

# **University of Nairobi**

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies

## **THE NEW SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICAN RESOURCES AS A SOURCE OF CONFLICT: A CASE STUDY OF THE SUDAN CONFLICT.**

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A Research Project submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Conflict Management, University of Nairobi.

September 2013

### **Declaration**

This thesis is a product of my own work and is not the result of anything done in collaboration. It has not been previously presented to any other institution. I agree that this thesis may be available for reference and photocopying, at the discretion of the University.

Signature of Student.....**Date**.....

**Gaitho John Kinyanjui**

This thesis has been submitted for examination with our approval as University Supervisors.

Signature of Supervisor.....**Date**.....

**Prof Maria Nzomo**

Signature of Co-Supervisor.....**Date** .....

**Mr. Martin Nguru**

## **Abstract**

The New scramble for Africa for oil and gas is inextricably linked to post cold war shifts in the power balance and ever growing presence of China on the world stage, which is seen as a big challenge to the hegemonic power that the United States of America has been monopolizing. The research analyzes how the contestation between the current hegemonic and emerging economic power are a possible cause of conflict in Africa. In addressing this, the research evaluates the contribution of western powers and the east in conflict over competition of natural resources. The research conclusions are that the external factors act as triggers of conflict and sustains or are themselves sources of conflict in Africa.

## **Abbreviations**

**AFRICOM**-Africa Command

**AL**-Arab League

**CNPC** -China National Petroleum Company

**CNPC**- China National Petroleum Corporation

**COMESA**-Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

**CPA**- Comprehensive Peace Agreement

**CPC** -Communist Party of China

**DDR**- Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

**DRC**-Democratic Republic of Congo

**ECOS**- European Coalition on Oil in Sudan

**EU** -European Union

**GNOC**-Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company

**GNPOC** -Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company

**GoS** -Government of Sudan

**GoSS** -Government of South Sudan

**ICC** -International Criminal Court

**JEM**- Justice and Equality Movement

**MNCS**- Multinational Corporations

**MNE**-Multinational Enterprise

**NIF**- National Islamic Front

**OAGs** -Other Armed groups

**PDOC** -Petrodar Operating Company Ltd

**SAF-** Sudanese Armed Forces

**SALW-** Small Arms and Light Weapons

**SINOPEC-** China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation

**SIPRI** -Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

**SPLM/A-** Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army

**SPLM-N-** Sudan People's Liberation Movement North

**TNC-**Transnational Corporations

**UK** -United Kingdom

**UNAMID-** African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

**UNISFA-** United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

**UNMIS** -United Nations Missions in Sudan

**UNMISS** -United Nations Mission to South Sudan

**UNSC** -United Nations Security Council

**US-** United States

**USAID-**United State Agency for International Development

**USD-** US Dollar

## **Dedication**

This research project is dedicated to my loving wife Lydiah Wairimu Kinyanjui, for being there for me, her sacrifice, time and resources.

## **Acknowledgement**

I would like to register my appreciation to Almighty God who has greatly facilitated my breakthrough. I owe particular thanks to my supervisor Prof Maria Nzomo and the co-supervisor Martin Nguru who have been there for me and through their instruction and direction I have managed to carry this research. Special thanks are owed to my wife for her encouragement and moral support while undertaking this research. I wish to acknowledge the encouragement and friendship of fellow students. I am indebted to my friends who have supported me morally in the course of undertaking the research. Finally I recognize my lecturers at IDIS who through their insights and inspiration in a way helped me to develop this thesis and consequently conduct the research.

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# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

### 1.1 Background to the Study

International relations have increasingly focused on gaining and maintaining access to and control of valuable natural resources, particularly oil. The end of the cold war saw the rise of economic powers. The scenarios playing out characterized by contestation to maintain relevance to the global economy is what is referred to by some scholars as the ‘New Scramble of Africa’ for oil and gas wealth.<sup>1</sup> As a matter of fact, China’s entry into international oil industry has ruffled feathers due to her approach to issues and the multiple deals she is striking, especially in Africa.

The west has accused China of exploiting Africa and turning a blind eye to governance malpractices and human rights abuses. This tension can eventually lead to conflict between the most powerful states such as United States of America, European Countries and China. It is evident that much of the world’s supplies of oil are located in weak, fragile states within Asia and Africa which are beset by multiple intra or inter-state conflicts characterized by political or religious extremism. The struggle to maintain status quo can make states more powerful international actors or more dysfunctional and chaotic as interested parties use every means possible to access and control the resource. Oil, a natural resource which has become critical due to its prominence in the industrialization process, has become core to states national interests. Against this background international conflict over oil and other natural resources is thus becoming a reality.

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<sup>1</sup> Strange Susan ,*Mad Money* Manchester University Press,Manchester,1998,p.116

## 1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Africa consists of some fifty four countries and about one third of these countries have experienced large scale political violence or war. Africa is an immense continent richly varied in its cultures and peoples. The continent is also well endowed with natural resources with some scholars arguing that the resources have been a curse rather than a blessing and therefore a major source of conflict.

This study examines how current and emerging economic powers contestation for natural resources is a source of conflict. The conflict of south Sudan and Sudan serves as our case study. The study will use China to represent emerging economic powers and the US as the current hegemonic power. Gum <sup>2</sup> observes that for the last half century at least, societies at low levels of development have suffered much more from societal warfare than prosperous. This is echoed by Paul Coulter and Anke Hoefler<sup>3</sup> who stipulate that conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievance. According to them groups engage in violent conflict not primarily motivated by grievance (ethnic discrimination, inequality, historical animosity), but essentially by economic agendas and therefore greed. Issues of identity and self-determination are dismissed in favour of a focus on the role that resources, by and of themselves, play as the main objectives of groups engaged in war. China's expansion into oil operations overseas has become more aggressive, with Chinese oil companies now having a presence in places as Canada, Peru and Sudan<sup>4</sup> just to mention but a few. Sergei observes that in

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<sup>2</sup> Cited in Pyan den Berghe, *The Ethnic Phenomenon*, Elsevier, New York, 1981

<sup>3</sup> Cited in M Berdal and D Malone(eds),*Greed and Grievance:Economic Agendas in Civil War*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder CO, 2000

<sup>4</sup> Taylor Ian, "China's Oil Diplomacy", *International Affairs*, Vol. 82,No.5,2006,P.943

1993, China became a net importer of oil and that oil would be the only feasible primary fuel for the foreseeable future that would be in a position to fulfill China's growing needs regarding both transportation and industry.<sup>5</sup> China seeks to position herself as a global player in the international oil market.

Through her policy of noninterference in domestic affairs of states, China is seemingly edging out most western outfits from the oilfields of Africa. China accelerated search for oil resource in Africa combined with the non interference, non-question asked policy is however coming under pressure both from within and outside Africa. As Homer Dixon<sup>6</sup> argues that when access to resources is restricted and unequal, where one group controls the resources to the detriment and exclusion of the others, conflict is likely to occur as the marginalized group seeks for equitable distribution and a greater share of the resource. Therefore the question is ;what will happen when the emerging hegemonic powers overturn the power balance?.

### **1.3 Objectives of the Research**

#### **1.3.1 Main Objective**

The Purpose of the study is to examine the new scramble for Africa as a source of conflict.

#### **1.3.2 Other objectives include,**

- To examine the hegemonic contestation between the economic powers over oil resources in Sudan.
- To examine the internationalization of natural resource based conflict
- To outline conflict management of natural resource based conflict

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<sup>5</sup> Sergei T., *China's Changing Oil Strategy and its Foreign Policy Implications* CNAPS Working Paper, Washington DC:Brookings Institute,1999,p23

<sup>6</sup> Homer-Dixon T and Blitt J. 1998,*Ecoviolence:Links among Environment, Population, and Security*. Lanham:Rowman and Little. P1

## **1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **1.4.0 Introduction**

This section will seek to analyze the literature on new scramble for Africa particularly the contest to access, maintain and control oil in Africa. However, the resonating theme is the implication of power plays between current economic and emerging economic powers over natural resources in Africa and how it translates to conflict. Therefore Sudan, China and USA relationship will be examined. Multinational corporations will also be investigated with the idea to find out how they serve as agents of neocolonialism and more so the role they play in Africa's conflict. The impact of new scramble on peace and stability will finally be scrutinized. However, relevancy of internationalization of natural resource based conflict cannot be ignored in this study.

#### **1.4.1 New Scramble for Africa oil**

Africa has witnessed the resurgence of a phenomenon it historically experienced in the 19<sup>th</sup> century; the scramble for its resources initiated by outside countries keen to fuel their industrialization projects and provide raw materials for the same. The new scramble that has taken root in the present era is not different from its predecessor except that countries with interest in Africa's resources have increased significantly. The rising economies of China, Brazil, India and South Korea have also become active participants in the new scramble. However the U.S.A and China have become the most active participants. The new scramble utilizes soft power tactics ranging from investment in infrastructure and provision of benevolent economic and humanitarian aid to preferential trade agreements. This trend has pointed in the



direction of a new cold war between the most active participants in the scramble, particularly between USA and China.<sup>7</sup>

David and Ronald observe that while the first scramble for Africa was directly related to colonialism and the desire by the west to keep their hands on raw materials for their industries, the new scramble is premised on neocolonialism but the objectives remain the same.<sup>8</sup> As Michael Watts alludes the strategic interests of the United states include not only access to cheap and reliable...oil imports, but also keeping the Chinese (for example in Sudan) and Islamic terror at bay. He further says energy security has turnout a terrifying hybrid of the old and the new: primitive accumulation[i.e.....looting] and American militarism coupled to the war on terror.<sup>9</sup> In 2002, American officials announced that African oil would now be defined as a “strategic national interest” of the United States. This means that – just as in the case of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf – the United States is now committed to the use of all necessary means, including military force, to ensure the free flow of oil from Africa onto world markets.

Most foreign policymakers in Washington – including leading members of the Bush administration – remained convinced that China’s actions in Africa do not threaten vital US national security interests and that the United States and China could cooperate in developing the continent’s natural resources in a way that is mutually beneficial.<sup>10</sup> But a growing and increasingly vocal group of legislators and influential think tanks insist that China has become a

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<sup>7</sup> International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol2 No17;September 2012

<sup>8</sup> Cited in Michael Watts, “*Empire of Oil: Capitalist Dispossession and the Scramble for Africa*,” *Monthly Review*, September, 2006

<sup>9</sup> Statement by Walter Kansteiner, US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, quoted in Mike Crawley, “With Mideast Uncertainty, US Turns to Africa for Oil,” *Christian Science Monitor*, May 23, 2003, electronic version accessed at <http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0523/p07s01-woaf.html> on 25 May 2002.

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, James Swan, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Tom Christensen, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Testimony,” US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *China in Africa: Implications for US Policy*, Hearings, 110th Congress, 2nd

strategic global rival to the United States and that its actions – especially in Africa – represent a direct challenge to the United States. Congressman Christopher Smith (Republican of New Jersey) told the House that International Relations Committee hearing on “China’s Influence in Africa” in July 2005 “China is playing an increasingly influential role on the continent of Africa, and there is concern that the Chinese intend to aid and abet African dictators, gain a stranglehold on precious African natural resources, and undo much of the progress that has been made on democracy and governance in the last 15 years in African nations.”<sup>11</sup>

The Bush administration radically increased US military activities in Africa and in February 2006 announced that it would create a new US military command for Africa – Africa Command or Africom – to oversee America’s growing military presence on the continent. While the principal missions of Africom will be to protect access to strategic raw materials in Africa and to make the continent a major front in the global war on terrorism, the creation of Africom should also be seen in part as one element of a broad effort by the Bush administration to develop a “grand strategy” of its own that will contain China’s efforts. It should also be understood as a measure that was intended to demonstrate to Beijing that Washington would match China’s actions, thus serving as a warning to the Chinese leadership that they should restrain themselves or face possible consequences to their relationship with America as well as to their interests in Africa.

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session, 4 July 2008, electronic version accessed at <http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2008/hrg080604a.html> on March 13/3/2013

<sup>11</sup> US Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations, *China’s Influence in Africa*, Hearings, 109th Congress, 1st session, July 28, 2005, p. 1, electronic version accessed at <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/22658.pdf> on March 13/3/13

It is important to recognize that China, India, and other countries have other reasons for expanding their involvement in Africa besides economic self-interest. China and India have longstanding historic ties to Africa. They both have an ideological and political interest in contesting Western dominance of the global economic and political order and in countering American claims to hegemony based on its assertion that it is the “world’s only remaining superpower.” They both have a genuine interest in promoting economic development and social progress on the continent. They both hope to use their relationships with Africa to enhance their global status as great powers in their own right. And they both seek to reduce internal economic, political, and social conflicts by providing new opportunities in Africa for their corporations and their citizens.

#### **1.4.2. Sino-Sudan Relations**

Sudan relationship with China can be traced to immediately after Sudan’s Independence in 1956, and since then China has continued to maintain good relations with the various political regimes in consistence with its doctrine of respecting sovereignty and non interference.<sup>12</sup> Chevron USA began exploring for oil in 1974 in the Muglad Basin. When Civil war broke out for the second time in mid 1980s, Chevron abandoned its investments and sold its interests to a Canadian firm, which formed the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). In 1997 GNPOC sold its 40 percent share to China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). This gave China a foothold in a potentially oil rich country where USA and European companies were unable to operate due to home public opinion pressure and US economic sanctions.<sup>13</sup> The former Sudan witnessed civil war between the South and North since the 1950s and oil has

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<sup>12</sup> Ian Taylor ,China’s oil diplomacy in Africa, *International Affairs*,vol 82, No. 5, 2006,p942

<sup>13</sup> Henry Wee and San Shalmon, “*Searching for oil:China’s Oil Strategies in Africa*” in Robert I. Rotberg(ed.) *From China into Africa:Trade,Aid and influence*,Washington D.C:Brooking Institute Press, p.125

played a significant role in this conflict. According to Lee and Shalmon<sup>14</sup>, Sudan's oil reserves are located in the south and central parts of the country, primarily in Unity and Abyei provinces close to the boundaries with the northern part of South Sudan. Initially all oil revenues from these fields went to the autonomous Southern Government. However when it became clear that the area had major supplies, the North reasserted control over the area and created a new province of Benitu. China provided technical expertise for the construction of 1000 kilometres pipeline and oil refinery near Khartoum allowing the Northern Government to control oil revenues from the Benitu that were ultimately used to fund the war against SPLM and other militia groups.<sup>15</sup> Consequently, China has been strongly criticized by the international community, with Amnesty International alleging in June 2006 that China had transferred military, security and police equipment to armed forces and law enforcement agencies in countries where these arms were used for persistent and systematic violations of human rights.<sup>16</sup> In Darfur CNPC held 95% in oil field Block 5 which straddles Kordofan and South Darfur. In these areas China has been accused of arming the Janjaweed militias through the government of Sudan and also blocking the Security Council Resolutions seeking to condemn the activities of the Government in that area.<sup>17</sup>

China and Africa had established cordial relations for a long time, but events of June 1989 at the Tiananmen square shifted China's perception of Africa. The existence of many unexploited resources due to poor governance and technological incapacitation coupled with a growing

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<sup>14</sup> Henry Wee, *ibid*, p.125

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*; p126

<sup>16</sup> Amnesty International, 'Doele's Republic of China: sustaining conflict and human rights abuses: the flow of arms accelerates', New York: Amnesty International, 2006

<sup>17</sup> Ian Taylor, *Op.cit* pp 128-129

resentment towards the West due to what was regarded as interference in the affairs of sovereign states played in the hands of China. She formulated a foreign policy whose rallying point was non-interference and freedom from domination. This found favour among African states where leaders of questionable character in terms of respecting human rights had failed the “western test” of governance just like the Chinese.

In the case of Sudan for instance, the head of state is wanted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity which he is alleged to have committed. Beijing has turned a blind eye on this in keeping with her noninterference policy. Chinese firms especially China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) have overtime managed to buy the largest control of ownership of the oil industry by a foreign firm in Sudan. The question that continues to linger is whether respect for state sovereignty is adequate enough to turn a blind eye on oppressive regimes?.

### **1.4.3 Sudan –US Relations**

Sudan broke diplomatic relations with the U.S. in June 1967, following the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War. Relations improved after July 1971, when the Sudanese Communist Party attempted to overthrow President Nimeiri, and Nimeiri suspected Soviet involvement. U.S. assistance for resettlement of refugees following the 1972 peace settlement with the south added further improved relations.<sup>18</sup> On March 1, 1973, Palestinian terrorists of the "Black September" organization murdered U.S. Ambassador Cleo A. Noel and Deputy Chief of Mission

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<sup>18</sup> Act for Sudan: <http://actforsudan.org/> accessed on 1/8/2013

Curtis G. Moore in Khartoum. Sudanese officials arrested the terrorists and tried them on murder charges. In June 1974, however, they were released to the custody of the Egyptian Government. The U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan was withdrawn in protest. Although the U.S. Ambassador returned to Khartoum in November, relations with the Sudan remained static until early 1976, when President Nimeiri mediated the release of 10 American hostages being held by Eritrean insurgents in rebel strongholds in northern Ethiopia. In 1976, the U.S. decided to resume economic assistance to Sudan.

In late 1985, there was a reduction in staff at the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum because of the presence in Khartoum of a large contingent of Libyan terrorists. In April 1986, relations with Sudan deteriorated when the U.S. bombed Tripoli, Libya. A U.S. Embassy employee was shot on April 16, 1986. Immediately following this incident, all non-essential personnel and all dependents left for six months. At this time, Sudan was the single largest recipient of U.S. development and military assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. However, official U.S. development assistance was suspended in 1989 in the wake of the military coup against the elected government, which brought to power the National Islamist Front led by General Bashir.<sup>19</sup>

U.S. relations with Sudan were further strained in the 1990s. Sudan backed Iraq in its invasion of Kuwait and provided sanctuary and assistance to Islamic terrorist groups. In the early and mid-1990s, Carlos the Jackal, Osama bin Laden, Abu Nidal, and other terrorist leaders resided in Khartoum. Sudan's role in the radical Pan-Arab Islamic Conference represented a matter of great concern to the security of American officials and dependents in Khartoum, resulting in several draw downs and/or evacuations of U.S. personnel from Khartoum in the

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<sup>19</sup> Burr, Millard; Collins, Robert (2003). *Revolutionary Sudan : Hasan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989-2000*. Leiden, NLD: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003.

early-mid 1990s. Sudan's Islamist links with international terrorist organizations represented a special matter of concern for the U.S. Government, leading to Sudan's 1993 designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and a suspension of U.S. Embassy operations in Khartoum in 1996.<sup>20</sup> In October 1997, the U.S. imposed comprehensive economic, trade, and financial sanctions against the Sudan. In August 1998, in the wake of the East Africa embassy bombings, the U.S. launched cruise missile strikes against Khartoum. The last U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan, Ambassador Tim Carney, departed post prior to this event and no new ambassador has been designated since. The U.S. Embassy is headed by a Charge d'Affaires. The Embassy continues to re-evaluate its posture in Sudan, particularly in the wake of the January 1, 2008, killings of a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) employee and his Sudanese driver in Khartoum.<sup>21</sup>

The U.S. and Sudan entered into a bilateral dialogue on counterterrorism in May 2000. Sudan has provided concrete cooperation against international terrorism since the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes on New York and Washington.<sup>22</sup> However, although Sudan publicly supported the international coalition actions against the al Qaida network and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the government criticized the U.S. strikes in that country and opposed a widening of the effort against international terrorism to other countries. Sudan remains on the state sponsors of terrorism list.

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<sup>20</sup>Peterson, D. (2003). *Inside Sudan : Political Islam, conflict, and catastrophe* / Don Peterson Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 2003; Pbk. Ed

<sup>21</sup> Khalid, M. : Kegan Paul (2003) *War and peace in Sudan : A tale of two countries* / Mansour khalid London ; New York: Distributed by Columbia University Press

<sup>22</sup> *ibid*

In response to the Government of Sudan's continued complicity in unabated violence occurring in Darfur, President Bush imposed new economic sanctions on Sudan in May 2007. The sanctions blocked assets of Sudanese citizens implicated in Darfur violence, and also sanctioned additional companies owned or controlled by the Government of Sudan. Sanctions continue to underscore U.S. efforts to end the suffering of the millions of Sudanese affected by the crisis in Darfur.

Despite policy differences the U.S. has been a major donor of humanitarian aid to the Sudan throughout the last quarter century. The U.S. was a major donor in the March 1989 "Operation Lifeline Sudan," which delivered 100,000 metric tons of food into both government and SPLA-held areas of the Sudan, thus averting widespread starvation.<sup>23</sup> In 1991, the U.S. made major donations to alleviate food shortages caused by a two-year drought. In a similar drought in 2000-01, the U.S. and the international community responded to avert mass starvation in the Sudan. In 2001 the Bush administration named a presidential envoy for peace in the Sudan to explore what role the U.S. could play in ending Sudan's civil war and enhancing the delivery of humanitarian aid. Andrew Natsios and subsequently Ambassador Richard Williamson served as presidential envoys to Sudan during the Bush administration. On March 18, 2009 President Obama announced the appointment of Major General (Ret.) J. Scott Gration as the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan.<sup>24</sup>

On October 19, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, accompanied by Special Envoy Gration and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice, announced the Obama

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<sup>23</sup> Cohen, Herman J. (2000). *Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent*. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.

<sup>24</sup> Ghazi Al Atabani. (2009, April 30). Obama's new policy toward Sudan: Chances of success. Asharq Alawsat newspaper: Retrieved from <http://aspx.aawsat.com/leader.aspx?article=517256&issueno=11111> accessed on 13/8/13



administration's new Sudan strategy.<sup>25</sup> U.S. strategy in Sudan is comprised of three core principles: 1) Achieving a definitive end to conflict, gross human rights abuses, and genocide in Darfur; 2) Implementation of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that results in a peaceful post-2011 Sudan, or an orderly path toward two separate and viable states at peace with each other; and 3) Ensuring that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for international terrorists.<sup>26</sup>

#### **1.4.4 Impact of the 'New Scramble for Africa' on Peace and Stability**

Daniel Volman observes that African governments have used their growing leverage over their external partners in ways that have harmed their citizens. For example, a number of repressive and undemocratic governments in Africa have used their increased revenues to buy arms to be used to keep themselves in power or when they pursue development projects that are environmentally dangerous or destroy existing communities.<sup>27</sup>

This competition has undermined African producers of raw materials, textiles, and other commodities. It has exacerbated internal political conflict in a number of African countries as external powers compete for political influence by providing support to different political groups within African countries and as these groups seek to use their ties to external powers to strengthen their position against their domestic political rivals. As noted above, it can enhance the internal security capabilities of repressive and undemocratic governments that violate human

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<sup>25</sup> Woodward, P., (2006). *U. S. Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa*. Abingdon, Oxon, GBR: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2006.

<sup>26</sup> Act for Sudan: <http://actforsudan.org/> accessed on 1/8/2013

<sup>27</sup> Daniel Volman (2009) *China, India, Russia and the United States "The Scramble for African Oil and the Militarization of the Continent"* Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala

rights and encourage them to rely on the use of force to stay in power and block political reform. In some cases, it has encouraged these governments to use their military forces to invade neighboring countries, as in central Africa, where six countries sent their troops into the Democratic Republic of Congo or in the Horn of Africa, where Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a bloody border war and where Ethiopia invaded and occupied Somalia. These can be seen as developments that have limited the policy space for African nations in ways that are generally harmful for Africans.

In order to enhance their global status as great powers in their own right, both China and India have used military programs – arms sales, military training programs, other security assistance programs, and a growing military presence in Africa – to bolster their ties with African countries and help them achieve their economic and political objectives in Africa. China has used military programs to strengthen the military capacities of key African allies and to expand its influence in Africa, particularly in major oil-producing countries. Sudan has received F-6 and F-7 fighter aircraft, T-62 light tanks, anti-aircraft systems, trucks, and other weapons.<sup>28</sup>

These actions have led to criticism of China's role in Africa, particularly from "alarmists" in the United States who emphasize China's ties with repressive regimes and its willingness to invest without imposing the types of conditions imposed by the World Bank and other international financial institutions or by Western governments. While these criticisms are valid, China's practices are not unique.<sup>29</sup> The United States has used the same means to build ties with repressive African regimes – particularly in oil producing countries like Algeria, Nigeria,

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<sup>28</sup> Daniel Volman 2009 China, India, Russia and the United States "The Scramble for African Oil and the Militarization of the Continent" Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala

<sup>29</sup> Dinah Rajak (2012). Review of R. Southall, and H. Melber 'A New Scramble for Africa: Imperialism, Investment and Development' The Journal of Modern African Studies, 50, pp 171-173.

Angola, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea – and has noticeably reduced its pressures for democratization, respect for human rights, and financial transparency in recent years.

#### **1.4.5 Impact of Multinational Corporations and political stability in Africa.**

Multinational corporations are business entities that operate in more than one country. Tatum<sup>30</sup> observes that in some circles they are referred to as multinational enterprises (MNE) or a transnational corporation (TNC). Rugman alludes that there is a risk that multinational corporations facilitate patronage problems in resource rich countries, exacerbating the resource curse.<sup>31</sup> Multinational corporation (MNCs) in service industries have given this sectors large and growing impact on the global economy.<sup>32</sup> The Marxists view the emergence of the multinational corporations as a historically progressive aspect of capitalism in the process of developing, at international level.<sup>33</sup> In a social formation where there are many MNCs from different nations, there are higher possibilities of conflicts than where they are mainly from the same country. The nature or objective of MNCs is maximization of profit at the lowest possible cost. Actually it is this feature that gave rise to MNCs. The idea of investing in a foreign land is not to better the lot of the host nation but to exploit as much as is possible in order to develop the home country. Luis Echeveria<sup>34</sup>, the former Mexican President had the belief and feeling that there is the need for transnational corporations to respect the social and cultural fabric, as well as the development priorities of the countries in which they are investing.<sup>35</sup> Historically MNCs are

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<sup>30</sup> Malcolm Tatum, 2010 [www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-multinational-corporation.htm](http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-multinational-corporation.htm) 13/3/2013

<sup>31</sup> Arne Wiig and Ivar Kolstad (2010) - *Multinational Corporations and Host Country Institutions: A case study of CSR activities in Angola*, *International Business Review* vol 19 no 2 pp 178-190

<sup>32</sup> Anthony Goerzen and Shige Makino (2007) - *Multinational corporation internationalization in the service sector: a study of Japanese trading companies*, *Journal of International Business Studies* (2007) 38, 1149-1169

<sup>33</sup> John Stopford, (1998) - *Multinational corporation, Foreign Policy*, Winter 1998 il 13 p12(1)

<sup>34</sup> Cited in John Stopford, (1998) - *Multinational corporation, Foreign Policy*, Winter 1998 il 13 p12(1)

<sup>35</sup> John Stopford, (1998) - *Multinational Corporation, Foreign Policy*, Winter 1998 il 13 p12(1)

creations of wealthy countries. Multinational Corporations have become an agent of neo-colonialism. According to Gilpin, the term multinational corporation for a long time was largely a euphemism for the foreign expansion of America's giant oligopolistic corporations. America took lead in this neo-colonialism in the form of MNCs. Other countries are also involved in this neocolonialism. However during the last two or three decades of the last century, the American dominance was challenged. Hence, there existed and continue to exist serious competition among the MNCs of many nations in almost all the world markets. The allusion that MNCs are the vehicle of neo colonialism arose from the type of relationship that exists between the MNCs and their home governments. Taking America as an instance, it has been observed that there is a complementarity of interests between the MNCs and the United States government. Equally important, MNCs are most veritable mechanism to spread the US ideologies abroad especially that of free enterprises system. In all these, the home countries of the MNCs are doing indirectly what Europe did directly during the colonial period namely, the exploitation and the oppression of their periphery states by milking them of their all-important raw materials and transferring the same to their respective nations for economic development and thereby systematically under-developing the periphery states.

Adebajo<sup>36</sup> says that conflicts in Africa are often provoked and sustained by ethnic rivalries and polarizations, economic underdevelopment and inequalities, poor governance and elite political instability and manipulations. These factors, individually or collectively, have a history rooted in the political economy of colonialism, post colonialism, and neo-liberal globalization; they are as much internal in their causation and scale as they are regional and transnational,

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<sup>36</sup> Adebajo, Adekeye and Chandra L. Sriram, eds. 2001. *Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. London:Frank Cass

involving national, regional and international actors and networks that are simultaneously economic, political, military and social.<sup>37</sup> As mentioned above in the impact of new scramble for African on peace and stability, MNCs maintain the status quo, that is, dependent development which encourages the emergence of Authoritarian regimes in the host country and go ahead to create an alliance between international capitalist and domestic capitalist elite. This exploitative alliance is sustained by the intervention of the corporations' home governments in the internal affairs of the less developed countries. They directly protect the existing government whenever a reactionary leader or group seems to take over the government. It is on record that the MNCs kept President Mobutu of Zaire in power for so long because he was tutelage to them and together with MNCs they sucked dry the economy of Zaire. The MNCs equally were responsible for the early exit and assassination of Patrice Lumumba because he would not allow their exploitative activities. Africa now has the greatest number of countries experiencing one kind of political crisis or the other. In all these, the wicked hands of the MNCs and their home governments are glaring.

#### **1.4.6 Internationalization of natural based conflict**

The notions of conflict systems/internationalization of conflict entails the fact that conflict seen as purely internal could in fact possess a different persona, creating linkages with other conflict across borders, and with processes that are informed by multiple actors and issues. According to Mwagiru, a conflict system consists of a tessellation of relationships and interactions between actors and issues within the system. These for example consist of relationship between internal and international conflicts in a region. At a wider level, these

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<sup>37</sup> ibid

relationships include those between actors, causes, issues and strategies.<sup>38</sup> Conflict systems are pegged on the system theory, which according to Kaplan<sup>39</sup> all science in the world is organized along systemic lines..... a system... means a set of patterned interactions in which behavior has both rhyme and reason. This means eventually that at some level of abstraction, generalizations can be made about that system. This implies that natural resources conflict can occur at international level and within sub regional conflict systems.

The nexus between the natural resource and conflict is not always straightforward, and manifestations of natural resource and its relation to conflict are in the form of triggers, sustainers and/or as a source of the conflict. Most often, environmental factors are enmeshed in a complex web of social, economic and political factors that function together to engender conflict. This is affirmed by Matthews in the assertion that, the link has been particularly established in many contexts in the developed countries where natural resources issues are a critical facet of the quest for political and economic stability and the pursuit of strategic goals around the world<sup>40</sup>

Population growth plays in engendering resource scarcity. This demand induced scarcity is a factor that could force nations to look beyond their borders for resources and hence propel state expansion, or create apprehension amongst population(s) within a nation who are most affected by this scarcity thus creating conditions ripe for intra and international conflict, but instead, the focus has shifted to renewable resources such as crop, land, fish, forests, air and water.

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<sup>38</sup> Mwagiru Makumi, 2006, Conflict in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management, Centre for Conflict Research, Exscape Printers, Nairobi Kenya, P.73

<sup>39</sup> Kaplan M, 1957, System and process of International Politics, Wiley, New York p.43

<sup>40</sup> Matthews R. 2000, The environment as a national security issue, Journal of policy History, 12pp. 101-122

In order to group and analyze the various aspects of the natural conflict relationship there are two important distinctions to be made: (1) direct vs indirect (2) international vs intra-national conflict. “Direct conflict” refers to natural resource conflict that arises because of direct competition between two or more parties for the control and/or access to natural resources. “Indirect conflict” refers to conflict that arises when environmental factors interacts with one or more social/economic factors to elevate friction within or between states. When “indirect conflict” occurs, environmental factors are only one factor exacerbating and/or interacting with other social phenomena such as poverty and ethnic tensions. International conflict refers to conflict between two or more nations. Intra-national conflict refers to conflict within national boundaries.

Moyround and Katunga,<sup>41</sup> identify three linkages that, in particular, underpin the relationship between ecology and conflict in Africa. This includes commodity chains, land and resource use systems, and ecological structures and functions. Valuable ecological resources, including agricultural products, are linked to regional and international political economies through complex commodity chains. Commodity chains consist of multiple value additional stages and involve a wide variety of actors from the level of the farm or range to transnational corporations and northern customers. In Africa these chains are marked by clear patterns of predation and exploitation that disadvantage primary producers, in most cases peasants and pastoralists.

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<sup>41</sup> Moyround C and Katunga J, Coltan Exploitation in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in Lind J. & Sturnameds 2002, Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts, Institute for Security studies, Pretoria South Africa, P. 159

## **1.5 Justification of the Research Problem**

### **1.5.1 Policy Justification**

This research aims at examining the contribution of the new scramble for Africa as source of conflict between the two Sudan's. The findings of this study can usefully be employed as a tool for conflict management researchers and practitioners both to understand better and to predict decision modes and methods that are likely to be used by decision makers in conflict management in Sudan and other parts of the world thus provide conflict solutions. The findings of this study will provide mitigation measures bearing in mind that power relations come into play on gaining or maintaining access to and control of valuable natural resources, particularly oil. Oil remains a key source of energy to drive the industrialization process in the foreseeable future. Industrialization is very central in projecting the economic standing of a nation, which consequently has implications on how that nation is viewed and/or respected among members of the community of nations. National interests of states run parallel which consequently often times lead to conflict.

### **1.5.2 Academic Justification**

The finding of this study which will be published for social study will encourage debate on the issue of new scramble for Africa as a source of conflict and the need for substitutes on non renewable resources as a means to mitigate conflicts in Africa. Finally the finding of this research will contribute to literature in this field of study and other related research work and provide room for further research on the same.



## 1.6 Theoretical Framework

This study will use the realist school of thought as the theoretical framework. The proponents of this theory argue that international system is anarchic and that there are no strict adherents to international principles. States and other international actors are driven to act as they do by the basic instinct of survival and the maintenance of their sovereignty but not on some constructs to be adhered to by good faith. The realist school of thought holds that energy resources are becoming scarcer and more insecure and hence, states will increasingly compete for access and control of these resources including oil. The competition will in return spur conflict and war as states seek to pursue power and national interest in the anarchic international system. Realism acknowledges the importance of oil and energy supplies, noting that they are a precondition for economic growth and, in turn, a strong military establishment to pursue a state's security needs<sup>42</sup> as espoused by Morgenthau<sup>43</sup>. Barry Buzan's<sup>44</sup> thinking on the conceptualization of security is that oil has been heavily securitized in the pursuit of power, thus heavily influencing global politics.

Thomas Friedman<sup>45</sup> identified the 'First Law of Petropolitics' which is that 'the higher the price of crude oil, the more free speech, fair elections, and independent judiciary, the rule of law and independent political parties are eroded'. This can be supposed as the causal linkages between oil wealth and realism. Therefore, power of states is driven by four dimensions of power-military, production, finance and ideas- and that any country's international standing and

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<sup>42</sup> Detailed rationalization can be found in Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations; The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York, A.A. Knopf, 1948

<sup>43</sup> Hans Morgenthau *ibid*

<sup>44</sup> See Barry Buzan, et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner, 1998 for more details

<sup>45</sup> Cited in Keohane Robert, *Neorealism and its Critics*. New York: Columbia University

relative power must be assessed across these four dimensions. Realist school of thought informs this research in that it will help in the analysis of global politics surrounding gaining or maintaining access to and control of oil and how it act as a source of conflict.

## **1.7 Hypotheses**

- Struggle between the emerging economic and the current hegemonic power over natural resources has influenced conflicts in Africa.
- Less power struggle by the current hegemonic and emerging economic powers for resources will secure minimal conflicts in Africa.

## **1.8 Research Methodology**

### **1.8.1. Research Design**

This study will adopt a case study design which will employ qualitative methods. This study which focuses on a single item that is the power play implication on peace and stability in Africa with the two Sudan serving as the case study, requires an in-depth descriptive study which will reveal the true scenario, therefore the case study design is the most suitable for the study of the singular, the particular, and the unique and involves data collecting methods such as document analysis and the focus on studying a single case in depth interpreted in a specific socio, cultural, political setting.

For this study, descriptive research will be appropriate because the process seeks to find the factors associated with a certain occurrence. This method will also be used to explain social economic phenomena in terms of the conditions for relationships that

exist. In this research qualitative case study will be the major design because of the historical nature of the topic. It allows the researcher to collect data through participation, observation in naturally occurring circumstances and in real life scenarios in political arena.

### **1.8.2 Methods of Data Collection**

The research will use the secondary data. The research therefore gathers data from the other literature materials written by scholars, newspaper, internet searches which have wealth of information regarding the study. In addition literature review from library books, Journals and other relevant research material serves better on determining the gaps in the study and suggest the possible thoughts to fill them, more so bringing in new thoughts that could probably provoke further research on the same.

### **1.8.3 Ethical Considerations**

First of all, the research project will be well planned so that chances of misleading results are fully minimized. Secondly, the project will be planned to meet ethical acceptability. In presentation of this study, the researcher will be ethical not to fabricate or falsify data as well as make sure that appropriate credit is given for the work of others through citations.

## **1.9 Scope and Limitations of the Study**

The main concentration in this research is on impact of power play over resources in Africa between current and emerging hegemonic powers and their contribution to Africa's conflict. In this research the author will concentrate on the two Sudan conflict as the case study. This will be

the area of focus for the purpose of being effective and doing the research within the given time.

The following would be the foreseen challenges; due to time constraints and financial implication reliance on secondary data may be wanting. However, in depth search for knowledge on this study and keen observation of the current trends will serve better in filling knowledge gaps.

### **1.10 Chapter Outline**

Chapter one introduces the topic of our research study by first setting the broad context of our research study, the statement of the problem, justification, theoretical framework, literature review, hypotheses and methodology of the study.

Chapter two provides the background to Sudan's conflict and how it has progressed to today.

Chapter three looks at sources of conflict in Africa-scarcity, Abundance and management

Chapter four analyses the external forces as a source of conflict in the light of the hypotheses and theoretical framework already stated.

Chapter five provides conclusions of the study, gives recommendations and provides suggestions on areas for future study.

## CHAPTER TWO

### 2. SUDAN CONFLICT

#### 2.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the history of Sudan conflict and how it has progressed up to date. The main actors in the conflict will be highlighted.

#### 2.1 Sudan's Modern History as a State

Sudan before secession covered an area of one million square miles; it was the largest country in Africa, located in the northeast just south of Egypt. Around 200 different languages and dialects were used by the 33 million Sudanese people. The country was in conflict even before it became a nation state in 1956. Darfur was annexed in 1916 to the Anglo-Egyptian territory by the British during World War I<sup>46</sup>. Since the territory was not strategic to them, it remained largely ignored, albeit with a local populace that was increasingly frustrated, until the 1950s<sup>47</sup>.

In 1955, a conflict between the north and south of the country evolved into an ongoing civil war between the government in the North and the Anyanaya Forces in the South who were seeking independence. The war ended in 1972 with an agreement that granted the South qualified autonomy. But conflict resumed in the 1980s among charges of discrimination by the Arab government in Khartoum against the Christian and Animist south. In 1983, the government dominated by northern Arabs tried to impose Islamic Sharia law across Sudan, even in areas

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<sup>46</sup> Burr, Millard; Collins, Robert (2003). *Revolutionary Sudan : Hasan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989-2000*. Leiden, NLD: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003.

<sup>47</sup> <http://hrw.org/doc?t=africa&c=darfur> accessed on 13/6/2013

where the majority is not Muslim.<sup>48</sup> This exacerbated a rebellion that had begun in the south, which is inhabited by black African Christians and those who practiced traditional religions.

In 2005, after long negotiations, a peace agreement was signed between the government in Khartoum and the rebels in the South. Key provisions of the agreement are that both sides will unify into 39,000-strong force if the south does not secede after six years.<sup>49</sup> The South will have autonomy for six years followed by a referendum for secession. Sudan's vast oil wealth will be shared 50:50.<sup>50</sup> However, the peace agreement between the North and South does not solve the ongoing crisis in the Darfur region.

Sudan was Africa's largest country (i.e. until the recent secession of the South) and home to one of the greatest empires on the continent has come to symbolize conflict. The two most prominent of these conflicts are the Darfur crisis in the western part of the country and the struggle between the North and the South. This North-South struggle which culminated in a referendum that allowed for the South to split from the North marks the latest addition to the geopolitical landscape of Africa.<sup>51</sup>

Until the 2005 referendum, the Darfur crisis dominated international headlines as the atrocities in Darfur, blamed entire on the Khartoum government were roundly condemned as genocide especially by the western media and campaigners. However, the truth about Sudan's conflicts, which is hardly told, dates back to the colonial period.

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<sup>48</sup> Peterson, D. (2003). *Inside Sudan : Political Islam, conflict, and catastrophe* / Don Peterson Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 2003; Pbk. Ed

<sup>49</sup> <http://www.unsudanig.org/> accessed on 13/6/2013

<sup>50</sup> *ibid*

<sup>51</sup> Khalid, M.: Kegan Paul (2003) *War and peace in Sudan : A tale of two countries* / Mansour khalid London ; New York: Distributed by Columbia University Press.

## 2.2 Colonial Roots of Sudan's Conflicts

The Aljazeera documentary of January 5, 2011, "Sudan: History of a Broken Land" presents a good historical insight into the persistent chaos in Sudan. Its strength lies especially in the fact that it contains testimonies by the key figures in the various conflicts during and after colonial rule. In all of these testimonies, accusing fingers point to Britain, the former colonizer.<sup>52</sup>

While acknowledging the role of Britain in establishing a strong civil service in Sudan Joseph Lagu, former Sudanese Vice President, lamented that this alongside other colonial privileges provided more benefit to the North rather than the South, saying "they did very little in the South." Out of 800 civil service posts bequeathed by the British just four were given to Southerners.<sup>53</sup>

## 2.3 The Seeds of Separation in British Sudan

It was under British colonial rule that the seeds of the North-South divide were sown in the Sudan. "It is the British to blame" says Abdul Al-Mubarak of the University of Khartoum, because they wanted the south to be a separate entity. The time bomb for ethnic and religious conflict in Sudan was created in 1922 when the British colonial administration restricted the movement of Northerners beyond the 10th parallel of latitude and Southerners beyond the 8th. This was the role of British colonialism in the partition of Sudan. Frantz Fanon<sup>54</sup>, the anti-colonial activist and writer could not be further from the truth in decrying colonialism as "separatist."

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<sup>52</sup> <http://suite101.com/article/a-brief-history-of-sudans-conflicts-a376760> accessed on 13/6/2013

<sup>53</sup> Aljazeera *Sudan:History of a Broken Land* documentary January 5, 2011

<sup>54</sup> Aljazeera *ibid*

## **2.4 Aftermath of British Rule in Sudan**

British colonialism successfully created all the conditions necessary for conflict in Sudan. It exploited the religious divide between the North and the South, transforming the South into a paradise for Christian missionaries while the North remained predominantly Muslim. “They should have allowed a natural intercourse to take place,” says Sadiq Al Madi, “but they didn’t.”<sup>55</sup>

Economic and political neglect of the South, which was a major feature of British colonialism throughout Africa – as seen for example in British Southern Cameroons, was another recipe for conflict in Sudan. The marginalization of the South led to the creation of the “anyanya” rebellion by Joseph Lagu, a struggle that was later taken up by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) formed in 1983.<sup>56</sup>

Sudan’s return to military rule in 1958, barely two years after independence was enough indication that the roots of chaos were too deep in this former British colony. The struggle for power has remained a defining feature of Sudan’s political life alongside recurrent conflicts both of which are fuelled today by great power interest in the oil-rich country.

## **2.5 Key Actors in Sudan Conflict**

### **2.5.1 National Actors**

**2.5.1.1 Government of Sudan (GoS)** – Sudan gained its independence in 1956, and had two years of civilian government before a series of coups put the National Congress Party in power. The dictatorial GoS had maintained its power through heavy-handed tactics, especially many campaigns of ethnic-based violence to repress any group, political, military, or civilian, that

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<sup>55</sup> <http://www.unsudanig.org/> accessed on 13/6/2013

<sup>56</sup> Djimeli, Alexandre T. Darfur, Au-delà de la guerre



threatened its hold on power. Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) an army of the GoS has 104,000 active soldiers, who are funded largely through the oil revenues. The army is used to contain any revolutionary groups that threaten the existence of repressive government. Through use of arms availed by external actors threaten the human security.<sup>57</sup>

Janjaweed is a tribal-based militia that is responsible for the vast majority of the genocidal human rights abuses in Darfur. However, the Janjaweed existed long before the Darfur genocide: the GoS radicalized, mobilized, and armed the Janjaweed militias for a genocidal military campaign to wipe out the ethnic groups associated with the SLM (Sudanese Liberation Movement) and JEM. The Janjaweed provide a cheap counterinsurgency campaign and a convenient excuse for the GoS that the Darfur crisis is a local, tribal issue and not an international concern.

JEM is a largely Zaghawa rebel group from Darfur. JEM continued to grow over the years until it was the most militarily powerful group in the region, and it refused to even enter into negotiations over the Darfur Peace Agreement. Since then, it has been the most unpredictable, launching an attack against the Government of Sudan in Khartoum. JEM is interested in centralized power in Sudan and is heavily Islamist.<sup>58</sup>

## **2.5.2 International Actors**

**2.5.2.1 Chad:** Chad is Sudan's neighbor to the West and shares a long, ill-defined, and lawless border with Sudan largely along the Darfur state. Chadian rebels have used Darfur as a launching

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Investing in Tragedy. China's Money, Arms, and Politics in Sudan, Human Rights First, March 2008.

<sup>58</sup> Khalid, M.: Kegan Paul (2003) *War and peace in Sudan : A tale of two countries* / Mansour khalid London ; New York: Distributed by Columbia University Press.

point for their own attacks, Sudan has accused Chad of supporting Darfur rebels and Chad has accused Sudan of supporting Chadian rebels. Many agreements have been signed between the two but none of them have ever been followed. CAR: The Central African Republic has been affected by spillover from the Darfur genocide and hosts refugees who have fled violence. Those who are fleeing violence in Darfur have often found themselves in the middle of another conflict between the government and rebel groups over political control.

**2.5.2.2 Libya:** Libya had an incredibly large and unacknowledged role in shaping the Darfur conflict: it was Libyan leader Colonel Qadaffi who first began to bring both weapons and Arab supremacy into Darfur as he tried to make Chad part of an Arab North Africa. Libya has been a continuing source of destabilization for Darfur.

**2.5.2.3 China:** China became the largest purchaser of Sudanese oil, the revenues of which go largely to the Sudanese military. Not only does China supply the funds for Sudan to purchase weapons and continue its genocidal counter-insurgency campaign, but it actually sells Sudan a great number of its weapons, despite an international arms embargo. On top of this, China has traditionally protected Sudan in the UN Security Council as a veto-wielding country

**2.5.2.3 Russia:** Russia is also one of the largest arms suppliers to Sudan and has also used its power in the UN Security Council to protect its business investments in the region<sup>59</sup>. France: France was an early leader in the UN Security Council to push through late but important resolutions on Darfur. When elected, President Sarkozy identified Darfur as a high priority. However, France may vote in the UNSC to suspend the ICC indictment of President Bashir.

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<sup>59</sup> Andrew McGregor, "Russia's Arms Sales to Sudan a First Step in Return to Africa: Part One", Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 26, February 11, 2009.

**2.5.2.4 Great Britain:** Great Britain governed Sudan for more than 60 years of colonial rule, and left Sudan with exacerbated ethnic tensions, uneven development, and poorly distributed power. In recent history, Great Britain has much of the same potential as the US to mobilize international players around effective action. However, Britain may also vote in the UNSC to suspend the ICC indictment of President Bashir.

### **2.5.3 Multinational**

**2.5.3.1 AMIS** was the first international peacekeeping force in Darfur. Amis was set up by the 2004 Addis Ababa agreement was so underfunded and understaffed that it was criticized for being virtually useless. When UNAMID was created, most AMIS soldiers “switched green berets to blue” and became part of UNAMID, which had disappointingly fewer resources and support than AMIS.<sup>60</sup>

**2.5.3.2 The United Nations:** The united nation is the international body responsible for maintaining a global order. UN has issued many resolutions on the subject of Darfur and created UNAMID. The UN is constrained by the will of its individual member states, so active opposition from strong countries such as China and Russia or simple indifference from countries with no stake in Darfur have severely hampered its response.

**2.5.3.3 UNAMID:** The joint United Nations-African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur. It was designed to be the UN’s largest and most expensive peacekeeping force at over 26,000 personnel. However, UNAMID currently has only a few thousand more troops than AMIS, and is vastly under-staffed, under-equipped, and under-funded. UNAMID is so vulnerable it

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<sup>60</sup> Cohen, Herman J. (2000). *Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent*. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.

continues to be attacked by parties on both sides.<sup>61</sup> The peacekeepers at time fail to carry the mandate and collaborate with militia.

**2.5.3.4 The International Criminal Court:** The ICC was established in was The Hague by the UN to try the perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Former Chief Prosecutor Ocampo applied for an arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir on all of the previously mentioned crimes. The ICC has previously issued arrest warrants for Ahmed Haroun and Ali Kushayb, both of who have yet to be turned in by the Sudanese Government, who refuses to recognize the court. The Court at times show selective justice and lack decisiveness.

**2.5.3.5 The Arab League:** An assembly of Arab states of which Sudan is a member. President al-Bashir often turns to the Arab League for assistance, such as in the wake of the recent ICC indictments when Bashir appealed to the AL to hold an emergency meeting on his behalf. The League could wield a great deal of unique power over the GoS and yet it has been largely silent on the issue of Darfur.<sup>62</sup>

## **2.6 State of the Conflict Todate**

The propensity for renewed clashes, the south says, depends on whether Sudan chooses to respect a security agreement reached. Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir has been mobilising for conflict following allegations that South Sudan was supporting rebels in Sudan, and has ordered the south to cease oil productions. <sup>63</sup>Sudan has put a hold on nine security and economic pacts with South Sudan, including vital oil shipments, and has begun what seems as mobilisation for battle.

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<sup>61</sup> Cohen, Herman J, ibid

<sup>62</sup> <http://www.standnow.org/learn/aoe/sudan/players> accessed on 11/6/2013

<sup>63</sup> President Omar Hassan al-Bashir addresses a crowd in North Khartoum, June 8, 2013. (REUTERS/Stringer)

However, South Sudan remains optimistic that peaceful solutions would be reached. "While President al-Bashir has declared jihad and is mobilising for war, I maintain my pledge to you and the world that I will not take the people of South Sudan unnecessarily back to a state of war," South Sudanese President Salva Kiir told reporters. "The people of South Sudan should remain calm and patient as we work with the African Union to resolve this impasse with Sudan," Kiir added. However the conditions for a return to war have been outlined by South Sudan.<sup>64</sup>

Col. Philip Aguer, South Sudanese army spokesman said any violations of an African Union-mediated pact signed in March would be taken as an act of provocation. "The oil can be shut down. What may amount to a declaration of war is if the security agreements that have been reached are violated. Oil is just a bilateral agreement which the Sudanese government has the choice to accept or not to accept," Aguer said.<sup>65</sup>

Jen Psaki, a spokeswoman for the US State Department, told reporters in Washington that Sudan's threat to shut down oil pipelines "is deeply disappointing."<sup>66</sup> Sudan assured the international community that Khartoum remained committed to good relations if South Sudan ended support for rebels. However, South Sudan denies supporting fighters in the north, and in turn has accused Khartoum of backing rebels in their southern territory.

According to Small Arms Survey, an independent Swiss research firm, South Sudan provided logistical, financial and political support, but not weapons, to SPLM rebels fighting the Sudanese

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<sup>64</sup> Africa report Thursday 15 August 2013

<sup>65</sup> <http://www.theafricareport.com/East-Horn-Africa/sudan-south-sudan-on-the-verge-of-conflict.html> accessed on 13/6/13

<sup>66</sup> *ibid*

military.<sup>67</sup> Sudan's threat of war against South Sudan on the basis of suspicion of Sudan's support for rebels is expected to continue if Sudan does not cease oil production.

After the 2011 split of Sudan and South Sudan, most of Sudan's oil production remained in the south, but the export infrastructure remained under northern control. The two sides stand to earn billions of dollars if the oil flows, but have failed to agree on how much South Sudan would pay to use the pipeline.<sup>68</sup>

The Sudanese government on Monday 12<sup>th</sup> august 2013 announced that it will further extend the deadline to stop the flow of South Sudanese crude through its territory, saying that this decision was taken in response to a request made by president Salva Kiir.<sup>69</sup>

The oil minister Awad Al-Jaz said that Bashir and Kiir agreed to delay the stoppage by another two weeks until September 6th. The agreement came "after positive developments in the Implementation Matrix led by the African Union chief mediator [Thabo Mbeki] who also brokered the extension", the official news agency (SUNA) quoted Al-Jaz as saying.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, online database, *Arms Trade Register*; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, online database, *Trend Indicator Value Table: Sudan, 1960-2006*, available at [http://armstrade.sipri.org/arms\\_trade/values.php](http://armstrade.sipri.org/arms_trade/values.php).

<sup>68</sup> <http://www.theafricareport.com/East-Horn-Africa/sudan-south-sudan-on-the-verge-of-conflict.html> accessed on 13/6/2013

<sup>69</sup> Sudan Tribune "Sudan extend oil shutdown deadline again" 12<sup>th</sup> August 2013

<sup>70</sup> Sudan Tribune ibid

## **2.7 Conclusion**

Sudan conflict therefore shows that conflict seen as purely internal could in fact possess a different persona, creating linkages with other conflicts across borders, and with processes that are informed by multiple actors and issues.

Fig 2.1

Sudan before Secession






Fig 2.2

After Secession



Fig 2.3



## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **3. SOURCES OF CONFLICT IN AFRICA**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

Africa has been endowed with a lot of natural resources but the continent remain poor and the question remain is it abundance or scarcity or mismanagement that causes the conflicts?. Issues such as poverty, environmental degradation and abuse, political and economic instability and other humanitarian disasters are at the highest peak in Africa as compared to other continents.<sup>71</sup>

This chapter seeks to focus on the sources of conflict in Africa with regard to scarcity and abundance of resources as well as analyze some of the management strategies that can be employed to address the concern.

#### **3.2 Sources of Conflict in Africa in Regard to Scarcity and Abundance of Resources**

Development theory explains how conflict as a result of resource scarcity, abundance and management, results. It focuses on the role that resources and societal development play on the onset of violence. In this respect, Gum considers that “for the last half century at least, societies at low levels of development have suffered much more from societal warfare than prosperous societies.”<sup>72</sup> The most Conflict in Africa tends to lie on an ecological perspective and the issue is whether the resources are scarce or abundant and/or poorly managed.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Mwagiru, M. *Human security, Setting the Agenda for Africa*(Nairobi: Africa Peace Forum, 2008)

<sup>72</sup> Pyan Den Berghe, *The ethnic phenomenon*, Elsevier, New York, 1981.

<sup>73</sup> UNEP, *Environmental scarcity and conflict*(New York: UNEP)

Many conflict in Africa have their roots in colonial conflicts e.g the region from South Sudan,Northern Uganda,Rwanda, Burudi and Congo experienced protracted colonial violence in the form of slave trading, slave labour, plantation labour and terror and a violent gun culture.

The conflict in Africa have an intricate and complex history exhibiting multiple and multidimensional causes and consequences from this history. Independence though did not bring the touted change in terms of re-establishing order as the insecurities were deeply rooted in the shifting pattern of division of labour at the international level, especially the challenges of state-making and nation-building, on the other hand, and the struggles over underdevelopment, dependency, and sustainable development, on the other. The challenge arising has been how to establish modern societies that are politically, economically and technologically viable in a highly competitive, unequal and exploitative world. Central to these conflicts were struggles over power and resources; power was around the nation state and its governance structures, development capacities, delegative and distributional abilities, and resources in terms of the availability, control and access.

Resources may be abundant or scarce, and either condition can be a source of conflict, depending on the organization and patterns of control and access. Control can be understood in the binding legal or flexible customary terms, personified in a community, corporate or state entities and it might imply segregation or open access. The negotiation of access includes the tripartite notions of contemporary analytical conversation i.e class, gender, and ethnicity. In the African context, the constructions and identities of religion, region and generation also count towards any talk of access. Access is further characterized and effected by gradations or scales of limitation. Conflicts in Africa are often provoked and sustained by ethnic rivalries and polarizations, economic underdevelopment and inequalities, poor governance and elite political

instability and manipulations. These factors, individually or collectively, have a history rooted in the political economy of colonialism, post colonialism, and neo-liberal globalization; they are as much internal in their causation and scale as they are regional and transnational, involving national, regional and international actors and networks that are simultaneously economic, political, military and social<sup>74</sup>. One cannot attribute to any single source as these causes often vary. The issue of resources both scarce and abundant plays a major role in the escalation of violent conflict.

The causes of the conflicts are as complex as the challenges of resolving them are difficult. Yet from a historical and global perspective, Africa has been no more prone to violent conflicts than other regions. Africa's share of more than 180 million people who died from conflicts and atrocities during the twentieth century is relatively modest: in the sheer scale of casualties there is no equivalent in African history to Europe's First and Second World Wars, or even the civil wars and atrocities in revolutionary Russia and China. The worst bloodletting in the twentieth-century Africa occurred during the colonial period in King Leopold's Congo Free State<sup>75</sup>. Africa experiences conflicts which are motivated by both grievance and greed. Grievance related to the unjust and inequitable distribution of land for instance which in many cases is a consequence of colonialism. Greed is motivated by the desire to explore valuable resources with the intent of personal gain.

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<sup>74</sup> Adebajo, Adekeye and Chandra L. Chandra L. Sriram, eds. 2001. *Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. London: Frank Cass.

<sup>75</sup> White Mathew. 2003 'Wars, Massacres and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century,' in *Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century*, [online] Available at <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/20centry.htm> accessed 19/7/2013

### 3.3 Scarcity

Scarcity refers to a situation where natural resources such as water, forests, minerals and land among others are degraded and/or decreasing (in the sense that it is used faster than it is replenished) in such a way that it cannot sustain the masses. It can also mean the inequitable distribution of resources within a region/country. Where resources are scarce, resulting from among other factors environmental stress and mismanagement, high population growth or unfavourable climatic factors, conflict emerge out of competing interests for the resources. Scarcity of resources is one of the main ecological dimensions that have been associated with several conflicts in Africa.

In Africa conflicts are sometimes as a result of scarcity of resources despite the fact that most of the countries in Africa do in fact have abundance of resources. However most of these resources are not available or are scantily available, access to them is controlled and people fight over them.

There are three drivers of scarcity.<sup>76</sup> Where demand for natural resources exceeds supply. Population growth and rates of consumption will reduce the availability of a particular resource and conflicts will thus generally arise if the resources can no longer support the needs of the people. Degradation of natural resources reduces supply and again the people are placed in a situation where they have to compete for whatever is available and this state of competition often results into conflicts. Access to resources is restricted and unequal. When one group controls the resources to the detriment an exclusion of the others conflicts are likely to occur as the

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<sup>76</sup> Supra

marginalized group seeks for equitable distribution and a greater share of the resource<sup>77</sup>. In Africa land scarcity is a major cause for conflict. In Rwanda for instance, a small country that witnessed genocide in 1994 historically, the issue of land has been a major concern in the country since a very large percentage of the population depend on Agriculture. The pressure on land has therefore prompted encroachment on Wetlands, National Parks and forest reserves thus leading to the degradation of the environment. Whereas it emerged after Rwanda 1994 genocide that ethnicity was largely to blame analyst observed that ethnicity was just a cover for competition to control scarce land.<sup>78</sup>

Resource scarcity is not divided along ethnic lines. The disparity of the distribution of land between rich and poor is also a major cause for conflict as very few rich individuals take control of huge chunks of land whereas the majority poor will cling onto land that decreases in size due to pressure and this more often results to struggle which generates into conflict. Land in Rwanda has been a major focus of ecological grievance in Rwanda. The population in Rwanda largely depends on this vital but limited resource for subsistence.<sup>79</sup> Land scarcity also has been found to be an indirect source of conflict in the agriculturally-rich Jubaland region of southern Somalia, where much of the fighting in the country's civil war is concentrated. Several factions in Somalia have battled for control in the Jubaland region, in part to stake their claim to its resource-rich "deegan"[Somalia concept referring to exclusive control of land and its resources]. "conflict in Jubaland centers on access and control of deegan. The overall ecology of the

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<sup>77</sup> Homer-Dixon T and Blitt, J. 1998. *Ecoviolence: Links Among Environment, Population, and Security*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield P1

<sup>78</sup> Homer-Dixon T and V. Pervival *Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of Rwanda* *Journal of environment and development*, no. 5, 1996

<sup>79</sup> Ibid

Southern Somalia region is considerably drier and less favorable to agro pastoralists than is the Jubaland region,”<sup>80</sup>

### **3.4 Abundance**

Abundance refers to a situation where a country is endowed with resources such that it becomes what is now becoming popularly known as “resource curse”<sup>81</sup>. It is argued that a country can be rich in resources such that those resources become source of conflict. This is more so where the resources are poorly managed in the sense that there is unequal distribution of resources and lack of policies put in place to manage and distribute this resources. Conflicts in Africa are not caused by scarcity alone indeed there are countries in the continent that are rich in resources yet they are so often in conflict.

Abundance of resources mean that a country is rich and wealthy because of the high profits it is expected to yield from trading in this resource and the development that is likely to be brought about by the profits. This fact alone could attract the attention of various interest groups and since most of these abundant resources are controlled by the elite and the gains from the resources hardly ever reach certain groups of people who consider themselves the marginalized; the divergent interests of these groups could encourage and sustain conflict.

Sudan is the largest country and possesses abundant resources such as water sources, oil minerals, gas and pasture land yet the three internal conflicts that have happened in the country were all in the rich areas in the south, east and west.

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<sup>80</sup> Farah I Ecology sources of conflict (internet source) 20/7/2013

<sup>81</sup> Supra



In Congo, abundance of natural resources has been a major cause of conflict. Despite the Congo having an abundance of natural resource wealth, the country remains poor. This poverty has led to conflicts which have been termed as civil wars but research shows they are externally instigated resource-based conflicts due to competition for abundant critical resources.

Coltan –a combination of Columbian and Tantalite is among the strategic minerals found in the Congo with 80% of global coltan reserves located in Africa and most of it in the DRC.<sup>82</sup> A number of analysts have argued that international demand for the metal has become one of the driving forces behind the war in DRC. There is a relationship between the exploitation of natural resources and manifest conflict in this country. However, the exploration of coltan is not the root cause of the conflict in DRC but a sustaining factor. The conflict in the DRC may be traced back from the time when the country's Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was assassinated and a series of rebellion and secessionist movement emerged. The coup led by Mobutu Seso Seko backed by the United States saw a despotic and corrupt regime emerge; Mobutu lasted for 32 years in power before being toppled by Laurent Kabila who himself was assassinated paving the country leadership to his son Joseph Kabila. In all these conflicts, external exploitation of its immense natural resources has always been a factor.

### **3.5 Conflict Management Strategies**

Resources based conflicts arise in situation involving stakeholders with different interests and goals in resource management and is a reaction from the other users for the impact they feel. The conflicts in Africa over resources are not about management of resources but mismanagement of it and exportation of the resources from Africa. Resources, whether scarce or

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<sup>82</sup> Supporting the war economy in the DRC:European companies and the Coltan Trade,IPIS Report,Brussels,January2002

Abundant, should be properly managed, the government which is tasked with the responsibility of protecting and managing these resources ought to put in place proper and efficient policies for managing these resources.

Conflict caused by resources create weak economies not to mention the fact the conflicts deteriorate and damages the resources and as a result the resources depreciate and decrease and this in turn acts as a fuel to conflicts. The political and economic state of a country, community and the people of the country are also affected.

The link between conflict and mismanagement of resources is not unique to Africa but it is also present in many other continents more so where there is weak governance and inequity in managing the resources that are present. Mismanagement of resources often invites conflict as its perpetrators are often corrupt and greedy individuals or groups, Multinational corporations and government officials who are all seeking their own selfish interests to the exclusion of others who should be benefiting from the resources.

Serious lapses in the management of resources in Africa should be resolved if we are to talk about peace. Equity and fairness in resource management can alleviate conflicts as where there is equitable management of resources, inclusive policies of economic and political rights allocation and distribution of resources; economic growth and cooperation will thrive and peace will be sustainable. A number of strategies can help to mitigate natural based conflict and sought to give a conflict resolution:-

**(a) Co-operations-** As Keohane<sup>83</sup> alludes mutual dependencies created by oil will lend themselves to cooperation which creates disincentives and mitigates the prospective of future conflicts. Intensive cooperation in natural resource management and trade issues (including banning the export, import and transport of illegal obtained natural resources) will minimize competition over natural resources. It is important that international embargos be imposed on exploration of such resources in order to exert pressure on conflict resolution. Those with the responsibility of managing these resources should look towards cooperation and development and shift their focus from selfish interest to equitable and proper distribution and management of natural resources because a world where this is to happen will know no conflict but peace. Regional co-operation helps in long term amelioration of population pressure and ecological stress and thus reduction in conflicts.

**(b) Facilitate collective action** –With extraction of minerals such as oil it has the negative effect to the environment. Therefore the need for comprehensive policies and collective action is becoming inevitable to address the region's complex socio-environmental problems. Multilateral organizations can serve as a platform to bring together governments to develop common stands and design collective action on their shared social and environmental problems such as food and water insecurity, climate change and biodiversity loss.

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<sup>83</sup> For more details, see Keohane Robert, *Neorealism and its Critics*. New York: Columbia University press, 1986

### **(c) Control of Multinational Corporations**

Amoa<sup>84</sup> stated that there is a general perception that home jurisdictions in vulnerable areas are powerless when it comes to the control of multinational corporations. While this assertion is largely correct, he argues that there cannot be effective control of multinational corporations (MNCs) at international, regional or private levels without the corresponding development of an effective minimum institutional framework at the domestic level. Just as domestic banks require regulatory institutions that restrain their speculative instincts, MNCs require regulatory mechanisms that check their instincts to put profit above all else. Howell and Edward<sup>85</sup> asserts that government policy which aims to attract MNCs to a host country as part of a strategy for economic development can optimize the benefits by distinguishing between types of companies, focusing particular attention on those which give their subsidiary responsibility for new product development, manufacturing and export marketing.

**(d) Substitutes-**As Resources become scarce, prices will increase and reduce demand. This will provide both time and an economic incentive to develop a substitute for the exhausted resource. Therefore alternative for the scrambled natural resources will be the way to go.

**(e) Capacity building-** There is a recognition that while environmental conditions in the “developing world” are not necessarily inferior to those of the “developed world”, the level of “technical ingenuity” required to overcome deteriorating environmental

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<sup>84</sup> Amoa, Olufemi, O 2008 –Corporate Social Responsibility, Multinational Corporations and the Law in Nigeria: Controlling Multinationals IN Host States, Journal of African Law, Vol. 52, No. 1, PP. 89-113

<sup>85</sup> Howell, A; Edwards, R.W 1998- Multinational Corporation Strategy: Implications for Research and Development, Innovation: Management, Policy & Practice, Volume: 1 issue: 5-6, November 1998, pp. 3-10

conditions is often inadequate.<sup>86</sup> The level of “technical ingenuity” in a society refers to its capacity to systematically marshal scientific and social solutions to societal quandaries. Efforts at conflict resolution and prevention, therefore, should be directed not only at improving environmental conditions, but also should be aimed at heightening the level of “technical ingenuity” required to mitigate environmental degradation. Additionally, multilateral organizations can serve as a platform to tackle major regional policy constraints such as lack of public participation and transparency. For instance COMESA tries to encourage public participation in the policy making process through campaigns and discussion blogs. Further, these institutions can activate transparency in the policy implementation phase by building up information gaps between national governments, authorities and the people. Disclosing important information on national and regional issues (including on trade relationships, investments, environment and development) among the member states and to the public can play a role in building trust between governments and their people.

### **3.6 Conclusion**

Scarcity or abundance of natural resources for example in the DRC where there is abundance has encouraged rebel movement to occupy these regions leading to struggle that result to conflict. The illegal exploitation of natural resources further adds to the complexity of existing conflict. It is therefore important that international embargos be imposed on exploration of such resources in order to exert pressure on Conflict resolution. Those entrusted with the responsibility of managing these resources should look towards cooperation and development

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<sup>86</sup> UNEP(1999),Swartz,Daniel and Singh Ashbindu,Environmental Conditions,Resources and Conflict:An introductory Overview and Data collection;Division of the Environmental Information,Assessment and Early Warning (DEIA&EW),UNEP,Nairobi Kenya,P6

and shift their focus from selfish interest to equitable and proper distribution and management of natural resources. Control of Multinational Corporation, which act as agent of neo-colonialism will minimize exploitation and competition over resources that eventually lead to conflict. Capacity building will secure public participation in policy making and heightening the level of “technical ingenuity” required to mitigate environmental degradation.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents analysis and summary of the study findings. The purpose of this study was to examine the new scramble for Africa as a source of conflict. Sudan served as the case study. The study used secondary data to analyze external forces as a source of conflict in Sudan. Various publication including books, Journals, internet, Newspaper, and other relevant materials were scrutinized to support the findings.

#### **4.2 Nature of the Sudan conflict**

The second civil war in Sudan (1983-2005) was not restricted to the north-south conflict, as it is often claimed. This commonly used definition “north-south conflict” fails to reflect the whole complexity of the confrontation between various armed groups in southern, central and eastern Sudan, known as the Sudanese civil war. Similarly, the widespread perception of the civil war as of an “Arab-African conflict” is no more adequate.

As a matter of fact, during this war a number of armed groups of non-Arab origin from the south of Sudan aligned themselves with the northern forces, while some Arab militias at times sided with the (mostly non-Arab) SPLM/A. In short, the conflicts were fought largely along miscellaneous ideological and ethnic lines and driven by multiple factors, and not only on the grounds of the parties’ rivalry.

It is clear that in the age of economic and political globalization any contemporary conflict is affected by a huge number of external factors, which is especially true for the so-called failed states.<sup>87</sup> Any of the contemporary intra-state conflicts is characterized by a high level of involvement of external factors. These are, for instance, foreign efforts to mediate the negotiation between the parties to the conflicts, political pressure exerted on the parties by other states and international organizations, policies of transnational corporations and other economic actors etc. Some of these factors, in principle, are of interest to this study.

Facing the need to restrict the scope of study, the author set certain criteria for his analysis. According to these criteria, primary for the focus of this study were those factors, which promote armed violence, result in proliferation of arms in the conflict areas and/or contribute to military built-up of the parties involved. As such, these are the factors which, from the author's point of view, immediately affect human security in the conflict areas.

The author's target has been, therefore, to answer the following questions:

Which external factors, relevant to the criteria set above, affected the intra-Sudanese conflicts at the recent stage? How did their influence evolve in the aftermath of the CPA?

Understanding that the majority of the external factors in question are, in fact, policies of foreign governments and other politico-military *actors* from abroad, the author attempted to explore, where possible and necessary, the motivations and perspectives of the involvement of these actors. This thesis doesn't offer detailed accounts on the technical side of their

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<sup>87</sup> On the debate around the so called *new conflicts* and the role of international actors in their development see: Kaldor, Mary (2000): *Neue und alte Kriege. Organisierte Gewalt im Zeitalter der Globalisierung*. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp; Matthies, Volker (2004): *Eine Welt voller neuer Kriege?* In: *Der Staat im Bürger*, 54. Jg., Heft 4/2004 (S. 185-190); Münkler, Herfried (2002): *Die neuen Kriege*. Reinbek: Rowohlt.



involvement. On the contrary, its aim was to explore the logics of the foreign actors considered, to point out the reasons of their involvement.

#### **4.3 External Forces in Sudan Conflict**

##### **4.3.1 Foreign Role in the Military Built-up of the Sudan Armed Forces**

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement forbids either side from reinforcing its military without permission from a Joint Defence Board, monitored by both the north and the south. However, both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) have reportedly<sup>88</sup> expanded their armed forces illegally ever since.

Practically no information is available on the quantity or the characteristics of the arms supplied by foreign exporters to the SPLA either before the CPA, or in its aftermath. Nevertheless, there are signs that the Government of South Sudan has been intensively rearming its military forces ever since 2005. Security spending of Juba totaled \$555 million in 2006, or 42% of its overall annual expenditures.<sup>89</sup> This amount has been growing ever since. In December 2008, the parliament of South Sudan voted to double its budget in order to cover the government's military expenses for 2009. However, it is not known, how much of this money was spent on arms purchases from abroad.

In 2006 Sudan spent an estimated USD 535 million on weapons and ammunition.<sup>90</sup> Since 1999, Khartoum's military spending has been growing constantly. In particular, its expenses on small arms rose 680 times from 1999 to 2005, with ninety-six per cent of reported transfers

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<sup>88</sup> Andrew McGregor, "Russia's Arms Sales to Sudan a First Step in Return to Africa: Part One", Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 26, February 11, 2009.

<sup>89</sup> World Bank. The 2007 Public Expenditure Review (PER) for Sudan. Available at: [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSUDAN/Resources/SD\\_PER\\_synthesis\\_report.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSUDAN/Resources/SD_PER_synthesis_report.pdf)

<sup>90</sup> The UN Comtrade Database, available at: <http://comtrade.un.org/db/>

coming from China and Iran. At the same time, most of the conventional arms imported by Sudan in this period of time were delivered by Russia. However, some analysts believe, that these figures are lower than the true value of arms imports by the Sudanese government, as the exporters are likely to underreport the amount of arms shipped to a war-torn country.<sup>91</sup>

#### **4.3.2 Chinese Expansion in Sudan: Oil and Arms in Focus**

Since 2002, China has largely increased its arms supplies to Sudan, as a result of an awakened program of military cooperation. Starting in 2004, China became Khartoum's near-exclusive provider of small arms, selling on average 90% of arms imported by the Sudanese government through 2006. Aside from supplying small arms and ammunition, Chinese companies have also assisted the Sudanese government in establishing its domestic production of this kind of weapons. Three assembly plants for small arms and ammunition in North Sudan are said to be built with the help of Chinese specialists. These factories reportedly produce heavy and light machine guns, rocket launchers, mortars, antitank weapons, and ammunition.<sup>92</sup>

Traditionally, Beijing hasn't been Khartoum's main source of conventional arms. However, since 1990s, Beijing gradually increased exports of this type to Sudan, becoming Russia's main competition on the market. In addition, China's high-rank officers provide Khartoum's forces with military expertise.<sup>93</sup>

The reason for Beijing's close attention to Khartoum's military program lies in the economic sphere. In 1996, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) purchased 40 per cent of the Sudanese oil consortium, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company. As of 2008,

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Investing in Tragedy. China's Money, Arms, and Politics in Sudan, Human Rights First, March 2008.

<sup>92</sup> These factories are located in Kalakla, Chojeri, and Bageer. See: Koang Tut Doh and Kur Yai Nop, *Looming Disaster in Western Upper Nile Region: A Political Eye Witness Report from the Field*, South Sudanese Friends International, Inc. Nairobi, Kenya, 2000.

<sup>93</sup> Sudanese President Meets Chinese General; Lauds Ties with China. Sudan News Agency. 24 October 2005.

China imported about 7 per cent of its crude from Sudan, with \$8 billion invested in fourteen projects.<sup>94</sup>

In the aftermath of the CPA China's natural interest is to preserve the status quo and by all possible mean, prevent a new war in the South. Its greatest concern has been that secession of South Sudan would make void all its agreements with Khartoum on the southern oil fields.

At present Beijing seeks to establish friendly ties with the Government of South Sudan (in Juba) and, thus, reduce its dependence on the Government of Sudan (in Khartoum). At the same time, Beijing obviously realizes that if its diplomacy fails to secure the nation's oil interest in Sudan, this will be done by Khartoum's military force.

#### **4.3.3 Oil Projects as a factor Negatively Affecting Human Security in South Sudan.**

When, in late 1990s, the Chinese started developing oil fields in South Cordofan, Unity, Upper Nile and other states, civilian populations were forcibly cleared from these areas.<sup>95</sup> In particular, by 2006 more than 15,000 civilians, primarily local Dinka and Maban populations, were displaced from parts of Melut and Maban provinces of the northern Upper Nile.<sup>96</sup>

In addition, oil development in the region of high proliferation of small arms means that Khartoum needs to keep armed units in these areas in order to secure the oil installations.

Under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) their security is to be ensured by the joint North-South military forces or the Joint Installation Units (JIUs). However, this provision

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<sup>94</sup> International Crisis Group, China's Thirst For Oil, Asia Report N°153, 9 June 2008. Available at: [http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/153\\_china\\_s\\_thirst\\_for\\_oil.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/153_china_s_thirst_for_oil.pdf)

<sup>95</sup> Oil Development in Northern Upper Nile, Sudan. A preliminary investigation by the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan. European Coalition on Oil in Sudan. Utrecht, The Netherlands, May 2006. Available at: [http://www.ecosonline.org/back/pdf\\_reports/2006/ECOS%20Melut%20Report%202006/ECOS%20Melut%20Report%20final-DEF.pdf](http://www.ecosonline.org/back/pdf_reports/2006/ECOS%20Melut%20Report%202006/ECOS%20Melut%20Report%20final-DEF.pdf)

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

of the CPA is one of the many that have not yet been implemented and the JIUs have not yet been formed. According to the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), high concentration of Sudanese armed forces remains in the areas surrounding the fields. Khartoum supported the “special police” or “oil police”—numbering approximately 3,000 and armed with approximately 4,000 units of small arms—have also been deployed near the oil facilities.<sup>97</sup> There were, in particular, reports that a branch of the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) led by former SPLA-commander Gordon Kong had been acting, up to 2007, as “police” for the Chinese-operated oilfields in the Upper Nile state.<sup>98</sup> Keeping ex-members of OAGs and tribal militias armed and in shape of “oil police” is another factor that undermines peace process in the region.

#### **4.3.4 Russia: Retaining Hold of the Sudanese Arms Market**

According to the SIPRI *Arms Trade Register*, Russia is estimated to have provided almost three-quarters of imports for the country’s current military arsenal.<sup>99</sup> Based on the same source, Russia accounted for 87 percent of Sudan’s major conventional weapons purchases in the period 2003-2007<sup>100</sup>, however Russia’s exports to this country grew slower in the period concerned than those of China. From 2000 to 2008, Russian weapons sales to Sudan included a large number of fighter jets<sup>101</sup>, helicopter gunships<sup>102</sup>, armored personnel carriers<sup>103</sup> etc.

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<sup>97</sup> International Crisis Group, China’s Thirst For Oil, Asia Report N°153, 9 June 2008, available at: [http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/153\\_china\\_s\\_thirst\\_for\\_oil.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/153_china_s_thirst_for_oil.pdf)

<sup>98</sup> John Young. The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration. Small Arms Study working paper no. 1, November 2006, p. 23.

<sup>99</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *The Arms Trade Register*. Available at: [http://armstrade.sipri.org/arms\\_trade/trade\\_register.php](http://armstrade.sipri.org/arms_trade/trade_register.php)

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> RIA Novosti, November 14; AFP, November 14, 2008.

<sup>102</sup> Kommersant, August 16, 2006; Andrew McGregor, “Russia’s Arms Sales to Sudan a First Step in Return to Africa: Part One”, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 26, February 11, 2009.

<sup>103</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, online database, *Arms Trade Register*; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, online database, *Trend Indicator Value Table: Sudan, 1960-2006*, available at [http://armstrade.sipri.org/arms\\_trade/values.php](http://armstrade.sipri.org/arms_trade/values.php).

Some of the Russian trainers, who instructed the SAF pilots in Sudan, were said to have flown combat missions against the rebels.<sup>104</sup>

Besides, dozens of items of Soviet-made armaments, incl. over 200 Soviet-model battle tanks and aircrafts, supplied to Sudan in the 1970-1980s have reportedly bombed South Sudan during the civil war.<sup>105</sup> In addition, Sudanese military helicopter pilots are trained under contract at the helicopter training center in Russia (Torzhok, Tver region).<sup>106</sup>

In short, for the past decades, Sudan's military has acquired rich experience of operating with Soviet-design weapons and equipment, and Khartoum is naturally interested in further providing its army with what has been familiar to it. At the same time, Russia understands that China can offer similar weapons at a lower price, and there are signs that Moscow is going to answer to this challenge from Beijing.

Since late 2008, when a senior Russian parliamentary official was appointed president's Medvedev special envoy to Sudan<sup>107</sup>, contacts between officials from Moscow and Khartoum have obviously become more intensive. It is likely that new arms transfers are in question. Both Russia and China realize that, demand for conventional arms will be constantly growing in Sudan in the following years, and none of them is going to lose this lucrative market.

Military co-operation by a range of actors has important implications for the balance of power between the parties. Russia, China, Belarus and Iran are among the most important sources of weaponry acquired in recent years by the GoS – with Russia the single biggest supplier by some

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<sup>104</sup> Echo Moskvyy, May 28, 2008; Interfax, May 29, 2008; Sudan Tribune, May 29, 2008.

<sup>105</sup> Andrew McGregor, "Russia's Arms Sales to Sudan a First Step in Return to Africa: Part One", Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 26, February 11, 2009

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> Sudan welcomes appointment of Russian special envoy. The Sudan Tribune. 23 December 2008.

distance.<sup>108</sup> Arms procurement by the GoSS is less easy to determine: Ukraine, the only supplier of arms to the GoSS listed in SIPRI's arms transfer database, reportedly supplied arms worth S\$82 million to the GoSS in the period 2007–2009.<sup>109</sup> The US and the United Kingdom (UK) also reportedly provide the GoSS with military advice.<sup>110</sup>

**Table 4.1**

**Origin of Sudan's arms imports, 1997-2010(\$ million)**

<b>Nation</b>	<b>Million \$</b>
<b>Ukraine</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Poland</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Iran</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>Balarus</b>	<b>118</b>
<b>China</b>	<b>210</b>
<b>Russia</b>	<b>751</b>
<b>Serbia</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>6</b>


Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Transfers Database

<sup>108</sup> *Op cit* Wezeman, pp 62–64.

<sup>109</sup> SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, 'TIV of arms exports to South Sudan, 1997–2010', accessed 1/8/2013.

<sup>110</sup> Development Initiatives, 'Sudan aid factsheet 1995–2009: Trends in Overseas Development Assistance', [www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Sudan-Aid-Factsheet-2011.pdf](http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Sudan-Aid-Factsheet-2011.pdf), accessed 1/8/2013

**Fig 2.4**



Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Transfers Database

#### **4.3.5 Policies of Foreign Governments**

China is focused on entry and exploitation of potential oil sources often seeking comprehensive development and economic arrangement. Its strategy is to acquire long term development contracts as well as purchasing assets in the energy industry. This approach is based on the desire to circumvent an over reliance on the global market through acquiring major stakes in Africa's oil fields or safeguarding access to them.<sup>111</sup> China non interference, non-question asked policy which guarantees unconditional respect for state sovereignty is prone to supporting autocratic

<sup>111</sup> Taylor Ian, China's oil diplomacy in Africa, International Affairs, vol. 82, No. 5, 2006 p.942

regimes that committed human right abuses and militated against democratic reforms.<sup>112</sup> There is high likely of the current hegemonic powers reverting back to lines long trodden by the like of United states and major western powers<sup>113</sup> who used whatever means and influence available to them to secure access to African oil including economic incentives, diplomacy and provision of arms and military equipments. An apt illustration is provided by Michael Klare<sup>114</sup> who contends that during the 1966/69 civil war in Nigeria, Great Britain and France armed different factions in the conflict in order to gain a foothold in the oil rich delta region.

#### **4.3.6 Conclusion**

In the period concerned, China was Sudan's single largest known provider of small arms and rapidly increased its share in Sudan's imports of conventional weapons.

The fact that many of China's oil facilities are located in the border areas of Northern and Southern Sudan, squarely astride the front lines of any renewed North-South conflict, makes Beijing's oil interests in Sudan heavily dependent on Khartoum's ability to control these areas and secure them.

China has several incentives to continue supporting Khartoum in future: in the long run, that is to keep the status quo in the relations between Juba and Khartoum, while in the short run China needs Khartoum's forces to prevent its oil-field crews from being attacked, its pipelines from being burnt and other facilities from being destroyed.

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<sup>112</sup> Denis M. Tull, "China's Engagement in Africa: Scope, significance and consequences", *The Journal of Modern African studies*, vol.44, No3, 2006, p.476

<sup>113</sup> Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, "America, China and the scramble for Africa's oil" in *Review of Africa political Economy*, vol 33, No.108

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid*:p304



Unlike China, Russia doesn't hold any stake on the Sudanese oil market and has no other interests to defend in Sudan. Therefore, it looks like Moscow sells arms to Khartoum just in order to sell them.

In view of the increasing competition on the Sudanese arms market between China and Russia, Khartoum finds itself in an advantageous position, as it has opportunity to demand more sophisticated weapons for reduced prices.

This latter may play key-role in successful rearming of the Sudan Armed Forces and lead to further militarization of the regime in Khartoum.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **5.0 Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation**

#### **5.1 Summary**

This chapter presents the discussion of the findings conclusion and the recommendations arrived at. It also gives suggestion for further studies.

The New scramble for Africa natural resources is live and is characterized with the desire to gain, maintain access and control valuable resources. The scenarios playing out are contestation to maintain relevance in global economy. The current hegemonic powers struggle to maintain status quo while the emerging economic powers tactfully use all the means to edge them out.

The Purpose of the study was to examine the new scramble for Africa as a source of conflict. External influences have shown that in one way or the other sustains, triggers or is source of conflict. China entry into international oil industry and her approach to issues and the multiple deals it is striking particularly in Africa alarm current hegemonic powers. The competition creates a fertile ground to sow seed of violence in African where the external forces seek to outdo the other.

The hypothesis of this study was struggle between the emerging economic and the current hegemonic power over natural resources has influenced conflicts in Africa. The negation is less power struggle by the current hegemonic and emerging economic powers for resources will secure minimal conflicts in Africa.

## 5.2 Conclusion

This research revealed that power play has impacted on violent conflict in Sudan. The current hegemonic power and emerging economic power foreign policies especially China has worked to sustain the conflict. In the period concerned, China was Sudan's single largest known provider of small arms and rapidly increased its share in Sudan's imports of conventional weapons.

The fact that many of China's oil facilities are located in the border areas of Northern and Southern Sudan, squarely astride the front lines of any renewed North-South conflict, makes Beijing's oil interests in Sudan heavily dependent on Khartoum's ability to control these areas and secure them.

China has several incentives to continue supporting Khartoum in future: in the long run, that is to keep the status quo in the relations between Juba and Khartoum, while in the short run China needs Khartoum's forces to prevent its oil-field crews from being attacked, its pipelines from being burnt and other facilities from being destroyed. Unlike China, Russia doesn't hold any stake on the Sudanese oil market and has no other interests to defend in Sudan. Therefore, it looks like Moscow sells arms to Khartoum just in order to sell them.

In view of the increasing competition on the Sudanese arms market between China and Russia, Khartoum finds itself in an advantageous position, as it has opportunity to demand more sophisticated weapons for reduced prices. This latter may play key-role in successful rearming of the Sudan Armed Forces and lead to further militarization of the regime in Khartoum.

This research reveals competition over natural resources has undermined African producers of raw materials, textiles and other commodities. It has exacerbated internal political conflict as external powers compete for political influence by providing support to different political groups

within African countries and as these groups seek to use their ties to external powers to strengthen their position against their domestic political rivals.

Although United states is not vividly shown as supporting repressive African regimes it has been cited to have used the same tactics to build ties with oil producing countries like Algeria, Nigeria, and Angola, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea and has noticeably reduced its pressures for democratization, respect for human rights and financial transparency in recent years.

The research has shown Multinational corporations as agent of neocolonialism for their idea of investing in a foreign land is not to better the lot of the host nation but to exploit as much as possible in order to develop the home country. MNCs maintain status quo, that is, dependent development which encourages the emergence of Authoritarian regimes in the host country and creation of alliance between international capitalist and domestic capitalist elite. The exploitative alliance sustained by intervention of corporations home governments meddle in internal affairs of the less developed countries.

The conclusion of this research shows that in order to maintain status quo current hegemonic and emerging economic powers, struggle over natural resources triggers, sustain or are a source of conflict as one tries to win prominence in the host nation. This is by use of every means possible which eventually lead to violent conflict. For example military programs, arm sales, other security assistance program, support of repressive and undemocratic government that block political reform and use force to stay in power.

### 5.3 Recommendations

The above analysis suggests that, given the tensions and outbreaks of violence, international engagement in Sudan and South Sudan needs to fulfill its full potential to sustain and strengthen peace in several ways. Firstly, external actors will have to continue to apply meaningful political and economic pressure and incentives to the parties to encourage their co-operation. Secondly, they should also ensure that peacekeeping interventions effectively defuse dangerous developments and strengthen security to the greatest possible extent. Thirdly and relatedly, external actors' military and security co-operation should avoid irresponsibly increasing the potential of either party to pursue escalations of conflict and support reform and improved capacity of the parties for democratic security provision.

Conflict management strategy requires innovative, holistic solutions to respond more quickly to outbreaks of violence, brokering settlements of disputes, re-establishing the rule of law and tackling the root causes of the problems. Stability in Sudan and South Sudan also requires economic development. Here, there is an obvious role for aid and commercial actors. However, volatility is clearly related to access to resources and services and perceptions of the responsiveness and accountability of government. Thus stability depends less on economic development *per se* than on whether such development is equitably shared. In terms of their working practices, aid agencies and commercial actors therefore need to promote an equitable share for all communities in development – most notably through following conflict sensitive working methods.

Effective support to capacity of legitimate institutions to provide security and justice and address poverty is also desperately needed. However, to prevent concerns about inequality and unfairness fuelling conflict in the long term, the behavior of leaders and institutions (listening to the people, respecting democracy and rights, behaving accountably and tackling corruption) are also crucially important to end current, and prevent further, violent rebellions. External actors' impacts on conflict in Sudan and South Sudan must therefore also be judged on two counts: whether they support or undermine better leadership; and whether they engage constructively with a range of actors outside the state who have a role in demanding and monitoring better governance by leaders and state institutions.

In their development engagement in South Sudan, Western governments and their donor agencies should remain openly committed to their core values and avoid falling into the trap of re-aligning their development priorities as a means to compete with Chinese influence. In fact, seeking co-operative or complementary development objectives and diplomatic approaches with China need not detract from promotion of core values – but could instead be crucial to their advancement.

As way of mitigating conflicts the research recommend use of substitutes for non renewable resources, look towards cooperation and development and shift focus from selfish interest to equitable and proper distribution and management of natural resources. Control of Multinational Corporation, which act as agent of neo-colonialism will minimize exploitation and competition over resources that eventually lead to conflict. Capacity building will secure public participation in policy making and heightening the level of “technical ingenuity” required to mitigate environmental degradation.

#### **5.4 Recommendation for further Research**

- 1) Can respect for state sovereignty be adequate enough to keep oppressive regimes?
- 2) Can international law serve as management strategy for natural based conflict particularly oil in Africa?
- 3) Are natural resources a curse or a blessing in Africa?

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