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**“THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE RWANDA PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES ”**

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
**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI,
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN
PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

OCTOBER 2001



DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree to any other university.




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This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as a university supervisor.



Dr. Makumi Mwangi

30 October 2001

Date

DEDICATION

To my Mother

Emily M. Oduma

In memory of my father

Peter P Oduma

His memories shall ever live.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACRF	African Crisis Response Force
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
APC	Armoured Personnel Carriers
CDR	<i>Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique</i>
CIO	Contributions for International Organisations
CIPA	Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	Economic Commission of West African States Military Observer Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
E-IMET	Expanded - International Military Education and training Programme
EUSCOM	United States European Command
FAC	Forces Armees Congolais
HRS	Human Relief Sectors
IGAD	Intergovernmental Development Authority
IMET	International Military Education and Training Programme
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
JCET	Joint/Combined Exchange Training
LPC	Liberian Peace Council
MOT	Military Observer Team
MPLA	<i>Movimento de Liberticao de Angola- Partido Trabalhista</i>
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberi
NMOG	Neutral Military Observer Group
OAS	Organisation of American States
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operations in Mozambique
ORH	Operation Restore Hope
RCD	<i>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie</i>
PDD 25	Presidential Decision Directive 25
PSD	<i>Parti Social Democrate</i>
RECAMP	<i>Reinforcement des Capacites Africaines de Maintien de la paix</i>
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SC	Security Council
SNA	Somali National Alliance
TMC	<i>Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines</i>
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAVEM	United Nations Verification Mission in Angola
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNITA	<i>Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola</i>
UNITAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNITAF	United Nations Unified Task Force
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group

UNOMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNOR	United Nations Office for Rwanda
UNOSOM I	United Nations Operations in Somalia I
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operations in Somalia II
UNPF	United Nations Protection Force
UNPROFOR	United Nations protection Force
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
US	United States
USC	United Somali Congress

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CHAPTER ONE

PEACEKEEPING: EVOLUTION AND BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

The functioning of the United Nations founded in 1945 was affected by the evolution of international relations after the Second World War, the process of decolonization and differing concepts among the membership about the use of United Nations' machinery.¹ It became apparent that since all international conflicts could not be resolved by peaceful means, ways had to be found to stop hostilities and to control conflicts so that they could not develop into broader conflicts. This need gave way to the evolution of United Nations peacekeeping operations as, essentially a holding action. They were born out of necessity as a practical response to a problem requiring action. There is therefore no particular theory or doctrine behind them.²

Just like the League of Nations, the United Nations emerged out of political turmoil. After the outbreak of the Second World War, allied powers thought of a new international body that would help to keep the peace since the League of Nations had failed.³ It had proved impotent in Manchuria and Abyssinia and also had done nothing to counter the German invasion of Spain. The League had only limited membership, without full American participation, but nonetheless subject to United States pressure.⁴

This, thus, brought the idea of collective security, which reach back several centuries through a long series of proposals for maintaining international peace.

¹ United Nations. *The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peacekeeping*. (New York: United Nations, 1985) p. 4.

² Ibid.

³ Papp, D. *Contemporary International Relations: A Framework for Understanding*. (New York: Macmillan, 1991) p.55.

⁴ Ibid.

However, the central idea still remained the same. The governments of all states would join together to prevent any of their member from using coercion to gain advantage, especially conquering another.⁵ To this, no government could with impunity undertake forceful policies that would fundamentally disturb the peace and security. Any attempt to execute such policies would be treated by all governments as if it were an attack on each of them. Collective security thus assumes that aggression by any state will be met by "all against one" that is, by the combined power of the rest of the world to cut short a disturbance to the peace.⁶

The League of Nations was established after the First World War. Its creation was aimed at protecting the peace by way of, among many things, a system of collective security. The idea of collective security seemed rather irrelevant especially considering a world driven by competing national interests, marked by cultural and ideological differences, and threatened by aggressive regimes which laughed at and despised the sentiment, calling for an end to war. This was a result of the failure of the League of Nations to prevent World War II.⁷

The idea that collective security could at least be operationalised gained considerable ground fifty years after the start of W.W.II. This, in a way can be related to the idea of peacekeeping. This was after freedom from the shackles of the Cold War and release from the effect of the regular exercise of the veto. The UN, it seemed, could be

⁵ L.Gordenker & T.G. Weiss, "The Collective Security Idea and Changing World Politics." In Thomas G. Weiss(ed) *Collective Security in a Changing World* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993) pp.3-18

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ A.Butfoy, *Common Security and Strategic Reform: A Critical Analysis* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997 & USA: St.Martin's Press, Inc., 1997) pp.88-89.

made to work as originally intended. However the notion came under criticism since 1991. It was viewed as being conceptually muddled, naively unrealistic and a thin cover for western, especially US, hegemony. This was a result of the fact that placing a UN flag on an operation did not axiomatically lift it out of the muddy world of politics and conflicting interests. In addition, the very idea of collective security was often shrouded in ambiguity and contradiction.⁸

The UN system of collective security was generally not employed in the way that many supporters of the UN would have liked. This was because the Cold War provided a framework for the free use of veto powers by the privileged core of the Security Council. The member states placed more value on the principle and political expediency of sovereignty and non-intervention than on the 'dream' and 'nightmare' of an international police force.⁹ The result of this reluctance to invoke the full weight of the Security Council was to focus attention on peacekeeping operations. Thus, collective security is based on the principle that peace is indivisible. Therefore a threat to the peace anywhere is of 'common concern' to the entire international community, which must agree 'in advance' both 'to react' against such a threat and 'how' to react against it.¹⁰

After the two world wars, people and particularly scholars had a desire to develop ways of maintaining peace and stability. They had a belief that since the League of

⁸ A. Buffoy, *Common Security and Strategic Reform: A critical Analysis* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997 & USA: St. Martins Press, Inc., 1997).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ M.S. Finkelstein & L.S. Finkelstein (eds) *Collective Security* (USA: Chandler Publishing company, 19660).

Nations had failed to prevent war, the United Nations Charter would correct the League Covenant's deficiencies.¹¹

Post-Second World War planning was concentrated in the United States of America, since much of Europe was overrun by Axis military forces or under the threat of annihilation by bombing. Thus, many private organizations in the United States generated ideas and plans for a peacekeeping organization. The United States of America showed great willingness, to help create and play a leading role in a general international organization.¹² In the period between 1940 and 1943, President Roosevelt of the United States favoured a decentralised system of agencies for non-security matters and advocated "Great Power" responsibility for curbing aggression.¹³ The United States has since then assumed greater responsibility in peacekeeping operations wherever there is conflict. The United States as a great power has taken it upon itself to intervene or not to intervene in conflicts whenever it feels that it has the opportunity to do so.

The UN, Gregg asserts, was the product of demands made and bargains struck by those who dominated the international scene in 1945, in regard to power and influence basically, the US. Although other states played important roles in the formation of the UN, the Charter was very much the handwork of the US. The Charter was perceived as a reasonably accurate reflection of the US interests and values, and the UN was widely

¹¹ Bennet, A. L. *International Organisations* (4th ed.) (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988) pp. 39-40.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 40

¹³ Bennet, A. L. *International Organisations* (4th ed.) (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988) pp. 40-44.

viewed within the U.S. as an important institutional tool for the exercise of U.S. leadership.¹⁴

Peacekeeping was pioneered and developed by the United Nations. It was not originally envisaged in the United Nations Charter as among the measures to preserve world peace, and has no simple definition. However the United Nations defines peacekeeping as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. Peacekeeping operations are authorised by the Security Council and may include military and police personnel, and civilian staff. They may involve military observer missions, made up of unarmed officers to monitor an agreement or a cease-fire, verifying troop withdrawals, or patrolling borders or demilitarised zones. They may be peacekeeping forces, deployed to carry on similar tasks, with weapons, to act as a buffer between hostile parties, but in most situations can use the weapons only in self-defence, or a combination of both.¹⁵

Peacekeeping is a mechanism of conflict resolution. The goal of conflict resolution is to bring about a long-term or permanent solution to conflict by ultimately addressing the root causes of the problem.¹⁶ Peacekeeping allows peaceful methods of settling disputes. Conflict settlement aims to re-establish peace that is, stop the fighting or

¹⁴ Gregg, R. *About Face? The United States and The United Nations*. (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993)p.5

¹⁵ United Nations, *Basic Facts about the United Nations*. (New York: United Nations Publications, 1997) p.71.

¹⁶ Col.E.D.J.Plante, "Predicting the net stage of a conflict: Conflict resolution in Peacekeeping Operations." War, Peace and Security www server. Advanced military Studies. Course AMSC1. <http://www.cfsc.dnd.ca/irc/amsc/amsc1/031.htm>

violence and promote a compromise.¹⁷ Settlement Procedures such as peacekeeping, intervention, good offices, mediation and negotiation, are all coercive in nature in the sense that one or all parties in the conflict are forced to give up something that they otherwise would want for the sake of the cessation of the fighting.¹⁸

While recognising the notable increase in the number of conflicts in the world, peacekeeping operations do not purport to replace the means of voluntary settlement of disputes. That is solution by negotiation, mediation conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, fact-finding, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice as set out in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Neither do they entail the use of more forceful action, such as embargoes and military intervention as envisaged in Chapter VII. They seek to supplement the purposes and intent of these two Chapters.¹⁹

Traditionally, peacekeeping operations involved the deployment of military personnel from a number of countries, under UN command; to help control and resolve armed conflict between hostile parties. The main goal of traditional peacekeeping was to stop armed conflict and its recurrence. This was done through the efforts of peacekeeping forces acting as physical barriers between conflicting parties and by monitoring military movements of the parties. Traditional peacekeeping had an aim of creating a stable environment for negotiations.

According to James, a peacekeeping body is a traditional-looking military force, composed of a number of battalions under the authority of a commander, appointed by

¹⁷ A.B.Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of UN peacekeeping*. (New York: St.martin's Press, 1994) pp.104-105.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

and responsible to the international authority which has arranged the operation, i.e. often the UN, and therefore by no means, a UN preserve.²⁰ This is not as it is in current peacekeeping operations.

Traditionally, the United Nations defined peacekeeping operations as involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict.²¹ The early generation of peacekeeping operations were mostly little more than *ad hoc* holding operations, designed to put in place erstwhile combatants and their lines of control until a peaceful solution to a conflict presented itself. A good case is that of the border monitoring operations in Kashmir, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan - UNOMOGIP and the Middle East United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO).²²

Traditional peacekeeping was characterised by consent of all the parties to the presence and activities of the mission, impartiality of peacekeepers, and the minimum use of force, only as a last resort and only in self-defence or to defend the carrying out of the mission.²³ As changes occurred in the international system, this type of peacekeeping was faced with major problems. There was difficulty in separating the international aspects of a crisis from its internal dimensions, even when the mandate has been defined in exclusively international terms. There has also been reluctance of parties, which put obstacles in the fulfilment by the force of its mandate, even if it had at the beginning

²⁰ James, A., *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990) p.1.

²¹ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peacekeeping*, 2nd ed. (UN: New York, 1990) p.4.

²² Findlay, T. (ed.) *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*. (US: Oxford University Press, 1996).

consented.²⁴ There have also been multiple interventions in the same crises. In addition to UN contingents, other forces act in the same theatre, whether regional organisations such as the former Yugoslavia, or to individual countries like Somalia and Rwanda, which are not part of the UN operations or under its command.²⁵

The operations also experienced problems in the Post-Cold War era. Risks and costs of operations became much greater than for traditional peacekeeping. The tasks assigned to the missions were complex and the situation so volatile tended to increase. UN operations were given relief escort duties where the security situation was so dangerous that humanitarian operations could not continue without high risk for humanitarian personnel. The missions have also been given mandates to protect civilian victims of conflict where potential victims were at greatest risk, and mandates to control heavy weapons in possession of local parties when those weapons were being used to threaten the mission and the local population alike.²⁶ In most circumstances, soldiers have been killed while carrying out their duties. Thus, this has made some outside powers reluctant to be involved in peacekeeping operations.

Multifunctional peacekeeping was developed by the United Nations in order to address the complex problems posed by intra-state and regional conflicts. It evolved at the end of the Cold War as a new form of peacekeeping, variously referred to as second generation, muscular, extended, wider, advanced, broader, aggravated, protected or

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Abi-Saab, G "UN Peacekeeping, Old and New: An overview of the Issues." In Daniel Warner (ed.) *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping* (London Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995). pp.3-6.

²⁵ Ibid, pp.5&6.

²⁶ Report of the United Nations Peace Operations. A/55/305-S/2000/809. The Brahimi Report.

enforced.²⁷ The old operation was thus superseded by the multifunctional operation. Peacekeepers here are mandated to seek just and lasting solutions by tackling the root causes of armed conflict, particularly intra-state wars they are faced with in the Post-Cold War era. Except for Congo, Cyprus and Lebanon, the UN traditionally did not become involved in this type of conflict. Of the eleven operations established since January 1992, all but two relate to intra-state wars.²⁸

Peacekeeping operations were pioneered in the Cold War years. The first deployment of military observers was in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in 1948. Since then, with the changing patterns of political administration, UN peacekeeping has evolved to meet the unique demands of sharply different conflicts²⁹ particularly at the end of the Cold War. Its role was recognised by the world in 1988, when the United Nations peacekeeping forces received the Nobel Peace Prize.³⁰

The Post-Cold War period has been characterised by a proliferation of civil wars and other armed conflicts within states, which threaten international peace and security. The world has experienced massive human suffering as a result of these wars and conflicts. Peacekeeping has been increasingly applied to intra-state conflicts and civil wars, although it was initially developed as a means of dealing with inter-state conflicts.³¹

²⁷ For arguments that dispute novelty of the new peacekeeping, see James, A. 'Is there a Second Generation Peacekeeping?' *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 1, no. 4 (September/ November, 1994), pp. 110-113.

²⁸ Findlay, T. *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*. SIPRI Research Report No. 12 (U.S.: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 13.

²⁹ UN, *United Nations Peacekeeping: 50 years. 1948-1998* (United Nations Department of Public Information, 1998).

³⁰ United Nations Basic Facts About the United Nations. (New York: United Nations Publications, 1998) p. 71.

³¹ *Ibid.*

However, whenever peacekeeping operations are combined with the use of force in the operations of the United Nations, the work of the United Nations is normally faced with a dilemma and made more complex. The involvement of forces outside the UN without the consent of the UN, such as the conflicts in Rwanda in 1994, Somalia between 1992 and 1995 and in Bosnia and Herzegovina³², makes the job of peacekeepers become difficult.

THE PROBLEM

In 1994, the world witnessed the greatest crimes against humanity committed since the First World War, the Rwanda Genocide. An estimated 800,000 people, were massacred.³³ The great powers, the United States, Belgium and France, which could have acted to prevent the massacre, did nothing to prevent it because of the different mandates with those of the United Nations. Efforts by the United Nations to inform them of the severity of the massacre that ensued were turned down.

In the Rwanda genocide, 'The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations' interfered with the efforts of the co-operative multilateral action to maintain peace and security in the region. It had completely new rules tightly drawn in scope, mission, duration, resources and risk, that only the easiest, cheapest and safest peacekeeping operations could be approved under them. Most UN operations could not because the directive was issued at a time when the United Nations peacekeeping was exhausted from previous peacekeeping missions.³⁴ The US effort, together with Britain's support to prevent the deployment of a UN force in Rwanda succeeded, genocide

³² United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping; 50 years. 1948-1998*. (United Nations Publications, October, 1998).

³³ B. B, Ghali, *Unvanquished. A U.S. UN Saga*. (New York: Random House, 1999)

³⁴ Ibid.

continued.³⁵ The early signs of deteriorating security conditions did not provoke greater international involvement. During the chaos and massive killings, a clear, resolute standby international community could have significantly curbed the violence.³⁶ Conditions and directives such as these from the great powers, imposed on the United Nations and on countries under tension or in conflict, are the causes of the reluctance of the UN to take action and carry out peacekeeping activities.

The expansion of mandates, such as that in Somalia and new tasks given to the United Nations operations, pose a danger to the United Nations peacekeeping operations. Misjudgments and diplomacy based on vested interests by US and its western allies, and the lack of political will, can also lead to conflict. This study will look into the hindrances brought about by the introduction of the US policy into the affairs of the United Nations, particularly in peacekeeping operations. The United States has long pursued its legitimate national interests by intervening forcefully in the affairs of other countries.³⁷ But most instances of US intervention have occasioned controversy. There is need for the Africans to device ways and means of managing their own conflicts to avoid acting on outside policies.

The question that most scholars and policy makers have posed concerns the objective of the United States in horror struck countries, and whether there is a moral obligation to use force in such cases. Their interference in Somalia for instance leads to the question of whether the United States should be the world's policeman. There have

³⁵ Ibid

³⁶ United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda: 1993-1996*. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996) p.110.

also been questions as to whether to revise the UN Charter, which pledges for the respect for the territorial sovereignty of all states.

In most peacekeeping initiatives, the United States has had a major role to play, and influence in the United Nations decision making to undertake peacekeeping activities. Misguided policies and misdirected peacekeeping initiatives have led to the reluctance or failure of the United Nations to carry out peacekeeping activities. The United States' policies have influenced the United Nations peacekeeping initiatives. All these together have led to the continuance of war in crisis ravaged areas of Africa, even where peace seemed possible.

The idea of peacekeeping particularly in the post-Cold War, was a result of UN frustrations at its inability to enforce the peace as envisaged in the Charter and its desire to do more to affect the course of international armed conflict than simply mediating and conciliating.³⁸ However it is clear that most peacekeeping missions have not achieved their goals, the maintenance of international peace and security.

This study seeks to look into the general rules and reasons that provide for the involvement of the United States in the United Nations peacekeeping activities. This, should be a way of helping the populations, especially the African population, beware of the laws that allow for the intervention in the African war ravaged regions. This will help to clear doubts about involvement by the US and maintain states national sovereignty and security and the hopes of permanent peace. The US is not the ultimate solution to African

³⁷ W. Clarke & J. Herbst, *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*. (U. S. A.: Westview Press, 1997.)

³⁸ T. Findlay, (ed) *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) p.1

conflicts. Its involvement in the work of the United Nations Organization has both negative and positive outcomes.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This study seeks to:

- (a) Examine the influence of the United States of America's involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa.
- (b) Investigate the problems, costs and benefits of the U.S. deep involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa
- (c) Analyze the contribution of the United States towards peacekeeping operations in Africa.

HYPOTHESES

- (a) The more the U.S. becomes deeply involved in the UN peacekeeping affairs, the more the resurgence of conflicts in the African continent.
- (b) Whether or not the United States of America becomes involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa, conflicts will still persist in the region.
- (c) The United States intervention in conflicts in Africa enhances the possibilities of peace in Africa.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

Since the United Nations was formed, there have been at least 150 major conflicts, some inter state and others, civil wars.³⁹ In most of these conflicts, the US has played a major role, in some instances without involving the United Nations Security Council. This has forced many countries to abide by the conditions imposed by the US on

the UN and other countries. As a result, the UN has had difficulty in making decisions whenever it wants to deploy forces in regions of conflicts.

There have been major debates about whether the United States should or should not intervene in the conflicts in the third world and also doubts about the US policy towards Africa in the Post-Cold War era, particularly the idea of equipping African with the capacity to solve African problems. This study intends to add to the literature on US policy towards Africa and its debates on the problems that face peacekeeping missions in Africa.

There is urgent need to diagnose and understand the complexities associated with peacekeeping operations in the modern world that perhaps make western countries pull away from active involvement in crises in Africa. There is also need to look at the effects of outside policies towards UNPK initiatives towards peacekeeping operations.

The involvement of the United States of America in United Nations peacekeeping operations has great consequences for international relations and peace in Africa. This has been a source of concern to the international community and the policy makers in international peacekeeping and security. There has been a resurgence of wars in areas where peacekeeping operations have been carried out. There is therefore a need to have a clear mandate on the peacekeeping missions in order to have peace restored forever and not just for a short period of time.

³⁹ D. Papp, *Contemporary International Relations*. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1991).

Despite the efforts to resolve conflicts in Africa, and increasing success in recent years, durable peace remains an elusive goal on the continent.⁴⁰ Annan observes that the persistence of conflict in Africa poses a major challenge for the UN in particular, 'as it goes to the heart of the organization's mandate.' The study calls for a sober and honest re-examination of the experience of the US, in its operations in Africa.

Most of the literature by scholars such as Wainhouse, Urquhart, Papp and even from the reports of the United Nations, is on the UN failure of peacekeeping operations, they cite problems of finance, lack of clear mandates, and lack of political will and the role of the US. This study assumes that most of the wars that recur in Africa, even after peacekeeping activities, and the failure of the United Nations peacekeeping operations taking place in conflict regions such as Somalia and Rwanda, is because of the deep involvement of the United States in peacekeeping operations.

Many scholars have talked about the US involvement in peacekeeping operations in Africa. Some scholars like Omach have criticized the United States policies great involvement in the United Nations, while others as Stremlau, and Bloomfield have supported its involvement. The study hopes to add to the literature on the contentious issues of peacekeeping and U.S. policies towards Africa with regard to peacekeeping. It will help policy-makers design appropriate policies on conflict management and peacekeeping in Africa that will be relevant to the African conflicts in the African context. It also intends to shade light on the problems of peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Africa and therefore help future organizations come up with mandates which will

⁴⁰ Secretary General Kofi Annan's Report to the United Nations Security Council in Africa. Briefing and Summary of the Report on the Causes of Conflict and the promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable

take care of these problems from the lessons learned from the past United Nations operations.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature will examine the relevant writings on the study. It contains literature on the contending views and issues in peacekeeping. It will particularly look at literature on peacekeeping in the post-Cold war, the United States peacekeeping policy towards Africa in the post-Cold War era and the problems of peacekeeping. The study assumes that it is because of the great involvement of the United States in the peacekeeping missions in Africa that there is resurgence of conflicts in Africa. From the arguments, this study will attempt to explain why the US plays a major role in conflicts in Africa through the United Nations and therefore try to find out where the solution lies.

Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War era

A United Nations peacekeeping operation has been defined by the UN as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the UN to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. They are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. They involve the use of military personnel, and therefore achieve their objectives not by force or arms.⁴¹ This does not recognize the fact that not all peacekeeping forces could act as voluntary forces in peacekeeping operations. It ignores the willingness of forces to carry out peacekeeping operations.

⁴¹ UN, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*. (2nd ed.) (New York: United Nations Publications, 1990) pp.4&5.

A strong support of the international community in Mozambique, together with the strong commitment of the major participants to peace was the key prerequisite that enabled the UN to help bring about a peaceful environment. However, the long delay in the initial deployment of the peacekeeping contingents contributed to the problems of maintaining peace. There were also logistical and procedural problems that made hard the establishment of military administrative presence as complex as that to be undertaken by United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).⁴²

The United Nations Military Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was established to work with ECOMOG, a sub-regional organization, composing of the military component monitored and verified compliance with equipment, as well as cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of combatants. It also consisted of civilian component including political, humanitarian and electoral personnel.⁴³ The cease-fire breakdown and the fact that ECOMOG could not provide security for UNOMIL to carry out many of its mandated activities. As a result, UNOMIL team sites were evacuated, the personnel of the mission reduced from its authorized strength of 368 to approximately 90 observers.⁴⁴ The reduction and evacuation of the peacekeeping personnel before a conflict has come to an end poses a danger in a region of conflict.

The operations in Somalia dealt with a devastating famine and brutal multi-sided civil war. The response of the UN was quite extensive, involving peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peace-building. There was the expansion of the

⁴² UN, *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995*. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information) pp.67-69.

⁴³ UN: *United Nations Peacekeeping* (United Nations, 1995). p. 176.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p.185.

mandate, with the creation of the United Nations Protection Force, UNOSOM I and II where the US sanctioned and led Unified Task Force all at one time. The mandate in the operations was broadened when UNITAF handed over operational responsibility to UNOSOM II, but the power to implement it was not provided. Thus it did not attain success.⁴⁵ The lack of political will and the international community's will and resources to intervene in the failed state led to the failure of the mission in Somalia.⁴⁶

The major problem that led to the tragedy of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was the absence of resolute commitment to reconciliation by some Rwandan parties compounded with the faltering response of the international community.⁴⁷ To Ghali, from the Rwanda genocide, the international community in a new global era, could and would act swiftly and resolutely in the name of peace, justice and global solidarity suffered a distinct setback.

From the Secretary General, the success of the United Nations Verification Mission in Angola and the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia was a result of full cooperation of the parties concerned⁴⁸ and the continuing support of the Security Council and the timely provision of the necessary financial resources.⁴⁹

The US government mediated between the countries concerned, Cuba and Angola, to negotiate agreements relating both Namibia's independence and to Cuban

⁴⁵ UN, *The United Nations in Somalia, 1992-1996* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information) p. 85.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p. 87.

⁴⁷ UN, *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996)p. 1

⁴⁸ UN, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. (United Nations Publications, 1990) p.340.

⁴⁹ UN, *The Blue Helmets : A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping* (United Nations Publications, 1990),p385.

troop withdrawal from Angola. The involvement of the US was because of its own interests in the region.

Post-Cold War U.S. policy towards Africa in the context of peacekeeping

In the Post-Cold War world the stated general goals of the U.S. foreign policy, development, democracy and security, seem congruent with those of the African peoples. But when deciding how best to achieve these widely endorsed goals, a chasm emerges between perspectives crafted purely in the US foreign policy arena and those rooted in African realities.⁵⁰

The US idea of having an African army for peacekeeping in Africa meant a reconstruction of America's African policy, which had fallen into tatters with the end of the Cold War. While for Africans it meant that they required to be seen to take responsibility for managing continental conflicts.⁵¹ The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was a US led initiative whose main goal was to enhance the capacity of the Africans to respond to humanitarian crises and peacekeeping challenges in a timely and effective manner.⁵² This recognizes that it is Africans who will determine the ultimate role of the OAU and sub-regional organizations in peacekeeping endeavors on the continent. But it ignores the context within which these operations should be carried out.

MaCallie places ACRI in the context of a broader vision of multinational peacekeeping training, which extends far beyond the capability of any one state or group of states. In his view, the intention is not to have a standing army in Africa, nor withdraw

⁵⁰ W. Minter, in "America and Africa: Beyond the Double Standard." *Current History. A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs. Africa*. May 2000, Vol. 99. No. 637. p.200.

⁵¹ M. Mwangi, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*. (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000).

from Africa, but, United States intends to remain working with the African partners to promote economic growth, democracy and stability, through training the Africans for service all over the world.⁵³ He however does not look into the interests and views of the Africans in order to have a reciprocal agreement on the idea.

Omach and Minter take a skeptical view of the African Crisis Response Initiative. Minter looks at the profusion of old and new internal conflicts in Angola, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Rwanda and the DRC. The US involvement was not seen to be much involved these countries in the conflicts. He takes a view that the US should be involved in the conflicts in Africa. It should add its influence whether by direct mediation or by supporting other efforts as those of the United Nations, to encourage all-party negotiations aimed at compromise solutions in conflicts. To him, the US thought of having an African army in its support for African peacekeeping is misplaced. The body still receives doubt about its impact and the use to which it will be put.

Omach, argues that states response to the ACRI was based on assessment of the internal security needs and the extent to which alignment with the US through participation in the ACRI would advance their national interests.⁵⁴ The idea by the US to establish an intervention force to manage conflicts in Africa is valid, but there are serious practical limitations and inherent danger to peacekeeping by states within the region concerned, or by regional and sub-regional organizations. The participation of states in

⁵³ McCallie, M., 'U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda'. *USIA Electronic Journal*, vol.3, no.2, April 1998.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ P. Omach, 'The African Crisis Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and Convergence of National Interests.' *African Affairs* (2000) 99, 73-95.

the ACRI, he argues, is with the primary motive of enhancing their capacities of their military forces for anti-insurgency operations and military intervention in regional conflicts, but not for peacekeeping activities as envisaged by the US. He also argues that the security assistance provided under the ACRI will influence domestic political outcomes and therefore contributing toward the militarization of disputes. There is a tendency of the governments with military resources to feel more confident and thus more inclined to use force rather than political means of resolving domestic conflicts.⁵⁵ There is a tendency of countries with strong military capabilities to use this capability against another country or conflict in conflict and therefore enhance rather than reduce or bring conflict to an end.

Rodman, Albright and Luck argue for a multilateralist US policy approach alongside regional organizations toward Third World conflicts. They see this as the best cause to meet the variety of regional issues such as border conflicts, economic and environmental problems and problems of regime changes, that plague Third-World countries. This would allow the US to share foreign aid costs with the rest of the international community.⁵⁶ However, the military, economic and social capabilities of the third world countries, and particularly African countries must first be taken into consideration.

Wainhouse saw the participation of the United States in UN peacekeeping operations as necessary. Without US political support, both technical and material, he

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ See debate on 'Alternative U.S. Foreign Policy Approaches to Third World Conflicts' in Brown, S. & Schraub, M. *Resolving Third World Conflict:: Challenges for a New Era.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992).

says, few if any of those operations would have come into being. He asserts that the legal basis, the policy and the organizational structure which gave rise to US support for peacekeeping operations of the UN found their practical manifestation in the variety and magnitude of goods and services the U.S. provided for such operations.⁵⁷

Scholars such as Stremlau argue for more US involvement in the conflicts in Africa. At the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and Europe seemed so disengaged despite renewed cases of conflict such as Sierra Leone and the Ethiopia-Eritrea border. Stremlau's view is that conflicts should be prevented before they begin, as American strategists preferred, so long as no vital national interests were compromised.⁵⁸ His view is that the strategy be adapted for and applied to Africa where most wars result from bad governance.⁵⁹ The major contending factor is the tension that normally sparks off conflict in the region that these strategies don't address. The weak, authoritarian African governments do not possess the institutional capacity to manage factional struggles. This idea ignores the fact that most of the African governments suffer from poverty and gross income inequality and also have a tendency of excluding majority or minority groups from power. This makes the US engagement in the conflicts in the region necessary.

Beginning in 1994, with the PDD 25, the US administration sought to streamline and improve the performance of multinational peacekeeping, focusing more on smaller, more focused efforts as opposed to large-scale multi-component operations. The trend has been away from large-scale multi-component operations and toward smaller, more

⁵⁷ Wainhouse, D. *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support, Experience and Prospects* (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) p. 535.

⁵⁸ Stremlau, J "Ending Africa's Wars". *Foreign Affairs*. July/August (2000), pp.117-132.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

focused efforts. Some of them UN-led, others organized regionally or in *ad hoc* coalition. This shift in emphasis reflects U.S. policy preferences as well as substantial innovations in the way peacekeeping operations are organized or conducted.

According to Schear, in broad policy terms, he says, peacekeeping should be viewed as a means not an end, not a strategy but a tool to be guided by larger US strategic interests.⁶⁰ But the hard part is that, although it can be valuable in preventing, containing and resolving regional conflicts, it is hard to figure out when a situation is ripe for the use of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping, he says, has the greatest utility when the conflict is stalemated, the parties are exhausted, and continued fighting simply promises hardship. If on the other hand the parties see war as preferable to any feasible negotiated outcome, or if conflict dynamics suggest a military rather than a diplomatic outcome, it is hard to imagine that peacekeeping would have much long-lasting value.⁶¹ Before intervention an important factor that peacekeepers must not forget is the fact that they must study the nature of the conflict and therefore know the right method and time to deploy peacekeeping forces. A conflict left to continue for a long time before decisions are made to keep peace could lead to the enhancement of the conflict.

Wanandi sees great power involvement in conflicts in Africa as worsening the situations of conflict. However, he says, the presence of the great powers does not necessarily increase internal or regional conflicts, provided that they agree to maintain

⁶⁰ A. Schear, 'Peacekeeping Policy: The Defence Department View.' *U.S. Foreign Policy*. USIA Electronic Journal, vol. 3, No. 2, April 1998. <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0498ijpe/pj28sche.htm>

⁶¹ A. Schear, 'Peacekeeping Policy: The Defence Department View.' *U.S. Foreign Policy*. Electronic Journal, vol.3, No.2, April 1998. <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0498ijpe/pj28sche.htm>.

regional or international order in the area, like in the case of Zimbabwe, where great powers showed restraint in involving themselves in internal conflict.

Intervention by great powers he says, can be of positive or negative effects, but can also be of limited value because their capabilities are not always suited to the resolution of Third World conflict, as intervention could escalate into global confrontation. He suggests that efforts to resolve Third World conflicts be undertaken by domestic or regional forces. Big powers should only provide help through diplomatic means, humanitarian aid or economic assistance, and always restrain themselves from getting involved in conflict by persuasion or by example. Initiatives should come from the Third World countries themselves and the great powers should only play a role of helping to maintain regional order.

The main contending factor here is the tendency of this initiative to magnify local and regional conflicts in some parts of the third world and also encouraging new conflicts to arise. Although military balance is often a necessity in preventing big power intervention, he says, in the long run third world conflicts are not unlikely to be solved by military means alone. This is because of the sound relations between countries of the Third World and the big powers both in the political, economic and cultural field, which are more profitable goals.⁶² Most countries would participate as long as their interests are met. This can be made possible by the need to get assistance from outside powers, thus the meaning for the regional organizations in peacekeeping operations eroded.

⁶² J. Wanandi, 'The International Implication of the Third World Conflict: A Third -World Perspective', in Bertman, C.,(ed) *Third-World Conflict and International Security* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 1985. pp. 14-20.

Bloomfield in his writing sees the necessity of US involvement in Africa. He brings out a view that if the US is not willing to use military power directly to intervene in some local conflict situations, a local or regional balance may be upset, a wider peace may be threatened, requiring urgent measures of pacification. It needs to be accompanied by non-military or peacekeeping measures that are likely to deal effectively with conflict-generating pressures.⁶³ Bloomfield does not discuss the effects of US involvement in Africa and the willingness of the Africa.

Sharing almost the same view is Durch who views US involvement as necessary and crucial for peacekeeping. All peacekeeping operations that have gone forward in 45 years have had support, while others that were stillborn suffered a lack of support. He says that the UN has acted only on a few of the 40 - 50 clear-cut aggressions that have taken place around the world since 1945, thus a number of member states don't see the UN as a neutral organ.⁶⁴ The decisions to keep peace in Rwanda took so long and failed because of the reluctance of the US to send troops to the country.

With the political changes in the international system after the break up of the eastern bloc, most African scholars and diplomats, see a change in the policies as downplaying the African issues. The change in the system has resulted in a *de facto* policy of "cynical disengagement"⁶⁵ The growing concern of the US according to Schraeder, has been over threats by what he calls "low-intensity conflict". He says that

⁶³ L. P. Bloomfield, L. P. *The Power to Keep Peace: Today and in A World Without War* (U.S.A: Massachussets Institute of Technology, 1971)

⁶⁴ J. Power, (ed.) *A vision of Hope; The Fiftieth Anniversary of the UN* (London: The Regency Corporation Ltd. Gordon House, 1995)

⁶⁵ P. Schraeder, 'Trends in U.S. Policy in the Post-Cold War Era' in Keller , E & Rothchild, D. *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security*. (UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1996) p.193.

the vital US interests are threatened by radical and revolutionary violence in Africa and the US must be prepared to use military force to protect these interests.⁶⁶ The military force influences the operations of the UN and the African continent to decide on which way to solve conflicts in the continent.

Problems of peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War era.

After 1989, there evolved a new form of peacekeeping, variously called second-generation, muscular, extended, wider, advanced, broader, protected, aggravated or enforced.⁶⁷ This multifunctional peacekeeping has been faced with growing complexity and danger, troubling the new peacekeeping. Ratner describes these peacekeeping missions as combining the three roles of administrator, mediator and guarantor.⁶⁸ MacInnis notes that this aspect of complexity poses challenges unthought of by peacekeepers only a few short years ago.⁶⁹ This reflects the lack of clear objectives on carrying peacekeeping operations.

In multifunctional missions (which are mainly post-conflict) unlike traditional peacekeeping (which takes place during the conflict), where the observation of a cease-fire line or other boundary was the principle purpose of the mission, towards which all other activities could be directed, the peacekeeper is faced with several objectives, some of which may be in conflict with each other.⁷⁰ Such complexities have been compounded by the failure of the UN in planning and managing peacekeeping operations, both at the

⁶⁶ P. Schraeder, in Keller, E & Rothchild, D. *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security*(UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1996) p.196.

⁶⁷ For arguments that dispute the novelty of the new peacekeeping, see James, A., "Is there a Second Generation Peacekeeping?" *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 1, No.4 Sept/Nov. 1994) pp.110-113.

⁶⁸ S. Ratner, *The New peacekeeping* (London: Macmillan, 1995) pp.44-50.

⁶⁹ J. A MacInnis, 'Peacekeeping and Post-Modern Conflict:: A Soldier's View', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol.6, no.2 (Spring, 1995) p.29.

UN headquarters and in the field. The *ad hoc* measures of the past simply could not keep pace and therefore resulted in disorganization, mismanagement and waste.⁷¹

Several UN operations after the end of the Cold War have had large civilian components, which have played an integral role in the peacekeeping missions and have sometimes been the reason for the escalation of the conflicts.⁷² From this literature, multifunctional peacekeeping is seen as complex and dangerous than the traditional peacekeeping.

Many countries doubt the notion of the UN's impartiality. They feel that the UN has not been so impartial in serving their purposes. In Durch's view, peacekeeping requires local consent, impartiality and moral authority of the peacekeepers' sponsoring organization. It also requires the support of the Great Powers and the US in particular and a prior alteration in the local parties' basic objectives, from winning everything to salvaging something.⁷³ He thus sees U.S. involvement as justified in conflicts in any region of the world in an attempt to keep peace. But in the peacekeeping operations so much is normally left undone that war normally recurs. This idea ignores the fact that the conflicts in the Post-Cold War era have assumed a different dimension and the matters in a state are also a concern of the international community.

The lack of the capacity of the UN to undertake new tasks and the limit to the financial support of the UN is a problem that has been persistent since the establishment of the organization. It has been a major a problem both in the old peacekeeping and in the

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² T. Findlay, (ed) *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers..* (USA: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 21.

Post Cold War era. This is evident from the wide literature, including the work of Mwangi, Wainhouse, Boyd and Urquhart and even from reports of the UN Secretary General.

Wainhouse, noted the most critical problems of peacekeeping. These included the problems of unclear mandates, lack of proper arrangements with host countries for operations, inadequate financing, the inappropriate size and type of operation and the problem of command and control of peacekeeping operations.⁷⁴

According to Mwangi, financial and political problems, together with logistical shortcomings occasion peacekeeping operations in Africa. He also notes the nativity of peacekeepers to attempt to visualize the complexity and logistical difficulties and challenges attending peacekeeping exercise. He also cited the difficulty encountered in moving men and material across international borders and the complexity that accompanies the getting of peacekeepers from different states and different armed forces and therefore different philosophies in conflict.⁷⁵

Urquhart suggests that a system be devised, in which drawing on the resources of all member states and on a small part of their defense budgets and installations would provide the UN with the capacity to act effectively in any part of the world if the situation demanded it. This idea is valid because the UN can command the respect and confidence of all its members and be seen to act universally and not only selectively when the

⁷³ W. Durch, *The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. (London: Macmillan, 1993).

⁷⁴ D. Wainhouse, and *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: national Support-experience and Prospects* (Baltimore & London: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) pp.606-609.

⁷⁵ M. Mwangi, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*. (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000) p. 147.

interests of its most powerful members are involved.⁷⁶ The US economic power, the ability to finance the UN in this case would help it pursue its interests. Financial support for peacekeeping operations has lagged behind political support despite the fact that assessed contributions are a legal obligation of member states.⁷⁷ In May 1995, outstanding assessments to the UN for peacekeeping amounted to \$1.03 billion.⁷⁸ This creates difficulty in the reimbursement of contributors for their peacekeeping costs and also the peacekeeping bill adds a financial burden on states due to the increased assessment contributions.⁷⁹

Boyd 1971, attributed the problems to the role of the political factors which created difficulty in reaching agreement on the proper role of the United Nations and the willingness of nations to earmark forces for operations. Legal and financial problems and the lack of the military to adopt measures before crisis arises and lack of military readiness and command also posed a great problem to peacekeeping operations. He also notes the problems of logistics, communications, and intelligence consideration, training, personnel and administration of peacekeeping operations.⁸⁰

Ghali, in Confronting New Challenges, clearly presents most of the problems of peacekeeping. The organization, he says, still encounters grave difficulties in obtaining resources from member states and adequate financing, which has led to unacceptable delays in the deployment of peacekeeping forces in emergencies. The UN personnel

⁷⁶ B. Urquhart, 'The UN and International Security after the Cold War' in Roberts, A. and Kingsbury, *United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations*. (2nd ed.) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993)pp. 81-103.

⁷⁷ F. Findlay, *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*. (U.S.: Oxford University Press Inc., 1996).

⁷⁸ UN, Press Release DH/1889, 9 May 1995, p.4.

⁷⁹ Ibid, p.30.

have experienced hostile climate from the parties endangering their life and health, for example in Somalia, and therefore put them under heavy strains and pressures, to the UN peacekeeping success.⁸¹

Peacekeeping is a necessary operation, domestic considerations being the prime factor motivating a country to or not contribute troops. But pressures from a major outside power occasionally tilt the balance, including international ambition, regional security, ideological or religious factors and economic interests. There have been an increased number of casualties suffered by the UN troops like in Somalia and Yugoslavia has affected troop availability. The expansion of mandates such as the case of Somalia, and new tasks given to UN operations, has added to the difficulties of recruiting new peacekeepers.

Remedies have been provided which include providing better training and equipment, encouraging and establishing additional or regional peacekeeping training centers and national stand-by arrangements.⁸² The situation in Africa may not allow easy deployment of peacekeepers unless Africa's problems in the post-Cold War era in the context of peacekeeping are looked into.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study adopts a theory that will try to address the various dimensions of the problem under investigation. The main theory employed will be realism. Realism sees the state as the most significant actor in the international system. It views international

⁸⁰ Boyd, J.M., *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: A Military and Political Appraisal* (London & New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971) pp.61-186).

⁸¹ B. B Ghali, *Confronting New Challenges* (New York: United Nations Publications, 1995) pp. 227-230.

politics as a struggle for power in an anarchic setting, and therefore there is no legal authority, in which nation-states inevitably rely on their survival. It also assumes that states exist in a condition of legal sovereignty, with no higher authority than the state in which nevertheless there are gradations of capabilities, with greater and lesser states as actors do. It also sees states as rational actors characterized by a decision-making process leading to choices based on maximizing the national interest. It also assumes that power is the most important concept in explaining, as well as predicting, state behaviour.⁸³

But states are not equal in capabilities and therefore whatever hierarchy exists in the international system is the result of differentiation among states in their capabilities.⁸⁴

The military, and economic capabilities of the U.S. gives it the preeminence in the decisions at the UN and thus on its decisions as compared to that of the State of Rwanda.

However, neorealists-neoliberalists, unlike the utopian-realists and realists who acknowledge the existence of anarchy, try to see the extent to which development of institutions such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or the European Community can transcend the basic structural characteristics of the anarchic international system. States act in accordance with their conception of national interest.⁸⁵

Keohane⁸⁶ acknowledges, that 'the fact that international institutions are used by states to pursue their interests does not demonstrate how significant they will be when

⁸² UN, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, Report of the Secretary General, UN document A/47/277,s/24111,17 June 1992.

⁸³ J. Dougherty, & R. Pfalzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*. (4th ed) (New York: Longman Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1997). p.58.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* p.59.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* p.62.

⁸⁶ R. Keohane, "Institutional theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War," in David A. Baldwin, (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp.294-295.

interests change. He asserts that realists and institutionalists agree that without a basis either of hegemonic dominance or common interests, international institutions would not survive.⁸⁷ Neorealists bridge domestic and international politics and specifically try to relate domestic structures to international structures. The cases of the US intervention here would then be valid since domestic politics and therefore structures are linked to international structures.⁸⁸

States as actors in the international system can make decisions that suit their national interest. The internal affairs of a state cannot be isolated from the international system. At the end of April 1995, Rwanda requested for the withdrawal of UNAMIR, and proposed that it be replaced with an all-civilian non-peacekeeping United Nations Office for Rwanda (UNOR) to assist with national reconciliation, strengthening of the judicial system, the return of refugees and rehabilitation of infrastructure. Henkin's view is that the purposes of the United Nations are the purposes of the United States, and therefore UN interests are US interests and that there is no dichotomy between 'U.S. interests and UN interests. Thus the question of US policy is not what the U.S. can do for the UN, but what the UN can do to the US.'⁸⁹

In Waldheim's words, in virtually all undertakings of the UN Nations, there is no clear point where nations accept that they have rights and obligations under the UN Charter. Power politics remains the prevalent mode of international behaviour, and therefore there is lack of a consistent and reliable system for the maintenance of

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Information from the UN Department of Public Information (New York, 10th January 1997).

⁸⁹ L. Henkin, 'The UN and its supporters: A self-examination' " The UN Political system" by Kay, D. (London, New York & Sidney: John Willey & Sons, Inc., 1967).

international peace and security based on respect of all nations for the Charter and for the decision of the Security Council.⁹⁰

The US as a world power has global responsibility of ensuring peace and security in the world. Thus it was involved in the Rwanda conflict to ensure peace in the country and the region. As a global policeman it must police the world justly and fairly. However, the process it sometimes fails to address the root causes of the problems that afflict the people it deals with or intends to help. Further, most of its policies are always to suit their own interests. The policies and activities in the Rwanda conflict only undermined the UN to action the genocide.

METHODOLOGY

The research will employ both primary and secondary data. The primary data will involve gathering information through live interviews from the officials concerned in the UN peacekeeping department in their Nairobi office and embassies.

The secondary data collection will involve library research of, but not limited, to texts, journals, periodicals, newspapers, magazines, seminar papers and summit reports. It will include UN reports, documents, and information from the United Nations Department of peacekeeping headquarters' website, all relevant to the study.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter One of this study will be the proposal, which intends to give a clear idea of the task the study is going to undertake and what it intends to achieve. It will look at the definition, evolution and background of peacekeeping operations. Chapter Two will

⁹⁰ Waldheim, K., *Building the Future Order: The Search for Peace in an Independent World*. (New York: The Free Press, 1980) p.53.

discuss the phenomenon of peacekeeping in Africa and the experiences in peacekeeping. Chapter Three will contain a discussion of the post Cold-War United States Peacekeeping policy towards Africa and the trends of the United States foreign policy towards Africa in this era. Chapter Four will be on the role of the United States in the United Nations peacekeeping initiatives in Rwanda. Chapter Five will give a critical analysis of the peacekeeping initiatives of the United Nations and the United States in Rwanda during the Genocide in 1994 and Chapter Six will combine the conclusions of this study.

CHAPTER TWO

AFRICA'S PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCES

Introduction

Until the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations mostly had traditional cease-fire monitoring mandates and no direct peacebuilding responsibilities. The 'entry strategy' or the sequence of events and decisions leading to UN deployment was straightforward war, cease-fire, and invitation to monitor cease-fire compliance and deployment of military observers or units to do so, while efforts continued for a political settlement.⁹¹ The UN involvement in peacekeeping operations in Africa has had a number of experiences. Some have been successful and it has also had unsuccessful cases. This chapter will discuss these experiences, particularly in Africa.

The Nature of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period

The complex nature of intra-state conflicts after the end of the Cold War has presented peacekeeping missions with complex tasks. The UN has often been forced to engage in multifunctional peacekeeping, that is, combining peacekeeping operations with peace building in complex peace operations deployed into settings of intra-state conflicts. These conflicts affect and are effected by outside actors. They are characterized by the presence of arms vendors, political patrons, buyers of illicit commodity exports, regional powers which send their own forces into the conflict region and neighboring states which host refugees who have fled from their homes.⁹²

⁹¹ United Nations, 'The General Assembly Fifty-fifth Session. Item 87 of the Provisional Agenda. Comprehensive Review of the whole question of Peacekeeping Operations in all their Aspects.' A/55/305-S/2000/805. 21 Aug 2000.

⁹² Ibid.

In the Post Cold-War peacekeeping operations have been so risky and costly as compared to traditional peacekeeping. This is because peacekeepers have become victims of heavily armed militiamen. For example, ten Belgian peacekeepers assigned to protect the Prime Minister of Rwanda were brutally murdered by RGA soldiers during the conflict in that country.⁹³ Some have had to operate in conditions of exceptional complexity. For example in Somalia where all organs of government had collapsed, and the operations called upon to deal with a devastating famine and brutal multi-sided war.⁹⁴ This made the response of the UN far-reaching and system-wide, involving peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peace building.⁹⁵ The period has also witnessed an increase in the complexity of tasks assigned to the peacekeeping mission and the volatile situation on the ground. The UN operations have had to work in very complex and risky environments. Their duties have included relief escort and dangerous security situations posing a risk to humanitarian personnel, mandates to protect civilian victims of conflict and mandates to control heavy weapons in possession by the local parties, yet these weapons are used to threaten the mission and the local population.⁹⁶

The Post-Cold War period has witnessed great changes in the frequency of the occurrence of conflicts. The nature of conflicts too has changed, with more conflicts being intra-state and not inter-state as before. Traditionally, the United Nations did not involve itself in such internal conflicts arguing that involvement would imply

⁹³ UN, *United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996.*, UN Publications) p.38.

⁹⁴ UN, *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996*, UN Publications) p.3.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

necessitating overriding the national sovereignty of the state involved.⁹⁷ This, it was thought, would also contravene Article 40, Chapter 7 of the UN Charter which calls for the Security Council to call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39. This Article requires that the SC shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with articles 41 & 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.⁹⁸ It also emphasizes that such provisional measures are not prejudicial to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned.⁹⁹

Debates on African Peacekeeping

Africa has had quite an interesting experience with the United Nations peacekeeping operations in conflict regions in the continent. There have been quite a number of operations where great powers have been involved in United Nations operations. In some, the UN has played a role alone but in others, the Western World has been involved in these conflicts.

The US has shown growing interest in having Africans try to solve problems in Africa by Africans themselves. There has also been a vision of hope to end conflicts in Africa. Leaders in the continent who have an urge of bringing change through democracy

⁹⁷ W.W. Bruce, The U.S. Role in Peacekeeping related Activities. 'The UN and Intra-State conflict' *World affairs*, vol.155, p.143, 1993.

⁹⁸ Charter of the United Nations & Statute of the International Court of Justice.

⁹⁹ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations & Statute of the International Court of Justice*. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information)

have expressed this. An example was Angola's attempt to install a government of national unity to mark the end of conflict that had gone on in the country for over thirty years.¹⁰⁰

Although at its inception the OAU was to articulate the interests of African states, much of its work, particularly in conflict management, has not had much impact. Focusing on the management of conflict in Africa, it has achieved some success and also failed to manage most of Africa's most festering internal conflicts. The cause of the failure can however be attributed to the dogmatic interpretation of the non-interference clause by the OAU in the internal affairs of states.¹⁰¹

Two very different visions colored African and OAU discourses and experiences in peacekeeping in the formation of the organization.¹⁰² There was a vision that advocated for a United Nations of Africa, eventually reflected in the OAU Charter. This required that the individual states of Africa would continue to do their own business, retain their sovereignty and cooperate as necessary in pursuit of African goals. The other, a view for a United States of Africa advocated for military security.¹⁰³ However, many leaders had a fear that the sovereignty and independence would be compromised by a United States of Africa approach to the conduct and direction of African international, diplomatic and security relations.¹⁰⁴ These two visions are perhaps some of the reasons why there has been confusion about the essential nature of peacekeeping in Africa whenever there is conflict. Evidence can be gathered from the many different experiences

¹⁰⁰ Remarks made by Thabo Mbeki to the editors at the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) USIA 11 April 1997.

¹⁰¹ M. Mwangi, 'Who will bell the Cat? Article 3(2) of the OAU Charter and the Crisis of OAU Conflict Management' (Kent Papers in Politics ad International Relations, Series 4, no.7, 1995.)

¹⁰² M.Mwangi, *Conflict:: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*. (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000) p.146.

¹⁰³ Ibid,

encountered in peacekeeping in Africa for example in Chad, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The Evolution of the Debate on African Peacekeeping

Two major themes emerge when trying to examine the debate on African peacekeeping. Firstly, there is a general consensus amongst all the interested parties on the desirability of indigenous African peacekeeping. Secondly, that the establishment and maintenance of such structures will be fraught with problems both political and practical, mainly logistics and financial issues.¹⁰⁵ This debate saw a number of countries including the US, Britain and France express support for and willingness to assist the establishment of African peacekeeping forces and institutions. France for example has continued to try to intervene unilaterally where it feels its interest warrant it and it believes it has to do so.¹⁰⁶ For example France in January 1996 effectively blocked an American plan for the employment of a preventative peacekeeping force in Burundi, which might have forestalled some of the horrors that subsequently took place there. France was obviously concerned about further incursions of 'Anglo-Saxon' influence into its backyard following the loss of Rwanda from the 'La Francophonie' in 1994.¹⁰⁷

The British too advocated for the cause of regional peacekeeping for Africa. The British Army in partnership with the Foreign office for example started providing peacekeeping training on material to military colleges in Zimbabwe and Ghana. Some part of this policy of supplying training assistance to African states, it heavily involved a

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ J. Cleaver, & R. May, 'African Perspectives: Regional Peacekeeping' in Peacekeeping in Africa by O. Furley & R. May, (USA: Ashgate Publishers, 1998) pp.29- 47

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

significant peacekeeping exercise held by members of Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) in Nyanga, Zimbabwe in April 1997. This operation later coded Operation Blue Hongwe involved around 1,000 troops from eight SADC member states, including 290 from South Africa. A sixteen-man British Military Advisory and Training Team helped design and run the exercises and Britain contributed some 300,000 Pounds toward their cost.¹⁰⁸

The US government, in what might be seen as a natural extension of its policy of opposition to UN-led peacekeeping operations, has expressed continuing support for various efforts designed to establish African peacekeeping structures, as May and Cleaver suggests. On 19 September 1994, Congress passed the African Conflict Resolution Act,¹⁰⁹ which provided for \$25 million of assistance for the OAU's conflict resolution capability, for sub-regional organizations engaged in peacekeeping activities, such as ECOWAS, for the promotion of demobilization programmes, the training of Africans in conflict resolution and the funding of NGO's involved in mediation in Africa.¹¹⁰ Although American forces were involved in the Central Africa Republic and in Liberia, in both cases, their role was strictly limited to protection of US lives and property. Despite the fact that the Somalia fiasco was as much the result of US political and operational failings as anything else, the UN has been burdened with the blame for that failure of US. The image of the dead US serviceman being dragged through the streets of

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ J. Cleaver & R. May, 'African Perspectives: Regional Peacekeeping' in *Peacekeeping in Africa* by O. Furley and R. May (USA: Ashgale Publishers, 1998) pp. 29-47.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Africa Research Bulletin, October, 1994, p.11629

Mogadishu affected the public opinion and policy maker's view about peacekeeping in Africa. Since then, peacekeeping in Africa seemed to be limited to the political, financial and logistical spheres. As stated clearly by a state department spokesman that although the US was prepared to offer communications, logistics and transport assistance to an intervention force either UN or African-led, the US government was 'not prepared to contribute troops to any kind of UN operation in Burundi.'¹¹¹ This policy of supporting peacekeeping efforts by Africans themselves without being involved in the ground militarily, was even pushed one stage further with the launching of the proposal for an ACRF.

The Chad Conflict

The Chad conflict, which was a case of internal strife among rival ethnic and religious factions, started in 1965, posing serious challenge and threat to the integrity of the regime in power in the country and the Chadian state itself. Apart from Libya, which intervened, France and the U.S. also intervened.

The first task that the OAU engaged itself in was in the peacekeeping activities in the Chad conflict in 1981. Although the organization wanted to attempt to move towards more practical conflict management, the experience in Chad was a sad one. This can be attributed to the confusion on what exactly should have been the nature of peacekeeping and naivety in dealing with conflicts. The Organization of African Unity was also not prepared both mentally and financially for peacekeeping activities. The organization had not taken time to learn from the UN the technicalities that surround peacekeeping

¹¹¹ Point made in July 1996 in the immediate aftermath of Buyoya's coup in Burundi when there was much discussion on military intervention by State Department's Spokesman.

activities. Furthermore, it was not financially capable of going it alone in the activity, relying mainly in the Western powers, which were not at the time ready to finance the peacekeeping activities.¹¹² Many of the OAU member states in Chad were either not willing to meet their financial burden towards the exercise or disagreed with its philosophy and thus failed to support the activity.¹¹³ Within its membership, in the 1980's of the 50 countries the OAU was the largest of the existing regional international organisations, yet it remained the poorest and weakest among them. Though it was one of the newest among regional organisations, it was the most traditional in structure and orientation. Despite the absence of any big power domination of the system, its operational context was much more international than that of other regional organisations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Arab League.¹¹⁴

However, besides political and financial problems, many other problems and complexities surround peacekeeping activities in Africa. Since independence, no group has been involved in peacekeeping activities. In the case of Chad, the peacekeepers had not been involved in such an exercise before and so had not visualized the complexity, logistical difficulties and challenges¹¹⁵ in peacekeeping activities. The success of any activity requires knowledge and awareness of the situation in the field long before any activity takes place. This is because of the complex nature of peacekeeping operations. As Mwangi notes,

¹¹² M.Mwangi, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*. (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000)

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ K. Mathews, "The OAU" in D. Mazzeo (ed) *African Regional Organisations* (London: New York. New Rochelle. Cambridge University Press, 1984) pp.49-84.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

"Moving men and material even within a state is a complex matter. Moving men and *materiel* across international borders is much more complex. Getting peacekeepers from different states and different armed forces, and therefore different philosophies to operate together is itself fairly complex matter...Feeding men on the ground, rationalizing command structures, and moving *materiel* sometimes quickly determines the success of peacekeeping excises.¹¹⁶

It is only sad to note that the lessons learned from the sad experiences were not really learned by the peacekeeping operations that came after the operations in Chad, such as that in Somalia, Liberia and Angola.

The weakness of the OAU and therefore much of its failure in the maintenance of peace and security could be attributed to a number of reasons.¹¹⁷ The OAU was first designed as an instrument for conflict management among its members, but not for collective measures against any of them or against an outside aggressor. It was also entrusted with disciplinary power over any offending member. The OAU was only a co-ordinator of African policies on regional problems but not a defense alliance. Article II of the Charter proclaims, as one of the main purposes of the organization, the defense of its members' sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. This required that member states co-ordinate and harmonize their general policies regarding defense and security, and provided for the establishment of a Defence Commission. These provisions were not however accompanied by any collective security treaty. The Charter contained no provision for collective security to the effect that member states were legally obliged to come to the assistance of other members in the event of aggression.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ K.Mathews, "The OAU" in D.Mazzeo (ed) *African Regional Organisations* (London & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

Although, subsequently it attempted to set up a military wing through the creation of an African Defense Organization (ADO), with its first ordinary session held in December 1964, nothing came out of these attempts. In 1970 the organisations council tried to reactivate the Defence Commission. The scheme did not materialize because of the inherent military weakness of most African states, among other reasons. The proposal in 1977 for the creation of a Pan-African force to cope with the worsening situation in Rhodesia was also in vein. In July 1978, a new proposal for an OAU 'Committee of Defense' was made. This could only succeed in cataloguing possible problems in the creation of a pan African Defense Force. Various problems seemed insurmountable - problems of logistics, standardization of weapons and training programmes, language barriers and ideological differences among African states.¹¹⁸

The Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration Commission of the OAU was created for the purpose of peaceful solution of intra-African conflicts. Initially, its record in the solution of Intra-African disputes was promising. For instance, it managed to arrange a cease-fire in the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute in 1963, to replace British with African troops in Tanzania after the army mutiny in 1964 and even managed to improve relations between Ghana and its neighbours on the issue of subversion in 1965. However, it was unable to deal with the Congo crisis and was impotent in dealing with the Unilateral Declaration of independence in Rhodesia. While it retreated into inactivity, super power influence on the continent spread.¹¹⁹ During the late 1960's and throughout the 1970's the organization played practically no role not only in the domestic conflicts or

¹¹⁸ K. Mathews, "The OAU" in O. Mazzo (ed) *African Regional Organizations* (London & NY: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

civil wars, but also in most intra-African disputes. For example the civil wars in Congo (1975-6), Sudan (1964-71), Chad (1977-81) or inter-African conflicts such as that between Algeria & Morocco (1903-05), Dahomey & Niger (1963), Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia since 1964 and Rwanda-Burundi (1966-73), Tanzania-Uganda (1972) etc. It was notoriously ineffective in the Somalia-Ethiopia and Uganda-Tanzania wars, the civil strife in Chad and the Western Sahara issue.¹²⁰

Peacekeeping in the Central African Republic

The United States involvement in the mission in the Central African Republic was a significant one. The US made a contribution to the Canadian-led multinational force in Central Africa, which had less than 1,000 troops. The participating personnel in Central Africa were mainly logistics experts, geared to operate chiefly in Rwanda¹²¹.

Many of the initiatives by the African organizations and *ad hoc* conditions have encountered some difficulties in the field. The main difficulties are related to the military capabilities of the participating state. In the initiative in Zaire in 1977-1997, the African-led multilateral force got military advisors from France¹²² and Belgium and supplied personnel in the Central African Republic. French troops served as a buffer in support of a state whose potential to collapse was great and also provided logistical and financial support. With this support, the African countries, under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) undertook the Inter African force to monitor the Implementation

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ J.S. Porth 'U.S. Reduces Troops for Central African Mission' U.S. Information Agency, 19 Nov. 1996.

¹²² Ibid, p. 217.

of the Bangui Agreements (Mission Inter Africaine de surveillance Des accords de Bangui).¹²³

This was done in December 1996 by leaders at the 19th France -African summit who decided to mediate in the conflict. France then planned to withdraw its support for MISAB by April 1998, thus the need for the deployment of MINURCA. This was established by the SC on 27 March 1998, and deployed on 15th April 1998. MINURCA too was faced with some difficulties as expressed by Ambassador Adeniji.¹²⁴ First, the mandate was restricted in nature. Limiting the mission's impact. This made the Secretary General recommend that it deploy in five locations in the country, in order to facilitate the work of the international observers during the elections. The geographical and infrastructural handicaps in the country aggravated the mission difficulties. This was because of the fact that the country is landlocked and therefore everything either had to be flown or transported by road from the nearest port in neighboring Cameroon, which took ages. The roads were very bad causing considerable delay in getting materials needed for operation. There were also other problems like post-conflict distrust and suspicion stemming from the local population that required constant mediation to get things done.

The rebirth of hope: The United Nations Operations in Mozambique

The United Nations Operations in Mozambique gave hope for successful peace keeping. This displays the need to have a well organized peacekeeping operations and the

¹²³ Ibid, p.223.

¹²⁴ Oluoyemi Adeniji, Secretary General's Special Representative in the CAR in John Nyamu, "UN Mission in CAR makes Progress:" CAR parties take advantage of International Presence" pp. 14-15. Africa Recovery UN Department of Public Information.Vol.12 No.4. April 1999.

importance of learning from previous operations and conflicts. Its success came after allegations that peacekeeping was not effective in domestic conflicts and especially after the experiences in Angola, Somalia, Cambodia and former Yugoslavia. Mozambique gave a different picture, making the UN recover its lost authority and international standing. The mission was successful because of UN's ability to learn the conceptual and operational lessons of the earlier cases.

ONUMOZ mandate included political, military, electoral and humanitarian elements. It had a force of 7,000, with an initial budget of 300 million dollars. The main difficulties it faced was that of long distances that it had to cover and the poor infrastructure destroyed by the war. There were also delays experienced, which actually led to an increase in violence and crime.¹²⁵ These delays were mainly caused by the mutual recriminations between the Mozambique government and RENAMO about failure to carry out what was envisaged in the peace agreements.

The ONUMOZ had the advantage of learning from the mistakes made by the operation in Angola. The government learnt that the international community must take all possible precautions to avoid a return to war by making RENAMO accept the election results. For RENAMO the lesson of Angola was securing a better deal even if it lost the elections. For the GPA observer countries, the lesson of Angola was conducting the process in order to reach the election knowing the future political contours. For ONUMOZ the lesson was a strategy to avoid the mistakes made in Angola: holding elections without a unified army, without full demobilization, and so on. Thus the

¹²⁵ A. Zacarias, *The UN and International Peacekeeping*. (London and New York; i.B. Tauris, 1996

interaction of these perceptions determined the trajectory of the operation in Mozambique and differentiated it from classic peacekeeping operations.

Mozambique came to peace because it satisfied two essential preconditions for a peacekeeping operation by the UN: agreement and consent by the parties to the conflict to accept UN help in solving it and there was already a peace to be preserved. The role of the UN was to observe the agreed mandate impartially.¹²⁶

The Somalia Conflict

The US tended to take a lead in Somalia with most of the operations especially UNITAF being under its command. The operation in Somalia was characterized by great and abrupt change. Initially, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) launched in April 1992 was deployed to mainly offer humanitarian assistance and to secure a stable environment in which political reconciliation could take place. But the deterioration of the situation in November 1992 led the UN to sanction the use of force by UNOSOM troops. In December 1992, the UNITAF spearheaded by the US arrived in Somali to create the conditions for political, economic and social reconstruction and to permit UNOSOM II to take over the peace process in a stable environment. However, UNOSOM II's operations were not successful. They were characterized by divisions between national contributors and was quite impartial, effectively becoming a party to the conflict.¹²⁷ What made the work of UNOSOM II more difficult is the fact that it lacked the unity of purpose, experienced unnecessary divisions and friction between contingents.

¹²⁶ A. Zacarias, *The Un and International Peacekeeping*, (London and New York: I.B.Tauris Publishers, 1996) p. 97.

¹²⁷ The Harare Workshop. *Africa and Peacekeeping: Peace Support Operations Case Studies*.

It also experienced poor coordination between the military, UN civil staff, humanitarian agencies and NGOs.

On 30 November 1992, when the Secretary General asked the SC to authorize a military operation to safeguard relief workers, President Bush had already authorized the use of 28,000 US troops in Somalia (under UN auspices). These troops became part of the UNITAF, and began landing in Somalia on 9 December 1992. The relationship between the US and UN was however uneasy from the beginning; in particular the aggressive tactics of the US troops were seen to be a barrier to effective peacekeeping.¹²⁸

By the end of January 1993 there were 24,000 US troops (nominally under UN control) and 13,600 from other countries in Somalia. By early February tensions had arisen between the US and the UN as to the manner in which control of the US-led intervention should be handed over to the UN. By mid 1993, the UN force was meeting bitter opposition from Somali National Alliance (SNA) of Aideed, and US aircrafts were attacking SNA targets. On 22 September, the SC passed Resolution 865 to end the UNOSOM II mandate by March 1995. On 19 October 1993, US rangers were withdrawn from Somalia. On 7 November Aideed warned he would end the cease-fire agreed on 9 October should the US troops (withdrawn then) return to the streets of Mogadishu. Clinton then announced troops withdrawal by 31 March 1994. US intervention in Somalia led to exceedingly poor US-UN relations. Once Clinton announced the withdrawal date for US troops, their ground forces showed great reluctance to be further

¹²⁸ G. Arnold, *Historical Dictionary of Civil Wars in Africa*. (Lanham, Maryland & London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1999) p.295.

involved in Somalia, even while there, In 1994 the US refused absolutely to become involved in Rwanda.¹²⁹

A Peacekeeping mission should always be aware of the situation and the type of conflict that it aims at ending. UNOSOM I had evolved without overall strategy. For example, the dispatch of the observers was not preceded by a detailed study of the situation on the ground. It did not reflect on the understanding, the character and specificity of the conflict. The political aspect was also neglected and put to one side by the UN, which had initially intervened only in the humanitarian field. The goals of UNITAF too were not well defined and it lacked a medium and long-term strategy. Not forgetting that the US, a country, spearheaded it with no experience in peacekeeping operations and one whose troops were trained for combat, not peacekeeping.¹³⁰ The principle aim of UNITAF was to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations as required in the Security Council Resolution 794 Paragraph 7. This endorsed 'the recommendation by the Secretary General in his letter of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) that the action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations should be taken in order to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible'.

The confused nature of the operations of the US also enhanced more conflict. For instance, the guidelines for the Operation Restore Hope (ORH) were never clear. Even before the full contingent of American soldiers had arrived in Somalia, military spokesmen were already talking about departure. At the time reports explained that the

¹²⁹ Ibid. p.296

US troops would open relief routes, feed the starving and leave Somalia, US president Bush spoke of getting the American Force out by Inauguration Day of the new president. Although disarmament was ruled out at first, soldiers at some checkpoints confiscated arms and then US forces decided to take away large weapons and any vehicle with a gun mount. These intentions, which kept changing day by day made warlords sense a lack of clarity and determination, and made them, play for time and favour.¹³¹

These rules were not stable, leading to confusion and accusations of the US for the escalation of the conflict in Somalia. For instance, there followed a breakdown of full-blown rioting in the capital Mogadishu after three months of quiet. This was after gunmen loyal to warlord- General Morgan, former dictator Siad Barre's son-in-law, attacked 450 fighters allied to General M. F. Aideed in the southern part of Kismayu. In fact, Aideed accused the US and Belgian troops of complicity in the attacks and called on Somalis to defend their own freedom and honour and not to allow themselves to fall under colonial rule. A week after the violence tapered off, the US insisted on the troop withdrawal.

The warlords took advantage of the US to further ever their dominance. Indeed, the renewed bloodshed may well have been calculated to further delay a US withdrawal. For instance, although Oakley's¹³² aim was to diminish the status of warlords like Aideed and Morgan, which would allow more peaceful leaders room to operate, Aideed continued to push his bid for national dominance. He saw US occupation as his main

¹³⁰ A.Zacarias, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping* (London & New York: I.B.Tauris Publishers, 1996) p.70.

¹³¹ J. Stevenson & J. Barth. "When the Rules Aren't Clear: Somalia's Would-be Helpers Learn the Hard Way". *Newsweek*. March 9, 1993.

chance to dominate, as Oakley had branded Morgan a "war criminal." Indeed, US presence was preferred to the UN, with Osman Ato, Aideed's second in command, warning that once the UN took over, everything would go backward. Since 'the US started the task, the SC should give the Americans more time to assist Oakley in national reconciliation'.¹³³

The situation was even worse because of the absence of a central government with which to negotiate. There were many factions some internally divided and all active in the conflict. The political chaos as a result of these divisions and the extensive physical destruction constrained the delivery of humanitarian supplies. This situation was made worse by the acts of looting of aid supplies, robbery, armed banditry and general disorder Somalia. The lack of government, failure of factions to cooperate with UNOSOM, the extortion, blackmail and robbery to which the international relief was subjected and the repeated attacks on the personnel and equipment of the UN and other relief agencies prevented UNOSOM from implementing its mandate.

UNITAF, the US-led force that was later transformed to UNOSOM II, endorsed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This was charged with the task of establishing a secure environment throughout Somalia. It was to complete the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability and order through disarmament and reconciliation. The mandate was also to empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political

¹³² R. Oakley, US envoy in Somalia

reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.¹³⁴

The task of UNOSOM II, efforts of disarming the Somali factions and armed groups who terrorized the people and obstructed humanitarian activities was not so successful. The clan leaders feared losing power and thus resorted to violence to frustrate efforts of the UNOSOM II to bring relief, peace and development in Somalia.¹³⁵ The mission had therefore to bear the difficulty of keeping the peace.

UNAVEM II in Angola

Angola's conflict presents us with the problems that the organization faces in the post-Cold War. It assumed another very unique character, the use of minerals by the rebels to sustain the conflict in the country. "Easily concealed, immensely valuable and largely untraceable stones from rebel-held mines raised billions of dollars on world markets to finance insurgencies in Angola, Sierra Leone and the DRC. For years these "conflict diamonds" have allowed rebel leaders to arm and equip their armies in violation of UN weapons and financial sanctions"¹³⁶

In Angola, the bartered diamonds allowed rebel leader Jonas Savimbi to re-equip his UNITA forces and resume the Angolan civil war in 1998 despite years of financial and arms sanctions. Similarly, the uncut stones from controlled mines for over a decade financed the brutal campaign of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to take power in

¹³³ J. Birth & J. Stevenson. *Newsweek* March 9, 1993. "When the Rules Aren't Clear: Somali's Would be Helpers Learn the Hardway."

¹³⁴ United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping. Information Notes*. 1995. p.134

¹³⁵ *Ibid*, p138.

¹³⁶ M. Fleshman. "Targeting 'Conflict Diamonds in Africa". Security Council Seeks to Enforce Sanctions Against rebels, Arms Suppliers. *Africa Recovery*. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information. Vol. 14, No.4. JAN.2001) p.6.

the diamond rich country of Sierra Leone.¹³⁷ The work of the mission was complicated by other factors. The ethnic, regional, clan and ideological problems overwhelmed the capacities of United Nations Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II).

The apparent success of the mission in Angola restored some faith in UN peacekeeping. The reputation of the UN in Africa which was deeply damaged after the debacles of Somalia and Rwanda and previous Angolan mission, moved towards some kind of restoration. The U.S., Russia, as superpowers and Portugal as a previous colonial power acted as observers in the peace agreement, the Lusaka Protocol. These bore much historical responsibility for the protracted horror of the Angolan civil war, which had been conducted with peaks and troughs of ferocity since the eve of decolonisation in 1975.¹³⁸ But the external mediation in the peace process, the Bicesse accords, that began in 1994 succeeded in 1997

UNAVEM II's experience was however a little bit different. There were political miscalculations and the force did not know exactly the situation that lay ahead considering the experience of UNAVEM I. UNAVEM I oversaw the withdrawal of about 50,000 Cuban combat troops support of MPLA (*Movimento de Libertacao de Angola-Partido Trabalhista*). The US, the Soviet Union, South Africa and Cuba were involved to ensure the success of the mission. This made it to be perceived as a conflict created and sustained by essentially external forces.¹³⁹ These countries were seen to be playing a central role in the negotiations, with the UN having a marginal position with no direct

¹³⁷ Ibid

¹³⁸ N. Macqueen, 'Peacekeeping by Attrition: The United Nations in Angola.' *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36,3. (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). pp399-422.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

influence in the architecture of the agreement, which emerged at Bicesse. The UN was only given poorly defined and verificatory role in the implementation of both its military and electoral components.¹⁴⁰ Not much was assigned to the mission.

The restoration of peace in Angola was disturbed by a number of factors.¹⁴¹ Troops remained for long spells at assembly areas with uncertain destinations and often without food, posing a threat to the peace process. This gave the UN more tasks. For instance it launched an emergency food programme to relieve shortages in the assembly areas. The Angolan government and UNITA also suspended the mobilization exercise under the Bicesse accords. This should have preceded elections, but was never completed. Furthermore, out of the three armies, the new joint army, the MPLA army and UNITA, only 65% of government forces and 26% of UNITA forces had been demobilization at the time of the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992.¹⁴² UNAVEM II also had difficulty in fulfilling its mandate and ensuring maintenance of order and monitoring of breaches of the Bicesse Accords. This is because it had to deploy a total of 350 military observers and 90 police monitors in Angola's 18 provinces, a number that was quite large to manage. Its budget was also too high. About 1213 million dollars covered the costs of maintaining 576 officials. It also faced transport shortages and inaccessible communication routes. The implementation of the mandate was difficult because of the large area Angola covers (more than one-and-a-quarter million square kilometers). There was also a problem with the supervision of the

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ A. Zacarias, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping*. (London. New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996)

demobilization process in order to detect any infiltration or clandestine military training. UNAVEM II lacked intelligence skills, which contributed to the shortcomings, coupled with the fact that officials were inadequately informed about the country. There was also the shortage of human and material resources, making it impossible to prevent effects of the shortage of demobilization. This permitted clandestine troop training outside the Bicesse provisions, or possible reassignment of the best troops to the police.

Behind this success, however, were problems. There were ethnic tensions, the infrastructure was destroyed, as were the transport and communication networks, and the manufacturing sector annihilated. UNITA which had control of the North-Eastern diamond fields armed and equipped itself without foreign support and in the face of UN sanctions was determined to retain control of its last significant resource, the diamond fields of the north-east.

The UN Mission in Liberia

The United Nations observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) established in 1993, was the first United peacekeeping Mission undertaken in cooperation with a peacekeeping operation already setup by another organization. UNOMIL, established in September 1993, worked with ECOWAS in assisting the Liberians to establish peace in the country. In the war in Liberia, ECOWAS took various initiatives for peace settlement. It created the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 and mediated a series of agreements, such as the Yamoussoukro Accords and the Cotonou Agreement, which became the basis for the peace plan of November 1990. On 30 October 1991, it

¹⁴² A. Vines, *One Hand Tied: Angola and the UN*, (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, June, 1993).

brokered the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, which outlined steps to implement the peace plan. This included the encampment and disarmament of warring factions under the supervision of an expanded ECOMOG, and also the establishment of transitional institutions to carry out free and fair elections in the country.¹⁴³

ECOWAS received UN support, which mainly provided humanitarian assistance, political reconciliation and electoral assistance. But even the two forces faced difficulties. On 18th January 1994, the president of the Security Council expressed in a letter the concern of the council that the transitional government had not been installed and disarmament had not yet commenced. The implementation of the Cotonou Peace Agreement, which was signed on 25 July 1993, laying out the a continuum of action, from the cease-fire through disarmament and demobilization of the holding of national elections, was delayed and efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance to all parts of the country had met with difficulties. The parties had differing views on the date for the installation of the transitional government and the commencement of disarmament, leading to an impasse in the implementation of the agreement. There was also fighting that erupted in the Eastern part of Liberia between the national Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), which got UNOMIL and ECOMOG into difficulty in bringing about a cease-fire between the two groups and disarming of the LPC. The LPC also launched attacks on the NPFL. There was great deal of mistrust for another, that led to the abduction of Nigerian and Ugandan contingents by the Mandingo elements of ULIMO and the LPC, who claimed ECOMOG had lost its impartiality and

¹⁴³ United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping. Information Notes.* (New York: Department of Public Information, 1995) p.173.

had become party to the conflict. They also asserted complicity between some elements of ECOMOG and Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) in supplying material and logistical support to LPC.¹⁴⁴

These assertions made ECOMOG's performance of its peacekeeping role more complex. Its work was also made complex by the refusal of the parties to engage actively in the disarmament of their combatants or even give up control of territory. The humanitarian efforts were not fully successful as about 400,000 people out of 1.5 million in need of humanitarian assistance, were inaccessible because of the factional fighting.¹⁴⁵

Peacekeeping in Rwanda

The 1994 Rwanda genocide, one of the greatest tragedies since the Second World War, came after the experiences in many other countries. The United Nations, charged with the task of restoring peace and security in the country in crisis, encountered a number of challenges. There were brutal killings and other grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and high speed of exodus of people from areas of conflict. This created a great crisis that actually taxed the expertise and resources of the entire United Nations system.¹⁴⁶ The events in Rwanda also brought new urgency to the debate that had been ongoing over the role of the United Nations in not only multilateral peacekeeping, but in peace-enforcement and post-conflict peace-building, an action that supports structures that will strengthen and consolidate peace.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid

¹⁴⁵ Ibid

¹⁴⁶ United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda*, 1993-1996. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996) p.3.

The Security Council of the United Nations established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1993 with a mandate encompassing peacekeeping, humanitarian support, through the Secretary-Generals good offices, for the peace process¹⁴⁷ in Rwanda. But there was no political will from both the parties to the conflict in Rwanda that would lead to transition towards peace. The Hutu majority, for instance, while talking peace, was actually planning a campaign to exterminate Tutsi's and the moderate Hutu's.¹⁴⁸ To add to this, the humanitarian community, charged with the task of providing large-scale relief to respond to the calamity, shifted its attention to an array of long-term and inter-related goals, which acted as a hindrance to its success. These included the rehabilitation of Rwanda's devastated infrastructure, revitalizing the economy, restoring law and order and promoting development in the country.

The need for financial assistance for the Rwanda operation was also seen when the president of Rwanda requested for humanitarian assistance. This led to the UN launching of an interagency appeal in 1993 amounting to \$78 million to meet the needs of war-displaced Rwandese from April to December 1993.¹⁴⁹ There were civilian combatants armed in the field that deterred the operations of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda. In its initial stages, 60 civilians were brutally killed by an armed and ruthless group operating in the Ruhengeri area. The groups aim was to disrupt or even derail the peace process.¹⁵⁰ This incident created an extra task for the peacekeepers, underscoring the need for UNAMIR to promptly acquire the capability to

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda, 193-1996*. (New York: United Nations Dept. of Public Information, 1996)p.3

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

monitor the areas of attacks effectively and also provide a safe environment for the large civilian population in that area.¹⁵¹ But the work of the mission was made even more complex by the movement of refugees, who created a destabilizing situation. It made that mission extend its monitoring activities into the southern sector, which was increasingly tense. This effort greatly taxed the operational capabilities of the mission.

The political divisions also posed major delays in the implementation and establishment of a transitional government. The misunderstanding between the two factions on the establishment of a transitional government and the presence of armed civilians in the field of operation was also a major cause of security deterioration in Rwanda. Weapons were being distributed to civilians¹⁵² and disarming civilians was always a difficult task. For example in Rwanda, the Belgian soldiers found it hard to disarm the Rwandan soldiers. Instead the Rwanda soldiers managed to order the Belgian peacekeepers to surrender their arms.¹⁵³

Most of the peacekeeping mandates are not normally clear and do not specify the purpose of the mission. The operations therefore turn out to be unsuccessful because, besides the work they are mandated to carry out, many other tasks are carried out. The UNAMIR forces for example tried to prevent the killing in the country and at the same time contain the conflict. The mission however, did not possess the mandate, neither did it possess the force to coerce the two parties in conflict to end the violence. The UNAMIR was charged with monitoring and assisting with the implementation of the

¹⁵⁰ Ibid

¹⁵¹ Ibid

¹⁵² Ibid, p. 35.

Arusha Peace Agreement. It had been established as a peacekeeping force under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and thus lacked the enforcement powers of Chapter VII operations. The resumption of fighting in Rwanda made it impossible for UNAMIR to carry out the task it was initially mandated to.¹⁵⁴ The mission did much more. It made efforts to secure a cease-fire, protect civilians and UN staff, rescued individuals and groups trapped in fighting and provided humanitarian assistance. It offered protection and provided food supplies and medical care to these groups.¹⁵⁵

The United Nations' Response

The immediate reaction of the United Nations Security Council at the outbreak of the massacres in Rwanda was disastrous to the people and peace in the country. After the Arusha Peace Agreement, the UN had already sent 2,500 troops in Rwanda as peacekeepers for the UNAMIR. This force had already been depleted to 1,705. The SC's reaction to the killings was to withdraw nearly all of them and leave a token force of 270 in Kigali. It considered that the troops had been powerless to stop the massacres, and was in considerable danger themselves.¹⁵⁶ This is not what a mission should do.

No country after the crisis in Somalia, which saw a number of troops killed, was willing to intervene in Rwanda. This lack of political will to act in the face of crises was one of the main factors that enhanced the crisis in Rwanda. There was also a dangerous decision by the Security Council to reduce the strength of the force after the genocide

¹⁵³ Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations in the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 15th December 1999.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. p.38

¹⁵⁵ I. Carlsson, 'Chairman of Independent Inquiry into United Nations Actions during 1994 Rwanda Genocide Presents Report to Security Council.' Press Release SC/6843. 14 April 2000.

¹⁵⁶ O.Furley, 'Rwanda and Burundi: Peacekeeping amidst Massacres' in O.Furley and R. May, *Peacekeeping in Africa* (USA: Ashgate Publishers, 1998).

started. The Council did not actively engage itself in ensuring that the capacity, resources, robust mandates and rules of engagement were clear to carry out the operations.

Any peacekeeping mission must be based on the commitment of all the parties to a peace accord and must also have political analysis and human rights monitoring capacity.¹⁵⁷ The fundamental failure of the UN to prevent or stop the genocide, Carlsson reports, was the lack of resources and political commitment devoted to developments in Rwanda and the UN presence there. The lack of political will among member states to act promptly affected the Secretariat's response, the Security Council's decision making and created difficulties in getting troops for the UNAMIR. The little available resources were also not well used.¹⁵⁸

In Rwanda, it took a move out of continental and sub-regional processes, and into the international realm, to push the peace process forward in the form of parallel talks at the US Department of State and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁵⁹ Thus the results of continental and sub-regional diplomacy - the Dar es Salaam Declaration, the N'sele cease-fire and Gbadolite cease-fire - would in retrospect form pre-negotiation texts for the more substantial and international, Arusha process.

France and the US became active at this stage, surprisingly, as US had no strategic or economic interests in Rwanda. One American diplomat said, "We didn't have a dog in that fight" referring to the Rwanda civil war. Thus the US engagement came not as a result of political interest but rather from a series of initiatives taken at the working

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ C. Fuller, former Desk Officer for Rwanda, US Department of State and H. Cohen, Former under-secretary of State for Africa, US Department of State, Washington, DC, June, 1995.)

level in the state Department and eventually reaching (but never transcending) Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen.¹⁶⁰

The Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25)

The US publication of the PDD 25 in 1994 restricted UN action in Rwanda. On May 3, while the massacres were raging in Rwanda, President Clinton signed the Presidential Decision Document 25, which actually hindered the co-operative multilateral action to maintain peace and security. Furthermore, this document entitled "the Clinton Administration's policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations' could not be approved by many UN peacekeeping operations. This was because the rules were so tightly drawn in scope, mission, duration, resources and risk, that only the easiest, cheapest and safest peacekeeping operation could approve it. This required that all conditions in the document apply before resolution 918 of May 17 1994, which increased the strength and extended the mandate of UNAMIR was carried out. The SC resolution decided "to expand the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda under resolution 912 (1994) to include the following additional responsibilities within the limits of the resources available to it: (a) To contribute to the Security and Protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas; and (b) To

¹⁶⁰ B.O. Jones, "civil War, the Peace Process and Genocide in Rwanda" in *Civil Wars in Africa; Roots and Resolution* by Taisier M. Ali and R.O. Mathews, eds. (Montreal & Kingston. London. Ithaca.: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999) pp.53-86.

provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations.¹⁶¹

For instance, it required that a cease-fire be put in place, the parties agree to a UN presence and restricted UNAMIR's engagement in peace enforcement unless what was happening in Rwanda significantly threatened international peace and security. The US was also opposed to the idea by the Secretary General to establish a large peace enforcement mission which would operate throughout Rwanda with a mandate to end the fighting, restore law and order and pacify the population. It succeeded to prevent the effective deployment of a UN force for Rwanda, with the strong support of Britain.¹⁶²

Furthermore the PDD 25 was issued at a very wrong time. At that moment, the UN peacekeeping was at an all time high, with 70,000 peacekeepers from 70 countries serving in 17 United Nations peace operations around the world More operations too had been launched in the past four years than in the previous forty. The Security Council, with the U.S. voting in favour approved all. But the UN member States were not willing to pay for what they had ordered. One third of the \$ 3 billion bill was unpaid¹⁶³ besides; the U.S. placed conditions for its own participation in UN peacekeeping operations. With the publication of the PDD 25, the new conditions were to apply before resolution 918 of May 17, 1994, which increased the strength and expanded the mandate of UNAMIR was carried. This required that a cease-fire is in place and parties agree to UN presence. It also

¹⁶¹ Doc. 62. Security Council resolution expanding UNAMIR to 5,500 troops and mandating UNAMIR II to provide security to displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk and to support relief efforts, and imposing an arms embargo on Rwanda.. S/RES/918(1994), 17 May 1994

¹⁶² B.B.Ghali, *Unvanquished, An Us-Un Saga*, (New York: Random House, 1999)

¹⁶³ B.B. Ghali, *Unvanquished AN U.S. -UN saga*. (New York: Random House, 1999).

prohibited the UNAMIR from engagement unless what was happening in Rwanda posed a significant threat to International peace and security¹⁶⁴

The issuance of the Presidential Decision Document 25 by Clinton and the employment of its requirements delayed the deployment of the full 5,500-man contingent to Rwanda in the 1994 genocide. With Britain's support, the effort of the US to prevent effective deployment of a UN force for Rwanda succeeded.¹⁶⁵ The international community did nothing as the killing continued.

The highly bureaucratic structure of the UN brought complications to the conflict in Rwanda, which had not received attention from the international community. Although the close military and humanitarian relationship actually saw some success in the field, there was limited cooperation at a higher political level and there was no coherent strategy, leading to grave problems in the country.

Unlike other hotspots in the world, the post-Cold War really affected Africa more than the other western countries. Africa witnessed a proliferation of arms, ethnic conflicts, and intra-state as opposed to inter-state conflicts. There were also other complex emergencies that accompanied Africa's conflicts. There were the enormous numbers of refugees and increased refugee movement, famine/drought in most of the areas of conflict, for example in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Somalia.

Since most of these intra-state conflicts are transnational in nature, the experience of the African peacekeeping operations has been quite complex. In most conflict areas,

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ *The East African*. "Rwanda: Why the UN did Nothing" Oct. 25-31, 1999. p.11

local parties to the conflict have their own interests in the ongoing conflicts. Most parties sign peace agreements for a variety of reasons. However not all could be favourable to peace. Spoilers" as referred to by the UN, usually derail the success of peacekeeping or peace-building.

In the post-Cold War world African countries have made great achievement with regard to peace and security. They have undertaken a number of military interventions in the continent outside regional and sub-regional organizations. They have provided infantry battalions and deployed peacekeeping forces¹⁶⁶ but in most cases they have deployed and remained operational because of assistance from outside.

In the post-Cold War, the UN has undertaken many operations than before the end of the Cold War. There has also been a great deal of readiness shown by Africans to take on serious responsibilities for Africa by Africans. Before 1989, only fourteen African countries contributed troops to the Blue Helmets peacekeeping operations, mainly provide military observers or civilian police rather than troops. The number however increased, with 22 African countries¹⁶⁷ contributing troops, observers or police to UN operations between 1997 and June 1999.¹⁶⁸ As of mid 1999, 33 of the 53 African UN member states had contributed military personnel or civilian police to UN peacekeeping operations.¹⁶⁹ UN missions have tried to keep peace but have in most of the cases failed. In Rwanda the UN mission failed, in Somali and also in Morocco. It partially succeeded in the Central African Republic. But in most occasions the powerful nations -France,

¹⁶⁶ E.G. Berman & K.E. Sams. *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*. (UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. ISS, Pretoria, South Africa. 2000) p. 383.

¹⁶⁷ For more information on this, see E. Berman and K.Sams,

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p.236

Britain, and the US have hindered the ability of the UN to respond effectively and sufficiently to crisis. They have done this by engaging in operations not under UN command but their own and introducing policies and conditions that are not in line with the policies of the United Nations.

REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING

The OAU and Sub-Regional Peacekeeping

It is acknowledged that regional organizations possess a potential to help in carrying out the functions of 'preventive diplomacy,' peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace building.¹⁷⁰ But it is worth to note some the shortcomings of the regional organisations and for this matter the OAU. Most of the OAU member states are low-income countries and are counted among the world's poorest. Their economic resources are scant and their, military forces, with few exceptions, are weak, ill-equipped and poorly trained. The absence of a regional power makes the OAU seek for outside powers to maintain peace and security.¹⁷¹ Furthermore, its decision-making system is complex and slow, depriving it of the versatility and flexibility needed to deal with peace mission matters.¹⁷² For example, The Council of Ministers meets twice a year or in extraordinary sessions on request approved by two-thirds of all members. The General Secretariat and the Administrative secretary General have few powers, and often have to wait for a council decision before moving forward on an issue.¹⁷³ Furthermore, the OAU has no permanent body with political and executive powers; the sensitive issues are

¹⁶⁹ Ibid

¹⁷⁰ B.B. Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* pp.11,37

¹⁷¹ A.Zacarias, *The UN and Ipeacekeeing*,p.117-118.

¹⁷² Ibid. p.118

decided by consensus and it has no formal machinery of sanction or punishment against those who do not fulfill its aims, except in cases of non-payment of dues. The lack of resources of its own functional executive machinery and means of persuasion, it is obliged to depend on institutions outside Africa on peacekeeping matters.¹⁷⁴

The OAU needs a board of professionals who can engage in peacekeeping tasks on a permanent basis, to make matters of peacekeeping a success. This can be learned from the Security Council, whose apparent success is due to the availability of professionals engaged in peacekeeping tasks on a permanent basis. For the OAU, the annual turnover of members proposed for its machinery makes it inefficient because each member normally goes to the office for a short time. Thus he is unable to accumulate sufficient experience and knowledge for conflict resolution.

Regional and sub-regional organizations have shown an interest in peacekeeping. These sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States and South African Development Community have played a role in peacekeeping. Their role is provided in the UN Charter in the maintenance of peace and security in their respective regions. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides for regional bodies such as OAU and ECOWAS to participate in peace missions.

The OAU in the post-Cold War has been involved in peacekeeping initiatives. It has made attempts to send observers, representatives of the Secretary General and also set up mechanisms for conflict resolution for example in Rwandan and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The end of the Cold War presented the African continent with great

¹⁷³ The OAU Charter, Articles 7 to 18.

challenges. Recalling the experience in Chad, it had a great urge to address the failings of the peacekeeping force there.¹⁷⁵ This was a result of a number of factors. First, there was the fear of marginalisation of the African continent since there was no other power the west had to compete with and second, the end of financial and military aid enjoyed during the cold war -disengagement. There was also the great concern of the increasing cases of intra-state conflicts with their harmful consequences.

In this period, the OAU sent a number of missions to solve conflicts. It sent a peacekeeping mission to Rwanda in 1990, where Burundi, Uganda and Zaire took part in military observation to promote reconciliation and put an end to hostilities i.e. the Military Observer Team (MOT) and later the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) to replace MOT. The OAU also established an Observer Mission Burundi (1993-96 and authorized OAU Observer Mission in the Comoros (OMIC).¹⁷⁶

The OAU operations faced some difficulties. The RPF and the government of Rwanda failed to respect a number of cease-fires creating great difficulties in the deployment of the force. There were also logistical problems, forced projections and problems with command and control of troops.¹⁷⁷ Another challenge that most peacekeeping operations face is the over-reliance on foreign countries to provide assistance to its peacekeeping initiatives. The lack of political will is another hindrance to the OAU peacekeeping operations as the case of Burundi government, which was not willing to accept the OAU mission.

¹⁷⁴ A.Zacarias, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping*. (London & New York: I.B.Tauris Publishers, 1996.)

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid*,p.47

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid*,p.58-70

Even the UN as an international organization well versed int. the vagaries of intervention, normally falls prey to pressure from external agencies. The OAU has, as an international body has also never escaped this influence. The OAU lacked salience or administrative wherewithal in Chad leaving it as another tutor in its own operation. France and the US treated the OAU as a necessary evil, rather than the instigator of the mission. Likewise, regional actors, including members of the IAF worked on their own agenda. The layers of confusion and intrigue multiplied as the OAU acted as a conduit for self-interested international political realism played out on the Chadian stage.¹⁷⁸

Regional and Sub-regional bodies are useful bodies because in many cases UN missions are perceived to be in crisis ranging from co-ordination and quality of troops, generation of troops, doctrine of the mission and finances. This is evidence for the UN Secretary General's statement on UN reform.

" The UN does not have, at this point in history, the institutional capacity to conduct military enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN charter. Under present conditions, *ad hoc* Members States coalitions of the willing offer the most effective deterrent to aggression or to the escalation or spread of ongoing conflict... The organization still lacks the capacity to implement rapidly and effectively decisions of the Security Council calling for the dispatch of peacekeeping operations in crisis situations. Troops for peacekeeping missions are in some cases not made available by member states or made available under conditions, which constrain effective response. Peacemaking and Human rights operations, as well as peacekeeping operations, also lack a secure financial footing, which has a serious impact on the viability of such operations."¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, p.59.

¹⁷⁸ S.massey and R.May , "Chad" in Peacekeeping in Africa" by O.Furleey and R. May(USA: Ashgate Publishing, 1998)pp.105-141

¹⁷⁹ Statement by the UN Secretary General on UN Report on Reform, on 16 July 1997. Peace Support Operations: A working Draft Manual for African Military Practitioners. DWM 1-2000.Norway, Institute of Security Studies 2000. p.23.

The ECOWAS has shown great potential to undertake peacekeeping operations as a regional body. Its initiative in the war in Liberia is evident of the effort gained international recognition through its massive peacekeeping efforts. ECOWAS responded to crises in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, both diplomatically and militarily. It has recognized that neither the OAU nor the wider international community can summon the political will to respond meaningfully to armed conflict in West Africa. The three ECOWAS cease-fire Monitoring Groups deployed in the three countries experienced difficulties including financial, institutional and transportation problems. These problems delayed the force's arrival in the mission area and the concept of operations was not determined in advance¹⁸⁰.

ECOMOG experienced financial difficulties, as most of its member states were not willing to contribute for the support of the mission. The insufficient funds had an adverse effect on the troop morale and discipline.¹⁸¹ The non-payment of some contingents for months engendered jealousy and hostility among troop contributors. There was also the problem of graft, and logistics which all hindered ECOMOG operations. The troops were sometimes not in possession of the necessary equipment for the operation and the force was not also equipped to conduct counter-insurgency operations. Furthermore, maintenance of equipment was inadequate. Most troops contributing countries had very old equipment that needed repair. The mission also experienced numerous command and control problems, and also training and doctrine to

¹⁸⁰ E. Berman & K. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: capabilities and Culpabilities*. (UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. ISS, Pretoria, South Africa, 2000) pp.75-92.

¹⁸¹ F. Olonisakin, "African 'Home made' Peacekeeping Initiatives" *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.23, No. 3, 1997, p. 364.

guide the military activities. To add to these, the differing military capabilities between contingents, distinct traditions and communication between ECOMOG contributors¹⁸² added to the problems facing ECOMOG.

In Sierra Leone, there was an even more complicated environment. The mission had an encounter with the rebels who had better knowledge of the terrain than it did. Its superior firepower was not effective against the tactful guerilla rebels, who controlled diamond mines and used the money from the diamond business to fund their activities. The ECOMOG force lacked the equipment and logistical support, had a shortage of weapons and ammunition thus restricting its activities and limiting its effectiveness¹⁸³

The troop contributing countries failed to coordinate their actions, This was made even worse by the corruption, ill discipline and the lack of '*esprit de corps*' causing a snag of ECOMOG'S activities. The trade in diamonds which was quite lucrative fanned and sustained the conflict in Sierra Leone. There were also financial constraints that limited ECOMOG's activities. This was made worse by the ECOWAS member States initial unwillingness and inability to come to aid those parties in conflict. Worse still was the continued arming and training of rebels by Burkina Faso and Liberia rebels who carried out gross human violations.

Just like Sierra Leone and Liberia, financial assistance and logistical support were a problem in Guinea. As Kouyate stated that until sufficient financial assistance and logistical support were secured, it would be impossible to predict when the ECOMOG

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

force could be deployed.¹⁸⁴ Logistical problems hampered ECOMOG's effectiveness, and when hostilities flared up on 6 May 1999, it experienced a communication breakdown, making it impossible to establish contact with the ECOMOG high command. The operation was small in size and the resources were scant for the force¹⁸⁵ and could therefore not carry out its duties effectively.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Member States have also considered undertaking concerted military actions on three separate occasions. The inter-African forces, which comprised SADC countries, were deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo and also in Lesotho.¹⁸⁶ In the DRC the countries showed cooperation. Luanda for instance provided all the bulk of logistical support required to deploy the three-nation inter-African force (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe) It airlifted its own troops, transported Namibian and Zimbabwean soldiers to the Democratic Republic Congo and transported Zimbabwean tanks and armored vehicles. It also ferried *Forces Armees Congolais* (FAC') contingents within the country. But the sporadic heavy fighting and infusion of additional troops on both sides of the war lead to a split in the country in 1998.¹⁸⁷ The split in the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie* (RCD), with one group headquartered in Kisangani led by Wamba dia Wamba and enjoying Ugandan Support, and another in Goma, led by Ilunga, which enjoyed Rwandan support,

¹⁸⁴ See more at IRIN, West Africa update 361, 16 Dec 1998 <http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int/>

¹⁸⁵ Situation Report: fighting breaks out in Bissau, UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 8 May 1999. [Http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int/](http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int/)

¹⁸⁶ E.Berman & K. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*. (UNIDIR, ISS, Geneva, Switzerland, South Africa, Pretoria, 2000)

¹⁸⁷ E.Berman & Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*. (Geneva, Switzerland: ISS, 2000)p. 181.

complicated negotiations with the rebels. The conflict in the Congo was therefore not resolved.

Regional and Sub-regional Peacekeeping

ECOWAS's initiative in essence involved the mobilization of the necessary political, diplomatic, economic and military resources within and without the region to ameliorate a regional problem that potentially threatened widespread destabilization and which the world did not seem too enthusiastic at the time to contribute towards its resolution.¹⁸⁸ In early August 1990, a mini summit was held in Banjul. ECOWAS insisted on an immediate cease-fire and deployment of 4,000 strong ECOMOG to assist the Standing mediatory Committee, which was designated on 30th May 1990 to supervise its implementation and to ensure strict compliance by all parties to the conflict. This was going to operate under the ECOWAS initiative.

Although its efforts and desire to succeed in its mission was high, ECOMOG was faced with some shortfalls;¹⁸⁹ It did not ensure all the regularities were followed and up to the requirements of the mission to succeed. Some of the key provisions associated with UN peacekeeping missions were absent in the operations of the ECOMOG force. The cease-fire agreement on which ECOMOG entered Liberia was signed by only the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the de facto military arm of the incumbent political authority and the INPFL. ECOMOG's mandate was strengthened and grounded on the invitation of the incumbent President. Doe. However, his position was at the same time undermined when the constitutional presidency was superceded by the interim presidency of the

¹⁸⁸ Liet. Col. Festus B. Aboagye. ECOMOG: A Sub-Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia. (Accra; Sedco Publishing Limited, 1999). p.57

ECOWAS peace plan. The conduct of peacekeeping operations against the NPFL, which was still opposed to any cease-fire materially and considerably, altered the situation to a worse one. In the circumstances under which the force was launched into operation, the Force Commander did not have the benefit of a clearly defined command, control and communication structure. The Force Commander also lacked a firm political direction in the field. The ECOWAS secretariat itself was not structured to provide for a military Staff Committee and did not have specific lines of communications with the force in the field.

ECOMOG might have been a good example of regional peacekeeping initiative. Some critics have however continued to see the organization as a pointless effort. They point to several of the shortcomings, most notably the lack of integration of the region's economies.¹⁹⁰ The lack of infrastructural integration among member states, was a challenge for the organization. This made communication and travel nightmare. There was also political instability and violence that was prevailing in Several West African countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone, which at the time had internal wars. At that time also, there was the threat looming over Nigeria along ethnic lines such as the clashes between Yorubas and Hausas or within areas such as the Niger Delta. Another weak point for ECOWAS was its weak democracy. In July 1991 the community held its Declaration of Political Principles and established that Political pluralism, civilian rule and freedom of expression would become the barometer of governance. Military turned civilian or long serving leaders however, rule the majority of the countries in the region.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid. pp 62-63

This was a contradictory to the set proposals of the community. Further, its treaty was not always respected. For example, the designation of the Executive Secretary was still done by the heads of State on the basis of a name recommended by them by one of their colleagues.¹⁹¹

ECOMOG experienced some operational problems in Liberia as discussed by Aboagye¹⁹² The force had no mandate in the absence of a comprehensive cease-fire by all the factions. There was no cease-fire, since Taylor initially failed to sign one along with the other factions. The force had therefore to fight its own way into Monrovia to enforce peace. The force was also faced with difficulties, as there was the imposition of the peace enforcement mission. Militarily,, there was a tendency of the political authorities to order ECOMOG to switch from peacekeeping to peace enforcement roles in response to the politico-military situation engendered by some or factions. Politicians perceived this switch of roles in terms of the force going in the offensive or reverting to static and defensive dispositions, as if it were in a conventional setting. This made it impossible for ECOMOG to continue to enforce the peace. This was because of a number of factors; ECOMOG was overextended - the extent of territory it had to hold was wide, contrasted with the small number of troops available. The NPFL also melted away into inaccessible areas within or outside the country, from where it infiltrated back into the country. The nature of the terrain - the vegetation, the roads, bridges, coupled with the effect of weather - precluded easy conventional type operations. Finally, the force became liable to

¹⁹⁰ A. Gaye (ed) "ECOWAS: An outdated name?" in *West Africa* Issue No. 4205. Published weekly since 1917. ^th Dec - 9th Dec 1999. Pp.12-14.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

irritating attacks and ambushes, as the major factions regrouped in Monrovia and elsewhere through infiltration tactics.

All these made the mission suffer from a serious operational handicap. ECOMOG lacked a clearly defined buffer zone, which would have served as a more secure base of its operations to separate the warring factions. Thus it became liable to inimical tendencies among its own troops from the civil population. Its positions and operations were liable to actions by the warring factions while its troops earned bad press from familiarity with the civil population.¹⁹³

There were also other problems that characterized ECOMOG. The force failed to maintain positive neutrality. There were also disparities in the doctrines of the various contingents ranging from Anglophone to the homegrown ones, which were sometimes too wide for effective force operations. Contingents without any support weapons cannot function effectively, as was the case of Nigeria. There were also inadequacies of basic battlecraft expedients like maps, intelligence and communication equipment. The lack of maps for ECOMOG implied a reliance on some of the factions as "guides" during deployment into their respective areas.

The lack of weapons and equipment created disparities in the level of morale of the force and also created operational and tactical gaps in the offensive and defensive postures of the force from time to time.

One of the main problems that hinder operations of multinational operations of regional operations is the idea of national interest. Most contributing countries do pursue

¹⁹² Lt. Col. F.B. Aboagye, *ECOMOG: A Sub-Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia*. (Accra: Sedco Publishing Ltd, 1999).

their foreign policies in multinational or inter-allied operations. Nigeria, for instance, was obliged to spearhead the Operation Sandstorm - to oust the military junta of Major P. Koromah. Even though the operation was aimed at preventing the Liberian virus that had infected Sierra Leone from spreading, it was also a continuation of Nigeria's foreign policy, under which it had a pact with Sierra Leone. We can also not forget the logistic and administrative problems that faced the organization. All these problems pitted ECOMOG as a sub-regional power with the capacity to deal with African conflicts, and especially in peacekeeping.

There are some scholars who view sub-regional organisations/regional peacekeeping as advantageous. Advocates of sub-regional forces such as Howe¹⁹⁴ argue that these groupings, when compared to non-regional interveners, have political and military advantages. In their view, sub-regional forces understand the conflict better, enjoy greater political acceptance by the combatants, will demonstrate a stronger and more lasting commitment, and can deploy, relevant (and often cheaper) equipment and personnel.

But by using ECOMOG's six-year Liberian involvement, Howe, however disputes these claims and argues that an inadequate peacekeeping force may instead prolong a war and weaken regional stability. ECOMOG it was hoped would enjoy political acceptance among combatants, display more knowledge about the contested country's political issues and physical geography and maintain a grater commitment to ending a nearby struggle

¹⁹³ Pp.157-7

¹⁹⁴ Herbert Howe, "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping" in M. Brown et.al (eds) *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (London: The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996-97) pp399-430.

whose suffering could affect neighboring states. It could also employ suitable military capabilities. These four factors, it was hoped, would quickly resolve regional conflicts. But, looking at political acceptance, the experience in Liberia suggested that existing sub-regional differences pose several serious problems to the force. Different countries could be having political tensions that would hinder the joint activities of sub-regional forces. For example, Nigeria's status as West Africa's economic power created difficulties for ECOMOG.

Analysis of ECOMOG

ECOMOG was welcomed, hoping it could become a model for future sub-regional forces which might exhibit political and military advantages over western military units. It was thought that such a force would enjoy greater political acceptance among combatants, display more knowledge about the contested country's political issues and physical geography and maintain a greater commitment to ending a nearby struggle whose suffering could affect neighboring states. Additionally it could employ more suitable military capabilities. These four factors - acceptance, knowledge, commitment and military suitability- could, it was hoped, quickly resolve regional conflicts.

In view of political acceptance, the Liberian conflict suggested that existing regional differences could pose serious problems. New sub-regional forces will reflect existing political tensions e.g. Nigeria's status as West Africa's economic and military power as West Africa's economy and, military power - created difficulties for ECOMOG. Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire supported Taylor, while Guinea and Senegal supported ECOMOG. Serious Anglophone and Francophone divisions occurred with the force. The National aim of contributing states may collide with those of the sub-regional force.

Thus, tension between the force and a corresponding drop in efficiency could prompt a contingent to abandon the alliance for example, Nigeria had agreed that a Ghanaian should always command ECOMOG, but, following Gen. Quainoo's apparent incompetence, Nigeria pushed to have him removed.

The political background of a sub-regional force's governments will affect the forces political legitimacy and probably also its acceptance. ECOMOG's mandate included "creating the necessary conditions for free and fair elections. But few of the governments contributing to it had not been democratically elected; most had gained power through military force, like Taylor himself was attempting, and few of them tolerated much domestic dissent. Existing political baggage may limit western support. US "desertification" of Nigeria for involvement in the international drug trade hurt ECOMOG's already serious financial plight. As a result, the US provided bilateral assistance to nations except Nigeria until 1995.

A regional force's conduct will, ipso facto, affect its acceptance. Prolonged presence may change public perception of the force from an army of Liberation to an army of occupation. Alliances with local factions, while offering as outside force some military advantages, may also lessen the intervener's political standing. A sub regional force of, and by, some factions will lessen its acceptance by others. Torture and even examples of cannibalism by ECMOG-supported factions hurt its general political acceptance. A sub-regional force has less control over factions - and their misdeeds-than its own troops.

In view of greater knowledge, ECOMOG had some experience. According to its experience, despite geographical proximity, neighboring country in Africa often has

surprisingly limited knowledge about each other. Ignorance about Liberia hurt ECOMOG's military operations and the frowning response of a precise mandate. W.A. has wide range of ethnic, linguistic and cultural groupings as well as a lack of regional transport and communication and politico-economic cooperation. W.A. states knew Liberia better than did any other states, but ECOMOG's initial understanding of Taylor and his motives proved negligible. It misjudged his willingness and ability to resist the multinational force. The organization lacked substantial understanding about Taylor's organization and the strength of domestic support. It was initially thought that the superior fire power of their conventional, professional force would a '*priori*' intimidate the ragtag NPFL. It assumed it could quickly achieve the cease-fire. The lack of intelligence hurt ECOMOG's tactical capabilities.

Knowledge, along with military capabilities, is crucial for specifying whether the intervener's should pursue peacekeeping or peace enforcing. ECOMOG's ignorance encouraged the new force to seek numerous - contradictory - goals. It first assumed it would be a peacekeeping, an interposition force between armed but peaceful force as in Cyprus. Its mandate " to keep peace, restore law and order and ensure respect for the cease-fire"¹⁹⁵ was not adhered to. It simultaneously attempted impartial peacekeeping and biased peace enforcement.

At the time ECOWAS proposed to enter Liberia there was no cease-fire and one faction (Taylor's) opposed the operation. Its faction denounced the intervention as aimed at discouraging citizens in other African nations from fighting dictatorships. It therefore

¹⁹⁵ Also see ECOWAS document A/Dec.1/8/90 on the cease-fire and establishment of an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group for Liberia, Banjul, 7 Aug 1990.

opened fire on ECOMOG to demonstrate against it, forcing ECOMOG to pursue the peace enforcement principles of UN Chapter VII. The UN formalities for such a mission had not even taken place. It ignored the UN Charter Article 53 requirement that prohibits the use of enforcement action under regional arrangements without authorization of the SC, and the SC decisions required for Chapter VII enforcement. It did not follow and apply the usual methods that could precede the offensive use of force, such as sanctions and an embargo on supply routes. It only considered these when public opinion opposed its harsh methods, as civilians, hospitals and aid agencies suffered under its bombing.¹⁹⁶

Its engagement in fighting against one of the factions complicated the peace making efforts that were being pursued by ECOWAS heads of state, making the efforts to establish an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) fail to attract all parties. Although under a cease-fire signed in Lome in February 1991, parties to the conflict agreed to the cessation of hostilities and to principles of disarmament,¹⁹⁷ there was no clear framework for disarmament agreed on. It raised other issues. About 90% of the force were provided by Nigerian contingents thought to be detrimental to NPFL interests.

Under the Yamoussoukro 10 accord, signed on 30 October 1991, the NPFL agreed to disarm under an expanded peacekeeping operation that included the reduction Nigerian contingents.¹⁹⁸ But it collapsed because a new faction; the United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO) had opposed NPFL involvement in the Accord. It preferred fighting NPFL to defeat it. ECOWAS launched operation Octopus, in which

¹⁹⁶ A.Zacarias, Liberia and ECOMOG: A Regional Organisation in Action.p.122.

¹⁹⁷ Agreement on Cessation of hostilities and peaceful Settlement of Conflict, signed 13 Feb 1991, *Official Journal of the ECOWAS*, Special Supplement, 1992, 21: 17.

ECOMOG and rival factions came under fire. ECOMOG responded by using force and co-ordination its efforts with other factions. It was ill equipped and under-resourced to impose a military solution in Liberia. The situation in Liberia did not improve but worsened: state structures collapsed and also had law and order, killing of civilians by warring factions, with 600 people massacred in the Carter Camp in Harbel in 1993 June.¹⁹⁹

ECOMOG mission experienced some organizational and operational difficulties.²⁰⁰ It had no institutional experience of participation in PKO's, much less in more complex operations requiring enforcement measures. Its command structure was ill defined; its communication system was deficient and its financial base shaky. This made it highly valuable, especially in the climate of grudging consent in which it operated, and these factors contributed to the prolongation of conflict. This led to a higher number of casualties in the force.

ECOMOG was accused of partiality because of its lack of strategy and breach of the principle of non-use of force. It was involved with some factions.²⁰¹ ECOMOG also allowed the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and ULIMO to pillage and to commit atrocities in locations presumed to support Taylor's NPFL, also trained, supplied weapons and equipped the two rivals.²⁰² All these shortcomings made the work of ECOMOG not a

¹⁹⁸ See also W.O. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 'Regional Organisations and The resolution of internal Conflict: ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia', *International Peacekeeping*, 1994, 1-3 at p.227.

¹⁹⁹ A.Zacarias. P.123

²⁰⁰ Ibid. p.124

²⁰¹ Also see for example, Africa Watch, 'Liberia: a Human Rights Disaster, Oct. 1990, p.25.

²⁰² Africa Watch, 'Liberia, Waging War to Keep Peace'

succession Liberia. This clearly shows that regional organisations are not fully ready to carry out peacekeeping activities on their own.

Assessing the Role of regional Organizations.

Zacarias²⁰³ view is that regional organizations have a limited capacity for intervention. They have both systematic and specific problems. From the activities of regional organizations discussed financial constraints and the lack of belief in the potential of any regional machinery to find a satisfactory solution to the cases that come under consideration, particularly in Africa. The OAU for example, is unable to engage in peacekeeping operations as demonstrated in Chad. African countries also have different cultures and customs that may be a hindrance to any peacekeeping mission. Different cultures have different values. The cultural factor for instance was seen as one of the reasons for the failure of the UNITAF in Somalia. ECOMOG's operation, as well as being poorly planned, showed an absence of the awareness of the context and political atmosphere in which it was operating. The personnel had scarcely any identification with African culture. Special attention needs to be paid to cultural issues in Peacekeeping operations.

The presence of regional force has to be an issue put first into consideration in order to minimize the problems of peacekeeping operations. The UN should limit its role to the support of regional and local structures with responsibility for peacekeeping left to the regional organisations, as Bakwesegba²⁰⁴ suggests. Regional peacekeeping according

²⁰³ A.Zacarias, *The UN and International Peacekeeping*. pp.125-130

²⁰⁴ Dr. C. Bakwesegba, Head of the OAU Conflict Management Division, in an Interview conducted in Addis Ababa on 4th Oct. 1993.

to Zacarias,²⁰⁵ has its own disadvantages. They see peacekeeping as a process of patching up family rows, and this could lead to solution of brief duration or sometimes to cover-up of crimes and injustice. This only post-pones settlement of conflict by making it more complex and entrenched. There is also a tendency of regional organisations having minor alliances based on old or new sites that provide the context for states and governments to build mutual relations. Thus in case of conflict between a government an opposition, the opposition will have difficulty in winning sympathy, and this can prevent regional peacekeeping from being neutral and impartial. The disadvantaged party will prefer an outside agency like the UN to intervene. There is therefore need for institutions and credible approaches to ensure impartiality of regional peacekeeping operations. There is also need of taking into account cultural differences. The environment in which the operation is conducted must be well interpreted and perceived.

In conclusion, there has been a general global will to intervene in conflicts and also experiments with the task of peacekeepers. It stems to a large extent from African States' readiness to take on a greater degree for promoting peace and security in the continent. However, in their endeavor for the search for peace the Africa peacekeeping operations have had a number of experiences, mainly, sad experiences.

The problems faced by peacekeeping operations show a lack of will among many contributors to have their soldiers operate under more enforcement type mandates such as the gathering of military personnel for UNAMIR in Rwanda. Most of the mandates are also not clear and are at times expanded not considering the capacity of the force to deal

²⁰⁵ A. Zacarias, *The UN and International Peacekeeping*, p.128.

with the mission assigned for. Peacekeeping forces in the post-Cold War have had to perform a number of tasks besides peacekeeping. Very few African countries are capable of deploying a battalion for a peacekeeping operation or multinational force without assistance. Besides, they do not possess the specialized units with sufficient equipment to deal with the situation on the ground. The lack of expertise hinder the adequate provision of required services for the continuance of the operation such as engineering, transportation of troops and material, medical and communication services, command and control of troops, and logistical problems make the work of the peacekeeping operations difficult.

The lack of political will to act in the face of a crisis and the commitment of both the Security Council and troop contributing countries has been a major obstacle to UN work for maintenance of peace and security. Very few African countries are capable of deploying a battalion for a peacekeeping operation without assistance they also lack the necessary equipment or expertise to provide the necessary services required in peacekeeping missions.

Financial and logistical limitations are also a problem to peacekeeping operations and have led to failure of the operations to materialize. The African countries too are not able to sustain a sizeable force and cannot project force to great distances and this is a great obstacle to peacekeeping operations. For a peacekeeping mission to succeed therefore the capacity, resources, robust mandates and clear rules of engagement must exist. The mission must also be based on the commitment of all parties to a peace accord and have both political analysis and human rights monitoring capacity.

CHAPTER THREE

UNITED STATES PEACEKEEPING POLICY IN AFRICA

Introduction

Chapter two discussed the experiences that the Africans have had in undertaking peace operations on their own initiatives. It has looked at the experiences in a few countries and has also looked at the work of the OAU as a regional organisation. This chapter will look at the US peacekeeping policy towards Africa after the Cold War. It will mainly look at America's policy of having African problems solved by the Africans themselves.

The post-Cold War US policy towards Africa has remained volatile, informed by the drastic changes ushered with the end of the Cold War, and an increasingly domestic pressure on its leadership as well as external challenges to its hegemony. Although the stated general goals of US foreign policy, in relation to development, democracy and security, seem congruent with those of the African peoples, that is not exactly the reality. When deciding how best to achieve these goals, a chasm emerges between perspectives crafted purely in the American foreign policy arena and those rooted in African realities.²⁰⁶

According to reports in 1999,²⁰⁷ the US military intervention in African conflicts would be considered only under three specific sets of circumstances. Washington could

²⁰⁶ W. Minter, "America and Africa: Beyond Double Standard." *Current History. A journal of Contemporary World Affairs-Africa*. Vol.99, No. 637. May 2000. p.200.

²⁰⁷ "US lays Down Conditions for military Action in Africa" *The East African* August 9-15, 1999.p.7

use force to halt attempted genocide²⁰⁸ but it would do so, only if vital American interests were at stake and if the US had sufficient military resources in the area. This put aside the interests of Africans and therefore the attempt for western disengagement in conflict resolution in Africa.

The US policy towards Africa is mainly pinned to one Aspect, the US interests. Schear²⁰⁹ asserts that few aspects of security policy are more challenging for the US government-and the Department of Defense in particular-than peacekeeping. Such operations helped advance US interests in such diverse places as Southern Africa. Peacekeeping should be viewed, in broad terms as a means, not an end. It is not a strategy but a tool to be guided by larger US interests.

Peacekeeping in Africa: The Role of the United States.

Optimism about the future was evident in the peace and security field, which derived from the fact that Cold War competition for political influence and military assets was no longer the defining framework for the policies of external powers vis-à-vis the African continent. This fundamental change in context it was argued would allow for a new, more innovative and disinterested approach to African conflicts. This was exemplified in the success of United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia between 1989 and 1990. The Namibian operation was seen as foreshadowing a new pattern of external involvement in two ways. First, with the debilitating impact of Cold War rivalry finally removed, outside powers would now co-operate in efforts to address African conflicts and facilitate transitions to democratic rule. Second, UNTAG

²⁰⁸ Comment by US National Security, Sandy Berger, 1999.

also appeared to suggest that innovations on 'traditional' peacekeeping - a distinctive form of third party intervention governed by the principles of consent and minimum use of force - opened up new avenues of action and pointed to new modes of involvement by external powers. However, this optimism to which the US, Britain and France had all subscribed in statements about Africa, had been profoundly undermined. An example is the success of ONUMOZ was dwarfed by the tragedy of events in Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia and Sudan. In fact, more than 300,000 people were thought to have died as a result of the resumption of civil war in Angola in 1992, and least 800,000 people lost their lives between April and June 1994 in the genocide against Rwanda's minority Tutsi and moderate Hutu.²¹⁰ It is against this background of shattered hopes and failed policies, that US, British and French peacekeeping policy and involvement in Africa after the Cold War must be reconsidered.

The peacekeeping policy cannot be separated from other aspects of policy towards Africa, but certain themes and concerns are evident. In the US, an initial commitment to focus on African issues has been replaced by reluctance to become directly involved and a preference for 'African Solutions to African problems'. The initial willingness to explore the scope for enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN charter has been decisively rejected. For instance, the chief determinant of policy for Britain has been limited resources. As with the US, the underlying thrust of British policy

²⁰⁹ J.A. Schear, Deputy Assistant secretary of defence for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance "Peacekeeping Policy: The Defence Department View" USIA, US Foreign Policy Agenda, April 1998.

²¹⁰ Mel McNulty, 'France, Rwanda and the Genocide: A Review of the Literature', in *Modern and Contemporary France*, (London: Longman Ltd). p.501

in Africa has been to 'help African states to help themselves', though, unlike the US, Britain has focused more on the mobilisation of existing resources and know-how' than on the infusion of additional resources from outside.²¹¹

With the end of the Cold War, it was thought that this would result to a more coherent approach to African conflicts by outside powers since there was no more rivalry between them. However, a more complex pattern of competition, involving a great number of actors driven by a wider range of motives, appeared to emerge. There was growing tension between the US and France, and particularly as was evident in Central Africa and which was exacerbated by the greater saliency of economic competition. This increasingly is complicating the task of developing a coherent policy towards conflict in parts of Africa.²¹² The supposed failure to develop the 'potential of peacekeeping in the early 1990s is only part of the reason why progress in resolving African conflicts has been so very limited, Berdal argues. The misguided attempt to combine peacekeeping and enforcement in one location undoubtedly contributed to the debacle in Somalia in 1993. UNAVEM II's efforts to steer Angola through elections in 1992 were critically undermined by the acute lack of resources devoted to the operation. Yet, in the long run peacekeeping or even enforcement can only be successful as part of a broader strategy based on a comprehensive understanding of the nature and functions of conflict.²¹³

²¹¹ 'Speech by the Foreign Secretary, Mr Douglas Hurd, to the 49th General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, 28th September 1994', FCO Information Department, p.4.

²¹² M. Berdal, "Peacekeeping In Africa, 1990-1996: The Role of the United States, France and Britain. In *Peacekeeping in Africa* by O. Furley & R. May (Aldershot. Burlington. USA. Singapore. Sydney: Ashgate Publishing Co. USA, 1998)p.51.

²¹³ *Ibid.* p.52.

The United States Peacekeeping Policy and Practice in Africa

There was a great sense of optimism in the academic and policy debates about Africa after the Cold War in the early 1990s strongly and genuinely felt in the US. This was partly related to the belief that new forms outside involvement offered unique opportunities for addressing conflicts no longer fuelled by global rivalry. The optimism was however so short-lived and particularly so with the US experience in Somalia in 1993. The US peacekeeping policy in Africa in the 1990s was characterised by a swing from initial enthusiasm to extreme weariness and caution about any direct involvement on the continent. The experience of Somalia and the administrations' generalised reading of the nature of conflict in Africa, powerfully influenced the US in its formulation of an overall peacekeeping policy, eventually codified as Presidential Decision Directive - 25 in May 1994. The operations in Somalia brought out the strength of domestic political constraints on US foreign policy. It also concentrated the minds of the US military, specifically with regard to the vexed issue of 'enforcement' and, more generally, the difficulties and dangers of intervening in intra-state conflicts.²¹⁴ These can be said to be a few factors that led to less involvement of the US in African conflicts in the 1990's.

The end of the Cold War also tended to reinforce U.S. policy to ignore Africa in favour of other regions. The 1990's saw bewildering profusion of old and new internal conflicts in Africa. Angola, Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Algeria, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo were engulfed in war. The U.S. influence, however, was not seen to be much in these countries in conflicts. This gave great evidence of the U.S.

new position of disengagement in Africa. Michael Clough's "Cynical Disengagement" summarises this new position in three ways; do not spend much money unless Congress makes you, do not let African issues complicate policy towards other more important parts of the world and most importantly, do not take stands that might create political controversies in the U.S.A.²¹⁵

The US as a super power and with a permanent membership in the Security Council should be involved in conflicts in Africa. All UN peacekeeping operations are authorised and continuously receive support from the UN Security Council. As a permanent member of the Security Council, the US plays a role in assessing the need for each peacekeeping operation, deciding to start a new peacekeeping operation, steering ongoing operations on the right course and closing down the peacekeeping operation at their right time.²¹⁶ Because the US has a veto in the Security Council, a UN peacekeeping operation cannot be authorised without US support. The US has long been an important contributor of troops to UN Peacekeeping Operations with 681 Personnel in February 1998, the US ranked 8th among the 71 nations contributing troops, military observers, and civilian monitors to UNPK.²¹⁷

Apparently, Africa still receives token rather than serious responses from the United States. Their policies are also inappropriate considering the context - the society, culture and politics- of the African continent. It endorses democracy, human rights and

²¹⁴ Ibid. p.53

²¹⁵ M.Clough, "The U.S.A and Africa: The Policy of Cynical Disengagement" *A Current History*, 91,565 (May 1992) pp.193-198.

²¹⁶ An aAssessment . by Nancy Soderberg, "UN Peacekeeping builds on lessons learned, Progress Achieved." Alternate US Representative for Special Political Affairs, UN.

²¹⁷ Op.Cit

conflict resolution in their policies, but their implementation is primarily an ad hoc response to crises. Furthermore, these policies do not attract sustained high-level attention. The Clinton administration failed to respond to the genocide in Rwanda and even initially refused to use the term genocide for the massacres in Rwanda. Shockingly, the Security Council too meekly followed the US lead in denying the reality of the genocide. The US spokesmen were instructed to avoid using the term in order to avoid having to fulfil their treaty obligations under the 1949 Genocide Convention.

The US administration did not respond to calls for an independent investigation of responsibility for the failure, as Belgium, France and the UN did. Furthermore, high-level officials at the White House and the State department, who dismissed warnings of genocide and lobbied to stop international action, have not been held responsible for their failures²¹⁸

On the night of October 3, 1993, the United States planned, decided and launched an operation in Somalia, without knowledge of UN officials. The Delta force staged a raid against a house in South Mogadishu, believed to be a place where key lieutenants of warlord Farah Aideed were meeting. In the battle, eighteen US soldiers and one Malaysian were killed, ninety US, Malaysian and Pakistan soldiers were kidnapped and one US pilot captured.²¹⁹ After these events, and with the world watching a US soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by jubilant, jeering supporters of Aideed, it became difficult for American military to be involved in efforts to resolve African conflicts.

²¹⁸ W.Minter "America and Africa: Beyond Double Standard." *Current History, A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs-Africa*. Vol.99, No.637. May 2000.p.201.

Alternatively, President Bush sought to enhance the capacity of the OAU, sub-regional organisations and individual countries to play a greater role in conflict resolution. For that purpose, the US provided military equipment, training, funding and logistical support towards the task. It did this in the case of Nigeria ECOWAS in Liberia. The Secretary of State went further and pledged \$ 20 billion to help set up the new all Africa peacekeeping force to further off load this burden to the U.S. The national security Bureaucracy was left to play a prominent role in African Affairs, with the White House handing over the Liberian issue to the African bureau to seek out the problem, instead of taking a hard-line military operation like in Panama and the Gulf.

In the 1992 humanitarian disaster in Somalia the U.S. administration saw a sense of urgency about Somalia through pressures from the U.S. Congress and the public. This prompted the administration to offer humanitarian assistance, which was later developed into a military operation. The attempt to resolve the problem however failed because there was no coherent overall humanitarian-politic-military game plan that would provide the parameters for a more powerful UN mandate to establish a secure environment. The deployment of UNITAF lacked the political objectives that would cause the warlords to back down from the fight.²²⁰

The UNITAF and UNOSOM II, both written by the Bush administration were both authorised under Chapter VII mandate of the UN charter. The administration chose to restrict the engagement of the US expeditionary force to little more than those that would apply in a Chapter VI situation. This decision made by the US influenced the

²¹⁹ B-B Ghali *Unvanquished: An US-UN Saga*. (New York: Random House, 1999)

logical development of Operation Restore Hope (ORH). Its repercussions fostered the political and military confrontations that plagued the UN successor force. All that the world could think of, unfortunately, was a failed UN and not a failed U.S. involvement and a failure in its operation.

The post-Cold War also witnessed growing U.S. diplomatic involvement in the resolution of conflicts in Africa. In March 1990, Namibia achieved independence, with the US acting as peace broker in the negotiation process.²²¹ The growing interest was however a result of growing concern on US security. Some of the issues in Africa are a threat to US interests. The US is increasingly concerned over threats posed by "low intensity conflict" in Africa. The assumptions made are that vital US interests are threatened by radical and revolutionary violence in Africa and the US must be prepared to use military force to protect these interests.²²²

Because of the need for extensive financial and human sacrifices to preserve the stability of the New World Order, the US began to pull back from a major leadership role in the African continent. The policymakers are only prepared to allocate limited resources to humanitarian relief efforts, as it did in Rwanda in 1994, and to give financial support for regional peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives. It has presented very little will for extensive involvement like that in Somali. The Clinton administration instead decided to subordinate foreign policy issues to domestic reconstruction agenda. The US therefore can no longer be counted on to take the lead in regional disputes unless it can discern

²²⁰ W. Clarke & J. Herbst (eds.) *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*. (U.S.A: Westview Press, 1997).

²²¹ F. Deng and I. W. Zartman (eds.) *Conflict Resolution in Africa*. (Washington, D.C.,: Brookings, 1991)

clear interests at stake.²²³ The lack of the US to play an important role as peacekeeper and peacemaker in Liberia, reflected the domestic constraints and a lack of a compelling need to offer world leadership in the less threatening circumstances of the post-Cold War environment.

Despite the occasional bursts of aid and attention to Africa, the U.S. seems to remain largely disengaged. Stremlau attributes this lack of involvement to a number of reasons; war in Africa poses no clear and present danger to US interests. Furthermore, most African conflicts are Intra- State and not inter-State.²²⁴

Taking a look at the conflicts in Africa, Minter argues that the US should add its influence, whether by direct mediation or by supporting other efforts, to encourage all-party negotiations aimed at compromise solutions. But the US should not leave the Africans to solve their own problems. However the US has thought of having an African army in its support for African peacekeeping. It provided approximately \$10 million to the OAU to enable it to send military observers on short notice to crisis areas in the year 2000.²²⁵

Historically, the interest of the United States in Africa has been negligible compared to attention and resources it has paid to other regions.²²⁶ Little interest was shown during the Cold War, during which time it supported or opposed several African

²²² P. J. Schraeder "Removing the Shackles? U.S. Foreign Policy toward Africa After the end of the Cold War. (UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1996).

²²³ G. R. Lugar, "American Foreign Policy in the post- Cold War Period," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 24, winter 1994, p.23.

²²⁴ J. Stremlau, 'Ending Africa's Wars' *Foreign Affairs*. July/August 2000. pp. 117-132.

²²⁵ W. Minter, America and Africa: Beyond Double Standard. " *Current History. A journal of Contemporary World Affairs*. Vol.99, No. 637. May 2000. p. 209.

²²⁶ E. Berman & K. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*. (Switzerland: Geneva, UNIDIR, 2000).

Countries, supplying or withholding military equipment and financial aid in line with geopolitical considerations. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the U.S. reduced substantially its involvement in Africa. It has no standing military army in Africa. Engaging one immediately whenever there is crisis is also problematic. In 1994 Rwandan genocide, the US issued the Presidential Decision Document (PDD 25), which was quite restrictive and confining.²²⁷ as discussed in Chapter Two. These rules dealt a deadly blow to multilateralism and the efforts of the UN to keep peace in Rwanda.

The lack of interest to become involved militarily in Africa explains the causes and contours of many US policies towards Africa. There have been many U.S. undertakings, all aimed at promoting Africa countries' abilities to manage and resolve conflicts in Africa. The centrepiece of this peacekeeping policy in Africa is the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).

There were perceived escalating crisis in the 1990's of UN peacekeeping on the African continent.²²⁸ For example, between 1989 and 1996, 30,000 out of 80,000 troops involved in peacekeeping were undertaking missions in Africa. These crises in Africa and especially the experience in Somalia and Rwanda, prescribed unique challenge to the UN and other agencies and institutions seeking conflict resolution in Africa. The western powers showed great political willingness to intervene in the post-Cold War as they demonstrated through participation in Operations Safe Havens and Provide Comfort. This followed the poor performance of the UN agencies and NGO's during the post-Gulf war humanitarian crisis, the principle of 'military humanitarianism', of using military

²²⁷ B-B Ghali, *Unvanquished: AN US-UN Saga*. (New York: Random House, 1999).

²²⁸ A.Roberts, 'The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping', *Survival*, 36, 3, Autumn 1994, pp.93-120.

personnel both to alleviate suffering caused by man-made and natural disasters and protect a UN -mandated relief operation was established.

However, this optimism did not last long. Somalia provided a mortal blow both to large-scale peacekeeping operations in Africa and Western willingness to intervene direct in African conflicts. This was as result of the massacre of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers in Mogadishu in 1993, and the killing of 18 US serviceman. This mission was a hard one for the UN leading to its withdrawal by the Security Council before completing its mission.²²⁹ For the US, the key player in any concept of international peacekeeping, it had an even more devastating impact with a radical review of America's role in global peacekeeping and African peacekeeping in particular.²³⁰ Significantly this was demonstrated in the presidential issue of the PDD 25 that led to a virtual cessation of the use of US ground forces in peacekeeping operations and severe budgetary cutbacks. This was the cause of the reluctance, chastened western governments and UN paralysis during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

As part of its radical review of its African peacekeeping policies, and what might be construed as a desire to divorce itself from any UN-led missions after Somalia, the American government launched a series of initiatives to support indigenous African conflict resolution. For instance, in September 1994 Congress passed the African conflict Resolution act providing for \$25 million of assistance for sub-regional organisations

²²⁹ Report of the United Nations Secretary General (New York: United Nations, 1998)

²³⁰ M.Michaels, 'Retreat from Africa', who detected signs of America's withdrawal even before the Somalia Debacle,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72. No. 1, 1993, pp.93-109.

engaged in peacekeeping activities.²³¹ Since the Somalia conflict the role in conflict in Africa has been limited and reactive. In Central African Republic and Liberia's operations were strictly limited to the protection of US lives and property. Much emphasis has been put in politico-diplomatic initiatives spearheaded by leading American government officials and at times the president himself. Example, the first major diplomatic mission since Somalia was led by Secretary of State Warren Christopher in October 1996 to promote African support for and participation in an African Crisis Response Force.²³² The programme cost between \$25 and 40 million included a proposal for a force of 5,000-10,000 troops, training support by US Special forces in joint exercises, and compatible communications and training equipment. Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, Tunisia and Uganda began receiving training in 1997 and Ghana followed in 1998.²³³ These initiatives however received a generally negative local reaction. Critics in Africa feared it was simply designed to avoid western involvement in future African crises, the financial aid set up for the ACRI was so little, and the lack of prior consultation over it also created suspicion. America did not recognise the growing role in conflict resolution of sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS and SADC. They did not define the proposals and appeared as an eleventh hour response to an on-going regional crisis.²³⁴

²³¹ E Yorke, "Regional Initiatives and Non-UN Forms of Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa." In D.S. Gordon and F.H. Toase (eds) *Aspects of Peacekeeping* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001) pp.78-98.

²³² Op.Cit

²³³ Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, SIPRI Year Book 1998(Oxford. SIPRI, 1998)p.51.

²³⁴ E.Yorke, "Regional Initiatives and Non-UN Forms of Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa." In D.S. Gordon & F.H.Toase (eds) *Aspects of Peacekeeping* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001) pp. 78-98).

All these demonstrate the desire of the US to disengage in African conflicts. They stress the alternation of regional conflict, the growth of democratic institutions, regard for human rights, sustained economic development and security from weapons of mass destruction and transitional threats as key American interests in the region. An earlier 1995, Department of Defence document however, declared that in the post-Cold War period, the USA had 'very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.'²³⁵ This in a way affected the actions of the US in the 1994 conflict in Rwanda.

The PDD 25 and US peacekeeping policy in Africa.

The Somalia events presented a tough experience that made the contents of a broad-ranging Presidential Policy review of peacekeeping policy, ordered in 1993 and finally presented in May 1994, differ greatly from the earlier pronouncements. The main objective behind the review had been to identify criteria that would provide the basis for making decisions about whether or not the US should support and participate in multilateral peace operations.²³⁶ The essence of the policy when US participation is being considered required that; The objectives of an operation must be clearly defined, in America's own national interest' and assured of 'continuing public and Congressional support'; The commitment of US troops cannot be 'open-ended and consequently an 'exit strategy' must be in place before troops are deployed; and operations involving US must have 'acceptable command and control' arrangements.²³⁷ But the operations that have been carried out by the UN and even regional organisations highlight clearly the

²³⁵ D.Henk, 'US National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Parameters* Winter 1997-1998. P.95.

²³⁶ The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operation (Executive Summary, May 1994, State Department) pp.4-5.

difficulty in applying these criteria. These ideas; of a narrow definition of 'national interest', strict adherence to the principle of 'no open-ended commitments' and the requirement for continuing public and congressional support, are just bound to limit the scope for direct peacekeeping involvement in Africa.²³⁸

Policy initiatives since 1994: 'African Solutions to African Problems'

In spite of domestic criticism, notably from the congressional black Caucus, about the absence of a coherent policy in the wake of the genocide in Rwanda, the basic parameters underlying PDD 25 continue to shape US peacekeeping thinking about Africa. Anthony Lake,²³⁹ for instance, spoke of the need to confront 'the reality of shrinking resources and honest scepticism about the return on our investment in peacekeeping and development.'²⁴⁰ The persistence of conflict since then thus and the danger of further eruptions of mass violence have forced the administration to recognise that it cannot disengage altogether. Thus the urge for the increase in emphasis on encouraging 'African solutions to African problems' through the strengthening of regional and sub-regional groupings.

Thus the creation of the African Crisis Response Force proposed by Warren Christopher, then US Secretary of State in his proposal during his visit he made this proposal to sub-Saharan Africa in October 1996. The force would consist of some 5,000-10,000 troops drawn from various African countries and 'reinforced by training,

²³⁷ M.Beral. "Peacekeeping in Africa, 1990-1996: The Role of the United States, France and Britain" in O.Furley & R.May (USA: Ashgate Publishing Co. USA, 1998) pp.49-79

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Antony Lake, President Clinton's Assistant for National Security Affairs and an African Specialist.

²⁴⁰ "Africans told to Expect less from the US", *The Washington Post*, 16 December 1994. P.46.

equipment, logistical and financial support' from the US and other donor countries.²⁴¹

The concept also envisaged the force to be 'fully inter-operable, fully-trained African-led and manned capability...composed of a headquarters element, support units and up to ten African battalions.' Its mission would be to 'protect innocent civilians, ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, and help resolve conflicts in Africa and beyond'. The administration's initiative does not envisage a major role for the UN in peacekeeping Africa. It further underscores American commitment to the force; the administration has earmarked \$20million for the project.²⁴²

While the proposal was welcome by some countries (Mali, Ethiopia and Tanzania) others including South Africa and SADC countries resented the fact that the proposal emanated from outside the region and bypassed the UN altogether. There were also fears that the proposal signalled a 'further writing off the continent with a ground sounding plan for which no real funding or interest would follow.' and that even if it were to become operational, it would only 'ensure that African troops would do the work and take the risks'.²⁴³ This clearly shows the lack of the US to be involved in African conflicts.

The African Crisis Response Initiative

The international community and the US failed to respond appropriately to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. This still fresh in minds of policy makers, political tensions escalated in Burundi, causing concern in Washington. Congress immediately

²⁴¹ 'Remarks by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the Organization of African Unity', Addis Ababa, 10 October 1996, US State Department (office of the Spokesman)

²⁴² Berdal, M. Ibid.

²⁴³ 'SADC reserved over US proposal for African Crisis Force', *Agence France Presse*, 13 October 1996.

appropriated US \$ 20 million to support preventive action in Burundi. This was out of fear of another Rwanda-type genocide in Burundi, to which the US might have been compelled to send its troops. The US hastily proposed to create a standby African peacekeeping force to respond to the crisis in Burundi or even elsewhere in Africa in the future.²⁴⁴

The introduction of the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), received much resentment throughout Africa. The claims were made that the proposal for the peacekeeping force was introduced heavy-handedly and in a non-transparent manner. A twist had therefore to be made in order to suit the wishes of the Africans to deal with their own problems. This led to the creation of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). Unlike the ACRF, the ACRI's aim was to develop a capacity rather than a force to deal with these problems. In the initiatives, national contingents receive training, brigade staff headquarters with support staff receive instruction and training based on procedures from both national and intergovernmental peacekeeping doctrines. The basic soldiering skills and specific peacekeeping functions are also taught. It also emphasises respect for human rights and developing and maintaining good relations with civil societies.²⁴⁵

The African Crisis Response Initiative was a US-led initiative, established as a mechanism to enhance the capacity of Africans to resolve conflicts in Africa.²⁴⁶ The primary missions of the ACRI were to enhance the capacity of African countries to

²⁴⁴ E.G. Berman and K.E. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*. (UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. ISS, Pretoria, S.A. 2000) p.383.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.* p.273.

²⁴⁶ "Summary of African Crisis Response Initiative" U.S. Department of State. International Information Programmes. <http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/acri/acrisumm.htm>

participate effectively in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian crises, and to build a more stable future for themselves and the continent as a whole.²⁴⁷

Hooks²⁴⁸ defines ACRI as a State department -managed programme that, at the cost of about \$ 20 million per year, aims to create a cadre of some 12,000 well-trained African peacekeepers. This was to be done through the skills of Special Forces trainers and a pool of retired US military contractors. These instruct battalion sized African military units in a spectrum of skills that will enable them to carry out peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations in Africa or elsewhere. ACRI also transfers about \$1.2 million in communications gear and other non-lethal equipment to each partner country. The intent of all these efforts is that with a common fund of peacekeeping skills and other inter-operable equipment such as radios, boots, and uniforms, ACRI-trained units from different African countries will have the ability to operate together in a peacekeeping or humanitarian operation. The programme of instruction that ACRI uses has been vetted with African and European militaries and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and that equal UN and European training standards.

In initiating the ACRI, each state participating in the programme was furnished with approximately US \$1.2 million worth, or related equipment. These were given to the battalions and also the individual soldiers, both for training and in the event of actual deployment. The US supplied recipients with equipment that meets UN specification to ensure inter-operability. Most of these were foreign manufactured systems. It also

²⁴⁷ 'ACRI: Working with African Nations to Build Regional Stability.' An interview with Ambassador Aubrey Hooks. U.S. Department of State. IIP's <http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/acri/interview.htm>

provided standard equipment (US radios and repeaters) night vision binoculars, water-purification equipment and each trainee out fitted with a complete uniform, boots, personal gear and eyeglasses.²⁴⁹ The recipients included Ghana, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, and Uganda, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and later on Kenya.

Rice²⁵⁰ summarised U.S. policy in Africa as having two overarching goals. The first entails Africa's integration into the global economy, with the aim of accelerating growth and prosperity and reducing social unrest and the need for costly intervention. Secondly, protecting the U.S. and its citizens from transitional threats, such as terrorism and internal conflicts emanating from Africa and the rest of the world. This is much so with regard to rogue states, weapons proliferation, drug trade, environmental degradation and international crime. Economic growth and development, the promotion of democracy and human rights, prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, together with humanitarian assistance, are imperatives for meeting the first overall objective-Africa's integration into the global economy. To achieve these goals, the US set aside training programmes. It provides training through the International Military Education and Training Programme (IMET) and the Expanded-International Education and Training programme (E-IMET). All these are aimed at shaping African forces to be more efficient, more professional and more responsive to democratic values. They are also aimed at improving the capabilities of the African forces in peacekeeping operations in order to

²⁴⁸ A. Hooks, Promoting Security. The U.S. contribution presented in a meeting series at the council entitled "American Policymakers in Africa" In co-operation with the Council on Foreign relations. Thursday February 10, 2000.

²⁴⁹ E. Berman & K. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* (UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland, ISS, Pretoria, S.A. 2000).p.273.

²⁵⁰ See more in Susan Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs under the Clinton Administration, Speech to the African Studies Association.

take an active role in peacekeeping in the region. It also established The U.S. European Command (EUSCOM) to manage security programmes in sub-Sahara Africa and provide exercise and training programmes and the Joint/ Combined Exchange Training (JCET) which supports national objectives.²⁵¹ All these were aimed at enhancing Africa's capacity in order to deal with crises any time they occur in the continent and elsewhere in the world. These exercises were seen as the first step towards the formation of the US mooted standing regional peacekeeping force.²⁵² The ACRI was thus a product of the U.S. desire to reduce costly intention and so enable Africans manage their own conflicts.

After the crisis in Somalia, all that mattered to the US was the psychological cost to the US public. Through television news programmes, the US public saw the victims of famine in Somalia, and later broadcasts of distressing scenes of the captured American helicopter pilot and the footage of the dead US ranger being dragged through Mogadishu streets. This changed American public and congressional opinion against US presence in Somalia.²⁵³

The ACRI presents a possibility of US initiative to disengage in Africa. It is strictly a chapter VI initiative and possesses nothing like peacekeeping. It does not reflect the situation on the ground. The use of Helicopters, missiles and marines in Somalia was purely US experience of fighting wars and not African.

Since the warring parties made the US delivery of Humanitarian assistance difficult, they developed a policy that would help secure a safe environment for

²⁵¹ P.Omach, "African Crisis Response Initiative. *African Affairs*. (2000), 99, pp 73-95.

²⁵² G. Warigi, "East African Armies for Joint Military Exercises in Kenya" *The East African* March 16-22, 1998.

²⁵³ B-B. Ghali, *Unvanquished: A US-UN Saga* (New York: Random House, 1999)

humanitarian aid delivery. The "shoot to feed policy" in Somalia was also an action in a strange environment. The Americans went into Somalia with soldiers to permit the delivery of food and other relief supplies to the Somalis. The aim of the Operation Restore Hope (ORH) by the Americans was to ensure supplies reached the needy as the situation were of the many cases of stealing in the operation. In fact in Mogadishu, people jokingly said that humanitarian aid was the only booming business in Somalia.²⁵⁴ The mandate was neither to restore peace nor impose a political settlement "We are going to confiscate those weapons, but we are not going to go out and look for them."²⁵⁵ But disarming the factions was a prerequisite to the resumption of aid relief and differentiating between factions and the people who had taken up arms for self-defence was not always possible.

To curb the same problem of humanitarian supplies, the Security had to take action to ensure its mandate is fulfilled. The Security Council, on 3 December 1992 adopted resolution 794 (1992) 'authorising the Secretary General and Member States, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to use of all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operation in Somalia'²⁵⁶ This decision was important, as it took care of the suffering population in Somalia. However, this still proved difficult for the mission, as the conditions did not improve.

²⁵⁴ E. Micheletti, Operation Restore Hope' *Survival*, p.8

²⁵⁵ Colonel Fred Peck, a Task Force Spokesman in the issue of Somalia crisis.

²⁵⁶ Document 35, S/RES/794(1992), 3December 1992.

The experience in Somalia and particularly the bloody clash between the United Somali Congress/ Somali National Alliance militia and the US Army Rangers on 3 October 1993, in which 18 Army rangers were killed, was a major turning point for US policy towards involvement in the African conflicts.²⁵⁷ Many countries too, became reluctant to intervene in conflicts after the experience in Somalia. This was especially so where the dangers of becoming entangled in local conflicts are great. To the US, the sad experience was followed by a policy shift from humanitarian enforcement and assertive multilateralism to the curtailment of U.S. involvement in humanitarian intervention.

A feeling arose in America's policy makers towards the development of regional states and organisations to play a more active role in conflict resolution and supported in taking an upper hand. This also sparked off a new debate in the U.S. over its support for UN peacekeeping. The U.S. senate came up with Fiscal Year 1998 State Department Authorisation Bill, which required a policy of sub-contracting peacekeeping missions to regional organisations.²⁵⁸

However, the US does not seriously consider the vital factors for successful peacekeeping. To Omach,²⁵⁹ what is vital for successful peacekeeping is the political will on the part of the region's leadership, recognition of the need for collective action, and formalised institutional structures to support peacekeeping efforts. Peacekeeping in the region has its own obstacles. The greatest being the lack of a unitary actor or

²⁵⁷ P.Omach, 'UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s: The Case of Somalia' (MPhil thesis, University of Cambridge, 1996) pp.86-87 and J. L. Hirsch & R.B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. (Washington, D.C: USIP Press, 1995) pp124-129.

²⁵⁸ Project on Peacekeeping and the UN. 'ACRI: A Peacekeeping Alliance in Africa' (Washington, DC, August 1997).

institutionalised security structures within which peacekeeping operations can be carried out.

Limitations of the ACRI

The idea of having an intervention force to manage African conflicts has its own limitations. This poses serious practical limitations and inherent dangers to peacekeeping by states within the region concerned, or by regional and sub-regional organisations. States tend to participate in ACRI with the motive of enhancing the capacity of their military intervention in regional conflicts. Participation of states in the programme may not necessarily be for peacekeeping activities as envisaged by the US. Security assistance under the ACRI, which involves the shipping of arms and ammunition, can influence domestic political outcomes, thus contributing towards militarisation of disputes. Governments with military resources at hand also feel confident and are more inclined to use force than political means of resolving domestic conflicts.²⁶⁰

The ACRI ignores the idea of the interplay between domestic politics and foreign policy. Different countries have different foreign policies and must always protect their national interest. Various countries have their own domestic problems they must take care of. Uganda for instance has a number of internal conflicts, especially in the northern and western parts of the country where the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) were engaged in armed rebellion against the government. This political state turned Uganda to resort to military solutions, adopting a militarist

²⁵⁹ P.Omach, 'UN Peacekeeping in the 90s: The case of Somalia' (Mphil thesis, University of Cambridge, 1996) p.27 and J.L. Hirsch & R.B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 1995)

policy.²⁶¹ of resorting to military action whenever there is a dispute that can even be resolved without turning to military action.

In August 1990, the National Patriotic Front (NPF) of Liberia, led by Charles Taylor, was attacked. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) dispatched a peacekeeping force, the Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) to deal with the conflict in the country. It prevented the fighting from escalating, contributed towards improving the humanitarian situation,²⁶¹ paved the way to the establishment of a transition government and created an atmosphere of dialogue and the subsequent elections. Nigeria took the lead in the operation, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso supported Charles Taylor's NPFL.²⁶² The force in Liberia was almost a Nigerian affair.

Regional powers will seek to use peacekeeping operations to advance their own strategic interests. For instance Nigeria's involvement in the Liberian conflict, created a fear among the Francophone countries that Nigeria was using ECOMOG as a vehicle for the promotion of its national interests and exercising its hegemony in the region. Participation in ACRI will only be if it is in line with domestic politics of country and foreign policy goals. Response to the US proposal will only be on the assessment of the country's security needs and the extent to which alignment with the US through participation in the ACRI would advance their national interests.

²⁶⁰ P. Omach, "The African Crisis Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and Convergence of National Interests." *African Affairs*. (2000), 99, 73-95.

²⁶¹ Ibid

²⁶² C. Clapham, 'Africa and the International system: The Politics of State Survival. (Cambridge University Press, 1996) p. 124.

Initially, countries selected to participate in ACRI were those whose security interests converged with US national interests. Although the programme required that participating states must have forces that had demonstrated some professional military capabilities, like participation in peacekeeping, and must accept the supremacy of democratic civilian government, Uganda and Ethiopia were included. But their governments clearly, came into power through armed struggle and their systems of government were also a 'hybrid' of civilian and military regimes.²⁶³

The inclusion of Ethiopia and Uganda and Eritrea was based on the case that they were seen as the anchors of stability in the region. These countries constituted a few of the new breed of leaders expected to bring democratic change in the continent. They were the frontline states against Islamist regimes like Sudan which was considered an international threat to peace and so much a threat to the US national interests. In 1996, Washington even approved military aid worth US \$20 million to the three countries, all opponents to the Islamist regime in Sudan.²⁶⁴

The US should not take offence at the suggestion by the Africans that it is disengaging from Africa. The US provided airlift equipment and subcontracted services for ECOMOG operations in Liberia amounting to US \$80 million, a year of ACRI training budget is about \$20 million. International Teaching centre has established quite a number of defence department programmes with African participation. The military training and education is often much less than US humanitarian assistance.²⁶⁵

²⁶³ P.Omach, African Crisis Response Initiative. *African Affairs*. (2000) 99, 73-95.

²⁶⁴ "Arms Against a Sea of Troubles", *Africa Confidential* 7, 23 (1996) p.1

²⁶⁵ E. Berman & K.Sams. *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*. (Switzerland :Geneva, UNIDIR & Pretoria, S.A.:ISS 2000)

Hooks²⁶⁶ however sees these contributions made to the African security as an on-the-ground engagement. The US contributed over \$100 million to support ECOWAS/ECOMOG efforts to build peace in Sierra Leone and Liberia and appropriated \$8 million to the OAU and its crisis management centre. In 1999 it spent \$1,000,000 to support the peace promotion activities of the Joint Military Commission established under the Lusaka Peace Agreement in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It committed substantial equipment and nearly \$1,000,000 to support an OAU-led observer mission to help implement a peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Whenever UN peacekeepers are deployed anywhere in the world, or where international organisations perform their work, the US receives a return on its investment. It therefore makes sure that these goals are achieved through funding to these organisations. The budget projection for the Fiscal Year 2002 by the administration was \$844,139,000 for Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) and \$878,767,000 for Contributions for International Organisations (CIO)²⁶⁷ to enable the US pay in full annual US assessed contributions to some four dozen International Organisations funded through the appropriation. The funds are essential for meeting the US International obligations to a host of organisations that serve US interests, to maintaining the financial stability of the organisations and activities covered, and to

²⁶⁶ A. Hooks, 'Promoting Security in Africa. The US Contribution. A Paper Presented in a meeting series at the council entitled " American Policymakers in Africa" in Co-operation with the Council on Foreign Relations. Thursday, February 10, 2000. Council of Foreign Relations Headquarters. The Harold Pratt House 58 East, 68th street, New York.

²⁶⁷ Statement for the Record subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary committee on Appropriations. U.S. House of representatives, May 10, 2001. C. D Welch, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, US Department of State. "Welch, on FY 2002 Funding for UN Peacekeeping. <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/usandun/01051001.htm>

bolstering US influence and leadership in these organisations. It also critically reviews proposals for UN peacekeeping missions against a certain criteria; the value of the mission, clear definition of goals and mandate, prospects to success, likely duration and exit strategy. The U.S. only supports those missions that serve U.S. national interests,²⁶⁸ taking into account these criteria.

Despite efforts of the US, the UN and other allies to alleviate Africa's conflicts, many Africans continue to perceive a disparity between Western reactions to crises in Kosovo and East Timor and crises in Africa. Hook however, argues that there are limits to what the outside world can do for Africa. Albright asserted that "Africa simply creates more crises that the UN can handle at one time. Where Europe has one Kosovo, and Asia has one East Timor, Africa has many Sierra Leones."²⁶⁹

Powell made a clear elaboration of the U.S. policy interests;

" There should always be some American policy interest in the particular peacekeeping operation that we are voting for in the Security Council. I think it is incumbent on us when new operations come along to make a clear judgement as to whether or not our interests are being served, as well as the interests of the UN and the interests of the country that is having the difficulty that is in question. When we have decided that peacekeeping makes sense to circumstances there so that the operation makes sense and we go along with it and vote for it, then we have an obligation to support it financially or in other ways"²⁷⁰

To Mbeki, the idea of African solutions to African problems is a plan to avoid engagement required of the Security Council with regard to international peace and security. "We have been very unhappy about the response of the UN to challenges of peace and security on the African continent." He said that too often the attitude of them

²⁶⁸ Ibid

²⁶⁹ M. Albright, Secretary of State, Statement to the ACRI Foreign Ministers, Sept. 1999.

²⁷⁰ Secretary Collin Powell's statement in testimony in front of the senate CJS(Commerce, Justice, State)

Appropriations Committee in 'Welch on FY 2002 Funding for United Nations Peacekeeping

<http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/usandum/01051001.htm>

Security Council had been that " if problems occur in Africa, we will let the Africans solve them. But in many instances it is used to avoid the sort of engagement which is required of the Security Council with regard to international peace and security."²⁷¹

²⁷¹ Address by T. Mbeki in a News Conference in New York on the final day of the millennium summit of the UN. On 7th September 2000 to consider proposals to overhaul on peacekeeping machinery in African Recovery " reform Plans dominate Security Council Debate on Peacekeeping in Africa by Fleshman. vol.14. No.3 Oct.2000.p.11.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES IN THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA.

Introduction

This Chapter will first discuss the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda as presented by the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the Organization during this time. This will then lead into an understanding of the role of the United States in Rwanda during the crisis.

Genocide

Genocide is a crime of destroying or conspiring to destroy a group of people because of their ethnic, national, racial or religious identity.²⁷²

In 1994, some US officials at first claimed what was happening in Rwanda was not genocide. Alan Kuperman²⁷³ argued that president Clinton " could have known that a nationwide genocide was underway" until about two weeks into the killing. It is true, he says, that the precise nature and extent of the slaughter was obscured by the civil war, the withdrawal of US diplomatic sources, some confused press reporting, and the lies of the Rwandan government. Nonetheless, both the testimonies of the US officials who worked the issue day to day and declassify the documents indicated that plenty was known about the killers' intentions.

A determination of genocide turns not on the numbers killed, which is always difficult to ascertain at a time of crisis, but on the perpetrators' intent: Were Hutu forces

²⁷² Microsoft Encarta 97 Encyclopedia.

attempting to destroy Rwanda's Tutsi? It was clear from the plane crash that killed the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi that there were systematic killings of Tutsi. Dallaire's early cables to New York described the armed conflict that had resumed between rebels and government forces and also stated plainly that savage "ethnic cleansing" of Tutsi occurring, as will be discussed in this chapter. US analysts warned that mass killings would increase. In an April 11 memo prepared for Frank Wisner, the under secretary of defense for policy, in advance with Henry Kissinger, a key talking point was 'Unless both sides can be convinced to return to the peace process, a massive (hundreds of thousands of deaths) bloodbath will ensue.'²⁷⁴

Several reports from Rwanda were also severe enough to distinguish Hutu killers from ordinary combatants of civil war. This warranted US action like directing additional intelligence assets toward the region on April 26 an attributed intelligence memo titled 'Responsibility for Massacres in Rwanda' reported that the ringleaders of the genocide Col. Theoneste Bagosora and his crisis committee, were determined to liquidate their position and exterminate the Tutsi populace. Further, a May 9 Defense Intelligence Agency report stated plainly that the Rwandan violence was not spontaneous but was directed by the government, with lists of victims prepared well in advance. The DIA observed that an "organized parallel effort of *genocide* [was] being implemented by the army to destroy the leadership of the Tutsi community."²⁷⁵

The case of Rwanda was clear; it was genocide. Power states this clearly citing different reports from the press and different organisations during that time. The case a

²⁷³ A.Kuperman, Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 2000.

²⁷⁴ S. Power, "Bystanders to Genocide' *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 2001.

label of genocide was straightforward. According to May 18 confidential analysis prepared by the state Department's Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research. Tomy Gati; lists of Tutsi victims' names and addresses had reportedly been prepared; Rwandan government troops and Hutu militia and youth squads were the main perpetrators; massacres were reported all over the country; humanitarian agencies were now "claiming from 200,000 to 500,000 lives" lost. Gati offered the intelligence bureau's view; "We believe 500,000 may be an exaggerated estimate, but no accurate figures are available. Systematic killings began within hours of Habyarimana's death. Most of those killed have been Tutsi civilians, including women and children." The terms of the genocide convention had been met. "We weren't quibbling about these numbers, Gati said. "We can never know precise figures, but our analyst had been reporting huge numbers of deaths for weeks. "

In 1948 the United Nations general Assembly passed an act called the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This act provided a legal definition of genocide and established genocide as a crime in International Law. According to the Convention, any of the following action, when committed without the intent to eliminate a particular national, ethnic, racial or religious group, constitute genocide; killing members of a group, causing serious bodily harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to

²⁷⁵ S. Power, "Bystanders to Genocide' *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 2001.

kill, imposing measures intended to prevent birth within the group, and forcibly transferring children out of a group.²⁷⁶

Frank Chalk & Kurt Jonassohn²⁷⁷ identify four main types of genocide; Ideological which is mostly conducted in an effort to achieve an ideal social structure in which all members of society are alike or hold the same beliefs for example the Nazi holocaust; Retributive, undertaken to eliminate a real or potential threat. This occurs most likely when one group dominates another group and fears its rebellion or when the other group actually rebels, for example the attempted extermination of Tutsi by Hutu in 1994; Developmental genocide which is undertaken for economic gain for example in Paraguay in 1960's and the 1970's, and finally, Despotic genocide which is intended to spread terror among real or potential enemies e.g. the killings orchestrated by Uganda's presidents Idi Amin and Obote. The case of Rwanda was retributive genocide as the Hutu attempted to exterminate the Tutsi.

Conflict in Rwanda

The Banyarwanda, are East Africa's largest ethnic group, living in Rwanda, Zaire, Western Tanzania and South West Uganda. They are close relations of the Banyankole and Bakiga of Uganda, Barundi in Burundi and other neighboring groups. It embraces three sub-groups; the Hutu (84%), the Tutsi (24%) and the Twa (1%). Before going deeply into the events and activities that surrounded the genocide in Rwanda in 1994,

²⁷⁶ The 1948 International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Helen Fein contribution in the Encarta 97 Encyclopedia, 1997.

²⁷⁷ Encarta 97 Encyclopedia. Contribution by Helen Fein, with work from F Chalk and K Jonassohn, Canadian Scholars.

and the United Nations and United States role in the genocide, it is worthy to first appreciate the history of the people: the Rwandans.

From history²⁷⁸ the killing of civilians in large numbers for ethnic or political motive is not a new phenomenon in Rwanda. From history, Rwanda was one of the most organized states in Africa from the 17th Century until the monarchy was overthrown in a revolution in 1959. The society was stratified into castes, with the Tutsi mainly being the royal family, nobles and cattle keepers, and the Hutu basically growing crops and the Twas, hunters and potters. The Tutsi was the dominant group, and made up the upper caste and exercised total control of over the Hutu. In fact, early European travelers noted the Tutsi's firm belief in their own intelligence and superiority and the Hutu's lack of self-esteem.

The Tutsi thus maintained this dominance through a feudal system based on cattle, while the Hutu were the serfs, giving labour to the Tutsi "patron" and in return received cows and protection. They therefore maintained this clientage relationship. This relationship was an oppressive burden for the Hutu and weighed heavily on poor Tutsi. But for many Tutsi it was an advantageous means of social advancement, as there were several categories of Tutsi, also linked by clientage, whose status depended on how closely they were related to the king. These Tutsi clients gave cattle and acted as pages, escorts or counselors to their masters. Although King Mutara Rudahingwa banned the formation of new client-patron ties in 1954, this still burned in the minds of the Banyarwanda. The Hutu used it to justify the expulsion of the Tutsi from Rwanda. The

²⁷⁸ C. Watson, 'The US Committee for Refugees'.. *Exile from Rwanda: Background to an Invasion Issue Paper*. February 1991.

coming of the Belgians in 1919 brought social changes. The Belgians deepened ethnic division, producing much of the bitterness throughout the years. They advanced the Tutsi at the expense of the Hutu for forty years.

A major change in power structure took place in this Hutu "social revolution" ending Tutsi domination of the country's political and economic structure, leading to the country's independence in 1962. The Belgians, who previously supported the Tutsi, abruptly switched their support in education and job opportunities to the Hutu and this created structural conflict between the two groups. They sharpened class differences by reclassifying all Rwandese with less than 10 cows as Hutu and those with more as Tutsi. Life became unbearable for the exploited Hutu and poor Tutsi leading to hundreds of thousands migrating to Uganda and the neighboring countries from the 1990's on. During the following decades, Rwanda has repeatedly been the scene of mass killings and the exodus of large numbers of Tutsis to then neighboring Burundi, Zaire, Uganda and Tanzania. There have also been repeated attempts by the Tutsi refugees to come back to power.

In 1959, the *Union National Rwandaise* (UNAR) was formed, as events began to run out of control, after the Hutu challenged the Belgian sanctioned Tutsi supremacy, criticizing the social, economic and political monopoly of the Tutsi in 1957. The UNAR included some Hutu, but was militarily pro-Tutsi and anti-Belgian. The all-Hutu *Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu* (PARMEHUTU) was formed to counter the UNAR in October. After the launch of PARMEHUTU, in November 1st, UNAR activists attacked a Hutu sub-chief, a key figure in PARMEHUTU. In revenge, the Hutu attacked a Tutsi belonging to the UNAR. There followed violence across country between the

Hutu and the Tutsi, with the Belgians doing little to contain it. When they finally acted, they arrested 919 Tutsi and only 32 Hutu. By April 1960, about 22,000 Tutsi were displaced.

Following the July elections 1960, amid more violence, the PARMEHUTU won and out of the 229 newly created administrative units, 210 were headed by the Hutu burgomasters, who used their positions to persecute the Tutsi. The PARMEHUTU then abolished the monarchy and declared Rwanda a republic on 28 January 1961. However, there were still attacks on the Tutsi even after independence. About 120,000 had again fled out of Rwanda to other countries by 1963.

In 1961, UNAR militants among the refugees organized themselves into guerilla bands and attacked from Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire, targeting Hutu officials. The Hutu in return lashed out at the Tutsi, killing most of them. In October 1990, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded the country from Uganda with a force of some 7,000 fighters, most of them of Tutsi refugees and former members of the Ugandan Armed Forces. Following this incursion by the RPF, hundreds of thousands were displaced. The government of Rwanda was prompted to undertake a significant build-up of its military forces, which prior to 1990 had numbered 5,000, and expanded to 30,000 during 1992.²⁷⁹ As a result of the attacks, and pressure from the Organization of African Unity, governments of the region and international community, the government of Rwanda began talks in late October 1990 with the RPF on settling the refugee problem. They also agreed on the inclusion of RPF representatives in direct talks on a cease-fire.

²⁷⁹ UN, *The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996* (New York: United Nations Publications, 1996) p.12.

There were, however, no cease-fire agreements signed in attempts to end the hostilities in July 1992, October and January 1993 to put an end to the armed conflict. A peace accord to formally end the conflict was signed by the Rwandan government and the RPF on 4th August in Arusha, Tanzania, leading to a call for a peacekeeping force to assist in the implementation of the peace agreement.

The Arusha Peace Agreement.

The Arusha Peace Agreement culminated from a number of peace talks. These talks began in late October 1990, as a result of the RPF invasion and pressure from the OAU, leading the governments in the region and the international community, the government of Rwanda began new talks in late October with the RPF on settling the refugee problem. The Un played a role in efforts to bring a negotiated peace to the region.

The negotiations for peace started on 17 October 1990, two weeks after the RPF invasion, with President of Rwanda and Uganda meeting in Mwanza, Tanzania, under the auspices of Belgians and Tanzanian mediators. The talks were to address the issue of refugees and the inclusion of RPF representatives in direct talks on a cease-fire. A ceasefire agreement was reached between Rwandese Government and the RPF following diplomatic intervention of Belgium in Gbadolite on 26 October 1990. Continued ceasefire violations led to more talks in Goma Zaire, with an agreement on the establishment of an OAU force of 50 observers to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire under the supervision of the OAU Secretary General; a force that was never deployed.

On 19 Feb 1991, the talk agreed in Mwanza in October 1990 were held in Dar es Salaam, leading to the signing of the Dar es Salaam Declaration. This committed the

government of Rwanda to offering Rwanda refugees a choice between returning to Rwanda, remaining in their host country while also retaining Rwandan nationality, or becoming nationals of their host country. It also called upon the two sides to arrange for a ceasefire to be supervised by the OAU and initiate political dialogue aimed at achieving a peaceful, long-term solution to the conflict.

A more comprehensive cease-fire agreement was successfully concluded on 29 March 1991 in N'sele, Zaire. However there were repeated cease-fire violations that led to the amendment of that agreement, on 16 September in Gbadolite OAU summit and again on 12 July 1992 in Arusha. Peace negotiations began in Arusha on 10 August 1992 but the final agreement was not signed until 1993.

On 4 August 1993 the government of Rwanda and The RPF signed the Arusha Peace Agreement. The agreement provided for a broad role for the United Nations through what it termed as the Neutral International Force (NIF), in supervision and implementation of the Accords during a transitional period, which was to last 22 months. The Government of Rwanda and the RPF had previously requested the establishment of such a force. The "letter dated June 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting a joint request by the government of Rwanda and the RPF concerning the stationing of a neutral international force in Rwanda."²⁸⁰

According to the Agreement the NIF was to assist in the implementation of the peace agreement, especially through the supervision of the protocol on the integration of

²⁸⁰ Document 16. S/25951, 15 June 1993.

armed forces of the two parties. The tasks of the force were: to guarantee the overall security of the country and verify the maintenance of law and order, ensure the security of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to assist in catering of the security of civilians. It was also to assist in tracking arms caches and in neutralization of armed gangs throughout the country, undertake mine clearance operations, assist in the recovery of all weapons distributed to or illegally acquired by civilians, and monitor observance of the cessation of hostilities.

The Arusha Peace Agreement's timetable for establishing transitional institutions by 10 September 1993 was however based on the realistic assumption that the neutral international force could be deployed in little more than a month and that, with the arrival of that force, French troops, which had been stationed in Rwanda would be withdrawn. The decision to deploy a UN force rested with the Security Council and the deployment could take up to three months. But given their serious concerns that any inordinate delay in establishing the transitional government might endanger the peace process, the parties had nonetheless decided to adopt the accelerated timetable. It however, proved impossible to establish the transitional institutions by 10 September 1993 as stipulated by the Arusha Agreements. The Security Council view in of this, issued a presidential statement taking note of the importance that had been attached by the Rwandan parties to 10 September as the date for establishment of the transitional institutions and urging the government of Rwanda and the RPF to continue to honour the Arusha Agreement.²⁸¹ The UN member states also shared the concern of the Rwandan Parties that a delay in establishing the transitional institution could jeopardize the peace process. The Secretary

general emphasized that the parties had to make an effort to respect the ceasefire because it would be even more difficult to get troops if fighting were to resume.²⁸²

The role of the United Nations in the Rwanda crisis: before and during the genocide.

Approximately 800,000 people were killed during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The systematic slaughter of men, women and children which took place over the course of about 100 days between April and July 1994, was one of the most abhorrent events of the 20th century. Rwandans killed Rwandans, brutally decimating the Tutsi population of the country, but also targeting moderate Hutus. Militia and armed forces committed atrocities, but also by civilians against other civilians.²⁸³

The brutal killings and other violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that occurred, and the sheer scale and speed of exodus of the people from the areas of conflict, created a crisis of unprecedented proportions that taxed the expertise and resources of the UN system.²⁸⁴

The most important aspect of UN involvement in Rwanda was the establishment of a peacekeeping operation: the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) for a six-month period. This was established in October 5th after the SC adopted resolution 872 (1993), as a response to the Secretary General's proposal of September 24th 1993 (S/26488) with a peacekeeping force of 2,548 military personnel, including two

²⁸¹ Document 22. S/26425, 10 September 1993.

²⁸² Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.

²⁸³ Report of the Independent Inquiry into the action of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. 15th December 1999. http://www.org/news/ossgrwanda_report.htm Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council in a letter dated 18 March 1999 informing the SC of his intention to appoint an independent Inquiry into the Aition of the UN during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. S/1994/339.

²⁸⁴ United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996* (New York: UN Publications, 1996) p.3.

infantry battalions. The SC however, only authorized the deployment of one infantry battalion. The resolution approved the secretary General's proposal for the integration of UN observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) into UNAMIR.²⁸⁵

The UNAMIR was originally established to help implement the Arusha Peace Agreement, signed by the Rwandese Parties on 4th August 1993. It was mandated to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali, monitor the cease-fire agreement and the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate leading up to the elections. It was also assigned to assist with mine clearance and the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations, and to investigate and report on the incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmes and police.²⁸⁶

The work of the UN before and during the genocide in Rwanda was however characterized by failure. According to the major findings of the Carlsson Report,

"The failure of the United Nations to prevent and subsequently, to stop the genocide in Rwanda was a failure by the United Nations system as a whole. There was a persistent lack political will by the Member States to act with enough assertiveness...The United Nations failed the people of Rwanda... The overriding failure can be summarized as a lack of resources and lack of will to take on the commitment which would have been necessary to prevent or to stop the genocide...the fundamental capacity problems of UNAMIR led to the terrible and humiliating situation of a UN Peacekeeping force almost paralyzing the force of the worst brutality in human kind was seen in centuries."²⁸⁷

The persistent lack of political will by Member States to act, or to act assertively enough, affected the secretariat's response, the Security Council's decision making and

²⁸⁵ Doc. 24. S/RES/872, 5 October 1993.

²⁸⁶ UN, United Nations Peacekeeping, 50 Years. 1948-1998(New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1998) p.32.

the difficulties in getting troops for the UNAMIR. In addition, although resources were chronically short, serious mistakes were made in using the resources that were available.²⁸⁸

The signal for a prepared massacre

In April, May and June 1994 between 500,000 and a million people died either in massacres or as a result of disease, starvation and exhaustion in refugee camps. Although the war was internal, it had strong overtones of foreign interference. After a series of clashes involving several massacres between rival Tusti and Hutu groups, and after an invasion of Rwanda by exiled Tutsi from Uganda., who formed the RPF in 1990, the UN and OAU had brokered a peace agreements in 1993 at Arusha, Tanzania, in an attempt to introduce democracy and power sharing. The Arusha Accords were however, never accepted by the Hutu extremists party.

Efforts by the UN and the international community to end the Rwanda conflict and to establish a peacekeeping role have since been met with criticism. The mysterious shooting down of President Habyarimana's plane on April 1994, was signal enough for a prepared massacre of Tusti and moderate Hutus by the Hutu extremists. As Furley asserts.²⁸⁹ It had been planned since 1990. There was a prepared list of leaders to be killed, who were deliberately sought out and eliminated. Since 1991 young Hutus had flocked to join the Interaahamwe, 'those who act together'. They were trained in two

²⁸⁷ Press Release, SC/6843. 14th April 2000. "Chairman of Independent Inquiry into United Nations Actions During 1994 Rwanda Genocide Presents Report to Security Council."

²⁸⁸ Press Release, Ibid.

²⁸⁹ For a good general account see R. Lamarchand, 'Genocide in the Great Lakes: Whose Genocide?', Paper presented at the Conference on *Peace and Human Rights in the Great Lakes of Africa*, Makerere University, December 1997. He asserts that the Tutsi RPF was also guilty of genocide during the invasion of Rwanda.

camps and given weapons by the ministry of Defence, and were worked up into a frenzy of hatred from the Tutsis. Radio broadcasts especially by private stations, poured forth propaganda saying RPF were coming to steal Hutu farms, all Tutsi's must be exterminated once and for all.²⁹⁰

The enormity of the conflict and the information concerning it in Rwanda was more than sufficient to demand a determined response by the UN. This is because there were adequate early warning signs of a pending genocide. In his report, Carlsson concludes that the UNAMIR presented a series of deeply worrying reports, which together amounted to considerable warnings that the situation in Rwanda could explode into ethnic violence. In sum, information was available, to UNAMIR, the UN Headquarters and to key governments, about a strategy and threat to exterminate Tutsi, recurrent ethnic and political killings of an organized nature, death lists, persistent reports of the import and distribution of weapons to the population, and hate propaganda. That more was not done to follow up on this information and respond to it at an early stage was a costly failure by the UN headquarters and UNAMIR, but also by the governments which were kept informed by UNAMIR, in particular those of Belgium, France and the United States. The lack of determined action to deal with the Dallaire cable as will be discussed later in this Chapter was only part of this wider range of failed response to the events that took place in Rwanda which were downplayed. If the important information had been taken seriously and acted on immediately, the genocide would have been

²⁹⁰ For a good general account see R. Lamarchand, 'Genocide in the Great Lakes: Whose Genocide?', Paper presented at the Conference on *Peace and Human Rights in the Great Lakes of Africa*, Makerere University, December 1997. He asserts that the Tutsi RPF was also guilty of genocide during the invasion of Rwanda.

stopped even before the conflict worsened. The headquarters expressed so much reluctance to act in Rwanda, as is discussed later in this chapter.²⁹¹ The UN was accused of not adequately responding to an advance warning of the genocide. Authorities depicted the US and other world powers as mainly responsible for the UN's inaction.

On the 22 October 1993 General Dallaire, appointed Force Commander of the New Mission to Rwanda, arrived in Kigali. He was joined later by an advance party of 21 military personnel on 27 October 1993. The Secretary General then appointed Jacques-Roger Booh Booh as his Special Representative in Rwanda. He arrived in Kigali on 23rd November 1993.

On 11 January 1994, Dallaire sent the military adviser to the Secretary General, Major General Maurice Baril, a telegram entitled "Request for protection of informant". This "genocide fax" reported in startling detail the preparations that were then underway to carry out precisely an extermination campaign. Dallaire's warnings to New York of Hutu plans to provoke a civil war and to force the withdrawal of most of the UN peacekeeping force were based on information given to him by a former member of the Habyarimana staff.²⁹² This informant was in the meantime paid to train Hutu *Interahamwe* (militias) to slaughter the Tutsi. The fax labeled 'most Immediate', cited the informant's calculations that a Hutu death squad would be able to kill 1,000 Tutsi in 20 minutes. The same informant was also offering to help the UN peacekeepers to stage raids on the *Interahamwe* arms dumps in exchange for protection for himself and his

²⁹¹ For a good general account see R. Lamarchand, 'Genocide in the Great Lakes: Whose Genocide?', Paper presented at the Conference on *Peace and Human Rights in the Great Lakes of Africa*, Makerere University, December 1997. He asserts that the Tutsi RPF was also guilty of genocide during the invasion of Rwanda.

family. General Dallaire urged his overseers in New York, including the under-Secretary General Koffi Annan, Assistant Secretary General Iqbal Riza and Mr. Hedi Annabi, who was the Head of the African Section in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to arrange for the evacuation of the informant from Rwanda. The request was however denied in a faxed reply to Dallaire from the office of the Secretary General.

Peacekeeping officials at the UN Headquarters had ordered their commander not to carry out pre-emptive raids on Hutu controlled arms dumps. Such actions, they said, would violate the rules of engagement set by the Security Council. Dallaire was also instructed to share his information about a planned anti-Tutsi extermination with Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana. French, Belgian and US ambassadors in Rwanda.²⁹³ All this information was stated clearly. The first related to the strategy to provoke the killing of Belgian soldiers and the Belgian battalion's withdrawal. The informant had been in charge of demonstrations a few days earlier, with the aim of targeting opposition deputies and Belgian soldiers. The *Interahamwe* hoped to provoke the RPF battalion into firing at the demonstrators and assassinate the deputies. They also planned to provoke the Belgian troops and if the Belgian soldiers used force, a number of them were to be killed. This would guarantee the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent from Rwanda.

Secondly, the informant reported of the *Interahamwe*, who had trained 1,700 men in the camps of the Rwanda Government Forces (RGF), and scattered in groups of 40 throughout Kigali. He had been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali, which he

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Ibid. p.7.

suspected, was for their extermination. Its personnel were able to kill up to 1,000 Tutsi in twenty minutes. Thirdly, the informant had told of major weapons cache with at least 135 weapons (G3 and AK 47). He was prepared to show UNAMIR the location if his family was given protection.²⁹⁴ The response from the headquarters in New York did not indicate quick and immediate action. The cable considered the information a course of concern but indicated it had certain inconsistencies. It finally ended "No reconnaissance of action, including response to request for protection, should be taken by UNAMIR until clear guidance is received from the Headquarters."²⁹⁵ No action was therefore taken after this alarming information from the informant.

On 4th August 1993, following years of negotiations, the government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) signed the Arusha Peace Agreement. A week after signing the agreement, Ndiaye,²⁹⁶ reported of massacres and a plethora of other serious human rights violations taking place, targeting the Tutsi. He invoked the genocide convention, wondering whether the term was applicable. The cases of inter-communal violence brought to his attention, he said, indicated very clearly that the victims of the attacks, the Tutsi, in the overwhelming majority of cases were targeted solely because of their membership of a certain ethnic group and for other objective reason. The key actors within the system ignored the report.²⁹⁷

Although the Arusha agreement included a call for a peacekeeping force to help ensure its implementation, the UN Secretary General made it clear that the SC members

²⁹⁴ Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the UN During the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. http://www.un.org/news/ossgrwanda_report.htm.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ W.B.Ndiaye was then special rapporteur of the commission of human rights.

would not fund an operation they did not command or control.²⁹⁸ This decision was made as a result of US influence in the Security Council's initiatives.

There was increased tension, widespread killings and distribution of arms and increased activities of militia throughout the early months of 1994. There were violent demonstrations on 2nd February. There were also grenade attacks, assassination attempts, political and ethnic killings and the armed militias were also stockpiling and preparing to distribute arms to their supporters. Booh Booh reported to the Under Secretary General, Annan and Jonah, who was then the Under-Secretary-General for political affairs on the same Day. He cautioned of the arms distribution, because it would worsen the security situation even further and create a significant danger to the safety and security of the UN military and civilian personnel and the population at large. At the same time the RGF was preparing for conflict stockpiling ammunition and attempting to reinforce positions in Kigali.

Focusing on the situation, the Belgian foreign minister, Mr. Willie Claes, on 14 February 1994 wrote a letter to the Secretary General arguing in favour of a stronger mandate for UNAMIR. The proposal was not given serious attention within the secretariat or among interested countries.

Tensions rose in Kigali and the rest of Rwanda after Gatabazi the Minister of Public Works and the Secretary General of the *Parti Social Democrat* (PSD) and Mr. Buchyana, the president of the *Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique* (CDR) were killed on 21st and 22nd February. On 23rd February, he expressed concern regarding

²⁹⁷ Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the UN in the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.

²⁹⁸ Ninyetegeka Kato, First Secretary, Rwanda Embassy, in an interview June 2001, Rwanda Embassy.

weapons distribution, death squad lists, planning of civil unrest and demonstrations. Dallaire emphasized the urgency of the operation stating that the increase in terrorist actions combined with the serious decrease in gendarmarie and UNAMIR reaction capability could lead to an end to the peace process.

On March 1, focusing on the blockage of the political process, the Secretary General threatened withdrawal of the UNAMIR unless progress was achieved. This followed a report by the Secretary General special adviser information to the SC of the inability of the political parties to agree on the establishment of transitional institutions. Cretina climate of tension and a deterioration of Rwanda's economic situation. Efforts to establish a transitional institutions were set back yet again as a result of a sudden outbreak of violence in Kigali and other regions of the country beginning on 21 February 1994.²⁹⁹ He emphasized the competing priorities of the UN and promised withdrawal of UNAMIR within 15 days unless progress was forthcoming. What followed was a report from the Secretary General on UNAMIR to the Security Council on 30th March. The report described the political stalemate, the deterioration of the security situation and the humanitarian situation in Rwanda. In view of this, the Secretary General recommended the extension of UNAMIR's mandate by six months, despite the reluctance of the key members of the SC to accept such a long mandate extension. On 1st April, a decision was taken in resolution 909 (1994), 'Security Council resolution regretting the delay in implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement and extending UNAMIR'S mandate until 29

²⁹⁹ Document 35. Second Progress report of the Secretary general on UNAMIR for the period from 30 December 1993 to 30 March 1994, requesting an extension of its mandate for a period of six months. S/1994/360, 30 March 1994.

July 1994.³⁰⁰ That extended the mandate by slightly less than four months. The SC continuously supported the mission. It even accepted the proposal by the Secretary General to increase the number of civilian police, contingent on the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

The worsening of the crisis in Rwanda

On 6th April 1994, President Habyarimana of Rwanda and Ntaryamira of Burundi flew back from a sub-regional summit under the auspices of the facilitator of the Arusha Peace Process, Tanzania's president Ali Hassan Mwinyi. President Habyarimana had committed himself to the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. On the same day, at 8.30 p.m.³⁰¹ there was a loud explosion at camp Kanombe from the presidential aircraft. The plane was shot down before landing in Kigali, crashed and killed everyone on board. This happened just a day after the SC extended UNAMIR's mandate and called for the second time for the Rwandan parties to put in place a transitional government. Since both presidents were Hutu, the Death's made the Hutu leaders declare the Tutsis to be the assassins and therefore launched a campaign to slaughter the Tutsi population.³⁰²

The deaths of the two presidents provoked the youth of Hutu militia to go to the streets. Armed with machetes, clubs and sharp homemade weapons, they roamed through Kigali, killing, looting and setting buildings ablaze.³⁰³ So many people sought safety in UN quarters. Later, warfare broke-out in the urban center as the Tutsi fighters RPF rushed out to protect their supporters.

³⁰⁰ S/RES/909(1994), 5 April 1994.

³⁰¹ Report on the Inquiry on the UN actions in the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.

³⁰² B.B. Ghali Unvanquished AN US-UN Saga. (New York: Random House, 1999)

³⁰³ Ibid.

In the early morning of 7th April, the government controlled Radio station; *Radio Television Libre Des Mille Collines* (RTLMC) aired broadcasts attributing responsibility for the plane crash to the RPF and a contingent of the UN soldiers.³⁰⁴ There were inflammatory broadcasts such as incitements to eliminate the "Tutsi Cockroach". Later in the day the Prime Minister, Uwilingiyimana and ten Belgian peacekeepers assigned to protect her were brutally murdered by RGA soldiers in an attack. Leaders of three opposition parties - *Parti Social Democrate*, the *Parti Democrate Cretien* and the *Parti Liberal*, were also assassinated. The Secretary General condemned these acts of violence and the despicable attacks on the members of the UNAMIR.³⁰⁵ These killings provoked civil war, which had stopped with the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

The UNAMIR tries to prevent the killings and to contain the conflict, but it could not end the violence. The mission did not possess the mandate or even the force to coerce the two sides into ending the violence. UNAMIR had been established as a peacekeeping force under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter and therefore lacked the enforcement powers of Chapter VII operations. The fighting made it impossible for the mission to carry out what it was mandated to. As laid out by the UN³⁰⁶ Peacekeeping operations are authorized to be deployed by the Security Council with the consent of the host government and usually of other parties involved. They may include military and police personnel together with civilian staff. Operations may involve observer missions, peacekeeping forces, or a combination of both. The military observer missions are made

³⁰⁴ Report of the UN Human Rights Commissioner for Human Rights on his mission to Rwanda of 11-12 May 1994.

³⁰⁵ UN, *The UN and Rwanda, 1993-1996*. (New York: UN Publications, 1996) p.38.

up of unarmed officers, typically to monitor an agreement or cease fire. Although soldiers of PK forces have weapons, in most situations they can use them only in self-defence, for example in case of threats to their own security.

Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the SC is allowed to take enforcement to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such actions range from economic sanctions to military sanctions. The council can therefore resort to economic and embargoes as an enforcement tool when peace is threatened and diplomatic efforts have failed for example in Liberia and Somalia or even Rwanda. Stronger action by member states may be authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter when peacemaking efforts fail. The council here authorizes coalitions of member states to use 'all necessary means', including military actions to deal with a conflict. Rwanda, this was done to permit Humanitarian relief operations.

Despite warning signs for the apocalypse, as discussed earlier, that was unleashed after April 6, not much was done by the UN. Claes, then Belgian Foreign Minister, in February described the political situation as 'five minutes past midnight'. He referred to the dangerous situation that was about to explode. The international community was accused of appearing totally unprepared despite the warnings and the SC of being unable to deal with the situation in Rwanda.

The power of the government in the events that went on at the time seemed more than that of the UN. In the early morning of 7 April 1994, the number of guards at the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana's home was increased and a group of Belgian

³⁰⁶ United Nations, Basic Facts about the United Nations (New York: Department of Public Information, 1998)p.71

soldiers dispatched from the airport to her residence. At 6.55 a.m Lieutenant Lotin informed his contingent that about twenty Rwandan soldiers who were armed with guns and grenades surrounded him. Members of the presidential guard demanded the Belgians to lay down their arms. Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana who sought refuge in the UN Volunteers compound in Kigali was shot in the evening. The RGF soldiers set up roadblocks, which heckled up the personnel who were sent by general Dallaire to protect her. The UN could not use force to break through because it had no mandated rules of engagement³⁰⁷ that prescribed the actions for it to take. There was no rule specifically allowing the mission to act and even to use of force in response to the crimes against humanity and other abuses. There followed a confrontation between Belgian peacekeepers and the Rwandan soldiers outside the Prime Minister's house, where ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed.

Dallaire revealed clearly that there was no military option to intervene and rescue the Belgians who were badly beaten and later brutally killed at camp Kigali. He informed the Belgian senate commission that an armed operation to rescue the Belgians was not feasible. He cited the high risk of casualties to those who would intervene and the high potential for the failure of the operation. He further described the shortcomings and the lack of resources of UNAMIR. He did not believe he had forces capable of conducting an intervention in favour of the Belgians. He stated that the UNAMIR was a peacekeeping operation and was not equipped, trained or staffed to conduct intervention operations.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁷ B.B. Ghali *Unvanquished. An US-UN Saga*. (New York: Random House, 1999).

³⁰⁸ Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the UN in the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.

Disorder continued to spread over the days that followed after the crash. These provoked Belgium, France, Italy and the United States to mount national evacuation operations that aimed at evacuating expatriates. The first three French aircraft's arrived on the early morning of 8th April, in order to carry out the evacuation exercise. Following this, on 9th April, a cable from Annan requested Dallaire to co-operate with both the French and Belgian commanders to facilitate the evacuation of their nationals and other nationals who requested evacuation. He was ordered not to compromise his impartiality or act beyond the set mandate but exercise discretion to do only what was essential for the evacuation of the foreign nationals. The commander could not also extend to participating in possible combat except in self-defense.

On 12th April in Bonn, Germany, the Secretary-General met with the foreign minister of Belgium, Mr. Claes. Claes put his message across to the UN clearly. He described well the unmet requirements to pursue a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. He expressed concern on the Arusha Peace Plan, which was dead, and the lack of the means for dialogue between parties to the conflict. Consequently, he asserted that the UN should suspend UNAMIR. At the time, the Ghanaian contingent had fled leaving UNAMIR with only 1,500 troops. Claes saw the withdrawal as risky and could exacerbate the risk of an all out war. But the mission had however been unable to stop the killings and 20,000 had died, despite the presence of UNAMIR. Belgium preferred the withdrawal to be a collective action of UNAMIR, but not of one contingent. He also stated that Belgium would be prepared to leave its weapons and equipment behind if UNAMIR were to stay.

The Secretary general in a letter addressed to the SC on 13th April 1999 expressed the extreme difficulty for UNAMIR carrying out its tasks effectively after withdrawal. He also expressed concern about the potential of the UNAMIR mandate becoming untenable unless the Belgian contingent was replaced by an equally well-equipped contingent or unless it reconsidered its decision.

The work of the UNAMIR was however let to continue, with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations providing two draft options. These were sent to UNAMIR for comments and to the Secretary general for approval on 13th April. 1994 The first option required that the UNAMIR be kept but without the Belgian contingent for a period of three weeks. This however had several conditions. It required that there be an effective cease-fire in existence, and that each side accept the responsibility for law and order and the security of civilians under their control. It also required that Kigali airport is made a neutral territory and finally, that UNAMIR concentrates in the airport. Worse still, it threatened the withdrawal of UNAMIR if the agreement was not secure by 6th May. The second option required the immediate reduction of UNAMIR and maintenance of only a small political presence of the Special representative, advisors, some military observers and a company of troops. The US initially accepted that a withdrawal of the mission be made. In the view of the US, there was no useful role for a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda under the circumstances that prevailed. It however indicated after further consultations, its support for the second options together with the United Kingdom and Russia.

On 21st April 1999, The Security Council voted unanimously to reduce UNAMIR to about 270 and to change the mission mandate. This was a result of the council's

disappointment at the large-scale violence that ensued, which resulted in the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children. This decision was however reversed with the recommendation of the Secretary General by the end of April. The situation in Kigali and other parts had deteriorated further. The capital city was effectively divided into sectors controlled by RGF and RPF, with frequent exchanges of artillery and mortar fire between the two sides. UNAMIR reported evidence of preparations for further massacres of civilians in the city, while massacres continued on a large scale in the countryside, especially in the south.³⁰⁹

The Secretary General's letter to the Security Council of 29th April provided an important shift in the emphasis on the actions of the mission. It viewed the role of the UN as that of a neutral mediator in a civil war to recognizing the need to bring to an end the massacres against civilians. In a draft of operations for future UNAMIR mandated which was outlined in a cable from Booh Booh on 6 May explained the situation of the civilian population and the need of empowering UNAMIR:

"The civil war has intensified and spread throughout the country and massacres of innocent civilians appear to be continuing, especially in the countryside. The steadily worsening situation raises serious questions about the effectiveness and viability of UNAMIR's revised mandate, UNAMIR neither has the power nor the resources to take effective action to end the large killings of civilians and to help establish a reasonably secure environment, essential conditions for the resumption of dialogue which would facilitate efforts to conclude a ceasefire agreement and to put the ceasefire."

This capability from UNAMIR clearly demonstrated that UNAMIR should first and foremost have been enabled to stop the killings and secondly continue the efforts to

³⁰⁹ UN, United Nations Peacekeeping. UN Information Noted. 1995.

reach a ceasefire. The UNAMIR under resolution 912 (1994) did not have the power to take effective action to halt the massacres. More action was needed to bring down the activities in the country. The council was then asked to reconsider its previous decisions and to consider what action to take, including forceful action, or could authorize member states to take to restore law and order. This development led to the establishment of UNAMIR under resolution 918 (1994) on 17th May 1994. This included a decision to increase the number of troops in UNAMIR and imposition of an arms embargo on Rwanda.

The council authorized a five-battalion strong force, which required contributions from member states. A few African countries were willing to contribute, but only if they received financial and logistical assistance. Nigeria and Ghana said their resources were already stretched with the intervention in Liberia. Zimbabwe and Botswana promised to assist but only if a western power led the peacekeeping force. Kenya and Tanzania were loath to interfere, and Uganda was a supporter of the Tutsi RPF guerrilla force.³¹⁰ There was commitment by the broader membership of the UN and no political will to provide the necessary troops that would permit the UN to stop the killing. Over two months after the resolution 918 was adopted, the mission still had only 550 troops, which was only a tenth of its authorized strength.

In following up resolution 918, the Secretary General sent a special mission on 22 and 27 May to Rwanda. The mission later reported to the Secretary General giving a vivid description of the horrors of the week since the beginning of the genocide. It clearly

³¹⁰ O.Furley, 'Rwanda and Burundi: Peacekeeping amidst massacres. In O.Furley and R.May, *Peacekeeping in Africa* (USA: Ashgate Publishing Co. USA. 1998) pp.239-261.

referred to a 'Frenzy of massacres' and an estimate of those systematically killed at between 250,000 and 500,000. It also brought to light the information, which had been available to the secretariat regarding developments in Rwanda leading to the genocide. The UNAMIR was aware and took note of the inflammatory broadcasts by *Radio Mille Collines* and suspicious movements by armed groups and cautioned the provisional government. It also had evidence of the arms traffic into the country and protested to the government and communicated to the diplomatic community. The report also made bitter observations regarding the delay of the international community to act on the genocide.

On 8th June, the SC adopted resolution 925 (1994). The UNAMIR was deployed under its expanded mandate and the mission extended until 9th December 1994. It also urged the member states to respond promptly the Secretary General's request for resources, which included logistical support capability for rapid deployment of additional forces.

The Role of the United States

In trying to understand the role of the United States played in Rwandan crisis it is of importance to look at US interests globally. There is still confusion as to how ethnic conflicts in Africa bear on US interests abroad. It is difficult to generalize about ethnic conflict and US interests given the range of situations around the world. A first step is to understand the kind of threats ethnic conflicts pose to vital US interests, that is the protection of American lives and territory, the security of core democratic allies, the health of the global economy and the overall stability of the international system.³¹¹ The conflict in Rwanda did not seem to pose a great threat to the US interests and especially

the desire for the protection of international peace and security.³¹² Historically, ethnic conflicts have not threatened the first three of these needs, but the overall stability of the international system.³¹³ Callahan sees US policy toward Rwanda in the early 1990's as being characterized by moderate attentiveness. For instance, it reduced aid to Rwanda in March 1993 after the government was implicated of human rights abuses, its involvement in peace negotiations in 1993 to address Rwandans deep political divisions and active role in the Arusha peace process to end Rwanda's war.³¹⁴ Cohen believed there was a potential for a wider US role across the continent and assured

"US involvement in conflict resolution is considered desirable most Africans, and the US is seen as impartial. American technical assistance is highly prized. Our involvement reassures the parties and the presence of the only remaining superpower seems to serve as a moral guarantee that agreements will be implemented."³¹⁵

By the end of March 1994, the peace process was threatened by the killings going on. But signs of the stalemate drew from January 1994 when UNAMIR raised concerns about a report of a plot formulated by Hutu militia aligned with the *Mouvement Republicain pour la Democratie et le Developpement* (MRND), known as the *interahamwe*, to kill large numbers of Tutsi in Kigali. The violence then increased in February 1994, setting back the efforts to establish transitional institutions. There were political killings, two prominent political leaders were murdered, an RPF soldier was killed and a

³¹¹ D. Callahan, *Unwinnable wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997).

³¹² L. Roughhead, Chief, KUSLO, United States Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya.

³¹³ *Ibid.*

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*

³¹⁵ US Congress, 103-1, "House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearings: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Africa" (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994).

UNAMIR military observer wounded in an ambush.³¹⁶ These warning signs were not properly heeded. The UN officials and foreign governments misinterpreted the signs and assumed that once the Arusha peace accord was implemented, the killings would stop.

Once the genocide erupted, The US and other governments immediately thought of a move to evacuate their nationals. After 10 Belgium Blue Helmets were killed by government forces, the Belgium government withdrew its entire contingent from Rwanda. But Boutros Ghali puts it, "the American Syndrome" afflicted them: "Pull out at first encounter with serious trouble."³¹⁷ The Secretary of State suggested that small skeletal operation be left in Kigali to show the will of the international community. The SC later in the midst of the genocide reduced the UNAMIR to a token level of 270 people and restricted its mandate to mediation and humanitarian aid.³¹⁸

The evacuations affected UN planning and organization. Together with delays in getting real action out of the Security Council it could not respond effectively to the genocide. The Clinton administration evacuated the 258 Americans from Rwanda when the killings had just begun. It also strongly supported a move to cut the UN Peacekeeping force in Rwanda, UNAMIR, down to a small size. The logic behind the move was that there was no role for a peacekeeping force in the absence of peace.³¹⁹ But a peacekeeping operation should never withdraw, as it is supposed to facilitate creating the peace. The

³¹⁶ UN, *The UN and Rwanda, 1993-1996*. (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996) pp.33-34.

³¹⁷ B.B. *Unvanquished A US UN Saga*. (New York: Random House, 1999).

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ D. Callahan, *Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict*. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997).

idea of withdrawal should not have occurred in the case of the Rwanda conflict despite its gravity.

Just as signs of problems in Rwanda appeared on the agenda of the SC, 18 soldiers of the US army were killed in Somalia. The US retreated on becoming involved again in another peacekeeping mission. The Clinton administration knew very well that a terrible calamity was looming in Rwanda: "The Americans were not ignorant about Rwanda, but nothing was at stake for the US in Rwanda. There were no interests to guard, no powerful lobbies on behalf of Rwandan Tutsi, but there were political interests at home to cater to."³²⁰ The interests of the people of Rwanda should have been looked at. The reluctance gave the killers the time and confidence to continue with the murders.

Critical of all was the signing of the PDI-25 by the US President on 3rd May 1994 while massacres continued raging. The document interfered with multilateral action to maintain peace and security. The new policy had rules, which were so tightly drawn in scope, mission and duration, and was also so risky. No peacekeeping mission could be approved under them. UN operations, occupied and exhausted, could not manage to carry out any operation. Some 70,000 peacekeepers from 70 countries were serving seventeen UN operations around the world. Furthermore, more operations had been launched, all approved by the SC, with the support of the US. Worse still, UN member states were unwilling to pay for the operations.³²¹

³²⁰ International Panel of Imminent Persons. File:///A:\IPEP12.htm

³²¹ Ibid. See also Chapter Two for more on this.

On the PDD 25, Scheffer³²² admits that as one of the staff authors of the PDD 25, the presidential directive on multilateral peacekeeping operations, he was keenly aware of its use during the Rwanda crisis. In addition to the advice being rendered by the UN Secretariat, PDD 25 influenced their initial decision in mid April to seek a withdrawal of UNAMIR because of its inability to fulfil its mandate. The factors set forth for the PDD 25, as will be discussed, also influenced the downsizing, rather than the termination of UNAMIR in late April and then its increase to 5,500 troops in May 1994.

However, in the same vein, Scheffer argued in part for the establishment of the PDD 25. He argued that document, which was essential of congressional support, was to be sustained for any UN peacekeeping operations. It imposed a discipline on decision making for UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations that have considerable merit. He asserted that the PDD 15 was not a straight jacket to deny justifiable interventions of preventive measures when the lives of thousands of innocent civilians were at stake. It is and should continue to be, applied realistically, in the light of the circumstances that confront the international community and besieged civilian population a time.³²³

The situation and decision to move into Rwanda was made difficult on the insistence of the US ambassador to the UN on the application of the Clinton PDD 25 conditions before resolution 918 of 17 May 1994 was carried out. This resolution increased the strength and expanded the mandate of UNAMIR. These conditions required

³²² D.Scheffer, Ambassador at large for War Crimes Issues "Atrocities Prevention: Lessons from Rwanda", Speech at the Conference on Atrocities Prevention and Response at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, October 1999.

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³²³ Ibid.

that a cease-fire be in place, the parties to the conflict agree to a UN presence, and that UNAMIR could not engage in peace enforcement unless what was happening in Rwanda was a significant threat to international peace and security.³²⁴

On May 9, the Secretary General distributed a text contemplating a UN force of some 4,000 soldiers, 721 support troops and appropriate headquarters and other personnel. The US position on the matter was presented by Ambassador Albright two days later. It expressed serious reservations about the proposals to establish a large enforcement mission, which would operate throughout Rwanda with a mandate to end the fighting, restore law and order and pacify the population. With the image of Somalia still in mind, Albright warned that the parties to the conflict would use force to oppose such a mission. She expressed her fear that it was unclear what the peace enforcement mission would be or when it would end.

On 17th May 1994 the SC increased the strength of the UN mission under resolution 918. It specified that the force should be 5,500 troops. These were to be deployed under Chapter VII mandate, that allows, the use of all necessary force to carry out its mission. Albright the requirements of the PDD 25 to the SC members to delay the deployment of the full 5,500 man contingent to Rwanda until all the US conditions had been met.³²⁵ According to the reports from the African Rights,³²⁶ at this time the US government was under domestic pressure. The US public opinion did not back the plan to intervene fearing another Somalia.

³²⁴ D.Scheffer, Ambassador at large for War Crimes Issues "Atrocities Prevention: Lessons from Rwanda", Speech at the Conference on Atrocities Prevention and Response at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, October 1999.

³²⁵ Ibid.

The SC met on 30th April and condemned the massacres in Rwanda. The role of the US government became crucial this time. It refused to back the call for more troops. On 29th April the Secretary General was unwilling to directly attribute blame for the killings in Rwanda. The US representative, Ambassador Albright played a lead role in blocking the dispatch of troops.³²⁷ The same day the US president made a radio broadcast, expressing his sympathy. He called on the Rwandan Army and the RPF to agree to an immediate cease-fire and return to negotiations aimed at lasting peace in the country. In as much as his heart may have been touched, the statement amounted to nothing. The emphasis on a cease-fire developed into a major obstacle to progress over the weeks that followed. "The international community, together with nations in Africa, must bear its share of responsibility for the tragedy, as well. We did not act quickly enough after the killing began. We should not have allowed the refugee camps to become safe havens for the killers. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide."³²⁸

A proposal was then made by the OAU to send a force. The proposal received responses from several African countries willing to contribute troops to the UN force. Ghana, Nigeria and Tanzania and later Senegal and Ethiopia promised fully equipped soldiers who would deploy very rapidly. The UN SC resolved on an African force of 5,500 men by 10th May. The only problems they faced concerned how the Ethiopians would be brought to Rwanda, obtaining equipment and organizing the necessary training

³²⁶ African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance. Revised edition (London, UK, August, 1995)

³²⁷ Col. L Harnette, Head of Department of Peacekeeping Operations in UN Headquarters Interview on 9th August 2001 at the Peace Support Training Centre DSC Karen during its inauguration.

³²⁸ President Bill Clinton statement during his first visit to Rwanda on 25 March 1998 .

in using it for the other troops and obtaining necessary backing from the United Nations Security Council.

The members of the Security Council and the UN secretariat discussed the number of troops, the countries they were coming from, the commandant, the mandate and the cost of the operation. Confusion and contradiction however reigned, as the US preferred creating a protection zone along Rwanda's borders, with a small number of troops enforcing a limited mandate.³²⁹ The UN Secretary General was at the time pushing for a plan for sending troops to Kigali. This was aimed at cease-fire and the resumption of political negotiations. The US State Department still insisted that before troops are deployed, there must be a cease-fire in place. This did not work well to stop the killings.

The UN resolution was also held up by the issue of whether or not use the word "genocide". Under pressure from the US, the mention of "genocide" was replaced with systematic widespread and flagrant violations of humanitarian law. So much cover was put on the word "genocide" to escape responsibility of the genocide: "As a responsible government, you don't just go round hollering 'genocide'. You say that acts of genocide may have occurred and they need to be investigated," remarked Rawson.³³⁰

The 1949 Genocide Convention³³¹ lays down the criteria for what acts constitute genocide. Article II of the convention defines genocide as "any of the following acts

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ D.Rawson, US Ambassador to Rwanda, 10 June 1994 in D.Jehl, "Officials told to avoid calling Rwanda Killings 'Genocide'" *The New York Times*, 10 June 1994.

³³¹ R.A.Falk, et.al, (eds) *Crimes of War: A legal, Political Documentary, and Psychological Inquiry into the Responsibility of Leaders, citizens and Soldiers for Criminal Acts in Wars* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971) pp.50-51.

committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such;

- a) Killing members of the group,
- b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,
- c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,
- d) Imposing measures intended to prevent birth within the group,
- e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article III of the convention outlines the acts that are punishable: genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide and complicity in genocide.

The ICTR determined the mass killings of the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994 constituted genocide, planned and incited by the Hutu extremists against the Tutsi. The US restrained from actively participating in the crisis in Rwanda. The Clinton administration sought in some ways to play down the gravity of what was occurring in order to reduce demands for intervention. The administration then instructed its officials to avoid using the term genocide to describe the killing in Rwanda, but acts of genocide may have occurred.³³²

Shelly explained the US policy clearly to address the situation and lack of the urge to intervene. Being the states Department's spokesperson, he said, "there are obligations, which arise in connection with the use of the term," He referred to the 1949

³³² D.Callahan, *Unwinnablwe wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997).

Geneva Convention, which makes all participating states responsible for preventing genocide.³³³ . In this regard, if the violence was not genocide, the US, which as a participant, did not have an obligation to act. Even as reliable estimates of Tutsi deaths rose past a quarter a million, Rawson claimed the US still did not have enough information.

The US was evidently unwilling to become involved in any way in Rwanda through its instruction to the officials to deny that genocide was being committed. Making the admission would have put powerful legal obligations on the US government to comply with the provisions of the convention, and take all necessary measures to stop the genocide and punish those responsible. The state department made the failure even more profound by its assertion that the genocide convention merely "enables " the world to respond.³³⁴

The US instigated another delay. It brought up the issue of money, an issue under the PDD 25 and had not been resolved. The US government promised to lease fifty Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) to UNAMIR urgently needed for the evacuation of trapped civilians in Kigali much more rapidly and safely. General Dallaire made a public appeal directly to the US government for the APCs on 1st June.

In late May 1994, Ghana, Ethiopia and Senegal volunteered troops for development. The administration offered 60 armored vehicles, since Ghanaian troops were not well equipped. Clinton himself promised to provide armored support necessary only if African states provided troops. The international community finally acted two

³³³ Ibid

³³⁴ Ibid

months into the killing campaign. The Pentagon began negotiations with UN authorities over the transfer of equipment. The Secretary General by the first week of June found 5,500 troops for the mission.

Unfortunately, the administration took a tough negotiating position mainly over the question of terms of hire for the APCs. In June the US introduced two further conditions to its involvement in the country. The administration raised the cost of the estimate by half, and insisted that the UN also pay for returning their vehicles to the base in Germany. The cost of the whole exercise amounted to fifteen million dollars, eleven million of which was the cost of transportation.

The APCs finally arrived in Uganda on 23rd June for the Ghanaians to begin training the provision of transport to fly the Ethiopian contingent, fully equipped and trained was delayed. Both the UN and the Western powers were not ready to fly the Ethiopian troops to Rwanda. The 800 Ethiopian troops, who were formally promised on 25 May 1994, were transported in August.³³⁵

What should be appreciated is the recognition by the US of the role it played in the genocide. Scheffer³³⁶ noted that the government learned much from mistakes it and the international community had made which contributed to the tragic genocide. More can be learned of the US ignorance in the crisis through Scheffer's speech and acknowledgement of the US involvement in the Rwanda Genocide. In reviewing and acknowledging the lessons learned from the Rwanda tragedy, he made a clear assertion that "We certainly now appreciate that high-level attention to such calamities must begin

³³⁵ African Rights, *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*, Revised Edition, August 1995.

much sooner and that is one of the reasons for the establishment of my office in the state department and for the creation in December 1998 of the Atrocities Prevention Inter-Agency Working Group." What is more is actually its acknowledgement that other policy priorities were put ahead of the activities in Rwanda, and thus the failure to take action in the country". He remarked "We cannot allow other policy priorities and breaking events to distract us from the need to respond swiftly to the outbreak of atrocities. Tough problems can be easily shunted aside by simply pointing to another crisis that more desperately needs US engagement".³³⁷

The US was and still has been strongly criticized for inaction in the face of the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Much of these criticisms commenced with the statements made by the president and secretary of state in 1997 and 1998 acknowledging the mistakes made. Albright I a speech in Addis Ababa on 9 December 1997 acknowledged that the US and the international community should have been more active in the early stages of the atrocities in Rwanda in 1994, and recognized them as genocide. On March 25, 1998 during his first visit to Rwanda, President Clinton echoed the Secretary's remarks on genocide. He asserted that the international community, together with the nations in Africa must bear its share of responsibility for the tragedy as well. He accepted that the US did not act quickly enough after the killing began, and that they should not have allowed the refugee case to become safe havens for the killers.

To Scheffer, during most of the genocide, the US did not really do what it is accustomed:" having our own people on the ground gathering and reporting facts".³³⁶ The

³³⁶ D.Scheffer, "Atrocities Prevention: Lessons from Rwanda," Speech at the conference on Atrocities Prevention and Response at the US Holocaust Museum, Oct 29, 1999.

US embassy in Kigali during that time was closed and events in Rwanda were monitored and analyzed from US embassies in the neighboring or nearby countries of Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania and Zaire. During the genocide, US officials only made a couple of trips to assess the humanitarian situation, but US personnel did not enter Rwanda until July 6th and 7th, after the French-led Operation Turquoise had established a presence in the country.³³⁸

The US played another role of militarizing Africa. The arms supplies play a major role in fueling African conflicts. It is worth noting that most of the countries engaged in serious conflictive the past 50 years were also recipients of US weapons and training. Throughout the Cold War, the US delivered over \$1.5 billion worth of weaponry.³³⁹

To Hartung and Moix, the skills and equipment provided by the US have strengthened the military capabilities of combatants involved in some of Africa's most violent and intractable conflicts.³⁴⁰ Whenever there are arms flows to Africa, they are accompanied by substantial transfers of light weaponry, carried out beyond government-to-government channels. Wood and Peleman³⁴¹ point out in their report that the weapons suppliers to the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda included brokers and shippers in the UK, South Africa and France working with collaborators in Albania,

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ Department of Defence, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Fact as of September 30, 1998,1999.

³⁴⁰ W.D. Hartung & B.Moix, "Deadly Legacy: US Arms to Africa and the Congo War" World Policy Institute, The arms trade Resource Centre. <http://www.worlpolicy.org/project/arms/reports/congo.htm>

³⁴¹ B.Woods & Peleman, "The Arms Fixers: Controlling the brokers and Shipping Agents," joint report by the British Security Information Council, The Norwegian Institute on Small Arms Transfers, and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (Oslo, Norway: PRIO, 1999)p.29

Belgium, Bulgaria, Egypt, Italy, Israel, the Seychelles and former Zaire. Although the US was not a major player in this arms traffic, many of its allies were.

US Policy towards the United Nations

It is virtually evident that the UN remains a critical instrument for the advancement of important US foreign policy objectives. It has pursued an engagement policy with the United Nations, and being a super power, the largest financial supporter of the UN, which is involved in, among many other critical issues, issues relating to peace and security. In its Fiscal Year ending 30 September 2000 the US set aside \$500 million to UN peacekeeping. It also contributed military observers or police officers to eight UN missions, and US troops worked in co-operation with UN operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor.³⁴²

Beside these contributions, the US really promoted innovative effort designed to equip the UN to meet the new challenges of the century, top being the challenges of peacekeeping. Together with other states, it worked to improve the major recommendations of the Secretary General's blue-ribbon panel on peacekeeping reform. This included improvement in UN planning capacity, better training and equipment for UN troops operating in certain environments and greater effort to develop the building blocks for political transitions like judicial institutions, electoral systems and economic development. The support for the UN has also been seen in its initiatives to train peacekeepers from African countries and its provision of 800 civilian police to ensure community-level protection of civilians in post-conflict environment. It also gave

³⁴² Fact Sheet on Bosnia, Kosovo' U.S. Support for the UN: Engagement, Innovation and Renewal.
<http://www.un.int/usa/fact9.htm>

transitional aid and longer-term development assistance through the U.S. Agency for International Development.³⁴³

The US-UN relations were so much affected by the coming in of a new administration, the Clinton administration. Appointed ambassador to the UN, Albright also put US first in its relations with the UN. Speaking of the 'need to bring pressure to bear on the belligerents of the post-Cold War world' in June 1993, Albright referred to the UN as one of the "collective bodies that increasingly steer the course of world politics."³⁴⁴ The UN was to serve as the chief vehicle for the conduct of 'assertive multilateralism', described as a 'broader strategy in multilateral forums that projects our leadership where it counts'.³⁴⁵ In this regard, the US government departments and agencies embarked on active restructuring and expanding to reflect the greater prominence given to the UN. It established a new post of Assistant Secretary for peacekeeping and democracy in the Department of Defence and new offices for peacekeeping in the State Department. The Secretary of State applauded the idea for the enhancement of capabilities to permit prompt, preventive action. Further, she declared that it would be a "top priority to work with the UN secretariat and key peacekeeping contributors to ensure that the UN is equipped with a robust capacity to plan, organise, lead and service peacekeeping activities."³⁴⁶

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ 'Albright Outlines Steps to improve UN Peacekeeping' (Text: Statement to Senate Panel), USIS Wireless File, 10 June 1993 in R.B.Berdal, "Fateful Encounter: The US and UN Peacekeeping." *Survival*. Vol.36. No.1 Spring 1994. pp.30-50.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ Testimony of Albright, 3rd May 1993. Joint Hearings before Sub-committees on Europe and the Middle East and International Security, International Organization and Human Rights of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, First Session (Washington: USGPO, 1993) p.165.

Luck and Rodman support Albright's argument for multilateralism as America's best foreign policy course toward Third World. In her view, a multilateral approach is the only one that can meet the variety of regional issues - border conflicts, economic, environmental and problems of regime changes- that plague Third World Countries. She argues for a strong and an active multilateralist US alongside regional organizations. America's continued international involvement is normally for the long-range benefits for the US as maintaining U.S. leverage abroad, participating in shaping multilaterally negotiated, and security authoritative position as "First among equals". She also asserted that US policy of international multilateralism allows the US to share foreign aid costs with the rest of the international community. She concluded that the 21st century world would not be dominated by one country, even the US" Where the problems are non-bilateral and certainly non-unilateral...it will be necessary to work with partnerships. These partnerships will have to be based on burden sharing, and the US will have to develop the will to be the first among equals."³⁴⁷

A Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD 13) followed this desire in 1993, which debated about the basis for and modalities of American participation in UN peacekeeping. Much of the interest was to have an inter-agency group to formulate a more active policy on peacekeeping. The PRD 13 became the center of the inter-agency debates about the basis for and modalities of American participation in UN peacekeeping. The US President ordered the review in February the same year, and appointed Berger to oversee the work of the inter-agency group. In mid July, an initial draft was submitted

³⁴⁷ S. J. Brown & Schraub (eds.) *Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a new Era.* (Washington D.C.; U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1992).

for presidential approval. This was intended to give some substance to the emphasis on multilateralism and declaratory commitments. The idea foreseen here was that operation under the UN auspices, both peacekeeping and enforcement were actually presented as ways of spreading risks and saving money.³⁴⁸ Furthermore, the draft also envisaged that American troops would be placed under the 'operational control of UN commanders on irregular basis.³⁴⁹

However, the bad picture presented in Somalia, in the UNOSOM II and the prospect of committing a large number of US ground troops to police an agreement in Bosnia received opposition, and especially after the deaths of American soldiers announced in early August 1993. There followed a number of foreign policy speeches by senior officials in September and October, raising concern, not with expounding the virtues of multilateralism, but emphasising its limitations and the President's continuing readiness to act unilaterally and without reference to the UN.³⁵⁰

This had however brought into the scene significant changes. After congressional support for the continuing US role in Somalia collapsed, in October 1993, a compromise bill between the House and the Senate cancelled a proposal of \$175 million contingency fund to cover immediate peacekeeping costs. At the same time, U.S. congress decided to withhold 10% of its regular contribution to the UN until Secretary-General appointed an Inspector General to eliminate corruption. It also decided to cancel the fourth of five

³⁴⁸ M.R. Berdal, "Fateful Encounter: The U.S. and UN Peacekeeping," *Survival*. Vol. 30.No. 1. Spring 1994. pp.30-50.

³⁴⁹ Op Cit. 'U.S. Narrows Terms for its Peacekeepers', *New York Times*, 23 September, 1993.

³⁵⁰ See Madeleine Albright's speech at the Naval War College on 24 September 1993 and President Clinton's address to the United Nations General Assembly on 27th September 1993, in M.R Berdal, "Fateful Encounter; The U.S. and UN Peacekeeping." *Survival*, Vol.30. No.1. Spring, 1994. pp.30-50..

special payments planned by President Bush to cover the US arrears. Furthermore, President Clinton was informed by the congress of the cut of the US share of future peacekeeping bills from 31.7 to 25%.³⁵¹ Further, there was even an attempt to limit the Presidents authority to deploy troops abroad.³⁵²

The US foreign policy after the end of the Cold War was faced with a central dilemma: to articulate interests and maintain a moral foundation for policy in the absence of direct threats to US strategic interests. This was basically in view of the debacle in Somalia and the ignominious withdrawals of US naval ships from Haitian waters on 13th October 1993. The US administration officials attempted to construct a more restrictive set of conditions for US participation in future peacekeeping operations. The PRD 13 underwent thorough policy review with elements clearly summarised. First, it required that the objectives of the operation must be clearly defined, in the US 'national interest' and assured of continuing public and congressional support. Second, the commitment of US troops cannot be 'open-ended'. An 'exit-strategy' must consequently be in place before troops are deployed. Finally, it required that operations involving US forces must have effective command and control arrangements.³⁵³

The moral obligation, that even prompted President Bush to launch Operation Restore Hope in December 1992, was the basis for US engagement in Somalia. The US involvement there demonstrated the limits of public and congressional support for a

³⁵¹ 'U.S Share Peacekeeping Arrears at UN near a Billion,' *New York Times*, 22 October 1993.

³⁵² Clinton Survives attempts to limit deployment of troops,' *The Times*, 22 October 1993.

³⁵³ Thomas Friedman, 'Foreign Policy under Clinton: A "Disjunction"', *International Herald Tribune*, 2nd October 1993; P.Lewis, 'US. Plans Policy on Peacekeeping,' *New York Times*, 18 Nov 1993; D. Williams and A.Devroy, 'US. Limits Peacekeeping role, Washington Post, 25 November 1993, in Berdal, M. R, "Fateful Encounter: The U.S. and United Nations Peacekeeping." *Survival*. Vol.36, No.1.Spring 1994. pp.30-50.

policy solely based on humanitarian interest. After 18 American soldiers were killed in Mogadishu the congressional support for further involvement in Somalia collapsed. Consequently, it made decisions to withdraw all US forces. All that seemed to matter then was the psychological cost to the US both the public and congressional opinion surged strongly against the US presence in Somalia.

After the debacles in Somalia, a fundamental dilemma confronted the US and also other troop contributing countries; how to explain to publics at home why lives should be put at risk especially where there is no compelling vital or national interest involved. Situations such as that in Somalia only suggest those humanitarian principles alone provide insufficient justification for long-term involvement particularly if it is likely to entail both casualties and major economic costs.³⁵⁴

The US military intervention in African conflicts have thus to be considered under specific sets of circumstances. Much more disinterest is shown in this shift in policy. Berger, national security advisor said in 1999 that Washington could use force to halt attempted genocide, but only if vital American interests were at stake and if the US had sufficient military resources in the area. The US would only act given the conditions that are in line with their interests. This will be in response to whether US "humanitarian intervention" would be limited to Europe, or the operations be launched in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world, given the success of US in Kosovo, and its failure to act in a timely fashion in Rwanda. Berger's declaration was that the US and its allies would not stand by and fail to act when, one; there is a systematic effort by a nation, or by

³⁵⁴ M. Berdal, "Fateful Encounter: The U.S. and United Nations Peacekeeping." *Survival*. Vol..36, no.1. Spring 1994. pp.30-50.

a government, to eliminate an entire people. The second condition "we have a national interest engaged as we clearly did in Kosovo because of what would have followed in Europe had we not ended the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians." Third, he declared, US military intervention will be an option "where we have the capacity to act, as we did with NATO". He even made it clear that such circumstances may apply outside of Europe, although he also thought of building up the indigenous local capacity to act in situations such as Rwanda.³⁵⁵

The US policy towards Africa is one in which US's interests are only forced down on Africa regardless of their negative consequences on the African continent. This makes it difficult for the Africans to govern themselves or even reap the fruits of its vast human, mineral and natural resources. The US therefore can never be the solution to African problems because its interests have never been to solve African problems. Whether it has plans for disengagement or support is not a matter so clearly explained.

In conclusion, in the 1994 the Rwanda Genocide, the United Nations' actions were not really effective. Significantly, most authorities, including American experts argued that the United States was responsible for the Rwanda genocide. One believed that "the desertion of Rwanda by the United Nations force (UNAMIR) was the Hutu powers' greatest diplomatic victory and it can be credited almost single handedly to the US."³⁵⁶ Some also similarly felt that the US almost single-handedly blocked international action in Rwanda six weeks prior to the genocide, which might have prevented the genocide.

³⁵⁵ Kevin Kelly and IRIN, "U.S. Lays Down tough Conditions for Military Action in Africa." *The East African* August 9-15, 1999. p.7.

³⁵⁶ P, Gourevitch, *We Wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda* (New York: Fairer Strauss and Giro, 1998) p.150.

Yet others agreed that the US played a significant role in preventing action from being taken to stop or mitigate the genocide, but were not almost single-handedly responsible, others too share the blame in the inaction in the genocide.³⁵⁷ Throughout the genocide American machinations at the Security Council repeatedly undermined all the attempts to strengthen the UN military presence in Rwanda. In the end, not a single additional soldier or piece military hardware reached the country before the genocide ended.³⁵⁸

The UN initiatives to intervene in Rwanda were not successful. Most of its efforts to take action were hindered by the US, which is a member of the SC. At the genocide in Rwanda the work of the UN was not so effective. The influence of outside forces and especially the US and the international community to immediately take action during the genocide led to the escalation of the crisis. Most of the US policies dominated the SC, which had to do what it was asked by the US. Although the scene in Rwanda was the most shocking in the whole world in a long period in history of genocide, the genocide was ended before a single effort of UNAMIR II ever materialized.

³⁵⁷ Independent Panel of Imminent Persons. <File:///A/IPEP12.htm>

³⁵⁸ African Rights, *Death, Despair and Defiance*. (London: Revised 1995 Edition, August 1995) p.1126

CHAPTER FIVE

THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES IN RWANDA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS.

Introduction.

The UN was formed in order to deal with matters of international peace and security, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. Peacekeeping evolved as a technique for controlling dangerous regional conflicts at a time when relations between the most powerful nations were not such to permit the Security Council to function fully in the manner envisaged in the Charter.³⁵⁹ The UN has however not been free from the influence of member states especially those which have a veto in the UN organisation as discussed in Chapter One.

The influence in the US has especially been seen in its policies in the UN. Most of the UN activities are influenced by the US as a super power. This is well discussed in Chapter Three. These policies tend to serve US interests. The defeat of the US to conduct its operation successfully in Somalia led to the US to develop policies that did a severe blow to the work of the UN. It is attributed to the lack of action by the UN in the conflict in Rwanda as discussed in Chapter Four. The sad experience in Somalia in fact enhanced its desire to have Africans resolve their own conflicts as seen in Chapters Two and Three. The African experience in peacekeeping has however not shown a very positive image. This makes the African continent handicapped in regard to peacekeeping matters. These experiences are well discussed in Chapter Two.

³⁵⁹ Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary General in his forward in the *Blue Helmets' A. Review of UN Peacekeeping* (New York; UN United Nations Publications,) 1990.

The previous Chapters discussed a number of issues. Chapter Two discussed the complex nature of intra-state conflicts that have characterised the post-Cold War world. It has looked at the capabilities and limitations of the peacekeeping missions in the African region. The peacekeeping policies toward Africa by the United States were discussed in Chapter Three. These policies are mainly led by interest³⁶⁰ and hinder most of the initiatives to keep peace by the United Nations in Africa. The task of regional organizations in their desire to resolve conflict in the peacekeeping aspect has also been discussed. This Chapter argues that all peacekeeping tasks should be taken by the United Nations, but with the support of the international community. Policies and initiatives to carry out peacekeeping operations should be purely under the UN directives. Western countries, particularly the US should heavily give support but not get directly involved in the work of the UN as a world body.

Chapter Four examined and assessed the role of the United States in peacekeeping initiatives in Rwanda. It criticises the US for its influence in the UN initiatives to take immediate action during the genocide in Rwanda. America's position on the genocide was clear. American machinations at the Security Council repeatedly undermined all attempts to strengthen the UN military presence in Rwanda; in the end not a single additional soldier or piece of military hardware reached the country until the genocide ended.³⁶¹ The US position could also be well read from the reaction of George Bush in early 2000 while running for presidency. Asked what he would do as president, if another 'Rwanda' should take place, he simply replied: "We should not send troops to stop ethnic

³⁶⁰ See Chapter Three

³⁶¹ African Rights, *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance* Revised 1995 Edition, p.1126

cleansing and genocide outside our strategic interest. I would not send the US troops into Rwanda.”³⁶² His statement clearly demonstrated that Rwanda was not a US priority.

However, the Chapter also explores the environment preceding the genocide. The relationship between the two groups in Rwanda is given in a short history in Chapter Four and thus of the history of conflict and violence, leading to the souring of relations and finally, genocide. Chapter Five examines the policy of the US toward the country and the way they contributed to prevent of the action by the international community in the face of genocide.

This Chapter analyses the actions of the US and the UN in the peacekeeping initiatives in Rwanda. It will also link the study hypotheses outlined in Chapter One. It will examine the responses of the scholars, the diplomatic body in the African region. It critically analyses the issues that have emerged in the four previous chapters, focusing on the diplomatic and political aspects of peacekeeping phenomenon. It also discusses the effects of the policies from the US in the United Nations, and efforts of Africa's desire to keep peace, in relation to what was discussed in Chapter Three.

US Policy towards Rwanda

The effect of the US involvement and the debacles in the latter part of the Somalia operations had made the Americans very wary of any involvement in peacekeeping.³⁶³ The executive offices of the Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) issued in May 1994 severely restricted US involvement in peacekeeping operations, including US authorisation and financing for such operations. However, the US still became involved

³⁶² American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), *This Week*, transcript, 23 January 2000.

in the peacekeeping operation related to humanitarian assistance towards refugees, who had fled to Zaire after the genocide.³⁶⁴ Livingstone and Eachus³⁶⁵ briefly explain the cause of the retreat of the US in the crisis in Rwanda. They attribute US involvement to the vacillation on the use of military forces in humanitarian crises by the Clinton administration in its initial two years in office. In the 1992 campaign and during the first several months of his administration, President Clinton spoke of "assertive multilateralism" and the need to come to the assistance of people in need. However, the US experience in Somalia made the administration reverse course and institute strict guidelines for future US intervention in similar crises. The approval of the use of US forces for humanitarian intervention became highly unlikely under the provisions of the PDD 25 as explained in Chapter Three. The strict conditions the US had to meet before getting involved in UN peacekeeping operations displayed a huge setback to UN endeavours to keep peace. This clearly stated the US interests in the operations, the approval of congress, the availability of the funds for the operation, a specifically fixed date of withdrawal of US forces, and an agreed upon command and control structure.

Following the directives of the PDD 25 the administration isolated itself from involvement in Rwanda during the massacres. Rwanda was seen as a test of United States restrictive new guidelines on peacekeeping. The administration not only ruled out

³⁶³ H. Adelman & A. Suhrke, *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis, From Uganda to Zaire* (eds) (New Brunswick USA & London, UK, Transaction Publishers, 1999)

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

³⁶⁵ S. Livingstone & T. Eachus, "Rwanda: US Policy and Television Coverage" in *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis, From Uganda to Zaire*, By H. Adelman & A. Suhrke (eds.) (New Brunswick USA and London (UK), Transaction Publishers, 1999) pp.209-227.

sending American troops, but also stood in the way of an aggressive UN plan to dispatch an African force of 5,500.³⁶⁶

The PDD 25 established certain conditions and criteria for launching a peacekeeping mission. This involved ensuring that the mission is clearly defined, linking the military and political objectives and making certain that there is an overall political objective to be served by establishing the peacekeeping mission. It also involved establishing when possible, end dates for the duration, getting a firm statement of the costs involved, so that the US does not have an open-ended financial commitment, and looking at, the risks involved and the objectives to be served.³⁶⁷ Conditions that came with this document should also be seriously looked at, in order to have all the operations carried out effectively and peacekeeping forces deployed immediately a crisis occurs.

The Role of the OAU before the genocide

The OAU and the Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region got involved in the Rwanda conflict far back during the RPF invasion on 1 October 1990. It started its work in 1989, when a group of refugee warriors carried out an abortive armed invasion of Rwanda.³⁶⁸ But the situation was complicated by the fact that the OAU had done nothing in the years prior to the invasion to help resolve the festering problem of Rwanda's refugees, despite clear guidelines set down in the 1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. The refugee problem did not seem to be

³⁶⁶ D..Jehl, *New York Times*, 1994, A8.

³⁶⁷ Judy Aita, "In Pursuit of International Peace and Security" In an Interview with Ambassador Karl Inderfurth, US Representative to the UN.

³⁶⁸ Otunnu Ogenga, "An Historical Analyses of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA)" in Adelman and A. Suhrke (eds.) *The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis, From Uganda to Zaire*. (USA: New Brunswick & UK: London, Transaction Publishers, 1999) pp. 31-49

a major problem and therefore not a concern of the OAU. The organisation only saw the impact when the problem developed into civil war stopping the Rwandan Patriotic Front invasion as it lacked the authority to condemn it.

Another factor that complicated the situation was the fact that President Museveni chaired the OAU at the time. President Habyarimana always saw him as the power behind the RPF, whom he believed were Ugandans, like President Museveni, from the Hima group, considered to be related to the Tutsi. The OAU understood well that political and security issues had to be resolved if refugee and other humanitarian problems were to be dealt with in a serious way. The OAU Secretary General was able to facilitate a cease-fire agreement in March 1991, which was to be monitored by a Neutral Military Observer team under the supervision of the OAU Secretary General as a prelude to the deployment of a full-blown African peacekeeping force. This initiative however, ran into difficulties. The observer team was to include the officers from Uganda, Zaire and Burundi, and from the Rwanda government and the RPFs thus disqualifying them as a neutral mission.³⁶⁹

The road to peace always needs the commitment of both parties and the acceptance of a peacekeeping mission into the country. The practice of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War, which was developed during the Cold War, was based on consent and co-operation of the parties and impartiality of the United Nations forces, with resort to arms only in self-defence. This proved most effective in multidimensional operations where the parties not only entered into negotiated agreements but also demonstrated the political will to achieve the goals established. However, where the climate was one of

hostility and obstruction instead of co-operation and political will, peacekeeping came under heavy strains and pressures.³⁷⁰ In Rwanda, the Habyarimana government did not abide by the commitments it made. It refused the idea of having the RPF military observer team, and remained in Zaire, at Goma, near the Rwanda border. Furthermore the UN peacekeepers came under attack³⁷¹ provoking the Belgians to withdraw their peacekeepers, as discussed in chapter four. The OAU representatives were forced to undertake almost on a daily basis, risky and circuitous missions to Goma and back to Byumba, where the observer team set up its headquarters, in order to consult with the RPF.

A spate of violations followed the cease-fire agreement due to the widespread scepticism about the military observers' neutrality and the bad government of Habyarimana.³⁷² The organisation did not however work on the political aspects of the conflict leading to the twice-shattered peace process; the N'sele cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1991 and the Gbadolite meeting of 16 September 1991 as discussed in Chapter Four.

A limelight was however seen in July 1992 in a meeting convened by the OAU Secretary General in Arusha, Tanzania and co-ordinated with the President of Tanzania. A new cease-fire was agreed upon and a commitment to deal with the root causes of the crisis. This process dealt with five fundamental issues- democracy, power sharing,

³⁶⁹ Independent Panel of Eminent Personalities (IPEP) file:///A/IPEP12.htm

³⁷⁰ B.B. Ghali, *Confronting New Challenges*, Annual Report on the work of the Organisation 1995. (New York: UN Department Public Information, 1995) p.222.

³⁷¹ See Chapter Two and Four

³⁷² IPEP file:///A/IPEP12.htm

transitional government, the integration of the armed forces and the return and rehabilitation of refugees.³⁷³

The OAU representatives and regional leaders at Arusha commendably put all their energies into the peace process. They however, ignored the warning signs that were already so evident.³⁷⁴ President Habyarimana had already dismissed one of the early cease-fire agreements as a mere "scrap of paper"³⁷⁵ This did not come to the organisation's awareness that it could bring down its efforts to peace.

A power sharing agreement between the government and the opposition parties was installed in January 1993. The government was however, not happy because it was pressured into the agreement. The president's party and the HUTU CDR staged demonstrations against the protocol. Habyarimana, as president accepted the deal on power sharing, but as president of revolutionary party, MRND, had reservations. Nevertheless, as president of Rwanda he supported the Arusha peace process.³⁷⁶ The Rwanda army too demanded remarkable concessions, which the government representatives accepted only under pressure. None of the government delegation, or army men from the government side supported the agreement to give the RPF virtual parity in military matters. The final Arusha Peace Agreement was signed in August 1993 by the Habyarimana government, the RPF, the president of Tanzania, the OAU Secretary-General and representatives of the UN Secretary General.

³⁷³ See more in Chapter Four.

³⁷⁴ See Chapter Four.

³⁷⁵ IPEP fil:///A/IPEP12.htm

³⁷⁶ See Chapter Four for information on the Peace Process.

But the OAU only assumed that the negotiations actually taking care of the various interests of the various parties in Rwanda. They never spoke of the powerful 'Akazu' or any of the segments of Rwandan society that would never accept accommodation with the Tutsi.³⁷⁷ This issue was crucial to the organisation. The OAU needs to be ready to combat the type of conflict that has been plaguing Rwanda, Somalia, Angola, Liberia and others.³⁷⁸ It should be able to learn from many conflicts and be able to solve many more future conflicts. The example of Chad should have been a great lesson to the organisation and the conflicts prior to that in Rwanda.

Regional African Solutions

As much as there might be a strong need and urge for African peacekeeping, these initiatives by the Africans still have shortcomings. A critical assessment of the indigenous African initiatives clearly shows that the Africans may not be very ready and effective to conduct peacekeeping activities. In May and Cleavers words:

"The precipitate withdrawal of the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR, after securing the safety of westerners, the apparent disinterest of the US, the questionable role of France and the failure of the UN to reinforce its ongoing mission and alter its mandate to deal with genocide, all combined to support a growing belief within Africa that Africa's problems could only be effectively addressed by themselves."³⁷⁹

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Henry Kwami Anyidoho, *Guns Over Rwanda: The Rwandese Civil War-1994. (A Personal Account)* (Uganda, Kampala: Fountain Publishers ITD, 1998)

³⁷⁹ R.May,& G.Claever, 'African Peacekeeping: Still Dependent,' *International Peacekeeping*, 4,3, Summer 1997, p.2.

The OAU has made great effort towards matters concerning security and conflict resolution. For example its efforts were seen in 1993 when it established the division-Mechanism for Conflict Resolution, Management and Prevention (MCRMP) and a Peace Fund to help finance this work. It has also shown great sense of urgency and responsibility in seeking 'African Solutions to African Problems' after the Somalia and Rwanda Conflicts by holding two major conferences held on peacekeeping in Cairo and Harare in January and February 1995. These conferences revealed huge problems that still confront the deployment of African forces in a peacekeeping context.³⁸⁰ The OAU does not at this stage have the ability to accomplish its mission to solve its own problems without the complete backing of the international community. The conference also observed that the OAU was perennially in financial difficulties often with account arrears amounting to about twice the annual budget of the organisation. The leaders also stressed on the biggest problem in terms of ground-level peacekeeping, that of logistics, especially the chronic lack of radio communications, vehicles and air transport resulting in an undignified 'begging syndrome' and a humiliating reliance upon donor countries. OAU's first peacekeeping operation in Chad resulted in almost total reliance upon French logistic support; its first sponsored observer group (NMOG), deployed in Rwanda in 1993, was paralysed by an almost incomplete lack of vehicle support. Its mission in Burundi (OMIB) was also emasculated by an almost total failure of communications, with a lack of contact with Bunjumbura lasting 'sometimes almost for a month.' Others included the lack of fully operational, brigade-level communications system in Africa except Egypt

³⁸⁰ "International Efforts to establish Collective Security Mechanisms from Africa", Collected Papers, Zimbabwe Peacekeeping Workshop, Harare, 23-27 January 1995, p.8.

and South Africa; the internal political divisions that continue to hamper concerted OAU action. For example, Zaire and Kenya refused to ratify the resolution on the MCRMP because of the belief that it would 'act as a licence to powerful countries to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries which is prohibited under the OAU Charter.

Furthermore, even with adequate financial and logistic support African military capacities are 'small', both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the population. It has a total manpower pool of 'little in excess of a million' as May and Cleaver observe; "The vast majority... are armies numbering less than 50,000 men. Nineteen states have armies between 10,000 and 20,000 and ten have forces between 20,000 and 50,000 men. Only five states have armies in excess of 50,000 strong and these three have recently been engaged in civil wars"³⁸¹ Most African forces are 'mere skeletons of western militaries,³⁸² generally lacking manpower, equipment stocks and complex logistic capabilities. A peacekeeping force must be strong in all the aspects that may lead to a successful mission.

However, African states have an advantage in peacekeeping. Several have experience in peacekeeping techniques, especially UNPK, with 22 African states participating in a total of 21 UN operations since 1960. For example the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) in Somalia and Mozambique and the Zimbabwe National Force (ZNA) when deployed in Somalia and Ethiopia.³⁸³ The greater cultural affinity of many African states has enabled them to enjoy enhanced legitimacy over non-African

³⁸¹ Mat and Cleaver, *African peacekeeping*, p.8.

³⁸² R.Orth, 'African Operational Experiences in Peacekeeping', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 7,3, Winter 1996, p.314.

peacekeeping contingents. For example in Somalia and Rwanda, militarily less capable African countries have 'displayed a significant degree of "cultural sensitivity"³⁸⁴

Sub-regional Organisations and peacekeeping

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter acknowledges the importance of regional arrangements in dealing with such matters as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN.³⁸⁵

However, regional and sub-regional organisations that engage in peacekeeping activities must follow the steps set out by the United Nations. In August 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) pressed by Ghana and Nigeria, with some support from the OAU, took the decision to establish a regional peacekeeping body ECOMOG (Economic Community Monitoring Group) in Liberia, which had been engaged in bitter civil war since December 1989. This non-UN force achieved control of the capital Monrovia at the beginning of 1991. It however engaged more in peace enforcement than peacekeeping activities.³⁸⁶

Regional bodies are important and act in the place of the United Nations. But regional peacekeeping has its own dangers. Most of the member states of the region may

³⁸³ May and Cleaver, 'Peacekeeping: The African Dimension', *Review of African Political Economy*, 22 December 1995, p.495.

³⁸⁴ R.Orth, 'African Operational Experiences in Peacekeeping', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol.7, No. 3, Winter 1996, p.313.

³⁸⁵ UN, *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*. (New York: UN Department of Public Information, Oct. 1997) p.34.

³⁸⁶ S. Orphet, 'UN Peacekeeping and Election-Monitoring? In Roberts, A & Kingsbury, B. *United Nations, Divided World: The UN's roles in International Relations* (2nd Ed) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) pp.183-239.

come in with their own interests. Omach³⁸⁷ doubts whether the African states will face up to the reality of peacekeeping. He cites political will on the part of the region's leadership, and recognition of the need for collective action, and formalised institutional structures to supplement such structures, as vital for successful peacekeeping. This hinders the possibility of having a regional force for peacekeeping. The reluctance of the countries to take action immediately as will be discussed in this chapter and also briefly in the previous chapter clearly showed the lack of political will to get involved in the Rwanda crisis.

Col Mulata's³⁸⁸ suggestion is that peace support in the region should be left to the United Nations organisation, since countries normally get involved in a conflict for various reasons and interests. Peacekeeping missions in the backyard are more disadvantageous. Even if peace is achieved, the impact may not be long lasting and can create tension and hatred between and among states. In cases of regional peacekeeping, the idea of interest may be the driving force into a peacekeeping operation. Tension may always be there of an emerging conflict anytime within the region especially if the parts to a conflict are not satisfied with the solution reached.

The element of unanimity amongst member states of any organisation sponsoring a peacekeeping operation is essential.³⁸⁹ The split of ECOWAS also impacted upon the effectiveness of ECOMOG and contributed to the prolongation of fighting as discussed in

³⁸⁷ P.Omach, 'The ACRI: Domestic Politics and Convergence of National Interests?' *African Affairs* (2000), No.99, pp.73-95.

³⁸⁸ An Interview with Colonel A.K. Mulata, Peace Support Training Centre, Defence Staff College, Nairobi on the work of regional organisations in Africa, 27 April 2001.

³⁸⁹ Gerry Cleaver, "Liberia: Lessons for the future from the experience of ECOMOG" in *Peacekeeping in Africa* By O. Furley and R. May, (USA,: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1998)pp.223-237.

Chapter Three. In fact the ECOMOG forces that arrived in August 1990 in Liberia did not obtain the consent of the belligerent parties. Taylor for instance, regarded the mission as a Nigerian force sent to deny him his deserved triumph over Doe.³⁹⁰

The lack of a unitary actor or an institutionalised security structure, within which peacekeeping operation can be carried out, is one of the greatest obstacles to peacekeeping.³⁹¹ The experience of the ECOMOG force in Liberia highlighted the problems involved in peace operations in regard to how a force should be structured, who should lead and who should follow.³⁹² The force degenerated into almost a Nigerian affair, with Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso supporting Charles Taylor's NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia) thus, hindering the effectiveness of ECOMOG.

Multilateral, rather than unilateral peace operations, like South Africa's work within the framework of SADC to resolve the political crisis in Lesotho is advantageous. This is because it helps to reduce domestic pressure, cushions against international isolation if things go wrong, and prevents overextending the capabilities of a country's armed forces.³⁹³

The founders of the United Nations envisaged an important role of regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is increasingly apparent that the UN cannot address every potential and actual conflict troubling the world. Regional or sub-regional organisations sometimes have a comprehensive

³⁹⁰ C. Clapham, "Problems of Peace Enforcement: Lessons to be drawn from Multinational Peacekeeping Operations in On-going Conflicts in Africa", a paper presented for the conference South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa, 13-14 July.

³⁹¹ P. Omach, "The ACRI: Domestic Politics and the Convergence of National Interests" *African Affairs* (2000) No.99 pp. 73-95.

³⁹² Ibid.

advantage in taking the lead role in the prevention and settlement of conflicts and to assist the UN in containing them.³⁹⁴ Thus the work of regional organisations are both important and necessary and support should be provided for regional and sub-regional initiatives in Africa. Such support is necessary because the UN lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that may arise in Africa. It is desirable because wherever possible, the international community should strive to complement rather than supplant African efforts to resolve African problems.³⁹⁵ This might be of great importance and desirable considering the reluctance of the SC to become meaningfully involved in the conflicts in Africa. These arrangements however, have their own disadvantages and shortcomings. Their prospects are quite disheartening.³⁹⁶

The vast African experiences in UN peacekeeping operations and Western-led multinational forces, underscores the problems they have encountered while undertaking missions on their own. It is evident that most of the units contributed to mission and infantry battalions provided have been deployed and remained operational as a result of outside assistance. Very few countries have provided specialised units to such undertakings. The lack of financial support normally undermines their ability to function effectively.³⁹⁷ For an organisation to run to the end there must be sufficient funds to sustain it.

³⁹³ R. Williams, 'Peace Operations and the South African Armed Forces; Prospects and Challenges, Strategic Review of Southern Africa 17, 2 (1995), pp.87-106.

³⁹⁴ B.B, Ghali, 1 Nov. 1995 from "Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa: Report of the Secretary General " Para 41, UN Doc. A/50/711 & S/1995/911.

³⁹⁵ Kofi Annan, 13 April 1998 from "The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa: Report of the Secretary General " UN Doc A/52/871 & S/1998/318.

³⁹⁶ Berman & K. Sams op.cit.

³⁹⁷ E.Berman and K. Sams, 'Keeping the peace in Africa' in Kerstin Vingard (ed.) *Peacekeeping: Evolution or Extinction? Disarmament Forum*. UN Institute for Disarmament Research. UN Geneva. 2000, pp. 21-31.

Africa does still suffer from the enduring legacy of colonialism. The end of the Cold War created a power conducive to the rise and spread of internal violence. African leaders have also contributed to the problems facing their nations. It is proving increasingly difficult for the state to respond to economic, social and security challenges. The proliferation of weapons, especially small arms, as well as the migration and displacement of large numbers of people have all contributed to the spread of armed conflict.³⁹⁸ In several instances, conflicts that have started on a national level have spilled over into neighbouring countries or have assumed regional dimensions.

The circumstances of ECOMOG's creation impacted on its operations in two ways.³⁹⁹ First, it allowed for extreme flexibility and even unilateral action on the part of Nigeria, its major sponsor. This gave Nigeria advantage, because it was the force's major financial and largest troop contributor. It was therefore able to change its mandate and command without reference to ECOWAS, as would have been the case with a fully institutionalised outfit. For example, Abuja unilaterally forced the exit of the Ghanaian commander of ECOMOG less than a month into the operation, when General Mamman Kontagora, a Nigerian, was appointed as field commander. This followed the murder Of Doe by Prince Yeduo Johnson of the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). Until the elections in July 1997, all subsequent ECOMOG commanders were Nigerian as discussed in Chapter Three.

³⁹⁸ E Berman & K. Sams, ' Keeping the Peace in Africa', in Kerstin Vingard(ed) *Peacekeeping; Evolution or Extinction? Disarmament Forum*. (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. UN Geneva. 2000) pp.21-31.

³⁹⁹ A. Sesay, 'ECOMOG and Sub-Regional Security in West Africa' *Conflict Trends* Issue 3. ACCORD.

Secondly, ECOMOG became a divisive issue in ECOWAS as Francophone countries led the by Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, vehemently opposed its creation and deployment. This caused a crisis of legitimacy and seriously hampered ECOMOG's operations and effectiveness, with the presidents of Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso deriding it as a Nigerian creation and an instrument of Nigeria's hegemonic intentions in the Sub-region.

It is also worth noting that the armies of most Sub-Saharan African states are small, both in absolute and as a percentage of the population.⁴⁰⁰ Thus the total military manpower pool available is thus a little in excess of one million. But due to a variety of political and military reasons not all these troops would be able to be called upon for peacekeeping missions.⁴⁰¹

The US led Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was established to develop the capacity of the Africans to deal with their own problems, that is, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance in Africa.⁴⁰² What it provides is strictly under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter on pacific settlement of disputes as discussed in Chapter Three. It therefore falls short of the peacekeeping requirements set out by the United Nations Charter. This programme does to reflect the realities on the ground, basically referred to as complex emergencies in the post-Cold War Era.⁴⁰³ The ACRI presents nothing in the form of peacekeeping. It is purely a move towards disengagement. First of all, it is a strictly Chapter VI operation and does not reflect the realities on the ground, mainly in

⁴⁰⁰ *The Military Balance* 1994-95, published by Brassey's for the IISS.

⁴⁰¹ 'May and Cleaver,' *African Perspectives: Regional Peacekeeping*, in R. May and O. Furley, *Peacekeeping in Africa* (USA: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1998)

⁴⁰² See Chapter Three.

the African conflicts. The ACRI programme exposes the host nations' military to full range of peacekeeping tasks authorised under Chapter VI of the UN Charter: convoy escort, logistics, protection of refugees, negotiations and command and control.⁴⁰⁴ ACRI does not give attention to the realities of the conflicts in Africa. For instance, it can hardly deals with the complex environment like that in Rwanda and Somalia as discussed in Chapter Two.

Berman⁴⁰⁵ agrees that ACRI is a sign of US engagement in conflict regions, but it is a small effort. In his view, regional peacekeeping should only be left for disaster management because of the problems that are associated with peacekeeping. Deployment of peacekeepers, political aspects, finance, hegemony and sustaining member states willing to take part in an operation, are all problems associated with peacekeeping operations which regional organisations are not capable of. African countries' responses to the US proposal were based on their assessment of their security needs and the extent to which alignment with the US through participation in ACRI would advance their national interests.⁴⁰⁶

The proposal to establish it received various reactions with some countries (like Mali, Ethiopia, Senegal and Uganda) backing the proposal and others (like South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe) being non-committal. Tanzania, for example, declined the US\$ 225,000 allocated to military training in peacekeeping because it was dissatisfied that the

⁴⁰³ Interview with Col. Mulata, A.K. Peace Support Training Center, 27th April 2001.

⁴⁰⁴ Summary of The African Crisis Response Initiative. International Information Programs. US Department of State. <<http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional.af/acri/acrisumm.htm>>

⁴⁰⁵ Interview with Eric Berman, 28th May 2001.

⁴⁰⁶ P.Omach, 'ACRI: Domestic Politics and the Convergence of National interests. *African Affairs*, (2000) No.99, pp.73-95.

objectives of the ACRI were consistent with its interests.⁴⁰⁷ Most Africans also felt that the idea should come from the Africans themselves. They would like to feel that they are handling things themselves, not acting in response to suggestions that come from outside.⁴⁰⁸

The ACRI is only aimed at enhancing the capabilities of selected African military forces to enable the Africans to respond to crises by participating in peacekeeping operations in Africa under Chapter VI of the Charter of the UN. But in the armed conflict in Rwanda, much more than the Chapter VI was required. This is because the activities of the Rwandan attackers required more than what this mandate set out. The Rwanda Government Forces for instance managed to disarm some Belgian peacekeepers in Rwanda.⁴⁰⁹ The Secretary General viewing the role of the UN as that of a neutral mediator in a civil war or recognising the need to bring to an end the massacres against civilians, The Secretary General stated that the mandate contained in resolution 912(1994) did not give UNAMIR the power to take effective action to halt the massacres. There were violent demonstrations, nightly grenade attacks, assassination attempts, political and ethnic killings and armed militias of the parties were also stockpiling and preparing for arms distribution.⁴¹⁰

US Policy and the 1994 Rwanda Genocide

⁴⁰⁷ Ally Saleh, 'Tanzania rejects US military help,' Monitor (Kampala), 15 January 1998, p.2 & "Tanzania Says No to US aid for Conflict Resolution,' *The East African* (Nairobi) 26 Jan-1 Feb 1997, p.1 in Omach, P. ACRI: Domestic Politics and Convergence of National Interest. African Affairs (2000), 99,73-95.

⁴⁰⁸ Cited I 'An American in Africa', *The east African* 14-20 October 1996,p.8 in P.Omach ACRI; ...

⁴⁰⁹ See Chapter Four

⁴¹⁰ Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the UN During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. 15 Dec1999.

Kuperman points a finger at American leaders for earlier action, which contributed to ethnic violence in places such as Bosnia, Rwanda and Iraq. He refers to the inadequate or dilatory US intervention as men responsible for many of the decade's worst humanitarian offences. Too much US diplomatic intervention inadvertently raised the false hope of follow up military intervention that triggered a series of events culminating in ethnic cleansing or genocide.⁴¹¹

He describes the situation in Rwanda and other countries as a phenomenon that is not new. First, an oppressive government discriminates against a subordinate group within its borders. Initially the group does not rise up because it knows that doing so will lead to its slaughter. The group then gets the attention of western human rights advocates and the media, who pressure the US and other western states to issue warnings to the oppressive government. The group infers optimistically from this rhetoric that the west will come to its rescue if it provokes a violent crackdown, and therefore escalates its insurgency. The government realising henceforth the group represents a threat to its continued authority, chooses to eliminate the group from the territory through genocide or ethnic cleansing. The Hutu in 1994 took these steps right from the 1950's.⁴¹² Westerners, afraid of risking casualties or comprising higher interests, do not deploy troops until violence ceased, prompting the human rights groups to decry the feeble response. American officials later say, they should have intervened sooner. In

⁴¹¹ Alan Kuperman, "False Hope Abroad; Promises to intervene often bring Bloodshed," *Washington Post* June 14, 1998, Sunday, Final Edition. <<http://www.nexis.com/research.search/do>>

⁴¹² See Chapter four for the Short History of Conflict in Rwanda.

Rwanda, this case was evident. After the genocide, American authorities said they should have intervened immediately they got reports about the genocide.

The west took sides with the rebels at the Arusha peace negotiations of 1992-93 using foreign aid and trade as leverage to compel Rwanda's government to concede on key points and pledging a multilateral peacekeeping force to guarantee Tutsi security during the transition. This western tilt however, emboldened the Tutsi to be uncompromising in their demands, which in turn helped radicalise the Hutu to seek a final solution. Only after the genocide against the Tutsi did the US intervene to provide humanitarian assistance in neighbouring Zaire that harboured perpetrators of the killings.⁴¹³ In his first visit to Rwanda, President Clinton issued an apology and asserted that:⁴¹⁴ "We come here today partly in recognition of the fact that we in the US and the world community did not do as much as we could have and should have done to try to limit what occurred in Rwanda."⁴¹⁵ In this statement he indirectly acknowledged neglect of the US of the people of Rwanda.

Quick US intervention could reduce such carnage. The loss of the 18 US soldiers in Somalia in October 1993, made the Americans wary of sending troops into ongoing civil wars like that in Rwanda⁴¹⁶ The conflict in Somalia should however not have been the one to make them judge the situation in Rwanda. There was need to strategize and use a different approach in solving the conflict in Rwanda.

⁴¹³ See Chapter four for further information on this.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ S.Power, 'Bystanders to Genocide', *Atlantic Monthly* September 2000.

⁴¹⁶ See previous chapter.

Washington had actually anticipated the atrocities in Rwanda and was in a position to stop it before it became worse as it did. According to Booker "The US response was literally running away from any responsibility."⁴¹⁷ According to a report⁴¹⁸ it is made clear that "the US was aware but decided not only not to stop genocide, but also to prevent others from intervening in a way that could have saved hundreds or thousands of lives." To Ferroggiaro⁴¹⁹ "no one had the political will to act. There were advocates for an initiative but bureaucratic infighting slowed the US response to the genocide." "US officials knew exactly who was leading the genocide, and actually spoke with leaders to urge an end to violence." The killing rampage that was triggered by the April 6, 1994 after the death of President Habyarimana in a suspicious plane crash should have served as enough warning of the coming genocide. Because within hours of the crash, extremist Hutu militias backed by elements of the armed forces set up roadblocks and barricades in preparation for the 100-day massacre that would eventually take the lives of as many as 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu. Even after images of mutilated bodies began appearing on television screens, US officials never classified the killings as genocide for fear it would compel the US to intervene.

Accordingly, diplomatic efforts should focus on preventing the outbreak of ethnic cleansing and genocide in the first instance. American officials should do everything they can to avoid a false message to oppressed groups that it would intervene on their behalf.

⁴¹⁷ Salih Booker, Director of the Africa Policy Center, reacting to documents released on 20 August 2001 by the National Security Archive, showing that as bloodthirsty Hutu militias fanned out across Rwanda, US diplomats advocated "an early withdrawal" of the Rwanda-based UN force known as UNAMIR that some believe could have helped protect civilians in Rwanda.

⁴¹⁸ Declassified official documents released on 21 August 2001 showing Washington anticipated events now seen as among the most gruesome atrocities in the late 20th Century. "US 'Ran from Rwanda Responsibility'" By Maxim Kniazkov. *Agence France Presse* August 22, 2001

Once these groups realise they are on their own, they are less likely to rise up and cause trouble.

Chapter four discussed the establishment of the UNAMIR. This made the Tutsi, who were already victimised at home become tragic victims of the poor timing and delay of the force to the country. In April, powerful individuals in the US government were actively rewriting the rules of international politics. They implemented changes that went beyond merely revising the ground rules for peacekeeping so that the dispatch of United Nations troops to the world's trouble spots would be almost impossible.⁴²⁰ They knowingly stood as genocide occurred. The situation was made more disastrous with the introduction of the PDD 25. This document effectively ruled out serious peace enforcement whatsoever by the UN for the future operations. This initiative deterred the UN secretariat from advocating stronger measures to protect Rwandan citizens. The PDD 25 led to a virtual embargo on the use of USA ground forces and severe budgetary cuts. The US also used its position of leverage within the UN to impose constraints on future UN operations.⁴²¹

The decision essentially to withdraw the force as the genocide was gathering had enormous practical and political consequences inside Rwanda. It made it impossible for existing troops to expand their efforts to protect the tens of thousands of Tutsis who had taken refuge in churches and schools throughout the country, and sent an unmistakable

⁴¹⁹ W.Ferrogiano, Project Director of the National Security Archives, an Independent Research Agency.

⁴²⁰ R.Omaar & A.de Waal, "Genocide in Rwanda", *Covert Action Quarterly* 2001

<http://mediafilter.org/caq/CAQ52Rwanda.html>

⁴²¹ Albright, M. K . 'Building a Consensus on International peacekeeping', a statement before the senate Foreign Relations Committee on 20.10.93, reproduced in the Department of State *Dispatch*, vol. 4, no.46.

message to the genocidal forces that there would be no impediment to their finishing the job.

There were no nations, which wanted to contribute troops, and there was also no mandate for UNAMIR to use lethal force to even protect neither itself nor the Rwanda civilians. When the decision was made killings were still largely confined to Kigali and its environs and it is possible that in the early days of the genocide a relatively small force which had appropriate vehicles, weapons and mandate, could have protected itself and concentrations of Tutsi in the capitol, and send an unmistakable signal to the presidential guard and militia to stop the killings. Such a force could also have dismantled the roadblocks, which were erected in Kigali and were rapidly going up all over Rwanda, and helped keep Tutsi civilians in their homes.⁴²²

Col. Scott Feil, in "Preventing Genocide, How the Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda," notes Rwandan Tutsi are thoroughly integrated into communities and are not easily identified by appearance or name. Thus the militia and Rwanda army soldiers bent on exterminating the Tutsi had to first get whole villages moving and funnel everyone through checkpoints where identity cards could be checked and Tutsi then separated for extermination. "Under these circumstances, measures to prevent people from leaving their villages would be extremely important; "safe sites," smaller and more easily defended community groupings, would be the best way to stabilise and secure the population in Rwanda."

⁴²² Congressional Testimony by Holly Burkhalter on behalf of Physicians for Human Rights on the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and US Policy. 26 May 1998, Document reposted by African Policy -APIC

The US should not have sabotaged humanitarian intervention in Rwanda because this only worsened the situation. After the April 21 decision to reduce UNAMIR forces, mass killing skyrocketed. On April 29, Secretary General B.B. Ghali, asked the Security Council to reconsider its decision and to consider "forceful action to restore law and order and end the massacres." On May 2, the Secretary General wrote to African heads of State requesting troops for an African peacekeeping force. At the time the US President said the US would only help in financing, equipping and transportation. The African force however never materialised. In Part, US refusal to commit its own troops to the effort reduced the prestige of the mission and discouraged troop-contributing nations which would have been eager to join an American-led intervention. Accordingly, the UN Secretary General floated a new plan - UNAMIR II that would enlarge the existing contingent by 800 men and augment it with another battalion within a few weeks. The mandate for UNAMIR II was limited to obtaining a cease-fire, supporting humanitarian assistance, and opening the airport. The US offered an alternative plan, and weeks were lost in negotiating the differences. Finally on May 17, the Security Council voted unanimously to support a compromise plan. But even then, the US insisted that the mandate of the force (which included no Americans) not be expanded to include the Use of Force to stop killings and demanded a review of the plan before its actual implementation, including before initial planned deployment of 150 military observers. Moreover, the Pentagon successfully blocked even the provision of vehicles and equipment, which, had they been provided, could at least have been used by the existing UNAMIR troops to enhance their security and enable them to travel outside Kigali to defend concentrations of displaced Tutsi in the countryside.

The armoured personnel carriers (APC) that Washington promised to provide in two weeks after the UN formally requested 50 APCs from them on May 19 should have been provided immediately. For two months the US managed to stall on its commitment: weeks were lost while bureaucrats differed over how much the US would be reimbursed for their use. Weeks later there were hot debates over whether to use tracked or treaded vehicles. Further, time was lost while it was determined that the vehicles were the wrong colour, then no one was able to figure out how to transport the vehicles from Frankfurt to the African continent, and so on.⁴²³

The Role of the United Nations

The United Nations, as discussed in Chapter One, was founded at the end of the Cold War during which genocide had been committed on a horrific scale. The prime objective was to prevent such a conflict from ever happening again. Three years after, the General Assembly adopted the genocide convention under which states accepted to "prevent and punish" this most heinous of crimes. However, in 1994, the world witnessed an act of genocide in Rwanda that went against this act. The whole international community, for example the UN and its member states, failed to honour the obligation. Their fellow countrymen and women, by virtue of belonging to a particular ethnic group, were massacred approximately 800,000 Rwandees. The UN and its member states failed to prevent this genocide. There was a UN force in the country at the

⁴²³ <http://www.africapolicy.org/docs98/rwan9805.2.htm> Doc reposted by APIC Rwanda: Genocide and the US policy. 26th May 1998.

time but it was neither mandated nor equipped for the kind of forceful action, which would have been needed to prevent or halt the genocide.⁴²⁴

The international community's reluctance to intervene in the conflict in Rwanda served as a way to encourage the massacres in Rwanda. Dallaire's comment after the genocide was significant: "If I had had the mandate, the men and the equipment, hundreds of thousands of people would be alive today."⁴²⁵ The international community in the form of the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda was not able to provide an effective practical response or any form of moral leadership as discussed in chapter four. It did not react immediately to the numerous warning signs for the apocalypse that was unleashed after 6th April. First, the transitional government process had stalled. Booh Booh and Dallaire, who met Habyarimana on 6th Jan 1994, had urged him to be flexible in finding a solution to the deadlock. Dallaire in the meeting informed the President of the weapons being distributed by the president's supporters. The Headquarters did not even react to his cable of the registration of the Tutsi by the *Interahamwe* in Kigali, and the plan to exterminate them; and generally reports informing about the deterioration of the situation in Rwanda, up to early 1994. The human rights activist, Biramvu criticised the UN and expressed disappointment in the UN, '...No, I didn't expect UNAMIR to protect each and every person who felt vulnerable. But what we could not understand is that after the

⁴²⁴ Statement on receiving the report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The Secretary General 16th December 1999.

⁴²⁵ Comment by General R. Dallaire, then military commander of UNAMIR, 24 July 1994 in. African Rights, revised 1995 Edition. *Rwanda; Death, Despair and Defiance*.

assassination of the President of CDR on 21st February, the world would pass people being killed and houses being burned and they did nothing."⁴²⁶

The experience of the UN in Rwanda was not new, given the number of operations it had carried out in the continent even before the genocide. The work of the organisation failed because it did not first address the structural sources of the conflict. It did not respond to the early warning signs that were clear and the reports about the situation deteriorating in the country. The UN should have an idea of what exactly a peacekeeping operation is supposed to do, Michael Walzer states that ' humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations are first of all military acts directed against peoples who are already using force, breaking the peace.'⁴²⁷ The UN should realise that peacekeeping is an activity that already bears military acts and that before any operation, there is need to assess the situation that prevails in the conflict in order to lay the best strategy that ends successfully. It should be aware that conflict in the post-Cold War period are complex and require attention. This is because in circumstances where there is no peace to be kept, peacekeeping forces have been forced to use coercion to secure a safe environment for transportation and communication in order to disseminate humanitarian assistance. Chapter Two and part of Chapter Four discuss the problems faced by peacekeepers.

The organisation should also have made assessment on the multifaceted and complex conflict and not just develop fear out of the results in Somalia. There was the political conflict inside Rwanda, the conflict between the Rwandan government and the

⁴²⁶ African Rights, *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*. Revised 1995 edition.

⁴²⁷ M.Walzer (1995) 'The Politics of Rescue', *Social Research*, Vol. 62, No.1, p.58.

Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)- a body of "mixed Rwandees refugees" that waged a "comeback home" war in the Rwanda government from Uganda on the 1st October 1990. Most of those in the Force were serving with Uganda's National Resistance Army, mainly Rwandan refugees formerly living in Uganda. There was also conflict, which resulted from the October 1st invasion by the RPF.⁴²⁸

Africa's efforts for peacekeeping involvement is a desirable and useful action since most often the Africans themselves know their problems and therefore are able to deal with them. But the African peacekeeping experience and military capabilities explain the predicament of the efforts of regional and sub-regional organisations. The experience of ECOMOG discussed in Chapter Three and Four provide for the limitations of regional peacekeeping.

It can be drawn from the many capacity-building initiatives that Western countries are willing to become militarily involved in African conflicts. They actually hope to obviate their need to intervene directly in Africa through the provision of peacekeeping related training, instruction and equipment.

To Berman and Sams⁴²⁹ these programmes designed by the West to develop African peacekeeping capabilities, is not a complete answer to these problems. These initiatives vary considerably in terms of their levels of financial and political commitment as well as their primary emphases. Most of them provide training, equipment or financing to African regional organisations or directly.⁴³⁰

⁴²⁸ D. Kamukama, "Pride and Prejudice in Ethnic Relations: Rwanda. In *Arms and Daggers in the heart of Africa: Studies in International Conflicts* by P.A. Nyong'o (ed) (Nairobi: Academy Science Publishers, 1993) pp.133-160.

To make Africans more self sufficient, it is important to provide them with appropriate peacekeeping related equipment and logistical assistance. These will enable African peacekeepers to respond effectively to crises in their continent. The west only concentrates on providing low-level training and instruction. The US furnishes only a small amount of non-lethal equipment to ACRI participants and the UK provides no equipment through its peacekeeping training and support.⁴³¹ Further, bilateral western capacity building initiatives only respond principally to domestic political concerns. They do not address the limitations of the Africans in peacekeeping. Evidence can be drawn from the initial proposal to create an African force (ACRF) to permit the US to work towards resolving African conflicts without having to commit troops. This emerged out of the fear of Burundi emerging into another Rwanda where the US faced difficulties and suffered losses.

Despite these western shortcomings, the US initiatives also have positive contributions to Africa. The west is channelling a lot of resources into Africa. The initiatives impart valuable practical and theoretical skills to participating countries and further, they are willing to alter their programmes in response to perceived shortcomings and criticisms. There has also been co-operation between and among the western and African states with regard to issues related to peace and security.⁴³² This co-operation has proved helpful and quite important especially for Africa's determination to build their

⁴²⁹ E. Berman & K. Sams, 'Keeping the Peace in Africa' in Kirstin Vingar (ed) *Peacekeeping: Evolution or Extinction? Disarmament Forum*. UN Institute for disarmament Research. UN, Geneva. 2000. Pp.21-31.

⁴³⁰ See Chapter Three.

⁴³¹ E. Berman & K. Sams, 'Keeping the Peace in Africa' in Kirstin Vingar (ed) *Peacekeeping: Evolution or Extinction? Disarmament Forum*. (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. UN Geneva, 2000)pp 21-31.

⁴³² Ibid.

own forces, to deal with issues related to peace and stability. For example, the Department of Defence of Kenya established the Peace Support Training Centre in May 2001. The Department is aimed at providing education and training to both the military and academic personnel on the ways of improving the capabilities of the African forces in peacekeeping operations. The US and the UK have provided equipment, books and funds for the functioning of the Centre. The joint military training by the US and the Kenyan military provide skills for the Africans to be able to tackle their own problems. The ACRI programme launched in Nanyuki on 18 April 2001 too proved useful. It involved many activities such as the rehabilitation of communities, schools, improvement of security, restoring tourist sites and mainly training. US\$ 20 Million was disbursed for the programme.⁴³³

The programmes under the US also vary in terms of their levels of financial and political commitment and primary emphases. As discussed in Chapter Three, most of them provide training, equipment and financing to African countries either directly or through regional organisations. For instance, the UK African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme focuses on education and training. France, through its *Reinforcement des Capacites Africaines de Maintien de la paix* (RECAMP), conducts sub-regional peacekeeping training exercises, provides classroom instruction and lends heavy equipment in designated locations in Africa. The ACRI provides training and related non-lethal equipment to African countries on a bilateral basis.

⁴³³ The KTN News, 18th April 2001.

There is a significant disparity between Africa's inabilities and needs, and the west's abilities and predisposition'. The Africans are at an advantage, as they possess the troops and the will to intervene. Unfortunately, they have no means. Western countries still pursue policies that reflect their own needs and are reluctant to devote the required resources with the speed with which the situation demands.⁴³⁴ Western programmes emphasis on capacity building represents a long-term approach .Too much should not be expected of them in the short term. The time frame for African countries and regional arrangements to capably assume responsibility for peacekeeping operations on their own continent is not "two, three or five years, but rather twenty, thirty or fifty years"⁴³⁵ It still requires many more years to undertake effective peacekeeping regional peacekeeping is an important step in conflict resolution. But the problems associated with these make the initiatives ineffective. African countries have no capacity to mount peacekeeping forces. Most have to be sustained by the west. Further regional peacekeeping can create hatred between and among countries with some feeling that others are playing a hegemonic role or impinging on their freedom to act. Many African countries also have their own political problems that getting involved in peacekeeping activities would be given a second priority in their daily agenda, or no thought at all, but not seen as a serious project.

The US and all other countries willing to participate in UN peacekeeping should contribute genuinely to the UN to help it pursue its goal of world peace and stability. The

⁴³⁴ E.Berman and K.Sams, 'Keeping the Peace in Africa' in K. Vingard (ed.) *Peacekeeping; Evolution or Extinction? Disarmament Research*. UN, Geneva.2000, pp.21-31.

⁴³⁵ Col. Francois Dureau, the chief of staff of the military adviser to the Secretary General, in an interview, UN Department Peacekeeping Keeping Operations, New York, 22 June 1999.

UN should be left to direct peacekeeping activities without influence from member states unless the influence is positive. A meaningful response to existing and future conflicts should be found to face the new challenges of peacekeeping. Relying so much on decisions by the west makes the UN ineffective and unable to immediately take action in crisis.

The deployment of UN observers to complement non-UN peacekeeping forces is more likely to create tensions than serve as either useful check and balance or a confidence building measure, as the regional force feels scrutinised⁴³⁶ if the UN observer mission is critical in its reporting, tensions will increase. There is also a tendency of the small observer mission to withhold criticism to maintain good relations between the small observer mission and the larger mission, since it depends on the agree mission for security.

A New Peacekeeping Policy

From the experience of the UNAMIR and UNAMIR II, there is need to develop new policies which would permit a more useful response in the event of futures genocide. First, because of American leadership at the SC, the US has the capacity to slow deliberations on Humanitarian intervention to a virtual standstill, eve when there are no American troops involved. Some of the obstruction and delay in 1994 were necessitated by the fact that expanded UNAMIR and other humanitarian initiatives were ad hoc. Some delays were also because of the American representatives who are ever mindful of congress's opposition to paying its UN dues or participating in its operations, who put the brakes while they scrutinised every detail of every new initiative. That is understandable,

but in 1994 the genocide killers moved much more quickly than did the US and UN bureaucrats. While the US officials demanded reviews, plodded through Pentagon and UN procurement bureaucracies, and checked Congress's pulses about intervention, hundreds of thousands of civilians were butchered.⁴³⁷

The US needs to change its policies and new introduce policies. The US government policies should be to respond vigorously and affirmatively to genocide in order to have a different outcome than that of Rwanda. The peacekeeping policy (The PDD 25) introduced in 1994 during the genocide should be changed. The PDD 25 was promulgated at the height of the genocide, on May 1994. It appeared to have been designed to thwart American anticipation situations just like Rwanda's, including such requirements that any UN mission be a response to threats to international peace and security, must advance American interests at acceptable risk, and must have adequate command and control procedures and an exit strategy.

The US should change its peacekeeping policy in Africa. If peacekeeping policy was changed so that suppressing genocide was identified as a vital American interest and included among the purpose of US peacekeeping policy, a host of activities that the executive branch might engage in to operationalize that goal would be great. Steps could include offering US military advice to the UN peacekeeping office to draw up interventionary plans on an urgent basis in advance of an actual outbreak of genocide so that the weeks of fumbling during the Rwanda genocide might be avoided. The Pentagon

⁴³⁶ E.Berman and K, Sams, 'Keeping the Peace in Africa' in Kerstin Vingard (ed.) *Peacekeeping: Evolution or Extinction? Disarmament Forum*. UN Institute for Disarmament Research. (UN, Geneva) 2000. pp.21-31

should be ordered to do what the UN has long desired locate, refurbish, and designate a supply of vehicles and equipment, which could be seconded to the UN on an urgent basis when needed. Only the UN's exceeds the Pentagon's red tape for procurement. That red tape must be obliterated in times of genocide. The president should order that supplies and equipment and vehicles be identified now, for possible use in times of crisis, and supply them immediately. Congress should warmly support the initiative. But in some cases, these measures alone may not be sufficient to prevent or stop genocide. In such circumstances of genocide, our own government should offer troops, as well as the material and technical assistance described above, to stop the killing.⁴³⁸

The ACRI can best serve at the behest of the UN or the OAU. ACRI is a classic peacekeeping initiative (Chapter VI) but not a designed to play a Chapter VII role. The ACRI model advance training of certain units in a number of countries, in advance of any specific crisis. Some have come with proposals that ten countries (not necessarily African) can each designate 5,000 troops that would train together as a unit on a regular basis at a UN/US peacekeeping training facility. They would be reimbursed at UN rates, and groups of them would be available for an operation. Commanders for each unit would have been identified long before the intervention and would have trained with the troops and familiar to each other. Thus instead of a pick-up scramble at the last minute -- when chances of success are lowest -- a trained and ready fighting force would be available for intervention before a genocidal situation spiralled out of control.⁴³⁹

⁴³⁷ Congressional Testimony by Holly Burkhalter on behalf of Physicians for Human Rights on the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and US Policy.

⁴³⁸ Ibid.

⁴³⁹ Proposal cited at the posting containing the Second part of congressional testimony (above)

The West's refusal to suppress the genocide in Rwanda was extraordinarily costly in three ways:⁴⁴⁰ First and foremost, it was costly in the terrible loss of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi Rwandan men, women and children and of the courageous Hutu civilians who sheltered them. A second casualty of the genocide was the image and thus the potential effectiveness of the United Nations and its various organisations. In particular, the UN's failure to stop the genocide and subsequent refusal to disarm the camps -- assured, in part, by the US -- has contributed to a "go it alone" mentality on the part of the Rwandan authorities that has had disastrous consequences for human rights in Rwanda and Congo.

The International Role

The international community should have reacted once there were signs of the war ahead, and no one should have interfered with their action. In the months prior to 6 April 1994, there was evidence of a germinating, large-scale outburst of violence accumulating. In the first months of 1994, UNAMIR learned of four secret plane loads of arms intervened. It placed the shipment under its joint supervision to prevent its distribution to the army and stopped delivery of three others, but said nothing to the public about the dangerous, organised build-up.⁴⁴¹ Action to prevent the conflict should have been taken immediately the signs of war were evident. Hiding the picture of the whole situation did not build, but destroy Rwanda.

The president Habyarimana, even as he pursued ethnic violence to keep his political power, he stayed alert to any international reaction to the killings. The country

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid

depended a lot on donor nations before and during the war to keep the government running. Foreigners resident in Rwanda, such as diplomats and experts, the clergy and technocrats, also wanted to maintain the positive image of the country, which was seen as little but clean, well-organised and hardworking. Even as evidence of human rights abuses mounted, many were reluctant to admit wrongdoing by the government. Even representatives of the major donors in Kigali were unwilling to admit that ethnic conflict posed serious risks.⁴⁴²

The Security Council should always act immediately in crisis once the signs or warnings come to their knowledge. It should deploy forces without referring to another conflict and think of failure even before it has tried to settle the conflict. But it should also be knowledgeable on the existing situation before any activity is undertaken. When an operation carried out, it should be willing and ready to provide enough resources and clear mandates.

The Security Council was not aware of the reluctance of Habyarimana in signing the accord.⁴⁴³ It also failed to devote enough resources necessary to ensure that the hard-won Accords were actually implemented, partly because they counted on an easy success and partly because they were not disposed to invest much in resolving the conflict in Rwanda.⁴⁴⁴ Although the accords called for a UN peacekeeping force to arrive thirty days after the signing of the agreement, this did not happen. Instead it took three weeks

⁴⁴¹ Scott Peterson, *Me Against my Brothers: At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda* (New York: Routledge, 2000)

⁴⁴² Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. Human Rights Watch. (New York; Washington, London. Brussels. 1999. p. 92.

⁴⁴³ Look at Chapter Four on Arusha Peace Agreement.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid

beyond the thirty-seven days for the Security Council even to pass their resolution creating the force. Such delay jeopardized the agreement.⁴⁴⁵

The UN was slow and stingy in Rwanda, as seen in the number of troops deployed.⁴⁴⁶ The US, which was assessed 31% of UN peacekeeping costs had suffered from enormous 370% increase in peacekeeping expenses from 1992 to 1993 and was in the process of reviewing its policy on such operations. In the meantime, it was determined to keep the costs of the Rwandan operations as low as possible, which meant limiting the size of the force. One UN military expert had recommended that UNAMIR include a minimum of 8,000 soldiers. General Dallaire had asked for 4,500 soldiers. The US initially proposed 5000. But when the SC finally acted on October 5, 1993, it established the UNAMIR at a level of 2,548 troops.

Worse still, UNAMIRs budget was formally approved on April 4, 1994, just two days before beginning of the genocide. It did not receive essential equipment and supplies because of delays in funding and administration problems. It also lacked the reserves such as basic commodities as food and medicine as well as military supplies.⁴⁴⁷

Proposals from scholars have been raised in recent times concerning peace enforcement to settle disputes. Scholars have argued that there can be no peacekeeping without peace enforcement. For the first time over 30 years, the UN Security Council, after an agreement on the mandate on the UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), authorised the use of force beyond self-defence as a part of a peacekeeping operation in

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid

⁴⁴⁶ Adelman, H and Suhrke, A 'Early Warning,' in *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis, From Uganda to Zaire.* p.35.

Somalia. This, however, had an effect and had hard d lessons about this relatively rare approach to dealing with conflict.

In December 1992, the SC authorised a multilateral -although not UN- mission to deliver humanitarian aid to Somalia. The government had collapsed during the civil and the people were suffering from famine and drought. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) led by the USA arrived to replace the existing small and ineffective UNOSOM I, which had been unable to provide sufficient security to safely deliver relief to the people. Although UNITAF made important strides in relieving the effects of the famine, the US did not wish to maintain a long-term presence in Somalia. In May, 1993, UNOSOM II was created by the UN to; restore peace, stability, law and order; provide security and assistance in bringing home refugees and resettling displaced persons; monitor the arms embargo against the various Somali factions and facilitate disarmament and to assist in the provision of relief and in the economic development of Somalia.

The efforts of UNITAF had been to disarm the Somali faction, which battled in Mogadishu. However, when UNOSOM II tried to disarm General Aideed's faction, it suffered its worst death toll in history in such a short period. 23 were killed and 54 wounded and there were many civilian casualties. Further losses were suffered by the US and UNOSOM when the US stepped up actions against Aideed. The US later announced its withdrawal. Other contributors wee also set to withdraw. UNOSOM later left Somalia

⁴⁴⁷ H. Adelman and A. Suhrke, 'Early Warning,' *The Rwanda Crisis: From Uganda to Zaire*. (New Brunswick, USA, & London, Transaction Publishers, 1999) p 36.

as scheduled, on March 1995. In the end, about 800 urban guerrilla fighters managed to severely disrupt a UN force of 28,000.⁴⁴⁸

From this experience, peace enforcement cannot be conducted by peacekeeping force. Not even when the force is used by a properly mandated peace enforcement operation. It requires political negotiations rather than peace enforcement to provide the ultimate solution to a conflict. Where UN troops and national forces of a UN member are operating in the same theatre, command of the two forces should be united or tightly coordinated. All contingents operating under UN command should be prepared to abide by the decisions of the UN commanders. Peace enforcement operations demand a strategic plan and military force.⁴⁴⁹

From the implications of operation 'Restore Hope': we learn that an enforcement force needs an offensive capability; that operational command should go to the country providing the largest contingent; that a combined command structure should be established - in the Somali case, between the US and the UN. In the Somali case, UNOSOM UNITAF, in operation 'Restore Hope', clearly did not bring peace to Somalia. The UN never ended its mission there. The issue of disarming the clans was never settled, the country's insecurity remained alarming, and Somalia had not returned into normal life,⁴⁵⁰ leading to the SC recommendations for transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.

⁴⁴⁸ *Peace, Security and Conflict Prevention. SIPRI-UNESCO Handbook.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) pp.59 & 60.

⁴⁴⁹ *SIPRI-UNESCO Handbook. Peace, Security and Conflict Prevention.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) pp.59 & 60.

⁴⁵⁰ A.Zacarias, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping,* (New York and London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996) p.71.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

This study sought to find the effects of US involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. The more the US gets involved in peacekeeping initiatives, it is assumed, the more conflicts recur in the African continent. The US actions and policies and the international community's failure to act mainly hindered the efforts of the UN take action in the genocide in Rwanda.

However, as Nyong'o says, 'conflicts do not just occur, they have a history'⁴⁵¹ the conflict in Rwanda in 1994 had its history from the past. The problem dated back to 1959 when there was the very first conflict. The causes were however, not looked into and therefore not solved. The problem was then complicated by other issues such as the refugees, the coming of the Belgians and the socio-economic and political problems, which were again not solved. The Rwandese thus suppressed these problems. The problem cannot therefore be entirely a result of US interference or inaction of the US and the UN even after warning signs of the genocide.

From the study, there were various causes of conflict as described in Chapter One. The US cannot be wholly blamed for the recurrent conflict in Rwanda. It is admitted that most of the actions and policies of the US towards Africa in general and in particular in Rwanda, made it impossible for the UN to deploy forces to stop the genocide. Its interference in the work of the UN was disastrous to the Rwandese.

⁴⁵¹ P.A.Nyong'o (ed) *Arms and Daggers in the heart of Africa: Studies in international Conflicts*. (Nairobi: Academy Science Publishers, 1993) pp133-160.

However, the international community also played a part in the conflict, and therefore should be partly blamed for not stopping the killings. They did not react immediately to the conflict in Rwanda. The UNAMIR did not also respond to the warnings before the genocide. Many other problems of the Rwandans were not tackled before the conflict, such as their ethnic differences and the refugee problems. Its bureaucracy too contributed to the worsening of the problem in the country. It should be noted that, in fact some of the reasons for the occurrence of the conflict in Rwanda were a problem of the Rwandese themselves.

Whether or not the United States becomes involved in peacekeeping operations in African, conflicts will still persist in the region. As long as the root causes of the conflicts are not tackled and solved in Rwanda, there is a likelihood of another conflict occurring in future. This is not a unique problem to other African countries; the same is likely to occur in any other country. This is because the issues such as the socio-economic problems, problems of the illegitimacy of governments, the refugee problem, and others, face African countries today. The US as a superpower only comes in to help resolve these conflicts. Although in the process, some failures and successes are experienced. Its contribution has proven negative and positive to the countries involved in conflicts.

The US-led programme, the ACRI, as discussed in the study has proven important. However it also has got its disadvantages. This and other western programmes only acknowledge reluctance from the west to become involved in African conflicts. However, as discussed in Chapter Two, recent events, particularly in the post-Cold War period, have highlighted the difficulties that the UN has had in establishing peacekeeping missions in complex conflict environments. The US, normally working with the UN, has

suffered losses while carrying out these operations. This complex nature of peacekeeping, risky and costly, partly explains why the US and other western countries are eager to have the Africans build their own peacekeeping capacity so that in cases of crises, the African forces would intervene.

The policy the US has set down for carrying out peacekeeping operations should be revised in order to have these operations run smoothly and therefore avoids much crises and costs. The UN as an international body should be left with the responsibility as required by the Charter. Contributions must be made to the body to help it carryout its responsibility of peace and security. The root causes of conflicts in Rwanda and other parts of the continent should be looked into and tackled to avoid occurrence of conflicts in Africa. This study also calls for a revision of the US policies in the UN and the independence of the UN, but with strong support of the member countries and the members of the Security Council.

African states need to be able to conduct full range operations that encompass both traditional peacekeeping and at times peace enforcement in order to succeed. The conflicts at times need peace enforcement to some extent to settle and bring parties to end it. Political will to intervene is important. In order to achieve political will, where all countries will be required to intervene in cases of crisis, there is need for proper organisational structures and institutions in Africa. Through the organisations, administrative and financial assistance can be provided for the peacekeeping forces. Through these arrangements, peacekeeping forces can funded. This will help curb financial, logistical and administrative problems that have faced peacekeeping missions.

All peacekeeping missions should always have clear mandates in order to avoid confusion when carrying out operations. Clear mandates reduce cases of extension of mandates, which are time consuming, and also waste of resources. The mandate of a force also needs to be agreed upon by the participants and clearly enunciated to those affected, the parties to the conflict. Further, for a peacekeeping mission to work successfully there must be a peace to keep. All parties to a conflict must express commitment to a peace accord in order to have the operations successful. No mission should assume that the parties are satisfied without the provisions of an agreement when it is not the case.

The genocide in Rwanda led to serious destruction of the social fabric and economic infrastructure. This means that the politics of the country need crucial address to ethnic relations and consciousness. The refugee problem must also be addressed. The states must also address the diplomatic and a foreign policy relation who was strained because of the refugee activities who fled the country after atrocities committed in the years of conflict prior to the 1994 genocide. The exclusion of one group of the population in politics and decision-making should be avoided. This will remove resentment and the desire to revenge and resort to war. The Hutu and Tutsi have a history of a culture of violence. There should be political will to the equal sharing of power and economic resources. Because if these issues are not addressed the possibility of more conflicts recurring in the country is inevitable.

The United Nations and the international community must realise the changing aspects of peacekeeping. The aspect of humanitarian assistance has become part of the peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War.

The introduction of new policies and programmes by the West should be a warning sign to the Africans. The West may provide financial and humanitarian assistance but may not be ready to engage their own ground troops in African conflicts. These calls for the Africans to rethink about enhancing their own capacity to engage in conflicts, rather than depend entirely on international action in their own conflicts.

In Rwanda the US did much more than fail to send troops to end the mission and led successful effort to remove most of United Nations Peacekeepers who were already in Rwanda. The US also worked to block the subsequent authorisation of UN reinforcements. The Hutu used the private radio broadcasting station to co-ordinate and perpetrate the genocide but the US did not use its technology to stop these radio broadcasts. This made the Hutu go on with the massacres confidently without fear. For fear of obligation to act, the US officials avoided the use of the term genocide. Instead it referred to the massive massacres as acts of genocide.

Future UN peacekeeping operations should have support from the entire international community. The US has the power to make contributions to the United Nations. Its policies should however be of positive importance to the conflicts in the world including Africa. The operations should be totally under UN. Member states can contribute funds towards this in the UN. But the US, which has a veto power in the UN, should not take advantage of this to meet its interests. It should not make policies that contribute to a damaging effect both to the UN and those countries in conflict. The idea of undertaking peacekeeping operations or not should come from the various UN member countries.

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