

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**  
**INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**The Role of Low Education Levels in African Ethnic Conflicts: A Case Study of Kenya,  
1992-2008**

**BY**

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**A Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
Master of Arts in International Conflict Management**

**Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi**

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## DECLARATION

I declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for any award in any other university.

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
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## **DEDICATION**

This research project is dedicated to my beloved parents, Joseph and Maria Nyamosi for the gift of life and education without forgetting all my siblings for the support they have accorded me throughout my life. Finally, it goes out to my dearly beloved and supportive wife, Peninah and my lovely children Linda, Henry and Immanuel who gave me the motivation to carry on with my studies. May God be with you throughout your life.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

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## ABSTRACT

Ethnic conflicts have been a major problem in Africa. Ethnic groups in Africa have been fighting over various issues ending up leaving a trail of destruction behind. In all these conflicts, elites have played a central role in igniting and sustaining them. They are the ones who mobilize ethnic masses into conflicts which end up benefiting the same elites. This is pegged on the instrumentalism theory of ethnic conflicts. What has been leaving all interested parties wondering is why these ethnic masses are vulnerable to these manipulations. This is why this study intends to investigate whether these masses are easily manipulated because of their low levels of education. Africa is a continent known for high levels of illiteracy. Could this be the reason why ethnic conflicts are rife?

In pursuing this objective, Kenya, as a case study, was investigated. Secondary data as well as primary data was analyzed. Primary data was collected from those areas considered to be among the hot spots of ethnic conflicts in Kenya. Secondary data was collected from scholarly materials, various official reports as well as from newspapers and magazines. From this study, it came out that low levels of education have nothing to do with ethnic conflicts. Those who engage in these conflicts are a mixture of both the educated and uneducated, lowly educated and highly educated as well as school drop outs. In fact, some elites are less educated compared to the people they incite. What enables the elites to manipulate the masses is the wealth they own as compared to the economically poor masses. The masses themselves are also greedy, just like the elites and this meeting of greed makes the ignition and sustenance of ethnic conflicts easy. Therefore, low levels of education have no role to play and the ethnic masses manipulated are not entirely innocent.

## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

<b>ANC:</b>	<b>Africa National Congress</b>
<b>CIPEV:</b>	<b>Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence</b>
<b>FORD:</b>	<b>Forum for Restoration of Democracy</b>
<b>ICDC:</b>	<b>Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation</b>
<b>IDPs:</b>	<b>Internally Displaced Persons</b>
<b>KANU:</b>	<b>Kenya African National Union</b>
<b>MP:</b>	<b>Member of Parliament</b>
<b>ODM:</b>	<b>Orange Democratic Movement</b>
<b>PNU:</b>	<b>Party of National Unity</b>
<b>SPLA:</b>	<b>Sudan People's Liberation Army</b>
<b>UN:</b>	<b>United Nations</b>
<b>U.S:</b>	<b>United States of America</b>

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## CHAPTER ONE

### 1.0 Background of the Study

Ethnic conflict seems to have supplanted nuclear war as the most pressing issue on the minds of policy makers. In fact; ethnic conflicts have formed the vast majority of wars since the epoch of decolonization began to sweep across the developing countries after 1945<sup>1</sup>. Indeed, violent ethnic conflict is the most significant threat to global peace. After the collapse of the USSR, a number of violent ethnic conflicts occurred, and the probability that this trend will continue, worries many academics, policy-makers and other concerned stakeholders<sup>2</sup>.

However, in as much as ethnic conflicts are a global phenomenon, Africa is arguably the hottest spot. There is this disturbing contrast: the rest of the world is rushing towards integration, while Africa, due to ethnic conflicts seems to be moving towards disintegration. This starkly puts Africa on the spot. The increase in violence and war has devastated people and their communities in Africa. Numerous conflicts in Africa in one way or another have shades of ethnicity. In the Sudan conflict, it was the Southern Sudan fighting the Northern Sudan. Though this was brought to a stop through a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which led to the independence of the Southern Sudan, tensions and suspicions are still high. In Darfur, the conflict is still ongoing. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Kenya

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<sup>1</sup>Sadowski, Y. 'Ethnic Conflict.' *Foreign Policy*, No. 111 (Summer 1998),pp.12-23

<sup>2</sup>Ter-Gabrielian G. 'Strategies in 'Ethnic' Conflict' Department of Political Science, Bowling Green State University,1999

among other countries, such ethnic conflicts have been experienced and may become an important feature of African countries after independence<sup>3</sup>.

### 1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

Ethnic conflicts have taken place and continue to take place in most African countries such as the Sudan, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda among others. In these countries, there are ethnic groups that can act as the basis for mobilizing people for or against a particular course. Ethnic groups in Africa have fought over various issues such as territories, resources and power.

Whereas among the many explanations by various scholars for the ethnic conflicts in Africa include economic factors like competition for scarce resources<sup>4</sup> and the demand for ethnic and cultural autonomy,<sup>5</sup> others however blame predatory elites<sup>6</sup> and weak, biased political systems<sup>7</sup>. While these explanations form an important part of explaining the causes of these conflicts, this research project will however focus on the role of low education levels in fueling these ethnic conflicts. The researcher will review this aspect because it is the masses who are usually mobilized along ethnic lines to attack fellow countrymen. The elites normally mobilize then step aside and watch the bloodletting. This is where the question of low education levels comes in: Could the low levels of education of the masses be playing a major role in enhancing these conflicts?

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<sup>3</sup>Oucho O.J. Undercurrents of Ethnic Conflict in Kenya Boston:Brill,2002

<sup>4</sup>Irobi E.G. (May, 2005) Ethnic Conflict Management in Africa: A Comparative Case Study of Nigeria and South Africa. A paper meant as a contribution to the ongoing search for new means of managing conflicts in Africa

<sup>5</sup>Rosecrance, Richard and Arthur Stein. 'Separatism's Final Country.' *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 4(July/August 2008):141-145.

<sup>6</sup>McDoom Omar 'Rwanda's Ordinary Killers: Interpreting Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide.' Working Paper, London School of Economics, December 2005

<sup>7</sup>A thesis presented to the faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree: Master of Military Art and Science by Daniel K.Mishio,Maj., Ghana

## **1.2 Objectives of the Research**

This research project will be guided by the following objectives

- To establish if low levels of education make people vulnerable to their elites' manipulation and machinations in instigating ethnic conflicts which serve selfish elite interests.
- To find out if low levels of education make people ignorant of the consequences wrought about by ethnic conflicts hence making them willing partners (of elites) in its instigation.
- To establish if the masses being manipulated have their own interests to serve or they are just disinterested people being manipulated

## **1.3 Research Questions**

- Do low levels of education make people vulnerable to their elites' manipulation and machinations in instigating ethnic conflicts which serve selfish elite interests?
- Do low levels of education make people ignorant of the consequences wrought about by ethnic conflicts hence making them willing partners (of elites) in its instigation?

- Do the people being manipulated have their own interests or they are just disinterested people being manipulated?

#### **1.4 Justification of the Research Problem**

This study will be very important to all those scholars, policy makers, agencies, governments in general and all those stakeholders interested in understanding the dynamics behind ethnic conflicts; and in this case, the causes.

This study will immensely contribute to the academic knowledge dealing with causes of ethnic conflicts, especially in Africa. The importance stems from the fact that this study will focus on low levels of education, an issue that seems to have been relegated to the backburner as scholars struggle to deal with the issue of resources and governance structures. As scholars focus on the perpetrators, especially the elites, of these conflicts, they forget to analyze the role that the 'victims' might be playing, albeit unintentionally. An understanding of the nexus between low levels of education and ethnic conflicts will go a long way in triggering more focused studies targeting this suspected cause of ethnic conflicts. This development, apart from contributing to the body of knowledge, will help in coming up with structured approaches in helping to prevent ethnic conflicts, basing such structures on attacking ignorance borne out of low levels of education.

The foregoing thus means that this study will greatly help in the formulation of approaches that will directly help in the mitigation of ethnic conflicts, especially in Africa where lack of highly educated populations is endemic. It will also contribute to the advancement of scholarship.

## **1.5 Literature Review**

In this section, the researcher will review literature that deals with ethnic conflicts, especially in Africa. To be specific, the review will focus on written academic materials touching on causes of ethnic conflicts, with more emphasis being placed on Africa. These are the materials which will give insight into the issues which lead into the eruption of ethnic conflicts, especially in Africa. Existing gaps will then be identified. More emphasis is placed on Africa as this is the focal point of this research. This part is divided into two. The first part will focus on the role of elites in causing ethnic conflicts while the second party will look at other causes of ethnic conflicts. This division is to ensure that the first part gets its own prominence as this research is more interested in the role that elites play while probing why people are easily convinced and manipulated by such predatory elites.

### **1.5.1 The Role of Elites in Ethnic Conflicts**

Predatory elites are a source of ethnic conflicts in Africa. Elites are known to manipulate ethnic markers for their own survival or gain. While in pre-colonial Africa the colonialists could be pointed at as the main beneficiaries of ethnic conflicts, in post-colonial Africa, elites and those in power are the beneficiaries. For example, in Liberia, the members of the ruling group and other elites benefitted from the antagonistic relations of African-Liberians and Americo-Liberians. In Benin, the Batombous had access to positions of power which other groups were barred from. Hence, underneath conflicts that are apparently ethnic, are personal (and class) ambitions which are desperate, opportunistic and violence-prone<sup>8</sup>. In the Rwanda and Yugoslavia ethnic conflicts, the bloodshed experienced as a result of ethnic conflicts was not the result of

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<sup>8</sup>Okwudiba N. ed. Ethnic Conflicts in Africa Nottingham:CODESRIA,1998

ethnic hatred that inflamed entire groups to attack one another. Rather it was the work primarily of 'small, ill-disciplined, and essentially cowardly bands of thugs and bullies.' These bands, recruited by political leaders and operating under their general guidance, unleashed this terror<sup>9</sup>. These illustrations point at the crucial role played by elites in instigating ethnic conflicts.

These elites normally engage in inflammatory discourse, including the use of history and myth<sup>10</sup>. They use approaches which can be attributed to what is referred as symbolic politics theory. In this aspect, predatory elites advance hostile ethnic myths and engage in emotionally driven symbolic politics based on those myths that popularize predatory policies. In this case, leaders engage in playing around with ethnic symbols which fuel hatred and eventually lead to ethnic violence. This is usually done for the benefit of the involved elites. Though this might lead to the downfall of the concerned elites, as it happened to the masterminds of the Rwandan genocide, the damage is usually already done; as the hatred and destruction will have taken place.

Going back to the Yugoslavian ethnic conflict, political elites took advantage of the symbolic power that ethnicity offers, and used it as a tool for pursuing territorial, political and economic objectives. Thus, ethnicity became the basis of political mobilization in pursuit of resurgent claims to territory and power. Ethnicity, finally became 'politicized' for the exacerbation of nationalism, the manipulation of which was in turn the underlying force of the conflict<sup>11</sup>. Such predatory national leaders and ethno-politicians can be a threat to the very survival of a state as they will

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<sup>9</sup> Mueller J. 'The Banality of 'Ethnic Conflict'' *International Security* Volume 25, Issue 1, pages.42-70

<sup>10</sup> Debraj R. and Esteban J. 'On the Saliency of Ethnic Conflict' *American Economic Review* 2008, 98:5, 2185-2202

<sup>11</sup> Sotiropoulou A. 'The Role of Ethnicity in Ethnic Conflicts: The Case of Yugoslavia'. MA in Contemporary European Studies, Euromaster, University of Bath

always be out to launch nationalistic claims on behalf of ethnic groups<sup>12</sup>. They are, therefore, a threat that must be checked if not eliminated. The other cause of ethnic conflicts that is closely related to this and can be applied to the Rwandan genocide is the aspect of internalization of a set of historical and ideological beliefs. This, combined with mass mobilization and the commitment of state institutions in some cases, can result in serious ethnic clashes.<sup>13</sup> In this cause, you get that people, of a particular ethnic group, have certain beliefs and ideologies etched in them about other ethnic communities, especially their rivals. Such beliefs, which are usually incorrect or exaggerated and of course negative, only need some sort of mobilization among the people and an ethnic conflict breaks out. The mobilization is of course normally done by the elites. In relation to state institutions, this is not the case in all such conflicts, but it becomes the case when those who are mobilizing their tribesmen happen to be in power; they will utilize state resources and institutions which will give such conflicts a sort of legitimacy and hence impunity rules the day. In the Rwandan genocide, there were beliefs in a historical Hutu oppression in the hands of the Tutsis and in an ideological definition of the genocide as an ethnic conflict in which the Tutsis were trying to reinstate this historical order.<sup>14</sup> We can thus see the role of predatory elites who manipulate their ethnic groups' histories and even identity narratives to cause ethnic conflicts that serve to advance the elites' interests.

In the Nigerian ethnic conflicts, those originating from oil rich areas such as the Niger Delta, a finger is pointed at predatory elites as having a hand in them<sup>15</sup>. In this Niger Delta, it is suggested

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<sup>12</sup> Roeder G.P. 'The Robustness of Institutions in Ethnically Plural Societies' Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego.

<sup>13</sup> McDoom Omar. 'Rwanda's Ordinary Killers: Interpreting Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide.' Working Paper, London School of Economics, December 2005.

<sup>14</sup> McDoom Omar. 'Rwanda's Ordinary Killers: Interpreting Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide.' Working Paper, London School of Economics, December 2005.

<sup>15</sup> 'Is Petroleum 'Oiling' or Obstructing Democratic Struggles in Nigeria? A paper presented by Cyril. I. Obi of the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, at the CODESRIA 12th General Assembly



that some of the communal conflicts which take place are proxy wars engineered and executed by elites to divide and rule the people of this area. The conflicts in this area, therefore, get an instrumentalist interpretation which emphasizes the role of elites in ethnic mobilization and conflicts<sup>16</sup>. In other cases; the elites will always seek to exploit the destabilizing effects of natural resource scarcity and social grievances to instigate ethnic conflicts when their political base seems threatened. This was evident in Kenya where widespread ethnic violence erupted between 1991 and 1993 pitting ethnic groups which were associated with the ruling class of the time against those associated with opposition politicians<sup>17</sup>. We therefore see that this elites' mobilization is a cause for concern because internal conflicts, particularly those with ethnic dimensions, have been responsible for some of the gravest violence in the world. Attempts to explain these conflicts as being results of a 'security dilemma' have been criticized for failing to adequately recognize the role played by politicians who intentionally incite ethnic animosities. This is why the role played by political elites' manipulation has continued to receive increasing attention<sup>18</sup>.

### 1.5.2 Other Causes of Ethnic Conflicts

Economic factors have been identified as one of the major causes of conflict in Africa. Competition for scarce resources is a common factor in almost all ethnic conflicts in Africa.<sup>19</sup> Resources in this case refer to material things such as natural resources and commons

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<sup>16</sup> 'On the Study of Ethnicity in Nigeria' A CRISE Working Paper No.12 by Ukoha Ukiwo: CRISE Scholar, Nigeria, University of Oxford, Department of International Development, Queen Elizabeth House, June 2005

<sup>17</sup> Kahl H.C. 'Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: The Case of Kenya, 1991-1993' *International Security*, Volume 23, Issue 2, pages 80-119

<sup>18</sup> Smith G.J. 'Fighting Fear: Exploring the Dynamic Between Security Concerns and Ethnic Manipulation in Internal Conflicts' *Peace Conflict and Development* Issue 8, February 2006

<sup>19</sup> Irobi E.G. (May, 2005) Ethnic Conflict Management in Africa: A Comparative Case Study of Nigeria and South Africa. A paper meant as a contribution to the ongoing search for new means of managing conflicts in Africa.

such as grazing land and watering points for pastoral communities and arable land for farmers. Resources also refer to those things that open up other opportunities; in other words, they are the avenues to the real resources or they keep people at a vantage position. Such things are like education, language, good health care and social amenities. There is normally competition to dominate and control these resources; and in order to do this effectively, groups mobilize themselves along ethnic lines as this is sure to provide effective glue within the various groups. Regardless of the level of demands, friction normally occurs between neighboring ethnic communities struggling to dominate each other and control resources. A conflict might arise either because one or more groups feel shortchanged or simply when a group has the desire to have an upper hand and keep calling the shots, to their advantage. Furthermore, in relation to resources, increases in an ethnic group's resources, augment the potential and the feasibility of ethnic collective action, which includes engaging in conflict. Hence, if groups are competing, they are more likely to mobilize in a way that reinforces ethnic divisions if ethnicity has clear economic, political or demographic advantages<sup>20</sup>. Uneven development and modernization can also lead to ethnic conflicts especially between groups living in concentrated fashion<sup>21</sup>. This will be bred by competition as modernization makes people want the same, not different, things, and this sets up a great scramble for resources<sup>22</sup>.

In relation to competition for resources, another aspect that can contribute to ethnic conflicts is that of demographic trends. Demographic trends can influence the rise of ethnic territoriality and ultimately violent resolution. A look at the case of the Bosnia and Herzegovina ethnic conflict

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<sup>20</sup>Brown C. 'Ethnic Conflict and Political Violence: A Cross-National Analysis' *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 1997 Vol.25 No.1 (Summer):111-130

<sup>21</sup>Mirzayev S. 'The Conflicting Theories of Ethnic Conflicts: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh' A thesis submitted to the Central European University, Nationalism Studies Programme for the award of an MA degree, 2007.

<sup>22</sup>Horowitz D.L. 'Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict' Paper prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., April 20-21, 1998

shows that two of the three protagonists in the war, namely the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs, were sensitive to demographic trends, and therefore the level at which that rivalry played out, was the local municipality, the Opstina, where competition over jobs and political power was manifest, influenced by demographic status<sup>23</sup>. Therefore, struggles over economic resources are bound to ignite and sustain ethnic conflicts.

Weak and biased political systems have played a great role in fuelling ethnic conflicts in Africa. Countries with multiethnic populations need working political systems that will not only check the aggression of ethnic communities but will also guarantee the rights of all ethnic groups. The groups will have to be confident that the political system in place can resolve their grievances without them resorting to confrontation or violence. If such political system exists, then ethnic communities will live together in an atmosphere of tolerance, mutual recognition and peace.<sup>24</sup> If such a system is not in place, then chaos are bound to erupt. Ethnic conflict is therefore a sign of a weak state or a state embroiled in ancient loyalties. In this case, states act with bias to favour a particular ethnic group or region, and behaviours such as preferential treatment fuel ethnic conflicts.<sup>25</sup> From this view, we can then conclude that a strong state is that one which strives to provide equity in all spheres of life; and this can only be possible if the political system in place is sound. If certain groups feel that they are being marginalized, then discontent will brew and they will try to fight for what they feel is rightfully theirs; which might include trying to secede. Of course the ruling ethnic group(s) will not take such moves lightly, leading to an ethnic

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<sup>23</sup>Doyon R.R. and Slack.AJ. 'Population Dynamics and Susceptibility for Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Mar., 2001), pp. 139-161

<sup>24</sup> A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree: Master of Military Art and Science by Daniel K. Mishio, Maj., Ghana.

<sup>25</sup>Irobi E.G. (May, 2005) *Ethnic Conflict Management in Africa: A Comparative Case Study of Nigeria and South Africa*. A paper meant as a contribution to the ongoing search for new means of managing conflicts in Africa.

conflict. Hence, political and social equalities are of greater importance in mitigating ethnic violence<sup>26</sup>.

Colonialism, especially in Africa, established the foundation that has ensured ethnic conflicts continue recurring. While violent conflict was undoubtedly present, if not highly prevalent, in pre-colonial African societies, the idea of a group of culturally similar peoples attempting to establish a unique identity, or crush the identity of another, was almost completely foreign. The persistent declarations of their innate differences today cannot obscure the fact that Ibo, Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Sukuma, and Luba are just a few of the labels that were either non-existent, or only applicable to a loosely bound group of people, prior to European contact. The Europeans applied it as a means to segregate and control different groups of people they deemed as “racially” distinct.<sup>27</sup>

When the European powers imposed formal territorial boundaries throughout the continent in 1885, the seeds for ethnic conflict in post-colonial Africa were sown. Those boundaries were drawn with little or no consideration to the actual distribution of indigenous ethno-cultural groups. With the demise of colonial rule, the former colonies, with their colonial borders essentially intact, were transformed into some of the most ethnically fragmented states in the world<sup>28</sup>. This segregation orchestrated by the Europeans established the structures ‘needed’ to whip up ethnic tensions and conflicts. This is because there are identities that can be clung upon to necessitate ethnic emotions and thus ensure there is mobilization towards a certain

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<sup>26</sup> Besancon .L.M. ‘Relative Resources: Inequality in Ethnic Wars,Revolutions,and Genocides’ Program on Intrastate Conflict, John F. Kennedy School of Government, HarvardUniversity, January 2005

<sup>27</sup>Safty G. ‘Colonialism’s Deadly Legacy: Ethnic Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa’

<sup>28</sup>Athow B., Mason D.T., Blanton.R. ‘Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic Conflict in Africa’ *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Jul., 2001), pp. 473-491

confrontation. Colonial incursions therefore exploited and compounded inter-ethnic inimical relations. Colonial powers utilized the segmentation of ethnic groups to their advantage in countries such as Nigeria, Burundi, Rwanda, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mauritania, Kenya, Tanzania, Zaire and Zimbabwe <sup>29</sup>. These divisions left fertile grounds for ethnic conflicts. In relation to the modern world, ethnic conflicts are seen as an inherent structural contradiction of the modern world-system. In other words, ethnic conflicts are a form of resistance to any form of hegemonic establishment. This establishment can be at the national, regional or international level<sup>30</sup>.

Ancient group hatred can also lead to ethnic conflicts. In this case, an ethnic conflict is rooted in old sources of enmity and memories of past atrocities that make violence hard to avoid. Groups concerned about possible threats to their security from other groups will ask themselves how those other groups behaved in comparable circumstances on previous occasions. If the previous behavior was hostile, the current response deemed appropriate may also be hostile<sup>31</sup>. Moreover, the clash of cultures (or civilizations) theory suggests that irreconcilable differences due to cultural gaps cause fear and conflict that beget violence. Therefore, basing on the foregoing, Africa's diversity and complexity is therefore blamed for the escalation of violent conflicts as identities clash<sup>32</sup>. A look at the theory of the ethnic security dilemma shows that fear is a core factor in causing ethnic conflicts. This theory suggests that territorial intermingling and

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<sup>29</sup> Okwudiba N., ed. *Ethnic Conflicts in Africa* Nottingham: CODESRIA, 1998

<sup>30</sup> Dunaway A.W. 'Ethnic Conflicts in the Modern World System: The Dialectics of Counter-Hegemonic Resistance in an Age of Transition' *Journal of World Systems Research*, IX,1, Winter 2003, 3-34

<sup>31</sup> Horowitz D.L. 'Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict' Paper prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., April 20-21, 1998

<sup>32</sup> Kagwanja P. and Hagg G. 'Identity and Peace: Reconfiguring Conflict Resolution in Africa' *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* Volume 7, No.2 2007 pp.9-36

mutual vulnerability exacerbate assurance problems that may lead to preventive wars by ethnic minorities who want to secede to increase their security<sup>33</sup>.

Insecurity of ethnic groups during transition can also lead to ethnic conflicts. Such transitions are normally from one regime to another or from one system of governance to another. It has been opined that extremists build upon these fears to polarize the society. This produces a toxic brew of distrust and suspicion that leads to ethnic violence.<sup>34</sup> Religious reasons cannot be forgotten as major players in causing ethnic conflicts in Africa, especially in Nigeria. To start with, religion is still a contentious issue in relation to whether it is the real reason behind those ethnic conflicts billed as religious. Do actors with genuine religious beliefs, both leaders and foot soldiers, actually fight wars and commit atrocities in the name of religion and religious institutions? Or is religion a proxy for materialist variables such as land grabs or wealth creation?<sup>35</sup> Whether religion is a cover or not, it eventually leads to ethnic conflicts.

It is therefore clear that ethnic conflicts have varied causes. Nevertheless, one fact cuts across all of them: some members of the various ethnic groups must take part in the actual conflict while there must be those who oversee the carrying out of the conflict.

### 1.5.3 Synthesis of the Literature

From the literature reviewed, we can see that ethnic conflicts can occur due to various reasons. We have seen several cases of elites being directly engaged in fueling ethnic conflicts while other cases can be blamed on other issues such as colonialism or competition for resources.

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<sup>33</sup>Sambanis N. 'Do Ethnic and Non-ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?: A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1)' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Jun., 2001), pp. 259-282  
January 24, 2001

<sup>34</sup>Irobi E.G. (May, 2005) *Ethnic Conflict Management in Africa: A Comparative Case Study of Nigeria and South Africa*. A paper meant as a contribution to the ongoing search for new means of managing conflicts in Africa.

<sup>35</sup>Michael C. Horowitz. 'Long Time Going: Religion and the Duration of Crusading.' *International Security* 34 No.2(Fall 2009):162-193

Nevertheless, it is important to note that, for any ethnic conflict to take place, people must be involved, and for people to be involved, they must be organized and directed. This, therefore, means that every ethnic conflict has leaders who direct it and this leadership can easily be attributed to the elites of the concerned ethnic groups. While a lot of blame has been placed on the concerned elites, nothing has been said about the people who heed their elites' call to participate in these conflicts. While these elites are motivated by their selfish interests, which drive them into manipulating people to engage in deadly conflicts, what makes these people so vulnerable to their elites' machinations and manipulation? What makes them easy targets who cannot see through their elites' schemes and therefore end up being 'partners' in executing their elites' plans? This is the question that the literature reviewed has not answered and therefore begs to be answered.

## **1.6 Theoretical Framework**

This research will be based on the instrumentalist theory<sup>36</sup> of ethnic conflicts. This theory talks about community leaders who use their cultural groups as sites of mass mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources because they find them more effective than social classes. In this case, ethnicity is viewed as an instrumental identity organized as a means to a particular end. Ethnicity is, therefore, primarily an ad-hoc element of a political strategy, used as a resource for interest groups for achieving secondary goals such as, for instance, an increase in wealth, power or status. This theory emphasizes the role of the elite in that ethnic elite is the constructor and manipulator of the ethnic identity for their own benefits. It

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<sup>36</sup> Eriten N.D, Romine J. ' Instrumental and Symbolic Sources of Ethnic Conflict: Application to the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey' University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, April 2009

stresses the calculated role played by ethnic activists, the elites, on ethnic conflicts. These ethnic elites create or manipulate the ethnic and nationalist sentiments of the group and provoke group awareness to mobilize ethnic followers through mostly economic and political interests. Ethnicity is therefore seen as a creation of elites who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate material from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent in order to protect their well-being or existence or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups as well as for themselves. Basing on the foregoing, this theory simply means that the elites of a given community will mobilize their community members, around a certain identity that brings them together, and use them to achieve certain things such as power.

### **1.7. Hypotheses**

The following hypotheses will be tested by this study

- There is a relationship between low levels of education and elites' manipulation of people into engaging in ethnic conflicts
- Low levels of education are not linked to elites' manipulation of people into engaging in ethnic conflicts
- Low levels of education do not enable elites to easily manipulate people into engaging in ethnic conflicts.

### **1.8 Research Design and Methodology**

This study will apply the use of both primary and secondary sources of data. On primary sources, the researcher will use questionnaires to collect data. These questionnaires will have both closed and open ended questions. Purposive sampling is to be used in identifying the correspondents in this research. This type of sampling ensures that the researcher deals with



people who provide the required information. This type of sampling is used when subjects/correspondents are chosen because of some characteristic and this type is popular in qualitative research<sup>37</sup>. It also ensures a balance of group sizes when multiple groups are to be selected<sup>38</sup>. 96 correspondents are to be targeted, 16 from each selected area. A cross-section of the society will be touched on. Ethnic conflict victims, teachers, provincial administrators, clergymen, politicians, local opinion leaders, youth, women, business people, farmers and elders will be reached. The number of correspondents selected is due to financial and time constraints. On secondary data, the researcher will rely on scholarly journals, books, newspaper articles, commission reports produced by various commissions specially formed in Kenya by the government to look into issues related to ethnic conflicts that have occurred in Kenya and as well use a report produced by an International Human Rights Group.

The resultant data will then be analyzed using content analysis. Content analysis is a technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of responses and objectively identifying and using the same approach to relate trends. The results will be presented under identified themes. This technique has been selected on the basis that subjecting the collected data to content analysis allows a researcher to learn about underlying attitudes, biases or repeating themes<sup>39</sup>.

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<sup>37</sup> Patton, M. Q. 1990, *Qualitative evaluation and research methods* (2nd ed.). Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

<sup>38</sup> Black, T. R. 1999, *Doing Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences: An Integrated Approach to Research Design, Measurement, and Statistics*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications

<sup>39</sup> Clayton.P., Gorman.G.E.,1998, *Qualitative Research for the Information Professional :A Practical Handbook*.London: Library Association Publishing.

## **1.9 Scope and Limitations of the Research**

On the scope of this study, it will target correspondents in the Rift Valley and Nairobi provinces of Kenya. In the Rift-Valley province, Molo, Ngata, Matunda and Naivasha areas will be targeted. In Nairobi, Huruma and Mathare North areas will be targeted. These are areas which have witnessed ethnic conflicts in the period 1992 to 2008. Some have experienced throughout this period while others were only affected in the year 2007/2008.

On limitations, the researcher expects to face some constraints in this study. Hostility is expected from some correspondents who might harbour suspicions regarding the real intentions of the researcher as well as those being hostile by virtue of being traumatized by incidents related to ethnic conflicts. Resources, in terms of time and funds are also likely to limit the study. Inadequate time and funds might limit the extension of the research to other relevant parts of the country.

## **Chapter Outline**

Chapter One introduces the research study by contextualizing the research problem and provides justification for this study. The chapter also presents a literature review where the relevant literature by various scholars on the causes of ethnic conflicts in Africa is analyzed. The theoretical framework adopted by the study is also presented. The chapter then outlines the hypotheses made by the researcher which will be tested. The chapter ends by giving the data collection and data analysis methods that will be used by the study.

Chapter two will review literature on elites, ethnicity and ethnic conflicts. In this chapter, the researcher will attempt to link elites to the creation of ethnicity and the causing of ethnic conflicts. The scope in this chapter will be worldwide. Chapter three will contain the historical background of ethnic conflicts in Kenya. It will further examine the role played by political elites in igniting and fueling the conflicts. Critical analysis will be found in chapter four. In this analysis, the researcher will critically look into the themes identified in the study and relate them to other findings. Chapter five will carry the findings of the research, conclusions and recommendations as well as the bibliography and the appendix.

## CHAPTER TWO

### 2.0 ELITES, ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter will focus on establishing the link between elites, ethnicity and ethnic conflicts. It will examine how elites construct ethnicities and use them in acquiring and/or maintaining political power. It will further analyze how competition between elites, based on ethnicity, leads to ethnic conflicts. The chapter will consider various examples drawn mainly from Africa as this is the larger area of focus for this study.

#### 2.2 Ethnic Conflicts

Violent confrontation along ethnic lines is the most apparent form of ethnic conflict, and has claimed lives in such diverse places as the Balkans, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Indonesia, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland and several other countries<sup>40</sup>. This illustration indicates that ethnic conflict is a global phenomenon which became intense after the Second World War. In this period, massive shedding of blood through inter-ethnic conflicts was experienced and all these arose out of ethnic mobilization<sup>41</sup>. However, ethnic conflicts became fully augmented after the Cold War<sup>42</sup>. Out of this experience, it therefore meant that the most common cause of state-level violence in the last several decades has not been external wars but internal ethnic conflict.

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<sup>40</sup> Coleman II J.W and Caselli F. 'On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict' CEP Discussion Paper No. 732, July 2006

<sup>41</sup> Tambiah J.S. 'Ethnic Conflict in the World Today' *International Security* Vol.21, No.2, Autumn 1996

<sup>42</sup> Senggirbay M. 'Main Approaches to the Definition of Ethnic Conflicts' *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH* Vol. 3. No. 1. January, 2011, Part III

For these conflicts to take place, ethnic mobilization had to take place and this meant that groups had to organize themselves around some feature of ethnic identity in pursuit of ethnic ends<sup>43</sup>. Mobilization of groups around ethnic identities has to be performed by certain individuals or groups of individuals. It is this understanding that leads us to our next discussion, touching on predatory elites in which we will see the link between this group in society and ethnic mobilization which eventually leads to ethnic conflicts.

### 2.3 Predatory Elites

Predatory elites have been pointed at as a major cause of ethnic conflicts. Elite competition and the actions of “ethnic entrepreneurs” drive ethnic conflicts. Elites manipulate ethnic identities in their quest for power. It is they who “construct” ethnic conflict for purposes of political gain<sup>44</sup>. Belligerent leaders are known to stoke mass hostility and they are supported by hostile masses and both, acting together, threaten other groups, creating a security dilemma which in turn encourages even more mass hostility and leadership belligerence. Such belligerent elites normally engage in the process of ‘outbidding’ in which they compete with each other in promoting increasingly extreme nationalist positions<sup>45</sup>. Ethnic conflicts are thus a result of mobilization of ethnic groups by ethnic entrepreneurs or elites pursuing private interests and capitalizing on the availability of ethnic networks (i.e., ethnically defined groups that reduce transaction costs and uncertainty with respect to the enforcement of contracts). Elites may also socially construct ethnic identities or reinforce racial, religious, or linguistic cleavages in such a

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<sup>43</sup>Yinger M.J. ‘Ethnicity’ *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 11 (1985), pp. 151-180

<sup>44</sup> Horowitz D.L. ‘Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict’ Paper prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., April 20–21, 1998

<sup>45</sup> Kaufman J.S. ‘Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War’ *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Autumn, 1996), pp. 108-138

way as to produce new sources of friction and conflict<sup>46</sup>. These elites therefore engage in utility-maximizing strategies in order to manipulate their constituents into engaging in ethnic conflicts. Hostile ethnic myths and an emotionally driven symbolic politics based on those myths is advanced hence leading into ethnic conflicts<sup>47</sup>.

Ethnic wars are therefore driven by hostile popular emotions toward out-groups, emotions harnessed by political leaders wielding emotive ethnic symbols. When a political opportunity arises, leaders or would-be leaders can manipulate group symbols to evoke hostile feelings and exacerbate fear. They use the hostility and fear, in turn, to justify extremist policies, justifying their own quest for power as 'defense' of their people's status and security. Thus, in the symbolist account, it is the interaction of these hostile myths and symbols, existential fear, mass hostility, and mobilization by symbol manipulating elites, that creates ethnic security dilemmas and turns ethnic conflict into war. Playing on those emotions, however, can create a 'symbolic politics trap' for the leader: once a leader has aroused chauvinist emotions to gain or keep power, he and his successors may be unable to calm those emotions later, even if they wish to reverse course and moderate their policies<sup>48</sup>. Whatever the case, these elites will have fanned ethnic conflicts. Elites can also seek to exploit the destabilizing effects of natural resource scarcity and social grievances to instigate ethnic conflicts when their political base seems threatened<sup>49</sup>. These elites, especially in Africa, might maneuver to define, or even to create, land communities. Specifically, they manipulate the rules and practices of land tenure to mold land communities to their design, often

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<sup>46</sup> Sambanis N. 'Do Ethnic and Non-ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?: A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1)' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Jun., 2001), pp. 259- 282

<sup>47</sup> Kaufman, Stuart J. "Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence." *International Security* 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 45-86.

<sup>48</sup> Kaufman J.S. 'Escaping the Symbolic Politics Trap: Reconciliation Initiatives and Conflict Resolution in Ethnic Wars' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Mar., 2006), pp. 201-218

<sup>49</sup> Colin H. Kahl. "Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: The Case of Kenya, 1991-93." *International Security* 23, no. 2 (Fall 1998): 80-119.

with the end goal of maintaining or acquiring personal power or wealth. Elites' land control maneuvers are frequently associated with conflict: they initiate conflict or they respond to conflict. These elites stir up group tensions about land control and even incite others to violence in order to secure their political position and economic interests<sup>50</sup>. Communal identities are therefore seen as a mask for class power and tribal movements may be created and instigated to action by new men of power in furtherance of their own special interests. For many observers, communal identities are frequently seen as both cause and effect of political strategies. Bates expresses what perhaps a leading view is when he states: "Given that most constituencies tend to be dominated by members of one ethnic group . . . an ethnic appeal is an attractive and efficacious weapon in the competition for office<sup>51</sup>

Therefore, when ethnic conflicts occur, they might pass as just ethnic conflicts. However, underneath such conflicts, you will find personal (and class) ambitions which are desperate, opportunistic and violence prone. Collective fears of the future can cause ethnic conflicts. As groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them the potential for tremendous violence. As information failures, problems of credible commitment, and the security dilemma take hold, groups become apprehensive, the state weakens, and conflict becomes more likely. It is at this moment that ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs, operating within groups, build upon these fears of insecurity and polarize society as political memories and emotions also magnify these anxieties, driving groups further

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<sup>50</sup>Rose L.L. 'African Elites' Land Control Maneuvers' *Études rurales*, No. 163/164, *Terre Territoire Appartenances* (Jul. - Dec., 2002), pp.187-213

<sup>51</sup>Bienen H., Londregan J. and Nicolas Van de Walle ' Ethnicity and Leadership Succession in Africa' *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Mar., 1995), pp. 1-25

apart<sup>52</sup>. Elites continue to emerge as a force to reckon with in matters to do with causing ethnic conflicts.

In Liberia, for instance, the members of the ruling group and other elites benefitted from the antagonistic relations of African-Liberians and Americo-Liberians. This is an indictment of the elite Americo-Liberians and African-Liberians whose rapaciousness was responsible for the deterioration of relations among ethnic groups. In Benin, the Batombous had access to positions from which other groups were barred; all these happened due to the manipulation of elites<sup>53</sup>. In Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Georgia, the elites from the dominant ethnic groups rejected interethnic conciliation and championed militant actions which led to serious bloodshed resulting from ethnic conflicts<sup>54</sup>. In the Yugoslavia and Rwanda ethnic conflicts in the 1990s, the bloodshed that took place in both cases was not the result of ethnic hatred that inflamed entire groups to attack one another. Rather it was the work primarily of "small, ill-disciplined, and essentially cowardly bands of thugs and bullies." These bands were recruited by political leaders and they operated under their general guidance<sup>55</sup>. We see, from these conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda how the elites were mobilizing and controlling groups of their constituents to engage in ethnic conflicts. In Yugoslavia still, much of the armed mobilization and fighting in Yugoslavia emanated from and occurred around enclaves. Enclaves were often strongholds of political and military authority in a war that selectively targeted civilians on the basis of ethnic identity. In this war, the manipulation of historical resentments by leaders was an essential contributor to rising

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<sup>52</sup> Rothchild D. and Lake A.D. 'Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict' *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Autumn, 1996), pp. 41-75

<sup>53</sup> Okwudiba N. ed. *Ethnic Conflicts in Africa* Nottingham: CODESRIA, 1998

<sup>54</sup> Robert H. 'Ethnic Conflict and the "Generosity Moment"' *Journal of Democracy* - Volume 9, Number 1, January 1998, pp. 140-153

<sup>55</sup> Mueller, John. "The Banality of "Ethnic Conflict." *International Security* 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 42-70.



fears and the development of exclusionary political formulas<sup>56</sup>. This war was thus a product of elite manipulation and fear-mongering by ethnic entrepreneurs who fanned the flames of hatred for their own purposes and who manipulated ethnonational identity issues that are themselves just a product of an invented tradition. Another case of ethnic mobilization orchestrated by elites and leading to ethnic conflicts took place in the south of Kyrgyzstan where the Kyrgyz and Uzbek population clashed, leaving about 200 people dead and many more injured, in what seemed to announce an era of ethnic conflict in the region. This was in 1990<sup>57</sup>.

Identity can therefore be said to be an artificial and modern phenomenon that is often at the mercy of ambitious leaders who manipulate and instrumentalize ethno-national identity. Ethnic identity, in this region, can be said to be a modern social construction that has been instrumentalized by political elites<sup>58</sup>. From the foregoing, elites are guilty of constructing ethnic identities and rallying people around them for personal selfish ends. In the next part, this aspect of constructing ethnicity is going to be closely examined so that we can have a clear link between elites, construction of ethnicity, mobilization and the eventual occurrence of ethnic conflicts.

## 2.4 Construction of Ethnicity

Elites have been known to use ethnic groups as they wish in order to achieve their selfish interests. Political elites are known for mobilizing populations around ethnicity in order to

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<sup>56</sup> Sekulic D., Hodson R. and Massey G. 'Ethnic Enclaves and Intolerance: The Case of Yugoslavia' *Social Forces*, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Dec., 1999), pp. 669-693

<sup>57</sup> Fumagalli M. 'Framing Ethnic Minority Mobilization in Central Asia: The Cases of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan' *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Jun., 2007), pp. 567- 590

<sup>58</sup> Majstorovic S. 'Ancient Hatreds or Elite Manipulation? MEMORY AND POLITICS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA' *World Affairs*, Vol. 159, No. 4 (SPRING 1997), pp. 170-182

achieve or maintain political power<sup>59</sup>. To carry out this mobilization effectively, they are known for constructing ethnic groups, for their own purposes, and such groups can be easily fragmented and deconstructed by the same elites if need be<sup>60</sup>. Hence, ethnicity is not a given thing but a social and political construction in a specific context in which elites manipulate cultural symbols of their ethnic groups to derive political and economic advantages in the quest for power and position<sup>61</sup>. Ethnicity is therefore created and recreated as various groups and interests put forth competing visions of the ethnic composition of society and argue over which rewards or sanctions should be attached to which ethnicities. They also create ethnic boundaries which determine who is a member and who is not and designate which ethnic categories are available for individual identification at a particular time and place. We therefore realize that the origin, content, and form of ethnicity reflect the creative choices of individuals and groups as they define themselves and others in ethnic ways. Therefore, through the actions and designations of ethnic groups, their antagonists, political authorities, and economic interest groups, ethnic boundaries are erected dividing some populations and unifying others<sup>62</sup>.

Elites will at times attempt to portray ethnic conflicts as struggles arising out of cultural clashes and portray ethnic groups as actors and parties to the spoils and/or sentiment arising from ethnic conflicts. For instance, the Jews and Arabs have not been fighting since antiquity; rather, they have been fighting intermittently since the 1920s. The Hutus and Tutsis have no history of ethnic conflict prior to colonization. Similarly, the Liberian, Cassamance, and Tuareg ethnic conflicts appear more political than primordial. In fact, it appears that intercultural cooperation

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<sup>59</sup>Jenne E.K. 'Political Opportunism and Ethnic Mobilization: A Triadic Model for Predicting the Ethnicization of Politics in New States' A Working Paper, Department of Political Science, Stanford University

<sup>60</sup>Green E. 'The(Mis)use of Ethnicity in Current Political Economy Literature: Conceptual and Data Issues' A Paper presented at UNU WIDER conference on Making Peace Work, Helsinki, June 2004

<sup>61</sup>Jetly R. 'Baluch Ethnicity and Nationalism (1971-81): An Assessment' *Asian Ethnicity*, Volume 5, Number 1, February, 2004

<sup>62</sup>Nagel J. 'Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture' *Social Problems*, Vol. 41, No. 1, Special Issue on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in America (Feb., 1994), pp. 152-176

has been much more common than intercultural conflict. Indeed, interethnic cooperation is much more prevalent than its antithesis in Sub-Saharan Africa. Elite power politics is what can be blamed for these ethnic conflicts<sup>63</sup>. Having established a link between elites; construction of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts, the next section will examine various examples of elites' involvement in construction of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts. The section will focus mainly on cases from Africa as this is the area of this study's focus.

## 2.5 The African Case

In Africa, African politicians, in the open secret of African politics, sedulously attend to the maintenance of the ethnic networks of patronage that are the basis of their power. African ethnicity, which is a social construction of the elites, dates back to the pre-colonial period where colonial states were grounded in the alliances with local 'Big Men', incorporating ethnically-defined administrative units linked to the local population by incorporation of pre-colonial patron-client relations. This was reinforced by European assumptions of neatly bounded and culturally homogeneous 'tribes' and a bureaucratic preoccupation with demarcating, classifying and counting subject populations, as well as by the activities of missionaries and anthropologists<sup>64</sup>. Before the colonial powers started collaborating with the traditional African society elites, pre-colonial political and socio-cultural boundaries were marked by fuzziness and flexibility; and Africans existed within a reality of multiple, overlapping and alternative collective identities.

Important twentieth century ethnic communities and identities, such as the Shona and Yoruba, had no conscious or institutional pre-colonial existence, although there were large numbers of

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<sup>63</sup>Henderson E.A. 'Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States, and the Onset of War, 1820-1989' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, No. 5 (Oct., 1997), pp. 649-668

<sup>64</sup>Berman J.B. 'Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism' *African Affairs*, Vol. 97, No. 388 (Jul., 1998), pp. 305-341

linguistically and culturally related people who would later become Shona or Yoruba. In another example, the Igbo of Nigeria and the Kikuyu of Kenya are cases of indigenous societies that lacked overarching political structures. A sense of wider Igbo or Kikuyu commonalities could only occur with the impetus created by colonial rule. Other groups resembled the Mfengu of South Africa, who were little more than an amalgam of people scattered by the upheavals associated with the Mfecane and located principally in the Ciskei. Although part of the Xhosa grouping, the Mfengu have for long been treated with suspicion by other Xhosa because of their alliance with colonial administrations-underlining the point that concepts like 'Igbo', 'Ovambo', 'Kikuyu', 'Shona' or 'Xhosa' do not refer to internally monolithic, solitary groupings but broad, fissile categories<sup>65</sup>. There is also evidence that the notion of the individual person with the fixed, unique and bounded identity of Western modernity simply did not exist until introduced under colonial rule. Therefore, ethnicity is not a fixed condition or essence, but a historical process that can only be studied in specific contexts. In the African case, no African society was or is culturally homogeneous and univocal. Ethnicity is constructed in societies containing multiple and conflicting versions of culture and custom, as well as divergent interests and conflicts of gender, generation, clan, faction and, under the impact of colonialism, developing classes. Moreover, the modern ethnicities of Africa, so much larger and more sharply defined and differentiated than those of the past, also continue to be internally differentiated into regional or cultural sub-groups and identities engaged in vigorous internal rivalries, as among the Yoruba; or even in the assertion of new and distinct ethnic identities, as in formerly subordinate and pariah groups among the Tswana.

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<sup>65</sup>Welsh.D. 'Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa' *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 72, No. 3, *Ethnicity and International Relations* (Jul., 1996), pp. 477-491

The social construction of modern forms of ethnicity in Africa is coterminous with the development of the structure and culture of colonialism. The structural characteristics of the colonial state, an apparatus of authoritarian bureaucratic control, and of the colonial political economy, based on African cash-crops and wage labour in capitalist commodity and labourmarkets, radically, albeit only partially, transformed the structural and spatial organization of African societies. These institutions constituted the structural context shaping both the form and content of ethnic communities, identities and interests, as well as the modes of ethnic political mobilization and organization. The ideology and culture of colonialism, especially in the imagining of African societies by colonial officials and European missionaries, provided the dominant cognitive context molding the invention of tribes and their customs by Africans themselves<sup>66</sup>.

In all the foregoing, as said earlier, the colonists worked hand in hand with local elites to shape up these ethnic identities and all that for their own benefit. This illustrates how ethnic groups and subsequent ethnic conflicts have been a product of elites' manoeuvring. In Nigeria, ethnic groups such as the Igbo, Yoruba, Kru and Mongo were born out of colonialism. Major ethnic identities such as Yoruba, Ibo and Hausa/Fulani were first politically salient before minority ethnic identities such as Ogoni, Ijaw and Andoni among others. The political salience of the former identities occurred with the transformation of their cultural organizations into political parties or bloc support for political parties as a response to the quasi-federalization of Nigeria by the British colonial regime. Ethnic identities have been flourishing in Nigeria for the benefit of the elites. Elite-led ethnic mobilizations have been taking place for the sake of personal gains of

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<sup>66</sup>Berman J.B. 'Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism' *African Affairs*, Vol. 97, No. 388 (Jul., 1998), pp. 305-341

the elites concerned<sup>67</sup>. In the case of Kenya, groups viewed today as monolithic entities were in fact not coherent communities before colonial rule. The Abaluhya, for example, are an ethnic group created by colonial anthropologists, missionaries, and administrators. The name Baluhya dates only to the 1920s, when it was used to profess the unity of Bantu-speaking groups to which the British referred to as the North Kavirondo, an administrative aggregation of sixteen separate groups. Although proximate in location and having related languages, they differed sufficiently from one another to make unity elusive. The British classification of these groups as one was strategically adopted by elites from the sub-groups to assert unity for political goals, for example, through the creation of the Baluhya Political Union to join the independence struggle. Today, the artificiality of Abaluhya identity is marked by perennial divisions, especially among politicians, interrupted by brief interludes of unity when corporate interests are threatened. Despite its recent and artificial nature, however, ethnic identity is instrumental in shaping individual interests and actions in the modern Kenyan state<sup>68</sup>.

In Botswana and areas around it, this construction of ethnicities also took place and though it did not lead to severe ethnic conflicts, it was still a product of elites. The resultant constructed ethnicities rarely conformed to a people's prior self-identification. For example, all Khoisan languages spoken in the Kalahari region, of which as many as ten are mutually unintelligible, were lumped non-differentially by Setswana under a single term, Sesarwa - the language of Bushmen - while the speakers of these languages became non-differentially labeled Basarwa. In like manner, independent eponymous Sekgalagadi-speaking Bangologa, Bakgwatheng, Bashaga, Baloongwe, and others living in the dry sandveld were non-differentiated as Bakgalagadi when

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<sup>67</sup> Isumonah A. 'The Making of the Ogoni Ethnic Group' *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 74, No. 3 (2004), pp. 433-453

<sup>68</sup> Ndegwa N.S. 'Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics' *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 3 (Sep., 1997), pp. 599- 616

they were reduced to subordinate status. Again, when Batawana established themselves on Lake Ngami in about 1795, they rather quickly subordinated indigenous Wayeyi and other Okavango Delta peoples who were disparagingly called Makoba, a term still often applied to them today<sup>69</sup>.

Therefore, in as much as ethnicity may have been a product of the colonial era, its major stimulus derived from the introduction of competitive politics. The use of ethnicity as a political resource has led many writers to yoke this fact to an instrumentalist account of ethnicity and to insist that it can be 'invented' or (as in the case of the Ngala ethnic community) emerge as the consequence of imputation<sup>70</sup>.

## 2.6 Other African Cases

In Ivory Coast, the utilization of ethnic associations by elites to consolidate their own economic and political position in the post-colonial state was perfected. Therefore; ethnic groups represented, in essence, coalitions which had been formed as part of rational efforts to secure benefits created by the forces of modernization-benefits which were desired but scarce. Ethnic groups were hence used by elite factions within the country as political capital in their competition for power and access to limited economic resource. This was a matter of elites using ethnic groups to maximize their material and political interests<sup>71</sup>.

In Southern Sudan, we now also look at the role played by elites in fuelling ethnic conflicts. At the height of the conflict between Southern Sudan and Northern Sudan, a split occurred in the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) IN 1991. The SPLA broke into two warring factions. Although first confined to the highest ranks of the southern military leadership, this political rift

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<sup>69</sup>Wilmsen N.E. 'Mutable Identities: Moving beyond Ethnicity in Botswana' *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 4, Special Issue: Minorities and Citizenship in Botswana (Dec., 2002), pp. 825-841

<sup>70</sup>Welsh.D. 'Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa' *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 72, No. 3, *Ethnicity and International Relations* (Jul., 1996), pp. 477-491

<sup>71</sup>Woods D. 'Elites, Ethnicity, and 'Home Town' Associations in the Côte d'Ivoire: An Historical Analysis of State-Society Links' *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 64, No. 4 (1994), pp. 465- 483

soon ignited a full-scale conflict between the Dinka (Jieng) and the Nuer (neitinaath), the two largest ethnic groups in the South that provided most of the guerrilla soldiers. Rural civilians were caught off-guard by this sudden turn of events but were soon swept up in a spiral of military raids and counter-raids with little hope of mediation. After several months of intense South-on-South fighting, mostly targeting the civilian population along ethnic lines, the Nuer-dominated SPLA-Nasir faction held most of the countryside in the Upper Nile, while the Dinka-dominated SPLA-Mainstream faction controlled most of Equatorial and the Bahr-el-Ghazal. Nevertheless, the number of South Sudanese wounded and killed continued to rise well into 1999. Even ordinary people in this conflict perceived it as a new breed of conflict: the war of the educated (elites). As one renowned western Nuer chief, who like most others was not literate, remarked in 1998: "They used to tell us that the reason why Nuer and Dinka fight each other was because we are ignorant. We don't know anything because we are not educated. But now look at all this killing! This war between the Nuer and Dinka is much worse than anything we experienced in the past. And it is the war of the educated [elites]-It is not our war at all!"

This observation was very correct as the war was as a result of a power struggle between two elites: Dr. John Garang and Dr. Riek Machar. Due to their struggles, they broke up the SPLA and formed SPLA-Torit (SPLA-Mainstream) led by Dr. Garang and bringing together members of his Dinka ethnic group and SPLA-Nasir led by Dr. Machar and bringing together his Nuer ethnic community<sup>72</sup>. This is a clear case of elites mobilizing their ethnic communities to engage in shedding blood for reasons that are only known to the concerned elites.

In Ghana, there was a spiral of violence that moved from elite, to communal, to mass forms of political exposition especially between 1975 and 1978. This violence was driven by demands

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<sup>72</sup>Hutchinson E.S and Jok M.J.'Sudan's Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities' *African Studies Review*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Sep., 1999), pp. 125-145



being made by urban elites who, having heretofore been able to manipulate and benefit from government achievements, found their position directly affected by the reduced circumstances of state resources. Their intention was to effect shifts in the government's uses and distribution of state power. Ethnic politics in such a context could best be called inter-elite conflict. Elites of different ethnic origins rallied the support of other segments of their ethnic groupings in a similar situation not only to protest against measures perceived as detrimental to their well-being, but also to acquire gains at the expense of other similarly organized elites. As the intensity of conflict grew, the bases of political interaction expanded from inter-elite, to communal, to mass constellations. A widening circle of individuals and groups were included in the political orbit. With no compromise on key subjects, a cycle of violence evolved which assumed more extreme forms as time progressed. The uses of ethnicity at each stage followed the overall patterns of political conflict. Ethnicity in inter-elite conflict was among several instruments for the aggregation of protest. At the communal level, ethnicity became an indispensable means for political mobilization<sup>73</sup>. These developments in Ghana further serve to highlight the role played by elites in propagating ethnic conflicts for their own benefits.

In Sierra Leone, political ethnicity has been primarily an instrumental phenomenon. There has been an emergence and development of competitive ethnopolitical identities in Sierra Leone. There has been politicization of Creole, Mende, Temne and Limba identity. These identities have played an important role in shaping political processes in post-colonial Sierra Leone. From the end of the nineteenth century until independence, the most divisive ethno-regional conflict in Sierra Leone pitted colony Creole elites against protectorate African elites. The Creoles, separatist in their political attitudes and aspirations, rejected political equality with protectorate

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<sup>73</sup>Chazan N. 'Ethnicity and Politics in Ghana' *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 97, No. 3 (Autumn, 1982), pp. 461-485

Africans and the latter resented both the assertions of superiority by Creoles and their relative dominance in Sierra Leone politics prior to de-colonization. This polarization persists even today, but its political significance has paled in comparison to both the rift between the Mendes of the south and the Temnes of the north and the contemporary dominance of Limba cultural entrepreneurs and politicians.

These cases of ethnic antagonism fuelled by elites are examples of how political ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa has functioned more as a mechanism for elite domination than as an emancipatory, mobilizational resource. Where it serves as an instrument of political domination, political ethnicity has been linked to the interests and aspirations of the new ruling classes of Africa. Dominant local classes have, as cultural politicians, attempted to shape and mobilize ethnicity to serve their interests. We therefore see that instrumentally, ethnicity offers a convenient basis for political and social organization<sup>74</sup>. This process of ethnic mobilization can be said to have five dimensions. First, the elites, in their struggles, construct a terrain of politics, particularly electoral politics, which is based on identity mobilization, solidarity and activism. Secondly, regime and ruling elites construct and reconstruct identity and identity politics in their struggles for hegemony and legitimacies. In some cases, identity conflicts are constructed to fragment resistance and conceal both legitimacy and regime problems as well as weaknesses. Third, regime leaders and officials through the politics of inclusion and exclusion, create regional and ethnic inequalities and generate regional, cultural, religious, ethnic and communal security. Fourth, regime officials and ruling elites deploy the authoritarian and oppressive African state against non-favoured groups. Finally, political elites—because of the large

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<sup>74</sup>Kandeh D.J. 'Politicization of Ethnic Identities in Sierra Leone' *African Studies Review*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Apr., 1992), pp. 81-99

stakes and role of politics in class formation and survival-build, fund and manipulate youth and identity organizations for lawless and violent power struggles<sup>75</sup>.

In mostly apartheid South Africa, violence between ANC and Inkatha supporters claimed tens of thousands of lives in Natal and in the East Rand of the Transvaal in the mid-eighties. ANC was a party that was pre-dominantly led by ethnic Xhosa leaders while Inkatha was fully identifiable with the Zulu. In this case however, Inkatha presents many of the essential features of mobilized ethnicity. It invokes a Zulu identity and solidarity based on the idea of an ancient nation which resisted colonial conquest and capitalist penetration into the early twentieth century, well after other ethnic groups had capitulated. This history, which was communicated through party speeches and structures as well as via an Inkatha civics syllabus for schools, honoured the kingdom's historic leaders, especially Shaka, in order to legitimize their present heirs. Moreover, in mobilizing identity, Inkatha persistently defined and redefined members and 'others'. Initially, Buthelezi (the Inkatha leader) depicted all Zulus as members of Inkatha and their various enemies as whites, the government, Xhosas and Indians. In the eighties, however, the increasingly bitter conflict between Inkatha and liberation politics divided people in Natal and on the Rand and led to the identification of 'an enemy within', Zulus who did not accept Inkatha leadership and who, indeed, denounced it as an apartheid structure. These people, Inkatha now branded as traitors. In 1986, the King called on all Zulus to 'eliminate from your midst all those disgusting usurpers of our dignity ... Thrash them, if necessary, only to purge them into becoming better Zulus'<sup>76</sup>. This is yet another example of elite manipulation of people into conflicts for political ends.

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<sup>75</sup> Ikelegbe A. 'State, Ethnic Militias, and Conflict in Nigeria' Vol.39, No. 3 (2005), pp. 490-516

<sup>76</sup> Szeftel M. 'Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 21, No. 60, ROAPE Review of Books (Jun.,1994), pp. 185-199

In Kenya, between 1991 and 1993, both national and local elites exploited ethnic grievances about scarce land just before the elections (of 1992). These elites, including senior ministers, members of Parliament and close advisers to the president, as well as sympathetic local elites, purposefully set out to incite ethnic violence in a desperate attempt to keep the president and his fragile coalition of minority groups in power. They mobilized minority ethnic groups to their support by invoking land rights, that is, by convincing the members of such groups that they were the victims of land grabbers who had contaminated their ancestral lands and therefore needed to be expelled. Clashes erupted in the Rift Valley, Nyanza and the Western Provinces, the former "White Highlands," which contained much of Kenya's most fertile agricultural land. On one side of the clashes were President Moi's own ethnic group, the Kalenjin, as well as members of other minority groups, including the Maasai, Samburu, and Turkana, and on the other side, were the Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhya, and Luo communities, all majority ethnic groups that were associated with the opposition to Moi's regime. By 1993, at least 1,500 people had been killed and 300,000 displaced. The elites exploited long-standing interethnic grievances over land to secure their tenuous political position: they aimed to stabilize their base, to mobilize new supporters from among those who hoped for access to land as a reward for their participation in violent activities, and to co-opt or crush political opponents. The ruling elite therefore manipulated pressing problems to polarize ethnic sentiments to its political and economic advantage<sup>77</sup>.

## 2.7 Non-Violent Elites' Confrontation

We also have cases where elites' competition for power and influence does not necessarily lead to bloodshed. Nevertheless; it leads to a sort of conflict either within the same ethnic

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<sup>77</sup>Rose L.L. 'African Elites' Land Control Maneuvers' *Études rurales*, No. 163/164, *Terre Territoire Appartenances* (Jul. - Dec., 2002), pp.187-213

community or with other ethnic communities. Taking a look at the Chinese ethnic community in New York's Chinatown, we see the existence of conflict between two groups of elites: the traditional elite (Kiu Ling) and the new elite (ChuenKa) for the control of the local Chinese community. The traditional elite (Kiu Ling) of the community are the cultural preservers. They are not the "literati," as expected by Max Weber, but rather are entrepreneurs in the ethnic businesses who have no high formal education, but control the means of production. They use their wealth, influence, and connections to recruit followers, to obtain the leadership positions in the traditional associations, and to oppose the presence and activities of the new elite.

Thus, there is intense conflict between the traditional and the new elite in the community. The latter (ChuenKa) are the "white-collar" professionals, educated in U.S. colleges, who seek an unreserved acceptance by the larger society and organize efforts to fight racism. The new elite from the social agencies and nonprofit service organizations follow a strategy directly opposed to the old elite. The former use ethnicity to assist members of the community to participate in the social, economic, and political life in New York City. Specifically, the new elite use ethnic status to obtain funding from city, state, and federal governments for their agencies and the minority status to gain employment and financial aid for the Chinese. In such endeavors, they attract many followers and users of the social agencies. Thus, their power base is expanding and their prestige is increasing. For those new elite who are social workers, job security is enhanced by a large clientele<sup>78</sup>. In this case, even though there is no bloodshed, we can see that the efforts put in by elites, which leads to their conflict, is meant to benefit themselves and not the community as such.

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<sup>78</sup>Wong.B.'Elites and Ethnic Boundary Maintenance: A Study of the Roles of Elites in Chinatown,New York City' *Urban Anthropology*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (SPRING 1977), pp. 001-022

## 2.8 Conclusion

In the construction of ethnic identities, one group is differentiated from another and this identity construction creates the potential for violence. Ethnicity is created and recreated as various groups and interests put forth competing visions of the ethnic composition of society and argue over which rewards or sanctions should be attached to which ethnicities. According to this constructionist view, the origin, content, and form of ethnicity reflects the creative choices of individuals and groups as they define themselves and others in ethnic ways. Through the actions and designations of ethnic groups, their antagonists, political authorities, and economic interest groups, ethnic boundaries are erected dividing some populations and unifying others. Ethnicity is constructed out of the material of language, religion, culture, appearance, ancestry, or regionality.

The location and meaning of particular ethnic boundaries are continuously negotiated, revised, and revitalized. The Arab-Israeli conflict, for instance, cannot be said to be simply historical antagonism, built on centuries of distrust and contention. Israeli and Palestinian ethnic identities are themselves fairly recent constructions, arising out of the geopolitics of World War II and the Cold War, and researchers have documented the various competing meanings of the Arab-Israeli conflict in American political culture. Similarly, to view black-white antagonism in contemporary American society simply as based in history-albeit a powerful and divisive history is to overlook the contemporary demographic, political, social, and economic processes that prop up this ethnic boundary, reconstructing it, and producing tension along its borders and within the two bounded ethnic groups<sup>79</sup>. This construction can take various forms. This can involve a specific process through which identities are produced and reproduced through action and

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<sup>79</sup>Nagel J. 'Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture' *Social Problems*, Vol. 41, No. 1, Special Issue on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in America (Feb., 1994), pp. 152-176

speech. For instance Serbs might be made to believe that Serbs cannot live with Croats, and vice versa, or making Montenegrins believe they are Yugoslavs, or peasants in Gascony believe they are French. On the symbolic approach, there is usually a development of discursive formations which can set one group in opposition to another or predispose them to see the other as a threat or natural subject for violence, independent of any more material basis for hostility. Elites take the blame for constructing ethnic identities and fanning ethnic conflicts. Ethnic violence is seen as both a means and a by-product of political elites' efforts to hold or acquire power. Elites foment ethnic violence to build political support; this process has the effect of constructing more antagonistic identities, which favours more violence.

It is thus seen that ethnic violence is provoked by elites seeking to gain, maintain, or increase their hold on political power. This violence has the effect, intended by the elites, of constructing group identities in more antagonistic and rigid ways. These newly constructed (or reconstructed) ethnic identities serve to increase support for the elites who provoked the violence while favoring the continuation or escalation of violence. However, the puzzle for such theoretical arguments is to explain how elites can convince their followers to adopt false beliefs and take actions that the followers would not want to take if they understood what the leaders were up to. Why should the 'masses' so readily respond to the call of ethnic origin and culture?<sup>80</sup> Why do ethnic publics follow leaders down paths that seem to serve elite power interests most of all?<sup>81</sup> This is the big question: what makes the masses to be so vulnerable to the manipulation of their elites?

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<sup>80</sup> Smith D.A 'Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism.' *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 72, No. 3, *Ethnicity and International Relations* (Jul., 1996), pp. 445-458

<sup>81</sup> Latin D.D. and Fearon D.J. 'Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity' *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 845-877

follow leaders down paths that seem to serve elite power interests most of all?<sup>81</sup> This is the big question: what makes the masses to be so vulnerable to the manipulation of their elites?

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## CHAPTER THREE

### 3.0 ELITES, ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN KENYA

#### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter is dedicated to dissecting the history of ethnic conflicts in Kenya. It will examine ethnicity as a driving force behind Kenyan politics and uncover how political elites have used it to sustain themselves in power and advance their own agenda. The chapter begins with a brief analysis of ethnicity and politics immediately after Kenya gained its independence. That is how the ruling elite, drawn mainly from the Kikuyu community, used state resources to advance ethnic patronage, an issue that led to growing resentment which continued until the second president of Kenya, from the Kalenjin ethnic community, took over power. In addition, it shows how the second president went ahead to replicate what had been started by the founding ethnic political elites but only this time he transferred patronage to his Kalenjin elites.

For this reason, the rule of the second president met resistance and resentment not only from the previous elites who felt marginalized but also other groups which shared similar sentiments. This resentment led to the clamour for the re-introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya. This was taken by Moi and his associates as a direct challenge to the very existence of his regime. This challenge was the genesis of ethnic conflicts in Kenya and through it; the foundation for ethnic conflicts in Kenya was laid. In analyzing the foregoing, secondary sources will be relied on. Scholarly journals and commission reports as well as one report by an International Human Rights Group will be used.

### 3.2 State Patronage

In typical Sub-Saharan African states (Kenya included), politicians appear much more likely to act as state-sponsored patrons. This expansive role is a result of the structural characteristics of African economies. Not only are African states the primary providers of basic infrastructure such as schools, health care, and roads, but, equally important in an environment in which employment opportunities are extremely limited, they are also employers. This refers not only to employment opportunities in the civil service, but also to opportunities in parastatal enterprises. Moreover, public figures at all levels are much more open about this "patron" role and about the extent to which political support translates into government expenditure<sup>82</sup>.

When, therefore, politicians- both incumbents and opposition leaders-campaign or give speeches in undeveloped areas, they openly blame the lack of infrastructure in those areas on the limited local support for the governing party or coalition. Incumbents typically pledge to increase the share of the state's resources devoted to a particular constituency if its residents support the government in a subsequent election. This can be done without legislating increased funds but by simply doing things such as creating a new administrative district in their new supporters' area, whose new district capital qualifies for a district hospital and such other things. For instance, retired president Moi had perfected this practice which he carried out in various ways. An example is the position of the Vice-President which he used to buy ethnic loyalty and achieve his own political ends<sup>83</sup>. In 1992, when the first multi-party elections were nearing, Moi secretly promised three politicians from different ethnic communities the post. This was meant to make them remain in Kanu and in the process bring in their communities' votes. The three were

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<sup>82</sup>Weinreb A.A. 'First Politics, Then Culture: Accounting for Ethnic Differences in Demographic Behavior in Kenya' *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 2001), pp. 437-467

<sup>83</sup>Society Magazine, Weekly Issue No.2, February 24, 1992 pp.14-16 'Nyachae for Vice-Presidency?

Njoroge Mungai, Simeon Nyachae and Elijah Mwangale. This led to the then deputy chairman of the Ford political party, Masinde Muliro to tell a political rally at Bungoma on February 9, 1992 that Moi was using the vice-presidency as a bait to attract and retain some politicians in the Kanu fold. This position was envied because it was closest to the presidency and in case of any eventuality, the vice-president would inherit the presidency and continue with ethnic patronage. This is an example which illustrates how state positions as well as resources were used for personal political gain.

During the Moi regime, huge tracts of public land, including forests were allocated to political loyalists. A case in point is the Mau forest<sup>84</sup> which was allocated to prominent people in the Moi government. These politicians also brought along their ethnic political supporters and allocated them small pieces of land as a way of buying political loyalty and also as a way of covering their tracks as land grabbers. This forest was misused for political patronage while it was and still is a public resource. When later on, in the Grand Coalition government of President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, there was an attempt by the Prime Minister to restore the destroyed forest by conducting evictions of encroachers; it became volatile. Kalenjin MPs from the South Rift, where the Mau forest is situated, told their ethnic political supporters living in the forest to stay put<sup>85</sup>. This tussle even led to William Ruto, an ODM politician from the Kalenjin community, to threaten that he would lead ODM (the party led by Raila Odinga) supporters from his ethnic community in ditching the party if Raila insisted on evicting people from the Mau<sup>86</sup>. These people in the Mau were predominantly from the Kalenjin community. From this scenario, it comes out that whoever was in power could determine whether people would stay in

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<sup>84</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspaper Friday, July 31, 2009 p.4 'Ghost firms got 7,000 ha of Mau land' by Kenneth Ogosia

<sup>85</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspaper Thursday, July 17, 2008 pp.1 and 4 '10 Rift MPs reject Raila plan on Mau' by Lucas Barasa

<sup>86</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspaper Monday, November 17, 2008 pp.1-2 'Waki: Row over Ruto threat to quit ODM' by NATION Team

the forest or not and this could be replicated in many other resources, where political considerations could be put into play in determining distribution and redistribution.

It therefore follows that, the state in Africa being this very important; it would be the desire of any given political grouping, to control it. Such groups, of course led and controlled by their elites would want to go in and be the patrons hence determining who gets what and who misses.

### **3.3 Kenya after Independence**

In the urge and desire to control state apparatus and hence control resources, political groupings normally have to organize themselves along ethnic lines in order to establish patron-client relations which has been central to Kenyan politics, whereby followers attach themselves to 'big men' whose mission is to capture resources for their home areas<sup>87</sup>. This approach to conducting politics and distributing resources can lead to resentment among ethnic groups and hence cause unwanted ethnic tensions and as well lead to ethnic scheming and counter-scheming, all in an effort to wrest the control of state apparatus and thus determine the distribution of resources. In Kenya, for instance, an imbalance of opportunity between ethnic groupings remains a stubborn fact of life. Although they may be attributable to a variety of inherited circumstances, these inequalities inevitably cause political tensions to rise to the surface. In the years following Kenya's independence, for instance, the success of Central Province (chiefly Kikuyu in composition) in securing support for social welfare activities and, in consequence, in building up a pool of trained manpower and an array of commercial enterprises was not lost upon the less

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<sup>87</sup> Wood G. and Southall R. 'Local Government and the Return to Multi-Partyism in Kenya' *African Affairs*, Vol.95, No. 381 (Oct., 1996), pp. 501-527

advantaged peoples of the country. For instance, a larger number of Kikuyus, as compared to other ethnic groups, got more loans from the government owned ICDC<sup>88</sup>.

Top jobs in the Government, at that time, in most of the ministries, including certain co-operatives, practically had been taken over by people from the Central Province. If one ethnic group [the Kikuyu] alone could take over about 72 per cent of the Kenya jobs, and they were less than two million people, how could 25 per cent of the jobs go to more than eight million people who belonged to other ethnicities? Time and again the spokesmen for the less advantaged tribes alleged that tribalism was a significant factor in determining appointments and promotions in the civil service. As an illustration, in the Ministry of Agriculture, the permanent secretary, the deputy permanent secretary, the under secretary and the director of agriculture were all from the Kikuyu tribe. The same case applied to the attorney-general, the commissioner of police, the director of intelligence and the controller of State House not forgetting a majority of district officers, provincial officers and land surveyors<sup>89</sup>. This is a classic example of ethnic patronage where state resources were channeled by tribal elites to their tribesmen. This might have been in an attempt to maintain loyal support among tribesmen and hence ensure the continued stay in power. So, at the end, all such maneuvers serve to benefit and sustain the tribal elites. Unfortunately, these tactics will always elicit a reaction from the elites of the disadvantaged groups. The complaining elites would also love to control state resources and hence gain the means through which they can manipulate and control their tribal blocks and thus the whole

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<sup>88</sup> Wood G. and Southall R. 'Local Government and the Return to Multi-Partyism in Kenya' *African Affairs*, Vol. 95, No. 381 (Oct., 1996), pp. 501-527

<sup>89</sup> Rothchild D. 'Ethnic Inequalities in Kenya' *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Dec., 1969), pp. 689-711

country by extension. Such reactions and counter reactions are bound to create ethnic hatred and thus are potential triggers for ethnic conflicts.

The post-independence Kikuyu political elites (first a petty-bourgeois, then graduated to a *matajiri* (wealthy) one, used their control of the state to provide differential benefits to their poorer brethren in order to avert the class struggle that would deprive them of their electoral base and threaten a revolutionary transformation of society. As they did this, the discriminatory pattern of resource allocation strengthened the colonially encouraged propensity of Kenyans to see their politics in tribal terms. This enabled the wealthy and the petty-bourgeois politicians to retain peasant and worker allegiance in their constituencies by portraying grievances arising out of class struggle as the results of tribalism. The mass of Kenyan peasants and workers therefore had little political class consciousness and were therefore at the mercy of their leaders. This elite manipulation, however, led to an anti-Kikuyu ideology. This ideology even penetrated outlying Kikuyu areas (hence creating intra-tribal hatred), where it took the form of accusing the Kiambu Kikuyu of having monopolized the fruits of independence. The theme was that the Kikuyu (or Kiambu Kikuyu) had taken over most large farms, big businesses and senior positions in government and industry<sup>90</sup>. The other tribes (or other parts of the Kikuyu) wanted to be given access to the benefits of independence too. This petty-bourgeois ideology was embodied by people such as the assassinated J.M. Kariuki and this explains the attraction of this Kikuyu politician to anti-Kikuyu political forces of the time such as Martin Shikuku and Jaramogi Oginga Odinga<sup>91</sup>. It is therefore clear that when a particular ethnic elite goes ahead to monopolize state resources, there will always be a counter reaction especially from the elites of the opposing ethnic groups. An example is the Moi presidency which from 1978 appeared to be systematically

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<sup>90</sup>Finance Magazine April 15, 1992 pp. 18-23 'Matiba: Is he fit to be President' by Njehu Gatabaki

<sup>91</sup>Leonard K.D. and Arney B.L. 'Public Policy, Class and Inequality in Kenya and Tanzania' *Africa Today*, Vol. 26, No. 4, *Political Economy and Government Policy* (4th Qtr., 1979), pp. 3-41

marginalizing certain ethnic communities politically and economically. The most conspicuous ethnic groups among these were the Kikuyu and Luo. This monopoly of power and resources led to elites from these communities such as Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia to call for genuine political and economic changes<sup>92</sup>. These calls led to the struggle for the reinstatement of multi-party politics. This struggle led to the shedding of a lot of blood and the emergence of ethnic conflicts. And as it were, from the previous literature looked at, these elites have a way of manipulating the masses and whenever they espouse a certain point of view, they go along with 'their' people. Hence when elites differ, 'their' people consequently differ.

### 3.4 The Moi Presidency

The worse however happens when the incumbents are replaced and the new entrants rush to transfer resources and put in place mechanisms to ensure that the dislodged group remains economically and politically disadvantaged lest they regain power. This, we are going to see in the subsequent part of this narration. When President Kenyatta died in 1978, Moi (the president who took over the reins of power) inherited the office. He discarded Kenyatta's old Kiambu-Kikuyu elite and in their place, especially after an attempted coup in 1982, forged alliances with smaller ethnic groups with whom he had originally been allied as part of the *Majimbo* (*federalism*) movement. These included other groups in Rift Valley such as the Maasai, as well as various groups in Coast Province and the Luhya-speaking groups in Western Province. For instance, he did away with Charles Njonjo, a Kikuyu who had been very powerful during the Kenyatta rule and started dealing with other politicians<sup>93</sup>. In this shift of leadership, there seemed to be a strategy for disproportionate levels of government spending and services to be moved

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<sup>92</sup> Society Magazine, Weekly Issue No.4 December 2, 1991 pp. 18-19 'Quest for Pluralism' by Ernest Moturi

<sup>93</sup> Society Magazine, Weekly Issue No.19, July 6, 1992 pp.33-34 'Kanu in FORD' by Mwangi Chege

from areas associated with the Kikuyu-led coalition to areas associated with the Kalenjin-led coalition<sup>94</sup>.

Therefore, Moi's succession to the presidency set the scene for the capture of the state by Kalenjin and minority elites who were relatively impoverished, and who in contrast to the Kikuyu elites who had dominated under Kenyatta, they had few roots in the capitalist economy. They therefore embarked upon a determined bid to accumulate wealth. For instance, a clique of Kalenjin elites around Moi milked the Kenya National Assurance Company dry. It was then headed by Henry Kosgey (a Kalenjin) and some of those implicated as culprits in getting unsecured loans which they did not pay back included Nicholas Biwott (Kshs.200 million), Joseph arap Leting (Kshs.300 million), Sally Kosgey (Kshs.8 million) among others. Henry Kosgey was also implicated and as well associated with looting money collected during the 1987 All Africa Games. He was then in charge of the Ministry of Culture and Social Services<sup>95</sup>. All these were in an effort to transfer power away from Kenyatta's Kikuyu centred ruling clique to a Kalenjin-centred alliance. This also entailed a concerted centralization of power under the presidency, whose authority had been deployed as much (if not more) by patrimonial and coercive, as by constitutional means<sup>96</sup>.

The Kenyan state therefore, like many other African states, served as the main dispenser of patronage and resources. The state alone therefore, as said earlier had the capacity to create conditions and pursue policies that privilege the accumulation of wealth by the political elite. Hence it is not surprising that control of the state or proximity to those who have access to state

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<sup>94</sup>Weinreb A.A. 'First Politics, Then Culture: Accounting for Ethnic Differences in Demographic Behavior in Kenya' *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 2001), pp. 437-467

<sup>95</sup>Society Magazine, Weekly Issue No. 13 May 25, 1992 pp.45-46 'Raping Kenya National' by Mwangi Chege

<sup>96</sup>Southall R. 'Dilemmas of the Kenyan Succession' *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 27, No. 84 (Jun., 2000), pp. 203-219



power became the main preoccupation of political activity. As a result, the Moi state became increasingly kleptocratic, largely because the coalition of class forces which came to dominate it were primarily non-productive classes. Thus the state was seen as the principal source of accumulation and a resource for patronage for that class. This was because, unlike the Kenyatta coalition which comprised the original indigenous accumulators, president Moi's ruling coalition was drawn from areas peripheral to capitalist development and hence the state under Moi became increasingly centralized and authoritarian, precisely because economic mobility and expansion of the new ruling class was largely tied to its continued control of state power. This broadly explains why this ruling elite was unwilling to be subjected to democratic accountability.<sup>97</sup> Nevertheless, this is not a qualification to exonerate the Kenyatta regime ethnic elites from blame. Even though it might be argued that they were 'producers' as opposed to consumers, they still enjoyed the leverage of state patronage that made their 'production' easier.

### 3.5 Multi-Party Politics and Ethnic Conflicts

Going back to our earlier point, that the worst however happens when the incumbents are replaced and the new entrants rush to transfer resources and put in place mechanisms to ensure that the dislodged group remains economically and politically disadvantaged lest they regain power, we have to see how the Moi rule faced resentment from opposing ethnic groups who organized themselves into political opposition. In challenging President Moi's regime, they obviously had to face formidable resistance from the ruling clique which eventually, as the

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<sup>97</sup> Ajulu R. 'Kenya: One Step Forward, Three Steps Back: The Succession Dilemma': *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 88, *Africa's Future: That Sinking Feeling* (Jun., 2001), pp. 197-212

following illustrations will show, led to ethnic conflicts. Moi's rule resulted in a campaign for the restoration of multi-party democracy which, drawing support from the United States and the West, was rooted in the marginalization of former party bosses (those politicians from other communities who had been in the ruling party, KANU, but had been thrown out), resentment by both Kikuyu and Luo elites against the 'Kalenjinization' of the state, the protest of human rights activists and radicalized, urban, educated youth against authoritarianism, and the political alienation of the (mainly Kikuyu) unemployed and informally employed in Nairobi and the smaller towns of Central Province. Following a protracted two year campaign, this was to result in Moi's reluctant restoration of multi-partyism, and the holding of Kenya's first competitive general election since independence on 29 December, 1992<sup>98</sup>.

The return to competitive multi-party politics in Kenya in 1992 took place against the stiff opposition from the ruling political elite, the ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU), and the government. Confronted with the prospects of an open political process, in which political institutions would have to be rendered more accountable, the ruling political elite responded by politicizing ethnicity, and launching a series of ethnic cleansings as witnessed in the Rift Valley Province between 1991 and 1992<sup>99</sup>. This was so because Moi and fellow Kalenjins perceived the calls for multi-partyism as an attempt to remove them and their fragile coalition of minority groups from power at a time of mounting urban social problems (rising crime rate) and economic stagnation (rising unemployment rate). In rural areas, tensions were growing due to the rapid population growth, accompanied by environmental degradation and unequal land distribution. The elites therefore decided to exploit long-standing inter-ethnic

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<sup>98</sup>Wood G. and Southall R. 'Local Government and the Return to Multi-Partyism in Kenya' *African Affairs*, Vol. 95, No. 381 (Oct., 1996), pp. 501-527

<sup>99</sup>Ajulu R. 'Kenya: One Step Forward, Three Steps Back: The Succession Dilemma': *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 88, *Africa's Future: That Sinking Feeling* (Jun., 2001), pp. 197-212

grievances over land to secure their tenuous political position: they aimed to stabilize their base, to mobilize new supporters from among those who hoped for access to land as a reward for their participation in violent activities, and to co-opt or crush political opponents. A report by Human Rights Watch-Africa similarly observed: "the (Moi) government ... capitalized on unaddressed issues of land ownership and tenure, dating back to the colonial period" and further "... manipulated these pressing problems to polarize ethnic sentiments to its political and economic advantage<sup>100</sup>.

Therefore, in a desperate bid to stay in power, the Moi regime sought to discredit the democratization process and consolidate his rule by orchestrating ethnic violence in Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Western Provinces. To accomplish this, state elites capitalized on and manipulated a set of demographically, environmentally, and historically rooted land grievances involving pastoral groups (the Kalenjin, Maasai, Samburu, and Turkana) and farmers from other ethnic communities (the Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhya, and Luo) who had moved onto traditionally pastoral land during the colonial and postcolonial periods. Here, Kenya's exclusive political institutions played a permissive role in the onset of violence by leaving state elites relatively unconstrained to pursue their narrow interests and pit ethnic groups against one another. In addition, the high level of groupness in Kenya's countryside, where discrete ethnic groups represent the key form of social identification, made it easier for state elites to mobilize conflict groups. The ethnic clashes began on October 29, 1991, at Meteitei farm, a cooperative located in the Nandi District of Rift Valley Province near the borders of Nyanza and Western Provinces. The Meteitei farm

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<sup>100</sup> Rose L.L. 'African Elites' Land Control Maneuvers' *Études rurales*, No. 163/164, *Terre Territoire Appartenances* (Jul. - Dec., 2002), pp.187-213

was similar to thousands of other cooperatives formed as a result of the redistribution of white settler land. Meteitei was jointly owned by 310 Kalenjin and 280 non-Kalenjin farmers (Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhya, and Luo). Violence erupted on the farm after Kalenjin members of the collective, with encouragement from local administrators and politicians, claimed sole ownership of the land and expelled non-Kalenjins. Those who refused to leave were killed or had their houses and property destroyed<sup>101</sup>.

Within days, the fighting escalated. Strife quickly spread from Nandi to neighboring Kericho District. Soon, ongoing ethnic fighting was affecting large areas running along the borders of Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Western Provinces. The main targets were the Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhya, and Luo communities living in "Kalenjin areas." In 1992 the violence spread south to Kisumu District (Nyanza Province) and Nakura District (Rift Valley Province), and north to Kakamega and Bungoma Districts (Western Province), the Burnt Forest area near Eldoret in UasinGishu District (Rift Valley Province), Trans Nzoia (on the border of Rift Valley and Western Provinces), and the border area of West Pokot and Trans Nzoia Districts (Rift Valley Province). Ethnic strife did not end when elections were held in December 1992. Large organized attacks by Kalenjins continued in many areas. Kikuyus, however, were increasingly singled out. In 1993 the violence was concentrated in the Trans Nzoia and Bungoma Districts of Rift Valley and Western Provinces, the Molo and Burnt Forest areas of Nakura District and Uasin Gishu District, both in Rift Valley Province, and spread to the previously unaffected Narok District in the south of the Rift Valley, where members of the Maasai community attacked Kikuyu farms. The violence fed on itself through a vicious spiral of fear, pre-emption and retaliation. Kalenjin attacks inspired reprisals by Kikuyus and others, contributing to further Kalenjin attacks, and so on. Within the

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<sup>101</sup> *Society Magazine*, Weekly Issue No.14 June 1, 1992 pp. 14-16 'Terror Unleashed' by Laban G. Gitau

first six months of fighting, the Catholic Church estimated that ethnic strife had displaced approximately 100,000 people. All told, Africa Watch estimates that between 1991 and 1993 at least 1,500 people were killed and 300,000 displaced by ethnic clashes<sup>102</sup>.

The opposition in Kenya was therefore ethnicized as Kikuyu, no doubt because the leading and most threatening candidates, such as the current President Mwai Kibaki (elected in December 2002), were Kikuyu. This violence appeared deliberately aimed at discrediting the opposition, which was accused of perpetrating the violence. Indeed, Moi had been warning that multiparty politics in Kenya would bring tribal warfare, and the "ethnic clashes" seemed to fulfill the president's dire predictions. The violence also caught the opposition off guard and destabilized key areas of support. Indeed, as the violence persisted up to the first multiparty elections in 1992, key voters became internally displaced and hence disenfranchised; some areas were effectively "emergency zones" sealed off from anyone except the government<sup>103</sup>. This was ultimately aimed at ensuring that the opposition got no votes in the Rift-Valley thus reducing its total national votes. It would also lead to dispossession of land owned by these 'outsiders'.

### 3.6 Elites in the Ethnic Conflicts

In the carrying out of these ethnic conflicts, ethnic elites feature prominently as the fulcrum of the conflicts. The elites were working to counter what they perceived as an effort by the elites from the communities associated with opposition political parties to take over power from their ethnic community. At the same time, they were out to dispossess the 'opposition' communities, especially of their land. Even some former Kalenjin leaders such as former speaker of the

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<sup>102</sup> Kahl H.C. 'Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: The Case of Kenya, 1991-93' *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Autumn, 1998), pp. 80-119

<sup>103</sup> Zuern E. and Klopp M.J. 'The Politics of Violence in Democratization: Lessons from Kenya and South Africa' *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Jan., 2007), pp. 127-146

National Assembly, Samuel arap Ng'eny, former MPs William Murgor and Henry Cheboiwo accused senior Kalenjins politicians of causing the ethnic conflicts in the Rift Valley through their inciting pro-federalism speeches issued at public rallies<sup>104</sup>.

Testifying before a Special Parliamentary Committee on the ethnic conflict, witnesses from Meteitei farm implicated some prominent figures in the then Kenyan government. They suggested that these politicians had incited local people to fight through "utterances urging the Kalenjin (the president's ethnic affiliation) to remove *madoadoa* (stains) from the area. Furthermore, they claimed that these politicians had transported warriors to the area and paid them for each person. New "shareholders" in the Land Buying Company, who had taken over the vacated land, were linked to these politicians. Similar eyewitness accounts of such "clashes", as the conflicts were referred to, would be repeated in different parts of the country as "ethnic clashes" spread, marring Kenya's transition to a multi-party political system. The timing of the "clashes" (immediately prior to the 1992 multi-party elections), the highly complicit behavior of many actors within the Kenyan government, and the testimony of numerous witnesses, all strongly suggest that the violence was part of a strategy to counter the onset of political liberalization in Kenya. Kenya's ruling clique continued to generate and benefit from a series of localized "clashes" in its struggle to remain in power. They also intensified their rhetoric, filling it with dark suggestions of violence. Ethnicizing the opposition as Kikuyu, the speakers made the implications of majimboism (federalism) clear when they asserted that all those Kikuyu settled in the Rift Valley province would have to pack up and resettle in Central Province. A member of parliament, Willy Kamuren, warned government critics to move out of Kalenjin areas for "with majimboism, they would all be required to go back to their motherland". Hinting at the potential

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<sup>104</sup> *Society Magazine*, Weekly Issue No. 12, May 18, 1992 pp.17-18 'Kalenjins Speak Out' by Mukalo Wa Kwayera

redistribution of land to Kalenjin government supporters, another MP, Kimunai Soi, told the audience that, "all outsiders who have acquired our land will have to move and leave our land to our children. Yet another MP directly advocated violence, saying that the residents of the Kalenjin districts were ready to take up arms against the multi-party proponents and had been restrained from doing so only by the president. The implication was, of course, that if the president gave the word, they were ready to cleanse the Rift Valley of "outsiders," taken en masse to be government critics<sup>105</sup>.

In the same vein of elite incitement, ethnic clashes were experienced in the Burnt Forest area in December, 1992, a few weeks to the General elections. Tensions in this area began after a tense standoff between Dr. Joseph Misoi, a Kalenjin who was vying for a parliamentary seat on a Kanu ticket and Julius Chomba, a Kikuyu, who was vying on a Ford-Asili ticket. At an earlier press conference, Dr. Misoi had said that Kanu would do everything to ensure no opposition candidate contested. This was in reference to Chomba. Another politician, Uashin Gishu Kanu branch chairman; Jakson Kibor had told a meeting in Eldoret that non-indigenous residents of the district should leave politics to the indigenous people<sup>106</sup>. The indigenous here referred to the Kalenjins who were the majority and they were competing, politically, against the Kikuyus, who were settlers in this area. Residents in the area claimed that the fight was ignited by the utterances of the two politicians. Eight people died and several houses were burnt. This was according to the then permanent secretary in charge of internal security, Wilfred Kimalat.

The Maasai community was equally not left behind in engaging in ethnic conflicts. As shown earlier, they were on the side of the Kalenjins. Those who engaged in this were led by a

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<sup>105</sup> Klopp M.J. 'Ethnic Clashes' and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya's Electoral Despotism' *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines*. Vol.35, No. 3 (2001), pp. 473-517

<sup>106</sup> *The Weekly Review*, December 18, 1992 pp.16 'Ethnic Clashes: An Intensified Outbreak'

prominent Maasai politician, William Ole Ntimama. Ntimama's agitation began on March 1991 at a majimbo rally held in his constituency, Narok North, home to many Kikuyu migrants. Attended by a number of prominent KANU ministers and MPs, including key figures in the president's inner circle, it was nothing less than an impressive show of power. Once again, Ntimama targeted the Kikuyu, calling them inciters and agitators and accusing them of acquiring Maasai land by dubious means. It was at this rally that the KANU parliamentarian issued his infamous order for the Kikuyu in Narok to "lie low like envelopes or face the consequences". Confronted with outrage by opposition activists, the president stood by his client<sup>107</sup>. This politician feared losing in the General elections and hence combined his accusation of land grabbing with telling non-Maasais in Narok (mostly targeting Kikuyus) not to register as voters. He thus further asked Maasais to take up spears and *njora* (swords) and chop non-Maasais<sup>108</sup>. The bad blood between Ole Ntimama and the Kikuyus would later resurface in the Kenyan parliament in the year 2000 when he was accused by two MPs from the Kikuyu community, Kamau Thirikwa (Ndaragwa) and Joshua Toro (Kandara) of intimidating the Kikuyu community from participating in the succession debate. This was in reference to an earlier remark in which Ole Ntimama had said that a Kikuyu clique wanted to topple him from leadership<sup>109</sup>.

Apart from inciting members of their ethnic communities into violence, hardliners in KANU, including high-level cabinet ministers, hired violence specialists from the army and police. In both cases these state-sanctioned networks of Special Forces directly planned and orchestrated violence to strengthen the position of the incumbent party. Violence by Special Forces was

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<sup>107</sup> Klopff M.J. 'Ethnic Clashes' and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya's Electoral Despotism' *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines*, Vol.35, No. 3 (2001), pp. 473-517

<sup>108</sup> *Society Magazine*, Weekly Issue No. 19, July 6, 1992 pp.37-39 "Being 'Slept On'" by Macharia Mugo

<sup>109</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspaper 17 February, 2000



therefore more aimed at protecting the status quo by ensuring victory in the newly competitive elections and strictly controlling any formal process of change; in this way violence was employed both as a positioning and a derailing strategy<sup>110</sup>.

Ethnicity in Kenya therefore became a handy tool in the hands of the Moi regime. When ethnic communities set themselves on a course of hostility and conflict between one another; it is the political carrion crows who gain from such conflicts by strengthening their domination over all the people irrespective of ethnicity<sup>111</sup>.

### 3.7 Institutionalization of Violence and Threats by Elites

The success of Kenya's "ethnic clashes," including the minimal international cost of the violence, encouraged the use of large-scale violence. The threat of future massacres became a routine aspect of Kenyan politics, and "ethnic clashes" now became part of the elite bargaining process. Two examples illustrate this argument. In 1997, just as pressure was building for constitutional reform, "ethnic clashes" broke out on the Coast and in the Rift Valley. KANU's bargaining position was thus strengthened since a number of opposition MPs, fearing large-scale violence, broke from a hard-line position in constitutional negotiations and agreed to a much weaker package of reforms. Indeed, this technique was used again after the December 1997 elections. When presidential runner-up Mwai Kibaki (the current President of Kenya) challenged the electoral results through the courts, he was warned by the then President Moi's highest patronage bosses through a new spate of *majimbo* rallies to drop the petition. As one prominent Rift Valley politician cautioned at one such rally, "Kibaki's petition is being viewed as an affront

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<sup>110</sup> Zuern E. and Klopp M.J. 'The Politics of Violence in Democratization: Lessons from Kenya and South Africa' *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Jan., 2007), pp. 127-146

<sup>111</sup> Sullivan B.D. 'Kenya: The Trial of Koigiwa Wamwere et al.' *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 22, No. 64 (Jun., 1995), pp. 262-267

not just to Moi, but to the entire Kalenjin community," and hence it will "directly affect relations with the Kikuyu". Shortly after, a new round of "ethnic clashes" emerged in Laikipia, directed against migrants from Kibaki's home area of Nyeri<sup>112</sup>.

Another threat came in the form of the word *majimbo*. *Majimbo* has appeared recurrently in the foregoing discourse as the clarion call of the Kalenjin elites in those early days of multi-party politics. These elites were propagating the *majimbo* system as an alternative to the multiparty proposal advocated by proponents of political pluralism. Substantively, the call for *majimbo* was a modification to that proposal, since it accepted political change as inevitable but sought to proclaim separate regions, where each party, presumably a "one-tribe party," would hold sway. The politicians announced they would introduce a *majimbo* constitution if the multiparty advocates persisted in their crusade for what the incumbent regime saw simply as majoritarian rule. A number of KANU's ideas underlined the centrality of ethnic citizenship, especially its rights and obligations and the limits placed on the rights of "others" in an ethnic homeland, notwithstanding liberal citizenship rights endowed by the state. Kalenjin politicians led the mass meetings in adopting "resolutions" committing the Kalenjin to ban a host of multiparty advocates from venturing into Rift Valley Province and asserting that "Kalenjins were not cowards and that they were ready to counter attempts to relegate them from leadership using any weapons at their disposal"<sup>113</sup>.

Moreover, the *majimbo* rallies introduced a new lexicon of difference and intimidation, especially with reference to rights of access to and settlement on land and rights of political participation in selected regions. For instance, *madoadoa* (spots) and *kwekwe* (blemishes)

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<sup>112</sup> Klopp M.J. 'Ethnic Clashes' and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya's Electoral Despotism' *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines*, Vol.35, No. 3 (2001), pp. 473-517

<sup>113</sup> *Society Magazine*, Weekly Issue No. 5 March 30, 1992 pp.12-15 'The Killing Fields' by Mwenda Njoka

referred to "contamination" of the ancestral lands of the Kalenjin and Maasai in the Rift Valley region by migrant ethnic groups (especially Kikuyu). These new settlers were also termed as *chui* (leopards), a more insidious reference to the interlopers as land-grabbers. These references suggested the need to cleanse the regions of non-indigenous groups. With regard to political participation, KANU politicians declared areas in the Rift Valley where the Kalenjin and Maasai were the majority or could claim nativity as exclusive "KANU Zones." In these areas, advocates of multiparty democracy and opposition politicians were banned from campaigning, and non-native residents were cautioned against voting for opposition politicians. The implication was that "settlers" without ethnic citizenship in the communities of the Rift Valley could not exercise their national citizenship rights in these areas<sup>114</sup>. Therefore, these elites conveyed ideas about the "proper" ethnic composition of land communities (encouraging a renewed ethnic homogeneity) and about the historical and cultural boundaries of the territory which encompassed these land communities. Their goals were to create the ideological and practical basis for consolidated local land communities within the larger political territory, to enlarge the membership of these communities, and finally, to ensure that the members of these communities would support them in the political arena<sup>115</sup>.

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<sup>114</sup> Ndegwa N.S. 'Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics': *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 3 (Sep., 1997), pp. 599-616

<sup>115</sup> Rose L.L. 'African Elites' Land Control Maneuvers' *Études rurales*, No. 163/164, *Terre Territoire Appartenances* (Jul. - Dec., 2002), pp.187-213

### 3.8 Summary of the 1990s Ethnic Conflicts

As a summary of what took place in the ethnic conflicts that were experienced in the Rift Valley, the Akiwumi Commission noted that in each clash area, non-Kalenjin or non-Maasai, as the case may be, were suddenly attacked, their houses set on fire, their properties looted and in certain instances, some of them were either killed or severely injured with traditional weapons like bows and arrows, spears, pangas, swords and clubs. The raiders were well organized and coordinated. Their attacks were generally under the cover of darkness, and where the attackers were in broad daylight, the raiders would smear their faces with clay to conceal their identities. The attackers targeted mainly the Kikuyu, but also the Kisii, the Luhya, and the Luo, other non-Kalenjin and non-Maasai communities were not spared. The attacks were barbaric, callous and calculated to drive out the targeted groups from their farms, to cripple them economically and to psychologically traumatize them. The commission concluded that there were three underlying causes for the conflicts. The first one was the ambition by the Kalenjins to recover what they thought they had lost when the Europeans forcibly acquired their ancestral land. Secondly, they had the desire to remove “foreigners”, derogatorily referred to as *madoadoaor* “spots” from their midst. The reference was mainly towards the Kikuyu, Kisii, Luo and other communities who had found permanent residence in the Rift Valley. Finally; they were caused by political and ethnic loyalty<sup>116</sup>. However, it is good to remember that all happenings were designed and executed by the elites who were pretending to be representing the people while they were actually pursuing their selfish urge of retaining political power.

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<sup>116</sup>The Akiwumi Commission Report on Tribal Clashes in the Rift-Valley, 1999.

### 3.9 The 2007/2008 Ethnic Conflicts in Kenya

The growing politicization and proliferation of violence in Kenya over the years, specifically the institutionalization of violence following the legalization of multi-party democracy in 1991 continued to grow. Over time, this deliberate use of violence by politicians to obtain power since the early 1990s, plus the decision not to punish perpetrators led to a culture of impunity and a constant escalation of violence. This, in turn, caused a further diffusion of violence in the country, which went outside of the control of the State and its security agencies. Thus, violence became a factor not just of elections but in everyday life. What this means in practice is that violence became widespread and could be tapped for a variety of reasons, including but not exclusively to win elections. This is an issue that played a role in perpetrating the ethnic violence that was experienced in Kenya in the year 2007 to 2008<sup>117</sup>. It is worth noting that even after Kenya experienced this worst round of ethnic conflicts, it seemed like the culture of impunity was still being entertained by some powerful sections of the political class even after witnessing the consequences of impunity. In 2008, when there was a clamour from most Kenyans and from around the world for justice to be done in relation to crimes committed in the post-election violence, President Kibaki seemed to think otherwise. He argued that punitive action against those named as suspects by the Waki (CIPEV) report should not be allowed to blind the need for national unity, political stability and reconciliation. This made Kofi Annan, the lead mediator in the Kenyan conflict, to say that the tendency to protect perpetrators for the sake of peace led to impunity and this had to be discouraged<sup>118</sup>. Cabinet ministers and government officials accused of crimes against humanity by the CIPEV report were still in office with the argument that thorough investigations had to be conducted to find them guilty if they were to step aside. This

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<sup>117</sup>The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) in Kenya (Waki Report), 2008

<sup>118</sup>*Daily Nation* Newspaper Tuesday, October 21, 2008 pp.1-2 'Poll Violence: Kibaki hints at amnesty' by Bernard Namunane

was after a deal was struck by MPs from across the Kenyan political divide. Under normal circumstances, those suspected of wrongdoing are required to leave office so as not to interfere with investigations<sup>119</sup>. It was this culture of impunity that had contributed to the 2007/2008 conflicts and it was, ironically, still being propagated.

The above mentioned issues were coupled with the perception on the part of the public that given the power of the president and the political class, everything flows not from laws but from the President's power and personal decisions. This also led the public to believe that a person from their own tribe must be in power, both to secure for them benefits and as a defensive strategy to keep other ethnic groups, should these take over power, from taking jobs, land and entitlements. This might explain why the residents of Mwingi took to the streets in song and dance when Kalonzo Musyoka, a politician from the area was appointed the Vice President after the contested 2007 elections<sup>120</sup>. While they were celebrating, riots broke out in Kisumu, Mathare slums and Kariobangi North, with Raila Odinga's supporters protesting as they felt that Kalonzo was taking advantage and benefiting from Raila's problems as he (Raila) had been declared a loser in the contested 2007 General elections, which they believed he had won but rigged out. The above perception led to acquisition of presidential power being seen both by politicians and the public as a zero sum game, in which losing is seen as hugely costly and is not accepted.

Hence, there was a tendency on the part of a variety of political actors to do anything, including engaging in violence to obtain or retain political power, leading to what one specialist has called a 'race to the bottom' because of a fear of being dominated by other ethnic groups and being subjected to the associated consequences of that. This created a climate of fear and suspicions which politicians easily exploited and used to mobilize violence. Furthermore, the failure of

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<sup>119</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspapers, Wednesday, January 28, 2009 pp.1-2 'Victory for ministers in Waki envelope' by Bernard Namunane

<sup>120</sup> *Daily Nation* Wednesday, January 9, 2008 pp.1-2 'Kalonzo is new VP' BY Eric Shimoli

President Kibaki and his first government to exert political control over the country or to maintain sufficient legitimacy as would have allowed a civilized contest with him at the polls to be possible caused more trouble. Kibaki's regime failed to unite the country, and allowed feelings of marginalization to fester into what became the post-election violence. He and his then government were complacent in the support they considered they would receive in any election from the majority Kikuyu community and failed to heed the views of the legitimate leaders of other communities<sup>121</sup>. For instance, in 2007 and before the General elections, Charity Ngilu, a politician from the Kamba community and who had supported Kibaki in the 2002 General elections, claimed that Kibaki could not be trusted as he had betrayed other politicians such as she and Raila who had fought very hard for him to occupy State House by campaigning in the year 2002 elections<sup>122</sup>. The politicians Ngilu was referring to belonged to ethnic communities different from Kibaki's Kikuyu and who felt shortchanged by Kibaki.

All of the above factors dove tailed to make the competition for political power to be so stiff and hence made violence to be the method of choice to resolve a range of political differences and to obtain political power. Furthermore, because the violence surrounding elections had been ethnically directed, this increased distrust among different groups and vastly eroded any sense of national identity. Hence, ethnicity took on a dangerous and negative connotation. It thus followed that in the 2007 elections, even before Mwai Kibaki was officially declared the winner of Kenya's presidential vote, parts of Kenya's Rift Valley erupted into widespread inter-ethnic violence<sup>123</sup>.

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<sup>121</sup> The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) in Kenya (Waki Report), 2008

<sup>122</sup> *Sunday Nation*, November 11, 2007 p.20 'The president betrayed other leaders: Ngilu' by Peter Ngetich and Barnabas Bii

<sup>123</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspaper, Tuesday March 18, 2008 pp. 1 and 4-5 'Violence was planned before poll, says report' by NATION Team

The epicenter of the first wave of Rift Valley violence was in and around the town of Eldoret. Tensions over land ownership and other issues had long been a source of mistrust and violence between the majority Kalenjin population around Eldoret and the area's Kikuyu minority. In fact, the conflict in this region and the wider Rift Valley province evolved into a broader settling of scores over issues including land rights<sup>124</sup>. In fact, after the conflicts, that is in 2008, internally displaced people from the Rift Valley province feared going back to the province after hate leaflets surfaced warning non-Kalenjins, especially Kikuyus and Kisiiis (those who had returned) to vacate their farms in the event that the government went ahead to evict illegal settlers from the Mau forest<sup>125</sup>. This incident indicates that the concerned Kalenjin residents of the Rift Valley province were really interested in the land owned by the unwanted settlers and hence could use any available excuse to go for the land. This was reconfirmed when MPs from the province resisted a move by President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga to resettle, in the province, some 150,000 people living in camps for the internally displaced. They argued that more time was needed to prepare the ground for the return. These were Kalenjin MPs from the North and South Rift of the province. On the other hand, Kikuyu MPs from the Central Rift of the same province demanded that the IDPs should be resettled unconditionally<sup>126</sup>. This resistance can only be tied to the issue of land in the province.

Going back to the period before the ethnic conflicts, tensions were exacerbated by the sharp ethnic lines drawn between opposing camps during the 2007 electoral campaign. Locally, support for the ODM was overwhelming among the Kalenjin while support for Kibaki's PNU was equally prevalent among the Kikuyu population. The delays in the counting of votes and

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<sup>124</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspaper, Tuesday January 29, 2008 pp. 1-2 'Annan's peace agenda' by Bernard Namunane'

<sup>125</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspaper, Wednesday October 29, 2008 p.4 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani a flop, says rights agency' by Oliver Mathenge

<sup>126</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspaper, Wednesday April 23, 2008 pp.1-2 'Kibaki-Raila face off with Rift Valley MPs' by Bernard Namunane



rampant rumors about the imminent rigging of the election sparked attacks primarily directed at members of Kibaki's Kikuyu ethnic group. That violence in turn spawned a series of ethnic-based reprisal attacks in other parts of the country, with Kikuyu militias attacking other ethnic communities seen as broadly supportive of the opposition. Up to 500,000 people were displaced in this violence and over 1,000 killed<sup>127</sup>. Apart from the Kikuyu reprisal attacks in Naivasha and Nakuru, there were other incidents recorded elsewhere though they were not as bloody as the two mentioned cases. In the Naivasha attacks, 26 people had been burnt to death through arson in just three days of attacks while 84 were recorded dead in a similar period of attacks<sup>128</sup>. In Thika town, youths armed with pangas and rungas were moving from house to house targeting people from outside the province, that is non-Kikuyus<sup>129</sup>.

In this 2007/2008 post-election violence, there was serious political manipulation of ethnic tensions during the campaigns. Around Eldoret town, for instance, many Kalenjin politicians stoked ethnic tensions to mobilize political support among their ethnic kinsmen, a tactic familiar to Kenyan politics. To cite just one of many typical examples, a Kalenjin councillor reportedly told a rally in the town of Soi that, if elected, the ODM would "remove the roots" of local Kikuyu communities "so there would be only one tribe there." One locally-prominent Kalenjin politician acknowledged to Human Rights Watch that, "Some ODM politicians would say, 'we have a snake we have to get rid of.' It was a clear metaphor for the Kikuyu. They seemed not to see the repercussions of this. Largely as a result of this ethnic rhetoric, many Kalenjin supporters believed that once elected, the ODM would find a way to redistribute most or all land owned by the Kikuyu to them. Human Rights Watch interviewed several Kalenjin involved in anti-Kikuyu

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<sup>127</sup>The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) in Kenya (Waki Report), 2008

<sup>128</sup>*Daily Nation* Newspapers, Tuesday January 29, 2008 pp.1-2 'Annan's peace agenda' by Bernard Namunane

<sup>129</sup>*Daily Nation* Newspaper, Wednesday January 30, 2008 p.7 'Man shot dead as panic spreads in Central region' by NATION Team

violence who said they were merely doing by force what they had been denied a chance to do through the ballot box. It is also good to note that divisive campaigning did not by itself cause existing ethnic tensions to boil over into violence. But in the days prior to the election, local elders and ODM organizers in many communities around Eldoret called meetings where they declared that electoral victory for Kibaki would be the signal for "war" against local Kikuyu. They told community members a PNU victory should be seen as conclusive proof of electoral fraud and that all Kikuyu were complicit in it<sup>130</sup>. To further illustrate the role played by local politicians in inciting their ethnic supporters into violence, there is the case of an Eldoret politician, Jackson Kibor, who was later charged, in 2008, in a Nakuru court with incitement to violence. He was accused of having said that the Kikuyu community voted for Kibaki and therefore the Kalenjin community was fighting them so that Kibaki could feel the pinch. He further stated that they wanted to drive the Kikuyus out of the Rift Valley and unite Kenya's 41 tribes and have the Kikuyus on their own<sup>131</sup>.

The ethnic nature of political parties in Kenya did not help the situation at hand; it only exacerbated the existing problem. As political parties hold different ideologies or rather campaign slogans, their followers, who are mostly drawn from certain ethnic communities, go along with them. Therefore, party ideologies end up being ethnic ideologies. In the 2007 elections, President Kibaki, heading the Party of National Unity (PNU) ticket and drawing his support mainly from the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru communities of Central and central Eastern provinces, campaigned principally on his socio-economic record. Mr. Odinga at the head of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), with the support of largely the Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin and some smaller ethnic communities, vocalized the need for fundamental political and socio-

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<sup>130</sup> Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya's Crisis of Governance. A report by Human Rights Watch

<sup>131</sup> Daily Nation Newspapers, Wednesday February 27, 2008

economic reform and devolution of state power. Although the emphasis was more pronounced at the civic and parliamentary levels, and in the rural areas, the ethnic configuration of the PNU and the ODM, and the origins of the two main contenders in the presidential contest, remained a factor. It therefore comes out clearly that these two presidential candidates had solid ethnic blocs behind them which were just waiting for the slightest provocation for them to erupt. This political divide remained even after the conflicts had ended. It was not once that cabinet ministers and other politicians aligned to the ODM party and led by their party leader, demanded the release of all the youths (arrested in ODM political zones such as the Rift Valley and Western provinces) held in custody over accusations of getting involved in the post-election violence<sup>132</sup>. However, this demand later moved on from being a party issue to being an ethnic one. Kalenjin MPs from the Rift Valley province, a region that was heavily affected, came out in defence of 'their' people against accusations of being behind the chaos. As they did this, MPs from other communities declared that those responsible for the violence had to face the consequences. This further serves to show the deep differences that existed between political parties as well as the ethnic communities which they were made up of<sup>133</sup>.

Another thing that contributed to the eruption of violence was ethnic hate speech and stereotyping which was propagated and communities living outside their "indigenous" provinces were threatened with eviction as well as 'zoning' which meant that dominant parties' strongholds were out of bounds to the opposing party candidates. Incessant claims of rigging and highly inflammatory language were heard several months before the polls. Some weeks to polling day, there were a number of reports of party supporters being maimed or killed for wearing their party apparel or campaigning in opposition territory. The media, especially the

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<sup>132</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspaper, Tuesday May 20, 2008 p.2 '130 held over post-poll violence' by Fred Mukinda

<sup>133</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspaper, Monday September 2008 p.2 'Ministers deny violence claim' by Bernard Ngunjiri

electronic one also played a role in worsening already existing ethnic hatred. Words and phrases such as "settlers", "let's claim our land", "people of the milk to cut grass", "mongoose has come and stolen our chicken", *madoadoa* and "get rid of weeds" aired by a certain ethnic radio station and songs such as "talking very badly about beasts from the west", "Kijji" and the song sung in Kikuyu dialect on Kikuyu language FM stations which implied that Odinga is a murderer, power hungry and does not care about other tribes but only his own tribe, and that Luos are lazy, they do not work, they do not pay rent and that they are hooligans, were received by Kenyans with mixed feelings. Luo stations also played a song "the leadership of the baboons" which vilified the Mount Kenya<sup>134</sup>. All these worked in combination with the factors mentioned earlier on to lead to the worst spate of ethnic conflicts in Kenya which fundamentally reshaped the history of this country.

### 3.10 Conclusion

From the foregoing discourse, it has come out clearly that ethnicity has been a potent issue in Kenya especially in determining the day to day politics in the country. It is also a vital tool in the operations of Kenyan politicians who use it to manipulate the masses for their own benefit. Unfortunately; these manipulations have at times led to ethnic conflicts which result in massive losses of life and destruction of property as was witnessed in the 1990s and in 2007/2008. Through these conflicts, the elites are the ultimate beneficiaries. They carry their own selfish and personal grouses and make them appear as if they are communal issues. They hence use their own means to manipulate and use their tribesmen to fight their wars with devastating results for these non-elite members of their ethnic communities. It is this manipulation that has left this researcher wondering what makes these ordinary members of ethnic communities so

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<sup>134</sup>The Independent Review Commission Report (IREC)-(Kriegler Report) on the 2007 Kenyan General Elections-2008

vulnerable to the machinations of these elites. Is it their low levels of education? This is the big question to be answered by this research.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### 4.0 CRITICAL ANALYSIS

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter will contain a critical analysis of the findings of this study. Findings generated by both secondary and primary sources will be integrated and/or juxtaposed critically with the literature reviewed in an attempt to answer the research questions. The discussion in this chapter will be conducted under identified themes. Each theme to be discussed was identified by relating a particular trend of characteristics reflected by both the secondary and primary data. The themes to be discussed are: manipulation by elites, unemployment, poverty and ethnic conflicts; state resources and ethnic conflicts as well as land and ethnic conflicts. After examining these themes, the last part before conclusion will be analyzing the cross cutting role of elites in all identified causes of ethnic conflicts.

#### 4.2 Manipulation by Elites

Elites, especially political elites, have been accused of fanning ethnic conflicts across the globe. They have been known to exploit ethnic identities for their own selfish gains<sup>135</sup>. In doing this, their main aim is usually to acquire and/or maintain political power. These elites apply various tactics in order to achieve their objectives. They can decide to engage in inflammatory discourse, including the use of history and myth<sup>136</sup>. These myths are usually meant to inflame passions which lead to the eruption of ethnic conflicts. Whichever tactic they use, the end result is that

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<sup>135</sup>Okwudiba N. ed. *Ethnic Conflicts in Africa* Nottingham:CODESRIA,1998

<sup>136</sup>DebrajR.and Esteban J. 'On the Salience of Ethnic Conflict' *American Economic Review* 2008,98:5,2185-2202

these ethnic conflicts erupt due to the mobilization carried out by elites. It is they, who, in their competition for power, mobilize ethnic groups into conflicts in pursuit of private interests<sup>137</sup>.

This study found out political elites as the culprits behind ethnic conflicts in Kenya. In both urban centres and rural areas, politicians were pointed out as the ones who incited and paid people to fight others during the 2007/2008 ethnic conflicts in Kenya. This was also true for the conflicts witnessed in 1992 and 1997. They would simply dish out money and also promise other goodies that would be delivered after the fighting. The youths fighting in the conflicts were given money and promised even more after the fighting. In fact, some politicians promised money based on the number of people killed. This really motivated the fighters to engage in killing. In 2008, a retired assistant commissioner of police was arrested on suspicion of financing and directing the burning of houses that left 3,000 people displaced in Gituamba area, Saboti constituency in Trans Nzoia county<sup>138</sup>. This further illustrates the involvement of elites in financing ethnic conflicts.

On top of the money given, the politicians also engaged in incitement and hate speech. In their incitement, they engaged in playing around with ethnic symbols<sup>139</sup> which fueled hatred and eventually led to ethnic violence. For instance, in Matunda area, near Eldoret, local Kalenjin political leaders were instructing Kalenjin youths to go and uproot *sangara* (a stubborn weed) that had grown amongst them and wanted to cling to power. This term was in reference to the Kikuyu community that was evicted from the area in the 2007/2008 ethnic conflict. In Naivasha area, members of the Kikuyu community were told that the enemy was any Luo as they were the

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<sup>137</sup> Sambanis N. 'Do Ethnic and Non-ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?: A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1)' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Jun., 2001), pp. 259- 282

<sup>138</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspaper, Wednesday February 13, 2008 p.8 'Ex-Police chief held over raids' by George Omonso and Kennedy Lumwamu

<sup>139</sup> Debraj R. and Esteban J. 'On the Salience of Ethnic Conflict' *American Economic Review* 2008, 98:5, 2185-2202

ones causing the suffering of the Kikuyus. This led to the killing and eviction of many Luos in Naivasha.

In the conflicts experienced in 1992, especially in the Rift Valley province, Kalenjin politicians were accused of inciting the local people to fight through "utterances urging the Kalenjin (the then president's ethnic affiliation) to remove *madoadoa* (stains) from the area"<sup>140</sup>. Stains referred to non-Kalenjin settler communities in the area. These politicians also transported warriors to the conflict areas and paid them for each person killed. Even some former Kalenjin leaders such as former speaker of the National Assembly, Samuel arap Ng'eny, former MPs William Murgor and Henry Cheboiwo accused senior Kalenjins politicians of causing the ethnic conflicts in the Rift Valley through their inciting pro-federalism speeches issued at public rallies<sup>141</sup>. Prominent Kalenjin political leaders such as Nicholas Biwott, Willy Kamuren and Kimunai Soi were implicated<sup>142</sup> same as Dr. Joseph Misoi and Jackson Kibor<sup>143</sup>. For Biwott, he was not only accused of incitement but the Kiliku Parliamentary Select Committee also accused him of financing the operations of the so-called Kalenjin warriors as well as owning a private army which operated during the clashes<sup>144</sup>. Elites are therefore squarely placed at the centre of causing ethnic conflicts.

After igniting ethnic conflicts, these elites end up being the biggest beneficiaries. They mostly benefit from political power and even if they do not end up benefiting, it is clear that their original intention is usually to benefit politically. This study pointed at the same elites as the greatest beneficiaries of all the ethnic conflicts which have taken place in Kenya. Other findings

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<sup>140</sup> Klopp M.J. 'Ethnic Clashes' and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya's Electoral Despotism' *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines*, Vol.35, No. 3 (2001), pp. 473-517

<sup>141</sup> Society Magazine, Weekly Issue No. 12, May 18, 1992

<sup>142</sup> Klopp M.J. 'Ethnic Clashes' and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya's Electoral Despotism' *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines*, Vol.35, No. 3 (2001), pp. 473-517

<sup>143</sup> *The Weekly Review*, December 18, 1992 pp.16 'Ethnic Clashes: An Intensified Outbreak'

<sup>144</sup> *Society Magazine*, Weekly Issue No.32, October 5, 1992 pp.12-14 'Kalenjin Supremacists' by Blamuel Njururi



have the same conclusion. The conflicts instigated in the Rift Valley province of Kenya were in an effort to help the then ruling party, KANU, associated with the Kalenjin community, to win the first multi-party elections held in 1992. The targeted communities were perceived to be supporters of the then opposition parties which were competing with KANU<sup>145</sup>. This study also reveals that the targeted communities, in the 2007/2008 conflict, were associated with the PNU party that was competing majorly with the ODM party that was associated with the Kalenjin community. The difference however lies in the fact that in 1992, fighting and evictions started before the elections in order to disenfranchise members of the 'opposition' communities while in 2007, conflicts erupted after the elections when the PNU party presidential candidate was declared the winner. The members of the Kalenjin community were not happy and hence decided to attack the victims. To bring in the political elites angle in these Kenya conflicts, it is proper to note that in this 2007/2008 conflict, members of the Luo and Luhya communities were largely safe in the Rift-Valley because they were associated with the ODM party, a party also associated with the Kalenjins<sup>146</sup>. This was unlike 1992, when these communities were attacked by the Kalenjins because they belonged to opposition parties which were being opposed by the Kalenjins.

To further illustrate the elites' benefit from ethnic conflicts, it is seen that after the 2007/2008 conflicts, politicians from both PNU and ODM agreed to share power. In readiness to share power, President Kibaki and Raila Odinga pledged to reunite Kenyans by accepting to allow their parties to take part in mediation talks held under the former UN Secretary General, Kofi

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<sup>145</sup> Kloppe M.J. 'Ethnic Clashes' and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya's Electoral Despotism' *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Etudes Africaines*, Vol.35, No. 3 (2001), pp. 473-517

<sup>146</sup> The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) in Kenya (Waki Report), 2008

Annan<sup>147</sup>. Later on, the political parties under the auspices of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee, agreed on the need to create a premier's position as part of the political settlement<sup>148</sup>. This position was later given to the ODM leader, Raila Odinga and PNU remained with the presidency. This was accompanied with the sharing of ministerial posts along with other government positions between the two parties. Elites benefited a lot from this arrangement. While the elites were in their acquired positions of power, some of the ordinary citizens affected by the conflicts were languishing in camps for the internally displaced with no apparent concern from the elites. In one incident, hundreds of IDPs were tear-gassed by the police in Nairobi as they attempted to see the president and the prime minister. They complained that they were languishing in camps with no food or proper shelter. MPs and Cabinet Ministers, seemingly unperturbed, chatted on their mobile phones as they zoomed past<sup>149</sup>.

Apart from these examples from Kenya, elsewhere there have been cases of elites' involvement in ethnic conflicts for personal gain. This further reinforces this accusation against elites. In Liberia, the members of the ruling group and other elites benefitted from the antagonistic relations of African-Liberians and Americo-Liberians<sup>150</sup>. In the Yugoslavia ethnic conflict of the 1990s, political elites took advantage of the symbolic power that ethnicity offers, and used it as a tool for pursuing territorial, political and economic objectives. Thus, ethnicity became the basis of political mobilization in pursuit of resurgent claims to territory and power. Ethnicity, finally became 'politicized' for the exacerbation of nationalism, the manipulation of which was in turn

<sup>147</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspaper, Wednesday, January 30, 2008 pp.1-2 'Pledge to reunite Kenya' by Bernard Ngunjiri

<sup>148</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspaper, Thursday, February 21, 2008 pp.1 and 5 'Annan team in crucial talks over PM'S role' by NATION Team

<sup>149</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspaper, Wednesday, November 12, 2008 p.8 'Police teargas displaced women' by Casper Waithaka

<sup>150</sup> Okwudibia N. ed. *Ethnic Conflicts in Africa* Nottingham: CODESRIA, 1998

the underlying force of the conflict<sup>151</sup>. In the Niger Delta, in Nigeria, it is suggested that some of the communal conflicts which take place are proxy wars engineered and executed by elites to divide and rule the people of this area. The conflicts in this area, therefore, get an instrumentalist interpretation which emphasizes the role of elites in ethnic mobilization and conflicts<sup>152</sup>.

However, it was found out that for the Kenyan case, there is one distinguishing factor between the political elites operating in urban areas such as Nairobi and Naivasha and those in rural areas such as Molo and Matunda, near Eldoret. While those in urban centres, during the 2007/2008 conflict, were being driven purely by political considerations, those in the rural areas, specifically in the Rift Valley province, also had land issues as another driving force. This can be attributed to the legendary land problems in the Rift-Valley province where there was the ambition by the Kalenjins to recover what they thought they had lost when the Europeans forcibly acquired their ancestral land<sup>153</sup>. The Kalenjins felt that after the exit of the Europeans, their land had been grabbed by 'outsiders'. They therefore referred to as "contamination" of their ancestral lands the settlement, in the Rift-Valley region, by migrant ethnic groups (especially the Kikuyu) who had to be evicted<sup>154</sup>. The elites were therefore motivated by the fact that once the 'outsiders' had been evicted, they would lead their tribesmen in acquiring the vacated land and in the process allocate themselves huge tracts of land through proxies. Therefore, pursuit of political power remains the central goal of all elites engaging in ethnic conflicts though there might be other accompanying objectives depending on the conflict context.

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<sup>151</sup> Sotiropoulou A. 'The Role of Ethnicity in Ethnic Conflicts: The Case of Yugoslavia'. MA in Contemporary European Studies, Euromaster, University of Bath

<sup>152</sup> 'On the Study of Ethnicity in Nigeria' A CRISE Working Paper No.12 by Ukoha Ukiwo: CRISE Scholar, Nigeria, University of Oxford, Department of International Development, Queen Elizabeth House, June 2005

<sup>153</sup> The Akiwumi Commission Report on Tribal Clashes in the Rift-Valley, 1999

<sup>154</sup> Ndegwa N.S. 'Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics': *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 3 (Sep., 1997), pp. 599-616

From this study, however, in relation to the theme under discussion, an issue emerged that seems to have been either unnoticed or overlooked by previous studies. This is because it was not noticed in all the literature reviewed. This is the issue of complicit ethnic masses. All through, the elites have been blamed as the inciters and beneficiaries. It is true they are guilty. However; it is good to note that the people being incited, organized and mobilized are not wholly innocent. It is true they are used as the implementing objects of the elites, but they also have their own independent motivating factors peripheral to those of their elites. When they respond to the call of their elites, they are therefore not exclusively serving their elites' interests but implementing their objectives alongside those of the elites.

In this study, it was found out that in the Rift-Valley province, ordinary members of the Kalenjin community, those who engaged in the actual fighting in the 2007/2008 conflict, immediately occupied land that had been vacated by members of the Kikuyu and Kisii communities among others. They also started grazing on these farms and as well feeding on the farm produce left behind. It is clear it is not the elites who did the actual occupation of land and grazing, but the ordinary villagers. Though some elites also got a share of these resources apart from political gain, a majority of the beneficiaries were the ordinary people who had engaged in the fighting. It therefore comes out clearly that even though the elites ignited and worked to ensure the conflicts were sustained, the masses were motivated by the desire to gain materially. The same case applies to the masses in urban centres. In Huruma area of Nairobi for instance, the marauding tribal gangs had a field day looting, robbing and gaining materially in criminal ways. They therefore had a motivation to remain in the conflict and sustain it. In Mathare North area, police had to be called in after the conflicts to evict people who had illegally occupied houses and refused to pay rent. After the eruption of chaos on December 30, 2007, these people,

predominantly from one ethnic community, had evicted the rightful owners of the houses<sup>155</sup>. In Kiambaa village, Uashin Gishu district, youthful looters descended on property left behind by those who fled the violence. Armed with machetes, the looters were breaking into abandoned houses and seizing valuables left behind<sup>156</sup>. Therefore, in as much as the ethnic masses were responding to the call by their ethnic political elites to engage in conflict, they also had their other driving force, that is, enriching themselves criminally.

However, for the gangs in urban areas, the desire to engage in looting was as a result of the political conflict. The occurrence of the conflict provided an opportunity and conducive environment for engaging in criminal activities. In other words, it is elite political misunderstandings that led to criminal activities that served to satisfy the fighters. In rural areas however, the desire for resources, land to be specific, preceded the political conflicts. This therefore means that those who engaged in the conflict, especially from the Kalenjin community in the Rift-Valley, were not just responding to the call by their elites but were out to fulfill what can be referred to as personal desires to acquire land owned by their 'enemies'.

From the foregoing, we can conclude that elites don't just manipulate disinterested members of their ethnic communities who blindly follow them. Yes, it is true that elites are always out to benefit themselves, especially politically, but their tribes always know that they will benefit in certain ways. In fact, even when engaging in ethnic conflicts that are perceived to be political in nature, ethnic communities do so in the hope that once their tribesmen get to power, they will benefit materially (this will be further looked at under a different theme). Hence elites have an easy time manipulating because they are dealing with equally greedy people who are out to gain

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<sup>155</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspaper, Thursday February 21, 2008 p.2 'Bus set on fire as violence flares over rent dispute' by Fred Mukinda and Richard Munguti

<sup>156</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspaper, Wednesday January 9, 2008 p.9 'Looters reap from victims agony' by Kipchumba Some and George Omonso

unfairly, the only difference being that the elites will eventually get bigger shares as compared to ordinary members of their communities. This finding therefore shows that elites are not entirely to blame neither are they the only beneficiaries of ethnic conflicts. Therefore, the elites carry out their manipulation through the complicity of their ethnic supporters.

### 4.3 Unemployment, Poverty and Ethnic Conflicts

This study found out that those who engaged in the actual fighting in the ethnic conflicts experienced in Kenya, were either unemployed or did low calibre jobs. A big percentage of the unemployed in this category were found in urban centres compared to rural areas. In rural areas, a majority of the actual fighters were small scale farmers, small scale village businessmen as well as low cadre civil servants. For instance, a Kalenjin primary school teacher, who was a civil servant, was among 16 suspects charged in a Nakuru court with the killing of a Kikuyu Catholic priest, Father Michael Kamau at Muserechi trading centre in the Rift Valley province<sup>157</sup>. In urban centres, such as Nairobi, those in employment were working as mechanics, matatu touts and drivers, construction workers, street vendors as well as those in other informal jobs such as barbers. In terms of age, these were people in the age range of 15-35, a group of young people. This was therefore a group with a desire to secure their future and with nothing to turn to. Most of them were also people with nothing to lose as they had no investments and/or families to make them think twice before engaging in conflicts.

The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) in Kenya in 2007/2008, commonly referred to as the Waki commission, also noted that there is a growing population of poor, unemployed and youth, educated and uneducated, who agree to join militias and organized

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<sup>157</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspaper, Monday February 4, 2008 p.3 'Pope prays for peace and tolerance' by NATION Team and Reuters

gangs. These gangs have been alleged to intersect with parts of the Government and the security forces. These groups now have become “shadow governments” in the slums and even in other parts of the country and have been used by politicians to attack their opponents; to secure their own security, and to gain power. Furthermore, these proliferating militias are also said sometimes to dovetail with the State and its security apparatus thereby not only reducing the State’s capacity to control the violence but also increasingly threatening the integrity of the State and the nation. This underlying endemic situation has created a climate where violence is increasingly likely to be used and where its use is increasingly unlikely to be checked<sup>158</sup>. A UN report<sup>159</sup>, released in 2008, noted the possibility of growing urban unrest in a number of African cities, Nairobi included, due to the growing wealth gap. It said that the high levels of inequality could lead to negative social, economic and political consequences. Therefore, considering the foregoing, an unemployed and/or poor population of young people becomes a potent ingredient in facilitating ethnic conflicts.

It is this group of desperate people that was used by the elites in conducting the violence and destruction experienced in the Kenya ethnic conflicts, especially the 2007/2008 which was widespread and even affected major cities such as Nairobi and Mombasa. These people were a soft target for mobilization and manipulation by elites by virtue of the fact that they were in need of financial gain as their occupations, for those who were working, were not giving them much income while the jobless were definitely in need of money for their day to day survival.

According to the findings of this study, these fighters got their pay through handouts from politicians as well as through engaging in criminal activities such as looting in both rural and

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<sup>158</sup>The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) in Kenya(Waki Report),2008

<sup>159</sup>*Daily Nation* Newspaper, Friday October 24,2008

urban centres. In urban centres, retail outlets were targeted, especially those belonging to 'enemy' communities as well as abandoned homes. In rural areas, livestock was driven away and foodstuff taken from granaries and as well harvested from farms then they went ahead to graze their livestock on the farms. In rural areas, it was also noted that communities organized themselves and supported fighters from their midst by feeding them and arming them.

A conclusion can therefore be drawn that unemployment among young people as well as poverty caused by the same cause as well as lowly paying jobs which cannot get a majority in this age group out of poverty, helps in fuelling ethnic conflicts. It fuels it in that these young people have either no sound income or no income at all and therefore they easily fall for handouts and the temptation to engage in these conflicts as they create a conducive environment for carrying out lawless activities which earn them some money. They can therefore be easily turned into marauding bloodthirsty tribal gangs driven by poverty. In the Rwanda and Yugoslavia ethnic conflicts, bands of thugs and bullies were unleashed to engage in bloodshedding. These bands, recruited by political leaders and operating under their general guidance, unleashed terror on 'enemy' ethnic groups<sup>160</sup>. These bands could only have been made up of such young people as those seen in the Kenyan case.

#### **4.4 State Resources and Ethnic Conflicts**

This study showed that each ethnic group that got entangled in the conflicts responded to their elites' call in the hope that these elites would bring back benefits in form of state resources. They therefore went out to fight in order to clinch or maintain political power through their elites who would in turn bring back the benefits of political power to the ethnic masses. The state resource

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<sup>160</sup>Mueller J. 'The Banality of 'Ethnic Conflict'' *International Security* Volume 25, Issue 1, pages.42-70



that was mostly thought of was state employment (jobs). The fighters had been promised jobs by their political elites. Even those who had not been promised believed that by fighting and ensuring that their ethnic elites got power to rule over other ethnic communities would make them benefit from such favours. This therefore served as a great motivator in fuelling the conflicts.

Going back to the elites, we had seen that the elites were the biggest beneficiaries, who benefited by acquiring political power. This is the power that would enable them to control state resources and hence work on redistributing them to their tribesmen who helped them to ascend to power through engaging in conflict. It is therefore worth noting that the elites were not interested in just political power, but political power that put them in control of the state. This is why the fight was between groups of ethnic communities which had coalesced around presidential candidates and their sponsoring political parties. The Kalenjins claimed to be fighting on behalf of ODM while the Kikuyus claimed to be retaliating on behalf of PNU. A case in point is the Rift Valley province where locally, support for the ODM was overwhelming among the Kalenjin while support for Kibaki's PNU was equally prevalent among the Kikuyu population<sup>161</sup>. These two ethnic groups clashed during the conflict.

The aim therefore, of each ethnic group was to gain control of the state apparatus in order to be the ones 'supervising' these resources. For the elites, the intention was to ascend to power or maintain power and continue or start carrying out ethnic patronage using state resources hence ensuring that support is assured from ethnic bases. For the ordinary fighters, they hoped that their ethnic elites who would be overseeing the distribution of state resources would give them priority. Therefore; this aspect of mutual greed, targeting state resources was noted as a factor in

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<sup>161</sup>The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) in Kenya(Waki Report),2008

fuelling ethnic conflicts. In other findings, it has been noted that politicians, especially in African countries, such as Kenya, act as state-sponsored patrons when they get to power and they end up having a powerful distributive role, distributing state resources such as jobs. Such politicians therefore keep on promising state resources if they get to power or if they maintain it<sup>162</sup>. It is clear that such promises can be lethal especially when given to people living in poverty and suffering high rates of unemployment. Such people, especially when given such promises by an elite member of their ethnic community, will strive to do everything and anything within their means to ensure that their patron-to-be gets to power. It will even be worse when they perceive the stumbling block to their elite's ascendancy to power, to be an elite or elites from another ethnic community. This will easily ignite an ethnic conflict as the other elite will be seen as a person vouching for the interests of his ethnic community and hence will end up taking the resources to his people. In such a case, elites are perceived as the torchbearers, carrying the aspirations of their entire communities and therefore any challenge to them is usually deemed as a challenge to the entire group which calls for a group response which in this case means engaging in conflict. This is what happened in Kenya in 2007/2008, according to this study.

When Moi took over power from Kenyatta, he and the Kalenjin elite engaged in plundering state resources in an effort to enrich themselves. In the process, the ordinary members of the Kalenjin ethnic group got some favours along the way. Most favours came in form of state jobs but all the same, it is the political elites who benefited the most. When Henry Kosgey, a Kalenjin, took over the running of KNAC (Kenya National Assurance Corporation), he orchestrated a plundering spree and mismanagement that led to its collapse. Many Kelenjins

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<sup>162</sup>Weinreb A.A. 'First Politics, Then Culture: Accounting for Ethnic Differences in Demographic Behavior in Kenya' *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 2001), pp. 437-467

were quickly employed and it was common for low cadre Kalenjin employees such as illiterate sweepers to earn more than experienced junior clerks. Kalenjins were haphazardly promoted to managerial positions without following any criteria apart from considering ethnicity. The Kalenjin elite greatly benefited by accumulating huge loans whose securities were so doubtful and it were possible for them to be written off as bad debts. Five Kalenjin elites alone owed the company Kshs.522.8 million<sup>163</sup>. Eventually, this government corporation collapsed. This example illustrates how elites use state resources to greatly benefit themselves materially and at the same time use them to buy loyalty from their ethnic supporters. However, even if some sections of the ethnic masses benefit, the ultimate and biggest beneficiaries are the elites.

While ordinary members of an ethnic group look upon their tribal elites to deliver state resources and hence are ready to fight on their behalf in order to get the resources, the elites on the other side are usually interested in sustaining themselves in power and not necessarily in helping their ethnic supporters. The elites will strive to channel state resources to their tribesmen in order to maintain loyal support among them. The elites will therefore use their control of the state to provide differential benefits to their poorer brethren in order to avert the class struggle that would deprive them of their electoral base and threaten a revolutionary transformation of society<sup>164</sup>.

In Ivory Coast, the utilization of ethnic associations by elites to consolidate their own economic and political position in the post-colonial state was perfected. Ethnic groups represented, in essence, coalitions which had been formed as part of rational efforts to secure benefits created by the forces of modernization-benefits which were desired but scarce. Ethnic groups were hence

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<sup>163</sup> *Finance Magazine*, April 15, 1992 pp.38-42 'Kosgey Rapes KNAC'- Investigative Report

<sup>164</sup> Leonard K.D. and Amey B.L. 'Public Policy, Class and Inequality in Kenya and Tanzania' *Africa Today*, Vol.

used by elite factions within the country as political capital in their competition for power and access to limited economic resource. This was a matter of elites using ethnic groups to maximize their material and political interests<sup>165</sup>.

Back to Kenya, the strategy of organizing along ethnic lines for purposes of gaining and/or maintaining political power became intense after the re-introduction of multi-party political system in Kenya in the early 1990s. The then ruling party, Kanu, banked on the Kalenjin votes, the community from which the then Kanu leader and president hailed from. It also hoped to mobilize minority ethnic communities such as the Mijikenda from the Coast and the Somali from North Eastern province. Kanu also worked towards breaking up the then main opposition party, Ford, so as to win the 1992 General elections. The Ford party was equally based on ethnicities. It was mainly supported by the Kikuyus, Luos and Luhyas. Due to ethnic rivalries however, the Kikuyu and Luo elites differed leading to the split of Ford. Matiba, a leader in Ford and a Kikuyu by ethnicity could not agree with Jaramogi Odinga, a Luo<sup>166</sup>. As members of each of these ethnic communities mentioned desired one of their own to ascend to the presidency, they could not agree on who had to become the presidential candidate of Ford. Therefore, Ford split into Ford Asili led by Matiba and Ford Kenya led by Odinga. This ethnic rivalry shows how each ethnic community would have liked to control the state and the accompanying resources.

Consequently, it is proper to state that resources are usually at the centre of the struggle for political power that leads to ethnic conflicts. Though the elites and their ordinary ethnic supporters have divergent objectives, their interests end up converging on the need to control the resources and this makes them natural partners in engaging in ethnic conflicts.

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<sup>165</sup>Woods D. 'Elites, Ethnicity, and 'Home Town' Associations in the Côte d'Ivoire: An Historical Analysis of State-Society Links' *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 64, No. 4 (1994), pp. 465- 483

<sup>166</sup>Society Magazine, Weekly Issue No.2, February 24, 1992 pp.10-13 'Who's Next President' by Muga K'olale

#### **4.5 Land and Ethnic Conflicts**

In this study, land as a resource came out as a factor in fuelling ethnic conflicts in Kenya, especially those experienced in the Rift Valley province. As an indication of the seriousness of this resource in causing ethnic conflicts, Molo and Matunda areas showed that land was a contentious issue in conflicts that took place in the region. Land therefore emerged as a factor that cannot be ignored when looking at motivators for engaging in ethnic conflicts. The Kalenjin fighters in the Rift Valley were told by their political elites that they would acquire the land that would be left behind by the fleeing 'foreign' communities. These promises therefore motivated them to take the conflicts seriously and engage in them. It had become a habit of the local Kalenjin community members to chase away settler communities such as the Kikuyu and Kisii every election year beginning 1992 and after the chase; they would occupy the deserted pieces of land. It was therefore observed that these people were greatly motivated by the desire to occupy land.

This habit went on up to the 2007/2008 ethnic conflicts where they repeated the same thing only that this time round it was worse in magnitude as compared to those before. In fact, owing to the intensity, most members of the settler communities, especially among the Kikuyu had to relocate and move to friendly areas, areas they described as occupied predominantly by Kikuyus while others moved to temporary camps set up for the displaced people. As they moved, members of the Kalenjin community promptly occupied their land. At the height of these conflicts, five people were shot dead, ten houses set ablaze and 300 people got displaced in a village in Trans Nzoia district. They had been attacked by the Sabaot Land Defence

Forces<sup>167</sup>. This was a Kalenjin militia group that was fighting over land rights. Their attack targeted members of a different ethnic community occupying land that they deemed to belong to their community.

Other findings further shed more light on the nexus between land and ethnic conflicts supported by predatory elites. In findings<sup>168</sup> relating to the ethnic conflicts that shook the Rift Valley province between 1991 and 1993, it was found out that local elites exploited ethnic grievances about scarce land just before the elections (of 1992). These elites, including senior ministers, members of parliament and close advisers to the then president, as well as sympathetic local elites, purposefully set out to incite ethnic violence in a desperate attempt to keep the president and his fragile coalition of minority groups in power. They mobilized minority ethnic groups to their support by invoking land rights, that is, by convincing the members of such groups that they were the victims of land grabbers who had contaminated their ancestral lands and therefore needed to be expelled. This actually led to conflicts with thousands being expelled from their farms in the Rift Valley.

In fact, the very early incidents of ethnic conflicts in the Rift Valley were recorded on a farm, Meteitei farm, a cooperative located in the Nandi District of Rift Valley Province near the borders of Nyanza and Western Provinces. The Meteitei farm was similar to thousands of other cooperatives formed as a result of the redistribution of white settler land. Meteitei was jointly owned by 310 Kalenjin and 280 non-Kalenjin farmers (Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhya, and Luo). Violence erupted on the farm after Kalenjin members of the collective, with encouragement from local

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<sup>167</sup> *Daily Nation* Newspaper, Tuesday January 22, 2008 p.2 '14 more people killed in latest round of post-poll attacks' by NATION Team

<sup>168</sup> Rose L.L. 'African Elites' Land Control Maneuvers' *Études rurales*, No. 163/164, *Terre Territoire Appartenances* (Jul. - Dec., 2002), pp.187-213

administrators and politicians, claimed sole ownership of the land and expelled non-Kalenjins. Those who refused to leave were killed or had their houses and property destroyed. Within days, the fighting escalated<sup>169</sup>.

Land is therefore portrayed to be a key player in these ethnic conflicts. Elites are well aware of the sensitivity surrounding land issues in this region and will therefore not hesitate to use it in inflaming passions which will return dividends in terms of political power. Kalenjin political elites were quoted saying that all outsiders who had acquired their (Kalenjin) land would have to move and leave their land for their children. In a similar case, a Maasai (a community that is mainly found in the Rift Valley and has had long political connections with the Kalenjins) political elite accused members of the Kikuyu community who were residing in his area of political representation, Narok, of being inciters and agitators accusing them of acquiring Maasai land by dubious means. He asked them not to engage in politics or they would face consequences<sup>170</sup>. Ethnic conflicts were witnessed in the same area in the same period pitting Maasais against Kikuyus and eviction of Kikuyus was recorded. Land is therefore an issue and even the Akiwumi Commission that was formed to investigate the ethnic conflicts that rocked the Rift Valley province in the 1990s concluded that land was among the three underlying causes of ethnic conflicts. It said that there was an ambition by the Kalenjins to recover what they thought they had lost when the Europeans forcibly acquired their ancestral land<sup>171</sup>. This behavior by Kenyan elites is not peculiar to Kenyan elites. Elites, especially in Africa, have been known to maneuver to define, or even to create, land communities. Specifically, they manipulate the

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<sup>169</sup> Kahl H.C. 'Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: The Case of Kenya, 1991-93' *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Autumn, 1998), s pp. 80-119

<sup>170</sup> Klopp M.J. 'Ethnic Clashes' and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya's Electoral Despotism' *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2001), pp. 473-517

<sup>171</sup> The Akiwumi Commission Report on Tribal Clashes in the Rift-Valley, 1999.

rules and practices of land tenure to mold land communities to their design, often with the end goal of maintaining or acquiring personal power or wealth. Elites' land control maneuvers are frequently associated with conflict: they initiate conflict or they respond to conflict. These elites stir up group tensions about land control and even incite others to violence in order to secure their political position and economic interests<sup>172</sup>. This is exactly what was witnessed in the Rift Valley province.

This study also concluded that the same desire for land owned by settler communities in the Rift Valley that contributed to bloodshed in the region can be directly linked to the reprisal ethnic conflicts that were experienced outside the Kalenjin dominated areas of the Rift Valley. A case in point is Naivasha town, a peri-urban centre found in the same Rift-Valley province but predominantly inhabited by members of the Kikuyu community. In the same town, during the 2007/2008 ethnic conflicts, lived a substantial number of members of the Luo and Luhya community and some Kalenjins too. Nakuru is another case with similar characteristics. As the conflict intensified, settler communities, especially Kikuyus and Kisiis left the Kalenjin dominated sections of the Rift-Valley in droves. Therefore; members of the Kikuyu community were enraged by stories of fleeing Kikuyu IDPs and influential Kikuyu business people allegedly held meetings to raise funds for attacks against the Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin communities. Kikuyu militias supported by members of the outlawed Mungiki sect and angry displaced Kikuyu youth armed with pangas, knives and petrol bombs were assembled and deployed to various estates-Kaptembwa, Kwarhoda, Mwariki, Free Area and Kiti to flush out 'enemy' communities. They attacked Luos using pangas and broken bottles and those who attempted to resist were beheaded. A former Provincial Commissioner for Rift-Valley, Hassan

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<sup>172</sup>Rose L.L.'African Elites' Land Control Maneuvers' *Études rurales*, No. 163/164, *Terre  
Territoire Appartenances* (Jul. - Dec., 2002), pp.187-213



Noor Hassan noted that emotions had been raised by the high numbers of fleeing IDPs arriving in the town and this made it logical that retaliatory violence was bound to occur. Nevertheless the Waki commission noted that despite the emotions, planning and anticipation of violence in Nakuru was had taken place<sup>173</sup>. The violence that took place in these two towns can be linked to the issue of land in the Kalenjin dominated areas of the Rift Valley. Land was therefore noted as a contributing factor to the ethnic conflicts that took place in Kenya.

A similar incident took place in 1992 but that time it was not as serious as the violence experienced in 2007/2008. As ethnic conflicts were going on in the Rift Valley Province, rumours spread to Nairobi that Kalenjin warriors had attacked and killed a number of school children and teachers in Njabini, South Kinangop. The affected were said to be from the Kikuyu ethnic community. Political activists led by Wang'uhu Nga'ng'a issued a press release on an alleged attack on pupils and teachers at certain primary schools in Kinangop. According to him, 50 pupils and a number of teachers had been killed by Kalenjin warriors. This information led to riots breaking up in Nairobi city. They took place at Macahakos Bus Station, Ronald Ngala Street and River Road and spread to Kawangware and as far out as Thika and Kiambu<sup>174</sup>. Those rioting were presumed to be Kikuyus expressing anger at the killing of fellow Kikuyus. At Machakos Bus Station, touts started hunting for any Kalenjin travelers in the public transport buses at the station. Fortunately, these riots did not lead to loss of lives or destruction of property as witnessed in Naivasha and Nakuru in 2007/2008. However, it still serves to illustrate how happenings in the Rift Valley had the potential of igniting conflicts elsewhere and this could be tied to the issue of land in the Rift Valley province.

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<sup>173</sup>The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) in Kenya(Waki Report),2008

<sup>174</sup>*Society Magazine* ,Weekly Issue No.14,June 1,1992 pp. 23-25 'Mayhem in the City' by George Owuor

#### 4.6 Cross Cutting Role of Elites in all Causes of Ethnic Conflicts

Elites have featured prominently in the identified causes of ethnic conflicts. Their role is core as they are the ones who incite, mobilize and finance these conflicts. Despite all the reasons that might be advanced as the causes of any given ethnic conflict, elites will eventually be found as the ones who played a major role in igniting and sustaining the conflicts. In the Kenyan case, several issues have come to the fore as playing a role in fueling the conflicts. State resources, land as well as unemployment and poverty have been mentioned as contributors. However, elites are seen featuring prominently in all these factors. They are the ones who set the agenda for engaging in the conflicts and go ahead to convince their ethnic supporters to involve themselves in the actual fighting. Across the globe, whether a conflict is blamed on economic factors like competition for scarce resources<sup>175</sup>, the demand for ethnic and cultural autonomy<sup>176</sup> or weak, biased political systems<sup>177</sup>, you will surely not miss the hand of the elites in all these if the Kenyan case is anything to go by.

Whatever the reason advanced as a cause of ethnic conflicts, there must be ethnic mobilization of groups for them to engage<sup>178</sup>. This mobilization is usually carried out by the elites. In fact, it is not these purported causes that bring in the elites to the picture but rather it is the elites themselves who design these conflicts and move ahead to justify them. It is elite competition for

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<sup>175</sup>Irobi E.G. (May, 2005) Ethnic Conflict Management in Africa: A Comparative Case Study of Nigeria and South Africa. A paper meant as a contribution to the ongoing search for new means of managing conflicts in Africa

<sup>176</sup>Rosecrance, Richard and Arthur Stein. 'Separatism's Final Country.' *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 4(July/August 2008):141-145.

<sup>177</sup>A thesis presented to the faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree: Master of Military Art and Science by Daniel K.Mishio,Maj., Ghana

<sup>178</sup>Yinger M.J. 'Ethnicity' *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 11 (1985), pp. 151-180

political power that drives them to manipulate ethnic identities in their quest for power<sup>179</sup>. The meaning of this is that ethnic conflicts are not just spontaneous occurrences which take place as a result of sudden friction between different ethnic communities. Rather, ethnic conflicts are a result of mobilization of ethnic groups by ethnic entrepreneurs or elites pursuing private interests and capitalizing on the availability of ethnic networks (i.e., ethnically defined groups that reduce transaction costs and uncertainty with respect to the enforcement of contracts). They use the conflicts for personal selfish political gains. When necessary, these elites will go out to create a conducive environment for these conflicts. They can also take advantage of any opportunity that presents itself to manipulate group symbols to evoke hostile feelings and exacerbate fear. They use the hostility and fear, in turn, to justify extremist policies, justifying their own quest for power as 'defense' of their people's status and security<sup>180</sup>. Therefore, when ethnic conflicts occur, they might pass as just ethnic conflicts. However, underneath such conflicts, you will find personal (and class) ambitions which are desperate, opportunistic and violence prone<sup>181</sup>. This means that no ethnic conflict is just a conflict but a rather a battle field designed by elites in their quest for power and the accompanying benefits.

#### 4.7 Conclusion

From the foregoing discussion, various issues related to the ignition and sustenance of ethnic conflicts have been examined. However, one major element has come out as being at the core of causing and sustaining these conflicts. These are the elites, especially the political elites. They

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<sup>179</sup>Horowitz D.L. 'Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict' Paper prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., April 20–21, 1998

<sup>180</sup>Kaufman J.S. 'Escaping the Symbolic Politics Trap: Reconciliation Initiatives and Conflict Resolution in Ethnic Wars' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Mar., 2006), pp. 201-218

<sup>181</sup>Rothchild D. and Lake A.D. 'Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict' *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Autumn, 1996), pp. 41-75

are the ones who mobilize their ethnic supporters into fighting for purposes of achieving selfish personal ends. However; this study on Kenya revealed that even the ordinary members of ethnic communities are motivated to engage in the conflicts for purposes of gaining materially. There is therefore mutual greed connecting the masses and their elites. This greed makes it easier for the masses to be mobilized by the elites. Nevertheless, at the end of it all, it is the elites who benefit the most and they should bare the biggest blame as they are the ones who design, initiate and sustain these conflicts.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **5.0 Conclusions**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This study set out to investigate if low levels of education make people vulnerable to their elites' manipulation and machinations in instigating ethnic conflicts which serve selfish elite interests. It was also interested in examining whether low levels of education make people ignorant of the consequences wrought about by ethnic conflicts hence making them willing partners (of elites) in its instigation. In attempting to answer these questions, this study considered vast literature touching on causes of ethnic conflicts. The literature reviewed covered the whole world though Africa was heavily represented as it is the continent most afflicted by these conflicts. In studying Kenya, the case study, both primary and secondary data was analyzed. Secondary data was derived from scholarly journals, books, newspaper articles, reports produced by special commissions set up by the Kenyan government and a report produced by an International Human Rights Group. Primary data was collected from the field using questionnaires. This chapter will contain the findings of the study; the conclusions reached and also give recommendations.

#### **5.2 Findings**

The study generated several findings which were classified as identified themes. These were the issues that could be linked to the ignition, occurrence and sustenance of ethnic conflicts in Kenya. This section will briefly discuss each of these findings.

### 5.2.1 Manipulation by Political Elites

There was a finding indicating that political elites are the culprits behind ethnic conflicts in Kenya. In both urban centres and rural areas, politicians were pointed out as the ones who incited and paid people to fight others. They would simply dish out money and also promise other goodies that would be delivered after the fighting. The same elites also emerged as the greatest beneficiaries of the ethnic conflicts, mostly benefiting or intending to benefit from political power. The desire to acquire or retain political power can therefore be termed as the driving force behind the manipulation by elites. It was however noted that there is one distinguishing factor between the political elites operating in urban areas and those in rural areas. While those in urban centres were being driven purely by political considerations, those in the rural areas also had land issues as another driving force.

Back to the people being incited, it was found out that they are not wholly innocent. It is true they are used as the implementing objects of the elites, but they also have their own independent motivating factors peripheral to those of their elites. When they respond to the call of their elites, they are therefore not exclusively serving their elites' interests but implementing their objectives alongside those of the elites. In this study, it was found out that in the Rift-Valley province, those who engaged in the actual fighting in the 2007/2008 conflict, immediately occupied land that had been vacated by members of the Kikuyu and Kisii communities among others. They also started grazing on these farms and as well feeding on the farm produce left behind. It is clear it is not the elites who did the actual occupation of land and grazing, but the ordinary villagers. Though some elites also got a share of these resources apart from political gain, a majority of the beneficiaries were the ordinary people who had engaged in the fighting. It therefore comes out clearly that even though the elites ignited and worked to ensure the conflicts were sustained, the masses were

motivated by the desire to gain materially. The same case applies to the masses in urban centres where marauding tribal gangs had a field day looting, robbing and gaining materially in criminal ways. They therefore had a motivation to remain in the conflict and sustain it. Therefore, in as much as they were responding to the call by their tribal political elites to engage in conflict, they also had their other driving force, that is enriching themselves criminally.

A difference also emerged between the fighters operating in urban centres and those in rural areas. For the gangs in urban areas, the desire to engage in looting was as a result of the political conflict. In other words, it is elite political misunderstandings that led to criminal activities that served to satisfy the fighters. In rural areas however, the desire for resources, land to be specific, preceded the political conflicts. This therefore means that those who engaged in the conflict were not just responding to the call by their elites but were out to fulfill what can be referred to as personal desires to acquire land owned by their 'enemies'.

Owing to the foregoing, the researcher concluded that elites don't just manipulate disinterested ethnic masses who blindly follow elites. Yes, it is true that elites are always out to benefit themselves, especially politically, but their ethnic groups always know that they will benefit in certain ways. In fact, even when engaging in ethnic conflicts that are perceived to be political in nature, ethnic communities do so in the hope that once their tribesmen get to power, they will benefit materially (this will be further looked at under a different finding). Hence elites have an easy time manipulating because they are dealing with equally greedy people who are out to gain unfairly, the only difference being that the elites will eventually get bigger shares as compared to ordinary members of their communities. Elites are therefore not entirely to blame neither are they the only beneficiaries of ethnic conflicts. Therefore, the elites carry out their manipulation through the complicity of their ethnic supporters.

## 5.2.2 Unemployment, Poverty and Ethnic Conflicts

There was a finding that clearly indicated that those who engaged in the actual fighting were either unemployed or did low calibre jobs. These people were a soft target for mobilization and manipulation by elites by virtue of the fact that they were in need of financial gain as their occupations, for those who were working, was not giving them much income while the jobless were definitely in need of money for their day to day survival.

Apart from these people being people in need of money owing to their income status, they were also made vulnerable by virtue of their age. These were people in the age range of 15-35, a group of young people with a desire to secure their future and with nothing to turn to. Most of them were also people with nothing to lose as they had no investments and/or families to make them think twice before engaging in conflicts. These people, who acted as ethnic fighters, got their pay through handouts from politicians as well as through engaging in criminal activities such as looting in both rural and urban centres. In rural areas, it was also noted that communities organized themselves and supported fighters from their midst by feeding them and arming them.

A conclusion was therefore drawn that unemployment among young people as well as poverty caused by the same cause as well as by lowly paying jobs which cannot get a majority in this age group out of poverty, helps in fuelling ethnic conflicts. It fuels in that these young people have either no sound income or no income at all and therefore they easily fall for handouts and the temptation to engage in these conflicts as they create a conducive environment for carrying out lawless activities which earn them some money. They can therefore be easily turned into marauding bloodthirsty ethnic gangs driven by poverty.



### 5.2.3 State Resources and Ethnic Conflicts

There was a finding that each ethnic group involved in the conflict had its eyes focused on clinching or maintaining political power through their elite ethnic leaders in the hope that these elites will bring back benefits in form of state resources. The state resource that was mostly mentioned was state employment (jobs). The fighters had been promised jobs by their political elites. Even those who had not been promised believed that by fighting and ensuring that their elites got power to rule over other ethnic communities, then they would benefit from such favours. This therefore served as a great motivator in fuelling the conflicts. Going back to the elites, we had seen that the elites were the biggest beneficiaries, who benefited by acquiring political power. This is the power that would enable them to control state resources and hence work on redistributing them to their tribesmen who helped them to ascend to power through engaging in conflict. It is therefore worth noting that the elites were not interested in just political power, but political power that put them in control of the state.

The aim, therefore, of each ethnic group was to gain control of the state apparatus in order to be the ones 'supervising' these resources. For the elites the intention was to ascend to power or maintain power and continue or start carrying out ethnic patronage using state resources hence ensuring that support is assured from ethnic supporters. For the ordinary fighters, they hoped that their ethnic elites who will be overseeing the distribution of state resources would give them priority. Therefore; this aspect of mutual greed, targeting state resources was noted as a factor in fuelling ethnic conflicts.

#### **5.2.4 Land and Ethnic Conflicts**

In this study, land as a resource came out as a factor in fuelling ethnic conflicts. Fighters in the conflicts were told by their political elites that they would acquire the land that would be left behind by the fleeing 'foreign' communities. These promises therefore motivated them to take the conflicts seriously and engage in them. For instance, it had become a habit of the local Kalenjin community members in the Rift Valley province of Kenya to chase away settler communities every election year beginning 1992 and after the chase; they would occupy the deserted pieces of land. Therefore it was observed that these people were greatly motivated by the desire to occupy land. This desire for land owned by settler communities in the Rift Valley that contributed to bloodshed in the region could be directly linked to the reprisal ethnic conflicts that were experienced outside the Kalenjin dominated areas of the Rift Valley such as Naivasha and Nakuru. Through these reprisals, members of the Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin communities were killed, injured and displaced from Naivasha and some sections of Nakuru. Land is therefore a culprit just like the other mentioned causes.

#### **5.2.5 Education Levels and Ethnic Conflicts**

From the start, this study was aimed at attempting to find out whether low levels of education are in any way related to causing ethnic conflicts by making it easier for the elites to manipulate ethnic masses. There was no link found between low levels of education and ethnic conflicts. This study indicated that those who participated in the actual carrying out of the ethnic conflicts, cut across all levels of education. It ranged from university graduates, high school leavers, primary school leavers; school drop outs to those with absolutely no education at all. Nevertheless, the composition, in terms of level of education, differed in those acting in rural

areas from those perpetrating in urban areas. In rural areas, the number of graduates and high school leavers involved was lower while that of those in the category of primary school leavers and with no education at all was higher. In urban centres, the opposite was noted. There was a larger percentage of graduates and high school leavers as compared to rural areas. In Molo area for instance, a majority of the fighters were primary school leavers and school drop outs. In Nairobi, it was noted that there was a mixture with all levels evenly represented. It was noted that even some of the politicians who engaged in inciting the youths to fight were less educated than the youths fighting and what made them to be heard was the fact that they had wealth while the youths were poor and hence needed money. Therefore, there was no indication that those who engaged in the actual fighting were only people with low education levels.

#### **5.4 Conclusions**

From the findings generated by this study, the researcher concluded that low levels of education do not enable elites to easily manipulate people into engaging in ethnic conflicts. What plays a role is the desire by the masses to earn a living from the handouts given by politicians and from goods obtained criminally. The promises for jobs and other resources given by politicians also plays a role as well as the prospect of those fighting to acquire and own the property left behind by those fleeing. It was also noted that these masses are not entirely innocent as they also have their own desires and greed just like the elites and this makes them to be easily manipulated regardless of their education levels. The masses could also not be termed as being ignorant of the consequences wrought about by ethnic conflicts as the research clearly shows they also had objectives, just like the elites, which they had to achieve regardless of the consequences.

### 5.5 Recommendations

The researcher recommends the carrying out of further studies on this topic but covering a wider sample. This is because the findings of this study are based on a small sample, especially in relation to the primary data.

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## APPENDIX

The following is a questionnaire intended to help in carrying out a study on the causes of ethnic conflicts in Kenya. To help in doing this, I request you to fill in this questionnaire as honestly as you can. The information you give will be kept confidential and will be used for this study only. Thank you in advance.

OCCUPATION: ----- RESIDENTIAL AREA-----

**TICK WHERE APPROPRIATE AND IN OTHER QUESTIONS, WRITE YOUR ANSWERS**

1. Have you ever experienced or lived in an area afflicted by ethnic conflict(s)?  
[YES] [NO]

2. If YES, please indicate the area and year. Be as specific as possible on the area.

-----

3. Was this conflict between two or more different ethnic groups or within one ethnic group?

(a)[Between Ethnic Groups] (b)[Within an Ethnic Group]

4. If your answer is [a] above, were these groups living and interacting in peace before the conflict?

[YES] [NO]

5. If your answer is YES above, what led to the conflict? Tick all appropriate.

(a) Fight over religious matters (b) Fight over political power (c) Fight over resources

Other (Specify) -----

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6. If you have ticked (c) above, please specify the resources. Tick the appropriate

(i) Land (ii) Water

Other (Specify) -----

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7. Was there any form of organization/mobilization or people just started to fight?

(a)[People just started to fight]      (b)[There was organization/mobilization]

8. If your answer is (b) above, who organized/mobilized? Tick all appropriate.

(a)Businessmen   (b) Religious Leaders (c) Politicians (d) Government Employees

Other (Specify) -----

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9. Please estimate the age bracket of most of those people who took part in the actual fighting.

(a)[0-15]      (b) [15-35]      (c) [35-55]      (d) [Above 55] (e) [All age brackets]

10. Please indicate the education level of those people in (9) above. You can add a comment if necessary.

(a)[University Graduates] (b)[High School Leavers] (c)[Primary School Leavers]  
(d)[School Drop Outs] (e)[No Education at All] (f)[A mixture of all these levels]

Comment: -----

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11. Were these people (in 10 above) in gainful employment before the conflict? Add a comment if necessary.

**[YES]**

**[NO]**

**Comment:** \_\_\_\_\_

12. If YES above, give examples of occupations they were in.

13. As they engaged in the conflict, did they stop working?

**[YES]**

**[NO]**

14. If YES above, how were they earning their living during the conflict?

15. In your view, who mostly benefited from this conflict?

16. How did they benefit?

17. In your view, what do you think really motivated those who actually engaged in the fighting?