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*SUB-REGIONAL CONFLICT EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE MECHANISM: A CASE
STUDY OF IGAD 2002-2007*

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DECLARATION

This project is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree to any other university

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Horn of Africa



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ABBREVIATIONS

AU	Africa Union
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms
CEWERU	Conflict Early Warning Early Response Units
DSC	Defense and Security Commission
EASBRIG	Eastern Africa Standby Brigade
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa States
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
ISDSC	Inter-States Defense and Security Committee
KC	Karamoja Cluster
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NIJK	Netherlands Institute of International Relations
NRI	National Research Institutions
OUA	Organization for African Unity
PSC	Peace and Security Council
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SROMS	Sub-Regional Peace and Security Observation System
TNCs	Transnational Corporation
UN	United Nations Organization
UNAMSIL	UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my wife Cecilia and Children for their support and understanding for the whole duration of my studies.

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ABSTRACT

The Horn of Africa which comprises of seven countries has witnessed intermitted internal conflicts which have common roots in the colonial past and were largely contained during the cold war period by super powers' patronage and ideological allegiances.

The end of the cold war witnessed a growth in internationalisation of conflicts which called for the international community to reconsider the notion of state sovereignty and external involvement in domestic disputes. This development saw the emergent of mechanisms in the regional and sub-regional levels charged with responsibilities of intervening in internal conflicts which threaten the sub regional peace, security and stability.

The study will briefly discuss the backgrounds of member states in order to understand the origins of the current conflict system and analyse the early warning and response mechanism as an instrument of conflict management within the IGAD to foresee conflicts before they occur and provide the information to relevant response institutions to act in order to forestall catastrophics. The study observes that the states of the sub-region individually and collectively continue to seek solutions to the conflict problem most of which are domestic but have regional implications.

The study utilizes the liberal institutionalism theoretical framework to critically analyse the operational and institutional arrangements for the IGAD's conflict early warning and response mechanism (CEWARN). It also examines the mechanism's performance in its short time of operation in selected areas of conflict and in few member states with a view to recommending future structural and strategy adjustments to meet future sub regional conflict challenges.

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Introduction

The Intergovernmental Authority and development (IGAD) sub region is located on the horn of Africa and stretches over an area of 5.2 million km² comprising the countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Some 80% of the region is arid and semi arid lowlands with low rainfall and the of the region has great variety of climates and landscapes including cool highlands, swamp areas, tropical rain forests and other features typical of an equatorial region. The region is prone to recurrent droughts and dry spells making it one of the most vulnerable regions on the African continent to climatic variations.

The IGAD region has a population of over 160 million people characterised by diverse ethnicity, high growth rates and variations in population density between the countries and ecological zone, ranging from 14.5 persons per km² in Somalia to above 95 per km² in Uganda. There are the deserts with scarcely anybody living in them, and pockets in rural areas with high populations of more than 600 persons living on one km²

A major strength of IGAD is the large and diverse population in the region and the political commitment of the leadership of the member countries towards the idea of regional cooperation. Despite prevailing bilateral differences between some member states, there is a positive commitment towards IGAD as an institution as affirmed by regular participation in IGAD activities and payment of annual contributions. However major challenges include harmonization of policies which may entail difficulties, resulting from un-conducive political environment caused by both inter and intra-regional

conflicts. The Horn of Africa like other African sub regions has been colonised by the British, Italians and Arabs who sub divided the region according to their interests and needs. The sub regional characterisation and colonial legacy laid down the foundation for the conflicts in the Horn of Africa and like elsewhere in the world; conflicts are a part of the dynamics of the society.

Post-Cold War Africa has witnessed a proliferation of internal conflicts which were characterised three dimensions of arms race, ideological competitions (the USA capitalism and the USSR socialism) and territorial expansion.¹ Arguably, the Cold War promoted insecurity and conflicts because the political elites deliberately undermined formal institutions through financial and military support from the super powers. However, the end of Cold War ushered in declining external support and increased internal pressures that led to the outbreak of new civil wars².

The Cold War was a critical setback for the maintenance of peace and security at the national, regional and international levels. At the international levels, principles such as territorial integrity, sovereignty and sanctity of existing borders were being challenged while at the national levels issues of access to resources and equity rekindled conflicts that hitherto were almost non-existent. Africa's political landscape has for a long time been characterized by violent and non-violent conflicts with most of them being intra-state including the conflicts in the Horn of Africa like in southern Sudan, Somali and the current Darfur Crisis in Sudan.

¹ Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* United Nations pubns, New York 1995

² W Reno "Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil wars" in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, (eds), *Greed and Grievances Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner,2000) pp 43-68

Violent conflicts have undermined economic development and sustainable growth in many African countries. These conflicts have brought about death, human suffering and generated hate and divisions among states and families forcing some people into being refugees and internally displaced persons.¹ The conflicts have resulted to the emergence of regional and sub-regional organizations that have come up with a security agenda complete with security initiatives to address the conflicts and their attendant security concerns.

Mial² defines conflict as the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups. Mitchell³ views conflict as a situation in which two or more human beings or groups desire goals, which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other but not both. Violent conflicts arise for a host of reasons including disputes over ideology, land, access to resources and power of state, gross inequality, ethnicity, religion and territorial borders. Any list of causes is bound to be incomplete but there is consensus with regard to general types of sources that are common. According to Chandra⁴ conflict can be categorized into four fitting broad groupings namely insecurity, inequality, private incentives and perceptions.

Africa, has witnessed emergence of regional and sub-regional organizations in response to various security challenges occasioned by conflicts. The study focuses on the

¹ See M. Mwangi, *The Greater Horn of Africa System: Conflicts Patterns Strategies and Management Practices* (Paper presented at the USAID Conference on Conflict and Conflict Management in the Greater Horn of Africa, Nairobi, April 1997) pp 3.

² See H Mial et. al, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts* (UK, Blackwell, 1999) pp 19-20.

³ See C.R Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict* (London Macmillan, 1981) pp16

⁴ Chandra Lekha & Zoe Nielsen (ed), *Introduction why examine sub regional sources and Dynamics of Conflicts?* in *Exploring sub regional conflict opportunity for conflict Prevention: Boulder London 2004* p2

Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) sub-region that has witnessed a series of intra-state conflicts such as in Somalia, Sudan and interstate ones like Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflict, in many instances, there is a regional dimension to the causes of conflicts and that a given region tend to have similar causes that can be linked to a host of historical, political, economics, and geographic factors. Conflicts also can be regionalized as they spill over or into other states. This regional perspective is important when it comes to management of these internationalized conflicts through the sub regional organizations

This study explores conflict early warning and response mechanism and the collective measures taken by sub regional member states through the IGAD security mechanisms to address the myriad problems bedeviling the sub region due to proliferation of conflicts within the sub-region.

STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

In its endeavor to actualize Article 6A of the Agreement establishing IGAD whose objective include the maintenance of peace and security, IGAD mandated a forum of technical experts to conceptualize an early warning mechanism whose central theme was to facilitate the establishment of a regional framework within which conflicts and disasters could be averted. Subsequently it adopted a strategy which focuses on the promotion of regional cooperation in order to achieve sustainable development, peace and security in the region. The underlying principle is that IGAD will remain focused on policy level interventions and development of concepts of trans-boundary nature with regional relevance. In this connection, the prioritization of programmes such as

promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs must reflect these higher goals of IGAD.

The decision in 2000 by IGAD to establish the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) under its division of Peace and Security was part of a broader peace and development mandate adopted by IGAD. The decision reflected IGAD's realization that timely intervention to prevent the escalation or to mitigate the worst effects of violent conflict was much cheaper in terms of human and material costs than waiting for conflicts, and at worst wars to erupt. It was also to augment the role that regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa had undertaken to incorporate early warning as part of their peace and security strategies, convinced that there could be no development without peace. While it is a fact that the Horn of Africa is plagued by a plethora of conflicts ranging from intra-state tensions, interstate conflicts to cross-border community conflicts and trade in illegal arms, IGAD member states decided to adopt an incremental approach in the operationalisation of an early warning and response mechanism, focusing initially on pastoral conflicts with the possibility to expand into other types of conflicts in due course.

This study analyses the mechanism with a view to identifying any factors that might hamper its full operationalisation. It responds to the following issues of socio-economic and political factors that have the potential to constraint the implementation and evaluate the efficiency of the institutional and organizational setting which might slow or reduce the expected output. The solution to these pertinent questions will inform this study.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

To effectively tackle the statement of the research problem the study was guided by two objectives namely,

- i. To analyze the IGAD sub-regional conflict early warning and response mechanism and make relevant policy and strategy adjustments.
- ii. To evaluate the functioning of the IGAD conflict warning and response mechanism and recommend structural and institutional improvements in order to mitigate on challenges encountered

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review in this study addresses conflicts management, conflict early warning and response mechanism and relate to the insecurity and general stability in the IGAD sub region try to bring out the gaps which this study seek to fill.

A number of scholars writing on conflicts have grappled with reasons as to why conflicts occur. Mitchell observes that conflicts arise as a result of incompatibility of goals among two or more parties over an issue.¹ Mwangiri also observe that by its very nature conflict is inevitable.² The dynamics of societal change also necessitates the rise of conflicts. As Vasquez argues, human inclination towards territoriality is a fundamental factor that eventually results in to war. Territorial encroachment therefore is a source of potential conflict and possible contestation.³

In addressing conflicts, scholars have prescribed diverse opinions on the approaches to be adopted, while international organizations like the UN have dominated

¹ Mitchell C.R 1996, *The Structure of International Conflict*, London Macmillan pp15-25

² Mwangiri M 1998, 'Understanding Conflict and its Management' Nairobi, Centre for Conflict Research

³ Vasquez A.J1993, *The War Puzzle*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press p 124

conflict prevention, there is a growing demand for a devolved structure of conflict prevention to regional and sub regional organizations¹⁰. As Bennett argues, sustainable prevention of regional conflicts must be rooted in comprehensive regional approaches¹¹. Toure analyses relevant situations for conflict preventions and argues that the emergency interventions sometimes make it possible to obtain window for critical intervention and prevention of conflicts. He further notes that it is possible to obtain a provisional peace or to delay the outbreak of fighting and create an environment for conflict resolution¹².

Mwagiru has also analyzed conflict management and argues that, since the process of conflict is complex, the process of managing it must also be complex. In which case, conflict management must reflect the different aspects and characteristics of the particular conflict being managed¹³. He further analyses the conflict cycle model and its relevance in conflict prevention. In this analysis he argues that different stages in the life of a conflict require different conflict management approaches, because different approaches will address different aspects of the conflict within its cycle¹⁴. In his analysis of the notion of structural conflict, Mwagiru argues that, while conflict is nested on structural violence, in it is embedded in the structure of relationships in society. Any effort at addressing conflict must therefore necessarily look beyond the physical violence

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¹⁰ See Michael S. Lund, 'From lesson to action', in Osler Hanpson and David M. Malone (eds) 2002, *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention Opportunities for the UN System*. New York, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. p159

¹¹ Bennett 'Introduction. Experiences in Prevention,' in Rubin B R 1998, *Cases and Strategies for Preventive action*. New York, the Center Foundation Press p 14

¹² See Toure A. 'Conflict Prevention and Management in Africa' in Girandvoinet and Shneider II (eds) 1998, *Conflict Management in Africa A Permanent Challenge*, Paris, OECD, pp50-63

¹³ Mwagiru M, 2002, *Peace and Conflict Management in Kenya*. A Catholic Justice and Peace commission Nakuru Diocese Publication. pp85-86

¹⁴ Ibid p57

and take into account the structures that underlie social relations¹⁴. Therefore, central to an effective capability to prevent conflicts is also the capacity to identify, monitor and analyse the long term underlying causes of conflict. This makes recognition of the complexity of conflict essential to the type of response initiative.

The peace treaty of Westphalia in 1648 created the current state system which defines states to have the following attributes, permanent population, defined boundaries (territory) a government and sovereignty with interests. These attributes of a state dictates how it interacts in the international system because it decides independently who to relate with and what goes on within its borders and hence the doctrine of non interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. The state system subsequently created an anarchic international system which requires diplomacy and international law to manage and contain the conflicts that would inevitably arise as a result of the relationship between them¹⁵. This anarchic international system with all its rules and imperfections is the one that African states joined when they attained independence. In classical Realist thought, the state is the central actor in the international system and even the United Nations charter envisioned a world of exclusively interstate relations. Because of the connections between the internal and external dimensions, the posture of international actors and organizations is salient to the prospects of conflict exacerbations.

The roots of the conflicts that disrupted all the countries of the Horn in the 1980s and 1990s correspond to the general conclusion of analysts like Ayoob, who comments

¹⁴ Mwaguru M, *Conflict in Africa, Theory, Process And Institutions of Management* CCR Publications, Nairobi (2006)

¹⁵ Mwaguru M, *Conflict in Africa, Theory, Process And Institutions of Management* CCR Publications, Nairobi (2006)

about the primacy of the domestic as threat to security.¹⁷ However, that phrasing, which avoids categorical statements about a single cause, is compatible with conclusions like those of Ohlson and Stedman that 'individual security, national security, and regional security are interdependent'¹⁸. This study seeks to explore those interdependencies rather than simply to debate external versus internal causation. In exploring the interdependencies between local, national and regional issues and to get away from a simple external-internal dichotomy, it is critical to look at what past and present internal cleavages owe to external influences. The following are some situations which can be logically identified: those which are only sustained because of external backing, like several Somali movements of the 1980s; those where conflict has been significantly escalated by the involvement of neighbouring states (as in the Sudan insurgency after the lull of 1991-94); those where neighbours' involvement hinders resolution of conflicts-as perhaps in northern Uganda, and to some extent in Somalia; those where external influences were present but not determinant, the Eritrean and Tigray liberation movements would be the most noteworthy examples. A related aspect of interdependency has to do with the geopolitical structure and whether it promotes, amplifies or dampens conflict.

Conflict early warning and Response Mechanism

Literature on early warning and response mechanisms especially in Africa acknowledges that there has been increasing need for the responsibility of peace and security to be

¹⁷ M Ayoub, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995

¹⁸ T Ohlson & S Stedman, *The New is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994, p 15.

devolved to regional and sub regional organizations¹⁹. Similar sentiments were echoed by the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan when he asserted that "broader international efforts in peace building can succeed only if there is genuine cooperation and support for such measures by the region"²⁰

The analysis of early warning has also centred on the nature of the models and their categorization. Reychler²¹ for instance, categories the anticipation methods of early warning into four. the 'signal model', which uses either premonitory or predictive signs for its early warning, the 'scenario model', encompassing the probability of various future development of conflict in its analysis; the 'value added model' on the other hand perceives violence to be consequence of the presence or absence of a series of objectives and subjective circumstances; while the failed intervention model examines what ought to have been done and when to avoid escalations or to favour a scaling down in conflict²². Given the fact that most approaches deal with anticipation of the outbreak of violent conflicts, they pay little attention to the proper circumstances in effecting constructive interventions. Violent conflicts are therefore deemed to be a 'history of missed opportunities'²³

In his analysis, Bennett²⁴ argues the case for model of prevention, which encompasses an intervention in the growing conflict before the out break of mass

¹⁹ See Ciru Mwaura 'Regional warning and Conflict Management Mechanisms' in Ciru Mwaura and Susanne Schmeidl(eds) *Early Warning and Conflict Management In The Horn of Africa*, Asmara, The Red Sea Press pp99-114

²⁰ See *ibid* p99

²¹ Reychler L, *Conflicts in Africa - An Analysis of Crisis and Crisis Prevention Measures*, Brussels, King Boudouin Fondation p29

²² See *ibid*

²³ See Reychler L, *Conflicts in Africa - An Analysis of Crisis and Crisis Prevention Measures*, Brussels, King Boudouin Fondation p29

²⁴ Bennett R R and Susanne P.C, 'Introduction : Experiences in Prevention,' in Rubin D R. 1998, *Cases and strategies for preventive action*, New York, the Century Foundation Press p13

violence. This model treats conflict as a growing particular event with a finite life cycle. This model is therefore applicable to conflicts set off by unique historical events.

Other analysis of the various early warning models have concentrated on issues related to the characteristics of the different models; the operational philosophy of the models namely, the 'hard' top down models and the 'soft' bottom up models; the decision making structure, their concerns, institutional and information base²⁴. With regard to the operational philosophy, Mwaura and Schmeidl make the distinction that, the 'hard' intelligence oriented model is associated with traditional systems of intelligence gathering commonly oriented towards strategic security concerns of states to protect their own national interests. The 'soft' model on the other hand require an information and analytic base that stresses human rather than strategic security and the welfare of all stakeholders based on information and analysis developed in transparent system rather than in a closed system, although information distributed may be classified and restricted to different levels of users. On the basis of operational philosophy, the African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) models have been characterized as 'hard' top down models, while the IGAD model qualifies as a 'soft' model²⁵.

Early warning and response to conflict prevention has emerged as a dominant consideration in the efforts at management and prevention of conflicts²⁶ the recent recognition that international programmes must address the basic causes of conflict

²⁴ See Ciru Mwaura 'Regional warning and Conflict Management Mechanisms' in Ciru Mwaura and Susanne Schmeidl(eds) *Early Warning and Conflict Management In The Horn of Africa*, Asmara, The Red Sea Press

²⁵ See *ibid* p170

²⁶ Bernie G Ramcharan, 'The international law and Practice of Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy,' *The emerging Global Watch*, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff.

through post conflict peace building, and indeed, nation building activities in order to prevent the re emergence of conflicts. Other scholars have also observed that the procedures entitled in the early warning, identifying and implementing appropriate preventive responses are beginning to be mainstreamed in the regular operations of major organizations. This is through the development of practical analytical tools for early warning and preventive policy response²⁸.

Other scholars have analysed the broader political process informing conflict. Leatherman²⁹ encourages building monitoring networks for information gathering on causes of conflict. In this context the relevant information for conflict prevention is inherent in the political process. Within the framework of devolving conflict prevention, various scholars have argued for the case of regional organizations as suitable frameworks for conflict prevention and management. They argue that, regional organizations would confine prevention to that particular conflict locality, as they better understand the conflict environment. Proponents of liberal institutionalism which gained prominence especially in the eighties and nineties as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye called for transnational cooperation to respond to common problems. This was based on the understanding that states seek multiple aims not just security but economic growth, environmental protection, advancement of civil liberties and human rights among others. Further, they argue that based on the rational actors assumptions of behavior rival states are predicted to cooperate in constructing an international security regime that limits the choice of war or use of force. What they envisioned was a sort of pluralistic security

²⁸ See Michael Lund and Andrea Mehler, *Peace Building and Conflict Prevention in Developing Countries*. London, Macmillan, 1991.

²⁹ See Leatherman J., *Breaking Cycle of Violence Conflict Prevention in Intrastate Cases*, Connecticut, Kumaran Press 1999 pp182-195

community³⁰ where various states while retaining their independence and political autonomy voluntarily cooperate with one another. As noted by Jackie, in the wake of inadequate and declining rapid response capability by the UN to conflicts in Africa, there is need for more localised response approach to conflict prevention in Africa³¹ Subsequently, sub-regional cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security has become a feature of the current security regime in Africa³² IGAD has ingrained all these in its Establishing Agreement in Article 13 and 18 A which acknowledges that peace and security from the standpoint of armed conflict is a prerequisite for socio-economic security.

To this end IGAD established the CEWARN in November 2000 and enshrined it in Article 2 (1) of its Agreement for it to gather process and share information and enable the Authority to take preventive actions against emerging conflicts. Secondly, it has engaged in conflict resolution activities especially in the Somalia and Sudan. In Sudan, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in January 2005 between the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) of the Southern Sudan and the Khartoum Government leading to a cessation of hostilities in Africa's most protracted conflict. These mechanisms conform to the tenets of liberal institutionalism which have allowed transnational cooperation among states for the resolution, management or containment of disputes before they become violent. Subsequently the security response mechanisms

³⁰ Sheehan M, *International Security: An Analytical Survey*, (New Delhi: Viva Publishers, 2006) p 28

³¹ Jackie C, 'Improving African and International Capabilities for Preventing and Resolving Violent Conflicts: The Great Lakes Region Crisis 2nd International Berlin workshop 3-5th July 1997 Stiftung Wissen

³² See L. Chweya, 'Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region' in M. Mwangi (ed), *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation* (Nairobi: Heinrich Hoff Foundation, 2004) p 36

have been developed and deployed to cater for the various pre-conflict, in conflict and post conflict stages in their management.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Liberal institutionalism is an offshoot of Wilsonian idealism developed from Emmanuel Kant's thesis about Perpetual Peace which is a seminal piece in classical liberalism. Kant envisaged a loose federation of States. Wilsonian idealism provided a shift from Liberal Internationalist perceptions on natural harmony of interests to the claim that a new international order had to be constructed, one that was managed by an international organization. It is from these nascent beginnings that liberal institutionalism grew and was given impetus by the growth and development of the UN.

The study borrows from the ideas of liberal institutionalism which focuses on institutionalizing global cooperation in the international system and calls for creation of a new global power structure by a variety of international organizations.³¹ Kegley and Wilkoff³⁴ defined liberalism as a paradigm predicated on the hope that the applications of reason and universal ethics to International Relations can lead to a more orderly, just, and cooperative world, and that international anarchy and war can be policed by institutional reforms that empower organizations and international laws for global governance. Global cooperation is founded on enhancing the role and influence of international organizations, instituting collective security and enforcing international law in order to transform anarchy within the international system as proclaimed by the realists

³¹ See B. Buzan and O. Waever, *Liberalism and Security: The Contradictions of the Liberal Leviathan* (Copenhagen, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute 1998) p 12-15

³⁴ Kegley CW and E R Wilkoff *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 2001).

and forge a harmonious community of states.³⁵ It is now commonplace to observe that the agenda of international security has expanded. Security policy and studies are no longer defined in its classical sense only where it was predominantly about military and "high politics" issues but also about economics, societal and environmental ones. Liberalism advocates the ideas of broadening the security agenda to include economic and other ideological concerns.³⁶

Liberal institutionalism challenges the classical realism that sees state as the only actor within the international system while upholding the principle of state sovereignty and drawing a dichotomy separating international and internal affairs of a state. Liberal institutionalism advances the notion of human security and sees no problem when the international community intervenes in situations of violations of human rights. Liberal precepts are important in the sense that they give predominance to institutions and institutional cooperation through collectivity and are thus important in the analysis of IGAD as one such institution.

The relevance of regional security theories has grown in the wake of the Cold War. The global system has more participants with Third World states having greater autonomy and involvement and hence shifting the locus of conflict down from the global level. Its foundational and most contested challenge to international relations (IR) theory revolves around the autonomy of a regional level of analysis between the state and the globe has three variables specific to regional structures. First, regional subsystems are porous and intervention from above can overlay local dynamics. Second, proximity qualifies the security dilemma dramatically. Most states only threaten their neighbors.

³⁵ See *ibid.* 26 pp 16-17.

³⁶ See B. Huzar et.al. *Security: A new Framework for Analysis* (London, Lynne Rienner, 1998) pp 21-25.

thus creating meaningful and distinct regional dynamics. Third, weak state-dominant regional complexes generate a shared internal security dilemma that trumps the external one. Regional organizations serve to repress shared centrifugal threats through pooled rather than ceded sovereignty. The end of the Cold War brought significant retrenchment of great power involvement from much of the developing world. After centuries of intrusion and meddling during colonialism and the Cold War, global regions are enjoying greater autonomy³⁷.

Mwagiru³⁸ observes that the reality of liberalism is cemented by the idea of interdependence because international society and the actors are interdependent making difficult to draw a distinct line between the domestic and international. In the context of conflict analysis, this means that internal and external actors are linked by many transactions and relationships and as these become more evident as a conflict develops. The only drawback is that with the states still remaining the most viable units of international relations analysis in the classic realist thought and they want to do their will without reference to integrated units. As member states jostle to emerge as regional hegemonies, IGAD's resolve will face a lot of challenges as this study will highlight.

HYPOTHESES

The following hypotheses will be demonstrated in the study:

- i. Effective operationalisation of conflict early warning and response mechanism in the sub region will bring about peace and stability in IGAD sub region.
- ii. Implementation of CEWARN is not a panacea to sustainable sub regional peace and security in the horn of Africa

³⁷ Robert E. Kelly, School of International Studies, University of the Pacific

³⁸ See *ibid.* 11 pp 62-63

METHODOLOGY

The existing regional and sub-regional conflict early warning and response mechanisms are fairly a new and evolving phenomenon in the academic discourse and require further research and analysis. The IGAD sub-region, which is the case study, has initiated the mechanism in order to mitigate on their increase and recurrence of violent conflicts. Based on these challenges the study will add value to the theoretical knowledge on the efficacy of sub regional security organizations in prevention, management and resolution of conflicts by investigating the role of IGAD and how effective its initiatives and mechanism have been in addressing conflicts.

The findings and conclusions of this study will be derived from the invaluable both primary and secondary data collected and analysed and will add value to policy makers, IGAD member states and any conflicting groups in the involvement of IGAD as an arbitrator in resolving conflicts by knowing what it can accomplish. Endeavoring to collect the relevant, accurate and current data, the study took cognizance of several considerations which includes the geographical location of the sub region which guided the collection and analysis of the research data. The types of conflicts found in the sub region which have differing causes, triggers and escalating factors needs to be investigated and the data evaluated.

The study therefore utilized both primary and secondary data. Primary data was sourced through field visits within Nairobi where unstructured questionnaire were administered to various actors and stakeholder such as the civil society, conflicts consultants and government officials. The target was the IGAD secretariat and officials from relevant bilateral and multilateral institutions, United Nations, African Union,

Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Office (EASBRCOM), NSC, ISS, Oxfam Peace study centre and National Defence College among others. Secondary data was sourced from a wide range of relevant literature both published and unpublished such as books, journals periodicals, newspapers as well as the Internet. Other secondary sources include IGAD secretariat publications and reports from AU and UN. Data analysis was guided by the research questions, objectives, hypotheses which were informed by the theoretical framework based on liberal institutionalism theory.

Chapter outline

Chapter One introduces the background and gives an overview of the study. It covers the following issues: introduction, statement of the research problem, objectives, literature review, theoretical framework, hypothesis, justification of the study and the research methodology.

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Chapter Two will give the overview of conflicts in the IGAD sub region

Chapter Three will examine the formation of IGAD and conflict early warning and response mechanism (CEWARN), its operationalisation and efficacy.

Chapter Four provides the conclusions of the study, recommendations and suggestions on the best early warning and response architecture for IGAD sub region

CHAPTER TWO

Conflicts in the IGAD sub region

Introduction

This chapter provides a brief overview of conflicts in the IGAD sub region and will discuss briefly the conflict types, management and resolution. The aim of this chapter will be to bring out the nature and types of conflicts found within the sub region while highlighting the causes. These background factors will be useful in chapter three when analysing the implementation and performance of CEWARN.

The horn of Africa has distinguished itself as the epitome of a continent at war with itself because, according to international media coverage of issues and development in the sub region, it is an area of famine, drought, poverty and starvation, civil conflicts and inter- state wars, and political instability. John Pendergast describes the horn as the 'deadliest conflict cluster in the world'¹.the sub region hosts some of the longest running civil wars and political instability, have produced an estimated 2.5 million casualties and the 'push and pull' factors of migration have also led to massive refugee flows and internally displaced persons, to the extend that the region has the largest number of internally displaced persons in the world².

The horn of Africa is described by analysts as a region of 'permanent emergencies' and hence is depended on international humanitarian agencies, relief organizations and UN agencies for crisis and development interventions. The latest in the long history of the region's susceptibility to humanitarian emergency is the Darfur region

¹ Pendergast J. *Building for Peace in The Horn of Africa. Diplomacy and Beyond*, special Report 50 Washington DC, USIP, 1999

² David J.F, *Uniting Africa, Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*, University of Bradford UK pp223-225, 2006

in the western Sudan where pro government Arab militias, the *Janjaweed*, are accused of perpetuating genocide and massive humanitarian disaster. Famine, wars and political instability in the region demonstrates the regionalisation of civil wars and natural disasters in the horn, and how the countries in the region are locked in a regional security complex and conflict formation. The horn of Africa has not been paralysed by the multiplicity of problems and challenges befalling the sub region, instead, out of these difficult problems, the sub region has developed mechanisms to respond to humanitarian emergencies and regional peace and security issues which unfortunately the international community has not laudably praised.

The Cold War superpower rivalries and confrontations played out in the horn compounded the contemporary peace and security problems in the region. Cold War ideological impacts led to the establishment of different political systems including military dictatorships, as was the case with Ethiopia. This also led to the establishment of military bases and global communication and intelligence bases and networks in the region. The superpowers of USA and USSR were unmatched in their injection of armaments in the horn and did so for strategic reasons in which their own rivalry grew, culminating in horn's centrality to the 'arc of crisis' during the Cold War¹. The superpowers supported dissident groups and propped up dictators with money and weapons which eventually led to proliferation of small arms and light weapons which continued to threaten security in the IGAD sub region long after the Cold War.

The horn of Africa is distinguished by its geographic location and how it has influenced its political and socio-economic development. The horn is a gateway to the Red sea, Arabian sea, Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. The sub region has for along

¹ Woodward, *The Horn Of Africa*, 2003 pp142-144

time been exposed to politics, commerce and security concerns and interests of countries outside the region. The continued interaction with the Middle East, North Africa and Europe connected the area with political rivalries among Middle Eastern and North African states, non state actors and sub national groups which affected the politics and security problems in the sub region. The distinguishing features in terms of conflict analysis can therefore be linked to food and environmental insecurity, conflicts, bad governance and underdevelopment. A good example can be cited of the transit trade across the Kenya-Somalia border which has a complex relationship to peace and conflict. In some instances border towns of El Wak, Bulo Hawa, Doblely, and Kismayo have at times been a source of tension and armed clashes. This is mainly due to the fact that the new cross-border commerce has introduced a new and lucrative new source of livelihoods and wealth in a zone of extreme economic scarcity. The specific aspects of commerce which have tended to serve as an item over which groups fight include control over border crossings, where tax revenue can be collected; business partnerships with wealthy traders in Mogadishu, who intentionally play local groups against one another for their own gain; and competition for contracts, especially with international aid agencies. A handful of wealthy businessmen profit from and may be complicit in prolonging humanitarian crises, due to their long-running service to aid agencies transporting food aid. In several instances – especially in Kenya – businesspeople have opted to exploit the exclusionist impulse in locations to drive rival businesses out of the area. In the case of Kismayo, control of the seaport has been a major source of revenue for both the militias controlling it and the businessmen importing sugar and weapons and exporting charcoal. Another issue is the regionalisation of wars, armed conflicts, environmental problems and humanitarian emergencies have spill over which affect the whole region. The conflicts in the sub region also affect operations of non

governmental organisations in the area like the Somalia Water And Land Information Management (SWALIM) office which is now located in Kenya and is working for Somalia. Its operations are vital for the effective service delivery by the Somalia government agencies, NGOs and INGOs. According to Dr. Njeru, the organisation loses money, resources and time by operating from Nairobi. He notes that although the TFG is recognised by the UN, it does not have effective control on the ground to guarantee security to all organizations operating there requiring protection⁴. Attacks by militias, al shabaab, pirates and other marauding gangs have forced most of the humanitarian agencies to operate from outside the country which causes them to spend a lot of their resources in transportation, security and general administration and thus making their operations expensive and ineffective in service delivery and reduced development output. However it was noted that some of the local and international agencies operating in conflict zones are actually involved in one way or another in escalating the conflicts in fear of losing their jobs, business contracts and relocation to other zones.

Zartman⁵ has defined conflict in reference to the underlying issues in dispute between parties. He adds that crisis refers to active outbreak of armed conflict. Mwagiru⁶ envisages conflict to be about values, wants and interests which are negotiable, and are not susceptible to settlement. Mwagiru's⁷ line of thought correlates well with views of other scholars that conflicts of interest can be negotiated, mediated or subjected to judicial determination and be bargained over. He further adds that conflicts involve needs

⁴ Dr. Lewis Njeru, interview at Somalia Water and Land Information Management (Swalim) offices on 1st October 2008, Nairobi.

⁵ See I.W. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* New York: Oxford University Press, (1989) pp 24-26.

⁶ See M. Mwagiru, *Conflict Theory, Processes and Institutional of Management* Nairobi, Watermark Printers, (2000) pp 3-4.

⁷ *Ibid* 19. pp 108-110.

and values which cannot be traded, compromised or repressed. Indeed the literature under this definition agrees that conflict is a process, which involves rational beings within states or within neighbourhoods clashing over values, wants, interests and needs. Some scholars look at conflict "subjectively" while others look at it objectively. The subjective group believes that for a conflict to exist there has to be some perception of incompatible goals by the social actors. While to the objective group, conflicts may exist without awareness of actors. Accordingly, peace researchers prefer to look at conflict as an objective phenomenon by focusing on underlying issues of structural violence.

The origin of protracted conflicts is mostly attributed to conflicting social-cultural ethnic relationships. Lund³ in his study of protracted conflicts has developed a theory that relates causes of conflict to ethnicity. Therefore, where ethnicity exists, there are chances of continuation of conflict for a longer time than necessary. The IGAD sub region has been faced with the same arbitrariness of borders inherited from the European colonial rule resulting to problems of state-making and nation building among desperate peoples and in contested territories with cultural links across those borders. The case of the Somali community that found itself fragmented is a case in point. It attempts to form a unified state of 'a greater Somalia' has been a major source of instability within the Horn of Africa region, causing both inter-state and intra- state conflicts in several countries in the region affecting mostly Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. The existence of the borders shared by Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya are themselves a periodic contributor to conflict. The principal role they play in conflict is as a source of safe haven for armed groups – criminal gangs and militia – which commit acts of violence and then cross to the safety of their home

³ See M.S. Lund, *Preventing, Mitigating Violent Conflicts: A Revised Guide for Practitioners* (Washington D.C. Creative Associated International, 1997) P 56-59.

country and disappear. The shared border area near Mandera is known locally as the "Bermuda triangle" for precisely this reason. This dynamic points to a curious aspect of the borders — they are relatively unpatrolled, ungoverned and porous, but not irrelevant. Kenyan military do not cross the border in hot pursuit of Somali bandits for fear of attack, Somali militias cross into Kenya in pursuit of rival combatants only reluctantly, for fear of encountering the Kenyan military or police; and Somali armed bandits take the same risk when mounting a cross-border raid. In practice, this has meant that the Kenyan Garre have been able to use the border to launch attacks on El Wak in Somalia and retreat across the border with little fear of Marehan counterattack, a tactic which infuriates the Marehan and has led them to accuse Kenya of favoring the Garre. Further south, Somali bandits have until recently stolen vehicles and even looted the Kenyan police station at Laboi and then retreated back to Doble. On the Kenyan-Ethiopian border, militia and possibly Ethiopian paramilitary forces have crossed into Kenya to commit devastating livestock raids. However, it has been observed that ethnicity has been widely used by the ruling elite to perpetuate marginalisation of specific ethnic groups when sharing resources and competing for elective politics.

Protracted conflicts are also caused by underdevelopment, class conflict and problems that involve identity and destructive justice. Mial et al,⁹ in their attempt to analyze conflicts, bring in a different perspective. There is a dichotomy between armed and unarmed conflicts. To them, armed conflict is where some type of military means is used, from low intensity or guerilla tactics to full-scale international war while unarmed conflict on the other hand may include involvement of diplomacy and pacific methods to pursue objectives in a climate of disagreement. The diplomatic patterns in the IGAD sub

⁹ See Muall et al, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly conflicts*, Blackwell publishers, UK 1999 pp 153-157.

region can be considered as a systemic element of conflict which is characterised by states experiencing tense relations which are either on suspicions of supporting rebel groups or just real security concerns among the states as the case has been between Sudan and Eritrea.

Some of the root causes of the conflicts in the sub region can be traced back into the colonial legacy as is the case of Somalia which had been subdivided into three parts namely Somaliland which was under the British and is seen to be more stable than others, Puntland, central and Southern Somalia which were under no particular colonial power and Italians respectively are rocked by inter clan conflicts and general instability compared to Somaliland. " Dr Njeru argues that compared to the other two, Somaliland relative peace and stability can be attributed to the British colonial rule which laid down the foundations of infrastructure in education, communication and economic fields which continue to function to date compared to the Italian Somalia colony which did not inherit much in terms of developed infrastructure and economy leading to scarcity of resources and poor governance structures during independence. 'this colonial socialization has continued to inform the internal conflicts of Somalia because , apart from Somaliland, the other Somalia regions seem to dwell more on how they will survive today by continuing to fight for accumulation of resources and survival'.¹¹

Conflict causes can further be explained in terms of root or structural causes, proximate causes, and triggers. The cause categorization recognizes that different causes will be of varying importance at different stages in the escalation or de-escalation of

¹¹ Dr Lewis Njeru, interview at Somalia Water and Land Information Management (Swalim) offices on 1st October 2008, Nairobi

¹² *ibid*

conflicts. It also facilitates the design of conflict prevention strategies that are responsive to the particular dynamics of play. Several scholars analyzing the conflicts in the IGAD sub region give a combination of causal attributes. Michael Brown attributes the conflicts in Africa to the ideological revolution among international financial institutions in the 1980s. When economic conditions were imposed and international aid denied to some states, it rendered their economies into jeopardy. This was partly because the African patrimonial states relied on international resources to support their clients; this was dealt the final death blow by the collapse of Cold War where the remaining states that were relying on the super powers were put on conditionality. The general consensus of the international development community, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, attributed the root-causes of Africa's problems to inappropriate policies, lack of democracy, bad governance, and lack of an enabling environment, inflexible institutions and bad leadership. World Bank¹² urged that 'rethinking' and a 'fresh look' on African problems of development were urgently needed. They recommended a series of policy imperatives all calculated to creating in the African countries the enabling environment so that people could freely and effectively participate in the development and democratization processes. They urged the adoption of market forces, democracy, good governance and plural politics. They accordingly imposed several structural adjustment measures and conditionalities in support of the policies they recommended. These created serious economic problems and precipitated political and social unrest, including ethnic conflicts.

¹² World Bank Post-conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank, The World Bank, U.S.A 1998: pp24-27

Mitchel,¹³ argues that in order to consolidate the newly acquired sovereignty, to popularize and distribute the fruits of independence an extensive Africanization of the public sector and the armed services was undertaken. In most cases this exercise entailed entrenchment of ethnic domination, thus perpetuating and intensifying ethnic conflicts. In response to the rising expectations triggered by the promises of independence, the post-colonial governments were forced to extend social services to areas where they did not exist, and expanded them in places where only a few existed. In the process the state became the main provider of social and other public services, thus involving government in a much wider circle of economic and social activities; and inevitably their control. Civil society was weak or virtually non-existent. Incrementally, the state became very powerful and the major source of "rent" and those who controlled it –the leaders and senior bureaucrats – manipulated its flow. Thus, as the role of the state became economic conditions were perceived by the people to be worse than they were during the colonial period.

The problem of access to resource especially among pastoral communities has also generated conflicts in some parts of Kenya and Uganda. Other related causes of conflicts in the region are attributed to the visible political, ethnic and religious persecution leading to violation and abuse of human rights. Universal human rights have challenged the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states as the international community has to intervene in situations of violations or in the provision of humanitarian intervention. There is an evolving doctrine of humanitarian intervention in international law which supports the forceful intervention by a third state to stop gross

¹³ Mitchell C.R., *The Structure of International Conflict Resolution the Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly conflicts*, Oxford, U.K. 1981 pp:46-52

human rights abuses and violations by a government to its citizens. The natural law approach to human rights instruments like the universal declaration of human rights regime is in line with the customary international law and even argued by some as part of *jus cogens*

Conflicts are also classified by use of the participants or players into intra-state where by the conflict takes place within the international boundaries of a given states while in inter-state, the actors are sovereign states. An example of the state collapse in Somalia which continues to destabilize her neighbours will suffice. The state is also a factor in conflict on the Somali side of the border, for three very different reasons. First, the complete and prolonged collapse of the Somali state has had disastrous impact on the Transjuba regions, producing a context of lawlessness and anarchy that is only partially mitigated by attempts to strengthen local governance. Second, efforts to revive a central government in Somalia have been conflict-producing. Because representation in Somali national fora is now explicitly clan-based, state-building negotiations encourage clans to maximize territory they can claim to control. Loss of a presence in or control of a district can carry serious consequences for political elites vying for top seats in the transitional government. This has been a factor in the recent Il Wak conflict. Third, when state-building efforts fail in Somalia, the international community has periodically sought to work with sub-national, regional or transregional polities. In the late 1990s, this was termed the "building block approach" to state revival, and indications are strong that a comparable policy is likely to emerge if and when the TFG fails. That increases local political competition for control over regional or multi-regional polities, and is likely to be a conflict issue in both Gedo and Lower Jubba regions.

There seems to be a paradigm shift in the humanitarian intervention system that traditional notions of national sovereignty should be set-aside in cases of massive violations of human right. The rights of individuals and groups can override the principle of sovereignty. Even though none of the nation-states are keen to promote a complete abandonment of the principle of non- intervention, they maintain that acts of genocide and flagrant violations of individual rights can never be purely an internal matter.¹⁴ This judgment is underlined by the fact that government oppression and civil war often produce international problems such as massive flows of refugees and proliferation of illegal arms which affects other states not necessary involved in the conflict. For example the widespread ownership and easy availability of small arms in the border area is widely cited as an intensifier of armed conflict. The flood of small arms in the Horn of Africa is well-documented, as is the devastating impact of semi-automatic weaponry on communal conflicts in the region. Criminal violence produces much higher casualty levels, criminal and militia gangs now often outgun police and military units, and the number of people a militia can massacre in a raid is vastly higher due to semi-automatic guns. The result is that casualty rates in contemporary violence in the border area are much higher than was the case fifty years ago, overwhelming customary law designed to handle conflicts from an earlier, less lethal era.

Given the chronic insecurity and porous borders in the region, small arms proliferation will remain a dangerous reality for border area communities for the foreseeable future. Some modest efforts in Wajir, Kenya have succeeded in disarming youth, but prospects for large-scale disarmament in the region are remote for now. In southern Somalia, the only factor which has reduced the lethal risk posed by near-universal ownership of semi-

¹⁴ Jongman A J. and Schmid A.P., *Monitoring Human Rights-Manual for Assessing Country Performance* Leiden, Proom 1994 pp 20-30.

automatics is the substantial rise in the cost of ammunition, which has shortened the duration of armed clashes since the early 1990s. For these reasons, there has been strong support for a broad interpretation of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

Rupesinghe and Michiko,¹⁵ argues that during the Cold War Africa became an important arena where the proxy ideological wars were conducted. In the circumstances it did not matter whether an African state was a democratic or not, or if its leaders believed in democracy and practiced good governance. What counted immensely was their loyalty and allegiance to either of the superpowers. The west supported African dictators and tolerated their brutalities, violation of human rights, bad governance and rampant corruption as long as they were opposed to communism. The Soviet Union supported any African leader who appeared to be anti-west irrespective of the fact whether his policies or leadership were beneficial to the people unmindful of the fact that whether or not he was caring about his people. In this manner dictatorship, bad governance, diminution of democracy, violations of human rights and basic freedoms in Africa were perpetuated and in some cases institutionalized. Good cases in point here are Somalia during Siad Barre and Ethiopia during Mengistu's rule. Miall *et al.*,¹⁶ suggest that with the demise of the Cold War, the reassertion of the democratic impulses and the proliferation of civil societies towards the 1990s, the west no longer felt the need to protect its former allies – the African dictators. And those abandoned by the communists had their weaknesses suddenly exposed, and were challenged by the people whom they had oppressed and repressed for a very long time. Directly exposed to the people many of whom were

¹⁵ Rupesinghe and Michiko, (eds), *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution*, Macmillan, UK, 1992:pp79- 106

¹⁶ Miall et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts* Blackwell publishers, UK, 1999,pp105-110

organized in political parties or in various NGOs and other civil society groups, some African leaders have frustrated the political parties, others repressed the emergence of strong civil societies, while yet others resorted to the manipulation of ethnic sensitivities and fears.

Zartman and Deng,¹⁷ have argued that poor leadership has also been a source of conflicts. Most of Africa leaders have perfected personal rule, while their desires, wishes and wills prevail and become law. The idiosyncratic variables of leaders in Africa have characterized the way many Africa countries are governed. This has been made possible by weak institutions that do not offer checks and balances to the presidency. This has contributed to corruption, ethnicity, patronage and military coups.

Kamenju *et.al*¹⁸ observe that availability of small arms and light weapons in private hands fuel conflicts in Africa especially cross-border conflicts among pastoral communities. These arms also are available to rebel groups that challenge the authority of governments. The collapse of Somalia as a state has resulted to smuggling of arms into Kenya increasing insecurity and cross-border conflicts. Most of the intra-state armed conflicts within the IGAD sub region have centered on the fight for political power, however livestock rustling, arms trafficking and refugee flows among others have also been sources of tensions¹⁹.

¹⁷ Zartman, W I and Deng, M F (eds), *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, The Brookings Institute, Washington, 1991 pp76-79

¹⁸ Kamenju J et al , *Profiling Illegal Small Arm and Insecurity in North Rift Region, Kenya*, SRIC, Nairobi, 2003:pp 26-28

¹⁹ Nhema, A G (ed) ; *The Quest For Peace in Africa: Transformations Democracy And Public Policy*, International Books with OSSREA 2004 p173

CHAPTER THREE

IGAD conflict early warning and response mechanism

Introduction

The conflicts in the Horn of Africa have been characterised by different causes and exacerbated by the environment where they are executed. One of the notable factors is the socio-economic which deals with the production, distribution and scarcity of goods and services. It is therefore important look at the prevailing environments briefly in order to understand its application to conflict early warning and response mechanism.

In 1999 the IGAD region achieved a total Gross Domestic Product valued at US\$ 35.9 Billion¹. This corresponds to an average income (Gross National Product) of US\$ 233 per capita, which has been stagnant in most of the IGAD countries for the last two decades. All the countries in the Region are characterized by poorly developed domestic market structures, low savings and investment, heavy debt burden and underdeveloped infrastructures.

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The economic mainstay of the region is agriculture, both livestock and crop production that provide the basis for food supplies and export earnings as well as employment for over 80% of the population. The contribution of industries to the national economies is about 15-20% on average. Since they produce similar commodities, the level of intra-state trade remains low and markets are neither inter-dependent nor inter-linked. Globalisation trends of the world economy pose both challenges and opportunities for the sustainable development of the IGAD region.

¹ IGAD strategy document , Djibouti 2003

There is a major trend for urbanization in the IGAD region with large numbers of people from the rural areas migrating to the big urban centers in search for employment and income. Socio-economic and environmental problems in the ever-growing urban centers have reached a level of disrupting peace and stability of some countries of the Region. Illiteracy rates showed a marked decline in the past decade in all IGAD member states. Life expectancy has increased and infant mortality had decreased between 1992 and 1999 but the effect of HIV/AIDS has visibly eroded this improvement. A fundamental principle for sustainable development is that human well being that is the health, wealth and quality of life of people, is part of, and linked to the diversity, productivity and quality of the ecosystem⁷.

The quality of life of the majority of the people and the quality of the ecosystem of the region have deteriorated in the last decade and the little improvement gained in some of the countries was eroded by high population growth, political conflicts and/or HIV/AIDS and other pandemics. Famine and civil strife have also retarded the region's progress toward sustainable development. Despite this poor economic outlook, the region is endowed with substantial natural resources, such as substantial oil and gas reserves, diverse ecosystems, alternative energy resources (hydroelectric, solar and geothermal), marine, water and livestock resources, which if properly managed, can significantly contribute to the economic development of the region. A population of about 160 million and an expansive territorial coverage provide a sizeable market, which can attract domestic and foreign investors. In addition the region is increasingly moving towards democratic governance and has progressed towards a free market economy. Admittedly, lack of stability, conflict and famine prevailed in some of the countries. Almost all IGAD

⁷ IGAD strategy document, Djibouti 2003

countries have undergone structural adjustment programmes with varying degree of implementation and success. It is against this background that IGAD member states have chosen to enhance their regional co-operation in all areas of interest so as to exploit these vast resources and propel the region to new economic growth levels.

IGAD was formed in January 1986 as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) to coordinate the efforts of the Member States in combating desertification and promoting efforts to mitigate the effects of drought. In 1990, IGADD prepared and adopted a framework strategy for each of its food security and environment protection sectors¹. The Authority also provided a regular forum for policy and decision makers of the member countries to tackle desertification and drought issues as well as other emerging regional and international challenges. However, due to increased security challenges member countries felt that IGADD would no longer provide an adequate forum to address socio-economic issues within the sub-region. In April 1995 in an extraordinary summit of Heads of States and Government, member states with exception of Somalia met and resolved to expand its mandate.⁴ The name changed to IGAD and member states added in its mandate the desire to promote peace and security in the sub-region and create a mechanism for the prevention, management and resolution of intra and inter-state conflicts through dialogue. It embraced a paradigm shift to serve a civil society that was increasingly becoming sophisticated by use of modern communications and transportation, with regional and global reach. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) sub region is made up of seven

¹ IGAD strategy document, Djibouti 2003

⁴ IGAD/SUM.96AGRE Doc Nairobi, 1996

countries which are found in the Horn and the East Africa namely; Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somali.

The IGAD is comprised of four hierarchical policy organs namely;⁵ the assembly of Heads of states and government which is the supreme policy making organ and determines the objectives, guidelines and programmes for authority. Its chairman is rotational among its members and meets once a year. The council of ministers is composed of ministers of foreign affairs and one other focal minister designated by each state. It formulates policy, approves the work programmes and annual budgets of the secretariat. The committee of ambassadors is comprised of IGAD member states ambassadors or plenipotentiaries accredited to the country of IGAD headquarters. It convenes as often as the need arises to advice and guide the Executive Secretary. The secretariat is headed by the Executive Secretary who is appointed by the assembly for term of four years renewable once. The secretariat assists member states in formulation, coordination and harmonization of regional projects and development policies and programmes for approval by the council⁶. The Executive secretary is assisted by four directors each heading a division of Economic cooperation and social development, Agriculture and Environment, peace and security and administration and finance.

The founding fathers of IGAD were motivated by a vision where the people of the region would have developed a regional identity and would be living in peace and a clean environment having alleviated poverty through appropriate and effective economic, food security and environmental programs. Towards achieving these noble objectives, the secretariat formulated a vision and mission which are

⁵ Intergovernmental authority on development :*Profile document*. pp4

⁶ IGAD/SUM 96AGRE Doc Nairobi, 1996

IGAD will be the premier regional organization for achieving peace, prosperity and regional integration in the IGAD region and to assist and complement the efforts of the Member States to achieve, through increased cooperation: Food Security and environmental protection, Promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs, and Economic cooperation and integration , respectively.

Conflicts forced the IGAD sub-region to rethink and reshape its strategy and in 2003, an elaborated IGAD strategy was adopted by the summit of Heads of states and government. The strategy provides a framework for guiding it in pursuit of its mandate and propels it forward into a regional economic organization for achieving peace, prosperity and regional integration. The driving force is the member states' desire to attain a viable regional economic cooperation. The peace and security division is mandated to deal with issues related to peace and security and humanitarian affairs. Under its docket, the division has three main programmes components namely; conflict prevention, management and resolution; political affairs and humanitarian affairs. In response to this phenomenon several security mechanisms have emerged and corresponding institutions established notable ones being: conflict early warning and response mechanism (CEWARN) whose strategy is to pro-actively prevent and respond to conflicts and the IGAD capacity building program against terrorism all based in Addis Ababa and the EASBRCOM with offices in Nairobi and all working under the direction of this division.

¹ IGAD strategy document, Djibouti 2003

CEWARN and the Prevention of Conflict in the Horn of Africa

The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan³, stated that "broader international efforts can only succeed if there is genuine cooperation and support of such measures by the sub region". By so doing, he was reinforcing the position of his predecessor, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali's *"Agenda for Peace"* where he noted that "regional arrangements or agencies in most cases possess a potential that should be utilized in serving functions of preventive diplomacy, peace keeping, peace making and post conflict peace building" (1992).

Early warning and response systems were first developed in Africa in the 1970s to deal with drought and to ensure food supplies to avoid humanitarian disasters. In the 1990s, accelerated by the Rwandan genocide, early warning efforts expanded beyond natural disasters to include food security and refugees. More recently, early warning efforts have been used to address the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts. Various African regional and sub-regional organizations began to prioritize these CPMR issues in the early 1990's.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) established the Central Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution charged with the anticipation and prevention of situations of armed conflict as well as with undertaking peacemaking and peace-building efforts. The establishment of a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), however, accelerated after the transformation of the OAU to the African Union (AU) in 2002. The CEWS is intended to be one of the key pillars of the Peace and Security Council in addition to the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force and a

³ Kofi Annan, *"The causes of conflict and the promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa"* (1998), 'Report on Peace and Security in Africa'

Special Fund. The Roadmap for the Operationalization of the CEWS which was developed in 2005 to describe the practical steps necessary for its implementation was adopted by the Peace and Security Council in June 2006.

The models of early warning systems developed in the various African regions are based on different premises⁹. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in cooperation with its implementing partner, West Africa Network for Peace-building (WANEP), operates through a network of civil society organizations in partnership with governments. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has developed an Organ for Politics, Defense and Security in developing a collective security or defense system. IGAD's CEWARN Mechanism is primarily based on governments, but also operates in partnership with civil society organizations.

The CEWARN Protocol lays down a wide range of areas on which CEWARN can collect information¹⁰. The mandate of CEWARN is to receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region. These include livestock rustling, conflicts over grazing and water points, nomadic movements, smuggling and illegal trade, refugees, landmines and handitry. However, CEWARN was mandated by the member states to commence with the monitoring of cross-border pastoral conflicts. The focus on cross-border pastoral conflicts was chosen as an entry point for CEWARN because such a pilot project was of mutual interest to all IGAD member states which held common interests in addressing the problem and as a means of gaining and to encourage cooperation among countries in the Horn. Arid and semi-arid cross-border areas with a livelihood system of pastoralists and

⁹ See Mwangura, C and S. Schmeidl 2002 (ed), *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*, Red Sea Press., Addis Ababa pp 99-112

¹⁰ See IGAD, 2002, *CEWARN Protocol*, IGAD Addis Ababa

agro-pastoralists run along all the borders of IGAD, with similar ethnic groups along the boundaries.

The decision in 2000 by IGAD to establish the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) under its Division of Peace and Security was part of a broader peace and development mandate adopted by IGAD¹¹. The decision reflected IGAD's realization that timely intervention to prevent the escalation or to mitigate the worst effects of violent conflict was much cheaper in terms of human and material costs than waiting for conflicts – and at worst wars – to erupt. It was also to augment the role that regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa had undertaken to incorporate Early Warning as part of their peace and security strategies, convinced that there could be no development without peace.

In 2002, the African Union member states signed a protocol establishing its Peace and Security Council, providing for the establishment of a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) in order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts in Africa. Earlier on, the establishment of a conflict early warning and response system had been identified as a key area within IGAD's peace and security agenda during a meeting of the Council of Ministers held in Khartoum in 2000 where a decision had been taken to establish CEWARN for the IGAD region. After focused research, consultations and assessments in all IGAD member states, the Council of Ministers of IGAD endorsed the Protocol Agreement in 2002, and subsequently the IGAD member states approved the protocol establishing CEWARN on January 2002 in Khartoum during their ninth (9) summit providing CEWARN with a legal entity and operational framework. The Protocol

¹¹ David J F, 2006, *Uniting Africa, Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*, University of Bradford UK pp223-225

entered into force in July 2003 having received the necessary instruments of ratification from Eritrea, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan. Djibouti ratified the Protocol in April 2005¹².

The AU Commission is currently engaged in a process to set up the CEWS and the IGAD Secretariat, through the CEWARN Unit is participating in this process¹³. It is anticipated that the culmination of this exercise will define clearly the modalities of collaboration and linkages between CEWARN and the Continental Early Warning System.

The role of CEWARN

CEWARN involves gathering, processing and sharing of information in order to enable the authority to take early actions to address emerging conflicts. Mwaura¹⁴ observes that CEWARN was conceived as a mechanism that would enable the IGAD sub-region to systematically anticipate and respond to various conflicts currently affecting the sub-region. Keyserling¹⁵ notes that the aims of CEWARN are: to enable member states to prevent conflicts in border areas from developing into violent conflicts on a greater scale, to enable local communities to play an important part in preventing violent conflicts, to enable IGAD secretariat to pursue conflict prevention in the sub-region and provide technical and financial support

To achieve its objectives CEWARN hopes to promote the exchange of information and collaboration among member states on early warning and response on the basis of the principles of timeliness, transparency, cooperation and free flow of

¹² Cewarn Unit, *Cewarn strategy 2007-2011*, Addis Ababa 2006

¹³ David J.F, 2006, *Uniting Africa, Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*, University of Bradford UK pp223-225

¹⁴ See Mwaura, C and S. Schmeidl 2002 (ed), *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*, Red Sea Press, Asmara p 119.

¹⁵ Keyserling, N. 2003, *Establishment of an Early Warning and Response Mechanism for the IGAD Region*, (unpublished paper in www.igad.org) p 23

information; gather, verify, process, and analyze information about conflicts and communicate all such information and analysis to the decision makers of IGAD policy organs. Mwaura¹⁶ notes that , the early warning functions of CEWARN include receiving information and reports from National Research Institutions (NRIs) and Conflict Early Warning Early Response Units (CEWERUs), processing and analyzing such information, bringing that analyzed information to the attention of the secretariat, providing the necessary feedback to the NRI and CEWERUs, disseminating such information as it is authorized, updating and synthesizing information, setting standards, monitoring and coordinating information collection and reporting, promoting dialogue on information and analysis, networking among information gathering organizations and verifying information received from NRIs and CEWERUs.¹⁷

Structure and Functions of CEWARN

CEWARN's mission is to establish and operate an effective, sustainable sub-regional mechanism that will undertake conflict early warning and early response consultations and foster cooperation among relevant stakeholders to inform and enhance the peaceful settlement of disputes and respond to potential or actual violent conflicts in the IGAD region.

CEWARN has established a system of local information collection networks to collect and document relevant information and data on cross-border and related pastoral conflicts. At national level, each network is composed of several Field Monitors (FMs), trained in collecting information, categorizing and placing that information into

¹⁶ See Mwaura, C' 1999, *Local Conflict Prevention Initiatives and Regional Frameworks Prospects for Integration in Africa*, Unpublished paper Pp 6-8

¹⁷ See IGAID, 2002, *CEWARN Protocol*, IGAID Addis Ababa

prescribed reporting formats. In each of the IGAD Member States, CEWARN has identified National Research Institutes (NRIs) and contracted them as partner organisation for the Mechanism. Each NRI has a CEWARN Country Coordinator (CC), supported by an assistant, whose responsibility is to organize and supervise the required field monitoring, coordinate information and data collection, and to analyze the data and submit EW reports.

The CEWARN Unit in Addis Ababa is the regional hub for data collection, conflict analyses, information sharing, and communication of response options. It acts as a clearing house and is responsible for quality control. It supports CEWARN stakeholders in capacity-building (including training), coordinates the different CEWARN organs, assists in developing regional cooperation structures and is the driving force for the political process behind the Mechanism.

At the national level, the CEWARN Mechanism builds upon Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERUs) as focal coordinating units integrated to operate within relevant Ministries of IGAD Member States¹⁸. These units are directed and managed by CEWERU Heads who are nominated by the Member States themselves. Each CEWERU is mandated to form a Steering Committee including representatives of relevant ministries and provincial administration, security bodies such as police, intelligence and military, legislative bodies, civil society organizations, academia, religious organizations or other influential members of societies. Bringing together governmental decision makers and civil society representatives, the CEWERUs are the

¹⁸ See Mwaura, C and S. Schneiderl 2002 (ed), *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*, Red Sea Press., Asmara p 119

responsible bodies for response initiatives on a country level to be implemented in close cooperation with local committees or sub regional peace councils.

The two regional coordinating structures of the Mechanism are the Technical Committee for Early Warning (TCEW) and the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS)¹⁹. At the intermediate level, the Heads of CEWERUs collectively form the Technical Committee which convenes twice a year to run technical consultations on the CEWARN Mechanism including the discussion of early warning reports and response options. The TCEW submits its recommendations to the CPS that comprises of senior governmental representatives designated by IGAD Member States. The CPS is the policy-making organ of CEWARN and it reports to the Council of Ministers which in turn reports to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The Executive Secretary, the Director of Peace and Security Division and the Director of the CEWARN Unit are ex-officio members of the CPS²⁰.

CEWARN has a structured system of quality control on daily, monthly and quarterly bases to ascertain and maintain the reliability, credibility, timeliness and quality of data and information collected from the field. Based on the data gathered in the field, the CEWARN Country Coordinators produce regular early warning reports: country updates based on the peace and security situation of the areas of reporting; alerts based on impending or existing conflict which requires immediate action; situation briefs to inform on existing events or events that may affect the dynamics of the conflicts being monitored including natural disasters such as floods or drought²¹. At regional level, the CEWARN

¹⁹ See IGAD, 2002, *CEWARN Protocol*, IGAD Addis Ababa

²⁰ CEWARN Unit, *CEWARN strategy 2007-2011*, Addis Ababa 2006 pp 14-18

²¹ See IGAD, 2002, *CEWARN Protocol*, IGAD Addis Ababa

Unit is responsible for quality control of analytic reports submitted by the Country Coordinators based within a National Research Institute.

The reports generated by CEWARN are shared with each national Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Unit (CEWERU). Ideally, when early warning information is relayed to the CEWERUs, response actions would be initiated to mitigate or prevent an imminent conflict. The response requires proper coordination with the local structures in the areas of reporting and close cooperation with local committees or sub-regional peace councils. These include the local leadership, civil society organizations and community based organizations in the area as well as the traditional dispute resolution forums where they exist. CEWARN reports are also shared with the two regional coordinating structures of the Mechanism: the Technical Committee for Early Warning (TCEW) and the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS). On the regional level too the respective authorities are expected to take appropriate actions to prevent an imminent conflict or deescalate violence. In summary CEWARN undertakes the collection of raw data by the National Research Institutions (NRIs) and CEWERUs of member states, processing of collected data in a conflict database, data analysis by Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR) experts, the development of appropriate scenarios and recommending early response policies and the early response by member countries in order to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.


IGAD CEWARN Structure

The IGAD CEWARN structure is made of the Technical component consists of member states conflict Early Warning Early Response Units and National Research Institutions, which mainly gather the information, Administrative component consisting of the IGAD

secretariat that houses the CEWARN unit, coordinating component which includes the technical committee on early warning and response and the committee of permanent secretaries where the information is analyzed and scenarios developed and Policy component consisting of the council and assembly whose work is to make policy and take action on mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolve the conflicts²².

²² See International Alert, 2003, *Resource Pack for conflict Transformation*, IA, London.
International Alert, 1995, *Regional Mechanisms for Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy in Africa*, (a report of focal point workshop in Addis Ababa, 9th – 11th October, 2003)

Organizational Structure of the CEWARN Mechanism



CEWARN Performance

Since becoming operational, CEWARN has been undertaking the crucial role of coordinating conflict early warning and response work in the IGAD sub-region by promoting and facilitating consultations between various relevant stakeholders including governmental institutions and civil society actors. The CEWARN model is the most developed data-based regional early warning system in Africa with regard to intrastate conflict³. It has managed to develop a state of the art field monitoring and data analysis tool along with the capacity building and training required for its operation. Given the amount of infrastructure and institutional development required to establish the CEWARN Mechanism, the choice was made to focus initially on developing and refining the methodology and data collection tool for the region. The information collection systems have been set up and constitute a network of field monitors who systematically monitor and submit reports about events likely to lead to violence, using an empirically-based standard format that is coded into the CEWARN Reporter. The model has proven successful in documenting the extent of violence in the pilot pastoralist areas that had been undocumented.

The partnerships and activities already in place have allowed for the activation of numerous channels of communication in crises that have pre-empted some conflicts.

CEWARN has proven effective, in certain instances, in identifying potential violent conflicts and alerting government institutions, civil society bodies, and local authorities who then intervened to prevent the violence from taking place.

Some notable achievements of CEWARN are: a unique database providing timely, constant and accurate information on cross border pastoralist conflicts, the approach tries

³ Cewarn strategy achievements, 2007-2011

to cope with the dynamism of conflicts and combines quantitative with qualitative analysis of field data; reports provide a good basis for developing intervention options and mechanisms for response; has conducted capacity building for conflict prevention, management and response (CPMR) through skill training and increased awareness among stakeholders and has managed to bring together state and non-state actors to collaborate and adopt strategies towards addressing violent cross-border pastoral conflicts²⁴

While CEWARN has successfully developed a primary source early warning capacity, it has not yet managed to link this capacity with an effective mechanism for prevention of conflict or response to mitigate conflicts after they have broken out. The CEWARN mechanism therefore lacks a 'response' component or arrangement to avert imminent conflicts. The slow development within national CEWERUs (so far operational in three member states only Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia) vital to initiation and implementation of responses has further impaired linking the early warning to early response. The delayed reactions to build the response devices such as information sharing, communication and cooperation between various actors that could enable the mechanism to assess capacities and use available resources have contributed to those failures²⁵.

The data-based monitoring system, however, needs improvement in broadening its sources of information and in the ability to interpret and analyze the information it collects. The current mechanism depends solely on the Field Monitors (FMs) and individual knowledge of Country Coordinators (CCs) for its information and analysis.

²⁴ David J.F, 2006, *Uniting Africa, Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*, University of Bradford UK pp223-225

²⁵ David J.F, 2006, *Uniting Africa, Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*, University of Bradford UK pp223-225

The tool does not yet integrate structural data (on ethnicity or culture, for example) that is required to contextualize and interpret the field events data. Other challenges include poor infrastructure, remoteness and inaccessibility of pilot areas, complexity of conflicts in the region and inadequate capacity in addressing other types of conflict. The main channels currently employed for dissemination and sharing of early warning information produced by CEWARN includes the use of its website and dissemination of its reports to the members of the steering committees of the national CEWERU's. As a result, save for some development partners with an interest in the development of CEWARN and a few academics and researchers, the work of CEWARN as a mechanism, designed to provide early warning (EW) and cause early response (ER) and thus promote peace and security, remains largely unknown by the stakeholders who also need to be interlinked and strengthened in order to build sustainable relations²⁶. Linkages with other regional bodies like ECOWAS, SADC or the AU are uncoordinated and limited to sharing of information on the occasional seminar or conference. In order to actively place the CEWARN mechanism within its larger political context CEWARN needs to develop a comprehensive communication strategy and effective public relations spelling out CEWARN's achievements and contribution to CPMR could ultimately inspire member states to endorse the expansion of CEWARN's EW functions to cover other types of conflicts.

Another core issue for CEWARN's further development is capacity building²⁷.

Training in particular has to become more regular and routine and will need to expand as

²⁶ See Mwaure, C and S. Schmeidl 2002 (ed), *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*, Red Sea Press, Asmara. p 119

²⁷ See IGAD, 2002, *CEWARN Protocol*. IGAD Addis Ababa

CEWARN's scope of activities grows. CEWARN needs to engage the academic community as well as civil society organizations, leveraging its resources and extending its reach and influence within society more broadly. For the time being there is no continuous backup in terms of operational research and training in order to inform and communicate relevant actors within the CEWARN mechanism of underlying factors that drive pastoralist and related conflicts. Much greater effort and commitment need to be made to strengthen the response capacity, institutional and functional capacity of CEWARN.

Another gap of the initial pilot phase was the absence of any fundraising plan. Solid funding and comprehensive resource mobilization are a precondition for the functioning of a reliable early warning and analytic system applicable to violent conflicts to enable timely and effective responses. Finally, an issue that is more often than not implicit in discussions about CEWARN is that of sustainability. If CEWARN is to be considered successful, those it serves must value it. The IGAD Member States have invested a great deal of effort into the design and establishment of the CEWARN Mechanism. Several states have supported the CEWARN effort through dedicated contributions of individuals who have taken an active role in establishing the Mechanism. However, there needs to be a commensurate shift in orientation from a project dependent upon external funds to a sustainable program financed and fully owned by Member States.

CEWARN Actor's Perspectives

This study collected primary data by means of interviews using unstructured questionnaire where CCEWARN/CEWERU, NRI, FM, and several civil society and

NGOs within Kenya were covered. The respondents shared their knowledge, experiences and challenges encountered in executing their mandates and interacting with the CEWARN practitioners, policy makers and officials.

Kenya has seen tremendous increase in the number of agencies working on peace and conflict issues at local, national and sub regional levels due to high incidences of conflicts and urgency in responding to the conflicts by various actors. There was a resultant duplication of efforts in peace building initiatives especially in Arid and semi arid areas. Arising from this concern, a national framework for peace building and conflict management was established to coordinate peace building work and harmonize approaches that need inputs from all stakeholders. The framework known as national steering committee (NSC) on peace building and management was established by the Kenya government, civil society and development partners in 2001 and operationalised in November 2002.its mandates among others includes; to facilitate networking among actors at all levels, to act as point of reference to information on peace building and conflict management, to facilitate dialogue among stakeholders, integration of peace building and conflict management into development programmes and reviewing and monitoring peace building activities at all levels.

The membership is consisted of various relevant government agencies like ministries of foreign affairs, Defence, internal security and provincial administration etc , national civil society organizations like NCKK,SUPKEM etc, international civil society organizations like Oxfam, Safe world etc, women organizations, research organizations, UN agencies like UNDP and UNOCHA, development partners like USAID, MS Kenya etc and regional organizations like IGAD CEWARN and CEWERU.

The role of NSC in CEWARN in pursuant to the CEWARN protocol and its accession by member states was to house the CEWERU and act as the national coordinating office. According to Hassan the operationalisation of the NSC/CEWERU has worked well in Kenya so far and has recorded remarkable achievement like increase of the reporting areas, development of the Draft National Policy on peace building and conflict management (March 2008) and now working on mechanism for increasing response by creating a fund which will diversify the response and intervention methods. The fund has attracted financing from development partners like UNDP and USAID who have contributed towards training of 197 District officers and additional 200 are expected to under go training before December 2008. Future plans are to produce more products to the stakeholders.

The Kenya National Research Institute is working well with the CEWERU and the field monitors as explained by the Baraza²⁸, however he highlighted major challenges as lack of adequate and well coordinated legal framework for early response mechanism which is also well funded by IGAD and the states. Overall the mechanism is a noble idea which presents a forum for governments and civil society to share and generate peace building and prevention initiatives²⁹

On paper, the CEWARN mechanism is well structured and institutionalized and has worked well so far for Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia according to Karuru of IDRC.sh however recommends that for CEWARN to be more effective in achieving the intended objectives specifically for Kenya and IGAD sub region in general, the CEWARN protocol needs to be domesticated by legislating a national law which among others should

²⁸ Baraza F M, Director of programmes, Africa Peace Forum, interview at APFOR offices 2nd October, 2008 Nairobi

²⁹ See Ibid

empower and institutionalize the NSC/CEWERU within the states governments structures and even upgrade it an autonomous body like a commission to free it from government's bureaucracy and at the same time maintaining linkages with relevant departments³⁰.

Field monitors perspectives revealed that the questionnaire used to file reports are complicated and do not clearly capture all details on the ground. It was noted that the area of reporting is too large, not well funded and supplied with the right tools. The Kenyan experience indicated that the reports from the field monitors do not immediately translate to early response and sometimes conflicts occur despite the early warning which poses a security risk to the field monitor. Its therefore recommended that legal framework need to be actualized linking the field monitors reporting with the respective district peace committees for response purposes in case of Kenya³¹.

Kiptugen noted that civil society in Kenya (Wajir district) discovered early that their development objectives could not be achieved due to the conflicts and the sole responsibility of dealing with them solely rested with the government agency. Oxfam therefore explored ways of bringing together the community and the state security machinery to have a common approach to the problem and hence the establishment of the first District Peace Committee which has since been replicated to other conflict area districts with a marked success. He further argued that strength of the CEWARN Protocol is its flexibility to allow member states to choose the relevant ministry within which to house it. In case of Kenya, he recommends that the CEWARN/CEWERU should be

³⁰ Karuru N, Senior Program Officer, Peace, Conflict and Development, International Development Research Centre Nairobi Office, 7th October Nairobi

³¹ Dhuhahu M, Former District Peace Committee Staff, Mandera District, 7th October, 2008, Nairobi

legally tied with the DPC to avoid duplication and increase response efficiency at the reporting areas (Districts). Further the rapid response fund introduced at the CEWARN headquarters needs to be decentralised downwards to the DPC. Legal framework need to be developed to ensure all government and civil society development and service delivery programmes have inbuilt conflict sensitivity clauses to prevent them from becoming sources of conflicts in future. Overall the CEWARN mechanism has succeeded in averting deadly conflicts and needs to be strengthened further as recommended.³²

Many conflicts in the IGAD sub region have been resource based and more so on cattle rustling which has continued to spiral in the Karamoja and Somali clusters. In response to this concern, IGAD-CEWARN and Institute for Security Studies (ISS) partnered in what is referred to as the Mifugo project (livestock protocol) which deals with livestock identification system through branding and electronic tagging. This project is supported by through the East African Police Chiefs Organization EAPCO Protocol which when fully operational is expected to support the DPCs and CEWERUs in prevention and resolution of pastoral conflicts according to Augusta, the program Head³³. Future plans to solicit support from members of parliament from pastoral communities for relevant legislations and capacity building.

CEWARN is still experiencing challenges of operating across international boundaries because the mechanism is yet to overcome the effects of state sovereignty as

³² Kiptugen D; Security, Conflict and Peace Advisor, Oxfam Nairobi Office, 7th October, 2008, Nairobi

³³ Muchai A, Program Head Mifugo (livestock Protocol) ISS Nairobi office, 7th October, 2008, Nairobi

was argued by Kona¹⁴. He notes that this challenge will continue to hinder diversification of the mechanism from moving on to other types of conflicts because there is still a grey area between what constitutes national and sub regional security. He recommends that cewarn to endeavour to be more visible within the region through more involvement in conflict areas, aggressive fund raising and capacity building and more importantly through diversified quality products to their consumers¹⁵.

¹⁴ Kona Kona S, Conflict Prevention and Resolution Consultant, 6th October, 2008, Nairobi

¹⁵ Ibid

CHAPTER FOUR

Conclusions

Conflicts in the Horn of Africa have caused, and continue to cause untold suffering and extensive damage to life and property with an adverse impact on the overall economic development and security in the region. The region has been closely associated with recurrent cycles of drought, famine and food insecurity and large-scale population displacement, grinding poverty, political instability and even state collapse in the case of Somalia. There have been three types of violent conflict that have plagued the Horn namely inter-state conflicts, conflicts between the state and part of the society governed by the state (intra-state conflicts) and society versus society conflicts that is, ethnic, pastoralist and pastoralist versus agriculturalist conflicts.

External factors have played a role in the evolution of both internal and inter-state conflicts in the IGAD region. This is because the Horn of Africa is strategically located at the crossroads of different continents, cultures and influences. The Horn of Africa region is also exposed to the hazards of peripheral areas which act as breeding grounds for trans boundary threats including smuggling, lawlessness, militias, and, increasingly, international terrorism. Each IGAD member state is vulnerable to spillover effects of violent conflict in other states of the region. Such effects include illegal cross-border movements and large-scale cross-border crime. The situation is further complicated by the prevalence of illicit small arms and light weapons. Other direct consequences of violent conflict are large numbers of refugees, as well as internally displaced persons (IDPs).

One of the objectives of the study was to analyse IGAD's conflict early warning and response mechanism. The study on analyzing the mechanism brought a debate on the efficacy of the early warning and response which seems to divide both the academics and policy formulators and practitioners in that there is a general view that, in Africa the problem is not lack of adequate information or early warning about the potential of outbreak of a conflict but rather the lack of or failure of early response. From the genocide in Rwanda to blood civil wars and state collapse in Somalia and others Liberia and Sierra Leone the story has been the same, not the lack of early warning to prevent the outbreak of these conflicts and mass murders, but primarily the lack of early response. Analysts question the validity of early warning and the correctness of the associated intelligence. Drawing a comparison with the 2003 Iraq war which was based on what came to be referred as 'faulty intelligence' one is likely to raise the issue of potential early warning information or intelligence to be politically driven to serve particular vested interest. Bruce Jentleson argues that the problems with early warning is not absence of timely information but sometimes 'flawed analysis' of the likelihood of escalation of conflict or costs of inaction. This clearly shows that the mechanism's objective has been met and therefore the efficacy of the mechanism will mainly rely on the institutional and structural arrangements put in place to address the response side of the mechanism.

It is against this backdrop that this study critically analysed the operationalisation and the implementation of the CEWARN strategy guided by the working hypothesis. Using the performance of the sub regional conflict response mechanisms as a basis, the study has demonstrated that the mechanisms have assumed a dominant role in conflict

management. The study analysed the institutional and organizational structure of CEWARN and how these structures enhance or otherwise reduce the expected output of conflict management in the IGAD sub region. The lessons learnt from analyzing other sub regional mechanisms are critical in the strengthening CEWARN in order to avoid the pitfalls the other mechanisms underwent.

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The role of IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and response mechanism is very critical in conflict management largely due to its strong institutional capacity. It has put in place structures for effective early warning and conflict resolution in the sub region, which would eventually ensure regional peace and stability conducive for sustainable development which is a key objective of IGAD. The other objective of the study was to evaluate the functioning of the mechanism since its operationalisation and make recommendations in order to mitigate on the challenges met. The structure is made to fulfill three important functions namely technical, administration and coordination and enhance the operations of the mechanism. The institutional and organizational set up is representative from the sub region, national and the provincial representation encompassing all key stakeholders¹. It has also a quality control system to ensure reliability, credibility and timeliness of data collected and submitted. This objective has been adequately met because the evaluation showed that the institutional arrangement is effective especially in identifying potential violent conflicts and alerting the stakeholders (consumers). Barasa notes that the structure of CEWARN has served Kenya well in bringing together the national and district stakeholders namely the government, civil society and the IGAD representatives for consultation, generation and sharing of peace

¹ See chapter 3

initiatives². He argued that the mechanism continue to face the challenges of sovereignty in that many government official are not willing to share other threats (political, economic and military) information freely because they feel it is the responsibility of respective governments to deal with such threats internally and funding. 'The decisions made at national coordinating committees are sometimes not binding because the institutions lack national legal backing',³

In the study, the hypothesis that effective operationalisation of the IGAD CEWARN mechanism will bring peace in the sub region has been demonstrated but it has been noted that the performance of sub regional conflict prevention mechanism has produced mixed results. This has largely been influenced by socio-economic and political realities. Effective measures in conflict management in future must take these regional peculiarities into consideration. In spite of the evident visible role they are playing in conflict management, the collective involvement of all actors is still imperative and must be embedded in their institutional make up. Interviews carried out in Nairobi covering the civil society stakeholders and National Steering Committee and CEWERU/NRI practitioners indicated a large degree of approval of the structure on the early warning side of the CEWARN from the respondents and a glaring inadequacy in the side of the early response mechanism and made recommendations as seen in previous chapter.

Looked from the perspectives of both the institutional and structural constructions, the study confirms that CEWARN's bottom up model (soft) has a relative edge over others in terms of information gathering, analysis and flow decision making and response capacity. It calls upon other regional mechanisms to re examine their early

² Harasa E.M, interview at APFOR offices 2nd October ,2008 Nairobi

³ Harasa E.M, interview at APFOR offices 2nd October ,2008 Nairobi

warning and response mechanisms taking into considerations the 'soft' bottom up operational philosophy. The implementation of early warning mechanisms also ought not to be the preserve of a dominant regional state actor as is the case in SADC and ECOWAS. Implementation should be all inclusive encompassing both state actors and non state actor and other international organizations, regional and global like UN. However there should be a clear demarcation of roles to be played by each entity and well defined channels of communication for coordination and consultation all the time. The benefits of cooperation bears additional fruits of collective responsibility which are actors contribution in information gathering, analysis and sharing.

Beyond the technical and conceptual challenges associated with early warning and response, the single biggest challenge faced by all early warning and response systems is linking good analysis with timely action. The linkage to timely action means clarity, proximity and engagement with those institutions responsible for action. In the case of CEWARN there is a complicated and somewhat distant relationship between the system and its response mechanism (national governments, the IGAD secretariat and its political masters) that still has to prove itself in practice. Without the mechanisms to harness and focus political will to action by IGAD member states, the danger is that CEWARN may not be able to operationalise its conflict prevention ambitions at the regional level" This does not give credit to the second and potentially fruitful focus of CEWARN, namely to initiate and support local conflict prevention working with and through local structures. However, as noted in previous chapter, the case of Kenya is different because the CEWERU is housed in NSC which is an operational government department partnering with civil society and is cascaded to the community level. The

arrangement has a country wide representation in all conflict zones and what now needs to be done is to give the mechanism legal backing and completely link it up with CEWARN headquarters.

Technically, the CEWARN system is complex and authoritative but has not yet closed the gap between analysis, options and actions. It is difficult to see how this will be possible in the longer term without the co-location of CEWARN (in Addis Ababa) and IGAD (in Djibouti) and the development of an integrated conflict prevention, management and response system similar to that working in West Africa and under development in Southern Africa. Without the mechanisms to harness and focus political will to action by IGAD member states, the danger is that CEWARN may not be able to operationalise its conflict prevention ambitions at the regional level. Despite its developed infrastructure necessary to observe the escalation of conflicts before it reaches its critical mass, this ability has yet to be matched with a capacity to intervene. It suffers from the same inherent constraints as CEWS, despite being better developed to date. With the inception of the planned Rapid Response Fund and funding promised by several European donors, there should be movement towards small interventions in the near future.

This conclusion does not give credit to potentially fruitful focus of CEWARN, namely to initiate and support local conflict prevention working with and through local structures. Early warning systems are necessarily tailored to their particular function and client(s). Each end-user (such as the Peace and Security Council of the AU) necessarily needs a system to meet its particular needs, resources, and organizational culture and response mechanisms. CEWARN in the Horn is a particularly distinct and carefully

designed system to meet particular and specific requirements. But equally the early warning system for the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council in West Africa differs from that being developed for Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.

This view leads to conclusion that a degree of practical skepticism appears to be warranted on the idea that Africa would be able to develop an integrated CEWS system. It is more likely that the AU and each regional economic community (REC) would develop an own system tailored to the specific requirements and usage of each organization within a loose cooperative relationship between systems.

The sub region has experienced several types of protracted conflicts before and after independence during and after the Cold War. This shows the seriousness of these conflicts which evidently left lot devastation and killings. The study concludes that there have been effective and sophisticated customary mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution at several inter-states, national and sub national levels and even between different ethnic communities in the IGAD sub region more than it was officially realized. The type and nature of the earlier conflicts compared to the contemporary or emerging conflicts clearly calls for readjustment of these traditional mechanisms and develop new ones which incorporate them in the new ones. However the continued decades of political change and the escalating scale and changed nature of conflicts, customary mechanisms handling them needed to be restructured, strengthened and linked with others to effectively achieve the envisioned objectives. IGAD members

when they were invigorating it in 1996⁴ they had taken cognizance of the emergent new threat and were responding in a way commensurating with it.

The establishment of CEWARN was driven by this need which the analysis of CEWARN has demonstrated its successes such as establishment of databank, capacity building through skills training, creation of conflict prevention, management and resolution awareness in the sub region and brought together states and non state actors to collaborate and strategize and deal with conflicts as advocated by liberal institutionalism theory which informed the theoretical framework of this study. However there are some notable short comings highlighted about the CEWARN mechanism in the study as indicated; in that it was not able to link effective response mechanism for prevention or response to mitigate after they have broken out, the CEWERU are developing slowly and need to cover all countries and all types of conflicts, the technical tool does not yet integrated structural data required to contextualise and interpret the field data and the region does not have good infrastructure and large part of it is remote and inaccessible and hence compounding the operationalisation further.

CEWARN remains a pioneering institution in early warning and response and its short time of operation has gained enough experience and clearly demonstrates concrete benefits in the area of operation and has been supported and given full commitment to further strengthens and expands the mechanism. CEWARN therefore needs to embark on a systematic process to set priorities through consultations with its stakeholders to develop strategic plan which will move from a narrow focus on pastoral conflicts to a broad effort that would address all types of conflicts in the region.

⁴ Chapter 2

A periodic evaluation is necessary by IGAD member states to decide on the direction and extent the future expansion of CEWARN. This includes a policy decision to undertake an incremental approach, continuing the focus on pastoral conflicts while taking measures to expand the monitoring and reporting to other areas to cover all member states enabling them to develop the institutional structure and capacity for EW and ER. The consultations, contributions and recommendations will help to clearly set out the goals, various objectives and map future activities that need to be undertaken in a given time period to strengthen and consolidate the work of CEWARN. A case example here is the efforts at mainstreaming gender into peace and security structures, women are represented in the conflict early warning and early response units. The continuing challenge is that CEWERU's gender policies have yet to be fully institutionalized. To enhance these processes, all conflict monitoring and early warning systems on the continents must incorporate indicators into their activities which can help to avert the prevalence of sexual violence during conflicts and in post conflict situations. There is also the need to review these indicators to ensure that they are gender sensitive and that women are recruited as field monitors. Interviews carried out confirmed this is already happening in Kenya.

The study concludes that as regards the functional early warning model the 'soft' model adopted by IGAD member states strongly emphasizes transparency, information sharing between governments, international organizations and civil society. It also enhances the national and micro-level collaboration in conflict prevention, through involvement of many actors in the process of information collection and analysis. Early warning to be effective must put as a priority cooperating with other regional actors and

policy makers like AU and global actors like the UN and aiming to enhance synergies with local or traditional prevention initiatives. Another important goal is to diversify in order to cater for as many types of conflict as possible including but not limited to democracy, abuses of human rights, poverty organised crimes and terrorism, HIV/AIDS, resource scarcity and environmental issues among others. The mechanism needs constant review and improvement in order to keep pace with new development. Overall, CEWARN can be viewed as a realistic effort on behalf of IGAD to address the human insecurity inducing conflicts in a coordinated and long term manner.

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