

**THE CHALLENGES OF FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF KENYA, 1963-2012**

BY

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DECLARATION

I, Edda Chelang'at **Maritim** declare that this dissertation is my original work and has not been submitted for the award of a degree in any other University.

.....

Edda Chelang'at Maritim

.....

Date

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the appointed University supervisor

.....

Dr. Ibrahim Farah

.....

Date

DEDICATION

To all my family members, especially my mother, Mrs. Ruth Magerer who has always
inspired me.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I acknowledge and give praise to the Almighty God who makes all things possible in his time. He guided me with his unlimited grace throughout my period of my research and gave me the strength when all hope was gone. To God be the glory. I am extremely grateful to my project supervisor, Dr. Ibrahim Farah. His advice throughout this period is something to be remembered, for he was always been patient with me. His wise counsel and professionalism helped me to coordinate my scattered ideas and develop them with more focus and direction.

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Name: Edda C. Maritim

Nairobi, September 2013

ABSTRACT

This research project was aimed at analyzing at length the foreign policy formulation and implementation challenges in the African context, the main focus being Kenya. It focused mainly on the actors be it state or non state actors. Non state actors include Multi-national Corporations, Non Governmental institution, Intergovernmental organizations among others. It further looked at the patterns and practices of Africa's foreign policies in the past. Most of the African countries at one time were under the rule of colonial masters mainly from Europe. This therefore means that these countries share a lot in common, structures not being an exception. African states have formed their own continental and regional institutions with an aim of developing the continent. This would also enhance their leverage on the international affairs. The broad objectives of the study were to provide an overview of foreign policy in Africa, analyze the role of leadership and their influence on foreign policy in Kenya; investigate the effects of external and internal environments on foreign policy. The approach used in the study was qualitative. A questionnaire was constructed and had both open and closed ended questions. They were then administered to the targeted group, from the relevant ministries who are usually tasked with foreign policy matters. This is the area that gave much insight in as far as Kenya's foreign policy is concerned. Secondary data was also used ranging from published books, journals, business magazines, service charter among others.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	i
DEDICATION	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Background to the study	3
1.3 Statement of the Research Problem	5
1.4 Research Objectives	6
1.5 Literature Review	6
1.6 Justification of the Study	16
1.7 Hypotheses	17
1.8 Theoretical Framework	17
1.9 Research Methodology	19
1.10 Chapter Outline	19
CHAPTER TWO: AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY: AN OVERVIEW	20
2.1 Introduction	20
2.2 Overview of African Foreign Policy	21
2.3 Africa foreign policy: The Main Debates	22
2.3.1 Liberalization and Democratization	22
2.3.2 The Global Economy	24
2.3.3 Debate over an African Agenda	26
2.3.4 The Debate on Globalization	28
2.4 Main Determinants	29
2.4.1 Leadership Qualities	29
2.4.2 External Environment	42
2.4.3 Domestic Challenges/Insecurity	51
2.5 Conclusion	55

CHAPTER THREE: THE CHALLENGES OF FOREIGN POLICY

FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION: THE KENYAN EXPERIENCE56

3.1 Introduction.....	56
3.2 Background	56
3.3 Kenya's Foreign Policy Since Independence	57
3.3.1 Foreign Policy Under Kenyatta	57
3.3.2 Foreign Policy in the Nyayo Era.....	62
3.3.3 Foreign Policy under President Kibaki	74
3.4 Foreign Policy Formulation and Implementation Reactions	78
3.4.1 Nature of Leadership.....	78
3.4.2 Relations with Other States.....	79
3.4.3 Insecurity.....	81
3.5 Conclusion	83

CHAPTER FOUR: THE CHALLENGES OF KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY

FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION : A CRITICAL ANALYSIS84

4.1 Introduction.....	84
4.2 Emerging Issues	85
4.2.1 Economic performance	86
4.2.2 Environmental Concerns.....	89
4.2.3 Conflict Management.....	91
4.2.4 Diaspora Issues	93
4.3 Conclusion	95

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION96

5.1 Summary	96
5.2 Key Findings.....	97
5.3 Recommendations.....	99

BIBLIOGRAPHY

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

This study was aimed at addressing the challenges or bottlenecks that face African countries during the formulation and implementation of their foreign policies, the main focus being Kenya. Foreign policy refers to those actions of state that are designed to achieve particular objectives involving other actors beyond the states own boundaries. Foreign policies therefore are the sinews of international relations between states. According to George Modelski's definition, foreign policy is the process whereby a state adjusts its actions to those of other states so as to minimize adverse actions and maximize the favorable actions of foreign states.¹

For over four decades, Kenya's foreign policy has served as a tool used to pursue, promote and protect the national values, interest and security abroad.² Kenya's world view builds on the foundation of its freedom struggle when the leaders begun engaging with the great questions and problems of the day. This engagement gave rise to the national principles which have consistently guided Kenya's international relations. The founders of the Kenyan republic were at the centre of the processes that led to the creation of the organization of Africa Unity(OAU) in 1963 and committed Kenya to the principles underpinning the Non- aligned Movement(NAM) to which Kenya has been a member.

¹ Dr Olatunde J C B Ojo, Dr D K Orwa, Dr C M Utete , African International Relations, 1987,p 43

Though each country has a way of doing things, most of them have almost similar aims and interests. Almost the whole of African continent at one time was under the colonial rule and so most of the structures that they now have were borrowed from the colonial masters. This is closely linked to the issue of resources where countries that have adequate resources tend to be more powerful than others, hence greater influence on the foreign policy. For many years, the policy-making process was simply assumed as a necessary prerequisite to the initiation of state action. Today it is commonplace to presume that what a state does is in no small way a function of how it decides what to do- in other words ,foreign policy action is a product of decisions and the way decisions are made may substantially affect their contents.²

States interact with each other, but today relations go beyond states, such that a state may be seen to interact with other major non state actors such as international organizations, non governmental organizations and even multinational organizations³. This therefore means that today, foreign policies touch a lot on such organizations of the many sub state actors that influence states 'actions in the international arena, those closest to the action are the bureaucratic agencies that states maintain to develop and carry out foreign policy.

Foreign policy⁴ like domestic policy is formulated within the state, but unlike domestic policy, is directed at and must be implemented in the environment external to that state, hence foreign policy can simply refer to external relation of a state as Frankel, puts it,

² Michael Clarke and Brian White Edward Elgar &, Understanding Foreign Policy, 2000, p 15.

³ Joshua S Goldstein and Jon Pevehouse, International Relations, 5th edition, p72.

⁴ Michael Clarke and Brian White Edward Elgar ,Understanding Foreign International Relations, 5th edition, p72.

foreign policy consists of decisions and actions which involves to some appreciable extent relation between one state and other.

Different states maintain different foreign policy⁵ bureaucracies but share some common elements. Virtually all states maintain a diplomatic corps, or foreign service, of diplomats working in embassies in foreign capitals (and in consulates located in non capital foreign cities) as well as diplomats who remain at home to coordinate policy. States appoint ambassadors as their official representatives to other states and international organizations. Diplomatic activities are organized through a foreign ministry or the equivalent (for example, the U.S state department). In many democracies, some diplomats are political appointees who come and go with changes in government leaders while others are career diplomats who rise through the ranks of the foreign service and tend to outlast changes in the administration.

1.2 Background Information

A state has certain interests that it strongly guards and advances while having relations with other states. This has not always occurred without hindrances, even though ways of doing that could have been done in a better way. Since the national interests are paramount, foreign policies are designed by the government through high level decision making which may not deliberate adequately due to other challenges. It is worth noting that a foreign policy does not have a clear cut boundary with the domestic policies, indeed there is a very thin line.

⁵ Joshua S Golstein and Jon Pevehouse, International Relations, 5th edition, p72

Kenya under the three Administrations of Kenyatta, Moi, and Kibaki have all had challenges in one way or the other. During Kenyatta's Administration⁶, there were a lot of challenges given that the country had just emerged independent. Some of the problems that were faced at this time included territorial integrity of the new state that was being challenged as early as 1961 when Somalia made claim to the Northern Frontier District (NFD). Somalia cited historical, cultural and racial reasons. Acceptance of this claim could possibly trigger Uganda's claim to Kenya west of the Rift Valley on historical grounds; Idi Amin attempted to do exactly that in 1976. There were unsettled minor border issues between Kenya and Uganda over Karsuk. And how Tanzania would have reacted over the Maasai in Kenya (since a majority of the population lives in Tanzania) was not known. Sudan had also a dispute with Kenya over the areas running northwards from Lokichoggio triangle. The existence of nomadic peoples across Kenya's common border with Ethiopia also raised the issue of legitimate borders.

According to Oyugi⁷, concern for regional status quo, which Kenyatta's Administration deemed essential for internal security and rapid socio-economic development also determined Kenya's extra-regional policy, especially the policy on non-alignment. Although non-aligned movement was an external development triggered by the cold war, its adoption by Kenya as the country's posture in international affairs was not an expression of idealism or radicalism in international affairs. Non-alignment as policy was consistent with the demands of national survival of the new state. It was a realistic response by the Kenyatta Administration to uncertainty about the reliability of the then

6. Walter O.Oyugi, *Politics and Administration in East Africa*, 1992, p303.

7 Ibid p306.

existing bipolar international system and the lingering fear that independence of the new state could be threatened by the resurgence of the neo-colonialism.

1.3 Statement of the Research Problem

A country has certain aims and interests in the form of foreign policy that needs to be guarded at all times if it has to be a meaningful one. On Leadership qualities, Diplomats contribute a lot to foreign policies though their main role is to carry out rather than create policies. It is this lack of their participation in creating policies that hinders a country in achieving its goals, more so when it comes to non career appointees, what many term it as political appointees. This means that, the structure, that is diplomacy, must have proper and competent human resource, with quality training so as to achieve the national interests.

The second aspect of the research problem concerns the domestic challenges and in particular insecurity within the country. Insecurity too affects the formulation and implementation of a foreign policy. This aspect is not peculiar to Kenya alone or a particular Administration, it cuts across the board, that is, most countries go through the same problem. In the recent past, issues of insecurity have affected Kenya and this has seen the government divert its attention from other major activities to try to resolve. This means that the country is forced to go for Ad hoc policies which are not only short term in nature, but has a number of disadvantages.

External environment is also an issue that affects formulation and implementation of a foreign policy from time to time. Most of the times states tend to mistrust each other and when this happens it affects the relationships too. Security is such a major concern that any country considers paramount before engaging themselves. Therefore Diplomats should be trained so as to continue analyzing and report on the central issues in the external environment.

1.4 Research Objectives

The overall objective of the study is to evaluate the challenges of foreign policy formulation and implementation in Africa; with a case study in Kenya.

Specific Objectives

1. Provide an overview of the challenges of foreign policy formulation and implementation in Africa;
2. Analyze the role of leadership qualities and their influence on foreign policy formulation and implementation in Kenya;
3. Investigate the effects of external and domestic environments on the foreign policy formulation and implementation.

1.5 Literature Review

This section deals with the past studies done in the area. The variables that were discussed included leadership qualities, external environment and domestic challenges particularly insecurity.

There have been useful and important contributions to the understanding of the foreign policy. However, while there have been significant contributions on the content of foreign policy, the central issue of its management have not been addressed. And neither in the intellectual history of states foreign policy have there been discourses on the management of the foreign (i.e. diplomatic) service. This paucity of research on the twin issues of management of foreign policy and of the Foreign Service, reflect the contemporary uni-dimensional aspect of the literature on, and approach to, studying foreign policy.⁸

Foreign policy makers attempt to reconcile domestic interest with external circumstances taking into account of the available means, resources, and institutions for doing so. Important to understanding foreign policy at specific domestic and external context and the interactions between these two environments⁹. As major players in foreign policy, elite operate between institutions that continually constrain them, but oftentimes, these policy makers can work around such limits and manage the tension between domestic and international society. Outcomes are interesting because they answer far reaching questions about how elites achieve their foreign policy goals, specifically how they balance means and objectives.

It is argued that the main challenges for foreign policy lie in its implementation. The proper management of foreign policy and of the diplomatic service is central to the

⁸ Makumi Mwagiru, *The Missing Link in the Study of Diplomacy: the Management of Diplomatic Service and Foreign Policy*.

⁹ Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons, *African Foreign Policies*, Lynne Rienner Publishers 2001. P1.

success or failure of the implementation of foreign policy. Foreign policy plus the administration of the diplomatic service and of the policy itself give rise to the implementation of foreign policy. This means that the traditional context of dividing foreign affairs into the 'policy' and 'administrative' aspects needs review. If not, the implementation of foreign policy will continue being held hostage to the turf wars between policy makers and administrators.¹⁰

The objectives and interests that a state seeks to promote or safeguard as it interacts with other states must be viewed against the background of its internal social structure and the configuration of political power within it. More specifically the class that controls and wields state power necessarily shapes foreign policy and does so, as might be supposed, in accordance with its own class interests even though these might be rationalized ideologically as the interests of the entire nation. The latter should not be taken to mean that there are no interests that can be shared by the members of a nation state in common.

Depending on the given political circumstances, defense of state sovereignty, national independence, and the territorial integrity of a country, among other things, all correspond to the interests of the nation as a whole. However, in the majority of cases, foreign policy decisions are not concerned with matters directly related to such 'core' interests or values as Holsti has termed them. Rather routine foreign policy decision making tends to centre on the so called 'middle-range objectives', such as interstate

¹⁰ Makumi Mwagiru, *The Missing Link in the Study of Diplomacy: the Management of Diplomatic Service and Foreign Policy*.

economic, commercial and political relations, including attempts to influence the behavior of other states in desired directions.¹¹

The preceding discussion suggests that foreign policy is an extension or complement of domestic policy. The distinction between the two is thus not a matter of substance. Rather it derives from the fact that a state's foreign policy takes account of the relevant attitudes, actions and reactions of other actors whereas its domestic policy is not, in general, burdened with such considerations. It should be clear that the more the resources and instruments at the disposal of a state, the greater its potential to influence the development of the international system in a direction favorable to itself. In common parlance, the more 'powerful' a state is, the greater is its capacity to influence other states, that is to say, the greater is its ability to achieve the objectives of its foreign policy.¹²

A more comprehensive formulation of the issue of means and capabilities has been made by Brucan. He suggests that the process of foreign policy formulation derives from five factors: natural – material basic, including size of territory, population, geographic location, resources and the state and level of economic – technological development; societal structure and forces, including social classes, ethnic composition and cultural and psychological factors at work in the society; contingency and situational factors, including political and economic crises, coups d' e tat, elections, massive strikes, large scale violence, military actions and war? These include the intensity of social and

¹¹ Dr Olatunde J C B Ojo, Dr D K Orwa, Dr C M Utete, „African International Relations ,1987,p 44

¹² Ibid,p45

national drivers and reactions. the state system including the governmental machinery of decision making and; leadership, which refers to the way in which state power is used by current office holders and decision makers.¹³

Foreign policy is a combination of aims and interests pursued and defended by the given state and its ruling class in its relations with other states, and the methods and means used by it for the achievement and defense purposes and interests. The aim and interests of a state in international relations are realized by various methods and means.¹⁴

The five variables cited earlier clearly all have reference for policy making and execution. It is, unfortunately not possible to assign ‘weights’ to them indicating a priori their relative significance in the policy – making process. Two general observations may, however, be made in regard to them. In the first place, the five variables may be viewed as falling into three broad categories: those which are in the nature of permanent and immutable physical realities which the policy maker cannot alter at all, or can only alter at great cost in terms of resources and time; those variables which are entirely amenable to manipulation by decision – makers, and those which occur randomly and yet are capable of exerting decisive, impacts on the course of events. The first set of variables includes the so called natural material basics and societal structure and forces. The second set refers to the state system, including the institutions and agencies of

¹³ Dr Olatunde J C B Ojo, et al, African International Relations, p 45

¹⁴ Macharia Munene, J. D. Olewe Nyunya and Korwa Adar, *The United States and Africa*, E.A. Educational Publishers Ltd, 1995, p 106

government which can be changed more or less easily by those in power or at their initiative.

The third set of variables—contingency / situational factors and leadership – is both unpredictable and also capable of influencing policy-making in sudden and decisive ways. There is no doubt at all, for example, that the coup de tat in Uganda in 1971¹⁵ and the personality and style of leadership of General Idi Amin significantly affected the substance and direction of Uganda's foreign policy after that coup.

It should, however, be noted that in the contemporary era of heightened superpower competition for spheres of influence, even so called local or regional issues, can, and often do, assume a global character as a result of superpower intervention. Territorial disputes in the Horn of Africa, the civil wars in Chad and in Nigeria and the political conflict between Libya and Egypt, have all in their turn attracted a more or less pronounced measure of superpowers intervention. Such external intervention not only bedevils the search for solutions to the issues involved, it also diminishes the capacity of the developing states concerned to influence the settlement of the issue or issues.¹⁶

Africa underwent a far reaching transformation in the 1990s. Clapham stated that the post-colonial era in Africa is now, and only now, coming to an end; and the problem confronting the continent, and those who seek to understand it, is to discern what is taking place. The cold war and apartheid ended, and with their departure, two issues that shaped much of African foreign policy were removed.

¹⁵ Dr Olatunde J C B Ojo, Dr D K Orwa, Dr C M Utete, ,African International Relations ,1987, p 45.

¹⁶ Ibid, p 46.

Domestically, continued economic crisis and the collapse of the neo patrimonial post colonial state and, in response, a surge in pressures for reform, shifted political calculations. These international and domestic transformations altered the topography of power and institutional arrangements across the continent and hence, the context in which foreign policy decisions was made. In some cases, African leaders responded with strained and fragile efforts to reform their economies and political systems in others, the pressures led to state collapse. Many states fall somewhere between these two extremes with the future still in the balance.¹⁷ African foreign policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century is still dominated by overarching constraints on the survival of weak states. The imperatives of state survival, Clapham notes, force elites to use foreign policy to garner political and economic resources from the external environment.¹⁸

Whether made singly or collectively, foreign policy reflects the continual attempts by elites to manage threats to domestic security and insulate their decision making from untoward external manipulation. Contemporary African elites, like their predecessors, are preoccupied with political stability, legitimacy, and economic security, issues whose importance seems to increase rather than diminish.¹⁹

Foreign policy outcomes are difficult assess with certainty in Africa mired in violent conflict and socioeconomic disintegration. The era when foreign policy was linked to

¹⁷ Gilbert M Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons, African foreign policies, 2001,p6

¹⁸ Christopher clapham “Discerning the new Africa” international affairs,1998,p 263

¹⁹ Gibert M Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons, African foreign policies, 2001,p7

strengthening Africa nation states has given way to a time of healthy skepticism. Building African institutions for conflict management and economic integration remains a critical foreign policy objective, but economic retrogression, the escalation of wars, and the decline of norms of interstate relationships continually cast a shadow of doubt on these efforts. The problem of outcomes is closely tied to the vital one of measuring substantive change. Although democratization has broadened the range of actors in the policy process, most have no meaningful impact on policies because the issues either are beyond their competence or are secondary in their priorities. How much input, for instance, does Uganda's parliamentary committee on foreign affairs have on Paris club economic negotiations with the government or the military's execution of the war in the Congo?²⁰

The capacity of the individual African state to exert influence on the course of events tends to decline as one moves from local or regional issues to continental and global issues. This is so partly, because such issues tend to be too remote from the immediate pre-occupations of the states concerned; partly because of inadequacy of the information on the basis of which policies could be formulated; partly because of lack of resources to tackle the issues involved; and partly because many other actors may by their prior or more intensive involvement have reduced the possibilities of effective African involvement.²¹

All African states share the aspiration of developing their economies rapidly and of doing so in part of least by importing or inviting foreign capital and technology. However there

²⁰ Ibid, p 12.

²¹ Dr Olatunde et al, African international relations, 1987, p46

is a wide divergence of views on whether, for example, transnational corporations (TNCs) are the appropriate agencies for effecting the transference of such capital and technology. Thus, where as socialist Tanzania is suspicious of the activities of TNCs, ‘free –enterprise’ Ivory Coast pursues an open door policy with regard to these corporations.²²

For Kenya this can be seen under the different Administrations since independence in 1963. The first president, Kenyatta, pursued a foreign policy that emphasized cooperation with neighboring countries, support of continental liberation movements and a mixed economy that strongly encouraged foreign investment and hence close ties with western countries. After his death in 1978, there was a smooth transition despite precarious political environment, allowing vice president Moi to become president. There were attempts to topple Moi in a coup d’etat in August 1982, and later the wind of change of multiparty, democracy that blew through Kenya, but Moi was able to hold a fierce challenge and win another term of office in 1992 and again in December 1997.²³

Jackson and Rosberg decried the lack of institutions in Africa and hence the emergence of personal rules. In the context of foreign policy, the most important policy formulation institutions are the presidency, often supported by the respective ministries of foreign affairs.²⁴ Kenyatta’s style of leadership was reflected in his foreign policy. Kenyatta assumed the presidency at a time when he had achieved heroic status among Kenyans and

²² Dr Olatunde et al, African international relations, 1987, p 47.

²³ Stephen Wright ,African foreign policies,p101

²⁴ Ibid,p101

condemnation as a leaders “unto darkness and death” by the colonial government.²⁵ At independence, Kenyatta apparently had already made up his mind about Kenya’s path in foreign affairs. Subsequent policy documents such as KANU manifesto and the sessional paper no. 10 of 1965 clearly spelled out Kenyatta’s wishes that Kenya would be built along the lines of free enterprise, tied to the west, and that the accumulation of foreign capital would be necessary for economic growth, which led to the Foreign Investment Protection Act 1964.²⁶

The comments put forward by Okumu and Makinda outlining various factors influencing foreign policy are partially accurate. It is the contention, here that the input by the head of state is paramount. Kenyatta at independence was the hero who brought “Uhuru” (freedom, independence) but settlers and the British government had earlier been hostile. The Kenya weekly News, the Mouthpiece of the British Settler Community, described Kenyatta as being “stained with the mark of the beast,” and in 1958, the chief secretary of the Kenya Colonial Administration, Walter Coutts, made perhaps the most representative of British commentaries: “All sensible people will know that these leaders of Mau Mau are not fit to return to civilized society much less assume the mantle of political leadership. Anyone who supports the contrary view stamps himself as a supporter of bestiality, degradation and criminal activity.”²⁷ The British were quick to change their opinion of Kenyatta on realizing the extent of his domestic and international support and

²⁵ Jeremy Murray Brown :a complete biography of Kenyatta

²⁶ Stephen Wright, African foreign policies,1999,p101

²⁷ Harry Ododa , “ continuity and change in Kenya’s foreign policy from Kenyatta to Moi government, journal of African studies”

perhaps above all his willingness to cooperate with Britain, the settlers, and foreign investors.²⁸

Kenyatta's personality had a strong influence on foreign policy and he maintained Kenya in a close relationship with western states. Others perceived his stance as a "wait and see" policy because Kenyatta was cautious and conservative. Okumu,²⁹ best summed up foreign policy under Kenyatta: Kenya has effectively maintained a "low profile" on many of the burning issues in Africa and elsewhere, a style of diplomacy that is best described as quiet diplomacy. It is a style which avoids radical aggressiveness which she cannot defend or promote. It is a diplomatic posture which recognizes that the uses and functions of foreign policy of a poor nation are to promote economic and social modernization, tasks, which require the services, of development diplomats.

1.6 Justification of the Study

This study has both Academic and Policy justification. Foreign policy is a critical area of international relations. Today no country lives in isolation, states depends on one another for one reason or the other, could be social, economic or political. It is in this perspective that this research has been done so that Students of International Relations could benefit. It is expected that this study will contribute to the literature that is already available on the area of foreign policies in Africa, something that is in dire need given that the literature that is there is inadequate due to the fact that foreign policy in most countries earlier on, was not meant for public consumption. Foreign policy is still crucial to African

²⁸ Stephen Wright, African foreign policies, 1999, p102

²⁹ Walter Okumu, Kenya's foreign policy, p136

countries. It is critical that the challenges facing these developing countries in relation to formulation and execution of foreign policy is understood and approached through informed policy actions. This study is expected to contribute to this end by offering alternative options of how to pursue the process more effectively.

1.7 Hypotheses

The study will test the following three hypotheses:

1. Leadership qualities have a strong influence in foreign policy formulation and implementation;
2. Both domestic and external environment affect the foreign policy formulation and implementation of states;
3. There are more external than domestic challenges that adversely affect foreign policy formulation and implementation in Kenya.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

The main aspects under this study include leadership qualities, external environment and domestic challenges. These aspects shall be analyzed using two different schools of thought namely Realism and Dependency. On Realism, foreign policy outcomes result from multiple forces at various levels of analysis. The outcomes depend on individual decision makers, on the type of society and government they are working within and on the international and global context of their actions. The study of foreign policy processes runs counter to Realism's assumption of a unitary state actor. Because the study of foreign policy concentrates on forces within the state, its main emphasis is on the

individuals and domestic levels of analysis³⁰. Individual decision makers not only have differing values and beliefs, but also have unique personalities-their personal experience, intellectual capabilities and personal styles of making decisions. Some IR scholars study individual psychology to understand how personality affects decision making.³¹

Dependency theory draws our attention to variables outside Africa, for in dependency theory the centre-periphery relation is of great importance and can be seen to operate at both global and continental levels.³² This theory illustrates how economics is of critical importance in African international relations. It has been suggested that economics is both an independent and a dependent variable in these relations and policies, and that African states are engaged in a struggle for economic independence in order to increase their chances of preserving their sovereignty and political independence from internal and external threats. If economics is indeed basic to African ,and any other international relations and foreign policies, it is obviously critically important for us to understand the nature and dynamics of the dominant capitalist global economic system; the ways in which it makes African dependent and underdeveloped on both inter-African state relations and African relations with the rest of the world. Only such an understanding of the capitalist world economic system and Africa's historical and contemporary relations with it can realistically inform political and economic policies and strategies in the African struggle.³³

³⁰ Joshua Goldstein and Jon C Pevehouse, *International Relations*, 2011, p79

³¹ *Ibid*, p81

³² Dr Olatunde J C B Ojo, et al, *African international Relations*, 1987, p15

³³ *Ibid*

1.9 Research Methodology

The study was based on both primary and secondary sources. As for primary data , the questionnaire was administered and in some cases, the researcher conducted face to face interviews with the respondents who have served in the relevant fields such as the missions abroad, or at the ministry of foreign affairs. As for secondary data, the researcher sourced from available literature which included books, journals, newspapers, magazines, conference notes, internet among others.

Chapter Outline

The study is divided into five chapters, namely;

- Chapter one lays the foundation of the study by identifying and developing research problem, reviewing the literature, and developing the development framework and the methodology of the study.
- Chapter two deals with theoretical and conceptual discussions which have been generated in chapter one.
- Chapter three analyses the challenges of Kenya's foreign policy formulation and implementation.
- Chapter four builds on chapter one to three by integrating theoretical issues with data gathered.
- Chapter five is the concluding chapter and it builds on chapter one to four.

CHAPTER TWO

AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY: AN OVERVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This section of the study sought to elaborate further the discussions that were developed in chapter one. It discusses at length the African foreign policy formulation and implementation challenges. The aspects that were discussed under theoretical framework in chapter one included leadership qualities and how it affects in general the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Foreign policy analysis starts from the premise that, while there are significant differences between the foreign policies of states there are enough similar and ,therefore ,comparable patterns of behaviour to enable the observer to make certain generalized statements about ,for example, the goals that states pursue, the range of instruments that they use, who actually makes the foreign policy as a result of what influences, and so on.³⁴

The second aspect that was also brought out under theoretical framework in chapter one is how external environment affects foreign policy formulation and implementation in a state. Though a state may want to remain at peace, it may have to consider undertaking a preventive war, for if does not strike when the moment is favourable it may be struck later when the advantage has shifted to the other side.³⁵ This is the reason why states mistrust each other, it is because the international system is anarchical.

Lastly is the aspect of domestic challenge and in particular insecurity. In the absence of peace no major goals are achieved for the attention is always diverted.

³⁴Michael Clarke and Brian White, Understanding foreign policy, Edward Elgar publishing ltd,p5

³⁵Kenneth N.Waltz, Man the State and War Columbia university press 2001,p6

2.2 Overview of African Foreign Policy

Over time Africa foreign policy has been developing. The main factors that shaped this policy at independence can be viewed under the impact of colonialism, the role of resources, membership of international organizations, non alignment among others, better known as traditional approach. Today contemporary influences on African Foreign policies include the end of cold war in the 1990s, liberalization and democratization, debates on Africa agenda and global economy. African foreign policy³⁶ has a lot to do with actors, contexts and outcomes. Foreign policy makers attempt to reconcile domestic interests with external circumstances, taking into account available means, resources, and institutions for doing so. Important to understanding foreign policy are specific domestic and external contexts and the interaction between these two environments.

As major players in foreign policy, elites operate within institutions that continually constrain them, but oftentimes, these work around such limits and manage the tensions between domestic and international society. The foreign policies of African states³⁷ are today being shaped by rapidly changing international and domestic environments to the extent that it is difficult to isolate purely “foreign” policies. These changes are having both detrimental and positive effects on policy options and are particularly impacting on intra-African diplomacy. Indeed the blurring of boundaries between domestic and international arenas has been so accentuated that such a distinction hardly exists. African foreign policy³⁸ at the beginning of the twenty-first century is still dominated by overarching constraints on the survival of weak states. The imperatives of state survival,

³⁶ Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence, Lyons, *African Foreign Policies*, 2001. P1.

³⁷ Stephen Wright, *African Foreign Policies*, West View Press, 1999. P1.

³⁸ Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence, Lyons, *African Foreign Policies*, 2001. P7.

Clapham notes, force elites to use foreign policy to garner political and economic resources from the external environment. Whether made singly or collectively ,foreign policy reflects the continual attempts by elites to manage threats to domestic security and insulate their decision making from untoward external environment. Contemporary African elites, like their predecessors, are preoccupied with political stability, legitimacy, and economic security, issues whose importance seems to increase rather than diminish. The debates arising from this are therefore discussed below:

2.3 Africa Foreign Policy: The Main Debates

2.3.1 Liberalization and Democratization

The global sweep³⁹ of liberalization, instigating economic reform across central and Eastern Europe and into China, and the pressure for democratization have had uneven impacts on African states. Many such as Kenya and Zimbabwe, have struggled to implement reforms, whereas others, such as Nigeria appear to have failed, possibly temporarily. Where moderate reforms have taken root, as in Benin, and Senegal, the framework for foreign policy has been expanded. Parliaments, pressure groups, civil society groups, and non governmental organizations (NGOs) have become factors in the foreign policy equation, attempting to shift decision making away from a purely centralized command post (an office of the president).

The “Quality of Political Leadership,”⁴⁰ has also become important. One can begin to talk about multiple and competing foreign policies, through which different factions pursue

³⁹ Stephen Wright, *African Foreign Policies*, West View Press, 1999. Pg. 8.

⁴⁰ Ibid. p 8.

their own goals. In countries where political elites have resisted change, political conditionalities – democracy and human rights – become important levers used by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and western powers to shape domestic and foreign policies.

Institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF)⁴¹ have often been accused of having a “one-size-fits-all” approach to stabilization. The IMF financial programming approach tends to offer broadly similar advice for widely differing situations. For example, IMF supported arrangements typically include similar types of conditions such as targets for net international reserves and government borrowing. Thus countries with widely differing circumstances, for example, in Latin America and Africa may be subjected to similar conditions. The financial programming approach is used in all instances of IMF lending. These changes have often been compounded because IFM conditions have been very extensive and have arguably intruded on the sovereign decision making power of the countries concerned. This issue was recognized in the IMF’s own review of conditions which argued that excessive broad conditions may undermine the national ownership of policy programmes thereby making it more difficult to implement programmes successfully.

The years since 1990, for example, have witnessed disinvestment by British⁴² and French companies in Africa, and greater attention paid by EU members to opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe. Failure to democratize, though, serious in itself is not the

⁴¹ Robert Mudida, *Modern Economics*, English Press Publishers, 2011 p 399.

⁴² Stephen Wright, *African Foreign Policies*, West View Press, 1999. p 8.

key factor in weakening African ties to Europe. Rather problems in providing stability and liberalization tend to be shaping the parameters for foreign economic policy.

2.3.2 The Global Economy

In the absence of the Cold War or another serious security threat,⁴³ issues within the global economy appear to be moving to the center stage. The interrelated developments of regionalization and globalization of markets are facilitated by the role of Multinational Corporations (MNCs). In a high-tech world, with increasingly global finance and banking, with information technology expanding rapidly, and with the talk of a shrinking globe and an “end of geography,” pessimists fear that Africa could become increasingly irrelevant, let alone marginal.

A thorny problem⁴⁴ to deal with is a simple one: where exactly does Africa fit or compete within the evolving global structure and the New International Division of Labour (NIDL)? How can Africa’s foreign economic policies maximize potential and overcome dependency and underdevelopment? Is through the traditional route of the EU and Lome Convention or through a radical departure toward more self-reliant policies? How can African policies be relevant in a continent arguably lacking any newly industrialized country (NIC) and where low levels of technology and productivity are the norm? How can Africa influence the North – South dialogue, which appears to be less interested about a southern agenda for a move just economic order and more about a Northern agenda of privatization, competitiveness and market adjustment?

⁴³ Ibid p 9.

⁴⁴ Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations*, Longman, 2011. p 295.

Because of the need for capital⁴⁵ and the wealth created by international trade, most states of the global south see their future economic development as resting on a close interconnection with the world economy, not a national autarky or regional economic communities. Thus poor states must play by the rules embedded in international economic regimes. The World Trading Organization (WTO) trading regime sometimes works against poor states to protect infant industries in order to build self-sufficient capital accumulation. It forces competition with technologically advanced states.

A poor state⁴⁶ can be competitive only in low-wage, low-capital niches –especially those using natural resources that are scarce in the North, such as tropical agriculture, extractive (Mining and Drilling) industries, and textiles. Yet those economic sectors in which developing countries have comparative advantage in world markets – agriculture and textiles in particular, were largely excluded from the free trade rules for decades. Instead, World trade deals concentrated on free trade in manufactured goods, in which states in the North have comparative advantage. As a result, developing countries had to open their home markets to foreign products, against which home industries were not competitive, yet see their own export products shut out of foreign markets. Current WTO negotiations are attempting to remedy this inequality, but so far without success.

⁴⁵ Ibid p 295.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

The achievements of the North-South Dialogue⁴⁷ have been little more than window-dressing. It could hardly be otherwise, given the nature of interests involved. The North is unlikely to yield more than marginally to the South partly because its nationalism and racism 'are unlikely to tolerate what must look like a reckless generosity towards real or potential enemies' and partly because its imperialist competitions lead to immense expenditure on armaments; leaving a mere pittance to be transferred to the South. And yet the South lacks the productive resources or the instruments of labour. Even the vaunted organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) depends entirely on the North's technology to drill oil in the first place. And since the North has a monopoly on this technology it is 'able to redeem the petro-dollars and to pass on the burden of OPEC's price hike to the (South's) countries as import inflation.' In addition to this is the issue of nationalism in a divide and rule fashion to further weaken the southern power.

2.3.3 Debate over an African Agenda

Though somewhat simplified, it is possible to argue that African states foreign policies were pursued with some commonality of objectives in the early post independence period. Admittedly, there were different levels of commitment, but there was basic agreement over such formal policies as non alignment, opposition to apartheid, anticolonialism and the goal of "modernization" / economic development.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Dr. Olatunde C. B. Ojo, et al, African International Relations, 1987. p 68.

⁴⁸ Stephen Wright, African foreign policies, West View Press, 1999. p 9.

The idea of African unity⁴⁹ originated in the black diaspora. The two movements – Pan Negroism and Pan Africanism – developed in the West Indies and North America. Pan Negroism was concerned with the dignity of all black peoples’ while Pan-Africanism began both as a cultural and political movement to group together blacks in diaspora and to mobilize blacks both in the diaspora and in Africa against white domination, oppression and racial discrimination. In political terms it was a movement for a united black world. For continental Africa,⁵⁰ Pan-Africanism nurtured the idea of African brotherhood and solidarity. It inspired the struggle for political independence and the call for African Unity. Pan-Africanism laid the basis for African nationalism (Macronationalism) and was the mother of the concept of continental unity.

Such common (modernization)⁵¹ ground appears to have receded in the post-cold war era, as a “vision” or common agenda for Africa is more hotly contested. States display a diversity of strategies and objectives. This is especially evident in the debates on IMF /World Bank Structural Adjustments Programmes, an argument to promote a more-elf regional organizations play? What is the future of OAU or the African Economic Community? How much support should there be for an African “champion,” such as South Africa (or Nigeria)? How much effort should be invested in maintaining the territorial status quo in the continent?

Pan Africanism and continentalism are terms gaining new currency in Africa out of an urgency to deal with political, economic, and social crises facing the continent. There is a

⁴⁹ Dr. Olatunde C. B. Ojo, et al, African International Relations, 1987. p 73.

⁵⁰ Ibid p 73.

⁵¹ Stephen Wright, African Foreign Policies, West View Press, 1999. p 9.

growing sense that Africa needs to respond collectively and as a region if it is to thrive in the coming years.

2.3.4 The Debate on Globalization

Recently the merits of globalization⁵² have been the subject of many heated debates. When the World Trade Organization (WTO) met in Seattle in 1999, there were extensive public protests about globalization and the liberalization of the international trade. Further there has been more anti globalization protests such as that of Davos, Switzerland in 2001. The contributions of Free Trade and Globalization to dramatic reductions in world wide poverty are contrasted with anecdotal stories of people growing power of multinationals. Likewise, increases in service sector employment are contrasted against losses in high-paying manufacturing jobs.

Globalization⁵³ encompasses many trends, including expanded international trade, telecommunications, monetary coordination, multinational corporations, technical and scientific cooperation, cultural exchanges of new types and scales, migration and refugees flows, and relations between the world's rich and poor countries. One popular conception of globalization is as "the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life".

Another view sees it as the fruition of liberal economic principles. A third school of thought sees globalization as more profound than the skeptics believe, yet more uncertain

⁵² Donald A. Ball et al International Business, Mc Graw Hill Publishers 2008, p 18.

⁵³ Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations, Longman, 2011. p 17.

than the view of supporters of liberal economics. These “Transformationalists” see state sovereignty as being eroded by the EU, the WTO and other new institutions, so that sovereignty is no longer absolute but just one of a spectrum of bargaining leverages held by states. The bargaining itself increasingly involves non state actors. Thus globalization diffuses authority. State power is not so much strengthened or weakened by globalization, but transformed to operate in new contexts with new tools. Globalization is changing both international security and international political Economy (IPE) but it is changing IPE more quickly and profoundly than security.

2.4 Main Determinants

2.4.1 Leadership Qualities

Africa has historically been forced, coerced and manipulated into adopting a foreign political methodology that has resulted in its underdevelopment, and general integration into lower levels of the global economic and political network, despite its wealth of potential. Yet Africa has also been impressive post independence growth with some progressive leaders; but unfortunately their cohort also consists of a class of kleptocratic and opportunistic leaders who have been of far greater benefit to themselves and foreign private industry than to the masses of the people, to whom they owe their official commitment.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Serie Mc Dougal, the Journal of Pan African Studies, vol. 2, No. 9, March 2009.

As political scientist, Barber⁵⁵ remarked, every story of decision making is really two stories: an outer one in which a rational man calculates and an inner one in which an emotional man feels. The two are forever connected. Foreign policy decision making is an outcome of how individuals with power perceive and analyses events. Political leaders are not beyond the reach of the human traits of assumptions, subjectivity, prejudices and biases. Their underlying beliefs and motivations will have a bearing upon the conclusions they reach. Culture, geography, history, ideology, and self-conceptions shape the thought process of a decision maker, forming what has been referred to as the psycho-socio milieu of decision-making⁵⁶. The foreign policy decisions of Harry Truman, Saddam Hussein and Charles de Gaulle can demonstrate clearly on how personality can affect the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

The effects of personality on decision making are difficult to quantify. Interpersonal generalization theory suggests that behavioral differences in interpersonal situations have some correlation to behavioral differences in international situations, for example, a relationship between self-assertiveness/dominance, and willingness to resort to military action⁵⁷. However, it would be naive and over-simplified to state that certain personality traits of a decision maker lead a country to war; instead they can be seen as tipping the balance towards or against a certain policy, because, put succinctly, "some leaders are willing to gamble the destiny of their people in a war; others are not"⁵⁸. It is also important

⁵⁵ Brewer, T.L. (1992). *American Foreign Policy: A Contemporary Introduction*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. p.149).

⁵⁶ Sprout, H. and Sprout, M. (1965). *The ecological perspective on human affairs: with special reference to international politics*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

⁵⁷ Etheredge, L. *Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1898-1968*, *American Political Science Review*. (1978). P 72(2)

⁵⁸ Ali Musallam, M, *The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait*. London: British Academic Press(1996).p.5)

to take into consideration the extent to which individual traits can be separated from role-playing. Decision makers may act how they perceive a leader in their society is expected to act, taking role-appropriate decisions which are not necessarily in line with their personal nature.

When analyzing the influence of personality upon foreign policy, it is important to emphasize that the differing political environments surrounding leaders will naturally create highly variable boundaries within which they have the freedom to operate. It is a given fact that a dictator in an authoritarian Administration has much greater, unconditional, unaccountable power to create policies suiting his personal interests, than the leader of a democracy. Within a democracy, the head of government is obliged, to some extent, to take into consideration the opinions of other authorities and experts, and must especially consult the Foreign Minister with regard to foreign policy. However, ultimately, the final decision does lie with the leader, and he does possess the power to override other opinion if he wishes. Leaders of governments can also have the advantage of hand-selecting those who they put into positions of power. A leader is likely to choose key advisors who share his core beliefs and he considers being generally cooperative, creating an environment in which groupthink has the potential to flourish.

Political leaders in democracies should, theoretically, and sometimes in practice, reflect the attitudes and core values of their citizens. Having been through the same socialization process and sharing the same core cultural values as his citizens, the democratic leader can be seen as an embodiment of societal character. Decision making is an

institutionalized process, in which "personality factors merge with cultural background factors and can often be explained in more generalized group terms"⁵⁹ . The mood of society sets broad boundaries around the theoretical foreign policy alternatives of decision makers.

Personality can impact to differing extents on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. While a policy can be formulated, within the relative situational and bureaucratic restraints, to the particular personal liking of a leader and his colleagues, the implementation stage, translating foreign policy objectives into practice and desired outcomes, is more complex. Attempts to implement a policy can come into conflict with the objectives of other actors and the environment, as the boundary between decision makers and the outside world is crossed. It is true that "orders may be easily issued, but that is only the beginning of the process of attempting to achieve one's goals for all kinds of states because leaders rely on sub-contracting to bureaucratic agents, some of whom may take the opportunity to slow down or undermine the policy, or even to run their own policies in competition"⁶⁰ .

Foreign policy is not self-executing, and requires resources, support or mobilization of the public, and some political consensus, particularly in a democracy. The more charismatic, persuasive and motivational the leader is, the greater the chances of overcoming such opposition. A leader can gain public support for his policy through the

⁵⁹ Cerny P.G. *The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press(1980), p.13)

⁶⁰ Brighi, E. and Hill, C.(2008). *Implementation and Behaviour* In: Dunne, T. and Hadfield, A. and Smith, S. eds. *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. New York: Oxford University Press.p130-4.

strategic use of propaganda, promoting both his 'greatness' as a decision maker, and that of the policy. Under dictatorship, foreign policy decisions lie almost solely in the hands of the leader; his decisions can be made without the accountability, checks and balances which exist in a democracy.

Personality in the formulation and implementation is variable. The more critical a situation is perceived to be, the fewer people will be directly involved in its management, and so there is a greater likeliness that their conclusions and actions will reflect their own personal beliefs, attitudes and interests. Despite institutional constraints, the political leader has a significant influence over decision making, particularly when national security is seen to be at stake, or when policy can be formed relatively secretly. Even in non-crisis situations, a political leader has "the potential to exercise power and thereby impose his preferences on policy. The extent to which he does so depend on his own values, beliefs, background and personality"⁶¹.

Every person in a position of power brings personal experiences, values, preconceptions and emotions to their decision making, although some will allow bureaucracy and the power-sharing nature of democracy to counter and balance these idiosyncrasies. Ultimately, the personality of a leader has the most influence in unaccountable, dictatorial Administrations, often due to the climate of fear surrounding their unlimited powers. Despite their individual differences, all humans prefer to be consistent in their beliefs, and studies show we often ignore or distort information that contradicts what we already

⁶¹Brewer, T.L. (1992). American Foreign Policy: A Contemporary Introduction. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. p.160.

believe. This is especially likely when we have strongly held stereotypes or “images” of other countries. Leaders who see another country as their enemy, for example, will often selectively attend to or perceive information about that country in a way that confirms their original belief. For this reason, images are extremely resistant to change, even if the “enemy” is making cooperative gestures, Ole Holsti, (1976).

Based on numerous findings in research, the conventional wisdom is that the public simply does not influence foreign policy. The average person tends to know little and care little about his or her country’s foreign affairs. Even if the public were knowledgeable about foreign policy issues, it is not clear that leaders would follow public opinion. They may instead try to lead the public to opinions that are in line with their preferences or ignore their opinion altogether.

Colonialism was the European foreign policy methodology for feeding its own economic growth and exploiting not only the material reality, but also the humanity of indigenous populations under the more digestible auspices of bringing non European countries into, “modernity, civilization and human progress.” However the 20th century ushered in the language of “development” which affects the negative and imperialistic connotation attached to the term colonialism. Therefore it is incumbent upon African leaders not to allow the change in language to skew their discernment between appropriate and inappropriate political relations. Furthermore, Afro centricity includes a conceptualization of the African world as Africans on the African continent and in their diverse circumstances and locations around the world. Conversely, one of Africa’s

greatest resources lies in the fact that the African world extends to all of the non African countries that Africans have been dispersed to over the centuries.⁶²

According to Mwagiru, the study of management of the Diplomatic service and foreign policy does not entail the study of so-called ‘practical’ aspects of diplomacy. It entails the study and analyses of diplomatic policies in certain areas of diplomacy, in this case areas like administering foreign policy, administration of the diplomatic service, such as posting policy, training policy, relationships among the different organs of diplomacy, implementing strategic plans for the Ministry, prioritizing foreign policy, implementation and the like. The administration of the foreign/diplomatic service is more straightforward in terms of its content. This is not the case for the administration of foreign policy. The administration of foreign policy does not mean making foreign policy for the country; if it did so it would create more impediments to this area. The management of foreign policy is concerned with how foreign policy that has already been created can best be implemented. Since the majority of those involved in the implementation of foreign policy are in the diplomatic service, managing that service goes hand in hand with managing foreign policy.⁶³

Traditionally, the distribution of labour in the leadership of the foreign ministry argued that managing the diplomatic service was the sole task of the permanent secretary, while the creation and management of foreign policy was the sole task of the minister. This framework is untenable. It was based on nice distinctions, which in practice are not easily

⁶² Serie Mc Dougal, the Journal of Pan African Studies, vol. 2, No. 9, March 2009. p67.

⁶³ Makumi Mwagiru, the Missing Link in the Study of Diplomacy: The Management of the Diplomatic Service and Foreign Policy.

distinguishable. It was also founded on inaccuracies in understanding. The management of foreign policy is different from the creation of foreign policy. The distinction is that the management of foreign policy concerns shaping the players, the organs and the environment, so as to best serve the actor. Managing the diplomatic service and where all the players are attuned to thinking about the best ways they can implement foreign policy.⁶⁴

According to Oyugi, Kenya's foreign policy during 1963-78 period was unambiguous. Foreign policy concentrated on promoting and intensifying relations in Eastern Africa and Western Europe. These were the areas in which Kenya's real interests lay. Socialist bloc countries and to some extent the rest of Africa were peripheral. During this period a majority of Kenyan Ambassadors were in the non-communist world mostly Western Europe and North America. Throughout this period no western ambassador was expelled from Kenya and no western aid – economic or military was rejected. On the other hand, Kenya broke diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 1966 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 having accused the two countries of interfering in the domestic affairs of Kenya. And it rejected Soviet military and economic assistance in 1966 on the ground that the equipment was obsolete.⁶⁵

However the main reason for the rejection appeared to be the controversy over the role of and closure of the Lumumba Institute which the Soviets had helped build in Nairobi. At the same time, Kenya refused to accept sterling pounds 16 million economic aid from the

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ ibid

Soviet Union without explanation. The only explanation that can be advanced in respect of these actions is that there was a strong anti-communist sentiment within the Kenyatta Administration at the time.⁶⁶

Again it appears that the anti-communist attitude of the government was influenced by what was considered to be in the best interest of the Administration. The official position as explained to the author by a desk officer in the Ministry of foreign affairs in 1983 was that Kenya's economic, cultural, political and military objectives, it thought, would better be served in a closer co-operation with western European countries and North America. It was held that Soviet economic system, the inconvertibility of the ruble and inappropriate technology was inconsistent with Kenya's development goals and strategy.⁶⁷

It is difficult to point out one single event that has transformed the characteristics of African foreign policies during the 1990s, and it is not easy to provide with absolute precision and confidence a year that is a watershed in changing policy procedures.⁶⁸ According to Stephen Wright, decision making mechanisms in African states need to be reconsidered. The simplification of the head of state as decision maker approach, though it has residual validity needs to be broadened to take account of these other groups. Increasing factionalism – an early product of partial democratization – often leads to competing foreign policy agendas within states as well as between states. Religious influences as seen in Senegal can become significant in influencing policy. And public

⁶⁶ Makumi Mwagiru, *The Missing Link in the Study of Diplomacy: The Management of the Diplomatic Service and Foreign Policy*. p 307

⁶⁷ Ibid page 308

⁶⁸ Stephen Wright, *African Foreign Policies*, 1999, Westview Press. p6.

opinion is becoming something to note in policy formulation in various states, though it is often difficult to pinpoint because it involves many diverse groups.⁶⁹

Many domestic actors seek to influence public opinion – the range of views on foreign policy issues held by the citizens of a state. Public opinion has greater influence on foreign policy in democracies than in authoritarian governments. But even dictators must pay attention to what citizens think. No government can rule by force alone. It needs legitimacy to survive. It must persuade people to accept (if not to like) its policies, because in the end policies are carried out by ordinary people, soldiers, workers and bureaucrats.⁷⁰

Because of the need for public support, even authoritarian governments spend great effort on propaganda – the public promotion of their official line- to win support for foreign policies. States use television, newspapers, and other information media in this effort. In many countries, the state owns or controls major mass media such as television and newspapers mediating the flow of information to its citizens, however, new information technologies with multiple channels (such as the internet) make this harder to do. Every international event is the result, intended or unintended, of decision made by individuals. International relations do not just happen. President Harry Truman, who decided to drop U.S nuclear bombs on two Japanese cities in 1945, had a sign on his desk: “The buck stops here.” As leader of the world’s greatest power, he had nobody to pass the buck to. If he chose to use the bomb (as he did), more than 100,000 civilians would die. If he chose

⁶⁹Stephen Wright, *African Foreign Policies*, 1999, Westview Press. p15.

⁷⁰ Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations*, 5th edition, 2011 Edition, Longman Publishers.p.75.

not to, the war might drag on for months with tens of thousands of U.S. casualties. Truman⁷¹ had to choose. Some people applauded his decision; others condemned it. But for better or for worse, Truman as an individual had to decide, and take the responsibility for the consequences.

The study of individual decision making revolves around the question of rationality. To what extent are national leaders (or citizens) able to make rational decisions in the national interest – if indeed such an interest can be defined? Individual rationality is not equivalent to state rationality: states might filter individual's irrational decisions so as to arrive at rational choices, or states might distort individual rational decision and end up with irrational state choices. But realists tend to assume that both states and individuals are rational and that the goals or interests of states correlate with those of leaders.⁷² Individual decision makers not only have differing values and beliefs, but also have unique personalities – their personal experiences, intellectual capabilities, and personal styles of making decisions.⁷³

Beyond individual idiosyncrasies in goals or decision-making processes, individual decision making diverges from the rational model in at least three systematic ways. First, decision makers suffer from misperceptions and selective perceptions (taking in only some kinds of information) when they compile information on the likely consequences of their choices. Decision-making processes must reduce and filter the incoming

⁷¹ Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations*, 5th edition, 2011 Edition, Longman Publishers, p81.

⁷² *Ibid.* p 81.

⁷³ Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations*, 5th edition, 2011 Edition, Longman Publishers p 81

information on which a decision is based; the problem is that such filtration often is biased. Information screens are subconscious filters through which people put the information coming in about the world around them. Often they simply ignore any information that does not fit their expectations. Information is also screened out as it passes from one person to another in the decision making process.⁷⁴

Second, the rationality of individual cost-benefit calculations is undermined by emotions that decision makers feel while thinking about the consequences of their actions- an effect referred to as effective bias (positive and negative affect refer to feelings of liking or disliking someone). As hard as a decision maker tries to be rational in making a decision, the decision making process is bound to be influenced by strong feelings held about the person or state toward which a decision is directed.⁷⁵

In Kenya, at the time of independence, Kenyatta and other Kenyan leaders decided to maintain the economic and institutional structures inherited from the British. The development strategy thereby adopted “conformed to capitalist values and ideas” advised by the British and the World Bank. It has therefore been argued that “Kenya’s increasingly close ties to US foreign policy interests” has been as a result of “her continued dependence.” The America and British confidence in Kenyan policies were established as early as the 1960’s due to the economic linkage. It has therefore been correctly argued that, “Kenya’s policy aims at providing a continuation of the conditions

⁷⁴ Ibid p 81.

and relations with other countries that will permit Kenya to build its mixed economy through a largely capitalist economy.⁷⁶

The signifying of Kenya-Ethiopia and Kenya-British military arrangements did not conform to Prime Minister Kenyatta's address on independence day, in which he stated inter alia that "The aim of my government which starts today is not to be pro-left or pro-right. We shall pursue the task of nation building in friendship with the rest of the world.....we want to be friend all, and we want aid from everyone."⁷⁷ Kenyatta's policy statement came at a time when geopolitical and strategic considerations were pursued in Africa by the United States and the Soviet Union. Kenyatta was determined to be a good neighbour within the East African region and protect Kenya's territorial integrity. Being an "elder statesman," he was consulted on continental matters.⁷⁸

Foreign policy under the Moi administration has become more of a presidential prerogative, more aggressive and consequently more controversial. Moi emphasized what came to be known as Nyayo philosophy, following the "footsteps" of Kenyatta with the objective of achieving espoused principles – love, peace and unity – as well as the more concrete objective of maintaining close links with the west. In the regional foreign policy, Moi put the Nyayo philosophy into practice in the following areas: good neighborliness, peacemaking and peacekeeping.⁷⁹ Kenya and Uganda have had stormy relations

⁷⁶ Macharia Munene, J. D. Olewe Nyunya and Korwa Adar, *The United States and Africa*, 1995, E.A. Educational Publishers Ltd. p 90.

⁷⁷ Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations*, 5th edition, 2011 Edition, Longman Publishers, p94.

⁷⁸ Stephen Wright, *African Foreign Policies*, 1999, Westview Press. p102

⁷⁹ *ibid* p103

especially on border issues. Moi handled challenges posed by Uganda by attempting to maintain good relations, bearing in mind that Uganda is Kenya's leading trading partner.

⁸⁰The Sudanese situation has also been difficult. Kenya has been torn between providing relief to southern Sudan and maintaining good relations with the Sudanese government. The Sudanese government has accused Kenya of aiding the rebel movement known as SPLM / SPLA.⁸¹

2.4.2 External Environment

When a nation's policy makers formulate their foreign policy, what is uppermost in their minds is the protection of their security. This involves three main elements: First, every nation is determined to remain sovereign and independent. Secondly, nations face threat to their existence from others, hence a nation has to be prepared to meet external threat to its independence from across the borders, if necessary by use of armed forces. Thirdly, and as a result, it has to be ever-prepared to meet any threat to its national security in which case foreign policy is national security policy. But this is only a narrow approach to national security. A broader approach includes not only armed strength and preparedness, but also a nation's economic strength as well as its domestic political stability and cohesiveness. Thus, how nations meet a challenge to their security depends not only on their military strength, but also on economic strength and national unity.⁸²

⁸⁰ Stephen Wright, *African Foreign Policies*, 1999, Westview Press. p104

⁸¹ Ibid p 104.

⁸² Macharia Munene, J. D. Olewe Nyunya and Korwa Adar, *The United States and Africa*, 1995, E.A. Educational Publishers Ltd.

This sub-section heavily relies on dependency theory. According to Light⁸³ there is no single coherent body of thought that can accurately be described as ‘dependency theory’ instead various theories stress the key notion that some countries (or economies) are conditioned in their development by their dependence on other countries (economies), and that this dependence is structural and deeper than the dominance relationship between societies that differ in size, but not in level of socio-economic development. Thus the relationship between Brazil and the United States could be, and usually is, described as dependent, but that between Denmark and West Germany would not be described so. Dependence is different from dominance. This is not simply a question of multinational capital and ownership: It is structure that is crucial. The general notion of dependency subsumes several different theories including dependencia; centre-periphery analysis and world-system analysis.

If imperialism concentrated the accumulation of wealth in the core and drained economic surplus from the periphery, one might expect that accumulation in the global south would take off once colonialism was overthrown. Generally, however, this was not the case. A few states such as Singapore have accumulated capital successfully since becoming independent. But others including many African states seem to be going backward, with little new capital accumulating to replace the old colonial infrastructure. Most former colonies are making only slow progress in accumulation .Political independence has not been a cure – all for poor countries.⁸⁴

⁸³ Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom, *International Relations*, 1st Edition 1985, SRP Ltd, Exeter.p. 56.

⁸⁴ Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations*, 5th edition, 2011 Edition, Longman Publishers. p 276.

One reason for these problems is that colonialism, the training and experience needed to manage the economy were often limited to white Europeans, leaving a huge gap in technical and administrative skills after independence. Another problem faced by many newly independent states was that their economies rested on the export of one or two products. For Zambia, it was copper ore; for El Salvador, coffee; for Botswana, diamonds. Such a narrow export economy would seem well suited to use the state's comparative advantage to specialize in one niche of the world economy. And having exportable natural resources might seem a big plus for an economy. But in fact the problems of basing economic growth on resource exports have been called the resource curse. Dependence on exporting resources distorts an economy, facilitates corruption, and leaves a country vulnerable to price swings.⁸⁵

Dependency has been defined by Marxist International Relations scholars as a situation in which accumulation of capital cannot sustain itself internally. A dependent country must borrow capital to produce goods, the debt payments then reduce the accumulation of surplus.⁸⁶ According to McDougal⁸⁷, the first imperative, victorious political agency requires Africa be proactive in its formulation of institutions and policies to moderate its relationships with non-African countries. For example, the mere existence of Bretton Wood's system of monetary management to establish rules and financial links among the world's major industrial nations does not mean they should also control African economic development. Because, if the African union is to become the United States of Africa as declared in the Accra Declaration of 2007, it must be robust enough to

⁸⁵ Ibid. p276.

⁸⁶ Ibid. p277

⁸⁷ Serie Mc Dougal, III ph.D, The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol. 2, no. 9, March 2009.

moderate and filter its most important relationships through its own institutions and organizations and in either case, this requires proactive self-conscious institution building and collective policy formulation. History has demonstrated that exploitative policies have resulted in Africa's underdevelopment, therefore the second imperative of a victorious political agency is to identify and neutralize anti-African policies that exist in Africa trade policies and relationships with other countries; thus policies that facilitate African development on African terms cannot exist concurrently with anti-African institutions and policies that are not consistent with African development on African terms.

To secure the sustainable exploitation of Africa, the US has found it necessary to further militarize its relationships. It is well known that Africa is a fast growing supplier of fuel minerals (crude oil, gas), as well as strategic non-fuel minerals (copper, platinum, manganese, cobalt) to the United States and other growing economies. To secure its investment, the US is becoming a growing military presence in West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea in particular. Securing the uninterrupted flow of resources to the US economy industry, and military industrial complex are two of the primary, yet under reported reasons for the establishment of Africa command (AFRICOM). However, AFRICOM cannot be successful without the complicity of African leaders who are willing to actively participate in their own exploitation by outsourcing African military sovereignty to the United States, and facilitating the militarization of Africa.⁸⁸

According to Mc Dougal, it appears that the United States is using its military to compensate for its vulnerability in the arena of economic competition in Africa, which it

⁸⁸ Serie Mc Dougal, III ph.D, The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol. 2, no. 9, March 2009.

faces from China, India and other countries with growing industries. AFRICOM is very likely to be a costly undertaking for African countries that cooperate, in several critical ways. First, Africa is likely to become a proxy battleground for the US war against radical Islam today, as it was made the proxy battleground for the US war on communism in the 1950's through the 1980's. And with this threat, comes the risk of further exacerbating divisions between African people along religious and ethnic lines.

Secondly, African countries risk increasing the economic gap between the rich and the poor within countries, a truism evident in IMF annual Economic outlook report which explains how the policies of dominant western countries and multilateral development agencies toward developing countries including those in Africa, have led to increased income gaps between African political and economic leaders and the majority of African people (plus, enhanced western private investment is likely to result from the more “inviting” commercial / business climate that will be provided by the security umbrella established by AFRICOM). Thirdly, African countries risk, not only, increased dependence on the US economic agenda, but the added element of military dependence on the US which does nothing to promote African Agency toward victory.

Fourth, the citizens of Africa risk unjustified shootings, detentions and humanitarian violations⁸⁹ that may ensue due to an increased presence of US based private militaries that are often not subject to the same rules as state militaries or domestic laws, as witnessed in Iraq. And any additional private military presence would only compound the already existing French, British and American private military presence on the continent

⁸⁹ *ibid*

by such firms as ALGIZ Services Limited, defense security, Broad Bridge Wraith and others. Thus it would be ill advised for African nations to outsource the handling of their regional security matters to dominant western countries, and furthermore enhancing African countries' ability to address military efforts on the continent does not have to come as a result of a series of bilateral military efforts with the United States, but African led operations supported by the international community.

Dependency model according to Munene, offers a competing explanation. Generally, it focuses on North-South relations, distinguishing between developed and underdeveloped worlds. Although the dependency model has many variants, its advocates share a common paradigmatic perspective that highlights the subjection of Africa, indeed the Third World to an international system dominated by the advanced capitalist countries of North America and Western Europe. Thus, the dependency model conceptualizes US-Africa relations as basically one of dominance – dependence relations in which Africa's raw materials are exploited for the benefit of the United States.

Thirdly, the Marxist theory⁹⁰ offers an alternative explanation. While the dependency school of core-periphery relations views global commerce as the engine of underdevelopment, the Marxist theory uses the economic analysis of modes of production which considers the possibility or impossibility of reproducing capitalist elite class in the periphery (i.e. in Africa). One version of the Marxist analysis argues for the possibility of developing an entrepreneurial African bourgeoisie which can be the engine of Africa

⁹⁰ Macharia Munene, J. D. Olewe Nyunya and Korwa Adar, *The United States and Africa*, 1995, E.A. Educational Publishers Ltd. p189.

capitalist development. The other version postulates a wealthy African bourgeois class that collaborates with foreign capital for the continued underdevelopment of Africa.

President Bush came into office in 2000 without any great interest in Africa and certainly with no conviction that the region was important to the United States. His ties to an evangelical Christian base, combined with pressures from congress and advocates for Africa, pushed him to respond to the situation in Southern Sudan and the Aids crisis, and to increase aid to the region. But the dictates of political realism, which has always devalued Africa as a foreign policy concern for the United States, have continued to restrict US engagement with the region. Meanwhile, the Global war on Terror (GWOT), inspired by neoconservative thinking, and self-interested concerns over oil imports, threaten to undercut efforts to achieve a fairer and more just Africa policy. GWOT in particular may be pushing the United States into actions that could prove destabilizing for parts of Africa.⁹¹

The Bush administration⁹² maintains that it strongly supports growth and development in Africa. Before leaving for the July 2005 G8 summit at Gleneagles in Scotland, President Bush said that ‘we seek progress in Africa and throughout the developing world because conscience demands it. In September he affirmed before the UN General Assembly’s 2005 world summit that we must defend and extend a vision of human dignity, and opportunity and prosperity. To spread a vision of hope, the United States is determined to

⁹¹ Raymond Copson, *The United States in Africa*, 2007, Gutenberg press Ltd. p16.

⁹² Ibid p17.

help nations that are struggling with poverty. We are committed to the Millennium Development Goals.’

The administration argues that it is promoting development in Africa through increased foreign assistance, trade promotion via the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) program, support for the reduction of trade barriers, and debt relief. US aid to Africa has indeed increased, but by far the largest increases have come through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDs Relief (PEPFAR) and other emergency and humanitarian programs, rather than in programs directly focused on reducing poverty and raising incomes.⁹³

If the United States is to make a larger contribution to fighting poverty in Africa, it will have to fund a much more substantial development assistance program, with a stronger focus on strengthening infrastructure, higher education, agriculture and other sectors that make a direct contribution to economic growth. The United States should take the lead in achieving more sweeping debt relief and a real reduction in trade barriers. New and creative ways should be found for promoting US trade with Africa, as well as investments by firms that can create jobs and develop Africa’s infrastructure. The Middle East, the global war on Terror, and other issues are dominating the foreign policy agenda, however, and the U.S budget is surely constrained by vast annual deficits. Agricultural lobbies opposed to trade reform remain powerful. Thus, there seems little reason to hope

⁹³ *ibid* p 18.

for substantial new commitments to reducing poverty and raising incomes in the near future.⁹⁴

States are committed to Diplomacy by the nature of the world in which they exist. In times and places where there are several separate states and their actions affect one another, they cannot function in a vacuum of isolation, with each community considering only how to manage its internal affairs. Each state is obliged, by the very desire to control its own destiny as far as possible, to take account of the neighbours who impinge on its interests and those of its citizens, whatever it considers those interests to be. In more formal terms, members of a group of independent states are obliged to manage the consequences of the fact that they enjoy their independencies not absolutely and in isolation but in a setting of interdependence.⁹⁵

When a group of states forms a closely knit system, the involvement of many self-willed political actors imposes upon each state a continuous awareness that the others have interests and purposes distinct from its own, and that the things other states do or may do limit partly determine its own policies. The body politic, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau called the state, 'is forced to look outside itself in order to know itself; it depends on its whole environment and has to take an interest in everything that happens.' So today every state in our global system depends not merely on itself but on its whole worldwide environment.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ Raymond Copson, *The United States in Africa*, 2007, Gutenberg press Ltd, p19.

⁹⁵ *ibid*

⁹⁶ Adam Watson, *Diplomacy, The Dialogue Between States*, 1991, Printed by J. W. Arrowsmith Ltd, Bristol. p14.

2.4.3 Domestic Challenges/Insecurity

The main issues that were discussed under this subsection were mainly on insecurity.

On security policies, all states need a foreign policy because they all exist in an essentially anarchical world in which each state lives in fear and must seek its own security. There is no world government to protect individual states. Each must guard itself in a system in which states tend to view each other as potential adversaries rather than friends. The analogy is the proverbial town of the “Old West” where there was no law and order and where men lived in fear of one another and more guns to protect themselves against those who might want to rob them, take away their land, or who were just plain ornery and mean.⁹⁷

States in general distrust one another. Even when one state extends the hand of friendship, the other wonders why. Is one state trying to deceive the other to strike later? Where their security is concerned, if not their survival, states are cautious and careful. No one guarantees them either; each is its own guardian states, therefore rarely take chances; the stakes are too high. The basic rule is “protect yourself.” This is fundamental since security is regarded as the prerequisite for a nation to preserve its way of life. Forgetting this basic rule is to risk endangering one’s territorial integrity and political independence.⁹⁸

Many of today’s challenges cannot be resolved by traditional (i.e military – focused) security policies. Unlike traditional military threats emanating from a determined

⁹⁷ John W. Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, *American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas*, 1994, Muncillan Publishing Company. P 6.

⁹⁸ Ibid

adversary, many of today's security challenges are risks and vulnerabilities shared across borders. While the poorest countries are most directly affected, none of these issues respect, human-drawn borders, and we might think of them as "problems without passports."⁹⁹

The pressures facing societies and people everywhere do not automatically or necessarily trigger violence. But they can translate into political dynamics that lead to rising polarization and radicalization. Worst-case outcomes are more likely where grievances are left to fester, where people are struggling with mass unemployment or chronic poverty, where state institutions are weak or corrupt, where arms are easily available, and where political humiliation or despair over the lack of hope for a better future may drive people into the arms of extremist movements. Insecurity can manifest itself in ways other than violent conflict. The Litmus test is whether the wellbeing and integrity of society are so compromised that they lead to possibly prolonged periods of instability and mass suffering.¹⁰⁰

The security interests of Africa and those of Africans should and have become a political subject in world politics. Africa's geopolitical setting has made it a viable arena for the playing out of emergent global security dimensions such as terrorism, climatic catastrophes, and the manipulation of weak despotic states. It is now paramount to identify the common security interests between Africa and the west, which by and large

⁹⁹ Prof. Makumi Mwagiru and Prof. Okello Oculi, *Rethinking Global Security: An African Perspective*, 2006, Heinrich Boll Foundation, p 2.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, p3

have turned out to be interconnected, affecting all of us around the world to at least some extent, even if their resonance, or impact, does vary.¹⁰¹

Conflicts and threats to security have direct results in the occurrence of massive human rights violations in Africa, and there have been attempts to develop mechanisms to deal with conflict in Africa. Africa's history in the protection and preservation of human rights lends further importance and urgency to the development of these mechanisms. Human rights abuses are widespread, for reaching and affect every level and type of person.¹⁰² The violence that attends the political fissures on the Horn of Africa continued unabated throughout 1984, making this the one region of Africa with a potential to embroil the leading military powers in conflict. In contrast to diplomatic developments in Southern Africa, the Horn in 1984 was characterized more by severe internal violence, notably in Sudan and Ethiopia, than by interstate aggression, and there was little sign of reconciliation and some backsliding in all of these conflicts during 1984.¹⁰³

The strategic stakes in the region remained high. The Soviet Union seems to be mired in an ulcerous civil war, supporting the Ethiopian government against the Eritrean and Tigrayan movements that seek autonomy, in which central governments forces made little headway in 1984. The United States had cause for concern in the Sudan where the Administration of president Nimeiri was confronted with amounting rebellion in the South and a tendency toward Islamic fundamentalism that alienated his fellow Arab allies

¹⁰¹ Ibid. p14.

¹⁰² Ibid p86.

¹⁰³ Barry M. Blechman and Edward N. Luttwak, *International Security Yearbook 1984/85, 1985*, Westview Press, p 226.

in the north. It is worth noting that although strategic investment of the U.S and the Soviet Union is high in the region, at least by African standards neither side made any significant move in 1984 to escalate its involvement in the region.¹⁰⁴

The United States has two important national security interests in Sub-Saharan Africa possible terror threats that might emanate from the region and growing U.S dependence on African oil. These interests are real, but they have been of great concern among those who seek a fairer and more just Africa policy because of a fear that in pursuing them the United States will cause harm to the region. Many worry that US relations with Africa will come to be dominated by policies and programs that have a clear and direct relationship to narrow security concerns, rather than to broaden, long term efforts to reduce poverty, promote peace and encourage respect for democratic principles and human rights. In the process, repressive Administrations may be shored up, and military and police elements within African societies strengthened to a degree that could lead to repression and coups. Missteps and miscalculations may occur that will precipitate a backlash against the United States and Administrations associated with it, causing lasting harm to the US Africa relationship.¹⁰⁵

There is reason to be concerned that US policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa is developing in ways that could have such consequences. The US voice in support of democracy is already being muted with respect to oil producing countries. The emerging dominance of immediate security concerns in US policy toward Africa, however, is still in its early

¹⁰⁴ Ibid p 226.

¹⁰⁵ Raymond W. Copson, *The United States in Africa*, 2007, Gutenberg Press Ltd. p110.

stages and is affecting primarily the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Gulf of Guinea. Thoughtful people in government and in the wider policy-oriented community recognize the dangers and are arguing that the interests of the United States and of Africa, are best served over the long term by policies that focus on creating a better life for the people of Africa. But the trend toward a security focus is very clear and if it goes too far, or, in the Muslim parts of Africa, comes to be perceived as part of an anti-Islamic Crusade, the consequences for Africa and US relations with the region could be severe.¹⁰⁶

Traditionally, the primary effect of terrorism is psychological. In part the effectiveness of terrorism in capturing attention due to the dramatic nature of the incidents, especially as shown on television news. Terrorism also gains attention because of the randomness of victims. Although only a few dozen people may be injured by a bomb left in market, millions of people realize “it could have been me.”

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter brought out the issues that affect African countries in their formulation and implementation of foreign policies. In the past, the actors, targets and outcomes of African foreign policies were less ambiguous. Due to multiplicity of actors in the international arena, African foreign policies have become more complex. It is clear that African foreign policy has a matter of deliberate actions by elites. It has shed more light on the actors, contexts and the outcomes.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid p111.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CHALLENGES OF FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION: THE KENYAN EXPERIENCE

3.1 Introduction

This chapter sought to address the issues that were raised in chapters one and two. It forms the case study which is Kenya's foreign policy formulation and implementation challenges. This is the chapter that is comprised of both primary and secondary data. With the use of a questionnaire the researcher was able to collect the data. In this method the researcher targeted a group of people believed to be reliable in giving the information rich cases for in depth analysis related to the central issues being addressed. The questionnaire used had both open and closed ended questions. Interview was also used. Secondary data was comprised of books, journals, newspapers among others. This section is further sub divided into various units that saw Kenya's foreign policy under different administrations. Below therefore are the discussions on Kenya's foreign policy under the various leaders since independence in 1963.

3.2 Background

The first two years of Kenya's independence¹⁰⁷ were years of political adjustment. This observation equally applies to the formulation and implementation of Kenya's foreign policy. The period 1963 to 1966 was taken by efforts to develop the philosophy and objectives of foreign policy, to outline national interests, and to set up a system on how foreign policy should be and what role Kenya should play in international politics.

¹⁰⁷ Walter Oyugi , Politics and Administration in East Africa , English Press. p 299.

Kenya acquired her sovereign status in 1963 and in the process became a subject of international law. ¹⁰⁸As a participant in international relations, she, like any other sovereign state defined her foreign policy within the context of her national interests. In order to achieve the goals and objectives of her national interests, she has since 1963 relied heavily on foreign aid, both economic and military. In the process, therefore, she has maintained and expanded linkages with the industrialized countries which were established during the colonial rule.

3.3 Kenya's Foreign Policy Since Independence

3.3.1 Foreign Policy Under Kenyatta

Mzee Jomo Kenyatta was Kenya's first president. When KANU led by Jomo Kenyatta formed the first independent Kenya government in December 1963, it was already clear that the new state's foreign policy would be affected by both domestic and external factors. The input by Head of State is paramount. For example, Kenyatta's personality had a strong influence on foreign policy and he maintained Kenya in a close relationship with western states. Others perceived his stance as a "wait and see" policy because Kenyatta was cautious and conservative. This perhaps stems from Kenyatta's maturity, his experience abroad, and his detention for about a decade in remote areas of Kenya. Under Kenyatta, foreign policy was characterized by a non-committal, wait and see attitude. Kenya's foreign policy of "good neighborliness" came to be president Moi's cornerstone policy in regard to nearby countries. However some scholars believe this policy has been ambiguous at best. Samuel Makinda wrote:- "It is a little difficult to see what professor Okumu calls a 'good neighbour policy' on the part of Kenya. It is indeed

¹⁰⁸ Macharia Munene et al, The United States and Africa, E. A. Educational Publishers Ltd, 1995. p 89.

difficult to see which of the East Africa community partners as interested in pursuing a ‘good neighbour policy,’ unless one takes that policy to mean an absence of real war.”¹⁰⁹

It may not be true that foreign policy under Kenyatta was of non-committal wait and see attitude because Kenyatta was a Pan Africanist who was interested in good neighbourliness and peace in the whole region. Moi handled challenges posed by Uganda by attempting to maintain good relations, bearing in mind that Uganda is Kenya’s leading trading partner.¹¹⁰ To date Kenya has maintained good relations with its neighbor forming the East African Community and greatly enhanced the membership to include two more countries Rwanda and Burundi and others on the lifeline South Sudan and Somalia.

Way back in 1962, Kenya’s place in global relations was clearly articulated by the minister of state for constitutional affairs and economic planning, Jomo Kenyatta. In his contribution to the legislative council debates prior to Kenya’s independence, Kenyatta stated that the “World Bank’s economic service and advice to Kenya will help the country in its economic planning.”¹¹¹ He further clarified this view by putting Kenya’s global linkage into a more meaningful theoretical perspective. He stated that the economic transition from colonialism to independence is raising very great problems in Kenya. These arise from economic dependence.”¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Stephen Wright, *African Foreign Policy*, 1999, Westview Press, p103.

¹¹⁰ Ibid p 104.

¹¹¹ Macharia Munene, et al, *The United States and Africa*, 1995, E.A Educational Publishers Ltd p 90.

¹¹² Ibid p 90.

In 1965, the Kenya government introduced an official document based on African Socialism. This document, known as “sessional paper no. 10” was designed to accelerate the process of Africanization in the workforce in particular and the economic sector in general. Tom Mboya, in his explanation of the document, stated that “we have declared ourselves for African socialism....and this means ... we have chosen against western capitalism and we have chosen against eastern communism.” However, this policy was more of a rhetorical tactic than a reality because Kenya’s trade with the socialized countries remained insignificant compared to that with the western industrialized countries.¹¹³

The achievements of the Sessional Paper No.10 were not realized because it is difficult to completely Africanize the workforce and the economic sector. Some of the reasons here could be because of financial aid or technology. Kenyatta’s policy statement, “the aim of my government which starts today is not to be pro-left or pro-right. We shall pursue the talks of nation building in friendship with the rest of the world...we want to befriend all, and we want aid from everyone,” came at a time when geopolitical and strategic considerations were pursued in Africa by the United States and Soviet Union.¹¹⁴

The U.S concern came at a time when the Kenyatta administration was attempting to rid Kenya of communist influence. President Kenyatta, in one of his public addresses in, 1965, stated that, ...to us, communism is as bad as imperialism...it is a bad mistake to

¹¹³ Ibid p 91.

¹¹⁴ Macharia Munene, et al, The United States and Africa, 1995, E.A Educational Publishers Ltd, p 91.

think you can get more food, more hospitals, or schools by carrying, communism.”¹¹⁵

Kenya’s concern took cognizance of her national interest based on the maintenance of a largely mixed free market economy. Her national security concerns in the 1960s were focused on the Horn of Africa and these concerns placed Kenya - US relations within the global East - West Paradigm. One Member of Parliament expressed the view that “we understand that there is a base already built in Somalia by Russia and the Chinese, and we know very well that these people are well trained with modern weapons.” The military and economic support Somalia received from the Soviet Union in the 1960s led another MP to state that the assistance “is all directed at Kenya.” He went on to explain that “I believe that this may be the root of the trouble between Kenya and Somalia.”¹¹⁶

The visit by Kenya’s vice President to United States in 1969 enhanced Kenya - US relations. President Nixon commented that president Kenyatta was pursuing a policy based on racial equality which in his view was consistent with that of the United States. Vice president Moi also defended United States and the west in general against the accusation that the CIA was involved in the assassination of Tom Mboya. Moi stated that the assassination was an international conspiracy directed.... to break the continuity of constitutional government and to create political and economic instability.... so that communism might gain in Kenya.¹¹⁷

It can be argued that the Moi administration paved the way for greater US involvement in Kenya. It has been observed that Kenya as opposed to Tanzania has had the view that

¹¹⁵ Ibid p 91.

¹¹⁶ Ibid p 95.

¹¹⁷ Macharia Munene, et al, The United States and Africa, 1995, E.A Educational Publishers Ltd, p95.

“American presence in the region is necessary to counteract Soviet – Cuban presence.” Indeed, U.S Presence in Kenya and Somalia gradually created an atmosphere of rapprochement. Within the decades of the 1970 and 1980s, particularly before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kenya - US relations fell within two paradigmatic conceptualizations. First, Kenya’s dependence on United States and her allies, and second, her national security concerns in East African and the Horn of Africa which influenced closer relations with the latter. This led to her integration into the global East-West strategies.”¹¹⁸

Kenya has been one of the largest recipient of U.S security assistance in the Sub Saharan Africa. Aid in the past decade has been increasingly focused on improving Kenya’s capabilities to control its land and sea borders and to counter terrorism. In addition to U.S assistance, Kenya purchases through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program are sizeable by regional standards and have included fighter aircraft, helicopters and the air force computer systems. The Kenyan Navy has received U.S assistance to enhance its ability to counter the piracy threats emanating from Somali. Kenya also has received aid through a regional State Department Program, the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT).....’ (Lauren Ploch Blanchard Congressional Research Service 2013).

¹¹⁸ Ibid p 95.

3.3.2 Foreign Policy in the Nyayo Era

President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi took over the presidency in 1978 when the first president of the republic of Kenya Mzee Jomo Kenyatta died. President Moi emphasized what came to be known as the nyayo philosophy, following the footsteps of Kenyatta with the objective of achieving three principles of love, peace, and unity. In regional foreign policies, Moi put the nyayo philosophy into practice in good neighbourliness, peacemaking and peacekeeping. In the 1990s, the issue of democracy remained a recurrent theme during the Bush administration. When the US Ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone, supported the emerging pro-democracy group, president Moi's administration reacted negatively. The initiative of the Ambassador was not supported at least publicly by the then assistant secretary of state Andrew Cohen when he visited Nairobi, late 1990. His refusal to meet with human rights groups and to denounce president Moi's Administration was an indication of US interest in Kenya. It has been argued that "Cohen's visit strengthened president Moi's hand at a time of mounting pressure on Kenya to democratize which culminated in the withholding of aid by some of the donor countries in 1991."¹¹⁹

The issue of democracy has also remained the central policy theme in the Clinton administration. Assistant Secretary of state for African Affairs, George Moose, stated that, "the promotion of democracy in Africa is.... important to the United States....because only democratic countries that reflected the will of their citizens can act legitimately and authoritatively." The acquiescence of the Moi administration allowed multiparty politics,

¹¹⁹ Macharia Munene, et al, *The United States and Africa*, 1995, E.A Educational Publishers Ltd, p100

it can be argued, was a result of Kenya's dependence on the western countries.¹²⁰ Relations between Kenya under Moi and western countries could be classified in two phases, before and after 1988. Prior to 1988, relations with most western countries were cordial, cemented by the stable political situation, a healthy economy and favourable conditions for western multinational corporations. Kenya accordingly received massive economic assistance from the west, both at the multilateral level through the European Union and the World Bank and on a bilateral level from individual countries.¹²¹ The second incident, developing from the early 1980s, concerned the harboring of Kenyan dissidents who clamored for multiparty democracy and was centered on writer Ngugi wa Thiong'o and others.

Moi and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had a close personal friendship, signaled by such things as the building of the Margaret Thatcher library at Moi University, and even at the height of calls for multiparty democracy, Britain did not join other western countries led by the United States in applying economic sanctions. However it did voice concern over certain issues, although in a subdued manner.¹²² When the US demanded that the one-party political system be replaced by a multiparty system, pleas by Moi¹²³ that Kenya was not cohesive enough to undergo multiparty transformation were not convincing. In the Kenya government's perception, the United States Orchestrated an anti—Kenya campaign in 1992 to freeze aid from all western countries and multilateral agencies, such as the IMF and World Bank. Encouragement

¹²⁰ Macharia Munene, et al, *The United States and Africa*, 1995, E.A Educational Publishers Ltd, p100.

¹²¹ Stephen Wright, *African Foreign Policy*, 1999, Westview Press, p 107.

¹²² Ibid P107.

¹²³ Stephen Wright, *African Foreign Policy*, 1999, Westview Press, P 109.

was given to anti-Moi elements to demand changes in the name of human rights and pluralism, though the Kenyan government claimed these were ethnically based demands. Some prominent Kenyans, such as lawyer Gibson Kamau Kuria, traveled to the United States and were provided funding by the Kennedy Family to facilitate these changes.

Kenyan leaders believed that the outspoken US ambassador Smith Hempstone was posted to Nairobi by the Bush administration to openly campaign against the Moi administration. Hempstone supported the formation of the opposition forum for restoration of democracy (FORD) and helped to fund publications critical of the government. Despite the overt U.S support for multipartyism, FORD split along ethnic lines and was defeated by Moi's KANU in 1992 elections. The country was rocked by the ethnic violence, and blood bath was predicted, but Kenya's resiliency has prevailed and it has had to meet all the demands imposed by the United States, the IMF and the World Bank but with mixed results.¹²⁴

Most of Kenya's diplomats are trained either abroad, in Oxford, Washington, or Islamabad, among other places, or at the University of Nairobi's Institute of Diplomacy. As yet, however there is no diplomatic cadre separate from the ordinary civil service. Officers from other ministries often find their way into foreign affairs and vice versa. There has been a quiet debate on whether this is healthy; the debate exploded publicly in 1996 when potential investors complained that Kenyan diplomats abroad were not particularly concerned about informing their hosts on investment opportunities. The mini-

¹²⁴ Ibid p109.

press war that ensued was enlivened by open disagreement between Kenya's ambassador to the United States and the permanent secretary in the Ministry.¹²⁵

Some writers have lamented the low-profile role played by African Diplomats in western capitals. A. H.M Kirk- Greene called for the study of the role of the African diplomat in a rather humorous paper entitled "The sad case of the missing African Diplomat." He said that closer attention must be paid to the structure and staffing of Ministries of external affairs in texts on international relations and diplomacy in their African context: "At present the basic literature on foreign policy and international relations all too often conveys the impression that the African Diplomat if he exists at all, is irrelevant to international diplomacy." In my assessment, African diplomats have made their presence felt. It now falls to the academic or academically inclined diplomats to write about their experiences.¹²⁶

In line with the above paragraph about the "the sad case of a missing African Diplomat, "research findings established that in trying to address the challenges of training and implementation of Kenya's foreign policy, the government is faced with other challenges also such as financial and human resources, the need for written policy, need for addressing the recruitment policy regarding career and non career diplomats. It suffices to state that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is involved almost on a daily basis in shaping and formulating foreign policy. The thirty – six missions abroad file reports that assist the permanent secretary and the Ministry in advising the president on policy matters. The

¹²⁵ Stephen Wright, *African Foreign Policy*, 1999, Westview Press, p 112.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, p113.

Monday morning “prayer” meeting in the Ministry’s boardroom often serves as a brainstorming session. Seminars on various aspects of foreign policy have been held and recommendations have been presented to the government.¹²⁷ According to the current directory there are 47 Missions with plans to establish more. The biannual conference of Kenyan ambassadors and high commissioners also serves as a useful forum for exchanging views on various foreign policy issues. Recommendations are then presented to the government for further action. The seventy – five foreign mission and twenty – three international organizations based in Nairobi also have some influence on the formulation of policy.¹²⁸

By the 1960s, Kenya’s economic performance had attained an average annual growth rate of 64 percent. This performance was attributed to the adoption of “an economic strategy that anticipated most of the key ingredients in the World Bank’s currency recipe for high economic growth.” However it has been observed that the expansion, which particularly occurred in the areas of commerce and industry at 50% increase of output between 1964 and 1970, and 100% increase in the annual level of investment, was foreign and controlled. This heavy dependence on the United States and her western allies explains Kenya’s foreign policy behaviour.¹²⁹

Having examined Kenya - US dependence relations in the 1960’s, it is necessary to turn to the global, geopolitical and strategic East - West paradigm. Kenya’s national security considerations have played consistent roles in her relations with the United States. These

¹²⁷Ibid p 113.

¹²⁸Stephen Wright, *African Foreign Policy*, 1999, Westview Press, p113.

¹²⁹Macharia Munene, et al *The United States and Africa*, 1995, E.A Educational Publishers Ltd, p 91.

considerations are also influenced by her economic interests who, together with national security, have placed Kenya - US relations with the context of global East - West Paradigm.¹³⁰ Whereas interests in Kenya date back to the 1950s, the focus mainly on the economic and military needs. The outbreak of the Mau Mau nationalist war efforts in Kenya against the British colonialists in the early 1950's laid the foundation for Kenya-US relations particularly with respect to the US concern about communist expansionism. It has been correctly observed that ideologically, the USA felt that, were Mau Mau to triumph, Kenya would fall to communist influence and that the Mau Mau cause afforded communism the opportunity to exploit the dominant social tensions in Kenya to the detriment of the western world.¹³¹

African foreign policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century is still dominated by overarching constraints on the survival of the weak states. The imperatives of state survival, force elites to use foreign policy to garner political and economic resources from the external environment. Whether made singly or collectively, foreign, policy reflects the continual attempts by elites to manage threats to domestic security and insulate their decision-making from untoward external manipulation. Contemporary African elites, like their predecessors, are preoccupied with political stability, legitimacy, and economic security, issues whose importance seems to increase rather than diminish.¹³²

¹³⁰ Ibid p 91.

¹³¹ Macharia Munene, et al *The United States and Africa*, 1995, E.A Educational Publishers Ltd, p 93.

¹³² Gilbert Khadiagala & Terrence Lyons, *African Foreign Policies*, 2001, Lyonne Rienner Publishers.p 7.

As foreign policy elites try to restructure institutions for conflict prevention and economic development, there are other threats lurking in regional environments that thus far defy Africa's limited resources. Ethnic and communal conflicts are boiling across the ever-porous African borders, spreading dangers of refugees, arms, disease, and environmental degradation. Although not entirely new, these threats are partly outcomes of a broader political disintegration of authority and the deepening militarization of Africa societies.¹³³

But overall aid levels remain insufficient, moreover the economic orthodoxy required to remain within the good graces of the international financial institutions severely constrains Africa states organizational ability. The legacy of the economy collapse of the 1980's persists, and with it the escalation of political conditionalities that African states are required to comply with before obtaining economic assistance. As demands for human rights, good governance, and elections have become standard in the international lending and aid community, the leverage of African actors has decreased. Under these constraints, some states have opted to draw resources from sometimes shadowy international actors that have a financial interest in protecting very weak states.¹³⁴

Foreign policy outcomes are difficult to assess with certainty in Africa mired in violent conflict and socio economic disintegration. The era when foreign policy was linked to strengthening African nation-states has given way to a time of healthy skepticism. Building African institutions for conflict management and economic integration remains

¹³³ Gilbert Khadiagala & Terrence Lyons, *African Foreign Policies*, 2001, Lyonne Rienner Publishers, p10.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* p 10.

a critical foreign policy objective, but economic retrogression, the escalation of wars, and the decline of norms of interstate relationships continually cast a shadow of doubt on these efforts.¹³⁵

Relations between Kenya under Moi and western countries could be classified in two phases, before and after 1988. Prior to 1988, relations with most western countries were cordial, cemented by the stable political situation, a healthy economy and favorable condition for western multinational corporations. Kenya accordingly received massive economic assistance from the west both at multilateral level, through European Union and the World Bank, and on a bilateral level, from individual countries.¹³⁶

Financial assistance has provided about 40% of Kenya's development spending in health, water, food, education, and transport and energy sectors. Through the Aids programs, western countries have played a key role in Kenya's development policies, such as sessional paper no. 1 of 1982 on district focus for rural development and sessional paper no. 1 of 1986. At the same time, close political relations have been maintained, most notably with Britain, the former colonial power. In fact there have been a few disagreements between the two countries, apart from a couple of incidents. The first was over Britain's obstinacy in regard to the Rhodesian crisis after Rhodesian's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. Kenya opted to vote against Britain and threatened to sever diplomatic relations.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ Gilbert Khadiagala & Terrence Lyons, *African Foreign Policies*, 2001, Lyonne Rienner Publishers, p10.

¹³⁶ Stephen Wright, *African Foreign Policy*, 1999, Westview Press, p 107.

¹³⁷ Ibid

In 1988, Kenya's relations with the west began undergoing change with the government being hostile to changed western perceptions. With the end of the cold war and the rapprochement between superpowers that culminated in the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower in 1990, western countries started looking more critically at governments in developing countries that they had previously supported, without question, as long as they were anticommunist. They increasingly pushed the following formula for good governance: multipartyism and democracy, free and fair elections, privatization and transparency and accountability in the management of public funds.¹³⁸

The Kenya government believed that the western powers, especially the United States, had become uncompromising and had adopted aggressive and interventionist policies towards it. These changing attitudes were reflected, for example, in relations with Norway and the United States. Kenya severed diplomatic relations with Norway in 1990, following the latter's granting of political asylum to Kenyan dissidents and extended adverse media coverage on Kenya that appeared to have the consent of the Norwegian government. Kenya had benefited from the Norwegian development assistance in the form of loans and grants, and the severing of relations with Norway adversely affected Kenya's relations with other Scandinavian countries that had been active in promoting rural development. The tensions that ensued, however, were short lived, as normal diplomatic relations resumed following the improved human rights situation in Kenya after 1992.

¹³⁸ Ibid

For the third world, the notion of an insecurity dilemma has been articulated. This dilemma is defined by the need for these states to address internal rather than external threats, and by the fact that given the weakness of their states, their citizens are also preoccupied by the need to protect themselves from their states and institutions. This line of thinking suffers from the problem of homogenizing the third world. But there is sufficient empirical support for the weakness of third world states, and hence for the notion of the insecurity dilemmas that they face.¹³⁹

The insecurity dilemma poses the serious challenge of whose security is to be preserved in a national security strategy. As Job argued, in principle, four or more distinct securities may be at issue simultaneously: the security of the individual citizen, the security of the nation, the security of the Administration, and the security of the state. For a society composed of communal groups, with distinctive ethnic or religious identifications, their perceived securities may also be at stake, making the interplay and competition among the various players even more complex and irresolvable.¹⁴⁰

In the national security and foreign policy literature, national interest, while used as the basis of policy, has also emerged as highly contestable, and elusive. And yet, while scientifically problematical, it has remained a central nationalizing concept for the formulation of national security policy. In practice, governments use the concept of national interest either as a criterion for assessing which policy to formulate and implement, or as a justification for the foreign and other policies that are made. In

¹³⁹Stephen Wright, *African Foreign Policy*, 1999, Westview Press, p 3.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid* p 4.

practice, the national interest “tends to become a somewhat and at times a psychological crutch for leaders who become locked into disastrous policies.”¹⁴¹

In practice for foreign policy formulation or implementation of a national security strategy, there is no lone national interest, but many competing interests. Often, some of these national interests conflict with one another. In those cases, the policy maker’s challenge is to harmonize these competing national interests as elusive as the national interests is to accept its formlessness as part of the apparatus that needs to be addressed in the formulation of national security strategy. National security serves the national interest, and the national interest helps to define the contours of national security strategy.¹⁴² Security is a major concern for Kenya. In the early 1990s, an influx of about 500, 000 refugees, caused by civil wars in Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia, strained the country’s security and resources. The government’s patience with refugees finally ended in 1995, when Moi ordered the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to repatriate refugees responsible for the worsening security situation.

The pragmatic approach towards domestic and foreign affairs has served Kenya well. The challenges ahead are many and difficult. The domestic scenario is threatened by ethnic intolerance and violence, unemployment in the midst of a rapidly growing population and insecurity as a result of armaments infiltrating in from countries such as Somalia. On the international front, there is a growing disinterest and marginalization of Africa. The withdrawal of US troops from Somalia and the absence of western intervention in Liberia

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid 4.

and Sierra Leone are clear signals that Africa must look for homegrown, regional solutions and peace keepers to cope with its problems.¹⁴³

The designing of a national security doctrine can be held hostage by certain constraints. While nothing can be done about some of these constraints, others can be addressed through less conservative and more forward – looking policy. One major constraint is economic. The economy is a major tool for policy implementation. The economic instruments mean not just money at hand, but what the economy in general can support. The options for this tool are also circumscribed by the general fact of economic interdependence, and also by domestic pressures. A national security policy must be designed with the economy in mind, otherwise what will result is a policy that cannot be implemented because of economic constraints, or one that involves tomorrow, but which does not secure the desired national (as opposed to Administration) security goals.¹⁴⁴

Domestic political pressure is another constraint to the design of a national security policy. In third world states, domestic pressures, such as public opinion have not always been a constraint, because in many cases, governments suppressed this opinion, and the freedom of its expression. But as the experience in Kenya have shown, that view of the role, place and influence of public opinion no longer fully obtains. This suggests that there is need to understand the emerging role of public opinion, and that it is also important to secure a place for it within the national security formulation structures.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ Stephen Wright , *African Foreign Policies*, 1999, Westview press, p115.

¹⁴⁴ Makumi Mwagiru: *Coordination of National Security Strategy: Perspectives on Grand Strategy Formulation in Kenya*. p13.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid* p13.

Perhaps the biggest constraint in designing a national security policy is the failure to carry out a proper analysis of the threats that face the country. Such an analysis can be done poorly using the wrong conceptual tools. The effect of this is that the wrong questions are asked, and hence the wrong answers are reached. Such wrong answers themselves pose a threat to national security in the sense that they leave the country unprepared for the real threats, and they also lead to a misallocation of resources. In particular, it is important to carryout regional analysis. Regional in terms of security analysis means,” that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other.”¹⁴⁶

3.3.3 Foreign Policy under President Kibaki

His term in the office of the president started in 2002¹⁴⁷ when he took over under a very competitive multiparty election under the National Alliance, Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government. This is a time when the country was already into multiparty politics hence, diverse interests from the general public, political parties, religious groups, human rights groups and the media, among others. These are groups that have come up from time to time to defend their interests. The general feeling of these groups is that the state does not take into consideration their interests when deciding on the course of action and yet a stakeholder input is perceived as necessary, if policy is to be effective.

¹⁴⁶Makumi Mwagiru: Coordination of National Security Strategy: Perspectives on Grand Strategy Formulation in Kenya. p14.

¹⁴⁷ <http://wikipedia.org/wiki/mwaikibaki>.

His term in the office also saw Kenya's desire to maintain a strategic position at the regional and international levels which depended on how issues were responded to beyond her borders. Mbaya, "external factors such as liberalization, attainment of Millennium Development Goals, Peace and Security, International Terrorism, piracy and drug trafficking, will require well thought out strategies if we are to advance our interests abroad. How well the fourth president responds to them will be critical to the implementation of a coherent foreign policy.

Kenya's foreign policy formulation and implementation have been determined by both domestic and external variables while comparing and contrasting Kenya's foreign policy during Moi and Kibaki's era, there have been more similarities than differences. While president Moi maintained a centre stage, Kibaki maintained a low profile in matters of foreign policy.

Foreign policy ¹⁴⁸ must reflect the aspirations of the new constitution. Kenya's foreign policy must be realigned to capture the new constitution which is already in place, it must be designed to be in tandem with the emerging realities. Under the new constitution functions such as international trade have been placed side by side with the foreign policy function. This means more prominence has to be given to promote trade. These remarks were made when he opened Biannual Conference of Ambassadors and high commissioners in August 2011.

¹⁴⁸ www.statehousekenya.go.ke.

President Kibaki oversaw the creation ¹⁴⁹of Kenya's vision 2030, a long term development plan aimed at raising GDP growth rate to 10% annually and transforming Kenya into a middle income country by 2030 that was unveiled on 30th October 2006. His regime also saw a reduction of Kenya's dependence on western donor aid, with the country being increasingly funded by internally generated resources such as increased tax revenue collection. Relations with China, Japan and other non-western powers improved and expanded remarkably during his term. China and Japan, especially the Asian Tigers such as Malaysia and Singapore, Brazil, the Middle East and to a lesser extent South Africa, Libya, other African countries became increasingly important economic partners.

At the Biannual Conference¹⁵⁰ that was held at Msambweni on August 2011, President Kibaki urged the envoys to bear in mind that one of the key pillars of Kenya's Foreign Policy is economic diplomacy hence should be given more attention. He pointed out that it is through promoting the country's economic interests in the international arena that Kenya shall achieve her economic goals as outlined in the vision 2030. He further pointed out that the conference provided an ideal opportunity for exchanging ideas pertaining to Kenya's national interests in the global arena and hailed the events theme to 'project Kenya's foreign policy under the new constitution dispensation.'

He expressed hope that deliberations during the conference would lead to the development of a proactive foreign policy that will promote Kenya's national interests and put the country in its rightful place as a leader amongst the community of nations. On

¹⁴⁹ en.wikipedia.org/wiki/mwaikibaki.

¹⁵⁰ www.statehouse.kenya.go.ke.

infrastructure development, president Kibaki said the construction of the Lamu Port – Southern Sudan – Ethiopia Transport Corridor, which is expected to open up large sections of the country which previously received little attention, is one of the most important investment under vision 2030.

With regard to dual citizenship, the Head of state then, told the envoys to enlighten Kenyans on this important development and to urge all citizens who gave up their citizenship in order to secure their livelihoods, to carry on contributing to building their country through increased investments and financial remittances.

In as far as Regional Peace and Security, President Kibaki observed that Kenya has played a significant role in mediating the peace processes in both the former Sudan and Somalia, but asked participants in the forum to discuss ways of entrenching and enhancing the peace dividend in the Horn of Africa region. In this connection the President said Kenya will continue to play a key role in East Africa community, adding that the country's political and economic destiny is strongly tied to the community which is set to expand with the inclusion of South Sudan and Ethiopia.

In the wider Eastern and Central African, region, Kenya has taken part in the discussions focusing on sharing resources of the River Nile together with other Riparian states. The Conflict areas and possible solutions to them are critical issues that should be deliberated in the light of the vital importance of water as a resource.

3.4 Foreign Policy Formulation and Implementation Reactions

The following forms the responses that were gathered from the field by use of a questionnaire which constructed and based on the three broad objectives.

3.4.1 Nature of Leadership

The first question sought to find out whether leadership is indeed a determinant of foreign policy formulation and implementation. It went to touch on the composition of the formulators, training of diplomats, challenges faced by the government while addressing the issues, and recommendations on how these issues could be improved. Majority of the respondents were of the view that indeed leadership qualities played a major role in shaping the foreign policy. This is in line with the famous saying that the class that wields power actually shapes the foreign policy.

It was also found out that the composition of the formulators and implementers of Kenya's foreign policy is not adequately addressed, most of the stakeholders are not involved in the formulation stage. This later on translates into a foreign policy that is not fully achieved. In connection to that, the respondents felt that the composition should comprise the relevant stakeholders such as the parliament, Key Ministries that is Trade, Immigration, Education, the private sector and the diaspora, among others. Others felt that there should be a clear cut policy on who is to formulate and implement, whereas others felt the composition is directly linked with the availability of resources.

In regards to the training of the diplomats, the researcher established that there was, no adequate training tailored to meet the Kenya's national interests and that regular follow up at implementation was not adequately addressed. The issue of availability of resources was raised in connection to that. According to the Handbook for Ambassadors/ High Commissioners and members of Diplomatic staff 2011, it shows that various reports such as Situation Reports, Quarterly Reports and Annual Reports are prepared from time to time. This handbook was evident that there is a move towards achievement of better results.

In connection to this, the respondents recommended that a well written foreign policy that is strategic in nature needs to be put in place, and that training of diplomats need to be given more attention, perhaps by redesigning their training and overall improvement in recruitment so as to tap those who merit. This means that Foreign service institute currently based at KICC should be equipped in such a way that it could offer training to diplomats from time to time, not necessarily when they are posted. Posting should cut across the board for it helps the diplomats have a better view, increase their knowledge and serve their country better.

3.4.2 Relations with Other States

The question on external environment focused on whether it actually affected the foreign policy, the challenges that it posed, how issues related to this affected the foreign policy and finally measures that needed to be put in place to counter those challenges. The data collected indicated that external environment was actually a major concern in the

formulation and implementation of a foreign policy. The following were given as the challenges posed by the external environment during foreign policy formulation and implementation: wars ,conflicts with neighbouring states of which Kenya has been facing from time to time since independence; effects of Regional and Economic blocks(RECs);issues of common market and free movement of goods and services; other states' interests; power muscle by the superpowers; political perceptions by foreign partners; availability of resources mainly financial, and issues of globalization.

Asked how the above mentioned challenges could affect the foreign policy formulation and implementation, the following were their responses: wars and conflicts makes a state to adjust its actions and a number of times goes for Adhoc policies. Its attention on other projects are diverted ,a good example is when the Kenya government sent their defence forces to Somalia to fight al Shabaab on October 2011; resources that had been set aside for other projects had to be used. Even the time taken there, by the forces had not been taken into consideration hence continues to consume the resources. On the issue of the effects of RECs ,a state does not benefit in all the areas, in some cases it has to shoulder the responsibilities of other states; issues of common market has its own complexities such as the currency to adopt, financial issues such as the location of the central bank among others; globalization is also a challenge to Kenya where technology on communications is changing fast ,hence making the conduct of diplomacy complex and unpredictable. There is need to take proactive measures to address this. This could be done in the following ways: delink the foreign policy execution from politicians and empower the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; adhere to the aspirations of Regional

economic blocks; harmonize all the bilateral & multilateral interests that Kenya has; and assist in peace mission in the warring neighboring states such as Somali, Sudan and DRC.

3.4.3 Insecurity

Regarding the third objective of general insecurity as a domestic challenge, the respondents were asked how this could affect the foreign policy formulation and implementation, and how it could hamper the process. They were further asked to elaborate more on the challenges that the government faced and to give measures in the overall improvement of Kenya's foreign policy. The following were their views:

General insecurity within the country is also a major concern when it comes to formulation and implementation of foreign policies. Following the research findings it was evident that security is paramount in achieving a sound foreign policy.

Dealing with insecurity at one hand is like improving the foreign policy on the other hand. Responding to how insecurity within the country could affect the formulation and implementation of a foreign policy, they felt that security is key because without it there would be no stability within the country hence a negative image is created and that affects relations with other states leading into mistrust. Before states engage with one another, the first thing they look at is the stability of that state which translates into security. Diversion of resources and energy into issues of security generally affects all policies of a country. Purchasing of more weapons by the state and even mass recruitment of military personnel to ensure the country is secured also affects the foreign policy process. Insecurity affects the country in several ways: foreign investment tend to

come down for no one would be willing to invest in a country that is mired with security issues from time to time. Secondly tourism would also be greatly affected. The challenges that a government would face in trying to address the issues of insecurity in relation to foreign policy may include : diverted attention; limited help from other countries; lack of goodwill; unsecure environment for the process of formulation of policies; and difficulties in handling international affairs.

These were the suggested platforms on how to improve the foreign relations in as far as security is concerned : Insecurity should be dealt with firmly because they not only affect the interests of a country but the interests of other countries too; encourage dialogue, openness and democracy and regular peace missions; address the issues of unemployment through empowerment of youths; restructure the training curriculum of security agents; increase the police ratio to citizens; increase equipment and resources; and have up to date economic and political intelligence of the countries to engage with.

Regarding the overall improvement in Kenya's foreign policy ,the following were suggested: emphasize on economic intelligence to guide in the formulation of an informed foreign policy; put in place a properly researched and benchmarked written foreign policy ; wide involvement of key stakeholders; regular review mechanism of the policy to keep pace with the changing environment; engaging experts in the formulation and implementation; ensuring professionals/experts are deployed to foreign missions; enhance knowledge of officers by training them further; and opening of missions in areas that have impact on Kenya's economy.

3.5 Conclusion

All the four Administrations in Kenya have been faced with challenges of formulation and implementation of foreign policy starting from Kenyatta's time through to Moi, then Kibaki and currently Uhuru Kenyatta. All these are because the world is changing fast, for example the influence of technology on communications has made the conduct of diplomacy complex and unpredictable. This means that, the need for a pro-active policy is always critical for Kenya to engage effectively on the international arena.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CHALLENGES OF KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION : A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter builds on chapters one to three. This is the chapter that critically examined Kenya's foreign policy formulation and implementation since independence. Chapters one to three laid the foundation. Kenya continues to be a relatively stable¹⁵¹ and important country in Africa despite the challenges facing it as a result of the collapse of the state system in many neighboring countries and the difficulties of democratization. It has continuously maintained a civilian government since gaining independence in 1963. It accomplished one presidential transition from Jomo Kenyatta to Daniel Arap Moi in 1978, and it transformed itself albeit with difficulties from a one-party to a multiparty state in the 1990s. In terms of economic development, Kenya has continued to be a model for other states. From time to time Kenya has maintained a low profile on the many burning issues in Africa and elsewhere, a style of diplomacy that is best described as quiet diplomacy.

It is a style that avoids radical aggressiveness which she cannot defend or promote. It is a diplomatic posture which recognizes that the uses and functions of foreign policy of a developing country are to promote economic and social modernization, tasks which require skilled manpower. Kenya's foreign policy¹⁵² has arguably stood the test of the time. This was initially because of Kenyatta's pragmatic approach to issues, which meant

¹⁵¹ Stephen wright, African Foreign Policies, westview press, 1999. p100

¹⁵² Ibid p114

that Kenya could cooperate with any other country in the world-as long as it was in the best interest of Kenya. Kenya's priority at independence was economic development and security. The government elite recognized that the west was economically better placed to deal with these needs, hence the evolution of closer relations. These relations, though unbalanced in favor of the west were built on the foundation of seventy years or so of the British colonial rule and the strong presence of western multinational corporations. Kenya over time has continued to engage in economic activities with other countries with the recent visit by head of state, Uhuru Kenyatta, to china being an example. It has also contributed to the prevailing of peace in the region and has been in the forefront of ensuring that there is stability in the neighboring countries. This therefore takes us further to the next step of looking at some of the emerging issues.

4.2 Emerging Issues

Emerging issues in relation to this study are therefore analyzed below. They are: Economic, Environmental, Peace and Diaspora. This is in line with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Service Charter¹⁵³, which states that, Kenya's foreign policy orientation rests on four interlinked diplomatic pillars as mentioned above.

¹⁵³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya, Service Delivery Charter, Current version, p2

4.2.1 Economic Performance

Kenya's foreign policy strategy of creating a peaceful and stable environment¹⁵⁴ is linked to the need to pave way for social economic development and prosperity. This has demanded a robust economic engagement to secure Kenya's regional and wider economic objectives. Kenya's foreign policy regards economic diplomacy as a tool of advancing its goals of creating employment and wealth for Kenyans in a prosperous East Africa region.

Kenya's economy since the time she attained independence has undergone major economic crisis and it is in this sense that a move towards economic diplomacy has been forged. The objectives of this economic diplomacy are as follows; Increase in capital flows to Kenya and the East Africa region by exploring alternative non-traditional sources of development assistance and direct foreign investment. Economic diplomacy¹⁵⁵ promotes the country as a favourite destination for direct foreign investment and tourism. Also, it expands access to traditional markets and explores new destinations for its products in emerging non-traditional markets in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East.

The Economic diplomacy further enhances technology advancement by exploring new sources of affordable and appropriate technology. Regional economic organizations especially the East Africa Community (EAC) will be strengthened to serve as a competitive bloc in the emerging global markets. Achieving these objects has demanded

¹⁵⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Foreign Policy of the Rep of Kenya(Draft working Document), 2007, p19

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, p20

strategy engagement to multiple fronts. Kenya has moved to transform regional organizations, particularly the EAC, into viable economic blocs in an increasing competitive global economic environment. For a country to succeed in marketing its products and services, it needs to do market screening¹⁵⁶, which will further enhance the bargaining power.

With the strongest economy in the region, Kenya is cognizant of the need to ensure an equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation. This calls for measures to accelerate the growth of weaker economies such as promoting free movement of people, goods and services in line with the IGAD agreement (1996) and the East African Treaty (1999). Kenya is committed to its obligations towards regional cooperation frameworks and has encouraged other members of the EAC, IGAD and COMESA to ratify existing treaties and adhere to their provisions.

Traditional markets in North America and Europe still matter to Kenya. Nonetheless it is also strengthening strategic ties with emerging economies in Western and Eastern Europe, Asia, Middle East and Latin America. Through active participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO)¹⁵⁷, Kenya's economic diplomacy has continued to advocate just and equitable rules and frameworks of international trade, especially for weaker African economies. A forceful and effective economic diplomacy requires an effective foreign policy machine. This is one of the reasons for a comprehensive re-engineering of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and foreign missions to meet the challenges of a

¹⁵⁶ Donald A. Ball, et al, International Business, McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2006, p 410

¹⁵⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Foreign Policy of the Rep of Kenya(Draft working Document), 2007, p20

competitive globalized economy. The extensive involvement of external agencies in Africa represents a further environmental factor which impacts on the process of policy formulation. Economic dependency on the outside world has become the rule rather than the exception, with many countries becoming almost completely dependent on external sources for their development finance. During the 1980's, the functioning of several African States was only made possible by external aid flows of a level relative to GNP rarely seen in other parts of the developing world. Donor conditionality - explicit or assumed - as well as actual availability of resources, affect policy at both the macro and the sector levels.¹⁵⁸

The lack of sufficient institutional capacity to cope with the scale and strength of external intervention increases the impact of this intervention on policy formulation, in some cases to a point where "the state as a nerve center for national policy-making may risk collapse"¹⁵⁹. What the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) describes as "the growing influence of officials of international institutions and donor agencies on policy design, implementation and monitoring, without any accountability to the people of Africa"¹⁶⁰ leads, in the view of that organization, to a gradual erosion of sovereignty. But how dependent, in fact, on outside influences has policy formulation been in the African countries? The picture conveyed by the studies is mixed. In Ghana, external agencies appear to have led the government, as part of the Economic Recovery Programme, to adopt policies which had been recommended by the National Consultation Committee ten

¹⁵⁸ Doorbos, Resources, Institutions and Strategies operations: Operations Flood for Indian Dairing, Sage Publications, 1990.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid

¹⁶⁰ Economic Commission for Africa journal, 1989

years earlier but which the government had been unwilling for political reasons to implement. In addition, external agencies insisted on the need for government to address long-standing problems of policy management in the education sector e.g the inadequacies in the information and data base and in its capacity to undertake monitoring and analytical work. For African countries to develop better, they ought to avoid problems related with International Trade¹⁶¹.

4.2.2 Environmental Concerns

Kenya is not an exception when it comes to environmental issues. It is because of such challenges that there has been a move towards environmental diplomacy. A distinct feature of Kenya's foreign policy is a strong orientation towards environmental issues. Kenya's environmental orientation emanate from the recognition of Kenya's enormous stake in the management of its own resources, those of the region and the world. As the cradle of mankind and custodian of unique flora and fauna, Kenya takes seriously its obligation to transmit humanity's inheritance to posterity in the same or better form.

Underlining the environmental diplomacy is the recognition of the global impact of contemporary environmental problems such as global climate change, ozone depletion, ocean and air pollution, and resource degradation-compounded by increasing world population. The environmental diplomacy is designed to provide the link between the management of the shared resources and issues of security and prosperity, especially in the Eastern African region. Clearly, degradation of the shared environment and resources threatened the prosperity, employment and health of all Kenyans. Further, lack of proper

¹⁶¹ Robert Mudida, Modern Economics, Focus publishers 2011, p407

management of trans-border resources such as water resources and biodiversity¹⁶² including wild life and forests, is a potential source of conflict within and between countries. Therefore, environmental diplomacy¹⁶³ will pursue five objectives. These are: Promote compliance with the relevant national, regional and international environmental legislation, regulations, standards and other appropriate operational procedures and guidelines; Promote integration of environmental management into national and regional economic activities including agriculture and tourism to minimize negative impact on the environment; Train through Foreign Service Institute cadre of diplomats with skills and responsibilities to promote understanding and awareness of and commitment reducing negative environmental impacts; Promote new technologies and encourage innovations to conserve the environment; Encourage public dialogue, awareness and knowledge, creation on environmental matters through national, regional and international forums; and maintained robust and open communication channels and promote research on environmental issues.

To integrate environmental issues into its foreign policy, Kenya is exploring new diplomatic tools. Schools of environmental studies in Kenyan universities, research institutions are a vital reservoir of knowledge and intellectual resources to enhance Kenya's leadership on environmental issues. International environmental bodies operating and headquartered in Kenya, such as United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), HABITAT, and the Lake Victoria basin commission are useful entry points for pursuing Kenya's environmental goals.

¹⁶²Joshua Goldstein and Jon C Pevehouse, International Relations, Longman, 2011p 314

¹⁶³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Foreign Policy of the Rep of Kenya(Draft working Document), 2007, p17

Similarly, the East African community (EAC), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes constitutes important for dialogue and policy implementation on trans-border resources and regional ecological challenges. Kenya also recognizes COMESA's potential role in catalyzing dialogue on the principal on equitable use of shared resources and environmental compliant economic activities. Another channel of Kenya's environmental diplomacy¹⁶⁴ is the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), launched in 1999 as a unique forum for ensuring cooperation and working relationship among the countries of the Nile basin and implementing decision by the member states.¹⁶⁵

Within the African union, Kenya will continue to support the promulgation and implementation of a binding continental framework for the management and exploitation of natural resources to ensure environmental protection. Kenya will also utilize its nationals as environmental ambassadors including supporting and promoting the environmental initiative of the Nobel Peace Laureate- the late Professor Wangari Mathai.

4.2.3 Conflict Management

From the time Kenya got independence in 1963, issues of security, be it internally or externally, has really affected its development and it is in this sense that there has been a move towards peace diplomacy. Closely related to Kenya's environmental diplomacy is its peace diplomacy or elevation of the search for peace. Underlying Kenya's peace

¹⁶⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Foreign Policy of the Rep of Kenya(Draft working Document), 2007,p18.

¹⁶⁵ *ibid*

diplomacy¹⁶⁶ is the recognition of peace and stability as necessary conditions for development and prosperity. Linked to this, is Kenya's conviction that its own stability and economic wellbeing are dependent on the stability of its own neighbours in the volatile Great Lakes region and the horn of Africa. This realization coupled with the impact of hosting thousands of refugees escaping war have compelled Kenya to actively broker peace in Sudan and Somalia, and to back peace processes in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda.

Underpinning Kenya's peace diplomacy are the following mutually reinforcing objectives: Promoting the resolution of conflict by peaceful means and establishing a peace fund with contributions by other African or non-African players to support peace initiatives, and to proactively respond to situations calling for rapid intervention. Further, the peace diplomacy is meant to create capacity to effectively support peace processes by using the Foreign Service Institute to coordinate the training of peace diplomats, appoint and deploy special peace envoys and work with independent mediators to resolve regional conflicts.¹⁶⁷

Kenya work with other African countries and external partners to strengthen the conflict prevention capacity of regional institutions, including the EAC, IGAD, COMESA and African Union. It also supports peace efforts by the African Union and the UN through contributing troops and providing leadership in peacekeeping missions within the continent and globally. Mobilization of support and resources for the peace consolidation

¹⁶⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Foreign Policy of the Rep of Kenya(Draft working Document), 2007, p18

¹⁶⁷ *ibid*

and development in African countries emerging from war through bilateral networks as well as regional and international peace building mechanism, particularly the AU Policy framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (2005) and the newly established UN Peace Building Commission (PBC).

In pursuing these objectives, Kenya's foreign policy¹⁶⁸ continues to draw on the experiences of Kenyan nationals who have been involved in mediating conflicts as well as our experienced and distinguished peacekeepers. Establishing a mechanism for recognizing and honoring individuals or institutions which have contributed to ensuring peace in Africa will go a long way in institutionalizing a culture of peace. Today, Kenya stands as a shining example of countries which have consistently provided support and leadership to the UN peace support operations worldwide. Kenya has participated in peacekeeping mission in Namibia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Western Sahara, Darfur, South Sudan, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Former Yugoslavia and East Timor. Its revamped peace diplomacy seeks to consolidate this legacy.

4.2.4 Diaspora Issues

Diaspora here refers to Kenyans living overseas. In this area also there has been a move towards diaspora diplomacy. The concept diaspora diplomacy is used broadly to refer to Kenya's foreign policy response to the growing significance of peoples of African descent and recent migrants living and working in the America's, Europe, Africa and Asia in the continent's political, economic and cultural regeneration and development. As

¹⁶⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kenya(Draft working Document), 2007,p19

a signatory to the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2001), Kenya endorsed the AU's position on promoting the participation of civil society and African professionals within the continent and in the diaspora.

Specifically, diaspora diplomacy¹⁶⁹ as a foreign policy strategy also centers on the growing number of Kenyan working and living abroad as a critical constituency and resource. Kenya is not yet a major immigration country but in the last two decades, the number of Kenyans living abroad has significantly increased to an estimated 1.8 million. Among this are professionals, technicians, and specialized skills providers. Recognizing that Kenyans abroad are potentially important resource for realization of the country's national development goals, the ministry of Foreign Affairs will creatively explore the various ways and frameworks of effectively promoting, utilizing and enhancing the contribution of this national resource by;

Promoting the access by Kenyans to the international labour market. This policy promotes access of Kenyan professionals to the expanding international labour market. In pursuit of this goal, the government has established an international jobs office to develop and manage a data bank of Kenyan professionals and bearers of specialized skills for the purpose of disseminating the relevant information on new international job opportunities and giving the requisite diplomatic backing to Kenyans pursuing such openings;

¹⁶⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Foreign Policy of the Rep of Kenya(Draft working Document), 2007,p21

Utilizing of standing Kenyans: successive generations of Kenya's world class athletes and a significant repertoire of eminent nationals who have earned international repute in different fields have contributed to the country's status and prestige globally. As a matter of policy, Kenya's strategy is to invite distinguished nationals to serve as good will ambassadors to pursue its foreign policy objectives; and tapping into the skills and the resources of Kenyans abroad: Working with other ministries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will invite Kenyans, in the diaspora, to invest their skills and resources in the various sectors of national development at home. Kenya will create incentives especially in form of industrial packs to encourage Kenyans to invest back home. In addition, Kenya is improving the provision of counselor services within each diplomatic mission to benefit Kenyans in the diaspora. Among structures to be created are honorary consuls that will be mandated to reach out and provide closer proximity to Kenyans abroad.

4.3 Conclusion

It is clear from the above discussions that Kenya is forging ahead in as far as improvement of its foreign policy is concerned. There is clear indication that Kenya's foreign policy is shifting from the west to the east. This is because goods and services from these countries are much cheaper and easily available compared to those from the west. Several bilateral and multilateral treaties have been entered between Kenya and some of these countries such as china, India, among others.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary

Chapter five is last chapter of the study. Again it builds on chapters one to four. It is the concluding chapter where major issues that have been highlighted all through from chapter are given a final touch. Following the research findings, it was found out that leadership qualities actually play a major role in the formulation and implementation of Kenya's foreign policy and Africa at large. The findings clearly revealed that effective policy formulation would benefit from increased participation of the various actors and stakeholders. It was also found out that, influence of individual personality traits is most evident in the Africa's foreign policies. For example, personality or leadership factor¹⁷⁰ has chiefly contributed to the type of foreign policy that Uganda has pursued for the last generation. Stiff-necked arrogance, ignorance and recklessness, all of which thrived easily in the country's policy formulation and implementation (due to authoritarian and dictatorial powers that the chief executives have enjoyed and continue to enjoy without effective restraints from such sources as parliament and the general public) are some of the factors that have led the country into the numerous 'temptation' and 'evils' in its external environments.

In democracies, during non-critical times, the extent to which the leader's personality influences decision making varies according to his relative passive/aggressive nature. The

¹⁷⁰ Macharia Munene et al, The united states of Africa, East Africa Educational publishers, 1995, p121

external environment¹⁷¹ of any one state in the system fundamentally encompasses all the other states in the system, both individually and in a variety of combinations. Within and between all the states in the system there also exist entities known as non state actors .All such non state actors ,like state actors, can create inputs from the external environment into any foreign policy system or systems .Inputs from external environment may not necessarily be transmitted directly to the formal decision-making centre. For instance a foreign government may choose to exert pressure on a target government either through an intermediary in the domestic environment or seeking to influence domestic public opinion. Although the legal distinction that marks the division between the two environments remains clear, it is now generally accepted that even the most powerful and relatively autonomous of states are vulnerable to ‘penetration’ of one sort or another from outside.

5.2 Key Findings

Since independence, the nature of Kenya’s foreign policy¹⁷² has been the subject of conflicting interpretations ,John Howell, perhaps the first scholar to undertake a serious look at Kenya’s foreign policy in 1968,rotated between the theory of realism, which he called conservative, and the theory of idealism, which he called radical. Therefore he saw two distinct foreign policies in Kenya ‘s international relations. The policy of realism operated with respect to Kenya’s objectives in Eastern Africa while continentally and perhaps internationally, Kenya was guided by idealism. In this approach, national variables were seen to affect Kenya’s foreign policy in East Africa only, while systemic

¹⁷¹ Michael Clarke and Brian White, Understanding Foreign Policy ,Edward Elgar Publishing limited,2000 p61

¹⁷² Walter O Oyugi,Politics and Administration in East Africa, English press1992,p300

variables affected the country's posture on continental African and other international issues.

The study concluded that, there is no adequate enabling institutional environment for policy formulation. The composition of the relevant ministries/stakeholders tasked with the work of implementation of foreign policy remains to be addressed. There is culture of governance based on centralized and bureaucratic decision-making which complicates the harmonization of policies.

In most countries, there is no clear cut line on who is to formulate and implement foreign policy and Kenya is not an exception in this case. For example, there is the use of career diplomats and non-career diplomats, commonly referred to as political appointees. The ratio of career diplomats to non career diplomats is almost equal, which is not supposed to be the case. Best practices go for 70% to 30% respectively. Kenya is yet to attain this percentage. This in turn affects the collection and analysis of information gathered from external environment resulting in unsound foreign policy. Implementation of Foreign policy is an aspect that needs to be done by experts, people with relevant skills in their work. This calls for immigration work to be done by immigration officials, trade to be done by trade officials, education by education officials and so on.

It was also found that, personal interests by parties involved, for example the legislature, the politicians, among others usually affect the implementation stage, more so when it comes to postings. Most African countries formulate their foreign policy basing their

policies on the level of interaction with the other countries. This therefore means the more developed a country is, the more it shapes the foreign policies of the less developed countries. This does not take into consideration the principle of reciprocity.

5.3 Recommendations

An effective process of policy formulation has to include the capacity not only to generate and analyze new policy options but also to monitor, evaluate and review ongoing policies as a basis for their modification or discontinuity. This is in line with the ministry of foreign affairs¹⁷³ undertaking to constantly inform the public on Kenya's engagement with the rest of the world, which again is in line with the ministry's public diplomacy objective, of keeping the public well informed of its role, functions and achievements hence the need for concerted effort between the ministry and many other stakeholders.

Given the relative scarcity of policy formulation capacity, it is important to avoid any overlapping of functions leading to waste or underutilization of existing resources. To ensure the necessary consultation, institutional mechanisms need to be in place and in working order. Implementers should take account of the overtly political nature of policy formulation. The strategic importance of time should be more fully explored so that those involved in the process can take cognizance of any likely hostile reactions on the political front and highlight how these might be ameliorated or removed.

¹⁷³ Ministry of foreign affairs Service Delivery Charter (current)p1

External actors, like donors who are also actors and stakeholders in the development process, can influence the policy formulation process both directly and indirectly. Measures to enhance institutional capacity, as identified in the findings, should necessarily reduce such external influence. More specific attention is needed in the following areas: Kenya requires a written foreign policy, which is strategic in nature, for this will not only ensure formality but will enable the ministry to stick to what has been outlined and will in turn lead to better achievement of the national interests. Best practices have policies that have been designed strategically so as to avoid going for adhoc policies which are short term in nature. Further, it is important to involve all the stakeholders at every stage of formulation and implementation of foreign policy, for this will not only make the policy a sound one but will serve the interest of the nation better, hence improved development overall.

The government should invest more in training career diplomats/professionals in diplomatic matters so as to serve the interests of the nation better. The establishment of Foreign Service Institute is already a move towards achieving the desired goals as envisaged in the Vision 2030 and the Constitution. This is in line with the Current Service Charter (MFA)¹⁷⁴, which states that, the Ministry is committed to providing excellent linkage with its customers by nurturing Foreign Service officers into highly competent, responsive staff who can anticipate customers' needs and desires. Since the ability to work with a multi-cultural clientele is critical in Foreign Service, the Foreign Service Institute is currently retraining its staff to enhance service delivery through multi-

¹⁷⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya, Service Delivery Charter, Current version, p1.

skilling and multi-tasking. The officers should be highly trained so as to tap economic and political intelligence of countries entering into relations with.

Delinking foreign policy execution from politicians and empowering the relevant ministry to carry out its mandate is important. Former Administrations in Kenya have seen the participation of politicians in the process of formulation and implementation of foreign policy, resulting in jeopardy of the work. This is usually evident when it comes to postings where the number of non-career diplomats commonly known as political appointees is almost equivalent to that of career diplomats.

Adhere to the aspirations of regional economic communities (RECs), that is moving forward as a block so as to achieve better results. This is in line with the service charter¹⁷⁵ which states that the pursuit of Kenya's national interest has demanded the establishment of cooperative global framework as a critical component of its foreign policy. The concept of good neighbourliness¹⁷⁶ remains its central pillar of Kenya's foreign policy and has been instrumental in the endeavor to improve relations with neighbours in the region. The concept also informs Kenya's involvement in continental initiatives, including building capacity of pan African institutions to promote peace, security, economic integration and development. Kenya therefore considers EAC, IGAD, COMESA and the AU as indispensable strategic blocs for the pursuit of its national goals. In addition to the above, the Government should open more missions in the developing world, for example Latin America, in order to tap more markets for Kenya's products.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, p.ii

¹⁷⁶ Stephen Wright, African foreign policies, west view press(1999)p103.

Kenya has been in the frontline in assisting warring neighbouring states and should be seen to continue doing so. For example, in the 1990's, Moi, then president of Kenya¹⁷⁷, handled challenges posed by Uganda by attempting to maintain good relations, bearing in mind that Uganda is Kenya's leading trading partner. During the reign of President Kibaki, he too handled security and territorial issues diplomatically, such as the case of Migingo Island, the birth of South Sudan as an independent country and bringing peace in Somalia by engaging Kenya Defence Forces and Africa union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in the fight against terrorism led by Al shabaab.¹⁷⁸

All issues of insecurity should be dealt with firmly because they affect foreign investment and other interests of friendly states. This is the reason why the former presidents of Kenya put a lot of energy and resources to ensure peace prevailed in the region and Africa in general. Kenya is placed strategically in the region; therefore it has comparative advantage¹⁷⁹ over the other countries. This is why even the current President, Uhuru Kenyatta under Jubilee government is keen on looking at the East particularly China¹⁸⁰.

In regards to the above recommendation, Kenya should benchmark in its foreign policy with the best practices, but those who compare favorably with Kenya. Regular review of the policy to keep pace with the changing environment, that is political, economic and social.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid p 104

¹⁷⁸ ibid

¹⁷⁹ Lipsey & Chrystal, Economics, Oxford University Press, 11 edition, p 10.

¹⁸⁰ *Daily Nation*, August 18, 2013, p34.

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