

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SUDAN: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS, 2005 - 2012

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DECLARATION

I declare that this is my original work and has never been presented in any other university or college for any academic purpose.

Signature.....

Date.....

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This research proposal has been submitted for examination with my approval as the student supervisor.

Signature.....

Date.....

Dr. Ibrahim Farah

DEDICATION

To my parents for their continue support in my education, the very reason why I came to Kenya to study. And to my aunt who has been my support system and inspirational in my life.

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This research would not have been made possible without the support of many people. Firstly I would like to acknowledge the role of my supervisor, Dr Ibrahim Farah, who has attributed his time and commitment during this whole process. His suggestions and comments when I was choosing my topic have been very constructive for this research. I would thank Sabina, Felicia and Martha my colleagues who help me with the access to so many useful scholarly books and articles which have all contributed to the successful completion of this research. Last but not least I would like to thank my aunt for her support and motivation

ABSTRACT

The study critically analyses the foreign policy of the Sudan from 2005 - 2012 and within the context of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on 9 July 2005. This period is seen as the period that fuelled and highly influenced the splitting up of Sudan into Sudan and South Sudan. The study utilised secondary data; mainly literature review. The study argues that the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on 9 January 2005 represented a major step towards ending the devastating 21-year civil war between the North and South of the country; and that the need to maintain strategic relations between the two states to manage the oil industry cannot be overemphasised.

LIST OF ABBREVIATION

| | |
|--------|--|
| ACPS | African-Caribbean-Pacific Summit |
| AS | African Summit |
| AUD | African Union in Darfur |
| AUHLIP | African Union High Level Implementation Panel |
| CBJ | Congressional Budget Justification |
| COMESA | Common market for Eastern and Southern Africa |
| CPA | Comprehensive Peace Agreement |
| DUP | Democratic Unionist Party |
| IADD | Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development |
| IGAD | Inter-Governmental Authority for Development |
| LRA | Lord Resistance Army |
| NCP | National Congress Party |
| NDA | National Democratic Alliance |
| NIF | National Islamic Front |
| NPC | National People Congress |
| SPLA | Sudan People's Liberation Army |
| SPLM | Sudan People Liberation Movement |
| TFA | Transitional Financial Assistance |
| UNISFA | UN Interim Security Force for Abyei |

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

The primary aim of this study is to provide a critical analysis on Sudan's foreign policy from 2005-2012. Which as noticed by the researcher is the period that fuelled and highly influenced the splitting up of Sudan into Sudan and South Sudan. The study will be interested in analysing the extent to which the two Sudan's' influenced the foreign policy of the country before the spilt. Other factors to consider include the key issues that have been utilized to draft a foreign policy for Sudan; this includes solemn issues like trade, security and other national interests.

Other issues to consider are those that have informed the foreign policy of Sudan; notably, the influence of Sudan with its government in Khartoum. It has for years advocated for a governmental system completely dictated by region. Islam is the major religion in Sudan, which also impacts on the political, social and cultural sectors of the nation based in the North. Hence, sharia law is a key concept of influence in both national laws and policies. Other issues of interest include the actors involved in the drafting, analysis and implementation of Sudan's foreign policy, both external and internal actors. Identified as second class generation of Arabs, Sudan's national decisions and foreign policy are centred on its interest to please and collaborate with the Arab League of Nations. ¹

The study will also explore how the search for identity and a longing for self-determination of the South Sudanese has influenced or not influenced the foreign policy decisions of Sudan.

¹ Nsamba A Morris et al, *State Building and Development in South sudan*, (Nairobi: African Research and Resource Forum, 2011), p 90-91.

Sudan has always dominated national laws and policies which include the foreign policy of the two nations when they existed as one. Its history on slave trade, whereby the black Sudanese were mistreated and misused by Arabs in the north went forth to affect the status of the country long after the end of the slave trade. Black Sudanese were treated as second class people with lesser rights; hence, their opinions were not considered or made much impact. This also explains the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM)'s decision to liberate the black Sudanese. It led South Sudan to self-determination where the people's rights and opinions were upheld and advocated for.

1.1.1 Background

The Republic of Sudan is located in the north eastern part of Africa; its closest neighbour is the South Sudan. Other countries that border it include Egypt, Ethiopia Eritrea, Chad, Libya etc. Sudan gained its independence and officially declared it on the first of January 1956. Morris et al uphold that the Sudanese nation was colonized by a combination of Britain and Egyptian groups who were both fighting for control.² Sudan gained independence while still in the midst of a civil war between the North and South which lasted for about 17 years.

The second civil war broke out in 1983; it was also fuelled by the conflict between the North and the south. The South was led by a group identified as the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). Through a coup d'état in 1989, colonel Omar al-Bashir took control of Sudan and declared himself as president. As a devote Muslim, the Sudan president highly advocated and installed Islamic principles in his rule. Morris et al add that, as president Omar al Bashir addressed the Organization for Islamic Unity (OIC) in Abuja, Nigeria he stated that Islam intended to win over Africa.³

² Nsamba A Morris et al, *State Building and Development in South Sudan*, (Nairobi: African Research and Resource Forum, 2011), p 90-91.

³ Ibid, 94

Until July 2011, the two States existed as one nation, standing as the largest country in Africa. For many years since its independence from the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in 1956, the two Sudanese nations existed as one but remained divided from within. Among their issues of conflict was in terms of governance whereby, South Sudan felt left out. The conflict between the two nations was halted through a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Weis emphasizes that the 2005 CPA which was signed by the Sudan government and the SPLA/M brought a memorandum of understanding between the two states in the North and South. The agreement corrected the unfair relationship between the two, bringing the former rebels of SPLA/M at the heart of the government.⁴ The agreement also created an autonomous state in the south complete with a government.

The two nations became part of the government, through a coalition; nonetheless the SPLA/M played only a junior role in the National Congress Party. Weis identifies the NPC as “a Khartoum based alliance of Islamists, senior security officers, finance/merchant capital, and rural traditional authorities.”⁵ The 2010 general elections contradicted the CPA on unification between the two states. It resulted in an agreement not to contest in the other’s sphere of influence. This only further emphasized and contributed to South Sudan’s quest for self-determination leading to a referendum. South Sudan was declared a sovereign State, celebrated as the independence of south Sudan on the 9th of July 2011.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Sudan’s Foreign policy has for many years been restricted and influenced by religion and sharia law. Several neighbouring countries like Ethiopia as well as countries from the international community have avoided relations with Sudan due to what has been described

⁴ Toni Weis et al, ed, *Sudan After Separation*, (Berlin: Heinrich-Boll-Stiftung, 2012), 21.

⁵ Ibid

as the nation's radical Islamic stance. Before the Sudan split and after the split and then, it was clear that, the foreign policy of the Sudan administration remained restricted and did not emphasize or consider the interests of all parties involved, in this case the SPLA/M.

The Sudanese nation's policies and laws are selfishly friendly to Arab nations. Examining the civil war in Darfur in which Sudan's President Omar al Bashir is accused of crimes against humanity, Sudan's loyalty to the Arabs resulted in military support from the Janjaweed militias, an Arab supremacist movement. These atrocities resulted in heightened damage of property and livelihoods not forgetting the huge number of people who were killed and displaced from their homes. It is essential to note Natsios contribution that the Janjaweed militias to ethnically cleanse out African tribes led to the destruction of 2,700 villages, death of 250,000 Sudanese and another 2 million ended up as refugees. The Bush administration identified the subsequent 2003 and 2004 atrocities as ones similar to genocide.⁶

These events represent what the researcher would identify as wrong choice of priorities and misplaced loyalties. After all, the essence of a good foreign policy and grand strategy is first and foremost to secure a nation's neighbourhood before pursuing the far external environment. This means that naturally the first Sudanese loyalty should be to its neighbours and Pan- Africanism, if not for any other reason, the fact that the country is located in Africa. As Morris et al note, the heavy attendance to the 7th Pan-African congress was not to display Sudan's pride to African nationalism; the nation prides itself to their Arab Identity and the Arab League. The congress provided a unique opportunity for Sudan to update itself on the trends, issues and apprehensions of the African Movement.⁷

⁶ Nsamba A Morris et al, *State Building and Development in South Sudan*, (Nairobi: African Research and Resource Forum, 2011), 95

⁷ Andrew S. Natsios. Beyond Darfur: Sudan's Slide toward Civil War, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2008), 77-93: p 78

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of the study is to critically analyze the foreign policy of the Sudan from 2005 – 2012. More specifically, the study aims to:

1. Provide an overview of the foreign policy of the Sudan;
2. Critique the salient features of Sudanese foreign policy;
3. Analyse the North-South relations and within the context of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

1.4 Literature Review

This section of the study will be utilized to analyze different issues in relation to foreign policy; the researcher will utilize books and journals by different scholars. The issues to be analyzed include definition of and need for foreign policy, foreign policy analysis and determinants. Finally, debates informing foreign policy in relation to the rational actor, bureaucratic and Organizational. The last section will apply the knowledge by a notable scholar on foreign policy, Mr. Graham Allison.

1.4.1 Definition and Need for Foreign Policy

Several definitions and explanations of what a State's foreign policy is composed of have been mentioned by different scholars. Plessis upholds that, before attempting a conceptual clarification of foreign policy, it is important to mention that most International Relation scholars admit that the concept is supremely contested, ambiguous, vague and futile⁸. Thus, it is not the intent of the study to offer an exclusive, standard, and single definition of the concept, but to provide a credible, general and yet detailed conceptualization.

⁸ Du Plessis, A. 2006. Foreign Policy and Diplomacy. In: McGowan, P.J., Cornelissen, S. & Nel, P. (eds.). Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa. 3rd ed. Cape Town: University of Cape Town University Press, pp. 119-146.

According to Ojo, Orwa and Utete foreign policy is a combination of aims and interests pursued and defended by a given state and its ruling class in its relations with other states, and the methods and means used by it for the achievement and defusing of these purposes and interests. There are limitations to this definition like many others considering that; foreign policy is defined as being representative of state interests only, ignoring the interests of non-state actors⁹.

Foreign policy can also be described as a blue print through which a country documents its strategies on how to relate with other countries and the specific national interests it aims to achieve from such relations. Li views foreign policy as a hinge of the domestic and international politics; better explained as an intersection between a country's domestic and international politics.¹⁰ Rosenau adds that, the foreign policy of a country consists of self-interest strategies chosen by the state to safeguard its national interests and to achieve its goals within international relations milieu¹¹. In today's globalized world the State also relates with international organizations like the United Nations. Li emphasizes that, a foreign policy just extends what a State does domestically. Several domestic factors influence how the foreign policy of a country is shaped; hence internal behavior affects how a country behaves externally.¹²

A State uses its foreign policy to relate with other nations in a peaceful manner or otherwise use force to achieve the same. Li mentions how the US has been credited for using force to advance its foreign policy through the military, in other words forceful means.¹³ These

⁹ Ojo, O., Orwa, D.K. & Utete, C.M.B. 1985. African International Relations. Lagos: Longman Group.

¹⁰ Yitan Li. domestic vs. international determinants of foreign policy: an empirical investigation of the case of china-taiwan, 1991-2000 (San Fransisco: 2008) p 5.

¹¹ James N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, 1980.

¹² Yitan Li. domestic vs. international determinants of foreign policy: an empirical investigation of the case of china-taiwan, 1991-2000 (San Fransisco: 2008) p 5.

¹³ Ibid

measures have been carried out with the explanation of enhancing the security of its nation and the people.

Needs for foreign policy lie on national interests in which a State aims to achieve when relating with other States. No State produces every single thing it requires hence has to rely on other States to acquire what it doesn't produce or what a State produces cheaper than it. Hence economic reasons in relation to trade, which includes coordinating with the World Trade Organization, are encompassed in the foreign policy. Others include keeping good relationships with other States who are also friends of the State.

State Security contained in the grand strategy is a key measure for every single State to relate and survive in an external environment. Cox and Stokes view grand strategy as "the overall vision of the State's national security goals and determination of the most appropriate means to achieve these goals."¹⁴ Mwangi argues that, States are able to survive in the regional and international environment due to its grand strategy.¹⁵ A State's power sources are distributed in economic, military and diplomatic. These are only some of those needs expressed by States in their foreign policies.

1.4.2 Foreign Policy Formulation

Foreign policy formulation is understood to be a lengthy course of action that engages a body of numerous actors often with different mindsets. It involves the whole process of brainstorming, decision making and analysis of the internal and external environments of interest. The state studies different aspects of the environments that affect or would affect its foreign policy. Hudson argues that, the foreign policy formulation process is characterized by

¹⁴ Michael Cox, Doug Stokes. Eds. *The US Foreign Policy*. (London: Oxford University Press) p19.

¹⁵ Makumi Mwangi. *Coordination of National Security Strategy: Perspectives on Grand Strategy Formulation in Kenya*, NDC Occasional Papers on Security No. 1 (2008) p 2.

an actor and his focus which signifies the fact that whatever happens between nations is based on decisions made by humans acting singly or in groups.¹⁶ Knecht and Weatherford identify several stages that underpin the foreign policy making process¹⁷

It is initiated by agenda-setting which comprises of two sub-stages. Firstly policymakers, usually government draft a list of possible areas on which focus should be set. Secondly, decision-makers clearly identify and describe the stakes involved in a policy, this involves brainstorming. Decision-makers randomly generate a list of specific issues from which the most urgent and critical are chosen. Domestic and international factors influence foreign policy behaviour, these influences must be channelled through the political structure of a government that identifies, decides, and implements foreign policy. Gardner argues that within the structure is a set of authorities with the ability to commit the resources of the society and, with respect to a particular problem. We call this set of authorities the ultimate decision unit, even though in reality the unit may consist of multiple separate bodies rather than a single entity¹⁸

The assessment of the international environment, this is carried out through diplomacy, the organization system of politics, rules of laws and mode of interaction between other actors in the environment. Gardner notes that, those who gather and analyze information supplied to policy makers shape and narrow subsequent options by determining what is passed along and how it is interpreted.¹⁹

¹⁶ Valerie m. Hudson. Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations. *Foreign Policy Analysis (2005) 1, 1–30: p 1*

¹⁷ Knecht, T. & Weatherford, M.S. 2004. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Stages of Presidential Decision-making. Paper presented at the Annual National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association held in Chicago on 15-18 April 2004 (published as conference proceedings).

¹⁸ Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy*, 1970.

¹⁹ Rosati, J. A. (1985) Developing a Theory of Foreign Policy: The Evolution of American Foreign Policy. Paper presented at the Conference on New Directions in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy, Ohio State University, May 9-11.

A State has to establish the objectives or goals it aims to achieve through its relations with other States and international organizations in the environment it seeks to pursue. Every State has different important needs to pursue through its foreign policy. Nonetheless, no State can be able to pursue all the needs it desires; hence, it has to priorities on what is more important than the other. Li mentions that determinants of foreign policy of a nation range around two perspectives, the domestic and the international. Both of these areas have to be considered and analyzed very keenly before any key decisions are made by a state.²⁰ This guides the State to choose the best policy options to fully implement its foreign policy and achieve its nation's interests. Other issues that come into consideration are the type of environment and the State's capabilities to achieve its objectives.

One of the final steps involves making critical decisions on the best strategies to install in the foreign policy document. The president of the country is one of the key persons that have the final word on the consequent final document. Jones affirms that, the final process involves the implementation of the foreign policy in the environment of interest. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is one of the key organs of State led by the Minister of Foreign affairs that is responsible for implementing the foreign policy.²¹ The ministry also coordinates with its embassies set up in the external environment of interest to that particular State.

The embassies that represent the State in the international environment are obliged to implement the foreign policy of the state in the host countries.

²⁰ Yitan Li. domestic vs. international determinants of foreign policy: an empirical investigation of the case of china-taiwan, 1991-2000 (San Fransisco: 2008) p 5.

²¹ Jones, R.E. 1970. *Analysing Foreign Policy: An Introduction to some Conceptual Problems.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

1.4.3 Models of Decision making

Graham Allison identifies different models or debates informing different actors which include the rational, bureaucratic and the organizational. The rational model identifies the State as a unitary or primary actor. The State is recognized as a capable actor that is able to make rational decisions in relation to what suits it the most and where its interests are maximized.

The rational model is distinguished in different steps to achieve the ultimate or final desired results. Allison identifies them as, clarifying the goals, ordering them by importance, listing the alternatives to achieve the goals, investigating the consequences of each and lastly choosing the best alternative to achieving the goal.²² Allison adds that, in the rational model the primary decision makers also evaluate the costs and benefits of their choices, hence choose the option with the highest benefits and the lowest cost. Nonetheless it is important to note that governments of unitary States are made up of individuals who have their different goals and opinions hence it's easy to diverge over issues. The rational model is complicated by the uncertainty and multiple goals of different decision makers in the foreign policy creation process.²³

In the bureaucratic model, different parties are seen as competing to maximize their gains. Decisions are made by actors as they compete against each other. Allison affirms that decision making in this model result from bargaining that occurs among government agencies whose interests and goals may be differing even on the final outcome.²⁴ It involves them utilizing as many resources in form of funds and other valuables to outdo each other and

²² Graham Allison. The rational model, along with the organizational process and bureaucratic politics models derives (1999) p 128.

²³ Graham Allison. The rational model, along with the organizational process and bureaucratic politics models derives (1999) p 126.

²⁴ Ibid 128.

maintain their importance in the competition. Allison adds that, “according to this government bargaining model, foreign policy decisions reflects a mix of the interests of state agencies.”²⁵

In the organizational model actors do not interfere with goals and objectives that are set out for all to adhere to. Allison notes that decision makers are allowed to skip the exhausting task of setting goals and objectives. They mainly rely on standardized operating procedures.²⁶ This model is dependent on financial funding; essentially actors’ actions and chooses are limited. Deborah adds....“this model implies that much of foreign policy results from management by muddling through.”²⁷

1.4.4 Literature Gap

The literature review richly informs on foreign policy, its formulation, its determinants, its needs, and different debates. All of which are very essential to the creation and good implementation of a credible foreign policy. However, the scholars don’t analyse much on other secondary but solemn matters that can affect the foreign policy of a State. A good example is religion and how its influence on a nation can affect its international relations through its foreign policy and grand strategy. What happens when a State that does not follow a particular religion comes into contact with a strictly religious State like Sudan. Does it affect their relationship considering that the other State may not be willing to confirm in the other’s religious conditions.

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Ibid 127.

²⁷ Avant, Deborah D. *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars*. Cornell, 1995.

1.5 Justification of the Study

Several scholars have looked at foreign policy, determinants, actors and needs and importance of foreign policy and analysis. Scholars like Weis have looked at Sudan after separation, the history of Sudan and the prospects and policies that have contributed to the current Sudan.²⁸ Others like the Morris, Nyong'o et al have looked at state building and development in South Sudan and its foreign policy prospects for the near future.²⁹ This study aims to contribute to this ongoing debate on foreign policy, specifically relating to Sudan. To identify areas of conflict and weaknesses in the Sudan's foreign policy document; to also identify the prospects in which Sudan could pursue its interests in the most uncontroversial of ways.

The study will also contribute to the policy level in that it will critically analyse Sudan's current foreign policy and its priorities. If its priorities are misplaced then the researcher will identify and recommend ways in which Sudan can improve its foreign policy and better pursue its national interests. The study will also look at ways in which Sudan can relate with other nations especially in the African continent without injuring its religious believes or appearing as a non-approachable unwelcoming state.

1.6 Research Questions

The study will answer the following research questions:-

1. What are the key salient features of Sudanese foreign policy during the study period?
2. How did Sudanese foreign policy contribute to the signing of the CPA?
3. Where do post-CPA relations between the two Sudans stand?

²⁸ Toni Weis et al, ed, *Sudan After Separation*, (Berlin: Heinrich-Boll-Stiftung, 2012) p 97 .

²⁹ Nsamba A Morris et al, *State Building and Development in South sudan*, (Nairobi: African Research and Resource Forum, 2011) p 21.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

The study makes use of realism theory of international relations. According to this theory, States are the major actors or organs in international or world politics. For realists, international anarchy is very present in foreign relations between states which blinds them and inhibits their cooperation with others even when they share common interests. Kenneth upholds that, international anarchy acts as a principle force that shapes both motives and actions of States. States engrossed in anarchy are more occupied with power and security and are prone to conflict and competition that overrides their will to cooperate with others like them.³⁰ Cox adds that States act in relation to self-help and hence has to take all appropriate measures to ensure that it survives in an anarchical international system.³¹

For realists, States are more interested in fulfilling their own interests, even if it means stepping on the toes of other States in the process. They do not care whether partners in the union do gain or not gain from the cooperation as long as they secure what is theirs. Mowle notes that, when States conflict they solve their differences through their material capabilities or resources; it may be inform of money or military.³² States invest a lot to achieve relatively greater gains so as to surge ahead and keep their competitors from becoming increasingly powerful partners. Mowle notes that, the balance of power relies on the fear that others may become more powerful and threaten one's own State.³³

Realists' biggest critics are the liberalists who advocate that, the State's role in world politics is challenged by emerging world actors like international organizations which encompass

³⁰ Kenneth. A. O. Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies- *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No1. (1985) p. 1

³¹ Michael Cox, Doug Stokes. Eds. *The US Foreign Policy*. (London: Oxford University Press) p11.

³² Thomas S. Mowle. Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict. *Political Psychology*. Vol. 24, No. 3 (Sep., 2003), pp. 561-592: 566

³³ *Ibid*, p.568.

intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. Mowle upholds that liberalists disagree with realists on the view that States relate with each other for selfish gains. For them States relations encourage those to work together even in the face of different interests.³⁴ This therefore means according to liberalists that States are more likely to cooperate in the eye of common interests. Cox and Stokes add that according to liberals pursuit of national interest through foreign policy has been replaced with common interests, characterized by collective security. This has also facilitated the creation of international institutions between States.³⁵

Realism relates to this study in that the foreign policy of a State encompasses how that State intends to pursue its own interests in its relations with others. Like Mwangi defines a good grand strategy- as indeed a good foreign policy....”is both a vision and a blue print about how the State intends to protect its interests and to survive in a volatile environment.³⁶ Sudan just like any other States tends to lean its foreign policy in the areas where it perceives that its interests are best met. According to the Sudan nation, its identity and interests are best advanced by the Arab league. Sudan is most unpopular with its neighbours and several African countries despite sharing common interests as a continent. Cox and Stokes uphold that each sovereign State views itself as the top authority hence orders its domestic affairs, laws and policies and especially its foreign policy as it so desires.³⁷

1.8 Research Methodology

The study will mainly utilize secondary data methods to retrieve or collect data. The secondary data will be utilized in the literature review section where by the researcher will consult knowledge from different scholars in form of books and journals. As the study

³⁴ Ibid, p.569.

³⁵ Michael Cox, Doug Stokes. Eds. The US Foreign Policy. (London: Oxford University Press) p14.

³⁶ Makumi Mwangi. Coordination of National security Strategy: Perspectives on Grand strategy formulation in Kenya, NDC Occasional Papers on security No. 1 (2008) p 2.

³⁷ Michael Cox, Doug Stokes. Eds. The US Foreign Policy. (London: Oxford University Press) p 11.

progresses, the researcher will also make use of other documents that include reports, articles and Law documents.

The research scope concentrates on the Sudan nation which is based in the north. It will also include some aspects of South Sudan, considering that the timeline of the study starts at a time when the two nations were still identified as one sovereign state. Limitations to the study are based on time; the researcher's time is too limited to carry out as much research as needed or desired.

1.9 Chapter Outline

This study is organized in five chapters

Chapter one: Introduction to the study;

Chapter Two: Foreign policy of the Sudan: An overview;

Chapter Three: Foreign policy of the Sudan, 2005 – 2012;

Chapter Four: Foreign policy of the Sudan: A critical analysis;

Chapter Five: Conclusion

CHAPTER TWO

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SUDAN: AN OVERVIEW

2.0 Introduction

Chapter one will provide a critical analysis of Sudan's foreign policy from 2005-2012. Which as noticed by the researcher is the period that fuelled and highly influenced the splitting up of Sudan into Sudan and South Sudan. The study will be interested in analysing the extent to which the two Sudan' influenced the foreign policy of the country before the spilt.³⁸

This chapter will look at the overview of the Sudan foreign policy, Sudan's Foreign policy has for many years been restricted and influenced by religion and sharia law. Before the Sudan split and after the split and then, it was clear that, the foreign policy of the Sudan administration remained restricted and did not emphasize or consider the interests of all parties involved, in this case the SPLA/M.

2.1 Foreign Policy of Sudan

Foreign policy of a country consists of self-interest strategies chosen by the state to safeguard its national interests and to achieve its goals within international relations milieu³⁹. Domestic and international factors influence foreign policy behaviour, these influences must be channelled through the political structure of a government that identifies, decides, and implements foreign policy. Within this structure is a set of authorities with the ability to commit the resources of the society and, with respect to a particular problem, the authority to make a decision that cannot be readily reversed. We call this set of authorities the "ultimate decision unit," even though in reality the unit may consist of multiple separate bodies rather

³⁸ *Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis*, International Crisis Group, 13 March 2006

³⁹ James N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, 1980.

than a single entity⁴⁰. Foreign policy is primarily concerned with the boundaries between the external environment outside of the nation state and the internal or domestic environment, with its variety of sub-national sources of influence.⁴¹ Foreign policies are designed to help protect a country's national interests, national security, ideological goals, and economic prosperity. This can occur as a result of peaceful cooperation with other nations, or through exploitation.

Sudan's Foreign policy has for many years been restricted and influenced by religion and sharia law. Several neighbouring countries like Ethiopia as well as countries from the international community have avoided relations with Sudan due to what has been described as the nation's radical Islamic stance. Before the Sudan split and after the split and the, it was clear that, the foreign policy of the Sudan administration remained restricted and did not emphasize or consider the interests of all parties involved, in this case the SPLA/M. The Sudanese nation's policies and laws are selfishly friendly to Arab nations.

The broad policy of Sudan believes in a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, their autonomy in global politics, the right of nations and people to relations based on common interest and mutual benefit. It also supports an international order that promotes justice, equality, human inter-dependence, sustainable development and one that strengthens and encourages neighbourly relations.

Given its dual Africa-Arab heritage, and in view of its strategic geographical position as the point of confluence for the two identities, Sudan is compelled to play an active role in the global and regional communities beyond the immediate framework of safeguarding its interests, principles and commitment to conventions it has ratified. Sudan resolutely supports

⁴⁰ Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy*, 1970.

⁴¹ *Webber and Smith*, 2000

Arab causes which include the just resolution of the plight of the Palestinians. Sudan was also active in settling inter-Arab differences, for example inter-Palestinian and inter-Lebanese disputes, particularly during its chairmanship of the Arab Summit.⁴²

Sudan also played a leading role in the process of African liberation when it co-founded the organization of African Unity (1963) and affiliated bodies and later the African Union. In 1986, Sudan along with other countries founded the inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the COMESA in 1993 and the Sahel and Sahara states group in 1998 and chaired the latter following its third summit in Khartoum in February 2001. Thereafter, Sudan played host to the African Summit, African-Caribbean-Pacific Summit, including 79 states from various continents, where Sudan was elected to chair this group for two years. Today, Sudan cooperates with the African Union in Darfur.

Goldstein argues that a common starting point for studying decision-making process is the rational model. Decision makers calculate costs and benefits of each possible course of action and choose the one with the highest ratio. Legg and Morrison in fact noted that the task of top decision makers in foreign policy process is to identify the political, economic and psychological needs of their country, recognize the limitations in the pursuit and work out a well-defined and well-ordered set of foreign policy objectives. The question arises about foreign Policy from the fact that policy evaluation should center on what is best for the country or for the decision maker. Therefore, leaders should focus on the country's interests to safeguard the citizens, territory and integrity of the country⁴³.

⁴² Andrew S. Natsios. Beyond Darfur: Sudan's Slide toward Civil War, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2008), 77-93: p 91.

⁴³ Mattes H. (2009), "Formal and informal authority in Libya since 1969," in Vandewalle D. (2009) p. 57.

2.1.1 Actors in Foreign Policy

Foreign policies decision makers use different decision making strategies according to the stakes threat characteristics where two difficulties arise for analysts interested in the task factors that affect foreign policy decision-making under various conditions⁴⁴. First, especially as compared to most foreign policy problems, decision tasks typically tested in experimental analyses involve relatively simple choices between equally simple or straight forward alternatives. Second, because the balance of this work has been conducted by analysts of human information processing, consumer choice, and psychology, the effect of the stakes-threat characteristic of a decision event-two of the most prevalent task related considerations in the foreign policy setting-remain untested. Nevertheless, the research on stress, complexity, and motivation effects on foreign policy decision-making can provide some direction.

Furthermore, Etzioni also believes that individuals have multiple utility functions because they have multiple goals, and that these functions are not tied together into some overreaching utility function.⁴⁵ Rather, political actors participate in overlapping networks of persons who share the goals of the moment for a single purpose. Factions are informal groups that come and go, aside from the formal institutional structure of government, which is one principal focus in the current paper. Brumfield and Fox term the manoeuvring of specific individuals with multifaceted goals as agent-centred action.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Keren (1996) commented on the bias associated with the (easier to study) gambling paradigm, where decision tasks represented s "well-structured unambiguous asks like choosing between ambles" that fail to capture the complexity of real decision-making.

⁴⁵ N. Geva and A. Mintz (eds), *Decision-making on War and Peace: The Cognitive –Rational Debate* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1997), p. 3.

⁴⁶ Alex Mintz and Geva Nehemia, "The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making," in A. Mintz, and N. Geva (eds), *Decision Making on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1997), p. 81

The extent to which the Policy Planning Staff participates in the decision-making process during a crisis the weight of its influence varies with the relationship between the staff and the secretary of state⁴⁷. If the staff is tied closely to the secretary, then it will assume an active role in the policy-making process. This follows from the impact of crisis on organizational structures. Because the formal decision-making process is constrained under these circumstances, the staff will participate if it has developed an ad hoc independent reputation. Clearly the relationship between the director and the secretary of state is an intervening variable. If the two men have a close personal relationship, then the staff is likely to participate in crisis decision- making and, further, is likely to have an impact on the direction of foreign policy.

The Determinant in foreign policy that interacted to influence the formulation of Sudan foreign policies is many and complex. Among the major determinants in the conceptual framework of the Sudan leadership are religion, culture, and perception. The concept of the nation-state system, with sovereign states interacting as theoretical equals, was unknown. Rulers of culturally inferior SPLA or their envoys were expected to appear in the in policy and mediation forums, make their views on policy making and present tribute. Foreign policy determinant of the analysis of international politics found in the works of late Garang one facet of the SPLA founders through which the Southern Sudan leadership has interpreted Khartoum event view of rapacious capitalist–imperialist states that colonized South Sudan region to exploit their resources and workers resonated with the founders of the SPLA Party.

⁴⁷ Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York 1968), p 317.

2.2 The Role of History in Foreign Policy

For all but 11 of the 48 years since its independence in 1956, Sudan has been engulfed in civil conflict. The conflict between the North and the South erupted one year before Sudan gained its independence in 1955. The war that the Government of Sudan and the Sudan's People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLAM/A) recently ended, erupted in 1983, following the breakdown of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement⁴⁸. The root causes which propelled the war included disputes over resources, power, the role of religion in the state and self-determination⁴⁹. Sudan policy has for many years been restricted and influenced by religion and sharia law. Before the Sudan split and after the split and the, it was clear that, the foreign policy of the Sudan administration remained restricted and did not emphasize or consider the interests of all parties involved, in this case the SPLA/M. The Sudanese nation's policies and laws are selfishly friendly to Arab nations. The role of Islam in the state has long been a source of tension within the regime.³⁴ Islamists associated with Turabi favor stricter application of sharia than Bashir favors. In fact, their advocacy for the use of sharia throughout Khartoum became so contentious during the CPA negotiations that the matter's resolution was postponed for future deliberations; Islamists are also unhappy that Islamic banking is limited to Sudan's northern regions.

The foreign policy of Sudan since its conception to the split of Sudan, was squarely self centred and discriminative. It was designed to favour the rights opinions of those in the North totally ignoring the South Sudanese. Majority of the South Sudanese were Christians something that did not go down well with the northerners especially the ruling class. Bankie mentions that when the North elite were installed in power by Anglo-Egyptians

⁴⁸ National Democratic Institute. 2004. *on the Threshold of Peace: Findings from Focus Groups with Men and Women Across Southern Sudan*.

⁴⁹ *Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis*, International Crisis Group, 13 March 2006

condominium, they considered it as a nation with their fellow Arabs. The Muslim Africans who were going through Arabisation where by the black ‘slaves’ had no authority.⁵⁰ In the Sudan context a light-brown citizen was an Arab and a black one was a slave. In essence the South Sudan led by the SPLA/M fought against this type of treatment.

The CPA clearly mentions that the Islamic/Sharia Law will only be applied in Sudan. This necessarily meant that the South Sudanese who are dominated by Christianity were now free to express themselves without intimidation. It also brought a close to forced Islamisation of the South Sudanese by some Northerners. Ahmed affirms that, the two parties involved agreed to share power and also agreed to respect each other’s ideologies in terms of rule. They also agreed to have competitive elections as “a non-violent strategy for achieving power”⁵¹ . Sudan policy should be restructured to accommodate other African countries and international community’s so that there will be relation with others.

2.3 Sudanese Foreign Policy and the CPA

Sudan’s Foreign policy has for many years been restricted and influenced by religion and sharia law. Several neighbouring countries like Ethiopia as well as countries from the international community have avoided relations with Sudan due to what has been described as the nation’s radical Islamic stance. Before the Sudan split and after the split and the, it was clear that, the foreign policy of the Sudan administration remained restricted and did not emphasize or consider the interests of all parties involved, in this case the SPLA/M. The Sudanese nation’s policies and laws are selfishly friendly to Arab nations.

⁵⁰ Andrew S. Natsios. Beyond Darfur: Sudan's Slide toward Civil War, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2008), 77-93: p 91.

⁵¹ Einas Ahmed The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Dynamics of Post-Conflict Political Partnership in Sudan. *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 44, No. 3, *Power-Sharing in Africa* (2009), pp. 133-147: P 134.

The CPA's signing marked the culmination of more than ten years of negotiation between Khartoum and the SPLM, mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). A collection of eight detailed protocols inked primarily since 2002, the CPA sets out political, economic, security and judicial arrangements for an interim period of six and a half years. Its stated goal is to promote stability, unity, development, democracy and reconciliation throughout Sudan. In addition to the important institutional features outlined below, the CPA sets out a clear sequence and schedule of benchmarks for the interim period including: population census by the end of the second year to determine the appropriate proportion of the parties in the relevant institutions (2006); general elections at all levels of government by the end of the third year (2007); and referendum and independence for southern Sudan and Abyei and at the end of the six and half years (2011).

The CPA is indeed consociationalism, as reflected by its provisions for power sharing in major national government branches, the civil service, and the security sector; national wealth sharing; regional autonomies; variations on minority vetoes; and sub national power sharing. The agreement treats the NCP and the SPLM as the dominant parties in the north and south respectively, though it reserves a small percentage of power for 'other' northern and southern political movements.

2.4 Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy

Foreign policy of any state is very important because it sets the agenda on how national interest will be achieved in the international arena. An important aspect of Foreign policy is that as it seeks to address the national interest of a particular state, it, in some cases, has to take into consideration the domestic factors that play a big role in achieving national interest. Depending on the country or state, national interest vary but they reflect the needs of the citizens of that particular state as well as the territory governed by that state. As Henry

Kissinger stated, “foreign policy begins, where domestic policy ends”⁵², it would be difficult to understand foreign policy of any state without taking a closer look at the domestic structure of that state and how it influences it in the foreign policy making process.

The whole idea of National interest seeks to ensure that certain issues within the state or within the territory of that state are enhanced, promoted and protected. These would include, state sovereignty, security, economic development, peace and stability etc. These are just some of the issues that are taken into account when foreign policy is being drafted. These issues are embedded in a state in various areas that are seen to be the sources of foreign policy from a domestic perspective. A really good example is the Kenyan Constitution as a domestic source of foreign policy. For example, in chapter 1 of the Constitution, article 2 (1), the Constitution is stated to be the supreme law of the republic, binding all persons and all state organs at both levels of government⁵³. In addition to this, in article 2(4) it states that any law that is inconsistent with the constitution is considered to be void to the extent of its inconsistency⁵⁴. This, therefore, sets the arena for policy makers when getting involved in foreign policy making to ensure that the relations established through foreign policy making, do not enact laws that go against those of the constitution. This means that it has power to exercise authority within a particular defined territory, it has a government, it also has a permanent population within that territory and it has the capability of entering into relations with other states⁵⁵. Therefore when the state is pursuing foreign policy, it has to ensure that its national interest to maintain sovereignty is not interfered with. Thus it takes on the role of providing guidance to the process of foreign policy making. It is important to note that the

⁵²Henry A. Kissinger. Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy. *Daedalus* Vol. 95, No. 2, Conditions of World Order (Spring 1966), pp. 503-529.

⁵³The Constitution of Kenya. Revised Edition 2010 Published by the National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney General, p.g 13

⁵⁴ The Constitution of Kenya, p.g 13

⁵⁵ Shaw, Malcolm. International Law: Article 1. Declaration of Rights and Duties of States. Cambridge University press pp178

constitution is a very important document because it sets the structure of how the state should conduct business. It is also a document that has placed a great deal of value on the citizen of that territory since they participated in approving the constitution in the first place. Therefore it acts as a great source of foreign policy.

Foreign policy can also be influenced by the concept of hard and soft power. Hard power predominantly lies in the military strength of the state as well as in the ability of the state to impose sanctions for the greater good of its nation. Good example of hard power is South Sudan's stand on halting oil production which is its major revenue earner due to disputes with Sudan over certain costs. Soft power is derived from the ability of the state to exert its influence without relying on its military power to do that. This would entail the use of economic or cultural means such as trade agreements, diplomacy and cultural exchanges to extend its influence. The last ten years has seen the emergence of certain nations in the international arena and due to their growth, they are keen to extend their influence for the benefit of their national interest. For example, China is one of the fastest growing economies in the world today and with this, it has become a major player in world politics. Currently China is a major economic partner to Kenya and is assisting the government to set up various infrastructures such as super highways as well as expansion of Jomo Kenyatta Airport. This partnership has also seen increased business from China with imports coming from its country and business from Chinese goods is quite rampant in Kenya. This can be seen as China extending its influence to Kenya through trade agreements in manner that could be seen as very innocent.⁵⁶

Finally Media is a great source of foreign policy not just in providing information to the citizens but in holding state organs accountable for their actions. Media has been described as

⁵⁶ *Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis*, International Crisis Group, 13 March 2006

the 4th Estate especially in playing that monitoring role. Media has such great power because it is able to provide information to citizens about certain issues that they need to be aware of, it is also able to direct people on issues that they should be holding their leaders accountable for and also it is able to provide information that could influence people on how they view certain issues. It is important to note that if utilized properly, media can be quite influential in setting the public opinion. They have been known to work hand-in-hand to make major changes to foreign policy but at the same time it would depend on who is utilizing these tools. It could be argued that after having seen what happened during the attack by the Sudan in Hijilic South Sudan government justified going to war against Sudan to not only protect its citizen but to also send a message that any threat to national interest was not going to be taken lightly.⁵⁷

2.5 Framework of Decision Making

2.5.1 Foreign Policy Decision Maker

Goldstein argues that a common starting point for studying decision-making process is the rational model. Decision makers calculate costs and benefits of each possible course of action and choose the one with the highest ratio. Legg and Morrison in fact noted that the task of top decision makers in foreign policy process is to identify the political, economic and psychological needs of their country, recognize the limitations in the pursuit and work out a well-defined and well-ordered set of foreign policy objectives. The question arises about foreign Policy from the fact that policy evaluation should centre on what is best for the country or for the decision maker. Therefore, leaders should focus on the country's interests to safeguard the citizens, territory and integrity of the country⁵⁸. Military as a source of power

⁵⁷ Andrew S. Natsios. Beyond Darfur: Sudan's Slide toward Civil War, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2008), 77-93: p 91.

⁵⁸ Mattes H. (2009), "Formal and informal authority in Libya since 1969," in Vandewalle D. (2009) p. 57.

is a very strong decree of the Sudan foreign policy, Sudan has always fought its wars through the military. Its national army is the Sudanese Armed Forces. Notably the president of Sudan is a retired army man himself who declared himself president through a coup in 1989. Hence the Sudanese nation does not take lightly the capability of an army, it guards and fights for what it considers as its own through military intervene. As a devote Muslim, the Sudan president highly advocated and installed Islamic principles in his rule. Before the Sudan split and after the split and the, it was clear that, the foreign policy of the Sudan administration remained restricted and did not emphasize or consider the interests of all parties involved, in this case the SPLA/M. The Sudanese nation's policies and laws are selfishly friendly to Arab nations. Morris et al add that, as president Omar al Bashir addressed the Organization for Islamic Unity (OIC) in Abuja, Nigeria he stated that Islam intended to win over Africa.⁵⁹

2.5.2 Domestic Environment

The domestic environment refers essentially to features, factors and forces peculiar to the state on which foreign policy is being made. The domestic environment includes geographical location of the state, its peculiarity, natural and human resources, the nature of the political system, quality of leadership, the nature of the interaction among groups in the society.⁶⁰ Domestic environmental factors have great impact on the decision/policy making of a country. For instance, foreign policies in Sudan today are influenced (even constrained) by such domestic factors as political system (power sharing through CPA), national integrity and sovereignty, Regional Integration (Arab states)

2.5.3 Foreign Policy Orientation

The slave trade in Sudan, which was popular during the Egyptian rule has haunted Sudan generations after its demise. Considering that the black Sudanese were considered inferior,

⁵⁹ Ibid, 94

⁶⁰ Otubanjo, 1999 *Foreign Policy Analysis*

soon after the independence of the Sudan, the Arab Sudanese took over power and continued installing that status quo. This has also engraved Sudan's loyalty to the Arabs hence installing a foreign policy dictating the same. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Sudan and South Sudan didn't quite change nor have any significant change on the Sudan foreign policy. Even if the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was developed to implement a fair relationship between the two Sudanese tribes, this has remained in theory and has not been fully implemented. Relations between the two states are still troubled.⁶¹

Sudan's first loyalty is centred on the Arab League which is expressed on foreign policy, in short as fellow African express their loyalty to the African unions, Sudan feels more comfortable among the Arabs. Its neighbours have had scores to settle with the nation hence have not had a peaceful co-existence or relations with each other. Uganda for example has accused Sudan of supporting anti- Ugandan rebels like the Lord Resistance Army (LRA). Its quest to join the East African Community was highly rejected by the member states.

2.5.4 Foreign Policy Bureaucratic

In the bureaucratic, different parties are seen as competing to maximize their gains. Decisions are made by actors as they compete against each other. Allison affirms that decision making in this process result from bargaining that occurs among government agencies whose interests and goals may be differing even on the final outcome.⁶² It involves them utilizing as many resources in form of funds and other valuables to outdo each other and maintain their importance in the competition. Allison adds that, "according to this government bargaining process, foreign policy decisions reflects a mix of the interests of state agencies."⁶³

⁶¹ Bankie F. Bankie . Foreign Policy Options for the Post-Independent Government of South Sudan, (Nairobi: African Research and Resource Forum, 2011), p 91.

⁶² Ibid 128.

⁶³ Ibid

2.5 Conclusion

The foreign policy of Sudan has been restricted and influenced by religion and sharia law which is consider very selfish because the government is working for the Islamization and Arabization of the entire country even before the separation of the north and south. Given its dual Africa-Arab heritage, and in view of its strategic geographical position as the point of confluence for the two identities, Sudan is compelled to play an active role in the global and regional communities beyond the immediate framework of safeguarding its interests, principles and commitment to conventions it has ratified. Sudan resolutely supports Arab causes which include the just resolution of the plight of the Palestinians. Sudan was also active in settling inter-Arab differences, for example inter-Palestinian and inter-Lebanese disputes, particularly during its chairmanship of the Arab Summit. ⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Henry A. Kissinger. Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy. *Daedalus* Vol. 95, No. 2, Conditions of World Order (Spring 1966), pp. 503-529.

CHAPTER THREE

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SUDAN: AN ANALYSIS, 2005-2012

3.0 Introduction

Chapter two will critically look at the overview of the Sudan foreign policy, Sudan's Foreign policy has for many years been restricted and influenced by religion and sharia law. Before the Sudan split and after the split and then, it was clear that, the foreign policy of the Sudan administration remained restricted and did not emphasize or consider the interests of all parties involved, in this case the SPLA/M.

This chapter will critically analyse the foreign policy of Sudan from 2005 to 2012, notable a period in which the split of the two Sudanese was initiated and finalized. The topics of interest in this chapter include the salient features of the Sudan foreign policy; this can be recognized as outstanding features about the Sudan foreign policy. Another issue to consider is the state of relations between Sudan and South Sudan. It is common knowledge that the two States relations have been troubled, long before the split especially in relation to the oil reserves located in the south. Further analysis will be on the CPA, that is development in relation of the two States and any significant concept to notice about it and how much it impacted on the Sudan policy.

3.1 Salient Features of Sudan Foreign Policy

One of the most notable aspects of the Sudan foreign policy is the influence of religion. Being what has been identified as a radical Islamic nation by many States around the world the Sudan nation has always identified itself as an Islamic State, which means that its laws and policies are implemented through sharia law. This directly means that Sudan is of the

opinion that it should always uphold its Islamic beliefs and morals even in its relations with external actors. Bankie terms this type of system as Islamisation, one that holds Islam not only as a religion but also political system. It governs the legal economic, social and foreign sectors of the State in relation to interpretation of Islamic law.⁶⁵ Bankie goes ahead to add that Islamists like the rulers of Sudan promote that Sharia, a system based the Koran and other Islamic traditional of jurisprudence are the bases on which the country operates.⁶⁶

Sudan's first loyalty is centred on the Arab League which is expressed on foreign policy, in short as fellow African express their loyalty to the African unions, Sudan feels more comfortable among the Arabs. Its neighbours have had scores to settle with the nation hence have not had a peaceful co-existence or relations with each other. Uganda for example has accused Sudan of supporting anti- Ugandan rebels like the Lord Resistance Army (LRA). Its quest to join the East African Community was highly rejected by the member states.

Notably Sudan's reaction to being listed as one of the State sponsors of terrorism was for Sudan to associate itself with Iran and Iraq. The Sudan State decided to ignore the fact that these two Arab States have been credited around the world as some of the most controversial States in relation to insecurity, abuse of human rights and terrorism. Bankie notes that in 1998 under the leadership of Omar al Bashir a radical Pan-Arab and his National Islamic Front/ National Congress Party residence rights granted to Osama Bin Laden. Osama was not only a wanted man for terrorism and the top leader of al Qaeda he was also a high promoter of Islamic fundamentalism.⁶⁷ It was definitely revealed that Hassan al Turabbi of the National Islamic Front (NIF) was the main culprit in this deal that still created a bad impression of

⁶⁵ Bankie F. Bankie . Foreign Policy Options for the Post-Independent Government of South Sudan, (Nairobi: African Research and Resource Forum, 2011), p 91.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Bankie F. Bankie . Foreign Policy Options for the Post-Independent Government of South Sudan, (Nairobi: African Research and Resource Forum, 2011), p 93.

Sudan. It looked like the Sudan State was ready to house Osama and protect him from facing justice and paying for his crimes. Natsios adds that, Hassan al-Turabbi was hence expelled by the NIF for his actions.⁶⁸

The foreign policy of Sudan since its conception to the split of Sudan, was squarely self centred and discriminative. It was designed to favour the rights opinions of those in the North totally ignoring the South Sudanese. Majority of the South Sudanese were Christians something that did not go down well with the northerners especially the ruling class. Bankie mentions that when the North elite were installed in power by Anglo-Egyptians condominium, they considered it as a nation with their fellow Arabs. The Muslim Africans who were going through Arabisation were the black 'slaves' had no authority.⁶⁹ In the Sudan context a light-brown citizen was an Arab and a black one was a slave. In essence the South Sudan led by the SPLA/M fought against this type of treatment. The Northerners mostly forced their will on the South continuously tried to convert them. Bankie notes that, that it is precisely this behaviour of the North, forced Arabisation/Islamisation that the South fought against. Intrinsically domestic policy determines the foreign policy options and decisions of the State.⁷⁰

Military as a source of power is a very strong decree of the Sudan foreign policy, Sudan has always fought its wars through the military. Its national army is the Sudanese Armed Forces. Notably the president of Sudan is a retired army man himself who declared himself president through a coup in 1989. Hence the Sudanese nation does not take lightly the capability of an

⁶⁸ Andrew S. Natsios. Beyond Darfur: Sudan's Slide toward Civil War, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2008), 77-93: p 82.

⁶⁹ Andrew S. Natsios. Beyond Darfur: Sudan's Slide toward Civil War, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2008), 77-93: p 91.

⁷⁰ Bankie F. Bankie . Foreign Policy Options for the Post-Independent Government of South Sudan, (Nairobi: African Research and Resource Forum, 2011), p 93.

army, it guards and fights for what it considers as its own through military intervene. The national army has been accused of perpetrating crimes against humanity and has been utilized by the president in all necessary avenues. It was involved in the conflict at Darfur and the civil war between the two Sudan divides. Thomas upholds that many diplomats believe that another coup has already taken place in Sudan; this is due to the clear strength of the military in Sudan. One event linked to this is SAF's occupation of Abyei in 2011 and the harsh behavior or hostilities of the military in Kordofan, which the president supported. Today, diplomats or foreign delegations are obliged to meet with military intelligence before meeting any politician.⁷¹

Power is very important to the Sudan administration also pursued through its foreign policy, according to the second class Arab nation and especially for Omar al Bashir and the NIF power is of essence in any rule. Considering that the current Sudan government took over power through a coup, its well aware that it must keep its power pots boiling otherwise another front may overthrow them.

Sudan portrays itself as a powerful front that is not easily intimidated the president of the nation plays a major role in maintaining that balance of power. The military is the most significant source of power for the Islamic state; it utilizes its sales from oil to keep the army strong and equipped at all times. Omar al Bashir himself is accused of crimes against humanity. The ICC has issued a warrant of arrest against him and urged States to cooperate. Nonetheless Bashir has been visiting several States and especially African States but they dare not arrest him. Natsios emphasizes that the ruling class of the NPC takes power very seriously, they are prepared to do anything to retain it. They may even kill if necessary,

⁷¹⁷¹ Edward Thomas. *The New Government in Juba and Khartoum – and How to Oppose Them.*(Berlin: Heinrich-Boll-Stiftung, 2012) p26-27.

impose actions that lead to massive civilian casualties and even go to an extent of violating international human rights norms no matter the force of the international pressure. The party member's main worry is that if they lose power they may face retributions at the home nations, not to talk of being tried for war crimes abroad.⁷²

3.2 North-South Relations and Foreign Policy

Sudan and South Sudan have had troubled relations for many years, mostly because Sudan's dominance over the South and the South fight for independence. Blanchard upholds that, both domestic and international efforts to bring together the big racially, ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse population for many years has never fully succeeded.⁷³ Notably the marginalization and bad treatment of black Sudan was initiated by the colonialists. They Anglo-Egyptian condominium who were popular with slavery initiated the idea among the light-brown Sudan that dark represents low class people who have rights and authority. Bankie upholds that this type of alienation has continued in Sudan for five centuries and continues to this day. The legacy of this Afro-Arab slavery has been the main cause of the distortion of the relationship between the Africans and Arabs even in the Sudan. Despite the adoption of the Arab Charter on Human Rights by the Arab League in September 1994, slavery is still witnessed.⁷⁴

One of the most controversial and cause of conflict between the two Sudan states is Abyei, each country claimed ownership to the 10, 546 square kilometres area. It is a bridge along the border of the two States. Natsios affirms that Abyei is an oil rich disputed area that is home to

⁷² Andrew S. Natsios. Beyond Darfur: Sudan's Slide toward Civil War, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2008), 77-93: p 82

⁷³ Lauren Ploch Blanchard. Sudan and South Sudan: Current Issues for Congress and U.S. Policy. October 5, 2012. P 1

⁷⁴ Bankie F. Bankie . Foreign Policy Options for the Post-Independent Government of South Sudan, (Nairobi: African Research and Resource Forum, 2011), p 92

the sub group of South Sudan most powerful tribe.⁷⁵ South Sudan has claimed the area as part of their territory but so have the Republic of Sudan. Sudan claimed that the Dajo people were the original inhabitants of the area before they were displaced by new migrants in the 17th century. Nonetheless from the 18th century Abyei's inhabitants were the Ngok Dinka coming from the Dinka tribe of south Sudan.

The Sudan nation has been controlling the area through its army men who were deployed to the area. This controversy led to the signing of the Abyei protocol in May 26, 2004 with the aim to halt the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan. In the protocol the residents of the Abyei area are described as Ngok Dinka and other Sudan citizens living in the area. The American Society of International Law notes that, the Abyei Protocol provided guidelines on how the administration of the Abyei area would be carried out after the signing of the peace agreement.

The protocol declared the area was to be rendered a special administration status by a local executive council chosen by the Abyei residents Area. The residents were to be of dual citizenship of Western Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal, who were to be represented in the two legislatures.⁷⁶ This protocol also created the Abyei Boundaries Commission with the responsibility of defining and demarcating the Abyei area with representatives from the governments of Sudan and South Sudan and five experts on the subject who are nominated by the UK, US and IGAD.

Despite this agreement to settle the disputes on the area between the two states, it is clear from the aftermath of incidents in the two nations that the conflict was not completely

⁷⁵ Andrew S. Natsios. Beyond Darfur: Sudan's Slide toward Civil War, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2008), 77-93: p 80

⁷⁶The American Society of International Law. Delimitation of the Abyei Area —Government of Sudan and The Sudan People's liberation Movement/Army, *International Legal Materials*, Vol. 48, No. 6 (2009), 1258-1423: p 1293.

resolved. Both Sudan and South Sudan violated the agreement and hence resorted back to fighting each other over the control of the area barely two years later. The death of John Garanga key leader of the SPLA/M in 2005, from a plane crash was seen as sabotage by some South Sudanese who saw it as an assassination. Natsios notes that south immigrants living in the north rioted and killed several Arabs, burning and rooting from their businesses.⁷⁷

The NCP leaders and the Arabs of the North were seriously alarmed by the south Sudanese attack after Garang's death nonetheless this among other things fuelled new conflicts over Abyei. Sudan had not recalled its military from Abyei, feeling undermined Salva Kiir Mayardit withdrew from the NCP government and military confrontation was initiated between the north and south. Natsios asserts that in 2007 the two States withdrew the war and SPLA/M rejoined the government but the Abyei dispute was still left hanging.⁷⁸ Blanchard adds that a referendum was set for the Abyei residents to decide if they wanted to be part of Sudan or South Sudan.

The referendum was supposed to be held simultaneously with the one on South Sudan, though, other border voter's eligibility disputed and derailed it.⁷⁹

It has taken quite some time to maintain some order in Abyei despite the continued tension, as both the Sudan and south Sudan nations disobeyed orders to withdraw their forces. The UN Security Council passed a resolution 1990 and in June 2011 in relation to the matter, it also authorized the presence of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) to the area. It was also authorized to look into the Sudan and South Sudan border. Blanchard notes

⁷⁷ Andrew S. Natsios. Beyond Darfur: Sudan's Slide toward Civil War, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2008), 77-93: p 86.

⁷⁸ Andrew S. Natsios. Beyond Darfur: Sudan's Slide toward Civil War, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2008), 77-93: p 81.

⁷⁹ Lauren Ploch Blanchard. Sudan and South Sudan: Current Issues for Congress and U.S. Policy (2012). P 1

that both states refused to commit to their previous agreements and the UN's orders by maintaining their forces in Abyei until mid 2012. However South Sudan has claimed that Sudan still maintains its forces in Abyei disguising them as oil police.⁸⁰

The consequent split of the two nations was supposed to solve many of their incurring disputes never the less the 2011 split still leaves some traces of disputes between the two nations. Despite each nation owning huge resources on which to serve its people the two nations citizens continue to be haunted by the past and past mistakes. Blanchard notes that areas that have experienced conflict in the two nations like Darfur, the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan about 2.5 million people are still displaced while others live in the face of drought, insecurity in terms of wellbeing and food.⁸¹ Restrictions by the Sudan government of humanitarian access to Sudan have disadvantaged many suffering groups of people. Relief agencies are not allowed to walk freely in the Sudan Republic. Blanchard adds that humanitarian needs in Sothern Kordofan and the Blue Nile are at alarming levels, yet an estimate of half a million people are not accessible to aid.

These have also affected South Sudan to some extent because the humanitarian agencies are not able to access people in need fleeing to south Sudan. Aid workers have reportedly being harassed in both States.⁸²

Other issues that continue to trouble the two nations are based on resources. Sudan and South Sudan have had disputes on the rich resources the country proud itself over, resources in which both states have shared ownership and interests. The main one to contend with has been over the oil reserves in Sudan. Both nations have always felt that the other side receives or benefits more from the oil reserves than the other. Initially the oil reserves were fully

⁸⁰Ibid 12.

⁸¹Ibid 1.

⁸²Lauren Ploch Blanchard.Sudan and South Sudan: Current Issues for Congress and U.S. Policy (2012). P 1

under the control of the Sudan administration. South Sudan was used to receiving very little benefits from the oil reserves; this status that changed after the split of the two nations. Blanchard upholds prior to the split, oil in Sudan represented 90% of Sudan export earnings and 60% of government revenue. The self-determination of South Sudan meant that Sudan lost 75% of its oil reserves. Thus the South remains reliant on the north's infrastructure to export its oil.⁸³ In January 2012, South Sudan shut down all of its oil production, a move that greatly affected the Sudan's economy which is highly dependent on oil. It accused Sudan of diverting oil that was worth more than \$800. Sudan on the other hand did not deny the action but also claimed that South Sudan owed it \$1 billion worth of transit fees.

The shared interests in between the two States could strike a ground for peaceful relations between the two States. These shared interests have led to conflict and immense violations of human rights coupled by a lot of mass murders and displacements. The United States has been instrumental in trying to solve the Sudan Agreements that have been drafted to restore peace but have been instrumental for a short while only crumbled soon after. The American Society of International Law notes some of these agreements like the Machakos Protocol 2002, Abyei protocol 2004 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 2005.⁸⁴

3.3 The Development of the CPA and its Effects on Foreign Policy

Efforts to solve the prolonged civil war between Sudan and South Sudan led to the establishment of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Sudan and South Sudan which had begun in 1983. Brosché mentions that the war resulted in about 54,000 battle related deaths and about 2million deaths as result of war, violence, famine and

⁸³ Ibid7

⁸⁴The American Society of International Law.Delimitation of the Abyei Area —Government of Sudan and The Sudan People's liberation Movement/Army, International Legal Materials, Vol. 48, No. 6 (2009), 1258-1423: p 1292.

disease.⁸⁵The National Congress Party representing the Sudan government (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement signed the CPA on January 9th 2005. The American Society International Law argues that, the two States reaffirmed their commitment to previous agreements that they agree upon all of which were integrated into the new agreement, the CPA. Some of the previous agreement were, the 2002 Machakos Protocol, the September 25th 2003 Protocol on Wealth-Sharing, the May 26, 2004 Protocol on Power-Sharing, the May 26th 2004 Protocol on the resolution of the Conflict in the Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile States and the Abyei Protocol.⁸⁶The CPA brought about significant changes in the two nations; first and foremost it declared South Sudan as an autonomous State with its own government.

The agreement brought out the former rebels of SPLA/M and made them equal participants in the Sudan government's National Congress Party. According to the new agreement, both the North and the South are supposed to share the Sudan resources equally. Weis affirms that, both Sudan States recognized each other's security forces the Sudan People's Liberation Army controlled the South while the Sudan's People Armed Forces controlled the North. The two forces were equally deployed to the controversial border areas of the South Kordofan, Blue Niles and Abyei. Both States officials and interests were represented in the two states according to the CPA.⁸⁷Ahmed adds that, the CPA is a peace deal that brought about considerable change to the underlying power relations between Sudan and South Sudan. Its

⁸⁵Johan Brosché. CPA - New Sudan, Old Sudan or Two Sudan?A review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.Journal of African Policy Studies Vol. 13, No. 1, 2007. P 1.

⁸⁶The American Society of International Law.Delimitation of the Abyei Area —Government of Sudan and The Sudan People's liberation Movement/Army, International Legal Materials, Vol. 48, No. 6 (2009), 1258-1423: 1293.

⁸⁷Edward Thomas. The New Government in Juba and Khartoum – and How to Oppose Them. (Berlin: Heinrich-Boll-Stiftung, 2012) p21

impact was instrumental to both the political and economic sector of the nation which as a result transformed the state structure in Sudan.⁸⁸

Of interest the CPA also touched on religion and its influence on the political scene especially in the northern part of Sudan that is completely influenced by Islam and Sharia. The CPA clearly mentions that the Islamic/Sharia Law will only be applied in Sudan. This necessarily meant that the South Sudanese who are dominated by Christianity were now free to express themselves without intimidation. It also brought a close to forced Islamisation of the South Sudanese by some Northerners. Ahmed affirms that, the two parties involved agreed to share power and also agreed to respect each other's ideologies in terms of rule. They also agreed to have competitive elections as "a non-violent strategy for achieving power"⁸⁹

Notably the CPA was seen as a result of the hard work of the late John Garang and the current vice president Taha. Both of whom wanted to see an end to the continued conflict and dispute between the two Sudan sides. Ahmed mentions that, the CPA is viewed as a result of the personal ambitions of the two men to conclude the agreement, without them the CPA would not have been so successful. For Garang it was important for him to put emphasis on his authority in relation to the SPLM; whereas Taha was aiming for an opportunity to enhance his personal political career.⁹⁰

⁸⁸EinasAhmed The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Dynamics of Post-Conflict Political Partnership in Sudan. *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 44, No. 3, *Power-Sharing in Africa* (2009), pp. 133-147: P 134.

⁸⁹EinasAhmed The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Dynamics of Post-Conflict Political Partnership in Sudan. *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 44, No. 3, *Power-Sharing in Africa* (2009), pp. 133-147: P 134.

⁹⁰EinasAhmed The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Dynamics of Post-Conflict Political Partnership in Sudan. *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 44, No. 3, *Power-Sharing in Africa* (2009), pp. 133-147: P 134. 138

The CPA's main agenda was to cater for the two main issues that had been a cause of a rift and escalating conflict and war between the two States, power and resources. The two were and are still a very sensitive issue to contend with, notably most of the oil reserves lie in the controversial areas that both States claim ownership over. Interestingly with this in mind the CPA offered the two nations an opportunity to decide either to remain united or solve their problems amicably or split in two sovereign States. The decision to split the nation in two was enormously agreed by the voters in the 2011 referendum. Ahmed mentions that the CPA provided the SPLM a 45% chance of representation at the executive and legislative levels.⁹¹

It is general knowledge that the CPA had good intentions and its impact was indeed felt on the initial stages of the implementation of the agreement. However as time progressed the agreement implantation weakened as the parties involved started to disobey the rules of commitment, many parts of the CPA have not been implemented. The CPA did not consider some of the contentious issues of the two Sudan nations. Brosché mentions that the CPA did not completely solve the issue of the Abyei, several stipulated commissions to solve the disputes of the two nations have not been launched and those that have are not working properly. The government of Sudan has not expressed enough will to commit while the SPLM lack enough implementation capacity.⁹² The CPA did not look at other issues like the consequent self-determination of South Sudan.

There are also other issues that have halted the implementation of the CPA. Some of these have been caused by other external factors and actors while others have been as a result of the factors in the Sudan. One of these factors is the conflict nature of Sudan. The nation is prone to conflict and has inhabited the vice for very many years. Conflict on its own has

⁹¹Ibid, 141

⁹²Johan Brosché. CPA - New Sudan, Old Sudan or Two Sudan? A review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Journal of African Policy Studies Vol. 13, No. 1, 2007. P 1.

continuously challenged any developments that have been initiated by any the two States. Sudan has not only been involved in conflict within the nation but also with its neighbours starting with its significant other South Sudan. Sudan has also been accused of supporting some force involved in conflict in the neighbouring States. Brosché mentions that Sudan was accused by Uganda of supporting its rebels, the Lord resistance Army that are fighting Museveni's government. This has understandably caused a rift between the two States as much of the conflict has taken place in the Sudanese territory. Uganda also supported the SPLM rebels to fight the Sudan government, these issues are very important to consider so as to enhance the security of Sudan.⁹³

Despite the hopes that CPA had brought about in Sudan the continued conflict both in the nation and its borders have only served to sour Sudan's foreign relations. Many States initiating from its neighbouring countries have expressed their distaste in the Sudan nation. Despite the new Interim Constitution of the Republic of Sudan adopted on July 6th 2005 that recognized Sudan's commitments to previous protocols the foreign policy of the republic of Sudan has remained the same.

3.4 Conclusion

Despite Sudan's desire to solve problems that have marred the nation for many years, its good intentions have been seriously challenged by many other factors that Sudan can't seem to detach itself from. One of this is its continuous disputes with South Sudan some of which challenge its very existence like its dependence on oil reserves. Notably losing complete control over the oil reserves and having to share it with another nation has been one of its big challenges. For example its disagreement with South in which South Sudan shut down all its

⁹³Ibid 3.

oil production in 2012 seriously harmed Sudan's economy. Insecurity in the nation and around its borders has also halted its commitment to the CPA and its relations with other States. Its continued disputes with neighbours have also hurt its state as a nation; a State that cannot secure its place around its neighbouring States fails to maintain a good reputation in the international community. The input by other nations like the United States and United Kingdom to secure the State and solve its continued disputes, have had only derailed results. Consequently Sudan has not evaluated its foreign policy and its national interests for many years.⁹⁴

⁹⁴ Johan Brosché. CPA - New Sudan, Old Sudan or Two Sudan? A review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. *Journal of African Policy Studies* Vol. 13, No. 1, 2007. P 1.

CHAPTER FOUR

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SUDAN: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

The study in chapter three will critically analyse the foreign policy of Sudan from 2005 to 2012, notable a period in which the split of the two Sudanese was initiated and finalized. The topics of interest in this chapter include the salient features of the Sudan foreign policy; this can be recognized as outstanding features about the Sudan foreign policy. Another issue to consider is the state of relations between Sudan and South Sudan.

This chapter will look at the critical analysis of the Sudan foreign policy when Sudan and south separate and after the separation, emerging issues, the role of external and non state actors and their contribution to the foreign policy of Sudan⁹⁵

4.1 Emerging issues:

4.1.1 Financial Arrangements

In accordance foreign relation between Sudan and South Sudan agreed to a tentative deal on oil and related financial transfers, it was signed on September 27. As part of the deal, fees and tariffs associated with southern oil transiting Sudan have been set, averaging \$10 per barrel. Additionally, South Sudan will provide \$3.028 billion in transitional financial assistance (TFA) over a 3.5 year period to Sudan (Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) for Foreign Operations). The TFA is aimed at partially addressing the financial gap Sudan faces as a result of the loss of southern oil revenues, estimated by the IMF at almost \$8 million. South Sudan's TFA payments to Sudan will commence after oil exports resume, which experts

⁹⁵ Johan Brosché. CPA - New Sudan, Old Sudan or Two Sudan? A review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Journal of African Policy Studies Vol. 13, No. 1, 2007. P 1.

anticipate will occur in early 2013 if implementation of the agreement proceeds as expected. The parties also agreed to cooperate on banking and monetary policy in the September accord. Also, as part of the deal, South Sudan has committed to advocate for international debt relief for Khartoum. Some observers suggest the AU mediators may overestimate the willingness of donors to provide Khartoum with funds to cover the remainder of its shortfall.

4.1.2 Border Monitoring

The African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) has proposed an administrative common borderline that the parties have agreed to use to define a Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (extending 10 km on either side of the line). The borderline does not prejudice a final decision on the border, but is to be used by a joint entity, composed of political and security officials from both sides, to oversee implementation of border-related deals and resolve related disputes. South Sudan, which had previously accepted the borderline, had noted its concern that the AUHIP borderline places four out of five of the disputed areas north of the line, and thus under the administrative control of Sudan until the final border is defined. Sudan rejected the borderline until South Sudan conceded to withdraw its forces from the fifth area, a 14 mile stretch between Northern Bahr el Ghazal and East Darfur that is one of the richest grazing areas in the region. South Sudan pressed unsuccessfully for all the disputed areas to be demilitarized. The talks have yet to formally address areas along the border controlled by the SPLM-N, which is not part of the negotiations, and the monitors' ability to patrol those sections remains unclear.⁹⁶

⁹⁶ Lijphart, "The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy" in Reynolds, ed., *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

4.2 Others Concerns

4.2.1 Citizenship

In order to meet international standard in citizenship the parties have reached agreement on “four freedoms” for nationals of both countries, namely the freedoms of movement and residence, as well as the freedom to undertake economic activity and to own property. If the spirit of the agreement is followed by both Sudan and south Sudan, then it should allow some 500,000 people of South Sudanese origin who remain in Sudan to formally live and work there, and allow Sudanese nomadic groups such as the Misseriya to continue their seasonal migrations into South Sudan. As with other issues, implementation of any citizenship arrangements may be linked to the status of relations between the two governments.

4.2.2 Resolving Border Disputes:

The proposed demilitarized zone is only a short-term, partial fix for long-standing disputes along the north-south border. The parties have yet to agree on the modalities for resolving ownership of the contested border areas. South Sudan proposes that any disputes that cannot be resolved by the parties be submitted for international arbitration, while Sudan maintains that the parties should resolve them through negotiations. South Sudan remains concerned that disputed areas such as Abyei could remain under de facto Sudanese control for an indeterminate time. An AUHIP panel of experts is expected to provide the parties with a non-binding opinion on how the border disputes should be resolved.

4.2.3 Threats to Stability in the North and South

The signing of the CPA was enabled by the focus on two clear power points in the north and south. Bashir of the NCP and Garang of the SPLM curtailed internal opposition to their respective leaderships, whether by cooption and repression, as in the former case, or by a

series of alliances, as in the latter. However, cracks are starting to appear in both of these groups. Subsequent fragmentation could have serious consequences for Sudan's hopes for democratic peace and might saw further doubt about the efficacy of consociationalism.

In the north, Bashir achieved single-handed control over Khartoum by the dominance of his NCP in Parliament, and by the squashing of all effective political opposition. Bashir was elected to a second, non renewable five-year term in 2000, but the CPA extends his reign he and his ruling clique are guaranteed the presidency at least through the interim period.⁹⁷ This political insurance, in combination with Bashir's recent strategic appointment of allies in key national and regional posts, insulates the president from rival northern politicians in the near term.

In the late 1990s, Bashir's most prominent opposition came from Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF), who introduced the strict use of sharia throughout Sudan in 1991. For much of the 1990s Bashir and Turabi, the Speaker of Parliament, enjoyed cooperative if cool relations. But when Turabi attempted to strengthen parliament at the expense of the presidency, Bashir ordered his imprisonment.⁹⁸

Turabi was released four years later in 2003, but is no longer seen as a credible threat to Bashir. Turabi has few western allies, either, on account of his strong Islamist views and alleged links to international terrorism. This reputation stands in contrast to Bashir, whose post-9/11 counter-terror efforts, particularly in terms of sharing Sudanese intelligence on al-Qaeda, have not gone unnoticed by the Bush administration. Still, factions beneath the NCP surface may assert themselves more forcefully in the future. Rumors of a coup plot against

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⁹⁸ Turabi was charged with treason. In addition to undermining the president, he was accused of negotiating secret deals with the SPLM.

Bashir in 2003 highlight the possibility of military disaffection with the NCP. Very few within the government, moreover, are thought to be interested in sharing power or in holding truly national elections. Splits within the party between hardliners are likely to be shaped by two primary factors: religion and international affairs.

The role of Islam in the state has long been a source of tension within the regime.³⁴ Islamists associated with Turabi favor stricter application of sharia than Bashir favors. In fact, their advocacy for the use of sharia throughout Khartoum became so contentious during the CPA negotiations that the matter's resolution was postponed for future deliberations; Islamists are also unhappy that Islamic banking is limited to Sudan's northern regions.

Furthermore, the NCP is struggling to contain the international forces that increasingly shape Sudanese politics. Ongoing international efforts to mediate north-south relations, in addition to international opprobrium over the crisis in Darfur, have introduced international opinion as a major factor within Sudan. Some hardliners within the NCP are content to disregard the international community, vocalizing their opposition to African Union and United Nation peacekeepers on Sudanese soil⁹⁹. But other more moderate voices wish to avoid further international isolation; many of them recognizing that receptivity to international concerns can ward off harsher sanctions, potentially encourage foreign direct investment, and accelerate oil exports, all of which are seen as keys to stimulating sorely-needed economic growth. In any case, as these voices weigh in against one another, we may find as time passes that the NCP that signed the CPA has changed dramatically.

⁹⁹ Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996).

Like the NCP, the SPLM in the south largely is unchallenged today, but similarly cannot become complacent¹⁰⁰. Salva Kiir sits at top an uneasy coalition of ethnic, religious, and regional interests that suppressed their internal differences to speak with one voice in opposition to the NCP. This voice emerged by means of an extraordinary series of agreements between the SPLM and other movements. In 2002, for example, the SPLM allied with Riak Machar of the SPDF; the agreement was significant because the SPDF, largely an ethnic Nuer movement, had been at war intermittently with the Dinka-dominated SPLM for over a decade. In 2002 also saw SPLM agreements with the Equatoria Defense Force, and the Sudan Alliance Forces. Finally, the Umma Party, led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, who has twice been prime minister in the north, has allied with the SPLM. The effect of these agreements, for now, is to render the SPLM the unrivaled movement in the south, and even the unofficial mouthpiece for the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) - an umbrella body of rebel groups and opposition movements, whose exile members remain in Eritrea, Egypt, and Kenya, and whose other prominent members include the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the north's largest opposition party, the Sudanese Communist.

Whether the SPLM can manage democratically this diverse coalition of interests is debatable. Encouragingly, the SPLM drafted a policy on dialogue with other southern voices and movements in 2003, recognizing that “in view of its national responsibilities as a principal party to the peace agreement, the SPLM remains committed to work with all concerned towards the attainment of the noble objectives of sustainable reconciliation, peaceful coexistence, justice, unity of purpose, and the prosperity of all the constituencies of Sudan.” Towards this end, it proposed a series of conferences to solicit the broad swath of opinions in

¹⁰⁰ Jones, “Civil War, The Peace Process, and Genocide in Rwanda,” in Taisier and Matthews, *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution*, (Montreal: McGill, 1999).

the south and throughout broader Sudan, including an Elders Conference, a conference of Armed Groups, Political Groups, Civil Society Organizations, Religious Groups, and a Community-to-Community conference at the grassroots; it also calls for north-south conferences. To date however, these conferences have not been scheduled, and it remains to be seen just how committed the SPLM will be to these proposals.

Successfully accommodating so many southern voices, firstly, relies on magnanimous, responsive leadership on Kiir's behalf; the SPLM high-command's autocratic decision-making style, largely shaped by its experience as a guerilla movement, is not encouraging in this regard. Moreover, as the leader of the struggle for southern independence for decades, a unique culture has formed within the SPLM that views other rebel movements condescendingly¹⁰¹. The SPLM has been said to be dismissive of other opposition groups, in some ways resentful that they are now reaping the benefits of a struggle for which they think they've made the bulk of the sacrifices. The need for internal democratization and reconciliation in the south, then, is paramount.

4.3 Conflict between Sudan and the SPLA/SPLM

For all but 11 of the 48 years since its independence in 1956, Sudan has been engulfed in civil conflict. The conflict between the North and the South erupted one year before Sudan gained its independence in 1955. The war that the Government of Sudan and the Sudan's People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLAM/A) recently ended, erupted in 1983, following

¹⁰¹ Hanf, *Co-existence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994).

the breakdown of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement¹⁰². The root causes which propelled the war included disputes over resources, power, the role of religion in the state and self-determination¹⁰³. The ensuing 21-year conflict devastated a significant part of Africa's largest country and deprived the rest of stability, growth and development. The Sudanese people have paid a terrible price. More than two million people died, four million were uprooted and some 600,000 people sought shelter beyond Sudan's borders as refugees.

The nature and size of the country's problems have frequently overflowed into neighbouring countries and brought misery and insecurity to the region¹⁰⁴. Over the long years of war, there was a plethora of attempts by various external actors, including neighbouring States, concerned donors and other States, as well as the parties themselves, to bring the conflict to an end. However, the immense complexities of the war and the lack of political will prevented its earlier resolution.

In 1993, the Heads of State of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) became involved in the latest initiative to bring the parties together. This was the beginning of a long process that has led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.

The United Nations has closely followed and supported the regional peace initiative under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)¹⁰⁵. The Secretary-General's Special Adviser, Mr. Mohamed Sahnoun, and other senior officials represented the UN at summit meetings of the IGAD countries, and carried out consultations with regional

¹⁰² National Democratic Institute. 2004. *On the Threshold of Peace: Findings from Focus Groups with Men and Women Across Southern Sudan*.

¹⁰³ *Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis*, International Crisis Group, 13 March 2006

¹⁰⁴ *Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis*, International Crisis Group, 13 March 2008

¹⁰⁵ *Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis*, International Crisis Group, 13 March 2006

governments and organizations in support of the peace process¹⁰⁶. They also took part in meetings of the IGAD-Partners Forum, composed of donor countries and organizations supporting the IGAD peace process and assisting the regional organization to enhance its capacity in several areas.

Three agreements needed to be finalized in order to achieve a comprehensive peace accord: one on permanent cease-fire arrangements, one on the implementation of all Protocols signed and the one yet to be concluded on permanent cease-fire arrangements and, one on the International/Regional Guarantees. The negotiations between the parties on Permanent Cease-Fire protocol were stalled during the round of talks, held in Naivasha in July 2004. The parties could not reach agreement on a number of issues, mainly: the redeployment of forces in eastern Sudan and the financing of the SPLM/A. Under sustained pressure from the international community, the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary-General and his Special Representative for the Sudan, the African Union and the IGAD, the parties agreed to resume the peace talks in Nairobi.

4.4 The Role of External Actors

The external actors have play role in Sudan war, in 1993, the Heads of State of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) became involved in the latest initiative to bring the parties together. This was the beginning of a long process that has led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.

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¹⁰⁶ *Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis*, International Crisis Group, 13 March 2008

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In the political arena, the revenue from oil had a direct impact on the delicate balance military power between the Government of Sudan and its principal enemy, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). This study show how the funds from the oil boom have allowed the government side to buy modern weapons in Eastern Europe and Asia, giving it the upper hand against its lightly-armed opponents.

4.5 The Level of Influence by Non-state Actors

The nature of non-state actors can well be traced, from a linguistic viewpoint, by looking at the meaning of the prefix “non“, which connotes “not”¹⁰⁷. In this regard, the discussion concerns actors that are not state actors; that is, they are not formed and managed by the state but nevertheless generally operate against the backdrop of national state laws. This may perhaps demonstrate the “power” that states possess, at least at the national political sphere ¹⁰⁸

However, there has been a significant increase in the number, size, and power of non-state actors due to increasing globalization. Idealism, as the main contender of realism, will argue that states are not the only actors that play an eminent role in the international arena. Vincent states that “... idealist scholars have argued that non-state actors have a significant impact on

¹⁰⁷ Hornby, A.S. 2005. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary: International Student's Edition. 7th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹⁰⁸ Adar, K.G. 2006. States and the Inter-state System. In: McGowan, P.J., Cornelissen, S. & Nel, P. (eds.). Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa. 3rd ed. Lansdowne: Institute for Global Dialogue and the University of Cape Town Press, pp. 100-118.

questions of politics, morality and peace, and that the state might not be the most important variable for explaining world events”. Nevertheless, although idealism supports non-state actors, it is against undesirable non-state actors such as criminal syndicates and terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda.¹⁰⁹

The Sudan State decided to ignore the fact that Iraq and Iran are two Arab States that have been credited around the world as some of the most controversial States in relation to insecurity, abuse of human rights and terrorism.¹¹⁰ Bankie notes that in 1998 under the leadership of Omar al Bashir a radical Pan-Arab and his National Islamic Front/ National Congress Party residence rights granted to Osama Bin Laden. Osama was not only a wanted man for terrorism and the top leader of al Qaeda he was also a high promoter of Islamic fundamentalism.¹¹¹ It was definitely revealed that Hassan al Turabbi of the National Islamic Front (NIF) was the main culprit in this deal that still created a bad impression of Sudan. It looked like the Sudan State was ready to house Osama and protect him from facing justice and paying for his crimes. Natsios adds that, Hassan al-Turabbi was hence expelled by the NIF for his actions.¹¹²

The militia known as Janjaweed - come from Arab pastoralist communities, who herd camels in northern Darfur and live on cattle herding in southern Darfur. The word “Janjaweed” is an Arabic colloquialism from the region, and generally means "a man (a devil) on a horse." The

¹⁰⁹ Vincent, L. 2002. Non-State Actors in International Relations. In: McGowan, P.J. & Nel, P. (eds.). Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa. 2nd ed. Lansdowne: Institute for Global Dialogue and the University of Cape Town Press, pp. 147-162.

¹¹⁰ Bankie F. Bankie . Foreign Policy Options for the Post-Independent Government of South Sudan, (Nairobi: African Research and Resource Forum, 2011), p 91.

¹¹¹ Bankie F. Bankie . Foreign Policy Options for the Post-Independent Government of South Sudan, (Nairobi: African Research and Resource Forum, 2011), p 93.

¹¹² Andrew S. Natsios. Beyond Darfur: Sudan's Slide toward Civil War, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2008), 77-93: p 82.

term was used in the tribal conflicts of the 1990s to specifically denote militias from mainly Arab tribes which would attack and destroy the villages of sedentary tribes.

When faced with the rebellion in Darfur launched by two rebel movements in early 2003, the Government called on a number of Arab tribes to assist in the fight. Some tribal leaders with relationships with both local and central Government officials played a key role in recruiting and organizing militia members and liaising with Government officials.

The Commission of Inquiry set up by the UN Security Council gathered substantial material attesting to the participation of militia from all three categories in committing violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. The Commission did not have exact figures of the numbers of active Janjaweed, however, most sources indicate that in each of Darfur's three states there is at least one large Janjaweed group as well as several smaller ones.

In 2012, three Darfur rebel groups, JEM, Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the SLA, joined forces with the Sudan People's Liberation Army-North (SPLM-North) forming a new group, the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF).

4.6 Conclusion

The overview of the Sudan foreign policy is seen to be based on the islamization and sharia law which is favouring the Arabs because they many things in common like culture, region and interest unlike the other who are left out and that why many other African countries do not have good relationship with Sudan especially the south that just came from there have gone through a lot in the hands of an Arab whose values are only favouring one side and not the south.¹¹³

¹¹³ Bankie F. Bankie . Foreign Policy Options for the Post-Independent Government of South Sudan, (Nairobi: African Research and Resource Forum, 2011), p 91.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

5.0 Summary

The study in chapter one will provide a critical analysis on Sudan's foreign policy from 2005-2012. Which as noticed by the researcher is the period that fuelled and highly influenced the splitting up of Sudan into Sudan and South Sudan. The study will be interested in analysing the extent to which the two Sudan' influenced the foreign policy of the country before the spilt.¹¹⁴

Chapter two will look at the overview of the Sudan foreign policy, Sudan's Foreign policy has for many years been restricted and influenced by religion and sharia law. Before the Sudan split and after the split and then, it was clear that, the foreign policy of the Sudan administration remained restricted and did not emphasize or consider the interests of all parties involved, in this case the SPLA/M.

Chapter three will critically analyse the foreign policy of Sudan from 2005 to 2012, notable a period in which the split of the two Sudanese was initiated and finalized. The topics of interest in this chapter include the salient features of the Sudan foreign policy; this can be recognized as outstanding features about the Sudan foreign policy. Another issue to consider is the state of relations between Sudan and South Sudan.

Chapter four will look at the critical analysis of the Sudan foreign policy from the emerging issues such as insecurity, border demarcation and stability threat of North and South before and after Sudan split. It will look at the conflict between Sudan and SPLM/SPLA and the contribution of external actors to Sudan.

¹¹⁴ *Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis*, International Crisis Group, 13 March 2006

5.1 Key findings

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on 9 January 2005 represented a major step towards ending the devastating 21 year civil war between the North and South of the country. The agreement calls for far-reaching changes to Sudan's structure and governance, including new interim national and state constitutions, and the formation of a new Government of National Unity and the Government of South Sudan. Furthermore, the agreement has paved the way for the European Union (EU) and other donors to resume development co-operation with Sudan.¹¹⁵

Sudanese civil society organisations face many obstacles to participating in the peace building process and influencing government and donor policies. However, their participation is critical to the emergence of a more open and democratic culture in Sudan and to holding the parties to the CPA accountable for implementing it the civil society potentially has a key role to play in broadening popular understanding and support for the peace agreement, and advocating for measures to bring an end to ongoing violence and humanitarian suffering in the northwest region of Darfur, as well as other parts of the country.

The African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) has proposed an administrative common borderline that the parties have agreed to use to define a Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (extending 10 km on either side of the line). The borderline does not prejudice a final decision on the border, but is to be used by a joint entity, composed of political and security officials from both sides, to oversee implementation of border-related

¹¹⁵ *Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis*, International Crisis Group, 13 March 2008

deals and resolve related disputes. South Sudan, which had previously accepted the borderline, had noted its concern that the AUHIP borderline places four out of five of the disputed areas north of the line, and thus under the administrative control of Sudan until the final border is defined. Sudan rejected the borderline until South Sudan conceded to withdraw its forces from the fifth area, a 14 mile stretch between Northern Bahr el Ghazal and East Darfur that is one of the richest grazing areas in the region. South Sudan pressed unsuccessfully for all the disputed areas to be demilitarized. The talks have yet to formally address areas along the border controlled by the SPLM-N, which is not part of the negotiations, and the monitors' ability to patrol those sections remains unclear.

The need to maintain strategic relations between the two states to manage the oil industry and to allow free movement of people across Sudanese territory especially for communities that have to cross the border on a seasonal basis for cattle grazing and other economic reasons. The foreign policy makes provision for two independent states that share government institutions. During the launch of the talks, Mbeki spoke about a non federal scenario. Given the need to manage several shared resource, social and political spaces, the creation of two independent states that share institutions on critical relational issues will call for compromises from both sides.¹¹⁶

5.2 Recommendations

The Sudan foreign policy should indicate that this is the pure separatist option. In terms of this option an international boarder will be established and all the other ties between Khartoum and Juba are severed. Given existing tensions regarding borders demarcation, this scenario may be recipe for reigniting the civil war.

¹¹⁶ Bankie F. Bankie . Foreign Policy Options for the Post-Independent Government of South Sudan, (Nairobi: African Research and Resource Forum, 2011), p 91

The second scenario major in government of south Sudan foreign policy caters for the establishment of an independent South Sudan, but with an open boarder and well-defined framework for co-operation with North Sudan. This highlights the need to maintain strategic relation between the two states to manage the oil industry and to follow free movement of people across Sudanese territory especially for communities that have to cross the border on seasonal basis for cattle grazing and other economic reasons .the foreign policy makes provision for two independent states that share government institution. During the launch of the talks, Mbeki spoke about anon federal scenario. Given the need to manage several shared resource, social and political spaces, the creation of two independent states that share institutions on critical relation issues will call for compromises from both sides.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ *Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis*, International Crisis Group, 13 March 2008

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