

THE POLITICS OF AID IN SOMALIA: A CRITICAL EVALUATION, 1992- 2012

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DECLARATION

This Research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

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This research project has been submitted for examination with our approval as the University Supervisors.

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DEDICATION

To my dearest Mum, Rukiyo Abdi, My sisters Farhiyo and Deqo and my brother

Abdikadir for inspiring me to work hard; May Allah bless them all.

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I thank Allah, The Almighty for giving me the strength and courage to complete this project. I am very grateful to my supervisor Dr. Ibrahim Farah for his advice, guidance and motivation. Without his support and dedication, this study would not have been completed. I owe the greatest intellectual debt to him. I ALSO appreciate my classmates for being there for me every time I needed their support.

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ABSTRACT

The overall objective of the study is to critically evaluate the politics of aid in Somalia from 1992 to 2012. The study adopted a cross sectional survey. Primary data was collected using an interview guide. The study found that there were emerging issues which are political in the aid distribution program and there are also the raging debate and the absence of a unified humanitarian code of conduct besides other issues like corruption, terror vs. anti-terror group interference and vested interests by various actors (UN/NGOs, Somali government, other authorities etc.). The study recommends that reform of aid agencies and aid practices has to be driven by forces within donor countries, not by internationally-driven bureaucratic processes and agreements such as the first Code of Conduct on humanitarian engagement for Somalia. The ideals embodied in the Code of Conduct on humanitarian engagement for Somalia were good, but they could not be achieved in practice.

ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM	African Union peacekeeping force
AU	African Union's
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
DMU	Disaster Management Unit
FTS	Financial Tracking Service
HIF	Hiran Inter-agency Forum
HQs	Head Quarters
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross's
IEEPA	International Emergency Economic Powers Act
JNA	Joint Needs Assessment
LICUS	Low Income Countries Under Stress'
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NFD	Northern Frontier District
NGO	Nongovernmental organizations
NPPPP	Northern Province People's Progressive Party
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ORH	Operation Restore Hope
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Program
SACB	Somalia Aid Coordination Body
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programme
SSS	Somali Support Secretariat

TI	Transparency International
TNG	Transition National Government
UN	United Nations
UNDOS	United Nations Development Officer for Somalia
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNMG	United Nations Monitoring Group
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS	UN Political Office for Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSECOORD	United Nations Security Coordinator
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WAWA	We are Women Activists
WHO	World Health Organization

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Background to the Study

The debate over the nature and impact of aid politics on the other policy strategies in African countries has been rancorous and protracted.¹ Humanitarian aid is material or logistical assistance provided for humanitarian purposes, typically in response to humanitarian crises including natural disaster and man-made disaster. The primary objective of humanitarian aid is to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity. It may therefore be distinguished from development aid, which seeks to address the underlying socioeconomic factors which may have led to a crisis or emergency.²

According to Bagachwa humanitarian aid essentially consists of a one-sided transfer of resources, usually from industrialized countries into poorer ones.³ Aid is funded by donations from individuals, corporations, governments and other organizations. The funding and delivery of humanitarian aid is increasingly international, making it much faster, more responsive, and more effective in coping with to major emergencies affecting large numbers of people (Central Emergency Response Fund). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordinates the international humanitarian response to a crisis or emergency pursuant to Resolution 46/182 of the

1 David D. Laitin (1977). *Politics, Language, and Thought: The Somali Experience*. University of Chicago Press. p. 73. ISBN 978-0-226-46791-7. Retrieved 2 July 2012

2 Bagachwa, M. S. D. (1997), "Aid Effectiveness in Tanzania with Special Reference to Danish Aid", in: Carlsson, J. et al. (eds.), *Foreign Aid in Africa, Learning From Country Experiences*, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.

3 Federal Research Division, (2004). *Somalia: A Country Study*, (Kessinger Publishing, LLC: 2004), p.38.

United Nations General Assembly. Larry notes that humanitarian aid is given to assist those affected by natural disasters, human conflict or other forms of severe political, economic or social breakdowns.⁴ Its aim is to prevent and alleviate human suffering in the context of life-threatening situations. This is mainly done through the short-term provision of food, water, shelter and emergency services to affected areas, though initial humanitarian operations often evolve into longer-term re-construction and rehabilitation efforts.⁵

Even though it is expected that the humanitarian aid be the last resort, major malpractices such as corruption in areas such as Somali undermines the fundamental purpose of humanitarian action.⁶ Its effects include the diversion of relief supplies away from affected communities, inequitable distribution of aid and sub-standard or inappropriately located infrastructure. Such outcomes ignore the needs of the intended beneficiaries of aid, often further marginalizing those from the poorest sections of society and deepening existing social conflicts. Tackling the major obstacles in humanitarian aid is therefore key to ensuring effective and equitable humanitarian assistance to those in greatest need.⁷

⁴Larry Minear (2002). *The Humanitarian Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries*. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press. ISBN 1-56549-149-1.

⁵James, Eric (2008). *Managing Humanitarian Relief: An Operational Guide for NGOs*. Rugby: Practical Action.

⁶Hansen, H. and F. Tarp (2001), "Aid and Growth Regressions", *Journal of Development Economics* 64, 540–570.

⁷Rhoda E. Howard, (1986). *Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa*, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.), p.95

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

There has been a growing trend among armed conflicts in the developing world to resist swift resolution; and some countries have for years become trapped in a deep-rooted, self-sustaining state of war.⁸ Conflict in Somalia has persisted for nearly two decades. With a collapsed state, widespread violence and criminal activity, as well as continued disagreement between warring factions, the prospect of peace seems bleak.⁹

Somalia faces one of the world's worst humanitarian crises following the two decades conflict and worsening cycles of drought and floods in the country.¹⁰ The country remains one of the most challenging environments for humanitarians to work due to the absence of a properly functioning state, a highly volatile security situation, and limited access. A number of factors make the humanitarian crisis in Somalia uniquely complex: Somalia is the longest case of complete state collapse in modern times and is fragmented into several polities with overlapping claims to sovereignty. It currently has one of the largest internally displaced populations in the world.

South central Somalia has some of the world's worst social indicators, with over 43 percent of the population living on less than \$1 per day, some of the worst rates of under-five (142/1,000) and maternal mortality (1,400 /100,000), and under-five acute malnutrition consistently above 19 percent.¹¹ In the past decade, Somalia has been among the top ten recipients of humanitarian aid, with the most UN consolidated appeals. South

8 UNHABITAT - <http://www.unhabitat.org>

9 Federal Research Division, (2004). *Somalia: A Country Study*, (Kessinger Publishing, LLC: 2004), p.38

10 Somalia Aid Coordination Body (2002) *SACB Donor Report 2001*.

11 Somalia Aid Coordination Body (1997) *SACB Collected Papers*. SACB Executive Committee.

central Somalia is currently the most dangerous place in the world for aid workers; two-thirds of all aid workers killed worldwide in 2008 was in Somalia. Humanitarian space has shrunk to the extent that since March 2010 there have been no international aid workers based in south central Somalia, and all aid operations have been managed remotely from Kenya.¹²

The current aid program is faced with challenges which have impacted to the aid process in Somalia. Political regime in Somalia tends to be highly corrupt. Aid resources are democratization and even appropriated by corrupt officials who use them to strengthen and solidify their control rather than making their way to their intended ends. The aid process has been interfered by Terror and Anti-Terror Group which include the *Al-shabab*¹³. The process has been worsened by vested interests by various actors in the aid program in Somalia who have politicized the aid program for their own interest rather than the intended goal.

Ikiara and Ndung'u in their study presented three particular reasons why humanitarian aid is at risk: conditions inherent in humanitarian emergencies; characteristics of the 'humanitarian aid system'; and levels of transparency and accountability in recipient countries.¹⁴ How to minimize the risk of challenges while still responding to humanitarian needs are an issue of concern to the humanitarian community and the intended beneficiaries of aid alike.

¹²Somalia Aid Coordination Body (2001) *SACB Donor Report 2000*.

¹³Stefan Goodwin (2006), *Africa's legacies of urbanization: unfolding saga of a continent*, (Lexington Books: 2006), p. 48

¹⁴Ikiara, G. and N. Ndung'u (1999), "Employment and Labour Markets during Adjustment – Kenya", in: Van der Geest, W. and R. Van Der Hoeven (eds.), *Adjustment, Employment and Missing Institutions in Africa: The Experience in Eastern and Southern Africa*, London: James Curry.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of the study is to critically evaluate the politics of aid in Somalia from 1992 to 2012.

More specifically the study aims to:

- i. Provide an overview of aid environment in Somalia;
- ii. Assess existing aid coordination mechanism in Somalia;
- iii. Explore the linkage between aid and politics in Somalia

1.4 Literature Review

This chapter section summarised the information from other researchers who had carried out their research in the same sphere of aid program. The study specifically covers humanitarian principles and the environmental humanitarian response.

1.4.1 Humanitarian Principles

The field of humanitarianism has undergone a dramatic transformation since the late 1980s, fueled by growth in the number of organizations and expansion in the scope and nature of missions. One of the most noteworthy trends has been the rise of rights-based and avowedly activist humanitarianism.¹⁵Conway witnesses the end of a strict separation between strategic ends-based state assistance and needs-based NGO activism. ¹⁶Bruce links Human Rights “solidarity” humanitarianism to Oxfam in Britain and MSF in France; these trends accelerated during the mid 1980s and after, reinforcing a new

15 Rhoda E. Howard, (1986). Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.), p.95

16 Conway, P. (2007), “The Revolving Door: Duration and Recidivism in IMF Programs”, Review of Economics and Statistics 89, 205–220

international system based on long term capacity building¹⁷. Mission expansion in turn has created tensions between those who advocate for a limited humanitarian role care as pre-political, based in charity and minimalist and perhaps the majorities, who link humanitarianism to broader notions of human progress, engage in consequentiality analysis, and focus on root causes. This relates also to the intersection of humanitarian relief and development.¹⁸

The growth in the sector and the response to certain crises notably Rwanda in 1994, but also the Southeast Asian Tsunami in 2004 has precipitated efforts among aid workers to elaborate common values and standards.¹⁹ This has been done most notably with codes and quality initiatives like the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief and the Sphere Project. The NGO Code of Conduct had at its heart an assumption that there is a shared set of core values. For humanitarian scholars, professionalization and regulation herald evolution in the field; the FIC's "Ambiguity and Change" report indicates that the sector is maturing with a growing number of technical standards, charters and codes to guide its activities for increased effectiveness and accountability.²⁰ Studies on humanitarian principles tend to assume the presence of a meaningful global humanitarian community that is bound by standards and linked by technology and networking.

17 David D. (1996). *Latin, Politics, Language, and Thought: The Somali Experience*, (University Of Chicago Press), p.75

18 Bruce Baker, (2003). *Escape from Domination in Africa: Political Disengagement & Its Consequences*, (Africa World Press), p.83

19 UNICEF (2000) *UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2000 (south Sudan)*.

20 Johnson, D. (2002) *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil War*. Bloomington: IN: Indiana University Press.

1.4.2 The Environment of Humanitarian Response

Complex emergencies and to a lesser degree natural disasters have a large impact on countries and people, like hyperinflation, massive unemployment, and net decreases in Gross National Product, which usually lead to a macro-economic collapse. People face episodic food insecurity, which frequently deteriorates into mass starvation, followed by movements of displaced people and refugees escaping conflict or searching for food. Finally, both central government authority and at least parts of civil society deteriorate or even collapse completely.²¹

According to Jock, the fundamental difference between natural and politically induced disasters in the way institutions are affected in natural disasters, there can be some significant interference with society and therefore institutional change arising from both the impact effects and the responses, but this is infrequent, mostly incidental and not normally widespread or long-term.²² In complex emergencies, most aspects of the impact and effects have deliberate institutional aims and overturns. Likewise, the response to this type of calamity is also bound to cause significant interference with society, which may be intense, long term and mostly deliberate.²³

The humanitarian sector became actively concerned about the quality of humanitarian interventions, even though tensions between conviction-driven social action and studied

21Jaspars, S. (2000) *Solidarity and Soup Kitchens: A Review of Principles and Practice for Food Distribution in Conflict*, HPG Report 7. London: ODI.

22Jok, J. M. (September 1996) 'Information Exchange in the Disaster Zone: Interaction Between Aid Workers and Recipients in South Sudan', *Disasters*, vol. 20, no. 3.

23Gostelow, Lola. 1999. The Sphere Project: The Implications of Making Humanitarian Principles and Codes Work. *Disasters* 23 (4):316-25.

professionalism with its standards, systems and accountabilities has energised humanitarianism since its founding years.²⁴ Oxfam realized as early as the 1980s that competition between agencies could lead to lower standards, and a number of initiatives have been launched internally within the sector that aimed to enhance the quality of humanitarian work and the accountability of humanitarian organisations. European non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in particular, were concerned that if they did not take the lead in implementing their own system of standards and accountability, they would find themselves forced to accept systems defined by their governmental donors.²⁵

A process was initiated to target the perceptions of weakness and inconsistency of the humanitarian enterprise and to search for an agreement on common principles based on international law and strategies to build capacity to respond to the changing humanitarian context effectively, including its social, economic, political, technological, environmental, and legal issues.²⁶

1.4.3 The Political Economy of Relief in Contemporary Civil Wars

The main and innovative idea put forward by political economists was that famines may not only produce winners but that the processes and prospects of asset stripping may be the very ‘objective’ of famines. The research of political economists has demonstrated

24 Collier, P., “Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective”, in: Berdal, M., Malone D. (eds.), *Greed*

25Griekspoor, André, and Steve Collins. 2001. Raising standards in emergency relief: how useful are Sphere minimum standards for humanitarian assistance. *BMJ* 323:740-2.

26Macrae, J. (2001) *Aiding Recovery?: The Crisis of Aid in Chronic Political Emergencies*. London: Zed Books.

that these man-made famines have often coincided with situations of civil war²⁷. It is argued that internal wars rather than just representing destruction create ‘alternative’ and rational political and economic systems, markedly by creating impunity for the use of violence²⁸. Keen locates ‘functions’ of violence in civil wars at the national and at the local level (“top-down” and “bottom-up” violence).²⁹

Violence during civil strife may enable state elites to crack down on political opponents and redistribute economic resources amongst followers.³⁰ At the regional and local level conflicts may create ‘forced’ markets with restricted entry that ensures high profits for monopolist traders. Certain groups may be pushed into cheap labor or even slavery. Other economic gains may be realized through the illicit appropriation and trade of resources (land, livestock, crops, mineral resources). Local asset transfers may tie in with national-level political and economic objectives (in the case of Sudan for instance with the project to open the South to Arab settlement) and with parallel markets controlled at the highest level³¹. War may become the continuation of economics by other means. These dynamics may be particularly strong in “weak” states with little or no monopolized power of coercion.³²

27Macrae, J. et al. (2002). *Uncertain Power: The Changing Role of Official Donors in Humanitarian Action*. HPG

28Macrae, J. and A. Zwi (eds) (1994) *War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies*. London: Zed Books with Save the Children (UK).

29 UNDP (2001) *Human Development Report Somalia, 2001*. Nairobi: UNDP.

30 Levine, I. (1997) *Promoting Humanitarian Principles: The Southern Sudan Experience*. London: ODI.

31 Journal of Humanitarian Assistance - <http://www.jha.ac>

32 Brabant van, Koenraad (2000) *Regaining Perspective: The Debate over Quality Assurance and Accountability*, in: HPN Humanitarian Exchange 17, ODI, London, pp.22-25

Based upon these assumptions violence is not so much a means of waging war (and eventually winning,) but an end in itself (in that it ‘produces’ immediate gains such as wealth and status for those who perpetrate it).³³ In the absence of an incentive to win the war and legitimize one’s rule the needs of civilians are at best irrelevant to rebel and government forces.³⁴ At worst civilians represent an immediate target of violence. The provision of relief to these most affected groups is against the interests of those who attack. It might upset the ‘forced market’ and make the exploitation of economic opportunities more difficult. But armed groups eventually let relief through their lines - in order to further their immediate economic, political and military objectives.

Relief becomes integrated into conflict strategies and consequently ‘fuels war’.³⁵ Research lists and analyzes numerous examples. Food aid, for instance, becomes a major “strategic resource” where it can be diverted to feed fighters and be withheld from contested areas. Under these circumstances it may pay off to use violence, in order to attract relief in the first place and then to loot and steal it. This manipulation leads to a situation where relief ebbs and flows according to the level of insecurity and, it could be argued, vice versa³⁶. In resource-scarce environments such as in Somalia, relief and the necessary logistic and human infrastructure may provide the main source of income (rents, transport contracts, import duties, taxes etc.) for a government or rebel group.

33 ALNAP - <http://www.alnap.org/>

34 Davies, V., “Sierra Leone: Ironic Tragedy”, in: *Journal of African Economies*, 9 (3), 2000, pp.349-369

35 Buchanan-Smith, M. & Maxwell, S., “Linking Relief and Development: an introduction and overview”, in: *IDS Bulletin*, 25 (4), October 1994, pp.2-16

36 Bangura, Y., “Understanding the Political and Cultural Dynamics of the Sierra Leone War: A Critique of Paul Richard’s fighting for the Rain Forest”, in: *Africa Development*, XXII (3/4), 1997

Recommendations for better relief frequently go beyond the original definition and mandate of relief as a life-saving or life-sustaining activity. In contemporary conflicts there seems to be little room for the “alleviation” of symptoms along impartial lines. In order to make a positive difference humanitarian relief is encouraged to tackle the root causes of conflict, “reduce” violence or be openly political.³⁷

1.4.3.1 Corruption

Humanitarian aid is given to assist those affected by natural disasters, human conflict or other forms of severe political, economic or social breakdowns. Its aim is to prevent and alleviate human suffering in the context of life-threatening situations.³⁸ This is mainly done through the short-term provision of food, water, shelter and emergency services to affected areas, though initial humanitarian operations often evolve into longer-term reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts.

Corruption in humanitarian aid undermines the fundamental purpose of humanitarian action.³⁹ Its effects include the diversion of relief supplies away from affected communities, inequitable distribution of aid and sub-standard or inappropriately located infrastructure.⁴⁰ Such outcomes ignore the needs of the intended beneficiaries of aid, often further marginalising those from the poorest sections of society and deepening

37 Aid Workers Network - <http://www.aidworkers.net>

38 UNHCR - <http://www.unhcr.ch>

39 Caverzasio, S.G. (2001) *Strengthening Protection in War: A Search for Professional Standards: Summary of Discussions among Human Rights and Humanitarian Organizations*, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva.

40 Dyke van, M., Waldman R. (2004) *The Sphere Project Evaluation Report*, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, New York.

existing social conflicts. Tackling corruption in humanitarian aid is therefore key to ensuring effective and equitable humanitarian assistance to those in greatest need. There are several potential problems with this. First, many acute humanitarian needs in Sudan and Somalia are not related to structural or underlying causes, but are linked directly to the war.

The link between poverty and corruption is equivocal and both the rich and poor alike can be casualties of war. Second, it is acknowledged that humanitarian corruption, let alone structural causes are enormous, and dealing with them is beyond the resources and capacities of humanitarian agencies.⁴¹ Furthermore, the ability of agencies to address these through community empowerment or sustainable self-managed development is consistently undermined by the activities of warring parties. Third, how an agency defines underlying causes often depends upon its particular area of interest. Thus, it may refer to political violence, a lack of economic resources or productive humanitarian efforts.

1.4.3.2 Terror Group Interference

Amidst the drought and famine that has recently hit the people of Somalia; humanitarian efforts are being further complicated by the terrorist group *Al-Shabaab*, which came into prominence as an Islamic fundamentalist organization in 2007.⁴² After struggling to gain momentum in the first few years of its existence, *Al-Shabaab* has emerged as a presence

41Dijkzeul, D. (2005) *Europe, the Future of Humanitarian Aid – Learning from Crises*, in: Paper for Bad Neuenahr Symposium within the Framework of Germany's

42 UNCU (2008) *A Study on Minority Groups in Somalia*. Nairobi: UNCU.

powerful enough to inflict major impacts on aid organizations attempting to address the humanitarian issues that have surfaced as a result of the extreme weather conditions. Such organizations attempting to operate in Somalia are being confronted with the uncomfortable dilemma of how to function in such a politically stigmatized environment.⁴³

The unfortunate irony of this conundrum is that these organizations, all of which exist based on the most fundamental principle of alleviating suffering, are finding that they must prioritize their own capacity to function and operate over the well being of the very people they are trying to help. To this effect, such organizations must make strategic decisions regarding issues of neutrality infringement that have serious implications on the imperative to help the helpless and the regime through which this may successfully be executed.⁴⁴ The way forward in Somalia, therefore, is a matter of understanding the politicized nature of *Al-Shabaab* in the context of a neo-neutral humanitarian space, and adapting the regime and imperative dynamics accordingly.⁴⁵

1.4.3.3 Vested Interests by Aid Agencies

Concern for the impact of humanitarian aid should not be narrowly restricted to the project level. There is a need for greater investment in system-wide evaluations that can ask difficult but important questions about the responsibility for humanitarian outcomes,

43 Somalia Aid Coordination Body (1997) *SACB Collected Papers*. SACB Executive Committee.

44 James, Eric (2008). *Managing Humanitarian Relief: An Operational Guide for NGOs*. Rugby: Practical Action.

45UNDHA (December 2010) *United Nations Consolidated Appeal for Somalia October 2010–December 2010. Volume Two: UN Agency Requirements*. New York/Geneva: UNDHA.

and the broader political dimensions within which the humanitarian system operates in terms of vested interests beside humanitarian goodwill.⁴⁶

Politically, the humanitarian context remains in the shadow of Western geostrategic counter-terror and ‘stabilisation’ efforts, and corresponding anti-Western movements in various parts of the developing world. For much of the past decade, several humanitarian responses have taken place in contested settings in which the major donors to the humanitarian system are also parties to conflict and seek to advance political and strategic aims, which often unavoidably overlap or conflict with humanitarian objectives. Continued suspicion of or outright hostility to humanitarian actors perceived as aligned with Western agendas exacerbates access and security constraints to aid operations. This is particularly acute in Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Sudan.⁴⁷

Donors, for both ideological and domestic political reasons, have increasingly framed the role of humanitarian assistance within a broader policy framework of interventions which include defence, international security and stabilisation of failed or failing states to prevent further conflict or support for terrorist movements.⁴⁸ The events of the Arab spring add a new element of uncertainty and politicisation to humanitarian responses for civilians affected by conflict.⁴⁹ By contrast, in the humanitarian contexts that is outside

⁴⁶Macrae, J. and N. Leader (2000) *The Politics of Coherence: Humanitarianism and Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era*. HPG Briefing Paper 1. London: ODI.

⁴⁷Montreux Group (2002) *Donors Retreat on the CAP and the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergencies*, 28 February–1 March 2002, Montreux, Switzerland.

⁴⁸Global Humanitarian Assistance.(2009). Summary GHA Report 2009. London: Development Initiatives.

⁴⁹Global Humanitarian Assistance.(2009). Summary GHA Report 2009. London: Development Initiatives.

the Western focus on terrorism such as the Central African Republic and Cote d'Ivoire where the problem is one of limited geostrategic relevance and consequent neglect.

1.4.4 Literature Gap

The review of existing literature reveals that there are several important research gaps in the study of aid politics. This section identifies a number of research gaps that this study tries to address to contribute to current literature base.

First, aid politics has become an increasingly important concept in conflict management research. The existing literature fails to provide a clear definition of "aid politics" and the use of this concept has been rather inconsistent. This study defines aid politics as a conflict induced by humanitarian intervention which is polluted by bad politics and power. Research on the fraught humanitarian-political relationship has been a core activity at the center since its inception. Through case studies in Sudan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the researcher analyses the relevance of the humanitarian principles on neutrality, impartiality, and independence in a more complex, globalized but also potentially more polarized world.

Second, the concept of aid politics has not been systematically studied. Insufficient attention has been paid to examine the factors that impact the level of the concept of humanitarian services conflict mostly in West Africa. There is therefore a need in developing a conceptual model that explains complex causal relationships between

various contextual factors and aid politics. This study fills in this research gap by exploring the concept of aid politics in Somali which is East Africa.

Finally, previous studies have identified a number of structural and environmental factors that impact on aid politics. However, relatively little research has been conducted to systematically examine the impact of various contextual factors on aid politics and an overall theory of the subject matter remains to be developed. Some scholars have proposed diversifying aid politics and improve aid politics management. Unfortunately there has been very fragmented empirical evidence to evaluate this diversification proposal. This study proposes an integrated model to explore the predictors of political intervention in humanitarian aid by including an analysis political as a potential determining factor of aid bureaucracy and failure.

1.5 Justification of the Study

Somalia is selected for the study on the basis that; since 1992 Somalia was at the collapse of the state and at the height of the civil war, Somalia set a benchmark for humanitarian crises in the immediate post-Cold War world. War and famine claimed the lives of a quarter of a million people. More than 1.5 million Somalis fled the country and an estimated two million were displaced internally.⁵⁰ Two decades later, as international efforts to restore a functional central government continue, Somalia is again being described as one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, with over 1.5 million

⁵⁰David D. (1996). *Latin, Politics, Language, and Thought: The Somali Experience*, (University Of Chicago Press), p.75

people internally displaced, over half a million Somalis living as refugees in neighboring countries, and humanitarian access extremely restricted.

This study was important to various stakeholders. It was specifically important to various donor agencies as well as the leaders who executed policies in the various ministries for they understood the role of aid politics and the issues surrounding it.

This study was also important to the policy makers whose responsibilities encompassed improvement of peoples' lives by empowering through community projects. The suggested recommendations were useful in proving ways that were considered applicable in sustaining such by provision of the necessary technical advice and advancement of supportive resources that ensured the projects were realized successfully.

The study was also significant to other countries which shared the same scenario as well as other policy makers that governed foreign aid in such countries as Somalia for they were in a position to lay strategies that helped them well in governing aid.

The study was a source of reference material for future researchers on other related topics; it also helped other academicians who undertook the same topic in their studies. The study also highlighted other important relationships that required further research; this was in the areas of relationships of aid politics and conflict.

The results of this study were used by academics to discuss issues of the concept of aid politics in other regions. The study was also significant to other academicians who wished to carry out further studies on the same area of aid. The results of this study therefore formed basis of their research.

1.6 Hypotheses

The study is guided by the following three hypotheses:

- i. Insecurity dictates the current aid environment in Somalia;
- ii. Existing aid environment coordination mechanisms suffer from the lack of local Somali ownership;
- iii. There is direct linkage between aid and politics in Somalia.

1.7 Conceptual Framework

A more recent form of aid provision is environmental aid. Charnan⁵¹ investigates the determinants of environmental aid allocation. Her conclusions, though not complete, indicate that 1) poverty and environmental variables are determinants of whether a country received environmental aid or not, 2) aid levels are determined by economic and environmental issues. Charnan finds no evident differences between bilateral and multilateral environmental aid. The findings showed no evidence in political variables playing a role in environmental aid allocation considerations; however, economic considerations do indicate a concern for financial viability. The findings attributes this to

⁵¹Charnan, Simon (1990). *Explorers of the Ancient World*. Childrens Press. p. 26. ISBN 0-516-03053-1.

the fact most environmental aid is in the form of loans which need to be paid back by recipients.

Aid coordination mechanism has raised a relationship between development aid and donor states' security interests has been rendered increasingly ambiguous given the shifting bases of security in an era of economic statecraft. This study relied on the traditional conception of security interests, which were related to recipients' levels of militarization on a relative and absolute level. Its underlying assumption has been that selective economic support to militarized LDCs serves indirectly to project the security interests of aid donors⁵².

Stefan⁵³ points out that evolution of foreign aid is the result of an ongoing conflict between the political Right and Left regarding aid policies. This conflict, he argues, is based on the relative importance each attaches to the issues of cost-benefit analysis and moral principles. The right is seen to be more concerned with the results of the former while the left is more concerned with the latter. These differences have often led the right to decry aid as wasteful, ineffective, and inefficient, and to argue that poverty alleviation is ultimately not the obligation of the international community but each individual state. The author argues that these concerns have been reflected in the introduction of new administrative practices in donor countries that increase accountability and monitor quality in the form of new 'results-based' management systems. In contrast, the left

⁵²Edward A. Alpers (2009). *East Africa and the Indian Ocean*. Markus Wiener Publishers. p. 79. ISBN 978-1-55876-453-8.

⁵³Stefan Goodwin (2006), *Africa's legacies of urbanization: unfolding saga of a continent*, (Lexington Books: 2006), p. 48.

believes that aid to poor countries is a moral obligation; it argues that the benefits are larger than the costs, and it is concerned about inadequate levels of aid. As the left's convictions on foreign aid are based on the similarities it perceives between the domestic and international order, believing that international aid is an extension of the responsibilities of the domestic welfare state.

1.8 Research Methodology

The study adopted a cross sectional survey. Cross-sectional surveys attempted to go further than just providing information on the frequency (or level) of the attribute of interest in the study population by collecting information on both the attribute of interest and potential risk factors. In this study, the populations of interest were 30 aid coordinators who have headquarter in Mogadishu which include United Nations, European Union, and African Union Mission in Somalia, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIPOS and UNDSS.

Primary data was collected using an interview guide. The open ended questions were used to elicit more information from respondents to complete any missing links. The interview guide had items aiming at answering the study questions and it met the research objectives. The choice of this tool of data collection was guided by the time available and the objectives of the study. Interview guide provided a high degree of data standardization and adoption of generalized information amongst any population.

Data analysis answered research questions and assisted in determining the trends and relationships among variables. Content analysis technique was used to analyze the data. Findings which emerged from the analysis were used to compile the report. Content analysis is defined as a technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics of messages and using the same approach to related trends.⁵⁴

1.9 Chapter Outline

The thesis represents a study into the concept of aid politics. The chapters of the study were as follows: Chapter 1 Introduction: In this chapter, a high level background provided the scope of the research that was undertaken. Chapter 2 the politics of aid in Somalia: an overview: In this chapter, a historical view and theories related to the study was provided. Relevant aspects of aid politics issues and theories were addressed. Chapter 3 the politics of aid politics in Somalia: a critical evaluation, 1992 -2012: In this chapter a literature review was provided on the concept of aid politics. Specific focus was leveled on corruption, terror group interference, vested interest by aid agencies factors. Chapter 4 the politics of aid in Somalia: analytical evaluation: In this chapter, the emerging issues from the interviews were critically analyzed in a more scholarly perspective. Chapter 5 Conclusions: In this chapter the research concluded, gave recommendations made and final analogies of the research were drawn.

⁵⁴Preece, R. 1994. *Starting Research – An Introduction to Academic Research Dissertation Writing*. Great Britain. Pinther.

CHAPTER TWO

THE POLITICS OF AID IN SOMALIA: AN OVERVIEW

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, a historical view and theories related to the study were provided. Relevant aspects of aid politics in Somalia issues and theories were addressed in terms of relevance to the research topic. Scholars have previously applied theories to humanitarianism as it appears in this chapter. However, the potential of the theories to complement quantitative analysis has not been explored. The first section of this chapter considered the use of the relevant theories principles to develop typologies of humanitarian organizations. Next, it described recent work considering humanitarianism as a principal-agent relationship. Three theories that relate to the topic under study were reviewed. Finally, a full analysis of the complexities of the Somalia context was presented in order to sketch in some major features of the context, particularly for those who may be unfamiliar with Somalia.

2.2 Typologies of Humanitarian Organizations

Many scholars have advanced typologies of organizations in an effort to explain and analyze differentiation among humanitarian actors, especially with respect to how organizations position themselves relative to the sovereign states of the international order. These typologies are especially relevant to this thesis, as it attempts to find quantitative impacts of that differentiation.⁵⁵

55 Adam, R. (1996), *Humanitarian Action in War: aid, protection and impartiality in a political vacuum*. Adelphi Paper 305, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996).

Krause proposes a tripartite typology, differentiating between religious, Dunantist, and Wilsonian organizations. Stoddard defines Dunantist organizations as those who seek to position themselves as outside of state interests and Wilsonian organizations, generally based in the United States, as those which see a basic compatibility with humanitarian aims and US foreign policy interests and project US values and influence as a force of good in the world.⁵⁶

Religious humanitarian organizations have grown out of traditions of missionary work; and represent a complicated facet of the international humanitarian community. Stoddard notes that most religiously affiliated aid organizations do not proselytize, and develops the interviewees of her analysis without considering religion. In the aftermath of September 11th, the Christian and Jewish religious affiliation of a number of aid organizations has become increasingly relevant, especially in humanitarian conduct in areas of religious tension, such as Afghanistan.⁵⁷ However, the experience of several religiously affiliated organizations suggests that an organization's position along the Wilsonian/Dunantism spectrum is more relevant than religiosity. Furthermore, the interviewees of recent scholarly literature consider in some way the Wilsonian/Dunantist divide. Therefore, this study focuses specifically on the difference between these two types of humanitarian organizations. Stoddard characterizes Dunantist organizations as those that define humanitarianism as the; neutral, independent, and impartial provision of relief to victims of conflict and believe that humanitarianism and politics must be

⁵⁶Krause, M. (2009). *The Logic of Relief: Humanitarian NGOs and Global Governance*. (New York University 2009) < <http://gradworks.umi.com/33/42/3342398.html>> 121.

⁵⁷Antonio D. &Donini J. (2004). "An Elusive Quest: Integration in the Response to the Afghan Crisis." (*Ethics & International Affairs*. 18:22004).

segregated. This definition provides an improved platform for analysis in that it is based explicitly on the fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence.⁵⁸

Macrae and Harmer⁵⁹ describe how Dunantism is not merely an idealistic adherence to principles, but rather an informed belief about effective humanitarian action.⁶⁰ Neutrality is both an end and a means to an end because it helps relief agencies gain access to populations at risk. In this way Macrae and Harmer describes an underlying belief of the Dunantist school of thought: that in order to effectively provide humanitarian aid, relief organizations must have access to populations.⁶¹ Furthermore, Barnett's description shows the Dunantist argument that politicization can potentially have negative impacts on humanitarianism in two ways. First, via control: if a humanitarian organization is under the control of a political entity, then they are not free to pursue humanitarian action in the way they see fit. Second, via perception: if those in need, or other actors in a conflict zone perceive that a humanitarian organization is affiliated with a political then that humanitarian organization potentially loses access to populations or loses security, both have which could have negative consequences for medical outcomes.

58Stoddard, A. (2003). *Humanitarian NGOs: challenges and trends*. Humanitarian Policy Group. (Overseas Development Institute: London. 2003).

59 Nicolas de Torrente (2004). "Humanitarianism Sacrificed: Integration's False Promise." *Ethics & International Affairs*. 18:2. (2004).

60Macrae, J. & Harmer, A. (2003). *Humanitarian action and the 'global war on terror': a review of trends and issues*. Humanitarian Policy Group. (Overseas Development Institute, 2003).

61Ibid (2003).

The issue of access to those in need is referred to in humanitarian literature as humanitarian space.⁶² The term is a complicated concept that is often insufficiently defined and used in different manners and for different purposes. Several definitions are used to specify the concept for the context of this thesis. Barnett defines humanitarian as physical locations that are safe from attack in a conflict, respect for core humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality, and the ability of aid agencies to access and help civilians affected by conflict without any interests.⁶³ The United Nations describes humanitarian space as the operating environment of relief organizations and states that maintaining a clear distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors and that of the military is the determining factor in creating an operating environment in which humanitarian organizations discharge their responsibilities both effectively and safely. Humanitarian agencies themselves, such as MSF, use humanitarian space to describe an environment in which humanitarian agencies could operate independent of external political agendas.⁶⁴ Based on these definitions and principles, this shows that humanitarian assistance has always been a highly political activity. It has always influenced the political economy of recipient countries, and has always been influenced by the political considerations of donor governments. Despite the pronouncements and practices of humanitarian actors seeking to ensure that their actions

62Goodhand, J. & Sedra, M. (2010). *Who owns the peace? Aid, reconstruction and peace building in Afghanistan*. (Disasters. 34(SI) 2010).

63Barnett, M. (2005). *Humanitarianism Transformed* (Perspectives on Politics 2005) 728.

64Weiss, K., Dijkzeul Dennis & Sean O'Malley (2010). 'A Typology of International Humanitarian Organizations' presented to the International Expert Conference. 24-25 May 2010.

confer no military advantage, and are driven solely on the basis of need, the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality are under constant assault.⁶⁵

The following more in depth description will demonstrate that Wilsonianism does not. Gregg also contributes to the understanding of Wilsonian organizations and their motives.⁶⁶ Joeland other scholars have noted the willingness of Wilsonian organizations to work with political entities.⁶⁷ However, it is often characterized pejoratively as a “pragmatic” decision based in “political reality.” As such, Wilsonianism is often seen as the abandonment of principles rather than a choice of operational philosophy with its own merit. Kenneth⁶⁸ recognizes the willingness of Wilsonian organizations to work with political actors, and proposes that such a choice is not an abandonment of principles, but rather an informed decision about how to best pursue goals. This decision is based in the Wilsonian belief that “it was possible and desirable to transform political, economic, and cultural structures so that they liberate individuals and produce peace and progress, desire to attack the root causes that leave populations at risk. Indeed, other scholars have suggested that addressing root causes is necessary and more effective than attempting to maintain independence. In this sense, the Wilsonian school of thought does not require humanitarian space for effective humanitarian action. Conversely, it is being aligned and

65Hubert D. & Brassard C. (2010) – Boudreau, *Shrinking Humanitarian Space? Trends and Prospects on Security and Access* (Journal of Humanitarian Assistance 2010).

66 Gregg H. (2005). “*The Ethos Practice Gap: Perceptions of Humanitarianism in Iraq.*” (International Review of the Red Cross. 90:869) 126

67 Joel R. (2004). *Upholding Humanitarian Principles in an Effective Integrated Response.*(Ethics & International Affairs. 18:2 2004).

68Ibid (2010).

integrated with government actors which allows organizations to most effectively address the root causes of need, and thus provide high quality humanitarian services.⁶⁹

2.3 Humanitarianism as a Principal Agent Relationship

Principal-agent theory is, briefly, a theory which seeks to explain the organizational structure and dynamics of a relationship in which one actor, the principal, delegates authority to complete a certain action to a second actor, the agent. The following section briefly reviews the theory's relevance to political science and considers the debate over the application of principal-agent theory to humanitarianism.

While principal-agent theory began as a tool to analyze economic and political behavior, it was soon applied to other fields. Scholars cite the relevance of principal agent theory to international relations beginning with Donini article on economic organization.⁷⁰ The theory has subsequently been applied to various aspects of international politics. Donini et al. provides one of the most technical considerations of the theory as it applies to governance, and raises several applications.⁷¹ Of most relevance to this thesis, Alchian and Demsetz consider the relative merits and drawbacks of government and NGO provision of humanitarian aid with attached interests.⁷² In as much as healthcare can be considered a public good, there is potential for the application of principal agent theory

69 Kenneth, A. (2004). *Humanitarian Inviolability in Crisis: The Meaning of Impartiality and Neutrality for U.N. and NGO Agencies Following the 2003-2004 Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts*. (Harvard Human Rights Journal, 17, 2004) 41-74.

70 Donini, A. (2009). *Afghanistan: Humanitarianism Under Threat*. Feinstein International Center. Tufts University. Briefing Paper. March 2009.

71 Donini, A., Minear, L., & Walker, P. (2005). *The Future of Humanitarian Action: Mapping the Implications of Iraq and Other Recent Cases*. (Disasters 28:2 2005).

72 Alchian, A. and Demsetz, H. (1972). *Production Information Costs, and Economic Organization* (American Economic Review 1972).

and specifically to the politicized international humanitarian duties in Somalia. Several scholars have previously applied the theory to humanitarianism. Mingst asserts that given the increasing proliferation of NGOs in the international community, as well as several characteristics of NGOs, the application of the principal-agent theory to humanitarianism is warranted.⁷³

As Rauchhaus states, with the notable exception of the International Committee of the Red Cross, international humanitarian organizations do not have independent legal status in international law, and thus “exist under the moral authority of a particular state.”⁷⁴ Furthermore, NGOs rely significantly on government funding, grants, contracts, food aid, technical assistance, and security. Additionally, humanitarian actors must gain access to those in need, and in that sense are beholden to the state with sovereignty over those persons. Finally, NGOs fulfill the role of an agent in that they possess unique skills, knowledge, and expertise, and often interests different from their donors. Besley admits that the theory and especially the issue of agent is applicable, and has recently become increasingly relevant to the international community.⁷⁵ States and international institutions can now compel humanitarian agencies to act in ways counter to their interests and principles. Although states have historically vacillated in their desire to use

73Mingst K. (2008). *Humanitarian NGOs: Principals and Agents*. Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association. (2008).

74Rauchhaus, R. (2009). *Principal-Agent Problems in Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and the Commitment Dilemma*. (International Studies Quarterly 53, 2009) 871-884.

75Besley T. (2006). *Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government*. (Oxford University Press, New York. 2006).

humanitarian action to serve their interests, the 1990s were unprecedented to the extent that states attempted to impose their agendas on agencies.⁷⁶

Monika provide further support for the assertion that humanitarian organizations can, and to varying degrees currently are, controlled by state interests.⁷⁷ ICRC considers the specific issues of moral hazard adverse selection and the commitment dilemma in applications of principal-agent theory to humanitarianism.⁷⁸ However, humanitarian organizations contest the notion that they are the agent of states of the international community, arguing that such control is antithetical to the principles of humanitarianism. Furthermore, such humanitarians argue those who apply principal-agent theory to the humanitarian sector blur the lines between state actors and humanitarians, and endanger aid workers and local populations. This debate over the application of principal-agent theory to humanitarianism is fundamentally a debate over independence and neutrality, two of the most valued humanitarian principles. As Hutchinson notes, international NGOs derive a significant degree of legitimacy from their (real or perceived) independence, impartiality and neutrality. As such, the theory and its implications are of paramount importance to humanitarian actors, who justify their actions, seek access, and depend for security, on the recognition of their humanity. While this thesis does not assume that all humanitarian organizations are the agent of same principal, it finds

76 Fournier, C. (2009) Speech to NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. 8 December 2009. <<http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=4309&cat=speech>>. Accessed 15 December 2010.

77 Monika K (2009), *The Logic of Relief: Humanitarian NGOs and Global Governance*. (New York University 2009) <<http://gradworks.umi.com/33/42/3342398.html>> 121.

78 ICRC *The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent*, (ICRC 1996, accessed 15 December 2010); available from: <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0513.htm>

principal-agent theory to be a useful tool for the analysis of politicized humanitarian aid in war torn countries.⁷⁹

2.3.1 Principal-Agent Theory

At the most basic level principal-agent theory deals with two actors, a principal, who delegates responsibility to a second actor, the agent. The principal enters the relationship in order to lower the costs of pursuing some interest; while the agent enters the relationship because doing so will enhance its capacity to pursue a separate, but related, interest. Critical to the relationship is that fact that the principal and agent each have different interests, yet also have different tools and advantages. In this situation, while the principal has lowered costs by delegating responsibility, they are confronted with the necessity to ensure that the agent carries out that action according to the principal's interests. As such, the principal develops mechanisms of control over the agent. These control mechanisms, and the effect that they have on the agent, are of extreme relevance to this thesis's application of the theory to humanitarianism. The power to structure terms of the relationship and develop these mechanisms of control comes from a benefit that the principal can offer the agent. This benefit is often funding, but there are other potential benefits to the agent, such as access to technology, information, or partnerships. Furthermore, the principal must balance increased control with the knowledge that if the agent feels too restricted, they will leave the relationship, and the principal will have lost an opportunity to increase efficiency.

⁷⁹ Hutchinson, J. (2009). *Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross*, (Boulder: Westview Press).

The agent, conversely, has his or her own interests, and seeks to maintain independence from the principal in order to pursue that interest unhindered.⁸⁰ Agents are often chosen because of specific expertise, knowledge or skills, and can use these attributes to bias the information that they provide to the principle, resulting in information asymmetry. However, the agent has entered into the relationship in pursuit of enhanced capacity through access to the principal's resources, and thus must balance its own interests and preferences with the need to maintain a relationship with the principal. Thus principal-agent theory is a delicate struggle for power over control of the ultimate action taken by the agent. Prior to the relationship, the principal had no control over the action, and the agent had full control. The agent has relinquished some control in exchange for enhanced capacity, and the principal has supplied that capacity enhancement in exchange for some control. In other terms, the theory fundamentally addresses the independence of the agent, or more specifically, the independence of the agent to pursue their original interest. In principal-agent relationships where the principal exercises strong control over the agent and thus controls the performance of the action through various accountability, incentive, and contractual mechanisms, the independence of the agent is minimal. Similarly, in relationships in which the agent is more effectively able to make use of their information advantage, they are more in control of the action and enjoy greater independence.

As discussed above, a number of scholars have begun to analyze humanitarianism through a principal-agent framework. In humanitarianism, the principal is a donor, either

⁸⁰Diana C. Mutz, *Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

of money or non-monetary resources, and is often a government, international organization or foundation. This study will consider governments. The agent is the humanitarian actor, often an NGO. Governments can decrease the cost of pursuing some interest, often security, by delegating authority and providing resources to an NGO. These lower costs come from decrease outlays of resources and decreased risk. First, while the government has committed resources to the NGO, the cost of these resources are less than the cost of mobilizing, training, and transporting personnel and running programs. Furthermore, the government does not risk the loss of personnel and lowers the risk of diplomatic costs of a humanitarian mission gone awry. As discussed in the opening chapter, since the end of the Cold War, governments have increasingly chosen to use humanitarian action in such a manner. The agent increases capacity to pursue their interest, for example improved medical outcomes, largely by increasing funding and access to non monetary resources. While some humanitarian NGO's have developed revenue generating mechanisms or significant bases of private donors, significant funding for humanitarian action still comes through governments and intergovernmental organizations.⁸¹

Humanitarian actors have information and skills that make them ideal implementers, such as strong local connections and knowledge of cultural context. NGO personnel have been trained, and have skills needed for effective humanitarian action such as medical training

81Elkin, M. (1977). On this theme, see generally Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

or language capacity.⁸² By being affiliated with such humanitarian action, governments seek to improve security through development and to improve their image, “winning hearts and minds. Governments act as principals would be expected to by exerting varying degrees of control over the relationship through their control of funding and non-monetary resources. Often governments seek to increase accountability by requiring yearly or often monthly reports detailing how funds were spent and what measurable objectives were achieved. Funding schemes are often structured to ensure that resources are put to good use, with sub-optimal performance punishable by the termination of yearly dispersals of resources. Previous scholarship and the above discussion establish the utility of principal-agent theory with respect to humanitarianism. However, with any application of theory limitations must be considered. Gary Miller establishes six core assumptions of principal-agent theory, leading to two primary results. The core assumptions are: (1) agent impact, (2) information asymmetry, (3) asymmetry in preferences, (4) initiative that lies with the principal, (5) backward induction based on common knowledge, and (6) ultimatum bargaining, resulting in outcome based incentives and efficiency tradeoffs. Humanitarian action adheres to all of these assumptions.

However, in a traditional principal agent framework, the observed outcome variable is the principle’s variable of interest, and the agent’s interests are to first continue to be compensated for work, but second use the information asymmetry they have regarding

⁸²David D. (1996). *Latin, Politics, Language, and Thought: The Somali Experience*, (University Of Chicago Press), p.75.

their level of work to shirk as much as possible.⁸³ However, in this study, the outcome variable of interest is the agent's primary interest, while the impact of NGO action on the security environment and the principal's desire to "win hearts and minds" is much less observable. Based on this difference, principal-agent theory is not used to analyze the ultimate outcome variables of security or interests. Rather the theory is used to analyze the ways in which a principal (government) can exercise control over an agent (NGO), and how those mechanisms of control affect the independence of the agent (NGO). This analysis will result in a quantitative index of humanitarianism. The principal's control over the agent is primarily manifested in the ability to structure incentives. Traditionally this involves structuring contracts and punishment schemes. Furthermore, the extent to which a principal's control over an agent is relevant depends to a large extent on how much the principal attempts to alter the agent's actions.

If interests are extremely divergent, principals must exercise greater control and incentivize significant changes in agent conduct. However, if interests differ slightly, incentive structure must only induce a small change in behavior.⁸⁴ As such, the extent to which restricted funding changes NGO action will also be a component of the index. Finally, the degree of NGO dialogue and cooperation with various actors affiliated with donors (for example military forces and government personnel) is incorporated in order to provide some measure of principal-agent interaction. While other factors specific to

83Ostelow, Lola. (1999). The Sphere Project: The Implications of Making Humanitarian Principles and Codes Work. *Disasters* 23 (4):316-25.

84John R. (2001). *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 13.

humanitarianism will be accounted for in order to make the index more robust, principal-agent theory provides the central foundation for the creation of the quantitative independent variable that establishes varying degrees of humanitarianism.

2.3.2 Realism Theory

Realism (or political realism) is a school of thought that explains inter-national relations in terms of power. The exercise of power by states toward each other is sometimes called real politic or just power politics. In this presentation, realism will emerge as a kind of community stew where everyone throws something different into the pot.⁸⁵ There is however a theme or sentiment that unites realists at the threshold the belief that high liberalism represents a desire to evade, displace, and escape from politics. Three quotations, selected from dozens, reveal the flavor of this critique: the major project in modern liberalism is to use ethics to contain the political;⁸⁶ politics is regarded not only as something apart from law, but inferior to law; and the concern of recent political philosophy was to state the principles of an ideal liberal constitution. The real subject of this effort “was not political. It was law.”⁸⁷

Williams offers a succinct summary of this line of argument, he points to a mysterious phenomenon namely, the displacement of politics in political theory, especially though

85 Bonnie Honig, *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 2.

86 Bernard Williams, *In the Beginning Was The Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 1-3.

87 Marc Stears, “Review Article: Liberalism and the Politics of Compulsion,” *British Journal of Political Science* 37 (2007): 543.

not exclusively contemporary political theory:⁸⁸ Those writing from diverse positions republican, liberal, and communitarian converge in their assumption that success lies in the elimination from a regime of dissonance, resistance, conflict, or struggle.⁸⁹ They confine politics to the juridical, administrative, or regulative tasks of stabilizing moral and political subjects, building consensus, maintaining agreements, or consolidating communities and identities. They assume that the task of political theory is to resolve institutional questions, to get politics right, over, and done with, to free modern subjects and their sets of arrangements [from] political conflict and instability.⁹⁰

Realists reject this account of political theory on the grounds that it is utopian in the wrong way that it does not represent an ideal of political life achievable under even the most favorable circumstances. Tranquility is fleeting at best; conflict and instability are perennial possibilities. The yearning for a world beyond politics is at best diversionary, at worst destructive. As Stears insists, there is no substitute for politics if by politics we mean the various ways in which we arrive at collective, authoritative decisions in a world in which people legitimately hold different views about the purposes of government and the manner in which it should be carried on.⁹¹

88 Bernard Williams, *In the Beginning Was The Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 1-3.

89 John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 13

90 Marc Stears, "Review Article: Liberalism and the Politics of Compulsion," *British Journal of Political Science* 37 (2007): 543.

91 Marc Stears, "Review Article: Liberalism and the Politics of Compulsion," *British Journal of Political Science* 37 (2007): 543.

2.3.3 Conflict Theory

The several social theories that emphasize social conflict have roots in the ideas of (1818-1883), the great German theorist and political activist.⁹² The Tullocks, conflict approach emphasizes a materialist interpretation of history, a dialectical method of analysis, a critical stance toward existing social arrangements, and a political program of revolution or, at least, reform.⁹³ The materialist view of history starts from the premise that the most important determinant of social life is the work people are doing, especially work that results in provision of the basic necessities of life, food, clothing and shelter. Tullocks thought that the way the work is socially organized and the technology used in production will have a strong impact on every other aspect of society. He maintained that everything of value in society results from human labor. Thus, Tullock saw working men and women as engaged in making society, in creating the conditions for their own existence. Tullocks summarized the key elements of this materialist view of history as follows; in the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production.⁹⁴ The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of

92Vahabi M. (2009b), "Integrating Social Conflict into Economic Theory", *Cambridge Journal of Economics*,

doi:10.1093/cje/bep 043, 14 July.

93Tullock G. (1974), *The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution*, Fairfax, VA: Center for the Study of Public Choice.

94Tullock G. (1974)

social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.⁹⁵

Plekhanov divided history into several stages, conforming to broad patterns in the economic structure of society.⁹⁶The most important stages for Tullock's argument were feudalism, capitalism, and socialism. The bulk of Tullock's writing is concerned with applying the materialist model of society to capitalism, the stage of economic and social development that Tullock saw as dominant in 19th century Europe. For Tullock, the central institution of capitalist society is private property, the system by which capital (that is, money, machines, tools, factories, and other material objects used in production) is controlled by a small minority of the population. This arrangement leads to two opposed classes, the owners of capital (called the bourgeoisie) and the workers (called the proletariat), whose only property is their own labor time, which they have to sell to the capitalists. Despite this sense of the unalterable logic of history, Tullockists see the need for social criticism and for political activity to speed the arrival of socialism, which, not being based on private property is not expected to involve as many contradictions and conflicts as capitalism.⁹⁷Tullockists believe that social theory and political practice are dialectically intertwined, with theory enhanced by political involvement and with political practice necessarily guided by theory. Intellectuals ought, therefore, to engage in praxis, to combine political criticism and political activity. Theory itself is seen as

95Sen A. (1983), "Cooperative Conflicts: Technology and the Position of Women", mimeo, Oxford.

96Plekhanov G. 1894,1974, "The development of the monist view of history," *Selected Philosophical Works*, vol. I, Moscow, Progress Publishers, pp. 480-737.

97Tullock G. (1974), *The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution*, Fairfax, VA: Center for the Study of Public Choice.

necessarily critical and value-laden, since the prevailing social relations are based upon alienating and dehumanizing exploitation of the labor of the working classes.⁹⁸

2.3.4 Power Theory

Young researched the phenomenon of quiescence the silent agreement in conditions of glaring inequality and tried to understand why, in difficult conditions of oppression and discrimination, no resistance arises against the rule of a social elite.⁹⁹ He found that the social elite make use of its power principally to prevent the rise of conflicts in its domain, and to attain social quiescence. In other words, a situation of apparent lack of conflicts is identified as both a sign and a consequence of deliberate use of power mechanisms. The purpose of power is to prevent groups from participating in the decision-making processes and also to obtain the passive agreement of these groups to this situation. A silent agreement, then, is not an expression of a desire not to participate, but evidence of a mute compliance with the situation. Hence, a violation of this quiescence is a rebellion, whether it be an explicit demand to participate in decision-making, or a more minor response, such as non-acceptance. Iris bases his model for the understanding of quiescence and rebellion in conditions of glaring inequality on Bernards' three dimensions of power¹⁰⁰ which were mentioned earlier in the chapter. This will be an opportunity to gain a deeper acquaintance of these dimensions, and to understand how each of them relates to power and to powerlessness.

98Tullock G. (1974), *The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution*, Fairfax, VA: Center for the Study of Public Choice

99 Iris Marion Young, "Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy," in Fishkin and Laslett. Ed., pp. 102-120. See also Lynn M. Sanders, "Against Deliberation," *Power Theory* 25, 3 (1997): 347-376.

100 Bernard Yack, "Rhetoric and Public Reasoning: An Aristotelian Understanding of Political Deliberation," *Power Theory* 34, 4 (August 2006): 429-30.

Power is activated on the second, covert dimension, not only in order to triumph over the other participants in the decision-making process, but also to prevent decision-making, to exclude certain subjects or participants from the process. A study of power in the covert dimension needs to observe who decides what, when and how, who remains outside, how this happens, and how these two processes interconnect. One of the important aspects of power, beside victory in a struggle, is to determine the agenda of the struggle in advance. That is, to determine whether certain questions will even be negotiated. The understanding of the second facet of power changed the explanation of the quiescence of deprived groups. From now on, nonparticipation in decision-making would be explained as a manifestation of fear and weakness, and not necessarily as a manifestation of indifference.¹⁰¹

Iris's theory of power helps to expose the direct and indirect ways in which social powerlessness is created and maintained. It draws attention to the great influence of indirect mechanisms in the creation of powerlessness a phenomenon which we will have more to say about. Iris's theory of power will serve, further on, as a basis for a discussion of powerlessness, not as a personal problem of the powerless, but as a social situation that has its roots in conditions of social inequality and in disempowering social solutions. The various mechanisms of the three dimensions of power will be used for developing strategies of empowering activity. It may be helpful to think about power dynamics in the inter-professional team through the framework of social exchange to understand team members' behaviors and to ensure that strategies to balance power make sense from a

101 Diana C. Mutz, *Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

social exchange theory. In other words, balancing power in the inter-professional team involves negotiation over the control of resources, as well as the delineation of roles and responsibilities. Powerful team members will not hand over power, resources, information and responsibility to make decisions, unless they see an advantage in doing so. In implementing power balance strategies, the inter professional team needs to seek solutions that are a win for everyone involved, so that team members are in touch with the benefits of sharing power. Uniting benefits for the team include improved quality of care and patient well-being.¹⁰²

2.4 Conflict in Somalia: An Overview

Somalia is a country located in the Horn of Africa. It is bordered by Ethiopia to the west, Djibouti to the northwest, the Gulf of Aden to the north, the Indian Ocean to the east, and Kenya to the southwest. Somalia has the longest coastline on the continent, and its terrain consists mainly of plateaus, plains and highlands. Hot conditions prevail year-round, along with periodic monsoon winds and irregular rainfall.¹⁰³

Since the civil war that led to the collapse of the Siyad Barre government in 1991, the famine between 1991 and 1993 that probably killed 300,000 people and the unsuccessful international interventions between 1992 and 1995, Somalia has been characterised by complex political, economic and social changes, fragmentation and the collapse of central state institutions. Somaliland declared its independence as a republic in 1991 and,

102 Elkin, p. 267. On this theme, see generally Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

103 Charnan, Simon (1990). *Explorers of the Ancient World*. Childrens Press. p. 26. ISBN 0-516-03053-1.

although not recognized internationally, has developed its own political and governmental structures.¹⁰⁴ North-East Somalia declared the ‘Puntland State of Somalia’ in 1999 and has also developed its administrative structures while wishing to remain part of a federal Somalia. Both Somaliland and Puntland have remained relatively stable, although Puntland went through a period of political instability in 2001/2 and its administration remains weak. Relations between Somaliland and Puntland have been strained almost to the point of open conflict over disputed areas of the Sool/Sanaag plateau.¹⁰⁵

In South/Central Somalia the situation has been extremely fluid with continuing low levels of conflict in different parts of the region. Some semblance of district and regional administrations has existed, but these entities have usually remained very weak and disrupted by outbreaks of conflict. Successive attempts at the re-establishment of a central government in Mogadishu have failed. The most significant attempt, the 2000 Transition National Government (TNG), failed to gain control of all but parts of Mogadishu and did not gather widespread international support.¹⁰⁶ Internationally, Somalia has been relegated to a low priority. The current peace talks have received little or no international media coverage. Since the attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001, Somalia has not figured highly in United States’ declared war on terror in spite of increased concern about ‘failed states’ being potential safe havens for terrorists. The main

104 Edward A. Alpers (2009). *East Africa and the Indian Ocean*. Markus Wiener Publishers. p. 79. ISBN 978-1-55876-453-8.

105 Stefan Goodwin (2006), *Africa's legacies of urbanization: unfolding saga of a continent*, (Lexington Books: 2006), p. 48.

106 Mazzilli, C. and Davis A. (2009). Health care seeking behavior in Somalia. A literature review. UNICEF.

point of interest for European governments in relation to Somalia remains the issue of refugees and asylum seekers in their countries.¹⁰⁷

Although levels of conflict have declined from the 1990s and some areas of Somalia have experienced relative peace for extended periods of time, the potential for instability and conflict throughout the country remains high.¹⁰⁸ Somalis have responded to the absence in most areas of government services and infrastructure by the development of private services in areas such as education, telecommunications, money transfer, transportation, electricity, health and veterinary services. Remittances from the Somali diaspora have been important in financing some of these initiatives as well as providing key support to many families.¹⁰⁹

Parallel to the development of the private economy has been the growing strength of civil society groups in Somalia including professional associations, business associations and chambers of commerce, private universities, community-based organisations, women's organisations and NGOs. An example is the Civil Society in Action Forum in Mogadishu that acts as peace catalyst. The forum draws fifty-six organisations from universities, schools, medical doctors, media, women groups and other peace and human rights activists. A number of studies, including UN and The World Bank, have highlighted how conflict and economic degeneration have given women increasing importance in

107OECD (2009). DAC report on aid predictability: survey on donors' forward spending plans 2000-2011.

108World Bank (2006). Somalia from resilience towards recovery and development. USA: World Bank.

109Burall, S. and Maxwell, S. (2006). Reforming the international aid architecture: options and way forward: Overseas Development Institute Working Paper 278, October 2006.

economic activities outside the home.¹¹⁰ The last Human Development report for Somalia was published in 2001 although the UNDP/World Bank Somalia Watching Brief Socio-Economic Survey 2002 has provided some updated information.

2.5 The Aid Context

Somalia provides a challenging and unpredictable operating context for aid agencies.¹¹¹ Fluctuating security conditions often disrupt programme activities, sometimes requiring relocations of offices and the withdrawal of international staff. In many most areas of Somalia, international aid workers travel with the protection of armed guards. The relatively stable situation in Somaliland has been more conducive to the implementation of rehabilitation programmes but the killings of international aid staff there has disrupted agency work and led to the strengthening of security arrangements for aid workers. The Kenyan government prohibition on Somali passports in 2004 has been another obstacle for Somalis wanting to travel to Nairobi and created further obstacles for aid agencies working in Somalia.¹¹²

There has been a decline in the number of international NGOs working in South/Central Somalia since the mid 1990s, although judging from Menkhaus documents it seems that the overall number of agencies working throughout Somalia, including Somaliland, may

110 UN and The World Bank (2006). Draft Report - Somalia Joint Needs Assessment. USA: UN and World Bank; 2006 Sep 14.

111 Foreign Policy/Fund for Peace, (2007). Failed States Index 2007. Available from: http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=366.

112 Menkhaus, K. (2008). Somalia: Political order in a stateless society. *Current History* 97, 220–224.
Little, D. (2003). *Somalia: Economy without State*. Indiana Univ. Press, Bloomington.

have stabilized during the 2000s.^{113, 114} Much of the operational work in Somalia is carried out by international and Somali NGOs. Security restrictions on international staff mean that the Somali staffs of international organisations play an important role in maintaining programme operations. Both Somalis and international aid staff express their frustrations at the difficulties of providing assistance to Somalia, reflecting more than 10 years of political impasse for Somalia and declining international interest. Many Somalis are critical and skeptical about external assistance, partly arising from the experience of the UNOSOM period in the 1990s when large quantities of aid were diverted to warlords and their militias. They see the aid agencies as wasteful, self-serving and remote this has led to distrust of Somali NGOs.¹¹⁵

International agency staff also expresses their frustrations at the difficulties of working in Somalia including the challenging and sometimes dangerous attitudes of local warlords and clan leaders to issues such as recruitment and vehicle hire and the limitations of usually having to travel with armed guards. The working conditions can make it difficult for agencies to recruit and keep staff. Reflecting Somalia's low priority, many donors and agencies, including INGOs and some UN agencies do not have specific policy documents or strategic plans for Somalia, although a number of INGOs noted that they were working

113UNDP, 2001.Human Development Report 2001—Somalia. UNDP, New York.

114UN, (2006).Somali Reconstruction and Development Framework, 4 vols. Available at <http://www.somali-jna.org/index.cfm?Module=ActiveWeb&Page=WebPage&s=clusters>.

115US Library of Congress, (2006). Country Studies: Somalia. Available at: <http://countrystudies.us/somalia/>.

World Bank, (2005).World Development Indicators.World Bank, Washington, DC.

on them.¹¹⁶ Exceptions include the EC, USAID, SCUK, UNICEF and the World Bank.

¹¹⁷The discontinuation of the position of EC envoy also reflects the diminishing importance of the Somali conflict on the agendas of the international community and the EU. However, in the case of the EU, the Cotonou Agreement has enabled increased funding to be made available to Somalia. The World Bank has selected Somalia as one of its ‘Watching Brief’ countries and also as a ‘Low Income Countries Under Stress’ (LICUS) country in 2003.¹¹⁸

2.6 Conclusion

Somalia's political culture is basically egalitarian, social and political change has created new patterns of social life. In recent years, a new urban group, educated in Western-type schools and working as merchants or in government, has emerged. These urbanites enjoy more wealth, better access to government services, and greater educational opportunities for their children than do other sectors of society.¹¹⁹ For Somalis, who are settled or partly settled farmers, the village and its headman assume social and political importance. In rural areas, links to the cities remain strong, with rural relatives caring for livestock owned by the urbanites. The family is the ultimate source of personal security and identity. Somalis typically live in nuclear families, although older parents may move in with one of their children. Households are usually monogamous; in polygamous households (one fifth of all families), wives usually have their own residences and are

116 Wolfe, A.(2005). Somalia: Where anarchy meets terrorism. Available at: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=12233>. August 7.

117WHO, (2004).WHO Somalia Annual Report 2003.WHO, Somalia.

118 World Bank, UNDP, (2003). Socio-Economic Survey 2002—Somalia.UNDP and the World Bank, Washington DC/New York.

119Hassan, M. (2007). UNICEF: Somali kids urgently need food. Associated Press (September 12).

responsible for different economic activities. Traditionally, marriages were arranged, since marriage was seen as a way to cement alliances. Increasingly, however, parents are willing to consider love interests if they think the match is suitable.

CHAPTER THREE

THE POLITICS OF AID POLITICS IN SOMALIA, 1992 - 2012

3.1 Introduction

Chapter Two provided a conceptualization of the role of politics in aid and within the Somalia context. This chapter is a case study. It will review the politics of aid in Somalia from 1992 to 2012. In addition to the use of secondary data, this chapter draws mainly from primary data; including primary documentary sources.

3.2 Background of the Somali Aid Environment

The findings identified Somalia aid environment as an ‘unavoidably wide and subjective concept’, where the variation between different responses given reflects the essentially arbitrary and often narrow basis upon which particular problems affecting aid action or affected populations are selected or prioritized by agencies at particular points in time . As a result, aid environment is essentially about the context of aid action and the context of needs to which aid actors are seeking to respond. The study findings has put forward an ‘actor-oriented concept of aid environment as a social arena’ in which aid environment ‘is occupied by a wide variety of interacting political, military, economic and other actors’ in addition to aid agencies and affected populations, thereby presenting the concept as a complex political and legal arena of civilian protection and assistance.

From the key informant’s findings, it is evident that Somalia’s economy, which was largely sustained by foreign financial contributions, was increasingly struggling. The conflict with Ethiopia, the drought and refugee crises stretched the government’s budget

to the limits. The level of foreign aid Somalia received becomes evident when one consider that, between 1972 and 1989, they had the highest number per capita beneficiaries of aid in Africa.¹²⁰ During the Cold War, Somalia's strategic position on the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea ensured continued support from opposing sides of the Cold War. Somalia first received aid from the USSR and after the USSR allied with Ethiopia, the US and Italy. Unlike the USSR, the Western powers often had conditions attached to their aid. One of these that was particularly crippling to Somalia's economy, were the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) proposed by the International Financial Institutions. These SAPs aimed at liberalising the economy by implementing structural reforms such as deregulating the economy and privatisation.¹²¹

As the Cold War came to an end, the US had less incentive to give foreign aid to Siyad Barre's regime. Since the Cold War ended, Somalia was no longer strategically important for the national security of the US. The rise of the civil war saw the evacuation of numerous aid organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, numerous NGOs and the UNHCR (UN refugee agency).¹²² The peak of the economic crises was reached in 1990 when the Central Bank ran out of money. In Puntland the study found that the government coordination structures are weak. Some SACB sectoral committees met in Puntland from time to time, but these were disrupted by the political

120Lewis, I. M. (2002) A Modern History of the Somali. *James Curry* Library of congress (2004) Library of congress country studies [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+so01111\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+so01111))

121ISS (2002) Observations, approaches and Proposals for the Somali Peace Conference in Nairobi, Paper No. 2. *Institute of Somali Studies, Mogadishu University*.

122Goobjoog (2004c) Efficiency of Aid Agencies Criticised. <http://www.goobjoog.net/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3228> [30/07/04]

instability. An NGO coordination meeting met on a monthly basis in the past, but since the political crisis and frequent attacks, the forum was suspended. The meetings were chaired by CARE and involved some local networks such as We are Women Activists (WAWA) and in Hiran the interviewee indicated that there are general-interagency and sectoral meetings. The general Hiran Inter-agency Forum (HIF) is chaired by OCHA; the sectoral one is chaired rotationally and does not involve OCHA. The HIF was initiated by a coordination of head of agencies in Nairobi which drew the TOR with the help of SACB. The sectoral meetings have declined as some focal agencies such as UNICEF, UNESCO and WHO moved out of the region.¹²³

In Mogadishu the study found that there are several coordination forums: UN agencies forum chaired by OCHA; Weekly security meetings held and chaired rotationally by the INGOs and UN agencies the latter being represented by OCHA and UN Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD). Weekly cholera task force facilitated by WHO attended by UN agencies, INGOs and some local NGOs working in the health sector; Health/nutrition monthly meetings organised by the TNG Ministry of Health but facilitated by WHO and attended by selected UN and international organizations including Arab agencies operating in the health sector; there is also bilateral coordination between some UN agencies such as UNICEF and WFP and their local and international partners; Civil society organisations have a semi-formal Civil Society in Action forum that acts as peace

123FSAU (2004) Monthly Food Security and Nutrition Report – August Issue 43.

catalyst.¹²⁴ The forum draws fifty-six organisations from universities, schools, medical doctors, media, women groups and other peace and human rights activists. The forum has secretariat meetings weekly and larger assembly meetings on a monthly basis. The forum plays an important role on ensuring aid agencies coordinate their affairs without much influence using media, protests and public rallies.¹²⁵

From the findings perspective, Somalia aid environment are influenced and constrained by the ‘various actions, interests, policies, institutions and processes stemming from the conflict or crisis; in the situations of complex conflict, access by aid actors to civilians was restricted. While this has been the case in Somalia since the collapse of the state in 1991, there have been periods of relative calm that have enabled greater access. Compared to the civil war and associated humanitarian suffering that ravaged the country in the early 1990s, from the mid-1990s until 2006 Somalia was relatively stable, experiencing mostly low-intensity armed conflict. However, major conflict resumed in late 2006, when Ethiopian forces entered the country in an effort to drive out the Islamic Courts Union, and the context became much more fluid, dynamic and destructive.¹²⁶ The Ethiopian withdrawal at the end of 2008 pitted the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), with support from an African Union peacekeeping force (AMISOM), against the

124Foreign Affairs Select Committee (2001) Efforts of the Transitional National Government in enforcing the rule of law, disarmament and accomplishing reconciliation. *Transitional National Parliament, Mogadishu, Somalia*

125House of Commons (2004) Migration and Development: How to make migration work for poverty reduction *International Development Committee, UKParliament*

126Goobjoog (2004a) A Sensitive Meeting between the TNG and the UNDP.<http://www.goobjoog.net/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3223> [30/07/04]

insurgent movement al Shabaab.¹²⁷ The ongoing violence has been compounded by flood and drought; this combination of natural and man-made disasters has led to severe food insecurity. From 2009, poor rains, rising food prices, conflict and lack of dialogue between Western donors and the *Al Shabaab* forces that control most of southern Somalia resulted in a worsening of vulnerability, peaking in September 2011 with approximately 4 million people, or 53% of the total Somali population, said to be in need of humanitarian assistance; the majority of those in need (3 million) were in South and Central Somalia.¹²⁸

In the second half of 2011, the UN declared six regions in the South to be famine areas, affecting an estimated 750,000 people. By February 2012 the situation had reportedly improved, with famine conditions alleviated in all regions; however, 2.34 million people were said to remain in crisis, 73% of whom were in southern regions.¹²⁹ The ongoing crisis has led to massive internal displacement, currently estimated at 1.5 million people, while the population in the Dadaab refugee camps in North-Eastern Kenya has grown from approximately 150,000 in mid-2006 to over 460,000 registered refugees, making Dadaab the world's largest refugee camp. New camps have also been established across the border in Ethiopia in response to the crisis and the influx of refugees; the refugee camps at Dolo Odo are currently home to approximately 127,000 people.¹³⁰

127Montani, A. and Majid, N. (2002) *Conducive Conditions: Livelihood Intervention in Southern Somalia. ODI Working Paper 193*

128Somaliwatch (2004) Abdulqasim holds a press conference in Mogadishu. <http://www.somaliawatch.com/news/shir.html>[30/08/04].

129World Bank (2012) *Socio-Economic Survey – Somalia. Report No. 1. Somalia Watching Brief. World Bank and UNDP Somalia*

130Narbeth, S. and McLean, C. (2003) *Livelihoods and protection Displacement and vulnerable communities in Kismaayo, southern Somalia ODI*

3.3 Existing Aid Coordination Mechanisms

3.3.1 The Making of SACB and its Work in Somalia

The Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) mandate derived from the 1993 Addis Ababa conference. Only the SACB survives from the original structures envisaged in the Addis Ababa declaration. The Somali structures of development committees never materialised as originally planned and the UN Development Officer for Somalia (UNDOS) became a controversial body within the UN Somalia system and was closed in 2001.¹³¹ The SACB's overall mandate and role have not been reconfirmed or revised by the international community in the light of the evolving Somalia context since 1997. The SACB works on the basis of voluntary involvement and commitment of its members and on the basis of consensus. It is somewhat unique in an international aid structure in providing equal access and membership for the three groupings of members, donors, UN agencies and NGOs.

According to the respondents SACB has made considerable progress in developing sectoral strategies, but there is a lack of an overall, over-arching strategy for international assistance for Somalia. The peace dividend approach has been a central plank of the international aid community's assistance for Somalia. The study found that while the peace dividend approach is still considered to be in place, in practice it has not monitored or evaluated, nor has there been any substantial discussion about it within the SACB committees. In addition, there is widespread misunderstanding about what the peace

131 MacLean, W. (2002) UN Official Says Somalia Vulnerable. *Global Policy Forum* <http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/targets/2002/0110kent.htm> Menkhaus, K. (2003a) Somalia: a Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment, *UNHCR*.

dividend approach means and considerable scepticism about its appropriateness.¹³² During the interviews, it was found widespread ignorance and misunderstanding and often negative views of the SACB and its role from both Somali officials in the various administrations and Somali NGOs and other civil society organisations. SACB is perceived sometimes as donor or a body that controls the flow of resources to Somalia. The power of SACB and its role are often over-estimated, being seen by some as a government in exile in Nairobi and a talking shop that excludes Somalis and is never seen on the ground. For some Somalis, the SACB encapsulates the distrust, suspicion and frustration that they have about international aid in general. They feel the agencies are self-serving and wasting money in Nairobi intended for Somalia. Conditions and context for aid coordination within Somalia vary considerably. As with most agency work, coordination functions are disrupted by security events resulting in periodic withdrawals of international staff from some areas and relocation of offices and programme work in others.¹³³

3.3.2 Introduction of the Somali Support Secretariat (SSS)

According to the findings Somali Support Secretariat transfer resources to chronically food-insecure households through food-for-work programs that engage recipients in public works activities focused on the development of community resources. Ensure food consumption and prevent asset depletion for food insecure households, stimulate markets

132Omer, A. (2004) Regulation and Supervision in the Somali Context. Conference on Migrant Remittances: Development impact, opportunities for the financial sector and future prospects. UNDP Somalia.http://www.livelihoods.org/hot_topics/docs/2

133ReliefWeb (2004) 'Somalia cannot afford another false start', says Secretary- General, urging Kenya conference to establish inclusive governance structures by 31 July.

and access to services.¹³⁴ The Increase access to education of both children and adults in disadvantaged areas and improve the capacity of education officers in planning and managing non-formal education programs. The project provides education to the hardest-to-reach populations by using low-cost construction materials and drawing on community labor and contributions to construct alternative basic education centers. It was also established that they assist in ensuring food insecure households protect their productive assets and prepare themselves for participation in the markets. Promote recovery, protection and diversification of livelihoods by ensuring access to immediate economic opportunities and developing high impact agriculture and non-agricultural markets.¹³⁵

The Somali Donor Group (SDG), assisted by the Somali Support Secretariat (SSS), was established in 2005 to provide a framework for a harmonized approach to enhance coordination and efficiency in the delivery of aid resources in Somalia, including their predictability. The SDG meets regularly in Nairobi on a bi-monthly basis and focuses on key areas of rehabilitation and development assistance. There is also the International Somalia Contact Group, an informal body of mainly western UN Ambassadors established in June 2006 at the UN headquarters in New York to support peace and reconciliation in Somalia. In addition to funds from the UN agencies, international NGOs and bilateral donors, there is a high, but unknown, level of support from Islamic NGOs and other agencies, largely to health and education. At the request of the TFG and the international community, the UN and the World Bank prepared a Somali Joint Needs

134 United Nations (2003) Somalia 2004: Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva.

135 SACB (2004d) SACB Coordination Structure <http://www.sacb.info/MainOrganograms.htm> [15/08/04]

Assessment (JNA) in 2005, which provides a prioritized reconstruction and development initiatives needed to support Somali-led efforts to deepen peace and reduce poverty. Consultations were undertaken with Stakeholders in all regions of Somalia. The recommendations of the JNA resulted in a long-term report titled, the Somali Integrated Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), endorsed by the TFG and authorities in Somaliland and Puntland. Three high priority areas were identified: (i) Deepen peace, improve security and establish good governance; (ii) Strengthen basic social services, particularly education, health and water supply; and, (iii) Rebuild infrastructure, jointly with other actions to expand economic opportunities, employment and incomes.

The Somali Support Secretariat (SSS) is the national emergency management agency of the Federal Republic of Somalia.¹³⁶ SSS works under the Jurisdiction of the Federal Government of Somalia and its headquarters are in Mogadishu. On May 30, 2013, the Federal Government of Somalia announced that the Cabinet had approved draft legislation on a Somali Support Secretariat, which had originally been proposed by the Ministry of Interior. According to the Prime Minister's Media Office, the Somali Support Secretariat will lead and coordinate the government's response to various natural disasters. It is part of a broader effort by the federal authorities to re-establish national

136Sahnoun, M. (1997) Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Somalia in Adam, H. and Ford, R. (1997: 303-315) ed. *Mending Rips in the Sky: options for Somali communities in the 21st century. Somali Studies International Association.*

institutions.¹³⁷ The Federal Parliament is now expected to deliberate on the proposed bill for endorsement after any amendments.

3.4 The UNDP/World Bank led Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) and the RDP/F Document

The UNDP Somalia programme is unique in many respects and UNDP is implementing programmes under extremely challenging circumstances. Almost two decades after the collapse of the State, Somalia continues to experience violence, political instability, governance and human security challenges. Enhanced security measures, as a consequence of grave incidents that affected UNDP staff members in 2008, present challenges to UNDP operations on the ground. Some of the unique characteristics of the UNDP programme in Somalia, such as the full direct implementation and remote management of its projects from the head office in Nairobi, reflect the very special operating environment. In analyzing the UNDP contribution in Somalia, it was important for the ADR team to take into account these special contexts.

The complex political process, continued armed conflict in many parts of the country, and general instability influenced decisions made by UNDP and its donors. The evaluation concluded that UNDP assumed responsibility for certain tasks and services, which have, as a result, reduced the credibility of the organization as a neutral and impartial development partner. A notable portion of UNDP expenditure has concerned

137SLPF (2004) SLPF commentary and contributions to the “Draft Code of Conduct for Sustainability of Community-Based Animal Health Program in Somalia” prepared by CAPE unit (of AU/IBAR) for consideration at Somalia Aid Coordination Body, Livestock Working Group.

activities that eliminated opportunities for UNDP to take strong leadership in its core corporate areas of work. In the recent past, however, UNDP Somalia has strived to address this image-related challenge by diversifying its portfolio in favour of UNDP traditional areas, such as pro-poor and Millennium Development Goal support activities.

The evaluation found that the UNDP contribution to development results has varied considerably depending on the region where activities were implemented. The regional diversity of Somalia was not sufficiently reflected in UNDP programmes and, oftentimes, UNDP corporate instruments were not suitable for programming in Somalia. Also, policy and operational guidance provided by UNDP headquarters was often insufficient or untimely. Despite the challenges and shortcomings in programme management, UNDP Somalia continued to seize opportunities as they emerged through the peace process and enjoy a privileged relationship with the authorities and donors. UNDP has initiated a process of change that should transform the institutional culture by emphasizing more cohesion and synergy between programmes, a results-based management as well as the mainstreaming of a rights-based approach and gender in programming. The evaluation strongly endorsed these approaches.

One significant dimension of humanitarian space in Somalia has been how emergency and development assistance has been very closely integrated into the country's political economy. This has come about through various means, including diversion of relief goods, the payment of fees for protection and for access to key assets (e.g. paying local authorities or clans for access to seaports and airstrips), rent of vehicles and housing and

other avenues of economic engagement. During the 1970s, the Somali government under Siyad Barre exploited large-scale international humanitarian operations mounted in response to a severe food shortage (1973–74) and the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977–78): government officials positioned themselves as intermediaries in the flow of resources to refugees, diverting much of the relief in what became a lucrative racket.¹³⁸ This practice continued in the absence of a centralised state, with the government replaced by militias, warlords, clans and other local authorities.

Without a significant natural resource base, the economic impact of humanitarian aid in Somalia after the collapse of the state was huge: humanitarian assistance and the UN peacekeeping missions became among the largest economic forces in the country. This financial injection also contributed legendary imbalances to the Mogadishu economy with aid and contracts, continuously fuelling conflict between sub clan militias.¹³⁹ Increased aid diversion combined with a growing culture of protection fees and other financial injections from aid agencies resulted in humanitarian assistance becoming increasingly embedded in the political economy of violence. Indeed, it has been argued that a main consequence of the UNOSOM period was that factional leaders used funding from international sources (including humanitarian organisations) to legitimise their claims to power and their standing as warlords.¹⁴⁰ In order to operate in Somalia, humanitarian agencies had to pay armed guards and authorities for protection. These

138 Longley, C and Maxwell, D. (2011) *Livelihoods, Chronic Conflict and Humanitarian Response. ODI Working Paper 182.*

139 NOVIB (2011) Civil Society Symposium Report – Somali Version, *NOVIB*

140 ReliefWeb (2011) Aid to Somalia Should Tackle Development Needs. <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/e3e95b3637ddc0e285256ed10008dfcf?OpenDocument> [30/08/04]

payments often amounted to huge sums (e.g. \$100,000 a week in Mogadishu or \$28,000 a month in Baidoa);¹⁴¹ such examples were not uncommon and were seen as the cost of doing business in Somalia, where gaining or maintaining access to a population in need was prioritised above all else. The development of such security rackets also greatly increased the number of employees that agencies were obliged to hire. As the number of aid agencies operating in Somalia grew in the early 2006, being employed by them (as security or programme staff) became a lucrative business.

Many private importers, transporters, security providers, hoteliers, owners of real estate and vehicles and others have still managed to profit from the war economy and the humanitarian aid that is channeled into the country, particularly following the expansion of aid funding in the latter half of the 2000s. In 2009, the UNMG reported that just three Somali businesspeople held the contracts for 80% of WFP's \$200 million transport budget.¹⁴² The key informants reported that WFP transportation contracts to Somali businessmen constitute the greatest single source of revenue in Somalia. The system offers a variety of opportunities for diversion all along the supply chain. These individuals became 'important powerbrokers' in Somalia with links to political actors; some directly channeled profits or aid to armed groups, in many ways replicating the financial role that aid played in Somali politics before the collapse of the state. The revelations of the 2010 UNMG report about the diversion of WFP aid were not a great

141UNDP Somalia (2012) Governance and Financial Service Programme. Why is UNDP involved with Somalia Financial Service? <http://www.so.undp.org/remittances.htm> [30/08/04]

142Lewis, I. M. (2009) A Pastoral Democracy. A study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa. *International African Institute, LIT, James Curry.*

surprise to actors engaged in Somalia. However, the report made official what many people already knew and created an impetus for response.

A great deal of service provision from Somali businesspeople, including money transfers, transport and property rental, are legitimate and essential links in the aid delivery chain. However, leakage and diversion of aid funds through loss, taxation and fraud are common. One of the factors that may help explain why there is such a high level of abuse of international funds is that aid money is not seen as belonging to Somalis and so in some ways it is considered to be 'free'.¹⁴³ The long-established rules about clan ownership and protection which oblige people to respect the property of a clan or pay restitution typically are not as binding on money provided from foreign sources. There is, therefore, a level of impunity that means that businesspeople may not feel compelled to be as responsible with funds from international sources as they would be with money provided by Somalis, particularly those with whom they have clan ties. With the possibility of making so much money, it is perhaps not surprising that getting or maintaining access to humanitarian aid resources has become a central objective of both the political and business communities. It also becomes a tactic of war: in the 2011 food emergency, both the TFG and al Shabaab have been accused of diverting aid resources in order to lure people to areas under their control or to prevent people from seeking assistance in areas outside their control.¹⁴⁴ All of these uses and abuses of aid resources

143Kaldor, M. (2011) *New and Old Wars - Organised Violence in a Global Era. Polity.*

144Goobjoog (2011) Col. BarreHiraale threatens ending aid agencies' operation in his territories. <http://www.goobjoog.net/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3295> [30/07/04]

make it even more difficult to disentangle international political and humanitarian engagements and political and humanitarian space.

Interviewees of the respondents indicated that the operational independence of aid programming in Somalia has been limited not only by external influences but also by local political dynamics. This includes the influence of clans and local authorities over organisations working in a given area. Access was facilitated or limited by the clan affiliation of staff or security conditions in a particular area, thereby further directing aid so that it is not provided exclusively on the basis of need.¹⁴⁵ Participation of the beneficiary population in community targeting exercises is one of the means by which needs are generally assessed in other countries. Historically in Somalia (as in many countries in crisis), community representation in these processes has often been unbalanced, with community elders and self-appointed community leaders participating more, and more disenfranchised groups having little or no involvement. As a consequence, aid programmes have often benefited the more powerful community members over those most in need of assistance and protection. Access often depends on 'gatekeepers', locally known as 'black cats', who controls information, access and resources in specific locations and displacement camps. In doing so, they take over the role of deciding who should receive aid, or insist that recipients should hand over a portion of the relief they receive. These may be businessmen, political actors, senior members of the community or clan or other powerful individuals or groups. As a result of

145Hassan, H. (2011) Axis of Anarchy *Open Democracy*
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/articles/ViewPopUpArticle.jsp?id=2&articleId=1273#> [30/08/04]

these influences, humanitarian aid may not be distributed solely on the basis of need (the humanitarian imperative) or impartiality.

The financial scaling-back of the mid-1990s was accompanied by a scaling-back in the physical presence of agency staff inside Somalia.¹⁴⁶ The post-UNOSOM era saw UN agencies and many international NGOs relocate to the relative safety of Nairobi, where, with their large salaries bolstered by hardship allowances and generous per diem payments, they were seen by Somalis to be living extravagantly, using funds that should have gone to programming inside Somalia. Distrust was compounded by the fact that many Somalis see the international community's political agenda as meddling at best, dangerous at worst, and its humanitarian work as a half-hearted effort to convince Somalis of the benefits of the state-building plan. This has contributed to a belief that accountability to donors is optional, and that misuse of aid will not be punished.¹⁴⁷ With worsening security conditions, there has been greater reliance by international organisations on LINGOs to act as implementing partners.¹⁴⁸ Not all of these have the capacity (see later discussion of remote management) and relationships with donors required for effective collaboration. Whether distrustful Somalis' suspicions are well-founded or not are hardly relevant: the fact that such perceptions are widespread makes demonstrating that aid is being targeted on the principles of neutrality and impartiality extremely difficult, and makes targeting based on the principles of neutrality and

146Drysedale, J. (2007) *Whatever Happened to Somalia: a Tale of Tragic Blunder*. Haan.

147Damooei, J. (2007) *Analyzing Somalia's Past and Present Economic Constraints and Opportunities for Creating a Conducive Economic Environment*: in Adam, H. and Ford, R. (1997: 271-297) ed. *Mending Rips in the Sky: options for Somali communities in the 21st century*. *Somali Studies International Association*

148Brons, M. H. (2011) *Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia, from statelessness to statelessness?* *International Books*.

impartiality virtually impossible. The mistrust further constrains actual and potential humanitarian space.

The redirecting of aid has also had indirect political effects. The 2011 UNMG report observed that, in 2011, many UN agencies and NGOs shifted their activities to central and northern regions where there are fledgling and developing local authorities'.¹⁴⁹ Although a relatively easier environment in which to operate in terms of security and funding regulations (as compared to the south), this increase in central and northern operations was also subject to efforts by local authorities to control assistance, including imposing conditions on access and delivery.¹⁵⁰ By casting themselves as the link between aid agencies and beneficiaries, local authorities sought to enhance their legitimacy by demonstrating a capacity to provide basic services to the populations within their areas of control. This behaviour has given rise to a culture of opportunistic aid, both on the part of Somalis and as part of the response. As discussed in the following section, because of the potential political and economic benefits of humanitarian assistance there is an incentive to create opportunities for humanitarian actors to provide assistance; the invitation, withdrawal or denial of access are also used as political tools. At the same time the political and security environment has meant that assistance has been dominated by an access-oriented approach, rather than a purely needs-based one, making humanitarian assistance more susceptible to political manipulation.

149Abdullahi, A. (2011) Survey on Civil Society Organisations in Somalia 1990- 2003, in Dirasat Ifriqiya, Centre for Research and African Studies

150Cassanelli, (2011) Explaining the Somali Crisis in Besteman and Cassanelli (2003) ed. The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: the War behind the War. Haan, London.

It is commonly accepted that humanitarian action in any conflict is inherently political. Negotiating access with non-state actors, for instance, or providing services in areas under their control, is seen by some as legitimising these actors, and often raises concerns about aid being used as a financial resource to sustain or fuel conflict.¹⁵¹ aid has often been politicised through the deliberate and direct co-option of humanitarian action by political actors, as in the use of humanitarian assistance in military campaigns and as a reward for peace-building. Politics and humanitarian action are thus connected, be it through the impact humanitarian assistance can have on political structures, or through the politicisation of aid, in which assistance is deliberately manipulated to serve political purposes. Politics had a significant role in foreign aid (including humanitarian and development aid) prior to the collapse of the Somali state; it was with the international interventions of the early 1990s that the marriage of humanitarian action and international politics became entrenched. Initially conceived of as a primarily humanitarian intervention to mitigate the effects of state collapse and famine, the UN missions of the 1990s were transformed from a humanitarian enterprise with a short-term clear-cut mandate (1992–99 under UNOSOM I and UNITAF) to longer-term projects of political reconciliation (1999–2012 under UNOSOM II), increasingly emphasizing peace-making (political) priorities and de-emphasizing humanitarian ones. By the final UN peacekeeping withdrawal in March 1995, the intervention had completed a 180-degree shift from the 1992 humanitarian conception; ‘the primary purpose’ of UNOSOM II was

151 Al-Ummah (2009) SRC President, A. Badiyow on Special Interview with Al- Ummah Monthly Magazine, Mogadishu.

‘to facilitate political reconciliation in Somalia.’¹⁵² In its pursuit of its new political mandate, UNOSOM II became a party to the conflict in Somalia. Through the course of UNOSOM II, ‘the humanitarian, political and military approaches in Somalia became increasingly and counter-productively skewed toward the aid distribution.

The UN’s decision to expand its political mandate in Somalia during the course of the UNOSOM intervention deepened many Somalis’ distrust of international actors. Trust between Somalis and international actors was already a scarce commodity before the collapse of the state, as a result of Somalia’s having been used in the proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the effects of aid diversion. The scaling up of international aid in the 2008 brought a massive expansion in the local NGO (LNGO) sector, but limited accountability and weak capacity led donors to distrust many local actors. Matters were further complicated by the attempt by international political actors to adopt a ‘peace dividend’ approach, using aid as an incentive to encourage local administrations to establish secure spaces in order to attract assistance. Aid thereby became a tool in peace-building and political stabilisation efforts.¹⁵³

Towards the end of the decade, donors, frustrated with the lack of political progress (the failure to produce a central state and bring about peace) backed away from Somalia on all fronts. As donors lost interest in the state-building project, humanitarian assistance also dwindled. From a high of \$410.6 million in 2002, international assistance fell to \$55.5

152EC Somalia Unit (2012) EC Strategy for the Livestock Sector in Somalia.

153Duffield, M. (2011) Global Governance and the New Wars. The Merging of Development and Security. *Zed Books*

million in 2005 and averaged about \$50–60 million per year from 2006–2007.¹⁵⁴ This drop was due, in part, to the fact that political and humanitarian interests were so closely intertwined. Partly owing to this funding drop, a period of peace prevailed and humanitarian conditions stabilised. Humanitarian operations functioned as livelihoods support both in terms of the goods they provided to beneficiaries and also in terms of employment and contracts. Since 2007 in particular (coinciding with the formation of the TFG), humanitarian assistance scaled up again in line with renewed international interest in Somalia, then dropped off again in 2009, only to spike in the second half of 2011 in response to the UN famine declaration. US assistance dropped by 88%, from \$237 million in 2008 to \$20 million in 2011.¹⁵⁵ Recent pledges of food aid and other famine relief include US contributions totaling \$591 million as of 15 September 2011, according to the Financial Tracking Service (FTS). There have been various explanations for the drop in funding prior to the 2011 famine, including donor nervousness (as well as fatigue) following the 2009 expulsion by al Shabaab of WFP and other organisations from areas under its control, and a report in 2010 by the UN Monitoring Group (UNMG) highlighting diversion of WFP aid.

3.5 The Disaster Management Unit (DMU)

The Istanbul Declaration emphasized the need to move forward with Somalia's economic recovery and development. While this can only happen in a meaningful way after there is an improvement in the security situation, it is a task for the international community. The

154Goobjoog (2007) Mogadishu Universities Network rebukes Maxwell

Gaylard<http://www.goobjoog.net/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3234> [20/07/04]

155Mogadishu University (2011) Teacher Training Programme.www.mogadishuuniversity.com [20/08/04]

TFG does not have the money for such an effort. The European Union is the most important development assistance donor in Somalia. It is currently supporting eighty-seven projects costing 180 million Euros. The projects are in three sectors: governance and security, including institution building; primary and secondary education and adult literacy; and agriculture, livestock and food security. The European Union also provides about 45 million Euros annually for humanitarian assistance and it has committed since 2007 about 100 million Euros to cover the costs of the African Union Mission to Somalia. For its part, the United States has committed \$185 million since 2007 to the African Union force in Somalia. It also provided \$12 million of in-kind support and \$2 million in cash support to the TFG. In June 2009, this included 94 tons of ammunition, small arms, uniforms, communications equipment and night vision equipment to the African Union troops to be transferred to TFG security forces.

In addition, the United States provides about \$150 million annually in emergency food aid, most of which goes through the World Food Program. Washington has not so far been a significant source of development assistance but must become a major donor once the security situation permits. TFG President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed called the Istanbul conference a window of opportunity for Somalia. He welcomed support promised for the TFG and the reinforcement of the African Union forces. He said that participating countries made firm pledges to assist the TFG in rebuilding both governmental institutions and Somali infrastructure. This is all well and good, but windows of opportunity can also slam shut unexpectedly and without demonstrable progress in Somalia this is likely to happen. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated

in Istanbul that the TFG represents Somalia's best chance in years to escape from the endless cycle of war and humanitarian disaster. While this may also be true, it is only because the international community sees no acceptable alternative to the TFG in Somalia today. The international community supports the TFG but remains skeptical about its ability to bring security and stability to Somalia. Ban Ki-moon did appropriately acknowledge the important role that the Somali business community, including those in the diaspora, can play in the reconstruction phase of the peace process.

Somalia has been without an effective government since 1991. There have been a number of attempts at international intervention and mediation since then, but instability and inter-tribal violence remain widespread. Numerous armed groups have emerged and some exert effective control over parts of the country. In February agreement was reached on a new political structure for the country. The country would become a federal state, with Mogadishu as the federal capital. There would be a parliament with 225 members and an upper chamber comprising 54 tribal elders.¹⁵⁶ Parliamentarians would be drawn from all regions and reflect the clan structure, and 30% would be women, selected by civil society and respected women. On 10th September MPs meeting in Mogadishu elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud president. These arrangements replaced the previous Transitional Federal Government (TFG) inaugurated in 2004 and whose mandate was extended during 2011 and expired in August 2012. The arrangements were made at a 3-

¹⁵⁶Gardner, J. and El-Bushra, J. (2004) Somalia, the Untold Story: the War through the Eyes of Somali Women. *CIIR and Pluto Press*.

day meeting held in Garowe, Puntland attended by key leaders of some parts of the country. However, leaders of Somaliland and Al-Shabaab did not attend.

During 2012 the country could be viewed under five geographical areas, namely: Somaliland in the northwest. This territory declared independence in 1991, though this is not recognised internationally. The territory has a constitution, functional government and legal and policy framework. In July 2010 there was the peaceful transfer of power from one president to another following an election. It was formerly a British colony/protectorate, whereas the rest of Somalia was an Italian colony and became independent in 1960; Puntland in the northeast operates as an autonomous region. It has its own Charter (i.e. constitution) and legal framework, but is not seeking independence; Galmudug is an autonomous region to the south of Puntland; Azania was formed as an autonomous region in 2010.¹⁵⁷ In April 2011 a week-long conference in the region that brought together representatives of the civil society, Somali youth, elders and members of the TFG chose the name Azania (a reference in pre-Roman times to different parts in southeastern Africa) and appointed Mohamed Abdi Gandhi as president. During 2012 the newly elected president of Somalia declared the formation of Azania illegal, and urged the process be delayed until the parliament establishes laws and territorial boundaries of proposed regional states within Federal Somalia; The South is notionally under the direct control of the federal government. However, effective control of some areas had broken down and such areas were ruled by local tribal elders or more widely based armed groups.

¹⁵⁷Goobjoog (2012) Somaliland announces end of its standoff with the UN agencies www.goobjoog.net

January 2010 marked one year since the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia was formed as a broad-based government of national unity. The anniversary was celebrated on Friday, 29 January 2010 in Mogadishu, in an event attended by President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, Speaker of Parliament Sheik Aden Mohamed Nor Madobe and a host of other officials from the government and parliament. Speaking on the occasion, President Ahmed highlighted the achievements of the Transitional Federal Institutions. He noted that great strides had been made in re-establishing the Somali security forces and lauded the progress made in attracting the support of the international community.

Somalia comprises 18 regions or provinces, namely: Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed and Togdheer are in Somaliland; Sool and Sanaag are claimed by both Somaliland and Puntland; Bari, Nugaal and the northern half of Mudug are in Puntland; The southern half of Mudug and Galguduud make up the autonomous region of Galmudug; Parts of Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba and Gedo are in Azania and; Hiiraan, Middle Shabeelle, Banaadir, Lower Shabeelle, Bakool and Bay, plus parts of Gedo, Middle Jubba and Lower Jubba are in the South.¹⁵⁸ The population of nine to ten million is remarkably homogenous, being approximately 85% ethnically Somalia, linguistically Somali speaking and religiously Sunni Islam. The divisions are clan, sub-clan and extended family based, with an ever-changing mix of loyalties, alliances and enmities. The instability has the potential to cross the nation-state borders into neighboring Djibouti,

158 Helander, B. (2003) The Huber in the Land of Plenty: Land, Labour and Vulnerability Among a Southern Somali Clan, in Besteman and Cassanelli (2003) ed. *The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: the War behind the War*. Haan, London.

Ethiopia and Kenya, all of which have areas in which ethnically Somali people constitute the interviewees of the population. Common social problems include the widespread availability of small arms, the presence of landmines in many areas, the use of qat and female genital mutilation. Violence, instability, together with floods and droughts in parts of the country have left many people displaced, either within their region, in another region or internationally. Education is provided primarily by private schools and most offer religious instruction. There is a significant number of externally funded madrassahs throughout the country that provide inexpensive basic education and adhere to conservative Islamic practices. Likewise, Mogadishu University and the University of East Africa in Bosaso, Puntland are externally funded from Islamic sources.

There were significant changes in 2012, a continuation of processes begun in 2011. The political situation changed during 2011, paving the way for the meeting of February 2012 that agreed on new governance structures. At the start of 2011 much of the southern areas were under the effective control of armed groups. The most widespread and influential of which was al-Shabaab, to which many smaller, clan-based armed groups were affiliated. Al-Shabaab are extremely well organised and highly disciplined (cf. Hamas and Hezbollah), suggesting that they are getting support from outside.¹⁵⁹ There were foreign nationals present and active in the armed groups that control most of the territory. In 2009, al-Shabaab ordered the World Food Programme (WFP) to cease all operations in the areas under its control, accusing them of undermining local farmers. WFP also reported that other NGOs were being told to stop employing female staff and to pay

159 Little, P. (2012) Somalia: Economy Without State. *International African Institute & James Curry*

US\$20,000 every six months for “security services”. Such actions exacerbated humanitarian challenges, especially when the effects of a severe drought became apparent during 2011.

The withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in January 2009 left the African Union’s (AU) then 3,400 member force of Burundian and Ugandan peacekeepers (referred to as AMISON) deployed since 2007 as the only (official) foreign troop presence in the southern part of the country. On 22nd December 2010 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 1964 which asked the AU to expand AMISON from 8,000 to 12,000 troops.¹⁶⁰ During 2011 AMISON was able to increase its military activity in and around Mogadishu. In August 2011 Al-Shabaab announced a “tactical withdrawal” from most of Mogadishu followed increased activity by government forces supported by AMISON.¹⁶¹ One factor was that drought and famine conditions were affecting the whole population and those with effective control were blamed for not ensuring sufficient aid reached those in need. This was affecting the level of support given by the general population for Al-Shabaab. On 30th September 2011 Al-Shabaab stated their intention to charge a 2.5% tax on personal income presented as Zakat on employees of three major firms, namely Nation link, Telecom Somalia and Dahabshiil. Violent clashes continued in Mogadishu, notably in early October 2011 when thousands were displaced.

160Narbeth, S. (2013) Emergency cash relief to drought affected families of soolplateau: Post distribution survey findings. *UN- Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs-Somalia*

161UNDP Somalia (2012) Human Development Report – Somalia

During 2012, forces loyal to the official government, supported by AMISON and assisted by military forces from Kenya and Ethiopia, made further military gains, re-establishing effective control of parts of the area.¹⁶² Of note was control of Beledweyne, Baydhowa, and the strategic port city of Kismaayo in September. There was widespread displacement from several areas during the change in effective control. Throughout 2012 al-Shabaab's influence was felt in Mogadishu and other areas that they officially withdrew. Many went into hiding or reintegrated into the community. Some groups entered neighborhoods and villages at night threatening, ordering them not to cooperate with Western agencies and threatening those working for NGOs. Anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines continued to be deployed by armed groups. Civilian casualties continued to occur, and access to arable land is severely affected in some areas. Distribution of aid continued to prove problematic due to poor infrastructure, insecurity and the use (or withholding) of food as a weapon and control mechanism by those controlling territory. In recent years many aid organisations switched to using national staff following attacks on international workers.

3.6 The Federal Government's Policy Unit

The Somalia Policy Unit cultivates an extensive contact base in Somalia and the region to produce frequent reporting of high quality. The Special Representative, his deputy, and the staff of a combined political/economic section function as reporting officers. They surmount the challenges of limited travel to Somalia by telephoning, traveling to regional capitals, meeting with visiting Somalis, and maintaining close relations with the Nairobi-

¹⁶²UNDP Somalia (2012) Human Development Report – Somalia

based UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and third-country diplomatic missions. The unit does an excellent job of drawing on a range of sources to explain to Washington the complicated and fluid situation in Somalia. The unit has no language designated positions or language qualified officers. Most unit officers communicate with Somalis in English or use locally employed staff interpreters. This is a serviceable arrangement pending permanent U.S. representation in Somalia.¹⁶³

Reporting appropriately focuses on the political process in Somalia, supported by an international effort to establish a legitimate, constitutional government. Other topics of reporting include updates on the military and humanitarian situations. The unit would like to do more reporting on developments in Somalia's semiautonomous regions as staffing and travel constraints permit. Washington consumers would also welcome more analysis on risks to the transition. Over the past year, the unit has established a record of policy innovation and operational effectiveness. As a result of the unit's initiative, Washington secured a UN Security Council's decision to ban the purchase of Somali charcoal in order to deprive al-Shabaab of a valuable funding source. Washington is considering the unit's recommendation to extend security assistance to Somalia national security forces outside of Mogadishu. Strong relationships in Somalia, timely reporting, and effective

163Seidman, A. and Seidman, R. (1997) Creating a Democratic Law-Making Process in Somalia in Adam, H. and Ford, R. (1997: 333-353) ed. *Mending Rips in the Sky: options for Somali communities in the 21st century*. *Somali Studies International Association*

coordination with Embassy Nairobi's legal attaché recently enabled the successful rescue by U.S. forces of an American hostage and a Danish hostage in Somalia.¹⁶⁴

3.7 The Current Aid Environment in Somalia

According to the key informants, there is a long history of misuse, misappropriation, and obstruction of humanitarian aid in Somalia that dates back to before the war. In the early 1990s, aid and the intended beneficiaries of that aid became resources that were fought over by rival factions and led to criticisms that humanitarian agencies were fuelling a war economy. Two decades later, in March 2010; the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia exposed how foreign aid remains entwined with the conflict. Investigations by the Monitoring Group concluded that humanitarian assistance had been obstructed by the substantive diversion of food aid, some of which had been used to support the efforts of armed groups opposed to the TFG. The largest Somali NGO in south central Somalia, which partners with several INGOs, was also accused of being complicit in the diversion.¹⁶⁵

Humanitarian agencies are, again, divided over the implications of the Monitoring Group's report. The WFP, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, and some INGOs have refuted the accuracy of the Monitoring Group's findings on the scale of food aid diversion. In March, the Humanitarian Coordinator also expressed concern that the report was adversely affecting flows of humanitarian assistance and will inevitably make

164Menkhaus, K. (2003b) Warlords and Landlords: Non-state Actors and Humanitarian Norms in Somalia (draft) *Davidson College*

165Mohammoud, A. (2010) Somalia: New rescue plan for "world's worst humanitarian disaster" *Humanitarian Affairs Review-Country Files*

it more difficult to sustain a humanitarian lifeline to central and Southern Somalia at a time when there are increasingly high levels of child malnutrition. The humanitarian consequences of the suspension of WFP assistance for the 3.2 million people identified by the UN to be in need of food aid is yet to be seen. Indeed, it may be difficult to demonstrate impact empirically because numerous variables such as remittance flows, food production, climate, and security can positively or adversely affect livelihood vulnerability.¹⁶⁶

For other humanitarian actors, the Monitoring Group report is a wake-up call for all humanitarian agencies in Somalia, for while WFP is singled out for investigation, the report raises questions about the entire humanitarian system in Somalia. As one aid worker commented: For NGOs the arms Monitoring Group has broken the shell of presumptive accountability that agencies are operating honestly in Somali. It is incumbent on us to explain what we are doing. Aid agencies differ in their views on the extent to which all forms of aid are diverted and what is acceptable. Some take the view that: Any agency delivering aid in Somalia has to pay for access indirectly through contractors, directly through extortion, or by commanders taking a cut from local aid worker's salaries. Others are adamant that they rigorously monitor the assistance that they deliver and do not "pay for access." It is likely, however, that the UNSC will deal

¹⁶⁶Gundel, J. (2011) The migration – development nexus: Somalia case study, in *International Migration* 40: (5) pp: 255-281 IOM

with aid diversion more harshly than it has done so with arms flows to Somalia, because humanitarian aid remains within the control of individual member states of the UN.¹⁶⁷

Although humanitarian agencies go to great lengths to present themselves as nonpartisan they are deeply enmeshed in politics. Budget allocations and turf protection require vigilance. Humanitarians also negotiate with local authorities for visas, transport, and access, which all require compromises. They feel the pain of helping ethnic cleansers, feeding war criminals, and rewarding military strategies that herd civilians into camps. They decide whether or not to publicize human rights abuses. They look aside when bribes occur and food aid is diverted for military purposes. They provide foreign exchange and contribute to the growth of war economies that redistribute assets from the weak to the strong.¹⁶⁸ Today, however, there is no illusion that humanitarian action is not a form of politics as there is no longer any need to ask whether politics and humanitarian action intersects. The real question is how this intersection can be managed to ensure more humanized politics and more effective humanitarian action. To this end, humanitarians should be neither blindly principled nor blindly pragmatic.¹⁶⁹

To further complicate the situation, USAID tenders for QUIPs have attracted the attention of for-profit contractors and private security companies, as well as INGOs. Donor funding of nontraditional aid actors to undertake developmental and nation

167FAO and SACB (2011) Proving the absence of rinderpest from the Somali Ecosystem. www.sacb.net/publications

168SACB (2011) Endorsed Minutes of the Executive Committee SACB Review Working Group. March 30, 2004.

169SACB (2010) Somalia Aid Coordination Body. <http://www.sacb.info/IntroM.htm> [26/08/04]

building activities has become commonplace in Somalia.¹⁷⁰ The increased number and variety of organizations involved in delivering assistance increases competition, uncertainty, and insecurity. The for-profit agencies are not bound by humanitarian principles and their objectives are less focused on meeting needs and more on winning hearts and minds through aid provision.¹⁷¹

Humanitarian NGOs have expressed concern that the presence of for-profit agencies could affect local perceptions of humanitarian actors and that their unprincipled and uninformed behavior could jeopardize the operations and security of already existing programs. If humanitarian principles are compromised further in favor of stabilization, some INGOs believe that the presence of for-profit contractors will make Somalia more dangerous for aid workers. The history of humanitarian aid in Somalia is not one of political neutrality and impartiality, but rather is the story of how external resources have been used as one of the primary economic and political prizes in a resource-scarce country.¹⁷² As mentioned at the outset, historically humanitarian space in Somalia has been constrained by the political economy of aid, the manipulation of assistance for political purposes (by domestic and international actors), insecurity and a lack of trust between the international community and Somalis, among other factors. The combined

170SLPF (2004) SLPF commentary and contributions to the “Draft Code of Conduct for Sustainability of Community-Based Animal Health Program in Somalia” prepared by CAPE unit (of AU/IBAR) for consideration at Somalia Aid Coordination Body, Livestock Working Group.

171United Nations (2003) Somalia 2004: Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva.

172 SLPF (2004) SLPF commentary and contributions to the “Draft Code of Conduct for Sustainability of Community-Based Animal Health Program in Somalia” prepared by CAPE unit (of AU/IBAR) for consideration at Somalia Aid Coordination Body, Livestock Working Group.

effect has been a curtailing of humanitarian principles, the protection of which is at the centre of the current debate on humanitarian space.

3.8 Conclusion

From the discussions about the link between politics and aid have been dominated by an overriding concern with trying to depoliticise humanitarian action, rather than responding to the protection needs of the most vulnerable civilian's.¹⁷³ However, opening up and preserving humanitarian space which may be better thought of as pursuing better access is, in the Somali context, an inherently political act. It involves negotiating with power brokers of various types and delivering resources that are in great demand, both to achieve humanitarian ends and to further the political ambitions of conflict actors on the ground. This means that humanitarian aid is always political, even if it seeks to keep its distance from the overtly political act of state-building. Rather than insist that humanitarian action should be somehow cleansed of politics, a task which is surely impossible, we advocate here for a better understanding of how humanitarian action is political in its own right, and how it can, deliberately or not, influence political outcomes, from the very local to the national. Only with this nuanced understanding of the political economy of conflict and humanitarian action in Somalia can agencies begin to work to enhance civilian protection as well as better protect their own staff. Even if it is accepted that humanitarian work is political, in that it influences and is influenced by political power structures, this is not to say that its use as a political tool is advisable or even

173 MacLean, W. (2002) UN Official Says Somalia Vulnerable. *Global Policy Forum* <http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/targets/2002/0110kent.htm> Menkhaus, K. (2003a) Somalia: a Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment, *UNHCR*.

defensible. The provision and withholding of humanitarian assistance for political outcomes (to punish one side, to lure civilians from one side's territory to that of another, to demonstrate the viability of one side over another, etc.) is at the root of the current humanitarian crisis. These tactics have enabled extreme hunger to take hold and to claim thousands of lives.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁴United Nations (2003) Somalia 2004: Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE POLITICS OF AID IN SOMALIA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

Chapter three has discussed the current aid environment in Somalia. This chapter aims to provide a critical analysis of the key issues emerging from the study: corruption, terror vs. anti-terror group interference and vested interests by various actors (UN/NGOs, Somali government and other authorities) as well as other issues for example the raging debate with regard to the politics of aid and the absence of a unified humanitarian code of conduct.

4.2 Emerging Issues

4.2.1 Corruption

Humanitarian aid is given to assist those affected by natural disasters, human conflict or other forms of severe political, economic or social breakdowns. Its aim is to prevent and alleviate human suffering in the context of life-threatening situations. This is mainly done through the short-term provision of food, water, shelter and emergency services to affected areas, though initial humanitarian operations often evolve into longer-term reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. Corruption in humanitarian aid undermines the fundamental purpose of humanitarian action. Its effects include the diversion of relief supplies away from affected communities, inequitable distribution of aid and sub-standard or inappropriately located infrastructure. Such outcomes ignore the needs of the intended beneficiaries of aid, often further marginalising those from the poorest sections of society and deepening existing social conflicts. Tackling corruption in humanitarian

aid is therefore key to ensuring effective and equitable aid assistance to those in greatest need.

Transparency International (TI) has worked to address the risk of corruption in humanitarian aid on several levels. Transparency International national chapters in affected countries sought to strengthen the accountability of national relief operations through their advocacy and capacity building work. The TI-Secretariat, meanwhile, has helped bring together key stakeholders in Somalia, where representatives identified measures to protect Somalia aid from corruption. At a global level, TI is supporting the humanitarian community's work to increase transparency and accountability through its Programme on Preventing Corruption in Humanitarian Assistance. Ultimately, TI's goal is to help ensure that affected individuals and communities can rebuild their lives without enduring additional hardship due to the corrupt misuse of aid.¹⁷⁵

Humanitarian emergencies create general conditions in affected countries that can allow corruption to flourish. Even where integrity systems are advanced, the authorities and humanitarian actors must work hard to ensure proper accountability and coordination of relief and reconstruction efforts. Where governance structures are already weak, there is a danger they may be overwhelmed by the sudden onset of an emergency. Similarly, the rule of law may falter or break down completely particularly in conflict

¹⁷⁵United Nations Security Council SC/9888, "Security Council Extends Mandate of Group Monitoring Weapons Bans in Somalia, Eritrea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1916 (2009)," March 19, 2012.

situations.¹⁷⁶ Parallel and often illegal structures, such as black markets, may emerge to fill the political and economic vacuum created by an emergency. In such circumstances, the substantial resource flows generally associated with humanitarian aid can create additional incentives for corruption.

The imperative to reach affected communities quickly can lead to a trade-off between effective disbursement controls and streamlined, unbureaucratic procedures. Strong yet flexible systems have in many cases been developed to cope with aid delivery in emergency situations, particularly by established humanitarian agencies. There is still a danger, however, that corruption may be facilitated by relaxed procedures aimed at ensuring fast aid delivery.¹⁷⁷ Though aid programmes seek to target resources as accurately as possible, errors inevitably arise resulting either in an over- or undersupply of aid. In the disruption inherent to emergency situations, both types of errors can give rise to opportunities for corruption. In the case of undersupply, individuals and communities may be forced to engage in corrupt activities in a desperate bid to survive. Where there is oversupply, aid not needed for survival may become available for illegitimate purposes.

The Somalia aid system is extensive and complex. It encompasses a wide variety of actors including international donors, international implementing agencies (such as UN

¹⁷⁶Chang, H.-J. (2007) *Bad Samaritans: Rich nations, poor policies and the threat to the developing world*, London, Random House.

¹⁷⁷Barnaby Willitts-King and Paul Harvey (2013), *Managing the Risks of Corruption in Humanitarian Relief Operations*, (Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute: April 2013), www.transparency.org/in_focus_archive/tsunami/tsu_harvey.pdf

bodies, the ICRC and international NGOs), national and local NGOs, as well as the governments of countries affected by emergencies.¹⁷⁸ Despite efforts to address its weaknesses, certain characteristics of this system may provide opportunities for corruption in humanitarian aid. Humanitarian aid essentially consists of a one-sided transfer of resources, usually from industrialised countries into poorer ones. Aid providers largely act voluntarily, while aid recipients are often dependent on external assistance. This power imbalance provides difficult conditions for accountability: aid recipients have very few powers of sanction in relation to aid providers, while the latter can largely choose for themselves the level at which their work is subjected to scrutiny. Many established aid agencies have developed sophisticated mechanisms that have greatly improved their capacity for financial accountability. These systems are, however, often geared towards justifying expenditures to donors rather than to intended beneficiaries. Such systems do not necessarily detect all forms of corruption ‘on the ground’ and thus potentially allow some forms of corrupt practice to go unreported.¹⁷⁹

The number of actors engaged in aid work can also create opportunities for corruption. For example, despite recent moves to harmonise donor policies in relation to disbursement control, implementing agencies dealing with multiple donors must often cope with multiple reporting requirements. This can increase the administrative burden of smaller agencies to such an extent that their own internal control activities may be

178 Donini, A. (2009). *Afghanistan: Humanitarianism Under Threat*. Feinstein International Center. Tufts University. Briefing Paper. March 2009.

179 World Health Organization (2013b). GIVS: global immunization vision and strategy 2006–2015. Geneva: World Health Organization and UNICEF; 2013. http://www.who.int/vaccines/documents/docspd05/givs_final_en.pdf. Accessed 24 August 2013.

overwhelmed.¹⁸⁰ The number of implementing agencies engaged in aid work has itself rapidly increased in recent years. Many smaller, newly established agencies have virtually no regularised internal governance structures and are often financed by individual, privately donated funds. This lack of internal and external controls makes them particularly vulnerable to corruption. The manner in which aid is given can also influence opportunities for corruption. Aid given in the context of aid relief can assume a number of forms. The current predominant model is that of direct project implementation by international aid agencies. This model has partly developed due to the perceived risks involved in transferring aid resources directly to national actors. Though such direct assistance often provides for stricter control of monetary resources, opportunities for corruption may still arise, sometimes involving international agencies themselves.

Aid is additionally vulnerable to corruption where there are low levels of transparency and accountability in countries affected by humanitarian emergencies. The interviewees of countries recently subject to humanitarian appeals rate poorly on TI's 2004 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). This indicates that aid is often provided in weak governance environments. Confronted with corruption that is deeply entrenched in a recipient country, humanitarian actors must work additionally hard to ensure that sufficiently robust control mechanisms are in place. Even in countries where governance structures are more effective, aid agencies may be unfamiliar with managing subtler forms of corruption present, for example, in public sector institutions. The provision of

¹⁸⁰Fischer, A. (2009) Putting Aid in its Place: insights from early structuralist on aid and balance of payments and lessons for contemporary aid debates, *Journal of International Development* 21: 856-867.

humanitarian aid is a complex, challenging and often dangerous task. The vast interviewees of those who engage in humanitarian action do so primarily out of concern for those affected by humanitarian crises, displaying high levels of commitment to their work under difficult circumstances. Addressing corruption in the provision of humanitarian aid is essential to reinforce the purpose of such action: to prevent and alleviate further human suffering.¹⁸¹

4.2.2 Terror vs. Anti-Terror Group Interference

The features that compose a given organization's aid space are inconsistently defined and largely dependent upon the intricate dynamics of the respective crisis. In the context of the Somali complex emergency, issues of neutrality are of primary concern due to the fact that the influence of Al-Shabaab is making relief efforts impossible to exclusively mitigate those consequences that are a direct result of the famine. The most obvious example of this is Al-Shabaab's blatant "refusal to allow international humanitarian aid agencies access to the population" for the purposes of addressing basic life necessities related to the famine. The primary ramification of such actions that interrupt the distribution of aid continuity is the prevention of the respective organization's ability to continue operations in a neutral capacity within the context of aid space. This is experienced through two primary methods: firstly, the disabling of the regime, or logistic and structural framework in which such organizations carry out day to day operations, and, secondly, in doing so, the devaluation of the fundamental imperative of the

181Barnaby Willitts-King and Paul Harvey, *Managing the Risks of Corruption in Humanitarian Relief Operations*, (Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute: April 2013), www.transparency.org/in_focus_archive/tsunami/tsu_harvey.pdf

humanitarian orthodoxy; the mandate or obligation to sustain, preserve, and uphold aid operations among and simultaneously unaffected by political, economic, and social forces unrelated to the natural disaster. Therefore, the sustainability of neutrally identified aid organizations in Somalia constitutes a reevaluation of the operational regime and aid imperative within the realm of aid space.

Al-Shabaab has employed two primary actions to square off this issue of maintaining the integrity of the aid imperative and regime within operations of neutrality: violent acts directed at NGO internal personnel used as scare tactics to manipulate and control aid organizations, and interrupting the supply pipeline by means of aid misappropriation. One high profile example of the former manipulation tactic is the killing of two Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) employees in December of 2011, which subsequently led to the organization's decision to close its largest medical facility in Mogadishu.¹⁸² The latter method may be demonstrated through the International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC) decision to temporarily suspend food distribution intended for approximately 1.1 million people until the organization receives assurances from the authorities that distributions can take place unimpeded and reach all those in need, as previously agreed. The internal personnel security breaches threatens the notion of the aid imperative, or the obligation to serve the needs of the public at any cost within the realm of aid space; the

182 "Somalia: ICRC Suspends Aid Deliveries." IRIN Africa: Humanitarian News and Analysis, accessed January 28, 2012, 2012, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=94635>

supply pipeline interruption is a means to fundamentally alter the operational regime of neutrality through which the imperative is structured.¹⁸³

These incidents of retailing identity lead to the formation of rogue organizations, which subsequently demands political representation, while emphasizing concerting divisions among the population, enabling pirates and terrorists, and encouraging corrupt officials to flourish at the cost of the wellbeing of the population and the genuine investment of the international community. Perhaps a better response to this longstanding trend of dysfunctionality of the political formula, which lends itself to the formation of such terrorist groups, is for those aid organizations who have the muscle capacity, in regards to regime and imperative, to exercise any power and authority they may have in a given situation to take strategic and proactive action to discourage the continuation of such incessant and reoccurring rouge uprisings (Samatar 1); to proverbially put the belligerent child in time-out, rather than looking the other way in the name of neutrality, until the child grows up to become Al-Shabaab, the neighborhood bully.

This notion requires a radical reorganization of the ideological and foundational framework on which aid assistance is based: the concept of neo-neutrality. Taken in the “aid space vacuum,” neo-neutrality refers to aid’s liberty to “work freely in a given set of circumstances by defining a limited relationship outside conflict that permits the pursuit of another interest. As applied to the context of the regime, neo-neutrality seeks to

183Abild, Erik. 2010. "Creating Humanitarian Space: A Case Study of Somalia." *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 29 (3): 67 102.

introduce the notion of pragmatic humanitarianism in which actualities, or the practicalities of staying in business, take precedence over the ideal of maintaining a purely neutral presence. This framework introduces several new factors into the consideration of aid space as a generalized idea. As pertaining to the complex emergency in Somalia, issues of security are of paramount importance. Al-Shabaab is most obviously maintaining its tyrannical control by manipulating humanitarian “aid resources to regroup thus relaunching their struggle for power. Furthermore, the manipulation of aid using it to curry political favor or for economic gain is helping to solidify the status quo of the terrorist group.¹⁸⁴

Consequently, broaching the subject of military coordination within the aid space regime is now a necessary requirement for the purposes of navigating through logistics complicated by Al-Shabaab actions. The employment of national security forces in Somalia, such as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and AMISOM (the African Union Mission in Somalia), address this relationship. AMISOM is designed as a peacekeeping force that was created to “pave the way for a proper UN mission” as a supplement to the internationally recognized TFG. The most advantageous aspect of AMISOM is that its “military operations have increasingly adopted aid component. The TFG and AMISOM gains in Mogadishu have created a safe haven for thousands of Somalis. Life, business, and the economy in these areas are slowly improving as AMISOM forces provide security, clean water and medical facilities.

184Fischer, A. (2009) Putting Aid in its Place: insights from early structuralist on aid and balance of payments and lessons for contemporary aid debates, *Journal of International Development* 21: 856-867.

This military collaboration both sustains the neo-neutral aid regime in Somalia and threatens its very existence. The relationship is a double edged sword due to the fact that the military presence can provide a physical and literal security component of aid space such that, under the discipline of neo-neutrality, aid organizations are not forced to abort all operations in order to avoid a situation similar to that in which MSF and ICRC found themselves; conversely, military enterprises such as AMISOM, which not only carry out security operations, but also have their collective hands in the distribution of supplies and other aid chores may very well consider international NGOs and other such organizations as expendable, and for good reason. In this sense, the aid regime is ‘knocked off its high pedestal’ as an untouchable entity carrying out an elite mission, and must realize the need and value of cooperation and ‘playing nice with other-entities-capable-of-similar-logistics’. Therefore, in the spirit of neo-neutrality, aid organizations operating in Somalia must learn to be adaptable to and utilize the military and other security resources available to them for their own regime benefit, as well as for the promotion of the highest quality of aid that can be offered to civilians.¹⁸⁵

If the reformation of the aid regime encompasses the rewriting of policy, rerouting of protocol, and the rethinking of procedure, then the revolution of the aid imperative is the ideological reevaluation of these notions. This calls for a quantum shift in the way that aid workers, as well as the general public, understand aid space and perceive complex

185Fischer, A. (2009) Putting Aid in its Place: insights from early structuralist on aid and balance of payments and lessons for contemporary aid debates, *Journal of International Development* 21: 856-867.

emergencies. This has primarily been brought about due to the fact that “there has been an increase in the use of UN organizations and NGOs as the primary providers of relief to meet the increased requirements for emergency relief.”¹⁸⁶ Simply put, there are more relief workers to be threatened in more dangerous situations. What can be derived from this sentiment is that humanitarian space and how it is perceived by the general public is largely the byproduct of discursive power that is, when agencies are able to use the concept of aid space to construct the situation as they want to see it. By characterizing the aid space solely as an operating environment for aid agencies, it is these agencies themselves who end up controlling the understanding of this space. Agencies often hold information relating to a given situation, they suggest how it should be solved, they do the actual operations, and they evaluate them. Therefore, by treating aid space as an exogenous variable over which they have no control, agencies construct it as a constraining factor and a defense of the status quo, rather than a controllable situation that can be acted upon and changed for the better.

This is not to suggest that the cultural context in which aid space operates is a “problem” needing to be ‘fixed’. However, as indicative of most complex emergencies such as that in Somalia, the byproduct of politicized actors like *Al-Shabaab* do create fundamental societal problems, such as food pipeline interruptions that leads to widespread malnutrition which affects the long-term neurological development in children, which do,

186Goobjoog (2007) Mogadishu Universities Network rebukes Maxwell

Gaylard<http://www.goobjoog.net/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3234> [20/07/04]

186Mogadishu University (2011) Teacher Training Programme.www.mogadishuuniversity.com [20/08/04]

to put bluntly, need to be fixed.¹⁸⁷ Once the aid enterprise wraps its collective head around this notion, then the aid imperative will take a giant step into the multi-dimensional reality that is neo-neutral aid space. The articulation of this ‘neo-imperative’ is that post-Cold War crises are no longer simple affairs of single cause or single response. The political, military, human rights, and aid dimensions, as well as the economic development implications, now all come together like an accordion and need to be handled.

Although this ‘handling’ must begin with humanitarians on the ground, the era of globalized information has transformed the essence of the imperative from a “call to act” to an undeniable and fundamental responsibility that needs to be acknowledged by the general public. Such responsibility is most obviously played out by means of donor-driven versus issue-driven funding. Within the current “information era,” international NGOs must act as their own secretary, vying for the media attention necessary to support their operations in crisis areas that do not always attract adequate publicity or suffer from the consequences of inaccurate or unreliable information being reported. This illustrates the point that many conflicts over aid are not necessarily over the aid given to people in need, but how aid is being delivered and who benefits from the process. The inability of aid agencies to provide firm assurances against the risk of misappropriation of aid has been particularly problematic in south-central Somalia, due to] fears that *Al-Shabaab* was benefiting from the influx of aid assistance, particularly food aid,” which consequently

187Goobjoog (2007) Mogadishu Universities Network rebukes Maxwell Gaylard <http://www.goobjoog.net/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3234> [20/07/04]
187Mogadishu University (2011) Teacher Training Programme. www.mogadishuuniversity.com [20/08/04]

lead to the suspension of \$50 million in humanitarian aid by the Office of Foreign Assets Control in 2009, as well as UN sanctions in April 2010.¹⁸⁸

Whilst aid action intends to save lives and relieve human suffering, and not support terrorism, the manner in which ‘support’ to terrorism has been interpreted directly impacts upon the work of aid organizations. For example, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977, the President may block resources to designated entities in wartime or if a national emergency is declared ‘to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.’¹⁸⁹

When applied to the current context of the “war on terror,” this “extraordinary threat” has now become a globalized, omnipotent, and ubiquitous force capable of reducing the entire aid enterprise to a moot point. However, aid assistance is anything but, and the humanitarian imperative is the counter-force that must now become the norm; if the war on terror is the new battlefield then the neo-neutralized aid imperative is the latest weapon. This weapon is the most powerful of them all due to the fact that it is a weapon of the mind, an ideology that humanitarians and the general public alike must adopt: the notion that individuals living in the day to day realities of complex emergencies, facing extreme poverty and other third world calamities in addition to the stigmas of a

188Dagne, Ted. “Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace, Congressional Research Service.” *Congressional Research Service* (April 20, 2011): 1-9.

189Mugisha, Nathan. 2011. "The Way Forward in Somalia." *The Rusi Journal* 156 (3): 26-33.

politicized environment, did not chose this life for themselves and therefore deserve help to be liberated from such atrocities. When used effectively, this ideological weapon will defend against forces that threaten the sanctity of Somalia's cultural existence. The general public must therefore adopt their own version of neo-neutrality, in which funding and other aid is sent to Somalia with acknowledgement of the probability that at least a portion of that funding or aid will be intercepted by Al-Shabaab.

Complex emergencies such as that currently existing in Somalia are sustainable because the politicized forces active in such areas, such as Al-Shabaab, are able to utilize manipulation tactics that are adaptive in nature and are constantly adjusting in order to take advantage of the weak and resource deprived general population. The aid actors with access to certain degrees of control through means of resources should therefore employ their abilities to end this politicized power cycle by not only delivering aid supplies and other services to the general public, but also by exercising their influence to, at the very least, discourage the political status quo.¹⁹⁰ This is not to imply that aid actors should all be transformed into politicized aid distributors, however, it is to suggest the notion of silence (or the absence of action) as a means of consent to the behavior of terrorist groups. Herein lays the concept of the neo-neutral regime and imperative within the realm of aid space. These concepts require a reframing of aid work on the part of humanitarians themselves, as well as the general public. They encompass lessons to be

190Goobjoog (2007) Mogadishu Universities Network rebukes Maxwell Gaylard <http://www.goobjoog.net/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3234> [20/07/04]
190Mogadishu University (2011) Teacher Training Programme. www.mogadishuuniversity.com [20/08/04]

learned throughout the duration of Somali's complex emergency and the application of such lessons to achieve a brighter future.

4.2.3 Vested Interests by Various Actors

Access for aid agencies has always been a challenge since before the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, but particularly during the international interventions that have occurred over the past twenty years.¹⁹¹ This is due to both external and internal factors. A key external challenge is the nature of international interventions. This comes out in comparison of Operation Restore Hope (ORH) in 1992 and UNOSOM from 1993 to 1995. ORH was an external attempt to mitigate the aid consequences of state collapse. Its mandate, authorised by the UN, was to mitigate, during a five month period, the diversion of relief aid and ensure its safe delivery to those in need. Although the mission encountered some difficulties, it succeeded in improving aid access and stopped an outbreak of famine. The nature of intervention changed in 1993 with the arrival of UNOSOM, which had aid and political mandate. In addition to safeguarding the delivery of relief, it was tasked with supporting reconciliation and building the institutional capacity of the state in order to foster law, order and peace. The intervention created significant difficulties for aid workers as the ability to adhere to the principles of neutrality and impartiality was compromised by the collision of aid and political agendas. Many aid organisations were dependent on UNOSOM for armed escorts and were seen to be taking sides by virtue of where they worked, who they worked with, the source of their

191S. Hansch, S. Lillibridge, G. Egeland, C. Teller, and M. Toole, "Lives Lost, Lives Saved. Excess Mortality and the Impact of Health Interventions in the Somalia Emergency" (Washington DC: Refugee Policy Group, 2012).

funds, and the nationalities of their staff by various militia groups, eroding their acceptance.¹⁹²

Internal factors relate to the changing context on the ground. In recent years, the aid community has been faced with new actors on the ground with different ideologies and forms of engagement. This is the case with al Shabaab, which controls most of the country and has placed significant restrictions on access by international aid actors, including checkpoints and heavily taxing the delivery of assistance. They espouse the idea that most aid organisations are spies or political tools for Western governments and this has contributed to intimidation and attacks on aid workers. The current international proscription of al Shabaab and other organisations on terrorist lists furthers these perceptions as aids are prevented from engaging in local level negotiation to try to build trust and negotiate access. This raises the question of how aid organisations might separate themselves from stabilisation and related state-building, peace-building and counter-terrorism agendas. Compromising principles may be seen as a solution to securing or maintaining a certain level of access in the short term. For example, accepting armed escorts and protection from the peace-keeping mission might improve access in certain areas. Yet, these actions can set a precedence that is difficult to reverse in the future. In some places, where the peacekeeping mission is seen to be a party to the conflict, accepting its ‘protection’ could be tantamount to exposing an organisation’s staff and programmes to unacceptable risk. It is important to find solutions that can ensure the ability of aid organisations to operate in the medium and long term. Perceptions and

192 Easterly, W. (2008) Introduction: Can’t take it anymore? In *Reinventing Foreign Aid*, (ed) W. Easterly, Cambridge MA, MIT Press. Pp.1-43.

image are central to this endeavour. This not only requires a disassociation with the West and their political agendas, but also ensuring high quality and timely programming and showing a broader commitment to Somalis, including those based outside of Somalia.

Operationally, this may involve refusing funding from donor governments, resisting donor insistence on branding and profile, not collaborating or commenting on the political agenda or peace-keeping mission (even on issues such as aid corridors). It requires ensuring that programmes are run by well-trained and well-supported Somalis and accepting that they are capable of fulfilling roles normally given to ex-patriots. It also requires transparent and honest engagement with all actors to the conflict, including al Shabaab. This engagement needs to be consistent and may need to be rooted in local values and principles, as negotiating on the basis of foreign norms and standards can lead to hostility. For example, the language of neutrality can have negative connotations in Somalia as it is translated as 'not caring'.¹⁹³

The use of the Quran or Somali customary law rather than the Geneva Conventions may also be a more effective tool for advocating behavioural change that provides more protection to civilians. Knowing the best approach and identifying the right counterparts for negotiation requires improvements in political analysis. This analysis may identify actors outside the formal aid sector, such as members of local communities, the Diaspora or the private sector, as more effective interlocutors. Yet, high-quality analysis is frequently lacking, partly due to the complexity of the issues but also because the aid

193Goobjoog (2007) Mogadishu Universities Network rebukes Maxwell Gaylard <http://www.goobjoog.net/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3234> [20/07/04]
193Mogadishu University (2011) Teacher Training Programme. www.mogadishuuniversity.com [20/08/04]

community often approaches Somalia with standard frameworks that limit their analytical lens. For example, *AlShabaab* is often assessed from a counter-terrorism perspective and not as a social movement, leading to a skewed analysis of their compositions, interests and motivations.

These interventions were initially preoccupied with supporting aid needs, and when engagement was limited to this role with state-building less of a priority there was greater acceptance for these types of intervention. Yet, since 2001, there has been an international trend towards prioritising peace-building and state-building as a means to enhance international peace and security. This was the case in Somalia during the Ethiopian invasion of 2006, which eroded relations between Somalis and international actors. The intervention was seen as a cause of instability and the West was accused of having double standards with respect to human rights, with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Ethiopian forces immune to criticism despite evidence that they were heavily implicated in abuses. It is no surprise that there has been little discussion of the responsibility to protect in Somalia.¹⁹⁴

In this environment of distrust, it seems that stabilisation efforts have led to destabilisation in practice. The assumption that building the capacity of the state will improve stability (the approach of ‘if we build it they will come’) has not worked in Somalia, and mars current efforts at strengthening the TFG. This possibly suggests the

194 Khan, M. (2008) Governance and Development: The Perspective of Growth- Enhancing Governance, in GRIPS Development Forum (ed.) Diversity and Complementarity in Development Aid: East Asian Lessons for African Growth, Tokyo: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies. pp. 107-52.

need for a reduced mandate in Somalia. After 1995, when the international community politically disengaged from Somalia, endogenous forces in Somalia created some stability, particularly in Somaliland (where the process of political stabilisation began earlier, in 2001) and Puntland. The lesson is that peace can rarely be imposed from the outside and that there is a need to ensure an effective aid response that might create the space for Somalis to resolve their problems. The lack of trust has severely impacted the ability of aid organisations to respond to needs. The number of NGOs in South-Central Somalia has significantly reduced since 1995 and there are questions about whether there is capacity to respond if aid access opens up.¹⁹⁵ Remote management has in most cases not sought to empower local staff to step up and take this responsibility. More needs to be done to support other forms of aid engagement. This includes strengthening and working with the Diaspora, which already plays an important role in responding to needs. This should involve the provision of money, training and bringing back skilled personnel to work for NGOs. There is a rich pool of people from the diaspora willing to return, including health and education professionals. There also needs to be an improvement in supporting national NGOs and a move away from the perception that they are less able or more politically compromised to carry out effective aid action.

Effective operational security management can enhance aid space as it allows for the delivery of assistance in insecure and volatile environments. This is well understood in the aid community and, as a consequence, the last decade has seen greater investment and

¹⁹⁵Maipose, G. (2009) Botswana: the African Success Story. In *The Politics of Aid. African Strategies for Dealing with Donors*, (ed) L. Whitfield, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Pp. 108-130.

emphasis on improving security management. Most organisations have security managers and various tools and best practice have been developed and published. Current approaches emphasise the need to manage rather than avoid risk; it is about how to stay rather than when to leave. Security management has moved beyond identifying risks and subsequently limiting activities and is now about ensuring critical programmes can continue to be implemented. The challenge is to ensure an adequate balance between security and programming. This is particularly important in Somalia where threats of violence, especially in South-Central, have been significant. This is related a lack of neutrality and impartiality in Somalia, which is proving increasingly elusive. However, there is an indication that the number of serious attacks against aid workers is declining. There were five separate incidents against aid workers in 2010 compared to fifty-one in 2008. The main reason for this decline is the contraction in the number of aid workers in Somalia, with most working though remote programming. This creates an additional challenge as agencies have to analyse threats from a distance.¹⁹⁶

This is symptomatic of the lack of a long-term strategic approach to state-building in Somalia. Aid assistance, despite its inadequacies in this role, has become the substitute for government service provision and is seen as creating peace dividends. This goes to the heart of politicisation of aid: it has become the default form of engagement in chronic conflict environments. In this role, the respect for principles has diminished as aid organisations are prohibited from engaging with all armed actors and assistance is used to

196Goobjoog (2007) Mogadishu Universities Network rebukes Maxwell Gaylard<http://www.goobjoog.net/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3234> [20/07/04]
196Mogadishu University (2011) Teacher Training Programme.www.mogadishuuniversity.com [20/08/04]

legitimise the TFG. In this context, principles have taken a back seat, evident in UNSC Resolution 1916. Moreover, access to and control over aid assistance has become not just a means of obtaining political power, but an explicit objective of gaining power. In a country that has been so heavily damaged by two decades of war, aid has become one of the most valuable prizes of political contestation. This discourages any form of compromise and power-sharing and leads to a winner-take-all mentality among many of the conflict actors.¹⁹⁷

Improvements to aid space need to be embedded in political change in Somalia. This entails a strategic and long term state-building approach that moves away from tactics and quick wins. The TFG should be a transitional facilitative government that tackles fundamental questions about statehood in Somalia. Internal consensus is needed on an acceptable type of governance structure that can lead to peace. This is likely to involve a 'light footprint approach' from the international community which is focused on enhancing local incentives to promote good governance. This process must involve some sort of accountability and reconciliation process so as to address impunity for human rights violations over the past decades. Aid actors also need to ensure that they are not hindering the political process by reducing their impact on the war economy. This requires greater dialogue with 'gatekeepers' based on sound political analysis and clarity on the concept of aid space. It is not always clear whose space is being talked about especially given the culture of resource entitlement in Somalia. This culture, based on the

197 Whitfield, L. (ed.) (2009) *The Politics of Aid. African Strategies for Dealing with Donors*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

sharing of resources rather than the provision on the basis of need, is a significant impediment to negotiating aid space.

The researcher hence agrees that there is a need for greater clarity on the concept of aid space and the questions of whose space are we referring to, who is an acceptable aid actor and what activities are acceptable for local communities and other stakeholders. This links to the need to assess the multiple factors that impact aid space. Whilst the politicisation of assistance is certainly an issue, it might be the economics of resource capture or the culture of resource entitlement that represents the greatest threat. Answers to these questions require engagement with stakeholders at different levels (international, national, regional, local) and will ultimately determine the parameters of an acceptance approach in Somalia. This is likely to be based on empowering local NGOs, the Diaspora and national staff so as to ensure they are able to operate effectively and to desired and accepted standards. The challenge of providing food aid effectively depends on the ability of these actors to access those in need and to minimise risks of diversion. The localisation of the response will also require some re-thinking in terms of profile and branding of donors and international agencies.¹⁹⁸

Greater political awareness is central to gaining acceptance and aids' local access puts them in a privileged position to gain the appropriate knowledge. This will require, however, significant investment in gathering information and engaging with key

198Goobjoog (2007) Mogadishu Universities Network rebukes Maxwell Gaylard<http://www.goobjoog.net/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3234> [20/07/04]
198Mogadishu University (2011) Teacher Training Programme.www.mogadishuuniversity.com [20/08/04]

stakeholders across both time and space. Although there is a tendency to position aid action ‘outside’ of politics, it is engagement with politics that will facilitate greater aid space. However, the key is to consider what type of politics is required: there is a need for greater political space for Somalis to discuss their priorities, and is this seen as lacking in the current climate. Opening up aid space will inevitably involve greater advocacy to end conditionalities and other political impediments that are hindering adherence to core principles of aid action. For instance, in order for impartiality to be a meaningful principle in providing aid assistance in Somalia, dialogue has to be opened up with local authorities, no matter who they are.

4.3 Other Issues

4.3.1 Aid and Politics: The Raging Debate

From the findings in chapter 3 to the researcher’s perspective and previous studies show that aid is not working as anticipated. Recognition of this fact within the international aid system is illustrated by repeated calls for and attempts to make aid more effective. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 was just the most recent event in a long, ongoing discussion on how to increase the impact of aid on development in less developed countries. Whether aid is helping African countries to achieve economic development and sustainable poverty reduction is definitely questionable. That aid has unintended consequences, some of which are negative, is widely accepted, but whether these are less, equal or greater than the positive effects of aid is hard to determine.¹⁹⁹

199 Moss, T., G. Pettersson, and N. van de Walle (2006) “An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State-Building in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Center for Global Development, Working Paper No. 72, www.cgdev.org.

The big question is how to change the status quo: change how aid is given, change how aid agencies work, change the international aid structures and processes, change the (ever growing) aid industry. Dambisa Moyo's book *Dead Aid* is a contribution to this debate.²⁰⁰ It is the most recent contribution in a spate of popular books on aid and Africa, which include books by William Easterly, Paul Collier, and Robert Easterly.^{201, 202} Easterly has argued that polemics is useful in aid debates, because too often what happens in the foreign aid world goes against common sense and basic economics.²⁰³ However, the use of polemical arguments can backfire if they are equally unfounded or over-simplified caricatures of reality. Unfortunately, this is the situation in which the aid debate now finds itself. The debate is drowning in dichotomies. Aid is good, or aid is bad. Aid works, or doesn't work. Aid promotes growth, or undermines it. More aid, or stop aid. Rather than staying in this cul-de-sac way of debating the problems with foreign aid and the solutions which stem from these ways of defining the problem, the researcher is to the idea that we need to reframe the debate.

This section presents a critical review of two well-known, and one less well-known, critics of foreign aid. Dambisa Moyo and William Easterly are now famous for raging against the 'aid machine'. Yash Tandon is relatively unknown in Western countries, but very well known in the so called Global South for his equally vehement critique of the

200Moyo, D. (2009) *Dead Aid. Why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa*, New York, Penguin Publishers.

201Easterly, W. (2006) *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good*, New York, Penguin Publishers.

202Collier, P. (2008) *The Bottom Billion. Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

203Easterly, W. (2008) Introduction: Can't take it anymore? In *Reinventing Foreign Aid*, (ed) W. Easterly, Cambridge MA, MIT Press. Pp.1-43.

international aid system. The review points out where their critiques are sound, but also where their critiques have gone astray. In order to set out how the aid debate should be reframed, it is first necessary to discuss the inadequacies of current arguments on the critic's side. Khan is right that the aid system is stiflingly bureaucratic and over-planned, and thus rigid and inflexible in the way aid is allocated and used. He is right that the amount of planning required by donors of Somalia governments in order to receive aid, whether for individual project proposals or for general budget support, is immense and many of the requirements are unnecessary. Khan is applauded for making this point so boldly. However, his boldness might have backfired. His method and tactics were so polemical and critical that he offended those who he was preaching to, and so they stopped listening. The researcher witnessed this happen at a conference where he spoke at the World Institute for Development Economic Research in 2006. The metaphor of planners versus searchers is simplistic and thus easy to understand, but it also closed down the debate with the 'planners' rather than engaging them. But that is not the only problem with Easterly's argument. His metaphor overly simplifies the world and paints caricatures that are inaccurate, if not outright wrong.²⁰⁴

Let us start with the planner's side. Easterly is right to criticize big-P planning; in other words, ending Somalia current poverty state through a global plan like the Millennium Development Goals. He is also right that so many individual plans and reports which

204Khan, M. (2008) Governance and Development: The Perspective of Growth- Enhancing Governance, in GRIPS Development Forum (ed.) Diversity and Complementarity in Development Aid: East Asian Lessons for African Growth, Tokyo: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies. pp. 107-52.

African governments are required to produce are not read by anyone and do not affect what gets implemented in a country like Somalia. However, Easterly paints an image of economic development occurring spontaneously through the cumulative effects of ‘searchers’, by which he means the decentralized efforts of individual entrepreneurs and firms operating in a free market. But economic development has never come about by individual searchers coming together in an unplanned, spontaneous way, as he asserts. Some development challenges require structural solutions that individuals cannot address by themselves. They require governments to provide public goods and to provide incentives (and sometimes coercion) to achieve certain objectives. Fischer’s distinction between big-P and little-p planning does not capture this point.²⁰⁵ Either advertently or inadvertently, Tandon continues to promote the state versus market dichotomy (where state is bad, market is good) that has proved so unhelpful for African countries.²⁰⁶

Economic history shows that neither the state nor the market on its own is adequate and that economic development is about finding a synergy between the two that works, but also changing that synergistic solution, over time, as conditions change. Asian countries on the aid strategy they have done it more effectively than African countries, and that is one of the keys to their aid success. It is not about the state intervening or not intervening, but rather how the intervention is done and the kind of state support provided, as Ha-Joon Chang and others have shown. Both planners and searchers exist, but neither is the

²⁰⁵Fischer, A. (2009) Putting Aid in its Place: insights from early structuralist on aid and balance of payments and lessons for contemporary aid debates, *Journal of International Development* 21: 856-867.

²⁰⁶Tandon, Y. (2008) *Ending Aid Dependence*, Fahamu Books, Nairobi. van de Walle, Nicolas. 2005. *Overcoming Stagnation in Aid-Dependent Countries*. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.

solution. Aid dependent countries definitely need less planning and they definitely need more searchers in productive enterprises, but Easterly forgets about the context and structure in which searchers operate. He only sees individual agency. An African government having a development aid strategy is not bad per se, and indeed they have been necessary, but they need to be focused, responsive to industry actors but also forward looking in terms of potentials and opportunities. The strategy has to lead as well as follow, incentivize investment in production as well as support individual searchers in the productive sectors. It is true that the challenges to economic development have to be tackled through trial and error, and thus require flexibility. Applying the concept of searching to governments, the researcher suggests that governments need to be searchers not planners of aid received since that is what successful countries have done.²⁰⁷

Birds all states clearly, so there can be no misunderstanding that it is time to stop pitying Somalia.²⁰⁸ Pity has not helped the State, and has actually hurt its external and self-image. Everywhere today, we see the image of Somalia that is poor and needy, unable to help itself. It is time for that to end. Likewise, the researcher points out the excesses and hypocrisy of the aid system, which benefits most, those who work in the aid industry. The researcher calls for Somalia to start representing itself on the world stage, rather than leaving it to Western rock stars. Brautigam makes these points with such fervor that she has injected new blood into the aid debate, stimulating it and putting the critical voice out

207Chang, H.-J. (2007) *Bad Samaritans: Rich nations, poor policies and the threat to the developing world*, London, Random House.

208Birdsall, N. (2004) 'Seven Deadly Sins: Reflections on Donor Failings', Center for Global Development Working Paper Number 50. Accessible at www.cgdev.org.

front.²⁰⁹ Unfortunately, that is where her contribution ends. The fact that her arguments against aid are not backed by relevant empirical evidence and that her generalizations are too broad sweeping may even be a liability for the critics. Interviewees of the researcher solutions offered are not based on an empirical assessment of how aid works and how its politicized, nor on an assessment of the economic challenges facing late ‘late industrializers’ in the contemporary global economy. Moyo implies that economic development in Somalia can come about through borrowing on international capital markets, plus Chinese investment, plus microfinance, plus remittances, minus ‘systemic foreign aid’. These ingredients might be useful, but they will not turn into a cake by simply mixing them together in a bowl. This is not to say that well coordinated Aid is the missing oven.²¹⁰

Tandon’s most important contribution to the debate is his argument for distinguishing between different types of aid. His rainbow categorization of aid into a spectrum of Red, Orange, Yellow, Blue/Green and Purple has inspired this author to think about the usefulness of breaking down what we call ‘aid’ into categories which actually indicate what is being provided. There are so many different transactions that fall under the label ‘foreign aid’. For example, foreign aid includes all of the following transactions (and this is not a complete list): political and military support, charity and NGOs providing money, goods and services, humanitarian and emergency aid (which is not a pristine form of

209Brautigam, D. and K. Botchwey (1999) “The institutional impact of aid dependence on recipients in Africa.” *Chr. Michelsen Institute*:1-39. Caldersi, R. (2006) *The Trouble with Africa: why foreign aid isn’t working*. New Haven, Yale University Press.

210Maipose, G. (2009) Botswana: the African Success Story. In *The Politics of Aid. African Strategies for Dealing with Donors*, (ed) L. Whitfield, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Pp. 108-130.

‘giving’ but can be extremely political, as the case of Sudan makes clear), balance of payments support (traditional IMF territory, concessional loans, particularly for infrastructure and provision of large public goods (traditional World Bank territory), policy prescriptions (which became attached to balance of payments and sector loans), individual projects and sector programs (often designed by aid agencies) and technical assistance. Do we even need to talk about ‘aid’ at all? Referring to aid as a single thing obscures what is actually going on, while imbuing the transactions with a notion of charity for the less fortunate. Instead of talking about ‘aid’, let’s be specific. Of course, these various forms of aid can, and often are, bundled together in one package from aid agencies. Once we break it down like this, we can be clear on what we are talking about. Different forms of aid are also problematic in different ways, thus breaking aid down into its component parts lets us be more specific about changing the aid system and how aid is provided.

4.3.2 The Absence of a Unified Humanitarian Code of Conduct

Conditions and context for aid coordination within Somalia vary considerably due to absence of a unified humanitarian code of conduct. As with most agency work, coordination functions are disrupted by security events resulting in periodic withdrawals of international staff from some areas and relocation of offices and programme work in others. The SACB’s presence and support role to coordination work through the Somaliland government ministries and with the aid agencies is generally welcomed and is reckoned to have helped improve the coordination work of some of the line ministries. Unfortunately, this work has been hampered by the lack of a counterpart and sometimes

unconstructive attitudes within the Ministry of National Planning and Coordination. In Puntland, government coordination structures are weak. Some SACB sectoral committees met in Puntland from time to time, but these were disrupted by the political instability of 2001/2002. Generally, there is a sense in Puntland that inter-agency coordination has been weakened by the 2001/2002 disruptions.²¹¹

OCHA's role in field coordination has generally been appreciated in Somalia, particularly in relation to the drought in Sool/ Sanaag plateau and other emergency responses, and also to the fact that it has field staff with a designated coordination role. However, the review found many international and national agency staff who are not clear about the respective coordination roles of OCHA and the SACB. Detailed proposals for a SACB field structure were drawn up in 1999 but never fully implemented. In the meantime OCHA filled the vacuum in field coordination arrangements left by the SACB. The pros and cons of whether OCHA, the SACB or some combination should carry out field coordination functions was, it seems, never fully debated, nor earlier proposals for SACB field coordination looked at again. The SACB model, for all its imperfections and slowness, is based on an inclusive vision of coordination providing a relative neutral forum without organisational biases. There is the danger of a mismatch between the relative neutrality and inclusiveness of the SACB framework and the focus of OCHA on and within the UN system. The SACB also aims to cover the full spectrum of aid activities from humanitarian relief work to development.

211 Reinert, E. (2007) *How Rich Countries Got Rich...and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor*. London: Constable & Robinson.

OCHA has a global mandate for UN humanitarian coordination often in close cooperation with NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. Nevertheless, the reality of the situation is that OCHA now has a network of field staff established and the way forward in strengthening field coordination will need to be practical and pragmatic. Field coordination meetings are usually limited to information exchanges and discussion of common operational issues such as security. There is less focus on programming and implementation, partly it seems because field staff often feel disempowered and subject to decisions made by their agency HQs in Nairobi. Interaction with and flows of information between the field and Nairobi are generally weak. Somali NGOs are generally marginalised in field coordination structures, although some of their umbrella organisations are growing in strength and capacity.

The review notes that the SACB has been weakened in the period since 2002, mainly due to a lack of leadership and vision from the key players, the EC and UN. The Secretariat has also been weakened during 2004 due to understaffing. It is important to point out that the SACB is always bound to be a reflection of its members, their strengths, weaknesses and priorities and above all, their commitment to effective aid coordination. It is also always going to be a reflection of complexities and fragmentation of the Somali context. The future of the SACB depends on the vision, drive and commitment of the key players, the UN group and the EC, with supporting commitment from other SACB members. This is the bottom line for the SACB. Taken together, the overall commitment of SACB's members will reflect the importance given to Somalia and the plight of its people, whatever the outcome of the current peace talks. It remains to be seen whether the

international community at large can respond appropriately to the challenges that Somalia will throw up. It could be that the two ‘systems’ and ‘cultures’ are worlds apart and will continue to grind uneasily against each other. As in other protracted conflict situations, aid agencies, both international and national, may be left trying to pick up the humanitarian pieces in the absence of effective and just political settlements. Somalia is a prime example where ‘Western’ aid systems are trying to operate across global geopolitical and religious fault lines that have widened substantially since 9/11 2001. However, it does seem that carefully handled; there might be opportunities for ‘Western’ and Arab and Islamic aid agencies to meet and develop better mutual understanding.²¹² International aid coordination mechanisms are never perfect. The international aid system contains too many built-in dysfunctions and conflicting and differing forces at work.

However, the SACB, with its imperfections, has been recognised internationally as a mechanism that offers a model of coordination based on voluntarism and equal participation of donors, the UN and NGOs. Given the fragmented nature of Somalia, the SACB can continue to play a role in the aid context in fostering all-Somalia discussion and standards. SACB and its members have an opportunity to engage with non-traditional aid players, such as those based in Arab countries or with Islamic identities. The SACB can play a key role in the early stages of Somalia’s reconstruction, if a viable central government takes shape.

212Whitfield, L. (ed.) (2009) *The Politics of Aid. African Strategies for Dealing with Donors*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

On the humanitarian side a great deal has been written since the first Gulf War in 1991 and in particular since the failures in international coordination in the Somalia State.²¹³ The major multi-agency, system-wide evaluation in Somalia emphasized that aid cannot be used as a substitute for political action. The increasing diversity of actors in aid responses, including peacekeeping forces, private contractors has been one of many incentives to improve international coordination and coherence. Another has been the increasingly dangerous operating environment for humanitarian workers with increasing numbers of targeted attacks for political reasons, not just ‘traditional’ reasons of theft. Aid workers no longer work on the assumption that, generally, their presence and role will be accepted and respected by belligerent groups. There is a growing concern that intensified interactions with non-humanitarian actors and the increasing trend to use the military in ‘humanitarian’ work threatens the impartiality of aid action.

In the donor arena, there are trends to increasing aid responses to humanitarian emergencies and increasing operational or semi-operational presences in some situations. Improving humanitarian coordination has been an important focus of the UN system, particularly since Resolution 46/182 of 1991 that created the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the IASC, and led to the replacement of UNDRO by DHA. As part of the UN reform process the UN Secretary General replaced DHA with OCHA with a streamlined focus on coordination, advocacy and policy development.²¹⁴ The UN

213 Amsden, A. (2001) *The Rise of “The Rest”*: Challenges to the West from Late- Industrializing Economies. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

214 UN Security Council, “Security Council Committee on Somalia and Eritrea Issues List of Individuals Identified Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of Resolution 1844 (2008),” April 12, 2010.

Secretary-General reports regularly to ECOSOC on progress in improving aid coordination. A particular feature of UN reforms and the Brahimi report has been a focus on increasing coherence in international responses where UN peace keeping forces and other international military assets are deployed and where the UN is playing a key political role in post-conflict situations. The shift to coherence has provoked the concern that aid is being co-opted for political ends. In terms of coordination tools, a great deal of work has gone on in the UN system to improve the CHAP/CAP as both a planning and coordination mechanism.

In the donor arena, work is being done on improving responses through the good donorship initiative. There is a considerable literature on aid coordination, both in humanitarian and development contexts, and to a lesser extent on post-conflict transitions. However there are some shortcomings: In the Aid arena there has been an emphasis by many major multi-country studies on coordination from the UN perspective. One study on developmental coordination notes that lessons from participating in various kinds of coordination activities are fragmented... Most experiences from aid coordination are not documented. This means having to rely partly on less well-documented and less formal but more relevant verbal information and less formal and more descriptive material such as working papers and consultancy studies. There is also a sense that reports focused on coordination as a topic can create their own distortions, unless coordination is clearly seen as a means to an end. Programme evaluations can often provide some useful observations on coordination from a more user- and field-orientated

perspective. This report has therefore looked carefully at the limited number of programme evaluations that have been made available.

Given that coordination is often a disputed area, judgments about ‘success’ or ‘failure’ will depend on who one talks to and their organisational experience and background. Thus it probably pays to be cautious in learning lessons from other settings unless the analysis and findings have a strong degree of independence and take a comprehensive view undistorted by institutional perspectives.

4.4 Conclusion

The study has noted that there is little work done on the costs of coordination, let alone questions of cost-effectiveness. Menkhaus notes in the developmental context that both donors and aid recipients are spending considerable resources on aid coordination activities. The trend seems to be towards an increase in these levels, yet relatively little is known about the outcomes and impact of these efforts. There is little written on coordination from a host government or civil society context. As has been mentioned, there is no established, agreed methodology for conceptualising coordination and evaluating it.²¹⁵

²¹⁵Menkhaus, K. “The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts,” *African Affairs* 106/204 (2007): 357–390.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary

Analysis in chapter 3 and 4 has shown that aid usually involves a critical political factor, which is circumscribed by ethical rules. Nevertheless, the whole confusion about the aid-political relationship seems to be the fact that aid is a form of politics in which it is useful to assert that one is non-political. Even though some relief agencies keep up their non-political façade, efforts to deliver aid assistance, especially in complex emergency crisis, cannot be divorced from overall political objectives.

Increasingly, donors see aid action often as a discrete and time-limited part of a broader set of activities in emergency response and stress the links between security, development and aid assistance, and their combined role in achieving foreign policy objectives. NGOs should therefore increase their investment in analyzing global and country specific trends in relation to aid policy in order to maintain critical engagement with official donors and to make an effort to ensure that donor priorities are more in step with their own priorities. Acknowledging that aid action is a form of politics does not mean that it should be a form of foreign policy. Without a way of distinguishing between the two, conceptually and organizationally, the risk is that aid will be politicized rather than foreign policy becoming more aid. ‘Sphere’s Aid Charter’ and its standards could provide an eligible foundation for agencies and donors to establish an agenda to share a common responsibility.

Host governments, on the other hand, also play a crucial role in determining the scope and nature of NGO activities as outlined in chapter 3. Further, military involvement in affairs traditionally belonging to aids is probably going to be a lasting phenomenon and the increasing proximity between the military and aid actors implies a need for the two communities to find agreement on core issues of responsibility and competence. The '2002 Sphere Implementation Report' has picked up this topic and expressed some pilot agencies' concern that NGOs are quickly losing ground to the military in disaster response. According to their evaluation, aid agencies should focus much more on the difference in roles and purpose as defined in the principles as well as to international aid law, human rights law and refugee law, as enshrined in the 'Sphere Aid Charter.

This overall heterogenic engagement in relief activities pushed aid support into becoming a more important form of politics, and enhanced the debate surrounding the neutrality of aid organizations. And while agencies are still searching for a common moral stance of being a third party in other peoples' wars, it becomes more and more clear that the traditional principles of aid action were not designed to cope with this political role. Their neutral and impartial logic may well have its justification in cases of natural disasters, when politically disinterested actors seek to combat human suffering with the active and full support of the host state of the operation. But in man-made emergencies, the key-contributing factor to the creation of suffering that is to be addressed lies in political factors within the host state, making the question of neutrality much more complex. Most of the different attempts to reframe aid principles seem to have three main ideals in common: a commitment to the principle of humanity albeit it in a minimal form; a desire

to speak out in the face of human-rights abuses; and a guarantee of third-party immunity for aid agencies. The idea of solidarity however, as described in Chapter 4, obviously involves taking sides, which contradicts the desire for immunity. Further, the decision to work with one group implies not to work with another, which makes some victims look more worthy of assistance while others are not because of a certain authority over them; an attempt that contravenes the fundamental idea of the aid imperative.

5.2 Key Findings

The co-ordination of relief measures of international aid organizations, local authorities and the international community can be an opportunity for a country regarding long-term development policy strategies. This has to be acknowledged by NGOs, but forces them to situate themselves and shun any political engagements in their role. This highly political activity requires aid agencies to acquire skills that go beyond the more normal short-term emergency focus of relief agencies. For instance, future aid agencies must be sensitized to political issues and need to have diplomatic skills to create alliances both between agencies and between different levels of authorities. Since the primary problem is seen to be that aid can have a negative political impact in an emergency situation, maybe the goal should be to ensure that it has a positive political impact instead, beyond its purely aid role of relieving suffering.

The history of aid in Somalia is not one of political neutrality and impartiality, but rather is the story of how external resources have been used as one of the primary economic and political prizes in a resource-scarce country. As mentioned at the outset, historically

humanitarian space in Somalia has been constrained by the political economy of aid, the manipulation of assistance for political purposes (by domestic and international actors), insecurity and a lack of trust between the international community and Somalis, among other factors. The combined effect has been a curtailing of humanitarian principles, the protection of which is at the centre of the current debate on humanitarian space.

In this study, the researcher has attempted to show how discussions about aid agencies in Somalia which has been dominated by an overriding concern with trying to depoliticize aid action, rather than responding to the protection needs of the most vulnerable civilians. However, opening up and preserving humanitarian space which may be better thought of as pursuing better access is, in the Somali context, an inherently political act. It involves negotiating with power brokers of various types and delivering resources that are in great demand, both to achieve humanitarian ends and to further the political ambitions of conflict actors on the ground. This means that humanitarian aid is always political, even if it seeks to keep its distance from the overtly political act of state-building. Rather than insist that humanitarian action should be somehow cleansed of politics, a task which is surely impossible, the researcher advocates here for a better understanding of how humanitarian action is political in its own right, and how it can, deliberately or not, influence political outcomes, from the very local to the national..

Even if it is accepted that humanitarian work is political, in that it influences and is influenced by political power structures, this is not to say that its use as a political tool is advisable or even defensible. The provision and withholding of humanitarian assistance

for political outcomes (to punish one side, to lure civilians from one side's territory to that of another, to demonstrate the viability of one side over another, etc.) is at the root of the current aid crisis. These tactics have enabled extreme hunger to take hold and to claim thousands of lives.

5.3 Recommendations

The current distorting and negative effects of aid dependence are due to an over-engagement of donors in African countries. The first step is to pull back, to loosen the ties and relax the relationships, rather than increase them further (as donors want to do). Donors tend to prize that proverbial 'seat at the table' more than anything else, but it is time to give it up. Without a general commitment to reduce the intensity of engagement, the following steps are unlikely to work. Aid donor agencies have projects in every policy area possible. Individual donors tend to have wide-ranging portfolios, with projects in water, health, local government, agriculture, trade, private sector development, good governance, and environment. Individual aid agencies should focus on one problem in a recipient country and on helping the recipient government address that problem in a holistic way with long term support. In reducing the number of areas and in focusing on specific problems for project aid, aid agencies should give priority to productive sectors and addressing the constraints on production (high production costs, access to technology, etc.).

Currently in Somalia, both government and donors are more concerned with providing social services which meet immediate needs and raise standard of living, but then rural

dwellers are left in subsistence farming and herding activities with few prospects of job opportunities and increased incomes, without migrating to the city. This type of aid is unsustainable, because it does not increase people's incomes nor government's self-generated revenue. The best technical assistance is that which can be provided long term. UN organizations should be able to pool the required expertise from other developing countries and people who would be willing to stay for many years. United Nations organizations such as UNDP and FAO already provide mostly only technical assistance, but they should stop pretending that they provide anything else and focus on being better providers of technical assistance. Technical assistants should be placed within government ministries for several years, where nationals can act as understudies and learn from them. This will facilitate the transfer of expertise and enhance state capabilities, rather than undermine them by creating parallel implementation units or outsourcing to consultancy companies.

Reform of aid agencies and aid practices has to be driven by forces within donor countries, not by internationally-driven bureaucratic processes and agreements such as the Addis I and Addis II (1992/1993) and the first Code of Conduct on humanitarian engagement for Somalia. The ideals embodied in the Code of Conduct on humanitarian engagement for Somalia were good, but they could not be achieved in practice. Instead, we see old practices emerge in the context of new processes and aid modalities. Furthermore, every donor country does not have to follow the same aid practices. The attempt of all aid agencies to conform to a common set of aid practices has not worked, but has produced negative unintended consequences for recipient countries. If reforms are

driven by processes within donor countries they are also more likely to actually be implemented.

Reforms should work with the grain of the politics and bureaucracy of individual aid agencies and push for realistic changes. Thus, societies and governments in individual donor countries must seek to change their own aid agencies. If a few attempt to do so, hopefully others will follow their example.

For multilateral agencies like the IMF and World Bank, there is of course a more multilateral effort needed. There is a lot of international support among both academics and politicians for moving the aid agencies, aid assistance and coordination and even policies in Somalia back to their original mandates. It will of course be difficult to downsize an institution like the World Bank and to reorient its hiring practices and aid practices, but it is not impossible with strong political leadership. The changes to the aid system proposed here would amount to a significant reduction in aid for aid dependent countries in Africa. However, crisis situations are also windows of opportunity for change. What one never knows is which direction the change will take. Since aid is buttressing unsustainable levels of government expenditure, by taking some of this away, governments will be forced to find new sources of revenue. It could force a government to do something about economic transformation: agrarian reform, increased exports, finding manufacturing opportunities. But aid agencies are not just walking away. They can advise governments, while supporting production and providing balance of payments support.

Sector wide approaches and budget support are not a panacea for solving the problems with aid practices. In fact, more often than not they have failed to achieve their goals: rather than reducing transaction costs and burden on recipient governments, they have by and large increased them; rather than pooling funds of all donors active in that sector behind a common sector strategy produced by the recipient government, only a few donors actually agree and commit to join and they are involved in producing the strategy to make sure that they can support it. Project support is a better way to give aid, but changes need to be made in the way it is given. Aid agencies must tailor project aid to the realities of that country and its government. A good way of making sure that project aid conforms to specific country needs is to follow the Botswana model.²¹⁶

In the Botswana model, the recipient government lays out its own needs and designs its projects, and then donors come in to support those projects. Donors negotiate individually with centralized agencies in the recipient government. Project design may change in dialogue with the donor, but only after much negotiation and approval by central planning and finance departments. This allows for coordination of separate projects to achieve an overall goal, and it allows governments flexibility to change the project as deemed necessary. Oversight in implementation should be minimal. The Botswana model of project aid also overcomes the critique of project aid being uncoordinated and projects failing because they cannot address broader constraints. If the projects are situated within a national strategic plan, then these problems should be addressed. This approach is different from the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper approach which came with donors

²¹⁶Maipose, G. (2009) Botswana: the African Success Story. In *The Politics of Aid. African Strategies for Dealing with Donors*, (ed) L. Whitfield, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Pp. 108-130.

involved from the beginning and a lot of other procedural trappings which distorted the objective of producing a national strategy. Here is where the ‘walk away from the table’ advice comes in.

The study has explored the concept of aid politics with a specific reference to Somalia and established that corruption, terror group interference and vested interest by aid agencies are the key influencers of aid politics in Somalia. Aid politics, however, is a global occurrence in the world which differs in their way of politics and have different settings all together. This warrants the need for another study which could ensure generalization of the study findings for all countries that face political disruptions and are in need of aid hence pave the way for new policies. The study, therefore, recommends further investigation on the concept of aid politics in war-torn countries.

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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. What is the role of politics in aid in Somalia?
2. What are the issues emerging from the process of aid engagement in Somalia?
3. What is the role of corruption, if any, in the aid distribution – and redistribution – processes of aid delivery in Somalia?
4. Do terror – and anti-terror -- groups have a role to play in aid in Somalia? If so, how do they interfere with the delivery or non-delivery of aid in Somalia?
5. Are there any vested interests by various actors in the aid/beneficiary/non-aid/non-beneficiary communities in Somalia?
6. What are the key emerging issues in aid politics in Somalia?
7. Does the absence of a one unified humanitarian code of conduct in Somalia affect the delivery and management of aid? If so, how?
8. What is the raging debate?
9. What are the roles of the different actors in the aid sector in Somalia? (This includes the government, the UN/NGOs, local Somali NGOs/CBOs, the donors and other stakeholders).