

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND  
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

RESEARCH PROJECT

*THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON RELIGIOUS RELATIONS:  
A CASE OF MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS IN KENYA*

PRESENTED BY:

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**A Research Project Presented for the Award of the Degree of Master of Arts in  
Diplomacy and International Studies**

**August 2008**

## DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree in this or any other University for examination.

Signed:




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Date: AUGUST 2008

This project has been presented for examination with my approval as the appointed supervisor.

Signed:



PROF. J.D OLEWE NYUNYA  
(Supervisor)

19-11-08

Date: AUGUST 2008

**A Research Project Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements of the Award of the Degree of Master of Arts, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi.**

**AUGUST 2008**

## **DEDICATION**

**This project is dedicated to the Kenyan civilians who lost their lives and limbs to the scourge of terror and to all those victims, from all countries of the world, who continue to fall in the wake of man's whimsical atrocities. Their blood ought not to have been shed. Their memory ought to be venerated for posterity.**

## ABSTRACT

The specific objective of this study is to determine the interrelationship between Muslims and Christians in Kenya with regard to terrorism.

The research methodology was based on a perception study. A closed ended questionnaire was used to collect data. The sample used in this study comprised of two different religious organizations, which are based in Nairobi. For the evaluation, data was collected for the two different religious organizations regarding their perception on terrorism. The questionnaire was dropped and collected later. The data enabled the researcher to examine the perception of people on terrorism. The study endeavored to show the perception relationship between the two religions. This was possible with the use of SPSS software.

From the findings one can safely conclude the following, based on the objectives of the study: terrorism is straining the relations between Muslims and Christians in Kenya and increasing the level of mistrust and mutual suspicions between the two groups. This study set out to evaluate the impact of terrorism on religious relations among Christians and Muslims in Kenya.

The findings of this study confirm that in environments of mixed ideological categories, religious relations are compromised because of terrorist related activities. The results show that most respondents think that the Kenyan Government's anti-terrorism fight is unfair to Muslims (1.05). In addition, the results also show that Muslims in Kenya are discriminated because of their faith (1.575) and as a result, most of the respondents think that terrorism damages relations between Christians and Muslims in Kenya (1.525).

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

This project would not have been possible without the priceless input, effort and encouragement of many people. It would not be fair on my part to list some and omit others, for this would amount to an atrocity. I therefore am obliged to profusely thank them all.

However, I must individually acknowledge and thank my supervisor, Professor J.D Olewe Nyunya, whose incisive reading and constructive critiques of the project (in progress) have been invaluable.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Background of the study

The relationship between Christians and Muslims can be discussed in several contexts, positive and negative. Among others, there is the current world situation in which there are conflicts being waged in many parts of the world, including Indonesia, Chechnya and Afghanistan where religious fervor plays an important role in fanning and sustaining the conflict. However, Muslims and Christians elsewhere throughout the world continue to live together in peace.

The Program for Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa was originally established in Ghana in 1959 as the “Islam in Africa Project.” The project was created because of the continent’s struggle for independence from European colonization. The Program for Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa is dedicated to working with the churches in Africa to promote the following: Faithful Christian witness to the Gospel in an interfaith environment of Christians and Muslims, and Constructive engagement with Muslims for peace and peaceful co-existence for the holistic development of humanity.

Terrorist acts or the threats of such actions have been in existence for millennia. Despite having a history longer than the modern nation-state, the use of terror by national and sub-national actors remains poorly understood. While the meaning of the word terror itself is clear, when it is practically applied to acts and actors in the real world it becomes obfuscated. Part of this is due to the use of terror tactics by actors at all levels in the social, political and military environment. Is the modern suicide bomber, with his solo campaign of terror, a criminal, terrorist, or revolutionary? Can he be compared to the French revolutionary governments who coined the word terrorism by instituting systematic state terror against the population of France in the 1790s, killing thousands? Are either the same as revolutionary terrorist groups such as the Baader-Mienhof gang of West Germany or the Weather Underground in the United States, the Basque Separatists

ETA of Spain or the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka? Can states be considered terrorist, especially when they employ weapons that deliberately target civilian populations, or when they support entities that carry out terrorist campaigns against soft civilian targets? These questions are pertinent because they embody the reasons why there is not an internationally-agreed definition of terrorism. For instance, in the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, both the Israeli army and Hezbollah directly targeted civilian installations and residences. But according to the American and even European definition of terrorism, a state cannot be terrorist and hence Israel stands acquitted. On the other hand, Muslims worldwide view Hezbollah to have been fighting in self-defense and on its soil and therefore its heroic escapades cannot be described as terrorist. Logically, both players engaged in basic actions that technically fit within the ambit of terrorism. The point is that the definition is politically malleable and subject to distortions, expediency and political bigotry.

Religious extremists often reject the authority of secular governments and view legal systems that are not based on their religious beliefs as illegitimate. They may even view modernization efforts as corrupting influences on their culture. Special interest groups include people on the radical fringe of many legitimate causes; e.g., people who use terrorism to uphold antiabortion views, animal rights, and radical environmentalism<sup>1</sup>. These groups believe that violence is morally justifiable to achieve their goals. The earliest known organization that exhibited aspects of a modern terrorist organization was the Zealots of Judea. Known to the Romans as sicarii, or dagger-men, they carried on an underground campaign of assassination of Roman occupation forces, as well as any Jews they felt had collaborated with the Romans. Their motive was an uncompromising belief that they could not remain faithful to the dictates of Judaism while living as Roman subjects. Eventually, the Zealot revolt became open, and they were finally besieged and committed mass suicide at the fortification of Masada.

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<sup>1</sup> : "Terrorism is the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."

## 1.2 Statement of the problem

The unprecedented terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001 (9/11) caused massive casualties and damage and ushered in an era of great uncertainty. Before that, terrorism brought unprecedented carnage to Kenya in 1998 when the American embassy in Nairobi was bombed and hundreds of Kenyans were killed. And again in 2002, a resort hotel at Kikambala in the Coast was destroyed and an Israeli plane nearly shot down by terrorists. The attacks also changed the way we think about terrorism and moved the topic to the front pages of academic and political discourse. One important way in which we have changed our thinking about terrorism is as a geo-political risk that affects the global economy and financial markets. There has been a lot of literature written about the short-term macroeconomic impact of the 9/11 and other terrorist attacks on investors' risk aversion, equity market valuations, oil prices, aggregate consumption and investment activity<sup>2</sup> and economic outlook<sup>3</sup>. However, much less is known about the long-term religious impact of a given attack or of terrorist activity in general on the socio-political harmony in environments of religious diversity. Not much is known about the impact of religious terrorism on relations between followers of the different religious organizations. Ultimately, an understanding of the nature of terrorism and the magnitude of its effects is a prerequisite for designing successful policies to prevent terror, to alleviate the costs of terrorism, promote social cohesion amid national diversity or to reduce religious vulnerability to attacks. Therefore, this study will aim at analyzing the impact of terrorism on religious relations in Kenya.

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<sup>2</sup> Lenain, Patrick, Marcos Bonturi, and Vincent Koen, 2002, *The Economic Consequences of Terrorism*, Economics Department Working Paper No. 334, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris CEDEX 16, Paris, France.

<sup>3</sup> Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2002, *Economic Consequences of Terrorism*, Economic Outlook No. 71, June 2002, ISBN 9264-19161-5, Paris, France.

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

#### **General objective**

The objective of this study is to provide a measure of the long-term religious impact of terrorism on relations between the world's major religions.

#### **Specific objective**

The specific objective of this study is to determine the interrelationship between Muslims and Christians in Kenya with regard to terrorism. It aims at revealing how the perceptions regarding terrorism and the Kenyan government's tactics of curbing the vice are affecting the adherents of the country's top two religions.

### **1.4 Significance of the study**

It is apparent that the global war on terrorism will not be won solely on military/police platforms. The underlying root causes have social, economic, political and even religious derivations and each must be tackled with the dexterity it deserves. At a religious level, there is a vital need to foster moderation and dialogue. And this involves co-opting religious and community leaders in the struggle against the threat. At the economic level, deprivation and subjugation must be addressed. All the policies designed to fight national and international terrorism must always be in tandem with the pulse of masses, so as to avoid counter-productive and ill-informed decisions such as the Kenyan government's deportation of its own citizens as terror suspects to Ethiopia in 2006. Such policies in fact only stymie the already difficult task of fighting terrorism. It is therefore necessary for the policy-makers to understand how specific actions or general policies are perceived by the people. It is also imperative that the relationship between the two largest religious groups (Muslims and Christians) is kept under close scrutiny because any discord will impinge negatively on the government's efforts against terrorism, particularly the religious brand.

The study will also be useful to religious leaders who wish to facilitate peaceful co-existence between religions for the sake of national cohesion, spiritual well-being and strengthening of the social and moral fabric of the society. They will be able to enhance understanding between their flocks, promote those factors that facilitate tolerance and trust and fight those that lead to discord and mistrust.

The study will also assist the government to administer justice and promote national security and cohesion with fairness and tact in spite of the individual's religious affiliations. This will be helpful in formulating strategies designed to promote equity and equality, fight discrimination and build confidence in national security institutions.

## **1.5 Literature review**

### **Introduction**

This literature review looks at the existing literary discourse on the topics of religion and terrorism. It first deals with the theoretical and conceptual perspectives regarding the causal relationship between religion and terrorism. Then the impact of religion on people's choices and politics is discussed. Finally, the effect of religiously motivated terrorism on community relations is explained with the help of some previous studies in certain countries.

Terrorism is not a recent phenomenon. Earlier waves of religious and politically motivated terrorist activity in the 1970s and 1980s prompted a more disciplined and rigorous study of the dynamics of terrorism from a quantitative analysis perspective. Hamilton and Hamilton (1983)<sup>4</sup> were among the first to study these dynamics from a formal perspective using stochastic models for social contagion. Not surprisingly, they find that more open societies have a harder time responding effectively to terrorism and reversing the tendency of terrorist acts to incite further violent acts. Cauley and Im (1988)<sup>5</sup> use interrupted time series analysis – also known as intervention analysis - to

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<sup>4</sup> Hamilton, Lawrence C. and James D. Hamilton, 1983, Dynamics of Terrorism, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 27 (1), pp. 39-54.

<sup>5</sup> Cauley, Jon and Eric Iksoon Im, 1988, Intervention Policy Analysis of Skyjackings and Other Terrorist

study the effectiveness of increased security measures in airports and embassies and find that only the former were effective in deterring terrorist attacks. Enders and Sandler (1993) take this analysis one-step further using intervention analysis and vector autoregressive models to find evidence of substitutes and complements among the attacks<sup>6</sup>. In their paper, Enders and Sandler (2000) study the time series properties of these terrorist attacks, distinguishing the stochastic from the deterministic components<sup>7</sup>. Spectral analysis is used to investigate the presence of cycles, and a vector autoregressive framework is used to look for, among other things, structural shifts. Interestingly, they document a shift from politically motivated terrorism to religious motivated terrorism, based on changes in the number of casualties, around the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.

Krueger and Laitin (2003) conduct a study to determine which countries are more susceptible to develop terrorists and which countries are these terrorists more likely to attack<sup>8</sup>. They find that the origins of terrorism are in countries that suffer from political oppression; the targets are countries that enjoy economic well-being. Krueger and Maleckova (2003) continue the research initiated in the previous paper, focusing on finding variables that could reduce the creation of terrorists within a country. They do not find evidence that reductions in poverty or increases in education reduce significantly the exporting of terrorist activity. Further, on the relation between poverty and terrorism activity, they claim that ‘any connection is complicated and weak.’ This is best corroborated by the fact that the nineteen Al Qaeda operatives who used civilian planes like guided missiles in September 2001 were well educated and mostly from middle class backgrounds.

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Incidents, *American Economic Review*, Vol. 78 (2), pp. 27-31.

<sup>6</sup> Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler, 1993, The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: a Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87(4), pp. 829-844.

<sup>7</sup> Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler, 2000. Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening: A Time-Series Investigation, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, pp. 307-332.

<sup>8</sup> Krueger, Alan B. and David D. Laitin, 2004, “Misunderstanding” Terrorism, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83(5), pp. 8-13.

In 'The Relation Between Religion and Terrorism', Oleh Rumadi argues that when religion is related and tied to terrorism, it is dragged into a dirty war which is contrary to the basic tenets of religion itself. The link between the two exists because the terrorists often use the spirit and symbols of religion and hence the suspicion that members of a specific faith are more likely to espouse terrorist ideologies.<sup>9</sup>

The article continues to point out that the problem is often with the interpretation and not the doctrine of religion. This explains why a single religious provision evokes diverse and sometimes contradictory actions and reactions from its adherents. The Islamic concept of Jihad is one such. To most Muslims, Jihad simply means a struggle; be it against ignorance, evil temptations; be it self discipline and in strict military terms, self-defence. But unfortunately, the view held by a few radical elements, which defines Jihad as offensive holy war is the transcendent interpretation of the concept even among non-Muslims.

Perhaps the strongest link between religion and terrorism is derived from the capacity of religion to raise fundamentalists who attach an extreme interpretation and violent response to its doctrines.

Religious beliefs have a major impact on worldviews and the choices people make. People make political decisions based upon their interpretation of religious texts. Monumental political incidents throughout the world have on many occasions been instigated by religion. In 1981 a radical Muslim group assassinated Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. In 1979, the Iranian Shah was dethroned by a revolutionary popular uprising marshalled by Islamic clerics. In the 1980s, the Catholic Church played an active role in the pro-democracy struggle against communism in Eastern Europe. The colossus that is the mighty United States of America never pretends to be a vanguard of religion. But the choice phrases "In God We Trust" and "God Bless America" reflect how forceful religious symbols are as rallying calls even for the rabidly secular establishments.

Religion is considered unique and more forceful than most other ideologies and convictions. This is because it deals with absolute truths. (Gill 2001). He asserts that

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<sup>9</sup> Oleh Rumadi. 2004. The Relation Between Religion and Terrorism. [www.islamlib.com](http://www.islamlib.com)

when laws are given by the will of God, there can be no room for compromise. Tolerance for alternative views becomes akin to heresy.<sup>10</sup> In *religion and international relations*, Ken Dark argues that “moral commitments and policy options derived from religious beliefs, practices and institutions are associated with the absolute and ultimate.”<sup>11</sup>

As a result, religion cannot be underestimated in international relations and global security. This is because it is an innate human trait and ignoring it means ignoring a crucial determinant of human interactions.

Fox and Sandler, 2004 contend that religion influences politics in four major ways: firstly, it influences people’s worldviews and choices. Secondly, it is an aspect of human identity. Thirdly, it is a source of legitimacy. Fourthly, it is perennially associated with formal institutions that have their own abilities to influence the political process.<sup>12</sup>

Therefore, to fully exploit the abundant potential of religion, Groups often cloak their objectives and methodologies in religious rhetoric in order to gain acceptance from religious masses and take advantage of the power of religion to confer legitimacy. That is why the majority of those groups that have their roots in the Middle East and are regarded as terrorists employ religious propaganda, hence the label ‘Islamic Terrorism’.

When the Balkan war erupted in the early 1990s, the warring parties, even those that belonged to the same race retreated to religious cocoons. The Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims are all Slavs but the war was waged between Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosnians. And it was as vicious and cruel as any war could get.

Religious identity is seen by many as responsible for increasing the intensity of wars. The Chechen (Muslim) war for independence from Orthodox Russia is another very reflective example of ethnic and political divides assuming religious dimensions.

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<sup>10</sup> Gill, Anthony. 2001. *Religion and Comparative Politics*. Annual Review of Political Science, 4:117-138.p.127

<sup>11</sup> Dark, Ken, R. ed. 2000. *Religion and International Relations*. New York: St.Martin’s Press. P.3

<sup>12</sup> Fox, Jonathan and Sandler, Shmuel. 2004. *Bringing Religion into International Relations*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan



Studies conducted in various countries clearly show the divisive results of terrorism and the subsequent war on it. In a submission to the British House of Commons' Home Affairs Committee in 2004, the Church of England revealed the desperately delicate situation resulting from the straining of relations between the Muslim minority and the Christian majority in Britain.<sup>13</sup>

It was noted that the current anti-terrorism measures were aggravating the tensions between Muslims and other groups in British society, with the Muslim society increasingly feeling anxious, isolated and misunderstood.

The report referred to the Terrorism act 2000 and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ACTSA) 2001. Under the provisions of the two said acts, power of arrest was disproportionately used against Muslims. A Case study form the Institute of Race Relations suggested that while majority of those arrested under the act were Muslim, majority of those convicted were non-Muslim. Most of those arrested have either been released without charge, had their charges dropped or thrown out in court.

The report went on to point out that the Policing system was causing fear and dissatisfaction among Muslims because the stop and search method of policing was disproportionately used against Muslims. It is confrontational and likely to be counter-productive, the report asserted.

Moreover, the security organs of the country seem to have been affected by prejudiced public opinion against Muslims as crimes committed by Muslims drew security responses entirely different from when the same crimes are committed by non-Muslims. For instance, Muslims involved in credit card fraud or forgery have been treated as suspected terrorists unlike non-Muslims who are treated merely as suspected criminals.

In addition, the report continued its observations by indicting the British media for perpetuating the stereotyping and biased treatment of Muslims. Media reporting compounded the widespread stigmatization; it was prejudicial, stereotypical, and

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<sup>13</sup> Church of England, 2004. Terrorism and Community Relations. A Report submitted to the House of Commons' Home Affairs Committee. [www.cofe.anglican.org](http://www.cofe.anglican.org)

portrayed Muslims as violent, irrational and radical. Moreover, the Media gave more coverage to the few radicals and mavericks among Muslims than the majority moderates. The report continued to blame the media for its coverage of Muslims by asserting that the “Media concentrate on dramatic incidents of arrests...” implying guilt and dangerousness, “giving no attention when the same arrested ‘dangerous’ people are released without charge or acquitted.”

Similarly in 2005, the British House of Commons’ Home Affairs Committee presented a report on Terrorism and community relations. The report concluded that community relations have deteriorated because of terrorism. The report also agreed with most of the findings of the Church of England. It particularly called for greater recognition for the problems of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism.<sup>14</sup>

It is not only in Britain that anti-terrorism measures alienate Muslims and isolate them from the larger society and government. Yvonne Yasbeck Haddad argues that after 911, Muslims in America were given the same treatment as the Germans and the Japanese in World War Two. Thousands of Muslims and Arabs were incarcerated under the Patriot Act which enables to imprison Muslims with no indictment at all.<sup>15</sup>

Globally, the ramifications of these actions and counteractions are being felt. Antagonism against Muslims is ballooning in most Christian societies, especially the developed world which has been targeted by terrorist campaigns. Top European politicians are publicly opposing admission of Muslim turkey into the EU simply because of the country’s Islamic identity, never mind Turkey is conspicuously secular. The Dutch parliament concluded that 30 yeas of multi-cultural policy had failed. In Britain, the chairman of

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<sup>14</sup> British House of Commons’ Home Affairs Committee. Sixth report 2004-5. Terrorism and Community Relations. [www.publications.parliament.uk](http://www.publications.parliament.uk)

<sup>15</sup> Yvonne Yasbeck Haddad.2002. Muslims and the American Experience. [www.woodstock.georgetown.edu](http://www.woodstock.georgetown.edu)

Commission for Racial Equality has dismissed the need for multiculturalism. As a result many Muslim youth are now turning towards religious symbols and organizations.<sup>16</sup>

## 1.6 Conceptual framework

Conflict is a complex phenomenon that takes on a very wide range of forms. Major instances of civil war entail significant casualties and can set development back by decades. At the other end of the spectrum, conflict is often a productive aspect of everyday interactions that does not escalate into violence. Within this spectrum falls a range of local conflicts that may persevere and/or escalate to major instances of violent conflict or even civil war.

Religious relations are a vital determinant of both national and international wellbeing and societal cohesion. Since religion is a fundamental and intrinsic human ideology, and since it induces responses and behaviors that transcend geopolitical and racial boundaries, its impacts on humanity are colossal. Almost all the countries of the world are cosmopolitan both in culture and religion. And the relationship among the components is crucial for the well being of the whole.

Terrorism is a contemporary security challenge facing the international community and it has the potential to severely undermine religious harmony. When conflicts assume religious dimensions, almost every other factor of the conflict becomes pegged on the rigid doctrines of faith and hence the conflict becomes dogmatic, intractable and difficult to resolve. The intensity that characterizes 'religious' conflagrations is an indication that religion is the most potent stimulant of human violence and aggression. In parts of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Middle East and South East Asia, conflicts have taken up religious facades and their consequences have been ruinous and often savage.

It is apparent from the literature of this study that terrorists motivated by religious zest often try to ignite a major war of religions by targeting people and symbols of other faiths and sugar-coating their violent objectives with impressive religious propaganda. Therefore, religion presents both a riveting platform and an inevitable battlefield in the struggle for and against terrorism.

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<sup>16</sup> Goh Tong 2004. Beyond Madrid: Winning Against Terrorism. A speech by the then Singaporean Prime Minister at the Council on Foreign Relations. [www.cfr.org](http://www.cfr.org).

Suffice to say that the universal War on Terror (and particularly the religious brand) must exploit the possibilities that religion offers and incorporate them into a multi-dimensional, all-inclusive endeavor. Otherwise, the efforts against terrorism and radicalism will be a disappointing failure. And that will be detrimental to humanity.

## **1.7 Research Questions**

The researcher attempts to answer three research questions which are:

- a) Is terrorism perceived to be associated with the teachings of a specific religion?
- b) Is terrorism causing mistrust between Kenyan Muslims and Christians and straining their relationship?
- c) Is the Government's war on terror alienating Muslims and complicating religious relations?

## **1.8 Methodology of the Research**

This research is an exploratory study. It is conducted through a case study. This method is chosen because it enables the researcher to probe and obtain an in-depth understanding of a case such as terrorism. This design is valuable for detailed analysis. Young, (1960) and Kothari, (1990) concur that a case study often provides focused and valuable insights to a phenomena that may be vaguely known and less understood.

Most case study advocates point out that case studies produce much more detailed information than what is available through a statistical analysis. Advocates also hold that while statistical methods might be able to deal with situations where behavior is homogeneous and routine, case studies are needed to deal with creativity, innovation, and context. Detractors argue that case studies are difficult to generalize because of inherent subjectivity and because they are based on qualitative subjective data, generalizable only to a particular context.

The case study approach is a comparatively flexible method of scientific research. Because its project designs seem to emphasize exploration rather than prescription or prediction, researchers are comparatively freer to discover and address issues as they

arise in their experiments. In addition, the looser format of case studies allows researchers to begin with broad questions and narrow their focus as their experiment progresses rather than attempt to predict every possible outcome before the experiment is conducted.

By seeking to understand as much as possible about a single subject or small group of subjects, case studies specialize in "deep data," or "thick description"--information based on particular contexts that can give research results a more human face. This emphasis can help bridge the gap between abstract research and concrete practice by allowing researchers to compare their firsthand observations with the quantitative results obtained through other methods of research.

"The case study has long been stereotyped as the weak sibling among social science methods," and is often criticized as being too subjective and even pseudo-scientific. Likewise, "investigators who do case studies are often regarded as having deviated from their academic disciplines, and their investigations as having insufficient precision (that is, quantification), objectivity and rigor" (Yin 1989). Critics cite opportunities for subjectivity in the implementation, presentation, and evaluation of case study research.

The approach relies on personal interpretation of data and inferences. Results may not be generalizable, are difficult to test for validity, and rarely offer a problem-solving prescription. Simply put, relying on one or a few subjects as a basis for cognitive extrapolations runs the risk of inferring too much from what might be circumstance.

Case studies can involve learning more about the subjects being tested than most researchers would care to know - their educational background, emotional background, perceptions of themselves and their surroundings, their likes, dislikes, and so on. Because of its emphasis on "deep data," the case study is out of reach for many large-scale research projects which look at a subject pool in the tens of thousands.

Researchers conducting case studies should consider certain ethical issues. For example, people who have, either directly or indirectly, power over both those being studied and those conducting the investigation (1985) often finance many educational case studies. This conflict of interests can hinder the credibility of the study. The personal integrity, sensitivity, and possible prejudices and/or biases of the investigators need to be taken into consideration as well. Personal biases can creep into how the research is conducted, alternative research methods used, and the preparation of surveys and questionnaires.

A common complaint in case study research is that investigators change direction during the course of the study unaware that their original research design was inadequate for the revised investigation. Thus, the researchers leave unknown gaps and biases in the study. To avoid this, researchers have been encouraged to report preliminary findings so that the likelihood of bias is reduced.

The sample that was used in this study comprised two different religions, Christianity and Islam in their broadest sense. That is, the denominations of the two were viewed as branches and not as independent religious entities. For the evaluation, data was collected for the two different religious organizations regarding their perception on terrorism.

The data for the different religious organizations regarding their perception on terrorism was collected using a structured questionnaire (See appendix 2). The questionnaire was dropped and collected later. A number of factors influenced the choice of closed-ended questionnaire method. Firstly, it is quicker to administer. It is also easier and quicker for the researcher to code and record responses. Secondly, the method makes it easier and quicker for respondents to answer all the questions because they are merely ticking boxes and they may not be inclined to skip questions they deem difficult or complex. Thirdly, the method makes no difference between articulate and inarticulate respondents and therefore makes it easier for the researcher to get the right respondents and for the respondents to understand and answer the questions. Fourthly, it significantly reduces researcher bias because he will be only checking boxes ticked by the respondents. That is,

he cannot direct the analysis to the responses towards his individual position because the answer format is rigid.

However, the method is not without weaknesses. Because of the limited, predefined options, respondents can only give restricted answers and the respondent may draw misleading conclusions due to the limited options. Similarly, the limited options make it impossible to introduce new issues. Nevertheless, the method is sufficiently appropriate for this study because it is a fairly simple study to explore people's basic feelings. The responses required are quite straightforward. While some concepts raised in the study may be nebulous and require qualified, complex responses, the questions asked are designed to evoke fundamental feelings that may not be altered much by the respondent's urge to qualify or quantify the responses.

The data enabled the researcher to examine the perception different religious groups have on terrorism.

Data collected for the different religious organizations regarding their perception was analyzed. The data analyzed showed the impact of terrorism on relations between the adherents of the two main religions in the country. This was made possible by the use of SPSS software.

### **1.9 Scope and limitations of the problem**

This study is restricted to Kenya as a case study. However, the related literature, recommendations and illustrations have been drawn from similar or related studies elsewhere in the world. While Kenya is a multi-religious country, this study only focuses on the relations between Christians and Muslims, the two largest organizations in the country. The two have been chosen for the ascribed importance emanating purely from their numerical strength as opposed to any other criteria.

The study has been limited by the dearth of secondary data and thus it has concentrated mostly on the primary data. Not much has been done on the topic and at a national level, this is a pioneer study as there have not been any public studies specifically into terrorism and religious relations in Kenya.

## CHAPTER TWO

### CAUSES OF TERRORISM

#### 2.1 Introduction

In recent years, a tendency towards increasing violence manifested itself across the world generally, with twice as many fatalities caused by terrorist attacks between 1980 and 1986 than had been the case in the preceding seven-year period.<sup>17</sup> Religious terrorism proved especially responsible for these higher levels of violence. By 1993, this was particularly evident from the record of Shia Islamic groups. Such groups inflicted 30 percent of the fatalities from terrorist acts since 1982, yet carried out just eight percent of all international terrorist attacks during the same period. The appetite for extreme violence was not restricted to Muslim groups, but shared by terrorists from across the religious spectrum.<sup>18</sup>

#### 2.2 Causes of terrorism

Various reasons have been suggested to account for the religious terrorist's willingness, if not eagerness, to indulge in mass-casualty attacks.<sup>19</sup> For instance, a degree of 'systematic desensitization' may have taken place among both terrorists and their targets and audiences, with increasing casualty tolls translating into a measure of success. However, while that might be probable to some extent, this does not easily equate with the trend towards casualty aversion that has also been observed in high-income, low-birthrate

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<sup>17</sup> Bruce Hoffman, "The Contrasting Ethical Foundations of Terrorism in the 1980s," *Terrorism & Political Violence* 1, no. 3 (1989), p. 361, n. 1. This cites statistics from the Rand Corporation's Chronology of International Terrorism. According to this 1573 people were killed by terrorists during 1973-1979, whereas 3,225 people were killed by the same means between 1980 and 1986.

<sup>18</sup> Bruce Hoffman, "'Holy Terror': The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 18, no. 4 (1995). The figure on casualties versus attacks by Islamic terrorist groups is again taken from the Rand chronology.

<sup>19</sup> See, for instance, Wilkinson, Paul. *Conflict Study 236: "Terrorist Targets and Tactics: New Risks to World Order."* (Washington: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990), which considers this question.



societies – something that might just as easily allow (perhaps even assist) terrorists to achieve their aims by inflicting *lower* rather than higher casualty rates.

Likewise, while the improved technological means available today has undoubtedly enhanced their capacity to inflict death and injury on a large scale, this does not, in itself, account for the religious terrorist's tendency towards (and success with) such attacks. Religious terrorists dating back as far as two millennia have achieved sustained casualty rates and affected their respective societies to a degree yet to be attained by their modern-day counterparts<sup>20</sup>. All these factors point to the religious terrorists' desired ends being the key factor in raising the threshold of death and destruction that they are capable of – something accentuated, by their means and impacts.

### 2.3 Identifying Religious Terrorism

Of all religious terrorists, the Thugs – a Hindu sect active in India from the seventh until the mid-19th centuries – are probably the only historical example to be moved purely by religious motives.<sup>21</sup> As this suggests, a group does not need to be wholly motivated by religious considerations to be considered religious terrorists. However, if the term is to retain a useful meaning, religious terrorism should be considered as that terrorism which is motivated *primarily* by religion. An ethnic or (political) ideological terrorist group does not cease to be so because their proponents have a religious element to their makeup – even if that religious element must be considered if any study of the group is to be effective.

The view that it is their motivation that distinguishes the religious terrorists from their secular equivalents is not held by all commentators. In his article “The Worldwide Rise of Religious Nationalism,” Mark Jurgensmeyer, breaks what he sees as the “potentially

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<sup>20</sup> David C. Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions,” *American Political Science Review* 78, no. 3 (1984), p. 659.

<sup>21</sup> See, *Ibid.* for more on the Thugs. Also, Mark Burgess, “A Brief History of Terrorism,” *Center for Defense Information* (2003), and Mark Burgess, “Explaining Religious Terrorism Part I: The Axis of Good and Evil,” *Center for Defense Information* (2004).

explosive mix of nationalism and religion” into two subsets: Ethnic and Ideological<sup>22</sup>. He differentiates these two categories thus, supplying examples of each one. The greatest differences between the goals of religious nationalists is the degree to which religion is an aspect of ethnic identity – the sort of religious nationalism one finds in Ireland, for example – and the degree to which it is part of an ideological critique that contains an alternative vision of political order. The latter is the sort of religious nationalism found, for instance, in the Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Revolution in Iran.<sup>23</sup> Such a reading, while addressing the religious element that is often present in many secular terrorist groups and the degree to which this is a factor, arguably risks misrepresenting such group's aspirations and motivations, and, as a result, mislabeling them in calling them religious terrorists. To take the case of the Northern Ireland conflict that is expounded upon by Juergensmeyer as an example of “Ethnic Religious Nationalism” – in this and subsequent work<sup>24</sup> – the protagonists are indeed divided along religious lines, with Republicans (who seek to abolish the Northern Irish state and unify the north and south of Ireland) invariably Catholic, and Loyalists (who seek to maintain Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom) Protestant. Both sides also often express their hatred for each other in religiously loaded rhetoric, and frequently resort to religious imagery and symbolism in promoting their respective political agendas. However, such groups are overwhelmingly motivated by a political not a religious imperative. As such, they should be considered secular rather than religious terrorists.

The same can be said of the Jewish organizations which were active before Israel became a state, and even of many of the various (nominally Muslim) organizations such as those operated under the auspices of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Like the Northern Irish examples, the religious aspect of such groups is mainly a reflection of their membership demographics rather than their motivations. Religion is important, but not necessarily the main motivation for such groups. This differentiates them from others,

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<sup>22</sup> Mark Juergensmeyer, "The Worldwide Rise of Religious Nationalism," *Journal of International Affairs* 50, no. 1 (1996), p. 2.


<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>24</sup> See also, Mark Juergensmeyer, "Terror Mandated by God," *Terrorism & Political Violence* 9, no. 2 (1997), or Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: the Global Rise of Religious Violence*, 3rd, rev. and updated. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

for whom the religious imperative is foremost, and who can correctly be considered religious terrorists. This distinction is far from mere semantics. As with a medical misdiagnosis, a failure to correctly recognize the motivations of specific terrorist groups makes arriving at adequate countermeasures immeasurably more difficult if not impossible.

### 2.4 Degrees of Religious Terrorism

At the danger of making the issue appear deceptively simple, Figure 1 attempts to break the dynamics that differentiate religious and secular activity – including terrorism – down to their bare components. Of the two axes shown here, the means continuum is the easier to supervise. To paraphrase the 17th Century Dutch philosopher Benedict de Spinoza, peace is not merely the absence of war.



Source: Mark Burgess, Fig. 1: Religious Terrorism's Ends-Means Dynamic

By comparison, the crossing of the secular-religious line is much more difficult to monitor. This is further complicated as groups do not necessarily remain at a static point within the quadrants formed by the ends-means axes. A group may increase or decrease the religiosity of its ends or the violence of its means. For instance, it has been claimed of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan that it shifted its mission from fighting injustice

domestically to inciting Islamic extremism globally, with its invocation of a global jihad earning it financial support from Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.<sup>25</sup> Similarly, there is evidence of disillusionment among Kashmiri militants at what is seen as the transformation of a religious struggle into one that is being waged in the interests of the state of Pakistan.<sup>26</sup>

Often such realignment of ends or means (or both) will be almost imperceptible. For example, Al Qaeda's offer of a truce to European nations in the wake of Spain's announcement that it was withdrawing its troops from Iraq, while far from political dialogue in its true sense, does indicate that Osama bin Laden's organization may not be as rabidly opposed to negotiation or discourse as was previously thought. Moreover, while Al Qaeda's enemies may not currently be disposed to negotiate with the group, this may not always be the case – witness for example the Reagan administration's dealings with 'Iranian state terrorists' or Margaret Thatcher's with the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Furthermore, as the British experience with the latter group illustrates, nudging a group across the violent (terrorism)/non-violent (political dialogue) line can be an integral and vital component of a counter-terrorism strategy.

In addition, groups will often straddle the various quadrants. Al Qaeda again supplies a good illustration of this. The group undertook reconstruction projects in Sudan and Afghanistan even as it planned and carried out attacks. Bin Laden's group also has a distinct political tint to its religious ambitions – in this case the ultimate aim being the establishment of a pan-Islamic state – meaning that it bestrides all four quadrants to varying degrees. While the majority in the Muslim world view Palestinian Hamas as a legitimate resistance movement, it has been classified mainly by Israel and the West as a terrorist organization. In the Palestinian lands, Hamas runs schools, hospitals and charities that directly benefit the besieged Palestinian masses. And as a result, it has acquired a solid grassroots support, bordering on fanaticism among the Palestinians. But

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<sup>25</sup> Jessica Stern, *Terror in The Name of God : Why Religious Militants Kill*, 1st ed. (New York: Ecco, 2003), p. 267.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 134-137.

the same organization has been carrying out military campaigns and sponsors suicide attacks against Israel. The same is true of Lebanese Hezbollah and Egyptian Brotherhood. Perhaps this explains why most movements that are described as revolutionary, rebellious or even terrorist have a political front as well as a military one. They have the political wing for non-violent political engagement, reflecting flexibility and dynamism. It can be argued that all violent groups keep a political faction to do the politicking or act as a propaganda machine. However, the reverse could also hold true, that is, many organizations that have a political objective usually have a radical, lunatic fringe that does the dirty, violent work to significantly raise the stakes when needed and to increase the bargaining muscle of the organization. This was true of the Irish Republican Army, the Basque ETA, PLO and many contemporary movements. Perhaps it is an adaptation stemming from the realization that the modern geo-political challenges require corresponding pragmatism. This political aspect is present with all religious terrorist groups, but particularly salient with regard to the Islamic outfits. Historically, the Islamic faith has not embraced the separation of 'church' and state to the degree that is common in Western countries – most especially the United States.<sup>27</sup>

This blurring of religion-and-politics/politics-and-religion that is characteristic of religious terrorism expresses itself in two forms. The first of these – the politicization of religion – attempts to apply political solutions (in the form of political violence through terrorism) to religious problems. It is religious terrorism that is more religious than political, although, as stated previously, this can change with the political imperative becoming the more dominant. Religious terrorism's second form of expression – the religionization of politics – attempts to apply religious solutions to political problems (again in the form of terrorism). Such attempts involve efforts to justify the violence, and attract and motivate terrorists, through religious rhetoric. It is religious terrorism that is more political than religious. This can also change with the religious imperative becoming the more dominant. However, one must be careful when hypothesizing about the politicization of religion and the religionization of politics in analyzing Islamic

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<sup>27</sup> For more on this topic see, John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 4th ed. (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1998).

groups. This is because Islam is a political, administrative, economic and social ideology and Muslims, even in secular Muslim countries continue to revere the Islamic system as the timeless supreme solution. The separation of religion and government therefore, among Muslims, is frowned upon but favored only by a small minority.

The mixing of religion and politics can be an oddly ecumenical and non-sectarian phenomenon: according to one of Israel's former security chiefs, the political and religious nature of their goals means that Jewish radical-right groups have much in common with Hamas.<sup>28</sup> How this mix is adjusted leads to degrees of religious terrorism – from terrorism motivated (and a priori justified by) by religion, to terrorism justified by religion and merely masquerading as religious terrorism. Both versions can be similarly difficult to label and counter. Indeed, it is easy to imagine a scenario whereby religion, hitherto used by the leaders of a terrorist campaign (as in the latter variant) as a means of attracting and indoctrinating recruits as well as attracting and sustaining support, can become the chief driving factor. This insinuates that operatives become brainwashed and engage in activities they deem religious when in fact they are political or economic. This is very common presently among Al Qaeda-style Muslim organizations whose motives are invariably political but whose propaganda and rhetoric are relentlessly Islamic. While employing such efficient distortions and exploitation of some religious provisions, the often charismatic leaders succeed in blurring other teachings that counter and contextualize the provisions they intend to employ to brainwash. In short, the religious imperative can be as difficult to limit and control as it is to counter.

## **2.5 Rationalizing Religious Terrorism**

Underlying this is the fact that, while it is their ends which set the religious terrorists apart from their secular counterparts, their means are also noteworthy and tend to be less restricted, resulting in more indiscriminate killings. This is not to say, as one scholar does, that religious terrorists are their own constituency, and “execute their terrorist acts for no audience by themselves.”<sup>29</sup> This might be true were it not for the political

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<sup>28</sup> Stern, *Op Cit.*, p. 106.

<sup>29</sup> Hoffman, “‘Holy Terror’: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative,” p. 273.

considerations also inherent in the thinking of even those terrorists motivated primarily by religion. Al Qaeda may have wanted to kill a lot of people in attacking America on Sept. 11, 2001, not to say exact revenge for the wrongs they considered the United States to have inflicted on the Muslim world; however they also wanted to stage a publicity coup for themselves in telegraphing to the world what they were capable of. Similarly, the Taliban illustrated their appreciation of the need for political expediency to outweigh religious zeal when, in January 2004, they publicly apologized after one of their bomb attacks left 15 people – eight of them children – dead in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

As such incidents show, the terror inflicted by the religious terrorist is not an end in itself.<sup>30</sup> Rather it is a means towards a larger goal. Nor is this goal a conventional one. As the U.S. National Commission on Terrorism put it: “Today’s terrorists don’t want a seat at the table, they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it.”<sup>31</sup> In addition, those whose terrorism has a religious nature or motivation see themselves as answerable only to God (or their idea of God) and their activities as divinely sanctioned. As a consequence, they operate within different moral, political, and practical constraints than secular terrorists. Far from being their own audience, the religious terrorist’s ultimate constituency is God.

The paradox of such violence being undertaken in the name of anyone’s idea of a good and just God, as religious terrorism tends to be (generally speaking religious terrorists no more consider themselves evil than do their secular counterparts – indeed they consider themselves righteous) was perhaps best addressed by the 19th century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard. Writing pseudonymously as Johannes de Silentio, in *Fear and Trembling*, Kierkegaard considered the dilemma of whether there can exist a “teleological suspension of the ethical” – a situation wherein normal moral considerations

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<sup>30</sup> Such a notion is put forward in S. K. Malik, *The Quranic Concept of War*, 1st ed. (Lahore: Wajidalis, 1979). Cited in Yossef Bodansky, *Bin Laden : The Man Who Declared War on America*, (Rocklin, Calif.: Forum, 1999), p. xv.

<sup>31</sup> National Commission on Terrorism, “*Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism: Report of the National Commission on Terrorism*,” (2000), p. 2.

are justifiably over-ridden when appealing to a higher ideal.<sup>32</sup> Examining the case of Abraham – a pivotal figure in Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, who was prepared to sacrifice his own son when ordered to do so (as a test of his faith) by God – Kierkegaard concludes (some might say somewhat equivocally) that such a suspension can indeed exist. It seems likely that this conclusion (which Kierkegaard views as a temporary expedient and not an abolishment of ‘normal’ ethical considerations) is shared by religious terrorists – or at least those whose terrorism is genuinely motivated by their religious convictions (however misguided), as distinct from those who seek to justify their use of violence or recruit others to their cause by the subjective interpretation of religious doctrine.

As this implies, the religious terrorist cannot, as is sometimes suggested, be dismissed as an irrational lunatic anymore than his secular counterpart can. Just as terrorism often resides in the eye of the beholder, so too does rationality. To the religious terrorists, their actions are imminently rational, predicated as they are (or are taken by them to be) on the will of God. Dismissing a terrorist group as irrational on the grounds that its rationality differs from their own is something that the United States (the self-styled vanguard of the war on terror) and the international community can ill-afford to do if they also hope to defuse the threat posed by religious terrorism. Likewise, insisting that religious terrorists such as al Qaeda are fighting the United States because of a hatred of liberty, freedom, or the American way of life is a dangerous canard that in fact stymies the anti-terrorism war. Indeed, it may even prove counterproductive. Understanding one’s enemy is a prerequisite to defeating them on the conventional battlefield. It is an even more crucial consideration on the unconventional one – especially when, as now, the enemy being faced is a religious terrorist.

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<sup>32</sup> Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941) The entire text is available on-line at: <http://www.religion-online.org/showbook.asp?title=2068> . Last downloaded April 22, 2004.



## CHAPTER THREE

### THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON RELIGION

#### 3.1 Introduction

Terrorism is not new, and even though it has been used since the beginning of recorded history, it can be relatively hard to define. Terrorism has been described variously as both a tactic and strategy; a crime and a holy duty; a justified reaction to oppression and an inexcusable abomination. Obviously, a lot depends on whose point of view is being represented. Terrorism has often been an effective tactic for the weaker side in a conflict. As an asymmetric form of conflict, it confers coercive power with many of the advantages of military force at a fraction of the cost. Due to the secretive nature and small size of terrorist organizations, they often offer opponents no clear organization to defend against or to deter<sup>33</sup>.

That is why preemption is now so important. In some cases, terrorism has been a means to carry on a conflict without the adversary realizing the nature of the threat, mistaking terrorism for criminal activity. Because of these characteristics, terrorism has become increasingly common among those pursuing extreme goals throughout the world. However, despite its popularity, terrorism can be a hazy concept. Even within the U.S. Government, agencies responsible for different functions in its current fight against terrorism use different definitions<sup>34</sup>.

The relationship between Christians and Muslims can be discussed in several contexts, positive and negative. Among others, there is the current world situation in which there are conflicts being waged in many parts of the world, including Indonesia, Chechnya and Afghanistan. The Program for Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa was originally established in Ghana in 1959 as the "Islam in Africa Project." The project was created because of the continent's struggle for independence from European colonization. The

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<sup>33</sup> Kimball, C. (2002). *When religion becomes evil*. San Francisco: HarperCollins.

<sup>34</sup> Hoffman, B. (1993). *Holy terror: The implications of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative* (RAND Research Paper P-7834). Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Program for Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa is dedicated to working with the churches in Africa to promote the following: Faithful Christian witness to the Gospel in an interfaith environment of Christians and Muslims, and Constructive engagement with Muslims for peace and peaceful co-existence for the holistic development of the humanity<sup>35</sup>.

Christian-Muslim relations have been an issue since the historical rise of Islam, more than fourteen centuries ago. From the beginning, there have been two dimensions to the question. The first is related to the practical living together of individuals and communities of the two faiths, and the second to theological challenges. These include questions of Christian self-identity and self-expression in relation to Islam as well as those of understanding its significance. These issues have engaged Christians and Muslims through the centuries.

During their long and eventful history, Muslims and Christians have enjoyed periods of constructive cooperation coexistence. During the infant years of Islam, when the minority Muslims fled the persecution by the polytheist Arabs, they were accommodated by Christian Abyssinia under the rule of King Negus. Prophet Muhammad's Quraish tribe was bent on obliterating the emergent and 'deviant' Islam and subjected the Prophet's disciples to barbaric and relentless persecution. Unable to bear the cruelty of their own people, the Prophet instructed some of his followers to migrate to Abyssinia which he heard was ruled by a just Christian ruler. When the Arabs realized what happened, they sent emissaries to the king to ask for the repatriation of the fugitives but the king objected to the demands. In fact, in the presence of the emissary, he called the leader of the Muslim group to present their case. After narrating to the king their ordeal, he recited a chapter of the Koran named Maryam which is named after the Virgin Mary and recounts the stories of Mary and Jesus. In addition to his pursuit of justice, the king was obviously won over by the moving similarities between Islam and Christianity.

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<sup>35</sup> Lincoln, B. (Ed.). (1985). *Religion, rebellion, revolution: An interdisciplinary and cross-cultural collection of essays*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

At the beginning of the eighth century, when Andalusia (Spain) fell to the Muslims, the stage was set for the birth of the world's first cosmopolitan culture. Spain became the beacon of progressive multiculturalism as it witnessed unprecedented growth of science, philosophy, astronomy, music, literature and entertainment, thanks to the exemplary fusion of Muslim, Christian and Jewish cultural inputs. This blend of eastern and western cultures catapulted Spain to the pinnacle of intellectual development when the rest of Europe was still un-initiated in education.

Currently, many parts of the Islamic world are haunted by unparalleled turbulence and political anarchy. From Chechnya in the Caucasus to Afghanistan, Kashmir, and The Philippines in Asia; From Iraq, Lebanon and occupied Palestine in the middle east to Algeria and Sudan in north Africa; from Somalia and Ethiopia in Eastern Africa to cote d'Ivoire and Chad in the west of the continent, all the way to Kosovo and Bosnia in the Balkans, Muslim nations are up in flames and some have been internationally designated as failed states. Even many of those that are not formally at war are dogged by despotic leadership and rotten political systems. Therefore, a huge chunk of world refugees happen to be Muslims. They have sought refuge in the developed (Christian) world in Western Europe and North America. They are hosted by overwhelmingly Christian nations and many now have assumed their citizenship. Despite the perennial problems of xenophobia and the recent rejuvenation of the far Right, the general image depicted is one of multicultural, inter-religious tolerance and integration, a sign that the adherents of the two religions are engaging in progressive intercourse.

In many countries the believers of the two faiths continue to live together and even integrate. Fr. Thomas Mitchell, who belongs to the Indonesian Jesuit Province, in his lecture, "Terror and Hope in Indonesia"<sup>36</sup>, related how Indonesian Muslims and Christians viewed each other. Indonesians live in a multi-religious environment. Mostly their tribe is the superior identity and religion comes second. Most tribes have followers of both religions. For instance, Bataks have Muslim, Catholic and Protestant. And so are

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<sup>36</sup> Fr. Thomas Mitchell. Terror and Hope in Indonesia. 1998. A lecture delivered at the Oxford University on Muslim-Christian encounters in history. [www.woodstock.georgetown.edu](http://www.woodstock.georgetown.edu)

the Javanese. In fact the three religious affiliations in many cases live within the same family homestead. So when an Indonesian Christian thinks of Muslims, he think of his grandmother or uncle. When a Muslim thinks of Catholics, he thinks of his aunt or cousin or some other relative.

To cap it all, many of the mainstream leaders of both camps at least try to work out some form of cooperation and unity against common threats. In 1994, the United Nation's Conference on Population in Cairo, Egypt became a platform for Muslim-Catholic cooperation against anti-religious bias.

However, history is replete with evidence of atrocities and disastrous animosities that characterized Muslim-Christian dealings.

During its early expansion, the forces of Islam conquered Christian lands all the way to the heart of France and knocked at the gates of Vienna and Rome and hence the negative but universal tag of ' a religion spread by the sword'.

When the Muslims were dethroned in Spain, the victorious Spaniards embarked on a passionate campaign of ethnic and religious cleansing. The Muslims were either forced to convert to Christianity, massacred or expelled. The historic Christian Inquisitions, crusades and colonialism are all reminiscent of oppression against Muslim populations.

On the other hand, one of the most barbaric pogroms carried out by Muslims against Christians happened in 1915 when Turkish forces massacred Armenian Christians who had rebelled against turkey and supported Russia. The Armenians claim that about a million people were massacred.

Contemporary challenges such as terrorism are definitely widening the already divisive conflict-ridden rift between the two religions. This is especially so when religious rhetoric is woven around the war-on-terror propaganda. When the de facto leader of that war, President George Bush of the United States referred to the struggle as a 'Crusade', and when he talks of 'Islamic Fascism', the bulk of the Islamic world has no doubt that

this war on terror is indeed not much different from the historic crusades that brought so much destruction to their people.

Modern 'Islamic terrorism' has been described as a war between a strain of Islamic militants that want a clash of civilizations (war between the camp of Islam and the camp of the cross).

It is not in doubt that many of these radical organizations are bent on widening the schism between Muslims and other religious groups especially Christians and successfully igniting a severe clash of civilizations. For instance, Jamaa Islamiyah in South East Asia engineered a serious conflict between Muslims and Christians. In 2002, it attacked churches in Indonesia and Singapore and fermented Muslim-Christian fighting in Ambon, Indonesia.

Christian-Muslim relations have a complex history sometimes marked by rivalry and internecine wars, but equally in many cases - though frequently forgotten, or deliberately ignored - characterized by constructive living together.

A striking feature of our historical memories has been the way in which conflicts overshadow the peaceful experiences. It is a truism that 9/11, among many other incidents of terrorist carnage changed our perception of the world. The transnational terrorist attack on the twin towers and the Pentagon made security throughout the world an overriding priority. Terrorist attacks did, however, not stop: terrorist groups targeted Madrid, London, and Istanbul. Some argue that an important instrument to discourage terrorist attacks is the closing or hardening of borders<sup>37</sup>. However, others maintain that terrorism and religious hatred can only be countered by promoting understanding and scaling down the level of mistrust between the affected religious societies.

Terrorist acts or the threats of such action have been in existence for centuries. Despite having a history longer than the modern nation-state, the use of terror by governments and those that contest their power remains poorly understood. While the meaning of the word terror itself is clear, when it is applied to acts and actors in the real world it

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<sup>37</sup> Carroll, J. (2002). *After Constantine's sword: Past, present, and future of Christian-Jewish relations*. Presentation at the Jewish Theological Seminary, March 19, New York.

becomes obfuscated. Part of this is due to the use of terror tactics by actors at all levels in the social and political environment.

In any organization, be it religious, political or environmental, there is always a lunatic fringe, whose Modus operandi diverts from the accepted norms of the larger whole. These groups believe that violence is morally justifiable to achieve their goals. And religious groups are no different as there are always peripheral factions that espouse violent and divisive doctrines. One thing is unambiguous, though; Religious rivalry has often led humans to catastrophic eventualities<sup>38</sup>.

### **3.2 Violence, Christianity and Islam**

Many Christians have often presented their religion as a religion of love and peace while they presented Islam as a religion of war and the sword. In the modern media, Muslims and Islam have often been covered in a way which reinforces this old stereotypic perception. The archetypal Muslim is depicted as frequently irrational, fervently dogmatic and genetically violent. For Muslims who have time to think about such things, the Christian and Western perceptions appear as a complete disregard of the most obvious facts.

The following paragraphs elucidate the divergent and conflicting worldviews held by both Muslims and Christians about the ills and wrongs each attributes to the other. There is no attempt here to prop up or justify the lamentations of any group. The aim is to highlight the deep-rooted reciprocal suspicions.

#### **3.2.1 Christian conduct**

This is a brief account of the perceived (or actual) conduct of Christendom in its treatment of Islam and Muslims both in historical and contemporary contexts. It may not be necessarily factual but nevertheless is representative of the historical and modern injustices Muslims attribute to Christianity:

For centuries now Christian nations have been busy beating up one Muslim nation or another. In the middle ages they came as crusaders. Then they colonized many Muslim

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<sup>38</sup> Carroll, J. (2002). *After Constantine's sword: Past, present, and future of Christian-Jewish relations*. Presentation at the Jewish Theological Seminary, March 19, New York.

countries and tried to destroy their cultures and religion. During their struggle for independence some Muslims have had to suffer terrible violence. The French killed about a million Muslims in Algeria because they wanted independence. In a way, this French war against Islam and Muslims is still continuing through the support of the military dictatorship in Algeria against the Muslim party that was set to win elections and persecutions in France of Muslim men with beards and Muslim women with hijab. The USA and Britain killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis (with the approval of about 70-80% of their people) without letting the world see the blood, thus practicing a lesson learned during the Vietnam War. Serbs have killed hundreds of thousands of Muslims and raped thousands of women in Bosnia and Kosovo. Although in these lands, a combination of rare circumstances put the West (USA and Western Europe) on the side of the Muslims, and belatedly so, this did no good to them because the Western powers did not want to loose any of their own soldiers. Had the West left the Muslim Bosnians and ethnic Albanians to their fate without putting an arms embargo on them, their suffering would not have been any greater<sup>39</sup>.

Israel has been for half a century destroying the Palestinian people with the help of arms and financial and moral support provided by the USA, the very sort of crimes that have been committed by the Serbs against the people of Kosovo and which have been condemned by the West, even though there were no cameras to record the cries of the Palestinians and photograph the pictures of the massacred people and burning homes. In Lebanon when Christians were in the majority there was war, but now that the Muslims are in the majority there is peace except in the south of the country where Christians have been helping a foreign enemy against their own countrymen. (This refers to the 1975-1990 Lebanese civil war when Christians massacred Palestinians with the aid of Israel.) When an American president needs to divert his people's attention away from his sex scandal the easiest thing he finds is to bomb Muslim countries -- Afghanistan, Sudan and Iraq -- because he knows that this will be approved by a vast majority of his people. And then there is the media which is ever busy in maligning the Muslims while they do not at

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<sup>39</sup> Deutsch, M., & Coleman, P. T. (Eds.). (2000). *The handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice* (pp. 21-40). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

this point in time possess the resources to speak up: for every word spoken/written by a Muslim and heard/read by one person, a thousand words from a Christian are received by a thousand persons in the world. At the international level the voices of the Muslims are all but drowned by the Christian voices and those Christian voices are for the most part condemnatory. If a cartoonist was to depict the situation between the Western and Muslim civilizations, he or she will draw a weaker person not able or inclined to stand up or to speak while another stronger person is standing over him with a big stick, now and then beating him, and all the while shouting to him in a loud voice: you are a violent man<sup>40</sup>.

It is important for both Muslims and Christians to ask: What will the Christians do if the tables were turned and their lands were first colonized by Muslims and then bombed or maligned or ethnically cleansed? If the past is any guide, the answer is clear: There will be a vicious reaction and given the chance, an attempt at almost total destruction of the Muslims. For in Spain Muslims lived for about 850 years as rulers. They lived with Jews and Christians for the most part in a spirit of tolerance and cooperation in promoting science and culture to the point that their work prepared for the modern scientific revolution with all its benefits for mankind. But the moment Muslims became weaker, the hate in the Catholic heart came out with a vengeance. Muslims were either killed, converted, or forced to leave Spain and their heritage was as fully destroyed as was humanly possible. Their mosques are now museums and theatres closed to Muslims forever. Before Palestine and Kosovo, there was Spain<sup>41</sup>.

But someone will counter this litany of complaints with the fact that the colonialists massacred their subjects regardless of their religion. Moreover, Christian Serbs slaughtered Christian Croats. Palestinians are being battered in a survival battle by Jews because they are Arabs and not necessarily because they are Muslims. Actually, Palestinian Christians are fighting alongside their Muslim compatriots. The most notorious Palestinian 'Terrorist' organization in the 1970s and 80s was the Popular Front

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<sup>40</sup> Fox, J. (2002). *Ethnoreligious conflict in the late twentieth century*. Lahman, MD: Lexington Books.

<sup>41</sup> Higgins, E. T. (1996). Knowledge activation: Accessibility, applicability, and salience. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), *Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles* (pp. 133–168). New York: Guilford Press.



for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). It was a communist organization founded by Dr. Wa'di Haddad and Dr. George Habash, both Palestinian Christians. So Muslims do not have genuine reasons to accuse Christians, or do they?

### 3.2.2 Muslim Conduct

In every religious group individuals have to grow to achieve the level of development that the religion requires. One would therefore find individuals in each religious group at different level of development and behaving accordingly. Some will doubtless perform some reprehensible acts. In recent decades, there have been deplorably some acts of violence against Christian minorities in such Muslim countries as Egypt, Pakistan, Iraq and Indonesia.

A Christian will argue that before the lamentable Crusades, there were Muslim conquests that occupied the heartlands of Christianity. Muslims viciously chant "Death to America! Death to the West!" And this is an affront on Christianity because those powers are the symbols of Christendom. Al Qaeda is a Muslim organization whose aim is to kill as many Christians and non-Muslims as possible. It is Sudanese Muslims who have been humiliating Christians and animists in The Sudan for decades. Muslim Indonesia has massacred East Timorese Christians. When a maverick Danish cartoonist insults Islam, Muslims vent their rage on an innocent Indonesian or Nigerian Christian. Everywhere, furious Muslims target innocent Christians whenever they feel someone has transgressed against a fellow Muslim. But then, a Muslim will retort that this is probably partly due to a reaction of the news of American, British and Serbian violence against Muslim peoples combined with some very local reasons. Even so, they are nothing compared to what Muslims have suffered and are suffering at the hands of Christians<sup>42</sup>.

Therefore, the rigmarole continues unabated. Moreover, the accusations and counteraccusations oscillate back and forth, ad infinitum.

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<sup>42</sup> Higgins, E. T. (1996). Knowledge activation: Accessibility, applicability, and salience. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), *Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles* (pp. 133–168). New York: Guilford Press.

### **3.3 Measurement of Terrorism**

#### **3.3.1 Traditional Measurement**

Given a definition of terrorism, the number of terrorist events can easily be measured. However, this means that terrorist activities of quite different sizes are indiscriminately lumped together. The attacks against the World Trade Center would be counted as one (or perhaps two) event(s), the same as taking one person as a hostage. It can be asked whether it makes sense to place such widely differing incidents on a common scale. Such measurement can at best capture general developments. Even then, they are useful only if the structure of terrorist events remains more or less unchanged. Thus, measuring the number of incidents makes sense if the share of terrorist hostage-takings and major attacks remains approximately constant.<sup>43</sup>

In contrast, if in one year (such as in 2001) a major attack occurred, although there have been none of that magnitude in preceding or later years, a time series based on the number of incidents is of little value. Therefore, in order to capture the unequal importance of different terrorist events, most series additionally measure the number of casualties. Some data take the number of persons killed, whilst others consider the number of people injured. In the latter case, the problem arises that being seriously injured, with permanent disabilities persisting for the rest of one's life (e.g. if victims lose their eyesight) differs markedly from being only lightly injured. There can be no strict rule as to what to count and what to disregard.

#### **3.3.2 Impact Studies**

One of the consequences of terrorism is the losses incurred by countries in terms of monetary revenues, for instance because the number of tourists declines or investors are less prepared to build up or buy firms in countries affected by terrorism. Kenya's tourism sector has suffered a great deal since 1998 and then after the 2002 Kikambala attacks because of the controversial travel advisories by the British and American governments

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<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

warning their citizens of the country's vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Over the last few years, economics scholars have analyzed the effects terrorist acts have on various aspects of the economy (Nasr, 2003).

Terrorists have often used *tourists* as targets because they are easy to attack. The effect on the choice of tourist location is extensive. The expected cost of a holiday in a country under threat of terrorist attacks is higher than for vacations in an alternative location without the threat of terrorism<sup>44</sup>.

At the same time, the resonance in the media is huge. Bombing, shooting and kidnapping tourists often has a highly positive expected net benefit to terrorists and is therefore often undertaken. An example is the Luxor massacre, in which the terrorists of the *Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya* shot dead 58 foreign tourists visiting the temple of Queen Hatshepsut in the Valley of the Queens, Egypt in 1997. Since then, terrorists have targeted Egyptian tourist resorts in Ariish and Sharmal Sheikh with calamitous consequences. Another example is the bombing of a disco in Bali in 2002, which cost the lives of almost 200 tourists.

Careful econometric analyses using advanced time series methods (vector auto-regression VAR) have been used to study the relationship between terrorism and tourism (Enders and Sandler 1991). The causal direction was found to run from terrorism to tourism and not the reverse. For Spain, in which not only the Basque *ETA* but also other (mostly left-wing) groups have committed terrorist acts, it has been estimated that a typical terrorist act scares away over 140,000 tourists when all the monthly impacts are combined. Similar results have been found for other tourist destinations such as Greece, Austria, Turkey and Israel (Enders, Sandler and Parise 1992, Pizam and Smith 2000 and Drakos and Kutan 2001). Terrorism thus has a substantial effect on tourism. It is transitory but compared to a situation in which no, or fewer, terrorist acts are committed, the income loss for the host country is large. The relevant comparison is not the number of tourists

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<sup>44</sup> Jessica Stern, *Terror in The Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*, 1st ed. (New York: Ecco, 2003), p. 267.

before the event, because without the event the number of tourists would most likely have risen.

### 3.3.2.1 Religious Relations

As implied earlier, arguments suggesting inherent differences among religious groups in terms of their wish to change the world and their endorsement of violent or peaceful activism have often been rightfully criticized as overgeneralizations (Fox, 2004). The inherent likelihood of certain religious groups to support the status quo or violent or peaceful activism varies with time and context. But historical evidence suggests that each of the major religions, as demonstrated below, has the potential to support both the status quo and opposition to it and to facilitate both violent and peaceful activism (Appleby, 2000; Fox, 2004; Rapoport, 1993)<sup>45</sup>.

In discussing the malleability of religions in terms of attitudes toward the status quo, Yinger (1965) proposes that a sect grows out of certain aspects of the teachings of the church, and if it is to survive in the currents of history, it must grow again into a church. One may say that, historically, all major established religions, regardless of how much they may currently support the status quo, have started as small revolutionary movements (Kimball, 2002). Lincoln (1985), in a similar manner, suggests that religions of resistance can transform themselves into religions of revolution, while religions of revolutions can become religions of status quo if they succeed in their struggle, or may fall back into being religions of resistance if they are defeated. In this context, Catholicism, which historically has often supported the establishment, has also been interpreted as supporting forms of political action in order to affect human liberation from social injustice. The robust role of the Catholic Church, and specifically the efforts of the late Pope John Paul II in the liberation of countries like Poland from the yoke of communism promptly come to mind.

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<sup>45</sup> Rapoport, D. C. (1993). Comparing fundamentalist movements and groups. In M. E. Marty & R. S. Appleby (Eds.), *Fundamentalisms and the state: Remaking politics, economics and militance* (pp. 489–561). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Finally, the Muslim belief that the “messianic” Mahdi will return, overturn a disliked social system, and bring justice to earth has been used during certain historical periods, when Shiite-supported governments came to power, to justify the status quo. During other historical periods, this belief fueled Shi’a revolts (Keddie, 1985).

In terms of violent versus peaceful activism the malleability of religious meaning system can be demonstrated in the following historical examples:

- (a) The same Catholicism, which does not reject the strong pacifist tradition within Christianity, is also responsible for the Crusades and the Inquisition (Fox, 2002), and according to some scholars has facilitated (crimes of omission or Guilt of silence?) to some extent the Holocaust (Carroll, 2001).
- (b) Judaism throughout history has usually encouraged peaceful resistance of the often-violent repression against the Jews. However, in both modern and ancient times Judaism has inspired some violent activism (Rapoport, 1993; Sprinzak, 1993).
- (c) Finally, Buddhists in Tibet have, despite a tradition of pacifism, on occasions, violently opposed the Chinese occupation<sup>46</sup>. In the build-up to the 1998 Beijing Olympics, violent protests by Tibetans and sympathizers in Tibet and across the globe have resulted in loss of lives.

The above historical examples raise the question of how can the *same* religion (e.g., Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, or Judaism) support both the goals of status quo and world change, and embrace both violent and peaceful activism as means to achieve them.

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<sup>46</sup> Rapoport, D. C. (1993). Comparing fundamentalist movements and groups. In M. E. Marty & R. S. Appleby (Eds.), *Fundamentalisms and the state: Remaking politics, economics and militance* (pp. 489–561). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

### 3.4 Kenya, the War on Terror and the Alienation of Muslims.

The western governments have responded to the challenges faced by fragile states by stepping up security-oriented programs in developing countries.

Kenya is conceptualised by the US as a frontline state in the fight against terrorism because of its strategic location and proximity to the volatile Horn of Africa which is thought to be spewing terrorist cells that have targeted Kenyan as well as western targets in the East African region.

In addition to the foreign terrorists, it is argued that there are possible home-grown terrorists nurtured by the marginalization of Kenyan Muslims. The two provinces largely inhabited by Muslims in Kenya, Coast and North Eastern are particularly poor and lag behind in almost every aspect of development. There have been historical complaints by the Muslim community that they are segregated by the government's political and economic policies and this led to Muslims mistrusting their government.

Realizing the potential importance of Kenya in the war on terror, the United States and other Western countries took keen interest in strengthening the country's security capability. Between 2000 and 2005, US military aid to Kenya rose by 220%.<sup>47</sup>

Several bi-and multilateral programs on military relations and counter-terrorism are now underway underlining Kenya's newly acquired importance in international circles.

The most important programs involve the United States. Since 1981, Kenya had allowed American forces to use Kenyan ports and airfields for military purposes but with the advent of terrorism as a serious international challenge, this cooperation spiralled upwards. Presently, the Mombasa port is used as surveillance base for American forces monitoring the red sea and Somalia

Kenya was enabled to form the Anti Terrorism Police Unit and the National Counter-Terrorism Centre with the help of American funding.

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<sup>47</sup> Bachman, Jan and Jana Honke. 2008. Fragile States and the Securitization of Donor Policies: transformation, appropriation and social effects on target societies. The case of Kenya. *A paper prepared for the 49<sup>th</sup> International Studies Association Annual Conference 26-29 March 2008 in San Fransisco, USA.*

Apart from the US, other western powers are helping the country to develop its security infrastructure and improve its capability to fight terrorism. The British are funding and equipping the Kenyan Administration police to effectively monitor the Somali border, a porous region thought to be used by international terrorists hiding in Somalia to sneak in and out of Kenya.

But the assistance the Kenyan government is getting from the donor community is not restricted to the security field. There are various other donor-funded programs for non-state actors such as NGOs targeting marginalised communities: drilling wells, building schools and health centres. This is regarded as an attempt at winning the hearts and minds of communities who, due to marginalization and deprivation, are likely to either produce local terrorists or harbour the international ones.

Locally, the Suppression of Terrorism Bill was tabled by the government in 2003 without any consultations with the civil society. It inevitably led to public outcry among Muslims, political leaders as well as the civil society. Eventually, the draft had to be withdrawn because the government certainly felt it would not garner the necessary support in parliament and even among the public. Some of its provisions were reckoned to violate human rights enshrined in the Kenyan constitution. Much of the criticism was, unfortunately, genuine. The controversial provisions included a vague and broad definition of terrorism.

Most critics pointed out the extensive powers given to police to stop, search and detain people and hold them incommunicado in secret detention facilities.

Another issue that drew loud protests is the immunity from prosecution bestowed upon state security officials engaged in terror-related incidents. This simply meant that security agents could do whatever they wanted without the possibility of anyone taking them to court.

The Bill was not short of contentious stipulations and one such was the reversion of the constitutional provision that one 'is innocent until proven guilty'. Under the new Bill, terrorism suspects would be deemed guilty until proven otherwise.

Equally infamous was the decision to award extensive powers to the minister for internal security to declare by decree that an organization is terrorist. That is, the minister would

have the power to personally designate an individual or group as terrorist. Critics argued that this was contemptuous to the national institutions as one person could make such a momentous legal decision. Instead of an institution taking charge of such crucial national processes, an individual would monopolize the decisions. There would be no way of insulating those decisions from personal interests, whims and prejudices. It was an affront on democracy, it was argued.

Another provision stipulated that being associated with a declared terrorist organization constitutes a crime. Critics pointed out that after the 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi, the government took a knee-jerk response by immediately banning several Islamic non-governmental organizations and up to date, no evidence was presented to link the said organizations to the crime. So if these organizations can be casually labelled as terrorist, all those Muslims who at any one time worked for them can also be labelled criminals under this law.

Perhaps the most outrageous part of the Bill was the provision to arrest a person without warrant “who, in a public place wears an item or clothing.... in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a member or supporter of a declared terrorist organization (Kenya Gazette Supplement 2003, Section 12)<sup>48</sup>

In response to this, Muslims were asking whether Turbans and walking sticks would not be regarded as ‘items’ and ‘clothes’ reminiscent of the Al Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden.

While the bill has not been passed, some of its provisions are nevertheless being employed by the Kenyan security agents e.g. religious profiling and arbitrary arrests.

Recently, mass arrests of ‘terror suspects’ have been creating widespread fear among Somalis and in the coast. These arrests are carried out mostly by the Anti Terrorism Police Unit, an outfit notorious for its random actions and lack of accountability and described by many Kenyans as an amorphous institution, filled with unnecessary secrecy and corruption. There is also a widespread view among Kenyans, especially the Muslims

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<sup>48</sup> Kenya Gazette Supplement 38, 2003. *The Suppression of Terrorism Bill*. Nairobi: Government Printers.



that the unit is serving foreign agencies and not the government of Kenya and that its dramatic mass arrests of Muslims is just a ploy to hoodwink the Americans and their partners into splashing more funds. The argument that Muslims have to contend with mass arrests so that the ATPU can justify its existence and funding is lent some credence by the fact that the Kenyan government is yet to successfully convict even a single terrorist. Yet every few months there are theatrical incidents of the police making mass arrests in the major Muslim towns, sometimes even publicly displaying explosives allegedly caught in the possession of the suspects. What follows is days of media hype and spectacular images of the suspects arraigned in court, their already 'guilty' faces splashed on the front pages of the papers and television screens. But strangely, all the drama simply fizzles out, the explosive exhibits disappear and the suspects are quietly released after some weeks.

As if the harassment by the local security forces is not enough, Kenyan Muslims have to contend with an even more humiliating treatment: Extra-ordinary renditions. In December 2006, during the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, Muslims fleeing the war were intercepted at the Kenyan border, rounded up, handed over to foreign intelligence officials, kept incommunicado for weeks and later about a hundred of them flown illegally to Somalia en route to Ethiopia.(amnesty international 2007<sup>49</sup>, Human Rights Watch 2007<sup>50</sup>, Muslim Human Rights forum 2007<sup>51</sup>). Most of them are still missing.

After the arrests, Kenya played mute; ignoring petitions, denying legal and family access and later on transferring the prisoners to external jurisdiction, even though many of them were Kenyans. At least one of them was the son of a retired Kenyan civil servant who was petitioning the government to explain how his son could be an alien who happened to be sired by a Kenyan.

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<sup>49</sup> Amnesty International 2007. Horn of Africa: Illegal transfers in "the War on Terror". London: Amnesty International."

<sup>50</sup> Human Rights Watch. 2007. "HRW Letter to Kenyan Director of Political Affairs Thomas Amolo." New York: Human Rights Watch.

<sup>51</sup> Muslim Human Rights Forum. 2007. "Horn of terror. Report of US-led Mass Extra-Ordinary Renditions from Kenya to Somalia, Ethiopia and Guantanamo Bay, January - June 2007". Nairobi: Muslim Human Rights Forum.

Muslims accuse their government of taking funding on the pretext of fighting terrorism and harassing them at the behest of those foreign masters. Almost every Muslim netted in the mass ‘terror’ arrests narrates an encounter with foreign, especially ‘white’ interrogators.

Counter-terrorism and anti-money laundering efforts target *Hawalas* (informal money transfer agencies) mostly used by Muslims. The government does not want to register them but they are largely serving a section of the society for whom banks and formal money transfer agencies are too expensive. A large segment of the Muslim population in Kenya, and particularly the Somali are sustained by remittances they receive from relatives in Europe, North America and the Middle East and therefore putting the *Hawalas* out of business will have dire financial consequences on them.

### 3.5 Concluding Remarks

The empirical literature on the impact of terrorism of religion is now fairly mature. The literature review raises the question of the extent to which terrorism has contributed towards an international system characterised by religious disharmony and suspicion. It is also obvious from the literature that only an in-depth understanding of the real causes of global terrorism can at least reduce the religious brand, which is by far the most destructive.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### DATA ANALYSIS AND INTEPRATATION

#### 4.1 Introduction

The study of attitudes toward terrorism is a vital psychological endeavor in the post-9/11 world. Fortunately, much work has been done and the resulting literature provides a great deal of insight into how people respond to terrorism and other threats of violence. Unfortunately, most of the empirical work has focused on responses to past terrorist incidents and has looked mainly at personal factors that are related to such responses. Because each terrorist attack evokes anger and resolve, however, terrorists primarily achieve their goal of fear and intimidation through the threat of future attacks rather than the occurrence of previous ones. From a psychological perspective, the terrorism that has not yet happened is as important and more fearsome as the terrorism that just happened.

This chapter deals with data analysis and interpretation of the results. This aims at giving an understanding of the respondents' views about the problem of terrorism and how it affects their perceptions and relations with people of other religious orientations. It also gives an account of the respondents' opinions on the subject of the war on terror.

#### 4.2 Response Rate

Table 4.2.2

What is your sex?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Males	28	70.0	70.0	70.0
	Female	12	30.0	30.0	100.0
	Total	40	100.0	100.0	

The final sample comprised of men (70%) and women (30%) as shown in the table above.

### 4.3 General Information

Table 4.3.1: Religion

What is your religion?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Islam	20	50.0	50.0	50.0
Christianity	20	50.0	50.0	100.0
Total	40	100.0	100.0	

The table above shows that 50% of participants were Muslims compared with the same percentage for Christians. They had also had equal frequencies of 20. This choice percentage of the respondents is not reflecting the actual population representation of the two religious groups in the country. In fact Christians overwhelmingly outnumber the Muslims in actual population. But since this is a study into the conflicting views of the two groups and to show the divided opinions, there was no need to reflect the actual religious demographics in the sample.

Table 4.3.2: Gender Representation

One-Sample Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
What is your religion?	40	1.5000	.50637	.08006
What is your sex?	40	1.3000	.46410	.07338

When respondents were asked about their religion, the results show that the sample had a 50-50 representation. This implies of the 40 respondents, 20 profess Christianity and the remaining 20 being Muslims as shown by a mean of 1.5 in the table above.

**Table 4.3.3: Duration of professing religion**

**For how long have you been professing your religion?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Less than 10 years	12	30.0	30.0	30.0
	Above 10 years	28	70.0	70.0	100.0
	Total	40	100.0	100.0	

As indicated in the table above, 70% of respondents had professed their religion for over ten years, and 12% had professed for less than 10 years.

**Table 4.3.3: Religion relationship**

**Do you have any religious relations with your Muslim or Christian Colleagues, for instance intermarriages, debates, religious workshops e.t.c?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	40	100.0	100.0	100.0

As shown by the table, all the respondents said they did not have any religious relationships with members of the opposite faith. This shows that there is not much going on in Kenya in terms of positive religious relations and collaboration in matters of mutual interest.

**Table 4.3.3a: Religion relationship as Per Christians**

**Do you have any religious relations with your Muslim or Christian colleagues?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	20	100.0	100.0	100.0

In table 4.3.3a above, all the Christians who were sampled for the study indicated that they do not have any relationships such as marriage or religious debates with Muslims.

This represented a frequency of 20, which is equivalent to 100% of the Christian respondents.

**Table 4.3.3b: Religion relationship as Per Muslims**

**Do you have any religious relations with your Muslim or Christian Colleagues?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	20	100.0	100.0	100.0

On the same question as in table 4.3.3a above, Muslim respondents also indicated that they also do not have any relationships such as marriage or religious debates with Christians. Table 4.3.3b above supports this conclusion as represented by a frequency of 20, which is equivalent to 100% of the Muslim respondents.

**Table 4.3.3c: Basis of relationship as Per Christians**

**Do you base your religious relations on terrorist related issues?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	20	100.0	100.0	100.0

**Table 4.3.3d: Basis of relationship as Per Muslims**

**Do you base your religious relations on terrorist related activities?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	20	100.0	100.0	100.0

When both respondents were asked whether they based their relationship on terrorist related activities, as shown in tables 4.3.3c and 4.3.3d, both sets of respondents said the do so. This indicates that they think terrorism affects how they choose to relate with one another. It may also indicate that the two groups share mutual suspicions especially on issues that relate to terrorism

**Table 4.3.4: Churches and Mosques representation**

**What is the name of your Mosque or Church?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	AGC Good Shepherd	2	5.0	5.0	5.0
	Family Basilica	3	7.5	7.5	12.5
	St. Marks	4	10.0	10.0	22.5
	Consolata	1	2.5	2.5	25.0
	AIC Milimani	2	5.0	5.0	30.0
	St.Cathedral	2	5.0	5.0	35.0
	Harvest Church	2	5.0	5.0	40.0
	Christ The King	4	10.0	10.0	50.0
	Jamia Mosque	9	22.5	22.5	72.5
	South C	3	7.5	7.5	80.0
	12th Street Eastleigh	4	10.0	10.0	90.0
	8th Street Eastleigh	2	5.0	5.0	95.0
	Mosque	2	5.0	5.0	100.0
	Total	40	100.0	100.0	

The table above shows that most of the Muslim are members of Jamia Mosque (22.5%) with the highest frequency of nine. However, membership in a specific mosque among Muslims is not as formal or even important as it is among Christians. In fact, the overwhelming majority of Muslims do not belong formally to any mosque, even though they might frequent a particular mosque, mostly for reasons of proximity. On the other hand, 10% of respondents who completed the questionnaire are church members of Christ is the King.

#### **4.4 Definition of terrorism**

Respondents were asked to indicate their opinions about the general definition of terrorism. Specifically, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they see terrorism as a i) political use of violence by civilians, ii) religious holy war; and, iii) Violent and repression by states, groups or persons. All responses were provided using a five-point scale: (1) least describes, (2) moderately describes, (3) fairly describes; and, (4) mostly describes.

In their responses as shown in the table below, most of the Christians believe that terrorism is a religious holy war as shown by a mean of 2.65. This reflects the current worldwide suspicion that religion plays a big role in perpetuating terrorist ideologies and fanning their activities.

Others believe that it is the political use of violence by civilians as indicated by mean of 1.60. In addition, others believe that it is the violence and repression by states, groups or persons. This is represented by a mean of 2.80.

**Table 4.4.1: Summary Definitions**

**Descriptive Statistics**

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Legitimate use of violence by civilians	40	1.00	4.00	1.6000	1.00766
Illegitimate political use of violence	40	1.00	5.00	1.6500	1.18862
Religious holy war	40	1.00	4.00	2.5750	1.51721
Violent intimidation by States, groups or persons	40	1.00	5.00	2.8000	1.82855
Valid N (list wise)	40				

**Table 4.4.2a: Definition of terrorism as Religious holy war among Christian respondents**

**Religious holy war**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Highly describes	20	100.0	100.0	100.0



**Table 4.4.2b: Definition of terrorism as Religious holy war among Muslims**

		Religious holy war			
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Least describes	19	95.0	95.0	95.0
	Moderately describes	1	5.0	5.0	100.0
	Total	20	100.0	100.0	

When respondents were asked whether they see terrorism as a religious holy war, almost all Muslims said it least describes terrorism. This is represented by a frequency of 19, which is equivalent to 95% of the Muslim respondents as shown in table in 4.4.2b. On the other hand, 100% of the Christians said terrorism is a religious holy war as shown in table 4.4.2a. This reinforces the notion that terrorism is related to Islam and it is a way of Muslims carrying out what their religion terms as Holy War. So the two sets of respondents show the different views about what constitutes terrorism; on one hand the Christians believing that at least some aspects of Islam espouse terrorism and the Muslims predictably denying that assumption which links certain provisions in their religion to terrorism.

#### **4.5 Causes of terrorism**

In order to know the perception on the causes of terrorism, respondents were asked to indicate their opinions on this aspect. All responses were provided using a five-point scale: (1), lowest rank; and, (5) highly rank.

In their responses as shown in the table below, respondents indicated that terrorism is caused by; a sense of personal or collective alienation (a mean of 2.40), humiliation (a mean of 2.25), and victimization (a mean of 3.07). others believe that it is an ineffective or inaccessible political institutions (a mean of 2.97), claims over territory (a mean of 2.80), demographic shifts (a mean of 2.50), discrimination on the basis of religion (a mean of 2.82), poverty (a mean of 2.60), history of devaluation and even demonization of out-group members (a mean of 2.70) ; and, religious provisions (a mean of 1.45). This reinforces the abundance of suspicion about the culpability of religion (especially Islam)

as a cause of terrorism. The responses also represent the common perceptions that alienation, discrimination and inaccessible political institutions are also to blame for the scourge of terrorism.

The responses to this question were again sorted according to the religious representation and the data shows that most Christians believe that there are religious provisions that perpetuate terrorism as shown by a mean of 4.00 as opposed to Muslim who thinks that that is not the case. This is shown by a mean of 1.0714. This also might indicate the reason why there is always a suspicion by Christians towards Muslims as regards to terrorism and the resultant mistrust between the two groups.

**Table 4.5.1a: Causes of terrorism according to Muslims**

**Descriptive Statistics**

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
A Sense of Personal Or Collective Alienation	20	1.00	5.00	2.2500	1.40955
Humiliation	20	1.00	5.00	1.9000	1.33377
Deprivation	20	1.00	5.00	2.6000	1.69830
Victimization	20	1.00	5.00	2.5500	1.73129
Ineffective Or Inaccessible Political Institutions	20	1.00	5.00	2.5000	1.67017
Claims Over Territory	20	1.00	5.00	2.3500	1.38697
Demographic Shifts	20	1.00	5.00	2.4500	1.70062
Discrimination On The Basis of Religion	20	1.00	4.00	2.7000	1.08094
History of Devaluation And Even Demonization Of Out-group Members	20	1.00	5.00	2.7500	1.65036
Religious provisions	20	1.00	2.00	1.0714	.26726
Valid N (list wise)	20				

**Table 4.5.1b: Causes of terrorism according to Christians**

**Descriptive Statistics**

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
A Sense Of Personal Or Collective Alienation	20	1.00	4.00	2.3000	1.26074
Humiliation	20	1.00	4.00	2.3500	1.34849
Deprivation	20	1.00	4.00	2.9000	1.41049
Victimization	20	1.00	4.00	3.0000	1.37649
Ineffective Or Inaccessible Political Institutions	20	1.00	4.00	2.6500	1.46089
Claims Over Territory	20	1.00	4.00	2.3000	1.12858
Demographic Shifts	20	1.00	4.00	2.8000	1.36111
Discrimination On The Basis Of Religion	20	1.00	4.00	2.3000	1.08094
History Of Devaluation And Even Demonization Of Outgroup Members	20	1.00	4.00	2.0500	1.46808
Religious provisions	20	4.00	4.00	4.0000	.00000
Valid N (listwise)	20				

**Table 4.5.1a: Causes of terrorism (overall response)**

**Descriptive Statistics**

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
A Sense Of Personal Or Collective Alienation	40	1.00	5.00	2.4250	1.55064
Humiliation	40	1.00	5.00	2.2500	1.54837
Deprivation	40	1.00	5.00	3.0750	1.85897
Victimization	40	1.00	5.00	2.9750	1.84651
Ineffective Or Inaccessible Political Institutions	40	1.00	5.00	2.8000	1.80028
Claims Over Territory	40	1.00	5.00	2.5000	1.51911
Demographic Shifts	40	1.00	5.00	2.8250	1.75247
Discrimination On The Basis Of Religion	40	1.00	5.00	2.6000	1.25678
History Of Devaluation And Even Demonization Of Outgroup Members	40	1.00	5.00	2.7000	2.00256
Religious provisions	40	1.00	2.00	1.4750	.50574
Valid N (listwise)	40				

**4.6 Terrorism, Religious Relations and the Impact of the War on Terror.**

Terrorism has the potential to evoke strong psychological reactions. Nonetheless, the extent to which it may do so can vary according to context (Wertheimer, 1993). In line with this literature, the respondents were asked to comment on the possible ways of tackling terrorism as shown in the table below. They were also asked whether religious leaders have an important role in deciding how they relate with the other religious groups. This question investigates the perceived importance of the clergy in creating positive religious relations or otherwise. Respondents indicated that their church/Mosque is involved in determining what kind of relations to maintain with adherents of the opposite faith, as shown by a mean of 1.65. Nevertheless, on whether the relations are freely negotiated and agreed upon an average of 1.57 said no. Those who said the relations are freely negotiated and agreed upon indicated that Sheikh/Priest influences the religious relations with an average rate 1.252. This shows that most of the respondents think that church leaders influence their religious relations.

This strengthens the need for religious leaders to play a more active role in fostering good relations between the two groups.

The respondents were also asked whether terrorism affects how one relates with people of other faith and most said yes it does (a mean of 1.225).

However, while the two set of respondents differ on many issues, their views tend to converge on some points regarding the Kenyan government's treatment of Muslims and the execution of the War on Terror. The results show that most respondents do not support the Kenyan Government's anti-terrorism efforts (a mean of 1.57). They also indicated that the Kenyan Government's anti-terrorism fight is unfair to Muslims (a mean of 1.57). In addition, the results also show that both Muslims and Christians believe that Muslims in Kenya are discriminated against because of their faith (1.00).

The convergence of views in these issues could mean that most Kenyans, regardless of their religious affiliations do not agree with the manner in which the government is handling the fight against terrorism. This points to a cross-religious accusation that the government is mishandling at least parts of the campaign. This stance by Christian respondents does not contradict their opinions on the previous questions about terrorism. Their opposition to the war on terror and convergence with the Muslim views here seem to be merely a belief that the efforts to curb terrorism are not being properly executed.

In line with this, it shows that most of the respondents think that terrorism damages relations between Christians and Muslims in Kenya (a mean of 1.50). This is reinforced by the view among Muslims that the anti-terror campaign is a conspiracy against them, the view by Christians that Muslims are more likely to be terrorists and the mutual mistrust illustrated by the conflicting responses given to other questions about the nature and causes of terrorism

The respondents were also asked whether they think the concept of Islamic Jihad gives rise to terrorism. The responses show that Christians believe that Jihad gives rise to terrorism as shown by a mean of 1.50. Expectedly, the Muslim respondents do not think Jihad gives rise to terrorism. This may confirm that either Christians misunderstand Islam

as a religion and equate terrorism with Islamic religion or that some Muslims have interpreted Jihad in a manner befitting their violent terrorist inclinations.

Furthermore, when respondents were asked whether they think that Muslims are more likely to be terrorist, Muslims said no while Christians said yes as shown by a mean of 1.5 in the table above. This finding is perhaps the best illustration of the deep mistrust and suspicion held by Christians against Muslims.

The results also show that Muslims believe that war on terror is a conspiracy against Islam as opposed to the Christian respondents who do not think there is any conspiracy against Muslims.

**Table 4.6.1a: Christians Responses**

**Descriptive Statistics**

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Is your church/Mosque in determining what kind of relations to maintain with other religions?	20	1.00	2.00	1.6500	.48936
Are the relations freely negotiated and agreed upon?	20	1.00	2.00	1.5500	.51042
If the answer to 2 above, who influences the religious relations?	20	2.00	2.00	2.0000	.00000
Does terrorism affect how you relate with people of other faith?	20	1.00	2.00	1.3000	.47016
Do you support the Kenyan Government's anti-terrorism efforts?	20	1.00	2.00	1.2000	.41039
Is the Kenyan Government's anti-terrorism fight unfair to Muslims?	20	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.00000
Are Muslims in Kenya discriminated because of their faith?	20	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.00000
Do you think terrorism damages relations between Christians and Muslims in Kenya?	20	2.00	2.00	2.0000	.00000
Do you think the concept of Islam Jihad gives to terrorism?	20	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.00000
Do you think that war on terror is a conspiracy by Christians and non-Muslims against Islam?	20	2.00	2.00	2.0000	.00000
Do you think that Muslims are more likely to be terrorist	20	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.00000
Valid N (listwise)	20				

**Table 4.6.1b: Muslims Responses****Descriptive Statistics**

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Is your church/Mosque in determining what kind of relations to maintain with other religions?	20	1.00	2.00	1.6500	.48936
Are the relations freely negotiated and agreed upon?	20	1.00	2.00	1.6000	.50262
If the answer to 2 above, who influences the religious relations?	20	1.00	5.00	3.0500	1.84890
Does terrorism affect how you relate with people of other faith?	20	1.00	2.00	1.1500	.36635
Do you support the Kenyan Government's anti-terrorism efforts?	20	1.00	2.00	1.9500	.22361
Is the Kenyan Government's anti-terrorism fight unfair to Muslims?	20	2.00	2.00	2.0000	.00000
Are Muslims in Kenya discriminated because of their faith?	20	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.00000
Do you think terrorism damages relations between Christians and Muslims in Kenya?	20	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.00000
Do you think the concept of Islam Jihad gives to terrorism?	20	2.00	2.00	2.0000	.00000
Do you think that war on terror is a conspiracy by Christians and non-Muslims against Islam?	20	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.00000
Do you think that Muslims are more likely to be terrorist	20	2.00	2.00	2.0000	.00000
Valid N (listwise)	20				



**Table 4.6.1c: Overall Responses**

**Descriptive Statistics**

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Is your church/Mosque in determining what kind of relations to maintain with other religions?	40	1.00	2.00	1.6500	.48305
Are the relations freely negotiated and agreed upon?	40	1.00	2.00	1.5750	.50064
If the answer to 2 above, who influences the religious relations?	40	1.00	5.00	2.5250	1.39574
Does terrorism affect how you relate with people of other faith?	40	1.00	2.00	1.2250	.42290
Do you support the Kenyan Government's anti-terrorism efforts?	40	1.00	2.00	1.5750	.50064
Is the Kenyan Government's anti-terrorism fight unfair to Muslims?	40	1.00	2.00	1.5000	.50637
Are Muslims in Kenya discriminated because of their faith?	40	1.00	1.00	1.0000	.00000
Do you think terrorism damages relations between Christians and Muslims in Kenya?	40	1.00	2.00	1.5000	.50637
Do you think the concept of Islam Jihad gives to terrorism?	40	1.00	2.00	1.5000	.50637
Do you think that war on terror is a conspiracy by Christians and non-Muslims against Islam?	40	1.00	2.00	1.5000	.50637
Do you think that Muslims are more likely to be terrorist has not been captured.	40	1.00	2.00	1.5000	.50637
Valid N (listwise)	40				

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the conclusions, recommendations, limitations and suggestions for further research for the study. The chapter summarizes the findings of the study in relation to the objectives of the study. The main objective was to identify and determine the extent of the impact of terrorism on religious relations among Christians and Muslims in Kenya.

#### 5.2 Conclusion

This study set out to evaluate the impact of terrorism on religious relations among Christians and Muslims in Kenya.

The findings of this study confirm that religious relations are compromised because of terrorist related activities. The results show that most respondents do not support the Kenyan Government's anti-terrorism efforts (a mean of 1.57). They also indicated that the Kenyan Government's anti-terrorism fight is unfair to Muslims (a mean of 1.57). In addition, the results also show that Muslims in Kenya are discriminated against because of their faith (1.575) and as a result, most of the respondents think that terrorism damages relations between Christians and Muslims in Kenya (1.525). This finding is consistent with Slovic's (2002)<sup>52</sup> and Lemyre's *et al.*, (2004)<sup>53</sup> comment that perceptions of a threat itself can lead to adverse effects on psychological well-being, the economy, or inter-group relations, rendering indirect effects of concern as well. Together, these findings highlight the complex nature of terrorism risks and their potential to evoke great public

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<sup>52</sup> Slovic, P. (2002) Terrorism as a hazard: a new species of trouble. *Risk Analysis* 22 , pp. 425-426.

<sup>53</sup> Lemyre, L., Krewski, D., Lee, J. E. C., Turner, M. C., Dallaire, C., Bouchard, L., Brand, K. and Mercier, P. (2005) A content analysis of word associations to explore Canadians' perceptions of general health risk and risks from five cases of hazards.. — Contract report prepared for Health Canada. Institute of Population Health, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada.

concern as put forward by Jarrett (2005)<sup>54</sup> depiction of the conflict substructure that supports suicide terrorism. The respondents were also asked to on whether the concept of Islam Jihad gives to terrorism. The responses show that Christian respondents believe Jihad gives rise to terrorism. This may confirm that either Muslim extremists misinterpret the Quran or Christians misunderstand Islam as a religion. The same divisive results were also attained when respondents were asked if they think that war on terror is a conspiracy by Christians and non-Muslims against Islam, with the Christians saying its not a conspiracy and Muslims maintaining it is.

### 5.3 Recommendations

The War on Terror is ideological as well as geopolitical and should be fought both with ideas and armies if it is to realize any tangible achievements. The war of ideas must be won as well as the military one. However, the problem with the present approach headed by The United States, and adopted by countries like Kenya is that the entire war has been militarized. As the world's most powerful nation, the US would logically be expected to lead the military front. However, the ideological front cannot, and should not be led by the Americans or even the West. Since the pandemic has its roots in troubled Muslim societies, the ideological front must significantly involve Muslim leaders. The US can lead the geopolitical battle but only Muslims can lead the ideological one.

In a 2004 speech delivered to the American Council on Foreign Relations, the former Prime Minister of Singapore, Goh Tong advocated for the involvement of local Muslims in the struggle against the phenomenon. He pointed out that Muslim scholars in Singapore were involved in rehabilitating terror suspects. This gave the Muslim community a stake in the war on terror and helped 'inoculate it against radicalism'.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Jarrett, D. (2005) Terror attacks - The public's response. *The Psychologist* 18 , pp. 524-525.

<sup>55</sup> Goh Tong 2004. Beyond Madrid: Winning Against Terrorism. A speech by the then Singaporean Prime Minister at the Council on Foreign Relations. [www.cfr.org](http://www.cfr.org)

He went further and urged all the stakeholders to work with the moderates and isolate the extremists: “While attempting to separate the wheat from the chaff, we have to appreciate that they both come from the same plant. How we encourage the Muslims to fight this ideological battle must reflect this sensitivity.”

He also advocated for Educational reforms arguing that religious education alone should not be let to “shape the mental horizon of the individual otherwise religion will turn inwards”. In Singapore, Madrasas (Islamic Schools) have to include a secular curriculum to enable graduates earn a living.

There is also a need for a scientific investigation into religiously motivated political behavior because religion is a complex and dynamic institution that cannot be restricted to the churches and mosques. When there is a religious problem, a military response will not suffice as it will only mess matters more. And perhaps this explains why the current War on Terror is not progressing as planned, if it ever had a plan.

The Kenyan government should review the links between its work on community cohesion and anti-terrorism. Counterproductive campaigns that only succeed in alienating local Muslims must cease if the security agencies intend to effectively mobilize the Muslim population against terrorists.

Schools have a vital role in inculcating moderation in the youth. Perhaps, Kenya should borrow the Singaporean model where Muslims have their own religious institutions in which the young generation is given both secular and religious education. They don't necessarily have to be run by the government. This is because the bulk of the Muslim Madrasas (Islamic Schools) offer pure religious subjects and the graduates do not possess any secular knowledge to help them gain any meaningful employment. It is also a fact that secular education broadens the mental horizon and enables the individual to properly connect religious content and reality. This will considerably stimulate moderation and pragmatism which are key to winning the ideological front in the struggle against radicalism, but also minimizing the mutual suspicions and mistrust between the country's religious groups.

Community and faith leaders should help to build bridges and drop defensive, reactive and conspiratorial philosophies and enhance a spirit of tolerance and respect. This especially goes to the leaders of the Muslim community who unfortunately are not

displaying any finesse in promoting the image of Islam. The Kenyan Muslim clerics, when not complaining about the harassment of their people, must take deliberate measures to immunize the Muslim community against the influence of extremist and intolerant ideologies. The Muslims must conduct an in-house analysis and conduct a credible, faith-led campaign against terrorism. And that campaign must be given the same prominence as the publicized struggle against the oppression of Muslims by the security agents.

It is a fact that the overwhelming majority of Muslims denounce the violent efforts of extremist but Islamic organizations like Al Qaeda. Unfortunately, that denunciation is so loudly silent because they have been victimized by the governmental efforts to curb terrorism. But if Muslims are to combat the notion that they commiserate with extremists, they must be vocal in their condemnation of violence. Sermons in the mosques are today inundated with lamentations about national and international persecution of Muslims. That is fair, even an obligation. But terror is today killing more Muslims than non-muslims in Iraq, Algeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Lebanon. It is slaughtering civilians whose only 'crime' is following a different faith. Combating terrorism, therefore, is as much the business of the Muslim community as it is the onus of governments and security organizations. The mosque minarets must reverberate with calls to the Muslims to fight extremism with all their might, because the alternative will be a guilt-by-association tag which is too costly. Similarly, Muslim institutions, such as schools and Madrasas must inundate the youth with the essential proficiency and expertise to shield them from radical indoctrination. If Muslim leaders do not publicly campaign against radicalism, the community's assertion that it does not empathize with terrorism sounds just a hollow and dubious defense meant purely for public relations.

Diversity in police forces and other security organs, especially the Anti Terrorism Police Unit and the National Security Intelligence Service, especially at the decision-making and execution levels will be necessary. The government must make deliberate attempts to exploit the Muslim human resource to inject more effectiveness in its security apparatus and minimize the unnecessary harassment of Muslims.

To recover the lost confidence in the security organs, the government should consider involving the Muslim community in an independent scrutiny of police intelligence. This would particularly bring some accountability to the notoriously unpopular Anti Terrorism Police Unit, ATPU. Such scrutiny may include detailed and accurate statistics and information on terrorism related detentions, charges and trials. This is to ensure that people do not languish in jail when they have no case to answer. It would also help to avoid potentially outrageous detentions such as the one involving a Muslim man who was arrested in 2006 on suspicion of terrorism merely because his wife made a U-turn at the Israeli embassy in Nairobi. Likewise, the government must come clean on the disturbing tales of foreign agents interrogating and even torturing Kenyans arrested on suspicion of terrorism.

The government also needs to engage Muslims in reviewing new and existing anti-terrorism powers and involve them in designing a coherent strategy against terrorism. This will placate the beleaguered feeling among the majority of Muslims.

The Kenyan media must also fight the perception that they are building and perpetuating a negative image about Muslims. The Kenyan Muslims complain that the media inadvertently participate in stereotyping of Muslims by dramatizing the arrests of innocent Muslims and simply playing mute when the same people are released without any charges. As the public watchdog, the Kenyan media rarely talks about the obvious mismanagement of the war on terror by the ATPU and instead act as cheerleaders who amplify the sweeping arrests of the suspects but never mention when or why the same people are acquitted.

Given the team-based problem-solving nature of total social programs, religious organizations adopting cohesive inter-religious relations must facilitate member's interaction and information exchange without suspicion. Therefore, religious organizations must ensure that frequent work-related meetings with members of different religious affiliates are encouraged. In line with the findings, the researcher recommends the following areas for further research:

- i. A further research be carried out by involving the heads of religious organizations as the third set of respondents in order to understand the influence the leaders have on their members,

- ii. Government being the custodian of the law, a further research should be carried out in order to know how they deal with terrorism; and,
- iii. A further research should be carried out in order to provide a descriptive account of the perception of terrorism threats in Kenya, specific types and effects of terrorism, as well as information sources on terrorism.

#### **5.4 Limitations of the study**

This survey study was limited by the small sample of the study. In order to be more representative, there is need for future studies using a larger sample. In addition, the study only targeted individuals in Nairobi on the assumption that being a cosmopolitan city, its population is representative. However, different parts of the country could possibly produce different outcomes and there is further need to investigate those possible variations to get a national representation.

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## **Appendix 1: Letter to the Respondent**

Dear Respondent,

This is to kindly request you to fill in the attached questionnaire for research Purpose. The research focuses on *'The impact terrorism on religious relations: A case study of Muslims and Christians in Kenya'*. The information sought will be treated with utmost good confidence and the results of this study will be used for academic Purposes only and a copy will send to you on request.

Thank you.

Yours sincerely

**ADEN SHEIKH HASSAN**

## APPENDIX 11

### THE RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

#### SECTION A

[Please freely answer the questions below. The information provided will be treated with the highest degree of confidence]

#### Part 1: General information

1. What is your sex?  
Male [    ]  
Female [    ]
2. What is your religion?  
Islam [    ]  
Christianity [    ]
3. For how long have you been professing your religion?  
Less than 2 years [    ]  
Less than 5 years [    ]  
Less than 10 years [    ]  
Above 10 years [    ]
4. Do you have any religious relations (e.g. inter-religious functions, intermarriage and religious debate) with your Muslim or Christian colleagues?  
Yes [    ]  
No [    ]
5. If yes in 4 above, what kind of relations is it?  
Positive [    ]  
Negative [    ]
6. What is the name of your Mosque or Church-----  
-----  
-----  
-----

**Part 11: Definition of terrorism**

1. Tick the appropriate answer about your view on the definition of terrorism (1 means the lowest rank) and (5 means the highest rank)

		1	2	3	4	5
1.	Political use of violence by civilians					
2.	Religious holy war					
3.	Violent and repression by states, groups or persons					

Others (specify) -----  
 -----  
 -----

2. Tick the appropriate answer about your view on causes of terrorism (1 means the lowest rank) and (5 means the highest rank)

		1	2	3	4	5
1.	A Sense Of Personal Or Collective Alienation					
2.	Humiliation					
3.	Deprivation					
4.	Victimization					
5.	Ineffective or Inaccessible Political Institutions					
6.	Claims Over Territory					
7.	Discrimination based on Religion					
8.	Poverty					
9.	Religious provisions					

Others (specify) -----  
 -----  
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**Part 1V: Tackling religious relations**

1. Is your church/Mosque in determining what kind of relations to maintain with other religions?  
Yes [ ]  
No [ ]
2. Are the relations freely negotiated and agreed upon?  
Yes [ ]  
No [ ]
3. If the answer to 2 above is yes, who influences the religious relations?  
Sheikh [ ]  
Church leader [ ]  
others[specify]-----  
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4. Do you support the Kenyan government's anti-terrorism efforts?  
Yes [ ]  
No [ ]
5. Is the Kenyan government's anti-terrorism fight unfair to Muslims?  
Yes [ ]  
No [ ]
6. Does terrorism affect how you relate with people of other faith?  
Yes [ ]  
No [ ]
7. Do you think that Muslims are more likely to be terrorists?  
Yes [ ]  
No [ ]
8. Are Muslims in Kenya discriminated because of their faith?  
Yes [ ]  
No [ ]
9. Do you think the concept of Islam Jihad gives to terrorism?  
Yes [ ]



No [ ]

**10. Do you think that war on terror is a conspiracy by Christians and non-Muslims against Islam?**

Yes [ ]

No [ ]