SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS INFLUENCING IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN SOMALIA: A CASE OF MIDDLE SHEBELLE REGION IN SOUTHERN SOMALIA

By

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DECLARATION

This research project report is my original work and has not been submitted to any other university for the award of a degree.

Signature…….date ……

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L50/62968/2010

This research project report has been submitted for examination with my approval as the university supervisor

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this project report, to my parents for laying down the foundation of success and being a source of inspiration and to my brothers and sisters for their prayers and support during my study period at the University of Nairobi. I also dedicate this research project report to all humanitarians who are working tirelessly for a better Somalia. May the Lord bless you all.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CFW	Cash for Work
ECB	Emergency Capacity Building
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Aid Office
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LNGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Organization for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TFG	Transitional Federal Government (of Somalia)
UN	United Nations
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNMG	United Nations Monitoring Group
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US (A)	United States (of America)
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to investigate the socio-economic factors that influence implementation of humanitarian assistance programs in Middle Shebelle region in Somalia. The objectives were; to examine the influence of implementing agency capacity on the implementation of humanitarian assistance, to establish the influence of culture on the implementation of humanitarian, to assess the security influence on the implementation of humanitarian response and to examine how funding influence the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle region of Southern Somalia. The study employed a descriptive survey research design based on a cross sectional descriptive research and data was collected using questionnaires administered to 60 humanitarian officers from FAO, UNHCR, UNOCHA and UNICEF that implement humanitarian assistance programs in the Middle Shebelle region. Data was analyzed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences interpreted and presented in form of tables. From the findings, the majority of the respondents agreed that the capacity of the implementing agency to manage humanitarian projects had played a key role in the effective implementation of programs in South Central Somalia. Only a few rated the extent of influence as moderate. Cultural factors also affected the implementation of humanitarian aid to a great extent according to the majority of the respondents. Gender roles were noted as a big contributor on the cultural issues affecting the implementation of humanitarian assistance. The extent of influence of security concerns on the implementation of humanitarian aid was to a very great extent according to the majority of the respondents. Similarly, majority of the respondents believed that funding had an effect to the implementation of humanitarian assistance. The findings also indicated that availability of funds influenced humanitarian aid and service delivery a great extent. The findings of this study will benefit the policy makers and humanitarian agencies especially those in Somalia for they will be able to understand the socio-economic factors that influence the implementation of humanitarian aid. The study recommends that humanitarian agencies develop strategies for mainstreaming gender across the organisation, come up with well-structured coping mechanisms to tackle the issue of security in Somalia, explore the levels of expertise, technology adoption and cooperation within the humanitarian sectors in Somalia and establish and strengthen flexible funding and coordination mechanisms.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

The number of emergencies that the global humanitarian system has to deal with has risen continuously since the end of World War II. It is poised to rise even further due to the effects of climate change and, combined with population growth and urbanization, will affect an ever growing number of people. Over recent decades, emergency response activities have become more effective, resulting in a decline in disaster-related deaths and improved assistance for the victims of conflicts and complex emergencies. This is due to improved national emergency response systems, the professionalization of humanitarian agencies, and the great increase of resources available for humanitarian assistance, now estimated at least $12 billion per year (OCHA, 2008).

Humanitarian aid is one of the most effective and practical means of mitigating situations of armed conflict, natural disasters and other disaster situations. Humanitarian crisis are in most cases unexpected and require immediate action to minimize suffering. It is a very complex area and assistance is given in many different forms, from efforts in conflict prevention to support to the difficult transitions phase towards peaceful development (Wohlgemuth, 2006). An increased number of natural disasters and drawn out situations of conflict have resulted in an increased need for humanitarian aid and international humanitarian operations have expanded substantially in reach and scale (MFA, 2010a). Disaster risks such as extreme depletion of water resources, rapid and unplanned urbanization, global climate change, and environmental degradation, among other reasons, are expected to create more frequent and severe disasters in the near future (McGoldrick, 2003). The increased humanitarian needs and growth of humanitarian assistance, in combination with a larger and more diversified group of actors, makes an increased international coordination and a strong, efficient and effective international humanitarian system even more important (MFA, 2010a).

Today, however, the humanitarian system faces significant challenges. Emergencies have not only become more frequent, affecting a greater number of people, they have also become more complex. Many conflict related crises, including in countries such as the Democratic

Republic of Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq have become protracted. Moreover, humanitarian agencies are often faced with a complex interplay of causes underlying emergencies, including natural and man-made factors. The current humanitarian system is built on the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. These principles have come under pressure as humanitarian actors face difficulties providing assistance effectively and on the basis of need; the nature of conflicts has been changing, blurring the lines between combatants and civilians; humanitarian actors are increasingly pressed to address root causes, especially in protracted crisis situations; and integrated approaches are being developed that link humanitarian to development assistance and include military and business actors in response activities. These developments, and the reactions of humanitarian agencies to them, reduce humanitarian space and lead to problems of access and security for humanitarian workers (OCHA, 2008).

Somalia is home to one of the world longest running crises and is one of the most difficult humanitarian operating environments in the world. From late 2010 onwards, as humanitarian actors responded to deteriorating food security conditions across the country, they were confronted with an evolving food access crisis exacerbated by two successive droughts, embedded within an increasing complex operational context of conflict, insecurity, geopolitical uncertainty, humanitarian access constraints and compliance concerns including donor antiterrorism legislations (Maxwell and Sandler, 2011).

By late 2010, it was clear that many populations in some of the most insecure areas of South Central Somalia were experiencing increasingly severe food insecurity. While initially the absence of large scale food aid distributions was offset by good harvests by late 2010 renewed droughts, large scale displacements due to conflicts, local food shortages and increasing food prices started to have a devastating impact. In absence of any intervention the trends worsened and by mid-2011 larger scale migration into Kenya indicated even greater stress and hunger for the larger segments of the population (Maxwell et al, 2011). During this period, some humanitarian actors recognised the need to quickly find an effective way to address the growing needs (CBRWG, 2011a). Further, if humanitarian response is to be delivered in any country, coordination between the different bodies is very crucial. In Somalia, it is different there is minimal level of coordination between the UN agencies, international NGOs and local NGOS. This has often led to duplication of efforts among the agencies leaving the bene-

ficiaries in confusion. This study therefore seeks to analyse the socio economic factors that influence the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle region in Somalia.

1.2 Overview of Middle Shebelle region

Middle Shebelle region is the food basket of the Shebelle valley regions and the country in terms of farming and livestock production. It is also one of the preferred regions by most humanitarian organization because of the density population which is estimated nearly 2.5 to 3.0 million inhabitants whom most of them are pastoralists' agro pastoralist and farming communities.

Middle Shebelle is bordered by the Somali regions of Galgudud, Hiran, Lower Shebelle, and Banadir, as well as the Indian Ocean. As part of the former Benadir region, Shabeellaha Dhexe's capital was Mogadishu up until the mid-1980s, when the town of Jowhar became the capital. It is named after the Shebelle River that passes through this region. Middle Shebelle is principally inhabited by various sub-clans of the Somali Mudulood clan, most notably the Abgaal. Other Mudulood subclans that live in this region include the Moobleen and Hiilebi. However, the Abgaal sub-clan is the predominant clan in Middle Shabelle. There are also members of the non-Somali ethnic minority Bantu group (Kaboole). The region supports livestock production, rain-fed and gravity irrigated agriculture and fisheries, with an annual rainfall between 150 and 500 millimeters covering an area of approximately 60,000 square kilometers. It has a 400 km coastline on the Indian Ocean.

Middle Shabelle is one of the bread baskets of Somalia, and in previous times accounted for 80 per cent of cereal production. However, the nutritional situation in Middle Shabelle is at famine level and still deteriorating. Population-wide death rates are above the alert level (1 in 10,000 people per day) in Balcad and Cadale agro-pastoral livelihood zone. Crop production declined to 46 per cent of 1991 post-war average (PWA) (FSNAU, September 2011). Food insecurity is exacerbated by increased food prices, lack of income opportunities, limited humanitarian assistance and the recent ban on some humanitarian agencies from the region by the Al Shabaab.

1.3 Problem Statement

Somalia has been the site of intermittent humanitarian crises since the 1970s, it is often portrayed as a "the world's most failed state" (Anderson, 2009). Somalia remains a home to one of the world longest running crises and is one of the most difficult humanitarian operating environments in the world. For over 20 years, an enduring civil war and regular droughts have forced millions of people into crisis. Armed militia control many areas, creating severe security risks for aid workers who attempt to fill the gap with services and goods, including significant in-kind food aid (Maxwell and Fitzpatrick, 2011).

According to the Hammond and Vaughan-Lee (2012) literature, in mid-2011 famine was declared by the UN in southern and central Somalia. An estimated 4 million people were in need of emergency food and medical assistance. Hundreds of thousands were displaced, some crossing the border to Kenya where the population of Dadaab camp rose to over 450,000. Darcy, 2012 discusses further that although labeled by many as a 'drought crisis', it is widely acknowledged that the real triggers of the famine were lack of access to food, in turn related to conflict and the denial of humanitarian access to a number of humanitarian agencies. Reports from UNOCHA further confirms that this came on top of rising food prices since 2009 (related to the global hike in food prices) and falling remittances from the Somali diaspora as a result of the global recession.

Further, owing to the 2010–2011 drought situations the UN Monitoring Group (2011) underscores that relief agencies confronted a far more daunting array of impediments where humanitarian actors were very limited in their ability to respond effectively to one of the world's worst famines in 20 years. An ''alarming void in international humanitarian aid'' emerged at precisely the moment when relief aid was needed most.

There has been a significant contraction of humanitarian space in Somalia, especially since 2010 (Hammond and Vaughan, 2012). By November 2011 most UN organizations and INGOs were expelled from Al-Shabaab controlled areas. By late 2011, it was clear that many populations in some of the most insecure areas of South Central Somalia were experiencing increasingly severe food insecurity. In the absence of any intervention, these trends worsened and by mid-2011 larger scale migration into Kenya indicated even greater stress and hunger for large segments of the population (Maxwell and Sadler, 2011).

In summary of these regards, there is very little research that has been done on the Socio-Economic factors that influence the implementation of humanitarian assistance. This study therefore, will attempt to fill the gap by establishing the Socio-economic factors that influence the implementation of Humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle region of Southern Somalia.

1.4 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to establish the socio economic factors influencing the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

1.5 Research Objectives

The study was guided by the following four objectives

1. To examine the influence of implementing agency capacity on the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle region of Southern Somalia.
2. To establish the influence of culture on the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle region of Southern Somalia.
3. To assess the security influence on the implementation of humanitarian response in Middle Shebelle region of Southern Somalia.
4. To examine how funding influence the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle region of Southern Somalia.

1.6 Research Questions

The study was guided by the following questions;

1. To what extent does the implementing agency capacity influence the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle region of Southern Somalia?
2. How does culture influence to the implementation of humanitarian response in Middle Shebelle region of Southern Somalia?
3. To what extent does security influence the implementation of humanitarian response in Middle Shebelle region of Southern Somalia?

4. How does funding influence the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle region of Southern Somalia?

1.7 Significance of the Study

The study was able to bring out the main areas of concern in the implementation of humanitarian aid. The study explored the obstacle experienced by humanitarian organizations in responding to different forms of assistance in Middle Shebelle region of Somalia. Various local and international agencies, therefore, will benefit from this study as the study comes in at a time when many scholars have embarked on the humanitarian assistance in Somalia owing to the complex situation that currently exists in the war torn country. The findings of this study will benefit the humanitarian agencies especially those in Somalia for they will be able to understand the socio-economic factors that contribute to the implementation of humanitarian aid. Lastly the study will add great value to the field of knowledge and the upcoming researchers may use it as a basis for further researcher.

1.8 Delimitation of the Study

The study covered Middle Shebelle region in South Central zone of Somalia. The study location was convenient to the researcher in terms of accessibility. It also made it easier to reach the programme staffs who formed the population from which researcher drew the sample size.

1.9 Limitations of the Study

The research instrument gave varying data depending on the individual or the agency where it was used. The shortcoming was addressed by applying both quantitative and qualitative approaches to research.

Due to technological dynamism and changes in the administrative styles in NGOs, approaches to humanitarian aid can change within a short time, rendering the research findings obsolete. Also, the study was carried out in Middle Shebelle region in Somalia which has unique characteristics and hostile environment, meaning that the results may not be generalized to other areas with great precision.

1.10 Assumptions of the Study

It was assumed that the the respondents being drawn for well-established and professional bodies will be available for the research and that they possessed relevant knowledge that will help the researcher to make accurate conclusion. This was actually confirmed following the high rate of return and the information they provided was adequate and it enabled the researcher to make accurate, valid and reliable conclusions.

1.11 Definition of Significant Terms

Culture - is the shared patterns of behaviours and interactions, cognitive constructs, and affective understanding that is learned through a process of socialization. These shared patterns identify the members of a culture group while also distinguishing those of another group. In this study the cultural aspects of clan settings and gender roles have been further discussed as a case of Middle Shebelle region in Southern Somalia.

Funding - Act of providing resources in the form of money, most humanitarian assistance funds come from the voluntary contributions of over 126 countries and the private sector donors.

Socioeconomic factors - relationship between economic activity and social life, in this study the social and economic measures in socioeconomic status include culture, level of technology, funding and access to resources. These socioeconomic factors present the combination of economic factors i.e. funding within a multiethnic society of Somalia and its integration within the Somalia economy.

Humanitarian assistance - this is also called emergency aid and refers to rapid assistance given to people in immediate distress by individuals, organizations, or governments to relieve suffering, during and after man-made emergencies (like wars) and natural disasters.

Implementation - It is an important component of the project cycle. It has been defined as the process that turns strategies and plans actions that accomplish objectives (pride and Ferrell, 2003) “it addresses the where, when and how to carry out certain activities successfully” (Kotter et al, 2003).

Implementing Agency An agency that aids in the implementation of humanitarian assistance to the needy communities.

Security - Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence.

1.12 Organization of the Study

This report contains five chapters: Chapter one covers the background to the study, problem statement, and purpose of the study, objectives of the study, research questions, and significance of the study, limitation of the study and delimitation of the study. Chapter two is a review of literature on socio-economic factors that influence the implementation of humanitarian assistance. Implementation of humanitarian assistance, influence of the implementing agency, influence of culture, influence of security and the influence of funding on humanitarian assistance have been discussed in detail in this chapter. Chapter three covers the methodology, target population, sample size to be used, sampling procedures, research instruments and their validity, data collection procedures and techniques of analyzing data. Chapter four covers data analysis, presentation and interpretation. Chapter five contains summary of findings, conclusion, recommendations and suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter summarizes the information from other researchers who have carried out their research in a similar field of study. The existing literature establishes the independent variables much more briefly with regards to how they influence the implementation of humanitarian assistance. The specific areas covered here are; implementation of humanitarian assistance, culture and humanitarian assistance, humanitarian assistance implementing agencies, security issues and funding influence on humanitarian assistance.

2.2 Implementation of Humanitarian Assistance.

According to OCHA humanitarian update March (2008) the number of emergencies the global humanitarian system has to deal with has risen continuously since the end of World War II. It is poised to rise even further due to the effects of climate change and, combined with population growth and urbanization; it will affect an ever growing number of people. Over recent decades, emergency response activities have become more effective, resulting in a decline in disaster-related deaths and improved assistance for the victims of conflicts and complex emergencies. This is due to improved national emergency response systems, the professionalization of humanitarian agencies, and the great increase of resources available for humanitarian assistance, now estimated at least $12 billion per year.

Even though OCHA (2008) argues that response activities have become more effective for the victims of conflicts and complex emergencies, OFDA (2007) brings the aspect of the significant challenges the humanitarian system faces. Emergencies have not only become more frequent, affecting a greater number of people, they have also become more complex. Many conflict-related crises, including in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq have become protracted. Moreover, humanitarian agencies are often faced with a complex interplay of causes underlying emergencies, including natural and man-made factors.

The research conducted by Smock (2005) on humanitarian assistance and conflict in Africa indicate that the provision of food and medical supplies to refugees, displaced persons, and those near the battlefields in Somalia, Rwanda, Zaire, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, Sudan, and elsewhere constitutes one of the most heroic and life-preserving activities of our time. Major NGOs like CARE, Save the Children, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, and many less well known organizations have been on the front lines relieving desperate human suffering in Africa.

It would seem as if humanitarian assistance based on the humanitarian imperative and major international conventions would be rather simple to deliver. However, at times it appears that problems in relation to humanitarian actions are rather more complicated than those related to development assistance. The problems in implementation relates to a number of complex issues such as ownership and capacities on the receiving end, the challenge of going from a humanitarian situation towards development (the problem of transition) and some major problems of ethical and moral nature (Wohlgemuth, 2006).

Anderson (1999) endorses Worgemuths research by pointing out that a basic principle when implementing humanitarian assistance is that it should be based on the principle of "do no harm" (Anderson, 1999). Not doing more harm than good calls for moral considerations but also that the humanitarian activities are locally embedded and the use of local capacity. Many actors today are talking about "mainstreaming" conflict prevention in all their cooperation programs. Others have developed "codes of conducts" to mitigate possible problems.

Over the past two decades Somalia (primarily south-central) has been described as: 'one of the world's worst and most enduring humanitarian crises' (Hammond and Vaughan-Lee, 2012:2). Conflict and the lack of effective governance, law and order in southern and central Somalia have been, and continue to be the principal factors affecting the humanitarian situation in the country, compounded by recurrent droughts and floods, and by external factors such as rising global food prices. The most acute periods of humanitarian crisis have attracted greatest international attention and have made international news, for example the 1992 famine that claimed the lives of a quarter of a million people after the Somali state collapsed, described as setting a benchmark for humanitarian crises in the post-Cold War world (Bradbury, 2010: 2), and the most recent famine in 2011.

Darcy et al (2012) in his literature points to mid-2011 where famine was declared by the UN in Southern and Central Somalia . An estimated 4 million people were in need of emergency food and medical assistance (Hammond and Vaughan-Lee, 2012). Hundreds of thousands were displaced, some crossing the border to Kenya where the population of Dadaab camp rose to over 450,000. Although labelled by many as a 'drought crisis', it is widely acknowledged that the real triggers of the famine were lack of access to food, in turn related to conflict and the denial of humanitarian access to a number of humanitarian agencies

Bradbury (2010:8) further describes the high levels of displacement in Somalia as 'a mark of a severe protection crisis in Somalia'. By the end of 2012 the estimated IDP population was 1.1 million (UNOCHA, 2011), although the number is in constant flux as some households split at the start of the agricultural season with some members returning to their areas of origin while others stay to benefit from humanitarian assistance and business opportunities in the urban areas.

2.3 Influence of Implementing Agency capacity on Humanitarian Assistance

Further, to this knowledge GHA (2010) presents arguments to emphasis that humanitarian needs and the response to it is complex and varied and not without its confusion. It involves a plethora of actors, international and national, large and small, organizations with complex global mandates and organizations that serve a community or neighborhoods. There are actions undertaken by militaries and governments and those by families and individuals. There is preparedness for events, immediate response to them, and the provision of basic needs and the first elements of recovery.

Archer, 2003 findings supports GHA (2010) by touching on an important aspect of age, gender and experience which affects the ability of a person to approach particular groups, establish dialogue with them or gain legitimacy. Many international organizations recruit local staff to work on emergency responses .He further advocates that organizations that are called to provide assistance during complex humanitarian disasters or other humanitarian crises are typically from a variety of backgrounds. Such organizations may be multilateral, bilateral, and international and indigenous non-governmental organizations. Multilateral organizations, also known as multinational organizations, are those organizations that work to fund international or intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and other non-governmental organizations

(NGOs). Given the high risks faced by humanitarian personnel in Somalia, particularly since 2007, organizations have increasingly adopted 'remote management' tactics to provide assistance in areas considered unsafe for international staff. This approach involves 'reducing or restricting movement or withdrawing internationals (or non-local nationals) while shifting responsibilities for programme delivery to local staff or partners' (Egeland, Harmer and Stoddard, 2011).

GHA (2010) continues to advocate the view that the recipient perspective, where humanitarian aid is defined as what is supplied by organizations on the ground. First among delivering agencies are often local organizations like churches, local NGOs and governments, and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, followed later by UN agencies and international NGOs all of them the visible part of the global humanitarian assistance that has originated with contributions from governments and donations from the public. Additionally literature from MFA (2010) asserts that many agencies may act as recipient, donor and implementer of aid, often at the same time, a severe identity crisis undermines the ability of humanitarian actors to respond coherently and effectively to these challenges. The current humanitarian system is built on the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. These principles have come under pressure as humanitarian actors face difficulties providing assistance effectively and on the basis of need; the nature of conflicts has been changing, blurring the lines between combatants and civilians; humanitarian actors are increasingly pressed to address root causes, especially in protracted crisis situations; and integrated approaches are being developed that link humanitarian to development assistance and include military and business actors in response activities. Lastly, these developments, and the reactions of humanitarian agencies to them, reduce humanitarian space and lead to problems of access for humanitarian workers (OCHA, 2008).

The notion that "being humanitarian" and "doing good" are somehow inevitably the same is hard to shake off. Slim (1997) further maintains that for many people, it is almost counter-intuitive to have to consider that humanitarian action may also have a dark side which compromises as well as helps the people whose suffering it seeks to alleviate. The increasing involvement of relief agencies in the very heart of war and political violence has given rise to a growing sense of moral unease among agency policy makers and field workers who more and more feel confronted by "moral dilemmas" in their work.

The existence of a large body of international humanitarian law and human rights law is another important part of the moral landscape in which relief agencies make their moral decisions. These international legal instruments often spell out what is right and wrong under law. Nevertheless, despite its ratification by a majority of states, humanitarian and human rights law is distinguished by failure of application both locally and internationally. More often than not, relief agencies will therefore find themselves making decisions in a legal vacuum (Slim, 1997).

Weil (2001) in his literature suggests that collaborative efforts and civil-military relations during complex emergencies have always been met with mixed results. In Kosovo, for instance, NATO's humanitarian engagement was challenged by competing priorities. As a result, the mission of the military and other humanitarian organizations were blurred. To this end, bilateral military and political objectives sidelined the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' mission. Furthermore, a lack of authority and a clear hierarchical structure in Kosovo hindered the success of missions there. In Kosovo, military operations were not launched by the Security Council and interventions were opposed by many. At the same time, governments that were active in the military campaign were funding NGOs to provide humanitarian assistance to the victims. Confirming, Weils (2010) findings Davis (2001) holds the position that both victims and aggressors see military forces and humanitarian organizations as a single entity in emergency situations hence, neutral and independent humanitarians denied access to the victims of war.

Whereas supporting both studies, Bellamy (2005) underscores the lack of authority and poor command structure which creates barriers which prevented successful collaboration in Kosovo. Therefore; nearly 200 NGOs operated in Kosovo. Coordinating the activities of these organizations proved tedious and was likened by some to "herding cats," as each organization had a specific area of interest and expertise. Additionally, attempts by the military to control and coordinate the work of NGOs were resented and proper modes of collaboration never reached (Bellamy, 2005).

OCHA (2008) findings finally conclude that to deal with the shrinking of humanitarian space, humanitarian actors, including donors and implementing partners, have to make tough choices. They could either revert to a strict interpretation of humanitarian principles to reestablish their credibility and protect humanitarian space, while accepting a narrow mandate that

would not cover local capacity building, address root causes, or link relief to development. Alternatively, they could widen their mandate to include these and other similar activities to respond to a wider set of needs of affected populations, while acknowledging that this would further blur the distinction between humanitarian assistance and other policy areas and would probably exacerbate access problems (OCHA, 2008).

2.4 Influence of Culture on Humanitarian Assistance.

To begin with, Olivier de Sardan (2005) advocates the view that during the colonial days, the prevailing perspective was that underdeveloped countries were simply primitive and motivated by irrational impulses. Since slave trade was a thriving industry in the Western World that relied on that perception, it was rare if not impossible to find even a mention of international aid in the literature of the day.

This finding is supported by Ross and Til (2001), asserting that through the 1920s, humanitarian aid activities seem to be merely an incidental element of American civil life. The only clear record of aid during those times was through the church and its missionaries. Although often driven by religious sentiment and friendly toward the work of the church, the American government did not seem to consider itself responsible for offering humanitarian aid. By the 1920s, the American government offered some forms of aid, but there were niches that they did not, could not, or chose not to manage. Organized charities filled some of these niches, but they were not yet recognized by the government as official entities.

Although Ross and Til (2001) studies focus on humanitarian aid and missionary work in the 1920s', they have omitted another interesting aspect to be considered when looking at humanitarian aid in Africa that is the distinction between missionary service, NGO activity, and government projects. According to Matthew Parris (2008) remarks on an insightful article concerning the effects of Christianity on African humanitarian aid entitled "As an Atheist, I truly Believe Africa Needs God: Missionaries, not aid money, are the solution to Africa's biggest problem the crushing passivity of the people's mindset". His perspective comes from his early years growing up in Malawi, his Western education, his return to Africa after 45 years in the west, and his many years of travel across the continent. He clearly stated that he is a confirmed atheist. Still, he has become convinced that Christian evangelism makes a significant contribution in Africa with the unique distinction of changing people's hearts. NGOs

and governments provide aid, but Christian missionaries provide a rebirth and spiritual transformation that goes deeper. This type of spiritual and emotional change is difficult to evaluate but extremely valuable to humanitarian aid efforts in Africa. Whether religious or non-religious, agents delivering some form of humanitarian aid can be found in almost any village in Africa. They do work ranging from livestock and agriculture management to medical to educational development projects (Olivier de Sardan, 2005). They provide the muscle, or money, vital to many projects' success.

Further emphasis from Mathew (2008) advocates that if organizations are to succeed, they must consider the recipients' culture, expectations, and needs based on local cultures. Short-term even more than long-term projects must intentionally look to the bigger picture and cultural relevance of the projects to which they feel called. Evaluating the effectiveness of short-term trips and projects will help workers answer these types of questions. Evaluation is an extremely important part of providing humanitarian aid in Africa.

2.5 Influence of Security on Humanitarian Assistance

HPG Humanitarian Policy brief (2009) reports that one of the most concerning manifestations of the deteriorating environment for the provision of humanitarian assistance in recent years has been a rapid decline in the security of humanitarian staff. The study found that 260 humanitarian aid workers were killed, injured or seriously injured in violent attacks in 2008 the highest toll in the twelve years that such incidents have been tracked by the HPG. The study also found that the average annual number of attacks was almost three times higher than the annual average for the preceding nine years, and that relative rates of attacks against aid workers (number of attacks per aid workers in the field) had also increased by 61%. Three quarters of the attacks in 2008 took place in just six countries, with the highest number of attacks occurring in Sudan (Darfur), Afghanistan and Somalia. The spike over the past three years was attributable to the surge in violence in these three most dangerous countries that is Sudan (Darfur), Afghanistan and Somalia (Abby et al, 2009).

The needs for humanitarian food aid are high in Somalia, civilians suffer from land expropriation and/or occupation, looting of all public and private commodities (such as cattle), from harsh violence (rape, mutilations), severe human rights violations (atrocities), and from the plundering and destruction of cities such as Mogadishu (Bestemans, 1996). The violence and

the food insecurity have led to widespread internal population displacement and created an extremely vulnerable population. As a result, Somalia has supposedly become one of the worst humanitarian crises of the world where an estimated 3.2 million people are currently in need of emergency livelihood and life-saving assistance (FSNAU, 2012).

Further, the WFP (2012) report indicates that from these 3.2 million people that face severe food insecurity, almost all are located in Central and Southern Somalia; 1.25 million people come from rural regions that have been affected by drought in 2011, 580,000 people from urban settings who struggle with very high prices of food and non-food items, and 1.39 million people that are classified as internally displaced people (IDPs) fleeing from the violent conflict (WFP, 2012). Unfortunately, Somalia only receives a relative small percentage of overall aid and attention when compared to other complex emergencies like Sudan and Afghanistan (UN CAP, 2010). Specific difficulties with which humanitarian agencies have to deal are for example diversion of food aid commodities, demands for security payments and kidnapping of staff (Jaspars, 2000).

A press statement issued by UNICEF on 17 June 2009, further said that it had been a month since the Jowhar compound in Middle Shebelle was attached and occupied by militiamen, rendering it inaccessible to its staff members. The looting and destruction of life-saving humanitarian supplies and equipment enormously affected UNICEF's ability to deliver services. Similarly, after Al-Shabab leaders threatened that NGOs might be attacked. As a result, Care, International Medical Corps and other NGOs working in Somalia were obliged to withdraw entirely because of such threats. This was under the suspicions that some humanitarian agencies were cooperating with the US war on terrorism by identifying insurgent locations. Kidnappings, assassinations and other attacks on NGO and UN humanitarian agency staff have increased further since August 2008 as more areas of the country are sucked into the violence.

To cope with and respond to these security concerns, humanitarian organizations can basically choose between two extremes; retreat until humanitarian principles can be respected by all involved actors or proceed to reach the most vulnerable people while (partly) neglecting the humanitarian principles (Leader, 2000). Most organizations choose for a middle way and try to find a balance between reaching the most vulnerable people and minimizing the harmful consequences of aid (by respecting the humanitarian principles).

This findings are supported by the AU Peace and Security Council (2006) which points out that in spite of a rapidly deteriorating human security situation in Darfur region, the international community struggled to define an entry point for intervention in Darfur, and until mid-2007 it was left to the African Union (AU) to monitor the ceasefire agreement, provide a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and (within capacity) protect civilians.

Additionally, the March 2003 UN Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civilian Defense Assets to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies define humanitarian assistance as "aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis affected population" (United Nations, 2003, p.3). Whereas; the Swedish government defines humanitarian aid as efforts to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity for the benefit of people in need who are, or are at risk of becoming, affected by armed conflicts, natural disasters or other disaster situations, which are severe impediments to populations' or entire communities' supply and survival mechanisms (MFA, 2010a).

OFDA (2007) adds by emphasizing that in the case of an armed conflict the main beneficiary group is the civilian population, but it may also include members of armed forces who are no longer engaged in hostilities, such as wounded and sick soldiers. The beneficiary group in the case of natural disasters and other disaster situations is the affected population (OFDA, 2007).

Reports from the Darfur Humanitarian profile (2008) states that restrictions on humanitarian assistance are not new to Darfur. Prior to the expulsions Darfur had been described as one of the most difficult and frustrating places to work in the world, with humanitarian access severely curtailed by general insecurity, targeted attacks on humanitarian personnel and their assets, and the harassment of and bureaucratic restrictions imposed upon humanitarian organizations and their staff. ODSR (2008) further indicate that targeted attacks against humanitarian personnel in Darfur including physical and sexual assaults, hijackings and abductions increased dramatically in the years leading up to the expulsions.

Additionally, reports from the Secretary General of the United Nations on the situation in Mali indicate that since mid-January, the humanitarian situation in the country has gradually

deteriorated (UN, 2012). The scope of the humanitarian crisis has increased for local populations who are unable to cope with both the chronic and generalized food and nutrition insecurity in the region and the massive inflow of displaced persons. Civilian displacement as a direct consequence of fighting in the north has occurred on a large scale.

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees OCHA (2012), a total of 412,000 persons had been forced to flee their homes. This figure includes some 208,000 refugees who are currently hosted in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mauritania, the Niger and Togo. An additional 204,000 individuals have been internally displaced and are currently living in extremely difficult circumstances, reliant on humanitarian assistance and the solidarity of relatives and friends who are providing hosting arrangements.

Lastly, the United Nations Security Council report (2012) concludes by noting that the International humanitarian organizations currently have restricted direct access to civilian populations in need of assistance, including internally displaced persons .United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations continue to work through their national staff and in close cooperation with civil society organizations, community leaders and religious institutions to make critical interventions but, owing to the prevailing insecurity, their practical reach is confined mainly to the urban areas of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal .

2.6 Influence of Funding on Humanitarian Assistance

Through years of humanitarian aid coming from out Africa, Africa has developed a dependency syndrome that has limited its own ability to develop independent of outside aid this dependency syndrome can be traced back for generations. Starting in the 1800s, the Western World invaded Africa with colonization, slave trade, and religious crusaders. This agitated the already tumultuous African culture and encouraged a dependency on the outside world either by requiring it through slavery or by the promise of riches and salvation for changing their ways (Chiteka, 2008).

These findings are supported by Krotz (2009) noting that dependency in Africa has grown in modern times. It is fueled by local and international competition for valuable resources; lack of structure and economic stability; and the politics of race, religion, and class. Co-

dependence inevitably gets built into the structure of any engagement between non-Africans and Africans no matter how short or long (Krotz, 2009).

Secondly, an assessment conducted by ECHO (2011) draws attention to the trends in disasters and humanitarian needs which are further compounded by the global financial crisis, which has a direct impact on funding for humanitarian aid, and in some cases contributes to increasing vulnerability. Humanitarian budgets are under increasing scrutiny as donors are pressed to demonstrate cost-efficiency and value for money. Further remarks notes that the increasing costs related to the delivery of humanitarian assistance add to this: between 2007 and 2011 the cost of food rose by more than 40% and oil prices increased by 30% in real terms. The mismatch between the global humanitarian needs and resources available, together with a chronic vulnerability in many parts of the world, continues to have a direct bearing on the lives of millions of people in need of assistance (ECHO, 2011)

Thirdly, GHA (2010) points out in his study that UN humanitarian reform process started in 2005 and built on existing thinking on the use of pooled funding as a mechanism for channeling humanitarian assistance. Country level pooled funds and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) which were thus established to improve both humanitarian effectiveness at country level and equity at a global level. The CERF, which replaced the previously existing Central Emergency Revolving Fund, allows donor governments and the private sector to pool their financing on a global level to enable more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance. Pooled mechanisms are now a significant part of the humanitarian system, used by many donors as a way of ensuring their own aid spending is coordinated and able to respond to shifting priorities in a flexible and coherent way (GHA, 2010).

Wohlgemuth (2006) advocates the views that problems in relation to humanitarian actions are rather more complicated than those related to development assistance on the capacity of agents' aspect. The problems in implementation relates to a number of complex issues such as ownership and capacities on the receiving end, the challenge of going from a humanitarian situation towards development and some major problems of ethical and moral nature. It is further observed by Anderson (1999) that a basic principle when implementing humanitarian assistance is that it should be based on the principle of "do no harm" Not doing more harm than good calls for moral considerations but also that the humanitarian activities are locally embedded and the use of local capacity. Where many actors today are talking about "main-

streaming" conflict prevention in all their cooperation programs. Others have developed "codes of conducts" to mitigate possible problems (Wohlgemuth, 2006).

Further to this knowledge, Odén & Wohlgemuth (2007) maintains that organizations providing relief assistance must make choices regarding where immediate assistance is needed most, but also take into consideration that the positive impact of aid on socioeconomic conditions in one community can lead to frustration in other communities. In conflict areas, armed groups may attempt to take advantage of the situation in order to strengthen their positions thus turning humanitarian assistance into yet another resource to be fought over or into a political bargaining chip.

In conclusion, Juma & Suhrke (2002) argue that the underlying humanitarian principles in all humanitarian aid means that organizations must base their operations on the needs and wishes of the local community and use local capacity and skills. However, it can often be difficult to find the local capacity needed. In some cases, the local capacity that originally was there has been undermined and disappeared in the shadow of an intensive international relief operation.

2.7 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework shows the relationship between the research variables of the study. The conceptual framework shows the identified variables and their interrelatedness that mitigate in the research framework.

A conceptual framework developed for this study shows the relationship of the socio-economic factors that influence the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle region in Southern Somalia. The dependent variable in this study is implementation of humanitarian assistance programs. The independent variables in this study are the four identified factors which are implementing agency capacity, cultural factors, and security concerns and funding. Another factor that can affect the implementation of humanitarian assistance is government policy. These have been summarized in a conceptual framework as shown in Figure 1.



Figure 1: Conceptual framework

2.8 Knowledge gap

The purpose of this study is to investigate the challenges facing the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle areas in South Central Somalia and thus the prevailing literature emphasized the need to invest in humanitarian services by stakeholders in order to uplift the livelihoods in drought stricken areas. There is not much literature on the specific challenges that affect the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Somalia this is the gap the study will endeavor to fill.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter is a blueprint of the methodology that the researcher used to find answers to the research questions. In this chapter the research methodology is presented in the following order, research design, target population, sampling procedure, data collection methods, instruments of data collection and the pilot study. The section also explains how data is analyzed to produce the required information necessary for the study.

3.2 Research Design

This study adopted the use of descriptive survey research design to analyze the socio economic factors influencing implementation of humanitarian assistance**.** According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), descriptive research is a process of collecting data in order to answer questions concerning the current status of the subjects in the study. A descriptive research determines and reports the way things are and it attempts to describe such things as possible behavior, attitudes, values and characteristics.

Kothari (2004) further notes that descriptive research is concerned with specific predictions, with narration of facts and characteristics concerning individual, group or situation. The descriptive design was used since it ensures complete description of the situation as it makes sure that there is minimum bias in the collection of data and reduce errors in interpreting the data collected. The design also provides a detailed and highly accurate picture of the situation that can be very useful in literature review.

3.4 Target Population

The target population for this study is 200 officers from four (4) humanitarian agencies this agencies are; UNOCHA, FAO, UNICEF and UNHCR. The officers were drawn from the caliber of staff; 36 consultants, 116 field officers and 48 managers operating in Middle Shebelle, Southern Somalia as shown in the Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Target population

Organisation	Managers	Field Officers	Consultants	Total population
FAO	18	40	12	70
UNICEF	6	24	10	40
UNHCR	10	14	6	30
UNOCHA	14	38	8	60
Total	**48**	**116**	**36**	**200**

Mugenda and Mugenda, (2003), explain that the target population should have some observable characteristics, to which the researcher intends to generalize the results of the study.

3.5 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure

The study adopted the simple random sampling design. Simple random sample is a subset of individuals (a sample) chosen from a larger set (a population). Each individual is chosen randomly and entirely by chance, such that each individual has the same probability of being chosen at any stage during the sampling process, and each subset of *k* individuals has the same probability of being chosen for the sample as any other subset of *k* individuals.

The population of interest comprise of the four major humanitarian organizations UNOCHA, FAO, UNICEF and UNHCR operating in middle Shebelle area. Through stratified random sampling which involves the division of a population into smaller groups known as strata, the strata are formed based on members' shared attributes or characteristics i.e. field officers, managers and consultants. A random sample from each stratum was then taken in a number proportional to the stratum's size when compared to the population.

According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) a researcher would have to use 30% of the total target population as a sample size for it to be accepted as a good representative sample. The researcher opted for the recommended sample of 30% by use of simple random sampling. The numbers of respondents were derived by calculating 30% of the total number of field staff from four (4) humanitarian agencies this agencies are; UNOCHA, FAO, UNICEF and UNHCR. The officers were drawn from the caliber of staff; 36 consultants, 116 field officers

and 48 managers operating in Middle Shebelle, Southern Somalia. Simple random sampling was then used to sample 11 out of 36 consultants, 35 out of 116 field officers and 14 out of 48 managers operating in Middle Shebelle, Southern Somalia.

Table 3.2: Sample size

Category of respondent	Categorized Total Population	Calculation of Sample size	Sample
Project Managers	48	48/200 of 60	14
Field officers	116	116/200 of 60	35
Organization's consultants	36	36/200 of 60	11
Total	**200**		**60**

3.6 Data Collection Instruments

The researcher administered a survey questionnaire to each member of the sample population. The questionnaire had both open and close-ended questions. The close-ended questions aimed to provide more structured responses to facilitate tangible recommendations. The closed ended questions was used to test the rating of various attributes and this helped in reducing the number of related responses in order to obtain more varied responses. The open-ended questions aimed to provide additional information that may not have been captured in the close-ended questions.

The questionnaire was divided into two sections: a) Demographic details (b) respondents opinion on matters regarding the socio-economic factors influencing the implementation of humanitarian assistance. The questionnaire was appropriate in this study because it was quick to administer and the researcher was able to collect information from many respondents simultaneously. It was also more impersonal and hence provided more anonymity than other communication modes.

3.7 Data Collection Method

A questionnaire is a technique of data collection in which the respondent completes a list of questions at his/her convenience. In this research the questionnaires were administered to all

the 60 respondents. The researcher then agreed with the respondents when the research instruments were administered and the specificity of the dates of collecting the questionnaires. The respondents were given nine days within which to fill them. The delivery was made to the agency offices in Middle Shebelle. Through the co-ordination of the project managers they were then distributed to the randomly to the field officers (respondent).

3.7.1 Validity of the research instruments

Validity is the degree by which the sample of test items represents the content the test is designed to measure. Content validity which employed by this study is a measure of the degree to which data that was collected using a questionnaire represents specific content that addresses the study objectives (Berg and Gall 1989).

Pilot testing was applied as a measure of validity. It involved sending the questionnaire to some respondents to rectify the contents to ensure that they are understood by the respondents as intended by the researcher and enhance its validity. The response was good where all the ten questionnaires were returned fully filled. Minor corrections were made to the questionnaire mainly on questions regarding security and funding. These adjustments were made owing to the sensitivity issue of security in the country.

3.7.2 Reliability of the research instruments

Reliability is the consistency of your measurement, or the degree to which an instrument measures the same way each time it is used under the same condition with the same subjects. In short, it is the repeatability of your measurement. A measure is considered reliable if a person's score on the same test given twice is similar. It is important to remember that reliability is not measured; it is estimated (Mustonen and Vehkalahti, 1997).

The test was split into a first half and a last half, and then correlated. Responses were divided using odd numbers for one set and even numbers for the other set. The reliability coefficient was then calculated using the reliability calculator for the odd-even split using the formula:

$$Correl(X,Y) = \frac{\sum (x-\bar{x})(y-\bar{y})}{\sqrt{\sum (x-\bar{x})^2 \sum (y-\bar{y})^2}}$$

As the split-half technique correlation provides a measure of reliability of measurements. A reliability of 0.8 and higher was generally considered to be good (Sax, 1997). To estimate the reliability of the whole test from knowledge of the correlation between the halves, the Spearman-Brown formula was used to compensate for the reduction in items (Sax 1997:278). The Spearman-Brown prophecy formula is applied to the correlation to determine the reliability using the formula.

$$r_{sb} = \frac{2r_{hh}}{1 + r_{hh}}$$

Spearman-Brown formula from Tredoux and Durrheim (2002:213): Using the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula, the test internal consistency value increased from 0.81 to 0.9. This was hence considered a very good value for reliability.

3.8 Data Collection Procedures

Before the actual data collection exercise, the researcher got an authorisation letter and introductory letter from the University of Nairobi. The researcher then undertook a preliminary survey to identify the locations of the agencies and also to also make appointments with the identified persons. During the appointment day, the researcher distributed the questionnaires in the morning and collected them after two days. However the respondents were informed by the researcher of availability for consultations or clarifications to ensure the data collected is relevant for the study.

3.9 Data Analysis Technique and Presentation

The questionnaires gathered both qualitative and quantitative data. The quantitative data was analysed by the use of frequency tables. The qualitative responses from the questionnaire was tabulated, coded and processed by use of the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 20 computer software for windows program. This made it easy to generate frequency tables and percentages. All the open ended questions were analysed and reported by descriptive narrative. The results of the study were compared with the literature review to establish the socio economic factors influencing the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

3.10 Operational Definition of Variables

A variable is an empirical property that can take two or more values. It is any property that can change, either in quantity or quality (Mugenda and Mugenda, 1999).

A dependent variable is a variable whose outcome depends on the manipulation of the independent variables. In this study the dependent variable is beneficiaries' accountability. Independent variable on the other hand is a variable that is manipulated to cause changes in the dependent variable (Allen et al., 1995). In this study the independent variables were implementing agencies' capacity, cultural factors, security factors and projects funding. Moderating variables behaves like the independent variable in that it has a significant contributory or contingent effect on the relationship between the dependent and the independent variable. In this study the moderating variable was government policies.

An operational definition describes how the variables are measured and defined within the study. It is a description of a variable, term or object in terms of the specific process or set of validation tests used to determine its presence and quantity. It is generally designed to model a conceptual definition. Nominal scales will used to investigate the various variables in the study (Allen et al., 1995).

Table 3.3: Operational definition of variables

VARIABLE	TYPE OF VARIABLE	INDICATORS	MEASURE	SCALE OF MEASUREMENT	TOOL OF ANALYSIS
Successful monitoring and implementation of humanitarian assistance	Dependent	• Decrease in Mortality • Growth in productivity • Increase in household income • Increased investment by donors	• Overall improved environment for economic activity	Nominal	Descriptive
Implementing Agency • Technology transfer • Staff expertise • Organization bureaucratic procedure	Independent	• Use of updated technology in communication • Improved technology • Coordination in delivery • Existing networks	• IT devices they use • Percentages	Nominal	Descriptive
Cultural Factors • Cultural values • Gender roles • Clan Conflict • Pastoralist livelihood	Independent	• Equality in participation of beneficiaries • Clans coexist in harmony	• Cultural sensitivity • Ratio of gender • Number of abduction	Nominal	Descriptive
Security • Militia • Hostility towards agencies workers • Looting and destruction of life-saving supplies	Independent	• Threats issued and reports • No of kidnappings and deaths	• Frequency of occurrence • Killings	Nominal	Descriptive
Funding Factors • Adequacy of the funds • Financial Management capacity and Skills • Conditions to funding	Independent	• Adequate and timely Donor funding modalities. • Training of beneficiaries and implementing partners • Flexibility on donor funding, credibility with donors	• Percentage • Types of trainings • Strengthen the capacity of key actors to deliver technical advice. • Longer term funding for resilience	Nominal	Descriptive

3.11 Ethical Considerations

Before the start of the interview sessions with respondents, the researcher and research assistants adequately briefed them about the aim of the study. This was done to avoid any misunderstandings that could crop up during the interview about the purpose of the research. Respondents were then interviewed at their own consent. During the entire study confidentiality of the respondent's was highly maintained. Where need arose, respondents anonymity were guaranteed.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETETION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter covers data analysis, presentation and interpretation for the purposes of answering the research questions. The data tool used in this research was a questionnaire containing both open and close ended questions. In open-ended questions the respondents were given room to explain their answers in detail. In the closed questions, the participants used Yes and No structure as well as a five-point Likert scale to indicate degree of agreement with the highlighted statement. The survey focussed on analysing the extent of influence of the suggested Socio-Economic factors on the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle region in Somalia.

4.2 Questionnaire Return Rate

Questionnaire return rate is the proportion of the sample that participated as intended in all the research procedures. The questionnaire was given to 60 humanitarian aid workers from the calibre of staff consultants, field officers and managers from four different UN agencies (FAO, UNICEF, UNHCR and UNOCHA), who are actively involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. However, only 57 returned the fully analysed questionnaires compromising of (95.0%) of the targeted sample population. This percentage deemed adequate for the study and the researcher went ahead and analysed the research findings. The respondents were asked to complete the comprehensive survey to ensure that the different perspectives of people working in this field were incorporated. All the respondents were in time with little delays.

4.3 Demographic Information

The demographic information of the respondents was sought in section A of the questionnaire.

4.3.1: Gender of the respondents

The respondents were required to indicate their gender bracket. The gender of the staffs who participated in the study is as summarized in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Gender of the respondents

Agency		**Gender**		**Total**
		Male	**Female**	
FAO	Count	16	4	**20**
	% of Total	28.1	7.0	**35.1**
UNICEF	Count	8	3	**11**
	% of Total	14.0	5.3	**19.3**
UNHCR	Count	7	2	**9**
	% of Total	12.3	3.5	**15.8**
UNOCHA	Count	14	3	**17**
	% of Total	24.6	5.3	**29.8**
TOTAL	**Count**	**45**	**12**	**57**
	% of Total	**78.9**	**21.1**	**100.0**

From Table 4.1, it can be seen that the female respondents were less with 21% compared to men who had a percentage of 79%.

According to the findings not many women have taken up this position probably owing to the harsh conditions involved. Also Somalia is a culture sensitive community women are not expected to go out in the field. Similarly, for the female aid workers they have to adhere to some cultural and religious issues practised in Somalia. All these conditions make it hard for the female to work as humanitarian aid assistance workers.

4.3.2: Age of the respondents

The population understudy was analysed in terms of age of the respondent. This was to help understand the average age of the respondent.

Table 4.2: Age of the respondents

Agency		Age					Total
		Below 25 yrs.	**25-34 yrs.**	**35-44 yrs**	**45-54 yrs**	**Above 55 yrs**	
FAO	Count	1	2	8	5	4	**20**
	% of Total	1.8	3.5	14.0	8.8	7.0	**35.1**
UNICEF	Count	1	1	5	2	2	**11**
	% of Total	1.8	1.8	8.8	3.5	3.5	**19.3**
UNHCR	Count	0	1	4	2	2	**9**
	% of Total	0.0	1.8	7.0	3.5	3.5	**15.8**
UNOCHA	Count	0	3	8	4	2	**17**
	% of Total	0.0	5.3	14.0	7.0	3.5	**29.8**
TOTAL	**Count**	**2**	**7**	**25**	**13**	**10**	**57**
	% of Total	**3.5**	**12.3**	**43.9**	**22.8**	**17.5**	**100.0**

From Table 4.2, the majority of the respondents were aged between 35 and 44 years accounting for 43.9% of the respondents. 22.8% of the respondents were aged between 45 and 54 years, 17.5% were aged above 55 year, 12.3% were aged between 25 and 34 years and only 3.5% were aged below 25 years.

Table 4.3.3: Academic qualifications of the agencies staffs

The population under study was also analyzed in terms of academic qualification. Since the research question involved management the researcher found it good to understand the respondent academic knowledge. The respondents' academic qualifications are summarised in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Academic qualifications of the agencies staffs

Job Position		**Academic Qualification**				**Total**
		Post graduate	**Graduate**	**Diploma**	**Certificate**	
Project Manager	Count	13	0	0	0	**13**
	% of Total	22.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	**22.8**
	% of Job Position	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	**100.0**
Field Officer	Count	0	22	8	4	**34**
	% of Total	0.0	38.6	14.0	7.0	**59.6**
	% of Job Position	0.0	64.7	23.5	11.8	**100.0**
Consultant	Count	7	3	0	0	**10**
	% of Total	12.3	5.3	0.0	0.0	**17.5**
	% of Job Position	70.0	30.0	0.0	0.0	**100.0**
Total	**Count**	**20**	**25**	**8**	**4**	**57**
	% of Total	**35.1**	**43.9**	**14.0**	**7.0**	**100.0**

From Table 4.3, 35.1% of respondent had various post graduate degrees, 43.1% had acquired undergraduate degree, and 14.0% of the respondents had a diploma while only 7.0% had up to certificate level of education. It was noted that all the project managers had post graduate degrees. Also 64.7% of the field officers were graduates, 23.5% were diploma holders and only 11.8% were certificate holders. Also 70.0% out of the consultants had post graduate degrees and 30.0% were graduates.

Table 4.3.4: Duration of experience of the agencies staffs

Also the population under study was analyzed in terms of the years they had been working on the specific organization. This was in order to provide inside information into the characteristic of the population under study. The reason for asking this question is to gauge whether the respondent had been exposed to humanitarian projects long enough to be familiar with the challenges.

Table 4.4: Duration of experience of the agencies staffs

Job Position		**Years of Experience**				**Total**
		0-5	**6-10**	**11-15**	**Above 15**	
Project Manager	Count	0	4	5	4	**13**
	% of Total	0.0	7.0	8.8	7.0	**22.8**
Field Officer	Count	26	6	1	1	**34**
	% of Total	45.6	10.5	1.8	1.8	**59.6**
Consultant	Count	0	9	1	0	**10**
	% of Total	0.0	15.8	1.8	0.0	**17.5**
Total	**Count**	**26**	**19**	**7**	**5**	**57**
	% of Total	**45.6**	**33.3**	**12.3**	**8.8**	**100.0**

From Table 4.4, it can be seen that a total of 54.4% had a working experience of more than five years. 8.8% of the respondents had over 15 years working experience, 12.3% had worked for between 11 and 15 years in humanitarian aid in the region, and 33.3% of the respondent had a working experience of between 6 and 10 years. Only 45.6% had worked for less than five years in the Middle Shebelle region in the humanitarian assistance field.

4.4 Socio-Economic Factors influencing Implementation of Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia

The factors influencing implementation of humanitarian assistance were measured using both closed and open ended questions. In open-ended questions the respondents were given room to explain their answers in detail. In the closed questions, the participants used Yes and No structure as well as a five-point Likert scale to indicate degree of agreement with the high-lighted statement.

4.4.1 Capacity of the implementing agency

In this section, the researcher also sorts to find out the influence of various agency capacity factors on the implementation of humanitarian assistance. Using a five point Likert scale (1 = to very small extent, 2 = to a small extent 3 = to a moderate extent, 4 = to a great extent, while 5 = to a very great extent), the respondents rated the various factors as shown in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5: The influence of implementing agency capacity

Implementing Agency Capacity	1 To a Very Small Extent (%)	2 To a Small Extent (%)	3 To a Moderate Extent (%)	4 To a Great Extent (%)	5 To a Very Great Extent (%)
Extent to which the capacity of implementing agency to manage humanitarian projects has played a key role in the effective implementation of programs.	0.0	0.0	3.5	87.5	8.8
Extent to which technology affects the effectiveness of implementing programs in South Central Somalia.	0.0	1.8	14.0	80.7	3.5
Extent to which my organization is employing advanced technology in its operations in Somalia.	0.0	5.3	42.1	52.6	0.0
Extent to which the knowledge and skill of staffs involved in the implementation of projects affects the effectiveness of program implementation.	0.0	1.8	42.1	47.4	8.8
Extent to which bureaucracy affects the effectiveness of implementation humanitarian programs.	7.0	35.1	43.9	14.0	0.0

The researcher sort to find out the extent to which the capacity of implementing agency to manage humanitarian projects had played a role in the effective implementation of programs. As it can be seen from Table 4.5, 87.5% of the respondents were of the opinion the capacity of the implementing agency to manage humanitarian projects had played a key role in the effective implementation of programs in South Central Somalia. Only 3.5% of the respondent rated the extent of influence as moderate.

The researcher further sort to find out whether the project had adapted the current technology in their operations. The purpose of this question was to assess the capacity of the agency in

the day to day activities for instance improved communication devices. 52.6% were on opinion that their project had great adoption of technology while 42.1% rated the adoption as moderate. Only 5.3% had opinion that their project adoption was small. On the extent to which the knowledge and skill of staffs involved in the implementation of projects affects the effectiveness of program implementation, 8.8% of the respondents were of the opinion that the extent was very great, 47.4% said that staffs knowledge and skills' effect was great and 42.1% of the respondents believe that staff skills and knowledge has a moderate effect. Only 1.8% believed that the skills and expertise of the staff has a small effect on the implementation of the project.

Out of the 57 respondents, 73.7% believe that their project has a bureaucracy challenges while 26.3% did not report bureaucracy challenge, the purpose of this question was to gauge how long does the agency take from planning to implementation and evaluation of project. The researcher further sort to find out to what extent the agency bureaucracy has effect on the implementation of humanitarian projects. 14.0% of the respondent said that bureaucracy in their project has great effect, 43.9% reported moderate while 35.1% said bureaucracy has small effect with a further 7.0% saying that bureaucracy had very small effect.

4.4.2 The Influence of cultural factors

In this section, the researcher aimed at finding out the influence of cultural factors and values in the implementation of humanitarian assistance. The respondents used Likert scale of 1 to 5 (where 1= to no extent, 2= to a little extent, 3= to moderate extent, 4= to a great extent and 5= to a very great extent) to rate the how different culture issues affected the effective implementation of humanitarian assistance. The responses from the participants are as shown in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6: Response to cultural factors issues

Culture issues	1 To No Extent (%)	2 To a Little Extent (%)	3 To a Moderate Extent (%)	4 To a Great Extent (%)	5 To a Very Great Extent (%)
Extent to which the implementation of humanitarian aid in Middle Shebelle affected by cultural factors.	0.0	0.0	12.3	82.5	5.3
Extent to which gender biasness and gender roles affect humanitarian assistance implementation.	0.0	0.0	5.3	17.5	77.2
Extent to which clan disputes and politicization of aid affect the implementation of humanitarian assistance.	0.0	0.0	3.5	87.7	8.8
Extent to which the pastoralist lifestyle of most Somalis affect the implementation of humanitarian assistance.	0.0	1.8	8.8	87.7	1.8
Extent to which the large and scattered clan-families patterns in Somalia affect the implementation of humanitarian assistance.	0.0	0.0	3.5	78.9	17.5
Extent to which culture values affect project implementation	0.0	7.0	10.5	70.2	12.3

From Table 4.6, 82.5% of the respondents admitted that cultural factors affected the implementation of humanitarian aid to a great extent with only 12.3% rating the effect as moderate. A total of 94.7% of the respondents agreed that gender roles were a big contributor on the cultural issues affecting the implementation of humanitarian assistance. Gender roles are well defined within the Somali culture, preferred gender roles are for men to work outside the home and women to care for children. Though women have important economic roles, it is

important for the male to be perceived as the person in control; therefore, viewed from the outside, Somali culture is male-centered. Women and children often fail to get humanitarian assistance because they are not allowed to mingle freely with everybody else; they are expected to remain at home.

Clan disputes and politicization of aid affect the implementation of humanitarian assistance to a great extent. This is according to 87.8% of the respondents with a further 8.8% saying the effect is to a very great extent. Somalia is divided into clans which the community strictly adhere to. When implementing humanitarian assistance projects, one must consult with the clan elders before reaching out the beneficiaries otherwise one maybe accused of favouring one clan. Therefore most of the respondents agreed that the clan feuding is a major contributor. Most Somali is nomadic pastoralists always moving away from place to place in search of pastures for their livestock. In case of follow ups say for medical assistance it would be difficult. This affected the implementation of humanitarian aid to a great extent, according to 87.7% of the respondents. 8.8% of the respondents however rated the effect as moderate and a further 1.8% rating it as little.

Another issue that came out clearly is the fact that the Somali families are too large and often distributed all over therefore reaching them is difficult. This affected the implementation according to 78.9% of the respondents. A further 17.5% of the respondents admitted that the influence was to a very great extent. Only 3.5% of the respondents rated the influence as moderate. The researcher further sort to find out to what extent the cultural values has effect on the implementation of humanitarian assistance projects. 12.3% said that had very great effect, 70.2% said it had a great effect, 10.5% said that cultural values in the community had moderate effect, while 18% reported small effect of cultural values in project implementation.

4.4.3 The influence of security factors to implementation of humanitarian assistance

In this section, the researcher aimed at finding out the influence of security factors in the implementation of humanitarian assistance. The respondents used Likert scale of 1 to 5 to give their opinion on how different security issues affected the effective implementation of humanitarian assistance. The responses from the participants are as shown in Table 4.7.

Table 4.7: Security factors

Security factors	1 To No Extent (%)	2 To a Little Extent (%)	3 To a Moderate Extent (%)	4 To a Great Extent (%)	5 To a Very Great Extent (%)
Extent to which security concerns influence the rate of implementation		7.0	10.5	70.2	12.3

Security factors	Strongly Disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Undecided (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly Agree (%)
There are strict prohibitions of what aid agencies could and could not do in south Somalia as a result of the role of the militia and its self-professed links to Al-Qaeda.	0.0	0.0	7.0	80.7	12.3
The new wave of aggression and hostilities against humanitarian aid workers in Somalia is putting the lives of children and women at great risk.	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.3	94.7
Aid agencies have become accustomed to providing their own protection through hiring of or payments to armed guards and militia.	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.5	89.5
The looting and destruction of life-saving humanitarian supplies and equipment enormously affects organizations' ability to deliver services to the most vulnerable children and women.	0.0	0.0	1.8	3.5	94.7
The delivery of aid to Somalis in need has been seriously reduced as NGO workers, both national and international, have become prime targets	0.0	0.0	1.8	5.3	93.0
Often the workers have no access to infrastructure due to security issues.	0.0	94.7	5.3	0.0	0.0

As it can be seen from Table 4.7, 70.2% of the respondents admitted that the extent of influence of security concerns on the implementation and rate of implementation was to a great extent with a further 12.3% rating it to a very great extent. 10.5% said the influence was moderate while 7.0% said the influence was little. The purpose of this question was to gauge whether insecurity hinders the effectiveness of the humanitarian assistance.

There are strict prohibitions of what aid agencies could and could not do in south Somalia as a result of the role of the militia and its self-professed links to Al-Qaeda. This is according to 80.7% of the respondents who agreed with that position. A further 12.3% strongly agreed with the opinion. The new wave of aggression and hostilities against humanitarian aid workers in Somalia is putting the lives of children and women at great risk. This is an opinion that was strongly agreed upon by 94.7% with a further 5.3% agree with the same.

According to 89.5% of the respondents, aid agencies have become accustomed to providing their own protection through hiring of or payments to armed guards and militia. A further 10.5% of the respondents also agreed with the same. 94.7% of the respondents strongly agreed that the looting and destruction of life-saving humanitarian supplies and equipment enormously affected their organizations' ability to deliver services to the most vulnerable children and women. 3.5% also agreed with the same with only 1.8% of the respondents' undecided about that view.

NGO workers, both national and international, have become prime targets of these militia groups. As a result, the delivery of aid to Somalis in need has been seriously reduced. This is a position that was strongly agreed upon by 93.0% of the respondents, with a further 5.3% agreeing with the same. Only 1.8% of the respondents were undecided about that position. However, 94.7% of the respondents said that they had access to infrastructure despite the security issues.

4.4.4 The influence of funding to implementation of humanitarian assistance

To determine how funding affected the implementation of humanitarian assistance; the respondents used both open and closed questions to express their opinions. Their responses have been summarized in Table 4.8 and Table 4.9.

Table 4.8: Influence of funding

Variable	Rating	Count	Percentage (%)
Does funding affect the implementation in humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle, Somalia	YES	50	87.7
	NO	7	12.3
Is there a clear structured strategy for consolidating funds in your organization?	YES	51	89.5
	NO	6	10.5

The respondents were asked whether funding affected the implementation of humanitarian assistance. According to Table 4.8, 87.7% of the respondents believed that funding had an effect to the implementation of humanitarian assistance only 12.3% differed to this opinion. The purpose of this question was to gauge how some funding exercises hinder the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance. Also 89.5% of the participants admitted that there was a clear structured strategy for consolidating funds in their organization with only 10.5% having a different opinion.

When asked how in their own opinion the implementation of humanitarian assistance affected by funding within their organisation, majority of the respondents argued that most of their funding sources had been constrained due to the numerous conditions attached of the funds. The respondents mentioned taxation by the militia and security charges attached to the funds during the actual implementation and not forecasted, hereafter execution entailed making payments through an informal system of taxation, and some amount of aid diversion being considered as the cost of doing business in Somalia. Also maintaining adequate funding levels in reality was a challenge where different donors have different modalities for funding in implementing projects in Somalia. This was a major hindrance to humanitarian work.

The participants also used a Likert scale of 1-5 (where 1= to no extent 2= to a little extent 3= to a moderate extent, 4= to a great extent, while 5= to a very great extent), to indicate the extent to which the provided funding factors affected the effectiveness of humanitarian aid delivery in Middle Shebelle Somalia. Their responses were as summarized in Table 4.9.

Table 4.9: Effects of funding on service delivery

Funding factors	1 To No Extent (%)	2 To a Little Extent (%)	3 To a Moderate Extent (%)	4 To a Great Extent (%)	5 To a Very Great Extent (%)
Extent to which availability of funds influence humanitarian aid and service delivery by my organization.	0.0	7.0	31.6	59.6	1.8
Extent to which service provision from Somali business people affect the implementation of humanitarian assistance by external agencies.	1.8	84.2	14.0	0.0	0.0
Extent to which collaboration with local organizations affects the implementation of humanitarian assistance.	0.0	0.0	1.8	89.5	8.8
Effect of the limited engagement with local international NGOs by the international community operating inside Somalia.	0.0	0.0	1.8	91.2	7.0

According to Table 4.9, 59.6% of the respondents said that extent to which availability of funds influenced humanitarian aid and service delivery was great with a further 1.8% rating the influence as very great. However, 31.6% of the respondents said the influence was moderate with a further 7.0% saying the influence was only to a small extent. The presence and service provision by Somali business people did not have much influence on the implementation of humanitarian assistance. This is according to 84.2% of the respondents who rated the influence as to a little extent. Only 14.0% of the respondents rated the influence of business people as moderate. The collaboration with local organizations affected the implementation of humanitarian assistance. 89.5% of the respondents said that the influence of this collaboration was to a great extent with a further 8.8% saying that it was to a very great extent. However, there was limited engagement with local international NGOs by the international community operating inside Somalia. This greatly influenced the implementation of humanitarian

assistance according to 91.2% of the participants. A further 7.0% rated the influence as to a very great extent. Only 1.8% of the respondents said the influence was moderate.

4.5 Implementation of Humanitarian Assistance

The respondents used both open and closed questions to rate their level of satisfaction with the service delivery in their organization. This was used to rate the level of success of humanitarian assistance by agencies in the Middle Shebelle region of Somalia. Their responses are as summarized in Table 4.10.

Table 4.10: Implementation of humanitarian assistance

Variable	Rating	Count	Percentage (%)
Are you satisfied with the way your agency has implemented humanitarian assistance in Somalia	YES	51	89.5
	NO	6	10.5

Implementation of Humanitarian Assistance	1 Strongly Disagree (%)	2 Disagree (%)	3 Undecided (%)	4 Agree (%)	5 Strongly Agree (%)
The implementation of humanitarian assistance programmes in Somalia has been successful.	0.0	0.0	0.0	19.3	80.7
Humanitarian assistance has greatly improved the lives of people in Somalia.	0.0	0.0	1.8	80.7	17.5

From Table 4.10, it can be seen that, 89.5% of the respondents were satisfied with the way their agencies had implemented humanitarian assistance in Somalia. 80.7% of the respondents strongly agreed that the implementation of humanitarian assistance programmes in Somalia has been successful with a further 19.3% of the respondents agreeing with the same. As a result, 80.7% of the respondents agreed that humanitarian assistance has greatly improved the lives of people in Somalia and a further 17.5% strongly agreeing with the same.

4.6 Correlation of Variables

Correlation describes the degree of relationship between two variables. Pearson correlation coefficient (r) is used to measure the strength of association between variables of interest. 2-tail test tests the possibility of a relationship in both directions. This is what has been used in this study. Correlation of the variables was generated from SPSS analysis and is as shown in Table 4.11.

Table 4.11: Correlation of variables

S/No	Independent Variable		Dependent Variable (HAP Implementation)
1	Capacity of the implementing agency	Pearson Correlation	.074
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.587
		N	57
2	Cultural factors	Pearson Correlation	.029
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.828
		N	57
3	Security concerns	Pearson Correlation	.023
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.567
		N	57
4	Funding	Pearson Correlation	.560**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	57

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

As indicated in Table 4.11, a positive correlation was found between capacity of the implementing agency and implementation of humanitarian assistance (.074). This implies that staff's competency, knowledge, skills and expertise do influence the implementation of humanitarian assistance among the agencies offering humanitarian services in Middle Shebelle region of Somalia. A positive significant correlation was found between cultural factors and the implementation of humanitarian assistance (.029). This implies that gender biasness, clan disputes, pastoralist livelihood and large and scattered families' pattern influences the implementation of humanitarian assistance. Also a positive correlation was found between security factors and the implementation of humanitarian assistance programs (.023), implying that se-

curity factors like organized militia groups, hostility towards humanitarian aid workers and the looting and destruction of life-saving supplies and equipment influences the successful implementation of humanitarian assistance. Again a strong positive significant correlation was found between funding and implementation of humanitarian assistance (.560). What this means is that at funding positively influences the implementation of humanitarian assistance. Programs run smoothly and efficiently with sufficient funding.

In summary, a strong positive correlation was found between the identified socio-economic factors and the resulting implementation of humanitarian assistance. There is a significant relationship between agency capacity, cultural factors, security concerns and funding and the resulting implementation of humanitarian assistance programs.

4.7 Summary of Chapter Four

The chapter explored an overall 95.0% survey return rate, summary of respondents' gender, age, years of experience, level of education and the identified socio-economic factors influencing implementation of humanitarian assistance. Data was collected using questionnaires and observations. The questionnaires used contained both closed and open ended questions. In open-ended questions the respondents provided qualitative data. Closed-ended questions were refined using Likert scale or made a choice of "Yes" or "No" answers. Descriptive statistics such as frequencies and percentages were used in data analysis. The analyzed data was presented in tables.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a summary of findings, discussion, conclusion and recommendations for further research. The researcher compared the study with the body of knowledge obtained from the literature review in chapter two to come up with the conclusion. This research was guided by four objectives and four research questions. The descriptive survey research method was used and questionnaires were used as the data collection method. The summary of the findings is as shown in Table 5.1. This thesis was developed to answer the questions on the Socio-Economic factors that contribute to the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Somalia; a case of Middle Shebelle region.

Table 5.1: Summary of findings

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE	RESEARCH FINDINGS
To examine the influence of implementing agency capacity on the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle region of Southern Somalia.	35.1% of respondent had postgraduate degrees, 43.1% undergraduate degree, 14.0% diploma and 7.0% certificate level of education. 8.8% of the respondents had over 15 years working experience, 12.3% between 11 and 15 years, 33.3% between 6 and 10 years, and 45.6% had worked for less than five years in the Middle Shebelle region. 87.5% of the respondents were of the opinion the capacity of the implementing agency to manage humanitarian projects had played a key role in the effective implementation of programs in South Central Somalia. Only 3.5% of the respondent rated the extent of influence as moderate. 52.6% were on opinion that their project had great adoption of technology 42.1% rated it as moderate. 5.3% rated the adoption as small.

	8.8% of the respondents felt that staffs knowledge and skills' effect was very great, 47.4% said that it was great, 42.1% of the respondents believed it was moderate effect and 1.8% said it had a small effect on the implementation of the project. 73.7% believe that their project had a bureaucracy challenges while 26.3% did not report bureaucracy challenge. 14.0% of the respondent said that bureaucracy in their project had great effect, 43.9% reported moderate, 35.1% reported small effect and 7.0% saying that bureaucracy had very small effect.
To establish the influence of culture on the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle region of Southern Somalia.	82.5% of the respondents admitted that cultural factors affected the implementation of humanitarian aid to a great extent with only 12.3% rating the effect as moderate. A total of 94.7% of the respondents agreed that gender roles were a big contributor on the cultural issues affecting the implementation of humanitarian assistance. 87.8% rated clan disputes and politicization of aid as great and 8.8% said the influence was to a very great extent. 87.7% of the respondents said that the nomadic pastoralist lifestyle of the Somalis affected implementation of humanitarian assistance to a great extent, 8.8% rated it as moderate and 1.8% rated it as little. 78.9% agreed that the large and scattered families' pattern affected the implementation and a further 17.5% admitting that the influence was to a very great extent. Only 3.5% rated the influence as moderate. 12.3% said that cultural values had very great effect, 70.2% said it had a great effect, 10.5% said that it had moderate effect, while 18% reported small effect of cultural values in project implementation.
To assess the security influence on the implementation of humanitarian response in Middle Shebelle region of Southern Somalia.	12.3% of the respondents admitted that the extent of influence of security concerns on the implementation was to a very great extent, 70.2% rated it as to a great extent, 10.5% said the influence was moderate while 7.0% said the influence was little. 12.3% strongly agreed that militia groups and their self-professed links to Al-Qaeda prohibited what agencies could do and 80.7% agreed with that opinion.

	94.7% strongly agreed that the new wave of aggression and hostilities against humanitarian aid workers in Somalia is putting the lives of children and women at great risk. 5.3% agreed with the same. 89.5% of the respondents admitted that aid agencies have become accustomed to providing their own protection through hiring of or payments to armed guards and militia. A further 10.5% of the respondents also agreed with the same. 94.7% of the respondents strongly agreed that the looting and destruction of life-saving humanitarian supplies and equipment enormously affected their organizations' ability to deliver, 3.5% and only 1.8% of the respondents' were undecided about that opinion. 93.0% strongly agreed that NGO workers, both national and international, have become prime targets of these militia groups resulting to compromised service delivery, 5.3% agreed and only 1.8% were undecided.
To examine how funding influence the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle region of Southern Somalia.	87.7% of the respondents believed that funding had an effect to the implementation of humanitarian assistance, 12.3% differed to this opinion. 89.5% of the participants admitted that there was a clear structured strategy for consolidating funds in their organization with only 10.5% saying they did not have any strategy. 59.6% of the respondents said that extent to which availability of funds influenced humanitarian aid and service delivery was great, 31.6% rated it as moderate and 7.0% said the influence was only to a small extent. 84.2% rated the influence of the presence and service provision by Somali business people as little, 14.0% rated it as moderate. 89.5% rated the collaboration with local organizations' effect as great and a further 8.8% said the influence was to a very great extent. The influence of the limited engagement with local international NGOs was rated as great by 91.2% and very great by 7.0%. Only 1.8% of the respondents said the influence was moderate.

5.2 Discussion of Findings

The researcher successfully investigated and analyzed the factors; implementing organization capacity, funding, effect of security and Somalia cultural practices that can hinder or encourage the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle region of Somalia

5.2.1 Influence of the implementing agency capacity on implementation of humanitarian assistance

From the study 87.5% of the respondent said that the implementing agency capacity had a lot of influence on project implementation. The factors that the researcher considered included organization capacity, bureaucracy, and adoption of advance technology and having skilled manpower. Analysis on the research data pertaining bureaucracy revealed that 73.7% believe that their project had a bureaucracy challenges while 26.3% did not report bureaucracy challenge. As discussed in the literature review, Bellamy (2005) underscores that the lack of authority and poor command structure in Kosovo created barriers and prevented successful collaborations. He further explains that, coordinating the activities of these organizations proved tedious and was likened by some to "herding cats," as each organization had a specific area of interest and expertise. Therefore agency which applied short and clear bureaucratic system were more effective since they were dealing with population under crises and hence minimized the delays, as opposed to long chain of command which delayed the disbursement of funds.

As outlined in the literature review, Juma & Suhrke (2002) argue that the underlying humanitarian principles in all humanitarian aid means that organizations must base their operations on the needs and wishes of the local community and use local capacity. However, it can often be difficult to find the local capacity needed. In some cases, the local capacity that originally was there has been undermined and disappeared in the shadow of an intensive international relief operation. Consequently, the above statement is confirmed by research findings in which 87.5% the respondents were of the opinion the capacity of the implementing agency to manage humanitarian projects had played a key role in the effective implementation of pro-

grams in South Central Somalia. However, only 3.5% of the respondent rated the extent of influence as moderate.

Improving the flow of information to aid workers in the field who are often dropped into chaotic situations with little information could be revolutionary. Most humanitarian aid programs are in data-poor environment, an environment where it's very difficult to find out how many people are affected, what is the degree of vulnerability, what are the vulnerable subgroups, where are they located, how to find out how to service them, and then track all the needs. After major disaster of the modern era, humanitarian organizations have reaffirmed a critical lesson: good communication is essential to effective coordination (Wohlgemuth, 2006. As a result, many institutions have made significant investments in information and communication technologies (ICTs). Field workers now rely on tools like portable satellite antennae that enable them to have Internet communications from many places on the globe. That was the reason as to why the respondents with 52.6% score of the research findings were on opinion that their project had great adoption of technology. Few respondents with 42.1% rated it as moderate. However 5.3% rated the adoption as small. This is a clear indication that technology adoption and transfer was identified as very essential in humanitarian organizations dealing with humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, payment of beneficiaries, communication with field officer and donors can only be effective if appropriate technology has been employed.

Given the high risks faced by humanitarian personnel in Somalia, particularly since 2007, organizations have increasingly adopted 'remote management' tactics to provide assistance in areas considered unsafe for international staff (Egeland, Harmer and Stoddard, 2011). This approach involves 'reducing or restricting movement or withdrawing internationals (or non-local nationals) while shifting responsibilities for programme delivery to local staff or partners". This research revealed that staff's skills, knowledge and ability to integrate well with the locals played a key role in the implementation of humanitarian assistances. A total of 8.8% of the respondents rated the staffs' knowledge and skills' effect as very great, 47.4% said that it was great, 42.1% of the respondents believed it had moderate effect and 1.8% said it had a small effect on the implementation of the project. The respondents were on the opinion that building a relationship with the agencies, rather than just contractual relationship over a relationship of genuine partnership may act as a disincentive to stronger agencies ca-

pacities that choose not to partner with others because of their loss of independence in the whole process was most important factor to assure implementation of humanitarian assistance.

5.2.2 Cultural factors and implementation of humanitarian assistance

According to Olivier de Sardan, (2005) discussion in the literature review, if organizations are to succeed, they must consider the recipients' culture, expectations, and needs based on local cultures. Short-term even more than long-term projects must intentionally look to the bigger picture and cultural relevance of the projects to which they feel called. Respondents with 94.7% of the scores agreed that gender roles were a big contributor on the cultural issues affecting the implementation of humanitarian assistance. Also a total of 82.5% of the respondents agreed that some Somalia cultural practices may have negative influence on the implementation of the project since they marginalize women. In this research question the researcher identified some Somalia cultural practices that affect implementation, some of the respondents argued that women participation is hindered by some taboo since they cannot share same venue with men. Women are seemed inferior despite being the sources of labor in agricultural projects.

Further emphasises from DARA (2011) literature outlines that women have been disproportionately affected by the emergency due to pre-existing inequalities. They have been often excluded from assistance or involvement in the process of aid distribution'. The statement is confirmed by the findings of this study where 78.9% of the respondents who agreed that the large and scattered families' pattern affected the implementation and a further 17.5% of the respondents admitting that the influence was to a very great extent. Only 3.5% rated the influence as moderate. He concluded by noting that lack of women participation hinder them from leadership even when they hold better skills and experience than men. This was echoed by majority of respondent that this has caused them to be dependent and vulnerable.

Literature from Kemp & Rasbridge (2004) retorts that owing to war, drought, and male migration in Somalia; many women are heads of households. That was the reason why nomadic livelihood and clan feuds also affected the implementation of humanitarian assistance at high level. In this study, 87.7% of the respondents said that the nomadic pastoralist lifestyle of the Somalis affected implementation of humanitarian assistance to a great extent, 8.8% rated it as

moderate and 1.8% rated it as little. Some respondents highlighted some gender roles for instance men practice pastoralist this makes them not to get involved in community activities since they are ever on the move, it's very hard for them to be targeted for assistance, since they are always absent fathers. He concludes by arguing that though unstable, clan alliances are very important to many Somalis and can outweigh their allegiance to a unified country of Somalia (Kemp & Rasbridge, 2004).

Mathew (2008) in agreement with the 82.5% scores of respondents advocating for the influence of culture in humanitarian assistance concludes by stating that if humanitarian aid organizations are to succeed, they must consider the recipients' culture, expectations, and needs based on local cultures. Short-term even more than long-term projects must intentionally look to the bigger picture and cultural relevance of the projects to which they feel called. Evaluating the effectiveness of short-term trips and projects will help workers answer these types of questions. Evaluation is an extremely important part of providing humanitarian aid in Africa.

5.2.3 Security issues and implementation of humanitarian assistance

The factors that the researcher considered in this section included, militia extortion, inter-clan conflict, reports of kidnapping of humanitarian aid workers, death threats and actual killings as some of the common security issues that the agencies face in Somalia. It is important to analyse these difficulties and its context to eventually be able to improve the implementation of aid in Somalia in a way that has the least influences by these factors and therefore serving the needy timely.

A total of 82.5% of the respondents agreed that security is a major concern in the implementation of humanitarian assistance. This was also confirmed by Stoddard, et al., (2006) literature which indicates that the past few years, reports on growing incidences of security risks for aid personnel and the difficulties in safeguarding aid cargo and services have accumulated for certain countries among which is Somalia. In agreement OCHA (2010) confirms by stating that in practice this has led to decreasing humanitarian space and thus to lower levels of aid delivered in Central and Southern Somalia while needs have increased.

A total of 93.0% of the respondents strongly agreed that NGO workers, both national and international, have become prime targets of these militia groups resulting to compromised ser-

vice delivery, 5.3% agreed and only 1.8% were undecided. In addition to the UN (2002) reports in the literature review herewith further confirming the finding when it announced that Mogadishu airport was temporarily closed to United Nations flights and International Staff ground operations because of "insecurity". The closure was put under review and would be influenced by humanitarian needs in the region.

As discussed in the literature review, Jaspars, et al (2009) argues that there are different types of threats to aid personnel, convoys and cargo with sometimes multiple motives. Threats or actual acts of violence come in form of ambushes, handling large scale of money, al-shabaab risk and taxation, bandits attacks, beneficiary being robbed, threats of kidnapping of humanitarian workers, extortion and armed incursion, landmines, individual attacks and assassinations that intimidate wound, kill, molest, or rob aid workers. Research showed that 94.7% of the respondents strongly agreed that the looting and destruction of life-saving humanitarian supplies and equipment enormously affected their organizations' ability to deliver, 3.5% and however only 1.8% of the respondents' were undecided about that opinion.

The United Nations Security Council (2012) notes that, the International humanitarian organizations currently have restricted direct access to civilian populations in need of assistance, including internally displaced persons. United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations continue to work through their national staff and in close cooperation with civil society organizations, community leaders and religious institutions to make critical interventions but, owing to the prevailing insecurity, their practical reach is confined to specific regions of Somalia. The study respondents confirms the literature where 89.5% of the respondents admitted that aid agencies have become accustomed to providing their own protection through hiring of or payments to armed guards and militia.

As outlined in the literature review Bestemans (1996), noted that the needs for humanitarian food aid are high in Somalia, civilians suffer from land expropriation and/or occupation, looting of all public and private commodities (such as cattle), from harsh violence (rape, mutilations), severe human rights violations (atrocities), and from the plundering and destruction of cities such as Mogadishu. The violence and the food insecurity have led to widespread internal population displacement and created an extremely vulnerable population. The above statement is established by 94.7% of the respondents who strongly agreed that the new wave of aggression and hostilities against humanitarian aid workers in Somalia is putting the lives

of children and women at great risk. As a result, Somalia has supposedly become one of the worst humanitarian crises of the world where an estimated 3.2 million people are currently in need of emergency livelihood and life-saving assistance (FSNAU, 2012).

5.2.4 Funding and implementation of humanitarian assistance

Most respondent were on the opinion that having few conditions attached to humanitarian funds and training the agency staff on financial management involved in the assistance process was most important factor to assure effectiveness of implementation. The researcher identified that financial management skills cause sustainability and ownership of the projects. In this study 87.7% of the respondents believed that funding had an effect to the implementation of humanitarian assistance, only 12.3% differed to this opinion. As pointed in the literature, GHA (2010) further affirms that community empowerment through training and creating awareness and providing relevant skill to locals and beneficiaries enable them to access project services hence prove sustainability since they can protect the projects initiated.

Further, Leader (2000) points out that the practical implementations of these humanitarian principles are more complicated as the conditions under which the terms of agreement were created. They have changed substantially. Humanitarian organizations have to deal with the difficulties of operating in accordance with the humanitarian principles while the environments in which they operate seem not respect these same principles anymore. This is confirmed by 84.2% respondents who rated the influence of the presence and service provision by Somali business people as little, 14.0% rated it as moderate. In Somalia, this basically means that humanitarian organizations design operations that are impartial, neutral and independent while warring parties cannot guarantee the secure implementation of these operations even though this is part of the idea behind International Humanitarian Law in which these principles have been incorporated (Stoddard, et al., 2006). Further confirmed by 91.2% of the respondents who scored the influence of the limited engagement with local international NGOs was rated as great. However only 1.8% of the respondents said the influence was moderate.

An assessment conducted by ECHO (2011) draws attention to the trends in disasters and humanitarian needs which are further compounded by the global financial crisis, which has a direct impact on funding for humanitarian aid, and in some cases contributes to increasing

vulnerability. In this study, 59.6% of the respondents confirmed that extent to which availability of funds influenced humanitarian aid and service delivery was great with only 7% of the respondents saying to a small percentage. This is in agreement with the findings of the assessment conducted by ECHO (2011).

Humanitarian budgets are under increasing scrutiny as donors are pressed to demonstrate cost-efficiency and value for money. Further remarks notes that the increasing costs related to the delivery of humanitarian assistance add to this: between 2007 and 2011 the cost of food rose by more than 40% and oil prices increased by 30% in real terms. The mismatch between the global humanitarian needs and resources available, together with a chronic vulnerability in many parts of the world, continues to have a direct bearing on the lives of millions of people in need of assistance (ECHO, 2011).

According to the literature, Odén & Wohlgemuth (2007) noted that organizations providing relief assistance must make choices regarding where immediate assistance is needed most, but also take into consideration that the positive impact of aid on socioeconomic conditions in one community can lead to frustration in other communities. However 89.5% of the respondents in this study rated the collaboration with local organizations' effect as great and a further 8.8% said the influence was to a very great extent.

5.3 Conclusions

Lack of expertise among the agencies, bureaucracy and minimal technology transfer among the implementing agencies influence significantly the implementation of humanitarian assistance. The lack of such a closer collaboration has limited the capacity of local community and organizations to mature or assume a larger role. Few international organizations have developed initiatives to build the capacity of local Somali NGOs.

Culture factors are also influencing the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, most Somali communities are either nomads or pastoralist and always on move in search of greener pastures, so it is difficult getting them together or following up for aid needs. Gender roles are also very influential in humanitarian assistance implementation.

Security is one of the key socio-economic factors that influence the effective implementation of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. The major concerns on security are the Alshaabab, militia group, increasing kidnapping of humanitarian aid workers and threats to the humani-

tarian assistance agencies. These factors have greatly reduced the efforts to meet the needs for the affected in the region.

Funding issues are also a factor influencing the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. Sometimes humanitarian agencies workers face difficulties in the course of their duties as they are met with unrealistic demands and conditions from donors such as adequacy of funding and strict adherence to humanitarian principle, there is also a lack of financial management skills among the local partners and agencies working within the region. There was no collective pot of finance to ensure that gaps could be filled, and no holistic and coherent support to post-conflict and transition countries

5.4 Recommendations

This study explored the socio economic factors influencing the implementation of humanitarian assistance and came up with the following recommendations:

1. Humanitarian agencies need to strengthen organization capability, this vital in the implementation of humanitarian projects. Competent staff, use of appropriate technology cannot be ignored if the agency wants to transform the lives of beneficiaries. However more research needs to be done to see whether use of foreigners as managers since they are majority in those project and the impact that has in the implementation.
2. Humanitarian Agencies need to explore levels of expertise, technology adoption and cooperation within the humanitarian sectors in Somalia and investigate what influences this has on improving humanitarian access of humanitarian aid in Somalia. A serious investment in trainings staff and holding senior level discussions especially with donors and humanitarian coordinators to further familiarize them on the use of humanitarian funds. Agencies leads in particular also need to be targeted with information and training so they are able to assess the viability of a market based response to meet humanitarian needs
3. Because varying cultural beliefs and practices exist among different group of people, assessing the culture of the settlement community may be an essential part of a humanitarian organization emergency response. One method of assessing cultural values is conduct interviews with members of the emergency settlement. By incorporating

volunteers from the emergency population, a culturally sensitive questionnaires can be drafted which will cover the information that is needed to determine culturally appropriate assistance.

4. There is need for humanitarian agencies to come up with well-structured coping mechanisms to tackle the issue of security in the country. Currently the existing mechanisms are not well structured and vary from agency and sometimes the aid workers are guided by intuition while ignoring the reality on the ground.
5. Donors need to establish and strengthen flexible funding and coordination mechanisms. In addition, agencies need to establish a funding mechanism for large scale humanitarian assistance programmes and hence donors need to be flexible in establishing a grantee or recipient of their humanitarian funds in emergency situations.

5.5 Suggestions for Further Study

This study was conducted to explore the socio economic factors influencing the implementation of Humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle region of South Somalia. In this regard there is still room for further investigation in this area, with the following suggestions for further studies being outlined below;

1. Factors influencing the use of cash and vouchers in Food for Work Programmes in Somalia.
2. Factors influencing the service delivery of International and local NGOs on the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Emergency situations

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

Joy N NASIMIYU

P.O Box 00625-00200

Nairobi

Dear respondent

Re: Collection of survey data

I am a postgraduate student at the University of Nairobi, school of distance and continuous education. In order to fulfil the degree requirement, I am undertaking a research project on the Factors that Influence the Implementation of Humanitarian Assistance in Middle Shebelle region South Somalia. You have been selected to form part of this study. This is kindly to request you assist me collect the data by filling out the accompanying questionnaires, which I will collect from your premises.

The information you provide will be used exclusively for academic purposes. My supervisor and I assure you that the information will be treated with strict confidentiality. Your name in my report, a copy of this final paper will be availed to you upon request.

I thank you in advance for your cooperation

Yours faithfully

Joy Nasimiyu, L50/62968/2010

MA - Project Planning and Management Student

University of Nairobi

APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNAIRE

Disclaimer,

This questionnaire is a survey to collect information on the Socio-Economic factors that influence implementation of humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle region in South Somalia.

Kindly fill in all the blank spaces provided and tick/circle appropriate

Date: ……..

SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

1. Gender

   Male [ ] Female [ ]

2. Kindly indicate your Age

   a) Below 25 years [ ]
   b) Between 25 -34 years [ ]
   c) Between 35- 44 Years [ ]
   d) Between 45 – 54 Years [ ]
   e) Above 55 years [ ]

3. Name of the Humanitarian organization you work for…….

4. What is your position within this Humanitarian organization?

.....

5. Please indicate the highest level of education attained? (Tick as applicable)

   a) Certificate [ ]
   b) Diploma [ ]
   c) Graduate [ ]
   d) Post Graduate [ ]
   e) Others (specify)…… ……...

6. Years of service/working period you have worked within Middle Shebelle region (Tick as applicable)

   a) 0 - 5 yrs [ ]
   b) 6 - 10 yrs [ ]
   c) 11 - 15 yrs [ ]
   d) 15 yrs and above [ ]

7. What is your nationality?

   a) Kenya [ ]
   b) Tanzania [ ]
   c) Uganda [ ]
   d) Somalia [ ]
   e) Other (Please specify)……..

SECTION B: IMPLEMENTING AGENCY CAPACITY

Implementing Agency Capacity	**1** **To Very Small Extent**	**2** **To a Small Extent**	**3** **To a Moderate Extent**	**4** **To a Great Extent**	**5** **To a Very Great Extent**
The capacity of implementing agency to manage humanitarian projects has played a key role in the effective implementation of programs in South Central Somalia. To what extent does your agency's capacity affect this?					
To what extent does technology affect the effectiveness of implementing programs in South Central Somalia?					
To what extent is your Organization employing advanced technology in its operations in Somalia?					
The knowledge and skill of staff involved					

in the implementation of projects affect the effectiveness of program implementation. To what extent has the expertise engaged affect the effectiveness of humanitarian program in Somalia?					
To what extent does bureaucracy affect the effectiveness of implementation humanitarian programs?					

8. In your opinion, how does the capacity of your agency affect the effectiveness of implementing humanitarian program?

……

……

……..

9. In your opinion, how can the staff expertise affect the implementation of humanitarian program in Somalia?

……

……

……

10. Does Bureaucracy at your Organization affect the effectiveness of implementing humanitarian program?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

If yes, please specify……..

11. How can effects of bureaucracy be reduced?

……

……

……

SECTION C: CULTURAL FACTORS

12. Do you find cultural factors to influence the implementation of humanitarian aid within Middle Shebelle region of Somalia?

    Yes [ ] No [ ]

    If yes, please specify……..

13. Using a likert scale of 1-5 where 1 = To No Extent 2 = To a Little Extent 3 = To a Moderate Extent, 4 = To a Great Extent, while 5 = To a Very Great Extent, indicate the extent to which the following culture issues affect the implementation of humanitarian aid delivery in Middle Shebelle Somalia;

Culture issues	**1 To No Extent**	**2 To a Little Extent**	**3 To a Moderate Extent**	**4 To a Great Extent**	**5 To a Very Great Extent**
To what extent is the implementation of Humanitarian aid in Middle Shebelle affected by cultural factors?					
To what extent has gender biasness and gender roles affected humanitarian assistance implementation?					
To what extent has clan disputes and politicization of aid affected the implementation of humanitarian assistance?					
Most Somalis are pastoralist and are always moving from place to place in search of pastures. To what extent has this affected the implementation of humanitarian assistance?					
In Somalia clan-families are too large and scattered for practical cooperation.					

To what extent has this affected the implementation of humanitarian assistance?					

14. Do culture values affect the implementation of humanitarian?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

If yes, please specify……..

15. What are these culture values that affect implementation of humanitarian response projects?

……

……

……

16. To what extent do culture values affect project implementation?

a) Very great extent [ ]
b) Great extent [ ]
c) Moderate extent [ ]
d) Small extent [ ]
e) Very small extent [ ]

SECTION D: SECURITY FACTORS

17. Is security a major concern in your efforts to implement humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle region of Somalia?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

If yes, please specify……..

18. To what extent do security concerns influence the rate of implementation of humanitarian aid?

a) To a very great extent [ ]

b) To great extent [ ]

c) To a moderate extent [ ]

d) To a little extent [ ]

e) To no extent [ ]

19. Please name a few causes of insecurity in your area that can affect the effective implementation of humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

……

……

20. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about security factors and implementation of humanitarian aid? Use a scale of 1 to 5 where 5 = Strongly Agree 4 = Agree, 3 = Undecided, 2 = Disagree and 1 = Strongly Disagree

Statements about security factors and implementation of humanitarian aid	**1 Strongly Disagree**	**2 Disagree**	**3 Undecided**	**4 Agree**	**5 Strongly Agree**
The role of the militia and its self-professed links to Al-Qaeda, there are strict prohibitions of what aid agencies could and could not do in south Somalia					
The new wave of aggression and hostilities against humanitarian aid workers in Somalia is putting the lives of children and women at great risk					
Aid agencies have become accustomed to providing their own protection through hiring of or payments to armed guards and militia.					
The looting and destruction of life-saving humanitarian supplies and equipment enormously affected organizations' ability to deliver services to the most vulnerable children and women.					
The delivery of aid to Somalis in need has					

been seriously reduced as NGO workers, both national and international, have become prime targets					
Often the workers have no access to infrastructure due to security issues.					

SECTION E: FUNDING

21. Does funding affect the implementation in humanitarian assistance in Middle Shebelle, Somalia?

    Yes [ ] No [ ]

    If yes, please specify……..

22. In your organisation is there a clear structured strategy for consolidating funds?

    Yes [ ] No [ ]

    If yes, please specify……..

23. In your own view, how is the implementation of humanitarian assistance affected by funding factors within your organization?

.....

.....

.....

24. Using a likert scale of 1-5 where 1 = To No Extent 2 = To a Little Extent 3 = To a Moderate Extent, 4 = To a Great Extent, while 5 = To a Very Great Extent, indicate the extent to which the following funding factors affect the effectiveness of humanitarian aid delivery in Middle Shebelle Somalia

Funding factors	**1 To No Extent**	**2 To a Little Extent**	**3 To a Moderate Extent**	**4 To a Great Extent**	**5 To a Very Great Extent**

To what extent does funds availability influence humanitarian aid and service delivery by your organization?					
To what extent does service provision from Somali business people affect the implementation of humanitarian assistance by external agencies?					
To what extent has collaboration with local organizations affected the implementation of humanitarian assistance?					
The international community operating inside Somalia have had limited engagement with local international NGOs. To what extent does this affect humanitarian assistance?					

SECTION F: IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

25. Are you satisfied with the way your agency has implemented humanitarian assistance in Somalia?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

If yes, please specify……..

26. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the implementation of humanitarian aid in Middle Shebelle region? Use a scale of 1 to 5 where 5 = Strongly Agree 4 = Agree, 3 = Undecided, 2 = Disagree and 1 = Strongly Disagree

Implementation of Humanitarian Assistance	**1 Strongly Disagree**	**2 Disagree**	**3 Undecided**	**4 Agree**	**5 Strongly Agree**
The implementation of humanitarian assistance programmes in Somalia has been successful.					
Humanitarian assistance has greatly im-					

proved the lives of people in Somalia.					

27. Give suggestions on how agencies can improve their operations in the implementation of humanitarian assistance.

.....

.....

.....

.....

THE END

Thank you for spending your precious time on this important research. God bless you.

APPENDIX III: THE ADMINISTRATIVE MAP OF SOMALIA AND MIDDLE SHEBELLE



Source: FSNAU & Protection Cluster 2011