IMPACT OF VIOLENT CONFLICT ON PRE-SCHOOL CHILDREN (A CASE OF 2007-2008 POST ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KIBERA, KENYA)

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DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

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This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as a University Supervisor.

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DEDICATION

This research project is dedicated to my family and all those who supported in its completion. Thank you and God bless you abundantly.
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It has been an exciting and instructive study period in the University of Nairobi and I feel privileged to have had the opportunity to carry out this study as a demonstration of knowledge gained during the period studying for my master’s degree. With these acknowledgments, it would be impossible not to remember those who in one way or another, directly or indirectly, played a role in the realization of this research project. Let me, therefore, thank them all equally. Firstly, I am indebted to the all-powerful God for all the blessings he showered on me and for being with me throughout the study. I also thank my supervisor for her guidance, lecturers who taught me during first year of study my classmate for their support. Finally, I take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to the lasting memory of my loving family, and friends who are a constant source of motivation and for their never ending support and encouragement during writing of this research project.
ABBREVIATIONS/ ACRONYMS

AIDS: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome

DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo

HIV: Human Immunodeficiency Virus

KANU: Kenya African National Union

NARC: National Alliance Rainbow Coalition

NCCK: National Council of Churches of Kenya

ODM: Orange Democratic Movement

UNDP: United Nations Development Programmes

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

WHO: World Health Organization
ABSTRACT
Since the end of the Cold War, inter-state conflicts have reduced, while intra-state conflicts have increased most of them unfolding along ethnic lines. The economic, social and political consequences of inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya are immense. Since the early 1990s, inter-ethnic conflicts have been leaving trails of destruction in Kenya and have become an endemic phenomenon, threatening the coexistence of the various ethnic groups. The objective of the study was to examine the impact of violent conflict on pre-school children after 2007-2008 post election violence in Kenya. Specifically it examined the physical, economic, and psycho-social impacts of violent conflict on pre-school children after 2007-2008 post election violence Kenya. This study was conducted in Nairobi County and will mainly pay close attention to the community in Kibera area. The study established the physical impacts of violent conflict on pre-school children after 2007-2008 post-election violence Kenya. Most visible effects of armed conflict on children are physically inflicted ones. Children sustain serious injuries and or lifelong disabilities such as losing limbs, eyesight and hearing. The psychological and physical trauma during pregnancy posed great health risk to the unborn children. A number of children born to rape victims after 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya were handicapped although it is uncertain whether factors relating to the rape itself were primarily responsible. There were other subsequent economic problems related to the 2007-2008 post-election violence such as food insecurity, labour disruption on industry and the public sector institutions, land grabbing, commercial disruption, breakdown in transport and communication, resource diversion, unexpected expenditure, infrastructural disruption, inflation and fluctuation of prices and environmental destruction among others. The social consequences of the clashes in Kenya were enormous and cannot be easily quantified, especially the psycho-social ones. Most of the victims of these clashes were left homeless, landless, destitute, injured, dead, abused, to mention but a few of the atrocities resulting from the menace. The study recommends that government agencies in collaboration with communities should ensure that children in areas affected by post-election violence are protected from strenuous household labour allocations. The community in conflict affected areas should address the problem of fear in the aftermath of violence. Fear is central in household decisions on whether to send children to school as children are particularly vulnerable to harassment, abductions and sexual attacks.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Since the end of the Cold War, inter-state conflicts have reduced, while intra-state conflicts have increased most of them unfolding along ethnic lines\(^1\). Indeed, in spite of the world being in an era of globalization, ethnic and communal violence persists, which according to Geschiere and Nyamnjoh\(^2\) seems to be the “flip side of globalization”. Consequently, the trend has been that ethnic groups that previously lived harmoniously together now turn against each other, leaving behind trails of destruction among civilians.

Ethno-political conflict is now considered one of the most important threats to global security\(^3\). Violent inter-group conflict represents a difficult and intractable problem in many regions of the world. Over the final decades of the 20th Century intra-state conflict (rather than inter-state conflict or war) became an increasingly common problem. The United Nations Development Programme recorded only three wars between states in the period between 1989 and 1992, while documenting 79 instances of intra-state conflicts over the same period, many of which had been underway for a decade or more\(^4\).


These types of conflicts differ from traditional warfare in a number of ways. The costs of such conflicts tend to be borne by civilians, rather than military personnel. In World War I, 10% of all fatalities were civilians. In World War II, civilians were estimated to comprise 50% of casualties. During subsequent conflict civilian casualties have represented upwards of 80% of all casualties, many of whom are children and their mothers\(^5\). This rise in civilian casualties can be attributed to the weapons and strategies of intra-state conflict. These conflicts tend to be characterized by the proliferation and use of small arms, land mines, bombings and low intensity “dirty war” tactics\(^6\). Further, problems such as political insecurity, state disintegration, and population displacement are exacerbated. Indeed the net effects of these experiences can often create a vicious circle, contributing to the intractable nature of intra-state conflict.

The economic, social and political consequences of inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya are immense. Since the early 1990s, inter-ethnic conflicts have been leaving trails of destruction in Kenya and have become an endemic phenomenon, threatening the coexistence of the various ethnic groups. Ethnic conflicts are a hindrance to both economic and human development. Loss of life, property, and displacement of persons has been rampant in Kenya. So destructive and pain inflicting are inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya, that their memory sends cold chills down the spines of those who have witnessed them or have been directly affected. Nyukuri\(^7\) points out that, “the thought of fresh inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya raises immense fear and apprehension.”


\(^6\) Ibid

regional significance of Kenya cannot be overemphasized. Considering that her neighbours in the Horn of Africa as well as the Great lakes region: Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have experienced civil wars, Kenya plays a key role of hosting both refugees and exiles from her neighbors\(^8\).

In addition, Kenya connects its landlocked neighbors to the Indian Ocean coast; hence, most of the shipped goods to these countries are transported through Kenya\(^9\). The Rift Valley Province, which has been adversely, affected by inter-ethnic conflicts, as well the Western and Nyanza provinces, which are also significantly affected, form an indispensable transport connection between Kenya and her neighbors. All these are some of the major sectors that are affected by ethnic conflicts in Kenya. This further attests to the negative impacts of Kenya’s inter-ethnic conflicts in an international context and consequently the much-needed research to dig out information that would assist in mitigating the conflicts and managing ethnicity.

Referring to ethnic conflict in Kenya in the 1990s, coupled with reprisals of political opponents, Apollos\(^{10}\) posits that “the last decade of the 20\(^{th}\) century in Kenya will be remembered for armed conflicts, massacres, displacements, uprisings, riots and demonstrations” adding that “their repercussions would be felt even in the 21\(^{st}\) century.” On the same note, Mkutu\(^{11}\) explicitly explains the repercussions of negative ethnicity, giving an account of the numerous deaths that have occurred in Africa due to violence organised along ethnic lines. He points out that negative

\(^{8}\) Galaty and Miller (2005) Pastoralist Community Harmonization in the Karamoja Cluster: Taking it to the Next Level, Tufts University, Medford.


ethnicity is not an African phenomenon; maintaining that it is also to blame for the ethnic violence that broke out in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. According to Mkutu\textsuperscript{12} the destructive nature of misused ethnicity is Africa’s second largest problem after HIV/AIDS that is hindering development, peace and happiness at an alarming rate.

Violent ethnic confrontations posed a great challenge to Kenya’s democratic transition throughout the 1990s. Whereas Kenya’s transition to multiparty political pluralism in 1991 was accompanied by ethnic violence that persisted throughout the decade, the transition from the Kenya African National Union (KANU) regime to the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in 2002 was relatively amicable and ethnic violence was minimal\textsuperscript{13}.

1.2 Problem statement

There has been an increasing awareness surrounding war and its effects on people. Although the majority of past research has focused on the impact of war on soldiers, there has been a growing interest in comprehending the experiences of civilians who are caught in the middle of war zones\textsuperscript{14} Since World War 1, the causalities suffered by civilians has increased from 5% to about 90%, with the majority affected being women and children. This drastic increase in children's involvement in war related trauma has been cause for understanding not only the experiences of these children but also their psychological ramifications.

The 2007-2008 Post election conflict is the most recent human-caused disaster to have rocked Kenya. Children were particularly affected both directly and indirectly, leading to gross violation

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid

of Children’s Rights. An accumulating body of literature reveals that war experiences can damage a child's psychosocial development and future life expectations. The effects of war can manifest as cognitive, behavioural and emotional disturbances. Studies show that exposure to war can result in nervous, aggressive, regressive and depressive behaviours, physical manifestations such as eating and sleeping disorders, somatic problems and possibly the development of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.

Although these research findings concur that war can impact the development of a child, there are discrepancies in the research regarding the level of effect war has on a child's well being. Discrepancies can be due, in part to the various kinds of stressors to which the child is exposed and how they are defined. Childhood exposure to violence is associated with a variety of aggressive and otherwise maladaptive behaviors that can disrupt children’s school adaptation and academic competence. Such behavioral problems not only interfere with classroom learning, they also hamper children’s efforts to make friends, another essential task of childhood and an important dimension of school adaptation.

The problem with the literature is that many studies document mental health problems of children of war but few compare children exposed to various kinds of trauma as well as comparing them to a control group. Past research has mainly examined particular groups of at-risk children independently without fully examining the physical, economic and psycho-social impacts of violent conflict. Thus this study seeks to examine the impact of violent conflict on pre-school children after 2007-2008 post election violence in Kenya.

\[15\] Ibid
1.3 Objectives of the Study

The objective of the study was to examine the impact of violent conflict on pre-school children after 2007-2008 post election violence in Kenya.

1.3.1 Specific objectives

The study will be guided by the following research questions

i. To assess the physical impacts of violent conflict on pre-school children after 2007-2008 post election violence Kenya

ii. To examine the economic impacts of violent conflict on pre-school children after 2007-2008 post election violence in Kenya

iii. To analyze the psycho-social impacts of violent conflict on pre-school children after 2007-2008 post election violence in Kenya

1.4 Hypotheses

i. Violent conflict has significant physical impacts on pre-school children

ii. Violent conflict has great economic impact on pre-school children

iii. Violent conflict has a major psycho-social impact on pre-school children

1.5 Justification

Political conflict has the potential of affecting many more children than other forms of violence. It is different for example from domestic violence because it concerns inter-group violence (violence determined by group’s affiliation) and the perpetrator is stranger to the victim. Political violence is considered to be more stressful for children than other forms of violence, because of the concealed, unresolved and cumulative nature. Furthermore, its prolonged state and
unpredictability makes it potentially more psychological damaging. In the 2007/2008 post-election violence, children went through several traumatic experiences such as ethnic discrimination, gang rapes, horrendous female genital mutilation, girls labia and vaginas were cut using sharp objects and bottles were stuffed into them. Boys had their penises cut off and were brutally circumcised. There was massive displacement in the Kibera slums and therefore children had to stay in the cold or in makeshift homes, this further exposed them to sexual abuse, unhygienic living conditions, lack of proper medical care and food insecurity.

Policy makers and development agencies will find interest in this research as providing an understanding into violent conflicts, which would further provoke them into devising ways of handling them and enhancing harmony as a precondition to human and economic development. Kenya is in the process of recovery after the recent atrocious violence that ensued in the country. Leaders and citizens alike could also gain some understanding of ethnic conflict from this research.

Exposure to violence both directly and indirectly affects children’s views of the world and themselves, their expectations for future happiness, and their mortal development. Moreover, exposure to violence often interferes with developmental tasks children need to accomplish in order to become competent members of society. Two key developmental tasks frequently associated with exposure to violence are children’s adaptation to school and academic achievement. Children exposed to community violence often demonstrate lower school achievement and poorer adaptation to the academic environment. Violence exposure can also lead to disturbances in cognitive functioning. Cognitive problems associated with exposure to

\[16\] Ibid
violence and abuse comprise one of the most direct threats to the developmental task of school adaptation and academic achievement. Deficits in attention regulation, language skills, and memory undermine the child’s ability to accomplish the central requirements of academic achievement and school adaptation, namely to encode, organize, recall, and express understanding of new information. Through a careful analysis of the effect of violent conflicts on pre-school children, the research findings will contribute to the much needed information and better understanding of ethnic conflicts that have posed a challenge to democratization not only in Kenya, but also in Africa at large. This research would go a long way in broadening the researcher’s intellectual horizons as far as understanding violent conflicts is concerned and in identifying the best practice in having long-lasting and transcending solutions.

1.6 Literature review

The Literature review of this study revolve around the following issues: ethnicity, ethnic conflicts, civil wars, magnitude and manifestations of conflicts, conflict resolution strategies and background to the 2007-2008 clashes as well as traumas on children.

Theoretically, democratization process in Africa has ushered in claims of autochthony in Africa. On that note, (Berman et al, 2004:11-12) cogently point out two dominant forms of autochthonous claims in the democratization process: the first revolves around discourses on distinction between the “natives/indigenous” and the “strangers/migrants/foreigners”. This leads to the assertion of communities to be represented by elite from their region “sons of the soil”. The second revolves around claims of autochthony as opposed to residence as the core principle of determining local/regional leadership. This highlights the struggle for supremacy between
ethnic communities that has dominated the political arena in the process of democratization in Africa. Moreover, on the basis of the same claims, those who consider themselves as “original” claim to have special rights to the region over the “strangers”.

According to primordialists, ethnic conflicts occur as a result of persistent inborn factors which are often used as basis for ethnic groupings and pursuance of a common goal. These ties involve common culture, and common ancestry or kinship ties, common language and religion, among others. They are social “givens” that one cannot live without and they bind one to their fellow kinsman, neighbour, and believer by virtue of their very nature. According to this theory, individuals engage in conflicts due to the bond that keeps them together and they therefore risk their lives for the common good of the entire group. Ethnic conflicts here are then carried out on the basis of identification as “us” and “them”. Emotions play a major driving force whereby members have affection for their own groups and hatred for other groups.

According to instrumentalists, ethnic conflicts are an outcome of mobilization of ethnic identity by individuals or even groups of individuals for political and economic ends. Among the supporters for this theory are Berman, who sees political elites as key actors in mobilizing their fellow ethnic group members who are receptive owing to perceived benefits accrued to the

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loyalty in the politics of “Big Man – Small Boy”. On the same note, Carment \textsuperscript{21} cogently posits that ethnic identity in this view is maintained for collective action as long as it yields competitive advantage; as such, it is fluid and situationally mobilized depending on its strategic utility. The instrumentalist view takes ethnic conflicts as political in nature and puts more emphasis not on cultural but political and territorial appeals. Instrumentalism is also reflected in rational choice theory and studies of class differences in society which provide grounds for ethnic mobilization\textsuperscript{22}.

Ethnicity in this context is viewed as an inclusive concept that defines groupings on the basis of indicators such as color, appearance, language, race, religion, common ancestry, height complexity, body structure, level of education and the like. It is an ascriptive phenomenon largely based on the myth of common ancestry, belief systems, physical settlements, group affiliations and relationships\textsuperscript{23}. After the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, hundreds of children conceived in mass rape campaigns were born to mothers who did not want them. Often forced to carry these children to term, most are said to have abandoned their babies\textsuperscript{24}; those that have kept them face ostracism and severe poverty in post-war Bosnia. In Kosovo, forced pregnancy victims have reportedly been killed by their families or committed suicide, and at least one is known to have killed her child at birth\textsuperscript{25}. Local and international


\textsuperscript{22} Ibid


actors contest these babies’ ethnic identities and citizenship rights; as a result, their rights to education, family, identity and physical security may be severely curtailed. Overall, however, because of lack of empirical research, almost nothing beyond the anecdotal is known about what has happened to these babies or their prospects for survival and empowerment in the “post-war” Balkans, where some are now approaching adolescence.

Anecdotal evidence suggests similar patterns in other conflict zones – Kuwait, Liberia, the Congo, East Timor, and Nicaragua, to give a few recent examples - where mass rape and militarized exploitation of local women by peacekeepers, foreign soldiers and even humanitarian workers has resulted in an influx of “war babies” The recent evidence is that several Iraqi women and girls are pregnant as a result of rape by US forces. In Rwanda, for example, sexual violence during the genocide produced an estimated 2000-5000 such babies. There have been reports of infanticide and severe abuse and neglect; the children are often referred to as “children of hate” or “children of bad memories”.

Violence is thus a common phenomenon in plural societies like Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Ethiopia and South Africa, to mention but a few perspectives. However, there has never been a consensus on the definition, causes, and manifestations, effects of conflicts and conflict management strategies or resolutions. Indeed, the concepts of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts as used in modern studies are so elusive and often defy definition. According to

31 Ibid
Oyugi\textsuperscript{32} African inter-ethnic conflicts are not as a result of the mere fact that the continent and national boundaries are brackets enclosing multi-ethnic groups. To him, the question of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts are issues of ethnic grudges. He asserts that the past inter-ethnic conflict management strategies in Africa have tended to concentrate on symptoms of the effects and not the root causes. He further postulates that there are numerous socio-economic and political grudges between or within the numerous ethnic communities in African states. His work augments the earlier works of other scholars like\textsuperscript{33}.

According to other critical scholars, numerous resolutions or management strategies have been attempted, but none of them seems sustainable in creating an atmosphere for peace, security and inter-ethnic as well as intra-ethnic co-existence in Africa\textsuperscript{34}. As Markakis put it, ethnic conflict in Africa is a many sides violent struggle waged at several levels. It involves nations, regions, ethnic groups, clans, lineages, and is fought between and within states, religious and ethnic groups. Amutabi(1995) cautions us from viewing ethnicity as a scourge only in Africa. To him, this is basically a Eurocentric interpretation of the African lifestyle. He adds that, "We need to move away from the state of despair and hopelessness towards more practical solutions by enhancing the existing positive ethnic structures". According to Gertzel\textsuperscript{35}, it is the primary task of the leadership to integrate the many groups in society, divided though they may be on class, ethnic, regional, economic, political and religious lines into a new national entity. He, like

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\textsuperscript{34} Amutabi N. Maurice (1995) "Challenging the Orthodoxies: The Role of Ethnicity and Regional Nationalism in Leadership and Democracy in Africa", UNESCO Seminar, 28 - 31 May.
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Amutabi, holds the point of view that it would be too much if politicians were to be relied upon in eradicating ethnic tensions as these underlie their survival\textsuperscript{36}.

As Okullu\textsuperscript{37} further observed: "Tribalism is a wasteful practice when the employment of all human resources for development is considered". It is inconceivable that there could be such a big concentration of talent training and experience in just one area of the nation. According to the late Tom Mboya\textsuperscript{38} ethnic conglomeration has two functions; one is positive while the other is negative. He argues that the promotion and safeguarding of traditional cultural and social practices of a particular ethnic group is vitreous and extremely necessary in Africa's search for an authentic culture of its own. He believed in unity within the diversity of the numerous ethnic groups in Africa.

According to Bienien\textsuperscript{39}, communal solidarities in Kenya have yet to be destroyed, and it is clear that economic development and social change seems to have given greater salience to ethnic consideration. This partly explains why the issue of ethnicity and land ownership has remained a very sensitive and explosive aspect of Kenya's historical and contemporary political economy\textsuperscript{40}. This study situates its discussion within the second category of conflicts in Africa as identified by Zartzan\textsuperscript{41}. This category refers to the immediate post-colonial efforts of the new regime in Kenya to consolidate its powers, if not complete national integration. These were efforts to bring

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid
\textsuperscript{38} Mboya, T.J., (1963), Freedom and After, London : Deutsch.
to heel regional, ethnic, ideological or personal forces which resisted state authority. For the losers, at least their leaders, exile was often the only survival option. This theoretical framework is augmented by Chazan\textsuperscript{42} who argues that after independence, "the focus of conflict has gradually shifted from disputes over political boundaries to disagreements over political values. The analysis focuses on ethnic/factional conflicts, which though based upon and organized by elites, extend outward into society as supporters are recruited and rewarded for the basic benefit of their patrons. Such conflicts are said to occur in those pluralist and administrative hegemonic regimes where either intermediate social organizations have flourished and/or where elaborate patronage networks have thrived\textsuperscript{43}. In this regard, we address the issue of access to power and scarce national resources in a plural society. The ethnic inequalities within Kenya in terms of extraction and distribution of the scarce resources has been a source of negative competition between those who control power and those who perceive themselves to have been marginalized. The ethnic mobilization and sensitization of the supporters to rally behind the "have" and the "have not" elites is a threat to peace and stability since at no point there will be equal distribution of resources in a growing economy.

\textbf{1.6.1 Background to the 2007-2008 clashes}

The country of Kenya was ruled by the iron hands of two men in succession from 1963 to 2002: Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) and Daniel Moi (1978-2002). In 2002, there was a change: the ruling political party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), that had ruled the country since independence, collapsed. It collapsed beneath a new political party comprised of an alliance that had formed between all of the major Kenyan tribes. This political stakeholder was

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid
named the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). The election victory was a landslide\textsuperscript{44}. Mwai Kibaki of the NARC won 62\% of the vote on a platform of fighting corruption, forming a coalition government that shared power amongst the various tribes, and changing the constitution within 100 days of being elected to limit the executive power that had ballooned over the previous four decades. People across Kenya from all tribes felt hope that the country’s government was finally on the verge of a system of governance that would have accountability through shared power\textsuperscript{45}.

Yet, within weeks of the election, the memorandum of understanding (MOU) that forged the tribal factions into the NARC alliance and that got Kibaki elected had effectively collapsed\textsuperscript{46}. The agreement in the MOU to share power within the cabinet did not occur, as four key positions that were to be created, including that of a Prime Minister position, did not materialize forward. Kibaki, from the Kikuyu tribe, broke his election promise and filled many appointed positions with fellow tribesmen, thus following in the footsteps of his presidential predecessors by selecting people for appointed positions primarily through tribal bias (Mutua, 2008) \textsuperscript{47}. This in turn led to discrimination of many people of other tribes who were more qualified.

Whether the decision to keep the massive executive power that Kibaki had campaigned to reform was premeditated, or whether he succumbed to certain pressures by his fellow tribesmen to hoard power within the tribe once in office may never be known. The result was the same: the disintegration of the NARC party and the broken promises of a shared government and new

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid
constitution. This left many citizens tasting what could have been and frustrated over what should have resulted from the new government coming to power in 2002. This frustration fueled the violence that took place after the election in 2007\textsuperscript{48}.

The carnage was horrific: 1,500 dead, 3,000 innocent women raped, and 300,000 people left internally displaced. Most of these atrocities happened in the first 14 days after the 2007 Kenyan general election. The severity of this conflict unfolded in a span of 59 days between Election Day, December 27th, 2007 to February 28th, 2008, when a political compromise was reached. The magnitude of the trauma and structural violence that took place in Kenya after the fourth multi-party general election took both Kenyans and the international community, alike, by surprise\textsuperscript{49}. In retrospect, the violence that occurred could not only have been predicted, it could most likely have been prevented.

One of the foundations of this conflict analysis is that what took place during the Kenyan 2007 elections had its roots in a weak national constitution. This constitution has progressively lacked a healthy check and balances system between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. Over the span of three decades, amendments to the constitution were made to systematically erode these balances in favor of strengthening presidential powers. The result of these broad powers effectively made the presidential office equivalent to a dictatorship, which gave the president the ability to use and abuse this power without restraint\textsuperscript{50}.

The violence was heavily experienced in the informal settlements. Kibera is one of the informal settlements that experienced widespread violence. Kibera is a division of Nairobi Area, Kenya,

and is located 5 kilometers from the city centre. It is the largest urban slum in Africa. Kenya Population and Housing Census of 2009 reports Kibera’s population as 170,170. The neighborhood is divided into a number of villages, including Kianda, Soweto East, Gatwekera, Kisumu Ndogo, Lindi, Laini Saba, Siranga, Makina and Mashimonio. The conditions in Kibera are extremely poor and most of its residents lack access to basic services, including electricity and running water\textsuperscript{51}.

Kibera is balkanized largely along tribal lines and specific groups are dominant in specific areas within the slums. The Luo for instance are majority in Kianda, Gatwikira and Kisumu Ndogo, Makina is mainly populated by Nubians while Liani Saba and Soweto are dominated by Kikuyus. The Luhya ethnic group dominates Mashimoni and Lindi areas\textsuperscript{52}. Once the violence broke out, looting, destruction of property and arson became rampant forcing people to move to the “ethnic enclaves” they perceived as safe tribally aligned gangs took over and exercised total control. Toi Market in Makina area which prior to elections had house over 3000 traders was burnt down. The market provided employment to a similar number of people which thousands of suppliers depended on it for livelihood support\textsuperscript{53}.

In another Kibera settlement, Mashimoni, 32 houses and business properties were looted broken into and burnt to sashes. In Soweto village a shopping complex housing a supermarket, butcheries, food restaurants, bars salons and small retail shops were burned down. Places of worship were also destroyed such as Kibera Catholic Church and Presbyterian Church of East

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid
Africa Church\textsuperscript{54}. The violence was characterized by forceful evictions; this is because there were deep seated rent disputes escalating to violence. There was a perception that landlords mainly from the Kikuyu tribe over-charged rents and discriminated tenancy on ethnic lines which brought about expectations among ODM supporters for rent deduction if ODM won. The forceful led to an estimated 5000 people displaced in Kibera. Their houses were taken over by members of other communities who started charging reduced rents\textsuperscript{55}.

1.6.2 Traumas on children

When examining the impact of various war traumas on children, it is important not only to look at the children and the stressors they face, but to also examine the environmental contexts in which they exist. By studying their environment, a better understanding of the impact of war can be gained. Children, their environment and the stressors they face should not be examined separately. Rather they should be regarded as a part of a dynamic process of mutual accommodation, where the child and the environment are both reciprocally active\textsuperscript{56}. It is through this reciprocity that the variety of development patterns can emerge. One model that incorporates this perspective is the ecological model for development.

Within the ecological model of human development, the environment is conceived as a nested order of concentric structures, each enclosed within the next. The innermost structure is the developing child, who is then surrounded by increasing social structures which are referred to as the micro, meso, exo and macro system. These systems can refer, respectively, to a child's family, school, institutions that the child is indirectly affected by such as school boards and the

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid
culture in which the child is embedded\(^{57}\). When examining children of war from a dynamic perspective, using well defined stress factors it may be possible to understand why some children cope better than others, demonstrating high levels of psychosocial resilience while others are left with long term trauma that surface in a variety of cognitive, behavioural and emotional problems\(^{58}\). Although a body of research dealing with the effects of war on children exists, much of the literature is focussed on various aspects of the developmental consequences from exposure to trauma, with little or no ecological integration. Past literature has often looked at the impact of fragmented family lives, personal loss and interactions with friend but the literature rarely extends beyond this to the culture and the environment within which the children are dynamically imbedded\(^{59}\).

A theoretical model proposed by Elbedour examines children of war from an ecological perspective\(^{60}\). This model is based on Belsky's work with maltreated children\(^{61}\). Grounded in the ecological model of development by Bronfenbrenner\(^{62}\) suggests four main forces that interact to determine maltreatment of children in society. These forces include the child, family community and culture in which these forces are embedded. These systems refer respectively to the child's ontogenic development, microsystem, exosystem and macro system. Belsky's\(^{63}\) model was further extended to understand the effects on children who are exposed to war. The dimension that was added to the model is the level of intensity, duration and suddenness of conflict.

\(^{57}\) Ibid  
\(^{58}\) Ibid  
\(^{59}\) Ibid  
\(^{62}\) Ibid  
\(^{63}\) Ibid
When looking at developing children as they interrelate in the family (microsystem), research has shown that the effects of trauma on development can be minimized if the child feels secure. According to Bowlby the quality of relationship that evolves between children and their caregivers serves to provide the foundation upon which mental and emotional states are built. If children feel content and secure with their attachment figures, cognitive and emotional development can progress smoothly, if however, children feel insecure in their environment or with their caregivers the possibility for mental distress and behavioral problems increases.

During war, children's reactions and ability to cope with trauma have been found to be conditioned to a large degree by their parent's reactions and ability to cope. This interactive process often results in the emergence of similar patterns of effect for both children and their parents. The relationship between children and the microsystem in which they exist therefore shapes how they cope with war. The effects of war on children are also influenced by their participation in an exosystem (community). Some factors within communities that are important to a child's development are school teachers, day care providers, peers and anyone that can fulfill the role of a caregiver when an attachment figure is unavailable or incapacitated.

According to Elbedour schools, day cares and other institutional communities offer a place where a care giving environment can be fostered. It has been found that within these environments children can become involved in care giving relationships that can then be used to

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65 Ibid
66 Ibid
68 Ibid
buffer traumatic events. Not only can children engage in relationships with adult care given, but peer relationships can be used as a source of community and a means of mitigating trauma's effects. Children who have lost families through war can use institutions as surrogate families, where the children support one another. Research has also shown that children who lose their parents can become attached to institutions and use this to buffer trauma. It is not the caregivers within the institution to which the children have become attached, but the institution itself. Through this attachment, children have been able to cope more effectively with their environment. For children of war, this active relationship with the community can help initiate the atrocities experienced. Since many children of war are placed into institutions, for example orphanages or refugee camps, it is imperative that the effects of institutionalization be understood.

The final structure that encapsulates the lower order structures is the macrosystem or the culture to which a person belongs. Research has rarely focused on the influence that culture has on children of warring areas. Culture is important because it forms the underlying belief, religious and ideological foundations that underlie a society. Culture governs the way in which the people within a community interact, which in turn affects the developing child. It is important to look at culture in order to know what type of relationships will be formed and how people interact.

The fifth dimension that was added in the model proposed by Elbedour involves the duration, frequency and intensity of war. These factors play a profound role in the effects of trauma on psychological development. For example, there is a difference between chronic and acute danger as experienced in war. Acute danger is a traumatic event that occurs in a regularly safe

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70 Ibid
environment, whereas chronic danger occurs when traumatic events occur serially over extended periods of time. By understanding these factors, it is possible to see how the effects can differ accordingly.

From the review of the literature it is clear that there is a need for increased understanding of the effects of war on children. Although there is a large body of literature that focuses on the consequences of war, the results reveal discrepancies that may be due in part to lack of adequate definitions of the stressors, lack of comparative analyses between groups who have endured various kinds of traumas, as well as lack of control groups. Many studies of children of war consider the experiences of children in a limited way, for example, either done, within a family, or sometimes within a community. Very little research examines the impact of the culture the children live in. There are no studies that examine these children using an applied ecological model. The literature that has used an ecological model has only conceptually applied it to previous studies and has not used it directly to examine a target population. Although important groundwork has been laid by past research, it is important that steps be taken to diminish the discrepancies that exist in literature.

Through the application of an ecological model, these four groups of children will be analyzed as a part of a dynamic system, which includes families or substitute attachment figures, community and culture. Since culture is a pertinent factor that is frequently overlooked, efforts will be made to analyze the effects of war on children with the variable of culture in mind. The fifth dimension of frequency, intensity and duration, as suggested by Elbedour will be examined with each

71 Ibid
specific group. As previous literature states that boys are often exposed to more war-related incidences and are sheltered less from the effects of war (Elbedour, et. al., 1993. Kuterovac, et. al., 1994, Macksoud, 1992), it is believed that within all groups, boys will perform more poorly on the tests of cognitive maturity and will be reported and observed to display more disturbances in social emotional functioning.

Since a review of previous studies show that older children have more exposure to war trauma, thus potentially increasing levels of distress, it would seem plausible to expect older children to perform more poorly on tests and to appear less well adjusted than their younger counterparts. Counter to these arguments however, it is asserted that there will be no effect of age on the children's ability to perform on the cognitive measures since the older children from each group would have had periods of stability preceding exposure to the war, in which their environments would have offered security through family, school and community relationships, in combination with the lifestyle habits. These assumptions are in accord with attachment theory, which proposes that individuals form internal working models of themselves and attachment figures based on previous experiences within this caregiver-child relationship.

This representation in turn is believed to form a cognitive working model of relationships, encoded with aspects of oneself, expected behaviours of others and emotional facets implicit in relationships. Although these models are modified by further development processes and experiences, later models that emerge cannot be conceived independent of the initial model, as it

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is through this initial model that situations and relationships are construed. Based on this theory, no effects due to age are anticipated.\footnote{Bowlby, J. (1979). The making and breaking of affectional bonds. London: Tavistock Publications}

1.7 Theoretical framework

This study is based on Human needs Theory

1.7.1 Human needs Theory

In order to live and attain well-being, humans need certain essentials. These are called human needs or basic human needs. Human needs theorists argue that conflicts and violent conflicts are caused by unmet human needs. Violence occurs when certain individuals or groups do not see any other way to meet their need, or when they need understanding, respect and consideration for their needs. Rosenberg states that violence is a tragic expression of unmet human needs, implying that all actions undertaken by human beings are attempts to satisfy their needs. If we are able to connect with our needs and those of others, we will therefore be able to look at other ways of meeting such needs, avoiding violence and destruction.

There are various individuals who have applied human needs theory. Here, the proposals of Abraham Maslow, John Burton, Marshall Rosenberg and Manfred Max-Neef will briefly be explored. In his Pyramid of Human Needs, Abraham Maslow puts emphasis on the hierarchy of needs, stating that some are more urgent than others. On the base of the pyramid he places food, water, and shelter. On a second level, he places the need for safety and security, followed by belonging or love. The need for self-esteem is found on a fourth level and finally on a fifth and final level, personal fulfillment. Maslow argues that each human being is trying to meet needs on
a certain level at any one time. An individual looking to meet needs for food and water will not be looking to meet needs of belonging, love or self-esteem. Only when the needs on the lower end of the Pyramid are met, will humans look to meet their need for personal fulfillment.

John Burton has been applying human needs theory more actively to current social and political conflicts. In his work on protracted, social conflicts, he looks at how universal human needs often are neglected, leading groups to use violence to claim their rights and satisfying their needs. In what is really a compatibility of human needs, Burton argues that education and culture make parties manipulate the issues and dehumanizing the other parties. In Marshall Rosenberg’s approach, human needs are universal and meeting them is essential to human survival and well-being. Rosenberg groups the needs in sub-groups, and is open to the existence of needs beyond what he has defined. He states that our education and culture often alienate us from connecting with our real needs, and through Nonviolent Communication, he proposes a model for connecting with our own and others’ needs, an approach he applies in all levels of society and which he has used in mediation in several countries.

The Chilean economist Manfred Max-Neef also proposes nine universal human needs, through which he argues that we can achieve human development and peaceful societies. Max-Neef defines his main proposal, Human Scale Development, as "focused and based on the satisfaction


of fundamental human needs, on the generation of growing levels of self-reliance, and on the construction of organic articulations of people with nature and technology, of global processes with local activity, of the personal with the social, of planning with autonomy, and of civil society with the state." Like Burton and Rosenberg, Max-Neef agrees that no need is superior to other, and that they are all complementary and essential to human life.\textsuperscript{77}

The human needs Theory of Schneider and Alderfer, human needs play an important role in the ensuring the well being of humans as enumerated in the Maslow theory.\textsuperscript{78} These needs are categorized into five broad groups namely; physiological such as the classic drives of hunger, thirst and sex, safety needs (material and interpersonal), belongingness, esteem needs and self actualization. \textsuperscript{79} Schneider and Alderfer identify that Maslow arranges these needs in a hierarchical order starting from the basic items of food, water and shelter then safety or security, belonging or love, self esteem and finally personal fulfillment. Burton states that no threat can deter human beings when their needs are at stake and denial by society of these needs would lead to alternative behaviors such as conflict to satisfy them. This means that people’s unyielding drive to meet their unmet needs on the individual, group and societal level is one of the primary causes of protracted or intractable conflict. He perceives human needs as an emergent collection of human development essentials whereby needs are sought simultaneously in an intense and relentless manner. The human essentials include safety or security or the need for structure,


\textsuperscript{78} B. Schneider and C.P. Alderfer, Three Studies of Measures of Need Satisfaction to Organizations’ Vol.8, No. 4, 1973), p. 489.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid
predictability and freedom from fear and anxiety, belongingness or the need to be accepted by others and to have strong personal ties with family, friends and identity groups; self esteem or the need to be recognized by oneself and others as strong, competent and capable; personal fulfillment or the need to reach one’s potential in all areas of life.\textsuperscript{80}

Rosenberg and Max-Neef both mention the importance of distinguishing between needs and strategies or satisfiers. In mediation, strategies and satisfiers are referred to as positions. While needs are universal and non-negotiable, strategies/satisfiers are cultural, contextual, specific and negotiable. They also point out that needs are always compatible, while strategies or satisfiers may not be. This concept is key to the human needs approach, as it implies that all conflicts are resolvable when we focus on human needs. Human perception also plays an essential role in conflict resolution. Culture, education and societal influences shape our minds and our perceptions. Enemy images are created, convincing groups and individuals that certain needs can only be met by certain strategies and that other groups are intrinsic obstacles to their needs being met. While a certain ethnic group’s needs for identity, autonomy, protection and equality may be met through a range of strategies, lack of trust and enemy images of the “other” may convince the group that the only acceptable or possible solution is a separate state. Building trust, deconstructing enemy images and fostering cooperation are therefore key elements in human needs-based conflict resolution.

The application of this theory in this study is based on the fact that it focuses on the source of conflict, looking at how best the parties can have their needs met, and those of others. Finding

strategies to meet underlying needs, we may be able to reduce the use of expensive peacekeeping, peace enforcement and creating of buffer zones. It also emphasizes common humanity. In a world context where differences are accentuated, Human Needs Theory attempts to unify human beings from different regions and cultures, creating a common understanding of who we are and how others need and feel the same way we do. Also, in that HNT points out that human need are non-negotiable.

1.8 Methodology

This study examined the impact of violent conflict on pre-school children after 2007-2008 post election violence. The study was drawn largely from literature reviews and field interviews. It focussed on Kibera slums. Kibera is one of the informal settlements that experienced widespread violence. Kibera is a division of Nairobi Area, Kenya, and is located 5 kilometers from the city centre. It is the largest urban slum in Africa. The 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census reports Kibera’s population as 170,170. The neighborhood is divided into a number of villages, including Kianda, Soweto East, Gatwekera, Kisumu Ndogo, Lindi, Laini Saba, Siranga, Makina and Mashimoni. The conditions in Kibera are extremely poor and most of its residents lack access to basic services, including electricity and running water. Reviews of relevant literature on violent conflict on pre-school children are sourced from books, journals, articles, reports and government policy documents. The review of literature examines nature of violent conflict, and their impacts on children generally and those that focused particularly on Kenya.

Primary data was obtained from parents, government and non-government officials in Kibera. These site visits were carried out as follows: meetings with key informant NGO officials, BBC Slums Life Series (2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2297279.stm(Referred 12th July 2013)
government representatives, parents and analysis and validation of findings with research assistant. Using purposive sampling procedure, all interviewees were asked if they knew anyone with similar knowledge on violent conflict. Interviewees were then subsequently contacted. The interviews were conducted using open ended questions with expert key informants from the government and NGOs in the study area. The interviewees involved communities in Kibera who bore the brunt of violence and eviction. The assumption was that the impact of violence was strongest and most direct among both these populations.

By structuring the interviews chronologically, narratives were obtained which gave information on the perceptions and experiences of informants about issues related to violence, its causes and mitigation, peace interventions and their impact on pre-school children and suggestions on ways forward. Information was also sought concerning their livelihood activities, their views on changing political conditions, how they were affected and how they coped with and adapted to violent conflicts.

1.8.1 Research Design

A research design is a master plan specifying the methods and procedures for collecting and analysing the needed information. The research design used was a descriptive research. This is because the primary purpose of a descriptive research is determining frequency of occurrence of a phenomenon.

The research adopted qualitative approach where the researcher took an active role as an observer and explore different settings, emotional reactions and attitudes of the informants. The design permits the researchers to adopt a holistic approach in the study of the chosen social institutions in an attempt to use indigenous structures to resolve conflicts. Second, it is easy to
apply research tools like interviews which could be supplemented by focus group discussions, opinion censors and observations where applicable. Field research entails study of communities/societies by allowing the researcher to take an active role in the activities by assuming the role of participants’ observer.82

1.8.2 Study Site
This study was conducted in Nairobi County and mainly paid close attention to the community in Kibera area. Kibera is one of the informal settlements that experienced wide spread violence. Kibera is a division of Nairobi Area, Kenya, and is located 5 kilometers from the city centre. It is the largest urban slum in Africa. Kenya Population and Housing Census of 2009 reports Kibera’s population as 170,170. The neighborhood is divided into a number of villages, including Kianda, Soweto East, Gatwekera, Kisumu Ndogo, Lindi, Laini Saba, Siranga, Makina and Mashimonio. The conditions in Kibera are extremely poor and most of its residents lack access to basic services, including electricity and running water83.

Kibera is balkanized largely along tribal lines and specific groups are dominant in specific areas within the slums. The Luo for instance are majority in Kianda, Gatwikira and Kisumu Ndogo, Makina is mainly populated by Nubians while Liani Saba and Soweto are dominated by Kikukyus. The Luhya ethnic group dominates Mashimoni and Lindi areas84.


81 Ibid
84 Ibid
1.8.3 Sampling Design and Sample Size

1.8.3.1 Sampling Frame

The relevant population consisted of local communities, Government officials, parents and children. A sample size of 384 residents (parents) was arrived at by calculating the target population of 170,170. With a 95% confidence level and an error of 0.05 using the following formula from Mugenda, (2008):

From Normal distribution the population proportion can be estimated to be

\[ n = \frac{Z^2 PQ}{\alpha^2} \]

Where:

- \( n \) = the desired sample size; if the target population is greater than 10,000
- \( Z \) is the \( Z – \) value = 1.96
- \( P \) = Population proportion 0.50
- \( Q \) = 1-P
- \( \alpha \) = level of significance = 5%

\[ n = \frac{1.96 \times 1.96 \times 0.5 \times 0.5}{0.05 \times 0.05} \]

\[ n = 384 \]

This implies that about 40 residents were sampled in each of the 9 villages in Kibera (Kianda, Soweto East, Gatwekera, Kisumu Ndogo, Lindi, Laini Saba, Siranga, Makina and Mashimon)

1.8.3.2 Sampling Technique

Purposive Sampling was used. In this method, the researcher purposely targeted a group of people believed to be reliable for the study. This study thus involved pre-school children (aged between 0 to 3 years) who were directly and indirectly exposed to violence, parents of the children directly or indirectly affected community leaders and officials from the government and non-governmental organizations. The type of purposive sampling that this research employed is
the Homogeneous Sampling. This type of sampling picks a small sample to describe particular groups in depth.

Purposive sampling was used in selecting 10 employees of non-governmental organizations operating in Kibera on the basis that the researcher knows some of these organizations. With respect to government officials from the ministries of education, children’s department and office of the President, purposive sampling was used to achieve desired representation sample size. A sample size of 10 was drawn from this category. In addition, 10 parents from each village were randomly sampled. In total, the sample size was 110 respondents.

1.8.4 Methods and tools of data collection

Instrumentation included use of interviews including key informant interviews, in-depth interviews with the intention of eliciting information and opinions. To compliment this, the researcher also played a keen role of observation to understand people’s behaviour and institutional values, rituals, beliefs, symbols and emotions. Analysis of recorded information/documents was done in order to obtain information that informants give thought to while compiling, and also information in their own words.

1.8.5 Data analysis

The collected data was edited to detect errors and omissions and corrected where possible. Editing involved a careful scrutiny of the competed interview schedules. Editing was done to assure that the data is accurate, consistent with other facts gathered, uniformly entered, as completed as possible and have been well arranged to facilitate coding and tabulation. Qualitative data was analyzed thematically. In addition, discourse analysis was used to analyze
written, spoken or sign language. The objects of discourse analysis are variously defined in terms of coherent sequences of sentences, speeches, intonations and repetitions. Trend analysis was applied where the researcher analyzed patterns of behaviour and sequence of events narrated and identify common or repeated occurrence.

1.9 Chapter Outline

Chapter one of this study looked at the introduction as well as the background to violent inter-group conflict which is depicted as difficult and intractable problem in many regions of the world. Chapter two review literature on the impacts of violent conflict on children; Chapter three examine perspectives on violence in Kenya; Chapter four looks at critical analysis of impact of conflict on children in Kenya while chapter five entail conclusion and recommendations of the study.
CHAPTER TWO
IMPACTS OF VIOLENT CONFLICT ON CHILDREN

2.1 Introduction

Children are often deliberately targeted in internecine warfare. To destroy or harm what is of highest value to the enemy, indeed the very symbol of a community’s future is one of the most effective forms of terrorism. Civilian children are affected in various ways.

2.2 Physical effects

Most visible effects of armed conflict on children are physically inflicted ones. Civilian children are killed outright as a result of torture, and firearms. Or they sustain serious injuries and or lifelong disabilities - losing limbs, eyesight and hearing. Those concerned with child protection wish to mitigate the impact of armed conflict on the physical security of children.

2.2.1 HIV-AIDS

One effect has to do with the link between sexual violence in war-affected areas and the transmission of HIV to local women through prostitution, exploitation, rape or abduction for sexual slavery. We know that HIV rates are high in war-affected regions partly due to these factors, and that in some cases rape is used with the explicit intent of spreading the virus, although in other respects the specific causal relations between these phenomena are not clearly understood. It is known, however, that vertical transmission of HIV from mother to infant is one of the most certain means of contracting the virus. If raped or exploited women are likely to

have been exposed to HIV, it is also likely that children brought to term as a result of this violence have been exposed. As Hess argues, research is needed to clarify whether HIV-positive war babies are at greater health risk due to their biological origins than other war-affected infants who also have HIV.\(^88\)

### 2.2.2 Neo-Natal Health Risks

Generally, little is known about the particular health risks faced by infants conceived as a result of sexual violence, and the extent to which these are distinct from other infants conceived consensually but born under similar circumstances. Based on available evidence however, a number of possible effects can be hypothesized, and these need to be evaluated with careful research.

There is some evidence that certain health risks are associated with children carried to term whose mother’s reproductive health is compromised or whose mothers experience psychological and physical trauma during pregnancy.\(^89\) Where the pregnancy itself is construed as a trauma due to its origin, it can be hypothesized that this could affect the physical development of the fetus. A number of children in Bosnia who were born to rape victims are handicapped, although it is uncertain whether factors relating to the rape itself were primarily responsible.\(^90\) There is reason to hypothesize that children brought to term as a result of such physical and psychological trauma, and in an environment where the mother continues to be under severe stress, may need particular medical care as neonates.

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90 Ibid
For various reasons, women and girls who have been raped or are living in exploitative circumstances frequently try to abort such pregnancies; where access to safe abortion is illegal or inaccessible; these efforts take place through the use of various informal means\textsuperscript{91}. Such means are not always successful, and such pregnancies sometimes nonetheless result in live births. Research is needed on the health effects of botched abortions on children nonetheless brought to term\textsuperscript{92}. Additionally, women and girls impregnated by rape often give birth without assistance, either because they are in captivity or wish to hide the pregnancy. Such babies are at risk during the childbirth process, particularly if their mothers have experienced nutritional deprivation or lack of maternal care during pregnancy. Moreover, the possibility of the mother’s death or incapacity as a result of childbirth has important physical consequences for children delivered live in isolation without a support network nearby.

\textbf{2.2.3 Infanticide}

Stories of infanticide pervade literary and social discourse on children born of war rape (Bonnet, 1995). In a novel about forced pregnancy based on interviews with numerous rape survivors from the former Yugoslavia, Slavenka Drakulic describes two such incidents\textsuperscript{93}. A recent Italian film about World War II portrays a group of pregnant rape survivors making a secret pact to kill all their children. Many real-life cases are rumored or reported by human rights and health workers who have known the victims. In Bangladesh, a social worker related stories of infants being put “in dustbins” by public officials after the genocide\textsuperscript{94}. After the genocidal rapes in


\textsuperscript{92} Ibid

\textsuperscript{93} Drakulic, Slavenka. 1993. “Women Hide Behind a Wall of Silence.” \textit{The Nation}, Mar. 1

Rwanda, Human Rights Watch reported “Health professionals assume that a number of women gave birth in secret and later committed infanticide. They also believe that a number of women who gave birth in the hospital allowed their babies to die after returning home”\textsuperscript{95}. In 1993, the director of the Documentation Center for Genocide and War Crimes in Zagreb stated that women who could not get abortions abandoned their infants “or they kill the babies… although we’ve never been able to prove it”\textsuperscript{96}.

While many of these rumors are indeed unverifiable, and unsubstantiated by carefully kept statistics, there is direct evidence of a few such cases. In Kosovo, for example, a young woman raped by JNA forces during the 1999 conflict gave birth in 2000, snapped her newborn’s neck in front of WHO nurses, and then handed them the corpse\textsuperscript{97}. In Bosnia, out of a sample of 15 rape-related pregnancies collected by Medica Zenica, 13 of which were carried to term and 3 of whose mothers chose to raise the child with psycho-social support from Medica, one child was eventually killed\textsuperscript{98}. A women’s advocate from Croatia recalls one survivor who threw her newborn child into the Sava River\textsuperscript{99}. Distraught mothers do not pose the only such risk to the children.

Some survivors have testified that children born to detained women in the former Yugoslavia were killed by their captors after birth. While worldwide, infant girls are at the greatest risk of infanticide overall due to son preference, in the case of children conceived “of the enemy” there

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid
\textsuperscript{98} Pojsic, Mirha. 1995. “Research: Dominant Gynecological and Psychological Consequences of Rape.” Unpublished Report available from Medica Women’s Therapy Center, Zenica, BiH
is anecdotal evidence to suggest that male infants may be at greater risk, being less digestible by a society that may see them as potential fifth column combatants, or by mothers whose attitudes toward males in general may be adversely affected by the experience of sexual violence\textsuperscript{100}. Infanticide not only seems to be directed at some of these children, but also seems to be constructed by some actors as a legitimate response to bearing a child of rape. A women’s advocate working with Kosovar rape survivors, referring to the case above, was quoted as saying, “The attitude that she is a cold-blooded murderer is wrong. Who knows what this poor girl has been through?”\textsuperscript{101} Beverly Allen\textsuperscript{102}, whose path breaking 1996 book \textit{Rape Warfare} defined forced pregnancy as genocide and as a form of biological warfare, suggested that infanticide should be considered a psychologically healthy reaction for a mother impregnated by rape\textsuperscript{103}. Evidence that this response is normalized in some contexts as a means of dealing with an influx of “war babies” strongly suggests that infanticide is a serious physical risk to the security of infants born of rape and exploitation.

\subsection*{2.2.4 Abuse/Neglect}
Children of war rape who are allowed to live may be abused or neglected\textsuperscript{104}. Indeed, family abuse and neglect of children in general is likely to increase under conditions of armed conflict and societal stress, and, like domestic violence against women, is one of the most understudied and commented-on dimensions of children’s suffering during war. But “unwanted” children conceived in rape may be at greater risk of such abuse, either by their mothers, who may be

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid
physically and psychologically unable to care adequately for the child, or, if the mother accepts
the baby, by the extended family. A number of reports document the correlation between
psychological sequel of rape and the risk of abuse or neglect of children born as a result\textsuperscript{105}.

In cases of wartime rape, neglect of infants carried to term is understood as a key symptom of
sexual trauma\textsuperscript{106}. Abuse is often reported by women who have raised their child born of rape,
either willingly or because they had no acceptable alternatives.

Describing a reluctant Rwandan mother, one journalist reported:

“Sometimes she awakes resentful. It is during those days that she finds her temper short and
she hits her child. A few times she has tried to give him away. Out of anger she tells him lies:
‘You are not even mine. I picked you from the trash.’ Sometimes she cries for hours, unable to
function. ‘I really beat him for such petty things, and I feel I can’t love anyone,’ she
whispered…”\textsuperscript{107}

Children whose mothers do summon the courage to care for them often face rejection and abuse
from extended family members instead\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{105} Lathrop, Anthony. 1998. “Pregnancy Resulting from Rape.” \textit{Journal of Obstetric, Gynecologic

\textsuperscript{106} Foeken, Ingrid. 1999. “Confusing Realities and Lessons Learned in Wartime.” In \textit{Assault on

March 29.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid
2.3 Economic Impacts

A second concern of international movement to protect war-affected children is to assess and alleviate deprivation that results from war, so that children can access the resources they need for short-term survival and long-term development.

2.3.1 Abandonment

Children born of rape and exploitation appear likely to be abandoned, although this likelihood seems to vary by context. In Bosnia, for example it is guessed that the vast majority of babies carried to term by rape victims were abandoned at birth by their mothers\textsuperscript{109}. Although Rwandan war babies are notable for the number being raised by their mothers, some have claimed that this is due to lack of alternatives: according to one news article one survivor said “she would gladly give up her 19-month-old boy to anyone who was willing to raise him. No one has offered.” In East Timor, by contrast, some aid workers report a “surprising” level of acceptance of the babies among East Timorese rape survivors. Such reports conflict, however, with evidence that many Timorese war babies are in institutions\textsuperscript{110}.

It should be noted that even within very conservative societies, women do not always wish to abandon their children conceived in rape: portrayals that this is a uniform response may result in part from a social expectation that this reaction is normal. To the contrary, there is evidence of governments forcing abortions or adoption procedures on women who preferred to keep their

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid
babies\textsuperscript{111}, and some women have testified that the choice to raise their child was a means of overcoming the horror of rape. However, there is certainly anecdotal evidence to suggest that abandonment of war babies is common, due to a combination of reasons, and making a choice to raise a baby is no guarantee that a woman will be able to follow through. It is unknown how many such children are abandoned after a period in their mothers’ or birth families’ care, or what then happens to them\textsuperscript{112}.

In general, the extent to which abandonment affects young children’s economic wellbeing will depend enormously on what kind of social mechanisms are in place to provide alternative care. It is typically assumed that the best outcome for a neonate is to be placed as quickly as possible with an adoptive family, but the availability of such families and a bureaucracy to connect babies to adoptive parents depends on the context and whether social services are in place. In war zones children are sometimes institutionalized for a period until an adoptive family can be found. Each of these two scenarios is considered below before a discussion of the economic impacts that may obtain if the child remains with her mother.

2.3.2 Adoption

There is conflicting evidence regarding the likelihood of war babies being adopted. These prospects may be indirectly affected if they are physically or mentally handicapped at birth. In some contexts, being “born of rape” is described as a direct liability on the willingness of local couples to adopt; those families that have done so have often had to deal with the ostracism engendered by raising a child “of the enemy” (Sullivan, 1996). On the other hand, this appears to

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid
be an advantage rather than an obstacle on the international adoption market. In the case of Bosnia, waiting lists existed in Western countries of couples specifically asking to adopt “rape babies,” and after the 1971 war in Bangladesh; many children born of the rapes were exported to the West¹¹³.

In many cases a war baby’s opportunities for placement will depend on political rather than ‘market’ factors. Some post-war governments actively seek to remove the children from the national population, while others will not allow such children to be adopted abroad. The new government of Bangladesh constructed a “marry-off” campaign for women raped during the war that depended on their relinquishment of their babies conceived in rape, to be sent to other countries¹¹⁴. By contrast, governments in the Balkans opposed the export of such children for symbolic reasons. By some accounts, the government was worried about being accused of “selling the children,” as had happened in Romania¹¹⁵. Policymakers were also under pressure from religious groups who, depending on their understanding of the child’s identity, sought limitations on which couples could adopt, either domestically or abroad.

The transnational Islamic community, for example, made the case that child born to Bosnian Muslim rape victims must be raised by Muslims. In other cases, governments are reluctant to surrender “their” citizens to foreign countries due to concerns about post-war demographics (Weitsman, 2003). “We have hundreds of thousands of orphans,” said a Rwandan Minister, “Adopting them to the outside means you are looting an entire population”¹¹⁶.

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policies of host countries also affect a war baby’s economic status and prospects for adoption if abandoned by its mother at birth. It is notable, for example, that while the UK actively sought to streamline its international adoption procedures to import “rape babies” from the Balkans as adoptees, and it maintained restrictive asylum laws that prevented pregnant rape victims themselves from immigrating). Similarly, the desire for Bengali war babies demonstrated by countries such as Canada did not extend to providing asylum for their mothers\textsuperscript{117}. The life histories of children born to pregnant women seeking refuge in neighboring countries (and therefore their economic prospects as well as eventual national identities) will be impacted by the extent to which their mothers are successful at seeking asylum, the psycho-social and economic assistance available to the mothers in the host newborns.

\subsection*{2.3.3 Institutionalization}

If an abandoned child is left in the care of authorities in a war zone, rather than being killed or left to die at birth, and if immediate adoption is not a possibility, is likely to end up institutionalized in the short or long-term. In East Timor, for example, “the orphanages are filled with these children of the enemy”\textsuperscript{118}. Ambiguity regarding a child’s biological origins can impede placement and perpetuate the experience of institutionalization. One girl in Bosnia has been in a “legal limbo” for twelve years because her mother abandoned her without instructions as to adoption, and the municipality in eastern Bosnia from which the mother originated now lies within the Republika Srpska, where authorities will not admit responsibility for the child’s origins or her well-being, required to initiate adoption proceedings (Toomey, 2003).


\textsuperscript{118} Grieg, Kai. The War Children of the World. (Bergen, Norway: War and Children Identity Project 2001). Available online at \url{http://www.warandchildren.org}
It is unclear how the experience of conflict affects the ability of orphanages to care for children. On the one hand, the resources of an entire society are typically stressed during conflict situations, and more goes to the military than to the social sector. On the other hand, orphanages are often a target of humanitarian assistance during armed conflict. Despite reports of atrocious conditions in some state orphanages, it should not be assumed that being raised in an orphanage is necessarily a worse alternative than placement with foster families or adoption for some children: this will depend enormously on the institution, on the families in question, and on the child. Longitudinal data following up on the economic, nutritional and psycho-social health of formerly institutionalized children who were placed with families could shed light on the effects of institutionalization on such children as a whole, and children born of war rape in particular.

However, even in the best cases, institutions are temporary families for individuals only, and that upon adulthood state responsibility generally ends. Therefore, if a child is never integrated into a “family” as constructed by the local society, will enter society as an adults without roots, a social network, or (depending on the educational opportunities offered) without viable economic skills. These may not only ensure short-term economic and social vulnerability but may adversely affect the adult war baby’s ability to marry or establish a family network during adulthood. Human Rights Watch has claimed that institutionalized children as a whole “suffer a lifelong stigma that robs them of fundamental economic, social, civil and political rights guaranteed by international treaties”\textsuperscript{119}.

2.2.5 Poverty

Children of rape or exploitation who are raised by their mothers are likely to be extremely poor. This is related to the status of women in war-affected societies in general, exacerbated by the stigma of having been raped, which may in turn be exacerbated by the “scandalous” choice to raise the child of rape.

It is well known that surviving wartime rape may result in social stigma against the rape victim him or herself. This stigma, if it exists, will typically be exacerbated if the mother chooses to raise her child for a number of reasons. First, the child constitutes evidence of the assault, which could otherwise be denied or repressed. To the extent that silence about one’s victimization is a protection mechanism, this option may be unavailable to women who bear their children conceived in rape. Second, to the surrounding community the child may represent an insult and a continual reminder of collective violence: “the perception of public ownership of women’s sexuality… makes it possible to translate an attack against one woman into an attack against an entire community; the impact is multiplied when the woman becomes pregnant.” Third, the enmity toward the child may be projected upon the mother, who in addition to being seen as dirtied or unmarriageable may also be viewed as complicit or traitorous for not rejecting the child herself.

A single woman raising a child needs above all a source of income. But if she lacks a reliable family network for assisting her, the child’s presence itself may prevent her from working or receiving job training unless alternative childcare arrangements are made available. In Sierra Leone, for example, a recent survey of demobilized girl mothers, impregnated by rebel captors in

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the bush, found that they considered job training the most important form of support, but that lack of childcare assistance for their babies, either by the families or by rehabilitation programs, made it difficult to attend trainings.\textsuperscript{122} Such girl mothers often become prostitutes instead, with related psycho-social, economic and physical risks to the children in their care as well as the risk of contracting HIV and transmitting it through breast milk. In interviews conducted in 2003, human right workers suggested to this author that due to a combination of caregiver ambivalence and extreme economic circumstances, children born of rape victims or prostitutes in conflict areas are more likely to be trafficked, recruited or to become street children. The extent to which this is true needs to be corroborated by careful study.

**Psycho-Social Impacts**

Little is understood about the psycho-social impact on children born of wartime rape, and most likely children in different circumstances will experience these effects differently. Based on available evidence, however, it seems clear that children’s development, sense of identity and psychological health may be affected in a variety of ways over the course of their young lives as a result of the social dynamics described above.

**2.4.1 Attachment Difficulties**

In infancy, the main psycho-social impact stems from the possibility of neglect and lack of long-term affective relationships, a difficulty not limited to children born of rape but to which they may be particularly likely to suffer. If a child is kept by his mother, he and she may experience

difficulties bonding\textsuperscript{123}; some rape survivors who have had no choice but to raise their child have reported extreme ambivalence toward their children (e.g. Wax, 2004).

Other rape survivors have expressed deep love for their children, constructing their baby not as a burden but as a gift from God after all else was taken from them. More research is needed on the factors that lead to positive relationships between a rape survivor and her child. Many survivors choose not to raise their children at all. If a child is abandoned, s/he may lack a close relationship with a caregiver as a result. The record of children’s psycho-social development when institutionalized in early childhood is bleak. Even institutionalization under the best conditions is known to affect children’s psycho-social development and physical health, depending on resources, ratio of care-givers to children, and the institutional norms\textsuperscript{124}. Combined with potential nutritional deficits in the first year, such children’s psychological development may be compromised if they lack an opportunity to develop trusting emotional attachments with an older child or an adult. Even children who are adopted into stable families after an initial period of institutionalization often suffer ill-effects as a result of neglect during the early years.

**Stigma and Discrimination**

The Graca Machel Review (2000:24) states that “with supportive caregivers and secure communities, most children will achieve a sense of healing,” but in social environments where a child is stigmatized or unwanted, it may be precisely these relationships and this security that such a child lacks. As a child grows older and develops a sense of self and a need for social attachments, the absence of these relationships and security may become more pronounced.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid
acceptance and belonging, becomes sensitive to stigmatization or emotional abuse from close relatives, peers and members of the broader community.  

In the early childhood years, war babies may be scorned, teased or stigmatized on the basis of their social origins, particularly if they are living with their mothers in close-knit communities or if their physical features identify them with their father’s lineage. One small child growing up in Gorazde with an adopted family was given the derogatory Serb name “Pero” by his neighbors, and reported (at age 3) “hating” to be called the name, though he did not understand the source of their enmity (Sullivan, 1996). Amerasian war babies growing up in Vietnam after the war were labeled “dust of life” by their neighbours or classmates. “Many children tried to hide their true identity and escape discrimination by quitting school.” Although many people assume that young children “don’t understand” enough to be harmed by name-calling, this kind of rejection can have dramatic effects. Older Amerasian war babies have reportedly mutilated themselves in attempts to look more “white” or more “Asian”. According to a social worker in Sarajevo, an older child in Bosnia learned of his origins from classmates at school after a popular German film around the issue of war babies was released, and became suicidal as a result of their teasing and bullying.

Identity Issues

Given these various impacts described in the preceding sections, it is not surprising that in terms of early psycho-social development, the conventional wisdom is that the best possible outcome for such children is to be adopted at birth into a social environment where their biological origins

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126 Ibid
are unknown\footnote{Aaldrich, G.H. and Th. A. van Baarda. 1994. \textit{Conference on the Rights of Children in Armed Conflict: Final Report of a Conference Held in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.} The Hague: International Dialogue Foundation}. Yet as children enter adolescence and young adulthood they begin to reinvent themselves, create a meaningful mosaic of their identities, and ask questions about their roots and origins. Children who have been adopted begin to demand information on their biological parents; children with one absent parent may begin to demonstrate an interest in making contact. For children born as result of war, there may be a particular need (as well as a difficult) in establishing contact with their parent in order to ascertain “who they are.” Numerous such cases of World War II-era European war babies in search of their North American fathers are documented in the recently published \textit{Voices of the Left Behind} (Project Roots, 2004). These issues can arise even for war babies adopted under the most auspicious circumstances.

For older war babies, the inability to trace one’s “roots” can become a source of psychosocial strain. States often place barriers on older war babies’ abilities to trace their parents. Canada’s Privacy Act, for example, protects World War II veterans who impregnated Dutch and British women after the war from unwanted contact by the women or their adult children\footnote{Jarratt, Melynda. 2004. “By Virtue of His Service.” \textit{Voices of the Left Behind}, edited by Olga Rains, Lloyd Rains and Melynda Jarratt, pp. 169-182. New Brunswick, CA: Project Roots.}. The desire to keep information secret is also embraced by a number of humanitarian actors, sometimes out of a desire to protect women’s interests, but often couched in terms of the child’s best interests as well: “It must be remembered that the women are protecting the babies from a stigma that would mark them for life”\footnote{Bonnet, Catherine. 1995. “Le Viol Comme Arme de Guerre au Rwanda: du Silence a la Reconnaissance.” Paris: Foundation de France. Available from the Defense for Children International Archive, Geneva.}. Indeed, the systematic repression of information about war babies in the former Yugoslavia has been justified by ministers, social workers and orphanages as necessary to...
protect both the mothers and the children from stigma\textsuperscript{130}. There is indeed a tension between a child’s right to know his or her identity and a rape survivor’s right to anonymity.

The sense of silence around the issue not only impedes access to desired information, but also can reinforce the feeling that war babies’ very existence is a taboo topic. For war babies unaware of their origins, whether this matters is unclear. But for those who know their origins and are attempting to create a functional social identity, lack of official discourse and information can be an impediment. Many Amerasian war children considered it a moral victory when the U.S. government recognized and took responsibility for them, awarding them immigration rights under the Homecoming Act of 1987. By contrast, as the film War Babies documents, Ryan Badol’s efforts to gather information on his background were frustrated by the Bengali bureaucracy and ongoing discourses of denial: in the end his greatest desire remains simply to raise awareness of the issue “so that it can be talked about”\textsuperscript{131}.


\textsuperscript{131} Provencher, Raymonde. 2002. Film: War Babies. Montreal, Quebec: Macumba Productions.
CHAPTER THREE
PERSPECTIVES ON VIOLENCE IN KENYA

3.1 Introduction

As Anthony Richmond\textsuperscript{132} observes, ethnic conflicts take various forms, sometimes combining different elements. He identifies six types of conflicts: conflicts that engage the state against a community. State-supported systems of domination and exploitation, usually of minorities, may even lead eventually to the extermination of a people or their relegation to the geographic and social margins of the society. Conflicts for emancipation by minority groups seeking to reclaim territory and reassert human rights, with or without the support of outside agencies. Conflicts in which questions of language, religion, and irredentism are involved. Conflict within states, stemming from inter-ethnic antagonisms, competition for scarce resources, political power struggles, and ideological disputes that fail to be resolved by other means\textsuperscript{133}.

Sectarian violence, communal conflict, civil wars, and independence movements may assert themselves under these conditions Conflicts that arise because of past and present migrations some of the factors in Richmond’s categories are relevant to Kenya. Policies pursued by the government have marginalized certain communities. Competition for scarce resources, political struggles, ethnic nationalism, and migrations have all shaped conflicts in Kenya.


\textsuperscript{133} Ibid
3.2 Classification of Conflicts in Kenya

The classification of conflicts in Kenya is based on the socio-economic characteristics of the communities at war. Four broad categories apply: conflicts within pastoral communities; conflicts between pastoral and agricultural communities; conflicts linked to the presence of refugees and ethnic clashes. Although this classification is far from absolute, it is a useful heuristic device for conceptual and analytical clarity.\(^\text{134}\)

3.2.1 Conflicts within Pastoral Communities

These conflicts manifest themselves as inter-clan or inter-community conflicts. Inter-clan conflicts are the oldest types of clashes, and many societies in Kenya have experienced them. However, as agricultural communities settled, and individual ownership became the basis for regulating resources, such conflicts have remained primarily in the domain of nomadic pastoralists.\(^\text{135}\) Their communities are still organized within the framework of communal ownership of the means of production. Pastoralists occupy ecologically fragile areas characterized by unreliable patterns of rainfall and high evaporation rates. Among these communities are the Somali, Boran, Turkana, and Pokot who live in a belt that stretches across the northern region of Kenya, and the Maasai in the southern Rift Valley. Sustaining their nomadic pastoralist way of life requires large tracks of land.\(^\text{136}\)

Under these circumstances, conflicts over the ownership, control, and use rights of land and other natural resources such as grazing fields and water wells are commonplace. While conflicts

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\(^{136}\) Ibid
are not new to these communities, a combination of factors has changed the dynamics of conflict. Cattle raiding and rustling have overwhelmed local mechanisms for dealing with long term problems and wreaked havoc in the affected communities. During the 1990s, pastoral life was transformed by environmental pressure from droughts and floods, commercialization of cattle raiding, the influx of sophisticated arms, and changes in the political landscape. According to the *National Development Plan*, by 1997, the drought alone threatened the survival of more than 25 per cent of the population and more than 50 percent of livestock\(^{137}\). Raiding of animals for social and cultural purposes is one of the characteristics of pastoral life. Herds, as indicators of wealth and status, are important in cultural rituals such as marriage and childbirth. When clans or communities suffer depletion of their livestock because of calamities or raids, counter raids are carried out against other clans or communities to restock\(^{138}\).

Pastoralists have developed elaborate social mechanisms and norms that govern negotiations for compensation after raids. These mechanisms have recently been rendered ineffective for several reasons. Increasing environmental pressure has caused an imbalance in these social systems. Between 1972 and 2000, the Turkana experienced 14 years of drought and famine that have literally wiped out their entire stock\(^{139}\). This depletion has increased pressure on them to raid other communities to restock. Such raids have resulted in conflicts with loss of life because Turkana are the least armed of the groups in a pastoral axis that includes north-eastern Uganda (Karamanjong), Northwest Kenya, southern Sudan (Toposa) and southern Ethiopia (Randile). Floods from the *El Niño* rains dealt another blow to pastoralists, particularly in north-eastern

\(^{139}\) Ibid
Kenya. Coming shortly after the 1997 famine and drought, these floods were accompanied by the Rift Valley fever that killed large herds of animals and thousands of people\textsuperscript{140}.

Depletion of herds has been exacerbated by the expansion of a market economy and the commercialization of raiding. Historically, raided animals have remained within the same ecological region. This meant that stolen animals could be recovered. However, as meat export to regions beyond Africa expands, raiding has taken on another dimension. The introduction of cash for animals has created a network of businesses that offer a ready market for raided animals. Once raided, animals are driven across borders and sold to markets beyond the reach of pastoralists. In this situation, traditional rescue efforts and negotiation mechanisms are useless\textsuperscript{141}. Raiding has become an income generating activity rather than a means for augmenting social status or fulfilling cultural roles. Knowing that raided cattle are valuable commercial assets in a money economy and that raided animals may never be recovered, pastoralists are forced to guard their remaining stock closely. Attempts at raiding are met with strong resistance, often ending in massive destruction of property and loss of life\textsuperscript{142}.

An increasing influx of arms complicates the pressures from the environment and the expansion of animal export commerce. Following the concert of conflicts in the Horn of Africa, and north-eastern Uganda, all of northern Kenya has become an arms bazaar\textsuperscript{143}. Two developments have increased the quantity and quality of arms. First, the influx of asylum seekers from countries

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid
afflicted by conflict has overwhelmed the capacity of the Kenyan government to control the guns that come in with these populations. Combatants, including militias, mercenaries, and remnants of armies from countries at war, have come with these groups. These men bring the skills and knowledge of waging war along with their sophisticated weapons. The influx of all these armed groups means that the pastoralists have to contend with more than the traditional raiders.

3.2.2 Conflicts between Pastoral and Agricultural Communities

Faced with expanding desertification from the north, ecological pressure within their zones, and encroachment on the fringes of their lands by farming communities, pastoralists have responded in ways that have escalated ethnic conflicts. Many pastoralists have moved out of their regions in search of pastures for their significantly reduced herds or alternative means of subsistence\(^\text{144}\). This development has brought them into direct conflict with non-pastoral communities. Migrating groups come into conflict with agricultural communities living on the borderlands of semiarid and arable lands. For example, conflicts between the Somalis and the Akamba people of northern Mwingi District, or between communities in northern Meru, epitomise the clash of different ways of life and the failure of a harmonious interface between pastoral and agricultural modes of production\(^\text{145}\).

For those without animals, the search for other means is affected by lack of education, skills, or training. The pastoral communities have the lowest levels of education and training. Therefore, those who seek jobs, enter the labour market at the lowest stratum. Some end up as farm hands in agricultural areas, often being paid as little as the food they need for survival. Others have moved


\(^{145}\) Ibid
to cities. In both cases, they join the inhabitants of sprawling slums in towns and peri-urban areas. Private security companies favour the Turkana and Maasai because of their reputation for fearlessness. They can obtain employment as watchmen, a job that is not only among the lowest paid, but also carries great risks. Just as their counterparts in the agricultural sector, they are exploited and abused.\textsuperscript{146}

Movement out of the northern pastoral zone ultimately destroys pastoral communities and their way of life. It has resulted in family breakdown as the mainly male population gravitates to urban centres and agricultural areas. Left without any other livelihood, the dependency on relief assistance has become the other “mode of subsistence” for those left behind. Most of these people are unprotected women and children who make easy targets for raiders. In Turkana for example, it is women and children who have suffered most from attacks by the better armed Toposas, Rangiles and Karamojong communities.\textsuperscript{147}

\subsection*{3.2.3 Conflicts Linked to the Presence of Refugees}

Kenya’s northern belt is ecologically fragile, however, since 1990; it has received more than 500,000 refugees in locations that support 10,000 people with difficulty. For example, the population of Kakuma division is more than 20,000 people; the Kakuma refugee camp covering an area of 12 square kilometres, hosts more than 100,000 refugees (UNHCR 2009). The effect of such large populations on such fragile environments is momentous. Yet, humanitarian assistance,

\textsuperscript{147} Mulaa, A. (1999). “Go to Famine Areas, Ndingi tells NGOs,” \textit{Daily Nation}, 27 November.\end{flushleft}
administered chiefly by international agencies, is designated for refugees. It ignores the plight of the locals whose material condition is usually worse\textsuperscript{148}.

The presence of humanitarian assistance resources for refugees in Kakuma, and other displaced populations in the Southern Sudan, for instance, has created oases in the middle of deprived local populations in Turkana districts. This has caused conflicts between the locals and the refugees. As camps continue to attract substantial resources, they develop and expand into surrounding areas. This kind of encroachment also causes conflicts between the locals and refugees\textsuperscript{149}.

Security in the camps and nearby is inadequate. Women are particularly vulnerable to physical attacks and rapes by locals who commit these negative acts to avenge perceived injustices. Human rights protests at the refugee camps in Dadaab are in response to unprecedented levels of violence, principally rape. Reports from that period disclose that most rapes are perpetrated by bandits, probably local Kenyan Somalis or Somalis from either Somalia or Ethiopia. Increased security measures such as fencing off the camps has reduced the number of reported rape cases to about 30 per month, of which more than half are perpetrated outside the camp\textsuperscript{150}.

Insecurity for women and other refugees is also becoming a problem in Kakuma refugee camp, once perceived as a safe area. Crisp\textsuperscript{151} reports that by 1998, UNHCR was developing a policy agenda to handle the state of insecurity in and around Kakuma refugee camp. Locals argued that refugees are better cared for, while they destroy the environment and consume natural resources.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid
The locals issued an ultimatum that refugees not use resources outside the camp. The numbers of women attacked outside the camp have been on the increase. While in 1997, only few cases were reported, by August 1999, three out of five women who attempted to harvest wild vegetables or gather firewood outside the camp were attacked or raped by local Turkanas. So high is the insecurity that UNHCR discourages refugees from buying and keeping animals within the camp because local Turkanas invade the camp and seize the animals by force\textsuperscript{152}.

3.2.4 Ethnic Clashes

The nature of conflicts in Kenya was transformed by multiparty politics in the 1990s. Across the country, conflicts broke out between or within ethnic groups. While this type of conflict is not new to Kenya, the clashes of the 1990s were noticeably different in scale, complexity, and consequences. These conflicts presented unique challenges for peace activities. Beginning in 1991, in the euphoria of democratization and the anticipation of the historic 1992 elections, the ethnic clashes that erupted reflected political developments. The first conflict erupted at Mitei-tei Farm in Nandi district\textsuperscript{153}. Violence then swept through the Rift Valley to Western Province. After the election, clashes intensified and kept recurring on a small scale at different times, in various places through 1995. As the next elections approached, the country witnessed a resurgence of conflicts starting in 1996. In August 1997, Mombasa, unaffected by earlier conflicts, entered the circus of violence\textsuperscript{154}.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid
Some analysts attribute these ethnic clashes in Kenya to increased competition for shrinking resources, particularly land\textsuperscript{155}. However, this interpretation does not explain why the clashes erupted in 1991, why they followed a pattern of occurring in ethnically heterogeneous zones, and more significantly, why the state was reluctant to deal firmly with the perpetrators of violence. Commissioned by UNDP the Rogge report takes an institutional view and does not focus on communities or mention the role of women in the restoration of peace\textsuperscript{156}. Other analysts look to the role of the state in democratization and opening the political arena in the 1990s, particularly with the repeal of Section 2(a) of the old constitution which made Kenya \textit{de jure} a one party state in 1982. Repeal allowed other parties and different political articulations that challenged the Kenya African National Union (KANU), whose power was beginning to erode\textsuperscript{157}.

The KANU ruling clique was uneasy over the prospect of losing the second multiparty election since independence. To ensure victory, they created zones of support that paralleled ethnic configurations. The ethnic zones were designed to isolate populations perceived as supportive of opposition parties. For the state, such communities, defined in ethnic terms, were perceived as enemy populations of doubtful allegiance, whose political actions would be difficult to control. The nexus between ethnicity and geographical space gave the 1990s clashes their unique character\textsuperscript{158}. The campaign against multiparty politics would have had a less violent impact, were it not for this association. These clashes were attempts to drive away populations seen as “alien” (non-indigenous) in a bid to create ethnic homogeneity, presumed to operate as bloc that


\textsuperscript{156} Ibid


\textsuperscript{158} Ibid
could offer political support. As “enemy” communities were expunged, KANU strongmen urged vigilantes to create and protect KANU zones. For example, in early 1991, the controversial majimbo rallies promulgated the theory that the Rift Valley was an exclusive Kalenjin KANU zone. Opposition party leaders were warned not to enter the Rift Valley. Meanwhile, their presumed supporters were being driven out of the Rift Valley. It is this aspect of the clashes that Peter Kagwanja (1998) labels state-sponsored violence.

Ironically, the relationship between ethnicity and territory is rooted in colonial policies that created the enviable “white” highlands. During this period, Kenyans were evicted to create space for settler agriculture. With independence, the principle of “willing seller, willing buyer” determined who could own these lands. People of different ethnic backgrounds, with the ability to purchase these farms, either individually or as members of co-operatives, became neighbours.

Meanwhile, large numbers of people who had been evicted earlier, but did not have money after independence, remained squatters. The areas that witnessed the most violent of inter-ethnic clashes were within the former “white” highlands. The principal areas of conflict included (1) the Rift Valley districts of Nakuru, Molo, Kericho, Nandi, Uasin Gishu, Trans-Mara, and Marakwet; (2) the districts that flank Mt. Elgon, namely, Trans-Nzoia, Bungoma and Mt. Elgon, and (3) Mombasa in the Coast region.

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160 Ibid

3.3 Stakeholders in 2007-2008 post election violence

3.3.1 Political Parties and Tribes

With the failure of the NARC party, many who were left out of power from the failed power-sharing MOU in 2002 formed the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The ODM was largely comprised of a tribal alliance between the Kalenjin, Luhyas and Luos. Kibaki and the Kikuyu in power formed the Party of National Unity (PNU). The three main tribes involved in the 2007 post-election violence were the Kikuyus, Luos and Kalenjins. The Luhyas were a part of the ODM, however, not much is written about their involvement. As Mutua puts it: “The reality on the ground is that most African political parties are not communities of political ideology or philosophy rather they are vehicles of ethnic nativism”\textsuperscript{162}.

3.3.2 International Community

Attempts by the ODM to stage public, peaceful protests in Nairobi and other cities were squashed by the police after Kibaki made them illegal through an executive order. Kibaki, on the other hand, was legally certified as the president and had the legal right to ban the protests, especially if the protests could compromise the stability of the government. The first to step in to mediate a solution between the PNU and ODM was led by an African Union negotiator along with a combined team of the French, British, US diplomats\textsuperscript{163}. After this mediation attempt failed, the former Secretary of the UN, Kofi Annan stepped in and negotiated a power sharing deal between Kibaki and Odinga where Odinga became Prime Minister and the ODM was given


10 cabinet positions. This deal was very similar to that which should have occurred in 2002 under the NARC’s pre-election agreement.

3.3.3 Land & Government

The issue of land in Kenya is central in its history of conflict and is an example of structural violence. This is in part because of long and complex histories of land dealings among tribes. Often the members of the tribe in power were unethically given or allowed to use land, frequently at the expense of other tribes. This is also in part due to the complex legal structure surrounding land (there are at least 42 laws that apply to land, some of which contradict to the other) combined with the weak judicial branch to carry out these laws effectively. During the 2007 post-election violence, the historic land issues between the Kikuyu and Kalenjins continued to be a major cause of conflict.

In 1939, under British colonization, the Kikuyu were forced to move from the Central Province by the British, making way for an exclusive community of white settlers known as the 'White Highlands'. Many Kikuyus traveled north to settle in the Rift Valley. After Kenya became independent from Britain, even more people from the Kikuyu tribe settled in the Rift Valley, protected by Kenyatta’s power. Some would say Kenyatta “gave” this resource rich land to the Kikuyu. But from the Kikuyu point of view, they were unjustly made to leave their land in the Central Province by the British, and were expected to go elsewhere.

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165 Ibid
167 Ibid
Similar to what Kenyatta did with the Kikuyu in the Rift Valley during his tenure (1963-1978), Moi (1978-2002) did with the Mau Forest, the most lush part of the Rift Valley. Given that the forest is government trust land, Moi used his position to grant executive permission for his tribal community, the Kalenjins, to settle there. Kibaki, also using the same executive power, expelled the Kalenjins from the Mau Forest in 2003, with most returning, arguing that they had a right to the land that “Moi gave them." This expulsion, along with the promise of future expulsion attempts played a large part in the Kalenjin bands militantly evicting the Kikuyu from their homes, destroying their dwellings, and occasionally murdering those resisting these actions after the election results were announced (Cussac, 2008). In an example of the dynamic nature of conflict, Kibaki in 2008 once again called for the removal of the Kalenjins from the Mau Forest. This time, the Kalenjins lobbied Odinga as Prime Minister and part of the ODM Luo-Kalenjin alliance, to resist the executive order.

In 2003, Kibaki set up a commission to document the history of illegal land disbursements during the Kenyatta and Moi eras. This resulted in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land, otherwise known as the Ndung’u report – a 244 page document with nearly 1800 pages of appendices intimately outlining the common practice by corrupt politicians of illegally awarding land for political gain.

Youth

Post-election violence resulting from the abnormalities seen in the 2007 election in Kenya involved many facets of society. Perhaps the most volatile of these were youth with little opportunity within the previous Kibaki government for jobs and had even less hope for the

\[168\] Ibid
future. The ODM understood this and harnessed the youth vote by organizing them, for the first time in a Kenyan election, into voting blocks\textsuperscript{169}. This vehicle of organization combined with Kibaki making peaceful demonstrations illegal is thought to have been why the youth violently reacted after the announcement of the Kibaki victory\textsuperscript{170}.

### 3.4 Responding to Conflict and Restoring Peace

Attempts to restore peace in Kenya have taken two distinct paths. One consisted of formal peace negotiations conducted by political leaders and sometimes mediated by external parties. The second path contains an array of grass-roots initiatives. These attempts culminated in three types of peace building. The responses can be classified as the formal (government), semiformal (individuals in government positions) and informal (grass roots).

#### 3.4.1 Formal Response - The Role of the Government

The conflicts that plagued Kenya in the 1990s were seen in political terms. Leaders in government, particularly KANU stalwarts, including the President, blamed the clashes on multiparty politics. At another level, clashes were seen as an attempt to ensure the survival of the state. According to this interpretation, the political agenda of the state took two forms. First, clashes became a vehicle to fulfill President Moi’s prediction that Kenya’s return to a multiparty system would plunge the country into tribal violence. The second agenda item was to influence the outcomes of the multiparty elections in 1992 and 1997\textsuperscript{171}.

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid
Emanating from these two positions, the search for peace needed to be conceived within the arena of high politics. Affected communities became recipients, rather than participants in these initiatives. This top-down perception of peace became the greatest weakness of the formal response. Activities within this framework remained ad-hoc; they lacked community support, and failed. Calls for peace by the government were met with suspicion and distrust. Government officials were viewed by most victims and analysts as partisan, unable to keep the conflict in check, and either unwilling or incapable of responding to its consequences. The people saw attempts to preach peace as pursuing state survival. The government argued that irresponsible utterances by opposition Members of Parliament (MPs) and their desire to wreak havoc before the elections had caused the clashes and perpetuated them.

After the 1992 clashes the President toured areas affected by clashes, ordered that violence stop, and appealed for calm. In the most insecure areas he invoked the Preservation of Public Security Act and declared the hardest hit areas of Elburgon, Molo, Londiani and Burnt Forest security operation zones. This act banned outlawed the possession of firearms, instituted curfews, and prohibited movement into these areas. As one young man explained, “When the President came to Mt. Elgon and told people the fighting should stop, it stopped.” While the President’s tour became a reference point for peace building activities, the declaration of security zones isolated these areas. The bans on entering or working in the zones interfered with the work of certain NGOs and prohibited certain individuals from visiting them. Among those obstructed were

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Aurelia Brazeal, the US Ambassador to Kenya and a team of MPs from the United Kingdom and Denmark. More government administrators went to affected areas. Their first tasks were to increase security and oversee the return of displaced people. Molo, one of the hardest hit sites, received an additional 15 district and police officers. The presence of government officers, some of whom were eager to begin their assignments, stabilized populations and provided a basis for peace work. These efforts did not go far enough in punishing the perpetrators of violence, leaving this as an unresolved issue in most of the areas affected by clashes. These government-driven efforts encouraged little participation from affected communities. For the most part, these communities remained suspicious of the government and reluctant to seek meaningful involvement.

3.4.2 Informal Grassroots Peace Building Initiatives

Local peace-building activities emerged out of despair and exasperation with conflict. Initial responses were based on the relief model and dominated largely by international actors. In this model, food relief comes first, followed by returning displaced populations, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. Peace and reconciliation are part of rehabilitation. However, persistent problems with displacement led to outside actors experiencing burnout. Furthermore, resources were diminishing because of donor fatigue, and frustration with the government was increasing.

Although the departure of foreign actors created a vacuum, it did leave local actors with the space to reassert their role and engage in a wide range of activities related to returning, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Peace building posed particular challenges for most local actors. It required specific skills and institutional support, both of which were scarce at the local and national levels. The withdrawal of foreign actors translated into reduced funds for local actors working with displaced populations. A set of challenges were generated at the ground level where most displaced persons began to show signs of weariness with assistance programmes and eagerness to return to their homes. This generated immense pressure for actors to look to issues beyond relief, a challenge that required big budgets and long term commitments. Constrained by limited expertise, resources, and government support, local actors were forced to turn to local resources. They sought skills, capacities, and available opportunities among members of communities with which they worked. Through intense interaction and working together, peace actions were initiated and the process of transforming conflict began. In short, local peace builders learned while working for peace.
CHAPTER FOUR

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IMPACT OF CONFLICT ON CHILDREN IN KENYA

4.1 Introduction

The main objective of the study was to examine the impact of violent conflict on pre-school children after 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya. Data was collected through interview of 10 parents from each of the 9 villages in Kibera (Kianda, Soweto East, Gatwekera, Kisumu Ndogo, Lindi, Laini Saba, Siranga, Makina and Mashimon), 10 employees of non-governmental organizations operating in Kibera and 10 government officials from the ministries of education, children’s department and office of the President. In total, the sample size was 110 respondents.

4.2 Respondents experience following 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya

Residents of Kibera went through painful experience following the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya. Their experiences ranged from physical, psychological and economical suffering. The ethnic dynamics in the city constituencies play out in the informal settlements which are largely Balkanized along ethnic lines. Specific ethnic communities have a dominant presence in specific areas within such settlements. For example in Lang’ata constituency’s Kibera settlement, the Luo are the majority in Kianda, Raila village, Gatwikira, and Kisumu Ndogo. Makina is mainly populated by Nubians while Kikuyus have a dominant presence in Laini Saba and Soweto. Luyhas dominate in Mashimon and Lindi areas. This ethnic balkanization has been used for electoral and political mobilization.
4.3 Killings, Forced Circumcision and Physical attacks

The violence saw a great deal of death and bloodshed in the informal settlements of Nairobi. These illegal organized groups armed with, clubs, machetes, stones and other crude weapons barricaded roads and violently attacked those they perceived to have voted for rival candidates. Between 27 December 2007 and 30 January 2008, City Hospitals and other medical centers treated many cases of injuries caused by post-election violence. Close to 50 people are estimated to have been killed the night presidential results were announced in Kibera. Children were among the casualties in the attacks.

Forcible circumcision was one particular form of violence visited on male members of the Luo community. As one respondent recounted:

“One night soon after the announcement of the presidential results members of the illegal gangs moved around the houses in the area calling on all male members to come out and defend their people. They claimed that their women and children were being raped and killed while we slept. I was forced out of the house and joined them ....That night I personally witnessed the members of this group led by their commander forcefully and crudely cut the foreskins of eight male adults, mainly the Luo community. They would stop matatus and force them to alight – some of the matatu drivers helped them identify the Luo passengers. The gangs then ripped the trousers and underwear of the person, including children, using sharp machetes, exposing the
There were many other reports of forced circumcision. For example, the local dailies reported of a fifteen-year-old boy who was attacked beaten and forcibly circumcised during fighting at Kiamaiko in Nairobi on January 1st 2008, and eight Luo men who had their genitals cut off on the 21st of January 2008. Young boys under the age of 11 and some under the age of five had their genitalia crudely cut with blunt objects such as broken glass.

4.4 Arson, Destruction of Property and Looting

Arson, destruction of property, and looting occurred mainly in Kibera informal settlements and the contiguous areas. While violence may have been sparked off by the announcement of the presidential results, witness after witness informed us that the youth took advantage of the situation to loot. In virtually all the areas affected by the violence, residential and commercial houses/properties were broken into, looted, before being razed. According to interviewees in Kibera, gangs bragged that they were going “shopping”. Where they were not looted or razed, the residential houses were taken over by illegal occupants. In the midst of squalor in Nairobi’s Kibera informal settlements, the thriving micro and small enterprises were destroyed. While other establishments including churches were not spared, these bore the brunt of the violence.

In Lang’ata constituency, Makina area, largely inhabited by Nubians, more than 3,000 stalls in Toi market were destroyed and property worth millions of shillings lost. Before being razed to the ground, Toi market housed over 3,000 traders. A big number of people were employed by the traders, and many others depended on the market as suppliers or customers. In Makina village, at

176 Mary Otieno (2013) Kibera resident
least 100 metres of food kiosks, hardware shops, and wood workshops business along the main road to Toi market were torched, and two supermarkets razed down.

Along the Mugo Kibiru Road near Ayany Estate, approximately 90 kiosks selling groceries were destroyed, permanent structures were broken into and property looted. The nearby Patrick Njiru Petrol Station was torched. At Ayany shopping centre, 12 business premises were razed as was a 200m stretch of kiosks. In another Kibera settlement, Mashimoni, 32 houses and business properties were looted, broken into and burnt to ashes. In Soweto village a shopping complex housing a supermarket, butcheries, food restaurants bars salons and small retail shops was burned down. Along Karanja Road all semi-permanent kiosks along the road to Olympic were looted vandalised and burnt while permanent residential houses off Karanja-Olympic road were vandalised, looted and invaded by illegal tenants.

Other forms of destruction of property included destruction of the railway line. On 18 January, 2008, protesters in Kibera uprooted about 2km of the railway line which passes through the slum. The youth involved also looted wheat containers. Unlike in previous electoral related violence, places of worship were targeted such as the Kibera Catholic Church and a Presbyterian Church of East Africa church. Toi market and Kijiji cha Chewa marked particularly notorious looting and burning of houses and property and where the livelihoods and in some cases lifetime savings and investments of many were destroyed. Many of the victims were able to identify some of their attackers. Some claimed they even know individuals who stole and continue to keep their property. However, some of the names they gave are what may be referred to as street names or nicknames.
4.5 Forced Displacement and Evictions

The violence was also characterised by widespread forced evictions and displacement of people. In Kibera, Lang’ata constituency, an estimated 5,000 people were displaced. In Silanga Village, there was extensive displacement of all landlords who are mainly from the Kikuyu community and invasion of houses by new and illegal tenants.

Many victims fled their houses on their own volition to escape violence and threats to violence while some fled to IDP camps, others shifted to more friendly neighbourhoods in other parts of the city and in some cases, to rural areas. In areas such as Kibera, Dandora and Mathare North, deep-seated resentment over rent has festered for a long time. In December 2001, Kibera faced one of the most violent periods following fights between landlords and tenants after President Moi, on the request of Raila Odinga, had directed that rents in Kibera be reduced. Again, this resentment erupted as part of the violence mainly occurring between December 30, 2007, and mid-February 2008.

In Kibera, residents hardly get water in the house beyond the second floor. The landlords are also alleged to discriminate along ethnic lines in choosing tenants. Asking potential tenants for their ID cards in order to determine the tribe from which they come from is reported to be common practice. The tenants also complain of degrading treatment, for instance the landlords switch off electricity during the day. Once the violence broke out, tenants from some ethnic communities forcibly evicted landlords and other tenants from other communities and took over the houses, and in some cases, started charging reduced rents. This situation precipitated rounds of violence as the owners hired gangs to reclaim their property. Although the disputes appear to have been about rent, there is an ethnic dimension as well.
4.6 Gender- Based Violence

There was widespread rape in the city’s informal settlements during the election violence. Women, men, boys, and girls were sexually assaulted as part of the unrest. A lot of these were cases of gang rape. From 30 December 2007 to 2 February 2008, some 230 sexual assault patients from all over the country were admitted at the Nairobi Women’s Hospital. Between 44 and 48 of the victims were children below the age of 18 years. About 90 of these cases were as a result of gang rape carried out by between two and 11 men. Rape victims were not only women and girls; several cases of men and boys who were raped were also reported. A lot of opportunistic rape also happened in the camps for internally displaced persons.

4.7 Illegal Organized Gangs

Criminal gangs have become part of urban settlement reality. These gangs are mostly organised around ethnic identities and while they normally engage in self-serving activities, during elections politicians have been known to use them for political activities including unleashing violence on their opponents. Perhaps the strongest indication that the violence was planned and organised is the fact that much of the violence in Nairobi was perpetrated by these organised illegal gangs. Many informal settlements areas are balkanised and have such gangs that operate in each region at will.

In Lang’ata constituency’s Kibera area, organised gangs are common and have operated there for a long time. They control economic as well as political activities in this area. They are hired by politicians and even other organisations who wish to hold events in the area and charge for use of grounds such as the open spaces. The gangs that were reported to have actively engaged in attacks were Siafu, Bukhungu, Jeshi la Darajani, Ghetto, and Mungiki. The
Siafu gang operates from Gatwikira/Olympic area and is suspected to be the one that usually initiates and oversees violence and other forms of protests. Throughout the time that violence and protests occurred, witness accounts reported seeing the gang members armed with machetes and other crude weapons engaging the security forces, barricading roads, looting and burning. The gangs are said to have coordinated their activities through mobile phones. Some respondents indicated that the gang received logistical support from some councillors.

The Bukhungu gang is said to operate in the areas of Lindi, Kichinjio where people from the Luhya community are the majority. It is reported to have been largely responsible for the mayhem in this part of Kibera. It consists mainly of Luyha youth and operates from an open area bearing the same name and which also serves as a venue for political rallies. It is engaged in various extortionist practices, e.g. it was reported that one has to pay a fee to the group to be allowed to conduct business in the area. The group was reported to control and collect rent from the houses that were owned by evicted landlords.

The killings, forced circumcision and physical attacks, arson, destruction of property, looting, forced displacement and evictions, gender-based violence and emergence of illegal organised gangs described above had great impact on children. The killings, forced circumcision and physical attacks left young children maimed. Children lost one or both parents and siblings in the killings. The destruction of property, looting, forced displacement and evictions left many young children without homes. Many parents whose properties were destroyed and evicted from their homes are not able to feed their children leave, pay for the school fees or meet medical expenses. To date, there are children who are homeless and have taken to street life while many others are
inn children’s homes. The gender-based violence, particularly rapes, resulted in unwanted pregnancies and children born out of wedlock.

Children were displaced and were not going to school because their homes and schools were destroyed and some torched. They are trying to learn and cope with the extreme situation in the refugee camps. The rainy season in Kenya, adversely affected displaced children. Most of the children could not withstand cold because they reside in polythene tents. The situation in camps got worse since the numbers of people in the camps were so many. Very many people were, for example, sharing one toilet. Children were therefore predisposed to more infection and diseases as malaria, typhoid, and cholera amongst others. These medical problems were not dealt with then because most of doctors and nurses amongst other medical personnel were also displaced and medical supplies were lacking.

PEV had a number of health impacts on the young children, and many parents said that HIV treatment had been compromised. A 45-year-old widow with three children described how the experience affected her health,

“After the post-election violence, my CD4 count went down to 179. I was really affected during this period because I was unable to come to the hospital the whole of January and February."

Positive clients who were at home were also unable to access hospitals since the roads became insecure. Gangs of youths attacking vehicles and robbing passengers their items made them scared and are unable to access medication. Besides, some parents and children who suffered

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177 Ruth Nyambura (2013) Kibera resident
rape acquired new HIV infections. The HIV rendered parents physically weak and unable to take care of their children. The health of children who contracted HIV deteriorated and the condition grew worse due to malnutrition and lack of medical attention.

As a result of the clashes, thousands of school going children was displaced. Some dropped out due to the financial and socio-economic constraints attributed to the menace. During and after the clashes, there had been a crisis in terms of identity and culture, especially for the offspring’s of the ethnic groups that fought each other. Several families have broken down and the children of mixed families are at crossroads in terms of ethnic and cultural identity. Some have been forced to leave on the paternal ethnic sides, while the others live on the maternal side, depending on where the pressure is most. This trend has created a new dimension in societal lives where children (potential marriage partners) are discouraged from engaging in any affairs with the ‘enemy’ ethnic group. This unless checked, may go a long way to affect inter-ethnic marriages and interactions.

The first-hand accounts by the clashes victims in the affected areas were extremely disturbing as far as health was concerned. The displaced families, having lost their shelters and food supplies, had to camp in over-crowded temporary shelters organized through donations and support from various organizations, such as the Catholic Mission, Red Cross, NCCK, Action-Aid Kenya and the UNDP among others. These camps were established haphazardly all over the clashes zones and had poor ventilation. The grossly inadequate water supply and sanitation facilities, coupled with overcrowding, made these camps ideal conditions for major outbreaks of communicable diseases such as meningitis, typhoid, upper respiratory tract infections, cholera and other related
diseases. The mixing of people with cattle, sheep, chicken, goats and other domestic animals was in itself a health hazard.

The clashes in various parts of the country brought about a situation of gender and child vulnerability. Indeed, it is the children and women who suffered more during the period of the clashes. They were abused, violated, embarrassed and at times raped in broad daylight during the clashes. In most internal refugee camps, there was inadequate room to accommodate thousands of the displaced families. Both men and women, together with children, were forced to share the often congested sleeping places in close proximity with one another with little or no privacy. Nature being what it was, we could expect uncontrolled, indiscriminate sexual behaviour, not only between adult men and women, but also involving sex abuse of young children, particularly girls. As a result of such immoral practices, sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS were passed from one individual to another, with children and women being the most affected victims of the circumstances.

4.8 Consequences of Ethnic Conflicts in other Areas

4.8.1 Social Consequences

The social consequences of the clashes in Kenya were enormous and cannot be easily quantified, especially the psycho-social ones. Most of the victims of these clashes were left homeless, landless, destitute, injured, dead, abused, to mention but a few of the atrocities resulting from the menace. The immediate and real consequence of the clashes in Kenya was felt most at personal and family level. There was loss of security in the clash-prone areas as the civilians took the law into their own hands, targeting perceived enemies. As a result of insecurity, there was indiscriminate loss of human life. Many people sustained physical injuries and others were
traumatized. The state of insecurity interfered with the day-to-day socio-economic and political undertakings within the clashes areas. There was loss of life among the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luhya, Luo, Iteso, Kisii and others. However, there is increasing evidence to suggest that although the loss was felt on either side of the conflict, the non-Kalenjin ethnic groups suffered most.

The clashes in Kenya exemplified the potential and real consequences of conflict on inter-ethnic marriage, family and social life. According to the field information collected in different parts of the clashes stricken areas, there were cases of breakdown of marriage and family life. Currently, inter-ethnic marriage between the Luhya (i.e. especially the Bukusu) and the Sabaot, Iteso and Sabaot, Kalenjin and Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Luo is viewed with fear and suspicion. This was one of the far-reaching social consequences of the clashes which have also created mistrust, prejudice and psychological trauma characterized by mental anguish and general apathy, among the various ethnic groups in Kenya. This emerging negative tendency contradicts the view that the conflicting ethnic communities have co-existed and inter-married for several decades.

As a result of the clashes, thousands of schools going children were displaced. Some dropped out due to the financial and socio-economic constraints attributed to the menace. For instance, the NCCK estimated that by 1994, over 10,000 in Trans-Nzoia District had been displaced as a result of the clashes. A similar number were out of school in Bungoma and Narok districts. This disruption of education activities was widespread in all the clashes - prone regions in Western Kenya, Rift Valley and Coast provinces.

As a result of the clashes, many schools were burned down or looted in parts of Nyanza Province bordering the Rift Valley Province. The same was witnessed in Cheptais, Kibuk, Kamneru, Kaptama in Western province and Sabaoti Division in Trans-Nzoia District. In a number of
cases, both students and teachers belonging to the so-called `wrong' (opposition) ethnic groups were attacked, a number of them fatally. Both the students and teachers belonging to the `enemy' ethnic groups were forced to transfer to other schools while others abandoned schooling and teaching respectively. Some schools such as the Bishop Okoth and Holo schools near the Kisumu and Nandi district boundary were completely closed during the clashes.

In all the districts, there was a mass exodus of non-Kalenjin teachers who feared for their lives while teaching in the hostile districts. Since then, many schools have had to do without the services of experienced teaching staff and the effect of this problem on the performance of examination classes was very serious. The clashes prevented some of the primary and secondary school graduates from continuing with higher education and training because of financial constraints caused by the menace. Apart from the pupils losing their text and exercise books and uniforms, they often went hungry and often fell sick because of food insecurity and poor living conditions in the makeshift camps and schools. As a result of the clashes for instance in Molo, over 55 primary schools in Molo South catering for over 16,500 pupils did not re-open for the new term because of insecurity. The Standard Eight pupils due to sit for their Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) fled their homes because of insecurity caused by the violence.

However, during and after the clashes, there had been a crisis in terms of identity and culture, especially for the offspring’s of the ethnic groups that fought each other. As earlier recounted, several families have broken down and the children of mixed families are at crossroads in terms of ethnic and cultural identity. Some have been forced to leave on the paternal ethnic sides, while the others live on the maternal side, depending on where the pressure is most. This trend has created a new dimension in societal lives where children (potential marriage partners) are
discouraged from engaging in any affairs with the `enemy' ethnic group. This unless checked, may go a long way to affect inter-ethnic marriages and interactions. The thousands of displaced families, having lost their shelters and food supplies, had to camp in over-crowded temporary shelters organized through donations and support from various organizations, such as the Catholic Mission, Red Cross, NCCK, Action-Aid Kenya and the UNDP among others. These camps were established haphazardly all over the clashes zones and had poor ventilation. The grossly inadequate water supply and sanitation facilities, coupled with overcrowding, made these camps ideal conditions for major outbreaks of communicable diseases such as meningitis, typhoid, upper respiratory tract infections, cholera and other related diseases. The mixing of people with cattle, sheep, chicken, goats and other domestic animals was in itself a health hazard.

The clashes in various parts of the country brought about a situation of gender and child vulnerability. Indeed, it is the children and women who suffered more during the period of the clashes. They were abused, violated, embarrassed and at times raped in broad daylight during the clashes. In most internal refugee camps, there was inadequate room to accommodate thousands of the displaced families. Both men and women, together with children, were forced to share the often congested sleeping places in close proximity with one another with little or no privacy. Nature being what it was, we could expect uncontrolled, indiscriminate sexual behaviour, not only between adult men and women, but also involving sex abuse of young children, particularly girls. As a result of such immoral practices, sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS were passed from one individual to another, with children and women being the most affected victims of the circumstances.
4.8.2 Economic consequences of the clashes

The total economic impact of the clashes in the affected areas is literally unquantified and not easy to quantify. There was gigantic waste of human and economic resources as partly illustrated by figures in the Kiliku Report and other publications, (Kiliku Report, 1992 p.85-90). The clashes had lasting consequences that will continue to alter Kenya's economic development for many years. One overall observation that emerges from the study of the clashes in Kenya is the fact that the economic consequences go far beyond the available statistics. Much of the destruction worked to the economic advantage of the perpetrators of the violence and their close aides. Generally, the clashes allowed some groups of people and individuals to capitalise on the insecurity to usurp land or purchase it at throw-away prices from the victims who had no otherwise.

One of the long term economic consequences of the clashes was the fact that land ownership patterns have been permanently altered. There was a general decline in economic production as many of the potential farmers ran away due to insecurity created by the violence. In a state of insecurity, as was the case in some areas, agricultural activities were disrupted. In most cases, maize, coffee, pyrethrum, tea, sugarcane and other crops were either destroyed or abandoned because of the widespread violence caused by the clashes. In some areas of Trans Nzoia, Kericho, Nandi and Uasin Gishu districts, work on agricultural land stopped for a long time as farm workers stayed away for fear of being attacked by the `clashing enemies'.

There were other subsequent economic problems related to the clashes such as food insecurity, labour disruption on farms, industry and the public sector institutions, destruction of property, land grabbing, commercial disruption, breakdown in transport and communication, resource
diversion, mis-allocation and unexpected expenditure, infrastructural disruption, inflation and fluctuation of prices and environmental destruction among others. Food shortage was one of the far reaching economic consequences of the clashes in the study areas. There was a drop in food production, food supply and raw materials for the agro-based industries such as sugar, tea, coffee, cereal (maize), pyrethrum and other agricultural crops. As a result of food shortages, many clashes victims experienced famine and this necessitated the appeal for local and international food aid and relief.

The findings revealed that many of the victims doubted the seriousness of the Government's participation in food relief and whenever it was distributed, there were instances of discrimination and corruption involving public administrators in charge. There have been disturbing mass media reports recently of land grabbing mania and general corruption in Kenya. Land grabbing and corruption have been going on since independence, creating an explosive situation that continues to sour relations between various ethnic groups. However, during and after the clashes, land grabbing in the clashes-torn areas has become rampant at the expense of the clash victims. Now that most of the urban and rural lands have been taken, pressure is mounting on the remaining land. After the clashes, there has increasingly been an obsession with land in this country which needs to be re-examined.

As a result of the clashes, some areas experienced an abrupt drop in effective demand for manufactured goods due to lack of cash income from the agricultural sector and employed labour in the agro-based industries such as tea, coffee and maize. Subsequently, some of the clashes-prone areas experienced massive unemployment, with all the attendant social and economic
consequences as the farming, industrial and distributive trade sectors were forced to lay off workers.

Transport operators in most of the areas before the clashes were mainly the Kikuyu and the Kisii. However, during the period of the clashes, the vehicle owners, fearing attack on their vehicles and passengers stopped their operations in the affected areas. The findings established that during the clashes, areas such as Kericho, Thessalia, Nandi, Burnt Forest, Molo, Mt. Elgon, Kapsokwany and West Pokot experienced transport hardships as a result of the clashes. The transport problems have been eased, although the vehicle owners still have some fear and suspicion about losing them in the event of renewed clashes. With most of the businesses closed and their vehicle and goods at risk of being destroyed or stolen, manufacturers stopped regular supplies of commodities to the affected areas. This in turn caused considerable hardships to the "final consumers" of essential goods.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of the Study Findings

The main objective of the study was to examine the impact of violent conflict on pre-school children after 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya. The study assessed the physical, economic and the psycho-social impacts of violent conflict on pre-school children after 2007-2008 post-election violence Kenya.

5.1.1 The Physical Impacts of Violent Conflict on Pre-School Children

The study established the physical impacts of violent conflict on pre-school children after 2007-2008 post-election violence Kenya. Most visible effects of armed conflict on children are physically inflicted ones. Children sustain serious injuries and or lifelong disabilities such as losing limbs, eyesight and hearing.

One of the physical suffering that children and women underwent as a result of violence in Kibera was rape. Some rape victims contracted HIV and have grown weak due to lack of proper medication and malnutrition. Vertical transmission of HIV from mother to infant is one of the means through which infants contracted HIV. The psychological and physical trauma during pregnancy posed great heath risk to the unborn children. A number of children born to rape victims after 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya were handicapped although it is uncertain whether factors relating to the rape itself were primarily responsible. Children brought
to term as a result of such physical and psychological trauma, and in an environment where the mother continues to be under severe stress, may need particular medical care as neonates.

The study established that women and girls who have been raped or are living in exploitative circumstances frequently tried to abort such pregnancies. Where access to safe abortion is illegal or inaccessible these efforts took place through the use of various informal means. Such means are not always successful, and some pregnancies nonetheless resulted in live births. Additionally, majority of women and girls impregnated by rape gave birth without assistance. Such babies were at risk during the childbirth process, particularly because their mothers had experienced nutritional deprivation and lack of maternal care during pregnancy. Moreover, instances of mother’s death or incapacity as a result of childbirth had adverse physical consequences for children delivered live in isolation without a support network nearby.

Some children of rape who were allowed to live were subjected to abused or neglected. Indeed, family abuse and neglect of children in Kibera increased after 2007-2008 post-election violence. The “unwanted” children conceived in rape are at a greater risk of such abuse, either by their mothers, who are physically and psychologically unable to care adequately for them, or by the extended family. Some cases of neglect of infants carried to term is a key symptom of sexual trauma faced by their mothers 2007-2008 post-election violence. The respondents stated that sometimes mothers become resentful as their temper short and they hits the young children. A few times mothers have tried to give their children away. Some children experiences verbal abuse when their mothers or other members of the society reminds them that they are bastards born of rape ordeals. Children whose mothers do summon the courage to care for them often face rejection and abuse from extended family members instead.
5.1.2 The Economic Impacts of Violent Conflict on Pre-School Children

The total economic impact of the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya is not easy to quantify. The 2007-2008 post-election violence had lasting consequences that will continue to alter Kenya's economic development for many years. One overall observation that emerges from the study of the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya is the fact that the economic consequences go far beyond the available statistics. One of the long term economic consequences of the clashes was the fact that property ownership patterns have been permanently altered. Some landlord and business owners were grounded after their properties were destroyed or they were forcefully evicted from their residence.

There were other subsequent economic problems related to the 2007-2008 post-election violence such as food insecurity, labour disruption on industry and the public sector institutions, land grabbing, commercial disruption, breakdown in transport and communication, resource diversion, unexpected expenditure, infrastructural disruption, inflation and fluctuation of prices and environmental destruction among others.

Food shortage was one of the far reaching economic consequences of the clashes. There was a drop in food production, food supply and raw materials for the agro-based industries. As a result of food shortages, many clashes victims experienced famine and this necessitated the appeal for local and international food aid and relief. As a result of the clashes, the residents of Kibera experienced an abrupt drop in effective demand for manufactured goods due to lack of cash income. There was massive unemployment in Kibera and other areas hit by the clashes. The drop in the supply of food and raw materials for the agro-based industries necessitated costly imports of such items as sugar,
maize and wheat. This in turn led to hiking and fluctuation of prices of essential commodities in the clashes-prone areas.

Children in areas affected by 2007-2008 post-election violence live in harsh economic conditions. Residents of Kibera were economically weakened as a result of and physical attacks, arson, destruction of property, looting, forced displacement and eviction. Some children born of rape and exploitation that followed 2007-2008 post-election violence were abandoned by their mother at birth or afterwards.

Majority of children living in the Kibera informal settlement are raised by extremely poor parents. A single woman raising a child needs above all a source of income. Majority of single mothers lack employment and they do not have a reliable family network for assistance. The child’s presence itself may prevent her from working or receiving job training unless alternative childcare arrangements are made available. Such girl mothers often become prostitutes instead, with related psycho-social, economic and physical risks to the children in their care as well as the risk of contracting HIV and transmitting it through breast milk.

5.1.3 The Psycho-Social Impacts of Violent Conflict on Pre-School Children

One of the objectives of the study was to establish the psycho-social impacts of violent conflict on pre-school children after 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya. The social consequences of the clashes in Kenya were enormous and cannot be easily quantified, especially the psycho-social ones. Most of the victims of these clashes were left homeless, landless, destitute, injured, dead, abused, to mention but a few of the atrocities resulting from the menace. The immediate and real consequence of the clashes in Kenya was felt most at personal and family level. There
was loss of security in the clash-prone areas as the civilians took the law into their own hands, targeting perceived enemies. As a result of insecurity, there was indiscriminate loss of human life. Many people sustained physical injuries and others were traumatized. The state of insecurity interfered with the day-to-day socio-economic and political undertakings within the clashes areas.

The clashes in Kenya exemplified the potential and real consequences of conflict on inter-ethnic marriage, family and social life. There were cases of breakdown of marriage and family life. This was one of the far-reaching social consequences of the clashes which created mistrust, prejudice and psychological trauma characterized by mental anguish and general apathy, among the various ethnic groups in Kenya. This emerging negative tendency contradicts the view that the conflicting ethnic communities have co-existed and inter-married for several decades.

Children’s development, sense of identity and psychological health may be affected in a variety of ways over the course of their young lives as a result of the social dynamics. Some of the psycho-social impacts of 2007-2008 post-election violence are the attachment difficulties, stigma and discrimination, and identity issues.

In infancy, the main psycho-social impact stems from the possibility of neglect and lack of long-term affective relationships, a difficulty not limited to children born of rape but to which they may be particularly likely to suffer. If a child is kept by the mother, he and she may experience difficulties bonding. Some rape survivors chose not to raise their children at all. If a child is abandoned, s/he ends up lacking a close relationship with the mother. Combined with potential nutritional deficits in the first year, such children’s psychological development may be compromised if they lack an opportunity to develop trusting emotional attachments with an older
child or an adult. Even children who are adopted into stable families after an initial period of institutionalization often suffer ill-effects as a result of neglect during the early years.

Children born out of post-election violence are prone to stigma and discrimination. As children grow older and develop a sense of self and a need for social acceptance and belonging, they become sensitive to stigmatization or emotional abuse from close relatives, peers and members of the broader community. The study established that children born out of wedlock are often scorned, teased or stigmatized on the basis of their lack of known father.

Given physical, economic and social impact of 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya, many children suffered problems of identity. As children born out of wedlock enter adolescence and young adulthood they begin to reinvent themselves, create a meaningful mosaic of their identities, and ask questions about their roots and origins. Children who have been adopted begin to demand information on their biological parents; children with one absent parent may begin to demonstrate an interest in making contact. For children born as result of conflict, there may be a particular need in establishing contact with their parent in order to ascertain “who they are.” For older war babies, the inability to trace one’s “roots” can become a source of psychosocial strain.

5.2 Conclusion

The study concludes that violent conflict is one of the most important development challenges facing developing countries. The 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya had great economic, political and social consequences which affected both adults and children. The conflict displaces population, destroys capital and infrastructure, disrupts schooling, damages the
social fabric, endangers civil liberties, and creates health and famine crises. Violent conflict results in deaths, injuries, disability and psychological trauma to men, women and children.

Exposure to violence interferes with a child’s ability to think and learn and disrupt the course of healthy physical, emotional, and intellectual development of a child. Children often are in frightening or stressful situations resulting from the death of beloved parents, relatives, friends or being hospitalized. These events range from evoking mild stress to being severely distressing. Children exposed to traumatic events suffer from academic struggles and adjustment.

5.3 Recommendations

The study recommends that government agencies in collaboration with communities should ensure that children in areas affected by post-election violence are protected from strenuous household labour allocations. Violent conflict affects considerably the income, consumption and wellbeing levels of households in areas of violence. Death and destruction mean that child labour is needed to compensate for lost income elsewhere. Children that need to work are not able to attend school. Even if they can combine work and school, low nutritional levels and tiredness will lower the educational outcomes of these children. Conditional cash transfers may prove quite successful as part of post-conflict economic interventions, although few have been implemented in conflict-affected countries.

The study recommends changes in returns to education approaches for children affected by post-election violence. Violent conflict affects the returns households can obtain from their investment in the education of children. There are lower rates of return to school among children affected by post-election violence. The identification of other factors that drive returns to
education will be central to the design of incentives to promote further education of children in households affected by violent conflict.

The community in conflict affected areas should address the problem of fear in the aftermath of violence. Fear is central in household decisions on whether to send children to school as children are particularly vulnerable to harassment, abductions and sexual attacks. This mechanism operates in areas where attending school may imply long walks often across military barriers, and further attention should be paid to the security of children in security sector reforms being implemented in conflict affected countries.

Displacement caused by the violence should be addresses through appropriate government policies. The study established that many children suffered physical and emotional harm as a result of post-election violence. Displaced children are particularly vulnerable to being denied access to education due to the poor conditions of camps, lack of documents, discrimination and prohibitive costs. Prioritizing education for displaced children should therefore be part of emergency interventions and central to development planning in post conflict in order to ensure the development, safety and well-being for a large number of children who otherwise will grow up deprived of education and the long-term opportunities it affords for themselves and their own families in the future.
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Appendix I
Interview Schedule for Parents

Introduction

I would like to interview you on your experiences during the 2007-2008 Post Election Violence and the impact of violent conflict on pre-school children. The information I will get from you will help to improve the quality of life for children and their families after an occurrence of political violence. This interview will take 30 to 35 minutes.

PART I : Respondent’s Socio-Economic Background

Age: ........................................................................
Gender: .............................................................
Type of Family
a) Joint Family
b) Nuclear Family
1. What experiences did you face following the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya?
2. If you are involved in income activity, what is that?.................................................
3. If you do business, what kind of business you do? .........................
4. Was there women and preschool children rape incidences in this area following the 2007-2008 post election?
5. Were children abandoned by their parents? Explain
6. Is there evidence regarding the likelihood of war babies being adopted following the 2007-2008 post election?
7. Briefly explain the status of pre-school orphaned children in this area.
8. Describe how poverty affected preschool children in this area following the 2007-2008 post election?

9. Briefly describe the relationships between the preschool children and parents as well as the community after 2007-2008 post election

10. Was there stigma and discrimination for preschool children? Describe the basis of this stigmatization


12. If your child suffered from any chronic disease after 2007-2008 post election, what is the disease?

13. Describe the relationship between health risks are associated with preschool children and mothers’ trauma during 2007-2008 post election

14. Did the parents abuse or neglect preschool children in this area after 2007-2008 post election? If yes Explain the basis of this attitude
Appendix ii

Interview Schedule for government officers

Introduction

The purpose of this interview is assessing impact of violent conflict on pre-school children (a case of 2007-2008 post election violence). This interview will take 30-35 minutes.

PART 1: Respondent’s Social Economic Background

Age:.................................................................
Gender:............................................................
Level of education completed..............................
Job Title:............................................................
Number of years in your current position..............
Department:.......................................................]
Ministry:............................................................
Nature of official duties
........................................................................

1. What were the consequences of 2007-2008 post election on preschool children based on the following?
   Economic Impacts
   Physical Impacts
   Psycho-Social Impacts

2. What was the role of the government in helping preschool children traumatized after 2007-2008 post election
APPENDIX III

Interview Schedule for the children

Introduction

I would like to interview you on your experiences during the 2007-2008 Post Election Violence and the impact of violent conflict on pre-school children. The information I will get from you will help to improve the quality of life for children and their families after an occurrence of political violence. This interview will take 30 to 35 minutes.

PART I: Respondent’s Socio-Economic Background

Age:..............................................................
Gender:...........................................................

Type of Family
a) Joint Family
b) Nuclear Family

1. What experiences did you face following the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya?
2. Were there Preschool children rape incidences in this area following the 2007-2008 post election?
3. Were children abandoned by their parents? Explain
4. Are there orphans adopted following the 2007-2008 post election?
5. How is the status of pre-school orphaned children in this area?
6. How has poverty affected preschool children in this area following the 2007-2008 post election?

7. How is the relationships between the preschool children and parents as well as the community after 2007-2008 post election

8. Was there stigma and discrimination for preschool children? Describe the basis of this stigmatization


10. Did you or any child you know suffered from any chronic disease after 2007-2008 post election, what is the disease?

11. Is there relationship between health risks associated with preschool children and mothers’ trauma during 2007-2008 post election

12. Did the parents abuse or neglect preschool children in this area after 2007-2008 post election? If yes Explain