UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

CHALLENGES IN COUNTER TERRORISM IN THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

A CASE STUDY OF KENYA

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R50/69030/2011

A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN THE PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES.

SEPTEMBER, 2013
DECLARATION

a) Declaration by Candidate

This research proposal is my original work. It has not, to the best of my knowledge been submitted or intended to be submitted by anybody else for any examination at any other institution of learning.

Signed...............................................................Date.................................

Josphat Kiprono Bundotich
R50/69030/2011

b) Declaration by the Supervisors

This project has been submitted for examination with our approval as the University supervisors.

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ABSTRACT

The study investigated the challenges in counter terrorism in the third world countries. Being a case study of Kenya the researcher’s main objective was to examine the challenges that Kenya is facing in the fight against terrorism. The researcher relied on both secondary and primary data in this study. The field study entailed collection of data from three key institutions that handle terrorism matters in the country i.e. the International Police Organization (Interpol), the Kenyan Anti-terrorism Police Unit and the Immigration Department. The study revealed numerous challenges that Kenya faces in countering terrorism. The respondents were rich in information most of them having served for many years in their respective organizations and therefore very resourceful. It came out clearly from the study that Kenya’s capacity to counter terrorism was in-adequate. The factors which have contributed to this in-adequacy include under-funding of critical institutions tasked with countering terrorism. Failure by the government to embrace modern technology especially in the Police service and the Immigration Department was found to be a contributing factor to this in-efficacy. Lack of proper tools and equipment for security agencies as well as in-adequate training were also pointed out by the study as another major challenge. A long this line as well, the study lay blame on the state for neglecting its security personnel in terms of pay, housing and general welfare thereby making them a de-motivated lot. High levels of unemployment which have made the youth an easy prey for terrorist groups also came out as a factor in the study. This is alongside radicalization and religious factors. The study recommends that third world countries should earmark security among their priority areas and address the shortfalls highlighted in the findings of the study. It acknowledges the fact that terrorism is a real security threat in Kenya and the region today.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDF</td>
<td>Kenya Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>International Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Department of Criminal Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Officer Commanding Police Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-governmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transition Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADE(651)</td>
<td>Advanced Detection Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEAS</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Closed Circuit Television</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATPU</td>
<td>Anti-terrorism Police Unit</td>
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DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to my wife Margaret Chepngetich and lovely children Brenda, Ivan and Tabby. I appreciate the sacrifice they made during the entire period of my study. I also dedicate this project to my parents John K. Bundotich and Patricia J. Kiprop who encouraged me to soldier on despite the many hurdles along the way in the course of my study. My brothers, in laws, colleagues and friends cannot go without mention. Thank you all for your support.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY (THE PROPOSAL)

1.1 Introduction

The study is aimed at interrogating the challenges that Kenya as a country is facing in the fight against terrorism. It aims at scrutinizing the efforts that the Kenyan Government has made in countering terrorism and the extent to which these efforts have realised positive results. To a large extent, Kenya has not been able to combat terrorism and adequately mitigate the consequences of the activities of these organised gangs. It is out of this situation that the researcher is interested in identifying the challenges that has curtailed the State’s effort in countering terrorism.

1.2 Background of the Study.

Terrorism is one of the major threats to human life in the 21st century instigated by the emergence of extremists who propagate use of violence with the intention of causing mass deaths. This phenomenon was uncommon at Kenya’s independence until the 1970s when the country was hit by the first terrorist attack targeting the Norfolk hotel. On August 7, 1998, another major attack was directed at the United States Embassy in Nairobi’s central business district. This caused hundreds of deaths with massive destruction of property. This drew a major security concern in the country and changed the perspective from which the government viewed terrorism.

Initially viewed as a problem of the west, terrorism is real in Africa and Kenya has equally suffered the consequences of this crime. The cruelty of this crime is such that the casualties are massive and therefore intimidate, demoralise and even cause great fear among governments and citizens of targeted states. This is exactly what has been witnessed in the attacks in Nairobi, all of which were directed at areas with much human activity like bus
termini, churches, night clubs and even public service vehicles. Government officials including security agents have not been spared by these terrorist attacks either.

In response to this wave of crime, the Kenyan government has put in place measures which include establishing the anti-terrorism police unit and increasing awareness of the public on the dangers of terrorism. There are still major milestones to be made in the fight against terrorism though. These non-state actors have become sophisticated by the day hence calling for the change in policies and general approach to this kind of crime. Many challenges which will be scrutinised in the course of this study have hampered the fight against terrorism.

1.3 Statement of the Research Problem.

Terrorism has affected Kenya a great deal just like many countries in the world in the 21st century. States have taken this phenomenon as one of the major threats to the security and the well-being of their citizens. Apart from individual state’s strategies to alleviate terrorism and/or mitigate its consequences, bilateral as well as multilateral responsibilities have been inadequate. This mutual response to terrorism allows for sharing of vital information and resources necessary to tackle the threat. Regional integration and now globalization has been greatly influenced by the quest to counter terrorism. Kenya as a country has taken the lead in the East African Region in fighting terrorism both within and outside its territory. The pursuit of the Al-Shabaab terror group into Somalia by the Kenya’s defence forces in October 2011 is one such bold action taken by the country towards this course. Within the country, on the other hand, the security agencies charged with internal security have not relented in the war declared on terrorism. Despite the effort by the government to tackle the insecurity brought about by terrorism, many constraints have hampered this commitment. After the terror attack on the world trade centre (twin towers) in the United States (now famously referred to as 9/11) the war on terror took a new dimension. After the US took the strategic lead in this
agenda, many other countries like Kenya who are perceived to be friends of the United States were forced to re-shape their security arrangements given the possible consequences from the terrorists who were believed to be at war with America and their allies. To affirm this argument, Kenya and Tanzania suffered a terror attack that targeted the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on August 7, 1998. Many resources have been pulled together to combat terrorism since then as the country attempts to cope with a problem that is new, expensive to deal with and so devastating. Pressure is also mounting on the government to guarantee its citizens protection from terrorism related crimes that in the last decade has become the most challenging security issue in Kenya. What efforts is Kenya making to counter terrorism and what are the challenges it faces?

1.4 Study Objectives

1.4.1 General Objective

The main objective will be to examine the challenges that Kenya is facing in the fight against terrorism.

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

The other objectives include:

- To outline the progress made in countering terrorism in Kenya.
- To recommend possible remedies to mitigate the challenges of countering terrorism in Kenya.

1.4.3 Research Questions

1.4.3.1 Is the Kenyan Government doing enough to counter terrorism?

1.4.3.2 What are the factors impeding Kenya’s fight against terrorism?
1.5 Justification of the Study

1.5.1 Academic Justification: A day hardly goes without a mention of either a terror attack, an attempted attack, a failed attack, or a travel advisory in Kenya. This is an indication that terrorism is real and a major problem in the country hence the need to understand why this is continuously happening. Given this state of affairs, the study will help to identify the hitches that make Kenya prone to terror attacks, address the factors contributing to these shortfalls and spell out corrective measures. The researcher will therefore be able to add into the data bank of knowledge in the academia revolving around this subject matter.

1.5.2 Policy Justification: This knowledge will help in finding solutions to the problem that Kenya is facing in the fight against terrorism. It is important for the country’s action both at individual and policy making levels. It is also critical for the determination of the country’s growth and development given the impact of insecurity on various sectors of the economy. The study could be a tool to be used to guide government’s planning on issues of insecurity emanating from the acts of terrorists. The problem that Kenya faces in tackling terrorism is common with other East African region countries especially Tanzania and Uganda. The findings and subsequent recommendations that will be made by the researcher can therefore be useful not only to Kenya but also to other countries in the region.

1.6 Literature Review

1.6.1 Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the review of earlier studies carried out by other researchers revolving within this area of study. It is important to point out that many books and other materials have been written on terrorism and recommendations made, many of which have
been useful. The researcher will in the course of his review attempt to fill in the gaps left by his predecessors.

1.6.2 Pro-terrorism Arguments

Payne notes that many nationalist groups attempt to achieve nonviolent political change but are often brutally suppressed by governments. This is seen in many states especially in the developing countries. Often nationalist terrorism is accompanied by peaceful, legitimate, political activities designed to achieve autonomy, political freedom and equality or independence. The role played by human rights groups which is not usually condoned by governments is an example of how interest groups of good will are often labelled terrorists by the governments they oppose but labelled national liberation movements or freedom fighters by their supporters, including other governments. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict stands out as the most prominent contemporary example of national terrorism. Payne brings out the fact that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has plunged the Middle East into four major wars and notes that it continues to fuel ongoing violence in the region. He recommends early mitigation of such conflicts because failure to do so has global implications, largely because of the world’s dependence on petroleum imports from the Middle East. It also affords an opportunity to other terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda, to use such conflict to justify their activities and to recruit members throughout the Islamic world¹. From Payne’s point of view governments should allow to be challenged by other actors within the state as long as such challenge is for the good of the citizenry.

In the decade prior to September 11, 2001, scholars and experts perceived that fundamental changes were taking place in the character of terrorism. The use of violence for purposes of political ideology or the representation of ethnic minority groups had failed in its purpose

leading to the emergence of postmodern or ‘new’ terrorism. Motivated by promises of rewards in the afterlife, some terrorists are driven by religious reasons to kill as many of the non-believers and unfaithful as possible. Laqueur and Wright\textsuperscript{2} point out that suicide tactics had been observed in Lebanon as early as 1983 and militant Islam had previously been viewed as a state sponsored, regional phenomenon.\textsuperscript{3} In common with death and taxes, terrorism will always be with us, just as it always has been. The strategic issue is how important will be its residual presence. Most of the world’s armed forces are not well designed, doctrinally prepared, trained and equipped to wage war against elusive handfuls of religious fanatics rather they are raised and maintained to fight regular enemies who would be approximate facsimiles of themselves. Notwithstanding their elusiveness, even terrorists with no fixed abode must have a territorial dimension to their existence and preparations. They require safe havens for training, for rest and recovery and for planning. Regular armed forces can threaten those sanctuaries. A popular American metaphor in the wake of 9/11 was that “we need to drain the swamps where terrorists lurk”\textsuperscript{4}. After 9/11 it was a mobilization of the global coalition by the US duped “war on terror”. The trail of Al Qaeda after it was founded in Afghanistan in 1988 is responsible for a string of atrocities including the failed attempts to blow up one of the towers of the World Trade Centre on the 23\textsuperscript{rd} February, 1993 (this would have killed 30,000 people and not the 3000 killed during 9/11), next it could have claimed credit for the successful assault on American soldiers in Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996 but it feared the wrath of the Saudi government. In 1998 it organised the lethal


\textsuperscript{3}Baylis J., S.Smith & P. Owens; The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations: 4\textsuperscript{th} ed; Oxford university press ,2008, pp 372-377

\textsuperscript{4}Gray Colin S., War, Peace and International relations- An introduction to Strategic History, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group ,London and Newyork,2007, pp 235-244
bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania then followed the Seaborne attack on the USS Cole in Port Aden in Yemen in 2000\textsuperscript{5}.

1.6.3 Assessment of Training and Development Needs

Relevant knowledge and skills are required for people to carry out their tasks effectively and efficiently. Lack of the know-how is likely to influence performance negatively. Training is an intentional act of providing the means for subordinates to learn. Any training efforts should, however, be based on a real need. Flipczak L. notes that “thou shalt know thy audience by doing a need assessment”\textsuperscript{6}. This implies that an organization or institution should tell what the trainees do not know about the subject it intends to impart knowledge on and why they need to know it. This point of view is critical if the war on terrorism is to be won not only in Kenya but in any state that is keen in fighting terrorism.

1.6.4 The Different Faces of Terrorism

Terrorism has been one of the most pressing political problems during the last half century. Its many-sidedness, inexpensive lethality and unpredictability make prevention and control difficult, costly and undependable.\textsuperscript{7} Domestic terrorism is another area that Payne dwells on and explores the April 19, 1995 where Americans watched in disbelief as bloodied bodies were retrieved from the federal building in Oklahoma City. The Americans were quick to lay the blame on Middle East terror groups but the reality was that the heinous act was committed America’s own Gulf war veteran Timothy McVeigh.\textsuperscript{8} This is clearly a challenge in dealing with terrorism given that the enemy is not always external but sometimes within.

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid
\textsuperscript{6} L. Flipczak, \textit{Training Need Assessment, Journal}, November, 1990, pp 121-125
\textsuperscript{7} Whittaker J. D., \textit{The Terrorism Reader}, London and New York; Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2003,Pg ii
The use of terror as a means to achieve political ends is not a new phenomenon but it has recently acquired a new intensity. According to Hottman terrorism owes its survival to an ability to adapt and adjust to challenges and counter-measure and to continue to identify and exploit its opponent’s vulnerabilities. Harold D. Laswell in his garrison state hypothesis centred on the proposition that a concatenation of social pressures and the technological developments were leading toward a worldwide domination of politics by elites specialized in the management of violence. That in the context of civil-military relations the garrison-state construct suggests that both economic and political elites are becoming increasingly dependent on the military as a coercion becomes more and more central to how societies resolve the fundamental question of “who shall rule”. The burgeoning strategic arms race and the accelerating proliferation of the various means of organized violence continue to lend persuasive support to lasswell’s view of coercion as a political currency. Indeed a competitive society and particularly one whose competitors are power hungry is a recipe for chaos. Among the strategies is to ensure that the competing enemy is defeated. The author’s suggestion that the militarization of society promotes disorder in the form of organised crime such as terrorism is a reality.

The attack by suspected Islamist militants on two churches in eastern Kenya in which the assailants killed 17 people and wounded 60 more is a confirmation of the emergence of African terrorist groups. This attack began after Kenya invaded Al-Shabab, a terror group into Somalia. The reflection of this attack depicted the many years the west have hunted down terrorists whereby Al-Qaeda pressed in Afghanistan and Pakistan, tries to establish a new staging ground in the Sahara and the Sahel, the band of lawless desert and scrub running

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10 Hottman, *Rethinking Terrorism and Counter Terrorism*, P 314
12 Ibid
east to west across Africa. A theory advanced here projects that Al-Qaeda would like to try to extend its franchise to three indigenous African groups: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which is in Algeria, Mali, and the Niger, then the Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria and Al-Shabab in Somalia. It is evident that the theory is seeing the light of day given the circumstances within the region. The three groups have strengthened by the day and today pose a great threat. The different terror groups employ different strategies and tactics to meet their objectives, for instance the Boko Haram attacks have a local focus. They target security forces, state institutions and churches although a faction has emerged with bigger ambitions, as it was demonstrated with a suicide car bomb attack on August 24, 2011 on the UN’s headquarters in the Nigerian capital Abuja which killed 24 people and injured 115. AQIM and Boko Haram represent a regional threat.

According to the US and Nigerian intelligence, AQIM has trained Boko Haram operatives for the last half decade. In spite of that, it is Al-Shabab that garners the most attention from western counter-terrorism efforts. This is where Kenya and the rest of the East African region have felt the impact, although the region has not had a long history Islamic terrorism. It was the August 7, 1998 US embassies bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in which 224 people died and which was carried out by Al-Qaeda affiliates based in Somalia, that gave the first notice to the world that a previously little known Saudi fundamentalist called Osama Bin Laden who lived in the Sudanese capital Khartoum for five years in the 1990s was making good on his 1996 and 1998 declarations of a global Jihad against the US. Al Shabab was originally the armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) an alliance of clerics and judges that tolerated the presence of the embassy bombers in its ranks and briefly ruled Mogadishu for six months in 2006. Ethiopia invaded Somalia and toppled the ICU in October 2006 in reaction to a Jihad declaration against the former by the leadership of the Islamic Courts Union. But Al-Shabab by presenting itself as a force for nationalist resistance, gained
strength and by 2008 was operating across much of Mogadishu and all of southern Somalia. It was encouraged by Al-Qaeda operatives in its midst leading to its alliance with Bin Laden’s group. It also drew 200 to 250 foreigners to Somalia to join mainly ethnic Somali from the US, Britain, Europe, and Australia but also itinerant Jihadists from across the Middle East and South Asia. According to Nigerian intelligence it also made contacts with Boko Haram. This would put Al-Shabab at the top of any western intelligence service’s Africa watch list. It also has a proven will and ability to operate internationally. In 2008 it killed 30 people in a series of bombing in Somaliland.

Terrorists are known to switch targets and this was witnessed when Uganda and Burundi troops went to Somalia as an African Union peace keeping force in 2007 to 2009 replacing Ethiopia. The consequence of this change of guard was a deadly attack on July 11, 2010 in Uganda’s capital Kampala where two Al Shabab suicide bombers blew themselves up within a crowd of soccer fans watching the world cup final match between Spain and the Netherlands. The devastating terror act claimed a total of 76 lives. The same revenge was applied to Kenyans when the Kenya defence forces invaded Somalia in pursuit of Al Shabab with several terror attacks majorly in Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa. Despite losing control of territory inside Somalia to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) which comprises of soldiers from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Sierra Leone and Kenya, Al Shabab’s operation outside it as a terrorist group grows ever bolder. The Kampala bombing was a watershed, says East African Human-rights and security investigator Clara Gutteridge. Suddenly, East Africa was a new front in the global war on terror”, she says.  

13 The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan in his address to the General Assembly on Terrorism on October 1, 2001 just like president George Bush of the United States described the terrorist attacks against the US as “acts of terrible evil” which shocked the conscience of the entire

world. Similarly on the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks the president of the General Assembly noted that terrorism must be seen for what it is—a global evil filled with hatred and extremism and evil which threaten the common values and principles as well as diversity of the entire civilised world.14

1.6.5 International Intervention on Terrorism

On the 11th September, 2001 (9/11), the international community was introduced to a new type of terrorism, one that was truly global in its organization and its impact. The post September 11, era has challenged governments, policy makers, religious leaders, the media and the general public to play both critical and constructive roles in the war against global terrorism15. The International Police Organization (Interpol) has had a major impact in the fight against terrorism. According to Dr. Todd Sandler a UT Dallas researcher, the International Police Organization redefined its mission by committing a share of its worldwide resources to combating terrorism and that effort appeared to be paying off a big way. “According to our calculations, Interpol gets about $ 200 in gain for every $ 1 it spends on the fight against terrorism” ‘and it is a big payback’ said Sandler, the Vibhooti Shukla professor of economics and political economy in UT Dallas School of economics, political and policy sciences, “that’s a big pay back”16.

Another milestone in the campaign against international terrorism is the economic sanctions imposed on governments who condone terror and the reward by way of incentives to those who denounce it. These are playing a significant and perhaps decisive role. Economic statecraft was mobilized quickly as an important part of the US and international response to

the 11 September 2001 attacks against the world trade centre and the pentagon. The carrot and stick introduced by the US and the UN came in handy with lifting of sanctions and offering economic assistance to specific nations to encourage them to cooperate in counter terrorism efforts and at the same time applying targeted financial sanctions against those individual organizations and states associated with terrorist activities. The Security Council took strong actions to crack down on international terrorism when it approved the Security Council resolution 1373 of 2001. This resolution was quickly adopted; just two weeks after the 11th September terror attack in the United States of America. It had the most sweeping sanctions measure ever adopted by the Security Council. It imposed worldwide financial sanctions, travel restrictions and military sanctions on terrorists and those who support them. It required every country in the world to freeze financial assets of terrorists and prevent the use of their territory for terrorist activities. The resolution required countries to prevent the movement of terrorists by means of effective border control and restrictions on the issuance of travel documents. 17 This intervention has played a major role in the fight against terrorism. However, it has also created divisions among states with those allied to the US strongly backing this agenda whereas those with radical views over the US fighting back and even turning their territories into hide outs for terrorists. Beyond this the anti-United States factions are key sponsors of terrorist organizations. What this means is that the application of the carrot and stick strategy has not fully addressed terrorism. Countries like Kenya who have been beneficiaries of the carrot have suffered the risk of reprisals in equal measure. Furthermore the strategy has contributed largely to intra-state conflicts creating social differentiations among citizens based on race, religion and other orientations.

1.6.6 The Link between Terrorism and the Proliferation of Firearms

Hillier and Woods explain that the war on terror has ironically fuelled the proliferation of weapons. It is critical that governments control arms particularly those illegally held within their territories in order to safeguard their citizens, however this is not the case. Government forces and armed groups have misused their easy access to weapons and target innocent civilians in disregard of fundamental human rights. At a time when fighting terrorism has been allowed to dominate the international agenda, one would expect that there would be a rekindled interest in arms controls and renewed efforts to prevent arms reaching those who commit abuses. Yet the reverse has occurred. European countries and others claim to base their arms-export criteria on respect for human rights; the USA has a specified law known as the Leahy Amendments to ban military aid and training to particular units of foreign security forces that commit human rights abuses. Yet these principles are being swept aside in the fight against terrorism. This argument by Hillier and Woods informs the reasons why illegal acquisition of illicit arms is rampant today particularly in developing countries. Kenya and many countries in the region are overwhelmed with the numbers of firearms and small weapons in the hands of unauthorised citizens. This situation has seen the creation of institutions to deal with what is now famously referred to as small arms and light weapons (SALW). Another key phenomenon arising from the writings of Hillier and Woods is the current struggle by states to carry out disarmament exercises and clearly explains why developing countries today have sophisticated arms illegally in possession of criminals. Such sophisticated weapons were a preserve of the west before the advent of the fight against terrorism. Moreover the increase in highly lethal and illegal firearms in the region has had an immense impact on the capacity of developing countries’ government forces particularly the

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internal security agencies to manage insecurity given the unmatched fire power of the criminals.

1.6.7 The Cost of Terrorism

It entails so much resources to deal with terrorism and more so the consequences of terror itself are costly. Richard Payne categorises the costs associated with terrorism into five. Firstly he says there is cost to individuals where citizens lose lives and suffer social, psychological and physical problems. This individual costs also involves fear which in the long run curtails the citizens’ freedom of movement, association, worship and many other rights and freedom associated with a secure environment. Payne says the second cost associated with terrorism is the economic cost. He says calculating the economic cost of terrorism and the responses to it are difficult given the complexities. The airline industry after the 9/11 attack suffered major financial losses and still feel the impact to date according to Payne. Cost to governments is another area that is identified in terrorism. This can be well explained by Kenya’s situation when it pursued Al-Shabab terror group to Somalia. The security checks we experience in today’s world e.g. when boarding airlines, when visiting private and public offices, socials places and even churches is a clear indicator that governments have an expensive responsibility over its citizen’s security. Payne says that the US federal state and local government spend money to guard bridges, nuclear power plants, train stations and many other areas. Reconstruction of Iraq is another example of how costly terrorism can be. Another cost is in terms of foreign policy. Alignments and re-alignments of states have been seen in the wake of terrorism, with many states cutting diplomatic ties with those they differ in opinion over terrorism and strengthening relations with those they read from the same script. Terrorism finally may cost democracy as Thomas Hobbes points out given that people may seek protection from forces that they perceive to be powerful hence
compromise their other democratic rights and freedoms.\textsuperscript{19} Governments also often justify violating individuals' rights by claiming to enforce national Security.\textsuperscript{20}

1.7 Theoretical Framework

Terrorism can be defined as the use of violence aimed to changed government policies on a certain issue (or issues) but directed on people who actually are not related to the policies in consideration.\textsuperscript{21} From this definition and the nature of this study, the researcher feels a political approach is critical in understanding terrorism. Instrumental approach is therefore the suitable theoretical framework that guides the research study.

Instrumental theorists point out that terrorists are deemed to be successful when they meet a political end. Furthermore, their relevance continues to exist as long as they achieve their objectives. This explains why terror attacks are not routine but come with devastating impact and when they are least expected. In many occasions the same terror organizations claim responsibility over several attacks occurring in different parts of the world and at different times. This clearly confirms the relevance aspect explained by the instrumentalists. Terrorists survive because they get publicity and recognition.\textsuperscript{22} Indeed the researcher believes Crenshaw’s argument explains the fact that different regions are known to dominated by different terror organizations. The east African region for instance considers Al-Shabab as a threat to the region. The United States of America would suspect first hand Al Qaeda over any terror attack that take place within its territory. These two scenarios are an indication that terrorists are recognised and therefore get publicity which enhances their survival. This


\textsuperscript{20} Hoffman Stanley, “Clash of Globalization,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 81, No 4, (July/August, 2002, P 113

\textsuperscript{21} Wilkinson Paul & Stewart A.M,(eds),\textit{Contemporary Research on Terrorism}, University of Aberdeen Press ,UK , 1987, P. 41

\textsuperscript{22} Rapoport, D. C., \textit{Inside Terrorist Organizations}, London; Frank Cass, 1988, Pp 27-34
theoretical approach is preferred by the researcher because it allows an in-depth study given the relaxed secretive information of terrorist organizations.

What distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violence is the fact that the former uses coercive intimidation such that people are terrified and therefore forced to toe those lines that the terrorist organizations want them to. Instrumental approach informs the fact that terrorism is motivated by their quest to achieve certain objectives by deliberately invoking violence. Terrorists are non-state actors and do not always fully achieve their goals given the state’s capacity to use its enormous machinery to suppress it. In this respect, terrorist organizations will therefore carry out a cost-benefit analysis in which case determines their course of action.

1.8 Hypotheses

- Kenya does not have adequate capacity to counter terrorism
- Terrorism is a major security threat to Kenya.

1.9 Research Methodology

1.9.1 Introduction

This section seeks to outline the method the researcher intends to adopt in carrying out his research. It will look at who comprises the population to be studied, who will be part of the sample drawn from the larger population and further explain explicitly the criteria to be used in arriving at the expected sample. Of essence in this section also is the information on the tools the researcher will use to collect the data relevant for the study.
1.9.2 Population

The researcher will carry out his study in Nairobi. The study will be centred on three key institutions that handle issues related to the subject under study. These institutions are the International Police Organization (Interpol), Kenya Police Anti-Terrorism Unit, and the Ministry of Immigration and Registration of Persons. The personnel (staff) under these ministries will therefore be the population under study.

1.9.3 Sample and Sampling Design.

The researcher will ascertain the number of employees in the above three institutions and draw a representative sample out of it. Given the researchers interest in generalizing the results of the study to the wider population, he will apply the probability sampling design by simple random sampling to select the representative sample.

1.9.4 Data Collection

Data will be collected by use of questionnaires. The researcher will prepare three sets of questionnaires that are tailor-made to suit the three institutions under which the study will be based. A total of fifty questionnaires will be prepared by the researcher and equally distributed to the relevant institutions for the input of the respondents. The researcher intends to hand deliver the questionnaires in person and collect them back at an agreed date and time.

The researcher will also base his findings on the observation he makes of the general environment. His observation of past terrorist incidences, how they have been handled and the reaction by the members of the public will be part of the researcher’s tool of data collection. The researcher’s experience in the subject matter will form part of the material by observation of past and present state of affairs in regard to the fight against terrorism hence the ability to realise the objective of the study.
1.9.5 Data Analysis

- Descriptive statistics will be used by the researcher to analyse his data. This will involve tabulated percentages and proportions. It will also include graphical representation of information.

1.10 Scope and Limitations of the Study

This research will widely rely on the knowledge and experience of the researcher in the police service. The researcher’s intensive training on investigation of terrorist activities and knowledge on counter terrorism-crisis management will be useful in carrying out the research. The research will also look into earlier studies with the same bearing. Furthermore, the researcher will carry out his study in the country’s capital (Nairobi) given that the impact of terrorism is greater here and also considering the accessibility of relevant information. Nairobi is also the command centre for the many agencies that deal with security issues among them terrorism hence the viability. The key institutions that the researcher will visit and collect relevant data are the Kenya Police Anti-terrorism Unit, the Kenya’s Ministry of Immigration and Registration of Person’s offices at Nyayo house and the International Police Organization (Interpol) offices in the capital city Nairobi. The data so collected in these three key institutions will be generalised and will reflect the true situation in as far as the challenges facing Kenya in the fight against terrorism is concerned.

1.10.1 Time: The researcher intends to set out for a field study and this requires more time which has not been taken into account. Although the researcher has a clear timetable to guide his work including when to send questionnaires to the field and when to receive feedback, there is likelihood that the respondents might work outside this timetable therefore constraining the researcher.
1.10.2 **Finance**: Financial constraint is another key limitation to adequately tackling the research problem. The researcher is not funded to undertake this study. The research will cover a wide area which will require the researcher to make several field trips to various institutions most of which are within reach. These trips will be at the researcher’s expense. The researcher may also incur other expenses in terms of food/beverage bills where potential interviewees prefer restaurants as ideal places to be interviewed.

1.10.3 **Confidentiality of information**: This is another challenge that the researcher foresees. The researcher will rely mainly on information from the Anti-terrorism Police Unit and other government agencies involved in counter-terrorism. Terrorism is treated as a security threat to a state and therefore records held by government on this aspect are confidential. As it is today, very fine details on terrorism is not availed for public consumption by the relevant security agencies citing the sensitivity of such information. Even in other instances inter-government sharing of this vital information is not forthcoming given their incompatible positions, perceptions and approach to terrorism. To minimize the likely impact of this constraint to the study, the researcher will draw a comparison of the diverse responses by the different security stakeholders under study with the view of ascertaining the truth. The researcher’s experience in the field under study will also be critical in countering this likely hurdle.

**1.11 Chapter Outline**

Chapter one forms the researcher’s proposal; it introduces the topic of the study subject. It gives the background information and the problem statement of the research. The chapter also outlines the objective of the study while reviewing previous literature. It gives the theoretical framework under which the researcher bases his study. Furthermore, here the researcher provides the hypothesis, the research methodology and the scope of his study.
Chapter two of this research study will give an overview of the security history of Kenya prior to the era of terrorism. It will also shed light on the uncommon terrorist activities of the period prior to the 9/11 full blown terrorism scenario.

Chapter three will highlight the state of affairs in Kenya and the East African region after the terror attack on the world trade centre in the United States of America (9/11)

Chapter four analyses the data collected by the researcher. It determines Kenya’s capacity in countering terrorism and comprehensively outlines the challenges the country has faced in the fight against terrorism.

Chapter five will conclude and make recommendations from the findings of the study.
CHAPTER TWO: TERROR ATTACKS IN KENYA BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

2.0 Introduction

Kenya as a country experiences numerous challenges in countering terrorism and therefore seeks to explain these challenges and demonstrates the government’s position in tackling them. This chapter therefore gives an historical background of terrorism in the country. It outlines how terrorism manifested itself in Kenya and limits its scope to the pre 9/11 (September 11, 2001) period. This is the period that witnessed the terror attack that hit the world trade center in the United States of America changing the world view on terrorism. The chapter also highlights a few similar attacks in the region and across the globe during the period in question therefore enhancing the understanding of the subject matter.

2.1 Kenya and Its Western Allies

Kenya has enjoyed a good relationship with the United States of America and the British since the pre-colonial period. The cordial relationship has been that of “friendship with benefits”. A case in point is the military cooperation between Kenya and the two countries where the US and Britain have military training bases in the country. From this relationship Kenya’s defense forces benefit from joint military training programmes among other financial and logistical support derived from this cooperation.23 An agreement between Kenya and the United States in which the latter is cleared to use the former’s military facilities signed in 1980 is one of its kind in the world’s military cooperation. This has not however, come without a negative impact. It is this same cooperation that the US relied on when it unsuccessfully raided Somalia in 1992. Accordingly, the hand extended by Kenya to the Americans clearly indicates that power can compromise and even replace neighbours,

looking at the powerful influence of the United States and other western super powers.\textsuperscript{24} Prior to the 9/11 terror attacks, the United States rubbished non-state actor’s threat to national security as unimportant but this was not to last because events that followed in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century saw Robert M Gates pronounce in his speech at Kansas state university in November 2007 that non-state actors were a threat to the US national security.\textsuperscript{25} According to him non-state actors had benefitted more than nation-states from globalization. Condoleezza Rice, the then President George W Bush’s national security advisor and who later become the country’s secretary of state spelled out the United States foreign policy priorities in the year 2000. Key among the five areas and which had a direct bearing to Kenya’s interaction with the US was that the United States was focused to renew strong and intimate relationship with allies.\textsuperscript{26} The other one was its pledge to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers which were increasingly taking the forms of the potential for terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction.\textsuperscript{27} It is this historical background that informs Kenya’s foreign policy. Acts of terrorism against Kenya since the 1970s to date is the consequence of the cooperation of the country with the western powers and America in particular.

2.2 The Terror Attacks of The 1970s

The period preceding the September 11, 2001 terror attack that changed the world’s view on terrorism was one that saw Kenya face challenges in dealing with this new nature of crime. The 1970s through to the 1990s was a period that the country was crippled by a couple of deadly terrorist attacks. It was a period that Kenya’s security intelligence agencies was one of


\textsuperscript{25} Robert Gates was US Secretary of State. Quoted in, Payne J. Richard, \textit{Global Issues;Political Economic and Culture},\textsuperscript{2}\textsuperscript{nd} ed, Pearson Longman. Illinois State University, 2009, P 116

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid

\textsuperscript{27} Rice Condoleezza, “Promoting The National Interest” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 79, No 1(January/February 2000), pp 46-47
the most effective earning recognition in the world map with comparison to the Scotland Yard detectives. Despite this status, the sophistication of terrorism was hard to deal with and furthermore, response and disaster management skills and ability as well as necessary equipment to mitigate terrorism and its consequences were inadequate during the period.

Among the very first bomb attacks that was associated with terrorism was the bomb strike of February, 1975 that hit the starlight night club and a travel bureau around the Hilton hotel in the capital Nairobi. On March 1\textsuperscript{st} of the same year, another similar attack was directed at a Nairobi bound bus killing 30 people. This was the beginning of a major security threat and general insecurity in post independent Kenya. Business was not as usual for both the government and its citizenry.

The country was fear stricken with the public demanding for assurance of their security from the government. The security forces muzzled their efforts in view of apprehending the culprits but this did not bear fruit. Another major challenge was the outcry by some politicians of the time that they were the target of the bomb attacks by the government. One such case was that of JM Kariuki.\cite{Githahu2011} It is important to note that at the time political assassinations were common in the world and particularly in Africa, given that states were ruled by military generals whose rise to power was through coups. An example of this was Uganda under President Iddi Amin Dada. States that were then under civilian rule were not exempt of suspicion from these assassinations because many of the leaders at the time were dictators. These scenarios therefore explain why it was difficult to believe the proponents of terrorism whenever there was an attack without suspecting a political game play by the government, hence the outcries by those that had rubbed shoulders the wrong way with the government that the purported terror attacks were an attempt on their lives. Pursuit of the

\footnote{Githahu M., “Star Newspaper”, August 11, 2011 \textit{Could String Of Bombings Be a Screen For Assassination Plot?} P 9}
criminals was further hindered and complicated by telephone hoaxes that distracted the
security agencies and also caused more fear among the public. Just like what has been
witnessed in the terror attacks of the 21st century where false threats are reported in offices,
institutions, streets and many other public places, the seventies was also characterized by
hoaxes majorly made through telephone calls.

The initiators of these falsehoods caused fear and uncertainty among the people, impacting
negatively on their livelihood. This also became a major challenge to the security agencies
given that they responded positively to any alarm raised only to realize that some were
hoaxes. Kenya and the region were not the only entities under siege. The period 1970/1980
marked the beginning of serious terrorism crisis across the world, particularly in Europe. The
Red Brigade of Italy for example carried out many assassinations of government officials and
several bomb attacks29. In Greece the Marxist Leninist terrorist group calling itself
Revolutionary Organization of November 17 had reigned terror since 1975. Germany also
suffered in the hands of terror groups that were motivated by white supremacy, anti-Jewish
and anti-foreigners principles just like the Americans30.

In the morning of September 5, 1972 a major terror attack occurred during the Olympic
Games which were taking place in Munich, Germany. This time the perpetrators were
members of a terror group known as the Black September. In this particular attack, eleven
Israeli athletes were killed. This was another terror act directed at the Israelis and whose
proponents were associated with the Palestinian Liberation Organization31 which has a long
standing history of conflict with the latter. Of essence to note is that wars of liberation have
never been received well by governments who want to maintain the status quo, hence the

University, 2009, P 125
30 Ibid
31 Ibid. PP 127
condemnation of freedom fighters and actions of those who differ with these regimes. What used to be guerilla warfare where selective violence was used against military targets, advanced to involve extensive violence with massive civilian casualties which reveal the involvement of terrorists. This explains Kenya’s situation since the advent of the Shifta war of 1963 to 1968 and which culminated into terrorism in the 1970s.

2.3 The Attack at the Norfolk Hotel In 1980s

The December 31, 1979 terror attack at the Norfolk hotel was more devastating. Apart from the huge number of casualties that resulted from the attack, it also took a different dimension as a terror group claimed responsibility over it. The attack was directed at the Norfolk Hotel which is at the heart of Kenya’s capital; Nairobi. It claimed the lives of at least twenty people with eighty others sustaining injuries. An Arab group calling itself Baader-Mainhof claimed responsibility over the attack. An event preceding the attack and which bears a direct link to this violent crime was Kenya’s participation in the hostage crisis in neighboring Uganda in 1976. It all started when members of a group calling itself Baader-Mainhof and the popular front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) took control of a French airline (Air France) which was carrying 258 passengers and ordered it to land in Uganda. Under the leadership of President Iddi Amin Dada, Uganda reinforced the hijackers with the president announcing his position in the hostage crisis whose victims were mostly Israeli nationals. This prompted a rescue operation by the Israeli Special Forces. The operation dubbed “Operation Entebbe” which got Uganda’s armed forces and Iddi Amin himself by surprise lasted for a record thirty five minutes but not without casualties as twenty Ugandan soldiers were killed, all seven hijackers and three hostages died.

Kenya’s role during the crisis and entire operation was that it allowed the Israeli military planes to land and re-fuel on its soil after their mission in Entebbe. The events leading to the
successful rescue mission humiliated Iddi Amin Dada and several Kenyans living in Uganda were massacred. Furthermore, Kenya was perceived as a sympathizer of the west and Israel following its logistical facilitation during the rescue exercise. This angered terrorist groups therefore subjecting the country to retaliatory terror attacks. The Palestinian Liberation Organization which had a historical conflict with Israel was majorly associated with the Norfolk attack given that the hotel was owned by the Jews.

The suspect in the Norfolk hotel bombing according to the Kenya police and international security agencies was one Quaddura Mohammed Abdel Al-Hamid who was 34 years old and a citizen of Morocco. Investigations revealed that he had checked into the hotel for a week before checking out and flying out of the country just a few hours before the explosion.32

2.4 The Bombing of the United States’ Embassies In 1990s

2.4.1 The Perpetrators of the Simultaneous Attacks

The US Embassy in Nairobi and that in Tanzania’s capital Dar es Salaam were targeted by terrorists on August 7, 1998. The two attacks were carried out simultaneously and were linked to members of the Egyptian Islamic jihad. The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation saw the hand of the self-proclaimed terrorist Osama Bin Laden and his accomplice Ayman Al-Zawahiri in the attack. Other suspects in the very attack who were in the Americans list were Azerbaijan and Fazul Abdullah Mohammed who actually was behind the planning and execution of the two attacks. Fazul was hunted down by Kenya’s security agencies but had managed to escape several police dragnets. With many attempts to subdue

him failing, Fazul was finally killed in Somalia in 2011. This took a combined effort of both local and international security apparatus.\textsuperscript{33}

The attacks were a revenge against the Americans whom the terrorists accused of taking part in the extradition and alleged torture of Egyptian Islamic jihad members arrested in Albania. The terrorists had issued a warning to the United States government that they would indeed revenge\textsuperscript{34}. Many theories have however been advanced on why the embassies were targeted by terrorists. Osama Bin Laden is one of such proponents of different viewpoints as to why the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed.

According to a journalist Lawrence Wright, Osama gave many reasons for directing these attacks to Kenya and Tanzania. One of the reasons is that America hatched the plot to partition Sudan in the two embassies. He also alleged that the invasion of Somalia in the 1990s by the Americans was planned in the same embassies.\textsuperscript{35}

2.4.2 The Casualties in the Embassy Attacks

Although the attacks were directed at the American embassies in the two East African countries and probably the intention was to cause mass deaths to the American citizens, those who bore the brunt of the bombings were the citizens of Kenya and Tanzania. In Kenya there were at least 212 recorded deaths and more than 4000 people were wounded. This huge number of casualties was a resultant of the magnitude of the impact of the explosion that shook the city bringing down other buildings adjacent to the embassy. Flying window glasses and many other objects caused massive injuries and destruction across the city. Furthermore the un-preparedness of the agencies tasked with disaster management contributed a great deal

\textsuperscript{33} B. Brian, \textit{Al Qaeda Operative Key To 1998 US Embassy Bombings Killed In Somalia}, Los Angeles Times, June, 12, 2011, P 9
\textsuperscript{34} H. Andrew, “A CIA backed team used brutal means to crack terror cells”, \textit{Wall Street Journal}, November 20, 2011, P 14
\textsuperscript{35} Lawrence.W., \textit{Looming Tower, Al Qaeda And The Road To 9/11}, New York, Knopf, 2006, P 272
to the increase in the number of those who perished. The country was overwhelmed by the magnitude of the attack forcing the government to seek international intervention and assistance in the form of specialized rescue equipment and personnel. In the Tanzanian case, 11 deaths were reported and 85 other people were injured. From the two incidences however, only 12 American citizens died 2 of who were CIA employees and a marine guard.36

Although terrorist acts are linked, in most occasions, to particular terror groups either through a claim by the leadership of the groups involved or through piecing together pieces of evidence, the challenge has been the false claims with the intention of cover-ups. In the 1998 US embassies bombings for instance, a group calling itself “Liberation Army for Holy Sites” claimed responsibility. However, according to the United States investigations, this was an attempt by the Egyptian Islamic jihad to cover itself yet it actually carried out the bombings.37 The attacks in Kenya and other countries in the east African region have come with many challenges.

One major challenge is that it has soared relationships among countries within the region. Neighbours have become suspicious of each other and in many instances watch over the other in the international relations arena. The cases in point are the enmity between Kenya and Uganda in the 1970s and that of the former and Somalia in the early 1990s. This is a confirmation that power manipulates and can cost neighbours a great deal. The Al-Qaeda agent who was arrested after the 1998 Nairobi blast Mohammed Sadeek Udah indicated to interrogators that he was willing to carry out terror attacks in Kenya because he hates Kenya.38 President Bill Clinton responded to the 1998 attacks by ordering for an operation dubbed “operation infinite reach”. The operation targeted Afghanistan and Sudan with

missiles fired to shell the identified sites. Sudan’s Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory was one of the victims of the attacks. The factory which was one of the pillars of the country’s health sector was destroyed. Essentially Al-Shifa accounted for the production of 50% of human and livestock medicine in Sudan. The facility was bombed because it was suspected to be a chemical weapons manufacturing plant. After the destruction however, the allegations and the suspicion over the dealings of the factory in the manufacture of the said illicit chemicals was disproved.  

2.4.3 Impact of International Intervention

Another international intervention was the passing of resolution 1189 by the United Nations Security Council which condemned attacks on embassies. After the attacks, Kenya was immediately considered for the anti terrorism assistance (ATA) program which is ran by the United States department of State Bureau of diplomatic security. This is a programme that was created in 1983 to help fight terrorism. It was aimed at providing necessary training to agencies of governments which are considered friends of the United States of America particularly in the fight against terrorism.

In Kenya, the government departments that benefit from this programme include the National Police Service, the Kenya Wild Life Service, the National Intelligence Service, the Immigration Department, the Treasury, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Judiciary. All these departments deal either directly or indirectly with terrorism hence the need for their employees to acquire relevant skills and knowledge in this field. The assistance also comes with grants and donations in form of specialized arms and equipment for use to counter terrorism. What stands out clearly however, is that Kenya finds itself in this love-hate situation because of aligning its foreign policy towards the interest of the United States and

the western powers in general. It is unfortunate that despite this phenomenon, Kenya still does not get a marching share of aid from its Western friends like other allies do. The Israelis and the Egyptians for example are beneficiaries of millions of US dollars annually that come as military assistance, if anything Kenya remains negatively affected. For instance Kenya’s tourism industry which is the third major contributor to the country’s gross domestic product has suffered a great blow since the advent of terrorism. Ironically the same western allies are fast at issuing travel advisories to their nationals against Kenya and the region.

Although the United States donated 48 million dollars to Kenya after the 1998 embassy bombing in Nairobi, it issued a statement that their position was clear that the donation was on humanitarian grounds and not because they were the cause of the attack. This is a clear indication that the United States was not ready to shoulder responsibility even where all fingers pointed at it as the cause of actions of certain terror cells. It also portrays a state that pursues and protects its interests even at the cost of other states without much regard to the latter.

A major step towards the fight against terrorism after the 1998 embassy attack was the creation of the Kenya Police Anti-Terrorism Unit. The unit started with officers numbering close to four hundred. This number was in adequate to handle the threat that was turning out to be an everyday affair and concern to citizens and visitors alike. With teething problems the unit faced challenges which included capacity to fight the crime it was created for.

It is important to note that the old form of terrorism was motivated by ideology. It was driven by the desire to achieve national liberation. The achievement of these expectations was made possible by pursuing some political agenda needless to mention the hand of overt state sponsors. Although the present day terrorism has taken a different dimension and portrayed a

different face due to new technology and globalization in general, the characteristics of the old terrorism are still at play in 21st century. The ancient acts of terrorism involved the actions of organized individuals with certain interests. These individuals had a well designed structure under which command and order was guaranteed and through which their politically, economically and socially motivated interests were pursued.

A good example of the kind of terrorism that was experienced in the 19th century and before then for instance was extreme leftism which was a product of Marxism or Leninism and Maoism. Although these largely had a great impact in the developed world, there was a spill over in the third world through channels such as colonization. The extreme groups of the time issued communiqués either stating their position and reasons for an attack that has already been executed or in some instances to sound a warning that they were about to carry out an attack. Their targets were also selectively identified with the preferred method of execution being by bombing.

2.4.4 The Secret Hand of Terrorism Sponsors

In many occasions terror attacks have been majorly sponsored by foreign elements and investigations have revealed concealed identities of the sponsors of certain terror attacks. A good example of such attempts to conceal the identity of those sponsoring terrorists is Libya’s case. In this case Libya commissioned the Japanese Red Army to attack the United States as a revenge following the latter’s retaliatory air strikes on Libya in 1986. The Japanese Red Army attempted to conceal their relationship with Libya by claiming that the terror attacks were the work of a Libyan sponsored operation citing a group calling itself Anti-Imperialist International Brigade. The true position however, was that Libya was the sponsor and not the fictitious organization named by the Japanese group. The attacks of the

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1990s were carried out by groups with more diffuse structures and membership.\textsuperscript{42} They were also characterized by a more amorphous religious objective with less-cohesive organizational pattern. This depicts the attacks of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998.

Seeking attention remains a key element that motivated terrorists in the 1990s. They felt that the media and the public were no longer drawn to the attention of terror violence unless they are lethal. Many incidents point to this argument. For instance a bomber in the federal building in Oklahoma city in April 1995, while under cross examination by his attorney, was not shy to say that he would not have drawn the same attention to his grievances against the United States without killing anyone. He said “…that would have not gotten the point across. We needed body count to make our point”. \textsuperscript{43} In the same breath, Ramzi Yousef Ahmed who was convicted for masterminding the New York City World Trade Center bombing in 1993 is believed to have planned to carry out simultaneously in-flight bomb attacks of 11 passenger airlines of the United States.\textsuperscript{44} Terrorists have benefitted from past experiences and the lethality of their weapons becomes pronounced by the day. This together with the enhanced relationship with state actors has increased their capacity and scope of attacks. In the 1980s, Libya for instance acquired 1000 tons of semtex, the product for the manufacture of chemical weapons from Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{45} The benefits realized by terror groups and which motivate them include military skills and tactics that have raised their stakes to commando levels.

Some notable terror attacks in the African region include the deadly gun fire attack by the Egyptian Islamic militants which targeted Western tourists in a Cairo hotel. The attack that


\textsuperscript{43} Quoted In Brooke J. “Newspaper Says Maceveh Described Role in Bombing”, New York Times March, 1, 1997, P 5

\textsuperscript{44} James Bone and Allan Road, “Terror By Degree,” The Times Magazine, London, October,18, 1997, P 16

\textsuperscript{45} Glenn Franklin, “Sale of Explosive Detection Systems Boosted, Blasted at Hearing,” Counter Terrorism and Security Intelligence, February, 12, 1990, P 6
took place in April, 1996 and which claimed 18 lives also involved the use of handgrenades.

Another incident of such magnitude was the terror attack in Egypt’s Temple of Queen Hatsheput in Luxur in November 1997. In this very attack at least 58 foreign tourists were massacred by Gamat al-Islamiya terror group\textsuperscript{46}.

2.4.5 The Role of the Cold War

The year 1996 recorded the highest number of fatalities in the international arena with a total of 510 people killed compared to 1968 when international monitoring and recording of international terrorism commenced, the year in question is ranked fourth highest\textsuperscript{47}. Rivalry among states after the cold war is a major factor to consider in understanding terrorism not only in third world countries but in the entire globe as well. Differences emanated from the cold war as various factions aligned themselves differently hence creating friends and enemies in equal measure. Before the Republic of Sudan split into two states, for example, it joined other countries outside the region like Iran and supported Islamic terrorism in Egypt. They did the same in other countries that they shared common interests with in the middle. The perception of Sudan’s neighbours’ in the region like Kenya over the former’s action would be that of suspicion given Kenya’s warm relationship with the west.\textsuperscript{48}

Religious extremism presented itself more after the 1980s away from the historical perspective of political and ideological terrorism associated with the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, this new phenomenon is partly to blame for the increased lethality of terrorism. Countries that have been faced with violent confrontations with religious bearing in Africa include Sudan, Egypt and Nigeria.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{47} Office Of The Coordinator For Counter Terrorism, \textit{Patterns Of Global Terrorism}, (1996), US Department of State Publication 10433, Washington DC, April 1997, PP 1-2
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid, P. 102
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid P.101
Other factors attributed to terrorism before the 21\textsuperscript{st} century includes ethnic separatism and the quest for nationalism. The two elements explain why the North and Sub-Saharan Africa, South and South East Asia as well as the Middle East experienced intensive terrorism after the 2\textsuperscript{nd} world war. Colonialism has played a big role in this case as the colonial masters in one hand and their subjects in the other hand pursued different interests. In many instances terrorism became an important tool for settling ethnic scores in central Africa, the Balkans and Caucasus.\textsuperscript{50}

It is estimated that over 80,000 lives have been lost since 1992 in Algeria as a result of factional terrorism. The United States on the other hand is expected to bear the effects of even distant ethnic terrorism given its power interests around the globe.\textsuperscript{51} This explains why the US government is very concerned with the safety and security of its citizens, military bases, and diplomatic missions and among other strategic institutions abroad. The impact of this concern by the United States to Kenya and other third world countries is that it comes with conditionality for instance compulsion to advance democracy in the region and failure to do so attracts negative consequences like travel advisories which in turn hurts affected economies.

Third world countries are major settings for terrorism, but also ill equipped with meagre resource base and skills as well as expertise to fight terrorism and its challenges. The terrorism acts of the 1970s and 1980s that rocked the world and which did not spare Kenya either was a reflection of a coordinated global terrorist network. Parties formed relationships of convenience which revolved around power interests. The region suffered in the wake of new terrorist groups that sprung up after transnational Marxist-Leninist group. The

newcomers were the militant Islamic Al-Qaeda groups which gained a global phenomenon. The period 1980 to 1990 became the decade of terrorism.\textsuperscript{52}

The era of transnational terrorism has witnessed terrorist groups plan and execute individual attacks or carry out several such attacks from a single base. This has been facilitated by advanced technology which favours coordination. The bombing of Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998 are a good example of coordinated simultaneous terror attacks. Commercially available handset radio communication and telephones have bolstered coordinated actions of terror cells. The Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) has made it possible for terrorist groups to communicate across a country, region and the entire world as long as such jurisdictions of interest are GSM enabled. The terrorist groups that were involved in the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania had a wide network of communication. Al-Qaeda terrorist groups have managed to use technology to beat counter measures put in place by anti-terrorist governments. Al-Qaeda for instance is neither centrally planned nor controlled but thrive across the world through individuals sympathetic to militant Islamic objectives with the activist motto “think globally, act locally”\textsuperscript{53}. Al-Qaeda like many terrorist groups consider their security paramount and therefore communication is limited and where there is any, prevention is taken which include surveillance and counter-surveillance measures like the use of clandestine or encrypted communication.\textsuperscript{54} Other major challenges in countering terrorism include legislation that concern infringements on civil liberties and privacy has enhanced the degree of security for terror cells. The development of 64 and 128-bit encryption freeware for example is difficult and costly to crack.\textsuperscript{55} Passwords, anonymity,

\textsuperscript{52}Baylis J., Smith S. & P. Owens,\textit{The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations:} 4\textsuperscript{th}ed; Oxford university press ,2008, PP 374-375
\textsuperscript{53}Ibid, P. 380
\textsuperscript{54}Ibid, P. 381
internet protocols and address generators have made individuals and groups thrive in criminality without easy detection by security agencies.

2.4.6 Contributors to Heightened Terrorism

Terrorism aims at demoralizing civilian population so that they can use discontent to manipulate national governments and other parties to a conflict. The Irish Republican Army planted bombs in the streets of London in the 1960s and 1970s with the intention of subjecting the residents of London to extreme fear and therefore compromising the government’s position on the Northern Ireland conflict. By giving action of terrorism television coverage the actors gain mileage. They are mindless and only often use calculated violence to have an upper hand. The fact that a few people may be injured in a single attack does not mean the same number gets affected. The reverse happens given that the psychological impact is devastating as the rest of the population keep imagining the same harm in the un-predictable future. The attacks in Kenya have left many people traumatized even where others were not survivors or eye-witnesses of a terror attack.

The terror attacks of the 19th century through to the 20th century have not seen any substantive deviation by the actors in their weapons of choice. The AK 47 remains the favourite gun for terrorists as well as the bomb. In the attacks in Kenya, these weapons have been used. Developing countries remain at the receiving end of the actions of terrorists as long as America continues to be the major target. The United States commercial interests abroad coupled with statuses that continually portray it as the only remaining super power makes it susceptible to the heinous acts of terror groups. Counter terrorism measures have been hampered by the availability of a wide range of weapons, some of which are simple while others are complex. Terrorists juggle between non-conventional and conventional

56 Ibid
57 Ibid P.199
means in their operations therefore continue to become a nightmare to security agencies. The difficulty in preventing the terror attacks in Kenya during the 20th century can be partly blamed on the simplicity of the weapons that makes them easy to conceal, deliver and detonate. Technological advancement and availability of materials necessary to develop explosives becomes another factor that has promoted terrorism. The explosive for instance that was used to bring down the Pan Am flight 103 in 1988 was simply a plastic explosive Semtex-H manufactured in Czechoslovakia during the cold war.58

Terrorists analyze mistakes made by their predecessors killed in the course of their acts, with a view of correcting them. Surviving group members use information in court records, press accounts and other sources to make their operations water tight. They are smart in their operations hence the explanation as to why there is an increase in the number of casualties on the part of the recipients of terror attacks and vice versa as we move from ancient to modern terrorism. In the same breath the precision at which terrorist groups operate increases with time. When the Red Army Faction realized for instance that the German Police were lifting finger prints from the bottom of toilet seats and from inside refrigerators, their surviving comrades resolved to use special ointment on their fingers to prevent visibility of finger prints hence defeating the intention of investigators.59 The Red Army Faction declared a cease fire in April, 1992 and according to one of its members serving a life sentence for the offence of murder, the group had “reached maximum efficiency” prior to the cease fire60

2.5 Conclusion

Since the 1960s through to the late 1990’s and to date, terrorism has been a critical security issue in Kenya. It came in with many challenges both to the government and its populace.

60 Quoted in Kempe Fredrick
Just like the rest of the third world countries, Kenya has over the years faced dire difficulties in countering terrorism. The meager resources in the part of the government and the advanced technology that have favoured terrorism are just a few of the many challenges that the country faced in countering terrorism in the period under review. Seemingly alien to Kenya and the region in general, terrorism followed the alien ideology to this part of the world. Given that the influence of the West remains dominant in the region, so will be the threat of terrorism as explained by the historical manifestation of terror attacks.
CHAPTER THREE: POST SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 TERRORISM EXPERIENCE

3.1 Introduction

The war against terror was globalized after September 11, 2001. This is the time the United States revived the armed foreign intervention which denounced rules of engagement and conventions dealing with international conflict. At this point the situation was worsened particularly in third world countries whose capacity to counter terrorism is negligible. Of essence to note is that after the terror attack on the world trade center in America in September 11, 2001, the dimension that terrorism took has never had as much negative impact to the developed countries as it has been to the developing world.

It goes without saying that the challenges facing governments, citizens and security agencies of the latter in dealing with terrorism are overwhelming. The train bombing in Madrid which targeted the commuter train system in Spain on March 11, 2004 killing at least 191 people and leaving 1,800 others injured just like scores of other bombings in the west did not shake the international power and/or internal structures of these great states; the reverse has been the case in the region.

3.2 Approach to Terrorism in the 21st Century

The United States entered the 21st century as a global power with nations, states, societies and regions facing the greatest terrorism threat ever coming in the wake of technological advancement61. Indeed every socio-political and economic change will be accompanied by threat of terrorism at all levels. This threat will not only target the US and the west but will affect its interests abroad directly or indirectly62.

62 Ibid
Direct threat of terrorism to the US is negligible given the difficulty to penetrate the security ring, it could be counter-productive politically or unnecessary to the traditional terrorists hence the option of hitting its allies in the third world which is a favourable target. Terrorists find the US citizens abroad as easy targets and therefore an opportunity to maximize on. United States citizens in Africa include military personnel who in essence are hard targets according to Bin Laden, diplomats, students, tourists and other US nationals engaged in different activities are a softer target for terrorists. Sadly though, non Americans have suffered more in past terror attacks targeting the US citizens. In the same breath the United States entered the century in question with a mindset to deal with terrorism as a problem both domestically and internationally.

The bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania are the consequence of engaging actively in world affairs. States have resorted to building their capacities in terms of preemption, deterrence and retaliation against terrorist groups and state sponsors in the 21st century with the US taking the lead.

Kenya continued to be a target of terrorist groups in the 21st century among other countries in the region. Coming just after the attack directed at the world trade center was the missile attack against an Israeli plane that was taking off from Mombasa airport in November 28, 2002. The surface to air missiles was fired at the Boeing 757 airliner owned by Arkia, an airline associated with Israel. The deliberately planned and executed mission by the terrorists however, aborted. A similar attack against the kikampala hotel was carried out as Israeli tourists were checking into the hotel. The aftermath of the attack was devastating with at least 13 people confirmed dead and another 80 sustaining injuries. Nine of those who perished

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were Kenyans who were either employees of the facility or members of an entertainment troupe hired to welcome the guests numbering 140.

As expected the Israeli military arrived aboard two military planes within hours to evacuate their injured citizens and also return home any other Israeli who was willing to leave the country following the incident. This is a clear demonstration of the might of developed countries.

3.3 Response to Al Shabaab Upsurge

Al Shabaab terror group became the most active in the region since the year 2011 following the invasion of Somalia by the Kenya defense forces (KDF) in pursuit of the members of this very group. The military operation between the transition federal government (TFG) soldiers and the KDF inside Somalia commenced in October 2011. On the outset the war was perceived to be a Somalia military offensive against the Al Shabaab insurgents with Kenya playing a support role. Interestingly the war became a Kenyan affair as the Somalia forces provided support.

Historically, Somalia has known no peace and since the start of the civil war in 1991 the country which is geographically placed in the horn of Africa has posed a security threat to its neighbours. Among key pointers to these threats is Somalia’s claim over Kenya’s northern frontier districts by the regime former president Said Barre. Such threats coupled with other issues of national interest like increased cross border abduction of high profile tourists, foreigners and government officials from Kenya-Somalia border towns triggered military action by the Kenyan government.

The incursion was geared towards securing Kenya’s porous borders and restoring its dignity as well as its image both nationally and abroad. The country had suffered bad publicity due to
soaring levels of criminal acts that were associated with terrorists. Of concern was the diminishing returns realized from the tourism sector as countries particularly in the west issued travel advisories to their citizens discouraging them from touring the region and in many instances Kenyan was singled out as dangerous to visit. In October 2011 for instance, the United States Embassy in Kenya warned its citizens about an imminent threat by terrorists. It warned that the attackers will target prominent facilities in the country and areas with busy human activity like shopping malls and night clubs.

In order to avoid international condemnation, Kenya invoked the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations charter in pursuing the Al Shabaab militants into Somalia. The article states that “nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individuals or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”

The Kenya defense forces further sort endorsement of regional organizations like the African Union and the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Subsequent to this, Kenya’s military was cleared by IGAD to employ air and naval blockade which was meant to cut off food supplies, war materials and communication from Kismayu by force. Consequently billions of dollars which the militants earned from Al Shabaab to finance piracy was curtailed.

3.4 Change of Strategy by Al Shabaab Operatives

The overview on the action of Kenya against Al Shabaab brings us to the repercussions as to whether the country has made milestones in the fight against terrorism or the problem has

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64 UN Charter, Chapter 51
been aggravated by Kenya’s military action. One major challenge experienced in the region after the operation by KDF and AMISOM is the change of tact by Al Shabaab.

While maintaining their main objective of intimidating governments and attempting to cause discontent among their populations, the terror group disengaged from its normal Modus Oparandii and adopted a hit and run attack strategy within and outside Somalia. Kenya became the main casualty in the region with its major cities and towns bearing the brunt of terror attacks.

Among the towns that have experienced a series of attacks are Nairobi, Garrisa, Wajir, Mombasa and Mandera. Critical scrutiny indicates that the expansive and in-adequately policed Kenyan borders have contributed to the upsurge of terrorists who sneak into the country un-detected and carry out their missions.

The involvement of the African Union in the war in Somalia through the AMISOM umbrella reflects the region’s concern over insecurity and paints a picture of solidarity in the fight against terrorism. It goes without saying that the eventual absorption of KDF into AMISOM enhanced the former’s capacity to engage the enemy away from home.

### 3.5 Retaliatory Attacks against Kenya

Just before the invasion of Somalia by the Kenya defense forces, there was a spate of attacks associated with terrorists across the country. On June 13, 2010 for instance 5 lives were lost and at least 75 people injured when a grenade was hauled at a crowd assembled at Uhuru Park in Kenya’s capital Nairobi during a rally organized by a church lobbying against the country’s proposed new constitution. Another attack on the same day targeted St. Polycarp Sunday school in Nairobi, an incident that claimed the life of one child⁶⁶. Of essence to note

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is the fact that Al Shabaab has a sizeable number of local Kenyan members a majority of whom are recent converts to Islam. This hinders the effort to fight the scourge greatly.

Al Shabaab and its sympathizers are believed to be behind a series of gun and grenade attacks that occurred in the year 2012 in various places across Kenya. Among the most deadly attack is one that claimed 17 lives of worshipers attending mass on July 1, 2012. Another one of almost similar magnitude was a grenade attack in an Eastleigh bound passenger vehicle that killed 10 people. Coming after Kenya’s invasion of Somalia was a clear indication that the terror group hit hard by the KDF where avenging the attacks.

Al Shabaab claimed responsibility over a spate of killings across the country. In another incident that would have been a retaliatory attack an Al Shabaab terror group member accidentally blew him-self up while planting an improvised explosive device (IED) at Garissa primary school grounds where a Kenyan presidential candidate Hon. Martha Karua in the March 4, 2013 general elections was to hold a rally.

An explosive was hurled at the Earthquake miracle ministries at Mirima area on Sunday June 9, 2013. The crusade had about 50 worshippers when at around 1900hrs the attack occurred. Many more attacks targeted law enforcement officers thereby worrying not only the citizens but also the government. As a remedy to these alarming events the Inspector General of police carried out a major reshuffle in the beginning of 2013. The changes saw the redeployment of senior police to various stations across the country.

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67 Ongeri Boniface, Terror Incident, “Explosives Kill Man Out To Attack Karua Rally”, The Standard Newspaper, Monday February 18, 2013, p 1 & 6

68 Mwajefa Mwakera, Security, “Terror Strike On Church Crusade Leaves 16 Injured”, The Daily Nation Newspaper, P 1 & P 4

enter the country illegally through north eastern Kenya and at the same time the government put on notice other government servants with similar intentions.

In one of such attacks two police officers attached to the department of criminal investigation (DCI) were shot dead while walking in Mugdi market in Garissa County at around 1230hrs. The undercover officers were killed on Friday November 16, 2012 and their firearms stolen. In September 30th of the same year two other officers on patrol along Ngamia road and its environs were killed prompting a swoop by the police that netted at least 10 suspects believed to be members of the Al Shabaab70. In another terror attack targeting Security agents, one police officer was killed and another injured while on routine patrol first Community Bank Limited within Garissa town71.

On May 27, 2013 members of Al Shabaab numbering at least 50 and who were heavily armed raided two police stations in Garissa County again. After the attack four civilians and two police officers were dead while another two policemen were left injured. The terrorists also upducted two other police officers who to date have not been traced72.

Fear gripped various parts of the country following the heinous acts of the terrorists aimed at the government security agencies. In fact the new dimension taken by the militia in retaliation was meant to demoralize the government and its forces hence back down from further pursuit of Al Shabaab in Somalia.

So intensive has been the arbitrary attacks directed at security personnel in Kenya that the services have had an obligation to protect themselves first before extending their security services elsewhere; this is a break from tradition where the police have never been the target

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71 Ibid
72 Ingati Stephen and Mangera Fabian, Garissa Terror Victim Speaks Out, m.news24.com/Kenya/News/20130607 Accessed on 24/07/2013 at 1300hrs
of criminals but only victims in situations where there is armed confrontations. To aggravate the bad situation even further, the terror group offered to reward handsomely any person who killed a security agent in the country\textsuperscript{73}.

According to the Garissa County Commissioner a bounty of $ 8,000 (Kshs 698,000) had been placed for any security officer killed\textsuperscript{74}. The reward would be more or less attractive depending on the level of the victim in the command hierarchy of the security services. Placing such rewards on the heads of security officers in itself is a clever and well thought out strategy that would not only cause fear across the rank and file within the security services but also influence critical decisions to be made in the fight against crime. Addressing the people during the December 12, 2012 Jamhuri day celebrations, however, the County Commissioner Mr. Maalim Mohammed termed the actions of the militants as desperate attempts to cause violence and encourage people to kill for money\textsuperscript{75} A month prior to the revelation security agencies had arrested six suspected Al Shabaab militants and recovered two pistols, 2 grenades and 85 Ammunitions\textsuperscript{76}.

3.6 Achievements Made By Internal Security Agencies

Although the challenges facing Kenya in the fight against terrorism is seemingly overwhelming security agencies a report by the United States Bureau of counter terrorism acknowledged that Kenya security forces managed to avert many major terror attacks and that much of the attacks that slipped from them were small scale\textsuperscript{77}.

\textsuperscript{73} Ongeri Boniface, \textit{Al Shabaab Offers Cash For Killing Of Security Officers}, Standard Digital. Found At \url{www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000072759}, Accessed On July 24, 2013, 1600hrs
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid
The report also mentioned the successful arrests and convictions of two Iranian citizens who were sentenced to life imprisonment on May 6, 2013 for the offence of plotting terror attacks in Kenya. Mr Sayed Mansour Mousavi and Ahmad Abolfathi were arrested by Kenya security personnel in Mombasa Golf Course along Mama Ngina drive. They were in found in possession of 15 kilograms of RDX explosives. While sentencing the two Iranians the Nairobi chief magistrate Kiarie Waweru Kiarie said: “I shudder to imagine the amount of damage that could have been seen……I have considered individual pleas but the cry of victims of previous terrorist attacks is louder”. He told the court that the explosive was capable of bringing down the Times Towers in Nairobi; the 24 floors storey building belonging to the Kenya Revenue Authority and which is the tallest in the capital city.

It goes without saying that detention of criminals of the magnitude seen in the Iranian’s case is another major challenge to Kenya or any other third world country. This is because of the international attention that such terrorists attract and particularly from states that sponsor them. The possibility of continuous terror from sympathizers of these detainees is eminent. Third world countries have more problems that need urgent redress and therefore the burden of watching over international terrorists in their local prison facilities is a taunting task given the amount of surveillance and security required to secure such places.

Internally the Security agencies have also made strides in the hunt for Al Shabaab operatives who are either Kenyan born or foreigners out to cause mayhem in the country. In the year 2013, suspects linked to the terror attacks against the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 7, 1998 were shot dead by police. The two Mr. Omollo Kassim and Salim Mohammed Nyiro were believed to have links with Al Shabaab and the slain Al Qaeda operative Fazul Abdullah Mohammed who was gunned down in June 11, 2012 in Mogadishu.

Successful hunt for terrorists on the run and particularly those believed to be in leadership positions within the ranks of the terror cells is an indication that the Kenyan security forces are not relenting in the fight against this crime.

The local media quoted the police who described Kassim as “an expert bomb maker trained with Al Qaeda allied terrorists in Somalia”\(^\text{79}\). The area Officer Commanding Police Division (OCPD) within whose jurisdiction the two terror suspects were killed told the standard interviewers “we managed to gun down Omollo who was one of the most wanted terrorist police have been looking for, and recovered a cache of Firearms, Ammunition, subversive literature, explosive making devices, a digital video disc and mobile phones”. The police boss was interviewed at Kisauni Police Station Dog Section.

Concerns have been raised by the US, however, on the capacity and ability of Kenya to counter financial transactions that favours terrorist organizations. This then puts the country on the international watch list of countries vulnerable to money laundering. Kenya enacted legislation that established the financial reporting center tasked with monitoring money transfers exceeding $ 10,000 thereby surviving further condemnation from the international community.

### 3.6 Great Powers versus Third World Countries

The budget of the US intelligence agencies was revealed in the year 2005 to be around $44 billion\(^\text{80}\) a year. Such figure explains why great powers have the capacity to counter terrorism compared to developing countries. The figure for instance stands above the total budget that runs entire operations of many third world countries.

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India known to be the world’s largest democracy is a typical example of how stable states have not been shaken by terrorism. Despite losing two of its leaders to assassins and having trouble with guerilla movements in some parts of its territory particularly the North-Eastern provinces and pockets of Marxist-Leninist tribal militants it remains steadfast in its operational order\textsuperscript{81}.

3.7 Hindrance of State Sponsored Terrorism

In certain occasions States sponsor terrorism for political reasons. The terror groups in this case are controlled by government intelligence agents. This type of terrorism makes even efforts of countering terrorism more sophisticated and complicated for other governments. A clear demonstration of this is the 1988 Pan Am flight 103 bomb attack whose fate was traced to Libya. Initially expected to explode over the Atlantic Ocean to conceal any trace of the perpetrators of the terror, the plane disintegrated at a Scottish countryside prompting a search for glues by investigators. Debris recovered included fragments of a tape recorder and tiny wire strands which the US and British investigators linked with two Libyan intelligence agents believed to have smuggled the tape recorder into the plane. Libya succumbed to pressure to hand over the suspects for trial after seven of UN imposed sanctions against it by the UN Security Council in 1992. The difficulty in countering terrorism is as a result of sophistication of terrorist operations. The International Police (Interpol) and national security agencies of individual states coordinate the actions of states in tracking as well as apprehending suspected terrorists and breaking into the secret networks of terrorist operations respectively\textsuperscript{82}.

\textsuperscript{81} Hobsbawn Eric, \textit{Globalization, Democracy and Terrorism}, Abacus publishers, Great Britain, 2008, pp 133-135
3.8 Counter-Terrorism Strategies

As terrorist strategies advance by the day, state actors as well as other institutions under threat continuously update their counter measures as mitigation against such threats. Since the September 11, 2001 terror attack, Private companies have been busy developing equipments to governments, companies and individuals who are adapting to a new security environment as terrorist threat increases in the 21st century\textsuperscript{83}. States have had to part with lots of money to acquire security devices like bomb detectors as terrorism bite. This has occasionally been at the expense of other critical needs of citizens in third world countries. In Kenya there was an outcry that the military budget shot up affecting other sectors of the economy prior to the KDF absorption into the AMISOM.

In some instances states have fallen victims to unscrupulous business magnets. A case in point is where a British businessman, James McCormick sold many bomb detectors believed to be fake to several states. Iraq was most affected by the revelation having bought many of the devices and its government blamed the many successful terror attacks on the false detectors.

Kenya bought the same product but the government has since come out strongly to allay fears that the detectors were fake despite a worldwide condemnation of the British company ‘ATSC’ which manufactures the ADE651 device equated with Golf-Ball-Finders. The 56 year Briton was convicted of fraud on Tuesday, April 30, 2013 and described by the court as a beneficiary of over $ 75 million from sales of fake devices in Iraq and Georgia. He had claimed that the devices could detect bombs, drugs, currency and ivory. It was also believed to be capable of tracking objects up 3,280 feet below the ground\textsuperscript{84}.

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\textsuperscript{83} Ibid
3.8 Transnational Crime and Terror

Crimes across boundaries like drug and human trafficking has become a recipe of terrorism in not only developed countries but also a big problem in third world countries. As the illicit business thrives, many actors develop interest in it resulting in political influence which culminates to violence.

Kenya like many countries in the region remains in the world map as a transit point for hard drugs with some cases of human and ivory trafficking associated with it too. The cartels involved in this kind of trade eventually become so powerful to the extent of using terror to advance their interests hence difficult to control.

The conflicts in Congo, Somalia, Nigeria, Rwanda among other countries in the region create space for transnational crime. States in Latin America which have been haven for drug trade have bore the brunt of narco-terrorism. Colombia is another example of a state ravaged by narco-terrorism bearing heavily on the United States. Being in the forefront in the fight against transnational crime the US again exposes its interests abroad to narco-terrorist attacks.

The post September 11, 2001 era has witnessed the strengthening of not only sub-regional and regional cooperation but also intensive mutual security engagements globally. The advent of transnational crime has influenced the international system towards the need to develop an international counterterrorism policy which focuses on cooperation and mitigative measures. Some terror groups however, discovered that transnational attacks were counterproductive thereby resorting to negotiation. An example of such groups was the Irish republican Army.

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3.9 Cultural and Economic Factors Influence on Terrorism

3.9.1 Cultural Factors

Culture remains a key component in promoting terrorism with certain cultural entities fronting hard-line cultural positions. Islam for instance has come out strongly to condemn the killing of terror suspects claiming that the action of the Kenyan government was a war against Muslims. Proponents of culture as a means of survival believe violence is the only method to preserve traditions and values against what could be perceived to be a brain wash by the western menu and materialism. The rejection of one culture by another clearly is a recipe to conflict that in its very extreme becomes terror.

3.9.2 Economic Factors

In economic terms, power derived from wealth can influence a state’s action. Economic might for instance can be used to advance political interests. The global North which comprises the US and the post-industrial Western Europe states represent the power houses, which control fiscal policies and manage the international economic institutions like the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Third world countries are mainly subjects to these economic power houses; the global South has no much control over their economies and in cases where they attempt to match with the developed world by carrying out certain regulations like privatizing public utilities is received with resistance by their citizens hence a threat of use of violence to resist. Another economic influence that is a challenge in countering terrorism in Kenya is the fact that opportunities for foreigners in the country to become wealthy is enormous hence the inflow of many foreign nationals particularly from neighbouring. On the reverse a large number of youth struggle to

87 Ibid
make ends meet after completing their studies because they can’t find jobs. Either way an element of criminality with foreigners advancing transnational terrorism while the jobless locals are driven by poverty into crime that.

Although the global North stands out as more civilized than the South, the latter does not always account for a high percentage of terrorism. 88

3.10 Contribution of Failed States to Terrorism

The global war on terror (GWOT) being fronted by the United States and its allies points out failed states as the most fertile fields for terrorist groups. Given the hot pursuit courtesy of counter-terrorism measures put in place by the above partners, terrorists seek save havens. The ‘nodes’ which imply small terror cells that carry out attacks thrive in failed states. On the other hand, terrorist ‘hubs’ provide the much needed resources which entail financial and ideological mentorship to these cells.

In the region, notable failed states like Somalia demonstrate the presence of both node and hub cells. This justifies the entry of KDF into Somalia if that is anything to go by. Hubs under the control of Al Qaeda in Sierra Leone and Liberia prior to the September 11, 2001 advanced illegal trade in arms, diamond and money laundering which has seen one of its leaders (Charles Taylor) face trial in the international criminal court in the 21st century among other offences against humanity. In Somalia however, Al Shabaab took charge.

Sageman distinguishes the two cells saying “small world networks are composed of nodes linked to well connected-hubs. Hubs receive the most communications from the more isolated nodes. Because of their larger numbers, innovations are more likely in the nodes. The

88 Ibid P. 377
nodes, link to the hubs which in turn sent the information along their numerous other links. Emerging terror groups after the September 11, 2001 supports Sageman’s position as confirmed by other scholars. Al Qaeda for instance is no longer a house hold name particularly in Kenya as other nodes like Al Shabaab has come into play.

Kenya’s approach to terrorists hibernating in failed states is a replica of the US approach however, unlike the US which front four perspectives, Kenya applies only two of the options. Firstly the use of stringent law enforcement strategies which include policing, control of aliens and other legislative obligations to curb terrorism. This did not however, work adequately because terrorists would strike Kenya and retreat into Somalia where the civilian policing services have no jurisdiction over.

The next option is the military action which the country has since applied in pursuit of Al Shabaab and which remain historic today. The other two approaches employed by the US are the security assistance programs through which third world countries benefit from training, equipment and other logistical and operational support necessary to combat terrorism.

3.11 Conclusion

The process of globalization has advanced terrorism and continues to do so in the 21st century. Despite the changing trends in which attacks are carried out by various terror groups, the fundamental facts advanced by terrorists that inform their actions remain the same. In other words the actors, environment and lethality may have changed but the driving force or ideology behind terrorism remains intact. The post September 11, 2001 period saw an increase in the number of small scale terror attacks across the world and more so in Kenya as the opportunity for the terrorist groups to cause greater attacks did not present itself. The

89 Quoted in the publication of Dempsey Thomas, Counterterrorism In Africa Failed States; Challenges and Potential Solutions, April 2006, United States Government, P 6
period under review presented a taunting moment for governments and security agencies with Kenya enhancing security checks in churches, Bus terminus, shopping areas and other critical institutions with high number of people at any given time. Intelligence collection became paramount leading to successful arrests of Key terror suspects in the country. Kenya’s daily nation newspaper quoted the president of the republic of Kenya giving stern warning to terrorists and vowing that relevant security bodies will stamp out terrorism in the country. The president declared that Kenya will not tolerate violent crime.\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{90} The Daily Nation, Monday July 1, 2013, “Top Security Organ Vows To Fight Terror”, P 6
CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, the concepts and theoretical background to the challenges in counter terrorism in the third world countries were discussed through a comprehensive literature study. In order to address the research objective highlighted in Chapter one, a research study was conducted to provide an understanding of the challenges. This chapter presents the analysis and interpretation of the data collected.

4.2 Response Rate

The research was conducted on a sample of 30 respondents from the three institutions that handle issues related to the subject under study. The institutes are: International Police Organization (Interpol), Kenya Police Anti-Terrorism Unit and Ministry of Immigration and Registration of Persons. However, out of the issued questionnaires, 28 were returned duly filled in.
Figure 4.1 presents the response rate of the respondents.

**Figure 4.1: Response Rate of the Respondents.**

Source: Research Data

Majority of the respondents responded and this was sufficient for statistical reporting.

**4.3 Background Information**

This section sought information on the background of the respondents. Among the questions that were asked include the age of the respondents, their gender, marital status, religion and education level. The information on this section will be presented using tables and figures.

**4.3.1 Age**

This part of the section sought information about the age of the respondents. Ranges were given from which the respondents indicated their age bracket.

Age distribution of the respondents is shown in Table 4.1 below.
### Table 4.1: Age of the Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 - 30 Years</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 40 Years</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 40 Years</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

From the findings, majority of the respondents (64.3%) were between 31 - 40 Years old, 21.4% were above 40 years and 14.3% were 20 - 30 Years old. This indicated that the majority of the employees in the three institutions were aged 31 - 40 Years.

#### 4.3.2 Gender

In order to understand gender distribution in the institutions, respondents were asked to indicate their gender.
Figure 4.2 indicates an analysis of gender.

**Figure 4.2: Gender of the respondent**

![Pie chart showing gender distribution](image)

Source: Research Data

From the findings, 68% of the respondents were male and 29% were female. Out of the respondents, 3% did not indicate their gender. This indicated that the majority of the respondents in the three institutions were male and few women.

**4.3.3 Marital Status**

In order to understand the marital status of the respondents, the researcher asked the respondents to indicate their marital status. Figure 4.3 presents gender analysis of the respondents
Figure 4.3: Gender of the Respondents

![Gender of the Respondents](image)

Source: Research Data

From the findings, the majority of the respondents are married (86%). Only 14% of the respondents are single. Here the study deduced that most of the employees in the sampled institutions were married.

4.3.4 Religion of the Respondents

The researcher wanted to understand the religion distribution of the respondents. They were asked to indicate their religious background. Table 4.2 presents an analysis of the religion under which the respondents belonged.
Table 4.2: Religion of the Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

According to the response 92.9% of those interviewed were Christians and 7.1% of them were Muslims. This shows that the majority of the employees in the institutions are Christians.

4.3.5 Academic Level.

The respondents were requested to indicate their level of academic qualification.

Table 4.3 illustrates the study findings in respect of this category.

Table 4.3: Academic Level of the Respondents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Level</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

From the findings, majority of the respondents (39.3%) were graduates, 32.1% were had gone through college education and 28.6% reported that they been to high school level. According to this feedback, it is reasonable to believe that a good number of employees in the institutions under study were knowledgeable.
4.4 Challenges of Counter Terrorism

This section of the research instrument sought information about the challenges in countering terrorism in the third world countries. The results in this section will be presented using tables, figures, means and standard deviation.

4.4.1 Duration Served in the Organisation

Here the researcher sought information about the duration in which individual employees had served in the organisations under study.

Figure 4.4 presents the statistical analysis of duration served in the Organisation.

**Figure 4.4: Duration Served in the Organisation:**

![Bar chart showing duration served in the organisation.](image)

Source: Research Data

From the responses, a majority of the respondents (50%) have worked in the organisation for a period of 6 – 10 years, 35.7% have a work experience of more than 10 years and 14.3% have worked for a period of less than 5 years. These findings mean that most of the
employees at the institutions had worked for a reasonably long period of time and therefore are rich in job experience. This build the confidence of the researcher that the feedback he would get from the respondents would reflect the true position of their organizations in countering terrorism.

4.4.2 Effectiveness of Training Course.

In this part of the section, respondents were first asked whether they had attended any courses in counter terrorism.

Figure 4.5 presents the findings in respect of counter terrorism course attendance.

**Figure 4.5: Counter Terrorism Course Attendance:**

![Pie chart showing 82% Yes and 18% No](source:Research Data)

The majority of the respondents (82%) indicated that they had at least attended a course in counter terrorism while 18% indicated that they had not. This shows that a majority of the employees were equipped with knowledge and skills in counter terrorism.
The researcher went on and asked the respondents to rate the training offered. They were given a scale of in-adequate, fair, adequate and excellent were they were to choose from. Table 4.4 presents the effectiveness of the training offered to the personnel.

**Table 4.4: Effectiveness of the Training Courses:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-adequate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adequate</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>excellent</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>did not respond</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

From the results above, most of the respondents (57.1%) indicated that the courses were adequate, 14.3% indicated that they were excellent, 10.7% said the courses were fair and 7.1% reported back that the courses were in-adequate. On the other hand 10.7% were non committal. The study revealed at this stage that in-adequate training is evident throughout the three organizations. This then points out a major challenge in Countering terrorism. A critical area such as this under study calls for adequate training of personnel if milestones are to be made in the fight against terrorism.

**4.4.3 Frequency of Counter Terrorism Training**

The study further sought to establish the frequency under which the institutions conduct training and sensitization about counter terrorism on employees.

Table 4.5 presents the analysis of frequency of counter terrorism training;
Table 4.5: Frequency of Counter Terrorism Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarterly</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On a need basis</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

The researcher established that trainings in the institutions under study are carried out on need basis. This was according to 64.3% of the respondents. Another 21.4% said their organizations carry out such trainings quarterly whereas 7.1% reported a time frame of once a month and on yearly basis. This is a major challenge in counter terrorism. If trainings happen on a need basis, it means that institutions are reactive and not pro-active and yet terrorism is a sensitive area that calls for preparedness not only in terms of weapons but adequate knowledge and skills in the part of human resources as well.

This finding also point out a possibility of trainings that are not planned for but rushed through when an attack takes place. In such situations the consequences would be that the institutions would produce half baked personnel in terms of skills and thus counter-productive in countering terrorism.

The researcher found out that even the quarterly trainings are not adequate given the stakes of the sensitivity of the area under study. With only 7.1% of the respondents reporting that trainings are on monthly basis, there is need to enhance the frequency in which employees are taken through necessary courses.
4.4.4 Capacity of Counter Terrorism

The study sought to establish the capacity of the institutions in countering terrorism. Respondents were asked to rate the capacity their organisations had in countering terrorism. Figure 4.6 presents the findings.

Figure 4.6: Capacity of Counter Terrorism

Source: Research Data

From the findings, 64.3% of the respondents indicated that the capacity of their organisation was good. 25% rated them as fair and 10.7 rated them as very good. This implies that the organisations are far from being very good. Terrorism is a crucial field where organisations should put in measures to improve their capacity in counterterrorism. These percentages informed the researcher that the capacity of the Kenya to excellently handle terrorism is yet to be realized and therefore pinpoints a great challenge.
4.4.5 Adequacy of Tools and Equipment to Counter Terrorism

The study sought information on the adequacy of tools and equipments to counter terrorism. Respondents were asked to indicate whether the tools and equipments under their disposal were adequate enough.

Figure 4.7 presents the analysis of the adequacy of tools and equipments to counter terrorism.

Figure 4.7: Adequacy of Tools and Equipment to Counter Terrorism

Source: Research Data

The findings show that 68% of the respondents believe that the tools and equipment under their disposal were not adequate. 32% of them think that the tools and equipment were adequate. This is another challenge that faces agencies tasked with countering terrorism in Kenya. Inadequate tooling leaves gaps that expose third world countries more to terrorists than developed countries. The Kenyan government have the responsibility to ensure its security agents are well equipped.

The researcher went further and sought information from the respondents on areas that require improvement. This was an open ended question where respondents were asked to comment briefly on adequacy of tools and equipments to counter terrorism and suggest areas
of improvement (if any). From the responses, modern equipment for surveillance and
detection of ammos was cited as lacking and should be provided. Many respondents also said
staff should be exposed to frequent trainings. Some advised that procurement channels be
fool proof so that the right equipment like those used in bomb detection are of the right
quality and work efficiently and effectively.

Enhanced technology was seen as an area that requires priority if government is committed to
improving security. The respondents commented that quality intelligence collection and
surveillance can be achieved if the country invested heavily on modern technology. This
according to them would mean conformity with the changing crime trends and tactics
adopted by terrorist groups. They cited internet hacking and general cyber crime and money
laundering as areas that need to be addressed by putting in place good legislation.

The Immigration department it was revealed needs to update its procedures to match with
current trends across the world this according to some respondents is because current
procedures have loop holes that can easily be manipulated by terrorists. A good example is
the need to inter-link points of exit and entry among states. A common data base through
which information on suspected terrorists and their activities can be monitored was also
mentioned as critical.

Other respondents stated that so far all the equipment have been successful when carrying out
all activities that involve terrorisms, and further recommended inter-agency sharing of
intelligence.
4.4.6 Inter-agency Cooperation and Coordination

The study sought information on inter-agency cooperation and coordination. Respondents were asked to rate the inter-agency cooperation and coordination between their departments and other stakeholders in countering terrorism.

Table 4.6 presents inter-agency cooperation and coordination.

Table 4.6: Inter-agency Cooperation and Coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

A majority of the respondents (71.4%) indicated that inter-agency cooperation and coordination was good. Another 28% pointed out that it was fair and none of the respondents said it was very good. To adequately tackle terrorism, several stakeholders should pull together their resources including conducting joint operations. The fact that no of the respondents agreed that inter-agency cooperation was very good raises concern as to whether counter terrorism is properly addressed.

The researcher wanted the respondents to support their answers by posing an open ended question. He sort to know at what level cooperation and coordination was forthcoming or not. It came out from the comments given that internationally, cooperation and coordination was fair. Locally, a lot has to be done. It was reported that different institutions still hold critical information unto themselves. There are no clear channels of communication that would
necessitate sharing of intelligence and general information on terrorism; barriers still exist in information sharing. It also came out that legal structures in regard to terrorism is not good.

It was also pointed out that awareness as not been effectively carried out. On a positive note some respondents echoed the cordial co-existence of security agencies especially when it came to joint operations or when responding to a terrorism crisis. However, where cooperation was minimal, the respondents cited un-healthy competition and superiority complexities. There is also suspicion over each and therefore one acts as the watch dog of the other. This is a great challenge that has impeded the fight against terrorism.

4.4.7 Policy on Counter Terrorism

The study sought information on the Kenyan policy on counter terrorism. Respondents were asked to suggest the areas to be addressed in the policy in order to enhance counter terrorism. From the responses, respondents stated that the terrorism act should be enforced. They also proposed a review of immigration procedures and clear policies put in place to guide training of security agencies in counter terrorism and ensure sharing of vital intelligence among key institutions that handle security. They also suggested review of procurement procedures with a view of ensuring purchase of modern and standard equipment.

The study further found out that there is need to review the law on counter terrorism and greater emphasis be placed on investigation and scenes of crime management. Another policy concern raised was the need to introduce a mechanism to be used to determine the minimum number of employees in the Counter terrorism Police Unit to avoid under staffing. The policy should also be able to ensure professionalism, enhance motivation of employees and ensure there is DNA data bank.
Of critical importance in this subject is also the need to allocate enough resources for intelligence gathering. The respondents also suggested that the government policy should address un-employment and poverty level lest many un-employed youth are lured into terrorism. The government is also expected to tame radicalization to avert the youth and other vulnerable groups from being recruited into terror groups.

There was also concern for the need of a policy that directs proper equipping of immigration officers working at border points and airports, proper border management procedures and priority on internal security as opposed to Kenya’s concentration on external threat.

**4.4.8 Factors Promoting Acts of Terrorism in Kenya**

The study sought information through an open ended question on the factors that promote acts of terrorism in the country. Respondents were asked to state the factors that promote acts of terrorism in Kenya. The respondents stated the following factors as contributors: Poverty, revenge attacks, presence of extremist cells in neighbouring countries, lack of standardized border/migration procedures, brain washing of youth and radicalization, lack of proper legislation to fight terrorism, hospitable attitude of Kenya, active involvement of Kenya in regional campaign against terrorism and particularly the invasion of Somalia, Kenya’s strategic global positioning, peer group pressure, drug abuse, un-employment, lack of knowledge, lack of adequate training, presence of Islamists extremists and Inadequate resources.

Other factors that were listed by the respondents are: unstable governments in the region, political instability, lack of political good will to fight terrorism, disenfranchisement of other societal members, corruption, single parenting leading to withdrawals, social inequity, indoctrination, rivalry between Christians and Muslims, porous borders, little cooperation between different agencies in the fight against terrorism and greed.
Factors Hindering Counter Terrorism in Kenya

The study further sought information on the factors that hinder counter terrorism in Kenya. Many factors were mentioned by the respondents, most of which were given in item 4.4.8 above. In addition to these however, was the fact that Kenya does not properly monitor its borders and aliens in the country. It also came out strongly that personnel in the Anti-terrorism Police Unit were overworked. Poor remuneration of security agencies was also seen as largely contributing to personnel being demoralized and therefore do not perform as expected. Inadequate funding of security agencies stood out as well a factor that hinders counter terrorism. The public were blamed for not taking interest in the fight against terrorism particularly for failing information to the police.

Motivation of Security Agencies

The study sought to know if the security agencies were motivated enough to counter terrorism. The researcher asked the respondents whether they thought security agencies are motivated enough to counter terrorism.

Table 4.7 presents the response on motivation of security agencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

From the results, a majority of the respondents (96.4%) indicated that the security agents were not motivated enough with only 3.6% saying they were. This is a challenge faced by
third world countries are facing in countering terrorism. Security agencies play a major role in any economy and therefore their welfare should put considered if they are to perform effectively. This is not the case in many developing countries.

The researcher wanted to know the type of motivations they referred to and asked an open ended question where they were to comment briefly. From the findings it was evident that the security personnel did not only look at monetary need as a motivating factor but were also concerned with lack of proper equipment and proper training. Resources were seen as inadequate to run daily businesses of the institutions.

**4.4.8 Kenya’s Capacity in Countering Terrorism**

The study sought information on Kenya’s capacity to counter terrorism. The respondents were asked to rate Kenya’s capacity in countering terrorism as presented in table 4.8 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

From the results, most of the respondents (39.3%) indicated that the country’s capacity is fair and the same percentage highlighted that it was good. 17.9% said Kenya’s capacity was satisfactory whereas 3.6% indicated that it is very good. Out of this findings, the researcher feels that the country’s capacity to counter terrorism is below bar.
4.4.9 Support from the International Community

The study sought information on whether the organisations get support from the international community.

Figure 4.8 below presents the finding to this inquiry.

Figure 4.8: Support from the International Community

From the results, the majority of the respondents (54%) indicate that organisations receive support from the international community while 46% indicate that they do not get any support. This implies that organisations get the support they require from the international community in dealing with counter terrorism.

The researcher went further and asked the respondents to comment on the support they get or do not get. From the responses, the international community provides alerts and prior information to local security agencies and other stakeholders. Most international law enforcement agencies share important information promptly and are always pro-active.

The international community according to the respondents have been involved a lot in training Kenya’s security personnel and other staff engaged in counter terrorism in one way
or the other. It is these specialized training acquired abroad that puts the country’s security apparatus above others in the region. Specialized surveillance and forensic expertise among elite police units in Kenya is attributed to the support of the developed partners. Two major contributors to these achievements are the United States and the British governments.

However, some respondents stated that the support is not adequate since it is seasonal. Sometimes relationships sore because of differences emanating from incompatibility of interests. In such instances support is cancelled and in some instances replaced with sanctions. International support was also cited as tied to other interests. This then portrays a challenge in countering terrorism.

4.4.10 Current Threat of Terrorism in Kenya

This part sought information on the current threat in Kenya as shown in table 4.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worst</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

From the study, 53.6% of the respondents which forms the majority rated the current situation as bad. 32.1% rated it to be worse and 14.3% rated it to be the worst. This outcome brings out clearly the fact terrorism remains a threat in Kenya and the region and however uncommon it may be the country is not safe from terrorism attack. This calls for stringent measures to be put in place to mitigate the threat.
4.4.11 Detection of Acts of Terrorism

The study was further concerned on whether the institutions under study have been able to detect acts of terror before they occurred. The respondents were to choose from none, always, less often and above average.

Table 4.10 presents what the study revealed in respect to this concern.

Table 4.10: Detection of an Act of Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less often</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above average</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

The researcher was told by 39.3% of the respondents that their institutions detect acts of terrorism less often. 28.6% said that they always detect acts of terrorism before they occur, whereas 25% points out that their detection is above average. Finally, another 7.1% confirmed that they have never detected acts of terrorism before it occurred. The findings are alarming and clearly portray insufficiency in counter terrorism. It points out that much has to be done in training and tooling responsible institutions in order to build their capacities.

4.4.12 Counter Terrorism Inputs

The study sought to find whether Kenyan Government, International Community, Security agencies and Kenya Citizens have not been adequate in countering terrorism.

Table 4.11 presents what the study found out..
Table 4.11: Counter Terrorism Inputs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Government</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International community</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security agencies</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya citizens</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

A majority of the respondents said that the citizens were not contributing as expected to the fight against terrorism. This was represented by 57.1% of the response. The government of Kenya was also perceived to be doing little in enhancing counter terrorism with 14.3% of the respondents reporting so. The international community tied with the Kenyan government at 14.3% according to the findings. The researcher further asked the respondents to elaborate on their comments through an open ended question.

The findings lay blame on the citizens particularly for failing to inform authorities of any suspected terrorists and criminals in general despite living amongst them. The reasons for failing to share information with LEAS included fear of intimidation by the Police and lack of confidence in the country’s legal system. The respondents believe the public are not convinced that the witness protection machinery is sufficient enough and therefore recommended a scrutiny of the witness protection Act in view of strengthening it. Fear of reprisal attacks was also mentioned as a factor that contributes to the failure to volunteer information by the citizens. The need for regular sensitization to the public on the problem of terrorism is critical as well but remains a grey area. The study blamed the government for lacking good will in countering terrorism. The respondents expect the state to be the lead agency in the fight against terrorism. It should bring together the citizens regardless of
religion and educate them that terrorism is a common enemy whose impact affects people regardless of their religious orientation.

4.5 Hypothesis Testing

The study used chi-square statistics to test the above hypothesis because the study required the test of independence of categorical variables in order to answer the question. Under chi-square, if the p value is less than or equal to $\alpha$ (.05) then you can reject $H_0$.

4.5.1 Hypothesis One

$H_0$: Kenya does not have adequate capacity to counter terrorism

$H_1$: Kenya has adequate capacity to counter terrorism

The question that was used in this case was whether Kenya has the capacity to counter terrorism. The result is presented in Table 4.12.

Table 4.12: Hypothesis Testing on Capacity to Counter Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi-Square Tests</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>8.343a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>9.429</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear</td>
<td>6.297</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

In this case the p value is 0.059. This value is more than $\alpha$, so we accept $H_0$. That is, Kenya does not have adequate capacity to counter terrorism.
4.5.2 Hypothesis Two

H0: Terrorism is a major security threat to Kenya.

H1: Terrorism is not a major security threat to Kenya.

The question that was used in this case was how you would rate the threat of terrorism in Kenya in the 21st century. The result is presented in Table 4.13 below.

Table 4.13: Hypothesis Testing on Threat of Terrorism in Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi-Square Tests</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>8.343a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>9.429</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear</td>
<td>6.297</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.80%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

In this case the p value is 0.086. This value is more than α, so we accept H₀. That is, terrorism is a major security threat to Kenya.
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of the Findings

Third world countries are and have been the scene of various attacks attributed to terrorist elements. Kenya does not have adequate capacity to counter terrorism making it a major security threat to the country.

This section provides the summary of the findings in line with the study objectives. From the findings discussed in the previous chapter, employees have attended necessary trainings provided by their organisations and the adequacy of the courses is good therefore have enhanced Counter terrorism but not to recommended standards given that it did not receive an excellent mark. The majority of the respondents (57.1%) indicated that the courses are adequate with only 7.1% indicating that they are inadequate.

On the frequency of counter terrorism training, the frequencies of the trainings happen on a need basis. This is supported by the respondents where 64.3% indicated that trainings of staff is conducted on a need basis. Only 7.1% indicated that the trainings happen monthly and annually. Institutions wait until there is an attack and that is the time training happens. During this period, employees won’t concentrate on the trainings given their diverted attention on the actual events that necessitated the training and therefore the objective of the training is not fully achieved.

The capacity of the institutions to counter terrorism is good. This is according to 64.3% of the respondents who reported to that effect. Only 10.7% rated them as very good. However, the tooling and efficacy of equipment necessary to tackle terrorism still remains below average. 68% of the respondents indicated that the tools and equipments under their disposal
are not adequate to counter terrorism. This in itself hampers the engagement of the security agencies in countering terrorism therefore becoming a major challenge. For any visible progress to be seen to be made in countering terrorism, the tools used should be adequate. Only 32% of the respondents indicated that the tools and equipment at their disposal for countering terrorism were adequate. The areas of improvement as indicated by the respondents are:

- Modern equipment for surveillance and detection of ammos should be provided
- Constant training of personnel
- Modern technology that includes forensic laboratories. This will boost intelligence collection and processing of data collected.

Although some respondents felt that all the equipment provided to them have been useful in countering terrorism for example the bomb detectors, others have a contrary opinion.

The study also found out that inter-agency cooperation and coordination between the organisations and other stakeholders in countering terrorism is good. This is evident from the results where 71.4% of the respondents affirmed so with only 28% indicating that the interaction was fair. None of the respondents pointed out an existence of a very good co-existence. The inter-agency is important in countering terrorism and it should be improved in order to fight terrorism effectively.

Furthermore the study reveals that at the international level, the inter-agency cooperation and coordination is fair. Locally, a lot has to be done given that barriers still exist in information sharing. The legal structure in regard to terrorism locally is not good according to those interviewed and cooperation is still wanting in most states. Lack of adequate awareness and proper channels of sharing relevant information remains a challenge. Other respondents
indicated that there is no cooperation since each agency downplays the other. Co-operation is rarely enhanced as some agencies see others as competitors as a result they fail to complement each other. There is minimal cooperation between the Immigration department, National intelligence service and Anti-terrorism Police Unit according to the study. There is a lot of unnecessary competition amongst the security agents hence impeding sharing of very important information and every stakeholder is just like a watchdog of the other instead of working together towards a common goal.

There are a number of factors that promote acts of terrorism in Kenya. This factors are, increasing poverty levels, presence of extremist cells in neighbouring countries, brain washing and radicalization of the youth, Kenya’s active role in anti-terrorism campaigns, invasion of Somalia and the country’s strategic positioning globally.

Other challenges that have been a hindrance in countering terrorism in Kenya just like many third world countries are:

- Porous borders
- General hospitality of Kenyans (Generosity)
- In adequate legislation on counter terrorism
- Corruption
- Lack of proper measures to check and control foreigners visiting and leaving the country
- Lack of stringent measures to monitor immigrants on arrival at all entry points
- Improper handling and monitoring of suspected terrorists
• Lack of political good will

• In-adequate funds

• Lack of adequate experts in the field of countering terrorism

• Heavy work load on officers in Anti-terrorism Police Unit.

• Religion based suspicion.

• In-adequate surveillance and intelligence collection

• Outdated immigration procedures

There is a general feeling that security agencies are not adequately remunerated and are therefore de-motivated. It also came out in the study that unemployment among the youth has encouraged them to engage in terrorism.

On the other hand there is a disconnect between the public and the security agencies which has led to suspicion and un-co-operation especially in the sharing of information on terrorism. Ignorance especially among the ordinary Kenyan and Lack of concern by the well informed is another challenge in countering terrorism.

Still on motivation of security agents, 96.4% of the respondents were in agreement that security agents were not motivated enough with only 3.6% saying they are motivated. The respondents did not only mention pay as a problem that is to blame for de-motivation but also cited other factors which included Lack of adequate equipment and transport facilities. There is also great concern over few training programmes and lack of funds to run critical functions of their organizations in the process of countering terrorism. It is important thus to ensure that proper resource Mobilisation is put into consideration as this remains a great challenge. Regular training for security agencies should also be enhanced, by so doing the personnel
will have confidence in themselves therefore feel motivated as they handle their assignments competently.

Kenya’s capacity in countering terrorism is not up to the expectation according to the respondents. This is following the reporting by the three institutions which handle terrorism where only 39.3% of the respondents said Kenya is fairly doing well. To further show that Kenya’s capacity in countering terrorism is below bar, only 3.6% respondents gave the country the excellent mark.

According to 54% of those interviewed, organisations receive support from the international community. Among the support pointed out as acquired from the international community is providing security alerts and information prior to any foreseen terror attack. In the same breath most international law enforcement agencies are active in sharing information with their counterparts across friendly states and are pro-active in putting in place counter terrorism measures. The international community the study found out plays a crucial role in providing specialized training to security agencies in Kenya. Apart from sharing important information on terrorism, these partners highly encourage local institutions engaged in countering terrorism to open up and communicate any intelligence necessary to deal with the problem of transnational crime.

Detection of an act of terrorism happens less often. 39.3% of the respondents alluded that their organizations less often detect any act of terrorism before it happens. Another 7.1% said they have never detected any threat prior to the several attacks in the country.

The input of the Kenyan citizens in countering was found out to be at its minimal compared to other institutions like the government and foreign countries. This is based on a response by 57.1% of those interviewed. The citizens according to the respondents live amidst terrorists but are reluctant to give information that would help security agencies to dismantle terrorist
cells. Some reasons given for this include the fear for reprisal attacks, weak witness protection Act, lack of confidence in the police, ignorance, lured easily because of high level of poverty and lack of good will from the government. Muslim citizens feel they are targeted by the Anti-terrorism crusaders.

On the other hand 14.3% of the respondents felt that the Kenyan government, International community and Security agencies have not been adequately countering terrorism.

5.2 Conclusions

Kenya does not have adequate capacity to counter terrorism and therefore terrorism remains a major security threat to the country and the region. Given the high sophistication, knowledge and skills of terrorist organizations, only an equally highly trained security apparatus can be up to the task hence the need to carry out a training need assessment followed by a role out of an appropriate and comprehensive training curriculum for the relevant agencies directly or indirectly tasked to tackle terrorism. The current training programmes for the security agencies is good, however, it does not meet the expectations of both the trainees and the country which needs to tackle terrorism adequately. It is also critical to put in place systems that will link various security agencies for the purposes of sharing intelligence therefore preventing eminent terror attacks. Where such attacks are not prevented then measures to mitigate the consequences should be within reach and prompt. It is important for the third world countries to invest in technology and capitalise on the expert assistance they received from the international community. This is possible if those trained abroad and even locally by foreign trainers are accorded the space to utilize the skills and knowledge so acquired. The expertise base can also be widened if those already can train others. Terrorism cannot be won by individual states or organizations and therefore cooperation from all quarters is important.
It is important for the citizens to participate fully in countering terrorism and their ignorance exposed by the study should be breached at all cost.

Without proper tooling, it will be difficult for government apparatus to adequately tackle crime. It is time that governments of third world countries consider equipping their security agencies with the right tools of trade if the war against terrorism is to be won. It is not enough to have tools and equipment used in counter terrorism rated at above average. Developed countries have invested enormously in security leaving third world countries as obvious targets as terror groups pursue western interests abroad. In furtherance to modern technology, surveillance should be enhanced right from the Kenya’s porous borders to the heart of the country.

Although Kenya has a legislative Act of parliament that helps in the fight against terrorism, there are still gaps that should be addressed. There is still need to strengthen this legislation and sensitize the citizens appropriately. For instance, there is need to convince the Muslim community in Kenya and the region that stringent laws meant to counter terrorism is not meant to harm Muslims.

The study further pokes holes in the government of Kenya’s commitment in the fight against terrorism. Although the country has an elite unit tasked with countering terrorism, the officers are not motivated for many reasons that range from poor remuneration to in adequate capacity building. Deployment of personnel is also not well thought out. To realise tangible impact of Anti-terrorism Police Unit and other counter terrorism machineries the government should in addition to increasing the numbers of personnel also pay the officers adequately and fund these entities appropriately.
The study lays some blame of in-adequate capacity to counter terrorism by Kenya on increasing poverty levels. This is a common phenomenon in many third world countries. The impact of this is that many youth end up engaging in serious crimes including terrorism. It is upon the government of Kenya to address this shortfall given that recent statistics indicate that terror suspects arrested or killed by police in the country are indigenous citizens turned radicals.

Although globalization has opened up regions and sub-regions leading countries to engage in constructive political, economic and social activities, this should not be an excuse for states to lose their sovereignty or compromise their security. In reference to this aspect, Kenya should put in place proper checks within the Immigration institution to ensure a water tight security scrutiny of visitors entering and leaving the country. There is still a major shortfall in this area according to this study. In line with this as well, corruption remains a hiccup in government institutions therefore compromising security.

The study also concludes that religious extremism is growing by the day in Kenya as locals are influenced by neighbouring countries and particularly the state of Somalia which is yet to be stable. Desperate Al Shabaab operatives have resorted to carrying out terror attacks in Kenyan soil as revenge to Kenya’s invasion of Somalia where the terror group was thriving in illicit trade and other terrorism activities. This calls for pro-active security agencies keen in detecting crime before it happens, collecting intelligence and maximizing on inter-agency coordination and cooperation. It also calls for the Kenyan people to be more vigilant and suspicious of strangers; a break from their traditional hospitality.
5.3 Recommendations

The study pointed out several challenges facing Kenya and other third world countries in countering terrorism. It is out of these factors that the researcher makes a number of recommendations which will help address the grey areas in counter terrorism. They include:

- Empowering institutions and security agencies tasked with countering terrorism by putting in place adequate legislation and building their resource base.

- Third world countries should enhance the knowledge and skills of their security agencies and other stakeholders in counter terrorism through regular training and development courses.

- Continuous sensitization and civic education should be conducted by respective states to enhance the contribution of their citizens in countering terrorism.

- Work towards a consistent, reliable, and regularized information-sharing system that links the government with the private sector, civil society and international community with clear guidelines on infrastructure protection and code of conduct to regulate communication.

- States should employ modern technology that can adequately detect and prevent terror attacks. Installation of CCTV cameras in strategic places like shopping malls, bus terminus, streets, government offices, high ways, ports and other places with massive activity can be a deterrent measure. Forensic laboratories should be installed to facilitate fast and conclusive processing of investigations.

- Third world countries should borrow a leave from the developed countries which prioritises security. This is given that terrorism is now real in the region. They should therefore adequately fund this sector.
• The international community should help reshape the lexicon of counter terrorism by avoiding terms that ostracize and/or generalize. They should promote public awareness campaigns, possibly spearheaded by their special envoys or eminent persons in third world countries.

• Appropriate legislation should be put in place and enforced to the latter on new crime trends in the region which include cyber crime, bank fraud and money laundering.

• Regional blocs should come out strongly to address intra and inter-state conflicts to avoid governance gaps that can easily favour non-state actors to thrive in crime. A good example is the case of Somalia where the AU has deployed a peace keeping force. Mechanisms should be put in place to prevent conflicts in the first place.

• Interpol should be strengthened and its staff increased for it to be able to effectively function. This should also be the case for the Kenya Anti-Terrorism Police Unit.

• States should reconcile the dichotomy between Counter Terrorism and human rights paradigms. They should Seek and promote common ground in the region.

• The welfare of the police in Kenya should also be considered. Their payment perks should be commensurate to their responsibilities. This should also encompass tools and equipment provided to them, housing, medical insurance cover and general logistical and operational support that will motivate them.
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My Name is Josphat Kiprono Bundotich. I am a post graduate student at the University Of Nairobi; Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS). I am currently conducting a research on the challenges in Counter Terrorism in the Third World Countries, a Case Study of Kenya. The research targets institutions (agencies) that are involved in countering terrorism. You are among the group of people within these institutions that have been selected for this study. I will highly appreciate if you spare some of your time to respond to the following few questions. The information you will give will be treated in confidence and will only be used for the purposes of this study.

**Questionnaire**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questionnaire</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Date Of Dispatch</th>
<th>Returned On</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1.8.4.1.2 Background information:

1. What is your Age?
   - 20-30
   - 30-40
   - 40 and Above

2. What is your gender?
   - Male
   - Female

3. What is your Marital Status?
   - Married
   - Single
4. What is your religion?
   Christian
   Muslim
   Hindu
   Traditional religion
   None

5. What is your academic level?
   Primary Level
   High School
   Tertiary (College)
   University

1.8.4.1.3 Experience in the field under study

6. How long have you served in your current Organization?
   0-5 years
   5-10 years
   10-Above

7. Have you attended any course in Counter Terrorism?
   Yes
   No
   If yes, how would you rate the training (Course)?
   In adequate
   Fair
   Adequate
   Excellent
8. How often does your department carry out training and sensitization of staff on Counter Terrorism?
   - Monthly
   - Quarterly
   - Annually
   - On a Need Basis

9. How would you rate your organization’s capacity in Countering Terrorism?
   - Fair
   - Good
   - Very Good

10. Do you think the tools and equipment under your disposal is adequate to counter terrorism?
    - Yes
    - No
    Comment briefly suggesting areas of improvement (if any)
    …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
    …

11. How would you rate the inter-agency cooperation and coordination between your department and other stakeholders in countering terrorism?
    - Fair
    - Good
    - Very Good
12. In your opinion which areas would you suggest to be addressed in your department’s Policy (or Kenya’s policy) in order to enhance Counter terrorism?
   i. 
   ii. 

13. What factors would you point out as promoting acts of terrorism in Kenya?
   i. 
   ii. 

14. What factors would you list as hindering Counter Terrorism in Kenya?
   i. 
   ii. 

15. Do you think security agencies are motivated enough to counter terrorism?
    Yes
    __________
    No
    __________

   Briefly Comment…………………………………………………………

16. How would you rate Kenya’s capacity in countering terrorism?
    Fair
    __________
    Good
    __________
17. Do you think your organization is getting adequate support from the international community in countering terrorism?
   Yes
   No

   Briefly
   comment……………………………………………………………………………………………

18. How would you rate the threat of terrorism in Kenya today?
   Bad
   Worse
   Worst

19. How often has your organization detected an Act of terrorism before it occurred?
   None
   Always
   Less Often
   Above average

20. In your opinion, whose input among the following institutions has NOT been adequate in countering terrorism?
   Kenya Government
International community (western allies)  
Security agencies  
Kenya Citizens  

Give a brief comment……………………………………………