

**THE IMPACT OF ARMED CONFLICT ON ECONOMIC  
DEVELOPMENT: A CASE OF MT ELGON REGION, WESTERN  
PROVINCE, KENYA**

**BY**

**MARY NYAMBASI**

**K50/70345/07**

**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE  
AWARD OF MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN COMMUNICATION STUDIES,  
SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM AND MASS COMMUNICATION,  
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

**NOVEMBER 2011**

University of Nairobi



0472/163

## DECLARATION

I declare that this report is my original work and it has not been presented in any other university.

Name: Mary Nyambasi

Signature:  ..... Date 17/11/2011 .....

This report has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

Signature:  ..... Date 25/11/2011 .....

Mr. Patrick Maluki

## **DEDICATION**

To my late father Mr. Nyambasi and my mother Penina Mmbone who believed in the great value of education and gave me the support to reach the highest level.

To loving husband, Mr Asutsa and children Ian, Danielle and Valerie for their understanding and moral support during the study period.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This study was made possible by the support and involvement of many persons who contributed their time and moral support towards its completion. First, I want to recognize the support and inspiration of my sisters Rose, Margret and Marble who ensured that everything goes well.

My special gratitude goes to my beloved husband and children for their moral support and encouragement. I am particularly appreciative of their understanding at a time when the study kept me away from home.

I want to recognize and appreciate most sincerely my Supervisor Mr. Maluki for a lot of support and guidance that he provided during the whole study period. You have always encouraged me and been available as much as possible and I am grateful to you. I want to note with appreciation the comments and advice provided by my colleague Simiyu. Your thoughts were very useful when refining the proposal.

I want to recognize the role played by My Sitini Simiyu for keying in the data and generating SPSS tables. I am grateful to my team of data collectors headed by Josphat Kaloki. I am equally indebted to the Western Kenya Provincial administration for assistance during data collection.

To all of you and any other person who made me succeed in completing this study, I am very grateful. I must thank Almighty God for His enabling grace that saw me through such monumental task.

God bless you all.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION .....	ii
DEDICATION .....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .....	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	v
LIST OF ACRONYMS .....	ix
ABSTRACT .....	xi
<b>CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Background of Mount Elgon Conflict .....	2
1.2 Statement of the Problem .....	7
1.3 Research Objectives .....	7
1.4 Justification of the study .....	8
1.5 Research Hypotheses .....	9
1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study .....	9
1.7 Chapter Outline .....	9
<b>CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW .....</b>	<b>10</b>
2.1 Introduction .....	10
2.2 Theoretical Framework .....	10
2.3 Previous Studies on the Effects of Conflicts .....	14
2.3.1 Introduction .....	14
2.3.2 Historical Causes of Ethnic Conflicts .....	17
2.3.3 Trigger Factors of the Recent Conflicts .....	22
2.3.4 Economic Consequences of the Clashes .....	24
2.3.5 Waste of Human Resources .....	25
2.3.6 Food Shortage .....	27
2.3.7 Land Grabbing Syndrome .....	28
2.3.8 Disruption of Commercial and Transport Sectors .....	29
2.3.9 Destruction of Property and the Environment .....	30

<b>CHAPTER THREE : RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....</b>	<b>31</b>
3.1 Introduction .....	31
3.2 Research Design .....	31
3.3 Target Population of the Study.....	31
3.4 Sample and Sampling .....	31
3.5 Data Collection Instruments .....	32
3.5.1 Questionnaires .....	32
3.5.2 Observation .....	32
3.5.3 Interviews Schedules .....	33
3.5.4 Focused Group Discussions (FGD) .....	33
3.6 Validity and Reliability of Instruments of the study .....	33
3.7 Procedure for Data Collection .....	34
3.8 Data Analysis Procedure .....	34

<b>CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULT .....</b>	<b>35</b>
4.1 Introduction .....	35
4.2 Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis .....	35
4.2.1 Analysis of Response Rate .....	36
4.2.2. Gender.....	36
4.2.3 Age .....	38
4.2.4 Marital Status.....	39
4.2.5 Monthly Income .....	40
4.2.6 Level of Education.....	41
4.2.7 Duration of Stay in the Current Area .....	42
4.2.8 Duration of Stay in the Current Area .....	43
4.2.9 If Respondents lost their Property during the Conflic .....	45
4.2.10 Loss of Property by Neighbours .....	45
4.2.11 Conflict's effect on Food Supply .....	46
4.2.12 Effect of Conflict on Essential Services and Social Amenities .....	48

4.2.13 Deterioration of Infrastructure as a result of Conflict.....	54
4.2.14 Migration of the Workforce due to the Conflict .....	50
4.2.15 Depreciation of the Value of Land.....	51
4.2.16 Possibility of Potential Investors investing in the area .....	52
4.2.17 Comparison of Conflict prone area with other Areas in Terms of Development ..	53
4.2.18 Dependence on Food Aid from Government and other Donors .....	54
4.2.19 Loss of Land during the Conflict.....	55
4.2.20 Reduction in number of Vehicles for Transportation .....	56
4.2.21 Loss of Professionals and Experts .....	57
4.2.22 Loss of Able people During the Conflict .....	58

## **CHAPTER FIVE: PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND**

### **RECOMMENDATIONS..... 60**

5.1 Introduction.....	60
5.2 Conclusion of Findings .....	60
5.3 Recommendations.....	65
5.4 Suggestions for Further Research .....	66

### **REFERENCES .....67**

APPENDIX I: TRANSMITTAL LETTER .....	70
APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNAIRE .....	71
APPENDIX III: BUDGET .....	73
APPENDIX IV: TABLE 1 FIGURES FOR DEATHS, INJURED, ARRESTED, CHARGED, FINALISED, DISPLACED .....	74

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Sample Design.....	32
Table 4.1: Gender.....	37
Table 4.2: Age .....	38
Table 4.3: Marital Status .....	39
Table 4.4: Monthly Income.....	40
Table 4.5: Level of Education.....	41
Table 4.6: Duration of Stay in the Current Area .....	43
Table 4.7: Location of Residence .....	44
Table 4.8: If Respondents lost their Property during the Conflict .....	45
Table 4.9: Loss of Property by Neighbours .....	46
Table 4.10: Conflict effect's on Food Supply .....	47
Table 4.11: Effect of Conflict on Essential Services and Social Amenities .....	48
Table 4.12: Deterioration of Infrastructure as a result of Conflict.....	49
Table 4.13: State of Roads .....	50
Table 4.14: Depreciation of the Value of Land .....	51
Table 4.15: Possibility of Potential Investors investing in the area .....	52
Table 4.16: Comparison of Conflict prone area with other Areas in Terms of Development .....	53
Table 4.17: Dependence on Food Aid from Government and other Donors .....	54
Table 4.18: Loss of Land during the Conflict.....	55
Table 4.19: Reduction in number of Vehicles for Transportation .....	56
Table 4.20: Loss of Professionals and Experts .....	57
Table 4.21: Loss of Able people During the Conflict .....	58



## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 4.1: Response Rate .....	36
Figure 4.2: Gender .....	37
Figure 4.3: Age .....	39
Figure 4.4: Marital Status .....	40
Figure 4.5: Level of Income .....	41
Figure 4.6 level of education .....	42
Figure 4.7: Duration of Stay in the Current Area .....	43
Figure 4.8: Location of Residence .....	44
Figure 4.9: If Respondents lost their Property during the Conflict .....	45
Figure 4.10 Loss of Property by Neighbours .....	46
Figure 4.11: Conflict effect's on Food Supply .....	47
Figure 4.12: Effect of Conflict on Essential Services and Social Amenities .....	48
Figure 4.13: Deterioration of Infrastructure as a result of Conflict .....	50
Figure 4.14: Migration of the Workforce due to the Conflict .....	51
Figure 4.15: Depreciation of the Value of Land .....	52
Figure 4.16: Possibility of Potential Investors investing in the area .....	53
Figure 4.17: Comparison of Conflict prone area with other Areas in Terms of Development .....	54
Figure 4.18: Dependence on Food Aid from Government and other Donors .....	55
Figure 4.19: Loss of Land during the Conflict .....	56
Figure 4.20: Reduction in number of Vehicles for Transportation .....	57
Figure 4.21 Loss of Professionals and Experts.....	58
Figure 4.22 Loss of Able people During the Conflict .....	59

## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

<b>AIDS</b>	Acquired Immunity Deficiency Syndrome
<b>ICJ</b>	International Commission of Jurists
<b>IDPS</b>	Internally Displaced Persons
<b>HIV</b>	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
<b>KHRC</b>	Kenya Human Rights Commission
<b>LRA</b>	Lords Resistance Army
<b>NCCK</b>	National Council of Churches of Kenya
<b>SLDF</b>	Sabant Land Defence Force
<b>SALWs</b>	Small Arms and Light Weapons
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme

## ABSTRACT

This study is an analysis of the impact of armed conflicts operations and offers a discussion of how these challenges may pose obstacles on economic development but also opportunities for security reform in Kenya. Armed conflicts have hampered development and reversed any development achieved since independence. The study was carried out in Mt Elgon County in Western Province. The objectives of the study were: to establish if the destruction of property and environment is an effect of conflicts in Kenya. To ascertain the extent of the destruction of human resources (man power) as a result of conflicts in Kenya. To examine food shortage as an effect of conflicts in Kenya. To establish if land grabbing mania is an effect of conflicts in Kenya. To ascertain the extent of disruption of commercial and transport sectors as a result of conflict in Kenya.

The purpose of this study was to generate pertinent information on the implications of ethnic conflicts on economic development as well as strategies for mitigation. The information contained in this paper, together with other papers, should enable the government, policy makers, donor agencies, churches, non-governmental organizations, local and international civic institutions, traditional community institutions, and other interested parties to identify:- structural, legal, social, political, economic, cultural, religious and other impediments to national and regional stability as well as sustainable development. The findings of the research were qualitatively and qualitatively analyzed evolving numerous findings. The study established that there was unequal distribution of land; a lot of property, lives, and infrastructure were destroyed. Also established was the loss of manpower, mass transfer of workers to peaceful areas, disruption of economic activities among other findings. Among the recommendations was the need to address the inequitable distribution of land, create employment opportunities for the youth, dismantle illegal armed organized groups, sensitize local people not be taken advantage by politicians among other recommendations.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

"Conflict" is defined as perceived divergence of interests, a perception by one of the parties; that its aspirations are incompatible with those of the other party (Zimmerman, 1981). It is a historical fact and current reality that most Kenyan districts are haunted by actual or potential ethnic conflicts. This is partly because of the fact that different communities continue to consciously or unconsciously rely on ethnicity to perpetuate their dominance and hegemony in an atmosphere characterized by scarce resources, fear and prejudice. The proliferation of ethnic conflicts in Kenya is so widespread that there is hardly any region where the problem has not reared its ugly head: Western, Rift Valley, Nyanza, Coast, Central, North Eastern, Eastern and even Nairobi. The necessity for a new vision in approaching the issue of ethnic conflicts and their management cannot therefore be overemphasized in this context. From the recent experience as well as studies carried out on ethnic conflicts in Kenya and the Greater Horn of Africa, there is increasing evidence to suggest that even where it has been brought under control psychological trauma (i.e. fear and suspicion) left behind are seldom healed, especially among children and women. This paper offers some empirical evidence to confirm the psycho-social and other effects of ethnic conflicts as well as their implications to economic developments in Kenya (Africa Watch, 1993).

According to the Africa Watch (2005) the conflict in the Mt. Elgon district was disastrous especially because it was within the same community inhabiting the district. It is believed that the conflict was the result of poorly managed land distribution between the various groups in the Chepyuk settlement scheme's last section. Besides land, the impact of the conflict had far reaching effects because traditional religious leaders participated in the preparation of the militia groups making it one of the most secretive organizations. Thousands of people lost their lives; many women and young girls were raped resulting in the high prevalence of HIV and AIDS and massive displacement of communities. There are now many orphaned children with much uncertainty of their future. Mt. Elgon has hundreds of widows and other displaced persons (IDPS) whose lives have been

shattered by the effects of the conflict and they do not know how to re-start their livelihood without spiritual, material and financial support.

There are many injustices which were committed from the colonial period, the independence era, and the successive Kenyan governments against the rights of the Sabaot peoples. For over forty years the grudges and wounds have grown and the consequence is conflict and tensions in the community which are bound to continue and even escalate. The forces that support the conflict are still present in the communities. These include the presence of other ethnic groups who acquired the land against the rights of the Sabaot peoples, the angry youth who participated in the conflict, the government delays and incompetence in allocating land to the rightful owners; poor governance and leadership etc (Kiraitu, 1995).

According to Nyukuri, the effects of the conflict are deep and varied. Those who lost their beloved ones from all the groups that were involved in the conflict are very bitter because no answer has come from the government in creating dialogue so that the different parties can sit face to face and forgive one another for the atrocities committed. It is only the churches that are struggling to bring the different parties into dialogue through prayer and the Holy Scriptures. Bitterness and hatred is still embedded in the lives of those who directly or indirectly witnessed the killings. No trauma healing sessions have been systematically organized so that depression, high blood pressure experiences and helplessness among individuals and groups are reduced (1992).

### **1.1 Background of Mount Elgon Conflict**

Mt. Elgon is situated at the border of Kenya and Uganda. It covers a geographical space of 944.3 sq. km. Most of the land is government gazetted land (609.6 sq.km). The district has four administrative divisions, namely, Kapsokwony with a population of 29,480; Cheptais (48,163); Kopsiro (55,957) and Kaptama (28,710). The approximate population for the whole district is about 200,000. The original inhabitants of Mt. Elgon are called the Ndorobo. The inhabitants of Mt. Elgon district are mainly Sabaots. The Sabaots are a Nilotic ethnic group who are closely related to the Maasai. Two major sub-groups make up the Sabaots: the Soy and the Mosop. Over the years, since Kenya's independence in

1963, other ethnic groups have moved into Mt. Elgon district through land purchase, friendly mutual agreements and government arrangements. The Sabaots were pastoralist communities moving all over the mountain slopes between Kenya and Uganda. They became a settled group, practicing crop farming and modern livestock husbandry. The Soy who are part of the Sabaot larger ethnic grouping became neighbours of the Ndorobo currently known as Ogick through migration. Both of these ethnic communities were pastoralists. After Kenya's independence in 1963, more communities came to live as neighbours of the Sabaot community (a name which is common to the Soy, Mosop and the Ndorobo communities) Kobia (1993).

The land at the slopes of Mt. Elgon is fertile, supporting most of the agricultural activities and grazing pastures. The rainfall and temperatures are favourable for growing coffee, tea, maize, vegetables of all types, especially cabbages, cattle keeping and other smaller livestock. Since the Sabaot were basically cattle herders, they were not particularly keen on crop growing.

The problems of the Sabaots surfaced during the time Kenya was a colonial state. In 1963, other Kenyan communities which lived as squatters on white settlers' farms bought land in Trans-Nzoia, including the land where the pastoralist Sabaots used to graze cattle and roam freely. The white settlers had forced the Sabaots out of their grazing land and converted it into crop farmland. The transactions of selling and buying land did not take into account the rights of the Sabaots who were the original inhabitants of the Mt. Elgon district. Having been forced out of the slopes of the mountain, most Sabaots had moved up to live on the upper regions of the mountain. In 1965 and 1971 respectively, the government tried to settle the Sabaots on designated land in the lower parts of the mountain but this plan did not work well because other Kenyan communities still took over the land through corruption and shady deals of government mechanisms. The Sabaots felt cheated, especially those who remained landless. In the 1992 land clashes, the Sabaots tried to raise their voice to reclaim the land but their riots were quickly put down by the government without a solution to the land issue. The 2006 - 2007 land

clashes were an out-burst, coming out of protracted grievances which were not adequately addressed for over forty years ( Nyukuri, 1992).

The history of violence has contributed to militarization of the area as local residents buy weapons either for self-defense or for carrying out operations of their own. This has been facilitated by a proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) along the Kenya-Uganda border following many years of instability and conflict in Uganda. The protracted conflict in northern Uganda between the Lord's Resistance Army led by Joseph Kony and the Uganda government forces means that such weapons are generally in circulation and because of the porous Kenya-Uganda border find their way into the Mount Elgon region. The state has itself been implicated in the proliferation of SALWs in the area. In the early 1990s the government provided an estimated 1 000 guns to members of the Sabaut community who were recruited as Kenya Police Reservists (KHRC 1996). These reservists are said to have taken sides in the clashes and used their guns against non-Sabaut (KHRC, 1996).

The implication is that any conflict situation in the area can potentially escalate because both combatants and the tools of combat are readily available. In a strict sense, the proliferation of SALWs is both a cause and effect of the conflict. As was argued above, perceived persecution provided a reason for the acquisition of weapons. Regardless of whether the motivation was offence or defense, the outcome was that it extended the conflict. In general, the presence of SALWs makes a conflict violent and undermines efforts to resolve it through dialogue and other peaceful means. For the purposes of this report, I cannot overemphasize the relationship between ethno-nationalism, availability of weapons and the most important resource in the region, which is land. Land provided not just the motive for the conflict, but the very space in which the conflict is played out and the efforts at resolution are attempted (KHRC, 1996).

It must be clear by now that hostile social relations have been an important cause as well as effect of intense and violent competition over land in Mount Elgon District and that it operated on three levels. The first was the intra-community rivalry between the Mosop

and Soy clans, the second was the rivalry between Soy factions allied to different politicians, and the third was inter-community rivalry resulting from Sabaot ethno-nationalist politics.

The Sabaot ethno-nationalist aspirations have taken various forms. The first was the Sabaot demand that an administrative district be created exclusively for them. They wanted such a district to be hived off the larger Bungoma District (in which they felt they were dominated by Bukusu) and Trans-Nzoia District in Rift Valley Province (their original homeland). They further demanded that the district be administered by Rift Valley rather than Western Province (Human Rights Watch 1993; ICJ-Kenya 2000). As was stated in the introduction, the Mount Elgon area remained grossly underdeveloped because state resources channeled to the district were directed to conflict areas dominated by Bukusu. The Sabaot saw this pattern of resource distribution as a deliberate and systematic scheme by Bukusu politicians and technocrats to marginalize them on the basis of ethnic identity. They hoped that a district of their own would correct this imbalance and enable them to receive their fair share of state resources and enable them to chart their own development path. This was in large part informed by the fact that at the time, the district was the principle planning unit for rural development as articulated by the district focus for rural development strategy. An inclusion in Rift Valley Province, where they would be administered together with their kin, would give them a sense of belonging (KHRC, 1996).

Although the geographical location has played a role in the economic and socio-political situation of Mount Elgon District, the crisis to a large extent derives from (mis)management, in that the authorities do not match their privileged position of power with the complementary obligation of including these people in their governance responsibilities. Therefore it could be said that the reason why the conflict about land has escalated so dramatically, is a function of governmental mismanaged not only of the land issue, but community matters in general. It also begs the question on how the area, as part of the country as a whole, is being governed. This leads to other questions, such as the reason for the disconnect between the ideal of egalitarianism and the practice of



favouritism. These are not purely theoretical questions: the future for young people is looking ever more uncertain, and their frustration could result in the youth taking up arms to rectify the situation as they see fit. In view of the Mount Elgon's history of violence as a means of solving problems, this is not a possibility to be taken lightly (KIIRC, 1996).

Regardless of whether it is the youth's frustrations stemming from dissatisfaction with government or whether it is the existence of competing political and economic elite interests in the district that provide the context for conflict, it is the likelihood that the youth will pursue a militant option as a means of addressing their grievances that should be of particular concern. As Osamba (2000:25) rightly notes, in the context of cattle rustling and banditry in north-western Kenya: The youths play a very crucial role in the system of conflictlordism. Since they are impoverished and marginalized by economic realities, the youths are structurally available and ready for mobilization and for offering service to the highest bidder. In general the youth are the group most excluded from the social, economic and political order of the society. They are amenable and can easily be manipulated (KIIRC, 1996).

Dysfunctional and exclusivist economies, sustained feelings of injustice, lack of legitimate means of earning a living and political frustration have topped the list of reasons for the emergence of youth outfits that seek to position themselves at the centre of socio-political and economic dynamics in post-colonial Africa. Indeed, across the continent, many such outfits have been conceptualized as a product of the lumpen or underclass culture. On the topic of militia formation in eastern Congo, Doom and Vlassenroot (2001:80) have argued that 'For the marginalized youngsters, joining this militia offers them an exit from exclusion and a way to reach some fruits of modernization. Violence in this case is an opportunity rather than a problem. In Kenya, for instance, it is for similar reasons that the Mungiki, a notorious religio-military outfit, has survived many government onslaughts aimed at annihilating it. The Mount Elgon conflict also confirms Obi's argument that where resources are monopolized by the state at the expense of the population and where scarcities stem from the state's distribution process, the state is more likely to follow through the process with violence to impose its will on the people. However, such threats or actual use of violence does not, on the

whole, deter 'counter-hegemonic social movements [from challenging] African states' exclusive control of resources, resulting in conflicts and resource conflicts'.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Mt Elgon conflict has had far reaching political, social and economic repercussions on the district, neighbouring districts and the country at large. Mostly affected was the economic development since the effects on the sector has long term effects on the development of the country.

Many spheres of economic development were affected. For instance agricultural production has been hampered by insecurity, and food security is a significant concern. Over 9,610 hectares were not cultivated in 2008 resulting in the loss of approximately 192,200 bags of maize. Other affected crops are beans, Irish potatoes, onions and carrots. Some IDPs moved with their livestock to areas in nearby divisions causing tension in terms of grazing land. (Over 30,000 heads of cattle have died, been killed or sold at cheap prices). Prices of foodstuffs have risen and productivity has gone down. Prices of charcoal, firewood and other essential fuels have also gone up (KIIRC, 1996).

The IDPs are now working in farms, hotels and recreational facilities doing odd jobs, as well as begging to raise income for their families. Residents are starving due to lack of food and malnutrition cases have been reported. Houses, commercial property and other important properties have been burnt, destroyed or vandalized. Commercial and transport sectors have been disrupted or ground to a halt. This study examines those issues critically with a view of coming up with recommendations for possible adoption by the relevant stakeholders.

## **1.3 Research Objectives**

The objectives of the study were:

1. To establish if the destruction of property and environment is an effect of conflict in Kenya.

2. To ascertain the extent of the destruction of human resources (man power) as a result of conflict in Kenya.
3. To examine food shortage as an effect of conflict in Kenya.
4. To establish if land grabbing mania is an effect of conflict in Kenya.
5. To ascertain the extent of disruption of commercial and transport sectors as a result of conflict in Kenya.

#### **1.4 Justification of the study**

The impact of the conflict had far reaching effects in terms of economic, social and other aspects. The land grabbing syndrome became evident among other effects. There was the emergence of militia groups because traditional religious leaders participated in the preparation of the militia groups making it one of the most secretive organizations. Thousands of people lost their lives; many women and young girls were raped resulting in the high prevalence of HIV and AIDS and massive displacement of communities. The district had more challenged and orphaned children who do not know where to go for help as all of them are in their formative stage. Mt. Elgon countless of widows and other displaced persons (IDPS) whose lives have been shattered by the effects of the conflict and they do not know how to re-start their livelihood without spiritual, material and financial support.

The purpose of the study was to generate pertinent information on the implications of ethnic conflicts on economic development as well as strategies for mitigation. The information contained in this paper, together with other papers, should enable the government, policy makers, donor agencies, churches, non-governmental organizations, local and international civic institutions, traditional community institutions, and other interested parties to identify:- structural, legal, social, political, economic, cultural, religious and other impediments to national and regional stability as well as sustainable development. This was an enormous challenge to researchers, scholars, mitigators, policy makers, governments, conflict managers and development agencies in Kenya and the Greater Horn of Africa. However, it was a task which required serious focus with great urgency to eliminate the creeping culture of violence in the entire Horn of Africa.

## **1.5 Research Hypotheses**

The study was based on two hypotheses:

- H0: Conflicts have no effect on economic development.
- H1: Conflicts have effects on economic development.

## **1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study**

The study was carried out in Mt Elgon District in Western Province. It involved clash victims, teachers, administrators, clergymen, politicians, local opinion leaders, women, youth, business people, farmers, elders and other relevant persons within and outside the study areas. There were several limitations to this study; inadequate updated information in the area posed a challenge to the outcome of the study. Time availability for carrying out the study was short as the researcher was a full time employee. Lack or inadequate resources to carry out the study, that is, limited equipment to collect data and insufficient funds. Also some participants were not comfortable to give certain information which did not give the researcher the required information. Some respondents answered the questions for the sake of answering and some may fail to return questionnaires. One unavoidable limitation was the part of the sample size consisted of respondents that never resided in the area at the time of the conflict and hence their responses might have not reflected what exactly transpired. However, the percentage of such respondents is quite insignificant as reflected in the responses.

## **1.7 Chapter Outline**

The study comprised five chapters. Chapter one, the introduction, which contained background information to the problem, statement of the problem, research objectives, research questions, justification of the study, theoretical framework, hypotheses, scope and limitations of the study and chapter outline of the study. Chapter two which comprised literature review of the previous studies done by other scholars and researchers in this area. Chapter three dealt with research methodology. It covered the research design, population, sampling, instruments, validity and reliability, procedure for data collection and data analysis. Chapter four dealt with presentation of data analysis and discussion of study findings. Chapter five dealt with the summary, conclusion and recommendations of the study.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.1 Introduction

This section accounts for what has been credited by scholars on the effects of conflict on economic development. It will review past studies carried out by others scholars in this field in order to enable the researcher gain a deep understanding of this area of conflict and eventually make an independent opinion in mapping the route for the research. This chapter also articulates the theoretical framework.

#### 2.2 Theoretical Framework

Conflict is a behaviour pattern exhibited by many primate species (Sanjida, 2004) including humans, and also found in many ant specie (Zimmerman, 1981). The primary feature of this behaviour pattern is a certain state of organized violent conflict that is engaged in between two or more separate social entities. Such a conflict is always an attempt at altering either the psychological hierarchy or the material hierarchy of domination or equality between two or more groups. In all cases, at least one participant (group) in the conflict perceives the need to either psychologically or materially dominate the other participant. Amongst humans, the perceived need for domination often arises from the belief that either an ideology is so incompatible, or a resource is so scarce, as to threaten the fundamental existence of the one group experiencing the need to dominate the other group. Leaders will sometimes enter into a conflict under the pretext that their actions are primarily defensive, however when viewed objectively, their actions may more closely resemble a form of unprovoked, unconflictranted, or disproportionate aggression.

In all conflicts, the group(s) experiencing the need to dominate other group(s) are unable and unwilling to accept or permit the possibility of a relationship of fundamental equality to exist between the groups who have opted for group violence (conflict). The aspect of domination that is a precipitating factor in all conflicts, i.e. one group wishing to dominate another, is also often a precipitating factor in individual one-on-one violence outside of the context of conflict (Maniscalco, 2007).

The Karl Marx theory which states that conflict is quasi-economic which means all modern conflicts are caused by competition for resources and markets between great (imperialist) powers. He claims these conflicts are a natural result of the free market. Karl Heinrich Marx (1818-1883) was a German philosopher, political economist, and sociologist revolutionary who addressed the matters of alienation and exploitation of the working class, the capitalist mode of production and historical materialism.

The Marxism theory seeks to use the tools of psychoanalysis to diagnose the ills of society. Marxism view a society's culture and institutions as shaped by its underlying economic system. Thus, a society's economic system and its relations of production function as its unconscious that is, a society's culture functions as its ego; and a society's legal system, police and military function as its super-ego hence, this theory aim to reveal the illness of a society's underlying economic system by analyzing its cultural products. The study will be modeled on the postulated of Marxist theory because conflict in Kenya have arisen due to class struggles between landowners or politically connected individuals and the landless that has impacted negatively on the economic development.

A distinct branch of the psychological theories of war are the arguments based on evolutionary psychology. This school tends to see war as an extension of animal behaviour, such as territoriality and competition. Animals are naturally aggressive, and in humans this aggression manifests itself as warfare. However, while war has a natural cause, the development of technology has accelerated human destructiveness to a level that is irrational and damaging to the species. The earliest advocate of this theory was Konrad Lorenz (Konrad, 1966).

Biologists studying primate behaviour have also added to the debate. Jane Goodall in 1974 documented what she called a war between groups of chimpanzees in the Gombe National Park of Tanzania (Goodall, 1974).

These theories have been criticized by scholars such as John G Kennedy, who argue that the organized, sustained war of humans differs more than just technologically from the territorial fights between animals. Ashley Montagu (1976) strongly denies such universalistic instinctual arguments, pointing out that social factors and childhood

socialization are important in determining the nature and presence of warfare. Thus while human aggression may be a universal occurrence, warfare is not and would appear to have been a historical invention, associated with certain types of human societies.

According to some psychologists such as E.F.M. Durban and John Bowlby in advancing behavioural theories have argued that human beings are inherently violent (Durbin, 1939). This aggressiveness is fueled by displacement and projection where a person transfers their grievances into bias and hatred against other races, religions, nations or ideologies. By this theory the nation state preserves order in the local society while creating an outlet for aggression through warfare. If war is innate to human nature, as is presupposed and predetermined by many psychological theories, then there is little hope of ever escaping it.

The Italian psychoanalyst Franco Fornari, a follower of Melanie Klein, thought that war was the paranoid or projective "elaboration" of mourning. (Fornari, 1975) Fornari thought that war and violence develop out of our "love need": our wish to preserve and defend the sacred object to which we are attached, namely our early mother and our fusion with her. For the adult, nations are the sacred objects that generate warfare. Fornari focused upon sacrifice as the essence of war: the astonishing willingness of human beings to die for their country, to give over their bodies to their nation.

While these theories may have some general explanatory value about why war exists, they do not explain when or how they occur. Nor do they explain the existence of certain human cultures completely devoid of war (Turnball, 1987). If the innate psychology of the human mind is unchanging, these variations are inconsistent. A solution adapted to this problem by certain thinkers such as the psychologist, Franz Alexander is that peace does not really exist. Periods that are seen as peaceful are actually periods of preparation for a later war or when war is suppressed by a state of great power (Franz, 1941).

An additional problem with theories that rest on the will of the general population is that in history only a tiny fraction of wars have originated from a desire for war from the general populace (Walsh, 1971). Far more often the general population has been reluctantly drawn into war by its rulers. One psychological theory that looks at the

leaders is advanced by Maurice Walsh (Walsh, 1971). He argues that the general populace is more neutral towards war and that wars only occur when leaders with a psychologically abnormal disregard for human life are placed into power. War is caused by leaders that seek war such as Napoleon and Hitler. Such leaders most often come to power in times of crisis when the populace opts for a decisive leader, who then leads the nation to war.

Evolutionary biologist and peace ethologist Judith Hand, looking at the proximal causes of war, also argues that a minority of mostly men—so called hyper-alpha males—are the instigators of wars. She argues that while several aspects of biology, particularly male biology, make humans susceptible to making war, war only emerges when cultural conditions favor it. If conditions favoring war were eliminated, she argues, as does anthropologist Douglas P. Fry, war could be eliminated.

Sociology has long been very concerned with the origins of war, and many thousands of theories have been advanced, many of them contradictory. Sociology has thus divided into a number of schools. One, the *Primat der Innenpolitik* (Primacy of Domestic Politics) school based on the works of Eckart Kehr and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, sees war as the product of domestic conditions, with only the target of aggression being determined by international realities. Thus World War I was not a product of international disputes, secret treaties, or the balance of power but a product of the economic, social, and political situation within each of the states involved.

This differs from the traditional *Primat der Außenpolitik* (Primacy of Foreign Politics) approach of Carl von Clausewitz and Leopold von Ranke that argues it is the decisions of statesmen and the geopolitical situation that leads to peace

Demographic theories can be grouped into two classes, Malthusian theories and youth bulge theories. Malthusian theories see expanding population and scarce resources as a source of violent conflict. Pope Urban II in 1095, on the eve of the First Crusade, wrote, 'For this land which you now inhabit, shut in on all sides by the sea and the mountain peaks, is too narrow for your large population; it scarcely furnishes food enough for its cultivators. Hence it is that you murder and devour one another, that you wage wars, and



that many among you perish in civil strife. Let hatred, therefore, depart from among you; let your quarrels end. Enter upon the road to the Holy Sepulchre; wrest that land from a wicked race, and subject it to yourselves."

This is one of the earliest expressions of what has come to be called the Malthusian theory of war, in which wars are caused by expanding populations and limited resources. Thomas Malthus (1766–1834) wrote that populations always increase until they are limited by war, disease, or famine.

This theory is thought by Malthusians to account for the relative decrease in wars during the past fifty years, especially in the developed world, where advances in agriculture have made it possible to support a much larger population than was formerly the case, and where birth control has dramatically slowed the increase in population. A youth bulge theory is evident for Africa, and to a lesser extent for South and Southeast Asia and Central America.

Youth bulge theory differs significantly from Malthusian theories. Its adherents see a combination of large male youth cohorts—as graphically represented as a "youth bulge" in a population pyramid—with a lack of regular, peaceful employment opportunities as a risk pool for violence.

While Malthusian theories focus on a disparity between a growing population and available natural resources, youth bulge theory focuses on a disparity between non-inheriting, 'excess' young males and available social positions within the existing social system of division of labour. Contributors to the development of youth bulge theory include French sociologist Gaston Bouthoul (Gastron, 1970), US sociologist Jack A. Goldstone (1991), US political scientist Gary Fuller and German sociologist Gunnar Heinsohn (2003).

## **2.3 Previous Studies on the Effects of Conflicts**

### **2.3.1 Introduction**

The Literature review of this study will revolve around the following issues: ethnicity, ethnic conflicts, civil conflicts, historical migration patterns and settlement, land tenure

systems, causes, consequences, nature, magnitude and manifestations of conflicts, conflict resolution strategies and other related variables which affect stability and sustainable economic development. Ethnicity in this context is viewed as an inclusive concept that defines groupings on the basis of indicators such as color, appearance, language, race, religion, common ancestry, height complexity, body structure, level of education and the like. It is an ascriptive phenomenon largely based on the myth of common ancestry, belief systems, physical settlements, group affiliations and relationships. It is a common phenomenon in plural societies like Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Ethiopia and South Africa, to mention but a few (Akinsola-Akiworo: 1964; Burke: 1965; Barth: 1969; Mafeje: 1971; Eken: 1986; Anderson: 1991; Nyukuri: 1992).

Over the last three decades, many scholars have dealt with the above issues from different perspectives. However, there has never been a consensus on the definition, causes, and manifestations, effects of conflicts and conflict management strategies or resolutions. Indeed, the concept of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts as used in modern studies are so elusive and often defies definition. The author contends that when trying to grapple with the issues of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts will be entering a theoretical or conceptual mine-field, whose literature can hardly be exhausted in such a limited paper, in terms of review.

According to Onyango (1995:1), African inter-ethnic conflicts are not as a result of the mere fact that the continent and national boundaries are brackets enclosing multi-ethnic groups. To him, the question of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts are issues of ethnic grudges. He asserts that the past inter-ethnic conflict management strategies in Africa have tended to concentrate on symptoms of the effects and not the root causes. He further postulates that there are numerous socio-economic and political grudges between or within the numerous ethnic communities in African states. His work augments the earlier works of other scholars like (Achebe, 1975, 83; Zangari, 1976; Nyong'o, 1987; J.B.Ojwang, 1989:3; Lunyigo, 1989:39)

According to other critical scholars like (Baldwins, 1962:195; Markakis, 1994:261; Murungi, 1995:5 and Amutabi, 1995), numerous resolutions or management strategies have been attempted, but none of them seems sustainable in creating an atmosphere for peace, security and inter-ethnic as well as intra-ethnic co-existence in Africa. As Markakis put it, ethnic conflict in Africa is a many sides violent struggle waged at several levels. It involves nations, regions, ethnic groups, clans, lineages, and is fought between and within states, religious and ethnic groups. Amutabi (1995) cautions us from viewing ethnicity as a scourge only in Africa. To him, this is basically a Eurocentric interpretation of the African lifestyle. He adds that, "We need to move away from the state of despair and hopelessness to conflicts more practical solutions by enhancing the existing positive ethnic structures". According to Gertzel (1994:217), it is the primary task of the leadership to integrate the many groups in society, divided though they may be on class, ethnic, regional, economic, political and religious lines into a new national entity. He, like Amutabi, holds the point of view that it would be too much if politicians were to be relied upon in eradicating ethnic tensions as these underlie their survival (Amutabi, 1995:7; Nyukuri, 1992:5; 1993, Africa Watch).

In this study, we contend the fact that it is time we joined the Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe in asking the question, "Where did the rain start beating us?" instead of "crying over spilt milk". Our experience in Kenya has shown that ethnicity tends to create a culture that is sometimes incompatible to human resource capacity. As Okullu (1974) further observed: "Tribalism is a wasteful practice when the employment of all human resources for development is considered". It is inconceivable that there could be such a big concentration of talent training and experience in just one area of the nation (Okullu, 1974:48). According to the late Tom Mboya, (1963), ethnic conglomeration has two functions; one is positive while the other is negative. He argues that the promotion and safeguarding of traditional cultural and social practices of a particular ethnic group is vitreous and extremely necessary in Africa's search for an authentic culture of its own..

According to Bienien (1974), communal solidarities in Kenya have yet to be destroyed, and it is clear that economic development and social change seems to have given greater salience to ethnic consideration..... (p.131). This partly explains why the issue of

ethnicity and land ownership has remained a very sensitive and explosive aspect of Kenya's historical and contemporary political economy (Leu, 1984). Atieno Odhiambo (1976) augments Bieniens point when he observed that the formation of ethnic associations such as the Luo Thrift and Trading Corporation (LUTATCO) by Oginga Odinga and other Luo traders was aimed at challenging the Asian monopoly of retail and wholesalc trade in Nyanza (p.225).

Chazan et el (1992) argues that after independence, the focus of conflict has gradually shifted from disputes over political boundaries to disagreements over political values. Our analysis focuses on ethnic/factional conflicts, which though based upon and organized by elites, extend outconflicted into society as supporters are recruited and reconflited for the basic benefit of their patrons. Such conflicts are said to occur in those pluralist and administrative hegemonic regimes where either intermediate social organizations have flourished and/or where elaborate patronage networks have thrived (Chazan, 1992:193). In this regard, we address the issue of access to power and scarce national resources in a plural society.

The ethnic inequalities within Kenya in terms of extraction and distribution of the scarce resources has been a source of negative competition between those who control power and those who perceive themselves to have been marginalized. The ethnic mobilization and sensitization of the supporters to rally behind the "have" and the "have not" elites is a threat to peace and stability since at no point there will be equal distribution of resources in a growing economy.

### **2.3.2 Historical Causes of Ethnic Conflicts**

As earlier observed, the causes as well as the consequences of ethnic conflicts that took place in Kenya may not render themselves easily to categorization. This is perhaps because of the fact that the practice of ethnicity is subterranean most of the time. Nevertheless, it is common knowledge that such causes and consequences must fall under broad categories such as social, economic, political, religious, environmental as well as psychological realms of life.

One of the long term causes of the clashes in Kenya is attributed to the colonial legacy, which is essentially historical but with ramifications in the post independence era. It is a historical fact that the indirect rule administered by the British colonialists later turned out to be the 'divide and rule' strategy which polarized the various ethnic groups in Kenya. This in turn contributed to the subsequent incompatibility of these ethnic groups as actors on one nation-state called Kenya. It was unfortunate that the early political parties in Kenya that championed the nationalist struggle against colonial establishments were basically 'distinct ethnic unions'. The Kikuyu for instance, formed the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), the Akamba formed the Ukambani Members Association (UMA), the Luhya formed the Luhya Union (LU), the Luo formed the Young Kavirondo Association (YKA), the Kalenjin formed the Kalenjin Political Alliance (KPA), the Coastal tribes formed the Mwambao Union Front (MUF), Taita formed the Taita Hills Association (THA), in that order of ethnic conglomerations. As a result of the foregoing ethnic trends, a situation prevailed in this country in which a common political voice was not possible (Leo, 1984).

At the dawn of independence, African leaders ascended to governmental structures which had been intended to preserve the colonial administrative legacy. These leaders were armed with the Western Constitution and ill-trained manpower to soldier on and make provisions for the enlarged nation-state, now encompassing diverse ethnic groups with variegated interests. As if this was not enough, Kenya, like most other African countries, inherited from the colonialists' scarce national resources, inadequate infrastructure, inadequate human resource capacity, inadequate capital, inadequate education and health facilities, among others. The scramble for the scarce national resources and facilities intensified and ethnicity became the main vehicle through which the dominance and preservation of power as well as resources could be achieved. Indeed, leadership (i.e. ruling elites) in post colonial Kenya has often relied heavily on ethnicity to remain in leadership positions or settle a dispute with their perceived enemies (Mugambi, 1989).

Land is yet another source of ethnic conflicts in Kenya, both in the long term and in the short term. For a long time in the history of this country, land has remained a thorny economic and political issue. Various scholars like Christopher Leo and Mwangi wa

Githumo, have attempted to provide some explanations as to why land has been a major source of ethnic/political conflicts. The land issue has its origin in the colonial history of Kenya, where the colonialists dreamed of making this part of Africa a white man's country. The colonialists established the Kenya protectorate and later on the Kenya colony with the finance that was to be generated from the white settler plantations which covered the highly potential areas of the country. History has it that large tracts of agriculturally potential land (i.e. white highlands) were alienated by the British colonial administration (Leo, 1984).

As a result of the massive land alienation activities in the early period of colonialism, many of the hitherto cultivating populations were pushed into the 'infertile' native reserves that were not conducive for arable farming. The displaced populations lived as farm laborers, casual workers, tenants as well as squatters. The process of land alienation was also extended to the pastoral ethnic groups like the Maasai, Samburu, Nandi, Pokot and other Kalenjin speaking communities. Like their agricultural counterparts, the pastoralists were pushed to the less conducive reserves. During the period of nationalism and decolonization, land grievances were central to all ethnic groups that actively participated in the struggle for independence. In fact the land question is one of the main factors for the MAU MAU rebellion of 1952 to 1956 in Kenya and the subsequent declaration of the state of emergency by the British. After this historic resistance of land alienation by the Africans, the British became very conscious in dealing with the issue of transferring power to the Kenyans at independence. Indeed, the colonialists were afraid that if the land issue was not handled properly, it could degenerate to civil strife as numerous ethnic groups engaged in the scramble to recover their alienated pieces of land (Leo, 1984).

The British administration, on the eve of independence, worked out a formula of handing over land to the indigenous ethnic groups in Kenya. The British government established a special grant that was aimed at facilitating the re-distribution of land, particularly in the former white highlands. The transfer on land took various forms, starting from small holdings to medium and large holdings. The obvious expectation during the struggle for independence was that the land would be freely distributed to the people since it had in

the first place, been forcefully taken away from them. But this was not to be the case because under the independence agreement with Britain, the Kenya government was to buy it from the settlers. In fact, the British advanced a loan to Kenya to facilitate this purchase. That in turn meant that there was no free land for distribution. The price-tag made land very scarce. This is the critical point at which the subsequent land-tenure became a factor of ethnicity and hence ethnic animosity intensified (Okull, 1974).

It is on record that the largest beneficiaries of this land distribution programme were the Kikuyu and their allies, thus the Embu and Meru. By projecting some mythological kinship and taking advantage of neighborliness, the Kikuyu managed to win the Embu and Meru into some 'land alliance' within the framework of GEMA which was a bargaining organ for these communities on the sharing of the 'national cake'. The Kikuyu with their allies quickly formed land buying companies and cooperatives with the blessing of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta. The critics of GEMA have often stated that the membership of these land buying companies and cooperatives was strictly ethnical-contrary to constitutional and company law provisions against this form of discrimination. Where did they get the money from? The critics further argue that the Kikuyu ethnic group which constituted the membership of these organizations was just as poor as other Kenyan ethnic groups. And yet they managed to buy some of the largest and most expensive tracts of land from white settlers. One possibility is that they raised money from their meager incomes. But this alone would not certainly have sufficed. The main source was banks and non-bank financial institutions into which President Kenyatta had appointed mostly Kikuyu management. For instance, the top management of the Kenya Commercial Bank, National Bank of Kenya and the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC) were registers of managers from one ethnic group (Ojwang', 1989).

The issue of unequal distribution of resources is yet another source of potential instability in Kenya. Apart from their easy access to land, the economic success of the Kikuyu region in the first ten years of Kenya's independence was enviable by other ethnic groups. The Kikuyu also enjoyed good modern roads, abundant school and education facilities, expanded health services, piped water, electricity and other forms of infrastructure. More

than that GEMA helped its members to acquire land and businesses. They visibly outdistanced other ethnic groups at a pace that posed immediate political risks to their newly acquired positions in the government structures.

In sharp contrast, Nyanza (i.e. the home of the Luo ethnic group) suffered severe repression and neglect, more than any other province for trying to challenge and question the unjust enrichment of one region on what was a 'national cake'. We give a few illustrations with regard to the ethnic suppressions during the Kenyatta regime. In 1966, Oginga Odinga, the undoubted Luo leader, who had hitherto been the vice president of the nation, and the ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU), lost both posts at the famous Limuru Party Conference. The message was clear but milder at this point in time. Odinga responded by forming his political party - The Kenya Peoples Union (KPU). The accusations and counter-accusations between Odinga and Kenyatta over KPU were largely emotive and it succeeded in heightening Luo-Kikuyu ethnic animosities that sometimes degenerated into open confrontations (Owen, 1995).

The assassinations of Joseph Tom Mboya (i.e. a Luo) for motives never fully ascertained on July 9, 1969, a few months after the mysterious death of Argwings Kodhek, another prominent Luo politician intensified the ethnic animosity between the Luo and the Kikuyu. The banning of KPU in October 1969 and the detention of Odinga and other leaders without trial sent wrong signals to the Luo ethnic group who could not hide their emotions and anger during the visit of Kenyatta to Kisumu. During this visit, a large crowd of Luo's reportedly menaced Kenyatta's security and was fired on by the security guards in what later came to be known as the 'Kisumu massacre'. In an explanatory statement, the government accused KPU of being subversive, intentionally stirring up inter-ethnic strife, and accepting foreign money to promote anti-national activities. The proscription in effect brought a return of Kenya to the single party state. Following these incidents, Nyanza province, like other non-Kikuyu areas, was virtually written off from national development plans. For instance, the government terminated the construction the Kenya-Uganda highway (part of a Trans Africa highway system) in 1969 because the road had reached Luoland. The plans to construct the Yala falls hydro-electric plant was also brought to a halt for spurious reasons (William, 1985).



Other tribes suffered their punishments in the same or varying fashions, which we do not intend to unveil in this limited paper. The same trends of unequal distribution of land, infrastructure and other national resources have been witnessed in the Moi regime, where the Kalenjin ethnic group has been 'perceived' to have benefitted more than others. However, just like for the Kikuyu, not all Kalenjins have benefited. It is only a clique that surrounds the mantle of power (i.e. executive) who seems to have enjoyed in the Moi era. The mysterious death of Robert Ouko in 1990 strained the relationship between the Luo and Kalenjin ruling elites. This could be considered as one of the long term causes of the conflicts between the Luo and the Kalenjin in the build-up to the 1992 general multi-party elections and after. We assert that as long as there exist ethnic prejudice and animosity among the diverse Kenyan communities, the search for peace and nation-building will remain elusive (Nyukuri, 1995).

Another long term factor of ethnic prejudice and subsequent conflict is attributed to the Africanization of the civil service. Just as there was immediate need to 'Africanise' the land, the government moved equally fast to give jobs in the civil service and para-government sector to the Africans. Independence had after all been fought for on the popular slogan "Uhuru na Kazi" (i.e. Independence will bring jobs). During the colonial period, the African population had worked essentially as plantation laborers or domestic hands for whites. It was therefore natural that independence should give them mobility into the higher echelons of the labour market as a realization of self-governance. Understandably, the government came up with a policy, first described as 'Africanization', then 'Kenyanization', and eventually, by some unofficial baptism 'Kikuyunization' and currently 'Kalenjinization'. This terminological mutation succinctly explains how a policy, otherwise well-conceived, deteriorated into the ethnicization of employment in the civil service (Nyukuri, 1995).

### 2.3.3 Trigger Factors of the Recent Conflicts

The recent and potential ethnic conflict in Kenya could be attributed to the following trigger factors:

First, although mystery still surrounds the root causes of the recent clashes, one fact that

is clear from numerous reports newspaper articles, press statements and other documents is that leadership played a crucial role in fueling these clashes. Indeed, such of what has been written or pronounced in the fore mentioned literature implicates the leadership of the day (i.e. top government officials) top ranking members of the ruling party and opposition parties, some church leaders and other high ranking members of society (see Task Force report of NCKK 1992, Daily Nation March, 11, 29, 31st, 1992). The cursed arrow, April 1992; Kiliku parliamentary Report, 1992; Human Rights Watch, November, 1993; Murungi Report, 1995; Nyukuri, 1996 etc).

The misunderstanding of pluralism and majimboism is also a source of ethnic conflicts in Kenya. The re-introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya in the early 1990s had a number of far reaching consequences one of which was the eruption of ethnic clashes in Western, Rift Valley, Nyanza and Coast provinces. This was partially a fulfillment of President Moi's earlier prediction that a return of his country to a multi party system would result in an outbreak of tribal violence that would destroy the nation (Human Rights Watch/Africa November, 1993). It was also because of the misconception of pluralism and majimboism by leaders from the ruling party and opposition parties as well as the general public. Beginning with the late 1980s, after the 1988 rigged elections and early 1990s many Kenyan political elites started questioning the quo perpetuated by the one party political system in the name of Kenya Africa National Union (KANU). They began to view multiparty political system (pluralism) as a panacea to democratic governance, which was and was not the case! It was the case because pluralism could offer a forum for competitive politics and hence guarantee freedom of choice. It was not the case because multi-partism is not synonymous to democracy and single partism is not synonymous to autocracy (Nyukuri, 1996).

The advent of pluralism in Kenya was misconceived as the advent for democracy as implied in some of the political slogans and ideologies propagated by the various pressure groups and political parties that were formed in the early, 1990s. For instance, Ford was dubbed as the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy, implying that democracy was once full realized, but later destroyed and now pluralism had given the orchestrators a forum to re-capture or reconstruct it. This is misleading in the sense that

although the intended meaning may have been good but the apparent implication was questionable. One is triggered to raise a critical question as to when did Kenya ever witness full democracy since her independence in 1963. The same analogy applies to other political parties like DP - dubbed as the Democratic Party of Kenya, SDP - which are the initials for the social Democratic Party of Kenya. The so called champions of these political parties and pressure groups never took enough time to explain to their euphoric supporter the meaning and practice of pluralism, and hence the subsequent confusion, conflict as well as instability (Nyukuri, 1996).

On the other hand, leaders and supporters of the one party political system in the face of this misconception or confusion were compelled to think that pluralism was a seed bed to chaos and anarchy. Perhaps such fear was justified if we go back to the historical experience of some countries that failed to promote democratic governance in an atmosphere of pluralism (Bernard M. Joinet, 1991:2). In augmenting Joinet's point Samuel Kobia asserts that "nor is pluralism a magic wade to introduce a new era of peace and stability." He goes ahead to identify some of the issues in society that can be intensified by a multiple - party system. These include corruption, tribalism, and ungovernability (Kobia, 1993: 33 - 34).

#### **2.3.4 Economic Consequences of the Clashes**

The total economic impact of the clashes in the affected areas is literally unquantified and not easy to quantify. There was gigantic waste of human and economic resources as partly illustrated by figures in the Kiliku Report and other publications. (Kiliku Report, 1992 p.85-90). The clashes had lasting consequences that will continue to alter Kenya's economic development for many years. One overall observation that emerges from the study of the clashes in Kenya is the fact that the economic consequences go far beyond the available statistics. Much of the destruction worked to the economic advantage of the perpetrators of the violence and their close aides. Generally, the clashes allowed some groups of people and individuals to capitalise on the insecurity to usurp land or purchase it at throw-away prices from the victims who had no otherwise.

According to this study, one of the long term economic consequences of the clashes was the fact that land ownership patterns have been permanently altered. There was a general decline in economic production as many of the potential farmers ran away due to insecurity created by the violence. In a state of insecurity, as was the case in the study areas, agricultural activities were disrupted. In most cases, maize, coffee, pyrethrum, tea, sugarcane and other crops were either destroyed or abandoned because of the widespread violence caused by the clashes. In some areas of Trans Nzoia, Kericho, Nandi and Uasin Gishu districts, work on agricultural land stopped for a long time as farm workers stayed away for fear of being attacked by the 'clashing enemies'. (Kobia, 1993: 33 - 34).

There were other subsequent economic problems related to the clashes such as food insecurity, labour disruption on farms, industry and the public sector institutions, destruction of property, land grabbing, commercial disruption, breakdown in transport and communication, resource diversion, mis-allocation and unexpected expenditure, infrastructural disruption, inflation and fluctuation of prices and environmental destruction among others.

### **2.3.5 Waste of Human Resources**

The social consequences of the clashes in Kenya were enormous and cannot be easily quantified, especially the psycho-social ones. Most of the victims of these clashes were left homeless, landless, destitute, injured, dead, abused, to mention but a few of the atrocities resulting from the menace. The immediate and real consequence of the clashes in Kenya was felt most at personal and family level. There was loss of security in the clash-prone areas as the civilians took the law into their own hands, targeting perceived enemies. As a result of insecurity, there was indiscriminate loss of human life. Many people sustained physical injuries and others were traumatized. The state of insecurity interfered with the day-to-day socio-economic and political undertakings within the clash areas. There was loss of life among the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luhya, Luo, Iteso, Kisii and others. However, there is increasing evidence to suggest that although the loss was felt on either side of the conflict, the non-Kalenjin ethnic groups suffered most (Nyukuri, 1992).

The Kiliku Parliamentary Select Committee of September, 1992 put the death toll of clashes victims at 778, those injured at 654 and those displaced at 62,000. These figures exclude the number of persons who were killed, injured and displaced after September 1992. The Human Rights Watch/Africa estimated that the number of those killed by November, 1993 was at least 1500, while those displaced was at least 300,000. However, with continued clashes in 1994 and 1995, the total number of those who died, injured or displaced increased drastically, following the Enosopukia, Macla, Mtondia, Nyatike and Kibera incidence. If we were to go by the NCCK Review Report of August/September 1994, the number of displaced people for 15 districts in Kenya was about 311,433 persons in 43,075 households. This study, building on the previous statistics, estimated that up to July, 1995, at least 1800 people were killed, 30,000 injured and 350,000 displaced as a result of the clashes (Nyukuri, 1992).

A flashback on the Government figures of those who died, those who were injured and those who were displaced, reveals far much less number than the above estimates including its own in the joint report with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In May 1993, a Minister of State in the Office of the President, Mr. Jackson Kalweo released a statement in Parliament claiming that the violence between October, 1991 and December, 1992 had claimed only 365 lives and had displaced only 7113 persons. The Office of the President gave the ethnic breakdown for the dead up to December 1992 as follows: Kikuyu - 102, Kalenjin - 87, Luhya - 69, Kisii - 44, Luo - 30, Maasai - 12, Somalis - 10, Turkana - 6, Teso - 4 and Arab - 1. Whereas the ethnic breakdown of the displaced population during the same period was as follows: Luhya - 2,382; Kikuyu - 1971; Kalenjins - 1720; Luo - 403; Kisiis - 354, Teso - 259 and Kamba - 25. Mr Kalweo dismissed all other figures as untrue (Nyukuri, 1992).

The figures for those who lost their lives and those displaced could be more than the estimates quoted here. However, the Government figures of the same were far much less than these. If we go by the data of the NCCK on Land Clashes Project in fifteen (15) districts in Kenya, there were about 311,433 persons in 43,075 households. (NCCK Review Report Aug/Sep. 1994).

The Human Rights Africa Watch estimated that the number of those killed by November 1993 was at least 1500, while those displaced was at least 300,000. However, with continued clashes in 1994 and 1995, the total number of those who died and those who were displaced increased. Up to July, 1995 at least 1,800 people were killed and at least 350,000 displaced as a result of clashes. The number of those injured by July 1995 was put at 3000 compared to 600 recorded in the Kiliku report of September, 1992. Another UNDP document assessing the situation of the displaced persons in the Horn of Africa quotes fairly accurate figures of displaced persons in the Horn of Africa of 223,700, attributing it to the NCCK (UNDP, Displaced populations in the Horn of Africa, undated, p.10) (KHRC, 1996).

The clashes in Kenya exemplified the potential and real consequences of conflict on inter-ethnic marriage, family and social life. According to the field information collected in different parts of the clashes stricken areas, there were cases of breakdown of marriage and family life. Currently, inter-ethnic marriage between the Luhya (i.e. especially the Bukusu) and the Sabaot, Iteso and Sabaot, Kalenjin and Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Luo is viewed with fear and suspicion. This was one of the far-reaching social consequences of the clashes that have also created mistrust, prejudice and psychological trauma characterized by mental anguish and general apathy, among the various ethnic groups in Kenya. This emerging negative tendency contradicts the view that the conflicting ethnic communities have co-existed and inter-married for several decades (KHRC, 1996).

### 2.3.6 Food Shortage

Food shortage was one of the far reaching economic consequences of the clashes in the study areas. There was a drop in food production, food supply and raw materials for the agro-based industries such as sugar, tea, coffee, cereal (maize), pyrethrum and other agricultural crops. As a result of food shortages, many clashes victims experienced famine and this necessitated the appeal for local and international food aid and relief. Before we go any further on this point of food shortage, we should repeat the earlier question asked by an NCCK report published in 1992: When we feed those who are hungry, we must also ask why they are hungry (NCCK: The Cursed Arrow). The output

of maize and wheat experienced a drastic downfall due to the farmers' insecurity caused by the clashes. For instance, maize production for 1992 was estimated at 2.34 million tons, a 6.1% increase from the previous year, but still 390,000 tons below average. The production of wheat dropped from 195,000 to 125,000 tons from 1991 to 1992 (Reuters, 9th June, 1993). The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in its 1993 Report observed that the victims of the clashes in the Rift Valley Province alone needed 7,200 tons of cereals and 1,080 tons of pulses and other food items in emergency aid for that particular year (Daily Nation 14th May, 1993 and 23rd May, 1993).

The clashes also led to the drop in milk production, particularly in the Rift Valley, which is one of the largest milk producing zones in Kenya. Although there were no reliable statistics to illustrate the drop, the figures of milk production in Molo is indicative of this falling trends. For instance, it was reported in a local newspaper that in Molo area, the milk supply had dropped from 75,000 litres per month to only 29,000 litres per month (Daily Nation, 19th June, 1993)

This study revealed that many of the victims doubted the seriousness of the Government's participation in food relief and whenever it was distributed, there were instances of discrimination and corruption involving public administrators in charge.

### **2.3.7 Land Grabbing Syndrome**

There have been disturbing mass media reports recently of land grabbing mania and general corruption in Kenya. There is nothing new in this. Land grabbing and corruption have been going on since independence, creating an explosive situation that continues to sour relations between various ethnic groups. However, during and after the clashes, land grabbing in the clashes-torn areas has become rampant at the expense of the clash victims. Now that most of the urban and rural lands have been taken, pressure is mounting on the remaining land

After the clashes, there has increasingly been an obsession with land in this country which needs to be re-examined. Land is a thorny issue in the former clash-torn areas and unless serious attention is taken, there is every likelihood of renewed clashes. For instance, the former clash-torn 392 acre-Thessalia Holdings, also called Buru Farm,

located in Kericho District is said to have attracted the attention of a senior State House official and a KANU Member of Parliament (MP) who have evicted families from it. The over 600 people (approximately 150 families) displaced from their plots on the farm in December 1993, have expressed fear that the farm L.R. No.3979/2, whose ownership is under dispute, is likely to have been grabbed by the two senior government officials between January and July 1996 (The Clashes Update August 31, 1996, No.43).

As a result of the clashes, the study areas experienced an abrupt drop in effective demand for manufactured goods due to lack of cash income from the agricultural sector and employed labour in the agro-based industries such as tea, coffee and maize. Subsequently, some of the clashes-prone areas experienced massive unemployment, with all the attendant social and economic consequences as the farming, industrial and distributive trade sectors were forced to lay off workers.

The drop in the supply of food and raw materials for the agro-based industries necessitated costly imports of such items as sugar, maize and wheat. This in turn led to hiking and fluctuation of prices of essential commodities in the clashes-prone areas. For instance, the prices of bread, salt, sugar, flour and other basic goods went up by over 50% due to the shortage caused by insecurity. The price of bread rose from Shs.10 to Shs.17; sugar from Shs.24 per kg to Shs.45 in Bungoma, Trans Nzoia and Mt Elgon areas. Another noticeable feature in the area of commerce was the drop in the prices of cattle within the clashes areas. For instance, in Mt Elgon and West Pokot areas, a mature bull which before the clashes cost over Shs.7000 was being sold at Shs.3000 or less due to fear of cattle rustlers who complimented the insecurity situation (The Clashes Update August 31, 1996, No.43).

### **2.8.8 Disruption of Commercial and Transport Sectors**

Transport operators in most of the study areas before the clashes were mainly the Kikuyu and the Kisii. However, during the period of the clashes, the vehicle owners, fearing attack on their vehicles and passengers stopped their operations in the affected areas. The study established that during the clashes, areas such as Kericho, Thessalia, Nandi, Burnt Forest, Molo, Mt. Elgon, Kapsokwany and West Pokot experienced transport hardships as



a result of the clashes. The transport problems have been eased, although the vehicle owners still have some fear and suspicion about losing them in the event of renewed clashes. With most of the businesses closed and their vehicle and goods at risk of being destroyed or stolen, manufacturers stopped regular supplies of commodities to the affected areas. This in turn caused considerable hardships to the "final consumers" of essential goods (The Clashes Update August 31, 1996, No.43).

### **2.3.9 Destruction of Property and the Environment**

As a result of the clashes in Kenya, thousands of families lost a lot of personal and household possessions as their houses, granaries, farms, shops and other business premises went down in flames.

In Molo, Nandi and Mt. Elgon, large areas of forest land were set on fire as part of a defensive strategy taken by victims of the clashes, to deny their attackers hiding grounds. This development in the long run may lead to catastrophic effects on the environment of these areas. In fact, these areas are some of the densely forested zones in Kenya and some are important rain catchment areas. The consequence of massive destruction of forests as was witnessed during the clashes in the mentioned areas would therefore affect the pattern and intensity of rainfall and subsequently affect the viability of rain-fed agriculture and water supply in these zones. For instance, Mt. Elgon is the major source of perennial rivers such as Kuywa and Kibisi, which flows into Nzoia River that draws into Lake Victoria. Any effect, therefore, on the Mt. Elgon water catchment area will have negative consequences on Lake Victoria and its surrounding (The Clashes Update August 31, 1996, No.43).

## CHAPTER THREE

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1 Introduction

The chapter presented research methodology. It comprised of research design, target population, sample and sampling techniques, instruments of data collection, validity and reliability of data collection instruments, data collection and data analysis procedures.

#### 3.2 Research Design

The research design for the study was descriptive survey. The type of research depicts the state of affairs as it exists at present. The researcher had no control over the variables and he had only to report what had happened or what is happening. The researcher attempted to discover causes when they cannot control the variables. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (1999) descriptive research is a systematic collection and analysis of data in order to answer questions concerning current status of a program, project or activity. It was used to obtain data useful in evaluating present practice and providing basis for decision (Shaughnessy, 2003).

#### 3.3 Target Population of the Study

Borg and Gall (1989) define target population as all members of a real or hypothetical set of people, events or objects to which an investigator wishes to generalize the results of a research study. In the study the target population consisted of: clash victims, administrators, clergymen, politicians, local opinion leaders, women, youth, business people, farmers, elders and other relevant persons within and outside the study areas.

#### 3.4 Sample and Sampling

A sample is a subject of the target population which the researcher intends to generalize the findings (Cohen and Marrison, 1994). In order to get a representative sample for the study, the researcher used purposive sampling procedure as he will specifically sample clash victims, administrators, clergymen, politicians, local opinion leaders, women, youth, business people, farmers and other relevant persons within and the study areas. To obtain a representative sample, 80 clash victims and their relatives, 10 local leaders and 10 civil society persons were sampled bringing the total sample size to 100 respondents.

**Table 3.1: Sample Design**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Target Population</b>	<b>Sample Size</b>	<b>%</b>
Clash victims and relatives	4080	80	50
Local leaders	1400	10	25
Civil society/ NGOs	174	10	25
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5654</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Author, 2011

### **3.5 Data Collection Instruments**

The researcher used questionnaires, interviews, observations and focused group discussions.

#### **3.5.1 Questionnaires**

Both closed-ended and open-ended questionnaires were used to gather information from teachers and parents. For the closed questions, the respondents provided 'yes', 'no', 'I Don't Know', answers whereas open ended questions, the respondents were free to express their opinion. Specific questions were posed as to their experience of various forms of violence experienced, scenes witnessed and other experiences which the respondents underwent during the conflict. The questionnaires were able to generate the information required because it was designed in tandem with the objectives and research questions. The questionnaires were given clash victims, teachers, administrators, clergymen, politicians, local opinion leaders, women, youth, business people, farmers, elders and other relevant persons within and outside the study areas

#### **3.5.2 Observation**

Observation were a vital data collection tool as it had enable the researcher to obtain first hand information as opposed to questionnaires where respondents might not give authentic information in some questions. The researcher had been able to observe the social behavior and reactions of the respondents to obtain crucial information.

### **3.5.3 Interviews Schedules**

Given that some respondents are illiterate, research assistants used interview schedules to obtain information. These interview schedules will cover a range of issues related to the experiences of the incidents and occurrences of the conflict. The data collection instrument were also used to get more information from other sampled population like clash victims, teachers, administrators, clergymen, politicians, local opinion leaders, women, youth, business people, farmers, elders and other relevant persons within and outside the study areas

### **3.5.4 Focused Group Discussions (FGD)**

Focused Group Discussion comprising clash victims, teachers, administrators, clergymen, politicians, local opinion leaders, women, youth, business people, farmers, elders and other relevant persons within and outside the study areas were held to corroborate the information gathered through questionnaires and interview. FGD on the effects of conflict provided the opportunity for flexible and free flowing of information. The unstructured and spontaneous discussions were expected to reflect genuine opinion, ideas and feelings of the clash victims, teachers, administrators, clergymen, politicians, local opinion leaders, women, youth, business people, farmers, elders and other relevant persons within and outside the study areas on the effects of conflict on economic development. The researcher was moderator and lead the discussions on the topic under study. The researcher was liaised with the provincial administration in organizing for these discussion groups.

### **3.6 Validity and Reliability of Instruments of the study**

According to Mugenda and Mugenda (1999), validity is the accuracy and meaningfulness of inferences based on research results. It is ability of the instrument to measure what it purports to measure. To test for content validity and reliability, the researcher conducted a pilot study of the questionnaire, observation schedules and interview guides which will be carried out in the neighboring Bungoma District as it shares the same characteristics with Mt Elgon District. The selection of the pretest sample was based on assertion by Mulusa (1999) that about 10 respondents which represented the target population in all the major respects be used in a pretest.

It must have the ability to consistently field the same results when repeated measurements are taken under the same conditions. To test reliability of the instruments, the researcher gave two clash victims, teachers, administrators, clergymen, politicians, local opinion leaders, women, youth, business people, farmers, elders and other relevant persons within and outside the study areas a questionnaire to fill and return.

### **3.7 Procedure for Data Collection**

The researcher obtained research permit from the Western Provincial Headquarters. With the help of research assistants who were trained before data collection starts together with the researcher, they visited the respondents and administer the questionnaires and conduct interview schedules as observations will be made simultaneously. The questionnaires were distributed to clash victims, teachers, administrators, clergymen, politicians, local opinion leaders, women, youth, business people, farmers, elders and other relevant persons within and outside the study areas collected after two days.

### **3.8 Data Analysis Procedure**

The returned and duly filled questionnaires were verified, coded and thereafter were quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed through the use of tables and figures. The researcher made use of the SPSS to analyze the data and the results presented in tables and figures. These analyses were based on the responses obtained from the respondents.

Qualitative data refers to the information gathered in a narrative form through interviews, focus discussion groups and observations. The responses from the people who verbalize their reactions in different ways were organized to answer the research questions of the study. The researcher gave much attention to the recurring responses that formed the themes of the study. Description of the matter under study was the main essence of the qualitative research.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

#### 4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter was to broadly discuss and present the analysis of data collected using the various data collection modes. Analysis therefore was to make it easy for the readers to comprehend each study variable and consequently draw any relationship between them. The questionnaires were administered to all sampled population and they were given ample time to respond to the questionnaires independently.

The study was done with the view of identifying the effects of conflicts on economic development. The responses contained in the questionnaires were interpreted for analysis based on the fundamental assumptions underlined in each question.

#### 4.2 Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis


The returned questionnaires formed the basis for the analysis which forms this study. The questionnaires were then verified, coded and tallied according to the themes there after were quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed by use of SPSS ( Scientific Package for Social Sciences) through the use of tables and charts. Qualitative data refers to the information gathered in a narrative form through interviews, focus discussion groups and observations. The responses from the people who verbalized their reactions in different ways were organized to answer the research questions of the study. The researcher gave much attention to the recurring responses that formed the themes of the study. This study was undertaken to analyze and discuss data collected from respondents in relation to research objectives and questions. The responses from the people who verbalized their reactions in open-ended questions in the questionnaires, Focused Discussion Groups, interview schedules and observations were organized to form the qualitative analysis and answer the research questions of the study.

The researcher gave much attention to the recurring responses that formed the themes of the study. The reactions were organized into various thematic aspects as outlined in the research objectives and questions.

#### 4.2.1 Analysis of Response Rate

The figure below indicated response rate.

Figure 4.1: Response Rate



A total of 100 respondents were selected as a sample size but 87 responded representing 87 percent while 13 respondents representing 13% of the respondents declined. This was a satisfactory response which gave credence to the findings of the study and gave out an exact and accurate picture of what happened in Mt Elgon as majority gave their views regarding the issue of study.

#### 4.2.2. Gender

This part sought to establish the gender of the respondents. The respondents were asked to indicate their gender. The results were presented in the tables and figures below.

**Table 4.1: Gender**

Gender	Frequency
Male	20
Female	67
Total	87

From the information on the table, 20 were male; while 67 were female. The information confirmed that the population dynamics is gender insensitive. The interpretation is that most respondents were women revealing the effects of the war were most of the people who were killed were male civilians. This is true as it is the male who are targeted in any war as they represent the strength of the society. It is a war strategy for any opposing assailant to weaken their opponent by eliminating the male population since it is perceived to be the backbone of a fighting segment. This explains the reduced male population that must have been killed leaving women and children.

**Figure 4.2: Gender**





From the information, 23 percent were male while 77 percent were females. Gender sensitivity reflects the information obtained from the area as biased. Areas which are gender sensitive will look balanced in decision making as they consider all aspects of life out of the mix of what happened and the end results tend to be more perfected than areas which has only one sex taking part.

#### 4.2.3 Age

This part sought to establish the age of the respondents. The respondents were asked to indicate their age. The results were presented in the tables and figures below. The response on age was as follows:


Table 4.2: Age

Age	Frequency
18-25	21
26-35	10
36-45	15
46 & above	41

From the table above 21 of the respondents were aged under 18-25 years, 10 were of age 26-35 years, those between 36-45 years were 15, 40-49 years and 46 & above were 41 respondents.

Reliability is seen as a good percentage of older traders who have taken part in the trade for several years are still available and can provide good information out of the judgment of history due to the time they have lived in the area. Young people gave real time information depending on their expectation out of past experience and response.

**Figure 4.3: Age**



#### 4.2.4 Marital Status

This part sought to establish marital status of the respondents. The respondents were asked to indicate their marital status. The results were presented in the table and figure below.


**Table 4.3: Marital Status**

Marital Status	Frequency
Single	9
Married	20
Separated	15
Divorced	3
Widow/widower	40

From the table above 9 respondents were single, an overwhelming 20 were married, 3 respondent was divorced, 15 respondent was separated while six (40) respondents were

widows or/and widowed. It is quite evident from the table that majority of the respondents are widowed which can be attributed to the fact that majority of their husbands or wives were killed in the conflict.

**Figure 4.4: Marital Status**



#### 4.2.5 Monthly Income

This part sought to determine the respondents' monthly income. The respondents were asked to indicate their monthly income. The results were presented in the tables and figures below.


**Table 4.4: Monthly Income**

Income Level (Kshs)	Frequency
Less than 5000	68
5,000-9,000	11
10,000-40,000	6
50,000-90,000	2

From the table above and figure below 68 respondent make less than Kshs 5000. 11 respondents earn between 5000-9000 shillings, 6 respondents earn between 10,000-

40,000 shillings, 2 respondents earn between 50,000 -90,000. The interpretation is that majority of the respondents are poor which is attributed to the loss of their property and income generating activities and opportunities in the conflict.

**Figure 4.5: Level of Income**



#### 4.2.6 Level of Education

This part sought to establish the highest level of formal education of each respondent.


The respondents were asked to indicate their level of education. The results were presented in the table and figure below

**Table 4.5: Level of Education**

Level	Frequency
Mid 8 & below	56
KCSE	28
Bachelor & above	2
Postgraduate	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>87</b>

From the table, majority (54) of the respondents had not attained any level of formal education, 56 respondents had attained between standard 8 and below, 28 responders had completed secondary KCSE, 2 respondents had attained Bachelor and above, one of the responders was a postgraduate. With such low levels of education, it is very unlikely that the respondents will make informed decisions on best way to co-exist with other communities. Ignorance is the worst enemy of development.

**Figure 4.6 level of education**




#### **4.2.7 Duration of Stay in the Current Area**

This part sought to establish the duration the respondents have stayed in the area. The respondents were asked to indicate how long they had stayed in their current abode. The results were presented in the tables and figures below.

**Table 4.6: Duration of Stay in the Current Area**

Duration of Stay in the Current Area	Frequency
Below 1 year	69
Between 2-5 years	12
Between 6-9 years	4
OVER 10 years	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>87</b>

**Figure 4.7: Duration of Stay in the Current Area**



From the table and figure above, 69 respondents had lived in their current residence for less than a year, 12 residents had stayed there between 6-9 years, 4 had stayed at the current residence between 6-9 years and 2 respondents had stayed there for over 10 years. The interpretation is that most respondents had stayed for less than a year in their current residence due to the conflict which had forced people out of their bonafide home.

The mobility of people from their homes interrupts people's participation in economic

development as they failed to carry on income generating activities.


#### 4.2.8 Location of Residence

This part sought to establish the respondent's location of abode. The respondents were asked to indicate the location they reside. The results were presented in the table and figure below.

**Table 4.7: Location of Residence**

Location	Frequency
Chepyuk	42
Cheptais	35
Other location	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>87</b>

**Figure 4.8: Location of Residence**



From the table and figure 42 respondents hailed from Chepyuk Location, 35 came from Cheptais Location while 10 respondents came from other 14 locations of Mt Elgon. The interpretation is that the conflict affected mainly two locations. This is due to their proximity to the Chepyuk settlement scheme that was the bone of contention.


#### 4.2.9 If Respondents lost their Property during the Conflict

This part sought to establish if the respondents lost any property during the conflict. The respondents were asked to indicate their opinion. The results were presented in the table and figure below.

**Table 4.8: If Respondents lost their Property during the Conflict**

Rating	Frequency
Yes	85
No	2
Total	87

**Figure 4.9: If Respondents lost their Property during the Conflict**



A total of 98% of the respondents indicated that they had lost their property while 2% gave a non-affirmative answer. As a matter of fact the 2 respondents who gave contrary opinion were new residents in the area who were not present during the conflict. This had a great impact on the economic development since gains made were reversed as respondents lost their property.

#### 4.2.10 Loss of Property by Neighbours


This part sought to establish if the respondents' neighbours equally lost their property. The respondents were asked to indicate their opinion. The results were presented in the following table and figure.



**Table 4.9: Loss of Property by Neighbours**

Rating	Frequency
Yes	77
No	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>87</b>

**Figure 4.10 Loss of Property by Neighbours**



Asked if their neighbours lost property equally, 89% of the respondents gave affirmative answer while a mere 11% answered in the non-affirmative. This information ascertains the fact that the conflict was widespread extending to neighbouring areas. This implies the intensity and severity of the conflict which affected economic organization of the region.

#### **4.2.11 Conflict's effect on Food Supply**


This part sought to establish if the food supply reduced as a result of the conflict. The respondents were asked to indicate their opinion. The results were presented in the table and figure below.

**Table 4.10: Conflict effect's on Food Supply**

Rating	Frequency
Yes	70
No	17
<b>Total</b>	<b>87</b>

70 respondents indicated that food supply reduced as a result of conflict while 17 respondents had a contrary opinion. Food is an integral part of the economy of any nation and hence it can affect the performance of the same. Food supply of a nation has a bearing on the Kenyan economy.

**Figure 4.11: Conflict effect's on Food Supply**



From the figure above 80% of the respondents answered in the affirmative that the conflict affected food supply while 20% of the respondents gave a non-affirmative answer. It should be noted that the 20% of the respondents who gave an unaffirmative answer were not present in the area affected by conflict and hence their non-affirmative response is without comparison since they were not able to note the difference between then and now.

#### 4.2.12 Effect of Conflict on Essential Services and Social Amenities


This part sought to establish if the conflict had an impact on essential services and social amenities in the area. The respondents were asked to indicate their opinion. The results were presented in the chart below.

**Table 4.11: Effect of Conflict on Essential Services and Social Amenities**

Rating	Frequency
Yes	60
No	27
Total	87

From the table above 60 respondents indicated that the essential services and social amenities were affected by the conflict while 27 respondents had a contrary view. The study therefore established that the conflict affected the essential services like shopping centers and social amenities.

**Figure 4.12: Effect of Conflict on Essential Services and Social Amenities**



From the figure above 62 of the respondents indicated that conflict affected the essential of services and social amenities while 38 of them had contrary opinion. Therefore the study established that the conflict affected essential services and essential amenities.

#### 4.2.13 Deterioration of Infrastructure as a result of Conflict


This part sought to establish if the infrastructure deteriorated as a result of the conflict. The respondents were asked to opine on this matter. The results were presented in the chart below.

**Table 4.12: Deterioration of Infrastructure as a result of Conflict**

Rating	Frequency
Yes	50
No	37
<b>Total</b>	<b>87</b>

From the table, 50 respondents indicated that conflict resulted in deterioration of infrastructure while 37 had a contrary view. The study therefore established that conflict resulted in deterioration of infrastructure. Fifty respondents answered in the affirmative that the infrastructure deteriorated as a result of the conflict while 37 respondents answered in the non-affirmative. Infrastructure especially roads is the backbone of any economy in any country since had infrastructure makes business expensive. It is therefore true to conclude that the investors might have pulled out of the area due to poor roads and insecurity which affects the overall GDP of Kenya.

**Figure 4.13: Deterioration of Infrastructure as a result of Conflict**



#### **4.2.14 Migration of the Workforce due to the Conflict**

This part sought to establish the state of roads in the county. The respondents were asked to indicate their satisfaction rate. The results were presented in the chart below.

**Table 4.13: State of Roads**


Rating	Frequency
Yes	50
No	37
<b>Total</b>	<b>87</b>

From the table, 50 of the respondents indicated that conflict resulted in the migration of the workforce while 37 had a contrary view. The study therefore established that migration of workforce resulted because of conflict.

It was quite revealing that the status of the roads in the county is wanting. As is seen in the table above, 3 respondents were satisfied with the status of the roads, only one was very satisfied, 24 were dissatisfied and 59 respondents were very dissatisfied with the status of the roads. The state of roads is pathetic in these areas which make it difficult and expensive for vehicles to pass to ferry animals to and from market centers. Lack of good roads is a great impediment to any form of trade since trade involves the movement of

goods from one point to the other. Infrastructural development is a pre-requisite to any meaningful development undertakings, and livestock is no exception. The poor state of roads prevents prospective investors.

**Figure 4.14: Migration of the Workforce due to the Conflict**



#### 4.2.15 Depreciation of the Value of Land


This part sought to establish if the value of land depreciated due to the conflict. The respondents were asked to indicate the opinion. The results were as presented in the chart below.

**Table 4.14: Depreciation of the Value of Land**

Rating	Frequency
Yes	54
No	33
Total	87

According to above table 54 respondents indicated that conflict resulted in depreciation of the value of the land while 33 had contrary opinion. Therefore from the above table the study showed that conflict resulted in depreciation of the value of land.

**Figure 4.15: Depreciation of the Value of Land**



#### **4.2.16 Possibility of Potential Investors investing in the area**

This part sought to establish if prospective investors would invest in the area characterized with conflict. The respondents were asked to give their opinion. The results were as presented in the chart below.

**Table 4.15: Possibility of Potential Investors investing in the area**


Rating	Frequency
Yes	12
No	75
Total	87

From the table above 12 respondents affirmed that there is possibility of potential investors investing in the area while 75 respondents had contrary opinion. Therefore the study showed that there was no possibility of potential investors investing in the area.

From the table above only 12 respondents answered in the affirmative that they received livestock marketing information while 75 respondents answered in the non-affirmative that they did not receive livestock marketing information. From the information above,

this lack of market information is an impediment to livestock marketing because the traders are likely to make losses since they are not informed of the most updated market prices. Marketing information is very vital to any business person and the lack of the same puts the person in a precarious position which consequently impacts negatively on the business.

**Figure 4.16: Possibility of Potential Investors investing in the area**



#### 4.2.17 Comparison of Conflict prone area with other Areas in Terms of Development

This part sought to compare the conflict prone area with areas that never experienced conflict in terms of development. The respondents were asked to indicate if the surrounding areas were more developed. The results were as presented in the chart below.


**Table 4.16: Comparison of Conflict prone area with other Areas in Terms of Development**

Rating	Frequency
Yes	50
No	37
<b>Total</b>	<b>87</b>



From the table, 50 of the respondents indicated that there was comparison in terms of development between conflict prone areas with others while 37 had contrary opinion. Therefore the study showed that there was comparison between conflict prone areas and those areas that did not experienced conflict.

**Figure 4.17: Comparison of Conflict prone area with other Areas in Terms of Development**



#### 4.2.18 Dependence on Food Aid from Government and other Donors


This part sought to establish if the respondents depend on the government and other donors for food aid. The respondents were asked to give their opinion. The results were as presented in the chart below.

**Table 4.17: Dependence on Food Aid from Government and other Donors**

Rating	Frequency
Yes	66
No	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>87</b>

The table above showed that 66 of the respondent indicated that people depends on food aid from Government and other donors while 21 of them had a contrary opinion. Therefore the study showed that most of the people depended on food aid from Government and donors for their survival.

**Figure 4.18: Dependence on Food Aid from Government and other Donors**



#### **4.2.19 Loss of Land during the Conflict**


This part sought to establish if the respondents, their relatives or neighbours lost land. The respondents were asked to give their opinion. The results were as presented in the chart.

**Table 4.18: Loss of Land during the Conflict**

Rating	Frequency
Yes	58
No	29
Total	87

The table above showed that 58 of the respondent indicated that conflict resulted into loss of land while 29 of the respondent had contrary opinion. The study therefore showed that loss of land resulted due to conflict.

**Figure 4.19: Loss of Land during the Conflict**



#### **4.2.20 Reduction in number of Vehicles for Transportation**


Transportation is a very crucial and instrumental aspect of economic development. For any nation to make progress in any sphere, transportation must be given great premium. That is why this question sought to establish if the number of motor vehicles decreased during and after the conflict. The respondents were asked to give their opinion. The results were as presented in the chart below.

**Table 4.19: Reduction in number of Vehicles for Transportation**

Rating	Frequency
Yes	54
No	33
<b>Total</b>	<b>87</b>

From the table above 54 of the correspondents indicated that conflict resulted in reduction of vehicles for transportation while 33 of the correspondent had contrary opinion. The study therefore showed that reduction of number of vehicles for transportation was due to conflict.

**Figure 4.20: Reduction in number of Vehicles for Transportation**



#### **4.2.21 Loss of Professionals and Experts**


Professionals and experts play an instrumental role in economic development of a nation as they are the brains behind designing and implementing of instruments of development.

That is why this question sought to establish if the professionals exist or left the conflict area during and after the conflict. The respondents were asked to give their opinion. The results were as presented in the chart below.

**Table 4.20: Loss of Professionals and Experts**

Rating	Frequency
Yes	54
No	33
<b>Total</b>	<b>87</b>

**Figure 4.21 Loss of Professionals and Experts**




#### **4.2.22 Loss of Able people During the Conflict**

Economic development of any nation is squarely hunched on the manpower. Apparently, it is young people who perform crucial duties especially in the agriculture sector. Mt Elgon being part of Rift Valley is the food basket of Kenya and hence the killing, maiming and general disabling of young people in this area derived the area of manpower to engage in economic activities. This question therefore sought to establish if any young people were killed or permanently disabled during and after the conflict. The respondents were asked to give their opinion. The results were as presented in the chart below.

**Table 4.21: Loss of Able people During the Conflict**

Rating	Frequency
Yes	74
No	13
Total	87

**Figure 4.22 Loss of Able people During the Conflict**



As indicated above 85% respondents answered in the affirmative that they had lost family members, relatives or friends in the conflict while 15% gave a non-affirmative answer. The economy of any state depends entirely on the youth and hence the elimination of youth through death or disability undermines economic growth and sustainability. Accordingly, the economic development of this area must have been affected.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Introduction

The chapter gives summary of conclusions and recommendations of the study.

#### 5.2 Conclusion of Findings

The researcher studied the effects of conflicts on economic development with Mt Elgon conflict being sampled as a case of study. The study established various findings that were discussed in the previous chapter.

The following were the major findings:

As earlier observed, the causes as well as the consequences of ethnic conflicts that took place in Kenya may not render themselves easily to categorization. This is perhaps because of the fact that the practice of ethnicity is subterranean most of the time. Nevertheless, it is common knowledge that such causes and consequences must fall under broad categories such as social, economic, political, religious, environmental as well as psychological realms of life.

One of the long term causes of the clashes in Kenya is attributed to the colonial legacy, which is essentially historical but with ramifications in the post independence era. It is a historical fact that the indirect rule administered by the British colonialists later turned out to be the 'divide and rule' strategy which polarized the various ethnic groups in Kenya. This in turn contributed to the subsequent incompatibility of these ethnic groups as actors on one nation-state called Kenya. It was unfortunate that the early political parties in Kenya that championed the nationalist struggle against colonial establishments were basically 'distinct ethnic unions'.

The study established that the scramble for the scarce national resources and facilities intensified and ethnicity became the main vehicle through which the dominance and preservation of power as well as resources could be achieved.

Land is yet another source of ethnic conflicts in Kenya, both in the long term and in the short term according to this study. For a long time in the history of this country, land has remained a thorny economic and political issue. The land issue has its origin in the colonial history of Kenya, where the colonialists dreamed of making this part of Africa a white man's country.

The study established that there were massive land alienation activities in the area with the indigenous populations being pushed into the 'infertile' native reserves that were not conducive for arable farming. The displaced populations lived as farm laborers, casual workers, tenants as well as squatters. Like their agricultural counterparts, the pastoralists were pushed to the less conducive reserves. During the period of nationalism and decolonization, land grievances were central to all ethnic groups that actively participated in the struggle for independence.

It was established that the largest beneficiaries of this land distribution programme was one community and their allies. The issue of unequal distribution of resources is yet another source of potential instability in Kenya. Apart from their easy access to land, the economic success of regions in the first ten years of Kenya's independence was enviable by other ethnic groups.

Other tribes suffered their punishments in the same or varying fashions, which we do not intend to unveil in this limited paper. The same trends of unequal distribution of land, infrastructure and other national resources have been witnessed in the Moi regime, where the Kalenjin ethnic group has been 'perceived' to have benefitted more than others. However, just like for the Kikuyu, not all Kalenjins have benefited. It is only a clique that surrounds the mantle of power (i.e. executive) who seems to have enjoyed in the Moi era. We assert that as long as there exist ethnic prejudice and animosity among the diverse Kenyan communities, the search for peace and nation-building will remain elusive.

The study established that leadership played a crucial role in fueling these clashes. Indeed, such of what has been written or pronounced in the fore mentioned literature implicates the leadership of the day (i.e. top government officials) top ranking members



of the ruling party and opposition parties, some church leaders and other high ranking members of society

Secondly, the misunderstanding of pluralism and majimboism is also a source of ethnic conflicts in Kenya. The re-introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya in the early 1990s had a number of far reaching consequences one of which was the eruption of ethnic clashes in Western, Rift Valley, Nyanza and Coast provinces. This was partially a fulfillment of President Moi's earlier prediction that a return of his country to a multi party system would result in an outbreak of tribal violence that would destroy the nation.

The total economic impact of the clashes in the affected areas is literally unquantified and not easy to quantify. There was gigantic waste of human and economic resources. The clashes had lasting consequences that will continue to alter Kenya's economic development for many years. One overall observation that emerges from the study of the clashes in Kenya is the fact that the economic consequences go far beyond the available statistics. Much of the destruction worked to the economic advantage of the perpetrators of the violence and their close aides. Generally, the clashes allowed some groups of people and individuals to capitalise on the insecurity to usurp land or purchase it at throw-away prices from the victims who had no otherwise.

According to this study, one of the long term economic consequences of the clashes was the fact that land ownership patterns have been permanently altered. There was a general decline in economic production as many of the potential farmers ran away due to insecurity created by the violence. In a state of insecurity, as was the case in the study areas, agricultural activities were disrupted. In most cases, maize, coffee, pyrethrum, tea, sugarcane and other crops were either destroyed or abandoned because of the widespread violence caused by the clashes. In some areas of Trans Nzoia, work on agricultural land stopped for a long time as farm workers stayed away for fear of being attacked by the 'clashing enemies'.

There were other subsequent economic problems related to the clashes such as food insecurity, labour disruption on farms, industry and the public sector institutions, destruction of property, land grabbing, commercial disruption, breakdown in transport

and communication, resource diversion, mis-allocation and unexpected expenditure, infrastructural disruption, inflation and fluctuation of prices and environmental destruction among others.

The social consequences of the clashes in Kenya were enormous and cannot be easily quantified, especially the psycho-social ones. Most of the victims of these clashes were left homeless, landless, destitute, injured, dead, abused, to mention but a few of the atrocities resulting from the menace. The immediate and real consequence of the clashes in Kenya was felt most at personal and family level. There was loss of security in the clash-prone areas as the civilians took the law into their own hands, targeting perceived enemies. As a result of insecurity, there was indiscriminate loss of human life. Many people sustained physical injuries and others were traumatized. The state of insecurity interfered with the day-to-day socio-economic and political undertakings within the clash areas. There was loss of life among the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luhya, Luo, Iteso, Kisii and others. However, there is increasing evidence to suggest that although the loss was felt on either side of the conflict, the non-Kalenjin ethnic groups suffered most..

The figures for those who lost their lives and those displaced could be more than the estimates quoted at the appendices of this document.

The clashes in Kenya exemplified the potential and real consequences of conflict on inter-ethnic marriage, family and social life. According to the field information collected in different parts of the clashes stricken areas, there were cases of breakdown of marriage and family life. Currently, inter-ethnic marriage between the Luhya (i.e. especially the Bukusu) and the Saboot, Iteso and Saboot, Kalenjin and Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Luo is viewed with fear and suspicion. This was one of the far-reaching social consequences of the clashes that have also created mistrust, prejudice and psychological trauma characterized by mental anguish and general apathy, among the various ethnic groups in Kenya. This emerging negative tendency contradicts the view that the conflicting ethnic communities have co-existed and inter-married for several decades.

Food shortage was one of the far reaching economic consequences of the clashes in the study areas. There was a drop in food production, food supply and raw materials for the

agro-based industries such as sugar, tea, coffee, cereal (maize), pyrethrum and other agricultural crops. As a result of food shortages, many clashes victims experienced famine and this necessitated the appeal for local and international food aid and relief.

The clashes also led to the drop in milk production, particularly in the Rift Valley, which is one of the largest milk producing zones in Kenya. This study revealed that many of the victims doubted the seriousness of the Government's participation in food relief and whenever it was distributed, there were instances of discrimination and corruption involving public administrators in charge.

The study established that land grabbing became a norm, creating an explosive situation that continues to sour relations between various ethnic groups. However, during and after the clashes, land grabbing in the clashes-torn areas has become rampant at the expense of the clash victims. Now that most of the urban and rural lands have been taken, pressure is mounting on the remaining land.

After the clashes, there has increasingly been an obsession with land in this area which needs to be re-examined. Land is a thorny issue in the former clash-torn areas and unless serious attention is taken, there is every likelihood of renewed clashes. As a result of the clashes, the study areas experienced an abrupt drop in effective demand for manufactured goods due to lack of cash income from the agricultural sector and employed labour in the agro-based industries such as tea, coffee and maize. Subsequently, some of the clashes-prone areas experienced massive unemployment, with all the attendant social and economic consequences as the farming, industrial and distributive trade sectors were forced to lay off workers.

The drop in the supply of food and raw materials for the agro-based industries necessitated costly imports of such items as sugar, maize and wheat. This in turn led to hiking and fluctuation of prices of essential commodities in the clashes-prone areas.

The study established that transport operators in most of the study areas before the clashes were mainly the Kikuyu and the Kisii. However, during the period of the clashes, the vehicle owners, fearing attack on their vehicles and passengers stopped their operations in the affected areas. The transport problems have been eased, although the

vehicle owners still have some fear and suspicion about losing them in the event of renewed clashes. With most of the businesses closed and their vehicle and goods at risk of being destroyed or stolen, manufacturers stopped regular supplies of commodities to the affected areas. This in turn caused considerable hardships to the "final consumers" of essential goods.

As a result of the clashes in Kenya, thousands of families lost a lot of personal and household possessions as their houses, granaries, farms, shops and other business premises went down in flames. The consequence of massive destruction of forests as was witnessed during the clashes in the mentioned areas would therefore affect the pattern and intensity of rainfall and subsequently affect the viability of rain-fed agriculture and water supply in these zones. For instance, Mt. Elgon is the major source of perennial rivers such as Kuywa and Kibisi, which flows into Nzoia River that draws into Lake Victoria. Any effect, therefore, on the Mt. Elgon water catchment area will have negative consequences on Lake Victoria and its surrounding.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

The findings of the study evolved the following recommendations.

It is imperative that the government establishes lasting solution to conflicts in the region and Kenya as a whole since the conflicts keep on coming up and again. It is necessary for the government to involve all stakeholders in this area if a lasting solution is ever to be achieved.

Top on the list of possible remedies will be dealing with unequal distribution of land in the area. The land issue is a very emotive topic that has to be carefully addressed with the local peoples' views in consideration.

It is imperative for the government to device strategies to sensitize the various communities to co-exist harmoniously by respecting each other's property and systems and ways of life. The government needs to increase security and the same be very vigilant on the formation of illegal groups that may pose risks to peace in the area. There is need to empower the youth so that they are not idle to be taken advantages by illegal gangs and

politicians who might want to exploit them for their own personal gain. Considerable support should be quickly deployed in order to improve the farming activities of the local people.

The government and other stakeholders need to involve the pastoral traders in decision making. The important element is to ensure that pastoralists are represented in the dialogues and informed about what is taking place. Some of the policy issue areas where pastoralists need to have a voice are: a) the relative focus and emphasis on domestic versus export markets for livestock and livestock products; b) the development of disease-free livestock zones; c) restrictions on international and cross-border trade in livestock and livestock products; d) activities to encourage regional collaboration in the management of livestock and national resources; e) investment levels for rural infrastructure such as roads, livestock holding grounds, water points, markets, etc.; f) provincial and district regulations on livestock market operations and management; g) tax policies and taxes levied on livestock and livestock trade; h) levels of funding for specific livestock development support programs; i) provision of technical and social services to pastoral areas and coordination among ministries in the provision of such services; j) programs to encourage livestock production; k) incentives to increase value-added processing in pastoral areas; and l) efforts to further develop terminal and intermediate markets.

Pastoralist or producer organizations can help put together more saleable, i.e. larger, quantities that will attract more buyers or which can satisfy larger orders. There is need to address the challenge of middlemen who apparently exploit the pastoralists. A more efficient system would limit the number of middlemen.

#### **5.4 Suggestions for Further Research**

The researcher dwelled on effects of conflicts on the economic development of Kenya. However, there are other pointing issues challenging the peaceful existence of communities in the area and would suggest a further research on specific issues. Specifically there is need for comprehensive study on the emotive issue of unequal land distribution.

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## APPENDIX 1: TRANSMITTAL LETTER

LETTER TO RESPONDENTS

P.O Box 30533 00100

NAIROBI

RE: DATA COLLECTION FOR RESEARCH

Dear Respondent,

I am an MA student at the University of Nairobi. I am undertaking a research project on the impact of conflict on economic development in Mount Elgon in Western Kenya (A Case of Mt. Elgon region). This is in fulfillment of the requirements for the Masters of Arts degree in Communication studies.

Kindly fill in the attached questionnaire as honestly as possible. The information you give is needed purely for academic research and will be treated with strict confidence.

Your assistance and cooperation is highly appreciated. Thank you.

Yours sincerely,

Mary Nyamhasi

## APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNAIRE

This questionnaire seeks to collect information on the effects of conflict on economic development. Please provide information requested frankly and honestly. The information provided will strictly and exclusively used for academic purposes. Information generated will be treated with adequate confidentiality.

Please tick in only one box per statement against each statement in the relevant box or insert the correct answer in the space provided.

### SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

1. Gender  
Male:  Female:
2. What is your age bracket?  
18-25  26-35  36-45  46 and above
3. Indicate your marital status  
Married  Single  Separated  Divorced
4. What is your level of education?  
Std 8 & below  KCSE  Bachelor Degree  Post graduate
5. What is your monthly level of income? .....
6. How long have you lived in this area?  
Below 1 yr  Between 2-5 yrs  Between 6-9 yrs  Over 10 yrs .
7. What is the name of your location? \_\_\_\_\_

### SECTION B: MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE

- 1) Did you lose any property during the war in Mt Elgon?  
Yes  No
- 2) If Yes, above name the property you lost .....
- 3) Did your neighbours equally lose property?  
Yes  No
- 4) Since the war has the food supply in the area been affected?  
Yes  No
- 5) Do your area still having essential services like shopping centers and other social amenities.  
Yes  No
6. Has the state of infrastructure deteriorated after the war?  
Yes  No
7. Are most of the workers in the offices and other companies around from outside the area or from within?  
Yes  No
8. Are there workers who transferred to other areas from your area as a result of war?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

9. Has the price of land decreased due to people fearing to settle in your area?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

10. If you had a business, will you put it in you area?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

11. If you compare your area with the neighbouring areas which did not experience was, do you notice any difference in terms of development?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

12. Do you depend on food aid from the government and other donors?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

13. Did you or your relative, friend or neighbor lose land during the war?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

14. Has the number of vehicles you used to use for commuting and transporting goods reduced during or after the war?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

15. Do most of the employees in the government offices and private companies come from the local people or from outside the area?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

16. Did you lose many young men during the war?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

17. Do you have professional people in your area?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

18. What are the effects of the war that were worst felt by your community?

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-----  
-----  
-----

19. Which suggestions can you give to avert future wars? -----

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-----  
-----  
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### APPENDIX III: BUDGET

	ITEM	No of Units	Cost per Unit	TOTAL COST (KShs.)
1	Stationery	-	-	3500
2	Photocopying	600PP	2	1200
3	Typing	8PP	30	2400
4	Traveling Subsistence	2 days	1000	3000
5	Consultancy	-	-	-
6	Orientation of Research Assistants	2pple x 2 day	1500	6000
7	Miscellaneous			4500
8	<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>12, 600</b>

Source: Author, 2011

**APPENDIX IV: TABLE 1 FIGURES FOR DEATHS, INJURED, ARRESTED,  
CHARGED, FINALISED, DISPLACED**

Districts	Deaths	Injured	Arrested	Charged	Finalised	Displaced
TRANS NZOIA	200	39	296	178	171	12,000
BUNGOMA	113	70	244	17	1	14,000
KAKAMEGA	19	23	36	20	20	•
UASIN GISHU	159	138	53	50	6	4,000
NANDI	25	•	79	24	•	7,000
KERICHO/ BOMET	50	262	100	21	6	10,000
KISUMU	17	•	92	92	33	•
2KISII	25	•	6	6	4	•
NYAMIRA	8	•	5	5	•	•
NAROK	48	22	20	18	2	2,000
NAKURU	114	100	290	•	•	13,000
<b>TOTAL.</b>	<b>779</b>	<b>654</b>	<b>1,236</b>	<b>248</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>54,000</b>

*Report of the Parliamentary (Kiliku Report) Select Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and other parts of Kenya, September 1992, P.85.*

**Figures Unavailable Source:**

Table 2 The Breakdown of the Figures by District *is as follows:-*

DISTRICT	Number of Displaced
BUNGOMA	21,100
BUSIA	1,800
ELGON	14,375
KAKAMEGA	•
VIIHGA	•
KISUMU	8,975
NYAMIRA	750
KISII	2,300
KURIA	•
TURKANA	16,625
TRANS NZOIA	18,525
ELGEYO MARAKWET	22,300
UASIN GISHU	82,000
NANDI	17,850
KERICHO	6,550
BOMET	•
NAROK	900
NAKURU	40,700
LAIKIPIA	600

*Source: Draft Report: "The Internal Displaced Population in Western, Nyanza and Rift Valley Provinces: A Needs Assessment and Rehabilitation Programme" prepared by John R. Rogge, April 28, 1993 as reported in the Government of Kenya/UNDP Programme Document: Programme for Displaced Persons, Inter-agency Joint Programming, October 26, 1993 P.8.*

Table 3: Houses Destroyed

DISTRICT	VALUE SPECIFIED IN KSHS.	VALUE UNSPECIFIED
BUNGOMA	1,022,000.00	6410 Houses
TRANS NZOIA	*	*
UASIN GISHU	234,107.00	680 Houses
KAKAMEGA	*	120 Houses
NANDI	14,539,130.00	767 Houses
KERICHO/BOMET	13,114,352.00	213 Houses
KISII	8,000.00	145 Houses
KISUMU	3,391,417.00	541 Houses
NAKURU	5,165,900.00	524 Houses
NAROK	6,155,497.00	*
MOMBASA	*	*
KILIFI	*	*
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>43,710,503.50</b>	<b>9,400 Houses</b>
KISUMU	3,391,417.00	541 Houses
NAKURU	5,165,900.00	524 Houses
NAROK	6,155,497.00	*
MOMBASA	*	*
KILIFI	*	*
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>43,710,503.50</b>	<b>9,400 Houses</b>

*Compiled from the Kiliku Report 1992, PP 85 - 90*

\* Figures Unavailable

Table 4: Livestock

DISTRICT	VALUE SPECIFIED IN KSHS.	VALUE UNSPECIFIED
BUNGOMA	13,000.00	360 Cattle & 2 Sheep
TRANS NZOIA	•	•
UASIN GISHU	191,604.00	499 Cattle
KAKAMEGA	•	239 Cattle
NANDI	1,823,360.00	134 Cattle
KERICHO/BOMET	1,989,350.00	299 Cattle, 156 Sheep, 267 Goats
KISII	792,540.00	202 Cattle
KISUMU	782,900.00	50 Goats, 60 Sheep
NAKURU	31,176,600.00	740 Cattle, 145 Sheep, 54 Goats
NAROK	7,406,768.00	130 Cattle
MOMBASA	•	•
KILIFI	•	•
TOTAL	44,175,122.00	3337+

*Compiled from the data recorded in the Kiliku Report 1992, PP.85-90*



Table 5: Farm Produce Destroyed

<b>DISTRICT</b>	<b>Value Specified in Kshs.</b>	<b>Value Unspecified</b>
BUNGOMA	7,500.00	1000 bags of maize
TRANS NZOIA	•	•
UASIN GISHU	144,780.00	700 Bags of Maize
KAKAMEGA	•	•
NANDI	2,862,540.00	500 banana plants uprooted, 3 acres of horticultural crops uprooted
KERICHO/BOM ET	1,554,600.00	194 bags of maize, 128 bags of beans
KISII	117,500.00	•
KISUMU	227,466.00	203 bags of maize, 83 bags of beans, 280 acres of maize, 60 acre of sugar, etc.
NAKURU	•	90 bags of maize
NAROK	106,590.00	•
MOMBASA	•	•
KILIFI	•	•
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5,038,976+</b>	<b>3235 bags of maize &amp; beans</b>

*Compiled from the data recorded in the Kiliku Report 1992, PP 85-90.*

Table 6: Electronic Destroyed

DISTRICT	Value Specified in Kshs.	Value Unspecified
BUNGOMA	14,645 + 14,600	* + *
TRANS NZOIA	* + *	* + *
UASIN GISHU	69,120 + 13,770	* + *
KAKAMEGA	* + *	* + *
NANDI	509,500 + *	* + *
KERICHO/BOMET	* + 68,400	* + 22 Television and 44 Radio Cassettes
KISII	3,600 + *	* + *
KISUMU	* + *	* + *
NAKURU	3,030,700 + *	* + *
NAROK	* + 11,640	* + *
MOMBASA	* + *	* + *
KILIFI	* + *	* + *
TOTAL	3,722,205.00	66 Television and Radio Cassettes

*Compiled from the data recorded in the Kiliku Report 1991, PP.85-90.*

Table 7: Farms Destroyed

DISTRICT	Value Specified in Kshs.	Value Unspecified
BUNGOMA	*	78 farms abandoned 200 coffee trees uprooted.
TRANS NZOIA	*	*
KAKAMEGA	*	*
NANDI	12,775,500.00	*
KERICHO/BOMET	1,000,000.00	*
KISUMU	7.8 Million	*
KISII	12,954,072.00	*
NAROK	60,590.00	*
NAKURU	2,507,000.00	*
UASIN GISHU	20,200.00	*
MOMBASA	*	*
KILIFI	*	*
TOTAL	37,117,362.00	78 farms + 200 Coffee Trees

*Compiled from the data recorded in the Kiliku Report 1992 PP.85 - 90*