

PROMOTING "BOTTOM UP" RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN A TRADITIONALLY  
"TOP DOWN" DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM: THE AFRICAN DILEMMA "

James K. L. Armstrong

A Thesis submitted in fulfilment for the  
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the  
University of Nairobi

1987


THIS THESIS HAS BEEN ACCEPTED FOR  
THE DEGREE OF.....*Ph.D.*.....*1987*.....  
AND A COPY MAY BE PLACED IN THE  
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY.

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI LIBRARY




0101847 2

This Thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.



James K. L. Armstrong

This Thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.



Prof. Shad Yahya

TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	1
List of Tables.....	iv
List of Illustrations.....	vi
List of Maps.....	vii
Map of Africa Showing Countries of Focus.....	viii
Acknowledgements.....	ix
Summary.....	x
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Statement of the Problem.....	1
1.2 Historical Perspectives : The Colonial Era.....	9
1.3 The Context of Rural Development Defined.....	14
1.4 The Need and Purpose of the Study.....	18
1.5 Scope of the Study.....	22
1.6 Methodology.....	23
1.7 Organization.....	25
CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF THEORIES AND APPROACHES :	
THE "TOP-DOWN" PARADIGM.....	27
2.1 Introductory Statement.....	27
2.2 Five Year Development Planning :	
"The Development Plan".....	30
2.3 National Physical Development Planning :	
The Parallel.....	40
2.4 The Context of Regionalism.....	47
2.4.1 Core Periphery: Growth Poles	
and Central Place Theory.....	52
2.4.2 Some Observations on Regionalism	
in Developing Countries.....	60
2.5 Summary.....	65
CHAPTER 3 DECENTRALIZATION : 'BOTTOM-UP' STRATEGIES.....	68
3.1 Introductory Statement.....	68
3.2 Community Development.....	70
3.3 Co-operatives and Self Help Approaches.....	75
3.4 Basic Needs Approach.....	80
3.5 Participatory Planning and Development.....	87
3.6 Integrated Rural Development (IRD).....	101
3.7 Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform.....	106
3.8 Summary.....	118
CHAPTER 4 THREE PERSPECTIVES ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT :	
GHANA, TANZANIA AND KENYA.....	122
4.1 Introduction : Ideologies for Change.....	122
4.2 GHANA: The Headstart.....	135

## TABLE OF CONTENTS (contd)

	PAGE
4.2.1 Centralization and the Sectoral Approach.....	139
4.3 Decentralization.....	143
4.3.1 Regionalism : 1967-69.....	145
4.3.2 Increased Agricultural Production 1969-70 and operation Feed Yourself 1972.....	151
4.3.3 Ideas of IRD.....	158
4.4 TANZANIA: Centralization, Conventionalism and Morality.....	160
4.5 The Quest for Decentralization and Rural Development: Arusha Declaration.....	167
4.5.1 'Mwongozo'.....	176
4.6 Operational Structures and Procedures.....	179
4.7 External and Internal Shocks.....	185
4.8 KENYA: A Cautious Start. Issue of Land.....	185
4.9 The Critical Issue of Land as a Basis for Rural Development.....	187
4.10 The Quest for Decentralization and Rural Development : Importance of SRDP.....	196
4.11 Beyond SRDP.....	202
4.12 The New District Focus.....	205
4.13 Summary.....	207
<b>CHAPTER 5 FINDINGS.....</b>	<b>209</b>
5.1 Introductory Statement.....	209
5.2 Evidence of the Continuing Intransigence of Rural Poverty in Africa.....	210
5.2.1 Basic Needs and Rural Development : What has been Achieved?.....	212
5.3 Inadequate Analysis and Awareness of the Rural Development Dilemma.....	224
5.4 Objectives, Policies and Strategies : The Gaps.....	227
5.5 The Problems of Disorganization at the Sub-National Levels.....	246
5.5.1 Illusions of Decentralization.....	246
5.5.2 Institutional Proliferation and the Bureaucratic Strangulation of Rural Development.....	257
5.6 The Role and Impact of International Agencies.....	272
5.7 Manpower Limitations.....	275
5.8 Summary.....	280

## TABLE OF CONTENTS (contd)

## PAGE

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	282
6.1 Introductory Statement.....	283
6.2 Ruralism Reconsidered : Need for a New Conceptual Approach.....	283
6.3 The Need for Concise Policies.....	291
6.4 Institutional Framework and Issues.....	296
6.5 Adaptive Planning Model and Implementation Strategies..	306
6.5.1 Considerations for the National Level.....	308
6.5.2 Considerations for the Sub-National Levels.....	315
6.5.3 Integrated Rural Development.....	320
6.5.4. Land Tenure & Agrarian Reforms .....	321
6.6 The Spatial Dimension : Urban Rural Linkages.....	325
6.7 Education and Training for Rural Linkages .....	329
6.7.1 Decision making.....	330
6.7.2 Planners.....	330
6.7.3 Managers.....	334
6.7.4 Extension Workers.....	335
6.7.5 The Community.....	336
6.8 International Agencies and Donors.....	337
6.9 Lessons for the Future: Summary.....	338
6.10 Bibliography .....	340
Books .....	340
Periodicals/Articles .....	350

## LIST OF TABLES

TABLE		PAGE
1	Incidence of Absolute Rural Poverty by Regions.....	3
2	Estimated Number of Smallholders (Near Landless) and Landless Households, 1980.....	108
3	Agricultural Gross Domestic Product as a Percentage of Gross Product and Agricultural Production as a Percentage of Total Population in 50 African Countries....	111
4	Growth Rates of Agricultural Production, 1969-71 to 1977-1979.....	115
5	Income Per Head, Ghana and Selected African Countries 1950-1975.....	138
6	Ghana : Gross Foreign Exchange Reserves as a Percentage of Annual Imports.....	142
7	Ghana : Average Annual Growth Rates.....	142
8	National and Regional Size Distribution of Holdings in Ghana, 1970.....	153
9	Growth of the Economy, 1965-1976 : Tanzania.....	166
10	Growth of Villagization : Tanzania.....	171
11	Aggregate Output Trends in Agriculture 1973-78: Tanzania.....	175
12	Tanzania's Food Imports, 1970-76.....	178
13	Classification of Land Area by Agricultural Potential: Kenya.....	190
14	Percentage Distribution of Land Holdings - By size/ Group : Kenya.....	191
15	Contribution of Rural Activities to the National Economy, 1976 : Kenya.....	193
16	Economic Indicators of Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya and Seven other African Countries.....	215
17	Health Indicators : Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya and Seven other African Countries.....	216
18	Nutrition : Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya and Seven other African Countries.....	217

		PAGE
19	Education Indicators : Ghana, Tanzania & Kenya.....	218
20	Growth in Agriculture for Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya and Six African Countries.....	219
21	Africa: Growth Rates of Per Capita Food Production and Levels of Food Imports.....	220

## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS


ILLUSTRATION	PAGE
1 The Comparison of the Effects Over Time of Four Approaches to Consumption by the Poor.....	85
2 Percentage of GDP from Agriculture Compared to Percentage of Agricultural Population in 24 Countries in Africa and 5 Other Countries.....	113
3 Synoptic View of the Evolution of Institutional Arrangements Related to Rural Development : Ghana.....	144
4 Three Schematic Scenarios of Irrational Development.....	236
5 Systems Characteristics.....	238
6 A Simple System With Input (a) and Output (b).....	238
7 A System with Feedback Loops.....	238
8 Goals and Policies Interrelationships.....	239
9 Expanded Cyclical Interrelationships : Objectives, Policies, Strategies.....	240
10 Comparison Between Traditional Administrative Functions and Added Development Functions at the District Level.....	260
11 Hierarchical Institutional Arrangements - Tanzania.....	265
12 Relationship Between DDC and Local Authorities:.....	267
13 Hierarchical Institutional Arrangements - Kenya.....	268
14 Three Hypothetical Districts.....	291
15 Decentralized System with "Loops" Back to the Top.....	299
16 National Development Framework.....	310
17 Sub-National Planning and Development Flow Chart.....	317



## LIST OF MAPS

MAP	PAGE
1 Map of Africa	viii
2 Two Aspects of the Relationship Between Population and Land Carrying Capacity in Africa.....	107
3 Map of Ghana and Key Indicators.....	136
4 Administrative Regions and Proposed Planning Regions : Ghana.....	148
5 Map of Tanzania and Key Indicators.....	161
6 Map of Kenya and Key Indicators.....	186
7 GNP Per Capita and Literacy.....	222

MAP OF AFRICA SHOWING COUNTRIES OF EMPHASIS



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to express his appreciation and thanks to various persons who were of assistance during the preparation of this Thesis. Prof. A. Subbakrishniah, who was the previous principal supervisor while still at the University of Nairobi, was very helpful in distilling the early concepts and arriving at a streamlined focus for this work. This assistance continued through the subsequent principal supervisors - Prof. Saad Yahya and Dr. Elijah Ndegwa - who were instrumental in guiding the gradual execution of this work. Their colleagues, Dr George Kingoriah and Dr. Peter Ondiege, who indicated an interest in this subject area also reviewed a draft of this work and provided very useful reference materials and comments. Likewise, Mr. Z. Maleche and Dr. R. Obudho have on occasions provided valuable information.

The author's interest in "decentralization" and rural development emerged during a 1972 travel fellowship to various countries in West Africa. Since that time numerous persons in most of the English speaking countries of Africa have in one way or another provided further insights to the problems of development in general, and sub-national level development in particular. In more recent years during the actual preparation of this Thesis, many policy officials and practitioners charged with the responsibility for decentralization and rural development have contributed of their time and knowledge. In particular, however, special mention should be made of the contributions provided by the masses of the rural people themselves whose knowledge of the rural development problem was most useful.

The understanding of the author's wife, Lenor, and children Lisa and Oronde, during the occasional periods of seclusion in the preparation of this work is most appreciated, for this was often coupled with further encouragement.

Last, but not least, is the assistance provided by Ms. Marion Simila in the typing (and indeed re-typing) of this dissertation, and also to Librarian, Ms. Wandia Seaforth, who often 'flagged' various bits of material of relevance to this work.

## SUMMARY

The main focus of this Thesis is on the existing dilemma of rural development primarily in Africa. In the initial stages of the research work the focus was primarily on Kenya, as contained in the original proposal, but during subsequent discussions with the then principal supervisor, it was agreed that since the problem is endemic throughout Africa, and Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. However, Zimbabwe was subsequently dropped from the study owing to the fact that it had just attained independence and had not as yet articulated any detailed policy guidelines or programmes with respect to rural development and decentralization, although, since that time some considerable work has been done in this area, albeit too recent to have been included here.

The dissertation is based on the recognition that the continent of Africa is still predominantly rural and will continue to be so well into the 21st Century. Africa's rural population is now estimated to be 400 million and is projected to reach 507 million by the year 2000. It has been observed that since independence of many of these states, there has been a widening disparity between urban and rural areas with the incidence of rural poverty and degradeties occurring at an alarming rate. Recent indications are that between 50-65 percent of the population of Africa live in conditions of abject poverty.

In recent years the problem has become so glaring and disconcerting that various countries have voiced some degree of concern about the problem and have advocated that action be taken to redress these imbalances. The international community has also added its voice to this continuing dilemma. A few countries, such as Tanzania for instance, have undertaken very concerted efforts to address the problem of rural deprivation. Others such as Ghana have occasionally, and with varying degrees of commitment, tackled the problem. Kenya, like many other countries, have openly expressed its concern for bringing the rural masses into the main stream of the development process. To-date, there are no success stories and many of these countries are still seized with the problem.

The basic hypothesis of the study is that with specific measures including appropriate policy guidelines, institutional arrangements, effective planning, improved technical capacity and perhaps most importantly, the systematic devolution of authority and resources to the local level, significant progress could be made in obliterating these conditions.

The study begins with an elaboration of the extent of the problem within its historical and current ramifications. The context of rural development is reconsidered and the scope and methodology of the study explained.

The conventional approach to sub-national development in most developing countries is 'top-down' in nature and the various theories and approaches in this regard are reviewed and commented upon. Various 'bottom-up' strategies

which have been attempted with varying degrees of impact, or which are of relevance to the concerns of this study, are also considered.

The study then looks at "Three Perspectives on Rural Development" including Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya. The various attempts at rural development projects/programmes are assessed for their impact and constraints. The various policy guidelines, institutional and technical capacity, as well as the socio-economic and political context of the strategies, are examined.

The 'Findings' illustrate the continuing intransigence of rural poverty and degradation inspite of the awareness of the problems and some attempts at solving them. Possible causes of the unresolved problems are outlined with references to specific constraints.

The study then draws specific 'Conclusions' and puts forth 'Recommendations' as a guide to Governments, international agencies, bodies and generally any party concerned with the decentralization and rural development.

## CHAPTER I

### 1. INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Statement of the Problem

Rapid increase in population in developing countries and the exacerbation of social and economic problems in rural areas with the concomitant spill over effect on urban centres, have given rise to increased concern on the part of national governments, as well as international agencies, for finding ways and means to ameliorate living conditions in rural areas.

While there is no consensus on what rural development is, it is generally agreed that it implies improving the quality of life for rural populations, increasing economic opportunities in these areas, provision of basic services, strengthening institutional structures in rural communities and involvement of rural populations in the entire development process. Although there may be virtual unanimity regarding the objectives of rural development, controversy envelops the strategies or means to these ends.

Africa, with 20 of the 31 least developed countries, and with approximately 400 millions living in rural areas characterized by extremes of underdevelopment, is impelled to pay serious attention to rural development. While the rate of rural population growth in Africa has decreased slightly, due largely to urban migration, the rural population is still increasing steadily. In 1950, the rural population of Africa was 189.6 million, nearly six times larger than the urban population. By 1980 this had risen to 339.2 million and is now projected to increase to 507 million by the year 2000<sup>1</sup>.

---

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, Estimates and Projections of Urban, Rural and City Populations, 1950-2025: The 1982 Assessment. (Document ST/ESA/SER.R/58 New York, 1985) pp. 24 and 97

Some other interesting population trends have been observed since 1950. In 1950 Northern Africa and Southern Africa had 24.5 and 9.8 per cent urban population, respectively; Eastern and Western Africa had 5.3 and 9.8 per cent, respectively. For "the period 1950 to 1980 the two sub-regions with the highest level of urbanization showed lower rates of urbanization than the sub regions with the lowest levels of urbanization"<sup>2</sup>. In spite of the population growth in the urban areas of these two sub regions, what is startling is that their rural populations are still growing at a higher percentage rate than the Northern and Southern regions. Between 1985-1990 the rural population in Africa as a whole is estimated to grow by 2.05 percent. However, it is expected to grow by 2.47 per cent for Eastern Africa and 2.32 percent for Western Africa, while the estimate for the North is 1.37 percent and for the South 1.29 percent<sup>3</sup>. (These figures exclude Middle Africa).

Against this backdrop there is also a very high incidence of poverty. Most reports indicate that over 50 per cent of the population in Africa live in conditions of severe poverty. Some put this estimate as high as 65%<sup>4</sup>. The following illustration shows the incidence of rural poverty by regions. It is conceivable that since the average incomes in rural areas are usually lower than in urban areas, the rural population must be in a most critical situation, bearing in mind the faltering economic conditions in many African countries..

This phenomenon presents a herculean task for the respective governments and their planning and development agencies, as the problem is severe on both

---

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p.20

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p.20

<sup>4</sup> Dharan Ghai & Samir Radnan "Agrarian Change, Differentiation and Rural Poverty in Africa : A General Survey" Agrarian Policies and Rural Poverty in Africa (Geneva, ILO, 1983) p. 13



TABLE NO. 1  
INCIDENCE OF ABSOLUTE RURAL POVERTY BY REGIONS

INCIDENCE OF RURAL POVERTY				
	High (over 50%)		Medium (35 to 50%)	Low (below 35%)
Far East	Bangladesh (86) India (51) Indonesia (51) Nepal (61) Papua New Guinea (75) (N=5)		Malaysia (38) Philippines(41) Burma (40)  (N=3)	Korea, Rep. (11) Pakistan (29) Sri Lanka (26) Thailand (34) Fiji (30) (N=5)
Near East	Sudan (85) Syria (54)  (N=2)		Afghanistan (36) Iran (38) Iraq (40) (N=3)	Egypt (25) Jordan (17) Yemen, D. (20) (N=3)
AFRICA	Rwanda (90) Sierra Leone (65) Benin (65) Botswana (55) Burundi (85) Chad (56) Ethiopia (65) (N=16)	*Ghana (55) *Kenya (55) Lesotho (55) Nigeria (51) *Tanzania(60) Somalia (70) Zaire (80) Zambia (52)	Morocco (45) Cameroon (40) Gambia (40) Mali (48) Niger (35) Madagascar (50) Swaziland (50)  (N=7)	Mauritius (12) Tunisia (15)       (N=2)
Central and Latin America	Bolivia (85) Brazil (73) Ecuador (65) Haiti (78) Honduras (55) Jamaica (80) Peru (68) Suriname (57)  (N=8)		Dominican, R(43) Mexico (49) Paraguay (50) Trinidad and Tobago (39) Venezuela (36)  (N=5)	Argentina (19) Barbados (23) Chile (25) Columbia (34) Costa Rica (30) El Salvador (32) Guatamala (25) Nicaragua (19) Panama (30) (N=9)

NOTE: Figures within parenthesis are the percentages of rural population living below an estimated poverty line.

SOURCE: Development Strategies for the Rural Poor. UN/FAO 1984

fronts - urban and rural. Addressing a forum of the UN Food and Agricultural Organization on Agrarian and Agricultural Development in 1979, former Tanzanian President Nyerere had this to say:

The bulk of the slum inhabitants and the beggars on our streets have migrated to towns because they are pushed out of rural areas by landlessness, joblessness and hopelessness. It is therefore in the rural areas that we can most effectively tackle the long-term problems of urban poverty, as well as dealing with the mass of misery which now exist unseen - but not unfelt by its sufferers. Trying to deal with mass poverty by improving conditions in towns simply attracts more and more people from the depressed areas.

Over the years some attention has been paid to the urban sector, in the form of improved health services, schools, etc., but as Nyerere has pointed out, this creates a pull factor to urban centres, while on the other hand the rural areas are virtually neglected vis a vis the towns.

In 1968, almost twenty years ago, when about 26 African countries had emerged from the yoke of colonialism, the first African Regional Inter-Agency Committee on Rural Development was convened in Ethiopia, to closely examine what rural development meant in the African context. It was with dismay, that in 1980, the OAU noted that Africa is unable to point to any significant growth rate or satisfactory index of well being.

During the past two decades the verbal commitment to rural development has abounded. Robert Chambers, in Managing Rural Development cites but a few:

"For us, developing the rural areas is a matter of life and death though we do not underestimate

the problems involved..... We must first of all succeed in developing the rural areas, no matter what our performance is in other sectors" (President Kenneth Kaunda: Zambia, 1971)".

"The greatest challenge ahead of us is undoubtedly that of rural development. The transformation of rural communities everywhere presents an intractable problem..... yet if the majority of Botswana are to benefit from the dramatic increase in the pace of development which has taken place since independence, this problem must be solved" (President Sir Seretse Khama, Botswana, 1970).

"This decision to give top priority to rural development does not only affect what is done in the rural areas: it also has implications for every other aspect of the Development Plan" (President Julius Nyerere, Tanzania, 1969)

"The key strategy of this Plan is to direct an increasing share of the total resources available to the nation towards the rural areas" (Republic of Kenya, Development Plan, 1970-1974)<sup>6</sup>.

Health campaigns, functional literacy programmes, agricultural projects, water projects, cottage industries, rural animation, self-help housing projects and various other sectoral programmes have been part of the ammunition to conquer rural poverty. None of these approaches have so far made an appreciable dent in the resistant armour of rural degradation. Indeed, as is noted in a recent World Bank report, "..... for a majority of the African population, the record is grim and it is no exaggeration to talk of crisis"<sup>7</sup>.

Several reasons have been put forward to explain the slow progress towards the attainment of development goals — scarcity of trained manpower, weak

---

<sup>6</sup> See Robert Chambers, Managing Rural Development (Uppsala, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974) p.11  
<sup>7</sup> The World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (Washington D.C., World Bank 1981) p.2

institutions, rapid population growth, political instability in some countries and an economic inheritance inimical to modern national economic growth. Indeed these have been formidable constraints, yet the question still remains — why have the rural areas, despite the professed commitment to their development, continued to bear the brunt of this economic crisis?

One United Nations report reveals:

True, there is no dearth of policy statements extolling the merits of rural development. Yet, in practice, it remained a low priority, as the budgets of many countries show"<sup>8</sup>

Close scrutiny of development strategies indicate that while rural development is a popular policy theme in Development Plans, and focus on certain sectoral programmes such as agriculture, health and nutrition, neither the popular Five Year Development Plans nor the annual budget allocations provide the guidance and support commensurate with the profusion of rhetoric on rural development.

Haque et. al. commenting on the similarly dismal situation in Asia assert that over a quarter of a century ago, these countries emerged as politically independent nations but maintained a planning model which was "indifferent if not inimical to rural development"<sup>9</sup>. This model had three major components:

---

<sup>8</sup> UN, ESCAP, Guidelines for Rural Centre Planning (New York, 1979) p.3  
<sup>9</sup> W. Haque, N. Mehta, et. al. "Towards a Theory of Rural Development" Development Dialogue (Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, 1977) p.11

1. Central planning, control and co-ordination of the economy as a 'top-down' process.
2. Industrialization and expansion of the modern sector as a means of rapid economic growth and 'take-off'.
3. Assistance from developed countries to bridge the savings of foreign exchange gaps whichever was dominant, and transfer of international technology<sup>10</sup>

This was based on the assumption that by placing emphasis on the development of the modern sector the "trickle-down" effect as the economy 'took-off' would have effected spontaneous development of the rural sector.

Neither in Asia nor in Africa have there been any signs to indicate that such economic growth, as there has been, has spread to the poor in the rural areas; nor has the piecemeal project approach with or without external assistance yielded any encouraging results. Nyerere firmly asserts that a policy of rural development is a policy of national development. It is no mere appendage, no fortuitous outcome of other policies. He states, "rural development must be a description of the whole strategy of growth - the approach to development and the provision through which all policies are seen, judged, and given priority<sup>11</sup>.

In some cases where there has been actual commitment to increasing expenditure on rural social and physical infrastructure development, the Central Government machinery either drastically reduces funds or fails to release them in the face of what is considered matters of greater priority - invariably those matters pertain to urban centres and are usually of high

---

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Julius Nyerere On Rural Development Op. cit.

visibility. Even where the local planning approach has been introduced to redress the problem of over-centralization, local level authorities have enjoyed minimal powers since the financial resources allocated to them have been limited. Furthermore, the administrative machinery for incorporating local level participation into the national planning framework has been weak resulting in the isolation of local government, and national plans being developed in oblivion to rural realities.

What is perhaps even more disconcerting, is the continued practice of preparing plans without due regard for implementation strategies. An ECA planners group, when considering this issue noted, "..... planning becomes limited to setting the targets and not much effort is made towards carrying the plans out. Preparing the plan becomes art for arts sake with very few practical results"<sup>12</sup>. Thus one finds even in cases where countries have adopted the much acclaimed integrated approach to rural development, planners have ignored the vitally important but politically sensitive issues such as land reform as a means to promoting increased agricultural productivity; the modification of educational policy and curricula to suit the needs of rural economies. The need for fundamental administrative, organizational and procedural changes, training of necessary rural personnel, provision of credit facilities, establishment of adequate communication and marketing networks, have frequently been side-stepped or mentioned only superficially. Budgets fail to detail these critical components.

---

<sup>12</sup> UN ECA, Report of the Meeting of the Expert Group on Comprehensive Development Planning, P.5

Indeed, when one considers that "agricultural output is the single most important determinant of overall economic growth" in most African countries, the fact that the majority of the population subsists on agriculture; furthermore that it is recognized that "raising the output and income of small farmers is the best way to meet basic needs", yet agricultural extension services, appropriate incentive structures for small scale farmers and other strategies crucial to the success and the rural development effort as a whole, are only vaguely implied in plans, hence, poorly implemented.

African countries have now come to a juncture, where with at least twenty years of experience at the complicated task of development behind them, the problems are well known. They are now more aware of the constraints, both internal and external. Objectives are now being more clearly defined. Advancements have been made in data collection and plan formulation. Various strategies have been attempted, modified, sometimes abandoned. However rural areas with their teeming populations continue to stagnate or progress only at a dishearteningly slow pace. What then have been the shortcomings? At what stage or stages have they occurred? What factors contributed to the poor performance? What new directions ought to be undertaken, or what old courses modified? These urgent questions remain.

## 1.2 Historical Perspectives: The Colonial Era

Before embarking on a discussion of planning and rural development in Independent Africa, it is important to review the legacy which was inherited from the colonial era. This would help to bring some of the existing problems into sharper focus. It would help to explain for instance why 'regionalism' in Africa may not necessarily be based on a 'natural region'

but perhaps more in accordance with administrative confines. Or why, inspite of the large land area of many Africa countries, the conventional economic theories about spread effects may not apply in all cases as they did for instance in pre-colonial West Africa with economic links between Ghana, Mali and what was then the 'Songhay Empire', where it is reputed that trading routes extended as far as present day Eastern Sudan.

This insular pattern of development is a manifestation of the unwavering colonial obsession with the cataloguing and exploitation of raw materials and human resources, and the efforts of each colonizer to consolidate effective control and ensure the perceived unending flow of wealth to the coffers of the metropolitan countries as observed by Seidman, Kingorih and Obudho.<sup>13</sup> Ann Siedman commented that infrastructure was primarily designed to "facilitate the export of raw materials and the importation and sale of manufactured goods".

Of course, if colonialism was going to succeed unhindered, the natural economic and socio-cultural forces in operation at the advent of colonization had to be deliberately destroyed. This policy thereby brought about the insularity of the economic system with beneficial linkages flowing only to the colonisers. This period also saw the modification of settlement patterns with a hierarchy of centres geared "to serve colonial governments' political and/or economic goals". It is reported that:

Pre-colonial urban settlements normally lost importance if they acquired no role in facilitating the production and export of cash crops. For instance, Badagry in Nigeria, one of the most important pre-colonial ports, lost importance as Lagos was developed from little more than a village to become the colonial

---

<sup>13</sup> For a fuller discussion of this phenomenon see: Anne Seidman, Comparative Development Strategies in East Africa (Nairobi, East African Publishing Co., 1972) pp 21-23.

George Kingorih, "Temporal and Socio-Economic Dynamics of the East African Regional Space" in Introduction to Land Economics (Forthcoming, Nairobi University Press).

R.A. Obudho "Planning from Below: The Role of Small Urban Centres in Spatial Development in East Africa." Equity with Growth? Planning Perspectives for Small Towns in Developing Countries, H. Kammeier and Peter Swan (eds) (Bangkok, AIT, 1984) pp. 134-154.



national capital, port and terminus for one of the railways<sup>14</sup>.

This same report also indicates that during the colonial era:

The administrative hierarchy of national and subnational capitals imposed to consolidate political control within the national boundaries has had profound influence on the developing urban system in many nations, because this hierarchy essentially provided the 'backbone' on which the urban system developed. In some instances, the creation of a hierarchy of administrative centres coincide with explicit economic goals to extract minerals or develop cash crops for export.....<sup>15</sup>

Any semblance of a broader national approach to planning and development which took place was incidental to the aspirations of the colonized. There was no theory of knowledge which emerged for effectively transforming the living conditions of the masses of the people; no body of knowledge or institutional and technical capacity to circumvent the mire of stagnation, if not indeed regression. Planning was practised not as a service; not as a rational process of indigenously motivated and directed development, but as an instrument of economic and political control which often incapacitated even the aspirations of the populace.

Some may argue that colonization did produce some 'trickle down' effect of goods, services and physical infrastructure to the colonies. Such a perception is tantamount to acquiescence with the fundamental tenets of colonization and planning during this period as pointed out by Nkrumah and others. In many cases plans amounted to no more than layout sketches for

---

14 United Nations, The Role of Small and Intermediate Settlements in National Development (Nairobi, UNCHS; 1985) p. 6

15 Ibid., p. 8

local areas. Some of these areas gradually evolved into satellite towns of the port capitals and some have grown into present day urban centres as cited above. Indeed, it was also not envisaged that colonialism would cease; at least, not at the time it did. The result of this misconception is that some of these 'capitals' were reasonably planned with the obvious intention of an 'indefinite occupation'.

Then there were the few natural resources development projects which required special study and development, again, for exploitative economic purposes. Local socio-economic considerations were not paramount unless incidentally forced upon the planners. The Volta development scheme in Ghana is a case in point which demonstrates the attitude which prevailed. Sir Robert Jackson who was closely associated with this project recalls that the effort arose out of the British Government's interest in the 1940's in finding a source of aluminium in the sterling area. He further explained that before he accepted an invitation to take charge of the Commission, "I sought assurances that the interest of the people of the 'Gold Coast'<sup>16</sup> would be safeguarded, and that the project was not intended only to secure advantages for the British Government, such as strategic development and improvement in the balance of payments"<sup>17</sup>. It is, however, obvious to the casual observer that as far as the Colonial Office was concerned, the interest of the Gold Coast was not of paramount concern.

Nevertheless, it should be observed that some of these capital intensive projects (both industrial and agricultural) and the need to install an

---

<sup>16</sup> As Ghana was called at the time

<sup>17</sup> Sir Robert Jackson in Robert Chambers Volta Resettlement Experience, (N.Y. Praeger,) 19 p.3

administrative machinery to undertake the local affairs of the colonial offices served to develop some administrative and limited technical capacity. By the time of independence, the administrative capacity in the colonies was fairly well installed at both the central and local government levels. The technical capacity was still provided largely by expatriates although some trickle down effect did take place and, therefore, skills associated with physical development, such as draughting, surveying, the middle levels of the building trades and engineering were developing. This 'rubbing-off' effect is akin to what Walter Rodney described as 'Development by Contradiction'<sup>18</sup>.

As far as economic planning was concerned, this continued to be handled actively by the colonial offices or their local representatives with the assistance of local functionaries. Therefore, while there were certain economic policies these were influenced strictly by the over-riding objective to exploit to the hilt. As such, it was a 'non-participatory' process of the colonial offices issuing the policy dictates to the administrators who were generally well schooled and versed in the implementation of such directives.

The possibility of integrating spatial and socio-economic planning was never considered, and indeed never necessary under the circumstances. This is a totally new dimension in planning in Africa. Even macro-level economic planning in the form of the currently popular "Five Year Development Plans" were frowned upon. These flourished with the establishment of "internal self-government" as a prelude to sovereignty, and have gained much foothold in developing countries as the primary planning and development instrument.

---

<sup>18</sup> Walter Rodney "How Europe Underdeveloped Africa" (London: Bogle - L. Overture, 1976) pp. 287-310

Therefore, if we were to consider planning as a tool for guiding the social, economic and physical development of a territory, with the over-riding objectives of accommodating the legitimate aspirations of the populace, and thereby systematically and deliberately improving the quality of life; then meaningful planning as a service is being attempted as a relatively new phenomenon in Africa. As Baroness Sharp pointed out:

Planning policies depend more on political than on technical objectives; and they are always in a state of evolution. Planning is essentially a service rather than a science in its own right<sup>19</sup>.

With this in mind it is most evident that the economic and political motives of this era have done a great disservice to Africa, and had set the emerging leaders a mammoth task of having to extricate their respective countries from a long period of neglect. Within this context, planning in Africa during colonialism bordered on a process of deprivation and plunder. It is against this backdrop that planning and development efforts have been struggling over the years.

### 1.3 The Context of 'Rural Development' Defined

Although increased attention to rural development is being pledged by various governments, and there is a steady outpouring of literature on this subject, the context in which the term is used varies widely. Consequently, there is also some ambiguity, if not outright confusion, about rural development policies, strategies, and achievements.

---

<sup>19</sup> Baroness E. Sharp former Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (UK)

Underlying this ambiguity, there are varied interpretations applied to the terms 'rural' and 'development'. With respect to 'rural', the term traditionally conjured up visions of remoteness and backwardness. It was the area to which delinquent civil servants were banished as a form of punishment. Conversely, officers in the rural areas aspired to being transferred to headquarters in the capital. Noting that the economic base of the rural areas is agriculture, much of the early development literature, further confused the issues of "rural development" with "agricultural development". The terms 'rural' and 'agricultural' became synonymous and are still used interchangeably. The conventional definition which emerged was that ruralism is characterized by a predominance of agricultural pursuits as opposed to commercial and industrial activities. Thus, for many years most developing countries equated agricultural development with rural development.

The attitude was repeatedly reinforced by some donor or international agencies. For instance, until recently, most UN-assisted projects pertaining to rural areas were considered to be within the purview of the UN/Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). A request from a government for assistance in rural development was usually channelled to the FAO office which in turn often assisted with the formulation of the project proposals which focused primarily on agriculture. The same could be said for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with a specialized bias towards agriculture.

In this regard, much has been done by the international community to retard the overall progress towards a more comprehensive approach to rural development. In fact, much of this 'defending of turf' by donor and

international agencies still exists and often still serve to cloud comprehensive development options which may be pursued by governments. As a consequence, much of the literature refers to concepts such as 'modern' and 'traditional' sectors of society.

In the 1960's these antiquated notions were challenged by many scholars. The concept of 'development' was seriously questioned, perhaps most notably by Seers who advised that the "starting point in discussing the challenges we now face is to brush aside the web of fantasy we have woven around 'development' and decide more precisely what we mean by it"<sup>20</sup>. He further stated that it is "very slipshod for us to confuse development and economic development and economic development with economic growth"<sup>21</sup>. Seers and others began to introduce more humane elements of measurement as determinants of development. Elements such as adequacy of food, nutrition, health care, income, shelter, clothing, etc. were introduced to the debate. He thus advised that:

The questions to ask about a country's development are therefore: What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned<sup>22</sup>.

In recent years a new concept of rural development emerged. Increased emphasis has been placed on the 'quality of life' of the rural population.

---

<sup>20</sup> cf. Dudley Seers "The Meaning of Development" in The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment ed. Charles K. Wilber, (New York, London House, 1973) p 6

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p.7

In Africa, one of the earliest indications of this changing attitude was recorded at the 1971 ECA sponsored meeting on Integrated Approach to Rural Development in Africa. The meeting defined rural development as:

...the outcome of a series of quantitative and qualitative changes occurring among a given rural population and whose converging effects indicate, in time, a rise in the standard of living and favourable changes in the way of life of the people concerned. It does not mean isolated programmes of 'community development' 'rural animation', 'mass education', 'agricultural extension', 'health and nutrition extension'...<sup>23</sup>

In 1975 this broader concept of rural development was echoed by the UN Economic and Social Council, through the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination and enshrined in a UNDP Study on Rural Development<sup>24</sup>. An added dimension has been the idea of the "involvement of the rural poor in the development process" which "requires their participation in the decision-making process and the implementation of these decisions"<sup>25</sup>. Likewise, Lele has defined rural development "as improving the living standards of the masses of low income population residing in rural areas and making the process of their development self sustaining"<sup>26</sup>.

This author endorses these broader concepts of rural development as a manifestation of the improvement in the "standards" of living of the people - the human element has now been rightfully placed on the centre stage of the rural development process. However, this concept raises other implications with respect to the actual planning for such development.

---

<sup>23</sup> United Nations, ECA. Integrated Approach to Rural Development in Africa (New York, UN, 1971) p.1

<sup>24</sup> United Nations, Rural Development Issues and Approaches for Technical Co-operation (New York, UNDP, 1979) pp. 11-14

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p.11

<sup>26</sup> Uma Lele, The Design of Rural Development (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1975) p.20

While this aspect will be focused upon in greater detail in the Conclusions of this study, it would be worthwhile to expand on this concept at this stage so that the intervening chapters are considered within a more holistic framework.

If it is agreed, as has been endorsed by various observers, that the human element in rural development, and indeed development in general, is of paramount concern in the planning processes, then issues pertaining to culture, attitudes, aspirations and so on must be brought into sharper focus as well.

In addition, the socio-political institutions and dictates which impinge on, or give latitude to mankind realizing his full potential within his national environment, if not our global society, must be brought into this matrix. It is this complexity of interactions and considerations which challenges our development efforts today, and it is within this broader conceptual framework that this study will consider rural development.

#### 1.4 Need and Purpose of the Study

Johnson and Clark, citing the various studies which have indicated that despite numerous efforts to alleviate the deplorable living conditions of the rural poor, failures continue to recur strongly stress the need to review and better understand development efforts, "to reflect systematically on the key issues, the large constraints, the feasible opportunities and the main priorities of the contemporary development debate"<sup>27</sup>.

---

<sup>27</sup> Bruce Johnson and William Clark, Redesigning Rural Development : A Strategic Perspective (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) p.11



This author shares the view along with an increasing number of concerned practitioners in the field of development, that it is not sufficient to merely apply theories of development to various situations or to become embroiled in the often frenzied and largely ineffective activities subsumed under the misnomer "development projects". It is now obvious that the process of development comprises the most complex and perplexing challenges of the century. The continuing lack of consensus regarding development strategies, indicators of development and the seeming inability to learn from past efforts are testimony to the intransigence of the problems.

The planning process is but one of the issues in the development mosaic. Although formal planning in developing countries has not yielded the anticipated results - many of these plans remaining unimplemented - planning is still considered to play an important and indispensable role in the development process. Planning is neither predictive nor a foolproof avenue to development success. Today's planners have begun to recognize the evolutionary nature of the planning process, the need for experimentation, the intricate weave of the socio-cultural, economic and political realms. It is imperative to understand as completely as possible the policy issues, institutional aspects and the planning practices involved in the rural development efforts. However, since development as a concept emphasises outcomes - increased food production, lower mortality rates, increased school enrollments - the retrospective analysis of the policy issues and planning processes; the implications which include budget and implementation strategies and impact, have been neglected areas of study. Evaluation studies focus on implementation issues and problems often without recognition that these are easily traced to erroneous assumptions, over optimistic approaches or even more seriously to the very philosophical under-pinnings of the planning structure.

What then are the critical variables to be considered in rural development planning? What are the important lessons to be gleaned from past failures in planning for rural development? What are the strategies most likely to accomplish the priority objectives of rural development? These and other key questions can only be answered following a systematic comparative analysis of the planning process as a whole and for rural development specifically.

This study therefore is an attempt to provide an historical analysis of rural development initiatives and impact in three selected African countries, Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya. Focus of attention is given to the goals and objectives of rural development in the respective countries, policies regarding rural development, the political, economic and social factors which spawn these goals, policies and strategies, the institutional arrangements and managerial procedures adopted for rural planning and implementation, the inter-relationships of the various factors including the interplay of internal and external variables i.e. those institutions directly involved with the planning process and those seemingly outside the sphere, and the perceptions of planners in the selected countries regarding the nature of the rural development problem and the role of planning in achieving rural development objectives.

The study further seeks to assess the adequacy of the planning approaches in the face of rural development challenges and highlight the major lessons learnt from the various approaches with a view to providing guidelines for planning for rural development and underscoring those areas which require further research.

The basic hypothesis of this study is that inspite of the clearly demonstrated need for the development of rural areas where the majority of the population reside; where perhaps the greatest economic opportunities exist for many African countries, and to which much lip service has been paid over the years, the various Governments continue to fail dismally owing to inappropriate policies, planning, institutional arrangements and related requisite needs. Therefore, unless this situation is rectified, Africa will for the foreseeable future continue to find itself in a position where, inspite of the vast potential, it is unable to feed itself and cater for even the most basic needs of its peoples, thereby repeatedly forced into a situation of having to seek assistance. It will be the contention of this Study that if more appropriate techniques are adopted, Africa could very soon be well on its way to playing a more significant role in sustaining itself, albeit, recognizing that there are 'external shocks' and natural setbacks such as occasional drought which have continued to plague some countries.

Furthermore, it has become very clear at the various international donor meetings that the traditional donors are beginning to seriously question the misguided policies of many African countries. Some go as far as threatening that aid will no longer be provided to countries which do not toe the line. To put it in proverbial terms, "he who pays the piper calls the tune". Such pre-conditions, of course, also bring into question the notions of independence and sovereignty for which most African countries have had to endure protracted bloody wars, and, after the three decades or so, now stand on the brink of imminent disaster.

It is worthwhile mentioning that during the concluding weeks of this study, yet another major event concerning Africa's plight was being

planned through the UN Preparatory Committee for the Special Session on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa", thereby reinforcing further the 'Need and Purpose' for a study of this nature.

### 1.5 Scope of the Study

This study will focus generally on Africa. The reason for considering Africa in a general manner is because of the historical, economic and cultural linkages which do present some degree of homogeneity for better comparative analysis of the type being undertaken here. Africa is also the continent facing the most severe problems of rural population growth and declining rural incomes and conditions. A recent FAO report confirms that in "most countries of Africa, the main sector of the economy is agriculture. Rural populations are growing faster than agricultural productions and incomes"<sup>28</sup>.

Within the general framework of Africa, emphasis will be placed on three countries - Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya - in reviewing and comparing the various rural development efforts and their impact on rural development.

Ghana is significant because it was one of the first to attain independence and was once an ardent advocate for objectives towards an egalitarian society and more dispersed development. Over the past approximately two decades, Ghana has also attempted a wide variety of rural development initiatives, including being one of the first countries in Africa to establish a separate Ministry responsible for rural development. In recent times, it has reaffirmed its commitment to decentralization and rural development.

---

<sup>28</sup> UN/FAO, Population and Labour Force in Rural Economies (Rome, 1986) p.2

Tanzania is of particular interest to the study because it has made very concerted efforts at rural development in the form of its now celebrated 'Ujamaa'. Also, its socialist policies represent another dimension for comparison. Perhaps Tanzania, more than any other country in Africa, has struggled with this problem with greater conviction over a longer period.

Kenya, while earlier sharing certain socialist ideals with Ghana and Tanzania has etched out its own unique brand of development. It entered the rural development arena more recently and its different political and economic development persuasions represent an alternative view. Also, much could be gleaned from Kenya's "Special Rural Development Programme" and its more recent "Rural Development Focus".

Together, these three countries represent a good cross section of the fullest possible range of policies, programmes, procedures and constraints regarding rural development initiatives on the continent.

## 1.6 Methodology

The choice of methods for any study is very much dependent on the perspectives and objectives being pursued. As indicated above, this study has been an attempt to provide an historical analysis of development strategies and their impact on rural transformation in Africa. Abstracting key concepts from narrative reports, noting the recurrence of certain phenomena and discovering linkages between policies, plans and strategies, have all been part of the process of gaining useful insights from the available data, which can be utilised for developing a theory of rural development grounded in reality.

Analysis of bibliographic data has therefore been the primary technique employed by this author. Research articles and reports, historical records and documents, studies of development models and other literature pertinent to the planning processes and implementation of programmes and projects, which were expected to have an impact on rural areas have been reviewed. Particular attention was directed to literature relating to innovative approaches to rural development such as 'Ujamaa' in Tanzania, Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP) in Kenya, and such as in Ghana.

It is on the basis of the content of the available documents and other literature, that key variables were abstracted. What were the major constraints in planning and implementing programmes for rural development? What key factors accounted for success? As described below, institutional arrangements, administrative capabilities, adequacy of feasibility studies, financial considerations, linkages between programme design and implementation strategies loomed large from initial readings and it was these and related categories that were probed in greater depth in both the reports on the selected countries and in the interviews.

Unstructured interviews were held with policy makers and technical personnel involved in the planning and administering of programmes for rural development. These interviews followed extensive reading of the available literature and were intended to provide information on the major categories identified as well as additional data on the rural development process from the perspective of the practitioner. Questions were open-ended to maximise discussion. They pertained to the factors which have influenced the development of policies which relate to rural development, the origins of projects and programmes, the reasons for project failure and their views on the types of action necessary to remedy the situation.

What is reported here are the commonalities of the processes of rural development in the African context. As is underscored throughout the study, the interdisciplinary nature of rural development, the numerous inter-related variables involved in planning and implementing programmes, plus the number of other determinants, make it difficult to provide blueprints for rural transformation. Instead, this author puts forward several propositions for consideration when designing future programmes in a similar context.

### 1.7 Organization of the Study

Both Chapters 2 and 3 focus on a review of the literature and a range of proposed or applied planning and development theories and strategies which are intended to impact on rural transformation. Chapter 2 concentrates on a review of the development 'from-above' paradigm. (Also referred to in the literature as 'top-down' or 'centre-down'). Emphasis is placed on 'top-down' as it applies to Africa i.e. 'Central Governments' as well as the other interpretations contained in the literature.

In the African context, such policies and aspirations are embodied in the traditional 'Five Year Development Plan (FYDP), and the review, of necessity, will commence at this level. As a parallel to the FYDP, some governments have also undertaken the preparation of National Physical Development Plans (also referred to as National Spatial Development Plans) in order to focus on the spatial dimension of the development process. This Chapter will conclude with a review of the 'regional' theories and strategies, some aspects of which could be of relevance to Africa.

Chapter 3 focuses on development efforts 'from-below', or at the 'local level' - (Also referred to as 'bottom-up'). It should be noted that in view of the largely heavily centralized systems which exist in Africa, and the structure of the administrative processes, development from below could be implied to mean from the village/district level or from the 'regional' level which administratively corresponds to the 'Provincial' level of government.

It will also be observed that not all the theories or development strategies mentioned are necessarily common in Africa at this stage, but nevertheless, could have some applicability in certain situations with appropriate modifications to suit specific conditions.

Chapter 4 undertakes a comparative review and assessment of the various ideologies and approaches adopted by the respective countries in their rural development initiatives. Owing to the variety of approaches, with certain countries placing more emphasis on selected aspects, or others completely omitting some aspects, the analysis is presented sequentially - Ghana, Tanzania then Kenya - as opposed to a single combine analytical approach. Where applicable, significant similarities, omissions, departures, etc., will be pointed out.

Chapter 5 elaborates on the Findings, highlighting the successes and constraints, but moreover, also examining the various approaches against the hypothesis of this study so that inferences could be drawn in regard to more appropriate strategies for rural development.

Chapter 6 sets out the Conclusions and Recommendations which could serve as a basis for consideration by policy makers, planners and other interested parties involved in the mammoth task of achieving rural development.



## CHAPTER 2

### 2. REVIEW OF THEORIES AND APPROACHES : THE 'TOP-DOWN' PARADIGM

#### 2.1 Introductory Statement

Over the past three decades development planning in independent Africa has been dominated by the 'Top-Down'<sup>1</sup> approach as is characterised by the traditional Five Year Development Plan and where applicable to a lesser extent the National Physical Development Plan.

Many of the theories and techniques on 'top-down' planning and development are to be found in the recent literature on regional planning with the focus on growth centre/growth pole concept and the continuing debate which this has engendered. Briefly, the concept is based on the idea that concentration of development in specially selected centres will have a 'trickle-down' effect to peripheral areas, and as is the concern of this study, open development in the hinterland which is within the orbit of that centre. Ghana in particular has attempted some of these approaches, although not with much success as we shall see below.

While these theories on regionalism do hold out some possibilities for application in certain situations in Africa, as will be discussed later on, the comparable 'top-down' approach in Africa aimed at similar objectives of the regional initiatives are based on the neo-classical Keynesian economic development strategies contained in the 'Development Plan'. It is also in this Plan that the policies regarding a 'trickle-down' effect to rural areas are stated. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, a review of the 'top-down'

---

1. Walter Stohr and D. Taylor (eds.) Development from Above or Below: The Dialectics of Regional Planning in Developing Countries. (Chichester, John Wiley and Sons, 1981) p.1

paradigm, as far as Africa is concerned, and more so the countries to be focused upon, must begin at the level of Central Government, and the Development Plan which is the single most important document guiding the economic development of the country as a whole, and assuming rural transformation.

In discussing 'top-down' theories and approaches it is also very important to understand the existing planning and decision making structures of the country or countries to be focussed upon. This is of significance because it is clear from the literature that the early theories espoused were based on institutional arrangements and capacities as were available in developed countries, and these were later applied to developing countries in which different structures exist.

In this regard Norman Uphoff has noted much ambiguity regarding levels of decision-making and activities within a governmental system, or at the international level. He has outlined ten levels which will be of relevance in this discussion:

1. International level (e.g. donor agencies)
2. National level (central government agencies)
3. Regional level (e.g. state or provincial)
4. District level (district administration)
5. Sub-district level (sub-district administration)
6. Locality level (a collectivity of communities, often around a market town)
7. Community level (so called 'natural' village)
8. Group level (neighbourhood residential group, economic enterprise, occupational caste)
9. Household level
10. Individual level

This breakdown applies to most countries, although the decision making arrangements regarding economic development issues may be very different. For instance, in the United States, where many of the early ideas on the 'top-down' paradigms arose, the decision making structures and institutional arrangements were quite different. Therefore, depending on the context of the discussion, 'top' could refer to the 'regional' (State) or (City) as the highest level of decision making regarding economic development. In Africa, as far as the planning and economic decision making is concerned, this has hitherto been at the central government level, and is, in fact, one of the major obstacles to decentralization - devolution of authority as often stated has not been forthcoming in most cases.

Some countries did recognize the limitations of national economic planning approach and encouraged the preparation of National Physical Development Plans which provide a spatial dimension to national development efforts. This, however, while a considerable improvement, has not been adopted by many countries, and in any event is still seen within the traditional centralized or 'top-down' approach.

With respect to this highly centralized traditional approach to planning Higgins and Higgins commented that:

While other kinds of planning went on in odd corners in the 1950s, outside of socialist countries planning was dominated by the application of neo-Keynesian growth models to problems of development.....

Keynesian economics, of course, was a highly aggregative affair. It provided no basis for tackling the regional and sectoral problems which were the roots of underdevelopment, let alone for incorporating socio-cultural and political

factors into the analysis<sup>2</sup>.

At the same time that disillusionment was growing about centralized planning, a new body of theories and practices in support of regional planning was emerging concurrently in the United States and some parts of Europe, and these provided new visions and hopes for development planners in developing countries. These were at one time seen as the panacea for rectifying the intransigent ills of spatial inequalities and bringing the hinterland into the orbit of increased benefits from their respective governments. The debate on these theories and practices has been prolific and is reviewed below.

## 2.2 National Five Year Development Planning: The Development Plan

Many developing countries, particularly in Africa, have evolved an unwavering addiction to "Five Year Development" planning which is based on a methodology and cycle inherited from the colonial powers at the advent of independence<sup>3</sup>.

This very formalized and rigid 'top-down' approach to economic planning and development has hardly ever been modified to address the full range of operational development issues which emerged since independence, and in many

---

<sup>2</sup> B. Higgins and J. D. Higgins, "The Reluctant Planner: An Overview of Planning in Developing Countries" Planning Processes in Developing Countries: Techniques and Achievements eds. W. D. Cook and T. E. Kuhn, North-Holland Publishing Co. (Amsterdam, 1983) p.17

<sup>3</sup> Some countries do have Four Year Development Plans and in rare cases a Seven Year Plan. Zimbabwe's first Plan was a "Three Year Transitional Plan" but they have since switched to the five year cycle. Ethiopia has had a Ten Year Plan. It should also be kept in mind that some of the countries to be considered later on actually prepared their first Five Year Plan during internal self government and continued with the practice after independence. It should likewise be noted that while the fixed term plans were common in some European countries, they did not become common place in Africa, in the context of their current objectives, until the dismantling of colonialism.

respects it tends to blur alternative options which may be more beneficial, or which could make development planning itself more effective.

An underlying objective of the Five Year Development Plan is the attainment of what W. W. Rostow described as the 'Take-off' and the achievement thereafter of sustained growth. Rostow asserts, inter alia, "that the rapid growth of one or more new manufacturing sectors is a powerful and essential engine of economic transformation". This objective, while not disputed, does seem to cloud other issues in the development process and has impaired the vision of the "central planners"<sup>4</sup>.

Basically, planning of this type concentrates on the rationalization and sustained development of the national resources, and the optimization of economic returns on investments. It therefore concentrates on economic input-output analysis, and often loses sight of the commitment to a more egalitarian society as may be evidenced by the 'eradication of poverty' or 'provision of basic needs' to the populace, etc. No doubt, the promises made in these plans are very well intentioned. The Fourth National Development Plan for Kenya was prefaced with this statement:

This Plan outlines the objectives, policies and programmes for the nation's development efforts in the next five years. Improvements in the well being of the people remain our dominant aim. The Plan focuses sharper attention on measures to deal with the alleviation of poverty through emphasis on continued growth, raising household incomes by creating more income earning opportunities, increasing the output and quality of services provided by Government, and improving income distribution throughout the nation.

The target set for overall annual growth of the economy is 6.3 per cent<sup>5</sup>.

---

<sup>4</sup> W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge, University Press, 1960) pp 36-58

<sup>5</sup> Government of Kenya, Fourth National Development Plan, 1979-1983 p.(iii)

Similar sentiments have been expressed in the Ghana Five Year Plan for 1975-1980. The major goals of the Plan were:

- i. Economic Growth: expanding the production base commensurate with the need to raise living standards of our growing population as far as resources permit.
- ii. Full employment.....
- iii. Equitable income distribution: eliminating extremes in the distribution of income and wealth
- iv. The promotion of National Economic Independence.
- v. Maintenance of a reasonable External Balance.....<sup>6</sup>.

This Plan aimed at "achieving an average growth rate of 5.5 per cent per annum of the economy over the next five years"<sup>7</sup>.

One is apt to think that the authors of these plans are schooled in the same academy and thereafter shared a common brief; they all extol the aspirations for economic take-off and consequent egalitarianism, but without any operational means for obtaining such results. There is no known report of any of these plans coming close to achieving the cited social transformation for the disadvantaged groups in the respective countries. As Logan has observed, even in cases where there has been significant improvement in the economy as may be confirmed by increases in per capita income and agricultural productivity, "These have done little for the poor"<sup>8</sup>. He further states:

---

<sup>6</sup> Government of Ghana, Guidelines for the Five Year Development Plan, 1975-1980. pp 2-5.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> M. I. Logan "Why Do Rural Areas Stay Poor" in R. P. Misra, (ed) Rural Development: National Policies and Experiences (Nagoya, Maruzon Asia, 1981) p.47

It was said that even a 5.6% average growth rate during the 1980s, proposed by the World Bank would still leave 600 million people trapped in absolute poverty by the Year 2000. Today forecasts are nowhere near such growth rate; in fact, many Third World countries are now close to zero economic growth with little prospect for improvement in the near future<sup>9</sup>.

In discussing this form of highly centralized planning and its consequences to-date, Beat Jenny<sup>10</sup> corroborates the points put forward by Higgins<sup>11</sup> and Logan<sup>12</sup>. He also stresses that the approach is steeped in Keynesian economic theory and practices and concerns itself:

.....more with national income; input-output analysis; techniques of allocation, and an awareness of knowledge more about monetary economics and international trade. It does very little to redress the plight of underdeveloped countries<sup>13</sup>.

Judging from the points of view of the stated objectives to improve the plight of the disadvantaged within the society, most of whom are in the rural areas, the centralized planning approach has been a dismal failure. There is very little connection between the stated objectives and modes of implementation to realize these objectives. It appears that any benefits accruing to the below average person is incidental, rather than intentional as far as this Plan itself is concerned - quite similar to pre colonial conditions.

---

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Beat A. Jenny "Planning Processes in Developing Countries" in W. Cook and T. E. Kuhn (eds) Planning for the Third World: Issues of the 1980s (Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Co. 1982)

<sup>11</sup> Op. Cit.

<sup>12</sup> Op. Cit.

<sup>13</sup> Jenny, Op. Cit.

In some cases, the objectives of the Plan, as far as the national economic targets are concerned, could be detrimental particularly to already impoverished sectors of the society. Because of the overriding desire to improve the economy and increase 'hard' currency reserves, central governments have been known to fix commodity prices internally; regulate the local market, and sell externally at higher prices, without much redress for the rural farmer. This practice also sometimes leads to acute shortages of essential commodities which are produced locally, especially if external quotas are to be met. This phenomenon is, of course, in full recognition of the fact that "an economy cannot start economic development by producing for the home market alone because some exporting would also be required"<sup>14</sup>, to bring about prosperity. It could be said therefore that the Plan is usually "outward looking" with respect to its actual development perspectives.

In commenting on this dichotomy and the obvious disregard to rural development and more inward looking aspects, Uma Lele states that:

National planning, thus, has to reconcile two apparently conflicting but basically interdependent goals: (a) the need for decentralization to take into account local potential and constraints and to channel the knowledge of rural people into the development process; and (b) the need for central control to foster national integration, regional specialization, and outside stimulus<sup>15</sup>.

One may, of course, argue that benefits are often inadvertently realized by the rural poor - perhaps through greater access to improved social services - once the economy gains buoyancy. However, in the main what prevails is an internal form of colonization in which the rural poor continue to

---

<sup>14</sup> Arthur Lewis, Development Planning: The Essentials of Economic Policy (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966) p.40

<sup>15</sup> Uma Lele, The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1975) p.142



subsidize the urban economy. It should be noted that in many cases, the export earnings are based largely on agricultural produce.

Furthermore, central planning and plans have consistently promised every conceivable goal, but focuses very little on the actual distributive aspects except for expousing the general hope that there will be an improved quality of life as the economy grows. Since the Plan is not intended to be operational in the sense that it contains specific strategies geared towards ensuring the desired and promised transformation (if the economy really grows as planned), they often turn out to be haphazard endeavours which fall far short of achieving significant change.

Lewis observes that these shortcomings in planning and implementation are quite prevalent with a new government which comes in promising everybody "schools, hospitals, water supplies, electricity, roads, houses, jobs and all the other good things of life"<sup>16</sup>. When it is then realized that taxes bring in only a very small percentage of the national income, predictions are made about the expected rapid rate of growth over the Plan period. Lewis further points out that:

The distinction between an 'indicative' and a 'controlling' Plan is important. The Plans made by Communist countries are documents of authorization; they tell each industrial unit what it must produce and how much it may invest. A Development Plan, on the other hand, authorizes nothing. Every public expenditure is authorized not by the Plan, but only by the Annual Budget passed by Parliament. The figures in a Development Plan indicate expectations, aspirations and intentions, but are not binding commitments. This is one reason for the irresponsible tendency to use grossly inflated figures, intended to impress the reader, without committing the writer<sup>17</sup>.

---

<sup>16</sup> Lewis, op.cit. p.17  
<sup>17</sup> Ibid., pp.20-21

Even a casual examination of the results achieved from development planning in most less developed countries indicates that they are falling short of what is reasonable to expect.

Governments in Africa, as well as many other developing countries, seem undaunted by the usually disastrous consequences of Plans and promises which seldom deliver the expected outputs. The performance to-date has been glaringly poor as indicated by Waterston.

The record is so poor - it has been worsening in fact - that it has sometimes led to disillusionment with planning and the abandonment of plans<sup>18</sup>.

He indicates that the Plan itself very seldom achieves its targets on the production side and that "the gap between promise and performance appears to be widening". He notes likewise that "some governments tend to overemphasize the fulfillment of investment targets to the neglect of physical targets because of the beliefs that investment virtually insures development"<sup>19</sup>.

John Classen<sup>20</sup> has surprisingly indicated that even in Britain National Five Year Development Planning has not been very successfully implemented. Both the "1965 Labour national plan and the earlier Conservative proposals came to ignominious ends". The plans were quite weak and hastily produced whereas, he claims "in France, there is a long history of successful national planning, with the production and fulfillment of five plans since the war, and the sixth currently in progress"<sup>21</sup>.

---

18 Albert Waterston, Development Planning : Lessons of Experience (Baltimore John Hopkin's University Press, 1965) p.4

19 Ibid. p.365

20 John Classen, Regional Planning. (London, Hutchinson 1978 edition) p.22

21 Ibid. p.22-23

It would appear therefore that the notion of five year planning in itself is not necessarily bad, but that clearly something has to be done on the implementation side, quite apart from improving the plan itself.

Classen further explains that planning structures in Britain are far more developed at the national and local levels. Particularly at the local levels they have had far better results since the introduction of the Town and Country Act of 1971 "which provides for two tiers of plans, with the preparation of structure plans - setting out the local authority's policy and general proposal"...<sup>22</sup>. Regional planning on the other hand, which deals with the intermediate level between the national and the local framework is still, therefore, evolving in Britain, although there is now legislation for this tier of planning.

One inherent problem in this 'top-down' form of planning, and its poor results to date, is also the way in which the Plan is often prepared as has been alluded to above. In most cases it is prepared by some form of 'Central Planning Agency' which has very little contact with the realities which exist. It is not uncommon for the sectoral line ministries to be left out of the policy aspects, although their full participation will be expected for plan implementation. To compound these problems, in developing countries, the Plan is very often prepared by expatriate econometricians and replete with figures rather than sound and realistic policies for reasonable implementation. It has also been observed that the private sector very rarely makes any contribution to the Plan inspite of the key role which this sector also has to play in implementation. In this regard Waterston makes the following points:

- i. Planners, perhaps aided by foreign technicians, sometimes produce plans largely within the confines of a central planning agency's office in virtual isolation from other government offices or the private sector.

---

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

- ii. The creation of a central planning agency, in itself, does little to eliminate bottlenecks to increased output, increased productive efficiency or improve the rate of development. Planning agencies have been established in most less developed countries, but many are little more than paper organizations<sup>23</sup>.

Nevertheless, as seen from the above, the body of literature on this subject does not conclusively suggest that this form of centralized planning is without merit and should be discontinued. In fact, without this form of planning it is conceivable that developing countries would not be in a position to effectively participate in global economic activities which are so vital for their survival. Economic growth, it is agreed, is of paramount concern to every sovereign state and it must be meticulously planned (for particularly by developing countries). However, this alone is not enough; the techniques of central planning must be improved as suggested, but likewise it is evident that there must be an 'inward' focus, and accountability should be emphasized. Greater attention must be paid to some form of decentralized and distributive mechanism in order to really achieve, even to a limited extent, the promises made to those who reside in the hinterland.

In this connection Logan asserts that:

The appropriateness of the centralized structure of government must be called into question..... Many rural planning programmes are managed through a centralized planning body, generally inflexible, where rigid bureaucratic structures allow a one way flow of directives. There is strong argument for both, a decentralization of administration (which already

---

<sup>23</sup> Waterston, Op.Cit. pp. 446-447

exists in many countries) and, more importantly, for a devolution of decision making to foster self reliance and growth from below.<sup>24</sup>

Moris, in contemplating this phenomenon arrives at a quite similar conclusion:

The third management reversal involves shifting power and initiative downwards and outwards. Decentralization - the deconcentration of staff and resources, and the devolution of authority - is usually seen as the result of central decisions. To some degree this is inevitable. But there is another angle. Administrative and service organizations are regarded as providers: they spread facilities, pass on knowledge, treat the sick, educate the children and so on.<sup>25</sup>

While it is now generally agreed that decentralization is perhaps the quickest and most effective means of reaching the rural population (and some noticeable attempts have already been made as will be discussed later on) the issue of staff, organizational requirements and attendant additional resources have repeatedly been cited as a serious constraint. The point is made that:

Presumably largely for historical reasons, planning has always had a strong top-down bias. Especially in developing countries a severe shortage of skilled planners and the problem of data aggregation at lower levels presumably dictated such highly centralized decision making.<sup>26</sup>

Lele, in exploring the same issue sums it up thus:

What explains such uncoordinated planning? To some extent the contrast tendency has been necessitated by the shortage of administrative

---

<sup>24</sup> Logan, op.cit. p.55

<sup>25</sup> Robert Chambers citing Moris. Managing Rural Development

<sup>26</sup> United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Guidelines for Rural Centre Planning (UN, New York, 1979) p.75

capacity in many African countries. The limited trained manpower has led to concentration of expertise at the center, inevitably weakening the capacity at the local level.....<sup>27</sup>

Nevertheless, it is also important to keep in mind a distinction between 'administrative decentralization' and 'technical decentralization' i.e. the decentralization of the technical capacity with respect to planning and development functions. This is important because as will be explored more fully later on, most of the countries under discussion already have some form of decentralized administrative structure, but this is never matched by technical capacity, and has indeed been an added bottleneck in developing countries.

### 2.3 National Physical Development Planning (NPDP)

It has been observed from the review of the literature and practices that very little attention has been paid to National Physical Development Plans, which, in the opinion of this author is a very important aspect of planning for development, particularly in Africa.

Most of the pundits of the planning and development debate have advocated some form of decentralization - and this view is not being contested here. Why then advocate another Plan which is national in scope? Why, in fact, have a few African countries already undertaken the exercise of preparing a National Physical Development Plan?

Unlike the Five Year Development Plan which is macro-economic in focus, the National Physical Development Plan concentrates primarily on land, not capital (in the monetary sense) as the basic resources. It is concerned with the orderly spatial framework for the integration of socio-economic

---

<sup>27</sup> Uma Lele, Op.Cit. p.143

and physical development, clearly identifying the spatial distribution of natural endowments. Consideration is therefore given to the comparative relationship of urban and rural areas in support of an overall spatial development programme based on potential, which also has relevance to efforts to influence population movements, and the promotion of a hierarchy of settlements and service centres.

It also promotes the rational use of land based on identification and scientific classification of possible alternative uses; and in conjunction rationalizes the development of communication networks, with empirical indicators for the most suitable location of economic activities in the settlement hierarchy. Consequently, the distribution of social services in a methodical manner is also possible, and defensible if questioned.

Equally important is the significance of the NPDP to both the 'top-down' or 'bottom-up' approaches to development. Also, unlike the Development Plan which often contains questionable statistical data in the absence of accountability, the NPDP tends to have a more empirical basis and fosters a systematic and gradual development of additional valuable statistical data. Therefore, once in possession of both plans, central government is immediately able to prioritize its interventions and promote national, regional and local level development which cumulatively contributes to the overall objective of national development.

This point is perhaps best illustrated by citing the discontent expressed by a senior provincial official in Zimbabwe who sought to know from a Local Government Ministry official why a particular district was allocated more central government funds than one of his, and why the same district was earmarked for two major donor projects while it was evident, in his opinion, that one of his districts was more deserving. The senior Local Government

official placed the responsibility on a 'Cabinet decision', but this did not seem to please the provincial official. What emerged during the interview is that in Zimbabwe, which does not have a NPDP, there is no real systematic way for central planners, or the Cabinet, to prioritize interventions in a situation of limited financial resources. Development efforts therefore are not optimized.

Nevertheless, Zimbabwe, like most other African countries, has a fairly well structured provincial and district level administrative system. In cases where these countries have embarked on some form of decentralized planning system, they have so far been in accordance with the decentralized administrative structure. Assuming, therefore, a situation of sixty districts, plus the metropolitan areas which are included in this structure, each eventually presenting plans to central government, this could not be but chaotic and raise serious questions about egalitarianism.

Even if these plans are formulated on a regional basis, central government is still often at a loss to rationalize the appropriate location for economic activities, social services, infrastructure development, etc. Redressing spatial inequities in the absence of information on the comparative degree of such inequalities, often leads to decisions based on political clout - the Minister with the most clout attracts more development inputs to his/her district or constituency, thereby perhaps widening the disparity which we are told "regionalism" will rectify. More often than not, however, the major urban centres attract a disproportionate share of the development.

Absence of a NPDP also makes budget allocations vague. As pointed out by Lewis, "public expenditure is authorized not by the Plan (Development Plan)



but by the Annual Budget passed by Parliament"<sup>28</sup>. It is not clear in many developing countries how these budget allocations are arrived at, whether allocated directly to a sub-national level of government or through a sectoral ministry. As Herman has likewise stressed, "planning without regard for the realities of annual budget implementation becomes an academic exercise of little operational value"<sup>29</sup>.

Furthermore, the NPDP as a parallel to the Five Year Plan allows for conceptual coordination and actual integration of certain development efforts with the support of central government interventions in conjunction with the sectoral ministries and the spatial development planners. It will be recalled that Lele, for instance, while also advocating the need for decentralization, also recognizes "the need for central control to foster national integration, regional specialization, and outside stimulus...."<sup>30</sup>. She has also rightly observed that even in cases where some degree of autonomy exists, or where a more decentralized focus has begun to emerge:

The tendency has been to draw up broad sectoral plans that are little more than shopping lists and may bear little relation to local resource endowments.....Thereby leading to implementation without planning<sup>31</sup>.

Herein lies a major problem which, based on evidence deduced during numerous interviews by this author, seriously constrains governments in the delivery of benefits promised in the Development Plan.

---

<sup>28</sup> Arthur Lewis, op.cit. pp 19-20

<sup>29</sup> Robert Herman, "Two Aspects of Budgeting" Indian Journal of Public Administration (New Delhi) Vol. III, No. 3, 1962 p.319

<sup>30</sup> Lele, op.cit. p.42

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. p.142

The case for parallel economic and physical development plans has been emphasized by the United Nations for many years. One report indicates that:

The efficiency of both plans by coordination will increase the possibility that sectoral policies and programmes complement one another and thus reveal opportunities for further development<sup>32</sup>.

This report also stresses the need for integration of all facet plans, pointing out that theoretically, the highest level of effectiveness would be achieved when all facets of development planning are completely integrated. Beyond a certain level, however, the cost of further integration may exceed the possible benefits<sup>33</sup>.

This point regarding the need for integration is very important. Nevertheless, this author would like to caution against efforts to directly 'integrate' plans at the national level. While this is technically feasible, trying to do so at the national or central government level would tend to again foster centralized control instead of coordination. It is therefore recommended that central government 'coordinates' and play a catalytic role while leaving the task of integration for the sub-national level in the foreseeable future.

This UN report also advises that what is necessary at the central government level is to fully recognize that:

Physical planning decisions concerning infrastructure such as roads, water systems, health and educational facilities,

---

<sup>32</sup> United Nations, Integration of Economic and Physical Planning, New York, 1975 p.2

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

inter-settlement linkages, and the management of a nation's physical assets - including land and national amenities - have an enormous impact on economic development. The manner in which those resources are used is heavily influenced by physical planning<sup>34</sup>.

The case for some form of coordination of economic and physical planning is perhaps best made under the 'Guidelines for Action' elaborated at the Vancouver Conference on Human Settlements. These state, inter alia:

It is the responsibilities of Governments to prepare spatial strategy plan and adopt human settlement policies to guide the socio-economic development efforts. Such policies must be an essential component of an overall development strategy, linking and harmonizing them with policies on industrialization, agriculture, social welfare, and environmental and cultural preservation so that each supports the other in a progressive improvement in well-being of all mankind<sup>35</sup>.

Some of the pertinent recommendations on this matter emanating from this Conference are cited at some length below owing to their importance in this discussion. The principal recommendations in this regard are as follows:

#### A National Settlement Policy

- a. Every aspect of human settlements: social, environmental, cultural and psychological is profoundly affected by the level of economic development, population growth and movements, as well as social relationships. The task of dealing with the consequential and rapid changes in the range and location of human activities, within the constraints of limited resources presents both a new challenge and a unique opportunity to achieve more balanced development in every nation.

---

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. p.5

<sup>35</sup> United Nations, The Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements and the Vancouver Action Plan. (June 1976) p.1

b. ALL COUNTRIES SHOULD ESTABLISH AS A MATTER OF URGENCY A NATIONAL POLICY ON HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, EMBODYING THE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, AND RELATED ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES, OVER THE NATIONAL TERRITORY

c. Such a policy should:

- i. Be based on the goals and objectives stated in the Declaration of Principles;
- ii. Recognize that difficult choices must be made between conflicting requirements;
- iii. Embody both a firm political commitment and public understanding of its implications;
- iv. Be based on a critical assessment of the present situation of human settlements, the emerging trends, and the impact of past policies;
- v. Be devised to facilitate population redistribution to accord with the availability of resources;
- vi. Focus on the central role of human resources as an agent for development;
- vii. Take into account the World Population Plan of Action.

d. A NATIONAL HUMAN SETTLEMENTS POLICY SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON KEY ISSUES AND PROVIDE BASIC DIRECTIONS FOR ACTION

e. Such a policy should:

- i. Promote the goals and objectives of national development and translate these into spatial terms;
- ii. Outline strategies appropriate to different time perspectives and different scales;
- iii. Establish priorities among regions and areas, especially in relation to the location of investment and infrastructure and the satisfaction of the needs of various social groups;
- iv. Be led by public sector action, and aim at the welfare of the people, with priority to the most deprived;
- v. Set minimum standards which should be expressed in qualitative and quantitative terms, based on indigenous values, related to local resources and abilities, capable of evolving over time and developed with the full participation of all those concerned<sup>36</sup>.

---

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. pp.2-3

In spite of these widely acclaimed pronouncements, very few countries in Africa have formulated comprehensive national human settlements policies which seek to coordinate or integrate economic and spatial planning and development.

As far as a National Physical Development Plan is concerned, Ghana was one of the first to prepare such a Plan in 1962, with the assistance of the United Nations, which was aimed at supporting the First Seven Year Development Plan. As this Plan is now dated, consideration is being given for the preparation of a new NPDP for Ghana.

Significant progress has also been made in Malawi towards preparation of their first NPDP in support of their economic planning efforts. Swaziland has had a draft NPDP prepared, and Zimbabwe is still giving serious consideration to embarking on such an exercise. Kenya does have a document which addresses national spatial development but it is not considered to be a comprehensive plan.

#### 2.4 The Context of Regionalism

As pointed out, most of the developing countries in Africa have Development Plans of varying time frames since the days of internal self government and the advent of independence. The practice has become institutionalized and, as observed there are some benefits to this form of central government planning if developing countries are going to compete effectively in the international market place. This requirement may not be as necessary for already industrialized countries, although it is practiced in many European countries. On the other hand, many governments have also recognized that they have not been able to achieve dispersed development as envisaged in

their Development Plans and have embarked on a multi-tiered decentralized planning and development system in order to achieve a more equitable distribution of benefits. Except for the very few countries which have seen it beneficial to prepare complementary National Physical Development Plans, most of the others have complemented their central planning efforts by moving directly to some variation of regional planning, and administration, and often also going down to district and village levels. It is at the regional and district levels that they have sometimes been able to introduce a combination of economic and territorial elements into planning.

It is also important to note that regionalism as discussed by some of the eminent theorists, when applied, could assume either a 'top-down' or 'bottom-up' approach depending on the institutional arrangements and the extent to which there is local participation etc. In the African context it has traditionally been a 'top-down' approach, except perhaps in the case of Ghana which has experimented with some regional planning strategies in a specific effort to decentralize. Even then, the major criticism, as we shall see in Section 4.3 is that the attempt was too centralized - in effect, complicated by the regional administrative structure as an extended arm of the central government bureaucracy.

The shift away from the narrow 'town' or 'city' planning schemes has been greatly influenced by earlier 'Western' regional planning theories and practitioners such as Hirshman and Friedmann.

Weaver notes that:

Although national planning had been part and parcel of the centre-down model of development from the outset, recognition of the relationship between sectoral planning and geography of modernization was long in coming, the spatial

dimension of development was not an important theme for neoclassical economists, nor were regional differences in the outcomes of development popular topics among politicians in the emerging nations, bent on national integration and political control<sup>37</sup>.

The developing countries under review here, however, were saddled with the traditional planning techniques which grew out of nineteenth century British Public Health Legislation that gradually encompassed building and overall physical development. The weaknesses of these techniques, particularly the often inadequate administrative structure, was long recognized, but change was always slow. In reviewing the limitations of these techniques it was once observed that the British "Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 operated for two decades without significant change"<sup>38</sup>.

Commenting further on these inadequacies, it was noted that: "over the years the plans have become more and more out of touch with emergent planning problems and policies, and have in many cases become no more than local land use maps"<sup>39</sup>. These concerns therefore gave rise to regional economic planning in Britain, which was:

... primarily concerned with creating the conditions for economic growth in some regions and controlling the pace of growth in others, within the framework of national economic planning. As a part of this process they will have to be concerned with physical planning issues which are of regional significance, with the overall distribution of population and employment, green belt policy and other limitations on growth in the conurbations. They also encompass other physical factors of regional

- 
- <sup>37</sup> Clyde Weaver, "Development Theory and the Regional Question: A Critique of Spatial Planning and its Detractors" in Development From Above or Below (eds) W. Stohr & D. Taylor, Chichester, John Wiley & Sons 1981 p.84
- <sup>38</sup> See J. B. Cullingworth, Town and Country Planning in Britain (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1964) pp. 17-34 for discussion of these drawbacks
- <sup>39</sup> Cullingworth, *Ibid* p.97

significance such as communications, water resources and major industrial projects; the economic implications of major development projects (motorways, docks, airports), and the impact of economic decisions on physical planning<sup>40</sup>.

These principles were enshrined in the 1968 Planning Act from which the Commonwealth developing countries took their cue. Furthermore, post colonial technical assistance from Britain, as well as assistance with training, did not allow for much exposure to some of the techniques which were emerging elsewhere in the US and other parts of Europe.

As early as 1955, John Friedmann, one of the stalwarts of modern regional planning theory also observed that the approaches to planning in Europe and the US were quite distinct. He commented:

American planning practice, and not only the practice but the idea of planning itself, has always been in sharp contrast to the approach popular in Central Europe and elsewhere. Characteristically, it is almost completely devoid of ideological overtones; it is, for the most part, loose and informal; and is closely linked to operations. As such, it is congenial to the American pragmatic temperament and well adapted to the federal system of decentralized government and administration. The Grand Conception, 'the Five Year Plan', is a phenomenon unknown in the United States. Planning tends rather to be piecemeal and experimental<sup>41</sup>.

It is perhaps this absence of 'ideological overtones' and rigid structures which makes planning in the United States so adaptive to change. Certainly

---

<sup>40</sup> Cullingworth Ibid p.98

<sup>41</sup> John Friedmann, "The Concept of a Planning Region - The Evolution of an Idea in the United States" in Regional Development and Planning (eds) John Friedmann and William Alonso (Cambridge, Massachusetts MIT Press) 1964 pp.497-498



planning in Britain is more formalized and rigid, as in the developing countries, where it is further compounded by development ideologies. It is therefore far less adaptive to change.

Decentralized regional planning in developing countries also has problems particularly owing to the lack of technical capacity and the existing antiquated administrative structures which have not changed along with the new efforts. It is extremely rare to find, for instance, economists or sociologists in the Town and Country Planning Departments in developing countries, and some of the planners have not been adequately trained to deal with the evolving requirements. There is, therefore, a gross incompatibility between the existing 'machinery' and personnel, and the initiatives geared towards decentralization.

Another problem facing regional planning in developing countries is the structure of the administrative system and decision making process as cited by Norman Uphoff<sup>42</sup>. Rondinelli and Ruddle also warned about laissez-faire application of some of these theories in developing countries owing to the "lack of adequate spatial structure for promoting and spreading development in developing nations" and that the "spatial patterns of developing countries are substantially different from those of North America and Europe"<sup>43</sup>. Nevertheless, this does not say that certain aspects of the varied regional theories might not be applicable. It will certainly be up to the development planners to extract what suits their particular situation best as will be discussed further on.

Regional theory had its inception in the work of the classic utopian city

---

<sup>42</sup> Uphoff. Op.cit.

<sup>43</sup> Dennis Rondinelli and Kenneth Ruddle, Urban Functions in Rural Development: An Analysis of Integrated Spatial Development Policy (Washington, USAID, 1976) p.16

planners and reformers during the 1920s and 1930s. These would include scholars such as Benton MacKaye, Howard Odum, Lewis Mumford, Patrick Geddes, and a few others<sup>44</sup>. However, it was not until the post World War II era that regional theory and planning really evolved into a separate field of knowledge and practice embodying specific principles for economic and spatial development.

The early theorists who pioneered these concepts into practice could be divided into two main groups based in the United States and Europe. Walter Isard, Douglass North and John Friedmann were based in the US working on concepts of core-periphery relationships, while Francois Perroux, Jacques Boudeville, Jean Paelinck and Walter Christaller were developing parallel growth pole concepts in Europe.

#### 2.4.1 Core-Periphery: Growth Pole Concepts and Central Place Theory

Tracing the evolution of regional planning in the United States, Friedmann explains that between 1933 to the end of World War II regional planning focussed mainly on the development of water resources and adjacent resources within a given river basin and this gave rise to entities such as the Tennessee Valley Authority. The post war era posed new kinds of problems "and the undogmatic character of planning in the United States made possible a quick adjustment to the new conditions, as attention shifted from the

---

<sup>44</sup> See the following works:

- Benton MacKaye, "The New Exploration : A Philosophy of Regional Planning" (Harcourt Brace & Co., 1928)
- Howard Odum, "The Case for Regional National Social Planning" Social Forces, October 1934, pp.6-23
- Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities (Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1938)
- Patrick Geddes, Cities in Evolution
- John Friedmann, "The Concept of a Planning Region - The evolution of an Idea in the United States" in Regional Development and Planning (eds) Friedmann and Alonso, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1964, pp.498

watershed to the metropolitan region as the major planning era<sup>45</sup>.

However, the metropolitan area as a logical unit of planning was not generally accepted and the new philosophy of regionalism took hold in the Southern United States where "planning came to be looked upon as the truly dynamic aspect of regionalism in accordance with Odum's and Moore's view that it should address itself to: "rehabilitation of the people, toward the reconstruction of regional economy, toward increasing the regions revenue to the nation as well as its own wealth, and toward general regional, cultural adjustment<sup>46</sup>. They saw this regional entity as the "largest possible degree of homogeneity measured by the largest possible number of economic, cultural, administrative, and functional indices, for the largest possible number of objectives<sup>47</sup>.

Since that time, the definition of the region has evolved through various conceptual stages. Mumford conceived of the region as a natural area consisting of the centre and periphery<sup>48</sup>. This would imply some degree of homogeneity with similarities to the concept put forward by Odum and Moore. In 1951, this idea was challenged by Louis Wirth<sup>49</sup> who believed that homogeneity was not necessarily the predominant criterion but that focus had to be placed in the inter-relatedness or inter-dependence of various criteria. Acceptance of the idea meant a dramatic departure from the earlier concepts of natural regions which made them easily definable in spatial terms - easily subject to delineation.

---

<sup>45</sup> Friedmann, Ibid p.498

<sup>46</sup> Howard W. Odum and Harry Moore, American Regionalism, New York (Henry Holt & Co. 1938) p.254

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. p.272

<sup>48</sup> Mumford. Op.cit. p.315

<sup>49</sup> Louis Wirth, "The Limitations of Regionalism" in Regionalism in America ed. Merril Jansen (Madison University of Wisconsin, 1951) pp.381-390

Weaver has illustrated that the conflicting interpretations prevailed with polarization towards "the territorial and functional elements of the theory"<sup>50</sup>. He pointed out that, "In practice, analysts either had to choose to deal with one part or the other; they either had to concentrate on regional - territorial characteristics (Hirshmann, Perloff et. al. ....) or opt for the spatial - functional approach (Friedmann, Duncan et. al.....)". He further states that "it was not until the fundamental ideological assumptions of 'top-down' development come to be challenged during the late 1960s that the theoretical nature of the conflict began to surface.

In a more recent work focusing specifically on less developed countries Perloff outlined a number of general rules to be observed in choosing a region which should be given special attention:

1. The possibility of developing an outstanding untapped resource, either of a limited type, such as a multipurpose river basin development, or a broad type involving a large spectrum of activities, such as Guayana or Aswan.
2. The solution to a severe and national threatening problem, such as an extremely depressed area, a culturally backward area not in the national mainstream, or an area threatening to break away politically.
3. A combination of both significant potentials and tough problems, such as the planning of major metropolitan regions<sup>51</sup>.

In accordance with these categories he further suggests that:

a large, underdeveloped country might have regional planning for its major metropolitan areas.....planning for a great new area to be opened up as a focal point for industry,

---

<sup>50</sup> Weaver, Op.cit. p.79

<sup>51</sup> Harvey Perloff, "Regional Planning in Less Developed Countries" in Regional Planning : Challenge and Prospects ed. Maynard M. Hufschmidt, (Frederick Praeger, New York, 1969) p.329-330

commerce, agriculture, immigration ..... development of severely depressed or isolated region for equity or political reasons. The different types suggest not only different objectives but different strategies of development and different mixes of the dominant economic, social, political, physical and technical elements .... Whichever of these types of planning is involved, a common feature will be the need to approach the problems in an openly experimental manner<sup>52</sup>.

The Perloff-Hirshmann school of thought does portray a "regional-territorial" bias, but as Perloff has mentioned, the approach must be experimental in manner and this flexibility perhaps allows for consideration of these concepts if the situation so warrants, particularly in developing countries where conditions are quite different from the metropolitan countries where these theories evolved. Hirshmann in particular "argued for massive investments in central locations, recognizing that such a policy would accentuate center-periphery differences" with the expectation that eventually the "trickle-down" or spread effects would take hold<sup>53</sup>.

Friedmann on the other hand stresses that:

The spatial shifts which are implicit in economic development necessarily create regional inequities : while economic development makes rapid strides forward at the "center", the "periphery" threatens to collapse .... But the rationale for regional policy does not derive solely from inequities on the periphery. Regional policy should be thought of as a tool for comprehensive national development in which all points of the country contribute in their own ways to the attainment of national objectives<sup>54</sup>.

---

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. p.330

<sup>53</sup> Albert O. Hirshmann, The Strategy of Economic Development. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958)

<sup>54</sup> John Friedmann "Regional Planning as a Field of Study" in Regional Development and Planning. eds. Friedmann and Alonso, (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1964) p.65

He believes that "human settlements can be defined as a system of nodes and functional linkages" which are "arranged in a loose hierarchical structure which is internally differentiated by function" and that "each node is a 'density field' of functional interaction"<sup>55</sup>.

Glasson has simplified those opposing concepts into what he calls a "formal region" and a "functional region". The former being a "geographical area which is uniform or homogeneous in terms of selected criteria" and the latter "an area which displays a certain functional coherence, an interdependence of parts, when deprived on the basis of certain criteria"<sup>56</sup>.

Another major contributor to the discourse on regional development theory is Francois Perroux who advanced the theory of "growth poles". One report comments that "this rather nebulous and ill-defined concept became a magic label almost overnight, giving rise to a variety of equally indistinct and confused notions about regional growth"<sup>57</sup>. Basically, it continues, Perroux's ideas of growth poles are likely to be firms or industries with a basic function and a strong growth potential.

Perroux's concern was primarily with the interaction between industrial sectors, rather than with spatial development process. He maintained that "analysis of sustained growth of total production should concentrate on the process by which various activities appear, grow in importance, and in some cases disappear....."<sup>58</sup>

---

55 Ibid. p.62  
56 Glasson, op.cit. pp.37-38  
57 Guidelines for Rural Centre Planning, Op.cit. pp.32-33  
58 See Walter Stohr and Fraser Taylor (eds) Development from Above or Below? The Dialectics of Regional Planning in Developing Countries. New York John Wiley and Sons, pp 15-39 for review of theories

Myrdal's concept was quite similar to Hirshmann's although it was developed separately. He proposed a theory of cumulative causation. Myrdal felt that "whatever the reason for the initial expansion of a growth centre, thereafter cumulatively expanding internal and external economies would fortify its growth at the expense of other areas".

The UN Report notes that "Perroux's concept constitutes a most weak basis for spatial policy". The assessment concludes:

Especially watered down versions which attempt to stimulate economic growth by, for instance, establishing some large industrial activity in a town or by improving non-basic services in rural centres have too often been used by policy makers as a panacea for regional development.

What this policy apparently overlooks is the fact that not every multiplier effect necessarily operates within a region.

It may well be that local spread effects are impaired by what Friedmann terms internal colonialism or other economic forces<sup>59</sup>.

There have also been some similarities with Friedmann's 'core-periphery interaction' approach. This is based on a centre-hinterland development model involving a reciprocal relationship in an economic and spatial setting.

By comparison, Hansen believes that:

Friedmann's theory assigns a decisive influence to the institutional and organizational framework of society and, specifically, to the patterns of authority and dependency that result from the usual capacity of certain areas to serve as cradles of innovation. The theory is attractive in many respects. In particular, it includes all space and it treats variables in specific areas as part of a larger system rather than as

---

<sup>59</sup> United Nations, Guidelines for Rural Centre Planning, Op.cit. pp.33

isolated phenomena. It also integrates cultural and political processes into the process of economic development<sup>60</sup>.

Unlike the variations of the 'growth pole' concept espoused by Perroux, Hirshmann and Myrdal, Friedmann's theory has not been applied to any significant extent in the African countries being discussed here. In fact, the concept grew out of Friedmann's work in Venezuela and has been experimented with largely in Latin America. However, his broader vision of regional development strategies does hold better prospects for some limited application in Africa and developing countries in general. Nevertheless, it is not without its drawbacks as has been pointed out by observers. While it has been stated that Friedmann moved "away from a purely economic linkage between regional polarization, interaction, and the theory of modernization" and introduced a spatial dimension, "a major problem of all theories of spatial polarization is the vague manner in which core and periphery are defined"<sup>61</sup>.

By and large, however, Perroux's concepts have been challenged more strongly in recent times as opposed to Friedmann's. With respect to Perroux, Glasson agrees that:

Although these basic concepts might intuitively provide a reasonable and dynamic explanation of the industrial clusters or agglomerations in regional spatial structure, some regional theorists have cast doubt on their validity<sup>62</sup>.

---

<sup>60</sup> Niles M. Hansen, "Development From Above : The Centre Down Development Paradigm". Development from Above or Below W. Stohr and F. Taylor eds. New York John Wiley p.21

<sup>61</sup> Guidelines for Rural Centre Planning, UN, op.cit. p.34

<sup>62</sup> Glasson, op.cit p.173



In this connection various questions have been raised regarding whether ".... growth poles grow indefinitely? What about the diseconomies of scale? Do the spread effects ever materialize?<sup>63</sup>.

Glasson indicates that Lasuass<sup>64</sup> has seriously questioned whether the (growth pole) polarization concept is as strong today as it used to be, indicating that firms are becoming more diversified and spreading, with the external economies becoming increasingly important. Nevertheless, while this query may be valid with respect to an already fairly industrialized economy, it will not necessarily hold true in the less developed countries and the concept may still have some modified applicability in the African context.

The 'spread effects' of the theory have also been questioned by other observers. Glasson notes that while "there has been some general discussion of the question of whether growth will diffuse outwards from a growth pole there is little empirical evidence that this does in fact take place". He also points out that Myrdal and Hirshmann have talked of the 'spread' or 'trickling down' effects of growth poles in contrast with 'backwash' or 'polarisation' effects and that "there is scope for considerable doubt over the relative strength of spread in comparison with backwash"<sup>65</sup>. Here too the criticism may not necessarily hold up in a developing country since, as also noted by Glasson, it could be a very efficient way of generating development in depressed areas.

---

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. p.173

<sup>64</sup> J. Lasuass, "On Growth Poles", Urban studies (1969)

<sup>65</sup> Glasson, Op.cit. p.179

Another significant contribution to the theory of decentralized development has been made by Walter Christaller. He elaborated much of the work on Central Place Theory, although others such as Dickinson and Lösch had already made much contribution to these ideas<sup>66</sup>.

Christaller based his conclusions on his work on 'The Central Places of Southern Germany'<sup>67</sup>. The concept is based on a hierarchy of services or service centres, each being supported by a threshold population. For instance, for a supermarket to be a profitable enterprise it would have to be located within an adequate population range necessary for it to break even. Below that threshold the enterprise will not be viable. The market range of the particular service is determined by the distance which people are prepared to travel to obtain the service.

"Christaller's ideas on hierarchical settlement systems are based largely on market and traffic principles. Lösch describes his 'economic' landscape more in terms of different market areas, while Gilpin and his followers analysed central places empirically from a rural point of view"<sup>68</sup>.

Like the Growth Poles concept, Central Place Theory has greatly influenced regional development planning. Here too there are some drawbacks as it applies to Africa. The basic premise of the theory is that the relative importance and hierarchical arrangements of settlements are determined by the complementary relationships of the respective settlements and the

---

<sup>66</sup> R. E. Dickinson "The Metropolitan Cities of the United States" Geographical Reviews 24, 1934, and Lösch The Economics of Location (Yale, 1954)

<sup>67</sup> W. Christaller, Central Places of Southern Germany (Translation by C. Baskin) Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1966

<sup>68</sup> Guidelines for Rural Centre Planning op.cit. p.53

influence which they may have on their surrounding areas. The importance of centrality is therefore based primarily on the relative importance of a place within a region in which it has a certain degree of influence.

Since Christaller and his contemporaries, an abundance of literature has emerged on this subject. Suffice it to say, that there is some validity to the theory, although this validity is subject to the geographical and economic context in which it is considered, as well as the cultural peculiarities of the social system. Therefore, like Growth Poles, it is not a theory which is applicable universally unless, of course, there is some commonality of understanding and application of what constitutes "importance" within a respective geographical area. The values of a society are extremely important when expressing such a theory and in a sense it tends to be locality specific.

In fact, not all economists agree on the indicators of measurement used by Christaller, especially since these symbols of importance tend to change over time. For instance, at the time Christaller was writing, he felt that the extent of availability of telephone service within a given area was a good indicator of its level of importance within its surrounding region. Clearly such an indicator cannot be used today and certainly not in the African context. Recognizing this, some economists who appreciate the basic validity of the theory have been identifying different indicators as measurements to determine relative importance.

What is evident, however, is that the theory loses its validity when considered outside of the metropolitan countries since the determinants of development and underdevelopment may not, and should not, necessarily be the

same as those of developing countries. Still it is conceivable that appropriate determinants of development based on suitable indicators could be adapted according to the conditions of Africa.

Another reason why the theory does not apply easily to developing countries, especially those with a more recent history of colonization and dependence, is that the hierarchy of areas in these countries were determined to some extent by artificial indicators of economic forces operating during the colonial period as has been demonstrated earlier. This point is emphasized by Rondinelli and Ruddle who note that in developing countries "one primate city or a few dominant centers continue to be the most desirable location for investment" partly owing to colonial policy which established "developing countries as raw materials exporters" which made the main city the only efficient location for infrastructure and services"<sup>69</sup>.

#### 2.4.2 Some Observations on 'Regionalism' in Developing Countries

We observe therefore that the body of theories and strategies directed away from the central theme of national economic planning as prevails in these developing countries is relatively new and have evolved under totally separate conditions. Owing to the heavy dependence on expatriate planning expertise we have seen variations of these techniques attempted in some way at decentralized planning and development in Africa without remarkable success. According to Lo and Salih:

A debate has arisen over the approval in regional development appropriate to the needs and conditions of the underdeveloped countries in the Third World: It revolves around the role of growth poles in solving the problems of polarized development and its manifestations such as urban primacy, regional inequalities, and rural stagnation. In both its technical and ideological dimensions, the issue reflects the

---

<sup>69</sup> Rondinelli and Ruddle, op.cit. p.16

wider concern over the theory and practice of development itself, based on increasing recognition that the models and strategies of the early 1960s, given the crisis of world development in the 1970s, have not achieved the real goals of development, namely, the well-being of people and human development, particularly in the Third World. In seeking a new concept of development and alternative strategies for the 1980s, the universalism of earlier theories has now been abandoned for a plurality of approaches based on the needs, history, and prevailing conditions of the individual countries concerned.

Located in this proper and wider context, regional development - like economic growth, cultural development, ecological balance, and structural transformation - is an instrumentality, the necessary means to achieving the goals of human development<sup>70</sup>.

The debate on regionalism apparently is far from over. Some critics have strongly objected to certain aspects while others have rejected the entire body of knowledge. The views are very diverse. Back in 1973, Conroy rejected the growth-centre strategy as being irrelevant to Latin America, for some of the same shortcomings cited above<sup>71</sup>. In 1982, Higgins and Higgins explained further that the main reason for dissatisfaction with the growth pole concept in developing countries "was that too much was expected of it, the concept was never very precise, but as time went by it came increasingly to mean an urban centre to which new economic activities could be added<sup>72</sup>.

It has also been observed that some of these theories as elaborated by Perroux or the Friedmann camp have received more harsh criticisms from the

---

<sup>70</sup> Fu-Chon Lo and Kamal Salih, "Growth Poles, Agropolitan Development, and Polarization Reversal. The Debate and Search for Alternatives in Development from Above or Below op.cit. p.123

<sup>71</sup> Michael Conroy, "Rejection of the Growth Center Strategy in Latin American Development Planning" Land Economics, Vol. XLIX No. 4 (November 1973) pp. 371-80

<sup>72</sup> Higgins and Higgins, Op.cit. p.25

socialist block commentators. In a more recent review Lavrov and Sdasyuk<sup>73</sup> cite Congstad as severely criticizing both Perroux and Friedmann. It is said that "Friedmann considers the existence of peripheral capitalism lawful since development means integration with the world capitalist system". He describes Friedmann as a "dualist who recognizes territorial - economic dualism in developing countries, but does not suggest means to eliminate it". These searching comments extend the same debate raised much earlier by Slater<sup>74</sup> about whether regions in developing countries should be incorporated into the "international capitalist economy" or into the "national economy". The distinction, of course, is that Slater did not in this context question the capitalist influence as such - only apparently whether international or national was more appropriate.

Holland on the other hand argued that "the key to unlocking the underlying imbalance between the regional distribution of capital and labour lies in the control of capital"<sup>75</sup>. He suggests that the liberal capitalist state must "at a minimum - concern itself in more overt State Capitalism"<sup>76</sup>.

In a much more recent work Charles Gore<sup>77</sup> delivered a blistering attack on the theories related to spatial analysis and regional science. Gore believes that the theories are weak because they do not deal adequately with the aspects of social interaction and many of the shortcomings already cited

---

73 S. B. Lavrov and G. Sdasyuk "The Growth Pole Concept and Regional Planning Experience of Developing Countries" Regional Development Dialogue Vol. 3 No. 1 UNCRD, 1982

74 Cited in S. Alonso and E. Meyer 'Pôles d'Influence et Espaces Dépendants', Tiers - Monde, Vol. XIII No. 50 (April, 1972) p.378

75 S. Holland, The Regional Problem (London, Macmillan, 1976) p.148

76 Ibid., p.14

77 Charles Gore, Regions in Question: Space. Development Theory and Regional Planning (London, Methuen, 1984)

over the years. Gore, it appears, fails to recognize the experimental nature of some of these early regional theories and the efforts made since then to streamline their application. Gore also concerns himself very much with the 'capitalist' issues as raised in Lavrov and Sdasyuk's review. He analyses the theories from the Marxist point of view.

In considering Gore's effort, Rondinelli had this to say:

Marxist academics should like this book : the argument is familiar and comfortable. Planners and policy analysts will find little that is new beyond a convenient rehashing of widely recognized limitations of theoretical regional science and regional economics. Development practitioners who do not believe that Socialist revolution is the only alternative for bringing about change are unlikely to find much that is of practical use<sup>78</sup>.

The review of these theories and approaches here does not support either camp based on political ideology. The position remains that it will be up to the countries concerned to determine what approach they wish to modify and adopt in pursuing their own 'spread-effects' and by so doing evolve a new perspective of more direct relevance to developing countries. Some further comments will be made on this in the Conclusions.

## 2.5 Summary

The above represents the general range of top-down approaches normally employed in the national development process. Of these, the most common as far as African countries are concerned, is the Five Year Development Plan, and to a lesser extent the National Physical Development Plan. Regional Planning, while it is not very common in strict accordance with the various theories and approaches, and has been experimented with by only a few

---

<sup>78</sup> See Dennis Rondinelli's Critical Review of Regions in Question in Third World Planning, Liverpool University Press, Vol. 7 No. 3 (August, 1985) p.268

countries, does hold out certain aspects which could be incorporated.

As alluded to above, it is not the intention of this study to advocate that the much criticised Five Year Development Plan be abolished as has been suggested by some observers. The case is being put forward, however, for placing more emphasis on the Physical Development Plan. Furthermore, while it will be necessary for African countries to also pursue various forms of decentralization of decision making, planning and development initiatives, the 'top' will still have a very important role to play in rural development. The extent to which devolution should and could take place in the African context is but one of the issues which will be addressed further on. Suffice it to say at this point that what is envisaged is a meeting point of the two approaches in a manner in which the best results could be produced in order to speed up rural development.

Regional planning, as we have seen, has not been implemented with such success in Africa, or other developing regions and varying degrees of success and failures have been reported in other parts of the world. The application of these techniques have been most successful in the highly industrialized countries. What has become clear, therefore, is that these techniques should not be applied 'carte blanche' in situations in which they obviously were not intended, or in which the basic requisites are not evident.

Nevertheless, it is the opinion of this author, as will be elaborated upon further on, that various aspects of regional planning techniques could play a significant role, in either 'top-down' or 'bottom-up' approaches to rural



development, particularly within the framework of the National Physical Development Plan which is strongly advocated here as national guide to 'top-down' interventions in support of rural development.

Of course, one of the conditions will be new policies and structures, as well as a re-orientation of practices and personnel associated with the task of rural transformation. Furthermore, what is most evident is that these 'top-down' approaches have failed to bring about redress in the rural areas and therefore the 'bottom-up' techniques to be reviewed in the next Chapter must be given priority consideration.

### CHAPTER 3

## 3. DECENTRALIZATION : 'BOTTOM-UP' STRATEGIES

### 3.1 Introductory Statement

Development 'from-below' has been receiving increased attention in developing countries as one of the possible means of achieving more rapid positive transformation in rural areas.

As indicated above, many of the traditional top down plans have not had much impact at the 'local level'. As will be demonstrated later on, it is believed that some combination of techniques contained in the approaches discussed so far and those which will follow may be more effective in reaching people in the rural areas. If even governments decentralize their top down development efforts from the Central Government level to innovative and appropriate intermediate levels, it would still be very advantageous to tackle the inequality problem from both the top and the bottom. A two pronged approach will also place far less of a burden on Central Government. Furthermore, the situation in the hinterland in developing countries is so appalling that it is virtually impossible for central or intermediate sub-national authorities to redress the situation independently in the foreseeable future.

Stöhr<sup>1</sup> has observed that quite unlike the strategies for development from above which have been carefully orchestrated and nurtured by the theories of the neoclassical economists over the past three decades, "there seems to be

---

<sup>1</sup> Walter Stöhr, "Development from Below: The Bottom-Up and Periphery-Inward Development Paradigm? Development From Above or Below: The Dialectics of Regional Planning in Developing Countries, eds Walter Stöhr and D. Taylor (Chichester, John Wiley & Sons 1981)

no well-structured theory available as yet for an alternative paradigm of development from below". He also advises that development from below, is not, as might be assumed, simply related to the level at which decisions on development are taken:

A change in the level of decision making is a necessary but not a sufficient - and possibly not even the most important - condition for such a strategy. Development 'from below' implies alternative criteria for factor allocation (going from the present principle of maximizing returns for selected factors to one of maximizing integral resource mobilization); different criteria for commodity exchange (going from the presently dominating principle of comparative advantage to one of equalizing benefits of trade); specific forms of social and economic organizations (emphasizing territorial rather than mainly function organization; and a change in the basic concept of development) going from the present monolithic concept defined by economic criteria, competitive behaviour, external motivation, and large-scale redistributive mechanisms to diversified concepts defined by broader societal goals, by collaborative behaviour and by endogenous motivation)<sup>2</sup>.

It is also generally believed that for "bottom-up" development to be effective, it may be necessary to have some degree of selective spatial closure "to inhibit transfers to and from regions or countries which reduce their potential for self-reliant development"<sup>3</sup>.

Such initiatives will thus require very innovative policy guidelines and indeed institutional arrangements on the part of governments which are serious about rural transformation. It may also, it would appear, require some sort of protectionist legislation in favour of the rural communities.

---

<sup>2</sup> Walter Stöhr "Development from Below: Op. Cit.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid pp 39-40

More importantly, however, development from below will require the full involvement of the people themselves in various combined arrangements with the government authorities or private bodies at the local level. Development from below is:

a more recent strategy and is a reflection of changing ideas on the nature and purpose itself..... development 'from below' considers development to be based primarily on maximum mobilization of each area, national, human and institutional resources with the primary objective being the satisfaction of basic needs of the inhabitants<sup>4</sup>.

It should be borne in mind that while Stöhr states, development from below is "a more recent strategy" this may not necessarily apply to the African context where there has been a tradition of various community based approaches to development. What we also see evolving are perhaps more formalized applications of some old and new techniques, of course, the fact that the development process has become so complicated that traditional techniques are no longer as effective.

### 3.2 Community Development

'Community Development' is one of the earliest techniques employed in order to introduce some form of bottom-up initiative in the development process. The basic idea hinges on the desire to draft selected pockets of society into the development process through specific interventions directed at particular problem areas.

In general terms community development is not a new process since

---

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

communities, wherever they occurred throughout history have always striven to improve their lot through combined concerted efforts. These community development efforts as described here involve a more formal approach usually including some combination of state and local participatory efforts. In this sense it is relatively new.

In discussing the concept and context of community development, Lee Cary indicates that community development also owes much of its earlier evolution to rural sociology, adult education, and the extension movement<sup>5</sup>. He believes that it could be viewed as a radical or a conservative process:

It is radical to the extent that in calling for greater citizens participation, it creates new groupings and patterns of decision makers. It tends to challenge existing social systems. It accelerates the pace of planned change and deliberate community decision-making. It broadens the scope of citizen interest and concern. All these factors tend to suggest new activity, new patterns of involvement and change that is more rapid and involves more people more directly than at any time in history<sup>6</sup>.

Conversely, it could be seen as a conservative process when:

It helps to keep decision-making at the local level and government responsive to the local citizens. Community interest is apt to center on issues close at hand.

Cary has made a very important distinction since many of the efforts towards community development initiatives in English speaking Africa have been in the latter category - conservative - as will be demonstrated later on.

---

<sup>5</sup> Lee Cary, ed. Community Development as a Process, (Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 1970) p.5.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

Furthermore, inspite of the fact that 'community development' has been talked about since the 1940s, and a plethora of projects flourished throughout the 1960s and 1970s, no precise applied theory has evolved although indicators are that there is a basic set of principles for action with the anticipation that a distinct professional discipline is emerging.

This subject area has hitherto relied upon social sciences generalizations and borrowed theories from related professions. Therefore, it has always been subject to various interpretations, definitions and practices. Perhaps because of this ambiguity it has lost much of its earlier appeal. Certainly in Africa the efforts have been 'conservative'. without concerted efforts on the part of the respective governments. This could best be observed from a statement emerging from the 1948 Cambridge Conference on African Administration which characterized community development as being:

a movement designed to promote better living for the whole community with active participation, and if possible on the initiative of the community, but if this initiative is not forthcoming spontaneously, by the use of techniques for arousing and stimulating it in order to secure its active and enthusiastic response to the movement. It embraces all forms of betterment<sup>7</sup>.

This definition certainly leaves some grey areas in that it tends to suggest the conservative approach defined by Cary. The need for a programmed role of the government is not clear. Therefore, while the effort may be sanctioned by government, and even acted upon by government, it may not necessarily be a specific objective of the governments' development strategy. This ambivalence has been quite evident in Africa.

---

<sup>7</sup> Community Development, Handbook prepared by a Study Conference on Community Development held at Hartwell House, Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire, 1957

Some observers such as Mondjanagni<sup>8</sup> suggest that in Africa the community development initiative has weakened because "political authorities lost their illusions as to the effectiveness of the programmes, which came up against the problem of power relations in the traditional village environments". He also believes that there has been "a lack of understanding of existing social structures". The question thus, is how could a government or one of its authorities not have understood a social structure under its charge? It appears to be more a lack of commitment rather than a lack of understanding - a fear of the 'radical'. For community development efforts to succeed as a bottom-up strategy, government authorities must be part and parcel of the process and not simply a respondent.

This requirement is clearly stated in an alternative UN definition of community development as being:

The process by which the efforts of the people themselves are united with those of government authorities to improve the economic, social and cultural conditions of communities, to integrate these communities into the life of the nation, and to enable them to contribute fully to national progress<sup>9</sup>.

Another observer, B. S. Madondo shares Mondjanagni's view that the 'community development' as a process in Africa has weakened. His explanation, however, is somewhat different. Madondo allies himself with those who believe that community development has its roots in the colonial

---

<sup>8</sup> Alfred Mondjanagni "Special Structures and Rural Development in Africa" Rural Development : National Policies and Experiences, Nagoya Maruzon Asia, 1981), p.288

<sup>9</sup> United Nations, Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, "Twentieth Report of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination to the Economic and Social Council" Annex III, Document E/2931, 1956 ✓

administrative era and was effectively used as a tool to polarise groups into their little enclaves. It subjugated the vision and aspirations of the community within the parameters of the 'projects' at hand and thwarted hopes of a broader based participation in the affairs and benefits of the country as a whole. It often cocooned the limits of one's horizon and relieved the central government of some of its major development responsibilities if it so wished. Reviewing the process in 'Rhodesia' (now Zimbabwe) Madondo concludes that:

community development was beginning to be seen by many black people as a subtle way of withdrawing government assistance to them.....Efforts to make community development work as a cure for economic ills before independence were quite clearly unsuccessful<sup>10</sup>.

The important aspect to be noted here is the specific indication that community development initiatives should not be advocated or implemented at the community level only or imposed upon them. It cannot be approached in an ad hoc and incremental manner. Warren goes as far as suggesting that "development planning usually has economic, physical and social aspects, each of which may be subject to explicit formulation. Community Development is sometimes viewed as the local counterpart to such national development planning and may be incorporated in the national plans as a means of achieving certain specific results"<sup>11</sup>

This view is echoed by another UN study which stressed that "community development programmes are not implemented in isolation, but must be an integral part of the national development effort. This poses the question

---

<sup>10</sup> B.B.S. Madondo "Community Development: A Quiet Evolution From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe" Community Development Journal, Oxford University Press, Vol. 20 No. 4, October, 1985 p.293

<sup>11</sup> Roland Warren, "The Context of Community Development" Community Development as a Process, ed. Lee Cary, Op.cit. p.34



of horizontal and vertical integration"<sup>12</sup>.

Community development therefore, has to be a two way process including clearly articulated programmes by the government and the 'participation' of the communities concerned in both the planning and implementation stages. This, as will be seen below has led to an expanded concept of "participatory development".

### 3.3 Cooperatives and Self-Help Approaches

Cooperative movements as an approach to rural development have been around in Africa since the pre-independence era. It is discussed here in conjunction with self help owing to the close similarities of these two approaches. Moreover, it is somewhat difficult to review self help approaches independently, since many of the 'bottom-up' techniques do reflect some element of self help.

The cooperative movement began in England during the 1840s and is one of the oldest techniques for providing assistance to poorer sections of the community. However, the principles of the cooperative movement could easily apply to any income group and was not restricted to lower income group activities.

Basically, a cooperative is usually formed to unite persons of similar circumstances, such as producers or consumers, in order to gain from the possible advantages of collective bargaining or economic benefits of a large scale combined operation. The capital is based on the investment of its

---

<sup>12</sup> Guidelines for Rural Centre Planning op.cit. p.271

members, who have one vote each irrespective of the level of investment. A cooperative is exempt from income tax on the grounds that any profits which accrue are refunds for over-payment by its members in the first place. It should also be borne in mind that there are four distinct types of cooperatives: agricultural, consumers', producers' and marketing. According to Seibel, the 'modern' cooperative movement in Africa:

.... began and took shape between 1900 and 1960, usually initiated by a colonial government and intended to promote cash crop production for export. These new cooperatives were modeled after types that predominated in the respective 'mother' countries. Curiously, no attention was paid to the fact that each cooperative type resulted from self help measures under very specific economic and social circumstances. Instead, a standard 'model' of producer or marketing cooperative was promulgated<sup>13</sup>.

Self help on the other hand, was common in many African societies as a traditional way of life, albeit, based primarily on ethnic affiliations. It was not until the colonial era that self help was promoted as a reformed mode of operation incorporated into various community based projects.

Self help techniques tended to be less formally constituted than a cooperative movement. A definition put forward by Budenstedt is that:

Self-help therefore always derives from an appraisal of a situation leading to the conclusion that it is impossible, inadvisable, or simply less advantageous to expect a solution to a given problem 'from above'. Therefore, a person helping himself abandons the general canon of norms and gears his actions over a shorter or longer period, to a different set of norms. This set of norms justifying self help is of only temporary or localised validity, and is marked by three characteristics:

---

<sup>13</sup> Hans-Dieter Seibel, op.cit. p.11

1. the self help norm is more diffuse, less specific than the generally valid set of norms, or in other words, simpler, more elementary;
2. the self help norm is not covered specifically by the general set of norms but only in its overall validity (i.e. whether and when self-help is allowed or required)
3. the self help norm is extremely dependent on the need of the person using self help; this need must, however really exist<sup>14</sup>.

While a 'cooperative' or a "self-help" organization have similar objectives (and self-help could be applied to many modes) a significant distinction is that a 'cooperative' has to be "legally registered under relevant legislation in a specific country.....<sup>15</sup>. It should also be noted that in many countries the title 'cooperative' can only be applied to a legally constituted body for the purposes as set out in the legislation in this regard.

The most common types of cooperatives set up in Africa pertained to the agricultural sector, and more recently to housing and other areas. Cooperatives, like 'community development' have come under increasing criticisms over the past few years as having "failed in most instances to serve the poor....." and, "for being little more than an extended arm of the state, and for having contributed little to development"<sup>16</sup>. This is certainly a serious indictment for one of the modes to be benefitting the lower income groups particularly in rural areas.

According to Seibel<sup>17</sup>, the cooperatives were introduced to Africa "from

---

14 A. A. Bodenstedt, "Self-Help: Reflections on the Strategical Utility of an Organized Form of Joint Social Actions for Development Purposes" Self-Help: Instrument or Objective in Rural Development ed. A. Bodenstedt (Heidelberg, Research Centre for International Agrarian Development, 1976) pp. 17-18

15 United Nations, Promoting Organized Self-Help through Co-operative Modes of Participation (Nairobi, UNCHS, 1984) P. 7 ✓

16 Seibel op.cit. p.11

17 Ibid

above" and "have not appeared to qualify as authentic self-help organizations". Therefore, even in cases where the operations were at the local level - rural areas - as an operation promoted from 'the centre' there was often very little 'participation' as discussed earlier.

To compound this phenomenon, it must also be mentioned that a cooperative requires a fairly competent level of management and administrative skills - in particular, proper accounting techniques are necessary. This requirement often left cooperatives open to 'capture' and domination by the already well off and more educated within any rural setting.

Lele<sup>18</sup> has likewise expressed some reservations about the cooperative movement in Africa. She also points out that "an effective cooperative requires organization, leadership, and entrepreneurial capacity". One significant point raised by Lele with respect to a cotton cooperative in Tanzania is that it "dealt with a crop with no domestic use. All the production was exported". In such cases a 'marketing board' was usually established, thus creating expanding overhead costs. Thus, while cooperatives were extended to cut out the middle man, very often the state run boards substituted for the middle man, especially in cases where there was no local market for the commodity being produced. As a result, the cost of marketing is exorbitant. To cover this cost, the state often intervenes and fixes the price of the commodity. Certainly, such techniques cannot benefit the rural poor. Johnson and Clark go as far as concluding that "cooperatives end up excluding the poor or exploiting them"<sup>19</sup>.

Chambers has added to this his opinion that "cooperatives were found to be

---

<sup>18</sup> Op.cit., pp.109-110

<sup>19</sup> Johnson and Clark, Op.cit. p. 163

inefficient, to be captured by local elites to the exclusion or exploitation of smaller farmers, poorer people and women.....<sup>20</sup>. Also commenting on cooperatives in East Africa Widstrand<sup>21</sup> arrived at similar conclusions: There have been few positive comments regarding the cooperative movement over the last decade or so<sup>22</sup>. Most of the criticisms in the literature appear to be levelled at particular types of cooperatives - mainly those which produce and/or market a commodity. The literature, quite apart from the general reservations about cooperatives, has failed to examine all the characteristics of cooperatives<sup>23</sup>.

Evidence to the contrary shows that within the last decade there have been very many successful cooperative/self-help housing or building materials production projects, including savings/credit operations<sup>24</sup>. An important feature of these successful cooperative/self-help projects is that the end product is locally marketed, and very often there is more local control or 'participation'. Such projects are evident in Tanzania, Lesotho, Kenya and Malawi with the assistance of the UN.

---

<sup>20</sup> Robert Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First (London, Longman 1983) p.31

<sup>21</sup> C. G. Widstrand, (ed) Cooperatives and Rural Development in East Africa (Uppsala, Scandinavian Inst. of African Studies, 1970)

<sup>22</sup> cf. United Nations, Rural Cooperatives as Agents of Change: A Research Report and a Debate (Geneva: UNRISD, 1975) pp. IX-X  
Goran Hyden, Efficiency Versus Distribution in East African Cooperatives (Nairobi, East African Literature Bureau, 1973)  
Anthonpe. Rural Cooperatives and Planned Change in Africa op.cit.

D. C. Korten "Community Organization and Rural Development: A Learning Process Approach" Public Administration Review. 40 No. 5, 1980 pp.480-511  
<sup>23</sup> See Bodenstedt op.cit. pp.25-34

<sup>24</sup> See UN Promoting Organized Self-Help Through Cooperatives Modes.....op.cit. for various case studies.

It is appropriate to conclude that inspite of the litany of bad experiences, this approach may still have possibilities for improving the quality of life for the poor in rural areas, particularly if we learn from lessons of the past. Possible applications will be explored further on.

### 3.4 Basic Needs Approach

As discussed earlier, economic growth theories, funnelled by stalwarts such as Lewis and Waterston, followed by the 'regionalists' dominated the development debate for a long time. In the midst of the disillusionment with the 'community development' efforts and the continued worsening human and environmental conditions in the impoverished areas of developing countries, the erstwhile economists were hard pressed to find measures to arrest the social and economic decline particularly in rural areas.

By the middle of the 1970s there was further evidence to confirm that the poor were being left further behind. "In the opinion of many observers a salient characteristic of recent history is that, especially in the poorest nations, economic growth has occured, but no development"<sup>25</sup>. As Alderman observed: "Average income per head in the Third World has grown more rapidly in the last two decades than ever before. But so have unemployment, famines, malnutrition, abject poverty and hunger"<sup>26</sup>.

This observation has more recently been corroborated by Norman Hicks of the World Bank. He commented that: "while the developing countries have had substantial increases in output during the past 25 years, it has been widely recognized that this growth has often failed to reduce the level of poverty

---

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

in their countries<sup>27</sup>.

Adelman<sup>28</sup> and his associates pointed out that apparently only those who had access to, or association with the key elements of production, benefitted from whatever growth had occurred. It was generally felt that development practices had to take a more serious look at the distributive side of economic growth, and more importantly increase the accessibility of the disadvantaged to the means of production such as land, capital, etc. Adelman argued for a very radical redistribution of assets and substantial investments in labour intensive growth. She also urged direct state intervention to bring about needed land reform and increased investment in education and other social services directly to the poor. This, of course, represented a rather radical, or at least jolting, proposition for non-Marxist oriented developing countries. Nevertheless, it was very clear that a broad based solution to attack poverty directly had to be found, and found quickly.

This problem also attracted the attention of Hollis Chinery and later Paul Streeten, F. Stewart and Shadid Buiki and others<sup>29</sup>. While Chinery had

---

<sup>27</sup> Norman Hicks, "Is there a Trade-off Between Growth and Basic Needs" Poverty and Basic Needs (Washington, World Bank, 1980) p.22

<sup>28</sup> I. Adelman, et.al. "A Comparison of Two Models for Income Distribution Planning", a paper presented at the World Bank Workshop on Analysis of Distributional Issues in Development Planning, Bellagio, Italy, April, 1977. See also: Development Economics. "A Reassessment of Goals", American Economic Review 65 No. 2 pp 302-309; and Adelman, "Redistribution Before Growth - A Strategy for Developing Countries", University of Maryland Department of Economics Working Paper, 1978 (Mimeo)

<sup>29</sup> See:  
Hollis Chinery et. al. Redistribution with Growth, Oxford University Press, 1974  
F. Stewart and P. Streeten "New Strategies for Development: Poverty Income Distribution and Growth" Oxford Economic Papers 28 No. 3 pp.391-405  
Paul Streeten and Shahid Buiki "Basic Needs : Some Issues", World Development, Vol. 6 (March 1978) pp.441-421

been at the World Bank since 1970, and had, through some of his works, indicated a great concern with income distribution as a basic requirement for bridging the disparity, it was not until 1976 that "the basic needs approach was moved to centre stage .....at the World Conference on Employment"<sup>30</sup>, albeit, apparently based on the ideas put forth by Alderman, Chinery and others.

In that same year (1976), the 'General Principles' on human settlements emanating from the U.N. Conference on Human Settlements stressed:

The improvement of the quality of life of human beings is the first and most important objective of every human settlement policy. These policies must facilitate the rapid and continuous improvement in the quality of life of all people, beginning with the satisfaction of the basic needs of food, shelter, clean water, employment, health education, training.....<sup>31</sup>.

It is perhaps correct to say that 'Basic Needs' as a concept for improving the quality of life of the most disadvantaged has been around for the past decade. The objective of the basic needs concept as described by Streeten, who has been one of its staunch supporters in the face of mounting suspicion about the approach is:

to provide opportunities for the full development of the individual. It focusses on mobilizing particular resources for particular groups, identified as deficient in these resources. It is contrasted with the income and employment approaches, which neglect important features of meeting basic needs<sup>32</sup>.

- 
- <sup>30</sup> Johnson and Clarke, Redesigning Rural Development, op.cit. p.21  
<sup>31</sup> United Nations. The Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements and the Vancouver Action Plan op.cit. p.4  
<sup>32</sup> Paul Streeten, Basic Needs and Promises & Promises, World Bank Reprint Series, No. 62. Reprinted from Journal of Policy Modeling, 1979, p.136



Basically, the concept advocates a shift away from the development emphasis on economic growth, and instead focuses on the provision of basic needs. These 'basic needs' support direct improvement in social and physical infrastructure requirements such as health, shelter, education, nutrition, water, etc. It also emphasizes specific measures to raise the income of the poor so that they may consequently increase their consumption and productivity. In order to implement such an approach, however, the implication is that investments should be diverted from the traditional 'economic growth' activities according to Streeten. However, Streeten and Stewart<sup>33</sup> argued for a more incremental and programmed approach to the redistributive process, unlike Adelman.

In any event, the promise is that the state would have to intervene through perhaps taxation and transfers for direct assistance to the poor and also to correct certain 'market' imperfections which might have perpetrated unequal allocations of consumption<sup>34</sup>.

In this connection, Srinivasan explains that:

Approaches to development problems other than basic needs implicitly or explicitly face the issue of temporal trade-offs in the sense that raising the incomes of the poor through redistribution now, if pushed, makes it difficult to sustain these incomes if the redistribution cuts too much into savings for growth. The literature on basic needs has not adequately discussed the issues of trade-offs among

33  
34

Op.cit.

See also Michael J. Crosswell "Basic Needs: A Development Planning Approach" Basic Needs and Development ed. Danny M. Leipziger, (Cambridge, Delgeschlager, Gunn) 1981

different basic needs (food, shelter, or health) at one time and over time, that is, satisfaction of a basic need now, versus more of this good or another in the future<sup>35</sup>.

The question of trade-offs has become a point of contention in the basic needs debate, and this has probably contributed significantly to this approach being on the wane over the past five years, inspite of its rear guard of converted advocates.

Streeten retorted in 1979 with an interesting, if not convincing explanation of the trade-off. He recognizes that critics often state "that such an approach sacrifices savings, productive investment, and incentives to work for the sake of current consumption and welfare"<sup>36</sup>. He explains that: "Basic needs and growth are not strictly comparable objectives. Growth emphasizes annual increments of production and income, and concern for the future. A basic needs approach must also contain a time dimension"<sup>37</sup>. He therefore suggests that if a comparison is to be made, the question should be whether basic needs imply "sacrificing certain components of current output or certain components of current incomes" .... in which case "such a sacrifice then may reduce aggregate growth of income per head by raising the capital/output ratio and/or lowering the savings ratio, and/or raising population growth"<sup>38</sup>.

He thus envisages four types of trade-off:

1. between benefits to higher income groups in favour of benefits to lower income groups;

---

<sup>35</sup> T. N. Srinivasan, "Development, Poverty, and Basic Human Needs : Some Issues". Food Research Institute Studies Vol. XXI No. 2 (1977) pp.20-21

<sup>36</sup> Streeten, Basic Needs : Promises and Promises, op.cit. p.139


<sup>37</sup> Ibid. p. 140

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

2. between non-basic needs goods and services consumed by all income groups, including the poor, in favour of basic needs goods and services consumed by the poor;
3. between activities that create incentives for large savings and efforts to work in favour of current consumption;
4. between goods and services which make a larger contribution to future production in favour of those that make a smaller contribution or none<sup>37</sup>.

This debate is perhaps best exemplified by an illustration put forth by Streeten as shown below:

ILLUSTRATION 1  
THE COMPARISON OF THE EFFECTS OVER TIME OF FOUR APPROACHES  
TO CONSUMPTION BY THE POOR



Source: Paul Streeten, Basic Needs: Promises and Promises

Op. cit. p.140

The log of consumption per head is indicated by the vertical axis, and time on the horizontal axis. Path 1 begins with a lower level of consumption but as "a result of better incentives and productive investment" surpasses path 2 at some point ( $T_1$ ) and thereafter the consumption of the poor is higher. Path 2 begins with a higher consumption by the poor but as a result of neglecting incentives, private and public savings, and productive investment "falls behind path 1 after a certain date ( $T_1$ ). He further explains that "the rationale behind basic needs, however, in path 4" as high "priority is given to some components of current consumption by the poor which may then, for a while, fall below the consumption levels that could have been obtained by two other paths". He predicts therefore that within a generation the new labour force would begin "to yield returns, ( $T_2$ ), the growth path is steeper than it would have been under 1, and overtakes first the welfare path and later the growth path 1". According to Streeten "Taiwan, Korea and perhaps Japan followed path 4" (Path 3, is ruled out).

Still, most developing countries are skeptical, since the approach to them amounts to a 'pie in the sky' inspite of the apparent immediate benefits to the impoverished. There is still much mistrust by planners in the developing world where the techniques have not been tried. The skepticism is based on the tenacious belief that if the consumption level of the poor is increased through such deliberate acts, this, as has been agreed will reduce the net level of savings and consequent investment and thereby affect everybody across the board, and many are not prepared to go this route.

Mahbub ul Haq also cites some reasons for the suspicion which prevails: "To some it conjures up the image of a move towards socialism..... To others it represents a capitalists conspiracy to deny industrialization and modernization to the developing countries and thereby keep them dependent

upon the developed world"<sup>40</sup>. He also suggests that Third World negotiators suspected that the stress on basic needs "will be used to deny assistance to them for infrastructure, modernization or industrialization"<sup>41</sup>.

Also, as Leipziger has pointed out, since "the costs of redistribution must be borne by the upper income groups, there are major political implications for governments undertaking redistributive policies"<sup>42</sup>.

It is very clear that the basic needs approach has produced some very positive results in improving health services, nutrition, shelter, non-formal education, etc., in some parts of Africa. However, as yet there is no evidence of the 'take-off' which could be likened to the examples of trajectory of Taiwan, Korea and Japan, although strictly speaking these countries did not follow the 'basic needs path' only. In any event their situations were certainly unlike the African condition. Officially, Sri Lanka, Cuba and Tanzania are said to have been pursuing the basic needs approach. Since the approach is expected to operate on the cycle of "a generation" it is perhaps still a bit too early to really determine the results.

### 3.4 Participatory Planning and Development

'Participation' is to the 1980s what 'community development' was to the fifties and sixties. Terms such as 'popular participation'; 'community participation' and 'participatory development' have been dominating the

---

40 Mahbub ul Haq "An International Perspective on Basic Needs" Poverty and Basic Needs op.cit. pp 32-33  
41 Ibid.  
42 Danny M. Leipziger, "Policy Issues and the Basic Human Needs Approach" Basic Needs and Development, ed. D. Leipziger, (Cambridge, Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain) p.113

rural development debate for the past decade. It is in this latest concept that the planners are now placing great expectations. The idea of 'participation' emerged out of the disillusionment with the earlier community development approach which was found to be too bureaucratic and was not reaching the most disadvantaged target groups.

According to Buije<sup>43</sup>, research in the seventies showed that techniques in agricultural production were only used by a small percentage of the population in rural areas and this also contributed to the growing socio-economic differentiation. Realizing the plight of the small farmers, as well as the landless, it was felt that something had to be done. It appears that some of the earliest efforts at involving the beneficiary community more in matters that concerned them directly were promoted by the social development oriented non-governmental organizations. Lessons were also learnt from the Chinese model, which also included the "collectivization of agriculture".

Unlike 'community development' which often alienated the community, or 'basic needs' which has created suspicion, the idea of 'participation' appears to have greater appeal. It is acceptable to the community because it affords a better arrangement for self-management with limited guidance. It is acceptable to the governments and donors because it further complements their efforts for providing basic services and materials for the most remote communities through a more effective dispersal of limited resources. Since it is virtually impossible for governments in developing countries to cater to the needs of the masses of the poor to any appreciable

---

43 Dieke Buije "On Admittance, Access, Co-operation and Participation: The Basic Concepts of the 'Access and Participation' Research "Participation of the Poor in Development (eds) Benno Galjart and D. Buije (Leiden, Institute of Cultural and Social Studies, 1982) pp.4-5

extent that would effect significant changes in the short run, it would certainly be advantageous to have them capitalize, as they see fit, on whatever limited resources they may gain access to. In general, it addresses the problem described by Frances Kerton<sup>44</sup> as 'Limited reach' in which governments were hitherto only able to reach "15-20% of their target populations".

In spite of the proliferation of essays written on this subject over the past few years, the concept of participation is still quite elusive to many. This is due partly to the vagueness with which the term is used and the fact that it could easily be applied to a variety of situations in which there is some semblance of community involvement. In addition, the 'experts' have not all as yet agreed on some of the key elements. As Buije and Galjart have mentioned:

Participation is a rather vague concept. It is used in political science, in development sociology, and in the sociology of organizations. Even if one limits the use of the term to the realm of decision making, and defines it as the attempt to exert upward influence, there remain problems. Is participation in development projects itself a goal, or is it a means to another goal"?<sup>45</sup>

Dieke and Galjart proceed to explain that participation could be seen as a means in various respects. Thus, as one UN report elaborates, it apparently depends on the brand of participation. It states:

---

44 Frances F. Kerton "Stimulating Community Participation: Obstacles and Options at Agency, Community and Societal Levels" Rural Development Participation Review. (Ithaca, Cornell University), Vol. II No. 3. Spring 1981 p.1

45 Dieke Buije and B. Galjart, Participation of the Poor in Development (Leiden, Institute of Cultural Studies, 1982) p.2

Participation is one of the most complex as well as basic areas of choice. It raises the questions - very hard for political leaders and planners to face frankly - of who is doing the choosing, how choices are enforced, and whether the style of development treats participation mainly as a means, or mainly as an end, an essential component of the style<sup>46</sup>.

Clearly, therefore, a precise definition of participation is quite elusive. It could include democratic processes within the state political apparatus in which people are allowed to elect their leaders. It may also include public participation of the type which require planning authorities to involve the public in the preparation of their plans<sup>47</sup>. These interpretations, while one cannot refute that they are forms of participation, do not represent the body of ideals which have led to the specific concept which is being discussed here.

The basic idea behind the concept of participation as is being focussed upon here, is that the disadvantaged should have a much greater say in decision making about the interventions which affect them, and furthermore should concur with the outcome of such dialogue and play a controlling role in the implementation of the respective activities. This means that projects designed by parties external to the intended beneficiary groups, irrespective of how well intended, would not qualify as an example of participation as the beneficiaries would not have been party to the planned intervention.

---

<sup>46</sup> United Nations The Quest for a Unified Approach to Development (Geneva, 1980) p.17

<sup>47</sup> This is required by legislation in many industrialized countries but is seldom practiced in Africa. Also see Dilys M. Hill, The Planning and Management of Human Settlements with Special Emphasis on Participation (International Union of Local Authorities, 1975) See as well Sydney Williams, "Citizen Participation in City and Regional Planning: An Effective American Methodology" Town Planning Review, Vol. 47 No. 4 (October 1976) for details of this type of participation which is somewhat different from the focus being discussed here.



Although the beneficiaries may also contribute fully to the implementation of the project, they may still lack control or adequate influence in directing or modifying the intended assistance to their own liking. As Alastair White has explained in this regard:

.... when an outside agency remains in total control of the process and merely calls upon the beneficiaries to give their labour directly, one cannot speak of community participation even though there is an element of self-help labour<sup>48</sup>.

White likewise warns that it is necessary to make a distinction between participation by a few local individuals and by the "community", which denotes a social unity.

Bugnicourt<sup>49</sup> further stresses that many experiments are often baptized as 'participation' when in fact they amount to no more than "forced labour pure and simple". He goes on to explain that the cornerstone of participation is best exemplified by a sharing of power. He states:

If popular participation is to be limited solely to the execution of tasks, it will have little chance of obtaining real and lasting support. If it is accepted that participation should start at the stage of conception and still be in evidence at the stage of supervision, then it is necessary to agree to share certain elements of power<sup>50</sup>.

This typology is closely aligned with the concept as projected by some of the other specialists in this field, notably Cohen and Uphoff<sup>51</sup>. Their

---

48 Alastair T. White "Why Community Participation: A Discussion of Arguments" Assignment Children. (UNICEF, 1982) p. 19

49 Jacques Bugnicourt, "Popular Participation in Development in Africa" Assignment Children. Ibid. p.169

50 Ibid. pp. 74-75

51 J. Cohen and N. T. Uphoff "Rural Development Participation : Concepts and Measures for Project Design, Implementation and Evaluation", Rural Development Monograph No. 2 (New York, Cornell U. 1977)

view is that real participation as a technique in rural development (or other situations) must begin with the emphasis on the sharing of power in the decision making process as well as the implementation aspects. This approval should also allow for the participation of the beneficiary community in the sharing of the benefits of the project, and also in the evaluation of the outcome. This last point is very important because if even all the earlier criteria are met for access to participation, and a project is concluded satisfactorily, through collective efforts, it does not conclude that the project is necessarily a success. Certain forms of collective representation and monitoring should continue in order to rectify any problems which may begin to emerge. Evaluation, including the participants, or by the participants, is also very important in that it helps to consolidate an expanded body of knowledge about this still relatively new concept and furthermore facilitates replicability of successfully completed projects. The continued involvement of the beneficiary community also ensures maintenance if the nature of the project so desires.

White lists ten reasons why community participation is desirable:

1. More will be accomplished.
2. Services can be provided at lower cost.
3. Participation has an intrinsic value for participants.
4. It serves as a catalyst for further development efforts.
5. Participation leads to a sense of responsibility for the project.
6. Participation guarantees that a felt need is involved.
7. Participation ensures things are done the right way.
8. It allows for greater use of indigenous knowledge and expertise.
9. It reduces dependence on professionals.
10. It facilitates conscientization.<sup>52</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> For a more detailed discussion of these ten points see White, "Why Community Participation" op.cit. pp. 20-32

In spite of the wide acclaim which the participation techniques have received it has been observed that some bottlenecks are still to be worked out.

Observations made by Abeyrama and Weber in 1983 conclude that:

...the process of participatory development has not been smooth really; in fact, it is rather complex and there have been distinct arguments for and against this concept. However, in general terms participatory development is considered to be an effective tool in the development process. Complexity of the participatory development process arises because of the complex nature of the society itself. No development programme can be introduced in a vacuum<sup>53</sup>.

Quite apart from the social organization problems, some other aspects may also present problems. A frequently cited concern is the dependency which participatory efforts may generate. Throughout the literature it has been repeated that the poor very seldom organize themselves into a group and often have to be coerced into so doing. In order to initiate this grouping, however, some form of benefit must be perceived by the target community, usually in the form of an enticement of some kind<sup>54</sup>. The danger is that as soon as the benefits cease, the participation also ceases. It is therefore extremely important to conscientize the participants, as well as the promoters. Participation training is therefore a necessary element of any such programme. The community has to be motivated to understand that the ultimate benefit is the upliftment from a deep state of poverty and not the initial input which should only serve as a catalyst.

---

53 Tilakasena Abeyrama and Karl E. Weber "Local Participation in Rural Development Planning : A Case Study". Research Paper No. 5 (Bangkok, Asian Institute of Technology, 1983) p. 1

54 cf. A Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York, Free Press, 1975)

Corruption, or domination by stronger cliques or individuals within the participatory group must also be guarded against. It has been noted that quite often the more powerful elements of the groups may be able to wield power and perhaps even manipulate the group for their own benefits. This position of dominance in the community or project group may be based on a previously established stature owing to a comparative degree of affluence. However, it is not always easy to exclude such elements.

Moris has outlined various other constraints which may be encountered and they are worth examining in some detail, although not in their entirety.

These are:

1. The stress on creating viable local organizations runs counter to the individualizing effects of socio-economic change.
2. The bottom-up approach often treats organizing costs as free, and may involve a substantial hidden subsidy as well as risks of collapse when support is withdrawn.
3. Some types of projects such as deep-well drilling or disease eradication require either specialized resources or mass compliance irrespective of local interest.
4. The approach idealizes the efficiency of the "village level worker" or "barefoot doctors"; in fact it generates technical demands beyond the ability of para-professionals.
5. Allowing communities to define their own priorities leads to a proliferation of social services without guaranteeing the productive fiscal base to support them.
6. The capital costs raised locally are actually less significant than the recurrent obligation to pay salaries and operating costs, but these are almost always left for the central government to pay.
7. Facilities constructed with self-help funds often do not operate effectively, and thereby devalue the currency contributed by the villagers.
8. Local participation unless tightly supervised puts the public program at the mercy of whatever interest groups are already organized in the local community, e.g. exploitative local elites.

9. In opening the door to community initiative, the government loses control over the location of new development which in the longer run goes to the richer districts and communities.<sup>55</sup>

Another major issue which has been discussed in the literature is that of "access". In discussing participation, some writers have focused on the problem of 'access' at length. Some consensus has begun to emerge on this topic, but some vagueness still exist. Owing to the extensive focus which this topic has received in the literature on participation it merits some mention here. Nevertheless, in view of the limited confines of this review it can only be presented in a brief manner.

It has been mentioned above that the poor often do not organize themselves for participatory action. If, however, there are common benefits to be attained, the inducement for organized effort is triggered. On the other hand, whether or not there is communal organization in order to participate, the state machinery continues to operate and is still charged with the responsibility of enhancing the quality of life of the population. Participation, therefore, is a continuum - accessible at various points and means within the socio-economic hierarchy.

Since much of the literature is not very clear, some assumptions are necessary. One assumption made by this author is that since many of the commentators have already indicated that the poor and disadvantaged are often mobilized for participation by an external agent of change, then 'access' is of importance when considered without the intervention of the agent. In other words access is also possible through a patron.

---

<sup>55</sup> Jon Moris, Managing Induced Rural Development (Bloomington, International Development Institute, 1981) p. 94

Buije<sup>56</sup> further explains that in order for people to "reproduce and to improve their quality of life" they need resources. "By resources we mean products, means of production and services; but also the knowledge of how to acquire these resources has to be considered as a resource". In his opinion the three ways in which one could obtain goods, services and means of production are "through a distribution system, the market and the administration, and through self sufficiency". He elaborates:

The possibility that people have to dispose of resources depend on their ability to 'manipulate' these "access routes". One of the main distribution points is the market where supply and demand meet<sup>57</sup>.

It is here that one gains admittance to the market based on the resources which one has to offer in exchange. If one has nothing to offer, then one is left out of the market, as is the case with the poor. Since the poor cannot participate in this system they turn to the "institutional sphere where government and private institutions offer to distribute resources on conditions which are not based on purchasing power"<sup>58</sup>. The concept of "access" is thus used to describe the form of institutional distribution. According to Buije, "we define access as the possibility of people to dispose of services and goods intended for them which are not distributed via the market system but through administrative institutions"<sup>59</sup>.

To this Shadid et.al. adds:

The concept of access is besides being vague and incomprehensible, defined and operationalized in

- 
- <sup>56</sup> Dieke Buije "On Admittance, Access, Co-operation and Participation; The Basic Concepts of the Access and Participation Research" Participation of the poor in Development, Op.cit. p.8  
<sup>57</sup> Ibid.  
<sup>58</sup> Ibid, p.9  
<sup>59</sup> Wasif Shadid et. al. "Access and Participation: A Theoretical Approach" in Participation of the Poor ..... op.cit. p.22

different ways. The definitions and delineations create again a diversity of new terminologies, such as 'counter', 'queue', 'delay', 'waiting', 'organizational connection', 'administrative allocation', 'distribution' and the like<sup>60</sup>.

Shadid agrees that 'access' implies all the above. A more precise definition advanced by this group is that 'access' is the formal right to have entrance to a certain institution and its products, as well as the actual use of that right if the individual desires it. "If the client has no right to access and possesses it, this results in corruption".

Schaffer, who has written extensively on this concept defines it as "the relation between the administrative allocation of goods and services and the people who need them, and for whom they are intended"<sup>61</sup>. One of the issues which still remains unclear with this concept is that it tends to ignore the fact that there are many cases in which participatory development efforts take place but without a problem of access - such as the Harambee<sup>62</sup> concept in Kenya or some of the other traditional forms of participation in Africa.

With respect to African traditional forms of participation, some of the critics view the efforts under a single banner and conclude that these approaches have not been successful. For instance, "Ujamaa" in Tanzania has been explained as not being successful<sup>63</sup>. Verhagen arrives at a similar conclusion with respect to Zambia<sup>64</sup>. Commenting on this same aspect

---

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> B. Schaffer, Editorial in *Development and Change*, Vol. 6, No. 2 1975 pp.3-12. See also B. Schaffer, "Improving Access to Public Services. Sussex IDS Discussion Paper No. 23, (Brighton, 1973).

<sup>62</sup> Harambee means "pulling together" and is discussed in Chapter IV

<sup>63</sup> M. von Freyhold. Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania: An Analysis of Social Experiment (London, Heinemann, 1979)

<sup>64</sup> K. Verhagen, Co-operatives and Rural Poverty, Op.cit. p.3

Morris<sup>65</sup> introduces the notion of "capture" and points out that "in Kenya the bureaucracy has become captured by members' private interest, while in Tanzania it has become subservient to the party's views".

Nevertheless, these views do not necessarily demonstrate that traditional forms of participation in Africa cannot be successful. As also mentioned by Morris, "the epitome of "bottom-up" development has been Kenya's Harambee (self-help)"<sup>66</sup>. Seibel<sup>67</sup> has also given very favourable reports of experiments with traditional models of participation with the "Nkaben" movement in traditional Akan Culture in Ghana, as well as with traditional co-operative techniques in Liberia.

There are also reports to the contrary of very successful Ujamaa projects which could serve as models for participatory development techniques. Morris reports:

If ever there was an integrated rural development project to offer insights on the importance of and appropriate modes of participation, the Arusha Planning and Village Development Project (APVDP) in Tanzania should have been it. The project design team was dominated by 'true believers' in bottom-up participation<sup>68</sup>.

---

<sup>65</sup> J. Morris, Op.cit. p.65

<sup>66</sup> Ibid. p. 95

<sup>67</sup> Hans-Dieter Seibel "Indigenous Self-Help Organizations and Rural Development: Some Liberian and Ghanaian Cases" Rural Development - Participation Review (Ithaca, Cornell University Summer, 1979) Vol. III, No. 1, pp.11-15

<sup>68</sup> Elliot Morris "The Arusha Planning and Village Development : An Assessment of Participation at Two Levels" Rural Development. Participation Review, Op.cit. (Spring 1982) Vol. III, No. 3..



James De Vries<sup>69</sup> has also reported favourably on the success of other communal projects in Tanzania. It is understood that in one case the participants reported that it was the first time they were challenged to think seriously about their project ideas. "Village members also felt much more positive about projects they helped plan", he reported.

How then does one account for this discrepancy in the literature? To begin with it appears that a distinction should be made between institutionalized traditional participatory techniques and the more spontaneous operations at the grassroots level. Therefore, "Ujamaa" as a nationally instituted and directed approach is not necessarily 'bottom-up', but instead, by manner of its promotion, turns out to be 'top-down' inspite of the participation of the communities - similar to what Moris describes as 'capturing'.

In the case of Ujamaa, Maeda and Bagachwa explain further:

Although the villages are intended to be self-governing, socio-economic and political units, they exist and operate within the context of a national economic and political system. The villages are institutionally linked to the party structures at the district and regional levels. Similarly, they are linked to the Central Government's administrative system at the district level through its election of a representative to the District Development Council<sup>70</sup>.

We see therefore that there are two faces of 'Ujamaa', one which is closely tied to party structure and has been 'captured' to perpetrate the party

---

<sup>69</sup> cf. James De Vries Participation and the Success of Communal Production Projects in Tanzania Rural Development, Op.cit. (Winter, 1982) Vol. III, No. 2, pp. 16-19

<sup>70</sup> J. Maeda and M. S. Bagachwa, "Rural Development: Policies and Perspective in Tanzania" Rural Development : National Policies and Experiences, Op.cit. p.335

ideologies and practices of socialism, and the other which is truly Ujamaa in the traditional context. The traditional system of participation has been captured more for political reasons. The success stories are those which have been nurtured along a separate route and have been able to disentangle themselves from the political and bureaucratic machinery and encourage meaningful participation from within. As Johnson and Clark observed: "Experience shows that the investment of effective participation cannot be commanded by policy makers but must instead be induced"<sup>71</sup>.

Quite apart from the political affiliation, some of these efforts at participatory development display a fair amount of disregard for the experience of the poor. Chambers places much emphasis on the need to make effective use of "rural people's knowledge"<sup>72</sup>. Bugnicourt also advises against the attitude by technicians and politicians that the rural poor cannot think for themselves and therefore must always have others think for them. "Participation can only be promoted where there is a degree of humility on the part of technical experts and political officials"<sup>73</sup>. With these views in mind, it is very possible that traditional forms of participation would play a useful role in conjunction with more current techniques. It may also be a better approach to nurture traditional techniques of participation rather than capture them. The Harambee experience in Kenya is a case in point, although this technique could likewise be used more effectively on the development process as will be discussed further on.

- 
- 71 Bruce F. Johnson and William Clark, Redsigning Rural Development  
Op.cit. p. 173
- 72 Robert Chambers, Rural Development : Putting the Last First (London,  
Longman, 1983) pp. 82-92
- 73 Bugnicourt, Op.cit. p.72

### 3.6 Integrated Rural Development (IRD)

Integrated Rural Development (IRD) was introduced as an approach for coordinating and strengthening the planning and implementation activities of rural areas. It has not been uncommon for interventions to be made by some ministries, or even donors, in rural areas without any systematic coordinated approach. Rural areas must also be integrated into the national development framework.

These efforts at integrating rural development activities have been evolving since the mid 1960s. However, the concept is still generally vague, although some countries have outlined very specific approaches. Moris presented a scenario in which it was discovered through economic planning that there was a glaring "lack of coordination between field agencies responsible for rural development"<sup>74</sup>. He continues to explain that:

The label "integrated rural development" became current. It continues to be used in quite contradictory ways. The original meaning was the coordination of the various components required for development in a given territorial unit. Then integrated rural development came to be attached to programmes of a multi sectoral nature, even though established separately from existing structures. Finally the World Bank has defined "integrated" to mean that all segments of the population would be involved, e.g. including women and the poor<sup>75</sup>.

Moris did not cite his World Bank source, but this interpretation definitely appears to be limited. Certainly women and the poor are to be included, or,

---

74 Jon Moris, Op.cit. p.11  
75 Ibid.

to be more precise, "integrated", but the concept is much broader than this and focuses more on projects, programmes and specified development activities as opposed to the composition of the beneficiary group.

In this connection, a description put forth at UN/ECA meeting on Integrated Rural Development in Moshi Tanzania in 1969 is still quite valid. It states:

The very nature of the process of rural development and the size of the problem of promoting economic and social progress in rural areas require that action be taken on several fronts simultaneously, and not independently of each other. Hence programmes of agriculture, education and training, health and nutrition, community development, etc. should not be planned and implemented each in isolation and without consideration of the implications that development programmes in one area might have for the others<sup>76</sup>.

In order to emphasize this concept, it would be useful to cite another major meeting which arrived at a similar conclusion as follows:

Integrated rural development is conceived by the Rehovot approach as a programme for the simultaneous implementation of multi-purpose planning activities. These are activities on:

- (a) the macro and micro levels;
- (b) the three economic sectors: agriculture, industry and services; and
- (c) the economic social, spatial and organizational aspects of the development process<sup>77</sup>.

Integration takes place on two axes - vertical and horizontal. It will be recalled that in reviewing the literature and approaches on 'top-down'

---

<sup>76</sup> United Nations, Integrated Approach to Rural Development in Africa (UN/ECA, 1971) p.41

<sup>77</sup> Michael von Boguslawski (compiler) Principles and Limitations of Integrated Rural Development (Gleesson, June, 1979) p.39

efforts, one of the major constraints is that macro-level economic planning lacks operational guidelines to effect meaningful changes at the local levels. Pretty much could be said for national spatial development planning except that in this case the central government is in a better position to rationalize its budget allocations particularly with respect to prevailing socio-economic trends which may be reinforced or rectified.

As cited in von Boguslawski's<sup>78</sup> compilation, "one of the major problems is that in most cases macro-planning gives only vague information on the spatial components of development" and therefore, "frictions are caused between the macro- and the micro-level which requires coordination". It is further noted that the responsibility rests with the regional planner, and "must involve all economic sectors and physical elements of the region".

A strong case has also been made throughout the literature on 'bottom-up' or local level initiatives for a shift in decision making authority from the top to the bottom - at least some amicable semblance of power sharing. Sharing of decision making, however, cannot be instituted in a vacuum, hence another reason for effective vertical integration within the hierarchy of the government's management and administrative structure. Wignaroju reiterates that:

In the Third World countries the critical structural changes relate to a shift in decision making power towards the poor by initiating a 'bottom-up' process; the village becoming the focal point of development, and a change in the education system redirecting it towards raising mass consciousness and remodeling elites<sup>79</sup>.

---

<sup>78</sup> von Boguslawski, Op.cit. p.24  
<sup>79</sup> P. Wignaroju "From the Village to Global Order", Development, Dialogue (Uppsala, Sweden, 1977) p.41

A most important aspect of the integration concept is the inter-sectoral horizontal axis at the local level. It is very common knowledge that owing to a lack of any coordinated planning at the local level, the home ministries often work at cross purposes or fail to provide adequate services. For instance, the Ministry of Works may be developing 'feeder roads' in one direction, while the agricultural development is taking place in another direction, or not in that locality at all. Education and health authorities may intervene in an area in a manner that is totally inconsistent with the social structure and population characteristics and trends. We also find that local level plans are quite often inconsistent with reality and amount to no more than shopping lists. Central government is therefore faced with a basket of shopping lists and a result very little ever gets done in the right place at the appropriate time, thereby putting a further strain on limited financial and human resources. This situation has been observed by various authors<sup>80</sup>.

The above represents the basic elements of the IRD approach as a concerted strategy for effecting rural transformation. In theory, the concept appears to be sound, but in practice it has not worked very well in developing countries.

Leupolt<sup>81</sup> rightly notes that there is no unique approach to integrated rural development. Choice of programmes has to be in accordance with overall political and local situation, taking into consideration:

- 
- <sup>80</sup> E. H. Jacoby "Aspects of Institutional Planning as Part of Agricultural Planning", Paper presented to Rehovot Conference on Comprehensive Planning of Agriculture in Developing Countries (Jerusalem, Land Settlement Department, 1963)
- <sup>81</sup> Manfred Leupolt "Action Oriented Principles of Integrated Rural Development" in Principles and Limitations of Integrated Rural Development. Op.cit. p.44

the stage of development  
the national resource endowment  
the local land/man ratio  
the power structure and decision-making processes  
the social attitudes, family structures and division  
of labour among social groups and members of a family,  
etc.

To this should be added appropriate policies and technical capacity required to realize any meaningful IRD. Even in cases where the IRD approach has been attempted, it has been found that the line ministries see IRD as weakening their power; less control on personnel and budgetary resources; a devolution of authority. This resistance, in the absence of a determined central government, often results in a tug-of-war.

Political interference is also a significant impediment to IRD. Many ministers for instance see the concept as a distraction of their efforts - a lack of visibility. Under the IRD programme a good low-cost rural housing project may give credit to the Minister of Local Government and not the Minister of Housing.

Nevertheless, in the view of this author, if developing countries are going to seriously tackle the problems of rural poverty in a rational manner the IRD concept, with appropriate modifications adopted to suit the situation, must be considered more seriously. This position will be elaborated upon in Chapters 5 and 6.

### 3.7 Land Tenure Agrarian Reform and Agriculture

Of all the various bottom-up strategies which have been considered and experimented with, land tenure and agrarian reform measures are perhaps the most important for obliterating rural poverty, but at the same time, these are most neglected considerations in most countries. Agricultural production provides the economic base for the large majority of the world's rural population. Indeed, agriculture also serves as the economic life line for most of the developing countries in Africa. For the rural poor, agricultural pursuits provide the single most important opportunity for improving the quality of life and in order to eke out a day to day sustenance.


Nonetheless, landlessness and near landlessness<sup>82</sup> have emerged as a serious constraint to rural development in Africa, particularly noting the skewed agriculture land carrying capacity as shown in Map 2 overleaf.

---

<sup>82</sup> The term "near landless" is used to describe "those who have access to land which is insufficient to provide a decent (or even minimum) standard of living" c.f. FAO Agrarian Reform and Rural Poverty, (Rome, 1984) p.46



MAP NO. 2 SHOWING TWO ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POPULATION  
AND LAND CARRYING CAPACITY IN AFRICA



Source: Extract from P. Harrison, "Land and people, the growing pressure", Earthwatch, No. 13, IPPF, London, 1983

According to a FAO report<sup>83</sup> it is estimated that nearly 72 percent of the world's agricultural households are classified as landless or near-landless. In Africa, nearly one-fifth of the continent's population falls into this category as well, and one-seventh is considered to be "completely landless"<sup>84</sup>. The following Table illustrates this situation.

TABLE NO. 2 - ESTIMATED NUMBER OF SMALLHOLDERS (NEAR-LANDLESS) AND LANDLESS HOUSEHOLDS, 1980

REGION	SMALLHOLDER HOUSEHOLDS		LANDLESS HOUSEHOLDS		ALL AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS	
	NO.	% OF TOTAL AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS	NO.	% OF TOTAL AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS	NO.	% OF TOTAL AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS
Africa	29	63.0	3	6.5	46	(100)
Far East	86	59.7	22	15.0	144	(100)
Near East	8	44.4	2	11.1	19	(100)
Latin America	13	54.2	4	16.7	24	(100)
Total	136	58.4	31	13.3	233	(100)

Source: FAO Agricultural: Toward 2000

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.  
<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

The phenomenon is particularly disheartening in the case of Africa which has had traditional systems for governing the accessibility to land. As noted by Mabogunje, "Unlike many other regions of the world, Africa did not evolve a land aristocracy. Land was held along kin lines"<sup>85</sup>. Under this arrangement, in most cases each child had equal access to his fathers land or was allotted designated parcels of land for individual use. Over the years this resulted in progressive fragmentation and reduction of land holdings. This situation was exacerbated by colonialism which brought much of the land out of circulation for food crops with the increase of export oriented cash crops. In addition, increased monetization of the economy has introduced a credit nexus as a condition for viable agricultural production beyond the subsistence level. Access to credit requires access to land under some formalized tenurial arrangement. This has in turn given rise to a situation in which the elites within certain communities or countries have been able to acquire a disproportionate amount of access to land and credit.

Since independence various strategies have been adopted in order to improve on the agricultural production, but these have not been as successful as was expected. In fact, in retrospect, many observers believe that the constraint of land and its obvious relation to agricultural production was not given adequate priority attention. One report cites a noted technical adviser to developing countries - Benjamin Higgins - who in the 1950s advocated that the only means to a cumulative improvement of agricultural productivity "is a policy designed to make labour relatively scarce in agriculture and opting for a more mechanized approach with an increased rate

---

<sup>85</sup> Akin L. Mabogunje "The Dilemma of Rural Development in Africa" in Regional Development Dialogue, Vol. 12, No. 2, Autumn, (Nagoya, United Nations Centre for Regional Development, 1981) p.2

of industrialization"<sup>86</sup>.

This view of forced industrialization and mechanization of agriculture was also shared by another advisor - A. F. Ewing. It has been noted that in 1968 he actually advised the UN Economic Commission for Africa that "industry is the sole means of raising the productivity of an economy"<sup>87</sup>. With this sort of policy bias it is understandable why many African countries have neglected small holder farming over the past few decades. The following Table and Graph illustrate the situation regarding agricultural GDP as a percentage of overall GDP and the agricultural population as a percentage of total population in selected African countries.

---

<sup>86</sup> Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development (New York, W. W. Norton, 1959) Ch.16 cited in Economic Report on Africa, 1986 (African Development Bank and Economic Commission for Africa)

<sup>87</sup> A. F. Ewing, Industry in Africa (London, Oxford University Press, 1968) p.11

TABLE NO. 3  
 AGRICULTURAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AS A PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL DOMESTIC  
 PRODUCT COMPARED TO THE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF  
 THE TOTAL POPULATION IN 50 AFRICAN COUNTRIES

COUNTRY	PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT FROM AGRICULTURE (y axis of Graph 1)	PERCENTAGE OF AGRICULTURAL POPULATION WITHIN THE TOTAL POPULATION (x axis of Graph 1)
<u>Northen Africa</u>		
Algeria	6	47
Egypt	18	50
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	3	13
Morocco	16	50
Sudan	22	76
Tunisia	12	39
<u>Western Africa</u>		
Benin	41	45
Burkina Faso	34	80
Cape Verde	18	55
Gambia	29	77
Ghana	46	50
Guinea	40	79
Guinea Bissau	46	81
Ivory Coast	24	78
Liberia	24	68
Mali	27	86
Mauritania	16	82
Niger	44	87
Nigeria	21	51
Senegal	31	73
Sierra Leone	32	64
Togo	20	67
<u>Middle Africa</u>		
Angola	26	56
Central African Republic	40	86
Chad	60	82
Congo	11	33
Equatorial Guinea	44	74
Gabon	8	75
Sao Tome & Principe	73	52
Republic of Cameroon	31	80
Zaire	32	73

(TABLE NO. 3 contd)

---


COUNTRY	PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT FROM AGRICULTURE (y axis of Graph 1)	PERCENTAGE OF AGRICULTURAL POPULATION WITHIN THE TOTAL POPULATION (x axis of Graph 1)
<u>Eastern Africa</u>		
Burundi	45	82
Comoros	42	63
Djibouti	3	47
Ethiopia	45	78
Kenya	27	77
Madagascar	48	82
Malawi	41	82
Mauritius	29	27
Mozambique	39	62
Rwanda	51	89
Seychelles	7	47
Somalia	31	79
Uganda	75	80
United Republic of Tanzania	34	80
Zambia	13	65
Zimbabwe	16	58
<u>Southern Africa</u>		
Botswana	14	79
Lesotho	22	82
Swaziland	24	71

---

Data are for 1981

Source: FAO Statistics Division Data Base

ILLUSTRATION NO. 2 PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT FROM AGRICULTURE COMPARED TO PERCENTAGE OF AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IN 24 COUNTRIES AND 5 OTHER COUNTRIES



NB: The relative positions for Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya have been plotted in and emphasized by the author.

Source: FAO Statistics Division Data Base.

As pointed out in the FAO report on these comparisons<sup>88</sup>, the labour productivity of agriculture is relatively meagre if GDP alone is considered, and the standard of living of the agricultural population is relatively low, if production is equivalent to income. In considering the reasons for these phenomena, one should also examine the influence of the prices at which production is remunerated and accounted for in the GDP. The Graph, which is based on data extracted from the Table, demonstrates the inequalities between agricultural incomes. The Report explains that:

- For a country on line OA, the income per caput of the agricultural sector is equal to the income per caput of the total population. Note that only two countries are above this line. This implies that their per caput income in the agricultural sector is higher than the per caput income of their total population.
- For countries on line OB, income per caput in the agricultural sector is equal to one half of income per caput of the total population. (Five of the countries shown are very near this line: France, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Malawi and Niger).
- For countries on line OC, income per caput in the agricultural sector is equal to one quarter of the income per caput of the population. (Among the countries shown, Libya is closest to this line).
- For countries along the same line, the difference between incomes per caput in the agricultural sector on the one hand, and those for the total of all non-agricultural sectors on the other, increases as the proportion of the agricultural population increases<sup>89</sup>.

One World Bank report further corroborates the rather fragile nature of the agricultural situation in Africa, as a result of ill conceived policies and programmes:

---

<sup>88</sup> FAO, Population and the Labour Force in Rural Economies (Rome, FAO, 1986) pp.15-18

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.



During the 1960s and 1970s, for example, many African countries directed a substantial proportion of their agricultural investment to large-scale, government-operated estates which involved heavy capital outlays for mechanization (as with the rarified crops) or irrigation schemes, or both. Why did they follow such a course? First there was the notion that only a rapid transition to mechanized, high productivity schemes, as practiced in the industrialized world, would overcome the stagnation linked with the traditional low-input, low-output methods<sup>90</sup>.

As the following Table indicates, these policies have proven disastrous for agricultural production in many African countries.

TABLE NO. 4 GROWTH RATES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, 1969-71 TO 1977-79  
(AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE IN VOLUME AS A PERCENTAGE)

4+	3-4	2-3	1-2	0-1	<0
Kenya	Cameroon	Benin	Botswana	Ethiopia	Angola
Malawi	Ivory Coast	Burundi	Chad	Gabon	Congo
Swaziland	Rwanda	Central African Rep.	Guinea-Bissau	Gambia	Ghana
		Liberia	Lesotho	Guinea	Mauritania
		Upper Volta	Madagascar	Somalia	Mozambique
		Zambia	Mali		Togo
		Zimbabwe	Mauritius		Uganda
			Niger		
			Nigeria		
			Senegal		
			Sierral Leone		
			Sudan		
			Tanzania		
			Zaire		

Source: FAO Production Yearbook tapes

<sup>90</sup> The World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington D.C., 1981) p.51

Furthermore, some African countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia and Tanzania opted for state farming. They reasoned that while state farms probably had a lower productivity, they produce a larger marketable surplus<sup>91</sup>. In effect, these predictions were wrong and evidence has shown that "these ventures did not fulfil expectations, and their contributions to growth was small when compared to cost"<sup>92</sup>. These ventures were beset by problems of management; overemployment of staff; underutilization of expensive equipment which also required a high maintenance cost. To this could be added the occasional periods of drought.

Another interesting conclusion has also come to the fore in recent years. Owing to the relatively high population growth rate in many African countries it has been proving extremely difficult to create additional jobs in the urban industrial sector. Against this backdrop, it is predicted that "Africa will undoubtedly remain a predominantly agrarian continent for the next 25 to 50 years"<sup>93</sup>. In Kenya for instance, it is estimated that between 1985 and 2010 an additional 8 million people will have to be absorbed in the labour force. In Zimbabwe, 80,000 people are expected to enter the labour force in 1986 alone, whereas the industrial service sectors will open up only about 6000 jobs<sup>94</sup>.

It has become increasingly clear that within prevailing agrarian structures, several fundamental problems remain:

---

91 Ibid. p.51

92 Ibid.

93 African Development Bank and Economic Commission for Africa, Economic Report on Africa, 1986 (Abidjan and Addis Ababa, March, 1986) p.23

94 cf. Ibid.

.....rural underdevelopment and poverty continue to be closely linked to inequitable distribution of land and water; landlessness is increasing very rapidly, leading to uncontrolled migration to cities and the emergence of a rural proletarian class; modernization of agricultural techniques and their supporting services have not benefitted the majority of small farmers.....<sup>95</sup>.

One would have thought that in light of the overwhelming evidence supporting the need for more progressive land tenure and agrarian reform policies, that more would have been done to reverse this calamity. It has been recognized that....."There are no easy solutions, radical measures are often ignored or circumvented either for ideological considerations or on grounds of feasibility"<sup>96</sup>. To this the World Bank adds:

The biggest problem with most agrarian reform, however, is that governments lack the political will to implement the laws fully once they are placed on the statute books. Access and rights to land are so important to the balance of power and influence in all rural societies.....reform laws remain mere expressions of equitable sentiment. Environment with short political horizons seldom have the staying power for this purpose. When agrarian reform is implemented successfully, however, it can bring about profound long-term changes in a society, stimulating and shaping economic development in significant ways, as in Japan, Taiwan, Egypt and Korea<sup>97</sup>.

Within the past decade or so, the clamour for reform has increased from all quarters. Specific calls have been made for an increased focus on "smallholders" as most of the literature on the economies of Africa suggest that "poverty on this continent, unlike in Latin America, is still predominantly a rural phenomenon" and therefore, "raising the income of

---

<sup>95</sup> FAO., Review and Analysis of Agrarian Reform and Rural Development in the Developing Countries Since the Mid 1960s (Rome, 1969) p.ii

<sup>96</sup> FAO., Landless - A Growing Problem (Rome, 1984)

<sup>97</sup> Warren C. Bavon and Stokes M. Tolbert, Investing in Development: Lessons of World Bank Experience (New York, Oxford University Press, 1985) p.99

small farmers is the best way to meet basic needs"<sup>98</sup>. This view is endorsed by other commentators such as Ghai and Radwan who have researched this dilemma in detail<sup>99</sup>.

Mabogunje emphasizes a further dimension to be considered with respect to agrarian reform including "the organization of an efficient system for the delivery of new seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, farm machinery, and other technical aids" such as "credit to the rural population" and a "stable market for agricultural produce"<sup>100</sup>.

It is thus very clear that if developing countries, and in particular Africa, are going to make any serious in-roads in alleviating rural poverty, a significant "bottom-up" strategy would be to hasten the pace of increased accessibility to land within the framework of small-holding with suitable tenurial arrangements and also the introduction of other agrarian reform measures to ensure an increased income distribution and reduction in the level of urban-rural inequalities.

### 3.8 Summary

It has been seen that much has been studied and written about 'bottom-up' approaches to development in general, and rural development in particular. In spite of this body of knowledge and experience, much is left to be desired in rural areas in Africa, and other developing regions of the world.

---

<sup>98</sup> World Bank Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, Op.Cit. p.50  
<sup>99</sup> cf. D. Ghai and S. Radwan, Agrarian Policies and Rural Poverty in Africa (Geneva, ILO, 1983) pp 21-28  
<sup>100</sup> Akin Mabogunje, Op. Cit. p.9

What is striking, however, is that if even the concepts of 'bottom-up' and 'participatory' development are cliches of the 1980s, in practice, some attempts were being made even during the colonial period as we have seen with 'community development' and 'cooperatives/self-help'. There are no startling success stories for any of these approaches which are distinctly within the category of what one would classify as bottom-up.

Why then haven't these approaches produced the desired results? Are not the advocates of this renewed emphasis on bottom-up planning and development surging back into a spiral that has not produced desirable results? Is this renaissance valid? What about the more recent introduction of 'participatory' in the development nomenclature?

Indeed, the analysis has shown that these approaches were operational at the local levels as bottom-up techniques. What appears to be evident is that these techniques were advocated and directed from the top. Many of the observers such as Madondo and Mandjanagni corroborate the view that community development techniques were seen as being externally imposed and perhaps intended as a roost to relinquish government assistance to the needy. Likewise the cooperative movement and self-help techniques have become suspect because of bad experiences. Co-operatives, it has been claimed, have failed to serve the poor.

What is evident is that none of these bottom-up modes have been found to be in themselves intrinsically bad. This author has, for instance, observed that agricultural and housing co-operatives in Malawi are producing satisfactory results.

As we shall see later on the 'basic needs' approach has produced some improvements in Tanzania inspite of the general malaise of the economy. Streeten has also cited instances in which significant strides have been made. This is therefore indicative of a more pervasive problem. It appears that many of these sub-national level initiatives may be faulted more so on the lack of 'participation' although involvement of the people in some way might have been evident. For instance, we shall see that while Ujamaa in Tanzania involved almost the entire rural population, the notion of participation is questionable.

The capacity of the people to participate in these bottom-up strategies must also be brought into question. There is no evidence that appropriate institutional arrangements have been made to allow these initiatives to have the intended impact for the poor. Therefore, as has been pointed out, the more privileged in the rural areas, or in locally based groupings such as co-operatives, have tended to benefit more from these efforts. This would tend to suggest that a receptive capacity should be in place, and more importantly, be in a position to actually participate in such strategies. Constraints in this regard were outlined by Moris.

The problem of 'access' is also important. The ability of disadvantaged groups to access resources or opportunities which are provided have not been given ample attention and remains a problem. Furthermore, evidence has shown that the land issue remains a significant political problem. Some countries have moved to address this bottleneck, but others lack the political will or commitment, which again supports the impression that the problem may not so much be with the lack of techniques for addressing the problem but rather with the manner in which action is taken or implemented.

No one could therefore expect much of bottom-up strategies without appropriate parallel institutional arrangements, organizational restructuring, and public awareness and meaningful participation.

It is also clear that some of these approaches are not entirely new and in fact there are areas of considerable overlap, perhaps suggesting a saturation point for the range of possibilities. If even new ideas were to evolve in the years ahead, it is unlikely that these would represent a very radical departure from the major theories and tested applications. In fact, it is also clearer now that there cannot be too many divergent approaches from the 'top' and the 'bottom' for rural development in situations of scarce resources and limited technical means.

Of the approaches discussed above, particular countries have indicated preferences for certain approaches and have achieved varying degrees of successes or failures. The next Chapter will review three countries in which one or more of the above approaches have been attempted, and together, will offer an opportunity for covering the full range of approaches discussed above, although not necessarily with the same degree of intensity in each case. For this reason, some aspects will be emphasized more from the point of view of countries in which a particular approach has been given considerable focus.

CHAPTER 4

THREE PERSPECTIVES ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT :  
TANZANIA, KENYA AND GHANA

4.1 Introduction : Ideologies for Change

In order to understand fully the various scenarios of development in Africa, and more specifically rural development strategies, it is imperative that one understands the ideologies which fired the imaginations of the African nationalists, and the sense of urgency which enveloped their aspirations for change as they inherited the reigns of power.

In most African countries, and very definitely in the countries discussed, the views of prominent political leaders pertaining to development policies and strategies, inevitably became the guiding force for government actions and interventions. Since these leaders were closely associated with having won the fight for independence - seen as the gateway to future development - their views, particularly in the initial years following independence, were regarded as gospel, the blueprint for success. In many cases such was the charisma of these leaders that party and nation were almost synonymous with their leadership.

These ideologies are viewed as a basis for the evolution of specific sets of economic and political ideas, not necessarily based on national empirical deductions, but more so on subjective extrapolations from a milieu of indicators demanding change.



Quite apart from the conventional interpretation of ideology as "a systematic scheme or co-ordinated body of ideas about human life and culture", Paul Sigmund has broadened the interpretation to include the "connotations of commitment (both emotional and intellectual), of action orientation (the maintenance of the status quo, which may be the goal of conservative ideologies, is itself an action), and even of conscious or unconscious distortion of the facts to fit a pre-established doctrine"<sup>1</sup>. Perhaps the connotation is best implied by Mannheim's definition as "more or less conscious diagnosis of the real nature of the situation"<sup>2</sup>. To this Lipton adds: "An ideology usually claims to explain the past, to be confirmed by all of it, and to predict the future. It lies too deep to be reasoned away"<sup>3</sup>. Nonetheless, ideology in development is not necessarily irrational or undogmatic, it is just deep seated in the political interlect; and inevitably encompasses and preoccupies the leadership group. Ideology therefore almost always manifests itself in a 'top-down' fashion except in its moral context. Generally, however, experiences around the world have shown that morality often gives way to matters of political expediency; in the case of the African nationalist the struggle for liberation was morally sound if not politically expedient.

An examination of ideologies in development strategies - both at the national or local levels (where this is discernible) - is important from various points of view. It will be recalled that Friedmann characterized

---

<sup>1</sup> Paul E Sigmund, (ed). The Ideologies of Developing Nations (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1967) p3

<sup>2</sup> Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1954) p.49

<sup>3</sup> Michael Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1976) p.91

American planning practice as "almost completely devoid of ideological overtones"<sup>4</sup>.

In Africa, planning and development strategies have been steeped in various ideological entanglements which have not always given way to rationalism in policy formulation. Ideology has served both as a catalyst and a constraint in Africa both prior to and after independence. The intent here is not to debate the abstractions of ideology, but more so to examine its application and obvious impact, particularly with regard to development in general and rural transformation in particular. The most significant aspect of the role of ideology in planning and development in Apter's observation is that ideology divides into two forms:

One form is dogma which can easily lead to violence and dissension..... The more hopeful alternative is science. It is in this sense that science can be said to have become an ideology<sup>5</sup>.

The implication of Apter's observation is that ideology should be flexible enough to give way to empiricism. Shils corroborates this view:

Ideologies also change because of the pressure of external reality. The 'world' does not easily accommodate itself to the requirements of ideologies. The 'facts' of life do not fit their categories..... The proponents of ideologies are often defeated in their campaigns for total transformation. Defeat is a shock, a pressing occasion for revision of the ideology to make it fit the facts which have imposed themselves<sup>6</sup>.

---

4 Friedmann "The Concept of a Planning Region" Op.cit. p.497  
5 David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1965) pp.315-316  
6 Edward Shils, The Intellectuals and the Powers (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1972) pp.31-32

It has been observed, therefore, that prior to independence, the nationalists were united within the Pan-Africanist movement on a sound basis of social morality - a banner of liberation and equality - manifested in ideological strands in the socialist political camp. The two spheres of influence were either within Marxist oriented ideologies or neo-classicism. Most nationalists could not align themselves with the neo-classical 'reactionary' doctrine. An observation of Lipton illustrates why:

Neo-classical economists and their evolutionist and functionalist counterparts in sociology, have stressed the likelihood, modalities and 'social efficiency' of individual optimising behaviour within a smoothly working market structure. Since they have been relatively uninterested in class alignments, dominance and elite formation, they could see neither how the small farmer might be continuously discriminated against under a free-market system, nor why, if in distress because deprived of resources by industrialization, he could not join the winning side by moving to the cities to work'.

One therefore could not talk about liberation and at the same time embrace an ideology inimical to the aspirations of the masses of the people for whom liberation was sought. It was, in effect, an ideology of political expediency, not, of course, necessarily denying the moralist content.

In the particular cases being discussed here, all the leaders who eventually came to power in their respective territories were previously associated in some way with the Pan-Africanist movement. All continued to profess allegiance to the socialist doctrine, but it is from this point that a bifurcation of the earlier concept began to emerge in distilled forms.

---

<sup>7</sup> Lipton, Op.cit p.90

While Marxism was not embraced in totality by the moderate Pan-Africanists, their stance could perhaps be better characterised as an objection of the extremes of capitalism which led to the colonization of Africa in the first place. With the advent of independence, the emphasis shifted from 'liberation' to 'development' - the thrust for modernization.

Socialism began to lose much of its Marxist content and was subjected to various forms of distillation. It became quite clear that none of the leaders embraced Marxist ideology, or even the conventional doctrinaire form of socialism. Lipton comments:

Marxists have stressed the struggle among great social classes, have viewed the outcome as determined, and have interpreted the peasant interest as objectively reactionary because its advancement would delay the historically inevitable victory of the industrial proletariat<sup>8</sup>.

African leaders thus felt compelled to forge a new socialist ideology which was termed 'African Socialism' which was viewed as a communicable ideology which gave a perspective for the exigencies of rapid development and changes in society at that particular time<sup>9</sup>.

Since the concept of African Socialism grew out of divergent ideas and approaches, and cannot be attributed to a single person or distinct clique, its meaning remained vague for many years. In fact, it is still difficult to discern a unified ideology and is interpreted differently in each country. Friedland and Rosberg anticipated that:

---

<sup>8</sup> op.cit p.90  
<sup>9</sup> See William Friedland and Carl Rosberg Jr. (eds) African Socialism, (California, Stanford University Press, 1964) pp V-VI

Though African Socialism is neither a precise ideology nor a specific guide to action, it is nonetheless a set of dimensions to which Africans will give specific content as they work out their problems on a day-to-day basis..... In this respect, a great deal of experimentation is taking place as the new nations of Africa pass through different stages of development and as ideology is shaped to meet different situational demands<sup>10</sup>.

Nonetheless, there was a common theme which emerged with the nebulous idea of African Socialism, and this was the commitment expressed by every African leader to forge a new egalitarian society; to spread the benefits of the nation in a far more dispersed manner than had hitherto been experienced. Noting that Africa was over "90 per cent rural" at that time, this by definition also implied a commitment to rural development, or perhaps more precisely, development which would have redressed the disparities suffered by the majority in the rural areas, and disadvantaged situations in the urban sector - close to 100 percent of the indigenous population.

African Socialism therefore in its various forms can thus be viewed as the pivot for rural development policies and strategies. An examination of the various development strategies provides a clue as to how African Socialism was interpreted in the various countries. Of the early group - Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania - Nkrumah of Ghana was the most vociferous. He felt that "what other countries have taken three hundred years to achieve, a once dependent territory must try to accomplish in a generation if it is to survive"<sup>11</sup>. Nkrumah also felt that capitalism might prove too complicated a system for a newly independent country since it would betray the "personality and conscience of Africa"<sup>12</sup>, it was necessary to wrestle total control from the

---

<sup>10</sup> Ibid p.2

<sup>11</sup> Paul E. Sigmund, The Ideologies of Developing Nations (New York, Praeger, 1969) p.225

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. p.257

"mother country". In his view, "Neocolonialism is a greater danger to independent countries than is colonialism" and therefore it is "far easier for the proverbial camel to pass through the needle's eye..... than for an erstwhile colonial administration to give sound and honest counsel of a political nature to its liberated territory".

Between the time of Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP) having won the 1951 elections to the time of his overthrow in February, 1966, Nkrumah's brand of socialism had moved very far "left". In spite of the earlier pronouncements about social justice and the like, Nkrumah concerned himself increasingly with continental socialism and the decolonization of Africa. As far as national development was concerned, he made it very clear that his approach was aimed at "state ownership of productive property" and "complete industrialization of our country"<sup>13</sup>. According to Legum, "the first attempt to give Nkrumahism pragmatic content was made in 1962 with the formulation of the 'Work and Happiness' Programme, which later became the basis of the new Seven Year Plan"<sup>14</sup>.

That Nkrumah had embraced Marxist ideologies as a basis for his development strategy was no secret. In his autobiography<sup>15</sup> he admitted that he concentrated on "finding a formula by which the whole colonial question and the problem of imperialism could be solved. In this connection he reported that he had read Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mazzini and that they did much to influence him in his revolutionary ideas and activities. These

---

<sup>13</sup> Colin Legum, "Socialism in Ghana : A Political Interpretation" in African Socialism. Op.cit. p.131

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. p.141

<sup>15</sup> Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (New York, Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1957)

inclinations were elucidated in a later work entitled "Consciencism"<sup>16</sup>.

It is ironic that in the broadcast to the nation on the overthrow of Nkrumah, J. A. Ankrāh claimed that:

..... most of us cannot get ordinary food to buy to eat. Let us consider the present prices of cassava, tomatoes, pepper, rice, milk, bread. How many of us are able to buy these basic needs with our incomes which have dwindled in terms of real value...<sup>17</sup>.....we are very close to famine and starvation<sup>17</sup>.

Another reason for the ouster of Nkrumah, was "undoubtedly Nkrumah's drift towards the USSR and the Eastern Bloc"<sup>18</sup>. With Nkrumah off the scene, Ghana uncoiled from its flirtation with the Eastern Bloc and its socialist ideology became somewhat muddled in a succession of coups d'etat. It was not until Busia took over the Presidency in 1969 that there was a specific resurgence of concern and measures to directly ameliorate the conditions of the impoverished. In fact, 1970 could be considered as the beginning of the rural development initiative in Ghana with the establishment of the Rural Development Fund<sup>19</sup> which at least was a significant gesture and indication of some awareness of the magnitude of the problem.

Both Tanzania and Kenya proceeded less vociferously during the early days of independence which they both obtained respectively in 1961 and 1963. Looking first at Tanzania, it is reported that:

At independence TANU\* appeared to have lost momentum. There was little party ideology save a

---

<sup>16</sup> Kwame Nkrumah, Consciencism : Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization and Development (New York : Praeger)

<sup>17</sup> Excerpt from "The Rebirth of Ghana - The End of Tyranny" (Accra, Ministry of Information, 1966)

<sup>18</sup> T.C. McCaskie "Recent History" (of Ghana) in Africa South of the Sahara (London, Europa, 1985) p.458

<sup>19</sup> Although a Ministry of Rural Development was established in 1967, it did not function well.

\* TANU - Tanganyika African National Union

desire for Africanization, on which Nyerere wished to proceed more slowly than some of his colleagues. He resigned his premiership barely a month after independence.....in order to deal with another organization of the party and its programme<sup>20</sup>.

Nyerere was forced to move more rapidly on the road to 'practical socialism' than he had expected. This was largely due to problems between the government and the trade unions which were agitating for more rapid Africanization. The conflict resulted in sharp wage increases which the Government could not meet or tolerate. Nyerere decided that the Unions had to be controlled and created an umbrella organization for this purpose. He then began to push for the expansion of co-operatives and the development of fresh lands for new settlement schemes.

Compared to Ghana and Kenya, Tanzania had far less resources at its disposal to undertake the envisaged development activities. Saul notes that "initial post-independence efforts towards industrialization also followed a typical trajectory - import substitution of consumer goods, often a semi-luxury variety, last stage assembly, and so on - "<sup>21</sup> which actually contributed very little to the requirements for the "long-term structural transformation".

According to Lonsdale<sup>22</sup>, Nyerere was also experiencing difficulties on the international scene. As a result of the earlier Zanzibar revolution which was to bring into a union with Tanganyika to form the unified state of Tanzania in April, 1964, the USA and the Western world were generally

---

<sup>20</sup> John Lonsdale, Africa South of the Sahara, op.cit p947

<sup>21</sup> J. S. Saul "Planning for Socialism in Tanzania: The Socio-Political Context" in Towards Socialist Planning (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1972) pp 3-4

<sup>22</sup> Lonsdale, Op.cit



nervous about the Zanzibar situation. Nyerere was also in the forefront of the objections to the operations of the Belgians in the Congo<sup>23</sup>. To compound these constraints, Britain froze a loan which was earlier agreed to, simply because Tanzania honoured an OAU resolution that African states should sever relations with Britain as a result of its poor handling of the unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia in 1965. Lonsdale concludes that "both external and internal pressures were pushing TANU in the direction to which Nyerere was philosophically inclined, a socialist strategy of development".

!

By this time, Nyerere had already presented his ideas on socialism in a 1962 address entitled "Ujamaa : The Basis of African Socialism"<sup>24</sup>. However, as Burke<sup>25</sup> points out, at that time Ujamaa was "neither a call to action nor a program for development but a statement of humanistic ideals". Therefore, Tanganyika's men of action did not quite know how to regard or use it. In fact, 'Ujamaa' oscillated for sometime without constituting a significant development policy, except perhaps to Nyerere himself. One could also glean from a pamphlet released in 1962<sup>26</sup> that Nyerere was concerned about the immorality of the "power which wealth brings with it", and that domination of others should not be used to acquire such wealth. He expressed a preference for development based on "our traditional African society" and objections to the "idea of land as a marketable commodity" which was not an African Tradition.

Faced with the vicissitudes of a lethargic economy and scepticism from

---

<sup>23</sup> Now Zaire

<sup>24</sup> An address at a Conference on Pan-African Socialism held at Tanganyika's Kivukoni College in April, 1962.

<sup>25</sup> Fred G. Burke "Tanganyika : The Search for Ujamaa" African Socialism. Op.cit p.194

<sup>26</sup> Pamphlet published by the Tanganyika Standard, Dar es Salaam, 1962

abroad, foreign investment required to finance the development plan was not forthcoming. Nyerere dug in his heels and began to refine his strategy of self reliance which will be discussed in greater detail further on.

Kenya, like Ghana, did not make any overt commitment to rural transformation during the early period of independence. However, its socialist stance and proclamation by definition were an expression of concern for the disadvantaged in the rural areas, and the general well-being of all Kenyans.

The architect of Kenya's early socialist ideology was Tom Mboya<sup>27</sup>. During 1958 Mboya visited Ghana along with various other nationalist leaders, including Nyerere, and made a very deliberate impact on Nkrumah with whom there were discussions on the Pan-Africanist movement and the future course of Africa. Nonetheless, inspite of Mboya's commitment to a socialist course, all indications were that Kenya intended to proceed cautiously and wished to evolve its own brand of socialism. No significant direction could be ascertained, except in so far as the overall economic policies were concerned.

Mboya, between 1956-62 was associated with the moderate wings of all political organizations and later founded KANU<sup>28</sup>; and was proving himself to be a pragmatic strategist on many issues. On the question of land reform, David Goldsworthy reports that: "From the beginning Mboya was not among those demanding massive structural change"<sup>29</sup>. It is also reported that in view of the radical agitation in some quarters, Mboya felt obliged to visit London "to allay the fears aroused in British business

---

<sup>27</sup> During this period Jomo Kenyatta, who was later to become President of Kenya, was still in detention but later directed the refinement of this ideology as far as Kenya was concerned.

<sup>28</sup> KANU - Kenya African National Union

<sup>29</sup> David Goldsworthy Tom Mboya : The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget (Nairobi, Heinemann, 1982) p.170

circles by settler leaders in their own recent visits to Britain"<sup>30</sup>. The purpose was to "stress KANU's positive attitude towards overseas capital, its commitment to preserving economic stability, and its willingness to provide just compensation for any expropriated land"<sup>31</sup>. In 1958, Mboya himself announced:

Most people will expect me to have no mercy for capitalists or big firms or employers. On the contrary.....I have a lot of sympathy for them because I realize one thing, that what this country needs most is the stimulation of more industrial development and greater investment<sup>32</sup>.

This had set the tone for Kenya's post independence strategy. Thereafter, Jomo Kenyatta was released from detention in August, 1961; accepted the presidency of KANU and moved on to become Prime Minister in June, 1963.

Noting that the stalwart of Kenyan politics, Kenyatta, was now released from detention and assumed the leadership of KANU, there was some eagerness to see whether the slant in development strategy would have changed, particularly since Nyerere was receiving much international acclaim in intellectual circles for his brilliant treatise on African Socialism. All eyes were now on neighbouring Kenya.

In March, 1963, Mboya, as Minister of Labour issued an article on African Socialism. He proclaimed, inter alia:

.....We have Africans who call themselves socialists - African Socialists.....these so called 'socialists' peddle and parrot foreign slogans and allow themselves to be swept away by emotions which have nothing to do with the noble aspirations of our people.

---

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. p.171

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Government of Kenya Legco Debates Vol. 76, Part 2 (May, 1958)

When I talk of 'African Socialism' I refer to those proved codes of conduct in the African societies which have, over the ages, conferred dignity on our people and afforded them security regardless of their station in life..... Since over three-quarters of Kenya's population depends on agriculture..... The expansion and modernization of agriculture and relative production must be given priority with three aims in view - first to expand the employment base and provide more food for the country's population; second, to diversify our export crops and expand their production.....to earn more foreign exchange.....Third, to accelerate rural development.....Fourth, to lay the foundation for industrialization<sup>33</sup>.

For sometime there was some uncertainty as to President Kenyatta's position vis-a-vis the earlier pronouncements by Mboya. This was clarified when the Lumumba Institute<sup>34</sup> was "teaching scientific socialism to party members"<sup>35</sup>. President Kenyatta then assigned Mboya the task of elaborating on Kenya's approach to socialism. This was promulgated in Sessional Paper No. 10 - "African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya"<sup>36</sup> which was presented to the press by Mboya. This document clearly stressed Kenya's intention to pursue a moderate course, it clearly repudiated any Marxist tendencies. Goldsworthy<sup>1</sup> summarizes Kenya's socialism as:

.....it would be a mockery simply to undertake an equal distribution of poverty. Wealth had first to be created and after that redistribution by progressive taxes and other means<sup>37</sup>.

- 
- <sup>33</sup> Tom Mboya "African Socialism" *Transition*, Vol. 3 No. 8 (March, 1963)  
<sup>34</sup> This Institute, according to Goldsworthy (*Op.cit.* p.234) was established with the assistance of Soviet funds. It tended to project a more radical stance which was inconsistent with official policy.  
<sup>35</sup> Goldsworthy, *Ibid.* p.234  
<sup>36</sup> Government of Kenya, African Socialism and Its application to Planning in Kenya (Nairobi, Kenya Government Printery, 1965)  
<sup>37</sup> *Op.cit.* p.253

This position contrasted sharply with the "classical conservatism or even romanticisms" of Nyerere's Ujamaa and the radical and more "orthodox economics" of Nkrumah<sup>38</sup>. To recap, while all three were committed to 'African Socialism', again, also by necessity an implication of commitment to ruralism, Ghana intended to pursue a rather circuitous route; Tanzania decided on an immediate frontal attack on poverty and the required restructuring, and Kenya wished to take an incremental approach, while at the same time accumulating wealth for the eventual elimination of poverty.

#### 4.2 GHANA : The Headstart

If ever there should have been a successful country model for rural development in Africa, that country should have been Ghana. Ghana has had a very long history of planning experience. The legendary Guggisberg Ten-Year Development Plan 1919-29 for Ghana is reported to have been the first comprehensive development plan ever<sup>39</sup>.

Furthermore, both prior to, and increasingly so after independence, Ghana has been well endowed with a relatively high calibre of indigenous technical expertise; a vibrant economy during the early years of independence; dynamic leadership, and, in proverbial terms, 'has tried every trick in the book' as far as rural development initiatives are concerned.

Commenting on this headstart Bequele<sup>40</sup> explains that in 1950 Ghana's income per head was the highest in Africa as Table No. 5 below indicates. In spite

---


<sup>38</sup> See Fred Burke, Op.cit. p.206

<sup>39</sup> cf. Jette Bukh, et al, Measurement and Analysis of Progress at the Local Level. (Geneva, UNRISD, 1978) p 3.

<sup>40</sup> Assefa Bequele, "Stagnation and Inequality in Ghana" in Agrarian Policies and Rural Poverty in Ghana. Op.cit. pp. 212-220

MAP NO. 3

GHANA



KEY INDICATORS							
Economic Indicators	Unit	Period	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Population	million	mid-year	11.32	11.45	11.83	12.17	12.68
Exchange Rate	Cedis/US\$	end-year	2.7053	2.7503	2.7503	2.7523	3.4494
International Reserves <sup>1</sup>	US\$m	end-year	291.6	196.6	148.0	182.4	144.9
Money Supply	mil Cedis	end-year	4,642.2	6,290.1	9,413	11,203	14,717
Consumer Price Index <sup>2</sup>	1980 = 100		66.63	100.0	216.49	244.74	507.05
Exports (FOB)	US\$m	year	1,076.9	1,257.3	1,063.2	873.4	
Cocoa	US\$m	year	671.3	706.2	396.8	353.0	
Wood	US\$m	year	81.40	33.6	36.0	15.9	
Imports (FOB)	US\$m	year	1,083.3 <sup>2</sup>	960.6	1,005.2	640.9	
Production							
Cocoa	000 tonnes	year	300	258	222	175	148.11
Coffee	000 tonnes	year	2.10	1.62	2.40	1.38	1.50
Gold	000 tonnes	year	0.011	0.0128	0.0136	0.013	0.018
Bauxite	000 tonnes	year	300	320			
Minus Gold							

Source: "South" (South Publications Ltd., London, September 1985)

of the high population density Ghana was blessed with an abundant supply of cultivatable land. He likewise recalls that Ghana had a "a much larger stock of educated and skilled manpower than any other country in tropical Africa", and in the 1950s also had a "large stock of capital and foreign exchange, and was thus relatively unfettered by the constraints normally faced by developing countries". Accounting for Ghana's advances in trained personnel it will be noted that it was the first country in Africa to have set up a rural training centre in Panfukron. The purpose of the school was "to allow people who already have some experience in village problems to acquire sufficient technical skills to be able to help villagers to improve, develop and plan their villages"<sup>41</sup>. Oberlander has reported that this school "was an unqualified success and proved to be an invaluable testing ground for many teaching ideas"<sup>42</sup>. Furthermore, Ghana graduated its first batch of planners from its University of Science and Technology in 1963. As Szereszewski sums it up, Ghana has had "a privileged place among the so called under-developed or developing economies"<sup>43</sup>. The following Table No. 5 illustrates Ghana's economic situation between 1950 and 1975 as compared to a selected group of other African countries.

It is also said that Ghana's efforts towards rural development date back to 1943 when the idea to establish the Department of Social Welfare and Community Development was first mooted"<sup>44</sup>. By 1949 a rural-development strategy which is today generally referred to as the "Social Amenities

---

41 Alasdair Sutherland, Report on School and Village Planning. (Accra, Department of Town and Country Planning)

42 Prof. H. Peter Oberlander, Report on the Establishment, Organization and Administration of an Institute for Community Planning in Ghana: (New York, United Nations, 1960) p.4

43 Cited in Beguele, Op.cit.

44 C.K. Brown "Rural Development strategies with Special Reference to Ghana". p.37

Single Project Approach"<sup>45</sup> began to emerge.

TABLE NO. 5

INCOME PER HEAD, GHANA AND SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES 1950 & 1975

COUNTRY	INCOME PER HEAD			
	IN TERMS OF 1974 US\$		RATIO BETWEEN GHANA AND OTHER COUNTRIES	
	1950	1975	1950	1975
Ghana	354	427	1.00	1.00
Congo	303	460	1.17	0.93
Ivory Coast	283	460	1.25	0.93
Morocco	353	435	1.00	0.98
Zambia	310	495	1.14	0.86
Nigeria	150	287	2.36	1.48
Senegal	238	341	1.49	1.25
Africa	170	308	2.08	1.38

Source: Derived from David Morawetz: Twenty-five Years of Economic Development, 1950 to 1975 (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1977)

The approach called for the establishment of community development committees with a District Commissioner or Chairman. Under the scheme, the colonial government did not provide the social amenities directly, but instead encouraged and organized the rural people to provide for themselves with technical guidance. This approach was, quite similar to the 'community

<sup>45</sup> Prof. K. Ewusi, The Dynamics of Rural Poverty.....p.72



development' and 'self help' schemes in many of the commonwealth countries, but, in Ghana it gradually incorporated broader elements of locally initiated participatory development initiatives, not unlike Kenya's 'Harambee' which will be discussed below.

It will also be noted that Ghana's special initiatives in rural development tended to follow a chronological pattern in sequence with the political regimes<sup>46</sup>. It will be kept in mind, however, that in some instances there have been some overlapping of approaches, although generally a specific emphasis could be associated with each regime.

#### 4.2.1 Centralization and the Sectoral Approach

Under the erstwhile Nkrumah, Ghana embarked on its first Five Year Development Plan 1951-56, which coincided with the 1951 granting of internal self government. Since that time Ghana, according to Ewusi, "in one way or another further experimented with planning" but, "after decades of macro planning, it appears it may have contributed less to improving the living conditions of the masses of the people....<sup>47</sup>" as this study has generally shown in Chapter 2. He further describes the situation as being paradoxical in that rural poverty prevails unabated inspite of the fact that the rural sector produces the bulk of the country's wealth". Ewusi's concern obviously stems from the skewed development which had begun to emerge in increasing proportions.

---

<sup>46</sup> Ghana has had successive governments as follows: Convention People's Party (CPP) 1951-66; National Liberation Council (NLC) 1966-69; Progress Party (PP) 1969-70; National Redemption Council 1970-

<sup>47</sup> Kodwo Ewusi "Report on the Country Case Study in Ghana". in Jette Bukh et. al. Op.cit. p.3

While Nkrumah retained some elements of the 'Social Amenities Approach' and in addition to technical assistance also provided materials, the rural poor were still falling further behind. Nkrumah assumed, as has been the case elsewhere, that through the economic growth expected in the First and Second Development Plans, benefits would have accrued to the rural poor through the programmes of the sectoral line ministries.

Ewusi explains that:

This approach to rural development derives directly from the strategy for national planning which was adopted in the First and Second Five Year Development Plans. Under this approach, specialized government departments have carried out programmes without any coordination or consultation. Agricultural extension, health programmes, adult literacy, family planning, feeder roads and water supply are being implemented.....they do not have any geographical focus.....are thinly spread and their impact on the rural communities tends to be so limited that the cry for more extension services, more marketing facilities, more roads is the most frequent way local people evaluate them<sup>48</sup>.

Not much more could be said about any direct impact of Nkrumah's centralized sectoral approach on rural development. Very little actual 'trickle down' took place and the direct assistance through the social amenities approach was the only evidence of support in the rural area. In all respects, these approaches still amount to the classical 'top down' model as discussed in Chapter 2.

During this period Ghana had also scored another first with the preparation of a National Physical Development Plan by the Town and Country Planning Department. As explained in Chapter 2, such a Plan should have normally

---

<sup>48</sup> Ewusi. The Dynamics.....Op.cit p.73

assisted Central Government and the line ministries in the rationalization of the spatial development objectives. However, the Town and Country Planning Department also appears to have been viewed as a line agency and it has had minimal inputs, if any, in guiding the operations of the line ministries inspite of the planning instruments which were being put in place for such purposes. Physical planning and economic planning continued to be poles apart.

In general, planning and development tended to be disjointed and there is no evidence that the "privileged" position in which Ghana found itself was being properly utilized. Towards the close of the Nkrumah era, some observers described the situation as one of increased central control with Nkrumah as the pivotal force. The mass support which had accompanied the early socialist ideas began to wane. Some claim that he developed a personality cult and that "power was understood to be vested in Nkrumah and in the committee and 'apparatchiks' of the CPP"<sup>48</sup>.

Nevertheless, in speaking to many Ghanaians in public and private life, they all at least agreed to the fact that most of the 'social amenities' which exist in the rural areas in various stages of decay were in fact provided during the pre-independence or immediate post-independence Nkrumah era. In various field survey discussions undertaken by this author, some planners informed him that Ghana is yet to redeem its days of glory. In this regard it is worthwhile to also point out that Ghana's eventual problems were due not only to a lack of coordination or ill conceived disjointed projects, but also in large part to the 'external shocks' also experienced by Tanzania and many other developing countries.

---

<sup>49</sup> T.C. McCaskie "Ghana : Recent History" in Africa South of the Sahara, Europa. Op.cit pp.459-460

Therefore, inspite of very gallant efforts to 'turn the clock back' successive governments have found the going very difficult owing to the poor economic situation which has prevailed in recent years. The two Tables - Nos. 6 and 7 below provide a view of what has transpired economically over the recent decades.

TABLE NO. 6

GHANA : GROSS FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES AS PERCENTAGE OF ANNUAL IMPORTS

YEAR	PERCENTAGE
1960	90.0
1970	11.5
1977	14.2

Sources: World Bank Tables, 1976; and  
idem: World Development Report, 1979

TABLE NO. 7

GHANA : AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES (IN REAL TERMS)

ITEM	1950-60	1960-70	1970-77
Gross domestic investment <sup>1</sup>	8.9	-3.2	-8.6
Total imports <sup>1</sup>	8.9	-1.6	2.0
Total exports <sup>1</sup>	3.2	0.1	-1.9
Cocoa exports <sup>2</sup>	5.4*	-1.2	-4.1 (-3.8)

Sources: <sup>1</sup> World Bank: World Tables, 1976; idem: World Development Report, 1979. <sup>2</sup> Estimated on the basis of data provided in FAO: Trade Yearbook, various issues. The data refer to cocoa beans only. The figure with an asterisk refers to the period 1955-60. The figure in parentheses refers to cocoa beans, paste and cake.

#### 4.3. Decentralization

Ghana's embarkation on a process of meaningful decentralization of the planning, administrative and development structures was introduced with far less fanfare, and has received far less attention than has Tanzania's 'Ujamaa' or Kenya's 'SRDP'. Certainly, one reason for this lack of detailed scrutiny and assessment, has been the lack of sustained strategies for a sufficiently long period of time to allow for meaningful observations of the real impact of any single approach or combination of approaches since the limited Nkrumah initiatives.

As a result of the relatively frequent changes in regimes, each successive government sought to distinguish itself from the previous one and introduce its own strategies for rural development. Recalling that one of the major criticisms of the Nkrumah era was too much central control which alienated the rural people, the succeeding regime of the National Liberation Council (NLC) found it very prudent to decentralize the decision making process and 'return the government to the people'.

This policy ushered in the series of short lived attempts by the various regimes to institutionalize a meaningful multi-tiered system of decentralized decision making, planning and development intended to impact favourably on the stated objective of improving the quality of life for the rural population.

It is very important to keep in mind the fact that Ghana's concern with rural development began in the 1940s. Therefore, the distinction being made here is between the rural development efforts within a heavily centralized

system as opposed to initiatives within an intended decentralized system purporting a devolution of authority and capacity to the sub-national levels. As the following chart illustrates, Ghana has not been in want of institutional instruments for rural development at both the national and sub-national levels as the following chronological listing illustrates.

ILLUSTRATION NO. 3

SYNOPTIC VIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS RELATED TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT: GHANA

<u>DATE</u>	<u>INSTITUTIONS/BODIES</u>
1943-44	Establishment of the Department of Social Welfare new Secretary of Social Services
1946	The Department extended to become the Department of Social Welfare and Housing
(1946	Housing created as a separate Division)
1948	The Department extended to include 'Community Development Division' and became the Department of Social Welfare, Community Development and Housing
1957	A new Ministry created with Departments for Co-operatives and Labour joined and called the Ministry of Labour, Social Welfare and Co-operatives. (The Housing Division transferred to the Ministry of Works and Housing)
(1967	National Physical Development Plan)
1968)	Regional Planning Committees (RPCs) established in all nine regions.
April 1969	The Ministry of Rural Development created with Social Welfare under new Ministry
October	The Ministry of Youth and Rural Development established.
1969	The National Service Corps created, including activities for rural development
1970	
January	The Ministry of Youth and Rural Development abolished.
1972	Social Welfare transferred to the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare
1972	The Department of Rural Development created.
1979	The new Constitution establishes Regional Councils, District Councils, Local Government Councils, and Village, Town and Area Development Committees.

Within this sequence of institutional developments, decentralization was not really attempted, and even so nominally, until the Regional Committees were established in 1968.

#### 4.3.1 Regionalism : 1967-1969

Of the countries under particular discussion, Ghana was the only one that actually attempted to establish a technical planning capacity at the regional level, quite unlike the traditional 'provincial administration' at this level. What is unique about this approach has been the effort to combine technical (planning) and administrative capacities at this level.

When the National Liberation Council (NLC) attained leadership they immediately embarked on the establishment of Regional Planning Committees (RPCs). This regime had attached great importance to rural development. According to Ewusi, the basic assumption underlying this approach was that since the Government normally invested "substantial amounts of resources in the improvement of rural areas through the annual development budget, it is necessary to ensure that an effective machinery exists at the regional and district levels" to facilitate "the prompt and efficient implementation of various projects and programmes outlines in the annual budget"<sup>50</sup>. These committees were expected to "serve as a framework within which the execution of development projects could be planned and effectively monitored"<sup>51</sup>. They were also to identify new opportunities for investment and forge a link between central government and private enterprise.

The RPCs comprised of representatives of the Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Health and Public Works; five private citizens each of the nine committees, as well as the chief executives from each district within the respective regions.

---

<sup>50</sup> K. Ewusi, The Dynamics of Rural Poverty in Ghana.....Op.cit p.73  
<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

The Two Year Development Plan 1968-70 elaborated on the view of the Government that the "lower level public bodies.....are closer to the problems involved than the central administration"<sup>52</sup>. The Plan also called for a feed-back system to check on the progress of projects and to provide as a guide for new projects.

A startling observation is that the work of the planners Grove and Huszar had not figured significantly in these new institutional arrangements for decentralization. This is an important consideration because it would appear that the NLC now had at its disposal detailed information on the national hierarchy of settlements and guidelines for a more innovative approach to regional development which, while largely recognizing the existing administrative framework would have introduced some new dimensions. In their in-depth analysis and ranking system of settlements, Grove and Haszar<sup>53</sup> had divided Ghana into twenty-two planning regions. They explained that:

We propose that these should be administrative areas only for the purposes of planning. In this respect alone they would become an intermediate tier between the eight regional administrations and one hundred and fifty local councils. Regional planning would become a characteristic service of grade II centres\*<sup>54</sup>.

---

<sup>52</sup> Government of Ghana, Two Year Development Plan 1968-70 (Accra, 1978) p.20  
<sup>53</sup> David Grove and Laszlo Huszar, The Towns of Ghana: The Role of Service Centres in Regional Planning (Accra, Ghana Universities Press, 1964) p.86  
\* Using telephones similar to Christaller's, Grove and Haszar devised a weighing system for the establishment of a hierarchy of centres based on the level of services. Five levels of service centres were thus determined. Level II included services such as hotels, municipal bus service, telephone exchanges, libraries, railway stations but exclude air transport, universities and specialist hospitals.  
<sup>54</sup> Grove and Huszar Op.cit. p.86



Accordingly, Grove and Haszar likened these grade II service areas to Dickinson's definition of a region as "an area of interrelated activities, kindred interests and common organizations, brought into being through the medium of the routes which bind it to the urban centre"<sup>55</sup>. Therefore, the combination of administrative districts were expected to be "homogeneous in natural features, and their economic life would tend to be dominated by a few major industries and crops".

Indeed, from a planning point of view, this idea was very innovative and logical. Recognizing the existing administrative structures these two planners combined the composite grade II areas in such a way that "no less than nineteen of the twenty two planning regions would lie wholly - or almost wholly - in a single administrative region", since these proposed new 'planning regions' did not correspond exactly with the boundaries of the administrative units. The following Map No. 4 shows the administrative regions and proposed planning regions as suggested by Grove and Huszar<sup>56</sup>.

It soon became clear that the Regional Committees were not functioning as well as had been anticipated. In many respects it was an opportunity lost as this was the first real attempt to decentralize and incorporate both administrative and planning functions side by side at the intermediate level.


Various reasons have been advanced for the poor performance of these Committees. Buxton and Dunham suggest that the shortcomings were as a

---

<sup>55</sup> R.E. Dickinson, City Region and Regionalism (London, Kegan Paul, 1947)  
<sup>56</sup> J.K. Buxton and D.M. Dunham "Some aspects of Regional Planning and Rural Development Policy in Ghana" in Development and Change, Vol. II, 1970-71 No. 3 (The Hague, Institute of Social Studies) p. 58

MAP NO.4

ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS AND PROPOSED PLANNING REGIONS



Source: Hurzar & Grove, Op.cit.

result of restrictions in "the nature of this administrative apparatus"<sup>57</sup>. While the NLC had broadened the technical functions and responsibilities at the regional level, the capacity still appeared to be lacking within the committees. For instance, it has been noted that in the preparation of a national plan with the Ministry of Planning at the apex in Accra:

The regional planning committees are also required to submit plans which reflect an attempt to co-ordinate the programmes of the regional branches of the various ministries. In this exercise, neither the sectoral ministries nor the regional committees are given guidelines as to the amount of resources that might be placed at their disposal, and under the present system financial allocations are made principally to the sectoral ministries.....Thus, although regional planning has been adopted as a policy approach to national development there is no question of the regional plans, properly coordinated by the Ministry of Planning, receiving direct financial support<sup>58</sup>.

In effect, the Committees served simply as a weighing station or transmission post, which certainly was less than what had been stipulated. Opoku-Afriyie sums it up by concluding that their "mandate was weak and blurred. They had no legal status, nor a sufficient budget.....They lacked purposeful direction from the Central Planning Agency"<sup>59</sup>.

In commenting further on the failure of the regional level initiative Harris believes that a major factor has been the lack of adequate qualified staff to meet the envisaged requirements for any form of professional planning function. He confirms that very often mediocre officers were sent to the

---

<sup>57</sup> Interviews by this author with various planning officials indicated that while they were aware of the work of Grove and Huszar, it was viewed as a research activity of the University and was not commissioned by the Government. It was never considered seriously by the Government and thus never implemented.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Opoku-Afriyie, "Regional Development Authority and Rural Development" Greenhill Journal of Administration, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1974) p.31

regions as punishment "Thus, regional posts were not very prestigious, and promotions and advancement usually meant a move to a major urban area"<sup>60</sup>. It was also felt that the formulation of projects at the regional level did not allow for sufficient participation of the people for whom the plans were being made.

The next Government later sought to bolster the regional planning approach by issuing new guidelines in the Five Year Development Plan 1975-80. It stated:

Ghana's planning experience has shown that regional planning has not received the due attention that it deserves in the methodology of national development planning: sector planning has been emphasized, while regional planning has been played down, as if they were two opposing approaches.....Government is dissatisfied with this state of affairs and is determined, during the Plan period, to employ regional planning methods to correct it<sup>61</sup>.

The thrust of this new directive according to the authors of the plan was to try to strengthen the machinery for regional development and reduce disparities between the regions. This led to the introduction of a four tiered system of growth foci based on growth pole techniques at the national and regional level; growth points at the district level, and service centres at the local level. This strategy also did not achieve much impact owing to the intrinsic drawbacks of this strategy as discussed in Chapter 2, and, as earlier indicated, owing to the lack of co-ordination and proper staffing arrangements.

---

<sup>60</sup> G. Harris "Some aspects of Decentralization and the Formulation and Implementation of Agricultural Policy in Ghana" in I. Ofori (ed) Factors of Agricultural Growth in West Africa (Legon, University of Ghana, 1973) p.185

<sup>61</sup> Government of Ghana, Guidelines for the Five Year Development Plan, 1975-80 (Accra, 1975) p.45

#### 4.3.2 Increased Agricultural Production (1969-70) and Operation Feed Yourself

Efforts to increase agricultural production were attempted since the days of Nkrumah, although these were not seen as a specific strategy for rural development at that time. For instance, Nkrumah had established 'State Farms' and an agricultural wing of the "Worker's Brigade". It is understood that for a time there was evidence of an increase in agricultural production and consequently rural incomes for those who were able to participate in these endeavours. However, this dropped rapidly owing to poor cultivation techniques and the "lack of proper marketing management".<sup>62</sup>

It was when the Busia Government came to power in 1969 that the 'Increased Agricultural Production' was emphasized as a specific strategy for rural development. A parallel significant development in April 1969 was the establishment of the Ministry of Rural Development. Busia restructured this into the Ministry of Youth and Rural Development in October, 1969. In spite of the various initiatives taken since 1943, many observers believe that concerted rural development strategies evolved with the Busia Government as it was at this stage that a specific institution was also established to concentrate on rural development.

The idea behind the 'Increased Agricultural' approach was to improve agricultural extension services; organize agricultural co-operatives; provide better machinery, storage and processing facilities, as well as increased credit and marketing. This approach was hindered by some of the drawbacks cited in connection with the Co-operatives movement as discussed in Chapter 3. By and large, the already better-off benefitted more from these initiatives.

---

<sup>62</sup> c.f Ewusi, The Dynamics.... op cit. p. 74

Perhaps more critical, however, was the skewed land tenure system which, as in the case of Kenya, prohibits the impoverished groups from participating fully in the benefits of any increased agricultural production. It is important that this situation be reviewed as it continues to have serious implications as discussed generally in Chapter 3, and as will also be seen below in the cases of Kenya and Tanzania.

Prior to the introduction of cocoa as an export crop towards the end of the nineteenth century, Ghana had a well defined and regulated system for accessibility to land. This was based on the traditional communal system of ownership or use as was common in many African countries. With the introduction of cocoa as a cash crop also emerged an indigenous rural entrepreneurial class which eventually sought to acquire and bring more land into cocoa production. This increased monetization in agriculture requiring private investments, also increased the privatization of land holdings. Over the years this process has led to a very skewed pattern of land distribution in favour of the entrepreneurial group and decreased accessibility for the rural poor<sup>63</sup>.

Table No. 8 gives a breakdown of land distribution as at 1970. We shall also see close similarities between the Ghanaian and Kenyan situation of land holdings - a phenomenon which Tanzania has moved to redress through a communal approach to land holdings.

---

<sup>63</sup> c.f. Kodwo Ewusi The Dynamics of Rural Poverty..... Op. cit. Chapter 5 of this document gives an overall review of the "Patterns of Land Distribution".

TABLE NO. 8

NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF HOLDINGS IN GHANA, 1970<sup>64</sup>

Size of holdings (acres)	Holdings		Holdings (cumulative) %	Land within each group %	Cumulative land area %
	Number	%			
<u>National</u>					
0-1.9	246,100	31	31	3.7	3.7
2.0-3.9	194,200	24	55	9.0	12.7
4.0-5.9	105,200	13	68	8.2	20.9
6.0-7.9	71,800	9	77	7.8	28.7
8.0-9.9	42,100	5	82	5.9	34.6
10.0-14.9	55,000	7	89	10.8	45.4
15.0-19.9	31,600	4	93	8.7	54.7
20.0-29.9	27,200	3	96	10.7	64.8
30.0-49.9	17,900	2	98	11.2	76.0
50 or more	14,100	2	100	24.0	100.0
<u>South</u>					
0-1.9	217,700	35	35	4.0	4.0
2.0-3.9	137,100	22	57	7.9	11.9
4.0-5.9	71,600	11	68	6.9	18.8
6.0-7.9	48,200	8	76	6.5	25.3
8.0-9.9	32,300	5	81	5.6	30.9
10.0-14.9	42,500	7	88	40.3	41.2
15.0-19.9	23,900	4	92	8.1	49.3

<sup>64</sup> The first three columns are derived from the Report on Ghana Sample Census of Agriculture, 1970. The rest are derived by assuming that farm sizes are normally distributed within each class, and farmers with average size of 50 acres or more are estimated as residual.

TABLE NO. 8 (contd)

Size of holdings (acres)	Holdings		Holdings (cumulative) %	Land within each group %	Cumulative land area %
	Number	%			
20.0-29.9	22,600	4	96	11.0	60.3
30.0-49.9	16,400	2	98	12.7	73.0
50 or more	13,000	2	100	27.0	100.0

North

0-1.9	28,400	16	16	2.2	2.2
2.0-3.9	57,100	32	48	13.8	16.0
4.0-5.9	33,600	19	67	13.7	29.7
6.0-7.9	23,600	13	80	13.5	43.2
8.0-9.9	9,800	5	85	7.2	50.4
10.0-14.9	12,500	7	92	12.8	63.2
15.0-19.9	7,700	4	96	11.0	74.2
20.0-29.9	4,600	3	99	9.4	83.6
30.0-49.9	1,500	1.0	100	(4.9	88.5
50 or more	1,100)			(11.5	100.0



It will be seen therefore that the Increased Agricultural Approach stopped short of reaching down to the level of the rural poor who by this time were hovering on the brink of precarious subsistence. This phenomenon in which the Government provided increased incentives and benefits intended to speed up the alleviation of rural poverty and bring the rural poor into the economic development process, which instead was 'intercepted', brings into sharp focus the points raised by Buijs, Schaffer, et.al., about 'Participation' and 'Access' as discussed in Chapter 3. In this particular case, the rural poor were again denied 'Access'.

Furthermore, the Rural Development Fund of 1970 budgeted for support to this approach were limited. A World Bank report points out the inadequacy of fertilizers, transport facilities, marketing arrangements as promised, and extension and research services, etc.<sup>65</sup> An overriding constraint to the expression of good will by this regime, was the faltering economy. McCaskie sums it up as follows:

.....the regime, by means of the Rural Development Fund of 1970, did at least make gestures towards the amelioration of increasing rural impoverishment. None of this, however, could redress the government's most important failure-the economy. On 13 January 1972..... the Busia regime was overthrown....<sup>66</sup>

The new government of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) (also National Redemption Council (NRC)) under Acheampong continued to express concern about rural development and retained the emphasis on increased agricultural production. In this connection they launched the 'Operation Feed Yourself

---

<sup>65</sup> c.f. World Bank, Ghana: Managing the Transition Vol 1. (Washington, 1984) pp. 41-42.

<sup>66</sup> T.C. McCaskie. Op. cit. p. 461.

Programme' which, as in the case of Tanzania, stressed self reliance. The then Commissioner for Labour, Social Welfare and Co-operatives, Lt-Colonel Abgo stated that:

Ghana's programme of Operation Feed Yourself, founded on our national philosophy of 'Self Reliance', is seen by us as a realistic attempt to tackle the problem of Rural Development from the grassroots. It is both an opportunity to learn by action and a challenge to raise the level of living of our rural communities, and thereby the national advance towards progress and prosperity.

In keeping with the the overall decentralization strategy the SMC introduced the Regional Development Corporations in 1972. These were to operate as profit making enterprises, and apart from the few jobs and consumer commodity outlets, there is no evidence that these had any significant impact on alleviating the problems at the 'grassroots level'. They were also expected to work closely with the Regional Planning Committees but the relationship was a rather nebulous one.

More importantly during this regime, however, was the recognition that hitherto the efforts of the government were not reaching the intended beneficiaries. It was therefore proposed that regional planning, as attempted in the previous regime be strengthened. The problem nevertheless was not simply with planning, which, as pointed out above, still resulted in a lack of local participation, but also with regard to the inappropriateness of the institutional arrangements particularly at the various administrative levels. To resolve this bottleneck the government decided that:

.....decentralization was to be taken even beyond the regional level. According to the Guidelines for the Five Year Plan 1975-1980, the

administrative machinery for carrying out the development strategy comprises:-

- i) Regional Councils
- ii) District Councils
- iii) Local Councils
- iv) Town and Village Development Committees

Steps were to be taken to establish planning committees for each of the administrative organs indicated above, as well as to strengthen the staffing position at the national, regional and local planning secretariats.<sup>67</sup>

It is in this connection that the Growth Pole strategies, as mentioned above and as discussed in Chapter 2, were attempted. The Plan intended to "create a number of development centres on towns across the country to serve the agricultural activities in the rural areas", and also "to serve as the new centres for industrial development and thus help raise rural incomes"<sup>68</sup>.

The proposal was to have:

- i. Growth Poles at the national level
- ii. Growth Centres at the regional level
- iii. Growth Points at the District level, and
- iv. Development Service Centres at the local and village level.

The drawbacks of growth pole strategies have already been discussed in Chapter 2. However, Brown cites some very specific reasons why the approaches incorporating administration and planning at the various levels, and the growth pole concept did not work in Ghana. He states that "one serious bottleneck is the lack of adequate development personnel at both the regional and district levels" and therefore it has not been possible for

---

<sup>67</sup> Ewusi. The Dynamics... Op. cit. p. 75

<sup>68</sup> Government of Ghana. Guidelines to the Five Year Development Plan.  
Op.cit.

regional developers to evolve comprehensive development plans for the district and local circles...."<sup>69</sup> Furthermore, he continues, "the successful implementation of the regional planning approach will require new sources of planning data and statistics.... the closer planning is carried to where projects are implemented, the more specific and detailed such planning must be".

In addition, there also appears to be a far broader problem. There is no evidence of the required collaboration between the Town and Country Planning Department; the Ministry of Rural Development; the numerous line ministries which intervened at the sub-national level within their sectoral programmes, and the additional layers of administrative and planning units. To compound this, the economy continued to worsen. Rural Ghana was in far more dire straits than ever before with no signs of improvement. In 1978 Acheampong was deposed.

#### 4.3.3 Integrated Rural Development (IRD)

It is now almost two decades since Ghana has been preaching the virtues of Integrated Rural Development as a possible strategy. When the Ministry of Rural Development was established in April, 1969, it was expected that it would have had a significant role in integrating the rural development interventions.

In October, 1969, the then Head of the Rural Planning Department of the Ministry of Social and Rural Development, Mr. Kojo Twumasi, presented a paper on "Integrated Approach to Rural Development in Ghana" at the Moshi meeting on 'Integrated Approach to Rural Development in Africa'. This paper

---

<sup>69</sup> Brown, Op. cit. p. 44.

had envisaged an innovative approach to rural development as discussed under the IRD section in Chapter 3.

However, for years the various Governments have paid only lip service to the idea and the Ministry which was established primarily with IRD as one of its functions played only a peripheral role in rural development.

In trying to commit Ghanaians to the idea and practice of IRD, Brown advised that some of the positive steps which should be taken are:

- i. Budget and manpower allocations must be based in favour of specific integrated rural development programmes and projects.
- ii. Government incomes and pricing policies must discriminate in favour of the rural areas instead of the urban.
- iii. Policies and incentives must be adopted which favour the transfer of high-level manpower to the rural areas to ensure the realization of the objectives of the decentralization exercise.
- iv. The land tenure system must be revolutionalized so that the rewards of cultivating the land accrue to those who work it, and not to those who claim to own it.
- v. The educational system must be more closely oriented to the needs of the environment and prepare its products for the world of work and not the next cycle of education.<sup>70</sup>

---

<sup>70</sup> C.K. Brown, Op. cit. p. 51.

It is difficult to deny that Ghana has often been at the forefront in the conceptualization of strategies for rural development, but it has been very weak on practice. Very little attention has been paid to the advice of the planners over the years. Thus, the Ministry of Rural Development, once hailed as the last word in rural development in Ghana remains a weak institution. As recently as 1985 the Government decided to embark on a new phase of decentralization and integrated rural development. This approach expects to place more resources at the disposal of the Department of Rural Development which has now been incorporated under Local Government and within the same Ministry with the Town and Country Planning Department. It is too early to tell what these new initiatives will produce, but there is evidence of a new determination.

#### 4.4 TANZANIA: Centralization and Conventionalism

Tanzania's post-independence development plans began in quite a conventional manner as an extension of the colonial techniques. "The initial Three Year Plan, 1961-64 was little more than a Three Year Development Budget, and did not represent or imply that there was any systematic ongoing planning process at that time"<sup>71</sup>.

The Five Year Plan 1964-69 which followed was somewhat better formulated taking into consideration a range of inter-sectoral development issues and establishing long range targets up to 1980. Shortly after the publication of this Plan it became quite evident that it was not achieving the desired objectives and "by early 1965 most planning activities - seen as a

---

<sup>71</sup> E. Bevan Waide "Planning and Annual Planning as an Administrative Process" in Planning in Tanzania: Background to Decentralization (eds) A. H. Rweyemamu and B. U. Mwanasusu (Nairobi, East African Literature Bureau, 1974) p.4

MAP NO.5

TANZANIA



KEY INDICATORS							
Economic indicators	Unit	Period	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Population	million	end-year	17.05	17.93	18.51	19.76	20.41
Product (GDP)	mill Shillings	year	37,583	40,426	45,468	47,853	
Real Change on pr. year	per cent		5.1	3.6	-1.7	3.3	
Exchange Rate	Shillings/US \$	end-year	8 250.2	8 195.0	8 322.2	9 283.3	11 143
International Reserves <sup>1</sup>	US \$m	end-year	68.0	20.3	18.8	4.8	20.7
Money Supply	mill Shillings	end-year	10,315	13,346	15,401	18,323	
Consumer Price Index	1980 = 100		76.8	100.0	125.6	162.0	205.8
Exports (FOB)	US \$m	year	543.50	508.36	553.3	446.5	
Coffee	US \$m	year	147.39	136.55	128.66	129.9	
Cotton	US \$m	year	59.63	43.81		52.5	
Sisal	US \$m	year	31.51	30.07	29.81	23.2	
Imports (FOB)	US \$m	year	956.24	1,093.72	1,054.7	989.1	
Petroleum	US \$m	year	171.87	287.74	305.5	338.9	
Production		year					
Coffee	000 tonnes	year	17	51	61	57	59.8
Cotton	000 tonnes	year	63	50	45	44.6	43.5
Sisal	000 tonnes	year	81	66	74	80	
Cashew Nuts	000 tonnes	year	50	48	41	25	45

<sup>1</sup>Minus Gold <sup>2</sup>CIF

systematic decision-making process - had come to a halt, not to resume until 1966"<sup>72</sup>.

There were several inherent drawbacks in the Plan inspite of its improvement over the previous one. Most significant was that "the economy's investment resources requirement was to be met mainly from foreign sources"<sup>73</sup>. It was observed that seventy-five per cent of the public investment envisaged was to be financed from foreign sources; fourteen percent was to be obtained from local borrowing, and eight per cent from taxation<sup>74</sup>.

By this time Nyerere's inclination towards a socialist mode of development was well known. The scholarship which he displayed, and fervor with which he articulated the cause of justice and liberation in Africa could not help but attract attention of a contentious nature. It is therefore impractical to compare Tanzania's development programme without recognizing its moral stance on a number of national and international issues. It is one of the few instances in which political and economic expediency has given way to idealism and morality in public affairs - certainly, in the eyes of many observers, not a pragmatic start for an impoverished state such as Tanzania. The limited confines of this discussion do not allow for any discourse on the merits or demerits of morality and development policy, nor should any subjective position be implied. The point is that it is virtually impossible to fully understand development initiatives and consequences in Tanzania, or any of the other countries cited here, without an appreciation of their applications, their ideological and moral

---

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> UN International Labour Office, Towards Self-Reliance: Development, Employment and Equity Issues in Tanzania; (Addis Ababa, ILO Office, 1978) p.3

<sup>74</sup> Ibid



inclinations. These aspects have often been overlooked in much of the literature on this subject.

Quite apart from the severe economic constraints which were to evolve, Tanzania, rightly or wrongly, set out on a course which has had some negative repercussions. The initial incident was that with the slant towards socialism, coupled with the early radical rhetoric by proponents for an outright Marxist movement<sup>75</sup>, Tanzania was viewed with some degree of caution by the international community. This has been viewed as inconsistent<sup>76</sup> since the envisaged external aid at that time would have had to come from 'Western' countries which viewed with suspicion any radical tendencies. In fact, in 1967, Nyerere returned home virtually empty handed from an aid seeking trip. He was to ponder this phenomenon and its implications in the months ahead.

When the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence crisis arose, the Organization of African Unity took a stand and challenged Britain on the matter. A resolution was passed calling on African countries to break off diplomatic relations with Britain by December 1965 if the situation was not resolved. Tanzania was the first to take action and sever relations with Britain on 15 December, 1965, and Ghana quickly followed. However, it soon became clear that the other commonwealth countries in Africa were not going

---

75 The early radical clique comprised mainly of the Marxist group from Zanzibar, including Abdul Rahman Mohammed. These elements were eventually 'neutralized' and Nyerere articulated a less radical ideology, which, nevertheless, did not allay the suspicions in many international quarters.

76 Nyerere has always advocated a non-aligned position. During a presentation to the 1965 Commonwealth Conference he elaborated his views in a luncheon address "Relations with the West" included in his collection "Freedom and Socialism" (London, Oxford University Press, 1968)

to honour the resolution<sup>77</sup>.

What is quite interesting about this position, is that Britain had already agreed in principle to provide Tanzania with a Pound Sterling 7.5 million aid package. Nyerere must have known fully well that this aid was vital to his Development Plan. Mazrui has commented that "Some critics in East Africa saw the act as an expensive moral gesture, other critics abroad saw it as an empty moral gesture"<sup>78</sup>.

Then there was the debacle of the East Germany and West Germany affair regarding both having representation in Tanzania as emerged out of the Zanzibar conflict<sup>79</sup>. Some Western donors were against East Germany having representation in Dar. Nyerere did make overtures to West Germany, but to the point that he felt the independence of Tanzania was being compromised he took a stand which led to the refusal of aid.

It soon became very clear that there was going to be a serious problem. The initial Three Year Plan had already faltered and now the First Five Year Plan was experiencing even more complicated constraints. Something was seriously wrong!

The Government sought assistance in diagnosing the interplay of problems which had beset the Plan period, and this was spelt out in the Ross Mission Report<sup>80</sup>. Some of the problems which surfaced are symptomatic of the

---

<sup>77</sup> The only other countries which severed relations with Britain over the Rhodesia affair were Algeria, Congo (Brazzaville), Egypt, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Sudan

<sup>78</sup> Ali M. Mazrui "Socialism as a Mode of International Protest: The Case of Tanzania" in Protest and Power in Black Africa (eds) Robert Rotberg and Ali Mazrui (New York, Oxford University Press, 1970) p. 1146

<sup>79</sup> See Mazrui, *Ibid*

<sup>80</sup> See Report of the British Economic Mission on the Tanzania Five Year Development Plan, December 1965 (unpublished)

drawbacks inherent in many Five Year Plans, as pointed out by Lewis<sup>81</sup> and discussed in Chapter 2. Waide<sup>82</sup> explains further:

.....the First Plan was adopted after much consultation but nevertheless without having reached a consensus with other ministries on major issues. Mainly this was due to lack of time for plan preparation, which meant that the Directorate had to force the pace. Also, several ministries failed altogether to cooperate and financial allocations had to be devised for them by the Planning Ministry. All elements of the Plan were approved at Cabinet level, but not all decisions were regarded as binding.....The Plan was also never elaborated for use by local party or government leaders.

For all practical purposes the Plan was a well articulated document which lacked any real implementation prospects. As also pointed out, it was not addressed to conditions at the local level.

In spite of the constraints it is interesting to note that there was reasonable growth in the Tanzanian economy over the period of the first two Plans as the following Table shows:

---

<sup>81</sup> Arthur Lewis Development Planning, op.cit.

<sup>82</sup> E. Bevan Waide, Op.cit. Note that Waide is referring here to the First Five Year Plan and not the first Plan which was the Three Year Plan.

TABLE NO. 9

GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY 1965-1976\*

YEAR	ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH OF GDP AT 1966 PRICES
1965	2.7
1966	12.8
1967	4.0
1968	5.2
1969	1.8
1970	5.8
1971	4.2
1972	6.7
1973	3.1
1974	2.5
1975*	4.6
1976*	5.2

\* Provisional

Source: National Accounts of Tanzania 1964-72 and Annual Economic Survey 1976-77<sup>83</sup>

The ILO has warned of weaknesses in the statistical analysis, particularly if pre- and post Arusha years are combined, which may give a misleading picture<sup>84</sup>. Nevertheless, most sources indicate that there was a reasonable rate of economic growth over the period which, on the average, compared

<sup>83</sup> As cited in ILO, Towards Self Reliance. op.cit. p.9. Also note that the provisional figures for 1975-76 were not achieved.

<sup>84</sup> Note for instance the sharp difference between 1965-66 and 67 in the Table above.

\* More recent indicators of the economy up to 1985 are given in Chapter 5.

favourably with Kenya. Ghana, on the other hand, had already plunged into a decline compared to Kenya and Tanzania for the same period.

Nyerere knew very early that attention had to be shifted from the National level to the lower levels of the Administration. In this regard there was also a vacuum at the regional level within the framework discussed in Chapter 2 and as was attempted in Ghana as discussed above. In reality, no significant regional planning has emerged in Tanzania although the term is used frequently. Within Tanzania the region is comparable to what Appalraju describes as:

.....an area that falls within an administrative border. Therefore the development of planning aims takes place within the borders of an existing public administration district. This set up has the disadvantage that economic and cultural affinities generally take little account of formal borders.....<sup>85</sup>.

Faced with this lacuna Nyerere launched his celebrated and scholarly treatise - The Arusha Declaration of February, 1967. Nyerere wanted to put his socialist ideology into practice as had already been indicated in some of his earlier speeches and writings<sup>86</sup>. He intended to move directly from the national level to the local level as far as his decentralization initiatives were concerned.

#### 4.5 The Quest for Decentralization and Rural Development: Arusha Declaration

The two main Themes of the Arusha Declaration were 'egalitarianism' and

---

<sup>85</sup> Jaya Appalraju "Regional Planning in Tanzania" (Dar es Salaam, Ardhi Institute, July 1983) (mimeograph)

<sup>86</sup> c.f. J. Nyerere Freedom and Unity (Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1966); and J. Nyerere Socialism and Rural Development, Dar-es-Salaam : Government Printer, 1967). Also see an extensive collection of writings and speeches, 1965-1967, in Freedom and Socialism op.cit.

'self-reliance'. This marks the dawn of a concerted rural development programme in Tanzania. Uma Lele describes it thus:

Ujamaa vijijini, or rural socialism, is Tanzania's unique approach to rural development. As much an ideology as a program, the concept of ujamaa was worked out over a number of years in the writings of Julius Nyerere and crystallized in the now-famous Arusha Declaration of 1967<sup>87</sup>.

The Arusha Declaration cuts across most of the 'bottom-up' theories and strategies discussed in Chapter 3. It is a blueprint for 'bottom-up' planning and self reliant development. In order to analyse its implementation and impact, it would be useful to succinctly describe these objectives as could be gleaned from the Declaration<sup>88</sup>. Basically, the Declaration sought, inter alia:

- (1) - development in accordance with the African traditional system, and increased emphasis on communal agricultural production in well organized villages.
- (2) - national control of the economy and increased self reliance, with a more equitable distribution of goods and services to rural areas.
- (3) - decentralization of government administration and decision making, and greater participation of the rural population in affairs which particularly affected them.

---

<sup>87</sup> Uma Lele The Design of Rural Development op.cit. p.151

<sup>88</sup> The Arusha Declaration was initially published in Swahili and accepted in principle by the National Executive Committee of TANU on 29 January, 1967 as presented by the President. Some modifications were then included and the Declaration published as a Party document. Freedom and Socialism. Chapter 26. op.cit.

This represents a summary of the operative aspects of the Declaration. Nyerere felt that:

We have put too much emphasis on industries.....The mistake we are making is to think that development begins with industries. It is a mistake because we do not have either the necessary finances, or the technical know-how.....even if we could get the necessary assistance, dependence on it could interfere with our policy of socialism<sup>89</sup>.

Nyerere indeed adopted a very noble and unique stance. He displayed a great deal of courage and concern for the rural population and attempted to devise very innovative techniques of effecting rural transformation. The effort commanded world attention in both academic circles, governments and development agencies. As Malecela has indicated Ujamaa in concept "is neither Marxist or Lockesan; it is neither Russian or Chinese; it is neither European nor Asian" but, above all "it is Tanzanian"<sup>90</sup>.

The approaches to be employed included all of those formally presented in Chapter 2 which include : cooperatives and self help; basic needs; participatory planning and development, and agrarian reform, along with an appropriate decentralized administrative and funding mechanism. In concept it was quite comprehensive. No doubt, these ideas also influenced Ghana's 'Operation Feed Yourself' and Self Reliance as cited above.

This Declaration also set the tone for the Second Five Year Plan in view of the obvious constraints of the First Five Year Plan which was being implemented at the time. The Plan was to set the basis for the increasing shift of development initiatives to the people.

---

<sup>89</sup> J. Nyerere Arusha Declaration, 1967

<sup>90</sup> J. S. Malecela "Some Issues of Development Planning", Planning in Tanzania, op.cit. p.19

While the Arusha Declaration represents the hallmark for rural development in Tanzania, it should be kept in mind that attempts in this direction were being made in Southern Tanzania since 1960. According to Brebner and Briggs:

.....pioneer agricultural communities based on communal production were operating in Southern Tanzania during the early 1960s, and the Village Settlement Agency had been established by the Government to sponsor Settlement schemes in underpopulated rural areas<sup>91</sup>.

With the declaration, however, the task at hand was tremendous. The intentions were now spelt out quite clearly. Since 1962 Nyerere had been advocating a policy of villagization. He advised that:

Before we can bring any benefits of modern development to the farmers of Tanganyika, the very first step is to make it possible for them to start living in village communities<sup>92</sup>.

As one report observed, the need to cater simultaneously for 13 million people in the villages alone, to say nothing of the urban poor" was indicative of one conclusion, "success must depend on the villagers themselves"<sup>93</sup>. This meant the satisfaction of "elementary basic needs - the provision of food, water, access roads, primary schools, health centres.....". With villagisation, the government also should have been in a better position to assist people who were living in nucleated settlements.

---

<sup>91</sup> Philip Brebner and John Briggs, "Rural Settlement Planning in Algeria and Tanzania: A comparative Study" Habitat International Vol. 6 No. 5/6 (Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1982) p.621

<sup>92</sup> J. Nyerere, Inauguration Speech, December 1962

<sup>93</sup> ILO Towards Self Reliance, op.cit. p.26



Initially, this effort was left up to the local communities, but its implementation was slow. In many cases there was resistance to the idea of having to relocate. Brebner and Briggs<sup>94</sup> indicate that by 1970 there were only 1,900 villages "which accounted for about 0.5 million peasants". The "authorities" response was to involve themselves more directly, particularly through the Party, in implementing the Ujamaa programme.

The following breakdown shows the growth of villagization over a seven year period.

TABLE NO. 10

GROWTH OF VILLAGIZATION IN TANZANIA

---

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Total Number of Villages/Groups	809	1,956	4,464	5,556	5,628	5,008	6,944
Village Population (Millions)	-	0.53	1.55	1.98	2.02	2.56	9.14
Average Membership per Village/Group	-	272	345	357	360	511	1,260

---

Source: United Republic of Tanzania (1975), Maendeleo ya Vijiji, Dodoma, Prime Minister's Office. Figures against 1975 relate to development villages

---

<sup>94</sup> Op.cit. p.623

Frustrated by the inertia of the programme in 1968, Nyerere urged on the population to "go Ujamaa" and some impetus was observed. By 1972 almost 2 million persons were living in villages but the increase continued to be only gradual.

On another front, at the national level, certain objectives of Ujamaa were being pursued with greater vigour. Nationalization was already taking place but this was rapidly expanded with "the decision in 1970 to take over wholesale trade and the nationalization of the larger rented buildings in 1971". Institutional changes were also rapidly taking place, but owing to the importance of this aspect to this study, it will be singled out later on for more detailed focus.

Nyerere suspected that the programme still was not proceeding according to his liking and various initiatives were taken to speed up the process. In 1967, the Government had also set up a Rural Development Fund<sup>95</sup> and this was expanded quite rapidly in order to provide access to credit and services for the rural population. In 1978, in order to speed up the process of the 'bottom-up' development the Fund was decentralized in accordance with the Presidential Circular 1/68 on the "Decentralization of the Regional Development Fund"<sup>96</sup>. In that same year, President Nyerere also set up the Pratt Commission to review the whole situation regarding decentralization. He felt that Tanzania had inherited an administrative system based on law and order and what was required were "administrative structures to promote

---

<sup>95</sup> See D. B. Jones "Rural and Regional Planning in Tanzania", op.cit. p.73  
<sup>96</sup> See Paul Collins "The Working of Tanzania's Rural Development Fund: A Problem of Decentralization" Planning in Tanzania, op. cit. p.90

development" which were "necessary to have decentralization in order to enable the regions to make decisions quickly, instead of waiting for instructions for Dar es Salaam"<sup>97</sup>. Another move made in 1969 towards decentralization was to give more powers to the Regional Directors of Agriculture to allow them to allocate recurrent funds within certain limits.

Commenting on Tanzania's rural development efforts, John Nellis had this to say:

The programme has not, to date proved overly successful partly due to lack of finance, proper planning and skilled manpower, but also because the programme has failed to meet the basic human problem: the lack of understanding and deep emotional commitment to the schemes on the part of the new settlers. The problem is that the inducement aspects of the Tanzania settler programme - and this applies to rural development in general - have suffered from a materialist bias which appeals to the rural farmer to change his production patterns in return for increased income and goods<sup>98</sup>.

It is not clear what criteria Nellis had set himself for arriving at these conclusions; perhaps they relate to the overall performance of the initial Three Year Plan and the First Five Year Plan. Nevertheless, an interesting comparison is noted by Maeda and Bagachwa. The total agricultural output in Tanzania, including forestry and fishing, increased at "an average annual rate of 3.5%. For the period 1967-72 monetized agriculture output grew at an average annual rate of 2.6%, but then declined sharply to 1.7% for the

---

<sup>97</sup> The Nationalist (Dar es Salaam) 14 June, 1969  
<sup>98</sup> John Nellis, "The Planning of Public Support for Tanzanian Rural Development" Seminar on Rural Development, Syracuse University & University of Dar es Salaam 4-7 April, 1966

period 1973-78. Furthermore, inspite of the recorded sharp decline in agriculture in real growth, subsistence output rose sharply from 2.7% for 1967-72 to 7.4% for the 1973-78 period, perhaps partly due to "Mwongozo" which we shall review shortly.

This is quite the opposite of the past trends in Kenya and Ghana in which monetised agricultural output outstripped subsistence output. The reason for this is the emphasis placed on food crop production after the 1973-74 drought. Table 11 gives an overall tabulation of the trend during 1973-78.

TABLE NO. 11

AGGREGATE OUTPUT TRENDS IN AGRICULTURE 1973-78 : TANZANIA  
(at 1966 Prices)\*

SECTOR	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Monetary Agr. GDP GDP (Shs. Mill.)	3,458	3,315	3,596	3,947	4,244	4,560	4,923
Real Growth (per cent)	0.3	-6.7	3.4	10.0	6.0	-2.9	-2.5
Share in Total GDP	39.2	39.8	37.6	39.2	39.8	40.5	41.6
Subsistence Agr. GDP (Shs. mill.)	1,833	1,799	2,029	2,265	2,452	2,747	3,006
Real Growth (per cent)	1.6	-1.9	12.8	11.7	9.7	10.3	11.0
Per cent Share in Total GDP	20.8	19.9	21.2	22.5	23.0	24.4	25.4
Total Agr. Real Growth	1.0	-4.1	8.5	11.0	8.3	4.6	4.9
TOTAL GDP	8,800	9,020	9,553	10,069	10,663	11,260	11,834

Source: FAO

\* More recent indicators are considered in Chapter 5.

#### 4.5.1 "Mwongozo"

In order to give a jolt to the sluggish development programme and set it on course at a more rapid pace, Nyerere introduced TANU Guidelines "Mwongozo" which were passed by the National Executive Committee of the Party in 1971. Mwongozo was clearly designed to involve the Party more forcefully in the implementation of the rural development programme. Some excerpts are as follows:

The responsibility of the party is to lead the masses, and their various institutions, in the effort to safeguard national independence and to advance the liberation of Africa. The duty of the socialist party is to guide all activities of the masses.....If development is to benefit people, the people must participate in considering, planning and implementing their development plans.....It is not correct for leaders and experts to usurp the people's right to decide on an issue just because they have the expertise<sup>99</sup>.

The Guidelines indicate a clear commitment to self determination - participatory planning and development. However, some reports on what followed do not bear this out, apart from some shortlived increases in subsistence outputs.

In particular, it is the opinion of Hyden that Ujamaa was imposed on the villagers. Therefore, while, as indicated earlier, Tanzania advocated all the principles of 'bottom-up' development as outlined in Chapter 3, Hyden and others bring this into question as far as implementation is concerned.

---

<sup>99</sup> TANU Guidelines, 1971

Hyden, in commenting on the rules governing the transformation of rural Tanzania believes that:

This created a contradiction that has been at the bottom of Tanzania's rural development efforts ever since. On the one hand, it is clear that such laws and regulations are necessary in order to make systematic party and government involvement possible. On the other hand, that move steals the principles of action from the peasantry.....The parameters of action are no longer local but imposed on the rural communities by the authorities<sup>100</sup>.

Hyden also states that: "village egalitarianism in Tanzania has been essentially concerned with ensuring everybody's right to subsistence"<sup>101</sup>, and that "virtually all studies of ujamaa production conclude that productivity on the communal farm was considerably below that of the private farms"<sup>102</sup>.

Furthermore, Lipton cites Sabot as concluding that:

.....the government of Tanzania, for all the sincerity of Mr. Nyerere's rural and egalitarian emphasis, has produced a rural-to-urban income transfer; 35 percent of monetary GNP in 1969-70 was urban, and a still smaller share of government revenue, while 44 percent of the total development budget benefitted urban areas totally or primarily<sup>103</sup>.

Certainly, as a consequence of the low level of production, by 1970 Tanzania was forced to import food at an increasing rate as the following Table shows, cited by Brebner<sup>104</sup>:

---

<sup>100</sup> Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry (London, Heinemann, 1980) Chapter 4

<sup>101</sup> Ibid p.117

<sup>102</sup> Ibid p.119

<sup>103</sup> Michael Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor : Urban Bias in World Development op.cit. p.284

<sup>104</sup> Brebner, op.cit. p.624

TABLE NO. 12

TANZANIA'S FOOD IMPORTS - 1970-76\*

YEAR	VALUE (TShs. million) <sup>22</sup>	PROPORTION OF ALL IMPORTS (%)
1970	64.0	2.8
1971	83.9	3.1
1972	176.0	6.1
1973	129.2	3.7
1974	1,013.3	18.9
1975	1,008.4	17.7
1976	427.7	8.0

Source: Bank of Tanzania, Economic and Operations Report, Dar es Salaam, June 1977

This situation therefore confirms that inspite of the subsistence output growth for 1973-78 as cited by Maeda and Bagachwa<sup>105</sup>, overall agricultural output was in fact declining, and also that the range of subsistence outputs were somewhat inadequate.

<sup>105</sup> Op.cit.

\* These figures are up-dated to 1985 in Chapter 5



#### 4.6 Operational Structures and Procedures

It is very difficult to fault Nyerere for his objectives as outlined in the Arusha Declaration. The TANU Guidelines were timely, but their implication will be discussed more fully in Chapter V. Up to the early 1970s, these were the two major policy directives for rural development. Let us now examine more succinctly the operational structure and what was actually taking place at the various levels.

##### Plan Preparation at the National Level

At the national level there were two main planning activities guiding overall development. These were the Five Year Development Plans and the Annual Plans. Svendsen had predicted that:

The intensification of planning, in particular the formulation of working programmes for lower units, will expose the existing organizational structure to new problems. Not only the financial dimension and the manpower aspects of the decision-making in the structure, but also the evolution of planning will change the actual operation of this structure and perhaps the structure itself<sup>106</sup>.

Svendsen, who was at the time Personal Assistant to the President<sup>107</sup> raised several additional interesting points which are worth examining.

Among many scientists there is a tendency to reduce the importance of general development ideologies to administrative matters, but for the Tanzanian reality, the policies announced and partly implemented in recent years have grown out

---

<sup>106</sup> K. E. Svendsen, "Development Administration and Socialist Strategy: Tanzania After Mwongozo" in *Planning in Tanzania*, op. cit. p.32

<sup>107</sup> He was on leave from his post as Director of the Institute of Development Research, Copenhagen, Denmark.

of such a general strategy and have posed a number of new problems for analysis as well as policy makers.

.....The socialization process has made a more comprehensive planning of the economy.....so far mainly related to Central Government investment decision.....There is already now a need to strengthen enterprise level planning.....to ensure continuous increases in efficiency.

.....The work units consist more of centrally determined assignments for the Ministries than of Ministry determined priorities. All this will, however, change with time<sup>108</sup>.

Suffice it to say at this point that constraints in planning and administration were clearly discernible at the central government level with the anticipation that in time these would be rectified.

### Regional Level

As mentioned above, 'regional' in Tanzania refers to the intermediate level between the central and local level administration. It does not correspond to the intermediate level of planning as contained in the theories of Freedmann, Hirshman, et.al.

According to Jones<sup>109</sup>, "there are no elected bodies at the regional level. There is, in fact, a good case for avoiding elected bodies at this level". This is because "most regions have a predominant tribe, and elected regional administrators might arouse tribal loyalties or rivalries". The senior

---

<sup>108</sup> Svendsen, Op.cit pp.30-31  
<sup>109</sup> D. B. Jones, Op.cit. p.74

"political and government officer" at this level is the Regional Commissioner who is "appointed by the President and is ex-officio, an MP and regional TANU Chairman". The most senior civil servant is the Administrative Secretary. Within this framework, however, the regional heads of Ministries did not come under the regional administration, and the administration at this level has had no control over the ministerial expenditures in their respective regions. At this level there is also a Regional Development Committee comprising representatives of various community bodies; regional officers, TANU, etc. and which meet quarterly to discuss a "wide range of regional affairs".

The regional administration was provided with a Regional Development Fund (RDF) of approximately Shs.30 million per year which represented roughly 4% of the Government's development expenditure. The regional bodies had control over this fund for small scale projects. However, in 1972 the RDF was superceded by a "radical decentralization in which many staff were posted from Dar es Salaam to the regions; budgetary authority was substantially devolved to the regions within limits set by central ministries"<sup>110</sup>.

In effect, there was no meaningful 'regional planning'. There were various references to 'regional development' but not in the context of a plan. It is clear from Lattrell's<sup>111</sup> commentary that regions were considered more in

---

<sup>110</sup> Robert Chambers Managing Rural Development op.cit. p.19

<sup>111</sup> William Lattrell, "Location Planning and Regional Development in Tanzania" Towards Socialist Planning, Op.cit. pp.124-129

terms of economic activities related to commodity production for export. Lattrell also indicates that there was a growing awareness within the Ministry's Planning Unit<sup>112</sup> for "successful comprehensive land use planning". However, this has never appeared to materialize. Regional planning, thus has been largely an administrative exercise.

### Local Level - District

Local government institutional arrangements have been around for a very long time in Tanzania, and indeed in Africa. Hicks states that "by the beginning of 1927 there were 184 superior authorities and 495 inferior authorities, over the thirty five Districts of Tanganyika"<sup>113</sup>. She has given a very detailed analysis of the evolution of local government institutions in the Commonwealth countries and this will not be mentioned in detail here. The assessment at this level will be confined primarily to any unique features of the local government planning and development processes.

According to Jones<sup>114</sup>, the administrative set-up at the district level was quite similar to that of the regional level. "There is a District Development Committee analogous to the Regional Development Committee" he states. There is also an elected District Council which eventually lost its administrative and revenue raising powers. The District Officers of respective ministries reported directly to the Ministry Headquarters in Dar es Salaam. This would again suggest constraints for effective coordination

---

<sup>112</sup> Referring to the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Co-operatives

<sup>113</sup> Ursula Hicks, Development From Below. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961) p.135

<sup>114</sup> Jones, op.cit. pp 75-77

at the local level, since it is also noted that 'plans' were submitted directly to Central Ministries.

During the 1960s the Central Government replaced the provincial and district "generalist administrative officers who headed the provinces and districts with political appointees", removed "all executive and judicial powers from the traditional chiefs" and extended "modern district councils throughout the country"<sup>115</sup>. Mawhood believes that the removal of the chiefs resulted in a lowering of legitimacy, ".....for which party loyalties were a feeblor and less disciplined substitute"<sup>116</sup>. In particular, there was a gap in control at the sub-district level, and this certainly would have presented a drawback for 'Ujamaa'. In general there appeared to be a growing tendency towards alienation of the communities.

With respect to the local level 'bottom-up' approaches discussed in Chapter III, they were alluded to in the policy directives promulgated at the Central Government level, but somewhat muddled at implementation (district level).

The 'community development approach' and extension work in order to improve peasant farming was tried for a time but abandoned. There was far more emphasis on 'cooperatives' and 'Self Help' techniques. The co-operative movement began since 1940 but flourished during the 1960s with much assistance from "the Israelis", according to Hyden<sup>117</sup>, the movement

---

<sup>115</sup> See Philip Mawhood, "The Search for Participation in Tanzania" in Local Government in the Third World (Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1983) Chapter 4

<sup>116</sup> Ibid. p.81

<sup>117</sup> Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa. op.cit. 132-133. Also see Uma Lele op.cit. pp.109-110 and Rweyemamu, Towards Socialist Planning p.108

eventually fell into disrepute with large scale mismanagement and misappropriation of funds by officials. The same thing has been said for co-operatives in Ghana and Kenya. It was originally expected that the cooperatives would have removed the 'middleman' and incorporate the peasants into the money economy. Instead it led in many instances to the development of 'petty-capitalist' farmers and became increasingly tied to the state operatives. This created a conflict between the idea of a co-operative as a communal enterprise or as an agent "responsive to central commands". The result is that primary cooperatives were abolished in 1975 and secondary cooperatives in 1976.

With respect to 'Self Help'. this has been an underlying principle of 'Ujamaa' and has worked to the extent that Ujamaa has been effective - in effect, not very well. It is also very clear that the idea of participatory planning and development has not been very successful either, being closely linked with 'Ujamaa' and 'Mwongozo'. As claimed by Hyden, actions were "no longer local but imposed on the rural communities by the authorities"<sup>118</sup>. It should be kept in mind, however, that there are queries to some of Hyden's conclusions and these will be discussed in Chapter 5. In general, nevertheless, it does appear that there was excessive coercion by the authorities and avenues for participation, contrary to Nyerere's stated wishes, were limited.

Nevertheless, inspite of all these constraints, Tanzania has been widely acclaimed as one of the few countries in Africa which has been able to provide a wide range of basic needs to its population as a direct result of the policies of the government. It would appear that inspite of the critical economic situation, Tanzania has achieved a more egalitarian society within its limited means.

---

<sup>118</sup> Hyden, p.99

#### 4.7 External and Internal Shocks

It should not be assumed that Tanzania's problems are all attributable to her development policies and practices. The external 'shocks' to which the Tanzanian economy has been subjected have often not been adequately highlighted in the literature. In this connection it is important to note that Tanzania has been hard hit by the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 which "added US\$56 million to the oil import bill in 1974"<sup>119</sup>. This was also compounded by the drought of 1974 and subsequent years which placed a further strain on limited foreign exchange resources. The breakup of the East African Community in 1977 meant that Tanzania had to "build and pay for whole new structures of civil aviation, locomotive repair shops, an earth satellite for the telecommunication system and a central service for post and telegraphs. To this could be added the war with Uganda which cost US\$500 million".

#### 4.8 KENYA: A Cautious Start

Kenya's approach to rural development has followed a somewhat different path to Tanzania or Ghana. While Tanzania eventually adopted a 'frontal' approach within the framework of its socialist ideology, and Ghana attempted a variety of piecemeal disjointed approaches since independence, Kenya's concern during the early years was somewhat indirect and in accordance with its own brand of cautious socialism. Kenya's ambivalence during the early years is also similar to the absence of early concerted rural development policies in Ghana. All three countries eventually gave much attention to rural development, but of a somewhat different nature. Succintly, Kenya's

---

<sup>119</sup> World Bank Tanzania : Country Economic Memorandum (August, 1984) p.13

# MAP NO. 6

## KENYA



KEY INDICATORS			Millions US \$				
Economic indicators	Unit	Period	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Population	million	mid year	15.32	16.77	18.35	18.12	18.90
Product (GDP)	Mill shillings	year	45,167	52,511	60,464	68,405	82,206
Real Change of year	per cent		3.8	2.9	-4.9	-1.3	3.6
Exchange Rate	shillings/US \$	end year	7,475.3	7,568.5	10,296.2	10,922.3	13,311.5
International Reserve <sup>1</sup>	US \$m	end year	622.7	538.49	231.10	211.7	376.0
Money Supply	Mill shillings	end year	10,638	12,127	11,106	13,352	22,365
Consumer Price Index	1980 = 100		87.9	100.0	111.8	134.7	150.2
Exports (FOB)	US \$m	year	1,104.4	1,324.8	1,035.0	1,042.9	
Petroleum	US \$m	year	206.8	4,334.7	328.5	273.5	
Coffee	US \$m	year	295.9	291.6	212.9	264.9	
Tea	US \$m	year	168.1	155.9	119.7	142.8	
Imports (FOB)	US \$m	year	1,422.2	1,996.2	1,564.5	1,504.9	
Petroleum	US \$m	year	321.3	498.1	657.6	637.1	
Production							
Coffee	000 tonnes	year	45.60	99.90	97.56	92.04	127.38
Tea	000 tonnes	year	99.31	90.0	90.4	96.0	119.7
Sugar	000 tonnes	year	401	349	308	324	350
Sisal	000 tonnes	year	32	46.9	41.3	46.0	

Source: "South" (South Publications Limited, London, September 1985)



early approach had been guided by highly centralized policies emanating from Central Government, and the intention to develop a vibrant economy before turning to the more begging question of distribution.

This does not imply that events having an impact on rural transformation in Kenya were not taking place at about the time of independence. The point is that 'rural development' did not emerge as a central development issue per se. Rural transformation was encircled, and perhaps, lost, within the land reform issue. 'Land' was the key issue which surfaced in Kenya in relation to the welfare of the masses of the people.

While in Tanzania land was being vested with the people as communal property, Kenya concentrated on the private acquisition of key parcels of land which were hitherto in the possession of the white settlers at the time of independence. Neither Ghana nor Tanzania had experienced the situation of large tracts of the most arable land being in the possession of 'White Settlers' at independence.

#### 4.9 The Critical Issue of Land as a Basis for Development

The re-acquisition and proper utilization of land was in keeping with Kenya's brand of African Socialism which Goldsworthy recaps, according to its chief architect, Mboya:

Socialism meant,.....neither revolution nor a predominance of public ownership. It meant mutual caring, democratic equality of individuals, dispersion of ownership, and 'national' utilization of the factors of production for the general good.....

Mboya recognized and certainly deplored the enormous extent to which Kenya's assets were foreign owned. His 'realistic' answer, in brief, was not nationalization, but Africanization<sup>120</sup>.

Within this context, land was going to be one of the key producers of the wealth to be eventually distributed. Oyugi, in reviewing the situation points out that by "1960 the settlers held one-fourth of the total cultivable land and supplied four-fifths of the agricultural exports and yet they formed only about 0.2 per cent of the population"<sup>121</sup>. According to Oyugi's report it is also understood that the major target of the immediate post-independence period for the land re-acquisition was the 'White Highlands' comprising 3.0 million hectares of land which were reserved for the exclusive use of the Europeans.

The immediate task was to bring this land, at least as much of it as possible, back into African possession. This was gradually arranged and eventually brought about by UK loans and grants which enabled the 'local' purchase of one million acres adjacent to densely populated African areas. "By the middle of 1968 about 32,000 families had been settled in small scale farms. Another 13,300 families were settled under the Squatter Scheme"<sup>122</sup>. Oyugi continues:

While this attempt to solve the problem of the landless Africans was underway, another parallel development was taking place - the acquisition of large scale farms by the rich Africans. This involved about 1200 large scale farms in about 400,000 hectares of land.

---

<sup>120</sup> David Goldsworthy, op.cit. p.253

<sup>121</sup> Walter O. Oyugi, Rural Development Administration: A Kenya Experience (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing, 1981) p.2

<sup>122</sup> Ibid. p.3

Interestingly enough nevertheless, Kenya's land acquisition policy was based on a pre-independence plan promulgated by one R. Swynnerton, after whom the scheme was named. His view was that:

Former government policy will be reserved. Able, energetic or rich Africans will be able to acquire more land, and bad or poor farmers less, creating a landed and landless class. This is a normal step in the evolution of a country<sup>123</sup>.

This perhaps sums up the policy even after independence as can be seen from Oyugi's account and the practice which followed. The situation which prevailed, is corroborated, and elaborated upon by Philip Mbithi. He confirms that by "the time of Independence the modern sector itself was divided into the progressive African farmers, the landless, poor peasants and European large farms and estate owners<sup>124</sup>.

The land acquisition plan sought also to provide some of the peasant farmers with title deeds for their property so that eventually they could obtain capital for improving their agricultural production. Unfortunately, things did not go as the Government might have intended. Both Oyugi<sup>125</sup> and Mbithi<sup>126</sup> attest to the fact that many of the poorer farmers, who probably had far less business acumen in the first place, fell into arrears and had their holdings taken over by wealthier Africans. In effect, therefore, much

---

<sup>123</sup> R. R. Swynnerton, A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya. (Nairobi, Government Printer, 1954) p.10

<sup>124</sup> Philip Mbithi, Rural Sociology and Rural Development: Its Application in Kenya (Nairobi, East African Literature Bureau, 1974) p.131

<sup>125</sup> Oyugi, op.cit. pp6-7

<sup>126</sup> Mbithi, op.cit. p.131

of the Pounds 13 million set aside by the 1966-70 Development Plan for the development of peasant agriculture, would have inadvertently eventually benefitted those who were already better off<sup>127</sup>.

It is difficult to detail this phenomenon as noted by House and Killick who have studied these trends. They state:

In trying to present data on the extent of land transfer and resettlement, the researcher is faced with a near-conspiracy of silence from official statistics. Land has become such a sensitive issue that few figures have been published. An attempt has been made to piece together such information as can be obtained, although it is impossible to vouch for its reliability<sup>128</sup>.

Furthermore, these two researchers have observed that, according to the following Table "inequality has been built into the country's rural economy by forces of nature"<sup>129</sup>.

TABLE NO. 13  
CLASSIFICATION OF LAND AREA BY AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION	AREA ('000 HECTARES)	% OF TOTAL
High potential	6,785	11.9
Medium potential	3,157	5.5
Low potential	42,105	74.0
Unsuitable for Agriculture	4,867	8.6
TOTAL	56,914	100.00

Source: Kenya Statistical Abstract 1978 Table 81<sup>130</sup>

<sup>127</sup> See also Colin T. Leys "Politics in Kenya: The Development of Peasant Society" The British Journal of Politics, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1971

<sup>128</sup> William J. House and Tony Killick "Social Justice and Development Policy in Kenya's Rural Economy" Agrarian Policies and Rural Poverty in Africa (eds) Dharam Ghai and Sumir Radwan (Geneva, International Labour Office, 1983) p.48

<sup>129</sup> Ibid. p.31

<sup>130</sup> As cited by House and Killick, Ibid. p.32

What is most noticeable is that Kenya is not copiously endowed with high potential agricultural land as compared to Ghana, or even Tanzania. High potential land represents just under 12%. Together with 'medium potential' land it represents 19.4%. Bringing more land into useful production would certainly imply more advanced scientific agricultural techniques, using greater inputs of fertilizers, etc. - a further disadvantage to the rural poor involved primarily in 'non-monetised' peasant farming at the subsistence level.

Also contributing to the skewed income structure in Kenya is the land distribution pattern as prevailed up to the middle of the 1970s. In a study undertaken for the Ministry of Finance and Planning between 1974-75 (Integrated Rural Survey), it will be observed that access to land continued to be a problem for the smallholder subsector as the following Table shows.

TABLE NO. 14  
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF HOLDINGS - BY SIZE GROUP

---

Below 0.5 hectares	13.91%)	
0.5 - 0.99	17.92%)	31.83%
1.0 - 1.99	26.99%)	
2.0 - 2.99	15.11%)	73.93%
3.0 - 3.99	8.89	
4.0 - 4.99	7.22	
5.0 - 7.99	6.50	
8.0 hectares and over	3.47	

---

Source: Integrated Rural Survey, Ministry of Finance and Planning, 1977

This study indicates that the average household within the smallholder subsector had access to approximately 2.33 hectares, of which 1.2 to 1.5 hectares were cultivated. It is also seen that about 30% of the holdings are less than one hectare and nearly 75% are less than three hectares. The Study indicates as well, that based on the average household size of 6.97 members, they disposed of an income of about KShs.4000 per year, or KShs.586 per capita. About 40% of the small holdings earned below KShs.2,275 per capita.

As compared to Tanzania and Ghana it is evident that agriculture has contributed significantly to the country's overall economic status since independence. In particular the monetized sector of agricultural production has done quite well, particularly up to 1977,<sup>131</sup> which was the culmination of a boom period for coffee and other cash crops. Therefore, unlike the stagnation of rural production in Tanzania and to some extent in Ghana, which has resulted in a less vibrant economy, Kenya's rural sector has shown very good returns to the economy as the following Table No. 15 indicates.

---

<sup>131</sup> There was a slump in the economy in 1974 and -75 as a result of the recession in the terms of trade but there was a remarkable recovery in 1976, based on improved weather conditions and high coffee on the World Market. GDP rose by 5.1%.

TABLE NO. 15

CONTRIBUTION OF RURAL ACTIVITIES TO THE NATIONAL ECONOMY :  
KENYA, 1976

---

ITEM	PERCENTAGES
1. Total agriculture as % of total GDP factor cost, in current prices	33
2. Monetary agriculture as % of monetary GDP	22
3. Rural employment as % of total employment	83
4. Agricultural employment as % of total employment	64
5. Agricultural surplus as % of total gross national capital formation	89
6. Net contribution of agriculture to import capacity (% of total imports)	57

---

Source: Items 1 to 4: Kenya: Economic Survey 1978 (Nairobi), Table 2.1 Item 5: "Resources transfers between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, 1964-77", in Tony Killick (ed.): Papers on the Kenyan Economy: Performance, problems and policies (Nairobi and London, Heinemann Books, 1982), p.315 Item 6: Kenya: Economic Survey 1979 (Nairobi), Table 6.6 and idem: Economic Survey 1978, Table 4.9

Another very interesting phenomenon in Kenya is that the rural economy is more diversified than in Tanzania, Ghana and most other African countries. Therefore, while agriculture dominates the rural economy, studies have shown that "marketing, distribution, education, government services, food processing, furniture making, tailoring and other trades also contribute significantly"<sup>132</sup>. It is understood that approximately 25% of the rural employment in Kenya involves non-farm activities.

One is also compelled to comment that in comparing the three countries in question, Kenya certainly inherited a far more developed and extensive infrastructure network at the advent of independence. This infrastructure has been expanded upon since independence and Kenya has also demonstrated remarkable gains in bringing more indigenous Africans into the modern economy - industrial, commercial and agricultural. Of course, the extent of local participation in the overall economy is still hotly debated<sup>133</sup>. The point is that Kenyans have participated increasingly in the agricultural sector since independence. Cowen observes:

.....There can be no more serious questioning of the fact that estate agriculture is now predominantly under the ownership of individuals of the indigenous class. Any disputation over the degree of ownership centres upon non-agricultural sectors and, even then, mainly upon the manufacturing sector<sup>134</sup>.

---

<sup>132</sup> Ibid. p.33

<sup>133</sup> c.f. Martin Godfrey "Kenya: African Capitalism or Simple Dependency?" The Struggle for Development: National Strategies in an International Context (eds) M. Bienefeld and M. Godfrey (Chichester, John Wiley and Sons, 1982)

<sup>134</sup> M. Cowen, "The British State and Agrarian Accumulation in Kenya After 1945" (Mimeo) Swansea, 1980.



The expansion of the tourist industry in Kenya has also contributed significantly to the expansion of the infrastructure network traversing the hinterland. In a sense, these tourist facilities have often served as possible 'growth points'.

In retrospect, for whatever reasons, Kenya has achieved one of its main tasks set at independence - the accumulation of wealth. Nevertheless, this has led to marked inequalities as pointed out by observers who claim that the rural population, inspite of the occasional vibrant rural economy, have lagged further and further behind. House and Killick report that:

Kenya has the reputation of having a highly skewed distribution of income, with many of the benefits of post-independence economic growth having been siphoned off by a small, but politically powerful, elite. For example, a World Bank staff member estimated for 1969 that the poorest 40 per cent of Kenya's population receive only 10 per cent of the total income; the richest 10 per cent received 56 per cent; and the top 5 per cent received 44 per cent<sup>135</sup>.

While House and Killick were commenting in 1983, Killick claims to have reported such findings as early as 1976<sup>136</sup>. There are various other reports reaching the same conclusion<sup>137</sup>.

The period under discussion corresponds to the first two development plans up to 1973 - a period of unprecedented growth in Kenya compared to Tanzania and Ghana. For Kenya, this period was:

---

<sup>135</sup> House, op.cit. p.34

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

<sup>137</sup> (a) Livingston Rural Development, Employment and Income in Kenya (Addis Ababa, ILO, 1981)

(b) E. Crawford and E. Thorbecke, Employment, Income Distribution and Basic Needs in Kenya (Ithaca, Cornell University, 1981) for ILO

.....one of remarkable achievement. With sound national economic management both agriculture and industry grew rapidly and during 1964-72 the overall growth rate was a respectable 6.5% per year<sup>138</sup>.

This is further testimony to the inadequacy of the 'Five Year Plan' as a guide for achieving equity or any actual rural transformation. Likewise, as Table No. 12 for Tanzania indicated, a reasonable rate of growth was experienced between 1965 and 1973. Lewis<sup>139</sup> et al. are again proven right in this respect in that economic growth does not necessarily result in development and Kenya's rural poor have been no exception to this rule.

#### 4.10 The Quest for Decentralization: Emergence of the Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP)

In Kenya, like in Tanzania, the intermediate 'regional' level served primarily for administrative functions. This level corresponds to the 'Province', of which there are seven. These regions are governed by Provincial Commissioners who also have within their jurisdiction a number of the forty districts which are headed by District Commissioners.

In spite of the pronouncements of the First Five Year Development Plan 1966-1970 which called for provincial planning officers and plans, the technical capacity at this level has remained relatively weak and has had very little direct impact on rural development. Ghana, as seen earlier, was able to introduce some planning capacity at this level, but like Kenya, in the final analysis the results were less than anticipated. Tanzania, it will be recalled, more or less circumvented this level except for mundane administrative functions.

---

<sup>138</sup> World Bank Kenya Economic Memorandum, 1979 p.i  
<sup>139</sup> A. Lewis, Development Planning, op.cit.

Provincial (or regional) plans have been prepared by the Physical Planning Department of the Ministry of Works in Nairobi, but these do not lend themselves to the kind of disaggregation required for local level actions.

According to Walter Oyugi, the regional authorities set up under the Independence Constitution "had the power to make laws for peace, order and good government of the region or any part thereof"<sup>140</sup>. Oyugi further explains that shortly after independence the Central Government, through the Ministry of Home Affairs effectively curtailed the earlier envisaged decentralization of powers on a regional level - 'Majimbo'. While this level of Government has continued to exist as County Councils, its role and impact on rural development is obscured by its lack of direct involvement with actual grassroots development initiatives.

Kenya's most direct rural development thrust is embodied in the SRDP. This Programme indicates that some Government officials eventually recognized that a more direct strategy had to be adopted for improving the quality of life in rural areas and achieving greater equity in the benefits of economic development. It had become increasingly clear that the 'trickle-down' which had been presumed, was not taking place. As indicated above, many observers from within and outside of Kenya attest to the skewed distribution of income and other benefits in Kenya.

As with the regional administrative level, rural development programmes and projects were highly centralized in Nairobi with minimal participation at

---

<sup>140</sup> Walter Oyugi "Local Government in Kenya : A Case of Institutional Decline" Local Government in the Third World (ed) P. Mawhood (Chichester, John Wiley, 1983) p.118

the local level<sup>141</sup>. In certain respects the initiative is comparable to Tanzania's Ujamaa, or Ghana's decision to establish a Ministry for Rural Development in 1969. What set SRDP apart from the other attempts in Tanzania or Ghana, is that it was also intended to redress the structural administrative constraints to rural development by making Local Government more responsive to the needs of the rural poor. It would also go beyond the administrative aspects down to field projects level, including local participation.

Various reasons have been advanced for the intention of the SRDP. Oyugi implies that its concept was vague and initiated "from outside Kenya"<sup>142</sup>. He speculates that the general concern might have been "with the emerging socio-economic conditions in Kenya and their implications for British interests"<sup>143</sup>. What is interesting to keep in mind about Oyugi's account is that the initiative came from outside Kenya, which then brings into question Government's commitment to the programme.

A somewhat different account given by Chambers is that the initiative grew out of "the widespread concern with the school-leaver problem in the 1960s"<sup>144</sup>. This concern led to a joint University of Nairobi and Government of Kenya conference on education, rural development and employment in 1966. This, according to Chambers, was followed-up by the appointment of an adviser in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development and a further conference in 1968.

---

<sup>141</sup> cf. Robert Chambers, Managing Rural Development, op.cit. pp.20-21 and Uma Lele The Design of Rural Development, op.cit. pp.143-144  
<sup>142</sup> Oyugi, Rural Development Administration, op.cit. p.8  
<sup>143</sup> Ibid.  
<sup>144</sup> Chambers, Managing Rural Development, op.cit. p.20

There is yet another angle to the decentralization issue, which would indicate that the Government had been harbouring some concern for the "participation of all people in the task of nation building as well as the enjoyment of the fruits of progress"<sup>145</sup> as stated in the sessional paper No. 10 of 1965. It is conceivable that these concerns could also have contributed to the ideas resulting in the SRDP.

The SRDP, when it eventually got started, was intended to:

- i. test co-ordination horizontally and vertically in government machinery and the improvement of development - planning and development administration;
- ii. test planning mechanisms and capacity at the district/division level;
- iii. increase the utilization of local resources;
- iv. experiment with project strategies for accelerating rural development;
- v. increase the involvement of local people in all stages of local development;
- vi. design strategies and development prototypes within the SRDP for replication to other areas in Kenya<sup>146</sup>.

The ultimate objectives were:<sup>147</sup>

- i. to increase rural production and productivity of rural resources;
- ii. to increase rural incomes, hence higher standards of living;
- iii. to increase rural employment opportunities and a better rural life.

The underlying principles were:

- i. to carry out the programme within the existing machinery of government;

---

<sup>145</sup> Government of Kenya, African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya. Sessional Paper No. 10 (Nairobi, Government Printer, 1965)

<sup>146</sup> This compilation is based on Mbithi's as contained in Rural Sociology and Rural Development op.cit. p.140

<sup>147</sup> Ibid.

- ii. to utilize existing resources of staff and finance as far as possible and to seek external assistance especially for experiments, innovations, training and equipment;
- iii. to achieve the results which are replicable in other parts of the nation, and;
- iv. to ensure that monitoring and evaluation were to be carried out regularly.

This then was the effort to reverse the hitherto highly centralized approach to rural development. The Programme came under the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP) which in turn established a coordinating body, the National Rural Development Committee (NRDC) in 1969. This Committee comprised of representatives of various government agencies involved in rural development, with interdepartmental cooperation facilitated by a 'linkman' from various ministries.

At the provincial level, Provincial Development Committees (PDC) were established, and at the district level District Development Committees (DDC) in order to facilitate local decision making and participation in the programme. An Area Coordinator was appointed to co-ordinate activities within a particular project area. Within this framework, project proposals were drawn up in accordance with guidelines set out by the NRDC. These plans were in turn scrutinized by the NRDC and then returned to the provincial planning officer for clearance with the PDC or DDC.

The Programme was to be financed by the Government and six donors: Britain, UN/FAO, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United States of America. Part of the contribution was in the form of expatriate staff who dominated the programme.

The SRDP was given high acclaim for its conceptual framework and application in eight districts. It was seen as the long awaited impetus for rural transformation. Indeed, there were very many who were committed to the effort. On the other hand, there were many who were indifferent or outright skeptical - even within the highest ranks of central government. The Programme soon ran into very many structural problems, of which only a summary could be provided here<sup>148</sup>.

In reviewing some of the drawbacks Lele indicates that the NRDC, while established to facilitate cooperation amongst ministries "such cooperation was not easy to achieve"<sup>149</sup>. Moreover, according to her, both the Treasury and the Ministry of Agriculture were ambivalent towards the Programme. It is understood that in 1970 the Treasury actually blocked the release of funds to the Programme inspite of the extensive preparation and discussions which took place at the central government level before the programme was launched.

The Programme thus had to increasingly depend on donor funds and this weakened the original idea of the solicitation of funding through a centralized consortium and instead specific projects were financed directly by individual donors. This broke down the efforts at coordination even further.

Plan preparation was also a problem because the district level officers

---

<sup>148</sup> For a detailed account of the SRDP see:

(a) Oyugi, Rural Development Administration, op.cit. pp.8-14 and pp.148-150.

(b) W. Oyugi "Participation in Planning at the Local Level" in D. Leonard, Rural Administration in Kenya. Nairobi, East African Literature Bureau, 1973

(c) Lele, op.cit. pp.143-150

<sup>149</sup> (d) Chambers Managing Rural Development, op.cit. pp.19-21  
Lele, op.cit. p.145

lacked appropriate training and experience. Participation, as was envisaged in the concept of the Programme, was minimal and in some districts not at all. Many projects were narrowly focused and concentrated mainly on infrastructure. The Programme therefore took a rather myopic view of district development in quite a disjointed and incremental manner, not unlike the scattered attempts of Ghana.

Perhaps a most critical drawback of the effort was that many people for whom the assistance was intended seem not to know what was going on - a further indication that community participation was limited. By and large SRDP has not been a successful endeavour in its totality, but it was able to bring to the fore some of the major issues concerning decentralization and rural development.

#### 4.11 Beyond SRDP

The failure of the SRDP certainly ricocheted up through the higher echelons of the Administration. It became increasingly obvious that there were serious problems in the local level government establishment. By 1971, the Ndegwa Commission of Enquiry was set up to shed some insight on these problems among others. In this connection, the Commission observed that:

Rural development must also mean planned development. This means that the process of planning, both plan-making and plan-implementing, must be extended down to the level of the District, and even into the Division, where the administration comes to grips with local realities. At present this is not really the case. So far, the machinery for planning extends only to the provincial level<sup>150</sup>.

---

<sup>150</sup> Government of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Enquiry p.112



The Commission also reported that the Provincial Administration lacked appropriate technical staff to allow it to perform specialized tasks for development. It called for trained planners at the district level, elaborated planning procedures and the generation of adequate data.

The findings and recommendations of the Commission did result in some cosmetic changes shortly thereafter. For instance, the DDCs were strengthened and the membership expanded to include local Members of Parliament, the heads of County Councils and selected KANU officials.

Major changes to facilitate district level planning were introduced in the Third Five Year Development Plan: 1974-1978. Guidelines and detailed objectives were included resulting in the preparation of approximately 40 district level plans. The Third Five Year Plan stipulated that henceforth:

Responsibility for the preparation of District Development Plans will rest with reorganized District Development Committees.....a District Development Officer, trained in project preparation and development planning, will be posted to each district to coordinate district planning work and the implementation of approved projects.....The District plans formulated by the District Development Committees will be forwarded to the Ministries' headquarters in Nairobi, to the Ministry of Finance and Planning and to respective Provincial Development Committees for comment.....Responsibility for the implementation of district plans will rest on respective operating ministries, who will also ensure that the facilities thus created are properly maintained<sup>151</sup>.

In addition various other steps were taken to strengthen rural planning and development. The Rural Planning Division (RPD) of the Ministry of Finance

---

<sup>151</sup> Government of Kenya, Development Plan 1974-78. (Nairobi, Government Printer)

and Planning proceeded to prepare guidelines for district plans including three main components:

- (a) basic statistical indicators and background information;
- (b) an appraisal of existing conditions and specific deficiencies;
- (c) a description of sectoral issues and programmes for the 1974-78 Plan period.

Furthermore, the Ministry recruited 20 DDOs in conjunction with the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) of the University of Nairobi and assigned them the task of preparing a 'Manual for Rural Planning'. Training of both technical and administrative personnel was stepped up with the assistance of various donor agencies to complement the Government's efforts. Put briefly, these efforts, while demonstrating the growing level of concern and commitment to rural development, did not achieve the expected adequacy of capacity. Mr. Peter Delp, who was an advisor in the RPD commented that the approximately 40 district plans thus prepared:

.....were not plans in the sense of proposing a course of action in light of local resource endowments, identified needs, problems and constraints, and potential opportunities. Furthermore, they were not prepared at the district level but by provincial and headquarters staff<sup>152</sup>.

This clearly indicates that the institutional arrangements and the actual availability of financial and human resources were not addressed. Delp continues:

---

<sup>152</sup> Peter Delp, 'District Planning' (Nairobi, RPD), p.15

.....as for the sectoral programmes, the district plans gave such sketchy descriptions that follow-up on actual implementation was nearly impossible.....The RDF\* projects identified were not so much gap fillers in the ministry programmes, but shopping lists generated by the DDC. During the Plan period, the implementation rate for these projects was slow<sup>153</sup>.

It is understood that below 50% of the projects approved had been completed as of 1976.

#### 4.12 The New District Focus

In spite of the multitude of vicissitudes, Kenya is not daunted in its concerns for achieving a more egalitarian society through dispersed development. In October 1982, President Daniel T. Arap Moi had this to say in an address:

We will henceforth be looking upon each district as the basic operational unit. Harnessing the full impetus of local knowledge and involvement, each district team will become the major force and instrument for the design of rural development.....such a fresh approach should sponsor more rapid and meaningful progress.

To this end the Government officially launched in July 1983 its new strategy for 'District Focus for Rural Development'. These Guidelines were modified in June, 1984, and implementation is in progress. It is still too early to realize any significant results from this renewed initiation, but much could be gleaned from the policy guidelines and intended course of implementation

---

<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

\* RDF - Rural Development Fund established for facilitating support to selected rural projects.

The Guidelines state that:

The responsibility for planning and implementing rural development is being shifted from the headquarters of ministries to the districts. This strategy.....is based on the principle of a complementary relationship between the ministries with their sectoral approach to development, and the districts with their integrated to addressing local needs. Responsibility for the operational aspects of district-specific rural development projects has been delegated to the districts. Responsibility for general policy, and the planning of multi-district and national programmes remains with the ministries. The objective is to broaden the base of rural development and encourage local initiative in order to improve problem identification, resource mobilization, and project implementation<sup>154</sup>.

The salient features are that greater responsibility and participation are to be shifted to the district level. The DDCs will have increased responsibilities for "rural development planning and co-ordination, project implementation, management and development resources."<sup>155</sup> It is now expected that project priorities will be tied more closely to resources for implementation, although it is still not clear how this will be rationalized either at the local level or at central government level. Development funds would still be highly centralized and plans/projects are to be submitted to the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) for funding. However, it appears that once funds are allocated the District Treasury will be responsible for their management. Figure 12 in Chapter 5 will further illustrate the intended relationship between the District Development Committees and the local authorities.

---

<sup>154</sup> Republic of Kenya, District Focus for Rural Development. (Nairobi, Government Printer, 1984) p.1

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

An important aspect of the approach is the intention to strengthen the sectoral technical support to the Districts. In this regard incentives are to be offered to key personnel and certain jobs are to be reclassified upwards. It appears, however, that technical personnel will still be under the jurisdiction of their respective line ministries with headquarters in Nairobi, while the Provincial Development Committee will be responsible for the traditional co-ordinating role.

Recognition has also been given to the need for closer integration of the 'District Focus into Government Administration' and the need for increased training of administrative and technical personnel. The approach certainly contains more cohesive and elaborated guidelines, and the strong backing of the Government should serve it in good stead. However, some aspects are still open to questioning as will be covered in Chapter 5.

#### 4.13 Summary

There is no doubt that Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya, as well as many other developing countries, have realized, in the years since independence, the need for effective rural development programmes and projects. This concern is evidenced by the multitude of attempts and varied approaches discussed above.

There is also ample evidence to deduce that in view of the realization that the urban sector cannot adequately accommodate the need for employment generation and provide a sustained boost to the largely agriculturally oriented economies of these countries, that the commitment to rural development will prevail into the twentieth century.

As can be seen, nevertheless, none of the three cases examined have as yet sprung upon durable strategies and solutions which will bring about the desired goals of rural development and a more equitable distribution of economic advancement.

Indeed, the tasks at hand are herculean and it is good to note that inspite of the drawbacks, the governments and their peoples are not daunted by the continued elusiveness of these aspirations. Still, it is important that these efforts be hastened, as has been seen above, the rural poor are in dire need of some relief from the years of neglect followed by repeatedly thwarted visions of a better life.

In the next Chapter we shall examine more closely the findings regarding some of the bottlenecks and thereafter put forward some proposals which may assist in charting a new course or realligning governments' initiative so that they may be more effective.

## CHAPTER 5

### FINDINGS

#### 5.1 Introductory Statement

At the beginning of this study, the author implied that there is a serious problem of intransigent rural poverty which has been plaguing developing countries, and Africa in particular, inspite of the attention which this phenomenon was supposed to have received from the various governments and assistance agencies. It has been claimed by the author that significant improvements in alleviating the plight of the rural poor have not been evident, and that, in many instances they have lagged further behind even in cases where there has been some evidence of national economic growth.

It has been demonstrated that these countries had inherited a colonial legacy which has been inimical to the aspirations of the indigenous peoples of the continent. It has been shown that the administrative and technical instruments of development inherited at independence were largely of a 'top-down' nature, so designed in order to accommodate the objectives of the colonial leadership. Many of these instruments, it has been pointed out, have been retained, perhaps with slight modifications, to suit specific ideological pastimes. These ideologies have often coloured the development policies of the respective countries.

The author then proceeded to examine some of the alternative 'bottom-up' approaches, which are of relevance in the efforts to eradicate rural poverty. Some of these have also been tried in various African countries, or, in the opinion of the author could be of relevance to this discussion of rural transformation.

The author then proceeded to examine the political ideologies underlying various development initiatives and pointed out that very often these ideologies hinder a pragmatic approach to development strategies, or, in many cases, prevent the leadership from realigning their position in spite of any evidence to the contrary vis-a-vis their faltering programmes. Three rural development perspectives were then reviewed - Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya - in which it has been seen that they all have accepted the need for bottom-up development but have so far not been successful in these efforts.

This Chapter will now examine the findings, either supporting or denying the positions taken by this author regarding the deplorable state of the rural poor; the wanton neglect of rational action in some cases, as well as recurrent problems in others, and from this, begin to evolve possible solutions to these problems which will be distilled in the following Chapter.

## 5.2 Evidence of the Continuing Intransigence of Rural Poverty in Africa

Most of the over 100 officials interviewed in connection with this study, and the literature reviewed attest to the position held by this author that in spite of the verbal commitment and various efforts of respective governments, donors, the persons affected, etc., the situation with rural poverty has perhaps worsened beyond what could have been imagined. Where it has not worsened, it certainly has not progressed at an appreciable pace. Many of the officials cite the 'external shocks' of oil prices, fluctuations in commodity prices, periods of drought, and other unforeseen circumstances for the rather poor performance of their economies, and consequently, of the development process. Indeed, it has to be recognized that these 'external shocks' have adversely affected the 'targets' set in development plans.



However, there is also overwhelming evidence, as will be considered below, to allow one to conclude that much of the rural poverty which still exists could be attributed to misguided policies and strategies, poor institutional arrangements, misallocation of resources, inadequate staffing, etc.

That there is now full recognition that this situation is a continuing and worsening problem is evidenced by the recently concluded U.N. "Special Session on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa". In a preparatory document for that meeting it was generally recognized that for the past 10 years, Africa's population has exceeded its production and that "food self-sufficiency of the continent is no longer assured". Furthermore, "life expectancy, the health of children and adults, literacy rates, the level of technical training and technological standards are the lowest in the world". The assessment also indicates that the importance assigned to small scale farming and in general to the immediate useful productive system has been nearly everywhere neglected. The same preparatory document cited the indifference to rural development efforts as an ongoing problem which requires attention. It notes that:

From the moment that he leaves family self-sufficiency behind to enter the market economy, the peasant-farmer, i.e. the agricultural producer who exploits his own land, has new means and new needs. These needs concern his own life and that of his family, his production and his work. If he is unable to satisfy them, he withdraws into himself. Thus rural development and planning become major pre-conditions for the development of agricultural production, on which they in turn depend<sup>2</sup>.

- 
- 1 United Nations, Preparatory Committee for the Special Session on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa "Contribution by the Chairman", Conference Room Paper No. 1, 27 April, 1986
  - 2 Ibid. p.9

One is apt to think of course that this might very well be a startling new discovery stumbled upon in preparation for the 1986 'critical' discussions. It has been observed from interviews, however, and the literature cited earlier that conclusions of this type have been reached over two decades ago. Indeed, African policy makers and technocrats have themselves repeatedly given recognition to this plight. Therefore, the deliberations of 1986 simply gave wider dramatic coverage of the situation and reconfirmed that it has now reached critical proportions warranting even a special session of the United Nations and pleas for further "external assistance".

#### 5.2.1 Basic Needs and Rural Development: What has Been Achieved?

In discussing rural development in Chapter 1, the author asserted that "development" should manifest itself in the improvements in the welfare of the people - in other words, their basic needs, whether or not, as in the case of Tanzania, 'Basic Needs' is pursued as an intentional development strategy. For instance, Kenya's proclaimed approach was one of increased wealth, and "distribution" - not unlike the early expectations of Ghana. It is against this backdrop that we may now view the extent to which these varied approaches have been meaningful in achieving both economic growth and socio-economic development as could be determined from comparisons in the standard of living of the masses of the people for whom the development, as cited in the Five Year Plans discussed earlier, was intended.

While this study concentrates on Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya, data will be included for a few other African countries so that a wider comparison of these phenomena could be made and the impact of similar strategies discerned.

Generally, what has been found is that no particular strategy has produced very effective results which could be singled out as a good indicator of a possible model which could be pursued. For instance, the economic indicators in Table No. 16 provide evidence that apart from Botswana, only Kenya enjoyed a reasonable level of economic growth between 1970-82. In 1981, the number of people still below the absolute poverty level in Botswana and Kenya stood at 55% as against 60% for Tanzania and 65% for Ethiopia. Urban poverty is far lower in both Kenya and Tanzania with a figure of 10% each. It is very clear that the rural population is in a disadvantaged position generally.

However, the statistics really do not tell us much about the achievements or the quality of life as such. Primary indicators of such achievements could be better obtained from conditions of health, nutrition, education, etc. Looking at the provision of access to water in Table No. 17 it is reported, for instance, that 85% of Kenyans in the urban areas have access to drinking water as compared to 41% in Tanzania and 72% in Ghana\*. In the rural areas nevertheless we observe that Tanzania is ahead with 55%, Ghana 33% and Kenya only 15%. In fact, of the countries cited, except for Botswana, it is only Tanzania which appears to have achieved the most in this area. The situation regarding life expectancy has improved at a comparable rate for these three countries, as it has for many of the other countries as well.

The information on Nutrition as in Table No. 18 does not allow for comparisons throughout. However, for the average index of food production (1974-76 = 100) Tanzania is 94, Kenya 89 and Ghana 77. Both Kenya and Ghana showed equal daily per capita calorie intake as a percentage of requirements

---

\* 'Access' has been used to indicate a distance of less than 400m to a water point.

at 88%, with Tanzania at 83%. In the group Somalia was reported to be the highest with 100%.

In the area of Education shown for the three countries in Table No. 16 it is reported that Tanzania has made significant strides compared to Ghana and Kenya, or for that matter any other country in Africa. UNICEF notes that:

In 1971, the Tanzanian government declared its intention of wiping out illiteracy within five years. With 70% of its population illiterate and its economy languishing among the 15 poorest in the world, this 'literacy revolution' seemed unlikely.

By the end of 1975, the target had not been met. But over 5 million Tanzanians had enrolled in adult classes was down from 70% to 40%. By 1977, it had fallen to 27% and by 1981 to 21%. In other words, the last decade has seen Tanzanians bring down their illiteracy rate by more than 10% a year - the steepest sustained fall in illiteracy ever achieved by any nation<sup>3</sup>.

Tanzania is now reported to have an overall adult literacy level of 85% as compared to under 50% for Kenya and Ghana. The following Map No. 7 gives a global perspective of literacy where it could be seen that inspite of Tanzania's inclusion in the lowest GDP per capita group, it is now in the highest literacy group (67-100 per cent).

Another interesting comparison is with respect to the Growth in Agriculture. In Table No. 20 Kenya and Malawi have recorded reasonable growth rates, and presumably reasonable economic returns. Nevertheless, food production is generally much lower than non-food production. Since the

---

<sup>3</sup> UNICEF. The State of the World's Children, 1985 (Oxford University, New York, 1985) p.48

TABLE NO. 16

ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF GHANA, TANZANIA, KENYA AND  
SEVEN OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES

COUNTRY	GNP PER CAPITA (US\$) 1982	GNP PER CAPITA AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE % 1970-82	RATE OF INFLATION	% OF POPULATION BELOW ABSOLUTE POVERTY LEVEL		% OF CENTRAL GOVT. EXPENDITURE ALLOCATED TO HEALTH/EDUCATION DEFENCE 1981			ODA INFLOW (MILLION US\$ 1982)	ODA AS % OF RECIPRO- CAL GNP 1981	DEBT SERVICE AS A % OF EXPORTS & SERVICES 1970-1982	
				1977 (URBAN)	1981 (RURAL)	HEALTH	EDUCATION	DEFENCE				
Ghana	360	-3.3	39.5	-	-	7.0	22.0	3.7	143	3	5.0	6.8
Tanzania	280	0.6	11.9	10	60	5.5	12.1	11.2	676	13	4.9	5.1
Kenya	390	1.9	10.1	10	55	7.8	20.6	10.7	482	7	5.4	20.3
Botswana	900	6.5	11.5	40	55	-	-	-	101	11	-	-
Ethiopia	140	0.7	4.0	60	65	-	-	-	184	4	11.4	9.5
Malawi	210	2.2	9.5	25	85	5.2	11.1	8.4	121	10	7.1	22.8
Nigeria	860	1.5	14.4	-	-	-	-	-	35	-	4.2	9.5
Somalia	290	0.9	12.6	40	70	-	-	-	136	15	-	6.2
Uganda	230	-4.7	47.4	-	-	4.0	10.9	34.5	131	5	2.7	22.3
Zimbabwe	850	0.5	8.4	-	-	6.9	19.5	19.9	214	3	-	9.2

Source: UNICEF

TABLE NO. 17

HEALTH INDICATORS : GHANA, TANZANIA, KENYA AND SEVEN  
OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES

	% OF POPULATION WITH ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER 1975-1980			% OF ONE-YEAR OLD CHILDRED FULLY IMMUNIZED 1982 (APPROXIMATELY)					% OF PREGNANT WOMEN FULLY IMMUNIZED AGAINST TETANUS	LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (YEARS)	
	TOTAL	URBAN	RURAL	TB	DPT	POLIO	MEASLES	ALL SIX DISEASES	1982 APPROX.	1960	1982
High IMR Countries (60-100) median	46	80	22	56	37	42	42	-	10	46	58
Ghana	47	72	33	-	-	-	-	-	-	43	52
Tanzania	85	41	55	58	56	37	-	-	35	41	51
Kenya	26	85	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	42	53
Botswana	-	98	72	94	82	77	75	62	25	45	54
Ethiopia	4	-	-	10	6	6	7	-	-	36	43
Malawi	41	77	37	86	66	68	65	-	-	36	45
Nigeria	28	68	18	26	24	24	20	-	11	40	48
Somalia	-	60	20	3	2	2	3	-	5	36	43
Uganda	16	90	7	7	3	4	4	-	20	43	52
Zimbabwe	-	-	10	64	38	37	55	-	-	45	55

Source: UNICEF

TABLE NO. 18

NUTRITION : GHANA, TANZANIA, KENYA AND SEVEN OTHER AFRICAN  
COUNTRIES

	% OF INFANTS WITH LOW BIRTH WEIGHT 1979-1981	% OF MOTHERS BREASTFEEDING 1975-1981			% OF CHILDREN UNDER FIVE SUFFERING FROM MID- MODERATE/ SEVERE MAL- NUTRITION 1975-1981	PREVALENCE OF WASTING AGED 12-23 MONTHS % OF AGE GROUP 1975-79	AVERAGE INDEX OF FOOD PRODUCTION PER CAPITA (1974-76=100) 1982	DAILY PER CAPITA CALORIE INTAKE AS % REQUIREMENTS 1981
		3 MONTHS	6 MONTHS	12 MONTHS				
High IMR Countries (60-100) median								
Ghana	-	-	-	-	-	-	77	88
Tanzania	13	-	-	-	43/7	-	94	83
Kenya	18	89	84	44	30/2	8	89	88
Botswana	-	-	-	97	27/-	13	70	-
Ethiopia	13	-	97	95	60/10	-	-	-
Malawi	-	-	-	95	-	-	103	94
Nigeria	18	98	94	90	24/16	-	101	91
Somalia	-	100	100	-	16/-	-	70	100
Uganda	10	85	70	20	15/4	-	90	80
Zimbabwe	15	-	-	88	-	-	75	90

TABLE NO. 19

EDUCATION INDICATORS : GHANA, TANZANIA, AND KENYA

	ADULT LITERACY RATE		PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT RATIO		% OF GRADES ENROLMENT COMPLETING PRIMARY SCHOOL	SECONDARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT RATIO 1980-82	
	1970 M/F	1980 M/F	1960 (Gross) M/F	1980-82 (Gross) M/F	1980-82 (Net) M/F	1975-1982 Male/Female	
Countries (60-100) Median	56/37	69/57	66/44	104/94	77/76	71	36/25
Ghana	45/20	59/37	52/25	77/60	-1-	71	44/27
Tanzania	48/18	80**	33/18	-	73/72	93	-
Kenya	44/19	61/38	64/30	114/94	69/63	44	29/35

Source: Compiled by the Author from UNICEF Data, mainly The State of the World's Children, 1985

\*\* Figure for 1983 in UNICEF's Country Programme Document E/ICEF/1986/P/L.5



1960s food production per capita has declined steadily and most of the countries in Africa have had to resort to increased importation of food at a tremendous cost and certain drain of foreign exchange reserves. Kenya, for instance, while having experienced an increase in overall agricultural production between 1977-1980 has had to steadily import food to the extent of US\$213.5 million (1970-80) and US\$152.9 million (1980-85). Table No. 21 gives a breakdown of growth rates on food production and the subsequent effect of food imports for selected countries.

TABLE NO 20  
GROWTH IN AGRICULTURE FOR GHANA, TANZANIA, KENYA AND 6 AFRICAN COUNTRIES

	AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF VOLUME OF 1969-1971 TO 1977-1979			AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF TOTAL PRODUCTION PER CAPITA 1969-1971 1977-1979		
	FOOD	NON-FOOD	TOTAL	FOOD	NON-FOOD	TOTAL
Ghana	-0.1	-4.5	-0.1	-3.1	-7.5	-3.1
Tanzania	1.9	-0.5	1.4	-1.5	-3.9	-2.0
Kenya	2.9	7.5	4.0	-0.5	4.1	0.6
Botswana	1.1	2.0	1.1	-1.1	-0.2	-1.1
Ethiopia	0.4	1.3	0.4	-1.7	-0.8	-1.7
Malawi	3.1	8.6	4.0	0.3	5.8	1.2
Somalia	0.6	-0.8	0.6	-1.7	-3.1	-1.7
Uganda	1.7	-8.3	-0.5	-1.3	-11.3	-3.5
Zimbabwe	2.6	3.8	2.9	-0.7	0.5	-0.4

Source: World Bank: Extracted from Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan Africa, p.167

TABLE NO. 21

AFRICA : GROWTH RATES OF PER CAPITA FOOD PRODUCTION  
AND LEVELS OF FOOD IMPORTS

COUNTRY	GROWTH OF PER CAPITA FOOD PRODUCTION (%)			LEVELS OF FOOD IMPORTS (MILLIONS OF US\$)			
	1961-70	1971-79	1980-84	1961	1970	1980	1985
Sub-Sahara: Low Income							
Benin	0.2	0.3	0.5	6.4	10.8	95.6	99.1
Burkina Faso	1.9	0.0	-2.1	8.8	11.3	71.8	74.5
Burundi	-0.3	0.0	-3.0	1.2	3.9	29.6	23.6
Central African Republic	0.0	0.0	-1.2	4.7	8.2	22.9	26.4
Chad	-1.9	-0.1	-4.2	5.9	12.6	5.4	-
Ethiopia	2.4	-1.6	-3.9	7.9	16.8	105.9	158.4
Gambia, The	0.02	-5.5	2.7	3.0	5.6	37.5	32.2
Ghana	0.8	-3.5	-0.8	61.4	77.2	131.6	214.7
Guinea	0.5	-1.7	1.2	6.1	9.8	75.0	-
Guinea-Bissau	-1.8	0.1	7.1	2.3	8.1	12.2	-
Kenya	0.1	-1.6	-2.0	40.6	49.7	213.5	152.9
Madagascar	1.5	-0.5	-0.5	17.4	21.2	76.0	80.6
Malawi	0.1	-1.3	-0.7	5.3	16.9	31.8	21.3
Mali	-0.3	-0.8	-1.6	8.3	17.2	70.0	81.8
Mozambique	0.9	-3.6	-3.9	21.2	37.3	114.0	84.0
Niger	-1.7	0.0	-5.7	3.0	8.9	82.0	44.6
Rwanda	2.6	0.4	-1.2	0.3	4.1	43.7	39.7
Sierra Leone	1.2	-1.9	-2.7	15.8	30.3	89.8	75.8
Somalia	0.5	-4.6	-4.1	12.4	16.4	147.3	163.6
Sudan	2.2	0.4	-3.6	41.4	65.3	390.0	202.6
Tanzania	2.6	-0.7	-3.4	31.0	32.4	164.8	100.7
Togo	5.8	-1.3	-3.2	6.4	13.4	86.0	125.1
Uganda	0.7	-1.2	0.7	14.6	21.3	45.0	17.6
Zaire	1.3	-1.5	0.6	27.4	73.4	165.5	146.8
Zimbabwe	2.3	-2.8	-7.9	12.2	10.8	61.9	40.4

Source: Compiled from World Bank and FAO

This would thus support the earlier indication that in general the rural poor who certainly are responsible for the bulk of this overall production for the agricultural economy are not benefitting to a comparative extent either economically or in terms of a reasonable rate of improvement in amenities.

It would appear, that overall Tanzania has achieved the best results in improving the conditions of the rural poor, although economically it trails the lot in many areas. Therefore, if Streeten's predictions are correct about the trade-offs of a "basic needs" approach, Tanzania's strategy should pay off for the next generation of Tanzanians. There are very definite limits to this approach if not accompanied with some degree of economic growth. Latest indications are that most commentators are of the opinion that Tanzania now has to shift its emphasis to techniques which will lift the economy so that consumption of the rural poor could also increase. It is evident that a continued negative economic growth rate has put this basic needs approach in serious jeopardy.

As has been demonstrated, Kenya has certainly had better achievements with respect to economic growth. Nevertheless, amenities and services are of a comparatively high standard in the urban areas, but it has not recorded comparable improvements in the rural areas - a further confirmation that economic growth without appropriate policies does not necessarily bring about dispersed development. The evidence in the preceding Tables in this Chapter confirms Kenya's skewed approach and the criticisms earlier levelled by observers such as Ghai and Radwan.



**GDP PER CAPITA:**




Less than 400    400 - 900

SOURCE: FAO, 1984

## GDP PER CAPITA AND LITERACY 1980

MAP NO. 7



\$1000 and above

34-66 percent 67-100 percent

It is important to keep in mind that the evidence does not necessarily conclude that all the rural poor in Kenya are worse off economically than in Tanzania or other countries in Africa. What it implies is that they should have had greater 'access' to amenities and services provided through the state apparatus. Another dimension, of course, is the quality of these amenities and services. What has been observed is that while the quality of services may be generally higher in Kenya and many of the other countries, they cannot be reached as easily by the rural poor owing to the traditional emphasis on urban sector inputs and the consequent cost to the rural poor. This phenomenon has been stressed by Schaffer et al.<sup>4</sup> in discussing 'access' and 'participation' in Chapter 3.

Ghana appears to have suffered the effects of a faltering economy, compounded as well by a lack of any policy to cushion the rural poor against the fallout of the external and internal shocks. Interestingly enough, some officials claim that the limited amenities now available were provided during the Nkrumah regime. It appears that there has been a lull in any new services installations being provided either in the urban or rural areas.

In general, these findings do not auger well for Africa. Even the best efforts of Tanzania still amount to a sharing of poverty. Where some degree of affluence has occurred it has not been shared equitably between urban and rural areas. These are more or less the two camps in which African countries find themselves, and, as has been stressed, the rural poor have to endure the brunt of these shortcomings.

---

<sup>4</sup> Op.Cit.

### 5.3 Inadequate Analysis and Awareness of the Rural Development Problem

It does not appear that any of the African countries have as yet been able to come to grips with the enormity of the rural development problem. While many regional and district plans were and are still being prepared, the implementation rate of any of these plans has been slow and problematic. Very recent reports indicated that Tanzania now intends to "reorganize" its 8,000 villages<sup>5</sup>. Ghana is just about to embark on a new decentralization programme reconceived in 1985-86, and Kenya's District Focus programme is barely about two years on the books.

Some of the major reasons for this periodic and incremental approach have been inadequate data and information systems; the shortage of skilled manpower, an inappropriate institutional framework which is not conducive to understanding or tackling the problem as a whole, a lack of real commitment in the past, and a general disregard for the knowledge of the poor regarding their needs and capacity to contribute to the development process.

Information is an essential ingredient of any planning operation. While most of the developing countries do have some information which is useful for planning operations at the national level, the lower one gets in the spatial planning hierarchy the more difficult it is to disaggregate the information which may be available at the national level. The manner in which the information is collected in the first place also makes it impossible to disaggregate it for micro-planning operations. For this reason, it is not advocated that plan preparation in the developing countries of Africa should await the compilation of sophisticated information data systems. However, even the basic requirements are often ignored and at the same time very little is being done to address this

---

<sup>5</sup> "Reorganization of Tanzanian Villages" Kenya Standard Newspaper, 22 June, 1986

inadequacy so that in the years ahead the information may be rectified.

There are two types of information requirements which appear to be particularly lacking. One form has to do with information required for the proper analysis of the problem and the subsequent preparation of plans at the sub-national levels as required by the respective government. The other category pertains to the requirement for the monitoring and evaluation of programmes, projects and general operations at the local level. Ewusi<sup>6</sup> has repeatedly cited this situation as a major constraint particularly in the case of Ghana. Likewise, planners in Tanzania have confided to this author that information with respect to the villagization programme was most inadequate.

Information is also lacking for support in the day-to-day operations of the government. As mentioned earlier, the central government authorities have very little information that could guide them in setting spatial development priorities for rural development. Furthermore, if the central government is going to have the final decisions on rural development within the framework of a national development programme, then the criteria governing these decisions should be fairly well known to all parties and this has not been the case, hence the reason plans are often shelved for not meeting criteria which were not known in the first place. At the district level plan preparation and project formulation is also hindered for lack of data. Such information is required at both ends in pursuit of a desired common goal. It has been noted that the Kenyan authorities had recognized these constraints and proposed in 1979 that District Information and Documentation Centres (DIDCs) be established. It is understood that very few of these

---

<sup>6</sup> Ewusi. Planning for the Neglected Rural Poor. Op. cit. (Chapter 6)



have been established and it is again envisaged in the new District Focus programme. The other significant improvement is the 'Household Budget' series issued by the Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics which planners indicate now allow for some disaggregated information.

There also appear to be very few linkages between rural development planning within the context of regional or district plans, and the budgetary requirements of such plans. This does not appear to be the fault of the district level administrators and technocrats, as quite often budget allocations are given only to be curtailed very early during the budget period. As cited in section 4.3.2 this has been a serious constraint of Ghana's sub-national planning efforts. However, the author has found no evidence that planning and budgeting are in accordance with any substantive data analysis, one of the reasons why such plans are never fully subscribed.

Reference has been made to the constraints of administrative personnel at the lower tiers of government. With respect to rural development planning this is only the tip of the iceberg. Rural development requires much more than administrative requirements at lower levels. Technical capacity is what has been found to be most lacking. Yet, very few governments have undertaken the kinds of manpower surveys which will clearly indicate where the most serious bottlenecks are occurring as obstacles to development.

Before proper indicators of manpower requirements could be ascertained, however, the issues pertaining to institutional arrangements and requirements will also have to be tackled. In this regard, a major problem of the general inadequacy of attention to information requirements and manpower inputs is the lack of awareness of the kinds of functions which

should and could be performed at the lower levels of government if the correct signals are to reach the central authorities. This problem has led to a proliferation of institutions and organizational structures which seem to operate on their own orbit without much feedback from the intended beneficiaries of their services. The cumbersome nature of these institutional arrangements, instead of helping the situation, makes an improper use of limited manpower and puts an added strain on the system it was intended to relieve. The problem is particularly serious and is expanded on below.

#### 5.4 Objectives, Policies and Strategies : The Gaps

Clearly defined objectives, policies and strategies are three of the basic prerequisites for effective planning at any level within the national hierarchy. Within the planning nomenclature the term "objective", which is often used interchangeably with "goal", refers to a target oriented end product or "output" which should normally be verifiable, if not also quantifiable. 'Policies' should normally include an array of guidelines and procedures for pursuing the desired objectives or goals. There is often an overlap between 'policies' and 'strategies'. In this connection, however, a clear distinction is to be made in that strategies here will refer moreso to the action oriented pursuits, as opposed to written intentions. In a broader context, however, the strategies are what will eventually define the policies, and not so much what is intended on paper.

These objectives, policies and strategies as basic pre-requisites, should then fit into a planning and implementation system; an interactive framework free of "gaps". The system, as defined by Hall and Fagan, "is a set of

objects together with relationships between the objects and between their attributes"<sup>7</sup>.

Within this context it has been found that many African countries fall far short of having any rationally determined objectives, policies and strategies with respect to rural development. Furthermore there is a glaring absence of any systematic approach to the general development goals even as espoused at the central government level. The case of Tanzania is perhaps the most glaring. Former President Nyerere has been heard on many occasions to lament that his policies were correct but that the problem was with the strategies for implementation. The Kenya Standard Newspaper of 5 February, 1987, reported that the head of the TANU party's ideology department, Kingugne Ngombale-Mwiru admitted that the Arusha policies did not achieve the desired results. He claims that the "failures have not come about because the policy is bad, but because we have not implemented it correctly....." The implication is that "implementation" continues to remain outside the realm of "policy" and this concept has in fact been a problem in Tanzania, in that gaps have been perceived or allowed to the extent that inspite of the experiences over the years, the leadership still envisages a separation of these interactive aspects. As mentioned above, in the final analysis the manner of implementation is in fact an indication of the overall policies and for this a feedback mechanism is important.

This finding could best be demonstrated against the backdrop of Chadwick's schematic description of a "national model of systematic planning" as follows:<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> A. Hall and R. E. Fagan, "Definition of Systems", General Systems : Yearbook of the Society for the Advancement of General Systems Theory Vol. 1 pp. 18-28

<sup>8</sup> George Chadwick, A Systems View of Planning (New York, Pergamon Press, 1971) p. 68

# Problem Finding

Goal formulation



Projection of goals



Evaluation of projection



Evaluation of alternatives



Evaluation of performance



Feedback

System description



System modelling



System projection



System synthesis



System control



Feedback



Within this simplified model, it has been found that most African governments are quite aware of the general problems as outlined in the Introduction to Chapter I of this Thesis, although they have not always been stated in precise terms. In general, the Five Year Economic Development planning discussed in Chapter 2 as a top-down guide to development also often has broadly stated the problems relevant to urban-rural disparities. Also stated in general terms are the overall development targets with an implication that this should trickle down to the rural areas. This myth of an expected trickle down effect has already been queried earlier in Chapter 2.

Suffice it to say that the problems of rural development have been usually well defined. Goal formulation has also been given a fair amount of attention, particularly in the case of Tanzania, but in Ghana and Kenya they were quite broad. Beyond this, the projection of goals, evaluation of alternatives, evaluation of performance etc. is very limited if existent at all. Consequently, systematic feedback is also hindered and thus policies are not adjusted. It is only now, after more than two decades, that Tanzania has agreed to change its agricultural policy which had discouraged large scale farming in favour of small scale units and will now allow a mixture of both which has proved to be more productive in Kenya<sup>9</sup>.

The gaps could further be illustrated by extracting some of the specific statistical indicators and comparing these against the system suggested by Chadwick. Given the stated goals for rural development, one would have expected the projection of these goals and the evaluation of these projections and alternatives to lead to increased allocations of investments

---

<sup>9</sup> cf. Kenya Standard, 22 June, 1986

in these areas, particularly in food production. In spite of this awareness and stated objective, Ghana and Tanzania had annual investments in agriculture of less than 5 per cent of per capita allocation of public expenditure between 1978-82. Kenya was one of the very few countries with an investment in this regard of over 10 percent<sup>10</sup>, still insufficient to result in any significant impact on reducing the food importation bill. This situation occurred in spite of Kenya's stated objectives in the Development Plan 1979-83 and the Sessional Paper on National Food Policy to give "priority to public investment in agriculture, and especially to staple food crops"<sup>11</sup>. The author has reviewed the various Development Plans pertaining to this period up to 1983 and the view earlier expressed in Chapter 2 about the ambiguity of achieving objectives of the Plan are again substantiated. There has been no evidence of significant evaluation of performance and subsequent feedback with respect to the earlier formulated goal. By the time one realizes that the goals are not met, it is much too late and usually time for the next Plan. Again the evidence shows a lack of relationship between stated objectives and what then pursues.

In the countries reviewed the issue as will be discussed later, has remained at the level of general awareness and has not yet progressed to the stage of specific analysis and the formulation of more definitive objectives which are periodically re-analysed. In this regard, African countries could be grouped into two broad groups: (1) those which recognized the problem of rural deprivation and did not tackle it seriously until recently, such as Kenya, Ivory Coast, Zaire, and (2) those which recognized the problem and decided to attack it frontally, albeit without much success, such as

---

<sup>10</sup> UN/FAO Development Strategies for the Rural Poor (Rome, 1984) p. 64

<sup>11</sup> cf. P. Ndegwa et. al. (eds) Development Options for Africa (Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1985) p. 232

Tanzania, Ghana, Malawi, Botswana and Sudan. Furthermore, for the better part of the last two decades Tanzania was the only country in Africa which could have laid claim to this concern and determination to alleviate the problem of rural disparities as a deliberate goal of the Government.

Even so, while no one could deny Tanzania's commitment to rural development, it could be argued that Tanzania lacked any clear cut targets which were to be achieved in this regard. It is generally understood from the famed Arusha Declaration that in the final analysis a socialist state was going to be created; there was to be an absence of exploitation, and, self-reliance and the provision of basic social services for all was a much talked about idea. How these objectives were to be achieved and sustained was perhaps clear in Nyerere's mind but were never properly worked out in detail through to the ultimate conclusion. The old adage that "we must run while others walk" seems apropos in this instance. Nyerere, like in some other cases, was virtually abandoned by his technocrats on the premise that his initiatives amounted to implementation without planning, although it is also possible that these technocrats who were more privileged were against those policies and strategies.

Rondinelli commented that "Nyerere had the general support of important political leaders — but received little cooperation from the bureaucracy"<sup>12</sup>. In the same vein he noted that "Numeiry acted in the Sudan with only a small group of associates within the Sudan Socialist Union", while Kenya's effort was advocated primarily by expatriate advisers and a

---

<sup>12</sup> Dennis A. Rondinelli "Decentralization of Development Administration in East Africa" in Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries. S. Cheena and D. Rondinelli (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1983) p.96

small group of leaders in the central government".

The situation was no different in post Nkrumah Ghana when it was agreed that some attention be paid to rural areas. There too the technocrats felt that there was no clearly synchronized approach to rural development and that it was quite a disjointed affair. This view is shared by Apoku Afriyie who concluded that their "mandate was weak and blurred"<sup>13</sup>. In discussions between this author and Mr. Clend Sowa, one of the architects of the current "decentralization focus" in Ghana, this view was emphasized with an indication that it was this generalization of objectives and insular determination of Nyerere, and some of the other leadership groups which eventually resulted in the realization that what was perhaps envisaged was not in reality being achieved, at least not at the pace and manner in which it was intended. It is now more or less agreed that serious gaps occurred between the "directives" of the President or leadership and the required systematic integrated approach necessary for achieving the intended outputs.

Particularly in the case of Nyerere, he pushed through his well intentioned Ujamaa scheme from conceptualization to action, completely foregoing any detailed analysis and very much underestimating the overall requirements in terms of administration and technical capacity. There has been no evidence of a feedback process or loop resulting from the sort of interactive analyses based on objectives and policies which incorporated the views of the operational level and the intended beneficiaries. Therefore, when the Arusha Declaration ran into resistance at the local level, Nyerere found himself having to reinforce his initiatives and priorities with the "Mwongozo" guidelines which pushed ahead forcefully with the project.

---

<sup>13</sup> Opoku Afriyie, op. cit. p.31



This study has revealed that there are three broad variations of this syndrome of development by "directives" and "decrees" as the following Illustration No 4 indicates.

Illustration (A) shows a situation in which Central Government (sometimes in collaboration with the leadership of sectoral ministries) determine the objectives to be achieved, the policies guiding the path, and the nature and timing of activities to be pursued - the strategies. This is then sometimes passed through a plan preparation stage, then to plan execution leading directly to action/outputs at the local level. In effect a package was handed down in a fairly orderly manner to the intended beneficiaries. Ghana's approach to rural development, it will be recalled, approximated this model for a time. This has been the most common approach adopted by many countries. Additional bottlenecks will be pointed out later during the discussion of institutional drawbacks.

The next scenario - B - shows the political party playing a significant role jointly with the government in the formulation of the objectives and policies. Often it has been difficult to distinguish the two bodies apart. The stages of national plan preparation, and consequently plan execution are bypassed and actions are pursued at the local level. It has often been said that Tanzania fitted into this model in which it was difficult to distinguish between government, Nyerere and the party and that it was also unclear whether the objectives were in the cause of the people, the government or furtherance of the party<sup>14</sup>. Being a one party state, however,

---

<sup>14</sup> cf. Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress, op. cit.

making such a distinction is always quite difficult. The significant drawback to be noted is that there was no rationalization of the intended actions. Both the Arusha Declaration and the TANU Guidelines "Mwongozo" were directives masterminded by Nyerere and endorsed by the party.

The next approach - C - is termed the 'Presidential Directive' syndrome. In this scenario the Prime Minister or President issues a 'directive' which then sends party stalwarts, technocrats and local leaders scampering to effect these directives.

In all three scenarios there is no arrangement for feedback and therefore the objectives, policies and strategies are battered around, misinterpreted, or even ignored. The assumption is that the leadership knows best what is good for the rural people and therefore local views are not considered at the conceptualization stage or thereafter.

Hyden was perhaps quite right in his observation which is shared here in that "political decisions have often ignored economic and financial feasibility considerations in the interest of pursuing a given political objective". He also observed that wherever the policy-making pattern of "we must run while others walk" prevails, "politicization tends to mean giving up managerial autonomy in the interest of an overall national objective"<sup>15</sup>.

On the other hand, while, for instance, Nyerere's objectives were quite well publicized and politicized in his haste to relieve the plight of the people,

---


<sup>15</sup> Hyden. No Shortcuts to Progress, op. cit. p. 101

ILLUSTRATION NO. 4

THREE SCHEMATIC SCENARIOS OF IRRATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Central Government and/or  
Sectoral Ministries

Local Government and  
Beneficiary Groups



in other countries they were often non-existent for many years or vaguely couched. Kenya, for example, it will be recalled, did not make any profound statement on rural development until 1983. Therefore, even though the SRDP was initiated since 1975, it proceeded without a framework of government policies, and, according to many, without any concerted support. It thus follows that with the general lacuna of any realistic objectives, no specific targets as such with the governments' development programme could be set. This has led to difficulty in evaluating progress. Another observation by Chadwick further supports the point:

Criteria imply standards of satisfaction of objectives; objectives imply goals, and goals, enshrine values ..... a problem recognized is a goal implied .... thus the second stage ..... is to formulate criteria for testing the system.

Nevertheless, it must be stressed that in the cases cited above there was no "system" as such. There has been no input-output relationship or analysis. This could be further stressed by a comparison with Mesarovic's expression of a system in mathematical terms as follows:


A set of implicitly defined formal objects  
A set of elementary transformations T  
A set of rules P for forming sequences T  
A set of statements indicating initial forms of  
the formal objects (for use in generating new  
forms of objects)<sup>16</sup>

---


<sup>16</sup> M. D. Mesarovic (ed) "Views on General Systems Theory" in Chadwick, op. cit. p. 38

The illustrations below are adapted from Chadwick<sup>17</sup> to characterise three systems with increasing degrees of complexity:


**ILLUSTRATION NO. 5**  
**SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS**



**ILLUSTRATION NO. 6**  
**A SIMPLE SYSTEM WITH INPUT AND (a) AND OUTPUT (b)**



**ILLUSTRATION NO. 7**  
**A SYSTEM WITH FEEDBACK LOOPS (c)**



17 Chadwick, op. cit. p. 38

Chadwick further explains that in order to specify a system it is thus necessary to determine the "inputs, the outputs, the system phase and a description (model) relating inputs, outputs and system states in time". A demonstration of a simple case of an input-output relationship is where (a) is subjected to a delay in time T before it results in an output (b). This is governed by the linear equation:

$$a(t) = b(t-T)$$

If however, T could somehow be compressed, then the outputs are assumed to be that much closer and attainable.

It will be noted from the foregoing that the basic characteristics include a unit of "input" through a system which then produces a desired "output". This of course is a very simplified schematic illustration of the process. However, it is from the feedback loops that rational policies should emerge and be repeatedly referred. Herein lies the fine distinction between directives and rational policies based on a systematic approach.


As this process evolves, one may find that the continuing interaction leads to an unending interrelationship of objectives (goals) and policies as demonstrated below:



The process in the African countries does not approximate this systematic pattern. Instead there is evidence of a linear pattern which becomes more muddled as it descends the hierarchy from objectives to strategies as in the case of Ujamaa. Strategies, in this context it will be recalled, refer to the actions being put into place in accordance with certain policies to achieve the desired objectives with respect to rural development. They bring into full gear the planners and various other interrelated technocrats, as well as the intended beneficiaries if a bottom-up approach is desirable. We may thus expand this cyclical process in the following manner:

ILLUSTRATION NO. 9

CYCLICAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS



In this figure it should be noted that the objectives now numbered (1) are largely determined based on broad societal goals as may be interpreted by a government elected through a democratic process. The objectives (goals) now numbered (2) should bring into focus the participation of the intended beneficiaries so that the refinement process takes place and feed back in to the number (1) sequenced position at the Top and feed back out again in a continuous cyclical process.

What has been seen is that this cyclical process has not been taking place. The strategies themselves, or lack thereof, are also questionable as the planning system may be weak or also non-existent. This, nonetheless, will be dealt with in a later section. The point being emphasized is that very often the development efforts move from directives to outputs, or at least attempt an output of some sort with these various gaps occurring in between.

In interviews held by this author with various planners in Ghana, some have pointed out that there is some validity in this sometimes irrational approach. The implication is that the situation is so critical that action at any cost is warranted. This really should be determined by the urgency of action required. It is certainly within the prerogative of a country's leadership to "direct" that citizens affected by excessive drought conditions be relocated owing to the exigencies of the situation. Such directives are understandable. However, the directives for forced and precipitated relocation in the case of Ujamaa is questionable particularly in light of the resistance.

The view that action may sometimes be necessary without adequate arrangements is also explained by Hyden<sup>18</sup>. This author will nevertheless strongly recommend that in such instances continuous evaluation and monitoring be instituted.

Conversely, there are also situations in which action is apparently forestalled inspite of overwhelming evidence that urgent action is required. Recall once more the issue of land and problems of food production in Kenya which may be addressed through land reform.

---

<sup>18</sup> Hyden. No. Shortcuts. Op. cit.



It will be further recalled from Chapter 4 that Kenya's early development efforts right after independence focused very much on the issue of land. Furthermore, the importance of land to any rural development initiative has been stressed as a local level requirement in section 3.7 of Chapter 3. Kenya's Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986-Economic Management for Renewed Growth is seen as a well articulated set of policy guidelines. The following is what was said with respect to the critical constraints of land:

In this situation, private owners have a social obligation to put their land to its best use. The sanctity of private land ownership will be respected in Kenya. But it can only operate if private land is used in socially responsible and productive ways. Two misuses of land must be prevented if the strategy of agricultural and economic growth presented in this paper is to be realized. First, despite growing population pressure on the land, there must be limits to the sub-division of small farms. Sub-division should be prevented beyond the point where total returns to land begin to diminish. Second, Kenya cannot feed itself and produce sufficient exports if land is allowed to lie idle or underutilized in large land holdings. Steps must be taken to put underutilized land to more productive use. Government recognizes the sensitivity of land issues. But the economic future will be bleak unless these twin problems are faced and solved<sup>19</sup>.

Exactly what strategies could emerge from such a policy guideline is yet to be seen. The planners, whose task it will be to find alternative solutions for operationalizing this policy will have an extremely difficult task. Interestingly enough, as if predicting the sensitivity of the issue, the document goes on to state that:

---

<sup>19</sup> Government of Kenya Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 on Economic Management for Renewed Growth (Nairobi, Government Printer, 1986) p 89

To correct this situation, Government will appoint a high level commission to review the land tenure laws and practices of the country and to recommend legislation that will bring the law into conformity with Kenya's development needs<sup>20</sup>.

Implicit in this approach is a gap between the policies and the possibility for planning and implementation. Recalling Kenya's critical land situation and the fact that it was one of the central issues in the struggle for independence, it is most noticeable that agrarian reform is still a pending issue. The statistics reviewed earlier indicated that inspite of Kenya's limited per capita increased investment in agriculture as compared to other countries, the food importation bill is staggering and the capacity to feed itself fragile at times. The need for land tenure reform is evident and the policy guidelines reflect this recognition. Notice, nevertheless, that no planning or action in this connection could take place by the planners before this gap is adjoined by the proposed "commission". Commissions in Africa have too often actually impeded action, and even when they sit and issue these guidelines, action still may not be undertaken. We may again recall the 1970 Ndegwa Commission and the fact that many of its recommendations on administrative reform are yet to be implemented, and the knowledge that local government institutional capacity and rural development will be impeded until such reforms are effected. The disjointed institutional relationships are also most noticeable. The District Focus initiative is taking place in the Office of The President which certainly will carry much weight. The rural planning unit on the other hand is in the Ministry of Economic Planning removed from the spatial planning unit. Local government responsibilities are in yet another Ministry.

---

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p. 40

It is also evident that these gaps do not allow for these governments and the technocrats to move from the traditional top-down approach. It is not too difficult to prepare a Five Year Economic Development plan which, as mentioned in Chapter 2, no one will necessarily have to account for once there are shortcomings, as there always are. It is the safest stance from which development could be directed. The lower one gets, the higher the degree of political accountability, and the more politically vulnerable the 'policy makers'\* become. It is therefore not uncommon to find that these policy makers then blame the technocrats when certain "directives" are not implemented. This gap still remains in many instances.

It has been found that one of the contributing factors to this incohesive approach to rural development is the mistrust of rural people's awareness of their needs and willingness or ability to contribute to the development process. In this respect planners and the so called experts have contributed much to this phenomenon, supported by the policy myth that rural people do not know what their needs are and therefore must be told and directed. Again, it represents a safe stance from the masses. Involvement of the masses of rural poor sharpens the focus of the resulting goals for which accountability will one day come into question. There is a constant fear that the limited resources of the government will not be able to respond to the needs, let alone the wants of these masses. The real problem, however, is that planning in turn has failed the people - or planning has totally ignored the people for whom the plans were intended. The authorities are convinced that the various projects (the outputs) are making strides in addressing the needs of the people and bringing them into

---

\* The 'policy maker' in this context refers to the political leadership as opposed to the technical personnel in the sectoral ministries.

the sphere of a "better quality of life". The 'outsiders' have again 'acted upon' their 'subjects'. Chambers has dwelt on this attitude extensively in one of his studies<sup>21</sup>. He points out that the "non-rural outsiders are trapped by core - periphery perception and thinking. Looking outwards and downwards towards the remote and powerless, their vision is blurred"<sup>22</sup>. He further concludes that

The links of modern scientific knowledge with wealth, power and prestige condition outsiders to despise and ignore rural people's own knowledge...<sup>23</sup>. Centralized urban and professional power, knowledge and values have flowed out over and often failed to recognize the knowledge of rural people themselves.<sup>24</sup>

It is this attitude which gradually led the Ujamaa initiative onto the rocks. A similar attitude was found in the attempts made in Ghana and other countries, whereby the 'authorities' were set apart from the rural people and transmitted rays of hope and good intentions, but without considering the realities of the local situation and the desperation for meaningful relief.

Why then, inspite of all the stated commitment, inspite of the experiences which have emerged to date, a gap still remains between the authorities and the intended beneficiaries? Quite apart from the attitudinal biases, many governments seem to have a real fear of being confronted with too many expectations from the rural poor. With proper and meaningful cooperation, however, this fear need not exist.

---

21 Chambers, Rural Development Op-cit.

22 Ibid. p. 141

23 Ibid. p. 75

24 Ibid. p. 82

## 5.5 The Problems of Disorganization at the Sub-National Levels

This author has found that one of the other major obstacles to rural development is the ambiguity which exists at the sub-national levels. The first aspect of this is that at the central government level there appears to be an illusion that decentralization of responsibilities and decision-making is taking place. The other aspect which is closely related to this illusion is that the proliferation of institutions and cumbersome organizational arrangements at the lower levels, which are often confused with 'decentralization', are actually further strangling the intended limited efforts at rural development.

### 5.5.1 Illusions of Decentralization

It is generally recognized that if governments are going to respond more readily to the needs of their rural population they will have to establish a greater presence and solicit the participation of the masses at the sub-national level. In Chapter 3 various bottom-up strategies were discussed including basic needs, community development, integrated rural development, etc.

It has also been stressed in Chapter 3 that "participatory planning and development" has become one of the catch phrases for the 1980s. In keeping with this notion of participation, some governments in Africa now pay some form of allegiance to the idea that the masses of the people should play a more significant role in the affairs of state and more so in the affairs which directly affect them at the lower tiers of the bureaucratic system. These decentralized structures as attempted have instead often placed a stranglehold on the intended beneficiaries, or have impeded progress.

The novel notion of decentralization also has added appeal to African governments because it is the antithesis of the centralized authority of the colonial administration. The mood which has prevailed over the past few decades is that government must be of the people and by the people. This is one of the noblest tenets of democracy. The idea is therefore to have the local government authorities at the provincial and district levels play a more pivotal role in the development process in accordance with some decision making authority and control over resources at the lower tiers.

Discussions with government officials responsible for or involved in the decentralization programme in many of the African countries indicate that there is no common interpretation of what constitutes decentralization. There is no single pattern to the various claims and the precise objectives of these individual efforts are not always clearly defined.

Mawhood describes decentralization as the sharing of part of the governmental power by a central ruling group with other groups, each having authority within a specific area of the state<sup>25</sup>. On the other hand, "decentralization" implies the sharing of power between members of the same ruling group having authority respectively in different areas of the state". In this regard a decentralized local body should thus have:

Characteristics	Typical signs
(1) Its own budget...	Balanced estimates of revenue and expenditure. A separate bank account, with the cheque-book held by an employee of the local authority (not a central civil servant).

---

<sup>25</sup> Philip Mawhood, "Decentralization: The Concept and Practice" in Local Government and the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa ed. P. Mawhood (Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1983) p.4.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| (2) A separate legal existence...                      | Corporate status, often with a common seal. Power to sue and be sued. Power to hold land and property as its own (not the government's).  |
| (3) The authority to allocate substantial resources... | Quantity of finance handled. Number and qualifications of the staff employed. Power to decide over expenditure. Power to vary revenues. Decisions over the staff-appointments, promotion, discipline. |
| (4) A range of different functions...                  | The functions can vary widely, but a single-purpose local body is not 'local government'.   |
| (5) The decisions being made by representatives        | Different forms of election or appointment may serve, provided that people feel the policy-making body is really representative of them.  |

Another authority on this subject, Wolfers<sup>26</sup>, has argued for more finely tuned distinctions within decentralization. He sees decentralization in two ways: (1) "by devolution to a political body, such as a sub-national legislature (political decentralization)," and (2) by deconcentration to an appointed official or a group of officials in the field (administrative decentralization).

Other authorities have put forward slight variations of the above characteristics. Nonetheless, the two major distinct features are the form in which there is a decongestion of administrative functions from the centre to the sub-national levels, and the other in which there is an actual devolution of authority and responsibility for the sharing of power and decision making. Some elements which seem to be overshadowed in theory and in practice are also the technical inputs required to facilitate the sort of decentralization which shifts the emphasis from administrative

---

<sup>26</sup> Edward Wolfers, Decentralization in the South Pacific (University of the South Pacific, 1985) p. 9

decentralization or decongestion, to the establishment of a broader development oriented capacity. While most of the governments have seen decentralization as traditionally pertaining to administration in the conventional sense, this author also believes that in developing countries the technical aspects are essential features which are somewhat ignored.

Contrary to what has been claimed by various observers and the respective governments about continuing efforts and achievements in "decentralization" which it is envisaged will foster a variety of bottom-up approaches to rural development, this author has found that much of what has been claimed is illusory, although perhaps indications of well intentioned aspirations.

Much has already been explained in the foregoing sections about the colonial authorities' myopic view of decentralization or "local government" as it was commonly referred to during that period. To recap briefly, the colonial authorities decentralized only in so far as they needed an outposted administrative presence to facilitate their objectives of exploitation. Development was therefore seen as any intervention which was compatible with the narrow objectives of the colonial government. The system which prevailed thus approximated a decongestion of administration as opposed to real decentralization or devolution of authority. The functions which were decongested ranged from the maintenance of law and order to tax collection and some basic infrastructure works. Most reports indicate that the system functioned reasonably well for the purposes for which it was intended then.

In Africa no significant attempts have been made to change this structure or arrangements except to some extent in Nigeria which now has a federal system of government. The general practice has been to adopt the structures left by the colonial authorities and try to make them responsive to the aspirations of the independent state and local development needs. The



decentralization focus in Zimbabwe has so far failed to alter the institutional arrangements. Kenya's District Focus is in accordance with the existing hierarchy. Tanzania, while maintaining the hierarchy, did attempt to transfer some additional authority to the lower level. It is only Ghana which now proposes a radical departure from the previous arrangements as we shall see below.

It has been observed, contrary to what is usually claimed, that since independence some governments have deliberately eroded even the little administrative authority which was established at the sub-national levels, and therefore instead of an expansion of functions in support of dispersed development, there has been a reduction, or at least stagnation. While the provincial and district level offices were left in place, power was increasingly centralized, in some cases moreso than during earlier times.

This phenomenon was clearly evident during the Kenyatta era in Kenya in which central government kept very tight reigns on the possible operations of sub-national bodies. In fact, as cited in Chapter 4, Oyugi explained that through the Ministry of Home Affairs the powers of the regional level administration were actually curtailed<sup>27</sup>. Nyerere on the other hand did not overtly curtail the functions of the sub-national authorities on paper as such, but he did bypass them on occasions as reported earlier. At the same time, it was observed that the respective political party representation for KANU and TANU was growing in strength and stature, albeit with decision making power still centralized. The same pattern has been evident in Ghana, where it will be recalled that Nkrumah was alleged to have

---

<sup>27</sup> Walter Oyugi "Local Government in Kenya : A Case of Institutional Decline" op. cit. p.118

increasingly concentrated power in his own hands, which contributed to his demise.

The long standing apprehension about vesting too much authority away from the central government leadership is still quite evident. However, there has been much disenchantment by both the leadership and the people with the earlier tendency towards stricter controls and continued centralization. Mawhood commented that:

Discontent with the results of this arrangement, and a new belief in the value of participation and rural development, led - from 1967 in Tanzania and Ghana, later in other countries - to experiments with mixed authorities. This was a cautious swing away from centralization, but left the ultimate power locally with 'deconcentrated' officials<sup>28</sup>.

Very little concrete evidence has been found by this author to support Mawhood's implications. Indeed, there is some evidence of the local authorities being vested with some decision making powers, but these have largely been through parallel proxy arrangements with the extended arm of the "party". Even so, owing to the strict hierarchical arrangements of the political party structure, it is very unlikely that much decision making authority could be vested away from the central executive body. Such is the nature of the political machinery. This implication by Mawhood and others attest to the indistinguishable relationship between "the party" and the government. In Kenya the authorities have clearly stated that the Party is paramount in relation to the Government. Edward Giradet in an article in the 21 March, 1986 Christian Science Monitor sarcastically stated that "Tanzanians doubt 'former' leader Nyerere will bring reform". The same

---

<sup>28</sup> Mawhood, op.cit. p. 8

Monitor also quotes a Tanzanian businessman as explaining that "in this country, the party is the real government. Nyerere might have stepped down as President, but the landlord has not changed".

Since, nevertheless, most of these countries have evolved a one party system, the nature of the relationship itself is immaterial. What is of importance is the nature of that which is devolved or decentralized. There appears to be a misguided belief that the devolution of political authority, if indeed this has been the case, is synonymous with the decentralization of administrative authority and developmental capacity. To admit to this is the final submission that "the party" has totally co-opted the government and thereby brings into question the entire democratic process, even to the extent that such is possible in Marxist leaning camps, such as Mozambique. Furthermore, politics by its very nature is already a decentralized affair in a democracy. Representation is anticipated through the electoral process, within the various levels of the legislature. One should therefore be careful not to equate the apparent expansion of the party apparatus at the sub-national level with what is envisaged of "decentralization".

The situation which prevailed with Ujamaa in Tanzania is perhaps a most glaring example. It is common knowledge that what was being billed as decentralization in fact resulted in a tightening of the controls and the imposition of ideas strongly held by Nyerere and endorsed by the Party. Ujamaa, it will be remembered, was intended to be the centrepiece of decentralization in Tanzania, and also in Africa. The policy was to provide the people with a greater say and general participation in what was going to happen at the local level. One international group of experts which met in 1977 to discuss rural development had already concluded that,

"Decentralization in Tanzania did not give power to the people" and that similarly "villagization did not give people the structure of collective responsibility to accelerate their development"<sup>29</sup>. There is a further interesting conflict in the events of the Tanzanian decentralization effort which is perhaps indicative of the illusions which prevail. While Ujamaa was introduced through the Arusha Declaration of 1967, "decentralizing the administration" did not take place until 1972. The intention was to reduce the authority of the sectoral ministries, grant TANU broader powers to implement its policies, and also to give the Prime Minister's office an important role in coordinating the overall Ujamaa strategy<sup>30</sup>.

Recent interviews by this author indicate that there is still a lingering resentment to 'Ujamaa' and the claims of its noble objectives as well as to Nyerere whose intentions were found to be most sincere, but moreso to the manner in which the whole scheme was forced upon the people. It has been found that 'Ujamaa' was not really planned in the sense that there was some type of structure plan of integrated elements. Had Tanzania taken the time to plan for 'Ujamaa' many of the pitfalls might have been avoided. Had the people really been able to participate, and had their views been taken into consideration, many of the causes of the resentment could have been eliminated. The following quote from the 22 June, 1986 Kenya Standard is very apt. It states: A directive has been issued that Tanzania's 8000 villages which were developed under the 1975 villagization programme should now be replanned to guarantee the peasants of land ownership as a means of accelerating agriculture and livestock development.

---

<sup>29</sup> United Nations, FAO. Report on the FAO/SIDA Expert Consultation on Policies and Institutions for Integrated Rural Development (Rome, FAO, 1977) p.7.

<sup>30</sup> cf. Uma Lele, The Design of Rural Development, op.cit. p.152

An examination of the technical capacity which existed in Tanzania at the time indicates that even if Nyerere wanted to take the time to effect Ujamaa through meaningful decentralization it would have been most difficult, if not impossible. Best estimates would have been a twenty year time horizon of gradual development before significant results could have been achieved. Therefore, even after Tanzania 'decentralized' its administration it did not help, resources and decisions were still controlled at the top. The glaring point is that a more rational planned approach is now being proposed more than a decade after the fact.

The officials delegated to the sub-national level also in most instances lacked the necessary means to perform their functions. Much the same problem has occurred in Ghana whereby inspite of some redistribution of administrative capacity at the lower levels not much had been achieved. Officials repeatedly complain of not having petrol and transport; lack of office space; inadequate accommodation, etc. Extension officers often complain of lack of the subsistence allowances promised to them. The grievances seem to be common throughout. Therefore, even as Ghana attempts a new radical approach to decentralization, one wonders how these problems will be dealt with.

The cost of effecting a systematic decentralization programme has been grossly underestimated by the various governments. This therefore raises the question of to what extent could developing countries afford decentralization, and how rapidly it could be implemented?. To what level and at what pace could they decentralize given certain limited resources and personnel? This will be discussed further in Chapter 6 with specific proposals.

A major problem to date is that the earlier leadership in many countries eroded the structure of local government to the extent that even the revenue collection aspects left in place by the colonial authorities have been affected. Decentralization has thus become an increased burden on the central government revenue and this has been a most critical drawback. Local government has become a welfare case and burdening this structure with outposted administrative officers in the name of decentralization has been a far fetched idea which has not produced effective results. Quite apart from the customary reluctance of the central ministries to devolve any of their authority or resources is the added dimension of its inability to meet the demands.

Another good example is Zimbabwe's programme of decentralization which calls for the preparation of a development plan for each district. This is certainly an improved approach on Tanzania's rushed unplanned approach. However, the preparation of 55 district plans and perhaps village level plans is no easy task to be achieved only with the decongestion of administrative personnel from the centre, or even with the devolution of more decision making authority if this should come about. Ghana at one time had 160 districts before these were reduced to 47. Harris observed that these were placed under the control of a District Administrative Officer who was "a generalist drawn from the elite administrative class of the civil service" and noted that neither the regional nor district tier "had been active in policy matters, generally they performed a loose and often casual form of co-ordination", and "furthermore, essentially existed as centres of party organization and political patronage"<sup>31</sup>.

---

<sup>31</sup> David Harris, "Central Power and Local Reform: Ghana during the 1970s" in Mawhood, Local Government.... op.cit. p. 201

Under these circumstances it is not difficult to understand why district and regional plans amount to large shopping lists for central government. Without proper planning, including the participation of the people for whom these plans are being prepared, it is virtually impossible to decentralize and share decision making power as there is no rational basis for making the decision and sharing such powers. The majority of the African countries have not begun to seriously tackle the information vacuum and acute shortage of technical capacity and other resources required to make decentralization meaningful.

Ghana, which was one of the earliest English speaking African countries to provide training for planners was able for a very brief time to provide some technical capacity at the lower tiers before the massive brain drain from which it has not yet recovered. But assuming however that some capacity were in place, it is inconceivable to imagine what the central government could do with approximately fifty plans reaching the central authorities. What emerges is not decentralization as one would like to see it, but rather a form of limited deconcentration in which hopes and aspirations are raised, and the perceived benefits are not achieved.

Another apparent misconception about decentralization is that it must be an end in itself for meeting the needs of the people at the lower scale of the social hierarchy. No government can, or should even try to address all the interests and needs of the masses. The main role in this regard should be to help these people to help themselves and not to direct their every pursuit. Particularly in a developing state the governments' role could at best be catalytic. There is a juncture at which either end of this spectrum should meet and this has not as yet been determined by any of the governments and therefore, while the notion of decentralization enjoys the

spotlight, and is indeed desirable, the evidence of it in practice remains much of an illusion.

### 5.5.2 Institutional Proliferation and the Bureaucratic Strangulation of Rural Development

In section 1.2 of Chapter 1, it was mentioned that the colonial authorities, particularly the British, developed a quite appropriate system of national and subnational institutional arrangements to service their own short sighted objectives of the exploitation of new materials and labour in their own interest.

It has also been found that three decades after independence very little substantive changes have taken place with respect to the relative functions and appropriateness of these arrangements, except that there has been a proliferation of bodies, all with a decreasing degree of administrative capacity, or, conversely, assigned responsibilities beyond their means, and also lacking technical competence.

Many observers who have examined this situation are somewhat amazed that since independence these colonial arrangements have "shown a remarkable resilience" and that "in most African countries as well systems which applied to the colonial era have been adapted incongruously to requirements of an age of modern economic and technological development"<sup>32</sup>.

The British system of institutional arrangements within the national hierarchy was of necessity a rigid top-down structure beginning in London and descending to the lowest levels where resources were to be exploited,

---

<sup>32</sup> Keith Griffin and Jeffery James, The Transition to Egalitarian Development (New York, St. Martins Press, 1981) p. 59



taxes collected or law and order maintained<sup>33</sup>. There was no question of the cyclical process as discussed. One obvious reason for the absence of this cyclical process was because the local institutional structures were not development oriented. Social and economic development for the benefit of the local population was not an objective of these institutional arrangements. However, with the advent of independence everyone professed this to be an objective. Shouts of self determination were to be heard everywhere. There is no doubt that these ideas of self determination by the nationalists were well meaning at the time. Nonetheless, self determination has not been a reality with the masses primarily because these countries have not been able, or have been unwilling, to radically reorganize the old arrangements to suit the current needs. In spite of all the rhetoric, the abundance of institutions and functions are within the structure left in place at the time of independence. The institutions, groups, etc. are ill equipped to foster development in a manner which incorporates the wishes and participation of the people as has been pointed out above.

It has been evident that the functions relative to the maintenance of law and order and basic infrastructure development works during the colonial era and the independence era are vastly different, particularly if local participation and contribution are envisaged.


The chart below partially illustrates the disparities which exist and continue to be a serious problem requiring urgent attention. The upper box -A- shows the range of "Traditional Administrative Functions" at the district level during the colonial era. These were usually administered by a District Administrator (Officer) or Town Clerk with a few supporting

---

<sup>33</sup> See description of these functions given by Ursula Hicks, op. cit. Chapter 3

ILLUSTRATION NO. 10

A HYPOTHETICAL COMPARISON BETWEEN  
TRADITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS AND ADDED DEVELOPMENT  
FUNCTIONS AND REQUIRED INPUTS AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL



officers. It is because of the largely administrative functions that the term "local administration" has been used in a literal sense.

Since independence these required functions have been greatly expanded into what may be called added "development functions" at the district level. Quite apart from the traditional limited administrative functions, the administrative requirements of these development functions have also expanded greatly. Most of the countries considered have generally been able to cope with the increased administrative requirements which could be attributed to the experience of the system and framework left in place since independence. However, none of the local government authorities have been able to cope with the added development functions and required inputs expected at the district/local level, and investigations by this author have indicated that they have not been paying much attention to this long standing bottleneck. Therefore, while we will observe that there has been a proliferation of institutions or bodies at the sub-national level, their areas of responsibility and usual competence relate to those indicated at 'A' on the Illustration, while those at 'B' require significant attention. This phenomenon will be elaborated upon in Chapter 6 with specific recommendations.

In keeping with the notion of decentralization and the requirement that plans be prepared for each district, this invariably falls under the responsibility of the regional or district authorities. In some cases district level plans have been prepared utilizing the technical capacity at the national level and handed down to the district authorities. This approach has met with repeated criticisms and has been largely discontinued. The alternative is the preparation of an average of fifty to

sixty district plans by the district authorities by the district authorities which are then to be considered and decided upon at the higher government levels. The efforts to date have shown that this approach has not worked for various reasons. Zimbabwe and Kenya are still pursuing this approach of multiple district plans coming up through the hierarchy to the apex for consideration and approval.

Firstly, in spite of the assigned coordinating responsibility of the district level leadership, there is very little cooperation from the sectoral ministries. Interviews by this author with District Officers (DOs) confirm that they continue to have problems influencing the interventions of the sectoral ministries even when an approved plan already exists. The DOs complain that the extension officers of the line ministries often ignore the plan, particularly since its implementation often depends mainly on financial resources still under the control of the respective ministries. Only Ghana has so far proposed to place the control of the extension services resources of the Ministries under the control of the district authorities.

Furthermore, the plans are very poorly and hastily prepared because the provincial and district levels lack technical personnel as will be stressed further below. In cases where technical personnel operate at the sub-national levels this author observed that in Zimbabwe and Ghana, they still largely ignore decisions taken at the level at which they are expected to operate. An examination of the plans prepared also confirmed to this author that indeed they are often no more than extensive shopping lists. Zimbabwe has since been receiving UN assistance in district level planning, but the institutional ambiguity still prevails.

In some cases governments have set up special planning bodies to assist with the preparation of model plans and at the same time install some local level technical capacity and appropriate organizational structure. This nonetheless has also not been very effective. Owing to the proliferation of institutions and the delegation of often conflicting powers to different bodies or individuals, planning in this atmosphere is extremely difficult. There is very little understanding of who is in control, and furthermore, invariably the party representatives carry tremendous weight, or are sometimes appointed specifically to ensure that the party line is followed. Confusion then prevails. While party representatives could play an effective role in imparting some policy guidance to the development process, invariably the role is one of domination and control as has been the case in Tanzania.

It has also been noticed that the more extensive the bureaucratic structure, the greater the confusion or the more extensive the control as will be shown in the case of Tanzania. In some cases it has been seen that certain positions were created more as a reward for party members in good standing. The clear cost of maintaining this structure is overwhelming to both the central government and the local community, as also mentioned earlier.

The Tanzanian structure which is somewhat more cumbersome than Kenya and Ghana will now be examined more closely in the following chart as an example of this phenomenon. At the national level there are two main offices influencing operations at the lower levels. These are the Prime Minister's office (PMO) which is responsible for rural development, and the Ministry of Planning. The PMO will review all plans coming to the national level from the regions and districts before they are forwarded to the Ministry of

Planning for incorporation into the National Development Plan. As indicated in previous sections, outside of the macro economic plan framework, there is no evidence that the Ministry of Planning has any rational or empirical basis on how to proceed. The spatial planning activities are conspicuously missing from the decision making framework. This is also the case in Kenya, Ghana, Zimbabwe and Uganda. In fact, this author has seen no evidence of physical planners playing a significant role in the decision making process.

At the regional level there are two main bodies, the Regional Development Committee (RDC) including the Regional Commissioner who is appointed by the President, and the Regional Management Team which is headed by a Regional Development Director (RDD). While the RDD is supposed to be the head of government's operations at this level the Regional Commissioner has been observed by this author to have considerable influence over what goes through to the top. A positive aspect at this level is the inclusion of Regional Planning Officers as well as the regional heads of the sectoral ministries. Unfortunately, evidence has shown that on technical matters the sectoral officers follow the guidance of their headquarters.

As one gets to the District level where the focus of the rural development effort is supposed to be located, the situation becomes even more blurred. There is the District Development Council (DDC) headed by an elected official. Representatives from each registered village are on the Council. Noticeably, however, the District Party Chairman is also the chairman of the Council. Parallel to this the District Commissioner who is supposed to be the head of Government at this level is appointed by the President. Then the District Development Director who is the top civil service appointee is the secretary to the Council. The executive arm of the Council is the District Development and Planning Committee (DD & PC). Within the DD & PC

there is supposed to be a District Planning Officer (DPO) to vet technical and financial requirements of the proposals to be forwarded for consideration. How this function is actually performed remains a mystery to many since it is known that there are no detailed budgetary guidelines at this level and allocations are invariably cut. The plans are therefore prepared outside the framework of any budget it seems. Then there is the District Executive Committee of the Party which still has to add its consent to plan/proposals before they get through to the regional level for further scrutiny as to whether or not they be included in the regional plan.

Below this level there are also an estimated 8000 village administrative units as autonomous entities. Within this level there is the Village Assembly made up of villagers over the age of 18, and the Village Council comprising 25 members who are elected by the Village Assembly. The Assembly has five standing committees:

1. Finance and Planning
2. Education, Culture and Social Services
3. Security and Defence
4. Works and Transport
5. Production and Marketing.

Additional committees as seen fit by the Council could also be appointed. The villagers are linked to the party machinery through the Party Branch of each village of which there should also be 8,000.

ILLUSTRATION NO. 11

HIERARCHICAL INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS - TANZANIA

National Level	The Prime Minister's Office (PMO) Ministry of Planning	
Regional Level	Regional Development Committee (RDC)	Regional Commissioner Party Chairman Regional Dev. Director
	Regional Management Team (RMT)	Regional Dev. Director Reg. Planning Officer Reps of Sectoral Ministries Guidelines for Plans
District Level	District Development Council (DDC)	District Party Chairman District Commissioner District Dev. Director District Member of Parliament District Management Team (No vote)
	District Development & Planning Committee	District Planning Officer
	District Executive Committee of the Party	(Vetting body)
Village level	Village Assembly Village Council	<u>Five committees</u> Finance & Planning Production & Marketing Education, Culture & Social Welfare Works & Transport Security & Defence
		8,000 Village Units



The Kenyan institutional structure is less cumbersome than the Tanzanian model, but, of course, it must be kept in mind that Kenya did not place as much emphasis on decentralization at the same time and this has only recently been given priority consideration. Kenya has traditionally had a strong provincial and district administration. The DDCs are responsible for rural development activities and the DCs are appointed by the Office of the President.

One significant drawback which this author observed is that inspite of the structure in place at the local level, the design and implementation of development projects were largely under the responsibility of the line ministries which carried out direct operations at the district level. Quite apart from the vetting of proposed development activities the DDC has been found to have a limited technical capacity, as well as responsibility for the control of resources. The major responsibility seems to be that of "coordination" more so of implementation rather than planning.

The new District Focus guidelines do envisage a greater "planning" and "coordination" role for the DDC, but it appears that the responsibility for resources will again largely be controlled away from the district level. The assumption, therefore, is that plans and projects may be prepared in a vacuum and forwarded for approval at the ministerial level. The following illustration No. 12 extracted from the District Focus guidelines illustrates what is envisaged.

ILLUSTRATION NO.12

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN D.D.C. & LOCAL AUTHORITIES : KENYA




ILLUSTRATION NO. 13

HIERARCHICAL INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS - KENYA

National Level	Office of the President Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning Ministry of Local Government (National Rural Development Committee NRD 1969)
Regional Level	Provincial Development Committee (PDC) Provincial Commissioner (PC)
District Level and below	Rural Trade and Production Centres (RTPC) (1986) National Project Development Committee (1969) Social Rural Development Programme (SRDP) 1977 District Treasury District Development Committee (DDC) (District Commissioner) County Councils and Town Councils Locations and Sublocations (Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs)

---

**Notes:**

- .. The DDC is responsible for rural development, planning and coordination - to identify and analyse local needs.
- .. DC - Chief Executive Officer of rural development activities at the district level
- .. Each district is expected to prepare an integrated annual Work Programme to coordinate the implementation of projects, particularly those which require interdepartmental cooperation
- .. County Councils and Town Councils vet projects through the DDC
- .. There are 19 Ministries operating at the district level
- .. There are to be 200 RTPCs by the year 2000; the first project is to be completed by 1990; the Guidelines were prepared by the Ministry of Planning and National Development, the Ministry of Works & Housing and Physical Planning.

The structure in Ghana approximates Kenya's. What is more relevant to this study is the proposed structure now under consideration. The decentralization effort in Ghana began in the late sixties, resulting in a proposed four year programme and the Local Administration Act 359 of 1971. The programme was not successfully implemented owing partly to the resistance towards the devolution of authority and the successive governments. The current Government of the PNDC has rededicated itself to a decentralization programme which is now gaining momentum.

The significant departure from the previous efforts, which is also a radical departure from any of the models attempted so far in Africa, and which is in accordance with some of the recommendations which will be proposed in Chapter 6. The proposal intends to bring all government line ministries, corporations under the Local Authorities as "Departments of the Councils". The guidelines state that the various "Ministries, Departments and Corporations fused with the District/Regional Administrations will cease to be directed from Accra"<sup>34</sup>. The existing Ministry of Local Government should become a "Secretariat or a Ministerial Council which will be a cleaning house for matters of an inter-ministerial nature".

A most interesting feature which is proposed is that all the ministries operating at the district level will form one unit of administration and have a composite budget. The finances of these ministries will therefore be controlled by the District/Regional Councils. The first step towards composite budgeting was attempted in 1983. Once the Central Government approved the final budget allocations for each sector the ministries were required to provide a breakdown for each district, which would have then

---

<sup>34</sup> Government of Ghana. Decentralization in Ghana, 1985. p. 7

formed a part of the composite budget for that district. All plans and projects were thereafter to be approved at that level without referral to the Central Government.

This author had an opportunity to observe the operations and participate in some of the district level meetings. It does appear that the District Officer exercises an unusual amount of authority over the officials of the line ministries. Nevertheless, the effort seems to be constrained by poor performance of the economy overall, and the rather fragile personnel capacity of the regional and district bodies. It is nevertheless an impressive undertaking, but much work is yet to be done.

Of all the countries assessed, it would appear that Tanzania has had the best tiered system to facilitate an effective bottom-up approach to planning and development, apart from the over proliferation of bodies and interventions. However, there is overwhelming evidence to indicate that while the structure has been in place it did not work, or, it was not used properly. Indications are that while Nyerere often chose to by-pass many of his technocrats, in a similar manner the participation of the grassroots groups at the bottom were being neutralized and made to conform to policies which had originally come from the top. This arrangement is what made it possible for the government to totally ignore the negative signals which the intended beneficiaries were sending to the top regarding Ujamaa. Consequently, the idea of reconsidering the strategy was far removed from the minds of the leadership. One could say that the top and the bottom never met inspite of, or because of, the several layers of structures.

Other countries such as Kenya and Ghana did not have as elaborate a structure at the grassroots levels - that is below the formal district level civil service structure. Kenya for instance, has had chiefs at the locational and sub-locational level but their functions were different from the 8,000 units put in place by Nyerere. These chiefs were not really expected to play a controlling role in any bottom up participatory process for rural development since the government itself did not have a rural development programme with such objectives in mind. With the new district focus it is conceivable that Kenya could encourage participation from this level in a structured manner. Ghana may also have to consider some system for ensuring participation as the proposed structure does not adequately address the issue of grassroots participation although it is clearly envisaged.

One similarity between Tanzania, Ghana and Kenya is that they all catered for a "District Planning Officer" apparently to add some professional orientation to the planning process. Evidence has shown that these posts were often vacant in all the countries and even when filled, the contribution of the Planning Officer could at best have been minimal in view of the extensive responsibilities which he/she would have had in terms of guiding the formulation of a good plan. It will again be recalled that in most cases the 10-20 specialist officers operating at the district level at any given time were still under instructions from headquarters and not directly required to participate fully in rural development planning. Nyerere realized this bottleneck, but owing to the bureaucratic strangulation there is no evidence that they have made any significant contribution to rural development other than some advisory services to what was decided elsewhere without the benefit of their technical opinion.

## 5.6 The Role and Impact of International Agencies

The international development financing and donor institutions unwittingly have contributed to the poor state of affairs with respect to rural areas. For many years the institutions have betrayed an urban bias towards development assistance and thereby reinforced the patterns of skewed development. Particularly with respect to lending institutions, there was for a very long time the belief that in order to generate sufficient funds for debt repayment, the investments had to be in urban based economic activities, except for export cash crops which as discussed earlier did not bring significant returns to the rural farmer.

A precondition for this external assistance was that the particular country should have a national plan along the lines of the fixed term national economic plans as discussed in Chapter 2. Development was therefore seen primarily in macro-economic terms as a condition of the international donor. A vast amount of resources has also been spent on feasibility studies to further interpret the implications and possibilities with respect to specific segments of these macro-economic plans. By the time any tangible development had begun, much of the funds which were eventually to be paid back would have left the particular recipient country in the form of consultancy fees.

It was only within recent years that the attitude of some of these agencies has changed to focus attention on the need to strengthen the local institutional and personnel capacity so that aid in its various forms could be more readily absorbed without the initial flight of funds for costly technical assistance. It was also only within the past decade or so that

the World Bank for instance saw investment in education and institution strengthening as critical to the longer term development needs of the Third World.

In spite of these encouraging shifts in the conditions and forms of external assistance which was hitherto inimical to long term and dispersed development needs, the recipient countries are still in the stranglehold of the donor community. It is the opinion of some managers interviewed that several international agencies or donor countries which have their own agenda and operational mandates impose upon the recipient countries projects which are ill timed and/or ill conceived. Particularly, in cases where an overhead cost is due to the implementing agency for the donor assistance unscrupulous pressure is sometimes applied to the recipient countries to accept projects which they themselves know they do not need. Once such a project begins, the agency will stop at nothing to ensure that it is extended in order to maximize the overhead costs benefits as well as direct fees which may be involved.

This attitude also brings into question the integrity of many international personnel involved in development work. International technocrats have been accused by locals of being insensitive to the needs and aspirations of the African countries with which they deal. In many cases field representatives may only be pursuing a course of action in accordance with the dictates of the parent institution. As the saying goes, "he who pays the piper calls the tune".

Another aspect which the international agencies will have to bear some responsibility for is the disjointed and incremental manner of development



projects. While it is often said that it should be the responsibility of the recipient country to regulate the interventions made by these agencies, the fact remains that the countries do not have the capacity to do so and very little assistance is channeled in this direction. It has been observed that some agencies would deliberately prefer to channel assistance into the projects which produce the most visible results on which a plaque could then be placed so that the agency is also given credit for its "contribution". This attitude further encourages projects without planning simply because planning is not as tangible an output.

An example could be cited of Uganda and Zimbabwe, which were both trying to emerge from years of struggle and wished to develop or redevelop affected areas within a planned framework as opposed to project interventions helter skelter. In the case of Uganda, at the determination of some of the technocrats involved, a combined programme of physical development and parallel planning was agreed to by the parties involved at that time. However, it was not long before the parties involved changed and planning was again relegated to the back burner in preference to the individual unplanned project approach. The technocrats in Zimbabwe are still agitating to attract assistance to its efforts to prepare a national spatial development plan, but one major donor has already voiced its opinion that there is too much planning. Very little effort was made to really understand the dilemma of development without planning, or the serious drawback of piecemeal incremental development.

Integrated rural development therefore has been virtually impossible because international agencies have been able to make direct interventions at the local level without much guidance, or even concern, from many of the central

planning agencies or local authorities. The SRDP of Kenya may again be cited as a case in point.

Another hidden or unobserved dimension of the unguided international aid syndrome is the manner it sometimes contributes to the drain of foreign exchange or strains the limited local resources. This is because some agencies project aid as an outright package of benefits from the outside. This is often not the case as external aid often requires local inputs in kind and hard currency cash. Here, too, many governments are not in a position to regulate such interventions or fit them into any long term programme to suit their own needs and capacity. Nyerere on occasions has spoken out against this phenomenon but it was not long before he succumbed because Tanzania is spotted with project assistance which has failed to significantly contribute to the critical development requirements such as basic plan preparation.

Furthermore, since many donors view their assistance on a project by project basis, their concept of planning, even when some do recognize this necessity, is far short of the overall focus which is required before looking at segments of the nation state. Instead of trying to adapt to the conditions of the Third World, techniques are applied which because of their unsuitability sometimes produce unsatisfactory results.

### 5.7 Manpower Limitations

The pervasive shortages of required, qualified personnel for development efforts is an unfortunate characteristic of developing countries. The complexities involved in planning for rural development implementing and evaluating the various programmes have in most cases as noted above proved

to be an onerous undertaking.

It is evident from the foregoing chapters that the formulation of rural development policies necessitates detailed knowledge of the relevant sectors. This implies thorough assessment and analysis of these various sectors - health, water and sanitation, agriculture, industry, education etc. and the factors which influence their functioning - to enable the decision makers to determine priority needs, available resources, and thus formulate policies based on a realistic picture of the problems and possibilities instead of merely ideological influences.

This study has uncovered no evidence of this type of systematic investigation prior to policy formulations. It would appear that in the absence of concrete information, decision makers have been primarily influenced by the development concepts of donor agencies and factors related to political expediency. While there is no guarantee that a more informed decision making body would be sufficiently responsible to advocate that which is technically sound and morally just, an uninformed and ill advised legislative body has fewer options.

The limited available data necessary for decision making, planning and programme implementation is directly attributable to the paucity of suitably qualified personnel. Those available have in the main, been immersed in the more pressing tasks of implementing programmes, thus allowing little or no time for evaluating approaches and achievements. Pressure to implement rapidly has led to sketchy feasibility studies and subsequent unmet objectives or at best only partially obtained ones.

Failure to pay adequate attention to analysis of problems and issues prior to implementation is also due to the particular type of training which personnel have received. It must be recalled that the concept of planning for rural development is still in an embryonic stage. As noted in Chapter 2, in most African countries and very definitely in the countries under study, the phenomenon of the Five Year Plan, concomitant with all its limitations remains paramount. Rural development as earlier outlined demands flexibility in approach, experimentation, synthesis of ideas related to the processes involved in the diverse sectors, an understanding of evolving technologies, sensitivity to the socio-cultural and political factors. In short rural development work requires a special orientation, an acknowledgement that rural areas in Africa are beset with particular problems, thus necessitating new perspectives.

Most of the personnel involved in the planning of rural development programmes have either been trained in the more rigid disciplines such as engineering, economics, sociology and even those with post-graduate training in planning would not have been exposed to the more challenging comprehensive approach to planning which rural development planning poses. The majority of the personnel interviewed have been trained in Europe or the United States, where the concept of regional planning is still being evolved and where the planning for developing countries is only now being introduced at some universities. During the training of these personnel, emphasis would have been on the spatial aspects of planning with little reference to the socio-cultural, political and economic processes.

Furthermore, planning was not problem oriented. Goals and objectives were not formulated on the basis of identification of specific problems,

available resources etc. but on the ideal as is the case with the Five Year Development models. Thus this type of training equipped the planner to perpetuate this model. Most planning schools in Africa still retain the traditional physical approaches with socio-cultural, administrative and political issues as an appendage.

A rural development officer in Africa who is not fully cognisant of the powers and limitations of local government, attitudes and taboos of communities towards health issues, the political implications of transport planning, the impact of increased agricultural production on marketing outlets, will not be an effective planner. Planning of necessity relates to the effective implementation of programmes, hence the need to be aware of those factors likely to be obstacles to successful implementation and the alternative measures to be undertaken. Short courses are increasingly being mounted to address these issues in several countries. However, there is great need for a more systematised approach to training, based on the real problems.

The failure to formulate realistic, coordinated programmes which reflect the assessed needs and priorities in the various sectors, the available resources including the managerial and administrative capabilities and the capacity of the respective communities to participate in development efforts, has therefore been a constant theme throughout this study.

The Ujamaa effort in Tanzania, despite its noble objectives, overlooked an assessment of its human resources. Programmes were highly dependent on (a) the local, technical, administrative and managerial capacity and (b) the willingness of the citizenry to participate, which in turn was virtually synonymous with their understanding of the entire development effort and their role in achieving the goals.

However, these rural development programmes did not include an assessment of the capacity of local groups and organizations to fulfil the responsibilities they were expected to perform within complex task environments.

Both in Ghana and Kenya, the story is retold. The national capacity for replicating both the imposed models and the nationally generated models was sadly lacking. One must therefore conclude that a programme plan is only as good as its potentiality for implementation. The human resources for so doing have been an impeding factor in virtually all the programmes reviewed.

The technical and managerial capacity of field personnel have been admittedly weak. Poorly trained extension workers were not always able to mobilize community support for the various development schemes and due to their limited numbers were unable to reach a sufficiently large number of the target group to provide the requisite services and support. This, coupled with the rather limited supervision from regional and central offices, has contributed to the shortfalls experienced by so many projects.

Evaluation shortcomings to some extent can be attributed to the fact that administrators very often have failed to appreciate the need for continuous evaluation of programmes and projects. Evaluation is sometimes conceived as something which is done at the end of a project and preferably by an external team of evaluators. Funds set aside for evaluation are at times diverted to take care of contingencies. Thus evaluation on many projects has amounted to an overview of the problems and achievements contained in a terminal report. The bulk of the report is usually devoted to a painstaking account regarding the disbursement of funds. This emphasis is often in

indication of the interests and priorities of the funding agency. Pitfalls which might have been avoided are thus replicated from project to project or even within the duration of the same project and valuable lessons remain imperceptible to managerial staff.

It must be emphasized that while the qualitative and quantitative shortfalls regarding personnel involved in rural development are formidable, poor performance may also be due to inadequate career prospects, inadequate logistical support, loosely defined tasks, weak information systems and other types of malaise so characteristic of the rural development effort. Thus while specific types of education and training are viewed by this author as being essential to any serious effort at strengthening the institutional capacity to formulate and implement programmes and assist communities to more effectively participate in these projects, the education and training programmes must be carried out in conjunction with the other measures indicated in Chapter 6.

### 5.8 Summary

The above represents the major findings of this study with respect to the continuing evidence of the extent of rural poverty which still exist in Africa two to three decades after independence, and the varied constraints which have hindered much progress in eradicating this problem.

It has been confirmed that some gallant efforts have been made in countries such as Tanzania and Ghana, while others have skirted the issue for years until the problem reached alarming proportions. With increasing rapidity many African leaders are now acknowledging that something has to be done for

the rural population which is also increasing through high birth rates. For instance President Moi of Kenya has expressed his full commitment to the 'District Focus' initiative and has requested that new programmes and projects be mounted to assist in bringing more benefits to rural areas. Chairman Jerry Rawlings has expressed similar sentiments and Ghana is also embarking on a new wave of coordinated rural development programmes. Likewise President Mwinyi of Tanzania has, since assuming the helm, reaffirmed the Government's commitment to rural development and to build on the initiatives of his predecessor.



## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 6.1 Introductory Statement

It has been demonstrated that rural deprivation continues to be a serious problem in Africa inspite of the stated commitments of the respective governments to eradicate such disparities. This Chapter will draw some specific conclusions and put forth concise recommendations for assisting in promoting the systematic improvement of rural areas within an overall framework of national development.

It is envisaged that these recommendations will be useful to policy makers, technocrats, academics, students and local communities interested in rural development in the African context. In addition, these proposals should also be very useful to district and local level institutions or individuals wishing to address the problems of rural inequalities. It could also serve as a guide to donor governments and multilateral agencies which are yet to grasp the full ramifications of the rural development dilemma which exists in Africa.

In drawing the conclusions, and putting forth recommendations, the author is of the opinion that no single solution is foreseen in this myriad of different political ideologies and systems. Some proposed approaches such as planning techniques, information systems, training and so on may be of common interest and applicability. Furthermore, some governments have already made reasonable efforts at rural development and have developed some

knowledge and procedures for tackling this problem. This study does not propose that this body of knowledge and experience be overlooked. Instead, it would be most useful as a complementary document for those who have already traversed these paths, and as a guide to those who have not.

## 6.2 Ruralism Reconsidered : Need for a New Conceptual Framework

If significant inroads are going to be made with respect to rural development in Africa, it will be necessary for government policy makers and planners to adopt a new conceptual framework about ruralism in order to release themselves from the stranglehold of the inappropriate and antiquated methods with which they have tackled this phenomenon in the past. The attitude of all parties involved - both at the top and at the bottom - must change if new approaches of jointly addressing rural problems and development are to evolve. Flexibility, as has been observed in some of the discussions put forward in the theories of Friedmann et al. in section 2.4.1 should be encouraged so that the respective governments and the responsible technocrats could formulate new ideas and perhaps combinations of hitherto untested theories and practices. At the moment it is evident that the repeated efforts of applying traditional planning techniques to the emerging peculiarities of development issues in the Third World will not produce the desired results. It is only with this new perspective and flexibility that dynamism could be fostered and rural development as a heuristic exercise continuously evolves to meet the changing needs and circumstances of individual nations and communities.

To begin with, it is now generally accepted that developing countries can no longer attempt to benevolently pay lip service to all the development needs of their respective countries down to the lowest level and the last detail.

The local authorities and the people must play a much more significant role, and contribute directly to development activities.

It will be recalled from the discussion on "Co-operatives" and "Self Help" techniques in Section 3.3 that even the now advanced economies were built on the flexibility of ideas and a willingness to adopt new ideas and techniques of promoting development particularly in the immediate post war periods. In this connection, the role which rural people themselves could play in the development process should be fully recognized and systematically encouraged. Governments must therefore begin to see the rural population not as an extended burden to be 'acted upon' and 'catered for', but moreso as an untapped resource and most valuable ally and asset which could serve as the foundation of any rural development programme. The uninformed notion that the rural poor are to be seen as 'passive peasants' should be dispelled from the minds of those charged with the responsibility of promoting and managing rural development. As has been argued earlier, the rural populations, it should be realized, are very much aware of their needs and are willing and most able to achieve great strides in relieving their plight with appropriate assistance and encouragement in innovative joint efforts with their governments and other interested agencies.

Also, while it is fully understood that the term 'rural' generally refers to areas involved primarily in agriculturally oriented pursuits, hence the reason some areas are spatially demarcated as being rural and distinct from urban areas, it is necessary to add a new dimension to this concept. It is strongly recommended that the central focus of any rural area development programme revolve around the human element which has often been a missing

link in the hitherto traditional approach of rigid physical considerations which inhibits the required interaction with urban areas and functions in order for rural development to be fully realized within a national development framework.

The concept of "rural settlements" as is now commonly defined in much of the recent literature and in practice should be reconsidered as it connotes some degree of separateness requiring disjointed and non-interactive treatment. The idea of a policy of rural development being a policy of national development as once espoused by Nyerere has not been appreciably applied in any known cases, not even Tanzania. The notion of rural area development within a broader network of overall development should therefore be recognized and put into practice. A national development perspective is therefore a prerequisite to any segmental focus as is presently the case.

It should be further recognized that this idea of networks is not entirely new as Doxiadis<sup>1</sup> had at one time advocated a concept of "settlements" development encompassing considerations beyond the traditionally rigid enclaves of narrow physical plans. This certainly would also apply to the current drawbacks of rural, or more precisely, sub-national planning in a vacuum.

However, there are some contradictions, or at least significant ambiguities in the ideas earlier advanced by Doxiadis, and later by some of his advocates. Again the problem appears to be a lack of focusing attention on the human element and instead Doxiadis and others concentrated on promoting "networks" of modern technology and often lost sight of the "elements" which

---

<sup>1</sup> C. Doxiadis

they said were basic to any settlement. The concept also placed too much emphasis on a two dimensional framework of settlements and as such these ideas fell short of the concept being advocated here.

Perhaps the best analogy to be cited here is the type of totality associated with the operational structuralism now widely associated with Marx. David Harvey provides a good analysis which best approximates this concept<sup>2</sup>. He discussed three types of totality:

- i. - a mere sum of parts - which enter into combination without being fashioned by some pre-existing structure within the totality.
- ii. - something emergent that has an existence independent of its parts, while it also dominates the character of the parts it contains.

In discussing the third concept, which best approximates the position of this author, Harvey also cites Piaget who elaborated on the concept of operational structuralism thus:

- iii. - it adopts from the start a national perspective, according to which it is neither the elements nor a whole that comes about in a manner one knows not how, but the relations among elements that count.\*

A concept of rural development must therefore emanate from a concept of national development, not only in the framework of the national economic plans, but more directly an overview of the national perspective which recognizes the elements, networks, economic linkages, etc. and directs and

---

2 David Harvey, Social Justice and the City (London, Edward Arnold, 1973) pp. 286-314

\* Underlined for emphasis by this author

encourages this interactive process so that the "relations among elements" play a more dynamically orchestrated and catalytic role resulting in the consequent dispersed development.

Furthermore, if the human element is given centrality in this concept, the rigid barriers surrounding rural areas will gradually begin to disappear bringing about perhaps more organic structures, planning entities and institutional arrangements which are responsive to specific human needs and aspirations. The ensuing flexibility of this open-minded process is what will allow technocrats interested in Third World development to chart new paths, of course, borrowing any already tested and applicable techniques from previous experiences to-date. Such a concept may very well mitigate against the current efforts of each country struggling unwaveringly to prepare 50 or 60 'District Development Plans', such as Zimbabwe, Ghana, Malawi, with a minimal chance that any will ever be implemented as proposed. It is further envisaged that plan preparation will be revolutionized resulting perhaps in a new body of knowledge, and uniquely combined top-down and bottom-up strategies for implementation.

To take this concept a bit further this author will pose the human as the central element of a hypothetical case. There is no need to further detail the varying physical and social conditions in which these rural dwellers exist. We know that they need improved shelter; an increased supply of potable water; better health care, nutrition etc. We must look further, however. From what particular regions do they migrate so that one could determine the areas which have people in excess of their support capacity? What is the ratio of males vs females? What is the ratio of children and youths to adults? What is the initial motivation of these potential

migrants? To what extent are aspirations modified by the continued existence in the rural area as opposed to the city? Is there community cohesion? Are there local methods of financing small projects? To what degree is there political awareness among lower income rural dwellers? Who are the local leaders? What measures are rural dwellers taking to improve their conditions? What is the rate of unemployment in these areas? What is the level of education and training amongst the inhabitants? Many of these questions are yet to be posed and answered about the rural dweller. In the larger society, education and health in particular have been equated with schools and hospitals. Much criticism has been levelled at this type of detached institutionalization. It is necessary to consider other means of channelling vital services to people in rural areas. What types of physical structures should be created so that they do not intimidate? Could such structures serve varied purposes so as to maximize the delivery of social services? To what extent should such services be centralized or decentralized? What are the attitudes of the intended beneficiaries to participating and contributing to the establishment of such services? What is the capacity and attitude towards savings? What type of information campaign would be necessary to encourage savings and income increases? These are all questions which depend on our knowledge of the attitudes of rural dwellers towards traditional schools, teachers, doctors, etc. and their particular needs.

Discovering needs, aspirations and attitudes implies working with the people. Governments and their agents have often considered themselves as "working for" or providing "services to", but seldom see themselves in a partnership with the intended beneficiaries. The dichotomies of "learned and ignorant", "haves and have nots", "donor and recipient" are too well

entrenched in traditional planning and development work and must be eliminated. The planner can no longer be set apart from the world, and in this particular case the rural environment, in a relationship of observer and the observed. As also observed by Grabow and Heskin, "Planning as it exists today calls only for the use or manipulation of others, of nature, of the world, it foregoes a meaningful relationship with the world<sup>3</sup>.

It is further asserted that this type of planning requires monitoring and control, hence centralized authority. In order to control, predictability is vital. Consequently, all that is unpredictable and uncontrollable has tended to be suppressed.

The human on the other hand is a dynamic creature and should not be acted upon; he is a spontaneous creature and thus rigid control stifles creativity; overcentralization leads to alienation. The relationship between him and his environment is essentially transactional. To attempt to reduce him to a condition of passivity is to deprive him of his "humanness". It is this lacuna of understanding of human interactions which should be redressed.

Consideration of the human element as the central theme of development planning at the sub-national level will also have serious spatial implications for planners, and the old administrative boundaries which are not always conducive to proper planning. It must be recognized that the minimum spatial extent of the planning entity for human needs is the maximum extent of the basic components required for sustaining a basic quality of

---

<sup>3</sup> Stephen Grabow and Allan Heskin "Foundations for a Radical Concept of Planning" in Bennis Warren et. al. The Planning of Changes (New York, Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1975) p. 413



life. Some of these basic components will include resources and services such as water, food, energy, shelter and so on. However, invariably, sub-national planning entities often lack one or more of these basic resources/services or adequate access to them, and therefore the conceptual approach to such physical planning entities is in effect inhibiting, if not impossible to work with. The following chart illustrates the situation of three districts - A, B and C - with varying endowments of basic resources.

If one were to attempt to plan effectively for District A, it will be noted that while water resources are adequate, energy resources and agricultural potential are limited. Adjacent District B, however, has good agricultural potential but it is limited in labour, as well as energy. District C has excess labour which could be beneficial to another district; water resources are limited. Therefore, it is not until we begin to combine some of these resources which are not evident in each district, that we could also begin to comprehensively address basic needs within a planning entity. Districts previously defined for administrative purposes are not always suitable as planning entities and the concept and purpose of the district plan must change. Finding new planning entities will nevertheless require some form of spatial planning at a national scale. Again, the case is being strongly made for National Spatial Development Plans to be a parallel to the Economic Development Plan. Until such Plans are prepared interim measures which begin to aggregate districts based on social, economic, physical and administrative considerations should be implemented along the lines proposed by Huszar and Grove in Ghana as cited in Section 4.3.2. Accordingly, the institutional framework and subnational organization structure of the traditional local authorities will evolve into more responsive and responsible structures.

Current district level planning tends to emphasize only the demand side with the supply side vaguely indicated and invariably left as the responsibility of the central government.

ILLUSTRATION NO. 14  
THREE HYPOTHETICAL DISTRICTS

<u>DISTRICT A</u>	<u>DISTRICT B</u>	<u>DISTRICT C</u>
10000 inhabitants	20000 inhabitants	5000 inhabitants
- adequate water	- good agricultural potential	- excess energy potential
- limited energy	- limited labour	- limited water
- limited agricultural potential	- limited energy resources	- excess labour

6.3 The Need for Concise and Innovative Policies

In section 5.4 it was pointed out that there is a great deal of ambiguity in policy statements as well as in any actions from which a policy pattern could be discerned. Once policy guidelines are properly elaborated, indications with respect to the objectives of the government and the intended beneficiaries, and the alternative strategies to be pursued for dispersed development will be very clear to all concerned parties. The sections on 'Institutional Arrangements' and 'Planning' below will cover important policy aspects. Before one could begin to consider institutional issues and planning techniques, various policy issues will require attention.

The responsibility for overall policy guidelines should rest with the central government and should at some point be vetted by the Cabinet. All the sectoral ministries, relevant parastatals and perhaps selected NGOs

should contribute to the policy guidelines. Most important, however, is the participation of the provincial/regional authorities; district authorities and to the extent possible, the people whom the guidelines will affect most directly in the long run. Reference is again made to section 3.5 on participation, particularly the ten reasons emphasised by White as to why participation is desirable. This study has found that in Tanzania, Kenya and Ghana the formulation of policy guidelines has not included significant contributions by rural people themselves. One official in Kenya, when discussing this point with this author, suggested that the views of the people are already considered through their respective elected leaders. While such an assumption may be adequate in the traditional top-down approach to rural development policy guidelines formulation, if the district focus approach is going to be effective, a more frequent dialogue between the authorities and the local people will be required. The intention of such a dialogue should not simply be to keep the people advised of Government's plans, but equally important to incorporate the participation, and indeed contribution, of the people in local development activities as a joint endeavour with the Government. Particularly in Kenya, the "Harambee" techniques could then also be given a more structured focus within the preparation of plans and projects.

In specific terms, the respective Governments should rededicate themselves to a programme of rural development and decentralization through clearly stated intentions and astute monitoring and evaluation of follow-up actions. This means that the policy guidelines should also include "procedures" to be followed, as in the case of the Kenya District Focus for Rural Development Guidelines which include Annexes on procurement, tendering, budgetary procedures, and so on.

The policy guidelines should also be flexible and subject to periodic review and reformulation, as well as expansion as the experiences of field experiments are fed back to the central government level. It is recommended that such policies be up-dated and published annually (in loose leaf binders) with the view that eventually an appropriate body of knowledge, institutional framework, procedures, will emerge and be acceptable as a nationally agreed policy on rural development.

The element of such a national policy should include, but not be limited to:

- .. Institutional arrangements including specific guidelines for the incremental devolution of appropriate resources and authority away from the centre.
- .. Human resources development, including the development of relevant training programmes and the strengthening of training institutions locally.
- .. The formulation of guidelines for employment generation in rural areas, including the programmed expansion of non-farm economic activities, and the strengthening of urban centres/rural areas relationships.
- .. An indication of commitment for the promotion of credit and financing of entrepreneurial ventures in rural areas, as well as a clear indication of budgetary allocations for planning purposes.
- .. The provision of adequate incentives for encouraging increased production, including the formulation of appropriate pricing and marketing mechanisms.
- .. Where necessary, propose and actively pursue changes in land tenure systems and thereby increase the accessibility of the rural population to land.

Parallel to these policy issues could be related aspects such as population control, as is required in Kenya which has a 4.0 growth rate, or specific focus on women and youth in rural areas. Some of the above aspects will be elaborated upon below.

The initial step to be taken in this regard is an indication that the government is fully aware of the disparities in spatial development and express a commitment to redress such imbalances. In view of the prominence given to "Five Year Economic Development" planning, this is the first stage of an indication of governments' commitment. Donors and investors would also be made aware of this commitment and hopefully wish to participate in opportunities which may arise out of the importance attached to this concern by the government.

We have seen, however, that the Economic Plan is not always a reliable barometer of economic activities or opportunities. The governments' commitment should also manifest itself in the form of special sessional papers such as has been the case with the new Kenya District Focus or Tanzania's Arusha Declaration. Thereafter, the government must seek to put these policy guidelines into action because it is only by the concrete activities that these policies could be confirmed and consolidated, and the gaps as pointed out in section 5.4 closed. Policies as statements do not in themselves bring about changes. These are only the initial steps to be taken more as indications of concerns and possibilities for action.

A significant indication of commitment leading to action is the level of funds committed to bringing about the obliteration of the urban/rural inequalities. The various instruments of development should be supported by

committed inputs to develop action plans/projects and for financing implementation of activities to bring about change. The government must take serious steps to enforce its intentions so that the urban biases are reversed and the ministries and parastatal bodies do not repeatedly find loopholes for resisting the inevitable devolution of authority and resources.

A national system of planning as will be elaborated upon below must be set in motion so that the planners also focus attention on formulating goals in conjunction with the local communities; produce projections on alternatives and institute feedback loops for evaluation and required adjustments in governments' assistance in order to avoid the constraints cited in section 5.4.

The effective participation of spatial/physical planners in this process will also have to be ensured by government statutes directing this role as in many cases developers have been able to ignore spatial planning guidelines. In many cases the government itself has been a major offender in this regard.

Legislation, as will be indicated more specifically below, is also an important policy consideration, particularly with respect to the issue of land and environmental conditions. Legislative measures could also be used to ensure that governments' priority guidelines on rural priorities are supported by appropriate statutory guidelines.

From these broad implications the policy guidelines should then begin to focus on specific target oriented outputs and sectoral issues. This will require the setting of specific time frames for achieving selected objectives along with the required commitment of personnel, materials and other resources required for achieving the various tasks. Directives

without the means as has been the case in Tanzania would also be ineffective. These targets should be based not only on statements in the economic plans, but also on empirical analyses and findings of a Spatial Development Plan which should be given equal status with the Five Year Plan.

The overall recommendation in this respect is to reiterate that the governments should move from statements of intention to policies by actions. Such actions should manifest themselves in all the sectors and arrangements pertaining to the concerns being expressed in this study.

#### 6.4 Institutional Framework and Issues

There is every indication that rural development will have to be tackled from both the top and the bottom of any institutional arrangements which may emerge in accordance with the particular circumstances of each country. Over-decentralization, or the advocacy of such an approach appears to be just as ineffective as over-centralization. The best known example of this structure is to be found outside of Africa - Papua New Guinea - where earlier indicators were that it facilitated more effective decentralization.<sup>4</sup>

It is recommended that for the foreseeable future it may be necessary to delegate the overall responsibility for rural development to a special ministry established for this purpose. Evidence has shown that such a ministry should not be the 'Prime Minister's Office' or the 'Office of the President' as such arrangements invariably lead to ideological entanglements and over politicization of the operations as a detriment to technical and empirical considerations as has been shown in the case of Tanzania.

---

<sup>4</sup> c.f. Diana Conyers, "Papua New Guinea: Decentralization and Development from the Middle" in Stohr and Taylor, Development from Above or Below, Op.Cit

However, strong links to the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (or the Ministry charged with these responsibilities) is most desirable. It is also conceivable that the responsibility for rural planning and development could be assigned to a special unit within a particular ministry. The most important consideration is that this body be provided with the appropriate authority to undertake the task at hand.

Authority nevertheless implies the force of specific legislative guidelines or special regulations. While there has been a practice of legislative guidelines for urban development and control, legislation pertaining to rural development apparently has lagged behind and are not responsive to Third World needs. Indeed, most of the planning legislation used in developing countries was adopted from the metropolitan countries and in this respect are quite limited. It is proposed here that development interventions at the sub-national level be promoted by specific guidelines and regulated by appropriate legislation if governments are in fact serious about tackling this problem. Such legislative guidelines or special regulations would encompass, but not be limited to, the following broad themes:

- .. Guidelines for the allocation and utilization of a given level of financial development resources within the sectoral ministries to be utilized under the control of sub national bodies within a given national plan framework which could be varied within given time frames.
- .. The formulation of appropriate legislation to systematize the tax structure and retention of a reasonable level of resources under local control.
- .. Concise guidelines for the provision of rural credit, and effective marketing of commodities.
- .. Civil service regulations should be modified to allow for local authorities to play a



more significant role in the promotion and reassignment of extension personnel within the line ministries. Selected staff should therefore come under the authority of the respective sub-national bodies.

- .. A policy of rotating staff within given time periods in order to assign qualified and experienced personnel away from headquarters within the respective line ministries should be included in the civil service regulations and systematically implemented.

#### "Development" Control


In spite of the squalor which exists in many rural communities, development control as it is usually termed in urban areas is also applicable to rural situations. "Development interventions" (which is a preferable term) should be subject to certain environmental guidelines and prerequisites so that environmental consequences are considered; debt burden and servicing (particularly in foreign exchange) are analysed; personnel are available; the proposal is acceptable to the affected communities, etc.

#### Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform

The importance of land for rural development has not been fully recognized. It is imperative that appropriate legislation be also introduced to regulate this situation so that local authorities have the means at their disposal to rectify these deficiencies. (Owing to the importance of land to rural development, this aspect will be elaborated upon below).

A primary initiative will be to increasingly and systematically shift authority and resources away from the central government institutions to local representation. However, the devolution of authority away from the line ministries within central government will have to be gradually implemented with due political commitment and arrangements. The parent sectoral ministry could continue to be responsible for broad policy issues and programming within a particular sector, but operations at the sub-national level should be delegated to appropriate lower structures, along with the budgetary means for undertaking these operations. Such an arrangement will facilitate more effective coordination utilizing a range of integrated rural development principles as discussed in chapter 3. The following Illustration No. 15 is one possible arrangement which allows for the devolution of authority and resources.

DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM WITH "LOOPS" BACK TO THE TOP



As has been observed, there has been a tremendous amount of resistance by the line ministries to this arrangement of devolution of authority and resources as they will inevitably appear to lose their 'power'. This is not necessarily the case as the line ministry within a combined top-down and bottom-up approach will still play a significant role in formulating the overall policies and general national responsibility for the sector. The significant change is that the respective ministry's Work Programme will be implemented through an integrated structure at a lower level through which line officers will work and in which lower level local participation could be encouraged. The sectoral operations will therefore be under the coordination and supervision of the local authorities and within the framework of coordinated plans and supervision of the local authorities and participation will be included at the 'local authority' level as well as at the implementation level within the respective communities.

One of the technical arms of the ministry responsible for rural development should be the Spatial Planning Department (the Town and Country Planning Department). The practice of ignoring the technical responsibility and capacity of the planning authorities should be discouraged and rectified. It will be recalled from the 'Findings' in Chapter 5 that the Planning Department has not featured significantly in any of the existing institutional arrangements. Planning and administration at the lower levels should be closely linked. This, however, also means changing the composition of the 'local government' authorities in order to henceforth include a technical service unit which could comprise of the sectoral line officers coordinated by the regional or district planners. Such a move will certainly require the training of a significantly increased number of regional planners in order to gradually staff the local authorities and establish the technical service units referred to above.

Of course, it is also recognized that as found in Chapter 5, many developing countries do not have the required technical capacity to service all the regions and districts. It is recommended that formal planning or more precisely, the preparation of plans, begins using the limited capacity at the top with a gradual expansion of the technical capacity at the lowest possible level. This does not imply that the sub-national levels will not participate in the preparation of plans which affect them. This proposal refers only to the utilization of limited technical capacity at the upper levels until additional personnel are trained. Plan preparation should still be based on the full participation and consideration of priorities and strategies worked out at the lower levels through legitimate representatives and within financial parameters and guidelines proposed by the Central Government. It is therefore conceivable that each country could have four or five planning teams as roving technical units to service the agreed upon local planning entities as opposed to a full planning team in every district. This recommendation is predicated on the understanding that each country will have as a prerequisite a National Spatial Development Plan which will set out potentials and priorities for development so that a staged approach could be adopted while the inadequacy of technical personnel is addressed.

The formal administrative units should not go below the traditional district level, if "administrative" is considered in the formal sense of government institutional support and recurrent financing on a regular basis. Of course, there is no foreseen reason why 8,000 units as in the case of Ujamaa should not be encouraged. What needs to be regularized is the role of such units in the development process and within the formal district level machinery. It is through these groupings that the needs and aspirations are to be articulated, again within the framework of a national plan and

specific guidelines for feeding information and encouraging participation from the bottom to the meeting point of central government and local government.

Participation of the intended beneficiaries is most important as has been shown. Nevertheless, decentralization of the institutional structure does not in itself ensure the participation of the people. Furthermore, participation should not only be limited to providing ideas about development strategies or project development, etc., but also decisions about the expenditures. Very few local groups, while sometimes allowed a voice in development matters, have any authority when it comes to expenditure control. Plan preparation should always be accompanied by the resource requirements and it is recommended that once these are approved by the higher authorities, to the extent possible the resources in terms of personnel and funding should then be transmitted to the local authorities. Below the district level, it is conceivable that funding could be provided directly to groupings which are properly organized for project implementation activities.


Each local authority should then also be an adequate representation of the respective community, preferably of persons who were involved in contributing to the plan preparation stage. An important aspect of this encouragement is also the participation in terms of inputs envisaged by the recipient groups. The plans or projects should be prepared with this commitment in mind and not with the intention that it should be financed totally through government's resources which will not be adequate to meet all the needs. It has been observed in many cases particularly Ghana, that rural communities are often willing to provide of their labour, materials

and even finances, to establish facilities which will directly benefit them. If such plans and projects are prepared as joint ventures in consultation with the respective communities, it is very likely that community based support will be provided during implementation. The previous "community development" approach in which it appeared to many that the government had simply abrogated its responsibility to the rural communities should be noted and avoided.

Within the context of these recommendations it is also important at this juncture to sound a word of warning with respect to District Focus as in the case of Kenya. As indicated earlier, from a policy point of view, in terms of awareness and concern, much has been achieved by way of guidelines. This author believes that the institutional arrangements will require fuller attention and refinement in subsequent policy statements. The main concern of this author as raised on p. 266 is that the 'District Focus' may very well emerge into another top-down only approach without significant participation from the lower level authorities. Quite apart from the various authorities at the top - the Office of the President; the Ministry of Local Government, and the Ministry of Planning and National Development (in which the Rural Planning Department is based). The practice of reverting to the top for authority appears to be still largely preferred. Of course, it is not yet clear how the district focus procedures will be finalized. What is noticeable, and should be reviewed, is the practice of having to forward projects back to the Ministry of Local Government or the Ministry of Planning and National Development (which controls the Rural Development Fund and other bi-lateral inputs) for approval. Some effort should be made to allocate a greater proportion of these financial resources to lower levels in accordance with the indicators cited by Mawhood (p 247).

Perhaps Kenya is cognizant of the constraints as cited by Moris in Chapter 3 (p 94). These, however, should be seen as constraints and not as outright obstacles which cannot be overcome. In this area Ghana leads the way in its effort to delegate real authority away from the centre by proposing the placing of the operational budgets of the line ministries to form a part of the "composite budget" under the control of the provincial and district authorities. To support this decision to decentralize, Ghana is also in the process of working out areas of responsibilities which will then also assist in guidelines for the redistribution of authority for the control of funds. Until this is clarified, decentralization of authority will continue to present a problem and institutional restructuring will be constrained.

The following are some broad recommendations for functions at the various levels, including village groups as was the case in Tanzania.



- Land reform
  - Guideline for devolution of authority
  - Preparation of regional plans.
  - Preparation of District Plans if the capacity does not exist at the district level
  - Implementation of land reform measures
  - Mobilization regional resources
  - Preparation of regional production targets
  - Consolidation of district level production targets (within jurisdiction)
  - Promotion of urban/rural linkages.
  - Preparation and implementation of projects which transcend district level jurisdiction, but are sub-national in scope.
  - Monitoring and evaluation of district level functions.
- Provincial/  
Regional  
Level

Reference has already been made to local level functions in discussing the expected increased responsibilities to be entrusted to local authorities in a decentralized system. (See Illustration No. 10). The listing will not be repeated here, but generally, all rural development functions for which the administrative, technical and financial capacity exist at this level should be transferred, or conversely, the capacity be gradually strengthened to facilitate such functions, including the devolution of authority and funds.

It is recommended that selected functions be encouraged and delegated to the village level. The functions could include self help projects, co-operative enterprises, small scale entrepreneurial endeavours, and most importantly, contributions to project formulation and execution. In fact, many of the functions listed for the local (district) level could be delegated to a lower level providing the organization and capacity exist or could be established at minimal cost. It is not recommended that the Governments



establish elaborate formal administrative structures at this level since this may further strangle the development efforts. Local initiative and self-help should nevertheless be encouraged and deliberately promoted.

#### 6.5 Adaptive Planning Model and Implementation Strategies

Planning for rural development has usually consisted of a series of disjointed district or regional plans; the nebulous fixed term economic plan; or incremental interventions by interested parties. This study has indicated that no single model is uniquely applicable for each country.

However, there are broad principles which should govern planning and development activities in the developing world, and particularly in Africa which is divided up into over 50 states - some persistently bordering on the fringes of subsistence.

Africa, as a continent, has to begin to seriously look inwards in order to begin to solve many of its economic problems. It was only recently that the general plight of the continent was considered so critical as to result in the special session of the United Nations General Assembly. A very significant focus of this session, and indeed the recent preponderance of activities directed at Africa have been based on the aid syndrome. Many African governments, and indeed some other Third World countries see aid as right and proceed unflinchingly with cap in hand to often demand such assistance. There is no doubt that Africa requires external assistance in light of the systematic and deliberate underdevelopment to which it has been subjected for centuries; the limited control which it has over commodity prices; external shocks of oil prices, and so on. Nevertheless, the question must be asked as to what Africa as a

continent could do for itself? Can bodies such as the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU), the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UN-ECA), the African Development Bank (ADB) or other continental and regional groupings such as ECOWAS or SADC play a more significant role in promoting general development and consequently rural development? Following on the various conferences and symposia, is there now the need and the possibility of a "Continental Plan of Action"? This author advocates that serious consideration be given to the formulation of such a Continental development strategy as a prerequisite to the national and subsequent sub-national focus. It must be recognized that since Africa is still predominantly rural and will remain so for some time to come, there are many common concerns which would warrant such an overall plan.

Furthermore, much of the information required for such a broad plan framework already exists in the volumes which have been produced and shelved. The basic objectives of such a Plan could include the following:

- .. The mapping of continental land classification and carrying capacity so as to rationalize utilization and decrease unwarranted competition, particularly in the agricultural sector.
- .. The identification and development of government/donor joint venture projects in areas such as hydrology, ground and air transport, appropriate technologies, and so on.
- .. The identification of continental manpower needs; joint training of personnel, the sharing of expertise and knowledge which will lead to the decrease in foreign experts.
- .. The promotion of investments in large scale regional or interregional projects, and also guide interventions by donor agencies in such ventures.

- .. The assessment of available resources and development potential and costs implications.
- .. Population dynamics.

As in the case of the National Spatial Development Plan, a continental development strategy could also cover various sectoral issues. The essence of this proposal is to encourage continental cooperation in development efforts, and also have some of the African bodies play a more significant role in promoting such efforts.

Quite apart from the overall development issues, closer cooperation through commitment to continental advancement in the form of treaties and various agreements which are respected and adhered to will go a long way in also fostering rural development. Very few of the donor conferences and international charity events ever focus on the extent to which, in addition to the already abject poverty, rural dwellers are displaced by turmoil and strife from within, and very often with the instigation of neighbouring countries. As disconcerting as it is, one must face the reality that the amount of refugees in Africa has multiplied at a phenomenal rate only within the period since independence. Invariably, the majority of these refugees are from the rural areas which in many countries are in conflict or most vulnerable to the not infrequent turbulence. A continental agreement to curtail this state of affairs will be one of the most significant steps towards rural development. In this connection it should be realized that Africa has on occasions exasperated its own rural deprivation dilemma.

#### 6.5.1 Considerations for the National and Sub-National Levels

It is within the national framework that governments as sovereign states

could take more concerted actions in support of rural development. A foremost requirement is the preparation of the National Spatial Development Plan referred to in chapter 2 as a general guide from the top and for the lower levels of the government. "Decentralization" and the devolution of authority or distribution of scarce resources are virtually impossible without such a plan. Likewise, sub-national plans and projects emanating from the lower levels would be served by this guide and not promote unattainable shopping lists. In this cyclical process, Central Government will also have a more rational basis for guiding dispersed development. The following Illustration No. 16 outlines this process.

At the outset the Cabinet or similar body will have the ultimate responsibility as a government unit for initiating and guiding the plan formulation activities - not the "Party". It will be noted that the National Spatial Development Plan is given sequential preference to the Fixed Term Economic Plan. However, this should not imply any ordering of the institutional hierarchy in which case the Ministry of Economic Planning would have the major responsibility for co-ordinating the development process. In any event, since most of these countries already have Five Year Plans, the priority is now to embark on the spatial development plans. The aspect to be noted is that this proposal calls for the economic plan to be based on the spatial plan and bringing into a more significant planning role the spatial planning body which has been gradually relegated to "development control".

The National Spatial Development Plan will have the following broad objectives which may be adapted and modified to suit particular country needs depending on what information is already available:

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK




ILLUSTRATION NO. 15  
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK

- .. The identification and classification of land types and carrying capacity.
- .. Proposal for the rationalization of land use and particularly the potential location of specific economic development activities nationally, including:
  - .. tourism development
  - .. industry
  - .. land tenure patterns and proposed reforms in order to foster equity distribution
  - .. agriculture, etc.
- .. Consideration for urban/rural linkages and conditions including:
  - .. hierarchy of settlements
  - .. population distribution and migration patterns
  - .. potential growth centres/points
  - .. identification of existing and potential natural resources
  - .. constraints and possibilities for exploiting resources.
- .. Physical Infrastructure including:
  - .. the extent, carrying capacity and state of the transportation network, particularly feeder road system to rural productive areas, and potentially productive areas.
  - .. electricity capacity and projected needs including rural electrification
  - .. existing water supply and projected requirements for domestic, industrial, agricultural and recreational use.
- .. Social Infrastructure including:
  - .. existing health facilities, level of service, projected needs
  - .. educational facilities, capacity, projected needs
  - .. leisure and recreational considerations.

The Plan should also include strategies in accordance with the above for aspects such as, but not limited to:

- .. investment opportunities for employment generation in the form of programming project dossiers for consideration by government, private investors, donors.
- .. guidelines for lower level regional or district plans based on considerations above.
- .. priorities for the hierarchy of growth centres and guidelines for linking such centres to hinterland in accordance areas of influence.
- .. guidelines for implementation of specific actions.
- .. guidelines on budgetary, institutional and personnel needs and projections where possible.
- .. guidelines on spatial policy issues, particularly for separate follow-up
- .. comments on possible legislation requirements for effecting proposed development activities.

Prior to the formulation of this Plan, it is envisaged that various sectoral issues will be looked into in varying degrees of detail by the sectoral ministries and sectoral studies and implications issued for deliberation before the actual formulation of the Plan. These topics are similar to those outlined above for the overall Plan, but could be undertaken in prior support for the Plan. It is also conceivable that after these sectoral issues are combined into an overall Plan, the respective individual policy issues and guidelines could be adjusted to form a framework for comprehensive integrated development.

- .. Population
  - Growth
  - Density
  - Migration
  - Projections
  - Classification by sex, age
  - Spatial implications, etc.
  - Budget and staffing requirements
  - Policy implications
  
- .. Transportation
  - Extent of network
  - Origin and destination studies
  - Linkages to potential economic activities
  - Rolling stock - public & private
  - Implications of cost, etc.
  - Budget
  - Policy
  
- .. Education & Training
  - Literacy rate by distribution
  - Classification of school age groups
  - Implications for the improvement and location of educational facilities
  - Education and training relevant to development needs.
  - Budget
  - Policy
  
- .. Water
  - Assessment of supply and projected requirements for domestic and public use
  - Assessment of potential against proposed location for selected activities in relation to agriculture, irrigation, industry, etc.
  - Budget
  - Policy
  
- .. Physical Environment
  - Mapping and relevant data to facilitate planning
  - Macro and micro level climatic conditions
  - Land classification and capacity, vegetation, etc.
  - Physical development constraints, etc.
  - Budget
  - Policy



Other sectoral studies could cover industry, health, tourism, agriculture, utilities, labour force, etc. It will be noted, however, that contrary to the connotation of "physical planning" the National Spatial\* Development Plan covers a full range of subject areas essential to national development and which are not similarly covered in an economic development plan.

In the preparation of this Plan or sectoral studies, there will be a reciprocal form of relationship between the spatial planners, the economic planners and the sectoral specialists. It is at this level that the initial steps at the coordination of social, economic and physical planning will take place. If these procedures are followed, then there will be less need for special efforts at integrating the components at a latter stage as the resulting guidelines of the plans would have already taken such related aspects into consideration in recommending follow up actions.

Both Plans - economic and spatial - are then fed back to the Cabinet as the client, and from whom the original terms of reference would have emanated. It is not suggested that any attempts be made to eventually incorporate both these plans as the economic plan and outlook may be subjected to more frequent internal and external factors requiring more periodic adjustments. It is conceivable, however, that a committee of spatial and socio-economic planners could be established to extract a national perspective plan as a document intended to guide plan preparation and execution at the lower levels if this is not specifically covered in the national level Plans.

---


\* While the term physical was used earlier in this Study as is usually the case, this has been changed in the Conclusions to spatial since it gives a broader idea of activities and developments in spatial terms.

This perspective plan should be a simplified version of the combined spatial economic considerations intended to facilitate operations from the lowest to the highest level of the hierarchy. It will be recalled that in both Ghana and Kenya, there have been indications that lower level planning had on occasions lacked synchronisation with a national development strategy.


#### 6.5.2 Considerations at the Sub-National levels

Once these activities proposed above are completed the "top" would have set in place appropriate guidelines for facilitating "bottom-up" initiatives. The next stage will be the sub-national plans and preparation of projects. Some countries in the past have given priority to regional plans which were in turn expected to be followed by district plans. If full scale district plans are going to be prepared in any event, it is recommended that this procedure proposed below should apply. However, as indicated, this study has raised questions about the capacity to prepare detailed interdisciplinary intersectoral district plans for each and every district. The capacity for such an endeavour is still quite limited and this is seen as a long term objective as the technical and institutional capacity increases. Perhaps for selected districts, owing to a particular resource consideration or a situation requiring special attention, formal integrated plans could be proposed. Outside of this it is recommended that the technical planning takes place at a higher level, but based on inputs and criteria from the lower levels. The National Perspective Plan should give direction to such an approach in which development parameters are established and noted at the lower levels. District and local level participation will therefore be encouraged to identify priority needs; indicate preferred implementation strategies, required assistance, local

resource capacity, etc. It should be stressed that the principles of district level planning and public participation will still be practised under this proposal, except that these may not necessarily be presented as a formal district plan - but more so as guidelines determined by the people within the stipulated entity. The following Illustration sets out this process.



SUB-NATIONAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT FLOW CHART



In this Illustration (No. 17) it is shown that the top down stages in terms of guidance or parameters are as a (1) and (2). The Regional Level is selected as the most appropriate meeting point, particularly if technical expertise are limited, although it does not preclude formal arrangements at the district level as resources permit. The variation at (3) illustrates these options in which (3a) incorporates technical services for detailed plan formulation at the regional level based on inputs from the district level, as well as the local levels such as, for instance, Ujamaa village units in Tanzania or sub-locations in Kenya. In the case of (3b) detailed plan formulation takes place at the district level, again with inputs from the local levels. This plan may then be incorporated within the regional framework or, as in (3c) be forwarded directly to some form of joint committee of spatial and economic planners. The plans will then be vetted by this joint committee and forwarded with recommendations for full approval as at (4). Once approved (5a/5b), it is recommended that the required resources for implementation of selected outputs of the plan be allocated directly to the regional and district levels. The level to which these resources are allocated will again depend on the available technical and administrative capacity at that particular level. There is certainly no reason why specific project funds could not be allocated on a selective basis directly to the district level.

Under this arrangement the budget component for the implementation of development activities will be gradually removed from the control of the sectoral ministries to sub-national bodies. The operational arm of these ministries would thus increasingly function as technical service inputs under the coordination of the body which controls the resources for such personnel and material inputs.

It would also be necessary to evolve and continuously test these planning and development techniques in order to eventually establish approaches which are most suitable. At the moment, however, it would appear that various of the regional planning techniques discussed in chapter 2 could be adapted to facilitate both the top down and bottom up requirements. Reference must again be made to some of the ideas espoused by John Friedmann as cited in chapter 2. His ideas about the congeniality of the American pragmatic temperament to planning is most apt<sup>4</sup>. The flexibility and adaptability of planning techniques of Friedmann and his colleagues appear to hold out the good prospects for planning and development in Africa at this stage of its development. Particular reference should also again be made to the work of Grove and Huszar who began to promote a regional planning structure in Ghana although this was never implemented<sup>5</sup>.

The plan implementation process should also be governed by certain procedures in order to regulate and monitor activities. The following illustration is a recommended process:

ILLUSTRATION NO. 18

DISTRICT & LOCAL LEVEL PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

Local Authority

Plan

- .. Objectives
- .. Policies
- .. Strategies

Implementation  
Activities

As defined in the District level  
plans and projects

- .. Monitoring
- .. Evaluation

Strategy  
Reformalization  
Refinement

---

<sup>4</sup> See pages 55 - 65 of Chapter 2

<sup>5</sup> See pages 148 - 154 of Chapter 3

### 6.5.3 Integrated Rural Development (IRD)

Special reference must be made to IRD which appears to be a popular slogan throughout the continent.

Many commentators have expressed doubts as to whether IRD could really be achieved within the disarray which now exists with respect to rural development programme or the absence of such programmes. This author has concluded that rural development could be integrated in both the conceptual and operational sense if the government understands the advantages of such an approach and is committed to it firstly through policy guidelines which could be enforced in practice.

The adoption of an IRD strategy has to be determined at the same time that the government sets out its policies and priorities for rural development. As discussed above under the need for a new conceptual framework, what is important is the relation amongst elements that count. Trying to bring together separately conceived and already disjointed programmes and projects falls short of the principle and practice of IRD, hence one of the major reasons why it has not been very successful in some cases. Here too, policies in this area will cover the entire spectrum of sectoral issues and government institutions and be taken into consideration in all plan preparation and execution activities. If IRD is going to be put into practice it will also be necessary for governments to link plan preparation with budget allocations for achieving the objectives of the plan in a cohesive manner, rather than having each party dissect the plan into components suiting their interest. As will also be stressed later on, this could also be encouraged by approved plans returned with the requisite

resources for implementation back to the sub-national level from which it originated and then deploying the technical officers of the line ministries to work through these local authorities in pursuing the required tasks.

#### 6.5.4. Land Tenure and Agrarian Reforms

As mentioned above, land tenure and agrarian reform are very important aspects of rural development and therefore should be given particular attention, both with respect to policy guidelines and the institutional framework.

It will be inappropriate to advocate any simple strategy on the land issue as this is the prerogative of the respective sovereign states. We have seen, however, that land tenure and agrarian reform techniques have not worked well in Tanzania where it had been given much attention, with a guarantee of the access to land. This is inspite of the legislation which promoted the nationalisation of large land holding and greater access for the indigenous rural population. This study does recognizes the right to access as a priority consideration, but we must go beyond this if the experiences of Tanzania are noted.

First, lets consider this problem of lack of access to land. It will be recalled from Section 3.7 that approximately one-fifth of Africa's agricultural population fall within the category of landless. Many of these countries, as shown in Table No. 3 (p.111) earn a substantial amount of their GDP from agriculture and have a large percentage of the labour force in agriculture. Nevertheless, as shown in Tables Nos. 20 (p. 219)



and 21 (p. 220) food production has been generally poor and increased amounts of foreign exchange have been spent on the importation of food. All of this has also taken place while expenditure in the agricultural sector has increased in most African countries.

It is therefore evident that food production must be given increased priority. Given the opportunity and appropriate incentives, there is ample evidence to indicate that the rural poor could produce substantially increased levels of food. Again, however, it will require a shift in policy - the most important being access to land. Without access to land, it will continue to be impossible for rural people to produce food even to meet local consumption needs. This phenomenon is compounded by the fact that income from non-food production cannot meet the cost of the food purchases for imported supplies which has been the trend in many African States. Again, the rural population are at a further disadvantage in that by the time imported food stuffs reach them, the added transportation costs is exorbitant. The policy emphasis must be on increased local food production for which access to land must be guaranteed.

Nevertheless, there are other problems, since, as we will recall, Tanzania did more to ensure the right to land. Tanzania, as compared to Kenya, has a fairly high land carrying capacity. Good agricultural land in Tanzania is estimated to be between 60-65 percent, while in Kenya it is between 12-15 percent. Furthermore, Kenya has not as yet tackled the land problem. Both countries have been affected by severe periods of drought and the so called external shocks. Still, Kenya has produced better results, although these are not satisfactory to address the still existing problem of

inadequate food production. The implication therefore is that access to land by itself would not produce the desired results. The policy guidelines in this regard must therefore include reforms in pricing and marketing, credit and finance, indigenous research, improved agricultural extension services, and in general, better incentives which will encourage production of food beyond immediate local needs. Kenya has already begun to address some of these drawbacks but it will require some time before the results could be properly accessed.

In this connection Africa could learn much from the Asian experience, particularly China and India which were the two countries most commonly associated with food poverty two decades ago when Africa was much better able to feed itself.

It is exactly because of these policy shifts as cited above that food security has been achieved in these two countries. One recent report indicated that while "20 years ago India had to import 10 million tons of grain to stave off starvation, it now has a 30 million-ton surplus of food grains" <sup>6</sup>. The same report noted that China, which incidentally is more within the socialist camp as Tanzania, "has achieved food security for its one billion inhabitants, on 22 percent of the world's arable land"<sup>7</sup>. This success in both cases was achieved through public policy packages which were geared towards the stimulation of sustained production by small farmers and improved consumption by the poor.

---

<sup>6</sup> UNDP, Co-operation South 1986 No.3, (New York, 1986) p.6.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid p.8

A very significant policy shift in the case of China, was the realization that the previous communal system of production experimented with before 1979 did not provide farmers with adequate incentives to expand production, whose value rose by just 3 percent "Between 1979-83 that rate jumped by about 8 percent per year".

The policy implication is also significant for countries such as Kenya which are faced with severe arable land constraints. For countries with the ideological inclinations of Tanzania, it shows that incentives in a socialist framework are also feasible. Again, the need for policy flexibility and innovativeness is evident.

6.6. The Spatial Dimension: Urban - Rural Linkages

Various theories on spatial planning and development were discussed in Chapter 2, but the investigations of approaches in Africa (in Chapter 3) and the specific case studies in Chapter 4, have shown that spatial planning in Africa is yet to chart new strategies for bringing about equity. This is a rather heuristic undertaking which does not allow for 'hard and fast' recommendations in support of any single theory or approach, although there are basic considerations which should be common to any efforts to foster equitable spatial development. Furthermore, the varying ideological slants and different inclinations to the existing international economic order, have made it futile for any observer to prescribe, at this stage, a single approach to spatial development in Africa.

It must be recognized, however, that the existing spatial development configuration of most African countries has not been of their own making, and was not intended to serve their own purposes. Therefore, an underlying feature of any strategy is that the premise on which the existing spatial development patterns have been based must be questioned and redressed in accordance with the overall development approaches and potential of respective countries.

The case for some type of national spatial planning framework has already been made earlier in this work. It appears to this author, nevertheless, that a most critical issue to be addressed is the functional interaction, and indeed interdependence of urban centres and the hinterland. Of course, the importance of this relationship had long been observed as discussed in Section 2.4 of this thesis. There is also evidence that some of these strategies such as 'growth pole' techniques have been attempted with mixed results.

The observation of this author is that the application of any variation of the existing theories in this regard has not in itself been found to be conclusively bad, but they have been attempted or imposed upon an existing dilemma which in itself has to be simultaneously overhauled. If, as has been stated in this study, as well as by other observers such as Seidman, Obudho, Kingoriah<sup>8</sup> and others, the spatial development configuration of Africa had been determined by insular economic goals of colonial authorities, then the basis of these criteria must be challenged and altered accordingly so as to give rise to the emergence of new "growth poles" or urban centres with a different orientation. Centres of potential development should not be promulgated in such a manner that they continue to reinforce a foundation which has already been found to be lacking. Linkages should also be internally focused. The author does not wish to imply that the existing order of hierarchy of settlements must be totally abandoned or neglected. However, there is a need to examine more closely the functional relationships between existing urban/rural centres or potential centres and their hinterland. Nor does this observation mean that sub-national centres in Africa should not be linked to the international economy, if in fact the locational considerations of such centres, such as mining towns for instance, are export oriented in the first place. What is most important, nevertheless, is that such centres be re-oriented to also play a more significant role in providing social services and economic opportunities to their adjacent areas, as well as nationally.

---

<sup>8</sup> Op. cit

For instance, the role of cocoa in Ghana has had a minimal impact on promoting national spatial rural development. Much the same could be said for coffee in Kenya, or other commodity production in various countries. The commodities have given rise to small enclaves for marketing, usually to a central government parastatal, but have yet failed to harness the full potential for dispersed development since independence. Commodity processing at 'source' is still underdeveloped, and certainly not overly encouraged by the donor and creditor community. It is therefore no small wonder that many rural centres have remained stagnant, subjected more or less to the whims and fancies of the international market place. The much talked about urban-rural linkages, in the view of this author, remains an illusion predicated on 'subsistence marketing' activities. Therefore, it is conceivable that even when capital is injected into a 'rural centre' the purchasing power of those within and around that centre still leave much to be desired and therefore meaningful 'linkages' or growth are hampered.

Efforts must be made to improve this relationship from one of a link for subsistence to promoting real opportunities which are nationally distributed. Governments will therefore have to direct more investment to carefully selected centres, but at the same time also allow for the emerging economic viability of such centres to increase on the purchasing ability and consumption within the respective 'catchment' area. Effecting such a move will also require Central Government to relinquish an increased amount of the proceeds from such investments to Local Authorities governing such areas. Under such an approach this author also envisages an increase in the ability of local communities to also invest in locally based ventures, and for local authorities to generate additional resources to finance social amenities and development works to more adequately service their respective hinterland.

Details of such possible initiative should be elaborated within the framework of plans from both the top and the bottom as discussed earlier. This author therefore does not entirely agree with some critics who suggest that the preparation of 'district level plans' in African countries is unwarranted. If urban-rural inter-action is going to be properly orchestrated then some form of plan formulation is necessary. The constraint seems to be more one of lack of capacity to do so immediately, rather than any substantive indication to the contrary.

An additional constraint is the unavailability of adequate information and data for promoting a proper hierarchy of settlements as cited earlier. Again, the pendulum swings towards the need for urgent national spatial planning which cannot be over-emphasized here. It appears only in this manner that meaningful urban-rural linkages, with attendant infrastructure to facilitate the reciprocally beneficial relationship, could be strengthened.

It also should not be assumed that re-orienting spatial development, and improving on the role of urban/rural centres in national development is going to be achieved within a short time frame. It could easily take the better part of a generation before significant results are realized. Such efforts may require new ports, highways, dams, agricultural research and development, as well as improvements in commerce and industrial knowhow.

6.7. Education and Training for Rural Development

Planning and implementing rural development programmes require multi-disciplinary approaches and community participation at all stages is essential. Planning embraces such fields as engineering, economics, statistics, sociology, design. Rural development focuses on agriculture, health, transport, marketing, human resource development, management and other diverse areas. Thus planning and effectively implementing rural development programmes demand competencies in a great complexity of disciplines and skills. There is a demand for specialists - engineers, architects, medical doctors, agriculturists, economists, educators, etc. There is equally a demand for generalists - social planners, environmentalists etc. Besides possessing technical expertise personnel involved in rural development planning and implementation must have flexible attitudes towards problem solving, must be capable of adapting models, experimenting, developing appropriate innovative solutions. No one type of specialisation can conquer the challenges of rural development. It is therefore imperative that all education and training programmes should underscore the necessity for team effort, co-ordination where feasible and flexibility of approach, besides the important aspect of imparting technical knowledge and skills.



### 6.7.1 Decision Making

While it is uncommon that education and training be proposed for decision makers particularly in the African context, it is essential that policymakers at the political level have the opportunity in various fora to discuss in detail with technical personnel, the demands of the rural development process, the choices based on resources and priorities, the institutional infrastructure and managerial capacity requirements. Policymakers will thus be more aware of the broader implications and constraints of rural development and that decrees are ineffective unless the resources are available for proper implementation. Any re-design or re-organisation within the rural development framework should thus be instituted on the basis of knowledge and understanding of the processes involved, the local expectations and constraints, and therefore be more realistic. Opportunities should exist on a regular basis for this type of discussion and reflection on policy issues.

### 6.7.2 Planners

In the past, planning has been viewed as a central government activity, with token inputs from regional and district levels. Now that the emphasis is gradually shifting to the district and lower levels, the inability of local personnel to develop adequate district plans becomes more acute. It is therefore essential that the planning capacity at district, regional as well as central levels be strengthened to undertake the new demands of integrated rural development planning.

Since, of necessity, an intersectoral approach must be emphasized, planners must be able to work with the various technical experts to determine the nature of the problems, the possible solutions, the priorities for action, the available resources and together with the representatives of community interest groups, draft a plan based on the realities and aspirations of the area.

It would be useful if training and upgrading programmes for planners afford abundant opportunities for field experience within their own countries as well as subregionally. As far as possible, recruitment for training programmes should focus on those untrained and inexperienced personnel already on the job.

Some reference must also be made to the type of planning education received by planners in Africa. Owing to the shortage of training institutions, many of the senior planners were trained abroad in programmes which very seldom reflected on case studies from developing countries or relevant to such needs. In some cases graduate students undertook research work on the respective countries, but the focus of the training still lacked much relevance to the African dilemma.

Furthermore, if the wave of district focus and decentralization programmes are going to prove successful in Africa, the quantity and quality aspects of proper training must be an essential and most urgent consideration. The planning institutions in Africa will have a most important role to play in meeting these oscillating needs.

This author strongly recommends that much greater emphasis be placed on regional planning, including optional concentrations in aspects relevant to district focus and decentralization - in general rural focus. For quite some time the two main institutions for the training of planners in Africa had been the University of Nairobi, Kenya and the University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana. Both these institutions have afforded opportunities for training in planning which allows for immediate case studies, within the African context and of relevance to current and projected needs.

It is therefore incumbent upon these two major institutions to anticipate the growing needs and focus, not only with respect to their own countries, but also regarding continental regional requirements. Additional emphasis on micro level regional planning will certainly be required in accordance with emerging events. The implications are that planners should be moving out of the traditional role in 'town and country planning departments' and also moving into local government institutional role which will require increased knowledge of local government; budgeting, revenue, etc., in addition to the traditional scope.

A good example is the case of Zimbabwe. When the concept of decentralization was first raised in 1981 immediately after independence, a study was commissioned by the UN and undertaken by Prof. Amos<sup>9</sup> who concluded that at that time the Ministry of Local Government and Town Planning was likely to need 157 planners of which "less than thirty are now in place".

---

<sup>9</sup> John Amos, Proposals for the Training of Planners in Zimbabwe, 1981  
(Study undertaken for UNCHS)

He further estimated that at the local rural level 125 planners were needed, and at the local urban level 50 planners. Overall he felt that there was a need for 283 planners of which only 38 were available. More recent estimates made by this author indicate that the need at the local level (rural and urban) has doubled as a result of the directive to undertake formal plan preparation at this level, plus the reorganization and strengthening of the local government machinery. The amalgamation of 'communal land' and 'large farm' holdings adds another dimension which will have to be addressed.

To-date, Zimbabwe has been the only country in Africa to establish a Post Graduate Diploma Programme in Rural Development Planning within the University's Department of Rural and Urban Planning. This author strongly supports this initiative which encompasses training in the following:

- .. Rural Production and Policies
  - environmental systems
  - farming systems
  - land use and land tenure
  - the economics of agricultural development
  - agrarian reform and resettlement
- .. Rural Infrastructure, Industries and Services
  - physical infrastructure and construction
  - rural industries, employment and technology
  - social services planning
- .. Rural Planning and Management
  - project identification; preparation and appraisal
  - management, implementation, monitoring and evaluation
- .. Research methods and Practical Work
  - research methods and data analysis
  - surveying and mapping
  - course project

- .. Individual Project  
Individual and group practical exercises  
make up a major part of the programme

It is also strongly recommended that another section be included to focus on administration and management aspects of local government since it is envisaged that many of these graduates will be working with local authorities.

The Department of Planning at the University of Science and Technology also restructured its training programme in 1985/86 and proposes to place greater emphasis on regional and district planning in a joint endeavour with the University of Dortmund. The content of the programme includes a focus on local government and financing and budgeting options. Likewise, the programme at the University of Nairobi does offer course options in local government issues and project work on rural planning, but neither offer a formalized concentration in rural development planning as is the case at the University of Zimbabwe.

### 6.7.3 Managers

Project managers, while often possessing various technical skills, sometimes lack training and experience in management and administration of rural projects. These managers can benefit from study tours to other countries in the region, where they might observe and discuss the various approaches practised and the relevance of these to their own projects. It could also be useful for managerial consultants from exemplary projects to visit and provide advice on management issues. Special attention should be given to enabling managers to facilitate greater communication - clarifying administrative procedures, obtaining regular feedback, assessing goals and achievements with staff, re-scheduling priorities as appropriate - in short,

adopting a more flexible, empirically sound approach to management.

#### 6.7.4 Extension Workers

Extension workers in the areas of agriculture and other areas of production, health and sanitation, nutrition, and social services are the backbone of rural development efforts. They must inculcate new ideas and practices, alter deleterious attitudes, guide communities to increase production, improve health and nutrition. These are the change agents essential to development. This fact is not always fully recognised as evidenced by the inadequate pre-service and in service training, lack of equipment and inputs and limited mobility afforded these personnel.

Training is but one aspect to be considered. All training programmes should be tailor-made to meet the particular requirements of the communities. Pre-service courses should ensure that participants are sufficiently knowledgeable in their respective disciplines to impart sound technical skills and information. Extension methods such as human relations, communication, adult psychology, etc. ought to be core courses with emphasis on participatory training methods. In service courses should be based on the day to day problems encountered, formulating solutions based on the available resources and up-dating the knowledge and techniques of personnel. Regular seminars at district or sub-district levels can serve to inform field workers of the situation in other areas, stimulate innovative approaches to problem solving and uplift the morale of those who toil in difficult conditions.

#### 6.7.5 The Community

One important area often overlooked when formulating rural development programmes, is the necessity to inform, educate and train the community to participate more fully in development efforts.

The type of training would vary from project to project and the nature of the community. However, it is safe to say that much greater attention needs to be given to upgrading the agricultural skills of both men and women. While a large percentage of women are engaged in agricultural pursuits, particularly provision of basic foods, these women receive little or no training which might enable them to increase production.

It is strongly advocated that rural development projects address themselves to assisting communities to become more self-reliant in the provision of basic non-agricultural needs to the extent that resources would allow. This implies careful survey of the community to determine the needs, resources available and the feasibility of setting up small scale industries to cater for these needs. Appropriate skills training would include the vocational and managerial skills. Functional literacy post literacy and other continuing adult education programmes relevant to development needs are a necessity for the success of projects and should form an integral part thereof rather than a mere appendage as often now is the case.

When considering the education and training of the community, particular attention should be given to strengthening the capacity of indigenous local groups such as farmers co-operatives, women's production groups and youths, to better manage their affairs. It would involve leadership training,

business management including marketing, communication and other identified areas of weaknesses.

Given the inadequate number of extension workers, consideration should be given to the training of para-professionals in the fields of agriculture and livestock, health and nutrition. These persons, drawn from the communities with a sound knowledge of traditional practices and attitudes, can be trained to be the "long arms" of extension workers reaching those areas virtually inaccessible to the extension worker, identifying problems, demonstrating innovative practices, reinforcing skills, assessing community acceptance, etc. These para-professionals would require short intensive pre-service training with regular in-service sessions to up-date their knowledge as well as obtain feed-back.

#### 6.8 International Agencies and Donors

It is strongly recommended that governments also issue policy guidelines governing the regulation of interventions by international funding agencies and bilateral donors. A major consideration is that such agencies and donors should work through a particular government body or ministry. While the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development is usually expected to co-ordinate and regulate these functions, in practice, they have not appeared to have the capacity or will to do so and have often relegated this function to the line ministries or even non-governmental organizations.

It is also for this reason that the Spatial Development Plan discussed below will also include the preparation of specific project dossiers in key areas so that the agencies and donors may then select, in consultation with government, rural project concepts in which they are interested. Failure to



take steps in this direction will continue to result in disjointed and incremental interventions which may not necessarily be in accordance with the established priorities of the government and the recipient communities.

#### 6.8 Lessons for the Future: Summary

The subject of this study was influenced by this author's encounters and experiences in Africa over the past fifteen years, and the voluminous amount of studies, seminars and conferences, concerned with bringing about development in Africa, particularly in the neglected hinterland. One indication noted from the abundance of efforts in this regard, and the proliferation of various bits of material on the subject, is that not much progress has been made and there is still a great deal of disarray in the African development arena. Many of the earlier commentators have since diverted their attention to other development fora; many have since returned to the corridors of academia in the metropolitan countries leaving behind a problem that could not be fathomed and which appears to be increasingly insurmountable. It is from this perspective that this author saw this subject area as a challenge and sought to delve beneath the platitudes in an effort to fully assess the historical constraints and potential opportunities.

The political historians Walter Rodney<sup>10</sup> and Eric Williams<sup>11</sup> have chronicled the very systematic underdevelopment of Africa, and it is now important that Africa learns from this history, and particularly draw conclusions from the strategies of the systematisation of the underdevelopment processes which,

---

<sup>10</sup> Op. cit.

<sup>11</sup> Eric Williams. Capitalism and Slavery (New York, Capricorn Books, 1966)

incidentally, still resurfaces in many areas of the continent, and thereby rally jointly against such discomfoting eventualities.

It is hoped that through this study, it would be recognized that with appropriate arrangements and instruments, re-development\* in Africa should not be a persistently arduous undertaking or evasive goal as has been hitherto the case.

We have seen that there exists a relatively extensive body of knowledge and techniques which are yet to be tested in the pursuit of development goals. Some may be more successful than others, but in the process of application new bodies of knowledge and solutions will arise. The author has put forth some of these options which, from the research work engaged in this study, has led him to believe that these findings, conclusions and recommendations of the last two chapters of this study would afford the same opportunities for achieving new directions and bench marks in the quest to relieve this plight with which many observers and victims are so concerned.

The author sees this work as a modest contribution in the search for solutions to this dilemma. He has undertaken a general overview of the situation and fully recognizes that much is yet to be done as the specifics of the various efforts present new problems to be addressed.

In concluding, however, it must be emphasized that if the respective governments place greater trust in the people for whom development is in the final analysis intended, a primary lesson in this herculean task would have been learnt.

---

\* Underlined for emphasis.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abeyrama, Talakasena and K. Weber. Local Participation in Rural Development Planning: A Case Study Bangkok: Asian Institute of Technology, Research Paper No. 5, 1983.
- Adelman, I. et. al. A Comparison of Two Models for Income Distribution Planning, Paper presented to a World Bank Workshop on Analysis of Distributional Issues in Development, Bellagio: Italy 1977.
- African Development Bank and UN Economic Commission for Africa, Economic Report on Africa Abidjan: 1986.
- Amos, John. Proposals for the Training of Planners in Zimbabwe Nairobi: United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, 1983.
- Anthony, Robert. Planning and Control Systems: A Framework for Analysis Boston: Harvard University Press, 1965.
- Appalraju, Jaya. Regional Planning in Tanzania Dar es Salaam: Ardhi Institute, July 1983.
- Apter, David. The Politics of Modernization Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1965
- Axinn, George. New Strategies for Rural Development East Lansing, Michigan: Rural Life Associates, 1978
- Barkan, Joel and John Okumu. Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania New York: Praeger, 1979
- Berry, Brian. J. L. The Human Consequences of Urbanization New York: St. Martins Press, 1973.
- Bienefeld, M. and M. Godfrey. The Struggle for Development: National Strategies in an International Context Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1982.
- Boesen, J. et. al. Ujamaa - Socialism from Above Uppsalla: Nordic Africa Institute, 1978.
- Bovon, W. and S. Tolbert. Investing in Development: Lessons of World Bank Experience New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Brown, L. and E. Eckholm. By Bread Alone New York: Praeger, 1974.
- Brownstein, Lewis. Education and Development in Rural Kenya New York Praeger, 1972.

- Bryant, C. and L. White. Managing Rural Development: Peasant Participation in Rural Development Connecticut, Kumarian Press, 1980.
- Buije, Deike and B. Galjart. Participation of the Poor in Development Leiden: Institute of Cultural Studies, 1982.
- Bukh, J. et. al. Measurement and Analysis of Progress at the Local Level Geneva UNRISD, 1978.
- Burke, F. Tanganyika: The Search for Ujamaa - African Socialism
- Burrows, J. et. al. Kenya: Into the Second Decade Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975.
- Cary, L. Community Development as a Progress Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1970.
- Chadwick, G. A Systems View of Planning Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1971.
- Chambers, R. The Volta Resettlement Experience London: Pall Mall Press, 1970.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Managing Rural Development Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Rural Development: Putting the Last First London: Longman, 1983.
- Chinery, H. et. al. Redistribution with Growth London: Oxford University Press, 1974.
- Christaller, W. Central Places in Southern Germany Englewood Cliffs New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1966.
- Classen, J. Regional Planning London Hutchinson, 1978.
- Cohen, J. and N. T. Uphoff. Rural Development Participation: Concepts and Measures for Project Design, Implementation and Evaluation Ithaca, New York: Rural Development Monograph No. 2, 1977.
- Connell, J. et. al. Migration from Rural Areas: The Evidence from Village Studies New York, Oxford University Press, 1977.
- \_\_\_\_\_. and Lipton, M. Assessing Village Labour Situations in Developing Countries New York, Oxford University Press, 1977.
- Cook, W. and T. Kuhn, (eds). Planning for the Third World: Issues of the 1980s. Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Co. 1982.

- Cowen, M. The British State and Agrarian Accumulation in Kenya after 1975 Swansea: Memeograph, 1980.
- Crawford, E. and E. Thorbecke Employment, Income Distribution and Basic Needs in Kenya Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1981.
- Cullingworth, J. Town and Country Planning in Britain London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1964.
- Currie, L. Accelerating Development New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.
- Dickinson, R. City, Region and Regionalism London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Press, 1947.
- Doxiadis, Constantinos. Ekistics: An Introduction to the Science of Human Settlements New York, Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Etzioni, A. A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1975.
- Ewing, A. Industry in Africa London: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Ewusi, Kodwo. Dynamics of Rural Poverty
- \_\_\_\_\_. Kodwo Report of the Country Case Study in Ghana
- Friedland, W. and Carl Rosberg. African Socialism, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964.
- Friedmann, John. Urbanization Planning and National Development Beverley Hills: Sage, 1973.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Territory and Function: The Evolution of Regional Planning Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
- \_\_\_\_\_. and W. Alonso. Reginal Development and Planning Cambridge, Massachussetts, MIT Press, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_. and D. Buijs. Participation of the Poor in Development Leiden: Institute of Cultural and Social Studies, 1982.
- Gant, George. Development Administration Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979.
- Geddes, Patrick. Cities in Evolution London: William and Norgate, 1949.
- Ghai, D. et. al. Agrarian Systems and Rural Development New York: Holmes and Meir, 1979

- \_\_\_\_\_. Godfrey, M. and F. Lisk. Planning for Basic Needs in Kenya: Performance, Policies and Prospects, Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1979.
- \_\_\_\_\_. and S. Radwan. Agrarian Policies and Rural Poverty in Africa Geneva, International Labour Organization, 1983.
- Ghana, Government of. Guidelines for the Five Year Development Plan 1975-1980 Accra: Government Printer 1975.
- Ghana, Government of. Two Year Development Plan, 1968-70 Accra: Government Printer 1968.
- Ghana, Government of. The Rebirth of Ghana: The End of Tyranny Accra: Government Printer, 1966.
- Ghambi, Roosevelt, "Rural Growth Centres: The Malawi Example" in H. Kammier and P. Swan (eds) Equity with Growth? Planning Perspectives for Small Towns in Developing Countries. Bangkok: Institute of Technology, 1984 pp 676-686.
- Gitelson, Susan. Multilateral Aid for National Development and Self Reliance. A Case Study of the UNDP in Uganda and Tanzania, Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975.
- Goldsworthy, D. Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget Nairobi: Heinemann, 1982.
- Gore, C. Regions in Question: Space, Development, Theory and Regional Planning London: Matheus, 1984.
- Griffin, K. and Enos, J. Planning Development London Addison-Wesley, 1970.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Political Economy of Agrarian Change (Cambridge), Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974.
- \_\_\_\_\_. International Inequality and National Poverty New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978.
- \_\_\_\_\_. and James, J. The Transaction to Egalitarian Development New York, St. Martins Press, 1981.
- Garbow, Stephen and Allen Keskin. "Foundation for a Radical Concept of Planning" in Warren Bennis et. al. The Planning of Changes New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1975, pp. 413-422.
- Grindle, Merille. Bureaucrats, Politicians and Peasants in Mexico: A Case Study in Public Policy Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

- \_\_\_\_\_. (ed) Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- Grove, D. & Huzar, L. The Towns of Ghana: The Role of Service Centres in Regional Planning Accra, Ghana Universities Press, 1964.
- Harvey, C. et. al. Rural Employment and Administration in the Third World: Development Methods and Alternative Strategies Farnborough: Teakfield, 1979.
- Harvey, David. Social Justice and the City London: Edward Arnold, 1973.
- Heyer, J. and D. Ireri and J. Moris. Rural Development in Kenya Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1971.
- Heyer, J., J. Martha and W. Senga, (eds) Agricultural Development in Kenya Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1976.
- Hicks, U. Development from Below Oxford: Clarendon, 1961
- Higgins, B. Economic Development New York: W. W. Norton, 1959.
- Hill, D. The Planning and Management of Human Settlements with Special Emphasis on Participation The Hague: International Union of Local Authorities, 1975.
- Hirsch, F. Social Limits to Growth Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Strategy of Economic Development New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1958.
- Hirshmann, A. Journeys Toward Progress New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963.
- Holland, S. The Regional Problem London: Macmillan, 1976.
- Holtham, G. and A. Hazelwood, Aid and Inequality in Kenya: British Development Assistance to Kenya London: Groom Helm, 1976.
- Hoyle, B. Spatial Aspects of Development London: John Wiley, 1974.
- Hufschmidt, M. Regional Planning: Challenge and Prospects New York, Praeger, 1969.
- Hunt, Diana. Credit for Agricultural Development: A Case Study of Uganda Nairobi: East African Publishing Co. 1975.
- Hyden, G. Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry London: Heinemann, 1980.

- . "Efficiency Versus Distribution" East African Cooperatives  
(Nairobi, East African Literature Bureau, 1973).
- . No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in  
Perspective London: Heinemann, 1983.
- . & Jackson, R. et. al. (eds). Development, Administration, the  
Kenya Experience Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Oqbozurike, M. Problem-Generating Structures in Nigeria's Rural Development  
Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976.
- Jackson, J. Introduction to African Civilizations New York: University  
Books, 1970.
- Jansen, M. (ed). Regionalism in America Madison: University of  
Wisconsin, 1951.
- Johnson, B. and D. Clark. Redesigning Rural Development: A Strategic  
Perspective Baltimore, John Hopkins, 1982.
- Jones, D. Aid and Development in Southern Africa: British Aid to Botswana,  
Lesotho and Swaziland London: Groom Helm, 1977.
- Jones, G. Planned Organizational Change London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977.
- Kay, Godfrey. Development and Underdevelopment London: Macmillian, 1975.
- Kenya, Government of. African Socialism and Its Application to Planning,  
Sessional Paper No. 10 Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965.
- Kenya, Government of. Legco Debates, Vol 76. Part 2 Nairobi: Government  
Printer 1958.
- Kenya, Government of. Report of the Commission of Enquiry Nairobi:  
Government Printer, 1971.
- Kenya, Government of. District Focus for Rural Development Nairobi:  
Government Printer, 1984.
- Kenya, Government of. Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 on Economic Management  
for Renewed Growth Nairobi: Government Printer, 1986.
- Kenya, Government of. Fourth National Development Plan 1979-1983 Nairobi:  
Government Printer, 1979.
- Kenya, Government of. Development Plan 1974-78 Nairobi: Government  
Printer, 1974.
- Kingoriah, George. Introduction to Land Economics Nairobi: Nairobi  
University Press, 1988 (Forthcoming).



- Korton D. and F. Alfonso (eds) Bureaucracy and the Poor: Closing the Gap Singapore: McGraw Hill, 1980.
- Kramer, Ralph. Participation and the Poor. Comparative Community Case Studies in the War on Poverty Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1969.
- Kulp, E. Rural Development Planning New York, Praeger, 1970.
- Lele, U. The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975.
- Leonard, D. (ed). Rural Administration in Kenya Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1973.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Reaching the Peasant Farmer: Organization, Theory and Practice in Kenya Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.
- Lewis, Arthur. Development Planning: The Essentials of Economic Policy London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1966.
- Leys, C. (ed). Politics and Change in Developing Countries London: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.
- Lipton, M. Why Poor People Stay Poor Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976.
- Livingston, R. Rural Development, Employment and Income in Kenya Addis Ababa: ILO, 1981.
- Lotchie, M. (ed) The State of Nations: Constraints on the Development of Independent African States Berkeley : University of California Press, 1970.
- Long, N. An Introduction to the Sociology of Rural Development Boulder: Westview Press, 1977.
- Lonsdale, John. Africa South of the Sahara London: Europa, 1975.
- Losch, A. The Economic of Location New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1954.
- Lynton, R. and U. Pareek. Training and Development West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1967.

- Mackaye, B. The New Exploration: A Philosophy of Regional Planning, New York: Harcourt Brace & Co. 1928.
- Mabogunje, A. and A. Faniran (eds) Regional Planning and National Development in Tropical Africa, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1977.
- Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1954.
- Mawhood, P. (ed) Local Government in the Third World Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1983.
- Mbilinyi, Marjorie. Women: Producers and Reproducers in Peasant Production. Dar-es-Salaam ERB Occasional Paper 77/3, Dar-es-Salaam: Economic and Research Bureau, University of Dar-es-Salaam, 1977.
- Mbithi, Philip. Rural Sociology and Rural Development: Its Application in Kenya Nairobi: East Africa Literature Bureau, 1974.
- Monod, T. (ed) Pastoralism in Tropical Africa, London: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Montgomery, J. and W. Siffin (ed). Approaches to Development: Policies, Administration and Change, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.
- Morawetz, D. Twenty Five Years of Economic Development 1955-1975 Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1977.
- Moris, J. Managing Induced Rural Development Bloomington, Indiana: International Development Institute, Indiana University, 1981.
- Morss, E. et. al. Strategies for Small Farm Development: An Empirical Study of Rural Development Project, 2 Vols., Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976.
- Mumford, L. The Culture of Cities New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1938.
- Mwansasu, B. and C. Pratt (eds) Towards Socialism in Tanzania Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979.
- Ndegwa, P. et. al. (eds) Development Options for Africa in the 1980's and Beyond Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Newby, H. (ed) International Perspectives in Rural Sociology New York: John Wiley, 1975.
- Nkrumah, K. Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization Development New York: Monthly Review Press, 1965.
- Nwabueze, B. Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa London: Hurst, 1974.

- Seidman, Anne. Comparative Development Strategies in East Africa, Nairobi East African Publishing House, 1972.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Ghana's Development Experience, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1982.
- Sigmund, P. (ed) The Ideologies of Developing Nations New York: Praeger, 1967.
- Sorrenson, M. Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Stohr, W. and D. Taylor (eds) Development from Above or Below: The Dialectics of Regional Planning in Developing Countries Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1981.
- Streeten, P. and M. Lipton (eds) The Crises of Indian Planning London: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Sutherland, A. Report on School and Village Planning Accra: Department of Town and Country Planning.
- Swynnerton, R. A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya Nairobi: Government Printer, 1954.
- Thimm, Heinz-Ulrich, et. al. (eds) Planning and Operating Rural Centres in Developing Countries, Hamburg: Verlag Weltarchiv GMBH, 1986.
- Ul Haq, Mahbub. The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World New York: Columbia University Press, 1976.
- United Kingdom, Report of the British Economic Mission of the Five Year Development Plan December, 1965 (Unpublished)
- United Nations, Twentieth Report of the Administrative Committee on Coordination, Annex III, New York, 1956.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Guidelines for Rural Centre Planning, New York, 1979.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Integration of Economic & Physical Planning. New York 1975.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Promoting Organized Self-Help Through Co-operative Modes of Participation, UNCHS, Nairobi, 1984.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Rural Cooperatives as Agents of Change. New York: UNRISD, 1975.

- Nyerere, J. Freedom and Socialism London: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Oberlander, H. Report on the Establishment, Organization and Administration of an Institute for Community Planning in Ghana New York: United Nations, 1960.
- Obudho, R. A. and D. Taylor (eds) The Spatial Structure of Development: A Study of Kenya Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979.
- Omari, C. The Strategy for Rural Development: Tanzania Experience Dar-es-Salaam: East African Literature Bureau, 1976.
- Oyugi, Walter. "Local Government in Kenya: A Case of Institutional Decline" in P. Mawhood (ed) Local Government in the Third World Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1983.
- Oyugi, Walter. Rural Development Administration: A Kenya Experience New Delhi, Vikas Publishing, 1981.
- Parsons, Kenneth et. al (eds) Land Tenure Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956.
- Perloff, H. Alliance for Progress. A Social Invention in the Making Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1979.
- Pitt, D. Development from Below: Anthropologists and Development Situations The Hague: Mouton, 1976.
- Rodney, W. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa London: Bogle - l'Ouverture, 1976.
- Rondinelli, W. and K. Ruddle. Urban Functions in Rural Development: An Analysis of Integrated Spatial Development Policy Washington: USAID, 1976.
- Rondinelli, W. and K. Ruddle. Urbanization and Rural Development: A Spatial Policy for Equitable Growth, New York: Praeger, 1978.
- Rostow, W. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto London: Cambridge University Press, 1960.
- Rweyemanu, A. G. Hyden (eds) A Decade of Public Administration in Africa Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975.
- \_\_\_\_\_ and B. Mwansasu (eds) Planning in Tanzania: Background to Decentralization Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1974.
- Shil, E. The Intellectuals and the Powers, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972.

- \_\_\_\_\_. The Quest for a Unified Approach to Development, Geneva, 1980.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements and the Vancouver Action Plan, New York, 1976.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Estimates and Projections of Urban, Rural and City Populations 1956-2025, New York, 1985.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Special Session on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa, New York, 1986.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Role of Small and Intermediate Settlements in National Development, Nairobi: UNCHS, 1985.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Integrated Approach to Rural Development in Africa Addis Ababa: ECA, 1971.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Report of the Meeting of the Expert Group on Comprehensive Development Planning, New York.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Landless - A Growing Problem. Rome: FAO, 1984.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Population and Labour Force in Rural Economics Rome: FAO, 1986.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Report on the FAO/SIDA Expert Consultation on Policies and Institutions for Integrated Rural Development, Rome, 1977.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Rural Development Issues and Approaches for Technical Cooperation, New York: UNDP, 1979.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Preparatory Committee for the Special Session on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa: Contribution by the Chairman, New York, 1986.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Development Strategies for the Rural Poor, Rome: FAO, 1984.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Review and Analysis of Agrarian Reform and Rural Development in the Developing Countries since the mid-1960s Rome: FAO, 1969.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The State of the World's Children, New York: UNICEF 1985.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Towards Self-Reliance: Development, Employment and Equity Issues in Tanzania, Addis Ababa: International Labour Organization, 1978.
- Verhagen, K. Cooperatives and Rural Poverty (compiled by the author)
- Vogeler, I. and DeSouza (eds) Dialectics of Third World Development Montclair, New York: Allanheld, 1984.

- von Boguslawski, M. (Compiler) Principles and Limitations of Rural Development Gleason: (Privately compiled), June 1979.
- von Freyhold, M. Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania. An Analysis of Social Experiment London: Heinemann, 1979.
- Waterston, A. Development Planning: Lessons of Experience Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1965.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Managing Planned Agricultural Development Washington, D.C.: Government Affairs Institute, 1976.
- Weitz, R. From Peasant to Farmer New York: Columbia University Press 1971.
- Weitz, R. (ed) Rural Development in a Changing World, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Integrated Rural Development. The Rehovot Approach, Rehovot, Israel: Settlement Study Centre, 1972.
- Widstrand, G. (ed) Cooperatives and Rural Development in East Africa Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1970.
- Williams, E. Capitalism and Slavery, New York: Russell & Russell, 1944.
- Wolfers, E. Decentralization in the South Pacific: University of the South Pacific, 1985.
- World Bank. World Tables, Washington, D.C., 1976.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, D.C. 1981.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Kenya: Into the Second Decade Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Kenya Economic Memorandum, Washinton, D.C. 1979.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Ghana: Managing the Transition, Vol. 1, Washington, D.C., 1984.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Tanzania Economic Memorandum, Washington, D.C. 1984.

Periodicals/Articles

- Alverson, Hoyt. "Peace Corps Volunteers in Rural Botswana". HUMAN Organization, Vol. 36 No. 3, 1977.
- Beer, C. Politics of Peasant Groups in Western Nigeria Ibadan University Press, Social Science, No. 7, 1976.
- Beguele, Assefa. "Stagnation and Inequality in Ghana". Agrarian Policies and Rural Poverty in Ghana.
- Belshaw, D. "Rural Development Planning: Concepts and Techniques" Journal of Agriculture Economics Vol. XXVIII (1977), pp. 279-292.
- Bodenstedt, A. "Self-Help: Reflections on the Strategical Utility of an Organized Form of Joint Social Actions for Development Purposes" in A. Bodenstedt (ed) Self-Help: Instrument or Objective in Rural Development, Heidelberg, 1976, pp. 17-18
- Brebner, P. and J. Briggs. "Rural Settlement Planning in Algeria and Tanzania: A Comparative Study" Habitat International, Vol. 6, No. 5/6 (1982) pp. 621-628.
- Brian, J. "Less than Seemed Class: Women in Rural Settlement Schemes in Tanzania" in Hafkin et. al. (eds) Women in Africa Standord: Stanford University Press, 1976.
- Brown, C. K. "Rural Development Strategies with Special Reference to Ghana", Accra: Memeograph (date not given)
- Bugnicourt, J. "Popular Participation in Development in Africa" Assignment Children, 1982, pp. 74-75
- Buijs, Deike. "On Admittance, Access, Cooperation and Participation: The Basic Concepts of the Access and Participation Research" in D. Buije and B. Galhart (eds) Participation of the Poor in Development Leiden: Institute of Cultural Studies, 1982, pp. 8-20.
- Buxton, J. and D. Dunham. "Some Aspects of Regional Planning and Rural Development Policy in Ghana" in Development and Change, Vol. 11, (1970-71). pp. 58-64
- Chambers, Robert. "Project Selection for Poverty Focussed Rural Development: Simple is Optimal". World Development, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1978.
- Chambers, Robert. "Administrators: A Neglected Factor in Pastoral Development in East Africa". Journal of Administration Overseas, Vol. 18, No. 2, (1979) pp. 84-94.
- Cohen, J. "Rural Change in Ethiopia: The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit". Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1974) pp. 580-614.
- Collins, Paul. "The Working of Tanzania's Rural Development Fund: A Problem of Decentralization". Planning in Tanzania

- Conroy, M. "Rejection of the Growth Centre Strategy in Latin American Development Planning". Land Economics, Vol. XLIX, No. 4. (Nov. 1973), pp. 371-380.
- Conyers, D. "Social Analysis for Local Social Development Planning" in Development Dialogue Vol. 7, No. 1, (Spring 1986) (UNCRD).
- Crosswell, M. "Basic Needs: A Development Planning Approach". Basic Needs and Development Cambridge: Oelgeschlager Gunn, 1981.
- Dawson, A. "Suggestions for an Approach to Rural Development by Foreign Aid Programmes". International Labour Review, Vol. 117, No. 4, (1978) pp. 391-404.
- Delp, P. "District Planning" (Nairobi, RDP).
- De Vries, J. "Participation and the Success of Communal Production Projects in Tanzania". Rural Development Participation Review Vol. III, No. 2, (1982) pp. 16-19.
- Dickinson, R. "The Metropolitan Cities of the United States". Geographical Reviews 24, 1934.
- Elkan, Walter. "Concepts in the Description of African Economics" Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1976) pp. 691-695.
- Ewusi, Kodwo. "Report on the Country Case Study in Ghana" in J. Bukh (et. al.) (eds) Measurement and Analysis of Progress at the Local Level, Geneva: UNRISD, 1978, pp. 3-10
- Feig, Douglas. "Political Development Theory and Africa: A Reanalysis" Journal of Development Areas, Vol. 12, No. 3, (1978) pp. 337-346.
- Galjart, B. "Rural Development and Sociological Concepts: A Critique" Rural Sociology Vol 36, No. 1 (1971) pp. 31-41.
- Godfrey, M. "Kenya: African Capitalism or Simple Dependency?" in Bienefeld M. and M. Godfrey (eds) The Struggle for Development: National Strategies in an International Context. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1982.
- Goss, Kevin. "Consequences of Diffusion of Innovations". Rural Sociology Vol. 44, No. 4 (1979) pp. 754-772.
- Garbow, Stephen and Allan Heskin. "Foundations for a Radical Concept of Planning" in Warren Bennis, et. al (eds) The Planning of Change New York: Holt Reinhart and Winston, 1975 pp. 413-419
- Hall, A. and R. Fagan "Definition of Systems". General Systems: Yearbook of the Society for the Advancement of General Systems Theory, Vol. 1



- Hansen, N. "Development from Above: The Centre Down Development Paradigm" in Stohr W. and D. Taylor (eds) Development from Above or Below New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1981.
- ✓ Haq. M. "An International Perspective on Basic Needs". Poverty and Basic Needs. Washington: World Bank, 1980.
- Hague, W. and N. Mehta et. al. "Towards a Theory of Rural Development" Development Dialogue 1977, Vol. 2, pp. 11-137.
- Harris, G. "Some Aspects of Decentralization and the Formulation and Implementation of Agricultural Policy in Ghana" in Ofori (ed) Factors of Agricultural Growth in West Africa Legon: University of Ghana, 1973, pp. 185-201
- Harrison, P. "Land and People, the Growing Pressure". Earthwatch, No. 13, (1983).
- Helleiner, G. "Beyond Growth Rates and Plan Volumes - Planning for Africa in the 1970s". Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 10 No. 3, (1972) pp. 333-355.
- Herman, R. "Two Aspects of Budgeting". Indian Journal of Public Administration (New Delhi) Vol. 111, No. 3, (1962).
- Hicks, N. "Is There a Trade-Off Between Growth and Basic Needs?" Poverty and Basic Needs Washington, World Bank, 1980.
- Higgins, B. and J. Higgins. "The Reluctant Planner: An Overview of Planning in Developing Countries" in Cook W. and T. Kuhn (eds) Planning Processes in Developing Countries: Techniques and Achievements Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1983.
- Hobbs, D. "Rural Development: Intentions and Consequences". Rural Sociology, Vol 45, No. 1, 1980, pp. 7-25.
- House, J. and T. Killick. In Ghai and Radevan, (eds) "Social Justice and Development Policy in Kenya's Rural Economy". Agrarian Policies, Geneva; International Labour Organization. pp. 48-52
- Jacob, J. "Schooling, Planners and the Poor: The Case of Calculated Anarchy" Comparative Education Review Vol. 23, No. 3, (1979) pp. 422-432.
- Jacoby, E.H. "Aspects of Institutional Planning as Part of Agricultural Planning". Papers presented to Rehevo Conference on Comprehensive Planning of Agriculture in Developing Countries Jerusalem: Land Settlement Department, 1963, pp. 33.

- Jenny, A. Beat. "Planning Processes in Developing Countries" in W. Cook and T. E. Kuhn (eds) Planning for the Third World: Issues of the 1980s Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1982.
- Johns, S. and R. Riley. "Local and District Councils - Should They Be Forgotten". Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1975.
- Kingoriah, G.. "Regions and Regional Delimitation of Aids for Urban and Rural Development in Kenya" Ekistics, Vol 51, No. 304 (Jan./Feb. 1984) pp. 18.
- Kingoriah, G. and E.C. Chesiya. "A Survey of Kenya's Land Policy under KANU" in Twenty Years of Independence 1963-83, Nairobi: Government Printer, 1983, pp. 145-155.
- Kerten, F. "Stimulating Community Participation: Obstacles and Options at Agency, Community and Societal Levels" Rural Development Participation Review, Vol II, No. 3, (Spring 1981) pp. 1-6.
- Korten, D. "Community Organization and Rural Development & Learning Process Approach" The Public Administration Review, Vol. 40, No. 5.
- Kramer, Fred. "Policy Analysis as Ideology" Public Administration Review Vol. 35, No. 5, (1975).
- Kulaba, S. M. "The Role of Small Towns in Rural Development in Tanzania" Equity with Growth? in H. Kammeier and P. Swan (eds) Planning Perspectives for Small Towns in Developing Countries, Bangkok, AIT, 1984.
- Lasuass, J. "On Growth Poles", Urban Studies, (1969)
- Lattrell, W. "Location Planning and Regional Development in Tanzania" Towards Socialist Planning Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972.
- Lavrov, S. and G. Sdasyuk. "The Growth Pole Concept and Regional Planning Experience of Developing Countries". Regional Development Dialogue, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring, 1982) pp. 57-65.
- Leach, J. "The Kenya Special Rural Development Programme". Journal of Administration Overseas, Vol XIII, No. 2 (April 1974) pp. 358-365.
- Legum, C. "Socialism in Ghana: A Political Interpretation" in African Socialism
- Leipziger, D. "Policy Issues and the Basic Human Needs Approach" in Leipziger Basic Needs and Development Cambridge, Gegeschlager, Gunn & Hain.
- Letell. "Rural Africa, Modernization, Equity and Long-Term Development" Science Vol. 211, (February 1981) pp. 547-553.

- Leo, C. "The Failure of the 'Progressive Farmer' in Kenya's Million Acre Settlement Scheme". Journal of Modern Africa Studies Vol 16, No. 4 (1978).
- Leupolt, M. "Action Oriented Principles of Integrated Rural Development" in M. von Boguslawski (Compiler) Principles and Limitations of Integrated Rural Development Gleesson, 1979.
- Leys, C. "Politics in Kenya: Development of Pesant Society" The British Journal of Politics Vol 1, No. 3, 1971 pp. 60-65.
- Lipton, M. "The Theory of the Optimizing Peasant" Journal of Development Studies Vol 4, No. 3, (1968) pp. 327-351.
- Livingstone, I. "Experimentation on Rural Development: Kenya's Special Rural Development Program". Agricultural Administration Vol. 3, No. 3, (1976) pp. 217-233.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "An Evaluation of Kenya's Rural Industrial Programme" Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 15, No. 3, (1977) p. 17.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Economic Irrationality Among Pastoral Peoples in East Africa: Myth or Reality?" IDS Discussion Paper No. 245, Nairobi, IDS, University of Nairobi, 1977.
- Lo, Fu-Chon and K. Salih. "Growth Poles, Agropolitan Development and Polarization Reversal" in W. Stohr and D. Taylor (eds) Development From Above or Below: The Dialectics of Regional Planning in Developing Countries: Chichester: John Wiley, 1981.
- Lofchie, M. "Political and Economic Origins of African Hunger" Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 13, No. 4, 1975.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Agrarian Crisis and Economic Liberalization in Tanzania" Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 16, No. 3, 1978.
- Logan, M.I. "Why Do Rural Areas Stay Poor" in R. P. Misra (ed) Rural Development National Policies and Experiences, Misra Nagoya: Maruzen Asia, 1981, pp. 41-55.
- Mabogunje, Akin. "The Dilemma of Rural Development in Africa" in Regional Development Dialogue Vol. 2, No. 2, (1981) pp. 1-19.
- Maeda, J. and M. Bagachwa. "Rural Development Policies and Perspectives in Tanzania" Rural Development: National Policies and Experiences
- Madondo, B. "Community Development: A Quiet Evolution from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe" Community Development Journal, Oxford University Press, Vol. 2, No. 4, October (1985) pp. 293-298.
- Malecla, J. "Some Issues of Development Planning" Planning in Tanzania. p. 19

- Mawhood, Phillip. "Decentralization: The Concept and Practice" in P. Mahwood (ed) Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1983, pp. 1-24.
- Mazrui, Ali. "Socialism as a Mode of International Protest: The Case of Tanzania" in Rotberg and Robert Ali Mazrui (eds) Protest and Power in Black Africa, New York, Oxford University Press, 1970, pp.
- Mboya, Tom. "African Socialism" Transition Vol. 3, No. 8, (March 1963).
- McCaskie. "Recent History" (of Ghana) in Africa South of the Sahara London, Europa, 1985.
- Mondjangni, A. "Special Structures and Rural Development in Africa" Rural Development: National Policies and Experiences Nagoya: Maruzen Asia, 1981, pp. 275-294.
- Montgomery, J. "Planning to Cope: Administrative Consequences of Rapid Population Growth" in W. Ilchmann et. al. Policy Science and Population Lexington, Mass.,: Lexington Books, 1975.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Populist Front in Rural Development: How shall we Eliminate the Bureaucrats and get on with the Job?" Public Administration Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 (1979).
- \_\_\_\_\_. and M. Eaman. "Popular Participation in Development Administration" Journal of Comparative Administration, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1971.
- Moris, J. "The Agrarian Revolution in Central Kenya: A Study of Farm Innovation in Embu District" Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Northwestern University, 1970.
- Moris, J. "The Transferability of the Western Management Tradition in Non-Western Public Service Sectors" Philippines Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 20, No. 4, (1976).
- Morss, E. "The Arusha Planning and Village Development: An Assessment of Participation at Two Levels" Rural Development Participation Review, Vol. III, No. 3, (Spring 1982).
- \_\_\_\_\_. and D. Gow. "Integrated Rural Development: Nine Critical Implementation Problems" Research Note No. 1, Washington, D.C. Development Alternatives, 1981.
- Mutiso, G. "Cleavage and the Organizational Base of Politics in Kenya" in Politics, Policy and Society Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975.
- Nationalist, The Dar-es-Salaam, 14 June 1969.
- Nellis, J. "The Planning of Public Support for Tanzania Rural Development" Seminar on Rural Development, Syracuse University, University of Dar es Salaam, 4-7 April 1966.

- \_\_\_\_\_. "Socialist Management in Algeria" Journal of Modern African Studies Vol 15, No. 4, (1977).
- Nyerere, Julius. Arusha Declaration Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1967.
- Obudho, R.A. "Planning from Below: The Role of Small Urban Centres in Spatial Development in East Africa" in H. Kammeier and P. Swan (eds) Equity with Growth? Planning Perspective for Small Towns in Developing Countries Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, 1984, pp. 134-154.
- Obudho, R. "Planning from Below or Above in Africa: An Introduction" African Urban Studies, 13 (Spring 1982) pp. 1-7.
- Odum, H. "The Case for Regional National Social Planning" Social Forces (October 1934). pp. 6-23
- Okoth-Ogendo, H. "The Adjudication Process and the Special Rural Development Programme" Nairobi: Institute of Development Studies, IDS Discussion Paper, No. 227, 1976.
- Okpala, D. "Towards a Better Conceptualization of Rural Community Development: Empirical Findings from Nigeria" Human Organization Vol 39, No. 2, (1980).
- Opoku-Afriye, Y. "Regional Development Authority and Rural Development: Greenhill Journal of Administration, Vol. 1, No. 1, (1974) pp. 27-36.
- Oyugi, Walter. Local Government in Kenya: A Case of Institutional Decline in P. Mawhood (ed) Local Government in the Third World Chichester: John Wiley & Sons 1983, pp. 107-140.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Participation in Planning at the Local Level" in O. Leonard (ed) Rural Administration in Kenya Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1973.
- Perloff, H. "Regional Planning in Less Developed Countries" in Hufschmidt M. (ed) Regional Planning: Challenge and Prospect New York: Praeger, 1969. pp. 329-330
- \_\_\_\_\_. Picard, L. "District Councils in Botswana - A Remnant of Local Autonomy" Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 17, No. 2, (1979)
- Rondinelli, D. "International Assistance Policy and Development Project Administration: The Impact of Imperious Rationality" International Organization, Vol 30, No. 4, (1976) pp. 573-605.

- \_\_\_\_\_. "Decentralization of Development Administration in East Africa" in A. S. Cheema and D. A. Rondinelli (eds) Decentralization and Development: Policy Implications in Developing Countries Beverley Hills, Sage, 1983.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "A Critical Review of 'Regions in Question'" in Third World Planning Review, Vol 7, No. 3, (August, 1985), pp. 263-268.
- Saul, J. "Planning for Socialism in Tanzania: The Socio-Political Context" in Towards Socialist Planning Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Publishing House, 1972.
- Schaffer, B. Improving Access to Public Services Sussex, IDS Discussion Paper No. 23, Brighton, 1973.
- \_\_\_\_\_. and Huang Wen Hsien "Distribution and the Theory of Access" Development and Change, Vol. 6, No. 2 (April 1975) pp. 13-25.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Review of Queuing and Waiting" Journal of Development Vol. 12, No. 4, (1976).
- Seers, D. "The Meaning of Development" in Wilber Charles (ed) The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment New York, London House, 1973.
- Shadid, W. et. al. "Access and Participation: A theoretical Approach" in D. Buije and B. Galjart (eds) Participation of the Poor in Development, Leiden: Institute of Cultural Studies, 1982.
- Seibel, H.D. "Indigenous Self-Help Organizations and Rural Development: Some Liberian and Ghanaian Cases" Rural Development - Participation Review, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Summer, 1979. pp. 11-15
- Smith, Courtland et. al. "Economic Development: Panacea or Perplexity for Rural Areas?" Rural Sociology Vol. 36, No. 2, (1971) pp. 173-186.
- Stewart F. and P. Streeten. "New Strategies for Development: Poverty Income Distribution and Growth: Oxford Economic Papers 28, No. 3, pp. 381-405.
- Stohr, Walter. "Development from Below: The Bottom Up and Periphery Toward Development Paradigm?" in W. Stohr and D. Taylor (eds) Development From Above or Below: The Dialectics of Regional Planning in Developing Countries Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1981, pp. 39-40
- Strachan, H. "Side Effects of Planning in the Aid Control System" World Development Vol 6., No. 4, (1978)
- Streeten, Paul. "Basic Needs, Premises and Promises" World Bank Reprint Series, No. 62, 1979.

- Streeten, P. and S. Burki "Basic Needs: Some Issues" World Development Vol 6, March 1978, pp. 411-421.
- Svendson, K. "Development Administration and Socialist Strategy: Tanzania After Mwongozo" in M. Rweyemamu and B. Mwansasu (eds) Planning in Tanzania: Background to Decentralization Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975.
- Tanzania, Government of. "Maendeleo Ya Vijiji".
- Vengroff, R. "Popular Participation and the Administration of Rural Development: The Case of Botswana" Human Organization, Vol 33, No. 3, (Fall 1974) pp. 303-309.
- \_\_\_\_\_. R. "Dependency and Underdevelopment in Black Africa: An Empirical Test" Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4.
- Waide, B. "Planning and Annual Planning as an Administrative Process" in M. Rweyemamu and B. Mwansasu (eds) Planning in Tanzania: Background to Decentralization Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975.
- Warren, R. "The Context of Community Development" L. Cary (ed) Community Development as a Process Columbia University of Mission Press, 1970
- \_\_\_\_\_. & Mulford, C. et. al. "Analysis of Cooperative Organizational Effectiveness" Rural Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 3, 1976.
- Waterston, A. "A Viable Model for Rural Development" Development Digest Vol 13, No. 3, (1975).
- Weaver, C. "Development Theory and the Regional Question: A Critique of Spatial Planning and its Detractors" in W. Stohr and D. Taylor (eds) Development from Above or Below: The Dialectics of Regional Planning in Developing Countries, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1981.
- Wescott, G. and Obudho, R. A. "Between Farm and City: Secondary Towns in Kenya to the Year 2000" African Urban Studies 13, (Spring 1982).
- White, A. "Why Community Participation: Discussion of Arguments" Assignment Children: UNICEF, 1982.
- Wignaroju, P. "From the Village of Global Order" Development Dialogue (1977) pp. 35-48.
- Williams, S. "City Participation in City and Regional Planning: An Effective American Methodology" Town Planning Review, Vol. 47, No. 4, (October 1976) pp. 349-358.
- Wirth, L. "The Limitation of Regionalism" in M. Jasen (ed) Regionalism in America Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1951, pp. 381-390