

**ENHANCING SOUTH SUDAN'S VISION THROUGH REGIONAL COOPERATION
AND INTEGRATION: AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTH SUDAN'S *VISION 2040***

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R51/70423/2011

**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE DGREE OF MASTERS OF ARTS IN
DIPLOMACY TO THE INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES (IDIS) UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

SEPTEMBER, 2013

DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been submitted for examination for an award of degree in any other University.

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This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University supervisor

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DEDICATION

To all South Sudanese people and our fallen heroes and heroines who sacrificed their lives for struggle and achievement of South Sudan vision of identity, and to my family (my wife Achel Manyuat, my son Achuil Angok, my daughter Akuach Angok) and to my late Father Achuil Angok Achuil and to my mother Akech Nuer Ajang.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First of all I thank my Creator, God Almighty for giving me the strength and ability to undertake this great academic pursuit and the courage to undertake this research work as well as keeping me safe from any difficulties that could have hindered the successful completion of this course.

My sincere gratitude goes to my supervisor Dr. Ibrahim Farah for his tireless effort in guiding me to accomplish this work, his research experience and direction played a major role in enhancing my overall understanding and made my work the way it is.

I am also very grateful to my family for their moral support and I appreciate my wife Achel Manyuat and my children Achuil and Akuach, my family always prayed for me to get excellent grades. Indeed your support was considerably rewarded.

Special thanks go to the University of Nairobi, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, lecturers, class mates and to all staff who made my study much easier especially the staff of Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library for the assistance they gave to me while using the library resources.

Lastly my earnest appreciation goes to my Governor Nyandeng Malek and Council of Ministers of Warrap State who granted me permission to attend my course.

Angok Achuil Angok Achuil

Nairobi, September 2013

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFP	Agence France Presse
AU	Africa Union
CEM	Country Economic Memorandum
CETs	Common External Tariffs
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East Africa Community
EADB	East African Development Bank
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa States
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ESA	Eastern and Southern Africa
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
GOS	Government of Sudan
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICSS	Integrated Control and Safety System
IGAD	Inter Governmental Authority on Development
INC	Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
JAM	Joint Aid Management
JIU	Joint Integrate Units
LRA	Lord Resistant Army
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
OAU	Organization of African Union
OROLSI	Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
NCP	National Congress Party

NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NIF	National Islamic Front
NTBs	Non-tariff barriers
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAF	Sudan Army Forces.
SMEs	Small and medium enterprises
SPLA/M	Sudan People Liberation Army/Movement
SPLA	Sudan People Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People Liberation Movement
SPDF	Sudan People's Democratic Front
SSA	Sub Saharan Africa
SSDF	South Sudan Defense Force
SSDP	South Sudan Development Plan
SSLA	South Sudan Legislative Assembly
SSLM	South Sudan Liberation Movement
SWOT	Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunity and Threat
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nation Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOPS	United Nations office for project services
US	United State

ABSTRACT

This study examines the possibility of enhancing South Sudan's Vision through regional cooperation and integration, the study analyses South Sudan's *Vision 2040* and the way South Sudan can benefit from cooperation and integration union. The study establishes challenges and advantages that South Sudan could face if it became a member of East Africa Community. It also analyzes how South Sudan uses strategies of enhancing South Sudan *Vision 2040*. The overall objective of the study is to analyse the role of regional cooperation and integration in enhancing South Sudan's *Vision 2040*. The study provides an overview of South Sudan's *Vision 2040*; examines the effectiveness of regional cooperation and integration in enhancing South Sudan's *Vision 2040*; and analyzes the challenges facing the achievement of South Sudan's *Vision 2040*. The study is based on realism theory of international relations: that states are the major actors in world affairs, the international environment severely penalizes states if they fail to protect their vital interests or if they pursue objectives beyond their means; hence states are sensitive to costs and behave as unitary agents. The study argues that enhancing South Sudan's vision 2040 requires regional cooperation and integration. For the new nation to achieve the country's vision it requires collective action of both state and non-state actors due to the anarchic nature of the international system. The study further establishes that integration and cooperation are motivated by a balance of absolute and relative gains and the extent of durability of such cooperative arrangement. The research project identifies possible ways of enhancing South Sudan vision through regional cooperation and integration. The methodology of the research involved the collection of both secondary and primary data. Data for study was collected using content analysis, scientific analysis and interview methodologies. The key findings in this research revealed that the Eleme Triangle border dispute between Kenya and South Sudan is a key challenge for the government of South Sudan in its quest for regional cooperation and integration and South Sudan needs to understand all the principles of EAC. It is argued that South Sudan should conduct a careful analysis of the implications of joining the EAC and, with its findings in hand, astutely negotiate the terms of its EAC membership. Another key finding is the issues of microfinance.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Background to the Study

Historians have traced the origins of the two civil wars that ravaged South Sudan after the Sudanese independence of 1956 to political changes and conquests in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries.¹ The formation of the Sudanese states in the 18th century, their subsequent incorporation into the Turco-Egyptian empire and the latter's replacement by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in the 1890s were important phases in the development of what is generally seen as the North-South conflict which took violent forms at different times and led to two civil wars with a decade of peace in between in southern Sudan.² In the days of the Turco-Egyptian regime, the south was subjugated and turned into a hinterland from which the state extracted taxes while commercial companies exploited its fertile lands. The south was also a reserve of labor including slaves for the northerners, who also used violent means to control people and land resources. There were rebellions by the southerners against the subjugation. The subjugation and violence continued during the Anglo-Egyptian occupation as well. However, by early 1920s, British officials adopted some legal means to curb the use of violence to access economic resources even though the political and economic marginalization of the south continued.³

The history of Sudan was characterized by population movements both in and out of it. In the North, the slow penetration of large numbers of Muslim Arabs, well under way by the beginning of 15th century, led to the integration of the region into the larger pan-Islamic world. The process of cultural and ethnic assimilation was a two-way process: it led, on the one hand, to the Arabization and Islamisation of large numbers of Sudanese people and, on

¹ D. Johnson, *The root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers. 2003

² Ibid.

³ J.R. Gray, *A History of the Southern Sudan 1939-1989*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.1996

the other, to the integration of Arab immigrants.⁴ The influence of Islam and Arabic culture on South Sudan was negligible. The expansionist energies of the Nilotes (Nilotic speakers) from the south succeeded in arresting the southward march of the Arabs as well as the spread of Islam.⁵ Indeed the Nilotes, especially the Shilluk and the Jieng, posed a serious threat to the northern Muslim states until the end of 18th century. Today, the north is presented as Arab and Muslim, and the south as African and Christian. Thus, the frontier that separates them becomes increasingly defined in religious and ethnic terms. The territory of the Republic of South Sudan comprises all lands and air space that constituted the three former Southern Provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatorial and Upper Nile in their boundaries. The Republic of South Sudan is bordered by Sudan in the north, Ethiopia in the east, Kenya and Uganda in the south, the Democratic Republic of Congo in the southwest, and the Central African Republic in the west. South Sudan is governed on the basis of decentralized democratic system and is an all embracing homeland for its people. It is also a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-lingual, multi-religious and multi-racial society.

Dau argued that, “bloody mutiny in the Southern town of Torit was ignited and sparked off, on August 18, 1955. Mutual mistrust and suspicion, has poisoned the relations between the South and the North in the period leading to independence and before.”⁶ The Anyanya I war lasted until March 1972, when the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement signed with General Nimeiri granted limited autonomy to the South. What is now known as South Sudan experienced decades of relative peace and a degree of development subsequent to the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement. However, the Northern policies towards the South consisted also of ongoing marginalization and Islamisation, accompanied by the introduction of Sharia

⁴ M.O. Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict*, Khartoum, Khartoum University Press, 1970, p.37-55

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Isaiah Majok Dau, *Suffering and God: Theological Reflection on the War in Sudan*. Nairobi Kenya, Paulines Publications Africa. 2002, p.21

Law by Nimeiri in 1983 and they prompted Southerners to rise up once again against the Northern regime. Sikainga examines that, “The provincial capitals of upper Nile, Equatoria, and Bahr al-Ghazal were specifically targeted. Mosques and Khalawi were constructed in an ever increasing number.”⁷

Understanding South Sudan’s complex conflicts is an essential step in establishing the linkages between conflict and stability in the region. South Sudan’s history of marginalization has produced a complex web of dynamics that often provokes conflict. There are varying views on the causes that relate to all conflicts in South Sudan. Therefore, it is important to underlie some general issues, which relate to all conflicts in South Sudan, and there are specific factors underlying some particular conflicts.⁸

Historical methods of conflict mitigation and resolution by respected leaders, where negotiation of land, grazing and water rights need to be shared, have fallen foul to the manipulation of armed malevolence for personal gain. In addition, too many people, particularly the young people in villages, are in possession of small arms. Rule by the force of a gun has replaced rule by respect for values and by the decree of those in authority, whether it is the judge, the chief, the parents or the policeman or woman. Given the years of conflict, many people, particularly in rural areas, feel they are distanced from normal services provided by the government in general and their security and rule of law institutions in particular.⁹

The situation is also exacerbated by ambiguity over the separation of powers between the law

⁷ Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, *Western Bahr Al-Ghazal Under British Rule: 1898-1956*, Ohio University, Center for International Studies, 1991, p.120

⁸M. Schomerus, and Timothy Allen, *Southern Sudan at Odds with itself: dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace*. Development Studies Institute, LSE. London. 2010

⁹ LeRiche Matthew, and Arnold Matthew, *South Sudan From Revolution to Independence*. Hurst and Company, London. 2012

enforcement organs and the fact that most civilians are armed. The presence and uncontrolled use of firearms by civilians remains a serious concern. The issue of protracted war has brought a culture of violence and proliferation of small arms, which in turn is perpetuating more violence. Like any systematic change, removing firearms from one community while allowing the neighbor to keep theirs may not reduce violence but bring it about – such plans need careful negotiation and implementation, with appropriate measures to overcome any real or perceived imbalance of security in either community until the disarmament concept is accepted all round. South Sudanese were fighting the war of vision which they achieved partially on 9 July, 2011 during the Independence Day but there is more to be done so that South Sudan could achieve a complete vision. This will happen through regional cooperation and integration.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Following the commencement of the CPA-premised interim period on 9 July 2005, government structures in South Sudan such as South Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA), judiciary, police force, and a human rights commission, were established. In April 2010, the President of GoSS, ten state governors, SSLA, and states' legislative councils, were all elected. Notwithstanding the establishment of these institutions, however, the situation in South Sudan following the declaration of independence on 9 July 2011 is in sharp contrast to the one that existed when British troops departed from the North in 1956. At independence in 1956, Sudan inherited from the colonial rule a viable civil service, worthy judicial institutions, a well-functioning railway network, and the largest irrigated agricultural scheme in Africa, a well-disciplined army and police force and a reputable educational system up to the tertiary level.

However, the new Republic of South Sudan struggles with the challenges of building both institutional and physical infrastructure of a modern, civil state in order to achieve *Vision 2040*. Most importantly, good political and economic governance, based on transparency and accountability, is the key for building a politically and economically viable state capable of articulating a common vision for national unity, and providing stability and dividends of peace to its aspiring citizens.

The agenda facing the South Sudanese leaders and intellectuals in the process of achieving *Vision 2040* and state-building is overwhelming, while they have to simultaneously deal with many problems, though they vary in terms of urgency. Discussions with government officials, political leaders, intellectuals, and donors, have highlighted a host of critical thematic issues that the nascent state has to address, and the dire need for the appropriate capacity and tools for their resolution require serious reflection on the part of the new state of South Sudan. In addition to the building of institutions and state structures, and physical infrastructure, there are three areas deserving utmost attention. The first problem is that of internal security, including identification of salient as well as latent causes of instability. Secondly, it is the responsibility of the new state to guarantee the dividends of peace to the people of South Sudan. Third, good governance and integrity in public life represent the key to political stability, regional economic integration and international relations in order to achieve *Vision 2040*. While the government of South Sudan is working towards the achievement of *Vision 2040*, the country faces many challenges.

The question that this research attempts to answer is that, what and how regional cooperation and integration can enhance the achievement of South Sudan's *Vision 2040*?

1.3. Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of the study is to analyse the role of regional cooperation and integration in enhancing South Sudan's *Vision 2040*. More specifically, the study aims to:

1. Provide an overview of South Sudan's *Vision 2040*;
2. Examine the effectiveness of regional cooperation and integration in enhancing South Sudan's *Vision 2040*;
3. Analyze the challenges facing the achievement of South Sudan *Vision 2040*.

1.4 Literature Review

This section discusses the literature on enhancing South Sudan's vision 2040 through regional cooperation and integration. It particularly focuses on how South Sudan can achieve her vision and what the new government institutions are doing to address the ways of enhancing regional cooperation and integration for the fulfillment of *Vision 2040*. The review is designed to map the state of knowledge, to identify gaps in understanding, and to suggest promising avenues for future practice work for the achievement of vision 2040 through regional cooperation and integration.

1.4.1. Economic Development in South Sudan

According to Ibrahim Farah, "regional organizations aim to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity among member states with the purpose of raising the living standards of their people, fostering closer cooperation among them."¹⁰

Sudan has developed more and more towards a typical oil economy. The growth rate of the GDP has been estimated at 10.8 per cent in 2006, based mainly on oil production. By 2007, oil output was estimated to have reached 559,000 barrels per day. In 2005, Sudanese oil

¹⁰ I Farah, African Regional Security Arrangements, Mwangiru, M. (ed). *Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn Africa*. (Nairobi: African Peace Forum, 2008) p.238

exports amounted to 86.7 per cent of exports by value; the forecast for 2007 was 94 per cent.¹¹ The growing revenues of both, GNU and GOSS could become the basis for reconstruction and rehabilitation of the war ravaged areas. According to the requirements of the CPA, both the GNU and GOSS have established their own development funds and in addition, benefit from various donor funds for their respective development programs.¹²

Both the national and regional governments are eager to attract investors. For this purpose, the GNU has established the 'Sudan Development Program' as an official institution to promote the development of the Republic of Sudan. Sectors included in the programme are infrastructure, irrigation and water, food and agriculture, oil, gas, mining, transport, education, communication, technology and security.¹³ The investors active in South Sudan largely come from China, India, Kenya, Uganda and Egypt and compete mainly in the construction, hotel and restaurant sectors, whereas shops are frequently run by northern Sudanese. Southern Sudanese private businesses hardly exist so far.

1.4.2 Regional Security

South Sudan faces a range of persistent and emergent security threats that will pose challenges for years to come. The potential for localized insecurity in some areas is high. Farah argues that “the OAU Inter-Africa Force, set up in 1981 to monitor the civil war in Chad, was the first practical example of inter-African cooperation in the field of peacekeeping, but it ended in failure.”¹⁴ South Sudan is awash with small arms, and armed cattle raids and violent disputes over land and water rights are common. Inter- and intra-

¹¹ United Nations & Partners (2007), 2007 Workplan for Sudan. Khartoum, United Nations.

¹² T. Tvedt, The Collapse of the State in Southern Sudan after the Addis 1994 Ababa Agreement, A Study of Internal Causes and the Role of NGOs, in: Harir, S. / Tvedt, T. (eds.): Short-Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan, Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

¹³ Sudan Development Programme (2007), The Sudan Development Program Summit

¹⁴ I. Farah, African Regional Security Arrangements, in Mwagiru, M. (ed). *Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn Africa*. (Nairobi: African Peace Forum, 2008) p.239

ethnic fighting claims thousands of lives annually despite the presence of United Nation Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) peacekeeping force. Farah observes that “pastoral communities often face extreme challenges in meeting basic needs due to significant reductions in land and water available as result of desertification, bush encroachment, soil erosion, population growth and political and economic marginalization.”¹⁵ The communities of the new Nation are facing all that are mentioned above, the government needs to come up with a way to protect communities’ properties and disarm all civilians in South Sudan.

Peter observes that the SPLM was driven by an internal battle in the 1990s, largely along ethnic lines, and the ethnic grievances that sparked that conflict still lie beneath the surface of South Sudanese politics.¹⁶ Boundary disputes with Sudan and Kenya remain a significant concern. South Sudan and Sudan have large numbers of troops deployed near the border, increasing the possibility that isolated skirmishes could quickly devolve into broader conflict. In the event of SAF military operations, the SPLA has limited ability to defend against air strikes.¹⁷ Militias remain active in parts of the country, complicating stabilization and recovery efforts. Farah argues that, “ECOWAS is assigned the responsibility of preventing and settling regional conflicts.”¹⁸ It is must for South Sudan to join regional organizations because she is still a young nation which needs to know how to solve her problems collectively. Several militia leaders were given amnesty. The 2010 elections and even in 2013, however, spurred the creation of new militias, as some who felt excluded from the political process resorted to armed resistance against the state.¹⁹

¹⁵ I. Farah, Human Security and Livelihood of Pastoral Communities in the Horn of Africa, Mwangi, M. (ed). *Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn Africa*. (Nairobi: African Peace Forum, 2008) p.240-241

¹⁶ P.E. Peters, The Limits of Negotiability: Security, Equity and Class Formation in Africa’s Land Systems. In *Negotiating Property in Africa*, eds. K. Juul, and C. Lund. Heinemann: Portsmouth NH. 2002, p.45-66

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ I. Farah, African Regional Security Arrangements, Mwangi, M. (ed). *Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn Africa*. (Nairobi: African Peace Forum, 2008) p.240-241

¹⁹ M.Schomerus, and Timothy Allen, (2010). *Southern Sudan at Odds with itself: dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace*. Development Studies Institute, LSE. London, 2010.

In Jonglei, South Sudan's most populous state, a militia led by David Yau Yau is a cause of concern. The SPLM has accused Khartoum of providing Yau Yau with material support, namely weapons.²⁰ Militias in Unity and Upper Nile states also remain a threat. The formerly Ugandan-based armed group, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), once also reportedly supported by Khartoum, continues to threaten and displace South Sudanese communities near the borders of the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo, although the threat it poses is localized in comparison to other armed groups. South Sudan and Uganda publicly accused Khartoum of resuming support for the LRA in 2012 and suggest that LRA leader Joseph Kony may be hiding in the border area between the Sudans.²¹

In parts of South Sudan, the number of deaths due to inter-ethnic violence, sometimes related to cattle raiding, has increased dramatically in recent years, and the violence appears increasingly politicized. In Jonglei, retaliatory attacks between the Lou Nuer and the Murle ethnic communities have resulted in large-scale population displacement and humanitarian need in the past year. Sixty nine (69) local authorities have limited capacity to address these conflicts.²² UNMISS which was established in 2011 and is smaller than its predecessor, UNMIS, has faced major logistical challenges such as poor roads and shortage of helicopters as it has worked to deploy peacekeepers to the area. The SPLA has conducted a civilian disarmament campaign in the state with mixed reviews; some communities have raised concerns that the disarmament is not being equitably enforced. Possible linkages between the militia activity in Jonglei and rising tensions among the Nuer and Murle communities raise questions about the capacity of the government, and UNMISS, to protect civilians should the

²⁰ JohnYoung, Sudan Liberation Movements, Regional Armies, Ethnic Militias and Peace, *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 97, 2003, p.423-434.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

situation deteriorate.²³

1.4.3 Regional Cooperation

Over the past year, South Sudan has made considerable efforts to participate in the global economy by applying for membership to strategic international and regional bodies, including the East African Community (EAC) a regional intergovernmental organization consisting of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. South Sudan made the application against a backdrop of envisaged economic benefits from trade and commerce that it hopes to gain from having access to a much larger market (140 million people).

Cooperation and integration is the joining of individual states within a region into a larger whole. The degree of integration depends upon the willingness and commitment of independent sovereign states to share their sovereignty. Deep diplomacy of cooperation and integration that focuses on regulating the business environment in a more general sense is faced with many difficulties.²⁴ For example, South Sudan is endowed with a significant amount of natural resources, which include oil, minerals, water, forests and rich agricultural lands, and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) has also indicated that it is interested in establishing the type of large-scale commercial farming that could turn South Sudan into the breadbasket of the region. Success of this ambitious project could help reduce the region's dependence on food imports and significantly improve food security (UNECA 2011). Joining the EAC is a great long-term plan for South Sudan. Kenya and South Sudan are keen on a relationship geared towards developing their respective nations.²⁵ There are many areas of cooperation between the two countries and on the table there have been joint ventures between the two countries. Several interactions reveal that the two states will explore more

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ People's Agenda for Alternative Regionalisms. "About PAAR. What is the Initiative People's Agenda for Alternative Regionalisms.

²⁵ Ibid.

avenues to boost relations both at the political and economic levels. The delegations from each country visiting their capitals point towards more negotiations in this regard. A consistent argument often presented is that the emerging ties merely affirm existing ties between the two countries.²⁶

The ties between the two countries go beyond the new investments. For instance, as several observers posit that South Sudan has invested efforts and determination, through regional support from Kenya to review its interim constitution so as to make the region more investor-friendly. The focus remains national growth and development of the respective countries. The likely benefits are legion and include creating employment opportunities, business opportunities and resultant benefits to consumers in the countries.²⁷ Apart from these, there are indications of more expansion even with the inception of key and transformative banking industry players such as Equity bank and Barclays. Already, Kenyan-owned Equity Bank has negotiated with the government of South Sudan in interest in oil development, and numerous foreign investment institutions have explored using Kenyan banks as intermediaries for ventures in South Sudan. In addition, Kenyan leaders envision prime markets for Kenyan exports in South Sudan.²⁸

1.4.4 Diplomacy

Diplomacy is the art and practice of conducting negotiations between representatives of groups or states. It usually refers to international diplomacy, the conduct of international relations.²⁹ South Sudan needs to practice diplomacy of cooperation and Integration so that she could enter into a diplomatic agreement in order to enhance regional cooperation and

²⁶R. Collins, *The southern Sudan in historical perspective*. New Jersey, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 2006

²⁷ E. Asebe, *Regional Trade and Transportation Facilitation Assessment in Southern Sudan and Northern Great Lakes Region*." Draft report prepared for the World Bank, September 15, 2010.

²⁸ *Ibid*.

²⁹ Black, Jeremy. *A History of Diplomacy* (U. of Chicago Press, 2010) ISBN 978-1-86189-696-4

integration through regional institutions and rules. The objectives of the agreement the new nation will benefit from, could range from economic, political and environmental, although it has typically taken the form of a political economy initiative where commercial interests have been the focus for achieving broader socio-political and security objectives, as defined by national governments. The foreign aid arena has recently seen the emergence of global South donors, with China being one of the most important. Diplomacy of cooperation and integration, in East Africa region as a phenomenon of territorial systems that increases the interactions between their components and creates new forms of organization, co-existing with traditional forms of state-led organization at the national level.³⁰ According to Hans van Ginkel, “regional integration refers to the process by which states within a particular region increase their level of interaction with regard to economic, security, political, and also social and cultural issues”.³¹

1.4.5. Theories of Regional Cooperation and Integration

This section looks at four theories-functionalism, Neo-functionalism realism and international cooperation. These theories have been applied in regional cooperation and integration in Africa. According to Senghor, any discussion of the theoretical foundations of regional integration in Africa must inevitable focus on functionalism and it offspring neo-functionalism.³² Neo-functionalism is an international integration theory, the theories will explain the level and scope of Regional cooperation and integration, and it will make us understand the fundamental conflicts: who is involved, on what issues and with what consequences. Therefore, theories will dig out the substantive character of the discussion over

³⁰ De Lombaerde, P. and Van Langenhove, L. (2007) "Regional Integration, Poverty and Social Policy." *Global Social Policy* 7 (3): 377-383, 2007.

³¹ Van Ginkel, H. and Van Langenhove, L: (2003) "Introduction and Context" in Hans van Ginkel, Julius Court and Luk Van Langenhove (Eds.), *Integrating Africa : Perspectives on Regional Integration and Development*, UNU Press, p.1-9,

³² Jeggan Senghor C., ‘Theoretical Foundations for Regional integration in Africa: An Overview’ in Nyong’o, Anyang (ed), *Regional Integration in Africa: unfinished Agenda*, (Nairobi: Africa Academic of Sciences, 1990) p.18

regional cooperation and integration. Mitrany managed to offer to the functionalist theory arguments for global but also regional integration.³³ The theory involves the introduction of non-state actors, the study of norms and ideas and increased examination of the effectiveness or impact of international cooperation. Waltz argues that “states would cooperate due to the existing anarchic international system characterized by a war of all against all.”³⁴ Kiamba stresses the shift of attention towards regional functionalism and how it reduces conflict and its effects. This is due to anarchic character of international relations and the emerging security threats face of political instability.³⁵ Realism seeks to describe and explain the world of international politics as it is, rather than how we might like it to be.³⁶ As result, institutions are promoting economic cooperation the most important factor distinguishing this approach from other integration efforts is the consideration of political integration as the main objective at the final stage. Milner argues that “international cooperation as the deliberate and coordinated adjustment of policies attempting to solve a mutual problem or achieve mutual again.”³⁷

The European integration movement, however, initiated with the creation of the ECSC, gives priority to the integration of economic sectors within a supranational framework in order to reach the desired political structure by a step by step method. The challenge for a theory of multi-level governance is that the functional need for human cooperation rarely coincides with the territorial scope of community. Communities demand self-rule and the preference for self-rule is almost always inconsistent with the functional demand for regional authority.³⁸

To understand regional cooperation and integration we need, therefore, to understand how,

³³ M. Griffiths, *International Relations. Schools, currents, thinkers*, Bucharest, Ed. Ziua, 2003. p.310

³⁴ K. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 14.

³⁵ See Anita Kiamba, *The Role of Military in the security Architecture of Horn of Africa*: Mwagiru, M. (ed). Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn Africa. Published by African Peace Forum. Nairobi, Kenya. 2008 p63

³⁶ Scott Burchil et al, *Theories of International Relations*, 2nd edition (New York: Palgrave, 2001) pp.70

³⁷ H. Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strength and Weakness,” *World Politics* Vol.3 No. 44, (1992), pp.466-496, p.467.

³⁸ Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, *A Post-functionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus*, United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press 2008. P 2

and when, identity is mobilized. Functionalism theory makes us understand that regional integration is an answer to the collective benefits of spreading the territorial opportunity of jurisdictions. The Neo-functional theory asserts that dealing, at first, with the sensitive political aspects of national sovereignty is not an appropriate way for an integration movement which has a political goal to achieve in its conclusion. To a considerable extent, neo-functionalists and inter-governmentalists talked past each other. Neo-functionalists were most concerned with day-to-day policy making, while inter-governmentalists were concerned with the major treaties.³⁹ This theory considers that integrating initially, economic sectors under an umbrella of a supranational organization, is a more appropriate method with a view to realizing the desired supranational political integration. According to O’Neil, Balsiger and Van Deveer, “the theory of International cooperation has devoted considerable attention to three substantive themes; non state actors, transnational norms and ideas and regime effectiveness.”⁴⁰

The integrated economic sectors would increase the interdependence and would also enable a broader welfare among people. Hasenclever observes, “cooperation can only be sustained by international treaty if no country can gain by not being a party to it and no party can gain by not implementing it.”⁴¹ Thus, all layers of society would be benefiting from this integration and there would be an increasing support for supranational integration. This integration movement, starting with strategic sectors of the economy, would spread to other sectors as well. This is referred to as the ‘spill-over effect’ of integration by the neo functionalists. It has always been advocated by neo-functionalists that a successfully progressing economic

³⁹ John Peterson, ‘The Choice for EU Theorists: Establishing a Common Framework for Analysis’, *European Journal of Political Research*, 39 (2001), 289–318; Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, eds, *European Integration and Supranational Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

⁴⁰ K. O’Neill Et al. “Actors, Norms and Impact: Recent International Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-structure Debate,” *Annual Reviews*, Vol. 7 (2004), pp. 149-175, p.150.

⁴¹ A. Hasenclever et al, “Integrating Theories of International Regimes,” *Reviews of International Studies*, Vol. 1 No. 26,(2000), pp. 3-33, p.4

integration would bring along its own political integration. Hence, they have suggested that starting with economic integration to achieve the political one is a profound method. Hasenclever argues, “Moreover, it must be in the interests of the parties actually to behave as the strategy demands. That is, the more threat to reciprocate to harm a country that has deviated from the strategy must be credible.”⁴² These theories (Functionalism, Neo-Functionalism and International Cooperation) enable the researcher to illuminate on the impact of enhancing South Sudan vision 2040 through regional cooperation and integration

1.4.6. The Development of National Visions

Deng argues that “the war of visions between the North and the South first broke out in August 1955, just four months before independence was declared on January 1, 1956.”⁴³ The South Sudanese still follow their vision for the better of their new nation and for generations to come. During the last few decades the societies of developing nations, have projected visions of their future development in various ways. Kenya Vision 2030 acknowledged, “The Kenya Vision 2030 is to be implemented in successive five-year Medium-Term Plans, with the first such plan covering the period 2008-2012. At an appropriate stage, another five-year plan will be produced covering the period 2012 to 2017, and so on until 2030.”⁴⁴ A country’s vision is usually for sustainable development and it encompasses economic, social, environmental and governance dimensions; grouped into six broad elements: Self-sustaining economic growth based on strong international competitiveness, innovation, productivity, and flexibility of resource use; A full-employment economy that provides a decent standard of living and quality of life for all citizens; elimination of poverty; and provision of adequate opportunities for young people, constituting an alternative to emigration; The longer term

⁴² Ibid. p.7

⁴³ Deng F. M. War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in Sudan. The Brooking Institution. Washington D.C 1995, p.11

⁴⁴ Kenya Vision 2030, The following feature contains extracts from the Government’s Kenya Vision 2030 proposals:

vision for the new Republic of South Sudan is guided by *Vision 2040*,⁴⁵ which sets out a comprehensive agenda to build a nation that is educated and informed; prosperous, productive and innovative; compassionate and tolerant; free, just and peaceful; democratic and accountable; safe, secure and healthy; and united and proud. Based on this, a post-independence South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP), the nation's response to core development and state- building challenges during the first three years of independence, identifies developing the country's agricultural and livestock potential as the most feasible way to enable broad-based economic growth and food security in the short- to medium-term.⁴⁶

The broad economic development strategy in the SSDP is premised on rural development supported by infrastructure improvements through creation of a diversified private sector led economic growth and sustainable development, which improves livelihoods and reduces poverty. The stated objective for the natural resources sector which is recognized to include agriculture, livestock, fisheries, forests and wildlife – is to ensure food security and improve livelihoods and income generation for the people of South Sudan, through sustainable use of natural resources and land management. The plan recognizes that South Sudan is endowed with abundant natural resources including a large amount of fertile rain fed agricultural land, land that is potentially irrigable, aquatic and forest resources as well as mineral resources.⁴⁷ It asserts that given these natural resources, a youthful but low capacity labor force, and the current low productivity and investment levels, the greatest potential for initial new growth is likely to be from the small-scale private, predominantly family, agriculture and livestock

⁴⁵ GoSS, (2011) Southern Sudan Vision 2040 - Towards Freedom, Equality, Justice, Peace and Prosperity for all. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Juba, Draft of 24 February 2011.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ UNDP, (2011), Draft country program document for the Republic of South Sudan (2012- 2013). United Nations Development Programme, Juba, South Sudan.

sectors.⁴⁸

However, much rural sector activity is currently focused on low input – low output subsistence agriculture instead of production for markets. Limited use of productivity-enhancing technologies, capacity constraints, non-tariff barriers, high labor costs and poor infrastructure hinder progress and also constrain production, productivity and the competitiveness of South Sudan’s agriculture relative to its neighbors.⁴⁹ The rural and agriculture sector will need to absorb high numbers of returnees and ex-combatants and provide opportunities for women and youth. This will be a significant challenge as people who are not settled may be reluctant to make investments and to cultivate land. Constraints on access to land and unclear property rights are likely to be a key impediment to these groups. Existing inequalities between men and women - such as over-control of resources, access to land and credit, extension services and basic education need to be removed to avoid them constraining development.⁵⁰

There is so much study on South Sudan in different fields but not on enhancing vision through regional cooperation and integration with an analysis of South Sudan *Vision 2040*. That way this research is very significant because the new nation will gain from the following: in regional cooperation and integration there is a broad access to a range of goods for consumers and companies, regional production markets emerge, free circulation of people of different nations in the region leads to social benefits, Regional cooperation and integration could make us deal with the issue environmental problems like cross-boundary pollution, over fishing on rivers, climate changes are solved by discussions, more trans border

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ World Bank, (2011), Policy Note on Infrastructure for GoSS Development Plan." Africa Sustainable Development Network, World Bank, Washington, D.C.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

data flow using communication satellites, the internet, wireless telephones, etc., South Sudan will benefit from regional criminal courts and justice, regional financial markets emerge, multiculturalism spreads as there is individual access to cultural diversity. Regional travel and tourism increases, local consumer products are exported to other countries, immigration between countries increases, the transportation costs are reduced, subsidies for local businesses decrease, capital controls reduce or vanish, and there is supranational recognition of intellectual property restrictions.

1.5 Justification of the Study

There has been literature on the development of South Sudan by many scholars. Most of the scholars writing about South Sudan and its development write from the political point of view without considering the extent to which regional cooperation and integration can contribute to the achievement of the nation's *Vision 2040*. All records of South Sudan's long struggle are available. This study approaches the aspect of South Sudan that has not received much academic attention from the point of view of enhancing South Sudan's vision through regional cooperation and integration. The study could make the new nation understand her vision, and how regional cooperation and integration could play a part in the achievement of the vision of the nation. Though some studies have done exposition on South Sudan at different institutions, no attempts have been made to argue for its relevance particularly in relation to the modern achievement of *vision 2040* through regional cooperation and integration.

Since it gained its independence on 9th July 2011, South Sudan has applied for membership in many international organizations. The new state bears her basic obligation by becoming a member of many existing international institutions including the regional ones like the African Union, and the EAC. The study will seek to justify the need for the achievement of *vision*

2040 through regional cooperation and integration and will come up with many advantages that could lead to the fulfillment of South Sudanese' dreams.

1.6 Research Questions

The following questions guided the study:

1. To what extent does South Sudan's history of conflict influence the achievement of South Sudan's *vision 2040*?
2. What is the effectiveness of regional cooperation and integration in enhancing South Sudan's *vision 2040*?
3. What are the challenges facing the achievement of South Sudan's *vision 2040*?

1.7 Theoretical Framework

This research project will apply realism theory of international relations to guide the researcher throughout the study. Realist scholars see international relations as driven by the unrelenting and competitive pursuit of power by states in an effort to secure state interests. For realists, the most important source of power is military capability, and the acquisition and use of military capability make the realists' world one prone to violence and warfare.⁵¹ Realism includes five suggestions that will be useful in analysing Enhancing South Sudan *Vision 2040* through regional Cooperation and Integration: an Analysis of South Sudan *Vision 2040*. First, states are most important actors in world affairs. Secondly international anarchy is the rule force determining the motives and behaviours of states. Thirdly the international environment severely disciplines states if they fail to protect their fundamental interest or if they follow objectives beyond their means; hence, states are 'sensitive to costs' and behave as unitary-rational agents. Fourthly, international institutions affect the forecast

⁵¹ Timothy c. Lim, *How to Think About The World Politics: Realism and Critics* Pol's 427 International Relations (Los Angeles: California State University,)

for collaboration marginally. Finally states in anarchy are preoccupied with power and security, are predisposed toward conflict and competition, and often fail to cooperate even in the face of common interests.⁵²

In proposing that states are unitary actors, realists are saying that states have a set of core interests that transcend the special interests associated with individuals and groups they govern. In proposing that states are rational actors, realists are saying that an ends-means relationship exists between those core interests (the ends) and the foreign policy choices that states make (the means) to reach those ends.⁵³ State rationality, from a realist viewpoint, has at least three elements; first realists assume that states are goal oriented. Second, realists assume that states have consistent goals. Third, states are assumed by realists to devise strategies to achieve their goals, and that these strategies take into account rank-ordering⁵⁴

Krasner argues that the international system is anarchical. It is help self system. Sovereignty is a political order based on territorial control. There is no higher authority that can constrain or channel the behaviour of states.⁵⁵ It is important to keep in mind the ethical and moral implications of realism as a theory of international relations, it tells us that there is little room for abstract principles such as justice and honour; instead, as we noted earlier, “might makes right” in world politics.⁵⁶

Senghor argues that strategies and actions on cooperation and integration are basically reflective of their perceived implications for domestic political fortunes and of the quest for

⁵² Joseph M. Grieco, ‘Anarchy and Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal institutions’ in David A. Baldwin(ed), *Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism: the Contemporary Debate* Op. cit. p.118

⁵³ Timothy c. Lim, *How to Think About The World Politics: Realism and Critics* Pols 427 International Relations(los angeles: California State University,)

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ S. Krasner, *Realism, Imperialism and Democracy*, *Political Theory*, 20 (1992) p.39

⁵⁶ Timothy c. Lim, *How to Think About The World Politics: Realism and Critics* Pols 427 International

monopoly of power in the society. Even when the latter is achieved, the domestic consensus based on which government can proceed to negotiate any form of surrender of national sovereignty often is, to a great extent, lacking. Integration means greater burden than existing political climate can tolerate.⁵⁷

Lim observes that realism holds that cooperation among states is generally limited because of “cheating” and “self-help”; states are also concerned with relative gains a hegemonic power enables the international system to overcome the problem of anarchy as long as the hegemon is willing (that is, has an interest) in bearing the costs of constructing cooperative relationships generally, and in supporting international organizations, regimes, and institutions that facilitate cooperation.⁵⁸

Carr argues that there is no binding law or legal system which can bring state to account for their behaviour. There is no corresponding force which can be invoked to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable clash of interest between nations.⁵⁹ Realism does a good job of explaining “such vitally important dynamic aspects of international history as the emergence of the nation-state, the rise and decline of major powers, and the oscillation in history between international conflict and cooperation.”⁶⁰

Clapham argues that sovereignty often has tended to give defensive shield for leaders acting ostensibly in the interests of the state, but actually lining their own pockets, through business

⁵⁷ Jeggan Senghor C., ‘Theoretical Foundations for Regional integration in Africa: An Overview’ in Nyong’o, Anyang (ed), *Regional Integration in Africa: unfinished Agenda*, (Nairobi: Africa Academic of Sciences, 1990) p.24-25

⁵⁸ Timothy c. Lim, *How to Think About The World Politics: Realism and Critics* Pol 427 International Relations (los angeles: California State University,)

⁵⁹ E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years crisis* (London:1939) p.297

⁶⁰ Joseph M. Grieco, ‘Anarchy and Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal institutions’ in David A. Baldwin(ed), *Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism: the Contemporary Debate* Op. cit. p.118

alliances forged during the conduct of international political affairs.⁶¹ For realists, state efforts to cooperate entail these dangers plus a much greater risk, for some states, that cooperation might someday result in lost independence and security.⁶²

Realist theory is not like functionalism, Neo-functionalism and International cooperation because according to realist theory states interest is not subordinated by functional cooperation in welfare areas. The hegemon essentially plays the role of "a centralized political authority, but (and this is a big but),"its actions are still based on national, not global interests. It observes that national interest decides a state willingness to cede sovereignty to regional institutions. The realist principle is that world politics is not about good versus evil. It is simply about interests and the best way to achieve those interests. This research project will use the lens to analyse how South Sudan *vision 2040* has impacted on regional cooperation and integration in EAC under the guise of protecting South Sudan sovereignty.

1.8 Research Methodology

The study examined the long struggle for South Sudanese in the achievement of their visions, how regional cooperation and integration could fulfill the long dreams, how it holds the nation together and how it is experienced in the state as it enhances its vision, as a young nation which lack many things, only regional cooperation and integration will give South Sudanese new idea, learn skills from neighboring countries, those international institutions already have policies and foundation that South Sudan can pick on. The study was carried out by talking to people working in government institutions in South Sudan's capital city Juba

⁶¹ Sandra J. Maclean, 'Challenging Westphalia: Issues of sovereignty and Identity in South Africa' in Dunn, Kevin and Shaw Timothy M. (eds) *Africa's Challenge to international Relations Theory* Op. cit pp. 149

⁶² Joseph M. Grieco, 'Anarchy and Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal institutions' in David A. Baldwin(ed), *Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism: the Contemporary Debate* Op. cit. p.131-132

and some people from different states in Juba to represent the view of ten States.

The study focuses mainly on South Sudanese living in South Sudan and those in East Africa. The study employed snowballing sampling to get the views from both young and old people. Purposive sampling was used to get views from those living in towns and those residing in the villages near Juba, semi structured interviews were conducted with senior government officials and staff in the ministry of foreign affairs as they are considered to be full of wisdom and experience on international relations and regional cooperation and integration. Semi structured interviews were conducted with two focus ground one composed of 10-15 women and another comprising 15 men. The separation in the group was done on purpose due to the need for gender inclusiveness.

In gathering data the researcher administered questionnaires to respondents. Semi-structured interviews reinforced the use of questionnaires. With interviews, the researcher is assured of sufficient data to shed light on the area of study. Most interviews were conducted in Arabic Juba and Dinka languages and it is natural that original richer and deeper expression could be lost in translation, as much as I speak these two languages, it was a challenge in bringing out the original intention of the speaker. The time was really very short on my side; also financial problem could not make me to go to all other nine states.

1.9 Chapter Outline

The study is organized into five chapters.

1. Chapter one: Introduction to the study.
2. Chapter two: Conflict in the Sudan and the making of South Sudan: An overview.

3. Chapter three: Enhancing South Sudan *Vision 2040* through regional cooperation and integration: An Analysis of South Sudan's *Vision 2040*.
4. Chapter four: Enhancing South Sudan *Vision 2040*: A critically analysis.
5. Chapter five: Conclusions.

CHAPTER TWO

CONFLICT IN THE SUDAN AND THE MAKING OF SOUTH SUDAN: AN OVERVIEW.

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter established the basis of the study by setting the broad context of the research, examining the background of the study, the statement of research problem, justification, and theoretical framework, literature review of regional integration and cooperation, development national vision, research question and research methodology. It captured the objective and rationale of the studies.

This chapter seeks to provide an overview of South Sudan and how the people of the new nation have long history of suffering, at the same time the citizens of South Sudan have long visions for their struggle to find their identity which they achieved on 9th July 2011. The chapter will show how the conflicts in the Sudan were deeply rooted in history that led southerners to vote for separation. It will examine the war of visions that have been fought by South Sudanese and how the two parties (SPLM and NCP) came into agreement through Comprehensive Peace Agreement which gives southerners the right to self determination.

2.1.1 Background

The territory and peoples of present-day South Sudan were for the first time united under a single rule following the Turco-Egyptian conquest of the Sudan by Muhammad Ali's troops in 1821. Throughout the 19th century, the South's integration consisted primarily of being the target of slave raids to fill the domestic and military demands in the Muslim North, Egypt, and the Middle East.⁶³ While the South remained largely unaffected by the Mahdist wars (1881–99), it nonetheless fell under British control after the latter's defeat in 1898, though

⁶³ Gray, Richard (1961), *A History of the Southern Sudan 1839-1889*, London: Oxford University Press.

“pacification” lasted until well into the 1920s.⁶⁴ In response to nationalist uprisings in Egypt and Northern Sudan, Britain instituted the Southern Policy, segregating the South from the North while devoting precious few resources to development.⁶⁵ Thus, when the Southern policy was repealed in 1946 and the South, where a regional Southern identity had begun to take root, became part of independent Sudan in 1956, it had hardly any trained personnel and Southerners were severely underrepresented in the new administration.⁶⁶ This underrepresentation combined with economic neglect and the central government’s policy of Arabization and Islamisation in the South sparked the Anyanya 2 insurgency, the first civil war lasting from 1955/1963 until 1972. The South attained regional self-government with the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Treaty until it was unilaterally dissolved by the president at the time, Nimeiry, in the early 1980s, which together with the nationwide introduction of sharia law in 1983 triggered the founding of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A) and the second civil war from 1983 to 2005.⁶⁷ Extraordinarily bloody estimates for total war-related deaths are in the range of 2 million and displacing even larger numbers of people, what had initially been a war between the government of Sudan and the SPLA also became a war between different Southern factions when the SPLA split in 1991.⁶⁸ This South–South war also led to a more rigid conception of ethnic identity as the warring parties resorted to presenting the war as being fought between Dinka and Nuer, two of the South’s largest ethnic groups.⁶⁹

By the turn of the century, it had become obvious that neither side could win the war

⁶⁴ Beshir, Mohamed O. (1968), *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict*, London: Hurst.

⁶⁵ Collins, Robert O. (1983), *Shadows in the Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918-1956*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

⁶⁶ Rolandsen, Øystein H. (2011), A False Start: Between War and Peace in the Southern Sudan, 1956–62, in: *The Journal of African History*, 52, 1, p.105-123

⁶⁷ Kymlicka, Will (2004), Nation-Building and Minority Rights: Comparing Africa and the West, in: Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh and Will Kymlicka (eds.), *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*, Athens: Ohio University Press, p.54-71.

⁶⁸ Nyaba, Peter Adwok (1997), *Politics of Liberation in South Sudan*, Kampala: Fountain Books.

⁶⁹ Hutchinson, Sharon E., and Jok Madut Jok (2002), Gendered Violence and the Militarisation of Ethnicity: A Case Study from South Sudan, in: Richard P. Werbner (ed.), *Postcolonial Subjectivities in Africa*, London: Zed Books, p.84-107.

militarily. With exports from Southern oil fields making peace more attractive and the 9/11 attacks putting the Islamist regime in Khartoum (in power since Omar al-Bashir's coup in 1989) under renewed international scrutiny, a series of internationally sponsored peace negotiations starting with the 2002 Machakos Protocol led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accords (CPA) in 2005, granting self-government to the South under SPLM leadership and providing for a referendum on the region's future status to be held by 2011.⁷⁰ Although the SPLM/A, in contrast to the Anyanya, had not called for Southern independence but rather for a reformed, unitary "New Sudan", the movement's position had shifted in the course of the 1990s and there were very few proponents of unity left after John Garang died in a helicopter accident shortly after the signing of the CPA. The results of the referendum in January 2011 (more than 98 per cent in favor of independence) are, alas, evidence of a remarkably universal preference for separate statehood.

Even from this cursory overview of South Sudan's history it can be gleaned that the presence of an aggressive and often predatory 'other' be it the central government or a rival faction in the South – that serves to unify those under attack has been a near constant. Thus, confronting and fighting a common enemy has been more important in defining the South. The South Sudan nation has internal dynamics of unifying around a positive common denominator (shared ancestry, language, destiny, etc.). With South Sudanese living in their own state for the first time in history, the question arises of what will hold it together now that the North–South divide no longer serves to "mute intra-regional differences and ethnic or tribal fragmentation."⁷¹ Presently, relations with the Republic of Sudan remain tense, and the short independence period has already seen outbreaks of violence in the contested area of Abyei, as

⁷⁰ Ahmed, Einas (2009), The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Dynamics of Post-Conflict Political Partnership in Sudan, in: *Africa Spectrum*, 44, 3, p.133-147.

⁷¹ Deng, Francis M. (2005), Sudan's Turbulent Road to Nationhood, in: Ricardo René Larémont (ed.), *Borders, Nationalism, and the African State*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, p.33-86.

well as a public spat over the division of oil revenues.⁷²

But while an external enemy or cultural disparagement from the outside may be a necessary condition for the birth of nationalism, it is not a sufficient one.⁷³ If it is true that “exclusion from power and relative resource deprivation serves to heighten the cultural identity and solidarity of subordinate groups, then the lack of North Sudanese oppression – as welcome as it is for obvious reasons – may strain the sense of togetherness in independent South Sudan. As one of the world’s poorest countries, South Sudan is not in a position to buy loyalty with hand-outs to the population; hence, appeals to nationalism and a widely accepted “imagined community” would be a much more plausible option.⁷⁴ Alas, this is not a process that happens automatically, as identification has to be made to matter, through the power of symbols and ritual experiences, for example. And loyalty does not come free: People are loyal to ethnic, national, or other imagined communities not because they were born into them, but because such foci of loyalty promise to offer something deemed meaningful, valuable, or useful.⁷⁵

According to Gurtong publication the new nation is “covering an area of just over 330,000 sq. miles (over 660,000 sq. km)...it has numerous streams, seasonal and all-season rivers flowing into the central through from bordering mountains, hills and from the forest of Congo-water divide that disappear under a canopy of greenery and expansive vegetation of Sudd, the largest grass swamp in the world.”⁷⁶ The new country is bordered by Sudan to the North, Uganda to the South, Central African Republic to the West, and Ethiopia to the east,

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Berlin, Isaiah (2001), Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power, in: Isaiah Berlin, Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer (eds.), *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p.333-355.

⁷⁴ Herbst, Jeffrey (2000), *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

⁷⁵ Eriksen, Thomas Hyland (1999), A Non-ethnic State for Africa?, in: Paris Yeros (ed.), *Ethnicity and Nationalism in Africa: Constructivist Reflections and Contemporary Politics*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, p.45-64.

⁷⁶ Gurtong (2013) <http://www.gurtong.net/Travel/tabid/66/Default.aspx> accessed on 12/August 2013 at 4:22 pm

Democratic Republic of Congo to the South-West and Kenya to the south-east. The country is divided into ten states which correspond to three historical regions (Greater Equatoria, Greater Upper Nile and Greater Bahr El Ghazal) of the Sudan which we mentioned above. Those states are: Central Equatoria, East Equatoria, Jonglei State, Lakes State, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Unity State, Upper Nile State, Warrap State, Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Western Equatoria. “It is highly diverse ethnically and linguistically. Among the largest ethnic groups are the Dinka, Zande, Nuer and Shilluk.”⁷⁷

2.1.2 Conflict in the Sudan: Issues

The history of South Sudan for almost 500 years is synonymous to suffering. Its resources have been its nemesis – people for slaves; land, water and forests for wealth accumulation, and then oil. Kingdoms based along the Nile River fought against the people of inland Sudan for centuries since the 17th Century. From 1820, when the Ottoman-Egyptian forces conquered Sudan, until 1898 successive invading forces extracted some 2 million slaves from “Bilad Al Sudan” or the “land of Blacks”. The policies of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899 – 1955) also largely isolated and marginalized the “remote” southern and inland Sudan under the ‘Closed Districts’ policy to allow the South to develop along indigenous lines. There was local resistance to all this that was met with massive repression. This history of marginalization produced a complex web of dynamics that often provoke conflict, even up to the present.⁷⁸

The unbalanced identity claims and counter-claims led to the split of Sudan. Dau argues, “The north and the south have different views as to what might be considered the root causes of conflict. A classical northern view lays the blame squarely on colonial powers for

⁷⁷ BBC Country profile <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14069082> accessed on 9th August 2013

⁷⁸ Deng, Francis M. (2005), Sudan’s Turbulent Road to Nationhood, in: Ricardo René Larémont (ed.), *Borders, Nationalism, and the African State*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, p.33-86.

administering the South as separate entity and thus creating secessionist aspirations therein.”⁷⁹ But according to Deng, “Arabization and Islamisation progressed in the North, whose racially stratified society deemed the Arabs people and culture superior... in contrast, the African Negroes was considered inferior, an active or potential slave the downtrodden of the earth.”⁸⁰ The most understandable and the most contentious has been the aspect of racial-cultural identification. The North is considered Arab and Muslim, and the South, Negroid and pagan with a Christianized leadership. People are now agreed that classification of the South and the North along racial lines is hardly justified.⁸¹ In many instances, the Northern Sudanese are accused of racism and the Arabs believe so much in their superiority and intelligence, and equally in the inferiority of the Negro, that they will probably never think we are capable of conceiving such a complicated strategy. The Arabs practice segregation by assimilation and ensure this assimilation by marrying women from outside, while preventing their women from being married to outsiders.⁸²

Northerners think that Southerners can do nothing for themselves without being influenced or instigated. Dau mentioned, “The northern view’s of solution to conflict is preservation of national unity by all costs. Methods of achieving this objective range from Islamisation to cultural uniformity through Arabization.”⁸³

All South freedom fighters argued that the root cause of war were northern domination and subjection of the south. Northerners have dominated all aspects of life (religious, economic,

⁷⁹ Isaiah Majok Dau, *Suffering and God: A Theological Reflection on the war in Sudan*. Nairobi, Kenya, Paulines Publications Africa. 2002, p.24

⁸⁰ Francis Mading Deng, *War of visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*. Washington, D.C. The Brookings Institution. 1995, p.35

⁸¹ Francis Mading Deng, *Dynamics of Identification a Basis for National Integration in the Sudan*. Indiana University press. *Africa Today*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1973), p.19-28

⁸² M.I. Shoush, *In Search of an Afro-Arab Identity: The Southern Concept of the Northern Sudan as Seen through the Novels of Francis Deng*. Taylor & Francis Ltm. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1991), p.67-81

⁸³ Isaiah Majok Dau, *Suffering and God: A Theological Reflection on the war in Sudan*. Nairobi, Kenya, Paulines Publications Africa. 2002, p.24-25

history, political and social)⁸⁴ The first Sudan civil war, also known as the Anyanya [“snake venom”] rebellion, started in 1955 as a mutiny by southern army officers who anticipated marginalization by the North, on the basis of the ‘Sudanization’ process of the period in the run up to Sudan independence on 01 January 1956 which was seen to be favoring the better educated northerners over peripheral populations. The war was further fuelled by the ‘Islamisation’ policies of subsequent post-independence governments and the northern politicians renegeing on their pre-independence promise to implement a federal system that would guarantee autonomy for the South. Half a million people, of which only one in five was considered an armed combatant, were killed and hundreds of thousands more were forced to leave their homes.⁸⁵

The Addis Ababa agreement that ended the fighting in 1972 failed to completely dispel the tensions that had originally caused it, and when Sharia law was introduced in 1983, the north-south conflict of identities was reignited. This second Sudan civil war, fought between the central Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), officially ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. The 50-year period between 1955 and 2005 is thus sometimes considered to be a single conflict with an eleven-year ceasefire that separates two violent phases. Roughly over two million people died as a result of war, famine and disease caused by the conflict. Four to Five million people were displaced at least once (and often repeatedly) during the war. The civilian death toll is one of the highest of any war since World War II.⁸⁶

Many conflict diagnostics have been undertaken in South Sudan and the typology of conflict suggests varying causes of violence. There are some general issues, which relate to all the

⁸⁴ W. Deng, and J. Oduho, *The problem of the Southern Sudan*. London: Oxford university press. 1963, p.21-59

⁸⁵ Garang Awan, John (2009), *The Sudanese in War Compared to the Hebrews of the Exodus*, Master's thesis submitted to the Faculty of the School of Theology of the University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

conflicts and there are specific factors underlying some particular conflicts. It is generally widely accepted that the war was a southern struggle against the northern elite who dominated the political, military structures of the central government and the exploitative northern merchants. Deliberate policies excluded or made it difficult for southerners and other peripheral ethnicities to equitably participate in governance, job placement and business. A key central government's policy, for example, was taking land from farmers (Muslims and non-Muslims alike) and transferring it to government officials and merchants, which had drastic effects on rural peasant populations eventually creating unrest all over Sudan. The conflict of identity is often painted as racial (Arabs in the central government vs. Africans in the South) or as religious (Muslims vs. Christians and Traditional African Religions). To the majority of South Sudanese, exploitative governance was the main root cause.⁸⁷

Another aspect in the second war were the natural resources of the South, where there are significant oil fields and also due to numerous tributaries of the Nile river and heavier precipitation, the south has greater access to water and is therefore much more fertile. The north's desire to control these resources, and the determination of the people of South Sudan to maintain control of the resources where they live, significantly contributed to the war and continues to be a source of conflict between the now Republic of Sudan and the newly independent Republic of South Sudan.⁸⁸

The major pre-occupation of the government in the south during the CPA interim period was managing the transition to independent Statehood. After elections in 2010, a referendum was held in January 2011 to determine if South Sudan should declare its independence from

⁸⁷ Garang, John (1992), *The Call for Democracy in Sudan*, London: Kegan Paul International.

⁸⁸ Khalid, Mansour (1990), *The Government They Deserve: The Role of the Elite in Sudan's Political Evolution*, London: Kegan Paul.

Sudan, with 98.83% of the population voting for independence. This led to a formal independence on 9 July 2011, although disputes still remain, such as sharing of the oil revenues, the disputed region of Abyei, and support for armed insurgents across both borders. Regional armed insurgencies like Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and widespread inter-ethnic warfare that in some cases predates the war of independence have also caused untold misery to populations over large swathes of South Sudan territory. In general, tribal animosities, proliferation of firearms, perceptions of insecurity, cattle rustling as a function of wealth acquisition, breakdown of cultural norms and values, and limited economic opportunities – still all together continue to build pressures and often erupt into inter-tribal conflict and violence.⁸⁹

2.2 Historical Aspects

The current achievement of South Sudan identity and independent on 9th July 2011 was rooted in history of mutual mistrust, suspicion and intrigue between the South and North Sudan. Mohamed Ali's invasion and the expressed interest in black slaves, not only in Egypt but generally in the Ottoman Empire due to the limitation on the flow of slaves from Europe and East Asia, signaled the start of a lucrative slave trade from Sudan and beyond. This involved soldiers and officers from the invading Turco-Egyptian army, who were eventually followed by traders who found their engagement in such trade more profitable than in other commodities. Those traders were, in the early days, individuals of many different nationalities, the majority being Egyptian and European.⁹⁰

Sudanese traders were the last to join the trade but were to be exposed as the most notorious in the history of this trade. By the mid-nineteenth century men like Zubeir Rahma and his

⁸⁹ Nyaba, Peter Adwok (1997), *Politics of Liberation in South Sudan*, Kampala: Fountain Books.

⁹⁰ Gray, Richard (1961), *A History of the Southern Sudan 1839-1889*, London: Oxford University Press.

lieutenant Rabih Fadlallah and others were in full control of the trade in the south-western part of Sudan. Zubeir was the leading figure and had built a reputation as a slave trader, administrator and state builder who was able to organize an army of loyal and well trained slave soldiers. He was able to assert his political and military leadership over other merchants in the area in the decades following 1850, and by 1874 was powerful enough to conquer the Dar Fur Sultanate. However, that region was not the only source of slaves in a trade that persisted into the first quarter of the twentieth century.⁹¹

According to Dau, “the slave trade was the first arena in which Southern trust and confidence in the foreigner were eroded. The government at first bought ivory fairly from local people and transported it to Khartoum annually.”⁹² A number of major markets that acted as transit points for the slave trade in Sudan seem to have dominated the scene during the 18th and the 19th centuries. They occupied strategic places in the flow of this trade in the country and were the points where merchants from different places outside Sudan gathered to exchange goods brought from Egypt, Europe and India and buy slaves, gold, ivory and other local commodities for export. Prominent among these was Shendi market, which was vividly described by Burckhardt in 1814.⁹³

Dau observed that, “Gordon came to the South with a pacific pragmatism and deep reluctance to use force. Unlike Baker, he had no comprehensive plans for development. His only burning passion was to fight the slave trade.”⁹⁴ But not everyone was happy with Gordon and his aides and their war against the slave trade, not certainly the Danagila merchants in Darfur

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Isaiah Majok Dau, *Suffering and God: A Theological Reflection on the war in Sudan*. Nairobi, Kenya, Paulines Publications Africa. 2002, p.26

⁹³ Mowafi, Reda (1981), *Slavery, Slave Trade and Abolition Attempts in Egypt and the Sudan 1820-1882*, (Malmo: Lund Studies in International History 14).

⁹⁴ Isaiah Majok Dau, *Suffering and God: A Theological Reflection on the war in Sudan*. Nairobi, Kenya, Paulines Publications Africa. 2002. p.28

and Bahr el Ghazal. Their resentment against Gordon and his slave trade crusade was intense.⁹⁵

During the Mahdi's perpetuation, Gordon and others took serious knock against slave traders. Although the Mahdist state did not abolish slavery it prohibited the export of slaves, especially males, so that they did not end up as part of the enemy forces. Even inside the country the sale of male slaves was discouraged. Strong male slaves were encouraged to join the Mahdist armies as 'Jihadiya' and promised freedom when doing so, while their owners were promised compensation. The sale of other categories of slaves was centralized in Omdurman and the slave market was attached to the state treasury (Bayt al Mal). The number of slaves that passed through this market was some hundreds at any given time.⁹⁶ Gordon and his supporters were triumphant in Bahr el Ghazal and many of these unhappy merchants suffered slave trade losses under Gordon and his supporters passionately supported the Mahdist uprising.⁹⁷ All these historical aspects of territorial invasion of the South, slave trade, cultural disregard, taken away natural resources and colonization has influence to South Sudanese's choice in referendum of separation.

2.3 The Struggle for Independence

South Sudan started to look for their identity before Sudan obtained independence in 1956 from a de facto double colonization by Egypt and Great Britain. More than other previous regimes in the country, it was British colonization that emphasized 'differential development' in Sudan. By 1924, Britain had launched its 'Southern Policy' in the southern part of Sudan with its two-pronged objective namely to prevent the rising nationalism in the North from

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Lovejoy, Paul E. (2004), "Slavery in Bilad al-Sudan and the frontier of the African diaspora" in Paul Lovejoy (ed), *Slavery on the frontier of Islam*, (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener), p.1-30.

⁹⁷ P. M. Holt, 1970. *The Mahdist state in the Sudan*. London: Oxford University press. p 33-48

spreading to the South and eventually to British East Africa, and to crystallize the separation of the three southern provinces (Upper Nile, Equatoria and Bahr al Ghazal) from the rest of the country while encouraging their assimilation by the governments of the neighboring British East African federation. It was thus no surprise that when Sudan became independent in 1956 it was already a country deeply divided between the Muslim North and the Black South.⁹⁸

British colonization simply gave place to the internal domination of the south by the north. This helps explain partly why the South Sudan first civil war was a secession war. When the rebels failed to achieve their core objective, they settled for autonomy within the framework of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement – which granted autonomy to the South. The coup by Nimeiri was a response to a situation in which there was no constitution, the political system was dominated by sterile sectarian interests, the economy was stagnant and there was no sign of an end to the war in the South. The Addis Ababa Agreement, signed between the government of Sudan and the SSLM, paved the way for the rebirth of the state of Sudan at least as far as its relation with its southern ‘periphery’ was concerned. However, the optimism created by the agreement appeared short-lived after Nimeiri succumbed to pressure from radical and Islamist politicians in the North, to whom the agreement merely represented a capitulation by the central government.⁹⁹

The radicalization of the Nimeiri regime climaxing in the decree in 1983 of Sharia as the law of the entire Sudan coincided with the creation of the SPLM/A in the South. Telar Deng mentions that, “the President Referred to Addis Ababa as not being a Quran or Bible. This

⁹⁸ Abd al-Rahim, Muddathir (1969), *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study in Constitutional and Political Development, 1899-1956*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

⁹⁹ Tvedt, T. (1994): The Collapse of the State in Southern Sudan after the Addis Ababa Agreement, A Study of Internal Causes and the Role of NGOs, in: Harir, S. and Tvedt, T. (eds.): *Short-Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan*, Uppsala, Nordiska Afrika institutet.

unilateral abrogation of the Addis Ababa Accord of 1972 was principal cause of the 1983 Bor revolt which later developed into full-fledged revolutionary movement (SPLM/A).”¹⁰⁰

The second civil war (1983–2005) was, to a large extent, the continuation of the first, except that it did not call for secession. Immature policies and the poor performance of national governments for failing to implement Addis Abba Agreement and comprehensive methodologies to deal with various issues such as issues of identity, fair distribution of power and wealth and the achievement of equitable development in all parts of the country, lack of communication between the Northern and Southern parts.¹⁰¹

The Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) was the main rebel force fighting within southern Sudan. The SPLA was formed in 1983 through a sequence of mutinies from the Sudanese Army, particularly after a portion of Sudanese soldiers became disappointed following the Army’s attack on the town of Bor during which many civilians were killed, the guerrilla base for the movement originated in Ethiopia in the middle of 1983. In an effort to avoid the factionalism in the south that dominated the first part of Sudan’s civil war (1956-1972), the SPLA was designed to be hierarchical with a tendency towards authoritarianism that grew throughout the 1980s. Discipline to the movement was deemed as pivotal, and any break in this discipline often led to long prison sentences or summary executions without trial.¹⁰²

A question that has plagued the SPLA since its existence has been the definition of what they were actually fighting for. While ideology has been a cornerstone of the Government of Sudan’s war efforts, the SPLA has been plagued by a distinct lack of an ideology. This is one

¹⁰⁰ Deng, Telar (2007) The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Progress and Challenges) lecture by (Telar Deng): State University of New York at Stony Brook 26th March, 2007

¹⁰¹ Ibrahim, I. M. (2012) Parliamentary modalities for managing a post-war situation: the case of Sudan. Kampala Uganda

¹⁰² Johnson, D. H. (2003), The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Oxford.

of the reasons why it has been so prone to splits, mutinies, and instability. The organization had a serious rift in 1991 which greatly weakened its war efforts with disastrous implications for the civilian population of southern Sudan. Since then they have not only been fighting the government, but have been just as intent on fighting the different factions within the SPLA, which resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. As with much of the war, civilians were hardest hit during the worst period of factionalist fighting amongst rival SPLA splinter groups. Two other factors contributing to the SPLA split were firstly the growing opposition by some party leaders to the dictatorial style of leader John Garang; and secondly the fall of Mengistu's regime in Ethiopia, which was not only the headquarters for SPLA activity, but also site of 200,000 Sudanese refugees who then returned to Sudan thereby worsening the situation in southern Sudan.¹⁰³

According to John Young, "Indeed, internal political disputes always risk developing a tribal dimension, sometimes with tragic results. When Riek Macher (Nuer) and Lam Akol (Shilluk) challenged the leadership of John Garang (Dinka) in 1991, it unleashed a war between the Dinka and the Nuer that cost in some 300,000 deaths."¹⁰⁴ The split within the SPLA in 1991 divided this rebel force into soldiers who remained loyal to Garang, and those that joined with Riek Machar. Machar was a commander serving under Garang in the Upper Nile region. Riek's faction have gone through many name changes in the following years; "In March 1993, SPLA-Nasir was renamed "SPIA-United" after several non-Nuer SPLA officers who had been imprisoned by Garang managed to escape and join Machar. This ethnic fusion disintegrated a year later."¹⁰⁵ SPLA-Nasir, SPLA-United, the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF). The significance of Riek's movement's search for identity coincided with its

¹⁰³ Agreement on Power Sharing (2004) between the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A, Naivasha, 2004/05/26.

¹⁰⁴ Young, J. (2003) Sudan: Liberation Movements, Regional Armies, Ethnic Militias & Peace. Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 30, No. 97, The Horn of Conflict (Sep., 2003), p.423-434

¹⁰⁵ Jok, Madut Jok and Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, (1999) Sudan's Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities: African Studies Review, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Sep., 1999), p.125-145

growing allegiance to the government in Khartoum. There were allegations that the GoS was supplying Riek with weapons as early as in 1992. When Riek's forces were operating under the title of the SSDF, it was aligned with the government in Khartoum. Riek was, for a short time, the president of a coordinating council in 1997, but pulled out in 2000 after the GoS, according to Riek, did not honor the terms of the 1997 agreement. Riek then went to Nairobi, and reassembled his troops as the Sudan People's Democratic Front (SPDF). It was only in January of 2002 that Riek and Garang resolved to put their differences behind them, at least for the time being, in order to fight again together against the government. "In April 1996, Machar and other former SPLA officers and politicians (some of whom were Dinka and Shilluk) agreed to negotiate a separate peace agreement with the National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Khartoum, under the slogan peace from with- in."¹⁰⁶

2.4 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed on 9th January 2005 at Nyayo Stadium which offered a roadmap for democratic transformation from the existing one-party rule to a multi-party democracy, through to a mid-term free and fair elections during a 6-year Interim Period, and constitutional restructuring of the Sudanese state on basis of citizenship rights, following two decades of monopoly of power by the ruling party, the NCP. The overarching objective was maintaining sustainable peace, while giving priority to unity of the country as a preferable option by making unity attractive to southerners. However, the CPA also granted regional autonomy for Southern Sudan in a manner that verges on confederacy (without using the term), coupled with unprecedented wealth sharing arrangements, including equal shares of oil revenues during the interim period, while ensuring the participation of southerners in legislative and executive power structures at the federal, as well as the northern states, levels,

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

including the position of the First Vice President of the Republic.¹⁰⁷

2.4.1 Pre-Agreement

The signing of the Machakos framework, on 20th July 2002, prepared the ground for reaching the CPA and its five Protocols 8- between the GoS/NCP and the SPLM/A on 9 January 2005. The CPA, however, was as much the result of international pressure as it was a reflection of the will of the Sudanese themselves, who yearned for peace after decades of a devastating war. The international community, represented by the quartet (USA, England, Norway, and Italy) and partners (IGAD countries), was heavily supportive and involved in mediation and facilitation, and served as guarantors of the Agreement. Ending an over two-decade long war, the CPA is a turning point in the modern history of Sudan as it shapes current and future political developments in both Northern and Southern Sudan. It is a landmark in the historical evolution of the relations between the centre of the Sudanese state and South Sudan, as well as other marginalized regions in the country.¹⁰⁸ “The negotiating process, between NCP and SPLM/A, for the CPA's power-sharing arrangements encouraged other marginalized regions and communities in western and in eastern Sudan to resort to violence, forcing the regime in Khartoum to close more deals in the form of political settlement.”¹⁰⁹ After a number of months of intense South-on-South fighting, mostly targeting the civilian population along ethnic lines, the Nuer dominated SPLA-Nasir faction held most of the countryside in the Upper Nile, while the Dinka-dominated SPLA-Mainstream faction controlled most.¹¹⁰ The CPA devised a constitutional framework, on the basis of a “one country-two systems” model, within which Islamic Sharia'a and Islamic banking would be followed in the North, while a

¹⁰⁷ Ahmed, Einas (2009), The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Dynamics of Post-Conflict Political Partnership in Sudan, in: *Africa Spectrum*, 44, 3, p.133-147.

¹⁰⁸ Ahmed, Einas (2009), The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Dynamics of Post-Conflict Political Partnership in Sudan, in: *Africa Spectrum*, 44, 3, p.133-147.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Jok, Madut Jok and Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, (1999) Sudan's Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities: *African Studies Review*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Sep., 1999), p.125-145

secular constitution and traditional banking would be adopted in the South. The Agreement also approved the existence of two forces, SAF and SPLA during the interim period, with the formation of Joint/ Integrated Units (JIUS) consisting of equal numbers from SAF and SPLA.

Above all, the CPA granted Southerners the right of self-determination to be exercised in a referendum at the end of the interim period. It attended to the problem of Abyei by assigning a special status to the region by keeping its administration under the Presidency of the Republic, until the people of Abyei determine, in a separate referendum to be organized simultaneously with the Southern Sudan referendum, whether they want to remain in the North or be part of southern Sudan. The CPA also resolved the conflict in the two transitional areas of the Blue Nile and South Kordofan through a special protocol for the people of the two areas to express their views on the CPA through a Popular Consultations process.¹¹¹

2.4.2 The Peace Agreement

The CPA signed between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Nairobi, Nyayo Stadium, Kenya on the 9th, January 2005 effectively ended a atrocious war that had raged for twenty one years (1983-2004).¹¹²The only assurance for realizing the transition to a genuine citizenship-state, and for making unity "attractive", was through honest and genuine implementation of the CPA in a way that would allay Southerners' fears of continued subordination, marginalization, and disenfranchisement, and guarantee their freedom, equality, and justice. The implementation process of the Agreement, however, has ostensibly reflected the conflicting interpretation, perception, and understanding by each partner of its terms and objectives. Thus, the implementation of the CPA had been hampered from the start by potentially serious tensions between the two

¹¹¹ Agreement on Power Sharing (2004) between the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A, Naivasha, 2004/05/26.

¹¹² Deng, Telar (2007) The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Progress and Challenges) lecture by (Telar Deng): State University of New York at Stony Brook 26th March, 2007

partners leading to widespread concerns. Besides, the sudden death of Dr. Garang only three weeks following the commencement of the interim period (30 July 2005) further caused a slow implementation by both partners.¹¹³

Moreover, "nationalists" in the South, within and outside the SPLM, were only concerned with the self-determination referendum as an exit opportunity for realizing the aspirations of Southerners in asserting their identity and human dignity by opting for separation. Given the history of un-met promises in the North/ South peace deals, it may be possible to understand the doubts in the minds of the Southerners with regards to the benefits to Sudan's unity or about the NCP's resolve to live up to the CPA. The international donor community also played a role in creating a favorable environment for the partition of the country. A mixed blend of all these factors predictably pushed Southern Sudanese to overwhelmingly vote (over 98%), at the self-determination referendum, in favor of secession and the establishment of South Sudan as an independent state.¹¹⁴

2.4.3 Post-CPA Developments

Following the commencement of the CPA-premised interim period on 09 July 2005, government structures in South Sudan (GoSS), South Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA), judiciary and police force, and a human rights commission, were established. In April 2010, the President of GoSS, ten state governors, SSLA, and states' legislative councils, were all elected. Notwithstanding the establishment of these institutions, however, the situation in South Sudan following the declaration of independence on 09 July 2011 is in sharp contrast to the one that existed when British troops departed from the North in 1956. Sudan, at independence in 1956, inherited from the colonial rule a viable civil service, worthy judicial

¹¹³ Agreement on Power Sharing (2004) between the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A, Naivasha, 2004/05/26.

¹¹⁴ Berman, Bruce J. (1998), Ethnicity, Patronage, and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism, in: *African Affairs*, 97, p.305-341.

institutions, a well-functioning railway network, and the largest irrigated agricultural scheme in Africa, a well-disciplined army and police force and a reputable educational system up to tertiary level. However, the new Republic of South Sudan will have to struggle with the challenges of building both institutional and physical infrastructure of a modern, civil state.¹¹⁵ Most importantly, good political and economic governance, based on transparency and accountability, is the key for building a politically and economically viable state capable of articulating a common vision for national unity, and providing stability and dividends of peace to its aspiring citizens. We could learn from the lesson of our counterparts in the North who failed throughout the post-independence era to articulate a nationally shared vision for equitable development and democratic management of Sudan's multiple diversities, and to preserve the unity of the country.¹¹⁶

2.5 Major Achievements

South Sudan achieved her vision of identity through independent on July 9, 2011. On July 9, 2012 and July 9, 2013, South Sudan celebrated its first and second anniversary as an independent and sovereign state. Independence brought with it hope for a better future and the opportunity to build a united developmental state. According to Mbaku and Smith, “South Sudan’s first year of independence was fraught with major challenges, like the continuing struggle with the Republic of Sudan over their common border.”¹¹⁷ These conflicts have become top priorities for the country, slowing down the ability of the government to focus on economic growth and human development. The agenda facing the South Sudan's leaders and intellectuals in the process of nation and state-building is overwhelming, while they have to simultaneously deal with many problems, though they vary in terms of urgency. Discussions

¹¹⁵ Ake, Claude (1996), *Democracy and Development in Africa*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ John Mukum Mbaku and Jessica Elaine Smith (2012) SOUTH SUDAN’S FIRST ANNIVERSARY: PROGRESS, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS: ONE YEAR AFTER INDEPENDENCE: *Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa’s Newest Country*. The Brookings Institution | Africa Growth Initiative

with government officials, political leaders, intellectuals, and donors, have highlighted a host of critical thematic issues that the nascent state has to address, and the dire need for the appropriate capacity and tools for their resolution require serious reflection on the part of the new state of South Sudan. In addition to the building of institutions and state structures, and physical infrastructure, there are three areas deserving utmost attention. The first problem after achievement of vision of identity is that of internal security, including identification of salient as well as latent causes for instability. The second problem is the responsibility of the new state to guarantee the dividends of peace to the people of the new nation. Third, good governance and integrity in public life represent the key to political stability and healthy economic growth as rightly maintained by GoSS in its own document on security sector reforms.¹¹⁸ Above all we the people of South Sudan are proud of our identity as South Sudanese with our national anthem, flag, arm code, our embassies abroad, our national certificate of identification and passport (ordinary, business, special, official and diplomatic passport) that has encouraged us that we have achieved our vision of identity but we need to achieve more for our new nation. Therefore, we must enhance South Sudan vision 2040 through regional cooperation and integration.

2.6 Conclusion

Generally, South Sudanese struggle for independence and the development of vision 2040 that provide an initial overview of the issues that feature in the domestic debate about the shape and form of the South Sudanese nation. And if the experience of fellow African countries, many of whom recently celebrated half a century of independence, is anything to go by, debates about national identity are not likely to conclude and disappear anytime soon. In summary the conflict in Sudan have all along appeared to be resources, inequality, races, religions and decimations

¹¹⁸ Arkell, Anthony J. (1955), *A History of the Sudan: From the Earliest Times to 1821*, London: Athlone Press.

CHAPTER THREE

ENHANCING SOUTH SUDAN VISION THROUGH REGIONAL COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION: AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTH SUDAN *VISION 2040*

3.1 Introduction

Chapter two addressed the conflict in the Sudan and the making of South Sudan; this is an overview of history of the new nation with emphasis on two identities view of conflict, historical aspect, struggle for independence, CPA and major achievements.

This chapter will explore about the enhancement of South Sudan *vision 2040* through regional cooperation and integration. South Sudan needs to benefit from free trade, and develop into a customs union, and the chapter explains a conceptualization of regional integration, on how South Sudan can benefit from regional integration as a collective form. This chapter also uses a SWOT analysis and challenges which are currently facing South Sudan and how regional cooperation and integration can assist the youngest nation in the world to achieve South Sudan's *Vision 2040*.

3.2 Regional Integration: A Conceptualization

A general definition of regional integration states that it is a shifting of certain national activities toward a new centre. Integration is a form of collective action among countries in order to obtain a certain goal. This goal can be as grand as political unification.¹¹⁹ The theoretical foundations of conventional approaches to regional integration date back to three important schools of economic and political thought, which are neo-classical, Marxist and development economics.

¹¹⁹ Haas, Ernst B. (1958) *The Uniting of Europe*, Stanford: Stanford University Press. (1961) 'International Integration: The European and the Universal Process', *International Organization*, 15: p.366-92.

The theory of economic integration was originally developed from traditional trade theory that assumes perfect competition, and whose major concern is the location of production of different kind of goods.¹²⁰ Bisworo argues, that “the earliest theoretical work on regional economic integration emanated from the theory of comparative and the interests of liberal economists in promoting the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade.”¹²¹ The main elements of regional economic integration, as indicated by theory, include the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers among member states, having a common external trade policy which initiates common external trade restrictions against non members, initiating free movement of goods and services, as well as free movement of factors of production across national borders, harmonization of policies, unification of national monetary policies, and acceptance of a common currency. This happen in stages which include free trade area, customs union, common market, economic union and complete regional integration.

Regional economic integration is pursued for a variety of reasons. The main motivation for all regional integration schemes has been the prospect of enhanced economic growth and development with regard to the welfare impact of regional economic integration, which is in terms of productive efficiency and consumer welfare, and dynamic effects of economic integration, which relates to member states’ long term rates of growth. The majority of sub-Saharan African countries are members of one or more regional or sub-regional arrangements that seek to promote economic coordination, cooperation of integration among the member integration, which relates to member states’ long-term rates of growth. The majority of sub-Saharan African countries are members of one or more regional or sub-regional arrangements that seek to promote economic coordination, cooperation or integration among the member

¹²⁰ Imbrianu C. & Reganati F. (1994). International production and economic integration. Toward economic convergence. *Economic a Internazionale*, 47 (4): p.333- 349.

¹²¹ Bisworo, J.M. (2003). *Perspective on Africa’s integration and cooperation from OAU to AU: an old wine in a new bottle.* WI U. Washington.

countries concerned. The various African regional economic blocs, and indeed the individual countries that comprise their membership, are at varying stages of development and implementation of their regional arrangements. The blocs' scope covers various socio-economic, developmental and political considerations, including the promotion of intra-regional trade, socio-economic policy coordination, and management or development of shared physical infrastructure and the environment. Some of the African regional arrangements also cover issues of common interest in the areas of public governance, defense and security, among other socio-economic and political dimensions.¹²²

Some of the many African sub-regional arrangements have a long history of existence, dating back to the pre-independence era, which has been punctuated by occasional stagnations or reversals in a few cases, and only modest achievements at best in others. Some African countries have only recently rekindled their interest in economic integration, but for different reasons from the initial decolonization agenda and the desire to overcome the colonially imposed "artificial" boundaries. They have been inspired by the success of integration efforts in Europe and the Americas. They also need post-independence economic integration to gain bargaining power and survive economically against the threat of marginalization in the globalization process.¹²³

Regional economic integration has a fairly long history in virtually all parts of Sub Saharan Africa (SSA). A number of leaders called for the integration of Africa already soon after independence, but it was only in the 1970s and 1980s that concrete steps were taken to re-launch or establish economic integration institutions in all sub-regions. The first generation regional integration schemes were motivated partly by the political vision of African unity,

¹²² Van Langenhove, L. (2003), "Regional integration and global governance", UNU Nexions, (August): p.1-5.

¹²³ Gilpin, R. (1987), *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton, New Jersey.

but also as a means of providing sufficient scale to import substitution industrialization policies. This inward-looking regional strategy failed for the same reasons as the underlying national import-substitution policies : national markets were too small and too poor; high input costs adversely affected transformation and export, causing foreign exchange shortages and overvalued currencies; domestic monopolies and trade protection contributed to powerful rent seeking and “nationalistic” lobbies, biased and organized against regional as well as global trade; nationalistic governments with spoken interest in regional cooperation gave token support to regional organizations, broke their regional commitments and implementation lapsed; and there was excessive emphasis on joint public investments as opposed to creating a truly unified markets for private operators.¹²⁴

As countries progressively switched from import-substitution to open-door policies since the early 1980s, likewise the second-generation regional integration schemes in SSA have become characterized by open regional arrangements. There are also palpable signs of a renewed political commitment to sub-regional integration from governments and private operators alike throughout sub-Saharan Africa as well as from the international donor community and finance institutions.¹²⁵ Promotion of regional integration remains an important economic and political goal in Africa. In view of this, it is appropriate to briefly reexamine why regional integration is pursued, what is understood by regional integration and pre-conditions and principles for regional integration in sub-Saharan Africa. The discussion is concluded by a few observations on challenges facing regional integration in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA).¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Jebuni CD. (1997). Trade Liberalisation and Regional Integration in Africa. In: Oyelide, A. 1997. Regional Integration and Liberalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa, Vol. 1, Framework Issues and Methodological Perspective. New York. Macmillan Press, Basingstoke and St. Martin's Press.

¹²⁵ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2006. African Economic Outlook: (2005/2006). Paris. OECD Development Centre and African Development Bank.

¹²⁶ Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). (2004). Economic Report on Africa 2004: Unlocking Africa's Trade Potential. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa

One of the most compelling arguments for regional integration in SSA is usually made on the basis of the fragmentation of sub-Saharan Africa, which has 47 small economies, with an average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US\$4 billion, and a combined GDP equal to that of Belgium or 50% of the GDP of Spain. The small domestic markets, combined with generally high production costs and deficient investment climates result in limited investment (Africa attracts less than 2% of global foreign direct investment).¹²⁷ Sub-Saharan economic growth achievements are disappointing. In 2003, 16 countries achieved an average economic growth rate of 3%, 16 countries growth of 3-5% and 18 countries more than 5%. The implication is that with the per capita growth rate being between 0-2% per annum, there is limited progress in poverty reduction and the achievement of many of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) seems to be elusive.¹²⁸

3.3 South Sudan Vision 2040

South Sudan vision 2040 has explained well how the country is aspiring to build an exemplary nation, a nation that is knowledgeable and informed, wealthy, productive and innovative, sympathetic and open-minded, free, peaceful and diplomatic, self-governing and accountable, safe, secure and healthy, and united and proud. Tiony argues that one of the pillars of Vision 2040 is safe and secure nation. So, if there is regional cooperation and integration, then there will be peace and security between South Sudan and its neighbours which will go a long way in achieving a safe and secure South Sudan.¹²⁹

According South Sudan *Vision 2040*, the first goal of national policy is about the Good governance. That is how can we achieve a transparent, democratic and accountable state

¹²⁷ Jovanović, M.N. (2001). *International Economic Integration*, 2nd edition. New York. Routledge

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Interview with Hilary Tiony, student of MA diplomacy in Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi, 23 June 2013.

capable of delivering public services efficiently and equitable with healthy balance of power between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. The second goal of national policy is safety and security. This is about the way we defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Sudan, prevent the resurgence of conflict and uphold the constitution by providing equitable access to justice and maintaining law and order through institutions which are transparent, accountable and respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. Thirdly, national policy on increased prosperity, this is how we can promote sustainable poverty reduction, and improve livelihoods, through diversified economic growth fuelled by a dynamic private sector, sustainable and transparent management of natural resources, and the development of basic infrastructure. The final goal is about enhanced quality of life that is how we can promote the well-being and dignity of all the people of South Sudan by progressively accelerating universal access to basic social services.¹³⁰

3.4 South Sudan in the East and the Horn of Africa Sub-region: A SWOT Analysis

3.4.1 Strengths and Weaknesses

As it has been stated in the preceding sections of this chapter, Southern Sudan needs to undertake massive institutional reform or construction in order to achieve sustainable peace and economic growth. Therefore, although there may not be a universally valid sequence of implementing institutional reforms, a possible path of institutional building in South Sudan is outlined below:

The beginning step to strengthen peace and security is the building of the state capacity to administer effectively. This refers to the strengthening of the state power, and the expansion of the scope of state activities.¹³¹ The strength of the state indicates the extent to which the

¹³⁰ South Sudan Vision: Towards Freedom, Equality, Justice, Peace and Prosperity for all. Torit (South Sudan). 24th February 2011

¹³¹ USAID (2009), South Sudan Post Conflict Economic Recovery and Growth: An Agenda for USAID Engagement, USAID, Washington D. C.

government is capable of maintaining security and enforcing laws. The scope of the state shows the extent of responsiveness of the state to diverse requirements. If one considers South Sudan, GOSS is a newly established fragile semi-autonomous administration.¹³² Its strength has yet to be built because weaknesses are being observed in its capacity to ensure security. The effective scope of GOSS activities is also limited due to its limited strength and capacity. So, still two years after the declaration of independence, efforts at enhancing the strength of the Republic of South Sudan has to be given focus in order to enable it to ensure security and to create the environment for the reconstruction of economic, social and political institutions.¹³³

Since the government of new born nation lacks the resources to enhance its own strength, a continuous and strong international support is crucial. It is true that the international donor community and countries in the region have been supporting South Sudan since its establishment. However, there are still many difficult problems to be tackled. Violent clashes among different ethnic communities have been observed more frequently. Disarmament of illegal armed groups is still ongoing. De-mining activities have yet to clear large areas of farm, grazing and forest land from the mines of the war period. The economy has not shown a significant fast growth as it is usually the case with post-conflict societies. The uncertainty created by the insecure environment frustrates potential investors to undertake investment activities and prevents those already in investment not to make further investments.¹³⁴

The question about how to strengthen security in the context of Southern Sudan requires due consideration. This is a country with many ethnic communities living under a communal

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom. 2006. "Post-Conflict Risks." Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, University of Oxford (August).

economic system and governed mainly by customary laws. So, one of the policies that should be pursued is the strengthening of peace through the promotion of participation of the different ethnic/community groups in the peace building process. This refers to conflict management institutions and to the level 3 or the governance level of the classification by institutions. The numerous ethnic groups conflict over resource use. These ethnic groups keep themselves apart from one another and there is a limited economic and social interaction between them. Therefore, a mechanism should be created for the economic and social interaction of the different communities in a mutually beneficial way. One such mechanism is to form councils of neighboring communities with the participation of representatives or elders or spiritual leaders of the hostile tribes and communities. Such a council should be entrusted with the power and responsibility of coordinating activities among the different tribes/communities, and to follow up the developments in the communities, to work for the intervention in and resolution of conflicts.¹³⁵

The council can also serve as a link between the government and the communities for consultation and dissemination of information among the communities. Since the objective of the transition period is to create broad-based participatory governance, an effective legislation is required to ensure the right of representation of every community at all levels of administration and the right to administer itself locally in accordance with the constitution of the country and the customary laws of the community. However, whenever conflict of laws arises, precedence should be given to the constitutional provision, and statute laws. In fact, the right to self-administer was implemented formally after 2005.¹³⁶

¹³⁵ Oxfam, America. (2008). "Field Report from Southern Sudan," *Smart Development in Practice*.

¹³⁶ Yongo-Bure, Benaiah (2007), *Economic Development of Southern Sudan*, University Press of America, Maryland/USA, Plymouth/U.K

However, it is still weak due to weak capacity and it has to be strengthened in order to be able to establish an effective local administration. The representation of communities at all levels of government has been implemented in Ethiopia where the different ethnic groups elect and send their representatives into the House of Federation, which is the Upper House of parliament.¹³⁷

Another means of promoting peaceful interaction between hostile communities is the establishment of economic and infrastructural structures that mutually benefit all the communities. For example, power plants, schools, dams for supply of water, and health facilities that can serve the population from different communities should be established in selected strategic areas that can bring together neighboring communities. Although such projects might be new and might not have been tried elsewhere, they can be tested and put into effect in South Sudan.¹³⁸ Initially it may result in some difficulties, but with strong external support from government offices, the condition, for a peaceful interaction on the joint use of resources developed by the more or less neutral government body can emerge.

Associated with these measures, there should be a plan for continuous awareness creation among the population at large. This relates to social institutions. On the other hand, cattle rustlers and those who participate in the abduction of children and women should be seriously punished as they destabilize order in the society. Moreover, South Sudan should establish a security information network that facilitates timely preparedness and intervention to discourage and frustrate potential participants in violent conflicts. For this purpose, a Peace Task Force has to be established in each community, with a coordinating committee at the center. The main duty of the Task Force is to facilitate conditions for preventive measures. It should gather information on threats and make it available for quick response to the threats.

¹³⁷ Ibid.
¹³⁸ Ibid.

Such measures are new but can be put to use in South Sudan with possible success.

Another component of activities in the promotion of security is the disarmament of illegally armed groups. This is necessary since the recent deadly clashes were also conducted with the force of arms. However, the measure should be implemented with precaution by first involving the local communities in a series of consultations. Each local community sees its armaments as a means of self-defense against attacks from rival communities. GOSS has to convince the local population that it is capable of providing unbiased equal protection for all communities before it engages in at least reducing the amount of armament in private hands. One possible means of getting rid of unnecessary arms is to organize local community police. This measure can lessen the fears of the local population about attacks from other groups and makes them to cooperate in the disarmament process.¹³⁹

With regard to those groups who participate in banditry with illegal arms, the communities and governments at all levels should take serious measures to deter them and finally put an end to banditry. The government should positively respond and reintegrate those who voluntarily give up banditry and desire to live peacefully. Another measure that needs more attention is de-mining. The de-mining process is in progress. However, it has been slow and needs to increase in pace. Still large areas have not been reached. Large agricultural land, grazing land, and forests are dangerous and cannot be put to productive use until they are cleared of the mines.¹⁴⁰

The institutional reform being suggested above in relation to the promotion of peace within the South Sudanese borders, through measures that promote the inter-tribal and

¹³⁹ Johnson, Douglas (2003), *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, the International African Institute in Association with Fountain Publishers/Kampala (Uganda), James Currey/Oxford (UK), Indiana University Press, USA

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

intercommunity relationships towards peaceful interaction, has taken consideration of the power structure between GOSS, State Governments, and communities. GOSS is the semi sovereign body in Southern Sudan and it is in command of the society. State governments are autonomous regional administrations under the sovereign power of GOSS.¹⁴¹ The ethnic groups and communities are local levels of a decentralized government system. In comparison to local administration, the higher levels of government are better organized, better informed, and have more exposure to modern conflict management approaches, thereby being better positioned to initiate, to monitor, and to strengthen the institutions which aim at resolving contradictions among communities and tribal groups.¹⁴²

There is also a possible threat to peace in South Sudan from the periodic clashes between the NCP, which is the major partner to the GNU, and SPLM. The outstanding border issues and the future of the three areas (still including Abyei), are among the factors that may lead to clashes. Therefore, the international community and concerned regional bodies should keep vigilance on any development towards violent conflict and should swiftly intervene to avert the catastrophe from happening. A continuous dialogue between the parties should be conducted over and over again. One thing to be considered is that the purpose of another round of fighting has already been defeated.¹⁴³ The war that could not be won in the past after being fought for about four decades cannot be won in the future. So, it is necessary and beneficial to understand this fact and refrain from a move that can aggravate the sufferings of both the South and North Sudanese civilians.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom.(2006). "Post-Conflict Risks." Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, University of Oxford (August).

In this regard, NCP should abide by the CPA, by the INC, and the various international conventions and agreements it has signed as Government of Sudan. GOSS should also promote good governance, improve law and order in the South, and conduct business in accordance with the provisions of the CPA, the INC, and the ICSS.¹⁴⁴ The international community should continuously monitor the situation and consider its enforcement role with the use of its “Commitment Technology” to ensure the implementation of CPA. For example, such measures like economic sanctions, limitation on international movements of government authorities can be used to pressurize parties to the peace agreement to respect the agreement. The CPA itself is an institution. Just like any other institution, the CPA can be viewed in terms of the power relationship between the NCP-led government of Sudan and the SPLM/A - led Government of South Sudan.¹⁴⁵

Institutions reflect the norms and interests of the key groups that support them. So, since the CPA came into existence within the context of domestic and international power structures, its successful implementation and transformation to other institutions like the general elections and the referendum, depend on the power structure of the key actors and groups in the political arena of Sudan, that is, the NCP, SPLM, and the Sudanese People.

3.4.2 Existing Opportunities and Threats

The linguistic diversity in South Sudan and EAC is generally viewed as an essential component of the Horn of Africa identity. New member states have to be introduced to Kiswahili language.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Virginie Mamadouh, *Beyond nationalism: Three visions of the European Union and their implications for the linguistic regime of its institutions*. published by Spring. Vol. 48, No. 2, *Territorial change and national identities in Eastern and Western Europe* (1999), p.133-144

The Nile-Sobat rivers zone is rich in fish resources (Nile Perch and Tilapia) and a source for potentially exportable fishery products, either in intra-Sudan and EAC trade cross-border trade. Because of decades of war, these potential resources were never developed. The gap between the current situation and unrealized potential is quite large, according to many agricultural and natural resource experts. South Sudan can become a bread basket for not only the entire Sudan but the region, according to these experts.¹⁴⁷ Food security is an achievable goal if only the man-made conflicts could be overcome, policy and mindset reformed, and institutional impediments to private entrepreneurs and private sector removed. In this regard, the CPA offers an opportunity for Southern Sudan to explore the considerable resource base for economic growth and development. In this sense, South Sudan is in a better and more distinctive advantage compared to many countries from post-conflict situations.¹⁴⁸

The Juba compact rightly emphasizes the need to have a long-term vision to diversify South Sudan's economy from its dependence on oil. The development of a growth strategy as suggested in the Compact's mutual accountability matrix is an initial step toward articulating the long-term vision.¹⁴⁹ The World Bank as part of its 2009 Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) has commissioned two studies at the state level (Upper Nile State and Eastern Equatoria State). The studies used a "growth diagnostics" approach, a useful analytical framework for assessing, identifying, and prioritizing the most binding constraints to private sector based growth, and indicating which of the binding constraints the government might be able to address. It is different from the conventional approach of studying a selected sector with some pre-assumed agenda.¹⁵⁰ The growth diagnostic approach begins with the basic notion that growth is *episodic*, where economic progress consists of a series of transitions

¹⁴⁷ Abdelnour, S., Badri, B., El Jack, A., Wheeler, D., McGrath, S., and Branzei, O. (2008) *Examining enterprise capacity: A participatory social assessment in Darfur and Southern Sudan*. Toronto: Centre for Refugee Studies, York University.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Denu-G, Berhanu (2009), *The Post-War Reconstruction Process in South Sudan*, Sudan Economy Research Group Discussion Papers, Discussion Paper No. p.37, p.47

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

from one phase to the next in an episodic fashion. The second notion is that the essence of growth is a transition from a lower to a higher level of productivity for labor. To achieve higher productivity, it requires investment by economic agents, whether from individual entrepreneurs or government. The basic question that a growth diagnostic framework attempts to answer is why private investment and private entrepreneurial activity are low. It then follows by proposing factors (hypotheses) that may contribute to the problem. The task of the study would be to determine to what extent these factors are constraints that are critical and binding based on the evidence in a specific context; and which may be constraints but not binding for the time being so that not all possible constraints have to be addressed at the same time.¹⁵¹

Some preliminary results of common binding constraints have emerged from the studies of the Upper Nile and Eastern Equatoria states. Common binding constraints that cause under-investment are: serious infrastructure shortcomings; uncertainty over the future given the 2011 referendum and remaining security concerns; and concerns regarding government policies related to its macroeconomic management and the lack of fiscal coordination regarding sub-national government entities' tax jurisdiction (states and counties, for example) that resulted in multiple taxes and discouraged private investment.¹⁵²

While pursuing security improvement and supporting sound macroeconomic policies, developing an enabling environment to attract private investment is the most important strategic element for encouraging sustainable, inclusive economic growth and poverty reduction in the medium and long term. Transitional employment creation discussed below is

¹⁵¹ Abdelnour, S., Badri, B., Brnzei, O., McGrath, S. and Wheeler, D. (2008a). Grassroots enterprise development in Darfur and Southern Sudan. In O.E. William CSC (Ed.). *Peace through commerce: Partnerships as the new paradigm* (p.283-306). South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press.

¹⁵² Johnson, Douglas (2003), *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, the International African Institute in Association with Fountain Publishers/Kampala (Uganda), James Currey/Oxford (UK), Indiana University Press, USA

also an important short-term requirement to keep the recovery going forward; but there is no substitute for long term private investment and enterprise development.

One of the key challenges facing business and investors in South Sudan, as in most post-conflict economies, is the uncertainty and unpredictability of the laws and regulations governing the conduct of business and the commitment and ability of the government to implement them in a transparent, accountable, and consistent manner. In the case of South Sudan, it is further complicated by the uncertainty and possibly risk associated with decisions and outcomes following the elections and referendum respectively in 2010 and 2011.¹⁵³

Investors and business people want transparent and predictable rules to allow them to apply their cost-benefit calculus and risk assessment in their business decision. This places a premium on keeping burdensome regulatory, licensing, and tax requirements to a minimum. Simplicity and transparency are important. A good starting point could be to eliminate any impediments, especially those that create rent-seeking opportunities associated with economic activity in the informal sector. The cost and risk of doing business in South Sudan is already very high, a legacy of the war in terms of poor infrastructure and security risk. There is no reason to add more to it with cumbersome rules, and regulations, or other burdens on the emerging entrepreneurs in the informal sector, even if it means sacrificing potential revenues for the government. In the end increased government revenue can only be sustained in the long run when the economy expands and grows.¹⁵⁴

The *World Bank Doing Business 2009*, an annual, inter-country comparative report of 181 economies that evaluates government regulations and practices affecting business activity,

¹⁵³ Collier, Paul, V.L. Elliott, Anke Hoeffler, et. al. (2003). *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. World Bank, Oxford Press.

¹⁵⁴ Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom. (2006). "Post-Conflict Risks." Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, University of Oxford (August).

South Sudan is ranked 147 out of 181 economies in terms of ease of doing business. The report uses ten sets of regulations to assess the ease or difficulty of doing business from starting to operating and closing businesses. They are measured in terms of the time and resources required to operate a business legally.¹⁵⁵

As a post conflict country, South Sudan lacks all the necessary conditions for normal functioning of economic and governance activities. It lacks fiscal ability, implementation capacity, and an experienced administration. All of these things are necessary for the success of the process of reconstruction and the achievement of sustainable peace. Weaknesses on the aftermath of the CPA undermine the strength of GOSS, and the prospects of peace agreement might be darker. The situation might even deteriorate and result in further instability and internal fighting within South Sudan.¹⁵⁶ There have already been bitter inter-tribal clashes in several places. So there is a strong need for South Sudan to take effective measures to create and strengthen the appropriate institutions, and to lead the transition period towards a successful path. Earlier, this study has identified the type of institutions that are necessary for reconstruction and in the following section an agenda for institutional reform is outlined. However, it should be underlined that the reform outline needs to be taken just as a specific suggestion which has to be further developed to be replicable.¹⁵⁷

The consideration of the process of institution building in South Sudan involves all the institutions in all the different classifications. That is to say, formal and informal institutions, the different levels of institutions, as well as the economic, political, and social institutions are all involved in the process of institutional reform. However, the classification of

¹⁵⁵ Government of Southern Sudan. (2009). "Update on Austerity Measures Being Put in Place by the Government of Southern Sudan in Light of the Current Financial Crisis"

¹⁵⁶ Government of Southern Sudan. (2007). "GOSS Aid Strategy," Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

institutions on the basis of hierarchy will mainly be used as a framework of discussion about the type of institutions required for South Sudan. The hierarchical classification categorizes institutions into 4 levels. Level 1 institutions consist of social norms, customs, traditions, etc. Level 1 institutions have been functioning for many centuries; they are informal and are regarded as exogenous to the economic system. Level 2 institutions are those that relate to the “rules of the game”. These institutions define and enforce property rights. Level 2 institutions are mostly formal laws and conventions, but also include traditional rules that relate to the use of common natural resources. Level 3 institutions are those that relate to the governance issue of the society. These institutions design the system of order and incentives, thereby structuring the governing system of the society. And: “Level 4 institutions define the extent to which adjustment occurs through prices or quantities, and determine the resource allocation mechanism”.¹⁵⁸

The classification by hierarchy gives indications of the stage at which institutions can be identified and the length of the time required for a change to be effective. In the hierarchical classification, the time horizon for change is identified as 100 to 1000 years for level 1, 10 to 100 years for level 2, 1 to 10 years for level 3, and a short time period for level 4. However, this length of time span for change can be debatable since it can be different among different communities and even the different components of a level of institutions might need different time periods to change. For example, the components of traditions like marriage, funeral, and the relation between male and female, feeding and dietary practices can change over a shorter time span than the indicated 100 to 1000 years. With the exception of level 1 and partly level 2, institutions, which are designated as exogenous, the other two levels are considered as endogenous to the economic system. These institutions are formal institutions that need to be

¹⁵⁸ Oxfam, America. (2008). “Field Report from Southern Sudan,” *Smart Development in Practice*.

designed by the government. Now, after deciding to use the hierarchical classification, the next question is about what types of institutions are to be suggested for South Sudan.¹⁵⁹

Rodrik's argument shows that, "developing countries lack in five market supporting institutions and lists the five institutions as: Institutions of property rights; Regulatory institutions; Institutions for macroeconomic stabilization; Institutions of social insurance; institutions of conflict management. These institutions are formal institutions that need to be designed by the government."¹⁶⁰ Rodrik's argument "helps if the aim of the reform is to promote a market economy. The market economy can function well if participants in the market are ensured control over their property."¹⁶¹ Then, property owners have the incentive to save, to accumulate and to increase the value of their property; they can exchange or pass it to another person in addition to using it for their own consumption. Further, a market economy can function better if instances of market failures are minimized through regulatory measures such as supervision of the quality of goods, control against fraudulent activities, and management of externalities. These regulatory measures protect people against unfair behavior of some elements of the market, like non-competitive or monopolistic tendency, adverse selection and moral hazard due to incomplete information. On the hand, such policy measures, like financial supervision, quality control offices, environmental management and pollution control are among the required regulatory institutions.

The market economies also require institutions like independent central banking, fiscal institutions, and instruments to minimize periodic fluctuations between aggregate supply and demand. These institutions work to stabilize fluctuations in income, employment, production

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Rodrik, Dani /Arvind Subramanian / Francesco Trebbi (2004), "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development", *Journal of Economic Growth*, No. 9,2004, p.31-165

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

and consumption. The targets of control can be either inflation rates, monetary aggregates, or Government budgetary activities, surpluses/deficits. Institutions of social insurance and conflict management are also necessary to reduce instability, to promote harmonious and stable social interaction, and to provide for the smooth functioning of the market system. So, since the aim of the transition in South Sudan is to reconstruct the economy on a market basis, the market supporting institutions are needed for South Sudan. While this is the case, the question of how to establish market-supporting institutions in a post-conflict society is also to be answered.¹⁶²

3.5 Enhancing South Sudan Vision 2040 through Regional Cooperation and Integration

The Vision of South Sudanese people can trace back to history of Sudan for long struggle of our identity, even though the country achieved independence on 9th July 2011, it came after the successful voting for self determination. There is great need for the new born nation to enhance South Sudan vision through regional cooperation and integration. Regional cooperation and integration process here refers to agreement and the increasing development in the areas of the mobility and exchanges of goods, services, labor and assets among states, the existence and influence of supranational institutions overseeing economic relationships among states, and the coordination of financial and monetary policies among them.

Many members of parliament argued that South Sudan could quickly lose her national identity if the country joins the EAC. The regional cooperation and integration helps us to view the issues of market access.¹⁶³ South Sudanese traders will have interest on economic, political, geographical and social factors intervene to make market access unequal across

¹⁶²Parmar, Sharanjeet (2007), An Overview of the Sudanese Legal System and Legal Research, Hauser Global Law School Program, New York University School of Law, New York, USA

¹⁶³ T. Huw Edwards, Measuring Global and Regional Trade Integration in Terms of Concentration of Access. Review of World Economics / Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 143, No. 2 (Jul.,2007), p.256-276
Published by: Springer Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40441136> .Accessed: 28/05/2013 06:48

producers from different EAC countries. From this viewpoint, to enhance our vision, we need our market to become more regional as we can be a big producer to EAC market.¹⁶⁴ With regional cooperation and integration, South Sudan will enhance her vision and become an expert on bargaining among the more powerful members of a regional group.¹⁶⁵ The newborn nation could benefit and achieve her from EAC because integration is a means for member countries to obtain domestic policy preferences through regional negotiation.¹⁶⁶ South Sudan government needs to be very careful because private investors' voice demands for greater integration and that could make the nation divert from the country vision. The loss of sovereignty over fiscal and monetary policy is a plus for private investment because of the reduced risk of inflationary and exchange rate volatility.¹⁶⁷ If South Sudan becomes a member of EAC, the integration results from the need to shift specific functions away from exclusively nation-state control toward supranational institutions.¹⁶⁸ The success of vision 2040 for the newborn landlocked country is through regional cooperation and integration, because integration depends upon the ability of member countries to adapt and respond to the cooperative agreements that define integration. This will provides us with the foundation for the perspective that regards integration as a function of negotiations between governments to produce cooperative agreements that evolve into further integration.¹⁶⁹

South Sudan *Vision 2040* must be seen as the gathering point of a procedure that focus attention on what must be done to make South Sudan achieve that vision through regional cooperation and integration. For the country to realize the goals of *Vision 2040* means

¹⁶⁴ Riezman, R., J. Whalley, and S. Zhang (2005). Metrics Capturing the Degree to Which Individual Countries Are Globalized. CESifo Working Paper 1450. Munich.

¹⁶⁵ Moravcsik, Andrew (1991) 'Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community', *Inter-national Organization*, 45: p.19-56.

¹⁶⁶ Keohane, Robert (1984) *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

¹⁶⁷ Cohen, Benjamin J. (1997) 'The Political Economy of Currency Regions', in Helen Milner and Edward Mansfield (eds) *The Political Economy of Regionalism*, New York: Columbia University Press.

¹⁶⁸ Mitrany, David (1975) *The Functional Theory of Politics*, London: Martin Robertson.

¹⁶⁹ Nye, Joseph S. (1971) *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization*, Boston: Little and Brown.

building a good cooperation with Sudan, to become a member of EAC and also we need to struggle by building more industries and more formalized economic structures and set ups.

To enhance South Sudan vision 2040 through regional cooperation and integration, the new nation has to have voluntary decisions and to remove barriers to the mutual exchange of goods, services, capital, or persons'.¹⁷⁰ South Sudan has to be keen because regional integration depends on specific conditions found in earlier stages that promote further cooperation.¹⁷¹

3.6 Challenges

Yier Yier observes that the macroeconomic situation resulting from the closure of oil production slow economic growth, the depreciated South Sudanese pound, and high inflation makes it difficult for South Sudan to meet the criterion necessary for full integration.¹⁷²

The Government of South Sudan does not have skill when it comes to macroeconomic policies. To a large extent, South Sudan's macroeconomic situation is just starting from nothing. For example, today the republic of South Sudan has control over the growth of money supply and credit, the change in monetary reserve requirements, or other monetary policy instruments. The GOSS have control over the exchange rate policy or the management through its expenditure management and revenue collection and allocation.¹⁷³ The only problem which South Sudan is facing now is because the country depends on income from oil which is 98%. Macroeconomic stability is a pre-requisite for private sector growth and development, and it becomes more critical in a post-conflict situation as in South Sudan.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁰ Smith, Peter H. (ed.) (1993) *The Challenge of Integration: Europe and the Americas*, London: Transaction Publishers.

¹⁷¹ Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph S. (1975) 'International Independence and Integration', in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds) *Handbook of Political Science*, Andover, MA: Addison-Wesley.

¹⁷² Interview with Yier Yier, Warrap State Coordinator in Juba, Government of Warrap State, Juba South Sudan, 16 June 2013.

¹⁷³ World Bank /International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/IBRD (2009), *Sudan: The Road toward Sustainable and Broad-Based Growth*, The World Bank, Washington

¹⁷⁴ Yongo-Bure, Benaiah (2007), *Economic Development of Southern Sudan*, University Press of America, Maryland/USA, Plymouth/U.K

Chol Biar argues that in spite of the foreign exchange windfall and increased aid flows, the South Sudanese economy as a whole showed a current account deficit of nearly 10 percent. Non-concessional loans from China and India were used to finance the growing current account deficit as South Sudan has no access to concessional borrowing from financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. South Sudan lacks roads and communication infrastructure. Providing itself with effective and fully functioning infrastructure, as well as appropriate governmental institutions to enhance trade, is key to South Sudan's ability to extract benefits from its membership in the EAC.¹⁷⁵

One of the big challenges is insecurity in rural areas which mostly is caused by tribal clashes and rebels who are fighting against the government of South Sudan; the insecurity in capital city of Juba is mostly caused by criminals from both South Sudanese and citizens from East Africa, slow down wellbeing and economic growth in the country. The change of culture required to move minds away from existing accepted practice to new ways of delivering security and rule of law, particularly to show that this Government is different from the previous one. Corruption and human rights violation become major challenges that are one of the requirements from East African community for South Sudan to improve on that side. There are also challenges on low levels of literacy, inadequate legal framework, inadequate infrastructure, equipment and communications. Resulting inadequate service delivery at all levels, including the challenges of keeping the population informed and consulted during this period of regular change, also many ex-combatants, not just in the SPLA, but in the Police, Prisons, Wildlife Services and possibly elsewhere. Nhial Enock argues that the Elemi Triangle border dispute between Kenya and South Sudan if not resolved remains a key challenge for the government of South Sudan in its quest for regional cooperation and

¹⁷⁵ Interview with Chol Bair, Brigadier General, Ministry of Defense, Juba South Sudan, 22 August 2013.

integration.¹⁷⁶

3.7 Conclusion

Therefore, with all these challenges which South Sudan are facing today, the new born nation still two years old baby with time, the South Sudan will work together with other in EAC. Also through regional cooperation and integration South Sudan could achieve its vision as it struggles for its vision of identity. Cattle raids in South Sudan have been a source of common fighting for decades that cannot prevent us for achieving our vision. In pastoral communities cattle are an indicator of social standing and wealth, often used in restorative justice and marriage practices.

¹⁷⁶ Interview with Nhial Enock, Deputy Speaker, Lakes State Legislative Assembly, Rumbek South Sudan, 2 June 2013.

CHAPTER FOUR

ENHANCING SOUTH SUDAN'S VISION 2040: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the importance of enhancing South Sudan's vision 2040 through regional cooperation and integration with an analysis of South Sudan's vision 2040. The study focused on conceptualization of regional integration, an explanation of South Sudan's vision 2040, and a SWOT analysis on South Sudan in East Africa and the Horn of Africa Sub-region. The chapter has argued on enhancing South Sudan's vision 2040 through regional cooperation and integration and finally the chapter mentioned the challenges facing both the new nation and the ruling party.

This chapter therefore focuses on study findings and analysis at length. The study was carried out through focused group conversation and interview with senior official from ministries, legislative assembly, state coordination offices and other informants who formed a narrative from their expectation on how South Sudan can enhance its vision 2040 through regional cooperation and integration. The chapter also critically analyses the policy on socio-economic and governance issues, the tension between South Sudan and Sudan, and how the cooperation agreement has not been fully implemented and the way the two parties (SPLM and NCP) blamed each other supporting for supporting rebels in both countries.

4.2 Emerging Issues

4.2.1 The Relevance of Regional Cooperation and Integration

When South Sudan applied for admission to the EAC, in November 2012, a technical committee of the EAC recommended to the body's Council of Ministers that South Sudanese admission be delayed until the country is able to satisfy various economic and institutional pre-conditions for membership.¹⁷⁷ However, there is little doubt that South Sudan will eventually join the EAC. Given that EAC membership is inevitable, it is argued that South Sudan should conduct a careful analysis of the implications of joining the EAC and, with its findings in hand, astutely negotiate the terms of its EAC membership.¹⁷⁸ David Demay observes that Regional cooperation and integration is an important aspect in achieving *Vision 2040* because it will open the market for South Sudan's goods and services in other countries within the EAC hence helping the country to achieve productivity and innovation and hence creation of wealth and reduction of poverty.¹⁷⁹

South Sudan is very rich in natural resources but not limited to oil. However, it faces significant economic challenges that largely stem from the fact that the country overwhelmingly depends on oil for public revenues and the fact that the country is land-locked with poor infrastructure. Pursuant to the 'Dutch Disease' process, a massive influx of oil revenues can cause real exchange rate appreciation and thus cause a shrinkage in the domestic tradeable goods sector (i.e., export), while increasing the country's reliance on imports. This is detrimental to the country's trade deficit and to economic diversification. Oil dependence also exposes the economy to international commodity price volatility, negatively impacting South Sudan's ability to engage in long-term fiscal planning.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ Beny, Laura Nyantung, (2012), *if managed Properly, Oil need not be a Curse for South Sudan*, Gurtong Focus Magazine.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with David Demay, Member of Parliament, National Legislative Assembly, Juba South Sudan, June 2013.

¹⁸⁰ Musa, Ismail, *Regional Blocs Threaten Uganda's Grip on South Sudan Market*, Daily Monitor (Kampala), Feb. 8, 2012,

In contrast, diversification of South Sudan's economic base will generate substantial benefits, such as increased employment and income opportunities in urban and rural areas and lower consumer prices.¹⁸¹ Economic theory and evidence underline the importance of export-led growth. Such growth is most effective when it centers on sectors in which the country has a competitive advantage, meaning it can produce those goods at relatively lower opportunity cost than its trading partners. In South Sudan, one of the most promising sectors is agriculture. The country's 'green belt' provides a fertile ground for a productive agricultural sector. Not only would development of the agricultural sector contribute to export-led growth, but it would increase South Sudan's food security and lower dependence on agricultural imports from neighboring countries, like Uganda and Kenya.¹⁸² It would also create income and employment opportunities in rural areas of South Sudan, which desperately need economic vitalization. Other highly promising economic sectors in South Sudan include livestock, animal products, and timber. Consumer demand for these products, like agricultural goods, is high in the region. National investment and trade policy should focus on these sectors in which South Sudan has a potential competitive advantage.¹⁸³

However, South Sudan faces considerable challenges in developing these sectors and promoting their exports. Such challenges include real exchange rate appreciation, poor transportation infrastructure inside South Sudan and between South Sudan and neighboring countries, and South Sudan's poor capacity in value-added production. Poor transportation infrastructure increases the cost and time required to export goods abroad.¹⁸⁴ Outdated capital stock and shortages of skilled labor currently hinder development of competitive industries. Cross-border trade is also stifled by institutional constraints, such as multiple (and often

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² *South Sudan 'Free to Join EAC'*, The Citizen (Dar es Salaam), July 12, 2011

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Onyiego, Michael, *East Africa Eager to Welcome Independent Southern Sudan*, Voice of America, Jan. 20, 2011

arbitrary) checkpoints and roadblocks and other burdensome customs regulations. Insecurity, violence and crime also increase the cost of transporting goods. As we explain below, EAC membership could help South Sudan to overcome several of the foregoing hindrances to trade.¹⁸⁵

The benefits of regional integration and cooperation for South Sudan, new born nation's accession to the EAC could have significant positive economic effects on the region. For example, South Sudan is one of the most lucrative markets for Ugandan goods and services, and South Sudan's EAC membership would further expand Uganda's access. Furthermore, South Sudan's oil and mineral wealth and agricultural potential may present attractive investment opportunities for the entire region.¹⁸⁶ EAC membership has contributed too many benefits for South Sudan which include: More efficient border clearance and information exchange, EAC integration has result in the harmonization of regional standards and the reduction of customs clearance procedures. Regional trade between South Sudan and its neighbors in the past was often constrained by inefficient border clearance procedures. It was also hindered by disparate product standards, and imperfect communication and information exchange between producers and traders on one side and markets and consumers on the other.¹⁸⁷ The EAC membership has resulted in harmonized procedures, better communications and information exchange, making regional trade cheaper and more efficient for South Sudan. A landlocked country, like South Sudan, is greatly benefiting from access to deepwater ports and urban population centers in EAC countries like Uganda and Kenya. Uganda, in fact, has began construction of a railroad linking Kampala to Juba and Kenya has proposed construction of a regional pipeline to transport oil from South Sudan to

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ *South Sudan 'Free to Join EAC'*, The Citizen (Dar es Salaam), July 12, 2011

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

Kenyan oil refineries and ports on the coast.¹⁸⁸ Access to other regional corridors through EAC membership could dramatically increase South Sudan's competitiveness and revenue. Moreover, such access may be essential if the Republic of Sudan persists in imposing high transport fees on certain South Sudanese exports, particularly oil. However, these benefits are contingent on the success of other regional integration programs, such as implementation of harmonized standards, more efficient customs clearance procedures, and reduction of non-tariff barriers.¹⁸⁹

EAC cooperation programs on the provision of power, transport, and water could spur infrastructure development in South Sudan. The 2006-2010 EAC Development Strategy, for instance, emphasized the importance of adequate and reliable provision of infrastructure "through the sharing of the production, management, and operations of infrastructure facilities."¹⁹⁰ The strategy also listed energy, road, and information and communication technology infrastructure provision as a priority. Improved physical and information infrastructure would reduce production and distribution costs for South Sudan, making its producers more competitive.¹⁹¹

In addition, EAC membership has given South Sudan the ability to join and buy shares in the East African Development Bank (EADB), which would help strengthen the country's financial infrastructure and provide South Sudanese entrepreneurs with access to technical and financial assistance. Financial services investment from Uganda and Kenya could decrease borrowing costs for South Sudanese entrepreneurs and thereby aid in poverty reduction. Regional cooperation has resulted in knowledge transfer from partner states to

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Strike, Meredith, *South Sudan: The South's Trading Trajectory*, The Independent (Kampala), July 8, 2011

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

South Sudan. Kenya, for instance, possesses expertise in financial services, while Tanzania has expertise in investment facilitation and Uganda has competence in coffee production. Transfer of some of this know-how to South Sudan is aiding the development of domestic industries. The educational services investment from EAC partners is likely to increase educational opportunities and the quality of educational instruction in South Sudan.¹⁹²

Regional integration offers the prospect of an important regional market for South Sudanese exports and services. According to commentators, Uganda has the potential to become a significant importer of South Sudanese products like coffee and gold. In addition, EAC countries are likely to buy South Sudanese oil, if given the opportunity. Regional demand and protective EAC tariffs could also support growth in South Sudan's agricultural sector, which is critical. Given high CETs on agricultural products, trade among EAC partners is somewhat shielded from non-EAC competition.¹⁹³

Moreover, as implementation of the EAC Common Market continues, citizens of South Sudan are benefiting from increased employment opportunities in other EAC partner states, more efficient and harmonized processes for issuing work permits, and freer movement within the EAC. In addition, increased remittances from more South Sudanese working in EAC countries could help promote rural development and serve as an important source of revenue for rural families. EAC membership would support the development of predictable, consistent and transparent regional economic policy frameworks and thus promote investment in the region, including South Sudan. For example, planned harmonization of

¹⁹² World Bank,(2011), Doing Business in Juba 2011, Subnational Series, Comparing Business Regulation In Juba And 183 Economies, Washington D. C: The IBRD/The World Bank

¹⁹³ Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), (2010). Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II (ARIA II). Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa

EAC partner states' taxes and investment incentives is likely to attract foreign investment. More generally, greater openness and economic integration may increase South Sudan's overall economic competitiveness.¹⁹⁴

Moreover, various EAC cooperation programs could help increase political stability and improve security in South Sudan, resulting in both economic and non-economic benefits. In particular, enhanced EAC cooperation to prevent terrorism, armed robbery, and drug smuggling has decreased crime and resulted in increased security in the region. It is also argued that an EAC security infrastructure program currently being discussed could act as a deterrent against Khartoum's aggressive stance towards Juba. Other EAC cooperation programs target important issues such as natural resource management and conservation, provision of health services, and food security. If these programs increase regulatory harmonization throughout the region, they may reduce the costs of economic exchange between South Sudan and other EAC countries.¹⁹⁵

EAC membership is positioning South Sudan as a regional corridor for EAC exports to non-EAC countries. Rwanda, for instance, has predicted that EAC membership will help it become a regional corridor for trade between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the “DRC”) and the EAC. Given its location, South Sudan could also become a regional corridor between EAC and non-EAC countries in the region, such as the DRC and Ethiopia. This would allow South Sudan to generate revenue through transportation support services and other related enterprises. South Sudan is also possibly becoming a critical conduit for trade between the region and the Republic of Sudan, possibly increasing its political and economic

¹⁹⁴ Abdoulahi, M. (2005). Progress Report on Regional Integration Efforts in Africa Towards the Promotion of Intra Africa Trade. Work in progress no. 5. African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC). Addis Ababa.

¹⁹⁵ USAID (2010), South Sudan Post Conflict Economic Recovery and Growth: An Agenda for USAID Engagement, USAID, Washington D. C.

bargaining power with its northern neighbor.¹⁹⁶

The regional cooperation through EAC membership is likely to strengthen South Sudan's relative position within the world system. EAC membership provides partner states a stronger, collective negotiating position that could result in deeper bilateral and multilateral trade concessions vis-à-vis non-EAC members. The EAC, for instance, is currently negotiating a collective Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union (EU). The EAC's negotiating power could also be leveraged in future multilateral and bilateral negotiations, thus resulting in better benefits for South Sudan in achieving Vision 2040. EAC membership could strengthen South Sudan's bargaining stance vis-à-vis the Sudan.¹⁹⁷

While regional integration may offer many benefits for South Sudan, there are also several potential challenges. The EAC economic bloc requires uniform standards across partner states. As partner states have differing trade capacities and differing development strategies, compromises are necessary. Uganda, for instance, was forced to adjust its export-oriented growth model and increase its external tariff rates to comply with the CET. Kenya and Tanzania, in contrast, were forced to reduce protective external tariffs in response to CET.¹⁹⁸

While some reservations and exemptions are possible, South Sudan may need to at least partially adjust its trade, investment, and development policies in response to common EAC goals. In addition, conversion to the CET and elimination of intra-EAC tariffs could result in lost tariff revenue and limit South Sudan's ability to implement autonomous trade and investment promotion programs. EAC membership may have negative effects on South

¹⁹⁶ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2006). African Economic Outlook: 2005/2006. Paris. OECD Development Centre and African Development Bank.

¹⁹⁷ Yongo-Bure, Benaiah, (2007), Economic Development of Southern Sudan, University Press of America, Lanham.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

Sudanese consumers. For instance, certain products such as rice, fresh and concentrated milk, maize, sugar, and wheat are currently designated as "sensitive" and thus face higher CET tariff rates. Higher CETs on imports of such fundamental consumption goods is likely to increase their prices and therefore the cost of living.¹⁹⁹ This effect occurred in Rwanda, especially in urban areas. Needless to say, a higher cost of living could make EAC membership politically unpopular among the population. The required elimination of intra-EAC tariffs and non-tariff restrictions could result in an influx of goods and services imports from more developed countries like Uganda and Kenya. Domestic producers already have a difficult time competing with producers from other East African countries in production, distribution, and access to finance. Even the agricultural sector, which has great natural potential, is currently unable to compete with neighboring producers. And, this effect may be magnified when South Sudan joins the EAC. If so, some domestic producers in South Sudan will lose out. Some experts, in fact, have expressed concerns that South Sudanese accession to the EAC within a few years of independence would undermine the development of domestic industry.²⁰⁰ One way that South Sudan might mitigate this effect is by negotiating temporary exemptions to protect emerging domestic industries, as will be discussed below.

Some commentators have questioned the utility of EAC trade integration generally, since partner states' economies are neither very complementary nor very competitive. As a result, they predict, trade gains from regional trade will be the result of trade diversion rather than trade creation.²⁰¹ If these commentators' predictions are correct, not all EAC members will benefit from greater trade integration and South Sudan, as a less developed EAC member, may be particularly susceptible. In addition, some partner states have questioned whether

¹⁹⁹ UNCTAD, *Economic Development in Africa: Strengthening Regional Economic Integration for Africa's Development* (2009)

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

regional markets in the EAC are large enough to support economic growth in the region. Rwanda and Kenya, for instance, have begun to explore parallel opportunities in other regional blocs like COMESA and SADC due to a realization that the EAC market alone may be too small to sustain economic growth.²⁰²

Even if South Sudan would gain from intra-EAC trade, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) may limit the realization of these benefits. While low intra-EAC tariffs may promise theoretical trade gains, commentators have noted that actual trade benefits are limited by EAC partner states' continued use of NTBs. NTBs in particular have prevented regional welfare gains, employment creation, and poverty reduction from being fully realized and have negatively impacted the flow of goods and services by increasing the costs of intra-EAC trade. Domestic political interests in EAC partner states may complicate EAC integration efforts. In the words of one commentator, the EAC still suffers from significant institutional weakness, lack of political will and the absence of a shared common vision for its future integration trajectory. In fact, EAC partner states' implementation of certain regional integration programs of potential benefit to South Sudan has been delayed because of domestic political resistance.²⁰³ For example, resistance from local political groups has obstructed implementation of the Common Market Protocol and the resulting free movement of skilled and unskilled labor across partner state borders. Implementation of infrastructure cooperation programs has also been slow because of a lack of technical support. In addition, regional tensions could also limit the actual benefits of EAC membership. In other words, even if partner states eliminate formal barriers to cross-border trade, the positive effects of such actions may be limited because of disagreements and disputes across borders. Some, for instance, have argued that some South Sudanese harbor a strong distrust of Ugandan

²⁰² Ibid.
²⁰³ Ibid.

traders. Specifically, many South Sudanese feel that they are unable to profit from trading opportunities because the market is dominated by Ugandans. Thus, even if formal barriers to trade between Uganda and South Sudan were eliminated, such distrust and animosity could constrain the efficient flow of goods between the two countries. Although unlikely, political differences could eventually lead to the unwinding of regional integration programs, as happened with the first EAC. While integration efforts have been promising, some harmful competition between EAC partner states remains difficult to eliminate.²⁰⁴ If the diverging interests of EAC partner states become irreconcilable, reversal of certain integration programs may become necessary. As in the first EAC, this could result in significant costs for EAC partner states.

4.2.2 The Role of Socio-Economic and Governance Issues

Organizations such as UNDP, UNFPA, UNOPS and UNICEF are supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan through various programmes and initiatives relating to socio-economic and governance issues in order to enable it achieve vision 2040. The various programmes are aimed at improving the skills of the workforce at all levels of the health system; providing reliable technology, equipment and supplies; and improving health infrastructure and supporting health services. Through its reproductive health programme, UNFPA is strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Health and other state entities to manage and deliver reproductive health programmes. UNFPA is also supporting service delivery at state and facility levels, including the provision of reproductive-health kits to Government and NGO facilities and the placement of more than 15 international volunteer midwives across 9 states in South Sudan.²⁰⁵ Additionally, in order to reduce maternal mortality, UNFPA is working with the Ministry of Health on the regulation and training of

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Government of Southern Sudan.,(2010). GOSS Priority Core Governance Functions" Prepared by MoFEP. , November 2010.

midwives. This work includes supporting the establishment of the first midwifery school in Juba.²⁰⁶

To help combat HIV/AIDS, create awareness about reproductive health issues and prevent gender-based violence, UNFPA has been partnering with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Recreation to provide youth peer education and youth-friendly health services. UNFPA and UNICEF are working together to advocate for and leverage resources for assessments and surveys that are needed to strengthen the evidence base for programming to reduce maternal mortality. UNDP has been managing grants from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, implementing projects through South Sudanese institutions, United Nations agencies and NGOs.²⁰⁷ A Round 9 Global Fund grant of \$47 million, which UNDP arranged for in 2010, will be used to strengthen the health systems in South Sudan through reconstruction of health infrastructure, capacity development and enhancement of service delivery. UNOPS will be able to complement these efforts by providing its expertise in the construction of hospitals, clinics, laboratories and warehouses, in the procurement and supply-chain management of goods, and in the rehabilitation of key access roads across all 10 states.²⁰⁸

As part of its gender and gender-based violence programme, UNFPA is working to enhance gender equality and to prevent and respond to gender-based violence in development and humanitarian settings. UNFPA has supported the development of the gender policy for the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare and of national standard operating procedures for addressing gender-based violence. UNICEF will be focusing on service delivery, capacity

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ SALIH, M.K., (2008). Gender Equality Assessment of the Basic Services Funds (BSF) in Southern Sudan: Phase II. CIDA ed., Southern Sudan NGO Policy Forum., 2011. INGO Strategic Intentions Report. , 12th May 2011.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

development, social transformation and behavioural development, as well as on developing knowledge of the situation of South Sudanese children and on advocating for child rights. Priority will be given to strengthening systems for the delivery of basic services and to implementing the provisions of the Child Act of 2008, especially as regards registering the births all children and strengthening formal and informal child-protection systems.²⁰⁹ UNICEF and UNOPS are implementing a multifaceted joint programme to ensure child-friendly learning environments through improvements in infrastructure, capacity development, sports activities and child and community participation. UNDP, UNICEF and other development partners will be promoting the use of cash transfers to households as a way of mitigating risks and of reducing vulnerability and poverty, particularly in households with young children.²¹⁰ Joseph Garang Deng observes that “In my opinion, IGAD is a major regional organization that is assisting South Sudan in achieving vision 2040. It does this through facilitating the peace initiatives between Sudan and South Sudan.”²¹¹

Efforts to accelerate inclusive economic growth and diversification aim at improving agricultural productivity and creating an enabling environment for private-sector development and microfinance, with the idea that this will generate growth employment, reduce poverty and provide the poor with greater access to markets, goods and services in order to achieve vision 2040. Among the key activities are building infrastructure, such as water catchments, irrigation canals and feeder roads, to improve production and access to markets.²¹² UNDP, in collaboration with other partners, such as the World Bank and the South Sudan Microfinance Development Facility, continue to support the creation of a regulatory framework for the microfinance industry in South Sudan. Institutional capacity

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Interview with Joseph Garang Deng, Senior Inspector, Ministry of Information, Juba South Sudan, 11th July 2013.

²¹² Wohlmuth, Karl, (2012), Promoting Agriculture, Agro-Industry and Agribusiness in Africa: Role of Science, Technology and Innovation (STI), 15 pages; forthcoming in: IWIM Blue Series Discussion Papers Number 124, IWIM: University of Bremen

and local-level microfinance services are being expanded, inter alia, with assistance from an ongoing United Nations Capital Development Fund/UNDP programme. Additional interventions to promote inclusive growth and economic development will address youth unemployment (e.g., through labour-intensive work programmes) and climate change. Negotiations are ongoing to replicate the successful cooperation between UNDP and UNOPS to implement climate-change projects with funding from the Global Environment Facility's Small Grants Programme.²¹³

In the area of governance, agencies are improving the capacity of Government to deliver on core state functions and public services. State-building and supporting decentralization will continue to be a fundamental focus of the post-independence period to enable South Sudan achieve vision 2040. At the same time, strong oversight and accountability mechanisms need to be established by strengthening the capacities of the South Sudan legislative assembly and of the 10 state assemblies, as well as of the South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission and the South Sudan Audit Chamber. UNDP will continue to deliver on capacity-enhancement initiatives, such as the Rapid Capacity Placement Initiative and the IGAD Regional Initiative.

In partnership with the Government of Norway, this latter initiative is seconding 200 civil servants from IGAD member States to functions within South Sudan ministries, commissions and state governments.²¹⁴ These civil servants have been mentoring South Sudanese civil servants and helping with the delivery of services. For its part, UNOPS is continuing to contribute to the enhancement of government physical infrastructure at national and state levels through the construction and equipment of offices. Additionally, as a corollary of its implementation of infrastructure projects, UNOPS is contributing to developing the

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ World Bank, (2011), A Poverty Profile for the Southern States of Sudan, Washington D. C.: The World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Africa Region, March 2011

capacities of officials of the Ministry of Transport and Roads and of the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure to plan, design, implement and monitor projects and to manage procurement.²¹⁵

UNDP is seeking to deepen its capacity-development support to rule of law institutions, including the Ministry of Justice, the Judiciary, and the Police and Prisons Services within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This support continues to aim at enhancing the reach and quality of justice services through actively supporting the decentralization of rule of law institutions and promoting a human-rights-based approach. As an example, for the Police and Prisons Services, UNDP will prepare front-line officers and wardens to deliver rights-based services to specific groups, paying special attention to vulnerable populations such as women, children and internally displaced persons. UNICEF support will further strengthen the juvenile justice system and improve access to justice for children. UNICEF will also contribute to inter-agency efforts to research customary justice systems and increase the protection of women and children who come into contact with customary laws.²¹⁶ A key component of the rule of law interventions is the construction of adequate facilities in South Sudanese states. As part of this effort UNDP and its implementing partners, including UNOPS, will be building 63 new police stations and posts, 4 court facilities and 7 correctional facilities. Additionally, UNOPS, together with the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, has developed designs for governance/rule of law hubs which would group together police, customs and judiciary functions.²¹⁷

Production of reliable and comprehensive statistical information is essential for the design of development strategies that promote employment, sustainable livelihoods and the effective

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ MSI., (2009). Government of South Sudan Functional Capacity Prioritization Study. USAID Juba.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

delivery of basic services. To this end UNDP, UNFPA, UNOPS and UNICEF will continue to support the development of the (formerly the South Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation), so that it can produce, analyse, store and make use of data to inform the decision-making processes.²¹⁸ UNFPA is also working to establish a Population Unit and Population Secretariat which will play a crucial role in the research, coordination and integration of population issues in policy dialogue and development processes. UNFPA led the taking of the census in 2008 and is supporting preparatory activities and resource mobilization for the first post-independence census. This is tentatively planned for 2014. UNOPS supported the 2008 census through the procurement of assets, construction of infrastructure, and building the logistical and operations capacity of the National Bureau of Statistics. UNICEF, together with UNFPA, has supported the conduct of the Sudan Household Health Survey (of round 1 in 2006 and round 2 is 2010). UNICEF has also supported institutional and human-resource capacity building for the establishment and management of the South Sudan Info database.²¹⁹

UNDP is contributing to the medium- and long-term planning for the next poverty reduction strategy covering the years 2014-2018. Working with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, UNDP will also continue to support sound planning, budgeting and fiduciary management across all three levels of government: national, state and local. UNDP provided essential support for the 2010 elections and the 2011 referendum, particularly through the management of the basket funds established to develop the capacity of the Referendum and Elections commissions, and by working in the areas of voter education, domestic observation, media training and procurement of essential materials.²²⁰

²¹⁸ UNDP (2012), Status of MDGs in Sudan in 2012,

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ UNDP/United Nations Development Programme,(2006), Macroeconomic Policies For Poverty Reduction: The Case Of Sudan, Published for the United Nations Development Programme In Sudan, Khartoum:

4.2.3 The Impact of the Ongoing Tension Between the two Sudans

Akoc Akoc Manhiem argues that the current wrangling between the Republic of Sudan and South Sudan over Abyei is likely to affect South Sudan in its quest for regional integration.²²¹

Although Sudan is a small player on the global oil stage, oil has been a dominant factor in the economies and domestic and international politics of north and south since it was first discovered in the late 1970s. The IMF had forecasted that following South Sudan's independence in 2011, Sudan's real gross domestic product would decline by 7.3% in 2012. AFP reports that an economist who declined to be named stated that it was estimated that the damage to the Heglig oil field during the fighting with South Sudan depleted oil revenues by a further 20%. The dispute with South Sudan over oil transit fees has resulted in an approximately USD 2.4 billion shortfall in Sudan's public finances. South Sudan has been even more negatively impacted.²²² According to the Sudan Tribune, a leaked confidential report by the World Bank states that South Sudan is potentially headed for an economic collapse in response to the shutdown of oil production earlier this year. The report predicts that there will soon be a "sharp" drop in the influx of hard currency and that once citizens realize that their currency lacks value, there will be a run for US dollars.²²³

The World Bank's Director of Economic Policy and Poverty Reductions Programs for Africa Marcelo Giugale stated that once this run begins 'the currency will almost certainly collapse.' An analysis of South Sudan's foreign reserves shows they could be depleted by July 2013 'at which point state collapse becomes a real possibility.' Giugale further stated that an economic collapse 'could result in social and political fragmentation, unrest and instability.' Additionally, the lack of state revenues will force the government to impose budget cuts on

²²¹ Interview with Akoc Akoc Manhiem, student, Buluuk Secondary School, Juba South Sudan, 15 July 2013.

²²² World Bank, (2011), World Development Report 2011, Conflict, Security, and Development, Washington, D. C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank

²²³ Ibid.

the SPLA, which is a fractious force that includes many former enemies of the government.²²⁴ In addition to the economic challenges posed by the conflict over oil, both countries are faced with other obstacles at home. South Sudan is confronted by heavily-armed, ethnic-based fighting that has resulted in thousands of deaths.²²⁵

Additionally, a looming major food crisis could be made worse by the lack of government revenue. On the other side of the border, Sudan is battling student protests, the simultaneous rebellions in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan state, strict US economic sanctions, International Criminal Court (ICC) genocide charges against President al Bashir, and lack of political cohesion within the ruling National Congress Party (NCP); all of these have put the Sudanese government on the defensive. The ICG states that if Bashir's government were to fall, it "could trigger a wild scramble by multiple armed actors for control of Khartoum and other parts of the country that would be hard, if not impossible, to restrain". In addition, both countries have been accused of supporting rebels on the other side of the border, thereby enabling a constant stream of weapons into each other's country.²²⁶ A coalition of African and Arab civil society organizations have warned that a return to war between Sudan and South Sudan could cost the region a loss of over USD 100 billion. The coalition believes that both Sudans would lose a combined total of USD 25 billion in gross domestic products (GDP), while neighbouring countries could lose up to USD 25 billion in GDP. It is expected that international peacekeeping and humanitarian costs for the region could exceed USD 30 billion.

²²⁴World Bank,(2011), Doing Business in Juba 2011, Subnational Series, Comparing Business Regulation In Juba And 183 Economies, Washington D. C: The IBRD/The World Bank

²²⁵ Outattarria AD. (1999). Regional Integration in Africa. An important step towards global integration. IMF Speeches.

²²⁶ Ibid.

4.3 Conclusion

Among many South Sudanese interviewed agreed that regional cooperation and integration could enhance South Sudan's vision 2040. Many citizens of the new nation want the country to be strong economically so that it could participate equally with EAC members. Many people want the government to have good relations with Sudan because they can survive economically together because both countries need each other. Regional cooperation and integration enjoys support of South Sudanese people. This is because the new country wants to be strong economically. Regional integration to EAC is relevant because if South Sudan desires to be a member, the policy makers should prepare themselves well and put all things in place, that is, requirements that must be met for a country to be admitted as a member of EAC. As we have deduced from these explanations, it is possible to enhance South Sudan's vision 2040 through regional cooperation and integration.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary

The first chapter dealt with the background of the study, statement of the research problem, objectives, reviewed the available literature, set objectives and research questions. It additionally provided a theoretical framework that guided the study. The framework is attached on the need to set up and maintain diplomatic scheme and regional cooperation and integration efforts as a developing system of international governance of regional cooperation and integration.

Chapter two provided an overview of conflict in Sudan and the making of South Sudan and long history of suffering; it explained the struggle for the vision of identity. The chapter provided the conflicts that were deeply rooted in history that led Southerners to vote for separation. It examined the war of visions that have been fought between the South and the North. It explained the power of negotiation and the way the two parties (SPLM and NCP) came into agreement through CPA which gave the Southerners the right to self determination. Finally the chapter provided the major achievements of the long struggle of South Sudanese people and independence of South Sudan on 9th July 2011.

Chapter three provided the way to enhance South Sudan's vision 2040 through regional cooperation and integration with an analysis of South Sudan's vision 2040. South Sudan needs to benefit from free trade, and develop into a customs union. The chapter explained a conceptualization of regional integration, how South Sudan can benefit from regional integration as collective form. The chapter also used SWOT analysis on South Sudan in East Africa and the Horn of Africa Sub-region, the chapter argued on the enhancement of South

Sudan's vision 2040 through regional cooperation and integration and finally the challenges which are currently facing South Sudan and how regional cooperation and integration can assist the young nation in the world to achieve its vision 2040.

Chapter four came out with the findings and analysis at length. The chapter focused group conversation and interview with senior official from ministries, legislative assembly, state coordination offices and other informants who formed a narrative from their expectation on how the country can enhance its vision through regional cooperation and integration. The chapter provided a critical analysis on the policy of socio-economic and governance issues, the tension between South Sudan and Sudan, and how the cooperation agreement has not been implemented and the way the two parties (SPLM and NCP) blamed each other for supporting rebels in both countries.

5.2 Key Findings

The study explored on how to enhance South Sudan vision 2040 through regional cooperation and integration with an analysis of South Sudan's vision 2040. The study further indicates that the achievement of South Sudan's vision 2040 should go hand in hand with regional cooperation and integration.

The study revealed that The Eleme Triangle border dispute between Kenya and South Sudan remains a key challenge for the government of South Sudan in its quest for regional cooperation and integration.

The key finding in the study is that South Sudan needs to understand all the principles of EAC. It is argued that South Sudan should conduct a careful analysis of the implications of

joining the EAC and, with its findings in hand, astutely negotiate the terms of its EAC membership.²²⁷

The study revealed that indeed South Sudan faces considerable challenges in developing these sectors and promoting their exports. Such challenges include real exchange rate appreciation, poor transportation infrastructure inside South Sudan and between South Sudan and neighboring countries, and South Sudan's poor capacity in value-added production. Poor transportation infrastructure increases the cost and time required to export goods abroad. Outdated capital stock and shortages of skilled labor currently hinder the development of competitive industries. Cross-border trade is also stifled by institutional constraints, such as multiple (and often arbitrary) checkpoints and roadblocks and other burdensome customs regulations. Insecurity, violence and crime also increase the cost of transporting goods. As we explain below, EAC membership could help South Sudan to overcome several of the foregoing hindrances to trade.²²⁸

Also, another key finding of the study shows that the macroeconomic situation resulting from the closure of oil production has slowed economic growth, the depreciated South Sudanese pound, and high inflation makes it difficult for South Sudan to meet the criterion necessary for full integration.

The other key finding from the study organizations such as UNDP, UNFPA, UNOPS and UNICEF are supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan through various programmes and initiatives relating to socio-economic and governance issues in order to enable it achieve *vision 2040*. The various programmes are aimed at improving the skills of

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Onyiego, Michael, *East Africa Eager to Welcome Independent Southern Sudan*, Voice of America, Jan. 20, 2011

the workforce at all levels of the health system; providing reliable technology, equipment and supplies; and improving health infrastructure and supporting health services.²²⁹

The other key finding of the study is that regional cooperation and integration is an important aspect in achieving *vision 2040* because it will open the market for South Sudan's goods and services in other countries within the EAC hence helping the country to achieve productivity and innovation and hence creation of wealth and reduction of poverty.

The outstanding border issues and the future of Abyei also emerged as another finding in the study. There is need for the international community and concerned regional bodies to keep vigilance on any development towards violent conflict and should swiftly intervene to avert the catastrophe from happening.

Another key finding is that one of the pillars of vision 2040 is safe and secure nation. So, if there is regional cooperation and integration, then there will be peace and security between South Sudan and its neighbours which will go a long way in achieving a safe and secure South Sudan.

Poverty is another key finding in the study. Through regional cooperation and integration poverty reduction and food security is an achievable goal if only the man-made conflicts can be overcome, policy and mindset reformed, and institutional impediments to private entrepreneurs and private sector removed.²³⁰

²²⁹ Government of Southern Sudan.,(2010). GOSS Priority Core Governance Functions" Prepared by MoFEP. , November 2010.

²³⁰ Abdelnour, S., Badri, B., El Jack, A., Wheeler, D., McGrath, S., and Branzei, O. (2008) *Examining enterprise capacity: A participatory social assessment in Darfur and Southern Sudan*. Toronto: Centre for Refugee Studies, York University.

5.3 Recommendations

On the strength of research findings several recommendations are advanced as follows:

There is need for South Sudan to join EAC, the total benefits to South Sudan may be greater than the total costs of joining the EAC, it is by no means certain. Thus, South Sudan should undertake a comprehensive economic analysis to investigate the potential advantages and disadvantages of membership, as well as the country's likely role as a member of the EAC. With regards to accession negotiations, South Sudan is potentially at a disadvantage vis-à-vis other regional states. Unlike South Sudan, current partner states have had the chance to incorporate their national interests into common policies, programs, and institutions at earlier stages. With the exception of the political federation, negotiations concerning the formation of other institutions (including the Customs Union, Common Market, and Monetary Union) may already be concluded by the time South Sudan joins the EAC. Therefore, accession will likely mean implementation of a variety of agreements that South Sudan was not able to negotiate and that may not be in its best interest. Rwanda for example entered into EAC accession negotiations with a clear understanding of how membership would affect its national priorities, welfare, and capacity. Before agreeing to membership, the country engaged in substantial research to determine the economic and non-economic opportunities and losses that could result from EAC membership. After such studies, Rwanda decided that EAC membership would facilitate and promote its national policy objectives and took steps to mitigate the costs of such membership. South Sudan would do well to follow suit.

Secondly, South Sudan should focus on polling and educating its local stakeholders on the effects of regional integration and cooperation on the achievement of South Sudan's vision 2040, since public support is critical. To ensure that all aspects of regional economic integration are considered and addressed, South Sudan should consult a diverse range of stakeholders, including ordinary citizens, bureaucrats, politicians, business community

members, and civil and professional organizations because each group of stakeholders may have different expectations and fears regarding regional cooperation and economic integration. Consultations with local stakeholders could help South Sudan safeguard stakeholder interests as well as lessen any negative impact of regional cooperation and economic integration to enable the country achieve vision 2040. Rwanda, for example, was able to safeguard its local small businesses through identifying and addressing weaknesses in advance of regional integration, by means of the government's consultations with stakeholders.

Thirdly, South Sudan should show the world that it is not a failing state but still two years old baby and that the economic difficulties currently being experienced are brought about by the shutdown of its oil production earlier last year.

Fourthly, South Sudan should consider the possibility of offsetting increases in the prices of critical consumption goods through subsidies or other public programs (for example, tax and redistribution policies). However, such measures will not be feasible if the government of South Sudan continues to be in a financial bind due to a self-imposed oil embargo.

Fifth, South Sudan should develop a priority list of national policies and important non-EAC consumer goods and negotiate temporary reservations or exemptions, as other EAC members have done upon joining the EAC. Rwanda, for example, was able to successfully exempt certain non-EAC tariff rates and investment incentive programs during its EAC accession negotiations.

In particular, Rwanda negotiated a list of specific industrial raw materials, key agricultural products, and other sensitive products for which different tariff rates other than the CET

would apply. The country also successfully negotiated the continuation of certain existing investment incentives and facilities for domestic manufacturers and investors. However, Rwanda agreed that its reservations and exemptions would expire in two years after its accession to the EAC when it would be required to fully implement its EAC commitments. Similarly, it is unlikely that South Sudan would receive permanent reservations or exemptions from EAC requirements.

Sixth, the regional cooperation through EAC membership is likely to strengthen South Sudan's relative position within the world system. EAC membership provides partner states a stronger, collective negotiating position that could result in deeper bilateral and multilateral trade concessions vis-à-vis non-EAC members. The EAC, for instance, is currently negotiating a collective Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union (EU). The EAC's negotiating power could also be leveraged in future multilateral and bilateral negotiations, thus resulting in better benefits for South Sudan in achieving vision 2040. EAC membership could strengthen South Sudan's bargaining stance vis-à-vis the Sudan.²³¹

Seventh, South Sudan might consider gradual implementation of its EAC commitments. Following accession to the EAC, for example, both Burundi and Rwanda were given two years to fully implement their commitments. However, two caveats should be noted. First, given the economic disparity between South Sudan and the regional states and the extensive programs to be implemented upon South Sudan's accession, South Sudan may desire a much longer implementation period than granted to Rwanda and Burundi. But partner states may be reluctant to agree to this. Second, while delayed implementation would allow South Sudan to mitigate the harmful effects of certain EAC commitments, complete

²³¹ Yongo-Bure, Benaiah, (2007), *Economic Development of Southern Sudan*, University Press of America, Lanham.

elimination of such effects may be impossible.

Eighth, South Sudan would be well advised to use the additional time to pursue the necessary economic and governance reforms, as well as encourage the development of domestic industry. Regional cooperation programs cover a variety of economic and non-economic issues. If properly implemented, such programs could greatly benefit South Sudan. However, as also discussed, domestic political resistance has delayed or frustrated implementation of several EAC initiatives and programs.

Last but not least, South Sudan should critically assess the probability that important cooperation programs will be implemented as planned. For programs in which timely implementation is uncertain, South Sudan should determine the extent to which EAC partner states would agree to definite, binding commitments and defined implementation schedules in conjunction with accession negotiations.

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