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**Regional Perspectives of Early Warning Systems (EWS): A Case Study of
IGAD's Response to Conflicts in the Horn of Africa**

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(R50/68368/2011)

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Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Degree of Masters in International
Conflict Management.

September, 2013

DECLARATION

I Valerie Akinyi Aseto declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been submitted for the award of degree elsewhere.

Signed

Date.....

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R50/68368/2011

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University supervisor.

Signed

Date.....

DEDICATION

This paper is dedicated to my lovely family from whom I draw a lot of inspiration.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to pass my gratitude to my brother, friends and colleagues whose support was invaluable towards the completion of this study. I would also like to thank Dr. Ochieng Kamuthayi who gave me the intellectual support and encouragement to carry out this research.

Thank you

ABSTRACT

Early Warning System has been in place for some time even though its operations have not significantly improved in Africa. For instance, despite the presence of CEWARN in the Horn of Africa the wave of conflicts continues to raise questions as to whether the mechanism has achieved its initial mandate. These existing gaps unless addressed the operation of CEWARN remains a case of a good policy undermined by poor implementation. The study establishes that Early Warning Systems was conceived as a means of protecting and preserving life. The study empirically reconstruct the historical development of conflict early warning in Africa; explores how CEWARN works, its successes and subsequently indicates the areas, modalities and challenges experienced in its operations. The study found out that accurate prediction of conflicts is impossible since main objects of analysis are human beings, human beings are complex and exhibit varied responses to similar stimuli. That early warning and response do not operate in a vacuum, they are part of sub regional peace and security project thus whatever weaknesses plague the working of sub regional organizations whether environment, legal, financial, human resource will have consequences on EWR or both. Hence sub regional organizations need to be strengthened and that regional EWS and response mechanisms should focus on improving the quality of reporting; the warning responses link and sensitivity among senior policy making of value of evidence based on decision making in situations of violent conflicts.

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ABBREVIATIONS

BMZ	-	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CEWARN	-	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWS	-	Conflict Early Warning Systems
COMESA	-	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
EAC	-	East African Community
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States
EWS	-	Early Warning Systems
EW	-	Early Warning
EWR	-	Early Warning Response
FEWER	-	Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
FAR	-	Forces Armees Du Rwandaise
HoA	-	Horn of Africa
IPF	-	Igad Partner Forum
IGAD	-	Inter Governmental Authority and Development
IGADD	-	Inter Governmental Authority on Drought and Development
IPSS	-	IGAD Peace and Security Strategy
OAU	-	Organization of African Union

- OSINT** - Open source intelligence
- OECD** - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
- PSD** - Peace and Security Division
- SAP** - France's Système d'Alerte Précoce
- SIIRA** - Security, Immigration and Refugees Affairs Authority
- UN** - United Nations
- UNISDR** - United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
Platform for the Promotion of Early Warning
- SADC** - South Africa Development Community

CHAPTER ONE

Development of Early Warning Systems

1.1 Background to the study

Since the end of cold war, economic dislocations, civil war, famine, ethnic and religious animosities have contributed to conflict and political instability in the Horn of Africa. These conflicts and instabilities frequently challenge national security interests and many at times the human rights atrocities. In his book, Mwagiru poses that conflicts are rarely abrupt; they develop over a period of time.¹ It is against this backdrop that the idea of preventing wars came to existence in Africa. Nonetheless, attempt to prevent conflicts through the use of early warning systems is inarguably a very recent phenomenon. Being an important component of conflict prevention, early warning system is basically conceived as a means of “avoiding or minimizing violence, deprivation or humanitarian crises that threaten the sustainability of human development and livelihood.”²

The application of Early Warning Systems (EWS) in the realm of conflict prevention in Africa was started in 1990s in line with a global trend in conflict management and resolution which espoused a preventive approach towards violent conflicts though Africa’s very first attempt at establishing EWS unit was initiated in June 1992, “when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) decided to establish the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.”³

¹Makumi Mwagiru, *conflict in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, Nairobi: Centre for Conflict Research, 2006.

² John Davies, *Conflict Early Warning and Early Response for Sub-Saharan Africa: Crisis and Transition Tool Kit*, Summary of Working Draft Submitted to Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland, Maryland, 2000, 2.

³ Jackie Cillers, *Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa: What Role for the Civil Society?*, in Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (eds.), *Resolution of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict Resolution and Post Reconstruction* (Oxford: James Curry Publishers 2008), 39.

OAU did not manage to establish a fully operational early warning system but later the Africa Union adopted the idea and passed it on to Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) that created a platform to governments faced with intra state conflicts to address them amicably. As a result, the heads of states and governments of Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea and Uganda resolved to expand IGAD's mandate of maintaining peace and security.

After adopting this new mandate, IGAD secretariat was mandated to produce a framework and provisions for more cohesive approach to addressing conflicts in the sub region. This paved way for the establishment of Conflict Early Warning System and Response mechanism (CEWARN.)⁴ CEWARN was established under IGAD's Peace and Security Division (PSD) by a protocol signed by its member states. The mechanism has been operational in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda with varying degree of implementation in each member state. There are no activities in Eritrea since it suspended its membership in 2008. It is against this backdrop that this research intends to examine whether IGAD as a regional organization has achieved its mandate to respond to the wave of conflicts in the region.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Inter Governmental Authority on Development conceived CEWARN to help prevent the wave of conflicts in the Horn of Africa region. This decision was also geared towards joining efforts to address sub region's development challenges, economic and social degradation, food insecurity, massive dislocations coupled with movement of people across borders. Member states also agreed to commit themselves to maintaining peace and security. This is reflected in one of the specific aims of IGAD

⁴ CEWARN official website at :<http://www.cewarn.org/index-files/page355.htm>,(accessed on April 15 2013)

that is to “promote peace and security in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts through dialogue.

It is true that an alert on upcoming crisis increases the chances to prevent conflict from escalating. A crisis often occurs as a result of a number of negative events which ideally can be monitored. If monitored, information about the events with the structural data about the country can be analyzed resulting in predictions and warnings.

But despite the mechanism being in place conflicts in the region have been recurrent and still continue to thrive. This is a clear indication that very little has been done to prevent the escalation of conflicts in the region. Member states are entrapped in regional power politics to show might and dominance and as a result, conflicts have taken new dimensions leaving the common citizens suffering and wallowing in abject poverty. This is a grave situation that requires attention both at the academic and policy levels. At the academic level, there is need to understand whether IGAD has achieved its intended goals to prevent conflicts in the region and at the policy levels, find solutions and at the same time analyze CEWARN operations, their successes and challenges. This study will explore the current debate about conflict prevention taking into account different EWS that exist in Africa with a specific case study of Karamoja and Somali cluster.

1.3 General objective of the study

This study will critically explore IGAD’s response to conflicts by analyzing effectiveness of CEWARN mechanism in the Horn of Africa.

1.3.1 Specific objectives of the study

The study aims:

- To examine IGAD's CEWARN contribution to the peace and security in the Horn of Africa
- To identify challenges that IGAD's CEWARN mechanism face in its operations.
- To analyze IGAD's CEWARN achievements in the Horn of Africa

1.4 Literature Review

The Literature Review will be tackled under four themes: The first theme; Concepts of Early Warning Systems will provide an overview on definitions and perspectives of different scholars this will help in understanding the topic of study; the second thematic area will look at Conflict in the Horn of Africa to show how conflict dynamics in the Horn are understood to provide basis of analysis; the third thematic area will look at the role of sub regional organizations whether they are suited to undertake their mandate to maintain peace and security and the fourth will provide literature on CEWARN.

1.4.1 Concepts of Early Warning Systems

There are several definitions of Early Warning Systems (EWS). Most of these existing definitions reflect attempts in various levels to respond to the four important questions in EWS. These questions are who to warn, when, of what, and how. While some of the definitions emphasize on the "what and who to warn" aspects of the question, others underscore methodological considerations of how to carry out EWS.

Originally, the concept of early warning was developed during the Cold War in the field of national military intelligence to enhance the capacity of predicting potential (ballistic) attacks. Within the United Nations System, early warning was introduced as an instrument to forecast natural disasters such as droughts. This has gone further to such that, nowadays, early warning is employed mainly to predict or respond in an early manner to both natural disasters and violent conflicts.

Austin defined EWS as any initiative that focuses on systematic data collection, analysis and/or formulation of recommendations, including risk assessment and information sharing, regardless of topic, whether they are quantitative, qualitative or a blend of both. Austin differentiated three components within Early Warning as estimating the magnitude and timing of relative risks of emerging threats, analyzing the nature of these threats and describing plausible scenarios, and communicating warning analyses to decision makers.⁵

Whereas the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) definition addresses the questions of what and who to warn by defining Early Warning System as a process that alerts decision makers to the potential outbreak, escalation and resurgence of violent conflicts; and promotes an understanding among decision makers of the nature and impacts of violent conflicts.⁶ On the other hand, the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) defined early Warning System more comprehensively as addressing the what, who, how elements of the Early Warning System by saying that Early Warning System is the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purposes of anticipating the escalation of violent conflicts, development of strategic response to

⁵ Austin Alexander, *Early Warning and field. A cargo cult science?*:Berghof Research Center for constructive conflict management(ends):Berghof handbook for conflict transformation, Berlin(2004)

⁶ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Interview with Mr. Augustine Sagna. *The Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC) News Letter*, No. 4-5 (2009). Available on: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/6/43014249.pdf>, (accessed April 10, 2013).

these crises, and the presentation of options to critical actors(national, regional and international) for the purposes of decision-making and preventive action.⁷ This definition can be said to be well placed since it addresses the idea of Early Warning holistically by bringing out the major components of who to warn, what, when and how it should be carried out.

According to Woocher, EWS means any initiative that occurs in the latent stages of a perceived potential armed conflict with the aim at reduction, resolution or transformation. To Woocher, the term systems refer to the units of an Early Warning such as data collection, data formatting, data analysis with the understanding that there is a relationship and process between these unities for the system to operate.⁸ Here, a crucial, yet so far mainly under-reflected, issue is the question of who is going to be warned and who is supposed to act upon this warning. Dorn on his part defined Early Warning as the act of alerting a recognized authority such as the United Nation Security Council to a new or renewed threat to peace at a sufficiently early stage.⁹

The question that emerges is the ideal of primarily addressing a ‘recognized authority’ a meaningful and sufficient criterion. Here, a question of who emerges once again. Barrs on his part has proposed that more effort should be on warning capacity as such an approach could facilitate the reduction or even overcoming the gap between Early Warning and Early Response.¹⁰

⁷The Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) Secretariat, Forum on Early Warning and Early Response: A New Collaborative Effort, *Refuge* 16, no. 1 (1997): 24.

⁸ Woocher Lawrence, *The effects of cognitive biases on early warning*: paper presented at the international studies association annual convention, March 29 Washington DC: Centre for Conflict and Prevention, United States Institute of Peace(2008)

⁹ Dorn Walter. 2004. *Early and Late Warning by the UN Secretary General of Threats to Peace: Article 99 Revisited*, in A. Schnabel and D. Carment (eds), *Conflict Prevention, Vol. 1: From Rhetoric to Reality*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

¹⁰ Barrs Casey, *Conflict Early Warning: Warning Who?:*Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (2006)

To him, efficient Early Warning Response Systems can tackle various threats to human security such as wars and armed conflict, state failure, genocide, and other gross human violations activities. In this sense, the latter are part of overall crisis prevention architecture.

Howard argues that Early Warning System is intended to detect rising tensions headed towards violent conflict and, therefore, is complementary to conflict prevention when it focuses on tensions that are already rising but has little to do with preventing tensions from rising at all.¹¹ That Early Warning does not only include the gathering of data but the analysis of that data to develop strategic options for response but does not include the responses themselves which come under conflict prevention. From the above views, it is clear that Early Warning is meant to inform, and detect violence manifestation at early stages before it fully blown out of proportions and therefore can be categorized as a key process in the management of conflicts. To this end there is unanimous agreement that EWS is very fundamental in conflict prevention.

Other scholars like Lund join the debate with regard to the related concept of preventive diplomacy that Early Warning involves efforts to either prevent or contain violent conflicts. The core idea behind preventive diplomacy is the argument that addressing problems the moment they emerge is better than responding when they have escalated. Thus a key defining criterion for preventive diplomacy would be the intensity of a conflict.¹²

According to Schmid, Early Warning involves “a process of communicating judgments about threats early enough for decision-makers to take action to deter whatever outcome is threatened; or failing that, to manage events in such a way that

¹¹ Adelman, Howard. 1998. *Defining Humanitarian Early Warning*, in S. Schmeidl and H. Adelman (eds), *Early Warning and Early Response*.

¹² M. Lund , 1994: *Preventive Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: A guide for the Post Cold War Era*(draft manuscript: Washington, 1994.)

the worst consequences are mitigated”.¹³ The objective here is to detect the signs of conflict escalation in due time in order to initiate preventive measures which is early response or early action.

According to Wiltshire, Early Warning is a major element of disaster risk reduction. It helps prevent loss of life and reduces the potential economic impact of disasters. To be effective, EWS need to actively involve the communities at risk, facilitate public education and awareness; communicate and disseminate warnings and messages, and ensure there is a constant state of preparedness.¹⁴

Jackie Cillers asserts that the purpose of early warning is the formulation of strategic options directed at taking preventive action in the common (regional or international) good as opposed to the national interest.¹⁵ It is also important to find out whether IGAD takes preventive actions when there is a threat that requires an early warning mechanism.

The German committee on disaster reduction argues that, a complete and effective early warning system should comprise of four elements, spanning knowledge of the risks faced through to preparedness to act on early warning. They go further to argue that failure in any one part can mean failure of the whole system of early warning. The four elements of effective Early Warning Systems, stressed on by the German Committee on disaster reduction include the development and operation of early warning systems in regard to: knowledge of risks; monitoring and warning services;

¹³ Schmid, Alex P.: *Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms*. Synthesis Foundation Erasmus University, 2000.

¹⁴ A. Wiltshire, *Early Warning –From concept to action; The Conclusions of the Third International Conference on Early Warning*, Bonn Germany, 27-29 March ,2006 p5.

¹⁵ Jackie Cillers, *Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa*, Institute of Security Studies Paper 102 (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2005), 1.

warning dissemination and communication; and emergency response.¹⁶ This informs the study as it will measure how effective CEWARN is in the Horn of Africa.

According to United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Platform for the Promotion of Early Warning (UNISDR), Early Warning is the provision of timely and effective information, through identified institutions, that allows individuals exposed to a hazard to take action to avoid or reduce their risk and prepare for effective response. In other words, Early Warning therefore can be defined as the set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning information to enable individuals, communities and organizations threatened by a hazard to prepare and to act appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the possibility of harm or loss.¹⁷

While Gurr, Harff, Schmeild and Jenkins observes that there is need for a possibility of Early Warning to prevent political crisis,¹⁸ other scholars like Crocker and Osler disagree on that by stressing on the monitoring of political reconstruction efforts but limited progress in developing empirically based dynamic indicators that capture the political crises or their resolution. Schmeild and Gurr draw distinction between risk assessments which focuses on the structural conditions leading to political tension as Early Warning. Esty on his part identifies the dynamic factors leading to political crisis as Early Warning indicators.

¹⁶German Committee on Disaster Reduction, Emerging Challenges For Early Warning Systems In Context Of Climate Change And Urbanization: A Joint Report Prepared By Dkkv/ Platform For Promotion Of Early Warning/ UNISDR With Inputs From Partner Organizations And Coordinated By Humanitarian & Development Network, Humanitarian & Development Network, Ch 1296 Coppet (Switzerland) September 2010, pp. 2-5

¹⁷ United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Platform for the Promotion of Early Warning (UNISDR) 2010 p 3

¹⁸ Gurr Ted Robert and Barbara Harff, *Early Warning of Communal Conflict and Genocide*: Tokyo, United Nations University Press(1996)

Schmeild and Jenkins further argues that there has been significant progress in developing structural indicators relevant to predicting various state conflicts, ethno political rebellions and humanitarian crises. Even though some scholars have different views, majority stresses for the need to put up Early Warning mechanisms to manage conflicts thus good basis for this research. In respect to the above arguments, IGAD is also loaded with the responsibility of ensuring that those affected by conflict are well taken care of and the most important thing is to reduce the possibility of a conflict outbreak hence the relevancy of this literature to this study.

Considering the above arguments, EWS therefore can be said to be a measure employed to prevent violent conflicts before they erupts to a major crisis.

1.4.2 Conflicts in the Horn of Africa

According to Okubo, while talking of conflict in the Horn of Africa, one cannot avoid saying that, politics in the Horn of Africa has been shaped by seeds of violence due to the historical and political factors that goes back to the Colonial boundary arrangements and the new dynamics during post-cold war era. Countries in the region have experienced large-scale conflicts manifested through inter- or intra-state wars, though not all of them are affected to the same degree. Coupled with re-current drought and famine, the political dynamics in the region has created challenges to sustainability of peace and stabilization. The situation in Somalia, the standoff between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Eritrea- Djibouti conflict and the Conflict in Darfur and Sudan are some of the hotspots in the region not withstanding other areas of concerns

for political instability in general.¹⁹ It is therefore important to look at the literature of conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

Conflict is viewed negatively in every society. This is because it has a social phenomenon which is dysfunctional and disruptive. In the World today, conflict has been used interchangeably with dispute to mean one and the same thing. However, scholars in the discipline of conflict studies contend that dispute and conflict are not synonymous. Coser defines conflict as a struggle of values and claims to scarce status, resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize injure or eliminate their rivals. From this definition, conflict arises when two or more people or groups have incompatible goals about something, especially values.

Irrespective of the prevailing circumstances, the structure of conflict is essentially the same: two or more parties facing off in the manner that beckons struggle.²⁰ Indeed Dahrendorf asserts that the conflict structure is the tendency of interests to oppose each other. He is echoed by Williams who points out that the parties locked in a conflict play both the roles of attacker and defender simultaneously.²¹

There is a degree of unanimity among scholars of conflict studies that conflict can either be violent or nonviolent (structural). Violent conflicts are those that are physically manifested that is, its consequences can be seen such as dead people, or destroyed property. Structural conflicts on the other hand are not physically manifested and they emanate from the structures in the society, causing tensions. On the other hand, various scholars have explored the concept of conflict using different points of views. For instance, there are those that see conflict as a sign of instability in the society because to them the society is a homogeneous and harmonious entity.

¹⁹ Y. Okubo Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, Presentation to the United Nations, New York 2010, pp. 2-12.

²⁰ Coser, Lewis (1956), *The functions of social conflict*, Newyork; the free press

²¹ Dahrendorf, Ralf (1959) *Class and class conflict in the industrial society*

This view was advanced by structural theorists such as Emile Durkheim. Other scholars such as Coser, see conflict as a “fundamental fact of existence.” Strictly speaking, conflict in itself is neither good nor bad. Deutsch & Coleman observes that it is the manner in which conflict is handled that determines whether it is constructive or destructive.²² While one may agree with Coser that conflict cannot be part of human existence, the occurrence of the conflict cannot be justified. This argument therefore provides the basis of this research in examining Early Warning Systems and how they can help prevent conflict of interests in the society. It also draws attention that there is need to curb conflict in every society in order to co-exist peace fully.

However, in order to regulate conflict, there is need to understand its causes. A modest start off point would be to acknowledge that the sources of conflict are very diverse and complex. In their contribution on the discourse of sources of conflict in the society, Zeleza & Nhema posit that conflicts are rooted in ‘the complex constructions and conjectures of the worlds political economies, social identities and cultural ecologies as configured out of specific local, national and regional historical experiences and patterns of insertion into, and engagement with an ever changing world system.’²³ This implies that the causes of conflicts are multiple and dynamic and they reflect the world’s diversity and complexity. It should be noted here that the driving force in conflicts tend to be deliberate and pre-thought actions by the parties and that they are always goal oriented. One of the main causes of conflict is unequal distribution of scarce economic resources. In this case the conflict mirrors those who control the scarce resources at the core of the conflict and those who do not.

²² Coleman, James S. (1957), *Community Conflict*. New York: The Free Press

²³ Zeleza, Tiyambe (2006) *The roots of conflict in Africa* in Tiyambe Zeleza and Alfred Nhema *The roots of conflict in Africa*,

Land has been another highly emotive issue in the third world countries and especially in Africa where most of her populations attach their survival on land. Perhaps this arises from the economic mode that was put in place by the colonial regime in Africa and which was fully adopted by the African governments upon the attainment of independence. Indeed most of third world economies are predominantly agrarian hitherto making access to and control of land a potential and inevitable root source of conflicts. For example the perennial conflicts that take place among pastoral communities in the horn of Africa, specifically the Karamojong of Uganda, the Merrile of Ethiopia and the Pokot of Kenya.

Given that these communities are found in the Arid and Semi Arid Lands where rains are inadequate, grazing lands and water points are fought over leading to deaths and driving away of herds by the victor of the moment. The subdued group plans and executes a revenge mission and hence the conflicts become perennial. Thus unless substantive measures are taken such as sinking of boreholes to provide water for the animals and grow fodder, these conflicts are there to stay and especially with the profound proliferation of small and light weapons in these communities.²⁴

Other natural resources that have led to deadly conflicts and civil wars in the Horn of Africa are oil and minerals.²⁵ These resources have pitted communities or regions within the same state and have as well transcended boundaries. It is not in dispute that oil is a major income earner to any country but if its extraction is not deemed all inclusive and the proceeds are not used to benefit all, conflicts are inevitable. Succinct examples of conflict arising out of oil include the Darfur conflict in Sudan, pitting the North and the South that led to the Secession of the south. Indeed, despite the

²⁴ Lionel Cliff, *Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (1999)

²⁵ Zeleza, Tiyambe (2006) *The roots of conflict in Africa* in Tiyambe Zeleza and Alfred Nhema *The roots of conflict in Africa*,

secession, the conflict still persists especially over the control of the oil rich Abyei region. Nigeria and Cameroon were also locked in very deadly conflicts over the control of the oil rich Bakissa region. The conflict in Angola also had its roots in the control and exploitation of diamonds in the country and so was the case in Liberia.

Conflicts are also the products of social dimensions of the society. Scholars, especially sociologists have been very instrumental in showing the link between conflict and members of the society. Mitchell espouses that conflicts have three components namely: The conflict situation, conflict behavior and conflict attitudes. A conflict situation is the product of a perceived goal incompatibility, and the incompatibility itself results from what Mitchell refers to as a mismatch between social values and social structures.²⁶

Elmore argues that, total conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa may be chimerical, but conflicts can be successfully managed if diplomatic strategies focus on opening political space through communication between leaders of nations, factions, militias, and clans.²⁷ In Ethiopia and Eritrea, the boundary has yet to be demarcated, and the political elite push their agenda through violence. Minimal communication between nations suffocates political space, and people living on the border are forced into violent action. In Somalia there is also little room for dissention, but the problem there rests on the validity of representatives. Peace conferences have previously excluded certain groups, and the resulting backlash was often violent. Opening a forum for all parties to actively communicate could negate the winner-take-all mentality, and allow

²⁶ bid

²⁷ E.K Elmore, The Horn of Africa: Critical Analysis of Conflict Management and Strategies for Success in the Horn's Future; Students pulse, p vol2, No 06, pp12

diplomacy to be effective. However, political space can allow peaceful dissent only if it is simultaneously promoted with public accountability and representation.²⁸

1.4.3 Role of Sub-Regional organizations

Apart from undermining the promise of African democratization and development, armed conflicts contribute to political decay, facilitating states collapse, causes widespread human rights violations and generate influx of Internally Displaced Persons.

African conflicts do not primarily stem from ethnic diversity despite the horrific level of ethnic violence and genocide as witnessed in Rwanda and Burundi. Despite the emerging recession in the number of armed conflicts in Africa the positioning of African states at transitional crossroads renders them more likely to experience periods of instability as they move towards establishing new socio economic and political frameworks.

In 1990, Organization of African Unity (OAU) rededicated itself to work together towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of conflicts in the region²⁹ Out of this agreement came into place to develop and implement a continental wide EWS for its member states, the secretary general of OAU, the central organ and partner, Non Governmental Organizations.³⁰

²⁸ E. K. Elmore, *The Horn of Africa: Critical Analysis of Conflict Management and Strategies for Success in the Horn's Future*; students pulse, Pvol2, No 06, pp 1-8

²⁹ J. Malan, *Conflict Resolution Wisdom from Africa (Africa Center for the constructive Resolution of Disputes*, Durban, S.A, 1997, Pg. 21)

³⁰ W.G Nhara, *Early Warning and Conflict in Africa, occasional paper 1 presented at the Institute of Security Studies*, South Africa 1996, pg 5.

However OAU began exploring the viability of EWS, some members expressed fears that the warnings would be criticized or even repressed by defensive governments not to open to perceived external criticism.³¹

OAU eventually gave way for the creation of African Union during the Durban summit of 2002.³² In December 2003 AU member states established the Peace and Security Council and mandated it to “anticipate and prevent conflicts through functioning continent EWS.” Article 12 of the protocol describes EWS as consisting of monitoring center called ‘The situation Room’ where data on political, economical, social, military and humanitarian indicators are collected and analyzed. Situation Room also coordinates efforts of regional bodies tasked with similar responsibilities. Other efforts are within sub regional organizations in Africa. In 1999 for instance, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreed on a protocol to establish an observation and monitoring center which would collect, process and analyze data and at the same time produce reports to its member states.³³

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is still in the process of creating an EWS. IGAD established CEWARN to focus on violent conflicts in two pilot areas along the borders.³⁴ Others like East Africa Community (EAC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), South Africa Development Community (SADC) do not have agreed functioning system.

According to Franke, conflict management can be made easier through the involvement of more regional organizations. This is because their geographical and cultural proximity can facilitate more rapid and less expensive responses to violent

³¹ Ibid

³² African Union, African Union in a nutshell, 2007 pg.1.

³³ ECOWAS newsletter, Issue 2 March 2007, ECOWAS.

³⁴ S. Suzzane, *Conflict Early Warning and Prevention: Towards a Coherent Terminology* in S schmeidl and Ciru Mwaura (eds) *Early Warning and Conflict Management in Horn of Africa* (Asmara, Eritrea: Red Sea Press, 2002)pg 43-67.

conflicts. At the same time they poses better understanding of the conflict dynamics, key players and context specific management and resolution options. Again, there is a possibility of warring parties are more willing to feel comfortable at managing disputes at regional levels as opposed to international level.³⁵

In their analysis of third parties negotiated settlements, Dixon et al observes that regional organizations seem to be the best at serving negotiated settlement. This is because they provide legitimacy and are more likely to foster trust that the organization will help fulfill the terms of settlement. Importantly by operating within a normative framework as outlined in their respective charters.³⁶

Buzan et al have justified the role of sub regional organizations using the concept of security complex. The notion of regional security complex is rooted on the reality that states which are contagious have interlinked security concerns and non can guarantee its own security without cooperating with their neighbours.³⁷This creates security interdependence best addressed through regional structures of security cooperation tailored to fit the security environment they target. This is more so when a given region is characterized by violent conflicts which have been internationalized.

From the above arguments it can be noted that regional organizations have responsibility to maintain peace and security and therefore the study intends to analyze whether IGAD as a sub-regional organization in the Horn of Africa has achieved its mandate.

³⁵See B Franke, *In Defense of Regional Peace Operations in Africa*, *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, Article 185, 2006. Also B Frank 'Competing Regionalism In Africa and the Continents Emerging Security Architecture', *Africa Studies Quaterly*, vol 9, issue no 3, 2007

³⁶ D. Frazer and W.J, Dixon 'Third Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements 1946-2000', *International Interactions*, 32, 2006, pp384-408.

³⁷ B. Buzan and O. Waeaver, *Regions and Powers: The structure of International Security*, Op cit, pp.4-5

1.4.4 Literature on CEWARN

CEWARN is an integral part of IGAD according to the 2002 protocol. At the top is the Assembly of Heads of State and Government which is the IGAD supreme body and the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and any other Focal Minister designated by each member state to supervise the mechanism. Under the council of ministers is the committee of Ambassadors, which is comprised of IGAD member of states Ambassadors or Plenipotentiaries accredited to the country of IGAD Headquarters. The committee of ambassadors advises and guides the executive secretary of IGAD. At the CEWARN operational level, the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS) composed by undersecretaries of the member states is formally responsible for political decisions on CEWARN and works closely with the IGAD Secretariat.³⁸

At the operational level, CEWARN unit has been instituted and tasked with the coordination and supervision of the national units or Conflict Early Warning Response Units (CEWERUs). In the CEWARN unit, all seven member states are represented. This unit facilitates the exchanges of information and builds capacity of the national CEWERUs. The third level of the mechanism is composed by seven national CEWERUs and National Research Institutes (NRI), one in each member state. The institutes are expected to inject intellectual rigor and expertise which is needed in conflict analysis, recruit and supervise CEWARN country coordinators and field monitors, receive, code and analyze field data as well as ensuring timely submission of analyzed reports to CEWARN and CEWERU units³⁹

³⁸ See CEWARN structure at <http://www.cewarn.org/structure.html>.

³⁹ Ibid

To enhance activities of CEWERU especially in response, a Rapid Response Fund has been set up to finance short term projects targeted at preventing, de escalating and resolving pastoral and related conflicts in the Horn of Africa. It finances programmes generated by CEWERUs and the local peace committees especially those whose goal is to support dialogue initiatives, support activities for the pastoralists, improving access to natural resources like water.

At the moment CEWARN focuses on the increasingly violent pastoral conflict along border areas in two clusters (as pilot projects), namely the Karamoja (Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia border) and Somali (Ethiopia, Kenya, Somali) clusters.

1.4.5 Literature Gap

There exists a lot of data on EWS in Africa even though the region still continues to witness rampant conflicts. Majority of scholars have focused on the need to put up the initiative of EWS leaving out the idea of early response. There is need therefore to focus on the response whenever an alert is given. In addition, CEWARN was founded to help prevent conflicts in the Horn of Africa but has restricted itself to two pilot areas (Pastoralist communities) this has left the region entrapped in constant wars since no attention is given to early warning concerning other forms of conflicts. For example the 2007-2008 Post Election Violence in Kenya was seen manifesting itself until it was blown out of proportion while early warning given and no action was taken. This therefore is a gap that calls for attention.

1.5 Hypothesis

Hypothesis of the study seeks to test the following:

- IGAD has failed in its mandate of maintaining peace and security in the Horn of Africa.
- CEWARN has not achieved its mandate and goal as stipulated in the constitutional protocol.
- Conflict and Early Warning is founded on the appropriate grounds to restore security among the pastoralist communities.

1.6 Justification

The research has got both academic and policy justifications. Concerning academic justification Early Warning Systems are understudied especially in the area of ‘Who to be warned’ and the relevance is not taken seriously. However, their relevance needs to be tested against reality on the hot spot areas of all spheres of conflict not only among the pastoralist communities. It is therefore important to test against reality on the ground that; do they predict conflicts? Are the mechanisms put in place capable to capture dynamics of conflicts in the region? On policy issues, this research will generate information to the relevant stakeholders to respond in time whenever conflict emerges. It will clearly show the gaps to fill and thus smooth implementation of the strategies that are in place.


1.7 Conceptual Framework

There are two major concepts that emerge in this particular topic of study; Early Warning and Early Response. Early Warning involves activities like data collection, assessment, and analysis. Early Response on the other hand, refers to the reaction to

Early Warning. This involves settling disputes through negotiations, mediation, and inquiry among others. In addition, this process can be accompanied by humanitarian assistance, and peace keeping. All these processes are key to determining the relevance of Early Warning.

Besides, it is also important to consider the quality of information to be relayed and to whom is it being addressed to. Conflict preparedness also involves forecasting and taking precautionary measures prior to eminent threats; Early Warning System is part and parcel to conflict prevention. For EWS to be effective, it is essential that they be integrated into policies for violence mitigation. Good governance priorities include protecting the public from violence through the implementation of violent risk reduction policies. Information provided by EWS enables authorities to immediately respond to conflict. These two variables therefore will enable this research undertaking to analyze CEWARN successes and challenges.

Figure 1: Conceptual framework concerning risk management



Source Adopted: J. Carlos Villagran de leon. “EWS: A tool for mitigation and coordination paper presented at EWS II conference in Bonn Germany, October 2003.

1.8 Research Methodology

This research will explore qualitative and explanatory method since it will provide an in depth analysis and investigation of the research problem. It will also capture opinions of individuals and scholars at the same time co-operate critical issues of CEWARN in a bid to respond to conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

1.8.1 Research Design

The selection of a case study as a principle research design in this study will be very important because it will help explore IGAD's operations since the inception of CEWARN. It will also explore history and preventive measures that were employed in specific scenarios. For example, CEWARN operations in the two pilot areas in Karamoja and Somali cluster. More particularly, a specific form of case study 'embedded' will be used in analyzing the research objectives indicated earlier. This is a form of case study in which there are several sub units that are analyzed within the case.

1.8.2 Data Collection Strategies

This research will employ primary and secondary data collection methods. Secondary data collection methods include; library research, analyzing published and unpublished reports and interviews. Primary methods include; data obtained through interviews that will be carried out according to expertise in the area of study.

1.9 Chapter Summary

In terms of structure, this research will be organized in the following manner; Chapter one has provided the contextual background of the research, outlined its major objectives, introduced the main research problem and briefly highlighted the research methodology. Chapter two will have conceptual analysis of Early Warning and Response Systems. Chapter three will be a case study of Karamoja and Somali Cluster where CEWARN mechanism was applied, its operations and achievements. Chapter four will be a critical analysis of chapter two with data collected from chapter three and analyzing the objectives of the study. Chapter five will be a conclusion with the

study findings followed by annexes, maps and pictures if at all there are any. Lastly, a bibliography will follow.

CHAPTER TWO

Conceptual issues on Early Warning Systems

2.1 Introduction

Chapter one introduced the topic of study and also gave background analyzing the conceptual framework of EWS. The chapter also gave the study objectives justification of the study as well as hypotheses and research methodology used in the study. It therefore laid the foundation on which the subsequent chapter shall be developed. This chapter will involve discussions on the historical evolution of EWS, classifications, shifts in the concept and the traditional notion of EWS. This will inform the project further in order to keep abreast of the evolution and the emerging developments will give in depth analysis of the topic of study.

2.2 Historical Development of Early Warning Systems

The idea of preventing wars is not new to Africa. Nonetheless, attempt to prevent conflicts through the use of early warning is inarguably a very recent phenomenon. Being an important component of conflict prevention, early warning is basically conceived as a means of “avoiding or minimizing violence, deprivation or humanitarian crises that threaten the sustainability of human development and livelihood.” The application of early warning in the realm of conflict prevention in the continent started in the 1990s in line with a global trend in conflict management and resolution which espoused a preventive approach towards violent conflicts. Early Warning System is perceived to have been initiated by intelligence and military practitioners in 1950s.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Debiel, Tobias and Herbert Wulf. *Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism: Tools for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Regional Organization? A Comparative Study of the AU, ECOWAS,*

During this period, EWS were developed to predict future dangers emanating from natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, and stock market crashes in the economic sphere as well as to predict the effects of these disasters on people.⁴¹

Later on, Early Warning Systems were further expanded into humanitarian affairs to predict famine and refugee migration with the purpose of alerting relief agencies about looming humanitarian crises.⁴² With the exception of their application for the anticipation of surprise nuclear attacks and other military incidents during the Cold War⁴³, EWS were not employed in preventive purposes in the context of violent conflicts in the earlier days. Subsequently, in the early 1990's EWS was used in the maintenance of global and regional peace and security that also witnessed a surge in their utilization as important intervention tools for the anticipation and prevention of violent conflicts. The rationale behind this surge was to be found in the advocacy for "preventive culture" that became the hallmark of the post-cold war international politics which reiterated the importance of preventive action based on timely and accurate knowledge of the facts, understanding of developments and global trends, and on sound analysis.⁴⁴

In 1992, Early Warning as a system of conflict prevention was established in the UN Secretariat after the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali's report, 'An Agenda

IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and PIF. Crisis States Research Center Working Paper Series No. 2. London: Crisis States Research Center, 2009.

⁴¹ Ruddy Doom and Koen Vlassenroot, *Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Minerva's Wisdom?*, *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (1997). Available on , <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a022.htm>, (accessed April 20, 2013).

⁴² Schmeidl, Susanne. 2002. 'Conflict Early Warning and Prevention: Toward a Coherent Terminology', in M. Cirû and S. Schmeidl (eds), *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*. Asmara, Eritrea: The Red Sea Press. p.72 -73

⁴³ AU-CMD, *The CEWS Handbook*, 35.

⁴⁴ United Nations, *An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. A/47/277 - S/24111. New York, 17 June 1992.

for Peace⁴⁵, highlighted the link between humanitarian action and the peace process. In the above report he mentioned the ‘valuable work’ of the EWS on environmental threats, the risk of nuclear accidents, natural disasters, mass movements of populations, the threat of famine and the spread of disease. He stressed that ‘there is a need to strengthen arrangements in such a manner that information from these sources can be synthesized with political indicators to assess whether a threat to peace exists and to analyse what action might be taken by the UN to alleviate it.’⁴⁶

Subsequently, the nature of conflict in Africa, the high death toll of civilians and the gravity of human rights abuses (including sexual exploitation), added to the high cost of peacekeeping and other post-conflict interventions, led the international community and African leaders to focus on conflict prevention. This shifted the focus onto the development of knowledge-based models that enhance the decision maker’s ability to identify critical policy developments in a timely manner.

In July 1990, the OAU decided ‘to work towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all types of conflicts on the Continent’. This was followed by the establishment of the *Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution* in 1992.⁴⁷ This decision was put into effect in June 1993 with the adoption of the *Cairo Declaration* which established the Central Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The Mechanism provided for the anticipation and prevention of situations of armed conflict as well as peacemaking and peace-building efforts during conflict and post conflict situations.

⁴⁵ See Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s report on *An Agenda for Peace*, 1992. Paragraph- 23

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ OAU, declaration of the assembly of heads of state and government on the establishment of a mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, 29th ordinary session, Cairo, 28-30, June 1993.

Nevertheless, while the Cairo Declaration created most of the Africa Union institutions (such as the Peace Fund) and practices (such as the use of eminent persons) that were subsequently included in the Peace Security Council Protocol, it did not explicitly provide for the establishment of a unit for early warning. The first specific reference to the establishment of an EWS at the level of the Organizations of Africa Union Heads of State appears in the Yaoundé Declaration of 1996 which followed a June 1995 OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that endorsed a proposal submitted by then Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim for the establishment of a continent-wide EWS.⁴⁸ After this, early warning as a body of the PSC was solemnly launched in 2004 under the Peace and Security Secretariat of the African Union. This PSC included the Continental Early Warning System in addition to the other bodies under the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

Since its formation the CEWS has undergone several changes, notably the inclusion of the eight Regional Organizations as major stakeholders, the identification of indicators for data collection and the establishment of the situation room in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Implementing the CEWS has been difficult and has generated various debates and controversies, especially about the purpose of EWS and how and when to use it.

Faced by new wave of wars, the international community has elaborated on effective prevention to be based on accurate knowledge of facts. To this effect, there is need to develop EWS by international organizations, academic institutions and the national governments. In the Horn of Africa IGAD's CEWARN is an example of regional Early Warning System.

⁴⁸ Yaounde Declaration, Africa: Preparing for the 21st century. 32nd OAU summit, July 1996, Yaounde

2.3 Classifications of Early Warning Systems

There are a large number of systems in the field of Conflict Early Warning often exhibiting differences in terms of specific models and tools in use; location of the early warning apparatus, and the nature of ownership of the early warning process.⁴⁹

There are also different ways of classifying EWS based on these parameters. The following are some of the classifications:

2.3.1 Generational classification: This category of classification is based on the location and organization; the systems are categorized as first, second, and third generation early warning systems.⁵⁰ In the first generation early warning systems such as the International Crisis Group, the entire early warning mechanism is based outside the conflict region.⁵¹ The second generation early warning systems (such as FAST) employ a mixed approach by maintaining monitoring mechanisms on the ground (e.g. field monitors) while conducting the analysis outside the conflict region. Lastly, the third generation early warning systems (such as CEWARN, CEWS) are located in the conflict region and integrate both early warning and early response activities.⁵²

⁴⁹ Debiel, Tobias and Herbert Wulf. *Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism: Tools for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Regional Organization? A Comparative Study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and PIF.* Crisis States Research Center Working Paper Series No. 2. London: Crisis States Research Center, 2009..

⁵⁰ Nyheim, David. *Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse: The Future of Conflict Early Warning and Response.* Paris: OECD/DAC Secretariat, 2009.

⁵¹ Matveeva, Anna. *Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas.* GPAC Issue Paper 1. The Hague: European Center for Conflict Prevention/International Secretariat of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 2006.

⁵² Ibid

2.3.2 Methodological classification: Versteegen identified four ideal forms of EWS namely correlational, sequential, conjunctural, and response models.⁵³ Correlational approach focuses on structural indicators (independent variables) and tries to relate causal models from empirical research to future outbreaks of violence (dependent variables).⁵⁴ The sequential approach is working with a sequence of triggers and accelerators, i.e. events, and it describes how changes in an environment bring about a specific event or a change in some specified variable.⁵⁵ Conjunctural approach works with a combination of conditions and events with the basic assumption that different combinations of a given political and geographical entity's circumstances lead to different outcomes.⁵⁶ This approach is trying to identify particular configurations or conditions that consistently precede the outbreak of violent conflicts and that do not occur in places that do not experience violent conflicts.⁵⁷ Finally, response models try to identify windows of opportunities for early and effective intervention in crisis situations.⁵⁸

⁵³ Suzanne Versteegen, "Conflict Prognostication: Towards a Tentative Framework for Conflict Assessment." Clingendael Institute Occasional Paper, 1999. Available on, http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/1999/19990900_cru_paper_versteegen.pdf, (accessed July 20, 2013). p 4-6

⁵⁴ Debiel, Tobias and Herbert Wulf. "Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism: Tools for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Regional Organization? A Comparative Study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and PIF." Crisis States Research Center Working Paper Series No. 2. London: Crisis States Research Center, 2009.

⁵⁵ AU [African Union] CMD [Conflict Management Division] (Eds.), Proposal for an Indicators Module towards the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System for the African Union, Issue Paper No.

2", In *Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention in Africa: Towards the Operationalization of the AU CEWS* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2008a), 84.

⁵⁶ AU-CMD, "Proposal for an Indicators Module", 84.

⁵⁷ Ibid

⁵⁸ Ibid

2.3.3 Classification based on the origin of the systems: In this form of classification, EWS are broadly categorized “according to the sectors from which they stem”⁵⁹ as governmental, inter-governmental, and non-governmental. The objective of governmental early warning is often “to identify and assess threats to national interests and/or to inform crisis prevention and peace-building programs.”⁶⁰ Examples of governmental early warning systems include the Crisis Early Warning System of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and France’s *Système d’Alerte Précoce (SAP)*.⁶¹

On the other hand, inter-governmental early warning systems are established by regional and sub-regional inter-governmental organizations such as the United Nations and the African Union with the purpose of bolstering “the organizations’ ability to anticipate crises and initiate preventive measures.”⁶² Notable examples of these types of systems include the Early Warning Unit of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the CEWS of the African Union, and IGAD’s CEWARN. Finally, non-governmental systems include those in the NGO sector, in academic institutions, and research organizations.⁶³

2.3.4 Classification based on early warning models in use: In this form of classification, Marshall categorized EWS as those using conditional and causal models, predictive models, and general risk and capacity models.⁶⁴ Conditional and

⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰ Ibid

⁶¹ Ibid

⁶² Ibid,52

Debiel, Tobias and Herbert Wulf. “Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism: Tools for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Regional Organization? A Comparative Study of the AU,ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and PIF.” Crisis States Research Center Working Paper Series No. 2. London: Crisis States Research Center, 2009.p, 5.

⁶⁴ An Early Warning Model (EWM) is an analytical forecasting tool that has been honed by systematic evidence and can be used to identify the likelihood of specified events or conditions occurring in the future. To be useful in filtering forecasting information, EWM needs to be guided by a theoretical

causal models deal with empirical evidence for causal interference between independent variables (of structural indicators) and violent conflict/political instability.⁶⁵ These types of early warning models do not predict the actual onset or risk of violence in specific countries; rather they lend support to predictive models by identifying the validity of early warning indicators.⁶⁶ On the other hand, predictive early warning models try to forecast the outbreak of violence in a time span of one to five years by focusing on selected variables of both structural and event based nature. Finally, general risk and capacity models are used ‘to rank countries from weak to strong, building on the general association between weakness, social problems, political conflict, and poor state performance.

2.3.5 Alexander Austin’s Methodological Classification: Based on their respective methodological approaches, Austin divided EWS into two categories: as quantitative, qualitative. Quantitative methodology is based on standardization of set variables which are assigned numerical values based on their relevance and used for analyzing empirical evidence through statistical manipulation to generate results.⁶⁷ Results are presented graphically showing a trend of a given conflict. Under this category the

model of the phenomena being forecasted (e.g. civil wars, genocide) and disciplined by exposure to systematic evidence. Craig J. Jenkins and Susanne Schmeidl, “The Early Warning of Humanitarian Disasters: Problems in Building an Early Warning System”, *International Migration Review* 32, no. 2 (1998): 472.

⁶⁵ Monty G. Marshall, Monty G, *Fragility Instability, and the Failure of States. Assessing Sources of Systemic Risk*. Center for Preventive Action Working Paper (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2008),p 9.

⁶⁶AU [African Union] CMD [Conflict Management Division] (eds.), “Development of Indicators for Early Warning Systems: Some Conceptual and Methodological Issues: Background Paper No. 3”, In *Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention in Africa: Towards the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2008a), 140.

⁶⁷ See J.A Goldstone, *Using Quantitative and Qualitative Models to Forecast Sustainability*. Washington:USIP, Special Report, 2008

main ones are: structural accelerator, threshold and response models.⁶⁸ Structural models from Galtung's triangle argue that long before there is a violent outbreak of conflict, there exist structural factors that generate injustices driving people to violence.⁶⁹ Based on this, structural models focus on identifying conditions under which conflict occurs. This is based on predefined list of indicators, a review of causal relationship between indicators and their magnitude in relation to conflict.⁷⁰ Indicators include regime type, economic inequality, health and education indicators.

The accelerator model focuses on immediate variables which causes violence. It is informed by understanding that usually the presence of enabling structural factors does not lead to violent conflicts. Gupta observes that there can be a wide ranging social, political, economical or even religious grievances in the society but this cannot necessarily lead to conflict.⁷¹ Political violence takes place when grievances are given a voice through well-defined social construction of the collective identity and grievances based on 'us' versus 'them' logic⁷² This is done through attribution and framing of grievances in a manner that justifies violence. Where framing refers to active construction and dissemination of meaning and the success of a social movement with regard to mobilizing resources and gaining adherents.⁷³ As such the accelerator model aims at identifying the triggers and antecedent processes that spark

⁶⁸ Austin Alexander, *Early Warning and field. A cargo cult science?*: Berghof Research Center for constructive conflict management(ed): Berghof handbook for conflict transformation, Berlin(2004)pg 4

⁶⁹ J. Galtung, *Violence*; *Peace and Peace Research' Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), 1996. Pp 167-192.

⁷⁰ Ibid pg 7

⁷¹ D.K. Gupta, *Exploring the Root of Terrorism*, in Bjorg T(ed). *The root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Way Forward*. New York: Routledge, 2005, p.19.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ See M. Crenshaw, *Decision to Use Terrorism: Psychological Constraints and Instrumental Reasoning*, in Porta D (ed), *Social Movements and Violence*. London :JA Press. 1992, p.31. Also , D. Porta, *Introduction: Individual Motivation in Underground Political Organisations*, in Porta D(ed)*Social Movements and Violence*, Ibid, p.5; D.Snow *Frame Alignment Processes, Micro Mobilization and Movement Participation*, *American Sociological Review*, 51, pp.464-481.

or lead to conflict through the use of such indicators the model aims at predicting when a clustering of events leads to violent conflicts.⁷⁴

On the other hand, threshold models develop data from analysis of conflicts globally and regionally using the knowledge generated to develop a set of variables which are assigned numerical values and used as index to map conflicts. Depending on the scores recorded against the benchmark indexes, states and regions are categorized on an instability risk scale and it is possible to establish causal factors. An example is the Predictive Model of the Political Instability Taskforce (PITF) which uses four independent variables: regime types, infant mortality, a bad neighborhood indicator and presence of state led discrimination to predict the onset of instability.⁷⁵

Response model is similar to threshold model but it does not establish violent conflicts causation. Rather it focuses on various interventions and their appropriateness to the conflict. The focus however is guided by the fact that Early Warning key goal is not predicting conflict but preventing conflict. Prevention here entails interventions by third parties and the strategies employed have a real risk further escalating the situation if not carefully crafted to suit the conflict context. A good example is the case of Rwandan genocide. Despite the early warning of the Rwandan genocide, the French which was the former colonizing power responded by strengthening the military capacity of the Hutu dominating regime. By the onset of the genocide, the force had expanded from 5,000 to 30,000 troops.

This enabled the *Forces Armees Du Rwandaise* (FAR) capacity to implement the genocide strategy.

Qualitative Early Warning Models involves statistical in depth research and present findings in form of narrative capturing the context, the actors, interests, opinions and

⁷⁴ A. Austin, *Early Warning and the Field*, OP cit, p.7.

⁷⁵ H. Wulf and T. Dibiell, *Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms: Tools for effectiveness of Regional Organisations?*, Op cit p.9

how they impact on conflict situation. One of the successful qualitative model is the one informing the early warning and response activities of the International Crisis Group.

2.3.6 Debate in modern context

Gurr considers EWS as a preventive measure for violent conflicts. In his view the collection of data and interpretation of events is used to empirically forecast and determine the chances of conflict intensification.⁷⁶ In contrast Rupesinghe considers EWS as information collection in order to provide a timely alert to conflict potentials.⁷⁷ Such a system therefore will collect information and data on the social, economic, political, religious, cultural, educational, resource utilization and military situations. Thus Rupesinghe links EWS and diplomacy. Accordingly its objective is early detection of developments that may result in eruption of violence. As such it is a specific aspect of the more general concept of conflict prevention. In this view EW refers to situations in which conflicting goals are controlled to avoid the development of hostilities.⁷⁸

However, Gurr considers EWS as a preventive measure; he ignores the preparedness aspects and calls for the development of early warning models. Gurr therefore emphasizes the collection and interpretation of events and data for forecasting and determining the chances of conflict intensification.⁷⁹ Barbara on the other hand recommends a diagnostic perspective that includes assessment of background

⁷⁶ G T. Robert, *Testing and using a model of communication conflict early warning*, Journal of Ethno – Political Development, vol.4, No.1. 1994. Pg.20

⁷⁷ K Rupesinghe and M. Kuroda, (eds) *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution*. (St Martins Press, New York 1992.)

⁷⁸ Ibid

⁷⁹ G T. R obert, *Testing and using a model of communication conflict early warning*, Journal of Ethno – Political Development, vol.4, No.1. 1994. Pg.20

conditions, including legacies of past antagonisms between groups, loss of political status, and economic equalities.⁸⁰

Lund recommends either a preventive or containment efforts. The core notion behind his thoughts is addressing problems as they emerge that responding after they have erupted and become less manageable. He concludes that there is need to develop more systematic data collection as a way to tract the antecedents and triggers processes in the emergence of conflicts. He warns that EWS should be tied to response mechanisms by decision makers.⁸¹

Kuroda o his part views EWS as a preparedness, preventive and mitigation tool for disasters, emergencies and conflict situations, whether short term or long term.⁸² He identifies preparedness, prevention and mitigation as three pillars of EWS. In this regard, the provision of information alone does not constitute to Early Warning unless such information serves a specific purpose. A critical issue is the origin of the information and data, and the time frame in which it is developed.

Barrs views EWS as complementarily activity between the external and internal. In this regard the local knowledge helps to solidify the regional international mechanisms and thus leads to credence to the actions supposed to be taken .EWS in this sense means not only gathering data analyzing the data and developing strategic response; options which are contingent to local and international resources.⁸³

⁸⁰ B. Harf, *A Theoretical models of Genocides and Politicides* The journal of Ethno Development. July 1994 Vol. 4 No,1- Special Issue.

⁸¹ M Lund, *Preventive Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: A guide for Post Cold War Era*. Washington United States Institute of Peace, 1996.

⁸² K Rupesinghe and M. Kuroda, (eds) *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution*. (St Martins Press, New York 1992. Pg 217)

⁸³ C. Barrs, *Conflict Early Warning: Early Warning for Who?* Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, February 2006.

Conclusion

In this particular chapter, the issue of methodology reflects an underlying question on whether Early Warning Systems are relevant or just a mockery in conflict management. This is because methodology addresses the issue of whether it is possible to predict violent conflict and what is generated as warning. The complexity of prediction is due to that fact that human action is informed by multiplicity if intrinsic and extrinsic processes and reactions to the same stimuli are as varied as there are people. As such uncertainties still continue to haunt scholars on the concept of early response.

CHAPTER THREE

IGAD'S CEWARN in the Horn of Africa (Karamoja and Somali cluster)

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter focused on the conceptual issues of EWS with attention to the historical development of EWS. The key issue that emerged is that the idea of preventing conflicts is not a new idea in Africa. This Chapter therefore will investigate IGAD's CEWARN initiative (successes and challenges) in the Horn of Africa especially in the two pilot areas of Karamoja and Somali cluster. It will incorporate data collected from different respondents.

3.2 Achievements of CEWARN in the Horn of Africa

CEWARN has been very instrumental in preventing conflicts in the Horn of Africa. At its conceptual stage, its very existence reflects a commitment by IGAD to adopt a preventive culture. As observed by one of the respondents;

The more conflict moves upward the escalation spiral, the more it becomes more expensive to manage. As such it is always prudent to arrest escalation before it transforms to violence, prevent relapse into violence once de-escalation has been achieved and comprehensively pursue post conflict peace building through addressing the indicators of violence as they emerge.⁸⁴

All these activities are originated by EWS which are in position to transform the wave of violence before they erupt.

⁸⁴Interview with Dr. Mohamed Guyo, IGAD official in Nairobi 11 /4/2012

Practically CEWARN through a system of data collection and analysis has managed to develop an advanced database of pastoral conflicts in the Horn (Karamoja and Somali cluster). It is observable that the region has the largest concentration of pastoralists in the world often occupying vast geographical areas. A defining characteristic of these communities is the extent they have socially, politically, and economically marginalized. He observes that;

Within the Karamoja cluster, 82 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. Less than 20 percent of the children go to school and the region measures low in all human and economic development indicators.⁸⁵

The extent of marginalization reflects the government' attitude towards pastoralists. Another respondent observes that;

Central governments in the region seem to judge these communities' pastoralist lifestyle as pre-modern, chaotic and economically unproductive. Policies pursued therefore serve to marginalize pastoral communities and their needs are ignored. At times the eradication of these cultures and identities is considered especially in states where the ruling groups come from farming and sedentary communities. The outcome of these practices is that much of what goes on in pastoral areas is ignored, suppressed and when there is a response, it is usually through despotic power of state best exemplified by forceful disarmament exercises.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Interview with Dr. Mohamed Guyo, IGAD official conducted in Nairobi 11 /4/2012

⁸⁶Information provided by senior government official in Nairobi 9/7/2013

Through developing the database on pastoral conflicts CEWARN helped to illuminate on these peripheral conflicts which have created widespread human insecurities and have been conveniently ignored by state operations. A respondent says;

The annualized data shows the extent which pastoral conflicts have contributed to violence and deaths in Karamoja and Somali clusters. It indicates that between July 2003 and September, 2009 there were 2,627 recorded violent incidents. During the same period there were 4,192 deaths. Currently this has led to increased attention towards addressing the causes of pastoral based conflicts. Importantly it has led to extensive knowledge on the dynamics of such conflicts especially in Karamoja and Somali clusters.⁸⁷

In addition to bringing into light the extent of pastoral based conflicts, CEWARN has managed to build confidence and cooperation among actors involved. This has been the case especially with local actors who have been integrated into CEWERUs. A respondent pointed out;

The importance of such integration noting that, ‘you find that these organizations have often been working there for a long time and have garnered a lot of trust within the local communities. They have strong linkages especially when they are Community Based Organizations’ because a lot of their members are from these local communities. So working with them just garners more trust and you have much more oversight with these organization you have a very good collaborative effort.’⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Information provided by Director of CEWARN, Dr. Kimani Mbugua 9/08/2013

⁸⁸ An interview with a member of Kenyan CEWERU conducted on 28th June, 2013

The linkages and cooperation have an additional benefit of spreading shared practices and in the process help build an early warning constituency. Though the study did not evaluate the extent of these contributions, the role of dissemination of certain norms and values is paramount in enabling the localization and institutionalization of the EW culture. New institutionalism scholars have made an important observation that institutions are not things but processes.

In this understanding, there is a difference between organizational structures and institutions. The existence and robustness of organizational structures is dependent on the institutional progress which is realized through increased spread and sharing of norms, values and practices. The spread leads to institutional isomorphism which creates a commonality of techniques, codes of conduct and methodologies for determining how to confront challenges. Drawing from this argument, the study notes that CEWARN has contributed towards the entrenchment of EW cultures in its areas of reporting.

A key contribution by CEWARN has been in issuing of early warnings. Since its inception in 2002, CEWARN has produced a number of early warnings which have helped avert violent conflicts through timely responses. A respondent says;

The first CEWARN alert was related to the conflict that occurred between two cross border pastoral communities namely Dassench of Ethiopia and Turkana of Kenya. The conflict emerged from the increasing fishing activities on Lake Turkana (Rudolph) by the Dassench fishermen who worked for the government owned enterprise, the Ethiopian Fishing and Marketing Enterprise. The Turkana fishermen felt that the increase would deplete the fishing resources of the lake and thus threaten their income. Moreover, some of their long

time clients, the Kenya Somali traders began to turn to the Dassench fishermen attracted by the lower prices the latter were offering them.

He adds that,

The Turkana launched 10 separate attacks between June 13 and July 12 on the Dassench fishermen to disrupt their fishing activities on the lake. In these attacks, they managed to steal 47 fishing nets. On July 27, the situation escalated to a more alarming level. On that day, the Dassench encircled and ambushed the Turkana who came on motorboats to steal fishing nets. They killed nine of them and seized their motorboats. On the following day, about 20 Kenyan security forces came to Dassench area and killed three Dassench fishermen.⁸⁹

After these incidents, the NRI produced the first early warning alert. The alert, then, was, communicated to the CEWERU head through e-mail on July 27, 2005. The head then passed the information to the relevant member institutions of the steering committee, the ministry of Federal Affairs and Security, Immigration and Refugees Affairs Authority (SIIRA). The two bodies passed the same information with the attached request for the necessary measures to the original and district level officials. In the next two weeks, the following activities were witnessed on the ground: security beefed up on the Ethiopian side of the Lake Turkana that restrained the movement of communities in the area. The immediate outcome of this action was a marked decline in fishing net thefts and assaults, Representatives of the local administration, elders and women went to a nearby Kenyan town to discuss about the conflict with their

⁸⁹ Information provided by Director of CEWARN, Dr. Kimani Mbugua 9/8/2013

Kenyan counterparts. Both sides agreed in principle to return the stolen fishing nets and find ways the two communities can resume fishing on the Lake.

The second alert was about the conflict that occurred between two pastoral communities who live on the Ethiopian side of the Karamoja cluster: Nyangatom and Dassench. The conflict began on June 4, 2005. Up to the time the alert was produced a total of 10 violent incidents of reprisal and counter reprisal nature occurred between these two communities. As a result, of these incidents, 10 people were killed and 220 cattle were stolen. Subsequently, many negotiations and peace conferences were held in November and December, whereby the two communities reached an agreement on many issues, among which were joint utilization of resources and bringing to justice those who committed crimes and caused chaos. As a consequence, marked decline in violent incidents between these two communities were realized.⁹⁰

Additionally CEWARN has contributed towards capacity building in early warning and management of conflicts. For instance June, 2010 CEWARN held a capacity building programmes in Eldoret. The programme brought together 60 grass root women organizations from Karamoja cluster with a goal of enhancing their capacities in conflict management. In February, in collaboration with German Technical Assistance Agency (GTZ) CEWARN held a training workshop on best practices on local response strategies in Hawassa town, Ethiopia. The workshop brought together community level peace actors as well as governmental and non governmental stakeholders from cross border areas of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan.

The capacity building programme has further been enhanced through the development training of manuals. The manuals cover capacity building for conflict prevention and

⁹⁰ Information provided by Director of CEWARN, Dr. Kimani Mbugua 9/8/2013

response mechanism (CPMR) report writing, training on setting up of indicators to anyone interested in setting EW mechanism. Additionally, under the Rapid Response Fund(RRF), CEWARN has instituted top down and bottom up capacity building that involves analyzing of capacity gaps at national and local levels and providing support where needed. The dissemination of such knowledge is an important component of CEWARNs knowledge management.

In terms of response, CEWARN has set a fund that aims at financing short term projects targeted at preventing and resolving pastoral related conflicts in the region. It finances programmes generated by CEWERUs and local peace committees especially those whose goal is to support dialogue initiatives, immediate support activities for vulnerable pastoralists, improving community access to resources. To be able to increase chances of livestock recovery, CEWARN has initiated pilot animal tracking programme. Animal tracking refers to the ability to trace the whereabouts of an animal at any given time. The programme targets regions in both Karamoja and cluster. The first step has been completed. It involved a comprehensive research whose goal was to locate the place of livestock identification, traceability and tracking in checking livestock raiding related violent conflicts among pastoralist communities in the IGAD sub region and Tanzania.⁹¹

CEWARN has also been piloting the use of remote sensing and Geomatic research to map out environmental security in pastoral areas. Using remote sensing technology it is possible to detect environmental change over wide area and predict the possible outcomes through simulations. When combined with the local information gathered through field monitors, it is also possible to develop a system view of environmental

⁹¹ Information provided by Director of CEWARN, Dr. Kimani Mbugua 9/8/2013

changes and how they may impact different communities. Remote sensing technology provides a superior method of resource mapping.

3.3 CEWARN initiatives used to avert conflicts

Peace building

Peace building has been one of IGAD's strategies used in Karamoja and Somali Cluster to help manage inter and intra- state conflicts. This has helped in the cultivation of peace through seminars and workshops that have been held with some IGAD's CEWARN officials. As one of the respondents asserts,

Cattle rustling which has been common across the border of Kenya and Uganda has reduced following the presence of CEWARN mechanism that has been able to bring different groups together thus the Pokot and Karamoja are living in peace as there has been no more threats from the neighbouring pastoralist communities.⁹²

Peace keeping

Peace keeping has also been employed by IGAD as member states have deployed military personnel in the areas of conflict to help in peace keeping in both Karamoja and Somalia cluster.

Peace enforcement

IGAD has also enforced peace to these pastoralist communities as it issues announcements for instance on CEWARN mechanism that have helped in identifying security threats that could arise at any given time. However, the enforcement on issues has been more sensitive on issues of cattle rustling and fighting for grazing land for pastoralist communities and resource related case for Sudan while issue of power

⁹² Oral Interview with a member of CEWARN at Nairobi 2/6/2013

has dominated the case of Somali. IGAD CEWARN has made it a priority for the Karamoja and Somalia cluster in managing the conflicts in the region.

Albeit, some of the respondent argued saying,

IGAD has not been able to successfully implement its decisions since it only issues announcements on CEWARN mechanism which are not often taken seriously even by the member states themselves, while on the other hand they feel constrained financially.⁹³

It was also noted that there has been a tendency of enforcement on issues that are less sensitive and political, such as environment and health issues forgetting about sensitive issues. As reported by one of the CEWARN officials,

Peace enforcement demands for unity among members states for it to successfully manage its CEWARN efforts. For him IGAD is highly divided internally and members give priority to their own narrow national interests forgetting the CEWARN as a priority that will stabilize the region from conflicts to peace.⁹⁴

3.4 Challenges IGAD face in Implementing CEWARN in the HoA

CEWARN has been faced with challenges when it comes to whether the indicators are comprehensive enough to capture all the dynamics of pastoral conflicts. As observed earlier, indicators have become widely used in many different field and play a useful role in highlighting problems, identifying trends and contributing to the process of priority setting, policy formulation and evaluation and monitoring of process. However for indicators to play this role, they must capture all aspects of targeted phenomenon. Though CEWARN has an elaborate set of indicators which are

⁹³ An Interview with senior IGAD official conducted in Nairobi 20/6/2013

⁹⁴ An Interview with senior IGAD official conducted in Nairobi 20/6/2013

capable of capturing the dynamics of pastoral conflicts, they have left out an important form of rustling. That is the commercialized livestock rustling.

One of the respondents observed that;

It is that commercialized rustling that has increased the intensity of raiding and leading to major changes in social, economic and political structures in the border area. It is creating a black market for commercial trading that straddles the localities, urban areas and the wider region. He says access to arms has also become essential to successful commercial raiding. This kind of rustling poses a unique problem since it is usually initiated by well resourced individuals with access to weapons and funds to recruit bandits from the region. Those individuals also have access to major urban areas where the stolen livestock is sold making recovery impossible and in other cases they have political networks which guarantee them protection. All these should be captured by EW indicators since they increasingly shape the tenor of pastoral based conflicts and their attacks are characterized by large number of casualties.⁹⁵

Related to inadequacy of indicators is the issue of data validity. As indicated in chapter two, the relevance of EWS has been questioned especially on whether they can predict conflict. Indeed continued failure in prediction leads to credibility crisis. Though it is not possible to make accurate prediction, it is possible to make good enough prediction through rigorous and meticulous collection of data. This calls for avoiding bias and thus poses a challenge to CEWARN.

Another respondent also observed that;

⁹⁵ Information provided by Machuka Fred in Nairobi 2/6/2013

CEWARN is also faced by communication barriers. Though structurally there are systems for efficient communication, in practice there exists barriers to information flow. To enhance this, there is need for transparency in dealing with information. The issue of transparency is a very delicate issue to CEWARN. He adds that many actors who detain information refrain from passing it due to their concerns over the circles that may utilize them for what is viewed as a hostile action. Also communication on EW is relayed to relevance governments on receiving the information have discretion on who accesses the information. This defeats the whole notion of open access. Significantly, in situations where the government which has received the warning is complicit in pastoral conflicts, such information loses its purpose.⁹⁶

In addition, the geographical remoteness of Areas of Reporting (AORs) poses considerable communication problems. One of the respondents observes that;

Field monitors used in collecting and sending information are facing difficulties in sending their reports in time due to the poor communication infrastructure. This makes relying on FM providing field reports a major setback. This is because they are unable to relay information on time. This difficulty in communication can be elaborated by what happened during the Turbi massacre in July 2005. About 1000 heavily armed bandits made a series of raids in Digigalalo-Turbi area near Marsabit town. In the attacks, more than 100 people were killed. Despite the enormity of violence, the reports reached Marsabit which is the nearest town, twelve hours later. Even the government security personnel

⁹⁶ Oral Interview with a member of CEWARN in Nairobi 2/6/2013

lacked communication gadgets to relay calls for back up. Such geographical barriers to communication will remain since pastoral regions face severe in fractural deficit.⁹⁷

Again CEWARN has limited its coverage to Karamoja and Somalia clusters and Dikhil (Djibouti) and among the focus areas; only Karamoja cluster is fully operational. This leaves vast territories affected by pastoral conflicts unreported.

Another challenge facing the early warning function of CEWARN is the weak institutional capacity the CEWERU units. Some CEWERUs have no proper housing institutions as well as budgets of their own. Some are housed within the ministry of foreign affairs which might influence their working.

The Ethiopian CEWERU for example has not established the local committee which is crucial for effectiveness of the CEWERU. Also there are various actors relevant for the work of CEWERU that have no formal relation with the unit. These agencies include CSOs and government bodies at various levels of government. It would be difficult to incorporate all these actors in the CEWERU structure. However, to establish a formal collaboration all these institution would certainly enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of CEWERU activities. A respondent says;

Early warning is not only about compilation and analysis of information but also developing a body of knowledge which can be used to improve on operation as well as develop best practices. To achieve this there is a need for knowledge management .Knowledge management is a process that helps organization to identify, select, organize, disseminate, and transfer information and expertise that are a part of organization's memory. The structuring of knowledge enables effective and effective

⁹⁷ Oral Interview with Gladys Koros a member of CEWARN in Nairobi on 2/6/2013

problem solving, dynamic learning, strategic planning, spread of best practices and decision making. In discussing knowledge and knowledge management there is a need to make distinction between data, information and knowledge.⁹⁸

Conclusion

This chapter has dealt in general with IGAD's CEWARN along Kenya Uganda border (Karamoja cluster) and Somali cluster. It was important to get views of the respondents on the achievements of the CEWARN mechanism. Indeed, this research has established some achievements as well as challenges.

⁹⁸ Ibid

CHAPTER FOUR

Critical analysis of Early Warning Systems in Africa

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter delved extensively on findings from the field on EWS in Karamoja and Somali cluster. One of the most important issues that came out strongly was the challenges that IGAD face in CEWARN and some of the efforts that IGAD has made in CEWARN. However, it also noted that it is important to warn those states that are prone to the violent and conflict. This involves the policy makers who are responsible for the implementation of the information gathered. To this end, this chapter gives critical analysis of EWS African conflicts under the following themes; how can these mechanisms be useful in conflict prevention in Africa?, the nature of conflicts cycles, efforts made by IGAD to prevent conflict, its successes, challenges, the development of concept of EWS in African context. This analysis utilizes the conceptual framework.

4.2 Development of the concept of EWS in African Context

Since its initial conceptualization, EWS has been integrated into the policies of nations, institutions and organizations. Though African conflicts lacks appropriate EWR mechanisms, CEWARN has been said to be the most advanced in Africa. According to Adelman, CEWARN is a cutting edge and even in its infant stage has shown greater strength than virtually any other EWS in respect to data collection. For example, the pilot study of the Karamoja cluster is termed as remarkable.⁹⁹ On the other hand, this does not mean that there are no failures experienced. Constant

⁹⁹ N. Von Keyserling and S. Kompfmuller, *Early Warning Systems: Lessons Learned from Establishing a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in the Horn of Africa*. Addis Ababa:GTZ, October 2006, p.5

conflicts among pastoralist communities still show that there are more than the eye could see. As a result, regional actors should strive to act as intermediaries. They should seek to strengthen local and national capacities, but also be prepared to step in in case the authorities at this level are inadequate or prone to failure. If the regional capacities do not suffice to handle a situation, there should be an alarm to alert the government to respond.

In the world today, EWS now exist even within multilateral agencies and NGOs. They play different roles ranging from sounding alerts and catalyzing response, to bolstering the evidence base of decision making to serving as response mechanisms themselves. There is a consensus of what constitutes a good EWS, and this good practice has been put into operation in several initiatives.¹⁰⁰ EWS provides; a crisis prediction capacity that enables proactive decision making a stronger basis for evidence based decision making on countries affected by crisis; improved programming through systematic country reviews and expert analysis; a priority setting contribution through watch list type products; a starting point for developing a shared problem definition for crisis affected countries that sets the stage for more coherent responses; and an ideas pool for responses and sometimes the forum to meet fellow respondents and plan joint strategies.

However, with a few exceptions, EWS suffer from under investment. The more natural clients for EWS are political decision making entities. Still, the often poor shallow quality of analyses, unrealistic recommendations and biased or ungrounded opinions present in many Early Warning products means 'poor early warning' remains an important.

¹⁰⁰ Y .de Moal, 'Promotion of Human Security in Rwanda'(Un published paper, Kigali , 1994).

Regional EWR models could have a cutting edge in pushing forward their requirements for communication and coordination and avoid the present ambitions of regional organizations in developing their own scenarios and recipes for action.¹⁰¹ The evolution of EWS has been driven by the advances made in qualitative and quantitative analytical tools. As the capabilities and value of the tools grew, they were integrated into the different EWS operated by governments, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs. Such tools have enjoyed significant advances; Quantitative methods have strong predictive capabilities, particularly in relation to political crisis and instability.

State fragility indices should be provided as they present easily graspable watch lists and help agencies working on these issues to set priorities. Qualitative methods provide rich contextual analysis as well as ways to plan programmatic responses and assess the impact of these responses on violent conflicts. The more recent qualitative method for state fragility analysis provides useful planning frameworks for programmatic responses. Qualitative tools satisfy important analytical requirements among development agencies, particularly in terms of informing programming.

Nevertheless, several weaknesses still persist with regard to EWR. For instance the existing analytical tools fundamentally oversimplify complex and fluid violent conflicts and situations of state fragility. They provide simple snapshots that are quickly outdated and the quality of analysis suffers from data deficits that characterize many of the countries covered by such studies. Provision of accurate information therefore requires proper tools of analysis in EWR mechanisms in Africa.

¹⁰¹ J. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, New York: Harper Collins, 1993

4.3 Conceptual problems of EWR in IGAD

Hagmeier Gaverus and Weismann argue that there are several reasons why EWR is not used effectively and why a warning response gap is so apparent in many conflicts.¹⁰² Institutional rigidity and cognitive biases; conflict escalation process and, in particular the role triggers and single events is still under researched. While structural indicators fits into relatively simple models, the escalation of a tense situation into violence does not result from the linear summation of a neatly defined set of causes, but from interactions among multiple phenomena in a complex system with several levels of organization.¹⁰³

There is also a disconnect between EW advisers and early action decision makers. Even if an EWS is accurate and timely, it does not automatically lead to action. Laurie convincingly argues that above all, it must be useful to the senior officials who are responsible for making decisions on early action. The system will have a scant value its outputs are not tailored precisely to meet their needs.¹⁰⁴ The various decision makers who deal with governance and human rights abuses, reconstruction programmes, mediation in conflicts deployment of peace keepers, planning and implementation of humanitarian and military programmes, or preventive diplomacy all of whom are engaged in peace and security missions need tailor made information rather than general reports on potential emergence of violent conflict. Specific information for each conflict requires. EWR mechanisms according to Meier are based on “hierarchical structures” that cannot adequately cope with non linear developments.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² See G. Hagmeier-Gaverus and W. Mikael, *Early Warning Indicators for Preventive Policy- a new approach In Early Warning research*, (Working Paper No.1, 2003)

¹⁰³ P. Meier, *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ L. Nathan”Africa’s *Early Warning System: An Emperor with no Cloths?* South African Journal of International Affairs 2007, vol14, no, 1pp.49-60:50.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*

According to Woocher, more accurate and a change in communication and the structures of organizations will not suffice because they do not reflect the ways in which individuals and groups process information and make decisions in the shadow of risk and uncertainty.¹⁰⁶ Most EWR models are based on the prevalent “rational actor” model. This model, however does not take into account that individuals and groups are prone to mental errors caused by our simplified information processing strategies.¹⁰⁷ These arguments suggest that the effectiveness of EWS is affected not only by the quality of alerts, but also by institutional factors and cognitive biases. Such biases can skew the empirical evidence and thus the reliability of early warning risk assessment or forecast.

Political interest, probably the most important structural deficiency in the sufficient use of EWR by regional organizations is that most governments do not want to or are unable to react. Governments are usually quite aware of acute or emerging major conflicts, Often they are the cause of this conflict. Sophisticated early warning indicators are not needed to warn about such conflicts. However governments are usually not interested in the fact that abuses of civil rights and violations of human rights are documented or cited on. Thus despite mandating secretaries of regional organizations might only be lip service.

IGAD although compromised by constant conflicts, has chosen a different approach due to its political and security situation. This is to operate in pilot areas occupied by the pastoralists. This compromise has both costs and benefits. Certainly, the declared intention of EWS of predicting violent conflicts cannot be met. This would require a region wide approach. Thus numerous conflicts and tensions with potential to turn into violent conflicts remain unobserved and unreported by CEWARN mechanism.

¹⁰⁶ L Woocher, *The Effects of cognitive biases on Early Warning*, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, March 2008.

¹⁰⁷ R .J.Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, (1999)

However, the concentration on the two local cross border conflicts has an advantage of collecting the relevant information at the local level. Thus, the strong criticism against many EWR models, of largely ignoring the strength of the local space in mediating conflict, is less relevant in the case of IGAD's two pilot projects.¹⁰⁸

The ultimate goal of EW is ER. It is therefore not enough to generate information and hand it to those who might be in situations to take necessary responses. If the recipient of early warning is not placed, capable or willing to take action, EW analysis would be nothing but an academic exercise without any effect on improvement of the volatile situations.¹⁰⁹ To avoid this, the CEWARN protocol integrates EW and ER mandates. To understand the ER challenges, there is need to situate the analysis in the Peace and Security Architecture (PSA) sine CEWARN with exception of RRF and local peace committees lacks any other capabilities of response. As such ER are dependent on other PSA's organs which have the diplomatic, military and financial competencies to respond. Thus the issues are challenges that have hampered the workings of IGAD's PSA. Some of the challenges are:

4.3.1 Weak member states

IGAD member states are weak and incapable of asserting empirical control over their territories. Consequently, there are vast territories where there are minimal state presences. The notion of borderland best denotes these territories-vast un captured spaces that thrive on the margin of existing states and are characterized by privatization of the use of force by community, cattle rustlers, warlords and bandits . These borderlands unite the region in a system of cross border insecurities. It is in

¹⁰⁸ T.A., *The OAU and Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution*, Asmara: Report Prepared for study ii, 1995.

¹⁰⁹See G. Hagemeyer-Gaverus and W. Mikael, *Early Warning Indicators for Preventive Policy- a new approach In Early Warning research*, (Working Paper No.1, 2003)

these territories that pastoral conflicts are located and the affected states are not capable of effectively deploying their power even in the face of warnings.

In response to this inability, states have responded to the infrastructural and despotic power deficit by arming local communities to take care of their own defense needs. In other situations owing to the availability of small and Light Weapons [SALWs] and government inability to provide security, communities are themselves for defensive and offensive reasons. First they need to protect themselves and their livestock from being plundered by hostile group. Second, they use the arms to forcefully raid other pastoral communities. The culture of arming communities whether from government armories or illicit sources has to localized arms race in regions such as Mandera Triangle which extends to Kenya, Ethiopia and Southern Sudan.

The region is highly militarized and different pastoral communities are locked in cycles of cattle rustling. Such arming undermines the whole idea of preventive culture and management of pastoral conflict, since cluster based disarmament is critical component of managing these conflicts. According to an early warning experts, a holistic and regional response to pastoral conflicts is required which addresses both the demand and supply dynamics fuelling such conflicts. This is hard to achieve since states view pastoral areas as sources of peripheral and economically non-viable environments. Even where there might be some commitment, the states do not have the capacity to fully deal with conflict drivers such as climate changes and droughts, SALWs proliferation and marginalization.

4.3.2 Presence of regional conflicts

A defining feature of the Horn of Africa is not only the presence of numerous conflicts but the extent they linked and subsequently regionalized. This has created complex conflict systems whereby armed conflict within one state rapidly become internationalized or a settlement of conflict in one state is usually followed by eruption of conflict in another state as the conflict epicenter shifts. The inter linkages of these conflicts pose fundamental security threats to IGAD members.

In the face of numerous conflicts, states have more pressing priorities. Indeed though pastoral conflicts were supposed to be the entry point for CEWARN, in anticipation that success achieved will encourage states to increase its coverage, the motivation behind this limitation was that these conflicts were not on top of their priorities, As such they assigned them to a regional body. In essence they were shifting the burden to CEWARN without any intention of playing their part in addressing them¹¹⁰

4.3.3 Absence of regional values

The presence of common values is very important in determining regional peace and security. This is best exemplified by democratic peace theory which has shown that democratic values in a given region to a large extent explains the sustained presence of peace and security.¹¹¹ IGAD as a sub region lacks consensus on how the region should go about addressing the issues of common concern. This has hampered the crafting and implementation of regional strategy for responding to early warnings.

¹¹⁰ T.A., *The OAU and Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution*, Asmara: Report Prepared for study ii, 1995.

¹¹¹ Makumi Mwangi, *conflict in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, Nairobi: Centre for Conflict Research, 2006, pp.74-82

In addition, being that members have divergent values has made it impossible to develop benchmarks for conduct which can go a long way in addressing some of the conflict indicators. Nhema argues that the bottom line is that in Africa the key Early Warning indicators for intra –state conflict and regional instability in Africa are abuse of power, ethnic politics, exclusionary practices, human rights violations, bad governance and institutional corruption.¹¹² These indicators are related to decision making ability and political willingness of member states to address them. Unless there is a move towards addressing them CEWS will remain unsuccessful.¹¹³ The observation captures situation in the HoA where issues such as exclusionary politics explain the marginalization of pastoral communities, Yet IGAD lacks the capability of influencing internal policies in a manner which can address marginalization and exclusion.

4.3.4 Hostile regional international relations

IGAD has been characterized as an organization of hostile brothers, a reflection of the international relations that is characterized by enmity rather than amity.¹¹⁴ Indeed all the members have fragile and at times hostile relations. For example Ethiopia and Eritrea have got into war twice and have troops on their borders, Ethiopia and Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. This has made trust impossible since members do not trust one another and thus hinder genuine cooperation in the region.

A good example of the impact of hostile regional international relations is the failure to adopt IGAD Peace and Security Strategy which Mwagiru et al has characterized as critical because it provides a road map on where the region intends to go in terms of

¹¹² A.G. Nhema et al, *The Resolution of African Conflicts: The management of Conflict Resolution and Post Conflict Reconstruction*, Ohio:Ohio University Press, 2008.

¹¹³ Ibid

¹¹⁴ U. Terlinden, *IGAD- Paper Tiger Facing Gigantic Tasks*. Berlin: Friedrich- Ebert Stiftung, 2004.

security.¹¹⁵ The IPSS in many ways aims at shaping the tenor of regional international relations and at the same time promoting the emergence of a regional normative framework. This is because it is based on the principles of collectivism which calls for regional approaches to security and shift from rigid interpretation of sovereignty and state centric understanding security; interest convergence which envisages promotion of frameworks which reconciles competing national interests leading to convergence of common regional interests; subsidiarity which entails leaving activities to authorities or levels best suited to handle them supranationality which invests regional organizations with policy making and enforcing competencies.

Additionally, it aims at establishing a Conflict Management and Response Mechanism (CPMR) which will anchor peace and security issues and also expand CEWARN mandate from pastoral conflicts to other areas.¹¹⁶

In absence of trust and cooperation, regional efforts are not possible. Hammerstad has argued that there are two main basic conditions which must be met if security integration is to take place. These are mutual trust and common value basis.¹¹⁷ Where they are absent, regional organizations operate at the whims of member states. As noted in Chapter three, that if the organization has incompatible interests, obviously its programmes will not move. This has been the case of IGAD and its programmes. Members are always bending such programmes to serve their own interests.

¹¹⁵ Mwagiru M and Njeri K, *Human Security in the Horn of Africa: Emerging Agenda*, In Mwagiru M (ed), *Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn of Africa*. Nairobi: Africa Peace Forum, 2008, p.254.

¹¹⁶ K.P. Apuuli, *IGAD Peace and Security Strategy*, Op cit pp,360-361.

¹¹⁷ A. Hammerstad, *Defending the State or Protecting the People: SADC Security Integration at Cross Roads*, South African Institute of International Affairs, Report No. 39 2003, p.2

4.3.5 Lack of resources and capacity

The analysis so far shows that IGAD CEWARN is plagued by multiple challenges making this study relevant. The challenges are further exacerbated by lack of resources. The resource constraint facing CEWARN means that even in ideal situation, it would still be incapable of implementing its early warning and response objectives.

Regarding financial capacity CEWARN is dependent on donors to fund its activities. Member states are hardly enough to cover the costs of running a secretariat, leave alone implementation of the programmes. Currently CEWARN is funded by United States International Agency for Development (USAID) which contributes 50 percent of overall budget, German's GTZ 30 percent and member states 20 percent.¹¹⁸ This has led to unhealthy dependence on donors and thus compromises CEWARN independence in its operations. Significantly, lack of adequate financial resources mean that IGAD is incapable of undertaking response operations such as peace keeping and peace enforcement which requires huge financial outlays. Additionally, weak resources make it impossible to recruit required members of staff to undertake its mandate.

4.3.6 Absence of regional hegemony

The concept of hegemony is associated with the work of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. He refined Marxist theory that says that ruling class dominated the rest of the society through coercion. Instead he argued that there are multiple dimensions of overt and covert power which is maintained through coercion and consent.

¹¹⁸ Information provided by Legal work Advisor, IGAD Peace and Security Division

According to him the mix of coercion and consent defines hegemony.¹¹⁹ Most of the times hegemony is maintained through consent since the dominant class use its political, moral and intellectual leadership to establish its view of the world as all inclusive and universal and to shape the interests and needs of subordinate group.¹²⁰ This way it is capable of co-opting the working class into a grand coalition under its own leadership.

The notion of hegemony has since found its way in international relations. Critical scholars such as Cox have defined hegemony as the formation of a coalition of top down forces activated by a common consciousness in which those at the bottom are able to participate.¹²¹ Keohane has argued that hegemony differs from simple domination in that the hegemonic power (state at the top of coalition) has to forge consent around their own values and strategies as common ones, which means that every relationship of hegemony is necessary a pedagogical relationship.¹²² In essence a hegemon acts like a benevolent big brother, rewarding and disciplining the younger ones.

The 'benevolent brother' role of a hegemon has been used to explain the success of regional organizations. Moller has argued that, a hegemon is a critical in solving problems associated with production and consumption of public goods especially free riding. This is because their total share of production is so large such that it has noticeable implications for what will be available for 'consumption'.

¹¹⁹ J.H. Mittelman, *Globalisation: Captors and Captive*, Third World Quarterly, Vol 21, No.6,2000, p.920

¹²⁰ D. Woods, *Civil Society in Europe and Africa: Limiting State Power Through a Public Sphere*, African Studies Review, Vol 35, No.2, 1992, p.82.

¹²¹ R. Cox, *The Way Ahead: Towards a New Ontology of World Order*, in Richard W. Jones (ed), *Critical Theory and World Politics*. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001, pp.45-50.

¹²² R Keohane, *The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Change in International Regimes, 1967-1977*, excerpted in Roe C et al (eds), *International Political Economy, State-Market Relations in the Changing Global Order*. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996, pp.78.

This ability to influence production and consumption of public goods and what is available for others to consume be it in trade, peace or security endows a hegemon with enormous influence in regional process since the ‘younger brothers’ are dependent on the activities of the hegemon.¹²³ Also the possession of power means that a hegemon can infuse its values and norms through regional regimes and disciplines the deviant members. Importantly, it is ready to underwrite the costs of regional activities since it stands to gain more relative to other when such activities are successful.

The success of the South Africa Development Community (SADC) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been attributed to the hegemonic role played by South Africa and Nigeria respectively.¹²⁴ This is due to their capacity to avail resources-military, financial and diplomatic –necessary for regional peace and security initiatives. For instance during ECOWAS intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Nigeria provided the bulk of forces and financed the operation to a tune of eight billion dollars.¹²⁵ Certainly, no member of IGAD can afford to raise 8 billion American dollars.

Indeed IGAD is opposite of SADC and ECOWAS since none of its members can undertake the hegemonic role. The absence means that no single state can successfully manage to undertake and underwrite regional initiatives, incentivize and/or apply pressure on other members to cooperate. The outcome has been unwarranted rivalry among members, hostilities, absence of consensus and a weak

¹²³ B.Moller, *The Pros and Cons of Subsidiarity: The Role of African Regional and Sub Regional and Sub regional Organization in Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa*, Copenhagen: Danish Institution of International Studies, Working Paper No.2005-4, p.8

¹²⁴ Ibid, pp.39-40

¹²⁵ A. Adeneji, ECOWAS: ‘A Retrospective Journey’ in Adebajo A. and Rashid I (eds) *West Africa Security Challenges: Building Peace in Troubled Region*. London: Lynne Rienner, 2004, p.45; B. Moller, *The Pros and Cons of Subsidiarity: The Role of African Regional and Sub Regional and Sub regional Organization in Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa*, IBID, PP.229-267.

regional organization starved of powers and resources to act. These problems extend to the operations of early responses.

Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the contribution of CEWARN to conflict management at the cross border of Kenya and Uganda (Karamoja Cluster) and Somali cluster. It has shown that CEWARN has made contributions in the management of conflicts. However, there exist gaps in both EW and ER capacities. These gaps hinder the operations of CEWARN and unless they are addressed, early warning will remain a mockery in the region.

CHAPTER FIVE

Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will involve summary, key findings of all the chapters, conclusions and recommendations of the topic of the study. This will help to understand the reason as to why the topic of study was in question. Further, it will open avenues to other researchers to research more in areas that the topic did not cover.

5.2 Summary of Findings

To evaluate whether grand designs of Conflict Early Warning Systems have been actualized and their utility achieved, the study was divided into five chapters. Chapter one introduced the study by giving the background to the topic of study. It is clear that post cold war Africa traditionally employed several initiatives to address the spectre of violent conflicts. The desire to generate African solutions to African problems led to the formation of sub regional organizations incorporating peace and security issues in their mandates. In the Horn of Africa, IGAD established CEWARN to help respond to conflicts in the region before they erupt. Second chapter brought out conceptual issues on CEWARN and response mechanisms. It showed that Early Warning Systems have been in place since 1950s. However, the systems started emerging into the field of conflict management during the post cold war period. It also showed various attempts by Africans to respond to conflicts. As relatively elicited various debates, the debates focuses on their relevance, how capable are they in predicting conflicts considering that human action is a product of complex process, what are the appropriate indicators capturing conflict management dynamics and who to warn.

The third chapter examined IGAD's CEWARN in two pilot areas that is Karamoja and Somali cluster. The chapter showed that CEWARN has generated comprehensive data on pastoral conflicts. It has also contributed to local peacemaking capacities which are key in ensuring sustainable peace and at the same time issued alerts that helped in preventing inter communal violence. It has also initiated pilot livestock tracking system to enhance the recovery of stolen stocks. Many Challenges facing CEWARN initiative too emerged strongly giving reasons as to why it cannot achieve its stipulated mandate.

Chapter four contains critical analysis of the previous chapters with the view to come to a conclusion. Nevertheless, CEWARN has also faced challenges in its operations. On early warning, the indicators have left out a critical kind of cattle rustling which is commercialized and prioritized by raiders and that has been a major setback in the two pilot studies.

5.3 Discussions of Findings

5.3.1 Findings from the statement to the problem

The study found out that despite the mechanism being in place, conflicts in the region continue to occur. This is because CEWARN operates in the two pilot areas restricted to the pastoralists though conflicts in the Horn of Africa have taken new dimensions. In addition, IGAD member states are entrapped in regional power politics of hegemony fighting for their selfish interests instead of committing themselves to maintaining peace and security in the region. CEWARN therefore should encompass all sorts of conflicts in order realize its mandate. The issue of early response comes in too. On occasions where alert is given on time, there is laxity in taking action. This is a major issue to the governments of the day.

5.3.2 Findings from objectives of the study

From the findings, the study achieved its general objective that was to analyze effectiveness of CEWARN mechanism in the Horn of Africa. It showed that the mechanism contributed to peace among the pastoralist communities (Karamoja and Somali clusters). Further, research revealed that CEWARN is the most advanced in Africa in terms of its conceptualization and structuring. Ideally CEWARN has been termed as progressive move aimed at entrenching the culture of preventing conflicts from transforming to violence in the region. Through a system of data collection and analysis, the initiative has managed to develop advanced database of pastoral conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

The study has not achieved its first specific objective, that was to examine IGAD's CEWARN contribution to peace and security in the Horn of Africa. It is clear that IGAD as a sub region organization has failed in its stipulated mandate to maintain peace and security in the region. The Horn has been in constant conflicts despite the existence of CEWARN. This is a grave situation that calls for attention.

The second and third objectives have been achieved in Chapter four and partly in chapter three. The assessment showed that though CEWARN is the most advanced Early Warning System, its achievements indicates that it has performed below average.

5.3.3 Findings from the Literature Review

Several issues have emerged. These are; whether CEW are necessary remain an enduring question. That accurate prediction of conflicts is impossible since main objects of analysis are human beings, human beings are complex and exhibit varied responses to similar stimuli. That early warning and response do not operate in a vacuum, they are part of sub regional peace and security project thus whatever

weaknesses plague the working of sub regional organizations whether environment, legal, financial, human resource will have consequences on EWR or both. Hence sub regional organizations need to be strengthened. This is because their geographical and cultural proximity can facilitate more rapid and less expensive responses to violent conflicts. At the same time they poses better understanding of the conflict dynamics, key players and context specific management and resolution options. Again, there is a possibility of warring parties are more willing to feel comfortable at managing disputes at regional levels as opposed to international level. Further, the notion of regional security complex is rooted on the reality that states which are contagious have interlinked security concerns and non can guarantee its own security without cooperating with their neighbours. This creates security interdependence best addressed through regional structures of security cooperation tailored to fit the security environment they target. This is more so when a given region is characterized by violent conflicts which have been internationalized. Regional organizations therefore have responsibility to maintain peace and security.

The study also found out that the different scholars agree on one issue that the problem lies on the question of 'who to warn' Nevertheless, there is a unanimous agreement that EWS can prevent the escalation of conflicts before they erupt to a major crisis.

Another issue is that conflict is viewed negatively in every society and therefore a measure to contain conflict is key to human security. In addition, there is need to understand its causes in order to regulate it.

5.3.4 Findings from Hypothesis

Based on findings, the first hypothesis is negative since IGAD has failed in achieving peace and security in the Horn of Africa despite the CEWARN mechanism being in place. There is a relationship between conflict management to peace and security. The second hypothesis is null, there is no relationship between the variables. For example, there is no relationship between CEWARN operations and the constitutional protocol. CEWARN is founded on its own mandate. The third hypothesis is positive, there is a relationship between CEWARN's mandate and preventing conflicts among the pastoralists communities. This is because CEWARN was established to respond to conflicts among the pastoralists.

5.3.5 Findings from Conceptual Framework

Based on findings, the study reveals that Early Warning System is part and parcel to conflict prevention. For it to be effective, it is essential that be integrated into policies for violence mitigation. Good governance priorities include protecting the public from violence and also safeguarding human security. Information provided by EWS should therefore be taken seriously and above all the issue of response ought to be a priority whenever an alert is given in order to prevent conflicts.

5.3.6 Findings from Chapter Two

The study found out that the idea of preventing conflicts is not a new idea in Africa. It began during the cold war period and since then it has taken new dimensions and at the moment became an issue in regional blocks. Every sub regional organization now works towards forming their own mechanisms to respond to conflicts. Another issue that emerged is preventive diplomacy. Most scholars agree on the management of

conflicts at their early stages before they erupt into major crisis at the same time, there is need to observe preparedness at all times.

The issue of methodology also reflects an underlying question on whether Early Warning Systems are relevant in management of conflicts. Methodology addresses the issue of whether it is possible to predict violent conflict and what is generated as warning. The complexity of prediction is due to that fact that human action is informed by multiplicity of intrinsic and extrinsic processes and reactions to the same stimuli are as varied as there are people.

5.3.7 Findings from Chapter three

Based on the data collected, chapter three revealed that IGAD's CEWARN mechanism is not popular among the people in the Horn of Africa region. Majority do not know its existence and therefore an issue of concern. The study also revealed that CEWARN has contributed to the successes in the two pilot areas Karamoja and Somali clusters. The chapter also captures some of the initiatives that IGAD has put in place to maintain peace in the region. For example, peace building among the warring communities, peace keeping among others. This has made it possible for the communities to co-habit together harmoniously.

5.3.8 Findings from Chapter Four

The most important finding in chapter four was that most EWR models are based on the prevalent "rational actor" model. This model, however does not take into account that individuals and groups are prone to mental errors caused by our simplified information processing strategies. This suggests that the effectiveness of EWS is affected not only by the quality of alerts, but also by institutional factors and cognitive

biases. Such biases can skew the empirical evidence and thus the reliability of early warning risk assessment or forecast.

Political interest, probably the most important structural deficiency in the sufficient use of EWR by regional organizations is that most governments do not want to or are unable to react. Governments are usually quite aware of acute or emerging major conflicts, Often they are the cause of this conflict. Sophisticated early warning indicators are not needed to warn about such conflicts. However governments are usually not interested in the fact that abuses of civil rights and violations of human rights are documented or cited on.

IGAD although compromised by constant conflicts, has chosen a different approach due to its political and security situation. This is to operate in pilot areas occupied by the pastoralists. This compromise has both costs and benefits. Certainly, the declared intention of EWS of predicting violent conflicts cannot be met. This would require a region wide approach. Thus numerous conflicts and tensions with potential to turn into violent conflicts remain unobserved and unreported by CEWARN mechanism. However, the concentration on the two local cross border conflicts has an advantage of collecting the relevant information at the local level. Thus, the strong criticism against many EWR models, of largely ignoring the strength of the local space in mediating conflict, is less relevant in the case of IGAD's two pilot projects.

The ultimate goal of EW is ER. It is therefore not enough to generate information and hand it to those who might be in situations to take necessary responses. If the recipient of early warning is not placed, capable or willing to take action, EW analysis would be nothing but an academic exercise without any effect on improvement of the volatile situations.

The challenges are not left out either. IGAD's CEWARN mechanism is also faced with myriad challenges that if not addressed the good idea of mitigating conflicts will be a pipe dream. For example, it faces severe human and financial capacities with thinly spread early warning staff. This makes it difficult to respond faster to conflict. Weaknesses of the member states are also a challenge. IGAD is founded by weak states and as a result their interactions are characterized by constant enmity which in turn politicizes every initiative as each member tries to maintain its hegemony over others. There is also lack of convergence of values and hence the region is susceptible to constant violent conflicts. Lack of regional peace and security strategies is also a challenge. This is because there are no tenets to properly guide that region towards peace processes. Lastly, the region also suffers resource constraints. All the above factors have made it more difficult for the region to achieve its mandate of maintaining peace and security in the region. The study therefore calls for attention especially to the policy makers to address these issues at hand in order to realize CEWARN mandate.

5.4 Conclusion

The study sought to examine IGAD's response to conflicts in the Horn of Africa. To do this, CEWARN has been used to analyze the successes and challenges. EWR should include local process more so in areas where the power reach of states is weak and the vacuum left has been filled with non state actors. Regional EWS and response mechanisms should also focus on improving the quality of reporting; the warning responses link and sensitivity among senior policy making of value of evidence based on decision making in situations of violent conflicts.

5.5 Recommendations

This research has got both academic and policy recommendations as discussed below.

5.5.1 Academic Recommendation

Early Warning Systems are understudied especially in the area of ‘Who to be warned’ and the relevance is not taken seriously. However, their relevance needs to be tested against reality on the hot spot areas of all spheres of conflict not only among the pastoralist communities. Future research should therefore take into consideration the above issue in order for the CEWARN mechanism to realize its mandate.

5.5.2 Policy Recommendation

There is need for the Horn of Africa region to spread the operations of CEWARN not only on pastoral areas but also to incorporate all sorts of conflicts to help the region avert the rampant wave of conflicts. In addition, in cases of conflict, governments need to take swift action instead of dragging the process of conflict prevention.

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APPENDICES
APPENDIX I:
QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear Respondent,

This interview is part of this project. It is required for the award of Masters Degree in International Conflict Management at the University of Nairobi. Kindly answer the following questions.

Name:

(Optional)

Profession:

Position:

What is IGAD's CEWARN mechanisms capacity in the management of conflicts in the Horn of Africa?

Please give your opinion on the following:

What is the CEWARN mechanism's ability for gathering information?

What is IGAD's capacity for processing and analyzing information gathered?

What are the challenges facing the implementation of early warning mechanisms and early responses?

How does IGAD respond to information indicating threats to peace in the Horn of Africa?

Does IGAD have structures for peace keeping, peace building and peace enforcement to complement CEWARN operations?

How would you rate IGAD's CEWARN mechanisms overall achievement in management of conflicts in the region?

What are the main sources of funding for IGAD's CEWARN activities?

Is the funding enough?

What peace and security mission have IGAD undertaken (Tick where appropriate)

Mediation

Conciliation

Peacemaking

Post conflict and peace building

What is the nature of interstate relations within IGAD as a sub region?

Apart from geographical criterion of membership, does IGAD have other requirements based on political and social benchmarks which members adhere to?

If these requirements are there, what are the enforcement mechanisms?

How does IGAD balance the need to respect member states sovereignty and to intervene in execution of its mandate?

How does IGAD manage conflicts between its member states and non member states?

Are there any other issues that impacts negatively on IGAD's CEWARN mechanism in conflict management in the Horn of Africa?

Thank you.