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11 THE SUB-REGIONAL MANAGEMENT OF AN INTERNAL  
CONFLICT IN AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF DJIBOUTI PEACE  
INITIATIVE IN THE SOMALI CONFLICT (MAY-AUGUST, 2000) //

BY

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## DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree to any university.

  
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
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This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as a university supervisor

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*4 November 2001*  
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Dr. Makumi Mwangi

Date

## **DEDICATION**

**To my mum and dad**

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First and foremost, I would like to thank Allah who gave me this opportunity to study. Second, I would like to acknowledge with gratitude all those people who helped in executing this remarkable work, particularly those who are not mentioned here.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMU	Arab Magreb Union
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African states
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
EAC	East Africa Community
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
FRUD	Front Pour la Restauration de l' Unite e de la Democratie
IGADD	Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
IMC	International Medical Corps
IPF	IGAD Partners Forum
LAS	League of Arab States
LGS	Liaison Group on Somalia
MSF	Medicine San Frontiers
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
OAS	Organisation of American States
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Conference
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
RRA	Rahanwein Resistance Army
SACB	Somali Aid Co-ordinating Body
SADC	Southern Africa Development Council
SCF	Save the Children Fund
SCS	Standing Committee on Somalia
SNF	Somali National Front
SNM	Somali National Movement
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRRC	Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
TPLF	Tigray People's liberation Front
TNG	Transitional National Government
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITAF	United Nations International Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation for Somalia
USC	United Somali Congress

## CHAPTER ONE

### THE SOMALI CONFLICT AND SUB-REGIONAL PEACE INITIATIVES

#### **Introduction**

The end of the Cold War is welcomed on the assumption that it would reduce the frequency of wars in the world. True, to some extent, it led to the decline of inter-state conflicts. But on the other side, it opened Pandora's box in terms of the frequency of intra-state conflicts. This is well manifested in Africa where the right for political participation and fair distribution of national resources were denied for long time by dictatorial regimes with the help of outside forces in return for ideological compliance and economic interests. During the Cold War, African leaders used foreign assistance to neutralise domestic threat in order to ensure the survival of their regimes. The East-West rivalry in the continent made this possible without due consideration to the legitimacy of the regimes in question. Thus, with end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, many African governments fell prey to an internal rebellion, mainly due to lack of an external patron to prop them up. Somalia is an extreme example where the state collapsed due to an internal conflict unleashed by the disengagement of the Cold War conflict prevention mechanisms. Probably, 'the removal of the superpower factor may create vacuums of power and heighten local insecurities and ambitions'.<sup>1</sup>

Despite an international effort to save Somalia from chaos, it defied the post-Cold War conflict management approaches. The failure of the American-led UN intervention in Somalia (1992-1995) to test the hypothesis of the new world order has shelved the idea of international management of Africa's inter and intra-state conflicts. This has

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<sup>1</sup> Crooker, C. A., 'Conflict Resolution in the Third World: The Role of Superpowers' in Brown, S. J. and Schraub K. M. (eds.), *Resolving Third World Conflicts: Challenges for a New Era* (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Peace Press, 1992), p. 196.



reanimated the principle of African solutions to African problems, which has fallen into disuse for long time due to the East-West rivalry in the continent. The "try OAU first" principle holds that African initiatives and resources must first be used to solve African problems before engaging outside ones. Since 1963, when the OAU was found, this regional organisation did not succeed in performing its duties satisfactorily mainly due to the superpower interference during the Cold War. The intractability of the Somali conflict has proved that there is something serious beyond Cold War pretensions and the ambiguity of the OAU Charter in relation to the management of conflict in the continent.

The failure of the OAU in addressing problems in the continent has led to the creation of miniature OAU replica sub-regional organisations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the South African Development Conference (SADC). Even though they have their own institutional problems, these sub-regional organisation are better placed than the OAU in tackling problems in their own sub-regions. Mediation efforts such as those of IGAD, which has formed a committee of member states to mediate in the Sudan conflict, suggest that the sub-regional organisations can play a more effective conflict management role than the OAU because they are unhampered by the OAU policy of non-interference.<sup>2</sup>

This study gives an overview of the role of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in conflict management in the Horn of Africa sub-region and the legitimacy and justifications of the Djibouti leadership for the management of the Somali

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<sup>2</sup> See Mwangi, M., *'Who will Bell the Cat' Article 3 (2) of the OAU Charter and the Crisis of OAU Conflict Management* (Kent Papers in Politics and International Relations) series 4, No. 7.

conflict. The study also explores the implications and importance of the Somali conflict to IGAD and its member-states. It also examines the most important peace processes on the Somali conflict as a prelude to Djibouti Peace Initiative in the Somali conflict. Such peace processes include the UN sponsored 1993 Addis Ababa Conference on National Reconciliation, the Ethiopian sponsored Soderre Peace Process of 1996 and the Egyptian sponsored Cairo Peace Process of 1997. The study will take the Djibouti peace initiative in the Somali Conflict (May-August, 2000) as a case study to seek explanations as to why the Somali conflict is intractable and what role and influence do IGAD and its member states have on that conflict.

It concludes with the lessons learnt from the management of an internal conflict by a non-supranational sub-regional organisation whose member-states do not have a common point of view about the solution of conflict in their sub-region because of conflicting national interests and the influence of extra-sub-regional forces. Finally, the study provides recommendation concerning the best way to solve the Somali conflict and a result that can be used for generalisation in order to explain similar phenomena elsewhere in the world.

### **The Problem**

Despite considerable efforts, the international community failed to find peace for Somalia. International organisations like the UN (1992-1995) tried to solve the matter but in vain because of wrong approaches and ill-timed intervention. Some regional and sub-regional stakeholders like Egypt and Ethiopia competed in managing the conflict after the UN's failure under the mandate of different regional/sub-regional organisations like the

League of Arab States (LAS) and IGAD respectively, but none of them succeeded in securing a durable solution for the Somali conflict.

In early 2000, tiny Djibouti faced the formidable task of managing the Somali conflict in an effort, which came to be known as “Arta Peace Initiative.” This initiative had the blessing of IGAD. Despite the awesome difficulties emanating from the boycott of the conference by the majority of the Somali warlords, leaders of the breakaway northern regions and the competing interests of the regional/sub-regional powers, the parties hammered out a solution with the help of Djibouti, which produced what is considered today as a Somali Government, which is still hanging in the balance under the threat of some disgruntled warlords and other outside forces. This shaky deal appears to be crumbling because of strong domestic opposition waged by the warlords with the help of Ethiopia, which accused the interim government as a Trojan horse for Islamic fundamentalism in the Horn of Africa. This deplorable state of affairs regarding the Somali conflict poses a serious question concerning the insolubility of the conflict. Twelve peace processes had failed before the Djibouti Peace Initiative in the Somali conflict. The failure of these peace initiatives is attributable to many internal and external influences. The enigma still needs to be unravelled in order to understand what went wrong in the management of the Somali conflict.

The study is going to answer the following research questions: What are the institutional weaknesses that hamper IGAD to manage the internal conflicts of its member states? What are the causes of these weaknesses? In what way and in what manner did these weaknesses impact on the Djibouti peace initiative in the Somali

conflict? Why so many peace initiatives in the Somali conflict failed? What is the way forward in solving the Somali conflict?

### **Objectives of the Study**

The broad objective of the study is to examine the institutional sub-regional conflict management approaches in place in the Horn of Africa. The specific objectives are:

- (I) To examine the Djibouti contribution to the management of the Somali conflict.
- (II) To analyse the outcome of Djibouti peace initiative in the Somali conflict.
- (III) To examine the impact of the activities of IGAD member states on Djibouti Peace Initiative in the Somali conflict.
- (IV) To investigate the role of IGAD in ensuring the survival of the outcome of Djibouti brokered peace process on Somalia as a guarantor.
- (V) To examine the role of IGAD in the management of conflict in the Horn of Africa Sub-region.

### **Justification of the Study**

One major aspect in which the study deserves to be carried is that it is investigating what causes the failure of many peace initiatives in Somalia. Is it the internal forces that do not agree to have a solution? Or is it outside forces that sabotage peace efforts? Or is it a combination of both? Or some other invisible forces are involved?

Another important feature of the study is how Djibouti peace initiative in the Somali conflict and its subsequent outcome are adequate to explain the strength and weaknesses of IGAD in its effort to find a solution to conflict in the Horn of Africa sub-region. Here, the enigma is what prevents IGAD to stop its member-states to sabotage the outcome of a

peace process it commissioned to be carried by a member-state in the case of Djibouti in the Somali conflict or a coalition of member-states as in the case of the Sudanese conflict.

These and other issues are important factors that need to be illuminated in order to have better conflict management approaches in Africa. Unless otherwise, the current conflict management mechanism in Africa, particularly those in use in the Horn Africa, will lead to waste of energy and resources while the conflicts are still outstanding, awaiting the right diagnosis and prescriptions. Good examples are the Somali and the Sudanese conflicts, which are raging for long time despite IGAD's efforts to manage them.

## **Literature Review**

The main purpose in this section is to provide a critical appraisal of literature relevant to this study. Such literature can be classified into five categories: literature on conflict, literature on conflict management, literature on sub-regional conflict management, literature on outcome, and literature on the Somali conflict and attempts to manage it.

### **Literature on Conflict.**

According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, the term conflict usually refers to a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings (whether tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, socio-economic, political or other) is in conscious opposition to one or more other identifiable human groups because these groups are pursuing what are or appear to be incompatible.

Zartman describes conflict as an inevitable aspect of human interaction, an unavoidable concomitant of choices and decisions.<sup>3</sup> Here, he shares a view with a number

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<sup>3</sup> Zartman, I. W., 'Conflict Reduction: Prevention, Management, and Resolution', in Deng, F. M. and Zartman, I. W. (eds.), *Conflict Resolution in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 299-319.

of scholars such as Burton<sup>4</sup> who goes further a step in arguing that conflict, like sex, is a necessary creative component in human relationships. For him conflict is the means to achieve social values of welfare, security, justice and opportunities for personal development.<sup>5</sup> He argues that if conflict is suppressed society becomes stagnant; it is neither to be condemned nor to be feared but rather enjoyed like sex.<sup>6</sup> Burton's agrees with what is reported in a conflict management handbook for councillors<sup>7</sup>, which says that conflicts are a part of our every day life and are not always bad for the fact that they are signs that there is something wrong with our relations that need to be changed.

In his *Ripe for Resolution*, Zartman<sup>8</sup> draws a distinction between conflict and crisis. For him conflict refers to the underlying issues in dispute between parties whereas crisis relates to the active outbreak of armed hostilities. Here, Zartman misses a point with Mwangi, *et al*<sup>9</sup> who divide conflict into structural conflict and violent conflict. They argue that violent conflict is the most visible because it results in injuries, death, loss and the destruction of property while in structural conflict, physical violence has yet to rear its ugly head, but might lead to violent conflict<sup>10</sup> if not addressed on time. Here, Mwangi *et al* are more elaborate than Zartman who mentions only the visible aspect of conflict (crisis) and evades mentioning the non-visible aspect of conflict (structural

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<sup>4</sup> Burton, J. W., *World Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 137-138.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> see *Conflict Management: A Handbook for Councillors* (Nairobi: CCR, FES, ALGAK, 2000), p. 2.

<sup>8</sup> Zartman, I. W., *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, Updated Edition* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 8.

<sup>9</sup> Mwangi, M., Munene M. and Karuru, N., *Understanding Conflict and its management: Some Kenyan Perspectives* (Nairobi: CCR-WLEA, 1998), pp. 4-5.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

conflict). More clearly, Mwagiru, *et al*<sup>11</sup> contend that conflict exists where people have incompatible goals and each believes that their point of view is the only correct one.

### **Literature on Conflict Management**

Mwagiru, *et al*<sup>12</sup> argue that the challenge of conflict management is not how to do away with conflict but is how to deal with them so that their harmful effects do not affect our societies and ruin our relationships.

Zartman<sup>13</sup> draws dichotomy between conflict management and conflict resolution. According to him resolution refers to the elimination of the underlying causes of the conflict, generally with the agreement of the parties while management refers to the elimination, neutralisation, or control of the means of pursuing either the conflict or the crisis. For him conflict resolution is rarely achieved easily by direct action, and if it is achieved, it takes a long period. In his view, management involves such measures as denying both sides the means of combat, neutralising one party's means by slightly increasing the other's, separating the combatants in space or time, and convening peace conferences to discuss.

Mwagiru<sup>14</sup> agrees with Zartman the definition of conflict resolution but totally disagrees with him the idea of treating conflict management as a separate process. This is because Zartman's explanation of conflict management is similar to that of conflict settlement. He does not specify the marked difference between management and

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<sup>11</sup> Mwagiru, M., Munene, M. and Karuru, N., *Understanding Conflict and its Management: Some Kenyan Perspectives*, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.

<sup>13</sup> Zartman, I. W., *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, op. cit., p.8.

<sup>14</sup> Mwagiru, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000), pp. 36-47.

settlement. Mwangi<sup>15</sup> argues that the relationship to power, and with power, distinguishes settlement from resolution. He views settlement as a process that is anchored on the idea of power, while resolution disapproves power as the dominant framework for managing social relationships. He believes that both conflict settlement and conflict resolution come under the umbrella of conflict management. Mwangi is of the opinion that the language, philosophy and methodologies postulated by settlement and resolution is inclusive enough to cover almost any management effort that third parties might resort to.

Mediation is, according to Dryzek and Hunter,<sup>16</sup> a process in which the parties attempt to reach a mutually agreeable solution under the aegis of a third party by reasoning through their differences. They see mediation as a device for settling a particular dispute or a means for resolving the problem facing the parties to that dispute.<sup>17</sup>

This definition of Dryzek and Hunter has more in common with that of Stenclo<sup>18</sup> who defines mediation "as the process initiated by a third party in his attempts to facilitate the solution of other parties' disagreements in order to ensure the achievement of a negotiated agreement." In his definition, Stenclo argues that a third party initiates mediation while he forgets the fact that mediation can also be initiated by one of the parties in seeking the assistance of third parties to solve the issue.

According to the nature, objectives, character and procedure of mediation, Davis and Dugan<sup>19</sup> posit a definition which holds that mediation is a third party dispute

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Dryzek, J. S. and Hunter, S., 'Environmental Mediation for International Problems', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 1987, p. 89.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid. p. 90.

<sup>18</sup>Stenclo, L. G., *Mediation in International Negotiations* (Lund, Sweden: Studentlitteratur, 1972), p. 37.

<sup>19</sup>Davis, H. E. and Dugan, M. A., 'Training the mediator', *Peace and Change*, 8 (1982), p. 85.



settlement technique, integrally related to the negotiation process whereby a skilled, disinterested neutral assists parties in changing their minds over conflicting needs mainly through the non-compulsory application of various forms of persuasion in order to reach a viable agreement on terms at issue. This is quite accommodating definition in terms of its non-parsimonious nature in defining mediation.

In the search of non-parsimonious definition, Bercovitch<sup>20</sup> tried to give a comprehensive one incorporating almost all the characteristics of mediation posited by other scholars in terms of the nature, objectives, attributes and *modus operandi* of mediation, in a manner touching the subject realistically. He defines mediation as "a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own efforts, where the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance, or accept an offer of help, from an individual, group, state or organisation to change, affect or influence their perceptions or behaviour, without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law."

Stedman<sup>21</sup> argues that that for any potential mediator or negotiator, leverage or power is associated with the ability to favourably change the bargaining set, that is, the ability to create alternative away from the table for oneself and the ability to lessen the desirability of alternatives away from the table for one's adversary. Lax and Sebenius<sup>22</sup> suggest that such leverage comes from five sources: coercion (the "stick"), remuneration

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<sup>20</sup> Bercovitch, J., 'The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations', in Bercovitch J. and Rubin J. Z. (eds.), *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management* (New York: ST. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 1-29.

<sup>21</sup> Stedman, S. J., *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1991), p. 23.

<sup>22</sup> Lax, D., and Sebenius, J., *The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Co-operation and Competitive Gain* (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 255-264.

(the “carrot”), identification (“charisma”), normative conformity (appeal to values, principles, and norms), and knowledge (information).

Bercovitch<sup>23</sup> argues that the control and possession of resources is a major determinant of a mediator’s ability to achieve a favourable outcome or other desired objectives. He further argues that without resources one may not achieve any objective. According to him, these resources may take the form of opportunities, acts and objects that can be used to effect a change in the behaviour or perceptions of the disputing parties. He argues that such resources may include money, status, expertise, access and prestige.

Stedman<sup>24</sup> further argues that the effective use of leverage depends on appropriate strategy and tactics, which consist of achieving a good fit between “substance, authority and resources, and administration” while clear goals, understanding of what is needed and a feasible plan of administration and implementation are required.

Zartman and Touval<sup>25</sup> argue that mediators use three modes to marshal the interests of all the involved parties toward a mutually acceptable solution to the conflict. These methods include communication, formulation, and manipulation. They further contend that at some stage adversaries may wish to discuss in order to find a solution for their problem but this may be prevented by the hostilities existing between them. According to them, ultimately this stalemate is overcome by as follows: first, the mediator establishes a communication channel between the parties; second, the mediator

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<sup>23</sup> Bercovitch, J., ‘The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations’, in Bercovitch, J. and Rubin, J. Z. (eds.), *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management* op. cit, pp. 1-29.

<sup>24</sup> Stedman, S. J., *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980*, op.cit., p. 3.

<sup>25</sup> Zartman, I. W. and Touval, S., ‘Mediation: The Role of Third party Diplomacy and Informal Peacemaking’, in Brown, S. J. and Schraub, K. M. (eds.), *Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era* (Washington D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992), pp. 252-254.

formulates ways to get out of the conflict; and third, the mediator manipulates the parties with the help of its power to bring the parties to an agreement pushing and pulling them away from conflict and into resolution.<sup>26</sup>

Pruit<sup>27</sup> argues, "as conflicts escalate, hard-to-reverse changes occur in the individuals and groups involved, thereby increasing the likelihood of further escalation." Examples of such changes are the development of rigid, unfavourable perceptions of the adversary and the emergence of militant leadership on both sides.<sup>28</sup> This is a very pessimistic outlook regarding the prognosis of conflict. Pruit forgets that escalation leads to high casualties of both life and property, which in turn is likely to lead to possibilities of dialogue and other means to solve the conflict.

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#### Literature on Sub-regional Conflict Management

Joseph argues that there have been high expectations of the role that sub-regional organisations could play in the resolution of armed conflicts in Africa.<sup>29</sup> He further contends that it seems reasonable that this devolution of responsibilities would bring specific advantages.<sup>30</sup> Joseph appears to be on the opinion that the considerable cultural and linguistic variations in Africa are major factors in the rationale for sub-regional approaches in conflict management in the continent.<sup>31</sup>

Mwagiru differs with Joseph in that he believes that the rationale for sub-regional conflict management approaches stems from the poor performance of the OAU in

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Pruit, D., 'Trends in the Scientific Study of Negotiation and Mediation' *Negotiation Journal* 2 (1986), pp. 237-244.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Joseph, R., 'The International Community and Armed Conflict in Africa: Post Cold War Dilemmas' in SØrbØ, G. M. and Vale, P. (eds.), *Out of Conflict: From War to Peace in Africa* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1997), p. 14.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

managing conflict in Africa, particularly intra-state ones due its dogmatic interpretation of its Charter.<sup>32</sup> Muagiru argues that it is necessary to support non-OAU formal and informal conflict management activities in Africa on the assumption that such activities can walk effectively where the OAU fears to tread.<sup>33</sup>

Henrikson concurs with Mwangi when he contends that the structural weaknesses of the Organisation of African Unity, which has plainly lacked the capability of handling conflicts located around the vast continent, and sometimes even the political interest to do so, have contributed to peacekeeping experiments both at the sub-regional level and through the involvement of the UN.<sup>34</sup> He takes as an example the *ad hoc* military intervention carried out in Liberia in 1990 by ECOMOC - the 'Monitoring Group' of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).<sup>35</sup>

### **Literature on Outcome of Conflict Management**

Various scholars such as Bercovitch have written quite amply about outcomes. For instance, Bercovitch<sup>36</sup> argues that there are three factors, which influence the possibility of successful outcome of mediation. Such factors include the identity of the parties, the nature of the conflict, and the characteristics of the mediator. In identifying and measuring level of success of outcomes, Bercovitch<sup>37</sup> observes two problems namely the temporal problem and the problem of the criteria of determining outcomes.

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<sup>32</sup> See Mwangi, M., "Who will Bell the Cat" Article 3 (2) of the OAU Charter and the Crisis of OAU Conflict Management, *op. cit.*

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> Henrikson, A. K., "The Growth of Regional Organisations and the Role of the United Nations", in Fawcett, L. and Hurrell, A. (eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organisations and International Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 147-148.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> Bercovitch, J., "International Mediation: A study of the Incidence, Strategies and Conditions of Successful Outcomes" *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 21 (1986), pp. 155-168.

<sup>37</sup> Bercovitch, J., *Social Conflict and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution* (Boulder Co.: Westview Press, 1984), p. 11.

Bercovitch *et al*<sup>38</sup> argue that mediation can be described successful when it makes a remarkable difference in the conflict or settles it in a manner agreeable to the parties, and to some extent successful when its activities commence negotiation and dialogue between the parties, whereas its achievements are bounded when it secures only a cease-fire or cessation of animosity. Kriesberg<sup>39</sup> posits that a successful outcome is one in which a conflict is transformed from an escalated to de-escalated level, which can be manageable.

Mwagiru<sup>40</sup> contends that the perception about outcomes depends to a large extent on the school of thought to which analysts belong. He further argues that Bercovitch observes outcomes under the conceptual glasses of realist paradigm while Kriesberg is wearing a hybrid glass of Realism and World Society approaches. This shows according to Mwagiru that the description of an outcome of a conflict is relative depending on what conceptual frameworks an analyst is operating under.

### **Literature on the Somali Conflict**

As far as the Somali conflict is concerned, several writers gave their comments on its genesis (pre-conflict phase), the outbreak (the actual conflict), and outcome (post-conflict phase). Samatar<sup>41</sup> captures that genealogical structure and its politicised modern version, clanism, as the cause of the devastation that visited Somalia. In view of this,

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<sup>38</sup> Bercovitch, J., Anagnoson, J. T., and Wille, D. L., 'Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 28 (1991), p. 7-17.

<sup>39</sup> Kriesberg, L., "Formal and Quasi-mediators in International Disputes: An Explanatory Analysis" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 28 (1991), pp. 19-27.

<sup>40</sup> Mwagiru, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, op. cit., p.104.

<sup>41</sup> Samatar, A., 'Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention' *Journal of Modern African Studies* 30 (40): pp. 626-41.

Ahmed<sup>42</sup> argues that the use of clanism as a scapegoat for the cause of the Somali mayhem does not offer a sufficient explanation for the problem. He asks, if not clanism, what led to the demise of the Somali State? He underscores that the defeat of Barre marked the end of a chain reaction that culminated in the disintegration of the Somali State. To him, there are forces beyond clanism and the regime of Barre that contributed to the collapse of the Somali State. Doornbos and Markakis<sup>43</sup> are of the opinion that the cause of the collapse of the Somali State is informed by the incompatibility between the decentralised pastoral structures and the highly central nature of the post-colonial state.

Mubarak<sup>44</sup> views the problem from an economic angle. He contends that serious economic mismanagement has played a key role and has been one of the instrumental causes of the state collapse. He further argues that since straying away from its scientific socialism path in 1980, the government failed to come up with any consistent economic development policies. According to him, its macro-economic policy was described as 'erratic, inconsistent and often oscillating between different objectives, thus confusing the domestic market.'<sup>45</sup>

Others like Gross<sup>46</sup> put the blame on Barre's militarisation policy that made the country one of the most heavily militarised states in Africa. He further argues that Somalia was one of the top recipients of US and Soviet military aid during the Cold

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<sup>42</sup> Ahmed, I., 'Understanding Conflict in Somalia and Somaliland', in Adedeji, A. (ed.), *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance* (London and New York: Zed Books, 1999), pp. 238-252.

<sup>43</sup> Doornbos, M. and Markakis, J., 'Society and State in Crisis: what went wrong in Somalia?', *Review of African Political Economy* (59): pp. 82-88.

<sup>44</sup> Mubarak, J. A., 'The Hidden Hand behind the Resilience of the Stateless Economy of Somalia' *World Development*, 25 (12): pp. 2027-41.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Gross, J. G., 'Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order: decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, and Haiti', *Third World Quarterly* 17 (3): pp. 455-71.

War.<sup>47</sup> Lefebvre<sup>48</sup> argues that the US, for instance, provided approximately US\$550 million worth of weapons and military assistance to the regime between 1982 and 1989. Maxted and Zegeye<sup>49</sup> mention that over 80 per cent of refugee aid, which in 1986 together with other non-military aid accounted for 25 per cent of GNP, was diverted to the army.

Bradbury<sup>50</sup> gives the most comprehensive statement that brings together all the different factors that contributed to the collapse of the Somali State. He argues that no single factor can explain the causes of the war. He writes: "the legacies of European colonialism, the Somali kinship system, contradictions between a centralised state and a pastoral culture, Cold War politics, militarisation, marginalisation, and uneven development, ecological decline, lack of power sharing, corruption, oppression and the cumulative impact of decades of armed conflict have all contributed."

The number of people killed, maimed and drove out of their homes is immense. Commenting on that, Sahnoun<sup>51</sup> writes that these skirmishes seemed grotesque in view of the tragedy and chaos in the country as a whole. At least 300,000 people had died of hunger and hunger-related diseases, and thousands of more were casualties of the repression and the civil war.<sup>52</sup>

UNDP<sup>53</sup> reports that the international peacekeeping intervention in Somalia, from December 1992 to March 1995, was a period of high expectations and deep

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> See Lefebvre, J. A., *Arms for the Horn: US Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953-1991* (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991).

<sup>49</sup> Maxted, J. and Zegeye, A., 'State Disintegration and Human Rights in Africa', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 38(1/2): pp. 64-86.

<sup>50</sup> Bradbury, M., *Somaliland: Country Report* (London: CIIR Publication, 1997), p. 1.

<sup>51</sup> Sahnoun, M., *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1994), p. 15.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> UNDP, *Human Development Report: Somalia 1998* (Nairobi: UNDP, 1998), p. 30.

disappointments. It further reports that this is, largely so, because many people hoped that the operation would eventually disarm the militias, end the famine, promote national reconciliation, rebuild the country and restore central authority.<sup>54</sup> UNDP is of the opinion that UNITAF operation did in fact quickly end the humanitarian crisis, and froze factional fighting, but did not wish to risk possible casualties in a disarmament mission against the factions.<sup>55</sup>

In 1996, the OAU changed its policy regarding the conflict in Somalia established, giving the responsibility of mediation to IGAD member-states, particularly Ethiopia, which sponsored Soderre Peace Process in 1996, which brought together some 26 factions to hammer out a deal. Johnson<sup>56</sup> contends that at a crucial stage the process was disrupted by Egypt's invitation to all faction leaders, resulting in the Cairo Declaration of December 1997. He further argues that this exposed a rivalry between Ethiopia, backed by IGAD, and Egypt, backed by the Arab League,<sup>57</sup> which took its toll on the peace process.

In a September 1999 speech to the Security Council, the Djibouti President Ishmael Omer Guelle proposed a new peace initiative for Somalia. Farah<sup>58</sup> argues that this was a peace initiative, which sidelined the warlords and gave more powers and participation to the civil societies in all decision-making processes towards Somali's peace and reconciliation. Farah contends that this peace conference known as Arta Peace Initiative

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Johnson, P., *Somalia/land: Political, Economic and Social Analysis: Report for Oxfam GB, 1999*, p. 12.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Farah, I. Q., *Dual Diplomatic Approaches in Conflict Management: The International Peace Initiatives in Somalia, 1991-1999* (M.A. Dissertation, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi, 2000), p. 108.



(May – August 2000) has produced an interim government, which won some recognition from the international community.<sup>59</sup>

### **Assessment of the Literature**

There is enough literature regarding the theoretical approaches of conflict management. There is also enough literature concerning the causes, dynamics and consequences of the Somali conflict. Literature concerning the reason why the Somali conflict is intractable is inadequate despite the use of international, regional and sub-regional facilities of conflict management. The study aims to contribute literature regarding the causes of the intractability of the Somali conflict and ways to avoid them in future Somali reconciliation efforts.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The study will be guided within the framework of three mediation theories, namely the theory of motives of mediation, the theory of the ripe moment and the theory of impartiality.

Zartman and Touval argue that states use mediation as a foreign policy instrument,<sup>60</sup> which is conducted to achieve the national interest of that particular state. In their opinion, states legitimise the goals of their foreign policies with altruistic claims such as the desire to reduce conflict and make peace, camouflaging the real motives, which best be described within the context of power politics.<sup>61</sup> They further argue that mediators are players in the plot of relations surrounding a conflict, possessing a certain

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Zartman, I. W., 'Mediation: The Role of Third-Party Diplomacy and Informal Peacemaking', in Brown, S. J. and Schraub, K. M. (eds.), *Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era*, op. cit., p. 243.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

interest in its outcome, which are the same for superpowers, medium-sized powers, and international organisations.<sup>62</sup>

Bercovitch<sup>63</sup> classifies motives to mediate according to the type of entity engaged in that particular mediation. For instance, he argues that if the mediator is an official person his motives include a desire to produce a change the pattern of a prolonged conflict, a desire to gain access to political leaders, a desire to test a particular idea of conflict management, and a desire to enhance ones prestige and professional status. According to him, if the person is an official representative of a government, or organisation, his motives include a mandate to intervene in disputes authorised by the constitution of the organisation which he represents, preservation of political interests, request from the parties to mediate their conflict, preservation of a mutual structure, and enhancing the influence of the organisation which he represents among the parties.

As posited by Zartman,<sup>64</sup> the essence of understanding the management of violent conflict is the concept of ripeness, that is, moments at which the conflict is highly acceptable to the intervention of a third party to solve it. He further argues that it is necessary to distinguish when conflicts are not ready for intervention from the times that mediators can manage the conflict.<sup>65</sup> Mwangiru<sup>66</sup> observes the ripe moment from an economic point of view when he contends that the ripe moment occurs when the parties reach a stage in their conflict in which the costs of continuing it are higher than the costs

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Bercovitch, J., 'The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations', in Bercovitch, J. and Rubin, J. Z. (eds.), *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management*, op. cit., p. 8-9.

<sup>64</sup> Zartman, I. W., 'The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third World Conflicts', in George A. (ed.), *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 341-364.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Mwangiru, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, op. cit., pp.117-118.

of negotiating.<sup>67</sup> It is arguable that this is a more sensible approach since the propagation of violent conflict depends on the means (economic resources) available at the disposal of the parties.

The theory of impartiality holds that when managing conflict, mediators should not side with any party in the conflict. That is, the mediators must be fair in conducting the affair between the parties. Touval<sup>68</sup> argues that if the acceptance of mediation is based on cost-benefit calculation, then the assumption that mediator must be perceived as impartial needs to be revised. Mwangi *et al*<sup>69</sup> contends that the classical view of the theory of impartiality is disputed by modern research on mediation by founding out that it is not imperative for the mediator to be impartial in order to secure a successful outcome to a mediation process.

Zartman argues that initially, third parties are accepted as mediators only to the extent that they are seen as capable of bringing about acceptable outcomes. That is, whether or not impartial, the crux of the matter lies in the ability of the mediator to work out a solution that is acceptable to the parties. So partiality and impartiality of a mediator is not something to be worried about as long as the conflict is ripe for resolution and the parties believe that the mediator can secure an acceptable outcome for the parties.

Since ripeness is related to a hurting stalemate, Paffenholz<sup>70</sup> argues that there are two types of stalemate: a plateau and a precipice. According to her a stalemate comes in when parties experience a deadlock while a precipice sets in, when a conflict situation

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Touval, S., "Biased Intermediaries", *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1975), pp. 51-69.

<sup>69</sup> Mwangi, M., Muncie, M. and Karuru, N., *Understanding Conflict and its Management: Some Kenyan Perspectives*, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

<sup>70</sup> See Paffenholz, T., 'Mediating Wars: Comprehensive Assessment of Mediation Approaches with Reference to Findings from Mozambique Peace Process' (Unpublished), p. 4.

changes suddenly as a result something beyond human control such as the death of a leader of one of the parties or a natural calamity like a drought.<sup>71</sup>

### **Hypotheses**

1. Mediation by a sub-regional organisation whose member states do not have a common vision regarding conflict does not achieve a positive outcome.
2. An individual member-state of a sub-regional organisation cannot manage a conflict successfully without the support of other member states.
3. Djibouti managed the Somali conflict ignoring the interest of some of the stakeholders and parties without whose support the outcome is likely to fail.

### **Methodology**

The study will mainly depend on secondary data as a source of information. This will involve systematically analysing data previously collected by other investigators for purposes other than the objectives of this study. Such activities include the collection, analysis and review of data in published and unpublished materials such as academic books, journals, periodicals, newspapers, magazines, UN, OAU and IGAD reports and any other literature relevant to the study. The draft agreement and the post Djibouti peace conference outcome report will be analysed critically.

In addition to visiting various libraries and archives to examine materials on Somalia and particularly that of the Somali conflict and attempts to manage it, there are still other significant bodies that need to be approached for reliable information regarding the objectives of the study. Such places include the headquarters of IGAD and Djibouti embassy in Nairobi.

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

## **Chapter Outline**

The study comprises of Six chapters as follows: Chapter one constitutes the introduction, the statement of the problem, objectives of the study, justification of the study, the literature review, theoretical framework, hypotheses and methodology. Chapter two will provides an overview of the Somali conflict, particularly causes, dynamics and consequences. Chapter three will examine the internationalisation of the Somali conflict. Chapter four will explore African sub-regional conflict management approaches. Chapter five will examine Djibouti peace initiative in the Somali conflict. Chapter six will analyse critically the findings of the study. Chapter seven will provide the conclusion of the study.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **THE SOMALI CONFLICT: An Overview of Causes, Dynamics and Consequences**

#### **Introduction**

Somalia, a state largely found under the auspices of the European conquest of Africa in the eighteenth century, was in the making for almost one and half century. After grappling with thirty years of independence from 1960 to 1991, it ceased to function as a unitary state in early 1991. International relations scholars are baffled greatly as to what led to the disintegration of one Africa's rare examples of a homogenous ethnic society. This chapter will give an account of the causes, dynamics and the consequences of the Somali conflict. The chapter is divided into four sections: Section one will give a brief social and geographical description Somalia. Section two will trace the historical background of the Somali conflict. Section three will narrate events that hastened the collapse of the Somali State. Section four will examine the legacies of the Somali conflict.

#### **Brief Social and Geographic Description of Somalia**

Situated in the eastern part of the Horn of Africa, Somalia covers an area of '637,540 square kilometres'. To the north, it borders with the Gulf of Eden, to the north-west it is bounded by the Republic of Djibouti, to the east the Indian Ocean, while Ethiopia and Kenya bound it to the west and south respectively. The country is named after its people, the Somalis, a Muslims Cushitic-speaking people who also inhabit parts of the neighbouring countries.

Somalia can be described relatively harsh semi-arid environment, which cannot support large permanent human population settlements without the assistance of modern

technology. Only about 13 percent of the land is arable and 45 percent suitable for raising livestock.<sup>1</sup> Somalia is drought prone country. 60 percent of the Somalis is estimated be to nomads.<sup>2</sup> The rest are urban, farmers, fishermen or what have you. Droughts occur periodically, once every five years reportedly. Water is very scarce and often cause clashes between clans, sub-clans and individuals competing for its mastery.

### **Historical Background of the Somali Conflict**

A large portion of today's Somali conflict is influenced by events that took place long time ago. Historical allegations and grievances by Somali clans play a major role in current Somali conflict. Looking back the country's history will facilitate understanding the current complex crisis in Somalia. This section will narrate some of the most remarkable historical topics and episodes moulding present Somali society and their contribution to the Somali conflict.

#### **Pre-colonial Somalia**

Although the Somali people existed as a nation for long time because of cultural and linguistic uniformity in the contiguous landmass known as the Horn of Africa, they did not develop a sense of nationhood to form a single political entity until the 1940s. Nationalism among the Somalis was facilitated by the imposition of colonial rule Somali territories in the late nineteenth century. Somalis were a nation but not a state, although they had all the elements that are prerequisite for viable statehood such as common language, religion, culture, and ancestor.

During this period, the Somalis were divided into clans. Such clans include the pastoral Darod, Dir, Isak and Hawiye clan-families and the agro-pastoral Digil and

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

Mirifle clan-families. As has been stated, these clans were not able to organise themselves into stable political units until much later than the arrival of the colonialists, largely because, the nature of clanism, which is not favourable to loyalties beyond the clan system. Like the children of Israel, the children of Samaale (the mythical ancestor of Somalis) are, with minor exceptions, politically acephalos and prone to internal schism and factionalism.<sup>3</sup> The clan identity through the male was a strong social measure to regulate all societal relations. Hence family genealogies gave the basis of clan alliances and political identity.

Three aspects of social structures were very prominent in regulating relations in pre-colonial Somalia. First, the Somali social and political configuration consisted of loosely allied confederation of clans, which were sub-divided into sub-clans and further into extended families and families. Among these divisions, 'the *dia*-paying group is the most stable unit, with a membership of groups of families ranging from a few hundred to more than a thousand'.<sup>4</sup> *Dia* is the compensation paid to the clan of a murdered person. It is often paid in camels, hundred camels for a man and fifty for women. All Somalis were, and are, members of a *diya*-paying group, which is analogous to modern day social security system. Second, the clan elders, who normally consist of all men beyond middle age, and possessing, proven bravery and oratory to defend clan rights were assumed to be the sole clan leaders. Completely decentralised civic power was infused in clan elders. Third, the only social system of regulating the relations between individuals and groups was the traditional Somali legal system (*heer*). The *heer* is unwritten contractual

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<sup>3</sup>Laitin, D.D. and Samatar, S.S., *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. 30.

<sup>4</sup>Ahmed, I., 'Understanding Conflict in Somalia and Somaliland', in Adedeji, A. (ed.), *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts* (London: Zed Books, 1999), p. 236.



agreement between clans, which regulates matters that need decision such as paying, and receiving compensation for injuries, death and other non-violent faults incurred by the parties. These three aspects act like a system of governance to regulate matters arising among the people from time to time.

### **Colonial Somalia**

Colonialism had its effect on the Somali people as it divided their country into five separate territories. These territorial divisions were as follows: British Somaliland, Italian Soamliland, French Somaliland, the Northern Frontier District (NFD) under British rule, later incorporated with Kenya, and Ogaden in Ethiopia. This colonial penetration, subjugation and division was made easy by the disunity within the competing Somali clans. The legacy of division had profound effects on Somali foreign policy at independence, leading into two failed irredentist wars with its neighbours.<sup>5</sup>

One of the main consequences of the territorial division was the loss of freedom of movement from one Somali inhabited area to another. For instance, a Somali to travel from Kismayo in southern Somalia to Garrisa in northern Kenya is subject to strange immigration rules and an alien demonstration. This has also curbed the free movement of Somali pastoral clans in search of pasture and water within clan stipulated grazing land. In establishing their respective frontiers, the colonial powers tended to ignore the economic necessity underlying the pastoral clans' cyclical migration between water wells and pastureland.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, the colonising countries drew up boundary lines that mutilated kinship units into confusing fragments, and when colonial administrations attempted to turn their boundaries into blockades, as has happened at various times with

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<sup>5</sup> UNDP, *Human Development Report: Somalia, 1998*, op. cit., p. 25.

<sup>6</sup> Laitin, D. D. and Samatar S. S., *Somalia: A Nation in Search of a State*, op. cit., p. 61.

various levels of success through the colonial period, this cut off entire clans from their traditional sources of water and/or pasture for their herds.<sup>7</sup>

The colonial system has undermined the traditional Somali system of social relationships and replaced it with an alien political structure that could not be applicable to the Somali social context. Colonisation brought the modern, centralised state to the Somali society.<sup>8</sup> This form of social organisation is a total contradiction to the traditional, radically egalitarian social structure of the Somali people.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, Somali society's introduction to the state was not a lesson in civic democracy; it was an authoritarian structure used by outsiders (European and Ethiopian) to tax, conscript the labour, and exploit the resources of others.<sup>10</sup> This lesson spilled over into post-independence political behaviour<sup>11</sup> as the state practised predatory measures in managing the affairs of the people.

Colonialists have introduced to the Somali people new concepts, which catapulted Somalia into the international arena soon after independence without sufficient means to face such a challenge. Colonialism brought with it European notions of nationalism, fuelling a rise of Somali nationalism.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, Somalis pursued nationalism instead of trying to solve other more nationally devastating problems such as clanism. Nationalism has caused the new Somali state to embark on a policy of militarisation. This has diverted huge resources from the development of other internal social programmes. The search for national reunification has claimed an undue portion of the nation's attention, thereby

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Heinrich, W., *Building the Peace: Experiences of Collaborative Peacebuilding in Somalia, 1993-1996* (Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute, 1997), p. xiii.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> UNDP, *Human Development Report: Somalia, 1998*, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

draining energies and resources badly needed for internal development into fruitless external ventures.<sup>13</sup> This policy had brought the country into head of collision with its neighbours until its collapse.

The colonial administration has also set the stage for unplanned urbanisation, which lured many people from their traditional living systems in the rural areas, without offering any meaningful replacement in the newly found towns. In the cities, the mandate of political leadership altered from regulating kin relationships, entitlements and pastoral resources to regulating access to the political and economic benefits of the state.<sup>14</sup> This brought intense clan competition for the control of the country, which later turned violent and caused the collapse of the Somali State.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the colonialist left Somali without viable economic base. Somalia did not inherit from the colonialists any significant economic programme. The only functioning economic sector left by the colonial administration was the production and export of a few primary products like banana, cotton and livestock products to the colonial market. At independence, the newly found Somali State was weak economically and politically because of the result of events initiated during the colonial period. That economic weakness coupled with Somalia's lack of prudence in her political and economic management led the country to a dangerous course.

## **Post-Colonial Somalia, 1960-1990**

### **The civilian Rule (1960-1969)**

In 1960, when Somalia got its independence from the European colonial powers, many thought, unlike other African countries, that a state with a strong national

<sup>13</sup> Laitin, D. D. and Samatar, S. S., *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State*, op. cit., p. 68.

<sup>14</sup> UNDP, *Human Development Report: Somalia, 1998*, op. cit., p. 26.

foundation for political stability was born. Not long ago Somalia was the envy of many African states because it was one of the very few nation states that existed in the continent.<sup>15</sup> It was a territory inhabited by people who shared the same ancestral origin, language, religion, and culture - all the elements of common ethnicity.<sup>16</sup> But that ethnic or nationality bond was not strong enough to prevent disintegration.<sup>17</sup> The fostering of that seemingly national cohesion was compromised by Somalia's loyalties to a lesser cause, clanism that took its toll on the country's development as a modern state.

One good testimony for that thought of the birth of a republic with the bases of strong political stability is manifested in the euphoria greeted with the merger of the southern and the northern territories on 1 July 1960, despite apparent flaws in the making of that union. The Somali crisis can be related in a way directly to the way the two territories merged. The northerners had the fear that the southerners will dominate the new government. Soon after independence, the northerners became disillusioned with the way the union was proceeding.<sup>18</sup> This is mainly because all significant government posts such as the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Parliament, heads of the army and the police went to the southerners. This led to that a majority of northerners voted against the 1961 constitution which is meant to consolidate the union. The south, which is numerically double the size of the north, voted willingly positive for the implementation of the constitution. This has increased the suspicion and discontent among the northerners. In December 1961, some young military officers from the north

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<sup>15</sup> Assefa, H., 'Ethnic Conflict in the Horn of Africa: Myth and Reality', in Rupesinghe, K. and Tishkov, V. A. (eds.), *Ethnic and Power in the Contemporary World* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1996), p.37.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Adam, H. M., "Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea", *Review of African Political Economy* (59), pp. 21-38.

tried to overthrow the government, with the intention of terminating the union. The coup aborted, but it mirrored serious cleavages in the Somali political system. Notwithstanding technical problems and anxiety in the north of southern domination, attempts by the political leaders in the early 1960s laid a solid base for the political unity of British Somaliland and Italian Somalia.

In the early days, one of the major problems that faced the new administration was how to reconcile and blend the two different administrative procedures employed by the colonial entities of British Somaliland and Italian trust territory. In addition to the language problem, there were immense differences between Italian and British conduct in management, executive procedure, accounting and law. These issues were not easily determined and there was often a fairly large dissonance between British and Italian trained staff. By mid-60s, however, a significant measure of effective integration was attained, both in politics and administration.

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The problems of merging the administrative systems of the two former colonies were offset to an extent by the shared Somali culture and by the presence of clans straddling the old colonial boundaries.<sup>19</sup> Internal harmony was further encouraged at the price of external conflict, by the commitment of all political leaders to a policy of extending the boundaries of the new state to include Somali communities in Ethiopia, French Somaliland (now Djibouti) and northern Kenya.<sup>20</sup> But in fact the pursuance of this irredentist policy took its share in causing the Somali conflict. Soon the country will

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<sup>19</sup> Gilkes, P., 'Somalia: Recent History', *Africa South of the Sahara, 1998* (London: Europa Publications, 1997), pp. 922-923.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

be in a war with its neighbours, which retaliated to destabilise Somalia in order to defend the territorial integrity of their states.

This was an era characterised by political pluralism and civilian system of governance, which contained an independent parliamentary system, the contribution of free press, and widespread freedom from executive controls, but it also harboured a flourishing dishonest and cumbersome bureaucracy and gross misappropriation of public purse by the ruling elite. This was followed by the degeneration of national politics into clanism and brazen corruption. The March 1969 legislative elections were contested by more than 1,000 candidates, representing 68 political parties and the most important lineages and sub-lineages of the Somali clan system.<sup>21</sup>

However, it was apparent that the civilian administration was not on stable ground. Critics were on the assumption that the days of the system were numbered because of the nature of the system, which later become autocratic in style and its clan-impinged environment. The root causes of the problems of the regime emanate from the nature of the Somali social system. Beneath the apparent homogeneity at the national level, Somali society was divided, not only by social and occupational stratification and differences between urban and rural sectors, but also the clan forms of social organisations to which most Somalis belong.<sup>22</sup>

Soon after independence, government posts and state favours replaced the Somali traditional ecological sources of conflict, water and pastureland. As new forms of wealth accumulated in the state, the mandate of public leadership altered from regulating kin

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> United Nations, *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996* (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996), p. 9.

relations and entitlements to pastoral resources, to regulate access to the political and economic benefits of the state, thus sowing the seeds of disunity and conflict. That is clanism out of its natural context and practised in the management of the modern state system. This is clearly reflected in the Somali party politics of the day, which was purely based on clan membership and support. This system is still active in post-state Somalia where current political factional fighting is the product of clan competition for national rule. And it is one of the main reasons that impede the resolution of the Somali conflict.

In October 1969, all these Somali problems culminated in the assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Sharma'arke in matters relating to the settlement of old clan scores. In fact, President Sharma'arke was killed for reasons concerning rivalry in his own Majerten clan. This event set the stage for a new era in Somalia, the era of military rule, which lasted for some twenty-one years.

### **The Military Rule (1969-1991)**

The assassination of the President on 15 October 1969, laid the ground for a successful, bloodless military coup staged by the army on 21 October 1969. The new head of state and government was General Mohamed Siyad Barre, a veteran military leader trained under the colonial army.

By the mid-1970s, the Barre regime embarked on certain policies that constituted one more nail in the coffin of Somalia's ambitions as a State. The socialist national development plans of the 1970s and 1980s, which incurred the state huge foreign debts, coupled with serious and devastating droughts dealt a heavy blow to the country's economy. Somalia's bleak economic performance in the 1970s and 1980s was not

inevitable.<sup>23</sup> This inevitability was precipitated by two mutually reinforcing factors: first, the country lacked leaders who were dedicated to develop effective public institutions (Disunity among the elite and the lack of a system of political accountability rendered public institutions both chaotic and corrupt).<sup>24</sup>

Furthermore, apart from being autocratic in nature, the regime further fuelled clanism in hope of longevity. The regime had to depend on certain clans for its survival. This scenario led to the mentality that certain clans have the right to defend the state while others are its enemy, working for its dismantling. This problem narrowed the political base of the regime in terms of support from the Somali clans. Again this was further aggravated by Somalia's 1977 and 1978 war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden, which generated huge numbers of refugees; and a regional arms race, propagated by the East-West competition for clients in the Horn. Few years after, the military regime embarked on a policy of increasing Somalia's armed forces in quantity and quality, aiming to liberate Somali inhabited areas in Ethiopia and Kenya.

In 1974, Somalia gained some international prominence when it joined the Arab League, and also hosted and chaired the OAU Heads of State summit in Mogadishu. This new aura which boosted the national image in the international plane, coupled with weakened position of the Ethiopian government at the time because of internal problems, wetted Barre's appetite for showdown with the Ethiopian government over the Ogaden. However, in 1977 the Somali army attacked Ethiopia in support of ethnic Somali Ogaden rebels of eastern Ethiopia. Within few months, the Somali regular forces overrun the whole Ogaden plain, inflicting heavy loses on the Ethiopian army. Contrary to the

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<sup>23</sup> See 'Somalia: Economic History' *Encyclopaedia of Africa South of the Sahara*, Vol. 4, 1997, p. 121.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*



expectation of the Somali government, the conflict led to strategic interest shift in the Cold War competition when Russia who used to support Somalia hammered out an alliance with Ethiopia's new Marxist regime at the expense of Somalia. Between November and February, 11,000 Cubans and 1,000 Soviet advisers were brought into the conflict area and with \$1 billion worth of new arms and the counterattack began.<sup>25</sup> After months of pounding by Cuban piloted-planes and Soviet artillery and attacks of Russian-driven tanks and human waves of Ethiopian militia, the siege of Harar and Dirdewa was lifted, and Jijiga was recaptured on 5 March.<sup>26</sup> This is followed by the complete defeat of the Somali army. The vacuum resulted from the Russian withdrawal from the Somali assistance was filled by the United States, which one of the factors that stopped the continuation of the fighting beyond the Somali border Ethiopia and its allies.

This period of Ethio-Somali confrontation was followed by a time in which the two countries eluded having direct military action but contracted each other's opposition groups by giving them basis, training, funds and arms in order to destabilise each other. In early 1991, both regimes succeeded in bringing down each other through their assistance of their respective oppositions, Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) supported by Somalia against Ethiopia and Somali National Movement (SNM) and United Somali Congress (USC) supported by Ethiopia against Somalia. Both rebellions succeeded in overthrowing violently these governments. The one in Ethiopia succeeded in securing a succession while that in

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<sup>25</sup> Zartman, I. W., *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, Updated Edition* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 106.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

Somalia failed in setting up a government and led the Somali people to more bloodshed and ten years of anarchy and statelessness.

## **Events that precipitated the Collapse of the Somali State**

### **The aftermath of the Ogaden War**

Many people argue that the defeat of the Somali army in the Ogaden war spurred the downfall of the Somali State. Both in the beginning and at its height, the operation of the Ogaden war had the unanimous support of the Somali masses. It enhanced the public image of president Barre in a scale never equalled before. Soon the defeat and the subsequent refugee influx that altered the existing clan balance dealt a staggering blow to the euphoria that initiated the conduct of the Ogaden war. This led to demoralisation in the army that quickly snowballed into public discontent and the revival of clanism as people sought scapegoats to find reason for the defeat.

The first response to the discontent regarding the defeat in the Ogaden war, was the abortive military coup against the regime on April 9, 1978. The perpetrators of the coup were from the Majerten (Darod) clan who had the upper hand in Somalia's previous civilian administration. After the failure of the coup, some of the perpetrators escaped arrest and regrouped, forming a guerrilla opposition group called the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which made its operational headquarters across the border in Ethiopia.<sup>27</sup> Seeking support in the land of Somalia's traditional archenemy (Ethiopia) became a clear manifestation of the extent to which the Somali nationalism has lost appeal. Despite the support of Ethiopia and the Majerten clan, this opposition group did not achieve any meaningful success. It was heavily subdued and subsequently dismantled

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<sup>27</sup> Ahmed, I., *Understanding Conflict in Somalia and Somaliland*, op. cit., p. 242.

politically due to internal wrangling and heavy infiltration and undermining activities from the government. By 1988, the SSDF lost potency and existed only in name.

The defeat of the Somali forces in the Ogaden war and the subsequent Ogadeni refugees influx in the north-west, which posed a threat to the Isaq land, combined with the autocratic rule of Barre, instigated the disgruntled Isaqs to form the Somali national Movement (SNM), in London in 1981. Following the example of the SSDF, the SNM was able to make its operational headquarters across the border in Ethiopia from which it launched a number of daring raids.<sup>28</sup> This was another step taken by a Somali opposition group to undermine Somali nationalism. Since early 1980s, the north-west was under harsh military administration, which dealt savagely with people assumedly related with the SNM. The SNM, which did not have widespread support in the beginning, began to win the confidence of the people gradually because of the government's drastic measures against the civilian population.

However, the weaknesses of the Ethiopian and Somali governments in the face of their respective rebellions forced Presidents Mengistu and Barre to seek other avenues to settle their dispute. In April 1988, Presidents Barre and Mingistu eventually signed a peace agreement brokered by IGAD in Djibouti, in which the main issues agreed included cessation of hostilities, restoration of diplomatic relations and termination of aiding each other's opposition. In 1988, fearful of loosing their bases in Ethiopia because of the accord, the SNM attacked government garrisons and briefly captured the northern cities of Buro and Hargeisa.<sup>29</sup> As result, the government forces handled the matter

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Bradbury, M., *The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace, Oxfam Research Paper no. 9* (Oxford: Oxfam, 1994), p. 12.

brutally, forcing thousands of civilians, mainly women and children, to flee their homes and seek refuge in Ethiopia. Some 50,000 people were estimated to have been killed between May 1988 and March 1989.<sup>30</sup> This incident has given a boost to the insurgent activities of the SNM as almost all the Isaqs rallied behind the SNM.

Bradbury<sup>31</sup> argues that the final downfall of Barre was precipitated by the emergence, in 1989, of a Hawiye-based military force, the United Somali Congress (USC), in the central regions. By 1991, United Somali Congress (USC) defeated Barre elite forces in Mogadishu. The USC army, a coalition of ragtag Hawiye forces made use of the stretching of government might and means in containing the rebellion in the north. When Barre fled from Mogadishu, in January 1991, the SNM took over the territory of the former British Somaliland and assumed authority. In May 1991, the SNM declared the secession of former British Somaliland and independence from Somalia, which is not recognised by the international community until today.

In its last days, the Somali government received a staggering blow from one of its loyal clans, the Ogadeni. During Barre's regime the Ogadenis, particularly those from outside Somalia became the backbone of Barre's administration. In fact, they were the second clan in loyalty to the regime, the first being the Marehan and the third the Dulbahante as shown by the acronym MOD which stands for Marehan, Ogaden and Dulbahante alliance.

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<sup>30</sup> See Africa Watch, *Somalia: A Government at War with its People* (New York, Washington and London: The Africa Watch Committee, 1990).

<sup>31</sup>Bradbury, M., *The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace*, Oxfam Research Paper no. op. cit., p. 13.

Barre's dismissal of the powerful Ogadeni Minister of Defence, Aden Abdulahi Nur (Gabiyo)<sup>32</sup> in April 1989, played the role of the straw that broke the camel's back. This sparked an army mutiny in a garrison stationed in the southern port town of Kismayu, precipitating the formation of an Ogadeni armed opposition movement, known as the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). That mutiny was quelled down by the red-berets, an elite army which composed mainly of Marehan tribesmen. The creation of the Ogadeni opposition movement signalled the break-up of the Darod clan alliance that dominated the rule of Somalia for twenty years.<sup>33</sup> In mid-1989 Ogadeni army officers in the north revolted against the government and a second Ogadeni front led by Colonel Ahmed Omer Jess<sup>34</sup> was formed. Starting from late 1989, until the fall of Barre, the Ogadeni insurgents were engaged in a guerrilla war with government forces.

### **The Withdrawal of Foreign Aid**

Both the Cold War and post-Cold War events had great impact on the fall and rise of the Somalia State. During the cold war, Somalia was given a high priority by the two superpowers, the USA and the former Soviet Union, largely, but not solely due to its strategic location. As a result, the two superpowers poured armaments into Somalia. The USSR supported the country's militarisation up to 1977, when it transferred its support to Ethiopia while the USA provided significant military assistance in the 1980s.<sup>35</sup> This superpower military assistance to Somalia gave Barre the opportunity and the means to

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<sup>32</sup> Gabiyo is an Ogadeni from north-eastern Kenya. He was a Kenyan army officer before he defected to former Somali Republic during the early years of the Shifto war in the 1960s. He attained high military career in Barre's regime.

<sup>33</sup> Bradbury, M., *The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace*, Oxfam Research Paper no. 9, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>34</sup> Jees is an Ethiopian Ogadeni by birth who gained access to the Somali army through the support of Barre. At the time of his defection, he was a high ranking military officer in the north.

<sup>35</sup> Visam, E., *Co-operation with Politically Fragile Countries: Lessons from EU Support to Somalia*, ECDPM Working Paper No. 66 (Maastricht: ECDPM, 1998), p. 3.

build a militarised state that depended on coercion and subjugation for its mandate to rule the nation. As the country was poor, and never able to stand on its own feet economically, the superpowers had also to finance the state machinery to function satisfactorily in order to attain their strategic aims.

When the Cold War ended, the strategic value of Somalia plummeted irreversibly due to lack of superpower demand. In late 1980s when the superpower assistance was withdrawn due to the end of the Cold War, the Somali economy went down to a level where the government was no longer able to finance its activist policies. This state of affairs caused the disintegration of the age-old client-patron system practised by Barre in maintaining his grip on power and as a result, the country descended into chaos.

This problem coupled with the practices of corrupt military officials led to massive desertion in the army, swelling the rank of the rebels. This caused that the government had to depend for its defence on forces motivated through clan ties and loyalties. Indeed, Barre was not in short with ammunition and types of all guns (small or big) as the government arsenals were still overflowing with the arms provided by the superpowers during the Cold War. But what Barre was lacking was organised national army to fight in his cause. The fact that the opposition forces had no plan beyond the clan agenda, which was only based on the hatred for Barre and his clan, all these arsenals fell into wrong hands to the detriment of the Somali people.

### **The Consequences of the Somali Conflict**

Consequences of the conflict are multifaceted. They range from loss of property to life, displacement to mass exodus, secession to regional autonomy, crisis in Somali identity to demise of Somali nationalism and disintegration to statelessness. All these

post-state Somali problems pose serious questions that need to be answered. However, the study will give a brief explanation of the most remarkable developments inherited from the collapse of the Somali State.

### **State Collapse**

The most interesting phenomenon to international relations scholars in the Somali conflict is the issue of statelessness. Somalia has become the first example of an African country where the postcolonial state completely collapsed and the greater part of the country remains stateless.<sup>36</sup> After three decades of independence Somalia proved that the concept of the modern state system has yet to take root in Africa as a stable system of governance. It opted to go back to its pre-colonial traditional system of regulating relations in society, particularly clanism. Somalia is stateless country for almost eleven years, and it is no less than its pre-colonial mode of living such as rearing animals, feuding and the application of traditional rules, the "Heer", to settle these feuds.

### **The Birth of Secessionist and Autonomous Entities**

An interesting legacy of post-state Somalia scenario is the birth of the self-declared republic of Somaliland and the autonomous regional administration of Puntland. Somaliland's position is that it wants to secede from Somalia and establish an independent republic out of the territory of former British Somaliland, further impairing the notion of pan-Somali solidarity. It has already declared itself an independent state in May 1991 and further consolidated this through a referendum conducted in May 31, 2001 whose result the Somaliland administration declared 79 positive. The international community has yet to recognise the efforts of Somaliland in regard to its independence

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<sup>36</sup> Masiwa, N., 'Somaliland: A Challenge to Africa', *African Political Economy*, Vol. 13, NO. 9, 6 (2000), pp. 13-14.

from Somalia. Unrecognised internationally and disparaged by Southern Somali leadership, successive Somaliland governments have nevertheless presented articulate historical and legal arguments in support of their case, and have made considerable progress in establishing *de facto* administration throughout much of Somaliland's territory.<sup>37</sup>

Puntaland's position on the future of Somalia is still ambivalent. It might secede and establish an independent republic or remain to be part of future Somalia. Founded on 1 July 1998 at a congress of representatives from the Harti Darod clans, the North-eastern state of Puntalnd perceives itself, not as a secessionist polity like Somaliland, but as a cornerstone of a future federal Somalia.<sup>38</sup>

However, unlike the south, which is still in political, economical and social dysfunction due exacerbating crisis, these two polities succeeded to establish functioning systems in their areas. But still many issues in these polities are regulated under traditional Somali clan laws. Whether Somalia will come back to its original form to fulfil the prophecy of the Eurocentric statistic approach of governance or disintegrate into smaller polities administered in traditional Somali legal system is a matter open to debate and conjecture.

### **The Somalia Diaspora**

Another legacy of the Somali conflict is the Somali Diaspora. Thousands of Somalis live today in foreign lands. Many have already taken the nationality of their adopted countries. A majority of these people reside in Western Europe, North America

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<sup>37</sup> Matt Bryden, 'New Hope for Somalia? The Building Block Approach', *African Review of Political Economy*, Vol. 26, No. 79, 3 (1999), pp. 134-140.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*



and Australia. It is observed that a majority of the current leaders of the interim government, including the President and the Prime Minister have foreign passports. Indeed, these people are exposed to cultures different from the turbulent Somali one in regard to relations of society and governance. During the ten years of statelessness, many Somali children were born, brought up and trained in these foreign lands. So the question is will these people spearhead a new system of governance based on the idea of the right man in the right position or will succumb until hitherto the counterproductive intermingling of the traditional Somali legal system and the one of the modern state system.

### **An Independent Private Sector**

In the economic front, there is a vibrant private sector that attained unprecedented level of freedom in the history of Somalia. During the Barre regime, all economic matters were tight under government regulation. The imports, exports, telecommunication, transport, industry, energy, social service (education, health, and water) were all under the public sector. Barre never gave the people a chance to test their entrepreneurial acumen in the private sector. This is one of the main reasons why the state became synonymous with something alien in Somalia, and subsequently destroyed as if it were nobody's property. The civil war has been a radical structural adjustment Programme.<sup>39</sup> Foreign trade has been liberalised and the exchange rate freed as recommended for years by the Breton Woods institutions.<sup>40</sup> This became possible because of lack of government regulation in the country after the downfall of Barre regime.

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<sup>39</sup> See Marchal, R., *The Private Sector: Its Role in Somalia*, Unpublished and undated, p. 2.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

In post-state Somalia, the private sector grew very strong and became a strong civil society that engaged today in peacebuilding throughout the country. They have their own armies that guard the corridors of trade. They assumed a clan transcending character, which is based on business partnership that spans all regions in Somalia.

Today in Somalia, the private sector has reached an unprecedented scale in running extensive business enterprises that have connections with many places in the world. At the moment, there are various private businesses with international connections such as shipping, air service, telecommunication, banking, import/export, private education, provision of utilities, and health services. For instance, telephone services in Somalia are cheap and available in many rural areas. The postal system is very cheap and letters can be sent everywhere in the world with speed and surety. The main legacy is that people understood that they could do what the state failed to do.

### **The Islamic Temptation**

Last but not least, another formidable legacy of the Somali conflict is the appearance of Islamic fundamentalist organisations that want to fill the power vacuum created after the ousting of Barre's regime. Commentators argue that all Somalis are Muslims. The Islamic system of governance in Somalia has the opportunity of being a clan transcending element that has the capacity to unite all Somalis under its banner.

Four factors are primarily thought obstructing the bringing of all Somalis under the Islamic system of rule. First, Islam by nature is dogmatic and Somalis are anarchic by tradition. Clan loyalties command more respect than any other social system intended to lead the people. This makes the application of Islam in Somalia a very costly affair. Second, many leaders of the Islamic reawakening in Somalia are believed to espouse

other aims beyond bringing people to near Allah. They are accused of being in search of power, fame and money under the façade of Islam, in a measure not less than that of other warlords.<sup>41</sup> Third, there is big difference among the religious community in matters patterning to the acquisition of an Islamic state in Somalia. This divergence of attitude among the Islamic *Uluma* in the country bred hatred. For instance, *Sufism* and the latter day introduction of Islam in Somalia are not on good terms. So are between *Al-ithad*, *Al-islam*, and *Al-takfir* the main protagonists of a secular state for Somalia. *Al-takfir* is the most radical Islamic organisation and believes that every thing on earth today is profane, corrupted and must be dealt with savagely, including other Muslims who do not belong to their sect. They are very few in Somalia but are on the increase reportedly. They are very strong in Algeria where they slit the throat of sinless infants as part of purging the sinful from this world. Apart from minor disagreement in some exegesis of the Koran and *Hadith*, *Al-ithad* and *Al-islam* have the same aim. They aspire to have a secular state in Somali but their approach is different. *Al-ithad* wants to attain such an aim through the barrel of the gun while *Al-islam* believes that educating the people in Islamic way and appealing to their Godly duties will lead to the establishment of a secular state. Fourth, there is direct and indirect international suppression of these elements in Somalia. For example, the Ethiopia government fights openly with the Islamists in Somalia, sometimes through direct armed confrontation as happened in Gedo region much of the late 1990s or through indirect proxy wars in the name of the Somali factions as is the case today in Somalia.

However, the presence, strength, will and opportunity of these Islamists to organise a secular state in Somalia cannot be overlooked. Already, Islamic courts are fully

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<sup>41</sup> See 'Somalia: The Islamic Road to Merka' *BBC: Focus on Africa*, January-March, 2000, pp. 14-17.

operational in many parts of Somalia such as the fertile Middle Shabelle region, some with the consent of the people and others at their own initiative. If solution of the Somali problem cannot be attained through non-secular means, then the Islamists may have a case in point, as most Somalis believe that going back to Allah is a pre-requisite for cure of all societal ills. Whether Somalia will go in this direction, or embrace the modern state system, as done by many Muslim inhabited countries is a matter open to theorising and prediction.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **THE SOMALI CONFLICT AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCE**

#### **Introduction**

In Chapter Two, the study discussed the causes, dynamics and the consequences of the Somali conflict. This chapter, which is divided into three sections, will explore the external influence that impacted on the Somali conflict. Section one will give the theoretical picture of the internationalisation of internal conflicts. Section two will examine the internationalisation of the Somali conflict. Section three will graph a strategic map of internal and external actors involved in the Somali conflict.

#### **The Internationalisation of Internal Conflicts: Some Theoretical Approaches**

Classical Realism, which dominated international relations for long time, has propagated the idea that domestic politics have nothing to do with international politics. Indeed the realists are obsessed with the state-centric approach to international relations. For them, states are the only actors in the international system. For this reason, they do not bother to account for what is going inside the state.

Since traditional realists were the dominant administrators and scholars of international relations in the period following the end of the Second World War, they succeeded in influencing the newly formed international organisations such as the United Nations to recognise and legitimise the dichotomy between domestic and international politics. This is reflected in the ordering of international society, and is enshrined in the main documents of international relations such as article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations, which endorses the idea of non-interference in the internal affairs of states.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Mwangi, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000), p. 58.

Likewise, the notion of non-interference in the internal affairs of states permeated in the charters of other regional organisations like the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)<sup>2</sup> and the League of Arab States (LAS).

One of the main objectives of the United Nations is to ensure the maintenance of International peace and security through the co-operation of its members, which are actually only states, hence the importance given to states by the Charter of the United Nations in terms international co-operation. For this reason, conflicts arising from inter-state disputes were thought only to constitute a threat to international peace and security. Despite their impact on international peace and security, Internal conflicts were left unattended and treated as matters of domestic affairs, which do not merit outside intervention. In the Cold War context, this was not surprising, and it is the Cold War vision of the world that prevailed in the interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations<sup>3</sup> and those other regional organisations.

As time went by and particularly after the Second World War, Realists point of view of international relations came under strong criticism. The realist theory of balance of power failed to ensure international peace and security as claimed by realist scholars. Also its claim that states are the only actors in international relations was strongly challenged by other non-state actors with transnational concerns such as international and regional non-governmental organisations and multinational corporations. Other schools of thought that appreciate the importance of non-state actors in international relations such as World Society gained ground. These non-state actors did not pursue only interests

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<sup>2</sup> See Article 3(2) of the Charter of the OAU.

<sup>3</sup> Mwaagiru, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, op. cit, p. 58.

beyond state boundaries but also influenced interstate relations in the international system.<sup>4</sup>

Some scholars argue that the causes and effects of conflicts have altered since the end of the Cold War. One major change, however, is that the international community is no longer passive in terms of conflicts wearing away the fabric of international security, be it local or regional. However, managing these conflicts is a difficult issue. Often they are exacerbated by the intervention of the international community because of the divergent interests in that community such as ideology, religion and nationalism. This led to the notion that the impact of internal conflicts on global peace and security can no longer be ignored, hence the international intervention in the Yugoslav and the Somali conflicts after the end of the Cold War. These conflicts were intervened because of their implications on regional and international peace and security.

As a result, the boundary between domestic and international politics became blurred because of the number of agents that internationalise internal conflicts. These agents include interdependence, human rights, that idea that international conflicts have domestic sources, and the problem of ethnicity, especially the division of an ethnic group by international borders, and the media.<sup>5</sup> This shows that the world is no longer made up of isolated politics that exercise absolute authority over their subjects but states that can no longer insulate themselves from outside influence because of the globalisation of both domestic and international politics. This makes it clear that every conflict in the world is

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<sup>4</sup> See Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).

<sup>5</sup> Mwagiru, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, op. cit, p. 62.

bound to assume an international character in one way or another because of the existence of these internationalising agents.

Intractable internal conflicts invite international intervention, endangering international security and peaceful coexistence of humankind. Internal conflicts in the modern world cannot be contained within state borders. They have the habit of passing to neighbouring countries, entangling and bringing together adversaries and strange bedfellows, thereby assuming a complex international character. As a result, it gives national, regional, and global level participants a broad opportunity either to pursue their own interests in the conduct of conflict or to see their interests in conflict's management.<sup>6</sup>

Ethnicity and the defective systems of governance of most states in the developing world; the pervious and porous frontiers of the international state system; the availability of cheap and rapid international means of communication across the globe; the international concern for human rights; the far-reaching mass media; and the burgeoning global population movements across borders have prompted the internationalisation of internal conflicts. There cannot be any doubt about the likely capacity of internal conflicts to spread to whole areas, consequently endangering stability in a delicate regional or international system.

### **The Internationalisation of the Somali Conflict**

The internationalisation of the Somali conflict took many forms including economical, political, social, cultural, and moral aspect. These elements led to the intervention of the Somali conflict by various actors such states, international organisations, multinational corporations, and religious organisations. What started as a

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<sup>6</sup>Zartman, I. W., 'Changing Forms of Conflict Mitigation', in Slater, R. O., Schutz, B. M. and Dorr, S. R. (eds.), *Global Transformation and the Third World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner publishers, 1993), pp. 325-338.



localised conflict in May 1988, when the Somali National Movement (SNM) attacked government garrisons in the northern cities of Burco and Hargeisa, has become an internationalised conflict, with the UN, under US leadership, in conflict with local factions (notably General Aidid), and with Somali refugees dispersed throughout the world, particularly in the Horn of Africa.<sup>7</sup>

Actors who intervened in the Somali conflict for different reasons, include states such as Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Italy, and non-state actors such the United Nations, European Union (EU), Organisation of African Unity (OAU), League of Arab States (LAS), and Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and some multinational corporations. All these actors were pursuing various interests ranging from security to economic gains, from geopolitics to strategic interests, and from cultural to religious propagation. Unfortunately, it is a feature of the current situation in Somalia that there are many foreigners with influence who do not want to improve their understanding of Somalia.<sup>8</sup> It is acceptable to describe the Somali conflict as the product of an internal conflict internationalised by circumstances beyond the control of the Somali people. Weapons, aid resources, and media have converged from abroad from Somalia; they have all exacerbated the conflict there, principally by prolonging it.<sup>9</sup>

#### **Agents that internationalised the Somali Conflict**

As has been mentioned earlier, there are certain agents that internationalise internal conflicts such as interdependence, human rights, domestic sources of international

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<sup>7</sup> Bradbury, M., *The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace* (Oxford: Oxfam Print Unit, 1993), p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>9</sup> Simon, A., 'Somalia: A Regional Security Dilemma', in Keller, E. J. and Rothchild, D. (eds.), *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 71.

conflict, and the problem of ethnicity, particularly the partition an ethnic group by international borders, and the media. In view of this classification of agents that internationalise internal conflicts, the study will attempt to depict a picture of how each agent established a link outside the borders of Somalia and which actors exploited the chances offered by that linkage. The agents applicable to the context of the Somali conflict are interdependence, human rights and humanitarian aid, ethnicity, and the media.

### **Interdependence**

Interdependence means a situation in which the economies, political and other social activities to some extent of certain countries depend on each other. Thus if there is slump in one country, it will have an impact on the economy of the other. Dependence, on the other hand, means, 'a situation in which the economies of certain countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected'.<sup>10</sup> In this situation the core country has always unlimited influence on the conduct of the countries in the periphery, politically, economically and socially. From this perspective it can be argued that Somalia has always been a dependent state. The past Somali governments had never been able to finance the needs of the country. Somalia's economic troubles made it more dependent on foreign aid and therefore more vulnerable to external influence.

Somalia's current woes are partly caused by its former patrons, particularly Italy. Italy thought that it would be better if the more docile Hawiye tribes replaced the Darod clans in power. The Hawiye tribes of Benadir area especially the Abgal clan of

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<sup>10</sup>Dos Santos, T., The Structure of Dependence, *The American Economics Review*, Vol. LX, 1870, pp. 231-6.

Mogadishu had always strong ties with Italy. Therefore one aspect of interdependence is the relationship between the conflicting parties and their sponsors abroad. This pattern of relationship crosses internal borders and enters the international realm.<sup>11</sup> It is arguable that Britain, the colonial master of former British Somaliland, held the same principles. Evidence of this is its complacency with the rebellion that tore apart Somalia. Both Italy and Britain never offered an alternative solution to the problem but encouraged the rebellion covertly until the downfall of Barre and the ensuing chaos. This shows from any perspective that the Somali conflict was exposed to international influences for short or long-term political gains.

#### **Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid.**

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One important aspect in which the internationalisation of the Somali conflict occurred is through the channel of a set of universally approved values and ethical beliefs. From late 1991 to early 1992, the Somali civil war in the south degenerated into ghastly acts of wanton killings, rape, mass starvation and vandalism, which led to the exodus of people into the neighbouring countries. Throughout this period a handful of aid agencies witnessing the vicious violence and impending starvation, notably International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), Save the Children Fund (SCF), Medicine San Frontier (MSF) and International Medical Corps (IMC), called on the UN and international community for a large-scale infusion of food to subdue the fighting.<sup>12</sup> At least 300,000 people died of hunger and hunger-related disease, and thousands more were casualties of the repression and the civil war.<sup>13</sup> In April 1992, after eighteen months of inaction, the

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<sup>11</sup> Mwagiru, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, op. cit., p. 62.

<sup>12</sup> See Africa Watch Report, 1993.

<sup>13</sup> Sahnoun, M., *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1994), p.15.

UN appointed a special envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, and mobilised a six-month plan of action to provide \$23 million in aid and the deployment of 550 military personnel as peace-keepers.<sup>14</sup> The operation, known as UNOSOM, was enlarged to 3,500 peace-keepers in August, after UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali accused the West of being more concerned with the 'rich man's war' in former Yugoslavia than with Somalia.<sup>15</sup>

Later this operation was taken over by United Nations International Task Force (UNITAF), which comprised of 30,000 US troops. In 1993, UNOSOM II replaced UNITAF. By April 1993, UNOSOM II had attained a significant level of military presence following the deployment of about 18,000 multinational forces out of a projected maximum force capacity of 28,000 troops.<sup>16</sup> Due to a combination of political misjudgements and military miscalculations, UNOSOM II soon became embroiled in a series of combat actions with Somali militia, especially General Aidid's from May 1993 onwards.<sup>17</sup> The American tried to capture General Aidid but succeeded only in killing several hundred Somali civilians. This led to the withdrawal of the American forces, which were the backbone of the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia because of public opinion pressure at home, after they lost eighteen servicemen in that conflict.

Aid in conflict is subject to the environmental conditions on the ground. Experience shows that even when it is effective in doing what it is intended to do to save lives or promote development, aid too often also feeds into, reinforces, and prolongs conflicts.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Bradbury, M., *The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace*, op. cit., p. 15.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid

<sup>16</sup> Adibe, C., *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia* (New York: UNIDIR, 1995), p. 64.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Anderson, M. B., *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace-Or War* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 37.

Prendergast argues that there are a number of ways in which aid inadvertently feeds conflicts by making more resources available to warring parties.<sup>19</sup> Such ways include according to Prendergast taxes levied on aid at many places such as at distribution sites and markets; extortion, roadblocks and checkpoints, and Mafia protection rackets; fungibility (the substitution of international aid for local public welfare responsibilities); dual-currency exchange rates; rents, salaries, fuel, transport contracts and storage contracts; import duties, licenses, permits, visas, and port or airport charges; local purchase schemes; the inclusion of warring authorities in assessment teams; plus some other issues.<sup>20</sup> This description fits best what happened in Somalia where aid was used as the grease to lubricate the machinery of war by the warlords of the Hawiye clans in Mogadishu where the international community poured the bulk of the aid. In Somalia during 1991-1992, major diversion was part of every agency's cost of getting access<sup>21</sup> into the work on the ground. But there the diversion was so extreme it was often an end in itself and directly fuelled much of the violence in 1992.<sup>22</sup> So it can be argued that apart from saving lives, aid can also exacerbate war by enriching the warlords by giving them the capacity to pursue their infamous aims of subjugating other peoples. It is obvious that the UN was giving humanitarian aid to the Hawiye tribes in Mogadishu lavishly from 1991 to 1992 until the UN fell from grace in the eyes of General Aidid. In Somalia, UNOSOM contributed legendary imbalances to the Mogadishu with aid and contracts, continuously fuelling conflict between sub-clan militias.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Prendergast, J., *Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 25.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

In Somalia, perception is as important as reality, and the US/UN were viewed as taking sides and building alliances of convenience with certain groups whose human rights records were as appalling as Aidid's, and in the case of the SNF, arguably more so.<sup>24</sup> This measure was taken by the UN personnel on the ground to help General Aidid to gain control of the whole country. This is one of the main reasons why Boutros-Ghali disagreed with his man on the ground at the time, Ambassador Sahnoun who was accused of being pro-General Aidid. Sahnoun criticised openly the UN's inertia over Somalia and demanded that political objectives be clarified.<sup>25</sup> He later resigned.<sup>26</sup> Starvation and the problem of conveying humanitarian aid to the needy amid warring clan-based factions necessitated the US-led "Operation Restore Hope" mandated by the UN to exercise force in support of humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.

But analysts often accuse the donors of using humanitarian aid as a ploy to hide their failure to solve conflicts before matters go out of hand. This is what Jean-Christophe Rufin calls the "humanitarian trap."<sup>27</sup> For instance in Rwanda, 'sending in the US military and giving the humanitarian effort a new military look was planned to gloss over the US policy failure to prevent and stop the genocide.'<sup>28</sup> It can be argued that the US intervened the Somali conflict for motives beyond humanitarian concerns. Mohamed argues that the plain truth is that the US oil giants of Conoco, Amoco, Shevron, and Philips petroleum were behind the US invasion in Somalia.<sup>29</sup> According to Mohamed these oil companies

<sup>24</sup> Prendergast, J., *The Bones of Our Children Are Not Yet Buried: the looming spectre of famine and massive human rights abuse in Somalia* (Washington, DC: Centre of Concern, 1994), p. 3.

<sup>25</sup> Hashi, A. N., *Weapons and Clan Politics in Somalia* (Mogadishu: Horn of Africa Printers, 1996), p. 88.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Rieff, D., "Humanitarian Trap," *World Policy Journal*, winter 1995/1996, p. 5.

<sup>28</sup> Kathi Austin, January 24, 1996, Cited in Prendergast, H., *Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa*, op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>29</sup> Mohamed, M. S., *Recolonization Beyond Somalia* (Mogadishu: New Era Publishers, 1998), p. 41.

desired to exploit Somalia's oil reserves without any concessions. If one looks at the history of American oil companies in Somalia, Mohamed's version of the story is plausible since these companies were heavily involved in Somalia's domestic politics in the last decade of Barre's regime.

### **Ethnicity**

One of the main factors that drag an internal conflict into international arena is ethnicity, particularly where ethnic groups straddle across international borders. This character presents one of the most important agents by which an internal ethnic conflict is internationalised. In every continent of the world, artificial maps do not reflect homogenous ethnic settlements, particularly in the Third World countries where borders were drawn without due consideration to ethnicity. For instance, the Somali ethnic group in the Horn of Africa is divided into five portions by the colonial authorities. Somalis are found today in the Somali Republic, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. The effect is that there has always been a conflict between Somalia and its neighbours since independence, in which Somalia was seeking to rule all Somali inhabited areas in the Horn of Africa. On the other hand, Somalia's current internal conflict spilled over to its neighbouring country because of the ethnic Somalis straddling across the border into Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya.

Both Ethiopia and Kenya have quite sizeable Somali populations. This has always been a sore point between these countries and past Somali governments. These countries, particularly Ethiopia are accused of frustrating the Somali peace process because of the ethnic factor. Ethiopia does not want a unified strong Somali state that can revive Somali

nationalism once again.<sup>30</sup> At least they prefer a system of Somali mini-states, which are not strong enough to challenge the legitimacy of Ethiopia in controlling Somali inhabited areas.<sup>31</sup> Gilkes argues that Ethiopia's long-term political interest is for a weak, enfeebled Somali State.<sup>32</sup> It has made several attempts to try and organise Somali national conferences, for which it had the OAU mandate; but more recently, it has appeared ready to endorse the idea of regional administrations as an alternative to a national structure.<sup>33</sup> Also Djibouti, which is dominated by ethnic Somalis, and tasted the fruits of sovereignty, had always some fears regarding the advances of Somali nationalism.

All these show that the Somali conflict is an international issue by nature of the ethnic Somalis living outside the borders of the Somali Republic. Ethnic Somalis living outside Somalia led to Somali nationalism, which aimed to unite all Somalis in the Horn of Africa under one state ruled by Somalis. In pursue of that policy, Somalia instigated a secessionist rebellion in northern Kenya from 1963-1967 and had two full blown war with Ethiopia, a brief one in 1964, and a disastrous one, commonly known as the Ogaden war in 1977-1978. In defence of their territorial integrity according to the tenets of international law, both Ethiopia and Kenya used all means available to them to avert the Somali threat, particularly by destabilising Somalia until it collapsed. This makes to reconstitute a Somali state once again an extremely importance to both these states. They are still involved in post-state Somali politics because they are stakeholders in any future Somali polity (ies).

<sup>30</sup> See 'Somalia: The man in the Hot seat' *BBC: Focus on Africa*, January-March 2001, pp. 16-18.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Gilkes, P., 'Briefing Somalia' *African Affairs*, Vol. 98, No. 393, 10 (1999), pp. 571-573.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*



## **The Media**

The media apparatus had always been an internationalization agent of conflict. What happens in one part of the world is at once transmitted to other parts of the world because of the work of TV, Radio, and Internet. The international mass media apparatus is one of the most potent agents that can quickly internationalize a domestic issue.

Affluent families in Europe and North America were disturbed and upset by pictures of emaciated and starving children and women in Somalia displayed in the international mass media. The media reported that the death toll in Bardere in October 1992 was 385 per day.<sup>34</sup> 20,000 people perished in Baidoa during the later half of 1992; almost all of the deaths being among the displaced and at least half were children under five.<sup>35</sup> It was the media's publicity on Somalia's crisis and the UN Secretary-General's accusation of the West on negligence that resulted in a concerted international plan of action, led by the US, for Somalia in the summer of 1992.<sup>36</sup> In short, it is can be argued that the mass media gave the most important justification of that invasion by putting across the globe the realities on the ground in Somalia at the time.

## **A Strategic Map of Internal and External Actors in the Somali Conflict**

### **Internal Actors**

The current internal actors in the Somali conflict consist of the southern clan-based warring factions, the self-declared republic of Somaliland, the autonomous regional administration of Puntland, the Islamic courts, the business community and the interim

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<sup>34</sup> Prendergast, J., *The Bones of Our Children Are Not Yet Buried: The Looming Spectre of Famine and Massive Humanitarian Rights Abuse in Somalia*, op. cit. , p. 5.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Adibe, C., *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia* (New York: UNIDIR, 1995), op. cit. , p. 24.

government. Some these actors have clear-cut aim like the self-declared republic of Somaliland, which is secession from the south.

### **The Southern Clan-based Warring Factions**

These actors consist of several armed groups the majority of which came into being after the overthrow of former Somali government. At the moment, there are about two dozen of them. Despite the current interim government, which took office in October 2000, most of these clan-based factions operate in South Somalia. They do not have clear mission beyond clan politics, which cannot coalesce into a national agenda that can lead to the establishment of a central authority in Somalia. They had several peace conferences sponsored by the United Nations and the neighbouring states, which ended in vain, largely due to lack of vision on the part of the warlords. The centrifugal power of clan politics overwhelms efforts to reunite Somalis.<sup>37</sup> Lineage-based alliances are notoriously prone to fissures and are extremely unstable, as those who have attempted to cobble together broad coalitions are well aware.<sup>38</sup> Each individual faction leader wants to become the President of Somalia, no compromise, no withdrawal and no consensus.

Of late, the warlords boycotted the Djibouti-led IGAD peace process on Somalia (may-August, 2000), which produced the current interim government of Somalia. The majority of the Somali people and indeed, part of the international community are accusing them of betraying their mandate, which was to return Somalia peacefully to statehood. Their present sabotaging of the interim government with help of the Ethiopian government is not acceptable to majority of Somalis. The interim government has

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<sup>37</sup> Makenkhaus, K., and Prendergast, J., 'Governance and Economic Survival in Post-intervention Somalia' *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 172, May 1995, pp. 1-10.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

repeatedly accused Ethiopia of undermining its authority by backing armed opposition groups and deploying troops inside Somalia.<sup>39</sup> It can be argued that without outside support for these clan-based factions, the warlords would not be able to match the interim government in terms of mass support, achievements and the amelioration of the plight of the people. These factions include Somali National Alliance (SNA) of Hussein Mohamed Aidid, Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) and many others.

### **The Northern Breakaway Politics**

These comprise of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland and the autonomous northeastern region of Puntland. Somaliland's aim is clear. It wants to become an independent state, separate from Somali Republic once and for all. Despite recent referendum carried out by Somaliland to legitimise its secession, it is crying for recognition from the international community, which has not been forthcoming. Somaliland boycotted the Djibouti-led IGAD peace process on Somalia and interpreted the outcome of that peace process as interference of its internal affairs. Somaliland argued that Djibouti erred in calling all Somali peace conference. It further accuses Djibouti of campaigning for international recognition for the interim government as the sole Somali representative in the international community. This problem, which stems from Somaliland's belief that Djibouti, is overlooking its sovereignty created bad blood between Somaliland and Djibouti.

The position of Puntland administration in regard of its future (secession or union) is not yet clear. But one thing is obvious: Puntland is behaving as if though it is a sovereign state. It has a parliament elected once every five years, and a judiciary and

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<sup>39</sup> See Somalia, Ethiopia Officials in Talks, *The Daily Nation*, No. 12689, June 14, 2001.

executive branch elected once every two years. It has also boycotted and severely criticised the Djibouti-led IGAD peace process on Somalia for treating Puntland administration like southern clan-based factions.

Some critics of all Somali past peace processes, like the European Union argue that both Somaliland and Puntland have a case in point. They have done functioning administrations while south Somalia is still in turmoil. These critics argue that it is not possible to have a Somali unitary state while ignoring already stable and functioning polities that need boosting from the international community. This school of thought on the synthesis of a future Somali state further argues that it is better to leave Somaliland and Puntland as they are, and that the peace process must concentrate in south Somalia in order to produce a polity (ies) like Somaliland and Puntland that would negotiate a federation or merger in a future all-Somali union.

### **The Islamic Courts**

The Islamic courts argue that they have the means to unite the Somali people under a non-secular, clan-transcending programme. Foreign military adventures have achieved little except to increase the influence of Islamic organisations, which offer the possibility of peace by making political and social promises, which the Somali clan-based factions cannot match.<sup>40</sup> They are in intense competition with the other warlords to assert their power in ruling of the country. Their relation with the current interim government is a hate-love one (i.e. blows hot and cold). They do not want to hand over their weapons and forces to the interim government without having an important say in the way the country is run. This cannot be accepted to the interim government because the power balance of

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<sup>40</sup> Gilkes, P., 'Briefing: Somalia' *African Affairs*, op. cit., pp. 571-575.

the current administration is based on clan share of power and most of the leaders of the Islamic courts are from the Hawiye clan which already has a share in the government through the traditional lineage system. So, at the moment, they are a state within a state.

### **The Business Community**

In Somalia, the business community is part of the actors in the Somali conflict. Many of them spent huge sums of money in the conflict without any result. At last their attitude towards the warlords changed, particularly when the latter were not able to secure a settlement in any way. This led to the formation of armies by the business community intended to open safe corridors for the convoys transporting goods across Somalia. This ensured the independence of the business community, which formerly depended on the warlords for the safety of their commercial goods. It created a business network that transcends clan allegiance throughout Somalia and has the ability to conduct business transaction throughout Somalia without the assistance of the warlords.

At the moment, the business community supports the interim government, simply because of the wish to have a secure business environment. A growing number of Somali entrepreneurs are concluding that their business interests could benefit from the emergence of some recognised central authority, albeit one coexisting with, rather than challenging, the Mafia-based economy from which these merchants profit.<sup>41</sup> Another reason of their support for the interim government is attributed to the fear of the resurgence of warlordism again in Somalia if this outcome fails. Critics accuse the current business community in Somalia Mafia-like dealing. Recently, there were under the spotlight for importing huge sums of fake banknotes that devalued the shilling at the

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<sup>41</sup> Menkhaus, K., and Prendergast, J., *Governance and Economic Survival in Postintervention Somalia*, op. cit., p.2.

rate of \$1: 25,000 ssh. This impaired greatly the purchasing power of the common man. However, it is a well-known fact that there is strong business community in Somalia today who will not remain docile or malleable in any future Somali polity.

### **External Actors**

There are a number of external actors involved in the Somali conflict. A majority of them revolve around two competing philosophies: to divide the Somali peninsula into smaller polities or establish a unitary state. The former's fruits are already in the making in Somaliland and Puntaland while the latter's brainchild is the interim government recently established in Djibouti.

The current Somali conflict has its roots, partially in the interests of outside forces, which do not agree on the type of solution suitable to the Somali conflict. Both the centrifugal and centripetal forces in Somalia conflict have been reinforced by competing regional and international influences, manifested in proliferating peace initiatives.<sup>42</sup> This problem of parallel initiatives conducted by competing foreign powers appeared when the OAU, through IGAD, appointed Ethiopia in early 1996 to carry out the reconciliation of the Somali parties. Following that authorisation, Ethiopia sponsored the 1996 Soderre Peace Process, which succeeded in bringing together some 26 Somali factions, which produced the Soderre Declaration. However, Apart from some internal actors who boycotted the Soderre initiative like the southern Mogadishu warlord, Hussein Mohammed Aidid and the leader of the self-declared republic of Somaliland, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, presumably at the instigation of Egypt, the Soderre deal failed largely due to Egypt's parallel peace process held in Cairo the following year, which produced

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<sup>42</sup> Johnson, P., *Somalia/Land: Political, Economic and Social Analysis, A Report for Oxfam, 1999*, p. 12.

the Cairo Declaration. Clan chiefs met in Egypt for peace talks, and succeeded in paving the way for an interim government and constituent assembly to be set up in the spring of 1998.<sup>43</sup> This included Hussein Mohamed Aidid and also achieved consensus on a federal structure for future Somali State. However, Hussein Moahamed Aidid succeeded in stalling the next stage of the process by remaining in occupation at Baidoa town, scheduled as the venue for the next conference of the peace process.<sup>44</sup> This competition between Egypt and Ethiopia to find a solution for Somalia's conflict exposed two issues: first, that Egypt is backed by the Arab League and Ethiopia by IGAD. Second that Egypt supports the Hawiye clans while Ethiopia supports the Darod clans.

### **Egypt**

It appears that Egypt is in favour of a Somali unitary state that can contribute positively to Egypt's advantage in the balance of power in the Horn of Africa. Egypt's interests seem to lie in a centralised Somali State (including Somaliland) that can be more readily controlled and potentially increase tensions on Ethiopia's borders, as potential leverage in Nile water negotiations with Ethiopia and Sudan.<sup>45</sup> For that reason, it can be argued that Egypt is undermining Ethiopia's aspirations as a sub-regional power in the Horn of Africa. Egypt has interests in the Greater Horn of Africa region. This region is the source of the Nile waters, which are vital to the existence of Egypt. Today, it is not inconceivable that Egypt would go to war with any of the upper Nile Valley countries were one of them to decide to divert the waters of the Nile for its own use, thus affecting

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<sup>43</sup> See Peace Pledge Union Online, *Armed Conflict Profiles – Somalia*, P. 1/5, Oct.17, 2000.

<sup>44</sup> Johnson, P., *Somalia/Land: Political, Economic and Social Analysis*, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

the volume of water flowing down stream to the Mediterranean.<sup>46</sup> So Egypt always wants to have a strong unified Somali State which deals with Ethiopia whenever the latter tries to interfere with the flow of the Nile. Despite its reluctance, Egypt was lucky that the president elected was someone it felt it could deal with.<sup>47</sup> Abdelkasim, the president of the Somali interim government is a fluent Arabic speaker and lived in Cairo from 1991-1993.<sup>48</sup>

The question of the Nile waters is very important for Egypt and other prospective users like Israel, Palestine and Jordan in the Middle East where water is very scarce. In view of that, there is a long-term plan to ensure the flow of the Nile towards the Middle East in a quantity and quality satisfactory with Egypt. In any case, Egypt continues to use Somalia as an element in its efforts to influence Ethiopia's policy on the Nile.<sup>49</sup> Critics argue that Egypt's Peace Canal, which takes the Nile waters to the Sinai, is part of a broader project designed to meet Israel's insatiable demand for water.<sup>50</sup> Ethiopia is of the opinion that this is infringing the legal rules on the mutual use of international rivers because it diverts water from the Nile basin. In addition, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) leader and Head of the Palestinian Administration, Yasser Arafat personally asked Meles Zenawi if Ethiopia would agree to Nile waters being diverted to Gaza and was told this was not acceptable.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Nyong'o, P. A., 'The Implications of Crisis and Conflict in the Upper Nile Valley', in Deng, F. M. and Zartman, I. W. (eds.), *Conflict Resolution in Africa* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 95-96.

<sup>47</sup> See *IRIN*, Oct. 16, 2000, p. 4.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> Gilkes, P., 'Briefing Somalia' *African Affairs*, op. cit., pp. 571-575.

<sup>50</sup> See 'Battle of the Nile' *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, Vol. 9. No. 3, May-June, 1997, pp. 12-13.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*



## Italy

In pre-conflict Somalia, Italy used to have extensive commercial interests in south Somalia, particularly in the banana industry, and is always inclined, for that reason, to emphasise reconciliation of the southern Somali factions. That is why it supported the Cairo initiative, which promoted reconciliation among the Southern factions. Italy, the former colonial master of south Somalia, is Somalia's patron in the EU and is very eager to see the revival of the Somali state in a manner compatible with its interests, which are mainly commercial in nature.

## Ethiopia

Ethiopia is apprehensive of a unified Somali state, which could have an impact on its vast Somali inhabited territory of eastern Ethiopia. In this region, secessionist tendencies are still as vibrant as ever. Already, there is an active guerrilla insurgent against the Ethiopian government, operating in the Ogaden, and led by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). In view of that, 'Ethiopia seems to be supporting a decentralised Somali state with less influence in the Horn of Africa, more potential for Ethiopian control of different Somali regions, continuing trade through Somali ports and less threat to Somali inhabited areas of eastern Ethiopia'.<sup>52</sup> Ethiopia is moving towards recognition of Somaliland (with a liaison office and security co-operation agreement).<sup>53</sup> Although it is not an internationally recognised country, Somaliland has signed an agreement with Ethiopia aimed at boosting trade between the two territories.<sup>54</sup> It can be

<sup>52</sup> Johnson, P., *Somalia/land: Political, Economic and Social Analysis*, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> See 'Ethiopia, Somaliland Sign Pact' *The Star of the Horn*, No. 016, Nov. 24 – 25, 2000, p. 12

argued that Ethiopia has already recognised Somaliland in *de facto* and is poised to recognise it in *de jure* when circumstances allow.

### **Eritrea**

Eritrea took part in the fray to destabilise Ethiopia by providing military assistance to the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) through Somalia. OLF struggles to liberate the Oromo land from the EPRDF-led administration of Ethiopia. Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia became more marked in 1989 as a spillover from the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict, particularly once it became clear that Eritrea was supporting the activities of Ethiopian opposition movements, including the OLF and the ONLF, in the Oromo and Somali regions of southern Ethiopia, and Somali factions opposed to Ethiopia.<sup>55</sup>

Since the start of the Ethio-Eritrean war, both countries have been accused of providing armaments to factions in Somalia who are fighting proxy wars in representation of Ethiopia and Eritrea. The aim of Eritrea was to open a second front for in southern Ethiopian in order to reduce the strength of Ethiopian forces on its front. In the southern front is locked in deadly conflict with three armed opposition movements: Ogaden National Liberation Movement (ONLF), Oromo Liberation Movement (OLF), and *Al-itiihad*. Ethiopia seeks assistance from the United States, Israel, and other western countries on the pretext that it is containing Islamic influence in the Horn of Africa but actually much of the conflict within its borders has other underlying issues such as ethnicity, denial of self-determination, lack of political pluralism and pseudo-democracy.

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<sup>55</sup> Gilkes, P., 'Briefing Somalia' *African Affairs*, op. cit., pp. 571-575.

## **Libya and Sudan**

Libya and Sudan throw their weight after any one who confronts the US because they perceive the US to be their greatest enemy on earth. In Somalia, these countries' generous support to the late General Aidid who fought with the Americans in Mogadishu in 1993, and his son, Hussein Mohamed Aidid, reflects this sentiment. Indeed, Libya went step forward in funding the proposed joint regional administration of Mogadishu warlords, which was the outcome of the 1997 Cairo initiative. However, the experiment failed because of the opposition of the venture by the Ethiopia backed Muse Sudi Yalahow faction leader of southern Mogadishu.

Symbolic quantities of medical and food aid were sent by Khartoum after Somaliland's declaration of independence in May 1991, but in the July 1991 Djibouti conference the Sudanese delegation tried to force the hand of the Hargeisa authorities in making them reunite with the south.<sup>56</sup> Sudan is also accused of having relations with Somali Islamic fundamentalist organisations.

## **Kenya**

Apart from some *ad hoc* mediation efforts by President Moi between the Somali warring factions, in contrast to Ethiopia, Kenya is not involved in Somalia's internal problems openly, probably because of its conservative nature in international relations. Kenya is home of a sizeable Somali ethnic population in north of its country. In 1963, when Kenya gained independence from Britain, there was no sinister plan against the Somali people, espoused by the Successor State, the Republic of Kenya. Apart from the harsh desert climate in the Northeast and the colonial market geared economy of the

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<sup>56</sup> Gilkes, P. 'Decent into Chaos: Somalia, January 1991 - December 1992' in Gurdon, C. (ed.), *the Horn of Africa*, op. cit., p. 72.

Kenyan highlands, the Somalis were first among equals. But the problem was that the Somalis never waited the chance to see what the new Nairobi government can do for them in terms of development. Somalis requested to secede and join the Somali Republic, which became independent in 1960, three years before Kenya. Kenya could not accept that proposal because it meant opening a Pandora's box in terms of ethnic aspirations to secede from Kenya. Kenya is composed of a combination of tribes, many of whom straddle across international borders, often the epicentre of their ethnic group lying across the border. Such tribes include along with the Somali the Luo, the Massai, and the Borana.

The Somali Province in Kenya was once a hotbed for Somali nationalism, which was active in the 1960s. That conflict led to the disastrous rebellion known as in Kenya the Shifita war that caused a loss of both property and life and severely impacted on the development of the region. Since the settlement of the conflict in 1967 under the mediation of President Kaunda in Arusha, Tanzania, Kenya has embarked on a policy of ameliorating the situation in the north politically, economically and socially. Unlike Ethiopia, Kenya succeeded partially in winning to some extent the confidence of its Somali people, much through education, development and plans to Kenyanize them. This development gained momentum when Somali members of the Kenyan army took part in crushing the 1982 coup attempt. The current political atmosphere of the multiparty system in Kenya has also enhanced the hope of Somalis that they can co-exist with other Kenyans. For those who want some form of self-rule, the future is promising because the story of federalism is already growing and gaining some outspoken advocates in other ethnic communities. The current Kenyan government's policy toward Somali Kenyans,

coupled with the collapse of Somalia is an important element that causes many Kenyan Somalis to call Kenya their home confidently.

However, this does not mean that Kenya is free from the problems of the Somali conflict. Kenya is worried about the by the lawlessness prevailing in Somalia, which spills over into its territory in the form of refugees, arms and contraband trafficking through the porous 1,000 kilometre long border it shares with Somalia. There is also banditry and insecurity in the border area. Also refugees of Somali origin who live in camps in northern Kenya have been an irksome problem. There are mounting allegations that the refugees are involved in robbery and arms trafficking. The refugees also pose a threat to the already fragile ecosystem by cutting trees heavily, thus rendering bare the area surrounding the camps. All these problems caused Kenya to close its border with Somalia in 1990 in order to control the situation. But that closure was lifted in 2000, under intense pressure on the government from Kenyan Somalis in northeast who share much with Somalis across the border.

### **Djibouti**

Practically, Djibouti is a small state inhabited mainly by two historically antagonistic ethnic groups, the Afar and the Issa. The Issa is a Somali speaking clan, which constitutes more than half of the total population of the enclave. They have been the dominant group in the political and economic life of the entity since its independence from France in 1976. Since 1990, there was a violent conflict between the *Front Pour la Restauration de l' Unite et de la Democratie* (FRUD) and the government forces in which many people were killed. There is a view that the Afar rebellion gets support from

other Afar groups in Ethiopia and Eritrea. In corroborating that view Johnson<sup>57</sup> contends that Afar/Issa opposition may threaten the stability of Djibouti with the support of other Afar groups in Ethiopia and Eritrea, as the French withdrawal from its military base impacts on the security of that state. In view of that, in case of an Afar attack, Djibouti may need the support of unified Somali State to turn the tide. This partially stems from the security dilemma facing Djibouti in current Horn of Africa sub-regional security. It can also be argued that Djibouti being a small state supports a unified Somali State for reasons concerning the strategic balance of power in the sub-region. Without unified Somali State in the proper Horn of Africa, Ethiopia, which is not on friendly terms with Djibouti of lately, would become the unchallenged sub-regional power.

In an effort to find a solution for the Somali problem, Djibouti held a peace conference at Arte (May–August, 2000) in which not just militia chiefs but civic and religious leaders, business people and peace activists were invited to discuss and sort out Somalia's problem. The conference culminated in the formation of the Transitional National Council (TNC), which in turn elected a president. The sponsor of the peace conference President Ishmael Omer Guelleh of Djibouti, whose country bore almost the entire cost of the talks, has been praised for his efforts by the international community.<sup>58</sup> Powerful states had failed to address Somalia's problems but Djibouti succeeded, French President Jacques Chirac said in a statement of support for the Somali conference.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Johnson, P., *Somalia/Land: Political, Economic and Social Analysis*, op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>58</sup> See IRIN, op. cit. p. 7.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

## Yemen

Different Yemen governments were always involved in Somalia's domestic politics for a long time for reasons concerning religion, culture, trade, ideology and proximity. Gilkes argues that Yemen, for reasons of cultural, geographical and historical proximity, is not a truly foreign land for Somalia.<sup>60</sup> In 1997, during the Ogaden war, former communist South Yemen fought alongside Ethiopian troops against Somalia. This happened after Somalia rejected the Cuban proposal of a confederate state bringing together Ethiopia, Somalia and former South Yemen. The Somali National Movement (SNM) sought refuge and assistance from the old enemy, Ethiopia, and received arms from South Yemen (PDRY), both of which were hostile to the now western-backed regime of Siad Barre.<sup>61</sup> Aden remained quite sympathetic to the SNM during the war years in Somaliland and hosted a quasi-Embassy of Somaliland and contacts with Berbera were frequent.<sup>62</sup>

In Somalia there is a significant population of Yemen origin mainly involved in business. Currently, the majority of them are living as refugees in Yemen Arab Republic. The Yemeni government has recently invited Somali faction leaders opposed to the new

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<sup>60</sup> Gilkes, P., 'Descent into Chaos: Somalia, January 1991 - December 1992' in Gurden, C. (ed.), *The Horn of Africa*, op. cit., p. 71.

<sup>61</sup> Woodward, P., *The Horn of Africa: State Politics and International Relations* (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), p. 69.

<sup>62</sup> Gilkes, P., 'Descent into Chaos: Somalia, January 1991 - December 1992' in Gurden, C. (ed.), *The Horn of Africa* op. cit., p. 71.

**interim government of Somalia to hammer out a deal in which they can become members of the new government.**



## CHAPTER FOUR

### AFRICAN SUB-REGIONAL APPROACHES TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

#### Introduction

In Chapter Three, the study discussed internal conflicts and external influence in the context of the Somali conflict. This chapter, which is divided into four sections, will explore the role of sub-regional organisations in conflict management, particularly IGAD in the Horn of Africa sub-region. Section one will examine the theoretical approaches to sub-regionalism in conflict management perspectives. Section two will examine who is responsible for maintaining peace, security and stability in Africa. Section three will explore the partnership of the United Nations, the OAU and IGAD in the field of conflict management. Section four will examine the capacity of IGAD as sub-regional conflict management organisation.

#### Sub-regionalism: Towards a Theoretical Approach

Malan<sup>1</sup> argues that traditionally, regionalism implies co-operation among states in geographically proximate and delimited areas to pursue a mutual gain in one or more issues of concern. Here the focus is on politically and economically organised entities, which can speak with one voice regarding issues in their region or sub-region. Malan<sup>2</sup> further argues that such regional organisations involve treaties of co-operation, which are entered into by geographically proximate states. Malan is of the opinion that while nothing is mentioned of sub-regions in the Charter of the United Nations, it is best to

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<sup>1</sup> Malan, M., 'Debunking Some Myths About Peacekeeping in Africa', in Cilliers, J. and Mills, G. (eds.), *From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa* (Pretoria: SAIIA and ISS, 1999), p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

regard regionalism and sub-regionalism as synonymous,<sup>3</sup> particularly in Africa where the relationship of the OAU and various African sub-regional organisations needs to be clarified. But for purposes of this study a region or sub-region means to any area in Africa with political institutional mechanisms detached from the OAU, which brings together geographically related countries in the pursue of objectives that are common to them.

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According to Markusen,<sup>4</sup> regionalism is defined as the rallying around one or more distinguishing characteristics of the region, levied as a territorial claim against one of several mechanisms. In another definition, Markusen<sup>5</sup> defines regionalism as the consciousness of a resident population about its commonalities across a geographical space and in distinction to groups in other regions. Nye argues that regions are relative and that there are no naturally determined regions.<sup>6</sup> Nye further argues that regional core areas can be determined and various boundaries delineated by analysing mutual transactions and other interdependencies, but the actual determination as to which of a large number of potential regions become relevant for organisation depends on political decisions concerning the purposes of particular organisations.<sup>7</sup>

Venter argues that in most of the successful examples of regionalism, states, which are already partners to solid processes (based on shared and complementary values) devolve collective decisions to structures that supplement rather than supplant national

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Markusen, A., *Regions: The Economics and Politics of Territory* (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1987), p. 17.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 238.

<sup>6</sup> Nye, Jr., J. S., *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organisations* (Lanham: University Of America, 1987), p. 6.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

institutions.<sup>8</sup> Venter points out that the most elaborate examples of regionalism (the European Community (EC), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN), and Mercosor) have occurred in regions where state structures remain relatively strong and where the legitimacy of both frontiers and regimes is not contested, while regionalism may over time lead to the creation of new political organisations.<sup>9</sup> Regionalism and state strength do not stand in opposition to each other, and states remain the essential building blocks with which regionalist arrangements are constructed.<sup>10</sup>

Sub-regions are areas in a particular region where people of different cultures, religions and occupations converge to produce a unique social and psychological attachment. Often sub-regions are the products of locality, struggles over territory for centuries, coupled with historical intermingling and legacies of peoples in a particular area. Indications from the literature imply that there are no natural political confines; regional, national or political boundaries are the result of social and political actions.<sup>11</sup>

### **Peace in Africa: whose Obligation?**

Africa has failed to maintain peace, security and stability in the continent. In an auguring editorial of February 24 1999, the *Economist* raised the question of who would mend Africa<sup>12</sup> That Africa is in trouble is hardly in doubt because seven or eight of its countries are convulsed by insurgencies, half a dozen more are involved in the war in Congo, several others suffer recurrent ethnic clashes, and another pair, Ethiopia and

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<sup>8</sup> Venter, D., 'Regional Security in Sub-Sahara Africa: What Role for South Africa' *African Journal on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution*, op. cit., pp. 23-40.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Massey, D., *Drawing Regional Boundaries: In whose Interest?*, Paper Presented at a Conference on Regionalism, Development Action Group, Cape Town, 29 April 1992.

<sup>12</sup> See 'Africa's Elusive Dawn' *The Economist*, February 24, 2001, p. 17.

Eritrea, are licking their wounds after an old fashioned, and very bloody, border war.<sup>13</sup> From Somalia in the east to Sierra Leone in the west, and from Algeria in the north to Angola in the south, violent conflicts, with dim prospects for resolution engulf the whole continent. The incidence of conflict in Africa is the highest in the world. Indeed, since independence the African continent has suffered the largest portion of the world's violent conflicts. By 1999, there were fifteen African countries mired in wars or grim civil strife.<sup>14</sup>

These conflicts claimed the lives of millions of Africans, caused the destruction of personal and national properties and precluded development. Furthermore, apart from causing death and destruction, these conflicts took their toll heavily on the survivors in the form of internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, trauma and lasting body injuries. In 1993, the UNHCR estimated that one third of the world's twenty million refugees are from Africa.<sup>15</sup> Just as worrying, many of the countries, which have escaped such fighting, are floundering economically.<sup>16</sup> Half of sub-Saharan Africa's 600 million people live on just 65 cents a day, and recently they have been getting poorer.<sup>17</sup> This prompted the *Economist* in 2000 to call Africa "the hopeless continent". In view of that immense suffering in Africa, the question: who is supposed to maintain peace and order in the continent opened a great debate.

In the beginning the international community tried to resolve conflicts in Africa. But the failure of the UN mission in Somalia caused the international community to go back

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Dirasse, L., 'Conflict, Development and Peace in Africa: Gender Perspectives' *Conflict Trends*, April 1999, p. 13.

<sup>15</sup> See UNHCR, *The State of the World's Refugees: The Challenges for Protection* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993).

<sup>16</sup> See 'Africa's Elusive Dawn' *The Economist*, op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

to the drawing board in terms of the maintenance of international peace, security and stability. A marked reluctance on the part of the major industrialised states to support peacekeeping missions on the continent since the 1992-1995 mission in Somalia has shifted greater responsibility to African states, the OAU and other sub-regional organisations in the continent such as ECOWAS, SADC<sup>18</sup> and IGAD. The priority of regional response, with the UN providing mainly substantive support, seems so far to have been the dominant lesson learned from the Somali catastrophe.<sup>19</sup>

The trend of maintaining international peace, security and stability took a new form such as regionalism, as Europe concentrated in finding a solution to its problems such as the question of former Yugoslavia; paying little or no attention to conflicts in Africa. African leaders had to accept this new state of affairs as symbolised by the words of the Mozambican Ambassador to the UN when he reminded council members in 1991 that responsibility for peace in Africa, as in the rest of the world, ultimately lies with Africa.<sup>20</sup> In a similar suggestion, former US ambassador to the United Nations, Richard Holbrook called for greater African efforts, arguing that where an international presence is required, the United Nations has a vital role to play, but the people of Africa and their leaders must be pressed to solve their problems on their own and, above all, to prevent them before they begin.<sup>21</sup>

Whether or not it is the outcome of a western tendency to reduce the burden maintaining peace and security in Africa or to help Africa put order in its house, the shift

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<sup>18</sup> See 'Sharing Africa's Peacekeeping Burden' *Africa Recovery*, Vol. 13, No. 4, December 1999, p.5.

<sup>19</sup> Henrikson, A. K., 'The Growth of Regional Organisations and the Role of the United Nations', in Fawcett, L. and Hurrell, A. (eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 150.

<sup>20</sup> See 'Sharing Africa's Peacekeeping Burden' *Africa Recovery*, op. cit., p.5.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

towards regional or sub-regional conflict management approach could lead a progress for the continent in the field of conflict prevention, management and resolution. This could be interpreted to mean that it would bring out Africa's potentiality in solving its problems by depending on itself. By depending on its own resources, experience, and expertise Africa will be led to an era where African conflicts will be managed jointly by African initiatives rather than outside ones. The role of the international community will be supportive as long as the African initiatives are in place and to function. Focus on regional or sub-regional capacity for peace is clear and sensible. The international community should support and assist in strengthening these initiatives.

#### **Sharing the Burden of Peace: UN, OAU and Sub-regional Organisations**

The end of the Cold War ushered a new era in the international system. By 1989, the rigid bipolar system, which was in force since the end of the Second World War metamorphosed into a unipolar system, dominated by the United States, particularly in the military sphere. The Post-Cold War international system is also multipolar, particularly in the economic sphere as Japan and Germany pose a threat to United States domination in that field. Hence, the guiding principles of the international system became economic rather than military adventure. This is what pushed Africa into the doldrums by exposing its weaknesses in terms of maintenance of peace and poverty alleviation. There is no longer superpower rivalry in Africa to gloss over the weaknesses of post-Cold War African regimes. New avenues to ameliorate the situation had to be found.

With end of the Cold War, the United Nations and regional organisations were called upon to assume greater responsibility for conflict prevention, management and resolution.<sup>22</sup> But at this stage, the nature of conflict in the world, particularly in Africa, shifted from inter-state to intra-state. This posed a significant problem for inter-governmental organisations whose Charters prohibited the interference in the internal affairs of states. Post-Cold War challenges in conflict management have caused the UN, regional and sub-regional organisations to go back to the drawing board in order to forge new ways to tackle inter-state conflicts. Peck argues that this new state of affairs led to the debate about which kind of organisation is best placed to carry out conflict management - the UN, regional or sub-regional.<sup>23</sup> According to Peck an either-or approach is not very helpful.<sup>24</sup> What is needed is careful consideration of the comparative advantage of each and how they could work together more effectively to achieve a more strategic partnership.<sup>25</sup>

### **The United Nations**

The United Nations, particularly the Security Council, has reasserted itself as the nerve-centre of international decision-making in the field of peace and security.<sup>26</sup> This encourages decentralisation of the management of international peace and security to the regional level. The Security Council is given primacy in managing the maintenance of

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<sup>22</sup> Peck, C., 'A More Strategic Partnership for Preventing and Resolving Conflict', in Mekenkamp, M., Tongeren, P. V. and De Veen, H. V. (eds.), *Searching for Peace in Africa: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities* (European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 1999), p. 39.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Henrikson, A. K., 'The Growth of Regional Organisations and the Role of the United Nations', in Fawcett, L. and Hurrell, A. (eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organisation and International Order*, op. cit., p. 122.

peace, but is supposed to restrict its attention to the most dangerous or general disputes, encouraging regional organisations to do their work without involving the whole world.<sup>27</sup>

This implies that the United Nations is in favour with regional organisations to share with it the burden of maintaining international peace and security. In consequence, the UN, on the one hand, and regional groupings, on the other, are no longer likely to be regarded as rivals, or even as alternatives to one another, in international decisions about peace and security.<sup>28</sup> The most important regional organisations recognised by the United Nations include the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

These regional organisations are supposed to settle disputes among their member states peacefully. They can appeal to Security Council only when they exhaust the regional arrangements of dispute settlement. This shows that the work of the United Nations and that of the regional organisations, particularly in the field of peace and security are tied together in order to co-ordinate activities pertaining to the stability of the international system.

All African states are members of the UN, the OAU and sub-regional organisations like IGAD, ECOWAS and SADC. Some like Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan and northern Arab states are members of extra-regional organisations like League of Arab States. They are answerable to declarations, resolutions and plans of actions emanating from these organisations. The activities of some African sub-regional organisations like IGAD

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<sup>27</sup> Gordenker, L., 'The UN and Political Co-operation in Africa', in Mazzeo, D. (ed.), *African Regional Organisations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). p. 14.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 122-123.



and those of some extra-regional organisations like LAS contradict each other on matters concerning the solution of problems in the sub-region. A Good example is the competition between IGAD and LAS over the Somali question. This problem is made possible by the simultaneous membership of Somalia, Egypt, Djibouti and Sudan in OAU, IGAD and LAS. This is the place where international advise is required in order to ease the problems of a sub-region like the Horn of Africa, which is complicated by the involvement of states belonging to different international bodies.

### **The OAU and Sub-regional Organisations: Supplant or Supplement?**

Thirty-one independent African states convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in May 1963 to lay the foundation of a continental multilateral organisation to pinpoint the interests of African states in the international forum. This was a measure to ensure the accommodation of the then competing African political camps to realise an acceptable post-independence African co-operation.

The two opposing views of the Monrovia and Casablanca camps espoused extremely divergent ideas about how Africa would conduct its internal and external affairs as a continent. The former campaigned for a type of co-operation modelled in the form of a United Nations of Africa. This vision which succeeded and is reflected in the OAU Charter, holds that individual states would continue to execute their own affairs, retain their sovereignty, and co-operate as necessary in the pursuit of African goals.<sup>29</sup> The latter advocated a form of continental union modelled in the way of a United States of Africa. This notion would have entailed the formation of a supranational continental organisation with unified legislative, judiciary and executive powers including military security.

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<sup>29</sup> Mwangi, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000), p. 146.

Despite the advantages this vision had for the development of the continent in terms of economy, security and stability, 'this was not a vision that African leaders at the dawn of independence would have accepted easily.'<sup>30</sup> This was tantamount to loss of sovereignty in the eyes of post-independence African leaders, which inherited colonial forged states.

The Monrovia group's view of United Nations of Africa triumphed in influencing the drafting of the OAU Charter in 1963. The Charter has not borrowed anything from the Casablanca group. The OAU Charter that emerged at Addis Ababa in 1963, with principles and procedures refined in the first two years of meetings, provided for an organisation of sovereign and juridically equal states whose most authentic voices were to be those of their individual leaders.<sup>31</sup> Article 3 of the Charter of the OAU shows clearly that Charter reflects the notion of United Nations of Africa. Except principle six and seven, 'on the internal affairs of its member states, the Charter is a most conservative document; six of the seven principles enumerated in article 3 are designed to serve in part or in whole to protect the autonomy of member states from interference or coercion by other members or by the organisation as a whole.'<sup>32</sup> The special significance given to supreme national authorities by making the Assembly of Heads of State and Government the decisive organ serves further to reinforce the individual leader's authority over his own state bureaucracy and other political elite<sup>33</sup> and the demise of the notion of a United States of Africa.

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Foltz, W. J., 'The Organisation of African Unity and the Resolution of Africa's Conflicts', in Deng, F. M. and Zartman, I. W. (eds.), *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, op. cit., p. 349.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 350.

The aims of the OAU as stipulated in article 2 (1) of its Charter are: (a) to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States; (b) to co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; (c) to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence; (d) to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and (e) to promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 2 (2) of the UN Charter concerns the manners in which these purposes would be realised. The signatories pledged themselves to co-ordinate and harmonise their general policies through co-operation, especially in the political, diplomatic, economic, communications, health, sanitation, nutritional, scientific and technical fields and in defence and security spheres.

In fact, Africa worked in contradiction of these promises. It had never been united in its stance of internal and external issues in the international fora. During the Cold War, African states were clients of their respective external patrons (former colonial powers and the superpowers). This showed that the unity mentioned in the OAU Charter was mere rhetoric. The assertion that the OAU would protect the sovereignty, independence and the territorial integrity of its member-states is only words on paper as the continent is the theatre of foreign bases, conflicts and political interference. Today, nearly all borders in Africa are contested. Some have already been changed *de jure* or *de facto* like that of Ethiopia and Somalia respectively. Others like Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo are on the verge of transformation.

The OAU considers itself as an exemplar of conflict management in Africa. Mwangiru<sup>34</sup> argues that it has achieved some success in this, but failed to manage Africa's most festering conflicts, especially internal ones. Others argue that the OAU failed dismally to address conflicts in the continent whether intra-state or inter-state. Scholars like Foltz argue that in recent years, complaints have come to focus on the organisation's failure to prevent or resolve the violent conflicts that have caused human misery in several parts of the continent and opened the door to penetration by non-African powers<sup>35</sup> like what happened in Somalia from 1992-1995. This is simply because most of Africa's conflicts are internal and article 3 (2) forbids the OAU from interfering the internal affairs other states.

The conflict that started in 1956, soon after the independence of Sudan is still raging in the eyes of the OAU; the difficulty in its resolution is attributed mainly to the application of the principle of non-interference of the internal affairs states. The same is true with Somalia where a meaningless and disastrous conflict is raging for the eleventh year, under the nose of the OAU. The Somali internal conflict shows that the OAU has no policy regarding the resolution of conflicts even where the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states is not applicable like Somalia. At least, in Somalia there is no central government to invoke that principle in defence of its sovereignty. This shows that there are very serious problems with the OAU, particularly in the field of conflict management.

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<sup>34</sup> Mwangiru, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, op. cit., p. 142.

<sup>35</sup> Foltz, W. J., 'The organisation of African Unity and Resolution of Africa's Conflicts', in Deng, F. M. and Zartman, I. W. (eds.), *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, op. cit., p. 347.

Towards the end of the 1980s, a series of exciting events began to occur that fundamentally changed the nature of the international system from one of East-West rivalry to a unipolar one of co-operation and *rapprochement*. In the course of events, the OAU had to change with time and adapt to post-Cold War challenges, which are no longer coloured by superpower rivalry and are characterised by a new generation of continental conflicts, which arise from intra-state sources. It is against this backdrop that in July 1990, African Heads of State and Government met in Addis Ababa and passed the Declaration on Fundamental Changes in the World and their Implications for Africa. New inter-state and intra-state relations in Africa marked this paradigm shift and led to the creation of the Division for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in the General Secretariat of the OAU in March 1992.<sup>36</sup>

This new process of addressing conflict in Africa climaxed in the formation of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Cairo, Egypt in 1993. An important underlying principle of this mechanism is that the OAU has the right to intervene the domestic matters of its member states. The decision to establish the said mechanism within the OAU had, therefore, been reached against the background that there was no way Africa could improve its socio-economic performance after the end of the Cold war in an ocean of wars, conflicts and domestic tension.<sup>37</sup> The Heads of State and Government, thus, saw in the establishment of such a mechanism, the opportunity to bring to the process of dealing with conflicts on the African continent a new institutional

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<sup>36</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> *ibid.*

dynamism, enabling speedy action to prevent or manage and ultimately resolve conflicts when and where they occur.<sup>38</sup>

The rationale for encouraging the use of regional and sub-regional organisations is that region and sub-regions are like families. Whenever some members of a family are in dispute, other members of the family intervene in order to save the family. It is also true that the inhabitants of a particular region or sub-region have cultural resemblance and a common social and historical background. Such people have an intimate knowledge of the circumstances prevailing in their region or sub-region than outsiders. They often know the evolution, cultural and political sensitivities of their problems than others do. The emphasis comes mainly from the idea that such regional or sub-regional organisations are able better to understand the conflict problems within their region.<sup>39</sup> Conflict management in its wider perspective, however, must be approached and tackled as a system, and not as an isolated issue, but as a part and parcel of its region or sub-region. This is why today regionalism and sub-regionalism in the field of conflict management is taking root so fast.

The weakness of the OAU conflict management mechanisms in addressing conflicts in the continent led to the appearance of other African actors in the field such as individuals, religious organisations, states and sub-regional organisations. There have been positive developments in that individual states and sub-regional organisations have walked where the OAU has feared to tread.<sup>40</sup> It can be argued that most African sub-regional organisations, particularly in conflict management perspectives, have been

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Nye, Jr., J. S., *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organisations*, op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>40</sup> Mwangi, M., 'Beyond the OAU: Prospects for Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa' in *Paradigms*, op. cit., p. 108.

formed to fill the gap created by the ineffectiveness of the OAU. Henrikson<sup>41</sup> argues that it would seem impossible for any one organisation to police the whole African continent. The structural weaknesses of the Organisation of African Unity, which has plainly lacked the capability of handling conflicts in continent, and sometimes even the political interest to do so, have contributed to peacekeeping experiments both at the sub-regional level and through the involvement of the UN.<sup>42</sup> The most remarkable case in point is the *ad hoc* military intervention carried out in Liberia in 1990 by ECOMOG - the Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).<sup>43</sup>

In current international relations, Africa is divided into five main sub-regions under five functioning sub-regional organisations: Horn of Africa Sub-region under IGAD, West Africa Sub-region under ECOWAS, North Africa Sub-region under Arab Magreb Union (AMU), the Southern Africa Sub-region under SADC, and Central Africa Sub-region under ECCAS. It appears that the OAU has recognised these five main sub-regions in Africa, and prioritised only one corresponding sub-regional organisation for each area<sup>44</sup> as above. A good number of sub-regional organisations in Africa have been active in the field of conflict management in the continent. ECOWAS is believed to be the most successful in managing conflicts within its jurisdiction, particularly the Liberian and Sierra Leonian conflicts, followed by SADC, particularly in its management of the Lesotho crisis in 1997. The third important sub-regional organisation in Africa, which is the focus of this study, is IGAD. IGAD plays an important role in the mitigation of

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<sup>41</sup> Henrikson, A. K., 'The Growth of Regional Organisations and the Role of the United Nations', in Fawcett, L. and Hurrell, A. (eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics*, op. cit., p.147.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. pp. 147-48.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Malan, M., 'Debunking Some Myths about Peacekeeping in Africa', in Cilliers, J. and Mills, G. (eds.), *From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa*, op. cit., p. 12.

conflicts in the Horn of Africa Sub-region. The co-operation between the United Nations, the OAU and the sub-regional organisations can be drawn graphically in the form of a pyramid. At the apex of the pyramid there is the UN, in the middle the OAU and at the base, the sub-regional organisations. This shows the importance given to the sub-regional organisations by forming the foundation of the edifice of international co-operation to maintain global peace, security and stability.

### **Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)**

#### **Background: From IGADD to IGAD**

The genesis of the IGAD is not like that of most other African sub-regional organisations, particularly if one looks the aim of IGADD, the predecessor of IGAD. With the direct urging of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)<sup>45</sup>, six countries in East Africa and the Horn of Africa - Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, and Uganda - established the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) in January 1986. Co-operating jointly these countries expected to enhance both the sub-regional and international efforts to address to natural and cyclical calamities that were disrupting life in the sub-region. On April 1986, a ministerial level session endorsed a financial arrangement and institutional regulations for the organisation, which were discussed at a meeting convened by possible international financial backers. However, despite the approval of more than sixty IGADD projects in 1987, none had been launched prior to the March 1988 heads of state summit. The slow implementation was attributed to the non-payment of financial obligations by members

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<sup>45</sup> Lyons, T., 'Can Neighbours Help? Regional Actors and African Conflict Management' in Deng, F. M. and Lyons, T. (eds.), *African Reckoning A Quest for Good Governance* (Washington, DC.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), p. 79.



and domestic conflict in most IGAD countries.<sup>46</sup> In view of the political problems prevailing in the sub-region, particularly conflicts, it became apparent that genuine co-operation in the sub-region would not be attained unless the organisation's mandate was expanded to other crucial fields such as conflict management and political co-operation.

One of the most important achievements of IGADD was the establishment of a sub-regional early warning system to deal with the effects of the cyclical natural disasters in the sub-region, particularly drought. There was also a range of other important developmental projects, which focused on agricultural research, human resources development, and a food security sub-regional plan which aims to store food in time of plenty in order to distribute it in time of need as and where needed. Nevertheless, IGADD's activities in the sub-region were hampered by other powerful events in the area. Little effective action had been achieved by 1990, in large part because of the civil wars in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and to lesser extent, continued sporadic rebel activity in Uganda.<sup>47</sup> By 1990, it was observed that the activities of IGADD were not poised to bear fruits as long as its member-states were not committed for the respect and non-interference of other states internal affairs. This was voiced in a meeting prior to a summit of the OAU in July 1990, where the IGADD heads of state described peace as a prerequisite to regional co-operation and pledged to respect each other's territorial integrity and refrain from backing each other's opponents.<sup>48</sup> Subsequently, by 1992 much of the sub-region experienced political, economic and social instability, which reduced

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<sup>46</sup> See 'Governments and Intergovernmental Organisations as December 1, 1996', in Banks, A. S., Day, A. J. and Muller, T. C. (eds.), *Political Handbook of the World: 1997* (Bingham and New York: SA Publications, 1997).

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

donor confidence in IGADD to a level that pushed the grouping into the doldrums. Eritrea joined IGADD in September 1993.

In 1996, the organisation made some changes in its Charter and activities in order to adapt to changing international, regional and sub-regional situation. The name of the grouping was changed to the inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on March 21, 1996, in conjunction with an expansion of the organisation's purview.<sup>49</sup> Initially, the mandate of IGAD was confined only to matters concerning drought and desertification. This led to the recognition of member states that the original IGADD mission, vision and *modus operandi* were too narrow to accommodate solutions for the most pressing issues in the sub-region such as the threat of conflict. New ways had to be sought to ensure the common interests of stability and economic co-operation, which are indispensable for sustainable development. In order to enable the institution to respond to the multifaceted sub-regional challenges, IGAD member-states agreed to expand the mandate to include the prevention of conflicts in their sub-region and that mechanisms should be put in place for the resolution and management of conflicts.<sup>50</sup> The new IGAD mandate allows the organisation to play a more visible and pro-active role in conflict prevention, and in maintaining peace by contributing to the resolution of existing conflicts, and in dealing with the daunting humanitarian issues confronting the sub-region. As with other sub-regional organisations in Africa, IGAD has subsequently turned its attention to peace and security issues.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Judith, D., 'IGAD: Constructing Conflict Capacities' *New Route*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1999, pp. 8-11.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

## IGAD's Sub-regional Diplomatic Activities

IGAD's diplomatic initiatives to address pertinent sub-regional issues began with its birth. The fact that its successive summits provide a regular forum for communication means that potential problems and policy areas other than environmental matters can be discussed.<sup>52</sup> In 1986, for example, Ethiopia and Somalia began talks aimed at détente and demilitarisation of their common borders.<sup>53</sup> IGAD performed an important task in trying to settle the conflict in southern Sudan, which pitted the Moslem Arab north against the Christian/Animist south for more than four decades. It established an institutionalised forum for diplomatic negotiations between the belligerents in Sudan to secure a settlement since 1993. It commissioned a committee in 1993, entrusted with the Sudan peace process, consisting of the Presidents of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya (Chair), and Uganda.

IGAD also began to intervene in the Somali conflict in 1996, particularly after the failure of the UN sponsored peace mission in 1992-1995, by appointing Ethiopia to mediate the conflict on behalf of IGAD member states and assist in attaining a diplomatic solution. Ethiopia has since convened numerous meetings to try and resolve the Somali conflict with no success, largely but not solely, because of lack of consensus of IGAD member states on the issue and other extra-sub-regional interference such as Egypt's involvement in Horn of Africa politics. After the failure of the Ethiopian peace process on Somalia, IGAD commissioned Djibouti in 1999 to carry on the peace process. The Djibouti peace process on Somalia culminated in an outcome, which led to the formation

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<sup>52</sup> Lund, M. and Betts W., 'In Search of Sub-regionalism', in Mekenkamp, M., Tongeren, P. V. and De Veen, H. V. (eds.), *Search for Peace in Africa: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities*, op. cit. P. 122.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

of an interim government in August 2000, which met disapproval from some IGAD members.

The international community supported IGAD peace initiatives in the Horn of Africa through financial, technical and diplomatic assistance. In pursuit of this aim, the international community established a forum known as the Friends of IGAD (FI) in 1996 to assist IGAD in its endeavours to ensure peace and development in the Horn. In January 1997, the Friend of IGAD forum was reorganised and given a new name as IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) with renewed vigour to procure and channel much needed funding and ensure international solidarity for enhancing the stability of the sub-region. However, Partners in Development in form of bilateral, multilateral and UN agencies, and even the private commercial and civil society sectors take a share in contributing towards the realisation of objectives of the organisation.<sup>54</sup> They play a significant role of ensuring that IGAD achieves the goals set by all the stakeholders including them in the spirit of global economic co-operation and integration.<sup>55</sup>

### **Prospects of IGAD Conflict Management Mechanisms**

The 1996 name change from IGADD to IGAD was not a cosmetic measure to hide the weaknesses of the organisation but a bold attempt to break the traditional silence regarding conflicts prevailing inside many IGAD member-states. It influenced the secretariat's competence to enhance peace and security more directly. Heads of State and Government of the member-states ensured that attainment of that aim, after revising and ratifying the Charter of IGAD in its new form. This resulted in the growth of the secretariat significantly in terms of mandate and manpower. The staff of the secretariat

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<sup>54</sup> See 'IGAD Forges Regional Co-operation in the Horn of Africa' *Summit of Heads of State and Government to Launch Revitalised IGAD, Djibouti, 25 and 26 November 1996* (Nairobi: IGAD, 1996), p. 5.

rose from 11 full-time staff to 19, with more expected to be employed. Its budget has grown to US\$ 2.27 million.<sup>56</sup> The Division of Political and Humanitarian Affairs was created, which includes a Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution section. IGAD has also made a five-point Plan on Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management: (1) developing capacity-building for conflict prevention; (2) documenting demobilisation and post-conflict peace-building experience; (3) elaborating a culture of peace and tolerance; (4) developing a conflict early warning mechanism; and (5) creating an emergency relief fund. These five proposals were deliberated on at IPF Technical Experts Meeting in April 1998, and plans have been drawn for developing each of the five outputs at a cost of just under US\$ 1 million.<sup>57</sup> The organisations receives the support of numerous western countries, including Canada, the UK, Netherlands, Norway, and the USA, through the mechanism of the IGAD Partners Forum, which was formally created in 1997 out of the Friends of IGAD.<sup>58</sup>

### **Problems Facing IGAD in Conflict Management**

IGAD's capacity to furnish a successful regional peacemaking programme is limited. Clearly, It failed in terminating present conflicts and delivering peace to the region. Its inability to foster peace and security co-operation among the countries in the Horn stems fundamentally from the persisting suspicions, geopolitical rivalries, and ideological differences among its members.<sup>59</sup> For the forecastable future its attempts to

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Written correspondence with Kamara, J. B., Chief Documentation and Information Section, IGAD Secretariat, 24 August 1999 and 29 September 1999.

<sup>57</sup> See 'IGAD: Programme on Conflict Prevention, Resolution and management', *Intergovernmental Authority on Development*, available on the Internet <<http://www.igad.org/press10.htm>>.

<sup>58</sup> Lund, M. and Betts W., 'In Search of Sub-regionalism', in Mekenkamp, M., Tongeren, P. V. and De Veen, H. V. (eds.), *Search for Peace in Africa: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities*, op. cit. P. 121.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 123.

prevent and resolve conflict will be confined to the sphere of diplomacy. The conflicts in Somalia and Sudan do not respond to IGAD's easy interventions, which is clouded by the divisions prevailing among its economically cash-strapped members. The members' conflicting political interests have completely precluded any direct action in resolving conflict in the sub-region.<sup>60</sup> Despite this, IGAD started high-ranking talks with leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia after the eruption of the border war in May 1998.<sup>61</sup> It was not able to mediate significantly to settle the conflict - even if the belligerents sought its intervention, which they did not.<sup>62</sup> To the dismay of IGAD, the Ethio-Eritrean conflict was settled by the OAU through the good offices of the President of Algeria, Abdi Elaziz Bouteflika.

This manifest weakness of IGAD in addressing conflict in the sub-regions stems mainly from three factors. First most of the governments in the sub-region are politically weak due lack of legitimacy. Two of the seven governments in the region, namely Eritrea and Sudan are open dictatorships, one is stateless (Somalia), the rest are merely pseudo-democratic regimes where power is gained and retained through illegal means. The resultant obsession and fear of losing power causes many of the leaders in the Horn to divert attention from domestic problems and create images of external aggression from neighbouring states. Through this they destabilise neighbouring states in order to consolidate their position at home. For example, Assefa argues that one of the problems facing the region in terms of generating durable peace has been the lack of visionary

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> See 'IGAD Sparing no Efforts to Prevent a Full-Scale Conflict Between Ethiopia and Eritrea', *IGAD Secretariat Press Release*, available on the Internet at <<http://www.igad.org/pres05.htm>>.

<sup>62</sup> See 'Africa's Forgotten War' *The Economist*, 8 May 1999, pp. 45-47.

statesmanship and democratic leadership.<sup>63</sup> In most instances, the wars in the Horn of Africa have been started by elite who then mobilise the population to join in.<sup>64</sup>

Second, IGAD is economically very weak and does not possess the leverage to secure a settlement in any of the conflicts raging in the sub-region. It lacks the means essential to reward or punish member states. Even were these inter-state differences are not so intense such as the question of the Sudanese civil war, IGAD also has a limited ability to broker a peace deal because of its lack of leverage over the warring parties.<sup>65</sup> The shortage of resources implies that IGAD also would not have the means monitor or guarantee peace should an agreement be achieved.<sup>66</sup> Third, most IGAD member-states are influenced by other international, regional or sub-regional organisation, which they belong to. For example, Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan are members of the League of Arab States and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), whereas Kenya and Uganda are members of the East Africa Community (EAC) and the Commonwealth. All these extra-sub-regions have their own policies, which are required to be observed by their members. Often the policies of IGAD and these other organisation are incommensurable. For instance, the League of Arab States policy towards the Nile basin states is different from that of IGAD for reasons concerning the consumption of the Nile waters. Likewise, Kenya and Uganda may be more inclined to the policies of the Commonwealth organisation, which commands effective political clout and considerable financial

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<sup>63</sup> Assefa, H., 'A Lack of Visionary Statesmanship and Democratic Leadership', in Mekenkamp, M., Tongeren, P. V. and De Veen, H. V. (eds.), *Search for Peace in Africa: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities*, op. cit. P. 117.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Lund, M. and Betts W., 'In Search of Sub-regionalism', in Mekenkamp, M., Tongeren, P. V. and De Veen, H. V. (eds.), *Search for Peace in Africa: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities*, op. cit. P. 123.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

resources, compared to IGAD. Membership in extra-sub-regional organisations legitimised the interference of external forces in internal affairs of the Horn countries. For instance, in interfering Somalia's internal affairs, Egypt invoked that country's membership of the League of Arab States and Organisation of the Islamic Conference, which can legitimise its involvement in the Somali conflict.

For all these reasons, IGAD member-states appear more inclined to dedicate their meagre resources to actively undermine other states in the sub-region than to assist secure a durable peace. Some members like Kenya and Uganda have trained armed forces enough to assume a peacemaking mission in the region. What is missing is the political will.



## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUB-REGIONAL ATTEMPTS TO MANAGE THE SOMALI CONFLICT: A Case Study of Djibouti-led IGAD Peace Process on Somalia (May-August, 2000).**

#### **Introduction**

In Chapter Four, the study discussed about sub-regional attempts to manage conflicts. This chapter, which consists of two chapters, will examine the management of the Somali conflict by Djibouti in May-August 2000. Section one will examine salient sub-regional mediation efforts prior to the Djibouti peace initiative in the Somali conflict in May-August 2000. Section two will analyse the peace process on Somalia by Djibouti from May-August, 2000 as a case study.

#### **Sub-regional Peace Initiatives before the Peace Process in May-August 2000**

##### **Djibouti One and Two Conferences (1991)**

Serious attempts to mediate the Somali conflict go back as far as 1991, when the former President of Djibouti, Alhaji Hassan Gouled Abtidon tried to settle the conflict through his good offices. He tried to address the exacerbating crises in Somalia by bringing together the Somali factions that toppled the Barre regime to establish some sort of central administration. Clan-based movements including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), United Somali Congress (USC), and SDM (Somali Democratic Movement) took part in that Djibouti organised peace conference.

This conference which is known as Djibouti One lasted from 5-11 June 1991 and adopted a four-point declaration with the following aims: (1) Since Barre's presence in the country was a threat to national peace and security, he must leave the country, or he would be subjected to the use of combined forces to arrest or evict him out of the

country; (2) To maintain peace and stability through the country and create an environment conducive for dialogue and mutual understanding; (3) To convene a national reconciliation conference which would be held in Djibouti on 13 June 1991; (4) Since the Somali Nation is indivisible, to appeal to the leaders of the SNM to participate in the National Reconciliation Conference.<sup>1</sup>

On the invitation of Djibouti President, the parties convened again in Djibouti on 15 July 1991 to hammer out a deal to restore a central authority to Somalia. This conference, which is called the Djibouti Two Conference, was more important than its predecessor in terms of attendance and publicity. Apart from the Somali factions, the most important attendees invited to the conference included the President of Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi and the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni. Others included representatives from League of Arab States (LAS), Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), European Economic Community (EEC) and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Dessertification (IGADD), plus the representatives of a host of governments such as China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Germany, Italy, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, USSR and Yemen.

The Djibouti Two Conference adopted a resolution with five points: (1) that Barre be pursued militarily by all factions under the direction of the Provisional Government and be brought to court if caught alive; (2) to institute an immediate national cease-fire; (3) to safeguard the territorial integrity of Somalia; (4) To form a provisional government based on the constitution of 1960 and shared by the factions; Ali Mahdi is elected to lead

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<sup>1</sup> Omar, M. O., *Somalia, A Nation Driven to Despair: A Case of Leadership Failure* (New Delhi: Somali Publications Co. Ltd., 1996), pp. 1-8.

this government for a period of two years; (5) To appoint a committee to assess the consequences of the conflict in terms of loss of life and property.

This attempt to find a solution to the Somali conflict failed for several reasons. The major obstacles in implementing the outcome of Djibouti One and Two conferences were (1) the conflict was not ripe for resolution as most of the combatants had not reached a hurting stalemate; (2) the conferences were not all-inclusive as they kept the potent Barre and his allies out of the peace process; (3) It was boycotted by the Somaliland, which declared its independence from South Somalia in May 1991; (4) General Aidid attacked the deal vehemently as a trick to give Ali Mahdi who co-operated with the former regime, the presidency on a silver plate. In fact, he derided it as little more than a Manifesto Group<sup>2</sup> meeting, and rejected Ali Mahdi's interpretation of the Djibouti Two Conference accord as an acknowledgement of his claim to the position of interim president.<sup>3</sup>

The implementation of the outcome of Djibouti Two Conference could not get off the ground. It exacerbated matters on the ground. On 17 November 1991, exactly one hundred and twenty one days after the Djibouti Two agreement, the power struggle between General Aidid, the Chairman of United Somali Congress (USC) and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, the Interim President, also of USC, exploded in Mogadishu.<sup>4</sup> The attempt at parachuting state power from Djibouti to Mogadishu proved unworkable because it ignored the realities of post-Barre Somalia: open warfare and Banditry made Mogadishu

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<sup>2</sup> Manifesto Group is comprised of intellectuals, businessmen, and officials from Barre and previous regimes who in 1990 wrote a manifesto calling for a national reconciliation conference to end the country's problems. Ali Mahdi an archrival of General Aidid was a member of this group.

<sup>3</sup> Menkhaus, K., 'International Peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in Somalia', in Clarke, W. and Herbst, J. (eds.), *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 47.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p.9.

ungovernable.<sup>5</sup> This violent power struggle between Ali Mahdi and General Aidid for the presidency, coupled with Barre's attempts to recapture the seat once again by conquering Mogadishu caused the famous humanitarian crisis of 1992 in Somalia, which led to the US-led UN invasion in Somalia. Consequently, the Djibouti Two conference, which could have established national control and saved the country from catastrophe, was futile.<sup>6</sup>

### **The Ethiopian Sponsored Sodere Peace Process (1996-1997)**

When UN efforts to restore a Somali state failed, the vacuum was filled by sub-regional initiatives. In 1996, the OAU stepped in by appointing Ethiopia to reconcile the warring Somali factions in order to restore peace and governance in the country. This national reconciliation initiative organised by the Ethiopian government in the resort town of Sodere, hosted 26 Somali political factions from November 22, 1996 to January 3, 1997. It produced a National Salvation Council (NSC) intended to serve as a Provisional Central Government. The structure of the NSC consisted of 41 members of whom five of them (two from Darod, two from Hawiye and one from Rahanwein) were elected as co-chairmen of the Council for a rotating period of one month. Eleven members from the Council were also chosen as permanent administrative council members.

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Besides the creation of the National Salvation Council, the parties unanimously agreed to convene a broad based and all-inclusive national reconciliation conference at

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<sup>5</sup> Adam, H. M., 'Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?', in Zartman, I. W. (ed.), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 81.

<sup>6</sup> See Gilkes, P., *The Price of Peace: Somalia and the United Nations 1991-1994* (London: Save the Children Fund UK, 1994), pp. 29-38.

Bosaso, the northeastern port town in June 1997. But this conference was dogged by the absence of some of Somalia's most important local players in the conflict such as Hussein Mohammed Aidid (south Mogadishu warlord) and Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal (President of Somaliland). The absence of these two protagonists suggested that a comprehensive solution was only an illusion pursued by the organisers of the conference and some ambitious participants. Although IGAD, OAU, the League of Arab States and the United States supported the initiative and its outcome as a step towards the right direction in Somalia's conflict, critics doubted the ability of the NSC to persuade Hussein Mohammed Aidid and Egal to accept the Ethiopian brokered deal.

Despite the contribution of the international community, particularly some stakeholders like Ethiopia, the proposed Bosaso meeting did not occur because of lack of consensus on the part of members of the NSC and the boycott of the conference by Somaliland and the south Mogadishu warlord. The initiative was further doomed to failure by Egypt's parallel initiative of the Cairo Peace Process, which was held on the eve of the Ethiopian-led initiative failure. This was a parallel initiative intended to thwart the Ethiopian plan.

#### **The Peace Process on Somalia (May-August, 2000)**

Since the failure of the Ethiopian initiative there had not been any serious sub-regional attempt to address the Somali conflict. At its seventh ordinary meeting, the Council of Ministers of IGAD, meeting at Djibouti on March 14-15, 1998, ascribed the lack of improvement in the situation in Somalia to the increase of simultaneous peace processes, lack of a visionary compromise essential to resolve the conflict on the part of

the Somali leaders and inadequate humanitarian assistance from the international community to support the peace process.

The Council of Ministers of IGAD confirmed the position of Ethiopia as the state commissioned to carry out the peace process on Somalia on behalf of IGAD. The international community was requested to comply with a new approach, which emphasised representatives of civil society as the centrepiece of the Somali peace process over the faction leaders. Especially, the international community was called to assist favourably those regions in Somalia whose authorities demonstrated a commitment to peace (peace dividend approach).

To lessen the possibility of simultaneous peace processes, IGAD proposed the establishment of an instrument that permitted the involvement of other interested countries in the Somali peace process. IGAD Heads of State and Government ratified these proposals at a session, which followed the seventh session of the Council of Ministers at Djibouti on March 14-15, 1998. In this meeting, the Liaison Group on Somalia (LGS) was created under the influence of the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) to assist stakeholders and other interested players in the Somali question to reach a consensus regarding the matter. Another consultative body, the Standing Committee on Somalia (SCS), whose membership is open to IGAD, IPF, LGS and other interested state and non-state actors, was constituted. Since then, the LGS and SCS continued to meet almost every two months at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at about the same time.

### **Pre-mediation Stage**

Pre-mediation efforts of Djibouti centred on two activities, which paved the way for the mediation stage. These activities were (1) the search of international, regional and

sub-regional consensus and support for the peace initiative; (2) preliminary activities aimed to facilitate the mediation stage.

### **The Search of Consensus and support for the peace process**

Djibouti's renewed interest in the Somali conflict was observed on July 29 1999 at a meeting of the Standing Committee on Somalia. It delineated a peace scheme, which embodied cultural and political components. The cultural component included a programme planned to take place between January and June 2000, whereas the political component envisaged the formation of a bicameral representative council: one for traditional elders and the other for political representatives. Representation in the council was supposed to be based on region rather on clan, with one third of the seats reserved for civil society. The council would have a three-year mandate to arrange a transitional constitution and referendum. An executive council was also proposed to act as a provisional government. The Djibouti envoy stressed that the international community should assume an important role by making available technical and financial support *ab initio*. Other members of the SCS welcomed the plan and agreed to study it.

In his address to the fifty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 1999, the President of Djibouti, Mr. Ismail Omer Guelleh, tabled a proposal outlining a peace plan for Somalia. The essential purpose of his peace plan was to re-establish the sovereign state of Somalia with democratic governance. Guelleh's peace plan sidelined the warlords whom he thought were not ready to restore law and order in the turbulent country.<sup>7</sup> He emphasised the need to consider civil society (elders, religious groups, the business community, women's organisations, and intellectuals) as an

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<sup>7</sup>See Guelleh's Inaugural address to the Fifty-fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1999.

indispensable factor in attaining peace in Somalia. In his proposal, Guelleh requested the support of the international community in realising his new peace plan on Somalia.

In effort to realise these aims, he suggested a three-point plan: first, the international community must fully recognise that Somalis are free to exercise their democratic right to choose their own leaders; second, the Somali society must agree to the demand of the international community to assist in the restoration of normalcy, law and order and a framework of governance; third, the warlords had to comply with the initiatives intended to find a remedy for the political and economic problems of the country.<sup>8</sup> He suggested that the warlords must convert their factions into political parties that would compete in elections, agree to a complete disarmament, and submit to the primacy of law. If the warlords do not agree with the peace plan, he requested the international community to institute stringent sanctions against them in the form of banning their travel to outside of the country, banning any foreign assistance to them in cash or kind and freezing all their assets in the world.<sup>9</sup> This would end the complacency with the warlords and any future process would be more closely tied to the Somali civil society.

In its seventh summit of Heads of State and Government on 26 November 1999, IGAD confirmed its full support to Djibouti peace plan on the Somali conflict and urged the international community to support the initiative in order to bring to fruition the Somali peace process.

During the pre-mediation period, Djibouti government officials made extensive tours of the neighbouring countries, the Middle East and the capitals of some stakeholders in the Somali conflict. A delegation led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.



and International Co-operation of the Republic of Djibouti, Mr. Ali Abdi Farah who was the Vice Chairman of the National Commission for Peace in Somalia, participated in the OAU Ministerial Meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 8<sup>th</sup> March, 2000.<sup>10</sup> The delegation informed the meeting of the progress of the peace process. Another important Djibouti delegation attended the ministerial meeting of the League of Arab States in Beirut on 11<sup>th</sup> March 2001, and informed the delegates about the progress and the support required for the peace process. Also the President of Djibouti visited various countries such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Ethiopia, Kenya, France, Sudan, Egypt, Eritrea, Uganda and Italy in order to inform the leaders of these countries about the Somali peace process and to seek their support.

There were also visits conducted by Senior Djibouti government officials in different parts of Somalia trying to convince the Somalis to attend the upcoming Somali National Peace Conference (SNPC). Among the people they met with included members of civil society, traditional leaders, warlords and leaders of the northern breakaway polities. For instance, Osman Ahmed Yussuf, Political Adviser to Djibouti Head of State, went all the way to Mogadishu to convince warlord Hussein Mohamed Aidid to participate the conference<sup>11</sup> but the mission ended in vain because Mr. Aidid's terms of participation were incommensurable with Djibouti's wishes. Similarly, Idiris Harbi Farah, the deputy parliamentary speaker of Djibouti, went to Puntland in order to secure the participation of its leaders to the conference.<sup>12</sup> Puntland authorities did not attend the conference, describing it as unfair to its status as a stable polity with administrative structures to sit

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<sup>10</sup> See 'Progress Report II: Djibouti, 9/03/2000' *Press Release*, Djibouti National Commission for Peace in Somali.

<sup>11</sup> See 'Confusion at the Peace Conference' *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, No. 913, 22 July 2000, p. 2.

<sup>12</sup> See 'Puntland Dictates its Terms' *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, No. 901, 22 April 2000, p. 7.

with members of lawless southern Somali factions. In Somaliland, the Djibouti delegation was not received to air its views regarding the Djibouti-led IGAD peace process.

### **Preliminary Pre-Mediation Facilitative Activities**

During the pre-mediation stage, Djibouti carried out an extensive network of activities aimed at selling the peace plan to the international community, Somalis in the Diaspora and in the country and setting the stage for the upcoming peace conference. Such activities included fund-raising campaigns, creating awareness for the peace process, consultations with Somalis inside and outside the country, and keeping in touch with international, regional and sub-regional partners.<sup>13</sup>

In addition, Djibouti established two task forces headed by senior government officials to execute different activities in order to realise the holding of the conference. These task forces included Policy task Force, headed by the President and a Operational Task Force officiated by senior government officer. These task forces in turn appointed committees to carry out specific tasks. For instance, the main duties of the Policy Task Force included contact, consultations, exchange of views, co-ordination and decision-making for leaders, ministers, and chief executives of regional and international actors; provision of guidance, leadership and inspiration, direction and oversight to the whole process; appointment of a committee of Somali elders and wisemen.<sup>14</sup> The Operational Task Force, which had the role of a secretariat, was to oversee the preparatory apparatus of the process through committees, contacts, meetings, symposia, workshops, and mass

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<sup>13</sup> See 'Press Release' *Progress Report II: Djibouti, 9/3/2000*, Djibouti National Commission, pp. 1-7.

<sup>14</sup> See *Somali National Peace Conference: An Action Plan for the Peace Process*, January 21, 2000, Djibouti, pp. 1-9.

media.<sup>15</sup> The main committees that the task forces established to facilitate the preparatory phase of the peace process included Somali Civil Society Network Committee, Organisation, Liaison, and Co-ordination Committee, Communications Committee, Cultural Events Committee, and Resources Mobilisation Committee.<sup>16</sup>

During the pre-mediation period, three important functions took place: a consultative symposium attended by Somali civil society members, a cultural festival and fund raising gathering. In the consultative symposium it was agreed that Somalis should forget what happened in the past and open a new chapter of history based on respect, co-operation and putting the interest of Somalia before that of individuals. The cultural festival was aimed to demonstrate what happened in Somalia and what ought to be the situation. The fund raising was organised by the chairman of the committee collecting funds for holding a reconciliation conference on Somalia, Abdurahman Borch, through a gala dinner for Somali peace in which Djibouti and foreign businessmen listed in the Djibouti Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DCCI) attended, held on 5 April 2000.<sup>17</sup> The gala dinner was chaired by the Head of State's wife Kadra Mohamoud and attended by several ministers including Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Abdi Farah. The committee charged with the finances of the Somali conference was supposed to collect 650,000,000 Djibouti Franc (DF) to cover costs of the meeting, which was expected to host more than 800 Somali delegates.<sup>18</sup> In addition to that, supplementary taxes were levied on alcohol, khat

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> See 'Gala for Somali Peace' *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, No. 900, 15 April 2000, p. 2.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

and tobacco, and a contribution of 2,000 DF per salaried worker in Djibouti was imposed.<sup>19</sup>

### **The Mediation Stage**

The mediation stage of Djibouti Peace process on Somalia can be divided into four phases. The first phase was concerned with a meeting to reconcile the Somali clans, selection of a steering committee (conference committee) and the selection of clan delegates who would represent their clans in the political phase of the conference. The second phase involved the sharing of the parliamentary seats on clan lines. The third was concerned with the election of the parliamentary speaker and three deputies. The fourth phase involved the election of the president by members of the National Transitional Assembly (TNA).

#### **First Phase of the Mediation Stage: Resolving Clan Animosity, Appointing Conference Committee and Selection of Clan Delegates.**

On 13 June 2000, the Somali Traditional Elders (STE) concluded their meeting with a six-point declaration: (1) proclamation of peace and reconciliation throughout Somalia, (2) to institute State Authority jointly by all Somalis, (3) to emphasise that the Somali unity is sacrosanct, (4) to return all stolen and robbed properties (assets and liquid) to its original owners, (5) to respect human rights, (6) to call the international community to assist the Djibouti Peace process on Somali and recognise its outcome.<sup>20</sup>

On 17 June /2000, the Somali delegates attending the Somali National Peace Conference (SNPC) elected a Conference Committee (CC), which had taken over the

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> See 'General Reconciliation: Djibouti, Arta, June 13, 2000' *World Reaction Forum: New ChatRoom*, undated p. 3.

organising and liaising role initially played by the Djibouti government, and comprising the chairman, Hassan Abshir Farah - previous minister of interior in autonomous Puntland region; Abdalle Derow Isaq, political secretary of Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA); Abdulaziz Mukhtar Ma'alim, from the minority Jarer clan; Asha Haji Elmi, a women's representative, from Moagadsishu; and Abdurahaman Douale Ali, from the Dir clan.<sup>21</sup>

During the negotiation period, one of the most difficult issues was how the clans and sub-clans, which constitute the Somali nation, would share the representatives of the National Transitional Assembly. In this regard, the Somalis were divided into five main groupings based on lineage and descent, namely Darod, Hawiye, Dir, Digile-Mirifle and others, which comprise of an alliance of minority groups such as Jarcer, Midgan and Yibir. The weight of different Somali delegations, which would address key issues at committee level, was decided as follows: Darod - 175; Hawiye - 175; Digil-Mirifle - 175; and Dir - 200; Small clans alliance - 90; and a special women's delegation of 100 women.<sup>22</sup> These delegates chose among their leaders those who would represent them in the political phase of the conference, which produced a parliament, which elected a president who in turn appointed a Prime Minister who set up a transitional National government (TNG).

### **Second Phase of the Mediation Stage: Sharing of the Parliamentary Seats**

On 25 June 2000, participants of the conference started to discuss how the parliamentary seats were to be divided among the various clans. It took three months of bargaining much of it behind closed doors, at a villa in Arta, a small resort town in

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<sup>21</sup> See UN IRIN-CEA 27 June 2000.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

Djibouti that the delegates finally reached a complex clan-based TNA power-sharing formula.<sup>23</sup> The commission appointed by the participants earlier to devise a plan to distribute the parliamentary seats for various clans in a manner commensurate to each clan's number and constituencies came up with a plan unanimously agreed by the participants except those representing the group of Small Clans Alliance (Jaree, Midgan, Yibir and Gibilad). According to the plan of the commission, the participants agreed to share the proposed 225 parliamentary seats as follows: Darod clan - 44 seats; Hawiye clan - 44 seats; Dir clan - 44 seats; Digil-Mirifle clan - 44 seats; Small Clans Alliance - 24 seats; and Women - 25 seats. The women from various clans shared the 25 seats, each clan getting five seats. This made a total of 225 parliamentary seats.

Some clans and sub-clans rejected the allocation of the parliamentary seats as an unfair deal and threatened to pull out of the peace process. For instance, the Small Clans Alliance declared their dissatisfaction with the 24 seats allocated to them.<sup>24</sup> However, Ishmael Omer Guelleh, the President of Djibouti, intervened and requested the approval of the participants of 20 parliamentary seats to be appointed by him. The Somali conference participants approved by acclamation a proposal empowering the Djibouti head of state to appoint 20 MPs to the National Transitional Assembly.<sup>25</sup> The Somali representatives adopted the proposal unanimously, which meant that the provisional charter had to be modified and that the total number of MPs was increased from 225 to 245. The Djibouti Government spokesman, Mr. Rifki Abdoukader Bamakhrama, said

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<sup>23</sup> See UN IRIN-CEA 24 August 2000.

<sup>24</sup> See *Ayaamaha* News Paper, Mogadishu, in Somali 26 July 2000.

<sup>25</sup> BBC MS 11 August 2000.

that the 20 additional seats were within the scope of a measure aimed at resolving the various crises, which emerged during the inter-clan sharing of parliamentary seats.<sup>26</sup>

### **Third Phase of the Mediation stage: Electing Parliamentary Speaker and Three Deputies**

On 20 August 2000, some participants contested for the position of the parliamentary speaker and three deputies. However, the campaign ended on 28 August 2000, in electing Abdalla Derow Isaq, former secretary-general of the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) as the Chairman of the National Transitional Assembly, plus three deputies in the allocation of one deputy from Darod, one from Hawiye and one from Dir. A walkout instigated by opponents of the candidacy of the elected parliamentary speaker failed, proving that the composition of the clan-based National Transitional Assembly could retain a sufficient quorum<sup>27</sup> which saved the TNA from an early blow intended to frustrate it.

The newly elected parliamentary speaker assumed the role of the chairman of the conference for all subsequent deliberations that led to the election of the president. The speaker of the parliament took charge of organising the procedures of submitting and registering candidates for the presidency and the rules and regulations regarding voting by the new MPs.

### **The Fourth Phase of the Mediation Stage: The Election of the President**

Voting for the president by the new MPs started on 31 August 2000. To speed up the process, Guelleh promised that he would take the newly elected Somali president, accompanied by other regional heads of state, to the UN Millennium conference in New

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> See 'Focus on the Djibouti Peace Conference' *IRIN*, 23 August 2000.

York in September 2000.<sup>28</sup> At first, 47 candidates went to the podium to announce their candidature and present their plan and promises for the nation. Under the procedures established for the election, each of the 47 presidential candidates needed the support of 10 delegates.<sup>29</sup> In any case, the principal contestants were supposed to earn cross-clan votes within the TNA to secure the required majority.

The majority of the candidates lost ground in the first round of the voting as they could not secure the votes of 10 delegates as a pre-requisite to continue competing the following rounds. On the eve of the historic vote, two candidates, who hailed from the same sub-clan (Habargidir) emerged, with no clear favourite. They were Abdullahi Ahmed Adow, who worked under Barre as finance minister and later as an ambassador in the United States; and Abdulkassim Salad Hassan, Barre's former deputy Prime Minister and interior minister. After much horse-trading among the candidates and supporters, Abdulkassim won a third round of voting, 145:92, by beating his main rival Abdullahi Ahmed Adow.<sup>30</sup>

*Africa Confidential* reported that there was little to choose between, both candidates since they hail from the same sub-clan and played crucial roles in the ousted regime of Barre into its last hours. It continued by pointing out that the only difference was their new backers: Abdulkassim by Djibouti, France and sundry Islamist groups in the region; and Adow by the United States. A critic contended that another difference was that Adow knows where the assets were hidden while Abdulkassim knows where the bodies were buried.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> See 'Somalia: Possible President' *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 41, No. 17, 1 September 2000, p. 8.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.



The Djibouti-led IGAD peace process on Somalia that commenced officially on 2 May, 2000 culminated in Abdulkassim taking the oath of office on 27 August 2000 in a gathering of some 2000 Somalis. In addition to that the swearing in ceremony was attended by a number of foreign dignitaries of whom the most prominent were the Presidents of the Eritrea, Sudan and Yemen and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia. The Sudanese President, Omar Hassan El-Bashir announced that his government recognised Abdulkassim as president of Somalia.<sup>32</sup> The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed support in a message read to the meeting and Charles Josseline, the French Minister for co-operation, pledged the backing of the European Union.<sup>33</sup> Oblivious to the fact that the elected incumbents were former leaders of Somalia and that Somalis were divided practically, President Guelleh, apparently euphoric at the outcome of his effort, said that those previously entrusted with authority in Somalia had failed dismally and that the people of Somalia had eventually come back to their senses on the need for unity.<sup>34</sup>

### **The Post-Mediation Stage**

The most important task of the post-mediation stage facing the new president was how to set up the council of ministers. On his arrival at Mogadishu on October 2000, he appointed Ali Kahlif Galaydh as his new Prime Minister. Galaydh, 59 at the time of his appointment, belongs to the Dulbahante - a sub-clan of the Darod group - and was lecturer at the Syracuse University (New York) where he gained a PhD in International Relations. He worked as a Minister of Industry under Barre between 1980-1982. At the time of his appointment, he was a shareholder and the Chairperson of Somtel, a

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<sup>32</sup> See Farah, C., 'Conference Elects President' *Reuters* 27 August 2000.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

telecommunications company operating in Somalia, co-owned by Djibouti businessman Abdurahman Boreh, a close relative of Djibouti Head of State, Isamil Omar Guelleh and Mohamed Deilaf, a cousin and partisan of Abdi Qassem Salad Hassan, and principal shareholder in the new television Station of Horn *Afrik*.<sup>35</sup> Later on, Galaydh fell from grace with with Barre and fled the country over matters pertaining to the management of Juba Sugar Project.

Prime Minister Galaydh established council of ministers comprising 25 ministers and 43 assistant ministers based on clan share. Ministers: Darod - 8; Hawiye - 8; Dir - 8; Digil-Mirifle - 6; and Samall Clans Alliance - 1. Assistant Ministers: Darod - 12; Hawiye - 12; Dir - 8; Digil-Mirufle - 6; Small Clan Alliance - 5.<sup>36</sup>

Since its inauguration at Arta in Djibouti, four issues in ascending order were very crucial for the survival of the TNG: International recognition, economic assistance, and internal acceptance. The TNG embarked on a policy of pursuing the realisation of these three priorities soon after its inception.

### **International recognition**

The Transitional National Government succeeded in obtaining significant international recognition, acknowledgement and accreditation. It received rights of representation in multilateral functions ranging from international, regional to sub-regional. After more than ten years in political limbo and absence from international fora, Somalia the TNG attended with full rights important international gatherings such as the UN millennium summit on 8 September 2000, the OAU summit in Lusaka on 9 to 13

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<sup>35</sup> See 'Boreh is a Happy Man' *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, No. 917, 16 September 2001, p. 5.

<sup>36</sup> See 'Names, clans of Appointed Ministers' *Xog-Ogal*, in Somalia, No. 3420, 21 October 2000, p. 4. See also ' Name, Clan and Ministry of Assistant Ministers Appointed' *Xog-Ogal*, in Somali, No. 3427, 29 October 2000, p. 3.

July 2001, the IGAD summit in Khartoum in December 2000, LAS summit in Amman on 25 to 27 March 2001, and the 9<sup>th</sup> OIC summit in Doha in November 2000. In all these fora, the TNG was received as an equal partner, encouraged and promised assistance.

The TNG received a substantial support and reassurances from the Somali Aid Coordinating Body (SACB), UN agencies, and donors. On 11 January 2001, it felt happy with a unanimous support in the UN Security Council for a proposal by Kofi Annan for a proposed UN peace-building mission to Mogadishu.<sup>37</sup> It also won the recognition of many states in Africa, the Arab world and Asia.

### **Sub-regional Accommodation**

It is obvious that the first practical threats that endanger the survival of the outcome of Djibouti peace initiative in the Somali conflict comes from the neighbouring states. Of the seven IGAD member-state, only Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan expressed their agreement with the outcome of Arta peace process, Ethiopia declared complete rejection,<sup>38</sup> In a statement given to the BBC Focus on Africa Programme, Yemane Kidane, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, announced that the Ethiopian government does not recognise the Transitional National Government of Ethiopia.<sup>39</sup> This is a major blow to the TNG, as Ethiopia has significant influence on most of the factions opposing the latter.

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<sup>37</sup> Menkhaus, K., 'Somalia: Situation Analysis, January 2001' *General Report Menkhaus Document*, Unpublished, p. 7.

<sup>38</sup> See 'Ethiopia Changed its Policy towards the TNG in Somalia' *Qaran*, in Somali, No. 2833, 9 August 2001, p. 2.

<sup>39</sup> See 'Ethiopia Changed its Policy towards the TNG in Somalia' *Qaran*, in Somali, No. 2833, 9 August 2001, p. 2.

Kenya appears drifting towards not accepting the outcome<sup>40</sup> and Uganda's position is not clear.

### **Funding**

This was one of the most pressing problems facing the Transitional National Government. During the civil war almost every thing owned by the government were either destroyed or looted. There were no chairs, desks, typewriters, computers, transport and buildings fit to accommodate ministers and other government departments.<sup>41</sup> This made the TNG activities became contingent on the availability of funds to run its administration.

The transitional National Government calculated that the international community would rush to inject funds into Somalia's moribund economy. On the other hand, the international community anticipated the creation of a stable environment by the TNG to provide funds. This has really become a chicken and egg argument. To get a stable environment the TNG needs financial assistance; to give financial assistance the international community needs a safe environment.

However, The TNG tried to workout its budget plan without any concrete assistance coming from the international community. Prime Minister Galayr submitted the country's first national budget to the Transitional National Assembly for the period of 2000-2001 set at US\$ 307 million.<sup>42</sup> The funds were earmarked for an ambitious set of projects - supposedly including reconstruction, printing new currency, resettling refugees

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<sup>40</sup> See 'Kenya President Met with Somali Faction Leaders' *Xidigta Banadir*, in Somalia, No. 656, 26 May 2001, p. 2.

<sup>41</sup> See 'Somalia: Government Formed' *New People Feature Service*, No.104, 1 November 2000, p.3

<sup>42</sup> Barise, H., 'The Hot Seat' BBC: Focus on Africa, Vol. 12, No. 1, January-March 2001, pp. 16-18.

and paying civil servants.<sup>43</sup> Some of that money was anticipated to come from the donors while the rest was supposed to come from loans provided by local businessmen who support the TNG, often through imported fake currency notes. So far, the business community has been providing up to US\$ 300,000 per month for the government's operations.<sup>44</sup> The business community expected to be paid back handsomely when the international community releases funds for the TNG.

Despite intermittent appeals to the international community, so far, the TNG has not secured any meaningful assistance. Since the TNG and its financial backers are counting on significant foreign aid to keep the administration afloat and enable it to repay loans from businessmen,<sup>45</sup> it will be in situation of ransom in the hands of its local financiers. The reasons for slow and minimal foreign aid from western bilateral and multilateral donors and the UN are self-evident: a combination of reduced foreign aid in general, reduced interest in Somalia, slow bureaucratic procedures for aid allocation,<sup>46</sup> and an unreliable situation in Somalia.

However, the bulk of Somalia's assistance is expected from the Arab world, where in October 2000, President Abdulkassim appealed to the Arab leaders to assist through a campaign equivalent of the Marshal Plan. So far, only 56 million US\$ from Saudi Arabia has been received by the TNG.<sup>47</sup> Another place where the TNG can make income is to reactivate the internal economic generating institutions of the country such as ports, airports, and other revenue collecting mechanisms. In the absence of central authority,

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> See 'Somalia: Government Formed' *New People Feature Service*, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>45</sup> Menkhaus, K., 'Somalia: Situation Analysis, January 2001' *General Report Menkhaus Document*, op. cit p. 7.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

business goes on without paying taxes and duties to any body, except security fees to militias. This will be a very difficult task to be achieved by a government lacking functioning state machinery.

However, one thing is obvious: without financial commitments to the TNG, its programmes will be hard to implement. No significant financial donations appear to be in the pipeline for the TNG in the foreseeable future. This does not augur well for the TNG in the face of internal and external growing adversaries.

### **Internal Obstacles**

The problem of re-entry manifested itself in the form of an opposition waged against the TNG by internal and external forces. The TNG's internal obstacles stem from two sources: the faction leaders and northern breakaway politics. Ethiopia nurtures both sources. The closer leaders and sub-clans are to Ethiopia, the more likely they are to oppose the TNG.<sup>48</sup> This situation immediately influences clans living near the border between Ethiopia and Somalia: for instance, the Marehan, Majerteen, Hawadle and Rahanwein are divided into groups opposing the TNG at the instigation of Ethiopia and groups supporting it.

In the beginning, the faction leaders and the leaders of the northern breakaway politics were sidelined by the sponsor of the Djibouti peace conference on Somalia in favour of civil society. This made them sworn enemies against any outcome of the conference. The fact that they control large swathes in Somalia enabled them to deny government officials a chance to visit a majority of the regions in the country. Those rejected vehemently the Transitional National Government include Hussein Mohamed Aidid,

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

Osman Hassan Ali (Ato), Muse Sudi Yalahow of Moogadishu and leaders of other factions outside Mogadishu. Unwilling to relinquish the lucrative fiefdoms they had built up through the barrels of their guns, they have roundly denounced the new administration.<sup>49</sup> With thousands of militiamen and large area of the capital under their control, the government will have to come to an agreement with them if anything is to be achieved.<sup>50</sup>

These factions received moral, political and military support from Ethiopia. This emboldened them more to reject the TNG as nothing more than a faction created by Ismail Omer Guelleh, the president of Djibouti to attain certain vested interests in Somalia. They vowed that if the TNG tried to impose their influence in their areas, the result would be another round of bloodshed in Somalia. The new government is backed by the influential Islamic courts and by wealthy business interests but many of the capital's most powerful warlords remain virulently opposed to it.<sup>51</sup>

The same is true with the northern breakaway politics, which describe the TNG as a ploy fabricated by the Djibouti government to destroy the developments they have reached comparatively. Somaliland completely rejected anything to do with southern Somalia and does not recognise the outcome of Djibouti peace initiative of the Somali conflict. Mohammed Ibrahim Egal, the President of the self-declared republic of Somaliland, made his views particularly clear, claiming that he is not interested in a power struggle with Abdulkassim. He nevertheless stressed that trying to force the

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<sup>49</sup> Barise, H., 'The Hot Seat' BBC: Focus on Africa, op. cit., pp. 16-18.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Barise, H., 'The Hot Seat' BBC: Focus on Africa, op. cit., pp. 16-18.

reunification of the whole country could allow the seeds of civil war to be sown in Somalia forever.<sup>52</sup>

Somaliland, rejected to attend the Djibouti conference because it considers itself a separate, sovereign state<sup>53</sup> whereas Puntland put forward conditions for its attendance at the peace process. For instance Puntland contended that it would travel to provided that a number of conditions be fulfilled: first, the reconciliation conference should recognise the legitimacy Puntland administration as an entity elected by its people; second, Somalis must be left alone to decide the type of government they want and where to have their national capital; third, Puntland government and its house of elders be empowered to pick the composition of its delegation in Djibouti; and fourth that Puntland would negotiate only with other elected regional bodies.<sup>54</sup> This was in total contradiction to the way Djibouti wanted to conduct the conference. Djibouti opted for members of the civil society as the major participants of the conference with less influence from the political leaders. Since Puntland's terms of participation were not entertained, it did not take part the conference and hence its opposition to the outcome.

At the moment, the TNG is holed up in a small part of Mogadishu with no financial resources to co-opt with faction leaders or to finance a major offensive against them. There is no external patron to throw its weight behind the TNG as Ethiopia did in favour of its opponents. Some critics argue that its days are numbered while others believe that it will survive the current tribulations. But one thing is obvious, since its inauguration one year ago: it has not achieved anything in terms of bringing peace and governance to the

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> see 'All that Somaliland Wants is what Djibouti has: A recognised Independent State' *Somaliland Forum Position Paper*, 22 March 2000, p. 4.

<sup>54</sup> See 'Puntland Dictates its Terms' *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, No. 901, 22 April 2000, p. 7.



people. The southern part of the country is still insecure as ever and the northern polities still claim their independence.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PEACE PROCESS INITIATED BY DJIBOUTI AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT IN DEVELOPMENT (IGAD) IN THE PERIOD FROM 1991 TO AUGUST 2000, WHICH COINCIDED WITH THE OPERATION OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT.

Introduction

This report will analyse critically the peace process initiated by Djibouti and the role of the state-government authority in Development (IGAD) in the period from 1991 to August 2000, which coincided with the operation of the State Government. From the beginning of the Peace Process, there was a number of activities - both internal and external - of how Djibouti managed the process. Over the course of 2000, as Djibouti carried out the peace process, these activities gained momentum and tended to become more active.

The report is divided into three sections. Section one will analyse critically Djibouti's role as the State mediator within the context of theories of mediation. The author's aim is to ascertain whether or not Djibouti followed the right procedures in carrying out the peace process according to theories of mediation. Section two will analyse critically the effectiveness of Djibouti as a mediator. Section three will discuss the implications of the findings of the study.

Background to the study: Theory and Practice

Observations regarding the conduct of the peace process reveal a wide divergence between theory and practice. Theory always sets the limit of what is possible or desirable, but in practice, the limited resources available - which greatly restrict the wish to do so - often prevent the theory from being put into practice. This report will discuss why previous endeavours failed and what the implications are for the future.

## **CHAPTER SIX CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF DJIBOUTI-LED IGAD PEACE PROCESS ON SOMALIA (MAY -AUGUST, 2000)**

### **Introduction**

This chapter will analyse critically the Somali peace process undertaken by Djibouti under the mandate of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the period from May to August 2000, which culminated in the formation of the Somali National Transitional Government. From the beginning of the Peace Process, there was no scarcity of criticism - both internal and external - of how Djibouti managed the conflict. Over the course of 2000, as Djibouti carried out the peace process, these critiques gained momentum and tended to become more sarcastic.

The chapter is divided into three sections. Section one will analyse critically Djibouti peace initiative in the Somali conflict within the context of theories of mediation. The aim of this section is to ascertain whether or not Djibouti followed the right procedures in managing the Somali conflict according to theories of mediation. Section two will examine critically the characteristics of Djibouti as a mediator. Section three will examine to what extent the hypothesis of the study conform to the findings.

### **Djibouti Mediation in the Somali Conflict: Theory and Practice**

Observations regarding the conduct of the peace process reveal a wide divergence between theory and practice. These divergences are the result of poor planning in designing the conflict management approach, which mainly emanate the wish an actor to realise an interest without adequate knowledge as to why previous endeavours failed and what are the realities on the ground in the moment.

## **The Ripe Moments**

Chapter One of the study talked about the of concept moments as a time in which a conflict is highly amenable to intervention by a third party. The fundamental element of a ripe moment is a deadlock that holds both parties from attaining their aims. After dragging for long time (more than ten years) and the failure of previous twelve mediations, the Somali conflict became ripe for resolution in 2000. But the question is for whom it became ripe for, the warlords or the so-called civil society?

Actually, the moment was ripe for the warlords who were the perpetrators of Somalia's civil war for more than a decade and not for non-existent civil society. During that period, twelve mediations before Djibouti Peace process on Somalia failed. In the meantime, no single warlord was able to impose his will over others by force. As such, the warlords realised that they cannot subdue each other by force and that its is necessary to find some other way to solve the conflict. It is during this period that the Djibouti Head of state, Ismail Omer Guelleh, the sponsor of the peace process, realised that the moment is ripe for interference. Unfortunately, he used a wrong approach in selecting the parties. Instead of calling the warlords for reconciliation, he invited what he termed civil society. This was major policy error that impacted negatively on the whole peace process.

## **Motives of Djibouti to Mediate the Somali Conflict**

Findings of the study reveal that the motives of Djibouti to mediate the Somali conflict range from security to economic concerns. It is now generally accepted that third parties mediate conflicts for interest. They do so for what they can gain from their

involvement as third parties.<sup>1</sup> Djibouti a small state wedged in between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia has its own reason to mediate the Somali conflict as will be seen below.

The position of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa is very precarious economically and politically. Two antagonistic ethnic groups, Afar and Issa who straddle across international borders inhabit the country. The Issas live in Djibouti, Ethiopia (epicentre) and Somalia while the Afar live Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia (epicentre). Eritrea claims part of Djibouti as its own territory while Ethiopia and Somalia claim the whole enclave respectively. This problem, coupled with the current poor inter-state relations threatens Djibouti's security. Of particular interest is the Ethiopian-Eritrean border conflict of 1998 to 2000, which gave Djibouti opportunity and security problems. Landlocked Ethiopia moved all its import and Export traffic from the Eritrean port of Assab to Djibouti, which previously handled less than a third of Ethiopian imports and exports.<sup>2</sup> This was double-edged sword business for Djibouti. First, it earned Djibouti the wrath of Eritrea. In late 1998, Eritrea accused Djibouti of allowing Ethiopia to use its port for importing military equipment for use in the border conflict.<sup>3</sup> Djibouti immediately severed its relations with Eritrea and recalled its ambassador.<sup>4</sup> Second, Ethiopia rejected to accept the high port duties levied by Djibouti on Ethiopian goods passing its port. The latter is what led to the souring of relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia in 1999. This tiny half-Somali ex-French territory is currently in economic and political crisis, not least because it is losing

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<sup>1</sup> Mwagiru, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of management* (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000), p. 55.

<sup>2</sup> See Murray, K., 'War and Famine Help Djibouti Expand Port' Reuters, 7 July 2000.

<sup>3</sup> Beurden, J. V., 'External Conflict Internalised' in Mekenkamp, M., Tongeren, P. V. and De Veen, H. V. (eds.), *Search for Peace in Africa: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities* (Utrecht, the Netherlands: European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 1999), p. 128.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

some of its vital Ethiopian transit trade to the booming port of Berbera in Somaliland.<sup>5</sup> This is one of the main reasons of why Ethiopia is dealing with Somaliland as separate entity from Somalia. Somaliland offers very cheap port duties on Ethiopian goods passing its port compared to Djibouti.

It can be argued that Djibouti mediated the Somali conflict to restore central authority in that country for three purposes. First, to have a strong unified Somali State, which is likely to balance the power disparities in the sub-region. This concurs with Mwangi when he contends that a state's motives to mediate a conflict include the desire to maintain a certain balance of power in international or regional relations.<sup>6</sup> Second, to beat Somaliland and Puntland as rivals in port services in the sub-region under unified Somali State, which owes its creation to Djibouti. Third, to institute Somali leadership that owes its coming to power to Djibouti. It can be argued this is why Djibouti minimised the role of warlords in the peace process because, most probably, the warlords would not have served the interest of Djibouti if they assumed the leadership produced by the peace process. This corroborates Zartman and Touval's posit which claims that the desire to make peace is intertwined with other motives best described within the context of power politics.<sup>7</sup> These are clear motives that can instigate a state to initiate mediation in order to produce something that is useful for its national interest. It is these motives that clash with other motives (those of Ethiopia) in the battle for ensuring national interests in the

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<sup>5</sup> See Lewis, I. M., 'New UN Adventures in Somalia' *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, Vol. 12, No. 3, May-June 2000, pp. 19-20.

<sup>6</sup> Mwangi, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of management*, op. cit., p. 56.

<sup>7</sup> Zartman, I. W. and Touval S., 'Mediation: The Role of Third-Party Diplomacy and Informal Peacemaking' in Brown, S. J. and Schraub, K. M., *Resolving Third world Conflict: Challenges for a New Era* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992), p. 243.

Horn of Africa. It is obvious that Djibouti had the motives to mediate the Somali conflict but appears not to command the ability of realising these aims of these motives.

### **Selection of the Parties**

From the beginning, it was clear that the Djibouti peace initiative in the Somali conflict lost direction when its sponsor, Ismail Omer Guelleh, the president of Djibouti declared that he wanted to host a peace process in which the main players will be members of the Somali civil society. Guelleh missed the point when he chose this group as the parties who would reconcile in his peace process. He antagonised the warlord by describing them a hurdle to Somalia's return to normalcy. Since they were not at war with each other, the civil society had no need to be reconciled. It is the armed factions and their leaders that needed to be reconciled.<sup>8</sup> The warlords still hold an awesome support both inside and outside of the country.

As evidenced by its outcome, the people who convened in Arta, Djibouti for the Somali National Peace Conference were not from civil society. Some of the most influential figures gathered in Djibouti were former ministers, ambassadors and high officials who served the previous regime and who found political asylum in Europe and North America.<sup>9</sup> Because of the role they played in Barre's corrupt dictatorship, which led Somalia to collapse, their credentials for nation-building are not impressive.<sup>10</sup>

### **(Im) partiality**

Djibouti was not impartial in her mediation of the Somali conflict. Djibouti wanted certain group of the participants to assume the role of leadership in the proposed

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<sup>8</sup> See 'The Djibouti-Sponsored Somali Peace conference: A Critique' Somaliland Forum Position Paper, 22 March 2000, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup> See Lewis, I. M, 'New UN Adventures in Somalia' *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

administration. Djibouti wanted to see the presidency go to Abdulkassim who is the cousin of Mohamed Deilaf, a Somali businessman who shares an extensive business with Abdurahman Boreh, a Djibouti businessman and a cousin of Ismail Omer Guelleh, the sponsor of the peace conference.<sup>11</sup> This is all the more so since the appointed Prime Minister of Somalia, Ali Khalif Galayr, is associated with Boreh in the Somtel telephone company based in Dubai and working in several Somali towns.<sup>12</sup> The question of impartiality was not a serious problem for the participants of the conference as most of them were interested to have an outcome that will allow the restoration of a Somali state as a framework in which most of them expected a role to play.

### **Tracks of Diplomacy Used in the Mediation Process**

Generally in conflict management, there are two types of conflict management approaches. These track one and two conflict management approaches. Track one is the type of conflict management approach practised by states and international organisation while track two is the one used by non-state actors such as private individuals and religious organisations. Track one is featured by official rules of conduct observed in formal structures while track two conflict management is characterised by informality because of lack of ceremonial arrangements.

The mediation of the Somali conflict by Djibouti in 2000 was performed within the precincts of track one conflict management approach. Several factors attest to this. These include the officials involved in the conduct of the mediation, the question of power basis, time pressures and pressure of constituents.

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<sup>11</sup> See 'Boreh is a Happy Man' *The Indian Ocean newsletter*, 917, 16 September 2000, 5.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

## **The Power Bases**

Track one conflict management, because it involves states and organisations of states, cannot be escape from the problem of pervasiveness of power.<sup>13</sup> For instance, the mediation of the Somali conflict by Djibouti in 2000 was the brainchild of Ismail Omer Guelleh, the President of Djibouti. The preparation of the conference, the conduct and the conclusion of the mediation were carried out under his guidance. The whole Djibouti State machinery attended the conduct of the peace process.

The issue of the power basis was clearly manifested in the clan sharing of the parliamentary seats and the election of the president. Since track one approaches are based on bargaining, most of the discussion centred on interests such as how many posts each clan will take and who will fill the key posts. This involved a lot of horse-trading and behind the scenes business conducted by officials of Djibouti government in order to arrives at a desired political aim

It was also evident, that the Djibouti head of state was very much interested in getting an outcome agreed and endorsed by the parties by hook and crack. In several occasions, particularly at times when the conference was nearly to be disintegrated due to clan disagreements, Guelleh intervened personally in order to avoid a breakdown of the conference. Once the business was started and the expenses were incurred, the main aim became to get an agreement and not to go down deep in the underlying issues of the Somali conflict because that needed a long time, which the Djibouti government officials were not prepared to face.

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<sup>13</sup> Mwangiru, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, op. cit., p. 123.



## Time Pressures

The factor of time pressures was very obvious since highly placed Djibouti government officials conducted the mediation under the watch of the public. Mwangiri argues that presidents and foreign ministers are rarely able to undertake conflict management projects, which might require a long period before they are finalised.<sup>14</sup> This in turn creates pressure to obtain results.<sup>15</sup> A good example of Mwangiri's argument is observed in the behaviour of President Guelleh during the mediation stage. For instance, A tight two-week schedule was agreed upon, with the election of a Transitional National Assembly anticipated by 10 July.<sup>16</sup> It is then hoped to have a president and prime minister elected by 13 July.<sup>17</sup> The schedule was being seen as a compromise between the Djibouti government - under considerable financial pressure to reach a conclusion to the talks - and Somali participants' desire for sufficient time to reach consensus.<sup>18</sup> The Djibouti government seemed to be in a hurry to see the end of the conference on Somali peace and reconciliation barely one and half months after its beginning.<sup>19</sup> In one instance, Djibouti head of state promised personally that he would take the newly elected president to the UN millennium summit provided that he is elected on time.<sup>20</sup> In all these conditions, Djibouti had recourse to a power setting, which generated the result required.

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 124.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> See 'Delegates Secure More Time for Debate' *IRIN-CEA* 27 June 2000.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> See 'Confusion at the Peace Conference' *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, No. 913, 22 July 2000.

<sup>20</sup> See 'Djibouti Conference Conclude: Transitional National Assembly in Place' *IRIN-CEA* 24 August 2000.

## Pressure of Constituents

Mwagiru argues that parties to mediation have constituents whom they must take into account as the management process unfolds.<sup>21</sup> Failure to take the demands and expectations of constituents into account leads to problem of re-entry.<sup>22</sup> Pressure of constituents occurred in the form of demonstrations expressing the wish of the war weary people to have once again the rule of law. These demonstrations took place in many parts of Somalia. Every morning since the Djibouti peace conference began, the people in Mogadishu had their morning tea over talks of the achievements the meeting made in every 24 hours.<sup>23</sup> This shows that the public on the ground had keen interest on developments in the conference. This amounted to huge pressure on the participants to attain a conclusion compatible with their aspirations. The public in these constituents wanted the restoration of Somali State. In view of that, the mediator and the participants worked to reach an agreement to that effect.

The mediator (Djibouti) also had external (i.e. France) and internal (Djibouti citizens) constituents who wanted the conclusion of the conference in a manner conducive to their interests. For instance, France felt happy with the success of Djibouti (a Francophone state) in arriving at a conclusion that can lead to the restoration of Somalia State that can enticed to join the Francophone world in the future. France sought recognition for the outcome in its game of expanding French influence in Horn of Africa, which deemed to be Anglophone area. Citizens of Djibouti (predominantly Somali ethnically) wished the welfare of that state, which lies in the restoration of a central

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<sup>21</sup> Mwagiru, M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, op. cit., p. 125.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> See 'Mogadishu Still Calm' *Xinhua* 18 June 2000.

authority. Also, Djibouti business community was keen on having the chance of being awarded contracts in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Somalia after the restoration of law and order.

Constituents contrary to the wishes of the above-mentioned constituents included warlords and their external allies. The warlords and the leaders of the northern breakaway politics challenged the legitimacy of the conference as a creator of unified Somali State. They are assisted in their campaign by external forces spearheaded by Ethiopia. Some critics argue that the United States is supporting Ethiopia in its bid to thwart the aims of Djibouti efforts in the Somali conflict. Currently, the American wait and see policy is being misread by some Somali and international actors as veiled hostility, linked to US support of Ethiopia.<sup>24</sup>

A brief analysis of the external and internal constituents of the mediator and the parties of the Somali conflict reveals a web of an interaction that goes far beyond imagination. It has political, economic, religious, linguistic and ethnic dimensions. There are horizontal and vertical connections that inform the Somali conflict. Among the constituents include the supporter and opponents of the outcome of the conference. They are external and internal forces. For instance, Djibouti who is driven by political, economic, security, religious, linguistic and ethnic consideration spearheads the supporters of the outcome of the conference. The main supporters of Djibouti' efforts include France and Egypt who is driven by divergent interests. For instance, France is driven by the competition between Anglophone and Francophone quarters and other economic considerations whereas Egypt is driven exclusively by ensuring the follow of

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<sup>24</sup> See Menkhaus, K., 'Somali Situation Analysis' *General Report*, 3 April 2000, p. 20.

the Nile waters and religious considerations to some extent. Egypt who is an Anglophone country falls in line here with France and Djibouti who are Francophone countries. A short glance on the cons reveals Ethiopia as the focal point of frustrating the realisation of the aims of Djibouti peace conference on Somalia. Like Djibouti, Ethiopia is driven by political, economic, security, religious and ethnic considerations. In its bid to destabilise what had been cooked in Djibouti, Ethiopia is supported by number of external and internal forces in the Somali conflict. For instance, United States is accused of siding with Ethiopia in her struggle to bring into nothing Djibouti's efforts on account of fear of the spread of two realities loathed by United States after communism: French culture and Islamic fundamentalism. All most all other states in the world that are stakeholders in the Somali conflict queue behind these two bulwarks in pursuit of their different interests.

This is a very complex situation in which foreign interests supersede the interests of the internal constituents. In tackling the situation, it needs careful examination in order to have a durable solution that is acceptable to all stakeholders. Unless otherwise, Somali will be doomed in a state of perpetual conflict and no single stakeholder will achieve its aims, unless it is an intentional obliteration of the Somali polity, which the trend favours now.

### **IGAD and the Djibouti Peace Process on Somalia**

In a statement released in the BBC on 26 August 2000, the then IGAD Executive Secretary-General (IESG), Dr. Atalaa Hamid Bashir welcomed and commended the effort of Djibouti in restoring a Somali central authority. He called upon the international Community to offer the necessary political, material and financial support in order to

ensure a complete implementation of the outcome of the Arta conference.<sup>25</sup> IGAD is ready to make every effort so that the new Somali government is recognised by the international community.<sup>26</sup> The IGAD secretariat should also be fully associated with the reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts, which should be undertaken urgently to ensure peace and stability in the country.<sup>27</sup> These statements of Dr. Atlaa were made mere rhetoric by the activities of the assembly who created his secretariat.

Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, Somalia's acting President attended the IGAD summit of Heads of State and Government in Khartoum on December 2000. It was reported that Ethiopia rejected the status given Somalia at the summit and requested the participation of Somaliland, Sudan, Djibouti and Eritrea supported Somalia attendance of the summit while Kenya and Uganda abstained from the matter. This shows a complete disagreement among the members of the organisation over the Somali matter. And this is one of the main reasons why the organisation is ineffective. It is ineffective because it is not a supranational organisation, which can exercise decisions that can supersede those of the member-states.

The sad story is that Djibouti was commissioned by the same IGAD summit of Heads of state and Government on 26 November 2000 to carry out a peace process on Somalia. After six months of mediation and 5 million US\$ expenses, the outcome is being rendered futile by the same body who endorsed it. This is ridiculous and an acceptable event to Djibouti and those who want peace in the Horn of Africa. This is setting a very dangerous precedent for future management of conflicts in the sub-region

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<sup>25</sup> See 'Foreign Reactions: IGAD supports Conference' *BBC MS* 26 August and *Radio Djibouti*, in French 24 August 2000.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

because all outcomes of any settled conflict will be measured according to unpredictable state interests in the Horn of Africa and not on general sub-regional co-operation for the development of the Horn. Given the nature of domestic issues the states and inter-state relations in the sub-region, unless otherwise, the sub-region will be the home of conflicts in the foreseeable future.

### **Hypotheses of the Study Revisited**

Hypothesis is an idea that is suggested as a possible way of explaining a situation, or proving an idea, which has not yet been shown to be true. In view of that, the study proposed three hypotheses for testing. These hypotheses were: (1) Djibouti mediated the Somali conflict ignoring the role of some important internal and external actors in the Somali conflict without whose support the outcome is likely to fail; (2) An individual member-state of a non-supranational sub-regional organisation cannot mediate a conflict successfully without the agreement of other member-states; (3) Mediation of an internal conflict commissioned by a non-supranational sub-regional organisation whose member-states do not espouse common views will not achieve a positive outcome. This section will examine to what extent the hypotheses stand true in relation with the findings of the study.

#### **Hypothesis One: Djibouti Mediated the Somali Conflict neglecting the role of some important internal and external stakeholders.**

In internal milieu, the extent of the truth of this hypothesis is available in the process the parties were selected. In his address to the 54<sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 22 September 1999, the President of the Republic of Djibouti, Ismail Omer Guelleh, presented a peace plan whose aim was to find a lasting solution to

the intractable problem of Somalia. As stated in the peace plan, the objective was restore normalcy back to Somalia by convening a reconciliation conference for the Somalis and ultimately to form a national transitional authority for the people of Somalia.

In the past, twelve peace initiatives were organised for Somalia to try to reach an agreement but all the attempts failed and some even ended in catastrophic armed confrontations.<sup>28</sup> That failure is largely attributed to the warlords who are accused of lack of vision, tact and the ability to compromise for the common good. In his new peace plan, Guelleh bypassed the warlords and the leaders of the northern breakaway polities and opted for civil society as the key parties of his peace process. There is no doubt that the warlords are key players in Somalia's conflict. True it was naïve to wish the faction leaders away: their military assets, their network of patronage, and their sensational political tactics render them indelible features of the Somali scene.<sup>29</sup> Foreign patrons who hold stakes in the Somali conflict augment all these attributes of the warlords.

### **The Warlords**

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Right from the beginning, the warlords criticised Djibouti's peace plan vehemently on account of its overlooking their role in the search of peace for Somalia. One year after the declaration of a Transitional National Government (TNG) at Arte, Djibouti, the Abdiqassim administration is still not functional. Mogadishu itself is divided into zonal enclaves ruled by different warlord, of which the TNG's part is the smallest. The TNG presently rules the vicinity of Ramadan hotel in north Mogadishu, the checkpoint at Kilometre 5 in south Mogadishu, and the region around the Interim President's house

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<sup>28</sup> See 'Djibouti Conference Continues: Last Face of the Conference Opens' *Xinhua*, 17 June 2000.

<sup>29</sup> Bryden, M., 'New Hope For Somalia? The Building Block Approach' *African Review of Political Economy*, Vol. 26, No. 79, March 1999, pp. 134-140.

near Kilometre 4. The remainder of the city is either under the control of one of the three strongest faction leaders rejecting the TNG or classified as no-man's land. When a UN fact-finding mission visited Mogadishu in December 2000, the TNG was ashamed by the reality that the UN delegation found them at a hotel. Instead, they met one of the faction leaders, Hussein Mohamed Aidid, at the one-time principal government house in Mogadishu (Villa Somalia), where Barre used to receive dignitaries. Hussein clings to the ruins as a symbol of his prestige ever since Barre vacated the villa, fleeing the rancorous and rapacious advancing USC forces.

The TNG's crucial trial will be taking control over Mogadishu. Blocking its way in that direction are the three opposing warlords who command large swathes of Mogadishu and its environs. The port and the airport of Mogadishu are still in the hands of clan militia that are demanding huge sums of money as a prerequisite for yielding control to the TNG. In the meantime, the faction leaders keep on dismissing the TNG as nothing more than a new faction created by Djibouti pure for its interest and caution that any TNG endeavour to interfere their authority will lead to another round violence.

The consequence has been a deadlock, particularly in Mogadishu. Neither the faction leaders nor the TNG is ready to fight. However, each side is buying time to get chance to get rid off the other. The faction leaders want to prolong the time until the TNG loses the steam. The more they frustrate the TNG, the more it loses legitimacy, economic aid, and durability. In this case, prolongation of the deadlock is favourable for the faction leaders - stalemate is tantamount to achievement for them. The TNG is also playing its cards to get foreign assistance, which will provide the means to disempower the warlords by buying away their militiamen, thus rendering them in a weakened bargaining position. The



faction leaders are apprehensive the possible arrival of foreign patron as TNG sponsor, which might expose their position vulnerability militarily. The chances of getting foreign patron is high on the side of the warlords because of certain states in the sub-region and other outside the sub-regional expressed their dissatisfaction of the outcome of Djibouti peace process on Somalia.

### **The Northern Autonomous Politics**

The regional autonomous Somali politics solidified in the informal process of state-creation that is continuing practically unacknowledged by the international community. These two self-ruling entities (each bigger than Djibouti in size and population), which nearly than other Somali part symbolise civil society, reject the Djibouti sponsored peace process on Somalia on the basis that it is not all-inclusive and endanger their apparent accomplishments in ensuring widely accepted administrations. Since these two politics opposing Djibouti initiative arguably contain one-third or more of the total inhabitants of the former Somali Republic, it is difficult to accept objectively the claim that the Djibouti peace process on Somalia is widely representative of the Somali people. The Djibouti politicking has sooner intensified tensions and aroused local conflicts, menacing surviving peace agreements and the delicate stability of those two autonomous regions that have so far escaped from the chaos that engulfed the southern part of the country.

The TNG's position vis-à-vis the autonomous northern regions of Puntland and Somaliland is nor promising. The TNG's council of ministers incorporates certain well known personalities from that politics intended to divide constituencies in order to undermine them. Such personalities include the Prime Minister, Assistant Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and several other ministers come from Somaliland while the

Ministers of Defence and Minerals and water resources come from Puntland. This places the TNG in direct confrontation with these polities. Thus, the net result of the whole peace process may be to destabilise and rekindle the civil war in the only truly peaceful parts of the country - the Recovery Zones.<sup>30</sup> However, officials representing the TNG cannot pay visit to these areas. If they do so, they will be arrested and charged in court of law as traitors.<sup>31</sup> As has been already mentioned, Somaliland wants to separation from Somalia. Somalilans's excuse for secession is based on two points: (1) the historical fact that it was a British colony while the rest of the country was an Italian colony; (2) the mistreatment of the northerners by the Barre's dictatorial regime. So far the territory has not received any international recognition.

Many Somalis doubt the validity of Somaliland's evidence for secession but appreciate the fact that the elected authorities succeeded to make a stable environment and operational institutions, which became elusive in the south. On the other hand, unlike Somaliland, which declared its independence from the south, Puntland stated that it does not nurse secessionist tendencies but advocates a system of federal states. It derides the south as a lawlessness place, which cannot be united with in this current situation. Despite the international community's neglect, the reality is that the northern polities laid the corner stone for the reconstitution of the Somali nation. Whether or not to support these polities to attain full sovereignty status or to force them join the south is a matter that needs careful consideration.

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<sup>30</sup> See 'Peace Process Questioned' *Somali Watch Organisation*, 24 June 2000.

<sup>31</sup> See 'Puntland President Issues Decree on Security' *Kaaha Bari, Bosaso*, In Somali, 7 September 2000. See also 'Government Arrests Member of Transitional National Assembly' *Xinhua*, 5 September 2000.

## Uncomfortable Neighbours

On the contrary, the warlords found an external patron who is not happy with what had been synthesised in Arte, Djibouti (i.e. the TNG) and willing to nip it in the bud. That is Ethiopia who believes that the Djibouti peace initiative in the Somali conflict did not take care of Ethiopia's interest and thus deserves to render it null and void. In response, Ethiopia took the position that the Somali reconciliation process is incomplete and needs to turn to negotiations with Somali actors outside the Arte process. Ethiopia is widely rumoured to be providing several Somali actors opposing the TNG with various types of support, ranging from financial to political to military. These factions supported by the Ethiopians include the RRA; General Morgan's militia, recently defeated in their bid to capture the southern port town of Kismayo, under the control of *Marehan* clan, allied to *Ayr* the clan of the interim president; Abdulahi Yusuf of Puntland; Hassan Abdulle Qalad of of the *Hawadle* in Hiran region; and Muse Sudi Yalahow in Mogadishu. Large arms shipments to warlords have been very inflammatory in Mogadishu and significantly worsened relations between the TNG and Ethiopia. The Ethiopians have also called for a meeting in Addis Ababa of the faction leaders who reject the TNG. A number of them attended that meeting in which the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration council (SRRC) was formed as a coalition of warlords opposed to the TNG. Recent activities of the Ethiopia sponsored SRRC include an attempt to capture Kismayo from clans allied to the TNG.<sup>32</sup> Recently, Ethiopia declared that it does not recognise the TNG.

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<sup>32</sup> See 'Somalia Peace Hopes Hit by Fresh violence' *The people*, No. 975, 10 August 2001.

### **The validity of Hypothesis One**

In view of Guelleh's original sidelining of the warlords and the leaders of the northern autonomous polities in his peace plan, coupled with the disregard to the wishes of the neighbouring states is testimony that Djibouti mediated the Somali Conflict without giving any consideration to the role of these actors in solving the Somali conflict. This dealt a major blow to the implementation of what had been agreed in Djibouti.

Had the agreement been one worked out by all the stakeholders, implementability could have been much easier than as it is today. The warlords, the leaders of the northern autonomous polities and the neighbouring states constitute an insurmountable obstacle that without one reckoning in their co-operation in the Somali question, his efforts will bear no fruits.

**Hypothesis Two: An individual member state of a non-supranational sub-regional organisation cannot mediate a conflict successfully without the agreement of other member-states.**

It is apparent that Djibouti mediated the Somali conflict without agreement the agreement of some members of IGAD. A testimony of this is found the reaction given to the outcome of Djibouti's initiative in the Somali conflict by Some IGAD members. Ethiopia rejected the outcome and went out to sabotage it openly, politically, economically and militarily. Kenya did not recognise the outcome and embarked on a policy of sabotaging it politically and economically (i.e. banning border trade with Somalia). Uganda has neither recognise nor rejected the outcome. Sudan's former recognition is being withdrawn gradually as Sudan's relation with Ethiopia and Kenya grows. Eritrea recognised the outcome but cannot do anything for raising the status of the

TNG because Eritrea itself is semi-isolated state in the sub-regional diplomatic manoeuvres. It is only Djibouti carrying the full weight of trying to bring Somalia in the sub-regional diplomatic circles at par with other states.

Had Djibouti co-operated with the IGAD member-states in mediating the Somali conflict, the prognosis of the TNG could have been more promising than it is today. The sub-regional states have bearing on the international environment and domestic politics of Somalia. Their clout would have paved the way for the TNG as a recognised government and would have eased internal tension as most of the warlords and northern autonomous polities depend for their survival on the neighbouring countries.

#### **The Validity of Hypothesis Two**

The validity of hypothesis two is based on the behaviour observed in the activities of some IGAD member-states vis-à-vis the outcome of Djibouti peace initiative in the Somali conflict which is characterised by non-co-operation in the direction of realising the aims of that outcome. This is shown in the form of not recognising the outcome, sabotaging its implementation and encouraging rival groups as supplants.

The success of the mediation effort would have been more favourable if the mediator sought the consensus of IGAD member-states in the first place. This would have been reinforced with constant consultations of the mediator with the neighbouring states about the direction the process is moving to in order to avoid the unnecessary elements that might jeopardise the implementation of the outcome beforehand. All these have not happened and the result is that the success of the outcome is in question because of the coming from some IGAD member-states as predicted by hypothesis two.

**Hypothesis Three: Mediation of an internal conflict commissioned by a non-supranational sub-regional organisation whose member-states do not espouse common views will not achieve a positive outcome.**

The study found that IGAD is non-supranational sub-regional organisation whose mandate includes the management of inter and intra-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa. So far it had commissioned the mediation of the Somali conflict and the Sudanese one. In 1996, it commissioned Ethiopia to mediate the Somali conflict. Ethiopia convened the famous Soderre conference in which 26 Somali factions attended to restore statehood to Somalia. This effort was frustrated in early 1997 by a parallel initiative instituted by Egypt who is in intense competition with Ethiopia in addressing Somalia's problem. The role of IGAD member-states in dissuading or goading Egypt in its rivalry with Ethiopia in the Somali problem is not clear.

In its 7<sup>th</sup> IGAD summit of Heads of State and Government on 26 November 2000, IGAD authorised Djibouti to carry out a peace process on Somalia. Several questions need to be answered in this regard. Where did Ethiopia's mediation ended? How did Djibouti assume the role of mediation? Is it a compromise between Egypt and Ethiopia or a representation of Egypt by Djibouti? The answers of these questions were not clear at the time Djibouti started its mediation initiative in the Somali conflict. However, an analysis of IGAD's authorisation of Djibouti to carry out a peace process on Somalia and the subsequent reactions of its member-states in regard of what Djibouti has achieved is something incompatible. IGAD is an organisation whose general assembly endorses resolutions to be carried out by a member or group of members but lacks the mechanism to ensure that its own members or other outside bodies do not derail the process.

This divergence of word and deeds is something very common in the conduct of all non-supranational organisations. IGAD as a sub-regional organisation is a replica of the OAU in structure and constitution. Articles 8 and 9 of its Charter show that the Assembly of Heads of state and Government is the highest decision-making organ of the institution. That Assembly currently brings together Afwerke, Beshir, Guelleh Moi, Melez and Museveni. Do such men from different backgrounds and under varying degrees of internal and external pressures ever agree on something? The answer of that question is not promising. The Charter of IGAD is framed in a manner supports the survival of these elite in power. Article 6 (2) of the IGAD Charter enjoins non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states. How could this be possible? For instance, Sudan had one of longest civil wars in Africa. How could this war be solved when IGAD is headed by states that have agreed not to interfere with the internal affairs of member-states? An another major problem is that the elite is interested only in the survival of their administrations. This has brought a new phenomenon in which alliances keep changing within the sub-region. For instance, only a few years ago Ethiopia and Sudan were sworn enemies, today they are erstwhile comrades-in-arms. Despite the existence of some of the worst in Africa in the Horn of Africa, since its inception as IGADD in 1986, IGAD has not solved any single conflict in the sub-region.

Some critics argue that the weaknesses of IGAD emanate from lack of funds, poor structures and lack of experience in conflict management. It can be argued that that argument is a mere rhetoric. The main problem comes from the components. If the units are healthy the whole will be healthy; the vice versa is true. None of the states that constitute IGAD is stable internally politically and economically. Most of the

governments in IGAD are made up of illegitimate coalitions comprising a bunch of elite who wants to cling to power till to the end. Such a system produces a weak sub-regional organisation which not capable of abiding by its word. That is why since its inception IGAD is not achieving any concrete results in the field of conflict management in the Horn of Africa sub-region.

### **The validity of Hypothesis Three**

The validity of hypothesis three is discernible in the course handling conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Since its inauguration in 1986 as sub-regional organisation there had been many inter and intra-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Major inter-state conflicts include the Ethio-Eritrean conflict of 1989 to 2000. This conflict is settled by the OAU through the good offices of the Algerian President, Abdul Aziz Bouteflika in December 2000, at Algiers. Major intra-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa include the Sudanese and the Somali one. These are still raging after several trails by IGAD to solve them. The Djibouti internal conflict between the FRUD and the government Djibouti was settled in Paris on 7 February 2000 under the brokerage of the French government.<sup>13</sup>

Where is the role of IGAD when foreign actors settle conflicts in the sub-region and some are still raging? Lack of positive result in conflict management programmes commissioned by IGAD is the result of the behaviours of IGAD member-states. An evidence of that is Ethiopia's current sabotaging of the outcome of Djibouti's effort in the Somali conflict which legitimised by IGAD in the beginning. This is a clear testimony to the validity of hypothesis three of the study.

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<sup>13</sup> See 'Djibouti-Armed FRUD Grounds Arms' *The Indian Ocean NewsLetter*, No. 901, 22 April 2000.



## CHAPTER SEVEN

### CONCLUSION: CONFLICT AND SUB-REGIONAL PEACE INITIATIVES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

#### **Introduction**

The Somali conflict is unique in terms of issues, duration, intractability and the parties. It is complex and prolonged conflict where the issues do not have religious, ethnic, class or territorial sources. It is an intractable conflict, which the international community failed several times to solve it. Normally, in many African conflicts, the internal parties are definite. They are mostly governments versus one or more armed opposition groups. In Somalia, the parties are not definite. The conflict is not between government and one or more armed groups. It is between many clan-based factions which none of them has the ability to subdue others. Since 1991, several international, regional and sub-regional efforts were mounted to solve that conflict with no success. Until then, the conflict is a thorn in the side of the international community and untold suffering for the Somali people.

The study examined and analysed the Somali conflict, which is characterised by that nature. The study gave particular emphasis to the Djibouti peace initiative in the Somali conflict in 2000. The main concern of the study was to explore the sub-regional interventions in the Somali conflict, their achievements and setbacks. However, it narrated extensively the Somali conflict: causes, consequences, dynamics, internationalisation, management, reasons of intractability and sub-regional influences.

This chapter will reach conclusions based on the findings of the study, assessed within the theoretical approaches of conflict management. The crux of the study is concerned with Horn of Africa, particularly the internal conflict in Somalia and its sub-

regional implications. Nevertheless, the conclusions reached can be generalised to explain internal conflicts in other sub-regions of the world. It will give comments concerning the institutional crisis inherent in the Horn of Africa sub-regional conflict management approaches, and describes its implications for the future of IGAD as an effective conflict management institution.

### **Findings of the Study**

Djibouti peace initiative in the Somali conflict had the aim of restoring a recognised Somali government in the international community. The study found that in the course of this feat, Djibouti made technical errors in approaching the problem. These errors included the selection of the parties. Djibouti selected what it termed civil societies as parties to be reconciled in its mediation of the Somali conflict. It ignored the warlords who could silence the guns in order to find peace in Somalia. Another error was that Djibouti as a heterogeneous third party mediator did not had an exogenous co-mediator to help here sort out intricate problems inherent to a protracted conflict like that of Somalia. In complicated conflict circumstances, an exogenous co-mediator, who would be less affected by the psychological and bureaucratic vicissitudes of the environment, should assist a lone heterogeneous intermediary involved in such conflict.

Like its predecessor's who tried to solve the Somali conflict, Djibouti tried to restore centrally administered Somali State. The UN sponsored 1993 Addis Ababa Conference on National Reconciliation, the Ethiopian sponsored Sodere Peace Process of 1996 and the Egyptian sponsored Cairo Peace Process of 1997 are notable benchmarks in a long history of failed mediations in the Somali conflict intended to restore a unitary Somali state. Djibouti in its mediation of the Somali conflict in 2000 followed the same formula

employed by the previous failed peace initiatives (i.e. to restore a unitary Somali state). It is necessary that the international community ask themselves why all these mediations failed. The answer is not simple.

Soon after the demise of the state in 1991, Somalia disintegrated into localities dominated by certain clans. For instance, Mogadishu, which once used to be the centre of the Somali people, is now a Hawiye clan stronghold. All other Somali clans were driven out through a campaign of clan cleansing. The result was that every clan migrated to its ancestral home and most rejects to go back to Mogadishu as the capital of a Somali unitary state. The trend assumed another dimension in which clans opted to form their own regional administrations. The first area to make its regional administration was Somaliland, which later declared its independence from Somalia, followed by Puntland. This grassroots administration is what inspired the building blocks paradigm in which some international scholars and politicians proposed as an antidote for Somalia's current conflict. The building block paradigm posits that since Somalis broke into regions that are not ready to unite at the moment, these regions must be assisted and fostered by the international community as separate entities until becoming full-fledged and recognised states. Eventually, these states have the right to discuss the nature of all-inclusive Somali State (i.e. unitary, federal or confederal ).

The EEC had so far shown some an interest in the building block paradigm as a solution for the Somali conflict. It appears that the majority of the internal actors in the Somali conflict and a significant number of the external stakeholders support the idea of the building block. But the problem is that they lack co-ordination and determination to effect this project. The stage is already set for it. For instance Somaliland and Puntland

are already there. They need genuine support to enhance their capacity to implement effective regional administrations.

The study pinpoints that the causes of the Somali conflict do not originate from Barre's dictatorship, as many would suggest. In a story published in the Economist on 21 October 2000, the author reported that Somalis used to say if only Barre were out of the way, everything would have been fine. They blamed their problems on the dictator, who seized power in 1969, But he was removed nearly ten years ago - and things then got worse. It can be argued that Barre's dictatorship was not more malignant than that of Amin, Bokassa, Habre, and Mingistu. Despite the heinous atrocities committed by these dictators against their own peoples, Unlike Somalia, they replaced by functioning and internationally recognised governments. In Somalia the story is different. The country was destroyed and torn apart by clan warfare, hundreds of thousands died, and more than one million fled into exile.

Another issue that the study discovered is that IGAD is no more than talk shop. This is true, particularly when IGAD commissioned Djibouti to carry out the exercise of reconciling the Somalis, and again some of its member-states openly sabotage the outcome of Djibouti produced. This shows that the rules and regulations of IGAD do not are not binding. The repercussions of this type of action for IGAD's future as a conflict management organisation will be far reaching. It will be difficulty in future for any member state to accept to carry out a peace process sponsored by IGAD. Djibouti reflects the consequences of such IGAD sponsored peace processes: after eight months of preparations, fours months of negotiations and 5 million US\$ expenses, the effort is made futile by the same people who authorised it. What an unfortunate situation! This shows

that some member-states supported the Djibouti peace process on Somalia rhetorically, but were apparently unwilling to take part in the concerted responses required to implement the outcome.

The study also found that sub-regional organisations are not better than OAU. All weaknesses accused with the OAU are available in sub-regional organisations. The structure, constitution, and *modus operandi* of IGAD are similar to that of the OAU. In Africa, where sub-regionalism in conflict management earned praise is West and Southern Africa. That is largely attributed to Nigeria and South Africa, which play the role of hegemonic stabilisers in their sub-regions. Without Nigeria ECOWAS would have been nothing. The same is true with SADC without South Africa. Despite some sub-regional disagreements, Nigeria carried out a successful peacekeeping mission in Liberia while South Africa restored normalcy to Lesotho. In the Horn of Africa, there are no such hegemonic stabilisers, which can throw their weight behind a peace process. Djibouti a tiny and poor state cannot afford such a role. Those countries in the Horn of Africa who can play the role of a hegemonic stabiliser the sub-region are not in the mood of restoring normalcy to the sub-region. This lack of backup by a hegemonic stabiliser in the Horn of Africa will render IGAD weaker, and ultimately dead.

The study found that lack of co-operation among the member-states of IGAD emanates from poor governance within the member-states. Most of the states are weak politically and economically due to lack of proper governing methods. This problem is due to the behaviour of the elite in power who are interested only in political survival. This renders states in the Horn insecure internally and externally. Often suspicions among member-states are very high. Co-operation and alliances are not durable and often

changing. Because of intra-organisational divisions, distrust and suspicions about the ulterior motives of member-states, collective decisions become difficult to be implemented by all member states. All of these make the possibility of building a strong sub-regional organisation just mere dream. A viable and effective sub-regional organisation cannot be made, as long the regimes in Horn of Africa are undemocratic.

## **Recommendation**

### **The Somali Conflict: The way forward**

It is argued that twelve peace initiatives were conducted prior to Djibouti involvement in the Somali conflict in 2000. All these peace initiatives had one common aim: to restore a Somali central authority. Djibouti's peace initiative in the Somali conflict followed suit and its outcome is wobbling to failure amid strong opposition from many quarters. In view of that the study is recommending that the international community should change its current conceptual glasses in looking at the Somali problem.

### **Building Block Paradigm: A New Optimism for Somalia**

The building block approach appears to be the current available antidote for Somalia's conflict as all other efforts seeking to establish a Somali unitary state failed for one reason or another. The fact that the two existing building blocks of Somaliland and Puntland gives credibility to the prototype. Somaliland and Puntland portray a administratively better authority and a apparently more improved approach of political reorganisation than in the rest of Somalia. In both examples, political clan-based arrangements have been progressively eroded and authorities have been subjected to solicit a mandate to rule from the public. A governing system, joining components of traditional Somali customary law (xeer) with present constitutional examples determine

the authority, rights and duties and limitations of leadership. The relative benefits of this paradigm are apparently clear: both polities are more developed than the rest of the country in terms of security, economic development and governance.

The actual force of the bottom-up approach, as sometimes is called this paradigm, emanates from that fact that more transparent, accountable, stable and accepted leadership replaces the power of the warlords. These administrations are attained through prolonged, all-inclusive meetings or electoral processes; their authorities are expressed in constitutions that contain both components of current laws and traditional Somali customary law (xeer); and their powers are defined by the terms of the agreement and the necessity to ensure unanimity. Conceivably even more significantly, they get their legitimacy essentially from the clear permission of the ruled, not by force or through foreign patronage, nor from through top-bottom approach synthesised in international reconciliation conferences. This shows that the building block approach is more promising than what the international community has been trying to achieve in Somalia for the last ten years (i.e. the establishment of unitary Somali State).

In view of that, the study recommends that Somaliland must be recognised as a sovereign state. Puntland and the rest of South Somalia must assisted to build separate regional administrations. In this case, there will be territories out of former Somali republic: Somaliland (sovereign), Puntland and South Somalia as a unit. The international community must assist the two territories of Puntland and South Somalia generously until going back to statehood. They must be protected adequately by the international community from the regional and regional rivalries, which impact negatively on the development of the polities.

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