are living in today. From Nigeria to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia to Sierra Leone or Sudan to Angola, corrupt exploitative governance has bred violent conflict because ordinary people are exploited and desperate. Ruling elites have mobilized this frustration into violence for their own ends and the

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<sup>20</sup> See PROF. LARRY DIAMOND: BUILDING A SYSTEM OF COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNTABILITY TO CONTROL CORRUPTION, an article published for the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University August 2005

<sup>21</sup> For a more authoritative reading, see NGUZU ZA HAKI, a publication of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights on the subject of corruption as a human rights issue.

ethnic violence and nationalist bloodletting that has flowed there from is contributing to make Africa more insecure than it has ever been.

44. The police, the civil service and other institutions function poorly and corruptly thus exacerbating an already grave situation. The rule of law does not exist to punish errant public officials. Salaries are meagre because corruption is expected and there is no sense of public purpose and discipline within the public service. Corruption is rife at the bottom of the government system because that is the climate set at the top and because government workers cannot live on the salaries they are paid.
45. The police do not enforce the law, judges do not decide the law and customs officials do not inspect goods. At the extreme, bad governance and its attendant social ills breed political violence, development failure and ultimately state collapse. To the extent that many African countries mirror this model, the risk for catastrophe is real. In such a scenario, there can only be one end result, total insecurity. The state is nothing more than a criminal racket.
46. Robber barons take advantage of the lack of law enforcement to traffic drugs and arms. There are no checks against money laundering activities from the proceeds of drugs, arms or human trafficking. It is easy for terrorist activity to take root because immigration officials are easily compromised and financing terrorism takes root for lack of regulation of the money markets.

### Is there a Panacea?

47. Clearly, no single solution exists for such a complex problem. Africa may be disempowered as a continent and millions of citizens left helpless to the whims of rulers so contemptuous to our basic needs and totally insensitive to our suffering. Eventually, a solution to the African problem will have to come from Africa.
48. The means can only be through taking our own destiny into our own hands through holding our leaders accountable to us. The crucial elements to reign in the scourge of Grand Corruption will be:
  - i) The Law: Beyond the narrow sector of laws against bribery, fraud, embezzlement and other violations of public trust an effective rule of law requires equal applicability to all, to both the mighty and the meek ensuring that everyone, no matter their status in society,

is answerable for the consequences of their conduct. A genuine rule of law system must be anchored on an independent and impartial judiciary.

- ii) Access to information: Malfeasance thrives in secrecy and obscurity. The more that government operations are transparent, visible and open to scrutiny, the easier it is to expose, deter and contain corruption. Citizens must therefore have the right to request and receive information on the functions and decisions of government
- iii) Wealth Declaration: There is need for the public scrutiny of the assets declarations of senior public officials to look for signs of malfeasance in a manner that poses a real threat of detection
- iv) Ombudsman Office: Going by whatever name, this office is important in receiving and investigating complaints of abuse of office and as a supplementary channel of public access to remedial governmental authority when power is abused
- v) Public audits of government finance. Independent systematic audits of major government agencies are essential to curb wrongdoing. This should be complemented by parliamentary oversight committees which can monitor and legislate on particular areas of government policy
- vi) Economic regulatory institutions: When corruption is endemic, it inevitably involves the banking system and other private areas of the economy. Corrupt bankers launder illegally acquired proceeds, equally corrupt lawyers set up dummy companies to cipher off state funds while rotten accountants collect bribes. Proper regulation will ensure the carrying on of commerce free of the corrupt links between government power and business
- vii) Electoral process: There must be a process that ensures competitive, free, fair and meaningful elections. The overriding imperative is that electoral administration should not be subject to direction or manipulation by the incumbent officials or the ruling party
- viii) An Independent Media: A free and independent media constitutes a crucial plank of accountability. Controlling corruption requires a press that cannot be intimidated. Diversity and market competition are thus key to ensure a plurality of sources of information
- ix) Civil Society: Civil society has fomented change in many countries by acting as an alternative voice for channeling public opinion through monitoring the conduct of government and to press for institutional

- reforms to promote transparency and hence curb corruption
- x) International Community: As we have seen, many policies of the international community towards Africa have contributed to the problem of corruption. African robber barons unlike their Asian counterparts prefer to take their booty to Europe, far away from prying African eyes. It is impossible to combat Grand corruption without unmasking the complex network of the international crooks involved
  - xi) A vigilant citizenry: Is by far the most potent weapon as the last line of defense, especially when they are well informed and politically aware. Coupled with “whistle blowing” in the lower levels of government hierarchy, a vigilant citizenry can be the much sang refrain of “An African solution to an African problem”.

# An African feminist perspective on security and early warning mechanisms: IGAD<sup>1</sup>

*Anita Kiamba and Attiya Waris\**

“But the real and lasting victories are those of peace, and not of war.”

Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Worship*

## Introduction

The Horn of Africa<sup>2</sup> has been characterized by perennial conflicts of all forms which include inter and intra state conflicts. There have been conflicts between Eritrea and Ethiopia, between Ethiopia and Kenya and even within Somalia to name but a few. Porous borders and communities split by the same border result in easy internationalization of conflicts. Consequently, security has become an issue that has required, and continues to require, the concerted efforts of all the states found in this region.

Conflicts and threats to security have direct results, in, the occurrence of massive human rights violations in Africa, and, there have been attempts to develop mechanisms to deal with conflict in Africa.<sup>3</sup> Africa’s history in the protection and preservation of human rights lends further importance and urgency to the development of these mechanisms. Human rights abuses are widespread, far reaching and affect every level and type of person. Human rights scholars test the quality of a democracy by the protection provided for each individual citizen and for vulnerable and disadvantaged groups notably: ethnic minorities, the disa-

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<sup>1</sup> The title of the conference that took place in Nairobi between the 22nd and 24th of February 2006 was Rethinking Global Security: An African Perspective. There was unfortunately no presentation on gender and global security and this paper is intended to fill in the perceived gap that has arisen as a result of this discourse.

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<sup>2</sup> The Horn of Africa region is found in Eastern Africa, although not part of the political definition of East Africa (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania). It includes Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti and the Sudan.

<sup>3</sup> See African Union, Declaration on the Establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevent, Management and Resolution, AHG/DECL. 3 (XXIX), available at [www.African-union.org](http://www.African-union.org). The Central Organ of this Mechanism was included as an organ of the AU at the 37th OAU Assembly in 2001. According to article 22 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of Peace and Security Council of Africa, available at [www.African-union.org](http://www.African-union.org), this Council will replace the earlier mechanism.

bled, women and children. Among other regional treaties, section 10 of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) declaration has undertaken to do more to advance the cause of human rights in Africa generally and, specifically, to end the moral shame exemplified by the plight of women, children, and the disabled and ethnic minorities in conflict situations in Africa.<sup>4</sup>

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has launched an early warning mechanism for conflict prevention that is gender sensitive. This mechanism is based on the clear and differing roles of men and women in society and how they react and interact in cases of conflict. Thus, it uses the inherently discriminatory mechanism of gender disparity to develop a conflict management mechanism. It is this paradox that will be the ambit of the discussion of this paper on gender discrimination and the method being used to analyse conflicts in the developing world with specific reference to the Horn of Africa. The challenge of this paper is to deal with the evolving relations between males and females in the Horn of Africa; encourage change in societal attitudes on gender issues and help track, and hopefully prevent conflicts while trying to ensure that the paradigm of gender imbalance continues to be useful for the analysis of conflict management.

At the conceptual level four concepts are crucial for the understanding of this paper, namely: *gender*, *security*, *conflict prevention* and *early warning mechanisms*.

First, *gender* is often assumed to include only women yet this is not the definition of *gender* as a concept. The use of the term *gender* in this paper will refer to women in conflict situations and women engaged in early warning mechanisms. *Gender* is not only about individual identity or what a society teaches us about what a man or woman, boy or girl should be like. *Gender* is also a way of structuring relations of power - whether within families (where the man is often considered the head of the household) or in societies where men tend to be the ones in whose hands political, economic, religious and other forms of power is concentrated.<sup>5</sup>

Secondly, *security* is dynamic and now no longer looks merely at threats of conflict. Other forms of security include food security and economic security, among others. In this paper security will be looked at from the perspective of '*conflict prevention*'. Nevertheless, conflicts or the potential conflicts still affect wider aspects of a woman's security as it also affects her family's security and survival. This paper will thus look at the ongoing dimensions and interrelation-

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<sup>4</sup> See New Partnership for Africa's Dev., Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex I, available at [www.nepad.org](http://www.nepad.org). Section 10.

<sup>5</sup> Kameri-Mbote P., 'Gender, Conflict and Regional Security' International Law Research Centre, Geneva.

ship between gender and security with reference to the continuously evolving and fluid meanings of the term 'security' and will thus look at the diverse possible dimensions of security that women are affected by, and women affect.<sup>6</sup>

Thirdly, a concept that is pertinent for the understanding of the linkage between gender, security and conflict early warning mechanisms is '*conflict prevention*'. Conflict prevention can be defined as those actions and policies which seek to prevent the emergence of violent conflict, and the identification of non-violent means of resolving conflict. This can be through stopping on-going conflict from spreading and deterring the re-emergence of violence. It requires a variety of approaches including measures aimed at building mutual confidence, reducing perceptions of threat, eliminating the risk of surprise attacks, discouraging competitive arms accumulation and creating an enabling environment for agreements on arms limitations and reduction, as well as on military expenditures.<sup>7</sup>

Fourthly, '*early warning*' is a conflict prevention strategy which is based on information which has been collected and analyzed to predict future actions. Early warning was first used during the 1980's to predict natural disasters and stock market crashes. Its main aim was to predict famine and potential refugee flows. It was, thereafter, adopted by relief agencies to alert and improve preparedness in providing essential services like food, water, shelter and medication. In the 1990's as a result of the increased outbreak of conflict not only in Africa alone, but in Europe as well, conflict analysts began focussing on early warning mechanisms and mechanisms to anticipate violent conflict.<sup>8</sup>

There are diverse and often conflicting theories on international relations, peace and conflict, security, strategic studies, feminism in the Third World. Traditional understanding of conflict theories are being overturned as globalisation sets in. International Relations scholars and peace researchers have had to come to terms with the global paradigm shift over how security, peace, conflict and politics are viewed in the post-Cold War era. This paper will make references to cases where the broadened conceptualization of global security is more favourable for women, assessing the unique role that women play or can play in the context of global security.

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<sup>6</sup> See generally Dr Heidi Hudson, 'A Feminist Reading of Security in Africa', Institute for Security Studies Published in Monograph No 20, Caring Security in Africa, February 1998.

<sup>7</sup> United Nations 'Women, Peace and Security' Study submitted by the United Nations Secretary General to the Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) United Nations 2002.p.72.

<sup>8</sup> Sara Rakita 'Note: EARLY WARNING AS A TOOL OF CONFLICT PREVENTION' New York University Journal of International Law and Politics United Nations Issue, 30 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 539.



## Contextualising security and feminism theories

Women are frequently portrayed as more peaceful than men due to their gender roles, despite notable women combatants or violent women leaders. Women should be included in peace building measures by virtue of their socially constructed and/or biologically given gender roles. While most men come to the negotiating table directly from the war room and battlefield, women usually arrive straight out of civil activism and family care. In this construction, men are projected as predisposed to violence and women to peace.

Despite the arguments on whether women are victims or perpetrators of conflicts, theories branch in different directions and reflect on different elements based on the background of the concerned theorist. Discussion here will centre around security theories, feminism and peace research.

### *Security theories*

From the seventies onwards, the effects of the so-called 'security dilemma' have been increasingly questioned. Unilateral military action was no longer adequate to protect a state and its people. Global interdependencies in the technological age and common problems which transcend national borders made the notion of 'common security' imperative. It completely ignored non-military sources of insecurity. Secondly, a military definition of security confined the debate to the realms of the developed (Western) world and negated the consequences for the majority of the world's population: those living in the developing world.<sup>9</sup>

Booth recommends a redefinition of security in terms of broadening the concept both horizontally and vertically. On the horizontal axis, security is seen as dependent on political democracy and a culture of human rights; social and economic development; environmental sustainability, as well as military stability.<sup>10</sup>

Human security defined as the absence of harm or threat to human life becomes a prerequisite for a condition of 'positive' peace, which is not only the absence of war (the so-called 'negative' peace), but also the existence of social justice. Such definitions, however, are far from unproblematic.

Though recognising the difficulties inherent in the notion of 'positive' peace, women in the peace movement, as well as feminists have linked this concept

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<sup>9</sup> H Solomon & J Cilliers, *People, Poverty and Peace*, in H Solomon & J Cilliers (eds.), *People, Poverty and Peace: Human Security in Southern Africa*, ISS Monograph Series, 4, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, May 1996, pp. 5-6.

<sup>10</sup> B S Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 34.

with their understanding of peace and have insisted that security can no longer be measured in terms of the absence of war. In this respect, the *Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women* (1985) stated that;

[p]eace includes not only the absence of war, violence and hostilities at the national and international levels but also the enjoyment of economic and social justice, equality and the entire range of human rights and fundamental freedoms within society.<sup>11</sup>

This definition highlights key areas, such as structural violence and the linkage of violence at the personal and international level; economic and gender inequality; the denial of basic rights and freedoms; and the deliberate exploitation of large sectors of the population.<sup>12</sup> Despite the growing acceptance of a more ambitious security agenda, the formal and consistent inclusion of gender relations on the agenda remains as elusive as ever. More often than not gender is mentioned only as a by-product of the inclusion of economic and development issues, e.g. when referring to the plight of African women in agriculture. In the light of such ad hoc references to women's 'place' in the global order, the need for a truly inclusive re-examination of security becomes imperative.

### *Feminist theories*

Feminist scholarship on war, building on a long tradition, has grown rapidly since the late 1980s. As in other fields, feminist research often tries to bring out the role of gender, and of women, in social relationships and war. Strands of feminist theory "The feminist theory" of war does not exist. Rather, a number of feminist arguments provide sometimes contradictory explanations and prescriptions.

Most feminist approaches share a belief that gender matters in understanding war. They also share a concern with changing "masculinism" in both scholarship and political-military practice, where masculinism is defined as an ideology justifying male domination. They see women as a disadvantaged class, unjustly dominated and exploited by men. Beyond these points of agreement, different feminist schools diverge.

Various authors describe feminist theories in terms of three perspectives or schools of thought. They explain gendered war roles in different ways. First, in liberal feminism there is sexist discrimination – women can be capable warriors.

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<sup>11</sup> United Nations, *Women: Challenges to the Year 2000*, United Nations, New York, 1991, p. 66.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

Secondly, in difference feminism there are deep-rooted and partly biological gender differences. Finally, in post-modern feminism there are arbitrary cultural constructions favouring those men who are in power.

Feminist<sup>13</sup> theories of security then, contribute new perspectives on the nexus of the security of the person and structures of violence at the local, national and global level, as well as state complicity in these forms of violence where the state is unwilling or unable to extend protection.<sup>14</sup> These studies have both informed and drawn upon nascent transnational and regional women's movements promoting gender equality within international institutions and regimes. These efforts have been recognized under a rubric of international laws, conventions and multi-national and bilateral forums relating to international security<sup>15</sup>, the most central of which is Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000 on Women, Peace and Security.

### *Feminism theory and Security/ Feminising Security*

Within the emerging body of feminist and/or gender studies, literatures and policies on women, peace and security, at least three themes emerge. Under the first theme, the impact of armed conflict on women, gender relations and gender roles are highlighted. Gender studies differentiate forms of harm encountered by men, women, boys and girls throughout cycles of violent conflict. Studies also examine how violent conflict disrupts family units, with wider implications for gender relations. For instance, women and girls are sometimes forced to take on untraditional gender roles in the public sphere – leading to opportunities for empowerment. For men, limited economic opportunities tend to prohibit their ability to fulfil expected roles as 'producer', and they may be more inclined to participate in violent conflict as combatants, or be forced to against their will.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> H Sol.

<sup>13</sup> Feminism is employed in this paper from a liberal perspective that is, seeking gender equality and equity to men within various social, economic and political institutions and life. I recognize there are different streams of feminist theory and action that would approach this topic in different ways, with different conclusions. However, because the primary impetus of the *Freedom from Fear Agenda* is overwhelmingly liberal, I confine the analysis to this particular perspective. Critical analyses from a feminist post-modern, Marxist or post-colonial perspectives would be welcome points of furthering the debate presented here.

<sup>14</sup> This review is not intended to be comprehensive, and acknowledges that it is missing critical theories in the discipline of international relations on the social construction of the state, conflict and military by feminist thinkers such as (Sylvester 1994; Pettman 1996; Tickner 1997; Sylvester 1998). Perhaps one of the richest theoretical contributions of feminists in redefining security from the personal to the political is on the topic of rape during violent conflict.

<sup>15</sup> A/CONF.177/20 1995; A/52/3 1997; A/S-23/10/Rev.1 2000; S/2000/693 2000; S/RED/1325 2000.

<sup>16</sup> *Gendering War Talk* (Miriam Cooke & Angela Woollacott eds., 1993); Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, *The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis* 275-307 (2000).

A number of studies have also begun to examine how gender relations shape or contribute to violent conflict.<sup>17</sup> These studies reveal how gender, ethnicity and sexuality are manipulated and exasperated in conflict-prone settings, resulting in gender-related forms of insecurity for men and women. It is argued that violent conflict is significantly more likely to take place in countries that have a large number of male youth with few economic opportunities and/or marriage prospects.<sup>18</sup> In these instances, such groups of male youth are more likely to be targeted and recruited into ultra-nationalist campaigns. Girls and women on the other hand, are often the target of strict gender codes regarding marriage, morality and sexuality.<sup>19</sup>

A second theme concentrates on the ways in which international humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations widen or diminish unequal gender relations within a given population.<sup>20</sup> Gender-neutral assistance practices or development initiatives potentially fail to grasp security concerns of women. In *Refugee Women*, Susan Forbes Martin<sup>21</sup> illustrated security concerns in refugee and internally displaced camps documenting a wide variety of cases where health, shelter, food and water distribution or camp set-up increased women's vulnerability to sexual predators.

While diverse and wide ranging, feminist literatures rests on the central idea that gender equality facilitates, or is essential to realizing, sustainable peace: "Only if women play a full and equal part can we build the foundations for enduring peace".<sup>22</sup> This idea is reiterated in Security Council Resolution 1325. The idea that peace and gender equality are interdependent variables, however, reveals a number of powerful assumptions in need of closer, more critical analysis, explored below.

Gender can therefore be said to describe the male and female constructions surrounding the society. It informs the society of the roles to be played by the sexes, these roles and norms usually point out at the physical differences of course based at the roles performed in society. What emerges because of these social

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<sup>17</sup> ACORD 2002; Schmeidl and ES., Piza-Lopez 2002; Baines 2003) E., Gender and CEWARN: A Framework for Action International Alert and Swiss Peace Foundation June 2002.

<sup>18</sup> A Feminist Reading of Security in Africa Dr Heidi Hudson Department of Political Science, University of the Orange Free State and Der Boer 2002 Research Associate, Institute for Security Studies Published in Monograph No 20, 'Caring Security in Africa, February 1998.

<sup>19</sup> Baines 2003.

<sup>20</sup> IASC 1999; Mertus 2000; Clifton and Gell 2001.

<sup>21</sup> 1992.

<sup>22</sup> Kofi Annan, in UN, Whitworth et al. 2002

constructs of behaviour, roles and relationships, is that women usually have less capacity and opportunities to participate in the political life of their individual countries. As a result their security remains compromised.<sup>23</sup>

At a global level, Charlie Carpenter (2003) suggests that while international humanitarian norms and laws might in principle protect men and women equally, in practice they are highly gendered. Thus, in calls for humanitarian evacuations, policy leaders often point to the number of female or child victims as a way of justifying intervention despite the fact men are more likely targets of violence in armed conflict. She thus challenges the idea that women and children are more vulnerable in armed conflict - a position often repeated in feminist literatures and advocacy campaigns. Such a construction only plays into stereotypes of men as aggressive and women as innocent, and do not lead to understanding the gender dynamics of armed conflict, and therefore also to inappropriate interventions. Carpenter refers to the sex-selective massacre of 7,000-8,000 Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica under the orders of General Mladic, who at the same time sought to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the international community by providing transport of women and girls to safety. The UN peacekeeping forces abetted this process, helping Mladic's troops separate men and women, boys and girls in the process of evacuation on the understanding that men were more likely armed combatants to be 'interviewed' by the Bosnian-Serb army.<sup>24</sup>

A second, interconnected assumption is that women best represent other women, and so a gender-sensitive approach will be more likely adopted in peace agreements if women are present at peace tables. By linking the prospects for peace to sustainable social change, gender proponents move beyond a moral normative argument (about fairness and equality) to one of practicality. That is, by including a gender equality approach, a peace building (or human security) initiative will be more efficient and effective. A third, seemingly contradictory assumption represents women as both passive 'victims' and active 'subjects', stemming from the focus on the impact of armed conflict on women, and roles women play as potential peace-builders or, presumably less often, perpetrators. When

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<sup>23</sup> Caucasus Women's League 'Regional Consultation of the United Nations Security Council' Resolution 1325, Sochi. March 2002.

<sup>24</sup> Evidence suggests otherwise, that most soldiers had already left Srebrenica prior to its fall, and the majority of men who remained were non-combatants (Rohde 1997). While the Responsibility to Protect report sought to clarify a clouded debate on intervention in sovereign states, one wonders when and if states might intervene in a country considered to exercise extreme prejudice and oppression against women. What did the international community learn from the exposure and recognition of mass rape during the Bosnian war? While mass rapes in Kosovo were in the media to justify military intervention to the public, was this part of the equation for deciding if NATO should drop bombs? Is this even the most effective way to stop sexual violence?

speaking of women as victims, there tends to be focus on the most vulnerable groups of women (female heads of household or survivors of rape in volatile settings), a representation that reifies the idea that in conflict, men are perpetrators and women are victims.

Our concern is that those seeking to engage women in decision-making or peace building may fail to understand the complex web of constantly changing social dynamics both within specific conflicts, and within different enclaves of a conflict or post-conflict setting. In failing to do so, inequalities based on gender might be addressed, but class, region or ethnic differences might potentially be exacerbated. While such a criticism is not new, most feminist studies of conflict and peace have remained a “solid feminist description of women’s troubles’, and failing to explain gender as a relational power construct, practice or outcome”.<sup>25</sup>

A number of interests guide these assumptions and representations within feminist approaches to women, peace and security. For one, the feminist normative claims naturally focus analyses and strategies for intervention on women. In focusing on women’s experiences, needs and resources, women become more visible in an otherwise male dominated realm - and so this is a keen strategy for advocates to promote. Such representations also make international policy interventions more ‘manageable’ and ‘justifiable’ for international actors working in otherwise highly political contexts and ethically challenging operations. Defined by their victim-hood or as solely gendered, women are cast as a political, a historical and in need of rescue or international support. When donors cast women as natural peacemakers, as apolitical or antinationalistic, “they also risk reinforcing patriarchal values, trapping women into domestic roles and excluding them from formal political activities”.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, they fail to identify or challenge power relations between women.

### *Peace Research*

The study uses as its framework, the peace research paradigm. Peace researchers posit that structures in society lead to conflict. These structures shape the relationships of individuals. In conflicts, the female gender is usually the hardest hit. Gender and security therefore remains of prime importance to conflict analysts and practitioners as well as the states experiencing conflicts.

This case is embedded in relationships, which are often lacking in unequal rights leading to injustices. As a result, the way individuals relate to each other is flawed

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<sup>25</sup> Carpenter 2002, 160; For a policy example see CIDA ND.

<sup>26</sup> Helms 2002, 16

and therefore conflictual in itself. Due to structural flaws structural violence emerges as a result of changing or revolting against the structures. In most cases, due to the extremely violent nature of structural conflict, peace researchers believe in the need to promote values in society. Some of these values include, the promotion of human rights, coexistence, peace and justice. Once these are introduced and inculcated in society, the root causes of conflict could be arrested and conflict prevented.

There are two approaches through which conflict may be prevented:<sup>27</sup> First, there is the operational approach which is also known as direct conflict prevention. This type of conflict prevention uses mediators to influence the parties in a conflict towards peaceful resolution. It usually adopts the partiality of politically and socially influential personalities to mediate in the conflict. It may use presiding or former presidents, e.g. former President Moi of Kenya was a mediator in the Sudan peace process, and so was former president of South Africa. Mediators could also be religious leaders. Operational prevention refers to short term, targeted mechanisms to contain or reverse the escalation of conflict.<sup>28</sup> Secondly, there is structural prevention. This type of prevention aims at perverting the manifestation of the root causes of conflict. This means that the inequalities experienced in society are remedied and that there is promotion of human rights and human needs such as dignity, belonging, and identity.<sup>29</sup> Structural prevention in brief encompasses the long term steps that reduce the potential for violence, addressing human rights, justice, good governance, development and human security.<sup>30</sup>

In conclusion, effective conflict prevention measures require coordination and collaboration between the various entities. The participation of all segments and sectors of society is required as well.<sup>31</sup> Conflict prevention policies and strategies should be directed at elimination or reversing the effects of the factors that cause violence and destructive conflict.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> 'Reports of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing deadly Conflict' available at <http://www.carnegie.org/sub/research/>.

<sup>28</sup> Shoemakers J., (ed.) *Inclusive Security: Women waging Peace-Conflict Prevention and Transformation Women's Vital Contributions* UN Foundation Conference Report, Washington February 23, 2005. p.13.

<sup>29</sup> Anderlini S., Stanski V., *Conflict Prevention, resolution and Reconstruction: Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Tool Kit for Advocacy and Action*.

<sup>30</sup> Shoemaker J., (ed.) *Inclusive Security: Women waging Peace-Conflict Prevention and Transformation Women's Vital Contributions* UN Foundation op cit., p.13.

<sup>31</sup> Anderlini S., Stanski V., *Conflict Prevention, resolution and Reconstruction: Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Tool Kit for Advocacy and Action*

<sup>32</sup> Sikoska T., Solomon J., *Introducing Gender in Conflict and Conflict Prevention: Conceptual and Policy Implications* Paper presented at the United Nations Organisation/Norman Patterson School of International Relations Workshop 'From Rhetoric to Policy: Towards Workable Conflict Prevention at Regional and Global Levels' Santo Domingo, 14-16 Dec. 1999.p.4.

## Conflict early warning mechanisms

Most states in the Horn of Africa region have to wield a number of component traditional ethnic nations into new and modern states and have faced and continue to face resistance from them in their efforts towards merging the nations into a state.<sup>33</sup> These states are characterized by a population that is divided between those who want to retain the traditional structures, those who want modernized structures based on western norms and indicators of modernity and yet others who seek a combination of the best of the west and traditional systems.<sup>34</sup> As a result, the Horn of Africa has over the years since independence experienced calls for secession and irredentist tendencies. Countries like Somalia and Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia, and Uganda and Tanzania went to war with each other in the 1960's and 1970's<sup>35</sup> as they claimed territorial integrity and sovereignty borne out of the need to claim and reclaim land that was identified as belonging to particular communities found along the borders. According to Chweya<sup>36</sup> the IGAD sub-region has experienced notable cases of secession. These are, Eritrea's eventual breakaway from Ethiopia, and Somaliland's apparent autonomy from Somalia.

Conflict in the region has been further complicated by the porous and volatile border areas. This has resulted in the almost unchecked flow of small arms and light weapons, slavery and refugees and narcotics. Indeed the region has several spots of conflict which have escalated due to the porosity of the borders.<sup>37</sup> In Northern Uganda, the Lords Resistance Army has been considered as a risk in the region<sup>38</sup> because they have managed for the most part to continue to fight the Ugandan government and be elusive to the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces due to the easy movement across the border with Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

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<sup>33</sup> Zartman I., *Ripe for Resolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985)p.82

<sup>34</sup> Modern day Somalia is a case in point where the north continues in almost complete peace having an active regional government while the south has for more than a decade been torn apart with traditional clan warfare with the result that Somalia is referred to as a 'failed state'.

<sup>35</sup> See Chweya Ludeki 'Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region' and Mwangi Makumi 'African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation' (Nairobi: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2004) pp. 31-48:p. 38.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*,p.41.

<sup>37</sup> Kenya for example does not legislate the right to bear arms. However since the disintegration of Somalia where the right to bear arms existed and hence many Somalis owned arms, with the escalating conflict there, the resulting informal border crossing along Northern Kenya has resulted in the influx of small arms and the escalation of traditional tribal conflicts within Kenya as pastoralist communities changed their methods of rivalry from bows and arrows to the use of arms.

<sup>38</sup> See Ofuho Cirino 'Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa' in Mwangi Makumi 'African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation' (Nairobi: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2004) pp. 7-17: p.13.



In addition, there has traditionally been an aversion by states to allow other organs to set up and collect information on states and this is seen as an infringement of state sovereignty. While Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter encourages regional organizations to solve problems within the regional context, it makes clear that the U.N. Security Council maintains primary responsibility for international peace and security. This is not to say that the role of regional organizations should not be expanded, merely that it is not strong enough at present.<sup>39</sup>

In addition, conflict early warning mechanisms (CEWARN) have at times not been effective in preventing conflict because of the timeliness of the information relayed as well as the willingness of governments. At times the very nature of information relayed may be treated as intelligence and often is subject to reaffirmation.<sup>40</sup> Indeed, effective CEWARN is about preventing conflict and resolving it when it arises. As a result it should encompass the promotion of containment as well as the resurgence of conflict.<sup>41</sup> CEWARN is supposed to and expected to fulfil the task of providing good and timely information, thereby reducing the barriers to its accurate analysis also taking into account its dynamic aspects.<sup>42</sup>

Early warning encompasses the collection of information i.e. specific indicators to show that there is impending conflict; analysis of information i.e. attaching meaning to indicators, setting it into context, and the recognition of crisis development; formulation of the best or worst case scenarios and response options; communication to decision makers, that is those individuals and institutions that are supposed to in turn use the information to come up with prevention and resolution strategies.<sup>43</sup> IGAD claims that they will be using a system based on gender but have failed not only to explain how they intend to do this but seem to be making no efforts whatsoever to begin to create this seemingly breakthrough early warning system.

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<sup>39</sup> Paul Martin, Note, Regional Efforts at Preventive Measures: Four Case Studies on the Development of Conflict-Prevention Capabilities, 30 N.Y.U. J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 881 (1998).

<sup>40</sup> Anderlini S. What is CEWARN? UNIFEM New York Sept.2003 available at [www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/prevention/docs/ewppt](http://www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/prevention/docs/ewppt). p.4

<sup>41</sup> Anderlini S. What is CEWARN? UNIFEM New York Sept.2003 available at [www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/prevention/docs/ewppt](http://www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/prevention/docs/ewppt). p.4.

<sup>42</sup> Moolakkattu S.J. The Concept and Practice of Conflict Prevention: A Critical Reappraisal International Studies 42, 1 (2005) New Delhi.

<sup>43</sup> See Women, Peace and Security Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) United Nations 2002 p.38. See also 35 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 671 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics Spring 2003 CULTURE SHOCK: OBSTACLES TO BRINGING CONFLICT PREVENTION UNDER THE WING OF U.N. DEVELOPMENT . . . AND VICE VERSA Owen Philip Lefkon at 708-709.

Typical CEWARN signs and indicators include: first, demography i.e. the displacement and movement of people as refugees or as internally displaced persons. Secondly, economic indicators include the changes in economic performance and increasing poverty which is engendered. Thirdly, policy indicators which are acts by the government against specific groups usually based on ethnic communities but also include gender. Policy indicators are mainly based on; public opinion which in turn is based on increased intolerance and prejudice. CEWARN also uses external indicators. These include intervention by state or non state actors in the support of groups in another state. In most cases the support is be categorised as being humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, intervention by external states or non state actors has been based on legitimising regimes which have often been thought to be non-legitimate or which legitimate but are threatened by illegitimate actors, both internal and external.

### *Gender based early warning indicators*

Peace and conflict research both discuss the early warning signs, which are comprised of the risk factors indicating imminent break out of armed conflict. These could be manifested as the extreme oppression of women; the uneven distribution of power resources, and control over resources.<sup>44</sup>

The literature on early warning has divided indicators into two categories: root causes and trigger indicators. Root causes of war, focus on gender analyses of power and structures which provide insights into violent societies. Some research suggests that countries with very low percentages of women in parliament<sup>45</sup> and in the formal labour sector, or cultures that restrict women, condone violence against them or treat them as property<sup>46</sup>, are more likely to resort to armed conflict to settle disputes.

Other indicators that have been used include the female literacy rate, average level of female education, and number of children per household – all of which influence a woman's ability to participate in structures that may prevent war by engaging in other forms of conflict resolution.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Chhabra S. Gender Perspective in Peace Initiatives: opportunities and Challenges September, 2005.p.7.

<sup>45</sup> Kenya currently has 15 women in a parliamentary sitting of 210 members of Parliament.

<sup>46</sup> Kenya has ethnic groups that condone wife inheritance currently.

<sup>47</sup> Research conducted by the writers in the past concerning the Rwanda conflict brought out many instances where an educated woman while fleeing her home found herself picking a gun from a dead soldier and then with a baby on her back spent the next four years as a soldier of the Interahamwe. This is but one of many stories coming from the rehabilitation camps in Rwanda.

Other underlying causes include monetary indicators such as military budgets and changes in those budgets. Gender budget analysis looks at the allocation and distribution of resources to determine how they impact women and men differently, and has been used by women's NGOs to demonstrate the impact of increased military spending on essential services impacting women disproportionately.<sup>48</sup>

Gender is also a relevant category when examining trigger indicators – the medium-term conditions that reflect rising tension in the society. The prevalence of the following occurrences – which may only be evident to those on the ground – indicate social discord that could result in armed conflict: gender specific human rights violations such as rape, abductions, trafficking, domestic violence, sexual harassment, abuse by security forces; killings and disappearances of women; election-related violence; lack of institutional prosecution of perpetrators; increased rates of prostitution and commercial sex work due to military presence; abrupt changes in gender roles, such as the imposition of restrictive laws, rewards for aggressive behaviour and propaganda emphasizing hyper-masculinity; a rise in the number of single female-headed households; sex-specific refugee migrations; sex-specific unemployment; sale of jewellery or other precious materials; and hoarding of goods.

While manifestations of the cultural impact of war and psychosocial trauma are less easy to document, it is certainly not invisible, and can be seen by those living in close proximity to the society. For example, it is recognized that restricting public debate on increasing political tensions is a sign of impending conflict. Politically active and visible women are silenced in gender-specific ways, threats of rape and threats of injury or death to children are common yet undocumented. Inflammatory public rhetoric very often manipulates gender roles and symbols to arouse hatred of 'the enemy'. Concrete examples in conflict countries of press materials, graffiti or social codes enforced by armed groups are relevant and useful in predicting the patterns violence may take, therefore prompting appropriate protection initiatives.<sup>49</sup>

According to some experts, gender analysis elicits different questions about the causes and effects of conflict on different sectors within society and their particular relationships and roles with each other. It also provides a better under-

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<sup>48</sup> However the efficacy of this argument in the African context is suspect at best as poverty is widespread in a continent where the common man lives on a dollar a day. Thus there would be great difficulty in tying national budgets to early warning systems in Africa.

<sup>49</sup> United Nations Press Release, SC/6759, 29 November 1999. The 1993 Declaration of the Assembly of African Heads of State established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

standing of unequal social hierarchies, including gender hierarchies, inequality and oppression, which are often characteristics of societies that are prone to, or embroiled in conflict.<sup>50</sup>

It has been argued that the gender disparity that exists between men and women can be used to shed light on gender-based early warning indicators. These include among others sex-specific refugee migrations and the increase in single female-headed households; upsurge in acquisition, transportation, concealment and training in weapons by women; making a scapegoat of women, accusing them of political or cultural betrayal; and disruption of women's cross-border trade activity.<sup>51</sup>

### *Engendering conflict prevention*

Security issues and issues surrounding conflict have often been associated with masculinity. It has been the responsibility of men to go to war, to engage in conflict and to ensure that the conflict is resolved. All the while, the women are to look into the other needs of the family, that is feed the family and ensure that the household activities continue running as usual. Women's analysis is therefore often devalued and their solutions deemed as irrelevant, because they are often seen as being disconnected from what are considered as high politics.<sup>52</sup>

The early warning indicators look to African women as the caretakers and peace makers and rarely as wagers and participants of war. In all these capacities women remain important in the society but are not deemed important when it comes to preventing conflict. It has been seen that they usually are privy to information concerning impending conflict. Their vulnerability reflects prejudice against them and they are often forced to migrate or face abuse and exploitation. However even within this paradigm exists the paradoxical situation where African women over the ages have led great armies causing conflict,<sup>53</sup> or have stood behind a great warrior<sup>54</sup> and encouraged conflict and yet the indicators only see the woman as the marginalised and weak and as the victim of the conflict.

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<sup>50</sup> Anne J. Tickner, 1999, *Why Women Can't Run the World: International Politics According to Francis Fukuyama*, *International Studies Review*, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 3–13 as cited in Susanne Schmeidl with Eugenia Piza-Lopez, 2002, *Gender and Conflict Early Warning: A Framework for Action*, Swiss Peace Foundation and International Alert, available at <<http://www.international-alert.org/women/Ewgender.pdf>>.

<sup>51</sup> Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, 2002, *Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peace-building*, UNIFEM, available at <[http://www.unifem.org/index.php?f\\_page\\_pid=149](http://www.unifem.org/index.php?f_page_pid=149)>.

<sup>52</sup> Rehn E., Sirleaf E., *Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peace building*- Undated.

<sup>53</sup> A recent example is the 'Black Diamond' of Liberia, who led soldiers in the Liberian conflict, Liberia.

<sup>54</sup> In Burundi wives encouraged their husbands to take up arms.

Traditional methods of conflict prevention take place within the framework of the institutions and not within informal groupings like women's organizations at grassroots and national levels.<sup>55</sup> In order for conflict prevention to be effective women need to be included. The threats to civilians and especially women in conflict situations has underscored the importance and need to incorporate gender analysis into the early warning activities and the opportunity for preventive measures to strengthen the protection<sup>56</sup> not only of women but men as well. Gendered indicators can provide a comprehensive picture of the situation contributing to an effective response. When a gender lens is used early in the process of conflict, there is greater likelihood that the response will also take into account the needs, concerns and rights of both women and men.<sup>57</sup>

Women may undertake roles and responsibilities in conflict prevention within but not limited to three conceptual frameworks.<sup>58</sup> First, through non violent transformation of conflict which includes changing the potentiality of conflict from becoming violent and hurtful to one which will lead to positive outcomes of the parties engaged in the conflict. More often than not transformation may be violent in nature as the parties try to emerge victorious. However, women can approach conflict transformation through non violent means. This includes reforming movements for democracy and human rights. It may also be achieved through mechanisms that may at any one time advocate for conflict. These are usually defence structures in a state. It could be the military or other organs of the state.

Secondly, through preventing the escalation of conflict by direct engagement of potentially violent actors. Conflict prevention here could be achieved by the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of the potentially violent actors. It could also include settling or resolving issues at stake. Finally, conflict prevention can also be achieved through the preventing the resurgence of violence. This can be done through the continued efforts by women to prevent conflict from reoccurring. As a result, the need by and for women to feel secure could be used as an indicator in warning about the possibility of conflict. The use of the need for women to feel secure can thus be used as an indicator to guide prevention of conflicts.

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<sup>55</sup> Marshall, Donna Ramsey. 'Women in war and peace: Grassroots peace-building' United States Institute of Peace, *Peaceworks* No. 34, 2000.

<sup>56</sup> Shoemaker J., (ed.) *Inclusive Security: Women waging Peace-Conflict Prevention and Transformation Women's Vital Contributions*, UN Foundation op cit., p.35.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid. p.15.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.,4.

Contributions of women are often overlooked because they are non-traditional or outside the informal issues of conflict.<sup>59</sup> However, IGAD considers the involvement of women as vital for ensuring sustainable peace. Women are not only important in preventing conflict but are also needed to fully participate in decision making efforts of conflict prevention and resolution as well as peace initiatives<sup>60</sup>. Mainstreaming gender in CEWARN involves putting in place measures that foster equal participation of women and men in CEWARN as well as response mechanisms among IGAD member states<sup>61</sup>. It is prudent that women are integrated into CEWARN because as the indicators show, conflict usually has gender specific indicators.

There are benefits of engendering CEWARN. These are firstly, making the existing models more comprehensive. That is both genders are supposed to participate in conflict prevention and resolution once it takes place. In making CEWARN more comprehensive, vulnerabilities and gender specific issues are addressed so that certain discriminatory policies are not perpetuated in post-conflict situations. During post conflict reconstruction, women are often not included yet governments can have policies that ensure that peace is sustained because they usually are aware of any impending conflict.

In conclusion, women appear to have a more holistic approach towards peace.<sup>62</sup> As victims, survivors and even wagers of armed conflict, women are the major stakeholders in the resolution of conflict and its course for future development.<sup>63</sup> The involvement of women are important to the use of early warning systems because they can through numerous women's organizations persistently advocate for peace.<sup>64</sup> Although they are the hands, voices, eyes and ears of the community and as such their integration is important,<sup>65</sup> it remains uncertain whether the gender based indicators are applicable in the fluid situation in which women in Africa reside.

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<sup>59</sup> See generally Anderlin S., Stanski V., *Conflict Prevention, resolution and Reconstruction: Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Tool Kit for Advocacy and Action*.

<sup>60</sup> *IGAD Summary Proceedings of the Workshop on Engendering CEWARN* Nov. 25-26, 2002 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. P.10.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.* p.15.

<sup>62</sup> See generally Anderlin S., Stanski V., *Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Reconstruction: Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Tool Kit for Advocacy and Action*

<sup>63</sup> UNIFEM *Securing Peace: Guiding the International Community towards Womens Effective Participation throughout Peace Processes*, Oct. 2005, New York. p.1.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p.2.

<sup>65</sup> Anderlini S. *What is CEWARN?* UNIFEM New York Sept.2003 available at [www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/prevention/docs/ewppt](http://www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/prevention/docs/ewppt).

### *The IGAD conflict early warning system*

There are currently only two regional political early warning systems, the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) early warning system, each of which has significant limitations.<sup>66</sup> The HCNM is only empowered to deal with situations involving national minorities, not other root causes of conflict. Furthermore, it is not likely that this institution could be replicated in another region with less developed law on human rights and national minorities. The OAU early warning system is in its infancy and does not presently have its own information-gathering capacity.<sup>67</sup> There is no regional organization that could assume an early warning function for Asia.

IGAD first begun in 1986 as an intergovernmental authority whose task was to deal with matters of drought and development. It was then known as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). Due to increasing conflicts in the region, IGADD in the 1990's transformed its mandate from one of drought and desertification to one which was to manage and resolve conflicts. Since then, IGADD became a vehicle for regional security and political dialogue<sup>68</sup> and was renamed IGAD. Since then, IGAD's new mandate has included, conflict prevention, management and resolution, humanitarian affairs, infrastructure development, food security and environmental protection. IGAD has been involved in the management and resolution of various conflicts in the Horn of Africa and more especially those in Sudan and Somalia.<sup>69</sup>

IGAD in recognising the internationalisation of intrastate and interstate conflicts initiated an early warning system based on indicators that are internationally recognised. These include among others, circumstances or events that predict food crises, imminent refugee flows, or outward signs of violent conflict such as cross-border trade disruption, sudden public displays of military-style weapons

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<sup>66</sup> Samuel Basseby Ibok & William G. Nhara (eds) (1996) OAU Early Warning System on Conflict Situation in Africa.

<sup>67</sup> See Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations, South Africa, The Early Warning System of the Organization of African Unity 4 (Nov. 1997) (unpublished report) (on file with New York University Journal of International Law and Politics) as quoted in the New York University Journal of International Law and Politics United Nations Issue Note: EARLY WARNING AS A TOOL OF CONFLICT PREVENTION by Sara Rakita 30 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 539 at note 157

<sup>68</sup>For more on the specific roles of IGAD see the IGAD website [www.igad.org](http://www.igad.org).

<sup>69</sup> Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Programme on Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management (1998) (visited Sept. 29, 1999) <<http://www.igad.org/press10.htm>> hereinafter IGAD]. The IGAD Program was introduced to build capacity, create an early warning mechanism, share its post-conflict peace-building experiences, and co-ordinate efforts to promote a culture of peace and tolerance. The IGAD does not envisage itself engaging in operable conflict management.

and increased crime rates or human rights violations. Too often these lists have not incorporated gender-sensitive indicators that could fine-tune the information collection and analysis work of security institutions, and reveal previously overlooked signs of instability at a grassroots level that can anticipate conflict before it spreads to formal politics.<sup>70</sup> IGAD however has taken a step forward and decided to base their early warning system on gender. In 2000, IGAD member states established a secretariat in Nairobi to facilitate negotiations for the states which were affected by conflict in the region. During this time, UNIFEM created a women's desk in the secretariat to ensure the participation of women in the negotiation processes. In recognition of the efforts made by the Women's desk, it became an institution of the IGAD<sup>71</sup>

The role of CEWARN is important. It is anchored in the member states, and these are known as Conflict Early warning and response units (CEWARU's), whose broad aim is to collect information from the grassroots, that would detect the causes of conflict.<sup>72</sup>

Most African states and regional actors do not have either mechanism in place warning them of conflict or risk assessment capabilities.<sup>73</sup>

## Recommendations: Engendering security in the Horn of Africa

In terms of national and international politics 'security' has always been understood in terms of securing the national interest in terms of military security when wars are supposedly fought by men and which among other objectives, for the protection of women. In this respect, women's experiences of violence were rendered nearly invisible in international law and traditional understandings of human rights because both originally operated on the assumption that the public and private spheres are sharply differentiated.

Women just like men are both actors and victims in armed conflict. They participate in the armed forces as combatants as well as playing supportive roles.

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<sup>70</sup> Smeidl S., Piza-Lopez E., *Gender and CEWARN: A Framework for Action*, International Alert and Swiss Peace Foundation June 2002.

<sup>71</sup> UNIFEM 'Securing the Peace Guiding the International Community towards Women's Effective Participation throughout Peace Processes' United Nations Development Fund for Women October 2005 p.20.

<sup>72</sup> Okoth G., 'Regional Institutional Responses to Security in the era of globalisation' in Mwagiru Makumi 'African Regional Security in the age of Globalisation' (Nairobi: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 204) p.54.

<sup>73</sup> Mexfed J. Zegeye A., Human Stability and Conflict in the Horn of Africa in *African Security Review* Vol. 11 No.1 2002. See also Knife Abraham, The Role of Regional and Sub-regional Organisations: Statement by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 18 Refugee Surv. Q. 102, 106 (1999).



Women are also peace activists, working to heal communities and build sustainable peace.<sup>74</sup> The role of governments in conflict mechanisms wherever women exist thus remains a point of contention.<sup>75</sup>

There is a need for the IGAD member states to re-conceptualise conflict early warning before it even begins to apply it in the region. There are many obstacles that it may encounter which include among others the inherent misuse of CEWARN being a squarely economic based system to solve a gender based problem. In addition, despite the illusion of the use of women to determine future conflict the failure by IGAD to at the most fundamental level define women and then how they will use the women in conflict prevention seems to shoot the mechanism in the foot.

The Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) that the UNHCR concluded with SADC in July 1996 and IGAD in November 1997 are also examples of possible future obstacles. These MOUs are weak in that they do not include provisions that set out the organization's commitment to adhere to the international protection regime (i.e., international human rights, humanitarian, and refugee law). Rule of law issues also need to be featured prominently in future agreements. Pursuant to their respective articles on supplementary arrangements, the SADC and IGAD Memorandums should be amended accordingly.<sup>76</sup>

## Conclusion

It seems as though as usual Africa is putting a bandage on a festering wound without cleaning it first. The bandage itself seems to be a used one and brings with it additions problems.

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<sup>74</sup> United Nations 'Women, Peace and Security' Study submitted by the United Nations Secretary General to the Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) United Nations 2002.p.26.

<sup>75</sup> Mayer A. E., 'A Critique of An-Naim's Assessment of Islamic Criminal Justice' in T. Lindholm and K. Vogt (Eds.), *Islamic Law Reform and Human Rights: Challenges and Rejoinders*, Oslo 1993, 37 at 49.

<sup>76</sup> Memorandum of Understanding between The Southern African Development Community and The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Gaborone, Botswana, July 25, 1996: Memorandum of Understanding between the Intergovernmental Authority for Development and the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, Djibouti, Djibouti, June 19, 1997.

# Laying the foundations for peace: The role of governments, businesses, and civil society in building a more secure world

*Erik Assadourian*<sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

Laying the foundations for lasting peace will require international cooperation on a broad range of fronts – from resisting aggression and combating transnational crime, to mediating peace settlements and addressing underlying causes of conflict and instability such as poverty, overpopulation, disease, and environmental degradation.

Of course, governments will play a paramount role in increasing global security – both through their efforts to strengthen international institutions and agreements, as well as through their domestic initiatives, such as reducing societal inequities and environmental degradation via the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and World Summit on Sustainable Development targets.

Businesses will also be essential in increasing global security. Proactive attempts by businesses to reduce their negative impacts on the environment and society as well as efforts to improve the lots of peoples' lives in the communities in which they work will be key in reducing poverty, disease, conflict, and environmental degradation.

Yet businesses and governments face significant barriers in prioritizing a more long-sighted agenda in which they focus on addressing complex societal and environmental issues instead of immediate concerns, such as quarterly profits and desires to be re-elected. Speeding the redirection of businesses and governments will depend on the effective mobilization of the world's civil society. Civil society organizations (CSOs), and the many citizens they represent, have tremendous power to help facilitate the implementation of proactive agendas by engaged governments and businesses. Moreover, when necessary, CSOs have

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<sup>1</sup> Erik Assadourian is a Research Associate at Worldwatch Institute. This paper is based on "Laying the Foundations for Peace," in *State of the World 2005*, co-authored with Hilary French and Gary Gardner, and on "Transforming Corporations," in *State of the World 2006*. References are not included in this conference paper but are available in the original chapters, which can be obtained from the author at [eassadourian@worldwatch.org](mailto:eassadourian@worldwatch.org).

the ability to pressure resistant businesses and governments, which can often accelerate change.

What lies at the heart of global security today? While this is a complex question with an equally complex answer, there are two key prerequisites:

- A safe, healthy and happy human population
- A stable, protected environment

Unfortunately, these two are increasingly in jeopardy. Today the world has: a population of 6.5 billion in which 2 billion suffer from hunger and chronic nutrient deficiencies; 434 million people face water scarcity – a number expected to increase to 2.6 or even 3.1 billion by 2025; and nearly 2 billion global consumers, using ever more resources, manipulated to desire ever more, and suffering connected physical and mental health side effects, such as obesity. All of this in a world with a population expected to grow to almost 9 billion by 2050.

Then there's the environment, which is in a state of decline. In March 2005, the results the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) were announced. This comprehensive study warned that 60 percent of the ecosystem services on which human society depends are being degraded or used unsustainably – a trend that could “grow significantly worse” over the next 50 years if human society does not alter its course. As the MA Board of Directors explained, human activity “is putting such strain on the natural functions of Earth that the ability of the planet's ecosystems to sustain future generations can no longer be taken for granted.”

Essential to creating a secure world will be to address poverty and environmental degradation – from improving health and education to curbing pollution and population growth. Supporting these efforts will take commitment by national and local governments as well as a strong global governance system that can encourage multilateral efforts to achieve these goals. Moreover, businesses, with their vast resources and power, will be crucial in redirecting human society's path before we pass a point of no return.

Yet governments and businesses face significant barriers in prioritizing a more long-sighted agenda in which they focus on addressing complex societal and environmental issues instead of immediate concerns, such as desires to be re-elected and quarterly profits. Speeding the redirection of businesses and governments will depend on effectively mobilizing the world's civil society. Civil society organizations (CSOs), and the many citizens they represent, have tremendous power to help facilitate the implementation of proactive agendas by engaged governments and businesses. Moreover, when necessary, CSOs have the ability to pressure resistant businesses and governments, which can often accelerate

change. Without a full-scale global movement, achieving environmental and human well-being priorities – and with it increased global security – will not be possible.

## The role of the United Nations

If the world is to increase security, it first needs to recognize which are the most significant threats it faces. Yes, cross-border military incursions and civil strife continue to raise their ugly heads, and the UN has often played an important role both in helping to resolve conflicts, and to maintain the peace. Indeed, the first purpose of the United Nations, defined by its charter, is “to maintain international peace and security.”

But from the very beginning the United Nations was seen as being about much more than military security. The U.N. Charter states that one of the central purposes is “to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character.” These provisions came about in part in response to a widely shared belief that the disastrous world economic conditions of the 1930s had indirectly helped precipitate World War II by contributing to the rise of Hitler.

In the half-century since the United Nations was created, poverty and destitution around the world have proved to be formidable foes. Nonetheless, the U.N. system has seen its share of successes on a range of social issues. In the field of global health, for instance, the World Health Organization (WHO), a U.N. specialized agency, initiated a global campaign to eradicate smallpox in 1967. At that time, the disease afflicted up to 15 million people annually, leading to some 2 million deaths. In 1980, WHO certified that the disease had been conquered globally. It is now nearing similar successes with polio, leprosy, guinea worm, and Chagas disease. Eradication is unfortunately nowhere in sight for a number of other deadly diseases, including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, but WHO is working with other international institutions and partners to reduce the number of people stricken by them and to expand access to treatment for those who need it.

Today many of the UN’s priorities have found a home in two policy documents: the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted unanimously in 2000 (See Appendix 1.) and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development Targets. These brought renewed political attention to sustainable development challenges, including the adoption or reaffirmation by governments of a broad range of targets on water, energy, health, agriculture, and biological diversity. (See Ap-

pendix 2.) The United Nations is currently finding a growing role for itself in encouraging governments to implement the policy reforms needed to achieve these targets and the MDGs and in monitoring their progress along the way.

To become more relevant in its efforts to increase security, the UN faces other challenges. These include:

- rethinking the composition of the Security Council to better represent today's world, including a voice from a Japanese, Indian, German representative as well as a voice from Latin America and Africa.
- using the Security Council's clout to expand the mandate to address non-traditional security issues, as happened in 2000 on HIV/AIDS.
- creating a Global Environmental Organization or making UNEP a full-fledged U.N. specialized agency in order to prioritize the mounting environmental problems we face.
- reforming the powerful UN institutions the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO—which are widely seen to disproportionately represent the interests of major industrial countries, and promote orthodox economic globalization strategies that have in all too many cases harmed rather than helped poor people and the environment.

### Shifting government priorities

Reshaping international institutions is only a first step. The United Nations and affiliated bodies, acting through their member governments, lay out a vision, enumerate goals for the global community, and help to guide implementation. But national and local governments have the tough tasks of marshaling the domestic political will and resources needed to make that vision a reality and of ensuring that their priorities are in line with today's burgeoning new global security threats.

One of the first things governments can do is recognize how misdirected security spending is today. More than \$1 trillion is spent annually on the world's militaries, most of which is targeted at traditional security threats. Political leaders who recognize the destabilizing nature of poverty, overpopulation, disease, and environmental degradation would soon conclude that social programs long deemed too expensive are actually affordable. In many countries, the funding to counter today's new threats already exists—it can be found in current military budgets. It need only be applied to the new array of emerging security threats.

Fortunately, the international framework to address this complex array of threats already exists—the Millennium Development Goals and the World Summit on Sustainable Development targets. While these goals were primarily

adopted in order to address growing global inequities in a sustainable manner, today, where security threats have become the dominant concern, the MDGs can equally be seen as a means to increase national and global security.

While the commitment on paper to achieving the MDGs is strong, progress for the most part been excruciatingly slow. Each year, for the past three years, the World Economic Forum asked some of the world's leading development experts to analyze the progress of working toward the Millennium Development Goals. The results were grim: governments continue to put in only a third of the effort needed to achieve these readily attainable goals.

Although some countries have made significant gains in reducing poverty, albeit primarily through stimulating unsustainable forms of economic growth, few are on track to achieve the other seven goals. According to the World Bank, less than one fifth of all countries are currently on target to reduce child and maternal mortality and provide access to water and sanitation, while even fewer are on track to contain HIV, malaria, and other major diseases. The Forum's analysis makes it clear that the primary reason for failure is a lack of focus on basic development priorities.

When governments do set the achievement of certain goals as a priority, however, they can rapidly register great success — success that is often multiplied because of the strong connection between different societal problems. By investing in AIDS prevention, for example, governments not only curtail the spread of the disease, they also reduce health care costs, the number of orphaned children, the loss of economic productivity, and the loss of much-needed professionals such as teachers and doctors. For example:

- Thailand prioritized an AIDS prevention campaign in the early 1990s after realizing that if left unchecked, AIDS could infect 6 percent of the population by 2000. Through a significant campaign, Thailand reduced the number of new infections each year from 143,000 in 1991 to 19,000 in 2003.
- Mexico provided basic benefits to 21 million people, significantly reducing illness in infants and children and increasing basic education — all for just a cost of 0.2 percent of the country's GDP.

Although national governments must take the lead in achieving the MDGs, a great deal can be done at the regional and local level as well when policymakers are determined to address societal problems.

- The state of Kerala in India through a significant government prioritization of basic human services like education and healthcare has

led to impressive development statistics: infant mortality is one quarter the national rate, immunization rates are almost double, and the fertility rate is two thirds that of India's.

- Porto Alegre in Brazil has increased access to sanitation from 75 to 98 percent of the population and quadrupled total number of schools – achieving this success mainly because the municipal government gave local people the power to choose what the government spend its funds on. People decided to devote resources to ensuring their basic needs were met, which meant increasing the health and education budget from 13 percent in 1985 to almost 40 percent in 1996.

Yet even as governments work to reach basic development goals, they will need to pursue them in an ecologically sustainable manner or risk making short-term gains at the expense of long-term well-being and security. There are many instances of development that in the short-term created a regional boon but in the end caused economic bust as the environment could no longer sustain the people. One example is the Aral Sea basin. For a time it was the cotton belt of the Soviet Union, through the use of intensive irrigation. Now, however, the sea has shrunk to half its size, no longer producing the 45,000 tons of fish each year it used to and contaminating the surrounding agricultural land with salt. Overall, this environmental disaster has affected 3.5–7 million people.

Although not always as dramatic, similar tragedies are unfolding around the world. Southeast Asia's mangrove forests have been decimated by shrimp farms that are themselves now dying; tropical rainforests have been cleared across the Amazon, erasing traditional lifestyles and countless undiscovered species with them; and 15,000 square kilometers of the Gulf of Mexico – an area nearly the size of Kuwait – is now dead from the spilling of farm wastes into the Mississippi River.

Overburdening the ecological systems we depend on thus poses a critical danger. Some of the strategies called for in the MDGs will automatically work to avoid this – for example, providing basic education to women tends to reduce fertility rates and subsequently population pressures. But other strategies may be in conflict – education may also provide the means or incentive to join the global consumer class, which could greatly increase resource use. To prevent further ecological stresses, governments will have to incorporate notions of sustainability directly into their development strategies.

Achieving the Millennium Development Goals will require greater investment. Some countries are already recognizing this and are acting accordingly. As

mentioned, one source will be redirecting military expenditures towards development. If developing countries redirect just a small portion of their estimated military expenditures of over \$220 billion to achieving the MDGs, significant additional funding could be available. Costa Rica, by having no military for the past 50 years, has been able to devote a much larger portion of its budget to social spending – with impressive results. With a similar GDP per capita as Latin America as a whole, Costa Rica has the highest life expectancy rate and one of the highest literacy rates in the entire region.

Yet most developing countries will need more funding than they can provide themselves. Indeed, for the poorest countries it will be nearly impossible to find enough funds within their own budgets to provide basic services. WHO estimates, for example, that to sustain a public health system, a minimum of \$35–40 per person is necessary. For the poorest countries, where GDP per capita is in the low hundreds, this will be impossible without outside aid. As the eighth MDG makes clear, a concerted effort from industrial countries and global institutions will be essential – both by providing additional development aid and by “leveling the playing field” through initiatives like increased debt relief and fairer trade.

Currently, too little aid is provided to achieve the MDGs. In 2004, donor countries gave \$79 billion in official development assistance (ODA), or just 0.25 percent of their gross national incomes (GNI). At the Johannesburg summit, governments reconfirmed the need to provide 0.7 percent of GNI in aid. But only five countries have done this – Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. If all donors committed to this readily attainable goal, annual development aid would increase by \$140 billion – more than twice the estimated \$50 billion in additional annual funds needed to achieve the MDGs.

In addition, donor countries will have to do better at targeting the aid they provide. In 2000, more than a quarter of the aid was conditioned on purchasing goods and services from the donor country, while less than a third went to improving basic health, sanitation, and education services. To address non-traditional security threats successfully, more aid will have to go directly toward achieving the MDGs.

Donor countries must also do more to reduce the unpayable burdens of highly indebted poor countries, many of which spend a significant percentage of their annual GDP just servicing outstanding debts – often at the expense of providing basic social services. After a long campaign for debt relief in the 1990s, the benefits are starting to accrue. The 26 countries that have received some relief have reduced their debt service by 42 percent, from \$3.8 billion in 1998 to \$2.2 billion in 2001. Some 65 percent of these savings have been redirected to health and



education programs. Yet Africa—the region furthest behind in achieving the MDGs—continues to pay creditors \$15 billion a year in debt service.

While aid and debt relief will help significantly, these gains are often overshadowed by a larger disparity—that of trade subsidies and tariffs. For example, while the European Union gives about \$8 in aid per person in sub-Saharan Africa each year, it gives \$913 in subsidies per cow in Europe. In total, more than \$300 billion in annual subsidies and agricultural tariffs weaken the ability of farmers in developing countries to compete with farmers elsewhere. According to a 2004 study by the Institute for International Economics and the Center for Global Development, removing these tariffs and subsidies could pull 200 million people out of poverty by 2020.

Removing \$300 billion in agricultural subsidies could be one new source for ODA funding. But there is another major potential source. If donor countries start to recognize sustainable development as critical to their national security, they could redirect some of their military budgets to development aid. In 2004, OECD countries spent \$811 billion on military expenditures. (See Figure 1.) Redirecting just 6.2 percent of these budgets to development aid would provide all the funds needed to pay for the MDGs. While this may seem a large portion, it is clearly achievable. According to a 2004 report by the Center for Defense Information and Foreign Policy in Focus, \$51 billion—or 11 percent—could be cut from the U.S. military budget just by removing outdated, unnecessary programs. This alone could provide the additional funds needed to attain the MDGs.




Figure 1: Military expenditures versus ODA, 2004.

Even if the Millennium Development Goals were achieved by 2015, however, there would still be 400 million people who are undernourished, 600 million who live on less than \$1 per day, and 1.2 billion without access to improved sanitation. And the world is not even close to meeting these modest goals. To do so, governments will have to make strong commitments – and then live up to them.

### Drafting the business community

Governments are essential to bringing about a more secure world – but then so are businesses. Businesses maintain vast wealth and resources. Indeed, if the revenues of governments and the largest corporations are compared, 77 of the top 100 are corporations. Indeed just the largest 100 corporations produced more than \$5.5 trillion in sales in 2003 – equivalent to 14 percent of the global economy. Moreover, they have significant influence over governments, the media, academia, and civil society. It is essential that we convince business leaders that it is in their interest to prioritize an ecologically stable world where humans (their employees and the consumers of their products and services) are healthy and happy. Unfortunately, there are three major barriers to making businesses more responsible – and by responsible I mean: acting in an ecologically sustainable and socially beneficial manner

- First: there is the perception that shareholders expect consistent and ever-increasing short-term financial gains, and thus corporations feel pressured to maximize returns even at the expense of being responsible.
- Second: true environmental and social costs are often not captured in current accounting methods or are distorted by perverse subsidies. One analysis found that the externalized social and environmental costs of corporations in the US in 1995 were 4 times greater than the \$822 billion they earned that year.
- Third: corporate influence over society has for the most part focused on increasing short-term gains for companies not on pushing for a most responsible business system.

Yet businesses must learn that it is in their interest to change. Mainly for the simple reason that – in the words of DuPont Chairman and CEO Charles Holliday, Jr. – “business will not succeed in the twenty-first century if societies fail or if global ecosystems continue to deteriorate.”

But this will not be enough to convince them – considering the pressure of short-term barriers. We must show them that there is a lot of opportunity in becoming more responsible – especially before their competitors do. Why? Because:

- businesses can reduce costs by reducing waste and inefficiencies
- they can attract and retain higher-quality workforces
- they can improve their reputation and prevent themselves being targeted by NGOs for negative publicity campaigns or boycotts
- they can avoid the risks of new regulations, maintain attractiveness to investors, and can reduce dependence on increasingly costly resources.
- and they can increase their access to new markets by selling new environmental technologies or selling products that provide essential services to the bottom of the pyramid – the poorest 4 billion people.

But more will be needed to overcome barriers than a promise of increased profitability.

Governments will again be essential in changing regulations to better internalize externalized costs, and cut subsidies that distort the market. And civil society, as I will discuss momentarily, will be key to supporting and pressuring companies, but companies and investors also must take leadership roles.

Investors, by directing their investments to socially responsible companies, will be key in creating a different investor pressure on corporations – pressure focused on demanding improved environmental and social activities, through both gentle encouragement, and when that fails shareholder resolutions.

To succeed, there will also need to be corporate leaders that are willing to be trailblazers, creating a new business system in which – in the words of management expert Peter Drucker – the corporation will be “organized as to fulfill automatically its social obligations in the very act of seeking its own best self-interest.” This will demand a redesign of industrial production to be eco-effective – meaning following the ways of nature – and redirecting corporate influence so that this influence promotes sustainable development, not short-term self-interest.

While this may sound naïve, many companies are learning that they can become responsibility leaders in ways that both help society and themselves. They are changing their production processes, increasing their transparency and are lobbying for regulations that are societally beneficial while also in their interest – for example energy companies lobbying for consistent climate regulations to simplify regulatory compliance for themselves. Moreover, some are helping proactively to address health and social issues, such as AIDS prevention, recognizing that it is in their interest to keep their employees healthy and safe. Yet the number of responsible corporations remains tiny and the business sector will need a serious jumpstart if it is to play a leading role in creating a secure world.

## Civil society's essential dual role

The question of whether governments or corporations can change quickly enough to prevent significant losses in human and ecological wellbeing — especially considering the pressures they face to maintain short-term profit and policy positions — is still an open one. In reality success will depend entirely on whether the global civil society can mobilize at a level yet seen to demand dramatic change by governments and corporations.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) will be one of the key forces in this mobilization of civil society. Over the past 25 years, CSOs, which now total some 26,000 organizations globally (up from less than 5,000 in 1975) have become increasingly powerful. They have two significant roles to play: supporting proactive governments and businesses, and compelling compliance from recalcitrant ones. Let me provide an example or two in each category:

### *Supporting proactive corporations*

CSOs can help support company initiatives to become more efficient or ecologically responsible. For example, Environmental Defense approached FedEx with an offer to help lower the emissions of its delivery fleet. FedEx agreed sensing this would provide a triple win — cost savings, good publicity, and less pollution. FedEx is currently introducing a new hybrid truck that will improve fuel efficiency by 57 percent per vehicle and reduce emissions of soot by 96 percent per vehicle.

### *Pressuring reluctant corporations*

Fear of public shaming — and the connected loss of profit and stock value — make corporations very susceptible to pressure campaigns by CSOs. The Rainforest Action Network (RAN) has proved that pressure campaigns can be very successful — forcing three banks with holdings of almost \$4 trillion to agree to implement an environmental lending policy (for example requiring environmental impact assessments for any loan over \$50 million). This strategy has been used successfully on a whole slew of industries: including jewelry companies, office supply stores, computer manufacturers, coffee roasters, and cosmetic companies.

### *Supporting proactive governments or global governance initiatives*

CSOs can help proactive governments by lending their expertise to specific initiatives. For example NGOs have helped analyze the role of big dams in development through the World Commission on Dams and have helped to support countries in sustainable water management through the global Water Partnership.

*Pressuring reluctant governments*

One can point to many examples here: from protests in Tienamen Square and the recent Orange Revolution in the Ukraine to global demonstrations to demand that the United States not invade Iraq. Not always successful, these efforts are increasingly loud and organized. Some efforts are gentler: CSOs united as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines helped push governments to adopt a Treaty to Ban Landmines that by October 2004 had 143 signatories.

Of course civil society is important in another role – that of mobilizing people directly to take care of their communities and their planet. One just needs to look at Kenya’s Green Belt movement and see how this can improve the lives of people – but what makes this group even more important is their role in politically mobilizing the populous.

Global security will depend on achieving significant successes in providing for the basic needs of human beings, and doing so in a way that maintains a healthy environment. This depends on governments, businesses, and especially in their role to support and pressure the first two, civil society.

**Appendix 1: Millennium development goals and targets****Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger**

By 2015, reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than \$1 a day and the share suffering from hunger.

**Achieve universal primary education**

Ensure that by 2015 all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling.

**Promote gender equality and empower women**

Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015.

**Reduce child mortality**

By 2015, reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five.

**Improve maternal health**

By 2015, reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality rate.

**Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases**

Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/ AIDS, malaria, and other major diseases by 2015.

### **Ensure environmental sustainability**

Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources. By 2015, cut in half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation. By 2020, improve significantly the lives of 100 million slum dwellers.

### **Develop a global partnership for development**

Develop an open trading and financial system that is rule-based, non-discriminatory, and includes a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction. Address the special needs of least developed countries, small island developing states, and landlocked-countries. Make debt sustainable, increase youth employment, and provide access to essential drugs and new technologies.

## **Appendix 2: Selected targets adopted at the World Summit on sustainable development**

- Halve the proportion of people without access to basic sanitation by 2015.
- Restore fisheries to their maximum sustainable yields by 2015 and prevent, deter, and eliminate illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing by 2004.
- Significantly reduce the rate of biodiversity loss by 2010.
- Reverse the current trend in natural resource degradation.
- Crack down on illegal logging that contributes to deforestation.
- Ensure that by 2020, chemicals are not used and produced in ways that harm human health and the environment.
- Ensure energy access for at least 35 percent of Africans within 20 years.
- Use renewable energy to meet 10 percent of the energy needs of Latin American and Caribbean countries by 2010, reaffirming a pledge by those countries.

# Environmental, Economic and Social Dimensions of Global Security

# Resource dimensions of the global security agenda

*Michael Renner*

## Introduction

Throughout human history, natural resources have often been at the core of conflicts and security questions, triggering civil wars and interventions by major powers, and yielding human rights violations and enduring political instability. Recent years have seen violent struggles in a number of developing countries, in which governments and a range of non-governmental forces, clamour over resources such as oil, minerals, metals, diamonds, timber, and agricultural commodities, including drug crops. With regard to oil, major importing nations are increasingly jockeying for access as demand is surging and prices are spiking.

This paper starts by discussing the various dimensions and contexts of resource-related conflicts. It then takes a look at the new geopolitics of oil against the backdrop of rising demand and limited supplies. Finally, the paper provides an overview of some of the efforts that have been undertaken in recent years to reduce the likelihood of resource-related conflicts. Many of these efforts are focused on corporate actions and transparency.

## Resource wars<sup>1</sup>

Abundant natural resources have played an important role in about a quarter of the wars and armed conflicts active during the 1990s and the first decade of the new century. This means that legal or illegal resource exploitation helped trigger or exacerbate violent conflict or financed its continuation. The human toll of these resource-related conflicts has simply been horrendous. Rough estimates suggest that more than 5 million people were killed during the 1990s. Close to 6 million fled to neighboring countries, and anywhere from 11 to 15 million people were displaced inside the borders of their home countries.

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<sup>1</sup> A more detailed discussion can be found in Michael Renner, *The Anatomy of Resource Wars*, Worldwatch Paper 162 (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, October 2002), and in Michael Renner, "Resource Wealth and Conflict," in Worldwatch Institute, *State of the World 2005* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2005), pp. 96-97.



For the vast majority of the local people, these conflicts have brought not only death and destruction, but also a torrent of human rights violations, humanitarian disasters, economic calamity, and environmental destruction. But the money derived from the often illicit resource exploitation in war zones has secured an ample supply of arms for various armed factions and enriched a handful of people – warlords, corrupt government officials, and unscrupulous corporate leaders.

We can distinguish three different sets of circumstances:

- (a) In some places, the pillaging of oil, minerals, metals, gemstones, or timber allows wars to continue that were initially driven by other factors – grievances, secessionist efforts, or ideological struggles – and in many cases bankrolled by the superpowers or by other external supporters. Colombia, Angola, and Afghanistan provide instructive examples:
- In Colombia, drug trafficking and oil money has fueled and complicated a conflict since the 1980s that originated several decades earlier.
  - In Angola, from the late 1970s to the end of the conflict in 2002, the combatants financed themselves increasingly through oil revenues (government) and diamond sales (UNITA rebels).
  - Opium and heroin trafficking helped finance anti-Soviet Mujahideen forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s and the civil war that broke out after the Soviet withdrawal. It also bankrolled the Taliban regime in the 1990s, whereas their opponents (called the Northern Alliance) relied on sales of gemstones to finance themselves.
- (b) Elsewhere, nature’s bounty attracts groups that may claim they are driven by an unresolved grievance, such as political oppression or the denial of minority rights, but are in effect predators enriching themselves through illegal resource extraction. They initiate violence not necessarily to overthrow a government, but to gain and maintain control over lucrative resources, typically one of the few sources of wealth and power in poorer societies. They are greatly aided by the fact that many countries are weakened by poor or repressive governance, crumbling public services, lack of economic opportunity, and deep social divides. Examples are events in Sierra Leone, Sudan, and the Congo.
- In 1991, Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels started a civil war in Sierra Leone in order to grab control over diamond-rich parts of the country. A ruinous decade-long conflict ensued.
  - The discovery of oil was a major factor in re-igniting the civil war between Sudan’s central government and the South. The government used a scorched earth strategy to de-populate and control oil-rich areas.

- In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, plunder of the country's natural wealth was a major (but not the only) factor in triggering the war that started in 1998 and drew in several neighboring countries.

Many of these conflicts have come to an end. But elaborate illegal networks and a variety of proxy forces have emerged in several cases, and this means that natural resources are often still being exploited for the benefit of few and to the detriment of the majority of the concerned populations.

(c) Commercial resource extraction can also be a source of conflict where governance is undemocratic and corrupt. In many developing countries, the economic benefits of mining and logging operations accrue to a small business or government elite and to multinational companies and their shareholders. But in case after case, an array of burdens – ranging from the expropriation of land, disruption of traditional ways of life, environmental devastation, and social maladies – are placed on the local population. Affected populations – in many cases, indigenous communities – are, typically, neither informed nor consulted, about resource extraction projects; as developments in Papua Guinea, Indonesia, and Nigeria, among others, demonstrate.

- On Bougainville island, the massive devastation caused by copper mining helped awaken ethnic and political passions and motivate a war for independence from Papua New Guinea. The guns have now fallen silent, and the island's ultimately political status is to be addressed in a future referendum.
- In Indonesia's Aceh province, secessionist passions were fueled by a volatile mix of resource politics, political centralization, and severe repression. A peace agreement, negotiated and signed after the December 2004 *tsunami* devastated the province, is now being implemented. Aceh is to retain a much higher share of revenues derived from its oil, natural gas, and other natural resources.
- Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta is characterized by a violent and corrupt tangle of relationships between foreign oil companies, government officials, ethnic militias, smugglers, and local communities. Despite great oil wealth, per capita income remains below \$1 a day. Violence continues to increase.

### The new geopolitics of oil

These conflicts are only in part driven by local dynamics and circumstances. The industrialized world's voracious appetite for resources serves as the backdrop

for these struggles. It is the strong demand for resources that makes many commodities so lucrative.

### *Rising global demand for oil*

This is particularly true for oil, which holds a dominant place in the global economy, and is arguably the most important strategic commodity ever. World-wide oil demand is projected to grow by 50 percent; reaching 121 million barrels per day by 2025, up from about 80 million barrels per day in March 2006.

Western economies and Japan have long been the dominant consumers; but “newcomers” such as (China and India), are now also dramatically increasing their demand for oil, as their economies expand rapidly and the number of cars multiplies. China became a net importer in 1993, and is now the world’s second largest oil importer after the United States; having surpassed Japan in 2003. China’s import-dependence is projected to double from 40 percent in the next 25 years. India already imports 70 percent of its consumption and is the world’s sixth largest oil importer.

The fundamental question is whether such rising demand can be met. The rate of oil discovery worldwide has been falling ever since the 1960s, from an annual average of 47 billion barrels to a mere 14 billion barrels during the 1990s, and an even lower figure during the current decade. A number of analysts now argue that the world may soon reach “peak oil” – maximum sustainable output – and then begin to experience a gradual decline in production. Although there is tremendous uncertainty – and controversy – as to when the peak might occur, it is already clear that demand and supply are increasingly on a collision course.

### *Jockeying for oil and power*

In this context of growing demand, tight supply, and rising oil prices, major consuming nations are increasingly jockeying for access to oil; generating in the process a new set of big-power rivalries. Tensions and disputes are rising in several cases in the Middle East, Central Asia, the East and South China Seas, Latin America, and parts of Africa. They find expression in territorial disputes, competing pipeline plans, and a variety of efforts to secure access to the most promising oil deposits.

### **Boundary disputes in oil and gas-rich areas**

- In the contested waters of the East China Sea, Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia all press incompatible claims to areas that may be rich in oil and gas resources.

- Likewise, parts of the South China Sea – the Paracel and Spratly islands – are heavily disputed among China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Indonesia.
- Indonesia and Malaysia saw territorial tensions flare over an oil-rich area in the Sulawesi Sea in early 2005.
- Nigeria and Cameroon have conflicting claims over the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula. The International Court of Justice ruled in October 2002 that Cameroon has sovereignty, but Nigerian troops continue to occupy the area.

### Competing pipeline plans

- The United States, Russia, and China have competing pipeline plans for the export of Caspian oil and gas resources, in what some are calling a modern version of the imperial “Great Game” in Central Asia.
- China and Japan are pushing mutually exclusive export routes in their struggle for access to Siberian oil. Although Japan appeared to be the winner at first, Japanese-Russian territorial frictions may well lead Russia to build a pipeline to China first.

### Securing access

In the Middle East, the United States has long manoeuvred to keep the Persian Gulf region in its geopolitical orbit, culminating in the U.S. occupation of Iraq after the 2002 invasion. After 11/9 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon, U.S. military deployments training and exercises in various oil-rich regions have been undertaken in the name of the “war on terror.” Oil and conflict have intersected in a number of ways:

- At least 500 U.S. soldiers are stationed in Colombia – in part to help protect an oil export pipeline against rebel attacks.
- A network of U.S. military facilities has emerged from Pakistan to Central Asia to the Caucasus and from the eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa.
- A January/February 2006 Congressional Research Service report states that “While terrorism is cited as the primary reason for U.S. military operations in Africa, access to Africa’s oil – which presently accounts for 15 percent of the U.S. oil supply and could reach 25 percent by 2015 – is also considered a primary factor for growing U.S. military involvement in the region.”
- Under the “Gulf of Guinea Guard Initiative,” U.S. soldiers patrol the waters off the Niger Delta with their Nigerian counterparts, and may set up a naval

base in nearby Sao Tome. The U.S. maintains military base in Djibouti, initiated the “Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative”, and is undertaking training and joint exercises with troops from Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia (“Flintlock 2005”).

A number of other governments are also manoeuvring for influence with oil-rich nations. The scramble for access is taking on a new intensity as China and India attempt to secure supplies and exploration contracts for their own oil companies in Africa, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Latin America. China derives a quarter of its oil imports from Africa.

Finding themselves more and more in direct competition with each other for the same energy resources (in Angola, Nigeria, Kazakhstan, and Ecuador), China and India signed an agreement at the beginning of 2006 to cooperate in securing oil supplies overseas.

But competition among various countries may well continue to heat up, and there are a number of geo-political and human rights-related implications. In order to secure supplies, oil importers are often willing to deal with repressive or violent regimes. This has been true for the US and other Western countries, and is increasingly true for China and India. Both countries are extending military and political support to several countries that are in a confrontational relationship with the United States in exchange for oil and gas supplies. The full political implications of these developments remain to be seen:

- **Sudan.** Sudan is China’s largest African oil supplier (more than half of Sudan’s exports go to China), and China is a leading arms supplier to Sudan. Oil interests have limited China’s willingness to have the UN Security Council impose sanctions against Sudan over atrocities in Darfur. A 2004 Council resolution had to be watered down to avoid drawing a Chinese veto.
- **Iran.** Iran accounts for 14 percent of China’s oil imports. It has offered China and India long-term supplies as well as exploration and development contracts – in part to counter U.S. efforts to isolate and pressure Teheran as in 2006 tensions over Iran’s nuclear program mounted. China and India have deepened their military cooperation with Iran by way of joint exercises and arms deals.
- **Venezuela.** President Chavez has invited Chinese oil companies to explore Venezuela’s oil fields and to build refineries. China is investing in a pipeline that will carry Venezuelan oil to Colombia’s Pacific coastline, bypassing the Panama Canal on the way to China. It remains to be seen

what China's growing presence will mean in the context of increasingly hostile US-Venezuelan relations.

## Policy responses

Consuming nations typically close their eyes to conflicts and human rights violations in producer countries, as long as the security of supplies is not in question.

Over the past five years or so, however, awareness of the close links between resource extraction, underdevelopment, and armed conflict has grown rapidly. Campaigns by civic society groups and investigative reports by U.N. expert panels have shed light on these connections. A number of initiatives have been undertaken in order to address the connections between resource extraction and conflict, as the following summary of efforts indicates:

### *"Naming and shaming"*

Non-governmental groups (NGOs) have undertaken investigative reports and engaged in a strategy of "naming and shaming" specific corporations, in an effort to compel them to do business more ethically or to terminate their operations in war zones. Such campaigns have been most potent in the case of companies that sell highly visible consumer products, or whose corporate logos and slogans are familiar to millions.

- Much attention has been directed at the diamond industry (with "blood diamonds" becoming a well-known slogan), and it succeeded in changing at least part of the behavior of what has been—and still largely remains—a very secretive industry.
- Consumer electronics companies were pressured to scrutinize their supplies of coltan, a key ingredient of circuit boards, and to ask processing firms to stop purchasing illegally mined coltan. But this effort never gained the breadth, visibility, and impact of the diamond industry campaign.

### *Commodity tracking and global certification:*

Under the so-called Kimberley Process, governments, industry, and NGOs developed a standardized global certification system for diamonds. While this is a positive development, the resulting system suffers from a number of critical shortcomings. It relies primarily on voluntary participation, and falls short on effective monitoring, enforcement, and independent scrutiny.

A recent investigation by Global Witness finds that the adopted controls are either not strong enough or are not adequately enforced. Parts of the industry

continue to evade Kimberley controls, and others turn a blind eye. Conflict diamonds continue to be certified under the scheme (for example, diamonds mined in rebel-held parts of Cote d'Ivoire have reached international markets – via Mali, which is not a Kimberley Process participant. Diamonds from Liberia travel via Sierra Leone and Guinea).

With regard to timber, the European Union has attempted to bring greater transparency into its imports through its “Action Plan for Forest, Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade” (FLEGT) – a voluntary licensing system, in partnership with wood-producing countries. According to estimates, up to half of the EU's tropical timber imports are illegal at source – connected either to armed conflicts or organized crime.

### *Industry transparency*

Efforts have also been directed at making the reporting of revenue flows derived from natural resource extraction more transparent. Greater transparency helps discourage the use of such revenues for illicit and violent purposes.

For example, the “Publish What You Pay” initiative proposes that natural resource companies be required, as a condition of being listed on leading stock exchanges and financial markets, to disclose all taxes, fees, royalties, and other payments they make to host governments. Such a step would shed some light on often opaque financial transfers, and increase accountability of how such payments are used.

There is a rich array of tools and initiatives that are potentially available to address the connections between natural resource exploitation and conflicts. Consumer education, shareholder activism, and campaigns for ethical investing can help achieve these goals. With greater consumer awareness, more pressure can be brought to bear on companies to reassess their own practices. Still, many efforts face limits and shortcomings – in terms of inadequate enforcement, gaps between voluntary and mandatory action, and insufficient coordination among governments.

Natural resources will continue to fuel deadly conflicts as long as consumer societies import materials with little overall regard for their origin or the conditions under which they were produced. That's particularly true for oil, as the use of this commodity goes to the very heart of how modern economies function. In that sense, the geopolitics and security implications of oil are much harder to affect than is a commodity like diamonds – which may, due to clever advertising strategies, be seen as something critical to the success of personal relationships, but clearly is not critical to the overall economic wellbeing of societies.

# Western views on African responses to economic, social, and environmental dimensions of the global security agenda

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## Introduction

There has been a remarkable consensus on redefining the parameters of global security since the start of the new century. This consensus stems largely from the post-cold war coalescence around the centrality of human security and the popular idea of development as freedom. Both conceptions denote the indivisible nature of socio-economic, political, and environmental security in the age of globalization. Globalization has also heightened expectations that agreement on core security issues would lead to the search for universal prescriptions, minimizing the debilitating divisions that had previously hampered discussions about global security. But the emerging clarity on salient linkages of economic, social, and environmental concerns conceals continuing disagreements on strategies to realize security objectives. Although there is agreement on the definition of security, there is neither unanimity on policy prescriptions nor a new realistic division of labor to attain security.

Gaps between defining security problems and finding common approaches to them characterize Western perspectives on Africa's contribution to the global security agenda. Western views on Africa are, understandably, divergent across the spectrum of security domains, yet they all reveal the continuities of resource and organizational imbalances that structure the business of agenda setting on global issues. Although Africa has increasingly participated in multilateral settings that have determined the contours of global security, the widespread invocation of partnerships as the organizational mantra for relations between Africa and the West has not diminished the persistence of power asymmetries.

More pertinent, building genuine partnerships is made difficult when some Western approaches are driven by the muted objective of protecting the globe from Africa's insecurity problems. Protective policies are often articulated as bids to reengage disinterested Western citizenries on African issues, but they in-



variably deepen Africa's role as a bystander rather than a partner in the quest for common security. This paper suggests that differences in Western and African expectations about global security issues and, more centrally, the management of Africa's multiple insecurities, could be narrowed not by a return to paternalism, but by deepening the bonds of reciprocity and responsibility embedded in the evolving global norms and institutions of partnerships. I also contend that strengthening African voices in international security ultimately hinges on rebuilding African institutions of national and collective coherence and confidence.

### Shaping the Consensus on Human Security

The decisive turn in new conceptions of global security came with the post-cold war perspectives on human security, attempts to transcend the previous fixation with state and military security by restoring the centrality of individuals, groups, and societies in the security enterprise.<sup>1</sup> By placing individuals at the center of security, proponents of human security sought to capture the wide range of environmental, economic, and ecological vulnerabilities that impinge on sustenance and survival. Also crucial in the search for human security was the postulation that despite cultural and geographic differences, human beings share many things, including a desire for physical security and access to economic opportunities, legal and political rights (including the right to association, expression, and equitable treatment).<sup>2</sup> Posed in such universal terms, the concept of human security described the bundle of values and rights while at the same time prescribing the domestic and international institutions to secure them.

Amartya Sen broadened both the descriptive and prescriptive components of human security by situating freedom at the center of development.<sup>3</sup> He emphasized that freedom had intrinsic and instrumental roles that endowed individuals and communities with wider choices and capacities to reduce human and non-human vulnerabilities, in particular poverty, disease, resource deple-

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<sup>1</sup> For diverse perspectives on new and multiple meanings of security see Fen Osler Hampson, *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991).

<sup>2</sup> J.T. Mathews, 'Redefining Security,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 2 (1989), pp. 162-77. There have equally been conceptual challenges to the notion of human security, for instance, Roland Paris, 'Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?' *International Security* Vol. 25(2001), pp. 88-93.

<sup>3</sup> Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Anchor Books, 1999). See also the debate on Sen's ideas in Peter Evans and others, 'Symposium on *Development as Freedom* by Amartya Sen,' *Studies in Comparative International Development* Vol. 37, No. 2 (2002), pp. 54-70.

tion, and environmental degradation.<sup>4</sup> By linking freedom to development, Sen underscored the significance of democratic development within the framework of building institutions, a subject that had been obscured by the scholarly and policy invocation of the less precise concept of good governance.

Global conclaves and conferences galvanized the consensus about human security and development, lending multifaceted voices and deepening these debates. In a 1992 declaration, the United Nations Security Council formally recognized that “the non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian, and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security.”<sup>5</sup> Pursuant to this declaration, Boutros-Boutros Ghali’s drew the *Agenda for Peace* that posited an “integrated approach to human security” that would meet the deeper causes of conflict such as “economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression.”<sup>6</sup> In the same vein, starting with the United Nations Development Report of 1994, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) became one of the principal agencies of translating Sen’s ideas into its policy programs. The 1994 report lend a comprehensive definition to human security that embraced food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. Furthermore, it proposed that the post-cold war environment offered a unique chance for meeting the 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges of diseases such as HIV/AIDS, drug trafficking, terrorism, global poverty, and environmental concerns.<sup>7</sup>

In recognition of the global scope of the causes and sources of human security, there has been a programmatic activism by most multilateral institutions to meet some of the underlying security issues. Consistent with the emerging spirit of collective approaches, the world leaders meeting in Copenhagen in March 1995, for the first time in history, dedicated themselves to tackle the structural causes and consequences of human insecurity and uncertainty. At the center of the movement was the conviction that “democracy and transparent and accountable governance and administration in all sectors of society are indispensable foundations for the realization of social and people-centered sustainable development.” Further,

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<sup>4</sup> Sen, *Development as Freedom*, particularly Chapter 2.

<sup>5</sup>Cited in Hampson, *Madness in the Multitude*, p. 17.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations, *An Agenda For Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (New York: Report of the Secretary Pursuant to Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992).

<sup>7</sup> United Nations Development Programme, *Global Human Development Report* (New York: UNDP, 1994).

economic development, social development and environmental protection are interdependent and mutually reinforcing components of sustainable development, which is the framework for our efforts to achieve a higher quality of life for all people. Equitable social development that recognizes empowering the poor to utilize environmental resources sustainably is a necessary foundation for sustainable development. We also recognize that broad-based and sustained economic growth in the context of sustainable development is necessary to sustain social development and social justice.<sup>8</sup>

Subsequently, the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) tried to furnish programmatic coherence to the spirit of Copenhagen, envisioning reductions in poverty, child mortality, HIV/AIDS infections and other diseases; improvements in primary education, maternal health, gender equality, and environmental sustainability by 2015.<sup>9</sup>

Alongside the elaboration of socioeconomic and environmental features of human security have been initiatives to construct rules and procedures for global governance. Echoing the concerns embraced in the MDG, for instance, the movement to reform the United Nations reflects the search for governance and institutional mechanisms that can furnish appropriate structures to deal with security challenges in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The impetus for reforms is driven by the fact that most of the governance, democracy, and participation prescriptions of the MDG cannot be realized without both fundamental reforms in state structures and the system of interstate relations underpinned by the United Nations. The urgency of UN institutional reforms forced the Secretary General Kofi Annan to constitute a High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change to lead the dialogue on new international institutions for human security.

The High-level Panel has identified six clusters of threats of concern: war between states; violence within states that occasion human rights violations and genocide; poverty, infectious diseases, and environmental degradation; nuclear and biological warfare; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. To meet these threats, the panel has recommended strengthening and revamping existing collective institutions and the creation of new ones such as the Peacebuilding Commission. More important, it has endorsed the emerging norm of "responsi-

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<sup>8</sup> United Nations, Report of the World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen, March 6-12, 1995, UN Document A/CONF. 166/9. See also Lucia Hamner and Jon Wilmshurst, 'Are International Development Targets Attainable? An Overview,' *Development Policy Review* Vol. 18(2000), pp. 5-10.

<sup>9</sup> United Nations, *UN Millennium Development Goals Declaration* (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 2000).

bility to protect” civilians: “When a state fails to protect its civilians, the international community then has a further responsibility to act, through humanitarian operations, monitoring missions and diplomatic pressure – and with force if necessary, though only as a last resort. And in case of conflict or the use of force, this also implies a clear international commitment to rebuilding shattered societies.”<sup>10</sup>

United Nations reforms remain a work in progress, but the report by a Task Force on the United Nations commissioned by U.S. Congress echoes the recommendations of the High-Level Panel. The report focused on five substantive areas: conflict prevention and building stable societies; preventing and responding to genocide and human rights violations; preventing terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; ensuring the effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of the UN system; and fostering economic development and poverty reduction. The report reiterates the interest of the United States to work to reform the UN and make it an effective institution, but it also warns that Washington may explore new multilateral avenues if the UN refuses to reform itself.<sup>11</sup>

### The promise and problems of partnership

One of the pillars of the MDG is to develop a global partnership for development, a wide-ranging dialogue on governance, trade, aid, and investment issues by national and international state and non-state actors. Since the early post-Cold War era, “partnership” became the core concept undergirding the reformulation of relations between Africa and Western powers. In European-African relations, partnership involved the inauguration of debate on changing the Lomé Conventions that had guided economic relations between Europe and African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries for most of the independence period.<sup>12</sup> At the beginning of negotiations for the Lomé IV Convention in September 1998, the EU commissioner Joao de Deus Pinheiro heralded the end of the “postcolonial days,” which he saw as a “unique opportunity to develop a new partnership based on common interests that adapts to changes in the world.”<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup> United Nations, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change* (New York: United Nations, 2004), p. 4.

<sup>11</sup> United States Institute of Peace, *American Interests and UN Reform, Report of the Task Force on the United Nations* (Washington D.C.: USIP, 2006).

<sup>12</sup> Kaye Whitman, ‘Africa, the ACP, and Europe: The Lessons of 25 Years,’ *Development Policy Review* Vol. 16 (1998), pp. 29-37.

<sup>13</sup> Cited in Gilbert M. Khadiagala, ‘Europe in Africa's Renewal: Beyond Post-Colonialism?’ in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, (eds.), *Africa in World Politics: The African State System in Flux* (Boulder: Westview Publishers, 2000), p. 83.

For Europe, partnership denoted the weakening of immediate post-independence special relationships with Africa and the transition to more mature and differentiated relationships. The end of the Lomé process and signing of the Cotonou Convention marked a critical phase in the articulation of the foundations for these new relationships.<sup>14</sup> Although preserving most of the gains of the previous agreements, the Cotonou Agreement of June 2000 introduced radical changes in the relationships based on five interdependent pillars: an enhanced political dimension, increased participation, a more strategic approach to cooperation focusing on poverty reduction, new economic and trade partnerships, and improved financial cooperation.<sup>15</sup> Contributing to the emerging posture was Tony Blair's Africa Partnership Initiative and the British government's *Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalization Work for the Poor*, which argued for the need to help "developing countries build the effective government systems needed to reform their economic management, make markets work better for poor people, and meet the challenges of globalization."<sup>16</sup>

Although framed primarily in European-African contexts, the notion of partnership found resonance in the Clinton administration's African policy, furnishing a Trans-Atlantic flavor to an outlook that still informs the Bush administration's views. During his visit to six African countries in 1998, President Bill Clinton proclaimed the "beginning of a new African renaissance," permitting the United States to nurture a new partnership between Africa and Washington.<sup>17</sup> Partnership allowed the Clinton administration to erect its Africa policy on the objectives of democratization, trade integration, fighting HIV/AIDS, conflict resolution, and regional stability. U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs Susan Rice claimed that the most important contribution of the Clinton administration was to have "redefined the U.S. relationship with Africa. We have

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<sup>14</sup> Genevra Forwood, 'The Road to Cotonou: Negotiating a Successor to Lomé,' *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol. 39, No. 3 (2001), pp. 423-42.

<sup>15</sup> See Gorm Rye Olsen, 'Challenges to Traditional Policy Options, Opportunities for New Choices: The Africa Policy of the EU,' *The Round Table* Vol. 93, No. 375 (2004), pp. 425-436; and Olsen, 'Western Europe's Relations with Africa Since the End of the Cold War,' *Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 35, No. 2 (1997), pp. 299-319.

<sup>16</sup> Cited in Ray Bush and Giles Mohan, 'Africa's Future: That Sinking Feeling,' *Review of African Political Economy* Vol. 88 (2001), p. 149.

<sup>17</sup> For analyses of the Clinton Administration's policy and beyond see Khadiagala, "The United States and Africa: Beyond The Clinton Administration," *SAIS Review* Vol. 21, No. 1(2001), pp. 259-73; Okbazghi Yohannes, 'The United States and Sub-Saharan Africa After the Cold War: Empty Promises and Retreat,' *The Black Scholar* Vol. 32, No. 1 (2002), pp. 23-44; and Bill Martin, 'Waiting for Oprah and the New U.S. Constituency for Africa,' *Review of African Political Economy* Vol. 25, No. 75(1998), pp. 9-25.

moved beyond the Cold War competition, superpower exploitation, and patron-client mentality to establishing a partnership with Africa based on mutual interest and mutual respect."<sup>18</sup>

The Bush administration built on the central policy planks of the Clinton years such as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the HIV/AIDS initiatives, and regional capacity building for peacekeeping to elaborate its own version of partnership with Africa. In a new initiative, the Bush administration introduced the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) to provide development assistance to countries implementing a rigorous regimen of reforms. As the Millennium Corporation's new director, John Danilovich indicated: "Millennium Challenge is not for everyone. Since selection is driven by scores and data, countries suffering from corruption, poor governance, and instability won't receive our assistance. Further, countries accepted into the program but that fail to maintain passing scores on their policy indicators, or fail to design good proposals, or fail to implement their Compacts will risk losing their eligibility. We will not hesitate to say 'no' or 'no more.'"<sup>19</sup>

Since the early 1990s, reversing creeping Afro-pessimism has, in part, energized Trans-Atlantic perspectives on partnership. Following decades of civil strife and economic stagnation in Africa, Afro-pessimism pervaded the development agenda, breeding aid fatigue among Western publics at the inopportune moment of international attempts to redefine human security. Fearful of the growing domestic inertia on African issues and the further deepening of African marginalization, Western policymakers tried to reclaim the moral high ground by redefining most of the 21<sup>st</sup> century security concerns as fundamentally having African origins. Thus, at the heart of hardheaded realism that pervaded Western policies was the assumption that Africa mattered because it was the source of most of the global travails ranging from weak states to environmental degradation. Former Senator Nancy Kassenbaum Baker and a member of the Blair Commission for Africa neatly summarized the Africa-as-a problem perspective:

Today, much of Africa is caught in a cycle of environmental degradation, poverty, and humanitarian crises. Battles over the allocation of resources can lead to political conflict, which, in turn results in forced migration, disruptions to food sup-

<sup>18</sup> Cited in Yohannes, "The United States and Sub-Saharan Africa," p. 23.

<sup>19</sup> "Ambassador John J. Danilovich Keynote Speech at a conference hosted by the American Enterprise Institute to mark the Second Anniversary of the MCC," Washington, D.C.: MCC, January 23, 2006.

plies and other essential goods, and further environmental destruction. As a result, the international community feels the effects not only of local environmental degradation on the global environment, but also refugee flows, political and social instability, and sagging trade revenues.<sup>20</sup>

Consequently,

From the point of view of America policy, a significant proportion of American interests in Africa at first seem to involve guarding against the negative effects of events and trends there. From infectious diseases to environmental destruction, narcotics trafficking to terrorism, we live in a world where national and geographic boundaries have less meaning. As a world leader—and as a matter of self-interest—the United States has a responsibility for promoting peace, stability, and development in Africa.<sup>21</sup>

Similar perspectives have characterized Europe's approaches on African security. European perspectives have found conceptual defense in the works of Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz that purport widespread chaos and disorder as "normal" patterns of African politics.<sup>22</sup> Encapsulated in the broad ideas of a Fortress Europe, protective policies have tried to insulate Europe from the predicament of Africa's presence and proximity. Noting that Europe's Africa policy oscillates between tepid engagement and neglect of African concerns, one of the leading French Africanists, Jean-Francois Bayart, has warned of the dangers of "abandoning" Africa:

Europe has condemned Africa to further military turmoil in the form of civil wars and interventions of a para-colonial type by some Sub-Saharan states. Europe has abandoned the field of action to religious revolutions associated with sects and charismatic movements of a frequently obscurantist nature, which are formidable vehicles of changing political values. The logical outcome, other than

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<sup>20</sup> Nancy Kassenbaum Baker, "Why Africa Matters," in David C. Major and John S. Major (eds.), *The Future of Africa: Essays in Honor of David A. Morse* (New York: The New York Society for International Affairs, 2003), p. 255.

<sup>21</sup> Baker, "Why Africa Matters," p. 258. See also Gregory L. Joachim, 'Draining the Swamp or Feeding the Crocodiles in Sub-Saharan Africa?' *Orbis* Vol. 32(2005), pp. 155-70.

<sup>22</sup> Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (Oxford: James Currey, 1999).

a frightening decline in the conditions of life and a worrying political decay, is an unstoppable wave of emigration. Fortress Europe has no response other than bureaucratic and police repression. The ravages of HIV-AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, the incidence of crime, the destruction of the forest, and the growing brutality of wars are all indicators that should worry Europe and suggest to Europeans that their continent will not remain immune from this turbulence forever.<sup>23</sup>

The dilemma of protective policies on both side of the Atlantic is that although they are geared to re-ignite public engagement with Africa, they invariably reinforce the Africa-as-a problem dynamic that, then, precludes partnerships that go beyond these problems. A more perverse form of the globalization of the “African problem” is seen in the academic and policy debates across the pacific, appropriately labeled, the “Africanization of the South Pacific.”<sup>24</sup>

Western protective policies have been instrumental in shaping the content of the global security agenda, particularly in the parceling of global responsibilities to regional organizations. This is variously revealed in wide ranging discussions about the content of international commitments to African peacekeeping and conflict resolution, debates that have gravitated toward creative versions of African peacekeeping capacities that do not overly burden the international community.<sup>25</sup> Western interest in African peacekeeping abilities grew mainly from the failures of United Nations intervention in Somalia and Rwanda. These failures wrought African complaints about U.N. inattention to African security that forced a new discourse on responsibilities and burden sharing. Subsequently, a major component in the donor dialogue with Africa on peace and security has hinged on plans to build local capacity. For instance in 2002, the G8 countries came out with an Africa Action Plan that commits them to assist African regional organizations to engage more effectively to prevent and resolve conflicts. Similarly, the EU has provided 250 million Euros in its development cooperation funds in 2004 to the AU to pro-

<sup>23</sup> Jean-Francois Bayart, ‘Commentary: Towards a New Start for Africa and Europe,’ *African Affairs* Vol. 103, No. 412 (2004), pp. 456-57.

<sup>24</sup> See in particular Ben Reilly, ‘The Africanization of the South Pacific,’ *Australian Journal of International Affairs* Vol. 54, No. 3(2000), pp. 262-70; and David Chappell, ‘Africanization’ in the Pacific: Blaming Others for Disorder in the Periphery,’ *Comparative Studies in Society and History* Vol.25, No. 2(2005), pp. 286-317.

<sup>25</sup> See these debates in International Peace Academy, *Refashioning the Dialogue: Regional Perspectives on the Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operations* (New York: IPA, 2001); Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle, (eds.), *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in the New Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); and more recently, Susan Willet, ‘New Barbarians at the Gate: Losing the Liberal Peace in Africa,’ *Review of African Political Economy* No. 106(2005), pp. 569-90.



mote peacekeeping in Africa.<sup>26</sup> Despite local training programs and the anticipated conclusion of the UN missions in Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, African conflicts continue to dominate the bulk of the UN peacekeeping budgetary commitments. Moreover, as the ongoing discussions about the mandate and efficacy of the African Union Mission in Darfur (AMIS) reveal, local capacity building initiatives may not obviate the short and medium term need for strong leadership from outside Africa. Consequently, after the lukewarm commitment to Darfur, the depth of the suffering in the region has forced the United Nations Security Council to reluctantly assume a more proactive role to boost the African capacity.

Less charitable Western perspectives have rallied against the disproportionate costs of African conflicts on the United Nations and the international community. From these viewpoints, state failure and civil conflicts in Africa are a heavy burden to international security and ought to be managed either through indigenous resources or left to run their own course. Thus, as Marina Ottaway remarked in a *Financial Times* article, problems of state failure in Africa were unduly taxing the international community and Africa ought to be left to its own devices, including revisiting the colonial boundaries:

Time has come to accept the limitations of what the international community can do, take stock of the damage that intervention can cause, and sit on the sidelines as the old order crumbles. It was not a particularly good order, it never worked without outside intervention, and it is not worth restoring. The only sustainable order in the long run is one Africans establish and maintain themselves. And if some countries break up in the process, if borders change, if new entities appear, that is simply the march of history, not a catastrophe to be prevented at all costs.<sup>27</sup>

Partnership promised more equitable participation in common matters of global security, but it coincided with the escalation of state-and-nation-building challenges in Africa, problems that have occupied the better part of the global security agenda since the 1990s. When these conflicts propelled Africa into the invidious position of a major claimant on humanitarian aid and peacekeeping operations, they greatly diminished Africa's standing as a confident interlocutor in shaping solutions to these problems. In this respect, the tepid international response to the conflagration in Somalia, Rwanda, and Darfur illustrates the co-

<sup>26</sup> Liisa Laakso, 'Beyond the Notion of Security Community: What Role for the African Regional Organizations in Peace and Security?' *The Round Table* Vol. 94, No. 381(2005), p. 489.

<sup>27</sup> Marina Ottaway, 'Personal View: Keep Out of Africa,' *The Financial Times*, February 25, 1999.

nundrum of Africa's relative inability to contribute significantly to the post-cold war security agenda. Civil wars skewed African input in security issues, consigning Africa, for the most part, to a supplicant rather than a partner.

Closely related to the protective perspective was the notion advanced since the early 1990s that sees Africa's engagement with the globe as overwhelmingly tilted toward aid and debt.<sup>28</sup> From this view, Africa's huge debt stock has, among other things, circumscribed the effectiveness of current and future assistance; by the same token, relief from debt service payments is viewed as equivalent to inflows of resource from aid. In *Can Africa Claim the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, the World Bank signaled disquiet about Africa's negative role in the international economic system, proposing reforms on four fronts that would strengthen partnerships with donors: improving governance and resolving conflicts; investing in people; increasing competitiveness and diversifying economies; and reducing aid dependency and strengthening partnerships.<sup>29</sup>

Aid and debt questions epitomize key issues at the center of development partnership. Against the backdrop of diminishing Western engagement in Africa and policymakers fighting rearguard battles with restless taxpayers fatigued by foreign aid, partnership on economic issues exemplified the renewed search for shared responsibilities.<sup>30</sup> Whether it was the Clinton administration's objective of integrating Africa into the global economy or the EU's policy on new trade arrangements, the operative themes have been structural reforms and policy dialogue. From the West's purview, partnership entailed Africa's acceptance and domestication of the political and economic conditionality regimes which donors had propounded since the 1980s. For Africa, policies of partnership tried to recapture lost ground in garnering additional aid and debt relief.

Although domestication had met many obstacles during the 1980s, the widespread convergence around governance as a universal good and the inextricable linkages between governance and economic development seemed to signal the inevitability of conditionalities. Predicated on Western assistance to reforming countries, the conditionality regimes now inform wide-ranging donor expecta-

<sup>28</sup>James D. Wolfensohn, 'Africa and Development,' in David C. Major and John S. Major (eds.), *The Future of Africa: Essays in Honor of David A. Morse* (New York: The New York Society for International Affairs, 2003), pp. 219-34.

<sup>29</sup>World Bank, *Can Africa Claim the 21<sup>st</sup> Century?* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000).

<sup>30</sup>Paul Mosley and others, 'Aid, Poverty Reduction, and the 'New Conditionality', *The Economic Journal* Vol. 114 (2004), pp. 217-43 and Tony Killick, 'Politics, Evidence, and the New Aid Agenda,' *Development Policy Review* Vol. 22, No. 1(2004), pp. 5-29. See also the essays by Michael Chege and Goran Hyden in Francis M. Deng and Terrence Lyons, (eds.), *African Reckoning: A Quest for Good Governance* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1998).

tions about political management, rule of law, respect for property rights, and accountability. Even as conditionality has, in some instances, given way to policy selectivity, the standards of expectations for donors and recipients remain embedded in the language of reciprocity and compliance with the burgeoning conditions attached to aid disbursements. For instance, the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative fashioned initially to alleviate the unsustainable debt burden has grown into the comprehensive movement for debt forgiveness that the G8 industrialized countries adopted in July 2005 by promising 100 per cent debt forgiveness to an initial group of fourteen African countries.<sup>31</sup>

Western policies of conditionality and selectivity are the most realistic approaches to managing political differentiation in Africa and the multiple responses to donor stimuli and incentives over pertinent questions of economic security. Through the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), Africa has essentially lurched onto such differentiation and began ownership of conditionalities. Yet, as Nicky Oppenheimer has noted in his critique of the G8's debt relief proposals, some donor programs may not foster responsibility:

[T]he debt cancellation plan currently proposed does not distinguish between responsible and bad governments. In so doing, it will significantly increase the difficulty for responsible African governments to develop instruments to fund their own development. Debt relief – like aid – in this way ‘shorts’ African economies . . . Blanket aid – such as the wholesale cancellation of debt, irrespective of the capacity of the recipient country – could have the effect of sweeping away good practices in those countries struggling to achieve it. It will also, inevitably, take responsibility for the solution to Africa's problems away from Africans themselves. There is also a tendency in all those who espouse the Big Aid concept, to adopt an ever-expanding wish list of target problems, which, it is assumed, can be resolved by the ever bigger injections of aid.<sup>32</sup>

Partnerships premised on differentiation are also inevitable in light of the efforts by Western governments and donors to find countries that approximate the standards established in various conditionality regimes. But in both the political and socioeconomic realms, some choices of African partners may fragment African voices in the articulation of global security agenda and probably impede pro-

<sup>31</sup> Pratibha Thaker, “Africa: Hope or Hype?” *The Economist*, Special Issue, The World In 2006, p. 57.

<sup>32</sup> Nicky Oppenheimer, ‘African Needs a Hand Up, Not a Hand-Out,’ Speech delivered at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Arundel House, London, June 13, 2005.

ductive policies that would benefit most of these countries. These were some of the criticisms that plagued the Clinton administration's close relations with Africa's ostensible New Leaders—Uganda's Yoweri Museveni, Ethiopia's Meles Zenawi, Eritrea's Isias Afwerki, and Rwanda's Paul Kagame. Not only did the partnership compromise an African policy that claimed to promote democracy, but also more important, it narrowed the choices of U.S. engagement with other African countries. When the new leaders ceased to be the vaunted fonts of Africa's rejuvenation, the credibility of U.S. policy was affected.<sup>33</sup>

In recent years, African countries have found representation at the annual summits of G8 countries, with Nigeria and South Africa as regular participants. Similarly, the Davos committee has routinely invited South Africa, Nigeria, and a smattering of other African leaders to the annual conclave. There was also the much-publicized presence of Tanzania's Benjamin Mkapa and Ethiopia's Zenawi on the Blair Commission for Africa. Soon after working on the Commission, Meles presided over the decimation of Ethiopian democracy and, in turn, invited the ire and sanctions of the British government. These invitations (and African participation in specialized functional institutions) connote a growing respect and recognition of African voices in shaping the global economic agenda, but they also raise profound questions as to whether such limited and sporadic participation trivializes African perspectives. How much of what passes for African participation at Davos and the G8 is substantive representation and how much of it is tokenism that sustains the illusion of movement on African concerns?<sup>34</sup> Meeting the enormity of Africa's political and economic difficulties will not occur with the fanfare of Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki's annual attendance at the G8 or Davos meetings.

### Toward realistic partnerships

Partnerships that proceed from the assumption of a problem-ridden Africa are unlikely to provide the solid basis for advancing the debate away from humanitarianism, Christian charity, and peacekeeping. Rather, there is need for a conceptual shift to perspectives that underscore the Africa of multiple opportunities.

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<sup>33</sup> For some of these criticisms see Khadiagala, 'The United States and Africa,' pp. 259-73.

<sup>34</sup> Jonathan Katzenellenbogen, 'Africa Slides Down Agenda At Davos As Asia Takes Centre Stage,' *Business Day*, Johannesburg, January 25, 2006, complains that at the recent Davos meeting, Africa was been upstaged by China and India: "It was at Davos back in the early 1990s that South African made some of its early steps towards re-entry into the international community, and where the initial thinking behind the New Partnership for Africa's Development was presented."

Yet the Africa-as-opportunity posture entails the expenditure of considerable resources to resolve problems that animate the logic of Africa-as-a problem. Western ideas on African opportunities converge, at heart, on trade and market integration, the rallying themes of globalization. These views are inspired by the conviction that most of Africa's economic problems lie in the precipitous decline of private investment and share of global trade. Although MDG goals are important to check Africa's economic woes, they are merely the economic versions of humanitarianism that may not address the vital objectives of self-sustaining growth. On the other hand, trade and investments are preferred in the long run because they may steadily enhance African participation in the global economy on more symmetrical and reciprocal terms.

In the U.S. policy context, there has been a recent bid to underline African opportunities, best illustrated by the report of the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Africa. This report is neither novel nor should it be read in isolation from previous policy initiatives on Africa. It draws largely from the ideas articulated by academic, corporate, and civil society actors who have built a broad-based constituency for Africa in the United States since the 1990s. The Council's report is instructive in underscoring the African opportunities that work in favor of trade integration and investments germane to new partnerships:

The Task Force believes it is critical to develop a new, comprehensive U.S. policy toward Africa that maintains the historic and principled concern for humanitarian issues, while broadening the basis for U.S. engagement. Such a comprehensive policy should place Africa squarely in the mainstream of U.S. global policy objectives. The Task Force recommends that the United States advance a policy to help integrate Africa more fully into the global economy. The new policy would also mean making Africa an active partner in U.S. programs to assure the safe and reliable supplies of energy for the world market, safe and reliable supplies of energy for the world market, combat terrorism, reduce conflict, and control pandemic diseases, and enlarge the worldwide community of democracies.<sup>35</sup>

Although the report exaggerates China's strategic challenge to Western interests in Africa, it accurately identifies the need for mutual responsibilities among a wide range of global actors in Africa's renewal. The report also recognizes the

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<sup>35</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, *More Than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach Toward Africa* (Washington D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force Report No. 56, 2006), p. 14

central role of African leadership in debates about conflict resolution, governance, the HIV/AIDS crisis, and economic recovery.

Across the Atlantic, the report by the Blair Commission for Africa sounds similar themes. The report highlights shared responsibilities in a “new kind of partnership,” based on “mutual respect and solidarity.” On Africa’s part, leadership is essential:

Africa’s development must be shaped by Africans. History has shown us that development cannot and does not work if policies are shaped and forced by outsiders. It is Africa’s actions and leadership that will be the most important determinants of progress in generating a resurgence in Africa, advancing living standards and taking forward the fight against poverty. The more effective the action taken by Africa itself, the stronger the case for support from outside Africa. Partnership must be constructed around Africa’s leadership. This is what AU/NEPAD is all about.<sup>36</sup>

There is also need for wider leadership in the developed world:

Strong and sustained action from developed countries in support of Africa’s development requires action for Africa to be a domestic political issue in developed countries. That, in turn, requires both political leadership and political support. This can come from parliamentarians, the electorates, the media, the private sector and civil society as a whole. Whilst all these sources of pressure are interrelated, they all have their individual roles to play. It was political leadership prompted by civil society and development campaigners that led to the foundation of the Commission for Africa.<sup>37</sup>

The recommendations of the Blair Commission for Africa and other initiatives by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries constitute efforts to strengthen responsibilities and reciprocities. As Zoe War has noted of the Blair Commission Report:

Although it has been criticized as more meaningless promises, it has signaled a reinvigorated interest in the continent. The Commission’s eminent panel has given

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<sup>36</sup> Commission for Africa, *Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa*. London: Commission for Africa, 2005, p. 370.

<sup>37</sup> Commission for Africa, *Our Common Interest*, p. 382.

the report credence, and it has undoubtedly benefited from having Tony Blair as its 'champion.' The report has begun to correct the image of Africa as a hopeless beggar with an unquenchable thirst for aid by placing emphasis on a 'partnership between the developed world and the continent of Africa that goes beyond the old donor/recipient relations.'<sup>38</sup>

Finding realistic partnerships is ultimately a momentous challenge in the redefinition of security and the task of establishing an intricate balance between sovereignty and responsibility.

Africa has been an essential actor in the fashioning of the agenda of the human security and development agenda, but international norms and strictures take much longer to translate into domestic contexts. At the African Union (AU) summit in Sirte in 2004, African states adopted a comprehensive view of human security, including human rights, participatory governance, equal development, access to resources and basic necessities of life, protection against poverty, good education, and health, gender equality and environmental integrity. In addition, the NEPAD initiative seeks to establish common variables that conform to international standards and norms that would, in turn, generate donor resources for development and poverty reduction. But NEPAD is still new and untested and its success will depend significantly on the ability of individual African states to muster sufficient political will to carry out the stringent reforms and conditions that accompany the aid provisions. At the same time, there are no guarantees that donors will fulfill their pledges toward NEPAD.<sup>39</sup> Although its flagship program, the Peer Review Mechanism, conforms to growing Western expectation about local accountability to domestic and international constituencies, the credibility of its structures may be watered down if all governments jumped onto the bandwagon of supervision and eligibility.

No amount of external incentives and disincentives can restore the institutional confidence and coherence of African states. Since most of the threats to individuals and societies in Africa are national, this is the arena where the domestication of the human security agenda needs to start. Knowledge about re-

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<sup>38</sup> Zoe Ware, 'Reassessing Labor's Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa,' *The Round Table* Vol. 95, No. 383 (2006), p. 150.

<sup>39</sup> For contrasting perspectives on NEPAD see Nicholas Cook, *New Partnership for Africa's Development* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, November 12, 2002); International Peace Academy, 'NEPAD: African Initiative, New Partnership?' (New York: IPA Workshop Report, July 16, 2002); and Alex De Waal, 'What's New in the 'New Partnership for Africa's Development?' *International Affairs* Vol. 78 No. 3(2002), pp. 463-75.

solving internal threats is very much in the public domain, starting with experiments with federalism, power sharing, and other constitutional arrangements that are critical to the stabilization of the African domestic environments. Since the 1990s, experience reveals that even ethnically divided societies, have, with leadership, commitment, and creativity, managed to stabilize politics and circumvented some of the circumstances of weak polities and economy. There has equally been progressive accumulation of institutional patterns about probity and accountability as organizing principles for economic management. Even without the severe supervisory regiment of donors, African states can seize these experiences and knowledge as part of the fundamental enterprise of restoring internal confidence in rules and institutions.

In regaining African coherence, there is also need to revisit the sub-regional context of African problem solving where the post-colonial functionalist objectives of economic integration and trade promotion are gradually getting drowned in the cacophony of peacekeeping, peace-building, and security collaboration. Once African sub-regional organizations began to assume decidedly security roles in the 1990s, they lost their *raison d'être*, inaugurating the current phase of weak and inchoate regionalisms. The most realistic pattern in rethinking the African security agenda is to refocus the attention of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic Community of Central African States (ECASS), and the East African Cooperation (EAC) toward the more traditional roles of trade integration and market expansion primarily because these organizations have more potential to adequately deal with these questions than the amorphous mandates of security collaboration that are inordinately taxing their abilities. Although the dominant trend has been for Western countries to devote resources in the security roles of sub-regional institutions, it probably makes more sense to invest more resources in the security institutions of the African Union (AU) than in functional sub-regional organizations.

## Conclusion

Agenda setting on global security still reflects the persistence of power imbalances, a problem that is not going to away soon. But there have been vistas for African participation, witnessed in Africa's input in the United Nations reform initiatives, the participation of key African leaders in the G8 summits, and finally in Africa's loud voice in the Doha Rounds of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations. All these have been avenues for the articulation of African positions on ques-



tions that reflect the intersection of governance, economics, and human security. The lesson from the WTO negotiations is that although African expertise, organization, and preparedness are critical variables in agenda setting, like before, Africa triumphs on global issues when these issues are not specifically African. Such globalization of the economic agenda (as in other security realms) also, invariably, mitigates the problem of 'Africanization' of the global security issues.

Africa's contribution to shaping the contours of future international security will hinge on resolving the multiple problems that retard respect for its voices and positions in the international arena. Equally pertinent, the principal obstacle to an appreciation of Africa contribution to global security agenda is the absence of internal conviction, organizational coherence, and the confidence that accrues from wider structures of domestic legitimacy and control. Coherence is a problem of the internal, regional, and continental fragmentation of African voices, but it also relates to the inability of African actors to exude sufficient confidence in framing their contributions to international debates. African partnerships with global actors have underscored the primacy of collective approaches to reducing the obstacles to human insecurity, but they cannot substitute for African initiatives that are anchored on local demands and responsibilities.

# Environmental and social dimensions of global security

*Elvin Nyukuri*

## Introduction

There have been many attempts to be more specific in identifying the linkages between the environment and security. To date these efforts have focused on the integration of security definitions into the issue of environmentally caused scarcities and conflicts.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, identifying the specific environmental cases that threaten a specific security issue is neither direct nor straightforward. Not all environmental problems are security problems. In fact, most environmental problems are decidedly not security problems. This is not to say they are any less important or critical to national and international agendas. Security issues are not inherently military, economic or in this case environmental.<sup>2</sup> Security is a response to the interplay between just such elements. Peter Gleick<sup>3</sup> considers threats to security to include resource and environmental problems that reduce the quality of life and result in increased competition and tensions.

The former US Secretary of State under the Clinton administration, Warren Christopher, once said, 'The environment has a profound impact on our national interests in two ways: first, environmental forces transcend borders and oceans to threaten directly the health and prosperity, and jobs of American Citizens. Second, addressing natural resources issues is frequently critical to achieving political and economic stability and to pursuing our strategies goals around the world.'

Damage to shared resources can have major impacts on the stability of relationships between with focus on security issues. The analysis of environmental issues must go together with the analyses of related security issues. If one begins from the environmental perspective, it is necessary to first establish the entire range of environmental issues, characterize their local consequences and then determine if there are any security issues that are impacted.

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<sup>1</sup> Shaw. B. (1996) *When are Environmental issues Security issues?* Woodrow Wilson Centre. Environmental Change; Security Project issue2, Spring.

<sup>2</sup> Anders Hjort af Ornas & Krokfos Christer. (1992), *Environment and International Security*, PRIO 7 Research Programme on Environment and International Security, Department of Human Geography, Upsala University.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Peter H. Gleick is a scientist working on issues related to the environment economic development & international security, with a focus on global freshwater challenges. <http://www.pacinst.org>.

This paper will focus on the Horn of Africa because sub Saharan Africa is a very large region and it is impossible to generalize about it. It will discuss selected characteristics of environmental patterns in the Horn of Africa, characteristics of conflict in the Horn, the major processes of environmental degradation that are taking place in the Horn, and a review of the literature on environmental sources of conflict model used by Thomas Homer developed by Thomas Homer-Dixon fits some of the situations experienced in the horn. The last section of this paper shall look at some of the findings of the ACTS project on ecological sources of conflict in the Horn and Great Lakes.

### **Characteristics of environments in the Horn of Africa**

Environments in the greater Horn of Africa exhibit great variety within each state. Somalia, for example, includes within its borders rich agricultural areas such as the Shabelle and Juba Valleys as well as large arid and semi arid land (ASAL) areas. The highland areas of Ethiopia and Kenya are internationally recognized for biodiversity. This variety also represents a wider range of livelihood strategies, each fitting into an ecological niche.

The key resource areas in this region have greater significance to livelihood systems than their size would suggest. These key areas include rivers, seasonal streams, salt licks, pockets of high precipitation such as hills and plateau as well as valley bottoms with high soil moisture content. Such areas, which comprise five to ten percent of the total land area of Africa's savannas, form lifelines for local communities. Degradation of these areas or their conversion into other uses may have negative impacts on livelihoods across a wide area.

Great variability exists in productivity in relation to seasons and cycles. The climate is characterized by great extremes, compared to the more temperate altitudes. Large areas of the Horn are regularly affected by droughts and floods often in rapid succession. In the last 30 years there has been at least one major drought event per decade. There is some evidence that these cycles are becoming unstable because of global warming.

Many ecosystems and livelihood systems straddle international borders. Examples of this include drainage basins and rivers such as Lake Victoria (Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi) and the Barka and Gash Rivers linking the Ethiopian highlands to south-eastern Sudan. Other examples include the pastoral migration routes of many communities such as the Maasai who regularly cross the Kenya/Tanzania Border or the Nuer who live on both sides of the Sudan-Ethiopia border. Transboundary pastures are particularly affected by violent cattle raiding and conflict.

Global climate change may be changing climatic cycles. While this has yet to be unequivocally proven, many scientists believe that the greenhouse effect is having a negative impact on climatic regimes. Evidence put forward for this theory includes rising temperatures, decreasing rainfall and the spread of desert areas.

Natural resources livelihoods are vulnerable to external shocks. Aside from global environmental changes mentioned above, African environments are also affected by changes in international markets. For example, the fall in price of livestock and the recent embargo on exports from Somalia to Arabian Peninsula may be one factor in environmental degradation in pastoral areas as herders graze more and more animals and change herd composition to compensate.

View points of the value of natural resources differ between communities and between local/national/international interests. Especially in rural settings traditional livelihood systems are part and parcel of cultural identity - the cultural and spiritual significance of cattle to pastoral groups is one example. Environmental features such a forest groves have great cultural, historical and /or religious significance to certain tribal or identity groups. Western/scientific methods of cost benefit analysis or conservation paradigms may not take these into account.

Land tenure regimes are often contested and are a root cause of many other problems, especially in rangeland areas. Many areas are customarily subject to multiple uses, often differing seasonally by a variety of stakeholders. However, these are rarely reflected in legal regimes. Dryland zones are typically owned by the state, which holds the land in trust for the nation. In practice, land is often alienated from local communities, without compensation, for projects which do not benefit them. More widely, women often have fewer rights to land than men, especially in terms of traditional inheritance systems: while they may enjoy user rights, they may not have full ownership. The security that was embedded in some of the traditional systems often through access to communal resources, has diminished due to the erosion of these traditional systems.

### **Selected characteristics of conflict in the Horn**

Interstate conflicts have significant overspill effects on neighbouring countries. These typically include small arms flows, influx of refugees, and the cross-border operations of armed opposition groups. Around centres of conflict there are often extended zones of bounded instability which experience sporadic violence.

Conflicts are linked in complex and changing ways, including the need for regional alliances, arms supplies, border security agreements and other regional

political agreements. As the balance of power in one conflict shifts, another conflict may be effected. The Sudan conflict is said to be the hub of a conflict system.

Survival in specific ecological zones demands the evolution of particular livelihood strategies. These strategies and their accompanying cultural forms, lead to the formation of an ethnic identity. Ecological borders therefore tend to become ethnic and social borders and are often the scene of conflict. However, identity is more fluid and constructed than is often supposed and is often manipulated.

Most of the casualties in modern warfare are civilians. Because conflict often takes ethnic overtones, and because modern African wars generally involve militias and guerrillas rather than regular troops, it is all too easy for civilians to be targeted just because they belong to an enemy group. This total war effect as well as ruthless counter-insurgency strategies employed by some states leads to the destruction of homes and food stocks as well as human rights abuses.

International border zones are specifically conflict affected. These zones of friction are the most politically and economically marginalized, with weak state administrative structures focused on security concerns rather than community development. Such situations may also involve deliberate destabilizing tactics from neighbouring countries. Examples include the Ogaden region adjacent to the Ethiopian-Somalia border, Red Sea Hills region on the Sudan-Eritrea border and Eastern Equatorial Province in Southern Sudan which borders Uganda and Kenya.

## **Environmental stress in the Horn**

Some major process of environmental degradation that are taking place in the Horn include; land degradation, deforestation, watershed degradation, water scarcity, pollution, biodiversity loss and dispossession of communities from local resources. This typology is, however, meant to be indicative and not exhaustive.

Land degradation as discussed earlier is a problem in many areas. The term encompasses a wide range of processes. One of the most notorious and controversial in the Horn is desertification which can also result from the interaction of a number of processes including the increasing frequency of drought and grazing or cultivation without the appropriate management and mitigation measures.

Deforestation is another problem affecting all the countries in the Horn due to collection of firewood, charcoal burning, expansion of cultivated land for subsistence farming and commercial logging interests. This activity has a number of impacts such as possible adverse changes to the microclimate, loss of habitat for wild species - including medicinal plant varieties used locally to treat illness.

Watershed degradation is a key problem in many countries of the Horn. Deforestation is a major cause of the phenomenon as it results in changes to surface water flows and ground water recharge rates. Many communities have seen their local rivers dwindle while others experience flash-floods. Such watershed degradation also involves increased soil erosion, which increases nutrient build-ups in lakes and rivers affecting flora and fauna. Such impacts can be international. As an example, watershed degradation in Ethiopia has led to increased siltation rates in Sudan's Gezira irrigation scheme.

Water scarcity which is partially caused by watershed degradation is also due to the increasing number of competing claims for water for a wide variety of subsistence and commercial uses. Even if water rights can be allocated successfully, it is very difficult to monitor and enforce water use due to lack of funds within the ministries as well as among water users. It is predicted that by 2025, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi Kenya and Ethiopia will experience water scarcity. Eritrea, Uganda and Tanzania will be water stressed. Water availability is also a factor of water quality; which is poor and deteriorating in many areas due to siltation and biological and chemical pollution.

Pollution is a problem in some areas especially urban areas and coastal deltas. Poorly regulated industries may contaminate water supplies or land. Slum dwellers in urban and peri-urban areas are also vulnerable to pollution, often living in river valley areas which absorb raw sewage or next to industrial areas with many associated health risks. In most countries environmental impact assessment is a legal requirement for large industrial projects. However, regulatory bodies in the region rarely have sufficient capacity or political will to enforce these laws comprehensively.

Biodiversity loss is also a problem particularly in densely populated areas. Diversity of crop and livestock varieties is a key component of food security in horn and there is a strong foundation of indigenous knowledge to manage biodiversity to best advantage. However, some of this diversity is under threat. There are many processes involved in biodiversity loss particularly the spread of monoculture agricultural practices, deforestation, drainage and cultivation of wetlands and coastal development and pollution. Drainage systems for example are threatening some of the world's largest and most ecologically significant wetlands in Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Sudan. Tanzania and Kenya have the greatest number of threatened and endangered plant and animal species in the Horn.

Dispossession of communities from local resources has been occurring since colonial times and continues at a rapid pace today. Dispossession occurs in a variety of ways. Legal means include the eviction of communities from their an-

cestral lands because of national interest. Semi-legal mechanisms include the selling of land by local leaders to politically connected businessmen. The ambiguous nature of land tenure in some areas and the lack of consultation with affected communities put the legality of such transactions into question. Outright illegal means are many and they include the use of violence, bribery and intimidation to displace resident populations; and clandestine resource extraction.

### Homer-Dixon model

Long before Homer-Dixon modeled the linkages between renewable resource scarcity and conflict, other scholars questioned the limitations of traditional security thinking centred on the protection of state territories through defensible boundaries. Rather they suggested an expansion of security definitions to incorporate economic and in particular environmental aspects. Ullman's pioneering 1983 article on 'redefining security' challenged the state-centric understandings of security and uncovered a great concern for crossborder security threats that demanded different tools and techniques than conventional ones employed to secure state securities.<sup>4</sup> Ullman maintained that it is useful to view security not only as a goal - implying military ones (as in removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait during the Operation Desert Storm), but also as a consequence of actions that improve the environment (such as planting trees on farms to increase the availability of fuelwood on smallholder farms).

Ullman purposefully re-defined security broadly to account for a wide range of environmental threats, including natural catastrophies such as earthquakes, and resource scarcities. Just as Homer-Dixon predicted in articles 12 years later, Ullman cautioned that conflicts over territory and resources were likely to grow and most would be in third world countries. Like Homer-Dixon, Ullman linked environmental threats to the security of Northern states by anticipating that immigration pressures would grow in Northern countries as refugees flee the deteriorating security of third world states, caused in large part by unwanted environmental events or conditions to the relative safety and security of Northern, first world states.

Ullman was followed in his call for expanding the traditional definition of security by Mathew's influential article on redefining security, published in the widely referenced *Foreign Affairs Journal*.<sup>5</sup> Mathew, like Ullman, cautioned that the threat posed by deteriorating environmental conditions was significant

<sup>4</sup> Ullman, R. (1983). 'Redefining Security' *International security*, 8, 129-153.

<sup>5</sup> Mathew, J. (1989). *Redefining security*. *Foreign affairs*, 68, 162-177

enough to pose security threats to US interests. Mathew called for a broadening of national security to encompass resource, environmental and demographic issues.<sup>6</sup> To support the argument that security definitions needed to be expanded to include environmental dimensions, Mathew assessed the state of a number of environmental ills, including deforestation, loss of genetic diversity, desertification and soil erosion. These environmental problems were significant sources of grave economic and political woes in Sub-Saharan Africa whose condition she characterized as 'catastrophic'. In Mathew's view, security planning had to incorporate environmental conditions and this meant widening security planning to a regional level to contend with cross-border environmental problems.

Deudney and others are more cautious about incorporating environmental factors into security planning. Deudney warns against treating environmental factors, and more specifically environmental degradation, as a national security issue.<sup>7</sup> Instead he contends that most of the causes of, and the solutions to, environmental problems must be located outside the domain of the traditional national security system. Dalby adds to Deudney's concerns, pointing out that although environmental issues may gain prominence under the rubric security research and planning, security solutions may not apply to environmental problems.<sup>8</sup>

Revisiting the classic theoretical frameworks developed by Thomas Homer Dixon<sup>9</sup>, environmental scarcity is a function of three variables; namely: 1) supply-induced scarcity which is caused by degradation in quality and/or quantity of the resource, 2) demand-induced scarcity caused by population growth and/or increased per capita consumption, and 3) structural scarcity arising from unequal distribution of resources.

Shortages in the availability of natural resources lead to the impoverishment of those most dependent upon them. Poverty prevents investments in technological means to improve the efficiency of resource use or to utilize alternatives.

This has led some analysts to combine data on environmental scarcity with data on social and technological capacity of the countries affected. For example water scarcity combined with Human Development Indicators is equated with social water stress index.

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<sup>6</sup>See Mathew 1989. pg 62

<sup>7</sup> Deudney, D. (1990). 'The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security' *Nillenium: Journal of International Studies*, 19, 461-476.

<sup>8</sup> Dalby, S. (1992). Ecopolitical discourse: "environmental security" and political geography. *Progress in Human Geography*, 16, 503-522

<sup>9</sup> Homer -Dixon, T (1999). 'Thresholds of Turmoil: Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict'. *Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the new Environmental Politics*. Eds. Deudney, D. H , and Mathew, R. A. Albany State University of New York Press.



Scarcity does not usually lead directly to conflict: instead, scarcity leads to negative social and economic effects which then contribute to conflict. Principal social and economic effects are thought to include;

- decrease in agricultural production
- general economic decline
- population displacement
- disruption of institutions and social relations

Resource scarcity reduces livelihood options leading to more frequent and serious violations of regulations and norms of behaviour. Over time, especially if local and state responses are inappropriate or inadequate, this will result in conflicts which are diffuse, persistent and low level.

*This model does not fit some of the situations experienced in the Horn. For example*

Agricultural production is declining in certain areas such as the thousands of hectares affected by salinisation due to poor irrigation management, or in areas affected by recurrent drought and water scarcity. In the 1980's, for example, thousands of hectares of irrigated land in the Awash Valley of Ethiopia were abandoned due to salinisation after only a few years of irrigation.

The shrinking pastoralist resource base in a number of countries, resulting from the sale or appropriation of key resource areas for rain-fed and irrigated agriculture, is an example of structural scarcity. Large scale mechanized and irrigated agriculture has received significant government policy support in Sudan and Ethiopia, in particular, often at the expense of subsistence livelihoods. In the Awash valley of Ethiopia, for example, pastoralists had lost access to some 52,000 hectares of dry and wet season grazing by 1997, due to the spread of large scale irrigation and the establishment of the Awash National Park.

Also the Horn has among the largest numbers of refugees in the world. Globally 5 of the 10 countries generating the most refugees are in the Eastern Africa Region. Some observers claim that some have been displaced due to environmental degradation including falling land productivity as well as reduced access to land (e.g due to plot fragmentation).

Homer- Dixon model highlights only violent forms of conflict involving environmental factors. However, there are multiple other non-violent contests with significant environmental underpinnings that are omitted from his analysis, even though their assessment would inform a much richer understanding of environment and conflict.

This model is necessarily simplistic as no differentiation is made, for example, between agricultural production at the household level and aggregates at the local/national /regional level. Access to food depends on a variety of factors in addition to overall food availability. Case studies could indicate whether widespread chronic food deficiencies are more likely to trigger conflict than localized acute food scarcity.

The governance environment will determine whether the effects of economic decline are felt evenly across society or are concentrated on the politically marginalized. The question then is whether conflict is more likely to occur when poor governance means that the marginalized are further impoverished, or when good governance means that a powerful elite feels its economic advantage slipping away. This raises further issues: trade offs between equality and national stability at least during a transition period from poor governance to good governance?

Population movements (except for those following sudden disaster such as flood or volcanic explosion) are generally the result of a combination of factors. These may include, perceived political marginalization, threat of conflict, general economic decline and drought. It is difficult to pin point one primary cause.

Disruption of institutions often due to political interference is a common non-ecological grievance that can be a motivating factor for conflict. There are numerous examples of centralized state institutions in the Horn intentionally weakening local institutions. It is, therefore, necessary to understand the political context to know the significance of environmental variables in institutional disruption.

Because of the number of non-ecological variables involved and the complexity of the processes of change, we must be careful not to over-estimate the significance of ecology. This is a particular risk as it is in the interests of some actors to use environmental change as a non political scapegoat for conflict.

In Darfur, western Sudan, for example, the effects of drought, degradation of grazing land and competing land use regimes (modern, customary, pastoral and sedentary) have been blamed for violence between pastoralists communities (such as Rizeigat), on the one hand, and farming communities such as (Fur), on the other. During the last two decades, more than 40 intertribal conflicts have occurred with significant loss of life.

The government has blamed the violence on bandits and observers wary of making political statements emphasize the environmental factors. Indeed, environmental changes which have caused a decrease in agricultural production, a general economic decline, population displacement and disruption of institu-

tions and social relations. However, they must be seen within the wider context of governance.

Still in Sudan, while the series of North/South internal wars have often been portrayed as resulting from a long standing religious confrontation between a northern Arab Islamic government and a Christian and animist African minority who practice pastoral and agropastoralism in the south, regional social exclusion characterized by relative deprivation in access to political, social and economic resources has been a primary motivation of insecurity.

Northern Sudan has a long history of exploitation and violent competition for resources against southern Sudan. The Dinka who live in the south have faced repeated violence and exploitation ever since. As early as the nineteenth century there had been widespread raiding for slaves and cattle that became a major source of tribute for the Turko-egyptian state. The slaves from the south had to provide much of the social and commercial infrastructure for large parts of northern Sudan. It was also at this time that strong Islamic thought had divided the world into the domain of Islam (Dar al-islam) and the domain of war (Dar al harb) where taking slaves as the prize of war was permitted. Efforts to abolish the slavery rarely had an impact at the local level where bribes from slave merchants were given a blind eye. This exploitation further benefited the cattle herding peoples of western Sudan known as the Baggara.<sup>10</sup>

The roots of the present series of conflicts can be traced back to the colonial era. When the British consolidated their rule over Sudan at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, the Dinka continued to be a target for social exclusion, exploitation and man-made famine. The continued Baggara raids on the Dinka was also tolerated as a way of defusing their potential as a political threat.<sup>11</sup> While the British attempted to reverse this situation in the last decade before independence, they were unsuccessful in instilling the sort of constitutional reform that could have remedied the acute economic and social disparities between the regions.<sup>12</sup>

Social exclusion witnessed in Sudan as mentioned above is not, however, the only social dimension of security. There are several and this include mostly the psycho-social ones e.g homeless, landless, destitute, injured, deaths, abuse and rural-

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<sup>10</sup> Keen, D. (1994). *The benefits of Famine: A political economy of famine relief in South Western Sudan*. 1883-1989. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

<sup>11</sup> See Keen D. 1994.

<sup>12</sup> Save the Children, Christian Aid, Oxfam, Care, IRC and Tearfund.( 2002). *The key to peace: Unlocking the human potential of Sudan*. See online at <http://oxfam.intelli-direct.com/> [http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what we do/issues/conflict\\_disasters](http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/conflict_disasters). Accessed on 26 March 2006.

urban immigration just to mention a few of the atrocities from a conflict. Loss of security occurs when civilians in a conflict take the law in their own hands targeting perceived enemies leading to indiscriminate loss of human life. Loss of security interferes with the day to day socio-economic and political undertakings in a society.

The 1992 clashes in Kenya, for example, exemplified the potential and real consequences of conflict on inter-ethnic marriages, family and social life. According to field information collected in different parts of the clash-stricken areas, there were cases of breakdown of marriages and family life. Currently, inter-ethnic marriage between the Luhya (i.e. especially the Bukusu) and the Sabaot, Iteso and Sabaot, Kalenjin and Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Luo is viewed with fear and suspicion. This was one of the far-reaching social consequences of the clashes which created mistrust, prejudice and psychological trauma (characterized by mental anguish and general apathy), among the various ethnic groups in Kenya. This emerging negative tendency contradicts the view that the conflicting ethnic communities have co-existed and inter-married for several decades.<sup>13</sup>

These very clashes created an identity and culture crisis, especially for the offspring of the ethnic groups that fought each other. Several families have broken down and the children of mixed families are at crossroads in terms of ethnic and cultural identity. Some have been forced to live on the paternal ethnic sides, while the others live on the maternal side, depending on where the pressure is most. This trend has created a new dimension in societal lives where children (potential marriage partners) are discouraged from engaging in any affairs with the 'enemy' ethnic group. This development unless checked, may go a long way in eroding trust in inter-ethnic marriages and interactions.

First-hand accounts by the clash victims in the affected areas were extremely disturbing as far as health was concerned. The thousands of displaced families, having lost their shelters and food supplies, had to camp in over-crowded temporary shelters organized through donations and support from various organizations, such as the Catholic Mission, Red Cross, NCCCK, Action-Aid Kenya and the UNDP among others. These camps were established haphazardly all over the clash zones and had poor ventilation. The grossly inadequate water supply and sanitation facilities, coupled with overcrowding, made these camps ideal conditions for major outbreaks of communicable diseases such as meningitis, typhoid, upper respiratory tract infections, cholera and other related diseases.

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<sup>13</sup> Africa Watch, (1993), *Divide and Rule: State-sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya*, Human Rights Watch, New York, Washington, November.

The mixing of people with cattle, sheep, chicken, goats and other domestic animals was in itself a health hazard.

The clashes in various parts of the country brought about a situation of gender and child vulnerability. Indeed, it is the children and women who suffered most during the period of the clashes. They were abused, violated, embarrassed and at times raped in broad daylight during the clashes. In most internal refugee camps, there was inadequate room to accommodate thousands of the displaced families. Both men and women, together with children, were forced to share the often congested sleeping places in close proximity with one another with little or no privacy. Nature being what it was, we could expect uncontrolled, indiscriminate sexual behaviour, not only between adult men and women, but also involving sex abuse of young children, particularly girls. As a result of such immoral practices, sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS were passed from one individual to another, with children and women being the most affected victims of the circumstances.

### **Major findings from ACTS ecological sources of conflict project 2000-2002**

Case studies commissioned by ACTS<sup>14</sup> three years ago found out that linkages between ecology and conflict are rarely direct. The function and dimension of the ecological variable in conflict situations is mediated by governance regimes, economic structures, external political intervention and a host of other factors;

Below is a model of ecological-conflict nexus from the synthesis paper of the ACTS ecological sources of conflict project.<sup>15</sup>

Commodity chains involve multiple stages of value addition. In sub-Saharan Africa, these chains are often marked by patterns of predation and exploitation. Those with the means to add value often belong to, or form, particular elite groups which act in their own interests at the expense of primary producers. Lack of political accountability is one major issue. Examples of this include the regulation of coffee in Burundi, where the commodity chain linking peasants to consumers in the developed world is regulated by the *Office des Cultures Industrielles du Burundi* (OCIBU). The OCIBU maintains a monopoly over coffee export and

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<sup>14</sup> The African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) is an International Policy Research Organization based in Nairobi Kenya.

<sup>15</sup> A simplified model of the interaction of Ecology and conflict presented in a synthesis report by ACTS Ecological sources of conflict project. Report by Jeremy Lind and Raymond Kitevu in 2002.




Figure 1. Simplified ecology- conflict nexus

marketing, consistently fixing low producer prices paid to coffee farmers. Similarly, primary extractors of coltan in the Kivu Provinces of the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo are paid very low producer prices in comparison to the prices paid at the higher levels of the commodity chain. Extraction of coltan involves an intricate network of individual extractors, middlemen, rebel authorities, regional governments, regional and international air transporters, and transnational corporations.

Natural resource use systems in Sub-Saharan Africa are highly flexible, resilient and adapted to the dynamic ecological structures and functions found on the continent. In that sense they are more 'open' and negotiable than may be expected. Interacting groups of livestock herders in the Horn of Africa, for example, have adapted to persistent ecological limitations through frequent movements between different macro-ecological zones, and through reciprocal resource sharing agreements between different groups. However, increasing ecological scarcity and the expansion of agricultural production into key resource environments undermines the sustainability of pastoralist resource use systems in the Horn.

Ecological structures are physical features of land and natural resources. The distribution of natural resources in the region is uneven: pockets of comparatively abundant natural resources along watercourses and in higher elevations are embedded in highly stressed overall ecological region where natural resource scarcity is common.

Ecological functions are cyclical or seasonal changes in the land and natural resource base, or biotic responses to climatic fluctuations. These include flood

and drought. In most parts of the Horn of Africa, for example, drought is experienced on a cyclical basis.

Ethiopia was affected by drought once every two years on average between 1965 and 1992.

Conflict triggers spark off and escalate violent conflict. Triggers are single key acts or unanticipated events that rapidly come to pass and provoke the use of violence or armed force. Ecological triggers are few and generally operate at local rather than national or regional levels. Examples include acute and severe drought, or devastating flood.

Conflict sustainers perpetuate or escalate existing levels of conflict. Sustainers undermine the need for communication among actors. For example, the continued extraction of coltan in the Kivu Province of the DR Congo has emboldened one particular community and led to their abandoning of peace initiatives between them and other local Congolese communities. Revenue generated from coltan production and marketing has enabled them to acquire arms and engage in conflict.

Sources of conflict are socio-economic and political structures which determine whether conflicting interests and social needs are articulated, organized and acknowledged, grievances are addressed and through what channels and how they are settled. Conflict in most cases is embedded in social, political and economic systems of a state. Political decisions have wide reaching implications for access to and control of valuable resources. Often, these are in the structures of relationships and social transactions. For instance, the peasantry in Burundi finds itself locked out of decision-making processes that determine sharing of benefits accruing from coffee production.

To summarize, the project found that ecological factors may trigger, sustain or generate conflict, though they are more likely to be sustainers or root causes than triggers. Environmental change includes improvement as well as degradation, and environmental abundance is a source of conflict, as is scarcity. There was much discussion during the conference on the definition of abundance and ways in which models can be developed to explain the role of abundance in conflict, just as models exist to explain the role of scarcity.

The concept of abundance is clearly complex, as it depends not just on the absolute quantity of the resource, but on the way that it is distributed, geographically and socially. It is relative (i.e. coltan deposits in DRC are 'abundant' because of global scarcity). Values of natural resources at any given point in the commodity chain also depends on the amount of processing done – indeed, some resources such as oil and deep groundwater cannot be exploited by local African

communities because they lack the technology to exploit the resource. In Western Upper Nile in southern Sudan, and the Ogoni Delta in Nigeria, for example, conflict has occurred when international companies have exploited resources which are unavailable to local people. Clearly, more work needs to be done on developing conceptual models for understanding the role of environmental abundance in conflict.<sup>16</sup>

Many political sources of ecological conflict are mistaken for ecological sources of political conflict, sometimes because of willful obfuscation by those involved. Conflict narratives are themselves highly contested. The pathways linking ecology and conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa are many. Different dimensions of ecology, including scarcity and abundance, ecological change, production and marketing and benefit sharing, relate to conflict systems in Sub-Saharan Africa through multiple pathways, and perform a number of functions in conflict systems. Conflicts, no matter how they start, often gain their own momentum and tend to generate war economies with their own dynamics, separate from ideology or the original “grievances”, no matter how genuine. Ecological issues can be root causes and also part of war economies. Conflict systems are complex, ever-changing phenomena. The linear model of conflict, which traces a “bell curve” progressing in a series of stages from gestation to the threshold of violent conflict, then through to resolution and reconstruction, often fails to capture the reality. Conflicts move unpredictably in both directions from one stage to another and often reoccur years after “rehabilitation” has taken place, suggesting that resolution did not fully occur. Indeed, within zones of conflict, areas of stability can be found alongside areas of turmoil.

## Conclusion

The role of different environmental factors in conflicts in Africa, including: natural resources abundance, natural resource scarcity, environmental improvement and environmental degradation, are a testimony to the fact that linkages between environmental factors and security are all about pathways to sustainable development and equity. Preventing and managing environmental sources of conflict means identifying ways of sharing environmental resources equitably and in a sustainable manner so as to meet the needs of different user groups. It also demands promoting more inclusive and participatory environmental decision making processes.

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<sup>16</sup> For a detailed analysis: See J. Lind and K. Sturman (eds) *Scarcity and Surfeit: the ecology of Africa's Conflicts*, African Centre for Technology Studies, Nairobi/Institute for security Studies, Pretoria, 2002.



Environmental sources of conflict are inseparable from environmental rights. Environmental sources of conflict are not exclusively a problem of improving the overall condition of the environment. Rather they relate strongly to the uneven distribution of environmental risks and opportunities. In Africa, numerous cases such as those in the great lakes region, in the Horn of Africa and in areas of West Africa have been precipitated by conflicts with strong environmental underpinnings. Crisis managers must recognize that environmental sources of conflict correlate strongly with the severity of crisis.

# Building peace through environmental cooperation

*Ken Conca, Alexander Carius, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko*

Running along the border separating Peru and Ecuador, the Cordillera del Condor's spectacular cloud forests host a raft of rare and endangered species. Sparsely populated and minimally developed, the mountain range's wealth of biodiversity is rivaled only by the richness of its gold, uranium, and oil deposits. Instead of benefiting from these, however, the people of the Cordillera del Condor have suffered decades of hostility, border conflicts, and government neglect. During the summer months, when the weather let them reach the remote region more easily, military forces from both countries lobbed artillery shells at each other in a low-grade conflict that endangered residents and destabilized the border region. Finally, after decades of simmering conflict and heated border disputes, Peru and Ecuador ceased hostilities under a 1998 peace agreement facilitated by Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and the United States<sup>1</sup>.

Redrawing the contested border required an innovative arrangement. The governments of Peru and Ecuador agreed to establish conservation zones along the border that would be managed by their national agencies but headed by a binational steering committee. This joint management follows both an ecological and a political logic. The countries' ecosystems are fundamentally interdependent; the Cordillera del Condor conservation zone (or "Peace Park") uses that interdependence to remove a particularly thorny obstacle to peace.

Yet the people of Cordillera del Condor still face certain enduring challenges: acute poverty, social tensions, and even violence, some of which is prompted by the peace park itself. In the protected forest around Canton Nagaritza, reports of violence between settlers and conservation agencies suggest that while the governments may have made peace, some people are still fighting—but this time they are fighting the park's architects. The peace park initiative may jump-start

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<sup>1</sup> Raul P. Saba, "The Arizona-Sonora and Ecuador-Peru Borderlands: Common Interests and Shared Goals in Diverse Settings." *Journal of the Southwest*, winter 2003, pp. 633–48; Carlos F. Ponce and Fernando Gheri, "Cordillera del Condor (Peru-Ecuador)," prepared for workshop on Transboundary Protected Areas in the Governance Stream of the 5th World Parks Congress, Durban, South Africa, 12–13 September 2003.

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conflict transformation between the two governments, but the human struggle for peace and sustainable development remains a daily battle<sup>2</sup>.

Eleven thousand kilometers and an ocean away, environmental cooperation is also helping southern Africa recover from devastating conflicts and prevent new violence from emerging. Following nearly three decades of civil war in Angola, it is peace that now threatens the tranquility of the Okavango River, which drops from its headwaters in Angola down to the wide, flat delta in Botswana, crossing Namibia on a 1,100-kilometer journey south to the Kalahari Desert. This pristine environment in one of the world's few remaining unindustrialized river basins, is home to myriad species of animals and plants, and escaped the impact of modern development<sup>3</sup>.

The three basin states' pressing developmental needs are placing demands on the fragile river environment, thereby raising the spectre of a different sort of conflict. Angola hopes to resettle citizens displaced by the war, who would need more of the river's water. And as the upstream state, Angola has the power to shake up arrangements that currently favor its downstream neighbors. Newly independent Namibia also has plans for the Okavango's water: it wants to build a pipeline to its arid interior and occasionally threatens to revive its long-standing proposal to build a dam on the short section of the river that crosses through Namibia at the Caprivi Strip. Botswana, on the other hand, favors the status quo, which draws a lucrative stream of tourists to explore the unique ecosystem of the largest inland delta in sub-Saharan Africa and an internationally recognized wetlands area of great ecological significance<sup>4</sup>.

Although these mixed and often contradictory objectives could lead to conflict to gain greater control of the shared water resources, there is hope that cooperative institutions – if strong and vital – could manage competing demands without violence. In 1994, the three countries created the Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission (known as OKACOM) to manage the river basin. There is considerable rapport among the OKACOM commissioners and a grow-

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<sup>2</sup> Alexander Carius and Wiebke Roessig, *Battle Fields and Peace Parks: Nature Conservation and Conflict in the Cordillera des Condor* (Berlin: Adelphi Research, in press). "This chapter is reprinted with permission of the Worldwatch Institute. It first appeared in *State of the World 2005: Redefining Global Security*. (New York: Norton): 144-155; 219-222.

<sup>3</sup> Alan Nicol, "The Dynamics of River Basin Cooperation: The Nile and Okavango Basins," in Anthony Turton, Peter Ashton, and Eugene Cloete, eds., *Transboundary Rivers, Sovereignty and Development: Hydropolitical Drivers in the Okavango River Basin* (Pretoria, South Africa: African Water Issues Research Unit and Green Cross International, 2003), pp. 167–86.

<sup>4</sup> Isidro Pinherio, Gabaake Gabaake, and Piet Heyns, "Cooperation in the Okavango River Basin: The OKACOM Perspective," in Turton, Ashton, and Cloete, *op. cit.* note 3, pp. 105–18.

ing recognition that cooperation can bring greater benefits to all than would fighting over or merely dividing the water<sup>5</sup>.

Unfortunately, the commission has struggled to find the financial resources and political formula to catalyze proactive cooperation. Recently, OKACOM asked nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society to play a more active role than is commonly found in other shared river basins, acknowledging that the three countries cannot implement effective basin management strategies in isolation. They have also pursued opportunities to collaborate with international donors and conservation groups promoting environmentally sustainable development. Thus far these institutional mechanisms have been sufficiently effective, equitable, and participatory to tip the balance toward confidence-building and cooperation rather than tension and violence<sup>6</sup>.

Blending ecology and politics in the service of peace, the Cordillera del Condor and the Okavango River basin institutions are two examples of a growing array of initiatives — including peace parks, shared river basin management plans, regional seas agreements, and joint environmental monitoring programs — that seek to promote environmental peacemaking. This involves using cooperative efforts to manage environmental resources as a way to transform insecurities and create more peaceful relations between parties in dispute. As such initiatives become more frequent and gain momentum. They may provide a way to transform both how people approach conflict and how they view the environment. Surprisingly, however, relatively little is known about the best designs for these initiatives or the conditions under which they are likely to succeed. While a large body of research examines the contribution of environmental degradation to violent conflict, little in the way of systematic scholarship evaluates an equally important possibility: that environmental cooperation may bring peace.

### **Environment and conflict: A history**

Over the past 15 years, many scholars have considered whether environmental problems cause or exacerbate violent conflict. Although scarce non-renewable resources, such as oil, have long been viewed as a potential source of conflict, this new research shifted the focus to renewable resources such as forests, fisheries, fresh water, and arable land. Most of this work, including projects by Cana-

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Anton Earle and Ariel Méndez, "An Oasis in the Desert: Navigating Peace in the Okavango River Basin," *PECS News* (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), spring 2004, pp. 1, 13–14.

dian and Swiss researchers in the mid-1990s, found little evidence that environmental degradation contributed significantly to war between countries. Yet the studies found some evidence that environmental problems can trigger or exacerbate local conflicts that emerge from existing social cleavages such as ethnicity, class, or religion<sup>7</sup>.

As the environment-conflict debate progressed within the scholarly community, the concept of “environmental security” began to attract attention from security institutions and policymakers throughout the industrial world. (As the term is commonly used, environmental security encompasses a diverse set of concerns beyond the narrower question of environment-conflict linkages, including understanding environmental impacts of the preparation for and conduct of war, redefining security to focus on environmental and health threats to human well-being, and using security institutions to aid in the study and management of the environment.) Most recently, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan called

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<sup>7</sup> Michael T. Klare, *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001); Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” *International Security*, summer 1994, pp. 5–40; idem, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Günther Baechler et al., *Kriegsursache Umweltzerstörung: +kologische Konflikte in der Dritten Welt und Wege ihrer friedlichen Bearbeitung* (Zurich: R. egger, 1996); Günther Baechler and Kurt R. Spillmann, *Environmental Degradation as a Cause of War: Regional and Country Studies of Research Fellows, and Günther Baechler and Kurt R. Spillmann, Environmental Degradation as a Cause of War: Regional and Country Studies of External Experts* (Zurich: R. egger, 1996). See also Günther Baechler, *Violence Through Environmental Discrimination: Cause, Rwanda Arena, and Conflict Model* (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), and Colin H. Kahl, “Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State Sponsored Violence: The Case of Kenya, 1991–1993,” *International Security*, Fall 1998, pp. 80–119. For an overview of the debate surrounding research on environment and conflict, see Ken Conca and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, eds., *Environmental Peacemaking* (Washington, DC, and Baltimore, MD: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). Table 8–1 from the following: Donella Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth* (New York: Universe Books, 1972); U.S. Council on Environmental Quality and Department of State, *The Global 2000 Report to the President. Entering the Twenty-first Century*, vol. 1 (Charlottesville, VA: Blue Angel, 1981); Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, *Common Security* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982); World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Sverre Lodgaard et al., *Environmental Security: A Report Contributing to the Concept of Comprehensive International Security* (Oslo: PRIO/U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP), Programme on Military Activities and the Human Environment, 1989); Arthur H. Westing, ed., *Cultural Norms, War and the Environment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); idem, ed., *Comprehensive Security for the Baltics* (London: Sage, 1989); Eduard Shevardnadze, “Ekologiya i Diplomatiya,” in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 22 November 1989 (published in English as “Ecology and Diplomacy,” *Environmental Policy and Law*, vol. 20, no. 1–2 (1990), pp. 20–24); Johan Jørgen Holst, “Security and the Environment: A Preliminary Exploration,” *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, vol. 20, no. 2 (1989), pp. 123–28; U.N. Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Alexander Carius and Kurt M. Lietzmann, eds., *Environmental Change and Security. A European Perspective* (Berlin: Springer, 1999); World Conservation Union–IUCN, “State-of-the-Art Review on Environment, Security, and Development Co-operation,” draft report for the Working Party on Environment, OECD Development Assistance Committee (Gland, Switzerland: 1999); Kurt M. Lietzmann and Gary D. Vest, eds., *Environment & Security in an International Context* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, for NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, 1999); European Commission, “Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention” (Brussels: 4 November 2001); German Federal Foreign Office, “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building Summary” (Berlin: 12 May 2004).

for integrating environmental contributions to conflict and instability into the U.N.'s conflict prevention strategy and the deliberations of his High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change<sup>8</sup>.

Several national governments and intergovernmental organizations have commissioned state-of-the-art reviews of the concept of environmental security in recent years, with an eye toward developing policy guidelines and implementation procedures. The European Union has discussed ways of integrating the concept into its emerging foreign and security policy and promoted environmental security as a theme for the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. In the United States, several government agencies — including the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Agency for International Development, and various intelligence agencies — developed mandates and policies in the 1990s to grapple with environment, conflict, and security connections. Although the events of September 11, 2001, pushed these ideas into the background, many U.S. federal agencies and NGOs continue to search for ways to translate these ideas into tangible programs<sup>9</sup>.

Claims that environmental degradation induces violent conflict remain controversial. Skeptics point out that the causal chain in most environment-conflict models is long and tenuous, with a myriad of social, economic, and political factors lying between environmental change and conflict. Others have questioned the implications of this concept, fearing that casting environmental problems as conflict triggers will “securitize” environmental policy, injecting militarized “us-versus-them” thinking into a realm that demands interdependent, cooperative responses<sup>10</sup>.

These reactions are not surprising in light of the national security framework that is often attached to the environmental security debate. Consider this 1996 statement by the Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, John Deutch: “National reconnaissance systems that track the movement of tanks through the

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<sup>8</sup> On the meaning of environmental security, see Geoffrey D. Dabelko and P. J. Simmons, “Environment and Conflict: Core Ideas and U.S. Government Initiatives,” *The SAIS Review*, winter/spring 1997, pp. 127–46; Jon Barnett, *The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security Era* (London: Zed Books, 2001); United Nations, Interim Report of the Secretary General on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*, 12 September 2003.

<sup>9</sup> European Union, “EU Non-paper on the Preparation for the Review of Agenda 21 and the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21” (Brussels: unpublished, 2000); Dabelko and Simmons, *op. cit.* note 8.

<sup>10</sup> Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature,” *Journal of Peace Research*, May 1998, pp. 381–400; Marc A. Levy, “Is the Environment a Security Issue?” *International Security*, Fall 1995, pp. 35–62; Daniel Deudney, “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, winter 1990, pp. 461–76.

desert, can, at the same time, track the movement of the desert itself.... Adding this environmental dimension to traditional political, economic, and military analysis enhances our ability to alert policymakers to potential instability, conflict, or human disaster and to identify situations which may draw in American involvement<sup>11</sup>."

Many observers have read statements such as this as evidence of ulterior motives. Attention to environment-conflict linkages is suspected to reflect not genuine concern but a desire to predict and isolate troublesome hotspots. Environmental concerns might even be used as a rationale for intervention – as in the U.S. government's rather sudden interest in the long-standing plight of Iraq's "marsh Arabs," which emerged in tandem with the military intervention against Saddam Hussein's regime. Seen in this light, the U.S. military's interest in, say, Haiti's devastatingly denuded countryside could be grounded in a desire to forestall waves of Haitian refugees rather than to find ways to address systemic poverty or reverse the degradation of vital natural resources.

Despite its momentum in many parts of the industrial world, the idea of environmental security has not played particularly well on the global stage. Governments in the global South have long been wary that the North's increased interest in international environmental protection might hamper their own quest for economic development. In the context of an already contentious North-South environmental dialogue, poor countries often view the concept of environmental security as a rich-country agenda serving rich-country interests to control natural resources and development strategies. Seen in this light, northern emphasis on southern security threats shifts the burden of responsibility for global ills, suggests a rationale for intervention in southern resource use, and underscores the tenuous sovereignty of poor countries in the face of unequally distributed economic, military, and institutional power. Many Brazilians have long viewed the North's characterization of the Amazon as the "lungs of the Earth" with suspicion, for example, seeing it as part of a campaign to "internationalize" the rainforest and inhibit development<sup>12</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup> John Deutsch, speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, 1996.

<sup>12</sup> Marian A. L. Miller, *The Third World in Global Environmental Politics* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Somaya Saad, "For Whose Benefit? Redefining Security," in Ken Conca and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, eds., *Green Planet Blues: Environmental Politics From Stockholm to Kyoto* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998); Adil Najam, "An Environmental Negotiation Strategy for the South," *International Environmental Affairs*, summer 1995, pp. 249–87; Tanvi Nagpal and Camilla Foltz, eds., *Choosing Our Future: Visions of a Sustainable World* (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 1995); Thomaz Guedes da Costa, "Brazil's SIVAM: As it Monitors the Amazon, Will It Fulfill its Human Security Promise?" *Environmental Change and Security Project Report*, summer 2001, pp. 47–58.

**Table 8-1. Selected National and International Initiatives on the Environment**

Group or Country	Year	Initiative
Club of Rome/ U.S. Department of State	1972 1981	The Club of Rome's <i>The Limits to Growth</i> and the U.S. government's <i>Global 2000 Report to the President</i> called attention to environmental risks and an array of associated socioeconomic changes (population growth, urbanization, migration) that could lead to social conflict.
Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues	1982	In its first report, <i>Common Security</i> , the Commission stressed the connection between security and environment.
World Commission on Environment and Development	1987	The Commission expanded the concept of security in <i>Our Common Future</i> : "The whole notion of security as traditionally understood—in terms of political and military threats to national sovereignty—must be expanded to include the growing impacts of environmental stress—locally, nationally, regionally, and globally." The Commission concluded that "environmental stress can thus be an important part of the web of causality associated with any conflict and can in some cases be catalytic."
U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP)/ Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)	1988	A joint program between UNEP and the Peace Research Institute, Oslo on "Military Activities and the Human Environment" included empirical research projects that were largely conceived and implemented by PRIO. From this initiative, PRIO developed a strong research focus on environment and security.
Soviet Union	1989	Proposals for creating an Ecological Security Council at the United Nations have emerged repeatedly over the past 15 years, beginning when Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and President Mikhail Gorbachev suggested to the 46th General Assembly that environmental issues be elevated to such a lofty status.
Norwegian Government	1989	In 1989, Defense Minister Johan Jørgen Holst pointed out that environmental problems can become important factors in the development of violent conflicts.



Table 8-1. (continued)

Group or Country	Year	Initiative
U.N. Development Programme (UNDP)	1994	The U.N. Development Programme explicitly included environmental security as one of the components of "human security," a frame that continues to find favor among UNDP and some prominent national governments, such as that of Canada.
German Government	1996	The Federal Ministry for Environment commissioned a state-of-the-art report on environment and conflict in order to explore opportunities to strengthen international environmental policy and law.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	1998	The Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development commissioned a state-of-the-art report on environment and conflict.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	1999	In March 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society published a comprehensive report, <i>Environment and Security in an International Context</i> , following a three-year consultation among security, environmental, and foreign policymakers and experts.
European Union (EU)	2001 2002	In April 2001, the General Affairs Council of the EU presented its environmental integration strategy on the issue of environment and security and the contribution of sustainable development to regional security (adopted March 2002). The EU discussed how to integrate environmental security into its emerging common foreign and security policy and promoted it as a theme for the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development.
Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation	2002	The Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation explored ways to adapt peace and conflict impact assessments to selected projects of their environment program.
United Nations	2002	U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for better integration of environmental contributions to conflict and instability in the organization's strategy on conflict prevention and the

Table 8-1. (continued)

Group or Country	Year	Initiative
German Government	2004	deliberations of his High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. The Federal Action Plan on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Post-Conflict Peace-Building (published in May 2004 after receiving Cabinet approval) identified sustainable development and transboundary environmental cooperation as key ways to foster peace and stability.

Source: See footnote 7

Given these concerns, recasting environmental debates in security terms has not been an effective catalyst for global environmental cooperation. Thus a conundrum: posing a problem as one of “environmental security” may inhibit cooperation in the very places where the ecological insecurities of people and communities are most stark.

### Why the environment?

A growing number of voices have suggested that focusing on peace – not security – may provide a way to break this impasse. As a peacemaking tool, the environment offers some useful, perhaps even unique qualities that lend themselves to building peace and transforming conflict: environmental challenges ignore political boundaries, require a long-term perspective, encourage local and nongovernmental participation, and extend community building beyond polarizing economic linkages. These properties sometimes make cross-border environmental cooperation difficult to achieve. But where cooperation does take root, it might help enhance trust, establish cooperative habits, create shared regional identities around shared resources, and establish mutually recognized rights and expectations<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>13</sup> Emanuel Adler, “Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, June 1997, pp. 249–77; Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Michael N. Nagler, “What Is Peace Culture?” in Ho-Won Jeong, ed., *The New Agenda for Peace Research* (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 1999); Dejan Panovski, “Fallbeispiel Lake Ohrid (The Case of Lake Ohrid),” paper presented at the Conference Naturschutz–(Aus)Loeser von Konflikten (Nature Conservation as a Trigger for Conflict or Cooperation), Berlin, 26–27 November 2002.

Ecosystem interdependencies present opportunities for mutual gain. When viewed in isolation, environmental problems often create severe upstream/downstream dichotomies, greatly complicating cooperation. For example, most international water law is based on the premise that upstream and downstream states have fundamentally different interests in water use and environmental protection. But communities typically are joined by many simultaneously overlapping ecological interdependencies; places that are upstream from a neighbor in one ecological relationship may well be downstream in another. Japan is down wind of China's smokestack industries, for instance, but the two countries share a regional marine ecosystem. The United States is upstream of Mexico on the Colorado River, but downstream (at least in the physical sense) of toxic industries flourishing on the U.S.-Mexican border. These complex interdependencies create opportunities to bundle different environmental problems into more robust forms of environmental cooperation.

By their very nature, environmental problems demand anticipatory action, entail longer time horizons, and require an appreciation for sudden, surprising, and dramatic changes. Given these characteristics, environmental cooperation could push decision makers to embrace a longer time horizon, such that future gains weigh more heavily in current calculations. For example, it has become more common in recent years for states signing accords on shared river basins to create a permanent basin commission as a platform for information exchange, joint knowledge initiatives, and a longer-term perspective on shared basin management<sup>14</sup>.

Environmental issues encourage people to work at the society-to-society level as well as the interstate level. Domestic constituencies can link up across borders around ecological interdependencies, at times taking the first steps at dialogue that is difficult to pursue through official channels. Over time, regular interaction among scientists and NGOs may help to build a foundation of trust and implicit cooperation. Despite daily battles in the streets of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to cite just one example, Palestinians and Israelis continue to meet informally as a means of managing aspects of their shared water resources.

It is almost an article of faith among liberal internationalists that growing interdependence is a force for peace in world politics. Yet interdependence based predominantly on trade and investment linkages can have deeply polarizing effects, as seen in the backlash against economic globalization. Environmental cooperation pro-

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<sup>14</sup> See Ken Conca, Fengshi Wu, and Joanne Neukirchen, *Is There a Global Rivers Regime? The Principled Content of International River Agreements, research report of the Harrison Program on the Future Global Agenda* (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, September 2003).

vides an important opportunity to extend cross-border community building beyond the narrow and often polarizing sphere of economic linkages. For example, many citizens' organizations and grassroots groups in Mexico and the United States that opposed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are involved in joint environmental protection efforts along and across the border<sup>15</sup>.

More ambitiously, and also more speculatively, it may be that cross-border environmental cooperation can also help to build a more broadly shared conception of place and community. One result may be to loosen the traditional moorings of exclusionary political identities in favor of a broader sense of ecological community.

### Using environmental cooperation to build peace

Most environmental peacemaking initiatives fall into one of three partially overlapping categories: efforts to prevent conflicts related directly to the environment, attempts to initiate and maintain dialogue between parties in conflict, and initiatives to create a sustainable basis for peace. If the minimum requirement for peace is the absence of violent conflict, then environmental cooperation may have a role to play in forestalling the sort of violence that can be triggered by resource overexploitation, ecosystem degradation, or the destruction of people's resource-based livelihoods. Not surprisingly, most of the scholarship linking environmental degradation with violent outcomes has pointed to the need to relieve pressures on people's livelihood resources and to enhance the ability of institutions to respond to environmental challenges. In other words, the most direct form of environmental peacemaking may be action to forestall environmentally induced conflict<sup>16</sup>.

Environmental cooperation may also soften group grievances that form around or are worsened by ecological injustices. Festering environmental problems can create a dangerous link between material insecurity and people's identification as a marginalized group. In settings where ethnicity affects political and economic opportunity, environmental effects often play out unevenly along ethnic lines as well. Thus, many of the most industrially polluted areas in the

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<sup>15</sup> For a review of literature on interdependence as a force for peace, see Ken Conca, "Environmental Cooperation and International Peace," in Paul F. Diehl and Nils Petter Gleditsch, eds., *Environmental Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000); Robin Broad and John Cavanagh, "The Death of the Washington Consensus?" *World Policy Journal*, Fall 1999, pp. 79–88; John Markoff, "Globalization and the Future of Democracy," *Journal of World-Systems Research*, summer 1999, pp. 277–309.

<sup>16</sup> UNEP, *Understanding Environment, Conflict, and Cooperation* (Nairobi: 2004).

post-Soviet Baltic states are home mainly to ethnic Russians—creating a potentially combustible mix of reinforced ethno-national identity, heightened social inequality, and environmental grievances. Proactive environmental cooperation could help dampen an important source of grievance that is aggravating these types of social divisions.

A second approach to environmental peacemaking moves beyond conflicts with a specifically environmental component, seeking to build peace through cooperative responses to shared environmental challenges. Initiatives that target shared environmental problems may be used to establish a direct line of dialogue when other attempts at diplomacy have failed. In many instances, governments locked into relationships marked by suspicion and hostility— if not outright violence— have found environmental issues to be one of the few topics around which on going dialogue can be maintained.

One of the most serious unresolved conflicts in the politically unstable Caucasus region is the struggle between Armenia and Azerbaijan for control of Nagorno-Karabakh. In autumn 2000, Georgia, which has mediated a dialogue on conservation issues, persuaded Armenia and Azerbaijan to establish a trilateral biosphere reserve in the Southern Caucasus region. The organizers hope that regional environmental cooperation will enhance nature conservation, sustainable development, and, above all, political stability. This long-term project will first collect data, build capacity, and raise awareness. Although Armenia and Azerbaijan are currently unwilling to cooperate directly, the agreement anticipates that natural biosphere reserves will be established and eventually merged. The two governments have also asked for an independent international environmental assessment of Nagorno-Karabakh; objective data acceptable to both parties could at least lay the groundwork for cooperation<sup>17</sup>.

A similar attempt is being made in Kashmir, which has been bitterly contested by India and Pakistan since British de-colonization at the end of World War II. Some international conservationists argue that establishing a peace park in the Karakoram mountains between India and Pakistan, which mark the western end of the greater Himalayan mountain chain, would help to manage the border conflict by promoting joint management of the unique glacier environment, where many military casualties are caused by the elements rather than enemy fire. The idea of joint management is also rooted in the recognition that pollution is the

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<sup>17</sup> UNESCO, Moscow Office, at [www.unesco.ru/eng/articles/2004/Admin1415.php](http://www.unesco.ru/eng/articles/2004/Admin1415.php); UNEP, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), *Environment and Security: Transforming Risks into Cooperation. The Case of the Southern Caucasus* (Geneva, Bratislava, and Vienna: 2004).

greatest threat to this unique environment. To be sure, a joint conservation program in a remote, unpopulated area, where the cost of mounting sustained military operations is prohibitive, seems unlikely to transform the structural dynamics of the India-Pakistan conflict. Yet given the current ceasefire and the recent thaw in relations, there is a growing sense that enhanced cross-border engagement of this sort has a useful role to play in conflict transformation<sup>18</sup>.

Shared environmental challenges may be useful not only for initiating dialogue but also for actually transforming conflict-based relations by breaking down the barriers to cooperation – transforming mistrust, suspicion, and divergent interests into a shared knowledge base and shared goals. Technically complex issues, in which parties work from rival bases of fragmentary knowledge, can heighten distrust. To overcome this, the technical complexity surrounding many environmental issues could be used to create jointly held cooperative knowledge. For instance, OKACOM identified joint assessments of the Okavango's water flow and the potential impacts of hydropower and irrigation diversions as a key step toward developing agreed-upon baselines for successful and peaceful management of water resources<sup>19</sup>.

Skeptics might be tempted to dismiss such initiatives as marginal matters, unrelated to the core of hardened conflicts – akin perhaps to superpower cooperation in outer space during the Cold War. But the political and economic stakes in environmental cooperation are high; in the examples provided in this chapter, that fact is clearly understood by the actors involved. Problems surrounding shared river basins, regional biodiversity, forest ecosystems, or patterns of land and water use are controversial, high-stakes questions that engage the state at the highest levels.

A third strand of environmental peacemaking recognizes that a robust peace will require a foundation in sustainability. A narrow focus on whether water shortages “cause” violence between Israelis and Palestinians, for example, misses the larger point: as a high-stakes issue, the resolution of shared water problems becomes a necessary condition for a broader peace. While water-related tensions between Israelis and Palestinians may not have precipitated the larger conflict, the management of water resources is not only a potential lifeline for continued dialogue during the conflict, it is also a key issue in the negotiations for ending

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<sup>18</sup> Saleem H. Ali, “The K-2-Siachen Peace Park: Moving from Concept to Reality,” in UNEP, op. cit. note 16, pp. 34–36; R. Prasannan, “K2 The Peak of Potential Dispute,” *The Week* (Kerala, India), 12 September 2004.

<sup>19</sup> Pinherio, Gabaake, and Heyns, op. cit. note 4.

the conflict. In the Oslo Peace Accords between the Palestinians and the Israelis, water warranted its own negotiating group, just as it does in the Indian-Pakistani negotiations initiated in 2004. Whether water is a root cause of conflict or merely exacerbates existing differences, there will be no lasting peace without finding a sustainable water footing for the region<sup>20</sup>.

## Remaining challenges

Despite environmental peacemaking's potential, a skeptical eye is warranted when such initiatives remain the narrow purview of governments and political-economic elites. Initiatives that improve trust and reciprocity among governments without promoting a broader, society-to-society foundation for peace run the risk of reinforcing the zero-sum, state-based logic of national security. They are also prone to short-term mitigation efforts that fail to address the full scope of the problem. A side agreement to NAFTA created an innovative mechanism for funding community projects on the U.S.-Mexican border, for instance. But investment in cooperative initiatives during the first several years of operation was only a fraction of what had been projected, and many citizens' groups on both sides of the border complained of being shut out of the process<sup>21</sup>.

Narrow government-to-government initiatives also risk creating the conditions for more efficient resource plunder, promoting neither peace nor sustainability. Many international river agreements pay lip service to principles of cooperative watershed management while focusing primarily on capital intensive schemes for water resources development and inter-basin transfers.

Similarly, peace parks in southern Africa serve as a means for reconciliation among apartheid-era enemies while achieving conservation gains by pulling down political fences that arbitrarily break up habitats. But there is the danger that governments are simply deciding things over the heads of people most affected by the projects. Ecotourism may benefit wealthy hotel owners and foreign investors far more than locals living in the shadows of cross-border peace parks and transfrontier conservation areas. Within the Southern African Development Community, the establishment of transboundary conservation areas provided a

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<sup>20</sup> Aaron T. Wolf, "Water, Conflict, and Cooperation," in Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick and Mark W. Rosegrant, eds., *Overcoming Water Scarcity and Quality Constraints, 2020 Vision Focus 9* (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2001); N. Manoharan, "India-Pakistan Composite Dialogue 2004: A Status Report," article (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 22 September 2004).

<sup>21</sup> Pamela Doughman, "Water Cooperation in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region," in Conca and Dabelko, *op. cit.* note 7, pp. 190–219.

strong impetus to regional cooperation. Yet the projects were most successful when, after a hurried and largely top-down process of establishing the first peace parks, greater control over land and resource use was ceded to local communities<sup>22</sup>.

Transboundary nature conservation has significant potential to contribute to conflict prevention, mainly by facilitating communication, improving local livelihoods, and promoting the ecological, social, economic, and political benefits of protected areas. Nevertheless, tensions remain between the imperatives of state-managed nature conservation on the one hand and the economic activities of indigenous populations on the other.

A healthy dose of realism is also warranted with regard to the crucial question of commitment. Even where initiatives have been designed with peace and confidence-building in mind, there has often been little follow-through. The Aral Sea offers a cautionary tale about the challenges of effective environmental peacemaking. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, what had been the fourth largest inland body of water in 1960 was a shadow of its former self. With its feeder rivers dammed and diverted for irrigation schemes, the sea's level fell by about 15 meters, its surface area was cut in half, its salinity level tripled, and its volume diminished by two thirds. The newly independent states of Central Asia faced a mounting socioeconomic crisis, sowing potential for water-related conflict to break out along ethno-national lines<sup>23</sup>.

With the help of the World Bank and other western aid agencies, the riparian states on the Aral Sea's feeder rivers, the Amu and Syr Darya, crafted a cooperative framework for responding to the crisis. By doing so, they stabilized interstate relations during a time of regional political turmoil. According to researcher Erika Weinthal, the initiation of water-related cooperation by the newly independent post-Soviet states may have helped prevent water-related violence<sup>24</sup>.

Their shared interdependence during the post-Soviet tumult was enough to draw Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan to the bargaining table, but it has not changed the fundamental problem: the slow death of the Aral Sea has heightened insecurities for the region's people. The basic problem — unsustainable agricultural practice — has barely been addressed, and the

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<sup>22</sup> Larry Swatuk, "Environmental Cooperation for Regional Peace and Security in Southern Africa," in Conca and Dabelko, *op. cit.* note 7, pp.120–60.

<sup>23</sup> Erika Weinthal, *State Making and Environmental Cooperation: Linking Domestic and International Politics in Central Asia* (Boston: The MIT Press, 2001).

<sup>24</sup> Erica Weinthal, "The Promises and Pitfalls of Environmental Peacemaking in the Aral Sea Basin," in Conca and Dabelko, *op. cit.* note 7, pp. 86–119



new cooperative framework creates little or no democratic space for stakeholders and civil society. The World Bank and the bilateral aid agencies may have played a catalytic role in brokering the interstate agreement on the crisis, but they have largely failed to create more robust forms of regional environmental governance. In fact, the common syndrome of flagging commitment known as “donor fatigue” has set in, and cynicism about the motives of the region’s governments and international actors runs deep. Transforming this situation will require a long-term commitment of resources to put the region’s economy on a sustainable footing and renewed initiatives to increase civil society’s engagement in the process<sup>25</sup>.

### **Making environmental peacemaking a reality**

It has long been apparent, if not always acted upon, that cross-border environmental cooperation can yield tangible environmental, economic, and political gains. If properly designed, environmental initiatives can also reduce tensions and the likelihood of violent conflict between countries and communities. Environmental peacemaking strategies offer the chance to craft a positive, practical policy framework for cooperation that can engage a broad community of stakeholders by combining environment, development, and peace-related concerns.

Obviously, environmental cooperation does not occur easily or automatically, nor will it automatically enhance peace. It all depends on the specific institutional form of cooperation. Yet knowledge of environmental initiatives designed specifically to address violence and insecurity is limited. Simply put, governments and other actors have not pursued enough peace-oriented cooperative activity on environmental problems to allow firm conclusions. Where they have started programs, they have just begun to share experience and knowledge about environmental peacemaking through peace-and-conflict assessments of environmental projects and programs. Without such knowledge, the international community may be missing powerful peacemaking opportunities in the environmental domain.

The challenge, therefore, is to amass evidence — however partial or indirect — that more-aggressive environmental peacemaking strategies could create opportunities. Such evidence might be used to nudge governments, intergovernmental organizations, social movements, and other actors to be more aggressive about environmental cooperation. Identifying credible peacemaking spin-offs may make people more willing to invest in these projects.

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

The Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC), a partnership among the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the U.N. Environment Programme, and the U.N. Development Programme that was launched in fall 2002, is an important attempt to test environmental peacemaking arguments. Its objective is to identify, map, and respond to situations where environmental problems threaten to generate tensions or offer opportunities for cooperative synergies among communities, countries, or regions<sup>26</sup>.

The effort is noteworthy not only for its application of an environmental peacemaking approach. It is also the first formal cooperation among these three organizations, which specialize individually in security, environment, and development. As a result, ENVSEC greatly benefits from their distinct but complementary expertise as well as a network of field presences in its regions of operation: Southeastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Southern Caucasus countries.

As a rough division of labor, the OSCE takes the lead on policy development and political issues, UNEP contributes experience in assessment, visual communication, and presentation, and UNDP is most closely involved in institutional development and project implementation. To be sure, challenges remain: the three partners have very different organizational cultures and operational modes, which are not designed for formally cooperating with other international organizations or jointly managing projects.

ENVSEC illustrates the hurdles commonly faced by attempts to put environmental peacemaking ideas into operation. The concept of environment-security linkages is sometimes contested by host governments or at least deemed less significant than other problems in the regions. At the same time, the initiative faces financial, political, or other development-support expectations that are beyond its reach. Various stakeholders have different expectations, and political sensitivities must always be considered. Despite these problems, the value of ENVSEC lies precisely in its practical application, which serves to reveal the complexity of environmental peacemaking on a daily basis.

World regions as different as post-Soviet Eastern Europe, post-apartheid southern Africa, post-Cold War Northeast Asia, and North America under NAFTA are sorting out new security relationships in the wake of a particularly turbulent period of international change. In each region, the transformations of the past decade have created the political space between states and across societies to

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<sup>26</sup> "An Environment Agenda for Security and Cooperation in South Eastern Europe and Central Asia," at [www.envsec.org](http://www.envsec.org), viewed 23 September 2004.

seek a more peaceful, cooperative future, even as daunting new challenges to peace and security have emerged.

Another new wrinkle is globalization. Its effects are complex and by no means entirely healthy for ecological sustainability. But globalization's ability to move political dynamics out of narrow interstate settings and into a broader society-to-society context is an important and healthy sign. This new social space holds much of the potential for environmental peacemaking. It is well worth finding out whether these changes create opportunities to build peace, lessen environmental insecurity, and break out of the zero-sum logic that so often plagues international relations<sup>27</sup>.

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<sup>27</sup> On the environment and globalization, see Hilary French, *Vanishing Borders* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000); Timothy M. Shaw and Sandra J. MacLean, "The Emergence of Regional Civil Society: Contributions to a New Human Security Agenda," in Jeong, op. cit. note 13; J. Lewis Rasmussen, "Peacemaking in the Twenty-First Century: New Rules, New Roles, New Actors," in I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen, eds., *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997).



# African Regional and Security Institutions and the Global Security Agenda

# Contemporary African responses to existing security scenarios: Challenges and opportunities of engagement for West African states

*Dr. Kayode Soremekun*

This paper examines security issues in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This paper will: 1) attempt a brief historical overview of ECOWAS; 2) highlight trends which shape the security architecture of this sub-region. This will be followed by how it perceives the issue of security, and analyze 3) challenges and opportunities of ECOWAS within contexts of African Union activities and the global security agendas. The paper will be rounded up with a focus on best practices as these relate to ECOWAS and contemporary security dynamics.

West Africa is an area of great contrasts and bewildering diversity. Precisely, a fairly accurate description of the physical location of the region of West Africa would invariably include the area lying west of the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon. It is the area bounded by Mauritania and Senegal on the West, and Chad and Cameroon in the East even though it has been suggested, that it should operationally include the area stretching from the Spanish Sahara to Angola. The region has a wide range of vegetation and climate. Along the coast of the West African region there is a plain of varying width, with alternating ranges of swamps, lagoons and sandy beaches. The swampy and almost impenetrable forests and heavy rains in the Southern parts of the region gradually diminish in intensity and taken over by savannah. The savannah and tropical south are reasonably good for agriculture.

The region is second in size to that of North Africa, and greater than either East or Central Africa. The population of the area is larger than the total population of the East African Community countries, but less than half that of the EEC countries. West Africa's food production is not only less than the continental average but it is also less than the yearly production of either East or North Africa. Thus the region is persistently a region that does not feed itself.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ralph Onwuka, 'Development and Integration in West Africa', University of Ife Press, 1982.

Meanwhile, attempts to discuss the origins of West African integration must take due cognizance of the prescience of the fifth Pan-African Congress, that was held in Manchester, England in October 1945.<sup>2</sup> The congress recommended the establishment of a West African economic union “as a means of combating the exploitation of the economic resources of the West African territories and for ensuring the participation of the indigenous people in the industrial development of West Africa. But the ‘West Africa’ that the conferees in Manchester had in mind was “British West Africa.” This was to be expected of a predominantly English-speaking conference organized by leaders from British colonies in Africa, the West Indies and the United States.

The current delineation of West Africa was undertaken early in the 1960s by the UN’s Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), based on the premise that the most viable approach to regional integration was one that, as a first step, embraced narrower geographical areas as opposed to an all-embracing continental organization. Accordingly, the ECA divided the African continent into four sub-regions: eastern and southern, central, northern and Western.<sup>3</sup>

Previous attempts to create ECOWAS were characterized by a measure of insularity; notably exclusively francophone regional bodies like the CEAO and the Council of the Entente. However, the 1963 Lagos Conference on Industrial Coordination in West Africa, the Liberian initiative that set up the Interim Organisation for West African Economic Cooperation;<sup>4</sup>

- the ECA – FAO sponsored Bamako Conference on coordination of Industries that would have led to the establishment of a regional Iron and Steel Industry.
- The ECA sponsored Niamey Conference that was aimed largely at enlarging the CEAO and
- the Nigeria – Togo initiative which ultimately led to the creation of ECOWAS in 1975, which transcended linguistic boundaries.

## The Nigeria – Togo initiative

Although, it was the Nigeria – Togo initiative which led to the eventual creation of ECOWAS, Nigeria was the main driving force which ultimately led to the

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<sup>2</sup> Adebayo Adedeji, ‘The Fifth Wave of Pan-Africanism’, in Adekeye (i) Adebayo and Ismail Rashid (ed) *West Africa’s Security Challenges* and (ii) Lynne, Reinner Publishers, London, 2004.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ralph Onwuka, *op.cit.*

birth of this regional body. For obvious reasons, however, she could not go it alone. Thus, although Nigeria did most of the ground work in promoting the principle of a transcended West African supranationality, nevertheless, it needed the confidence of all the West African States, including the French-speaking states to succeed. Therefore the choice of Francophone Togo as a companion in this initiative gave the attempt a broad base that was necessary for regional legitimacy. The choice of Togo was in itself very instructive, unlike the other Francophone countries, she, i.e Togo was not as thoroughly French - since her Francophone connections had been diluted by an earlier experience of German colonialism. This hybrid character of the Togolese social formation, made it easier for the country to be susceptible to the overtures from Nigeria. Of course, there were other variables - historical and psychological which made it possible for Nigeria and Togo to form the nucleus of this union.

The rapport and chemistry between Nigeria and Togo dates back many years. Sylvanus Olympio, the Togolese Head of State had a great understanding with his Nigerian counterpart, Sir Abubakar Balewa. Meanwhile, it will be recalled that in his formative years, Olympio studied in King's College, Lagos in Nigeria and this would also partly explain his inclination towards Nigeria. When in January 1963, Olympio was assassinated in the first African coup d'état, his family found in Nigeria not only a reservoir of goodwill, but also a comfortable home. Three years after the death of Olympio, Abubakar witnessed a similar fate. The Nigerian Federal Government and its counterpart in Togo readily united in a common purpose either because the regimes were both military ones which had ousted civilian leaders who were friends or because the military regimes were consciously continuing the former friendship of Abubakar and Olympio.<sup>5</sup>

The first of the two agreements signed on November 6 1964, by the two countries removed visa requirements placed on the movements of the citizens of the two states by their respective governments. Again on May 4, 1966, Nigeria and Togo signed a Trade Agreement, which was aimed at the achievement of a maximum development of trade between the two countries through non-discriminatory practices.

In what seems to be in no way different from other bilateral trade agreements in the sub-region, the contracting states, in Article 1, agreed to grant each other "most favoured nation" treatment in all matters affecting import and export trade. This "most favoured nation" clause would however, not apply to advantages, concessions and exemptions that each contracting party might grant to:

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid.



- fellow member countries of a customs union;
- a free trade area of a monetary zone already established;
- a bordering country in order to facilitate trade between such country and either Contracting Party.

The two states also agreed to promote and develop trade in accordance with the laws and regulations in force in each of the states. To facilitate commercial intercourse, the contracting Parties also agreed to furnish each other on request with all necessary information concerning the needs and possibilities of supplying goods and commodities originating from their respective territories. They also contracted to grant freedom of transit of commercial goods originating in the territory of one of them and transported over the territory of the other.

The civil war in Nigeria interrupted the smooth implementation of this agreement.<sup>6</sup> Although the civil war interrupted Nigeria's active participation in international affairs, the end of the war which restored the country's territorial integrity and confidence also created for Nigeria a new and dynamic role in Africa. Nigerian leaders desired this significant role, and establishing a West African economic community was high on their roster of expectations. To achieve this, it was necessary to establish friendly relationships with all West African states, not just with Togo. This style of Nigerian diplomacy was well articulated by J. Herskovits when she said that, as "from 1971 and moving in ever-widening circles, Gowon and his Foreign Ministry however, kept the 'very low profile' that African diplomats always mention. And that with little publicity, Nigeria tackled its neighbours first: Dahomey, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Togo. State visits led to long-term interest-free loans, bilateral agreements on building Nigerian-financed roads across borders, and reviving moribund efforts at economic co-operation through projects dealing with power, communications and transport. Dr. Okoi Arikpo, Commissioner for External Affairs, in a lecture at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs summarized these aspects of Nigeria's West African diplomacy in the following sentences:<sup>7</sup>

Within the few years, Nigeria had concluded trade agreements with seven neighbouring countries in the West African sub-region, air services agreements with five, and economic co-operation agreements with another five. We have also

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<sup>6</sup> The Lessons of the Civil War Revamped Nigeria's Foreign Policy (i) Thrust, such that, Nigeria started to pay more serious attention to her neighbours.

<sup>7</sup> See Ralph Onwuka, *op. cit.*

established telecommunication links with five OAU member countries in the sub-region, and joint customs posts with three others... Cash grants of over four million naira (some 6 million US dollars) have been made available to eight member countries of the OAU, in addition to over a million naira (1.5 million US dollars) worth of grain and other foodstuffs donated to the Republic of Niger. Nigeria continues to make the facilities at her ports and airfields available to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation free of charge for the purpose of transporting relief material to the neighbouring countries (as a result of the drought that crippled a number of countries in the region.)

Herskovits, commenting on the style with which Nigeria was reaching beyond its neighbours, said that when Nigeria worked with Togo to set in motion a West African common market, it was more than sound economics – Before 1972 there were several Nigeria – Togo meetings, designed to achieve “the evolution of an economic community in West Africa – a community which will cut cross linguistic, cultural and other barriers.” In April 1972 the Heads of State of Nigeria and Togo decided to revive the process arrived at, in achieving a West African economic co-operation. To this end, the officials of the two countries prepared a proposal patterning the structure and scope of a possible West African community. This proposal which showed the taxonomies of the characteristics of the intended common market made it very explicit that a pragmatic approach to West African economic integration would be preferred. Then the other West African states were invited to discuss the proposal.

### **The decisive Lome meeting**

In this first ministerial meeting since 1967 to discuss West African economic co-operation, fifteen States (this time, Guinea-Bissau was the only new addition to the regulars) assembled in Lome, Togo between December 10 and 15, 1973 to debate the Nigeria – Togo scheme for action. The governments agreed in general on necessary institutions for a community and possible areas of co-operation as well as the taxonomies and nature of various levels of integration.

The conference elected the head of the Togolese delegation as President, that of the Sierra Leone delegation as Vice-President, while the office of rapporteur went to the Ivory Coast.

Although most delegates highlighted the advantages of economic co-operation, a few had some reservations on certain issues raised by the Nigeria – Togo scheme. The leader of the Mauritanian delegation, who most of the time spoke

on behalf of the CEAO states, suggested the forming of an all-embracing outward-looking community which would not be hampered by the existence of other sub-regional groupings. "It is necessary" he emphasized, "to draw from the Community experience of some of us, shifting the positive aspect and improving on it.". Upper Volta, a land-locked state, expressed some reservations on the question of fiscal charges, and the conditions governing the imposition and collection of the charges, draw-backs, and transit rights (granting unrestricted freedom of transit through each territory for goods proceeding to or from another member state and conditions attached to such goods in transit.) Meanwhile, Senegal, in view of its apprehension about the hegemony called Nigeria, requested that Za-ire and Cameroons be brought into the regional grouping as counter-weights.

After detailed consideration of the Nigeria - Togo proposal, the ministers adopted the basic principles of the document, and further requested that the two pioneering states prepare a draft treaty with the assistance of the ECA. Another meeting, this time of the experts from the 15 states was scheduled to be held in Accra, Ghana in early January 1974, when the draft treaty was to be discussed. A second ministerial meeting was to be convened in Niamey, Niger during the first week in March, 1974 to consider the draft treaty submitted to it by the Accra meeting. After this, it was planned that in the first half of 1975, the final phase of the formation of the West African Community, would be ratified by a meeting of the Heads of State and Government in Lagos at which the treaty would be considered and signed. This particular meeting took place on May 28 1975, and thus, ECOWAS was officially born in Lagos.

At this juncture, it is apposite to dwell on the security perceptions of this body. The earlier attempts to optimize African security efforts could be located at the continental level. The initial debates on the issue were centred on Nkrumah's idea of an African high command, which he first advanced in November 1960. This was later presented in many Pan-African fora as a concerted plan of action for peace and security in Africa. These debates about continental defence arrangements went on for more than a decade before attention was directed towards a regional approach to the problem.

Thus, as far as Africa is concerned, regionalism in defence terms, as distinct from continentalism, did not receive serious attention until the 1970s. From the immediate foregoing, it is infact possible to generalize that the establishment of an economic union by a group of states usually has defence implications which transcend territorial borders. In the case of ECOWAS, it was felt that the protection of joint services as well as industrial and economic ventures could not be left in the hands of the individual states. This was moreso because the members were too weak indi-

vidually to protect themselves. Under such circumstances, common security arrangements were deemed to be necessary to protect such collective ventures. It is in this sense that an economic union usually advances a state's focus beyond its borders. In this respect, ECOWAS is not unique in having a complementary defence component. Indeed, there are many other examples in history where international economic organizations went on to develop complementary defence components.<sup>8</sup>

For instance, NATO provides the defence umbrella for the European Economic Community (EEC) even though a principal member of NATO (the United States) is not in the EEC. NATO was a product of the post-war integrative effort in Europe which had its genesis in the Marshall Plan. Also the Organisation of American States (OAS) which was basically a forum for joint economic assistance has a defence component, as embodied in the Lima Accord. In the then, Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact also formed the defence umbrella over the COMECON. The Arab League also has its defence component in the Arab Defence Council. Even in the EEC's economic association with Africa, there was the tendency by France to give it a defence backing. In January 1978, the former French President, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, proposed a pact of solidarity which would include defence provisions between the EEC countries and Africa.

From the foregoing it could be said that the ECOWAS Defence Pact emanated from a general concern by its members to protect shared interests. According to Togo, one of the leading exponents of the Pact, if economic integration and cooperation are to be meaningful then they have to be accompanied by a defence and security arrangement. Senegal also gave a similar impression in the proposals it submitted for the creation of a defence component for ECOWAS.

### Threat potential within ECOWAS

As proposed by Tom Imobighe, need to add a defence component to the ECOWAS Treaty became imperative not only because ECOWAS ideals conflict with those of the powers with imperialistic interests in the region, but also because the area has been the object of previous external violations. For instance, in November 1970, the Republic of Guinea experienced an attempted invasion by Portuguese-led mercenaries. Also, in January 1977, the Republic of Benin experienced another mercenary assault on the region. Besides, the numerous French military interventions and the presence of French troops in and around the ECOWAS

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<sup>8</sup> See details of earlier notions of Security in ECOWAS in Tom Imobighe, (i) ECOWAS Defence Pact and Regionalism in Africa, in Ralph Onwuka and A. Sesay (ed) *The Future of Regionalism in Africa*, Macmillan, London, 1985.

region (to promote its imperialistic designs in the area) pose a lot of security worries for some of the ECOWAS member states.

A number of these states were worried about these threats, the more so because if the high hopes of ECOWAS should materialize, the neo-colonial powers lurking around in the region would find the situation rather uncomfortable and may decide on hostile action against selected targets. In this regard, one must say that ECOWAS countries are very vulnerable since these external forces have strategic information about ECOWAS States within their easy reach.

Another source of threat was posed by the then apartheid South Africa. Even though remote from the region the apartheid regime developed long-range capability which would have diminished the crippling effect of the distance between her and West Africa. Thus, South Africa could feel that the increasing prosperity of this region will lead to more positive support for the freedom fighters from the region. She could thus see the success of ECOWAS as a big threat to her apartheid institutions and as a result, decide on a pre-emptive action on selected ECOWAS targets.

Nevertheless, initial attempts to effect a collective regional security arrangement date back to 1977, when the first indigenous institutional mechanism for conflict resolution and security management among the Francophone family of nations in the sub-region was designed and put in place. The Agreement on Non-Aggression and Assistance in Matters of Defence, (ANAD) was concluded by seven member states of ECOWAS. Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo – all of whom are French speaking. It has been pointed out that ANAD represents a fortification of the linguistic exclusivity of certain countries in West Africa, and therefore a deepening of the Francophone – Anglophone divide which European imperial rule imposed on Africa's political landscape. It is significant to note however that, ANAD has no competence to deal with intra-state conflicts. And there is a touch of irony here, for as we shall see shortly the main security threats in the region have largely been spawned by intra-state conflicts. According to Jean Gomis, ANAD does not intervene when the internal security of a country is jeopardized by internal political ethnic, social or economic causes, even if they generate large mass casualties.<sup>9</sup>

In view of the fact that the entire landscape of West Africa's security is wider than the territories within which ANAD operates, the sixteen member states of ECOWAS concluded an agreement on non-recourse to force by Member States

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<sup>9</sup> R. A. Akindele, 'ECOWAS, Good Governance and Sub-Regional Security in (i) West Africa in R. A. Akindele (ed) Civil Society, good Governance and The Challenges of Regional Security in West Africa AFSTRAG and Vantage Publishers, Ibadan, 2003.

of the Community in April, 1978 to cover the entire territory. Under this agreement (the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression), Member States undertook to:<sup>10</sup>

- Refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression or from employing any other means inconsistent with the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity against the territorial integrity or political independence of other Member States;
- Refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of other Member States;
- Prevent foreigners resident on its territory from committing the acts (of subversion, hostility or aggression) against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other Member States;
- Prevent non-resident foreigners from using its territory as a base for committing the acts (of subversion, hostility or aggression) against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States;
- Respond to all peaceful means on the settlement of disputes arising among themselves;
- (Refer) any dispute which cannot be settled peacefully among Member States... to Committee of the Authority (of ECOWAS).

Three years later i.e in 1981 another protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence MAD was concluded.

ECOWAS' MAD is anchored on both the principle enunciated in Article 2, which is that "any armed threat or aggression directed against any Member State shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community," and hence the undertaking in Article 3 "to give mutual aid and assistance for defence against any armed threat or aggression." Its mutual assistance on defence is envisaged for three specifically defined circumstances: (i) armed conflict between two or several ECOWAS Member States; (ii) external armed threat or aggression directed against a Member State of the Community; and (iii) internal armed conflict within any Member State engineered and supported actively from outside likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire Community. But neither the 22 April 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression nor the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence of 21 May 1981 provides for the right of ECOWAS intervene without invitation by a member state and a written request for military assistance in case of need.

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

The institutional machinery designed for ECOWAS' collective security management consists of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the supreme decision-making organ, the Defence Council consisting of the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of Member States, the Defence Commission made up of the Chief of Staff from each Member State, and the Secretariat headed by ECOWAS' Executive Secretary. Presumably to drive home and emphasize the military character of the MAD outfit, provision has been expressly made for the appointment of a Deputy Executive Secretary (Military). Although he is under the authority of the Executive Secretary of the ECOWAS, he oversees and administers the technical military affairs of the MAD outfit.

Two major complaints have been made against these provisions. The first is that planning for conflict management has been anchored on the increasingly outdated assumption that inter-state warfare constitutes the dominant threat to peace and security.

In this respect, Rafiu Akindele, has contended that, the changing pattern of conflict, especially its occurrence (preponderantly) more within rather than across state borders, certainly represents a new and unanticipated set of challenges to the problematic of peace and security management. For instance, the United Nations has become preoccupied less with inter-state conflicts for which it was established than with intra-state civil and ethnic conflict for which it was not designed. In any case, it is also relevant to note that "the intersection between inter-state and intra-state conflict is important in the African context, although the line between the two has never been easy to draw".

As pointed out earlier, ANAD was not designed, and indeed expressly denies itself the legal competence, to get involved in intra-state ethnic and political conflict, no matter the level of anarchy and the resulting casualties. Again, ECOWAS' MAD Protocol allows intervention in internal armed conflict within any Member State only if that conflict is engineered and actively supported from outside and is likely to endanger peace and security in the Community.

The second ground for complaint is the unnecessary duplication of conflict management mechanisms operating within the same sub-region. This is moreso when one of the two mechanisms, the regional security outfit of ECOWAS MAD opens its membership to all the states of the community. As a matter of fact, five of the signatories to ANAD – Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Niger and Togo have ratified the ECOWAS, 1981 MAD Protocol. The need for the creation of a single management mechanism within the West African sub-region is generally said to be the logical and appropriate solution to this problem of dualism.

Subsequently, in response to this dualism, the ECOWAS Heads of State and

Government decided in Togo in 1997 to set in motion, the processes of establishing a new mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution for the sub-region. And by December, 1999, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security had been finalized and approved for implementation. What arguably informed and underscored the new initiative was the need to harmonize both the ANAD and ECOWAS' MAD outfits and evolve an acceptable single conflict management mechanism for West Africa. This 1999 mechanism was expected not only to facilitate and enhance an effective West African input into, and cooperation with, the 1993 OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Management but also to create respectability and confidence by the wider international community for the capacity of the African governments to manage their conflicts and security problems.<sup>11</sup>

It is to this 1999 ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security that we shall now direct our attention. With respect to institutional structure, prominent among the principal and subsidiary organs of the Mechanism are: (i) the Authority of the Heads of State and Government, (ii) the Mediation and Security council, (iii) the Defence and Security Commission, (iv) the Executive Secretary, (v) ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), (vi) the Council of Elders, and (vii) the Deputy Executive Secretary in charge of political affairs, defence and security. The institutional structure as well as some other provisions in the Mechanism's constitutive legal regime invites and indeed compels a number of comments.<sup>12</sup>

The first is that the Mediation and Security Council (MSC), composed of nine carefully selected and broadly representing the entire membership, is unquestionably the Mechanism's nerve-centre of gravity. Empowered to take decisions on issues of peace and security in the sub-region on behalf of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, ECOWAS' Mediation and Security Council operates on three levels: Heads of State and government of the nine members; Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Affairs and Security of the MSC Member States; and Committee of Ambassadors of the nine members who have dual accreditation to the host state and to ECOWAS. The second comment is that the Council of Elders, a classic innovation in institutional engineering for conflict resolution, reflects and illustrates African respect and veneration for the views and roles of elders in the settlement of disputes. Thirdly,

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.



ECOMOG, which grew up in the 1990s as ECOWAS' ad hoc response to the situation in Liberia and Sierra Leone and subsequently commanded respect and admiration for its activities, seemed to have been sanctimoniously legitimized and accepted as a stand-by arrangement for conflict management and peace-keeping operations in the sub-region. Fourthly, constitutional and institutional investment on an early warning system can be seen in the creation not only of a regional Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) at the ECOWAS Secretariat but also of four Observation and Monitoring Zones (OMZs) in different parts of the sub-region: Banjul, Ouagadougou, Monrovia and Cotonou. The primary function of the early warning mechanism at the Centre and in the Zones is to gather, analyze and report data from Member States indicating signs, if any, of deterioration of political, social, economic and other predetermined indicators that may lead to new or renewed conflict. This institutional innovation clearly indicates the high value placed on conflict anticipation and prevention as a strategy for security management in West Africa. Fifthly, although the Mechanism's new legal regime suggests that ANAD may choose to disappear through transformation into a specialized agency of ECOWAS, there is yet no evidence that it has actually disappeared. In effect, rationalization and harmonization may well still have a long way to go in view of the subsisting realities in the sub-region. Sixthly and finally, efforts were made to define three situations justifying ECOWAS' involvement and intervention in **intra-state** conflicts, which ordinarily in general international law, fall within the domestic jurisdiction of individual states. Arguably, the most progressive but certainly legally controversial is the right of intervention conceded to ECOWAS in an internal armed conflict which results from the overthrow, or an attempted overthrow, of a democratically elected government in any Member State in the sub-region; in an internal situation that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster, or in the event of a serious and massive violation of human rights and the rule of law. Apparently in recognition and awareness of the diminishing sacrosanctity of state sovereignty, a limited doctrine of intervention in internal affairs of states in support of democratic entitlement and/or in response to a humanitarian disaster would seem to have been admitted and endorsed by ECOWAS leaders.<sup>13</sup>

All the Mechanism's institutional organs for conflict resolution have been set up and have become operational. The Mediation and Security Council has become heavily involved in the search for reconciliation and stability in Liberia

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

and for a lasting peace in Sierra Leone. The Council of Elders has been constituted, while the structure for an early warning system operating under the authority of the Executive Secretary but through the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence and Security has been put in place at the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja and in the fields in the sub-region. With respect to peace building aimed at mitigating the effects of the destruction of institutions of government, the economy and public infrastructure, ECOWAS has adopted a three-stage strategy, namely: at the on-set of conflicts, during conflicts, and at the termination of conflicts. Post-conflict peace-keeping activities include disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of belligerents, reconstruction and rehabilitation of government and social institutions and monitoring of, if not involvement in, the organization and conduct, of elections.

Implementing the new ECOWAS' mechanism on conflict management has also entailed the reorganization and strengthening of ECOWAS Executive Secretariat. What is significant is not just the creation of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence and Security (DES-PAD) and the recruitment of General Cheick Oumar Diarra as Deputy Executive Secretary but also the reorganization of the section of the Executive Secretariat involved in carrying out the mandate of the mechanism. Under the Office of DES-PADS are: (i) Department of Operations, Peace-keeping and Humanitarian Affairs Division; (ii) Department of Political Affairs and Security, which is sub-divided into Political Affairs Division and Security Division; and (iii) the Observation and Monitoring Centre, which coordinates the activities of the four zonal observation bureaux and liaises with research centers and other agencies with a view to collating and analyzing information on peace and security situation in the sub region.

Ultimately, ECOWAS' capacity to effectively preside over the management of peace and security in the sub-region depends upon the availability of a well-equipped deterrent and operational force that can be put into action at a short notice. The choice facing ECOWAS' Heads of State and Government is between establishing a **standing** force, which will be unprecedented in the history of international security management, or calling upon each Member State in the sub-regional organization to earmark in their national Armies a specially trained stand-by force for release and deployment into the services of the ECOMOG at the request of the appropriate organ in ECOWAS and in compliance with the constitutional processes in each of the Member States. For quite obvious reasons, ECOWAS has opted for the latter arrangement. In effect, troops for peace-keeping missions, while constantly in a position of preparedness, would be normally

engaged within their different national Armies. The deployment of an ECOMOG force is to be authorized by the Heads of State and Government of members of ECOWAS' Mediation and Security Council, and its Force Commander appointed by the MSC on the recommendation of the Executive Secretariat. The understanding is that appointments to certain key posts are to be given to states, which contribute the largest contingents to the force. Again, as to the funding of the Force, the 1999 Protocol on the Mechanism is quite explicit, namely: that the funding of ECOWAS peace-keeping operations must come from the revenue generated from the implementation of the protocol establishing the Community levy as well as from voluntary donations by Member States and international organizations. Above all, with respect to every peace-keeping and security management operation, issues such as mandate, mission, size of force, area of deployment, logistics, deployment plan, duration and status of the mission are to be thrashed out by the Defence and Security Commission consisting of Chiefs of Staff.

### **The tragic triplets: An empirical rendition**

A lot of the security arrangements and protocols outlined earlier on, were not forged in a vacuum. Rather, they partly embody experiences which were learnt in the hard school of life. Specifically, this hard school of life centers on the conflicts and wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. The loss of lives, the refugee flows as well as the gross human rights abuses which these wars generated were such that, Adekeye Adebayo was forced to refer to these countries, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau as the tragic triplets of West Africa.<sup>14</sup> A number of features were common to these conflicts. First, it could be said that the wars were essentially triggered off by the crisis of state formation. Liberia is perhaps the most illustrative of this situation, where the long reign of the Americo-Liberians spawned a deep resentment which ultimately led to alienation and war in this unfortunate West African country that is just beginning to reclaim its soul. Another central dimension was the emergence of war lords, who undermined state authority for the sake of personal and instrumental objectives. There was also the central role of a core state like Nigeria, such that, in the course of time it became apparent that, for good or for ill, Nigeria constitutes the centre of gravity in the West African sub-region. Closely related to this was the presence of extra-African powers, who were necessarily drawn into the conflicts by contem-

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<sup>14</sup> Adekeye Adedayo, *Peace Building in West Africa*, International Peace (i) Academy Occasional Paper Series; Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Boulder, Colorado, 2002.

porary and historical imperatives. Aspects of this global dimension will be examined in the subsequent phase of this paper.

### **ECOWAS: The AU and the global security agenda**

In terms of correlations with the African Union, it should be pointed out that, overtime, and given the stalled profile of the African high command, the continental body fell back on the expedient of allowing the various sub-regional bodies to take care of their respective security arrangements. For an organization, whose funding was not particularly, robust, this policy of delegation was inevitable. In more recent times however, there has emerged a more activist body within the AU. This is the Conference of Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation. The first CSSDCA initiative was launched in Kampala under at the behest of the African Leadership Forum, the OAU and the ECA. The principal motivation of the CSSDCA, was the urgent need for a redefinition of Security and Sovereignty. In this respect, Obasanjo has contended along the following lines: we must ask why does sovereignty seem to confer absolute immunity on any government who commits genocide and monumental crimes. One striking correlation that can be observed here is that both organizations i.e ECOWAS and the AU, have since revised their respective notions of security to embrace, a much more elastic concept of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. Hitherto, the sacrosanct view was that of non-interference in the affairs of member states.

With the accession of Obasanjo to power in 1999, he has sought to incorporate the CSSDA into the mainstream of AU activities and policies. According to Chris Landberg, the second coming of the CSSDCA saw its adoption as a proposal for establishing a permanent machinery covering continental peace-keeping, promoting conflict prevention and military self-reliance in Africa, establishing an African peace council of elder statesmen to mediate conflicts and the promotion of a drastic reduction in military expenditure. Some of these ideas have since been incorporated into the African Union Project. In terms of correlation however, what is perhaps more remarkable is that the stated aims of CSSDCA and the 1999 ECOWAS Mechanism ... appear to be mirror-images of each other. For instance, apart from the obvious similarities of tasks like, peacekeeping and conflict prevention, there is also the striking similarity of a Council of Elders whose mandate is to mediate in conflicts. In view of the fact that the 1999 ECOWAS Mechanism was brought on stream much earlier, it is possible to contend that, CSSDCA has partly drawn its inspiration from the 1999 ECOWAS Mechanism. The conviction about this becomes more deepened by the comments of a commentator who declared that:

...compared to other sub-regional and regional organizations, ECOWAS appears to have articulated the most advanced security architecture in Africa...

Even then, at the concrete level, the correlation appears to have been manifested in the fact that, the AU gave ECOWAS, \$300,000 for its troops deployment in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

### The global dimension

As a playground for various external if not intrusive actors, West Africa continues to be affected by the security calculations of extra African powers. This cannot but be so, in the light of the role that colonialism has played in the various social formations in the region. Specifically, the extra-African powers are France, Britain, the United States and even Portugal.

As regards Britain, she has all along eschewed a world role for herself particularly since 1945, and of course the Suez crisis. Indeed, in terms of concrete and visible security engagement, she virtually withdrew from West Africa. More recently however an exception could be seen in Sierra Leone where contrary to the grain of her foreign policy impulses, she decided to take an active interest in that West African country. One major reason that has been adduced for this unusual move on the part of Britain, has to do with what has been called the ethical dimensions of British foreign policy. This moral dimension has been traced to the Victorian muscular Christianity which is deemed to be part of Blair's personality profile. There was also the presence of Clare Short, the former head of the Department for International Development (DFID). She has been described as the most influential voice in the British cabinet as regards the decision to go into Sierra Leone.

Paul Williams has also explained this unusual and isolated move of Britain along the following lines:<sup>15</sup>

The British government decision to intervene militarily in Sierra Leone in May 2000 can be understood as a combination of five imperatives: a concern to protect British citizens; the humanitarian impulse to do something as Sierra Leoneans teetered on the brink of a crisis that could be averted by the use or threat of military force; the defence of democracy; the need to live up to the commitment it made about the

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<sup>15</sup> R. A. Akindede, *op. cit.*

‘ethical dimension’ of foreign policy and the perception that the future credibility of UN peace-keeping operations was at stake, particularly in Africa.

By contrast, the security involvement of Paris in West Africa and by extension Africa, has always been an extensive and pervasive phenomenon. Throughout the Cold War, France consistently sought a much higher security profile in Africa, than either Britain or the United States. For some 35 years, the French security policy proved to be a unique phenomenon. Of course, security was only one of the three essential material props of the French sphere of influence in Africa. There were first the monetary zone of *Communauté Financière Africaine*, (CFA); second, the Cooperative accords for Development, Education and Culture, and third, defense accords. These props were tied integrally into the overall structure known generally as *la coopération*.

While a Ministry of Cooperation was established to handle this Africa – centred foreign policy, the system also gave the Ministry of defence, a defined but constrained role in conducting security operations and providing tactical support when needed in much of Francophone Africa. In the post-cold war era however, France has cut back considerably on her military presence in West Africa and by extension, Africa. But Emeka Nwokedi has been quick to remind us that the reduction in the deployment of French troops in the sub-region was more than compensated for by the establishment of a 47,000 – man strong Rapid Deployment Force, based in the South of France. Predictably and ominously too, this force can be put into action anywhere in sub-saharan Africa, within 48 hours.<sup>16</sup>

## The United States

As regards Washington, West Africa, and indeed Africa, has never featured prominently in her foreign policy calculations. This would probably explain why, it was only towards the end of the Liberian civil war in 1996, that the US decided to contribute substantial logistical and financial support to the Nigerian led ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group. ECOMOG in Liberia – a country with which the United States had special historical ties, and a state that was a staunch ally of the United States during the Cold War. In the same year, and in a wider context, Washington came forth with the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). Under this programme, later named ACOTA – African Contingency Operations

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<sup>16</sup> Emeka Nwokedi, *Democratic Renewal in Francophone West Africa at the (i) Threshold of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, in R.A. Akindele, (ed) *op.cit.*

Training Assistance, the United States would work with Western allies and African nations to enhance African peace-keeping and humanitarian relief capacity. Through the ACRI programme, Washington has offered training and equipment to African countries that are committed to democratization and civilian rule. In this context, Washington has conducted initial training with battalions from a number of West African countries: Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Benin, and Nigeria.

However, in recent times particularly in the wake of the 9/11 incident, a more novel and activist dimension can be observed in US security imperatives in West Central Africa. The major variables that are responsible for this new turn can be traced to oil and the volatile politics of the Middle East. This is because in recent times, particularly in the wake of the 9/11 incident, oil from West – Central Africa has assumed more importance in the calculations of the Washington power elites.<sup>17</sup>

For instance Ed Royce, the chairman of the Congress African sub-committee contends that African oil should be treated as a priority for US national security in the post 9/11 era. By contrast, during the presidential elections i.e before the 9/11 episode crystallized a new policy thrust, George Bush was reported to have said that, Africa does not fit into the national strategic interests of the United States.

However even well before 9/11, the West Central Africa had become a geopolitical priority, Robert Murphy a state department official says for instance that:<sup>18</sup>

Much of West Africa's oil is off-shore, insulated from domestic, political or social turmoil.

It is appropriate to stress here that much of this new thrust on the part of Washington has also been catalysed by social forces within Israel. Prominent among these is the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (IASPS). The IASPS has close links with the Likud Party, a long-standing advocate of reducing dependence – on Middle-East oil.

In the bid to consummate this new policy thrust, relatively novel overtures can be observed on the part of Washington. These include a gentle pressure on Nigeria to leave OPEC, a Washington inspired, symbolic breakfast party for 10 heads of state from West-Central Africa. Most importantly perhaps, and particularly in the light of strategic considerations, Carlton Fulford, visited West Africa in July 2002.

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<sup>17</sup> See Details of US Oil Diplomacy in CQ Researcher, January 24, 2003.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

The aim of his visit was to review the security of oil operations in the Gulf of Guinea, with a view to setting up a regional command centre that is reminiscent of the one situated in South Korea. Thus, it is safe to contend that, as regards the US, there is a changing configuration of Washington's security interests in West Africa.

## Conclusion

In this paper we have examined the security challenges and dynamics in the West African sub-region. In the process we have been able to apprehend the changing nature of the security dynamics in this region. One persistent trend that is noticeable relates to the presence of extra-regional powers – all of whom have interests that are not necessarily consistent with one another nor with those of the West African States. In this context, Washington's interest is particularly remarkable, if only because of the oil variable and the evolving politics of the Middle East. As regards the West African States, it could be seen that overtime, the threat potential has changed such that, intra-state as opposed to inter-state conflicts currently constitute the major threat(s) to peace and security in the region.

In the process and in response to these new threats, ECOWAS has put in place various protocols that have been designed to come to terms with conflict management and peace keeping. As noted earlier on, perhaps the most remarkable of these are the 1999 Protocols and the Conference of Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation (CSSDCA). As regards, the former, i.e. the 1999 protocols, there is still a lot to be done, particularly in according a substantive essence to security issues in the region.

If the ECOWAS security mechanism is to be successful, member-states of the sub-region must be dissuaded from offering support to warring fractions in neighbouring states.

Experience also clearly indicates that, Nigeria being a core state is very central to the issues of conflict management and peace-keeping in the region. However, the country is having to contend with her own formidable problems. Some of these problems revolve around deep political fissures and socio-economic issues which individually and collectively continue to interrogate the essence of the Nigerian State itself. Matters have certainly not been helped by the fact of a perceived arrogant unilateralism, which easily serves as a turn-off for the other ECOWAS member states. Indeed, such a 'go it alone' posture on the part of Nigeria has the potential of setting off the country against the rest of the sub-region. On this note, the comments of Burkinabe interior minister are worth recalling. "Nigeria cannot do what it wants and then go to ECOWAS for approval".



The 1999 protocols also provides for a Council of Elders which is supposed to mediate in conflicts. The Council consists of eminent personalities from Africa and outside the continent. This is clearly one novel instance, where civil society can be used to mitigate conflicts in the sub-region. As good as this novel idea appears to be, a measure of cautious optimism is needed. This is because, when push really comes to shove, i.e. in the heat of conflicts, as happened in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, the key to the resolution of the war often lay with warlords and rebel groups, who were usually unwilling to lay down their arms. Thus, as Adekeye notes, while the involvement of civil society actors in mediation efforts may serve a useful purpose, its effectiveness as a method of resolving national conflicts should not be overestimated.

Again as envisaged in the ECOWAS Security protocol of 1999, an Observation and Monitoring Center is currently being established within the ECOWAS Secretariat. This project is being funded by the European Union, and the director of the center, program manager and the heads of the four zonal bureaus have now been recruited. But the EU insisted that the recruitment be done according to its own bureaucratic rules and not those of ECOWAS. This is clearly a heavy-handed posture in which ownership of a sub-regional mechanism is virtually taken away from those who should in fact be central to such mechanisms. On another note, one lingering issue is the duplication posed by the presence of ANAD in West Africa. Thus far, attempts to integrate ANAD into the larger ECOWAS sub-regional force have not been successful. Whereas, for now and in the foreseeable future, there is the need to merge these two bodies.

At this juncture, it should be stressed that, as currently constituted, ECOMOG is an ad-hoc arrangement. There is therefore the urgent need to institutionalize this peace-keeping and enforcement force.

All told, it is necessary to stress that, as far as comparisons so, West Africa remains the world's poorest and most conflict - prone sub-regions all of them significantly involved in recent conflicts. Four ECOWAS states, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone, are among the ten poorest countries in the world. In essence then, it is not enough for ECOWAS and its member states to regard security in purely conventional terms. Rather, security should also embrace the human component. This human component should emphasize a situation in which the hapless and helpless peoples of this sub-region have access to basics like: potable water, adequate nutrition and viable, as well as, stress-free health facilities. It is only when these indices of human security are ensured, that the total security of the ECOWAS sub-region would have been enhanced.

# Contemporary African Responses to Existing Security Scenarios: Challenges and Opportunities for Engagement for SADC

*Dr. Naison Ngoma*

## Introduction

Scenarios are a form of prediction premised on an existence of a variety of factors which may interplay during a given time period. Even more crucial is the nature of reactions to a variety of them that may be considered to be plausible or indeed implausible even if only considered as a means of eliminating the viability of any such considerations. What is nonetheless pertinent is that scenarios are unavoidable if accurate predictions about a future are to be made. Their value to a decision making process is not only crucial but absolutely unavoidable.

If the importance of scenarios to socio-economic and political landscape is undisputable, so too would that of security. However, what makes the security scenario rather unique –complex even – is that more than any other dimension, the security component has complex inter-linkages. This is more so on the African continent where the nature of its historical development – ranging from the scramble of the continent in the 1880s to the era of the Cold War when it was the battle ground for the Super and Great Powers.

Just as the African continent has undergone a variety of security challenges over time, which would take several doctoral theses and a lifetime of study, so too would the SADC region, which only a decade ago was a battle field in the wider Cold War in which several lives were lost and massive amounts of property destroyed. At the global level, Chris Landsberg and Shaun McKay have identified the reduction of poverty, social development related issues, which include the HIV/AIDS pandemic, unemployment and illiteracy as well as promotion of peace building, human rights and democratic governance and finding ways of

bringing about an end to wars and conflict as some of the challenges of great concern.<sup>1</sup> The SADC region is not immune to similar challenges.

The SADC region's special historical circumstances makes it the only part of the continent with the largest European settlement where the settlers created minority governments and fought bitter inter and intra-state wars which only ended a decade ago.<sup>2</sup> Further contributing to the complex nature of the region is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which is grappling with the transition from war to peace. The DRC having been a source of what was referred to as Africa's First World War, remains a source of instability to its neighbours in the region. Therefore the SADC region poses a special African case and may serve as a template for the sustainability of peace and development on the Continent.

The paper examines the nature of conflicts in the Southern African region and subsequently examines some of its various aspects namely inter-state and intra-state dimensions, regional security and development structures, and issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity before finally examining some opportunities for the region.

## The Nature of Conflicts in Southern Africa

SADC has successfully built inter-state and government-to government solidarity. This solidarity has been spurred by the liberation struggle and has created a strong Southern African identity amongst governing elites, albeit not amongst the peoples of the region. There have also been efforts at harmonising policies, laws and programmes aligning the region around common policy positions.<sup>3</sup>

The region's traumatic past, which tends to present both the intra and inter-state dimensions in a manner that shows close linkages to both aspects, has a significant effect in any security scenario. The relationship between the apartheid South African regime and its 'white' bloc allies on the one hand and the rest of the region, on the other, was such that it presented an inter-conflict dimension between the two blocs while simultaneously, directly and indirectly being responsible for each other's intra-state conflicts.

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<sup>1</sup> Chris Landsberg and Shaun McKay, "Engaging the New Pan-Africanism: Strategies for Civil Society", Centre for Policy Studies, p. 1.2.

<sup>2</sup> See Anjan Sundaram, "Making Order Out of Chaos for the 2006 Election", Inter Press Service News Agency, Monday, August 28, 2006. <http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews+30207>.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p.1.8.

The fact that the events in the region have been taking place within brief and compact time frames is that the past is not as distant as the term may imply. The past in the region is impossible to ignore in security scenario building, even as South Africa may now be characterised as largely a benign and democratising 'hegemony' while the rest are 'willing' participants in an era and region that has seen a dramatically reduced insurgency and general insecurity. This is also an area that has witnessed a general upsurge of liberal democratic ethos and yet one that somehow continues to display polarity on the scholarship front. It has even been argued that the region is destined for further insecurity in spite of the establishment of seemingly elaborate security architecture and a number of protocols and a mutual defence pact.<sup>4</sup> However the contrary view points to both the existence of these instruments as essential for a safe and secure environment and general absence of empirical evidence to the contrary. Solidifying the optimism is the current debate on whether the region is moving towards a security community.<sup>5</sup> Karl Deutsch (the person most associated with the concept) has described a security community as follows:

A security community is a group of people, which has become "integrated". By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a "sense of security" and of institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to assure... dependable expectations of "peaceful change" amongst its population. By sense of community we mean a belief...that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of "peaceful change".<sup>6</sup>

Ben Rosamond compliments this definition by looking at the community as a group of states amongst which the prospects of war are eradicated as the condition where a war as a means of dispute settlement between states is obsolete in what is a zone of peace.<sup>7</sup> Whether one should actually refer to the SADC region as a "zone of peace" may be stretching it. With an intra-conflict war ranging in the DRC, Angola just emerging from conflict, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe undergoing political and economic stress, some would ar-

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<sup>4</sup> Nathan, Gina Van Schalkwayk, "Challenges in the creation of a Southern African sub-regional security community", ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs, Vol. 1 No. 1, 2005.

<sup>5</sup> Naison Ngoma (2005), Prospects for a Security Community in Southern Africa: An analysis of Regional Security in the Southern African Development Community, UNESCO (Harare Cluster) & Institute for Security Studies.

<sup>6</sup> Deutsch, K.W. et al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton: Princeton University Press Deutsch et al. 1957: 5.

<sup>7</sup> Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration. New York: Palgrave.2000.

gue are a result of an incomplete demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) is anything but a zone of peace. But this does not mean a region cannot be a security community or at least approximating one, as studies of the Baltic region have shown.<sup>8</sup> The Southern African region is evidently one in which there is little consensus on the level of its security or insecurity. What the SADC region will be is clearly a matter of debate and great concern for a region whose prosperity depends on the perception the international community has of it.<sup>9</sup> Whether the SADC region that has experienced the trauma of the apartheid era would be a candidate of inter-state or intra-state conflict is a matter that needs to be evaluated. Therefore choreographed by a variety of security challenges, the inter and intra-state conflicts in the SADC region are issues that require careful evaluation.

### *Inter-state Conflict: an unlikely Dimension?*

War between states is a phenomenon that is increasingly becoming rare. Such occurrences have been left to wars by proxies and thereby disguised the actual belligerents. For instance it has been mentioned that conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has been viewed as a war between the former and Iran and Syria through the latter.<sup>10</sup> Some of the basis for such a conclusion includes the inhibitive cost of such a war fought at the magnitude of states. Nevertheless, wars between states have occurred, albeit at severely reduced rates when compared to the era when the armaments were relatively less high-tech than those of the contemporary era. Therefore it may be for this very observation that inter-conflict in Southern Africa cannot just be dismissed as an impossibility without subjecting the issue to some level of inquiry. In this regard the scenario that seeks to interrogate the evolvement of inter-state conflict in the SADC region is a potent one. To put this to test this paper begins by taking the view that careful study of events in the region suggest that *an inter-state conflict in the SADC region is an unlikely dimension*.

The argument runs like this: The states in the SADC region are not in the immediate or long term future ever going to be involved in inter-state conflict. This view is premised on the fact that such a conflict would not only involve large amounts of state resources which the countries can least afford, but would also be highly unlikely in a region which is essentially fatigued by decades of state-sponsored insecurity as seen in during the apartheid era. Further inhibiting

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<sup>8</sup> Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System*. London: Thousand Oaks, 2002.

<sup>9</sup> Ngoma, 2005, *ibid*.

<sup>10</sup> Jonathan Marcus, "Lebanon exposes wider fault lines", BBC NEWS, 12 August 2006.

such an eventuality is that the SADC region's improvement on the democracy scale is that public opinion has become more crucial than in the past when political and military elites could plunge countries into war without recourse to the people. With wider interests encapsulated in the concept of human security, militarism has fallen considerably on the long list contributing to insecurity.

Further more, the nature of the region's leadership remains seized with the motivation premised on common values and solidarity that has seen the region through the apartheid era.<sup>11</sup>

Should this viewpoint be regarded as somewhat too subjective to be of any real value in the analysis of the scenario, the developments of regional structures for security and development serve as objective realities. After all the development of regional structures is one of the indicators of the development of a security community. There can be little doubt that the developments in the Southern African region support the conclusion that the SADC region conforms to one moving towards a security community and therefore highly unlikely to have inter-state military conflicts.<sup>12</sup> However this has not always been this way leading to the development of security architecture that is intended to enhance peace and security in the region, which was the most violent place on the African Continent about a decade ago.

### *Regional security and development structures*

The Southern African region has a long history of conflict, which one may take as far back as the first settlement by the Europeans at present day Cape Town.<sup>13</sup> From the onset race proved to be the major source of conflicts in the region. This did not by any means discount conflicts among the indigenous peoples of the region as the era of Shaka Zulu testifies.

The history of the sub-region shows that the survival mechanism by the peoples of the region has been building up of alliances in the form of regional security arrangements (which also took a social-political and economic dimension) and predates decolonisation. The alliances, which were designed for the purpose

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<sup>11</sup> Ngoma, 2005, Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. See also Maxi Schoeman, *Imagining a Community: The African Union as an Emerging Security Community*, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 29 (1), 2002.

<sup>13</sup> Gwendolene M. Carter in the article 'South Africa: Growing Black-White Confrontation', in Carter and P O'Meara (ed.), *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982, writes that the "long history of black-white relations" in the region dates back to 1652, when the Dutch East India Company, comprising Dutch settlers of the "elitist Calvinism" persuasion who had "a sense of mission to dominate the heathen and to build their own characteristic society", established a base in Cape Town (Carter, 1982, p. 95).

of meeting the challenges of inter-state security nature, were characterised by the aggressive foreign policy projections of apartheid South Africa, the settler colonies of Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and reactive policies by other African-ruled states in the region.<sup>14</sup> The more significant alliances would have to be those beginning in the 1970s to the 1990s divided along racial lines as has been overtime. The so-called 'white' bloc included Prime Minister PW Botha's Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), and the Total Strategy as well as the British-sponsored Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The 'black' bloc included the newly independent states of the period. Their alliances - the East and Central African States, the Mulungushi Club, the Frontline States alliance (FLS), the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) [sometimes merely referred to as the SADC Organ] and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)<sup>15</sup> were not only survival mechanisms in view of the stronger 'white' bloc but also a serious effort to set the stage for sustained cooperation which was to entail an inter-state relationship which would make inter-state conflict highly unlikely. Although all these alliances explain both the character of the inter-state conflicts in the region and their influence on current and possibly on future trends, it is to the more contemporary ones of SADC and the OPDS that greater emphasis is made. This is essentially because of their greater role in the interrogation of challenges and opportunities in the region in the present and the future.

There can be little doubt that the creation of the SADC in the region has played a pivotal role in resolving several, if not, most security challenges in the region.

SADC's Declaration, Treaty and Protocol establishing the SADC from the SADCC on 17 August 1992 although generally concerned with economic integration, was nevertheless determined to have a considerable influence on political and security influence, as the SADC Treaty itself shows. In Chapter 7, article 21 (3), the Treaty identifies areas of cooperation as "food security, land and agriculture; infrastructure and services; industry; trade, investment and finance; human resource development, science and technology; natural resources and environment; social welfare, information and culture; and politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security", thereby preferring a holistic approach

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<sup>14</sup> Jakkie Cilliers, "Building Security in Southern Africa: An Update on the Evolving Architecture". Institution for Security Studies Monograph Series, 43, 1999 & Ngoma, 2005

<sup>15</sup> The concepts of 'white' and 'black' blocks have been adopted by Cantori, I.J.R and Spiegel, S.L. *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1970; and Willie Breytenbach, *Conflict in Southern Africa: From Frontline State to Collective Security*. The Arusha Paper, 2, 1995.

to resolving security challenges.<sup>16</sup> In the adoption of human security through the SADC Treaty, a stage was set for the establishment of an institutional framework to address the region's security concerns by strengthening regional solidarity and concerted efforts to bring about sustainable mutual peace and security symptomatic of a community of states, even a security community. However this has not always been without some critics. For instance Peter Vale has argued that the region hardly exhibits any sense of community at all:

There is very little real sense of community between Southern Africa's states. This may again sound...well, mischievous: after all the region's states claim to be joined in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and a treaty, protocols, a sense of renewal and even a few buildings attest to their commitment.<sup>17</sup>

The value of Vale's observation lies in serving as an impetus for a functional body that lives to its declared objectives. The challenge has clearly been moving beyond mere declarations and physical structures as evidence of a community of states. Nonetheless, with "common cultural and social affinities, common historical experiences, common problems and aspirations"<sup>18</sup> as well as an intention to develop "a vision of a shared future" and solidarity on issues of peace and security, it can be argued that the region has both the basic ingredients for a future without inter-state conflicts and the determination to achieve such a peaceful environment which lives to the vision of the regional body. However, what the states in the region may have lacked (or even may continue to lack) in a coherent regional structure, they appear to make up for in good inter-state relationships which are pivotal in avoiding inter-state conflicts.

If there is structure in Southern Africa which epitomises inter-state relationship in the region, it is the SADC Organ. Establishment in 1996, the OPDS was intended to implement SADC's vision and yet almost ended up being the source of regional instability when questions arose as to whether it should be a structure under SADC or whether it should retain the independence of its fore runner, the FLS. The debate was also interwoven by what others saw as competition for regional leadership between South Africa (the then Chair of the SADC) and Zimbabwe, which at the time held the Chair of OPDS on account of its President

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<sup>16</sup> SADC, "TOWARDS A SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY – A Declaration made by the Heads of State of Government of Southern Africa at Windhoek, 1992.

<sup>17</sup> Vale, P. (manuscript). *The First Amongst Unequals*, 2003, p. 121.

<sup>18</sup> SADC, 1992 p. 1.



being the senior most of the Heads of States as per tradition of the FLS its forerunner.<sup>19</sup> However the institution has since overcome the early differences over its relationship as regard the SADC, thereby proving that the Heads of States and Governments in the region have the ability of overcoming inter-state divergences. Nonetheless, although overcoming several challenges at the strategic level, their ability to continue with those successes required a functional OPDS. Critical for this to become a reality was making the organisation to work. Of greater significance is how the operationalisation of the SADC Organ since its creation in 1996 and its formalisation in 2001 has evolved.<sup>20</sup> The activities of the SADC Organ can be traced to a much earlier period of the Frontline States (FLS) during which period the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), closely interacted with the states of the then 'black bloc'.<sup>21</sup>

The SADC Organ, especially given the post 2001 structural arrangements comprising of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO), and the Mutual Defence Pact, give the SADC an even better chance of meeting the challenges. Some of these challenges include the inter- and intra-state conflicts in the Great Lakes region, including the question whether in view of the history of the SADC Organ it may later become a subject of inter-state rivalry as the case was earlier.

In the backdrop of the violent past characterised by inter-and-intra state wars complicated by Cold War geopolitics dynamics, the Southern African region was one of the most volatile areas in the world, particularly during the late 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. The SADC Organ in 1996 was focussed towards the fulfilment of the SADC Treaty principles of sovereign equality of all states in the region; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; equality, balance and mutual benefits; and peaceful settlement of disputes<sup>22</sup>. With its objectives in various components of security, such as the military, crime

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<sup>19</sup> See Mark Malan, *Regional Power Politics Under Cover of SADC: Running Amok with a Mythical Organ*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1998, [www.iss.co.za/pubs/19/paper19.html](http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/19/paper19.html); Walter Tapfumaneyi, *Regional Security Cooperation in Southern Africa: A view from Zimbabwe*. *Global Dialogue*, 4 (2), August, 1999 for details of the debate over the OPDS and the SADC.

<sup>20</sup> See The Extra-Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), Windhoek, Namibia, 9 March 2001, <http://www.sardc.net/Editorial/sadctoday>; 2001 SADC Summit Final Communiqué, Blantyre, Malawi, 14 August 2001; and Munetsi Madakufamba, "Blantyre Summits Quite Endorsement of Restructuring Misses Media Attention", *Southern African News Features*, Issue No. 15, August 2001, <http://www.sardc.net>.


<sup>21</sup> For a more elaborate analysis of the 'black bloc'; see Ngoma (2003 and 2004) and Breytenbach, W. (1995). *Conflict in Southern Africa: From Frontline State to Collective Security*. The Arusha Paper, 2.

<sup>22</sup> See SADC Treaty and Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, "The SADC Treaty – Building Security in Southern Africa, An Update on the Evolving Architecture", Monograph No 43, 1999.

prevention, intelligence, foreign policy and human rights, it may be argued that the SADC Organ has been set to ensure absence of inter-state conflicts in the region. The developments in 2001, which subordinated the SADC Organ to the mainstream SADC and the Protocol on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation, and the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact in 2004 can be said to have ensured such an eventuality absolutely impossible.

Further augmenting the scenario that makes inter-state conflict in the region highly unlikely is the nature of the inter-state relations that is premised on sovereign equality of states and respect of territorial integrity of states in the region as stipulated by the SADC principles upon which the SADC Organ objectives are premised. However the intensity of solidarity among states in the region reflects a movement towards the sharing of sovereignty as the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, the SIPO and Mutual Defence Pact suggest. However the extent to which the SADC lives to its principles and objectives relies to a large extent to the manner in which the region coordinates its efforts. Here therefore lies the value of the SADC Secretariat. Structured as under at figure1, the SADC Secretariat exhibits a thorough make-up within the broad regional defence and security structure.

**Figure 1: SADC Security Architecture<sup>23</sup>**



<sup>23</sup> L. Gen. L.M. Fisher and N. Ngoma, "The SADC Organ: Challenges in the New Millennium, ISS Paper 114, August 2005.

The success of the SADC Secretariat depends on the availability of qualified resource persons and adequate funding. However, there are neither enough qualified personnel nor sufficient financial resources to meet the many challenges, which the Southern African regional body faces.<sup>24</sup> However hope lies in the apparent realisation of this major shortfall by the leadership of the region.<sup>25</sup> Overcoming these huddles has not been easy and will not be easy without the assistance by the international community for a region which is still facing post-conflict challenges, the 'birth pains' of democratisation, the wrath of HIV/AIDS and a whole range of other human security issues. Table 1 below shows the magnitude of the HIV/AIDS pandemic to highlight the seriousness of the non-military challenges facing the region. In this regard SADC's relations with major donor countries like the USA, UK, and the EU in SADC programmes is necessary but given the Zimbabwe factor the SADC Organ is unlikely to receive the required donor support to adequately meet the challenges of peace and security in the region.

**Table 1: HIV Prevalence in SADC Members States**

Country	Population	HIV Prevalence (%)	People with HIV	Death 2001	Orphans
Angola	1 352 700	5.5	350 000	24 000	100 000
Botswana	1 554 000	38.8	330 000	26 000	69 000
DR Congo	52 552 000	4.9	1 300 000	120 000	930 000
Lesotho	2 057 000	31.0	360 000	25 000	73 000
Malawi	11 572 000	15.0	850 000	80 000	470 000
Mauritius	1 171 000	0.1	700	< 100	No Info.
Mozambique	18 644 000	13.0	1 100 000	60 000	420 000
Namibia	1 788 000	22.5	230 000	13 000	47 00
South Africa	43 792 000	20.1	5 000 000	360 000	660 000
Swaziland	938 000	33.4	170 000	12 000	35 000
Tanzania	35 965 000	7.8	1 500 000	140 000	810 000
Zambia	10 649 000	21.5	1 200 000	120 000	570 000
Zimbabwe	12 852 000	33.7	2 300 000	200 000	780 000
SADC	193 534 000	19.02	14 690 700	1 180 000	4 964 000

Source: UNAIDS 2003

<sup>24</sup> Chris Landsberg of The Institute for Policy Studies in South Africa was interviewed on a South African radio station, SAFM on 4 April 2004.

<sup>25</sup> The Summit has been very critical of the slow pace by the Secretariat in implementing decisions by the Summit on the restructuring exercise launched in 2001. For details see Munetsi Madakufamba, "SADC shows determination towards self reliance", Southern African News Features 4 No. 79, August 2004.

The creation of inter-state structures in the Southern African region as early as FLS designed to be a response to the violence of the pre-1994 era in the Southern African region; the SADCC as the precursor of the SADC and indeed the SADC itself have been crucial to the security and development of the region with their imperfections. These institutions have served as rallying points of governments in the region in meeting the security and development challenges facing the region.

The creation of the OPDS including the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), the Mutual Defence Pact and protocols designed to vigorously pursue a stable region, can only point towards a region that is working towards tranquil relationships amongst states in the region. However there are some credible arguments that the continent's inter-state institutions tend to be 'mere extensions of government interest', the case in point often cited is the presumed failure by SADC Head of State and Governments to address Zimbabwe's political and economic crisis, thereby appearing to affirm the view that creation of the regional security architecture is for regime security.<sup>26</sup> Ironically such a perception only serves to consolidate the view that inter-state conflict is unlikely in the SADC region. However, the apparent affirmation of state sovereignty and sensitivity to territorial integrity could be regarded as an indentation, if not a serious threat to inter-state relations.

### *Sovereignty and territorial integrity*

The basis of an inter-state conflict is generally understood to be severe threats to the survivability of a country's state-hood which essentially means respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The latter aspect has been most instrumental in igniting inter-state conflicts. In this regard, notwithstanding the developments of peace and security architectures, the number of territorial disputes in the SADC region affecting most of the states would seem to suggest the volatility of the territorial integrity issue. For instance, the border conflict between Namibia and Botswana over a seemingly non-strategic island resulted in the deployed military forces of both countries, thereby serving as probably the most serious of such cases in the region.<sup>27</sup>

The region has also continued to experience a number of border disputes in the majority of countries in the region yet these disputes have not in developed into inter-state conflicts per se, a factor one would attribute largely due to inbuilt

<sup>26</sup> Southern Africa: Zimbabwe not on SADC heads of State agenda", IRINNews.org, Monday 28 August 2006.

<sup>27</sup> International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island, Volume 1 November 1997, [http://www.icj-icj.org/icjwww/idocket/ibona/ibonepleadings/ibona\\_impleading\\_1998](http://www.icj-icj.org/icjwww/idocket/ibona/ibonepleadings/ibona_impleading_1998).

political mechanisms. Current border disputes are between DRC and Angola; DRC and Zambia; Zambia and Malawi; Zambia and Angola; Namibia and Botswana; Namibia and South Africa; Botswana and Zimbabwe; and Zimbabwe and South Africa.<sup>28</sup> Playing a crucial role in mitigating these boundary disputes have been bilateral relations that are exhibited in Joint National Commissions which amount to pragmatic efforts by both parties towards what are after all meaningless boundary lines which were never of their own making in the first place.

Yet another source of inter-state conflict associated to international boundaries lies in the general inability to police them, usually because of the combination of factors such as the states' restricted capacity and the lengths of the borders. For instance, Tanzania and Zambia have long borders with the DRC, which are generally porous and tend to allow for the uncontrolled movement of people who include both refugees, combatants, bandits and opportunists taking advantage of the instability in the region.<sup>29</sup> Both Tanzania and Zambia have therefore undergone some severe economic and environmental hardships as well as general feelings of insecurity attributed to thousands of refugees who have crossed the common border in search of a more stable and safe existence.<sup>30</sup> Without good bilateral relations and firm resolve at regional level to seek a more comprehensive solution to the movement of peoples across boundaries, the large inflow of illegal immigrants into South Africa from Zimbabwe would have soured relations between the two states.<sup>31</sup>

While the feeling and fact of state sovereignty continues (despite efforts towards integration, which include the development of a regional anthem), inter-state rifts over where borderlines run in the SADC region will also persist thereby leaving an ever-present possibility of inter-state differences that technically could worsen if not well managed. It would also seem that the African Union (AU) and the Organisation of the African Unity (OAU) before it was wise to insist on the retention of the continent's colonial political boundaries despite the ridiculousness of the boundaries divide communities.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> The DITF HQ IAC, Addis Ababa, 2006, Current African Situation.

<sup>29</sup> \*\* Gerry Cleaver and Simon Massey, 2001. 'DRC: Africa's Scramble for Africa', in Oliver Furley and Roy May (eds.), *African Interventionist States*, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Aldershot, 2001.

<sup>30</sup> Naison Ngoma "Hawks, Doves or Penguins? A critical review of the SADC military intervention in the DRC" ISS Paper, Number 88, April 2004

<sup>31</sup> See Hussein Solomon, "Turning Back the Tide: Strategic Responses to the Illegal Alien Problem in South Africa", Institute for Defence Policy, Monograph No. 4: People Poverty and Peace, Human Security in Southern Africa, May 1996, <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/No4/Solomon.html>.

<sup>32</sup> See <http://www.africa-union.org>, Article 4(a) and (b); OAU Article 111 (3).

Another possible source of conflict derives from access to natural resources - especially fresh water resources. This presents daunting challenges for the countries in SADC, a number of which are seriously becoming water deficit areas despite the existence of some major rivers, lakes and wetlands in some of the countries. The DRC, Tanzania and Zambia are among the few countries with disproportionate access to fresh water. While the existence of several serious water studies are under way in the region with special focus on the water deficit areas in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, the existence of SADC Protocols on the resource is a reflection of the intent by countries in the region not to make the resource the nemesis it has become in such areas as the Middle East.<sup>33</sup>

On balance it is evident that the SADC region is unlikely to experience inter-state conflict, largely because of the region's own initiative of creating inter-state structures designed to mitigate security and development challenges. It is also evident that OAU's and consequently also that of the AU's established principle of sovereignty and the inviolability of borders, together with its other continental institutions of conflict prevention embodied in the AU Commission have played a major role in mitigating conflict between states. Whether such successes in curbing inter-state conflicts can be extended to intra-state conflict is a matter of intense debate.

#### *Intra-state Conflicts: A Certainty or Over Stated?*

Intra-state conflict is a phenomenon that may be difficult to predict in whatever country one may be examining - 'developed' or 'developing'. This is because of the array of factors which may range from political to economic, social to ethnic, and so forth. The question that arises in respect to the SADC region is whether intra-state conflict can be said to be a certainty now or whether in fact it can be regarded to be an overstatement to consider intra-state conflict as endemic in the region. Although today the Southern African region (excluding the DRC) is not at conflict, the existence of some factors give a rather pessimistic picture of the region as the quotation below testifies:

Like elsewhere in Africa, **parts of Southern Africa** have been bedevilled by violent intra-state conflicts, resulting from political, economic and ethnic exclusion. These intra-state conflicts have been accelerated by a vicious culture of violence, which is sustained by arms trafficking, trans-border organised crime, and eco-

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<sup>33</sup> See "Water: A source of conflict of cooperation in the Middle East", [mfa.gov.tr/NR/waterasourceofconflictofcoopintheMiddleEast.pdf](http://mfa.gov.tr/NR/waterasourceofconflictofcoopintheMiddleEast.pdf); [www.mideastweb.org/water.htm](http://www.mideastweb.org/water.htm).

conomic and social deprivation presided over by weak and at times dysfunctional state institutions, or (in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo) **collapsed states that are unable to manage and ensure the socio-economic, human and political security of their citizens.**<sup>34</sup>

While the above statement would appear to suggest that states in the SADC region are embattled with insecurity, it also acknowledged that this is not necessarily the case for the whole SADC region. It is this ambiguity that tends to characterise analysis of events within states in the Southern African region. Before interrogating the most plausible scenario in this respect, defining intra-state conflict is necessary.

Intra-state conflict is regarded as large-scale violence between communities in the population or between states and sections of the population. It is also regarded at the extreme point as genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights, over and above the other factors indicated at the commencement of this paper. Intra-state conflicts are also exhibited in military coups or other threats to the legitimate authority of a state as well as a coalition of civil war or insurgency.

Indeed intra-state conflicts also threaten peace and security in the region, thereby showing a firm inter-linkage with inter-state conflict. There is little doubt (if any) that all these factors accurately described the Southern Africa of the apartheid and a significant part of the post-apartheid era up to the early part of the new millennium. The exception remains the DRC, which has continued to struggle in its effort to cross the threshold of the "collapsed state" tag and in the process, threatens to overflow into its neighbouring states and beyond.

Taking what is possibly the worst case in the SADC region - the DRC through the August 2006 elections, also signifies a state that is determined to join the community of states which are experiencing relative peace, stability and development. However the situation in the DRC is unlikely to improve within the next decade as political factions in the country endeavour to exist in a new political dispensation. With the assistance of the SADC, AU, the global community, as well as benefits from the country's massive wealth, the DRC is destined to eventually become a viable and peaceful country it has never been but can be like its neighbour Angola, which is recovering well from years of intra-state conflict.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> IDRC Grant No. 101125, May 2003- April 2005

<sup>35</sup> Rev Kinaimbuta Sambu Pedro, "Angola: Rally for Peace Sparks Hope", Peace Tour, August 10, 2006; <http://www.peace-tour.org/tour2006/nation/angola.php>

If the DRC can be described as a country at the threshold of hope, it has been argued that Zimbabwe, unlike its other neighbours in the SADC region, can be regarded as a 'failed state' in that it is unable to provide security to its own people.<sup>36</sup> Characterised by the USA and a number of Western states as "an outpost of tyranny"<sup>37</sup>, Zimbabwe is confronted with immense challenges that are unlikely to improve despite concerted support by other SADC states and the AU until the retirement from politics by President Robert Mugabe. The resolve by the USA, UK and Western Europe to make an example of Zimbabwe is likely to falter any move by the country and region as well as the AU to turn the country around.

The extent to which the SADC is disadvantaged for its stand on Zimbabwe is a matter that is yet to be fully determined. The engagement of Western donors has a significant effect on the performance of the regional body because of the significant amount of resources their participation could bring.<sup>38</sup> What remains factual and of major concern is that large numbers of Zimbabweans have kept trekking into neighbouring countries with South Africa getting what are believed to be in millions as Zimbabwe's economic state appears to be on 'free fall'.<sup>39</sup> Even the monetary intervention by the country's central bank in August 2006 is unlikely to sufficiently improve the situation without the critical comprehensive improvement on the internal political front. The latter remains particularly fundamental if the Western countries which have continued to isolate Zimbabwe's political leadership and virtually maintain economic sanctions on the country which are more than likely the major cause of the seemingly irresolvable economic chaos the country is going through. However, with rest of the region vigorously pursuing democratic practices in both the political and economic spheres and undertaking pragmatic social policies, external support to other countries in the region is likely to continue despite the regional stand on Zimbabwe. As indicated earlier donor support to the SADC institutions is likely to be adversely affected by the region's collaborative stand on Zimbabwe.

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<sup>36</sup> Nilu Ndolu, "Is Zimbabwe a failed State?" New Zimbabwe.com, <http://www.newszimbabwe.com/pages/opinion115.13747.html>.

<sup>37</sup> Rupert Cornwell, "From the 'Axis of Evil' to the 'Outposts of Tyranny'", Common dreams News Centre, April 10, 2005, <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0120-01.htm>.

<sup>38</sup> See Artwell Manyemba, "SADC in Solidarity with Zim", Sunday Mirror, 10 August 2003 and Fisher & Ngoma

<sup>39</sup> See Barry Mason and Barbara Slaughter, "Zimbabwe economy in free fall", <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/apr2001/zim-05.shtml>; Zimbabwe's economy takes a long fall, SABCNEWS, Friday May 2006, <http://www.zwnews.com/issuefall.cfm>.



The role of the SADC in meeting the challenges of intra-state conflicts have not been without critic. Despite the fact that the SADC Treaty Article 2 including the AU Constitutive Act places premium on the protection of people and development, there has nevertheless been a firm view that the former has tended to represent the interests of political elites. However, how such a view can be sustained remains a mystery given the SADC's Zimbabwe's political impasse as well as its consistency in condemning insurgency and military coup attempts in the region.<sup>40</sup>

What has remained evident is that the nature of intra-state conflicts in the SADC region is a matter of magnitude. Mitigating the culture of violence in South Africa, which only recently was in conflict and would technically be regarded to be in a post-conflict stage, as well as arms trafficking in the region and is an undertaking that the SADC Organ has been consistent with through its Inter-State Defence and Security Committee with a mandate to reinforce democracy by becoming "the foremost institution of SADC mandated to address issues relating to political stability, conflict prevention, management and resolution, democracy and human rights as well as issues pertaining to peace".<sup>41</sup>

### *Opportunities for SADC*

The SADC region faces many challenges. While a number of them may be resolved through cohesive and determined undertaking by regional political leaders, others such as the conflicts in the Great Lakes region are likely to take longer due to the complexity of factors. This may also be the case with the intra-state rivalry in Zimbabwe in which the role by exogenous actors appear to be determined to stay their course and consequently and effectively making the regional body on somewhat of a collision course with the USA and the UK who have taken a particularly hard line on the country. This is the basis of the paper's pessimism about the outlook of the region in the new millennium. The relatively poorly skewed financial base of the region, as shown in Table 2 below, places comparatively greater pressure on a few countries such as South Africa and Botswana.

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<sup>40</sup> See "11 days that led to war", Sunday Times, 27 September 1998, <http://www.suntimes.co.za/1998/09/27/news/news23.htm>.

<sup>41</sup> SADC Communiqué, 28 June 1996.

**Table 2: SADC GDP Estimates<sup>42</sup>**

COUNTRY	GDP (US\$ bn)		
	2002	2003	2004
Angola	11.2	12.1	17.0
Botswana	5.7	7.8	8.7
DRC	5.3*	-	-
Lesotho	0.7	1.1	1.6
Malawi	1.6	1.5	1.6
Mozambique	3.6	4.4	5.3
Namibia	3.0	4.3	5.5
South Africa	445.6	466.5	492.7
Swaziland	1.2	2.1	3.1
Zambia	4.1	4.8	6.0
Zimbabwe	4.8	4.6	4.5
Tanzania	9.4	9.2	9.7
Mauritius	4.7	5.7	6.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>500.9</b>	<b>524.1</b>	<b>561.9</b>

Sources: <http://www.sadc.int/>; Economic Intelligence Unit estimates

There are nevertheless bases for some optimism. The elaborately outlined principles and objectives of the SADC Organ indicate a well thought-out structure of the regional security architecture. The structure of the objectives of the SADC Organ outlined at Table 3 shows that the region is at the least poised towards a broadened approach to security. The region’s seriousness in combating the SADC Organ objectives is seen in such implementation tools as the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security, the SIPO and the Mutual Defence Pact.

**Table 3: Categorized objectives of the organ for Politics, Defence and Security**

Military/Defence	Crime Prevention	Intelligence	Foreign Policy	Human rights
Protect against instability	Close co-operation to deal with cross-border crime	Close co-operation	Promote co-operation and common political value systems and institutions to deal with cross-border crime	Develop democratic institutions and practices

<sup>42</sup> L.M. Fisher and N. Ngoma, (2005).

**Table 3: (continued)**

Military/Defence	Crime Prevention	Intelligence	Foreign Policy	Human rights
Develop a collective security capacity	Promote community-based approach	Early warning	Develop common foreign policy	Encourage observance of universal human rights
Conclude a Mutual Defence Pact			Conflict prevention, management and resolution	Encourage and monitor international human rights conventions and treaties
Develop a regional peacekeeping capacity			Mediate in inter-and intra-state disputes	Early warning
			Early warning	
			Preventive diplomacy	
			Encourage and monitor international arms control / disarmament conventions and treaties	
			Co-ordinate participation in peace operations	
			Address extra-regional conflicts which impact on the region	

The restructuring of the SADC Secretariat which includes the OPDS, the revitalisation of the region's Peacekeeping Centre in Zimbabwe and the relatively strong political will the states in the region have shown exhibiting determination while confronted by pressure by the global powers. SADC's cohesiveness is a result of its capacity for solidarity in the face of adversity. If nothing else, it will be this that will be the leading factor as the SADC organ confronts the challenges in the short, medium and long term dimension.

What is apparent is that the states in the Southern Africa region, through several resolutions and instruments of the SADC security architecture, have committed themselves to the collaborative approach to conflict prevention, peace building and the maintenance of sustainable peace and stability for common development. SADC's aspirations are consistent with the AU's peace and security architecture, which is being designed with regional organisations as the building blocks of the continental structure. What nevertheless remains as a challenge is moving rapidly on implementing its formal commitments, operationalising its structures to the fullest as it strives to ensure that inter-state conflicts never occur and intra-state conflicts are never allowed to threaten the peace and security of the region.

The region has been generally successful in the development of a peaceful and secure community through a sense of solidarity, oneness by the regional elites, and the inbuilt realisation by the peoples of the region that their destiny is inexplicably tied. While national interest may have been an important factor in the determination of decisions, the behaviour of the members of the FLS, SADCC and SADC/OPDS have also been driven by this sense of regionalism.

The developments of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Cooperation, the SADC Mutual Defence Pact, and the various regional instruments have shown an extensive sense of unity among the states in the region. This is an indication that the Southern African region has similar values, interests, and that the states have developed such a relationship that they cannot not target each other militarily and therefore as a region are able to overcome several obstacles.

## Conclusion

Peace, stability and development are issues that are associated with a lack of inter-state and intra-state conflicts. The history of the SADC region exhibits efforts to not only attain all these issues but also to ensure that they are sustained. This paper has focused on two fundamental questions. The first question being whether inter-state conflict in the SADC region is ever going to be a possibility, while the second being on the likelihood of intra-state conflict.

The paper began the interrogation of the major questions by taking a general perspective of the regional security environment and in the process discussed the region's violent past which took the dimension of both inter-state and intra-state conflicts to the scale that the region would be correctly viewed as having been at war. The paper has also shown that out of this rather dark past evolved efforts to create collaborative security developmental structures out of the desire

for peace and the recognition of the linkage between conflict and development. It has further been argued that while regional efforts have evidently enhanced inter-state relations, an important observation is that there is a view that the regional security architecture is very cordial to the political elites to the extent of being more concerned for regime security than the security of ordinary people. This point has further been stressed in the discussion of the intra-state conflicts dimension with the case of the Zimbabwe crisis. It was observed that not only was this view perpetuated despite efforts by the regional body to resolve it, but also the entry into the fray by the international community brought in a new dimension that in the view of the paper negatively affected the regional body. It has become clear there is a limit to state sovereignty as challenges that evolve in countries begin to have a spread effect and consequently demand what may appear as intervention in sovereign matters of the state.

The paper has also argued that although the SADC region has developed comprehensive security architectures, its effectiveness depends on qualified human resource and adequate funding. The paper has reflected that the region is overburdened by a number of challenges competing for limited resources and that donor support in this regard is necessary but unlikely in the required doses because of the regional body's stand on Zimbabwe.

The paper has further argued that although inter-state conflicts in the region is highly unlikely because of relatively cordial inter-state relations, it is the maturing regional institutions that is playing a harnessing role and in the process making the region live its common vision. However, it has been argued that intra-state challenges require concerted attention by the regional body because of their magnitude and possibility of flowing across countries. Therefore SADC must of necessity focus on member states internal developments in a manner unlike before and continue to make the necessary adjustments to the regional architecture in order to meet the challenges of the time. In the final analysis having a comprehensive policy document is essential but even more critical is operationalising those policies and having sufficient resources to live up to the objectives, which would be, summed up simply as human security needs.

# Correlating African regional and security institution initiatives to the emerging global security agenda

*Dr. Anthoni van Nieuwkerk*<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

This paper discusses the place, role and impact of the African Union vis-à-vis international actors as well as African sub-regional organisations. Hence the paper covers the following themes: a brief history of the African Union (AU); AU conceptualisation of security; challenges and opportunities of the AU in the resolution of security situations; correspondence between the AU and global security agenda, if any, and the AU's role in creating synergies between regional organisations and itself in terms of security. The approach of the paper is deliberately technical and less philosophical, because it recognises that the vexing themes of Africa's security, the multiple understandings thereof, and Africa's relations with the international community are addressed elsewhere. The paper's underlying assumptions are that Africa's political leaders have chosen to refashion the institution of the OAU in the image of the UN and EU; are expecting the international community to assist in its ambitions to stabilise Africa; and are hopeful that peace and stability will result in Africa's re-integration into the global economy. The paper finds that although the resultant institution of the AU can boast of a progressive constitution which resonates with the latest thinking around conflict management, including the *human security* and "*responsibility-to-protect*" paradigms, a range of factors, internal and external, exist with the potential to prevent the AU from liberating Africans from fear and want. It concludes with a proposed 'policy upgrade' to enable the AU to fulfil its mandate more effectively and efficiently.

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<sup>1</sup> Anthoni van Nieuwkerk is a senior lecturer at Wits University, Johannesburg. Part of this paper is based on an earlier chapter entitled 'Promoting collective security in Africa: the role of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development', in Field, S (2003) *Towards a collaborative security regime for Africa*. Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue. The paper also benefited from critical debates during the 2006 conference *Rethinking Global Security: An African Perspective*.

### *AU history*

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963 to protect African unity and independence. The end of the Cold War period brought global and continental changes that necessitated the OAU's restructuring. Between 2001 and 2002 the OAU was transformed into the African Union (AU). The new organisation aims to accelerate inter-state political and economic cooperation and integration, and adopted the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) as its key developmental programme. Both the AU and the Nepad programme recognise that economic growth and human development cannot take place in the context of war and violent conflict. Consequently security considerations feature prominently in the architecture of the AU.

### **AU conceptualisation of security**

The AU faces a range of challenges in attaining its vision, including the need to create appropriate institutional structures, a stable and secure regional environment, the character and shape of international support for the process, a strong working triangular relationship, involving the UN, AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and the need to create an appropriate funding strategy for the Union (Adisa, 2003; Cilliers and Sturman, 2004; Solomon, 2004; Van Nieuwkerk, 2004). A stable and secure environment is indeed a condition for the economic and political progress of the continent. Since the 2002 Founding Summit in Durban, the AU has sought to tackle the issue of conflict with greater resolve, recognising that several of these conflicts are associated with the crisis of democratisation and development. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) Directorate of the Union has adopted a more proactive approach to conflict situations and a model of active mediation on a day-to-day basis through Special Envoys. Following the decision at the Durban Summit to create the Peace and Security Council protocol, the PSC Directorate has adopted a work programme, which seeks to operationalise the protocol, to determine modalities for facilitating common defence and security policies, to strengthen the role of the AU in conflict prevention and resolution, to follow up the 2000 Lome Declaration, to pursue measures against terrorism, and to build a human resource capacity for the Conflict Management Centre.

According to the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission, delivered at the launch of the PSC in May 2004, the continental peace and security architecture is underpinned by two pillars: the PSC Protocol and the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). The Report also notes that the continent's

Regional Mechanisms (that is, the seven RECs – see footnote one) have the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. As the Report argues, “The need for harmonisation and close cooperation between the AU and the Regional Mechanisms cannot be over-emphasised... If the AU and the RECs are to form a single security architecture, as envisioned in the PSC Protocol, decisions taken at continental level should be upheld by the Regional Mechanisms” (Report, 2004: 7). To institutionalise this relationship the AU is preparing a draft MoU, to be finalised by 2005.

The Constitutive Act of the AU of 2000 (hereafter the CA) can be regarded as the Union’s founding document or constitution. It is a visionary document, but also tempered by practical considerations. Its preamble recognises the quest for continental unity and collective action and recognises the fact that “... conflicts in Africa constitute a major impediment to the development of the continent...” It also recognises that peace, security and stability are prerequisites for the implementation of the development and integration agenda.

According to the CA, **the peace and security objectives of the AU** shall be to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states (Art 3b), promote peace, security and stability on the continent (Art 3f) and coordinate and harmonise policies between existing and future Regional Economic Communities<sup>2</sup> (Art 3l). The relevant **principles** include the establishment of a common defence policy for the continent (Art 4d), peaceful resolution of conflicts through means decided upon by the Assembly (Art 4e), prohibition of the use of force or threat thereof (Art 4f), non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of another (Art 4g), the right of the AU to intervene in a member state “in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (Art 4h), the right of member states to request intervention from the AU in order to restore peace and security (Art 4j), and condemnation and rejection of (i) terrorism and subversion (Art 4o) and (ii) unconstitutional changes of governments (Art 4p).

The functions of **the Assembly**, which is the supreme organ of the Union (Art 6.2), are to determine the common policies of the Union (Art 9.1.a), receive, consider and take decisions on reports and recommendations from the other organs of the Union (Art 9.1.b), monitor the implementation of policies and decisions of

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<sup>2</sup> The AU recognises the following seven Regional Economic Communities (RECs): Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) (AU, 2004: 29).



the Union and ensure compliance by all member states (Art 9.1.e), and give directives to the Executive Council on the management of conflicts, war and other emergency situations and the restoration of peace (Art 9.1.g). The **Executive Council** is composed of the ministers of foreign affairs and meets at least twice a year in ordinary session (Art 10). The **Commission** of the Union is its secretariat and is composed of a chairperson, a deputy and commissioners (Art 20). As the section on the PSC below makes clear, the chairperson and commissioner in charge of peace and security plays an important role in conflict prevention and resolution.

The AU did not immediately decide on a security organ. In 2001 its Assembly incorporated the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management & Resolution and after a restructuring exercise adopted the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the **Peace and Security Council** (the Protocol) in 2002 (the key provisions of the Protocol are discussed below). With the transformation of the OAU to the AU, issues relating to peace and security are handled by the newly created department, the Peace and Security **Directorate**, which is headed by a Commissioner for Peace and Security. In the Commission of the AU, the Commissioner is assisted by a Director who acts as a chief operating officer, playing a central role in the day-to-day management of the Directorate. The Peace and Security Directorate seeks to provide an enhanced institutional capacity for achieving peace, security and stability in Africa. It aims to facilitate and ensure a more effective, efficient cooperation and coordination of initiatives within the continent, as well as the Regional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms and other international initiatives. It furthermore contains a Conflict Management Division (CMC), a Peace Support Operations Division and a Secretariat to assist the PSC. The CMC, which will continue to be the operational arm of the new Peace and Security Council, is comprised of an Early Warning Unit and a Conflict Management and Resolution and Post conflict Unit. These two units will develop policy options and coordinate activities to support the prevention, management and resolution of African inter and intra-state conflicts.

Like the Conflict Management Center, the Peace Support Operations Division comprises two units, an Operations and Support Unit and an African Standby Force and Military Staff Committee Unit. It undertakes, facilitates and mediates in peace support operations in conflict situations, establishes liaison offices, deploys facilitators and special envoys, supports regional peace efforts, assists in post-conflict reconstruction and deploys observers.

To carry out its mission of promoting peace, security and stability in Africa, the Peace and Security Directorate is also supported by a Strategic Security Issues and a Project Management Team. The Project Management Team is the

management facility that provides administrative support and management oversight functions. It ensures that the various activities within the PSD are prioritized, planned and implemented in a timely and efficient manner while the Strategic Security Issues facilitates disarmament and coordinates African efforts at preventing and combating terrorism.

As far as conflict prevention and resolution is concerned, other structures also play a key role. The **Department of Political Affairs** has remained a core department in the Organization of Africa Unity/ African Union since its inception in 1963. It is believed that its core functions relating to democratization, governance, human rights and the rule of law, if managed well and successfully implemented at the level of Member States, "...will prevent conflicts and promote sustainable peace and development on the continent" (<http://www.africa-union.org>). The mandate of the department is to contribute to the emergence of a political environment, within and among African countries, as well as at the international level, which is conducive to bringing about sustainable development and accelerating the economic integration of the continent. To that effect, the department plays a prominent role in promoting, facilitating, coordinating and encouraging democratic principles and the rule of law, respect of Human Rights, the participation of civil society in the development process of the continent, and the achievement of durable solutions for addressing humanitarian crisis.<sup>3</sup>

The above-mentioned Protocol, which entered into force in December 2003, established a **Peace and Security Council (PSC)** within the AU, as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The discussion of the PSC in this section is based on the provisions of the Protocol.

The **structure and purpose** of the PSC is as follows. The PSC is composed of fifteen members of whom ten are elected for a term of two years and five for

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<sup>3</sup> The core functions of the Department of Political Affairs are:

- To develop common positions in the Political Field for use in International Negotiations;
- To monitor the implementation of common policies by Member States;
- To prepare reports for monitoring and tracking progress on democratization, good governance and electoral processes;
- To disseminate reports and share best practices;
- To develop an effective early warning system for predicting population displacements;
- To gauge the socio-political impact of international developments on Africa;
- To develop and monitor policy on popular participation in the activities of the Union;
- To monitor the implementation of International Humanitarian Law by Member States;
- To monitor the situation and flow of refugees and displaced persons in Africa;
- To collaborate with CSSDCA and NEPAD to ensure harmonization of activities.

three years. According to article 2 of the protocol, the PSC shall be a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa, and shall be supported by the Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force and a Special Fund. The PSC will function continuously through a system of regular (closed) meetings. On the level of Permanent Representatives (diplomats stationed at AU headquarters) it will meet at least twice a month. It may hold informal consultations with interested parties, Regional Mechanisms, international organisations and civil society organisations. Under the new peace and security architecture the Chairperson of the AU Commission (including his/her office as well as a PSC secretariat) plays a critical conflict management role. Similar to the UN Secretary General, s/he is responsible for bringing issues to the attention of the PSC, Panel of the Wise, or other relevant parties and for ensuring implementation and follow-up action. The Chairperson will be supported in this function by the Commissioner in charge of Peace and Security (and responsible for the affairs of the PSC).

The **objectives** of the PSC shall be to promote peace, security and stability in Africa (Art 3a), anticipate and prevent conflicts (Art 3b) including promoting democratic governance (Art 3f), peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities (Art 3c), prevent and combat international terrorism (Art 3d) and develop a common defence policy for the Union (Art 3e).

According to Article 6 of the protocol, the PSC “shall perform **functions**” in the following areas:

- Promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa;
- Early warning and preventive diplomacy;
- Peace-making;
- Peace support operations and intervention, pursuant to articles 4h and j of the AU Constitutive Act;
- Peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction;
- Humanitarian action and disaster management;
- Other functions as may be decided by the Assembly.

The protocol confers a wide range of **powers** (and responsibilities) upon the PSC. According to Article 7 it shall:

1. Anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts;
2. Undertake peace-making and peace-building functions to resolve conflicts;
3. Authorise the mounting and deployment of peace support missions (including defining mandates and reviews thereof);

4. Recommend intervention pursuant to Art 4h of the CA of the AU (“grave circumstances”)
5. Approve the modalities for intervention by the AU in a member state pursuant to Art 4j of the CA of the AU;
6. Institute sanctions in the case of unconstitutional change of government in a member state;
7. Implement the common defence policy of the AU;
8. Ensure the implementation of the OAU and related conventions dealing with international terrorism;
9. Promote harmonisation and cooperation between “Regional Mechanisms” and the AU regarding peace and security;
10. Promote a “strong partnership for peace and security” between the AU and UN;
11. Ensure that external initiatives in the field of peace and security in Africa takes place within AU parameters;
12. Use the conflict prevention framework to promote democratic governance;
13. Promote the implementation of relevant conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament;
14. Examine and take action to protect members’ independence and sovereignty from acts of aggression (including mercenaries);
15. Support and facilitate humanitarian action in cases of conflict or natural disaster;
16. Submit regular reports to the Assembly on the state of peace and security in Africa.

According to article 11 the PSC will be supported by a **Panel of the Wise**, composed of five “highly respected African personalities” selected by the Chair of the Commission on the basis of regional representation (presumably one panel member per region) and tasked with advising the PSC and Chair of the Commission on any and all matters relating to peace and security in Africa.

A continental **Early Warning System** (EWS) shall be established to “facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts” (Art 12). The EWS shall consist of:

- The Situation Room – an observation and monitoring centre located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the AU;
- Observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms linked directly to the Situation Room.

The AU Commission will collaborate with the UN and other relevant non-state organisations to facilitate the effective functioning of the EWS. In order to analyse developments, an early warning module needs to be developed, based on a range of indicators. The Chair of the AU Commission shall use the EWS to assist him/her in his/her duties, and to advise the PSC on potential conflicts.

An **African Standby Force** (ASF) will be established to enable the PSC perform its responsibilities regarding the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4h and 4j of the AU CA (see description above). In May 2003 African Chiefs of Defence Staff agreed on the modalities of an African Standby Force (ASF) (Cilliers, 2003: 7). The concept of a 'force' is perhaps misleading, because what is in fact proposed is a multidimensional (civilian, police and military) standby system, where the components remain in their countries of origin, but are organised and trained in a coordinated fashion so that they would be ready to be deployed together when the appropriate authorization has been received.

The ASF provides for five sub-regional stand-by arrangements, each up to brigade size (3,000-4,000 troops), which will provide the AU with a combined stand-by capacity of 15,000 to 20,000 troops (AU, 2003). Between 300-500 military observers who are trained and ready to deploy on 14 days notice. A police stand-by capacity of at least 240 individual officers and two company strength police units (gendarmerie), which should enable the AU to staff two complex peace operations with a police component each. And a centrally managed roster of civilian specialists in mission administration, human rights, humanitarian, governance and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).

The ASF design was developed on the basis of six possible mission scenarios, ranging from (1) military advice to a political mission, (2) AU observer mission co-deployed with a UN peacekeeping mission, (3) stand alone AU observer mission, (4) traditional peacekeeping or preventative deployment mission, (5) complex multi-dimensional peace operations and (6) peace enforcement or what the ASF Framework document refers to as intervention missions.

The ASF recommends a two phased implementation process: the first phase is aimed at developing the capacity to manage scenarios 1 to 3 by mid 2005 and the second phase is aimed at developing the capability to manage the remaining scenarios by 2010.

The PSC is also required to assist with **post-conflict peace-building** activities. Article fourteen of the Protocol identifies the following: consolidation of negotiated peace agreements, establishment of conditions of socio-political and economic reconstruction of society and state, implementation of DDRRR

programmes, and assistance to vulnerable persons and groups in society. The PSC is furthermore required, in article fifteen of the Protocol, to take an active part in coordinating and conducting **humanitarian action** in cases of conflict or natural disaster. This translates into an expectation that the PSC shall develop its own capacity to undertake such action, and further, that the ASF will not only be adequately equipped to undertake humanitarian activities in its mission areas, but also facilitate the activities of humanitarian agencies.

The PSC anticipates a close working relationship with Africa's regional organisations. Although the Protocol talks in article sixteen of "**Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution**", a definition or list is not provided. Regional Mechanisms can be assumed to be similar to the organisations defined in the Protocol as Regional Economic Communities or RECs. As detailed in footnote 1, the seven RECs identified by the AU are AMU, COMESA, CEN-SAD, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC. The East African Community (EAC) appears not to enjoy official recognition as a REC in the Protocol. At least four RECs have evolved operational security management functions: COMESA, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC. The other RECs appear to have underdeveloped, dormant or weak security functions. However, the Common African Defence and Security Policy of the AU includes the EAC in its list of "regional instruments and mechanisms".

A further complication is that the AU has adopted the OAU's definition of Africa's five regions: North, Southern, East, West and Central – but at the same time also talks of Inter-Governmental Organisations (such as the EAC) that overlap these five regions. Confusingly, the AU Commission's 2004 Strategic Plan also identifies Regional Integration Communities (RICs). There is therefore a significant amount of overlap between geographic regions, RECs, RICs and Regional Mechanisms. The DRC for example is a member of ECCAS, SADC, COMESA and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Region (CEPGL)(AU, 2004). This state of affairs has led to confusion regarding roles of regional organisations and although AU documents mention rationalisation<sup>4</sup>, much more needs to be done in order to ensure the effective operationalisation of the security architecture of the continent.

Article 4d of the CA of the AU as well as article 3e of the PSC Protocol committed the AU to establishing a common defence policy for Africa. The AU adopted the

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<sup>4</sup> For example, mission two of the AU Commission's Strategic Plan identifies harmonising and rationalising the RECs, as well as integrating NEPAD and CSSDCA into the AU.

**Common African Defence and Security Policy** in February 2004. Its mix and match of definition, analysis, policy and description, and the fact that it is not written in typical AU policy or protocol format, will make implementation difficult.

It contains the following key sections: identification of Africa's common security threats, principles and values (similar to article 4 of the CA of the AU), objectives and goals (a list of twenty-five), implementing organs and mechanisms, relations with the UN and other international organisations and lastly the building blocks of the policy (the document lists thirty-four).

The essence of the policy is the operationalisation of the objectives of the CA of the AU relating to defence and security matters. However as it is written its main purpose seems to be the promotion of mutual trust and confidence.

Key objectives include:

- Ensure collective responses to threats;
- Enhance defence co-operation between African states and eliminate suspicion and rivalry;
- Provide a framework for defence and security cooperation and harmonisation, including the ASF, humanitarian action, the role of women and civil society in conflict management, and peace-building.

Implementing organs of the policy include the AU Assembly, the PSC, the Commission and Regional Economic Groups (*sic*). Regarding the coordination procedures for implementing the policy, the document adds little that is not already contained in the PSC Protocol, except for the notion of regular review conferences (paragraph 36).

The African Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact was discussed at the first meeting of the African Ministers of Defence and Security on the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and Common African Defence and Security Policy in January 2004. It was subsequently adopted as an AU policy. It is a short document with 19 articles. It is a classic mutual defence pact, with the essence in article seven: "...an armed attack against one (whether from another member state, a non-state party or external aggressor) shall constitute an attack against the continent as a whole...in the event of such an attack, state parties shall...mobilise the necessary...support through a common defence mechanism, in order to restore peace..." The experience with the development of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact ought to be instructive for the further development of this draft. Perhaps the most important aspect of this document is the attempt by its drafters to address the historical and persistent problem in Africa whereby states tolerate (or actively support) subversive opposition groups who use their

territory as a springboard for attacks across the border or even further afield. The draft pact attempts to proscribe such behaviour.

## Challenges and opportunities of the AU in the resolution of security situations

### *Historical background: the experience of the OAU*

In peace and conflict management terms, the legacy of the OAU is that of non-intervention. It was created in an attempt to protect the independence of its members – not only from former colonial powers, but also from one another. Rather than collective security, the OAU's Charter prioritised sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in members' internal affairs, and it purposely limited the powers of the Organisation's Secretary General. The OAU's dispute resolution structures were largely undeveloped and unused. After the OAU failed to intervene meaningfully in the dispute between Algeria and Morocco in 1963, the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1966, civil unrest in the Congo, and the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970), countries largely avoided it in favour of countries and institutions outside the continent for assistance (Berman and Sams, 2000: 45).

The exception to the rule is that in the early 1980s the OAU did undertake a large-scale multinational peace operation. In 1981-2, the OAU deployed an inter-African force of about 3500 troops in Chad in an effort to bring the civil war to an end. The operation suffered from financial difficulties, logistical shortcomings, an unclear mandate and was terminated prematurely.

The end of the cold war brought a realisation that the West might disengage from the continent and that further marginalisation would necessitate the OAU from managing conflicts without extensive outside support. This changing mindset was illustrated by an OAU decision in 1990 to send a peacekeeping mission to Rwanda. A Military Observer Team (MOT) was sent to Rwanda in 1991, followed by a larger Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) from 1991 to 1993. NMOG achieved its political objectives in the sense that it prodded the UN to contribute to the Rwandan peace process. This it eventually did by deploying the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), a force of about 2700 personnel.

By 1992, the OAU was unsure how to respond to conflict on the continent. The idea of greater involvement in peacekeeping was not universally greeted. Rather, the organisation's leadership focused on *conflict prevention* instead of *conflict management or resolution*. In 1993, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was established at the OAU Summit in Cairo. Its purpose was stated as follows:



The Mechanism will have as a primary objective, the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, it will be its responsibility to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions in order to facilitate the resolution of these conflicts. Emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures ... will obviate the need to resort to the complex and resource-demanding peace-keeping operations, which our countries will find difficult to finance.

The Mechanism provided for a decision-making body called the Central Organ, a separate source of financing called the Peace Fund, and a Conflict Management Division. The OAU chose to model the Central Organ on the Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government – an ad hoc arrangement that comprised 15 countries elected annually on the basis of geographical representation to consider issues before the OAU and to assist the Chair. Proposals by the OAU Secretary General to create an African Security Council based on the UN model, or to revive the Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, were not seriously considered. The Organ differed from the Bureau in that it met regularly on three levels: annually, at the Heads of State and Government level; bi-annually, at the Ministers of Foreign Affairs level; monthly, at the level of Ambassadors accredited to the OAU. Its decisions were binding. The Peace Fund was designed to support initiatives of the Central Organ and to develop the Conflict Management Division. By 1998 the Peace Fund had received \$28 mn since its creation in 1993 – two-thirds of it from Western countries. Most of the money spent has gone to support OAU peacekeeping operations (see below). The Peace Fund also supported the development of the Conflict Management Division, including constructing and equipping its Conflict Management Centre and training its staff. The Situation Room at the Centre was intended to serve as the basis for an Early Warning System.

Although the focus of the Mechanism was on conflict prevention the Central Organ has approved two small peacekeeping operations. Following the murder of Burundi's President, Melchior Ndadaye in 1993 in a military coup, the OAU decided to send a 'preventive diplomacy force' (given the Burundian Military's opposition to an intervention) to Burundi. The OAU Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB) was deployed between December 1993 and October 1994. Although not a complete success, the observers served as useful intermediaries between the military authorities and civilian leaders, defusing numerous explosive situations (Berman and Sams, 2000: 70). OMIB's military component was withdrawn following the coup of July 1996 by Pierre Buyoya. Regional states condemned the coup, imposed sanctions and resolved to find a solution to the crisis. The OAU Central

Organ endorsed these decisions and had since been working to assist the peace-making efforts of first Nyerere, then Mandela, and currently deputy president Zuma.

The OAU's involvement in the Rwanda crisis was even less of a success. Following the Rwandese Patriotic Front's invasion of Rwanda in 1990, the OAU launched a mediation effort which initially resulted in a cease-fire agreement and an arrangement to send a 55-person Military Observer Group (NMOG) to Rwanda in 1991. This group was later subsumed into the 1993 2500-person UN peacekeeping force (UNAMIR) because of difficulties with financing it. In 1994, genocide broke out in Rwanda. The OAU requested the UN to intervene to protect civilians. However, with the Somalia debacle still fresh in the UN's mind, the US led the decision to reduce the number of UN peacekeepers in Rwanda. Although the UN Security Council eventually succeeded in enlarging the mission, it had trouble finding additional personnel. The OAU agreed to coordinate the commitment of about 6000 troops. *However, the deployment of the troops was delayed for five months due to a lack of logistical and other equipment needed for such an undertaking which Western countries were to have provided.* In the meantime UNAMIR was quickly overwhelmed by the situation (800 000 people massacred in three months) and was withdrawn.

In July 1997 separatists on the islands of Anjouan and Moheli unilaterally declared itself independent from the Comoros, and the OAU's Central Organ authorised the OAU Observer Mission in the Comoros (OMIC) in August of that year, to monitor the situation and act as a confidence-building mechanism. OMIC had mixed success. Only 20 observers deployed, playing a mediation role among factions and providing humanitarian assistance when violence broke out. In April 1999 a coup took place and the observers withdrew in May 1999. Regional states, under the leadership of South Africa, then pursued the task of peace making, which finally bore fruit.

The war in the DRC demanded a high level of attention from the OAU and its Central Organ. However, a chronicle of the fluctuations of war and peace in the Congo (too detailed for this paper) reveals that the OAU merely played a *reactive*, and at best a *limited supportive role*: far removed from its original ambition of anticipating and preventing conflicts. For example, *in reaction to* the Rwandan and Ugandan decision in 1998 to back rebels in eastern DRC against their former proxy, Kabila, the OAU's Salim urged both sides to 'exercise restraint' and to 'seek a peaceful solution' to the crisis (Muyangwa and Vogt, 2002: 12). Two years later, we were told that '... the OAU has been extremely active in its diplomatic efforts to bring the DRC conflict to an end. In January, it participated in a series of meetings to discuss ways in which it and the UN could coordinate their

efforts...later that month, the OAU participated in the fourth session of the Joint Military Committee ...and the special session of the UN Security Council on the DRC ... ' (Muyangwa and Vogt, 2002: 12). This is hardly evidence of a decisive intervention by the continental organization in pursuing peace.

*In reaction to* the eruption in 1998 of a territorial dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the OAU collaborated with the UN in efforts to find a solution to the crisis, apparently having learnt some lessons from its experiences in the DRC. The OAU's main contribution was two-fold: it established a 'high-level delegation' that studied the problem and submitted proposals for a Framework Agreement to achieve a cessation of the hostilities (peace was achieved only in 2000); and it deployed military observers, with the UN, to the disputed border region.

What did the Central Organ achieve? The assessment of Berman and Sams is that the approval of two peacekeeping missions provided '...an important base upon which to build' (2000: 72). This base includes:

- the establishment of administrative, financial, institutional and operational structures as guidelines and benchmarks for future missions;
- the provision of basic tools of the trade: communication equipment, clothing, and the like;
- precedents for the relative reimbursement levels for the commanding officer, military observers, and Non-Commissioned Officers.

Apart from these 'lessons learnt', the Mechanism had been active in the area of election monitoring. Preventive diplomacy, it seems, remained the chief preoccupation of the Mechanism.

In the assessment of Muyangwa and Vogt (2002: 5) the OAU had some successes in conflict management. In the first years, numerous border disputes were successfully resolved. Working with the UN, the Front Line States (FLS) alliance and an ad hoc 'wise men's' committee, the OAU assisted in bringing an end to colonial and apartheid rule. And limitations? Berman and Sams are of the opinion that the Central Organ's decisions to create only two observer missions (of 67 and 27 personnel) reflect deeply-entrenched conservative political sensibilities, rather than an appreciation of the OAU's limited resources. The OAU's evident failure to predict – let alone prevent – coups such as the one in the Comoros calls into question the success of its observer missions. The reluctance of the OAU to field peacekeeping missions could also be seen as a fundamental limitation on its ability to manage conflicts on the continent.

As Muyangwa and Vogt (2002: 3) argues, while the Peace Fund has been able to raise revenue from African and external sources, three issues have become

obvious over the years: first, the conflict management needs of the continent have far outweighed the resources of the Peace Fund; second, the failure of member states to meet their financial obligations has adversely affected the work of the Mechanism; and third, if the Mechanism is to be successful, then the Peace Fund must be financed on a regular and long-term basis.

### *Current practice*

The AU security architecture provides for a **range of tools** to be employed in pursuing its objectives of promoting and managing peace and security. The tool box includes **structures** such as the Assembly, Executive Council, Commission, and the Peace and Security Council. The Peace and Security Directorate (PSD) is located in the Commission, and headed by a Commissioner for Peace and Security. The latter is assisted by a Director who acts as a chief operating officer, playing a central role in the day-to-day management of the Directorate. The Commission also hosts the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), with a smaller staff complement. As elaborated above, its responsibilities relate to human rights, democratic governance, accountability and transparency, refugees, humanitarian crises and election monitoring – in a sense, a real conflict prevention toolbox.

Cilliers and Sturman (2004: 98-9) has argued that the bigger PSD “...reflects the inevitable focus of the AU on (more expensive) conflict management as opposed to (much cheaper) conflict prevention.” Some of the reasons for this, according to them, relate to bureaucratic politics, but also “...member state concerns regarding an intrusive role for what is a new and bold area of engagement by the Commission, namely that of internal governance” (2004: 99). However, the commitment by African government leaders to processes meant to strengthen “internal governance”, such as the APRM, needs to be recognised.

In the area of conflict prevention and resolution, the toolbox therefore also features a range of declared **objectives, functions and powers** such as the promotion of peace, security and stability, conflict anticipation and prevention, peace making, and the promotion of democratic governance. It could be argued that some of the AU’s recently established organs, such as the PAP, ECOSOCC and African Court on Human and People’s Rights and processes such as the APRM play a supportive role in conflict prevention, but this paper will not explore these additional areas.

What has the newly-designed AU achieved with this toolbox, given that Africa continues to be devastated by conflicts in each region? Apart from the Commission’s ongoing activities, the PSC has met regularly since its inception. Most of these took place at the level of ambassador, with some at ministerial and Heads

of State level. An analysis of the communiqués issued after each meeting reveals that in the five months since its inception, the PSC focused its attention on **five major crises**: Sudan / Darfur (ten statements), Burundi and Ivory Coast (six statements each), the DRC and Somalia (five statements each). The following crises also received attention: Comoros (four statements), Ethiopia/Eritrea and Liberia (three statements each) and the CAR (two statements). In addition, the PSC released in-depth analytical reports under the name of the Chair of the Commission dealing with three crises: Somalia, Comoros and Sudan / Darfur.

The reports of the PSC use UN Security Council-type diplomatic language which is illustrative of its approach to situations of crisis. The pronouncements of the PSC are typically expressed in three phases: first, it recognises a crisis situation or problem, often condemning the behaviour of certain parties; where appropriate it then expresses encouragement or support for conflict resolution processes underway; and thirdly it announces action in the form of requests, calls, demands, or even mandates and authorisations.

It is evident from the brief review of the PSC's activities that the AU has a powerful and committed leadership that ensures engagement with Africa's crises. However there seems to be a contradiction at play: surely the AU's approach should be to prevent conflicts from turning violent? Most of the AU and PSC's activities to date are concentrated on conflict resolution efforts (which requires engagement with the international community too) and less on conflict prevention. Why is this so?

Conflict prevention is not easily done. It requires a harmonious application of the range of instruments that exists on paper but not yet in practice. Unless and until the Pan African Parliament, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), the African Peer Review Mechanism of NEPAD, the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) and African civil societies can coordinate activities and action, conflict prevention will remain mostly a dream. There is the further question to what extent Africa's leadership is prepared to allow the AU to pronounce on or intervene in matters relating to 'internal governance' – an area still believed to be of sovereign jurisdiction

What about intervention? As we have argued, Africa now has a more comprehensive peace and security architecture in place than at any other time since African regional cooperation started in 1963. In the peacekeeping and military intervention sphere the African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Council is now operational and the AU has agreed on the establishment of an African Stand-by Force.

However, many of the new structures still need to become fully operational. In the AU context the focus should now be on the operationalisation of the Afri-

can Stand-by Force. But the question on the table is whether the AU's ASF (and the costs associated with its establishment and management) is the appropriate response to Africa's conflicts. Indeed, in the post-Cold War era, the focus of international conflict management is increasingly shifting from peacekeeping, which is about maintaining the status quo, to peacebuilding, which has to do with managing change.<sup>5</sup> The nexus between development, peace and security have become a central focus of peacebuilding thinking and practice over the last decade (Uvin, 2002). The contemporary conflict paradigm requires a complex multidimensional peacekeeping response that recognises that a collective effort by a wide range of agencies in the political, security, socio-economic and reconciliation dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction are needed to achieve sustainable peace. **The ASF framework, which is preoccupied with military capability, appears to be out of step with contemporary needs and practise.** The ASF Framework mentions a civilian component and sets targets for a police component, but it is primarily focused on the military role in peace operations. This is probably because the AU, instead of forming a multidimensional group that is representative of the various role players in complex peace operations, tasked its Chiefs of Defence Staff to develop the ASF Framework. What is further worrying, however, is that the precedent set at the AU level seems to be followed blindly at the sub-regional level. In SADC, for instance, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) have been given the task to consider the ASF and to develop a programme for the establishment of a SADC peacekeeping stand-by system. The Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), who would presumably be responsible for the political and peace making aspects of any peace operation, seem to have been left out of the loop. It will thus not be surprising if the SADC version, like the ASF concept, fails to provide for a truly complex multidimensional stand-by system.

### **Assessment of the impact of the creation of the AU on conflict management**

Since the launch of the Union in February 2002, the peace processes in Angola, DRC and Burundi took off and now seems to be irreversible. Similarly, Sierra Leone appears to be making progress under UN supervision. As a matter of fact, the UN continues to play an important role in the continent's peace and security affairs, maintaining four current UN (and two non-UN) peacekeeping opera-

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<sup>5</sup> I am indebted to colleague Cedric de Coning for guidance on these aspects of the AU's role.

tions. However, since the formation of the AU several new conflicts on the continent broke out and old ones continued. The list includes both intra- and inter-state conflicts. In West Africa, although Liberia can be proud of its (and Africa's) first-ever woman president, tensions in various countries remain. Despite a ruling by the International Court of Justice, tension between Nigeria and Cameroon over the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula persists. Despite IGAD's efforts in the Horn and East Africa, the internal and external dimensions to the Sudanese conflict makes peacebuilding a daunting task, and the Ugandan government struggles to contain the vicious activities of the Lord's Liberation Army. Conflict in Somalia remains intractable, and tension in the Central African Republic and Chad continues. Despite progress with peace, the eastern parts of the DRC – particularly the Ituri and Uvira regions – remain mired in conflict. The growing socio-economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe attracts little AU attention. In very few of these problem areas – if any – does the AU play any meaningful peace-making or peace-keeping role. Against this background, what assessment can one make of the AU's Peace and Security Council in promoting collaborative security?

*The first category of assessment relates to the relationship between the AU and the UN and how it ought to be structured*

The Charter of the UN states that its prime objective is that of maintaining international peace and security (a responsibility conferred upon the Security Council of the UN). It also has the right to use sanctions, blockades and military force to this end. Chapters six and seven of the UN Charter specifies in detail how and when these activities may be used. According to chapter eight, the Security Council may further use regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. In terms of the UN Charter the AU or any subregional organisation that intends to undertake enforcement action must therefore seek the prior authorisation of the UN Security Council.

The preamble of the PSC protocol is 'mindful' of these provisions of the Charter of the UN as well as the need to forge closer cooperation and partnership between the UN and AU in the promotion of peace and security in Africa. The protocol further states, in Article 4 ('Principles'), that the PSC 'shall be guided' by the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU, the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Both sides therefore clearly recognise the responsibility of the UN in maintaining international peace and security, as well as the principle of regional assistance. The AU itself has adopted a groundbreaking intervention clause

(enforcement operations in cases of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity), very much in line with the Canadian-led policy initiative called Responsibility to Protect.<sup>6</sup> However, what if the UN is unwilling or unable to authorise timely action? Is it time for the AU to take bold steps? It is the view of Cilliers and Sturman (2002: 34) that the path of military intervention by regional organisations in Africa is tempting but dangerous – it could serve to further marginalise Africa while undermining the global responsibilities for peace and security of the UN Security Council. In their view there is a strong argument for intervention to be internally generated and externally supported and assisted. Even if there appears to be broad acceptance of the idea of standby arrangements (multidisciplinary contingents to participate in peace missions mandated by the AU and UN) amongst African ambassadors and Chiefs of Defence Staff, the reality is that African military capabilities are very limited. Should Africa be able to develop the capacity to deploy ready contingents on standby in member states, such deployments ‘...would probably not have the capacity to perform more than traditional Chapter Six missions (*that is, peaceful settlement of disputes*), provide an initial holding force prior to reinforcement by international contingents or secure a safe zone for the provision of humanitarian assistance’ (2002: 35).

If the key role of the UN – slow-moving as it may be – remains uncontested, then perhaps Africa needs a more modest arrangement for a standby unit to serve as a small, rapid response force to intervene at moments of extreme crisis.

However, this line of thinking raises the question of why the need for rapid response forces when an early warning system is in place, and indeed if the PSC is actively anticipating and preventing conflicts or crises – via early warning, and by deploying AU Commissioners and members of the Panel of the Wise?

There are additional problems with the relationship, as highlighted by members of a consultative meeting on the relevance to Africa of the ICISS’s Responsibility to Protect (AISA, 2005). On the role of the UN and international community, the meeting noted that the history of the UN in enforcement was problematic (especially the time it takes to respond adequately to crises); the nature of international politics and the interests of key players in the international community might prevent strengthening the structures necessary for the R2P to be implemented fully; the permanent members of the UN Security Council play a

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<sup>6</sup> The 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) identified two threshold cases which justify humanitarian intervention: large-scale loss of life and ethnic cleansing, underway or anticipated. It prescribes four ‘precautionary conditions’: right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects of success. And it recommends that the UN Security Council be the preferred decision maker.



minimalist peacekeeping role in Africa, and the trend towards the regionalisation of security was worrying to some; the manner of implementing the recommendations of the R2P should be via multilateral institutions of the UN in a manner that will promote predictability; despite these difficulties, efforts regarding capacity-building via ongoing dialogue and consultation with state and non-state members of the international community were recognised and encouraged.

*The second category of assessment relates to the relationship between the AU and subregional organisations*

In discussions with a senior military official who attends meetings of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security he made it clear that the Chairperson of the Commission of the AU is going to have to rely on the conflict management activities of the continent's **subregional** bodies, known as 'regional mechanisms' in Protocol-speak, (SADC, Ecomog, IGAD, etc) for its success. In his view, the Commission and PSC's challenge will be one of coordination and harmonisation at the continental level and support (diplomatic and resources, where possible) for regional activities. Article 16 of the PSC Protocol makes provision for a formal relationship between the Commission and these bodies in the form of Memoranda of Understanding (it is unclear whether any such MoU has yet been signed). The same clause also anticipates the involvement of these bodies in the establishment and functioning of the EWS and African Standby Force. The concern of course is to what extent regional organisations are able to carry the burden of peace-making and peace-keeping. Despite commendable efforts to address conflicts (Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, etc), the following issues need attention (AISA, 2005):

- Sovereignty was still a sensitive issue in Africa. One way around it could be to promote and strengthen regional economic cooperation and integration.
- Unlike the EU's ability to respond militarily to crises (by way of constructing battle groups), Africa suffers from a serious lack of capacity and resources and therefore might not be able always to promote military security.
- The role of 'middle powers' on the African continent needed to be explored. Instead of South Africa and Nigeria leading with peacemaking and peacekeeping, it was believed the AU should do so, given its legal mandate and because no single country possessed the capacity to intervene in all of Africa's conflicts. On the other hand, the role of 'lead nations' cannot be ignored. Their strengths ought to be recognised and be required to play a leadership role on the continent.

- The contribution of structures such as SADC and AU (NEPAD, PAP, APRM, AFRICOM and others) to the promotion of human security needs to be explored.
- A closer relationship between the UN, AU and African sub-regional structures can be developed in the following ways: Africa needs permanent representation on the UNSC, African structures must be capacitated to undertake operations, institutional efficiency needs to be strengthened, authority to intervene needs to be specified more clearly, the role of CSO is key in the area of conflict prevention, overlapping membership needs to be harmonised, shared values are key to regional operations.

*The third category focuses on whether the new (AU) structures will be able to overcome the strictures and constraints that paralysed the old (OAU) structures.*

The OAU suffered from limitations in its mandate; lack of political will or trust in the organisation; limitations of capacity and experience in core conflict management areas; lack of financial resources and the impact of international politics. With the formation of the AU, what is different?

- **Sovereignty is relative.** Although the AU still prioritises sovereignty and non-interference, it simultaneously recognises democracy, human rights, good governance, people's participation, and international cooperation as worthwhile objectives. Crucially, it allows members to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security (Art 4 (j) of the Act) and recognises the right of the Union to intervene in a member state in cases of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (Art 4 (h) of the Act). This is in line with the new doctrine of humanitarian intervention (Thakur, 2002), but unlike the US and EU, is unable to afford its implementation.
- **Recognition that without popular legitimacy the AU will fail.** The drafters of the AU Act and a core group of leaders recognised the need for acceptance by domestic and international non-state constituencies (CSOs, business, labour, media). NGOs played an important popularising role in the run-up to the launch of the AU, and continues to play an influential clarifying role (see for example Justice Africa at [www.justiceafrica.org](http://www.justiceafrica.org)). However, the jury is still out. It appears the bulk of the AU's leadership is poorly placed to 'take the Union to the people', and it does not harbour well for the future.
- **Capacity in conflict management will be built; experience will hopefully follow.** This lesson has been learnt, and an increasing number of resource providers are available to make a difference, including foreign

donors who are keen to stay in line with the current international political trends (see below). However, it is unclear whether the money is available to set up the necessary instruments for conflict management.

- **Lack of financial resources remains a major obstacle.** There is a funding proposal to implement the peace and security agenda of the AU for an amount of \$120 mn over three years. The Peace Fund has attracted about \$48 mn by March 2002. However, the OAU budget of \$32 mn carried about \$52 mn in arrears during May 2002 (Cilliers and Stuurman, 2002: 37). Despite substantial EU support, the AU will require a budget several times that of the OAU if it is to contribute to peace and security on the continent.
- **Africa's place on the international political agenda.** The international environment is characterised by processes of globalisation and despite Nepad's initial acceptance by the G8, continuing conflict on the domestic front will see Africa's further marginalisation. Post 9-11 America is pursuing an aggressive Cold War-like foreign policy, crudely distinguishing between friends and enemies. Peacekeeping and -making will take a backseat to America's war on terror (Malan, 2002). Or, as Powell (2005: 53) recently argued, '...the dynamics of the G8's increasingly narrow concentration on developing military capability over conflict prevention and resolution capacities risks building a security architecture exclusively focused on mounting military responses to crises'. Africa's conflicts and human tragedies are irrelevant to globalisation and American hegemony except where they impact on perceived national interests.

## Conclusion

There are many indicators that illustrate the suffering of the African people. According to the latest Human Development Report, the bottom 20 countries on the Human Development Index are all from Africa (UNDP, 2002). For citizens of these countries, the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 is an average of 40%! Conflict imposes heavy social and economic costs in the countries where it occurs. It also imposes costs on neighbouring countries. The resources diverted from development uses by conflict are estimated at \$1 billion a year in Central Africa and more than \$800 million in West Africa (World Bank, 2000: 59). To this must be added the costs of refugee assistance and environmental degradation.

The history of the OAU's efforts at anticipating, preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in Africa is disappointing. Since its formation in 1963 it responded to at least 13 conflicts but deployed some form of peacekeeping opera-

tion in only five. Perhaps its failures at peace-making and peacekeeping are not unexpected, given the nature of the organisation and the great obstacles it encountered (some self-inflicted, others externally imposed). These included limitations of its mandate (non-interference), lack of political will and support, capacity problems, lack of financial resources, and the nature of international political environment (cold war era).

Recently, African leaders have indicated that they plan to develop new ways of dealing with conflict. In 2002 they adopted a new set of management tools, in the form of the AU and Nepad. However, much of the toolkit exists only in declaratory form – yet to be constructed, or operationalised. There is a great need to think through the relationship between the key conflict management organs of the AU (Commission and Peace and Security Council) with the UN system. At the same time clarity is needed on the relationship of the AU's PSC with regional mechanisms such as SADC, Ecowas and IGAD. Apart from these horizontal relationship issues, there are difficult vertical relationship issues. On the one hand is the question of the integration of Nepad and its provisions into the structures of the AU, and on the other, the status of the CSSDCA. Lastly, Africans remain sceptical of the international community's commitment to assisting Africa in developing the necessary capacity to deal with conflicts and the promotion of human security. As the toolbox ordering process takes off, the demand for intervention remains as great as ever. The AU needs to intervene to alleviate the suffering of people – whether from hunger, poverty, intolerance or war. In this context, it looks as if an African standing army will not be the most appropriate tool to do the job. The political demand must be for the UN to carry out its internationally-agreed mandate of preventing conflict. Whilst waiting for a reformed UN system to speed up the delivery of peacemakers, -keepers and -builders, a smaller, professional rapid deployment force of Africans can fill the gap.

In the longer term, the AU needs a well-ordered toolbox that allows Africa's leaders to adopt a variety of tools to anticipate and manage the continent's multiple human insecurities. To assist in (re)conceptualising this agenda, Africa's regional organisations should place the following ideas on its agendas for discussion and debate:

- 1 If not already in existence, a task team consisting of representatives of key stakeholders (regions, academia, donor community, NGOs) should review the AU's performance in the area of conflict management (peace making, -keeping and post-conflict peace building) with a view to making recommendations for enhanced efficiency.
- 2 The institutional framework similarly needs analysis. For example, if the entire structure is too cumbersome and costly, which priority areas need attention? It

is the contention of this paper that a more robust agreement needs to be put in place to enable the AU and its donor partners to prioritise and pursue the peace making abilities of the AU. Further, the potential confusion over regional membership (as discussed in this paper) needs urgent attention.

- 3 Closely related to the second point, the AU relationship with the UN as well as its relationship with Africa's REC's need systematic monitoring and evaluation. To what extent is the AU clear about its interests in a reformed UN and restructured UN Security Council? And how is the AU paying interest in the security and development needs of the 'African Indian Ocean Region' (the group of ten Indian Ocean islands and littoral states) which does not constitute a 'region' or REC but nevertheless share similar interests and challenges?
- 4 Regions or RECs need to be capacitated to build peace prevention, -making and -keeping capacity to enable them to move beyond the current 'fire-brigade' approach to crises. A significant aspect of such capacity building include the recognition of the critical role of civil society as well as its active involvement in the activities of the AU and its regional partners. One practical suggestion is for regions to develop second-track dialogues on security and development issues (the human security agenda) which brings together key constituencies: policy makers, civil society interests (including academics) and the donor community. To launch such dialogues, the AU should commission the production of an annual (regional or continental) human security review. Such a review (or reviews) should be produced by an African research consortium (perhaps coordinated by the African Commissioners of the Global Commission on Human Security<sup>7</sup>), and should focus on indigenous knowledge production to enhance regional and continental decision-making.

These proposals are made in the hope that it is possible to advance the human security agenda in real terms, by breaking the stranglehold which the state-centric paradigm-setters hold over the shape and character of the AU. Africa's people deserve no less.

## Official documentation

1. Communique of the 84<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at Ambassadorial Level, 24 September 2002 at [www.africa-union.org](http://www.africa-union.org).

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<sup>7</sup> The African Commissioners of the Commission on Human Security were Frene Ginwala (South Africa) and Albert Tevoedjre (Benin).

2. Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July 2000.
3. Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa between the member states of the OAU/AU, 8-9 July 2002.
4. Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 9 July 2002.
5. Policy Framework for the Establishment of an African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part 1), 12-14 May 2003, Addis Ababa, Exp/ASF-MS/2(1), see [www.iss.org.za/AF/RegOrg/unity\\_to\\_union/aurep.htm](http://www.iss.org.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/aurep.htm).
6. AU Commission (2004) *Strategic Plan of the AU Commission*. Volume One.

# Sustainable globalization

*Ralf Fücks*

It appears to be a matter of common sense within international ecological and Third World movements that the transition to sustainable modes of production and consumption stands in conflict with the liberalization of global trade. And indeed it is obvious that the current structure of global markets and financial relations represents *one* major driving force behind ecological and social impoverishment, particularly within the continents of the southern hemisphere.

I say *one*, because there are a number of additional “home-grown” causes that are the responsibility of Third World states and governments themselves. The question is what conclusions can be drawn from this diagnosis and what “therapy” should be prescribed as a result. Should there be increased regulation of global markets in the form of supranational agreements and institutions, in order to promote global governance with the goal of strengthening the democratic, ecological, and social welfare dimensions of globalization processes? Or should we completely oppose economic globalization and the principle of free trade? I admit that this choice is formulated somewhat simplistically, but it is nonetheless politically relevant, as is demonstrated by current debates within movements critical to the globalization process.

In my view, the position of total opposition toward economic globalization is dubious both theoretically and politically, to say nothing of its poor prospects for success. Particularly against the backdrop of Europe’s experience, I proceed from the assumption that economic integration promotes prosperity, peace, democracy, and the rule of law in the longer term. Whether these potentials come to fruition depends on the political framework within which this integration occurs. In contrast, economic protectionism and nationalism form an unholy alliance. Authoritarian regimes tend to place markets under state control.

Modern economies require a framework governed by the rule of law, and they require a high degree of participation and individual initiative. And it is no coincidence that, within the past 20 years, one dictatorial regime after another has been sent packing worldwide, and that repressive and fundamentalist regimes — often accompanied by ethnically charged military conflicts — are strongest in those regions that are least integrated into global markets.

The greatest danger facing poor countries in the South — and I state this as a

somewhat pointed thesis – is not their integration within the global marketplace but rather the possibility that they will be de-linked economically and forced out of world markets. This is a very real danger, for example, in parts of Africa. Social and ecological development in the South requires massive investment – particularly private investment – from the North. It is inconceivable that this investment can be provided solely through official development assistance. This private investment, including the transfer of the most modern technology available, is conceivable only within the framework of global market relations.

This process involves more than just the export of capital to the South; rather, it also involves the export of modern standards of environmental protection, workplace safety, occupational training, and labor relations. Exploitative sweat shops and special economic zones guarded by private armies are brutal forms of capitalism that we also encountered in 19<sup>th</sup>-century Europe. However, these are not the only possible – and not even the only existing – forms in which globalization manifests itself. Transnational corporations with renowned brand names are highly sensitive to public criticism. When environmentally destructive or inhumane modes of production are exposed in the media, these corporations are forced to change their business policies. Conversely, there are many examples of transnational corporations that set positive benchmarks for ecological and social welfare standards in Southern countries. I would mention for example the in-house abolition of apartheid and the exemplary occupational training programs at Volkswagen in South Africa prior to the fall of the colonial regime, or the introduction of worldwide codes of conduct by large corporations such as Ikea. This surely does not happen without public pressure, but it happens.

### **The European Union as model**

The European Union can serve as a model for the structuring of globalization processes beyond Europe, first and foremost for regional integration on other continents, but also for the architecture of global institutions and rules for global markets. The European Union is based on the actual establishment of a common market together with a common currency and a European Central Bank. The creation of a European common market was always a political project; it was never a purely economic project. The European project was about overcoming nationalism, which included economic nationalism, and it was about shaping a political union among the nation-states of Europe. Consequently, from its very conception, the European Single Market was embedded in political arrangements. What began with the regulation of the steel industry and agriculture now



encompasses monetary and fiscal policy as well as a common environmental policy in the form of minimum standards that apply to all member states.

The EU thus constitutes a legal, social, and ecological framework – unfinished as it may be – for the European Single Market. I therefore suggest, with regard to international policymaking, that we concentrate on structuring the political framework of globalization and making progress in integrating ecological and social welfare standards into the global trade regime. These efforts require an expansion of the matrix of supranational institutions. This includes multilateral treaties and agreements, the strengthening of international jurisdiction, and better coordination of global trade policy, environmental protection, and development policy under the purview of the United Nations. The WTO cannot be given a monopoly over the structuring of world trade.

### **Opening the markets of the North, strengthening the export orientation of the South?**

In my opinion, we must confront certain contradictions and conflicting goals within our concepts of sustainable development.

According to many development economists, the opening of Northern markets to products from the South represents a decisive factor in promoting the South's economic development. One of the key demands made by Southern governments to the United States, Europe, and Japan centers on the removal of trade barriers and restrictions. This has already been achieved to a certain extent in the treaty between the European Union and the ACP states, which after all comprise 93 countries. Yet we know that trade restrictions have not been removed for many products and markets. However, the opening of Northern markets to products from the South would tend to reinforce export-oriented development strategies in the South; these strategies are in turn criticized by many NGOs, particularly from the perspective of food security and the protection of ecological diversity.

Promoting energy supplies that are based on renewable energy sources – in my opinion the key project for making the transition to sustainable development – requires an energy supply system that is far more *regionalized* than is the case today. Making the transition to organic agriculture also requires much more *regionalized* agricultural policies than is presently the case. These projects cannot be easily harmonized with the current export structure of Southern countries. Within the ecological development strategies of the North, there is a tendency to move in the direction of increased independence from traditional raw material and energy exports from the South. The strategy of dematerialization, of devel-

oping substitutes for minerals and other resources, is one that also tends to reduce the South's export opportunities within the current international division of labor. Such policies presuppose an economic transformation within Southern countries that is oriented much more strongly toward the production and export of high-quality, processed, and technologically sophisticated goods – which in turn also requires further integration into global markets.

A solution to the conflict between free trade and sustainability may lie in the implementation of minimum ecological and social welfare standards that must apply equally to export products from the South. Therefore the question is how the continued liberalization of markets can be embedded within a framework that prevents the emergence of a global dumping competition. This requires fair prices for exports from the South, in order to help reduce the pressure on local resources.

### **Four projects to promote sustainable globalization**

In my view, there are four projects we should concentrate on for purposes of establishing a global Alliance for Sustainable Development.

1. A North-South pact for sustainable energy supplies. If any, this is the most important initiative launched at the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. Meanwhile, with oil prices going up to 60 USD per barrel, it has gained even more importance, both environmentally and economically. In this pact, the industrialized nations of the North should commit themselves to providing financial and technical resources to help industrializing Southern countries convert their energy supply to renewable sources. This is the key question that will determine whether we have any chance to succeed in achieving sustainable development. If nations such as China, India, or Brazil satisfy their appetite for energy in the same fashion as Europe and the United States did in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the ecological ruin of this planet will be sealed.
2. A Global Initiative for Fair Trade. This would include binding commitments to minimum ecological and social welfare standards for investments and products. Such commitments would be established within the framework of a multilateral agreement and would also be binding upon the WTO. This process can be pushed forward through the introduction of seals of approval (e.g., Rudmark, Forest Stewardship, and Transfair) and corporate codes of conduct that are monitored by independent organizations.

3. The expansion of Clean Development Mechanisms. I believe that the institutionalization of tradeable certificates not only represents a significant financial instrument for promoting sustainable development in the South, but can also prove decisive in changing the system of relative prices in global markets to such an extent that CO<sub>2</sub>-intensive products will become more expensive and less CO<sub>2</sub>-intensive products will gain a decisive competitive advantage. This will create a powerful economic incentive for ecological investments and technologies.
4. Increased debt reduction for Third World countries, in order to improve their conditions for development and to reduce the pressure to export at all costs. I certainly believe that this debt reduction should be subject to conditionality and that corresponding interest savings must be invested in education, the fight against poverty, and environmental protection in Southern nations. This is not a new form of colonialism. Rather, it represents a contribution to the implementation of good governance in the people's interest.

# Sources of African security condition and agenda setting

*Dr. Ludeki Chweya*

## Introduction

The study of security has become more complex in recent years. Previously, security was confined to threats to the interest of states, mostly from the military, geo-strategic standpoint as first posited by Edward H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau – the founders of the realist school in International Relations.<sup>1</sup> The realist conceptualization of security is, however, restrictive and conveniently delimits the range of issues and variables that can be considered in peace and security studies.<sup>2</sup> Recent studies have attempted to overcome the weakness in realism by extending the meaning of security further a field so as to reach the social, economic, and political spheres of individual and community life. The expanded scope of security focuses on variables like poverty, diseases and ill-health, environmental safety, reproduction, civil liberties and individual freedoms, and the rule of law. While the broadened meaning of security is a milestone in the evolution of the discipline (security studies) the corresponding increase in the range of researchable factors has occasioned considerable methodological and conceptual difficulties. The difficulties have given rise to new perspectives in security studies, notably the human security school. Research proposals in security studies must therefore specify *a priori* the preferred paradigmatic standpoints so as to pave the way for clarification of the conceptual meaning of security and point toward the range of variables and issues that may be analyzed. For example, the human security perspective is bound to suggest a different meaning of security from the realist viewpoint. While the realist school would direct a research towards variables like the state and the military, the human security school would invite the researcher to focus on variables like poverty, human rights, and the environment.

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<sup>1</sup> Carr E.H., *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1956); Morgenthau H.J. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson), (New Delhi: Kalayani, 2004).

<sup>2</sup> Michael Renner, "Security Redefined", *State of the World: Redefining Global Security* (New York: W.W. Norton) ch. 1; Makumi Mwangi, Introduction, in Mwangi M. ed., *African Regional Security in the Era of Globalization*, Nairobi, Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2004.

This chapter recognizes the importance of the established theoretical perspectives in security studies, the different meanings of security, and the different categories of security issues and variables. However, the chapter makes an overarching argument that the present security condition in Africa, including the security strategies and programs that have been adopted has arisen from the confluence of external and internal forces and in all the spheres and meanings of security. The external-internal analytic model in international relations is often applied in the study of the sources of the foreign policy of states. The foreign policy literature shows that there are two proposed sources of policy, namely *aussenpolitik* (external politics) and *innsenpolitik* (domestic politics). The model has enlisted debate between scholars who believe in the primacy of the external (*primat der inszen*) politics in explaining foreign policy and those who believe in the primacy of the domestic (*primat der innsen*) politics.<sup>3</sup> The internal-external model shows potential for application in the study of regional security as well. Indeed, we can ask the question; what is the relative contribution of *innsenpolitik* and *aussenpolitik* to the present condition of African security? What are the choices and outcomes of security strategies and programs? This chapter attempts to answer these questions through analysis of the interaction between the internal and external variables in the formation of the present condition of security in Africa, the process of security agenda-setting and the implementation of the agenda. In so doing, the chapter hopes to shed more light on the security problems in Africa today.

The African continent is depicted in academic discourses mostly as a continent in a security crisis in the light of the different meanings of security. A focus through the realist lens provides a view of interstate suspicions, conflicts, military buildup, and war. A focus through the liberal lens provides a view of a continent with minimal success in regional and sub-regional cooperation in the sphere of peace and security and in the pursuit of socioeconomic prosperity. Lastly, a focus on the continent from the viewpoint of the human security school shows a region that is characterized by poverty, unemployment, human rights abuse, social conflicts and the influx of refugees from both internal and external displacements, ill-health, especially the HIV/AIDS pandemic, illiteracy, famine, and environmental degradation.<sup>4</sup> Students of security studies have persistently

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<sup>3</sup> For an elaboration on the for terms, see Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay", *International Security*, Summer 1992 (Vol.17, No. 1), pp.177-198; Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics", *International Organization*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn 1978), pp. 881-911.

<sup>4</sup> See Jeffrey D. Sachs, *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time* (London: Penguin, 2005) ch. 10, 12; Mwangi M. ed., *African Regional Security in the Era of Globalization*, Nairobi, Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2004.

sought an explanation for the prevailing security conditions on the continent. Against the historical background of incorporation of Africa into global politics at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century – though a few other forms of incorporation had begun centuries earlier – we can venture to investigate the relative contribution of the external and the internal forces in the creation of the crisis-ridden security condition in Africa. This analysis can be attempted from the perspective of the three broad sources of insecurity: the nation state framework, extra-continental power rivalry, and capitalist production.

### The nation state framework

The appropriate departure point in the analysis of interstate relations in Africa is the formation of the nation state system.<sup>5</sup> Arguably, the nation state constitutes the framework for the present forms of insecurity on the continent. Africa's nation state system is the creation of European powers with imperial interests and claims on the continent.<sup>6</sup> Specifically, African nation states are a product of a historical process that involved the partition of the continent into colonial units at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. These political units were enshrined further on attainment of independence and sovereignty about six decades later; mostly during the 1960s. The former colonial powers established the territorial borders of the present-day African nation states during the partition of Africa that was more formally concluded at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. The borders marked the boundaries of the territorial possessions of the different imperial powers and thereby helped to contain conflicts and prevent imperial wars between and among these powers. While colonial borders were a means to reassure peace and security among European countries, they became a basis for conflict and wars on the African continent once independence had been attained. The new, externally established borders at once defined the primary units of African intrastate relations and the battle lines in interstate conflicts and war.

While the European powers were responsible for partition and colonization of Africa, the local African people were, in their economic and technological weakness, responsible for the success of European partition and colonization. The forms of pre-colonial African political organization that are said to have varied between centralized and decentralized societies produced conflict and wars that were different from what emerged in the post-colonial era; an era that is characterized by

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<sup>5</sup> For other perspectives, see Davidson, B. *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State*, James Currey, London 1992.

<sup>6</sup> Britain, Belgium, Holland, France, Germany, Portugal and Spain.

the Westphalia nation state framework, complete with its modern international borders. Had pre-colonial African political units facilitated successful resistance of European imperial partition, conquest and occupation, the resultant reconfiguration of the framework for 'international' relationships within the continent, the forms and patterns of conflict and war that we witness today would certainly have been different. Indeed, Ethiopia's successful resistance against Italian occupation, notably at Adowa paid off, for, in Freud's words, "the Ethiopian state was able to survive..."<sup>7</sup> However, the unsuccessful Asante resistance, as everywhere else on the continent, led to fundamental colonial restructuring of preexisting political organization. The military and economic might of the European imperial powers encountered the weakness of the pre-colonial African political organizations and together laid the foundation for the present nation-state system that in turn became the framework for conflict and even war both within and between the emergent African countries.

### *Intrastate conflicts*

Intrastate conflicts in Africa are expressed mostly in secessionist or irredentist activities. External powers had a hand in the rise of these forms of intrastate insecurity and war. The colonial boundaries that the European powers established constituted the framework within which European imperial powers set up new structures and processes of government that were subsequently carried over into the post-colonial period. Minor modifications were carried out on the structures and processes to suit the requirements of self rule following the attainment of independence. The structure and process of government that the departing colonial powers left behind in each of the African countries became the main source of the struggle for political power among the local political elite as well as between the masses and the political elite. The struggle has resulted in conflicts and, in some cases, outright civil wars.

At the second level, intrastate security problems in Africa can be attributed to the predominance of authoritarian rule, especially political exclusion based on a variety of criteria. Authoritarian rule in Africa has resulted in selective application of otherwise complementary elements of Western modernity, namely the nation state, capitalism, liberal democracy, and industrialization.<sup>8</sup> The nation state and liberal democracy are the elements of Western modernity that are most

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<sup>7</sup> Freud B. *The Making of Contemporary Africa: The Development of African Society Since 1800*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1998 p. 87.

<sup>8</sup> Giddens A., *Consequences of Modernity*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1990.

relevant to the present discussion. The viability of the nation state as a framework for managing domestic affairs is arguably conditional upon the application of liberal democracy. In Africa, the former colonial powers created nation states with internal structures of government that reflect the West European system of liberal democracy. However, the post-independence African political elite attempted to operate the newly introduced nation state system through a non nation state-compatible model of political exclusion in decision making and distribution of national resources, leading to conflicts and wars that characteristically stem from marginalization of important regional, religious or ethnic-based interests.

Numerous examples can be cited to show that in post-colonial Africa intrastate conflicts and war stem from the malfunctioning of the nation state or from the failure of liberal democracy. The Katanga conflict in Congo Kinshasa, the Biafra conflict in Nigeria, the Shifta conflict in Kenya, and the Eritrean crisis (while the territory was a part of Ethiopia) were among the earliest security problems while the crises in Southern Sudan, Somalia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Sierra Leone are among the more recent illustrations. The Somali crisis reached an unprecedented level: the civil war in the country culminated in fragmentation of the nation state and the rise of unconventional political units, each under the control of a warlord, including the breakaway republic of Somaliland whose claimed sovereignty no foreign country in Africa or elsewhere has so far acknowledged. In the case of the Sierra Leone crisis, Alan Bones has attributed it to "greed, in combination with political marginalization and weak governmental institutions."<sup>9</sup>

The secessionist and irredentist threats that African countries have faced since independence jeopardize the integrity of the African nation state while armed political dissent has jeopardized national political stability. Nevertheless, the containment of such internal threats to security is an African security agenda that has been defined by both internal and external forces. Once the insecurity occurred, external powers also collaborated with African governments in attempt to prescribe remedies. African governments can be blamed for the practice of authoritarian rule, the political conflict that this form of rule caused, and the consequent rise of internal insecurity. However, external powers can be blamed for the extension of their Cold War rivalry to the continent. Foreign powers gave priority to Cold War ideological containment and subordinated democracy even though democracy was clearly a prerequisite for the internal peace and stability

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<sup>9</sup> Alan Bones, 'Case Study: Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone', in Micrae R. & Hubert D. eds., *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace* p.55.



of African countries. In deed, ideological containment entailed unfettered facilitation of African strongmen to effectively suppress political dissent and pro-democracy insurgent movements as a security agenda. Political strongmen like Kenyatta, Kaunda, Mengistu, Dos Santos, Eyadema therefore repressed their citizens under the pretext of containment of ideological subversives essentially on behalf of or with the support of external powers.

External support for African regimes that are still significantly authoritarian has declined but it has not disappeared, although the motive for such support has somewhat shifted in favor of the search for economic gain. External powers have since the end of the Cold War turned against their erstwhile Cold War political allies in Africa in favor of the introduction of democratic regimes; a change of policy that has led to the retirement or to the electoral defeat of some of the renowned authoritarian leaders on the has had.<sup>10</sup> Consequently, democratization has helped to promote peace and political stability in countries in which the new system of government has incrementally formed over the past one dozen years or so. Such countries include Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia. Unconventional political dissent or insurgency is now by far less tenable in this category of countries than during the previous Cold War era.

Democratization as an agenda for peace and security is therefore a product of combined external-internal influence. Internally, the potential for the rise of an active civil society had by the end of the 1980s become a reality. Workers, professionals, students, and the mass of politically disenfranchised and economically marginalized population all acted to lay claim to political participation and government accountability, to be achieved through specific structures and institutions, notably a multiparty political system. However, the democratization agenda in Africa could not have succeeded without the restraint of external powers from solidarity with the target authoritarian regimes and their tendency to provide outright material and political support for the democratization effort. The disappearance of the Soviet Union and the dissipation of the Cold War led Western powers to redirect their interest towards maximization of economic gain from the global economy as benefits of the victory of liberalism over communism. Such economic gains were only tenable under conditions of peace and security, underwritten by democracy and respect for human rights, and a liberalized, de-controlled, and privatized market that allows free flow of Western goods and capital and restricts competition from local African producers and entrepreneurs.

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<sup>10</sup> Abdoulaye S.M. Saine; 'Democracy in Africa: Constraints and Prospects, in Mengisteab K. & Logan I. eds., *Beyond Economic Liberalization in Africa: Structural Adjustment and the Alternatives* (London: Zed Books, 2995).

In short, Western powers are presently interested in the establishment of a globalization-compliant political and policy regime on the Africa continent.

Meanwhile, the UN and Western powers began to take an active conflict interventionist role as a security agenda once the world body was established and the Cold War set in. But the success of the intervention of the UN and Western powers in conflicts was less successful during the Cold War period than has become in the present era. The UN peacekeeping mission in Egypt in 1956 and the mission in Congo in 1960 were remarkable cases that could be described as two success stories based on a variety of criteria. However, the UN failed to intervene in all other cases of intrastate conflict in Africa throughout the Cold War period. The UN was expected by its own charter to intervene in the fighting in Angola, Mozambique, Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, and even in Rwanda in the immediate post-Cold War period. However, the UN failed to intervene in these crises leading prolongation of the conflicts and intensification of human atrocities. The failure of the UN to intervene in African conflicts combined with the local political and international conditions to produce circumstances that favored protracted armed conflicts in the affected African countries. However, the UN has been able in the post-Cold War period to intervene and help to restore peace and security in many of the recent conflicts on the continent, notably the 1993-5 United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOMSIL), the 1999 United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)<sup>11</sup> and the 2003 United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC).<sup>12</sup> Individual Western powers have also attempted to intervene in conflict situations in Africa, though this has been minimal. For example, the US intervention in Somalia in 1993-5 to facilitate the distribution of humanitarian relief suffered a major setback from the established Somali warlords; a setback that led to the withdrawal of US forces from that country.

The US experience in Somalia is probably responsible for less frequent occasions for unilateral intervention of an external power in Africa's intrastate conflicts. Presently, interventions tend to occur under the auspices of the UN or else African countries intervene in conflicts under the auspices of the AU or a regional organization such as IGAD and ECOMOG with some financial, technical, and logistical support from external powers. For example, an AU force has been deployed in the Sudan to assist in the containment of the crisis in Darfur. IGAD has facilitated the peace talks in both Sudan and Somalia: Somalia has an interim

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<sup>11</sup> Alan Bones, 'Case Study: Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone' *op cit*.

<sup>12</sup> See Malan M & Porto J.G. eds. *Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, Training for peace & the African Security Analysis, ISS, Pretoria, 2003.

government – the Transitional Federal Government – while the Government of Sudan has signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the Sudanese peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) – both through Kenyan mediation.<sup>13</sup>

### *Interstate conflicts*

African nation states that are a product of West European colonialism are frequently in interstate conflict and war within the continent. There has been conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon, Uganda and Tanzania, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Somalia and Ethiopia, and more recently Uganda-Rwanda-Congo DR-Angola, and Zimbabwe in the ongoing Great Lakes conflict. These conflicts are evidence of the inadequacy of the African nation state as a framework for peaceful co-existence among African people. The Westphalia nation state system that colonial powers introduced in Africa can be a basis for interstate peace and security only if the internal political organization of countries is based on the principles and practice of liberal democracy. In Africa, however, the established nation state system has converged with the authoritarian political structures and processes that the African political elite operate to prevent the realization of interstate peace and security.

While African states have all been consistently rated to be more authoritarian than they are democratic, at least for much of the post-colonial period, the degree of authoritarian rule is not uniform. Some African countries have been less authoritarian than others. Certainly, political life in Botswana, Kenya, Zambia, and Malawi was by far less authoritarian than political life in Ethiopia under Mengistu, Uganda under Idi Amin, Sudan under Numery and Bashir, and Zaire under Mobutu. All interstate wars that have been fought in Africa have involved states with authoritarian government, at least, by African standards. We can argue, for example, that the Uganda invasion of Tanzania in 1979 could not have occurred if Idi Amin had been a democratically elected president of his country, accountable to the people of Ugandan. Similarly, Ethiopia under strongman Mengistu and Somalia under Strongman Barre completed the recipe for war between the two countries – the Ogaden War. With the exception of Ethiopia that had not been colonized, it can be observed that Western powers had established the nation state in Africa, the African political leaders had failed to govern the nation states on the required basis of liberal democracy, and the result has been the propensity for interstate conflict and war.

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<sup>13</sup> See Samson Kwaje, 'The Sudan Peace Process, From Machakos to Naivasha; and Ochieng Kamudhayi, 'The Somali Peace Process,' in Mwangi M. ed., *African Regional Security... op cit.*

Despite realist refutations, liberal institutionalism holds the view that states are able to cooperate with each other to maintain international security through the establishment of institutions that subsequently condition the behavior of states.<sup>14</sup> The effectiveness of international institutions shows much evidence in the relations among Western powers, especially in the operation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). However, the experience of Africa with regard to the operation of international institutions shows mixed performance, success and failure. For example, the success of regional cooperation in East Africa in the form of the East African Community (EAC) had by the early 1970s, surpassed the level that the EU has only recently attained, including the establishment of a monetary union. However, the EAC success was short-lived, for the Community disintegrated in the mid-1970s.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, African nation states, once established, attempted to follow in the path of their Western predecessors in the adoption of the nation state system as well as the establishment of supranational institutions to facilitate interstate cooperation and in some ways transcend the nation state system. While the departing European powers introduced the nation state system at independence, the successor African political elite have failed to transcend this system through the establishment of effective institutions for interstate cooperation. African political systems have largely stagnated within the nation state structure, although the experience of Somalia shows the potential for a reverse movement toward a caricature of the pre-nation state era. The forms of post-nation state system that African countries have attempted both in the past and at present have been few, far between, unsuccessful and clearly ephemeral. For example, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) – the present African Union (AU) – remained weak and ineffective in its security mandate and failed to prevent or to quickly stop many interstate conflicts and wars on the continent. Furthermore, the continent is far from the establishment of an institution – an alliance – equivalent to NATO that is now rapidly expanding.

Why was African continental integration pursued less vigorously during the Cold War years than after? The extension of the theatre of the Cold War to Africa through recruitment of African allies on either side of the divide created conflicts

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<sup>14</sup> See the seminal realist-liberal institutionalism debate in John J. Mearsheimer "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49; John J. Mearsheimer, "A Realist Reply," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 82-93; Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization*, 42, 3, Summer 1988, pp. 487-509.

<sup>15</sup> Mazzeo D., *African Regional Organizations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984.

and suspicions among African states; conflicts and suspicions that prevented negotiations for cooperation and integration along the experience of Western Europe. For example, the decline and eventual demise of the 1967-established East African Community (EAC) has been widely attributed to the rivalry between capitalist Kenya and the then socialist Tanzania.<sup>16</sup> Within a period of five years upon the commencement of the collapse of the EAC, Tanzania closed its border with Kenya, Amin lay claim to half of Kenya's territory, and Uganda and Tanzania were at war with each other, a war that culminated in the overthrow of Idi Amin by Tanzanian military forces. The Cold War had undermined cooperation and integration and deprived the continent of regional institutions that could facilitate the pursuit of peace and security. Indeed, the end of the Cold War was quickly followed by a fresh attempt at institutionalization of regional cooperation; that is, revitalization of regional organizations that had declined, reestablishment of those that had collapsed, and creation of new ones such as IGAD, the Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC), and the New EAC. Indeed, the continental organization – the OAU – actually transformed into AU that involves closer cooperation including the establishment and operation of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP). Most importantly, AU treaties as well as treaties of most African sub-regional organizations contain provisions for cooperation in a wide range of security issues, including counterterrorism.

At the global level, the UN charter promised to underwrite the security of member states through cooperation in all spheres of national life, but most importantly, through a trilateral system that involved collective security, peace keeping, and peace support. However, the UN fell short of its expectation as a transnational, somewhat post-Westphalia arrangement that could rein in African nation states and secure peace and security on the continent. This weakness can also be attributed to the Cold War at large to the extent that the Cold War inhibited the operation of the major UN organs, especially the Security Council. While the UN has made some attempts to resolve both internal and interstate conflicts in Africa, the performance has been dismal. The experience in Rwanda, Somalia, Congo DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Darfur illustrate the weakness of the UN.

The belief that states threaten each others' territorial integrity is often taken without question. This emanates from the hegemony of the realist thought in international security studies and partly because of the particular mode of socialization that International Relations scholars, statesmen, and society in

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<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*

general have experienced. While external threats to the territorial integrity of states is an indisputable possibility that African governments take cognizance of, the apprehension is shared by external forces that count on this possibility and even help to exaggerate it in order to secure self-interests. External powers helped to promote interstate conflicts in Africa during the Cold War years in order to ostracize and isolate countries with opposing ideological inclination. The conflict between Kenya and Tanzania, Kenya and Ethiopia and between Ethiopia and Somalia were based on the belief that one country threatened the security of the other based on ideological differences between the parties. The two external patron blocs fanned such conflicts through foreign military aid ostensibly to deter threats from an opposing country. In cases where the conflict advanced into war, the patron external bloc supplied the necessary means to wage the war. Indeed, most interstate wars in Africa are in many respects proxy wars.

Non-state actors have also been instrumental in the promotion of the agenda of interstate conflict in Africa. In this regard, the role of the military arms industry is outstanding. The industry is driven by accumulation motive, like other capitalist investment ventures. The success of the arms industry, like any other, depends on availability of an expanding market that is defined in terms of ever-increasing incidence and intensity of armed conflicts. The first direct beneficiary of the hegemony of interstate conflicts as a security agenda are arms manufacturers and dealers, for threats to interstate security often prompts budget increase for military spending, the bulk of which is consumed in arms purchases. Some studies have attempted to depict the enormous profits that the top ten US arms manufacturing firms earn.<sup>17</sup> With specific reference to Africa, Table 1 below shows the value of US arms deliveries to the continent between 1996 and 2003.<sup>18</sup>

Country	1996-1999	2000-2003	2003
Cameroon	\$14 million	-	-
Nigeria	-	\$12 million	\$4 million
Kenya	\$11 million	\$8 million	\$2 million
South Africa	-	\$4 million	\$3 million
Ethiopia	\$7 million	\$3 million	\$1 million
Botswana	\$5 million	\$4 million	\$2 million
Senegal	\$7 million	-	-

<sup>17</sup> Top Ten Defense Contractors Fiscal Year 2002: <http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/top10fy02.html>.

<sup>18</sup> Source: Leading Purchasers of U.S. Defense Articles & Services; Total Values of Deliveries Concluded <http://72.14.207.104/custom?q=cache:BA5x9NeYXooJ:www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32689.pdf+sales&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=4&ie=UTF-8>.

The figures in the table show huge returns in external arms sales to Africa; profit that can only be sustained through prior sustenance of the security agenda of interstate conflict and the potentiality for war on the continent. In short, the security agenda of interstate conflicts in Africa originates from external sources; sources that have also come round to provided the 'remedy' – war.

### Extra-continental power struggles

The Cold War and international terrorism are two successive forms of insecurity that have shaped most significantly, the security condition in post-independence Africa. The Cold War was based on ideological rivalry between the East and the West while international terrorism is born out of a conflict that is based upon real or perceived Western imperial domination and exploitation of the non-Western societies, especially the developing world. During the Cold War, Eastern and Western powers encountered each other on the African continent as in Asia and Latin America. The external powers had assigned to African governments the choice between communism and capitalism as a development ideology. Countries that attempted to introduce local, more relevant ideologies such as African socialism in Tanzania found it difficult to practice their newfound ideological models in an international system that was already polarized along the East-West divide. In the end, each of the two external power blocs acquired a clientele in Africa and in so doing created a microcosm of the East-West confrontation between and among African countries themselves. In the ensuing conflicts, belligerent African states essentially represented their respective extra-continental power patrons.<sup>19</sup>

African countries understood the security dangers that alignment with the East or the West posed for the independence of the new states and therefore expressed desire to pursue a non-alignment foreign policy safeguard. The failure of these countries to maintain their autonomy and security in the face of the East West rivalry can be attributed to absence of economic autonomy that is a prerequisite for political autonomy. Consequently, intra-African security was compromised in the ideologically divided and hostile international system. The condition of dependency that is often defined as inability to realize autonomous development compelled African countries to rely on one or the other of the two conflicting global blocs for the satisfaction of national economic and social needs. However, this was realized at the immense security cost of promoting locally the

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<sup>19</sup> See for example, Jeffrey D. Sachs, *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time*, op cit p. 188-190.

ideological interests of the patron bloc including the desire to wage war against other African states.

External powers extended the East-West ideological confrontation not only to client states resulting in proxy interstate conflicts, but also to client groups and movements within African states leading to proxy internal rivalry, conflict, and in some cases civil wars. Where the government of an African country leaned towards one of the external ideological blocs, the other bloc quickly sponsored an opponent, often an insurgent movement against the government. Therefore, civil wars in Africa were essentially, proxy wars that African governments and insurgent groups fought on behalf of their respective external patrons. Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia are cases in point. In short, interstate as well as intrastate conflicts and war in Africa have been indeed proxy conflicts that arose from a convergence between, on one hand, the East-West Cold War conflict that external protagonists extended to Africa and, on the other, the condition of economically weak African states that could not sustain the security policy of non-alignment.

On its part, international terrorism in Africa is essentially a violent external attack that African nation states face. International terrorism is a peculiar external threat to the security of African states and their citizens; a threat that has increased in significance in the post-Cold War period. The belligerents in international terrorism are Western powers on the one hand and their adversaries in the non-Western societies mostly in South and South-East Asia, the Middle East and the Gulf region. The bone of contention is in the conflicting perception of the relative fairness or unfairness of the Western powers, especially the United States and its allies, in the international transaction of political and socioeconomic affairs in the affected regions of the world. Africa has been drawn into the conflict insofar as international terrorist organizations target Western interests on the African continent and in the process threaten African security interests as well. Thus, in Africa the protagonists in international terrorism and counterterrorism are mostly non-Africans, but the majority of the victims are invariably Africans, caught between external belligerents engaged in confrontation on the African soil.

Africa's contribution to the prevalence of this threat on the continent is in the weak national counterterrorism security system. International terrorism had been until recently a security problem for other continents of the world rather than for Africa. During that time, the security system of African states was attuned to the more conventional threats like external military aggression and armed internal conflicts, insurgency, and regular crime. The upsurge of international terrorism thus found African states unprepared for and without capacity to cope with the peculiar threat of international terrorism. African countries have therefore be-



come an easily accessible ground for international terrorist groups in search of Western targets. Thus, the heightened threat of international terrorism in Africa is a product of increased conflict between external protagonists on the one hand and relative un-preparedness of African countries to contain such threats.

International terrorism has become a credible security threat to African countries despite its external origins and African states have to provide for counterterrorism measures in their security programs for two reasons. First, although non-African interests on the continent are the primary targets of international terrorism, the toll on the security of African states and their citizens is always higher than it is on the security of the intended external targets that are located in these countries. For example, the August 1998 terrorist attack at the US embassy in Nairobi killed about one dozen US citizens and over 280 Kenya citizens. Secondly, the security of external interests within African countries is the responsibility of African governments no less than the security of their own citizens and has to be addressed. In short, external belligerents in international terrorism have imposed a new security agenda upon African countries. The external actors have elevated previously less-than-urgent concern for international terrorism to the extent that the concern has become a priority security interest for the countries of the region. Indeed, many African countries have now included counterterrorism units and programs within their security systems. At the regional level, AU member states have signed the convention on international terrorism that outlines the rules and procedures for joint action in the effort to prevent and control international terrorism.

Western powers – the primary target of international terrorism presently – have included anti-terrorism among priority issues in their relations with African countries since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US and the subsequent attacks on other Western interests in different parts of the world. Essentially, Western powers have compelled African countries to cooperate with them in the war against terrorism, first at the level of unconditional condemnation of acts of international terrorism based on the adage that “you are either with us or with the terrorists.” This proverb is imbued with a sense of ultimatum and a promise of reprisals for non-compliance. Already, Afghanistan and Iraq have suffered military reprisal for non-compliance and so did Sudan in 1998. The ultimatum with regard to African countries is the implementation of anti-terrorist security measures that match US specifications – a stringent anti-terrorism legislation, enhanced security barriers around vulnerable facilities, creation of specialized antiterrorism units, and enhanced security surveillance such as in immigration, and in international money transfers. Towards this end, Western powers have provided technical and financial support to African countries and thereby helped to entrench

the counterterrorism agenda in the hierarchy of national security programs. In short, the present preoccupation in Africa with security threats from international terrorism is a security agenda that has been imposed upon Africa from the outside in terms of both causes and remedy.

### **Capitalist production, poverty and environmental insecurity**

The most remarkable contribution of the human security perspective in peace and security studies is the redirection of attention from the state and the international structure with emphasis on military issues to the social, economic, political and environmental conditions of human life. Rob Mcrae describes the new approach more succinctly in the expression that human security “takes the individual as the nexus of its concern, the life *as lived*, as the true lens through which we should view the political, economic, and social environment.”<sup>20</sup> Michael Renner has pointed out that the Cold War insecurity has given way to the visibility of other forms of insecurity, notably terrorism. Renner suggests that terrorism is a manifestation of more profound problems that include “endemic poverty, convulsive economic transitions that cause growing inequality, and high unemployment, international crime, the spread of deadly armaments, large-scale population movements, recurring natural disasters, ecosystem breakdown, new and resurgent communicable diseases, and rising competition over land and other natural resources.”<sup>21</sup> The human insecurity condition that Renner has described occurs in Africa as in other parts of the developing world.<sup>22</sup> This section of the chapter has focused on poverty and environmental degradation as leading forms of human insecurity in Africa. Specifically, the section shows that the long-term condition of social, economic, and environmental insecurity in Africa is a product of the capitalist structure of the colonial economy that Western imperial powers introduced on the continent and the inability of the post-independence governments to stem the problem.

#### *Capitalism and poverty*

Colonization was a Western imperial project intended to find new openings for Western industrial capitalism with regard to markets and sources of raw materi-

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<sup>20</sup> Rob Micrae ‘Human Security in a Globalized World,’ in Micrae R. & Hubert D., eds., *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace.*, McGill-Queen’s University press, Motreal & Kingston, 2001 p. 15.

<sup>21</sup> Michael Renner, “Security Redefined...”, *op cit* p. 3.

<sup>22</sup> See a description of some of the African conditions in Blomstrom M. & Lundahl M. eds., *Economic Crisis in Africa: Perspectives on Policy Response*, London, Routledge, 1993.

als. The economic structure that was subsequently established in the European colonial empire in Africa was inevitably capitalist in both outlook and essence. The new economic structure was initially spearheaded by chartered companies followed by a settler commercial and agrarian bourgeoisie and, in some cases, by native peasant producers. The new system of production brought along the conventional trappings of capitalism, notably accumulation, exploitation, class formation and social conflict.<sup>23</sup> Colonial states were also established to promote the emergent goal of accumulation; a goal that inevitably pursued at the social and economic expense of the African native population. The Africans were exploited through land alienation and social dislocation, the cultivation of cash crop production at the expense of food production, involuntary labor at capitalist production sites, urbanization and disintegration of the pre-existing structure of mutual social obligation, and ultimately the rise of structural poverty and inequality that persists to this day.<sup>24</sup> The present socioeconomic conditions in Africa arise therefore from the convergence between Western imperialism and the establishment of the colonial capitalist economy, on one hand, and on the other, a state of pre-capitalist African society that was *ipso facto* unable to withstand imperial onslaught. European imperialism had penetrated Africa while the pre-capitalist African polities had failed to forestall the onslaught, resulting in the introduction of capitalism and the attendant socioeconomic exploitation and inequality.

While political emancipation was the overt motive for the struggle for independence, the need to correct the social and economic injustice that the advent of capitalism had introduced in Africa was perhaps the real motive. Political emancipation was essentially a means to securing the desired change in the then social and economic conditions. This motive became clear following the rise of the euphoria for development that prevailed within the post-colonial African governments and their population. Indeed, the rise of independence in Africa coincided with the advent of the welfare state system that had been forged in the West after the Second World War. The welfare state system sought to safeguard the liberal economic system at the national level as well as in international economic relations. Keynesian economics that underscored the welfare policy regime involved state intervention in the economy so as to safeguard the welfare of individuals and communities whom the underlying pursuit of the liberal system tended to marginalize, undermine the credibility of the system and expose it to challenge

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<sup>23</sup> Berman B. & Lonsdale J. *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa*, Book One and Book Two, James Currey; Ohio University Press, Athens, 1992.

<sup>24</sup> *ibid.*

from the opposing economic and political radicalism, be it in the form of communism or autarchy.<sup>25</sup>

State intervention in the social and economic life of the population in Africa occurred mostly through market controls and regulation as well as through state subsidy in economic activities and social services thereby aiding immensely enhancement of the condition of human security, especially the alleviation of poverty and inequality. Post-war Western ideological interest to safeguard liberalism through Keynesian (state welfare) economics coincided with the advent of newly independent but poor African states and thereby facilitated the introduction of the rudiments of state welfare programs on the continent. In Africa, therefore, the attempted state intervention policy regime that was introduced helped to alleviate the high degree of human insecurity that the colonial powers had helped to generate, although the policy was externally driven. The Keynesian hegemony in the West began to decline mostly at the turn of the 1970s and by the end of the decade there was a general trend to dismantle the welfare state system and restore the classical liberal model that had existed previously. Keynesianism gave way to neo-liberalism that has since become the orthodoxy in the West. In Africa, neo-liberalism has been imposed also from the West mostly through the two leading multilateral credit institutions – the IMF and the World Bank.

State intervention in the economy of African countries had been blamed for poor economic performance on the continent that in turn hurt Western economies mostly through default in the fulfillment of external debt obligations. The consequent dismantling of the Keynesian policy regime in African countries through implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) was therefore the handiwork of the Western powers. SAP were intended to safeguard the prosperity of Western economies through reduction of public spending in Africa, realization of balanced budget, and, most importantly, the realization of budget surplus necessary to service foreign, Western debt. Implementation of SAP has therefore lowered dramatically the standards of living of the African people on most dimensions: food and nutrition, healthcare, education, shelter, employment and incomes, deprivation and crime and thereby heightened the state of human insecurity.<sup>26</sup> Africa often rates poorly relative to other continents against most of the indices of development, especially the proportion of citizens

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<sup>25</sup> For a variety of ideas about Keynesian economics, see Hettne B., *Development and the Three Worlds*: Essex, Longman, 1995; Leys C. *The Rise and Fall of Development Theory*, James Currey, New York, 1996.

<sup>26</sup> For detailed discussion of the emergence and effects of SAPs in Africa, see Mengisteab K. & Logan B. I. eds., *Beyond Economic Liberalization in Africa: Structural Adjustment and the Alternatives*, London: Zed Books, 1995.

living below poverty line, life expectancy, per capita income levels, maternal and child mortality rate, and the rate of unemployment.<sup>27</sup>

The primary security threat to the vast majority of the population in Africa is therefore poverty in all its social and economic forms. The present manifestations of poverty are a colonial invention, for their pre-colonial precursors could have taken a different form. Specifically, structural poverty in Africa is a colonial legacy, invented by external powers. Social and economic deprivation in Africa, more than political exclusion was responsible for the rise of the anti-colonial movement on the continent mostly in the period after the Second World War when the social and economic toll of colonialism on the local population had reached a point of crisis. Indeed, development became the primary demand or expectation of Africa's population once independence was achieved. Development as a human security agenda for Africa is therefore a colonial legacy.

The development agenda in Africa received an impetus from the Cold War during which the countries on the continent gained independence. From another perspective, development as a concept and a program of action was a Western creation intended to facilitate or ameliorate the social and economic suffering in Africa and other developing countries in order to forestall or to counter communist advance in those countries. Communism appeared to appeal to persons and societies in distress rather than to those in affluence. The rise of technical assistance programs including the post-war Marshall Plan for Western Europe was a counter-communism program in everything, but name. Thus, for the external powers, development became a global security agenda once that idea had been invented.

External powers believed that the promotion of development in Africa was a bulwark against ideological threats, either communism or liberalism. On the other hand, African governments and people believed development was a remedy for the continent's social and economic suffering as well as a means for the realization of human security. Throughout the independence period, African governments pursued development through commitment of national budgets to the provision of social services, development of infrastructure, and implementation of economic programs in agriculture, commerce, mining, and industrialization. Regardless of their motive, external actors have also contributed to development in Africa through the disbursement of foreign aid, although the long term impact of aid has been adverse to African economies. In addition, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) programs, seen from the positive viewpoint, have contributed capital, technology, skills,

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<sup>27</sup> See the series of World Bank publications under the title "*World Development Report*".

employment opportunities, and revenue, although, FDI, like foreign aid, has caused considerable problems for the economy of African countries; problems that include exploitation and environmental pollution and degradation.

External powers involve themselves in Africa's development largely in pursuit of their national interest rather than in pursuit of the interest of the continent. For example, the decline of Western economies mostly from about the end of the 1960s eventually compelled Western actors to enforce changes in Africa's macroeconomic management in line with the emergent neo-liberal orthodoxy, although the policy shift was socialized as a panacea for Africa's own economic stagnation and decline. Implementation of SAP under the auspices of neo-liberalism suggests that external actors have once again spelled a human security agenda for Africa. African countries that attempted to resist the new agenda faced external reprisals that ranged from diplomatic snub to cessation of foreign aid disbursement. Would Western powers take such drastic measures in Africa's own human security interests?

Implementation of SAP has been widely blamed for aggravating rather than ameliorating the human security condition in Africa; that is, SAP has entrenched poverty on the continent. External actors initially declined to acknowledge the suffering that the implementation of SAP had brought upon the African continent. Eventually, the human security crisis into which the neo-liberal agenda had placed the African people became indisputable and external actors responded with the introduction of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) – a new agenda to contain poverty on the continent. The ostensible implementation of the contents of PRSP in Africa simultaneously with continuation of SAP is an insincere human security strategy, for SAP and PRS are strange bedfellows. The two processes are mutually antagonistic.

External actors have contributed both positively and negatively to Africa's human security condition. African governments have also contributed both positively and negatively to that condition. Responsibility for development in Africa lies mostly with African governments, yet African governments have performed less than they could have in effort to promote development and obviate the negative side of the contribution that the external powers have made towards increased poverty on the continent.

### *Capitalism and environmental destruction*

The incorporation of environmental issues in the realm of security was initially controversial but is now complete. Conventional knowledge shows the existence of a category of potential or actual armed conflicts within and between coun-

tries. The cause of these conflicts lies in environmental degradation and competition for dwindling natural resources. That is, the environment has become either hostile or incapable of providing for and safeguarding human life. Ken Conca *et al* state that:

...environmental security encompasses a diverse set of concerns beyond the narrower question of environment-conflict linkages, including understanding of environmental impacts of the preparation for war and conduct of war, redefining security to focus on environmental and health threats to human well-being, and using security institutions to aid in the study and management of the environment.<sup>28</sup>

In Africa, environmental security is in jeopardy and the problem can be attributed to both external actors and African governments. The advent of agrarian and industrial capitalist production in Africa during the colonial period had a profoundly negative impact on the environment. In countries that experienced land alienation, the security of the environment suffered significantly in two main respects. First, mono-cropping destroyed Africa's biodiversity and, second, concentration of peasant production in less agriculturally viable zones resulted in congestion and the inhibition of the environment to reproduce itself in the way it had done through the pre-capitalist production system.<sup>29</sup> Soil erosion, desertification, and depreciation, extinction of important plant and animal species, and the introduction of biotechnology, especially the hazardous Genetically Modified Foods (GMF), are some of the environmental security threats that Africa faces today. The advent of industrial capitalism in Africa, especially manufacturing by Western Multinational Corporations has created previously non-existent environmental pollution. For example, foreign oil companies in Nigeria have polluted the local environment through frequent spillage and emission of toxic gasses. Indeed, the relationship between foreign oil companies in Nigeria, the Nigerian government and the local Nigerian population reveals conspiracy, accumulation, exploitation, and most importantly, environmental dangers. The interests of external corporate actors in Africa are pursued jointly between the corporate firms themselves and their respective governments. While

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<sup>28</sup> Ken Conca *et al*, Building Peace through Environmental Cooperation, in The World Watch Institute, *State of the World... op cit* p. 146.

<sup>29</sup> Dannielle Nierenberg and Brian Halweil claim that "since the beginning of the last century, 75 percent of the genetic diversity of agricultural crops has been lost." Dannielle Nierenberg and Brian Halweil, "Cultivating Food Security," in The World Watch Institute, *State of the World...ibid* p. 64.

the activities of these actors succeed in satisfying Western corporate interests it causes local despondency that often culminates in armed conflicts. Finally, conspiracy between dishonest African governments and Western MNC has led to the dumping of toxic waste in Africa and endangered life.

Threats to environmental security in Africa arise therefore from external capitalist actors (MNC) in an insatiable quest for accumulation and African national environmental regulatory and protection regimes that are woefully weak mostly due to corruption and ineptitude. The continent now faces environmental insecurity of enormous proportion. Governmental negligence and capitalist production mostly by MNC are the two main sources of environmental destruction in Africa. Corruption and ineptitude has led to unchecked destruction of forests, pollution of both rivers and the atmosphere, and toxic waste dumping. The literature on MNC in Africa is replete with illustrations of MNC ravages that include the destruction of Africa's otherwise rich biodiversity through monoculture agro-production; emission of untreated gas and liquid waste; deforestation that leads to desertification; and application of biotechnology. The virtues of a clean, safe and sustainable environment have been lost to profit, corruption, and ineptitude that arise from both internal and external sources.

The agenda for environmental protection also has its sources in both Africa and the West. In Kenya, land alienation for European settler farmers led Africans to poor, overcrowded native reserves that took toll on the security of the environment.<sup>30</sup> Hill side cultivation and overgrazing, for example, destroyed plant cover and paved the way for soil erosion. Shifting cultivation that previously allowed for soil and plant regeneration was no longer possible since land had become scarce. By the late 1930s, the environmental problem in the colony had reached a crisis level leading the colonial state to initiate soil conservation programs such as de-stocking and contour farming. The colonial state had thus created an environmental conservation agenda through its non-environment friendly, agrarian capitalism. Western cooperate firms in the lumbering and mining industry around Africa have also introduced token environmental protection programs such as distribution of seedlings for re-forestation and restoration of vegetation cover in disused minefields. The corruption and ineptitude that is entrenched in African governments also contributed to the rise of the environmental crisis that in turn generated the need for environmental protection measures and many countries on the continent now have ministries of environment.

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<sup>30</sup> For details about environmental conservation programs in colonial Kenya see Berman B., *Control and Crisis in Kenya: The Dialectics of Domination*, James Currey, 1990.



## Conclusion

This chapter has assessed the relative significance of *aussenpolitik* and *innsenpolitik* in the formation of the present condition of security in Africa, in the security agenda setting, and in the formulation and implementation of national security programs. The main findings of the chapter show that the security condition in Africa today as well as the process of security agenda setting and action is an outcome of the convergence of external and internal political, social and economic forces. The external forces are both historical and current. The historical forces include the colonial legacy of the nation state system, the post-colonial big power Cold War rivalry in Africa, and pre- and post-independence capitalist development. The local forces in Africa include authoritarian rule and social and economic marginalization that contradicts the requirements of the nation state as a mode of political organization, weak and dependent economies, and corruption and a lack of dedication to the security and welfare of the continent on the part of governments.

The external and internal forces have combined in different proportions to produce intrastate and interstate conflicts, poverty, international terrorism, and environmental degradation. Furthermore, the different security agendas pursued in Africa arise from a combination of the external and internal influences, counterterrorism, and environmental security. The findings of the chapter suggest that attempts to analyze Africa's security condition as well as security strategies and programs can be woefully inadequate unless conducted from the dual perspective of *aussenpolitik* and *innsenpolitik*.

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