UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF TERRORISM IN EAST AFRICA: A CASE OF AL SHABAAB IN KENYA

BY

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R50/ 63781/2010

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A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

OCTOBER, 2013
DECLARATION

This research study is my original work and has not been presented to any other examination body. No part of this research should be reproduced without my consent or that of the University of Nairobi.

Signed:...........................................................  Date.............................................

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R50/63781/2010

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

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DR. OCHIENG KAMUDHAYI
DEDICATION

This research work is dedicated to my parents, who are also my mentors.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to extend my sincere gratitude, first to the Lord, Almighty who gave me the endurance needed to tread the rocky path of completing this project. Secondly, to all University of Nairobi lecturers with special regards to Dr. Ochieng for guiding me all the way to its successful completion. Lastly, to my friend Rahab W. Njoroge who kept me going through encouragement and never letting me give up during the entire period of this project.
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to assess the socio-economic impacts of terrorism in East Africa, with Kenya as a case study. The study began by giving an insight into the meaning of terrorism, examining different definitions as variously put forward by different scholars. The study then settled on one working definition that formed basis upon which it was founded. This definition that portrays terrorism as unlawful use of threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives best resonated with the objectives of the study. The literature review was done with a wealth of extractions from well-known authors and rich sources of publications to re-emphasize the fact that their ideologies were in line with the study objectives. This strengthened the study. The literature review focused a lot on the research questions and objectives. Thus, the areas largely explored in the literature review were social impacts of terrorism, economic impacts, as well as impacts of acts of terror and terrorism on the prospects for regional integration in Eastern Africa. To further examine the implications of terrorism on Kenya, and by extension East Africa, the study was divided into five chapters. In chapter one, the researcher defines the research study and puts it into context through the introduction and background of study. This chapter also presents the Research Questions, the dependent variables, thesis, and hypothesis and the methodology and the literature review sections. Chapter two puts the study in context by first examining international terrorism, highlighting the history of modern international terrorism and examining its relation to Islam as a religion. Furthermore, this chapter examines some of the causes of terrorism and its general impacts on the global society. Chapter three focuses on terrorism in Africa. Here, the researcher presents a history of terror in Africa and examines terrorism in the African context. Also, this chapter examines terrorism in Kenya and her neighbors. This the study does by examining some specific acts of terror that have been experienced in Kenya. The chapter also discusses Al-Shabaab as a terror group and their motives in East Africa. Finally, the researcher presents data analysis, presentation of data and interpretation of the collected data. This is done in form of graphs, tables and charts that clearly show correlation between the variables in chapters four and five. These are accompanied by brief notes to explain each figure and chart, to further enhance the understanding of the data. Finally, the study gives the recommendation and conclusion.
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction and Background to the Study

1.1 Background to the Study

There is neither an academic nor an international legal consensus regarding the definition of the term terrorism. Various legal systems and government agencies use different definitions of "terrorism". Moreover, the international community has been slow to formulate a universally agreed upon, legally binding definition of this crime. These difficulties arise from the fact that the term "terrorism" is politically and emotionally charged and one act of terrorism in one part of the world may have considerable differences from another act of terror in another part of the world. Nonetheless, the various definitions that that scholars have managed to come up with reflect the diverse schools of thought, and academic disciplines ranging from economics, political science, history, sociology and psychology, among other disciplines. And for a phenomenon that arouses such widespread anxiety, anger, fear and dismay, “terrorism” is not surprisingly difficult to define satisfactorily. It has been estimated that there are over 100 different definitions of the term in scholarly world.¹

The United Nations General Assembly defines terrorism as an act that takes innocent human lives, jeopardizes fundamental freedoms and seriously impairs the dignity of human beings.

However, according to the Terrorism Research Center in the United States, has agreed on a number of working definitions of the term “Terrorism”.\(^2\) These include: Firstly, terrorism is the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change. Secondly, terrorism constitutes the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective when innocent people are targeted. Finally, terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

The above definitions, if looked at keenly, reveal the confusion that has marred the attempts to define the word “Terrorism.” For the sake of this study, however, we shall adopt the definition that portrays terrorism as unlawful use of threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives.\(^3\) Our working definition shall portray terrorism, as unlawful since it is usually an act that may not necessarily be violent in nature. However, such acts are usually intended to intimidate or coerce a certain group of people or the government to act or behave in certain ways, which are pleasing to those unleashing terror. Terrorism may be motivated by political gains, social, cultural and so on. The question of illegality of terrorism obviously raises questions such as, “what or whose laws are broken here”. This can be an endless debate. However, if we look at it from an “innocent people” point of view, it gets much easier to get the meaning of terrorism. Our focus in this study will be that terrorism causes mayhem to innocent people, who are usually its most victims.

\(^3\) Ibid.
1.2. **Statement of the Research Problem**

The statement of the research problem investigates the Socio-Economic impacts of Terrorism in East Africa, with Kenya under the threats of the Shabaab militants used as a case study. How do terror activities impact on East Africa? Above questions form the backbone of this study. In East Africa, Al-Shabaab has been at the forefront of terror activities. Therefore, terror activities have been witnessed in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, while the neighboring Somalia has been the heart beat of these terrorist group. In Kenya and Uganda, they have majorly targeted civilian population. In Uganda, it is thought that their main motive was to put pressure on the Ugandan government to withdraw its troops from the AU peace-keeping mission in Somalia. In Kenya however, it is not so clear what their motive was, but one probable reason for their attacks in Kenya could have been due to Kenya’s seemingly strong ties with the West. Indeed, Kenya has all along been the destination of choice for most American and European investors. Thus, the US and Europe have had a lot of vested interests in the country. And since it would be very difficult for the Al-Qaeda linked Al-Shabaab terror group to directly attack USA or countries in Europe, Kenya was seen a soft-target for Al-Shabaab.

Many Kenyans, despite knowing that Al-Shabaab was a terror group, showed support to the government by supporting the government’s efforts. But the question remains, did their activities slow down progress in East Africa or did it impact in any way on East Africa? This study seeks to answer these questions.
1.3. General Objectives

To assess the socio-economic impacts of terrorism in East Africa.

1.3.1. Specific Objectives

1. To find out the impacts of terrorism on the regional integration efforts by East African countries.
2. To assess the impacts of terrorism to Kenya’s economy.
3. To examine the social impacts of terrorism among Kenyan communities.

1.3.2. Research Questions

1. Does terrorism threaten regional integration in East Africa, and how has this threat been dealt with?
2. How does terrorism affect the Kenya’s economy?
3. What are the social implications of terrorism among Kenyan communities?

1.4. Literature Review

This section provides an in-depth analysis of the concept of terrorism. It shall therefore enhance the reader’s understanding of the topic under study. In addition, it puts into context, terrorism in East Africa with a special focus on the Al-Shabaab terror activities in East Africa and more so in Kenya.

1.4.1 International Terrorism

As stated in the introduction part of this study, defining terrorism has been a major issue of contention among scholars studying international terrorism. It would be important to look at the widely accepted definition of terrorism, so as to put this study in its proper context. According to Badey (1998), international terrorism is defined as “an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine
individual group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human targets of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence- based communication processes between terrorists (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.

Coming up with a precise definition of terrorism is important to this study for two main reasons: First, the definition clearly defines the methodology that has been used by the main terror group, at the center of this study, Al-Shabaab or simply the Shabaab, in its activities in Kenya. Most activities of the Shabaab terror group, across East Africa, are usually directed at people who are usually not the main targets. In most cases, the victims are just innocent people, going about their day to day activities. Usually, terror activities are aimed at sending a message to the government, or an influential part of the society, but through the innocent victims without extensive security. Secondly, the definition demonstrates the fact that terror activities usually have just one major aim, that is, to cause anxiety, to cause fear and panic among the people. These terrorists achieve by involving in violence. Of course, they know no panic can be caused by doing things peacefully. Therefore, many at times, these terror groups engage in violent acts and repeatedly, to show that they are consistent in their quest for whatever means they set out to achieve. In any case, usually their primary aim is to either intimidate a particular group
of people, coercion, or just propaganda. In the case of East Africa, and Kenya particularly, one can easily say that the aim of the terror groups all the three. Based on their activities, they were out to intimidate, coerce the Kenyan public or the government for act in certain ways or just spread propaganda.

We shall look at certain aspects of this definition in details.

a) Repetition

One of the critical underlying characteristics of violence generally classified as terrorism is repetition. The assumption of systematic violence distinguishes terrorism from isolated events or individual violence. While individual acts of violence may resemble terrorism, employ similar methods, evoke similar responses, or meet other definitional criteria, they are not, despite the temptation to use the term, terrorism.\(^4\)

Thus, one must clearly distinguish between isolated acts of violence which evoke terror and repetitive violence and systematic patterns of violence, called terrorism. Terror is something one feels. Terrorism is the repeated, systematic exploitation of this fear.\(^5\)

A variety of events may cause individuals to experience deep-seated fear, anguish or even terror. For example, one of the most common incidences in Kenya’s sprouting East lands, is a usually a public vehicle being hijacked by gunmen, everyone robbed and thereafter stripped naked, and if one raises an alarm, the whistle-blower’s head meets the bullet instantly. The thought of such occurrences, no doubt create fear and panic among people travelling in such public vehicles. However, even though these events can be identified as part of a larger pattern of violence, and may meet other definitional criteria, they cannot

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\(^5\)Ibid.799
be classified as terrorism. Terrorism hinges on the credible threat of repetition and the systematic use of violence or the existence of a pattern of violence.⁶

It is important to note that the definition of international terrorism offered here does not focus on the threat of violence, but on its actual use. While some authors fail to differentiate between the threat and the actual use of violence, a clear distinction between both is an important factor in classification. Threats of violence are transmitted and received around the world on a daily basis. The impact and reaction to these threats normally depend on the nature and believability. While investigations are initiated and safety precautions, such as searches and evacuations, are often taken, the level of response to a threat is usually based on its perceived credibility. Regardless of the fact that threats can create fear and may cause inconvenience, most are unsubstantiated and should not be classified as terrorism unless they are proven to be part of a larger pattern of violence. The actual use of violence is a prerequisite for terrorism.⁷

b) Motivation

One aspect of the continuing definitional debate concerns itself with the question why people commit acts of violence described as terrorism. While a variety of motivations behind terrorist violence have been identified, discussions about motivations often turn into arguments about moral justifications for the use of violence.⁸ Judgments about good or bad, right or wrong, innocence or guilt, freedom-fighter or terrorist are

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⁷ Ibid.97
⁸ James M. Poland, Understanding Terrorism: Groups, Strategies, and Responses (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1988).pg.103
from definitional perspective irrelevant and tend to lead toward definitional division rather than cohesion. The over-riding purpose of almost all international terrorism is political. Terrorists attempt to assert their interests in the complicated process of deciding 'who gets what, when, how', the process of politics. They seek to force governments and institutions to focus on real or imagined social, economic, and political injustices, or seek to affect their status within their immediate environment.⁹

Terrorists rarely function completely outside the norms and values of society and take great pains to rationalize their behavior.¹⁰ Through the drafting of charters and manifestos or the creation of semi-legitimate political organizations such as Hezbollah or Hizbullah, which has been blacklisted by European Union, with claims of being a terror group, but which disguises itself as a political party.¹¹ However, it is not only European Union that has classified the group as a terrorist group, but also the governments of the United States and Australia. Same way, the Shabaab group, after much outcry from the public, especially the people in Somalia itself, that it at first claimed to be protecting and caring about their welfare began criticizing their activities, they turned to legitimate propaganda tools to try and redeem their image. However, it is important to note that the public outcry over the activities of the Shabaab group came only after the group began terrorizing the Somali citizens, by claiming to be following the strict Shariah laws that allowed even amputation as a punishment for crime. And even after the public outcry,

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⁹ Ibid. 106
they turned to legitimate tools of communication like tweeter, to explain their cause. Therefore, terrorists groups are usually at pains to justify their actions within societal norms. Later they attempt to separate themselves from the incidents and subsequently modify their behavior and tactics in response to public outcry and condemnation. These justifications have little to do with the original motivation for the use of violence. Some insist that terrorists are criminally motivated. In most cases, however, criminal activity is not the primary motive; it is simply the result of their actions. While all terrorists are criminals, not all criminals are terrorists even if they commit exactly the same acts.

c) Intent

As important as the motivation for violence is the intent of such actions. Ostensibly because of the origin of the word 'terror', one of the most enduring features of both historical and contemporary definitions of terrorism is the element of fear. The term, a product of the French revolution, has been traced to the system, regime de la terreur" 'the reign of terror'. Its primary instrument, the Committee of Public Safety (1793) under Maximilien Robespierre, created fear and terror with its liberal use of the guillotine to eradicate all those deemed counter-revolutionaries. Fear and anxiety are components of terrorism, as they heighten the effectiveness of communication and increase its impact upon a target population. The creation of fear and anxiety in a larger population, however, is a byproduct of all violence, stemming from an inherent tendency of most human beings to personalize violence against others (this could have happened to me) or

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13 Ibid.103
empathize with the victims of the violence (those poor children, women or clergy).

Terrorism attempts to draw upon this element of human nature to elicit a physical or psychological response.\textsuperscript{15} While fear is a component of terrorism, it is neither a distinguishing characteristic of terrorism, nor is it necessarily the primary intent of most terrorists. Terrorists intend to influence the behavior of others. They use fear to provoke a response. The response sought depends on their motivation and objectives and may differ from case to case as may their audience.

d) Actors

A fourth component of this definition of international terrorism focuses on the actors. Traditionally, two tracks have been pursued in classifying actors involved in international terrorism. One focuses on the victim, the other on the perpetrators.\textsuperscript{16} The perpetrators are usually the terrorists themselves. Perpetrators may have different motives or intentions, but usually the end results share more of the characteristics. The victims are in most cases presumed to be innocent, unarmed or non-combatants as they have been described by most scholars studying terrorism.

1.4.2. Terrorism as a Crime and State Terrorism

Most, if not all activities commonly perpetrated by terrorists, are considered illegal if not always illegitimate by the international community. Typical expressions of terrorist violence such as indiscriminate bombings, armed assaults on civilians, focused assassinations, kidnappings, hostage-taking and hijacking are considered criminal

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. 126

offences in national or international laws.\textsuperscript{17} While the criminal nature of acts of terrorism is widely accepted, most observers acknowledge the presence of political motives underlying certain terrorist activities. A crime is defined as ‘the intentional commission of an act usually deemed socially harmful or dangerous and specifically defined, prohibited and punishable under the criminal law’. \textsuperscript{18} Since the state defines crime, the question arises whether states can commit crimes, and, by implication, engage in terrorism. There is broad consensus that states can commit international crimes, like in the case of interstate aggression, or that the armed forces of a state can, even when engaging in legitimate self-defense, commit war crimes if there is a violation of the laws, customs or established rules of warfare.\textsuperscript{19} However, An analysis of the chronologies of 330 'Significant Terrorist Incidents' identified by the State Department between 1992 to 1996,\textsuperscript{40} revealed only six incidents in which state actors were purported to have had direct control over the potential perpetrators (see Table 1).

\textsuperscript{17} David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander. 2\textsuperscript{nd} Ed. (1989). \textit{The Morality of Terrorism}. New York: Columbia University Press, pg. 76
From the above table, it can be concluded that state involvement in terror or terrorism activities occurs very rarely. Most of activities, classified as terrorism are carried out by non-state actors.\textsuperscript{20} In comparison, two-thirds of incidents classified as international terrorism are directly attributed to, and are carried out by, non-state actors. At least 90 per cent of the remaining incidents, although unspecified or unclaimed at the time they occurred, would also fall into the non-state category. It is therefore safe to say that the overwhelming majority of cases currently classified as international terrorism are not carried out by states, but by non-state actors. These non-state actors exist at various levels of organization and have adopted various forms of social structure.\textsuperscript{21} Although the number of charismatic and highly visible personalities in international terrorism who were pre-eminent in the 1970s, such as Osama Bin Laden, has diminished and have been

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{} & \textbf{States} & \textbf{Non-States} & \textbf{Unspecified} & \textbf{Total} \\
\hline
1996 & 2 & 62 & 21 & 85 \\
\hline
1995 & 1 & 64 & 16 & 81 \\
\hline
1994 & 2 & 41 & 14 & 57 \\
\hline
1993 & 1 & 35 & 35 & 71 \\
\hline
1992 & 0 & 14 & 22 & 36 \\
\hline
\textbf{TOTAL} & \textbf{6} & \textbf{216} & \textbf{108} & \textbf{330} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Suspected Perpetrators of Significant Terrorist Incidents between 1993-1996}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{20} Charles W. Kegley, ed. (2003). \textit{The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls}. Upper Saddle River and Prentice Hall.pg130

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.141.
largely replaced by the highly organized groupings or terror organizations like Al-Shabaab with no individual being its symbolic figure. However, individuals still play a role in terrorism.

There are several examples of some of the significant terrorist incidents in which direct state control or involvement was suspected. These are briefly discussed below: In Russia, in October 1996, in Vladivostok, two or three assailants attacked and killed a South Korean consul near the victims’ apartment. He reportedly died of a heart wound. No one claimed responsibility. South Korean authorities believe that the attack was carried out by professionals and that the assailants were North Koreans. North Korean officials denied the country’s involvement in the attack. In Turkey, in February 1996, two members of Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian dissident group, were found dead in their Istanbul apartment. In April 1996 authorities apprehended three Islamic militants and several Iranian and Turkish nationals in connection with the killing. The militants later claimed that they had received their orders from Iranian diplomats stationed in Turkey. Another incident is in Greece, in February 1995 when Khidir Abd al-Abbas Hamza, a defecting Iraqi former nuclear scientist was abducted in Athens while he was attempting to call a newspaper office from a phone booth. The Iraqi Ambassador in Athens has denied any Iraqi involvement, but the incident is similar to other Iraqi Government sponsored abductions. Also, in Lebanon in April 1994, five individuals, including two Iraqi diplomats, were arrested for assassinating an Iraqi opposition figure, Shaykh talib Ali al-Suhayl in his house near West Beirut. Finally, in Kuwait in April 1993 Kuwaiti authorities arrested 17 people as they attempted to infiltrate Kuwait from

22 Molina Op Cit.89
Iraq. Another person was arrested later, and a large car bomb and weapons were recovered. Fourteen are charged with being part of an Iraqi Government plot to assassinate former President Bush while he was visiting Kuwait.

1.4.3. Terrorism and Religion

While terrorism is often perceived as a modern phenomenon, it has roots that predate modernity and link it to religion. The Hindu Thugs in South Asia were probably already active 2,500 years ago, the Jewish Zealot-Sicarii more than 1,900 years ago, and the medieval Islamic Assassins 900 years ago. All of them are arguably precursors of some contemporary fundamentalist terrorists. 23

A key feature of religious practices is the ritual of making ‘sacrifices’, whereby a living creature (preferably pure and innocent) is to be offered to the gods. The terrorist victimization was often perceived by the terrorist as a ‘sacrifice’. 24 The sacrifice can consist of attaching innocent people from the adversary’s camp or of a terrorist blowing himself or herself up in the midst of a group of ‘guilty’ enemies. In that case, he sees himself as a martyr. 25 This dimension of martyrdom links it to the activity that some scholars see as the most fundamental form of religiosity: sacrifice. It is a rite of destruction that is found, remarkably, in virtually every religious tradition in the world. The term suggests that the very process of destroying is spiritual since the word comes from the Latin, sacrificium ‘to make holy’. 26

25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
What makes sacrifice so shrouded in mystery is not just that it involves killing, but also the irony involved in the killing of the innocent victims. The destruction is performed within a religious context that transforms the killing into something considered positive that is expected to please the gods of the terrorists. Thus, like all religious images of sacrifice, martyrdom provides symbols of a violence conquered—or at least put in its place—by the larger framework of order that religious language provides. There is some evidence that ancient religious rites of sacrifice, like the destruction involved in modern-day terrorism, were performances involving the murder of living beings. Sacrifices are usually made to please god and favour his cause. Yet sometimes the ardent believer also expects to be rewarded. An Islamic suicide bomber might expect as reward for his ‘martyrdom’ to wake up in paradise with 72 black-eyed virgins waiting to be married to him.

The religious rationalization of terrorist acts appears to be effective for the ‘true believer’. Human rights violations are ‘justified’ in the name of an invoked ‘divine law’ which supersedes man-made laws and which can give brutal violence a ‘sacred’ character and elevate the slaughter of infidels to a ‘holy war’. Such a reframing of inhuman acts in the terrorist’s mind to heroic deeds constitutes a ‘defense-’ or ‘neutralization-mechanism’, which turns an actual murder into a perceived sacrifice.

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28 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
The French philosopher Blaise Pascal already noted in the 16th century: ‘Men never do evil so openly and contentedly as when they do it from religious conviction’.  

Karl Marx once called terrorists ‘dangerous dreamers of the absolute’. Religious groups often claim to be in possession of absolute truth, while those outside the group have not yet seen the ‘light’ or are part of the forces of ‘darkness’. Many acts of violence which we consider ‘immoral’ as a means to achieve an end, are, in the view of the religious or ideologically motivated terrorist, justified by the absolute end for which the terrorist purports to fight. Yigal Amir, the assassin of Yitzhak Rabin, claimed that he acted ‘on orders of God’. This, a ‘crime of obedience’, the unspoken implication being that it is not a crime at all when the will of God is executed. With individual culpability removed by religious justifications, killing is no longer murder but sacrifice. With such a transformation of human values, the terrorist believes that he has acquired the moral high ground he needs to defend the indefensible—non provoked attacks on non-combatants, the taking of hostages and the killing of prisoners—the main types of terrorist victimizations. Neither religion, nor any other lofty cause, can be accepted as a license to kill with impunity and a good conscience.

Juergensmeyer has developed a stage theory that can help us to understand how religious impulse can turn into terrorist violence. A characteristic of terrorists is that they

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33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
tend to see the world in a polarized way—either you are part of the solution or you are part of the problem and there is no grey area in-between.\textsuperscript{39} The ‘us vs. them’, dichotomy also characteristic of others involved in escalating conflict, turns into a ‘cosmic war’ between the ‘forces of evil’ and the ‘forces of good’, between the profane and the sacred.\textsuperscript{40} In the four stages in the construction of ideas of cosmic war as part of an effort of ennoblement, empowerment and dehumiliation, terrorism appears, only in later stages of a pattern that begins with a feeling of helplessness. From this perspective, ‘perpetrating acts of terrorism is one of several ways to symbolically express power over oppressive forces and regain some nobility in the perpetrator’s personal life.’\textsuperscript{41} This brings us back to the secular formula of terrorism being ‘a weapon of the weak’.

\section*{1.5. Justification of the Study}

Many previous researches on terrorism have tended to overly emphasize on the visible aspects of terrorism like conflicts that accrue as a result of terror, impacts of such conflicts on the vulnerable victims, the 9/11 incident and how the United States have reacted to terrorist threats, the Al-Qaeda and their activities, and so on. While this study acknowledges the importance of such previous studies, it aims at shifting focus of terrorism from such ‘loud’ and visible events to the nitty-gritties of terror but which nonetheless, should form the basis of any serious inquiry into acts of terror and terrorism in general, especially within the region where this study shall be based. Thus, my research intends to showcase that terrorism has strong impacts on the socio-economic and

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{40} Schmid Alex (2004) Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, 16:2, 199.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.202.
political developments in Kenya, and also impacts on the efforts aimed at regional integration.

To the government of Kenya, and the East Africa, therefore, this study shall be unique, in the sense that it shall provide it with knowledge about the impacts of terrorism. This information will be particularly important for the government when formulating not only public but also foreign policies, especially with regards to terrorism. In addition, the East African Community shall also get important information on how terrorism impacts on the efforts at integration.

The Kenyan public, no doubt, shall be interested in knowing how terrorist activities have impacted on their country. In addition, this study shall discuss in details, Al-Shabaab as a terror group, thus giving the public more insights into the group and its activities across East Africa.

Finally, to the Non-Governmental Organizations, such as the fourth estate and the civil society, which are seen as the main pressure group in good governance, and the strongest force to keep the government in checks will also come face to face with the recommendations on how terror activities can be kept in check and their negative impacts minimized. This will strongly inform their decisions, even as they play their role of “pressure groups”.

1.6. Theoretical Framework

Conflict in International relations and its significance are best explained by two of the oldest theories in international politics. Although the two are divergent in more ways than they converge, they present a deepened analysis of the significance of conflict, use
of force and by extension terror in international relations. These two theories are Realism or real politik and Idealism. We shall look at each in turns.

Realism is often associated with such terms as the balance of power and realpolitik. This philosophical approach to politics believes that political struggle among humans is inevitable because humans have an inherent dark side. This belief is drawn from political philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679).\textsuperscript{42} Thomas Hobbes believed that humans possess an inherent dark side which gives them the urge to dominate, an animus dominandi. This belief about the human nature made Hobbes argue that if any two men desire a thing, which they cannot both enjoy at the same time, they will become enemies, and endeavor to destroy and subdue one another. And supporting the same kind argument, one of the leading modern realist scholars Hans Morgenthau argues that “…it’s the ubiquity of evil in human actions that inevitably turns churches into political organizations…revolutions into dictatorships…and love of a country into imperialism.”\textsuperscript{43}

Realists like Hans Morgenthau together with the neo-realists, tend to focus their argumentations on the anarchic nature of the international system, based on competition among various actors and sub-actors, rather than the human nature, as the shaper of international politics.\textsuperscript{44} This school of thought holds that the international system is made up of sovereign actors(state and non-state) which act on their own whims and pursue their own objectives and interests differently through any possible means that will make them

\textsuperscript{42} Rourke, T.John.7th Ed.	extit{International Politics on the World Stage}. Dushkin/McGraw-Hill, USA.1992, pg. 34
\textsuperscript{44} Rourke, op Cit.pg.34
achieve their end. To them, the use of violence is the most appropriate since the stronger will always have their way, and the end justifies the means. Realists believe that the sovereign actors are answerable to no one, and since the international system is a self-help anarchical, with no overarching authority providing security and order.45 Because of this, the international actors usually resort to war to achieve their ends.

Since realists believe that power will determine who carries the day in the anarchic international system, they emphasize and encourage actors to hold and maintain as much power as possible. They believe that international politics is all about increasing power, keeping power or demonstrating power. Thus to them, the possession of power to a greater degree makes a king superior, to an equal degree equal, while to a lesser degree, lesser. 46 Hence a king should always endeavor to augment his power. Therefore realists believe in the Darwinian concept of “man-eat-man” or “country-eat-country” world in which power is the main determinant of who shall eat who. The idealists therefore subscribe to the notion of a world of conflict in which the anarchic world system is based on competition and conflicting interests of the actors.

Idealists on the contrary advocate a more peaceful approach to international politics and relations in general. Idealism rejects the notion that that all or most humans are inherently political predators. Instead, they believe that human and actors, whether state or non-state actors are capable of achieving more cooperative and less conflictive relations. Based on this less-conflictive relations principle, Idealists, it may be said, trace their intellectual arguments from political philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

45 Ibid.53
Rousseau argues in his book “The Social contract (1762)” that humans had joined together in civil societies because they had reached a point when the obstacles to bettering their existence had become greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual. Having reached that point, Rousseau reasoned that people realized that “the primitive condition can subsist no longer, and the human race would eventually perish unless it changed its manner of existence.” And just like Rousseau, contemporary idealist thinkers and scholars not only believe that in the past people joined together in civil societies to better their existence, but they are confident that now and in future people can join together to build a cooperative and peaceful global society. Just like the idealists, neo-idealists, a contemporary school of thought, that draws much of its tenets from the idealists, believe that the anarchic world system hinders cooperation and therefore, the best path to cooperation is through building effective international organizations which will promote dialogue in resolving the conflicting interests, rather than resort to use of force. Idealists believe that humanity can and must successfully seek a new system of world order. Idealists hold that the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction are detrimental to the human race, as has been witnessed in the activities of terrorists throughout the world. They therefore propose that the world should move away from the use of such weapons for whatever reason, and start on a new path that would see people come to a table of dialogue instead of going to war.

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47 Ibid. 40
48 Ibid. 42.
However, the period of warfare and political conflict that embroiled Europe after the French Revolution provided inspiration for political theorists during the early 1800s. Several important theories of social revolution developed during this time. The link between revolutionary violence and terror was developed early on. Revolutionary theories rejected the possibility of reforming the system and demanded its destruction. This extremism laid the groundwork for the use of unconstrained violence for political ends.

Two ideologies that embraced violent social change were Marxism, which evolved into communism, and anarchism. The main proponent of Marxist theory of social sciences was Karl Marx. Marx argued that the economic situation, the form of the productive system, is the most important determinant of all the other aspects of the society, such as its social institutions and ideas, such as the system of law, morality and education. Marx argued that dominant ideas are the result of material or economic conditions and he was therefore strongly opposed to reformers who thought that mere change in ideas can change society. The main types of society Marx distinguished were primitive, slave, feudal and capitalist. In a capitalist society capitalists own and control the productive resources (i.e., capital), workers own only their labour and work for capitalists, who then own the product and sell it at a profit.

In feudal society land was the crucial factor of production and the feudal lords owned and controlled it. In capitalist society capital, machinery, mines, factories etc. are

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52 Ibid.69
the major factors of production and these are owned and controlled by only handful capitalists as opposed to being owned by all members of society, as should be the case.

Marx saw the relation between the factors of production and the relations of production as the main determinant of the type of society existing and of social change. At first the relation between new forces of production and new relations of production is progressive or beneficial to society in general. Marx stressed the great increase in human welfare that economic growth under capitalism had brought. However as time goes on the situation becomes less and less beneficial. The new social relations of production begin to hinder the full development and application of the new forces of production.

Marx also observed that the social relations of production involve different classes. The basic determinant of one's class is one's relationship to the means of production. For example in late capitalist society the two basic classes remaining are the owners of the means of production, i.e., capitalists or bourgeoisie, and those who own only their labour, i.e., the workers or proletariat.\(^5^3\) Inequality in wealth and power was of fundamental moral concern to Marx. Some groups come to dominate others and to win for themselves a disproportionate share of the society’s wealth, power and privileges. The ultimate goal Marxists aim at is a classless society, i.e., a society in which all enjoy more or less equal wealth and power.\(^5^4\) In capitalist society the capitalist class benefits most; i.e., those who own and control the means of production receive a disproportionate share of wealth, power, privileges and status. There are other classes but as time goes on these are squeezed into either the small capitalist class or the large working class. A

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\(^5^3\) Ibid. 81
fundamental Marxist theme is that capitalist profit making constitutes exploitation of workers.

Marx thought that capitalism contains forces and processes which cannot help but increase its internal difficulties to the point where it inevitably collapses. Through the deteriorating alignment between the forces and the relations of production contradictions become more glaring, there is polarization into capitalists and proletarian classes, the immoderation of the proletariat increases, the class consciousness of the proletariat increases and revolution breaks out. Major social change is not possible without revolution. Bourgeois revolutions overthrew feudal society, e.g., the French Revolution. Marxists insist that dominant classes will not voluntarily give up power, wealth and privilege. Their control has to be taken away from them, and this might have to involve violence. Immediately after the revolution when the proletariat gained control there would have to be a period of "dictatorship of the proletariat" which would be necessary to remove all elements of capitalism, especially the ideas and values making up bourgeois ideology.55

**Criticisms of Marxism**

Too much emphasis is given to the economic factor in explaining social order and change. Culture seemed to be explained solely as derived from the economic "substructure". However it has a degree of "autonomy"; for example it is difficult to explain the advent of gay liberation in terms of productive or economic relations. Even if you get rid of capitalism you might still have enormous problems of conflict and

55 Ibid.398
domination in society. State bureaucracies as well as capitalists can dominate just like in Russia, in the period preceding the cold war.

Marx’s theory of history is contradicted by the fact that industrialized countries have not moved closer to revolution. The recent revolutions have been in peasant societies, such as China. Capitalist societies seem to have become more secure from threat of revolution throughout the 20th century. Both were utopian; they held that putting their theories into practice could produce ideal societies.\(^5^6\) In fact, to the proponents of both, complete destruction of the existing system was the only way. This destruction of status quo could not be done peacefully, since there were even stronger forces which wanted the status quo to remain. The only way the status quo could be uprooted was through violence.\(^5^7\) Both acknowledged that violence outside the accepted bounds of warfare and rebellion would be necessary. Communism focused on economic class warfare, and assumed seizure of state power by the working class (proletariat) until the state was no longer needed, and eventually disposed of. Anarchism advocated immediate rejection of all forms of governance.

The third theory and the one that shall form the basis of this study is the Stage Theory, conceptualized by Schmid.\(^5^8\) Schmid provides a critical analysis of Juergensmeyer’s stage theory that can help us to understand how religious impulse can turn into terrorist violence. A characteristic of terrorists is that they tend to see the world


\(^5^7\) Ibid.101

\(^5^8\) Schmid Alex (2004).*Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism: Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16:2, 196.
in a polarized way—either you are part of the solution or you are part of the problem and there is no grey area in-between. The ‘us vs. them’, dichotomy also characteristic of others involved in escalating conflict, turns into a ‘cosmic war’ between the ‘forces of evil’ and the ‘forces of good’, between the profane and the sacred.\footnote{Ibid.199} In the four stages in the construction of ideas of cosmic war as part of an effort of ennoblement, empowerment and dehumanization, terrorism appears, according to Juergensmeyer, only in later stages of a pattern that begins with a feeling of helplessness. From this perspective, Juergensmeyer observes, ‘perpetrating acts of terrorism is one of several ways to symbolically express power over oppressive forces and regain some nobility in the perpetrator’s personal life.’\footnote{Ibid.202} This brings us back to the secular formula of terrorism being ‘a weapon of the weak’.

According to the stage theory, terrorism is not a spontaneous act. It is something that develops through several stages to mature into what it becomes when it erupts through acts like bombings, assassinations, and so on. These stages include: First, a world gone awry, where the process begins with real problems: the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the corruption of secular governments in Egypt and India, the discrediting of traditional values, and the dehumanization of modern societies in Japan and the United States. Most people are able to cope with such situations. Others rebel against them politically and culturally. A few take these situations with ultimate gravity and perceive them as symptoms of a world gone badly awry. These few are part of emerging cultures of violence. The second stage is the foreclosure of ordinary options. Here, most people who feel so strongly about such desperate conditions to want to change them join in
political or social campaigns that sometimes are successful, sometimes not. But they persist with the expectation that eventually changes can be made through ordinary means: electing new leaders, advocating changes in public policy, and rallying public support.

The few who are part of cultures of violence, however, see no possibility of improvement through normal channels. Their sense of frustration about the world around them is experienced as the potential for personal failure and a meaningless existence. The third stage is the satanisation and cosmic war. For those in cultures of violence who experience both despair and defiance over what they perceive to be hopeless situations, religion provides a solution: cosmic war. As opponents become satanised and regarded as ‘forces of evil’ or ‘black-coated bachelors from hell’, the world begins to make sense.61 Those who felt oppressed now understand why they have been humiliated and who is behind their dismal situation. Perhaps most important, they feel the exhilaration of hope, that in a struggle with divine dimensions God will be with them and, despite all evidence to the contrary, somehow they can win. The final stage is the symbolic acts of power. This final stage comprises the performance of acts that display symbolically the depth of the struggle and the power that those in cultures of violence feel they possess. These performances include holding private rallies and public demonstrations, publishing newsletters and books and staging media events that humiliate the cosmic foe, flaunting weapons in an effort to show military might, developing communications systems and organizations, and creating alternative governments with courts and cabinet ministers and social services. In moments of dramatic intensity those within cultures of violence who

61 Ibid.220
want to express power symbolically may also choose an explosive act—terrorism—either as an isolated incident or as a part of a protracted state of guerrilla war.\textsuperscript{62}

The only problem with this theory is that it tends to lean so much on the religious causes of conflicts and terrorism, forgetting other causes like politics. Nonetheless, it is a good framework upon which to build our inquiry, since it gives explicit explanation of how religion has been used by terrorists and terror organization as a scapegoat while carrying out their terrorist activities. Since this inquiry is about the Shabaab activities in East Africa, and it’s one of the terror groups that has widely used religion as a scapegoat in its activities and to brainwash its unsuspecting recruits, this framework sufficiently resonates with this study.

\textbf{1.7 Methodology}

The primary method in this study will be quantitative survey. Questions will be delivered verbally due to the widespread prevalence sensitivity of the topic under study. In addition, many people in Kenya, both government officials and citizens, still do not have an in-depth understanding of terrorism. Indeed, terrorism is relatively new in Kenya, and many people are still coming to terms with the fact that it exists. Therefore, delivering the questions verbally will give the researcher a good chance to explain every single concept about terrorism. A random stratified sampling method will be used to draw a representative sample from each perceived by the researcher to be representative of the diversity required in the study.

The researcher will then disaggregate the sample population by gender into male and female subgroups and a random sample selected from each group according to the total number of a particular sample population. The researcher will then pick randomly the name of the participant from the list. In case of non-availability or non-willingness of the person selected to participate in the survey, the researcher shall again randomly replace the person with another one from the same list.

A sample will then be chosen from each of the population stratum to participate in a focus group discussion. The researcher intends to use about thirty focus group discussions for the verbal interviews within the study area. Focus group discussions only require people to participate who are willing to give views voluntarily.\textsuperscript{63} Therefore, members of these groups should feel comfortable even as they give out information for the purposes of this study. The number of people who will be selected to participate in the focus groups may vary from four to seven, depending on the population strata sizes. The researcher will use tape-recorders to record the discussions, some in English while others in Swahili, which will later be translated to English.

The other tool for primary data collection will be the questionnaire which will have both open and closed-ended questions. Respondents to the questionnaires will be the target population. The questionnaire will be structured in three parts as follows: Part A: General information; Part B: focused on objectives which are to establish whether or not there could be any socio-economic impacts of terrorism in East Africa. Part C will

\textsuperscript{63} Wendt, Alexander (1999) \textit{Social Theory of International Politics}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pg.56
focus on finding out how terrorism has impacted on the integration efforts among East African countries. Drop- and- pick- later method will be used to administer the questionnaire since it is deemed cheaper and convenient, especially for the government officials who may find it hard to afford time to sit down with the researcher. The researcher will also be present physically to clarify any issues that the respondents, especially those of low level of education may encounter.

Therefore, although verbal interviews backed by focus groups will be the main methodology, questionnaires will play an important role in supplementing these data. In addition, the researcher shall enlist the use of secondary data such as journals, books by different authors, and other relevant literature for the purposes of comparison so as to get the most accurate data possible.

1.7.1 Research Design

The researcher will use descriptive research design. The aim of such is to identify the various ways through which terrorism has impacted on Kenya and by extension the larger East African region. The survey will be carried out at ministries of foreign affairs, trade, immigration, and that of East African Community. In addition, the researcher shall enlist the use of secondary data such as journals, books by different authors, and other relevant literature for the purposes of comparison so as to get the most accurate data possible. Also, the general public shall be engaged in data collection through random sampling, which will enable the researcher to get indiscriminately the overall population response desired.
1.7.2 Target Population

The target population of this study will be the staff at ministries of foreign affairs, trade, immigration, planning and that of East African Community and some private corporations, mainly in the hospitality industry. About 300 respondents are targeted.

Table 1.2: Target Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Category</th>
<th>Population frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Min.of Immigration</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min.of EAC</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min.of F.A</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min.of Trade/planning</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author (2012)

1.7.3 Sample Design

A stratified sampling method was used to draw up the sample size, an equivalent of 10% of the total number of employees at each of the ministries concerned. The government officials and the public were divided into stratum according to the categories they belong to.

1.7.4 Data Collection

The main tools for primary data collection will be the questionnaire which will have both open and closed-ended questions. Respondents to the questionnaires are the target population. The questionnaire will be structured in three parts as follows: Part A: General information; Part B: focused on objectives which will seek to establish how
terrorism has impacted on East Africa, and Part C will focus on objectives 1-3 which aims at finding out how terror has efforts aimed at regional integration in East Africa. Drop- and- pick- later method may be used to administer the questionnaire since it is deemed cheaper and convenient, especially for those top government officials who may not find sufficient time to sit down with the researcher. The researcher will also be present physically to clarify any issues that the respondents, especially those of low level of education may find difficult to understand.

Thus, questionnaires will be the main tool of primary data collection for the researcher. Oral interviews may be used where there may be need to supplement the questionnaires and to clarify any queries by the respondents. Use of secondary data will also be important in this study. Main sources here will be journals touching magazines, relevant books and the internet.

1.7.5 Data Analysis and Presentation

The data analysis will be carried out in the form of descriptive statistical techniques. Measures of central tendencies will be established. The data will be analyzed using the statistical package for the social sciences (SPSS, Ver. 12). The data will be presented in frequency tables, charts and graphs. The findings will be used to draw conclusions and recommendations as shall be seen in chapter four.

1.8. Chapter Summary

Chapter One

This chapter will define the Problem, the Research Questions, the Dependent Variables, Thesis, and Hypothesis and the Methodology. This chapter introduces our research study first by setting the broad context of our research study. It gives the
statement of the problem, justification of the study, theoretical framework, literature review, hypotheses plus the methodology of study.

**Chapter Two**

Chapter two will look terrorism in depth, and also discuss terror in East Africa, with a special focus on Kenya.

**Chapter Three**

This chapter will analyze the data that has been collected in the previous chapters in light with the objectives of the study.

**Chapter Four**

This chapter will provide conclusions of the study and give recommendations and suggestions on further areas of study.
CHAPTER TWO

International Terrorism and International law

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses terrorism with relation to international law. The chapter presents an indepth analysis of terrorism and how the international community has responded to the various acts of terror. It also aims at putting this study into context as it discusses terror and acts of terror globally before the study narrows down to terror in East Africa in the next chapter.

2.2. Criminalization of Terrorism in International Law

Molina, in her writing, *Can States Commit Crime? The Limits of Formal International Law*, has noted that a combination of pragmatic and principled arguments supports the case for defining terrorism in international law including the need to condemn violations to Human rights, to protect the state and deliberative politics, to differentiate public and private Violence, and to ensure International Peace and Security.64

Carlos Diaz-Paniagua (2008), who coordinated the negotiations of the proposed United Nations Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, noted, on his part, the need to provide a precise definition of terrorist activities in international law. Criminal law has three purposes: to declare that a conduct is forbidden, to prevent it, and to express society's condemnation for the wrongful acts. The symbolic, normative role of criminalization is of particular importance in the case of terrorism. The criminalization of

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terrorist acts expresses society's repugnance at them, invokes social censure and shame, and stigmatizes those who commit them. Moreover, by creating and reaffirming values, criminalization may serve, in the long run, as a deterrent to terrorism, as those values are internalized.\textsuperscript{65} Thus, international criminal law treaties that seek to prevent, condemn and punish terrorist activities, require precise definitions.

Also in 2004, a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change composed of independent experts and convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations called states to set aside their differences and to adopt, in the text of a proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, the following ‘political description’ of terrorism: any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.\textsuperscript{66}

The following year, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan endorsed the High Level Panel's definition of terrorism and asked states to set aside their differences and to adopt that definition within the proposed comprehensive terrorism convention before the end of that year. He said, "It is time to set aside debates on so-called State terrorism. The use of force by states is already thoroughly regulated under international law. And the right to resist occupation must be understood in its true


meaning. It cannot include the right to deliberately kill or maim civilians. I endorse fully the High-level Panel's call for a definition of terrorism, which would make it clear that, in addition to actions already proscribed by existing conventions, any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act. I believe this proposal has clear moral force, and I strongly urge world leaders to unite behind it and to conclude a comprehensive convention on terrorism before the end of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly.  

The suggestion of incorporating such a political definition of terrorism into the comprehensive convention was rejected. United Nations' member states noted that a political definition such as the one proposed by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and endorsed by the Secretary General, lacked the necessary requirements to be incorporated in a criminal law instrument. Carlos Diaz-Paniagua, who coordinated the negotiations of the proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, stated that a comprehensive definition of terrorism to be included in a criminal law treaty must have ‘legal precision, certainty, and fair-labeling’ of the criminal conduct - all of which emanate from the basic human rights obligation to observe due process.\[68\] Militant groups’ crop every day especially in the developing countries and this has become one of the challenges facing such countries. Such groups have great impact on the security situation, economic and social impacts on the countries they operate. A case

\[67\] Ibid:49
in point would be the Al-Shabaab militant group which has its base in the greater horn of Africa and operates across most of the Eastern African countries, with significant backing from Al-Qaeda, so far the world’s leading terrorist group. The presence of Al-Shabaab in this region has caused much havoc, as it impacts on these countries economically, socially and politically. Al-shabaab has sought to impose the harsher version of Islam as a religion on the citizens of this country. Having achieved that in Somalia without much resistance, it sought to spread its ideals into Kenya and Uganda by provoking the governments of Kenya and Uganda into some form of tussle with them. In Kenya, their terrorist activities ranged from kidnapping and killing foreigners to sabotage Kenya’s biggest income earning industry, tourism. They also hurled grenades at public and social places, killing and maiming quite a number of innocent citizens to instill fear into the citizens.

Defining a word like “terrorism” therefore, is far more than an academic exercise. Superficially, it means different things to different people, but in depth of social complexity, the way terrorism is defined had deadly consequences. Definitions can legitimize repressive state power and delegitimize peaceful struggles for justice and peace. Interpretations may justify violence that would never be acceptable in normal circumstances, or they may encourage actions from a violent group that randomly murders innocent victims under the burner of political revolutions.

2.3. Islam as a Religion and Terrorism?

Much of international terrorism, or even most of the main terrorist groups, in a way have their roots in Islam as a religion. And as stated earlier in this study, terrorism, even though the perpetrators are most of the time at pains explaining their actions, is seen
by many scholars who study terrorism and conflict, as a way of expressing oneself. The minority, in order to have their say, usually engages in terrorist activities to cause fear and anxiety among innocent people, and in that way, tend to have their way. Thus, most scholars agree that terrorism and repugnance of Western ideals has been one of the ways used by Islam societies to make themselves. And some of the recent publications have given reasons for the Islamic rejection of Western policies and modernity. For example, some scholars such as Abdo, 2000, have traced the failure of democratization in many Islamic nations to historic reasons such as the fact that Muslims, until the 20th Century were governed as one nation and ruled by a theocracy.69 These Islamic Ummas shared not only religion and despotic theocratic leaderships but also language and culture, because Islam governs all aspects of the Muslim social life. That is why Huntington observed, “Islam is not just a religion but a way of life” that is constant among all Muslims and serves as a unifying force (1996, 111).70 Huntington observed that although borders between Islamic nations are free and unrestricted, Islam has always had “bloody borders” (1996, 117). 71 Yes, there are historic precedents for the ongoing violent and explosive nature of Islam that are being misinterpreted and reenacted by contemporary spiritual leaders who are out of step and out of time in their attempts to mimic [Qualed] Islam’s founder, Muhammad, in his use of the sword to herd its followers into its realm.

Other equally insightful scholars (Eubank and Weinberg, 2001; Juergensmeyer, 1993) attribute the failure of democracies in the Arab and Islamic nations to

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71 Ibid.
sociopolitical and economic reasons. In the Islamic world, democratization is associated with Americanization and “Westoxification,” and the fact that technology is democratized may explain why Islamic nations failed to modernize Islam in the same way that the Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese were able to modernize not only the Bushido code but also Buddhism and Shintoism.\textsuperscript{72} Another important factor contributing to the failure of Islamic nations to move toward democratized governments is the fact that globalization is being regulated by the United Nations International Monetary Fund (IMF), which mandates social, environmental, and political concessions that are anti-ethical to Islam. This factor is important because the IMF requires interest-earning banking and loan regulations that are prohibited by Islam.\textsuperscript{73}

Also “pervasive internal and external conflicts, which characterize Islam” may have created excessive amounts of risk sufficient to reduce its attractiveness to foreign investments. Because there is no Islamic core state able to modernize Islam and because of the realization by its leadership (e.g., King Hussein of Jordan) “that secular governments had little future in the Arab world” democratization of the Islamic world is almost impossible.\textsuperscript{74}

Any of these factors, reasons, or observations is viable to explain the reasons behind the Islamic world’s rejection of democracy and modernity as well as their ongoing Islamic resurgence and propensity to violence and by extension, what this study may call modern terrorism. Thus we may as well conclude that the concept of nation-state and

\textsuperscript{74} Huntington, S. 1996. \textit{The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order}. New York: Simon & Schuster Inc.pg.135-136
democracy is, to most contemporary Muslim nations, as alien to them as pork rinds. However, three facts must be realized:

First, that this Islamic religious ‘awakening’ is not something that has occurred spontaneously. As (Al-Turabi, 1992, 186) seeks to explain, “it is not just about individual piety; it is not just intellectual and cultural, nor is it just political. It is all of these, a comprehensive reconstruction of society from top to bottom”. And secondly, that the rejection of democracy by many Islamic nations is not a theory or a postulate but is a documented outcome measured not only by Western observers but also by Arab and Muslim scholars as those at the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Amman in Amman, Jordan who have periodically polled Arab opinions on democracy since 1993. See Ayla Schibley (2004):209.

Wisdom and hindsight require that all of the latter reasons are allowed to depict comprehensively the mosaic picture of contemporary Islamic resurgence. However, and again, they have all failed to provide the centerpiece and glue that explains the interconnectedness between these mosaics, they failed to spell out the propensity of certain Quranic verses for misinterpretation and, therefore, the relentless provision of canonic foundation for this enduring Islamist violence. The “pervasive internal and external conflicts, which characterize Islam” (Huntington, 1996, 135) are most likely related uniquely to Islamic attributes that are the by-products of repetitive misrepresentation of Quranic quotes. This is made possible because public safety is not Islam’s most important public good; rather it is the citizens’ total surrender to Allah13 and his Quranic canons14 (Abdo, 2000; Khalaf, 1997). Even though Zawati’s (2001)

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75 Ibid.138
study on political correctness, prudence, and cultural and Quranic competency justifies the conclusion that in Islam peace is the rule and the norm, and war is the exception, the following Quranic verses have permitted others to infer a difference.

And kill them whenever you find them, and drive them out of the places where they drove you out. . . . Fighting is ordained for you, even though it be hateful to you; but it may well be that you hate a thing the while it is good for you. . . . And how could you refuse to fight in the cause of God and the utterly helpless men and women and children. . . . When you meet in battle. . . . do not turn your backs on them. For whoever on that day turns his back to them. . . . shall indeed have earned the burden of God’s condemnation, and his goal shall be hell. . . . Permission [to fight] is given to those against whom war is being wrongfully waged—and verily, God has indeed the power to succour them—those who have been driven from their homelands against all right for no other reason than their saying. (Quran, 2:191; 2:216; 4:75; 8:15–16; 22:39–40)

Although few, these are not the only Quran verses, uniquely Islamic, whose call on all believers to fight in the name of Allah may be misunderstood, misperceived, or misinterpreted. Verses 3:157, 8:12–14, 9:111, 52:17–22, 56:31–37, and 78:32–34, may encourage the ill-minded, searching for dogmatic foundations to justify hate and pathological inclinations, to not only subjugate Christians and Jews by name, but also to reclaim their shrines. Along with the ongoing clash of religions as “the central defining characteristic of civilizations” is an ongoing clash of values and characters (Huntington, 1996, 47). In lieu of building bridges, these resurgences are building human cruise missiles17 that will soon lead to the restructuring of world political identities, polarities,
and the United State’s hegemony (Dolnik, 2003; Benjamin and Simon, 2002; Ergil, 2001; Schweitzer, 2001).

Although a core Islamic state able to modernize Islam was and is absent, core Islamist terror organizations able to reunite Muslim nations in Jihad do exist. Islamic resurgences are seeking reunification and reconsolidation and this is being spearheaded by terrorist organizations. These terrorist organizations have themselves been unified and consolidated and are now operating under the charter of the Al-Jihad al-Islami [The Islamic Holy War]. As the latter’s actions in Afghanistan, Algeria, Chechnya, Egypt, India, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Namibia, Pakistan, Sudan, Tamil, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United States have demonstrated, the by-product of this unholy union and their incited resurgencies is expected to be violent and relentless.

The success and long reach of Hizbullah have been established as well. Appleby (2000b) postulates, “to be effective . . . religious militants must find vehicles of persuasion, not coercion” (96). It appears that Appleby’s rationale may have been based in part on Hizbullah’s behavior, for Schbley (2000) concluded, “Hizbullah in Lebanon, an organization originally established as a religious network with narrowly defined politicosocio-economic goals, has eroded” (175). It is evolving into a transnational political party of militants with wider undefined politico-socioeconomic interests and is permitting its fundamental Islamic jihad to run parallel Success and governmental support and their own manifestos have ensured that the Hizbullah and Islamic Brotherhood organizations take the initiative in uniting terror organizations and, in so doing, the Muslim world (Hamzeh, 1993; Hoffman, 2002, 1999; Kramer, 1991, 1990). They are able to sponsor an annual congress and commissions in Tehran and Beirut20
because these organizations are agents of Iran and Syria and part of the political machinery of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Palestinian Authorities, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey (Hamzeh, 1993; Kramer, 1990, 1991). The success and long reach of the Islamic Brotherhood Organization has been established. Al Qaeda, which has captured the world’s attention and resources for the past two years, is just one of its cells. Membership in its ranks was required for Jamal Abdel-Nasser, Anwar Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, Yasser Arafat, and Bou Madian to acquire power. This is fusion of politics with ‘holy war’ may well be viewed as a political jihad. These latter observations are also supported by the outcomes of the last three Lebanese parliamentary elections. Lebanon and the Muslim world, in the view of a leading cleric of Hizbullah, Sayyid Ibrahim al-Amin, “is an impure realm that has to be cleansed [and in which] the Shi’a state that found its fulfilment in Iran should be duplicated . . . by Hizbullah” as a step toward a world’s central Islamic state (Schbley, 1989, p. 17). In addition to liberty and freedom from imperialism, Hizbullah’s objectives include Israel’s obliteration and the consolidation of the Islamist International liberation movements.

2.4. Causes of International Terrorism

Terrorism is a product of rational political choice. A conceptual distinction is drawn with the division of the structural variables into preconditions (root causes) and precipitants (trigger causes). Preconditions are further divided and classified into enabling (or permissive) factors that provide opportunities for terrorism to occur, and situations that serve as direct motivations for terrorist campaigns.76 There are three

prominent categories of causes of terrorism, comparable to namely structural and psychological causes, as well as those related to the concept of “rational choice.”

A number of factors breed terrorism. However, the most common factors cited in most of the literature reviewed are external support, repressive governments, religious extremist ideologists, and socioeconomic conditions. Terrorist groups need safe havens, intelligence on the environment they will operate in, training and recruitment bases, logistic support, and other infrastructure. These can only be achieved by obtaining external support to sustain their acts of terror. In addition, financing is key to international terrorism survival, naming financial support as a principle part of state sponsorship of terrorism and the most important part of the assistance some states have given to some terrorist groups.

Kurt M. Campbell and Michele A. Flournoy further identify the emergence of Islamic agencies funded by wealthy Saudi and other Persian Gulf states, which have supported and sustained terrorism. In Kenya, terrorists have found readily available internal support from some sections of the population that have enabled them to conduct two successful terrorists’ attacks. External support, which is the lifeblood of terrorism, provides terrorists money needed for recruitment, training, indoctrination, and execution of transnational terrorism. This is an area on which counterterrorism strategies and efforts should be focused to deny terrorists their lifeblood.

77 Ibid.
The grievances of minorities concerning their perceived lack of political and civil rights can often trigger violence. As such, international experts, at a meeting in 2003 in Oslo, discussed terrorism’s root causes. They determined that some of the causes included lack of democracy, inequality of power, illegitimate or corrupt governments, and the expression of social injustice and failure or unwillingness by the state to integrate dissident groups or emerging social classes. The experts pointed out that terrorism occurs in wealthy countries as well as poor countries, and in democracies as well as in authoritarian states. Thus, there exists no single root cause or even a common set of causes. However, there are a number of preconditions and precipitants for the emergence of various forms of terrorism. In Kenya, there is a perceived political marginalization of some segments of the population, especially in coastal and northeastern regions, which gives terrorists groups a perceived legitimacy for agitating and spreading their form of rule through violence and indoctrination, as witnessed by the propaganda being spread by Bin Laden and his lieutenants. The government needs to confront the root causes of terrorism and act to reduce the perceived problem. Religious extremist ideologies often lead to the spread of terrorism. Former Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu attributes the source of terrorism to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The Soviets used terrorism as a weapon during communist struggles in many western strongholds.

According to Moustapha Hassouna, in his article on why radicals find fertile grounds in Kenya, technology, such as the internet and satellite television, as well as increased travel and employment around the globe, has resulted in making Kenyan

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Muslims more informed of what is happening globally.\textsuperscript{82} This increased awareness was especially highlighted in the conflict in the Middle East and Iraq and the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is important to note that many Muslims along the Kenyan coast share a common religion, language, and significant aspects of their culture with the Muslims in the Middle East. Because of these factors, an element of radicalism has invaded Kenya from the east through Somalia and along the Kenyan coast. This encroachment breeds dissent among some sections of the Muslim community, which makes them easy targets for terrorist activities.

Economic imbalance also contributes to terrorism. In their analysis of terrorism in Africa and Kenya in particular, Campbell and Flournoy acknowledge the roles marginalization and poverty play among the Muslims that invite sectarian and inter-ethnic strife, despair, and anti-Western resentment.\textsuperscript{83} They also note the emergence of Islamic agencies, funded by Saudi and other Persian Gulf states and individuals, which are addressing the social problems of Muslim communities while sowing seeds of discord and anti-Western sentiment, recruiting, and providing safe havens for terrorist organizations.

Pillar supports this view, noting that terrorism and terrorist groups “do not arise randomly and they are not distributed evenly around the globe”.\textsuperscript{84} He attributes the living standard and socioeconomic deprivation of some segments of society as the breeding stock for terrorists: “Terrorism is a risky, dangerous, and very disagreeable business.”


Few people who have a reasonably good life will be inclined to become terrorists. Pillar believes cutting out roots can be useful. However, he acknowledges that if all root causes were somehow removed, there would always remain a core of incorrigibles, such as Bin Laden and his inner circle.\(^{85}\)

All of the authors mentioned touch on the common factors that cause some sections of the Kenyan population to lean toward joining terrorist groups—poverty and widespread unemployment. Kenyans are especially vulnerable to indoctrination and terrorist recruitment in exchange for financial gain. Thus, economic deprivation enables terrorist groups to exploit and recruit foot soldiers from the poor segment of the population.

2.5. Impact of International Terrorism on Society and Economy

Terrorism poses a serious law and order problem and leads to disintegration of society. Terrorism states that the incident of murder, torture, mutilation, kidnapping, arson and extortion create atmosphere of suspicion, fear and panic. He says that life becomes uncertain and as the terrorists kills unarmed civilians including women and children.\(^{86}\) This organized crime and violence cause social disharmony and the interrelationship among various insurgent groups and their foreign linkages bring illegal money and encourages smuggling.\(^{87}\) Also, majority of the insurgent groups collect certain percentage of money from the employees and businessmen on regular basis hence impacting negatively on the economic development of affected areas.\(^{88}\)

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\(^{88}\) Ibid.
Immediate impacts of terrorist acts usually include loss of life, destruction of property and depression of short-term economic activity. All these acts are compounded by the costs associated with the continuing threat of terrorism and that Counter-terrorism measures should be taken as an investment against future attacks.

However, positively, terrorism prevention measures increase defense spending hence creating jobs in a variety of industries as well as increased funding for disaster recovery. He argues that, like natural disasters, things that are destroyed are generally, replaced, which contributes to a positive GDP. In addition, increased security spending creates a boom in that sector of industry and the increased costs are generally transferrable to the consumer and accounted as increased fixed overheads that are shared by all within an industry.89

The targeting of public transportation such as buses, planes, and trains for terrorist attacks has made many travelers leery of straying too far from home. Events such as subway bombings and plane hijackings serve to hurt the travel industry as well as the hotel industry, especially in Middle Eastern countries. Both India and Nepal experienced a massive drop in tourism after the September 11 attacks on America in 2001. The reason for this drop in tourism was due to their close proximity to Afghanistan and the subsequent war that followed the September 11 attacks.90

Thus, impacts of terrorism on the economy can be summarized as follows; changes in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), high unemployment levels, Inflation levels, the rate of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), poor performance of the stock

market, changes in the value of the local currency, the level of the governmental debt and changes in government defense spending and the health of particular sectors of the economy.
CHAPTER THREE

Terrorism in Africa

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an insightful presentation of terror in Africa, and how terrorism has affected Africa as a continent, economically, politically and socially. Most importantly, this chapter examines the threat of terror in Kenya and its socio-economic impacts on the country’s economy. It also discusses the attempts by the Kenyan government to counter terror in Kenya.

3.2 Terrorism in the Context of the African Continent

Since terrorism is already endemic to Africa, the future threats in the continent lie in a complex mixture of sub-national and international terrorism. Africa, lately, has played a major role in international terrorism and the debates that surround this phenomenon. The motivation, means and targets all exist and these opportunities will not go unheeded for much longer. Africa presents both a facilitating environment and a target-rich environment for terrorists that seek to attack the United States, and indeed the global system Terrorism majorly aims at terrorizing. Its unlucky victim or destructive effect is simply a means to an end.

To confine the debate in Africa, statistics that seek to calculate instances of international terrorism would, however, do a terrible injustice to Africans. Terrorism in Africa is widespread. It is overwhelmingly of a domestic, sub-state nature that kills, maims and affects millions of people. Many latter day insurgent movements and government forces have adopted practices that rely heavily on the use of fear and terror. These include UNITA and RENAMO in Angola and Mozambique, the Mai Mai, Lord’s
Resistance Army, the LURD, MODEL, and so on.\textsuperscript{91} Government policies often rely upon intimidation and terror, including those of Liberia under Charles Taylor, the Zimbabwean government (particularly during the suppression in Matabeleland in the mid eighties and around elections more recently), that of Angola (particularly during the final stages of the campaign that led to the killing of Savimbi), the policies of the present regime in Khartoum in the south and elsewhere. \textsuperscript{92}

3.3. The Rise of International Terrorism and Its Effects in Africa

Since the early 1990s terrorism experts have been warning about a new breed of terrorists that would come to replace the earlier era of revolutionary and state-terrorism. \textsuperscript{93} In contrast to the close-knit, disciplined groups of the 1980s, the new threat came from loose groupings of people with similar backgrounds and beliefs, who resorted to terror as a way to strike against their enemies. Today’s international terrorism retains some characteristics of those of a previous era, but there are also important differences. Gone are the tightly knit groups of professional terrorists, often in the pay of foreign powers—the characteristic that gave birth to the term state-sponsored terror. In their place are larger amorphous groups, which provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes. \textsuperscript{94}

Although most contemporary writing focuses on the international dimensions or manifestations of terrorism, sub national terror and even state terror has been a long-standing feature of Africa. In fact, by any objective standard, Africa is the continent most

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} Cindy C. Combs (1997). \textit{Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century}. New Jersey Prentice Hall.pg.106
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.121
afflicted by terrorism—albeit not yet by international terrorism. At the one extreme, figures provided by the US State Department’s ‘Patterns of Global Terrorism’ indicate that international terrorism is on the increase in Africa, although from a very low base with only 6% of international terrorist incidents committed on African soil between 1990 and 2002.95

Evaluating the costs of international terrorism in terms of human casualties presents a different and more alarming picture. Africa recorded 6,177 casualties from 296 acts of international terrorism during the same period, second only to Asia in terms of continental casualties, with 1998 as the year with the highest number (5,379) due to the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.96

There is much evidence to indicate that the resurgence of international terrorism during the 1990s has its roots in the development of a covert alliance to counter and reverse Soviet expansion in Central-South Asia, Afghanistan in particular. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the US counter-strategy sought to draw the former Soviet Union into its own military Vietnam. The problem is that the strategy spawned any number of offshoots.

In the process the CIA let a genie out of the bottle for immediate benefit (contributing massively to the collapse of the Soviet Union) but with long-term and unintended consequences.97 The subsequent withdrawal of the CIA once the Soviet Union retreated from Afghanistan ten years later left former US allies isolated and betrayed. The training of liberators (consisting of various factions of the secret anti-

96 Ibid.102
97 Ibid.103
Soviet Muslim army in Afghanistan) became terrorist training for a new international guerrilla brotherhood with global ramifications. Aided by the collateral benefits of globalization, this coalition brotherhood is coalescing around a single global target, the United States, Israel and those perceived to be their close allies. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the contagion carried by returning veterans from that war spread particularly rapidly in northern Africa. It soon affected Algeria, Egypt and Sudan. The spread of radical fundamentalism was first financed from countries such as Saudi Arabia, and later by largess from the late Osama bin Laden and other radical private financiers. In the final years of the Afghan war, from 1986 to 1989, somewhere between 600 and 1,000 battles hardened Algerian nationals returned home. They provided a nucleus for the terrorist movement that would follow.

Previously violent extremism had primarily been orientated towards domestic issues. The return of the veterans from the war in Afghanistan invigorated these groupings and reoriented their focus externally. The ripple effects from that conflict would even add to the motivation for a wave of terrorist attacks in South Africa in the late-1990s and a series of attacks in East Africa.

The match to the flame was provided by the annulment of the 1992 Algerian elections. Tens of thousands of people died and several times this number were wounded, displaced from their homes or disappeared in the events that followed the cancellation of the 1992 elections in Algeria. The country has been in a state of virtual civil war since then, as economic stagnation and massive unemployment in the post-independence

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99 Ibid:89
shantytowns that ringed its cities provided fertile seed for radicalization. In one of its most gruesome episodes, 412 men, women and children were hacked to death on the night of December 29th, 1997 in three isolated villages in Algeria’s Elizane region.

Only early and effective countermeasures from Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and other Sub-Saharan states managed to halt the spread of radical terror further afield. Despite these efforts, foreign tourists and four Egyptians were massacred in Luxor, Upper Egypt, in November 1997, garnering international attention and damaging that country’s vital tourist industry. The subsequent bombing of two American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on August 7, 1998—and evident but unsuccessful attempts to destroy others in Kampala (as well as Bangkok and Tirana) reflected the extent to which Africa, despite its oft reported global strategic marginalization, had been drawn into a new chapter in an old story.  

The international character of this threat was reflected in the US retaliatory cruise missile attack on a purported chemical factory in Khartoum, Sudan on August 20th, 1998. Further north, the summer 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, blamed on Al Itihad members, had already increased tension between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. In retrospect, it is clear that the terrorist threats in a number of countries in the Middle East, in the Magreb and the US Embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi were a preview of the events of September 11, 2001. Although the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania came as a surprise, danger signs

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had been evident before then, going back to the states or internal and/or regional conflicts.

3.4. Al-Shabaab Threats in Kenya

Al Shabaab is a radical Islamist militant group that controls most of southern and central Somalia. The group is considered to be one of Africa’s most fearsome militant Islamist group. The group has been fighting against the UN-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia since 2006, based in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu. The existence of the group in Somali has had negative impacts to the neighboring countries with majority of Somali nationals fleeing to Kenya. A series of grenade attacks have occurred in Kenya and this led to the resolution of Kenyan government to fight the group.

3.4.1. Background of Terrorism Attacks in Kenya

Kenya has been the scene of various attacks attributed to terrorist elements. In 1980, the Nairobi Norfolk hotel was attacked. In 1998, the US embassy in Nairobi was bombed, as was the Israeli-owned Paradise hotel four years later. In total, over 300 people have been killed and at least 5000 injured in the various attacks. Recently, grenade attacks by the Al Shabaab have been happening across the country.\(^\text{101}\)

In early 1975, the first bombs to strike independent Kenya exploded. In February, there were two blasts in central Nairobi, inside the Starlight nightclub and in a travel bureau near the Hilton hotel. They were followed by a more serious blast in a Nairobi bus terminal on March 1, which killed 30 people. Despite a massive public outcry and a

police manhunt, no arrests were made. For several days thereafter, the city lived in fear, destabilized by numerous telephone bomb hoaxes.102

The second bombing happened on the Norfolk Hotel on New Year’s Eve 1980. In that attack a bomb flattened the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi, killing 20 people and injuring 80. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by an Arab group that said it was seeking retaliation for Kenya’s allowing Israeli troops to refuel in Nairobi during the raid on Entebbe Airport in Uganda four years earlier to rescue hostages from a hijacked aircraft.103

The major terrorism incident in Kenya took place on August 7, 1998. This was the bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi, which killed over 200 people and injured thousands. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility.104

On 28 November 2002 there were missile attacks on an Israel Plane after takeoff from Mombasa airport. Subsequently there was an attack on Kikambala Hotel when they were receiving Israeli tourists. The blast occurred just after some 60 visitors had checked into the hotel, all of them from Israel, hotel officials said. 13 people were killed and 80 injured.

Almost simultaneously, two shoulder-launched Strela 2 (SA-7) surface-to-air missiles were fired at another chartered Boeing 757 airliner owned by Israel-based Arkia Airlines as it took off from Moi International Airport Mombasa. Kenyan police

102 KSR Volume 1, Number 1, December 2009
103 KSR Volume 1, Number 1, December 2009
discovered a missile launcher and two missile casings in the Changamwe area of Mombasa, about two kilometers (1.25 miles) from the airport.  

Kenya is a good target of global terrorism because of a combination of geographic, regional, historical, political, economic and socio-cultural factors. Some of these factors are direct justifications of attacks while others facilitate the attacks. Direct motivations of terrorism in Kenya include the country’s close ties with Israel and Western countries, especially the US.  

Factors facilitating terrorist attacks in Kenya include the country’s coastal geographic situation and strategic location relative to Europe, Asia, and neighboring African countries, porous borders, unstable neighboring countries, especially Somalia and Sudan, relatively open and multicultural society, relatively good transport and communications infrastructure and relatively advanced regional economy.  

Since independence the country has aligned itself with U.S.A., Europe, Israel and other western capitalist interests. This geopolitical stance led to beneficial economic and technological aid flows that have advanced many aspects of the country’s development. The close relationship between Kenya and the West, together with an abundance of tourist attractions and the country’s pleasant tropical climate and alluring beaches, have made the country a major magnet for western tourists.  

Kenya also has a substantial presence of western interests, investments, installations, diplomatic corps, and the headquarters of international agencies such as the UN. Many western countries and corporations run their Sub-Saharan African operations from Nairobi because the country’s relatively well-developed infrastructure, financial
system, and strong economy facilitate such endeavors. Moreover, the country has close military relationships with a host of western countries e.g., US, Britain, Germany, Italy, France and Israel. Many of these western nations run de facto military bases in Kenya. The comparatively large Western presence in is the main attraction and target of anti-western terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.

Another geopolitical factor that contributes to terrorism in Kenya is its close ties to Israel, a country that Muslims around the world dislike for its persecution of Palestinians. This relationship is a major irritation to foreign and native Muslims who have repeatedly but unsuccessfully been calling for the severance of the relationship. One indication of the strength of this relationship is Kenya’s June 1976 decision to offer Israel crucial logistical support in its raid on Entebbe Airport in order to free Israeli hostages held there by Palestinian hijackers allied to then Ugandan dictator Idi Amin. This assistance was later avenged in the 1980 bombing of the Israeli owned Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi, killing 15 and wounding more than 80 mostly Kenyans.

Another indication is Israel’s prompt dispatch of a strong contingent of an Israeli Defense Force rescue team to Nairobi during the 1998 terrorist attacks. The Israel team was the first to arrive from abroad. Given that one of Al Qaeda’s major grievances against the US is its support of Israel at the expense of Palestinians, it is not surprising that Kenya’s long pro-Israel stance is viewed by Al Qaeda as evidence of Kenya’s

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support of US policy in the Middle East. Whether right or wrong, this makes Kenya a bona fide Al-Qaeda target.\textsuperscript{109}

3.4.2 2012 Al-Shabaab Attacks

In October 2011, a coordinated operation between the Somali military and the Kenyan military began against the Al-Shabaab group of insurgents in southern Somalia.\textsuperscript{110} The mission was officially led by the Somali army, with the Kenyan forces providing a support role. Since then, a series of explosions have rocked various areas in Kenya, bombings that are believed to have been retaliatory attacks by Al-Shabaab. In early June 2012, Kenyan forces were formally integrated into AMISOM.

According to US Embassy in the past 2011/2012, there have been at least 17 attacks involving grenades or explosive devices in Kenya. At least 48 people died in these attacks, and around 200 people were injured. Nine of these attacks occurred in North Eastern Province, including locations in Dadaab, Wajir, and Garissa. Four attacks occurred in Nairobi, and four in Mombasa. Targets included police stations and police vehicles, nightclubs and bars, churches, a religious gathering, a downtown building of small shops, and a bus station. The most recent attack involved two simultaneous assaults on churches in Garissa on July 1, 2012. In this attack, 17 people were killed and about 50 people were injured.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
On 13 June 2010, during a constitutional campaign rally; a petrol bomb was thrown into the crowds as the meeting dispersed at dusk, sparking a stampede as people fled. Some witnesses reported that there had been two separate explosions, in Uhuru Park in the centre of the city. Five people were killed and as many as 75 were injured. The meeting was organized by a church leader to campaign against a proposed new constitution in a referendum. On 17th Sept 2011, a grenade shell was recovered within the premises of the office of the Prime Minister. However, police cooled off the issue saying it was not targeting anybody. On 30 September the Sunday school of St Polycarp's church in Nairobi, Kenya was attacked with grenades. According to newspaper reports, one child was killed. Kenyan police blames the attack on al Shabaab sympathizers.

At the urging of Al-Shabaab, an increasing number of terrorist attacks in Kenya have been carried out by local Kenyans, many of whom are recent converts to Islam. Estimates in 2012 placed the figure of Kenyan fighters at around 10% of Al-Shabaab's total forces. Referred to as the "Kenyan Mujahideen" by Al-Shabaab's core members, the converts are typically young and overzealous, poverty making them easier targets for the outfit's recruitment activities. Because the Kenyan insurgents have a different profile from the Somali and Arab militants that allows them to blend in with the general population of Kenya, they are also often harder to track. Reports suggest that Al-Shabaab is attempting to build an even more multi-ethnic generation of fighters in the larger region. According to diplomats, Muslim areas in coastal Kenya and Tanzania, such as Mombasa and Zanzibar, are also especially vulnerable for recruitment.
3.4.3. Current Security Impacts of Terrorism in Kenya

The declining success of Somali pirate operations at sea during 2011 coincided with more frequent kidnapping for ransom on land. Four kidnappings took place between September 2011 and January 2012, at various locations in Kenya. Some of the hostages were handed over or sold to Shabaab affiliated groups or individuals, but all eventually ended up in the hands of Somali pirates associated with the Hobyo-Harardheere piracy network (HHPN), and held in areas nominally controlled by either the Gaalmudug or ‘Ximan iyo Xeeb’ administrations. The identities of some of the initial attack groups, abductors and organizers remain obscure or unknown.111

3.4.4. Kidnap Case Studies in Kenya

a) Judith Tebutt (11 September 2011 – 21 March 2012)

Northern Kenya, Kiwayu Island, Sunday 11 September 2011, 0400 am

United Kingdom nationals Judith Tebbutt and her husband David were reportedly spending their first night on vacation at the Kiwayu Safari Village resort near Kiwayu Island, when attacked in their lodge by six Somali gunmen. Responding to the attack, David Tebutt was shot in the chest and died at the scene. Judith Tebbut was taken to a waiting speedboat and brought to Somalia the same night. Multiple sources confirmed that Tebbutt was initially taken to the Al-Shabaab-controlled port city of Kismaayo, which led observers to believe that the movement had plotted her abduction. However, on several occasions Al Shabaab denied its involvement and in time Tebbutt was transferred or sold on to a pirate group active in and around Harardheere. Although moved to


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different locations by her abductors or guards to avoid detection, Tebbutt is believed to have mainly been held in the vicinity of Cadaado, where she was released from custody on 21 March 2011 after a payment of ransom reported to have been approximately US$ 1 million.\textsuperscript{112}

b) Marie Dedieu (01 October 2011 – 19 October 2011)

Northern Kenya, Manda Island, Saturday 01 October 2011, 0300 Am

French national Marie Dedieu and her Kenyan partner John Lepapa ole Moiyio had just returned from a trip in France when at night they were attacked and overpowered by 6 Somali gunmen in their house on Manda Island, near the tourist town of Lamu. John Lepapa who escaped the assault and went for help could not prevent the disabled woman taken out of her house and lifted into a waiting speedboat. The attackers then fled Manda Island and headed for Somalia. A pursuit initiated by the Kenyan Defense Forces proved unsuccessful and a local private air charter company tried to monitor the group’s movements’ but could do little more than determine that Dedieu had been taken ashore in the vicinity of Raas Kaambooni, Lower Juba region, just across the Kenyan-Somalia border. From there, Dedieu was taken to the Al-Shabaab-controlled port town of Kismayu, where her presence on 6 October 2011 was confirmed by multiple independent sources. However, less than two weeks later, Dedieu, who was a paraplegic and reportedly suffered from other serious health issues, was declared to have died in captivity, since medical supplies that the French Government had tried to deliver to her captors had apparently not reached her. A ransom demand never materialized while she

was alive, but a day after her death was announced, the French Minister of Defence, Gerard Longuet, According to Kenyan deputy police spokesman Charles Owino, confirmed that the hostage-takers were seeking payment in exchange for Dedieu’s body.113

c) Montserrat Serra and Blanca Thiebout (13 October 2011)

Northern Kenya, Dadaab, Thursday 13 October 2011, 1315-1330 Pm

Spanish Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) aid workers Montserrat Serra and Blanca Thiebout and Kenyan MSF driver Mohamed Hassan Borle, had reportedly left the UNHCR IFO Extension Camp – part of the Dadaab refugee complex in north-eastern Kenya- when their 4X4 vehicle was ambushed and attacked by a number of gunmen. After shooting Borle, the gunmen escaped to Somalia, taking the car and both women with them. A pursuit initiated by the Kenyan authorities on land and with helicopters was unsuccessful and the MSF car was later found abandoned some 19 km from the border with Somalia. An unconfirmed report indicated that the Spanish women may have initially been brought to Elaasha Biyaha, a settlement in Lower Shabelle region, where they were possibly handed over or sold to local members of Al-Shabaab. They were last reported sighted in Lower Shabelle region in December 2011, but were reportedly resold and transferred to a pirate group in Harardheere, Mudug region, in early January 2012. They are believed to have been held in the area ever since.114

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3.5. Governments’ Reaction to Kidnapping

Kenyan government reacted to the kidnappings by launching a fifth against the Al Shabaab in October 2012. The most positive though unexpected effect of Kenya’s conflict with al Shabaab has been a sharp reduction of ransom prices demanded by Somali pirates. According to Kenyan shipping experts ransom prices have dropped by at least 50 percent since the conflict started. It is also thought that ransom demands could drop even further if al Shabaab loses its grip over southern Somalia. Although al Shabaab is not directly involved in the business of piracy in the Horn of Africa, it is believed that the group provides protection to pirates as well as arms and logistical support.

Yet despite this seemingly unexpected success, the short-term effects of Kenya’s incursion into southern Somalia have been far from positive. In addition to provoking a series of retaliatory attacks in Nairobi and Mombasa, there has been an increase in arrivals at the Dadaab refugee camps. Indeed, prior to the incursion the level of refugees arriving at the camps was at an historical high.

CHAPTER FOUR

Data Analysis, Presentation and Interpretation

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a summary of the findings collected from the target audience. The data was obtained through the use of questionnaires which were the main tools for data collection used in the study. The data was interpreted in light of research questions and objectives. The questionnaires were distributed to the target audience i.e. the Kenyan public servants employed in the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Trade, East African Community, Immigration, and the private sector enterprises. The data provided information that formed the basis for discussions and the interpretation of the results.

4.2 Data Analysis

The questionnaires were distributed to a total of 180 respondents. Out of 180 questionnaires distributed, the researcher managed to get back 109 of the total questionnaires distributed whereas 71 were not returned by the respondents.

4.2.1. Data Analysis

SECTION A: BIODATA

Frequencies

[DataSet1] C:\Users\fred\Desktop\AdanRotichRaw.sav

Statistics

Gender of Respondent

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Table 1: Gender of Respondent

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>41.3</td>
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</table>

Classified according to gender of respondents, the response rate stood at 63 and 45 respondents for male and female respectively. This translates into 57.8% and 41.3% for male and female respondents respectively. The same information is represented in the chart below.

Figure 1: Gender Respondent

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=EDUCATION

/BARCHART FREQ

/ORDER=ANALYSIS.
Frequencies

[DataSet1] C:\Users\fred\Desktop\AdanRotichRaw.sav

Statistics

Level of Education

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<td>37</td>
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<td>29.4</td>
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<td>72.2</td>
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<td>University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The researcher also classified the respondents according to their level of education. Those with basic level of education were 9 respondents. High school level stood at 37 respondents while Tertiary and university level stood at 32 and 30 respondents respectively. The same information is represented on the chart below.
Figure 2: Level of Education

```
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=AGE

/PIECHART FREQ

/ORDER=ANALYSIS.
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**Frequencies**

[DataSet1] C:\Users\fred\Desktop\AdanRotichRaw.sav

**Statistics**

Age of Respondent

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Table 3: Age of Respondent

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<td>18-25</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>26.9</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 and Over</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another category under the biodata section was age. Categorized according to age, 29 out of the total respondents were aged between 18-25 years, while 53 and 26 were of the age groups 26-35 and 36 and above respectively. This was represented by 26.6%, 48.6% and 23.9% respectively.

Figure 3: Age of Respondent
The study also sought to find out where the respondents work. 63.3% of the respondents work in the government, in various ministries as outlined in the research design section of this work. The hospitality industry, also classified as the private sector was represented by 35.8% of the total respondents.
Figure 4: Where Respondents Work

![Pie chart showing where respondents work]

Statistics

Ministry of Government Employee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Frequency</th>
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<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>27.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Out of the total 63.3% working with the government, the researcher sought to categorize the respondents according to the various ministries and departments that they work for. 13.8% work for the Immigration department that handles almost all matters pertaining to our borders and who crosses our borders and how. 17.4% was from trade department, which also mans both internal and external trade and documents how terror affects Kenya’s economy in terms of both bilateral and multilateral trade networks, plus foreign investments. 17.4% of the respondents were from the department of East African Community and Integration, which mans all the relevant data on integration efforts of the East African countries.

**Figure 5: Ministry of Government Employee**

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/P piechart freq
/Order=analysis.
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The question on government economic diplomacy sought to find out how terror threats affect Kenya’s economy through travel bans and direct investment warnings. Many at times, whenever there is any terror threat or terror activity in Kenya, such as during the time when Al-Shabaab captured the French national at the coast and transferred her to Somali, just before the Kenyan forces went into Somali, most western
nations slapped a travel ban Kenya and warned the investors that Kenya is no longer a safe place to do business. With no doubt, this directly impacts on the Kenyan economy negatively. For example, tourism would be affected negatively by travel ban, making many who work in the tourism sector jobless. This also explains why the researcher chose the hospitality industry to represent the larger private sector in this study. During such bans, hundreds of workers are laid off and the Kenyan economy adversely affected. In addition, by simply issuing warnings that Kenya is not safe for their citizens, the investors are mostly discouraged from investing in Kenya, making the economy stagnate if not to reverse.

This question sought to find out how the government has managed to deal with these negative effects of terror alerts. This question was targeted only at those working in the government. 43.1% of the total respondents admit that there have been many threats to slap travel bans on Kenya and many travel advisories by the West, US and other countries that contribute largely to the Kenyan economy, that have been silently and diplomatically dealt with by the Kenyan government on a government to government levels. Many of these travel advisories do not even come to the public knowledge, but somehow, the government through economic diplomacy manages to thwart them. However, 20.2% of the respondents thought otherwise.
Figure 6: Government Economic Diplomacy

[DataSet1] C:\Users\fred\Desktop\AdanRotichRaw.sav

Statistics

Tourist Influx

<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This section sought to find out the impacts of terror activities on the influx of tourists in the country. 13.8% of the respondents thought that terror activities have actually increased the influx of tourists in Kenya. Most of these, thought that even with the travel ban, often than not slapped on Kenya by the West and US, Kenya has managed to acquire new tourism markets in the East. This may seem like a valid reasoning but the question remains, what if Kenya acquired new markets in the East, in addition to the markets in the West if travel bans were not imposed? 18.3% admit that due to travel bans, tourism influx into Kenya has slightly reduced, 22.9% say it has reduced significantly while 8.3% say there has been no significant change.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Increased</td>
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<td>13.8</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>21.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slightly Reduced</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significantly Reduced</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>63.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</table>

Table 7: Tourist Influx
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=LAYOFFS
/BARCHART FREQ
/ORDER=ANALYSIS.

Frequencies

[DataSet1] C:\Users\fred\Desktop\AdanRotichRaw.sav

Statistics

Existence of Lay-Offs

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Existence of Lay-offs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Valid</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>64.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>109</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This section of the study sought to find out whether there are usually any lay-offs, especially in the hospitality industry since 2011 when Kenya began experiencing
increased terror threats and activities. A whopping 79.5% thought travel bans and advisories lead to lay-offs while only 20.5% of the total respondents thought otherwise.

**Figure 7: Existence of Lay-offs**

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of Lay-Offs</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 9: Frequency of Lay-offs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid Once a Year</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 3-4 a Year</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>87.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 3-4 a Year</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing System</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</table>

The study also sought to find out from those who usually suffer such lay-offs, the frequency of these lay-offs. 28.2% said the lay-offs happen once a year, 59.0% said more than 3-4 times a year, while 12.8% believed layoffs can occur up to less that 3-4 times annually.

Figure 8: Frequency of Lay-offs
Statistics

How Busy Hotels Are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</table>

Table 10: How Busy Hotels Are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid Mostly Empty</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid Always full</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid Effect of Insecurity</td>
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</table>

This section, sought to find out how terror threats and activities affect the hotel businesses in Kenya. This question was back-dated to 2011, the period when Kenya began experiencing increased terror threats and activities, and the period that preceded KDF’s entry into Somalia to pursue al-shabaab. 15.4% said the hotels are always full throughout the year. 20.5% said the hotels are mostly empty. In addition, the respondents were asked to give their reason for low tourist numbers if they were of the opinion that
the hotels have since been empty or half-full as compared to before. 64.1% mentioned insecurity and terror threats as the main reason.

Figure 9: How Busy Hotels Are

Statistics

Respondent Opinion on Terrorism

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81
Table 11: Respondents Opinion on Terrorism

<table>
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<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Valid One Religion</td>
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<td>71.6</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid Any Religion</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid Total</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This section sought to find out the social effects of terrorism on Kenyan citizens. The respondents were asked whether terrorism and terror activities should be associated with only a particular religion, or whether they thought everyone, regardless of religion can get involved in terror activities. 72.2% associated terrorism with just one particular religion, while 27.5% thought terrorism cuts across all religions in the world: Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and other world religions.
Figure 10: Respondents Opinion on Terrorism

**Statistics**

<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trust for Others
As a result of this association of terror with either one or all religions in the world, the study sought to find out if this has impacted in any way on the level of trust that the Kenyan communities hold for each other currently, as compared to say, 5 years ago. 36.1% of the respondents claim they no longer trust members of other religions and always want to handle them with a lot of caution, as opposed to before when they could interact freely. 10.2% say they still trust members of other religions, despite the presence of terrorism in Kenya. 47.2% say they still hold trust to people of other religions, but only those they know very well and are close to them. This means they don’t trust the larger percentage that they don’t know personally.

Table 12: Trust for Others

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Frequency</th>
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<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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<td>10.2</td>
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<td>Trust Only Known</td>
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<td>93.5</td>
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<td>No effect on Trust</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When asked whether terrorism and terror activities have contributed to this change of attitude and mistrust among the public, only 6.5% say NO, meaning 93.5% say terrorism has led to the erosion of trust.

**Figure 11: Trust for Others**

![Pie chart showing trust for others](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has Trust Drifted Over Years?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</table>
Table 13: Has Trust Drifted Over Years?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Beyond 3 years</td>
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<td>36.1</td>
<td>36.1</td>
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<td>Trust Changed with</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</table>

Finally, these respondents were asked the period to which this change of trust may date back. 36.1% said the change in the level of trust towards members of other religions date back to well over 3 years ago. However, 63.9% believe it began with the increase in terror activities and dates back to well less than 3 years ago.

Figure 12: Has Trust Drifted Over Years?
Statistics

Gov't Approach to EAC

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<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>Less Enthusiastic</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More Enthusiastic</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>8</td>
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</table>

This section sought to find out the impact of terrorism in the integration efforts in the EAC. Thus, the respondents were asked to compare the level of enthusiasm of Kenya’s government and other EA governments towards the integration call since 2009. 60.9%, thought the government has become even more enthusiastic towards integration, based on the level of resources and speed with which they push the integration matters.
However, 27.5% thought the government has become less enthusiastic. 11.5% said they haven’t noticed any change in the government’s level of enthusiasm over the period.

**Figure 13: Government Approach to EAC**

![Bar chart showing government approach to EAC](image)

**Statistics**

Strategies of war on terror

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<th>Valid</th>
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<td></td>
<td>69</td>
<td>40</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
When asked whether they thought terrorism could be best fought through individual state efforts, or through international efforts, 31.9% thought individual state efforts could be more effective in war against terror. However, 68.1% said war on terror can be best fought through collective international effort, and that an individual state cannot effectively fight and win war on international terror. The respondents were also given a chance to express their own views on with regards to their choice of answer in this question. Most of those who thought war on terror can be best fought as individual nations cited disharmony and lack of coordination among sovereign states. However, those who chose international efforts, majority of them cited collective efforts, pulling together resources and technical capability, training and transfer of equipments to the poor countries.
Figure 14: Strategies of War on Terror

Statistics

Public View on Integration

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Table 16: Public View on Integration

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<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Increases Threats</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn't Increase Threats</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Effect</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Missing System                  | 70        | 64.2    |               |                    |
| Total                            | 109       | 100.0   |               |                    |

The study also sought to find out the public opinion on integration with regards to terror threats. 33.3% thought integration and opening up of our borders to immigrants from other nations would only increase terrorism related activities in Kenya. However, 38.5% of the respondents thought it would actually increase terrorism in Kenya. However, 28.2% said it would have no impact on terror activities in Kenya.
Figure 15: Public View on Integration

![Bar chart showing public view on integration frequencies]

**Public View on Integration**

Frequencies

[DataSet1] C:\Users\fred\Desktop\AdanRotichRaw.sav

**Statistics**

How EAC should Approach Terror Threats

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<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Valid</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>70</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 17: How EAC should Approach Terror Threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>30.8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Countries</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>109</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, the study sought to find out the opinions of the public on how best terrorism threats and terror activities can be handled by the East African countries. 30.8% of the respondents thought each of the EAC countries should focus on protecting its own borders. However, 69.2% thought the EAC countries should collaborate in protecting their borders and probably establish a regional surveillance body that would focus on survey of the whole region, as opposed to individual countries.

Figure 16: How EAC should Approach Terror Threats
CHAPTER FIVE

Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Introduction

The main objective of this study was to investigate the socio-economic impacts of terrorism in East Africa. This chapter presents the summary of the major findings, answers to research questions, conclusions and recommendations of the study. It also presents proposed future studies.

5.2 General Information and Answers to Research Questions

5.2.1. To Find out the Impacts of Terrorism on the Regional Integration Efforts by East African Countries

The study clearly shows that terror has a big impact on the integration efforts by the governments of East African countries, represented in this study by Kenya as one of the major players in this regional organization. A larger percentage of the respondents at 60.9% say that terrorism has made the government more enthusiastic towards East African integration. This enthusiasm can be measured in terms of the speed with which the various governments are moving to seal the various agreements under the EAC treaty. Also, this can be measured by the amount of resources allocated to the various ministries and departments in charge of the East Africa Integration in the various countries.

Additionally, it seems the war on terror has made more people appreciate regional integration. When asked for example, whether they thought war on terrorism is best fought nationally by the various nations in the EAC, or collectively as EAC 69.2% prefer collective effort, as opposed to the 30.8% that prefer national efforts.
To find out the influence of terrorism and impacts of terror related activities on East Africa integration efforts, the respondents were asked whether the government has since 2009, the period relatively associated with increased terror activities in Kenya and East Africa as a whole, been more enthusiastic about the integration efforts or it has been less enthusiastic.

An overwhelming percentage of the respondents at 60.9% say that terrorism has made the government more enthusiastic towards East African integration. This enthusiasm can be measured in terms of the speed with which the various governments are moving to seal the various agreements under the EAC treaty. Also, this can be measured by the amount of resources allocated to the various ministries and departments in charge of the East Africa Integration in the various countries.

Still, the respondents were asked whether they thought war on terror could be well fought by individual nations at national level, or whether it could be fought better collectively as a region. Again, 69.2% prefer collective effort, as opposed to the 30.8% that prefer national efforts.

Thus, from the above data, one can easily conclude that war on terror has impacted rather positively on East African integration, and has made a lot of people appreciate supranationalism, as compared to nationalism. This is in contrast to before, when most of people praised nationalism and national sovereignty more than supranationalism. Besides, if this study were to be carried out, say a decade ago, when terrorism was still just an imagination in the minds of many Kenyans, most of the respondents would say opening our borders to people of other nationalities would be dangerous. But since today, people of even British, Pakistani, Somali, American and
other origins come to commit acts of terror on our own soil, this view has significantly changed and many now think opening our borders in the name of regional integration would not jeopardize our security in any way, and instead, may just better it.

5.2.2. To Assess the Impacts of Terrorism to Kenya’s Economy

On the Kenyan economy, the study shows that terrorism and threats that accompany it affect very negatively, the economy. For example, terror and terrorism led to a significant decrease in influx of tourists from 2011, as compared to before. This has been contributed to largely by travel advisories and bans imposed on Kenya by Western countries and reduction in direct foreign investments. This has led to frequent lay-offs, in the hospitality industry, for example, and a significant reduction in the level of bookings of these hotels, thereby indicating a serious reduction in revenue for these hotels.

On the influx of tourists, 13.8% of the respondents thought that terror activities have actually increased the influx of tourists in Kenya. Most of these, thought that even with the travel ban, often than not slapped on Kenya by the West and US, Kenya has managed to acquire new tourism markets in the East. This may seem like a valid reasoning but the question remains, what if Kenya acquired new markets in the East, in addition to the markets in the West if travel bans were not imposed? 18.3% admit that due to travel bans, tourism influx into Kenya has slightly reduced, 22.9% say it has reduced significantly while 8.3% say there has been no significant change.

Questions that touched on effects of terrorism on Kenya’s economy sought to find out the level and significance of Kenya’s economic diplomacy efforts that most of the time are not made public. Indeed, the study found out that any time there are terror threats, the developed countries issue travel bans and advisories that negatively affect the
economy of Kenya. As a result, the government has devised a way of silently lobbying the relevant departments in such countries not to issues such travel bans. To this effect, there are many travel bans that are negotiated by the government that don’t materialize. In addition, the study sought to find out whether such travel bans could affect the number of tourists and investors that visit the country during the periods when we have terror threats. In addition, the study sought to find out if the Hospitality industry is affected and the impact on the local economy. A whopping 79.5% thought travel bans and advisories lead to lay-offs of employees in the hospitality industry while only 20.5% of the total respondents thought otherwise. Thus from the data, it can be concluded that terrorism and terror related activities and threats affect Kenya’s economy very negatively.

5.2.3. To Examine the Social Impacts of Terrorism Among Kenyan Communities

On the social effects, the study once again demonstrates that terrorism and terror activities or threats of terror has caused mistrust among Kenyan communities and has the potential of causing fully blown religious conflicts and suspicions among Kenyan citizens. As found out by the study, 72.2% of the total respondents interviewed by the researcher believe that terrorism can be associated with one particular religion or religious affiliation. Only 27.8% believe that terror cuts across all religions. This means if the trend continues this way, members of a particular religion may be targeted as a “possible way of eliminating terror”. This could lead to inter-religious war.

On the matter of trust among Kenyan citizens, 36.1% of the total respondents say they don’t trust members of other religions. However, 10.2% still hold the trust irrespective of one’s religion. Interestingly, most of the respondents at 63.9% say their trust of members of other religions have been eroded mainly as a result of terrorism.
On the Social impacts of terrorism on Kenya’s communities, the researcher sought to find out the level of trust that exists among various communities in Kenya. Here, the study found out that most people associate terrorism with members of a certain religious affiliation. Besides, most people no longer trust members of other religions, except those that they have known over the years. According to the data collected, 36.1% of the respondents claim they no longer trust members of other religions and always want to handle them with a lot of caution, as opposed to before when they could interact freely. 10.2% say they still trust members of other religions, despite the presence of terrorism in Kenya. 47.2% say they still hold trust to people of other religions, but only those they know very well and are close to them. This means they don’t trust the larger percentage that they don’t know personally. Besides, a whopping 93.5% of the respondents claim this erosion of trust has been majorly caused by terrorism.

Therefore, one can easily conclude that terrorism has led to mistrust among Kenyan communities. And since this mistrust is continually getting rooted into religion, it has the potential of developing into fully blown inter-religious conflict. This has been seen largely as the strategy that is being used by the terror organizations, that is to sow seeds of distrust among Kenyan communities and portray terror as “fighting for the rights of another religious group”.

5.3. Recommendation and Conclusion

From the above data, it is clear that Kenya cannot fight terror alone. Terrorism is an international phenomenon. It is a war that is fought internationally, not only in Kenya or Somalia. Terror organizations exist everywhere globally and they have networks that link their activities. Therefore, to win the war against terror, Kenya needs other nations
just as they need Kenya. War on terror need huge amount of resources and personnel, plus technical know-how. These can only be achieved in collaboration with other countries in the war against terror. However, regionally, the study has shown that EAC is the first big step towards war on terror. Therefore, the governments of all the nations in the EAC: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan need to formulate policies that will encourage collective war on terror. This will help reduce the burden of the war on individual states, and also, will help reduce the chances of targeting individual states by the terror groups. Since the countries will be working collectively, it will be hard for the terror groups to just target one country.

Economically, terrorism affects the country’s economy negatively. Therefore, Kenya needs to step up its war on terror and secure its borders even more. These efforts should go hand in hand with positive publicity about Kenya. Indeed, Kenya through the department of tourism has stepped up efforts to market herself abroad, but still a lot need to be done to “kill” the negative image that the country has gotten so far from terrorism. Socially, Kenya should develop a programme of demystifying different religions and their practices. It is now open that terrorism entrenches religious mistrust. However, this mistrust is also as a result of the mystery that shrouds different religions. If people could understand different religions and understand their principles and doctrines, terrorists would find it hard for example to disguise themselves as religious fighters.

5.4. Suggestions for Further Research

The researcher recommends that further research be conducted to further demystify terrorism. Thus a study focusing on the relationship between religion and terrorism would be more unraveling. This study focused on the effects of terrorism on
Kenya, with specific reference to the social, economic and regional integration efforts. However, since the study found out that most people associate terrorism with a particular religion, it would be interesting to study the correlation between religion and terrorism.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


KSR Volume 1, Number 1, December 2009.


APPENDIX 1

Biodata Information

1. Gender
   Male [ ]    Female [ ]

2. Age
   18-25 [ ]
   26-35 [ ]
   36 and Over [ ]

3. Education Level
   Primary [ ]
   High School [ ]
   Tertiary College [ ]
   University [ ]

4. Which one of the following best describes your religious affiliation?
   I consider myself a Christian [ ]
   I consider myself a Muslim [ ]
   I consider myself a Hindu [ ]
   I consider myself a Non-Believer [ ]
   Other .................................................................

5. Where do you work?
   Government [ ]
   Hospitality Industry [ ]
6. If you work with the government, chose below which Ministry you belong to.

- Immigration [ ]
- Trade [ ]
- Foreign Affairs [ ]
- East African Community [ ]

SECTION I

Please answer question 7-8 ONLY IF you work with the government

7. From your position as a government worker, which of the following statements is closest to your observations on the government’s Economic Diplomacy

- The government silently deals with many Travel Advisory threats as a result of terror activities in Kenya. [ ]
- Only a handful of our diplomatic engagements are about security concerns. [ ]

8. In terms of the number of tourists coming into the country in the recent past, which of the following options is accurate from your observation as someone who works for the government?

- Tourists have increased in number [ ]
- Tourists have slightly reduced in number [ ]
- Tourists have significantly reduced in numbers [ ]
- There hasn’t been any noticeable change in the number of tourists [ ]

Please answer question 9 a, b and c ONLY IF YOU work in the Hospitality Industry.
9.a) In the last three years, has your employer laid-off any workers?

YES [ ] NO [ ]

b) If yes above, how frequent has the lay-offs been?

Averagely once in a year [ ]
More than 3-4 times a year [ ]
Less than 3-4 times a year [ ]

c) In your observation since 2011, averagely how busy is your organization?

The hotels are always full throughout the year [ ]
The hotels are mostly empty throughout the year [ ]
The space in the hotels are usually affected by [ ] prevailing security situation

SECTION II

10. a) Chose one of the following options which best describes your opinion.

Terrorist activities are done by members of a particular religion. [ ]

Terrorist activities can be done by anyone regardless their religion. [ ]

b) Following recent terrorist incidents in the country, which one of the following options closely describe your view of other people.

Generally, I don’t trust people from other religions [ ]
Generally, I trust people irrespective of their religions [ ]
Generally, I trust only people I know well regardless of their religion [ ]
The recent terrorist incidents have not affected my trust in any way. [ ]
c) Look at question 15 b) above, compare your views as they are today to as they were three years ago.

My lack of trust to people from other religions goes beyond [ ]

three years ago

My lack of trust to people from other religions started with [ ]

the terrorist incidents

SECTION III

Please answer question 8-9 IF ONLY you work with the government

11. From your experience as someone in government, since 2009, choose one statement that best describes how the government has approached the issue of East African Community (EAC)

Compared to before, the government is MORE enthusiastic towards EAC [ ]

Compared to before, the government is LESS enthusiastic towards EAC [ ]

The level of government enthusiasm has neither increased nor decreased [ ]

12. a) From your experience as someone in government, chose one statement that best describes your views on war on terror.

Terrorist threats are best dealt with as individual states [ ]

Terrorist threats are best dealt with through international efforts. [ ]
b) Give reason for your answer above
...........................................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................................

Please answer question 13-14 **ONLY IF YOU DON’T** work with the government.

13. Please choose one option below which best describes your views on
national security and cross border migration

Regional integration will increase national security threats [   ]
Regional integration will **NOT** increase national security threats [   ]
Regional integration will have **NO** effect on national security arrangements. [   ]

14. In your view, how should East African states approach the terrorist threats
constantly experienced in the region?

Each country needs to focus on protecting its own borders [   ]
All the countries need to collaborate in protecting the regions borders [   ]