

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

**Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies**

**The Effects of Strategic Communication of Foreign Policy Execution during  
the Post Cold War Era: A Comparative Study of the USA and Japan's  
Communication Strategies in Kenya**

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**A Research Project submitted in partial fulfillment of the Degree of Master of  
Arts in International Studies**

**16<sup>th</sup> November 2009**

# DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

IRENE KINYA KAUMBUTHU      SIGN       DATE 25/11/2009.

This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

DR. ROBERT MUDIDA      SIGN       DATE 25/11/2009.

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Finally to God most high, most able, to will and to do.

# DEDICATION

To my sister Nelly, for your strength and ability to fight the obstacles that come your way. You are indeed a great inspiration.

# ABSTRACT

This research project is a comparative study of how the United States Government and the Japanese Government through their diplomatic missions in Kenya conduct strategic communication of foreign policy execution in the post cold war Kenya.

The research analyzes this using a flexible and responsive methodological framework that was developed by Julia Coffman of Harvard Family Research Project for conducting strategic communication assessments on organizations.

The study utilized both primary data and secondary data. In order to evaluate Japan's and US foreign policy strategic communication in Kenya and found out how the two compared. A Semi structured interview method was used to conduct the research since it was considered a fairly open framework which allowed for focused, conversational, two-way communication.

The findings brought to the fore that current strategic communication practices in the world today are based on outdated message influence models. To succeed in this environment communicators should deemphasize control and embrace complexity, replace repetition of messages with experimental variation. It also became clear that strategic communication and public diplomacy are not clearly defined and it is not apparent if one is a subset of the other or whether the two are one and the same thing.

The vast majority of the documents reviewed and interviews conducted in this study indicated that effective coordination of strategic communication would require further organizational change. The number of countries exploring strategic communication of foreign policy making and execution will continue to grow due to the new stage that the evolution of diplomacy finds itself in. The practitioners of strategic communication of foreign policy therefore have to make good preparations for the changed realities of the profession and students of international relations would benefit more by embracing this new approach to foreign policy communication.

## ABBREVIATIONS

9/11	September 11 <sup>th</sup> 2001 Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center
AICAD	African Institute for Capacity Development
CDC	Centre for Disease Control
CNN	Cable News Network
DSB	Defense Science Board
JICA	Japan International Corporation Agency
JKUAT	Jomo Kenya University of Science and Technology
KEMRI	Kenya Medical Research Institute
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NHK	Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai, (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WRP	Walter Reed Project
USIS	United States Information Services

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# CHAPTER ONE

## BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

### INTRODUCTION

The twenty first century is a century of global information flow. Advances in information and communication technology have led to instantiation of events happening anywhere in the world. Famine in a remote village in Kenya, or environment destruction by a multinational company in the Congo rainforest for instance are brought to attention of global audience in real time through various mediations of mass communication eliciting reactions raging from support to condemnation.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, there has arisen a need to try to influence people's hearts and minds, if an entity whether it is a state or an organization is to achieve its interests.<sup>2</sup>

In the case of states, it has become imperative to cultivate favorable public opinion and reputation both domestically and internationally. This is only possible if favorable strategic communication of foreign policy making and execution takes place. Just like firms package a product to make it appealing to the market due to its utilitarian and non-utilitarian attributes, states have to package themselves in an attractive manner.<sup>3</sup>

The advances in information communication and technology have been reinforced by increased democratization. Democratic process has led to expansion of political spaces for participation, access to information and influencing of government decisions.<sup>4</sup> Consequently citizens have played an increased role in both domestic and foreign policy making observing and

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<sup>1</sup> T. Blankley and O. Horn, 'Strategizing Strategic Communication' *Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies* (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation Press, 2008) pp.1-10

<sup>2</sup> P.E. Djerejian, 'Changing minds Winning Peace A New Strategic Direction for US Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World' *Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009)pp.7-14:7

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*p.7

<sup>4</sup> C. Adelman, 'How Information Technology can Promote Democracy' *Washington D.C Centre for International Private Enterprise* Vol. 3, No.1, 2005 pp.2-10:2

determining execution processes. The increased role has translated to increased say on the nature of relations of their states with other states as well as determining limits which other states should operate in their country.

The increased public influence in foreign policy making and executing processes and in limiting the level of external actors' involvement in their countries means that states are no longer content with having cordial relations with foreign governments only but also they are reinforcing traditional government with public diplomacy.<sup>5</sup> This is done through processes which target the foreign policy publicly with an aim of cultivating favorable foreign reputation and opinion in order to enhance their pursuit of national interests. Foreign policy however has always been a state to state affair.<sup>6</sup> The general public being aware of a foreign states' intention in the execution of its foreign policy may have been of minimal importance in the past but not in the world we live in today.

One key tool which has gained prominence is the strategic communication of foreign policy making and execution which denotes instrumental use of information in the advancement of national interests. When well crafted and utilized strategic communication can help influence how foreign policy is perceived abroad. Strategic communication of foreign policy execution hence is a critical diplomatic asset.

As far as the analysis of US-Japan relations of foreign policy making and execution in a changing world, is concerned, The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of U.S. security interests in Asia and is fundamental to regional stability and prosperity. Despite the changes in the post-Cold War strategic landscape, the U.S.-Japan alliance continues to be based on shared

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<sup>5</sup> P.E. Djerejian, 'Changing Minds Winning Peace A New Strategic Direction for US Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World' *Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, op.cit. pp.7-14:8

<sup>6</sup> T. Blankley and O. Horn, 'Strategizing Strategic Communication' *Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies*, op.cit. pp.1-10

vital interests and values. These include stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the preservation and promotion of political and economic freedoms, support for human rights and democratic institutions, and securing of prosperity for the people of both countries and the international community as a whole<sup>7</sup>

Vogel points out that inevitably there will be both continuities and changes in the coming years. He argues that the United State and Japan will have to work much harder to preserve the stability of their foreign policy relationship through communication. He says that foreign policy relations will be more contentious and more open to redefinition compared to economic relations. He argues in either case, Japanese foreign policy will become more independent from the United States, or, at least, relatively less dependent.<sup>8</sup>

Above all, Vogel suggests that the defining feature of the U.S.-Japan foreign policy relations in the near future will be the expansion of the US agenda from the cornerstone issues of trade and security to highly important but frequently overlooked issues such as energy, the environment, human rights and immigration that will require more strategic communication. This expansion will bring great cooperation and collaboration in between the United States and Japan, but, at the same time, more scope for conflict.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Electronic Information and Public Affairs Office  
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4142.htm>

<sup>8</sup>S.K. Vogel, 'U.S.-Japan Relations in a Changing World' (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002) p.286

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.p.286

## STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

States engage in external relations with an aim of securing interests which are critical to their well being and progress in executing their foreign policy. States try to influence external environment with an aim of maximizing opportunities and minimizing threats. This calls for crafting of a range of strategies capable of influencing other actors in an international system characterized as anarchic.<sup>10</sup> The strategies employed are mainly economic, military and diplomatic.

The application of these strategies is faced with two obstacles. Firstly, miscommunication and misconception arises making states misinterpret the intentions of the others and act on the basis of such misperceptions raising the cost of implementing selected communication strategy.<sup>11</sup> Secondly, states which are victims of such misconception fail to correct them and instead may end up pursuing self-defeating interests by taking ineffectual measures, just because they way they communicated their foreign policy was not well understood by the other party. In other cases, state's execution of foreign policy may not elicit misconceptions, perceptions and failure to correct misperceptions but may fail to gain returns that are beneficial to the state as the state intended and at the same time commensurate to the cost incurred in such pursuits.<sup>12</sup>

The problem of perceptions, misperceptions and failure to correct misperceptions, or have returns favorable to the costs incurred is attributable to failure of effective strategic communicating of foreign policy execution. This raises two questions, one, what is the role of strategy in communicating foreign policy execution two. if strategic communication is central to

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<sup>10</sup> K. Waltz, 'Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power' in G. J. Ikenberry, (eds) *American Foreign Policy Theoretical Essays* (New York: HarperCollins, 1989) pp.625-636

<sup>11</sup> J. Melissen, 'Wielding Soft Power: The New Public Diplomacy' (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Press, 2005) pp.14-22

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* p.20

pursuit of a states foreign policy,<sup>13</sup> what are the components which makes it a success, in influencing foreign public opinion, in effect enhancing ones image and reputations abroad as the policies are executed<sup>14</sup> To answer the above questions this study as a comparative study of the American and Japanese diplomatic missions in Nairobi evaluates how the two states have used strategic communication to execute and advance their foreign policy in Kenya, during the post cold war era.

## **OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

The study has as its main objective as to

- Firstly, investigate traditional diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy execution and how it needs to be reinforced by strategic communication.
- Secondly, the study has as its sub objectives to analyze the components of good strategic communication of foreign policy and,
- Thirdly, to evaluate Japan's and US communication strategies in Kenya.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

The literature analyses various perspectives that have been put forward by scholars and practitioners in the international relations and communications fields on how communication strategy can help influence public opinion abroad due to foreign policy executed by a foreign state in its community. This study reviews contemporary thinking regarding the advancement of strategic communication and identifying common debates and themes which are brought out prominently in the study of strategic communication of foreign policy.

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.p.21

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.p.22

The literature reviewed examines how public diplomacy using strategic communication is an important tool for the advancement of national interests. This public diplomacy critical tool is strategic communication of foreign policy making and execution. The importance of how the public perceives this communication is important for states so that they are able to assess whether they need repeat action of the same communication using the same tools and methods, or if they need to change or improve these methods and tools of strategic communication.

## LITERATURE ON STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Communication in the 21<sup>st</sup> century has developed as a sub-field of international relations studies. Maclelland<sup>15</sup> in his support of these sentiments explains that diplomacy is no longer about government dealing with governments but also people speaking to people. He attributes the shift to the democratization process which has given people a share in the formation of government policies. People are divided along political, economic, sectional or class lines and possess competing interests which have to be reconciled before government policy emerges. Hence there exists a need to strategically communicate to the public if a state has to influence policies on execution of foreign policy both at home and abroad.

Communication therefore is a variable of diplomacy and international relations as analyzed by Schnell<sup>16</sup> who agrees with Maclelland.<sup>17</sup> It was effectively used as an instrument of foreign policy to diffuse the controversy related to a United State's surveillance plane landing on Hakan Island of China in April 2001, after it collided with a Chinese fighter jet. He notes that through the whole negotiation process communications role cannot be underestimated. It

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<sup>15</sup> D. Mc Clelland, *Theory and International System* (Bouldre: Prentice Hall, 1986) p.136

<sup>16</sup> S. Jim, 'An Analysis of Communication Variables Related to the 2001 Emergency Landing on Hawaiian Island by a US Surveillance Plane' *International Journal of Communication*, Vol.4 No.1, 2007 pp. 95-115.

<sup>17</sup> D. Mc Clelland, 'Theory and International System' op.cit. pp.136-140

reported the story, became part of the story and provided instantaneous channels for the United States and Chinese governments to interact through communication in diplomacy.

In relating with what Maclelland<sup>18</sup> and Schnell<sup>19</sup> have to say about communication in international relations, Nicholson<sup>20</sup> in his book agrees that diplomacy is not an end but a means, not a purpose but a method in pursuit of national interests. He further notes that diplomacy has experienced three major changes which have affected its conduct. One, the growing sense of the community of nations, the increasing appreciation of the importance of public opinion and the shifted diplomacy from being government to government affairs, to including the public which has the power to veto government decisions.

This communication does not take place in a vacuum and is carried out by people. Freeman<sup>21</sup>, leads us to see who conducts the communications of foreign policy discussed above by Maclelland<sup>22</sup> and Schenell<sup>23</sup>. He explains that the main task of diplomats is to secure national interests, through harvesting of power of other states to their own in coalitions to promote these interests through precise articulation of a government's intention abroad using the right tools. Additionally they aim at shaping the perceptions and actions of other states and people, in a manner capable of making them supportive to their state's interest abroad.

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid. pp.136-140

<sup>19</sup> S. Jim, 'An Analysis of Communication Variables Related to the 2001 Emergency Landing on Hawaiian Island by a US Surveillance Plane' *International Journal of Communication*, Vol.4 No.1, 2007 pp. 95-115

<sup>20</sup> H. Nicholson, *Diplomacy*, op.cit. p.70

<sup>21</sup> A. Freeman, *Arts of Power - Statecraft and Diplomacy* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000) pp.3-5

<sup>22</sup> D. Mc Clelland, 'Theory and International System' op.cit.pp.136-140

<sup>23</sup> S. Jim, 'An Analysis of Communication Variables Related to the 2001 Emergency Landing on Hawaiian Island by a US Surveillance Plane' *International Journal of Communication*, Vol.4 No.1, 2007 op.cit. pp. 95-115

Nye<sup>24</sup> brings out this strategic communication that Freeman<sup>25</sup> talks about. Nye<sup>26</sup> in his concept of soft power explains the three aspects of communicating to people. One refers to a set of simple themes much like what occurs in political or advertising campaigns, two, daily communication which explains the context of domestic and foreign policy decisions and development of key lasting friendships. He further notes that, states which manage to make their power legitimate in the eyes of the others encounter less resistance to their wishes and if a country's culture and ideology are attractive, and enjoy credibility, it is capable of amassing soft power, which it can use to make others more willing to follow its wishes.

In his support to the state's need to build soft power as Nye<sup>27</sup> calls it, Keohane<sup>28</sup>, agrees with him that reputation is a crucial resource and the most important aspect of an actor's reputation in world politics is the belief of others, that it will keep its future commitments even when particular situations, myopically viewed makes it disadvantageous to do so.

In relation to this soft power and communication that is discussed by Nye<sup>29</sup> and supported by Keohane,<sup>30</sup> Shing Ding<sup>31</sup> agrees that this is important and continues to further the study by examining the role of diasporas in building national image through communication. He argues that national image has come to be regarded as an intangible source of national power. Branded states like branded products depend on trust and customer satisfaction, and image and reputation have become essential parts of a state's strategic capital. The reality has led to

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<sup>24</sup> J. Nye, *Soft Power - The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004) pp.11-15

<sup>25</sup> A. Freeman, *Arts of Power - Statecraft and Diplomacy* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000) pp.3-5

<sup>26</sup> Ibid pp.11-15

<sup>27</sup> Ibid pp.11-15

<sup>28</sup> R. Keohane, *After Hegemony - Cooperation and Discord In the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) pp.116-120

<sup>29</sup> J. Nye, *Soft Power - The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), pp.11-15

<sup>30</sup> R. Keohane, *After Hegemony - Cooperation and Discord In the World Political Economy* op.cit. pp.116-120

<sup>31</sup> S. Ding, "Digital Diaspora and National Image Building- A new Perspective on Chinese Diaspora Study in the Age of China's Rise" *Public Affairs* Vol. 80, No. 4, 2008.p.11



increased need to have a brand that sells. He provides China's rebranding, which has been characterized by strengthening of China's international broadcasting power, use of internet to publicize government views, setting of overseas China television channels and China radio international, moves which a senior Chinese official noted will help provide greater awareness of China and enable studying of the needs of overseas audience for China's own good.

From the above, scholars have helped bring out communication as an important tool in the communication of foreign policy making and execution. Zaharna<sup>32</sup> in his advocacy for a new communication network notes that in order to balance domestic and foreign opinion, there is a need for network model of communication, which underscores the importance of winning the battle for hearts and minds based on American values and democracy, especially now that US communication is suffering from credibility crisis and lack of a working communication strategy and pre planned channels.

Reynolds<sup>33</sup> agrees with Zaharna<sup>34</sup> and in bringing to the fore the importance of internet and its impact on communication in Iraq war, he argues that internet blogging has created a virtual community allowing for close interaction beyond national boundaries. As such, the internet is cutting out the role of diplomats in projecting their national images internationally. He concludes that while government to government negotiations are likely to remain the province of professional diplomats, the role of diplomats as a public face for their home country may be reduced as communication between individuals and groups become widespread. Hence there is a need for states to influence how bloggers view and communicate about them.

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<sup>32</sup> R.S. Zahrana, *The New York Paradigm of Strategic Public Diplomacy* (Washington D.C.: Foreign Policy in Focus Publications, 2005) pp.1-10

<sup>33</sup> G.H. Reynolds, 'The Blogs of War - How Internet is Reshaping Foreign Policy' *National Interest*, Vol. 75, 2004, pp. 59-75

<sup>34</sup> R.S. Zahrana *The New York Paradigm of Strategic Public Diplomacy* op.cit.pp.1-10

Picking on Reynolds<sup>35</sup> and Zarhanas<sup>36</sup> theme, Noveck<sup>37</sup> brings in the concept of digital diplomacy as diplomacy conducted through communication channels beyond the control of the state. He notes that the specter of information war is but one of the many challenges facing foreign policy makers as information and communication technologies transform international relations. Criticisms is posed by the reality of disinformation strategy where states actually sponsor sites which portrays their rivals as weak, immoral, authoritarian and so on. As such states should have information superiority over the enemy if it is to avoid defeat in information wars.

The famous scholar on perceptions and misperceptions Jervis<sup>38</sup>, in his seminal work observed what Reynolds<sup>39</sup>, Zarhanas<sup>40</sup> and Noveck<sup>41</sup> say about communication and agrees that the international system transmits signals to communicate policy demands. For the signal to conciliate, the sender, the communication must succeed at two levels. First the receiver must understand the message that the sender is trying to communicate. Second the receiver must believe that the message accurately reflects the sender's intentions, otherwise the receiver will be skeptical about making concessions. Drawing on Jervis observations, any communication must be backed by credibility, when credibility is lacking, even genuine message is not believed on the basis that if the sender is untrustworthy then message must be a lie.

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<sup>35</sup> G.H. Reynolds, 'The Blogs of War - How Internet is Reshaping Foreign Policy' *National Interest*, Vol. 75, 2004, op.cit. pp. 59-75

<sup>36</sup> R.S. Zahrana, *The New York Paradigm of Strategic Public Diplomacy* op.cit.pp.1-10

<sup>37</sup> N. Simone, 'Digital Diplomacy: US Foreign Policy in Information Age' *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 3, 2002, pp.318-327

<sup>38</sup> R. Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, (New Jersey: Princeton Press, 1970) p. 24

<sup>39</sup> G.H. Reynolds, 'The Blogs of War - How Internet is Reshaping Foreign Policy' *National Interest*, Vol. 75, 2004, pp. 59-75

<sup>40</sup> Zahrana, R.S *The New York Paradigm of Strategic Public Diplomacy*, op.cit. pp.1-10

Building on above ideas on signaling, Jervis et al<sup>42</sup> in their analysis on stability and change in United State's elite belief about international relations after the end of the cold war period, argue that there is consistency and coherency among elite about international relations even after the end of cold war. The framing effects derived from cold war experiences, they note, can be used to explain United States failure to communicate to Russian publics, for much of the rhetoric coming from policy makers is reminiscent of cold war's grandstanding.

Along Jervis et al arguments, Abrahams<sup>43</sup> in his analysis of United States and Al Qaeda communications strategies states that United States failure to reach to the Muslim world is due to policy maker's misperceptions. Despite the consistency of demands by Al Qaeda such as need for US to change its policy execution towards Israel-Palestinian conflict, redeploy its soldiers from holy cities in Saudi Arabia and moderate its Middle East policies, United States sees Al Qaeda as insatiable religious extremist as Bush observed 'hate not US policies but US existence, and her freedoms. He concludes that the US misperceptions have played into Al Qaeda's policy of committing atrocities to attract counter-atrocities which solidifies its support in the Muslim! world, as an underdog fighting a global superpower<sup>44</sup>.

On Al Qaeda strategy he argues that Osama Bin Laden has managed to out-communicate US, for he understands his target audience. He legitimizes Al Qaeda's action through invoking the name of Allah, emphasizing Jihad in order to unify followers, and skillfully using religion by telling Muslims that it is their religious duty to ignore minor differences among themselves because those engaged in internal wars will suffer grave consequences<sup>45</sup>.

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<sup>42</sup> R. Jervis et al, 'Stability and Change in American Elite Beliefs About International Relations' *Journal of Peace Psychology*, Vol. 14, 1995, pp. 365-382

<sup>43</sup> M. Abraham, 'Al Qaeda Miscommunication War: The Terrorism Paradox' *Terrorism and Political Violence Journal*. Vol.17, No 1, 2008, pp. 529-549

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. p. 532

<sup>45</sup> Ibid. p. 541

## LITERATURE ON STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC OPINION

Power over public opinion is essential to a nation's power. It encompasses building national morale at home, psychological warfare abroad and the fight for moral leadership everywhere. Abroad, power over public opinion is used to recruit allies and weaken enemies. It is observed that in traditional diplomacy, diplomats were not allowed to interfere in internal affairs of the state, but this has become increasingly important.<sup>46</sup> Today, Palmer and Perkins<sup>47</sup> say the blurring of what is internal and external has provided diplomats with a range of techniques of formal and informal penetration of foreign societies. Diplomats use various tools such as radio, newspapers and other methods of making direct appeals to people's rather than to government through formal channels is becoming a common approach, of communicating a states foreign policy and executing it abroad.

In his analysis of the role of propaganda as an instrument of communicating foreign policy Palmer and Perkins<sup>48</sup>, provide insightful analysis of how states throughout history have exploited propaganda to secure their national interest. He gives an example of how United States used propaganda to influence the outcome of Italy's election in 1948, when the electoral contest was balanced between the communist side and the non-communist side. He observes that the United States launched direct communication to the people to shift their opinion in favor of the non-communist. The then assistant secretary of state in public affairs Allen George remarked 'by press, motion pictures, and radio we tried our level best to communicate to the people. This

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<sup>46</sup> H. Perkins, and N. Palmer, *International Relations* (New Delhi: A.I.T.B.S Publishers, 2007)pp.33-34

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.p.33

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.p.34

caused the Italians to change their mind and they noted that democracy, although offering no immediate paradise was a surer method of progress than communism'<sup>49</sup>.

Allen further noted that James Dunn the US ambassador to Italy assiduously met almost every ship bringing American supplies to Italian ports and on each occasion made public address on the aid which the Americans were extending to the people of Italy. This was a way of influencing foreign policy through communication for the Americans to achieve their national interest goals. Perkins concludes by arguing that in the age of mass communication, of growing literacy and of a bitter war for the hearts and minds of men, the state ability to communicate to foreign publics for strategic gains is critical in helping diplomacy achieve its national interest's goals through foreign policy execution<sup>50</sup>.

Conducting analysis on the role of public opinion Irving<sup>51</sup> observes that public opinion is critical to all kinds of people. Businessmen, politicians, policy makers and so on. He notes that public opinion is formed through communication, for communication is the medium of all social processes through which human relations exist and develop. Thus, human organizations exist not as entities but as shared communication networks. Further he argues that new technologies in communication have led to profound impact, for they have led to increase in size and heterogeneity of populations that participate in public opinion process and has increased the opportunities and capabilities to engage in public debate in some way<sup>52</sup>.

Another scholar, Lemert identifies the role of strategic communication in influencing public opinion.<sup>53</sup> While quoting W. I Thomas, he agrees with Irving and says that if men define

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid.p.34

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.p.34

<sup>51</sup> I Crespi, I. and J. Lemert, *Does Communication Change Public Opinion After All? A New Approach to Effects Analysis*, (London: OC Press, 1990) pp.47-50

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.p.48

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.p.49

situations as real, they are real in their consequences.<sup>54</sup> To make men real there must be a mediating, variable which affects perceptions and opinions. He says a key variable is the communication effect which refers to consistent communication to the public in order to create some saliency of certain issues.

On the contrary Klapper<sup>55</sup>, responding to Lemert's argument on relationship between strategic communication and public opinion argues that individual attitudes and opinions are minimally influenced by mass communication and other method of communication, hence the law of minimal effect should apply. This law argues that mass communication and generally other modes of communication do not normally have major consequences with respect to changing individual attitudes and opinions. Furthering Klappers and Lermerts arguments, other scholars, such as McCoombs and Shaw<sup>56</sup>, as well as Mc Quail<sup>57</sup>, and Barbara<sup>58</sup> respond to the law of minimal effects, in their studies on the impact of communication modes such as mass media to public opinion and perceptions.

McCoombs and Shaw<sup>59</sup> in their response to Klapper's argument, presented an alternative view that mass media plays a central role in agenda setting. By dealing, with what news items to report and of those which to highlight, editors are able to dominate what issues people talk and think about. In this way the news media play a major role in determining what the public thinks is important, and in this case what the public thinks about the actions of a foreign state through

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<sup>54</sup> W.I.Thomas, *The Child in America: Behavioral problems and programs* (New York: Alfred Kaopf publishers, 1928) p.10

<sup>55</sup> J.T. Klapper, *Effects of Mass Communication* (Glence: Free Press, 1960) p.2

<sup>56</sup> M.E. Mc Coombs, and D.L. Shaw, 'The Agenda Setting Function of Mass Media' *Public Quarterly*, Vol.15, No. 1, 1977, pp.176-177

<sup>57</sup> D. Mc Quail, 'The Influence and Effects of Mass Media' in Curran et al (eds) (London: Sage Publications, 1979) pp.70-93

<sup>58</sup> B. Nelson, *Making an Issue of Child Abuse: Political Agenda Setting for Social Problems*. (Chicago: Chicago University Press 1984)p.22

<sup>59</sup> M.E Mc Coombs, et al, 'The Agenda Setting Function of Press - How The People Speak' *Public Quarterly* Vol.17, 1977, p.2

the actions of its diplomatic mission abroad. The same view is reinforced by Mc Quail<sup>60</sup> when he argues that media offers a chance for social learning which may be planned or incidental, conscious or unconscious. The process occurs through projection of a consistent picture of the social, political and economic world which may lead the audience to adapt this version as a version of reality, facts, norms, values and expectations. Thus media can provide a channel for persuasion and mobilization of people's minds.

Gade<sup>61</sup>, furthers Mc Quails attitudes in his studies about how collective action can be mobilized using communication strategy, and affirms that media especially mass media is important in cultivating reference to a public sympathetic to one's cause. Larson<sup>62</sup> agrees with Gade as in his analysis of the role of television and United States foreign policy during the Iran hostage crisis, he brings to the fore the dramatic competition between Iran and US in influencing publics. He concludes by arguing that; during the hostage crisis, television was used by both US and Iran as a way of addressing audiences across national boundaries; television network news in US usually follows or reinforces government policy. He adds that television news sometimes participate in foreign policy making and execution serving as a direct channel of communication between government officials and policy elites. Lastly but most importantly, television can change public perception about foreign affairs particularly when it conveys visual information and is repeatedly presented over a long time.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> D. Mc Quail, 'The Influence and Effects of Mass Media' in Curran et al (eds) (London: Sage Publications, 1979) pp.70-93

<sup>61</sup> G. Wolfeld, 'Collective Action and Media strategy - The Case of Yamit' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol.2, 1984 pp.363-381

<sup>62</sup> J. Larson, 'Television and US Foreign Policy: The Case of Iran Hostage Crisis' *Journal of Communication* Vol. 36, No. 4, 1986 pp.108-130

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. p.110

Albutton<sup>64</sup> furthering on the studies of Gade and Larson focuses his study of third world countries demands for a new international information order observes that the amounts of rhetoric, diplomatic effort and economic resources implied third world countries attests to the depth of their concern over images of the third world that reach other nations. He further notes that some third world countries have contacted public relations firms to provide services such as preparing of press units, counseling embassy personnel regarding how to phrase discussions and running programs highlighting economic and other resources of the client country. He concludes that the creation and manipulation of informational setting can exert a positive influence on public opinion and political outcomes.<sup>65</sup>

Zaharna,<sup>66</sup> takes a different tangent and instead of focusing on Alburtons study of third world countries, focuses on the United States. In his support for a new US foreign policy after September, 2001, he calls for a new communication strategy capable of simultaneously speaking with multiple audiences – including hostile ones, in a rapidly changing, highly visible and politically competitive communication environment. He characterizes US failure to strategically communicate to foreign publics are due to its inability to balance domestic pressures with foreign realities. As domestic support increased after war on terror started, foreign support weakened. A critical component of strategic communication, brought out is the need to match words and deeds as well as show cultural awareness. For instance whereas US promised liberty and freedom to the Middle East, the Middle East view of US troops as ‘occupiers’ in a region with charged emotions meant something totally different to the people of the Middle East.

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<sup>64</sup> R. Albutton, ‘Public Relation Efforts of the Third World Images in the News’ *Journal of Communication*. Vol. 35, No. 1, 1985, pp.43-59

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.* p. 56

<sup>66</sup> R. S. Zaharna, *Towards a New Foreign Policy* (New York: Foreign Policy in Focus Publications, 2005), pp.1-2



Taylor<sup>67</sup> focuses on a different thing all together and assesses the role of national leaders in shaping foreign public opinions of their country's citizens, Taylor<sup>68</sup>, gives an example of the famous statement made by Bush that 'You are either with us or against us'. This message altered foreigners opinion of Americans. The Economist reported, that the Bush administration shows an unmatched ability to put its case in ways that makes its friends squirm and its enemies fume with rage, or as The Daily Mirror reported after Bush re-election 'Are they mad'.

Comparing pre-Bush attitudes towards United States, which was rated at 60 percent by publics in thirteen countries to less than twenty percent, in 2007, especially in countries which were US allies, the scholar argues that Bush leadership has done more damage than good to United States image abroad. He recommends that, United States should pursue a policy similar to Britain during World War II where in a bid to end US isolationist policy the British government cultivated opinion leaders and fed information to friends in the media to promote 'their Britain' in United States<sup>69</sup>.

Another critical observation is that strategic communication to foreign publics has its limits especially when it is in dissonance with policies for communication relies on soft power to win respect and admiration abroad as opposed to hard power. In addition, he underscores the needs to differentiate between real perceptions and misperceptions. Real perceptions can only be addressed by dealing with substantive issues whereas misperception can be addressed by better and more targeted communications.

Citing examples of United States Taylor notes that despite the fact that Washington professes to be a strong supporter of human rights, what the world hears about is Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, extra-ordinary rendition, refusal to prohibit water boarding and accept that Geneva

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<sup>67</sup> H. Taylor, 'The Not So Black Art of Public Diplomacy' *World Policy Journal* 2007 pp.51-59

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. p.56

<sup>69</sup> Ibid. p.58

conventions apply to unlawful combatants, rejection of landmark treaties such as ban on landmines, trade in small arms, comprehensive test ban treaty, chemical warfare treaty and international criminal court treaty. All this portray United States as hypocritical, preaching to others that which she does not practice<sup>70</sup>.

Etyang unlike Tatyton, focuses on national leaders role in his study of why Israel has failed to generate favorable public opinion internationally Etyan<sup>71</sup>, notes that national reputation has become a critical asset to any state and 'soft power' has become a major instrument of foreign policy execution. He further defines national reputation as what other people think about state's conduct and behavior and stresses that good strategy of international conflict requires force, diplomacy and communication. The latter is decisive for it aims at winning the hearts and minds of people.

He goes on to make critical observations regarding how mass media, if not persuaded to be sympathetic to one's cause can damage a nation's reputation, on the basis of words it uses to describe these and processes.<sup>72</sup> For instance, media commentators have often used words and statements generated by Arab states to describe Israel's external relations with its neighbors. Israel refers to Lebanon war as operation peace Galilee, the media calls it Israel's invasion of Lebanon, on land, when Israel refers to land taken from Arab in 1967 war as administered or disputed territories, the international media terms them as occupied territories.

In his reaction Ambassador Holbrooke's question, how can a man in a cave out-communicate the world's leading communication society' in reference to Osama Bin Laden,

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid. p.59

<sup>71</sup> E. Gilboa, 'Public Diplomacy -The Missing Component in Israel's Foreign Policy' *Israel Affairs* Vol.12, No. 4, 2006 pp.715-747

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. p.745

Zaharan<sup>73</sup> notes that it is strategic communication perception and not reality that matters. (Perception is what makes spin possible despite abundances of facts or logic. In addition he brings to the fore the need for inter-cultural intelligibility as opposed to cultural-centralism, in strategic communication. Drawing parallels between US culture and Middle East culture, the above author argues that some societies are best persuaded with facts whereas others persuaded with emotions. Hence communication strategy should be crafted in a manner responsive to different cultures.

## LITERATURE ON JAPAN - KENYA RELATIONS

Japan's diplomacy blue book<sup>74</sup> notes that Japan as a global economic power is heavily dependent on trade with and investment to and from other countries. Hence in order to secure its national interest, it is extremely important to build up and maintain stable relationships with the countries and regions with which Japan has economic ties and create suitable business under a multilateral free-trade system.

To achieve this end, Japan's diplomacy in observance of military management like other great nations, is based on the need to pursue peace as a tool or protecting Japan's interest abroad. This involves working to eliminate or reduce threats in a manner that is visible on the ground, relying mostly on Official Development Assistance (ODA) as its main leverage in Kenya and internationally<sup>75</sup>.

However, the book rightly acknowledges that Japan's diplomacy strategy is inadequate to face the twenty first century challenges, as well as to compete with other rising powers in Asia

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<sup>73</sup> R.S. Zaharan 'America Public Diplomacy in the Arab World: A Strategic Communication Analysis' (Washington D.C.: Foreign Policy in Focus publication, 2001) pp.1-3

<sup>74</sup> Foreign Affairs Executive Brief on Japan, *Diplomatic Blue Book* (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Publication, 2008) pp.3-6

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.* p.5

such as China. Hence there is a need to promote Japanese ways internationally, through strategy and efficient use of Japan's diplomatic asset in order to create comparative advantage over other states especially when competing with China's involvement in Africa today.<sup>76</sup>

Japan's white paper of 2004<sup>77</sup>, notes that Japan has contributed greatly to social and economic development of developing countries as a major donor country. This is mainly through official development assistance which foreign policy makers view as key to ensuring Japan's security, and prosperity through building of peaceful and stable international order and relationships as well as strengthening Japan's position and influence in the international community.

In Africa, Japan has established bilateral relations with various countries, which are based on human security approach to development. It has two proposed strategies focusing on the protection and empowerment of people<sup>78</sup>. Kenya currently stands as the leading recipient of Japanese development assistance in Africa which cumulatively, stands at Kshs. 298.8 billion. For instance in 2007 Kenya received ODA from Japan totaling Kshs. 5.8 billion. Various projects have been completed using monies from Japan. Notable projects include Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology, Mombasa Airport Improvement Project, and New Nyali bridge to name but a few.<sup>79</sup>

In addition, Kenya has continued to benefit in human resource support in various sectors. The prominent support in Strengthening of Mathematics and Science Education (SMASE) program, provincial management support for health sector, and in public construction sector

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid. p. 6

<sup>77</sup> Japan's Official Development Assistance Brief, *White Paper* (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Publication, 2004)p.40

<sup>78</sup> H. Shinsuke, *Japan's Policy on African Development Through the TICAD Process*, (Tokyo: MOFA, 2006)pp.1-10

<sup>79</sup> Foreign Affairs Executive Brief on Japan, *Diplomatic Blue Book* (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Publication, 2008) pp.3-10

where currently Japan is funding a Kshs. 550 million low cost housing project as part of its humanitarian assistance after the post election violence.

## LITERATURE ON KENYA - US RELATIONS

The US foreign policy for Africa has been changing over the years. According to Baptiste<sup>80</sup>, in the post 1945 era, the US was concerned with the decolonization of Africa. During that period, Kenya US relations were established as early as the 1950s when it became apparent to the United States that Kenya was in the process of becoming independent.<sup>81</sup> By the 1970s Kenya's foreign policy behavior could be explained by the heavy reliance it had on the US in the area of trade.<sup>82</sup> The Kenya US relationship has been explained as one of continued dependence of Kenya on the US, Nyunya explains that among other theories, the dependency model explains well the relationship that exists between the US and Kenya. It is a model that highlights the subjection of Africa to an international system dominated by the advanced capitalist countries such as the US.<sup>83</sup> The US says the strategic value of Africa South of Sahara and strategic locations like Kenya, stems principally from the area's geographic location with alternate air and sea routes to the Far East and for strategic materials.<sup>84</sup>

After the cold war a concept that is centered on the absence of communism created a greater opportunity for the US to pursue its global strategies in Kenya. It has been demonstrated

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<sup>80</sup> F.A. Baptiste, 'US Foreign Policy and Africa' *Africa Journal* Vol. XII, Issue 1. 2005.p.1

<sup>81</sup> K.G. Adar 'Kenya-US relations: A Recapitulation of the patterns of Pragmatic Conceptualization' in M. Munene, J.D.O. Nyunya, and K.G. Adar (eds), *The United States and Africa From Independent to the end of Cold War.1960s-1990s* (Nairobi: Edited by East Africa Educational Publishers, 1995) p.90

<sup>82</sup> G.K. Ikiara 'US-Africa Trade' in M. Munene, J.D.O. Nyunya, and K.G. Adar (eds), *The United States and Africa From Independent to the end of Cold War.1960s-1990s* (Nairobi: Edited by East Africa Educational Publishers, 1995) p.272

<sup>83</sup> J.D.O. Nyunya 'Towards Understanding US-Africa Relations during the Cold War era' in M. Munene, J.D.O. Nyunya, and K.G. Adar (eds), *The United States and Africa From Independent to the end of Cold War.1960s-1990s* (Nairobi: Edited by East Africa Educational Publishers, 1995) p.177-191

<sup>84</sup> U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Electronic Information and Publications Office  
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2962.htm>

that US was not interested in black Africa for any moral humanistic or economic reason during the cold war era, but was basically concerned with her own geopolitical global hegemonic designs.<sup>85</sup>

The policies of the United States with respect to Africa began to change dramatically around 1990 towards a greater concern for democracy, accountability and human rights. The United States Information Services (USIS) and United States Information Agency promote cultural exchanges, training of journalists and provision of information to nurture democratic cultures and societies.<sup>86</sup> Relations became even closer after Kenya's democratic transition of 2002 and subsequent improvements in human rights. The Kenyan and U.S. governments have intensified cooperation to address all forms of security in Kenya, including terrorism.<sup>87</sup> In its dialog with the Kenyan Government, the United States urges effective action against corruption and insecurity as the two greatest impediments to Kenya achieving sustained, rapid economic growth. U.S. assistance to Kenya is substantial. It promotes broad-based economic development as the basis of continued progress in political, social, and related areas of national life.<sup>88</sup>

## LITERATURE ON FOREIGN POLICYMAKING, EXECUTION AND DIPLOMACY

Scholars have confused foreign policy and diplomacy sometimes consciously and deliberately. Magaliaes<sup>89</sup> argues the identification between diplomacy and foreign policy is so frequent and persistent that it sometimes leads to unexpected conclusions. He clarifies that

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<sup>85</sup> J.D.O. Nyunya 'Towards Understanding US-Africa Relations during the Cold War era' in M. Munene, J.D.O. Nyunya, and K.G. Adar (eds), *The United States and Africa From Independent to the end of Cold War. 1960s-1990s* (Nairobi: Edited by East Africa Educational Publishers, 1995) p.177-191

<sup>86</sup> L.Diamond 'Promoting Democracy in Africa: United States and International Policies in Transition' in M. Munene, J.D.O. Nyunya, and K.G. Adar (eds), *The United States and Africa From Independent to the end of Cold War. 1960s-1990s* (Nairobi: Edited by East Africa Educational Publishers, 1995) p.209

<sup>87</sup> U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Electronic Information and Publications Office <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2962.htm>

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> J.C. Magalhaes, *The Pure Concept of Diplomacy* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988)pp.4-5

diplomacy is an instrument of implementing foreign policy. It's the means that states use to achieve the ends of their foreign policy by agreement rather than by war.

Diplomacy is the most difficult of the political arts in foreign policy execution. Freeman<sup>90</sup> says diplomacy is equated with appeasements and insists that we can talk to our enemies only when they come out with their hands up, or we can choose another tool of foreign policy execution which is war. We therefore need to rediscover diplomacy, professionalize it, and develop a suitable doctrine to coordinate other instruments of statecraft so as to execute foreign policy well.

Foreign policies are the strategies that governments use to guide their actions in the international arena. Foreign policies spell out the objectives states choose to pursue their agenda. Different states have different foreign policy strategies and comparative foreign policy compares how different states and governments use different policies comparing across states and across time frames for the same state.<sup>91</sup>

Gynwell and Wesley<sup>92</sup> discuss foreign policy as a subject worth taking seriously. If it is conceived and implemented effectively foreign policy delivers to a country benefits as tangible and significant as those produced by good economic policy. If done badly the consequences are frequently serious and can eventually be calamitous.

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<sup>90</sup> A. Freeman, *Arts of Power - Statecraft and Diplomacy* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000) pp.3-5

<sup>91</sup> M. Mwangi, *Diplomacy: Documents Methods and Practice*. (Nairobi: Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, 2004. pp.133-135

<sup>92</sup> A. Gynwell, and M. Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) pp.1-2

## RECAPITULATION OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature reviewed has pointed out the changing nature of diplomacy as a key method of pursuing national interests. The revolutions in information and communication technologies coupled with increased democratization process have created access to information and participation space by the public. The outcome has been increased influence in foreign policy making and execution processes by the strategic communication of states. Hence there is need for a state to build favorable reputation through strategic communication of foreign policy if it has to lower the costs of pursuing national interest. In this period where the main battle is the battle for hearts and minds, crafting of economic, military and social strategies but all communication strategies capable of instrumentally reinforcing the aspect of foreign policy execution.

This study can be justified on both academic and policy grounds. On academic grounds the study will contribute to an in-depth understanding of the rarely studied field of strategic communication of foreign policy execution within the broader field of international relations. Much of the reviewed work on the need to have strategic communication of foreign policy execution save for the United States; other countries have not been given enough attention. For instance Japan despite being the second largest economy in the world, lacks international influence as far as communicating its foreign policy execution abroad is concerned. This is therefore commensurate with its failure to strategically communicate its foreign policy execution. In addition, considering Japan is a leading non-western society, why has there been the absence of proper communication of Japan's foreign policy execution in international relations.



Secondly, the review indicated an absence of studies which focuses on the components of good or proper strategic communication of foreign policy execution. Instead focus has been on practical examination of how nations communicate, but not on how they ought to communicate foreign policy strategically to arrive at the desired results. The study aims at increasing the understanding of strategic communication by undertaking a comparative study focusing on Japan's and US relations with Kenya through the communication strategies used by their diplomatic missions in Nairobi. This will help shed light on how each of them communicates their foreign policy execution, an area which has not been given attention previously.

On policy grounds the study is justified as it will provide policy makers with understanding on how to build soft power through strategic communication. One of the main problem affecting international relations is the problem of misperceptions and cross-cultural understanding. States failure to clearly communicate to others or to align policies with strategic communication has led to failure to resolve many global problems, as states misinterpret other states' intentions. Hence there is a great need to equip policy makers and diplomats who execute policy abroad with an understanding of how an effective communication strategy of their policies can help a state to use its soft power to influence opinions abroad in its favor and eventually to lower many costs of external engagement with states.

## **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

This study relies on a strategic communication audit matrix which is an assessment tool for non-governmental organizations developed by communications consultant at Harvard Family Research Project, (HFRP) Julia Coffman. A strategic communications audit is a systematic

assessment, of an organization's capacity for, or performance of, essential communications practices. It has both evaluative and formative value.

Using this brief a study on the two diplomatic mission's communication strategies for foreign policy execution in Kenya was conducted. The brief outlines five basic steps in a strategic communications audit which are i) Knowing critical strategic communications practices, ii) Identifying possible levels of practice, iii) Assessing current performance and capacity, iv) Identifying areas for improvement and, v) refining process and repeating the process as needed.

The conduct of the study, on one side of the framework is a table with sixteen essential strategic communications practices grouped into three main themes i) strategy, ii) implementation, and iii) support and alignment. Firstly, strategy includes the core tasks of communications planning and strategy development.<sup>93</sup> Secondly, Implementation includes practices most common to a diplomatic mission with an active communications function.<sup>94</sup> Thirdly, support and alignment Includes non-communications-specific practices within the diplomatic mission that help to ensure the communications function is successful.<sup>95</sup>

On the other side of same table, is a practice maturity scale adopted from the Carnegie maturity model that is used as a gauge. This practice maturity scale<sup>96</sup> offers a continuum of possible performance levels for any given communication practice classified as i) ad-hoc, ii) planned, iii) institutionalized, iv) evaluated, and iv) optimized<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Coffman, J. *Strategic Communication Audits*, (Washington D.C.: Communications Consortium Media Centre, 2004)pp.1-10

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.p.4

<sup>95</sup> P. O'Malley, *Strategic Communications Planning*, (Ottawa: O'Malley Communications Inc,1996)p.1

<sup>96</sup> Carnegie Mellon software Engineering Institute's work, Capable Maturity Model Intergration (CMMI).

[www.sei.cmu.edu/cmmi/cmmi.html](http://www.sei.cmu.edu/cmmi/cmmi.html)

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.p.1

The matrix arrays the sixteen communication practices<sup>98</sup> along the bottom row, and arrays the practice maturity scale vertically.<sup>99</sup> Interviewees answered questions related to the description in the box that best represented where on the scale they felt the diplomatic mission falls for each practice. A completed audit matrix for each of the diplomatic missions provides immediate assessment of areas in which they need to improve in their communication of foreign policy execution.

Eventually, the strategic communications audit should result in more than just an identification of areas or practices that need to be improved. To maximize the chances that audit findings will be used and actual practice improved as a result, the audit should demonstrate through data how communications problems are causing problems in the present as opposed to speculating about their future impact. At the same time, the audit should reinforce practices that are current organizational strengths and generate specific recommendations for how actual communication practice can be enhanced.

This theoretical framework is relevant to the study as it works as an evaluative tool of the communication practices of the two diplomatic missions and helps in drawing comparisons between the two diplomatic missions. It focuses on the critical areas of communication that need to be examined so as to assess the need for improvement in communication functions of diplomatic missions. Experiencing the strategic communications audit process, using the approach described here can be a critical part of an organization's progression toward more strategic, and ultimately more effective, communications.

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<sup>98</sup> Coffman, J. *Strategic Communication Audits*, (Washington D.C.: Communications Consortium Media Centre, 2004) op cit. pp. 1- 10

<sup>99</sup> Carnegie Mellon, p.61

## **HYPOTHESES**

The study will test the following hypotheses

Firstly, poor and up-hazard communication of foreign policy causes states not to be able to achieve their intended national interest.

Secondly, foreign policy perception abroad can be positively influenced by strategic communication

## **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

### **PRIMARY DATA**

The study utilized both primary data and secondary data to evaluate Japan's and US foreign policy strategic communication in Kenya and found out how the two compared. A Semi structured interview method was used to conduct the research since it was considered a fairly open framework which allowed for focused, conversational, two-way communication. To collect the primary data some questions were open ended while others were specific. The targeted study sample included members of the Japanese embassy and the American embassy in Kenya, especially those tasked with public relations, communication and the execution of foreign policy. Public relations officials who work in organizations that work in close collaboration with the two embassies such as language institutions, media personnel as well as academics and professionals in the field of diplomacy, international relations and strategic communication were interviewed.

This method was preferred as it was less intrusive to those being interviewed since it encouraged two-way communication. Those being interviewed were able to ask questions of the interviewer. It was useful as it confirmed what was already known but also provided the

opportunity for learning, as it provided not just answers, but the reasons for the answers. It was easier for those interviewed to more easily discuss sensitive issues that they would not have otherwise discussed if the researcher had used questioners for instance.

The limitations the researcher encountered included receiving a lot of extra information that surfaced during interviews and that eventually needed a lot of editing. The interviewees were influenced by personal bias on different opinions about foreign policy communication. It was also difficult to assure the people I interviewed that their responses will be confidential. It took some time for the interviewer to find the balance between open-ended and focused interviewing. To overcome the problems and apprehensions that the researcher faced, she kept the atmosphere relaxed and informal since it helped the respondents to be more interested in the conversation. The researcher explained why the interview was necessary and the benefits of the research to the interviewees. She also assured the respondents that the information they gave would be treated with the necessary confidentiality.

Primary data collection was important as it put the researcher in touch with the reality under study. This method of data collection was important in that it helped gather information on the subject matter that was being studied.

## **SECONDARY DATA**

This study made use of secondary data. It involved systematic reading of texts and other documents, with the aim of getting the required information. The study sourced for content from text books, journals, newspaper articles and other relevant publications in the field of strategic communication of foreign policy execution. Data generated allowed for assessment of low

strategic communication of foreign policy coordinates and how they influenced negatively or positively the execution of foreign policy.

The study also employed critical reflection on the data collected from the field. This was important as it incorporated the researcher's critical contribution to the study. This allowed critical appreciation of prior studies that had been done on the areas related to the subject under study. Primary and secondary data generated was analyzed qualitatively and used to test the hypotheses of the study.

## **CHAPTER OUTLINE**

The study is divided into five chapters.

Chapter one: Introduction of the study.

Chapter two: Debates in strategic communication of foreign policy execution in the post cold war era.

Chapter three: A comparative study of strategic communication of foreign policy execution in Kenya by the US and Japanese governments through their diplomatic missions.

Chapter four: A critical analysis of the challenges and limitations of strategic communication of foreign policy execution by states.

Chapter five: Conclusion.

# CHAPTER TWO

## DEBATES IN STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION

### INTRODUCTION

This chapter commences with a brief introduction that discusses in detail the various arguments advanced by different scholars in the study of how foreign policy execution is communicated. The chapter is then divided into nine other different parts that discuss the main debates of scholars in the area of strategic communication and foreign policy execution. Which are; the debate on the definition and differentiation of strategic communication and public diplomacy; the various deliberations on the calls for leadership in the area of strategic communication and foreign policy execution; the various arguments on the demand for increased resource allocation for strategic communication and foreign policy execution; the various discussions for and against there being a clear definition of the overall strategy of strategic communication of foreign policy; the need for better coordination and organization of strategic foreign policy execution; the effects of globalization on strategic communication of foreign policy execution; the role of the electronic and print media in strategic communication of foreign policy execution; the effects, importance and use of propaganda and the debate on the effects, importance and use of the internet in foreign policy execution.

This chapter intends for one to better appreciate how strategic communication of foreign policy execution has shaped various debates and arguments in the post cold war era. Foreign

policy execution is communicated by an assortment of people and in the process elicits various effects on those who receive the communication.<sup>1</sup>

Countless studies, articles, and opinion pieces have announced that strategic communication and public diplomacy are in crisis and inadequate to meet current demand. There is consensus that such capabilities are critical and that they need to be improved.<sup>2</sup> An equally large number of reports and opinions offer recommendations: some general, some specific, some vague, some unambiguous, some ambitious, some contradictory.

This chapter reviews contemporary thinking regarding the advancement of strategic communication identifying common themes and debates that are endorsed by scholars. This research is based on a substantial literature review on materials of experts. These reviewed debates will help in recommendations for the improvement of strategic communication and public diplomacy. The debates are divided into common key categories that appear to have the broadest support across the documents reviewed. Definition and differentiation of strategic communication and public diplomacy, a call for “leadership” in strategic communication of foreign policy execution, a demand for increased resources for strategic communication and public diplomacy, a call for a clear definition of an overall strategy, the need for better coordination and organization of strategic, globalization and its effects on strategic communication, the role of mass media in strategic communication.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> P. Christopher, *Wither Strategic Communication: A survey of Current Proposals and Recommendations* (Santa Monica: The RAND Cooperation publications, 2009)pp.5-22

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*p.5

<sup>3</sup> P.Christopher, *Wither Strategic Communication: A survey of Current Proposals and Recommendations* (Santa Monica: The RAND Cooperation publications, 2009)op.cit. pp.5-22



## DEBATE ON THE DEFINITION AND DIFFERENTIATION OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

While there is consensus on both the criticality of and the need for improved strategic communication and public diplomacy, there is a lack of consensus on definitions and what should be included under the auspices of the terms. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines strategic communication quite broadly as focused Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.<sup>4</sup>

Some experts use strategic communication and public diplomacy as synonyms,<sup>5</sup> while some subordinate strategic communication to public diplomacy<sup>6</sup> and others vice versa.<sup>7</sup> Although less common, some describe public diplomacy quite narrowly as “exchanges, international information programs, and field operations carried out by ministries of foreign affairs.”<sup>8</sup> Others pluralize strategic communications and still others refer to perception management<sup>9</sup> or something else entirely.

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<sup>4</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms’ *Joint Publication* Vol.1-02, 2001 p.522

<sup>5</sup> B. Gregory, *Public Diplomacy* (Washington D.C.: Public Diplomacy Institute Press, 2008)p.3

<sup>6</sup> J.R. Kelley, ‘Between ‘Take-Offs’ and ‘Crash Landings’: Situational Aspects of Public Diplomacy’ in N. Snow and P.M.Taylor, (eds) *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (New York: Routledge Publications, 2009) p.74

<sup>7</sup> P.M. Taylor, ‘Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication’ in N. Snow and P. M. Taylor, (eds), *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (New York: Routledge, 2009) p. 14

<sup>8</sup> American Academy of Diplomacy and Stimson Center, *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness* (Washington D.C.: Stimson Center, 2008) p.6

<sup>9</sup> G. Matteo, and M. Martemucci, *A Critical Analysis of the US Government’s Current Perception Management Efforts* (Washington D.C.: IO Sphere Publication, 2008)p.14

Although, in some sense, it makes little difference how exactly we define strategic communication and public diplomacy, this research embraces the term strategic communication and advocates defining it as broadly and inclusively as possible. Todd has argued for broad conceptions of communication to include the message content of policies and actions and for the coordination of communications of all kinds with other activities in the pursuit of strategic or operational goals.<sup>10</sup> This is not a unique view: A 2008 article in IO Sphere notes the importance of keeping the definition of strategic communication connected both to the national-level context and to kinetic activities and what they communicate.<sup>11</sup> Of greater impact than exactly which activities are included and whether they are strategic communication, public diplomacy, or both are debates over approaches to public diplomacy.

Different theories of public diplomacy suggest different and sometimes conflicting courses of action. These are not just academic debates, but real, consequential divergences in contemporary communication activities. Which to pursue and in what balance affects the allocation of resources. As one interview respondent noted, “Public diplomacy has been divided over what it is trying to accomplish for a long time.”<sup>12</sup> The first divergence of approaches is between those who believe that “to know us is to love us”<sup>13</sup> and want to focus public diplomacy on telling a nations story and those who hold that demonstrating shared values and respect

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<sup>10</sup>T.C. Helmus, P.Christopher and W. G.Russell, *Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation Publication, 2007)p.5

<sup>11</sup> C.S. Gramaglia, *Strategic Communication: Distortion and White Noise* (Washington D.C.: IO Sphere Publication, 2008)p.12

<sup>12</sup>P. Christopher, *Wither Strategic Communication. A survey of Current Proposals and Recommendations* (Santa Monica: The RAND Cooperation publications, 2009)op.cit. p.7

<sup>13</sup>P.M. Taylor and N. Snow, *Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (New York: Routledge, 2009) op.cit.p.68

through policies and the explanations of those policies is more effective.<sup>14</sup> A second pair of competing areas of emphasis is noted in a 2007 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that contrasts changes in the British government's strategic communication efforts to emphasize building support for specific policy objectives with efforts that aim primarily to "help improve the general image of states."<sup>15</sup>

A third area of disagreement is over communication models, with one side caricatured as trying to craft the perfect message in isolation and then broadcast it, with opponents criticizing the one-sided nature of such transmissions and suggesting instead that true communication is based on understanding and "engagement" through successfully built relationships.<sup>16</sup> A fourth area is the disagreement over the use of both "black" and "white" communication—namely, those who want to include propaganda with all its negative connotations in strategic communication and those who prefer to influence exclusively through trustworthy and credible communication.<sup>17</sup>

Finally, and related to the first and last disagreements is between those who consider audience-building a success and those who would prefer to see actual evidence of influence. Certainly, being clear about what will be included under the definition of strategic

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<sup>14</sup>N.Snow, 'Rethinking Public Diplomacy' in N.Snow and P.M.Taylor, (eds) *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, (New York: Routledge, 2009)p.30

<sup>15</sup>U.S. Government Accountability Office, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and of Research*, (Washington, D.C.: GAO-07-904, 2007) p.36

<sup>16</sup>R.S. Zaharna, 'Mapping Out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives: Information and Relational Communication Frameworks' in N. Snow and P.M. Taylor, (eds) *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (New York: Routledge, 2009)p.5

<sup>17</sup>J.R. Kelley, 'Between 'Take-Offs' and 'Crash Landings': Situational Aspects of Public Diplomacy' in N. Snow and P.M.Taylor, (eds) *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (New York: Routledge Publications, 2009) p.74

communication and what core philosophy or philosophies will underpin government efforts is something that is called for in the recommendation of defining an overall strategy.

## **DEBATE ON CALLS FOR LEADERSHIP IN STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION**

Most of the studied documents explicitly call for “leadership” on strategic communication or public diplomacy. Leadership is used in this context to denote several different concepts. Several reports and scholarly works call for direct presidential interest and involvement or direct presidential access for those deputized with responsibility for strategic communication<sup>18</sup>. For example, the report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication. This type of leadership is necessary, proponents argue, because of the sweeping reforms required in a rapidly changing communication environment that we find ourselves in.

Most studies and reports advocate for reforms that are much more likely to require direct presidential attention. Leadership of this kind would include clear evidence that strategic communication is a national priority, which would increase the attention and responsiveness of those involved in planning and execution.<sup>19</sup>

Other invocations of leadership refer to a need for authority. Because strategic communication requires coordination across departments and agencies, proponents indicate that interagency leadership will need coordinating authority.<sup>20</sup> These leaders must have authority as

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<sup>18</sup> K.M. Lord, *Voices of America: U.S Public Diplomacy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Washington D.C.: Broking Institutions, 2008) p.32

<sup>19</sup> P. Christopher, *Wither Strategic Communication: A survey of Current Proposals and Recommendations* (Santa Monica: The RAND Cooperation publications, 2009) op.cit.p.10

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.p.11

well as responsibility- authorities to establish priorities, assign operational responsibilities, transfer funds, and concur in senior personnel appointments. False starts in organizing for strategic communication have revealed that “a committee of equals without an authoritative director is a recipe for inaction.”<sup>21</sup> Christopher Paul in his writing says if any organization attempts to exercise strong leadership, it risks offending those who don’t have these skills. He suggests that anointing a leader with authority over parts of the whole usually resolves the problem.<sup>22</sup> Leadership is also invoked by some sources as a proxy call for good choices, with regard to both organizing for strategic communication and creating policies and statements about those policies. As Christopher noted, “Bad policies cannot be well communicated.”<sup>23</sup> The president is the United States’ “communicator-in-chief” and is advised to maintain a personal awareness of global public opinion and how it will affect and be affected by policy.

Advocates indicate that showing this kind of leadership requires not only mindfulness of the communication implicit in policies and decisions, but also the inclusion of communication specialists at “the take offs, not just the crash landings.” According to Christopher, a key question remains: “Are we thinking about strategic communication when we make policy?”<sup>24</sup> In a similar vein, proponents use a call for leadership as a call for clear direction. Lindsay laments

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<sup>21</sup> N.Snow, ‘Rethinking Public Diplomacy’ in N.Snow and P.M.Taylor, (eds) *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, (New York: Routledge, 2009)p.30

<sup>22</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and of Research*, (Washington, D.C.: GAO-07-904, 2007) op.cit.p.36

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.p.36

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.p.37

“the lack of clear, articulate strategy from the national leadership” for strategic communication.<sup>25</sup>

Clear direction can include both the prioritization of strategic communication and its inclusion in the foreign policymaking process and direction on strategic goals and communication themes.

<sup>26</sup>There are not many scholars who think that communication strategies and especially those of states are doing well in achieving the required goals. Some have set programs for effective public outreach but many states still require effective planning.

## DEBATES ON THE DEMAND FOR INCREASED RESOURCES FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION

There is strong consensus that strategic communication and public diplomacy are under resourced. Most if not all of the documents reviewed recommend resource increases in this area.

<sup>27</sup>Specifically, most of the recommendations concern increases in both personnel and funding for programs and activities. Christopher argued the importance of balance between the two people is needed “out there” to execute the funded programs.<sup>28</sup> Many experts advocate quite substantial funding increases—three- to five fold in certain areas.<sup>29</sup> Repeated detailed recommendations for increased resourcing include, establishing quadrennial and bi-annual reviews of strategic communication and public diplomacy.

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<sup>25</sup> J.R. Kelley, ‘Between ‘Take-Offs’ and ‘Crash Landings’: Situational Aspects of Public Diplomacy’ in N. Snow and P.M.Taylor, (eds) *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (New York: Routledge Publications, 2009) p.74

<sup>26</sup> P.M. Talyor, ‘Public Diplomacy and Stratategic Communication,’ in Nancy Snow and P. M. Taylor, (eds) *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (New York: Routledge, 2009) p.14

<sup>27</sup> P. Christopher, *Wither Strategic Communication: A survey of Current Proposals and Recommendations* (Santa Monica: The RAND Cooperation publications, 2009) op.cit.p.20

<sup>28</sup> American Academy of Diplomacy and Stimson Center, *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness* (Washington D.C.: Stimson Center, 2008) op.cit. p.6

<sup>29</sup> G. Matteo, and M. Martemucci, *A Critical Analysis of the US Government's Current Perception Management Efforts* (Washington D.C.: IO Sphere Publication, 2008)p.14

Revising old government Acts that hinder communication, increase exchanges, libraries, international education programs, and other resources, review international broadcasting, have a greater focus on measurement, encourage better use of research, have formulas for better influencing the private sector, adopt enterprise-level or whole-of-Government solutions to communication problems, increase technology use and experiment with new technologies and finally update or revise doctrine or training and increase training and education so that to improve the overall organizational strength and performance<sup>30</sup>

### **DEBATE ON CALLS FOR A CLEAR DEFINITION OF THE OVERALL STRATEGY OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY.**

Strategy is a theme in most public diplomacy studies issued since 9/11. Reports of the Defense Science Board, Council on Foreign Relations, and U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy recommend Presidential directives to advance a variety of implementing strategies. The Djerejian advisory group urges “a new strategic direction” for public diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim worlds.<sup>31</sup> Government Accountability Office reports address deficiencies in the strategic approach of U.S. international broadcasting, the absence of a State Department public diplomacy strategy, and recently the lack of a “national communication strategy.”

Political leaders paid only nominal attention to public diplomacy and strategic communication after 9/11. For example in the US, The House of Representatives passed two bills requiring the State Department to develop a “comprehensive strategy” for use of public

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<sup>30</sup> P.Christopher, *Wither Strategic Communication. A survey of Current Proposals and Recommendations* (Santa Monica: The RAND Cooperation publications, 2009) op.cit.p.20

<sup>31</sup> P.E. Djerejian, *Changing minds winning peace: A New Strategic Direction for US Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World* (Washington D.C: Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World. Submitted to the US House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations 2003)p.1

diplomacy resources and to “ensure that the public diplomacy strategy of the United States is cohesive and coherent.”<sup>32</sup> No counterpart measures passed in the Senate. In creating a soon moribund Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee in 2002, then National Security Advisor Rice sought “development of strategic communications capabilities throughout the government.” The White House Office of Global Communications, mandated by Executive Order in 2003 to “facilitate the development of a strategy” among “appropriate agencies,” failed to do so. The Office closed in 2005.

Widespread use of the word strategy does not mean agreement on its meaning. Some experts seek public diplomacy strategies in support of policies such as war in Iraq, war on terrorism, relations with Muslims to name just a few. Others advocate strategies to achieve public diplomacy reform or to measure program and agency performance. Still others recommend strategies to be implemented by departments and agencies or coordinated among them. A few call for a comprehensive communication strategy intended to support national security interests and values. Nor is there common ground on what constitutes a public diplomacy institution.

The term public diplomacy is now part of a global conversation following several decades of use and considerable dispute on its meaning among professionals. Recently the term strategic communication has gained traction; some analysts use it synonymously with public diplomacy, others use it more narrowly or more broadly. Both terms raise analytical and practical questions. Are they interchangeable? Should strategic communication be used as an umbrella

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<sup>32</sup> M. Bowman, *9/11 Commission Recommends Renewed Focus on US Public Diplomacy* (Leeds: Institute of Communication Studies University of Leeds, 2004) p.2



label for public affairs, public diplomacy, international broadcasting, and open military information operations. To what extent are these analytically separable activities? Should public diplomacy and strategic communication relate just to governments or also to non-state actors? Should strategic communication describe only short-term instrumental activities as a sub-set of public diplomacy, which also includes longer term exchange of people and ideas? To what extent are perceptions of public diplomacy and strategic communication shaped positively or negatively by other terms such as, spin, manipulation, advocacy, propaganda, branding, and perception management? Naming is part of a struggle over meaning. In naming, we judge as well as describe.

Roughly one-third of the reviewed documents put forth recommendations for a clearly defined overall strategy.<sup>33</sup> Such calls range from very general statements such as countries should identify what they stand for and communicate that message clearly to the specific.<sup>34</sup> Multiple reports call for strategy statements regarding specific objectives, such as how officials intend to implement public diplomacy in the Muslim world, how private-sector public relations techniques will be incorporated into states efforts, and how to include measurable program objectives, implementation strategies, and resource requirements.<sup>35</sup><sup>36</sup> Many of the calls for clear strategy relate to topics discussed earlier under the category of leadership. According to one

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid.p.20

<sup>34</sup> G. Matteo, and M. Martemucci, *A Critical Analysis of the US Government's Current Perception Management Efforts* (Washington D.C: IO Sphere Publication, 2008)p. 14

<sup>35</sup> C.S. Gramaglia, *Strategic Communication: Distortion and White Noise* (Washington D.C.: IO Sphere Publication, 2008)p.12

<sup>36</sup> Interview of B. Sherman, director of strategic planning, Broadcasting Board of Governors, with P. Christopher, Washington, D.C.: in 2008

scholar, without a clear strategy, “the leaders of each department, agency and office are left to decide what is important.”<sup>37</sup> Most of the sources recommending clear strategy call for highest-level strategy, as well as strategy that goes beyond strategic communication.

## **DEBATE ON THE NEED FOR BETTER COORDINATION AND ORGANIZATION OF STRATEGIC FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION**

Second in prevalence to increased resources for strategic communication is an admonition to coordinate better, with of the reviewed documents making such a recommendation.<sup>38</sup> Many sources lament the lack of coordination of government strategic communication efforts, both within and between agencies. Most subsequently recommend increased efforts to coordinate or new ways to organize or support efforts. Some organizational change is recommended in almost every document reviewed; the exceptions are those that focus on a narrower set of issues.<sup>39</sup> Consensus is less strong, however, on the specific organizational changes needed. These include, creation of new government agencies, creation of new independent supporting organizations, reorganization within existing organizations, rebalancing authorities between government agencies and creation of new advisory or coordinating positions.<sup>40</sup>

Several scholars expressed considerable frustration with the lack of success of coordination efforts to date. This frustration appears in many of the documents included in this

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<sup>37</sup> Taylor, H. ‘The Not So Black Art of Public Diplomacy’ *World Policy Journal* (2008)

<sup>38</sup> P. Christopher, *Wither Strategic Communication. A survey of Current Proposals and Recommendations* (Santa Monica: The RAND Cooperation publications, 2009) op.cit.p.21

<sup>39</sup> Ibid p.21

<sup>40</sup> B. Fulton, B. Gregory, D. Oglesby, W. R. Roberts, and B. Zorthian, ‘A Dissent: Transformation Not Restoration’ dissent to the January 2005 Public Diplomacy Council report, *A Call for Action on Public Diplomacy* (undated)

analysis and in the broader community of interest.<sup>41</sup> For example, Jeffrey Jones, former director for strategic communication and information on the NSC, laments, “There is little evidence of cooperation, coordination, or even appreciation for the impact of strategic communication.”<sup>42</sup> One scholar advocated for real authority in coordination: “You’ve got to have teeth, if it is just a coordination committee. Coordination is a pernicious word.”<sup>43</sup> In another study the researcher indicated concerns about further organizational changes within the U.S. government. He argued that what we have “may not be perfect, but it is workable” and that radical changes could set public diplomacy and strategic communication back years if the existing network of coordinators and practitioners is disrupted.<sup>44</sup> This minority view of concern about fragmentation and disruption during reorganization is explicitly echoed, along with other objections, by the dissenting opinion of the 2005 report of the Public Diplomacy Council.

## **DEBATE ON THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION**

The theme of the effects of globalization is one that is widely studied and discussed by many scholars to assess its effects and impact on foreign policy execution. The world of today practices a completely different foreign policy from what was practiced in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup>

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<sup>41</sup>U.S. Government Accountability Office, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and Coordination of Research* (Washington D.C.: GAO-07-904, 2007)p.36

<sup>42</sup>P.M. Talyor, ‘Public Diplomacy and Strategetic Communication,’ in Nancy Snow and P. M. Taylor, (eds) *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (New York: Routledge, 2009) p.14

<sup>43</sup>P.Christopher, *Wither Strategic Communication. A survey of Current Proposals and Recommendations* (Santa Monica: The RAND Cooperation publications, 2009) op.cit.p.22

<sup>44</sup> B. Fulton, B. Gregory, D. Oglesby, W. R. Roberts, and B. Zorthian, ‘A Dissent: Transformation Not Restoration’ dissent to the January 2005 Public Diplomacy Council report, *A Call for Action on Public Diplomacy* (undated)

century.<sup>45</sup> The new foreign policy in the age of globalization in the 21st century must be international, extending across the entire globe. It must develop new thought and a believable moral strategy to shape a better world, focused on actions to promote these goals.<sup>46</sup> One way to try to measure "Globalization" in foreign policy is the annual index of A.T. Kearney and the Foreign Policy Magazine of the Carnegie Endowment in Washington D.C.<sup>47</sup>

This index includes rankings of 62 countries for 14 variables grouped in four categories: economic integration (trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio capital flows, and investment income), personal contacts (international travel and tourism, international telephone traffic), technological connectivity (internet users and hosts), and political engagement (memberships in international organizations, international treaties ratified, contributions to UN Security Council missions).<sup>48</sup> This index is a more theoretical statistical approach, but it shows some important trends in a world of more personal contacts, economic integration and technological connectivity. Equally important to factor in this debate are the factors of power and influence on who shapes the new foreign policy in the age of globalization and which countries or organizations will be in the best position in this new way of foreign policy.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> R.W. McChesney, 'Global Media, Neoliberalism, and Imperialism' *Monthly Review*, Vol. 52, No.10 2001 p.2

<sup>46</sup> H. Hoffman 'The Globalization of Foreign Policy' *International Analysis Network* Vol.1 No.1 2006 p.3

<sup>47</sup> A.T. Kearney Consultants, *Foreign Policy* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009) p.1

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.p.1

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.p.1

When considering the actors in foreign policy critically, there is a lot of room for outsourcing new actors and actions due to the globalization of foreign policy. At the core, one has to identify just who is putting forth the topics and proposals for action. The nationally centered foreign policy of the 19th century has in the 21st century been replaced by a never before seen globalization of power influences, organizations, media, and personal contacts.<sup>50</sup> Never before have so many people maintained as many international contacts worldwide as today. The world is considered a village of global information and opinion, events at a distance of several a thousand miles had such an effect on everyone, so many committed people are involved politically in foreign policy today. This is real globalization as a fact. This has an enormous impact on the way in which nations interact with each other today.<sup>51</sup>

Modern day states also need to recognize that the days of tailoring different messages to foreign and domestic audiences are long past. Today's globalised media environment ensures that all the people can scrutinize every detail of a foreign states policies in their own country – from speeches intended for domestic audiences to seemingly obscure decisions. It no longer makes sense to think in terms of a firewall separating domestic and foreign audiences; a suitable way of communicating to both audiences at the same time will be more appealing in the future. The traditional instruments of public diplomacy can and should be enhanced, particularly to reach millions of people in foreign states.

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<sup>50</sup> R.W. Mc Chesney, 'Global Media, Neoliberalism, and Imperialism' *Monthly Review*, Vol. 52, No.10 2001,p.2

<sup>51</sup> H. Hoffman 'The Globalization of Foreign Policy' *International Analysis Network* Vol.1 No.1 2006 p.3

## DEBATE ON THE ROLE OF THE ELECTRONIC AND PRINT MEDIA IN STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION

Usually the major debate in foreign policy execution and the media according to Price, raises at least two salient questions.<sup>52</sup> The first is whether foreign policy execution is affected by media considerations and more specifically have modern technological developments meant that foreign policy execution is increasingly affected by media coverage and how the media portrays that information?<sup>53</sup>

The second debate he examines is whether there is what might be called a foreign policy of media structures, namely an interest by an individual state or the international community in the mode by which media is developed through an interdependent set of nations, so as to shape how foreign policy execution in certain countries is communicated by the media.<sup>54</sup> According to Price, the answer to both questions is yes, and the issues are interconnected and are constantly a subject of scholars. He explains, how the term CNN effect is used to describe a variety of putative consequences of new media technology for foreign policy (Technology and Communication). The term was first used during the Gulf War of 1990.<sup>55</sup> The argument was that because of the rise of CNN and its style of reporting, leaders learned more from television than from their own officials about what was going on both on the battlefield and in the diplomatic

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<sup>52</sup> M. E. Price, 'Foreign Policy and the Media' *The International Encyclopedia of Communication* Vol.1, No.1, 2008 pp.11-15

<sup>53</sup> T.B. Allen, B. F. Clifton and N. Polmar, *CNN: War in the Gulf* (New York: Maxwell International, 991) p.13

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* p.13

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.* p.14

sphere. By conducting diplomacy in real time and in the fishbowl of a global news service, leaders could directly reach past official and autocratic gatekeepers to broad civil publics.<sup>56</sup>

If, in the traditional world of diplomacy, television and newspaper is still regarded as a nuisance, real-time coverage adds a further threat: it means that the public is often made aware of an event at the same time as the politicians who are accordingly forced to respond in a manner which runs counter to the diplomatic traditions of working methodically, systematically and slowly. According to Lee Hamilton, "television and newspaper real time reporting also encourages policy-makers to react quickly, perhaps too quickly, to a crisis. Television, critics say, leads not to sound foreign policy but sound bytes masquerading as policy"<sup>57</sup> The debate that clearly manifests itself here is that of synchronizing modern day reporting with the slow systematic and methodical workings of a diplomat. Inquiry has been made as to how better results can be achieved by the diplomat when these two are merged.

The traditional channels for communication—the printed press, radio, television, and motion pictures—are supposedly well understood by political leaders, government officials, diplomats, and military officers as very critical in the role of strategic communication of foreign policy execution and making.<sup>58</sup> Despite years of experience in dealing with journalists of all stripes, however, these leaders are often inept. James Lacey, a reserve Army colonel and a freelance journalist, once wrote: "Thousands of officers who spend countless hours learning

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<sup>56</sup>Ibid.p. 9

<sup>57</sup> P.M. Taylor 'Television: Force Multiplier or Town Crier in the Global Village?' *Corporate Communications Bradford* Vol. 4, No. 2, 1999 p.61

<sup>58</sup> R. Halloran, *Strategic Communication* (Leeds: The Institute of Communication Studies University of Leeds, 2008) p.5

every facet of their profession do not spend one iota of their time understanding or learning to engage with a strategic force that can make or break their best efforts.<sup>59</sup>

According to most scholars, until comparatively recently, the role of television and newspaper in international affairs appeared limited to providing a "window on the world" for national or local audiences that were anyway assumed to be largely divorced or disinterested in occurrences on foreign fields, except perhaps during international sporting events or when nations went to war.<sup>60</sup> This has however changed and attracted various debates for study and examination by public diplomacy and public relations personal. Television and newspaper, in other words, were traditionally seen more as passive observers of foreign affairs and somewhat arbitrary observers rather than as active ones.<sup>61</sup>

Now, however, there is a growing debate about the role and impact of television and newspaper on the foreign policy-making and execution process, especially in light of the Gulf War of 1991 and subsequent events in Bosnia and Somalia.<sup>62</sup> Television and newspaper are beginning to be regarded as potentially quite significant players in international affairs and therefore warranting critical independent study and analysis by scholars.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> J. Lacey *Who is Responsible for Losing the War in Iraq?* (Washington D.C.:Naval Institute Proceedings, 2004)p.14

<sup>60</sup> P.M. Taylor 'Television: Force Multiplier or Town Crier in the Global Village?' *Corporate Communications Bradford* Vol. 4, No. 2, 1999 p.61

<sup>61</sup> F. Aukofer, and W. Lawrence, *America's Team: The Odd Couple- A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military* (Vanderbilt: Freedom Forum First Amendment Centre, 1995)p.1

<sup>62</sup> T.B. Allen, B. F. Clifton and N. Polmar, *CNN: War in the Gulf* (New York: Maxwell International, 991) p.13

<sup>63</sup> P.M.Taylor 'Television: Force Multiplier or Town Crier in the Global Village?' *Corporate Communications Bradford* Vol. 4, No. 2, 1999 p.61



Besides the study of the increased use of newspaper and television, another key debate that emerging is on the internationalization and the commercialization of the media and the inability of states to control it and the threats thereof. This internationalization and commercialization is what was the ideological motivation behind the Reagan-Thatcher determination to herald in a new era of deregulated media and communications.<sup>64</sup> It was also why in the mid-1980s, the USA and the UK both withdrew from UNESCO, which had been the principal forum for the international community's debates about freedom of the press and the free-flow of global information.<sup>65</sup> It seemed to them that a new world information order was being called for by states which proved reluctant to practice such concepts within their own societies.<sup>66</sup> Market forces and consumer capitalism would decide the issue, not political regulation.<sup>67</sup> This debate on commercialization and internalization of the media still continues to be given attention especially when coupled with the effects of globalization of media and its effects on making and execution of foreign policy.

Although scholarly attention has only recently begun to appreciate it, television and newspaper are in fact a highly deceptive medium, and this is yet another debate that is clearly highlighted in the study of media and foreign policy relationship. We are, of course, talking mainly in this context about news, current affairs and other "factual" programming;

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<sup>64</sup> M.D. Alleyne, *International Power and International Communication* (London: Macmillan, 1995) p.3

<sup>65</sup> M. Burton, *UNESCO Handbook on Media Relations* (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2003 )

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid* p.3

<sup>67</sup> M.D. Alleyne, *International Power and International Communication* op.cit p.3

entertainment or fictional programmes, such as movies and soap operas, which command infinitely larger audiences, are not the main object of attention here.<sup>68</sup>

For news gathering, just like diplomacy, it is indeed a process requiring a team of professional individuals making judgments about the available pictures prior to them ever being seen by an audience. In the editorial rooms, the pictures sent in from reporters in the field can be synthesized, chopped about and re-ordered with a new commentary.<sup>69</sup> In other words, they are editorialized until they are whipped into a comprehensible story. Depending on the nature of the target audience, that story may be told in differing editorial styles, prompting accusations that on many commercial, advertising-driven stations, news stories are determined more for their entertainment value rather than for information purposes ("infotainment")<sup>70</sup> Many television and newspapers are increasingly doing this and therefore they end up entertaining rather than bringing to the fore the true information to the audience. Various studies about television the truth and foreign policy have focused on this area of study especially the ones dealing with contemporary propaganda. This is still another debate that receives a good number of studies accredited to it.

But whether in the field or back at base, according to differing broadcasting traditions, some pictures may still be omitted on grounds of 'taste and decency'.<sup>71</sup> This is still another debate that

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<sup>68</sup> P.M. Taylor 'Television: Force Multiplier or Town Crier in the Global Village?' *Corporate Communications Bradford* Vol. 4, No. 2, 1999 p.61

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.* p.61

<sup>70</sup> For example, the use of the "News Bunny" on the Mirror Group's cable services "Live TV" in P.M. Taylor 'Television: Force Multiplier or Town Crier in the Global Village?' *Corporate Communications Bradford* Vol. 4, No. 2, 1999 p.61

<sup>71</sup> D.M. Morrison, *Television and the Gulf War*, (London: John Libbey, 1992)p.1

receives a good number of studies accredited to it. During the Gulf War of 1991, for example, close-up pictures of the horribly burned remains of women and children killed in the bombing of the Al Firdos installation in the Amiriya suburb of Baghdad were omitted by some Western broadcasters for the same reason that they would not use similar pictures of the victims of a plane crash<sup>72</sup> Pictures of the aftermath of a mortar attack on a bread queue in Bosnia in 1992 were treated likewise, a "sanitisation" process which, according to one analyst, meant that those news reports would "never have the same impact on the political process"<sup>73</sup>

The power of television and newspaper in foreign policy is a mixed blessing and has been studied as just that by some scholars. As mediums of communication they play too much to the heart, and too little to the head. It presents powerful, emotive images that conjure strong reactions. Anecdotes about individual suffering make compelling television and newspaper stories, but they rarely form a good basis to make policy.

Foreign policy should be made by democratic governments, accountable to parliament, not in reaction to which trouble spots the news gathering organizations can afford to cover from time to time. Reactions to the priorities of the news room are unlikely to yield a coherent or sustainable foreign policy<sup>74</sup>

It is this belief that the media serve as forces for freedom and democracy, a belief consolidated by the role of glasnost in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War, which

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<sup>72</sup> F. Aukofer and W. Lawrence, *America's Team: The Odd Couple. A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military, Freedom* (Vanderbilt: Forum First Amendment Centre, 1995) p.6

<sup>73</sup> N. Hopkinson, *The Media and International Affairs After the Cold War* (Leeds:HMSO,1993)p.18

<sup>74</sup> E. Bickham, 'Playing to the heart of the nation' (Leeds: Spectrum, 1993)p.3

has given satellite television a new status in international affairs, its role being almost as an instrument of political warfare.<sup>75</sup>

## **THE DEBATE ON THE EFFECTS, IMPORTANCE AND USE OF PROPAGANDA FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION**

Themes of propaganda that are brought out in strategic communication center around the classification of propaganda, which can be classified according to the source and nature of the message. White propaganda generally comes from an openly identified source, and is characterized by gentler methods of persuasion, such as standard public relations techniques and one-sided presentation of an argument. Black propaganda is identified as being from one source, but is in fact from another. This is most commonly to disguise the true origins of the propaganda, be it from an enemy country or from an organization with a negative public image. Grey propaganda is propaganda without any identifiable source or author.<sup>76</sup> Never before have there been so many propagandas of such great importance to the lives of all of us. And never before have there been such powerfully implemented propagandas. The modern news-gathering systems of the newspapers and the gigantic radio broadcasting facilities of the world have made the chief differences, but refinements in propagandist methods have kept pace.

Propaganda may well be the most ancient and widely applied strategic tool in political history, serving to consolidate or shift influence through the manipulation of information and perception. The term itself was coined in the 16th century by the Catholic Church, and referred

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid.p.4

<sup>76</sup> E. Boehm 'Behind Enemy Lines; W.W.II Allied/Axis Propaganda' (City: The Wellfleet Press, 1989)p.5

to the “propagation” of faith, but it has since broadened from this narrow base to incorporate virtually any deliberate manipulation of public perception, especially by political actors.

According to Ellul, the propagandist can play an important part in stimulating both enthusiasm and organization. The fact that propaganda can help to promote organization is perhaps more significant in the foreign policy context than the fact that it can affect individuals.<sup>77</sup> This is the main theme that emerges in the study of propaganda and foreign policy and how it has been used to promote organizations. Many organizations make use of communications from abroad. Industrial and scientific groups try to obtain the information that will be most useful to their work, regardless of where it originates. For instance, governments are particularly large consumers of political information from abroad, as is testified by the volume of diplomatic reporting and the voracious appetite of all foreign offices for media that contain news about foreign areas. Private organizations concerned with foreign policy likewise require large quantities of international news. Their work in providing information that helps emerging countries to develop new institutions of industry and commerce, and to expand old ones, has great long-term political significance.

Through propaganda, policy initiatives and covert actions, agents act directly to influence values ideas beliefs opinions politics and culture.<sup>78</sup> Foreign policy officials observe, report, and participate in this. This has caused diplomats and IR students to have a great area of study to dwell on. Electronic communication has transformed the emergence of popular opinion as a significant force in communicating propaganda.

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<sup>77</sup> J. Ellul, *Propaganda: The formation of Mens Attitudes* (New York: Konrad Kellen, 1973)p.254

<sup>78</sup> A.M.Winkler, *The politics of Propaganda: The office of War Information* (New Haven: 1978) p.23

Foreign policy communication therefore can no longer be pursued as in the last century when diplomacy was the exclusive province of diplomats who used secret codes including propaganda to communicate. Development in mass communication and the increased attentiveness to domestic audiences abroad regarding foreign policy making and execution meant that the target of diplomacy has widened to include popular opinion as much.<sup>79</sup>

Consequently by appealing over the heads of governments directly to public opinion, effective propaganda and other measures would encourage public opinion to support policy which would in turn exert pressure on government policy makers. The awareness that international public opinion has become a major factor in the conduct of diplomacy meant that propaganda considerations intruded on policy making and execution.<sup>80</sup> For that reason public opinion had to be an ingredient in policy formulation at all levels. Planning, coordination, timing of operations and finally execution. Even within Ministries of foreign affairs, traditional diplomats were wary of popular opinion in that it would influence foreign governments' actions and attitudes of Foreign policy. A meeting of diplomats today is no longer merely an opportunity for resolving issues between diplomats but meeting points for public opinion and forums for propaganda.<sup>81</sup>

As a debate in scholarly work, propaganda more than ever is being used as an instrument of aggression, a new means for rendering a country defenseless in the face of an invading army. While it has been used in a halting way for centuries, and in the early years of this century we

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid.p.23

<sup>80</sup> J. Ellul, *Propaganda: The formation of Mens Attitudes* op.cit. p.254

<sup>81</sup> Ibid. p.254

saw it prepare the way for Hitler to seize the Saar, Austria, the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia. It is most recently studied as an new instrument of aggression because modern technological developments has given it an effectiveness never before experienced in the history of the world.<sup>82</sup>

## **THE DEBATE ON THE EFFECTS, IMPORTANCE AND USE OF THE INTERNET IN FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION**

In discussing the media, it is important to also look at the internet and the great role it plays in communication of foreign policy execution in the world today. According to Roma, The Internet holds in it the promise to fundamentally alter the way and capability of national, regional and the international economies deliver global information.<sup>83</sup> She explains that democracy is strengthened by the access to knowledge. The sharing of ideas made possible through the Internet, mobile phones, satellite TV, and other connections both within a country as well as to the rest of the world can have a powerful impact on how people relate to their government and what they expect from it.

For instance in China the cyber community has made an increasing impact on the way in which Chinese foreign policies are being formulated and communicated to other states and the citizens. By an increasing impact, it has become more discernable that public opinions and popular nationalism expressed through the cyber community are now playing a more important

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<sup>82</sup> A. McClung and E. Briant, 'The Fine Art of Propaganda; A Study of Father Coughlin's Speeches' (New York: The Institute for Propaganda Analysis Harcourt, Brace and Company publishers, 1939)p.2

<sup>83</sup> N. Roma, *A Wired World: The Internet and International Relations* (Washington D.C: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005)pp.2-4

role in shaping China's external behavior.<sup>84</sup> This role is not only noticeable in traditional foreign policy areas such as Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations, to where public attention is always being paid, but also in non traditional and non sensitive areas. This area of study has not been dealt with adequately by scholars of media politics and foreign policy.<sup>85</sup> This is a clear indication that foreign policy communication is a subject that needs to be further exploited if we are to explain how effectively governments will be able to say what they want to say to the world while achieving results for their states.

Another dimension in the study of the internet and the communication of foreign policy execution is what is called political communication. According to Jankowski and Selm, research is increasingly concerned with the study of political life and communication in online environments. In their findings, some recent investigations make use of Internet-based tools for the research process: for project management, for data collection and analysis, and for the preparation and publication of findings. In these respects, political communication research reflects methodological transformations underway across the social sciences, often known as e-Science and e-Research.<sup>86</sup> Here scholars have turned from traditional methods of looking for data and are increasingly using the internet to look for suitable materials for their study. Foreign policy communication has not been left behind and scholars like Jankowski and Selm, have

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<sup>84</sup> Y.A. Liu, *Cyber Community changing foreign policy in China*, (Scarborough: University of Toronto, 2008)p.2

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*p.1

<sup>86</sup> N.W. Jankowski, and M. Selm, 'Internet-Based Political Communication Research: Illustrations, Challenges & Innovations', *The Public* Vol.15, Issue 2, 2008 pp.5-16:12



studied how internet based political communication is intertwined with foreign policy communication.

As discussed in this chapter, bad relations between two governments involved can lead to hostility between peoples, and good inter- governmental relations. Good relations on the other hand, often leads people in the states involved to have more favorable images of each other. Basic attitude changes are thus usually brought about by changes in the social, political, or economic environment-not by poor communication.<sup>87</sup>

Neither poor strategic communications nor traditional public diplomacy is adequate to the task facing diplomatic missions today in foreign countries. Nor will changing foreign policy alone be enough, since almost anything any state does today will be met with criticism from knowledgeable bureaucrats and a generally more informed public. Improving any states relations with its host country will require a dramatically new approach to engagement.<sup>88</sup>

Public affairs officers will have to do more and get out of embassies, despite the security risks that are common in many countries and engage with as wide a segment of the public as possible if they are to effectively communicate their foreign policy execution to those countries. Rather than pour endless money into their own television programs and other soft power publicity materials that few know about, these officials will have to take up a new strategy and for example appear regularly on local networks – not only to advance their arguments, but to

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<sup>87</sup> F. Aukofer and W. Lawrence, *America's Team: The Odd Couple. A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military*, Freedom (Vanderbilt: Forum First Amendment Centre, 1995) p.6

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.p.6

hear the objections from the people in their host countries and be ready to take them into account.

## CHAPTER THREE

# A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF JAPAN AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION THROUGH THEIR DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN KENYA DURING THE POST COLD WAR ERA

### INTRODUCTION

This chapter is introduced by an explanation of why communication practices must add up to more than a series of isolated events and how that can be assessed using a strategic communication audit matrix to measure the performance of communication strategies in an organization. The purpose of conducting a strategic communication audit is because the examinable variables used in this study are the ones that are employed in everyday communication practices by diplomats and communication experts to pass their messages across to their target audiences to achieve their national interest goals

The rest of the chapter is divided into five main parts, starting at step one and ending at step five. Step one is titled knowing existing critical strategic communication practices of the two diplomatic missions.<sup>1</sup> Step two introduces the practice maturity scale that is used as a measuring tool to assess the three main themes identified in step one in each of the diplomatic missions.<sup>2</sup> The third step is an assessment of the current capacity of each of the diplomatic mission using the three themes of divided into sixteen variables<sup>3</sup> against the communication practice on the other hand.<sup>4</sup> The two form the strategic communication audit matrix. Step four is an interpretation of results obtained in step three identifying areas for improvement. Step five of

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<sup>1</sup> J. Coffman, *Strategic Communication Audits*, (Washington D.C.: Communications Consortium Media Centre, 2004)pp.1-10

<sup>2</sup> P. O'Malley, *Strategic Communications Planning*, (Ottawa: O'Malley Communications Inc,1996)p.1

<sup>3</sup> J. Coffman, *Strategic Communication Audits*, op.cit. p.55

<sup>4</sup> P. O'Malley, *Strategic Communications Planning*, op. cit. p.55

the strategic communications audit is a result in more than just an identification of areas or practices that need to be improved on.

This framework is useful as diplomatic missions can tactfully use these communication tools and strategies that have been developed by the two communications experts and tailor them to suit their purposes to help them achieve their goals.<sup>5</sup> The framework is useful in comparing how the American and the Japanese governments through their diplomatic missions in Nairobi have set up communication strategies that communicate the execution of their foreign policy in Kenya.<sup>6</sup>

### **DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AUDIT**

A strategic communications audit is a systematic assessment, either formal or informal, of an organization's capacity for, or performance of, essential communications practices. It determines what is working well, what is not, and what might work better if adjustments are made.<sup>7</sup> Defined in this way, a strategic communications audit has both evaluative and formative value. It is evaluative in that it provides a "snapshot" of where an organization currently stands in terms of its communication capacity or performance. It is formative in that it also points to areas in which the organization can strengthen its performance.<sup>8</sup> Communications audits are a relatively common practice, though they are more common among for-profits than diplomatic missions, and not familiar to most non communications professionals. Audits are most often performed by external communications or evaluation experts, but can also be performed internally.

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<sup>5</sup> Mc Clelland, *Theory and International System*. (Bouldre: Prentice Hall, 1986), p.5

<sup>6</sup> P.E. Djerejian 'Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for US Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World' (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009) pp.7-14:7

<sup>7</sup> P. O'Malley, *Strategic Communications Planning*, op. cit, p.55

<sup>8</sup> For a further discussion on strategic communication audits see chapter 2 p.39

Using this brief previously used for nonprofit organizations that want to better understand their strategic communications,<sup>9</sup> it has been used in this study on the two diplomatic mission's communication strategies for foreign policy execution in Kenya. The brief outlines the basic steps in a strategic communications audit approaches that were used. The audit was applied to the two mission's communication strategies specifically concerned with foreign policy execution.

### **STEP ONE: KNOWING EXISTING CRITICAL STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PRACTICES OF THE TWO DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS**

The first step involves knowing the specific themes that eventually determine practices associated with communications in assessing a foreign missions performance and capacity with respect to the practices of its ODAs projects and foreign policy activities abroad. These are communication themes and practices that every diplomatic mission executing foreign policy abroad should be performing and adhering to at some level, whether by a single individual or by many staff members throughout the organization to assess the impact of their work as far as achieving national interest goals are concerned.

Using this table as developed by the communications consortium media centre,<sup>10</sup> sixteen essential strategic communications practices were identified that are essential and grouped into three main themes: i) strategy which includes the core tasks of communications planning and strategy development.<sup>11</sup>, ii) implementation which Includes practices most common to a diplomatic mission with an active communications function.<sup>12</sup> and iii) support and alignment

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<sup>9</sup> K. Bonk, H. Griggs, and , E. Tynes *Strategic Communication for Nonprofits*, op.cit. p.2

<sup>10</sup> J. Coffman, *Strategic Communication Audits*, op.cit.pp.1-10

<sup>11</sup> For a further discussion on the main themes of strategic communication practises see chapter 2 p.30

<sup>12</sup> P. Christopher, *Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for US Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World* , (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2009) p.4

which includes non-communications-specific practices within the diplomatic mission that help to ensure the communications function is successful.<sup>13</sup>

The table also offers quality standards or criteria for each communication practice. It describes in brief what the communication practices should look like.<sup>14</sup> This list, just on its own, has substantial value in the process of studying as it can be used as a checklist to help determine if the diplomatic mission is actually performing each strategic communications practice. But more importantly, the audit process can reveal if quality criteria are being met, and if not where improvements can be made in the communication practices performed.

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.p.4

<sup>14</sup> K. Bonk, H. Griggs, and , E. Tynes *Strategic Communication for Nonprofits*, op. cit p.2

ESSENTIAL STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS PRACTISES ASSESSED IN A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE JAPANESE AND AMERICAN EMBASSY COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES OF FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION IN KENYA

STRATEGY

IMPLEMENTATION

INTERGRATION

Strategic communications practices	Quality criteria /standards
a. Identifies the vision of the mission	The communication vision is aligned with but distinct from the organization's overall mission
b. Mission chooses goals and outcomes	Goals and outcomes are well defined measureable and help guide a defined plan of action
c. Mission selects target audiences	Audience are specific media, government officials, MOFA officials, general public, direct ODA recipients, students
d. Develop messages	Messages are specific, clear, persuasive, reflect audiences values and include a solution or course of action
e. Identify credible messengers	Messengers are seen as credible by the target audience and can be recruited and available to the cause
f. Choose communications mechanism /outlets	Outlets ( both in the air ) (media) and on the ground are chosen for their access and availability to target audiences
g. Scan the context and completion	Risk and contextual variables that can affect communications success of the mission are identified and factored into planning when possible
h. Develop effective material	Materials are developed in attractive accessible and varied formats for maximum exposure and visibility
i. Build valuable partnerships	Linkages exist with internal and external stakeholders who can help align with and carry the message
j. Train messengers	Internal and external messengers(diplomats and local staff) are trained in key message and are consistent in their delivery
k. Conduct steady outreach	Outreach and dissemination to audiences through multiple outlets is regular and sustained
l. Monitor and evaluate	Activities and outcomes are regularly monitored and evaluated for purposes of accountability and continuous improvement.
m. Support communication at the leadership level	Management understands and support communications as an integral part of organization viability and success
n. Earmark sufficient resources	Fund raising regularly includes dedicated resources for communication practices
o. Integrate communications throughout the organization	Communication is seen as an integrals part of every organizational project or strategy
p. Involve staff at all levels	Communication is not seen as an isolated function; most if not all staff members have some knowledge and /or participation in communication efforts

## STEP TWO: IDENTIFYING POSSIBLE LEVELS OF COMMUNICATION PRACTICE AT EACH OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS

To assess the diplomatic missions on their practices in the previous table, it is important to have a gauge that helps to measure and illustrate where they currently stand in terms of their performance. That gauge is offered here in the form of a "practice maturity scale." The practice maturity scale adopted from the Carnegie maturity model<sup>15</sup> offers a continuum of possible performance levels for any given communication practice. The figure below illustrates the scale's five levels. Higher levels in the scale represent higher levels of organizational commitment to, integration of, and performance on the communication practice. Each practice is classified as 1) ad-hoc, 2) planned, 3) institutionalized, 4) evaluated, and 5) optimized<sup>16</sup>

In this comparative study of each of the diplomatic missions' current performance on their strategic communications practice is assessed using this scale which has five levels for interpretation of results as follows.


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<sup>15</sup> Carnegie Mellon software Engineering Institute's work, Capable Maturity Model Intergration (CMMI). [www.sei.cmu.edu/cmmi/cmmi.html](http://www.sei.cmu.edu/cmmi/cmmi.html) op. cit

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.p. 1



# PRACTICE MATURITY SCALE



Uncoordinated  
Unassigned  
No resources

Deliberate/  
Managed Resources  
Allocated Responsibility  
Assigned

Regularly per-  
formed "Best"  
practices  
Coordinated

Performance  
measured Progress  
tracked Practice  
predictable

Regular Reflection  
Continuous  
improvement

### **Level One: Ad Hoc**

The communication practice is ad hoc and unorganized. Few if any staff and financial resources are dedicated to it.<sup>17</sup> Success is based on the competence and efforts of one or two "heroic" individuals. Despite this chaotic environment, however, the communications practice may be implemented successfully. But because it is uncoordinated, efforts are often inefficient and go over budget and schedule.<sup>18</sup> Quality may also be variable because different people perform the practice over time.

### **Level Two: Planned**

The practice is planned and deliberate as opposed to being performed on a reactive or "as needed" basis. Resources are allocated to the practice,<sup>19</sup> responsibilities are assigned, and the process is managed.<sup>20</sup> The practice does not occur regularly, however, and may still be performed by one or two individuals.

### **Level Three: Institutionalized**

The practice is routine and part of the missions "fabric." The diplomatic mission has qualitatively determined the best way to approach the practice and has institutionalized it.<sup>21</sup> Practices are known and coordinated within and outside the organization.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> P. Christopher, *Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for US Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World*, op cit, p.36

<sup>18</sup> For a further discussion on uncoordinated communication efforts see chapter 2, p.39

<sup>19</sup> For a further discussion on resources allocated to communication practices see chapter 2, p.36

<sup>20</sup> For a further discussion on managing the process of communication see chapter 2 p.34

<sup>21</sup> American Academy of Diplomacy and Stimson Center, *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness* (Washington D.C.: Stimson Center, 2008) p.36

<sup>22</sup> Scale is adopted from the Carnegie Mellon software Engineering Institute's work on its capable maturity model Intergration (CMMI). [www.sei.cmu.edu/cmmi/cmmi.html](http://www.sei.cmu.edu/cmmi/cmmi.html)

#### **Level Four: Evaluated**

The practice is evaluated and analyzed. Measures of performance and progress are collected and analyzed.<sup>23</sup> Often a quantitative understanding of success is known and tracked, and the mission has a better ability to predict or estimate performance.

#### **Level Five: Optimized**

Because of its recognized importance to the organization, the practice is continuously reflected on and improvements incorporated.<sup>24</sup>

Distinctions between levels one and two are based on the degree to which the diplomatic mission is reactive and disorganized (level one) versus purposeful and proactive (level two). At level three, the practice is performed regularly, consistently across staff members, and has been performed enough that the mission has gained a certain level of proficiency at it. At level four, the mission has committed to tracking the communication practice for purposes of better understanding how to improve performance. The mission is monitoring the quality of the practice. Level five demonstrates an even higher level of the diplomatic mission's commitment to the communication practice, as it cares enough about it to learn from and improve performance over time.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> M. Bowman, *9/11 Commission Recommends Renewed Focus on US Public Diplomacy* (Leeds: Institute of Communication Studies University of Leeds, 2004) p.2

<sup>24</sup> B. Sherman, Director of strategic planning, Broadcasting Board of Governors, interview with P. Christopher, Washington, D.C.: in 2008

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.* p.1

### STEP THREE: ASSESSING CURRENT PERFORMANCE AND CAPACITY OF EACH OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES FOR FOREIGN POLICY COMMUNICATION

The main task for the third step is to collect data about communications practices on each of the diplomatic missions, and to use that data to make assessments about organizational performance and capacity. It involves actually using the scale described above to gauge where the diplomatic mission stands on all essential strategic communications practices necessary for foreign policy execution.<sup>26</sup> The figure on the next page illustrates in matrix form how this assessment is structured. This audit step is also involved in assessing actual communications strategy content or materials and making assessments about their quality.

The matrix arrays the sixteen communication practices<sup>27</sup> along the bottom row, and arrays the practice maturity scale vertically.<sup>28</sup> Interviewees filled in or checked the box that best represented where on the scale they felt the diplomatic mission falls for each practice, besides answering semi structured questions based on the same communication practices. The two diplomatic missions were assessed on each communications practice using the five level scale using answers from five officials at the Japanese embassy and four at the American embassy.

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<sup>26</sup> Carnegie Mellon software Engineering Institute's work, Capable Maturity Model Intergration (CMMI). [www.sei.cmu.edu/cmmi/cmmi.html](http://www.sei.cmu.edu/cmmi/cmmi.html) op cit. p.61

<sup>27</sup> J. Coffman, *Strategic Communication Audits*, (Washington D.C.: Communications Consortium Media Centre, 2004) op cit. p.59

<sup>28</sup> Carnegie Mellon software Engineering Institute's work, Capable Maturity Model Intergration (CMMI). [www.sei.cmu.edu/cmmi/cmmi.html](http://www.sei.cmu.edu/cmmi/cmmi.html) op cit. p.61

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AUDIT MATRIX

		5. Optimized	4. Evaluated	3. Institutionalized	2. Planned	1. Ad Hoc	0. Not performed
<b>STRATEGY</b>	a. Identify the vision						
	b. Choose goal[s] and outcomes						
	c. Select target audiences						
	d. Develop messages						
	e. Identify credible messengers						
	f. Choose communications mechanism/outlets						
	g. Scan the context and competition						
<b>IMPLEMENTATION</b>	h. Develop effective partnership						
	i. Build valuable partnership						
	j. Train messengers						
	k. Conduct steady outreach						
	l. Monitor and evaluation						
<b>SUPPORT AND INTEGRATION</b>	m. Support communication at leadership level						
	n. Earmark sufficient resources						
	o. Integrate communications throughout organization						
	p. Involve staff at all levels						

#### **STEP FOUR: IDENTIFIED AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES FOR FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION IN KENYA**

Once the assessments were made, areas for improvement were identified. Diplomatic missions are not expected to be a "Level 5" on all strategic communications practices. Rather, the assessment of where the organization should be must be based on an accounting of the organization's realistic capabilities with respect to communications of their foreign policy execution.<sup>29</sup> For example, it may not be reasonable to expect that all funding that comes into an mission will be earmarked for communications. While a diplomatic mission can make communication of foreign policy execution a priority and request specific resources for it, the outcome also depends on what the home government through the ministry of foreign affairs is willing to support. Completed audit matrix using the data obtained from the interviewees for each of the diplomatic missions provides immediate assessment of areas in which they need to improve in their communication of foreign policy execution.

#### **STEP FIVE: REFINE PRACTICE AND REPEAT THE PROCESS AS NEEDED**

The strategic communications audit should result in more than just an identification of areas or practices that need to be improved.<sup>30</sup> To maximize the chances that audit findings will be used and actual practice improved as a result, the audit should demonstrate through data how communications problems are causing difficulties in the present as opposed to speculating about their future impact and at the same time, the audit should reinforce practices that are current organizational strengths and generate specific recommendations for how actual communication practice can be enhanced.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> For a further discussion on organizations realistic capabilities of communication see chapter 2, p.34

<sup>30</sup> J. Coffman, *Strategic Communication Audits*, (Washington D.C.: Communications Consortium Media Centre, 2004) op cit. p.59

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.* p.60

**USING THE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AUDIT FOR AMERICAN EMBASSY ASSESSMENT ON STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION**

		5.Optimized	4.Evaluated	3.Institutionalized	2.Planned	1.Ad Hoc	0.Not performed
<b>STRATEGY</b>	a. Identifies the vision						
	b. Chooses goals and outcomes						
	c. Selects target audiences						
	d. Develops messages						
	e. Identifies credible messengers						
	f. Chooses communications mechanism/outlets						
	g. Scans the context and competition						
<b>IMPLEMENTATION</b>	h. Develops effective partnership						
	i. Builds valuable partnership						
	j. Trains messengers						
	k. Conducts steady outreach						
	l. Monitors and evaluates						
<b>SUPPORT AND INTEGRATION</b>	m. Supports communication at leadership level						
	n. Earmarks sufficient resources						
	o. Integrates communications throughout the mission						
	p. Involves staff at all levels						

With respect to vision and a choice of goals and outcomes, the American embassy does foreign policy execution communications planning that is based upon the parent ministry institutionalized structure but tailored to the Kenyan audience<sup>32</sup>. The target audience usually the public recipients of ODA do not request communication strategies and plans. However such documents are requested by the department of state for specific projects that have to be executed under specific description.<sup>33</sup> Even then communication strategy for execution of foreign policy may not be necessarily labeled communication strategy but clear guidelines of communication of the information from the diplomatic mission to the respective recipients exists.<sup>34</sup> At the proposal writing stage whoever is writing the proposal usually includes modes for dissemination of information to the correct audience though this is a more recent development in foreign policy execution.

The diplomatic mission is clear about its audiences, as they do not change much over time. As for formal communication efforts, such as a campaigns, exhibitions and workshops the mission puts resources into testing messages and messengers with polling on their mailing databases. Hardly are efforts less formal and routine communications have standardized procedures,<sup>35</sup> usually, hardly do one or two people decide on messages, messengers, and communication mechanisms. Serious systematic scanning is done of the environmental context and potential risks of messages delivered to target audiences bearing in mind modern communication environments and existing media perceptions in Nairobi in particular and Kenya

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<sup>32</sup> United States Mission to Kenya, President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief ,2008 Fact Sheet <http://nairobi.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/pepfar08.pdf>

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.p.1

<sup>34</sup> The researcher's interview with Ms. Muia C., Researcher, American Reference Centre, American Embassy Nairobi, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2009.

<sup>35</sup> The researcher's interview with Mr. Kamau G., Director, American Reference Centre, American Embassy Nairobi, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2009.



in general. The message is more direct and forthright which sometimes ends up rubbing politicians and even stakeholder audiences at the grassroots the wrong way.<sup>36</sup>

Regarding implementation, the mission is purposeful in its communications practices; they have an established policy news page on their website that explains and addresses different areas of targeted foreign policy execution such as President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).<sup>37</sup> Communications efforts are all directed to and disseminated by the media centre and are integrated as an important function throughout the diplomatic mission.<sup>38</sup> Outreach is varied depending on the department that is dealing with a particular ODA project. Established and written policies regarding outreach are carried out by the diplomats and local staff on a slightly more routine way, on collaboration with, target audiences on the mailing list who receive info alerts.<sup>39</sup>

In terms of support and integration, the director of the resource centre recognizes and supports the educational efforts especially with regard to the study of international relations diplomacy and general foreign policy and not necessarily the advancement of American culture. Diplomats and local staff have the necessary training and routine reinforcement of such training to achieve the objective of communicating the intentions of the diplomatic mission to the various audiences. At the same time communications is considered an important part of the budget. Allocations for social media, media tours and international press centers as well as

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<sup>36</sup> The researcher's interview with Mr. Kamau G., Director, American Reference Centre, American Embassy Nairobi, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2009.

<sup>37</sup> United States Mission to Kenya, President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, 2008 Fact Sheet <http://nairobi.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/pepfar08.pdf>

<sup>38</sup> United States Mission to Kenya Foreign Press Centre, <http://nairobi.usembassy.gov/resources/foreign-press-center/>

<sup>39</sup> The researcher's interview with Mr. Omondi G., Communication Officer, American Reference Centre, American Embassy Nairobi, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2009.

international information center with connections on face book flicker, twitter and You tube, as well as facilities for web chat.<sup>40</sup>

## **AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES OF FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN KENYA**

The audit assessment points to various areas for potential improvement. However, given its size, resources, and the fact that it is functioning quite well under the current model, the diplomatic mission is recommended to have two main areas for development and improvement. The top priority, because it affects all others, is making sure that communications and materials are accessible to the public despite strict security controls.<sup>41</sup> This is well achieved through an active and interactive website. The mission will also need to develop a communications strategy for familiarizing target audience with the existence of the resource centre.<sup>42</sup> In doing that, more attention will be paid to goals and outcomes, and assessing competition from other diplomatic missions and risk of communication that a diplomatic mission is prone to have in the security volatile environment of today. The overall communications function will be largely coordinated by the media centre and other departments exist as linkages for this information.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> U.S. Department of state, Africa partnering for peace and prosperity, <http://www.america.gov/world/africa.html>

<sup>41</sup> The researcher's interview with Mr. Kamau G., Director, American Reference Centre, American Embassy Nairobi, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2009.

<sup>42</sup> The researcher's interview with Mr. Kamau G., Director, American Reference Centre, American Embassy Nairobi, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2009.

<sup>43</sup> The researcher's interview with Ms. Muia C., Researcher, American Reference Centre, American Embassy Nairobi, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2009.

**USING THE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AUDIT FOR JAPANESE EMBASSY ASSESSMENT ON STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION**

		5.Optimized	4.Evaluated	3.Institutionalized	2.Planned	1.Ad Hoc	0.Not performed
<b>STRATEGY</b>	a. Identifies the vision						
	b. Chooses goals and outcomes						
	c. Selects target audiences						
	d. Develops messages						
	e. Identifies credible messengers						
	f. Chooses communications mechanism/outlets						
	g. Scans the context and competition						
<b>IMPLEMENTATION</b>	h. Develops effective partnership						
	i. Builds valuable partnership						
	j. Trains messengers						
	k. Conducts steady outreach						
	l. Monitors and evaluates						
<b>SUPPORT AND INTEGRATION</b>	m. Supports communication at leadership level						
	n. Earmarks sufficient resources						
	o. Integrates communications throughout the mission						
	p. Involves staff at all levels						

With respect to vision and a choice of goals and outcomes, the Japanese embassy does foreign policy execution communications planning.<sup>44</sup> The target audience usually the public recipients of ODA do not request communication strategies and plans. However when such documents are requested by the ministry of foreign affairs if a specific project has to be executed under specific description.<sup>45</sup> Even then, communication strategy for execution of foreign policy is usually done by whoever is writing the proposal that concerns the actual execution and only revisited when a progress report is due to the ministry of foreign affairs of Japan.

The diplomatic mission is reasonably clear about its audiences, as they do not change much over time. When it comes to formal communication efforts, such as a campaigns, exhibitions and workshops, the mission puts resources into testing messages and messengers with polling on their mailing databases.<sup>46</sup> When efforts are less formal and more routine, however, usually one or two people decide on messages, messengers, and communication mechanisms.<sup>47</sup> Serious systematic scanning is done of the environmental context and potential risks of messages delivered to target audiences which sometimes ends up hampering the effect the message is supposed to elicit at the execution level.<sup>48</sup>

Regarding implementation, the mission is purposeful in its communications practices, but they still tend to be concentrated in the efforts of one or two individuals rather than integrated as an important function throughout the organization. Outreach is slightly more routine, with established and written policies regarding outreach to, and collaboration with, target audiences.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *ODA Evaluation Guidelines* (Tokyo: International Cooperation Bureau, 2009)p.18

<sup>45</sup> K. Yamaya, *New Development of Administration*, (Houritsu: Bunka Sha, 2002) (in Japanese)p.19

<sup>46</sup> Embassy of Japan in Nairobi, Japan information and Culture Centre <http://www.ke.emb-japan.go.jp/jicc.htm>

<sup>47</sup> The researcher's interview with Mr. Wairua I., Information Officer, Japan Information and Culture Centre Embassy of Japan Nairobi, 27<sup>th</sup> June 2009.

<sup>48</sup> The researcher's interview with Mrs. Muimi C., Projects Officer, Embassy of Japan Nairobi, 4<sup>th</sup> July 2009.

<sup>49</sup> The researcher's interview with Mr. Futaki H., Information Officer, Japan Information and Culture Centre Embassy of Japan Nairobi, 27<sup>th</sup> June 2009.

In terms of support and integration, the director of Information and Culture recognizes and supports the cultural effort more than the actual communication function.<sup>50</sup> Diplomats and local staff lack the necessary training and routine reinforcement of such training to achieve the objective of communicating the intentions of the diplomatic mission to the various audiences.<sup>51</sup> At the same time communications rarely makes it into the budget as a separate line item, and when it does, it is usually payment for events exhibitions that have already taken place sometimes haphazardly. Communication is usually the first area of the budget to be cut when the overall budget needs to be reduced.

Communications funds tend to appear when surplus funds are left over from other allocations and need to be spent down quickly before the end of the financial year. In addition, the communications function is concentrated in the information centre only without proper synchronization between the political and economic sections which are most of the time in charge of or closely involved with ODA projects.<sup>52</sup> Communication is left to the one staff member of the information centre who also handles all editing, publication design, and audience database management, rather than have communication emphasized as a competency that most staff members should share.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> The researcher's interview with Mr. Kikuchi H., Director of Information, Japan Information and Culture Centre Embassy of Japan Nairobi, 26<sup>th</sup> July 2009.

<sup>51</sup> The researcher's interview with Mr. Wairua I., Information Officer, Japan Information and Culture Centre Embassy of Japan Nairobi, 27<sup>th</sup> June 2009.

<sup>52</sup> The researcher's interview with Mrs. Muimi C., Projects Officer, Embassy of Japan Nairobi, 4<sup>th</sup> July 2009.

<sup>53</sup> The researcher's interview with Mr. Kikuchi H., Director of Information, Japan Information and Culture Centre Embassy of Japan Nairobi, 26<sup>th</sup> July 2009.

## AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES OF FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION OF THE JAPANESE EMBASSY IN KENYA

The audit assessment points to numerous areas for potential improvement. Former Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi actively engaged in MOFA reforms following her appointment in 2002. Soon after assuming office, she announced the Ten Reform Principles to Ensure an Open Foreign Ministry, one of which was to improve the efficiency and transparency of ODA.<sup>54</sup> However, given its size, resources, and the fact that it is functioning reasonably well under the current model, the diplomatic mission is recommended to have three main areas for development and improvement.

The top priority, because it affects all others, is making sure that communications resources are a distinct budget line item every financial year. The organization will also develop a communications strategy for the overall organization rather than only for specific projects. In doing that, more attention will be paid to goals and outcomes, and assessing competition from other diplomatic missions and risk of communication that a diplomatic mission is prone to have.

While ODA execution evaluations are now carried out at each stage, from ex-ante to mid-term and finally to ex-post, new concepts have not necessarily been clarified, at times leading to confusion.<sup>55</sup> For now the communications function will still largely be concentrated in one department only and all the programs of the diplomatic mission are at risk if the people at the information centre leave. Moving forward, however, the communications official will try to build communications capacity among diplomats in the economic and political sections who are ideally project managers by acting as support on communications rather than by performing the function independently.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *ODA Evaluation Guidelines* (Tokyo: International Cooperation Bureau, 2009)p.18

<sup>55</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *ODA Evaluation Guidelines* (Tokyo: International Cooperation Bureau, 2009)p.34

<sup>56</sup> The researcher's interview with Mrs. Muimi C., Projects Officer, Embassy of Japan Nairobi, 4<sup>th</sup> July 2009.

## CHAPTER OVERVIEW

The strategic communications audit results is more than just an identification of areas or practices that need to be improved by each of the two diplomatic missions. To maximize the chances that these audit findings will be used by a diplomatic mission and actual practice of communication of foreign policy execution improved as a result, the audit has (i) Demonstrated through data how communications problems are causing problems in the present, as opposed to speculating about their future impact. At the same time, the audit reinforces practices that are current organizational strengths.<sup>57</sup>

(ii) Generated specific recommendations for how actual communication practice for communicating foreign policy can be enhanced as data need to be linked to concrete communication actions.<sup>58</sup> (iii) Made transparent the organizational benefits of adopting these communication actions in addition to the weaknesses they are designed to address.<sup>59</sup> (iv) Prioritized recommendations so diplomatic missions are not immobilized by the prospect of implementing them.

In terms of frequency, formal communications audits should be conducted about every five years. Informal audits on which diplomatic missions internally revisit their strategic communications capacity and performance levels for foreign policy execution may be done more frequently.<sup>60</sup> Audits should also be considered after a diplomatic mission experiences a critical incident that might affect communications, such as when the missions changes their foreign

<sup>57</sup> The researcher's interview with Mrs. Muimi C., Projects Officer, Embassy of Japan Nairobi, 4<sup>th</sup> July 2009.

<sup>58</sup> The researcher's interview with Mr. Kikuchi H., Director of Information, Japan Information and Culture Centre Embassy of Japan Nairobi, 26<sup>th</sup> July 2009.

<sup>59</sup> The researcher's interview with Mr. Wairua I., Information Officer, Japan Information and Culture Centre Embassy of Japan Nairobi, 27<sup>th</sup> June 2009.

<sup>60</sup> The researcher's interview with Mr. Futaki H., Information Officer, Japan Information and Culture Centre Embassy of Japan Nairobi, 27<sup>th</sup> June 2009.

policy in a state, new technologies impact on traditions of conducting diplomacy, or a reorientation of these policies are needed.<sup>61</sup>

As described here, strategic communications audits are, at their core, an evaluation tool that can be used to conduct comparative studies on two or more units. Unlike most evaluation tools or practices, however, they do not focus on the results or outcomes of an organization's communications practices after they are implemented or among their target audiences.<sup>62</sup> Rather, they focus on the organization itself, its practice and capacity, and how the organization has positioned the communications function.<sup>63</sup>

Diplomatic missions, often overlook this type of assessment as a possibility when asked to evaluate their communications strategies or activities. Experiencing the strategic communications audit process, using the approach described here or another designed toward a similar end, can be a critical part of an organization's progression toward more strategic, and ultimately more effective, communications.

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<sup>61</sup> The researcher's interview with Mr. Wairua I., Information Officer, Japan Information and Culture Centre Embassy of Japan Nairobi, 27<sup>th</sup> June 2009.

<sup>62</sup> The researcher's interview with Mr. Wairua I., Information Officer, Japan Information and Culture Centre Embassy of Japan Nairobi, 27<sup>th</sup> June 2009.

<sup>63</sup> The researcher's interview with Mr. Futaki H., Information Officer, Japan Information and Culture Centre Embassy of Japan Nairobi, 27<sup>th</sup> June 2009.



## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION BY STATES**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

This chapter is a critical analysis of the challenges and limitations of strategic communication of foreign policy execution by states. It draws a lot of the issues discussed from actual challenges as pointed out by secondary data and primary data obtained from interviewees views on the state of strategic communication of foreign policy execution. It starts with a brief overview of the challenges and constraints that diplomats and communication experts face in their endeavor to bring across the right information to target audiences. The first part addresses the lack of a communication strategy as one of the major issues that need to be tackled.

The lack of proper coordination and ability to share data and information is the next challenge that is discussed. The issue that follows is that of the Human Resources being a challenge that hinders the quick and proper achievement of communication goals in foreign policy execution. Cultural relations pose a threat to achieving proper and precise delivery of critical information if not well addressed. This is the issue that is addressed last in this chapter.

Strategic communication of foreign policy is the effort to understand, inform and influence foreign publics in support of foreign policy objectives. This has never been more important to the security of states than it is today. The challenges confronting states strategic communication are varied and there is no single easy fix for them. Accomplishing synchronized coordination of statecraft, public affairs, public diplomacy, military information operations, and

other activities, reinforced by political, economic, military, and other actions, for national interests." is much more difficult than it sounds.<sup>1</sup>

The message or variations thereof must be tailored for different geographic, demographic, cultural, and socioeconomic groups.<sup>2</sup> In addition, this process goes far beyond "send-message-receive."<sup>3</sup> If conducted properly, strategic communications would serve as a dialogue or two-way education because the same information and analysis used to craft messages would enable government leaders and policymakers to sharpen their judgment and decision-making.<sup>4</sup>

### **THE 'LACK OF STRATEGY IN COMMUNICATION POLICY' AS A CHALLENGE AND LIMITATION TO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION**

The first major challenge and limitation that states face is the lack of clear and definite strategy in communication. The fact that there is no national policy execution strategy for strategic communications or even a government-wide definition of "strategic communications" is nothing less than a travesty.<sup>5</sup> In 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda deputy, proclaimed, "More than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. We are in a media battle, a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma."<sup>6</sup> Yet, rather than a clear, synchronized response to this communication challenge, many governments have created a cacophony of discordant messages. Colonel Lindsey Borg, a public affairs officer in the American Air Force stated:

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<sup>1</sup> J. Jones, 'Strategic Communications: A Mandate for the United States,' *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No. 39, 2008 p.1

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.p.1

<sup>3</sup> T. Blankley and O. Horn *Strategizing Strategic Communication* (Washington D.C.: Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, 2008) p.1

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.p.1

<sup>5</sup> For a further discussion on lack of clear strategy in communication of policy see chapter 2 p.30, see chapter 2 p.71

<sup>6</sup> See Chapter 1 p.1

"Without a clear, articulate strategy from national leadership, each department, agency, and office are left to decide what is important.<sup>7</sup> In most cases the answer is to use the organization's communication efforts to advance its own interests."<sup>8</sup> Simply put, bureaucratic turf battles and misperceptions are not a recipe for success.

In addition, government agencies have insufficiently adopted new communication techniques and technologies that are currently exploited not only by commercial organizations but also by adversaries of states and the public in general.<sup>9</sup> For example, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the Department of State failed to evaluate the impact of its communications efforts on target audiences. They failed to poll target groups and analyze focus group data to determine which messages would resonate.<sup>10</sup> These are basic research capabilities found in almost any modern public relations or marketing firm. The GAO concludes that these efforts are "hampered by a lack of interagency protocols for sharing information, a dedicated forum to periodically bring key research staff together to discuss common concerns across topics of interests, and a clearinghouse for collected research."<sup>11</sup>

This suggests the need for a central information and research hub, which is currently non-existent. As Richard Holbrooke, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, famously quipped, "How can a man in a cave out-communicate the world's leading communications

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<sup>7</sup> For a further discussion on lack of clear strategy in communication of policy see chapter 2 p.34

<sup>8</sup> L.J. Borg, 'Communicating With Intent' The Department of Defense and Strategic Communication, *Center for Information Policy Research*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008) p.10

<sup>9</sup> op cit. Bowman p.37

<sup>10</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and of Research*, (Washington, D.C.: GAO-07-904, 2007) p.36

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.p.36

society?"<sup>12</sup> The bottom line is that states can and must improve in strategic communications. In today's rapidly expanding information universe,<sup>13</sup> efforts to change negative perceptions of states policies and values must be more deliberate, sophisticated, and coordinated.<sup>14</sup>

## **LACK OF COORDINATION & ABILITY TO SHARE DATA AND INFORMATION USING MODERN TECHNOLOGY AS A CHALLENGE AND LIMITATION TO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION**

Despite the existence of various mechanisms of communication, information officials express general concern about the limited sharing of information and coordination across policy executing agencies.<sup>15</sup> Government efforts to share and coordinate research data on foreign policy making and execution are hampered by the lack of interagency protocols for sharing information, a forum to periodically bring key research and communication staff together to discuss common concerns across all topics of interest, and a clearinghouse for collected information.<sup>16</sup> Diplomats and a new strategic communication plan specifically highlighted the need for evaluating and improving diplomatic mission's coordination of media monitoring activities, both within the mission and within foreign states.<sup>17</sup>

Increasingly, conflict is taking place in a population's cognitive space,<sup>18</sup> making sheer military might a lesser priority for victory in this information age.<sup>19</sup> Use of the nation's hard

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<sup>12</sup> R. Holbrooke, *Get the Message Out* (Washington D.C: Washington Post, 2001), p.1

<sup>13</sup> For a further discussion on improving strategic communication see chapter 2 p.52

<sup>14</sup> For a further discussion on efforts to change negative perceptions see chapter 2 p.35

<sup>15</sup> For a further discussion on limited sharing of information and coordination across policy executing agencies see chapter 2 p.40

<sup>16</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *International Broadcasting: Management of Middle East Broadcasting Services Could Be Improved*, (Washington D.C.: GAO-06-762, 2006)p.5

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*p.6

<sup>18</sup> For a further discussion on conflict in the mind see chapter 1 p.1, and chapter 2 p.80

<sup>19</sup> For a further discussion on the use of hard power for communication see chapter 2 p.15

power is inadequate as the sole or even primary means to address an insurgency.<sup>20</sup> Instead, national decision makers must create a synergistic approach that emphasizes the country's soft power capabilities while drawing on complementary efforts of its hard power if necessary. The public information environment is a key battleground in the modern information environment. Some leaders have labeled the current operating conditions as Fourth Generation Warfare<sup>21</sup> a term that refers to an enemy that operates in a virtual realm and uses mass media cleverly, effectively making the media the terrain.<sup>22</sup>

Personal electronic devices such as cell phones, digital cameras, video recorders, and various kinds of computers have created a new intersection between the individual and the mass media. The public can no longer be viewed as passive information consumers, the public now more than ever actively contributes to the information environment via World Wide Web sites, blogs, and text messaging, to name only a few.<sup>23</sup> The new technologies also give individuals, groups, and in some regards nations enormous capability to organize and influence various audiences.<sup>24</sup>

Likewise, the public media, citizens, and international organizations can directly affect the success or failure of foreign policy operations through their influential effect on the public.<sup>25</sup> To bring success in the modern operating environment, policy and diplomatic operations must

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<sup>20</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and Coordination of Research*, op.cit. p.1

<sup>21</sup> W.S. Lind, *Understanding Fourth Generation War* (Washington D.C: Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation, 2004)p.7

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.p.2

<sup>23</sup> Winik L.W., 'Cycle of Hate' *Parade Magazine*, (2006)p.3

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.p.3

<sup>25</sup> For a further discussion on how public media influences the success of policy see chapter 1 p.13

include consideration of public information and integration of the efforts of the resources that deliver it.<sup>26</sup> The DSB states in its 2004 report, strategic communication will be less effective if managed separately, since it cannot build support for policies that audiences view negatively.<sup>27</sup> Simply put, consideration of communication and its effects must be integrated into operational planning, decision-making, and execution cycles, not considered as an afterthought. Just as the operating environment has changed from what it used to be in the cold war era, so must the methods and tactics of communication and the organizational constructs that facilitate them.

Indeed, the intent of the efforts in strategic communication is to transcend the information instrument of national power by synchronizing and integrating efforts between all instruments of power diplomatic, information and economic. There must be harmony between the instruments of power to realize their full potential and the diplomatic missions current efforts in strategic communication are designed to provide a process to coordinate efforts to achieve desired effects.<sup>28</sup>

Therefore, strategic communication development efforts must take place at all levels every public information resource must be developed with a consideration of its strategic communication role. Simultaneously, a massive culture shift must occur to counteract the instincts of those who manage varied information resources instincts that have them focused on

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<sup>26</sup> For a further discussion on the role of public information see chapter 1 p.13

<sup>27</sup> Defense Science Board Task Force report on Strategic Communication. 2004

<sup>28</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and Coordination of Research*, (Bethesda: USIA Alumni Association, 2007)p.1

funding and career-field-specific issues instead of on enhanced coordination to achieve the diplomatic missions or states' communication goals.<sup>29</sup>

A culture shift also must occur within the leadership hierarchy of each service, the diplomatic mission, the ministries of foreign affairs as a whole, and the government to value strategic communication,<sup>30</sup> provide access to decision-making and planning efforts, support efforts in this area with new training programs,<sup>31</sup> and clearly articulate the enterprise goals and objectives. Without such changes, efforts to communicate foreign policy execution strategically likely will fail.

## **THE HUMAN RESOURCE AS A CHALLENGE AND LIMITATION TO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION**

Getting the human resources dimension of strategic communication right, however, can go a long way toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of any nation's outreach to the world.<sup>32</sup> According to the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Stimson Center report, significant portions of a nation's foreign affairs business simply are not accomplished due to lack of personnel.<sup>33</sup> Increased diplomatic communication needs in the Middle East for example in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere are not supported by increased staffing and positions that exist have vacancy rates of nearly 15 percent for most states.<sup>34</sup> The study found critical personnel shortages

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid.p.1  
<sup>30</sup> For a further discussion on leadership in strategic communication see chapter 2 p.34  
<sup>31</sup> For a further discussion on training for strategic communication see chapter 2 p.34  
<sup>32</sup> The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Getting the People Part Right*, (Washington D.C: A Report on the Human Resources Dimension of US Public Diplomacy 2008) pp.1-41  
<sup>33</sup> Adams, G. and Glaudemans, D. *A Foreign Affairs Budget For the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness* (Washington D.C: The American Academy of Diplomacy at the Stimson Center, 2008) pp.1-3  
<sup>34</sup> P.E. Djerejian, 'Changing minds Winning Peace A New Strategic Direction for US Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World' *Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009)pp.7-14

in all four major categories of foreign affairs activities – core diplomacy, public diplomacy, economic assistance, and reconstruction, stabilization and training.<sup>35</sup>

Persistent staffing gaps at hardship posts continue to impede important policy pursuits. Training lags because of personnel shortages. A well-trained workforce is extremely difficult to have when every additional training assignment could leave an operational job unfilled.<sup>36</sup> A 2006 report by the Government Accountability Office of the United States of America (GAO) found that 29% of language-designated positions at embassies and consulates were not filled with language-proficient staff.<sup>37</sup> The study concludes that increased staffing capacity alone will not be sufficient to meet diplomacy and foreign policy execution goals and suggests that a number of international exchange and other programs should be significantly expanded. There is an even greater shortfall in functional training - particularly in program management skills.<sup>38</sup>

In public diplomacy and strategic communication, reduced budgets and staff devoted to explaining states abroad especially after the end of the Cold War contributed to a decline in understanding of and respect for ‘The State’ in many parts of the world.<sup>39</sup> Increased resources, including larger numbers of skilled personnel, are required in this area. For example, for almost a decade public diplomacy and strategic communication has missed opportunities to develop a

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<sup>35</sup> Adams, G. and Glaudemans, D. *A Foreign Affairs Budget For the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness* op.cit. pp.1-3

<sup>36</sup> The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Getting the People Part Right*, (Washington D.C: A Report on the Human Resources Dimension of US Public Diplomacy 2008) p.83

<sup>37</sup> U.S. General Accounting Office *Staffing and Foreign Language shortfalls persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps* (Washington D.C.:GAO 06-894, 2006) p.25

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.p.26

<sup>39</sup> <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123556.pdf>



vigorous global internet programming capability to reach millions due to insufficient funding and a lack of trained career personnel in most states, particularly in program management skills.<sup>40</sup>

A review of the dozens of reports on strategic communications that have come out in recent years establish that several of these questions specifically, those relating to recruitment, the examination process, the promotion process, the function of the PD and communication area offices, and the role of the public diplomacy officers have rarely if ever been posed.<sup>41</sup> A good number of reports have taken up the issue of training, but though these reports have emphasized the need for enhanced language and area studies training (with a heavy accent on the Middle East region), very few, if any, have called for enhanced training in the fields of communication and persuasion skills that are at the very heart of effective public diplomacy and strategic communication.

While some reports have called for a new, more public diplomacy and strategic communication that is friendly to “corporate culture” still public diplomacy and strategic communication are fully integrated into the mainstream of ministry of foreign affairs. These are important questions that go directly to some of the systemic challenges facing most nations’ public diplomacy apparatus.<sup>42</sup>

## **CULTURAL RELATIONS AS A CHALLENGE AND LIMITATION TO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION**

Throughout history, cultural diplomacy has bridged the gaps left by political disagreements, and now more than ever the U.S. should be devoting resources to sharing its

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> The CRS Report for Congress Public Diplomacy: *A Review of Past Recommendations*, 2005 (<http://www.opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33062/>).

<sup>42</sup> The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Getting the People Part Right*, (Washington D.C: A Report on the Human Resources Dimension of US Public Diplomacy 2008) p.83

cultural riches with the world<sup>43</sup> Government cultural work has been diminished in scope even as trade in cultural products and Internet communication has increased the complexity and informal character of cross-cultural communication.<sup>44</sup> However, because cultural work constitutes a long-term, diffuse, and largely immeasurable solution to a pressing problem in an age of quick fixes, the larger concept of cultural diplomacy defined most broadly as the propagation of a states culture and ideals around the world tends to get short shrift in these presentations.<sup>45</sup>

In addition, the lion's share of many states cultural content is conveyed by private-sector film, recording, and broadcasting industries, functioning beyond the realm of official policy objectives. Yet any meaningful, real-world cultural-diplomacy policy ought to take into account the considerable impact of private-sector cultural products such as movies, music, and television on international sentiments toward them.<sup>46</sup>

The cultural element faces particular challenges. While extensive lip service is still paid to the role of culture in international affairs, the reality is that cultural policy has fallen out of fashion.<sup>47</sup> There is, perhaps, discomfort with proposing culture as a solution to a problem that seems, at first glance at least, to stem primarily from cultural difference and cultural conflict. In addition, and more significantly, cultural programming requires time and assumes a depth of

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<sup>43</sup> C. Merrill, *CD - The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: University of Iowa, 2005) p.4

<sup>44</sup> B. Ivey, *Cultural Diplomacy and the National Interest: In Search of a 21st-Century Perspective* (Washington D.C.: Art Industries Policy Forum, 2009) pp.1-45:18

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.* p.19

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.* p.19

<sup>47</sup> The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Getting the People Part Right*, (Washington D.C.: A Report on the Human Resources Dimension of US Public Diplomacy 2008) p.83

dialogue that extends beyond press releases, TV infomercials, and websites. Any results are unlikely to surface as positive responses in focus groups or surveys for a long time.<sup>48</sup>

Today there is more talk of “culture” in international affairs than at any time since the end of the Cold War. However, paradoxically, the newly elevated profile of cultural differences and cultural hostility has increased, rather than reduced, the demand for instantaneous results. Against a background of global-attitude polls that appear every few days, weeks or months, programs intended to transform public opinion that require a number of years to play out lack political oxygen.<sup>49</sup> As long as cultural diplomacy is conceived narrowly as comprising touring artists, professorial exchanges, and language lessons, it will be crippled by its time horizons in a pressed for results policy environment.<sup>50</sup>

Much of cultural diplomacy operates on the assumption that a one-way conversation is sufficient, and that a simple exposition of facts, as we see them, will set everything right in the world’s view of a state.<sup>51</sup> It has been suggested that the most effective aspect of any states exchange programming over the years has been the enthusiasm for encouraging foreigners to visit for long periods of time in order to see for themselves how such a state works, how diversity of opinion is managed and even encouraged, how diversity and depth of culture produce a richness that is not always visible from overseas.<sup>52</sup> Cultural insight of this nature are difficult to present on a website; it is even more difficult to sustain when visas are ever more expensive and when security concerns make travel documents ever harder to come by.

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<sup>48</sup> Sherry L. Mueller, Presentation at the Heritage Foundation Forum “Regaining America’s Voice Overseas,” July 10, 2003.

<sup>49</sup> B. Ivey, *Cultural Diplomacy and the National Interest: In Search of a 21st-Century Perspective* op.cit.pp.1-45:18

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.pp.1-45:19

<sup>51</sup> P. Taylor, *Cultural Diplomacy (2007) from Demos Group* (Leeds: The Institute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds 2007) pp.1-4

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.p.3

The new mode of strategic communication is no longer confined to messaging, promotion campaigns, or even direct governmental contacts with foreign publics serving foreign policy purposes.<sup>53</sup> It is also about a new culture of building networks with the civil society actors in other countries and about facilitating relations between non-governmental parties at home and abroad. This is because the world is no longer state centric and modern culture determines the actions of everyone diplomats now operate in complex transnational networks and trust building and the facilitation of cross boarder civil society links is becoming part of their new business. In order to safeguard their needs abroad in this globalized world, states need "permanent friends" there.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Melissen, J. *Wielding Soft Power: The New Public Diplomacy*, (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2005) pp.14-22

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.p.26

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **CONCLUSION**

The study was divided into five chapters. Chapter one introduced the study, developed the research problem, reviewed literature related to the problem of study, developed the hypothesis and provided the methodology of the study.

Chapter two analyzed the various arguments that have been addressed and studied by scholars and experts in the area of strategic communication of foreign policy execution during the post cold war era. It investigates the relationships between strategic communication and foreign policy execution and how that has brought about various thoughts and arguments by scholars in the post cold war era in foreign policy execution.

Chapter three is a comparative case study of Japan's and United States communication strategies of foreign policy execution through their diplomatic missions in Kenya. It focuses on why communication practices must add up to more than a series of isolated events and how that can be assessed using a strategic communication audit matrix to measure the performance of communication strategies in an organization. This chapter also details the findings arrived at which are separated into three main themes of strategy, implementation and thirdly support and integration.

Chapter four is a critical analysis of the challenges and limitations of strategic communication of foreign policy execution by states. It explains the difficulties and challenges that diplomats and communication experts face in their attempt to communicate strategically.

Accomplishing synchronized coordination of public affairs, public diplomacy and information operations, and other activities is much more difficult than it sounds.

Chapter five is a summary of the study that emphasizes on the need for institutionalized mechanisms and techniques which modern day diplomats can use to communicate foreign policy in the changed realities of the profession to achieve their intended results.

Current strategic communication practice in the world today are based on outdated message influence model from the 1950s that views communication as a process of transmission from a source to a receiver using simple, consistent, repeated messages or otherwise described in this study as “send- receive-send”. This model fails because it does not recognize communication as a meaning-making process. The old model should be replaced with a 21st century view of communication as interpretation and attribution of actions in an uncertain environment.<sup>1</sup>

To succeed in this environment communicators should deemphasize control and embrace complexity, replace repetition of messages with experimental variation, consider moves that will disrupt the existing system, and make contingency plans for failure. Making these changes will ensure better preparedness by states in a constantly changing environment.<sup>2</sup>

According to published work and the interviews conducted as part of this effort, strategic communication has been plagued by misses and false starts and remains an urgent matter<sup>3</sup>. The core themes discussed in this study from various sources agree with these sentiments. Many observers and analysts such as Christopher agree that strategic communication and public diplomacy are not clearly defined.<sup>4</sup> It is not apparent if one is a subset of the other or whether the

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<sup>1</sup> S.R. Corman, A. Trethewey and B. Goodall *A 21<sup>st</sup> Century Model for Communication in the Global War of Ideas From Simplistic Influence to Pragmatic Complexity* (Arizona: Consortium for Strategic Communication, 2007) p. 3

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.p.3

<sup>3</sup> For a further discussion on challenges of strategic communication see chapter 3 p.79

<sup>4</sup> For a further discussion on lack of clear definition of strategy see chapter 2 p.36

two are one and the same thing. Scholars also assert that strategic communication needs leadership, including authority to compel coordination, high-level commitment to strategic communication at the enterprise level, and decision making that considers the impact of international public opinion on policy and vice versa.<sup>5</sup>

The most frequently appearing themes are of the different facets of relationships of strategic communications and propaganda, differentiating strategic communications and public diplomacy, the role of public opinion in strategic communication of foreign policy and the role of mass media and modern technology in communication and its effects in ushering in a new era of modern fast and unregulated as well as boarder less diplomacy.<sup>6</sup>

Most recommendations in this area of study support the increase of monetary resources for strategic communication.<sup>7</sup> Increased training is recommended in the area of strategic execution and not necessarily the study of foreign languages alone. Other recommendations include leadership, priority, and a commitment to communication-mindedness as the cornerstones of an effective communication strategy.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, many experts such as Christopher, and Kelly assert that a clear articulation of national foreign policy strategy and the role that communication plays in that strategy is essential.<sup>9</sup>

The vast majority of the documents reviewed and interviews conducted in this study indicated that effective coordination of strategic communication would require further organizational change. There is however no clear agreement among the various sources about

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<sup>5</sup> For a further discussion on the difference between strategic communication and public diplomacy see chapter 2 p.33

<sup>6</sup> For a further discussion on frequently appearing themes in the debates on strategic communication see chapter 2 pp.41,43,49,52

<sup>7</sup> For a further discussion on increasing resources for strategic communication see chapter 2 p.35

<sup>8</sup> For a further discussion on recommendations for improving strategic communication see chapter 2 p.35

<sup>9</sup> Kelley, J.R. 'Between 'Take-Offs' and 'Crash Landings': Situational Aspects of Public Diplomacy' in N. Snow and P.M.Taylor, (eds) *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (New York: Routledge Publications, 2009) p.74

exactly what changes are required.<sup>10</sup> These may include realignment and reorganization of the coordinating authority at the decision making level. Many documents reviewed and many interviews suggest new, independent organization for the analytical support of strategic communication.<sup>11</sup> Such organizations could facilitate many recommended benefits for the community, including the involvement of the private sector, better research, and better use of new technology.

The number of countries exploring strategic communication of foreign policy making and execution will continue to grow due to the new stage that the evolution of diplomacy finds itself in. As stated in the objectives of this study, that traditional diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy execution needs to be reinforced by strategic communication. It has become imperative that the need to speak to citizens abroad instead of the state leaders has grown in leaps and bounds has taken a new meaning.

Democratization of access to information has turned citizens into assertive and active participants in international politics and policy issues. Grassroots concerns have to become increasingly more important to diplomats and foreign ministries have to take into account the concerns of ordinary people than in the past. Non state actors have tremendously increased, transnational protests and movements are also on the rise with new advancements in media where non official actors have turned out to be extremely agile and capable of mobilizing support.

Simply put the game of diplomacy and international relations in the area of communicating foreign policy execution abroad has changed. Diplomats have to directly deal with foreign publics and societies and this is a hard nut to crack as engaging with them is no

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<sup>10</sup> For a further discussion on coordination of strategic communication see chapter 3 p.68

<sup>11</sup> For a further discussion on new independent organization of strategic communication see chapter 3 p.72



longer one directional. Among other things it has to include the use of calculated risk abandoning the illusion of near complete control over other people's behaviors' abroad. The practitioners of strategic communication of foreign policy therefore have to make good preparations for the changed realities of the profession and students of international relations would benefit more by embracing this new approach to foreign policy communication.

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## APPENDIX I INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

	Interview conducted at the American Embassy on 9 <sup>th</sup> July 2009 with Ms. Catherine Muia – Researcher on the communication strategies that aid foreign policy execution in Kenya  Duration: 30 minutes	Not performed	Ad Hoc	Planned	Institutionalized	Evaluated	Optimized
a.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to identify its communication vision?						
b.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to choose communication goals and outcomes ?						
c.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to select target audiences?						
d.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to develop messages?						
e.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to identify credible messengers?						
f.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to choose communications mechanism/outlets?						
g.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to scan the context and competition?						
h.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to develop effective partnerships?						
i.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to build valuable partnerships?						
j.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to train messengers?						
k.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to conduct steady outreach?						
l.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to monitor and evaluate communication?						
m.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to support communication at leadership level?						
n.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to earmark sufficient resources?						
o.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to integrate communications throughout the organization?						
p.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to involve staff at all levels?						

APPENDIX II INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

		Not performed	Ad Hoc	Planned	Institutionalized	Evaluated	Optimized
	<p>Interview conducted at the Japanese embassy on 4<sup>th</sup> July 2009 with Mrs. Catherine Muimi-Projects Officer on the communication strategies that aid foreign policy execution in Kenya</p> <p>Duration: 45 minutes</p>						
a.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to identify its communication vision?						
b.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to choose communication goals and outcomes ?						
c.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to select target audiences?						
d.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to develop messages?						
e.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to identify credible messengers?						
f.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to choose communications mechanism/outlets?						
g.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to scan the context and competition?						
h.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to develop effective partnerships?						
i.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to build valuable partnerships?						
j.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to train messengers?						
k.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to conduct steady outreach?						
l.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to monitor and evaluate communication?						
m.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to support communication at leadership level?						
n.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to earmark sufficient resources?						
o.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to integrate communications throughout the organization?						
p.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to involve staff at all levels?						

### APPENDIX III INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

		Not performed	Ad Hoc	Planned	Institutionalized	Evaluated	Optimized
	<p>Interview conducted at the American embassy on 9<sup>th</sup> July 2009 with Mr. George Kamau – Director of the American Reference Centre on the communication strategies that aid foreign policy execution in Kenya</p> <p>Duration: 30 minutes</p>						
a.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to identify its communication vision?						
b.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to choose communication goals and outcomes ?						
c.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to select target audiences?						
d.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to develop messages?						
e.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to identify credible messengers?						
f.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to choose communications mechanism/outlets?						
g.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to scan the context and competition?						
h.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to develop effective partnerships?						
i.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to build valuable partnerships?						
j.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to train messengers?						
k.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to conduct steady outreach?						
l.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to monitor and evaluate communication?						
m.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to support communication at leadership level?						
n.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to earmark sufficient resources?						
o.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to integrate communications throughout the organization?						
p.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to involve staff at all levels?						

## APPENDIX IV INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

	Interview conducted at the American embassy on 9 <sup>th</sup> July 2009 with Mr. G. Omondi – Communications Officer on the communication strategies that aid foreign policy execution in Kenya  Duration: 30 minutes	Not performed	Ad Hoc	Planned	Institutionalized	Evaluated	Optimized
a.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to identify its communication vision?						
b.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to choose communication goals and outcomes ?						
c.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to select target audiences?						
d.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to develop messages?						
e.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to identify credible messengers?						
f.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to choose communications mechanism/outlets?						
g.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to scan the context and competition?						
h.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to develop effective partnerships?						
i.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to build valuable partnerships?						
j.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to train messengers?						
k.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to conduct steady outreach?						
l.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to monitor and evaluate communication?						
m.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to support communication at leadership level?						
n.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to earmark sufficient resources?						
o.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to integrate communications throughout the organization?						
p.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to involve staff at all levels?						

## APPENDIX V INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

		Not performed	Ad Hoc	Planned	Institutionalized	Evaluated	Optimized
	<p>Interview conducted at the Japanese embassy on 27<sup>th</sup> June 2009 with Mr. Hiroyuki Futaki – Information Officer on the communication strategies that aid foreign policy execution in Kenya</p> <p>Duration: 25 minutes</p>						
a.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to identify its communication vision?						
b.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to choose communication goals and outcomes ?						
c.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to select target audiences?						
d.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to develop messages?						
e.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to identify credible messengers?						
f.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to choose communications mechanism/outlets?						
g.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to scan the context and competition?						
h.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to develop effective partnerships?						
i.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to build valuable partnerships?						
j.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to train messengers?						
k.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to conduct steady outreach?						
l.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to monitor and evaluate communication?						
m.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to support communication at leadership level?						
n.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to earmark sufficient resources?						
o.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to integrate communications throughout the organization?						
p.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to involve staff at all levels?						



## APPENDIX VI INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

	Interview conducted at the Japanese embassy on 26 <sup>th</sup> June 2009 with Mr. Hitoshi Kikuchi – Director of Information, on the communication strategies that aid foreign policy execution in Kenya  Duration: 30 minutes	Not performed	Ad Hoc	Planned	Institutionalized	Evaluated	Optimized
a.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to identify its communication vision?						
b.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to choose communication goals and outcomes ?						
c.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to select target audiences?						
d.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to develop messages?						
e.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to identify credible messengers?						
f.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to choose communications mechanism/outlets?						
g.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to scan the context and competition?						
h.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to develop effective partnerships?						
i.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to build valuable partnerships?						
j.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to train messengers?						
k.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to conduct steady outreach?						
l.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to monitor and evaluate communication?						
m.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to support communication at leadership level?						
n.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to earmark sufficient resources?						
o.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to integrate communications throughout the organization?						
p.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to involve staff at all levels?						

## APPENDIX VII INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

	Interview conducted at the Japanese embassy on 27 <sup>th</sup> June 2009 with Mr. Ian Wairua – Senior Communications Officer on the communication strategies that aid foreign policy execution in Kenya  Duration: 30 minutes	Not performed	Ad Hoc	Planned	Institutionalized	Evaluated	Optimized
a.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to identify its communication vision?						
b.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to choose communication goals and outcomes ?						
c.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to select target audiences?						
d.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to develop messages?						
e.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to identify credible messengers?						
f.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to choose communications mechanism/outlets?						
g.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to scan the context and competition?						
h.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to develop effective partnerships?						
i.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to build valuable partnerships?						
j.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to train messengers?						
k.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to conduct steady outreach?						
l.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to monitor and evaluate communication?						
m.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to support communication at leadership level?						
n.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to earmark sufficient resources?						
o.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to integrate communications throughout the organization?						
p.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to involve staff at all levels?						

**APPENDIX VIII INTERVIEW SCHEDULE**

	Interview conducted at the Japanese embassy on 7 <sup>th</sup> June 2009 with Mr. Kosaku Onaka – Second Secretary on the communication strategies that aid foreign policy execution in Kenya  Duration: 30 minutes	Not performed	Ad Hoc	Planned	Institutionalized	Evaluated	Optimized
a.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to identify its communication vision?						
b.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to choose communication goals and outcomes ?						
c.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to select target audiences?						
d.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to develop messages?						
e.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to identify credible messengers?						
f.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to choose communications mechanism/outlets?						
g.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to scan the context and competition?						
h.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to develop effective partnerships?						
i.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to build valuable partnerships?						
j.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to train messengers?						
k.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to conduct steady outreach?						
l.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to monitor and evaluate communication?						
m.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to support communication at leadership level?						
n.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to earmark sufficient resources?						
o.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to integrate communications throughout the organization?						
p.	Do you think this diplomatic mission has been able to involve staff at all levels?						