

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI  
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

\\

**The Structure and Operation of the SADC: A  
Comparative Assessment of its Conflict Management  
Approach: Case Study-Madagascar //**

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(R52/70289/2011)

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A Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Degree  
of Master Arts in International Conflict Management (ICM)

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## **Declaration**

**I, Manuel Jose Goncalves**, hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

**Nairobi, 2 November 2013**

**W J I**



**(Manuel Jose Goncalves)**

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University  
Supervisor;  
t

**Nairobi, November 2013**



**(Dr Kamudhayi Ochieng)**

## **ABSTRACT**

This research intends to attempt to investigate why the constitutional crisis has ranged on in Madagascar in spite of mediation efforts by SADC. In answering this question, the paper is looking into exogenous and endogenous reasons for SADC's failure in bringing peace to Madagascar. As such, the study shall attempt to answer the question, has the structure and/or the conflict management of SADC affected mediation efforts in the Madagascan conflict? The main objectives of this research shall be: To assess the structure and operation of SADC, to carry out a comparative assessment of its conflict management approach and to investigate SADC's conflict management efforts in Madagascar. To guide this study, the concept of mediation shall be employed throughout.

The hypotheses that are tested in the research are: Competing interests within SADC contribute to SADC's failure in Madagascar conflict management, competing/conflicting interests in Madagascar by the parties contribute to mediation efforts failure and that the structure and conflict management strategies of SADC are party to mediation failure in Madagascar. The methodology used describes the research design which in this case is case study, research site being SADC, sampling procedures, research instruments, that is, questionnaires and interviews and data collection which shall be questionnaires and interviews as well.

## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ANC</b>	African National Congress
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>CENI-T</b>	Independent National Electoral Commission of Transition
<b>COMESA</b>	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
<b>CMDN</b>	Military Council of National Defence
<b>CT</b>	Congress of the Transition
<b>CSC</b>	Comite de Suivi et Controle (Follow-up and Oversight Committee)
<b>CST</b>	Superior Council of the Transition
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FFM</b>	Filankevitra ny Fampihavanana Malagasy (Malagasy Reconciliation Council)
<b>FFKM</b>	Fikambanan'ny Fiangonana Kristnina Malagasy (Federation of Malagasy Christian Churches)
<b>FLS</b>	Front Line States
<b>HAT</b>	High Authority of Transition
<b>ICG</b>	International Contact Group
<b>ICG-M</b>	International Contact Group on Madagascar

<b>MNCs</b>	Multi-National Cooperations
<b>OIF</b>	Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (International Organisation for the Francophone)
<b>OPDSC</b>	Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
<b>PSC</b>	Peace and Security Council
<b>SADC</b>	Southern Africa Development Community
<b>SADCC</b>	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
<b>SIPO</b>	Strategic Implementation Plan for the Organ
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>US</b>	United State
<b>USA</b>	United State of America

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this Research Project to my family: my wife Cecilia, my daughter Tatiana and my son Dickson, for their constant and unconditional support and love.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my Supervisor, Dr Kamudhayi Ochieng, for the continuous support in my Research Project and for his patience. His guidance helped me at all time during research and writing of this Project.

I express my gratitude to my fellow classmates at Master of Arts in International Conflict Management 2011/2013 for their support and in promoting a stimulating and welcoming academic and social environment. I learnt a lot about Kenya and they helped me to promote Mozambique's name in Kenya.

My sincere thanks go to my colleagues from High Commission of the Republic of Mozambique in Nairobi, especially to Mr. Fredrick Gachari. Mr. Gachari has been very supportive and has shown great patience at all times.

I have a debt of thanks to my wife, daughter and son for their unequivocal support throughout. I would not be well succeeded in this project without them.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### CONTEXTUALIZATION OF THE STUDY

#### 1.0. Introduction

Conflict is endemic in all social life. It is an inevitable part of living and has it has to do with scarce resources, divisions of functions, power relations and role differentiation. Conflict when analysed from the perspective of stability and equilibrium in organizational design, the term then means violence, destruction, inefficiency and irrationality<sup>1</sup>. From another perspective, conflict means any social interaction in which two parties or more compete for scarce resources. Conflict can also be defined as a situation in which two or more parties have incompatible objectives and in which their perceptions and behaviour are commensurate with that incompatibility. From the above definitions, it can be deducted that conflict is a social phenomenon that is found in personal, group or organizational interactions. As such, conflict has several dimensions<sup>2</sup>.

Conflict management is a generic term 'for a wide variety of approaches and methods of dealing with conflict situations. It subsumes a very wide range of behaviour, from the use of military force to negotiation and mediation. Conflict management does not mean conflict avoidance instead it can be understood as a process designed to stop the destructive aspects of a conflict and realize its constructive potential. This can be achieved among other things through negotiation, arbitration, adjudication, fact-finding, peace keeping and mediation. Conflict management is employed so as to affect the entire structure of a conflict situation and to contain the destructive components in the conflict like hostility and violence and

<sup>1</sup> Jacob Bercovitch, *Mediation Success or Failure: A Search for Elusive Criteria*; August 2007, p 290.

<sup>2</sup>K. Singer, *The meaning of conflict*, Australian Journal of Philosophy, 27, 3, (1949), p147-157.

help the warring parties to find some solution. Conflict management that is effective succeeds in minimizing disruption which results from the conflict and provides a solution that is satisfactory and acceptable to both parties.

SADC has fifteen members: Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, South Africa, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Madagascar joined SADC in 2005 and traditionally it has had little economic and political interaction with the rest of the region apart from hosting the African National Congress in the struggle years. SADC is indeed a diverse region as it includes Africa's richest country (South Africa), as well as some of the poorest, landlocked and island states. Democratic Republic of Congo has the largest population in Africa and Seychelles is the smallest in the continent. Another characteristic of SADC is that some of its members are not according to African Union's division of the continent found in the south like Tanzania, Angola and DRC but are members out of their volition. SADC is probably not a 'security complex'<sup>3</sup> where the security of one state is dependent on that of all the other members nor are there necessarily strong economic, social and political ties that bind all the countries together.

So as to understand the basis of the current debates within the SADC regarding how to manage peace and security, there is need to look into a little history. The precursor to SADC, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) deliberately excluded explicitly political, peace and security issues from its agenda, instead, focusing on economic development. Security issues lay in the Front

<sup>3</sup> Barry Buzan, *An introduction to strategic studies, military technology and international studies*, Macmillan, London, 1987, p67.

Line States (FLS) an informal alliance of countries willing and able to counter South Africa's military hegemony and support the armed liberation movement<sup>4</sup>.

This functional division initially continued with the foundation of SADC in 1993, with a position being raised that SADC *per se* should concentrate on economic issues and that security issues should be dealt with by a separate structure. At the core of the issue was whether member countries were willing to accept potential *de facto* South African hegemony over both economic and political spheres, as well as the involvement of what are now called International Cooperating Partners (ICPS) in political and security affairs. The FLS had also operated much as a 'club of presidents' and there was some resistance to any institutionalisation. In addition, President Robert Mugabe wished to preserve the tradition that the longest-standing president (in this case himself) retained the chair<sup>5</sup>.

The matter was resolved 2001, with the agreement that the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) should report to the SADC Summit of Heads of States thus in effect integrating political and security functions. A Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation was adopted, which set out a wide range of ambitious issues which the Organ (and the Summit) should address, including key issues related to peace and security cooperation. These issues were due to be implemented through a Strategic Implementation Plan for the Organ (SIPO) adopted in 2004. In short, it is only in the last five years that a comprehensive plan for peace and security management in the SADC region has been agreed. The Organ is tasked with, *inter alia*, promoting regional cooperation on matters related to defence

<sup>4</sup> *ibid*

<sup>5</sup> Mark Malan and Jakkie Cilliers, *SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Future Development*, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, South Africa, Occasional Paper No 19 - March 1997, p.4

and security, preventing, containing and resolving inter- and intra state conflict by peaceful means<sup>6</sup>.

In terms of conflict resolution, SADC has been partially active mainly through the appointment of mediators (typically a serving or retired presidents. The body was also active in attempting to resolve conflicts in Angola, Lesotho and DRC. The interventions had mixed results.

### **1.1 Madagascar conflict**

Madagascar, a former French colony, is the world's fourth-largest island, located in the Indian Ocean, approximately 280 miles off the Mozambique coast. Its 22 million people are a product of historical migrations from Africa, Arab countries, Southeast Asia, and Polynesia. They speak a Malayo-Polynesian language, Malagasy, which functions as an official language, along with French. The use of English has grown in recent years. Approximately three-quarters of the Malagasy people live in rural areas, making a living through small-scale commercial and subsistence farming. The country regularly suffers massive economic losses, physical destruction, and loss of lives during the annual cyclone season, and from cycles of drought and floods. Over two-thirds of the population lives below the poverty line<sup>7</sup>.

The Madagascar crisis in Madagascar began in early 2009; its roots may be traced to the difficult history of democratic transition in the country, and the failure to consolidate democratic processes and structures. Madagascar attained its independence in 1960. A military coup in 1975, saw Didier Ratsiraka take the reins. Didier ruled through authoritarian/military means until 1993 when he was forced to bow to

<sup>6</sup> *ibid*

<sup>7</sup> Kellesman Brittany, *Human Security in SADC, African Peace and Security Agenda, Pax Africa, Vol 5, 1/3/2009, p30.*



pressure to hold elections in which Albert Zafy won. Ratsiraka came back to power in 1996 after Zafy was impeached for breach of the constitution. After general elections in 2001, the results Ratsiraka were disputed by his challenger Marc Ravalomanana one of the wealthiest men in Madagascar who had developed a power base as mayor of Antananarivo and used his own personal wealth and charisma to project a populist cause.

Ravalomanana claimed victory with 52 per cent of the votes and declared himself president although official results showed he had not reached a majority required to avoid a second round. Despite a declaration of martial law in the capital by Ratsiraka, the military remained relatively neutral and refused to clamp down on pro-Ravalomanana demonstrators. A complex set of judicial and political manoeuvres ensued, with increasing international involvement, especially from the OAU, which denied recognition to the Ravalomanana administration, and negotiations in the Senegalese capital Dakar established a framework for a 'High Transitional Council.' Eventually, however, Ravalomanana established his grip on power, including over the military, and after legislative elections international support gradually shifted in his favour. His government was eventually recognised internationally and Ratsiraka was obliged to flee the country for exile in France after the collapse of his support base, in particular the militias he had set up<sup>8</sup>.

The current crisis stemmed from the 2009 crisis which had began a year earlier when Marc Ravalomanana's government decided to close a television station owned by the then Antananarivo Mayor Andry Rajoelina, after it aired an interview with former President Didier Ratsiraka, who is living in exile in France. When

<sup>8</sup> M. Baregu, *Economic and military security challenges, from Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's evolving security challenges*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2003.

Rajoelina's radio station was closed a month later, he convened a public demonstration to demand the stations' reopening, accusing President Ravalomanana of corruption and authoritarianism. Rajoelina claimed that his stations were closed as part of a politically-motivated campaign against him.

Ravalomanana sacked Rajoelina from office on February 3, 2009, after the mayor declared that he was taking over the central government and announced a parallel cabinet. At least 28 people were killed when security forces opened fire on an opposition demonstration in the capital<sup>9</sup>. In spite of the country's constitutional court rejection, Rajoelina continued to call for the President's impeachment and arrest and the establishment of a transitional government to lead the country for two years until the constitution could be rewritten and elections held. In response, Ravalomanana, who was expected to run for re-election when his term expired in 2011, publicly acknowledged mistakes made by his government during the crisis and proposed a national referendum to determine whether he should stay in office<sup>10</sup>.

Rajoelina rejected his proposal<sup>11</sup>. Ravalomanana resigned and handed over power to a military directorate, which was subsequently coerced by members of Camp Capsat to transfer power to Rajoelina. The military argued that a popular uprising had taken place and a legitimate government already existed and Ravalomanana was obliged to leave the country hoping to gather international support, including that of SADC for his return. In 2005, Madagascar had fully joined SADC under the presidency of Ravalomanana. The AU and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) suspended Madagascar's membership because

<sup>9</sup> Oliver Jutersonke and Moncef Kartas, *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA): Madagascar*, Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP), Geneva, Switzerland, 2010, P 88

<sup>10</sup> E. Adler and M. Barnett, *Security communities*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

<sup>11</sup> Lauren Ploch, *Madagascar's Political Crisis*, Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 2011.

there was no provision in the constitution for Ravalomanana to hand over power to the military or for the military to in turn transfer power to Rajoelina. Rajoelina who was then in his mid 30's did not even meet the age requirements for assuming presidency.

## **1.2 Statement of the problem**

Since the crisis broke out in Madagascar in 2009, SADC and the international community have been involved in attempting to find solution. However, more than four years have passed since the conflict broke out and country still faces constitutional crisis. Therefore, this research intends to investigate why the constitutional crisis has ranged on in Madagascar in spite of mediation efforts by SADC.

In answering this question, the paper will look into exogenous and endogenous reasons for SADC's failure/difficult in bringing peace to Madagascar. Since 2009, all attempts at mediation have failed and no element of pressure has been sufficiently decisive to promote genuine change to Malagasy stakeholders and to find the lasting peace in the country. As such, the study shall attempt to answer the question, has the structure and/or the conflict management of SADC affected mediation efforts in the Madagascan conflict? Or are there other factors that contribute to SADC's mediation delay in finding a solution to Madagascar crisis?

## **1.3 Objectives of the study**

- i. To assess the structure and operation of SADC
- ii. To carry out a comparative assessment of its conflict management approach
- iii. To investigate SADC's conflict management efforts in Madagascar

#### 1.4 Literature Review

Mwagiru<sup>12</sup> defines conflict management as any management by which parties to the conflict are encouraged to come together and to do something about conflict. However, he brings the question if the aim and end conflict management should be to solve conflict or to settle it. As Mwagiru underlines, conflict settlement does not address the causes of conflict and each party in conflict has certain power to influence the process and the outcomes of conflict settlement. On the other hand, the aim of conflict resolution is bringing mutual satisfaction of needs and a mutually self sustaining solution<sup>13</sup>. Niklas L.P. Swanstrom and Mikael S.Weissmann submit that the process of conflict management is based on effective conflict resolution". However, Herbert C. Kelman defends that conflict resolution is not eliminate conflict entirely; rather it is eliminate the violent and otherwise destructive manifestations of conflict<sup>14</sup>.

Niklas L.P. Swanstrom and Mikael S.Weissmann consider conflict management as measures that limit, mitigate and/or contain a conflict without necessary solving<sup>15</sup>. They argue that conflict management can be enforced, through reducing military forces, third party intervention, confidence-building measures, informal and formal communication, as an effort to reduce tension and prevent further escalation<sup>17</sup>. Eileen Babbit and Fen Osier Hampson bring the role that some regional

<sup>12</sup> Makumi Mwagiru, *Conflict in Africa: Theory, processes and Institutions of Management*, CCR Publication on Conflict Management, Nairobi, 2006, pp 36-43.

" ibid

<sup>14</sup> Niklas L.P. Swanstrom Mikael & S.Weissmann, *Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management and beyond: a conceptual exploration*, Concept paper, Summer 2005, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, Washington DC, p 25

<sup>15</sup> Herbert C. Kelman, *Social-psychological Dimensions of International conflict*', in I. William Zartman, *Peacemaking in International Conflicts: Methods & Techniques*, Revised Edition, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 2007, p 67

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p 25

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, p 13

organizations in promoting confidence-building negotiations through consultation, problem-solving, dialogue, and sometimes moral example to shift perceptions and change attitudes among conflict parties<sup>18</sup>.

The causes of Madagascar conflict according to Gavin Cawthra can be traced back to the post-independence history of the country which saw long periods of autocratic and authoritarian rule, periodic crises involving military a failure to establish a consolidated democracy or effective governance. He also identifies the general conditions of poverty and marginalisation as factors, and this was seen to have worsened under Ravalomanana's rule.

To him, the people of Madagascar don't willingly attest to ethnicity or regional divisions as underlying causes although he found some tensions between the coastal region and the highlands especially Antananarivo, and that to some extent this corresponded to ethnic differences between the minority Merina population, based in the highlands, and the Coders, those of predominately African origin and mostly residents in the coastal areas. However, these divisions are not generally seen as the cause of the crisis<sup>19</sup>.

The more immediate cause was widely perceived - including by some former Ravalomanana supporters - to be failures of governance by the Ravalomanana administration, perceptions that he had used his position as president to benefit his extensive business interests (through control of regulations, contracts etc and by monopolisation) and by an essentially authoritarian and capricious management style. Certainly Ravalomanana seemed to have alienated many of his senior colleagues and

<sup>18</sup>Eileen Babbitt and Fen Osier Hampson, *Conflict Resolution as a Field of Inquiry: Practice Informing Theory*, *International Studies Review* (2011) 13, p51.

<sup>19</sup> Gavin Cawthra, *The role ofSADC in managing political crisis and conflict*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Maputo, Mozambique, 2010.

little room was left for political dissent, with parliament marginalised and decisions increasingly taken in a centralised manner by the presidency.

Another study found that alienation of the military and the security structures as a whole was a factor to the crisis. When the CAPSAT mutiny took place, although it was carried out by only one unit (consisting of 500-600 personnel out of a total security establishment of around 25 000), is it noticeable that neither the military, nor the police, nor the gendarmerie were willing to intervene in support of Ravalomanana. Some of the factors given for this alienation included Ravalomanana's perceived favouritism in senior promotions and his disdainful treatment of senior officers; his attempts to reign in military privileges; attempts at security sector reform.

Perhaps the most important immediate cause, however, was simply personal animosity between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana, and a struggle for power between the two. It is however believed that Rajoelina had not expected to be able to seize power and did not have a master-plan for this: He simply grabbed the opportunity when it arose as a result of a chain of circumstances. Nevertheless, as mayor of Antananarivo, Rajoelina had orchestrated a challenge to the central government, precipitated by the closure of his television station, which included two months of street protests. Many observers also believed that the competition between the two men was fuelled by their competing business interests, and the advantage that they could gain by fusing political power with business.<sup>29</sup>

The international community especially France has been seen to have major influence in the Malagasy conflict. France has traditionally been the major international influence in Madagascar. Ravalomanana, who has extensive business interests in Southern Africa, was seen as steering the country away from the French

sphere, emphasising stronger links with the USA, South Africa, and the East. While France did not evidently orchestrate the events leading up to 2009, it is evident that the French government was quick to work with Rajoelina, and gave him some protection at crucial periods leading up to and immediately after the coup. Although France does not officially recognise Rajoelina's de facto government and is publicly even-handed, it is believed that France has played a behind-the-scenes role in support of Rajoelina.

Available literature on SADC, points to the fact that SADC countries with the exception of South Africa have few interests in Madagascar and there is only limited diplomatic representation. Again, there is an almost complete lack of knowledge within Madagascar about SADC, and the Rajoelina camp likes to project the country's involvement in the regional community as a personal project of Ravalomanana, carried out for business reasons. Despite this, SADC was involved at an early stage in the crisis, although it took it some time to make any sustained interventions.

While the conflict in Madagascar is, relatively, the shortest-running and perhaps least historically troubling among conflicts in Southern Africa, the relationship between the UN, AU and SADC in its conflict resolution efforts on the island has been tension-filled and problematic. Confusion and an absolute lack of coherent leadership undermined the mediation process that was initiated after the 2009 coup d'etat<sup>21</sup>. At least six mediators/envoys from different organizations were quickly sent to Madagascar and it was unclear who would take the lead. The SADC communique issued on 20 June 2009 included collaboration with the AU, UN and

<sup>21</sup> Sarah Ancas, *The effectiveness of regional peacemaking in Southern Africa*, *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 2011, p 140

International Organisation of la Francophonie (IOF), as well as ensuring Malagasy ownership of the process, in the mandate of the SADC mediation effort.

There are some perceived reasons as to why so far any conflict management attempts have failed in Madagascar. The concept of the failure or success in conflict management is elusive, given the fact that what appears as successful or failure to one person/country may be seen as unsuccessful by others. Jacob Bercovitch<sup>22</sup> considers that the success or failure can hinge on what mediators expect from their conflict management; the goals and expectations established by mediators in the pre-mediation phase. In the context of Madagascar, the SADC's main goal was 'for an immediate restoration of constitutional order in the country through Andry Rajoelina vacancy of the office of the President as a matter of urgency paving way for unconditional reinstatement of President Ravalomanana'<sup>23</sup>. Mediation as part of conflict resolution follows a continuum of time. When SADC called for immediate it meant to meet the following goals: stop the escalation and find a lasting solution.

According to Jacob Bercovitch quoted by Blair and Jessica Katz Jameson<sup>24</sup>, there are four criterions that measure the success of mediation. These are *fairness*, which suggests to most people an evenhanded procedure and equitable outcome that is indicative of some conception of 'success', *satisfaction*, that means that the parties involved are satisfied with the outcome, hence the outcome is more likely to be stable, longer-lasting, and, thus, more successful, *effective outcome* is another criteria which is a measure of results achieved, change brought about, or behavioral transformation, and finally *efficiency* which addresses the procedural and temporal dimension of

<sup>22</sup> Jacob Bercovitch, *Mediation Success or Failure: A Search for Elusive Criteria*; August 2007, p 292-294

<sup>23</sup> Communique: Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, Swaziland, 30.03.2009

<sup>24</sup> Jacob Bercovitch, *Mediation Success or Failure: A Search for Elusive Criteria*-, August 2007, p 292-294



conflict management as the cost of conflict management, resources devoted to it, timeliness and disruptiveness of the undertaking.

In analyzing the SADC mediation, there is need to note that the above criteria are interconnected and interdependent because according to Bercovitch, a successful outcome is one that meets more than one or two criteria. Efficiency and effectiveness mean little if parties are not satisfied. Likewise, satisfaction and fairness mean little if mediation has proven to be ineffective in a practical sense. Stability can only be achieved when the parties are satisfied and the agreement is fair.

According to Laurie Nathan, there are endogenous and exogenous reasons for SADC's failure. The factors that could contribute for the failure in each case include the history, nature and causes of the conflict; the goals and conduct of the disputants, the role of foreign powers and neighbouring states, the style and methods of the mediator<sup>25</sup>. Some of the reasons according to her are:

Parties' lack of genuine interest to submit and commit to mediation as well lack of confidence and non-compliance in spirit and letter of agreements by parties. Opposition political movements representing former presidents of the country have called for an inclusive and consensual organisation of the de facto transition that began with Ravalomanana's fall and the HAT's takeover. The leaders of the four political movements (the three former presidents and Rajoelina) agreed to do just that at meetings in Maputo and Addis-Ababa in 2009, but the HAT president unilaterally cancelled these agreements.

Internal vis-a-vis external solution; The HAT accused SADC mediation of biasness in favor of Marc Ravalomanana. The HAT President and his supporters have

<sup>25</sup> Laurie Nathan 'I/Wien *push comes to shove*' The failure of international mediation in African civil wars. *Track Two* Vol.8 No.2 November 1999 (CCR, Cape Town).

defended that the crisis should be resolved at the national level. It is in this context that a national dialogue process was launched, known as *mallgacho-malgache* (Malagasy with the Malagasy).

Cooperation vis-a-vis competition among SADC members: In spite of being SADC member, South Africa decided, in April, in coordination with France to take the initiative and organized a meeting between the four leaders in Pretoria, but this failed to find a solution. This failure strengthened Rajoelina's will to see the crisis resolved internally. The lack of a common position allowed Rajoelina to plot a course between international actors and considerably reduce their influence in the search for a solution.

External interests in this case France. Although it has not openly supported Rajoelina, France was less sympathetic with Ravalomanana who turned away from the French sphere to stronger links with the USA, South Africa, and the Asia.

The same body has been criticized for the use of force in the deployment of SADCBRIG. Granted, the brigade, with its civilian, policing and military standby arrangements is potentially an important instrument in the resolution of regional conflicts, however, there has been call for the clarification of political processes behind its use and the threat to use. The problem being that there seems to be little understanding of or involvement of SADCBRIG in Madagascar. SADCBRIG is one of the five regional brigades under the African Union's African Peace and Security Architecture (ASPA). SADC has also suffered a bruised reputation due to its handling of a member country, the conflict in Zimbabwe where it repeatedly reaffirmed its solidarity with the ZANU-PF government and publicly ignored the violations of human rights, breaches of the rule of law and political repression. In Madagascar, SADC has emerged with a much bruised reputation, and is seen as being partial to the-

now largely discredited Ravalomanana. The aforementioned has to do with its performance on Zimbabwe conflict. In the case of Madagascar, it has not yet been clear whether the body's support for Ravalomanana was informed by the solidarity between heads of state that form a kind of informal club at the core of SADC, or in other words, regime solidarity<sup>26</sup>.

SADC is perceived not to have succeeded so far in its mediation efforts due to lack of capacity in the mediation process. Its ad hoc approach to mediation where there is lack of institutionalized approach as the body's secretariat has played little role while bulk of the work has been left to the heads of state. As such, SADC to effectively carry out conflict management needs to strengthen and consolidate its institutional capacities and be able to mobilize actors within member community states. The body needs to according to Gavin Cawthra<sup>27</sup> needs to improve its institutional, conceptual and mobilizing potentials<sup>28</sup>.

### **1.5 Justification of the study**

Regional and sub-regional intergovernmental organisations - with their close historical, political, economic, cultural and geographic ties and typically superior local knowledge, strong links and sustained commitment and interest - hold considerable potential for collective approaches to early conflict prevention. SADC mandate is protocol on politics, defence and security cooperation. The organization, despite being one of mediators in the Madagascar conflict, a tenable solution has not been reached. All agreements that have been so far been passed, none has been

<sup>26</sup> N. Ngoma, *Prospects for a security community in southern Africa, An analysis of regional security in the southern African Development Community*, Pretoria, Institute for security studies, 2005.

<sup>27</sup> Gavin Cawthra, *The Role of SADC in Managing political crisis and conflict: The Cases of Madagascar and Zimbabwe*, Fredrich Ebert Stiftung, Maputo-Mozambique, 2010 .

<sup>28</sup> L. Fawcett and A. Hurrell, *Regionalism in World Politics organization and international order*, Oxford, Oxford University press, 1995.

honoured with the latest that Rajoelina, who had agreed not to be a presidential candidate backtracked on his promise and has now declared his intentions of vying for presidency.

Regional organizations have the potential to contribute to conflict prevention: they can create standing institutions or mechanisms dedicated to the prevention of violent conflict, incorporate and mainstream conflict prevention (and peacebuilding) perspectives and approaches in their programmes and work, and build capacity for effective action, notably early warning and early action via diplomacy along with political and economic measures and arrangements<sup>29</sup>. Due to the perceived failure of the SADC to manage the conflict, a study is needed to assess the body's structure and operation and in particular its management approach. Besides, SADC has failed in its mandate to provide security for its member states, the Madagascar people being the victims here as the people already mentioned continue to live below the poverty line and there seems to be no hope as the international community continues to black out the current presidency.

## 1.6 Conceptual framework

Mediation from the above literature emerges as the concept that guides this study. Of particular interest is the mediation process by SADC. Folgerg and Taylor<sup>30</sup> define mediation as:

"the process by which the participants, together with the assistance of a neutral person or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop

<sup>29</sup>Johan Bergenas, *The role of regional and sub-regional organizations in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A preliminary assessment of the African continent*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2007.

<sup>30</sup> Jay Folgerg and Alison Taylor, *Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving Disputes without Litigation*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1984, p7.

options, consider alternatives, and reach a consensual settlement that will accommodate their needs."

The above definition is more general, however there is need to understand this concept from the international perspective with SADC being an international organization. Lall<sup>31</sup> thus defines mediation as:

"is the injection of a third state or states, individual or individuals, at the request of or with the consent of the parties to an international dispute or situation, with the view to assisting in or obtaining its settlement, adjustment, or amelioration".

In question is the conflict management approach of SADC in the Madagascar conflict. SADC has been using mediation as the mode of managing the conflict. Bercovitch" considers the following important elements for understanding mediation and its outcomes: (a) parties in conflict, (b) a mediator, (c) a process of mediation, and (d) the context of mediation. According to him, mediation is undertaken by mediators who can be individuals, states or organizations. These organizations can be governmental or non-governmental. In this paper, the mediation under study is that carried out by SADC, an international organization and this qualifies the mediation in Madagascar as an international mediation. Bercovitch and Houston define international mediation as:

"as a reactive process of conflict management whereby parties seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or organization to

<sup>31</sup> Arthur Lall, *Modern International Negotiation: Principals and practice*, Colombia University Press, New York and London, 1996, p 12.

<sup>32</sup> Jacob Bercovitch and J.W.L. Arnare, *The process of international mediation: An analysis of the determinants of successful and unsuccessful outcomes*; *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 28:290-305, 1993.

change their behaviour, settle their conflict, or resolve their problem without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law."<sup>33</sup>

International organizations have entered in mediation processes since the complexity of the international community is such that states and nations can no longer facilitate the pursuit of human interests alone. Organizations are involved in international mediation in the forms of multilateral ad hoc teams, international organizations and transnational non-state organisations. International organizations, this paper's interest, represent regional or global collections of states signifying their intention to fulfill the obligations of membership as set out in their formal treaty<sup>34</sup>.

### **1.7 Hypothesis**

This study is tested the following hypothesis:

- i. Competing interests within SADC contribute to SADC's failure in Madagascar conflict management
- ii. Competing interests in Madagascar by' the parties contribute to mediation efforts failure
- iii. Structure and conflict management strategies of SADC are party to mediation failure in Madagascar

<sup>33</sup> Jacob Bercovitch and A. Houston, *The study of International Mediation: Theoretical issues and empirical evidence*, in *Resolving international conflicts*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, US, 1996, P13.

<sup>34</sup> Jacob Bercovitch, *Social conflicts and third parties: Strategies of conflict resolution*, Boulder, Co, Westview Press, 1984.

## **1.8 Methodology**

This section presents and justifies the research design and methodology. It describes the research design, research site, the target population, sampling procedures, research instruments, data collection procedures and analyses.

### **Research Design**

The research design that this study employ is case study. Case study is the study of the particularity and complexity of a single entity with clearly defined boundaries.<sup>35</sup> Dornyei states that a case study is a method of collecting and organizing data so as to maximize our understanding of unitary character of the social being or object studied. It focuses on the particular one. In this research, the case study is Madagascar conflict and the mediation efforts by SADC.

### **Target Population**

Mugenda and Mugenda<sup>36</sup> define population as an entire group of individuals, events or objects having a common observable characteristic. Accordingly, the target population is those affiliated with SADC, been involved in the mediation process and the Madagascar people to assess their opinion of the process.

### **Sample size and sampling procedures**

This being a quantitative study, sampling is used. This study generalizes the results to a well defined larger group. Since a large population was under study,

<sup>35</sup> Zoltan Dornyei, *Research Methods in Applied Linguistics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p151.

<sup>36</sup> Olive Mugenda and Abel G. Mugenda, *Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*, African Centre for Technology studies, Nairobi, Kenya, 1999

smaller sample was selected that was adequately represented the population, in this case, probability sampling. Probability sampling is a method of sampling in which the subjects are selected randomly in such a way that the researcher knows the probability of selecting each member of the population.<sup>37</sup>

### **Research instruments**

Dornyei<sup>38</sup> states that case study researchers often combine a variety of data collection methods such as interviews, questionnaires, document archives and observation checklists. This study uses interviews and questionnaires. Dornyei defines questionnaires as any written instrument that presents respondents with a series of questions or statements to which they react either by writing out their answers or selecting them among the answers. He further states that questionnaires can yield three types of data about the respondents. Factual questions which are used to find out certain facts about the respondents such as demographic characteristics, behavioural questions which are used to find out what people think, covering attitudes, opinions, beliefs, interests and values. This study seeks the above data.

### **Data collection procedure**

As already mentioned, data was obtained through questionnaires and interviews.

### **Data Analysis**

Data is categorized according to three types: Authorities or people involved/working for SADC, unaffiliated resourceful persons on SADC operations

<sup>37</sup> J. H. McMillan, *Educational Research, Fundamentals for the consumer*, Pearson Education, Boston, United States of America, 2004.

<sup>38</sup>Zoltan Dornyei, *op cit*, p152



and the Madagascar people. Data is organized and classified according to the patterns of the responses given by the respondents in line with the research objectives. This categorization will facilitate the data analysis.

### **1.9. Chapter Summary**

This research is undertaken in the context of analyzing the conflict in Madagascar and the role plays by SADC in the peace process. The paper is not exhaustive research rather it analyses the current crisis taking into account the broader historical framework profound and structural conflict.

The research includes: chapter one which devotes to background and context of this research. It also highlights some of the methodological elements involved in this project, including the design and construction of a database which was a vital analytical tool. Chapter two is dedicated to background (structure and operation) of SADC in the context of peace process. It emphasizes the evolution of SADC in conflict management and resolution and SADC challenges in managing Madagascar crisis. Chapter three examines current situation of conflict in Madagascar. It examines how the SADC agreements are implementing aimed at bringing normalcy in Madagascar. Chapter four is devoted to analyze critically the findings about current situation and how SADC is dealing with the peace process in Madagascar. Chapter five is reserved for conclusion and recommendations.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **EVOLUTION OF SADC IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION**

#### **2.1. Introduction**

In recent years, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) has been involved in peace process in the region, particularly after the establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). The Organ's task is promoting regional cooperation on matters related to defence and security, preventing, containing and resolving inter- and intra state conflict.

Therefore, this chapter is dedicated to analyze the structure, involvement and challenges of SADC in conflict management and resolution in Southern Africa region.

#### **2.2. Evolution**

Cooperation in politics, defence and security in Southern African region can be traced back to the creation of the Front Line States (FLS) in 1977. FLS was politically responding to the PW Botha government in South Africa. The Front Line States played a pivotal role in the liberation and ending of apartheid and racial regimes of the Southern Africa region. This grouping, originally composed of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia came together in 1976 in order to crisis-manage the Rhodesia- Zimbabwe war, and it was considerably strengthened

when the resolution of the conflict resulted in an independent Zimbabwe becoming the sixth Front-line State in 1980<sup>39</sup>.

SADC originally SADCC, was established in 1980 in tune with the Lusaka Declaration: Southern Africa Towards Economic Liberation. The body then had nine members and its core objective was to reduce economic dependence on Apartheid in South Africa. SADCC was transformed into SADC in 1993 after the 1992 Windhoek Treaty. Since then, its membership has grown to fifteen members. Originally, each state had a specific responsibility but this lasted until 2001 when a more central approach was adopted when a secretariat was set in Gaborone, Botswana.

SADC was originally mandated to reduce economic dependence on the apartheid in South Africa, promote cooperation between states in the region, mobilise resources so as to carry out national, regional and international projects and to liaise with international organisations so as to acquire finance and technical assistance. However, it has over time evolved and taken on peace and security issues in the region. SADC entrenched the heads of state and government summit as the supreme policy making organ with help from council of Ministers and the Organ on Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, OPDSC. SADC has been involved in peace process in the region, particularly after the establishment of OPDSC in 2001. OPDSC is the main body of the organization that is involved in all peace building and security related initiatives. Anthoni van Nieuwkerk considers the security challenges facing the region as not primarily military, but largely political, social, and economic. Poverty and underdevelopment are at the heart of the region's human insecurity, and,

<sup>39</sup> M. Evans, *The Front-Line States, South Africa and Southern African Security: Military Prospects and Perspectives*, Department of History, University of Zimbabwe in February 1985, Zambesia (1984/5), XII.

given external as well as internal dynamics, insecurity continues to deepen. Essentially, the region faces a dual crisis<sup>40</sup>.

Member States have over time demonstrated the political will to cooperate in political, defence and security matters and this has created an enabling environment for peace, security and stability in the region through the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts within and between states. In this context, SADC has been undertaking various actions aimed at contributing to the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security. A Summit of Heads of State and Government held on the 28th June 1996, in Gaborone, Botswana, established the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. On the 14th August 2001, in Blantyre, Malawi, the Heads of State and Government signed the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, which provides an institutional framework by which Member States coordinate policies and activities in the areas of politics, defence, and security<sup>41</sup>. The Extraordinary Summit held in Blantyre, Malawi, on the 14th January 2002, decided to mandate the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation to prepare the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), which would provide guidelines for the implementation of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation for the next five years. The key policy frameworks guiding decision-making in the areas of politics and security are the SADC Treaty and the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation.

The establishment of this Organ was endorsed by Extraordinary SADC Heads of State and Government Summit held in Gaborone-Botswana, June 1996, as it

<sup>40</sup> Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, *Towards Peace and Security in Southern Africa*, Africa Peace and Security Series no 6, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Maputo-Mozambique, January 2012, P.10

<sup>41</sup> Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, SADC, Gaborone-Botswana, August 2, 2004, pp. 9-11

mentioned above. During this Summit, it was formally established the objectives of the Organ, *inter alia*, to be: (i) protect the people and safeguard the development of the region, against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, inter-state conflict and external aggression; (ii) cooperate fully in regional security and defense through conflict prevention management and resolution; (iii) mediate in inter-state disputes and conflicts; (iv) use preventive diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region, both within and between states, through an early warning system; (v) where conflict does occur, to seek to end this quickly as possible through diplomatic means; (vi) develop a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defense Pact for responding to external threats<sup>12</sup>. These objectives are stipulated in the Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation concluded in 2001, which provide an institutional framework for cooperation by member states in these areas.

The Organ constitutes an appropriate institutional framework by which SADC countries have been coordinated in the areas of policies, politics, defense and security. The Organ as a subsidiary part of SADC, it abides by the same principles as those of SADC, including the sovereign equality of all member states, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the observance of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

The Organ's task is to promote regional cooperation on matters related to defence and security, preventing, containing and resolving inter- and intra-state conflict by peaceful means, promotion of democracy and human rights, promoting cooperation between police and state security services, encouraging the implementation of UN and other international treaties on arms control, disarmament

<sup>12</sup> Communiqué of the Extraordinary SADC Heads of State and Government Summit, Gaborone-Botswana, 28<sup>th</sup> June 1996

and peaceful relations between states, and developing peacekeeping capacities<sup>43</sup>. In establishing the OPDSC, SADC countries underlined their desire to emphasize the close cooperation on matters of politics, defence and security. They aimed to achieve this by promoting peaceful settlement of disputes by preventive diplomacy, negotiation, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, good offices and adjudication by an international tribunal. It is also envisaged that the Organ should resort to enforcement action, as a matter of last resort, only with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council, in accordance with Article 53 of the United Nations Charter<sup>44</sup>.

The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) should report to the SADC Summit of Heads of States thus in effect integrating political and security functions. A Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation was adopted, which set out a wide range of ambitious issues which the Organ (and the Summit) should address, including key issues related to peace and security cooperation. These issues were due to be implemented through a Strategic Implementation Plan for the Organ (SIPO) adopted in 2004. In short, it is only in the last five years that a comprehensive plan for peace and security management in the SADC region has been agreed.

SADC might be considered as integral part of African Union and United Nation architecture of peace and security. In fact, Chapter VIII of the United Nation Charter gives regional organisations the mandate to deal with peace and security in their respective regions. The Protocol on Organ underlines that the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence shall be immediately reported to the United Nations Security Council and to the Central Organ of the Organisation of

<sup>43</sup> Mark Malan and Jakkie Cilliers, *SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Future Development*, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, South Africa, Occasional Paper No 19 - March 1997

See Article 11.3.d) of the Protocol and Article 2 of the Organ

African Unity Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution\ AU established Memorandum of Understanding with sub-regional organizations on prevention, management and resolution of conflict, in the context of Article 16 of the Peace and Security Council. However, Lt. General (Rtd.) Louis Matshenyego Fisher et al<sup>45</sup> argues that, institutionally, there is no formalized relationship between the troika of the Organ and the PSC, making collaboration on conflict situations such as the ongoing crisis in Madagascar problematic. Troika is the functional unit of the Organ and it comprises of the outgoing, serving and incoming member and it is supported by the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC). Matshenyego further underlines that the cooperation between SADC and the AU in finding solutions to political crisis in member states was very rocky in the initial stages, maybe due to the lack of coordination between the two institutions<sup>47</sup>.

As mentioned in chapter 1, the Final Communique of the Extraordinary SADC Summit (June 1996), SADC decided to appoint President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe as the Chairman of the Organ and there was no provision of the chairmanship should rotate among member states. However, this issue was tackled in 2001 when it was decided that a Chairperson and a Deputy Chairperson of the Organ shall be held on rotational basis from among the member State (Article 4 of the Protocol of the OPDSC). It was in the same meeting where it was decided that the Organ should report to the SADC Summit of Heads of States. The Organ operates at

<sup>45</sup> Article 11 of the Protocol on the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation

<sup>46</sup>Lt. General (Rtd.) Louis Matshenyego Fisher et al, *African Peace and Security Architecture, 2010 Assessment Study*; adopted in Arusha-Tanzania, 4-10 November 2010 P.241

<sup>47</sup> Ibid

Summit level and at Ministerial, involving different ministers (foreign affairs, defense, home affairs and intelligences).

A Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation was adopted in 2001, in Blantyre, Malawi, which set out a wide range of ambitious issues which the Organ (and the Summit) should address, including key issues related to peace and security cooperation<sup>48</sup>. This was twelve years after the 1992 treaty and this delay signifies the slow pace of SADC's peace and security architecture. To implement the 1992 protocol, the organ was required to produce a strategic plan which was to be implemented in five years. In 2004, the heads of state and government adopted the strategic indicative plan of the organ (SIPO 1). SIPO's objective is to create a peaceful and stable political and security environment through which the region will endeavour to realize its socio-economic objectives<sup>49</sup>.

However, in spite of this desire and relative stability, the region still faces potential and actual military and other threats that include, inter alia, armed conflicts in some member States (for instance DRC), unfinished demobilisation, disarmament, reintegration and monitoring of former military personnel, imbalance development and poverty, unconstitutional changes of government (e.g. Madagascar), the growing vulnerability of national borders, and increase in organizing transnational crime, drug and human trafficking, illicit mining, economic recession and the prevalence of landmines. The Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) passed in 2003 sets a framework for security cooperation among member states in face of external aggression. It also indicates a deeper intention to build a regional security commission.

<sup>48</sup> Article 11 is dealing with Conflict prevention, management and resolution

<sup>49</sup> Ibid



Conflict prevention, management and resolution is stipulated in Article 11 of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, including the issue of military coup or any other threat to the legitimate authority of a State. However, for intervene in inter- and intra-state conflict, SADC shall seek to obtain the consent of the disputing parties to its peacemaking efforts<sup>50</sup>.

In 2007, in recognition of the need for a collective self-defence system in line with the United Nations and African Union, SADC resolve to be proactive in preserving peace and security throughout Southern Africa. Consequently, on 16th August 2007, it concluded the Memorandum of Understanding Amongst the Southern African Development Community Member States on the establishment of a Southern African Development Community Standby Brigade, which comprises of military, police and civil personnel who provide peace and security assistance to the region<sup>51</sup>.

### **2.3. SADC challenges in managing conflicts**

Generally, SADC has been plagued by many challenges in implementation of its objectives. Some of challenges include regional dynamics and the lack of domestic security. The region has faced many conflicts among its members. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has faced continued violence while Zimbabwe continues to face political instability. Angola, still faces structural challenges in relation to post conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation after 27 years of civil strife. Funding is another challenge facing SADC. Her finances are obtained from equal contributions from member states and donations. OPSDC needs steady flow of finances to run its operations. Some countries are performing poorly economically

<sup>50</sup> Ibid

<sup>51</sup> Memorandum of Understanding amongst the Southern African Development Community Member States, Lusaka-Zambia, 16/08/2007

like Seychelles and Lesotho and may not be able to provide sufficient contributions to maintain a permanent secretariat. There are however other challenges that directly affect SADC's ability to meet her conflict management and resolution objective. Such challenges include:

### **2.3.1. Political**

Arguably the most important dimension of conflict management is the political dimension. How does political level relate with conflict management? Are they supportive to mediators? In general, when SADC decides to appoint a mediator to resolve a conflict SADC gives all rounded support both politically and financially. Madagascar is a case in point where SADC is the prime source of funds for President Chissano's Mediation efforts. In spite of support from partners, the organization traditionally comes up with a supplementary budget to deal with crisis.

SADC region has no predetermined set of rules of who is to be a mediator to a conflict<sup>52</sup>. It can be a personality (statesman or Eminent person) for instance the case of former President Joaquim Chissano in Madagascar or the Head of State of one member state (e.g. South African mediation/facilitation in Zimbabwe and in DRC). In the last case, the mediator should change in event of the election of a new President as it happened in Zimbabwe where the mediation process started with the South Africa former Thabo Mbeki and now the current President Jacob Zuma took over. Sometimes it is not ensure the continuity of the process.

The SADC mediation has also faced other challenges that are politically oriented. The mediation in SADC is mandated to deal with leadership change

<sup>52</sup> Fako Johnson Likoti, *Election Process and Future African Security Threats*, in *The State of Human Security in Africa: An assessment of Institutional Preparedness*, Monograph No 185, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria-South Africa, 2011, p 24.

annually, since the chairmanship of the Organ is elected annually on the basis of rotation from among the member States (Article 4 of the Protocol of the OPDSC). Sometimes the chairmanship can influence the role and the dynamic of mediation. In the case of Madagascar, mediator has to act in parallel with or even against other state, non-state and multilateral actors that are also trying to involve themselves in the peacemaking process<sup>53</sup>. On 20 June, 2009, the SADC leaders appointed former Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano as a mediator to lead and coordinate an all-party dialogue in Madagascar with the AU and UN<sup>54</sup>. However, in spite of being SADC member, South Africa decided, in April 2010, in coordination with France to take the initiative and organized a meeting between the four leaders in Pretoria. Moreover, in 2010 during South Africa chairmanship of the Organ, the role of SADC mediation was reduced drastically and instead of the ministerial committee being in charge, South Africa took over the process. On the other hand, on July 25, 2012, South Africa decided to organize unilaterally a meeting between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana in Desroches, Seychelles, where South African President Jacob Zuma played a key role in persuading the rivals to talk<sup>55</sup>.

Therefore, between 2010 and 2013 the SADC mediation did not even present any report to PSC, as it was reported by former Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano during the 355<sup>th</sup> Session of the Peace and Security Council, on February 13, 2013. The situation changed in 2012/2013 when Tanzania assumed chairmanship of the Organ and Mozambique was elected the chair of SADC. The SADC mediation

<sup>53</sup> Gavin Cawthra, *The Role of SADC in Managing political crisis and conflict*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Maputo-Mozambique, 2010, p 17

<sup>54</sup> Communique of the Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, 30/06/2009

<sup>55</sup> RFI, Rajoela, Ravalomanana meet on remote Seychelles Island, <http://www.enRlish.rfi.fr/africa/20120725-rajoelina-ravalomanana-meet-seychelles>, Accessed on 10/08/2013

was put again in place and the process has been moving toward presidential and legislative elections scheduled for July and October 2013, respectively. This scheduled date has been recently delayed by a month. It is important to refer that the lack of a common position has not contributed in the search for a way out of the crisis.

Lesley Connolly submits that SADC's role has not been viewed positively by all the parties involved in Madagascar, because of the perception that the SADC is pro-Ravalomanana, given the fact that Madagascar became a member of SADC under Ravalomanana's leadership in 2004 and that because South Africa is hosting Ravalomanana, which has the consequence of discrediting the mediators in the eyes of both Rajoelina supporters<sup>56</sup>.

On the other hand, it is important to recognize that South Africa will continue to play a leading role in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction, given its economic and political influence. However, SADC countries should find the way for counter balance this influence aimed at reducing dependency and becoming a collective body for peace and security in the region.

There are other political factors that have influenced SADC mediation such as: the regional security complex and language influence (Anglophone, Francophone and Portuguesephone). In case of regional security, SADC intervened in Lesotho, in 1998, by military force led by South Africa aimed at restoring order after an attempted coup. South Africa was more concerned about conflict in Lesotho since it could directly affect South Africa. In 1998, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola sent troops to DRC in response to a request for assistance in the framework of the SADC, which the DRC had become a member. Angola was more concerned about the DRC conflict given

<sup>56</sup> Lesley Connolly, *The troubled road to peace: Reflections on the complexities of resolving the political impasse in Madagascar*, ACCORD, Umhlanga Rocks 4320. South Africa, 2013, p 5

their proximity as well as political, economic and social impact to Angola. The former Zaire regime had assisted the Angolan rebel movement UNITA.

To say the least, this deployment of troops provoked controversy among SADC members because some member states saw it as an illegal intervention. In fact, they were never authorized by OAU and the United Nations or even SADC itself, despite their argument that their actions were in accordance with the OAU Charter and the United<sup>57</sup>. After these military interventions, it was eventually agreed that those SADC states that felt were in a position to intervene to assist a member state at the request of its government, should do so<sup>58</sup>. Summarily, sometimes the regional security complex might compel the SADC to involve in conflicts and this can jeopardize its own regional mechanism on conflict management.

Difference in opinion in these interventions brings to the fore a political dimension challenge which is discord between member states which was still present at the organs formation. There have been different perspectives on the interpretation of the body's objectives, structure and the region's Security framework. This discord brought on two groups headed by Robert Mugabe and Nelson Mandela. The relationship then between Mugabe and Mandela was strained hence the differences. Their differences became an impediment to the region's security cooperation. PPDSC brought an end to this acrimony.

<sup>57</sup> Fako Johnson Likoti, *African Military Intervention in African Conflicts: An Analysis of Military Intervention in Rwanda, the DRC and Lesotho*, Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD. in the Centre for Southern African Studies, School of Government, University of the Western Cape, South Africa, January 2006, p.149

<sup>58</sup> A. Essuman-Johnson, *Regional conflict resolution mechanisms: A comparative analysis of two African security complexes*, *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* Vol. 3 (10), October, 2009, pp. 409-422

### **2.3.2. Liberation struggle history**

Shared history among member states in their liberation struggle has seen many member governments compose military which is more loyal to the politicians than the state. Consequently, member state leaders have demonstrated reluctance in allowing the evolution of regional military platforms and structures operating within some level of autonomy. Such has impeded SADC's involvement and open interaction in reference to state security and defence committees resulting in complex and sensitive political-military relations. Liberation struggle history can be seen to have constituted to an overlook on diversity among members and this can be seen to have brought on by SADC's emphasis on shared history of colonialism and its core objective 'to evolve common political values, systems and institutions.

Within SADC, national sovereignty supersedes collective responsibility thus weakening chances of accountability. Also the lack of a legislative oversight and the suspension of the tribunal have augmented tolerance towards impunity by member states. Impunity violates principles and values of the SADC treaty. Members have hidden behind the notion of sovereignty to limit intervention or what they term as 'interference' in their domestic affairs. This is in contravention of the AU's Constitutive Act: 'places important limitations on state sovereignty. It is based on the premise that sovereignty is conditional and is defined in terms of a state's willingness and capacity to provide protection to its citizens'.

### **2.3.3. Military**

The SADC has the requisite military personnel and range of military assets needed for complex peace operations. Question of concern is does the SADC have specialists in the fields of medicine, engineering, and intelligence gathering? SADC-

region has the firepower perhaps the most robust of the African continent. It is also in SADC that one finds the most tested armies in a really armed conflict. 80% of the armies in SADC are a product of armed conflicts. They have amassed considerable experience in fighting and winning wars. The region has the most developed and sophisticated military industry. In war people both soldiers and civilian get injured. Infrastructures get destroyed for strategic reasons or otherwise. SADC's military machine does possess all this.

There lacks clear outlines on the interactions between ISDC sub committees responsible for defence and police and the ISPDC dealing with political and diplomacy matters. There are military frameworks that have been constituted however, ambiguity reigns on how to integrate these frameworks into decision making and conflict resolution. Even though, defence chiefs subcommittee has been mandated to carry out conflict management and resolution, its specific role in SADC'S conflict prevention process is not clearly outlined.

However, too much power can be a curse. The experience of war and the current economic boom militates against military adventurism unless absolutely necessary. SADC armies defeated western armies. Any collaboration with western armies is done with cautious stand. This makes these armies the most diverse in terms of partners and hence commands considerable degree of self-reliance. When SADC conducted Exercise GOLFINHO aimed at preparing SADC to participate at the AU planned peace support training Exercise AMANI AFRICA, none of the members imported equipment. For SADC, the whole exercise was self funded to the tune of

approximately \$6 million to sustain more than 35 thousand military and para-military personnel<sup>59</sup>.

The exercise included highly sophisticated communication equipment, air and navy power. All these capability can be put to service in case of peace support operations. The only constrain is that the level of poverty and the power of parliaments inhibits governments to request permission to go to peace support operations especially in countries peripheral to SADC's core survival. But any provocation to SADC's core countries, you can expect an overnight full deployment with no resort to either AU or UN. In spite of controversy, the deployment of troops to Lesotho and DRC in 1998 testifies the readiness of SADC.

However, the analysis of the SADC military situation should take into consideration the reality in the region. South Africa has been considered as the region's military power based stronghold on material power potential and this incorporates competitiveness, technology, infrastructure, geography, energy, agricultural, environmental and human development factors as well. As Daniel Flames underscores, the regional power should indicate and assume the role of regional leader, stabilizer and, if not peacekeeper, at least peacemaker. Regional powers seem to be expected to support and promote acceptable rules and norms in terms of which regional politics and relations are conducted. Has South Africa playing this role? Some international donors have encouraged and supported South Africa to be the regional powers by giving her training, instruction and equipment related to peacekeeping in African crises.

<sup>59</sup> Interview with Dr. Joao Machatine Ndlovu, SADC Representative to African Union, Addis Ababa, 3/6/2013



However, some regional countries are not embracing the initiative of South Africa being their representative at international arena. On the other hand, South Africa has demonstrated that its peacekeeping policy follows the framework established by SADC, African Union and United Nations<sup>60</sup>. However, the deployment of its troops to Central African Republic was not endorsed by SADC, African Union or United Nations.

#### **2.3.4. Infrastructure**

The SADC's conflict management initiatives need adequate facilities, systems, and infrastructure to sustain peacekeeping missions and mediation efforts in the field. What is the current situation in SADC? Where the support comes from? What should be done to improve? Infrastructure and hardware for peace support missions are mostly domestic. There is high degree of collaboration between SADC armies. A justification to this is the high degree of mutual trust and the fact that SADC is truly a knit security complex.

However, recently SADC military outfit' has only been deployed twice as a compact unit: in DRC and Lesotho. The rest of her participations are under the UN or AU/UN as part of each countries' international responsibility. Almost all SADC countries are involved in peace support operations worldwide, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Croatia and this is constantly reported to the MCO. This has helped the armies gather experience which can be put to use in the region or in the continent. The challenge here however is the nature of the mandate because this determines the kind of reimbursements involved.

<sup>60</sup> Daniel Flemes, *Conceptualising Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South African Case*, GIGA Working Paper Series, No 53, Hamburg, June 2007, Pp 11-40

To theorize on how to close these gaps, SADC should revert to its initial strategy of Standby Arrangements whereby it had in store two options (i) pursue missions under the UN or AU mandate, and (ii) pursue missions of domestic nature inside SADC area of responsibility. In the case of the latter, SADC should exercise high levels of flexibility. Armies can be deployed and justifications provided later. In addition to this, SADC should prevail over the AU to actually commit to building an intra-African peace support operation relying on the regional structures and not on a country-to-country basis. AU must narrow the bargaining platform by using the regional mechanisms effectively and not only to serve as Focal Point and when the AU wants troops goes directly to a country.

SADC does have a High-tech based, sophisticated early warning system whose core role is to track potential conflict from within and beyond. The shortcoming is that the civil society asserts that the system is sidelining. There is an outcry from civil society for SADC to open it to civilian component and research institutions. But SADC counter argues saying, early warning is for decision-making not for news making. Hence the SADC early Warning system is basically a widen intelligence system whose products serve decision-makers. SADC does collaborate with research institutions on specific issues. But when they graduate to early warning data, SADC applies the principle of compartmental access to information, that is, on the need-to-know basis. It has served well the region especially because of the high level of mutual trust between and among relevant government officials. For this reason an intra-SADC conflict is unthinkable. An out of control crisis in the core SADC members is a remote possibility<sup>61</sup>.

<sup>61</sup> Interview with Dr. Joao Machatine Ndlovu, SADC Representative to African Union, Addis Ababa, 3/6/2013

Communication and sharing of information as a form of infrastructure continues to be a challenge to SADC. Communiques issued after meetings have been perceived to be blunt working instruments not divulging much information into what transpired. This in effect lock out independent analysts, civil society and national constituencies from participation. Even SADC ministers are sometimes left in the dark.

#### **2.3.5. Human resource**

Rather than developing a systematic approach to mediation, the SADC has proceeded on an ad hoc basis, largely dictated by the personalities of the senior figures involved. SADC has no civilian in conflict management that could enhance mediation capacity. It has often deployed high-level candidates who lack the relevant expertise and experience. It is a fact that civilian component plays critical role in conflict prevention and resolution. The role of civilian component depends on the nature of a conflict. In any case all conflicts 'whether armed or not end up in a negotiated settlement with civilian component being at the center stage.

In accordance with Article 9 of the Protocol on Organ, the SADC Secretariat has the responsibility to provide secretariat services to the Organ, assisting both the Chairperson of the Organ and the committees, keeping records of meetings, assisting in policy development and monitoring the implementation of decisions as well providing administrative backup to the functioning of the Organ. To minimize the problem, the Extra-Ordinary SADC Summit held in Blantyre, Malawi, in January 2002, decided to establish Department for Politics, Defence and Security within the SADC Secretariat. The Department shall comprise the following sub-divisions: (i) Directorate for Politics and Diplomacy; (ii) Directorate for Defence and Security; and"

(iii) Strategic Analysis Unit<sup>62</sup>. As it was recognized by Antoni van Nieuwkerk (2013) The SADC Secretariat, specifically the Organ Directorate exists to carry out political instructions and not to engage in political decision-making relating to politics and security matters. The secretariat and directorate restrict the organization to an administrative role with little or no decision-making powers. In so doing it has avoided to establish a regional institution with supranational powers in the areas of politics, defence and security - a vital precondition for moving the institution towards a security community<sup>63</sup>.

The SIPO which is a five-year strategic plan for the implementation of the Protocol for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation on politics, defence and security has been criticized. The first plan was seen as lacking clear benchmarks for monitoring and evaluation. It was also seen as having many priority areas minimizing the real chances of it being implemented. SIPO 2 which was approved in 2010 is yet to be made public, two years after it was adopted. Issues have also been raised over the lack of incorporating civil society in SIPO 2'S development. The protocol has also failed according to some critics failed to address the shaky relationship between the organ and her international cooperating members.

#### **2.3.6. Human security**

SADC's definition of security has been centered on state security rather than human security. The set up of a security community requires centralized structures at

<sup>62</sup> Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, SADC, Gaborone-Botswana, August 2, 2004, pp. 47-48

<sup>63</sup> Anthony van Nieuwkerk, *Towards Peace and Security in Southern Africa: A critical analysis of the revised Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO) of the Southern African Development Community*, Commissioned by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Africa Peace and Security Series no 6, Maputo-Mozambique, January 2012, p 10

lower or regional levels that are in each member state. Security policy ideally gives guidelines on national security institutions with an aim to guarantee common values and offering a framework for implementation. SADC does have provision for state, defence and public security sub-committees, however, it lacks any formal structure that is dedicated to human and member citizen's rights<sup>64</sup>.

### **2.3.7. Conclusion**

Southern Africa region intervention in conflict management and resolution can be traced back to the middle of 1970s with the establishment of the Front Line States in order to reinforce the struggle against colonialism, minority regimes and apartheid in the region.

In spite of SADC being originally mandated to promote economic issues, it has over time evolved and taken on peace and security issues in the region in the context that without peace there is no development. The establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation in 1996 and its operationalisation in 2001 through the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation brought new impetus in coordination policies and activities in the areas of politics, defence and security among SADC's member States.

However, SADC face some challenges to meet her conflict management and resolution objective. In this context, it is important to underline that SADC and the Organ Troika leadership change annually. Sometimes the chairmanship can influence the role and the dynamic of SADC mediation since the new chair can bring new vision and orientation. On the other hand, SADC has no civilian in conflict

<sup>64</sup> Ana Leao, *Different opportunities, different outcomes-Civil war and Rebel groups in Angola and Mozambique*, Bonn, 2007.

management that could enhance mediation capacity. So, generally it is responsibility of the mediator to decide and choose who would be the team mediation. All these challenges are reflected in Madagascar peace process.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **THE CONFLICT IN MADAGASCAR - CURRENT SITUATION**

#### **3.1. Introduction**

Since the beginning of the crisis in Madagascar, the international community and different stakeholders in Madagascar have been trying to find a lasting solution. The international community through the SADC brought Malagasy political stakeholders on the table and they signed the Roadmap, in September 2011, aimed at ending the Crisis in Madagascar followed, on 14 October 2011, by that of the Framework for Implementation of the Roadmap.

Therefore, this chapter focuses on the find out the current situation in implementation of this agreement, particularly within last six months. In this context, it will be analyze the role of the major Malagasy political stakeholder as well as the role of SADC's mediation.

#### **3.2. Background on the case study: Madagascar**

Madagascar, a former French colony, is the world's fourth-largest island, located in the Indian Ocean, approximately 280 miles off the Mozambique coast. Its 22 million people are a product of historical migrations from Africa, Arab countries, Southeast Asia, and Polynesia. They speak a Malayo-Polynesian language, Malagasy, which functions as an official language, along with French. The use of English has grown in recent years. Approximately three-quarters of the Malagasy people live in rural areas, making a living through small-scale commercial and subsistence farming. The country regularly suffers massive economic losses, physical destruction, and loss

of lives during the annual cyclone season, and from cycles of drought and floods. Over two-thirds of the population lives below the poverty line<sup>65</sup>.

The 2009 political crisis in Madagascar started in December 2008, when Marc Ravalomanana's government decided to close a television station owned by the then Antananarivo Mayor Andry Rajoelina, after it aired an interview with former President Didier Ratsiraka, who is living in exile in France. When Rajoelina's radio station was closed a month later, he convened a public demonstration to demand the stations' reopening, accusing President Ravalomanana of corruption and authoritarianism. Rajoelina claimed that his stations were closed as part of a politically-motivated campaign against him.

Ravalomanana sacked Rajoelina from office on February 3, 2009, after the mayor declared that he was taking over the central government and announced a parallel cabinet. At least 28 people were killed when security forces opened fire on an opposition demonstration in the capital<sup>66</sup>. In spite of the country's constitutional court rejection, Rajoelina continued to call for the President's impeachment and arrest and the establishment of a transitional government to lead the country for two years until the constitution could be rewritten and elections held. In response, Ravalomanana, who was expected to run for re-election when his term expired in 2011, publicly acknowledged mistakes made by his government during the crisis and proposed a national referendum to determine whether he should stay in office. Rajoelina rejected his proposal<sup>67</sup>. Ravalomanana resigned and handed over power to a military directorate, which was subsequently coerced by members of Camp Capsat to transfer

<sup>65</sup> Lauren Ploch , *op cit*, p 1

<sup>66</sup> Oliver Jutersonke and Moncef Kartas, *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA): Madagascar*, Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP), Geneva, Switzerland, 2010, P 88

<sup>67</sup> Lauren Ploch, *op cit*, p 4



power to Rajoelina. The AU and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) suspended Madagascar's membership.

There are many factors that contributed to the 2009 political crisis in Madagascar. The post-independence history of Madagascar, which saw long periods of autocratic and authoritarian rule, periodic crises involving military and a failure to establish a consolidated democracy or effective governance. Resignations, assassinations and removal of Presidents have been common in the five decades of independence. For example, Didier Ratsiraka was removed from the office, in 1991, after *Forces Vives* movement composed by clergymen, trade unionists, entrepreneurs and intellectuals organized strikes, demonstrations and civil disobedience activities as result of economic deterioration. President Albert Zavy was toppled by an impeachment process given the fact that his democratically elected government was unable to solve the economic and social challenges in Madagascar and Ratsiraka came again to power following general elections in 1996<sup>68</sup>. In 2002, Ratsiraka fled to exile in France after Ravalomanana refused to participate in a postponed runoff poll, evoking electoral irregularities, and in February 2002 he declared himself the winner of the election<sup>69</sup>. This factor of conflict Mwagiru<sup>70</sup> considers it as historical taking into account that the earlier conflicts in Madagascar have never been resolved; instead they have been raged on.

In addition, poverty and marginalisation are also factors that have contributed to the current situation. However, some interviewers considered that poverty was not the main cause of 2009 crisis because Ravalomanana regime did well in economic

<sup>68</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012 – Madagascar Country Report, Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012, p 5

<sup>69</sup> Lauren Ploch and Nicolas Cook, *op cit*, p.8

<sup>70</sup> Makumi Mwagiru, *The Water's Edge: Mediation of Violent Electoral Conflict in Kenya*, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, Nairobi, First Edition, July 2008.

sphere judging from GDP annually growth. In fact, from 2001 to 2008 the GDP growth was almost 6% annually<sup>71</sup>. Ethnicity was a category that simply did not exist in Madagascar until it was introduced by anthropologists<sup>72</sup>. Therefore, the ethnic or regional divisions are not seen as causes, although some pointed to tensions between the coastal region and the highlands, especially Antananarivo, and that to some extent this corresponded to ethnic differences between the minority merina population, based in the highlands, and the coders, those of predominately African origin and mostly resident in the coastal areas<sup>73</sup>. It is important to underline that both Rajoelina and Ravalomanana are from Marina ethnical group; so, ethnicity should not see as a principal reason of the conflict.

Another reason was the failure in governance as demonstrated by the Ravalomanana administration, perceptions that he had used his position as president to benefit his extensive business interests and by an essentially authoritarian and capricious management style. Ravalomanana seemed to have centralized the power, particularly after 2007 referendum, with hiarginalised parliament and decisions increasingly taken in a centralised manner by the presidency<sup>74</sup>. The respondents defended that Ravalomanana received a great support during his first term particularly from highland people because it was the first time that Merina people were ascending to the helm of power (the Cotiers, mostly residents of the coastal areas have been dominant in political, economic and military sphere in the country). They stated that steadily Ravalomanana became authoritarian maybe due to this support.

<sup>71</sup> Global Finance, Madagascar Country Report, <http://www.gfmaB.com/gdp-data-country-reports/228-madaeascar-edp-countrv-report.html#axzz2dYnx7p7>, Accessed on 2/8/2013

<sup>72</sup> Oliver Jiitersonke and Moncef Kartas , op cit, P 36

<sup>73</sup> Gavin Cawthra, The Role of SADC in Managing political crisis and conflict, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Maputo-Mozambique, 2010, p 15

<sup>74</sup> Lauren Ploch, op cit, p3

Respondents considered that politicians have used the military for selfish purposes and benefits and they defended that it is important to implement security sector reform in Madagascar aimed at securing that the defence and security force can obey constitution and national law. Therefore, alienation of the military and the security structures as a whole was another factor to the crisis. Many observers noted that during Camp Capsat mutiny the military, the police, the gendarmerie were willing to intervene in support of Ravalomanana. Some of the factors given for this alienation included Ravalomanana's perceived favouritism in senior promotions and his disdainful treatment of senior officers; his attempts to reign in military privileges; attempts at security sector reform which were driven by a senior German advisor with little concern about local sensitivities; the failure to address chronic problems in the military including a lack of facilities such as accommodation and the top-heavy structure of the armed forces; the use of the security forces to physically protect Ravalomanana's business interests; and simmering resentments arising from the 2001/2 crisis, which had resulted in the imprisonment of some military personnel from outside the capital<sup>75</sup>.

Perhaps the most important immediate cause has been seen as simply personal animosity between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana, and a struggle for power between the two, as was mentioned above. Nevertheless, as mayor of Antananarivo, Rajoelina had orchestrated a challenge to the central government, precipitated by the closure of his television station, which included two months of street protests. The competition

<sup>75</sup> Gavin Cawthra, *The Role of SADC in Managing political crisis and conflict: The Cases of Madagascar and Zimbabwe*, Fredrich Ebert Stiftung, Maputo-Mozambique, 2010, p 16

between the two men was fuelled by their competing business interests, and the advantage that they could gain by fusing political power with business<sup>76</sup>.

The international dimension has been seen as another factor that contributed to the political crisis. France has traditionally been the major international influence in Madagascar. Ravalomanana, who has extensive business interests in Southern Africa, was seen as steering the country away from the French sphere, emphasizing stronger links with the USA, South Africa, and the East Asia (notably with China and South Korea). Evidently, French government was quick to work with Rajoelina, and gave him some protection at crucial period leading up to and immediately after the coup. On the other hand, June 2002 US President George Bush sent a letter of congratulation to Ravalomanana was the first country to formally recognize the Ravalomanana government<sup>77</sup>. Madagascar was the first country to sign a U.S. Millennium Challenge Account compact in 2005, worth an estimated \$110 million". It is also important to mention that Madagascar, through the April 2007 Referendum approved English, for the first time, as a third official language. Leading investors in 2008 came from the UK, Canada, Japan, South Korea, France and Mauritius, with a particularly significant rise in investments in the mining sector by the UK and Canada<sup>79</sup>.

### **3.3 Data collection and analysis**

This research as discussed above used case study as the research design. Madagascar is a suitable case study to carry out an analysis of SADC's conflict

<sup>77</sup> Oliver Jutersonke and Moncef Kartas, *op cit*, p 87.

<sup>78</sup> Lauren Ploch, *op cit*, p 10

<sup>79</sup> *ibid*

management strategy because it is particular case on an unconstitutional change of government in the region. It is also an analysis of the process of conflict management of an ongoing conflict unlike other analyses that are done once a solution has been found. Besides, the conflict has ranged on for a while now without any solution in sight.

To collect data, both secondary and primary sourced were used as data sources. The primary data was obtained from Malagasy people and SADC mediation team members while secondary data was mainly from books and periodicals. The main data collection technique for this study was personal interviews and questionnaires. Respondents were chosen for their relevancy and their representativeness. The questionnaires were based on the research's objectives. It is these objectives that the data was analysed from. Just as a recap, the objectives for this study were: To assess the structure and operation of SADC, to carry out an assessment of its conflict management approach and to investigate SADC's conflict management efforts in Madagascar.

### **3.4 SADC's conflict management approach: The peace roadmap**

#### **3.4.1. Electoral Process**

All respondents whom the questionnaires were administered to were aware that there were pending elections. Upon asking how the elections came to being, they said they hoped the elections would bring peace back to their country. The informed respondents were aware of SADC's conflict management strategy: The peace roadmap. It emerged from the responses that roadmap stipulates the holding of elections. The roadmap aims to bring constitutional normalcy in Madagascar through credible, transparent and fair elections.

In this regard, it is important to mention the formation of inclusive and acceptable Independent National Electoral Commission which in August 2012 released the electoral calendar proposing that the elections (Presidential, legislative and municipal) would take place in May 2013<sup>80</sup>. It emerged that the roadmap seeks to recognize the ownership of the process by Malagasy people and emphasizes the importance of strengthening the transition institutions, namely: The Government of National Unity, the Parliament of Transition, the Supreme Council and the Independent National Electoral Commission of Transition (CENIT).

Initially, as a way of restoring peace and ensuring there is a change in guard, Ravalomanana and Rajoelina agreed not to present their candidature for the 2013 presidential elections, a decision which was welcomed by the SADC mediation. However, the presentation of candidature nomination papers by Lalao Ravalomanana, wife to Ravalomanana was a game changer in the peace process. Former President Didier Rastiraka also presented his papers for nomination.

In May 2013, Andry Rajoelina also announced he will be vying for presidency in the next elections after Lalao's decision. He argued that Mrs Ravalomanana's move broke the joint agreement not to contest the poll. The decision of the Special Electoral Court to endorse those candidatures was considered as a violation of the spirit of the SADC mediated Roadmap and it brought the new challenges to the mediation. As a consequence to the above, the planned July 24, 2013 elections were postponed after special court decided preparations for the poll had been compromised.

<sup>80</sup> The first electoral calendar adopted by CENIT with UN (August 1, 2012) was the following: 08 May 2013 - first round of presidential elections; 03 July 2013 - Presidential runoff and legislative elections and 23 October 2013 - municipal elections. However, given some logistical constrain, CENIT decided to reschedule the date of the elections as follows: 24 July 2013 - first round of the presidential elections, 25 September 2013 presidential runoff and legislative elections and 23 October 2013 - Municipal elections. These new dates were also rescheduled and first round of presidential elections has schedule to 23 August 2013.

Respondents were aware the elections had been postponed; some understood why while others did not as they had this attitude it was of no consequence who vied as the people already knew their preferred candidate. In support of the above data obtained, CENIT chair Beatrice Attalah on 25 June called on international community to allow exceptionally all 41 presidential contenders to run for elections, including transitional president Rajoelina, former president Ratsiraka and wife of former president Ravalomanana<sup>81</sup>. Furthermore, the army's leader, Malagasy Council of Reconciliation and the Committee of implementation of the Roadmap asked the international community not to make any announcement to disturb peace and stability and appeasement in the country in respecting Madagascar's sovereignty<sup>82</sup>.

In accordance with the roadmap, the elections were supposed to take place fifteen months after 17 September 2011 aimed at restoring the constitutional order in Madagascar. However, since then and in particular after the establishment of CENIT, the elections have been postponed several times due to different reasons. As a way of explanation, in August 2012, CENIT announced an electoral calendar which was: First round of Presidential elections, Presidential Run-off and Legislative elections and Municipal elections. The elections were to take place between May and July 2013. However, due to logistical and technical problems as well as because the situation policy remains very tense in the absence of a consensus on the list of candidate, the CENIT updated the electoral calendar which provided for, among others, the first round of presidential election on 24 July 2013, and the second round

<sup>81</sup>Raissa Loussouf, *Madagascar's president to run for elections*, <http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20130505-madagascar-presidential-candidates> Accessed on 1/8/2013.

<sup>82</sup> Mu Xuequan, *Madagascar presidential candidates to gather in capital to ensure election: army*, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2013-05/22/c\\_124744775.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2013-05/22/c_124744775.htm), Accessed on 1/8/2013

of the presidential election, coupled with the Legislative election on 25 September 2013, and the local election on 23 October 2013.

It emerged from interviews that there is conflict among different stakeholders in connection to the planned elections. These stakeholders were named: The CENIT (which is the mandated electoral body in Madagascar), the cabinet and the Special Electoral Court (SEC). As indicated, the CENIT has postponed the election dates due to logistics in the first two instances while the postponed was due to lack of finances after the international community suspended its pledged financial election aid. On the other hand, the cabinet met on 12 June 2013 after the final postponement of the elections. The cabinet agreed that the elections should take place on August 23, 2013.

Besides, the special electoral court whose duty is ideally dealing with post election disputes has involved itself with election preparations<sup>83</sup>. These developments bring in the question of who has the responsibility of planning and organizing the country's elections. Some analysts considered that the Government has no power in dealing with electoral issues, particularly the fixing of election calendar. Is it the judiciary responsibility, specifically the SEC, to do that. On the other hand, there are some that defend that it is the responsibility of CENIT to deal with electoral issues.

More than to consider who has the responsibility to fix the date for the election, it is important to analyze if realistically it is possible to organize the elections in August 2013. In this context, it is important to mention that before this new crisis result from the 'Three', some stakeholders in Madagascar had considered before the

<sup>83</sup> RFI, Madagascar delays crucial elections  
<http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africanews/2013/05/31/madagascar-delays-crucial-elections>.  
Accessed on 1/8/2013



possibility the postponement of the presidential election after July 2013 but maintaining it in 2013<sup>84</sup>.

Data obtained indicated that most respondents had negative feelings towards the international community. Asked if they felt, the international community had done enough or played a part in solving the conflict, they asserted that the international community was not doing enough to help the country to solve the crisis. This was coming in heels after the postponment of the elections which the international community played a huge part in the cancellations. The presence of the international community is through the SADC, the African Union and International Group of Contact as their mouthpiece. However, some informed people have shown their satisfaction with SADC's mediation but they considered that the organization should have permanent representative in Antananarivo aimed at facilitating to deal with potential situations. In lieu of the above, the international community gave warning that it will not recognise the election results and it would impose sanctions on the President of the transition, Andry Rajoelina, Lalao Ravalomanana, the wife of former President Marc Ravalomanana, and former President Didier Ratsiraka if the three maintain that they shall be candidates in the forthcoming elections. There is the possibility of the Security Council of the United Nations calling upon to adopt a resolution for mandatory sanctions and penalties<sup>85</sup>.

As demonstrated above, there is confrontation between Malagasy interests and ways and international and the mediators on the appropriate means of solving quickly the Malagasy crisis. Internally they prefer to have elections immediately and with

<sup>84</sup> Erick Laperozy, *Madagascar's presidential candidates urged to quit by July 31*, Xinhua, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2013-07/15/c\\_125006023.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2013-07/15/c_125006023.htm) Accessed on 1/8/2013

<sup>85</sup> AFP, *Madagascar candidates told to withdraw or face sanctions*, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/07/13/madagascar-candidates-told-to-withdraw-or-face-sanctions>, accessed on 1/8/2013

every body even if it violate the national laws and SADC, AU and international principle and previsions. On the other hand, the mediation and international community consider that the elections must be respect the national law and international previsions aimed at having credible and transparent elections.

### **3.5. The role of the main actors**

#### **3.5.1 Court**

A respondent, who indicated his profession as a Malagasy diplomat said that the Special Electoral Court (SEC) is an obstacle and has been a major contribution to the derailment of the n implementation of the roadmap, particularly in the realization of the elections. He pointed out the case where the transitional president candidature was cleared.

In this context, in May 3, 2013, the SEC endorsed the candidatures of Rajoelina, Lalao Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka, a violation of Malagasy laws and the relevant provisions of the Roadmap. Rajoelin& submitted his candidature after 28 April 2013 CENIT's deadline. Moreover, it was in contravention of AU provisions where perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government shall not be allowed to participate in elections held to restore the democratic order<sup>86</sup>. The purpose of the next election is to put an end to the current situation that has seen Andry Rajoelina stay in power for more than four years without having been elected democratically.

In spite of the SADC's Mediator and international community pressure, the Special Electoral Court has been reaffirmed its position. In this context, on June 5,

<sup>86</sup> African Charter On Democracy, Elections and Governance adopted by the Eighth Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 30/01/2007.

2013, SEC reconfirms the controversy three candidates, namely A. Rajoelina, Lalao Ravalomanana and D. Ratsiraka, and it considered that its decision is irreversible.

SEC's ruling does not only go against the mediation and international community but also some sectors of Malagasy society such as Prime Minister Omer Beriziky, the Malagasy Council for Reconciliation (FFM) and the Committee of Monitoring and Enforcement of the Roadmap (CSC) and the Minister of Defence<sup>87</sup>. The Defense Minister, Lucien Rakotoarimasy, stressed on the importance of the three political leaders finding a lasting political solution. The international community needs Special Electoral Court recomposed and restructured aimed at bringing credibility and respect to this judiciary institution<sup>88</sup>.

### **3.5.2 Political actors**

All respondents were able in their responses able to identify the main three political actors in Madagascar. In connection with how each has affected the peace process, responses were varied but one factor that emerged was that most of the respondents felt that the political actors were selfish and were putting their interests ahead of the country's search for peace. Interviewees voiced that at near future it is difficult to reconcile the Rajoelina and Ravalomanana because their differences are beyond political sphere instead they have mostly personnel issues.

<sup>87</sup> Le Monde, Madagascar: la cour electorate confirme trios candidatures controversies, [http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/06/05/madagascar-la-cour-electorale-confirme-trois-candidatures-controversees\\_3424655\\_3212.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/06/05/madagascar-la-cour-electorale-confirme-trois-candidatures-controversees_3424655_3212.html), accessed on 1/8/2013.

<sup>88</sup> Communique of the 7<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the International Contact Group on Madagascar (ICG-M), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26/6/2013

### 3.5.2.1 Andry Rajoelina

Most of the respondents felt that Rajoelina had served his time as a transitional president and it was time he let someone else take over the mantle. In 15 January 2013, Rajoelina addressed Malagasy nation reiterating his statement made in May 10, 2010, that he is not standing as a candidate for the presidential elections, preferring to sacrifice himself than the all country and people<sup>89</sup>. This announcement was welcomed by mediation and international community. His decision was in line with SADC's mediation *nor or neither* approach. Rajoelina's decision was widely seen as a result of the pressure made by SADC's Mediation to stand aside to prevent unrest the elections in Madagascar.

Questions on Rajoelina's candidature drew mixed reactions. One group expressed surprise at the president's change of mind to decide to vie for presidency while the other whom it became apparent were behind the transitional president welcomed his move since they felt Lalao's candidature left them with no other option. On May 3, 2013, Andry Rajoelina reneged on his earlier decision and presented his candidature to the SEC which in turn cleared him. He said his decision was informed by Ravalomanana's wife decision to run for the elections.

On 14 April, 2013, the former president Marc Ravalomanana's *Mouvance* coalition submitted the former first lady Lalao Ravalomanana as presidential candidate. Lalao's candidature is suspect since in reality Ravalomanana has respected SADC's requirements not to present himself as a presidential candidate. Marc Ravalomanana is not a viable candidate for presidency since election laws requires a candidate to have lived in Madagascar for six months prior to the elections and Ravalomanana is still in exile. In line with SADC's requirements that the three don't

<sup>89</sup> Statement made made by Mr. Andry Nirina Rajoelina, Tuesday, 15 January 2013

vie, Rajoelina's Tanora malaGasy Vonona (TGV) party had submitted Edgar Razafindravahy, the transition Mayor of Antananarivo, as its candidate in the presidential elections before Rajoelina's volte-face.

Rajoelina has maintained that he would withdraw his candidature if his rivals replicated. However, the real scenario is that Marc Ravalomanana's *Mouvance* does not have an alternative presidential candidate if it decides to withdraw Lalao Ravalomanana as the *Mouvance* submitted only one candidate. Rajoelina's *Mouvance* also has Edgar Razafindravahy as a candidate. Razafindravahy was the *mouvance's* presidential candidate before Rajoelina announced his candidature. It also emerged from the data that Rajoelina's *mouvance* has two other candidates Jean Lahiniriko (the former Speaker), Hajo Andrianainarivelo (Vice-Prime Minister in charge of National Development) and Camile Vital<sup>90</sup>.

On the other hand, Rajoelina refused to resign on May 27, 2013, (two months before the elections) as required by electoral law and in accordance with the Roadmap, which asks all candidates in the July 24 presidential elections had to resign from their government positions before 27 May 2013. Rajoelina argued that his resignation would create instability in the country and it could jeopardize the smooth transition<sup>91</sup>. Rajoelina's refusal to resign was in violation of Article 14 of the Roadmap and in confrontation with SADC decisions that stipulate that government members should resign from office sixty days before the election date<sup>92</sup>.

<sup>90</sup> RFI, Madagascar's final list of candidates for the presidency announced May 3, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130503-madagascar-liste-definitive-candidats-retenus-presidentielle-annoncee-3-mai> Accessed on 1/8/2013.

<sup>91</sup> AFP, Madagascar: Rajoelina surprise candidacy disrupts the crisis in the country, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130504-madagascar-candidature-andry-rajoelina-perturbe-sortie-crise-pays> Accessed on 1/8/2013.

<sup>92</sup> SADC Declaration, Dar es Salaam-Tanzania, 10/01/2013

### 3.5.2.2 Marc Ravalomanana's *Mauvance*

Marc Ravalomanana has lived in exile in South Africa and he was sentenced in absentia to life in prison with hard labour. He was accused of ordering elite troops to kill Rajoelina's supporters during streets protests that to his overthrow. In spite of appeals for the return of all exiled Malagasy, Ravalomanana's return has been prevented, a warning that this might jeopardize the ongoing dialogue on breaking the current political impasse.

Surprisingly from the data obtained, many respondents listed Marc Ravalomanana as a political candidate unlike his wife Lalao who is a presidential candidate. Further, other indicated that the former still as the President. A few of respondents listed Lalao as political actor. An explanation to the above findings is that Lalao was originally allowed back into the country on humanitarian grounds since her mother was seriously ill. Andry Rajoelina allowed her to return on condition she would abstain from all political activities. Others, considered that Lalao and Ravalomanana's *Mauvance* are responsible for current deadlock in the electoral process.

It became clear from the data obtained that many were surprised with Lalao's candidature. Lalao's husband, Ravalomanana accepted not to run in the forthcoming presidential elections. However, on April 14, 2013, Ravalomanana's *Mauvance* decided to submit Lalao Ravalomanana as its presidential candidate in Madagascar's elections, creating the current complications that have become synonymous with the elections<sup>93</sup>.

<sup>93</sup> BBC, Madagascar election: Lalao Ravalomanana bids to stand; <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22299881>, accessed on 1/8/2013

International Contact Group on Madagascar delegation, including SADC's Mediator visited Madagascar aimed at persuading the three controversial candidates to withdraw from the elections. However, there is information that Lalao Ravalomanana refused to withdraw her candidatures<sup>94</sup>. As mentioned above, if the three candidates withdraw, there will be no representative for Ravalomanana political movement in the elections. The other two controversial candidates' withdrawal is depended on Lalao's withdrawal and it is quite unlikely that Marc Ravalomana's *mouvance* would agree to give the elections a pass. As such, the peace process remains deadlocked. Some diplomats interviewed considered that it might be possible to find solution through giving the possibility to the three to present new candidates as a guarantee for their withdrawal.

### **3.5.2.3 Other stakeholders**

During data analyses, it emerged that besides political actors, especially the already discussed three, there were other actors who have played part, either positively or negatively in the conflict management process. These other stakeholders that emerged were the church and military. There was the general feeling that the military has had an hand in the conflict. Some respondents failed to indicate the reason for their allegations apart from the fact that the military could have prevented the constitutional crisis. Madagascar's military has historically been considered neutral during political confrontations. While the military does not want to seize power for itself, it has somewhat made it clear it will not accept anyone beside Rajoelina as the transitional president and that it will not accept any political

<sup>94</sup> Peter Fabricius, Time for SADC to admit defeat in Madagascar as it has, effectively, in Zimbabwe; Institute for Security Studies, Independent Newspapers, South Africa, 18/7/2013

interference in its structure. To this end, it has clearly pointed that it rejects Article 22 of the Maputo agreement which aimed at setting up a Committee for Reflection on National Defence and Security<sup>95</sup>.

The military argued that it held its own reconciliation conference shortly after the coup and came with modalities on the way forward including the release of imprisoned military personnel dating from the Ravalomanana-Ratsiraka conflict and addressing issues of cohesion and unity within the armed forces. During the rise in tensions between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina, the armed forces repeatedly pledged to protect the civilian population and maintain the rule of law. During the peace process, the military has maintained neutrality and submitted itself to political decisions. As mentioned above, the Defense Minister appeals the political leaders to find political agreement aimed at unlocking the electoral process.

Respondents indicated that the church has been instrumental in searching for peace in the country. Majority of the respondents indicated that they were Christians. The church in Madagascar has been actively involved in the search for peace in the country. In the beginning, Malagasy Council of Christian Churches (FFKM) attempted to mediate between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina camps; an effort was supported by the UN. However, these efforts have been confronted by different interests within the FFKM, which brought divisions.

The 'tug of war' between those favouring internal and those for external solution has been a great challenge to the SADC mediation. The HAT has on record accused SADC mediation of being in favor of Marc Ravalomanana. The HAT President and his supporters have defended that the crisis should be resolved at the

<sup>95</sup> **Gabriel G.G. Malebang**, *Peacebuilding and security policy in Southern Africa: The case of the Southern African Development Community*, paper presented at Hiroshima University, 2013



nationa level. In line with the above argument, a national dialogue process was launched known as *mallgacho-malgache* (Malagasy with the Malagasy)

Malagasy Council of Churches (FFKM), on April 18, 2013, launched national dialogue involving 180 political parties and entities to solve political crisis. The international community criticized FFKM mediation for broaching idea of postponing elections on first day of dialogue<sup>97</sup>. For different reasons, in reality the elections were postponed.

Furthermore, some Malagasy political leaders have defended that the country needs to overcome the current crisis through the credible and transparent elections, appealing the illegal candidates to withdraw their candidature. It is in this context that in July 23, 2013, the presidential candidate, Laza Razafiarison, led a demonstration in Antananarivo asking the holding of the elections and accusing Rajoelina of willfully extending the country's four-year political crisis. He argued that Rajoelina can unlock the current situation by passing an order and resigning from his post<sup>98</sup>. This demonstration was considered illegal and Razafiarison and three other protesters were arrested by the police. The police fired tear gas to break up the demonstration.

### **3.6 SADC peace roadmap and the complications**

Data obtained from informed respondents like retired military personnel, a Malagasy don working outside the country, Malagasy diplomat and university political students indicated that the reason for the lack of a solution to the conflict was

<sup>96</sup> Africa Report N°166 - 18 November 2010, p 3

<sup>97</sup> International Crisis Group Crisis Watch Database, No. 118,1/6/2013

<sup>98</sup> Le Monde, Madagascar: Un Candidat a l'election Presidentielle arrete, [http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/07/23/madagascar-un-candidat-a-l-election-presidentielle-arrete\\_3452571\\_3212.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/07/23/madagascar-un-candidat-a-l-election-presidentielle-arrete_3452571_3212.html), accessed on 1/8/2013

due to complications that have arisen in the implementation of SADC's peace roadmap.

### **3.6.1 Lack of implementation of decisions**

SADC's roadmap replaced the previous three agreements and has been viewed as a good foundation for a move towards political stability in Madagascar. The roadmap stipulates the return of Ravalomanana from South Africa and general elections to be held in 2013, the two issues which have been of challenge. The roadmap outlined the formation of a Transitional Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI-T) which established in March 2012. It consists of 10 civil society organizations, nine political parties and two administrators.

The need for elections has been agreed on by all the political stakeholders but the task of holding these elections has been regarded as almost an impossible one. The roadmap does not specify who can stand or cannot stand in the elections. SADC's position was that neither Rajoelina nor Ravalom'anana should contest in the elections so as to decrease the potential of a contentious result. This has known as "*r.'-ni*" solution. In December and January, Ravalomana and Rajoelina, respectively, accepted the ni-ni deal and the problem, from SADC's perspective, seemed to be solved. In this regards, in January 2013 SADC welcomed and commended the both leaders for the decision have taken".

This positive scenario changed in April 2013, when Ravalomanana's *Mauvance* decided to submit Lalao Ravalomanana as a presidential candidate to forthcoming elections followed by Rajoelina and Ratsiraka. As mentioned above, the problem was that Lalao Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka had not met the legal

<sup>99</sup> SADC Declaration on Madagascar, Dar es Salaam, 10/01/20013

requirement of at least six months of residence in Madagascar before the election and Rajoelina missed the deadline for submitting his candidacy. But even with these irregularities, the Special Electoral Court accepted all three of them as candidates. This situation represents a reverse for mediation and peace process.

On 10 May 2013, the Troika of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation had a Summit in Cape Town, South Africa, and it expressed concern on decision of the Special Electoral Court to endorse 'illegitimate' candidatures and expressed displeasure on the decision of Rajoelina to renege on his earlier decision not to stand in the forthcoming Presidential election. The Summit was softer in urging the three 'illegitimate' candidates to 'consider' withdrawing their candidatures<sup>100</sup>.

However, during the Extraordinary Summit took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 26 May and in Maputo in June 15, 2013, SADC came with strong message to the Malagasy stakeholders. It expressed its concern due to approval by Special Electoral Court of three 'illegitimate' candidates, in violation of the constitution and electoral law of Madagascar<sup>101</sup> and urged the AU and the international community to exert more political pressure on the three candidates in order to ensure a peaceful conduct of elections and stability in Madagascar<sup>101</sup>. These decisions go in line with African Union decision, particularly with PSC decision took during 376<sup>th</sup> meeting held in Addis Ababa on 17 May 2013.

In this context, the International Contact Group on Madagascar (ICG-M) met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 June 2013 and decided to encourage the international community to apply targeted sanctions against those undermining the electoral

<sup>100</sup> Final Communique - SADC Organ Troika Summit, Cape Town - South Africa, 10/5/13

<sup>101</sup> Final Communique - Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, Maputo-Mozambique, 15/6/2013 and Communique of the Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa, 26/5/2013.

process, including the members of the Special Electoral Court. The sanctions include travel ban and freezing of Malagasy leaders targeted, their relatives, collaborators and close business partners'<sup>102</sup>.

However, the targeted sanctions have not achieved much in forcing Malagasy stakeholders to comply with mediator initiatives. They continue to challenge agreed upon decisions and compromised solutions presented by mediation. They have been refused to recognize the effectiveness of a consensual and inclusive government to prepare for the elections as recommended by the mediation. Some respondents argue that the Malagasy politicians will comply with mediation initiatives if France decides to impose sanctions and travel bans against targeted politicians and their families because they have interests in France.

### **3.6.2 Ravalomanana's return**

Ravalomanana's return to Madagascar is paramount in the peace process as he has supporters in the country that feel he has been a victim. The Amnesty Law introduced in Madagascar by the roadmap provides some intricacies. It states that all Malagasy citizens in exile can return to Madagascar 'without condition.' However, Article 45 of the roadmap says that Article 20 is to be read alongside the appendix explanatory note in which SADC provides that it cannot support impunity and thus all convictions under Malagasy law will stand. The implication then is that if Ravalomanana was to return to Madagascar, he would be subject to imprisonment as per the sentence meted out in his absence in 2009 trial.

<sup>102</sup> Communiqué of the 7<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the International Contact Group on Madagascar (ICG-M), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26/6/2013

For the roadmap to be met where Ravalomanana should return, the amnesty must be awarded in full as per the roadmap's provision. Full amnesty seems a little problematic due to the introduction of the explanatory note on Article 20 which was introduced by the Troika at the insistence of Rajoelina's government which refused to sign the roadmap unless the note was included. Another issue that seems to be complicating his return is the issue of his unpaid taxes. Although his businesses were halted when he left the country, his agribusiness company, Tiko, still owes approximately US\$100 million in unpaid taxes. Ravalomanana has however objected to paying the taxes pointing out that he has been unable to operate the businesses since he left.

However, there is divided opinion among respondents. Some defended that Ravalomanana's return could contribute to the development of the country since he has vast economic interests. This group believes also that other Malagasy politicians should be taken to court as well since during their regime there were registered deaths perpetuated by defense forces. Other asserted that Ravalomanana should remain in exile because his return could result in increased political instability in the country. However, both groups are unanimous that Ravalomanana should not return to the country before the elections.

### **3.6.3 Sanctions and election funding**

Another concern is on the sanctions and funding for the elections. Madagascar was imposed with sanctions in 2010. The roadmap's article 41 and 42 recommend that the sanctions be lifted so as to achieve the roadmap. However, it is understood that the sanctions will only be lifted when the roadmap is adhered to which in essence means if elections are held and Ravalomanana returns to the country. SADC, the"

African Union and the international, beside vowed that they will not recognise any of 'illegitimate three' if they are elected, they are also refusing to fund the poll. For elections to take place, funds are needed. Before the announcement by Mrs Ravalomanana and Rajoelina's announcement of their intention to run that led to the EU freezing their pledged funds, the EU was yet to release any funds despite of its conditions being met.

The EU stipulated that it would only release election funds once UN recommendations had been met and an election date was set for 2013<sup>103</sup>. That was fulfilled when the CENI-T announced that presidential elections which had been set for May 8 were moved to July 24 due to operational difficulties. As way of explanation, the roadmap stipulates that the CENI-T and the UN should work together in planning the elections. In a bid to ensure the peace process is achieved through the roadmap, SADC has pledged US\$10 million to the election process and has encouraged other member states to provide financial and logistical assistance to ensure a peaceful vote.

#### **3.6.4 External interests and the mediation process**

External interests have seemingly interfered with SADC mediation in Madagascar. Madagascar, being a Francophone is understandably of special interest to France. Although it has not openly supported Rajoelina, France was less sympathetic with Ravalomanana who turned away from the French sphere of influence to form stronger links with the USA, South Africa, and the East. During his

<sup>103</sup> Lesley Connolly, *The troubled road to peace: Reflections on the complexities of resolving the political impasse in Madagascar*, ACCORD, Umhlanga Rocks 4320. South Africa, 2013, p.4

presidency, there was regular friction as he challenged the interests of French entrepreneurs in Madagascar, introduced English as an official language and expelled the French Ambassador in 2008. French government's position was ambiguous, but it seemed to favour Rajoelina. For example, Rajoelina was hosted for several days in the French embassy in early 2009.

In terms of the peace process, France's position meant that it did not fully support Chissano's mediation, presumably because it was concerned that the process could undermine their ally Rajoelina. Therefore, France could influence initiatives to avoid the reinstatement of Ravalomanana as President. It is in this context, the Pretoria meeting organized by South Africa and France can be viewed as a derailment to the SADC mediation<sup>104</sup>. However, presently, France has been supporting publicly, even if minimally vocal the SADC mediation and AU positions, for example that it would not recognize the results of the Madagascar elections if the three personalities (Rajoelina, Lalao Ravalomanana and Rastiraka) will run for the elections.

An analysis of the conflict in Madagascar should take into account role of the different competing interests brought on by the different players in the conflict. The 2009 crisis and structural conflict in country is (has been) as a result of competing interests among the internal and external actors. On the other hand, the SADC's mediation in Madagascar has been affected by different interests within and outside of the SADC.

To understand the SADC mediation in Madagascar and the lack of a solution for a while, there is need to focus and bring about the principal actors in the conflict and their own interests. Look at how SADC has played its role as the mediator, its

<sup>104</sup> Sarah Ancas, *The effectiveness of regional peacemaking in Southern Africa*, *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 2011, p 140.

influence on the different interests and if the organization has contributed positively or negatively in its role. The current situation and the lack of progress is influence mainly by internal factors. The personnel interests have been putted above national interests.

### **3.7 Conclusion**

In spite of international community efforts, the SADC's mediation has not yet brought stability and constitutional normalcy in Madagascar. The main factor for this delay is internal. Malagasy stakeholders have shown lack of interest in solving the country's crisis. They have put their own interest above those of the nation.

All Malagasy respondents underlined that elections will be the solution of the current crisis and Malagasy people are ready for the elections. However, for lasting stability it was recognized that neither Rajoelina nor Ravalomanana should be the next president. The solution will be finding another leader from among other Malagasy leaders.

There is conflict of interest between external solution and internal one. It seems that the church sometimes has played political games. The SEC came as a new factor for delaying the process. In this context, it is important that international community speaks in one voice and it should harmonize and coordinate their actions, particularly against those are bringing the obstacle to the process.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### SADC PEACE DEALS IN MADAGASCAR

#### 4.0 Background

This chapter will outline the peace accords that SADC has managed to mediate in Madagascar conflict which was discussed in chapter three. It shall also test the hypothesis: Competing interests from internal and external actors in Malagasy conflict contribute to mediation efforts failure, competing interests within SADC contribute to SADC's failure in Madagascar conflict management and Structure and conflict management strategies of SADC are party to mediation failure in Madagascar.

Mediation is the conceptual framework that this study employs and the SADC mediation began immediately in Madagascar after the crisis broke out in 2009. Joaquim Alberto Chissano, Mozambican's former president, was appointed SADC's mediator. SADC's mediation in Madagascar therefore has been through International Contact Group (ICG). Under Chissano, the Maputo and Addis Ababa transitional power sharing agreements were signed in 2009. The Maputo agreement was signed by Rajoelina, Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka and Zafy in August 2009. These four would form what was to be called the four movements (*mouvances*) throughout the mediation. The Maputo agreement was an attempt to establish transitional institutions. It however failed because of Rajoelina's unilateralism and failure to reach a consensus on implementation modalities and political resistance from all the parties. The Addis Ababa agreement was a follow up to the Maputo deal mainly outlining out the parameters on sharing executive powers to address Rajoelina's unilateralism<sup>105</sup>.

<sup>105</sup> C. Nicolas & P. Lauren, *op cit*.

Implementation of both was blocked majorly by Rajoelina who instead pursued an internal parallel initiative to consolidate power through the promotion of unilateral constitution making and electoral processes<sup>106</sup>. In both agreements the four agreed to an elaborate power sharing formula, to form an inclusive transitional government that would rule up to 15 months during which time elections would be held. However, they did not agree on who would run the transitional government. Rajoelina distanced himself from the power sharing agreement and unilaterally declared a government of national unity and outlining his own timetable for elections.

After this development, Ravalomanana and other three main opposition parties denounced Rajoelina's government and threatened to establish a parallel government. Rajoelina's new government was rejected by SADC and the AU. Talks later resumed and it was agreed that Rajoelina was to head the new transitional government until new elections were held. Ravalomanana agreed to this development on the condition that Rajoelina would not vie for the presidency in the elections. Under the Accord, Rajoelina's administration was replaced by consensus candidates including the post of the Prime Minister which was given to a consensus prime minister. Three months after the accord, Rajoelina fired the consensus prime minister and replace him with his own candidate. He went ahead and planned for legislative elections which were to be conducted in March 2010 but due to international pressure, he agreed to postpone the elections until later on in the year.

In response to the failed earlier peace agreements, SADC's mediation focused on establishing a transitional roadmap towards credible and conclusive elections. The final peace agreement, the Roadmap, was signed by ten of eleven major Malagasy

<sup>106</sup> Crisis Group Report, *Madagascar: Crisis Heating Up?* Africa Report N°166, International Crisis Group, 18 November 2010.

political movements and nine additional ones in September 2011. The parties in the peace deal referred to all former presidents: Andry Rajoelina, Marc Ravalomanana, Didier Ratsiraka and Albert Zafy. They agreed to work together to create a genuine, consensual, inclusive, permanent, sustainable, nationally and internationally acceptable solution to the Madagascar political, economic and political situation in the country. The Roadmap required the parties to implement the confidence-building measures outlined in the Maputo and Addis Ababa Agreements, implement a process of national reconciliation to heal wrongs especially those related to 2009. The Roadmap required the setting up of a National Reconciliation Council as a guarantee of the implementation of a Truth and Reconciliation Policy.

Under the new peace deal, National Independent Electoral Commission of Transition was to be established. This body was given administrative powers of investigation, instruction, oversight and sanction. Other responsibilities entrusted to it were:

- i. Drawing and verifying new electoral
- ii. Determine the electoral calendar
- iii. Choosing the type of ballot
- iv. Supervising functioning of regional offices of body
- v. Monitor vote counting
- vi. Proclaim the final results of elections

CENIT was also required to work with the offices of the mediator, UN, AU and SADC. It was to seek expert services in the establishment of voter registration lists, financial administration and management and resolution of disputes.

Most importantly, the Roadmap outlined the establishment of a transition which was to begin with the appointment of a consensual and inclusive transition-

government led by a Prime Minister to ensure the executive's neutrality in the preparation of elections. As a transitional government therefore, it has no powers to make deals/agreements or decisions in the areas of political, international, economic, mining and energy. Under the transition article, the president of the transition was to assume the position of the head of transition.

As of September 2011, the SADC roadmap had been signed by ten out of the eleven key Malagasy political stakeholders. It can be argued that progress has been made in the implementation of the Roadmap<sup>107</sup>:

- i. A consensus prime minister was appointed in accordance to the transition clause. He has reportedly taken a relatively neutral stance vis-a-vis the differences between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana especially on the thorny issue of amnesty.
- ii. A 35- member national union government cabinet was appointed. It has 12 opposition members.
- iii. The legislature, the Congress of Transition (CT) and the Superior Council of Transition was appointed.
- iv. Formation of inclusive institutions of the transition including a Government of National Unity, a Parliament of Transition and an Independent National Electoral Commission of Transition (CENIT).
- v. Several legislation including Amnesty Law, Law on Political Parties, the Electoral Law among other laws have been negotiated and enacted by the Parliament of Transition as provided for in the roadmap.

<sup>107</sup> Statement of the SADC mediator on the mediation process in Madagascar peace and security council of the African Union, Addis Ababa, Feb, 13<sup>th</sup> 2013.

- vi. CENIT, in conjunction with the United Nations, has adopted electoral calendar, set up election dates and the sequence of the elections.
- vii. Although behind the Roadmap schedule, the Amnesty Law was passed in 2012 by the lower and upper houses of parliament.

In the Roadmap's implementation, the Malagasy people are playing a more active role in the process. For instance the establishment of the Follow-up and Oversight Committee (CSC-Comite de Suivi et Controle) under article 28 of the Roadmap and composed by Malagay Civil Society personalities. This body has played a huge role as a balancing and stabilizing factor. To this effect, it has set up a political forum for a systematic evaluation of the implementation of the roadmap with the participation of the signatories to the Roadmap and institutions of transition with key roles in its implementation, notably the Presidency, Prime Minister's office, the Congress of the Transition (CT) and the Superior Council of the Transition (CST).

The result has been that this dialogue has resulted to a consensual and inclusive monitoring and oversight of the implementation of the transition with resolutions adopted on the Roadmap made public through joint press conferences. CSC has become one of the trusted and respected institutions of the transition government signatories. The committee is playing a crucial role currently in the establishment of the Malagasy Reconciliation Council (FFM- Filankevitry ny Fampihavanana Malagasy), an institution that will be mandated with addressing issues related to amnesty.

The implementation of the Roadmap can be judged to be progressing on well. The Malagasy Reconciliation Council (FFM- Filankevitry ny Fampihavanana Malagasy) which was the last institution that was remaining to be set up has been

established. As a result, institutional frameworks for confidence building measures and national reconciliation have been done. FFM in accordance with article 25 of the Roadmap is tasked with leading the national reconciliation process as well as issues on amnesty. However, there are still technicalities in terms of cabinet coherence, cohesion, effectiveness and coordination. It is composed of 45 members from the 22 regions of Madagascar. There is a general feeling in the country that the transition period has gone on for too long and it has brought in dire social, economic, political and security ramifications to the nation. The postponement of the elections and further transition prolonging will definitely not bear very good results<sup>108</sup>.

There are still outstanding issues that need to be fully implemented despite the completion of the legal and institutional framework for confidence building measures, national reconciliation and appeasement. Some of these outstanding issues are amnesty, return of President Ravalomanana, ending politically motivated judicial persecution, curtailing on the enjoyment of basic fundamental freedom like freedom to assemble, opinion, expression and demonstration.

#### **4.1 Actors interests on SADC peace process**

It is indeed true that interests of both internal and external actors have been a hurdle in resolving the Madagascar conflict. In the implementation of the Roadmap, one of the major obstacles has been the neutrality of the President of the Transition, Rajoelina. The transition head and the Prime Minister of the Consensus have been at loggerheads and have dividing the cabinet in two opposing camps with each having a team aligned to them. Rajoelina seems to have the upper hand as he has key portfolios

<sup>108</sup> Report No. 54277-MG , *Madagascar governance and development effectiveness review: A political economy analysis of governance in Madagascar*, report No. 54277-MG, December 2010-2012.

like finance, justice (judicial machinery), communications (media/press) and the security forces (defence, gendarmerie, police and security)<sup>109</sup>.

#### **4.1.1 Andry Rajoelina**

The head of the transition has also been accused of interfering with the electoral process by demanding in January 2013, the reversal of the order of the elections to start with legislative and not presidential elections as outlined by the CENIT and the UN. The president in his defense for interfering with the electoral body said that the root cause of post-electoral cyclical crisis in Madagascar has been the holding of Presidential elections before the legislative. He further asserted that elected president always influenced the outcome of the legislative elections winning the parliamentary majority leaving the opposition with no executive or legislative powers. Thus according to him, the opposition now underrepresented and with less power is thus left with no option but to mobilize its supporters to take to the streets.

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To arrest this scenario Rajoelina says he saw it fit to reverse the order of election so as to ensure a balanced composition and representation of smaller political parties in the parliament.

His assertions have however been refuted by Malagasy Political Stakeholders and his actions have been judged to be self-serving. His motives are construed as a desperate attempt to hang onto power as the elections draw nearer. The stakeholders actually believe that if his political allies and platform takes the day in the legislative elections, they will control the legislative, appoint a new Prime Minister and Cabinet, control the executive and consequently influence the outcome of the Presidential elections and most likely post pone indefinitely the holding of the presidential

<sup>109</sup> Statement of the SADC mediation the AU PSC ministerial meetin on Madagascar, April 22<sup>nd</sup> 2013.

elections to maintain Rajoelina in power as the President. Rajoelina's actions have been viewed by others as an attempt to undermine CENIT's credibility, violate its mandate and manipulate its operations for personal gain. The same critics argue that the president gave his support to the electoral calendar when it was announced by the CENIT in August 2012 only to turn back on his support<sup>110</sup>.

This actor, the transition president has also been accused of undermining relevant provisions of the Roadmap pertaining appeasement and national reconciliation, including the provision of amnesty, access to state media and respect of fundamental freedoms like freedom of press, expression, opinion, association and demonstration. Corruption allegations have also been voiced against the president especially in his handling and dealings with MNC's (Multi-National Cooperations) where he is said to demand illegal payments and that he applies politically motivated fines and other forms of harassment when they refuse to make the payments. However, the president has gone on record to refute these allegations. He has defended himself asserting that he approaches Companies asking for their voluntary contributions for the financing of local projects like building or rehabilitation of roads, schools, hospitals among others which he says is within the framework of their social responsibility programs.

His interests have also clearly come out after he announced his candidature following that of Lalao Ravalomanana. He has ignored calls by SADC not to run but has reportedly said it is up to the people to decide whether he should stand for presidency or not. Previously, he had publicly announced that he would not be running for presidency.

<sup>110</sup> Statement of the SADC mediator on the mediation process in Madagascar peace and security council of the African Union, Addis Ababa, 13 February, 2013.



An observation by a political analyst who is also Rajoelina's former communication minister is that Rajoelina's candidacy is only to upset the elections. He purports that his actions are just to sabotage the elections since he wants to follow the scheme designed by the churches' council which is just to put an end to the roadmap and upset the elections. The council proposes to postpone the planned presidential elections by holding a referendum which will change the constitution adopted in December 2010.

#### **4.1.2 Marc Ravalomanana**

Another actor, Ravalomanana seems to be derailing the peace process due to personal interests. Initially, he declared that he would not be running for presidency after being impressed on by SADC. He has gone back on his word by having his wife, Lalao Ravalomanana, present herself as candidate for the presidential elections. From a legal perspective, her candidature is contravention of the constitutional requirement of an aspiring candidate to have been living in Madagascar for six months prior to presentation of their papers.

Further to elaborate the self serving of this actor is that the same actor on her earlier visit to the country in March 2013 promised to be averse to politics and instead take up the position of a humanitarian. Lalao Ravalomanana candidature should be seen as main cause of the current situation given the fact that other two main candidates followed her example.

#### **4.1.3 Federation of Malagasy Christian Churches and other stakeholders**

There are other Malagasy stakeholders who are doubling their efforts in undermining the implementation of the Roadmap and see the postponement of the ~

elections. The later has come to pass with no new election date in sight after the already set date being cancelled. The said stakeholders to firm their mission, have come together with the Federation of Malagasy Christian Churches (FFKM-Fikambanan'ny Fiangonana Kristnina Malagasy). This coalition has purported that for the transition government to come to a smooth end, they should conduct reconciliation and appeasement exercise, through what the national dialogue (Malgacho-Malgacho).

FFKM, by asserting to be invoking the church's responsibility of reconciling Christians convened in April 2013 for what they called national reconciliation and appeasement exercise. Preliminary indications from this exercise indicate towards doing away with the Roadmap, launching a new transition and postponing of the elections.

Still under this hypothesis, the neutrality of the transition institutions has been questioned. Madagascar Political Stakeholders have denounced cases of cabinet ministers trying to use their offices to manipulate the forthcoming electoral process. Some of the high-level government leaders have been visibly engaging in pre-campaign. They have taken advantage of government positions to target Mayors and heads of regions so as to secure support. This is in contradiction to the roadmap which calls for neutrality of the government during this transition period.

#### **4.2 How SADC structure and mediation strategies affected the peace process**

The structure and conflict management strategies of SADC are party to mediation failure in Madagascar and available data is in support of this hypothesis. The latest peace deal brokered by SADC is the Roadmap to restoration of the constitutional normalcy. The Roadmap has been lauded as the deal that shall deliver

peace to Madagascar. However, it has been faulted that it fails to clearly outline who and who cannot stand in the elections. This loophole has been exploited by the two earlier mentioned protagonists who despite promising not to run in the forthcoming elections after being impressed on by SADC, reneged on their promise and announced their candidacy, one of who through his wife. This of course prompted outcry from Malagasy Political Stakeholders and the international community that the actions of the Special Electoral Court were illegal and contrary to the Roadmap. In reality there is no provision in the Roadmap on the restriction of candidature. For doing so, SADC's mediation might be supported by Malagasy constitution and electoral law as well as AU provisions" which stipulates which stipulates some conditions for being candidate.

The Roadmap also required the establishment of a temporary Special Electoral Court under article 11. This court is meant to adjudicate electoral disputes and certify final results of presidential elections. These is however challenge in the court executing its duties because the Malagasy Constitutional High Court contends that it has the constitutional right and duty to decide these matters and is apparently seeking to have control over the Special Court. The Special Electoral Court took over the CENIT task, *in alia*, the decision on who should be candidate.

SADC mediation has been faulted for not recognizing that the Madagascar conflict is beyond the President of the Transition, Andry Rajoelina and the former president Marc Ravalomanana and that they were the main cause of the conflict. The Roadmap implementation has been undermined in a way by the heightened tensions between the two protagonists. In this regard, the SADC Organ Troika and the SADC

<sup>111</sup> Africa Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance states that perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government shall not be allowed to participate in elections held to restore the democratic order. Therefore, Rajoelina is not fit to be a candidate

mediator have been criticized by Malagasy stakeholders that they were linking the fate of the Malagasy people to the conflict between the former two. This is despite the fact that SADC's multiple, concerted efforts to bring the two together which have failed to bear any fruits. The stakeholders argue that the conflict between the two is deep rooted and are pessimistic of a solution in the near future.

Thus, SADC realized that for a solution that is tenable, the two protagonists should be locked out presidential and legislative elections. As such, the two leaders accepted in January 2013 not to run in the Presidential and legislative elections scheduled for May and July 2013. This agreement was broken when the wife of the ousted president Marc Ravalomana said that she would stand in the presidential elections. In turn, Rajoelina put his name forward and he was among the 41 people whose names were published by a Special Electoral Court. This move put into question the credibility of the Electoral Special Court (CES), since it violated constitutional provisions such as allowing the candidates that were not living in Madagascar at least six months before to submit their candidatures.

Further issues have been that many stakeholders have suspected that Rajoelina submitted his application after the April 28 deadline. The larger concern here is that the CES has already rigged the elections. Under SADC's Roadmap for peace deal, hurdles have come along the way that has not reflected SADC's peace deal in positive light. This is however not to say that this is not a good peace deal, actually it is far from it. However for the purposes of dissecting SADC's peace process, the electoral process and electoral body as well as the amnesty law embodied in the Roadmap shall be discussed under the hypothesis 'SADC's conflict management strategies have played role in delaying peace in Madagascar.

However, the SADC's mediation strategy can be seen from another approach, which emphasis consistent and a lasting solution instead of finding immediate but weak solution. This approach has advantage in the context of long and transformative perspective because it is addressing the root causes of conflict. As mentioned above, Madagascar conflict is structural and it requires transformation solution.

#### **4.2.1 The electoral process and electoral body**

The roadmap embodied the establishment of the formation of Transition and an Independent National Electoral Commission of Transition (CENIT). The CENIT was established in March 2012 and it comprised of 10 civil society organizations, nine political parties and has two administrators. The CENIT is credited with conducting its mission with a high degree of professionalism. This study views SADC as responsible for the woes that this commission has encountered. SADC having passed on the absolute necessity of this body, the organization should have set out parameter of for instance how the body was to get election finances with the background that the country's economy has taken a downfall due to the crisis and also due to the international sanctions. CENIT came up with an electoral calendar that was widely accepted by all Malagasy Political Stakeholders, the civil society and the international community. In August 2012, CENIT announced an electoral calendar which was: First round of Presidential elections, Presidential Runoff and Legislative elections and Municipal elections. The elections were to take place between May and July 2013.

CENIT has however in the course of carrying out its mandate has encountered obstacles. One of them is the registration of more than 800, 000 voters. This process had to be delayed because CENIT is cash strapped. The elections were budgeted to use up to US\$71 Million. There is a deficit of US\$13 Million. The EU pledged to

donate towards the elections but constraints in the disbursing of funds has resulted to delays in the implementation of election calendar activities. These activities include the issuance of identity cards, space for installation of the National Data Processing Centre among others. As such, the election dates had to be rescheduled to new dates of between July and October 2013.

SADC was interested in having the elections in July 2013. However, the ICG-M in June 2013 recognized that it is impossible to organize the elections in July in Madagascar. Therefore, ICG-M gave CENI-T opportunity to set new dates<sup>112</sup>. Therefore, SADC's mediation started to work with AU and international community to find the new solution aimed at securing elections in 2013.

The electoral body faces these many financial issues due to the fact that Madagascar was imposed with sanctions in 2009. The roadmap's article 41 and 42 recommend that the sanctions be lifted so as to achieve the roadmap. However, it is understood that the international community has made it clear that the sanctions will only be lifted when the roadmap is adhered to which in essence means if elections are held and Ravalomanana returns to the country. CENIT faces challenges in its authority to decide the timing and sequence in which legislative and presidential elections are held<sup>113</sup>.

It is important to underline that the electoral body in Madagascar has full support from SADC and international community as a whole. It is working closely with UN, including the coming up of the electoral calendar. Its work and the conclusion of the electoral process depend on international community support both technically and mostly financially.

<sup>112</sup> Communiqué 7<sup>th</sup> meeting of the international contact group on Madagascar (ICG-M) Addis Ababa, June 26<sup>th</sup> 2013

<sup>113</sup> Ibid

#### **4.2.2 The return of Ravalomana and the Amnesty law**

Amnesty Law article 18 calls for 'the granting of a blanket amnesty for all political events which happened between 2002 and 2009 except for crimes against humanity, war crimes, crimes of genocide and other serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This law provides general amnesty and amnesty by view of an inquiry. It puts an end to all legal proceedings and erases all judicial condemnations.

The Amnesty Law (Article 20) stipulates that all Malagasy citizens in exile can return to Madagascar without condition. The reason why the amnesty law has brought issue to SADC's Roadmap peace deal is the provision that Ravalomanana should return to the country. Due to this, the amnesty law however had to have an explanatory note introduced to it before the Rajoelina's camp could agree to sign it. The explanatory note states that SADC cannot support impunity and thus all convictions under Malagasy law stand. The explanatory note was to explain the term unconditionally. The implication here is that upon Ravalomanana's return, he would be subject to imprisonment due to the sentence handed to him in the 2009 trial that was conducted in his absence. This brings in issue because for Ravalomanana to return to Madagascar, the amnesty must be awarded in full as provided for in the Roadmap.

What actually is the real problem is the modality for his safe return and the public overture by the Malagasy security forces to cooperate with whatever decision is politically arrived at concerning the former. His return is viewed to bring in significant complications on security and political situation in Madagascar. Ravalomana's supporter view his return as a solution to the crisis while his opponents

view his return as a factor that could trigger social unrest, lawlessness and violence in the state.

On the other hand, security apparatus has also voiced concerns that Ravalomanana is motivated and driven by hatred and a strong desire for revenge. There is fear that that he could meet out reprisal to the security leadership. It is noteworthy that the head of Military Council of National Defence (CMDN) has come out to refute these claims. He said that Ravalomanana's issue is one that should be decided upon by political leaders and that the security forces would accept that decision. Another issue that seems to be complicating his return is the issue of his unpaid taxes. Although his businesses were halted when he left the country, his agribusiness company, Tiko, still owes approximately US\$100 million in unpaid taxes. Ravalomanana has however objected to paying the taxes pointing out that he has been unable to operate the businesses since he left Madagascar.

#### **4.3 Competing interests within SADC mediation**

Competing interest with SADC have played part in delaying peace deal to Madagascar people. Related to this hypothesis and which makes it true is the lack of coordination in SADC's mediation. The mediation is headed by former President Chissano. However, South Africa decided to directly involve itself in the mediation efforts through President Zuma, particularly when the country assumed the chairmanship of the Organ, 2011/2012. South Africa is a member of SADC. Critics have argued that President Jacob Zuma directly involved himself in the mediation to rebuff the notion in Madagascar that South Africa supports Marc Ravalomanana after



the country welcomed the former president. Such a notion could harm South Africa's interests"<sup>14</sup>.

Others have argued that South Africa wanted to obtain a seat in the United Nations Security Council and as such, she sought to restore her image as a regional mediator and show commitment to democracy by helping end the crisis in Madagascar. Zuma in his endeavor therefore set up a parallel mediation. This hypothesis on conflict management of SADC can be married with that of actors interfering with mediation efforts and the actors in question is external actor France. Madagascar is a former colony of France and France has had long dealings with the country<sup>15</sup>. Until Ravalomanana tried to move the country to the West/Asia, French was the main language in the country and it still is. Madagascar is still home to many French people both residing and working there. French around the same time as South Africa decided to intervene openly and not through the intermediary of international and regional organizations. France decided to join hands with South Africa.

This informal initiative by the two countries was seen as clumsy; France was perceived as opposing the mediation effort conducted by Chissano. The two countries formulated the notion of 'sufficient consensus' where they focused on the two main actors in the crisis, Ravalomanana and Rajoelina. This action they argued was due to the fact that the centre of the crisis rested on the opposition between these two actors. Participation of the other two former presidents was to them secondary and the later were only to be brought to the negotiating table once the two main protagonists had reached agreement. They were however to be brought into the mediation as Rajamandreny (wise elders). Granted, this new plan was met with great opposition

<sup>114</sup> D. Bob, M. Simon, M & B. Bruce, *Madagascar: Time to make a fresh start*, (Chatham House & Coventry University: London, 2013).

<sup>115</sup> *ibid*

especially from Zafy and Ratsiraka who had been brought back to the forefront of the political scene through the creation of the concept of the four political movements which was what SADC mediation was using. Besides, SADC's mediator Joaquim Chissano felt that it was inconceivable to sideline the two former presidents especially due to their coastal origin. His sentiments were also shared by South Africa diplomats<sup>116</sup>.

#### **4.4 Measuring the impact of the Madagascar political crisis**

At the time of conducting this study, Madagascar has so far been plunged into political crisis for four and half years and the effects of the conflict have had severe economic and social outcomes. The country's economy has stalled; with her high population growth of 2.9 per cent, since 2008 to 2013 resulting to fallen income per capita due to the economic stagnation. A resulting situation due to the above is increased poverty. Even before the crisis, the population which was living under the poverty line was high but now more than 92 per cent of the population lives under the poverty line making the nation one of the poorest in the world<sup>117</sup>.

Social outcomes like school drop outs, malnourished children have become critical as health centres close. Parents have had to shoulder all educational expenses as the transitional government is unable to subsidize education. In addition to damage from natural cyclones, budget cuts in investment and maintenance have resulted to dilapidated roads, lack of power and water. Although previously the country has had governance issues, they seem to have been exacerbated. There is weak rule of law

<sup>116</sup> Jospeh Ngwawi, *SADC forges ahead with its common agenda*, *Southern African News Features*, 12, 31 (2012), p 24.

<sup>117</sup>The World Bank, *Madagascar economic update: Aid effectiveness during political instability, a look at social sectors*, April, 2012.

even with the transition government, increased insecurity, poor governance in natural resources (rosewood, gold and precious stones) management and exploitation.

#### **4.5. Conclusion**

The internal and external factors have been a challenge for SADC's mediation to achieve her objective in Madagascar. Internally, Madagascar stakeholders have not implemented fully the agreements signed under SADC auspicious. Rajoelina, Ravalomanana and Federation of Malagasy Christian Churches have been playing an important role in peace process in Madagascar. Recently, the mediation process as well as the international community were challenged and blindsided by Special Electoral Court in its endorsing of illegal candidates and, consequently, undermining electoral process.

SADC's mediation has been characterized by cooperation *vis-a-vis* competition. South Africa took some unilateral initiatives, which undermined the mediation role. However, recently, international community seems to be united and its interest to find solution in Madagascar through SADC's mediation.

SADC realized that for a lasting solution for Malagasy crisis the two protagonists must be locked out presidential and legislative elections. The protagonists are considered as the main cause of the conflict. After international pressure, both accepted this approach, which however was broken when the Ravalomanana's wife decided to present her candidature. The SADC's mediation position should be considered as the appropriate way aimed at bringing constitutional normalcy and for consolidating stability in Madagascar. It is one way that can minimize or avoid any revenge measures.

The return of Ravalomanana and the implementation amnesty law represent challenge. Maybe SADC will have to continue addressing this issue even after the elections. Malagasy people need immediate solution to the crisis through the elections. They are affected by international sanctions. Poverty is growing and social sectors are suffering. The lifting of sanctions should contribute to increasing the foreign investment and economic assistance and consequently it can contribute to improving Malagasy wellbeing.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.1. Conclusions**

Since the start of political crisis in Madagascar started in 2009, SADC has been trying to find a lasting solution to the conflict. However, all attempts and initiatives by SADC mediation have failed and elements of pressure including sanctions have taken time to bring the result that can contribute to promote genuine change in bringing constitutional normalcy.

Competing and conflicting interests in Madagascar by different Malagasy political stakeholders have been the main reason why mediation has so far borne no fruits until now. Personal animosity between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana and a struggle for power between the two has been the principal cause of the unsuccessful mediation. They continue to challenge agreed upon decisions and compromise on agreements reached by the mediation team. For instance, the recent decision took by Andry Rajoelina to renege on his earlier decision not to present his candidature for the forthcoming elections.

The church has been a crucial player in Madagascar politics. It has proved to be part of the solution as well as an impediment to the peace process. The church in Madagascar has been actively involved in the search for peace in the country. However, it has used its position to undermine the implementation of the Roadmap. The church has recently been in favour of postponing or delaying the elections and instead finds an internal solution that does not involve outside mediation. It is also important to mention that the church was the first mediator when the first mediator when the conflict first broke out. Internal division within the church led to mediation

breakdown. It is known that Ravalomanana is Anglican with a great influence in that religion congregation since he was national vice-chairman while Rajoelina is Catholic.

The position taken by SEC in endorsing Rajoelina, Lalao and Ratsiraka candidatures bring to fore the question of neutrality and exemption of the transition institutions. The judgment passed by SEC was clearly in violation of the Malagasy constitution and other national laws, it might be concluded that the SEC is not an impartial institution. The body's actions can be interpreted to be a frustration to the implementation of the peace roadmap. Their judgment might be as a result of intimidation/pressure from political leaders or a result of manipulation/corruption. This reality undermines the institution's transparency and its credibility in its role in transition period if it will indeed serve its purpose which is ultimately the holding of elections.

The structure and conflict management strategies of SADC are party to mediation failure/delay to find solution in Madagascar. The chairmanship of the Troika of the Organ and of SADC as a whole has contributed or acted as reinforcement to the body's mediation. SADC mediation has been challenged by national laws in the context of check balance. In spite of recognition that SEC's decision to endorse Rajoelina, Lalao Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka was in violation of SADC principles and the roadmap as well as Malagasy constitution and laws, the mediation has no alternative in dealing with such violation except the threat of sanctions. SADC mediation has limited its intervention in the context to avoid interfering with member states domestic affairs and the principle of check and balance. The solution might found through the effective implementation of the sanctions, restructuring and recomposing of the Special Electoral Court as it was

decided during the 7<sup>th</sup> meeting of ICG-M. In this context, France could play an important role given her relationship with Madagascar and her people. Madagascar is a former colony of France.

Competing interests within SADC contribute partially to SADC's failure in Madagascar conflict management. Sometimes, the SADC mediation process has been characterized by cooperation vis-a-vis competition among SADC members. In spite of being a SADC member, South Africa took her own initiatives such as a meeting between the four Madagascar leaders in Pretoria, in 2011, in collaboration with France. This initiative can be seen from a general perspective as complementary to the mediator's efforts but in reality South Africa tried to take leadership of mediation process, particularly when South Africa was chairing the Organ 2010-2011.

Consequently, it resulted in criticism on the role played by SADC in solving the crisis in Madagascar, particularly since the Troika was composed of Anglophone members (South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia). This brought some dialogue difficulties in the conducting of mediation with Malagasy stakeholders. This situation also strengthened Rajoelina's will to see the crisis resolved internally. The lack of a SADC common position is considered as the reason as to why Rajoelina is able to plot a course between international actors and considerably reduce their influence in the search for a way out of the crisis. On the other hand, the presence of Ravalomanana in SADC member state (South Africa) might jeopardize the impartiality of the SADC mediation.

At regional level, South Africa will continue to play a leading role in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction, given its economic and political influence. However, SADC countries should find the way to

counter balance this hegemonic influence and forge ways of becoming a collective body for maintaining peace and security in the region.

External interests have seemingly interfered with SADC mediation in Madagascar. Madagascar, being a Francophone is understandably of special interest to France. As previously discussed in earlier chapters, although it has not openly supported Rajoelina, France was less sympathetic with Ravalomanana who turned away from the French sphere of influence. French government's position is/was ambiguous, but it seemed to favour Rajoelina. At the beginning, France's position meant that it did not fully support SADC's mediation, presumably because it was concerned that the process could result to the reinstatement of Ravalomanana as President, undermining their ally Rajoelina. It is in this context that the Pretoria meeting organized by South Africa and France can be viewed as a derailment to the SADC mediation. However, presently, France has been supporting publicly, even if minimally vocal the SADC mediation and AU positions, for example that it would not recognize the results of the Madagascar elections if the three personalities (Rajoelina, Lalao Ravalomanana and Rastiraka) will run for the elections. The current France's position might be the result of the change of administration in France as a result of the elections took place in 2012.

The situation in Madagascar should be seeing beyond 2009 crisis. It is structural conflict as a result of competing interests among the internal stakeholders. As mentioned above, there is no single President in the country's history who has ever served fully their term. Resignations, assassinations and removal of Presidents have been common in the five decades of independence. Political, social and economic issues have been seen as the major cause of the instability in Madagascar.



In spite of current crisis and unconstitutional government, Malagasy lives in relative peace and stability despite financial restraints and difficulties. Defense forces have respected political command and they impose law and order when it is necessary.

## **5.2. Recommendations**

As mentioned above, the instability in Madagascar is as a result of political, social and economic problems. For lasting solution to be achieved, it is important to address these root causes of conflict in Madagascar. The main cause of conflict is a failure to establish a consolidated democracy and/or effective governance. On the other hand, the political stability efforts have been challenged by the government's failure to look into socio-economic causes of the conflict like particularly the issue of poverty, marginalization and inequality. Madagascar needs long-term solution, which should include transformation process through increasing justice and equality in the social system, improving democratic institutions and public service, improving sharing of resources and the non-violent resolution of conflict between groups of people.

The church and civil society could play an important role in calling for national reconciliation and appeasement exercise, during and post election period. For this purpose, the church should not be taking political sides. Madagascar needs a holistic approach that includes all stakeholders in preventing, managing, transforming and mitigating conflicts.

SADC should not establish the election as a final goal. The election should be an indication that roadmap was implemented and constitutional order was restored. However, there is a need to address the root causes in the post-crisis phase otherwise"

the conflict could re-emerge. It should continue to work closely with Malagasy authorities after the elections in implementing transformation phases in the country. Priority should be given to helping Madagascar become a strong state with strong democratic institutions. Judiciary system has played an important role in Madagascar, particularly since the beginning of 2009 crisis. Efforts should be made to ensure that the judicial system becomes strong and stays impartial to maintain its credibility in its role of ensuring law and order ensue. It is important to continue support political reform in Madagascar. However, this process should be owned by Malagasy people and SADC should come as supporters in avoiding the perception that solutions and the process are imposed by outsiders.

Given the historical background of Madagascar, SADC should continue monitoring the situation aimed at preventing the future actions that can bring again instability in the country. It is recognized that early warning is effective in arresting conflicts in their fomenting stage.

SADC needs to develop a systematic approach to mediation rather proceed on an ad hoc basis, largely dictated by the personalities of the senior figures involved. SADC has no civilian in conflict management that could enhance mediation capacity. It is a fact that civilian component play critical role in conflict prevention and resolution.

SADC should continue to enhance its financial capacity for conflict management so that the influenced by outsiders on their mediation processes is limited, particularly those give financial support.

To unlocked the current situation, the SADC, AU and international community as a whole should develop the coordinate and harmonized action in Madagascar, putting pressure to who undermine the transition process.

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# APPENDICES

## ANNEX 1: MAP OF MADAGASCAR

Figure 1: Map of Madagascar



## ANNEX II: SADC POLICY AND EXECUTIVE STRUCTURES<sup>118</sup>




Figure 2: SADC Policy and Executive Structures

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### ANNEX III: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear sir/madam,

I am undertaking a research project as part of the requirements for the fulfillment of my Master of Arts in International Studies degree. The topic of my research project is: *The Structure and Operation of the SADC: A Comparative Assessment of its Conflict Management Approach: Case Study - Madagascar.*

To this end I kindly request that you complete the following short questionnaire regarding the peace process in Madagascar and the SADC mediation.

Although your response is of utmost importance to me and your participation in this survey is entirely voluntary.

Please note that you may choose to fill the form anonymously or enter your name or contact details on the questionnaire. However all information provided by you remains confidential and will be reported in summary format only.

If you have any queries or comments regarding this research, you are welcome to contact me on [cematamig@hotmail.com](mailto:cematamig@hotmail.com) or [cematamjg@gmail.com](mailto:cematamjg@gmail.com).

#### GENERAL INFORMATION

1. What is your marital status?  
/
2. What is your occupation?
3. Are you resident of Madagascar?
4. If the answer to question 3 is (Yes) please state where.

#### PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS BY WRITING DOWN YOUR ANSWER IN THE SPACE PROVIDED

5. What is the main cause of political crisis in Madagascar?
6. What main the source of conflict in Madagascar (internally and externally)?
7. What role does the France play in the political crisis in Madagascar?

8. How do you assess the role play by Southern Africa Development Community for put an end the conflict in Madagascar?
9. Do you think that the solution for Malagasy problem should find mainly from outside (SADC) or from inside (church)?
10. Do you believe that the elections would take place this year? Who do you think that can run for presidential elections?
11. According to you, who are the main political actors in the Madagascar conflict?
12. Which actors do you think have influenced the Madagascar peace process and how?
13. Do you think that the elections would be a lasting solution for Madagascar's political instability? Why?
14. What lessons can be learned from the SADC's mediation in Madagascar?

Thank you