## EVALUATING EFFORTS TO RESETTLE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS: A CASE STUDY OF MOLO CONFLICT AREA, 1990-2012.

BY

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## DECLARATION

This research is my original work and has not been presented in any other University or College for the award of degree, diploma or certificate.

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#### **SUPERVISOR**

This work has been submitted with my approval as University supervisor.

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# **DEDICATION**

This work is dedicated to all internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kenya.

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I am solely responsible for any shortcomings, error of omissions and commission found in this study.

#### ABSTRACT

Internal displacement is a big problem facing Africa and the world today. This problem has gained prominence over the refugee problem due to the increase in intra-state conflicts. This study evaluates the responses made to the internal displacement problem in Kenya and specifically in Molo conflict area. This includes responses by different actors including the government, non- governmental organizations (hereafter NGOs), civil society and religious leaders towards a durable solution to the internal displacement problem in Kenya.

Three main objectives guided this study. The first was to examine resettlement programmes in Molo conflict area. These were programmes that had been initiated by either the government or other non-state actors. The second objective of the study was to identify challenges of resettling IDPs in the area of study. These challenges were classified into those facing IDPs in the post-resettlement period and those challenges that the people and institutions resettling them faced in the process. The third objective of the study was to investigate the effectiveness of the resettlement programmes.

This study tested three hypotheses. First, that current resettlement practice does not adequately cater for the internally displaced in Molo district. Second, that failure to adequately tackle the IDP problem is as a result of the lack of a national IDP policy and thirdly that resettlement programmes in the area of study have been ineffective.

The study utilized the social contract theoretical framework which gives an understanding on the responsibility of a government to its citizenry. It, therefore, has a duty to ensure that citizens, including IDPs, enjoy the right to life, shelter and ownership of property. This study thus examined ingredients necessary for successful resettlement which is a first step towards durable peace in Kenya and specifically in the area of study.

The study found out that indeed various resettlement programmes had been initiated in the area of study. However, it was found that this process had not achieved a durable solution to the IDP problem. The resettled people continue to face various challenges, for example, lack of a livelihood. Another finding is that reconciliation between the communities still requires a lot of intervention. The land issue still poses a major threat. It is hoped that the current constitutional

dispensation and the land reforms envisioned in this environment will address the historical land problems once and for all.

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### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
DDC	District Development Committee
EWS	Early Warning System
GCG	Grand Coalition Government
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KNDR	Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation
KRC	Kenya Red Cross
MoSSP	Ministry of State for Special Programmes
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NSC	National Steering Committee of Peace Building and
	Conflict Management
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PEV	Post - Election Violence
PNU	Party of National Unity
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UON	University of Nairobi
UNDP	United Nations Development Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

#### **DEFINITION OF TERMS**

#### **Internally displaced Persons (IDPs)**

This study will adopt the definition of an IDP as used in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement which defines IDPs as, "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violation of human rights or natural or man-made disaster, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border."<sup>1</sup>

#### Refugee

According to article 1(A) (2) of the 1951 United Nations (UN) Refugee Convention, a refugee is a person who is outside his/her country of nationality or habitual residence, because of a wellfounded fear of persecution because of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion and is unable or unwilling to avail himself/herself for the protection of that country or to return there for fear of persecution.<sup>2</sup>

#### Conflict

The English word 'conflict' comes from the Latin word 'confligere' meaning to be antagonistic, incompatible, contradictory or being in opposition. Thus a conflict arises when two or more parties have incompatible goals about something.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), **The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement**, New York; United Nations. February 1998. Available at http://www.brookings.edu/projects/idp/gp\_page.aspx

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The Convention relating to the status of Refugees, <u>http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/o\_c\_ref.htm</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> C.R. Mitchell, **The Structure of International Conflict** (London:Macmillan,1998), pp.15-25.

#### Resettlement

Resettlement can be defined as "actions necessary for the permanent settlement of persons dislocated or otherwise affected by a disaster to another area different from their last place of habitation."<sup>4</sup>

#### **Multi-party**

This refers to the presence of different political parties that compete for political supremacy. This is also a system in which three or more political parties have the capacity to gain control of government separately or in a coalition.

#### Violence

Physical harm meted out to a person.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Corsellis, T., and Vitale, A., **Transitional Settlement – Displaced Populations.** Cambridge, University of Cambridge Shelter Project, Oxfam, 2005, p.414.




FIGURE 1: Map of Molo Conflict Area

Source: Ministry of Planning: Rift Valley

## **CHAPTER ONE**

## **INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY**

### **1.0 Introduction**

Armed conflict has characterized many countries' history. Before the end of the Cold War, interstate wars were common. Inter-state wars were those between different states. One of the impacts of these wars was the high number of refugees. With the shift in the nature of armed conflict to civil warfare, internal displacement has grown. Intra-state conflict and resultant internal population displacement is one of the greatest challenges facing Africa and the world today. Intra-state conflicts are those that occur between various groups within the boundaries of a state.

Internally displaced person (hereafter IDP) is a term that is used to refer to one who has been forced to leave his/her home or place of habitual residence. This could be because of disaster or armed conflict. Such a person, however, remains within the boundaries of his country. This is as opposed to a refugee who seeks refuge in another country.

In the last few years, the problem of the world's internally displaced people has grown and attracted a lot of media attention. Today, the largest number of forcibly uprooted people in the world is displaced within their own countries, largely as a result of internal political or ethnic conflicts. By the end of 2008 the number of IDPs had grown to 26 million.<sup>5</sup>

In Kenya, the issue of IDPs is not a new phenomenon. Since 1963, when Kenya gained selfgovernance from the United Kingdom (hereafter UK), ethnic politics have been demonstrated on the Kenyan political scene. This began with Jomo Kenyatta's leadership which vested power in a small circle of Kikuyu leaders. After his death in 1978, his successor Daniel Arap Moi also concentrated power in a few political elites from his ethnic community.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Thomas Weiss . "Whither International Efforts for Internally Displaced Persons?" **Journal of Peace Research**. Vol. 36 (3), Thomson Reuters, New York, 1999; p.363.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> C. Lekha and Wermester, K., eds., "Quiet Diplomacy and Recurring 'Ethnic Clashes' in Kenya." in **From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict,** Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003: p.2.

The introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya in 1991, following years of single party rule by Kenya African National Union (hereafter KANU), ushered in some political challenges.

According to Mwathane, there was a perception that opposition to KANU with a strong presence in the Rift Valley was spearheaded by leaders from outside these zones.<sup>7</sup> This perception was exploited by local politicians in such areas to successfully incite inter-ethnic violence even prior to 2007 general elections, peddling claims that 'outsiders' had unfairly benefited from their land. During the 1992 multi-party general election, some land owners considered non-indigenous from the land they had otherwise been allocated or bought and occupied for long were evicted. This was repeated in the 1997 and 2002 general elections to various degrees.<sup>8</sup> These conflicts affected parts of the Rift Valley, Western, Coast and Eastern provinces. These inter- ethnic fights broke out after Moi's thesis that multi-party politics were unworkable in Kenya.<sup>9</sup> The consequence of these conflicts was loss of life, destruction of property and means of livelihood, fear and insecurity in society, and internal population displacement of approximately 300,000 people.<sup>10</sup>

By the time Kenya approached the 2007 general election, it had become routine for politicians to incite inter-ethnic violence on account of perceived or real land injustices by outsiders. This provided fertile environment for the violence that erupted following the disputed elections. <sup>11</sup> According to the Report of the National Accord Implementation Committee of March 2008<sup>12</sup> the post-election violence (hereafter PEV) led to an estimated loss of 1,200 lives, displacement of over 350,000 people, destruction of property estimated at 90 billion shillings and general disruption of social and economic life. In December 2008, the Ministry of State for Special Programmes (hereafter MoSSP) in conjuction with the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees and the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, released the results of a profiling exercise

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Ibrahim Mwathane, **The contribution of land to the recent violence in Kenya: Implications for the on-going Land Policy Dialogue**, *A paper presented at the World Bank Annual Bank Conference on Land Policy and Administration*. Land development and Governance Institute (LDGI) Nairobi, April 2010, p. 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Ibid p. 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Andrew Morton, **Moi: The making of an African Statesman**. London; Michael O.Mara Books Limited, 1998, pp.246-247.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Nowrojee, B., 'Human Rights Protection: Looking at the experience of UNDP in Kenya' **The Mustard Seed** Washington D.C: Jesuit Refugee Service, 1998, pp.12-17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Mwathane, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Rebublic of Kenya, **Report of the National Accord Implementation Committee on National Reconciliation and Emergency Social and Economic Recovery Strategy**, Nairobi, March 2008, p. (v).

in the country, which showed that the 2007 PEV produced 663,921 IDPs.<sup>13</sup> Internal displacement, especially after the PEV has seen stakeholders, including Government and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), come together to deal with the humanitarian crisis. In doing this, many obstacles have been met, including the dilemma on how to deal with the IDPs, where to resettle them and factors to consider when doing this.

Molo District is one of the areas in Kenya that has been worst hit by electoral violence since the quest for multi-party government began in the early 1990s. This violence came to a head again in the post-election violence in 2007. The two major communities in Molo are the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu. The root cause of conflict among the communities is attributed mainly to post-independence distribution of land. According to the Kenyan Red Cross Society, Molo District already had approximately 22,000 internally displaced people before December 2007.

This study will investigate the attempts that have been made to respond or address the IDP crisis in Molo District, Sachangwan location between 1990 and 2012. These are efforts made by both the government and non-governmental organizations on the same. The study will also focus on the challenges and opportunities in handling this problem. This is especially taking into consideration the fact that resettling IDPs is an important component to peace building and sustainable peace. This means that in a post-conflict situation, resettling of IDPs becomes among the first steps of peace building.

### **1.1 Historical Background**

Throughout history people have been forced to flee from their homes due to various reasons, such as natural disasters, epidemics and conflict. In the same light, the tradition of offering sanctuary to those displaced is almost as old. For a long time, individual communities, states and leaders carried the burden of helping uprooted people. Nations began to develop an international conscience in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century and efforts to assist refugees began globally.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project, Report on implementation of Agenda Item 2 January 2009. P 1 <u>http://www.south.co.ke/Downloads/Reports/Agenda2.pdf</u>, Accessed on 10th May, 2012

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> <u>http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html</u>, accessed on 12th January 2011 at 12.09 p.m.

In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed, followed a year later by the fourth of the Geneva conventions covering protection of civilians caught up in conflict. Refugees fall under protection of international instruments, such as the United Nations Convention relating to the status of Refugees and the Organisation of African Unity (hereafter OAU) convention governing the Special Aspects of Refugee problems in Africa. A specialist UN Agency 'The United Nations Commissioner for Refugees' (hereafter, UNHCR) was created by the UN General Assembly in 1950 to cater for refugees. It was meant principally to help an estimated one million war time refugees around Europe. In 1969, OAU adopted its own liberal refugee convention.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, there are no comparable standard or mechanisms to safeguard the rights of IDPs. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were developed by a team of international legal experts and presented to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1998.<sup>16</sup>Although they do not constitute a binding legal instrument, they are consistent with international humanitarian law in that they reflect human rights law and international humanitarian law that is legally binding for states. The 30 articles of the Guiding Principles tackle the specific vulnerability of IDPs who do not benefit from the protection of international refugee law because they have not crossed international borders. They maintain that national authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction.<sup>17</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a change in the nature of armed conflicts. Interstate wars have increasingly declined giving way to the predominance of intra-state wars. In Africa, this was often explained by the fact that the end of the Cold War rendered Africa unimportant to the west with the exception of a few strategic African nations. The state became an even more powerful entity and yet at the same time it was weak with neither accountability nor legitimacy. This led internally to a lot of anger especially from those who felt left out of power, which signified control of resources. This was the beginning of civil wars, whereby those affected were now civilians as opposed to soldiers in inter-state/conventional warfare. One of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> http:www.africa-union.org/officialdocuments/Treaties\_%20 conventions\_%20 protocals /Refugee\_ convention accessed on 12<sup>th</sup> January 2011 at 12.30 p.m.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Nur Mohamud, "Internal Displacement: The cases of Kenya and Somalia." in Fischer C., and Vollmer R. (eds) **Migration and Displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa,** The Security- Migration Nexus BICC, 2008, p 39.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Guiding principles. , op cit, Principle 3.

consequences of this has been a rise in the number of internally displaced people as opposed to refugees in Africa.

Internal displacement has been a feature of the Kenyan history since the colonial times. This started with the eviction of indigenes from land to make way for settlers. After the introduction of multi-party democracy in the early 1990s, displacements were a feature in the general elections of 1992, 1997, and 2002, long before the general elections in 2007.

Land conflicts have been at the centre of Kenya's political life since 1991 when tribal clashes erupted in the Rift Valley only months to the 1992 general elections. Kalenjins in the Tinderet division of Nandi District- incited by politicians anxious to drive out non-Kalenjin voters out of the area to tilt the voting balance in their favour – attacked the Kikuyu, Luo and Kamba. According to Akiwumi, the attacks were not only meant to drive the settlers out of the Kalenjin areas but also to "cripple them economically and to psychologically traumatize them."<sup>18</sup>

Following the announcement of the results of the presidential elections results in December, 2007, ethnic- based violence erupted in many parts of the country. It brought to the surface deeprooted issues and divisions in the country. These issues are those that had contributed to inequality in the country. They include ethno-regional political patronage, dominance of the Kenyan State, colonial legacy, perceived historical grievances and inter- ethnic rivalries.<sup>19</sup>

Efforts were put together to push the Party of National Unity (hereafter PNU) led by Mwai Kibaki and the Orange Democratic Movement (hereafter ODM) led by Raila Odinga to sit down and negotiate. This resulted in the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (hereafter KNDR) process, which was led by members of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities under the chairmanship of former UN Secretary-General Koffi Annan. Others in the group included former Tanzanian president Benjamin Mkapa and Graca Machel. On 4<sup>th</sup> February 2008, they issued a statement which set out to immediately deal with the humanitarian crisis.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Republic of Kenya, **Report of the Judicial commission of inquiry into tribal clashes ( The Akiwumi report),** Nairobi, Government Printer, 1999 p. 60.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Raymond Muhula, "Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno regional politics in Kenya," **Kenya Studies Review**, Vol. 1 Number 1, Nairobi, 2009, p.85.

Out of the intense civil society backed diplomatic pressures, on 28<sup>th</sup> February 2008 PNU and ODM signed the 'Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government,' under the leadership of the African Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities. They agreed to enact the National Dialogue and Reconciliation Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008 to end the political crisis. This laid the foundation for power sharing between ODM and PNU. The National Accord and Reconciliation Act included a four point agenda for addressing the situation.

These four agenda items included:

- Immediate action to stop violence and restore fundamental rights and liberties.
- Immediate measures to address the humanitarian crisis, promote reconciliation, and healing.
- How to overcome the political crisis.
- Action to address long term issues, including constitutional, legal and institutional reforms, land reforms, tackling unemployment, poverty and inequity, addressing impunity, transparency and accountability.

In agenda item two on addressing the humanitarian crisis, the issue of IDP was addressed. The coalition government took over humanitarian relief and other reconstruction efforts. During the violence, this had been done by international agencies and the Kenya Red Cross. This meant that the government would be responsible for the large numbers of IDPs.

According to a special report, the government actively discouraged civil society, the media, and the private sector from involvement, squandering their activism and goodwill during the initial crisis.<sup>20</sup> The government handed the job to the Ministry of State for Special Programmes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Jacqueline M. Klopp, et al., Internal Displacement and local peacebuilding in Kenya. United States of Peace Special report, Washington, 2010, p. 7.

In May 2008, the ministry then launched, Operation Rudi Nyumbani (Return Home) and related operations *Tujenge Pamoja* (Build Together) and *Ujirani Mwema* (Good Neighbourliness), using the provincial administration to manage these operations.<sup>21</sup> The government was to meet the full cost of resettlement of the IDPs, including reconstruction of basic housing, replacement of household effects and rehabilitation of infrastructure, such as community utilities and institutions destroyed during the PEV. According to Jacqueline Klopp, there were no proper plans to develop transparent registries, compensation, and restitution schemes, nor was there a place where IDPs could check on the whereabouts of lost relations.<sup>22</sup> Instead, the government ordered the provincial administration to dismantle camps, putting the administration in the awkward position of forcing people out, sometimes into hostile communities where informal militias persisted, exacerbating the security problem it was supposed to address. It also exacerbated resentment among the displaced, deepening ethnic divisions. In June 2008, the government began disbursement of Ksh. 10,000 to each household for families that were willing to return to their farms. This was called 'start-up funds' and was meant to support IDPs in buying basic items to restart their lives in returned areas.<sup>23</sup> However, the Kenya Land Alliance Survey found that the majority of the 2,746 displaced people interviewed did not receive the funds.<sup>24</sup> Of the 6,978 families targeted for land allocation the ministries of Special Programmes, Lands and Provincial Administration had settled 2,287 families or 32.7% on 8,412 acres by the end of 2011.<sup>25</sup>

The lack of an adequate international response to the problem of internal displacement continues to be voiced. There have been calls to have a body to deal specifically with the IDP problem. In the 1990s, the UNHCR developed guidelines and criteria for its involvement with IDPs. According to the guidelines, the UNHCR only gets involved with IDPs in situations where there is a clear link with refugee or returnee populations, or where there is the potential for internal displacement to develop into external refugee movements. UNHCR involvement depends on the request of the UN Secretary-General or the General Assembly, the consent of the concerned

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Jacqueline Klopp, Kenya's unfinished Agendas, **Journal of International Affairs**, Spring/Summer Vol.62,No. 2, Washington, 2009, p. 148.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Op cit., The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project, p. 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Kenya Land Alliance, Land Data Survey Report, p. 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Ministry of Special Programmes, Press Release-progress on Implementation of the IDPs Resettlement, **Daily Nation**, 23, December. p. 25.

government and other parties to the conflict, and assurances of adequate funding, full access to the displaced, and staff security. This illustrates the inadequacy of IDP's protection internationally.

#### **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

The former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted in a 2005 speech to the UNHCR that "the return of refugees and internally displaced persons is a major part of any post-conflict scenario ... it is often a critical factor in sustaining the peace process and in revitalizing economic activity." <sup>26</sup> One of the main activities in a post- conflict society is peace building. As the representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs has argued, finding solutions for IDPs can contribute to peace building and conversely when solutions are not found, the renewed outbreak of conflict becomes more likely.<sup>27</sup>

One of the initial stages of peace building include resettling those who are internally displaced so as to bring about normalcy in order to provide an enabling environment to deal with the root issues or causes of the conflict. Return of internally displaced populations is often used as a benchmark against which progress in post- conflict stabilization and peace is measured. Scholars of displacement, such as Francis M. Deng of the Brookings Institution, believe that resolving the issue of displacement in post-conflict nations is a necessary prerequisite for that nation to achieve lasting peace and economic rebuilding.<sup>28</sup>

Thus the IDPs phenomenon cannot be ignored in peace building efforts. Unlike refugees who seek sanctuary in another country, IDPs are confined to their home country. They are, therefore, a constant reminder of the conflict. If ignored, they impact on the social-economic development of a country. Due to the fact that they now do not have a source of livelihood, people who were

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> UN Secretary-General's address to UNHCR Executive Committee, Geneva, October 6, 2006. Cited in Brookings-Bern Project, **Addressing Internal Displacement in Peace Processes, Peace Agreements and Peacebuilding** (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2007), p. 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Walter Kalin. **Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons: An Essential Dimension of Peace Building**. March 13, 2008. Available at <u>http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/0313\_Peacebuilding\_kalin.aspx</u>

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Francis Deng., Protecting the Dispossessed: A challenge for the International Community, Washington, D.C:
 The Brookings Institution, 1993 p.54.

previously economically independent get into unconventional methods to survive, including getting into criminal activities, prostitution and drug trafficking.

In Kenya, the plight of IDPs has aroused a lively debate. The government through the Ministry of Special Programmes has undertaken different approaches in handling the IDP problem. In addition, other players like NGOs have also been involved in seeking the right approach to the IDP issue. However, the issue of how the resettlement should be done continues to draw a lot of debate.

Although the government of Kenya put a 31<sup>st</sup> December, 2010 deadline to resettle the IDPs resulting from the 2007/2008 post-election violence, this is yet to be done. This has led to disgruntled IDPs who feel forgotten in their own country. On the other hand, there have been highlights of IDP resettlement plans being rejected by proposed recipient local communities. An example of this is the case of a 2,400 acre piece of land bought by the government in Mau Narok to resettle IDPs living in Pipeline Camp in Nakuru district. Resettlement has not taken place because of the resistance from the local Maasai community. A group of Maasai youths recently vowed to block this exercise. They chased away a team of surveyors who had started subdividing the land.<sup>29</sup> Through their leaders, they claim that the land belongs to their community since it had originally been taken from them by the colonial masters. The same happened in Trans Nzoia County where locals led by the Forestry Minister, Noah Wekesa, blocked a group of IDPs from being resettled on land the government had bought.<sup>30</sup> Further there have been reports in the media to the effect that some IDPs have benefited more than once in the allocation of shelters built by the government and NGOs. <sup>31</sup>This has raised many questions on the resettlement process.

This study aimed at investigating the responses by the government and other stakeholders to the plight of IDPs in Molo conflict area. It critically looked at the process of resettlement, the challenges that were experienced and opportunities that can be pursued to improve the process. It also aimed at focusing on IDPs who have been resettled in order to evaluate how the process was carried out and also the effectiveness of the same.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>Noah Cheploan, "Stop Resettlement bid at own risk, says PC," **Daily Nation**, Thursday, June 2<sup>nd</sup> 2011 pg 33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Ibid p. 33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Francis Mureithi, "Fresh crisis as State moves to resolve the headache of IDPs," **Sunday Nation**, March, 25<sup>th</sup> 2012, pp.10-11

#### 1.3 Objectives

The general objective is to examine the various responses made by the Kenya Government and other stakeholders to the IDPs problem in Molo conflict area. Specific objectives include the following;

- i. To examine IDP resettlement programmes in Molo conflict area.
- ii. To identify the challenges of resettling internally displaced persons.
- iii. To investigate the effectiveness of the resettlement programmes.

#### **1.4 Justification of the Study**

Despite the growing academic attention to the issue of IDPs, there is a noticeable gap in the literature. What is lacking is a systemic analysis of the post-return/ resettlement phase of displacement. There has been little effort to evaluate the effectiveness of resettlement processes. Effective resettlement is important because it impacts on the stability in the affected population. Very few studies have been undertaken in the period after resettlement to evaluate how successful, or unsuccessful, the process is and thus identify areas of improvement.

In Kenya, the issue of internal displacement continues to raise many questions. The first issue involves a comprehensive look at what has been done by different players to resettle IDPs. Related to this is the question of who is supposed to resettle them and who influences how and where they are resettled. Other issues that arise include the dilemma facing those involved in the resettlement process. The challenges and opportunities in the resettlement process and after resettlement is also another question.

This study was timely as it interrogated issues to do with how different stakeholders have handled the IDP issue. The study looked at the various actors involved in the resettlement process and how consultative the process had been. At a time when Kenya had seen incidences of hostility from host communities in the resettlement process, this study interrogated how resettlement was done and who the stakeholders were. The study was timely because all efforts needed to be put in place to ensure that the issues are resolved in order to avoid a scenario whereby dissatisfied populations will present yet another threat to peace in future. This study has generated insightful information that will be useful in guiding and improving policies put in place to resettle IDPs.

Considering the fact that conflict induced displacement started at the height of the quest for multi-partism, this study covered internal displacement resulting from the early 1990s clamor for multi-party democracy to those generated as a result of the 2007/2008 PEV.

#### 1.5 Scope and Limitations

This study covers the period between 1990 and 2012. This period covers the onset of multi-party politics and consequently the birth and development of ethnic clashes in Molo District. Internal displacement resulting from this was studied. The conflict spilled over to the 2007 elections. Internal displacement is, therefore, a feature in this district. The researcher laid focus on IDPs who are resettled in this area. These IDPs have been resettled through the MoSSP and with support from other humanitarian organizations, for example the Norwegian Refuge Council.<sup>32</sup> This study targeted fifty homesteads where IDPs had been resettled. Another set of questionnaires were administered to the representatives of institutions who had been involved with resettling IDPs.

The researcher had anticipated various limitations. The first one was respondents' fatigue. Many studies have been done in this region for various aims and objectives. It was expected that they could be tired of giving information. To counter this, the researcher made contact with the local NGOs especially those offering humanitarian assistance to IDPs, for example, the Centre for Conflict Resolution. This opportunity was used to interview the IDPs. The researcher also

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Ibid., p.11.

worked closely with the Provincial Administration, especially the local chiefs and assistant chiefs who provided support especially in identifying the respondents.

Another challenge that was anticipated was financial limitation. This was countered by taking part as a volunteer for an NGO. Language barrier was countered by the use of research assistants, who were conversant with local languages.

High expectations from the IDPs, who expected the researcher to provide solutions to their problems, were also a challenge. This was dealt with by explaining the importance of the study in that it would contribute to policy guidelines that would in the long run ensure speedy response to internal displacement.

#### **1.6 Literature Review**

#### **1.6.1 Introduction**

Internal displacement has continued to occur as a result of many factors, including conflict. This literature review will cover works that have explained the root causes of the Rift Valley conflict in Kenya. This is important in order to understand the IDP phenomenon and its dynamics. Displacement leads to either internally displaced persons or refugees. In my literature review, I therefore intend to also review works on responses to refugees so as to compare that with IDP response. Therefore, my literature review will first look at the refugee responses internationally and in Africa generally. I shall then compare that to responses to IDPs generally. I shall then narrow on the Kenyan situation in Rift Valley province. I will look at the causes and consequences which include internal displacement and then responses of various stakeholders.

#### 1.6.2 Response to Refugees compared to that of IDPs at a global arena

A lot of research has been done on refugees compared to internally displaced persons. Akokpari discusses causes of migrating and refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa, placing a crucial responsibility on the state.<sup>33</sup> The state as a cause of displacement is well illustrated especially with examples from African countries, such as South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo hereafter (DRC), Chad, Sudan, Rwanda, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Liberia, among other countries.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> John K. Akokpari, **The State, Refugees and Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa,** Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p. 212.

These states are characterized by bad governance, unequal distribution of resources, impunity, negative ethnicity and perceived or real historical injustices. He highlights other causes of displacement to include environmental degradation, disaster induced migration and also those influenced by the hostile global economy. This is relevant to my study because it gives possible causes of conflict to include unequal distribution of resources.

A defining feature of the post-Cold War era is the large number of internal conflicts pitting ethnic, racial and religious groups against one another in bitter fighting. As a result of this, around 26 million persons are internally displaced globally. This number is nearly double the number of refugees the United Nations assists. Given the significantly higher number, one might expect states and international organizations to have well-developed laws, norms and procedures governing IDPs.

Catherine Phuong shows that although internally displaced persons have always existed, it is only recently that the concept and debate on legal rights for such people emerged. <sup>34</sup>The end of the Cold War and the end of usefulness of refugees as pawns accounts for the sudden interest in internally displaced persons, Phuong argues. States now fear refugees flowing across their borders and thus wish to keep displaced persons "internal" at their native states. Not wanting to be overwhelmed by asylum seekers or to be castigated for refusing asylum to desperate people, political leaders now prefer that would- be refugees stay home.

The international response to the IDP problem has been an area of interest to a number of authors. The shortcomings of the international response preoccupy Kimberly Magnard.<sup>35</sup> Magnard describes in detail how international aid focuses too narrowly on emergency relief instead of trying to address the fundamental causes of the crisis which can create dependencies. While criticizing the donor countries, there is need to take into consideration challenges that face the donor countries, for example, financial constraints, limited attention spans and also their own national interests. All these factors come into play to determine the extent of their aid to the IDP crisis. To some extent, this study will interrogate the extent to which the IDPs have received international humanitarian assistance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Catherine Phuong, **The international protection of internally displaced persons**, Vol.7,No.4, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2004,2004,p. 318.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Kimberly Magnard, Healing communities in conflict: International assistance in complex emergencies, New York, Columbia University Press, 1999. P. 58

The authors of **Masses in Flight** acknowledge that internal displacement is a global crisis.<sup>36</sup> They acknowledge the growing IDP numbers. IDPs are among the most desperate victims of crisis, though they are frequently invisible. This book provides an overview of the crisis. It also focuses on policy issues concerning IDPs and the inadequacy of international law in protecting them. IDPs remain the responsibility of their own governments but are often bereft of domestic or international support. Cohen and Deng take on the issue of protection of IDPs which has often meant necessary but insufficient provision of water, food and emergency health care. International protection efforts under conditions of internal displacement will almost certainly raise issues of national sovereignty and strain relations with government authorities.

Susan Martin in her review of the **Masses in Flight** sees the book as a great resource for articulating the challenges and opportunities facing the international community and for offering sound recommendations for change. The authors equate sovereignty with responsibility. They argue that no state claiming legitimacy can justifiably quarrel with the commitment to protect all of its citizens against human rights abuse.<sup>37</sup> Therefore, the state has the responsibility to ensure that all its citizens enjoy their human rights which include the right to a livelihood and shelter. This is relevant to this study because it aims at establishing the way the IDP problem has been handled and the factors that affect the responses by the government.

Francis Deng focuses on the paradox of IDP protection.<sup>38</sup> Most of the member states of the United Nations are in varying degrees divided nations, suffering from national identity crises as both cause and effect, as a factor in the official response to humanitarian crises. The attention of the international community tends to be focused on the humanitarian dimension. The internally displaced are paradoxically assumed to be under the care of their own governments, despite the fact that their displacement is often caused by the same state authorities. This article aims to help develop a new international response to the global crisis of internal displacement in acutely divided nations. It suggests that the problem is more than a humanitarian and human rights issue;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> J.Kunder, **A review of masses in flight: The global crisis of internal displacement**. Human Rights Quarterly, vol.21,no 1, Feb,1999, p. 253 <u>Http://www.jstor.org/stable/762746 Accessed on 19/05/2011</u> 0850

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Martin S, **A review of Masses in Flight:The global crisis of internal displacement** International Migration Review,Vol.34,No.3(Autumn,2000) pp 978-980, The Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc http://www.jstor.org/stable/2675955. Accessed on 19/05/2011 0850.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Francis Deng, **Divided: The Paradox of National Protection** Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.603 Law society and Democracy: Comparative Perspectives(Jan.,2006), pp 217-225. <u>http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097767 Accessed on 19th/05/2011</u> 0851.

the underlying causes have to do with gross inequalities in the shaping and sharing of values and gross discrimination and marginalization of certain groups.

Deng also discusses the sovereignty and legitimacy of a state. He argues that a state can no longer assume it is sovereign regardless of how it treats its citizens. The state must be legitimate, and its legitimacy is now defined as to whether it protects its citizens' basic rights. These rights Deng defines as "physical protection, shelter, food, clothing, basic health care, and the integrity of the person and the family as the most fundamental social unit." <sup>39</sup>Such rights are "so fundamental ... that they are not derived from any particular political or economic ideology".<sup>40</sup> Deng criticizes the current stress on multi-party elections as a sign of democracy, given the absence of these more fundamental rights. This book is important to this study because it agrees that a government has the responsibility to protect its citizens. However, unlike the intended study it does not show how this has been done. This book which is an overview of the background to the conflicts and internal displacement in six countries around the world (Somalia, Sudan, Yugoslavia, Russia, El Salvador and Cambodia), underlines the gravity of the plight of IDPs and the need for national and international protection and assistance.

In discussing refugee policy choices, Karen Jacobsen gives positive and negative choices or responses.<sup>41</sup> For example, the choice to accept refugees is positive, while the choice not to accept them is negative. In the case of IDPs, there is no choice because they are citizens of the affected country and the government has no choice but to deal with them. The author also suggests 'durable solutions' to the refugee problem. These include firstly, repatriation whereby refugees are returned to their country of origin. The second solution is local integration in the country of asylum. This solution comes with many challenges, for example, hostility from local communities. The third solution is resettlement in a third country. This could be resisted by the refugees who may have a desire to return home. This is relevant to the study. It will be interesting to investigate how the reception by the host communities has been from the IDPs' point of view.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Francis Deng, op cit., p. 134.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 125.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Karen Jacobsen "Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes" in **International Migration Review**, Vol.30, NO.3 (Autumn, 1996), Center for migration Studies of New York, pp.666-668.

The author further discusses one of the major factors influencing refugee policy choices as the absorption capacity of the local host community. This is mainly affected by the economic capacity and also the social receptiveness of a local community. This is important because the factors affecting refugees' absorption will be compared with those that affect IDPs.

According to the author, factors influencing the social receptiveness of host communities include cultural receptiveness of host communities and cultural meaning of refugees, ethnicity and kinship, historical experience and beliefs about refugees. According to Akokpari, tension between local communities and displaced people is very common.<sup>42</sup> This is especially true in cases where languages and cultures are diverse. Tensions may easily arise over farming and grazing lands or commercial activities. This may, however, be averted or minimized in cases where those displaced settle among their kith and kin.

#### 1.6.3 Response to IDPs in Kenya

One of the root causes of the conflict in the Rift Valley is related to colonialism. The colonial policies especially those aimed at creating room for the white settlers led to landlessness and displacement. Tim Mwenesi in his study provides an overview of how the colonial government displaced people of the Rift Valley and how at independence the government settled non-indigenous people, mostly the Kikuyu, in schemes.<sup>43</sup> He focuses on how colonial land policies and post-colonial resettlement dynamics generated a volatile ethnic grouping in the Rift Valley. This gives valuable information towards understanding the history of displacement in Kenya.

William Ochieng argues that the main cause of conflict in the Rift Valley has been competition for resources especially land in the former white highlands.<sup>44</sup> He argues that the Kenyatta government settled large numbers of agriculturalists in former white highlands without considering the interests of the original inhabitants.<sup>45</sup> This then becomes the beginning of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Akokpari op cit., p.225.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> T.O.A Mwenesi, "The Centrality of Land in Kenya: Historical Background and Legal Perspective." In Smokin C. Wanjala, **Essays on land Law: the Reform Debate in Kenya Nairobi**: Faculty of law, University of Nairobi, 2000, pp 3-24.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> W.R Ochieng, Historical Studies and Social Change in Western Kenya: Essay in Memory of Professor Gideon S.
 Were. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 2002, p.271.
 <sup>45</sup> Ibid.

historical injustices that have long been among the reasons for dissatisfaction of some communities in the Rift Valley.

This study focuses on internal displacement beginning with displacement as a result of the quest for multi-party democracy in the early 1990s. Andrew Morton points out that during this period serious ethnic clashes occurred in parts of the Rift Valley. This was as a result of hate speeches given by the Rift Valley leaders. Although the author agrees that Rift Valley leaders rallied communities to vote for them in 1992 and 1997 general elections, he concentrates on competition for resources as the cause of ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley.<sup>46</sup> But he does not delve into the consequences of the clashes, among them displacement.

#### 1.6.4 Conclusion

Therefore, there exists a gap in the literature in the sense that post- resettlement period of dealing with the internally displaced persons has not been covered. This study intends to focus on this so as to contribute to informed decisions that will come from the IDPs themselves on how they would wish the process to be conducted. It hopes to establish whether or not the perception that the IDP problem ends at resettlement is true. The study aims at evaluating the responses to the IDP phenomenon in Kenya and therefore, contribute to better policy guidelines to improve this.

### **1.7 Research Hypotheses**

In order to achieve the goals of this research the hypotheses below guided the investigation.

- Current resettlement practice does not adequately cater for the internally displaced in Molo District.
- 2. Failure to adequately tackle the IDP problem is as a result of the lack of a national IDP policy.
- 3. Resettlement programmes have been ineffective.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Andrew Morton, op cit.p.172.

#### **1.8 Theoretical Framework**

This study will adopt the social contract theory in its general aspect. Social contract theory expounds the view that persons' moral and/or political obligations are dependent upon a contract or agreement among them to form the society in which they live. This theory is associated with modern moral and political theory and was given its first full expression and defence by Thomas Hobbes. After Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau are the best known proponents of this theory, which has been one of the most dominant theories.

According to Hobbes, the justification for political obligation is that: given that men are naturally self-interested, yet they are rational, they will choose to submit to the authority of a sovereign in order to be able to live in a civil society, which is conducive to their own interests.<sup>47</sup> Hobbes argues for this by imagining men in their natural state, or in other words, the state of nature. In the state of nature, which is purely hypothetical according to Hobbes, men are naturally and exclusively self-interested, and they are more or less equal to one another. Given these conditions in the state of nature, Hobbes concludes that the state of nature would be unbearably brutal. In the state of nature, every person is always in fear of losing his/her life to another. Given Hobbes' reasonable assumption that most people want, first and foremost, to avoid their own deaths, he concludes that the state of nature is the worst possible situation in which men can find themselves.

The situation is not, however, hopeless. Because men are reasonable, they can see their way out of such a state by recognizing the laws of nature, which show them the means by which to escape the state of nature and create a civil society. The first and most important law of nature commands that each man be willing to pursue peace when others are willing to do the same, all the while retaining the right to continue to pursue war when others do not pursue peace. Being reasonable, and recognizing the rationality of this basic precept of reason, men can be expected to construct a social contract that will afford them a life other than that available to them in the state of nature. This contract is constituted by two distinguishable contracts. First, they must agree to establish society by collectively and reciprocally renouncing the rights they had against one another in the state of nature. Second, they must imbue some one person or assembly of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Thomas Hobbes **Leviathan**, Harmondsworth, 1968, pp 228-229.

persons with the authority and power to enforce the initial contract. In other words, to ensure their escape from the state of nature, they must agree to live together under common laws, and to create an enforcement mechanism for the social contract and the laws that constitute it. Since the sovereign is invested with the authority and power to mete out punishments for breaches of the contract which are worse than not being able to act as one pleases, men have good, albeit self-interested, reason to adjust themselves to the artifice of morality in general, and justice in particular. <sup>48</sup>

On the other hand, according to John Locke, the state of nature, is a state of perfect and complete liberty to conduct one's life as one best sees fit, free from the interference of others. This does not mean, however, that it is a state of license: one is not free to do anything he/she pleases, or even anything that one judges to be in one's interest. The state of nature, although a state wherein there is no civil authority or government to punish people for transgressions against laws, is not a state without morality. The state of nature is pre-political, but it is not pre-moral. Persons are assumed to be equal to one another in such a state, and therefore equally capable of discovering and being bound by the Law of Nature. Because we all belong equally to God, and because we cannot take away that which is rightfully His, we are prohibited from harming one another.

John Locke says that in nature men are free, equal and independent and are subjected to the political power only with their consent. Therefore, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, man puts himself under an obligation to everyone in that society, to submit to the determination of the majority.<sup>49</sup> According to Locke there are three natural rights:

- Life: everyone is entitled to live once they are created.
- Liberty: everyone is entitled to do anything they want to so long as it doesn't conflict with the first right.
- Estate: everyone is entitled to own all they create or gain through gift or trade so long as it doesn't conflict with the first two rights.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 125.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> John Locke, **Second Treatise of Government**, Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company, 1980, p. 52.

The social contract is a contract between a being or beings of power and their people or followers. The King makes the laws to protect the three natural rights. The people may not agree on the laws, but they have to follow them. The people can be prosecuted and/or killed if they break these laws. If the King does not follow these rules, he can be overthrown.

According to Rousseau, society is justified only as a means of enabling men to advance to a higher level of achievement than could be arrived at in its absence. A social contract according to him is an agreement among men previously in a 'state of nature' to constitute a 'corporate and collective person through which they endow themselves with a constitution or code of laws designed to regulate their relations with other men.<sup>50</sup>

Although critics of this theory argue that the social contract theory subjects individuals and groups to an agreement that does not advance their particular self-interests, this theory is relevant to the intended research. There exists a social contract between a government and its citizens. The citizens who, in this case include the IDPs, agree to be governed by a government that they have democratically elected. The government, on the other hand, has the responsibility to ensure that the citizens enjoy all their rights.

The social contract in the context of my study identifies the government as duty bound to ensure that its citizens enjoy the right to life, shelter and property ownership. For the purposes of this study, the researcher will look at these concepts to explain the fact that for enduring peace the problem of IDPs must be resolved. This goes hand in hand with resolution of root causes of the conflict that led to the displacement in the first place.

### **1.9 Methodology**

In this section, the methodology used to conduct research for this report will be presented. Both primary and secondary sources were used. The study was based on fieldwork and library research.

#### **1.9.1** Selecting the study area

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, **The Social Contract and Discourses,** London, Everyman, 1993, p. xxv.

Sachangwan location of Molo District was selected for this research because it was one of the areas where the resettlement process was deemed to be a success. It, therefore, provided an opportunity for the researcher to evaluate the resettlement process in the area. The local population in Sachangwan is made up of different ethnic communities, for example, Kipsigis, Kikuyu, Kisii and a small percentage of the other communities which is representative of the larger Molo conflict area.

#### 1.9.2 Data sources and collection strategies

In seeking secondary data, books, journals articles publications and unpublished documents were used. Credible articles and documents were sourced from NGOs and government reports. Newspaper articles and electronic journals from online journal database like JSTOR were also used. Review of reports generated by the government, civil society organizations, UN agencies, and humanitarian agencies, like the Kenya Red Cross, was done.

To acquire primary data, purposive sampling was used. In purposive sampling the researcher targets a group of people believed to be reliable for the study.<sup>51</sup>In selecting respondents, snowballing was used. Snowball sampling begins with a few people or cases and then gradually increases the sample sizes as new contacts are mentioned by the people the researcher started out with. 52

Open ended questionnaires were also administered to some IDPs in conjunction with their leaders. In addition, key informants including officials of the MoSSP, local NGOs and CBOs, church leaders and politicians were interviewed.

The researcher visited IDPs in this district. These were those who have been resettled back home or from other areas. The MoSSP officials, Provincial Administrators and also regional Kenya Red Cross Society officials as well as CBOs and NGOs, who had interacted with the IDPs, were also interviewed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Kisilu D. Kombo and Delno L.A. Tromp, **Proposal and Thesis writing – An Introduction**, Paulines Publications Africa, 2006, p. 79 <sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 83.

Unstructured questionnaires as well as face- to- face interviews were conducted to allow probing and to provide room for in-depth information as the respondents were left free to answer.

#### 1.9.3 Population and Sampling

We engaged primary sources through administering questionnaires and also conducting interviews with some IDPs and key informants under study. The interviewed group comprised of a sample of 18 (60%) males and 12 (40%) females of which 13 (43.3%) were above 40 years, 12 (40%) were between 31 – 40 years, 4 (13.3%) were between 21 – 30 years while only 1 (3.3%) was below the age of 20 years. A majority of the respondents 25 (83.3%) were married, 3(10%) were single while 2 (6.7%) were widowed.

Among the IDPs sampled, 15 (50%) belonged to the Kikuyu ethnic group, 10 (33.3%) were Kisii while 5 (16.7%) were Kipsigis. A majority of the respondents 19 (63.3%) had attained a primary school education, 9 (30%) had reached secondary level while 2 (6.7%) had not attended school.

#### 1.9.4 Focus Group discussions

We engaged with respondents first as individuals and afterwards engaged some of them in focus group discussions. We also engaged key informants among those organizations / agencies that had been involved in resettling of the IDPs.

#### 1.9.5 Data Analysis

The collected data was analyzed with a view to meeting the main objective of the study. The analyzed data was then interpreted and conclusions arrived at.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

## NATURE OF CONFLICT IN THE MOLO CONFLICT AREA

### **2.0 Introduction**

Armed conflicts are rooted in various factors. These include resource scarcity and inequitable distribution, politically instigated conflicts, negative ethnicity and perceived historical injustices. Such conflicts have consequences amongst them internal displacement. This chapter starts by providing an understanding of the geographical and tribal composition of people in the area of study. The chapter further looks at the genesis of settlement in this area. This is in order to provide an understanding of the people who are settled in this area and thus an understanding of the origin of the conflict. In this regard, the chapter also discusses the history of the Molo conflict. This chapter also provides an in depth understanding of the conflict, creation of IDPs is discussed.

### 2.1 General understanding of Molo District

The area of study, Molo, is in the former Rift Valley Province. The Rift Valley was one of the former eight provinces in Kenya and is home to people of various ethnic communities. The district had 10 administrative areas: namely, Njoro, Molo, Elburgon, Lare, Mauche, Olenguruone, Keringet, Kuresoi, Mau-Narok, and Kamara Divisions.<sup>53</sup> It was hived from the former larger Nakuru district in 2007. <sup>54</sup> It lies within the Great Rift Valley and borders five other districts: namely, Baringo to the North, Kericho to the North West, Nakuru to the East, Bomet to the South West and Narok North to the South.

The study area was chosen purposively because it has been affected by ethnic conflicts since the era of the quest for multi-party democracy in the early 1990s. Molo District at the time of the study, had two constituencies, Kuresoi with a Kalenjin majority, a sizeable number of Kikuyu, Kisii and Molo constituency that had majority Kikuyu, a sizeable number of Kalenjin and Kisii minority. Both constituencies have a number of other communities mainly Ogiek, Luo, Luhyia,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> See Figure 1 below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Molo District Development Plan, 2008.

and Gusii, although in small numbers. This ethnic diversity has been a source of ethnic violence pitting the Kalenjin tribe and Kikuyu tribe against each other especially related to resource control. This ethnicity is illustrated by the sample of IDPs interviewed during the study.

Tribe	Absolute figure	Percentage (%)
Kikuyu	15	50
Gusii	10	33.3
Kipsigis	5	16.7
Total	30	100

**Table 1: Ethnicity of the respondents** 

Source: Field work, 2012

As shown in the table above, 50% of the IDP respondents were from the Kikuyu ethnic community while the rest were from Kisii and Kipsigis communities.

#### 2.2 History of Molo Settlement

Kenyans like all Africans whose nations were colonized, lost their land to the white settlers. In Kenya, arguably, the people of Central Province lost more land to European settlement than people of other regions in the country. It was the Kikuyu especially those from Kiambu who were most seriously affected by colonialist land settlement.<sup>55</sup>

By 1920 the problems of land shortage in the Kikuyu reserves were already becoming evident. This resulted from the twin pressures of settler land exploitation and peasant commodity production. Increased commodity production was accompanied by the breakdown of precolonial land tenancy relationships and the concentration of land. The independent landowners (*githaka owners*) began limiting the rights of tenant farmers (*ahoi*). The latter were therefore the first to lose access to land and seek wage employment. Also some lineage heads began

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> W.R Ochieng (ed), **A Modern History of Kenya, 1895- 1980**, London, Evans Brothers Limited 1989, p.46.

appropriating land privately. The youth were the ones who lost out, and many drifted to settler farms and colonial towns in search of work.<sup>56</sup> This was the genesis of the movement of the Kikuyu people from their original habitants to other areas like the Rift Valley.

After independence, former President Kenyatta encouraged his fellow Kikuyus to form land buying companies, which benefitted from attractive loans advanced by "politically correct" banking institutions. <sup>57</sup> Thus the Kikuyus rushed to buy land from the departing whites under a million acre resettlement scheme that was subsidized. Descending from the escarpment, they flooded in their hundreds and thousands into the previously off limits Rift Valley seizing land the Kalenjin and other communities regarded as having been appropriated by the white man but rightfully theirs. Given a selling scheme based on the principle of willing buyer, willing seller, there was little the locals and the poorer could do." <sup>58</sup>

Some of the transactions were voluntary ones, encouraged by the colonial government. The British permitted Kikuyus to buy land in the Rift Valley, and Kikuyus, using official title deeds saw themselves as the rightful owners of that land.

Therefore, Molo District became home to a diversity of ethnic communities. They included crop farmers, for example, the Kikuyus and pastoralists, for example, the Kipsigis at that time. As seen before, the diverse communities were as a result of movement of some communities in search of land. Prior to the multi-party era, they lived harmoniously together and engaged in trade. In the wake of multi-party democracy in the early 1990s the crop farmers, mainly from Central and Western provinces, were ordered to return to their ancestral lands, and failure to do so resulted in their being killed and their property looted and destroyed. In this area, fighting intensified during the general election years – held in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007 - and in 2005, when the national referendum on the country's constitution was held.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Joe Khamisi , **The Politics of Betrayal: Diary of a Kenyan Legislator,** Trafford Publishing, p. 71

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> Michela Wrong, **It's Our Turn to Eat: The story of a Kenyan Whistle Blower**, Fourth Estate, 2010, p.112

#### 2.3 History of Molo Conflict

The conflict in the area of study is mainly a resource based conflict. This can be traced to the colonial period. During this period, the patterns of uneven regional development began to take shape in Kenya. At independence, those who acquired land were composed of those who had collaborated with the British during and after the conquest of Kenya, and others who were straddled between permanent employment as teachers, for example, and private accumulation as traders.<sup>59</sup>

At Independence, as the land issue had been at the root of most of Kenya's political troubles, it was necessary to find a solution to it in the interest of stability and growth. The KANU government tackled the land issue by a massive resettlement of African farmers on the previously European owned farms. Between 1961 and mid 1970s the British government loaned to the Kenyan government a large sum of money to enable the latter to buy the farms of the departing white settles for the resettling of Africans.<sup>60</sup>

The scheme involved the sub-dividing of large farms into smaller farm units which the African farmers could afford. By 1971, over a million acres of land had been settled by about 50,000 families. A large number of former European farms had also been transferred to Kenyan citizens as intact units, usually with financial assistance from public funds. Thus the first thrust of state support to indigenous development involved the rapid transfer of land in the former white highlands through the settlement schemes. In this process members of the Kikuyu community moved to the Rift Valley.

Negative ethnicity and political incitement, especially during election periods, saw tribal clashes in Molo District. Tribalist mentality and ideology developed during the colonial period due to ethnic competitions over colonial jobs and patronage. The British also manipulated ethnic differences by tribalizing local governments, schools and political associations in order to divide and rule.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 210.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Ibid., p.215.

In 1982 Kenya became officially a one party state, as it was feared that a multi-party system might encourage tribal groupings in several parties. The origin of the conflict thus had roots in the colonial period.

#### 2.4 Causes of Molo Conflict

This study on evaluating efforts to resettle IDPs focused on Molo conflict area that has experienced ethnic conflicts since the restoration of the multiparty democracy in Kenya in 1992. Since IDPs in this context are as a result of armed conflict, it is important to highlight the nature or cause of ethnic conflicts in Molo district, Kenya. The main cause of conflict in the Rift Valley has been competition for resources, especially land.<sup>62</sup> Hate speeches by political leaders and inadequacy of state authorities have also resulted in displacement of persons. The root cause of conflict among communities in Molo areas is the post-independence distribution of land. In this regard, ethnic conflicts in the Rift valley province, and specifically Molo district (over land), can be traced to the colonial period. The Kikuyu migrated to the Rift Valley during the colonial period because of land shortage and early labour recruitment by white settlers.<sup>63</sup> This is because the white settlers settled in the white highlands and required cheap labour. This land in question was in the Rift Valley province and was historically communally owned by the Kalenjin and the Maasai ethnic communities.

At independence, squatters who had previously worked in settler farms formed co-operative societies and limited companies to buy land. This gave rise to large-scale land acquisition by the Kikuyu in Rift Valley due to the policy of `willing buyer, willing seller' that the government assumed for land transfers. In addition, the Kenyatta government introduced alternative and cheaper schemes for settling the landless.<sup>64</sup> Using this economic and political advantage available to them during this period, the Kikuyu, Meru and Embu ethnic groups, but especially the Kikuyu, took advantage of the situation and acquired land. The companies they formed

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> W. R. Ochieng, "Historical Studies and Social Change in Western Kenya." Essay in Memory of Professor Gideon
 S. Were, Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 2002, p. 271.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> Tabitha, K., **Squatters & the Roots of Mau Mau, 1905-63,** East African Educational Publishers Ltd, Nairobi, 1987, pp.13-14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> Ibid p.175.

would, throughout the 1960s and 70s, facilitate the settlement of hundreds of thousands of Kikuyu in the Rift Valley, especially in the districts with arable land, notably Nakuru, Uasin Gishu, Nandi, Trans Nzoia and Narok. The land in the said districts historically belonged to the Kalenjin, Maasai and kindred groups, such as the Samburu. This new settlement continued in spite of opposition by the indigenous ethnic groups of the Rift Valley and as a result, there has always been a conflict in the Rift valley. These farms have been at the centre of the 'ethnic' violence experienced during election times.

Apart from resources (land) another cited cause of ethnic conflicts in the area of study is negative ethnicity. Kenya is ethnically diverse with at least forty-two (42) distinct tribal groups. This diversity in Kenya has been used to pit ethnic communities against each other for political reasons. Violence is, therefore, organized along the ethnic lines. The inference is that ethnic clashes in Kenya, which occur every year there is an election, have been caused by "ethnic hatred", but the hatred must be quantified. The hatred can correctly be linked to the electoral politics and competition among new arrivals in the region, groups with the large land ownership and the native groups who feel threatened by others. Ethnic conflicts in the study area have been due to the resentments and mistrust of the Kikuyu (the ethnic group most affected by violence) arising from the Kikuyu expansionism which has seen them own large pieces of land. From the above discussion, it is clear that the conflict in the area of study is as a result of competition for land, negative ethnicity and political incitement.

#### **2.5 Impact of the Conflict**

Electoral violence in Kenya, and especially the violence as a result of the disputed presidential elections in Kenya, led to massive displacement of Kenyan citizenry. In addition, innocent lives were lost and many Kenyans also lost their sources of livelihood. Reports by local and international organizations indicate that an estimated 500,000 persons were internally displaced in various parts of the country.<sup>65</sup> About 1,300 lost their lives in the violence.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> OCHA Kenya, Humanitarian Update, Vol.6, 2008, p.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election violence (Waki Commission), 2008, p.273.

The violence resulted in loss of domestic animals, harvests, interruption of learning for children, loss of property and family break downs. The economic status of IDPs was, therefore, lowered as a result of losing jobs and possessions and being unable to raise school fees for their children. As a result of this, currently the area continues to suffer from poverty.

#### 2.6 Conclusion

This chapter focused on the nature of conflict in the Molo conflict area. Here, the objective of the chapter was to provide an understanding of the area of study. This understanding involves providing a picture of the settled people in the area. This is important because the PEV took tribal dimensions. Hence, the chapter explains the different ethnic communities and how they came to be settled in this area. This explains the issue of original inhabitants and those who came later and who were to be gotten rid of during the violence.

The chapter also looks at the genesis of the conflict right from the colonial era to the postcolonial period and finally the 2007/2008 PEV. This goes on to explain the fact that to a certain extent the PEV was a conflict deep rooted in historical factors and was therefore not just a sporadic violence. In this regard, the chapter looks at the main cause of conflict in this area. Though the violence can be attributed to many factors, a resource (land) was really at the centre of the conflict.

The chapter goes on to focus on the impact of this conflict. Here, the interest of the study is discussed. This is internal displacement which affected many people directly and indirectly. This then provides a basis for the next chapter which discusses the resettlement process itself.

#### **CHAPTER THREE**

#### **RESETTLEMENT PROCESS**

#### 3.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I have discussed the nature of the conflict in Molo conflict area. In this chapter, I shall mostly use the qualitative methods in the analysis of the interviews and the focus group discussions that were undertaken in Sachangwan location of the District. This is interpreted and discussed within the social contract theoretical framework, whereby the government has the responsibility over the citizenry.

In general, this chapter seeks to give an insight on the resettlement efforts that have been carried out in this area by different stakeholders. These stakeholders include the government, through the MoSSP and the Ministry of Provincial Administration and Internal Security. In this regard, resettlement programmes initiated by the government in the Molo conflict area will be examined. Other stakeholders that participated in resettlement in the area of study were NGOs, civil society and the church. Findings on their contribution will also be analyzed in this chapter.

This chapter gives an analysis of data collected from IDPs resettled in this area and their views on the success or failure of the process. It also provides an overview of the responses to the IDP problem from other stakeholders and how they related in this process. This process is important since resettling IDPs is a first step towards normalcy and hence provides an enabling environment for dealing with the root causes of the conflict.

#### **3.1 Components of ideal resettlement Programs**

Ideally, all persons including IDPs are entitled to enjoyment of human rights which are enshrined in legal frameworks. In Kenya, these rights are protected in the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 in the Bill of rights.

These rights should be well protected in an ideal resettlement programme. The Guiding Principles on internal displacement provide for considerations that should be considered in a resettlement programme. The guiding principles are thirty in number. They are based on international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee laws. They set forth the rights of IDPs and also explain the obligations of national authorities and non- state actors towards these populations. They identify the various causes of internal displacement, including natural disasters, human made disasters, conflicts and violations of human rights.

The guiding principles cover the phases of displacement including the pre-displacement phase, the displacement itself, the return or resettlement and also the reintegration phase. In terms of the period before the conflict, what is important is to ensure that measures are put in place to address possible causes of conflict. For example the draft policy on internal displacement in Kenya recognizes that displacement in Kenya is a complex historic issue that has multiple causes: the major ones being politically instigated factors, resource based conflicts, natural disasters, development projects and projects to preserve the environment.

A component that is desirable in an ideal resettlement programme is consultation and participation of IDPs. Section 18(3) requires that "special efforts be made to ensure the full participation of women in the planning and distribution of basic supplies."<sup>67</sup> Principle 29(2) stipulates that "special efforts should be made to ensure the full participation of IDPs in the planning and management of their return or resettlement and reintegration."

Another important component that should be considered in an ideal resettlement programme is ensuring that measures for addressing the long-term sustainability of return and resettlement programmes, provisions for supporting host communities and families which often bear a large burden in assisting IDPs. Also a resettlement programme should also provide means of combating discrimination against IDPs.

#### 3.2 An Overview of resettlement efforts in Molo by the government

After the GCG was formed it formally, through the MoSSP, took over the coordination of humanitarian aid for IDPs from international agencies like the Kenya Red Cross. Three programmes were launched by the government: namely, *Operation Rudi Nyumbani, Operation Tujenge Pamoja* and *Operation Ujirani Mwema*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> Guiding principles on Internal displacement op cit.

Almost five years down the line, IDPs that were resettled in the area of study can trace their origins to a number of villages in Molo. Most of them came from Kimanyi and Sachangwan, while a few were from Gitinge, Kidawa Ndogo, Kapsoit and Chesilongo. Approximately 50% of the IDPs belonged to the Kikuyu ethnic group while the rest came from the Kalenjin and Kisii ethnic groups. The IDPs were resettled on their land through the MoSSP and with support from other humanitarian organizations, such as the Danish Refugee Council, Norwegian Refugee Council and Goal Kenya.

#### 3.2.1 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' (Operation Return home)

On 5<sup>th</sup> May 2008, the Grand Coalition Government through the Ministry of State for Special Programmes launched *Operation Rudi Nyumbani*. It was launched at a time when IDPs had high expectations for compensation and a return to normalcy. It was therefore expected that this programme would see all those people displaced during the 2007 PEV return home. It was carried out in all the areas where displacement had been experienced. This programme focused mainly on IDPs who owned land as opposed to landless IDPs.

Among the resettled IDPs that were interviewed, agriculture was the main source of livelihood before they were displaced. Others depended on wages from informal employment and financial assistance from relatives.

According to the MoSSP, the Government provided Kshs. 1.0 billion and Kshs. 750 million for the resettlement programme in the financial years 2007/08 and 2008/09, respectively. In addition to the budgetary allocations, H.E. the President Mwai Kibaki, presided over a successful fund raising drive which attracted contributions from well wishers. The fund raised Ksh. 520,449,132 which included Ksh. 294 million donated by the Government of Japan to the Ministry of Agriculture.<sup>68</sup>

These funds were used to pay each household Ksh. 10,000/- for families that had been willing to return to their farms to enable them buy basic items and restart their lives. Ksh. 25,000/- was given as support for reconstruction for those whose houses were burnt or destroyed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> Ministry of State for Special Programmes, The facts about IDP Resettlement, Nairobi, p. 50.

Those IDPs who had a national identity card and proof of where their previous houses had stood benefited from the construction money. However, a few IDPs claimed that they were required to cater for transportation of building materials or meet the cost of labour which they could not afford. Among the IDPs interviewed some claimed that they did not receive the funds which was attributed to corruption. This was further demonstrated by claims that some IDPs benefited more than once. People who were not genuine IDPs got the money at the expense of genuine IDPS. As a result, there was dissatisfaction with the process.

According to a MoSSP official interviewed, payments were done on the basis of registers of affected persons jointly prepared by the Provincial Administration in close consultation with IDP leaders. The payments were apparently, done transparently in public offices with each recipient witnessed by a family member, an IDP leader, and the local Provincial Administration official. Photographs of recipients were fixed on to the forms of payment.<sup>69</sup>

In the opinion of the provincial administrator interviewed, families who received payments used the money to reconstruct their lives in different ways, such as purchase of household items, seeds, agricultural implements, and reconstruction of houses. What is more, IDPs showed remarkable resilience with a resolve to become self sufficient using funds received. In a number of cases, formerly landless IDPs formed self-help groups and pooled resources to buy themselves pieces of land. For example, a group of 3368 families who had lived in the Nakuru Showground camp moved to a 50 acre piece of land they purchased collectively in Mawingo, Nyandarua North District. Others bought land in the pipeline area of Nakuru, Ngata farm and Mai Mahiu.<sup>70</sup>

According to government officials, generally the sums of cash disbursements had a much needed positive impact on the local rural economy. In addition to the cash support, the Government ploughed and distributed seeds and fertilizers to returnees.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> Oral interview, MoSSP official, Nairobi, 2<sup>nd</sup> March 2012.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> Oral interview, Chief, Molo, 25<sup>th</sup> July, 2012.(For security reasons some of the government officials remain anonymous).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Oral interview, chief, Molo, 25<sup>th</sup> July 2013.

## **3.2.2** 'Operation Ujirani Mwema' (Operation Good Neighbourliness) and 'Operation Tujenge Pamoja' Operation (Let's Build together)

After *Operation Rudi Nyumbani* was implemented, there was need to follow up the places of resettlement to ensure that the transition went on smoothly. As a result, the government introduced *Operation Ujirani Mwema* and *Operation Tujenge Pamoja* in an effort to reintegrate the IDPs in their original homes or in new areas of resettlement.

The first of the two programmes was *Operation Ujirani Mwema*. This programme was meant to cement and bond different communities together which were previously warring. The United Nations Development Programme (hereafter UNDP) in partnership with the government of Kenya supported the Neighbourhood Volunteer Scheme to train District Officers and the youth on peace building. The District Peace Committees were also to play a major role in peace building and reconciliation efforts. Peace committees are chaired by the District Officer and attended by chiefs, District steering groups, civil society and elders. One of the reasons why they are not able to meet their objectives is lack of funds. Another reason was limited legitimacy of these committees at the community level. Some members were suspected perpetrators or associates of politicians who mobilized violence. In addition, in some instances these committees were said to have included unpopular individuals at the local level.

One of the major challenges that faced this programme was low community participation. There was a perception among the local ethnic community that the meetings organized were designed to benefit only the returning population who were from a different community. As a result, participation of the locals in peace activities was low. Another challenge that faced this programme was the fact that at this point there was still a focus on IDP camps as opposed to the returnees whose cases were considered to have been completed. In addition, successful healing and reconciliation, depends to a large extent on the commitment of politicians. The fact that there was no political goodwill posed a major challenge to this programme.

*Operation Tujenge Pamoja*, on the other hand, was meant to encourage communities to rebuild their lives together and encourage all the IDPs to move out of camps back into their homes. The government gave early recovery support in the form of seeds, fertilizer and farm tools to returning farmers. This was also done by NGOs such as the Catholic Relief Services and Save the Children. They gave support in the form of agricultural training and tools. The main drawback in this programme was the perception that only one community seemed to benefit.In this case the local Kipsigis community felt that the Kikuyus who were being resettled were benefiting more than they deserved. This fuelled resentment from the locals who felt that they were also needy and would have wished to also benefit from this. The locals felt that there was a failure to recognize their suffering and grievances, including historical land injustices.

#### **3.3 Non- Government actors in the resettlement process**

Apart from the government, there were other organizations or institutions which played an active role in the resettlement process. Even before resettlement was initiated by government, other stakeholders were already involved in dealing with humanitarian issues concerning IDPs. For example at the onset of the violence, churches acted as shelter for those displaced. Other humanitarian institutions, for example the Kenya Red Cross, provided humanitarian assistance in the form of food, clothing and medication.

Apart from the church, other non-government actors who participated in the resettlement process in the area of study included: Mercy Corps, the Kenya Red Cross, National IDP Network and the Internal Displacement Policy and Advocacy Network. During the resettlement process, the Provincial Administration offered security, the NGOs and Ministry of Special Programmes offered humanitarian aid, while the churches gave spiritual nourishment. In addition, the churches also took up other roles, such as peace building and reconciliation, resettlement, monitoring and advocating policies to ensure protection of IDPs rights.

Moreover, the Government launched a partnership for 40,000 low-cost housing initiatives for IDPs in collaboration with Development Partners, UN agencies and civil society groups. Pledges were received from UNHCR, Kenya Red Cross, International Organisation for Migration, Italian Government, SAFAL Group, Japanese Centre for Conflict Prevention and ACCORD. Houses

were built and handed over to beneficiaries. Friendly governments and international organizations also pledged support for the completion of this project. <sup>72</sup>

#### 3.4 **Involvement of IDPs in Resettlement Process**

Despite the positive evaluation of the resettlement process by the government officials interviewed, the picture on the ground demonstrated a different scenario. Before the commencement of the resettlement process, IDPs were informed that the government was to meet the full cost of their resettlement, including reconstruction of basic housing, replacement of household effects and rehabilitation of infrastructure. However, this did not happen. Most IDPs interviewed were still living in wanting conditions. They complained of insecurity, lack of adequate food, lack of safe drinking water, lack of clothing, and lack of a livelihood.

On the level of consultation that was undertaken to determine how the process would be undertaken, IDPs complained that the government failed to consult them. As a result, there was the challenge of inadequate house space. An example was given by an IDP who had several houses in his homestead for his extended family before the violence. These were all burnt down. During resettlement, only one house was rebuilt and, therefore, most of his family could not return home.

Besides, the IDPs held that the government did not steer communities to have effective peace and reconciliation initiatives which left them in fear, though resettled in their original place of residence. Little has been done to encourage healing and sustainable peace. One IDP commented, "Their children and our children do not visit each other's homes since we came back. We generally avoid meeting each other because deep down we have not forgiven them".<sup>73</sup>

Further, the IDPs felt that they were not given any choice on whether or not to return. They were forced to return especially with the threat that their camps would be closed down by a certain date. Local administrators interviewed on condition of anonymity, acknowledged that Operation *Rudi Nyumbani* had failed due to poor coordination by MoSSP.<sup>74</sup>

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Oral interview, MoSSP official , Nairobi, 2<sup>nd</sup> March 2012.
 <sup>73</sup> Oral interview, 1DP, Sachangwan, 25<sup>th</sup> July, 2012.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Oral interview, Assistant Chief, Sachangwan, 25<sup>th</sup> July, 2012.

Amongst the IDPs there was a feeling that there had been miscarriage of justice. This is because none of the perpetrators of the violence were arrested and prosecuted. This is despite the fact that they were known to the returnees. In addition, the stolen property had not yet been returned to the owners which led to bitterness among returnees.

Despite the fact that generally, IDPs were dissatisfied with the resettlement process, some considered resettlement procedures to be satisfactory to them. An IDP from Kimanyi stated that, "The houses that were built are better than tents in the camps."<sup>75</sup> This can be attributed to the attempts made to normalize life through movement from camps to houses, thereby facilitating resumption of life back to the previously abandoned farms.

#### 3.5 Conclusion

This chapter set out to examine the government IDPs' resettlement programmes in the Molo conflict area after eruption of ethnic - based violence due to the disputed presidential elections results in December 2007. It has also examined responses by other non- state actors. The government did not involve IDPs in resettlement plans and as a result, forceful resettlement occurred and concerns of host communities were not considered. There was also inadequate and inequitable compensation and no restitution. However, the real danger lies in the continued existence of negative ethnicity, tribalism, insecurity and failure to bring inciters and perpetrators of post- election violence to justice.

The causes of displacement have not been addressed, creating a worrying political scenario. Despite the existence of NCIC / TJRC which has improved peace building efforts, and the new constitution which addresses many issues including land, there still exists negative ethnicity; tribalism is still rife, while insecurity is still an issue.<sup>76</sup> As a result, peace building efforts have not been completely successful due to perceived pretence of remorse by the perpetrators. Inciters and perpetrators of post-election violence are still free, while all promises were either not delivered or were delivered unequally. An IDP stated, "A sub- chief in Kimanyi is still causing problems by encouraging negative ethnicity and does not support the work of peace

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Oral Interview, IDP, Kimanyi Village Molo, 25<sup>th</sup> July, 2012.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Chapter V Sections 70(c) and 75(i) of the Constitution protect the right to property and from deprivation without compensation.

committees".<sup>77</sup> This illustrates lack of commitment and neutrality by the local leaders who play a big part in peace building at the grass root level.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> Oral Interview, IDP, Kimanyi Village Molo, 25<sup>th</sup> July, 2012.

#### **CHAPTER FOUR**

## CHALLENGES FACED DURING AND IN THE POST-RESETTLEMENT PERIOD

#### 4.0 Introduction

As discussed in the preceding chapter, there was very little satisfaction with the resettlement process that was undertaken in the area of study. Dealing with the internal displacement problem continues to pose many challenges to the different actors. In Kenya, and other countries that do not have clear guidelines on how to deal with this problem, the challenges are magnified. This chapter takes a look at challenges that were faced in the area of study during the resettlement process and also in the post-conflict period. Specifically the chapter focuses on the challenges that were faced by government and other actors during the process of resettlement and those challenges faced by IDPs in the post-resettlement period.

However, the IDPs also faced numerous challenges during the resettlement period. One of these challenges was the requirements that they were supposed to fulfill before they were accorded assistance as internally displaced people. According to one resettled person interviewed, his resettlement took a long period because he did not have his national identity card. His documents were destroyed in a fire that had burnt his house. He therefore had to seek confirmation from the local leaders that he was indeed displaced in order to be assisted.<sup>78</sup> This thus means that in case one could not get confirmation from the local leaders then it became difficult for them to be assisted accordingly. In addition, even after resettlement some of those resettled still expressed frustration by the government's failure to efficiently replace their official documents which were destroyed or got lost during the PEV. These documents (both national cards and passports) and land title deeds. Most of IDPs, who sought for replacements were either asked for bribes or referred to their places of original residence which was problematic for people in need of essential services. This chapter discusses in depth the challenges during this period.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Oral Interview, Geoffrey Kimani, 45years , Sachangwan, 25/07/2012.

### 4.1 Challenges facing IDPs in the post – conflict period

One of the challenges that faced the IDPs in the post-resettlement period was the poor living conditions that they experienced after resettlement. Before the violence, most of those interviewed were people who had homes and household goods. During the violence, most of their houses were burnt down and their household items looted or destroyed. During resettlement the houses that were constructed for the IDPs were generally too small to cater for their needs, especially for the larger families. The lack of adequate space forced parents to share single rooms with older children, hence little or no privacy within the family unit. One person interviewed lamented having been forced to live with his children and grandchildren.<sup>79</sup> This was because, despite the fact that his homestead originally had three houses, at resettlement only one small house was built to replace those burnt down. Clearly, this was not adequate for him and his family.

Another major challenge that the IDPs faced was the loss of livelihood. This was as a result of loss of livestock and inability to work in their farms because of fear of repeat attacks. Consequently, the returnees could not support their families financially and this contributed to an increase in their poverty levels. Because of this, they could not afford to take their children to school or even take care of their families' medical expenses. This then meant that they were vulnerable to various diseases as they could not afford to seek necessary medical attention.

An acute shortage of safe drinking water was a major challenge that faced those who were resettled. The reason for this was in the words of one IDP because their boreholes were destroyed or contaminated during the violence.<sup>80</sup> This, therefore, worsened the health situation among them.

In the post-resettlement period, the IDPs suffered a humanitarian crisis due to lack of basic personal commodities, such as clothes and household items. This was worsened by the fact that non-state actors concentrated on the IDPs who were still in camps because they were considered more vulnerable. Hence, those who were already resettled were not given priority in provision of household items, foodstuff and clothing.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> Oral Interview, Kiarie Ng'ang'a, 70 years, Sachangwan, 25/07/2012.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Oral Interview, Youth leader, Ken Wang'ombe, Sachangwan, 25/07/2012.

Having to deal with internal displacement is a big problem by itself. However people with special needs and who face internal displacement have to deal with more challenges. This is the case for people living with HIV/AIDS. Their special needs were not addressed in the resettlement process. One woman explained that she was for many months unable to access her anti- retroviral drugs.<sup>81</sup> This had a negative impact on her health and as the interview took place she was under the care of her son's family.

Another challenge and one that was a threat to peace and security that was experienced was tribalism. This was especially in job opportunities and youth employment. This alludes to a situation whereby one's tribe was used to discriminate and deny them opportunities. This depended on the leadership and their tribe.<sup>82</sup>

Some of the IDPs alleged that there were cases of some IDPs receiving the Kshs. 25,000 upstart funds, while others received nothing due to tribalism and corruption.<sup>83</sup> Similarly, some IDPs were given land and houses while some received none, showing a tendency of unequal compensation. There were reports in the media that some officials in the MoSSP had misappropriated funds meant for IDPs.<sup>84</sup>

Unemployed youth pose a security threat to any society or nation. As discussed earlier, some of the factors that denied the youth employment included corruption and tribalism. Lack of employment and livelihood to a large extent contributes to people engaging in criminal activities and drug abuse. In addition, cases of women engaging in prostitution in order to support their families would result from lack of alternative sources of a livelihood. The PEV led to a rise of families that would be headed by women. Such women have to provide for their families by whichever means.<sup>85</sup>

Lack of adequate and well equipped police officers is also another threat to security in any society. In a post-conflict context, this is partly attributed to the burning down of the previous police stations during the violence. In the area of study, another issue that came out was the fact

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> Oral Interview, Stella Njeri, Kimanyi village, 25/07/2012.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> Oral Interview, Youth leader, Ken Wang'ombe, 25/07/2012.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> Oral interview, Youth leader, Sachangwan, 25/07/2012.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> Francis Mureithi, "Issues that derail the resettlement," Sunday Nation, 25<sup>th</sup> March, 2012 p. 11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> Oral interview, Women group leader, Sachangwan, 26/07/2012.

that in some instances, the police were also partial. They took sides depending on their tribe and political affiliation. They were not neutral as they ideally would be expected to be.<sup>86</sup>

One of the issues that came out at the time of interviews with those resettled, was the fact that there was still a lot of fear of the unknown. Uncertainty was a drawback for the returnees. They were wary about what the future held for them. This state of affairs had contributed to hopelessness among some of them who were not convinced to work hard again only for everything to go down the drain like it had happened in previous general elections that they had participated in.<sup>87</sup>

### 4.2 Challenges facing actors involved in IDP resettlement.

The Government and the other non-state actors who were involved in the resettlement process also faced various challenges in the process of resettlement of the IDPs. One of these challenges was negative ethnicity and hostility from communities found in the area of resettlement. In this case, members of such communities had been the perpetrators of the violence. Therefore, in some instances they were hostile to any indications that the IDPs would return to their farms, which some had already identified ready for occupation. This is also because of the fear of prosecution for their actions during the violent period. Related to this, were security concerns of humanitarian aid workers in this hostile environment.<sup>88</sup>

The dilemma on how best to respond to the IDP problem was another challenge that the actors faced. On one hand, the IDPs expressed genuine concerns on why they did not want to return to their farms. On the other hand, there was fear of a humanitarian crisis at the camps. Therefore, it was a balancing act between preventing the humanitarian crisis in IDP camps and also ensuring that those resettled, would feel safe in their homes.

Another challenge that the different actors involved in the resettlement faced, was the fact that there was a problem of some people pretending to be IDPs. Therefore, the issue of genuine and fake IDPs arose, hence a need to interrogate the resettlement process more. In this regard, the big question of who actually deserved to be referred to as an IDP arose. Is it a person who previously

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> Oral interview, Youth leader, Sachangwan, 25/07/2012.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> Oral interview, Tabitha Akinyi, Red Cross volunteer, Nakuru, 28/07/2012.

owned land? What about the people who had rented houses and were involved in small and medium businesses and were also displaced? Where were they to be resettled? The actors had to deal with all these questions. The fact that there were no guidelines in this process worsened the situation.

Lack of adequate finances by organizations posed another challenge faced in the resettlement process. The IDP problem was one of high magnitude and thus required financial commitment. This was compounded by the high expectations that IDPs placed on NGOs. In some cases, the NGOs were not able to meet the needs of those who required assistance. This situation was made worse by the fact that there was poor co-ordination between the organizations. In this sense, there was no co-ordination between the different actors who were involved in the process. This meant that there was no clear manner in which any of the actors was able to identify where their assistance would be most beneficial. This led to some of the needy people being neglected while others got assistance from more than one humanitarian organization.<sup>89</sup> This challenge was inter- related to the lack of policy guidelines to guide the resettlement process. As a result, there was confusion in some cases.

Another challenge was lack of political will from the local leadership. In this regard, local politicians were cited to be at the forefront of inciting their people not to co-operate with the actors in the resettlement process. They frustrated the process and went on to inculcate the feeling that those who had been displaced were outsiders and should therefore go back to their ancestral lands. One interviewee gave an example of a certain local administrator who continued to incite the locals against accepting those who were resettled.<sup>90</sup>

One of the actors that was involved in the resettlement process was the church. After the violence broke out, those displaced sought shelter in the church. During the resettlement period the church still played a major role. It mobilized its members (those who had not been displaced) to donate clothing and foodstuff for the returnees. However, in some instances the church faced some challenges. This was due to the fact that some of the local people, who were opposed to the IDPs return, felt that the church was taking their side. The church, therefore, in such cases experienced some division amongst its members.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> Oral Interview, Civil Society Activist, Molo, 26/07/2012.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> Oral interview, Evans Kimani, Chief, Molo, 26/07/2012.

#### 4.3 Conclusion

This chapter began by giving a general overview of the challenges that were experienced during the resettlement process and also in the post-resettlement period. It is the assertion of this chapter that the resettlement process is a complex process that has many challenges. These challenges are faced by both the IDPs and also by the actors who are involved in the resettlement process. Therefore, the chapter discussed in length the challenges that IDPs face during and after resettlement. Some of these challenges include, having to meet some requirements in order to be assisted. This is during the resettlement process. In the post-resettlement period, this chapter has proved that resettlement does not necessary mean an end to the problems that IDPs face. This is contrary to what would ordinarily be expected. Even after resettlement, those resettled continue to face many challenges, including; lack of a livelihood, and lack of social amenities, health facilities and educational facilities.

The chapter has also discussed the challenges that face the actors who are involved in the process during the actual process. Some of these challenges as discussed include; lack of political will, lack of adequate finances, hostility from the local communities, the dilemma of how to respond to the IDP issue and also lack of guidelines to guide the process. This lack of guidelines then led to an uncoordinated process which left the beneficiaries dissatisfied.

In conclusion, it was quite evident that though great efforts had been put in place to solve the IDP problem in the area of study, this was not adequate. At the same time, many challenges were experienced as highlighted in this chapter.

#### **CHAPTER FIVE**

#### **CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The outcome of the presidential elections held on 27<sup>th</sup> December 2007 and subsequent political crisis brought to the surface deep seated and long standing divisions within Kenyan society. In efforts to address the humanitarian crisis, promote reconciliation and healing, the issue of resettlement of IDPs emerges.<sup>91</sup>

This study drew impetus from the fact that the government through the MoSSP, NGOs and other stakeholders have attempted to solve the internal displacement problem. However, how resettlement was to be undertaken was a matter that drew many questions.

The study had three objectives. The first was to examine resettlement programmes in Molo conflict area. These were programmes that had been initiated by either the government or other non-state actors. This objective was met through in-depth examination of programmes, including *Operation Rudi Nyumbani*, *Operation Ujirani Mwema* and *Operation Tujenge pamoja*. The process of implementation and the impact that this initiatives had on the IDPs was examined. In addition, the role played by non-state actors was evaluated. The NGOs and other stakeholders also came in and gave humanitarian assistance. It was the finding of this study that the resettlement programmes that were implemented did not resolve the IDP problem. In fact, it was found that IDPs felt that they had been forced to go back home. This is because there was no consultation with them to find out how they felt about being resettled. Their expectations were, therefore, generally not met.

The second objective of the study was to identify challenges of resettling IDPs in the area of study. These challenges were classified into those facing IDPs in the post- resettlement period and those challenges that the people and institutions resettling them faced in this process. It was the finding of this study that from the onset the resettlement process faced numerous challenges. Most of these challenges are as a result of the fact that at that point there was no policy to guide the process. It is therefore, hoped that the recent formulated IDP policy will in future mitigate against such problems and challenges. It was also a finding of the study that the IDP problem

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> The National Accord and Reconciliation Act No. 4 of 2008, Nairobi, National Council for Law Reporting, p. 7

does not end with resettlement. Resettlement should ideally mark the first step towards dealing with the problem of internal displacement. The returnees in the area of study continue to experience numerous challenges, ranging from lack of a livelihood to facing hostility from those who consider themselves as the original inhabitants of the area. In future, the extent of violence will depend on the political coalitions and in the long run it will depend on the success of structural reform stipulated in the national accord and the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.

The third objective of the study was to investigate the effectiveness of the resettlement programmes. It was the finding of the study that due to the challenges that were experienced during and after resettlement, the resettlement programmes were not effective. They did not meet the expectations of the IDPs and even those involved in the process faced challenges in this process.

This study tested three hypotheses. First, that current resettlement practice does not adequately cater for the internally displaced in Molo conflict area. This was confirmed by the findings of this study. The second hypothesis was that failure to adequately tackle the IDP problem is as a result of the lack of a national IDP policy and the third was that resettlement programmes in the area of study have been ineffective. These two hypotheses were also confirmed by the findings of this study. In this regard, the adoption and implementation of the National Policy on Internal Displacement should be expedited.

The study utilized one theoretical paradigm; namely, social contract theory which helps us to understand how a civil society is created and subsequently the members agree to obey laws in order to live in peace with one another. The government, on the other hand, has a duty to ensure that all citizens, including IDPs enjoy the right to life, shelter and ownership of property. Therefore, despite the fact that NGOs played a role in resettling IDPs in the area of study, the government is duty bound to ensure that those displaced are settled in order to protect their constitutional rights. However, these interventions do not end at resettlement. A follow up in the post- resettlement period is necessary to ensure durable solutions.

This study took an in-depth look at the various programmes and efforts that were implemented in response to the IDP problem in the area of study. It was a finding of this study that IDPs in Molo conflict area and specifically in Sachangwan, were resettled on their land through the MoSSP

and also with support from other humanitarian organizations. Before the violence, these IDPs mainly depended on agriculture as a source of livelihood. At resettlement factors such as corruption, played a role in denying a good number of the IDPs start up funds and equal compensation.

This study found that there were many challenges that were experienced during the resettlement process. It was a finding of this study that some of these challenges included lack of consultation, poor co-ordination among the actors involved in resettlement, and lack of adequate funds to meet the high expectations of those displaced. These factors, therefore, derailed the effectiveness of the resettlement programmes. Further, in the post-resettlement period, it was found that there had been no restitution. This is whereby those who had taken the property of those who were displaced would be required to take the same back to the rightful owners. Also, what has been done to encourage healing and sustainable peace is still negligible. The root causes of displacement have not been addressed and there still exists negative ethnicity, tribalism and insecurity. Peace building efforts have not been completely successful. Absence of policy guidelines, lack of political will and non - involvement of all stakeholders are other challenges that have rendered the resettlement programmes ineffective.

Consequently, although the IDPs were resettled in their original homes, durable peace in the area of study is far from being achieved. For this to be achieved the different actors have to work together for durable solutions. It is expected that the government which has the responsibility to ensure that all citizens live at peace wherever they choose to settle will provide an enabling environment for this to be possible in future.

Lack of an IDP policy at the time of study was found to be a major contributor to the ineffectiveness of the programmes and efforts that were put in place to deal with internal displacement. In this regard, the recently formulated IDP policy presents an opportunity for future handling of internal displacement. The IDP policy provides guidelines on resettlement exercises, including how to incorporate the work of stakeholders handling IDP issues, guidance on compensation of IDPs and management of IDPs data. Full implementation of the policy will be a huge step towards addressing the challenges that have been experienced in responding to the needs of IDPs. It will also present a forum for independent auditing of resettlement assistance given to IDPs. This should be conducted by an independent organization to ensure accountability

and transparency. Implementation of the policy will go a long way in ensuring that all IDPs receive adequate and equitable compensation and assistance corresponding to their loss. This will enable IDPs to return to their previous economic status. This entails building permanent houses for those who had similar houses before post-election violence and curbing corruption in disbursing of funds. A major challenge facing returnees in the post- conflict environment is lack of a livelihood. In order to counter this, the government and other non-state actors should provide easy access to funds to start businesses. In addition, provision of seeds and fertilizers will also ensure food security.

Another opportunity has been provided in recent legal frameworks. In order to prevent violence in the future, undertaking land reforms is important since this will protect ownership of land and eliminate sources of agitation and complaints. All dealings done on land when guided by law will necessitate all parties to comply with the laid down regulations.<sup>92</sup> The constitution also provides clear principles of land issues which when fully implemented will address one of the root causes of conflict.<sup>93</sup>

Poverty and unemployment are catalysts to violence since they predispose people to conflict upon slight or no provocation and addressing the two would reduce the risk of violence. In order to eradicate poverty and unemployment, education will play a major role in ensuring that the youth become economically empowered. One of the impacts of the 2007 / 2008 post - election violence was an interruption of education for children due to destruction of education facilities, displacement or loss of livelihood resulting in lack of school fees. Restoring education systems and ensuring that all children return to school is vital for successful resettlement. This involves reconstructing, re-equipping and re-staffing all schools vandalized by the PEV up to their previous status. On health, the government must ensure affordable and quality healthcare for IDPs and all citizens

Another way by which the IDP problem can be dealt with includes enforcement of the rule of law. In this regard, the culture of impunity witnessed by the conduct of some politicians in the area of study should come to an end. Perpetrators of post-election violence and those who incite

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> The Land Act 2012 provides for the sustainable administration and management of land.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> Chapter 5 of the Kenya Constitution, 2010.

and fund them should in future be prosecuted. This will serve as deterrence to other members of the community and also to the politicians.

A sense of patriotism needs to be enshrined and promoted in people as opposed to tribal identity. In this regard, being a Kenyan citizen becomes more important than hiding behind an ethnic identity. This should be promoted through the education system and also ensuring equitable distribution of resources. One of the objectives of devolution system is to ensure equitable sharing of national and local resources throughout Kenya.<sup>94</sup>

Successful resettlement programmes can also be achieved by addressing negative ethnicity and hostility from host communities. Civic education by government and promotion of peace and reconciliation through peaceful coexistence is achieved by fighting tribalism, discouraging negative ethnic stereotyping and insisting on good leadership.

Incentives should be offered to encourage return of IDPs. Houses constructed for IDPs should be large enough for the size of the respective families to ensure adequate privacy for all members of the family. Those who have been taken to areas where the IDPs face tension should be resettled elsewhere. To this extent, it is important to obtain views from IDPs on how they wish to be resettled. There should be no forceful resettlement and concerns of host communities should be considered. In addition, provision of household items, such as utensils, beddings, furniture and basic amenities, will lessen difficulties made towards adjusting to a new life.

Other issues to be considered when resettling IDPs include cooperation of all stakeholders in order to achieve better results. In this regard, for example, there should be inclusion of the church to play a major role and provide counseling to address psychological and spiritual welfare for the IDPs. Engaging in civic education, addressing special needs of children and women and encouraging peace building efforts, healing and reconciliation are also important. In addition, it is important to involve IDPs in decision making.

The resettlement exercise can be improved if there is adequate civic education on negative ethnicity to ensure understanding of all issues among the various ethnic groups. Patriotism should be promoted while discouraging negative ethnicity. Most importantly, the government is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> Article 174 (g) , Kenya Constitution, 2010.

obligated to implement IDP policy to address and identify IDP, issues such as resettlement work of stakeholders handling IDP issues, guidance on compensation and how to manage IDPs data. Such policy guidelines are required to be fully implemented.

Starting up projects to yield income especially to youth through provision of basics and employment is important towards taking care of this crucial section of the population. This is because in most conflicts, youth is the group which participates most actively.

Improvement of security through active law enforcement and prosecution of inciters, such as some political leaders, eliminates impunity and is, therefore, an important way by which the resettlement exercise can be improved. Also security should be enhanced with more, staffed, equipped, accessible and response oriented police apparatus within the areas affected by the PEV. For durable solutions the government and other partners should ensure security sector reforms and sustain effective peace building and harmonious relationship at both local and national levels.

All local leaders, politicians and stakeholders should be involved in resettlement efforts and undertaking capacity building for all stakeholders is important. In addition, the list of beneficiaries to resettlement assistance should be made by an independent organization to prevent cases of favouritism and corruption. Views and needs of both IDPs and local communities should be considered, in addition to promotion of reconciliation among the ethnic groups in the area.

In conclusion, the draft Kenya IDP Policy is meant to provide a durable solution to the IDP problem by providing an institutional framework that protects the displaced and restores them to their normal life. The draft policy acknowledges that the process of drafting the policy needed to be inclusive, consultative, participatory, interactive, consensus based, transparent and that it has been accountable to and respected the needs of the IDPs, whom the policy has put at the heart of the process.

Since Independence, the government has not shown commitment to resolve IDP problems. Government action has been characterized by political manipulation, allegations of corruption, mismanagement of IDPs funds and exclusion. The government has not undertaken deliberate measures to overcome the challenges to resettlement. This study focused on IDPs displaced in 2007 to the exclusion of other categories of IDPs. There is need to also look at the responses made to other IDPs. For the policy to succeed community involvement will be of paramount importance. The policy also calls for laws to address historical injustices, such as the National Land Policy 2009. This is because land is a root cause of conflict and subsequent displacement.

Thus the resettlement of IDPs is a key component of assuring Kenya's long-term stability. The government should provide the means and ensure the conditions necessary for the displaced to voluntarily and safely return to their homes, relocate, and reintegrate into the host communities. In particular, the government must address security issues beyond building police posts to promote and facilitate community level reconciliation.

Although keeping IDPs high on the national agenda is a key first step, the government should not believe that once IDPs have largely moved out of the main camps the task is over. Towards this end, the government must adopt a comprehensive approach that follows up in the post-resettlement period.

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## APPENDIX 1: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS' QUESTIONNAIRE

## TOPIC: EVALUATING EFFORTS TO RESETTLE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS: A CASE STUDY OF MOLO CONFLICT AREA, 1990-2012

My name is *Esther Kabura Ng'ang'a*. I am currently undertaking studies at **The University of Nairobi**, P.O. Box 30197 – 00100, **Nairobi**, in the **Department of History and Archaeology**, leading to the award of **Masters of Arts Degree** in **Armed Conflict and Peace Studies**.

Your information will be useful in compiling my research on *Evaluating efforts to resettle internally* displaced persons: A case study of Molo conflict area, 1990-2012

#### Instructions

This questionnaire is part of a study carried out to investigate internal displacement response activities in Molo conflict area and the impact of internal displacement.

The questionnaire does not bear your name and therefore the information will not only be treated as confidential but will be used on the basis of this study only.

Finally, I wish to thank you sincerely for taking time to fill this questionnaire.

#### **Personal information**

•	Gender	::Male Female
•	Age	
	Below	20 years 21 to 30 years 31 to 40 years Above 40 years
•	Tribe .	
•	Marital	Status:
	Single	Married Widowed Separated Divorced
•	Educati	ion Level
	i.	Primary School
	ii.	Secondary School
	iii.	Technical College
	iv.	University
•	Date of	f interview
•	Period	as an IDP in years
•	District	t/Division of origin

Please answer the following questions by ticking or writing the correct answer where applicable

### SECTION A

Q1.	Who resettled you?
Q2.	Did you own land in your original habitat?
Q3.	What were the requirements for you to be resettled?
Q4. (Please	<ul> <li>Which of the following if any are challenges that you face in the area where you were resettled?</li> <li>a)</li></ul>
Q5.	<ul> <li>specify)</li> <li>What are your sources of income?</li> <li>a) Social welfare programs.</li> <li>b) Wages/earnings of family members.</li> <li>c) Aid of relatives.</li> <li>d) Agricultural products.</li> <li>e) Not sure</li> </ul>
	• Others (please specify)
Q6.	<ul> <li>Are you happy with your resettlement?</li> <li>a) Yes, I chose it.</li> <li>b) Yes, since I have no choice.</li> <li>c) No, I was not consulted.</li> <li>d) No, I was not compensated enough.</li> <li>e) No, our living conditions are poor.</li> <li>Give any other</li></ul>

Q7. According to you what is the greatest threat to security in the area where you have been resettled?

	<ul> <li>a)</li> <li>b)</li> <li>c)</li> <li>d)</li> <li>e)</li> <li>f)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Youth unemployment.</li> <li>Tribalism.</li> <li>Drug abuse.</li> <li>Criminal activity.</li> <li>No threats.</li> <li>Lack of adequate police officers.</li> </ul>
	Giv	e any other
Q8.	(i)	Do you feel safe in your present environment?
	(ii)	Please give reasons for your choice of Yes or No to8 (i) above
SECT	ION B	
Q9.	(i) (ii)	Are you satisfied with the procedure of resettling IDPs in Kenya? (a) Yes (b) No Please give reasons for your choice of Yes or No to 9 (i) above
Q10.	Do you	think that the issues that led to your displacement have been addressed?
Q11.	In your a) b) c) d) e) f) g)	<ul> <li>view what is the most important way to prevent violence in future?</li> <li>Undertake land reforms.</li> <li>Eliminate poverty and unemployment.</li> <li>Free and fair elections.</li> <li>Prosecute those who incite.</li> <li>Deploy more security.</li> <li>Promote peace and reconciliation.</li> <li>Civic education.</li> </ul>

	h) Implementation of the constitution.
	Give any other
Q12.	How has being internally displaced affected you?
013 (i)	Were you involved in the resettlement process?
Q13.(I)	(a) Yes (b) No
(ii	i) Please explain Yes or No of the above Q13 (i) Answer

Q14. Could you please list some of the issues you would wish to be considered when resettling the Internally displaced?

	(i)
	(ii)
	(iv)
	(v)
Q15.	Suggest ways in which you consider most effective in dealing with the IDP problem? (i)
	(ii)

(v)	•••••

Q16. What do you think can be put in place to improve the resettlement exercise in the country? Give as many suggestions as possible.

## **APPENDIX 2**

# QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THOSE INVOLVED IN RESETTLING OF IDPS:

## EVALUATING EFFORTS TO RESETTLE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS: A CASE STUDY OF MOLO CONFLICT AREA, 1990-2012

My name is *Esther Kabura Ng'ang'a*. I am currently undertaking studies at **The University of Nairobi**, **P.O**. Box 30197 – 00100, **Nairobi**, in the **Department of History and Archaeology**, leading to the award of **Masters of Arts Degree** in **Armed Conflict and Peace Studies**.

Your information will be useful in compiling my research on *Evaluating efforts to resettle internally* displaced persons: A case study of Molo conflict area, 1990-2012

#### Instructions

This questionnaire is part of a study carried out to investigate internal displacement response activities in Molo conflict area and the impact of internal displacement.

The questionnaire does not bear your name and therefore the information will not only be treated as confidential but will be used on the basis of this study only.

Finally, I wish to thank you sincerely for taking time to fill this questionnaire.

#### **Personal information**

•	Gende Male	r:		Fem	ale							
•	Age		_			·····			•••••			
•	Date o	f intervi	ew					•••••				
•	Organ	isation.						•••••		•••••		
Please	answer	the follo	wing qu	uestion	s by t	ticking or w	vriting the	correc	et answe	r where a	pplicabl	e
SECTI	ION A											
•		have	•			organizat						resettling

\_\_\_\_

Q2. (i) In your opinion has enough been done to resettle IDPs? Yes No

(ii) Please give reasons for your choice of Yes or No to (i) above.....

Q3. What are some of the challenges you have faced in your efforts to resettle IDPs? (Please tick as many as appropriate.)

g)	Lack of finances	
h)	Insecurity	
i)	Lack of policy guidelines	
j)	Lack of political will	
k)	Negative ethnicity	
1)	Hostility from host communities	
0	Others	(please
	specify)	
		•
What a	are some of the opportunities that you see in resettlement efforts of IDPs?	•
f)	Social welfare programs.	
g)	Policy framework.	
g) h)	Policy framework. Participation of the IDPs in their resettlement.	
g)	Policy framework. Participation of the IDPs in their resettlement. Consult local communities.	
g) h)	Policy framework. Participation of the IDPs in their resettlement.	
g) h) i)	Policy framework. Participation of the IDPs in their resettlement. Consult local communities.	(please

#### **SECTION B**

Q4.

Q5. (i) Are you satisfied with the procedure of resettling IDPs in Kenya? (b) Yes (b) No (ii) Please give reasons for your choice of Yes or No to 5 (i) above..... .....

Q6. Could you please list some of the issues you would wish to be considered when resettling the internally displaced?

Q7. Suggest ways in which you consider most effective in dealing with the IDP problem?

(i)	
(ii)	
(iii)	
(iv)	
(v)	

Q8. What do you think can be put in place to improve the resettlement exercise in the country? Give as many suggestions as possible.....

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Q9. What is the most important thing the government and other stakeholders can do to address the problem of IDPs in Kenya?

- a) Resettle them elsewhere.
- b) Return them to the areas where they were displaced from.
- c) Take them to their ancestral districts.
- d) Give them financial assistance.
- e) Increase security.

- f) Give them land
- g) Promote peace and reconciliation
- h) Resettle them where they are.
- o Others

(please

specify).....