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
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**THE IMPACT OF THE COLD WAR ON THE  
ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA RELATIONS, 1960-1990**

MA Dissertation Submitted to the  
Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies,  
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Award of  
Master of Arts Degree in International Studies



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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION .....	5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	6
DEDICATION .....	7
ABBREVIATIONS .....	8
MAP OF THE HORN OF AFRICA .....	10
MAP SHOWING GREATER SOMALIA CLAIM .....	11
CHAPTER ONE: THE IMPACT OF THE COLD WAR ON THE ETHIOPIA - SOMALIA RELATIONS: A CONCEPTUALIZATION .....	12
1.1 Introduction .....	12
1.2 Statement of the Problem .....	15
1.3 Justification of the Study .....	19
1.4 Objectives of the Study .....	20
1.5 Literature Review .....	21
1.5.1 Literature on the Cold War .....	21
1.5.2 Literature on Ethiopia and Somalia .....	25
1.5.3 Critique of Literature Review .....	29
1.6 Theoretical Framework .....	30
1.7 Hypotheses .....	33
1.8 Definition of Concepts .....	33
1.8.1 Cold War .....	33
1.8.2 Interstate Relations .....	33
1.9 Research Methodology .....	34
1.10 Tentative Chapter Outline .....	34
CHAPTER TWO: THE COLD WAR IN THE HORN OF AFRICA .....	35
2.1 History of the Cold War .....	35
2.2 Background of Somalia and Ethiopia .....	38
2.2.1 Somalia .....	38
2.2.2 Ethiopia .....	41
2.3 The Superpowers' Interest in the Horn .....	43
2.4 Treaties of Friendship and Co-operation .....	44

2.5	Security Dilemma in Somalia and Ethiopia .....	45
2.5.1	Somalia .....	45
2.5.2	Ethiopia .....	48
2.6	Patron-Client Relations Deteriorate .....	50
2.6.1	Somalia .....	50
2.6.2	Ethiopia .....	51
2.7	Shift of Alignments .....	53
2.8	American-Soviet Foreign Policies in Somalia and Ethiopia .....	57
2.9	The Demise of the Cold War in the Horn of Africa .....	59
2.10	Impact of the Cold War in the Horn of Africa .....	60

CHAPTER THREE: THE DYNAMICS OF THE ETHIOPIA - SOMALIA RELATIONS..... 64

3.1	Background of Ethiopia-Somalia Relations .....	64
3.2	Somalia's Policy towards Ethiopia .....	67
3.3	Ethiopia's Policy towards Somalia .....	69
3.4	Socialism in the Horn.....	70
3.5	Soviet's Plan to Sideline USA in the Horn Fails.....	73
3.6	Ethio-Somali Wars.....	75
3.6.1	1963-1964 War .....	75
3.6.2	1977-1978 War .....	77
3.7	Renewed Cold War in the Horn of Africa.....	83
3.8	The Horn of Africa in the Post 1977-1978 Ogaden War .....	85

CHAPTER FOUR: THE IMPACT OF THE COLD WAR ON THE ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA RELATIONS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ..... 88


4.1	Impact of the Cold War on the Ethiopia-Somalia Relations .....	89
4.1.1	Weakened Interstate Relations.....	89
4.1.2	Rivalry .....	90
4.1.3	Interstate Hatred and Mistrust.....	91
4.2.4	Proliferation of Arms in the Horn .....	91
4.2.5	Support of Rebel Movements .....	92
4.2	An Analysis of the Hypotheses .....	94
4.2.1	Ethiopia .....	96
4.2.2	Somalia.....	101
4.3	An Analysis of the Objectives.....	101

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARIES, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS..	104
5.1 Summaries .....	104
5.2 Conclusions .....	104
5.3 Recommendations.....	105
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	109
Books .....	109
Journals .....	114
Periodicals .....	114
Articles, Papers and Monographs .....	116
Reports and Bulletins .....	118
Documents.....	118
Others .....	119

## DECLARATION

I, Elizabeth Chebet Kigen, declare that this is my own work, achieved through personal reading, critical reflection and scientific academic research. I also declare that this project has not been submitted to any institute for academic credit.

I have acknowledged all the information from other sources.



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Elizabeth Chebet Kigen

December 2004

This project has been submitted to the University of Nairobi with my approval as University supervisor.

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Prof. J. D. Olewe Nyunya

December 2004

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to KAAD, for financial assistance during the period of my studies. My heartfelt gratitude also goes to my supervisor, Professor Olewe Nyunya for his tireless and committed efforts and guidance while supervising my project. I cannot forget to thank Mr. Andrew Wenani for his resourcefulness and guidance. Finally, I thank all the teaching and non-teaching staff of IDIS as well as my classmates for their support and encouragement.

## DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to my beloved mother, Priscah Kigen and my late father, Benjamin Kigen. Had it not been for their hard work, I would not be where I am today.


## ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union, the successor of OAU
CELU	Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Union
CIS	Commonwealth Independence of States
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAF	Ethiopian Air Force
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDU	Ethiopian Democratic Union
EEC	European Economic Community
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
EPLF	the Eritrea Popular Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	European Union (the successor of EEC)
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GFR	German Federal Republic
IetAF	Imperial Ethiopian Air Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFD	Northern Frontier District
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
PMAC	Provisional Military Administrative Council
SAC	Strategic Air Command (Air force of USA)
SAF	Somali Air Force



SALT	Strategic Arms Liberation Treaty, in two parts, I and II
SEPDC	Southern Ethiopia Peoples' Democratic Coalition
SNA	Somali National Army
SNM	Somali National Movement
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRC	Supreme Revolutionary Council
SRRC	Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SYC	Somalia Youth Club
TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPLF	Tigrayan People's Liberation Front
UNO (or UN)	United Nations Organization
USA (or US)	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United Somali Congress
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, also called the Soviet Union
WPE	Workers' Party of Ethiopia
WSLF	Western Somali Liberation Front


# MAP OF THE HORN OF AFRICA<sup>1</sup>



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<sup>1</sup> Map of the Horn of Africa [www.nystromnet.biz/Horn\\_Africa.html](http://www.nystromnet.biz/Horn_Africa.html).

# MAP SHOWING GREATER SOMALIA CLAIM<sup>2</sup>



<sup>2</sup> Cf. Africa Research Bulletin 15.1 (February 15 1978).

# CHAPTER ONE: THE IMPACT OF THE COLD WAR ON THE ETHIOPIA - SOMALIA RELATIONS: A CONCEPTUALIZATION

## 1.1 Introduction

The Second World War destroyed the multi-polar balance of power system that existed since the birth of modern nation state with the 1648 Treaty of West Phalia. A one time American financier and presidential advisor, Bernard Baruch first used the term *cold war* on March 12 1947 during a congressional debate on the Truman doctrine.<sup>3</sup> Scholars disagree on the beginning of the cold war. According to LaFeber,<sup>4</sup> the cold war is divided into two parts. The first part began after The First World War and lasted until the end of the Second World War, while the second part commenced from 1945 to 1990. He sees the cold war from the point of view of economic imperialism, and defines it as “the ongolic struggle between the world’s commercial centres and the lying countries that provide markets and raw materials.”<sup>5</sup> The third part is fought within the United States (US), between the opposing ideologies.<sup>6</sup>

Harbutt<sup>7</sup> and Churchill<sup>8</sup> consider the formation of the Warsaw Pact Treaty as the onset of the cold war. For Vogl, the cold war began on September 2 1945, with the formal surrender of Japan.<sup>9</sup> Some writings consider the Yalta Conference to be birth of the cold war.<sup>10</sup> Another article argues that the cold war began in 1917 with the Russian Revolution when communism

<sup>3</sup> “Cold War” in Macmillan Dictionary of Historical Terms (2<sup>nd</sup> edition) (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990) p. 69.

<sup>4</sup> Walter LaFeber, “An End to Which War?” in Michael J. Hogan, ed., The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) pp. 14ff.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 16.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America and the Origins of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Winston S. Churchill, “Iron Curtain Speech” in Modern History Sourcebook (March 5 1946).

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Mark Vogl, Cold War: When Did It Begin? (New York: AMVETS Cold War Veterans Committee, November 10 1999).

<sup>10</sup> The Cold War Begins [www.history.acusd.edu/gen/20th/coldwar1.html](http://www.history.acusd.edu/gen/20th/coldwar1.html).

dawned.<sup>11</sup> Most of the scholars believe that cold war began in 1945, immediately after the Second World War, whereby USA emerged as a political, economic and military superpower. It replaced powerful actors like Germany, Italy and Japan, while Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) emerged as its close rival.<sup>12</sup>

The end of the cold war is also debatable. According to Garthoff, the cold war ended from 1989 to 1990.<sup>13</sup> For some, scholars, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the birth of 15 newly independent nations in Eastern Europe marked the end of the cold war.<sup>14</sup> According to Hogan,<sup>15</sup> the cold war ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany. Finally, according to Vogl, the cold war ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union.<sup>16</sup> He asserts, “the cold actually ended on Christmas Day, 1991 with the last day of the Soviet Union.”<sup>17</sup>

During the cold war, the global community was split into two ideological blocs: the East and the West, depending on whom they allied with between the rival superpowers. USA led the Western bloc while USSR led the Eastern bloc. The Eastern bloc promoted socialism, while the Western bloc promoted capitalism. The causes of contention between the two superpowers were based on political, economic and ideological differences of communism vis-a-vis capitalism. The international atmosphere was very tense. USA and its European allies formed

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<sup>11</sup> The Cold War [www.gohworld.com/sgspace/Cold-war.html](http://www.gohworld.com/sgspace/Cold-war.html).

<sup>12</sup> Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global (Toronto: Little Brown and Co., 1981) p. 39; Vito V. Mannino and Albert L. St. Clair, Cold War: When Did It Start? Why Did It Start? [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs/99-118.html](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs/99-118.html).

<sup>13</sup> Raymond L. Garthoff, “Why Did the Cold War Arise and Why Did It End?” in Michael J. Hogan, The End of the Cold War: Its Meanings and Implications op. cit. p. 130.

<sup>14</sup> Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History” in National Interest, 16 (Summer 1989) pp. 3-18; “Cold War” in The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 3, Micropaedia Ready Reference (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. 1997) p. 444.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Michael Hogan, ed., The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications op. cit. pp. 14ff.

<sup>16</sup> Mark Vogl, Cold War: When Did It Begin? When Did It End? op. cit.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), whose headquarters is in Brussels, with a membership of 19 by 2003. Russia led the states of Eastern Europe that were aligned to Moscow, and formed the Warsaw Pact Treaty. The two superpowers competed in providing military and economic aid to their clients with the aim of winning them. Most of their clients were drawn from the developing world, since they are in need of financial aid.

The superpowers did not use nuclear weapons against each other because “they both had nuclear weapons that could cause vast damage and did not want to start another war.”<sup>18</sup> Garthoff adds that “nuclear weapons also helped to keep the cold war cold to prevent a third world war in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.”<sup>19</sup> The early part of the cold war was characterised by peaceful co-existence between the superpowers. USA devised a policy of containment to keep the communism within the Eastern Europe so that it does not spread to other parts of the world. The bipolar system started declining gradually in 1960s through to 1980s until its end, which marked a shift from a bipolar to a unipolar world, as USA became the sole superpower.

The effects of the cold war on the Ethiopia-Somalia relations are felt even today. This study intends to explore the impact of the cold war on the interstate relations between Ethiopia and Somalia. This impact was mostly political, not religious or cultural. Probably, because of the initial spread of Islam in Somalia and the strong Orthodox Christianity in Ethiopia at that time, which may have stiffened the European and American cultural influence.<sup>20</sup> This research will focus on the political aspects.

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<sup>18</sup> The Cold War op. cit.

<sup>19</sup> Raymond L. Garthoff, “Why Did the Cold War Arise and Why Did It End?” in Michael J. Hogan, The End of the Cold War: Its Meanings and Implications op. cit. p. 128.

<sup>20</sup> John W. Harbeson, “The International Politics of Identity in the Horn of Africa” in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., African in World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) p. 123.

## 1.2 Statement of the Problem

Ethiopia and Somalia have not had good relations for a long time. They share a long history of enmity coupled with repressed grudges. Conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia started soon after Somalia's independence and culminated in the 1964 Ogaden War. The cold war is called so because it did not lead to direct-armed conflict between the superpowers. Throughout the cold war, the superpowers avoided direct confrontation; the confrontations were mostly through their allies. Although there were real wars, also called *proxy wars*, they were fought by the surrogates of the superpowers in the Third World, rather than the giants themselves. In addition to North and South Korea, the Horn of Africa is one of the rare cases in the world where the cold war manifested differently as the clients of the superpowers came into direct armed battles, incited and armed by the superpowers.

Prior to the shift of alliance in the 1977, USA fought Somalia through Ethiopia while the Soviet Union fought Ethiopia using Somalia. USA incited Somalia and supplied the weapons and military advisers to fight Ethiopia. In turn, Somalia armed the *shifita* in the "lost land" in the neighbouring countries, especially in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, who terrorized the populace. On the other hand, the Soviet Union armed Ethiopia immensely, provided the military advisers, and incited Ethiopia against Somalia. After the shift of alliance, it was the vice versa. USA moved in to support Somalia while USSR moved to Ethiopia. When Barre abrogated the 1974 treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union in 1977, as the latter refused to support his attack of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, the Soviet advisers and troops moved into Ethiopia immediately. They quickly signed a new friendship treaty with their new client in 1978, and took over the multibillion-communication base at Asmara, which the Americans had occupied for years.

USSR and Cuba even aided Ethiopia with arms and troops when Barre attacked the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 1977, and secured victory for Ethiopia. Similarly, when Ethiopia abrogated the 1953 US-Ethiopia military relationship treaty in April 1977, USA quickly moved into Somalia and took over the multibillion-dollar military base at Berbera, which the Soviets had occupied for many years. The superpowers played *hide and seek* games with Ethiopia and Somalia. They took advantage of the enmity between Ethiopia and Somalia, instigated conflicts and fought each other through these states.

Ethiopia and Somalia fought two major Ogaden wars in 1964 and 1977-1978 and many minor disputes. As the Soviets competed with the Americans during the cold war, the Ethiopians and the Somalis slaughtered each other. A popular saying states that *when two bulls fight, the grass suffers*, not the bulls. The superpowers competed in providing political, military and economic assistance to their clients, thus instigating local divisions among their clients. In turn, the client states spent millions of dollars on arms and military development at the expense of development.

Henze, a one-time official in the time Carter administration, estimates that US\$ 7.5 billion worth of weapons entered Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan from 1981 to 1987 only, most of which found their way into the black market.<sup>21</sup> Vogl asserts that experts estimate the cold war cost the USA between \$12 and \$13 trillion while about 100,000 Americans and millions of other people around the world died in the *hot wars* of the cold war.<sup>22</sup> Henze also noted that Somalia alone received more than US\$ 310 million worth of weapons between 1974 and 1976 only.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Paul B. Henze, *The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991) p. 119.

<sup>22</sup> Mark Vogl, *Cold War: When Did It Begin? When Did It End?* op. cit..

<sup>23</sup> Paul Henze, *Arming the Horn, 1960-1980: Working Paper No. 43* (Washington DC: The Wilson Centre - Smithsonian Institute, 1982) p. 25.



The cold war coincided with Ethiopia and Somalia being ripe with opportunities as these states sought for political ideas and aid to develop their infant economies, considering that Somalia gained independence during the peak of the cold war. They provided a fertile ground for the cold war rivalry. Involvement of these states in the superpower competition fuelled interstate conflicts. The Horn of Africa came to the limelight of international politics in the late 1970s. After Nixon and Kissinger's détente, the tensions of the cold war reduced and almost declined, only to erupt in the Horn of Africa when Ethiopia and Somalia fought a major war over the Ogaden region.

Even today, Ethiopians and the Somalis have a bone of contention each other. Some of the current tensions between these states can be traced to the cold war yet, with the collapse of USSR over a decade ago, the cold war rivalry is outdated in the foreign policy of the sole superpower. USA is now concerned with terrorism and other challenges it faces today. The research question that will guide this study is: what was the impact of the cold war on the interstate relations between Ethiopia and Somalia between 1960 and 1990? This question links two variables: cold war vis-à-vis Ethiopia-Somalia interstate relations.

This study seeks to fill the gap of the impact of the cold war on the Ethiopia-Somalia relations, which has been scantily addressed. It intends to provide insights to peacemakers in the Horn of Africa on the interstate tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia that are rooted in the cold war and the possible solutions for peace. This research chose the period 1960 to 1990 because; first, this period marks the political life span of Somalia as a state from birth to collapse. Somalia gained independence in 1960 and collapsed in 1991. The cold war rivalry is evident throughout the existence of Somalia as a state. Second, most scholars agree that the cold war ended in 1990 with the fall of Berlin wall and reunification of Germany. In addition,

the Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991, when the countries that were aligned to Moscow attained independence.

This study chose Ethiopia and Somalia because of two major reasons. As stated already, the Horn of Africa is one of the rare cases in the world where the cold war manifested differently as Ethiopia and Somalia came into direct battles incited and armed intensively by the superpowers. In addition, unlike many other African countries that maintained close relations with their former colonial masters who assumed the role of a parent state after independence, Ethiopia and Somalia lacked post-colonial relationship with their former colonial masters. Forty years down the line, Britain still maintains close relations with Kenya and funds development projects.

Ethiopia and Liberia are the only African countries that were not colonized. Although the Italians extended their territory from the Italian Somaliland gradually from the 1920s and had captured Ethiopia in 1936, they later quitted Ethiopia.<sup>24</sup> In Somalia, though the Italians and the British colonized Somalia, Italy relinquished all its titles and rights to Italian Somaliland in the Peace Treaty of 1947 after conflicts with the British, when the latter attacked Ogaden in 1948, which Italians had captured in the late 1920s.<sup>25</sup> British Somaliland merged with Italian Somaliland at independence in June 26 1960 to form the Republic of Somalia.

After independence, Somalia's dream was to conquer the neighbouring territories occupied by Somalis in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti and form a *Greater Somalia*. Consequently, it sought military assistance from the West quite soon. When USA and other European powers were prepared to offer Somalia \$18 million in 1963, the Soviet Union was ready to offer military

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<sup>24</sup> Bureau of African Affairs, Background Note: Somalia (Washington DC: Bureau of African Affairs, October 2003).

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

hardware of around \$30 million. Thus, Somalia rejected the offer from USA. From then onwards, other European powers, including Britain and Italy, who were Somalia's colonial powers stopped manoeuvring around Somalia and left the territory for USA and USSR.<sup>26</sup>

Although the British hang around for a few more years, they pulled out when Major General Mohamed Siad Barre took over in a coup on October 21 1969 and established close ties with the Soviet Union.<sup>27</sup> As for Somalia, it aligned with the superpowers because it had a great need of arms in order to attack the neighbouring countries and realize its dream of forming a Greater Somalia. When USA and USSR moved into Somalia, they did not assume the role of a parent state as the former colonial powers did in their former colonies, since they had selfish interests in the Horn of Africa.

### 1.3 Justification of the Study

Ethiopia and Somalia did not escape the tensions of the superpowers during the cold war. Unlike in other developing countries, the cold war manifested differently in Ethiopia and Somalia, as these countries came into direct conflict and sought arms and assistance from the superpowers in the war, as stated earlier. Some of the current tensions between these states are rooted in the cold war' competition between the rival superpowers among their clients, and have remained repressed long after the end of the cold war. Thus, the cold war is not yet over in Africa because we are still suffering its painful legacies. Obasanjo lends credence to this argument:

Although we may talk about the end of the cold war in the East and the West, for us in Africa, the cold war is not yet fully over. We are still left holding on to the debris of the war; with little means of support, we have a long, arduous task of reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation. In addition, we are even blamed and condemned for the ills of the war that have

<sup>26</sup> Christopher Stevens, *The Soviet Union and Black Africa* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1976) p. 175; Cf. *New York Times* (November 11 1963); *Guardian* (November 12 1963).

<sup>27</sup> Crawford Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981) p. 62.

In order to understand a person's behaviour, it is important to analyze the entire historical background since, as the psychologists say, there are events that we experienced in our childhood that affect our behaviour as adults. The same applies to conflicts. It is important to analyze the entire history of the conflict in order to find possible solutions. Consequently, in order to build a peaceful Horn of Africa, all the possible root causes of the conflicts ought to be addressed extensively. So far, very little has been analysed on the impact of the cold war on the Ethiopia-Somalia interstate relations, especially from the African angle.

This study realizes that there are interstate tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia that have not been given due attention. As Van Marter puts it, "an inability to address the needs of the people of Africa was one of the most painful legacies of the cold war... Our problems continue because the cold war legacy doesn't allow for the realistic addressing of problems."<sup>29</sup> The few available literature is general, brief or biased as they are written from the Western perspective. Yet, Africa was the major victim of the cold war rivalry. This research intends to shed light on the understanding of the background of the tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia. Hence, the need to give attention to the impact of the cold war in the Horn of Africa cannot be ignored.

#### **1.4 Objectives of the Study**

- The broad objective of this study is to analyze the impact of the cold war on the Ethiopia-Somalia relations.

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<sup>28</sup> Olesegun Obasanjo, "A Balance Sheet of the African Region and the Cold War" in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in the New International Order (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996) p. 19.

<sup>29</sup> Jerry L. Van Marter, After Serving as Cold War Battleground (Geneva: World Council of Churches Central Committee Meeting, September 1 1999) p. 3.

- The specific objective is to examine the interstate relations between Ethiopia and Somalia.

## 1.5 Literature Review

The literature review will be divided into three parts. The first part will review literature on the cold war; the second part will review literature on Ethiopia and Somalia; while the third part is a critique of the literature reviewed.

### 1.5.1 *Literature on the Cold War*

Considering that the cold war ended over a decade ago, most of the literature was written either during the cold war or in the early 1990s. They were written from various points of view. As such, cold war is outdated in the discussions of contemporary scholars. London's and Steven's work are very precise. They tackle the repercussions of USSR in the policies of other states such as the attempt of Somalia to create a Marxist-Leninist structures of government<sup>30</sup> and the influence of the Soviet Union on Somalia's policy of forming a Greater Somalia.<sup>31</sup> Saivetz and Woodby<sup>32</sup> and Chazan et. al.<sup>33</sup> discuss very briefly how USSR used the third world countries as their playfield as they competed in providing military aid. Moscow even formalized relations with its allies in the third world with friendship' treaties.

Spanier<sup>34</sup> reviews cold war. He discusses US' policy of containment, construction of the Berlin Wall, Korean War and other aspects of the cold war. On the part of the cold war in other countries, he looks at the third world broadly, from Central America to the Middle East, but

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<sup>30</sup> Kurt London, The Soviet Union in World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980) p. 140.

<sup>31</sup> Christopher Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa op. cit. p. 175.

<sup>32</sup> Carol R. Saivetz and Sylvia Woodby, Soviet-Third World Relations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985) p. 162.

<sup>33</sup> Naomi Chazan et. al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (3<sup>rd</sup> edition) (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) pp. 431ff.

<sup>34</sup> John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Co. Ltd., 1988) pp. 303-341.

without analyzing the Horn of Africa. Woodby and Cottan<sup>35</sup> go through the cold war in detail, while analysing essential points such as détente and the arms race. Still on détente, Bell<sup>36</sup> studies the contributions of Nixon and his Secretary of State, Kissinger, to the policy of détente, and their role in ending the cold war. He asserts that negotiations on arms control measures led to decrease of the East-West confrontation.

Kissinger, in his big book,<sup>37</sup> writes about his experiences as the Secretary of State. Among other topics, he discusses intensely Strategic Arms Liberation Treaty (SALT) I from his personal experience, which he initiated with Nixon. In another book, he tackles the foreign policy in the *nuclear age*. He argues that limited war is the only way of escaping from nuclear stalemate, “the secret dream of American military thought: that there exists a final answer to our military problem, that it is possible to defeat the enemy utterly, and that war has its own rationale independent of policy.”<sup>38</sup> Schlesinger<sup>39</sup> and Harbutt<sup>40</sup> examine the origins of the cold war. Harbutt gives a glimpse of role of the British in the outbreak of the cold war.

Gaddis<sup>41</sup> discusses how developments of the atomic bombs contributed to the cold war tensions. McWilliams and Pietrowski<sup>42</sup> discuss colonial imperialism in Africa and the catastrophes that have been afflicting Africa since independence. Ulam<sup>43</sup> dwelt on the Soviet foreign policy and the Soviet leaders from Lenin to Khrushchev. Although he examines the cold war in depth, he concentrates only on the superpowers and their European and Asian

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<sup>35</sup> Sylvia Woodby and Martha L. Cottan, The Changing Agenda: World Politics Since 1945 (2<sup>nd</sup> edition) (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) pp. 83-109, 303-341.

<sup>36</sup> Coral Bell, The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era (London: Martin Robertson, 1977) pp. 54ff.

<sup>37</sup> Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979) p. 1216.

<sup>38</sup> Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957) p. 25.

<sup>39</sup> Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Some Lessons from the Cold War: Paper Presented at the Soviet-American Seminar on the Origins of the Cold War (Mascherino: June 27 1990) p. 12

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America and the Origins of the Cold War op. cit.

<sup>41</sup> John L. Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) pp. 27-28.

<sup>42</sup> Wayne C. McWilliams and Harry Pietrowski, The World Since 1945: A History of International Politics (3<sup>rd</sup> edition) (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993) pp. 121-140, 237-282.

<sup>43</sup> Adam Ulam, Expansion and Co-existence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-67 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968) pp. 378-629.

allies, without looking at Africa. Blum<sup>44</sup> examines American foreign policy from the inauguration of John F. Kennedy to the resignation of Richard Nixon, noting how they dealt with various issues during the cold war such as Vietnam War. They reigned during the peak of the cold war.

Lundestad<sup>45</sup> examines the changing American and Soviet attitudes. He compares the changing American foreign policy to pendulum swings. Hoffman and Fleron<sup>46</sup> examine the origins of the cold war in part four and the policies of USA vis-à-vis USSR in part five. Bialer<sup>47</sup> probes the aspects of the Soviet internal dynamics that influenced its foreign policy during the cold war such as the communist ideology. Rubinstein<sup>48</sup> argues that the Soviet policy since the end of the Second World War was characterized by conquest and territorial expansion. He reviews the first twenty-five years of the cold war.

Goldman<sup>49</sup> argues that perestroika and other reforms that Gorbachev initiated led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Conquest<sup>50</sup> examined the personality of Stalin: his background and personal differences with Roosevelt and Truman that contributed to the onset of the cold war. However, this study revolves around Stalin's personality. Ali<sup>51</sup> analyzes Stalin's tenure and his role in the onset of the cold war and his influence afterwards. Ambrose<sup>52</sup> examines the

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<sup>44</sup> John Morton Blum, Years of Discord: American Politics and Society 1961-1974 (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1991) pp. 124-132.

<sup>45</sup> Geir Lundestad, The American Empire and Other Studies (Oxford: Scandinavian University Press, 1990) pp. 122-127, 131-134.

<sup>46</sup> Erik Hoffman and Frederick J. Fleron Jr, The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Alding Publishing Co., 1980) pp. 213-275.

<sup>47</sup> Seweryn Bialer, ed., The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981) pp. 19-48

<sup>48</sup> Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global op. cit. pp. 35 and 63.

<sup>49</sup> Marshall I. Goldman, What Went Wrong with Perestroika? (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1991) pp. 203ff.

<sup>50</sup> Robert Conquest, Stalin, Breaker of Nations (London: Butler and Tanner Ltd., 1991) pp. 269-300.

<sup>51</sup> Tariq Ali, Stalinist Legacy: Its Impact on 20<sup>th</sup> Century World Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1985) pp. 273ff.

<sup>52</sup> Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: Ruin and Recovery 1973-1990, Vol. 3 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991) pp. 494ff.

impact of Nixon's resignation in 1974 to the cold war tensions. His scholarly critique of the USA after Nixon is very precise.

In another work, Gaddis<sup>53</sup> explores the fall of the Berlin Wall and the revolutions in Eastern Europe that marked the end of the cold war. He thoroughly examines the issue of ideology. Hinton<sup>54</sup> explored the growth and spread of communism in China, highlighting features such as the Sino-Soviet Alliance. He excludes other important features such as nuclear race as it was written in the 1960s. McKay<sup>55</sup> underscores the Soviet and American foreign policies at the dawn of independence of most African states in part three and four. There is nothing on cold war in the Horn of Africa. Similarly, *The Washington Post* and<sup>56</sup> *The Journal of Cold War Studies*<sup>57</sup> are very brief articles that focus on the cold war from a very general panorama.

*The Fate of the Warsaw Treaty*<sup>58</sup> describes the events that led to the end of the cold war in the Soviet Union. It includes documents and commentaries on the events like the February 25 1991 agreement dissolving the Warsaw Pact Treaty. Hogan<sup>59</sup> looks at the lessons of the cold war. Fukuyama<sup>60</sup> also discusses the last years of the cold war. The periodicals that tackle the dawn of the cold war include *Diplomatic History*,<sup>61</sup> *Diplomacy and Statecraft*,<sup>62</sup> *World Policy Journal*,<sup>63</sup> *The Political Quarterly*<sup>64</sup> and the *Washington Quarterly*.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> John L. Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations and Provocations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) pp. 51-52.

<sup>54</sup> Harold C. Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966) p. 122.

<sup>55</sup> Vernon McKay, *Africa in World Politics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963) pp. 191-428.

<sup>56</sup> *The Washington Post* (March 5 1977) p. A10; *The Washington Post* (September 27 1977) p. A14; *The Washington Post* (March 5 1978) p. A10 and Cf. *The Washington Post* (August 28 1980).

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *Journal of Cold War Studies* 4, 2 (2002).

<sup>58</sup> *The Fate of the Warsaw Treaty: Recollections, Documents, and Facts* (Moscow: Russkaya Kniga, 1998) p. 199.

<sup>59</sup> Michael J. Hogan, ed., *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications* op. cit. 32.

<sup>60</sup> Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History" in *National Interest*, 16 op. cit. p. 18.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. *Diplomatic History* (Winter and Spring Issues, 1992).

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *Diplomacy and Statecraft* (November 1990).

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *World Policy Journal* (Summer 1990 and Spring Issues, 1991).

<sup>64</sup> Cf. *The Political Quarterly* (January/March 1991).

<sup>65</sup> Cf. *The Washington Quarterly* (Spring, Winter and Summer Issues, 1991).



Few writings talk about the cold war per se. Most of them look at the cold war within the contest of other topics or in relation to various countries. Although the authors mention the clients of the superpowers here and there, they do not examine the impact of the superpowers on their clients.

### 1.5.2 Literature on Ethiopia and Somalia

The literature on conflicts in Ethiopia and Somalia is vast. Keller and Rothchild<sup>66</sup> discuss in detail the challenges Africa is facing in the post-cold war era such as marginalization by the international community. After the cold war, USA shifted its attention to the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe that were aligned to Moscow. Similarly, Menkhaus in two separate writings<sup>67</sup> discusses the political problems Somalia faces in the post-cold war era. These include insecurities and the struggle to reform the state. It was written when Somalia state had just collapsed. Young, Remnek and Clapharm in two different writings moved further and looked at the superpower rivalry in a few selected regions in Africa.

Young<sup>68</sup> examines the impact of USSR in the foreign policies of Ethiopia while Clapharm,<sup>69</sup> Ottaways<sup>70</sup> and The Transition in Ethiopia<sup>71</sup> look at the revolution in Ethiopia under the leadership of the Derg, which was mostly influenced by USSR. The United States and Ethiopia<sup>72</sup> looks at the various events in Ethiopia when the country was aligned to USA.

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<sup>66</sup> Edmond J. Keller, "Introduction: Toward a New African Political Order" in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in the New International Order op. cit. pp. 2-13.

<sup>67</sup> Ken Menkhaus, "Getting Out vs. Getting Through in Somalia: US and UN Policies in Somalia" in Middle East Policy 3.1 (1994) p. 146-162; Ken Menkhaus, ed., "What Are the Lessons to Be Learned From Somalia?" in CSIS Africa Notes No. 144 (January 1994).

<sup>68</sup> Crawford Young, Ideology and Development in Africa op. cit. pp. 74-81.

<sup>69</sup> Christopher Clapharm, Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) pp. 185-186.

<sup>70</sup> Marian Ottaway and David Ottaway, Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution (New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1978) pp. 169-170.

<sup>71</sup> "The Transition in Ethiopia" in CSIS Africa Notes No. 127 (August 1991).

<sup>72</sup> "The United States and Ethiopia: The Politics of a Patron-Client Relationship" in Northeast African Studies 8:2-3, 53-75 (1986).

Remnek<sup>73</sup> explores the underlying elements of the superpowers' interest in the Horn of Africa, dwelling more on USSR. In addition to the interest in the Horn of Africa, Clapharm in another work<sup>74</sup> went further and tackled the relationship of the aligned states vis-à-vis the superpowers. His data looks at the entire period of the cold war. Kobia<sup>75</sup> argues that the states in the Horn of Africa that were aligned to the superpowers did not actually gain anything, since the superpowers only used them and dumped them when the cold war ended. The Political Lessons of Somalia<sup>76</sup> also dwells along the same line and concludes that by getting involved in the cold war rivalry, Somalia was the loser, despite declaring openly its stand on the alignment.

Likewise, Gurr<sup>77</sup> moved further and examined the tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia that resulted from aligning with the superpowers, however, it is limited to the events of 1960s only. Lefebvre<sup>78</sup> looks at US security dilemma in the Horn of Africa while Harbeson discusses the superpowers competition for clients in the Horn of Africa, each with its own vested interests in the region. He notes that "the international politics of the Horn of Africa has largely been a struggle of competing actors to establish just such settled identities."<sup>79</sup> In the same manner, in two different writings, Henze focuses on the superpowers' battle in Ethiopia<sup>80</sup> and the Horn of Africa<sup>81</sup> at large.

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<sup>73</sup> Richard B. Remnek, "Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa: The Decision to Intervene" in Robert H. Donaldson, ed., The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981) pp. 125-135.

<sup>74</sup> Christopher Clapharm, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp. 135ff.

<sup>75</sup> "Samuel Kobia" in Jerry L. Van Marter, After Serving as Cold War Battleground op. cit.

<sup>76</sup> "The Political Lessons of Somalia" in The Brookings Review 12.2 (1994).

<sup>77</sup> Tedd Gurr, "Tensions in the Horn of Africa" in Feliks Gross ed., World Politics and Tensions Areas (New York: New York University Press, 1966) pp. 316-334.

<sup>78</sup> Jeffrey Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn: US Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia 1953-1991 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992) pp. 197-240.

<sup>79</sup> John W. Harbeson, "The International Politics of Identity in the Horn of Africa" in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., African in World Politics op. cit. p. 123.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Paul Henze, "Ethiopia in Transition" in Ethiopia Review (July 1992).

<sup>81</sup> Paul B. Henze, The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace op. cit. p. 119.

On the other hand, Webber's<sup>82</sup> short article expounded on the impact of the Soviet Union in Ethiopia by going through Mengistu's foreign policy. Ottaway<sup>83</sup> chose to focus on Ethiopia's relationship with Eritrea. She narrows down to the struggle for nation building in Ethiopia and Eritrea while Lyons studies the leaders in the Horn of Africa and speaks of "vulnerable regimes".<sup>84</sup> In other writings, Ottaway<sup>85</sup> and Farer<sup>86</sup> discuss the role of the superpowers in fuelling regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa by providing the arms and instigating divisions among the client states. Within the same context, Ottaway, in another book,<sup>87</sup> discusses the role of USA and USSR in fuelling regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa. She comes close to the analysis of this research, but she dwells on the impact of USSR in the Horn of Africa. Along the same path, Clapharm<sup>88</sup> narrowed down to the impact of regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa during the cold war.

Fukui and Markakis<sup>89</sup> elucidate on the suffering and destruction of the peoples in the Greater Horn of Africa due to regional conflicts, such as the tragic fate of the Mela and their neighbours. In another work, Markakis<sup>90</sup> looks at liberation movements in the Greater Horn of Africa. Particularly, he explores Eritrean Nationalist Movements at length. Likewise, Li and

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<sup>82</sup> Mark Webber, "Soviet Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Final Phase" in The Journal of Modern African Studies 30.1 (1992) pp. 12-14.

<sup>83</sup> Marian Ottaway "Nationalism Unbound: The Horn of Africa Revisited" in SAIS Review 12.2 (Summer/Fall 1992) pp. 111-128.

<sup>84</sup> Terence Lyons, "The Horn of Africa Regional Politics: A Hobbesian World" in Howard Wriggins, ed., The Dynamics of Regional Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992) p. 180.

<sup>85</sup> Marian Ottaway, "Superpower Competition and Regional Conflicts in the Horn of Africa" in R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, The Soviet Impact in Africa (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1984) pp. 170-183.

<sup>86</sup> Tom Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: A Crisis for Détente (2<sup>nd</sup> edition) (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979) p. 50.

<sup>87</sup> Marian Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa (New York: Praeger, 1982) pp. 152-164.

<sup>88</sup> Christopher Clapharm, "The Political Economy of Conflict in the Horn of Africa" in Survival 32, 5 (September/October 1990) pp. 403-420.

<sup>89</sup> Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis, Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1994) p. 33.

<sup>90</sup> John Markakis, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) pp. 104ff.

Thompson,<sup>91</sup> Lutz<sup>92</sup> and Hill and Rothchild<sup>93</sup> focus on politics and conflicts in Africa as a whole, with a very brief mention on the Horn of Africa. Buzan<sup>94</sup> and the *Journal of Peace Research*<sup>95</sup> highlighted that the conflicts in the Horn of Africa during the cold war, particularly from 1960s to 1980s, are interlinked. They pinpoint the underlying elements of these conflicts, which includes the arms race. Several articles in *Africa Contemporary Record* and *Indian Ocean Newsletter* look at the cold war in the Horn of Africa from a very broad perspective, ranging from the reasons for the superpower's interest in the Horn,<sup>96</sup> military aid Somalia received from the superpowers and its impact in the region.<sup>97</sup>

Castagno<sup>98</sup> explores the policies of Somalia to create a Greater Somalia, which led to the tensions along the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya. Tucker,<sup>99</sup> Ododa,<sup>100</sup> Legum and Lee,<sup>101</sup> Laitin<sup>102</sup> and Laitin and Sheik-Abdi<sup>103</sup> narrow down to the consequences of the Ogaden war on Somalia. These include displacement, spilling of the refugees and the inter-clan tensions. Shepherd<sup>104</sup> also discusses the Ogaden War, but from a different perspective.

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<sup>91</sup> Richard P. Y. Li and William Thompson, "The 'Coup Contagion' Hypothesis" in *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19,1 (March 1975) pp. 63-87.

<sup>92</sup> James M. Lutz, "The Diffusion of Political Phenomena in Sub-Saharan Africa" in *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 17,1 (Spring 1989) pp. 93-114.

<sup>93</sup> Stuart Hill and Donald Rothchild, "The Contagion of Political Conflict in Africa and the World" in *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30,4 (September 1987) pp. 716-735.

<sup>94</sup> Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983) p. 106.

<sup>95</sup> "Regional Conflict Formation: An Intractable Problem of International Relations" in *Journal of Peace Research* 21,4 (1984) pp. 344-347.

<sup>96</sup> *Africa Contemporary Record* 10 (1977-1978) p. B. 373; *Africa Contemporary Record* 10 (1977-1978) p. B. 397.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.* p. B. 264; *Ibid.* 13 (1980-1981) p. B. 307; *Indian Ocean Newsletter* (March 20 1982); *Indian Ocean Newsletter* (November 30 1985).

<sup>98</sup> A. A. Castagno, "The Somali-Kenyan Controversy: The Future" in *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 2 (1964) pp. 164-165.

<sup>99</sup> Jonathan Tucker, "The Politics of Refugees in Somalia" in *Horn of Africa* 5,3 (1982) p. 22.

<sup>100</sup> Harry Ododa, "Somalia's Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations Since the Ogaden War of 1977-78" in *Middle Eastern Studies* 21,3 (1985).

<sup>101</sup> Colin Legum and Bill Lee, "Crisis in the Horn of Africa: International Dimensions of the Somali-Ethiopia Conflict" in *Africa Contemporary Record* 10 (1977-1978).

<sup>102</sup> David Laitin, "The War in the Ogaden: Implications for Siyaad's Role in the Somali History" in *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 17,1 (1979).

<sup>103</sup> David Laitin, "The War in the Ogaden"; "The Ogaadeen Question and Changes in Somali Identity" and Abdi Sheik-Abdi, "Ideology and Leadership in Somalia" in *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 19,1 (1981).

<sup>104</sup> George Shepherd Jr., "Dominance and Conflict on the Horn: Notes of United States-Soviet Rivalry" in *Africa Today* 32,3 (1985).

He speaks of internationalization of Ogaden War. Naper<sup>105</sup> also analyzes the Ogaden War, but from a different perspective. He looks at the role of the superpowers in the war. Farah<sup>106</sup> discusses the effectiveness of track one and track two diplomacy in the effort of resolving the current conflicts in Somalia, hence out of the scope of the cold war. Finally, *The Military Balance*,<sup>107</sup> the US Congress' documents<sup>108</sup> and the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency<sup>109</sup> give exact statistics of military expenditures of the superpowers in Ethiopia and Somalia. They also show how the size of the armies of Ethiopia and Somalia grew rapidly during the cold war.

### 1.5.3 Critique of Literature Review

From the literature review, two schools can be clearly discerned. The first school examines the cold war. These include Hogan, London, Steven, Saivetz and Woodby, Spanier, Chazan Woodby and Cottan, Bell, McWilliams and Piotrowski, Ulam, Ali, Ambrose, Hinton, Blum, Conquest, Hoffman and Fleron, Goldman, Rubinstein, Gaddis, Kissinger, McKay. Although they viewed the cold war from different perspectives, the core of their study was the cold war. The second school has Ethiopia and Somalia as the focus of their study. These include Keller and Rothchild, Menkhaus, Markakis, Menkhaus and Lyons, Young, Donaldson, Clapharm

<sup>105</sup> A. Napper, "The Ogaden War: Some Implications for Crisis Prevention" in Alexander L. George, ed., *Managing US-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983) p. 234.

<sup>106</sup> Cf. Ibrahim Qassim Farah, *Dual Diplomatic Approaches in Conflict Management: The International Peace Initiatives in Somalia 1991-1999* (Nairobi: Unpublished MA Dissertation, 2000).

<sup>107</sup> *The Military Balance 1975/1976: The Military Balance 1976/1977: The Military Balance 1977/1978* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies).

<sup>108</sup> US Congress Soviet Military Capability in Berbera, Somalia, *Report of Senator Barlett to the Committee on Armed Services* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975); US Congress Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Security Commitments and Agreements Abroad, Part 8, Ethiopia: Hearings Held by the Subcommittee on US Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad 91<sup>st</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session* (New York: US Congress Senate, June 1 1970).

<sup>109</sup> US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1967-1976* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978) p. 129; US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989* (Washington DC: Department of Defence, 1990) p. 115; US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1986) p. 43; US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1963-1973*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1974) p. 67.

Marian Ottaway and David Ottaway, Cobia, Gurr, Harbeson, Webber's, Farer and Remnek, Fukui and Markakis.

While the first school details the impact of the cold war, the second examines interstate relations between Ethiopia and Somalia. However, very few writings link the two variables of cold war vis-à-vis Ethiopia-Somalia interstate conflict. The few available works are either too general or too brief in analysis. There is no comprehensive analysis of this study. For this reason, this study intends to bridge the two schools. The effects of the cold war in Ethiopia and Somalia are vast, ranging from intra to interstate relations. By examining Ethiopia-Somalia relations' vis-à-vis the cold war, this research will illuminate light on the effects of the cold war on the interstate relations between Ethiopia and Somalia. The pertinent question that the study seeks to answer is; can the resentments and the tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia be situated in the effects of the cold war? It is against this background that the study is undertaken.

## **1.6 Theoretical Framework**

The study will be guided by realism. This theory emerged immediately after the Second World War. As is always the case, new theories emerge to explain phenomena, which the prevailing theory cannot explain. Realism sought to rectify the limitations of idealism, whose claims and hopes were utopian. Idealism emerged right after the First World War. It claimed that international institutions would lead to collective security. Consequently, the League of Nations, which was formed in 1919, was supposed to stop another continental war. On the contrary, the Second World War erupted in 1939.

Carr<sup>110</sup> proposed a new approach of analysis of events. He analyzed the underlying elements of the First and the Second World Wars as the struggle for power between various states. Later, Morgenthau<sup>111</sup> shaped realism, which Carr had initiated. He asserted that seek to achieve power and national interests, which are central in international relations. Due to the emphasis on power as the dominant force in international relations, realism is also called power-politics model.

Realism is predominantly based on the state level of analysis, although it also moves to the systems level of analysis, depending on whether it is analyzing states as a single unit or collectively. For realists, the state is a rational unitary actor. It is the main actor in international relations. This analysis will assess USA and USSR as the major actors during the cold war, and other states that were aligned to the superpowers. Although Somalia was not considered a state from 1991 to 2004, it was a state between 1960 and 1990 and even had a seat at the United Nations (UN). According to Montevideo Convention, the characteristics of a state are territory, authority, population, legitimacy and government.<sup>112</sup> Somalia lacks legitimacy and its population is dispersed into refugees worldwide.

Realism argues that the international system is informed by anarchy, which results from lack of a central authority to control the behaviour of all the states. Similarly, during the cold war, there was no central authority to control the behaviour of the two superpowers. Although the UN has the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security,<sup>113</sup> in most cases states go against the UN, for example, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the US attack of Iraq in 2003. Furthermore, realists maintain that all states are concerned with their "interests

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<sup>110</sup> Cf. Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1946).

<sup>111</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (6<sup>th</sup> edition) (New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 2001) pp. 4-17.

<sup>112</sup> *Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States* (Montevideo: December 26 1933).

<sup>113</sup> *UN Charter Article I, No. 1* (San Francisco: June 26 1945).

defined in terms of power.”<sup>114</sup> They see states in an endless struggle for acquisition of power. Such was the motive of the USA and USSR and their allies during the cold war.

In an effort to preserve their interests, realists assert that states seek to enhance power. Therefore, acquisition of arms between USA and USSR was meant to enhance security. This tendency to seek for security leads to arms race, which eventually leads to security dilemma.<sup>115</sup> Realists further argue that states do not trust one another, however friendly they appear to be, because the hidden motives are never known. Therefore, for security reasons, states arm themselves to the teeth as though they are permanently preparing for war.<sup>116</sup> During the cold war, the superpowers invested heavily in the production of more sophisticated arms for security purposes, lest the rival power attacks it or the territory of its ally. Their relationship was that of suspicion and mistrust, hence they had to be constantly alert.<sup>117</sup>

When North Korea attacked South Korea with the help of the Soviet Union and China on June 24 1950, USA responded immediately and aided South Korea. Similarly, USSR and Cuba aided Ethiopia and secured victory when Somalia attacked the Ogaden in the 1977-1978 war. Realism embraces the idea of building of alliances as a process whereby states seek to counter power with greater power, as states feel stronger in alliances. Such were the alliances of NATO and Warsaw Pact Treaty, which were based on political, economic and ideological differences. Finally, realists assert that states are in endless competition of displaying their might. During the cold war, USA and USSR competed in providing economic and military aid to Ethiopia and Somalia while displaying their power. As noted already, the superpowers spent billions of dollars on arms and military aid to Ethiopia and Somalia during the cold war.

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<sup>114</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace op. cit. p. 5.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid. p. 439ff.

<sup>116</sup> Cf. Sylvia Woodby and Martha L. Cottan, The Changing Agenda: World Politics Since 1945 (2<sup>nd</sup> edition) op. cit. p. 36.

<sup>117</sup> Marian Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa op. cit. pp. 163-164; Journal of Cold War Studies 4.2 (2002) pp. 55-84.



## 1.7 Hypotheses

The following hypotheses are pertinent to this study:

- The cold war influenced Ethiopia-Somalia interstate relations.
- The interstate conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia are influenced by peculiar internal factors of each state.
- The geopolitical factors underlie the relations between Ethiopia and Somalia.

## 1.8 Definition of Concepts

### 1.8.1 Cold War

The Encyclopaedia Americana defines the *cold war* as “the conflict between the Communist nations led by the Soviet Union and the Western nations led by United States, fought by all means – ideological, economic, political and limited military action – short of total war.”<sup>118</sup>

Mark Vogl defines the cold war as “a zero sum global struggle between two ideologies, championed by two superpowers (USA and USSR), which occurred within a nuclear weapons’ environment...”<sup>119</sup> Cold war did not involve direct fight between the superpowers, rather between proxies. It entailed a high degree of mistrust, spying and deception.

### 1.8.2 Interstate Relations

The word *interstate/inter-state* is a combination of two words: *inter*, which stands for between or among, and *state*, which implies a nation or a country, characterized by territory, authority, population, legitimacy and government, as stated earlier. Hence, *interstate relations* connote interactions between or among nation states. The Oxford English Dictionary defines *interstate/inter-state* as “lying, extending or carried on between independent states or between

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<sup>118</sup> John W. Spanier, “The Cold War” in The Encyclopaedia Americana, Vol. 7 (int. edition) (Danbury: Americana Corporation, 1979) p. 222.

<sup>119</sup> Mark Vogl, Cold War: When Did It Begin? When Did It End? op. cit.

states belonging to a union, federation, etc.”<sup>120</sup> The opposite is *intrastate/intra-state*, which involves activities within the state, while *interstate* involves two or more states.

## 1.9 Research Methodology

Data on the cold war as well as on Ethiopia and Somalia from 1960 to 1990 will be used for this study. Consequently, this study will mainly use secondary sources of data, which include newspapers, books, journals, internet sources and public records. The secondary data will be subjected to critical analysis within a historical context in order to reveal the impact of the cold war on the interstate relations between Ethiopia and Somalia. Due to the nature of this topic, very little primary data will be utilized. This will involve interactive interviews with personnel competent in international relations.

## 1.10 Tentative Chapter Outline

- Chapter one: The Impact of the Cold War on the Ethiopia-Somalia Relations: A Conceptualization.**
- Chapter two: The Cold War in the Horn of Africa:** will examine how the superpowers fought indirectly through Ethiopia and Somalia.
- Chapter three: The Dynamics of the Ethiopia-Somalia Relations:** will examine the Ethiopia-Somalia interstate relations within the perspective of the cold war.
- Chapter four: The Impact of the Cold War on the Ethiopia-Somalia Relations: An Empirical Analysis** will analyze the impact of the cold war on the Ethiopia-Somalia relations.
- Chapter five: Summaries, Conclusions and Recommendations:** will review each chapter, then outline the conclusions and recommendations.

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<sup>120</sup> J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner, *The Oxford English Dictionary*, Vol. 8 (2<sup>nd</sup> edition) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) p. 1140.

## CHAPTER TWO: THE COLD WAR IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

### 2.1 History of the Cold War

Immediately after the end of the Second World War, USA, USSR and Britain ended an alliance they had formed. Thereafter, an intense rivalry developed between USA, the leader of the Western world and the Soviet Union, the leader of the Eastern world. The East promoted communism while the West promoted capitalism and democracy. The two countries had clashing goals. USA and USSR saw each other as the main potential enemies. Their relationship was that of mutual distrust and suspicion.<sup>121</sup> The Russians felt insecure after having been attacked three times, and so wanted a secure Western border, so that the surrounding states would act as a block against the potential enemies. USA had also been attacked during the bombing at the Pearl Harbour in 1941.<sup>122</sup>

Thus, for security purposes, each sought to create atomic bombs. USA also had economic interests in Europe, which would not be possible if Russia dominated these countries.<sup>123</sup> In addition, both USA and USSR wanted to take leading roles in the affairs of the world. Meanwhile, USA was greatly preoccupied by the potential expansion of communism in the developing nations. Thus, to keep communism within Eastern Europe where the states were already aligned to Moscow, USA devised a policy of containment in August 1948. *Containment* refers to a strategy of a foreign policy US pursued after the Second World War, whose aim was to keep communism within Eastern Europe, so that it does not spread to other parts of the world.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> Raymond L. Garthoff, "Why Did the Cold War Arise and Why Did It End?" in *ibid.* p. 127ff; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global* op. cit. p. 39.

<sup>122</sup> *NBC News Report* (December 7 1941).

<sup>123</sup> "Origins of the Cold War" in *Foreign Affairs XLVI, I* (October 1967) pp. 22-52; Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt, 1962) p. 231.

<sup>124</sup> John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II (11<sup>th</sup> edition)* op. cit. p. 35ff.

George Kennan, the then US State Department Adviser on Soviet affairs introduced the term containment. Containment had three goals: to restore the balance of power in Europe, to curtail the Soviet expansion and power and to modify Soviet conception of international relations.<sup>125</sup> The three pillars of the containment policy were the Truman Doctrine (named after President Harry Truman), the Marshall Plan and the National Security Act. With the Truman Doctrine, USA noted that it would assist any non-communist state to resist communism.<sup>126</sup> In fact, its aim was to “protect the free peoples of the world.”<sup>127</sup>

Worried by the spread of communism, USA and twelve countries in Western Europe formed an alliance against Soviet expansion to Western Europe by signing NATO at the Mellon Auditorium in Washington DC on April 4 1949.<sup>128</sup> These were France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Belgium, United Kingdom, Canada, United States, Iceland, Italy, Denmark, Portugal and Norway. Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, West Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982. Through this alliance, the members agreed that they would consider an attack on one of them as an attack on all of them. The members were expected to support USA against communism not only in Europe, but also in other parts of world.<sup>129</sup>

When West Germany joined NATO in 1955, Stalin reacted by forming Warsaw Mutual Defence Pact (also called Warsaw Pact Treaty or the Warsaw Treaty Organization) with eight states in the Eastern bloc in the same year to counter NATO. German Democratic Republic (GDR) was founded in 1949 as a socialist one-party-state. It joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in 1950 and the Warsaw Pact in 1955. It was a Soviet

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<sup>125</sup> Containment [www.nuclearfiles.org/kinuclearweapons/strat\\_containment.html](http://www.nuclearfiles.org/kinuclearweapons/strat_containment.html).

<sup>126</sup> “The Truman Doctrine: The Unstoppable Boulder” in The Economist (March 14 1989) pp. 19-22; Cecil V. Crabb Jr., The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy: Their Meanings, Role and Future (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1982) p. 107ff.

<sup>127</sup> David McCullough, “Harry S. Truman” in Robert A. Wilson, Character Above All: An Exploration of Presidential Leadership (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) pp. 246- 268, 353-357.

<sup>128</sup> “NATO at 50: New Challenges in a New Age” in New York Times 13, 17 (1999).

<sup>129</sup> Sylvia Woodby and Martha L. Cottan, The Changing Agenda: World Politics Since 1945 (2<sup>nd</sup> edition) op. cit. p. 18.

satellite state.<sup>130</sup> Both German Federal Republic (GFR) and GDR claimed to be the legitimate successor of the German Reich (which ceased to exist in 1945), hence were competing for international recognition.

USSR maintained an interest in Africa insofar as it strengthened its communist ideology. Competing with USA, it patrolled around to establish its influence as a gigantic power, secure political and economic interests as well as divert attention and resources to where it felt weak and prone to Western invasion. To attain this, it relied on the policy of supporting national liberation movements. However, USSR did so with fears of a possible war of superpower nuclear exchange. The era of Richard Nixon and Mikhail Gorbachev are important in the history of the cold war. Nixon initiated détente, a policy of relaxation of tensions between the two superpowers, which reduced the security dilemma to a certain extent. He initiated SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) I talks between USA and USSR with Henry Kissinger, the then US Secretary of State.<sup>131</sup>

The cold war started fading in the early 1980s when Gorbachev became the Soviet Prime Minister and more so when he came to power in 1985, replacing Chernenko. He initiated perestroika (restructuring and reforms that led to the reduction of the political and economic power of the communist party) and glasnost (openness in terms of political freedom). Perestroika aimed at removing inefficiency and corruption in the Soviet government.<sup>132</sup> The reforms Gorbachev initiated went beyond his control. The states that were aligned to Moscow began to demand for independence. As they held elections, they voted in non-communist leaders. The new leaders launched full-scale economic reform programmes aimed at creating market economy.

<sup>130</sup> Journal of Cold War Studies 4,2 (2002) pp. 55-84.

<sup>131</sup> Cf. Coral Bell, The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era op. cit. p. 55ff.

<sup>132</sup> Wayne C. McWilliams and Harry Pietrowski, The World Since 1945: A History of International Politics (3<sup>rd</sup> edition) op. cit. p. 515.

On December 8 1991, the presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus declared disintegration of USSR and called for Commonwealth Independence of States (CIS) of Eastern Europe, which marked the collapse of the Soviet Empire. The Warsaw Pact Treaty was dissolved in an agreement dated February 25 1991, titled "Agreement on the cessation of the military covenants concluded under the Warsaw Treaty and the dissolution of its military organs and structures".<sup>133</sup> East Germany opened the Berlin Wall on September 11 1989, after which East and West Germany were reunited under Helmut Kohl on October 3 1990, forming the Federal Republic of Germany. All these events marked the end of the bipolar system that left USA as the sole superpower in the post cold war era.<sup>134</sup>

## 2.2 Background of Somalia and Ethiopia

### 2.2.1 Somalia<sup>135</sup>

Somalia is located on the East Coast of Africa and North of the equator. It borders Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. Somali Democratic Republic covers an area of 637,657 km<sup>2</sup>. About 85% of the population are Somali while the remaining 15% are either Bantus or Arabs. Somalia has a predominantly Muslim population of 99.9%. It attained its independence on July 1 1960 from two colonial powers. The British colonized the British Somaliland while the Italian Somaliland gained independence from the Italian-administered UN trusteeship. The French colonized the French Somaliland. It became independent in 1977 and formed the Republic of Djibouti.

The British gained control of Northern Somalia in 1886. A year later, the boundary between Ethiopia and British Somaliland was established after negotiations between the British and Emperor Menelik. In 1889, Italy concluded agreements with Sultans Obbia and Aluula, who

<sup>133</sup> The Fate of the Warsaw Treaty: Recollections, Documents, and Facts op. cit. p. 199.

<sup>134</sup> The RUSSIA site [doj.shcf.ac.uk/ma\\_02/russiasite/history2.htm](http://doj.shcf.ac.uk/ma_02/russiasite/history2.htm).

<sup>135</sup> Bureau of African Affairs, Background Note: Somalia op. cit.

placed their territories under the protection of Italy. Between 1897 and 1908, Italy made agreements with the Ethiopians and the British on the boundaries of Italian Somaliland. Gradually, the Italians extended their territory inland. By late 1920s, they extended as far as the Ogaden region in the Eastern part of Ethiopia. By 1935, the Italian forces had reached Addis Ababa. In 1936, Ethiopia was annexed to Italy.

When Italy declared war on England in June 1940, Italian troops captured British Somaliland and drove out the British troops. In 1941, British forces began operations against the Italian East African Empire and quickly brought a bigger portion of Italian Somaliland under the British control. From 1941 to 1950, while Somalia was under the British administration, transition toward self-government begun with the establishment of local courts, planning committees, and the Protectorate Advisory Council. In 1948, Britain attacked the Ogaden and the neighbouring Somali territories. With the Peace Treaty of 1947, Italy relinquished all the titles and rights to Italian Somaliland.

On September 15 1948, the question of disposal of former Italian colonies was referred to the UN General Assembly. The Assembly adopted a resolution recommending Italian Somaliland to be placed under an international trusteeship system for a period of ten years, under the administration of Italy. In 1959, the Assembly advanced the date of independence from December 2 to July 1 1960, upon the request of the Somalis. The British Somaliland became independent on June 26, 1960. It joined Italian Somaliland five days later, on July 1 to form the Somali Republic. In its early days, political parties reflected clan loyalties. This contributed to a basic split between the regional interests of the former British colony in the North and the Italian colony in the South.

Two peaceful elections were held between 1960 and 1969. President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated on October 15, 1969 after which Prime Minister Ibrahim Egal formed a successive government. However, Major General Mohamed Siad Barre overthrew Egal's government and took over power in a coup organized by the police and the army on October 21, 1969.<sup>136</sup> In Barre's new government, the power of the executive and the legislature was in a 20-member Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) under him. Barre declared Somalia a socialist state a year later.<sup>137</sup>

He embraced scientific socialism that reflected ideological and economic dependence on USSR, which culminated with a friendship' treaty and co-operation between Somalia and the Soviet Union in 1974. However, Barre abrogated it in November 1977, when USSR, its main supplier of arms, diverted attention and support to Ethiopia. In turn, Barre developed a close relationship with USA, and even gave the American access to military facilities in Somalia. In the late 1980s, Barre's regime experienced crises that gradually led to its collapse. He was attacked in the Northeast and Northwest, with the aim of overthrow of his government.

By 1988, the country was at war with him. At his orders, an aircraft from the Somali National Air Force bombed several cities in the Northwest province, injuring many civilians. The country soon experienced severe economic crisis as Barre looted as much as possible from the treasury. By 1990, the army dissolved into smaller groups of former commanders and clan leaders. Many Somalis fled their homes. As Barre's forces fled, Somalia Government collapsed while Barre fled first to Kenya and then to Nigeria in 1991, where he died in exile. In 1990, Somaliland declared itself independent from the rest of Somalia.

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<sup>136</sup> I. M. Lewis, "The Politics of Somali Coup" in *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 10,3 (1972) p. 401.

<sup>137</sup> Tom Cooper, *Ogaden War, 1977-1978* (September 2 2003).



### 2.2.2 Ethiopia<sup>138</sup>

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia covers an area of 1.1 million square km (472,000 square miles), with a population of about 68 million. It is located in the Horn of Africa, bordered by Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Sudan. Ethiopia is the second largest populated country in Black Africa (ten times larger than Somalia)<sup>139</sup> and the oldest independent country in Africa. Islam and Ethiopian Orthodox are predominant religions of about 48% each. Most of the populace speaks a Semitic or Cushitic language. The Oromo, Amhara and the Tigreans comprise over three-fourths of the entire population. However, Ethiopia has over 80 ethnic groups.

Ethiopia's history is rooted in millennial kingdom as opposed to a colonial territory. Ethiopia and Liberia are the only African countries that were not colonized. A legend states that Menelik I, the son of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba founded the Ethiopian Empire. The missionaries introduced Christianity in Ethiopia in the fourth century AD. In 1493, the Portuguese established some contacts with Ethiopia with the aim of spreading Catholicism to counter Islam that was spreading fast since the seventh century. However, after a period of conflicts with the Ethiopians, Catholic missionaries were expelled in 1630s.

This contributed to Ethiopia's hostility towards Europeans and its isolation from the rest of the world. Ethiopia was isolated from world politics until the Italian invasions of 1895 and 1935. Gradually, the kingdom came out of isolation under Emperors Theodore II (1855-68), Johannes IV (1872-89), Menelik II (1889-1913) and Haile Sellassie from 1931 to 1935, when the Italian forces invaded Ethiopia and forced him to go to exile. He returned to Ethiopia five years later when the British and Ethiopian forces defeated the Italians. Sellassie ruled again

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<sup>138</sup> Bureau of African Affairs, Background Note: Ethiopia (Washington DC: Bureau of African Affairs, May 2003).

<sup>139</sup> Richard B. Remnek, "Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa: The Decision to Intervene" in Robert H. Donaldson, ed., The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures op. cit. p. 133.

from 1942 to 1974, when the Derg overthrew him on September 12 1974. He was among the founders of Organization of African Unity (OAU). To this date, its headquarters (now AU) is in Addis Ababa.

When the Derg (also called the Provisional Military Administrative Committee - PMAC) took over power in Ethiopia under Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, they installed a socialist government. The word *Derg* is derived from the Amharic word of *committee*. The Derg executed 59 members of the royal family, ministers and generals of Sellassie's government and strangled him on August 22 1975 in the basement of his palace. Soon, they began to experience hardships in the Northern part of Tigray and Eritrea that led to its collapse. There were droughts and famine. Worse, the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) merged with ethnic opposition movements and formed Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1989. As they advanced towards Ethiopia in 1991, Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe where he is until the present time.

The EPRDF and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and others established Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) in July 1991. OLF withdrew from the government in June 1992 and in March 1993, Southern Ethiopia Peoples' Democratic Coalition (SEPDC) left the government. Led by Isaias Afwerki, Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) took control and established a government in Eritrea until April 27 1993, when Eritrea attained independence. Ethiopia held elections of the first national parliament chosen by the people in May and June 1995, whereby EPRDF won. In August 1995, the government was installed. The current President is Girma Wolde-Giorgis while the Meles Zenawi is the Prime Minister. Since the Second World War, Ethiopia has played an active role in international politics and African affairs. It took part in the UN operations in Korea in 1951 and in Congo in 1960.

### 2.3 The Superpowers' Interest in the Horn

The Horn of Africa has been a source of contention since the scramble and partition of Africa during the 1885 Berlin Conference between the great powers, namely Britain, France and Italy.<sup>140</sup> Its terrain is bad and devoid of natural resources. It is also filled with mountains, hills and deserts along the coast, yet it was very attractive due to the link with Asia and Europe. The strategic position of the Horn attracted the superpowers' interests. It has proximity to the Gulf, which contains half of the world's oil and the origin of Islam. It is also situated next to the Red Sea, the bridge between sub-Saharan Africa and the old traditions of the Middle East and Europe.<sup>141</sup> Ottaway outlines the reasons for the superpowers' interests in Somalia as,

first, the country had the location and the physical characteristics suitable for the establishment of a major communications centre; second, it lent itself to serve as a link on air routes toward India and the Far East; and third, as the only independent country in Africa at the time, it afforded United States an opportunity to establish a presence in the continent preparing itself to play a greater role in the years to come.<sup>142</sup>

Moreover, the position of Somalia at the mouth of Red Sea attracted the Soviet strategy. USSR wanted to maintain the Indian Ocean as a powerful nuclear force. Thus, it showed continuous interest in the Horn of Africa. This was indicated, among others, by continual deployment of a naval squadron of about 18 ships in the waters.<sup>143</sup> Ethiopia's geographical position at the mouth of the Red Sea (this was before Eritrea attained independence) also attracted the superpowers. The superpowers' interest in Africa developed especially in the second half of 1970s after America lost in Vietnam War.

<sup>140</sup> Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa (New York: Avon Books, 1991) p. 276ff.

<sup>141</sup> African Studies Centre, The Horn of Africa Forum (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania, November 11 1993).

<sup>142</sup> Marina Ottaway, "Superpower Competition and Regional Conflicts in the Horn of Africa" in R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, The Soviet Impact in Africa op. cit. p. 168.

<sup>143</sup> Richard B. Remnek, "Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa: The Decision to Intervene" in Robert H. Donaldson, ed., The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures op. cit. p. 129.

Moreover, the long enmity between Ethiopia and Somalia attracted the superpowers as the superpowers could use these countries to fight each other.<sup>144</sup>

## 2.4 Treaties of Friendship and Co-operation

Despite the Non-Aligned Movement of the 1950s, most African countries were polarized, “the division of African states into Casablanca and Monrovia groups in the early 1960s... was a result of the ideological polarization of African leaders at that time along the East-West divide.”<sup>145</sup> US-Ethiopia relations go back to the September 1951 treaty of friendship and economic relations. Two years later in 1953, the two countries signed two agreements. The first agreement was for mutual defence assistance under which US agreed to assist Ethiopia with military equipment, training and communication facility at Asmara. The second agreement was a twenty-five year US-Ethiopian military relationship. Ethiopia abrogated the latter agreement in April 1977, when relations with USA turned sour.

Moscow too sought to formalize relations with its clients through friendship and co-operation treaties. The first treaty was signed in June 1971 with Egypt, with India in August 1971, with Somalia in 1974, with Angola in 1976, Mozambique in 1977, Vietnam, Ethiopia and Afghanistan in 1978, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1979, Syria in 1980 and Congo in 1981. Although Ethiopia was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement when the Derg assumed power, it established a close relationship with USSR and its allies, especially Cuba, South Yemen and Libya. The Soviet’s treaty with Somalia aimed at securing the Middle East against Western invasion. However, Egypt and Somalia abrogated the treaties in 1976 and 1977 when their interests with those of Moscow clashed. After the shift of

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<sup>144</sup> Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival op. cit. pp. 135-136.

<sup>145</sup> Olesegun Obasanjo, “A Balance Sheet of the African Region and the Cold War” in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in the New International Order op. cit. p. 16.

alignments in 1977, when USA moved to Somalia while the USSR moved to Ethiopia, USSR signed a new treaty of friendship and co-operation with Ethiopia, its new client in 1978.<sup>146</sup>

## 2.5 Security Dilemma in Somalia and Ethiopia

According to the realists, security of a state is self-help. Any foreign policy that does not address this fact is making a grave mistake since a state has to survive in the anarchic world, which defines national interest. Therefore, a state should arm itself tremendously for security purposes.<sup>147</sup> This was the reality in the Horn of Africa during the cold war, as Ethiopia and Somalia sought arms from the superpowers. As for Somalia, the need of weapons was more for territorial expansion and the formation of a Greater Somalia while Ethiopia needed the arms for defence against Somalia.

### 2.5.1 Somalia

Socialism in Somalia dates back to contacts between the Somali elite and the Italian Communist Party. After independence in 1960, Somalia headed towards a foreign policy of nonalignment. "It received major economic assistance from the United States, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as from the Soviet Union and China. The government also sought ties with many Arab countries..."<sup>148</sup> However, close relations with the Soviet Union began after 1961. Initially, Somalia approached USA for military assistance but the latter declined to assist. After this, Somalia approached USSR, which responded by aiding Somalia with a strong air force of 1500 at the time they were expelled in 1977.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> Carol R. Saivetz and Sylvia Woodby Soviet-Third World Relations op. cit. p. 162.

<sup>147</sup> Sylvia Woodby and Martha L. Cottan, The Changing Agenda: World Politics Since 1945 (2<sup>nd</sup> edition) op. cit. p. 36.

<sup>148</sup> Bureau of African Affairs, Background Note: Somalia op. cit.

<sup>149</sup> Sylvia Woodby and Martha L. Cottan, The Changing Agenda: World Politics Since 1945 (2<sup>nd</sup> edition) op. cit. p. 38.

In November 1963, Somalia announced that it was willing to accept an offer of \$30 million military aid from USSR. From 1962-1963, several Western powers, led by USA, had offered packages for arms to Somalia, but Somalia declined to accept. USSR was clever. It won Somalia by offering the highest amount in order to entice Somalia. USA did not want to force its way into Somalia since it had already established a relationship with Haile Sellassie.<sup>150</sup> Somalia accepted the offer from USSR in 1962 because, at that time, US was supporting Ethiopian and Kenyan regimes, which were resisting expansion of Somalia. After the coup in 1969, the Soviet's role in Somalia increased as Somalia embraced socialism with a serious campaign of endeavouring to break Somalis' allegiances to clans. Barre abrogated the constitution, outlawed all political parties and destroyed democracy that existed.

His military regime leaned to Moscow for all kinds of help. "President Siad Barre worked consistently... to create a classic Marxist-Leninist structures of government. However, Somalia never approached the character of a Communist state."<sup>151</sup> In 1969, USSR improved Somalia's deepwater port at Berbera. In April 1970, there was a prolonged diplomatic visit of Soviet leaders to Mogadishu to support the regime against a coup attempt. After the coup, Somali army grew from about 12,000 men in 1970 to 23,000 in 1975 and 30,000 by 1977.<sup>152</sup> A new agreement was negotiated in 1972 between the two states, whereby the Soviets provided arms, trained 2400 Somali military personnel in USSR and assigned 1,000 military advisers to work with the Somali army.<sup>153</sup> In addition, 695 students were sent to USSR for studies in 1977.<sup>154</sup> During this time, Barre made this witty remark:

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<sup>150</sup> Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, "The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali-Soviet Arms Deal: Containment and the Balance of Power Dilemma in the Horn of Africa" in The Journal of Modern African Studies 36,1 (1998) pp. 611-643.

<sup>151</sup> Kurt London, The Soviet Union in World Politics op. cit. p. 140.

<sup>152</sup> Cf. The Military Balance 1975/1976 and 1977/1978 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies).

<sup>153</sup> Cf. US Central Intelligence Agency, Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1977 op. cit.

<sup>154</sup> Crawford Young, Ideology and Development in Africa op. cit. 62-63.

In order to realize the interests of the Somali people, their achievement for a better life, the full development of their potentialities and the fulfilment of their aspirations, we solemnly declare Somalia to be a Socialist state.<sup>155</sup>

The relationship between Somalia and the Soviet Union was cemented in 1974, with the signing of a 20-year treaty of friendship and co-operation. When Somalia signed the treaty, USSR cancelled all foreign debts owned by Somalia that amounted to US\$ 45 million (16% of Somalia's GDP). In return, the Soviets were given the port at Berbera.<sup>156</sup> The same year President Podgorny visited Somalia. The Soviets build a base at Berbera, which provided training facilities to 700 Somalis.<sup>157</sup> USSR spent huge sums of money in developing the facilities at the port and naval installations. Before 1972, Soviet warships had made frequent visits to Indian Ocean port.

However, after 1972, they gained unrestricted access to Berbera. In that same year, Somalia became the second Third World country to grant the Soviets access to its ashore, after Egypt. At Berbera, the Soviets built a missile handling, a storage facility and an airfield. The Somalis were barred from entering the base. Colonel Suleiman, the then head of Somali secret police and Siad Barre's son-in-law, requested to enter the installation, but they he was not allowed in.<sup>158</sup> It is only Somalia's strong desire for arms that kept it aligned to Moscow. Meanwhile, the existence of the military base at Berbera greatly worried USA, especially Soviet penetration in the region and the missile-handling facilities. When USA asked Siad Barre about existence of the base at Berbera, Barre categorically denied its existence. In 1975, when

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<sup>155</sup> David Laitin, "Somalia's Military Government and Scientific Socialism" in Rosberg and Callaghy, eds., Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979) p. 174.

<sup>156</sup> Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin op. cit. p. 231.

<sup>157</sup> Christopher Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa op. cit. p. 175.

<sup>158</sup> US Congress Soviet Military Capability in Berbera, Somalia, Report of Senator Barlett to the Committee on Armed Services op. cit.

he invited a US delegation to visit Berbera and see for themselves, the Soviets barred the delegation from visiting part of the installations.<sup>159</sup>

Gradually, Somali officer corps embraced socialism as the Soviets maintained a close relationship with Somalia. However, domestically, Somalia had a Western style of democratic system, with clan-based political parties. When the first Soviet ambassador arrived in Kenya, he admitted that military aid to Somalia was one of the topics of discussion. He blamed the press for using the issue of arms to damage the relationship between Somalia and the Soviet Union.<sup>160</sup> The first Russian ambassador was rewarded with the highest award in Somalia, The Order of the Grand Star of Somalia when he left the country.<sup>161</sup>

### 2.5.2 Ethiopia

Relationship between Ethiopia and USA began formally with the 1953 Agreement. Both USA and Ethiopia had vested interests on each other. USA wanted the former British communications centre near Asmara. On the other hand, Haile Sellassie wanted his regime to survive. Ethiopia was an imperial power whereby nationalist movements like TPLF (Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front), EPLF (Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) clashed.<sup>162</sup> Thus, Haile Sellassie wanted to suppress these movements locally as they were challenging his imperial government.

In addition, the Emperor was not satisfied with the decision of UN concerning Eritrea, because of a large degree of autonomy in the region. This meant that Eritreans enjoyed more freedom and self-government, contrary to the Emperor's concept of monarchy. Haile Sellassie

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<sup>159</sup> Marina Ottaway, "Superpower Competition and Regional Conflicts in the Horn of Africa" in R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, *The Soviet Impact in Africa* op. cit. p. 173.

<sup>160</sup> *Voice of Kenya* (March 10 1964) 16.00 GMT.

<sup>161</sup> *East African Standard* (August 3 1964) p. 1.

<sup>162</sup> John W. Harbeson, "The International Politics of Identity in the Horn of Africa" in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., *African in World Politics* op. cit. p. 130.



abrogated the federation and declared Eritrea an integral part of Ethiopia's imperial government in 1962 and annexed Eritrea to Ethiopia. It happened that under the terms of the Italian Peace Treaty, USA, USSR, Britain and France were not able to decide the fate of the former Italian colonies. Hence, the decision was transferred to UN General Assembly, which voted on this in 1950, as noted earlier.<sup>163</sup>

Thus, Eritrea was federated into Ethiopia in 1952 under UN Resolution 390V of 1950. However, USA could not do anything until UN decided the fate of Eritrea. Rebel forces like the Eritrea Liberation Front (ELF) were fighting for the autonomy of Eritrea. Consequently, the emperor needed to suppress the rebel forces in Eritrea that were fighting for autonomy. Haile Sellassie did not want Eritrea to be autonomous because Ethiopia would be reduced to a land-locked state, without access Red Sea and the Assab Port. Ethiopia also needed arms for protection against continuous conflicts with Somalia. There were conflicts every now and then, especially along the Ogaden region. Somalia supported the *shifita* in the Ogaden region, and were behind the conflicts every now and then in along the Ogaden boundary.

Above all, Ethiopia did not trust Somalia. This meant that Ethiopia had to be heavily armed and prepared for battle at any time with Somalia. Therefore, Ethiopia needed a big army and weaponry for self-defence lest Somalia attacks. All these factors made Ethiopia develop a great hunger for the weapons. In 1970, Ethiopia had already received \$159 million worth of military aid and \$228 for economic aid.<sup>164</sup> This fostered American-Ethiopian relations, just as it also fostered Soviet-Somalia relations, based on mutual beneficial exchange. The 1953 US-Ethiopia Agreement lasted until the late 1977, when Ethiopia's military government that had

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<sup>163</sup> Marian Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa op. cit. pp. 152-153.

<sup>164</sup> US Congress Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Security Commitments and Agreements Abroad, Part 8. Ethiopia: Hearings Held by the Subcommittee on US Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad 91<sup>st</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session op. cit.

taken over power from Haile Sellassie in 1974 embraced socialism, evacuated all the Americans from the Kagnew Station and expelled them.

## 2.6 Patron-Client Relations Deteriorate

### 2.6.1 Somalia

In Ethiopia, an excellent opportunity came for USSR when the Derg approached Moscow for arms in 1976.<sup>165</sup> USA had not given the Derg the arms it wanted. The Soviets wanted to expand their presence in the region. They thought that in order to achieve this goal, they had to reconcile Ethiopia and Somalia. However, Somalia-Soviet relations turned sour when USSR began offering military aid to Ethiopia, Somalia's rival. Somalia saw this as betrayal. USSR tried to reconcile the two countries in vain. USSR used Fidel Castro of Cuba, who travelled all the way to the region to meet Mengistu and Siad Barre in Aden. He proposed creation of a federation comprising of Ethiopia, Somalia and People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen. Nevertheless, his proposal was rejected, leaving the Soviets in dilemma.<sup>166</sup>

Moreover, Barre wanted to attack the Ogaden region of Ethiopia with the assistance of the Soviet Union. However, the latter did not support the attack. In fact, USSR told him not to do so, as it was trying to reconcile Ethiopia and Somalia. Barre did not listen to USSR. He attacked the Ogaden in 1977. The Soviets were uncertain on whom to back. They did not want to lose the military facilities in Somalia, yet Ethiopia was a better choice considering its bigger size.<sup>167</sup> USSR was not actually interested in the policy of the Greater Somalia. It was only interested with the coast and the military facility at Berbera.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> Cf. Marian Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa op. cit. pp. 163-164.

<sup>167</sup> Marina Ottaway, "Superpower Competition and Regional Conflicts in the Horn of Africa" in R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, The Soviet Impact in Africa op. cit. p. 178.

<sup>168</sup> Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin op. cit. p. 231.

Therefore, Moscow was reluctant in supporting Somalia attacking Ogaden. Ethiopia and Somalia fought during the Ogaden War from 1977 to 1978. In July 1977, when Somalia used Soviet weapons to conquer Ogaden, the Soviets responded even more by aiding Ethiopia. At first, Ethiopian forces were driven back. Later, with the assistance from the Soviet Union and Cuba, they drove out the Somali forces out of Ogaden in March 1978. Barre was angered by the fact that the Soviet Union and Cuba aided Ethiopia.<sup>169</sup>

## 2.6.2 Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, Emperor Haile Sellassie had ruled for over 40 years within an economy organized on semi-feudal lines in such a way that concentration of land and wealth contributed to periodic famines. Continuous calls for reform heightened during the 1960s and reached its peak with a take-over by the Derg in September 1974, led by Mengistu. He promoted Ethiopian socialism of self-reliance and land reform, supporting the peasants and workers. The fall of Emperor Haile Sellassie's government and the take-over by the Derg led to major socio-economic reforms that were to dilute Ethiopia's relations with USA. Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam adopted communism officially in the late 1970s, promulgating a Soviet-style constitution, *Politburo*, and the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE). Funded by USSR and assisted by Cuba, his reign was marked by intense militarization.

The Ethiopian military were carrying out a revolution very similar to the Soviet one, one with its overthrow of a feudal monarch, its bypassing of a bourgeois revolution to plunge headlong into a socialist one...<sup>170</sup>

It was then that the Soviet alliance materialized, "this period can therefore be considered a major turning point in Soviet policy on the Horn."<sup>171</sup> In the late 1970s, many opposers of the Derg were tortured and killed, hence this period became known as *the red terror*. "Like a

<sup>169</sup> Bureau of African Affairs, Background Note: Ethiopia op. cit.

<sup>170</sup> Marian Ottaway and David Ottaway, Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution op. cit. pp. 169-170.

<sup>171</sup> Richard B. Remnek, "Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa: The Decision to Intervene" in Robert H. Donaldson, ed., The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures op. cit. p. 125.

child's toy resting on its back while its wheels spin, reform was noise without movement."<sup>172</sup> First, the Derg nationalized the banks, and then thirteen insurance companies, followed by 72 industrial and commercial concerns and finally took a big holding in the 29 other business.<sup>173</sup> The urban land followed as well as rental housing in July 1975, formation of neighbourhood associations known as *kebeles* and the dissolution of the powerful labour union called Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Union (CELU).<sup>174</sup> Young asserts that the coffee boom of 1976-1977 funded the revolution.<sup>175</sup>

Although USA did not approve the actions of the Derg, it gave the military aid. When the Derg approached USA for military aid, USA was silent at first, due to the fear of arms race in the Horn of Africa. However, when Ethiopia threatened to end the patron-client relationship, Washington responded immediately. It was then that USA maintained its relationship with Ethiopia and prevented Moscow from entering the region of its client.<sup>176</sup> In 1974, USA gave the Derg \$12.5 million in grants, \$11 million in credit and \$5 million in cash sales. A year later, the same amount of grants were issued while the credits rose to \$25 million and the cash rose to \$20 million. In 1976, Ethiopia received cash sales of 100 million, less than what it had asked for.<sup>177</sup>

In December 1976, US signed the first military aid agreement worth \$100 million for the second-line equipment e.g. T-34 tanks. At this time, the outgoing Ford Administration cancelled the military assistance program.<sup>178</sup> Two years before this, the Ford Administration

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<sup>172</sup> Tom Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: A Crisis for Détente (2<sup>nd</sup> edition) op. cit. p. 50.

<sup>173</sup> Crawford Young, Ideology and Development in Africa op. cit. p. 74.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid. pp. 77-78.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid. p. 81.

<sup>176</sup> Terrence Lyons, "The International Context of Internal War: Ethiopia/Eritrea" in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in the New International Order op. cit. p. 85.

<sup>177</sup> Colin Legum and Bill Lee, Conflicts in the Horn of Africa (London: Rex Collings, 1977) p. 70.

<sup>178</sup> The Washington Post (March 5 1977) A10.

had increased the US weapons' to Ethiopia.<sup>179</sup> In 1978, US gave Ethiopia \$282 million as military aid and \$366 million as economic assistance.<sup>180</sup> In spite of all these, Ethiopia was unable to create a political movement that would incarnate revolution due to unwillingness to share its power, despite the pressure from USSR and Cuba in 1977-1978.<sup>181</sup>

Meanwhile, USA was not happy for the changes in Ethiopia. The Derg had embraced socialism. The developments in the satellite communications at Kagnew Station seemed stagnant due to increase of Eritrean nationalist movements. Yet, USA had invested heavily there. In 1970, Kagnew Station had an American population of more than 300, which included military and other civilian personnel. However, by the end of 1974, the number had reduced to 40.<sup>182</sup> In fact, USA wanted to leave the region, but the thought of leaving USSR unchallenged in the region made it stay; though it was not gaining anything from the stay.

## 2.7 Shift of Alignments

Meanwhile the changes taking place in Somalia and Ethiopia gradually led to changes in alignments. The Soviets had underestimated Somali forces and the fact that Somalia could attack Ethiopia. In April 1977, USSR had assured Ethiopia that Somalia would not attack.<sup>183</sup> Somalia-USSR relationship was diluted in 1977 when the Soviet Union failed to unite Ethiopia and Somalia. The reign of Soviet' patronage in Somalia ended in 1977. Somalia abrogated the 1974 Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union in November 13 1977, closed all

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<sup>179</sup> US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1967-1976 op. cit. p. 129.

<sup>180</sup> Bureau of African Affairs, Background Note: Ethiopia op. cit.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid. p. 78.

<sup>182</sup> Marina Ottaway, "Superpower Competition and Regional Conflicts in the Horn of Africa" in R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, The Soviet Impact in Africa op. cit. p. 174.

<sup>183</sup> The Washington Post (September 27 1977) A14.

the naval facilities at Berbera and expelled the Soviet and Cuban advisors. They quickly moved to Ethiopia and assisted to repel Somalia's invasion of the Ogaden.<sup>184</sup>

After the Ogaden war, Barre turned to USA for military support, arms equipment and economic aid. At first, USA and other Western countries were reluctant to provide arms due to Barre's attack of the Ogaden. The Carter government was divided on whether to back Somalia or not. On one hand, USA was not interested in the Horn. On the other hand, the Somali policy of territorial expansion did not appeal to OAU, which noted that the borders established by colonialists should stay. On the contrary, the policy of the Greater Somalia wanted to conquer the regions occupied by the Somali speaking people in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which includes the NFD of Kenya, yet Kenya was a silent darling of USA.

However, in May 1977, USA promised to assist Somalia with the condition that it cuts ties with Moscow. Bradbury notes that Barre received \$100 million annually for military development from USA in return for the access of facilities at Berbera for the US Rapid Deployment Force.<sup>185</sup> After pulling out of Ethiopia, Carter stated that he was to "aggressively challenge the Soviet Union" in many parts of the world, including Somalia.<sup>186</sup> Carter's government had not aided Barre during his attack of Ogaden, arguing that it would provide arms only if Somali troops withdrew from Ethiopia. In addition, USA did not allow Saudi Arabia and Iran to transfer the arms of America to Somalia, as USA did not support the attack

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<sup>184</sup> Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin op. cit. p. 232; Carol R. Saivetz and Sylvia Woodby Soviet-Third World Relations op. cit. p. 129.

<sup>185</sup> Mark Bradbury, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace, Oxfam Research Paper No. 9 (Oxford: Oxfam, 1994) p. 10.

<sup>186</sup> President Jimmy Carter in an Interview with Magazine Publishers Association, June 10 1977 in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 13, 25 (June 20 1977) p. 866.

of the Ogaden. France and England, who were considering giving military aid to Somalia, changed their minds. Hence, Somalia was left unaided during the attack of Ogaden.<sup>187</sup>

In 1978, US reopened the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) mission in Somalia. Somalia was out of USA's policy until late 1979, when American hostages were seized in Iran and USSR intervened in Afghanistan. It was also at this time that USA was developing its rapid deployment force. Hence, USA considered Somalia a potential staging ground. In 1980, Somalia concluded an agreement with USA that gave US forces' access to military facilities in Somalia. In August, that same year, USA aided Somalia with \$40 million military aid and another \$5 million for a two-year budget.<sup>188</sup> In exchange for the aid, USA was given the base at Berbera. By the end of 1980, USA had established a military base where the Soviets had established.<sup>189</sup>

However, it was only in 1983 that the Americans started working at Berbera. America's military aid to Somalia increased. US - Somalia agreement was renewed in 1982.<sup>190</sup> When Ethiopia forces invaded Somalia at the central border in 1982, USA aided Somalia with two emergency airlifts to assist Somalia defend its territory. In the mini-Ogaden war of the early 1980, Somali troops crossed to Ethiopia. From then on until 1990, USA and Somalia were close partners. In fact, Somali officers of the National Armed Forces were trained in the military schools of USA. USA improved the facilities at Berbera with a military construction program that ended in 1985.<sup>191</sup>

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<sup>187</sup> Marina Ottaway, "Superpower Competition and Regional Conflicts in the Horn of Africa" in R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, The Soviet Impact in Africa op. cit. pp. 180-181.

<sup>188</sup> Cf. The Washington Post (August 28 1980).

<sup>189</sup> Crawford Young, Ideology and Development in Africa op. cit. p. 67.

<sup>190</sup> Marina Ottaway, "Superpower Competition and Regional Conflicts in the Horn of Africa" in R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, The Soviet Impact in Africa op. cit. 181.

<sup>191</sup> Cf. M. Abir, "Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa" in Richard Gray, ed., The Cambridge History of Africa 4: From c. 1600 to c. 1790 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) pp. 537-577.

In Ethiopia, USA could not hold back its anger due to the reforms of the Derg. In the early 1977, USA announced suspension of military aid to Ethiopia "on the grounds of human rights violations."<sup>192</sup> In April 1977, the Derg retaliated. They abrogated the military assistance agreement with the USA, expelled the American military advisory group and closed down the US military installations. Before the twenty-five year US-Ethiopian military relationship ended, the Soviets had taken over Ethiopia.<sup>193</sup> US recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia at the request of the Ethiopian Government in July 1980.

Meanwhile, USSR was courting its new client. In December 1976, an Ethiopian delegation visited Moscow and signed the military assistance agreement with USSR in December 1976. The Soviet Union signed the military aid worth \$500 million for weapons when Mengistu visited Moscow in May 1977.<sup>194</sup> In late November 1977, the Soviets began air and sea lift to Ethiopia. In December, about 16,000 Cuban troops arrived. In February 1978, Ethiopia repelled with the assistance of the Soviet and Cuban troops when Somalia attacked Ogaden. By March, Somali forces had withdrawn from Ogaden. Ethiopia and the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship and co-operation in 1978. With the help from the Soviet Union, Ethiopian armed forces increased from 54,000 in 1977 to over 300,000 ten years later. In 1991, Ethiopian army was estimated to be more than 600,000, while Somalia's army increased from around 32,000 in 1977 to around 65,000 by 1987.<sup>195</sup>

Reacting to USSR move into Ethiopia, USA entered a military alliance with Ethiopia's neighbours, Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and Oman. US Rapid Deployment Force used these countries to enter Middle East. Upon realizing this, USSR reacted even more by inciting

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<sup>192</sup> Richard B. Remnick, "Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa: The Decision to Intervene" in Robert H. Donaldson, ed., The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures op. cit. p. 126.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid. p. 135.

<sup>194</sup> The Washington Post (March 5 1978) A10.

<sup>195</sup> Cf. The Military Balance 1976/1977 and 1989/1990 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies).



Ethiopia and South Yemen to come together and block USA. Weapons flowed freely into Somalia, which intensified internal clan-conflicts.<sup>196</sup> In USA, the 1985 International Security and Development Act forbade all US economic assistance to Ethiopia, except for humanitarian disaster and emergency relief.<sup>197</sup> With the shift of alignments, US-Soviet tensions increased although the two countries did not confront each other directly. They did so indirectly using Ethiopia and Somalia.

## 2.8 American-Soviet Foreign Policies in Somalia and Ethiopia

The cold war coincided with Africa being ripe with opportunities as thirty-seven countries gained their independence during the peak of the cold war.<sup>198</sup> Between 1956 and 1964 only, over twenty-four countries gained independence. Consequently, Africa was a fertile ground for cold war rivalry as the newly independent nations sought for political advice and aid.

Because most African countries gained their independence during the height of cold war tensions, the superpowers – i.e. the Soviet Union and the United States – dictated the terms of their freedom. The African people were robbed of the opportunity to design their own governments and systems.<sup>199</sup>

The superpowers were concerned with their selfish interests of winning as many clients as possible. They were not after development of their allies. Makinda adds, “the overriding interest of the superpowers was not to help Somalia but to pursue their own global and regional agendas.”<sup>200</sup> The emphasis of the superpowers was military, economic and nuclear competition, however, not in their countries lest they cause damage and loss of lives, but in the territories of their surrogates.

<sup>196</sup> Anna Simmons, “Somalia: A Regional Security Dilemma” in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, Africa in the New International Order eds. op. cit. p. 71.

<sup>197</sup> Bureau of African Affairs, Background Note: Ethiopia op. cit.

<sup>198</sup> Waldemar Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa (London: Paul Mall Press, 1969) p. 3.

<sup>199</sup> Cf. “Samuel Kobia” in Jerry L. Van Marter, After Serving as Cold War Battleground op. cit.

<sup>200</sup> Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993) p. 51.

They wooed Ethiopia and Somalia insofar as they provided a playground for their competition. They were not ready to commit their armed forces in Somalia and Ethiopia, as USSR did in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979); and as the USA did in Guatemala when it helped to overthrow the communist government (1954), Cuba (1961), Grenada (1983) and Vietnam (1964-1975) when unsuccessfully it prevented Communist North Vietnam from bringing South Vietnam under its rule.<sup>201</sup> Although there have been periodical explorations of oil and gas since 1940s in Ogaden,<sup>202</sup> the superpowers were not concerned with exploiting these resources. Young has argued that Somalia is enriched with minerals, yet they have not been exploited.<sup>203</sup>

Largely unexploited reserves of iron ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, uranium, copper, and salt; likely petroleum and natural gas reserves. Minerals, including uranium and likely deposits of petroleum and natural gas, are found throughout the country, but have not been exploited commercially. Petroleum exploration efforts, at one time under way, have ceased due to insecurity and instability.<sup>204</sup>

During the Ogaden War, many people were displaced, a matter they ignored. The 1973-1977 drought displaced 10% of the population as refugees, yet this was out of the scope of their concerns. In total, it is estimated that there were 1.4 million refugees by the middle of 1980.<sup>205</sup>

From the Soviet perspective,

Africa was both distant from its areas of primary concern, and so poorly underdeveloped as to make it an unlikely setting for the establishment of genuinely socialist states. Though each superpower sought global allies in its contest with the other, this search was, at least until the mid-1970s, more a matter of collecting support on generalized issues...<sup>206</sup>

In USA, an Assistant Secretary of State was assigned to handle Africa from the time of John F. Kennedy. Although this meant a certain relations between USA and Africa, Africa was

<sup>201</sup> "Cold War" in *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Vol. 3, *Micropaedia Ready Reference* op. cit. p. 444.

<sup>202</sup> Marina Ottaway, "Superpower Competition and Regional Conflicts in the Horn of Africa" in R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, *The Soviet Impact in Africa* op. cit. p. 183.

<sup>203</sup> Crawford Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa* op. cit. p. 61.

<sup>204</sup> Bureau of African Affairs, *Background Note: Somalia* op. cit.

<sup>205</sup> Crawford Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa* op. cit. p. 61.

<sup>206</sup> Christopher Clapham, *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia* op. cit. p. 137.

generally isolated from the mainstream of the foreign policy of USA, apart from during the 1977-1978 Ogaden War, where the issue came to limelight. In the Soviet Union, African affairs were left to the foreign ministry (collaborating with Africa Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences) with the Secretariat of the Communist Party having little to do with this. It was only in mid 1970s that Africa came to the core with the visit of President Podgorny to Somalia in 1974.<sup>207</sup> From the part of the superpowers, they did not gain anything from Ethiopia and Somalia, neither before nor after shift of alignments in 1977. In fact, they spent billions of dollars on arms. Some of their forces died during the hot wars in other parts of the world. The region was not offering any economic wealth or strategic importance. They only wanted the Horn as long as it served as their battleground superpower for competition.

## **2.9 The Demise of the Cold War in the Horn of Africa**

The tensions of the cold war had reduced during the reign of Nixon and Kissinger after they initiated détente. However, they had resurfaced again in the Horn of Africa during the 1977-1978 Ogaden War. As the superpowers entered into serious negotiations on elimination of missiles during the reign of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, Africa was gradually left out of the margin. Harbeson notes that “Africa became... even more peripheral to the international political and economic order.”<sup>208</sup>

They were no longer interested in competing for clients. After the 1977-1978 Ogaden War, Africa vanished gradually from the foreign policies of the superpowers as they dialogued and signed one treaty after another on elimination of arms until the end of the cold war. This led to declines in the East-West confrontations. The Soviet military and technical assistance reduced drastically as Gorbachev engaged in serious negotiations with USA on elimination of

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<sup>207</sup> Ibid. p. 136.

<sup>208</sup> John Harbeson, “Africa in World Politics: Amid Renewal, Deepening Crisis” in John Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in World Politics: Post Cold War Challenges (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) p. 14.

missiles. Chazan notes that “Africa did not loom large in the new political thinking of Gorbachev. The optimism concerning the continent... had dissipated.”<sup>209</sup>

## 2.10 Impact of the Cold War in the Horn of Africa

One of the visible effects of the cold war in the Horn of Africa was the increase of the army. The size of Ethiopia’s army grew from 54,000 in 1977 to over 300,000 ten years later. By 1991, it was estimated to be over 600,000.<sup>210</sup> On the other hand, Somalia’s army grew from 32,000 in 1977 to 65,000 in 1987.<sup>211</sup> With the aid of the Soviet Union, Somalia built the largest army in Africa between 1969 and 1977. After the shift of alliance in 1977, Barre received \$100 million from USA for military aid, in return for the port at Berbera for US Rapid Deployment Force.<sup>212</sup>

The superpowers contributed to the escalation of the arms race in the Horn of Africa. During the cold war, Ethiopia and Somalia acquired large quantities of arms from the superpowers and their close allies, namely Italy, East Germany, Bulgaria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, South Africa, Saudi Arabia and China.<sup>213</sup> By mid 1970s, Somalia had the best armed forces in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>214</sup> It had about 250 tanks, over 300 armoured personnel carriers and more than 52 fighter planes.<sup>215</sup> In 1987, 16% of Somalia’s imports were arms.<sup>216</sup> USA delivered military aid worth \$1.4 million in June 1988 after the outbreak of war in Northern Somalia.<sup>217</sup> Woodward

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<sup>209</sup> Naomi Chazan et. al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (3<sup>rd</sup> edition) op. cit. p. 451.

<sup>210</sup> Cf. The Military Balance 1976/1977 and 1989/1990 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies).

<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

<sup>212</sup> Mark Bradbury, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace, Oxfam Research Paper No. 9 op. cit. p. 10.

<sup>213</sup> Ibid.

<sup>214</sup> Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia op. cit. p. 57.

<sup>215</sup> Cf. The Military Balance 1975/1976 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies).

<sup>216</sup> Third World Guide (1991/1992).

<sup>217</sup> Mark Bradbury, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace, Oxfam Research Paper No. 9 op. cit. p. 10.

notes that the Soviet Union armed Somalia with weapons worth \$200 million between 1974 and 1977 only, making it the fourth largest army in Africa after Nigeria, Zaire and Ethiopia.<sup>218</sup>

The arms and ammunitions are scattered all over Somalia in the hands of warlords and other individuals. The readiness of the superpowers and their allies to supply arms encouraged arm flow and diverted resources for development to unproductive wasteful ends. Barre needed the arms to achieve the policy of a Greater Somalia and to keep his dictatorial regime against domestic opposition groups while Ethiopia needed the weapons for self-defence against Somalia's expansionist policy and for suppression of domestic opposition forces.

The cold war rivalry impelled the superpowers and their allies to compete in providing economic assistance to the newly independence African states. Somalia sought Soviet aid as early as 1962 because at that time, USA was supporting Ethiopian and Kenyan regimes as they were resisting Somali expansionist policy. By involving in the superpower' politics, the defence budget of Ethiopia and Somalia swelled up, as most of the country's expenditure went to defence. Ethiopia's defence budget grew from \$103 million to almost \$472 million, while Somalia's budget grew from \$36 million to \$134 million between 1977 to 1985.<sup>219</sup>

In addition, during the cold war, the preoccupation of regional security was narrowed to military security. The superpowers did not solve the problem of regional conflicts. In fact, they worsened internal conflicts with the free flow of arms. They were ready to supply arms, which fuelled military based regional conflicts and worse, diverted resources meant for development. To this day, small arms are abundant throughout Somalia. By involving in the superpower ideological politics, Ethiopia and Somalia aggravated their internal conflicts and

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<sup>218</sup> Peter Woodward, The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996) p. 137.

<sup>219</sup> Edmond J. Keller, "Introduction: Toward a New African Political Order" in Edmond Keller J. and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in the New International Order op. cit. p. 6.

encouraged instability.<sup>220</sup> Even minor disputes were seen through the lens of cold war ideological differences and seemed protracted. Almost each conflict was exacerbated by the reaction of one superpower to the other's involvement in a particular crisis.<sup>221</sup> Keller notes that the cold war contributed to "several of the incidents of militarily based regional conflicts."<sup>222</sup>

Barre embraced socialism in 1969 and even signed a treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union. When Mengistu embraced socialism in the late 1970s and shifted alliance to the East, Barre was not happy. He abrogated the friendship treaty and expelled Soviet advisers. USA did not hesitate to court its new client, Somalia. In this patron-client game where the clients and the superpowers switch alignment, the superpowers instigated divisions between Ethiopia and Somalia. Today, Somalia is far behind in development than it was at independence despite receiving billions of dollars from the superpowers.

Conflicts in one state have effects in the neighbouring countries. Ethiopia and Somalia have many of its peoples scattered throughout the neighbouring countries, especially Kenya and Djibouti. The Horn of Africa is the source of one of the highest numbers of refugees in Africa.<sup>223</sup> Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the superpowers were not after promoting long-term development plans in the Horn of Africa. Today, most African states are worse off economically than they were thirty years ago. Despite receiving huge aid from the superpowers, per capita income of Somalia declined by 0.2% from 1970 to 1975 and 0.35%

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<sup>220</sup> Anna Simons, "Somalia: A Regional Security Dilemma" in *ibid.* p. 76.

<sup>221</sup> Peter J. Schraeder, "Removing the Shackles: US Foreign Policy Toward Africa after the End of the Cold War" in *ibid.* p. 102.

<sup>222</sup> Edmond J. Keller, "Introduction: Toward a New African Political Order" in *ibid.* p. 5.

<sup>223</sup> African Studies Centre, The Horn of Africa Forum op. cit. (November 11 1993); African Studies Centre, The Horn of Africa Forum, Issues 8-9 op. cit. (1996/1997).

since independence.<sup>224</sup> Indeed, the Horn of Africa is among the poorest regions globally, characterized by underdevelopment and inter and intrastate conflicts.

Furthermore, most of the states and governments that depended on the superpowers heavily during the cold war came out with weak basis of domestic political legitimacy. Moreover, during the cold war, Ethiopians and Somalis were denied their civil and political rights to choose their political status and pursue developmental plans as dictatorial regimes reigned in both countries. Both Mengistu and Barre lacked grassroots' support and relied heavily on the superpowers on the running of the state, ignoring the participation of the masses. The impact of these dictators is still felt today. Barre led to shuttering of Somalia and the collapse of the rule of law and order, fragmentation into smaller regions and inter-clan wars, which saw Somalia collapse in 1991. Mengistu caused a lot of suffering among the populace during the reign of the Derg, who butchered the people mercilessly.<sup>225</sup>

During the cold war, Somalia and Ethiopia spent a lot of time and resources on military and arms at the expense of development. They have to bear the heavy burden of servicing the heavy debts. In 1977, Somalia's debt was around \$300 million. It doubled in 1980 and quadrupled by the end of 1984, which was estimated to be around \$1.4 billion, more than the total value of the country's exports in 1983.<sup>226</sup> Finally, in Ethiopia, the conflicts with Somalia led to development of black market. After the destruction of Hargeysa in 1988, the Ethiopian City of Direedawa was filled with cheap electronic goods and vehicles sold by Somali refugees.

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<sup>224</sup> Cf. World Bank Atlas (1972).

<sup>225</sup> Africa Studies Centre, The Horn of Africa Forum, Issues 8-9 op. cit.

<sup>226</sup> Cf. Indian Ocean Newsletter (November 30 1985).

# CHAPTER THREE: THE DYNAMICS OF THE ETHIOPIA - SOMALIA RELATIONS

## 3.1 Background of Ethiopia-Somalia Relations

The scramble for the Ogaden region began long before Somalia's independence. Although the 1897 and 1908 treaties between King Menelik and the Italian authorities defined the boundary between the then Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia, the Italians were not happy that the Ethiopians defeated them when they tried to conquer Ethiopia in the battle of Adawa in 1896, despite the fact that these treaties were agreed upon mutually. The Italians had underestimated the strength of Ethiopia and thought they would win the battle.<sup>227</sup>

In 1920s, the authorities in Italian Somaliland started probing further inland beyond the agreed boundary as the Italian and Somali army attacked the Ogaden region in 1935 with about 40,000 troops. Their next agenda was to attack the British Somaliland. Following this, there were battles in 1940 between the Italian and the Somali forces on one hand and the British on the other. The British evacuated themselves to Aden through Berbera. After seven months, the British attacked the Italians in order to recapture their territory in the Ogaden. They defeated the Italian and Somali army.<sup>228</sup> Meanwhile Haile Sellassie, who was in exile, returned to Ethiopia and campaigned for the expansion of Ethiopia,

I have come to restore the independence of my country including Eritrea and Southern Somalia whose people will henceforth dwell under the shade of the Ethiopian flag.<sup>229</sup>

Later, in a memorandum to the UN, Ethiopia stated that before the division of Africa during the Berlin Conference, its territory included a coastline along the Red Sea and Indian

<sup>227</sup> Tom J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: A Crisis for Détente (2<sup>nd</sup> edition) op. cit. p. 70.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid.

<sup>229</sup> Ibid., p. 68.



Ocean.<sup>230</sup> Haile Sellassie continued to treasure his expansionist dreams. An agreement that granted the British temporary administrative authority of the Ogaden region was approved. The Emperor pressed on with his ambitions to regain total control of the region that the colonialists mapped out of Ethiopia during the division of Africa. The British withdrew in 1948, but retained the rights of supervision over Somali clans that pastured their livestock in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

In Mogadishu, the Somalia Youth Club (SYC) was formed in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Its members included several religious leaders representing the major clans. They were united by a common desire of promoting Islamic values. In 1955, the members of SYC in the British Somaliland started demanding for their grazing lands in Haud, which Britain had ceded to Ethiopia a year before.<sup>231</sup> The grazing lands belonged to the Isaaq clan. This was followed by mass demonstrations demanding their “lost land” in the Ogaden. The British did not know what to do. Finally, they decided to leave the region.<sup>232</sup> The British Somaliland gained independence on June 26 1960 while the Italian Somaliland became independent four days later. The two united to form the Republic of Somalia.

In Kenya, the Somalis in Somalia condemned the British for relinquishing the NFD, which they claim, should have been part of Somalia. Thus, immediately after Kenya’s independence, the government of Britain frequently raised the issue of separating the NFD from Kenya and annexing it to Somalia. In 1962, Britain appointed a commission to study whether the Somali speaking populace in the NFD prefers to be in Somalia or Kenya. The study of the commission revealed preference for Somalia. However, the leaders of Kenya complained, as they did not want the region to be curved off from Kenya. At the same time, Somalia

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<sup>230</sup> Robert F. Gorman, Political Conflict on the Horn of Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981) p. 29.

<sup>231</sup> Mark Bradbury, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace, Oxfam Research Paper No. 9 op. cit. p. 8.

<sup>232</sup> Why Ogaden War [www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1986/KCA.html](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1986/KCA.html).

government felt deprived of its territory of the Somali-speaking population in the NFD of Kenya, Ogaden in Ethiopia and Haud in the French Djibouti.<sup>233</sup>

There followed war for a brief period along the border after the British withdrew their decision and decided to leave the NFD in Kenya.<sup>234</sup> Due to this fact, Somalia broke diplomatic relations with Britain until March 1963 when the British and the Kenya government refused to consider any steps that will curve NFD out of Kenya and incorporate it into Somalia.<sup>235</sup> Moreover, In the early 1960s, the Soviets were not happy with the British for incorporating NFD into the Kenyan territory, the French for the presence in Djibouti and the Americans for supporting Ethiopia, since both Britain and France were allies of USA in NATO. Thus, the Soviet Union sought to aid Somalia to unify all the Somali speaking people into a Greater Somalia.<sup>236</sup>

After independence, leaders in the post-independent Africa did not consider the boundaries of the ethnic groups that were divided by colonialists. On the contrary, the OAU Annual Summit Conference held in Cairo adopted a resolution that was proposed by the late Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. The doctrine, *Uti Possedetis Juris* declared the boundaries that were established by the colonialists inviolable, thus accepting the boundaries created by the former colonial masters. Morocco and Somalia rejected the proposal and took the case to the OAU. However, since the Ethiopians dominated the OAU secretariat, they often excluded the topic from the agenda. It was finally tabled in the OAU Summit Conference held in Addis Ababa in 1973.<sup>237</sup>

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<sup>233</sup> A. A. Castagno, "The Somali-Kenyan Controversy: The Future" in The Journal of Modern African Studies 2 op. cit. pp. 164-165; Jama Mohammed Ghalib, The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience (New York: Lilian Barber Press, Inc. 1995) p. 105.

<sup>234</sup> Marian Ottaway, "Superpower Competition and Regional Conflicts in the Horn of Africa" in R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, The Soviet Impact in Africa op. cit. p. 170.

<sup>235</sup> Jama Mohammed Ghalib, The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience op. cit., p. 105.

<sup>236</sup> Christopher Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa op. cit. p. 175.

<sup>237</sup> Jama Mohammed Ghalib, The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience op. cit., pp. 110f.

OAU appointed a committee of eight member-states to look into the matter. Meanwhile, Haile Sellassie was overthrown in 1974 on return from the 1974 OAU Summit that was held in Mogadishu. Soon the issue remained unresolved as the Derg underwent through internal crises, and fought with Somalia in 1977-1978. The committee again met in Libreville, Gabon from August 5 to 8 1977, to discuss the issue as well as the war between Ethiopia and Somalia that was already on. Somalia's Minister of Foreign Affairs walked out of the meeting. Other African countries, led by the then Kenya's Vice President Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi, went to see Carter, urging the Western countries not to supply Somalia with arms.<sup>238</sup>

Since independence, the boundaries between Somalia and its neighbours – Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya – have provoked conflicts between Somalis in Somalia and those in the diaspora. In Ethiopia, the Ogadeni Somali claim to be part of the Somalia nation that was divided by colonialists. The Somali policies to create a Greater Somalia that will include Somali ethnic communities living in the “lost land” led to the two major Ogaden Wars of 1964 and 1977 and numerous disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia. The border-disputes between Somalia and its neighbours, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, have remained unsolved to date.<sup>239</sup> This has been a major cause of the tensions along the boundaries of these three countries.

### 3.2 Somalia's Policy towards Ethiopia

After independence, a major goal of Somali nationalism was unification of the Somali-inhabited territories. Somalia felt that the colonial boundaries were unjust to its Somali-speaking population, who are scattered all over Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. This explains why Somalia has had endless battles with Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti as Somalia supported the *shifto* along the boundaries with the three countries.

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<sup>238</sup> Ibid.

<sup>239</sup> Anna Simmons, “Somalia: A Regional Security Dilemma” in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in the New International Order op. cit. p. 16.

In addition, the fertile grazing lands and wells in the Ogaden fell under Ethiopia. This meant that only the Somalis in the Ogaden part of Ethiopia had access to these resources. Yet, the Somali pastoralists in the Ogaden region of Somalia also wanted free access. Somalia feels deprived of this pastureland for livestock of its nomadic populace. In fact, many Somali nomads have migrated into Ethiopia searching for grazing lands and the wells for their livestock. Consequently, of the three neighbouring countries of Somalia, Ethiopia was the most appealing to Somalia because of these resources.

In order to achieve the goal of uniting all the Somali-speaking population under a Greater Somalia, Somalia needed a strong army and sophisticated weaponry that would capture the territories inhabited by Somalis in the Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia. After the 1977-78 Ethiopia-Somalia war, Somali government continuously called for the self-determination among the Somalis in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Yet, in the Non-aligned Movement Summit in New Delhi in March 1983, Barre declared that his government had no aims of expansion, and that he was willing to negotiate with Ethiopia in order to solve the border conflicts.<sup>240</sup>

In addition to the Ogaden factor, Somalia never trusted Ethiopia, a “thorn in its flesh”. Their relationship was that of suspicion, spying and enmity. Somalia was not happy that the OAU headquarters was in Addis Ababa. So it needed a strong army and sophisticated weapons for self-defence in case of a possible attack from its enemy number one, Ethiopia. Somalia sought to undermine Ethiopia in every possible way. It supported rebel forces against Ethiopia, most of who operated from Somalia. Somalia also wanted to be regional hegemon in the Greater Horn of Africa in order to scare other countries in the region with its military might. Thus, it needed aid in order to build a strong army. This is why it aligned with the superpowers.

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<sup>240</sup> Bureau of African Affairs, Background Note: Somalia op. cit.

### 3.3 Ethiopia's Policy towards Somalia

Like Somalia, Ethiopia aligned with the superpowers during the cold war because it needed the weapons for defence against Somalia. Since the 1964 Ethio-Somali War, Ethiopia lived in perpetual fear of attack from Somalia over the Ogaden region. Moreover, there were continuous conflicts along the Ogaden boundary caused by the *shifto*. Therefore, Ethiopia needed a very strong army and sophisticated weapons for self-defence. Ethiopia also undermined Somalia by supporting rebel forces, which operated from Ethiopia. They staged a successful battle that toppled Barres's regime.

The interstate relations between Ethiopia and Somalia affected the relations between Ethiopia and Somalia with other countries, it confirms the saying *my neighbour's friend is my enemy*. Any country that was friendly to Somalia automatically implied enmity with Ethiopia. When Somalia experienced problems that led to its collapse, Ethiopia was happy because Somalia's attention was diverted from its expansionist policy to the internal problems it was experiencing. Ethiopia plays a double game because on one hand, it does not want Somalia to reunite because an unstable Somalia is good for its security since a stable Somalia may pursue the policy of the Greater Somalia. On the other hand, Ethiopia was one of the key countries in the just concluded Somali peace talks under IGAD auspices. Although Ethiopia supported the peace talks, it feels that a united Somalia poses great risks to its security and stability.

When Somalia collapsed, the problem seemed to be over, only to reach climax in the North with Eritrea in the early 1990s. Therefore, Ethiopia does not want to risk attacks from all corners since Eritrea is already a threat to its territory in the North as it controls Badame and the contested Assab port. Ethiopia's hidden agenda was and still is to be a regional hegemon in the Greater Horn of Africa for security purposes, since the chances of attacking a regional hegemon are less. By doing so, it would scare Somalia, its great enemy. In order to attain this

goal, it aligned with the superpowers during the cold war in order to receive military aid. Today, Ethiopia wants to build strong relations with the sole superpower since it smells danger in the region. Somalia may reunite and may revisit the expansionist policy, Eritrea is a threat in the North and the conflicts with Kenya seem to increase.

### 3.4 Socialism in the Horn

From 1961 and 1967, Somalia supported the *shifita* in the “lost land” in both Ethiopian, Kenyan and Djibouti territories, as it waited for the opportune time to conquer and capture the regions. From early 1969, there were instabilities within Somalia, which led to assassination of President Shemark on October 15 1969. Although the Prime Minister, Egal, who was out of the country, hurriedly returned home, it was too late. Siad Barre had already taken over power before the dawn of October 16 in a coup.<sup>241</sup> Barre embraced socialism and allied with the Soviet Union. He declared Somalia a socialist state a year later and signed a treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union.

He was a typical Stalinist dictator. He tolerated no opposition to his rule. He needed a strong army to keep his regime in power. He got huge military aid from the Soviet Union in exchange for air and naval facilities in the ports of Berbera, Kismaya and Wein. In 1972, tensions began along the Somalia-Ethiopia border, which heightened when Mengistu Haile Mariam acceded to power in Ethiopia in 1974. In 1974, Somali Air Force (SAF) received the first 40 MiG-21MFs and MiG-21UMs, and some Mi-8 helicopters. However, the Somali force was not capable of maintaining all the aircrafts, and by 1977 only some 30 MiG-21s, 10 MiG-17s and a handful of Mi-8s and transports were operational. Most of them were in Mogadishu.<sup>242</sup>

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<sup>241</sup> “President Shemark is Assassinated” in Daily Nation (October 16 1969) p. 1.

<sup>242</sup> Tom Cooper, Ogaden War. 1977-1978 op. cit.

Prior to 1974, Ethiopia was a major recipient of US military support. About 300 US soldiers were stationed at Kagnew (near Asmara, in Eritrea today) while about 25,000 Ethiopian Army and Air Force officers were trained in USA.<sup>243</sup> In the early 1970s, the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force (IetAF) was small, but well-equipped with one squadron of ten F-5As and two F-5Bs (delivered since 1966), one unit with F-86s, three Canberra B52 bombers and a combined training unit of T-28Ds and T-33As. Most of the C-47s and C-54s were used as transports. However, most of these aircrafts were lost during the fighting with Eritrean rebels between 1970 and 1974. Thus, Ethiopia ordered more 14 F-5Es, three F-5Fs, 12 A-37Bs, and 15 Cessna 310 from 1976.<sup>244</sup>

A major event happened in September 1974 that led to a U-turn in US-Ethiopia relations. The Derg overthrew Emperor Haile Sellassie in a bloody coup on February 3 1977, whereby Mengistu Haile Mariam acceded to power. The day after, the PMAC members unanimously voted Mengistu chairman. The first leader from the communist states to meet Mengistu after the coup was Fidel Castro, who visited Addis Ababa from March 14 to 15. After the visit, Castro flew across the Red Sea to Aden in South Yemen, to co-chair a joint Cuban-Yemeni Mediation Effort to settle the Ethio-Somali dispute. Both Barre and Mengistu were invited to the meeting. On April 3, Castro went to East Berlin to report about his African mission and to consult Erich Honecker of East Germany.<sup>245</sup>

The Derg caused dramatic revolution in Ethiopia as they embraced socialism. USA was not happy that Ethiopia was becoming socialist. Gradually, it reduced the military aid to Ethiopia from the late February 1977.<sup>246</sup> Internally, the Derg experienced many problems. In the North,

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<sup>243</sup> Ibid.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid.

<sup>245</sup> Ermias Abebe. The Horn, the Cold War, and Documents from the Former East-Bloc: an Ethiopian View [www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/cwihp/bulletins/b8-9a6.htm](http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/cwihp/bulletins/b8-9a6.htm).

<sup>246</sup> Marina Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa op. cit. p. 101.

an opposition group called ELF was operating in the present-day Eritrea. It received military equipment from the Arabic countries. During this time, Eritrea was still part of Ethiopia. From December 1976 to May 1977, the ELF controlled almost the whole Province of Eritrea with about 15,000 guerrillas.<sup>247</sup> Along the Ethiopian-Sudanese border, the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) was fighting, supported by the Sudanese government and the Eritrea Popular Liberation Front (EPLF). There were also the White and Red Terrorist Squads, who manoeuvred within the country, killing the citizens that were loyal to the Derg.<sup>248</sup>

While this was going on, the Ethiopian army was continuously involved in the war against Eritrean rebels along the coast of the Red Sea, and against the Western Somali Liberation-Front (WSLF) that had commenced guerrilla' operations in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in the mid-1970s. By the spring of 1977, Somalia reinforced the WSLF in order to mount a conventional campaign, the target being the recapture of the whole Ogaden Area in Ethiopia, where the majority of the population were Somalis. Ethiopia was in serious domestic crisis. It faced opposition from all the corners of the country. Its imperial government was almost collapsing. In addition, the provinces of Wollo and Tigre were hit by severe drought. Consequently, no grain was harvested in the region. It also led to death of many people.

The 1974-oil crisis worsened the situation as the price of a barrel of oil increased four times. Ethiopia experienced serious political and economic crises. Since USA reduced aid to Ethiopia, the latter was forced to look for alternative source of funds. Fidel Castro held a secret meeting with the leaders of the Derg in March 1977. After the meeting, Ethiopia started leaning towards the East. On April 23 1977, Ethiopia closed the US embassy in Addis Ababa. Within a week, USA stopped the delivery of almost \$100 million to Ethiopia.<sup>249</sup> In early May

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<sup>247</sup> Richard Sherman, *Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980) p. 88.

<sup>248</sup> *Ogaden War* [www.onwar.com/aced/data/oscar/ogaden1976.htm](http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/oscar/ogaden1976.htm).

<sup>249</sup> "United States Turned Down Ethiopian Request" in *New York Times* (May 2 1977) p. 16.



1977, Mengistu met Soviet's Foreign Minister Gromyko and President Podgomy in Moscow.<sup>250</sup> After the meeting, the presence of the Cubans in Ethiopia increased.<sup>251</sup> Meanwhile, Somalia was angered by the Soviet Union's friendship with its enemy Ethiopia.

### 3.5 Soviet's Plan to Sideline USA in the Horn Fails

As the Soviet Union supported the Marxist-Leninist regime in Ethiopia, it also wanted to maintain Somalia as its client at the same time. Eager to maintain good relations with both Ethiopia and Somalia in order to humiliate USA, the Soviet Union attempted to reconcile Ethiopia and Somalia. Fidel Castro held an emergency meeting with the leaders of Somalia and Ethiopia in Aden to convince Mengistu and Barre to forget their differences and form a Marxist Confederation in the Horn of Africa.<sup>252</sup> During the meeting, Barre vowed that he did not intend to attack another socialist country. However, after the meeting, he stated that the international solutions were fruitless until he formed a Greater Somalia.<sup>253</sup>

After attempts of reconciling Ethiopia and Somalia through mediation failed, USSR decided to abandon Somalia. USSR had been the major supplier of arms to Somalia. However, the Soviets switched their full support to Ethiopia with the delivery of arms and 10,000-15,000 Cuban troops. The Soviet Union promised the Derg military aid on condition that it renounced the alliance with its rival power, USA. Mengistu closed down the military mission and the communications centre of USA in April 1977. As the relations between Ethiopia and the East grew stronger and as Somalia's relations with the East turned sour, the Arab States and USA stepped in to aid Somalia.<sup>254</sup> Simons adds that the Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and

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<sup>250</sup> Marina Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa op. cit. p. 149.

<sup>251</sup> "Cubans in Ethiopia" in New York Times (June 11 1977) p. 15-16.

<sup>252</sup> Robert F. Gorman, Political Conflict on the Horn of Africa op. cit. p. 61.

<sup>253</sup> Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>254</sup> Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia op. cit. p. 54.

Lybia, stepped in before the other Western states came to fill in the assistance gap.<sup>255</sup> Saudi Arabia offered Somalia an equivalent of US \$200 million dollars in May 1977.<sup>256</sup>

On his return to Addis Ababa Colonel Mengistu lashed out at Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Moslem countries for planning to intervene on the side of the “aggressor” Somalis, and accused the United States with its NATO allies of co-ordinating an “imperialist plot” against Ethiopia.<sup>257</sup>

Within one year, Somalia’s foreign aid from UN agencies, the Arab world and the European Community (EC) surpassed the Soviet aid, and this was before USA came in.<sup>258</sup>

By 1982, Somalia was the third largest recipient of US’ aid in the whole of Africa.<sup>259</sup>

World Bank noted, “the total of official development assistance for Somalia is one of the highest in Africa per head of population.”<sup>260</sup> Somalia had sought military assistance from the Soviet Union in order to attack the Ogaden territory of Ethiopia. However, the Soviet Union had declined to aid Somalia, as it was not in favour of the policy of a Greater Somalia. Barre was not happy. In September, Moscow suspended all military aid to Somalia, began to ship weapons to Ethiopia and transferred military advisers from Somalia to Ethiopia. Moscow’s allies also moved into Ethiopia. Cuba and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen provided infantry, pilots and armoured units.

Meanwhile, Mengistu’s government was not able to resolve the problem in Eritrea. It focused its attention in the conflicts with Somalia over the Ogaden region. In August 1977, USSR suspended shipments of arms to Somalia and increased the same to Ethiopia. Upon realizing that the Soviet Union was with its enemy, Barre abrogated the treaty of friendship and co-operation with USSR in November 1977, and expelled all the Soviet advisers as noted earlier. USA found out that it was being locked out the Horn of Africa,

<sup>255</sup> Africa Contemporary Record 10 (1977-1978) p. B. 397.

<sup>256</sup> Marina Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa op. cit. p. 119.

<sup>257</sup> “Horn of Africa; Everybody’s War” in The Economist (February 4 1978) p. 62.

<sup>258</sup> Africa Contemporary Record 11 (1978-1979) p. B. 289.

<sup>259</sup> Africa Contemporary Record 14 (1981-1982) p. B265; Indian Ocean Newsletter (March 20 1982).

<sup>260</sup> Indian Ocean Newsletter (November 30 1985).

as it was neither with Ethiopia nor with Somalia. Thus, in June 1977, Carter's government began to study ways of enticing Somalia. Carter worked tirelessly to get Barre close to USA. He instructed Dr Kevin Cahill, a close friend and physician of Barre to "get Somalia to be our friend."<sup>261</sup> When Dr. Cahill delivered the message to Barre, the latter, "got an impression that the United States did not care about Ogaden."<sup>262</sup>

The friendship between Barre and USA began during the administration of Jimmy Carter, after Barre expelled the Soviets.<sup>263</sup> Worried by the Soviet influence in the region, USA signed agreements with Kenya, Somalia and Sudan for access to military bases.<sup>264</sup> Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states promised Somalia that it would soon ship weaponry. With all these promises, and considering the internal problems Ethiopia was undergoing, Barre decided that the time was opportune for conquering the Ogaden. From 1976 to 1977, Somalia had *shifto* guerrillas led by regular Somalia National Army (SNA) personnel that established bases in the Ogaden Region.

### 3.6 Ethio-Somali Wars

#### 3.6.1 1963-1964 War

Since colonial times, Somalia has always claimed Ogaden in the Ethiopian territory. Somalia's goal has always been to unite its entire Somali-speaking people in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti under Somalia. In the early 1960s, Somalia sought military aid in order to achieve this goal. It needed military equipment for its 20,000-man army in the early 1960s. In 1961, a small war erupted in the contested Ogaden area between Ethiopia and Somalia. Tensions heightened in March 1963, when the Somalis in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia

<sup>261</sup> Robert F. Gorman, Political Conflict on the Horn of Africa op. cit. p. 70.

<sup>262</sup> Ibid.

<sup>263</sup> Ali Mazrui, "Crisis in Somalia: From Tyranny to Anarchy" in Hussein M. Adam and Richard Ford, eds., Mending Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali Communities in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (Asmara: The Red Sea Press, 1997) p. 8

<sup>264</sup> Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia op. cit. p. 55.

rebelled against their government, led by their elders. They were not content being in Ethiopia. Border disputes eventually led to war and numerous disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia.

For this reason, “there were serious diplomatic clashes between Haile Sellassie and Aden Abdulla (of Somalia) when OAU was formed and its Charter signed in Addis Ababa on May 25, 1963.”<sup>265</sup> The two leaders met to resolve their disputes and agreed to cease all hostilities. In fact, Somalia voted for Ethiopia’s permanent membership of OAU, upon Sellassie’s request to Abdulla in a personal telegram, whereby the later acknowledged the telegram and promised to back him. Relations seemed to have improved between the two countries in the following months. However, tensions erupted again as Ethiopia reacted over Somalia’s inability to curb insecurity in the Ogaden. To make it worse, Somalia supported a guerrilla campaign, Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF); a pro-Somali liberation group in the Ogaden aimed at seizing Ogaden from Ethiopia. In addition, Ethiopia’s rebel leaders lived in Mogadishu, yet Somalia did nothing about them.<sup>266</sup>

The superpowers worsened the tensions with their military aid. In mid 1963, USA, West Germany and Italy were jointly prepared to offer \$18 million as well as an army of 600 men and adequate security. However, USA noted that it would only give the funds on condition that Somalia rejects the offer from all the other countries. On the other hand, USSR was prepared to offer military hardware of approximately \$30 million. Thus, Somalia rejected the offer of USA and turned to the Soviet Union.<sup>267</sup> It signed a military agreement with the Soviet Union in 1963.<sup>268</sup> Immediately after Somalia rejected the offer of from Washington, a major

<sup>265</sup> Jama Mohammed Ghalib, The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience op. cit. p. 106.

<sup>266</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 109ff.

<sup>267</sup> Cf. New York Times (November 11 1963); Guardian (November 12 1963).

<sup>268</sup> Terence Lyons, “The International Context of Internal War: Ethiopia/Eritrea” in Edmond Keller J. and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in the New International Order op. cit. p. 89.

border war broke out between Ethiopia and Somalia from 1963 to 1964 over the contested Ogaden region.<sup>269</sup>

During this time, the OAU Annual Summit Conference that was held in Cairo in 1964 adopted a resolution proposed by the late Julius Nyerere of Tanzania that accepted the boundaries created by the colonialists. Only Morocco and Somalia rejected Nyerere's proposal.<sup>270</sup> As the war continued, USA hesitated to send military aid to Ethiopia due to fear of arms race in the region. However, when Ethiopia threatened to end the patron-client relations, US' response rescued Ethiopia, which won the battle.<sup>271</sup>

### 3.6.2 1977-1978 War

#### 3.6.2.1 The Ripe Moment for Attack

Barre took advantage of the internal problems Ethiopia was experiencing, especially the turmoil arising from the recent changes initiated by the Derg and the nationalist movements in Eritrea, who had launched an attack in the provincial capital of Asmara in January 1975. Thus, his attack of the Ogaden looked winnable. He thought that since Ethiopia's government seemed weak, the moment to pursue his expansionist policy was ripe.<sup>272</sup> Moreover, the Soviet Union had aided Somalia to build one of the most powerful armed forces in the entire sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>273</sup> Bradbury comments that between 1966 and 1977, Barre built the largest army in Africa, with the help of the Soviet Union.<sup>274</sup> Therefore, Barre was sure of victory.

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<sup>269</sup> Cf. Tedd Gurr, "Tensions in the Horn of Africa" in Feliks Gross, World Politics and Tension Areas op. cit. pp. 316-334.

<sup>270</sup> Jama Mohammed Ghalib, The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience op. cit., p. 110.

<sup>271</sup> Cf. Terence Lyons, "The International Context of Internal War: Ethiopia/Eritrea" in Edmond Keller J. and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in the New International Order op. cit. p. 89.

<sup>272</sup> Anna Simons, "Somalia: A Regional Security Dilemma" in Edmond Keller J. and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in the New International Order op. cit. p. 76.

<sup>273</sup> Africa Contemporary Record 10 (1977-1978) p. B373.

<sup>274</sup> Mark Bradbury, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace, Oxfam Research Paper No. 9 op. cit. p. 10.

In January 1976, the government of Ethiopia distributed to the heads of state during the OAU meeting at Addis Ababa a thirty nine-page memorandum entitled *War Clouds in the Horn of Africa*.<sup>275</sup> The aim of the document was to alert the leaders on the increasing tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia. It documented several border incidents and noted that Somalia “has made a decision to go to war against Ethiopia immediately.”<sup>276</sup> Smelling some danger, Ethiopia accused the SNA of fighting along the Ogaden in June 1977. However, Somalia strongly denied the allegation. Colonel Feleke Gedle Giorgis of Ethiopia remarked,

The situation is a serious threat to international peace and security, is a culmination of Somali's expansionist policy, which has its goal of Ethiopian territory. Over the last several months, the government of the Democratic Republic of Somalia has been infiltrating its regular troops into Ethiopia for deliberate purpose of committing aggression against Ethiopia short of launching a full-scale conventional war.<sup>277</sup>

Before the outbreak of the war, the SNA comprised 23,000 men, equipped with about 250 T-34 and T-54/T-55 Soviet-built medium tanks and over 300 armoured personnel carriers. This gave the SNA a force that was more than three times larger than Ethiopia's. When put together with WSLF, the total Somali force was about 50,000 men. Somalia's air force was also mighty, with 52 combat aircraft, 24 of these were Soviet-built supersonic MiG21s. Barre also had 35,000 regulars and 15,000 fighters of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF).<sup>278</sup>

On the other hand, Ethiopian Air Force (EAF) was equipped with between 35 and 40 aircrafts only. Ethiopia was soon to acquire US-built Northrop F-5 fighters from Iran. In addition, 15,000 Cuban troops and Soviet military advisers had arrived after Ethiopia embraced socialism. In June 1977, Mengistu contracted some Israelis to rebuild the Ethiopian Air Force,

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<sup>275</sup> Cf. Hillary Ngweno, “Ethiopia Alerts Heads of States” in *Weekly Review* (January 1976) p. 4.

<sup>276</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>277</sup> “Somalia Invades Ethiopia” in *Daily Nation* (July 24 1977).

<sup>278</sup> Ogaden War [www.onwar.com/accd/data/oscar/ogaden1976.htm](http://www.onwar.com/accd/data/oscar/ogaden1976.htm).

which put a number of F-5As into working order. They started flying first operational missions on July 24.<sup>279</sup>

### 3.6.2.2 Outbreak of the War

Somalia initiated the Ogaden War on July 13 1977, with a strong WSLF-drive towards Gode, in the Southern part of Ethiopia, where they encountered strong units of the Ethiopian army. On July 16, Ethiopia's two F-5As on a CAP near Harer detected a section of four MiG-21MFs coming close. Ethiopian fighters shot down two of them while two others collided while trying to avoid an AIM-9B fired by F-5s. Barre deployed the Strategic Air Command, (SAC) the air force of USA, to support of the WSLF. The same month of attack, the SNA-WSLF forces captured Gode along River Shabeelle River that is about 550 km inside Ethiopia.<sup>280</sup>

On July 21 1977, Somali MiG-21MFs began a series of attacks against different points in Ethiopia. On July 23 1977, Somalia Armed Forces (SAF) crossed the boundary into the Ogaden Province in Ethiopia without encountering any resistance. Mogadishu reported that at least eight Ethiopian aircrafts were destroyed in air raids. From July 24 to 26 1977, the SNA-WSLF forces captured ten major towns in Ogaden. When the SNA-WSLF forces went to capture Dire Dawa and Jijiga in August, their three battalions defeated Ethiopian forces, which withdrew to Marda Pass, thus leaving the SNA-WSLF alone in the region.<sup>281</sup>

However, they lost tanks in Dire Dawa and Jijiga, which prevented their victory. Moreover, the SNA-WSLF forces were stronger than Ethiopia's on the ground battle, but not in the air. Mengistu accused Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Moslem countries for supporting the "unjust war". He also accused USA and NATO members for co-ordinating an attack against

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<sup>279</sup> Ibid.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid.

<sup>281</sup> Ogaden War [www.acig.org/artman/publish/article\\_188.shtml](http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_188.shtml).

Ethiopia.<sup>282</sup> United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Italy had met in Washington on January 21 and had decided neither to respond to pressure nor to intervene in the increasing Ethio-Somali tensions. They agreed that they would not supply arms to Ethiopia and Somalia. The pressure for these states not to intervene came from moderate Arab states. On August 9 1977, Ethiopia was forced to admit that it had lost control over Ogaden.<sup>283</sup>

On August 28 1977, the SNA-WSLF forces headed towards Jijiga and Harrar. On September 13, they captured Jijiga. Meanwhile, SAF lost 23 fighters. The Ethiopians deployed all of the remaining operational F-5s, and two Canberras, to air bases at Bhir and Dire Dawa. By mid-September 1977, the SNA-WSLF forces had captured about 90% of the Ogaden. On September 29, the Somalis captured Gara Marda Pass, as one of their columns turned towards Harrar, while another put the 3<sup>rd</sup> Ethiopian Division and the entire city of Harrar under a blockade. About 20,000 SNA-WSLF forces attacked Harer from October 1977 to January 1978 where there were almost 50,000 forces armed with Soviet arms and 11,000 Cubans and 1,500 Soviet advisers. However, the SNA-WSLF was short of supplies and had few forces to conquer the city.<sup>284</sup>

### **3.6.2.3 Cuba and the Soviet Union Intervene in the War**

Somalia was on the verge of victory when Cuba and the Soviet Union came to rescue Ethiopia. Still bitter after Barre ordered 6,000 Soviet advisers out of Somalia, USSR and Cuba intervened in the war. In November 1977, the Soviet Air Force established an air-bridge to Ethiopia, deploying 225 Il-18, an-12B, an-22, and Il-76 transports from Tashkent through Baghdad to Addis Ababa to fly enough T-55 MBTs, BMP-1 and BRDM APCs, artillery, ammunition and supplies for three divisions. In the following two weeks, a new Soviet

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<sup>282</sup> "Horn of Africa: Everybody's War" in *The Economist* (February 4 1978) p. 62.

<sup>283</sup> Ibid.

<sup>284</sup> Mark Urban, "Soviet Intervention and Ogaden Counter-Offensive of 1978" in *RUSI J for Defense Studies* (June 1983) pp. 42 - 46.



transport aircraft landed every twenty minutes at Addis Ababa. Moscow also delivered 48 MiG-21s and MiG-23BNs, at least ten Mi-6s, some Mi-8s and Mi-24As. The personnel who operated these equipments were flown from Cuba and Angola, and 300 other instructors came from various Warsaw Pact' countries.<sup>285</sup>

Ethiopia's forces launched attacks from nearby Jijiga on November 14 1977 supported by the Cubans and the Russians led by the then First Deputy Commander of the Soviet Ground Forces, General Vasily Petro.<sup>286</sup> On November 28, the Somali forces staged their last attack against Harer. The bad weather forced the EtAF-units at Dire Dawa to remain on the ground. Meanwhile, the first Cuban units were deployed to Ethiopia. Barre was able to obtain little US and Egyptian support. Seeing that it was losing the war, Somalia contracted 20 Pakistani pilots and some personnel to assist the SAF. However, they were still very weak.

After some air strikes on Somali forces based at Hargeisa, Ethiopian and Cuban forces, led by the Soviet General Petrov, moved towards Jijiga on January 8 1978. They stormed the city after 6,000 more Cubans were flown in. After two days, they recaptured Jijiga and killed 3,000 Somali troops. A week later, Ethiopia recaptured the entire Ogaden. On January 21 1978, US and NATO members met to discuss the Ogaden war, especially the Soviet and Cuban involvement in the war.<sup>287</sup>

The situation was so bad that, fearing an attack on their former colony, the French deployed an aircraft carrier Clemanceau to the coast of Djibouti, which was to repel any attack on Djibouti. Meanwhile, OAU pressured on finding "African solutions to African problems" and

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<sup>285</sup> Cf. "The Associated Press (AP), Horn of Africa: Facts on File- World News" in Digest (February 6 1978).  
<sup>286</sup> Mark Urban, "Soviet Intervention and Ogaden Counter-Offensive of 1978" in RUSI J for Defense Studies op. cit.

<sup>287</sup> "The Associated Press (AP), Horn of Africa: Facts on File-World News" in Digest (January 27 1978) p. 43 E2.

appealed to both governments to negotiate. However, their appeal was not considered because the war was becoming “internationalized” as other external actors were getting involved. OAU feared that if the Somalis succeeded in uniting all ethnic Somalis, similar wars would erupt all over the continent. Thus, OAU “did not take a strong stand against the Soviet and Cuban aid to Ethiopia, although the Organization was concerned over the recent growth of outside involvement on the continent.”<sup>288</sup>

On March 5 1978, Petrov initiated an attack. After a few hours that morning, the Cuban-flown Ethiopian MiG-21s, MiG-23s, and Mi-24s flew 140 combat sorties that hit the Somalis. Petrov simultaneously dispatched all the available Mi-6s and Mi-8s to fly troops and 70 ASU-87s and BRDMs deep behind the Somali frontline, followed by the second Cuban armoured brigade. The Somali units fled towards the border as the Cuban tanks drove through Jijiga and continued Eastwards at a high speed followed by Ethiopian divisions. They recaptured Ogaden a week later.

Barre recalled the SNA troops from Ethiopia on March 9 1978. The same day, US President Jimmy Carter announced that it had recalled its troops from Ethiopia’s Ogaden.<sup>289</sup> In his announcement, Carter noted that Somalia was requesting for withdrawal of all foreign forces in the Horn of Africa. Barre said this with reference to Soviet and Cuban forces and called for a “just and lasting” settlement of the controversy over Ogaden.<sup>290</sup> Carter praised the decision of Somalia to withdraw from Ogaden, and expressed hope that the OAU “can move quickly to assist all parties to terminate hostilities”.<sup>291</sup>

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<sup>288</sup> Ibid.

<sup>289</sup> “Somalia Withdraws Ogaden Forces” in World News Digest: Facts on File. World Affairs- Horn of Africa (March 17 1978) p. 137A1.

<sup>290</sup> Ibid. p. 178 D2.

<sup>291</sup> Ibid. p. 160 D3.

After the withdrawal of SNA, the WSLF remained and repeated the tactics they had learned during the war. However, Ethiopian forces defeated them and a few SNA that had remained after Somalia pulled out.<sup>292</sup> By March 15 1978, all Somalia troops had retreated into Somalia although the guerrilla and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) continued their activities in the Ogaden.<sup>293</sup> By the end of March 1978, Ethiopia had recaptured the whole of Ogaden. Thus, the Ogaden war ended, although the Ogaden remained tense until 1980.<sup>294</sup>

During the war, the Soviets demonstrated their capabilities of organizing operations. It was the first performance of the Mi-24A attack helicopter, which was successful. Ethiopia won the war. On May 12, Ethiopia's Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam warned Somalia that his country would go to war if Somalia does not cease supporting guerrillas in Ethiopia's Southern Ogaden region. He noted that he was warning Somalia "for the last time", as the war was not yet over.<sup>295</sup>

### **3.7 Renewed Cold War in the Horn of Africa**

The events in the Horn of Africa attracted the attention of the international community. After Nixon and Kissinger's policy of détente and the SALT talks, the tensions of the cold war had relapsed in the early 1970s. However, all of a sudden, they erupted in the Horn of Africa. During this time also, there was shift of alliance between the superpowers and their allies, whereby the Soviet Union switched to Ethiopia after being expelled from Somalia while USA pulled out of Ethiopia and began to court Somalia. Before the 1977-1978 Ogaden war, Somalia allied with the Soviet Union while Ethiopia allied with USA.

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<sup>292</sup> "Ethiopia Launches Counteroffensive" in World News Digest: Facts on File, World Affairs-Horn of Africa: (February 17 1978) p. 99 C2.

<sup>293</sup> Bureau of African Affairs, Background Note: Somalia op. cit.

<sup>294</sup> Cf. "Somali Government Declares Completion of its Military Withdrawal from Ogaden" in World News Digest: Facts on File, World Affairs-Horn of Africa (March 15 1978).

<sup>295</sup> "Mengistu Threatens Somali" in World News Digest: Facts on File, World Affairs-Horn of Africa (March 19 1978) p. 178D2.

However, after the revolution of the Derg in Ethiopia in 1974, Ethiopia embraced socialism, which displeased USA. At the same time, the Soviet Union did not support Barre's expansionist policy. After Soviet's attempt to reconcile Ethiopia and Somalia failed, Barre's relations with the Soviet Union turned sour. Thus, the Soviet Union moved to Ethiopia while USA moved to Somalia. After the break of relations between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia in 1977, Carter's government embarked on

expansionism in the Horn and Middle East by engaging in military alliances with Ethiopia's neighbours: Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and Oman. In addition to assisting these countries in upgrading their military facilities and capabilities, the United States engaged these countries in joint military exercises.<sup>296</sup>

US Rapid Deployment Force used these states as their stage, which was aimed at facilitating the efficient projection of US military power in the Middle East and the entire Persian Gulf.<sup>297</sup>

On January 25 1978, Carter warned a delegation from the Soviet Union that US-Soviet relations could suffer if Moscow increased its military role in the Horn of Africa. During the one-hour meeting with Boris Ponomarev, Carter stressed that co-operation in other areas of the world were necessary for promoting bilateral ties.<sup>298</sup> When Brezhnev complained of stagnation of the SALT talks and trade agreements, US State Department responded that "the character of our general relations also depends upon restraint and constructive efforts to help resolve local conflicts, such as the Horn of Africa."<sup>299</sup>

While the USA agreed with Brezhnev on the need for a favourable outcome of the SALT talks, the statement noted that the Soviet presence in Ethiopia "inevitably widens and

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<sup>296</sup> Edmond J. Keller, "Introduction: Toward a New African Political Order" in Edmond Keller J. and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Africa in the New International Order* op. cit. p. 6.

<sup>297</sup> Cf. Henry F. Jackson, *From Congo to Soweto: US Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960* (New York: William Morrow, 1982).

<sup>298</sup> Cf. "Carter Warns Soviet Official" in *World News Digest: Facts on File, World Affairs-Horn of Africa* (March 19 1978).

<sup>299</sup> "US, USSR Quarrel Over Ogaden" in *World News Digest: Facts on File, World Affairs-Horn of Africa* (March 3 1978) p. 137 A1.

intensifies hostilities and raises the general level of tension in the world.”<sup>300</sup> The Horn of Africa went through many upheavals during the 1970s. With the coup d'états in both Ethiopia and Somalia, new leaders took over power. The superpowers battled each other indirectly using the Ethiopia and Somalia. The problems encountered by Mengistu's government offered an excellent opportunity for Somalia to pursue its expansionist policy.

### **3.8 The Horn of Africa in the Post 1977-1978 Ogaden War**

The superpower rivalry in the Horn eased through the 1980s and ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war. The tensions of the cold war reduced during the reign of Nixon and Kissinger, after they initiated détente, only to resurface in the Horn of Africa during the 1977-1978 Ogaden War, when the Horn of Africa came to the limelight in international politics. They faded again gradually as the superpowers vanished from the Horn of Africa in the early 1980s. Throughout the 1980s, the superpowers signed many treaties that led to the end of the cold war. USA realized that there were other ways of containing communism other than fighting it. In addition, USA was spending huge sums in weaponry. Hence, a peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union would cut off expenses on weaponry.

Likewise, the Soviet Union encountered serious economic problems due to heavy expenditure on weapons at the expense of development. In addition, the Soviet-Chinese relations were worsening, thus, USSR realized that it would be better to make peace with USA. The weapons were also becoming very expensive as the superpowers raced in acquiring weapons that are more sophisticated. In fact, the top issue for détente was arms control. When Gorbachev came to power, the superpowers entered serious negotiations on elimination of missiles. This marked the end of the superpower competition for clients in the third world and reduction of the cold war tensions. By the late 1980s, the superpowers had left the Horn of

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<sup>300</sup> Ibid.

Africa. With the waning of the cold war tensions, the Horn of Africa reduced its strategic importance for the superpowers and the other great power and indeed the entire international community.

With the departure of the superpowers, Somalia's internal problems resurfaced. Inter-clan war and rivalry climaxed, which weakened Somalia's social cohesion and undermined its political structures. Soon, the country's economy and infrastructure deteriorated. There were extreme inequalities in the rural-urban distribution that contributed to the unrest and the outbreak of the civil war in 1991. 1988-1991 saw increased inter and intra-clan fighting, largely due to Siad Barre's policy of using one clan to fight another. This undermined peaceful coexistence of the clans. The civil war began in 1988, when the Somali Nationalist Movement (SNM) rebels launched an attack across the border into North-western Somalia.

Many civilians died while many others were displaced. In the South, General Mohamed Farah Aided, leader of the military wing of the Hawiye-based United Somali Congress (USC) launched attacks against the government and advanced gradually towards the centre. In the late 1980s, Western donors placed political conditions on foreign aid to Somalia. Barre's poor human rights' record led to freezing of almost all foreign aid by 1989. Thus, without external aid, the government encountered serious economic problems. Barre's government weakened as guerrilla fought from all sides of the country, worsened by inter-clan fighting. The government was under attacks from all sides. Barre's regime collapsed in January 1991.

In Ethiopia, TPLF and EPLF shared a long history of enmity. During Mengistu's regime, the government was able to suppress TPLF and other opposition forces internally with the aid of the superpowers. However, with the departure of the superpowers, Ethiopia began experiencing serious internal problems. The opposition forces seemed to be becoming

powerful. Tensions between the TPLF and EPLF heightened. Eritrea's EPLF was fighting for autonomy from Ethiopia, yet the latter was not for Eritrea's autonomy since this would reduce Ethiopia to a landlocked state. Moreover, the contested Assab port would fall under Eritrea, which would mean Ethiopia would have to pay revenue for using the port. Throughout the 1980s, there were serious clashes along the Badame boundary of Ethiopia and Eritrea. The clashes between Ethiopia's TPLF and Eritrea's EPLF reached the climax in the early 1990s whereby UN intervened in a supervised referendum that led to Eritrea's independence.

The interstate tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia remain to date. After the collapse of the Somalia State in 1991, the focus of the Somalis was on the inter and intra-clan rivalry and other internal problems. To date, there is so much hatred between the Ethiopians and the Somalis, who do not trust each other. Ochieng<sup>301</sup> notes that the hatred is so deep that a mention of Ethiopia changes the mood for most Somalis, and vice versa with Ethiopians. Ogaden is a contested territory because the Somali pastoralist communities want access to the grazing lands in Haud and the entire Ogaden, which Britain ceded to Ethiopia in 1954.

Omar notes that "Ogaden still remains in bondage under Ethiopian yoke."<sup>302</sup> Ethiopia was happy after the collapse of Somalia since a united Somalia may pursue its expansionist policy. The international community has not addressed the Ogaden issue. Probably, it is not considered an important. The focus of the international community is now on reuniting Somalia. Somalia has not attained peace despite the election and installation of Abdulahi Yusuf as President in 2004. Since the interstate tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia remain buried, they may resurface when Somalia attains peace and the warlords unite.

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<sup>301</sup> Bernard Ochieng, Interview on Ethiopia-Somalia Relations (Nairobi: May 30 2004).

<sup>302</sup> Mohamed Osman Omar, Somalia. A Nation Driven to Despair: A Case of Leadership Failure (New Delhi: Somali Publications Co. Ltd., 1996) p. 209.

# CHAPTER FOUR: THE IMPACT OF THE COLD WAR ON THE ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA RELATIONS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The broad objective of this study is to analyze the impact of the cold war on the Ethiopia-Somalia relations while the specific objective is to examine the interstate relations between Ethiopia and Somalia. This research has shown that the cold war did not lead to the improvement of the Ethiopia - Somalia interstate relations. On the contrary, it worsened.

The cold war is called so because it did not lead to direct armed-conflicts between the superpowers as they fought indirectly through their surrogates in the Horn of Africa. Prior to the shift of alliance in 1977, the Soviet Union fought Ethiopia using Somalia, while USA fought Somalia using Ethiopia. After the shift of alliance, the Soviet Union fought Somalia using Ethiopia while USA fought Ethiopia using Somalia. To date, some of the tensions in the Horn of Africa can be traced to cold war.

As Modelski argued, "every internal war creates a demand for foreign intervention."<sup>303</sup> The Horn of Africa provided a fertile ground for the superpower rivalry as the superpowers took the advantage of the enmity between Ethiopia and Somalia, and instigated conflicts and war among them, thus worsening the already existing rifts. The Horn attracted the attention of the international community in the late 1970s when Ethiopia and Somalia fought during the 1977-1978 Ogaden War.

The tensions of the cold war had eased. However, they erupted in the Horn of Africa after the shift of patron-client alliances. As opposed to other parts of the world where the surrogates of

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<sup>303</sup> George Modelski, "The International Relations of Internal War" in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964) p. 20.



the superpowers did not confront one another, or if they did, it was short-lived, Ethiopia and Somalia engaged in direct-armed battles throughout the cold. USSR and Cuba confronted Somalia directly in the 1977-1978 Ogaden War, and made sure Ethiopia won the battle. Surprisingly, USA and the Soviet Union did not confront one another directly in armed battles. Ethiopia and Somalia fought two major wars and several minor wars along the Ogaden border.

## **4.1 Impact of the Cold War on the Ethiopia-Somalia Relations**

### *4.1.1 Weakened Interstate Relations*

The cold war did not lead to improved interstate relations between Ethiopia and Somalia as stated already. By inciting the clients to fight one another, USA and the Soviet Union worsened the already weak and tense relations between Ethiopia and Somalia. Throughout the cold war, Ethiopia and Somalia were great enemies. They supported ideological positions of countries that were thousands of miles away from them, who did not contribute anything to their welfare.

There was a step towards reconciliation between Ethiopia and Somalia towards the end of the cold war in 1988, when the superpowers did not need these countries anymore for their military and ideological competition as they were signing treaties that led to the end of the cold war. Ethiopia and Somalia signed a Peace Accord ending their hostility. The Accord also recognized Ethiopia's control over Haud and the contested grazing lands in the Ogaden that the British ceded to Ethiopia in 1954.<sup>304</sup> However, Somalia seemed to have partial commitment to peace and thus hostilities between these countries remain to date. It may take a very long time to establish good relations between Ethiopia and Somalia.

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<sup>304</sup> Cf. Mark Bradbury, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace, Oxfam Research Paper No. 9 op. cit. p. 10.

#### 4.1.2 Rivalry

As the Soviets undermined each other through their surrogates in the Third World during the cold war, so too did the Ethiopians and the Somalis. By doing so, the superpowers extended their rivalry to their clients, who viewed minor disputes through the prism of the cold war' ideological differences. They could not make objective decisions or reach consensus on issues that were of vital interests. This hindered successful pursuit of objectives like interstate co-operation. The dictatorial regimes of Mengistu and Barre used the threat of Soviet expansionism to attract the attention of the White House and expansion of capitalism to attract the attention of Moscow.

By providing military assistance to their clients in the Horn of Africa, the superpowers instigated divisions among the concerned states. Even in international meetings, Ethiopia and Somalia saw each other as enemies because they were aligned to two rival powers. The division of the heads of states at Casablanca was a result of the cold war ideological differences. Crocker expounds on this as follows:

The search for peace in Africa has been frustrated by the legacies of colonial frontiers and the cold war, ethnic rivalries, and the special interests of powerful individuals and sectors. While some countries were able to create (or recreate) a sense of national identity following independence, others are still coping with internal struggles, contested nationalism and claims on land beyond their current borders. Although the end of the cold war and the end of apartheid in South Africa opened new prospects for peace and co-operation, there are continuing wars and precarious coalitions in several regions of Africa.<sup>305</sup>

National Summit on Africa also noted that the causes of most of the conflicts in Africa are rooted in colonial rule, slave trade, struggles for decolonization and the cold war rivalry between the superpowers.<sup>306</sup>

<sup>305</sup> Chester A. Crocker, Why Africa Needs Our Attention (An A-Z of African Studies on the Internet, June 1995).

<sup>306</sup> National Summit on Africa, Draft Policy Plan of Action, Document No.: MW/81998/I VI: Peace and Security (Washington DC: July 1998).

### 4.1.3 Interstate Hatred and Mistrust

Linked to the above, the superpowers worsened the interstate hatred between Ethiopia and Somalia whose history is “littered with distrust, animosity and war.”<sup>307</sup> They extended their hatred, mistrust, suspicion and ideological competition to the rivals of their clients, who in turn extended to one another. Today, the relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia is rooted in suspicion, fear, political extremism, hatred and mistrust. Both Ethiopia and the Somalia have a bone of contention with each other, just as USA and the Soviet Union had with one another. Ethiopia is happy that Somalia has not attained peace despite the installation of the president because the attention of the Somalis is diverted to the internal conflicts. Hence, Ethiopia feels that a divided Somalia is good for its stability since a stable Somalia may revisit the expansionist policy.

### 4.2.4 Proliferation of Arms in the Horn

The superpowers competed in arming their clients with sophisticated weaponry. In turn, their clients used these weapons to butcher one another. Although the Soviet Union did not support Barre’s attack of Ogaden in 1977, Barre used the weapons USSR had been supplying him during the war. Mazrui argues that

the superpowers poured armaments into that little country. Once again, the stage was being set for the type of brutalization that tyranny at first unleashed and later anarchy would exacerbate... The two mighty capitals of the world – Washington and Moscow – were competing to make sure the city was in the “right hands”.<sup>308</sup>

Today, the weapons are scattered all over Somalia and Ethiopia and are in the hands of “immature and callous individuals.”<sup>309</sup> The big arsenals of weapons that the warlords have at their disposal today and are using them to fight the civil war have been the cold war’s main

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<sup>307</sup> UN Integrated Regional Information Network, Ethiopia-Somalia: An Uneasy Relationship (Nairobi: January 2 2001).

<sup>308</sup> Ali Mazrui, “Crisis in Somalia: From Tyranny to Anarchy” in Hussein M. Adam and Richard Ford, eds., Mending Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali Communities in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century op. cit. p. 9.

<sup>309</sup> Mark Bradbury, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace, Oxfam Research Paper No. 9 op. cit. p. 115.

legacy to Somalia.<sup>310</sup> Most of them are in the hands of the warlords in Somalia, who have used them for private interests.<sup>311</sup> The arms contributed greatly to the chaos in Somalia throughout the 1990s. They have undermined security, peaceful co-existence of the people and the smooth movement of people and property in Somalia. It is very unsafe to walk freely in some parts of Somalia today. The arms have also worsened the current conflicts in Somalia and have contributed to the destruction of national assets and resources. They have contributed to the displacement of many citizens and have legalized the killings, banditry and other illicit inhuman activities.

The weapons have grounded and undermined the functioning of the administrative activities of the governments and stopped all humanitarian, rehabilitation and developmental activities, which has reduced Somalia to ruins. When the UN peacekeepers searched for weapons in 1993, 24 Pakistanis were killed in Mogadishu. By mid September, over 53 UN soldiers and other Somalis had been killed.<sup>312</sup> The arms have drastically undermined the realization of peace accords that Ethiopia and Somalia have bilaterally and multilaterally signed. They have also brought individuals to perpetual fear and terror that bred mental instability and other psychological problems.<sup>313</sup>

#### *4.2.5 Support of Rebel Movements*

Ethiopia and Somalia undermined each other by supporting rebel movements against one another. Ethiopia supported SNM, USC, Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). These movements collaborated to topple Barre. They all operated from

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<sup>310</sup> Ibid. p. 10.

<sup>311</sup> Ibid. p. 115.

<sup>312</sup> Ibid. p. 16.

<sup>313</sup> Ibid. p. 115.

Ethiopia.<sup>314</sup> SSDF was formed by the military officers from Darod clan, who staged a coup that aborted in 1978, led by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf. After failing to overthrow Barre, they escaped to Ethiopia, formed SSDF and launched a guerrilla attack against Barre.<sup>315</sup> The SNM comprised the Isaaq in the Northern region, which took arms against Barre in 1981. Barre too did the same with Ethiopia. He supported the ELF, the EPRDF and the OLF. All these operated from Somalia. Barre also supported the *shifto* in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia throughout the cold war.

Considering the above effects of the cold war on the interstate relations between Ethiopia and Somalia, we can conclude that the cold war has not ended in Africa, as Obasanjo stated, “although we may talk about the end of the cold war in the East and the West, for us in Africa the cold war is not yet fully over... with little means of support, we have a long, arduous task of reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation...”<sup>316</sup> The tensions of the cold war are still alive in the Horn of Africa yet the Soviet Union collapsed over a decade ago. The wounds and the scars of the cold war are still painful and visible in the Ethiopia-Somalia relations. The grudges have remained buried since the end of the cold war. It may take a long time to let go of them, since they are very deep. However, as stated already, they may resurface in the future if Somalia unites and attains peace.

The Horn of Africa has lost its strategic position in the international community. It was important insofar as it served as a playfield for the superpowers in their military, ideological and economic competition. However, there is renewed interest again after the September 11 2001 events, whereby the sole superpower has committed itself to combat terrorism, which is

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<sup>314</sup> Anna Simons, “Somalia: A Regional Security Dilemma” in Edmond Keller J. and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in the New International Order op. cit. p. 77.

<sup>315</sup> Mark Bradbury, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace, Oxfam Research Paper No. 9 op. cit. p. 9.

<sup>316</sup> Olesgun Obasanjo, “A Balance Sheet of the African Region and the Cold War” in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in the New International Order op. cit. p. 19.

seriously challenging the hegemonic position of USA as the sole superpower in the post cold war era. With all its economic, military and diplomatic might, USA cannot fight terrorism.

Probably this explains why USA was suddenly on the frontline in the fight for peace in Somalia after many years of silence since the fall of Barre and the collapse of the state. Perhaps a renewed interest of the sole superpower in the Greater Horn of Africa may bring order and stability. USA has a renewed interest in the Horn because it is worried by Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia and the rapid spread of Islam in Ethiopia. Ethiopia has always had strong Orthodox Christianity. However, today, the percentage of Orthodox Christians vis-à-vis the Muslims is 50-50.

#### **4.2 An Analysis of the Hypotheses**

This study was premised on three hypotheses as follows:

##### **The cold war influenced Ethiopia-Somalia interstate relations:**

This study has shown that the cold war influenced Ethiopia-Somalia interstate relations. It went further to show that the influence was negative. One of the visible influences is the weakened interstate relations. This research asserted that by inciting Ethiopia and Somalia against one another, the superpowers worsened the interstate relations between Ethiopia and Somalia. To date, the relations are not good. Probably, Ethiopia and Somalia would have had good relations if the cold war did not exist. This is one of the painful legacies of the cold war.

This study also showed that the cold war hindered successful pursuit of common objectives in Ethiopia and Somalia, as they could not make objective decisions. They could not reach consensus on issues that were of vital interests, since they viewed everything through the lenses of cold war' rivalry and ideological differences. This research noted interstate hatred,

mistrust and suspicion among the Ethiopians and the Somalis as another painful legacy of the cold war. Even at the personal level, most Somalis hate the Ethiopians and vice versa. I interviewed five different Somalis at different times about what they think about the Ethiopians and they did not mention anything positive. They do not trust each other.

This research found out that, as great enemies, Ethiopia and Somalia fought two major wars in 1964 and 1977-1978 and supported rebel movements against one another. From the birth of Somalia State at independence in 1960 to its collapse in 1991, Ethiopia and Somalia have always been at par. As explained already, underlying the cold relations are several factors, all which rotate around the controversy over the grazing lands in the Ogaden and the policy of the Greater Somalia.

Furthermore, this research identified proliferation of arms in the Horn as another legacy of the cold war, which has brought about insecurity in the entire region. Using statistics, it showed that the greatest amount of the national budget of Ethiopia and Somalia went to acquisition of sophisticated weapons, which have hindered smooth movement of people in Somalia and some parts of Ethiopia. Finally, due to the negative impact of the cold war on the Ethiopia-Somalia interstate relations, it may take a very long time to establish good relations between these states.

Even if Somalia attains peace and unites, Ethiopia fears that a united Somalia may re-consider the expansionist policy. Alternatively, even if Somalia relinquishes its expansionist policy, there will still be a lot of hatred and mistrust between these states. In case Ethiopia becomes the AU chair, Somalia may have a difficult time accepting this. It may be difficult for Ethiopia and Somalia to have bilateral agreements.

**The interstate conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia are influenced by peculiar internal factors of each state:**

This study has shown that this hypothesis is not true. The peculiar internal factors vary in each state.

**4.2.1 Ethiopia**

In Ethiopia, the current internal tensions in Ethiopia can be explained in the context of Eritrea's struggle for independence and Ethiopia's history of hegemony. Between 1890 and 1941, Eritrea existed as an Italian colony independent of Ethiopia. Eritrea was federated into Ethiopia in 1952 under UN Resolution 390V of 1950. However, Haile Selassie abrogated the federation and declared Eritrea an integral part of Ethiopia's imperial government. The act of annexation marked the beginning of a 40 years of Eritrea's liberation struggle before attaining full independence in 1993 following a UN-supervised referendum.

In 1984, the border issue again arose and agreement between TPLF and EPLF acknowledged the possibility of disputed area along the borders and pledged to open negotiations soon after the struggle. However, when the two fronts came to power and signed the principles of co-operation between the transitional governments of the Ethiopia and Eritrea, the border demarcation was never given due attention. Rather, the two countries agreed that the Italian colonial borders were to form the basis from which joint negotiations on demarcating the borderlines would depart.

Some attempts to demarcate the border were in progress, but they were frustrated when Ethiopia unilaterally issued a new map of Tigray region of Ethiopia that included part of Eritrea. Although the common border between the two countries had been defined by successive Ethiopian-Italian treaties of 1900, 1902 and 1908 and was further amended by the



Italians in 1937, they were vague and left a considerable room for dispute. On May 6 1996, the Ethiopians attacked Eritrean troops in the border area. The joint commissions attempted to sort out the conflict in vain.

The border dispute was awakened by basic disagreements on economic relations that resurfaced. There are issues regarding the currency, common monetary policy and free trade. Above all, the accessibility of Ethiopia to the Mediterranean Sea and use of Assab Port, which Ethiopia ceded to Eritrea at independence, has been a major cause of contention since the loss of the Port landlocked Ethiopia's and meant loss of revenue. Moreover, Eritrea increased port-handling facilities and charged in dollars instead of Birr. Another controversy arose when Eritrea introduced its currency in November 1997, despite Ethiopia's strong protest.

On December 12 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed the Algiers Border Agreement witnessed by OAU, European Union (EU) and USA. The Agreement was to delimit and demarcate the border, investigate the causes of the war and address claims for compensation from both countries. The International Boundary Commission passed the verdict in April 2000 and declared that Badame lies in the Eritrean territory. Ethiopia rebuffed the verdict, arguing that some local problems must be addressed such as division of local communities, as some fell in the Ethiopian while some fell in the Eritrean side. However, the Commission rejected Ethiopia's claims, as the Algiers Agreement did not give room for appeal. The Commission also announced that the borderline would be modified when the two parties agree. To date, Ethiopia has not accepted the ruling of the International Boundary Commission. Ethiopia now feeds Djibouti with revenue it pays for using its port.

Tensions in Ethiopia also have to do the citizenship of the people in Badame since Ethiopia has not accepted the ruling of the International Boundary Commission. Ethiopia believes they

are Ethiopians while Eritrea believes they are Eritreans. Eritrea, which is a weaker party, wants Ethiopia to accept the verdict and relinquish Badame and Assab, just as it accepted the ruling of the Commission over Hanish Islands that were ruled in favour of Yemen. Eritrea also feels that Ethiopia should accept the ruling and give up Badame just as it gave up a claim over the Southern border of Djibouti in 1996.

The above analysis shows that Ethiopia is undergoing other internal problems that do not necessarily influence the interstate relations with Somalia and also have nothing to do with the cold war. The peculiar internal factors are the demarcation of the border with Eritrea, the citizenship of the people in the contested region and lack of access to Assab port that falls in the Eritrean territory. These factors have nothing to do with Ethiopia-Somalia inter-state relations.

#### 4.2.2 *Somalia*

Barre took over power through a military coup on October 21 1969. He came from the Marrehan sub-clan of the Darod clan. Many Somalis perceived the 21-year period of Barre's rule as a time of "Marrehan" hegemony with non-Marrehans having fewer advantages. Those who felt disadvantaged under his regime were ready to fight to install a regime under which their own clan relationships may accord them greater advantages. This was, and continues to be, a key factor in Somalia. Somali conflict is rooted in the clash between the traditional, pastoral society. Clan-individualism and the straitjacket of the modern state characterize it. Because of Barre's militarism, this clash resulted in considerable violence. It became more serious because the natural resources were scarce, and the lack of justice, good governance and education were strongly felt.

The years 1988-1991 saw a widespread increase in inter and intra-clan fighting, largely due to Siad Barre's strategy of using one clan to fight another with the massive military aid provided by both the East and the West. The proliferation of clan-based militias contributed to the intensity of clan disputes and deteriorating mutual distrust. This further compromised the peaceful coexistence of different clans and by extension, the bases of Somali national unity. In 1988, the civil war began in earnest as the SNM rebels launched a desperate offensive across the border into North-western Somalia triggering a conflict that led to massive retaliation by Barre's government and the destruction of Hargeisa by artillery shelling and aerial bombardment. Thousands of civilians were killed and others displaced.

Further South, General Mohamed Farah Aideed, leader of the military wing of the Hawiye-based USC launched attacks against the government forces and began to advance Southwards through central Somalia. The end of the cold war also dramatically reduced Somalia's strategic importance and made it possible for Western donors to place political conditions on foreign aid. Barre's regime's very poor human rights' record led to a freezing of almost all foreign aid by 1989. Without aid, Somalia was a castle built on sand, and within a year, the government lost control of most of the countryside.<sup>317</sup>

In December 1990, the situation exploded with a sudden uprising in Mogadishu, based largely on the Abgal sub-clan of the Hawiye, living in and around the capital. The insurrection took advantage of a convergence of factors; the general weakening of Siad Barre's regime due to political collapse and economic disintegration; widespread guerrilla warfare in the North and centre; and inter-clan fighting in the South. Under attack from all sides, the government collapsed in 1991.

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<sup>317</sup> Cf. K. Menkhaus, Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment (Nairobi: UNHCR - Department of International Protection, August 2003) p. 3.

Another source of the Somalia conflict has to do with inequalities. Extreme inequalities in the rural-urban distribution contributed greatly to unrest and the eventual outbreak of civil war. The excessive concentration of development, power and wealth in Mogadishu and the corresponding impoverishment of the rural areas led to marginalization of large sectors of the rural South and the acceleration of rural-urban migration.

The above analysis of the conflict in the Somalia shows that not all the conflicts in Somalia are also rooted in the cold war. Somalia is undergoing many internal problems that have nothing to do with neither inter-state relation with Ethiopia nor with Ethiopia itself. The peculiar internal factors in Somalia are the inter-clan rivalry, unequal distribution of power and resource, among others.

#### **The geopolitical factors underlie the relations between Ethiopia and Somalia:**

This study has proved this hypothesis true. Two major geopolitical factors underlie Ethiopia-Somalia relations.

- *The Greater Somalia policy:*

As stated already, Somalia felt deprived of its Somali speaking populace after independence. It felt that the boundaries established by the colonialists were unjust. Therefore, Somalia sought to conquer and acquire the "lost land" that is inhabited by the Somali-speaking people in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, NFD of Kenya and Djibouti. Throughout the cold war, Somalia supported *shifto* in these regions, which caused a lot of tensions. Somalia befriended the superpowers with the aim of getting military aid so that it can attack these countries and recover the lost land.

- *The grazing lands and wells in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.*

Out of the regions inhabited by the Somalis in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, Ogaden region of Ethiopia is the most appealing to the Somalis because of the fertile grazing lands and wells, considering that the Somalis are pastoralist in lifestyle. Somalia attempted to recapture this region in 1977-1978. Since it looked winnable as Ethiopia was undergoing many internal problems, Barre decided to attack. However, the Soviet Union and Cuba rescued Ethiopia, and Somalia lost the battle.

Ogaden is a semi-desert, inhabited by Somalis from both the Ethiopia and Somali. The Somalis from the Marehan clan who are in the Somalia side want free access to the grazing lands and wells for their livestock in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. They feel deprived of these assets which they have had access to for centuries until 1954 when Britain ceded to Ethiopia. The Somalis feel that the colonial boundaries were unjust to their unity as they are scattered in Ethiopia and Somalia.

These two geopolitical factors have perturbed Ethiopia since it lives in perpetual fear of attack from Somalia. Ethiopia fears that a united Somalia may pursue the Greater Somalia policy and recapture Ogaden. This explains why Ethiopia wants to be a regional hegemon in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia has relaxed as the attention of the Somalis is now diverted to the inter-clan conflicts, as noted earlier. This is why Ethiopia fears that a united and stable Somalia poses great risks to its unity and stability. Ethiopia also fears that even if Somalia does not pursue the Greater Somalia policy, it may start supporting opposition movements against its government.

#### **4.3 An Analysis of the Objectives**

This study has two objectives:

- *Broad objective: to analyze the impact of the cold war on Ethiopia-Somalia relations*

This research realized this objective and showed how the cold war impacted negatively on the Ethiopia-Somalia relations. It noted weakened interstate relations, rivalry, mistrust, inability to make objective decisions, support of opposition movements against one another and insecurity as some of painful legacies of the cold war on the Ethiopia-Somalia interstate relations.

It underlined that the impact of the cold war in the two countries was negative, and that the impact is still felt even today among the Ethiopians and the Somalis. It noted that the superpowers did not contribute anything positive to the development of the Horn of Africa as they were only after their selfish interests. They were interested in the Horn insofar as it served as their major playfield for ideological and military competition. Even what is normally called *aid* was not aid per se because they were for military expenses, which did a lot of harm and no good.

Barre used these weapons to attack Ogaden in 1977. The impact of these arms is visible today in Somalia. The warlords used them to butcher one another. This research noted that the weapons have caused insecurity in the entire Greater Horn of Africa. They have proliferated to the neighbouring countries of Somalia and have posed a great threat to regional security. This study concluded that since the scars and the wounds of the impact of the cold war on Ethiopia and Somalia are still alive long after the end of the cold war, it might take a very long time to heal them as they are buried deep in people's hearts. They may resurface in the future.

- *Specific objective: to examine the interstate relations between Ethiopia and Somalia*

This study realized this objective by analyzing the relations between Ethiopia and Somalia from 1960 to 1990. It devoted chapter four to this topic, which analyzed the background of the relations, Somalia's policy toward Ethiopia and vice versa. It showed how the sour relations led to two major Ogaden wars and numerous disputes between these states. It showed how the superpowers fought indirectly through Ethiopia and Somalia by arming and inciting them against each other. Instead of the Soviet Union and Cuba confronting USA directly, they confronted Somalia in the 1977-1978 Ogaden War.

This research showed how, even today, the relations between Ethiopia and Somalia are still bad long after the end of the cold war. It noted that for this reason, Ethiopia is now happy that Somalia is in chaos since a united Somalia poses great risks to its stability. Finally, this research noted that underlying the cold relations between Ethiopia and Somalia are several factors, mostly the policy of the Greater Somalia and the contested grazing lands and wells in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

Chapter one of this dissertation underlined three hypotheses. This study has shown that the first hypothesis, **the cold war influenced Ethiopia-Somalia interstate relations** and the third, **the geopolitical factors underlie the relations between Ethiopia and Somalia** are true, while the second, **the interstate conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia are influenced by peculiar internal factors of each state** is not true. Chapter two outlined why the superpowers were interested in the Horn of Africa, and noted the strategic position as the most important factor. Chapter three noted that at the base of Ethiopia and Somalia's policy towards each other were the Greater Somalia policy, the grazing lands and wells in the Ogaden, mistrust and enmity that made these states support rebel forces against one another. Chapter four went through the impact of the cold war in the Horn of Africa and underlined proliferation of arms, weakened interstate relations and mistrust among other factors.

# CHAPTER FIVE:                   SUMMARIES,                   CONCLUSIONS                   AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## 5.1       Summaries

Chapter one of this project was the proposal. It outlined the background of the study. It contained the research problem, objectives of the study, review of the literature, theoretical framework, hypotheses, defined the major concepts and methodology to be used in the research. Chapter two presented a brief history of the cold war and analyzed how the superpowers fought indirectly in the Horn of Africa. It started by noting why the superpowers were interested in the Horn, the relations between the superpowers and Ethiopia and Somalia both before and after the shifting of alliance, American and Soviet policies in the Horn and the impact of the cold war in the Horn.

Chapter three analyzed Ethiopia-Somalia interstate relations in the context of the cold war. These include Somalia's policy toward Ethiopia and vice versa, the two major Ogaden wars and the renewed cold war in the Horn in the late 1970s. In the light of the above, chapter four examined the negative impact of the cold war on the Ethiopia-Somalia relations, and reviewed the hypotheses and objectives. Chapter five is the last chapter. It will present the recommendations and the conclusions.

## 5.2       Conclusions

The post cold war era is an opportune moment for Ethiopia and Somalia to heal the wounds of the cold war and map out their differences. In the past, there was a tendency among the African leaders to identify the sources of ills as external. Today, there is a growing sense of introspection and resolve to find African solutions to African problems. Africa's leaders should view their predicaments as a challenge in the traditional manner and put their heads together in order to find solutions to common problems afflicting them. Otherwise, the cold



war will never end in Africa. Powerlessness of Africa in the global arena can only be changed when three conditions are met and eventually become self-sustaining: establishment of genuine democratic political systems, effective resolution of conflicts and increased economic, social, cultural and scientific co-operation at all levels. These conditions will eventually pave way for the foundation of security at the local and regional levels.<sup>318</sup>

The post-cold war era provides Africa an opportunity to obtain its rightful place in the global system. Africa needs a second independence in order to overcome its crises. In this new century, conflicts continue to constitute one of the greatest challenges facing Africa. Governance, identity, resource allocation and power struggle have caused tremendous suffering, destruction of resources, loss of lives, spilling of refugees and displacement of peoples. Ethiopia and Somalia have to reconstruct, rehabilitate and reconcile their past. They need new initiatives in order to achieve effective governance that will mobilize economic growth and promote human development.

Ethiopia and Somalia got billions of dollars during the cold war, most of which went to weaponry at the expense of development. Development based on self-reliance is the only foundation of a self-sustaining economic development. However, this objective can only be achieved in an atmosphere of peace, security and stability. This implies that for these countries to meet the challenges of the post-cold war era, they have to resolve the problem of the interstate tensions and build a sense of trust among themselves.

### 5.3 Recommendations

Colonial governments divided Africa according to administrative conveniences. After independence, the leaders did not pay attention to the political integration of various ethnic

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<sup>318</sup> Solomon Gomes, "The OAU, State Sovereignty and Regional Security" in Edmond Keller J. and Donald Rothchild, Africa in the New International Order eds., op. cit., p. 50.

groups that were divided by colonial boundaries. The OAU Doctrine on Inviolability of Boundaries declared that the boundaries established by colonialists remain. In some regions, such as Morocco and Somalia, there were no boundaries, while in other regions, the borders were questionable.<sup>319</sup> The boundaries between Somalia and its neighbours, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya, have provoked conflicts with the Somalis who live beyond the geographical borders of Somalia. There are many Somalis in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, who are not satisfied with being outside Somalia. In Kenya, they form a big percentage in the NFD.

Among other factors, this led to the 1964 and 1977-1978 Ogaden Wars and numerous disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia. The border disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia have remained unresolved to date. This study raised the critical issue of the policy of the Greater Somalia and the contested grazing lands and wells in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Since Somalia's expansionist policy is one of the contentious issues underlying Ethiopia - Somalia interstate tensions, perhaps Somalia should forget about the policy of a Greater Somalia and focus on other more important issues that affect its pastoralist populace.

If Somalia succeeds in uniting all its Somali speaking people under one flag, it may be disastrous for the entire African continent since other ethnic groups that were divided by colonial boundaries may demand unity such as the Maasai that are in both Kenya and Tanzania. Thus, for the sake of peace and stability of Africa, it is important for Somalia to accept the boundaries established by the colonialists. If Somalia unites and attains peace and reconsiders the expansionist policy, perhaps the great powers could use their leverage to coerce Somalia to forget about it.

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<sup>319</sup> William Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa (2<sup>nd</sup> edition) (Lanham: University Presses of America, 1989) p. 50ff.

There is also need of bilateral dialogue and agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia that will foster mutual understanding and trust. It is necessary to build a sense of trust by involving Ethiopia and Somalia on common developmental projects, so that they focus on important issues that will lead to their development. It is also important for Ethiopia and Somalia to forget their dirty past and focus on the present and the future.

European Economic Community (EEC, later EU) was established after the Second World War. It achieved its primary goal of preventing another continental war and promoting development. EU is the role model of Africa. Fifty years ago, the countries in Western Europe were fighting and undermining each other in the wars that were worse than the current conflicts in Africa. They fought in two major world wars that affected the whole world. Who could believe that fifty years later they will unite and to form close economic integration? Who ever thought that they would renounce their sovereignty in the monetary field and accept one currency? AU should follow EU's path in order to attain peace, unity and prosperity.

Japan also has a leaf to lend to Somalia. The 1945 Hiroshima and the Nagasaki bombings reduced the country to ruins. Within fifty years, Japan had attained tremendous economic development. Today, USA, EU and Japan are the pillars of global economy. Japan has proved that it is possible for Somalia to attain the same level of economic development fifty years down the line. All Somalia needs is to put its house in order and lay strategies for steady development.

In Africa, sub-regional organizations are very weak. They have failed to tackle the problem of conflicts and regional insecurity. The Peer Review Mechanism of AU does not recognize leaders who come to power through undemocratic means. Nevertheless, some of the leaders like Muamar Gaddafi and Omar El Bashir came to power through military coups. Thus, some

African leaders Africa play double standards. To make it worse, some support efforts for regional integration during the day and back rebel forces against each other at night.

Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone accuse are all members of Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS). Yet, they all back rebel movements against each other, who have turned their common border into very insecure zones. The Great Lakes region is another nightmare where Museveni backs rebel forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Ethiopia and Eritrea also back forces against each other. Sudan and Uganda do the same. Perhaps it is necessary to build strong sub-regional organizations that will effectively handle conflicts and enforce peace agreements.

Considering that the weapons obtained during the cold war are in the hands of the warlords and other civilians in Somalia, perhaps the first step in the peacemaking process would be to disarm the warlords and the masses, especially in Somalia. The weapons have found their way into other countries in the Greater Horn of Africa, and have contributed to regional insecurity. Peace building through education is another important factor. The civil society is the carrier of peace and reconciliation as it is at the grassroots level. Peace may pave way to security and stability, which are indispensable for sustainable development.

Finally, many Somali refugees are scattered all over Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Some have caused tensions in these countries and in other countries where they relocated. It is important to resettle them when Somalia attains peace. Ethiopians and Somalis face common challenges and must give new meaning and direction to their existence in order to emerge out of their entrenched crises. In this new century, they are at a historical juncture. They will either rise to the occasion and vanquish poverty, famine and conflict or succumb to doom.

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