POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING IN EAST AFRICA: THE

CASE OF SOTIK AND BORABU CONSTITUENCIES IN KENYA, 1990-2012

BY

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DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

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Gideon Solonka Kilakoi　　　　　　　　　　Date

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

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DEDICATION

To my wife, Jecinta Solonka and sons Brian Pareno, Elton Pasha, Livingston Pashile and daughter Nicole Reni.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

This research study is an intensive examination of peace-building initiatives in East Africa, with a case-study of post-conflict peace-building efforts in Sotik and Borabu constituencies, which are located in Bomet and Nyamira Counties in the Republic of Kenya. This area has faced continuing violence from the period 1990 to 2012. The most significant violence in the area was experienced following the 2007/2008 disputed elections in Kenya. A household questionnaire, interviews and focus group discussions were used to collect qualitative data from members of the community in Sotik and Borabu. The researcher gathered data from community members from 12 villages in this area. Thematic analysis of this data elucidated community members' experiences of the conflict during the period 1990-2012, as well as the leading causes of violence and the main drivers of peace in the area. The researcher also collected secondary data and examined peace-building efforts in East Africa. This study showed that community members mainly engage in violent conflict in an effort to meet their basic human needs. The study has demonstrated that indigenous peace-building efforts that take into account the local context and utilise local solutions are extremely effective and sustainable.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACCORD - African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes

ACORD - Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development

AHSI - African Human Security Initiative

AP - Administration Police

AU - African Union

CBO - Community Based Organisation

CGA - Cereal Growers' Association

DDR - Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

DFID - UK's Department for International Development

DPC - District Peace Committee

DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo

EAC - The East African Community

ECOWAS - The Economic Community of Western African States

FBO - Faith Based Organisation

FGD - Focus Group Discussion

ICG - The International Crisis Group

IDPs - Internally displaced persons

INCORE - International Centre of Excellence for Conflict and Peace Studies

ISS - Institute of Security Studies

LNP - Liberia National Police

MDG - Millennium Development Goal

MLC	-	Movement for the Liberation of the Congo
MONUSCO	-	The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Congo
MRU	-	Mano River Union
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBI	-	Nile Basin Initiative
NCIC	-	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NCS	-	National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management Secretariate
NSC	-	National Steering Committee
NSIS	-	National Security and Intelligence Service
ODI	-	Overseas Development Institute
RCD-Goma	-	Rally for Congolese Democracy
RCD-ML	-	RCD-Movement for Liberation
SAIS	-	School for Advanced International Studies
SDA	-	Seventh Day Adventist
SMI	-	Structure Militaire d'Integration
SMS	-	Short Message Service
SSRs	-	Security Sector Reforms
UK	-	United Kingdom
UN	-	United Nations
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Program
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Program
UNMIL	-	United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNPBC   **-**   United Nations Peace Building Commission

UNPBF   **-**   United Nations Peace Building Fund

USA   **-**   United States of America

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

The term conflict implies a confrontation between one or more parties. Contrary to popular belief, not all conflict is bad. Conflict has been a popular way of resolving disputes throughout human history. Non-violent conflict can be positively transformative, allowing deep rooted issues that have contributed to the disputes to come to the fore to be debated and hopefully solved in a sustainable manner. Violent conflict may also achieve this, but at a very high cost. Violent conflict is highly destructive, resulting in massive loss of human lives, injuries (both to combatants and civilians), loss of infrastructure and devastating effects on economies and general development. The Human Security Centre defines four types of conflicts: "(i) *Intrastate conflicts*-these are fought between a government and a non-state group, (ii) *Internationalized intrastate conflicts*- this is when either the government, non-state armed group, or both, received external military support from a foreign government, (iii) *Interstate conflict*- conflicts fought between two or more states and (iv) *Extra-state conflict*- conflicts between a state and a non-state armed group outside that state's territory. These are essentially the wars of liberation from colonial rule"[1]. Most conflicts in Africa in the 20th and 21st century have been intrastate conflict and have been fought throughout an entire country, or in certain parts of a country or both. During the period 1990-2012 Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and most recently Kenya have been involved in intrastate conflict.

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[1] Human Security Centre. *Human Security Brief 2006, (*University of British Columbia: Vancouver, 2006), 6.

Indeed violent conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa has been responsible for the direct and indirect deaths of millions of civilians and has contributed significantly to the low levels of human security in the region.[2] Bowd has argued that the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa that have been embroiled in violent conflict are characterised by abject-poverty, inadequate service provision, political instability, retarded economic growth and other challenges to overall development that deter the enhancement of human security. The successful and sustainable resolution of these conflicts represents an enormous barrier to future prosperity in the region.[3]

During the period 2002-2005 Sub-Saharan Africa showed the greatest decline in state-based conflict around the world. The number of state-based conflicts has dropped by more than 60 per cent between 2002 and 2005. The year 2005 was also the first year since 1996 in which Sub-Saharan Africa did not experience a war − that is a conflict that results in more than 1,000 battle deaths in a calendar year.[4] This study will focus mainly on intrastate conflict, which are internal conflicts fought between a government and a non-state group such as militias, rural guerrilla groups, clans, warlords or organized communal groups, without the involvement of a government. [5]

According to Richard Bowd, intrastate conflicts emerge for a complex variety of reasons. At a theoretical level, social change of sort occurs and leads to the emergence of conflict. Bowd

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[2] Richard Bowd & Annie B. Chikwanha; Understanding Africa's Contemporary Conflicts, Origins Challenges and Peace building. A monograph for Africa Human Security Initiatives (2008) , 10.
[3] Ibid, 10.
[4] Human Security Centre *Human Security Brief 2006, (*University of British Columbia: Vancouver, 2006), 6.
[5] Ibid.

argues that conflict is not necessarily a negative phenomenon, what is important is the way in which the society responds to the emerging conflict.[6]

1.2 Background to the Study

Before looking into the peace initiatives in East Africa, it is important to note that what will determine the result of the social change and emergent conflict is a combination of societal capacity and conflict triggers. If society has the capacity to manage conflict, then a situation of cooperation amidst latent tension can arise and, if societal capacity is greater and conflict management can lead to conflict transformation, then an environment of peace is possible.[7]

Bowd has identified four prominent characteristics contributing to the outbreak of intrastate conflict that are shared by most cases.[8] These are: Internal battles to gain control of an existing state, Ethnic groups seeking greater autonomy or striving to create an independent state for themselves, "Failed states", where the authority of a national government has collapsed and armed struggle has broken out between the competing ethnic militias, warlords or criminal organisations seeking to obtain power and establish control of the state and Impoverished states where there exists a situation of individual hardship or severe dissatisfaction with one's situation and the absence of any non-violent means for change.[9]

E. Cairns has observed that as the nature of conflict has changed from interstate to intrastate so, too has its toll on human life.[10] The direct and indirect results of intrastate conflict leave a complex lasting legacy that is difficult to erase. Economies need to be stabilised and developed,

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[6] Richard Bowd and Annie B. Chikwanha; Understanding Africa's Contemporary Conflicts, Origins Challenges and Peace building. A monograph for Africa Human Security Initiatives (2008), 10-11.
[7] Ramsbotham et al; Contemporary Conflict resolution, 2nd edition, Cambridge; Policy Press, 2005, 29.
[8] Ibid.
[9] B F Walter, Does Conflict beget conflict? Explaining re occurring civil wars, Journal of Peace Research. 41(3) (2004), 371-388.
[10] E Cairns, A safer future; Reducing the human costs of war, Oxford: Oxfam, 1997 .

infrastructure needs to be rebuilt and institutional renewal or replacement needs to take place. R. Paris has noted that, the greatest challenge in the removal of legacy of violent conflict and the reconstruction of the country is probably the re-establishment of society.[11] Indeed societies emerging from war face a range of urgent, interconnected problems on all fronts, not too dissimilar to situations of natural disasters. However, it is the destruction of relationships, including the loss of trust, dignity, confidence and faith in others that proves the most far reaching, potent and destructive problem and the most difficult to address. It has the potential to undermine possible solutions to a wide range of other issues.[12]

Sultan Barakat has argued that post war reconstruction begins in the hearts and minds of those who suffer the horrors of war and want to change societies so that there is no return to mass violence.[13] How then do war torn communities with reduced capacity set about their reconstruction and arrive at a situation of peace?

In answering this question, this study will examine the various peace building initiatives undertaken in East Africa. The study will also consider the key challenges and obstacles faced by the post-conflict East African countries such as Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya with special emphasis on success stories in the reconstruction of the said countries through looking at various theoretical and contextual examples.

1.3 Statement of the Research Problem

Countries in East Africa, namely Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and recently Kenya have experienced intractable conflicts and have emerged as post-conflict societies. The causes of

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[11] R. Paris, At war's end: Building peace after civil conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 1.
[12] Ibid, 1.
[13] Sultan Barakat (ed); After the Conflict: Reconstruction and development in the aftermath of war, London 1B Tauris, 2005, 10.

conflict in Africa are complex, with many intertwining root causes, including: The Legacy of Colonialism, Resource Based Conflicts, Ethnic Based Conflicts, Political Based Conflicts and Religious Based Conflicts.

Oscar Mateos has scrutinized the usefulness of current understanding of conflict, suggesting that a more comprehensive approach to African armed conflict is necessary. He argues that since the 1990s, African armed conflicts, especially their nature and root causes have been the subject of intense debate.[14] The result is the emergence of two dominant schools of thought as almost the only valid interpretations (greed and grievance). However appealing alternative explanations have become apparent and have underlined the multiplicity of causes and actors (internal and external).[15]

This research will focus on the peace-building efforts in Sotik and Borabu, in Kenya. It will examine the main causes of violent conflict in the area. It will also examine the main drivers of peace initiatives and the lessons learnt from peace-building activities in this area. The study will demonstrate that negative ethnicity, irresponsible use of the media, and to some extent retrogressive cultural practices are the conflict triggers that light the touch paper, resulting in the descent into violent conflict in East Africa. It is also worthy to note that the same triggers such as media and religion have been used as successful tools in post-conflict reconstruction and peace building. Does this confirm what has been portrayed in international media that, wars in other parts of the world are justified as they are ideological, with noble goals and are for the greater

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[14]Richard Bowd & Annie B. Chikwanha; Understanding Africa's Contemporary Conflicts, Origins, Challenges and Peace building. A monograph for Africa Human Security,15.
[15]Ibid, 15.

good, whereas African wars on the other hand are simply violence, with no real cause, just bloodthirsty people killing each other?[16]

Is it true that African Conflict is simply bloodthirsty people killing each other? Why would Kikuyu and Kalenjin in Kenya kill each other in 2007-2008 post-election violence only to unite and vote together in the 2013 general election?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of the study is to critically examine post-conflict peace building initiatives in East Africa. More specifically, the study aims to: -

1. Examine causes of conflict in East Africa;

2. Examine the Western understanding of conflict in Africa vis-a-vis the African understanding;

3. Examine post-conflict peace building efforts in Sotik and Borabu Constituencies in Kenya.

1.5 Literature Review

The literature review is divided into five sub-headings: literature review of post conflict societies, the sources of conflict in Africa (Root causes of conflict), peace building models, peace building in the East Africa Sub region and literature gaps. The researcher will use thematic analysis to analyse academic discourse, as well as experiences and opinions of leading actors in the study and implementation of peace building in East Africa. This review will elucidate the leading theories of sources of conflict in Africa, peace building models and specific peace building initiatives in East Africa. This will generate sound understanding of conflict in this context, by clearly articulating the dominant views, while pointing out the difference in opinions

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[16]Jeffrey Gettleman, Feature: Africa's Forever Wars", *Foreign Policy*, April/March 2010.

and points of contention. This review will also determine the gaps in the literature and propose how this research will fill these gaps, thereby contributing to the discourse in this field. Such an understanding will permit the development of policies that best overcome challenges and obstacles to successful and sustainable conflict resolution and peace building.

1.5.1   Power and Conflict in Africa

Zeleza argues that power plays a key role in causing conflict in Africa. The disproportionate distribution of power among Africans has its roots in colonialism, and it seems that ever since independence, Africans have been fighting to gain or retain this power. Whoever holds the power can use it to distribute resources equally or unequally, thereby fostering conflict or peace. Political leaders are well aware of this and have used political ideology, religious and ethnic differences to insight conflict.[17] This has led some scholars to propose that although conflict in Africa may begin due to legitimate grievances such as discriminations due to ethnicity or religion, or unequal distribution of resources, it is sustained by the profit to be gained by being in the state of conflict.[18]

This "greed versus grievance" argument poses that the profits of conflict include employment in armed forces, asset stripping, looting, trade in illicit goods such as drugs and arms, and smuggling high value commodities such as diamonds. As Barbero argues, this creates the "political economy of conflict" which results in the "concentration of power and wealth, the destruction of economic assets, and impoverishment of vulnerable groups."[19] The economic incentives of war eventually become extremely lucrative and the conflict is then driven by simple

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[17]Ibid, 7.
[18]Conflict Sensitivity Consortium. *Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peace building: tools for peace and conflict impact assessment.* Christian Barbero and Manuela Leonhardt. (2003), 8.
[19]Ibid.

greed for economic gain. On the other hand, these arguments have been heavily criticised by scholars like Zeleza for "their exclusion of neo-liberalisation and structural adjustments that creates the content for conflict and predation through increased poverty and inequality."[20] Zeleza also adds that that these arguments are too simplistic because of the "inseparability between political and economic factors"[21].

As this review has shown, the sources of Africa's conflict are incredibly complex. Zeleza clearly articulates this point when he says, "at best, one can only say that these conflicts are rooted in complex constructions and conjunctures of Africa's political economies, social identities, and cultural ideologies as configured out of specific local, national, and regional historical experiences and patterns of insertion into and engagement with an ever-changing world system."[22]

1.5.2 Causes of Conflict in Africa

Scholars such as Zeleza note that there has been the tendency in Western media and even in academic discourse to portray African conflict as strange and unfathomable. In contrast, Zeleza asserts that "African conflicts are remarkably unexceptional: they have complex histories and exhibit multiple and multi-dimensional causes, courses and consequences."[23] It is imperative that we take an objective look at the causes of the conflict in Africa. That does not mean to downplay the magnitude of Africa's conflict. Indeed, throughout the 1980s, up to now, Africa has been the

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[20]Conflict Sensitivity Consortium. *Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peace building: tools for peace and conflict impact assessment.* Christian Barbero and Manuela Leonhardt. (2003), 19.
[21]Ibid.
[22]Ibid, 2.
[23]Paul Zeleza. "The causes and costs of war in Africa". In *Roots of African Conflict : The Causes and Costs,* edited by Alfred Nhema and Paul Zeleza, (Addis Ababa: James Currey Ltd., Ohio University Press & Unisa Press, 2008), 1.

region with the most conflicts.[24] However, it is important to "emphasise the need for more balanced debate and commentary, to put African conflicts in both global and historical perspective".[25] Having acknowledged the complexity of African conflict, it is important to note that the researcher will not attempt an exhaustive review of the debates of the causes of these conflicts as this is not possible given the space constraints. However, the researcher will present an overview of the overarching themes of the causes of conflict in Africa, with examples of conflict in East Africa.

1.5.3 Resource, Political, Ethnic and Religious Based Conflicts

Zeleza argues that the causes of conflict in Africa are "multiple in their dynamics-internal and external, local and transnational, economic and political, social and cultural, historical and contemporary, objective and subjective, material and ideological, concrete and emotive, real and rhetoric."[26] Political and or religious ideology, ethnic identity, and the struggle for access to and control of resources are some of the most commonly cited reasons for conflict in Africa. However, it is imprudent to try and pry any one of these causes from the others and label it as the leading cause of conflict. Attempts to do so show an inadequate analysis.[27]

1.5.3.1 Ethnic-Based Conflicts

Scholars such as Pottier recognise that African conflict has often been explained as due to ethnic differences.[28] The 1994 genocide in Rwanda where nearly a million Tutsi were killed in a few months is often cited as one of the deadliest uses of ethnic identity to incite violence. However,

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[24]Paul Zeleza. "The causes and costs of war in Africa". In *Roots of African Conflict : The Causes and Costs,* edited by Alfred Nhema and Paul Zeleza, (Addis Ababa: James Currey Ltd., Ohio University Press & Unisa Press, 2008), 1.
[25]Ibid.
[26]Ibid, 2.
[27]Ibid.
[28]James Pottier, *Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the late twentieth century*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 9.

Pottier argues that the ruling Hutu majority used an imagined and poorly understood history of the Tutsi and their migration and conquest of Rwanda to instil ethnic hatred that spurred the majority Hutu ethnic group to kill over 800,000 Tutsi and Hutus viewed as sympathisers. Pottier argues that ethnicity as a cause of the Rwanda conflict is too simplistic. Instead, he views this is an example of how "power hungry leaders shamelessly twisted ethnic argument for sake of class privilege."[29] Increasing numbers of scholars hold this type of view.

1.5.3.2 Resource-Based Conflicts

Barbero observed that, "there is a widespread assumption that poverty is a source of violence."[30] However, this view is far too simplistic. Let us take the Kenyan example of conflict in pastoral communities, which is often explained as communities fighting for control and access to pasture and water for their animals. With climate change, these resources are becoming scarcer, leading communities to conflict. While this is true, it is important to remember that "resources may be abundant or scarce, and either condition can be a source of conflict, depending on the organization and patterns of control and access."[31] The resource scarcity in the pastoral regions in Kenya and the conflict it causes occurs within a wider regional and national political framework. The Coast Province of Kenya is a good example where resources are abundant but access and distribution is unequal causing conflict. Many people, certainly the Coastal and Pastoral communities of Kenya claim that this imbalance in the distribution of resources is due to ethnic and religious discrimination.

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[29]James Pottier, *Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the late twentieth century*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 9.

[30]Conflict Sensitivity Consortium. *Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peace building: tools for peace and conflict impact assessment.* Christian Barbero and Manuela Leonhardt. (2003), 1.

[31]Paul Zeleza. "The causes and costs of war in Africa". In *Roots of African Conflict : The Causes and Costs,* edited by Alfred Nhema and Paul Zeleza, (Addis Ababa: James Currey Ltd., Ohio University Press & Unisa Press, 2008), 6.

1.5.3.3 Political--Based Conflicts

Barbero recognises that contrary to popular belief, conflicts in Africa are steeped in ideology.[32] Groups have continually engaged in conflict to seize control over power on ideological grounds. For example, the Southerners in Sudan engaged in conflict in independence from the North, culminating in the formation of the new nation of South Sudan in 2011. Of course, the other predominant reason is that the Southerners wished for independence was to have the power to control their resources.[33]

1.5.3.4 Religious-Based Conflicts

Zeleza notes that conflicts in Sub-Saharan are usually dominated by ethnic divisions, whereas that in North Africa is dominated by religious differences. However, religion is still a source of conflict, although to a lesser extent in East Africa. Like ethnic identities, religion is hardly ever the sole cause of any conflict in Africa. It too is intertwined with the struggles for power, resources and ethnic identities.[34]

1.5.4 The Legacy of Colonialism and Neo-Liberalism

Zeleza argues that "there is hardly any zone of conflict in contemporary Africa that cannot trace its sordid violence to the colonial history and even the late nineteenth century."[35] African scholars, such as Zeleza, tend to begin with a discussion of the effect of colonialism when considering the root causes of the conflicts in Africa. As discussed below, these arguments

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[32]Paul Zeleza. "The causes and costs of war in Africa". In *Roots of African Conflict : The Causes and Costs,* edited by Alfred Nhema and Paul Zeleza, (Addis Ababa: James Currey Ltd., Ohio University Press & Unisa Press, 2008), 2.
[33]"About Human Development", UNDP, May 2013.
[34]Paul Zeleza. "The causes and costs of war in Africa". In *Roots of African Conflict : The Causes and Costs,* edited by Alfred Nhema and Paul Zeleza, (Addis Ababa: James Currey Ltd., Ohio University Press & Unisa Press, 2008), 23.
[35]Ibid.

present an examination of the effect of historical practices on modern day Africa and are extremely sound. They cannot be overlooked. Interestingly, many modern Western scholars do not acknowledge the effect of colonialism on Africa's current conflicts.

Rothchild acknowledges that colonial systems created and sustained inequalities between ethnic groups, between rural versus urban dwellers and generally between any group who held more favour with the colonialists.[36] For example, the colonialists' use of stratification, where they assigned one ethnic group as superior to another, was a means of creating inequalities in the psyche of the different ethnic groups and has continued to cause tensions among these groups. Rothchild argues "such an externally radiated hegemonic system [colonialism] concentrated bureaucratic, military, educational, commercial, industrial, communications and other modern sector activities within a small, privileged, white-led urban core".[37] Over time, communities with greater access and favour from the colonial masters would prosper, while their counterparts who did not enjoy such favours did not. Rothchild argues that colonial powers promoted unity or disunity among ethnic groups depending on the security, economic and political gains to be made. "The effect of encouraging these socially constructed identities was to create an incentive among elites to mobilise support along ethnic lines."[38]

The colonial powers used authoritarian rule, where power was concentrated in the hands of the few whites. This was a highly effective system as most of East Africa remained colonised for more than 100 years. It is therefore not surprising that this system of "an economically privileged and politically powerful centre" became entrenched. The experience of colonialism set up the prime conditions for inequalities in political and economic power. From their colonial

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[36]Donald Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa*, (Washington: Brookings Institutional Press, 1997), 6.
[37]Ibid,8.
[38]Ibid.

masters, Africans learned that ethnic differences could be used to gain and keep power and wealth.[39] Furthermore, the liberation struggles were often very violent and while they "liberated African societies from colonialism, in many cases, they left a lasting legacy of conflict that sooner or later festered and erupted."[40] Therefore, an examination of the role of colonialism is a logical place to begin any examination the root causes of conflict in Africa.

Zeleza argues that the Cold War is another period in history where Western actors influenced African politics to the continent's detriment, leading to "hot proxy-wars" in Africa.[41] Africa's engagement with the US and the Soviet Union was fuelled by ideology and the desire to increase their international influence. However, this too had a lasting negative impact on African countries; "while the cold war may have created auspicious conditions for and even accelerated decolonisation and enabled African states to gain international influence by manipulating super power rivalries, the developmental, democratic and humanitarian costs of the wars it engendered or aggravated were extremely high and persisted even after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991."[42]

Putzel argues that the liberalisation movement that was forced upon by the Word Bank in the 1980s and 1990s supported the conditions for conflict in Africa as it undermined state-led economies.[43] In its push for market-based economies, these policies included the removal of trade barriers and relaxation of state control over foreign exchange, enabling smuggling of resources such as diamonds out of Africa in exchange for arms which enabled and fuelled

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[39]Donald Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa*, (Washington: Brookings Institutional Press, 1997), 6.
[40]Paul Zeleza. "The causes and costs of war in Africa". In *Roots of African Conflict : The Causes and Costs,* edited by Alfred Nhema and Paul Zeleza, (Addis Ababa: James Currey Ltd., Ohio University Press & Unisa Press, 2008), 3.
[41]Ibid.
[42]Ibid, 4.
[43]James Putzel, The Political Impact of Globalisation and Liberalisation: Evidence from Crisis States Research", *Crisis States Discussion Papers, Development Research Centre*, No. 7, (2004): 8.

African conflict.[44] Alusula also points out that Warsaw Pact countries were involved in supplying all the warring sides of Rwanda with illicit arms, a fact that contributed in the escalating the magnitude of the Rwanda conflict: "If weapons (of any kind) had not been sold to Rwanda during the period leading up to the genocide, a calamity of the magnitude of the genocide would not have taken place."[45] Furthermore, dictators and other elites were also able to drain their countries, stashing away foreign currency in European countries. "This created a perverse and vicious cycle: falling state revenues, leading to increasing ineffectiveness of authority, allowing expanded smuggling, leading to further declines in revenue − a pattern of incentives that could only increase violence."[46] African countries have been further disadvantaged through globalisation. It is clear that manipulative relationships between the West and African countries have been at the core of the conflicts in these countries. Although colonialism ended, it has been continually replaced by systems that are equally unjust and exploitative.[47]

1.5.5. Post - Conflict Societies

Junne and Verokren explain that the term 'post-conflict' is used to describe "a conflict situation in which open warfare has come to an end."[48] Post-conflict societies face many context specific challenges. According to Collier, the greatest challenge to post conflict societies, regardless of

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[44]O P Cit

[45]Nelson Alusala, "Disarmament and reconciliation: Rwanda's Concerns." *Institute of Security Studies Papers,* Paper 108 (2005): 4.

[46]James Putzel, The Political Impact of Globalisation and Liberalisation: Evidence from Crisis States Research", *Crisis States Discussion Papers, Development Research Centre*, No. 7, (2004): 9, accessed May 21, 2013, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/843/1/dp07.pdf

[47]Paul Zeleza. "The causes and costs of war in Africa". In *Roots of African Conflict : The Causes and Costs,* edited by Alfred Nhema and Paul Zeleza, (Addis Ababa: James Currey Ltd., Ohio University Press & Unisa Press, 2008), 5.

[48]Gerd Junne and Willemjin Verkoren, "The Challenges of Post Conflict Development". In *Post Conflict Development: Meeting new challenges,* eds. Gerd Junne and Willemjin Verkoren, (Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publications, 2005), 1.

their contexts, is preventing the country or region from slipping back into open warfare[49]. The World Bank statistics show that countries at the end of a civil war face 44% more risk of returning to it in five years".[50] Given this tendency, and the fact that these societies are highly polarised, the most urgent business in post conflict societies is to quickly establish systems that will ensure sustainable peace. While dealing with the delicate business of building sustainable peace, post-conflict societies also have to grapple with the humanitarian crisis that conflict engenders[51].

1.5.6 Peace Building Models

1.5.6.1 Liberalisation and peace building

As Paris notes, the most dominant peace model is the liberalisation model. It is based on the assumption that countries with a democracy and a market-economy are most likely to achieve and sustain peace. Under this model, post-conflict societies are encouraged to democratise and liberalise their economies.[52]

Institutionalisation before Liberalisation

Paris argues that while liberalisation may be good in the long-term, in the short-term it is destabilising.[53] Functioning economies need a state with reliable legal systems. Establishing a market based economy immediately after the cessation of conflict may actually work to entrench

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[49]The World Bank. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Policy Research Reports).* (Washington DC: 2003), 4.

[50]Ibid.

[51]Conflict Sensitivity Consortium. *Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peace building: tools for peace and conflict impact assessment.* Christian Barbero and Manuela Leonhardt. (2003), 3.

[52]Alina Rocha and Kate Kilpatrick. "Towards more effective peace building: a conversation with Roland Paris." *Development in Practice*, Vol 15, (2005), 1.

[53]Ibid.

the disparities that caused the conflict in the first place, setting the scene for increased tensions between groups which may lead to a return to conflict.[54]

Elections are usually the hallmark of a democracy. However, pushing for immediate elections may actually lead the country into more conflict.[55] In order for peaceful elections to occur, functional and reliable systems that can ensure peace throughout the election period and after the results have been announced must exist. Structures like reliable electoral commissions, legal systems and courts equipped to handle disputes that may arise during the electoral process and following the election result are crucial. Therefore, instead of pushing for immediate liberalisation, peace builders should focus on setting up structures that can support a democracy and a market-based economy.[56] Failure to do so may put the country at a very high risk of relapsing into conflict. According to Paris, countries that are most likely to experience internal conflict are not authoritarian states, but those that are not fully democratized, where "there is incomplete or partial democratization, where the transition has become stuck."[57]

1.5.6.2 Indigenous Peace Building Models

Ayindo asserts that "one way of resolving much of the conflict we face is by building a strong identity as African people, being conscious and proud of our history. We must believe that we are able to create a culture of peace, in contrast to the culture of violence we have created in the past decades."[58] Indigenous peace building models are based on the premise that peace building should be driven by Africans. This calls for Africans taking a strong participatory role in peace

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[54]Alina Rocha and Kate Kilpatrick. "Towards more effective peace building: a conversation with Roland Paris." *Development in Practice*, Vol 15, (2005), 1.
[55]Ibid.
[56]Ibid.
[57]Ibid.
[58]Babu Ayindo, Sam Doe, and Janice Jenner, "When you are the Peace Builder: Stories and Reflections on Peace building from Africa." Conflict Transformation Program, Eastern Mennonite University, 2001, 4.

building initiatives, a view shared by Barbero who says, "traditional forms of justice and reconciliation are also crucial in post-conflict situations."[59] However, the literature fails to acknowledge that these indigenous methods of peace building have not been institutionalised and therefore cannot achieve maximum impact. Furthermore, the peace builders in the indigenous movements lack the capacity to participate in peace building at national and international levels, meaning that their unique expertise and experiences are not incorporated into the higher level policy making level, which may ultimately mean that policies created at this level are difficult to enforce and are unsustainable.

The African Principles of Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation state that the underlying principle of peace building is *"to prevent latent conflict escalating into violence, through open dialogue, exploitative relations or re-incorporate offenders into the community and to maintain social harmony."[60]* In order to achieve this, they recommend investigating the context and all its root causes of conflict or offense, building consensus around expected outcomes of the discussion, public admission of responsibility and expression or remorse, determination of damage and redressing the victim, including compensation, whether symbolic or proportional."[61]

1.5.7 Peace Building in the East Africa Sub-region

Maina's examination of peace building perfectly embodies the challenges facing East African post-conflict societies, as they try to find the perfect balance between peace and justice. She posits that these two elements must be present in order to foster sustainable peace, when he states

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[59]Conflict Sensitivity Consortium. *Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peace building: tools for peace and conflict impact assessment.* Christian Barbero and Manuela Leonhardt. (2003), 8.
[60]Josphat Balegamire. "The All-Africa Conference on African Principles of Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation". *Conflict Prevention Newsletter*, Vol 3 (2000):3.
[61]Ibid.

that "both justice and reconciliation are fundamental and significant to ensuring successful post-conflict resolution."[62] However, these elements may sometimes seem mutually incompatible, especially at the beginning of peace building efforts where the most urgent need is to ensure cessation of violence and prevent a relapse into conflict. In such cases, common practice shows us that peace building methods that initially focus on reconciliation may be best to bring the warring parties to the negotiation table. However, Maina argues that although this is common practice, "such processes can very often perpetuate a culture of impunity as well as ignore claims for justice that may cause dissatisfaction amongst aggrieved groups and undermine any hope of achieving a sustainable positive peace."[63]

Peace Building in Burundi

Wolpe argues that although conflict in Burundi has been traditionally depicted as ethnically driven disputes between the Hutus and Tutsis, this is an erroneous view. Instead, "the conflict is best understood as a result of the manipulation of ethnic identities by the political class in the struggle for postcolonial control of the state."[64] The country had four peacemaking phases: the initial UN intercession, Julius Nyerere as facilitator, Nelson Mandela as facilitator, and the transitional government. This long and complex road to peace lasting from 1993 to 2005 has provided crucial lessons, which can be applied to other post-conflict countries in East Africa. Among these is the importance of choosing a facilitator with excellent listening skills and is

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[62]Grace Maina, "Making Deals for Peace: The Peace and Justice Dilemma." *Policy and Practice Briefs from The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes*, 8, (2011): 1.
[63]Ibid.
[64]Howard Wolpe, "Making Peace after Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process", *Peace Works,* No 70, (2011): 3.

perceived to be neutral. For example, the Tutsi community viewed Nyerere as pro-Hutu partisan and this frustrated the peace negotiations.[65]

It is also imperative that all parties, especially those with destabilizing potential are at the negotiating table and that these parties own the process. "One of the unfortunate aspects of the Burundi peace process was the extent to which many decisions made in the course of negotiations—particularly on matters of process, and sometimes on matters of substance—were determined by the facilitation team, rather than by the Burundian parties. As the process morphed from facilitation to mediation to arbitration, Burundians were thus increasingly negotiating not with each other, but with the facilitator."[66] The lack of ownership of the process will also frustrate the peace building processes. Another crucial lesson to be learned from the Burundi peace process is that "premature agreements on cease-fires that cannot be implemented can be used by the belligerent parties to demonstrate that their adversaries are not trustworthy", which will of course comprise the outcomes of the peace talks.[67] In the Burundi example, Nyerere pushed for the rebel groups to commit to ceasing attacks on civilians and each other prematurely. Under pressure, the rebel groups signed the agreement. However, as the root causes of the conflict had not been addressed, the agreement soon disintegrated and conflict relapsed.[68]

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[65]Howard Wolpe, "Making Peace after Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process", *Peace Works,* No 70, (2011): 3.
[66]Ibid.
[67]Ibid, 5.
[68]Ibid.

Peace Building in Rwanda

As Alusula explains, Rwanda's conflict, like that in Burundi, was mainly a result of perceived ethnic differences, being used in the struggle for political power.[69] Rwanda's peace building process is a good example of the use of indigenous based methods of conflict resolution, after formal peace building approaches had failed. A system called the *Gacaca* was introduced. This was a "blend of traditional Rwandan justice system and conventional courts" with "11,000 jurisdictions, each with 19 elected judges."[70]

This system was given the jurisdiction to try genocide suspects who participated in voluntary homicides or serious acts of violence, people who committed violent acts without intent to kill and people who committed crimes against property."[71] These courts could not however prosecute organisers and leaders of the genocide- this was left to the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR).[72] The *Gacaca* courts have been widely successful and are a good example of how both justice and reconciliation can be used to build peace. However, as the literature shows, the *Gacaca* courts do not have the jurisdiction to control or enforce disarmament. The widely available arms compromise the peace fostered by the *Gacaca* courts as they present an easy means to return to conflict[73].

Peace Building in Uganda

The International Crisis group have monitored the peace building process in Northern Uganda, following the 20 year conflict between the rebel group, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and

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[69]Nelson Alusala, "Disarmament and reconciliation: Rwanda's Concerns." *Institute of Security Studies Papers,* Paper 108 (2005): 1.
[70]Ibid, 3.
[71]Ibid.
[72]Ibid.
[73]Ibid.

the government of Uganda, and report that the process is on-going, albeit somewhat stalled.[74]

Core issues such as justice, security and livelihoods have yet to be agreed upon. Some scholars

believe that both the LRA and Government of Uganda are less than totally committed to this

peace process, while there is donor and international fatigue in the peace process.[75] This is

usually cited as an example where the push for justice, through the indictment of the LRA

leaders by the International Criminal Courts has actually negatively impacted the peace talks and

impeded the cessation of violence.[76]

Peace Building in Kenya

As reported by the Kenya Human Rights Commission, over 1,000 people were killed following

the violence that erupted after the disputed elections in 2007. Kenya then followed the popular

model of initiating peace talks in the immediate aftermath in order to stop the conflict. Mediation

talks, led by Kofi Annan resulted in the formation of a power sharing government, which

stopped the violence, resulting in a power sharing government. The country then engaged in

efforts to strengthen its structures through judicial reform, overhaul of the electoral commission

and most notably the development and promulgation of a new constitution.[77] However, issues of

justice in Kenya's peace building process have been largely absent. While top organisers and

leaders of the conflict were indicted by the International Criminal Court, they have yet to be

tried.[78] Furthermore, this did not stop them from assuming the two highest leadership roles in the

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[74]International Crisis Group. *Northern Uganda Peace Process: The Need to Maintain Momentum,*
(Nairobi/Kampala/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2007), 1..
[75]Ibid.
[76]Ibid.
[77]Kenya Human Rights Commission. *Elusive Justice: A status Report of the Victims of the 2007-2008 post-election
violence in Kenya*, (Nairobi: KHRC, 2012), 1.
[78]Ibid.

country-President and Deputy President. As the Kenya Human Rights Commission notes, the debate in Kenya has mainly centred on resettlement of the displaced persons, but there has been no justice for the crimes committed against them. "Those whose family members were killed, who lost substantial productive capacity due to injury, and those who experienced sexual and gender-based violence have seen virtually no targeted response to their violations", thus denying them their rights "to know the truth about violations, to justice, and to reparation are basic rights of all victims of gross violations of human rights".[79] The commission point out that despite the establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, no domestic justice mechanism has been established to hold perpetrators to justice".[80]

1.5.8 The Role of Women and Youth in Peace and Conflict in Africa

Lahai and McIntyre recognise that most women and youth are viewed mainly as victims of violence during conflicts in Africa.[81] They also argue that although women and youth face increased violence during conflicts, their every-day lives are also very violent.[82] Lahai claims that women's every-day lives are "gendered battlefields" due to forced marriages, domestic violence and so forth.[83] Utas also recognises that youth face similar every day violence.

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[79]Kenya Human Rights Commission. *Elusive Justice: A status Report of the Victims of the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya*, (Nairobi: KHRC, 2012), 1

[80]Ibid

[81]John Lahai. "Gendered Battlefields: A contextual and Comparative Analysis of Women's Participation in Armed conflicts in Africa." *The Peace and Conflict Review*, Vol 4, (2010): 1.

[82]Angela McIntyre, "Rights, Root Causes and Recruitment: The youth factor in Africa's armed conflicts", African Security Review, Vol 12, No. 2, (2003): 1.

[83]John Lahai. "Gendered Battlefields: A contextual and Comparative Analysis of Women's Participation in Armed conflicts in Africa." *The Peace and Conflict Review*, Vol 4, (2010): 1.

According to Utas, "youth in urban areas of post-war African countries lead lives that are not very different from non-post-war societies." [84]

Although there are differing opinions on the classification of youth, it is usually defined as period between from age 15 to 25 years.[85] As Utas argues, this period is "manifest in a lack of livelihood and educational opportunities and a near total absence of forums for the peaceful participation of young people in decision and policymaking."[86] The lack of livelihoods engenders poverty in both youth and women. Furthermore, both women and youth have been relegated to the bottom of the society, where their opinions are usually not heard. Utas argues that this causes "a social form of death – the feeling of having no social worth, being devoid of social value."[87] It is this feeling of worthlessness that may lead both women and the youth to become engaged as perpetrators of violence during conflicts in Africa. Political leaders are aware of these feelings and utilise them to incite women and youth to violence.[88]

Lahai argues that although most of the discussion about women in conflict focuses on their roles as victims, it is evident that women also play a role as combatants in these conflicts.[89] This is also true for children and youth.[90] Although many women and youth are coerced into participating as perpetrators of violence, some also join the armed conflict voluntarily. For example, some women join conflict in order to gain power that has otherwise been a stronghold

[84]Mats, Utas. "Urban youth and post-conflict Africa: On policy priorities." Nordic African Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, 2012, 1.
[85]Ibid.
[86]Ibid.
[87]Ibid.
[88]Angela McIntyre, "Rights, Root Causes and Recruitment: The youth factor in Africa's armed conflicts", African Security Review, Vol 12, No. 2, (2003): 1.
[89]John Lahai. "Gendered Battlefields: A contextual and Comparative Analysis of Women's Participation in Armed conflicts in Africa." *The Peace and Conflict Review*, Vol 4, (2010): 3.
[90] Mats Utas. "Urban youth and post-conflict Africa: On policy priorities." Nordic African Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, 2012, 1.

of the men. In a way, they join the conflict and perpetrate acts of violence in order to "transcend their femininity".[91] Utas offers a similar argument where youth join conflict in order to be "seen" to finally have power in a society where they have been powerless.[92] Zeleza reiterates this view in his argument that conflict for women can be positively transformative, enabling women to break gender barriers and assume power that has previously been inaccessible to them.[93]

Women and youth also have a key role to play as peace builders. According to McIntyre, "the youth represent a tremendous resource for the future of the country and how to make them peace-builders, instead of potential spoilers of the newly won peace is a major challenge."[94] Due to their unique experiences, women also have a good understanding of peace building processes and have the potential to impact the process positively.[95] Unfortunately, tapping into the potential for women and youth to contribute effectively to peace building has been challenging. When involved in peace building initiatives, they are usually relegated to the grass roots level and absent at national, regional and international peace building initiatives.[96]

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[91]O P Cit

[92] Mats Utas. "Urban youth and post-conflict Africa: On policy priorities." Nordic African Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, 2012, 2.

[93]Paul Zeleza. "The causes and costs of war in Africa". In *Roots of African Conflict : The Causes and Costs,* edited by Alfred Nhema and Paul Zeleza, (Addis Ababa: James Currey Ltd., Ohio University Press & Unisa Press, 2008), 21

[94]Angela McIntyre, "Rights, Root Causes and Recruitment: The youth factor in Africa's armed conflicts", African Security Review, Vol 12, No. 2, (2003): 3

[95]John Lahai. "Gendered Battlefields: A contextual and Comparative Analysis of Women's Participation in Armed conflicts in Africa." *The Peace and Conflict Review*, Vol 4, (2010): 3.

[96] Mats Utas. "Urban youth and post-conflict Africa: On policy priorities." Nordic African Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, 2012,1.

1.5.9 The Role of Civil Society

1.5.9.1 The role of Religious Actors in Peace and Conflict in Africa

Although religion has usually been seen as a force to divide and cause conflict, some scholars like Ayindo, support the view that it can be used to foster peace.[97] Many Africans have religious beliefs. As Ayindo states, "we Africans are a spiritual people". These beliefs can be used to promote peace.[98] For example, religious leaders were used to mediate conflict between warring clans in Sudan, where they successfully used religious arguments to promote peace. "During the mediation talks between the warring clans in Sudan, the representative said, "As Muslims, we have an example of forgiveness in Prophet Mohammed. Although it is difficult to forgive those who quarrel and are unjust to you, as good Muslims we have to follow the example set by the prophet."[99] Although such arguments may seem simplistic, they can be very persuasive amongst a religious community. Ayindo posits that as Africans we need to ask ourselves, "what really motivates us especially in times of crisis?" The answer to this question for many Africans is the belief in God and active participation in religion. This is an untapped resource for fostering peace.[100]

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[97]Babu Ayindo, Sam Doe, and Janice Jenner, "When you are the Peace Builder: Stories and Reflections on Peace building from Africa." Conflict Transformation Program, Eastern Mennonite University, 2001, 6.
[98]Ibid.
[99]Ibid.
[100]Ibid.

1.5.9.2 The role of the Media in Peace and Conflict in Africa

As Zeleza points out, there is the "the tendency to treat African social phenomenon as peculiar and pathological."[101] Western popular media and even some academic scholars would have us think that African conflict is primitive, particularly violent and devoid of ideology. Western media portrays Africans as greedy barbaric people intent on killing each other. There is also the tendency to over simplify African conflict, treating it as primitive "tribal" conflict based upon "age-old" differences between groups.[102] These kinds of views trivialise African conflict, drawing attention away from the root causes of the conflict. In doing so, the Western media can be seen as perpetuating conflicts in Africa because it obscures objective debate on the root causes of conflict, which would in turn lead to discussions on sustainable peace building initiatives.[103]

Paris argues that African media has also played its role in triggering and perpetuating conflict. He recognises that although an independent media is often pushed as part of liberalisation, it can have negative effects if the country lacks legitimate systems to ensure that the power the media holds is not abused.[104] He cites the case of Rwanda, where the media was used by the organisers of the conflict to incite and even coordinate violence during the 1994 genocide.[105] Similar use of the media was observed in the post-election violence in 2007, where the media, especially vernacular radio stations broadcasted messages to incite hate among different ethnic groups and spur them to violence.

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[101]Paul Zeleza. "The causes and costs of war in Africa". In *Roots of African Conflict : The Causes and Costs,* edited by Alfred Nhema and Paul Zeleza, (Addis Ababa: James Currey Ltd., Ohio University Press & Unisa Press, 2008), 1.
[102]Ibid.
[103]Ibid.
[104]Alina Rocha and Kate Kilpatrick. "Towards more effective peace building: a conversation with Roland Paris." *Development in Practice*, Vol 15, (2005), 1.
[105]Ibid.

1.6   Literature Gap

While analysing the literature above, the researcher has noted the following gaps as discussed below. Scholars such as Zeleza[106], Rothchild[107] and Maina[108] have argued that the legacy of colonialism and liberalisation set up the conditions that entrenched economic and political inequalities which still exist today and continue to cause conflict in Africa. However, there has been no attempt to suggest ways to address these deep rooted inequalities. Questions such as how do African countries go about getting on with what Zeleza terms as the "unfinished business of liberation" such as land distribution issues which continue to plague countries like Zimbabwe and Kenya still remain unanswered.[109]

Discussions by scholars such as Zeleza[110], Barbero[111] and Junne[112] show that Africa/Western relationships have been exploitative; creating conditions that caused and or exacerbated conflict. As Africa moves into the 21st century with new relationships with China and the Middle East, how can we guard against replicating exploitative Cold War type of

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[106]Paul Zeleza. "The causes and costs of war in Africa". In *Roots of African Conflict : The Causes and Costs,* edited by Alfred Nhema and Paul Zeleza, (Addis Ababa: James Currey Ltd., Ohio University Press & Unisa Press, 2008), 1.

[107]Donald Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa*, (Washington: Brookings Institutional Press, 1997), 6.

[108]Grace Maina, "Making Deals for Peace: The Peace and Justice Dilemma." *Policy and Practice Briefs from The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes*, 8, (2011): 1.

[109]Paul Zeleza. "The causes and costs of war in Africa". In *Roots of African Conflict : The Causes and Costs,* edited by Alfred Nhema and Paul Zeleza, (Addis Ababa: James Currey Ltd., Ohio University Press & Unisa Press, 2008), 1.

[110]Ibid.

[111]Conflict Sensitivity Consortium. *Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peace building: tools for peace and conflict impact assessment.* Christian Barbero and Manuela Leonhardt. (2003), 3.

[112]Gerd Junne and Willemjin Verkoren, "The Challenges of Post Conflict Development". In *Post Conflict Development: Meeting new challenges,* eds. Gerd Junne and Willemjin Verkoren, (Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publications, 2005), 1.

relationships? As Lahai and McIntyre acknowledge, women and youth have traditionally been treated as victims of conflict.[113]

Their role in peace building has been relegated to the grass roots levels and they have been absent in national and international level peace building processes.[114] Further information is needed on the role that women and youth play in peace building and how can they be supported to have greater impact. Zeleza acknowledges that religion has a basis for division and conflict. He also acknowledges that more information is needed to answer the questions of to what extent religious actors can be used in peace building, and they can be supported to contribute effectively to national and international level discussion on peace building issues.[115]

Scholars such as Zeleza and Barbero are especially critical of the media's negative role in African conflicts.[116] International media has played a role in perpetuating stereotypes of Africa as a continent steeped in irrational never-ending conflict and local media has been used to instigate conflict.[117] However, we need to ask ourselves, can the media be used to promote peace? What role does media control and censorship play in peace and conflict? Finally, African scholars such as Ayindo continually espouse the need for a galvanised African identity.[118] However, what exactly is this identity and practically, how does one go about achieving this? Furthermore, to what extent will such an identity prevent conflict or promote peace?

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[113]John Lahai. "Gendered Battlefields: A contextual and Comparative Analysis of Women's Participation in Armed conflicts in Africa." *The Peace and Conflict Review*, Vol 4, (2010): 3.

[114]Angela McIntyre, "Rights, Root Causes and Recruitment: The youth factor in Africa's armed conflicts", African Security Review, Vol 12, No. 2, (2003): 3.

[115]Paul Zeleza. "The causes and costs of war in Africa". In *Roots of African Conflict : The Causes and Costs,* edited by Alfred Nhema and Paul Zeleza, (Addis Ababa: James Currey Ltd., Ohio University Press & Unisa Press, 2008), 9.

[116]Ibid, 1.

[117]Conflict Sensitivity Consortium. *Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peace building: tools for peace and conflict impact assessment.* Christian Barbero and Manuela Leonhardt. (2003), 3.

[118]Babu Ayindo, Sam Doe, and Janice Jenner, "When you are the Peace Builder: Stories and Reflections on Peace building from Africa." Conflict Transformation Program, Eastern Mennonite University, 2001, 6.

As this review has shown, the causes of African conflict are incredibly complex. However, none of those causes are unfathomable or irrational, and they are very much like causes of conflict in other parts of the world. Therefore, Africa can learn both what works and what does not from conflict in other parts of the world. Furthermore, the examination of the peace models and initiatives has shown that conflict resolution and sustainable peace building is indeed possible. From the literature reviewed, it seems that a mix of conventional peace building approaches and traditional African methods works best. The need for innovative context specific conflict resolution and peace building approaches cannot be underscored enough. Finally, there is the need for rigorous, context specific, systematic, unbiased and logical examination of each actor and the role they play in the peace and conflict. If we are to devise sustainable solutions to peace building, we must base our efforts on accurate knowledge gained through sound methodology.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

Malejaqc argues that Western theoretical perspective and explanations of conflict in Africa have been focused primarily on social-political and economic causes of conflict and that this approach to understanding African conflicts has influenced western policies and reactions to conflict in Africa. [119] He suggests that historically most conflicts in Africa were described as barbaric and irrational and the west did not generally seek to understand their underlying causes. Malejaqc explains that by the end of the cold war there was a paradigmatic shift in explaining the causes of conflict in Africa. Arguments became increasingly based on the theory of democratic peace and

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[119]Richard Bowd & Annie B. Chikwanha; Understanding Africa's Contemporary Conflicts, Origins Challenges and Peace building. A monograph for Africa Human Security Initiatives (2008) , 10-11

the premise that African countries experienced violent conflicts because they were not democratic.[120]

The theoretical framework underpinning this study is the human needs approach which rest on the basic assumption that human needs are a key motivational force behind human behaviour and social interactions.[121] Indeed the crux of the human needs approach, as applied to international relations can be found in the work of John Burton.[122] Burton claims that over time all societies experience conflicts between the institutional values and structures of society on the one hand and human needs at the level of the individual on the other hand.[123] Burton further explains that, individuals in striving to meet their needs will interact with other individuals. As a result of this interaction, individuals identify with, and join in various associations that might facilitate the satisfaction of their needs, since social institutions tend over time to express the bargaining power of elites and higher status groups.[124] He argues that society that thus fails to meet the needs of their members eventually become unstable over time. If they are to survive and be seen as legitimate by the vast majority they will ultimately be forced to undergo change. Global politics thus are a function of the processes of legitimization and delegitimisation in world society, which result from individuals and groups pursuing needs and values.[125]

There is no consensus amongst scholars on the crucial definition of human needs. However Maslow's hierarchy of needs is a theory in psychology proposed by Abraham Maslow in his 1943 paper "A theory of Human motivation.[126] Maslow used the terms physiological,

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[120]Ibid

[121]John Burton & Frank Dukes; Conflict : Readings in Management and Resolution, the Macmillan Press Ltd (1990) , 162.

[122] R. A. Coate and J. A. Rosate: A critical Assessment of the power of Human needs in world society in conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution Edited by John Burton and Frank Dukes, The Macmillan Press Ltd (1990),157-160

[123] John Burton & Frank Dukes; Conflict : Readings in Management and Resolution, the Macmillan Press Ltd (1990) ,162.

[124]Ibid.

[125] Ibid.

[126] A. H. Maslow; A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review, 50(4) 370-96.

safety, belongingness and love, Esteem, Self-Actualization and Self Transcendence needs to describe the pattern that human motivations generally move through.[127]

A critical analysis and examination of violent conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa will lead to the irresistible conclusion that individuals participate in groups and become part of different social networks in order to pursue their needs and values. This explains why in Kenya for example the Kikuyu and Kalenjin fought each other in 2007 post-election violence when the two tribe were in different political camps, but their quest for political power united them in the 2013 general elections, which elections were generally peaceful and devoid of ethnic clashes.

1.8 Hypotheses

The study tested the following hypotheses:

1. Conflict is prominent in societies that fail to meet the basic human needs of their members;

2. Human needs do not play any role in causing or perpetuating conflict.

3. Other factors such as cattle rustling and competition for natural based resources are the triggers and drivers of conflicts.

1.9 Justification of the Study

In trying to understand violent conflicts in Africa, there has been a much more holistic, multidisciplinary approach to understanding the causes of violent conflicts and their resolution. The study seeks to contribute to the literature in the academic field by interrogating the varying explanations of violent conflicts on the continent with a view to providing suitable responses to such conflicts through sustainable post-conflict peace initiatives.

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[127] A. H. Maslow; A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review, 50(4) 370-96.

This study is especially relevant in light of the recent violent conflict experienced in Kenya following the disputed 2007/2008 elections. The study will have both academic and policy justification. The researchers' contribution will definitely be useful to academicians, researchers, policy and decision-makers, conflict managers and peace practitioners to mention but a few.

At the policy level, the study will identify the key challenges and obstacles to successful and sustainable conflict resolution and peace building. This will enable policy makers in East Africa to develop policies that best overcome these challenges and obstacles. The findings of this study can be used to inform a wide range of policies, including economic and social policies. The study will show that conflict has negative impacts on the economy and the general well-being of the population. Economic and social conditions are also pre-disposing factors for violent conflict. It is therefore imperative that social and economic policy makers embed peace-building mechanisms into these policies.

At the academic level, this study will contribute to the general discourse on peace-building initiatives in East Africa. Unlike her neighbours, Kenya had not experienced a high intensity conflict until the post-election violence in 2007/2008. There is therefore not as much academic discourse focusing on violent conflict in Kenya, as compared to the other East African countries that have experienced high intensity conflict. This study will therefore add to the growing body of academic literature on high intensity conflict in Kenya. It will show how conflict triggers like cattle rustling and the competition for limited resources that are associated with low intensity conflict can trigger high intensity violent conflict.

The study will also elucidate best practices that lead to sustainable peace, such as community driven peace initiatives. This information can be used to strengthen pre-existing

peace promotion programs, as well as providing further justification for advantages of indigenous peace-building models, as opposed to Western "one-size-fits-all" approaches.

Finally, the study will uncover other areas for future research in peace-building. The results of this study will benefit government and other development actors such as NGOs, CBOs etc. who are involved in peace-building activities.

1.10 Research Methodology

The study was based on people's (inhabitants of Sotik and Borabu) experiences and their perspectives and opinions about conflict in Kenya from 1990-2012. For this reason, the study used qualitative research methodology. Primary data was collected using interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs). Secondary data was obtained from library and internet searches of peer reviewed online journals, books, newspapers, documentaries and organisational reports.

Primary data was collected in Sotik and Borabu Constituencies, located in Bomet and Nyamira Counties, respectively in Kenya. Thirty one questionnaires with open and closed ended questions (see Appendix 1) were administered to individuals in households in 12 villages in Sotik and Borabu. Nine interviews were held with key opinion leaders in the area, using a semi-structured interview guide (see Annex 3-5). Ten group discussions were held with groups of men, women and youth using a semi-structured discussion guide (see Appendix 2). 216 men, women, youth (including secondary school pupils) participated in these discussions. Interviews and discussions were voice recorded with the participants consent. In total, this study captured the experiences, perspectives and opinions of 256 people on conflict in Kenya from 1990-2012.

The study targeted men, women, youth, village elders, religious leaders, youth leaders and government leaders. The researcher used purposive sampling to identify participants for the interviews and group discussions. Respondents were selected because they had the information

the researcher wished to capture. Random sampling was used to select households where questionnaires were administered to individuals.

The data was analysed manually using thematic analysis. This enabled the researcher to identify the emerging and recurring themes and view how they related with each other.

The research was carried out mainly in Sotik and Borabu Constituencies in Bomet and Nyamira Counties in Kenya. The researcher was limited by time and the lack of resources to carry out a more extensive study. The researcher chose to use qualitative methods as they are best suited to capturing information about perceptions, experiences and experiences. As Patton and Cochran state, "if the question is a qualitative one, then the most appropriate and rigorous way of answering it is to use qualitative methods."[128] However, Patton and Cochran have noted that qualitative methods have been criticised as the sample size is usually small, making it difficult to generalise results to the broader population and they sometimes lack of rigour. In order to try and overcome these limitations and minimise bias the researcher made all attempts to maximise the variation of the sample, by selecting participants with a range of demographic variables (age, gender, ethnicity etc) and ensure that the research was systematic, reproducible, transparent and credible.

1.11 Chapter Outline

The study is structured into five (5) chapters.

1. Chapter One: Introduction to the study.

2. Chapter Two: Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies: An overview

3. Chapter Three: Post Conflict Peace-building in East Africa: The Case of Sotik and Borabu

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[128]A. H. Maslow; A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review, 50(4) 370-96.

CHAPTER TWO

PEACE BUILDING IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES: AN OVERVIEW

2.1 Introduction

In Chapter 1, the researcher presented an introduction to this study which will focus on peace building in post-conflict societies. The researcher examined the literature on the main causes of conflict in Africa, peace building models as well peace building in the East Africa Sub region. Chapter 1 also provides an overview of the methodology which the researcher will use to gather and analyse both primary and secondary data, as well as discussing the theoretical framework underpinning the whole study. This framework is based on the Human Needs Theory by John Burton which claims that individuals will interact with other individuals in an effort to meet their basic human needs and conflict is the result of individuals' efforts to meet these needs.

In this chapter, the researcher will examine approaches to peace building on a global scale, followed by discussion of peace building from an African and East African perspective.

2.2 Definition

There are several definitions of the term "peace building". However, most scholars such as Gendron and Hoffman acknowledge that the term was coined by Johan Galtung in 1970. According to his definition, "peace building is the creation and strengthening of institutions and structures which not only remove or significantly diminish the causes of war, but create circumstances in which peace is the most likely result."[1] According to Galtung, peace building

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[1] Renée Gendron and Evan Hoffman, "Resource Scarcity and the Prevention of Violent Conflicts", *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 1, (2009):2.

has three facets: peacekeeping, peace-making and peace building. The United Nations (UN) defines peacekeeping as "the deployment of international military and civilian personnel to a conflict area with the consent of the parties in order to: stop or contain hostilities or supervise the carrying out of a peace agreement."[2]

Recognising and building upon Johan Galtung's definition, The Berghof Foundation[3], states that the term "peace-making usually refers to diplomatic efforts to end violence between conflict parties and to achieve a peace agreement."[4] In defining peace, Galtung distinguished "positive peace" from "negative peace". In his view, negative peace describes peace as the absence of war or direct physical violence" whereas positive peace "includes the increase in social justice and the creation of a culture of peace among people within and across societies."[5] It is therefore apparent that the notion of peace is complex and has different intertwining elements. The Berghof foundation attempts to make sense of this complexity when they argue that peace-building, which is a more comprehensive approach to attaining sustainable peace, has the following elements: altering structural contradictions (by promoting state building and democracy), improving relations of conflict parties and changing individual attitudes and behaviours.[6] This inclusive definition of peace building is similar to that of the John Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) which defines peace building as, "a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution

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[2] United Nations Peacekeeping. Definition. 2007.
[3] The Berghof Foundation is a nonprofit, non-governmental organization involved in peace and conflict research, education and operations. It was started by Professor Zundel in 1971
[4] The Berghof Foundation. *Peace, Peace building, Peace-making.* (Berlin: The Berghof Foundation Operations, 2012), 60.
[5] Ibid, 59.
[6] Ibid, 63.

building and political as well as economic transformation."[7] Peace building encompasses short-term, medium-term and long-term actions. In the short term these include, mediation and negotiation of peace agreements and peacekeeping. Institution building and strengthening, promotion of democracy and equitable distribution of resources are examples of medium-term actions, while developmental transformation (ensuring citizen's basic human needs are met); including economic transformation are examples of long-term actions which can be taken to promote sustainable peace.

2.2   Peace Building: A Global Perspective

2.2.1 International Approaches to Peace Building

2.2.1.1 Traditional Approach to Peace Building

As Guldimann explains, the traditional approach to peace building focused on peacekeeping, led mainly by the United Nations (UN) and its member states.[8] This approach was centred on impartiality which "adhered to the principles of the United Nations Charter".[9] According to De Coning, traditional peacekeeping was about "maintaining the status quo."[10] In this traditional sense, the peacekeepers had "the full consent of the conflict parties".[11] Peacekeeping troops would be involved in activities such as "establishing a buffer zone between the belligerents, supervising troop withdrawals, securing a stable environment by providing protection of borders,

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[7] Renée Gendron and Evan Hoffman, "Resource Scarcity and the Prevention of Violent Conflicts", *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 1, (2009):2.

[8] Tim Guldimann, "Peacekeeping Under Strain: Coping with Evolving Contradictions?" *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 2, (2010):4.

[9] Ibid

[10] Cedric De Coning, "The Coherence Dilemma in Peace building and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Systems", *Accord Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 8, no. 3, (2008) 87.

[11] Tim Guldimann, "Peacekeeping Under Strain: Coping with Evolving Contradictions?" *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 2, (2010):5.

government buildings, politicians, election activities and humanitarian services, as well as mine clearance and disarmament."[12] However, due to their adherence to impartiality, the UN peacekeeping forces did not have the mandate to engage in cases where one party was in direct violation of the peace agreement or was engaging in actions that jeopardized human security.[13] Many in the international community as well as locals in countries where the UN peacekeeping troops were stationed viewed this as inaction, leading to severe criticism of this approach. This can be seen in Guldimann's assertion that, "where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil."[14] This refusal to distinguish aggressor from victim led to severe criticism of this approach, leading to diminishing confidence of the ability and willingness of the UN as the guarantor of world peace.[15] This was especially evident in the 1990s in countries like Rwanda where the UN's failure to act was severely criticised and was named as one the reasons for the large scale loss of human life during the 1994 genocide.[16]

2.2.1.2 A New Approach to Peace Building

In response to the heavy criticism of the above approach, the UN and its member states adopted a different peace building approach. As De Coning asserts, "during the post-Cold War era, the focus of international conflict management has increasingly shifted from peacekeeping, which

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[12] Tim Guldimann, "Peacekeeping Under Strain: Coping with Evolving Contradictions?" *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 2, (2010):4.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid, 5.

was about maintaining the status quo, to peace building, which has to do with managing change."[17] This shift reflects the more holistic definition of peace building discussed above. This change is especially evident in the UN, which continues to play a major role in the international response to conflict and peace building.

In light of this shift, the UN needed a more robust mandate that would propel its activities from the much criticised onlooker to a more hands-on approach. According to Guldimann, "in addition to basic peacekeeping and stabilisation, enforcement also includes complex stability tasks such as to: guarantee security to populations at risk and provide them with humanitarian aid under difficult conditions, forcibly disarm belligerents and disruptive elements, conduct sanctions and embargo operations, arrest war criminals, control air space and waters, and maintain its own, robust quick-reaction forces."[18] This meant that the UN and its member states would begin to distinguish victim from aggressor, which they had been accused of failing to do in the past. Not only would they need to make this distinction, they would also need to back this up with action. As Guldimann explains, in order to operationalise this new approach, "the UN kept the classical tasks of peacekeeping by lightly armed peacekeepers and concentrated on the civilian and police fields. For more complex or challenging military tasks, the Security Council mandated individual states or NATO."[19] This meant that NATO states or other individual states now had an increased role to play in peace building activities in other countries. This shift can be seen by the fact that "in October 2008, a new regulation for the US army ('Stability Operations FM 3-07') put operations for stabilising a crisis area at the same level as traditional combat

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[17] Cedric De Coning, "The Coherence Dilemma in Peace building and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Systems", *Accord Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 87, no. 3, (2008) 100.
[18] Tim Guldimann, "Peacekeeping Under Strain: Coping with Evolving Contradictions?" *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 2, (2010):4.
[19] Ibid

operations."[20] With these changes, the international community, led by the West and the UN began to take on more holistic approaches to peace building, including initial peacekeeping, creation and strengthening of structures and institution building. This is reflected by the 2005 UN Peace building Commission mandate, through which the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council mandates it "to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peace building and recovery; to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;" and "to to provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post conflict recovery."[21]

To demonstrate its support of this holistic approach to peace building, a fund called the United Nations Peace Building Fund was established in 2006, with members of its advisory group from Japan, UK, Bangladesh, South Africa, USA, Sweden and the Netherlands. Its aim is to "support activities, actions, programmes and organisations that seek to build a lasting peace in countries emerging from conflict."[22] From 2008-2011, this fund has allocated US$ 212 million to 6 priority countries (Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Guinea Bissau) in areas of security sector reform, peaceful dialogue, rule of law, national reconciliation, short-term employment strategies, sustainable livelihoods, public

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[20] Tim Guldimann, "Peacekeeping Under Strain: Coping with Evolving Contradictions?" *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 2, (2010):4.

[21]Ibid

[22] United Nations Peace building Fund, *Who we are*, (New York: UN Peace building Fund, 2006).

administration and public service delivery". [23]

This new approach to peace building has been carried out in several states including the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Guatemala Liberia and Somaliland, just to mention a few. As part of the holistic approach to peace building, in 2010, the UN Peace building Fund contributed US$3million to the safe return and socio-economic recovery of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sri Lanka, while in 2010, the fund committed US$10million to Guatemala for security sector reforms (SSRs), justice and programs aimed at empowering women.[24] In the DRC, from 2007, the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) was comprised of "appropriate civilian, judiciary and penitentiary components, a maximum of 760 military observers, 19 815 military personnel, 1 050 personnel of formed police units and 391 police personnel [and] authorised to allocate a standby force ready for rapid re-deployment elsewhere in the country, while focusing the attention of its military capabilities in the unstable eastern part of the country."[25] De Coning[26] notes that in Burundi and Sierra Leone, the UN Peace building Commission is working on an integrated peace building approach involving international donors and agencies, while the Overseas Development Institute discusses this new international approach to peace building, citing Somaliland as an example, where the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) has partnered with the UN Development Program to provide institutional support including capacity-building for key ministries, training of police and judiciary as well as support for a new constitutional

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[23]UN, *The Peace building Fund Report of the Secretary General.* (New York: UN Peace building Fund, 2012), 6-8.

[24]Ibid, *Sri Lanka, Guatemala*, (New York: UN Peace building Fund, 2010).

[25] James-Emmanuel Wanki, , "Disarming war, arming peace: The Congo crisis, Dag Hammarskjöld's legacy and the future role of MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" *Accord Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 11, no. 1, (2011): 118.

[26] Cedric De Coning, "The Coherence Dilemma in Peace building and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Systems", *Accord Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 8, no. 3, (2008) 100.

process.[27]   Similarly, the African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) explains that "the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has been the key partner involved in strengthening the capacity of the 4,000-strong Liberia National Police (LNP)."[28]

2.2.1.3 Challenges facing this New Approach of Peace Building

Clearly, this new holistic approach to peace building requires a delicate balance of the elements that will contribute to short, medium and long-term peace building. However, successfully managing all these elements, with their different actors is challenging. As De Coning asserts, "despite a growing awareness that the security, development, political, human rights, humanitarian and rule of law dimensions of peace building systems are interlinked, the agencies that implement programmes in these dimensions are finding it extremely difficult to meaningfully integrate them."[29] This view is echoed by the Institute of Security Studies, which points out, in these situations [new holistic peace building missions], there is often confusion of command and control, citing the African Union (AU)-UN mission in Darfur.[30] Guldimann asserts that this approach can only be successful if "the fragile equilibrium of successful peacekeeping and successful peace building can be maintained" which require "a strong military and peace building engagement from the outset, otherwise the process can fall victim to a vicious

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[27] Overseas Development Institute, *A new donor approach to fragile societies: The case of Somaliland* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2008), 103.

[28] ACCORD. *Enhancing security and justice in Liberia: The regional hub model (*Umhlanga Rocks, South Africa: ACCORD, 2013), 2.

[29] Cedric De Coning, "The Coherence Dilemma in Peace building and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Systems", *Accord Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 8, no. 3, (2008) 86.

[30] Institute of Security Studies. *Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the African Union Charter, Peace, Security and Justice* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), 20.

circle."[31] Guldimann's analysis of the challenges facing peace building in Afghanistan illustrates this point:

> In Afghanistan, the military engagement at the beginning was weak. Worsening security conditions have seriously jeopardised the development of civilian capacity. At the same time, setbacks in peace building efforts, especially in the judiciary and police, hampered social development, affected internal stability and increased conflict potential. This vicious circle has now provoked fundamental doubts about the Western approach in Afghanistan. The problem cannot be resolved by a mere increase of foreign troops, now provided by the US but refused by most European states.[32]

According to Guldimann, this approach of "outsourcing more robust tasks to individual states or NATO" gives individual states "such as the US, enhanced influence in the political development on the ground."[33]One has to therefore question, whether the outcomes of the peace building process are in the best interest of all the parties, including the post-conflict country and its citizens, or is the outcome skewed to reflect the best interest of the individual countries. Scholars like Paris, Fritz and Menochal have begun to question the Westernised state-building process adopted by most international peace building missions.[34] As discussed in chapter 1, this model often pushes for democratization through elections and adoption of a market-based economy prior to establishing the structures that can support the above, and in so doing, further destabilises the country.[35] The Overseas Development Institute observes that "the state-building model promoted by donors has a narrow focus and fails to address some of the challenges facing

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[31] Tim Guldimann, "Peacekeeping Under Strain: Coping with Evolving Contradictions?" *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 2, (2010):7.

[32]Ibid

[33]Ibid, 5

[34]Overseas Development Institute. *A new donor approach to fragile societies: The case of Somaliland* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2008), 1

[35]Ibid

fragile societies."[36]

As Guldimann explains, this new international approach to peace building gives individual states greater power, as they have invested more economically and militarily towards peace building in these post-conflict societies. This approach also carries greater political risk to the individual countries involved in the peace building actions. As Guldimann explains, countries now commit themselves to greater achievements such as attaining political stability, which includes building and strengthening political structures. In such situations, the countries run the risk of a never-ending engagement. "If an end-date for the international commitment depends on the success of its stabilising and rebuilding activities – such as in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan – the political risk is far greater. Here, the international actors themselves assume responsibility for the success of an open-ended project, and can hardly afford the high political costs of failure."[37] As the Overseas Development Institute mentioned, Western approaches to peace building may be too narrow minded. Guldimann supports this point through his discussion of an example where the international community raised community expectations of a situation they could not guarantee:

> Leaving the political solution unclear can provoke new conflicts, as with the riots in Kosovo in March 2004, five years after the international intervention. The riots forced the international side to accelerate institution-building in view of the envisaged political solution of a supervised independence, as defined by the Ahtisaari Plan. Institution-building by international actors had contributed to local expectations for independence. Western governments had actively promoted independence to the point that they in the end could pretend that there was no other solution for securing stability than independence, declared in February 2008.[38]

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[36] Overseas Development Institute. *A new donor approach to fragile societies: The case of Somaliland* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2008), 1

[37] Ibid

[38] Tim Guldimann, "Peacekeeping Under Strain: Coping with Evolving Contradictions?" *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 2, (2010):5.

Another challenge facing the international actors as they implement this new approach is that in order to stabilise the situation, they often have to deal with people or factions who during the conflict committed crimes against humanity. For example, "in Afghanistan, the West felt obliged to work closely with brutal warlords in order to foster security", while "in Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj became a strong partner of the international actors, although he was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and then acquitted due to lacking testimonies."[39] This lowers the legitimacy of the West and the UN in the face of the local community and increasingly, in the face of the international community.

One of the most significant challenges facing the West while implementing peace building using this approach is the lack of building local ownership. This is a serious obstacle as it questions the sustainability of the peace they have helped to build. Guldimann argues that "political stability can become sustainable only if local ownership is assured, that is if local structures are developed to empower local partners to take responsibility for the process." However, this is not the case with many international missions which "are inclined to keep control; and bureaucratic structures tend to perpetuate themselves."[40] Also, the lack of involvement of locals results in the creation of policies that may look good on paper, but are very difficult to implement. As Guldimann argues, "if laws are written by foreign experts, as in Kosovo, they not surprisingly comply with international standards but their implementation is hampered by social reality and traditions". These Western led missions tend to overlook the local realities, which doom the sustainability of their actions and ultimately undermine peace. For

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[39]Tim Guldimann, "Peacekeeping Under Strain: Coping with Evolving Contradictions?" *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 2, (2010):5.
[40]Ibid

example, "if peace operations promote rule of law and democracy in traditional societies – for instance with quotas for female candidates in elections – they accelerate modernisation, but provoke conflicts with traditional elites."[41] In such cases where the West tries to override the local traditions, instead of working with the locals to promote transformation, the result is increased tension and conflict, which in essence is the opposite of peace. Such actions, structures and policies cannot be expected to lead to sustainable peace, as the Afghanistan example shows, where "the Taliban and others oppose efforts for granting equal rights for women, denouncing this interference as 'Western cultural imperialism'."[42]

Furthermore, as Wanki argues, Western missions are facing a crisis of credibility where most locals feel "that these organisations spend huge sums of money footing the cost of their personal comfort, at the expense of actually carrying out the development tasks for which they have been deployed."[43] For example, "a UN official in the Congo recently admitted that about a third of MONUC's budgetary allocations were dedicated to transportation costs alone and many other international partners spent at times exorbitant sums on chauffeurs for their staff."[44] These peace building missions are also coming under scrutiny for failing to assure human security. The DRC is a good example where the UN mission has failed to assure general human security of the citizens, including protection of the women from becoming victims of brutal continual rape attacks. The UN mission soldiers have been accused of perpetuating some of these acts of rape themselves and becoming involved in the illicit smuggling of arms, drugs and diamonds to and

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[41]Tim Guldimann, "Peacekeeping Under Strain: Coping with Evolving Contradictions?" *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 2, (2010):5.

[42] Ibid.

[43] James-Emmanuel Wanki, "Disarming war, arming peace: The Congo crisis, Dag Hammarskjöld's legacy and the future role of MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" *Accord Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 11, no. 1, (2011): 123.

[44]Ibid

from the country.[45] It is therefore no surprise that "local people may welcome foreign presence initially, for assuring peace and security. However, the foreign presence is increasingly questioned, the longer it lasts."[46] Ultimately, the "foreigners who promote democracy also execute power, for which they have no democratic mandate from the population concerned."[47] This model is therefore facing serious challenges, including growing inefficiency, and most importantly, a credibility crisis. As Wanki asserts, "the UN stands taunted at the crossroads, painfully bogged down by serious and intensifying security challenges, alongside a growing credibility deficit resulting from controversies surrounding its work."[48]

2.2.1.4 Moving Away from Western Dominated Models of Peace Building

According to Guldimann, the West is losing its position as the world's dominant force in international peace building. This is due to the challenges facing the dominant Western approach to peace building as discussed above. "Guldimann argues that in the past eight years, US international credibility has suffered serious setbacks, affecting Western credibility generally in the rest of the world." This, and its declining success in "imposing its concepts on local actors by mobilising global support for its projects, as exemplified in Kosovo, in the Iranian nuclear issue or in the Near East" has all had the effect of diminishing Western dominance in peace building.[49]

The global economic downturn, which has affected the West, especially the US, is also

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[45] Tim Guldimann, "Peacekeeping Under Strain: Coping with Evolving Contradictions?" *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 2, (2010):5.

[46] Ibid.

[47]Ibid.

[48] The Congo crisis, Dag Hammarskjöld's legacy and the future role of MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" *Accord Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 11, no. 1, (2011): 103.

[49] Tim Guldimann, "Peacekeeping Under Strain: Coping with Evolving Contradictions?" *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 2, (2010):9, accessed June 17, 2013,

responsible for this decline of Western supremacy. Although current peace building missions have yet to suffer budget cuts, it is likely that fewer countries from the West will have the capability and/or the will to engage in future peace building efforts. As Guldimann argues, "peacekeeping now and in the near future will have to cope with three serious obstacles: limitations in staffing, financial restrictions and declining Western influence."[50] Guldimann predicts that "in case of a new major crisis, international consensus on a larger new peace operation with strong military and financial commitments from different Western governments is rather unlikely."[51] Guldimann further predicts that the weakening of the West as a peace building force is likely to lead to increased conflict as the world may not be ready for the removal of the traditional power in world politics, and this removal may have "wider destabilising effects"[52]. On the other hand, Guldimann sees this as an opportunity for peace building to be "established on a broader basis", including involvement of new powers such as China, India, Brazil and others. On the whole, this point to a move away from a Western dominated approach to peace building.[53]

2.2.2 Non-Western Models of Peace Building: Peace Education

In light of diminishing Western dominance in peace building, more innovative and non-Western approaches to peace building are arising. Peace education is one such approach. As Kester explains, "peace education is grounded in active citizenship, preparing learners for assiduous participation in a democracy, through problem-posing and problem-solving education, and a

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[50] Tim Guldimann, "Peacekeeping Under Strain: Coping with Evolving Contradictions?" *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 2, (2010):9, accessed June 17, 2013,
[51]Ibid
[52]Ibid
[53]Ibid

commitment to transformative action in our societies."[54] Kester examined education systems in traditional, homogenous settings is Kentucky (USA) and Japan where discrimination based on class, race and gender were rampant. In Kester's opinion, traditional classrooms are "sites of oppression" where learning is "dominated by an authoritarian facilitation of subject matter that keeps students silent and unengaged with the material and their peers."[55] Kester argues that traditional education does not espouse the values of peace and therefore cannot nurture children to grow up to be citizens who are able to manage and solve conflict in a non-violent manner. In traditional education systems, learning "requires an omniscient teacher who 'knows' the right answer", creating a right-wrong dichotomy where differing opinions cannot coexist. According to Kester, this "essentially nullifies attempts to respect the other—if other is perceived as wrong instead of different."[56]

In contrast, peace education allows for a unidirectional flow of information-from the teachers to the students, from the students to the teachers as well as from the students to their fellow students. The role of peace educators is to ensure that learners understand "a full range of possible world views, explanations, and solutions to social issues and problems" and "engage their learners in a constant dialogue, in order that basic assumptions underlying any worldview are critically analysed and not passively accepted as given truths".[57] In such settings, students and teachers are encouraged to share their experiences, and question the status quo, essentially learning to accept differences. As Kester explains, storytelling is a powerful tool in peace education. It is a process of "sharing, listening, and recording lived experiences of the

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[54] Kevin Kester. "Peace Education: Experience and Storytelling as Living Education" *Peace and Conflict Review*,2, Issue 2, (2007): 9.

[55]Ibid

[56]Ibid

[57] Toh Swee-Hin and Floresca- Cawagas, *Peace Education: A Framework for the Philippines,* (Virginia: Phoenix Publishing House, 1987) 30, quoted in Kevin Kester, "Peace Education: Experience and Storytelling as Living Education" *Peace and Conflict Review*,2, Issue 2, (2007): 4.

marginalized" which empowers "those 'without a voice' by giving the silenced vociferation."[58] Through peace education, people are encouraged to listen and respect those telling the stories and be genuinely interested in their experiences and this "helps to counter the hegemony of the dominant groups."[59]

Peace education is increasingly recognised as a means of peace building. For example, during an international peace conference organised by the African Human Security Initiative (AHSI) in Ethiopia 2008, the members recommended the civil society to "lobby the African Union (AU) to set an agenda for peace education at all levels of the education system."[60] During this workshop, Professor Hassan Saliu of the African Centre for Peace Research Empowerment and Documentation emphasized "the urgent need for 'peace education' as a strategy for conflict management and to advance the cause of human security."[61] Saliu argued that African nations need to make a "conscious attempt to institutionalise peace education in the primary and post-primary educational levels, thereby targeting youth in their formative stages of value development", especially as "youths are often victims as well as players and/or actors in armed conflicts (e.g., child soldiering and child trafficking)."[62] His ideas were echoed by those of Gbesso, who argued that "institutionalising peace education could help address educational disparities between social groups, urban-rural populations", differences which have caused conflict and have the potential to continue to cause conflict. However, as Gbesso points out, "currently, the educational systems in most African countries do not systematically integrate

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[58] Kevin Kester. "Peace Education: Experience and Storytelling as Living Education" *Peace and Conflict Review*,2, Issue 2, (2007): 9.

[59]Ibid

[60] Institute of Security Studies. *Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the African Union Charter, Peace, Security and Justice* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), v.

[61]Ibid, 22.

[62]Ibid, 23.

peace and development in their curricula and teaching programs and there is a need to introduce reforms in the curricula and education programmes to make them more suitable for new teaching methods and guide them towards peace, non- violence and development."[63] As Kester explains, peace education, especially through storytelling can help "groups and societies create, recreate, and alter social identities, power relations, knowledge, memory, and emotion…Thus, peace building involves community building in a way that is driven forward by the parties themselves and not imposed from above or without."[64] This therefore represents a more sustainable peace building approach because it encompasses local knowledge and utilises and builds local capacity, which all contributes to enhancing ownership. Furthermore, the short, medium and long term approaches to peace building are considered in the peace education approach which increases its sustainability. In the short term, building a culture based on a genuine desire to understand the "other" will lead to better conflict resolution, including mediation and negotiating cessation of conflict. Peace education will also encompass discussions and analysis of development, human rights, economic transformation and so on, engendering medium and long term peace building. Gbesso underscores the importance of peace education when he asserts that peace education will "enhance the capacity of African citizens to address the many problems facing their countries as well as facing the continent. Institutionalising peace education at all levels of the educational system in the continent will ensure that issues of justice, structural inequities and developmental priorities are taken into consideration."[65] As Paulo Freire, an adult educator who criticised the oppressive forms of traditional education in Brazil argued, "through dialogue and a constant

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[63] Institute of Security Studies. *Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the African Union Charter, Peace, Security and Justice* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), 23.
[64]Ibid
[65]Ibid

reflection on 'reality' and systems, peoples would be liberated."[66]

2.3 Peace Building: An African Perspective

2.3.1 Regional Cooperation for Peace Building

Violent conflict affects not only the country in which the conflict takes place, but also its neighbours and the entire region. Such conflict has a negative effect on the region's economic, social and human development. This can be clearly observed in conflicts in African countries, where the most prominent issues of regional security include cross border trade or smuggling of arms, natural resources (such as diamonds), as well as the fleeing of refugees from one country to another. For example, as a result of the conflict in Darfur, there has been an influx of Darfurian refugees into Chad and the Central African Republic, creating a humanitarian crisis.[67] The conflict in Liberia is yet another example where regional dynamics have affected the security in Liberia and its neighbours, mainly Guinea, Sierra Leone and Cote D'Ivoire. Conflict in this area is interconnected, where instability in one country contributes to the instability of its neighbours. For example, it is alleged that Liberian forces that supported the former President Laurant Gbagbo were responsible for attacks on the current president Ouattara's supporters during the 2010/2011 crisis following the post-election stalemate in Côte d'Ivoire. It is also alleged that Ivorian militias loyal to Gbagbo sought refuge in Liberia after Gbagbo's arrest in April 2011.[68] Such interconnectedness of conflict can also been seen in the conflict in the DRC, which has involved several African countries, necessitating the signing of the peace accord in

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[66]Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed,* (New York: Continuum International Publishing, 2006), as quoted in Kevin Kester, "Peace Education: Experience and Storytelling as Living Education" *Peace and Conflict Review*,2, Issue 2, (2007):6.

[67] Institute of Security Studies. *Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the African Union Charter, Peace, Security and Justice* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), 19.

[68] ACCORD. *Enhancing security and justice in Liberia: The regional hub model (*Umhlanga Rocks, South Africa: ACCORD, 2013), 5.

2013 which included 11 African countries: Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Angola, Zimbabwe, Congo, South Sudan, Zambia, South Africa and the Central African Republic.[69] Yet another example of the regional dynamics of insecurity in Africa involves Somalia. The Institute of Security Studies states that "weapons' trafficking in Somalia has resulted in a huge influx of weapons both in the Somali markets and in the markets of its neighbours."[70] Furthermore, terrorist groups have sprung out of Somalia or have taken advantage of the country's state of unrest and lawlessness to set up base and operate unhindered, allowing such groups to proliferate and spread into neighbouring countries such as Kenya and even influence the state of global security through acts of global terrorism and piracy.[71]

The examples above adeptly illustrate how insecurity in one country can lead to insecurity and conflict not only in the region, but on a global scale. It is therefore imperative that peace building is also tackled from a regional perspective. The main regional body concerned with peace building in Africa is the Africa Union whose main objective is to "prevent, manage and resolve conflicts" with a motto of "ending conflicts, sustaining peace."[72] Throughout Africa, regional cooperation for economic development has been established. These co-operations have included provisions for promoting peace in the region as they realise that economic development is related to peace, and that violent conflict negatively affects regional economic development. For example, The Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) formed in 1975 for economic growth of the West African region amended its protocol in 1999 to reflect the peace and conflict dimensions of regional cooperation by signing the Protocol Relating to the

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[69]Geneva Centre for Security Policy. *After the Fall: Leaders, Leadership and the Challenges of Post-Conflict Peace building,* (Geneva: GCSP, 2011), 2.
[70] Institute of Security Studies. *Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the African Union Charter, Peace, Security and Justice* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), 18.
[71]Ibid
[72]African Union: Peace and Security.

Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. This protocol was created during conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone and it can be applied following "aggression against a member state or the threat of aggression; Conflict between several member states; Internal conflict that threatens to result in humanitarian disaster, or poses a threat to peace and security in the sub-region; Serious violation of human rights and the rule of law, and/or Overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government."[73] Around Liberia, an inter-governmental association, called the Mano River Union (MRU) was established in 1970, to promote the implementation of joint security initiatives between Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea. The East African Community (EAC) is another regional economic cooperation body, established in 1999 to foster economic cooperation between Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda. This regional cooperation body also recognises the importance of promoting peace in order to achieve economic growth, and states that "peace and security has been acknowledged as critical to creation of the right environment upon which regional integration in all aspects can be fostered" and "as the negotiations for the EAC Common Market progresses, strategies on the control of cross border crime and ensure security of persons and goods as they move within the region are continually being developed."[74]

However, all these regional co operations have been plagued by lack of capacity, but most alarmingly by a lack of political will to fully engage in peace building activities.[75] For example, during the African Human Security Initiative conference on peace and security in Africa held in Addis Ababa in 2008 and attended by leaders, implementers of peace building

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[73] Institute of Security Studies. *Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the African Union Charter, Peace, Security and Justice* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), 21.
[74] East African Community http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=frontpage&Itemid=1
[75] Ibid, 18.

activities as well as academics from various African countries as well as the rest of the world, the "major consensus was that there is a need for a paradigm shift from non-interference to interference."[76] Members of conference argued that there is the need for greater political will to intervene to stop violent conflict and that sovereignty is not an adequate reason for failing to intervene. For example one member of the conference noted that it "is important to ask why the AU goes against the adage, 'In Africa, you do not ask your neighbour if he needs help when his house is on fire; you just come in to extinguish it'", while the members concluded that "at a time when conflict continue to cause irreparable damage to human security and development on the continent, we must critically interrogate whether the issue of sovereignty provides justification for inaction."[77] African conflict continues despite the fact that many of these regional cooperation bodies have been in existence for a long time (since the 1970s for some of them). There is therefore a need to move beyond the rhetoric espoused by these bodies and move to action, which can only be achieved with political will. As the members of the African Human Security Initiative Peace in Africa conference concluded, "resolutions, protocols and proclamations alone will not help to stop conflict if there is no political will or a genuine desire for peace."[78]

2.3.2 Restoring Human Security and Justice

Guaranteeing human security and justice is essential to achieving and maintaining peace. As ACCORD states, "a state's failure to guarantee security and justice presents major obstacles to

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[76]East African Community http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=frontpage&Itemid=1, IV.
[77]Ibid
[78]Ibid, 18.

the achievement of political, social and economic development."[79] Without these elements, sustainable peace cannot be achieved. According to the World Bank's Development report 2011, "successful transitions [to peace] have rarely been achieved without prioritising citizen security and justice."[80] One of the ways through which citizen security and justice has been achieved is security sector reforms. This mainly involves reforms within the national and local police force and army (military and para-military forces) as well as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). According to the World Bank, "prioritising the institutions that provide citizen security and justice (including control of corruption)...prevent a recurrence of violence."[81]

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)

The World Bank asserts that the first step following violent conflict is to "re-establish trust between the people and state with the core function of a state, the capacity to assert its monopoly on the legitimate use of force."[82] During violent conflict, the state may have lost its monopoly over the use of force. For example, other armed groups may have challenged this monopoly by applying force of their own. Also, the state's own armed forces may have been seized, and used by groups other than the state for non-legitimate uses (i.e. the force has not been used to promote security of the citizens) as is the case in coup d'états or the state itself could have used force for non-legitimate purposes. It is therefore imperative that the state regain control over the monopoly of the use of force (for legitimate purposes-which is to protect its citizens) in order to build the foundations for sustainable peace. The prevailing model of achieving this has been through

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[79] ACCORD. *Enhancing security and justice in Liberia: The regional hub model (*Umhlanga Rocks, South Africa: ACCORD, 2013), 1.
[80] World Bank, *World development report 2011: Conflict, security and development* (World Bank, 2011) in Saferworld, *Approaching 2015 from a peace perspective* (London: Safeworld, 2012), 3.
[81] World Bank, *World development report 2011: Conflict, security and development* (World Bank, 2011), 147.
[82] Ibid, 149

disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR).[83] For example, the UN Peace building

mission in the DRC recognised the importance of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

and its link with security sector reforms and through a series of decrees, created a nation-wide

DDR framework with military backing in 2008 (Structure Militaire d'Integration, SMI), that

aimed to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate at least 150,000 ex-combatants, including 30,000

child soldiers.[84]

Like many peace building initiatives, DDR activities in the recent past in Africa tend to

have been led by international actors, including but not limited to, the UN and state armed forces

from Western states such as the USA. As Guldimann argues, these peace building missions have

been largely dominated by Western, one-size-fits all approaches, and often do not involve the

locals.[85] DDR activities in the DRC present an excellent example of this major shortcoming. Led

by the UN, disarmament in the DRC focused on collecting guns from ex-combatants. For

example, in Ituri (DRC), the DDR program aimed to "demobilise and pacify the region by

collecting firearms from a targeted caseload of 15,000 elements of armed groups who had

endorsed the Acte d'engagement de Kinshasa."[86] However, this focus on guns ignored the local

context where the combatants mainly used other weapons, such as machetes, instead of guns.

Wanki points out that the focus on guns in disarmament activities in Africa is inherently flawed

and shows a lack of basic understanding of the local context. He asserts that, "nowhere has it

been pre-ordained that being a militiaman requires one to only possess a gun," and notes that

"not all combatants own guns; in fact more than twenty combatants, especially those from the

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[83]World Bank, *World development report 2011: Conflict, security and development* (World Bank, 2011), 147.

[84]James-Emmanuel Wanki "Disarming war, arming peace: The Congo crisis, Dag Hammarskjöld's legacy and the future role of MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" *Accord Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 11, no. 1, (2011): 118.

[85] Tim Guldimann, "Peacekeeping Under Strain: Coping with Evolving Contradictions?" *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 2, (2010):5.

[86] James-Emmanuel Wanki, "Disarming war, arming peace: The Congo crisis, Dag Hammarskjöld's legacy and the future role of MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" *Accord Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 11, no. 1, (2011): 119.

Mai Mai [DRC], could share a single rifle while in the jungle."[87] Furthermore, conflict in Africa has been continually characterised by the use of machetes (and not just guns). As Wanki emphatically states, "machetes have equally been used repeatedly before in African warfare to inflict tragedies in proportions that have been quite dispiriting, as was the case in the course of the Rwandan genocide".[88] Despite this, disarmament programs continue to focus on "the gun-in-the-hand prerequisite."[89] Failure to contextualise disarmament processes severely impact their success, undermining their ability to secure sustainable peace. For example, in the Ituri [DRC] example given above, although 15,811 ex-combatants had been disarmed at the end of the program in 2005, the UN Secretary General expressed his concern of the potential for "re-escalation of violence in the region as 70% of the 6,200 weapons collected were defective and not in a serviceable condition and hence there was a strong possibility that ex-combatants might have gamed the system."[90] This is a good example of the earlier point, where failing to adequately assess the local situation and tailor programs suited for that context may actually work to promote more conflict in the area and not the peace that the program is designed to engender. Wanki notes that by failing to involve local community in the DDR process, "MONUC [UN peace building mission in DRC] missed a golden opportunity to harness local grassroots intelligence on weapon stockpiles, rebel activity as well as strategies for encouraging more voluntary disarmament and demobilisation of members of armed groups" all of which would have enhanced the success of disarmament activities and contributed to sustainable peace.

Similar criticisms have been levelled at demobilization and reintegration activities led by

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[87]James-Emmanuel Wanki, "Disarming war, arming peace: The Congo crisis, Dag Hammarskjöld's legacy and the future role of MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" *Accord Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 11, no. 1, (2011): 119.
[88]Ibid
[89]Ibid, 118.
[90] Amnesty International 2007, as quoted in James-Emmanuel Wanki "Disarming war, arming peace: The Congo crisis, Dag Hammarskjöld's legacy and the future role of MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" *Accord Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 11, no. 1, (2011): 118.

UN peace building missions. Rouw and Willems carried out investigations on reintegration activities carried out by the UN and international NGOs in the DRC, revealing a similar situation of the lack of involvement of locals in the programs, which undoubtedly compromised their success. According to Rouw and Willems, local communities in the DRC are disgruntled that they are not consulted in the DDR process and that "the demobilized are just dumped into their communities while they still have the esprit of the military."[91] This sentiment speaks directly to the dangers of excluding local communities in the DDR process, revealing the inefficiency of such programs, as they have not successfully reformed ex-combatants by transforming their "esprit de la guerre", which is essentially, their self-identification as militia whose purpose is to commit acts of violence and continue to play their role in perpetuating the violent conflict.[92] This means that the 'reintegrated' ex-combatants are very vulnerable to re-recruitment into the militia system, and can be easily coaxed back by militia leaders. Sadly, this is especially true for the child soldiers, who represent a significant proportion of the militia, as is the case in the DRC. For example, the 2004 Child Soldiers Global Report estimates that more than 40% of the armed forces of political groups in DRC comprised of children. This report goes on to state that despite DDR activities, re-recruitment of child soldiers was high and armed political groups such as RCD-Goma (Rally for Congolese Democracy, RCD-ML (RCD-Movement for Liberation) and MLC (Movement for the Liberation of the Congo) actively re-recruited child soldiers that had been demobilised, even from demobilisation centres.[93] According to Wanki, the UN and its

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[91]Utrecht, Peace, Security and Development Network, *Connecting community security and DDR: Experiences from Eastern DRC* by Hans Rouw and Rens Willems (Utrecht: Utrecht University, 2010), in James-Emmanuel Wanki, "Disarming war, arming peace: The Congo crisis, Dag Hammarskjöld's legacy and the future role of MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" *Accord Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 11, no. 1, (2011): 119.
[92]Ibid
[93]Child Soldiers International, *Child Soldiers Global Report 2004 - Congo, Democratic Republic of the,* (Child Soldiers International, 2004).

international partners ignored the fact that securing peace is a long-term process, and instead rushed to implement reintegration programs which "disregarded the local context in which ex-combatants live in", which consequently led to their failure.[94] Rouw and Willems give the example of where reintegration programs clearly did not consider the local realities of the Congolese people, for instance when the UNDP its partners would train people in electrical skills, despite the fact that these people came from villages without electricity or would donate electrically powered equipment, such as grinding mills, to villages with no electricity supply.[95]

Police and Armed Forces Reforms

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, one of the methods of achieving security sector reforms, in an effort to promote sustainable peace, is through reform of the police and armed forces. The World Bank development report states that it is important for post-conflict societies to consolidate and coordinate security in order to promote lasting peace. This report goes on to state that one of the ways of achieving this is through security sector reforms that promote professionalization of the armed forces (police and army).[96] Liberia is a good example where such measures have been undertaken and show promising results. Like in many post-conflict countries, the citizens of Liberia had very low confidence in security forces of Liberia because they had failed to ensure the security of its citizens, and in many instances, members of the armed forces were directly involved in perpetrating acts of violence against its citizens. Also, prior to the war, security and justice systems were viewed as biased, creating a culture of

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[94] James-Emmanuel Wanki "Disarming war, arming peace: The Congo crisis, Dag Hammarskjöld's legacy and the future role of MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" *Accord Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 11, no. 1, (2011): 118.

[95] Amnesty International 2007, as quoted in James-Emmanuel Wanki "Disarming war, arming peace: The Congo crisis, Dag Hammarskjöld's legacy and the future role of MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" *Accord Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 11, no. 1, (2011): 118.

[96]World Bank, *World development report 2011: Conflict, security and development* (World Bank, 2011), 152.

impunity, where those in power where able to manipulate the system and avoid punishment.[97] The government of Liberia, with the aid of UMNIL (UN mission in Liberia), has embarked on a "re-professionalization" program of the security forces, in an effort to transform the negative view of the security sector and restore citizen confidence in the security and justice systems in Liberia, thereby promoting sustainable peace.[98] The World Bank notes that one of the ways of restoring confidence in the security sector in post-conflict countries is to remove perpetrators of human rights abuses from the armed forces through professionalization programs.[99] As Gadin explains, security sector reforms involve training the armed forces and para-military services on peacekeeping, international human rights standards, norms and the respect for the rule of law.[100]This has been the case in Liberia.[101]

Enhancing local community participation in ensuring citizen security has been shown to increase the success of security sector reform programs and help to restore citizen confidence in the security systems. For example, the World Bank asserts that "at the local level, involving communities and the private sector can improve the relations between the state and its citizens and thereby help prevent violence and conflict."[102] For example, the security infrastructure in Liberia is poor and only available in Monrovia, the capital city. As part of peace building activities (supported by UNMIL), Liberia has begun to implement programs to promote regional security hubs that will bring formal security and justice systems to the other regions outside the

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[97] ACCORD. *Enhancing security and justice in Liberia: The regional hub model (*Umhlanga Rocks, South Africa: ACCORD, 2013), 1.

[98] Institute of Security Studies. *Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the African Union Charter, Peace, Security and Justice* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), 21.

[99]World Bank, *World development report 2011: Conflict, security and development* (World Bank, 2011), 151.

[100]James Gadin in Institute of Security Studies. *Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the African Union Charter, Peace, Security and Justice* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), 21.

[101] Institute of Security Studies. *Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the African Union Charter, Peace, Security and Justice* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), 21.

[102]World Bank, *World development report 2011: Conflict, security and development* (World Bank, 2011), 151.

capital city. In order to do so, the programs are relying on the citizens to help with community policing and to supply intelligence on areas with security concerns.[103] ACCORD states that Liberia "has made significant strides towards the re-consolidation of its security and justice structures."[104]

The World Bank asserts that "attention to gender sensitivity and women's full participation in security-sector reform can contribute to success" as women can add value to broader security tasks by bringing a gender-specific focus. This includes enhancing "access to services by women, fewer incidents of sexual misconduct, and greater trust of the civilian population in the security sector."[105] For example, the creation of a Family Support Unit within the UN Mission in Sierra Leone encouraged more women and children to come forward to report sexual violence.[106] In Liberia, an all-female police unit was formed to perform night patrols in conjunction with the local police, which helped restore trust in the country's security system which had been eroded by citizens' (especially women's) experiences during the civil war.[107] Similar success in restoring citizen confidence in the security systems were seen in Namibia when a women and children's protection unit was created within the police force to deal with domestic violence.[108]

According to the World Bank, justice is an essential part of promoting sustainable peace and "effective linkages must exist between the police and other justice institutions, including the

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[103] ACCORD. *Enhancing security and justice in Liberia: The regional hub model (*Umhlanga Rocks, South Africa: ACCORD, 2013), 1.

[104]Ibid

[105]World Bank, *World development report 2011: Conflict, security and development* (World Bank, 2011), 151.

[106] Ibid, 152

[107]Ibid

[108]Ibid

judiciary, public prosecutors, and prisons, to address crime and violence."[109] Many post-conflict African countries are grappling with the issue of transitional justice for this very reason. As mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, transitional justice presents a unique challenge where post-conflict countries try and balance the seemingly incompatible and competing issues of providing justice for victims and persecuting perpetrators of violence, while fostering peace in the short, medium and long terms. A comprehensive discussion of transitional justice can be found in chapter 4.

2.3.3 Natural Resource Management as a Peace Building Mechanism

Conflict over natural resources and the revenue they produce is not new to Africa. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this is one of the most commonly cited reasons for African conflict. While the causes of African conflict may be more complex, conflict over resources and their distribution definitely contribute and exacerbate tensions that may lead to, and/or perpetuate violent conflict. For example, the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) states that "the possession of natural resources within a particular country often triggers conflict, especially in a state where the structures and institutions of the government are weak."**[110]**

Most African states endowed with natural resources such as oil and diamonds have been involved in violent conflict e.g. Sierra Leone, DRC, Angola, Nigeria, Sudan and Liberia. Akinwale asserts that the conflict in the Niger delta in Nigeria is intimately linked to the oil reserves in this area. However, the distribution of the wealth gained from these reserves is unequal, leading to persistent violent conflict in the area despite "successive efforts by

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[109]World Bank, *World development report 2011: Conflict, security and development* (World Bank, 2011), 154.

[110] Institute of Security Studies. *Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the African Union Charter, Peace, Security and Justice* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), 21.

governments and international organisations to broker peace in the area."[111] Akinwale states that this is because the revenue derived from this region has not been used to meet the human needs of the people living in this area, as "approximately 96 per cent of all government revenue comes from the Niger Delta region", yet "many of these communities are still poor and do not feel they are receiving a fair share of the resources coming from the area."[112] As the ISS states, weak structures create "opportunities for elites to unfairly allocate and distribute natural resources or profits."[113] This causes grievances from marginalised groups, which in turn has led to violent conflict in countries such as Nigeria and Sudan.[114]

Gendron and Hoffman argue that "easily lootable resources tend to create circumstances in which warlords emerge and resources which require significant capital to exploit, such as the building of large mines or pipelines, tend to generate separatist conflicts."[115] This can be seen in African countries such as Sierra Leone and Angola, where conflicts were led by warlords who were driven by their desire to control the lucrative diamond trade.[116] Other natural resources such as water and land have also caused tensions among communities and countries, which may lead to violent conflict. For example, the control and use of the Nile waters has caused tensions between Egypt and the other countries (Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sudan and Tanzania) through which the Nile flows. As Gendron and Hoffman state, the tension over the control and use of the Nile waters "have led many to flag this river basin as the

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[111] Akeem Ayofe Akinwale in Institute of Security Studies. *Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the African Union Charter, Peace, Security and Justice* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), 8.

[112] Ibid

[113] Institute of Security Studies. *Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the African Union Charter, Peace, Security and Justice* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), 21.

[114] Ibid.

[115] Renée Gendron and Evan Hoffman, "Resource Scarcity and the Prevention of Violent Conflicts", *Peace and Conflict Review*, 4, Issue 1, (2009):2.

[116] Ibid, 2.

most likely to experience international water wars."[117] In Kenya, conflict over land and its inequitable distribution has been one of the leading causes of violent conflict over the years, and especially in the violence following the disputed elections in 2007.[118]

Conflict over natural resources in Africa has always involved international actors. As Zeleza notes, this has been the case from the colonial era, where natural resources were siphoned to support the growth of Europe, to the cold-war times when the world super powers supported different African regimes in exchange for natural resources such as diamonds.[119] This international aspect of competition for resources in Africa has not abated. Recently, countries such as the USA, China and Japan have joined the competition. This point is echoed by Ayangafac who argues that "in light of the interest of foreign powers in Africa's natural resources…a discussion on natural resources and conflict in Africa is timely and important."[120] African countries need to consider if foreign interest has the potential to influence politics and cause violent conflict. They then need to consider how to best mitigate this situation.[121] This is especially important as Gendron and Hoffman assert that "many analysts within the peace building field predict that future violent conflicts will likely take the form of resource wars – which can be understood as those conflicts which are primarily waged over access to scarce resources such as rare minerals, water, or oil."[122] With this in mind, it is extremely important to examine natural resources and conflict within the context of post-conflict reconstruction and

[117]Renée Gendron and Evan Hoffman, "Resource Scarcity and the Prevention of Violent Conflicts", *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 1, (2009): 6.

[118]Kenya Human Rights Commission, *Elusive Justice: A status Report of the Victims of the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya*, (Nairobi: KHRC, 2012), 1.

[119]Paul Zeleza, "The causes and costs of war in Africa", In Roots of African Conflict: The Causes and Costs, edited by Alfred Nhema and Paul Zeleza, (Addis Ababa: James Currey Ltd., Ohio University Press & Unisa Press, 2008).

[120] Chrysantus Ayangafac in Institute of Security Studies. *Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the African Union Charter, Peace, Security and Justice* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), 8.

[121]Ibid

[122] Renée Gendron and Evan Hoffman, "Resource Scarcity and the Prevention of Violent Conflicts", *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 1, (2009):1.

development in order to foster sustainable peace.[123]

Due to the above reasons, it is apparent that resource management is key for building sustainable peace in Africa. As discussed above, inequitable distribution of resources most likely occurs where weak government structures exist.[124] It is therefore imperative that as post-conflict countries engage in programs to strengthen their government structures, they do so with a specific focus to resource distribution. This includes enacting policies that govern the equitable distribution of resources, ensuring that the marginalised gain from the revenues derived from these natural resources. It is also integral to peace building that such policies are well implemented. Akinwale suggests that one of the ways of doing this is through the "democratisation of resource remittances and political and economic reforms and reconstruction." Akinwale asserts that holistic approaches and strategies would ensure a fair distribution of oil wealth, and would also eradicate the elites' corrupt practices. Such strategies should focus on resource extraction, allocation and distribution."[125]

It is also important that African countries engage in efforts to protect natural resources through general environmental practices that will protect its scarce natural resources such as land, water, oil reserves etc. In instances where natural resources may be the cause of conflict between two or more countries, there is the need for greater commitment to devising solutions that allow for equitable use of the natural resource. As Gendron and Hoffman note, the creation of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), which is meant to "develop a shared vision of sustainable use of those waters," includes agreements of water resource management, regional power trade and

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[123] Chrysantus Ayangafac in Institute of Security Studies. *Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the African Union Charter, Peace, Security and Justice* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), 8.

[124] Renée Gendron and Evan Hoffman, "Resource Scarcity and the Prevention of Violent Conflicts", *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 1, (2009):1.

[125] Akeem Ayofe Akinwale in Institute of Security Studies. *Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the African Union Charter, Peace, Security and Justice* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), 8.

efficient use for agricultural projects. Gendron and Hoffman assert that while this agreement is "formally framed as a development enterprise, these efforts also implicitly serve as a means to prevent conflict predicated on environmental interdependence."[126] Gendron and Hoffman also suggest that resource monitoring systems, such as those developed by UN Water can be applied for conflict prevention. Essentially, these systems monitor the amount of water available in certain regions Vis a Vis the population who use this water, flagging areas where the resource is becoming too scarce to meet the human needs of that population. Systems like these can be used as an early warning system to flag areas of potential violent conflict over resources, forming part of a conflict prevention framework. [127]The UN Water model could be used as a template to develop a monitoring system for the use of other natural resources, creating an early warning system for potential violent over resources in Africa.

2.4 Peace Building: An East African Perspective

2.4.1 Refugees and their impact on Peace Building

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are a standard result of violent conflict. However, their presence in other countries or regions to which they flee lingers long after the actual violent conflict that led them there has ceased. Loescher and Troeller have named these situations as "protracted", arguing that they have the potential to negatively impact peace building.[128] According to Loescher and Troeller, about 7.7million refugees, representing about

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[126] Renée Gendron and Evan Hoffman, "Resource Scarcity and the Prevention of Violent Conflicts", *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 1, (2009):6.

[127] Ibid, 2

[128] Gil Loescher and Gary Troeller, *Protracted Refugee Situations and Peace building (*Tokyo: United Nations University, 2007), 1.

70% of all the refugees in the world, are trapped in these protracted situations that are "often characterized by long periods of exile, stretching to decades for some groups."[129] Countries in which these situations occur represent some of the most conflict afflicted countries such as Afghanistan, Liberia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Burundi. Also of significance is that the number of these protracted refugee situations continue to rise as does their duration.[130] With exception of Burundi, these other countries are not found within the East African region. However, Sudan and Somalia neighbour the East African region and therefore have the potential to impact sustainable peace in the East Africa Region. As discussed in the previous section, conflict and general insecurity in one country can significantly impact peace in the entire region, continent and even globally. It is therefore imperative that the issue of refugees in protracted situations is given due consideration while discussing peace building from an East African perspective.

The case of Somalia is a good example of the point above. Conflict in Somalia in 1990s led to a massive influx of refugees into Kenya, which in turn affected peace in Kenya. The conflict in the 1990s escalated and spilled over into Kenya (around the Somali border), making this entire region insecure. Loescher and Troeller assert that the refugee populated areas in Kenya became "an extended dynamic of the conflict in the country of origin (Somalia)."[131] Conflict and instability in Somalia has continued to be a source of insecurity for Kenya. Recently, Somalia has become tied to radical international terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab who have been involved in carrying out terrorist activities such bombings of civilian buildings

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[129]Gil Loescher and Gary Troeller, *Protracted Refugee Situations and Peace building (*Tokyo: United Nations University, 2007), 1.
[130]Gil Loescher and Gary Troeller, *Protracted Refugee Situations and Peace building (*Tokyo: United Nations University, 2007), 1.
[131]Ibid, 2.

and most recently piracy. These attacks have been carried out in Somalia and even in Kenya.[132] It has been difficult for Kenyan authorities to distinguish Somali radical terrorists as they hide among the general Somali population living in Kenya, a significant proportion who are aliens (who essentially remained in Kenya after fleeing from the violence in Somalia) and are therefore an example of the protracted refugee situation and its impact on peace. Loescher and Troeller state, "recurring refugee flows are a source of international-mainly regional-conflict, causing instability" as seen in the case of Somalia and Kenya.[133]

Loescher and Troeller assert that neglecting refugee situations can be extremely dangerous and detrimental to sustainable peace. Refugees, who remain in camps, provide a good recruitment ground for militia, as was the case in Rwanda. During the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front recruited people who had fled Rwanda during conflict between 1959 and 1962 and had been living as refugees for almost 30 years within the sub-region. As Loescher and Troeller explain, "in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, it was widely recognised that the failure of the international community to find a lasting solution for the Rwandan refugees from the 1960s was a key factor that put in motion the series of events that led to the genocide in 1994."[134]

According to Loescher and Troeller, protracted refugee situations also engender humanitarian crises and widespread human rights abuses. Situations in refugee camps foster general insecurity including, "arms trafficking, drug smuggling, trafficking in women and

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[132]Gil Loescher and Gary Troeller, *Protracted Refugee Situations and Peace building (*Tokyo: United Nations University, 2007), 1.
[133]Ibid.
[134]Ibid.

children, and the recruitment of child soldiers and mercenaries."[135] The Kenya Human Rights Commission also reported widespread sexual violence in the camps for the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) that were set up for displaced persons following the violence that erupted in 2007/2008.[136] Protracted refugee situations (including IDP situations) have significant implications on the host country's ability to meet the human needs of the refugee population. This includes their needs for education, health, security and so forth. Loescher and Troeller suggest that these situations have the potential to give rise to violent conflict as the refugees become increasingly disgruntled with the fact their human needs are not being met. [137]

Loescher and Troller further argue that protracted refugee situations also have the potential to increase tension among neighbouring countries, which in turn can hinder the ability to build sustainable peace. For example, the "prolonged presence of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, coupled with allegations that anti-government rebels were based within the refugee camps, led to a significant breakdown in relations between the two African neighbours from 2000 to 2002."[138] Wolpe asserts that this was one of the reasons that led to the failure of President Nyerere as the peace mediator for the Burundi process, which in had the effect of slowing the peace building process.[139]

Loescher and Troeller suggest that "refugee populations are increasingly being viewed by host states not as victims of persecution and conflict, but as a potential source of domestic and

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[135]Gil Loescher and Gary Troeller, *Protracted Refugee Situations and Peace building (*Tokyo: United Nations University, 2007), 2.
[136]Kenya Human Rights Commission, *Elusive Justice: A status Report of the Victims of the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya*, (Nairobi: KHRC, 2012), 2.
[137] Gil Loescher and Gary Troeller, *Protracted Refugee Situations and Peace building (*Tokyo: United Nations University, 2007), 3.
[138]Ibid.
[139]Howard Wolpe, "Making Peace after Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process", *Peace Works,* No 70, (2011): 3.

regional instability."[140] Given this and the evidence above, it is surprising that peace building initiatives have not focused on addressing the issue of protracted refugee (and IDP) situations. Rather, "peace building efforts have generally addressed refugees as a matter of secondary concern, focusing instead on programmes in the country of origin to consolidate peace and prevent a return to conflict."[141] This has led to programs that push for early and "unsustainable repatriation" because "the return of refugees [and IDPs] is seen as a barometer of the extent to which peace building has been successful."[142] The premature repatriation of IDPs and refugees before the systems and structures are in place that allow for their successful and peaceful return and continued peaceful existence in their places of origin can significantly comprise peace and cause the re-eruption of conflict.[143] Given these reasons, it is extremely important that as East Africa continues to grapple with issues of peace building, protracted refugee situations are given the focus they deserve.

2.4.2 Leadership and Peace Building

Throughout the discussions in this chapter, it has become increasingly clear that leadership and successful peace building are intricately linked. Without the political will, peace building in East Africa and the rest of the continent cannot be achieved. Regional economic cooperation in East Africa is one of the strategies aimed at stabilizing the region, and ultimately fostering sustainable peace. However, as the Westerkamp and Thompson argue, "while regional cooperation may be important in developing constructive relations between states….Whether regional cooperation

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[140] Gil Loescher and Gary Troeller, *Protracted Refugee Situations and Peace building (*Tokyo: United Nations University, 2007), 3.
[141] Ibid, 5
[142] Ibid, 3.
[143] Ibid, 5.

yields peace building benefits depends on the capacities and willingness of those involved."[144] For example, although members of the East African Community are supposedly committed to peace within the region, and despite the fact that the EAC Treaty contains specific regional peace promoting clauses, the region continues to experience violent conflict. The violence experienced in Kenya following the disputed elections in 2007 is a good example where the East African Community did not intervene to prevent or stop this violence. This is a good example of how the members of African countries have taken to using the excuse of state sovereignty as a reason not to intervene to prevent and stop violent conflict.[145] These actions show a discrepancy between leaders' actions and their many declarations on their commitment to regional security. Ultimately this comes down to the question of good leadership.

Leadership and its effect on peace building in post-conflict situations can also be seen in the example of Northern Uganda, where the peace agreement remains at a stalemate. The International Crisis Group (ICG) suggests that there is a lack of political will in finding a lasting solution for this crisis. According the ICG, "many in the government [Ugandan] and army are pursuing [peace] talks with less than full commitment and President Museveni appears to want to increase the chance for an eventual military solution."[146]

However, leadership is not confined to local and regional leadership alone. International leadership also plays a big role in fostering (or not) sustainable peace. This is especially true as peace negotiations and other peace building initiatives which are rarely free of international

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[144] Meike Westerkamp and Alison Thompson, *Regional Cooperation in the Great Lakes Region: A contribution to peace building?* (Brussels: IFP, 2009), 12.

[145] Institute of Security Studies. *Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the African Union Charter, Peace, Security and Justice* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), 19.

[146] International Crisis Group. *Northern Uganda Peace Process: The Need to Maintain Momentum,* (Nairobi/Kampala/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2007), 1.

actors. This can be seen in the peace negotiations in Burundi, Northern Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya, all of which involved actors from African countries as well as Western countries such as the USA. Research conducted by the International Centre of Excellence for Conflict and Peace Studies (INCORE) in conjunction with the United Nations University concluded that "international leaders at the helm matter every bit as much as local leaders: the presence and potential pressure affords a better chance at getting leaders to alter their behaviour as leaders would do on their own."[147] Some of the ways through which international leaders have used their influence to foster peace is through use of sanctions and other "carrot-and-stick" measures, which the INCORE suggests can be very effective.[148] This has implications on the peace building strategies adopted by the East African Region countries, and echoes the view of the ISS that in order "to build a culture of peace, there is a need for a paradigm shift from non-interference to interference, including tackling the 'in- visible veto' head on."[149]

In order to build a leadership that is capable of addressing peace building issues, it is important to utilise local leadership, who are "well versed in the politics of conflict."[150] However, "in an ever increasingly internationally overseen world, local leaders have actually very little power over grand issues of conflict and peace."[151] It is therefore imperative that peace building initiatives work to build the capacity of local leaders, enabling them effectively contribute to the peace building debate at the national, regional and international levels. This calls for capacity building among local leaders to equip them with the skills of "basic

[147]International Centre of Excellence for Conflict and Peace Studies. *From Warlords to Peacelords: Local Leadership Capacity in Peace Processes* (Londonderry, Northern Ireland: Incore, University of Ulster, 2004), 12.
[148]Ibid

[149] Institute of Security Studies. *Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the African Union Charter, Peace, Security and Justice* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), IV.
[150]International Centre of Excellence for Conflict and Peace Studies. *From Warlords to Peacelords: Local Leadership Capacity in Peace Processes* (Londonderry, Northern Ireland: Incore, University of Ulster, 2004), 12.
[151]Ibid

administration and basic building blocks for effective governance" to allow them to take part in these high level discussions on peace building issues that impact the entire region.[152]

Building effective leaders also depends on citizens' ability to hold their leaders to account. The INCORE research found that followers have "little influence over the actions of their leaders."[153] This was due to the perception of a gap between leaders and the citizens, where citizens felt unable to compel their leaders to act in ways which they felt were in their best interest or hold them to account when they acted contrary to these interests, leading to a "glum acceptance by many that they can do little to affect change."[154] It is therefore of utmost importance that peace building programs engage citizens with the aim to creating a well informed and empowered citizenry able to hold their leaders to account. The civil society has traditionally been involved in such activities, and has made big strides towards this in Kenya. A more detailed discussion on the role of the civil society in peace building can be found in chapter 4.

2.5 Conclusion

From the above discussion it is clear to see that there has been a diminishing popularity in Western led peace-building models, due to decreasing Western influence among global peace-building. As a result, more indigenous peace-building models have arisen. Traditional peace-building in Africa has focused on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, usually led by UN and NATO forces. However, newer approaches to peace-building have included managing

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[152]International Centre of Excellence for Conflict and Peace Studies. *From Warlords to Peacelords: Local Leadership Capacity in Peace Processes* (Londonderry, Northern Ireland: Incore, University of Ulster, 2004), 14.
[153]Ibid
[154]International Centre of Excellence for Conflict and Peace Studies. *From Warlords to Peacelords: Local Leadership Capacity in Peace Processes* (Londonderry, Northern Ireland: Incore, University of Ulster, 2004), 12.

natural resources in Africa to foster peace, dealing with protracted refugee situations, building leadership that is able to engender peace and promoting peace education.

In chapter 3, the researcher will discuss peace-building in pre and post conflict Kenya, using Sotik and Borabu as a case-study. The researcher will use both primary and secondary data to critically examine the causes of conflict in Kenya, indigenous peace-building models in Kenya as well as the role of the civil society and the government in peace-building in post-conflict Kenya.

CHAPTER THREE

POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING IN EAST AFRICA: THE CASE OF SOTIK AND BORABU CONSTITUENCIES IN KENYA, 1990 - 2012

3.0 Introduction

Chapter two gave an overview of peace-building processes in post-conflict societies. It examined peace-building in post-conflict societies from a global perspective, then discussed peace-building in post-conflict societies from an African and East African perspective.

This chapter will now discuss post-conflict peace-building efforts in Kenya, using Sotik and Borabu as an example. Although Kenya has been viewed as a largely stable country in the region, it has experienced sporadic conflict throughout its history. Indeed Mwagiru[1] has noted that Kenya witnessed electoral conflict during the electoral season of the 2007 civic, parliamentary and elections. He argues that in the electoral season, the electoral conflict became violent once the presidential elections were announced.[2] Mwagiru has observed that in earlier seasons, such as in 1997 and 1992, electoral violence happened before the voting, but died off once election results were announced. In 2007, the election season was generally physical violence free, although a lot of structural violence only became manifested once the actual voting was over[3]. Of particular significance is the political, election related conflict that the country has experienced since the 1990s, with the disputed elections of 2007/2008 being the most severe conflict the country has experienced. Chapter 3 will present a discussion of the peace-building

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[1]M. Mwagiru; The water's Edge, Medication of violent electoral conflict in Kenya, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies 2008, P1.
[2]Ibid
[3]Ibid

efforts implemented in Sotik and Borabu, following the 2007/2008 conflict which affected the area. The researcher will present secondary data obtained from published articles from leading international and local peace and development actors. The researcher will supplement these findings with primary data collected through interviews and discussions with community members, elders, youth, women and spiritual leaders in Sotik and Borabu.

3.1 Causes of Conflict: An Overview

Unresolved Land Grievances

Conflict in Kenya, much like conflict in the rest of Africa and globally, is extremely complex, with intertwining causes that act to trigger and perpetuate violent conflict. According to the National Steering Committee on Peace-building and Conflict Management (NSC), the causes of conflict in Kenya vary according to region.[4] Although there are specific regional causes of violent conflict, one the recurring causes of violent conflict in all the regions of Kenya is the land tenure system, or general land issues.[5] As the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) explains, unrest and tensions that eventually lead to conflict in Kenya are intimately tied to land distribution issues, pointing the historical genesis of conflict in Kenya and its intimate ties to the legacy of colonialism.[6] As discussed in Chapter 2, many African countries can trace the cause of their conflict partly to the legacy of colonialism. Kenya too, was not immune to the negative effects of colonialism. As explained by the Overseas Development Institute, (ODI), colonial powers seized some of the most fertile land across the country for agricultural purposes,

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[4] National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management (NSC) Secretariat, *National Conflict Mapping and Analysis: Peace and Conflict Trends in Kenya*(Nairobi, 2011), page 15
[5] Ibid
[6] Overseas Development Institute, *Crisis in Kenya: land, displacement and the search for 'durable solutions' (*London, 2008), 2.

displacing indigenous Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Maasai (mainly), forming the "White Highlands", a process which was legalized by instituting an "individual freehold title registration system at the expense of customary land tenure systems".**7**

After independence, Kenya's government, led by the country's first President Jomo Kenyatta, maintained the individual freehold title system and did not reverse the injustices caused by the colonial powers. This government fuelled these land injustices by instituting resettlement schemes based on market systems. This meant that those with the financial resources were able to acquire land while those without these resources could not, yet the land that was now up for sale was originally theirs before the colonial powers came and grabbed it, making them landless. The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) points to this as a key moment of weakness as Jomo Kenyatta's government did not question how the land had been acquired.[8] In the eyes of the law, those who had bought the land and acquired title deeds had a legal claim over the land. Kenya's second president, Daniel Arap Moi also did not work to reverse these previous land injustices and instead fuelled them. For example, he brought the concept of *"majimboisim" (*"a type of federalism that promotes provincial autonomy based on ethnicity"), whose point was to recover "stolen" land. This led to the conflict in 1990s where Kikuyu were evicted in the land where they had settled in the Rift Valley, leaving 350,000 people displaced and thousands dead.[9] Kenya's third president, Mwai Kibaki, also did not act to adequately address these land issues that were tied to historical injustices, and neither has the country's fourth and current president, Uhuru Kenyatta. It is this displacement of original land owners that

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[7]Overseas Development Institute, *Crisis in Kenya: land, displacement and the search for 'durable solutions' (*London, 2008), 1.
[8]Ibid,2.
[9]Ibid.

set the stage for tension and violent conflict that Kenya has experienced throughout its history, most notably during 1990-2012, with the violence in 2007/2008 being the most profound the country has experienced.[10] According to The Overseas Development Institute, violence and the subsequent displacement of people are not an anomaly in Kenya because they represent unresolved land grievances.[11]

The argument above is supported by the primary data gathered in Sotik and Borabu, located in Sotik and Borabu respectively. This area lies on the border of both provinces and has both Kisii and Kalenjin communities living in the area. The area has experienced conflict during the 1990s, especially during the election years of 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007/2008. The researcher asked respondents some of the causes of conflict in the area. Interestingly, older respondents started their narrative by explaining the effects of colonialism and the subsequent land injustices. Colonial powers grabbed land from the Kalenjin, settling in the area. After independence, the land grabbed by the colonialists was not returned to the Kalenjin, and instead the area around the Sotik/Borabu area was turned into a settlement scheme. Settlers, mainly from the Kisii community moved from interior Kisii to buy land near Sotik from the Kalenjin. A recurring theme throughout the research results is that there are some community members who still hold grievances towards the Kisii community and feel they are occupying 'their' land. The following excerpts from interviews clearly illustrate this point:

> The people of this region [Kalenjin] think that the land of this side [Kisii side] is theirs. The same with the other side. They have the mindset that this is their land. They have that mindset of thinking that one day; they will live on that other side [where the Kisii settled]. But when the White

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[10]O P Cit.

[11]Overseas Development Institute, *Crisis in Kenya: land, displacement and the search for 'durable solutions' (*London, 2008), page 2.

settlers [colonialists] left, people came into the settlement scheme [the Kisii bought the land as part of the settlement scheme].[12]

From the data, it is clear that members of the Kisii community felt aggrieved when told that their land boundaries needed to be relocated to Kericho. The following excerpts illustrate this point:

> Kalenjin were saying, your [Kisii] boundary is Motamaywa (near Kericho). Now, we said because this Borabu area is belongs to settlers, that returning land to Kalenjin is an impossibility.[13]

A village elder from Borabu contacted for interview also expressed a similar view:

> I don't know, I was around 3 years old when I came to live here… but someone was saying, "no let them [Kisii] leave our country!" [Our land] But really does this country belong to one person?[14]

> There were people saying that it may be that you will leave these pieces of land to their owners. My father gave you this land, and if the owners want their land, you will give it back to them. The Kalenjin were saying you're your [Kisii] boundary is Motamaywa (near Kericho). Now, we said because this Borabu area is belongs to settlers, that's [returning land *to Kalenjin] an impossibility.*[299]

Political Conflicts

While historical land injustices have certainly played their role in causing and perpetuating conflict in Kenya, it would not be fair to ignore the political drivers of conflict. As the Nordiska Africainstituet posits, Kenyan political leaders have utilised divisive politics in their quest for

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[12] Interview with Respondent 10, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research, August 4, 2013.

[13] Interview with Respondent 32, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research, August 6, 2013.

[14] Interview with Borabu Village Elder, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 4, 2013.

power.[15] This has included playing the 'ethnic card', where political leaders have campaigned for votes by invoking negative ethnicity. This has included but has not been limited to demonizing a particular community or set or communities and/or rallying on ethnic grounds. According to National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management Secretariate (NCS), ethnicty has been politicised by elites and used to sow conflict. Research conducted by the NCS showed that 50% of the respondents believed that Kenyan politics are influenced by ethnicity.[16]

Politicians have also utilized historical injustices such as the land issues discsussed above to incite people of one community to engage in violence, attacking another community. For example, the Nordiska Africainstituet is extremely critical of the Moi regime, citing his actions to entrench ethnic divisions, which led to the conflict in 1992 and 1997.[17] The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) supports this view, adding that Moi sought to gain support by invoking ethnic divisions among the citizens, by portraying the advent of multi-party politics as Kikuyu-led, who were then demonized, resulting in ethnic conflict in 1992 and 1997.[18] The National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management Secretariate (NCS) also agrees with these views, saying that politicians have formed political alliances along ethnic lines, politicised the formation of electoral and administrative units by creating ethnic overtones in these processes, all of which has led to the ethnicisation of politcs in the country, which in turn leads to conflict.[19] As the Nordiska Africainstituet states, Kenyan politicians have "undermined nation-building by sowing discord among citizens…pitting communities against each other in

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[15] Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. *Spontaneous or Pre-Meditated? Post- Election Violence in Kenya, (*Uppsala, 2011), page 9
[16] National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management (NSC) Secretariat, *National Conflict Mapping and Analysis: Peace and Conflict Trends in Kenya*(Nairobi, 2011), page 12.
[17] Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. *Spontaneous or Pre-Meditated? Post- Election Violence in Kenya, (*Uppsala, 2011), page 9
[18] Overseas Development Institute, *Crisis in Kenya: land, displacement and the search for 'durable solutions' (*London, 2008), page 3.
[19] National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management (NSC) Secretariat, *National Conflict Mapping and Analysis: Peace and Conflict Trends in Kenya*(Nairobi, 2011), page 12.

the struggles for political supremacy and the economic rewards that go with high office."[20]This suggests a battle for power, which is also echoed by the NCS, who state that politicians have used ethnically divisive tactics in their quest for dominance. Politicians' quest for power is then misguidedly translated into an ethnic community's quest for power. The NCS gives the example of Transmara where the battle for political dominance has pitted the Maasai and Kipsigis (Kalenjin) against each other, which according to the NCS "might fester into worse conflict".[21]

Given the discussion above, it is not surprising that most violent conflict in Kenya should occur during election times and that it would include ethnic conflict. The Nordiska Africainstituet argues that political violence, with ethnic overtones, has become normalised in Kenya.[22] Kenya has experienced most of its conflict during election years, with the 2007/2008 being the worst the country has experienced, where over 1,000 people were killed and as many as 600,000 displaced from their homes and costing the country over Kshs 100billion.[23]Primary data collected in Sotik and Borabu supports the views above that politicians pitted communities against each other, leading to the violence in this area:

> The conflict of 1992 was politically related. When President Moa saw that he could lose the elections- he said divide and rule. [He turned the communities against each other]. During the multi-party time, we would be called and told that the world has become bad.[24]

> During the elections [2007/2008], people were saying "if no Raila, no peace!" They would write this on pieces of cloth and walk on the roads

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[20] Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. *Spontaneous or Pre-Meditated? Post- Election Violence in Kenya, (*Uppsala, 2011), page 9.

[21]National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management (NSC) Secretariat, *National Conflict Mapping and Analysis: Peace and Conflict Trends in Kenya*(Nairobi, 2011), page 13.

[22] Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. *Spontaneous or Pre-Meditated? Post- Election Violence in Kenya, (*Uppsala, 2011), page 10

[23]Overseas Development Institute, *Crisis in Kenya: land, displacement and the search for 'durable solutions' (*London, 2008), page 1.

[24] Interview with Respondent 10, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 4, 2013.

chanting this, while carrying branches. They destroyed a lot of things that day.[25]

The violence [2007/2008] was brought about by politicians pledging impossible things. If somebody told you that if you voted for a particular candidate, you would get some land somewhere. That our scheme [Borabu settlement scheme] belongs to Kalenjin and that our border should be further back at Motamaywa (near Kericho). When we heard this, we began to quarrel.[26]

Everyone wants to align himself/herself to the source of power- you want to cling yourself to where the power is. And when there is division you see the other as an enemy.[27]

Resource Based

Conflict in Kenya is also caused by the competition for resources. For example, the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management Secretariat (NCS) states that conflict in Kenya is also caused by poverty, inequality, unemployment and competition for scarce resources such as land and water. Research carried out by the NCS showed that 46% of the respondents felt that competition for land caused conflict in Kenya whereas 38% felt that competition for other resources led to conflict and 54% felt that poverty contributed to conflict in the country.[28] As pointed out above, land remains a source of conflict in Kenya. This is because land is still a major resource for a country whose economy is still largely agrricultural. Therefore, ownership and access to land is of utomost importance to safeguarding livelihoods,

[25] Interview with Respondent 20, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 5, 2013.

[26] Interview with Respondent 22, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 6, 2013.

[27] Interview with Respondent 18, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 6, 2013.

[28]National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management (NSC) Secretariat, *National Conflict Mapping and Analysis: Peace and Conflict Trends in Kenya*(Nairobi, 2011), page 14.

and can become a source of conflict. The Nordiska Afrikainstitutet argues that the state is the "highest prize as access to it guarantees economic gain."[29]The political quest for power is ultimately a quest to capture and control resources that will ensure enhancement of livelihoods. Due to the ethnicisation of politics, the politican's ethnic group becomes of utmost importance, because each ethnic group believes that they stand to gain access to livelihood improving resources should their politician of choice enter into office. It is therefore not surprising that this will cause conflict because each community is fighting for the chance to improve their livelihoods in a country with increasing poverty and unemployment rates, especially among the youth.[30]

The NCS also listed livestock theft as an issue that contributes to conflict in Kenya. In their research, 39% of their respondents listed livestock theft as a cause of conflict. Livestock such as cattle are a main source of livelihoods for some communities, especially pastoralist groups. Conflicts arise due to the theft of the animals and/or disputes over decreasing grazing/watering areas. The NCS has concluded that livestock theft can be a major trigger of violent conflict in Kenya, especially among pastoralist communities.[31]

Livestock (cattle) theft is especially prominent in the area and is a source of conflict. These views are supported by the findings of the primary data collection in Sotik and Borabu, as seen from interview excerpts provided below:

> Cattle are frequently stolen in our area. Another time, they followed a
> stolen cow but could not recover it. When they returned, they stole the
> neighbour's cow [to revenge because the cow had been stolen by a thief

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[29] Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. *Spontaneous or Pre-Meditated? Post- Election Violence in Kenya, (*Uppsala, 2011), page 9.
[30]National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management (NSC) Secretariat, *National Conflict Mapping and Analysis: Peace and Conflict Trends in Kenya*(Nairobi, 2011), page 14
[31]National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management (NSC) Secretariat, *National Conflict Mapping and Analysis: Peace and Conflict Trends in Kenya*(Nairobi, 2011), page 13.

who comes from the same ethnic community as the neighbour, although the two had no connection]. Conflict began. It is things like this that I think sometimes bring conflict.[32]

During election periods, every 5 years there is violence, but that of 2007/2008 was the worst. When they steal cows, that is what leads to tension, because people are angry.[33]

The youth do not have any money to enjoy themselves. They see it is best for them to steal [cows] so that they can get money to enjoy themselves. Some of the youth here, those who steal cows, don't have any other work to do. They do not have any other source of income. So they see that stealing cows will be easy because, firstly, if you steal one cow, in one night you will have made a lot of money. About 20,000Kshs per cow.[34]

Weak Institutions

As the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management Secretariat (NSC) argues, weak institutions can cause and perpetuate conflict in Kenya. Usually this is by "failure to apply legal provisions, the limited scope of legal provisions, or their absence all together."[35] Impunity and corruption have led to weak institutions that are unable or unwilling to serve the people, contributing to conflict. The NSC argues that as people see that they will be no consequences for the wealthy politicians who flout the law, and that they are unlikely to get justice from these systems, they become more inclined to engage in conflict.[36] The Nordiska

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[32] Interview with Respondent 9, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 4, 2013.

[33] Interview with Respondent 13, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 5, 2013.

[34] Discussion with Youth, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 4, 2013.

[35] National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management (NSC) Secretariat, *National Conflict Mapping and Analysis: Peace and Conflict Trends in Kenya*(Nairobi, 2011), page 14

[36]Ibid

Afrikainstitutet presents arguments from the school of thought that conflict in Kenya is really part of a larger social movement as people continue to agitate for stronger, more effective and transparent institutions, capable of supporting the needs of its citizens.[37] Whichever way you view it, the weak institutions in Kenya have definitely played a role in causing and perpetuating violence in Kenya. For example, the Nordiska Afrikainstitutet points out that the former President Kibaki's unilateral appointment of 16 new Electoral Commission of Kenya Commissioners just months before the elections, in direct violation of the interparty parliamentary group agreement without any opposition, contributed to the conflict in 2007/2008. Later when these election results were disputed, the appointments of these new commissioners were some of the irregularities at the Electoral Commission of Kenya that raised suspicions over the reliability of the results, and threw the country into conflict.

3.3 Post-Conflict Peace Building in Kenya, 1990 - 2012

3.3.1 Pre-Election Kenya

As the Uwiano Platform for peace explains, Kenya has experienced sporadic conflict that can either be categorized as low level incessant conflicts, driven for competition for resources and high level conflicts that are characterized by ethnic based competition for state control.[38] Prior to 2007/2008, these incidents of conflict have been localized and have not affected the entire country. Peace building activities have therefore consisted of bringing together groups of individuals to dialogue and try and find a way of resolving their conflict over the control of resources such as grazing land on a small scale local level, usually led by the area chiefs.[39]

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[37] Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. *Spontaneous or Pre-Meditated? Post- Election Violence in Kenya, (*Uppsala, 2011), page 9.
[38] Uwiano Joint Secretariat, *Uwiano Platform for Peace: Experiences and Lessons Learned*, (Nairobi, 2012), viii.
[39]Ibid

During the election related conflict, peace-building activities have also focused on returning security through the use of police in affected areas as well as promoting reconciliation among the conflicting communities. However, these activities have all been at a localized level and not a national level as witnessed after the conflict resulting from the disputed 2007/2008 elections.[40]

3.3.2 Post-Election Kenya

Peace building in post-election Kenya has become a robust activity, involving a variety of stakeholders working together to find solutions to bring lasting peace in the country. These peace-building efforts have included peace promotion activities, centered on dialogue between ordinary Kenyan citizens to unearth the root causes of conflict as well as brainstorming effective solutions for sustainable peace so as not to repeat the conflict of 2007/2008.[41] The most notable difference between peace-building activities in pre and post-election has been their countrywide reach. Peace-building activities in post-election Kenya have involved consultative forums with key stakeholders, innovative media engagement to spread effective peace messages as well as regular peace and conflict monitoring activities.[42] It is also important to note that these activities have been enabled by the creation of strong partnerships with national, provincial and local government bodies working together with grassroots organizations as well as international donors and development organizations. As the Uwiano Platform for Peace states, some of the key successes in peace-building in post-election Kenya has been the synergy between the Provincial Administration, Security Agencies, District Peace Committees, Community Based

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[40]Uwiano Joint Secretariat, *Uwiano Platform for Peace: Experiences and Lessons Learned*, (Nairobi, 2012), viii.
[41]Ibid, xi
[42]Ibid

Organizations and Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) in collaboration with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and other international and local development partners who have supported peace initiatives by mobilizing funds and expertise.[43] It is however important to note that although peace-building in post-election Kenya has grown significantly, there is still room for further improvement, especially along the lines of strengthening systems for early warning and response.[44]

3.3.3. Post-Election Peace Building in Sotik and Borabu Constituencies

Sotik and Borabu Constituencies are located in Bomet and Nyamira Counties respectively, and are home to the Kalenjin and Kisii ethnic communities. This is a border area, with both communities living side by side. The area has experienced recurring violent conflict, especially during election years, with the worst conflict experienced during the 2007/2008 elections. During this time, "people lost their lives, many women were raped, more than 500 buildings, including schools and businesses, were burned down, cattle were stolen and farming came largely to a standstill because people were afraid of being attacked if they went out into the fields."[45]

Initiating Dialogue between the two communities

As the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), one of the NGOs leading the peace-building process in the area explains, although fighting had ceased after the signing of the national peace agreement that gave rise to the Raila/Kibaki power sharing

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[43]Uwiano Joint Secretariat, *Uwiano Platform for Peace: Experiences and Lessons Learned*, (Nairobi, 2012), viii.

[44]Ibid, xii

[45] Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), *Case-Study: Peace building after post-election violence, (*Nairobi, 2012), 1.

government, tensions were still very high in the region. Peace building efforts in the area first focused on trying to bring people together from the different communities to dialogue. These efforts were led by community leaders such as elders, religious leaders and women leaders, as well as the Government through Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs, District Peace Committees and NGOs. The initial focus of the peace-building efforts was simply to bring people together in a neutral place. ACORD explains that "initially the atmosphere was tense and participants separated themselves into two groups, looking at each other suspiciously, and the peace agents had a hard time, pleading with their respective community members in their mother tongue to come closer together, mingle and hold hands while singing the national anthem."[46] According to ACORD, innovative techniques which included ice breakers and focusing on mutual experiences of trauma, with the goal of healing psychological wounds, were used to initiate peace dialogue.[47] The following quotes from primary data collection through interviews and discussions with members of the community from Sotik and Borabu support these points:

> After the conflict, Kalenjin and Kisii came together and talked about peace matters.[48]

> People started to separate. We started by following them one by one and asking them what is making us separate and we were united in the past? We started holding peace meetings, and a few people came and started talking, and then we started interacting.[49]

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[46] Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), *Case-Study: Peace building after post-election violence, (*Nairobi, 2012), 1.

[47] Ibid

[48] Interview with Respondent 24, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 6, 2013.

[49] Interview with Respondent 3, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 4, 2013.

The NGOs brought us together, but during the first meetings, we didn't even talk about peace and conflict issues. We couldn't even sit together. The hardliners would sit facing opposite sides. The first agenda was to bring people together.[50]

In-Depth Discussion of Causes of Conflict

Following the initiation of dialogue, participants in the meetings debated all the causes of the violence in the area, with the goal of finding a lasting solution. As ACORD admits, this was a difficult process that took several months and included guest speakers from other countries that have experienced conflict such as Burundi.[51] The results of these talks identified the main reasons for conflict in the area as "destructive messages spread by politicians, cattle rustling and land issues."[52] The primary data already presented in the previous sections of this chapter supports this finding. The issue of cattle rustling will be discussed in further detail in chapter 4.

The peace-building process in Sotik and Borabu led by ACORD also delved into issues of truth and reconciliation with the goal of members of each of the communities acknowledging what had been done to them, as well as what they had done to others. The result was that the communities acknowledged that "elders instructed the youth to defend their respective communities, women hosted combatants or sent out false alerts calling for help and young men were actively engaged in destruction, killings, rape and smuggling."[53] Yet again, the results of the primary data collection provided similar findings as illustrated by the quotes below:

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[50] Interview with Respondent 6, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 6, 2013.

[51] Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), *Case-Study: Peace building after post-election violence, (*Nairobi, 2012), 1.

[52]Ibid, 2

[53]Ibid

You cannot steal, without someone telling you to go and steal. The older generation, our fathers, they send us, telling us, why not go and bring [steal] two of his cows. It is them who incite us. If it were not for them, I wouldn't go and still his cows. Therefore, our grandfathers send us, telling us that if you want to be a man, you should go and bring us [steal] two cows![54]

The older generation organizes the fight then they send us youth to go and fight.[55]

During the conflict, you would find the women and girls were alone. When the youth find them vulnerable like this, even those youth who had come to support them in the conflict, they would take advantage of the women and girls' vulnerability because they were all alone, and would rape them.[56]

Signing of Social Peace Agreement

Peace building efforts in Sotik and Borabu also included the signing of a social peace contract, which stated that members from the Kisii and Kalenjin ethnic communities had both agreed to live in peace with each other. Community elders from both communities were chosen to sign on behalf of their communities. The signing of the social peace agreement included traditional peace ceremonies from both communities, to signify that they had both come to an agreement to live in peace with each other.[57] As ACORD states, "the dialogue process was concluded with a cultural

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[54] Discussion with Youth, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 4, 2013.

[55] Interview with Respondent 6, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 6, 2013.

[56] Discussion with Youth, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 6, 2013.

[57] Hannah Chira- Program Officer ACORD, Interview by Gideon Solonka, July 23, 2013

rite where members from both communities shared milk from one traditional pot to symbolise their unity as Kenyans", which then allowed them to sign the social peace agreement.[58] The ceremony was held in a school in the Sotik/Borabu area and was attended by community leaders, political leaders such as Mzalendo Kibunja, members of NGOs and ordinary citizens of the Sotik and Borabu area. The peace agreement stipulated measures that the community would take to ensure peace was maintained, including re-opening of businesses, as well as measures for resolving future disputes. The agreement also listed individuals from both communities who were appointed as community peace watch members, whose job was to ensure that the social peace agreement was upheld.[59]

Peace Projects

From the primary data collection process in Sotik and Borabu, it became very evident that the peace-building process has also included peace projects, intended to improve the livelihoods of community members from both ethnic groups. For example, NGOs have supported youth from both communities to come together and plant trees, which they will sell when mature to yield revenues to improve their livelihoods. Sports teams have also been organized among the youth, with young people from the Kalenjin and Kisii tribes meeting to play sports, mainly football. Among the women, peace projects have included small microfinance groups ('merry-go-rounds') comprising of both Kalenjin and Kisii women who meet regularly and contribute small amounts of money, which is used to support the members with their daily domestic requirements such as utensils and blankets. Although these projects do not tackle peace issues directly, they are very

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[58] Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), *Case-Study: Peace building after post-election violence, (*Nairobi, 2012), 3.

[59] Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), *Annual Report 2011 (* Nairobi, 2012), 12.

successful because they bring people together on the mutual business of improving livelihoods. They then become avenues of peace-building as people interact as they grow their businesses and learn to live together.

Church leaders and the Government are involved in direct peace promotion projects. Church leaders have formed a Pastors' Association of Sotik and Borabu with church leaders from both ethnic communities. Members of this association actively preach peace in community gatherings in both communities. The Government, through Chiefs, Assistant Chiefs and the District Peace Committee continue to hold peace promotion meetings in both Sotik and Borabu. The following quotes from primary data collection exercise in Sotik and Borabu clearly illustrate the above points:

> Church leaders from both Sotik and Borabu came together to preach that peace is the more important than anything else, and people were happy.[60]

> We started women's groups; we work together, and spread the love. I see the woman from Borabu as my fellow woman.[61]

> We started a women's group of this side and other side. We came together and said let us women start peace in this area. We all contribute 10Kshs each. If I don't have plates, they will buy for me [using the contributed funds]. Tomorrow, we shall go to another's home, and if she doesn't even have a blanket, we will buy for her one. Now, this has brought peace because we eat together, we participate and help each other, we sit together and we live together. That is the only way that we see that can bring peace into the area.[62]

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[60] Interview with Respondent 2, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 6, 2013.
[61] Interview with Respondent 11, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 6, 2013.
[62] Interview with Respondent 20, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 4, 2013.

We as youth, meet here to play football. We have a youth group with young people from both sides of Sotik and Borabu. We take our football group very seriously. If someone is late, or fails to attend, they are fined a little money. This way, everyone tries very hard to come [so as not to be fined]. Even if you are with a girl, you say, it is better that I go for the football club so that I am not fined. Then as we play together, we get to know one another and peace follows because we view each other as fellow youths. Also, when you return home you don't have the energy to go steal cows [which contribute to tension and conflict in the area] because you are too tired. It is those idle youth, who have not been doing anything the whole day who have the energy to go and steal cows at night.[63]

3.4 Indigenous Peace Building Models

Through primary data collection in Sotik and Borabu, the researcher has learned of various indigenous peace-building models that have been operationalised since the post-election violence experienced in Kenya in 2007/2008. The leading model used in Sotik and Borabu was created by the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), an NGO that was extremely active in peace-building efforts in the area. Their model is a community based peace-building one that promoted dialogue among conflicting communities, with the goal to finding solutions for sustainable peace. This process culminates in the signing of a social peace agreement, which acts as a social peace contract, which community members adhere to.[64] This model was first developed as part of the NGO's peace-building efforts in Burundi. This Burundian model was adapted to fit the Kenyan context and has since been used to form the Community Peace Recovery and Reconciliation Handbook, published in 2011. This is a joint publication by ACORD, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the National

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[63] Discussion with Youth, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 6, 2013.

[64] Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), *Annual Report 2011 (* Nairobi, 2012), 12.

Steering Committee on Peace building (NSC).[65] This handbook elaborates on this community approach to peace-building that emphasizes dialogue, capacity building on conflict management, equipping community leaders and organisations to become peace monitors and equipping them with the skills to facilitate community peace and " enable communities to understand their rights to peaceful co-existence and challenges relating to sharing limited resources".[66] Through this model, conflicting communities in Sotik and Borabu have established and maintained peaceful co-existence despite previous tensions and conflict among the Kisii and Kalenjin ethnic groups who reside in the area. This model has also been used to negotiate peace among the Teso, Bukusu and Sabaot communities that have been at conflict with each other in the Mt. Elgon area.[67] The Mt. Elgon social peace agreement between these three conflicting communities has been so successful that other minor communities living in Mt. Elgon area have asked to be included in the social contract, and work is under way to amend the document to reflect the needs of these communities. This model is also in use in peace-building processes which are preliminary stages in Transmara and Tana River regions.[68]

During primary data collection, respondents and interviewees mentioned the Active Citizen peace-building model initiated by the British Council. This model utilized mobile phone technology to send peace promotion messages to community leaders, who would then spread these messages among community members, educating their fellow neighbours on the importance of peace and urging them to keep the peace, especially during the 2013 elections.[69] Religious leaders have also been very active in forming groups that spread peace promotion

[65]Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), *Annual Report 2011 (* Nairobi, 2012), 12.
[66]Ibid
[67]Ibid
[68]Hannah Chira, Program Officer ACORD, July 23 2013.
[69]Interview with Respondent 9, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 4, 2013.

messages. For example in Sotik and Borabu, the Pastors formed a Pastors' Association that preached peace using pastors from members of both communities.[70]

3.5 The Role of the Government in Post-Conflict Peace Building

Following the violent conflict experienced in Kenya 2007/2008, the government has stepped up its peace-building efforts. Most notably, there has been the creation and revamping of government bodies whose mandate is to foster peace in the country. These bodies include the National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management (NSC), National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) at the national levels.[71] Such bodies have been involved in conducting research studies on the causes of violent conflict around Kenya, with the aim of finding sustainable peace-building solutions. The government, through these national peace-building bodies has formed collaborations with NGOs and communities in an effort to carrying out peace-building research as well as peace promotion activities. For example the Uwiano Platform for Peace was created during the 2010 referendum process, the first major action calling for citizens to exercise their voting duty since the disputed 2007/2008 elections had led to violent conflict in the country. This platform brought together several government peace-building bodies such as the NSC and NCIC, as well the Kenya Police, Administrative Police, the National Security and Intelligence Service (NSIS) as well as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and other stakeholders for "conflict prevention, de-escalation

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[70]Interview with Respondent 12, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 4, 2013.
[71]Uwiano Joint Secretariat, *Uwiano Platform for Peace: Experiences and Lessons Learned*, (Nairobi, 2012),ix.

and response strategy that laid emphasis on preventive action, diplomacy and community dialogue…to ensure that Kenya remained peaceful before, during and after the vote."[72]

At District levels, the government has been involved in the creation of District Peace Committees. These committees rely on peace monitors from the community to promote peace-building messages to other community members. With the help of community members, these committees have instituted early warning systems, where community members give intelligence on likely causes of violent conflict, leading to the deployment of peace monitors to quickly act to resolve the conflict, preventing it from giving rise to further conflict.[73] Even closer to the communities are the Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs, who are involved in peace-building by resolving conflicts brought to their offices, such as land disputes, and also through peace promotion activities intended to reach community members, to get them to dialogue and find sustainable solutions to bringing peace in the area.[74] The government is also primarily involved in peace-building efforts by promoting security in the area. The following quotes from discussions with community members in Sotik and Borabu clearly illustrate the points above:

> The government has supported peace building through *Barazas* with Chiefs, DC initiating dialogue, looking for solutions.[75]

> The government has done a lot of work, at night they go around [to protect from stock thieves], they have done peace promotion meetings on both sides and the peace has brought development.[76]

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[72]Uwiano Joint Secretariat, *Uwiano Platform for Peace: Experiences and Lessons Learned*, (Nairobi, 2012), x.

[73]Interview with Peace Monitor, District Peace Committee, August 4, 2013.

[74]Interview with Borabu Chief, Government of Kenya, August 4, 2013.

[75] Interview with Respondent 13, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 4, 2013.

[76] Interview with Respondent 12, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 6, 2013.

The government brought people together; it reinstated the anti-stock theft unit and brought security and peace along the border.[77]

3.6 The Role of Civil Society

The civil society has taken up a significant role in peace-building in post-conflict Kenya. In Sotik and Borabu, the civil society was responsible for providing peace-building support right from the beginning of the conflict. Throughout the primary data collection process, it became evident that the civil society had played a big role in supporting peace-building in Sotik and Borabu. At the onset of the conflict, while people had fled their homes and were living in the forests with little shelter, food and sanitation, the Catholic Mission and representatives from the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) church, were the first to come in, providing blankets and food relief for the displaced persons. The following quotes from community members in Sotik and Borabu clearly illustrate this point:

> ADRA is a project supported by the Seventh Day Adventist Church. They were the first ones to come when we were very badly off. They brought for us blankets, cooking pots, and food.[78]

> The Catholic mission was the first to come. They gave aid like blankets and mattress and the Catholic Mission built for us houses.[79]

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[77] Interview with Respondent 32, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 6, 2013.
[78] Interview with Respondent 33, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 6, 2013.
[79] Interview with Respondent 32, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 4, 2013.

Church leaders have also been involved in post-conflict peace-building in Sotik and Borabu by forming peace promotion groups like the Pastors' Association which has been responsible for touring the area, promoting peace by using the word of God.

As well as providing relief at the beginning of the conflict, the civil society has also been involved in peace-building by organizing peace meetings to initiate and sustain dialogue on sustainable peace solution. NGOs like ACORD and Active Citizen through the British Council have been involved in capacity building activities, equipping local community members with conflict resolution skills. They have also facilitated exchange meetings with community members of Sotik and Borabu and other conflict afflicted areas like Mt. Elgon, so that they learn from each other about approaches that work towards building sustainable peace.[80]

The civil society has also been active in providing peace projects as discussed in other sections of this chapter. These projects have had the effect of bringing together members from both ethnic groups for mutual livelihood promoting activities. By working together, this has cemented peace throughout the two communities. NGOs like ACORD have supported the community to rebuild houses, supported youth to plant trees as an income generating activity, while Red Cross has initiated a project to build a good road running through Sotik and Borabu, which will ease access between both communities, promoting cross border trade, which will further enhance peace in the area as people from both communities interact with each other for mutually benefitting trade. Furthermore, the Red Cross has utilized youth from both communities

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[80]Interview with Peace Monitor, District Peace Committee, August 4, 2013

to build this road, providing a source of livelihood for youth for both communities, which they

can work towards together.[81] The following quote from a community member illustrates this

point:

> NGOs have been coming to the area, for example Red Cross worked to
> repair this road from Sotik to Borabu. It was work that brought youth from
> both sides together. It was menial work, starting from one part like Sotik,
> working towards the other community of Borabu. This brought about
> peace because the youth were working together, they would get to know
> each other and associate well with each other.[82]

Finally, as one of the District Peace Monitors explained, media has also played a role in

promoting peace-building in post conflict Sotik and Borabu. They have been preaching peace,

especially in the lead up to the 2013 elections. They have also been involved in monitoring the

cattle rustling situation, informing the public when a theft occurs so that people may be on the

look –out for a foreign looking cow and report the matter to the nearest police station.[83]

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed peace building in Kenya, focusing on the example of Sotik and

Borabu. It is evident that effective peace-building requires the collaboration of many

stakeholders, including community members, the government and the civil society. It is also

clear that effective peace-building requires the initiation and maintenance of constant community

dialogue, where community members can have the opportunity to discuss the issues which bring

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[81] Interview with Peace Monitor, District Peace Committee, August 4, 2013.
[82] Interview with Respondent 20, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study Borabu, August 6, 2013.
[83] Interview with District Peace Monitor, District Peace Committee, August 6, 2013.

conflict amongst them and brainstorm appropriate solutions to bringing sustainable peace. In chapter 4, the researcher will discuss in detail emerging issues from the primary data collection exercise conducted in Sotik and Borabu.

CHAPTER FOUR

POST-ELECTION PEACE-BUILDING EFFORTS IN SOTIK AND BORABU CONSTITUENCIES IN KENYA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

In chapter 3, the researcher discussed peace-building efforts in pre and post-election Kenya before introducing the case-study of peace-building efforts in post-conflict Sotik and Borabu. The discussion in this chapter focused on providing an overview of the peace-building models and the role of the civil society and the government in peace-building efforts in Kenya, focusing on Sotik and Borabu as an example. The researcher developed his arguments using secondary data and supported these arguments with findings from the primary data collected in Sotik and Borabu.

In this chapter, the researcher will continue to delve deeper into the emerging issues in the primary data collected from interviews and focus group discussions held with community members in Sotik and Borabu. The researcher will present an overview of the community's experience of the violence in Sotik and Borabu, followed by a discussion about the significance of indigenous peace-building models, and thereafter by an examination of the factors of that enhanced peace-building activities in Sotik and Borabu. The researcher will conclude by examining the causes of the common practice of cattle rustling in the Sotik/Borabu area, and its effects on peace-building.

4.2 Emerging Issues

4.2.1 Community Experiences of the Conflict in Sotik and Borabu Constituencies in Kenya

The researcher collected primary data from members of the Sotik and Borabu community through household questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussions. One of the recurrent themes in all the data collected from the respondents was the immense hardship they faced during the time of conflict. Although conflict in the area has occurred in 1992, 1997 and 2002, the most violent conflict occurred as a result of the disputed elections in 2007/2008. The following analysis of their experiences was therefore based on the 2007/2008 post-election conflict. As the figure below shows, the most common negative responses were the loss of property, displacement of people, children suffering and the negative effects of supporting combatants.


Figure 1: Community experiences during the conflict in Sotik and Borabu

Displacement of people was the most common recurring theme amongst the respondents. This finding corroborates the reports of the effects of the 2007/2008 post-election conflict. According to the Kenya Human Rights Commission, 663,921 persons were displaced during this conflict with 350,000 IDPs seeking refuge in 118 camps, about 331,921 IDPs being integrated within the communities across the country.[1] In this study, none of the participants claimed to have sought refuge in IDP camps. Instead, participants reported that they fled their homes, with many living in the forests for long periods of time, as they were afraid that they would be attacked should they return to their homes. From the beginning of the conflict, there has been a lot of discourse on the conditions in the IDP camps. For example, the Kenya Human Rights conditions reported that although the shelter, water and sanitation conditions in camps was atrocious at the beginning, as the crisis continued, and donor and government supported the camps, these conditions improved. Specifically, conditions such as shelter and sanitation improved as houses and toilets and bathrooms were constructed for the IDPs to use. Some IDP camps even had access to health camps close by or within the IDP camp itself, offering health services at a fee, whereas others had rain water harvest tanks to collect and store rainwater for use.[2] However, not much has been reported about the conditions of the people, like those of Sotik and Borabu, who were mainly living in the forests, and not in IDP camps. Conditions in the forests were deplorable, with participants lacking basic necessities such as food, water, shelter and sanitation facilities. The following quotes from participants aptly illustrate this point:

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[1]Kenya Human Rights Commission and the National Network for IDPs in Kenya, *Gains and Gaps: A status Report on IPDs in Kenya 2008-2010,* (Nairobi, 2011), 18.
[2]Ibid, 2.

Life was very bad, imagine, the children were sleeping outside. Also, I have grown up girls. So, it reached a point that we would all go to the bathroom in the bush together. That was terrible.[3]

Life was very hard, even the cows that we had fled with, some died, even some of the goats died. The things that we had would get lost, even clothes-we didn't have anything. And we were very hungry because we didn't have food from here and where we fled to, there was no food.[4]

Life was bad because houses were burnt, and there were a lot of people who had been displaced. Finding shelter, food and clothing, and everything else for them was a problem. We went to live outside in the forest for a period of 9 months. We lived inside a plastic paper [makeshift shelter].[5]

The participants also reported that as they fled their homes, there was a complete disruption of their social and economic lives. Businesses came to a standstill. This was especially detrimental to an area like Sotik and Borabu which relies on cross-border trade among the two communities living along the border. The area, like most of the country also relies heavily on agriculture and most respondents reported that they were farmers. They could however not engage in farming activities such as tilling and planting their farms and taking care of their livestock as they had fled their homes.

Loss of property was another recurrent theme amongst the research participants, who mainly reported that their homes had been burnt and that they had lost property through looting. Most of the reports about the effects of the post-election conflict in Kenya reported the widespread burning of houses. For example, the Kenya Human Rights Report states that

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[3] Interview with Respondent 10, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research, August 4, 2013.
[4] Interview with Respondent 33, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research, August 4, 2013.
[5] Interview with Respondent 3, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research, August 4, 2013.

approximately 78,254 houses around the country were destroyed.[6] Looting of household goods was however not highlighted in these national reports, but this issue came out very clearly during the primary data collection in Sotik and Borabu. Respondents reported that as they fled their homes, combatants and other criminals taking advantage of the situation came and looted any household goods that they were unable to carry. The following excerpt from an interview with a village elder clearly illustrates this:

> I ran into my house to take my title deed, it was in a small suitcase, and then I took my cow and I ran away with it. Everything was destroyed! If it wasn't burnt, they [combatants and other opportunists] came and looted it. They even destroyed the water pipes we had put.[7]

Another recurring theme amongst the views given by the participants of this research study is the extent to which women and children suffered during the conflict. This is not surprising as many scholars such as Lahai[8] and McIntyre have presented clear arguments that women and children usually suffer the brunt of conflict.[9] In the conflict in Sotik and Borabu, children mainly suffered from separation from their parents and the harsh conditions of living in the forest, including lack of food, water, shelter, sanitation and the diseases that are associated with these conditions. They also suffered from the disruption of their education, as many could not attend schools while they were still in hiding in the forests. Even those who had not fled their homes could not attend schools due to fear of being attacked due to the general insecurity or the

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[6]Kenya Human Rights Commission and the National Network for IDPs in Kenya, *Gains and Gaps: A status Report on IPDs in Kenya 2008-2010,* (Nairobi, 2011), 18.

[7] Interview with Village Elder, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research, August 4, 2013.

[8] John Lahai. "Gendered Battlefields: A contextual and Comparative Analysis of Women's Participation in Armed conflicts in Africa." *The Peace and Conflict Review*, Vol 4, (2010): 3, accessed May 14, 2013

[9]Angela McIntyre, "Rights, Root Causes and Recruitment: The youth factor in Africa's armed conflicts", African Security Review, Vol 12, No. 2, (2003): 3.

lack of classroom facilities as their schools had been burned down. The following excerpt from a

household respondent and interview with a village elder illustrate the extent to which women in

the area were afflicted by the conflict:

> When there is conflict, there is only trouble. Where you run to seek
> refuge, they tell you, 'why are you leaving your homes' [i.e. they don't
> welcome or help you]. You don't even have anywhere to cook for the
> children. The children stay hungry. We stay hungry. It is only when we
> hear that the government is coming closer [security forces] that we come
> out of hiding and we draw nearer and we come to places where we can
> cook for the children some porridge.[10]

> This forest [pointing to a shrub] here, it is very bad because it is full of
> mosquitoes, because we do not trim it. We let it grow for security
> reasons. The mosquitoes killed the children here [when people fled to
> live in the forest] because the forest is full of shrubs like this with many
> mosquitoes. You were not able to live in this forest with children
> [because of the mosquitoes that brought malaria].[11]

Scholars such as Lahai[12] and McIntyre[13] argue that sexual violence is a common

occurrence in conflict. They are supported by El-Bushra and Ibrahim who examine different

conflict contexts in Africa and find that there is an element of increased gender based violence

during conflict. This includes sexual violence such as rape and forced marriages being used as a

tool of war.[14] The Kenya Human Rights Commission reported sexual abuse during and following

the conflict in 2007/2008,[15] as did the Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development

(ACORD), a leading international NGO that was heavily involved in peace-building activities in

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[10] Interview with Respondent 15, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research, August 6, 2013.

[11] Interview with Village Elder, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research, August 4, 2013.

[12] John Lahai. "Gendered Battlefields: A contextual and Comparative Analysis of Women's Participation in Armed conflicts in Africa." *The Peace and Conflict Review*, Vol 4, (2010): 3, accessed May 14, 2013

[13] Angela McIntyre, "Rights, Root Causes and Recruitment: The youth factor in Africa's armed conflicts", African Security Review, Vol 12, No. 2, (2003): 3.

[14] Judy El-Bushra and Ibrahim Sahl, *Cycles of Violence: Gender Relations and Armed conflict, (*Nairobi: Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development (ACORD), 2005), 18

[15] Kenya Human Rights Commission and the National Network for IDPs in Kenya, *Gains and Gaps: A status Report on IPDs in Kenya 2008-2010,* (Nairobi, 2011), 18.

Sotik and Borabu.[16] Despite their being reports of sexual violence in the area, this was not highly reported among the research participants. When sexual violence was reported as one of the challenges facing women and children during the conflict, it was mainly by younger people and more educated people. During interview, a Peace Monitor with the District Peace Committee (DPC) attributed this discrepancy to the cultural beliefs of the people in the area. According to her, sex, even in the case of rape, was still a taboo topic that people were reluctant to talk about. From her first-hand experiences with the victims of the violence, she reported that there were many rape cases, although few women came forward to report it because they felt afraid to break the taboo and speak about the violation. They were also afraid that they may be made to recount the details of the attack which they found traumatic, plus describing "anything to do with your private parts is a big taboo."[17]

The literature surrounding the conflict in Kenya in 2007/2008 does not portray the great burden of supporting the combatants. This came out very clearly during the primary data collection in Sotik and Borabu. This is a border area, with members from the Kalenjin and Kisii community living side by side. During the conflict, other members from inland Kalenjin and Kisii areas moved to Sotik and Borabu to help their kinsmen in the conflict. However, supporting these community members became a problem, and they sometimes proved to be more of a nuisance, than a help to their fellow kinsmen. For example, research participants reported that they would often loot their remaining property, force them to feed them with their dwindling supplies of food and even threaten to leave them to the 'enemy' should they refuse to comply

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[16] Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), *Case-Study: Peace building after post-election violence, (*Nairobi, 2012), 1.
[17]Interview with Peace Monitor, District Peace Committee, August 5, 2013.

with their demands. The following excerpt from a discussion with youth clearly illustrates this

point:

> Those that came to help us had very many demands. If you had a chicken or a goat, they would demand that you slaughter it for them. They came and filled people's homes. They would say that they have come to help us in the conflict. If there were any valuable things, they would steal them. If you tried to refuse, they would say that they would leave you to defend yourselves against the others. They would even say that they would go and incite the others and leave you to fight them alone. So you had no choice but to do as they demanded.[18]

In light of all these negative experiences, it is not surprising that recovery has been very slow. More than 6 years after the conflict, residents of Sotik and Borabu are still rebuilding their lives. Many of them told the researcher that although peace has returned to the area, rebuilding their lives to the level at which they were pre-conflict is still very difficult. Although the conflict is now over and there is peace among the residents of Sotik and Borabu, the effect of the conflict is still very evident. For example the researcher could see the remains of many houses that were burnt during the conflict and could also see many new houses being constructed, with the aid of the civil society, evidence that the community members in Sotik and Borabu are still rebuilding their lives. Many participants also reported that there is a food shortage as they did not plant during the period of conflict. Participants also mentioned the psychological effects of conflict, claiming that many residents of the area had developed trauma related diseases such as high blood pressure as a result of the conflict.

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[18] Discussion with Youth, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research, August 5, 2013.

4.2.2 The Significance of Indigenous Peace Building Efforts

As discussed in chapter 2, there is a growing movement away from Western led peace-building models and towards indigenous models. As Guldimann argues, one of the biggest criticisms about Western-led approach to peace-building is that it has continuously neglected local knowledge, to its detriment.[19] Western led approaches have downplayed or simply ignored the wealth of knowledge that locals hold. This includes intelligence on eminent attacks or knowledge on the whereabouts of perpetrators of violence. This has significantly comprised the efficacy of such peace-building models.[20] Peace building in Sotik and Borabu effectively utilized an indigenous peace-building model. The diagram below depicts the main reasons that this home grown peace-building effort has been extremely successful.


Figure 2: Factors that led to a successful peace-building model in Sotik and Borabu

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[19] Tim Guldimann, "Peacekeeping Under Strain: Coping with Evolving Contradictions?" *Peace and Conflict Review*,4, Issue 2, (2010):9, accessed June 17, 2013.
[20]Ibid

Throughout the primary data collection exercise in Sotik and Borabu, it became extremely evident that the peace-building process in the area was largely community led. All the peace-building activities in the area involved community members, especially community leaders. These leaders were paramount to bringing people from the two communities and initiating dialogue on finding solutions to the root causes of conflict in the area. The solutions that were proposed such as the signing of a social peace agreement, the appointment of peace monitors, the initiation of group projects between the two communities show a thorough understanding of the issues that bring conflict to the area, which can only be achieved if the community is wholly involved in the peace-building process. Relevant and therefore successful solutions, such as those mentioned above cannot be achieved in tokenistic use of community members or ignoring them completely as mentioned at the beginning of this section.

Peace building in the area has also been successful due to the key partnerships created between the community members, government and the civil society. The main NGOs operating in the area had utilized key community leaders and peace actors as a gateway into the community. Programmes initiated by these NGOs also involved community members at every point of their cycle, from inception, to implementation, even monitoring and evaluation.[21] The NGOs also made key partnerships with government representatives such as the Chiefs, Assistant Chiefs and District Peace Committee Members as well as liaising with other members of the civil society, private sector as well as general community members, who had an interest in restoring peace in the area. This enabled numerous peace-building activities to be conducted,

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[21] Interview with Community Leader, August 7, 2013

each meeting the needs of the community, while avoiding duplication of efforts. The following

quote from the Program Officer of one the NGOs operating in the area and a Peace Monitor with

the District Peace Committee clearly illustrates this point:

> We always work through a local partner. In Sotik/Borabu, it was through the Cereal Grower's Association (CGA). Although this wasn't a peace organization, they were interested in peace because the conflict was affecting them. The Sotik/Borabu area is an agricultural area, but if the people were fighting, then they were not farming and this affected the Cereal Growers Association. Therefore, the association became interested in fostering peace in the area.[22]

> There were very many NGOs that came to this area in the run up to the 2013 elections. There was a lot of funding for peace-building activities and each NGO came up with its own initiative. Some came up with peace meetings, others sports for the youth, others peace promotion through SMS services, very many things. But they all worked with community members. This way, they were able to avoid duplication.[23]

As the International Centre of Excellence for Conflict and Peace Studies explains, one of

the key shortcomings in indigenous led peace-building efforts is that the local leaders do not

have enough skills and knowledge to build and sustain effective peace-building programs.[24]

Wanki notes that Western-led peace-building models have also been criticized for their lack of

skill transference to the local population.[25] This was however, not the case in peace-building in

Sotik and Borabu. NGOs have been involved in numerous efforts to raise the capacity of the

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[22] Interview with Hannah Chira, Program Officer ACORD, July 23, 2013.

[23] Interview with Peace Monitor, District Peace Committee,, August 5, 2013.

[24]International Centre of Excellence for Conflict and Peace Studies. *From Warlords to Peacelords: Local Leadership Capacity in Peace Processes* (Londonderry, Northern Ireland: Incore, University of Ulster, 2004), 12.

[25] James-Emmanuel Wanki, "Disarming war, arming peace: The Congo crisis, Dag Hammarskjöld's legacy and the future role of MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" *Accord Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 11, no. 1, (2011): 123.

community members, by offering training on peace-building and civic education.[26] These NGOs have even been involved in facilitating exchange meetings, where community members from Sotik and Borabu have visited Mt. Elgon to exchange views on peace-building with community members of that area. One community leader was even sponsored to attend an international peace-building workshop held in the UK to exchange ideas and learn from other peace-builders around the world. Members who attend these learning events are then charged with ensuring that they teach other members of the communities.[27]

The combination of peace-building activities in Sotik/Borabu being community led, with the creation of effective partnerships and the transfer of peace-building knowledge to locals has created successful and sustainable peace-building efforts in the area. This approach has created local ownership and even though many of the NGOs have since moved on from the area, peace-building activities have continued running, spearheaded by local community groups, community leaders and the government. This is the ultimate hallmark of sustainability.

4.2.3 Factors that Enhanced Peace Building Efforts in Sotik and Borabu Constituencies

In Chapter 1, the researcher presented the Human Needs Theory as argued by John Burton, which argues that individuals will interact with other individuals as they strive to meet their own basic human needs. Conflict or lack thereof, is therefore a function of the extent to which a society is able to meet the basic human needs of the individuals within it.[28] The need for

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[26] Interview with Community Leader, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study, August 7, 2013
[27] Ibid
[28] Quincy Write, The Nature of Conflict, in Conflict, Readings in Management and Resolution Edited by John Burton and Frank Duke, McMillan Press Ltd, 1990, 20-24.

individuals to meet their basic human needs came out very clearly as the primary data from Sotik and Borabu was analyzed. One of the overarching themes identified throughout the data gathered was that the people of Sotik and Borabu initiated peace in an effort to meet their basic human needs. At the very beginning, when the conflict was still on-going, the actions of certain groups of people initiated dialogue between the warring communities that then opened the gateway for other peace-building actors to come in. If it was not for these early peace initiators, peace-building processes would have taken much longer to take hold in the area, leading to further losses of life, property, displacement and general community suffering. The diagram below depicts the major early change agents in Sotik and Borabu.


Figure 3: Early Peace Initiators in Sotik and Borabu

The theory of change as presented by Everett Rogers in 1962 has been used to explain the uptake of new ideas or the speed at which people change in the face of new situations. This model classifies people into 5 categories: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards. The innovators are the first to adapt to change, to take up a new idea whereas the laggards as the last. The majority of people lie between the early and the late majority.[29] Aspects of this theory can be used to explain the phenomena witnessed in peace-building efforts following the conflict in Sotik and Borabu. As the figure above shows and as mentioned above, there were specific groups of community members who emerged as "innovators" of peace. According to Kaminski, innovators are venturesome and risk takers and are the gatekeepers for the next group of people to adopt the change.[30] As we can see, women in general were innovators of peace in Sotik and Borabu. From the results of the primary data collection exercise, women were the first initiators of peace, or "innovators" of peace as they sought to meet their basic needs, namely the need to provide for themselves and their families and their need to access healthcare. One of the recurrent themes in the data is that women were the first to come out of hiding and seek dialogue with the members of the other community out of their need to access healthcare facilities. During the conflict, the Kisii community who mainly live in Borabu had fled further inland towards Kisii and away from the border. However, as community members explained, most of the healthcare facilities were situated in the Sotik side-those in Kisii were too far away. Some of the first groups to cross from Borabu to Sotik during the conflict were pregnant women in search healthcare facilities to deliver their babies. This led them to cross the barriers of combatants from both sides that decide not harm them. After one group of women led a pregnant woman over these barriers, several other groups of women heard of this

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[29]*June Kaminski,* "Diffusion of Innovation Theory," Canadian Journal of Nursing Informatics, 6, issue 2, (2011), 1.
[30]Ibid

and also decided to cross the divide among the warring communities and go deliver in the healthcare facilities. The following excerpt from a focus group discussion with women clearly illustrates this point:

> Here, we did not have a hospital- the hospital is in Kisii. One day, the pregnant women of this area wanted a hospital to deliver their babies, but could not find one. Their fear left them and they got the courage to go to the hospital on the Sotik side- they just went! They travelled and found that they had passed the border [where the main conflict was] on their way to take their patient to deliver, without any harm coming to them. When they arrived at the hospital, the woman delivered well, and they returned safely. There are many shops on the Sotik side, unlike the Borabu side. So while leaving the hospital, they asked for sodas to be brought. The Kalenjin brought the sodas and came to greet the new-born and we started associating and peace started from there.[31]

True to the theory, it is the actions of these peace "innovators" that paved the way for the others to start interacting with the members of the other community.

Women were also peace "innovators" as they searched for food. In times of peace, members of these two communities rely on each other for food, with one side providing milk and meat, while the other provides maize, beans and vegetables. As mentioned in previous sections, there was a food shortage crisis during the time of conflict. In order to find food for themselves and their families, women started crossing the conflict zones and into the "enemy" territory in search for food. Women of both communities did this. This initial crossing of the conflict zone and interacting with the "enemy" community initiated dialogue along the common grounds of searching for food.

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[31] Discussion with Woman, Participant in the Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study, August 4, 2013.

Also true to the theory of change, the women of Sotik and Borabu, were indeed venturesome and risk takers.[32] These two examples show the lengths to which women will go to meet their human needs of finding food and a safe place to deliver their children. Also true to the change theory, the actions of the innovators paved the way for others.[33] After noting that women could cross from one community to the other in search of healthcare facilities and food, other women started coming out and resuming mutual activities such as attending church together. The following quote from the focus group discussion with women clearly illustrates this point:

> Women from the other community stopped coming to the church where we used to worship together. Finally, when they saw that the pregnant women who had gone to deliver in Sotik had passed unharmed, and because this lady is a Kisii who is married to Kalenjin here in Sotik, she told the other women in Borabu to come and attend church together with those of Sotik. Others were asking, 'what happened? What did you do?' She told them not be afraid, just come and let us go to church. They came and we started from there and everything went on well and even now we live in peace and we continue to preach peace.[34]

After these unique individuals had set the tone for dialogue and peace, it was then easier for other women in the community to start up peace-building activities, such as micro-investment groups as mentioned in chapter 3, peace promotion groups and prayer groups. All these groups have women from both communities.

There were peace "innovators" among the men too, albeit from a very unlikely group-the community drunkards. As one of the community members explained, drinking alcohol is part of socializing for men of both communities, especially the Kalenjin. According to doctors, having

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[32]*June Kaminski,* "Diffusion of Innovation Theory," Canadian Journal of Nursing Informatics, 6, issue 2, (2011), 1.
[33]Ibid
[34] Discussion with woman, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study, August 4, 2013.

social time to relax and unwind with friends, helps to form closer bonds among friends, release stress and is part of a healthy lifestyle, while isolation may exacerbate stress and even lead to depression.[35] Therefore, socializing, especially during times of enhanced stress such as during conflict, can be viewed as a human need. For many men in the Sotik/Borabu community, socializing means meeting friends over an alcoholic drink. While a lot has been written about the vices of excessive alcohol consumption, not much has been written about any positive gains from socializing with friends over the consumption of alcohol. In fact, the case of Sotik and Borabu may prove to be one of the few examples of this. During the period of conflict in Sotik and Borabu, some of the peace "innovators" were men who liked to consume alcohol. As the researcher learnt, the alcohol is brewed among the Kisii, whereas most of the customers come from Sotik. As the conflict prolonged, men seeking alcohol, mainly from Sotik got the courage to approach their neighbours in Borabu in order to get an alcoholic drink. The following quote from an interview with a community peace monitor clearly illustrates this point:

> This is a boundary area and there are very many drunkards from the Kalenjin and Kisii communities. What made peace return in the area is because a lot of Kalenjin and a few Kisii like to drink alcohol. The drunkards really brought peace to the area. They started calling each other from the hills, saying 'come! There is something [alcohol] I have found somewhere!' When two people met, they found that the conflict has started to cool down. They would drink today, and tomorrow there would be more people [from both communities]. They were drunkards, but they brought peace, and the rest of us followed [because they had already paved the way]. The thing that people may think is a bad thing; sometimes it may be a route [to bring peace]. People say that alcohol is bad, but they were the first ones to meet. When they met, they would talk and due to the influence of alcohol, their fear would leave them and they would interact very quickly. Then we followed behind with peace meetings until peace returned.[36]

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[35] Mark Underwood "Boost your brain by Socializing," *Santa Monica Mirror*, 8 April, 2012.
[36] Interview with Peace Monitor, ACORD, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study August 4, 2013

Sentiments such as the one above were echoed throughout by numerous participants. It is therefore clear that the men, through their need to socialize by drinking alcohol, were willing to be the first people to approach the "enemy" community. Their actions, just like those of the women, enabled other peace actors to engage community members in peace-building activities, because some dialogue had already been created between the two communities. The above situation also points to another human need, that of sustaining livelihoods. As research participants explained, all economic activities had come to a halt during the conflict, thereby exacerbating poverty and making it very difficult to find the income to pay for basic necessities. Therefore the issue of the drunkards being the first to initiate dialogue is also representative of a group of individuals' decision to forgo the conflict in order to earn a living from their trade of brewing alcohol. This led the Kisii brewers to agree to sell their liquor to the Kalenjin customers, which in turn created an avenue for dialogue initiation and sowed the seeds of peace. Transport operators also came to a truce on similar grounds.[37] The conflict had negatively affected the flow of transport from Sotik to Borabu, which in turn minimised their revenues as they continuously lost customers. For this group, this became the basis of dialogue initiation as both communities wished to continue with their work in order to enable them to earn a living.[38]

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[37] Interview with Respondent 4, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study, August 4, 2013.
[38] Ibid

4.2.4 The Effect of Cattle Rustling on Peace Building Efforts in Sotik and Borabu Constituencies

Cattle rustling (theft) was a recurring theme during the primary data in Sotik and Borabu. This issue continues to be a thorn in the peace-building efforts in Sotik and Borabu. Many participants claimed that this was one of the leading causes of the conflict in the area. The following quote from an interview with a village elder clearly illustrates this point:

> Here, the only thing that brings misunderstandings amongst the two communities is the issue of cattle theft. There is nothing else! Our children have married each other [intermarriage between both communities] and they go to school together. We don't have any problem with them, except this business of cattle theft.[39]

Such sentiments such as those above were repeated amongst nearly all the participants in the interviews and discussion groups that the researcher conducted. The Uwiano Platform for Peace reports that Kenya faces both high intensity violent conflict, such as those experienced during election periods, but also faces low-level incessant conflict, mainly driven by competition for resources such as livestock.[40] Cattle rustling in Sotik and Borabu falls under this category of low-level incessant conflict. Whereas cattle theft may not yet have caused conflict of a larger, high intensity scale, it definitely has the potential to trigger such conflict. The National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management defines conflict triggers as "events, actions and decisions which result in the escalation of disputes into violent conflict."[41]Given this

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[39] Interview with Respondent 4, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study, August 4, 2013.
[40] Uwiano Joint Secretariat, *Uwiano Platform for Peace: Experiences and Lessons Learned*, (Nairobi, 2012), viii.
[41]National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management (NSC) Secretariat, *National Conflict Mapping and Analysis: Peace and Conflict Trends in Kenya* (Nairobi, 2011), 7.

definition, it is easy to see that cattle theft can contribute to the escalation of disputes amongst communities, and may even lead to violent conflict. The NSC has acknowledged this, stating that cattle rustling is a significant conflict trigger amongst pastoralist groups. The NSC further listed cattle rustling a trigger for conflict in the South Rift and Nyanza provinces, in which Sotik and Borabu are located respectively. During interview, one the village elders eloquently argued that cattle rustling can result in further conflict in the area. Below is a quote from that interview:

> I want to tell you that these days, since January, cows have been stolen continuously. There isn't even one day that I don't hear that a cow is being tracked [because it has been stolen]. In the evening, I ask, 'was the cow found? Was it returned?' They reply 'no.' Instead of waking up early in the morning and starting the search where they had left off the previous day, they [police officers that have been engaged to find the stolen animal] just leave it. What will this lead to in the future? It will lead to conflict. This peace, where is the peace? It is true there is a little peace because we are here, but what will this lead to in the future?[42]

Causes of Cattle Rustling

There are many intertwining causes of cattle rustling in Sotik and Borabu. The diagram below depicts the main issues surrounding cattle theft and how they interact to fuel conflict in the area.

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[42] Interview with Village Elder, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study, August 4, 2013.

Figure 4: The causes and effects of cattle rustling

One of the first causes mentioned among the research participants as a cause of cattle rustling in the area is the cultural practice of stealing cows as a source of dowry or as a means to show the community that you are a man and attain their respect. Interestingly, during interviews and discussions, the older generation would mention that this culture existed, but it is no longer present. However, the youth painted a different picture, arguing that their fathers and grandfathers still have that mindset and urge them to go and steal cows from the other community. As a community leader explained, there is still a notion within the members of the Kalenjin community that it is wrong and a taboo to steal from fellow Kalenjin. However, stealing from other communities is considered acceptable; it is not even considered as a crime.[43] The following quote from a participant in a focus group discussion with the youth illustrates that there is cultural history and pride associated with cattle rustling, which drives the youth to continue the practice:

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[43]Interview with Peace Monitor, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study, August 5, 2013.

If you look at the issue of cattle theft, the cows are stolen from the Nyanza side [Borabu] heading towards Sotik. It is because there has been cattle theft since long ago. Their grandfathers and fathers would steal, and even now, the youth feel that they should steal so that they can enhance their pride by stealing from another community.[44]

Cattle theft, which is mainly carried out by the youth has become a very lucrative business. As research participants explained, the theft has become a well-organized affair with thieves from both communities collaborating in the business. As a village elder in a focus group with elders explained:

Cattle theft has become the business of the night. There are people- we call them the third tribe- who are in business together. There is a person responsible for pushing the cow away from the homestead, another to take the cow to the hiding place. This happens until it reaches the buyer. These days, they even use motorcycles to bring people [to steal the animals] and pay them using MPESA![45]

The above quote clearly demonstrates that this is a business. Peace actors in Sotik and Borabu have tried very hard to convince residents that there are three types of people living in the area: Kalenjin, Kisii and thieves. They have termed thieves as the 'third tribe' in order to convince the community that a community should not be held responsible for the actions of a group of criminal individuals.[46]

The National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management (NSC) reported that it is mainly the youth who are involved in general conflict and also in cattle

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[44] Discussion with Youth, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study, August 4, 2013.

[45] Interview with Village Elder, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study, August 4, 2013.

[46] Interview with Peace Actor, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study, August 7, 2013.

theft.[47]The researcher found this to also be true in Sotik and Borabu. According to most participants, the youth engage in cattle rustling because they do not have alternative sources of livelihoods. Unemployment among the youth is very high and many youth lack legitimate sources of livelihoods and therefore turn to cattle rustling. The following quotes from participants in the focus group with youth clearly illustrate this point:

> One needs money in life, in order to live well. The youth lack jobs in Kenya and this is the cause that has led many of them to turn to stealing.[48]

> When he lacks money, he feels it is best that he goes to steal so that he can get some easy money. He does not want to do hard work- he wants to profit from somebody else's hard work.[49]

> Being far away from a town also contributes to us stealing [cows]. Because I need money to go and enjoy myself and have fun in town. So when I steal and make that Kshs 20,000 [per cow], I can afford to go and have fun in town. The youth of Mombasa do not steal because the amenities associated with a larger city are closer to them. [Youth in Sotik/Borabu have to travel further to access these amenities]. Now for me, the fun associated with larger cities will pass me by and I will age quicker.[50]

From the above quotes, it is clear that there is a growing culture of theft as a means of earning a livelihood because due to the general unemployment situation, but also because it is an easier options. The youth also added that stealing cows is viewed as an easier option due to their

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[47]National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management (NSC) Secretariat, *National Conflict Mapping and Analysis: Peace and Conflict Trends in Kenya* (Nairobi, 2011), 27.

[48] Discussion with Youth 1, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study, August 4, 2013.

[49] Discussion with Youth 2, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study, August 4, 2013.

[50] Discussion with Youth 3, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study, August 4, 2013.

limitations in terms of education and resources, e.g. the lack of capital to start and sustain profitable businesses.

Every single participant who mentioned cattle theft as a key issue that affects peace in the area also complained very severely about the justice system. Participants complained of that the government officials were sluggish in their efforts to trace and recover stolen cattle, even when clear footprints were visible, suggesting that they too were involved in the cattle rustling 'business'.[51] Cattle that had been stolen were rarely recovered. Participants also complained that when suspects were brought to court, they were released for lack of evidence. The court required that the suspects were caught 'red handed' and thus the participants said that they rarely had this kind of evidence, although they were certain that a particular individual was involved in cattle theft. Their subsequent release into the community brings fear into the community as they are afraid that the released suspect may attack the persons who reported him to the police.[52]

Research participants also mentioned that retaliatory attacks due to cattle theft occurred in Sotik and Borabu. Those whose cattle had been stolen and not recovered, would sometimes blame the entire community for the theft and choose to steal their neighbour's cow as an act of revenge.[53] All of these issues discussed above have the effect of sustaining the practice of cattle rustling and enhancing its chances of causing higher level violent conflict in Sotik and Borabu.

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[51]Interview with Village Elder, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study, August 5, 2013.
[52]Ibid
[53]Interview with Respondent 21, Participant in Sotik/Borabu Peace-building Research Study, August 6, 2013.

4.6 Conclusion

From the above discussion, it is clear that violent conflict has numerous negative effects, some of which, for example the psychological trauma and the financial devastation due to loss of property, halting of business activities etc. can have lasting effects on the society. As seen from the case of Sotik and Borabu, these effects can take up to several years to overcome.

From discussions presented in chapters 2 and 3, and those presented above, it has become increasingly clear that successful peace-building initiatives need to take advantage of the wealth of knowledge that community members hold. It is important that peace-building initiatives create and sustain ownership by transferring knowledge to locals and encouraging effective partnerships with the government, the civil society, international and local donors, the private sector and other peace stakeholders. It is also very important to recognize the early peace "innovators". In Sotik and Borabu these innovators were mainly women seeking healthcare facilities and foodstuffs for their families as well as men seeking alcohol. As Kaminski argues, these "innovators" are the gateway for others to take action and can be used to recruit other peer educators. Finally, the potential for cattle rustling to bring further conflict in the Sotik/Borabu area cannot be underscored enough. It is therefore essential that peace-builders continue working towards finding a sustainable solution to curbing this practice.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Summary

Human societies exist by the cooperation of individuals and subgroups and the existence of the latter implies that they have some initiative and some autonomy; they cannot exist unless each defends some sphere of freedom. Such a defence implies conflict.[1] It is now evident from this research paper that violent conflict is highly destructive, resulting in massive loss of human lives and properties, leaving psychological and social wounds that have to be healed by reconciliation efforts. Overall, this research has suggested what can be done to improve sustainable peace-building in Africa, with Sotik/Borabu being the case-study.

From the findings discussed throughout the research study, it has become evident that the drive to fulfil individuals' basic human needs drives members of society towards violent conflict. We have seen this repeatedly in examples throughout the world and especially in Africa. Although the causes of conflict are complex and intertwined as discussed, the overarching theme is the competition for individuals or groups of individuals to assume positions in the society that will better enable them to meet their human needs. This includes access to economic gains that will secure better livelihoods. This has been especially evident in the case of Sotik and Borabu, where the conflict was mainly caused the political manipulation of community members, who incited them to engage in conflict, with the promise that this would somehow lead to the improvement of their livelihoods. It is also very clear that the drive to meet one's basic human

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[1] Quincy Write, The Nature of Conflict, in Conflict, Readings in Management and Resolution Edited by John Burton and Frank Duke, McMillan Press Ltd, 1990, 20-24.

needs is very strong. Indeed, as seen in Sotik and Borabu, it is this drive that led community members to initiate peace amongst them, as the cost of conflict on their livelihoods was too high. This study has therefore produced results that support the first hypothesis that "conflict will be prominent in societies that fail to meet the basic needs of their members" as presented in chapter 1. The study has not found any evidence to support hypotheses two and three which state that "human needs do not play any role in causing or perpetuating conflict in Africa" and "Factors other than human needs are triggers and drivers of conflict in Africa" respectively.

The researcher concurs with Albert Camus that "peace is the only battle worth waging."

5.2 Key Findings

From critical contemplation of the results of the research study, the researcher has identified the following key findings: Indigenous peace-building models or community-led peace-building models have a clear advantage over Western peace-building models, as they take advantage of the wealth of knowledge that community members hold. Involving community members in key decision making roles in peace-building efforts is imperative in order to build a sense of ownership of the peace-building movement and ensure transfer of peace-building skills and knowledge to the community members. Ultimately, indigenous peace-building models are more sustainable compared to the typical Western led approaches to peace-building.

During times of conflict, there are individuals or groups of individuals with a higher capacity to initiate peace. In the case of Sotik/Borabu, these were groups of women and men in search of healthcare facilities and food, as well as social recreation through alcohol consumption. Although these early peace innovators may come from unlikely members of the society, it is

important to identify them as they play a very important role of paving the way for other peace-building activities. Their actions lead to earlier initiation of peace-building.

Latent causes of low intensity conflict are significant because they have the potential to exacerbate conflict in the area. This was well elucidated by the issue of cattle rustling in Sotik/Borabu.

It is extremely important to find a sustainable solution to the issue of youth unemployment. As seen in the case of Sotik/Borabu, the youth are the ones who are mainly involved in carrying out the acts of violence during times of conflict. They engage in these activities because they lack legitimate sources of earning a livelihood. This makes them extremely vulnerable to manipulation by politicians who offer them livelihood improving incentives in exchange for their active participation in violent conflict.

5.3 Recommendations

As a result of critically examining both primary and secondary data, the researcher has developed the following recommendations:

There is the need for more income generating peace-building programs targeting the youth. Participants noted that projects involving youth from both communities were especially successful. For example, youth from both communities were involved in tree planting as an income generating project. Participants noted that none of the youth would wish for conflict to occur in the area as they had invested in it. They all wanted to safeguard their livelihoods. This is especially important given the finding that most youth involve themselves in activities such as

cattle rustling for lack of other income generating sources. It is also imperative to focus on developing income generating activities for youth with little education. Most of the youth who engage in theft and conflict have low education levels and low chances of furthering their education. It is there of the utmost importance that projects focus on empowering the youth to create sustainable livelihoods for themselves as a means to safeguarding peace in the area. There is also the need to create girl specific programs. Most of the discussion about youth focuses largely on male youth, forgetting the girls. This calls for an increased focus on issues that affect female youth, with the goal to empowering them to become active in their own development, enabling them to maintain sustainable livelihoods. This requires a detailed analysis at their needs, desires and competencies Vis a Vis livelihood enhancing initiatives.

During the primary data collection, it became clear that the court systems ability to dispense justice to victims of cattle theft was wanting in Sotik and Borabu. Most of the suspects of cattle theft were dismissed by courts due to lack of evidence. This points to the need for legal training among the community members, to increase their knowledge on legal processes and sensitize them on their legal rights and how they can utilize the law and the justice systems to their benefit.

Most participants claimed that the violence in Sotik and Borabu is politically related as politicians incite people to violence. There should be further empowerment of the citizens to enable them to put their politicians to task, ensuring that they do not make utterances or promises that may cause tension in the area.

Finally, the researcher noted that although there were reports of sexual violence occurring in the area during the time of conflict, many community members were reluctant to admit to this

during the primary data collection exercise. This indicates a gap in the knowledge of human rights, specifically women and children's rights. Therefore further work should be done in the area to raise awareness on women's sexual and reproductive rights, focusing on issues such as gender based violence and the women and children's right to protection against this form of violence. Such projects should involve men, women, youth, community elders and spiritual leaders in order to gain the buy-in required to tackle such a sensitive topic.

As mentioned earlier, girls and their needs are usually ignored in peace-building activities. Further research in this area is needed. Researchers should focus on the consequences of neglecting girls in peace-building activities, and establish if there is a nexus between this practice and conflict. The research should also illuminate effective strategies for engaging girls in peace-building activities, with the goal of building sustainable peace.

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APPENDIX 1 : HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRES

INFORMED CONSENT:

Dear Participant,

I am a Masters of Arts student in International Conflict Management Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies University of Nairobi at the University of Nairobi. I am carrying out research on post-conflict peace-building in East Africa (1990-2012). I have come to Sotik and Borabu to learn about the peace-building initiatives carried out in this area following the post-election violence in 2007/2008 in Kenya. I would like to ask you some questions regarding these initiatives. I will not take much of your time. The information you provide will be treated with utmost confidentiality. Your name will not appear anywhere. Your responses cannot be traced back to you because they will be combined with the responses of others to establish common trends. Participation is voluntary and you can choose not to take part. Also, if you do not want to answer a certain question, please inform me and we will skip that question. If you would like to stop the interview, please let me know and I will stop immediately. Do you have any questions? (Answer all questions appropriately). Would you like to participate? **If yes, ask the participant to sign or put their thumb print below.**

Respondent has agreed to participate:
I have read or been read to and understand the above and agree to participate in this survey.

Signature (respondent) ……………………………………… or thumb print if unable to write………………

Thank you very much for agreeing to take part in this research study.

SECTION I: GENERAL INFORMATION

101. Village or Community Name:
………………………………………………………………...

102. Stoic or Baraboo Constituency (please circle one):

103. Sub-Location……………………. Location……………………
District……………….County……………..

104. Start time: ……………………………… Finish time: …………………Date:………………

SECTION 2: DEMOGRAPHICS

Question	Write Responses in this column
201. Gender of Respondent **(M/F)**	
202. Age of Respondent	
203. Marital Status of Respondent 1=Single 2=Married 3=Divorced/Separated 4=Widow/Widower	
204. Highest Level of Education of the Respondent 1=never attended school 2=attended some primary 3=completed primary 4=attended some secondary 5=completed secondary 6= college/university	
205. Occupation of the Respondent	
206. How many people live in this household?	
207. How many children? (under 18yrs)	

SECTION 3: Community Experiences of Conflict

301.   In your opinion, what are the main causes of violent conflict in Kenya?

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302.   What were the main causes of conflict in Sotik and Borabu?

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303.   What was life like for you during the time of conflict in Sotik and Borabu?

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304.   How is life different for you now that there is no conflict?

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305.   What was the focus of the peace-building initiatives in Sotik and Borabu?

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306.   Were you personally involved in these peace-building initiatives? (Yes/no). If yes, how?

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307.   What were some of the challenges you faced implementing these peace building
         initiatives?

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308.   How did the recent 2013 elections affect peace in the area?

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309.   Do you think the peace will last? Please explain your response.

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310.   What would you advice other communities in conflict to do in order to create lasting peace?

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SECTION 4: Role of the Government and Civil Society in Peace building

401. What role did the government play in the peace building process in Sotik and Borabu? Please give examples.

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402. What role did NGOs play in the peace building process in Sotik and Borabu? Please give examples.

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403. Did religious actors (Pastors, Imams etc) play a role in peace building in Sotik/Borabu? Please explain your response.

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404. a) In your opinion, what role have political leaders played in promoting conflict in the area? Please explain your response.

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404. b) In your opinion, what role have political leaders played in promoting peace in the area? Please explain your response.

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405. In your opinion, what role have community elders played in promoting peace in the area? Please explain your response and give examples.

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406. In your opinion, what role have the media played in promoting peace in the area? Please explain your response and give examples.

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407. What role have women played in peace building in Sotik/Borabu? Please explain your response and give examples.

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408. What role have the youth played in peace building in Sotik/Borabu? Please explain your response and give examples.

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409. What are the major challenges facing women during conflict?

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410. What are the major challenges facing youth during conflict?

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411. What would you advice other women in conflict affected societies to do in order to create lasting peace?

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412. What would you advice other youth in conflict affected societies to do in order to create lasting peace?

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THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION.

APPENDIX 2: DISCUSSION GUIDES (FGDs)

DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR DISCUSSION FOR MEN, WOMEN AND YOUTH

1. A) What were the main causes of conflict in this area?
    B) Have these issues been resolved?
2. A) What peace-building efforts were put in place to deal with this conflict?
    B) How did you deal with the perpetrators of violence?
3. Who were the main drivers of peace-building in this area? (probe, e.g. community elders, NGOs, individuals etc)
4. What were the main challenges of peace building in this area? How did you deal with them?
5. What are the main lessons you have learnt from this experience of rebuilding peace in the community?
6. Has life changed after peace was established? If yes, how? If no, why?
7. How did you deal with the recent 2013 elections? Did the elections threaten peace? How did you keep the calm?
8. How do you resolve disputes now? How is this different from before the signing of the peace agreement?
9. How about the issue of cattle rustling? Is this still an issue in the area? How are you dealing with it?
10. Do you think peace in Sotik and Borabu will last? Why?
11. What role have community elders played in peace-building in this area?
12. What role have women played in peace-building in this area?
13. What role have youth played in peace-building in this area?
14. What role have religious actors played in peace-building in this area?
15. What role has the media played in peace-building in this area?
16. What role has the government played in peace-building in this area?
17. What would you advice other communities facing conflict in Kenya to do in order to build lasting peace?

APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW GUIDE (RELIGIOUS LEADERS)

1. In your opinion, what were the main causes of violent conflict in Sotik and Borabu? (probe, what are some of the root causes of this conflict?)

2. How has this conflict evolved?

3. Do you think politicians had any role to play in causing the conflict in this area? Please explain your answer.

4. Do you think the government had any role in causing the conflict in this area? Please explain your answer.

5. Do you think the media had any role to play in causing the conflict in this area? Please explain your answer. (probe contents of what media was airing then).

6. What are the main consequences of this conflict?

7. What peace building initiatives have been implemented in Sotik and Borabu?

8. What role have religious leaders played in peace building? What additional value has this brought to the peace building process?

9. What are some of the main activities religious actors are involved in to promote peace?

10. How can religious leaders be supported to promote peace-building? Who would be best suited to provide this support?

11. What are the peace building challenges you have faced? How have these challenges been resolved?

12. How do you resolve conflict now? How do you deal with the perpetrators?

13. Following the violence, what do you think is the best way to live with the perpetrators of the crimes? (probe along the lines of reformation of the perpetrators)

14. What role has media played in peace-building activities? (probe contents of media now compared to then).

15. What role has the government played in promoting peace in this area?

16. In your opinion, have the issues that led to the post-election violence been resolved? (probe, if yes, how? If no, why?)

17. Do you think this area has the chance of experiencing such kind of violence again? If yes, why? If no, why? Please explain.

18. What role do you think you can play in fostering lasting peace in Kenya?

19. What would you advice other communities facing conflict in Kenya to do in order to build lasting peace?

APPENDIX 4: INTERVIEW GUIDE (COMMUNITY ELDERS)

1. In your opinion, what were the main causes of violent conflict in Sotik and Borabu? (probe, what are some of the root causes of this conflict?)
2. How has this conflict evolved?
3. Do you think politicians had any role to play in causing the conflict in this area? Please explain your answer.
4. Do you think the government had any role in causing the conflict in this area? Please explain your answer.
5. Do you think the media had any role to play in causing the conflict in this area? Please explain your answer. (probe contents of what media was airing then).
6. What are the main consequences of this conflict?
7. What peace building initiatives have been implemented in Sotik and Borabu?
8. What role have the community elders played in peace building?
9. How can community elders be supported to promote peace in the area? Who do you think is best suited to provide this support?
10. What are the peace building challenges you have faced? How have these challenges been resolved?
11. How do you resolve conflict now? How do you deal with the perpetrators?
12. Following the violence, what do you think is the best way to live with the perpetrators of the crimes? (probe along the lines of reformation of the perpetrators)
13. How are community elders chosen? Are there any women?
14. What role has the government played in peace-building in this area?
15. What role do you think women play in peace-building? How do you think they can be supported to increase their role in promoting peace?
16. What role do you think the youth play in peace-building? How do you think they can be supported to increase their role in promoting peace?
17. In your opinion, have the issues that led to the post-election violence been resolved? (probe, if yes, how? If no, why?)
18. Do you think this area has the chance of experiencing such kind of violence again? If yes, why? If no, why? Please explain.
19. What role do you think you can play in fostering lasting peace in Kenya?
20. What would you advice other communities facing conflict in Kenya to do in order to build lasting peace?

APPENDIX 5: INTERVIEW GUIDE (GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS)

1. In your opinion, what are the main causes of violent conflict in Sotik and Borabu? (probe, what are some of the root causes of this conflict?)
2. How has this conflict evolved?
3. Who are the main actors in this conflict?
4. What are the main consequences of this conflict?
5. Did you have any experience with the Kenyan 2007/2008 post-election violence? If yes, please describe your experiences.
6. In your opinion, have the issues that led to the post-election violence been resolved? (probe, if yes, how? If no, why?)
7. What is your experience with the justice system following the Kenyan 2007/2008 post-election violence?
8. What were the main crimes committed during the Kenyan 2007/2008 post-election period?
9. Did people come forward to report these crimes and seek justice for them?
10. What were the main issues that people sought justice for? How were these issues resolved?
11. What were the main challenges of executing justice for crimes perpetrated?
12. In your opinion, what could have been the barriers preventing people from coming forward to report crimes and seek justice?
13. In your opinion, what is the best ways (most effective) in which to seek justice for the people against whom crimes were committed during the 2007/2008 post-election violence? (What are the worst ways (lest effective) ways?
14. How about the perpetrators of this violence? What is your opinion on them? In your opinion, what sort of reasons do you think could have led them to committing these crimes?
15. Following the violence, what do you think is the best way to live with the perpetrators of the crimes? (probe along the lines of reformation of the perpetrators)
16. Have you encountered situations where the victims of crimes have to live in the same community with the perpetrators of the violence? Please describe these situations.
17. In such situations, what, in your opinion is the best way to foster peace in that community?
18. What role has the government played in promoting peace in this area?
19. What role have community elders played in promoting peace in this area?
20. What role has the media played in promoting peace in this area?
21. What role has have women and youth played in promoting peace in this area?
22. What role has have religious actors played in promoting peace in this area?

23. Do you think this area has the chance of experiencing such kind of violence again? If yes, why? If no, why? Please expand.
24. What steps do you think that Kenya, as a nation, needs to take in order to ensure lasting peace? Who should be responsible for initiating these actions? How can we ensure these actions are actually implemented? Who should be responsible for this?
25. Finally, what role do you think you can play in fostering lasting peace in Kenya?