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I recently had the good fortune to travel through several countries in different regions of the world: Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and North America. Traveling to such disparate countries as Norway, Nigeria, Jordan, and the United States allowed me to reflect upon the histories and futures of the various peoples that live in these places. Despite the differences in geography, language, culture, and sensibilities, the recurring centrality of oil and the exploitation of natural resources was a common denominator that one could not ignore.

In Europe, I visited Sweden, Finland, and Norway. I was immediately struck by the contrast between the violent history of the Vikings and the modern sensibilities of this resource-rich Nordic region. Although it is one of the largest oil producers in the world, Norway is a model of responsible husbandry, using its wealth for the benefit of the entire populace. Comfortable without yielding to opulence, the Norwegians I met were homely and without pretension, seemingly devoid of titles and imbued with a subtle sense of humility.

My trip to Nigeria came next. The most populous country in Africa (130 million), Nigeria is a country defined by its contradictions. While its oil resources exceed Norway’s, a short downpour floods the streets for lack of proper drainage. Nigeria’s cities claim pockets of opulence and wealth that rival any global capital, and yet are also home to some of the poorest and most wretched slums on the African continent. The luxury SUVs, mobile phones and modern conveniences of the economic elite belie the lack of basic necessities for the majority of the people. I found solace in the inspirational efforts of my good friends Segun and Kayode, two very successful entrepreneurs who are working with young people to build a new society. They represent a future that transcends the inequities of the present.

Comparing the glorious history of Nigeria’s enlightened and organized Ibo Kingdom with the savagery of the Vikings inescapably led to a comparison of the present conditions of these two countries and the divergent paths they’ve followed—from conflict to civilization and civilization to conflict.

My travels culminated in a land existing simultaneously in conflict and civilization. In the Middle East I attended a fascinating conference in Jordan at the United Nations University Leadership Centre that drew participants from several countries including, among others, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Iran. The highly intense conference was punctuated by emotional outbursts from both Arab and Israeli participants, providing me with a first hand account of the intense feelings on both sides of their conflict. Concerns and suspicions about exploitation of oil revenues and resources abounded. I left the conference with deep concern for the people of the Middle East and for the future of humanity.

Looking for a temporary distraction en route to South Africa, I picked up a magazine at the Dubai Airport. International Homes showcased some of the most opulent homes in the world. I immediately realized that the future of humanity that I was so concerned about has two faces and live in two different worlds. This stark contrast was laid bare in all its splendour as I looked out on the skyscraping glass structures of the futuristic city of Dubai, carved out of the desert and existing alongside Bedouin tents and barracks of imported indentured labourers. I wondered if those who frequent this futuristic playground, built on oil money, will ever have the opportunity or desire to see how the other half of this city, and the world, live.

This brings me to my final destination, a mountain retreat called Bear Mountain, situated on a lake surrounded by pristine forests just outside Manhattan, New York (the very embodiment of opulence and consumption). The silence of Bear Mountain made time stand still. The only movement came from my mind conjuring the sounds of gushing oil barrels emptying from the earth in Norway, Nigeria, and Dubai, and feeding a culture of consumerism. I counted myself lucky to be standing in this pristine enclave…but I wondered for how long it will last and when will we learn to use our planet’s resources responsibly to advance the cause of humanity instead of letting greed and prejudice lead to irresponsible exploitation, conflict, and violence!

Vasu Gounden is the Founder and Executive Director of ACCORD.

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The decade of the 1990s represents, to all intents and purposes, the age of democratic rebirth in Africa. After decades of authoritarian rule and military dictatorship, several African countries have embraced one form of democratic transition or another. This is understandable given the seemingly irresistible spread of what has been generally referred to as the “third wave” of democratisation due to internal and external pressures. At inception, this development elicited new hopes and expectations in two directions: for one thing, the new era of democracy was seen as one that would mark a significant break away from the authoritarian past, characterised as it was by a monumental squandering of hopes, despair and repression of the fundamental human rights of citizens. For another, the new order was seen as the last opportunity for African countries to consolidate democracy.

Contrary to popular expectations, however, democracy in much of Africa has been constantly subjected to violence of diverse forms, given the perversion of the basic institutional and behavioural requisites that make democracy work. Consequently, rather than democracy promoting political stability and development, it has yielded, full circle, a regime of conflict in its diverse manifestations. While this is generally an African phenomenon, the Nigerian experience seems more devastating. Since 1999, when Nigeria returned to democracy, there has been an unprecedented resurgence and expansion of violent conflicts that are mostly ethno-religious in nature. The spatial dimension of the conflicts shows that no part of the country has been totally free from the rising phenomenon of violence, the Niger Delta region being the worst hit.

There is already a bourgeoning literature on the phenomenon of growing ethnic tensions in Nigeria. There is, however, a missing link – a concentration on the phenomenon at a general level at the expense of specific
case studies. This article therefore focuses on a critical analysis of the growing ethnic tensions in Nigeria under the nascent democracy, using Kogi State as a case study. This approach has ramifications not only for a deeper understanding of the phenomenon, but also for identifying particular variables with implications for a general understanding of rising ethnic tensions in Nigeria.

The Context

It is common knowledge that Nigeria was a colonial creation from an amalgamation of disparate and diverse ethnic groups. Consequently, the country, like other plural societies, has always found it difficult to forge a sustainable sense of nationhood among the diverse and competing groups. The attendant struggle for group autonomy and the transformation of identity politics have combined to exert pressure on the state to adjust and readjust in many respects. One such adjustment relates to the structural composition of the federation. Prior to the attainment of political independence in 1960, state creation was rife with problems, especially the incessant agitation by ethnic minorities for a separate state of their own. This resulted in the establishment of the Henry Willink Commission in 1954 to investigate such problems, which set the tone for post-independence identity politics. Ever since, the demand for state creation has been very fierce as it is seen as one of the surest ways of gaining access to the “national cake”. It was therefore not surprising that after independence in 1960, the administrative structures of Nigeria’s federalism changed significantly from three regions to 36 states and a federal capital today.3

Kogi State was a product of the continuous process of adjustment to the structure of Nigerian federalism. What is known as Kogi State today was a reincarnation of the defunct Kabba Province, which by the state creation of 1967 fell under Kwara State. However, following the creation of the 19 state structures in 1976, a division polarised Kabba Province, keeping the Okun and Ebira in Kwara State, and merging the Igala and others across the river with Benue State.4 In 1991, however, when Kogi State was created under the 30 state structures, there was a reunification of a sort such that the composition of the state was coterminous with the defunct Kabba Province. The Okun and Ebira of Kwara State were merged with the Igala and Bassa of Benue State to form the new Kogi State.

The creation of Kogi State heralded a new configuration of power politics. Located in the Middle Belt of the country, what has come to be regarded as the north-central geo-political zone of the country, the state, according to the census of 1991, had a population of 2,141,756. The breakdown is such that the Eastern Senatorial District had 943,434 people; the West had 444,865 people and the Central Senatorial District had 753,456 people.

Kogi State is quintessentially Nigerian, with three dominant ethnic groups and several minorities. In the East, the Igalas are not only dominant, but have also monopolised the highest political office in the state. The Central Senatorial District is predominantly Ebira, but with a minority group known as Ebira Koto; and the Western Senatorial District is predominantly Okun but with other minorities especially the Oworo and Lokoja people.

It is this composition of the state that partly explains the squandering of the hopes that accompanied the creation of the state on the one hand, and the renewed faith that the democratisation process elicited at inception, on the other. This is because, as presently constituted, the state has tragically become a source of empowerment to some groups and disempowerment to others. The result is the increasing ethnic tensions in the state, with telling impacts on the democratisation process.

Democratisation and Political Stability

As a concept, democratisation refers to a movement from authoritarianism to a stable democracy, which ideally should bring about transformation in various aspects of national life for the better. Accordingly, Osaghae defines it as “the process of establishing, strengthening, or extending the principles, mechanisms and institutions that define a democratic regime”.5 For David Potter, democratisation has to do with “a political movement from a less accountable to a more accountable government, from less competitive (or non-existent) elections to fuller and fairer predicted civil political rights, from weak (or non-existent) autonomous associations to numerous associations in civil society”.6 What these definitions suggest is that democratisation is aimed at attaining a democratic society where the ideals of democracy will be the order of the day. These ideals include the notions of fairness, equity and justice where all – individuals and groups – are treated as rightful members of the political community, irrespective of creed, political alignment, race, ethnicity or religion.

The effective functioning and sustenance of such a society has come to be linked with certain key elements. These include democratic constitutions and
constitutionalism; a vibrant civil society; open and free press; independent judiciary; the conduct of periodic, competitive, free and fair elections; representation and the protection of civil, political and economic liberties, including those of minorities; and the existence of democrats, people with a democratic mindset, capable of managing these structures and institutions in line with democratic demands. This is contingent upon the availability of democratic political culture and citizenship.

The popular assumption is that wherever the aforementioned key elements exist, there is the tendency for democracy to yield a sustainable regime of stability. This is because such a system has built-in mechanisms for conflict management that would be able to deal with the attendant crises that the opening of the public space for democratic discussion, deliberation, disagreement and consensus may generate. Conversely, in the event of the failure of democratic political structures and institutions to effectively mediate in societal conflicts that democracy may generate, the conflict-management capability often ascribed to democracy becomes a façade. This becomes more intriguing when the failure is rooted in the negligence or deliberate perversion of such institutions by those saddled with the responsibility of managing them.

Without any doubt, the political liberalisation of the public space following the democratisation of Nigeria in 1999 created room for the expression of pent-up anger and frustrations, which successive military regimes had unduly suppressed. The poor handling of these expressions of grievances, which were most often violent, by those in charge, served to pervert the conflict-management capacity of the new democracy. The result is a regime forged from a painful legacy of violent conflicts, bloodletting and accompanied losses that was foisted on the democratic space after 1999. Consequently, instead of democracy yielding peace and development, it has become a major source of ethnic tensions and under-development. The Kogi State experience illustrates this.

Democratisation and Growing Ethnic Tensions in Kogi State
Prior to 1999, Nigeria was under the authoritarian grip of military rulers for an uninterrupted period of sixteen years. During this time, the country came close to total collapse for a number of reasons. Not only was
there a loss of direction in the national leadership, there was also disillusionment experienced by a large part of the populace. Basic human rights such as freedom of association, speech and the press were also recklessly violated. Fortunately domestic and external pressures for political renewal eventually ushered in the current wave of democratisation in the country.

The basic features of the democratisation process includes multi-party, competitive and periodic elections and, ideally, a rule-based government where the rule of law prevails; and power sharing consistent with the configuration of the state, with specific attention paid to the minority question and other such elements of equality and inclusion. Paradoxically, however, these elements have become sources of ethnic conflicts in the democratisation process in Nigeria. Although this development is a national phenomenon, this article examines the Kogi State experience.

As noted earlier, the democratisation process in Kogi State has, over the years, been a source of empowerment for some groups and vice versa. Since the creation of the state in 1991, the Eastern Senatorial District, comprising one of the three major ethnic groups (Igala), has continued to monopolise the highest political power in the state. In the governorship election of 1991, Alhaji Abubakar Audu emerged as the first Executive Governor of the state and governed it until 1993, when General Sani Abacha seized power. Abubakar Audu once again became the state governor in 1999 under the auspices of the All People’s Party (APP), and later All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP) until May 2003. His controlling style of governance led to the formation of a broad-based coalition that cut across the three senatorial districts; an alliance that worked and led to his defeat during the 2003 governorship election. It is however important to note that a major factor that aided the success of the alliance was that the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), although in power at the centre, opposed the state and tactically opted for another Igala native, Alhaji Ibrahim Idris, as its gubernatorial candidate. This strategy worked in favour of the coalition in two ways. One, it won the Igalas’ support, as they were certainly fed up with Abubakar Audu but would continue to prefer him over any other ethnic group. Two, it also helped to secure federal support. This largely resulted in the defeat of Audu and the emergence of Ibrahim Idris as the governor in the 2003 election.

During the reigns of both Audu and Idris, basic democratic tenets were flagrantly violated. In all the political appointments, for example, there was no time when Kogi East (Igala) had less than 70 per cent of the commissioners and chairmen, as well as board and parastatal members. The situation was worse in terms of the allocation of state resources such as higher institutions of learning, recruitment into the state public service and allocation of other infrastructural facilities such as roads, water, etc. Even retrenchment from public service in Kogi West and Central became ethnically defined. For example, in the creation of new local government areas in March 2002 by Abubakar Audu, out of the 25 new councils, he gave 14 to his ethnic Igala, and the Okun and Ebira just six and five respectively. This generated spontaneous violent riots across the state especially in the central senatorial district, resulting in large-scale killing and arson.

The result has been the manipulation and transformation of identity particularly ethnic identity in the state. Consequently there has been great stress and strain on inter and intra-group relations, resulting in a vicious cycle of growing tensions and conflicts across the state. The most notable aspect of this trend is the seemingly irremediable polarisation of the state into two power blocs: “power stay” and “power shift”. The supporters of “power stay” insist that what the state needs is continuity in political leadership, meaning that all other things being equal, the incumbent governor should be re-elected in 2007 and remain in power until 2011. In this instance, if power changes at all, it will only affect the person, not the zone (Igala). This position hinges on the demographic strength of the Igala over others in the state and since democracy is a game of numbers, others are helpless in their quest to capture political power. For the advocates of “power shift”, largely drawn from the Kogi West (Okun) and Central (Ebira) Senatorial Districts, the struggle for change is inevitable given that since the creation of the state in 1991, power has always been held by the Eastern Senatorial District (Igala). This has conferred unequal advantages on the Igala in terms of the allocation of state resources. Power must therefore shift to allow for a balance.

Admittedly, both “power stay” and “power shift” do have their merits. Be that as it may, they both falter by predicing their arguments on faulty theoretical premises – forces of identity. This explains why neither “power stay” nor “power shift”, as presently constituted, offers much protection for the masses, who have been at the receiving end of years of malgovernance and power struggles between the contending forces. Even at that, one finds it hard to understand why the attendant tension of the “power stay”–“power shift” struggle has penetrated and captured the local towns, villages and hamlets, which suffer the outcome. Across the length and breadth of the state, there have been violent clashes in the name of “power shift” and “power stay” ahead of 2007. A frightening dynamic is the crystallisation of sub-ethnic identities, which have otherwise been moderately kept under effective control. Among the Okun people, for example, identities such as Kabba/Owe, Bunu, Ijumu, and Yagba have always existed. But today they have
become the basis of political polarisation. Within each of these sub-groups, further identity groups have fomed as every group attempts to re-write its history for better deals in the democratisation process. As such, it is not surprising to see the Ijumu people speak of the Gbedde group, Ijumu Arin (Middle Ijumu) and Ijumu Oke (Upper Ijumu), as a basis of political bargaining even when nothing divides them.16

The manipulation and transformation of these identities have resulted in conflict on several occasions. At the official celebration of Democracy Day on 29 May 2005, an armed group believed to be loyal to Senator A.T. Ahmed, the head of “power shift” from Kogi Central, launched a violent attack on the Kogi State Stadium, leaving several people seriously injured. It took the reinforcement of security operatives to rescue the State Governor from the venue.17 On another occasion, the Governor’s entourage to Okene was waylaid by militant Ebira youth, causing serious damage to their cars. In fact, it became so serious that the Governor was not allowed to enter Okene, the heart of Ebira land. This was repeated when the governor and his entourage wanted to attend the final funeral rites of Senator A.T. Ahmed.18

The cumulative effects have been rising tensions across the state, especially now that the 2007 general elections are imminent. Not only has governmental attention been diverted from governance and developmental issues, the struggle for 2007 has, like previous experiences, been situated within questionable frameworks, signalling the tone of governance to be expected in 2007. Certainly, any government that ascends to power via questionable means is bound to be deeply enmeshed in a deepening crisis of legitimacy that will affect its general governance tasks. By implication, the people will bear the brunt and will likely be susceptible to diverse forms of manipulation especially for negative ends. The Kogi State example demonstrates why the democratisation project in Nigeria, rather than promoting stability through effective management of conflicts, is serving contradictory purposes.

Concluding Remarks
What is it about the democratisation process in Nigeria that fuels ethnic tensions across the country? What can be done to alleviate this phenomenon? The preceding analysis suggests that the democratisation process in Nigeria has not been adequately participatory and inclusive in line with democratic ideals. It has also not been people-driven and development-oriented. The bifurcation and decomposition of the state, such that
it empowers some at the expense of others, has been largely responsible for the growing ethnic tensions in the country, as exemplified by the Kogi State experience. The failure of the struggle for redress, coupled with the poor handling of the attendant crises by the powers that be, has served to accentuate the tensions. There is an urgent need for the devolution of power from the state to lower levels of governance. While existing local governance frameworks may be a good starting point for more power, the long-term target should be the communities and grassroots civil organisations. Such devolution can work well provided independent and effective regulatory mechanisms are instituted and sustained. In the final analysis, the most viable resolution to growing ethnic tensions may be a system of power sharing and rotation on a one term (four year) basis among the various groups in a given political entity. Such a system may provide a sense of belonging and ownership for all, especially within a plural setting.

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Endnotes
6 Kogi State is popularly referred to as the confluence state because it is at Lokoja, the state capital, that the rivers Niger and Benue meet to form a Y-shape confluence. The confluence divides the state into two, such that the Igalas and Bassa are regarded as those across the river by the Western and Central Senatorial districts.
11 The brief interlude of the Chief Ernest Shonekan Interim National Government (ING) in 1993 after General Babangida “stepped aside” was a continuation of military rule by another means.
16 J. Shola Omotola (Ongoing research) “Democratisation, Sub-Ethnic Identities and Intra-Group Relations among the Okun of Kogi State, Nigeria” and “Democratisation, Identity Transformation and Inter-Group Relations in Kogi State, Nigeria” (field work stage).
17 Nigeria returned to democracy on 29 May 1999. Since then, it has become the rule rather than the exception to celebrate “Democracy Day” every 29 May especially at the federal and state levels.
18 See “IBRO Attacked: Rampaging Youth Demand Governor’s Head, Akamkwo to the Rescue...”, Confluence Mirror, 15 October, 2006, p. 3.
Studies of leadership seek broad understanding of the relations between personality and context-driven factors in decision-making. Personalities and institutions interact in the exercise of authority and mobilisation of resources to meet societal needs. Typically, institutions constrain and discipline individuals as they exert authority and establish priorities. Civil conflicts, however, often create an imbalance between individuals and institutions, decimating rules and structures while heightening the roles of individuals in the leadership equation. A core element of post-conflict reconstruction is to redress this imbalance by resurrecting (or creating anew) institutional rules that lend order to individual action. It has been widely recognised that charismatic authority is inherently unstable and ought to be replaced, over time, by the norms and routines of bureaucratic authority and regularity. As well as the extent of socio-economic problems caused by conflicts, most post-conflict leaders seldom have clear mandates or broad-based consensus to embark on economic reconstruction. Besides, post-conflict leaders socialised in wartime institutions such as insurgent movements, military-led governments and predatory, black market economies are usually least prepared to face the enormous tasks of transition from violence to peace. There is, nonetheless, widespread recognition that most post-conflict environments provide extraordinary scope to set up new norms, rules, leaders, and institutions. From this perspective, the transitions may afford fortuitous moments for bold experiments in remaking the relationships between individual leaders and institutions.

There is significant knowledge about the restoration of institutional capacity in post-conflict states, but not on leadership as a distinct factor in this process. The singular interest in strengthening technical and administrative capacity as part of post-conflict institutional reforms barely specifies the place of leadership in these reforms. This essay suggests that focusing on post-conflict leadership as a puzzle in capacity building is a promising avenue to enrich the debates on post-conflict reconstruction. Our analysis of leadership challenges in post-conflict reconstruction draws comparative lessons from past successful and failed post-conflict transitions in Africa. We also briefly analyse how these countries dealt with questions of post-conflict planning and gender relations.

Characteristics of Post-Conflict Transitions and Typology of African Cases

While some trends may be universal, each post-conflict transition is shaped to a significant degree by the specific nature of the conflict itself, the stakes at hand, and the actors coalescing about the transition. Since the scale of post-conflict reconstruction differs by the nature and intensity of the previous conflict, how and when state institutions collapse and alternative ones develop will determine the questions that the leadership may face. There are also distinctive paths to transitions depending on whether the conflict is informed by a contestation over central power or by the quest for self-determination and independence. Equally critical is how the question of leadership is settled – by victory in insurgency or victory in post-conflict elections – as this matters for the quality of leadership, the sources of popular legitimacy, and the challenges such leaders face in the reconstruction.

In Somalia and Liberia, the old state institutions collapsed completely, leaving a vacuum that was filled by new structures (some organised, some inchoate); in other areas the state remained viable or became even stronger in one or more geographic zones even as it collapsed in others. The Sudanese state remained strong in the north and in the key economically productive zones even while losing its grip and authority over large parts of the south. During the Mozambican and Ugandan civil wars, the state was severely limited in its reach beyond the capital and its environs. In many of these cases, reconstruction became a formidable task because conflict left little in the way of formal institutions, the social fabric was in tatters, and economic activities were at a standstill.

In other cases, however, the state did not collapse but became more centralised and authoritarian as a consequence of mobilisation for the effective pursuit of war. Under Mengistu Haile Mariam, for example, the Ethiopian state developed the capacity to conscript large numbers of young men and mobilised the resources to keep nearly 500 000 personnel in uniform. The Angolan
government came out of civil war with its military capacity strong but its ability to furnish basic social services virtually non-existent. In such environments, the legacy of militarisation conceals the real weaknesses of governmental institutions.

Where insurgents won the war, the fundamental questions of national leadership were settled from the outset, usually on the battlefield. In vanquishing the old order, post-conflict leadership in Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Rwanda devolved to insurgent groups with strong personalities. Because of the manner by which they gained power, such successful insurgent leaders as Yoweri Museveni, Meles Zenawi, Isaias Afwerki, and Paul Kagame put a disproportionate imprimatur on institutions in the post-conflict era. Triumphant movements in Rwanda, Eritrea, and Uganda evidenced remarkable levels of cohesion and organisational hierarchy in the top leadership and decision-making structures that affected the transition trajectories. Such leadership, derived from successful management of insurgency, often scores high in its unity, discipline, and ability to take decisions but poorly on its acceptance of open debate and political rivals. In Rwanda, a young triumphant leadership confronted a fragmented social order bereft of any functional institutions. Nonetheless the cohesion within the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) movement afforded the victorious leadership a measure of organisational coherence and purpose.

Although the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) had to create many institutions from scratch, it benefited from momentum arising from the successful transformation of the political apparatus of national liberation into a set of political institutions conducive to peacetime governance. During the period of armed struggle, the EPLF demonstrated a remarkable degree of coherence and an extraordinarily capable cadre of leaders. After winning independence (first and most definitively on the battlefield in 1991 and with subsequent ratification by referendum in 1993), the liberation front transformed itself into the Popular Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) and Isaias turned to the challenges of post-conflict state building and reconstruction.6

In its guerrilla campaign against the Ugandan government, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) under the leadership of Museveni achieved high levels of organisational discipline both in managing its military force and dealing with civilians under its control. At the height of the war, Museveni brought together diverse ethnic and political groups into a broad-based movement. Although Museveni is a man of strong ideas, the NRM initially evolved as a collegial movement with a remarkable tolerance for divergent perspectives. Equally significant, the NRM instilled a high level of discipline among its troops and was able to cultivate amicable relations with civilians under its control.

The larger and more diverse Ethiopia followed a slightly different trajectory. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) had a tight, disciplined leadership circle hardened under extremely difficult conditions on the battlefield.4 As the liberation movement advanced from its home territory in Tigray through Amhara and Oromo populated areas, it created new ethnically defined affiliate parties, such as the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO). While the TPLF had a leadership and ideology that developed over years of struggle and that had deep roots in conditions of rural Tigray, the OPDO was a party created almost overnight and in part from remnants of the old regime’s military forces that lacked organic links to the countryside. The Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front coalition, therefore, was an amalgam of organisations with significantly different leadership styles and capacities.

Where a conflict ended in a negotiated settlement, leadership questions are inherently open-ended, awaiting elections. Difficult decisions relating to the core questions of national leadership are deferred from the battlefield to the ballot box. In Burundi, Mozambique, Liberia, and Sierra Leone neither insurgent groups nor incumbent regimes could settle the question of the occupants of paramount positions of leadership. In these cases, negotiations became vital events where the incumbents and challengers jostled for control of levers of state power, but they also occasioned inter-party and intra-party strife that sometimes postponed the decisive leadership issues. These conflicts were heightened when parties strove to transform their organisations into more open and participatory political movements to compete in post-conflict elections and to gain positions in the new political order. Factional conflicts before and after negotiations had implications for leadership cohesion in the reconstruction phase.

Mozambique escaped some of the uncertainties of negotiated transitions because the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) formed the new post-conflict government and imparted remarkable political continuity and stability during the recovery phase. There was no clear departure in the core leadership’s commitment to reforms after the civil war because the parameters of the reform agenda were already established prior to its onset. The insurgent group Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo), in contrast, transformed itself from a military organisation to a political party capable of competing in elections. Its leader, Afonso Dhlakama, remained the head of Renamo throughout the transition, while new political leaders who had spent the war abroad but had leadership skills more appropriate for the new electoral competition replaced most of the mid-level military commanders who had served in the bush.8
In Liberia, Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) remained the most powerful institution along the lines of Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM), but without the essential ideological or organisational stature that lent coherence to reconstruction in Uganda. Despite its nominal transformation into a political party, the NPFL continued to operate outside of formal politics and through predation and black markets, thereby squandering the opportunities to broaden its internal base across the country. Taylor’s leadership style and core constituency never changed after the elections and soon war returned; eventually, Taylor was forced into exile. The electoral mandate of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, in contrast, supports a very different type of leadership and a new set of opportunities to build sustainable institutions.

Another distinctive typology is between conflicts over central power (Angola, Uganda, Liberia, Mozambique) and conflict over self-determination and separation (Southern Sudan, Eritrea, Somaliland). The latter conflicts ended with the creation of new polities, guaranteeing that the processes of institution building...
and governance would proceed from a relatively clean slate. Following Mengistu’s defeat in 1991, the new state of Eritrea needed to build an entirely new set of national institutions that would mark its transition to statehood. The ongoing transition in Southern Sudan is seeing a remarkable period of leadership and institutional development, particularly since the demise of the dominant leader of the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SPLA), John Garang, in August 2005. Although there was a peaceful transition to a new leader, Salva Kiir, the extent of institutional decline and the ethnic diversity of Southern Sudan mean that leadership questions are still very open.

Planning and Setting the Broad Agenda

How leaders plan for the post-conflict phase is one of the key comparative measures to assess leadership styles and outcomes. Post-conflict planning reflects the extremes of reforms managed by few strong leaders versus intense contestation among numerous factions. Furthermore, the legacies of the old regime policies and the paths already established by pre-existing organisations and institutions shape post-conflict planning contexts. Leaders make choices but resource constraints and competing priorities frequently force them to retain some of the time-tested institutions. Path dependencies set by pre-existing structures shape policy options and often generate continuities even in the context of the critical junctures represented by conflict and peace processes. Leaders engaged in post-conflict agenda-setting must first assess what they can salvage from old structures (where they exist) and what powerful interests must be accommodated or at least tolerated. Medium to long-term planning in reconstruction is contingent on whether leaders agree on the continuities or discontinuities in principles, policies, and institutions.

The institutional legacies of the conflict provide the context for deliberations on post-conflict governance and economic issues. In some cases broad (if not always transparent) discussions took place within the insurgent movement over post-conflict policies (as in Eritrea, Uganda, and within the TPLF in Ethiopia). In other cases, the rebel or liberation movement governed a liberated territory prior to gaining power in the capital, providing additional time and experience to develop effective means of administration and planning. Leaders of such movements have years in the field to develop their platforms and to create proto-government structures prior to seizing power. Leadership emerging from these difficult conditions has already passed a series of demanding tests that remove those without talent.

Museveni’s Ten-Point Programme negotiated during the guerrilla war provided a template for post-conflict planning and national visioning. Although broad and amorphous, this programme contained a road map that different NRM factions could coalesce about in the early phases of the reconstruction. Equally significant, it was flexible enough to adjust to changes in economic and political circumstances and left considerable room for refinement and factional pacts. As the Presidential Economic Council sought to translate the NRM’s broad vision into concrete policy objectives, disagreements in the government in the initial years culminated in the victory of factions hostile to a stringent donor reform regimen, leading to Uganda’s imposition of price and foreign exchange controls. But when these policies failed, there was a reversal that stemmed from Museveni’s determination to bring an end to the factional conflicts. Museveni subsequently broke the policy stalemate in the NRM over the post-war reconstruction policy by successfully tilting the debate towards market reforms. This intervention was decisive in bringing a consistent direction to the macro-economic policies articulated and implemented from the early 1990s.
In Eritrea, almost 30 years of armed struggle had produced a cohesive leadership with a broad blueprint for governing the country. In the transition period before independence in 1993, the EPLF engaged new actors in debates about forging consensus on the modalities of reconstruction. The conference on economic policy held at the University of Asmara in 1991 was one such attempt to broaden the dialogue on economic strategy. After the Asmara conference, the government announced a macro-policy document in 1994 that expounded strategies for rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development embracing all sectors. The centerpiece of the macro-policy document was the establishment of an efficient, outward-looking private sector-led market economy, with the government playing a proactive role to stimulate economic activities. At its Third Congress in February 1994, the EPLF adopted the National Charter for Eritrea that expounded on the vision for the future. The victorious insurgents proceeded speedily in launching policy frameworks to avoid dissipating the large reservoir of support they had garnered by winning the war. While this consensus building exercise proved important in launching economic reconstruction, the top-down command and control system of decision making that was another legacy of the armed struggle also created an authoritarian framework that stifled debate and dissent. The leadership legacies of the struggle reinforced early initiatives to build broad consensus but simultaneously created the authoritarianism that undermined effective participation.

In Ethiopia, there was a mixture of old and new institutions and practices by the regime of Meles Zenawi. Meles kept in place Mengistu Haile Mariam’s land policy under which all land was the property of the state while dropping the old regime’s policies of state farms and agricultural marketing boards. Similarly, in Mozambique, the Frelimo regime built on the previous legacies of market-oriented economic reforms introduced in the late 1980s. Early liberalisation gave Mozambique a head start in reconstruction and it also diminished the debilitating leadership debates that convulse post-conflict states. The key questions of long-term political and economic structures were set prior to the commencement of the transition. In the Mozambique case Frelimo won the post-conflict elections and continued to pursue market-oriented liberal policies. Even if the opposition Renamo party had won, however, it is likely that these policy paths established prior to the transition would have been followed.

Charles Taylor’s heavy-handed control of “Greater Liberia” in Bong County reveals a remarkable measure of continuity from civil war to post-conflict governance. This example demonstrates that the governing experience in the liberated zone may not suffice for the post-conflict phase. Taylor created the patrimonial NPFL on the basis of resources obtained through violence and predation, and international trade in diamonds, gold, rubber, and timber. Despite winning elections, Taylor’s leadership style and institutional basis remained unconstructed and he continued to derive his power through military force and the old wartime routines of violence, fear, and polarisation. The endurance of militarism under Taylor typified the problems of transition from war-based structures of control and organisation to managerial ones conducive to the imperatives of reconstruction. When he continued his predatory leadership style, the UN Security Council maintained sanctions on exports of diamonds and timber to compel the transitional government to reform. Sanctions were a double-edged sword: they were promoted as a draconian instrument to force institutional compliance and behavioural change, yet they also deprived the post-conflict government of revenues that would have restored a modicum of functional governance.

Managing Gender Roles

Post-conflict environments furnish significant prospects for redefining gender roles, redrawing the rules that underpin property rights, and propelling women into leadership positions across society. In addition, the gender dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction can involve the encouragement of policies that compensate for gender disparities in rights, education, resources, and power. Given their social power, women are key actors in post-conflict service delivery particularly where formal mechanisms of delivery are frail or absent. The moments from war to peace may allow for greater involvement of women in building equitable and prosperous societies.

The vital problem of incorporating women in the development process lies in how post-conflict societies seize the chances of gender role reversals that conflicts occasion. In Rwanda, women became leaders because men were either in the military, prison, or dead; in
post-conflict Eritrea, women headed 45 per cent of the households. As women assume new leadership roles in the home and the community, the salient question becomes whether these new roles could be strategic fulcrums to enhance their socio-economic status or whether they merely connote a multiplication of their social burdens. In Eritrea, the EPLF tried to involve women in political decision-making from the outset because of their centrality to the liberation struggle. Thus 21 members of the constitutional commission were women, 40 per cent of the participants in the commission’s consultations were women, and 35 per cent of seats in the National Assembly are reserved for women.16

In addition to giving women political voice, the EPLF sought to incorporate gender concerns in the provisions of services such as health and education. Gender equality was enshrined both in the macro-policy document and the National Charter for Eritrea. To underscore the leadership’s commitment to gender equality, the Land Proclamation Act of 1994 granted equal access to women, recognising the rights of married women, widows, and divorcees. Although formal legal equality members to become effective leaders and cultivated linkages and partnerships across women constituencies. Even before the numbers of women in Rwanda’s legislature increased considerably following the 2003 elections, women had already created a formidable social infrastructure that has been an integral part of the post-conflict reconstruction.18

**Conclusion**

Leadership that is grounded in institutions is particularly important in post-conflict reconstruction, but it is always initially in short supply because institutions have either weak or strong individuals often overwhelming them. This paper has argued that in the transitions from war to peace, leadership issues revolve around finding a meaningful balance between individuals and institutions. The most effective post-conflict leaders derive their authority from strong organisations, not charisma. In the longer term, personality-based leadership cannot sustain peace-building.

While the tension between institutional and personality-based leadership occurs in all post-conflict cases, the challenges to post-conflict leaders are highly context-

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did not prevent continued gender discrimination, the Eritrean leadership made a deliberate bid to incorporate the principle of gender equality into economic and social policies, particularly land, agricultural assistance, training and education.17 Similarly, the NRM’s affirmative action policies in Uganda opened avenues for women in education and parliament, in addition to the gender components injected into economic reconstruction programmes. The landmark Domestic Relations Bill that is currently under legislative review promises to enshrine and broaden women’s rights.

Recognition of women as an underutilised resource in leadership for reconstruction has also marked the Rwandan experience. Building on the leadership gains that Rwandan women made in the post-genocide era, the Rwandan state has tried expanding their rights to participation and access to resources and services. Part of this task has involved boosting women’s participation through leadership training, support for women parliamentarians, and women’s civil society organisations. Women’s civic groups coalesced in the umbrella organisation, the Pro-Femme Twese-Hamwe, who have trained sensitive and varying depending on whether the old state collapsed in the conflict, whether the war ended in victory by one side or in stalemate and a negotiated agreement, and whether the war ended with self-determination for a new state. In some cases, significant exercises in leadership through agenda setting and consensus building take place during the course of the conflict, as seen in the NRM’s Ten-Point Plan and the EPLF’s National Charter. Some insurgent leaders have the opportunity to administer liberated zones, providing another arena to hone leadership skills and decision-making processes. These plans and processes represent important models for charting the future development course.

The strength of the institutional legacies of civil war may curb the potential for post-conflict leaders to engage in peace-building. Some leaders face difficulties in adapting the experiences of mobilisation and organisation for war to the managerial imperatives of reconstruction. They may squander the exceptional opportunities that stem from the transition from leadership as mobilisation for war and rebellion into leadership for the post-conflict context. Charles Taylor in Liberia
provides a good example of the failure of such transformation, but so too is Isaias Afwerki in the latter phase of Eritrean transition. In some cases, wartime challenges forge strong bonds in a small group that is then effective in leading the insurgency through discipline and clear vision. These same characteristics of leadership, however, often fail to evolve into open, participatory systems of governance in peacetime. The very qualities of leadership that made the EPLF and TPLF so effective in the bush inhibit these same movements in making the transition to democracy.

In the end, although the various cases of post-conflict leadership arise from distinctive interactions between personalities and institutions, institution building remains the primary objective of long-term and sturdy reconstruction.

**Endnotes**


5 John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (Cambridge, 1997).


The relationship between security and development is becoming increasingly significant in African countries. Since the end of the Cold War, the nexus between security and development has become more salient as development agencies recognise the interdependence of well-being and security. The concept of security has shifted from a phenomenon concerned more with sovereignty and territorial boundaries, with the state being the primary actor, to a concept which focuses on human development. It is therefore imperative that the 21st century becomes an era where security is broadened to incorporate individual concerns apart from state interest. Present-day conflict in Africa has become more internal and protracted in nature, with structural dimensions like poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment assuming centre stage. It is therefore crucial to acknowledge that development in an insecure world threatens human development, while the lack of development or inept development policies poses a serious threat to the security of the nation and that of the individual. It is also important to note that in order to address security threats facing Africa, there is an increasing need to confront the development malaise in the continent, manifested in aspects such as declining standards of living, HIV/AIDS, unemployment and environmental degradation.

Development is a process through which societies and states seek to achieve more prosperous and equitable standards of living. During this process, different players are involved including governments, civil society organisations, grassroots institutions as well as international development agencies. Thus, according to Todaro (1993), development is “a multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes, and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of Above: Thousands of women and children line-up to receive food aid in Niger.
economic growth, the reduction of inequality, and the eradication of poverty”.

On the other hand, security is much more than the protection of territorial integrity, stability and the vital interests of states through the use of the political, legal or coercive instruments of the state. Security issues now grapple with attempts to address threats to the security of individuals, communities and nations. In essence, the emphasis should be on promoting ‘human security’ and the welfare of ordinary people. Against this background, security therefore refers to the attempt to prevent or resolve violent conflict, which emanates from structural conditions. This holistic definition explains why security sector reform is such a topical issue in contemporary Africa. Security sector reform acknowledges that security is an essential condition for sustainable development and poverty reduction. The security sector should therefore reflect a multiplicity of voices including the military, police, judiciary, collective security organisations and civilian associations.

The post-Cold War era in Africa brings new types of conflicts and security threats, which are no longer confined to the international and military arena, but are more internal, protracted and intractable. Consequently, it has been increasingly recognised that there is a need to integrate security and development policies. Many scholars (including Bond, Stiglitz, and Boutros Ghali), the United Nations (UN), the Department for International Development (DFID), other development practitioners and actors in the security realm do realise that peace, conflict, security and development are intrinsically connected. These two concepts have to be viewed through integrated lenses for sustainable peace and development.

Although nuclear war and terrorism present threats to the global world, the main security threats in Africa are poverty, unemployment, the Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), and environmental degradation. Widespread poverty and unemployment create easy targets for war recruitment and political manipulation. Thus, if development challenges are left unaddressed, they tend to spill over and transform into agitations for self-determination, fundamental freedoms as well as struggles for identities and values. Furthermore, in Africa, the lack of human security is compounded by the failure of development projects such as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). SAPs have largely witnessed burgeoning poverty, unemployment and a boom in HIV/AIDS. Such development quandaries leave the continent vulnerable to internal strife, as in the case of Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where protracted civil wars raged for decades.

There is a growing consensus that security must be concerned with the protection of individuals and communities from all forms of violence. Too often in Africa, the military is used to sustain governments in power instead of promoting internal security. However, an encouraging development is that security is increasingly becoming interdisciplinary. This connection has been embraced by international agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as a result of the deepening inequality between the North and the South and the chronic poverty in many areas of the developing world. It is widely acknowledged that interstate wars and instability in Africa have inhibited and destroyed development and progress. Collier presents empirical evidence to demonstrate how instability in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, the DRC and Angola has retarded development in areas of health, education, agriculture and infrastructure.

The importance of non-military dimensions of security, such as the economic, social and environmental spheres of security should be acknowledged and debated. Both the security and development fields have the ultimate purpose of seeking to enhance and improve the human condition. It is encouraging that the UN does realise explicitly the relationship between security and development. The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, acknowledges that development and security are inseparable and mutually reinforcing factors. He adds that poverty, inequality and underdevelopment create and reproduce conditions of instability, making poor countries ripe for civil discontent. This is why the alleviation of poverty surfaces as one of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. The same view is echoed by Collier and Tandon who, when analysing causes of civil conflicts in Africa, posit that poverty and poor economies make resource endowed countries such as Sierra Leone more susceptible to rebellion.

The mere presence of strong state security is not adequate for building sustainable peace. Security without development is hollow and is likely to lead to a situation of violent conflict. State machinery alone cannot build sustainable, durable and positive peace. Comprehensive security must account for the overall security context, allowing for both fundamental and specific aspects of sustainable development. Hovland, who writes about violent conflict in post-apartheid South Africa, concretises this argument when he posits that the conflict settlement in South Africa, exemplified by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, did not tackle the economic needs of communities. After apartheid, structural dimensions of the conflict were largely left untouched, with black South Africans remaining poorer than their white counterparts. This implied that the peace processes had not tackled the human security realm. The exclusion of structural dimensions of the conflict essentially evoked insecurity and mal-development. In the post-apartheid
era, the inequality gap between blacks and whites leads the young South African “rainbow nation” to grapple with internal violence in the form of crime, mainly robbery and rape. Although South Africa is considered the most developed country in Africa, the country has one of the highest rape statistics on the continent. The crime rates in South Africa are an indicator of how ignored human development needs can curtail stability; there is a need therefore for inclusive development in order to promote sustainable security. It is increasingly being recognised that conflict is generated when certain parts of the population, groups or communities feel excluded from the development process. In order to promote security, sustainable development as a concept and praxis becomes a key issue. According to Yash Tandon, sustainable development should address the increasing social and economic imbalances that divide the world by analysing the underlying political and economic causes of conflict.

Development without security is ephemeral. Similarly, security without development is a façade. One aspect of the development and security equation is the assertion that security is a prerequisite for development. For any country to be labelled secure and developed, it is imperative to have investor confidence, rule of law and stability in order to nurse the development dream. Investors do not want to risk their wealth in volatile economic and political climates where their private property is not guarded safely. There is increasing evidence of how instability has stifled development in most African states. The “farm invasions” in Zimbabwe, which began as peasant revolts and were later sanctioned by the government, have dealt a blow to Zimbabwe’s economic development. The country has witnessed massive capital flight as investors and farmers realised the high degree of impunity in the country. Many multinational companies moved to other parts of Southern Africa, thereby contributing to “development in reverse”. This haphazard land reform has negatively affected agricultural exports, further creating a volatile and inflationary environment. Such an economic malaise is a security threat in Zimbabwe and the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party is aware of this “time bomb”, hence the muzzling of the press, repression of civic freedoms and growing militarisation of the state in anticipation of civil turmoil.

In order to promote development through security, there is a need for programmes to support the rule of law in most developing countries. The rule of law is emphasised in order to address the current developmental challenges facing developing societies, particularly the African continent. This requires that laws be understood, be clear and be equally applied to everyone. This means that the security sector, namely the police, judicial and penal institutions upholding the legal system, should be reasonably fair, competent and efficient. Local actors have to be meaningfully involved, and their capacities enhanced for success in strengthening the rule of law.

In Africa’s security-development discourse, human development and human security can be achieved by civil society, the private sector, education centres, international agencies and the state, through a multidisciplinary approach. This brings to the fore the concept of multi-track diplomacy, where each player has a significant role in the achievement of security, development and durable peace. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Africa are working to promote both human security and human development through various humanitarian and development operations. Similarly, educational institutions, health agencies and industries are also working towards the same goal. This trend has seen the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Heads of States and Government coming together in 1993 to formulate the SADC Declaration, asserting that the objectives of security and development go hand in hand, implying, furthermore, that security is considered to be a prerequisite for development: “These [peace, security and stability] are prerequisites for development, and for the improvement of the standard and quality of life of the peoples of the region.”

Since the violent conflicts in Africa reflect the challenges of weak and failed states, the search for security and development should be accompanied by attempts to enable the states to resuscitate and revitalise their governance structures and operational machinery such as the legislature, executive, judiciary and security forces. It is apparent that weak states are in themselves unable to create conditions for stability, security, development and ultimately durable peace. Successful democratisation and development depends to a large extent on state capability and strength. In Africa, the problem of weak and failed states is a reality, with Somalia and Sudan topping the list on the weak states scale. Weak states are not only unstable, they also struggle to address the issues of poverty, unemployment, HIV/AIDS and environmental degradation, the major factors in development. Subsequently, this process leads to a “legitimation crisis”, wherein citizens become discontented with the state. Discontented citizens usually choose from an array of options, ways of expressing their disgruntlement. In most cases, the frustration has been manifested through rebellion, riots, crime and coups.

The linkage between security and development demonstrates an awareness of the extent to which security is a human development issue. The security of states is merely instrumental; the state is a necessary actor in the provision of security and in the process of development. To fulfil this role, the state itself needs to
be secured and developed. For a state to be secured and developed, there is a need to achieve a just society in which people actively participate in development and human security processes. Such a society demonstrates the rationale for security, which is to enable people to develop and become the architects of their own lives. Therefore, the creation of capable states is also imperative in the security-development discourse.

The UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report identifies seven specific elements that comprise human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. In the development realm, HIV/AIDS is a primary security threat in sub-Saharan Africa. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has called the virus no less destructive than warfare itself. This assertion is heavily backed by statistical evidence. For example, in 2000, more than 200,000 people died in conflict in Africa, while 2 million people died of AIDS during the same year. Against this background, in 2000, the UN Security Council historically recognised the link between human security and development by acknowledging that HIV/AIDS is indeed a threat to peace and security in Africa. In developing countries AIDS curtails security and development by infecting the ordinary people who are pivotal to development. These casualties include teachers, doctors, nurses, and other caretakers in their most productive years. The pandemic creates a cycle of poverty and underdevelopment, reversing the advances developing countries have achieved in these areas. According to Kofi Annan, “…AIDS is causing a social and economic crisis which in turn threatens political stability. In already unstable societies, this cocktail of disasters is a sure recipe for more conflict. And conflict, in turn, provides fertile ground for further infections.”

Rebel activity in most African countries is another indicator of the inextricable link between security and development. While it is not given that poverty causes internal wars, there is a broad consensus that addressing instability and internal strife should also be merged with the fight against poverty, underdevelopment, inequality, disease, and other economic and social problems. The concept of “solbels” is an indicator of the link between security and development. Solbels are “soldiers by day and rebels by night” and are found in most war-torn African countries. Such people easily cross the divide between rebel movements and government forces depending on the economic gains they get from either side. Such a practice occurred in Sierra Leone during the civil war and is still common in the Northern Ugandan war as well as the conflict in the DRC. In most civil wars, young men join warring parties if they are not employed or if their income-earning opportunities are increased by joining the war. Thus, as long as young people are hungry, uneducated, and unemployed, the prospects of insurgencies remain high. This is why the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, emphasises that poverty reduction, basic literacy, employment creation, and infrastructural development should occupy the central stage in Sierra Leone’s peace process.

It is against this background that the effects of development on poor countries should be juxtaposed with security and defense issues. Most dependency scholars including Amin (2001) assert that the impact of the economic slowdown is most acutely felt by developing countries. Poor countries such as Mali, Chad, Ivory Coast, and Ghana are struggling with unsustainable debt repayments, unfair terms of trade, and insufficient development assistance volumes from rich countries. It is also in these countries that internal strife has erupted or threatens to explode. Therefore, issues of debt cancellation, fair terms of trade, and conflict-sensitive development must be urgently addressed in order to promote durable peace and sustainable security in Africa. The realisation of such a nexus has spurned
several development-focused projects in developing regions, including Africa’s own New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). NEPAD offers hope for Africa because it is a tool for inclusive development, with its vision for eradicating poverty and promoting sustainable development.

Overall, the security-development nexus compels us to think outside the box. Acknowledging the nexus between security and development calls for a revision of mind-sets and thinking in the security studies and development realm. New approaches to security are needed in Africa because the continent has its own set of security concerns. For example, the proliferation and unlawful use of small arms poses one of the most pressing security problems in countries such as Kenya, Uganda and Sudan. Poor economies and lack of resources to endow the security sectors have meant that law enforcement agencies in these countries are often incapable of collecting illegal arms and prosecuting offenders. This compounds the insecurity-underdevelopment challenge. Against this background, there is a need for continued security sector reform to facilitate collaboration between traditional security providers and civilian actors. While a poorly managed security sector curtails development, discourages investment and helps to perpetuate poverty, a lack of development and shortage of state organs pose a security threat. Security sector reform should therefore provide a safe and stable environment for development, while development should enhance the delivery of security.

It is important to note that as the relationship between security and development in Africa continues to unfold, so does the terrain of conflict resolution and peace-building. Overall, security is central to development, while development is a condition for security. Any approach to peace that does not realise the congruence between security and development is transient and may not lead to durable peace. Making the security-development nexus a reality requires concerted efforts from civil society, the private sector, education institutions and the state itself to introduce and sustain development that addresses poverty, HIV/AIDS and environmental insecurity. The benefits from such processes will not only promote human development, but will also cushion the continent from instability and agitations, thereby promoting holistic security.

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Endnotes
5. Ibid.; UNDP (1994), Human Development Report 1994, New York: Oxford University Press. I make the point elsewhere, though, that this link between security and development was already drawn earlier in the Kampala Document and in the rationale for creating SADCC in 1980.
14. Ibid.
17. J. Habermas (1975), Legitimation Crisis, Boston: Beacon Press.
PARLIAMENTS AND LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA:
BREAKING NEW GROUND

WRITTEN BY JEFF BALCH

The international development community seems to have discovered parliamentarians, at long last, at the intersection of collective efforts to help democratise and develop Africa. At the forefront, a new generation of African leaders has taken up the challenge, in the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), to correct the failures of past leaders and, among other things, put parliamentarians into the front seat, and perhaps eventually even in the driver’s seat, of the political process. At seemingly the ideal moment, a plethora of parliamentary handbooks, toolkits and guidelines has emerged around the turn of the century, in recognition of what parliamentary bodies have been insisting for quite some time: without a central role for parliaments, lasting peace and prosperity in Africa will be an illusion.

The growth in numbers and successes of democratisation processes in Africa, coupled with the changing nature of conflict itself in the post-Cold War geopolitical environment, has significantly affected the role that parliamentarians can play, and has opened the door to a new recognition of their possibilities and responsibilities, in conflict-affected countries. The increased presence of intrastate conflicts in Africa has led to a reassessment of the roles different actors can play in preventing and resolving hostilities, bringing parliaments into more prominence as fora for the debate of contentious issues with the potential for contributing to peace-building processes. This newly perceived importance of parliaments stems partly from the new respect gained by parliamentary institutions as a result of a wave of democratisation in Africa.

Africa, through its own leadership, must solve its own problems and take its destiny in its own hands. This is the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) message. The cooperation of the international community will be required in relation to issues extending beyond Africa’s borders (such as aid, trade, debt relief and transnational corruption), but the message is clear: parliamentarians stand ready to take up a new and exciting role as champions for human rights. Their single most enticing challenge as an antidote for bad leadership, is to be the voice of the people in poverty reduction, conflict prevention and peace-building efforts. Parliamentarians are more conscious than ever of their responsibility to create an environment conducive to long-term sustainable relationships that do not spiral into violent conflict. All they lack are the resources to play this role. The international donor community has, however, encouragingly, begun to realise the added value for their other investments of having a parliamentary capacity-building component in their assistance programmes.

At first blush, parliamentarians must be considered the most unlikely heroes in the story of African leadership. In virtually all countries in the world, politicians are reviled and pigeon-holed as corrupt, lazy and even suspected or accused of being responsible for most of the country’s ills at one time or another. Despite the bad image of the profession, elected representatives are there to do a job, and their motivation comes mostly from a strong desire to improve the lot of their country and their fellow citizens.

As guardians of democracy and champions of the people’s rights, parliamentarians bear a heavy responsibility to deliver on the basics: peace, stability, health and prosperity. In the present-day African context of continued (albeit in some cases diminishing) challenges such as latent conflict, overabundance of arms, HIV/AIDS and endemic corruption, it is a tall order to expect that the frequently under-paid, under-staffed and otherwise under-resourced parliamentarians can make even the slightest dent in these areas. Evidence, however, points to the contrary. Some examples can be mentioned:

1. Members of Parliament (MPs) from Burundi, Rwanda and DRC have taken the initiative to jointly draft harmonised legislation on small arms and light weapons, as a contribution to the success of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.

   In the framework of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol concerning small arms and light
MPs from Southern Africa have developed parliamentary action plans on orphans and children made vulnerable by HIV and AIDS.

In 2004 AWEPA launched a multi-year campaign on Children and AIDS, in cooperation with the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, the Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund and others, to scale up the parliamentary efforts for Children and AIDS. The first preparations for this campaign began in September 2004, with the Parliamentary Consultation on Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC) in Cape Town. This consultation resulted in the Cape Town Declaration, which contains guidelines on how parliamentarians can make a unique contribution to scaling up efforts on behalf of orphans and vulnerable children. UNICEF and AWEPA jointly organised a series of regional seminars in East and Southern Africa in 2005 and 2006, to develop national parliamentary plans of action on OVC. These plans will be stimulated, implemented and assessed in national workshops in each parliament concerned. Common elements of the parliamentary plans include revision of legislation (e.g. on inheritance rights) and reallocations within national budgets (e.g. towards health and education).

The message that parliamentary leadership is bringing in relation to OVC, is that the current crisis threatens to unravel the very fabric of society. When there

2. MPs from ten Southern African countries have developed and are implementing parliamentary action plans that facilitate success of the national plans of action on orphans and other children made vulnerable by HIV and AIDS.

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The message that parliamentary leadership is bringing in relation to OVC, is that the current crisis threatens to unravel the very fabric of society. When there
is no adequate safety net for children, mothers and families, what kind of future can the youth look forward to? Without decent prospects for a life and livelihood, there are no guarantees for safety and security when the future generation takes over the helm of society. It is expected of leadership to consider the position and prospects of the next generation, when making policy decisions.

3. **MPs from Central and East Africa have developed parliamentary guidelines for Parliamentary Action on curbing corruption and creating a more conducive environment for business, entrepreneurship, investment and trade.**

On 8–9 September 2006, over 50 Parliamentarians from the Great Lakes Region and Central Africa and European MPs from Ireland, Sweden and Germany, took part in a seminar entitled *Parliamentary and Private Sector Cooperation for Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction in the Great Lakes Region*. The seminar was organised by AWEPA in cooperation with the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). It was the first in a new programme to build parliamentarians’ knowledge about private sector development and strengthen links between parliamentarians and the business community. Parliamentarians are not often involved in the area of private sector development, and the seminar was the first step in engaging both sides in a sustained dialogue and information exchange which can only be beneficial in the long-term for creating employment, reducing poverty, and maintaining peace and stability.

During the event, twenty experts from the private sector, parliaments, civil society, academia and international organisations covered four key topic areas: creating an improved and conducive business environment and investment climate; exploring public-private partnerships; ensuring environmentally sustainable private sector development, especially in the Lake Victoria Basin; and providing more people with access to affordable credit. The most significant outcome of the seminar was the adoption of a set of *Draft Guidelines for Parliamentary Action on Creating a Conducive Environment for Business, Entrepreneurship, Investment and Trade*. These guidelines emphasise the importance of a thriving private sector to provide the growth rates needed to meet the Millennium Development Goals (7% by 2010 from current levels of 3%).

After providing information about conditions that need to be improved to facilitate a successful African business environment, the guidelines listed a number of concrete actions that parliamentarians across the region can undertake to achieve this. These included:

- organising regular meetings between parliamentary committees and the business groups;
- streamlining investment, business and tax procedures, and harmonising them regionally where possible;
- introducing laws to punish corrupt practices;
- promoting policies to encourage entrepreneurs and small and medium enterprises, particularly among women and young people, and providing business training facilities;
- welcoming both local and foreign investors, and motivating parliamentarians to promote business opportunities both at home and abroad;
- encouraging the media to report more positively and accurately on business subjects.

In order to facilitate the discussion and adoption of these guidelines in national parliaments, AWEPA will organise national level follow-up workshops prior to a second regional seminar in 2007 which will discuss progress so far. Parliamentarians will also take the two other documents from the seminar back for discussion in their national parliaments: *Towards a Draft Code of Conduct for Private Sector and Parliamentary Engagement in Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction, and Recommendations on the Role of Parliamentarians in Improving Access to Finance*. In this way, the seminar will have a definite and long-term impact on improving the success of the private sector in the region, and demonstrating the importance of a well-functioning parliament.

Some of the lessons we can draw from these case studies point to a new way of interpreting leadership, from a parliamentary perspective. For example, even though the bulk of the work needs to be done at the national level, regional political dialogue – including with key representatives from civil society – plays a catalytic role to help politicians get off the mark. Often the presence of international organisations (e.g. UN agencies) or MPs from donor countries, can lend credibility to a process and add resources that, although small, may be pivotal in overcoming obstacles. Another major conclusion is that
women parliamentarians can – and indeed must – play a crucial role in decision-making around conflict management, peace-building, family healthcare and employment creation and entrepreneurship.

All this has serious implications for the international donor community. Slowly but unmistakeably, donors are awaking to the realisation that the traditional dichotomy in democratisation and peace-building programmes, for supporting either governments or civil society, no longer holds. The challenge for the future is to achieve a re-balancing of power at the national level, by encouraging a realistic separation of powers and autonomy for the legislative branch of government, in which the parliament is free to engage in a structural and positive way with a broad range of civil society.

Part of the reason African parliaments have traditionally not played a role of any significance in oversight of the security sector, and have frequently been totally excluded from decision-making in this area, is that they are under-resourced. Classified material has been kept secret from parliament for fear of security breaches, but often parliament lacks access to even the requisite unclassified information and its members are not fully equipped to digest and analyse it properly. In Helping Parliamentarians and Legislative Assemblies to Work for the Poor: A Guide to the Reforms of Key Functions and Responsibilities, priorities are outlined to enable improved performance. An effective parliament cannot be run on the cheap. While members and staff must be paid adequately and resources managed carefully, it is also central that the parliamentarians have access to information and advice (libraries and research centres and researchers) as well as to all necessary facilities and services (meeting rooms, office space technology, administrators, secretaries, receptionists) and technology and relevant training to use it (phones, copy machines, computers, Internet, etcetera). Similarly, if the security forces are to be held accountable by the representatives of the people, for their actions and their use of public funds, then parliament needs a minimum resource base for this.

The wave of democratic elections in Africa, over the last two decades, has brought in a new generation of African leaders and created excellent opportunities for strengthening democratic control over the security sector, and for initiating peace-building budgetary and development processes. However, chances have been missed by the neglect of parliaments. In young democracies, the technical capacity of parliaments needs to be built up before the institution and its members can be fully effective. Not only do new parliamentary procedures need to be established but also the resource base of parliament must be confirmed. Fledgling executive branches, particularly those with something to hide, are often hesitant to provide their legislatures with sufficient funding for it to fully play its active and independent oversight role. Budgetary resources for parliaments are often insufficient, and they can be usefully topped up from external development cooperation funding. When parliaments do not have the capacity to meet stringent donor contractual requirements, which is often the case, non-partisan intermediary organisations can play an important role in assisting them.

Parliaments in Europe and other developed countries have a responsibility to make sure their countries play a constructive role in NEPAD, and can encourage their development ministries to target more resources towards African parliamentary development. However, European parliamentarians suffer from a serious knowledge and capacity deficit themselves when it comes to Africa. It is not only important but urgently needed that European parliamentarians come to understand the conditions and developments within Africa, economic and political, as well as the implications for NEPAD’s success of their own political decisions and international policy choices. Armed with such knowledge, parliamentarians in the donor countries can better hold their governments accountable for the promises made – and broken – in the past, such as in the MDGs, in Monterrey, and in the G8 Africa Action Plan.

Parliamentarians often do not realise their potential influence and impact. They have a mandate, a responsibility and an opportunity to change the course of history. Individually and collectively, their actions can make the national, regional and global treaty obligations worth more than just the paper they are written on. Whether in relation to the basic rights of women (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women – CEDAW) and children (Convention on the Rights of the Child – CRC), landmines, electoral reform, small arms reduction, or even the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, government (executive branch) commitments
South African Members of Parliament being sworn in, in the National Assembly.

are meaningless without parliamentary action. And parliamentary action would be further strengthened by permanent regional networking and inter-regional parliamentary dialogue and cooperation mechanisms.

This applies to Africa just as it does to other world regions. Experience has shown that inter-regional parliamentary solidarity can be effective in addressing intransigent and seemingly irreconcilable conflicts. North-South parliamentary solidarity instigated sanctions and helped to end apartheid, and it can be put to use in ending war and poverty. The world needs more champions and heroes: courageous leaders, men and women, who are willing to risk their careers, even their lives, for a just cause. They need support to achieve these objectives. NEPAD parliamentarians touring European donor countries in late 2004 concluded that there is a glaring lack of resources for promoting a better understanding of NEPAD among both African and European parliamentarians. Effective leadership on both continents is needed, in order to secure a sustainable, peaceful and prosperous future for Africa.

Parliamentarians need to be invested in, in order for them to function more effectively, to fight this battle, and for democracy and peace to be sustainable. This is the challenge of the current century. Africa need not wait for the next Nobel Peace Prize to be awarded, but can create its own awards to honour those political leaders who have the courage of their convictions, who make it their daily work to build peace, democracy and prosperity.

Dr. Jeff Balch is Director of the Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), and coordinates an AWEPA research programme on the role of parliament in conflict prevention and peace-building in Africa.

Endnotes
1 Nathalie Lasslop, Zoe Ware and Jessica Longwe of AWEPA also contributed to this article.
The landlocked Central African Republic (CAR), with a total area of 622,984 square kilometres, is bordered by Cameroon to the west, Chad in the north, Sudan to the east, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Congo-Brazzaville to the south. The country’s terrain consists of a plateau, mainly covered by savanna; dense tropical forests in the south; and a semi-desert area in the east. The Bongo Massif in the northeast reaches a height of 4500 ft (1370 m). The country is drained by numerous rivers, but only the Ubangi is commercially navigable. Rivers are the chief means of transportation. Timber, diamonds, uranium, gold, oil and hydro-electric power are the major natural resources.

CONFLICT OVERVIEW
The CAR is surrounded by four traditional zones of conflict, in the Sudan, Chad, the DRC and the Republic of the Congo, and is thus susceptible to spill-over conflicts which influence socio-political and economic events in the country. CAR has had limited experience with democratic institutions, and has frequently experienced coups and mutinies since independence.

CURRENT STATUS
The current situation in the northern CAR is serious as the rebels’ continuous attacks and widespread violence are leading to thousands of refugees fleeing their homes. For example, the February 2006 crossfire battles between government troops and rebel forces led to more than 7,000 people fleeing to neighbouring Chad. On 27 September armed raiders attacked a theological college in Bata, 7km east of Bozoum. On 2 October 2006, L’Hirondelle, an independent daily newspaper, published a communiqué from the APRD that claimed 22 government troops had been killed in 3 different encounters with APRD fighters in the north since 23 September 2006.

MAIN ISSUES
- UN-paid troops used by President Bozize and later dismissed from service.
- Corruption associated with nepotism by political leaders.
- Decades of instability have undermined the economy; people here are among the poorest in the world.
- Government struggles to pay wages.
- The unstable region, due to spill-over conflicts, poses a threat to the stability of the entire country.
- Chadian rebels engage in cross-border raids.

PARTIES
- Government forces of the Republican Guard.
- Rebels from Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et de la Démocratie (APRD), headed by Bedaya N’Djadder.
- Insurgents from neighbouring countries like Chad and Darfur-Sudan. (continued on page 27)
KEY EVENTS

1960 CAR attained independence from France with Dacko as president.
1962 Dacko with the support of the military introduced a one-party system and suspended the post-independence constitution.
1966 With a failing economy, and rife with corruption, the regime was threatened by a general strike. Dacko decided to resign in favour of his cousin, Jean-Bedel Bokassa. Bokassa’s infamous rule was marked by chronic economic problems, and erratic, brutal acts.
1979 Bokassa was ousted through a coup which saw Dacko’s return to power and the introduction of a short-lived multiparty system in early 1981.
Sept 1981 A military government, headed by André Kolingba, stepped in and later re-introduced a one-party system because of growing opposition to his regime.
July 1991 Pressure from the international donor community forced the legalisation of political parties.
Aug. 1993 Ange-Félix Patasse won the elections.
1996 The country faced a deepening economic crisis and army mutinies.
1999 France ended its military presence in the country and was replaced by an all-African peacekeeping force.
Sept. 1999 Patasse was re-elected.
2001 & 02 Unsuccessful coup attempts were mounted against the president and were curbed with aid from Libyan forces.
Mar. 2003 General Bozize and his supporters seized power.
Dec. 2004 A new constitution was approved. National elections were held in March 2005, followed by a run-off in May. Bozizé was elected president in May, and his National Convergence coalition won 42 of the 105 seats in the national assembly.
Mid 2005 Attacks begun by unidentified armed groups in the northern part of the country led several thousand people to flee to Chad.
June 2005 Clashes erupted between government forces and Chadian rebels, who had entered the Central African Republic in the north.
June 2006 33 people were killed in a rebel attack on an army camp in the north.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION
France has intervened in the form of military personnel and logistics to help the national army deal with the rebellion in the north. The aid includes a C-130 cargo aircraft to transport heavy military equipment from Bangui to the affected area of the north. In addition, senior French army officers are also to be deployed in the CAR to help with planning operations on the ground. In sum, however, not much has been done to address the brewing conflict in CAR, and especially to intervene in the effects of spill-over conflicts from Sudan (especially Darfur), Chad and the DRC. It is imperative that CAR be part of a regional conflict resolution strategy.

FINAL COMMENT
CAR’s stability is quite fragile. The insurgents pose an ongoing threat to the country unless the critical issues pertaining to the root causes of their demands are acknowledged and addressed. The issue of the Chadian rebels believed to have been used and expelled by President Bozize should be addressed and settled amicably with the help of regional or international bodies. In addition to the UN Security Council's condemnation on 7 July 2006 of the attacks in the Vakaga Prefecture, regional and international efforts should be undertaken to address the insurgency before it escalates. The Bozize government needs assistance in embracing democratic values, including involving all political stakeholders in managing the country’s affairs. The instability in Sudan, Chad, and DRC should be addressed concurrently and as part of a regional multi-pronged conflict resolution strategy.

References
The Republic of Angola is situated in south central Africa and shares its borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to its north, Namibia to its south, Zambia to its east and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. The country is divided into an arid coastal strip stretching from Namibia to Luanda, the capital; wet interior highlands, dry savanna in the interior south and southwest; and rain forests in the north and in its enclave, the province of Cabinda. Several Congo River tributaries have their sources in Angola.

### Socio-Cultural

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>14.5 million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth Rate</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth Rate</td>
<td>45.11 births / 1000 population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death Rate</td>
<td>24.2 deaths / 1000 population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
<td>Men: 39 years. Women: 42 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate</td>
<td>185.36 deaths / 1000 live births</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS Adult Rate</td>
<td>2.8% (2004 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>Ovimbundu 37%; Kimbundu 25%; Bakongo 13%; Mestiço (mixed European and Native African) 2%; European 1%; Other 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>Indigenous beliefs 47%; Roman Catholic 38%; Protestant 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Portuguese (official), Umbundu, Kimbundu, Kikongo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/literacy</td>
<td>66.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Political

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Parties</th>
<th>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA); the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Type</td>
<td>Transitional government, multiparty democracy with strong presidential system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees/IDPs</td>
<td>500,000 refugees; 4 million internally displaced persons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP &amp; GDP Growth Rate</th>
<th>US$ 23.176 billion. US$ 2,100 (per capita)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>Revenue: US$ 8.5 billion. Expenditure: US$ 10 billion including capital expenditures of US$ 963 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>US$ 8.165 billion: machinery and electrical equipment, vehicles and spare parts, medicines, food, textiles, military goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt</td>
<td>US$ 9.401 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Current Status

For 27 years, after independence, Angola was embroiled in a cruel civil war, which killed and displaced thousands of innocent people and ravaged the country. The conflict resulted in destruction that removed the country from the status of one of the most potentially advanced African countries to the neediest people on the continent. To date, the country is still striving to tackle the physical, social and political legacy of the 27-year conflict. The UN peacekeeping force which was withdrawn in 1999 left behind a country rich in natural resources but littered with landmines and the ruins of war.

The death of UNITA rebel leader Jonas Savimbi in a gunfight with government forces in February 2002 heralded an environment of peace, which led to the army and rebels signing a ceasefire in April to end the conflict.

At present Angola faces the daunting task of rebuilding its infrastructure, retrieving weapons from its heavily armed civilian population and resettling tens of thousands of refugees who fled the fighting. Landmines and impassable roads have cut off large parts of the country. These are proving to be some of the biggest challenges facing the government of the day.

Much of Angola’s oil wealth lies in the Cabinda province, where a decade-long separatist conflict simmers. Cabinda, a sliver of land sandwiched between Congo Brazzaville and the DRC, produces approximately 60 per cent of Angola’s oil. Separatists claim the enclave has its own distinct and separate history and culture, and was illegally occupied by the ruling MPLA government at independence. The government has sent thousands of troops to subdue the rebellion in the enclave. Cabinda remains a conflict hot-spot.

### Main Issues

- State control.
- Power sharing between rival parties (UNITA, MPLA).
- External influence and control (i.e. China, USA) as a result of internal divisions.
- Lack of unity between parties and the Angolan people hampering progress towards peace, justice and development.
- Historical differences between ethnic groups became religious differences and subsequently political differences.
- Differences of identities and ethnicities.
- Failure of leadership.
- Class differences.
- Self-determination.
- Uprising of civil society groups and the media.
KEY EVENTS


June 1989 Gbadolite Accords (Mediated by President Mobutu Sese Seko).


Sept. 1992 First multiparty and presidential elections. Second civil war began after the defeat of Jonas Savimbi during the run-off to the second presidential elections.


April 1997 Inauguration of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation. Recognition by the USA of the country as a sovereign state.

1998 Start of third war (a brutal conventional war).


2006 MOU for Cabinda ceasefire.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

June 1989 Gbadolite Accords
May 1991 Bicesse Peace Accords
November 1994 Lusaka Protocol
April 2002 Luena MOU
August 2006 Namibe MOU for Cabinda

PARTIES

- MPLA
- FNLA
- UNITA
- Cabinda Forum for Dialogue (FCD)
- Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC)–Armed Forces of Cabinda (FAC)
- Russia
- Portugal
- South Africa
- China
- USA
- Cuba
- Zaire/DRC

FINAL COMMENT

Multiparty elections, the first since 1992, are expected to take place between 2007 and 2008, but with many towns and villages remaining inaccessible, the government of President José Eduardo dos Santos insists that repairs to roads and railways need to be completed before voting can occur. It is the hope of many that when elections do finally take place, history will not repeat itself with the resumption of a guerilla war, which is what happened prior to the run-off of the second round of election when Jonas Savimbi rejected the election results in 1992.

The situation in Angola remains quite volatile. The general perception by the international community is that Angola is a stable country; however, there are growing concerns with regard to the peace agreement between the government and the secessionist movement in Cabinda. Human rights groups have alleged abuses against civilians in Cabinda and in the diamond-rich provinces of Lunda Norte and Sul. There is growing concern that pressure from the Angolan government to enforce a peace deal it brokered with Cabinda’s secessionist movement may fuel political tension. The majority of FCD and FLEC members refuse to recognise the peace deal, with civil society groups such as the Catholic Church questioning the legitimacy of the peace deal, as they were not invited to the negotiation table. Only time will tell if durable peace will prevail in one of Africa’s richest states.

References


Comerford, 2005.
The republic of Senegal is the most westerly situated state in Africa. It borders the North Atlantic Ocean, Mauritania, Mali, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. The Gambia forms an enclave in southern Senegal. Its key natural resources are fish, phosphates and iron ore. Casamance forms the southern part of Senegal. Its location between Gambia and Guinea-Bissau makes it fairly isolated from northern Senegal. It has a more lush landscape than the rest of Senegal and its beaches are a major tourist attraction. Culturally it is more similar to Guinea than the rest of Senegal.

CONFLICT OVERVIEW

The struggle for Casamance’s independence dates back to the Jola’s resistance to the French in the 1940s. The Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) has been leading an armed insurgency against the Senegalese government since 1982, making it the longest running conflict in West Africa.

Prior to Senegal’s independence, its first President, Leopold Senghor, promised Casamance’s leaders that if they joined Senegal for twenty years they would be granted independence thereafter. When the government failed to deliver on its promise in 1980 the MFDC began an armed struggle for independence.

CURRENT STATUS

Since the 2004 peace agreement sporadic fighting has been breaking out between Sadio’s radical wing, based in southern Casamance, and Magne Dieme’s more moderate wing, based in the north. Sadio did not sign the 2004 agreement and continued with the armed insurgency. The two wings are currently fighting each other for control over land and Dieme’s strategic bases in northern Casamance. The most recent bout of fighting between the Senegalese government and the MFDC erupted in August when the government’s forces targeted Sadio’s faction as they moved from the south to the frontier with the Gambia. A senior army officer confirmed that the government’s offensive will continue for another four months and that Dieme’s faction could possibly also be targeted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIO-CULTURAL</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>11 987 121 (July 2006 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth Rate</td>
<td>2.34 % (2006 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth Rate</td>
<td>332.78 births / 1 000 population (2006 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death Rate</td>
<td>9.42 deaths / 1 000 population (2006 est.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
<td>59.25 years (2006 est.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate</td>
<td>52.94 deaths / 1 000 live births</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/Aids Adult Rate</td>
<td>44 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>Wolof 43.3%; Pular 23.8%; Serer 14.7%; Jola 3.7% (Doila is the French translation) largest group in Casamance; Mandinka 3%; Soninke 1.1%; European and Lebanese 1%; Other 9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>Muslim 94%; Christian 5% (mostly Roman Catholic); indigenous beliefs 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>French; Wolof; Pulaar; Jola; Madinka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/literacy</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICAL</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Parties</td>
<td>African Party for Democracy and Socialism (PADS/AJ); African Party of Independence; Alliance of Forces of Progress (AFP); Democratic and Patriotic Convention (CDP); Democratic League-Labour Party Movement (LD-MPT); Front for Socialism and Democracy (FSD); Gainde Centrist Bloc (BGC); Independence and Labour Party (PIT); National Democratic Rally (RND); Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS); Socialist Party (PS); SOPI Coalition (led by the PDS); Union for Democratic Renewal (URD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Type</td>
<td>Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees/IDPs</td>
<td>27 000 in The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECONOMIC</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP &amp; GDP Growth Rate</td>
<td>US$ 20.53 billion (2005 est.). 6.1 % GDP growth rate (2005 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>US$ 1.526 billion (2005 est.): Fish, peanuts, petroleum products, phosphates and cotton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>US$ 2.405 billion (2005 est.): Food and beverages, capital goods and fuels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt</td>
<td>US$ 3.529 billion (2005 est.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFLICT OVERVIEW

The struggle for Casamance’s independence dates back to the Jola’s resistance to the French in the 1940s. The Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) has been leading an armed insurgency against the Senegalese government since 1982, making it the longest running conflict in West Africa.

Prior to Senegal’s independence, its first President, Leopold Senghor, promised Casamance’s leaders that if they joined Senegal for twenty years they would be granted independence thereafter. When the government failed to deliver on its promise in 1980 the MFDC began an armed struggle for independence.

CURRENT STATUS

Since the 2004 peace agreement sporadic fighting has been breaking out between Sadio’s radical wing, based in southern Casamance, and Magne Dieme’s more moderate wing, based in the north. Sadio did not sign the 2004 agreement and continued with the armed insurgency. The two wings are currently fighting each other for control over land and Dieme’s strategic bases in northern Casamance. The most recent bout of fighting between the Senegalese government and the MFDC erupted in August when the government’s forces targeted Sadio’s faction as they moved from the south to the frontier with the Gambia. A senior army officer confirmed that the government’s offensive will continue for another four months and that Dieme’s faction could possibly also be targeted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAIN ISSUES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➤ Autonomy and self-determination: the radical MFDC wing demands the secession of Casamance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➤ The moderate MFDC wing is willing to negotiate the status of Casamance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➤ Identity and power: the Senegalese government regards Casamance as an integral part of Senegal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➤ Basic human needs: the Casamançais believe they are not receiving sufficient amounts of revenue which their tourism and fish exports generate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➤ Inequality and discrimination: The Casamançais believe that poverty and underdevelopment is due to a lack of investment by the Senegalese government in the area. They are also under-represented in the Senegalese government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➤ Robberies in Casamance by armed groups and rebels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➤ Internal cleavages: Sabio and Dieme’s factions are fighting each other for the control of land and Dieme’s strategic bases in northern Casamance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
KEY EVENTS

1886 Casamance, a Portuguese colony, is handed over to the French.

1943 Jola resistance causes the French to send traditional Jola leader, Queen Diatta, into exile.

1947 MFDC is formed and declares Casamance independent.

1960 Republic of Senegal proclaimed, with Leopold Senghor of the Senegalese Progressive Union as President. MFDC demands independence of Casamance.

1962 Prime Minister Mamadou Dia sentenced to life imprisonment for attempted coup. Senghor assumes premiership.

1963 Constitutional revision strengthens powers of the president.

1966 UPS only legal party (later changes its name to Socialist Party).

1973 Dia released.

1978 Government mandates a three-party system.

1981 Senghor hands over power to Abdou Diouf.

1983 “Red Sunday”, a battle between separatist demonstrators and police, leaves 25 dead.

1990 MFDC declares armed struggle for independence.

1991 Diouf and MFDC peace agreement.

1992 MFDC splits into north and south front.

1993 Ceasefire signed by the Senegalese government and Father Senghor, leader of the southern faction of the MFDC. Independent study by French historian Jack Charpy into the origins of the status of Casamance. MFDC rejects finding that the region is Senegalese.

1995 Father Senghor placed under house arrest. MFDC annuls ceasefire.

1998 Movement splits into gangs of armed bandits.

1999 Banjul Peace agreement, in which demand for full independence is not mentioned, signed by MFDC and the Senegalese government.

2000 Abdoulaye Wade of PDS becomes president after 40 years of Socialist Party rule.

2001 March peace agreements, which fail to include the status of Casamance, signed by Father Senghor and the Senegalese government.

2004 Ziguinchor Peace agreement signed by Father Senghor, Magne Dieme and the government.

Final Comment

The conflict has been complicated by the division of the MFDC into a moderate and radical wing since the beginning of the 1990s. It is unlikely that the Casamance conflict will be resolved until all the factions of the MFDC are included in the peace negotiations.

Furthermore the government and the armed wing of the MFDC need to soften their hard-line positions in negotiating the status of Casamance. Peace agreements which do not mention the status of Casamance will continue to be futile.

PARTIES

- Senegalese government.
- Salif Sadio’s MFDC faction.
- Magne Dieme’s MFDC faction.
- France.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

1991 Guinea-Bissau mediates and acts as guarantor for peace accord.


1993 Ceasefire signed by Father Senghor of the MFDC and the government.


1997 French ambassador facilitates meeting between MFDC cadres in Casamance and foreign representatives in France.

1998 Gambian president Jammeh offers to mediate. Father Senghor calls for a ceasefire.

2001 March peace agreements signed by Father Senghor and the government.

2004 Ziguinchor peace agreement signed by Father Senghor, Magne Dieme and the government.

References


SITUATION REPORT

CHAD

WRITTEN BY DANIEL VENCOVSKY

Chad is a landlocked country in Central Africa sharing borders with Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, and Sudan. Chad’s climate ranges from dry in the north to tropical in the south. With an area of 1.3 million square kilometres, it is the fifth largest country on the continent. The country’s landscape is very diverse, ranging from desert in the north to arid plains in the central areas (but only less than three percent of land is arable), mountains in the north-west and lowlands in the south. The country has sizeable oil deposits and became an oil-exporting nation in 2003.

CURRENT STATUS

Chad has experienced little calm since being granted independence in 1960. Various conflict issues, including the cleavage between the Arab Muslim North and the Christian-animist South, the border dispute with Libya over the Aouzou strip, and the ever-present struggle for power among various groups, frequently escalate into violence. Chad’s problems stem from two main root causes. First, the absence of a democratic political environment results in the militarisation of political disputes. President Déby has been in power since 1990 and his rule has seen a number of coup attempts and rebellions. The second cause of violence in Chad is linked to the conflict in neighbouring Sudan’s Darfur province. The Janjaweed has been in power since 1990 and his rule has been marked by numerous human rights abuses. The Janjaweed has been responsible for widespread atrocities, including mass killings, torture, and forced displacement. In April 2006, President Déby had to fight off a major offensive mounted by the United Front for Democracy and Change (FUDC), a Sudan-backed rebel movement. The FUDC are alleged to be supported by the Khartoum government and Darfur rebels are reportedly aided from within Chad (Darfur rebels belong to the Zaghawa, Déby’s ethnic group). Chad’s anti-government movements are reportedly also operating in Darfur in aid of the Sudanese government and the Darfur rebels are believed to have helped the Déby government defeat a large rebel offensive in April 2006.

Earlier this year, Chad decided to cut off diplomatic ties with Sudan but diplomatic relations were resumed again a few months later. Also, the Chadian army is currently preoccupied with attempting to defeat its home-grown rebels and has left the Chad-Sudan border largely unprotected. This has enabled the Janjaweed to expand its operations into Chad and directly target more of the Chadian civilian population.

MAIN ISSUES

- Lack of democracy and political oppression.
- Spill-over from the conflict in Darfur, Sudan.

PARTIES

- The government of Chad (President Idriss Déby).
- Rebel groupings: United Front for Democracy and Change (FUDC), Rally of Democratic Forces, (RaFD), the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT).
- The government of Sudan.
- France.

Socio-Cultural

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>9.9 million (July 2006 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth Rate</td>
<td>2.93% (2006 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth Rate</td>
<td>45.73 births / 1 000 population (2006 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death Rate</td>
<td>16.38 deaths / 1 000 population (2006 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
<td>48 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate</td>
<td>91.45 deaths / 1 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS Adult Rate</td>
<td>4.8% (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>200 distinct ethnic groups including the Arabs; Gorane; Zaghawa; Kanembou; Ouaddai; Baguirmi; Hadjerai; Fulbe; Kotoko; Hausa; Boulala; Maba; Sara; Mountang; Moussei; Massa and French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>Muslim 51%; Christian 35%; animist 7%; other 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>French and Arabic (official), Sara and other local languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/literacy</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
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</table>

Political

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Parties</td>
<td>Federation Action for the Republic (FAR); National Rally for Development and Progress (RNDP); National Union for Democracy and Renewal (UNDR); Party for Liberty and Development (PLD); Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS); Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP); Union for Democracy and Republic (UDR); Union for Renewal and Democracy (URD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Type</td>
<td>Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees/IDPs</td>
<td>224 924 refugees from Sudan and 29 683 from the Central African Republic (2005). 55 000 IDPs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Economic

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP &amp; GDP Growth Rate</td>
<td>US$ 5.5 billion (2005). 5.6% GDP growth rate (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>Cotton, oil, livestock, textiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>Machinery and transportation equipment, industrial goods, foodstuffs, textiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt</td>
<td>US$ 1.6 billion (2004)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The International Court of Justice rules in Chad’s favour in the long-standing border dispute with Libya.

January 2002

Government and MDJT sign a peace agreement, which only holds for a few months.

2003

MDJT and the Déby government sign a peace deal but hard-line MDJT elements refuse to abide by it.

2006

Chad restores diplomatic relations with Sudan and both sides pledge to cease hosting rebel groups.

FINAL COMMENT

For Chad to achieve a state of lasting peace, the political grievances of rebel groups have to be acknowledged and addressed in a non-violent manner. However, any changes towards the accommodation of political dissent seem unlikely given the current political climate in the country. The current spate of fighting in the East is directly linked to the conflict in Darfur. Chad’s relationship with the Sudanese government has recently taken a turn for the better: diplomatic relations have been re-established and both sides have promised to cease hosting foreign rebel groups. However, it remains to be seen if this agreement will be honoured. As long as the conflict in Darfur continues to escalate, it is unlikely that Chad’s eastern region will experience complete restoration of peace.
The Republic of Congo, with a coastline of 169 kilometres on the South Atlantic Ocean, is bordered by Angola in the south-eastern part, Cameroon in the northeast, Central African Republic in the north, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to the west, and Gabon to the east. The country has a total area of 342,000 square kilometres. Congo is rich in natural resources that include timber, potassium, petroleum, lead, zinc, uranium, copper, phosphates, gold, magnesia, natural gas and hydro-power.

CONFLICT OVERVIEW
The Congo has been embroiled in conflict since independence and is characterised by many assassinations and civil wars. Catastrophe broke out with the workers’ unrest in 1963, barely three years after independence, leading to the forced resignation of President Fulbert Youlou. Since then, the country has been marred with violence grounded in ethnic divisions, economic marginalisation, corruption and unequal distribution of national resources among other factors. Peace in the country remains elusive even after the government signed a peace deal with the Ninja rebels in 2003. Political divisions, human rights abuses, poverty, and troubled neighbouring states are exacerbating insecurity in the Congo.

CURRENT STATUS
Three years after the signing of a peace deal between the government and the Ninja rebel group at Mindouli in March 2003, peace remains elusive in the Congo. Violence has persisted and there are still many vulnerable areas which require special attention. The instability in the neighbouring states coupled with porous borders is a significant problem for the Congo as there are spill-over conflict effects and gun trafficking, which further complicates the national disarmament programme.

MAIN ISSUES
- Political marginalisation based on ethnicity.
- Unequal redistribution of resources.
- Political and ideological differences with the PCT.
- Corruption.
- Unemployment and poverty.
- Human rights abuses.
- Instability of neighbouring countries and the region.

PARTIES
- Government forces.
- Former rebels (Ninjas).
- Politicians in the diasporas.
- France, which is a former colonial power.
- Rebel movements associated with the neighbouring states.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION
The inclusion of opposition parties in the government has contributed to greater stability in the country. The international community has been quite supportive in funding disarmament projects. For example, the European Union and the United
1960 Congo becomes independent with Fulbert Youlou as president.

1963 Youlou forced to resign following workers’ unrest, and Alphonse Massamba-Debat became president.

1964 Massamba-Debat set up the National Revolutionary Movement.

1968 Marien Ngouabi ousted Massamba-Debat through a coup.

1970 Ngouabi proclaimed Congo a Marxist People’s Republic with his Congolese Workers party as the sole legitimate party.

1977 Ngouabi was assassinated in a plot by Massamba-Debat, who in turn was executed, and Joachim Yhombi-Opango became president.

1979 Yhombi-Opango handed over the presidency to the Congolese Workers Party (PTC) and Denis Sassou-Nguesso succeeded him.

1990 The Congolese Workers Party (PTC) abandoned Marxism.

1992 Voters approved a constitution which established a multi-party system and Pascal Lissouba became president in Congo’s first democratic elections.

1993 Bloody fighting broke out between government and opposition forces over disputed parliamentary elections.

1994-95 A ceasefire was established between the government and opposition parties; the opposition was given government posts.

1997 Full-scale civil war broke out; pro-Sassou-Nguesso forces, aided by Angolan forces, captured Brazzaville, forcing Lissouba to flee.

1999 Government and rebels signed a peace deal in Zambia providing for a national dialogue, demilitarisation of political parties and re-admission of rebel units into the security forces.

April 2001 Peace conference ended by adopting a new constitution, leading to presidential and parliamentary elections.

Sept. 2001 Transitional parliament adopted a draft constitution. Some 15,000 militia disarmed in a cash for weapons scheme.

Dec. 2001 Former president Pascal Lissouba was convicted in absentia on treason and corruption charges, and sentenced to 30 years’ hard labour, by the high court in Brazzaville.

Mar. 2002 Denis Sassou-Nguesso won presidential elections unopposed after his main rivals were barred from the contest. Intensive fighting between government and “Ninja” rebels drove many thousands of civilians from their homes.

Mar. 2003 Government signed deals with the Ninja rebels aimed at ending fighting in the Pool region.

April 2005 Government claimed a group of army officers, arrested in January for arms theft, had been planning a coup.

Oct. 2005 Former Prime Minister Bernard Kolelas was allowed home to bury his wife after eight years in exile.

Nations Development Programme have contributed US$ 2 million to disarm former combatants. Under the country’s National Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration Bureau, 5,000 former rebel fighters in the Pool region are being demobilised, with funding from the World Bank.

**FINAL COMMENT**

The situation in the Congo is fragile and there are risks of returning to violence if key differences are not fully resolved. Political tolerance and consensus on the economic direction of the state are among the key issues that need to be addressed by all the stake-holders to avoid derailing whatever weak stability has been achieved. In addition, the instabilities in the neighbouring states pose a great threat to the Congo. Insurgents operating in the DRC, Central African Republic and Cameroon spill over into Congo and further jeopardise the situation. The international community and regional governments need to work collaboratively to restore peace in the region.

**References**

<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications>
<http://www.irinnews.org/report>
<http://allafrica.com/>
The economic reintegration of ex-combatants into society is an essential element of the broader peace-building framework in contemporary peace support operations. The DDRR (disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration) of combatants has become an integral part of present-day efforts to transform war-torn societies into peaceful entities. The role of DDRR is to augment security by disarming and reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian society. It has been recognised that the success of DDRR and that of wider peace-building are mutually interdependent; sustainable peace cannot be attained without successful DDRR, and conversely, any gains achieved by DDRR cannot be sustained without broader long-term recovery. Getting DDRR right can have a significant positive effect on the fate of war to peace transitions in Africa and a deficient DDRR process can prolong the state of insecurity and hinder the transition to peace.

DDRR itself is a multi-faceted process that consists of a number of interdependent components. After having been disarmed and demobilised, former combatants embark on the process of gradual reintegration into the social and economic fabric of civilian society. It is crucial that they are supported in this process through national and international assistance. The focus of this article is on economic reintegration, the process of absorbing ex-combatants into peaceful economic structures. This process consists of two phases: reinsertion (interim assistance that meets the immediate needs of the ex-combatants in the period before lasting reintegration structures are established) and reintegration (efforts to durably engage ex-combatants in non-violent economic activities). It has been noted that “possession of arms

Above: A young fish-monger: Economic reintegration of ex-combatants must include viable options for employment.
is not just a function of insecurity but also an important economic asset”. For many, living by the gun presents an opportunity to earn a livelihood and, in peacetime, ex-combatants have to be offered an alternative mode of making a living.

The failure of reinsertion and reintegration (RR) can negate previous successes of the disarmament and demobilisation (DD) phase and hinder the transition to peace or result in increased crime and insecurity, discouragement of other ex-combatants from disarming and substantial re-recruitment. DDRR programmes in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been criticised for their inability to create sustainable economic opportunities for ex-combatants and for the slow pace of progress, respectively. In order to successfully reintegrate youth ex-combatants in Liberia, the DDRR programme needs to address the socio-economic conditions that contributed towards the emergence of the conflict, among them the lack of economic and educational opportunities. Lack of progress on RR has contributed to the reported re-recruitment of former fighters for the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. Similarly, in 2005 deficiencies in RR components in Ituri in the DRC reportedly resulted in heightened crime and insecurity as only a fraction of disarmed ex-combatants had enrolled in reintegration programmes or found employment.

Despite their importance, RR programmes across Africa have suffered from a lack of and delays in donor funding and operational difficulties due to inadequate design. This article aims to contribute to the improvement of the RR component in DDRR programmes in Africa by identifying the main lessons learned from DDRR experiences in West Africa and the DRC. The article first reviews two debates surrounding reinsertion assistance. First, it explores whether this should take the form of a cash payment or in-kind assistance, and secondly, whether cash payments should be made as a lump sum or in a number of instalments over a longer period of time. The article proceeds by reviewing the success of stop-gap projects (interim projects between demobilisation and reintegration) and suggests that these projects can have a significant positive impact. As regards reintegration modalities, this paper criticises some common deficiencies in the design of vocational training programmes, namely lack of consideration for the attributes of the post-conflict labour market, and suggests that more international arms markets, it can pose a security risk for beneficiaries, it can be easily extorted by former commanders, it can be used to rearm, it can accelerate inflation and if markets are disrupted beneficiaries may not be able to purchase objects of daily use. Porous borders, the wide availability of weapons across Africa, and different value of reinsertion assistance in various countries may result in the creation of regional arms flows: it has been noted that reinsertion assistance in Côte d’Ivoire was in excess of US$ 900, while in Liberia ex-fighters were offered a total of US$ 300 only. The use of cash also increases the likelihood of DDRR being perceived as a cash-for-arms scheme. This approach creates expectations that may prove difficult to manage. DDRR in Liberia in 2003–2004 resulted in violence and the temporary suspension of the process due to unsatisfied expectations of ex-combatants. In addition, due to the widespread proliferation of small arms, weapons can

Reinsertion

The first step in RR is reinsertion assistance, also known as the transitional ‘safety net’. It aims to bridge the gap between demobilisation and lasting reintegration. It is usually targeted for a period of six to twelve months after demobilisation and can comprise both monetary contributions and in-kind entitlements, such as clothing, basic household goods, hygiene products and baby-care kits. The precise format of reinsertion assistance is a subject of contention and the benefits and drawbacks of monetary assistance and non-liquid aid have been hotly debated among academics and practitioners. The second point of contention centres on the form of the payment of cash assistance, which can be disbursed either as a lump sum or in instalments over an extended period of time. These debates are explored below.

Cash versus in-kind allowances

The advantages of cash payments include relative logistical simplicity and the resultant cost-effectiveness, flexibility for beneficiaries, stimulation of local trading systems, and increased attractiveness of the DDRR process and resulting acceleration of the peace process. Counter-arguments stress that cash may fuel

AFTER HAVING BEEN DISARMED AND DEMOBILISED, FORMER COMBATANTS EMBARK ON THE PROCESS OF GRADUAL REINTEGRATION INTO THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FABRIC OF CIVILIAN SOCIETY

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be easily reacquired. It has been suggested that DDRR should embrace a development-for-arms approach and make cash assistance conditional on participation in the longer-term reintegration process, as is being attempted in Liberia.⁶

**Lump sum versus instalments**

The second dilemma centres on the disbursement of cash assistance as a lump sum or in a number of instalments. Proponents of lump sum payment argue that it is logistically easier and offers a resource that can be invested in productive ways thus going beyond reinsertion itself and providing an instrument of reintegration. Critics argue that a lump sum payment may be squandered on alcohol and objects of short-term benefit, may pose a security risk for recipients, and increases inflationary pressures. Logistics have presented a daunting challenge in the DRC due to the size of the country and the high number of ex-combatants to be catered for (77 000 as of June 2006). DDRR in the DRC has utilised both approaches (at differing points in time): a larger initial payment followed by twelve smaller monthly instalments or two larger lump sum payments. The DRC has utilised cutting-edge technological innovations to deal with these challenges. A mobile phone operated payment system has been devised. Payments are verified via a mobile phone network and cash is released in a mobile phone outlet, where the immediate funds come from local sales of mobile phone services. The sum is later reimbursed by the government. Instalments paid over a period of time have the advantage of embedding reinsertion into a process and their payment can be made conditional on participation in reintegration activities and decreased over time in order to phase out dependency. This would contribute towards entrenching payments into the development-for-arms approach.⁷

**Stop-gap projects**

The void between demobilisation and reintegration can also be filled by stop-gap projects. These are “short-term interventions that can help ensure a smoother transition from demobilisation to reintegration. Stop-gap projects implemented through community-based activities in sensitive and strategic areas, can help reintegrate ex-combatants into the community by creating short-term jobs, whilst they wait to enter longer-term reintegration programmes.”⁸ Stop-gap projects, also known as quick impact projects (QIPs) in the peacekeeping mission setting, offer a number of benefits: they contribute to the short-term economic well-being of ex-combatants, they can involve skills transfer and if conducted in conjunction with employing the local civilian workforce, and for the purpose of infrastructure and amenity renovation, they can also contribute to community reconstruction and reconciliation.

Stop-gap projects have been successfully used in various post-conflict environments throughout Africa. In the DRC, the United Nations peacekeeping mission (MONUC), as well as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), have been using interim reintegration projects. In Sierra Leone, the UN peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL) employed around 6 000 ex-fighters, together with 1 500 community members in short-term infrastructure reconstruction and agricultural development QIPs. Ex-combatants and civilians were encouraged to take meals together and engage in sports activities, thus positively impacting on economic reconstruction as well as reconciliation. Various international and domestic organisations have successfully run reconstruction projects that employed both ex-combatants and community members in various countries.⁹

It is apparent that stop-gap projects can have substantial positive benefits. Their increased use in the pre-reintegration stage (if they are used as a means of paying ex-combatants for the work they carry out rather than offering them reinsertion payments) could not only embed reinsertion assistance into the development-for-arms approach, but also aid later reintegration due to skills transfer, reconciliation and reconstruction, which is a precondition for later economic development.

**Reintegration**

This section elaborates on the main deficiencies of the reintegration modalities previously used in DDRR programmes. The various strategies of economic reintegration are conditioned by the state of the post-conflict economy, for example the availability of land and the state of the labour market, and by the characteristics of the target group, such as education and skills attainment, age, gender, etcetera. The main reintegration avenues include either formal education or vocational training followed by employment, either in wage jobs, self-employment, or in agriculture. There is a wide scope for international and domestic assistance in this process and the most common methods include vocational
training, sponsorship of formal education, and employment creation initiatives.³

**Vocational training: the car mechanic syndrome**

Vocational training offered to ex-combatants commonly includes soap making, tailoring, plumbing, woodworking, car repairs, electrical work and agricultural skills. There are two main problems associated with vocational training in DDRR. First, the training may not reflect the needs of the labour market, and secondly, post-conflict economies may not offer enough opportunities for employment. It has been noted that reintegration training support can take two forms: either establish a predetermined set of options that are offered to ex-combatants or shape these options according to the expectations and desires of reintegration clients. The latter option helps promote individual initiative and ownership of the process, but the ex-combatants’ choices may not correspond with the demands of the labour market. In Liberia, the latter approach was adopted and ex-combatants were asked to make decisions about their reintegration route: as regards vocational training, auto mechanic was the most popular choice among men and tailoring was the most favoured option among women.

In a non-African example, Baaré notes that in Haiti, “of the 4 867 [ex-combatants] trained, only 304 had found employment, 28 of them as security guards, which was not a job for which training had been provided… What of the reality that 1 790 men had been trained as auto mechanics, probably doubling or even tripling the number of mechanics in Haiti.”¹⁰ A similar observation has been made about Mozambique, where most ex-combatants did not find employment in the field that they received training in. The same phenomenon may be taking place in Sierra Leone. There are indications that vocational training may offer a better option than formal education due to the more practical nature of the skills transfer, but reservations remain as to which sectors of the economy have the highest capacity to take in large numbers of ex-combatants. An economy with few cars can only sustain a limited number of car mechanics. It may also be a fallacy to expect ex-combatants, who spent a number of years in the bush, to realistically access the
opportunities available. The most realistic options seem to be agriculture, and self-employment in a trade or craft.

Reintegration programmes also have to reflect the absorption capacity of the labour market. Labour markets in post-war societies tend to suffer from high unemployment, breakdown of productive economic activities, and decayed infrastructure, and are usually unable to absorb more job seekers. In Liberia, the unemployment rate is reported to be between 75 to 85 per cent. For this reason it is suggested that more emphasis be put in reintegration into agricultural activities and micro-enterprise creation. These options are further explored.

**Viable Options**

Agriculture may offer a means of securing a living even in the absence of a developed labour market. However, the DDRR schemes in Liberia and Sierra Leone failed to encourage viable agricultural reintegration, partly due to reliance on choices made by ex-combatants. The situation was further complicated by issues relating to land ownership and inadequate access to land by young people. However, those who sought employment in agriculture fared better than recipients of other forms of training. Micro-enterprise offers a livelihood option in environments where there are no opportunities for wage employment. Micro-enterprise creation can be supported by start-up grants or loans, skills training and business coaching.

**The community-based approach**

DDRR programmes harbour an inherent conflict between equity and security: there is a need to neutralise the threat posed by ex-combatants by offering them viable economic opportunities; however, this often affords them preferential treatment over the rest of the population, which can cause resentment in the society. A focus on ex-combatants may result in adverse reactions (including instances of violence) from the rest of the community and accusations of rewarding ex-fighters for their participation in the war. By offering economic advancement to ex-combatants and persons associated with fighting forces only, these individuals enjoy an unfair advantage over the rest of the society. It has been suggested that ex-combatants should be merely reintegrated into the living standard of the rest of the society. It has also been suggested that RR should adopt a broad community-based approach and focus not only on ex-combatants, but on the community at large and reintegration of ex-combatants through overall economic recovery. Community-based reintegration is, however, a comparatively more expensive option. Many stop-gap projects have embraced this approach.
In addition to examples mentioned earlier, in southeastern Liberia a Danish Refugee Council project engaged a group of 4,500 people in reconstruction efforts. This group comprised both ex-combatants (60 percent) and unemployed civilians (40 percent). DDRR in the DRC introduced the ComRec scheme, a United Nations Development Project (UNDP)-managed project that gives funding to ex-combatants. The idea is for the ex-fighters to organise themselves and, with the help of a local non-governmental organisations (NGO), design business ideas in the area of reconstruction of local communities. These projects are then funded from the ComRec budget. ComRec embraces many approaches already mentioned: it is community-based, promotes reconciliation and offers the opportunity for a business start-up. It is, however, hampered by insufficient capacity on the part of local NGOs and ex-combatants themselves.12

**Funding Difficulties**

DDRR processes invariably suffer from funding difficulties: delays are common, and donors often express reservations as to the use of their funds. To date the majority of DDRR donor funding has been into DD, rather than into creating sustainable livelihoods through ex-combatants’ reintegration. DD can be funded through the UN budget but RR tends to depend on voluntary contributions from a variety of actors, therefore funding for RR is often late or insufficient.

In Liberia, funding problems were compounded by a massive underestimation of how many combatants would join the DDRR process. The initial estimation was 38,000 but in the end 103,000 were included. DD was financed through assessed UN contributions (UNMIL), and RR was to be funded through a UNDP-administered trust fund. Budgetary shortfalls and delays resulted in deficiencies in the RR process that fell short of the needs of the ex-combatants.13

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

DDRR aims at the durable reintegration of ex-combatants into the economic fabric of civilian society. This article has reviewed a number of tools in RR and assessed their appropriateness by identifying the main tensions and dilemmas. In concluding, it can be summarised that reinsertion cash payments should be spread over a period of time and tied to participation in reintegration programmes, and possibly be taken as a wage for participation in community reconstruction projects. Stop-gap projects play a vital role in providing interim sources of income before reintegration efforts can take effect and can positively contribute to community reconstruction and reconciliation. Reintegration has to better assess vocational training options offered to ex-combatants and more attention should be given to truly viable reintegration options, such as agriculture and stimulation of micro-enterprise. The community-based approach should be utilised wherever financial capabilities allow. 

Daniel Vencovsky is an intern with ACCORD’s Training for Peace Programme. He also runs www.africainfo.org.

**Endnotes**


6 UNDP Practice Note, p. 46; MDRP In Focus 3; Williband (2006).

7 UNDP Practice Note, p. 46.

8 Bragg (2006) p. 16; UNDP Practice Note, p. 49; IRIN News 2005, Interview with Clive Jachnik, the Head of the UNDP Rapid Response Mechanism in the DRC.


10 Baaré (2005).


12 IRIN News 2005; UNDP Practice Note, p. 47; Baaré (2005); Isima (2004); SIDDR Final Report, p. 27; Bragg (2006); Danish Refugee Council, Available at <www.drc.dk> Accessed on 10 October 2006.

Burundi is a nation that has been beset by ethnic conflict between the dominant Tutsi minority and Hutu majority. Since attaining independence from Belgium in 1961, numerous coups d’état and a violent civil war lasting 13 years have marred the country’s history. Despite Burundi’s turbulent past, strides are being made to achieve peace. As the country begins to lay a foundation for long-term peace and stability, Burundi’s efforts to resolve conflict will impact on the Great Lakes region, and potentially influence moves towards peace on the African continent. This article examines the steps Burundi has taken in resolving ethnic conflict and civil war. Most notably, it examines the recent Ceasefire Agreement signed on 7 September 2006 between Burundi’s government and the only remaining rebel force, the Forces for National Liberation (FNL), and evaluates the extent to which the Ceasefire Agreement is able to secure long-awaited peace for the nation of Burundi.

**Burundi’s Civil War**

The Burundi civil war began in June 1993, after Burundi’s first multiparty elections were held. Melchior Ndadaye of the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) was elected president. Ndadaye was the first Hutu to become president since Burundi gained independence in 1961. The election results heightened rivalry and tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. Although the Hutus were the majority ethnic group, up
until Ndadaye’s election in 1993, Burundi’s government had been dominated by Tutsis, through the Union for National Progress (UPRONA) political party.

On 21 October 1993, Ndadaye was killed in a violent coup d’état carried out by the Tutsi military. Ndadaye’s death was a catalyst; the simmering conflict between the two ethnic groups erupted into a full-scale civil war. The Hutus reacted to Ndadaye’s killing by seeking revenge against the Tutsis, while the Tutsi military massacred Hutus in an attempt to regain power. The civil war pitted the minority Tutsi-dominated military against numerous Hutu rebel groups; the main Hutu rebel group being the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD). Burundi’s civil war continued for 13 years. Violence, bloodshed, rebel military activity, refugees and internal displacement of nationals characterised this chapter in Burundi’s history, which were attended by Agathon Rwasa, leader of the FNL, the UN and international partners, and the government of Tanzania. At the conclusion of the meetings, the FNL delegation issued a statement in which it expressed the armed group’s intention to negotiate with the government of Burundi and cease hostilities.²

In September 2004, Burundi’s parliament approved a post-transition constitution. In 2005, numerous steps towards peace were taken, including the peaceful holding of a national referendum on the post-transition constitution on 28 February 2005, and democratic legislative elections on 4 July 2005. The former rebel group, the FDD, now known as the CNDD-FDD, was democratically elected to power. The swearing in of Hutu ex-rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza of the CNDD-FDD as president in August 2005 marked a turning point in bringing 13 years of civil war to a close.

AS THE COUNTRY BEGINS TO LAY A FOUNDATION FOR LONG-TERM PEACE AND STABILITY, BURUNDI’S EFFORTS TO RESOLVE CONFLICT WILL IMPACT ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION, AND POTENTIALLY INFLUENCE MOVES TOWARDS PEACE ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

with an estimated 300 000 people having lost their lives during this period.¹

Steps Towards Peace

May 1998 saw the beginning of a peace process in Burundi. Peace talks between the warring factions were held in Arusha, Tanzania in 1998. The former Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, mediated the talks. After Nyerere’s death, former South African President, Nelson Mandela, supported by the United Nations (UN), took over the mediator’s role. The Arusha Agreement was signed on 28 August 2000, although rebel groups refused to participate in the peace process.

In July 2001, Burundi’s 19 political parties agreed to form a power-sharing government. The power-sharing government was sworn in on 1 November 2001. However, two armed Hutu rebel groups, the FDD and the FNL, refused to lay down arms and join the power-sharing government.

In November 2003, the main rebel group, the FDD, signed the ceasefire and power-sharing agreement. The FNL remained the only one of Burundi’s rebel groups outside of the peace process.

On 21 April 2004, the FNL indicated at a meeting held in Kigoma, Tanzania, that it was willing to suspend hostilities against the transitional government of Burundi. Almost a year later, from 4 to 12 April 2005, a series of meetings were held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which were attended by Agathon Rwasa, leader of the FNL, the UN and international partners, and the government of Tanzania. At the conclusion of the meetings, the FNL delegation issued a statement in which it expressed the armed group’s intention to negotiate with the government of Burundi and cease hostilities.²

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The Ceasefire Agreement of 7 September 2006

In April 2004, the FNL indicated that they were willing to negotiate with the Burundi government, and in 2006 the time was ripe for a peace agreement to be brokered between the government and FNL. South Africa agreed to act as a mediator between the two parties, and peace talks were set for May 2006. Official peace talks between Burundi’s CNDD-FDD government and the last remaining rebel group, the FNL, began on 29 May 2006. The talks were mediated by South Africa and Tanzania.

A provisional truce known as the Agreement of Principles Towards Lasting Peace, Security and Stability was signed between the CNDD-FDD government and the FNL on 18 June 2006. The agreement provided for, inter alia, the FNL to be transformed into a political party; refugees and internally displaced persons to be repatriated; and Burundi’s defence and security forces to be re-organised. The agreement also awarded members of the FNL with provisional immunity, and committed the government and FNL to addressing issues of ethnicity.² Despite the apparent success of the agreement, the FNL continued to harbour reservations concerning the reintegration of FNL fighters into Burundi’s national army.

On 7 September 2006, the Agreement of Principles Towards Lasting Peace, Security and Stability was cemented by the signing of a formal Ceasefire Agreement between Burundi’s CNDD-FDD government and the FNL. Burundi’s President, Pierre Nkurunziza, and the leader of
the FNL, Agathon Rwasa, signed the Ceasefire Agreement in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania at the 25th Summit of Regional Initiative on Burundi. South Africa’s Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula, facilitated the Ceasefire Agreement. South African President Thabo Mbeki, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, and representatives from regional and international bodies also attended the ceremony.

The Ceasefire Agreement of 7 September 2006 aimed to put an end to conflict between the CNDD-FDD government and FNL. While the text of the Ceasefire Agreement remains inaccessible, the content prohibits all forms of aggression between the parties, whether armed or otherwise. It further disallows parties to partake in public hate speech and propaganda against each other. The Ceasefire Agreement prescribes that the parties, within 72 hours of having signed the Agreement, cease all hostile activity.

During negotiations, the parties had difficulty reaching consensus on issues surrounding the composition of Burundi’s national army. The FNL wanted the army to be drastically transformed or dissolved, and refused to reintegrate into the national army as it stood.

The Ceasefire Agreement accommodates the FNL’s wishes by setting out a programme catering for the repatriation, protection in transit and static protection of the FNL leadership in the Great Lakes region and in the diaspora. The Ceasefire Agreement further provides for the disarmament of FNL combatants and their transportation to cantonment areas supervised by the UN. The agreement stipulates that disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the FNL fighters must take place within a period of 30 days of the signing of the agreement. In response to the terms of the Ceasefire Agreement, an estimated 3 000 FNL rebels are to disarm by gathering at assembly points, at which point they are to decide whether to be integrated into the national army or be demobilised. The process is to be monitored with the assistance of the African Union (AU) and UN.

In order to ensure that the terms of the Ceasefire Agreement are fulfilled, a Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM) has been appointed. The JVMM is mandated with the task of monitoring the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, through the establishment of joint liaison teams. The JVMM comprises 24 members: Burundi’s CNDD-FDD government and the FNL are represented by seven members each, other members include one representative from the national commission in charge of the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, two delegates from the AU, and two from the UN Mission in Burundi. Three delegates from South Africa, one from Tanzania and another from Uganda will represent the regional peace initiative.

Prognosis For Peace

As the 30-day period for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the FNL fighters draws to a close, hundreds of FNL fighters have come forward and given up their arms in compliance with the Ceasefire Agreement. However, a significant problem that remains is the lack of food and healthcare for the former combatants. The UN and AU pledged their support in this regard.

Optimism for the establishment of peace and stability occasioned by the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement in Burundi has been partially overshadowed by coup plot allegations that have led to the arrest of several high profile figures, including former President Domitien Ndayizeye, as well as the resignation of Vice-President Alice Nzomukunda, who argued that corruption and human rights abuses were hampering the fulfilment of her duties.

Some analysts and human rights groups opine that the government’s security forces used the pretext of suspecting people of being FNL supporters or combatants as an excuse to commit human rights abuses. They therefore question whether the Ceasefire Agreement...
Agreement will successfully reduce the commission of human rights abuses.10

Further reports have surfaced that FNL fighters have been collecting ‘taxes’ from civilians in FNL stronghold areas. In addition some FNL faction fighters, led by Jean-Bosco Sindayigaya, are resisting demobilisation. South Africa, the mediating country in the Burundi peace process, has indicated that negotiations with Sindayigaya’s FNL would take place after the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement.11

Conclusion
The Ceasefire Agreement of 7 September 2006 is viewed as a fundamental step towards achieving long-term peace, security and stability in a nation torn apart by a 13-year civil war. To many, the Ceasefire Agreement marks the end of a turbulent civil war and the beginning of a season of stability, building of Burundi’s economy and the creation of national unity.12

The situation in Burundi will remain tentative throughout the implementation phase of the Ceasefire Agreement. The newly established peace could easily be compromised by the slightest aggression or provocation. It is crucial that the basic needs of the former FNL combatants are met, failing which dissatisfaction will likely cause them to renege on the Ceasefire Agreement. The political stability within the ruling CNDD-FDD government also remains precarious, and any political upheaval may potentially undermine the Ceasefire Agreement. Crucial to the Ceasefire Agreement’s success is the role of the JVMM in providing an effective mechanism to ensure accountability and compliance with the terms and conditions of the Ceasefire Agreement.

Building trust between the parties is a key element for securing peace. During the September 2006 negotiations at Dar es Salaam, a film called Freedom was screened. “This movie illustrates the rivalry between young African leaders at the dawn of independence. The viewing was followed by discussions on the importance of truth, forgiveness and reconciliation, which helped alleviate concerns on either side, and strengthen unity within the ranks of the FNL as well as their determination to bring the talks to a successful conclusion.”13 The trust that was created as a result of the Ceasefire Agreement remains fragile and needs to be strengthened if lasting peace is to be achieved in Burundi.

Both the CNDD-FDD government and the FNL have expressed their optimism in terminating hostilities, following the signing of the agreement. President Nkurunziza stated, shortly after signing the Ceasefire Agreement, “We want to reassure our brothers and sisters of FNL that our government is ready to work with them in promoting peace, democracy, reconstruction and reconciliation in Burundi.” In turn FNL leader Agathon Rwasa noted that he was happy with the agreement and was looking forward to its full implementation.14

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Endnotes
5 Supra, note 3.
8 Supra, Note 4.
10 Supra, Note 9.
12 Supra, Note 1.
14 Supra, Note 4.
After 1996, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) entered into a notable cycle of violence, first with the rebellion led by Laurent Kabila against the Mobutu regime, and secondly with the rebellion initiated by the Rassemblement des Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) against the Kabila regime. The international community’s priority was to negotiate a settlement to this conflict, that is, the reaching of an agreement between the parties that would enable them to end the armed conflict.

An analysis of the conflict in the DRC reveals that many diplomatic initiatives were undertaken by the international community, indicating the concern by different parties for this conflict to be resolved. A number of recommendations were adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and a number of agreements were signed by the parties involved. Since 1997, conflict in the DRC has seen approximately 23 peace initiatives aimed at ending the hostilities and addressing the concerns of...
neighbouring countries, mainly Rwanda and Uganda, as the conflict in the DRC has regional dimensions.

From 1998 to the present, more than 34 resolutions have been adopted by the UNSC and four peace agreements signed, namely the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 1999, the Pretoria Agreement in 2002, the Luanda Agreement in 2002, and the Global and Inclusive Accord in 2002. Several other mechanisms were also put into place in order to address the security concerns of neighbouring countries, for example the Joint Verification Mechanisms between Rwanda and the DRC in 2004 and the Tripartite Plus Commission in 2004 (DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi).

This article analyses the contribution of these diplomatic initiatives to the resolution of the DRC conflict. It argues that although diplomatic initiatives have contributed to the de-escalation of the conflict, they have not guaranteed a lasting peace in terms of the deeper underlying causes of this conflict, which remain unaddressed.

Since 1997, conflict in the DRC has seen approximately 23 peace initiatives aimed at ending the hostilities and addressing the concerns of neighbouring countries.

Overview of Diplomatic Initiatives in the DRC

Diplomatic initiatives in the DRC resulted in the signing of four agreements and the establishment of several mechanisms, as previously outlined.

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement provides for the establishment of a ceasefire, the freezing of territorial control of all conflicting parties and the subsequent withdrawal of all armed groups operating in the territory of the DRC, the deployment of a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force in the DRC, the establishment of a Joint Military Commission made up of African countries to monitor the implementation of the agreement as well as the disarmament of destabilising forces, and the initiation and setting up of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, aimed at bringing about a new political order in the DRC and based on the participation of Congolese armed groups, the unarmed political opposition and representatives from civil society.

However, the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement has faced a number of problems that were minimised or ignored during the negotiation process. Among these problems, are:

- The exclusion of certain actors. The Lusaka Accord, negotiated and signed only by the main actors (DRC government, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, RCD and Mouvement de Libération du Congo), did not encompass other rebel groups such as the Ugandan, Burundian, Rwandan and Angolan rebel groups operating from the DRC and the Mai Mai. Even though the negotiators recognised the existence of these militias and their role in the conflict, they minimised their impact in the global process. The evolution of the conflict indicates that despite a ceasefire among the main actors, the war has continued through the actions of these militias.

- The Lusaka Agreement did not address the causes underlying the existence of foreign armed groups in Congolese territory. Although the security concerns of neighbouring countries were addressed, the agreement treated the question from a Congolese perspective only.

- The Lusaka Agreement failed to take cognisance of the ‘greed factor’ as opposed to the ‘grievance factor’. In the analysis of the causes of the conflict, it has been argued that greed motives have also guided the involvement of outside actors in the DRC conflict. However, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement only addressed grievance factors such as the security concerns of neighbouring countries. No reference was made to the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC, a major factor that encourages the sustenance of the DRC conflict for economic gain for certain opportunistic actors.

The Pretoria Agreement

In the preamble of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the parties recognise that addressing the security concerns of the DRC and neighbouring countries would contribute to peace. But the lack of will in the implementation of this agreement did not allow this provision to be implemented.

The Pretoria Agreement signed by the DRC in July 2002, committed, according to a programme and timetable for implementation, Rwanda to withdraw its troops from the DRC and the Congolese government to support the disarmament, demobilisation and repatriation of those groups identified in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement as ‘negative forces’. In fact, as previously stated, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement did not take into consideration the
fact that militias were actors in this conflict. The Pretoria Agreement recognised their existence and committed the DRC to their disarmament, demobilisation and repatriation.

The commitment made by both parties had to be verified by a third party defined in the Agreement (Paragraph 3) as the Secretary-General of the UN and South Africa.

The strength of the Pretoria Agreement is that it brought Rwanda back into the peace process. It also committed the DRC government to cease arming and supporting the Interhamwe (Rwandan Hutu militia) and ex-Rwandan armed Forces (FAR).

The Luanda Agreement

The Luanda Agreement, brokered by Angola, shows many parallels with the Pretoria Agreement, mediated by South Africa. The main difference resides in the provision allowing the Ugandan army to withdraw in a gradual manner.

The Luanda Agreement, signed in September 2002 between the DRC and Uganda, is one of the diplomatic initiatives that had addressed the security concerns of neighbouring countries referred to in the preamble and Article 2 of the 1999 Lusaka Agreement.

It provides for the withdrawal of Ugandan forces from the DRC, establishing a Joint Pacification Committee on Ituri to govern the district with the assistance of MONUC (UN Mission in the DRC), and acceptance by the DRC for Uganda to remain on the slopes of Mount Ruwenzori until the parties put in place security mechanisms guaranteeing Uganda’s security.

The Global and Inclusive Accord

The fifth chapter of the modalities for the implementation of the ceasefire agreement in the DRC stipulated that “the parties agree to do their utmost to facilitate the inter-Congolese political negotiation which should lead to a new political dispensation in the DRC”.

Despite the difficulties faced in the process of grouping together all the Congolese parties, the diplomatic initiatives succeeded in assembling these parties for the 25 February 2002 Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Sun City, South Africa, in an effort to establish an agreement on a power-sharing formula.

The diplomatic initiatives finally resulted in the signing of an Inclusive Agreement on 16 December 2002, in which all the involved parties agreed to a cessation of hostilities and the organisation of a transitional period of 24 months, with the possibility of one extension of six months. They also agreed on the objectives of the transitional period, which included:

• The unification and reconstruction of the country, the re-establishment and the restoration of
territorial integrity and state authority in the entire national territory;
• National reconciliation;
• The creation of a restructured, integrated national army;
• The organisation of free and transparent elections at all levels allowing a constitutional and democratic government to be put in place;
• The setting up of structures that will lead to a new political order.

Contrary to the Pretoria Agreement and the Luanda Agreement, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue was aimed at addressing the internal dimensions of the conflict in the DRC. This formed part of the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.

**Different Mechanisms**

The implementation of the Pretoria Agreement and the Luanda Agreement resulted in the setting up of the Joint Verification Mechanism and the Tripartite Plus Commission. These mechanisms deal with the question of foreign armed groups operating in the DRC and causing insecurity in neighbouring countries.

**The Joint Verification Mechanism**

The Joint Verification Mechanism was established between the DRC and Rwanda on 22 September 2004. The aim of this mechanism was to verify and investigate any allegations made by any of the parties. For the purpose of verification, the DRC and Rwanda have set up Joint Verification Teams, which are deployed at specific points along the common border in order to verify allegations made of border cross-overs. The main objective pursued through this mechanism was to build trust among the parties as one of the major causes of tension between these countries is the lack of trust.

**The Tripartite Plus Commission**

On 23 September 2004, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, signed the Memorandum of Intent on Regional Security in the Great Lakes. The objectives of this memorandum, brokered by the USA, are to strengthen relations between the parties, to create a mechanism to address regional instability and a process of political and diplomatic rapprochement, to neutralise and eliminate any security threat prevailing at the parties’ common borders among and between the parties, and to ensure respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries in the region and cessation of any support for armed groups or militias, in accordance with relevant resolutions of the UN and other rules of international law.

The implementation mechanism provides for the establishment of a Commission referred to as the Tripartite Joint Commission (Art. VII). The Commission was mandated to address the obstacles that have hindered effective government authority in the eastern parts of the DRC. It was also tasked with implementing the memorandum and ensuring that its objectives are met. After Burundi joined the Commission on 23 October 2005, the Tripartite Joint Commission was renamed the Tripartite Plus Commission.

Despite the multitude of diplomatic initiatives having taken place in the DRC conflict, the country still does not enjoy stable peace. What are the challenges facing the DRC and the quest for stability and peace?

**Obstacles to Peace in the DRC**

Diplomatic initiatives have contributed to the de-escalation of the conflict but they have not guaranteed a stable peace in this country as the obstacles jeopardising peace still remain. Among these obstacles are the presence of foreign armed groups, the integration of the Congolese army, and the management of ex-combatants in the community.

**The presence of foreign armed groups**

The presence of foreign armed groups in the Congolese territory is one of the factors destabilising the Great Lakes Region, with the consequence of an increased circulation of arms and increased flow of refugees and displaced people. These foreign armed groups are located in the north-east and eastern part of the DRC, namely Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu.

Apart from the local militias operating in the Ituri District, there have been incursions of elements of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) fleeing from South Sudan who have regrouped in the Garamba Park since 2005. The presence of the LRA has exacerbated tensions between the DRC and Uganda, who threaten to invade the DRC in order to fight the LRA.

In North Kivu, the presence of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda/Alliance of Democratic Forces (NALU/ADF) and Forces Démocratiques pour la
The conflict trends

*Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR) sustains tensions between the DRC and Uganda on one hand and the DRC and Rwanda on the other hand.

The presence of foreign armed groups in the Congolese territory is one of the main obstacles to a stable peace in the DRC because, as long as the armed groups are active in the DRC, its relations with the neighbouring countries will always be tense. Rwanda and Uganda continue to use this pretext to threaten the DRC even when other agendas, such as the exploitation of Congolese resources, underlie their actions.

**The integration of the army**

One of the main provisions of the Global and Inclusive Agreement is the integration of the army. This integration was based on the armed forces of belligerents. At the date of elections (30 July 2006), only 12 brigades out of the 18 planned were constituted. This means that presently there is a huge number of non-integrated ex-combatants who still maintain ties with their leaders.

According to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General who heads the UN Mission in the DRC, about 87,000 ex-combatants are still not integrated. These soldiers therefore continue to pay respect to and follow leaders who are not in official command in the Congolese army.

The existence of a large number of non-integrated combatants is one of the main obstacles to peace in the DRC. In fact, the presence of large numbers of armed men with membership in rival groups poses a major threat to stability, especially when parties lose elections.

**The management of ex-combatants in the community**

Almost 60 per cent of ex-combatants choose demobilisation rather than integration in the new army. The conditions offered by the CONADER (National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration) to ex-combatants seem to be more attractive than those offered to integrated soldiers.

The management of these combatants is a major challenge to peace for both the government and the community. In a country characterised by a high rate of unemployment, the presence of a large number of ex-soldiers whose skills lie in handling weapons will jeopardise the security of the country. This concern is heightened when one considers that the number of weapons retained by ex-combatants, once they leave the army, is not known. The danger is evident when some political leaders challenge the results of elections and resolve to use violence. The unemployed ex-combatants become cheap manpower, easily recruited for the purpose of fostering corrupt politicians’ interests.

**Conclusion**

Diplomatic initiatives in the DRC conflict have succeeded to some extent in creating conditions for the cessation of hostilities, at least between the main belligerents. But as discussed, there are still several serious obstacles that jeopardise the DRC’s fragile peace. More initiatives, aimed at addressing the aforementioned obstacles, are needed if there is to be any sustained and long-term benefit to conflict resolution interventions. The DRC therefore needs the ongoing support of the international community if peace in this country, and the stability of the region as a whole, is to prevail.

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**Endnotes**

At the Ntare School’s golden jubilee celebration held on 30 September 2006 in Mbarara, Uganda, a jovial Rwandan President Paul Kagame, said that he was hopeful that he would work with his fellow alumnus, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to help Ntare School produce three more presidents for the region.

Ugandan academic institutions have been known to produce high-calibre leaders who have made their mark locally and internationally.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President, Joseph Kabila, the late Tanzanian President, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, and his second successor, President Benjamin Mkapa (now retired), Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki, and former Kenyan Vice President, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga were trained and educated at Uganda’s prestigious Makerere University.

Four Ugandan heads of state and all the Ugandan post-war vice presidents were trained there. Others include former and current Ugandan Prime Ministers Benedicto Kiwanuka and Prof. Apollo Nsibambi and world renowned Kenyan intellectuals Ngugi wa Thiongo and Ali Mazrui.

Uganda’s success in developing leaders of such high standing rests on a very strong education system that is over 100 years old. This article examines this much-ignored aspect of Uganda and outlines its continuing impact on leadership.

Above: Uganda's success in developing leaders rests on a strong and unique education system.
Overview of Uganda's Leading Secondary Schools

Uganda’s most prominent schools include Kings College Budo (established in 1906); St Mary’s College Kisubi (established in 1906); Busoga College Mwiri (established in 1911); Gayaza High School (established in 1906); Namilyango College (established in 1902); Mityana High School (established in 1904); Nabumali High School (established in 1900); and Mengo High School (established in 1895). These are known as the “centenary schools”, and form part of Uganda’s heritage.

The second generation of educational institutions was modelled on the traditions of the centenary schools. They include Mount St Mary’s Namagunga (established in 1942); Nyakasura High (established in 1926); St Joseph’s College Ombachi (established in 1947); Teso College (established in 1957); Nabbingo High School (established in 1937); Nabusuna Girls High School (established in 1951); Makerere College School (established in 1945); and Sir Samuel Baker School (established in 1952) among several others.

The third generation of schools (established in the 1960s and beyond) has largely carried forward the traditions of the centenary and second generation schools. In 1991, universal primary education (UPE) was introduced and enrollment figures in primary school shot up from 4.5 million to the present 7.9 million students. Universal secondary education (USE) will be introduced in 2007. Currently, Uganda has 4 000 privately run secondary schools and 850 government secondary schools.

While the first and second generation of schools account for 80 percent of the composition of all Ugandan governments from independence in 1962 to date, a large proportion of Ugandan leaders beyond 2020 is likely to emerge from the UPE and USE systems.

Calls to improve the quality of UPE are therefore based on its potential to diversify Uganda’s skills base – an essential component for building effective leadership. There is also a real need to ensure that rural schools are improved to the required standards.

Ugandan Schools and National Leadership

The list of prominent leaders that were produced by the first, second and third generation of tertiary institutions is endless. Mityana High School trained and produced four Buganda Kingdom prime ministers and six Ugandan bishops. Kings College Budo produced three Ugandan presidents, one vice president, a Speaker of Parliament, two chief justices, and several ambassadors and politicians. Former Kenyan Attorney General Charles Njonjo, and internationally acclaimed Malawian scholar-diplomat, David Rubadiri, were educated there. Mwiri College produced one president, three bishops, and several top politicians. St Mary’s Kisubi produced a vice president, Speaker of Parliament and some of Uganda’s top lawyers and academics. Ntare produced a generation of leaders in Rwanda and Uganda including Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni.

The following is an overview of unique leadership traditions developed by a select sample of leading schools:

Kings College, Budo

Situated on a hill where all Kings of Buganda were crowned, this school was initially established to train and educate sons of officials from the royal court of the Buganda Kingdom. This tradition was broken to accept girls (the first intake being in 1933), and later to admit Ugandans from all walks of life. Budo’s leadership style focuses on modesty in success. It is modelled on the traditional Kiganda concept of Gakyali Mabaga — meaning “we have just begun and more is to come”.

Budo is a famous melting pot of cultures in a highly conservative region. Budo students (Budonians) are revered for their matter-of-life-and-death attitude towards sticking to principles.

The prestigious “Budo Order of Merit” – a most coveted honour in Uganda – is awarded to former Budonians of high standing in the public and private sectors who best exhibit the Budo principles. Recipients include former students Sir Frederick Muteesa II, former King of Buganda and President of Uganda; Omukama Patrick Kaboyo former King of Tooro; Justice Benjamin Odoki, the current Chief Justice; Prof. Apollo Nsibambi, the current Prime Minister; and former President, Godfrey Binaisa among several others.

Namilyango Boys College

Namilyango developed a philosophy of quality-oriented education, which was especially alien to Catholic institutions at the time and it remains one of the school’s outstanding traditions.

Prominent former students include: the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) Secretary General, Ambassador Omare Okurut, and former Ugandan Vice President, Cosmas Adyebo. The school is famous for producing several generations of judges including attorney general Justice Bart Katureebe, high court Justices JB Katutsi, Pius Kawere, and Joseph Bbosa, and top constitutional lawyers Mathias Nalanya, Edward Mugulumu and JC Ssempebwa.

St Mary’s College for Boys, Kisubi

Originally intended to train Catholic youth, this school has, for 100 years, trained a generation of students from all religious backgrounds on a well entrenched
tradition of tolerance and respect for diversity – which today constitutes part of the school’s identity.

There is perhaps no better testimony to this spirit of diversity than the establishment of an alumni branch in Rwanda. Some prominent former students include Vice President Gilbert Bukenya, Speaker Edward Sekandi, former Democratic Party President Paulo Ssemogerere and politicians Henry Mugerwa Kajura, Omara Atubo, Hilary Onek, Charles Bakabulindi, Baguma Isole and Joseph Mukiibi.

Gayaza High School for Girls

At Gayaza’s centenary celebrations in 2006, Uganda’s leading newspaper, the New Vision,4 commented that nearly every professional field now has a Gayaza girl – engineers, mathematicians, doctors, historians, playwrights and politicians. When the school was founded, its initiators said: “we venture to predict for this school not only success but an honourable place in the making of this nation”.

Underpinned by the motto: “never give up”, theirs is a philosophy of practical problem solving and innovation. As part of this problem-solving spirit, Gayaza girls are required to make their own uniforms upon arrival at the school. If there is a single symbol of Gayaza’s impact on the cultural life of the Ugandan nation, it is the national dress – which evolved from the school uniform.

Prominent former students include: Sarah Ntiro, the first woman university graduate in East and Central Africa, Betty Bigombe, the first woman peace mediator in the northern Uganda war, Miria Obote, first woman president of a major opposition political party, Cecilia Ogwal, a veteran opposition political leader, and parliamentarians Ruth Kavuma, and Beti Turomwe.

Mount St Mary’s Girls, Namagunga

Of the endless list of Namagunga’s traditions, it is its system of governance which is unique among Ugandan schools. It consists of nine ministries, each complete with a patron (teacher) and minister, who are aided by officials in advanced level classes. Students are also trained in speech and poise, to develop their diplomatic skills.

Namagunga has produced several women lawyers, politicians and judges including Supreme Court Lady Justices Laetitia Kikonyogo and Stella Arac Amoko. Africa’s first female Vice President, Specioza Kazibwe, was educated here.

Namagunga is especially famous for producing a generation of women scientists and doctors. Prominent ones include Dr Cecilia Achadu Otim, Dr Josephine Namaganda, Dr Rose Azuba, Dr Tereza Namatovu, Dr Jane Frances Kamya, Dr Angelina Kakooza, Winnie Byanyima, Dr Barbara Natabbi, Dr Julie Bataringaya, Dr Nakakeeto Kijjambu, Dr Salome Kiribaka Bakeera and Dr Sabrina Kitaka Bakeera.

Ntare School

Ntare School distinguished itself for its laissez-faire approach especially during the time of William Crichton. Crichton was the school’s first headmaster, who believed in “educating the whole man”5 both academically and through extra-curricular activities, especially sports. So informal is Ntare that up to now the school has no definite motto. Ntare’s flexible approach helped the students to develop personal responsibility and therefore greater seriousness towards academic excellence.

Contrary to popular belief at the time that it was a school for ethnic groups from western and southern Uganda, Ntare had students from all corners of Uganda, including some from Sudan. Because it shunned discrimination, it was a magnet for students from Rwanda and interestingly, the current head prefect is from northern Uganda.

Apart from Presidents Kagame and Museveni, others trained there include Ugandan Deputy Prime Minister
Eriya Kategaya, Minister of Defence Amama Mbabazi, Minister of Transport John Nasasira, Minister of Local Government Tarsis Kabwegyere and Dr Vinand Nantulya, one-time infectious diseases advisor to President Museveni and currently working for the United Nations.

On the Rwandan side are Patrick Mazimhaka, former presidential advisor and current African Union (AU) Deputy Chair, Musoni Protais, Minister of Local Government, Sam Rugege, the Deputy Chief Justice, and Emanuell Ndahiro, a senior presidential advisor, among several others.

**Namasagali College**

Namasagali College, where this author was educated, is probably the only school that was governed almost entirely by students. It had a cabinet of ministers with various portfolios: internal affairs, commerce, works and health, entertainment, cabinet affairs, information and education. There was a civil service comprising permanent secretaries, commissioners and captains and a judiciary comprising a chief justice, judges, ordinary courts and courts of appeal. The school had a penal code which was enforced by constables known as ‘reeves’ who had powers of arrest.

Namasagali adopted a unique system of ‘power sharing’ between the headmaster and cabinet. Teachers did not participate in the system. Some prominent students include the current Deputy Speaker of Parliament, the former Deputy Inspector General of Government and former Minister of Ethics and Integrity. Several others went into politics, law, performing arts and the military. Namasagali rose to international prominence for its contribution towards developing Uganda’s literary and performing arts. In 1994, the school set up a university specialising in the arts.

**Attributes of the Ugandan Education Experience**

**Tolerance of diversity and non-sectarianism**

At the turn of the century, the centenary schools focused on training students from designated religious and social backgrounds, but this eventually gave way to accommodate and educate students from all backgrounds. It has given the Ugandan educational system a decidedly non-sectarian outlook which is a good foundation for developing conscientious and nationally minded leaders.

**Inclusion and integration of foreign learners**

At Ntare’s golden jubilee, HE Paul Kagame had this to say: “In Ntare the old boys looked after the young; so for instance, Mr Museveni used to be my president and my commander in chief at some point... but in our tradition, the old president looked after the young, who also became president.”

He went on to say: “This school gave us the home that our country denied us and if you check the statistics you will find that probably most of those young Rwandan refugees passed through Ntare more than any other school ... This golden jubilee is therefore a very exciting moment for us to give something back to the Ugandan people and this school, which gave us more than we can ever give back.”

The Rwandan connection to Ntare School is symbolic of the generally well entrenched culture of non-discrimination in Ugandan schools.

Nabumali High School, for instance, was a haven for Sudanese and Kenyan students mainly because of its academic reputation and its geographic location.

Among the luminaries educated there are the late Sudanese Vice President, John Garang, and Kenya’s first African Chief Justice, Maluki Kituli Mwendwa.

In 1993, Namasagali College was among the first to open its doors to children of Burundian asylum seekers and any form of bullying was punishable by expulsion. The Rwandan students there were well integrated and contributed immensely to the intellectual and social atmosphere of the College, including the student government. Some of them joined the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in their struggle to end genocide.

There is perhaps no better indicator of the ‘open door policy’ of the Ugandan educational system than the number of foreigners in primary and tertiary institutions.

Since 1999, 250 000 Kenyan students have enrolled to study in Ugandan high schools each year. At Bugema University and Rakai College, there are more Kenyan students than Ugandans. At Kampala International University, Kenyans make up the largest percentage of students followed by Tanzanians, Somalis, Sudanese and Rwandans.

The multi-cultural orientation of the Ugandan educational system could be used as a tool to develop leadership values that promote and respect diversity.

**High academic standards and competition for national prominence**

In 2003, the Africa Almanac listed Gayaza High School, Namilyango College, Kings College Budo, Makerere College, Lincoln College and Rainbow School among Africa’s 100 best high schools. Mengo Secondary School, Kings College Budo, Namilyango College, Gayaza High School, St Mary’s Kisuhi, Trinity College Nabbingo, Busoga College Mwiri, Bweranyangi Girls Secondary, Makerere College School, Nyakasura School, and Mbarara High School were listed among Africa’s 50 best secondary schools.

Such international recognition of the strength and quality of the Ugandan education system has made
Uganda one of the most attractive choices for primary and secondary education in Eastern Africa. Credit is due to the centenary schools and many of their second and third generation counterparts.

Conclusion

Leadership programmes currently in place in Africa tend to focus on short training courses for select interest groups. Others focus on propagating the personal leadership styles and philosophies of former presidents (mainly through presidential foundations). The Ugandan experience, however, shows that to be effective, sustainable and realistic, leadership programmes ought to be targeted at primary and secondary school level instead.

There is also a widely held notion that colonialism and dictatorship brought about a leadership deficit on the continent and that there are no institutional mechanisms through which leaders can be nurtured, trained and deployed. The Ugandan case shows that this is not the case.

Thanks to the foresight of the nation’s educators, the processes of developing leaders through the educational system were shielded from negative political developments (including 25 years of civil war), and transformed to shape the very foundation of the Ugandan nation.

This unique system is based on a 14 year programme (seven years of primary school; four years of junior high; and two years of advanced level education). Most of the prominent schools have primary, junior high and advanced level sections – thus taking students through a comprehensive educational and cultural experience that is carried forward many years after formal schooling. This is reflected in the immense contribution made by former students in the last 40 years, and the active reach of the “old boys and old girls” associations through reunions, awards, honours and other means of giving back to their school communities. This indicates that Uganda does in fact have a firm base and institutional framework to prepare the next generation of leaders; this just needs more development and utilisation.

Uganda recently officially marked 100 years of the centenary schools – a truly successful educational and training package that is integral to the life of the nation and a rarity, given that the country is only 44 years old. Ugandans ought to exploit this unique aspect of their national heritage by piloting leadership programmes to complement the educational and training packages already on offer at the nation’s top schools.

Paul Nantulya is piloting a National Leader for Tomorrow (NLT) programme for a select consortium of African schools. He is also involved in a government partnership to develop training and educational programmes for the recently established Rwanda Peace and Leadership Academy.

Endnotes

1 Address by President Paul Kagame in ‘USE starts next year – Museveni’ . Available at <http://www.monitor.co.ug> Accessed on 2 October 2006.
7 For more information, see Uganda Ministry of Education Website. Available at <http://www.education.go.ug/> Accessed on 5 October 2006.
Prof. Wangari Muta Maathai is the first woman in Africa to win the Nobel Peace Award, which crowned her international recognition in the field of environmental conservation. *Unbowed: One Woman’s Story* is her memoir.

Written in chronological order, the narrative is simple and descriptive. The book is divided into 13 chapters and an epilogue. It ends with a short story, which Prof. Maathai says was narrated by one of her aunts. Former US President, Bill Clinton, prefaces the memoir, but it has no introduction.

The narration takes the reader through Maathai’s formative experiences in Nyeri District in Central Kenya, where she was born into a polygamous family in 1940. Kenya was under British colonialism at the time and this reality shaped social relations. Maathai then traces her school years in her home district, and at Loreto-Limuru, near Nairobi, and later St Scholastica College in Atchison, Kansas, USA, where she graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in biology, and the University of Pittsburgh in Pennsylvania, where she achieved a master’s degree in biology. In tracing these progressions, she reflects on the major events of the time including Kenya’s independence, the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the civil rights campaign.

Maathai then turns to her adult life. She recalls her employment at the School of Veterinary Medicine at the University of Nairobi in 1966, though she was not a veterinary doctor; the start and break-up of her marriage; her election to the leadership of the National Council of the Women of Kenya (NCWK); and the foundation of the Green Belt Movement. She recounts her battle of wills with Kenya’s political elite over various environmental issues including deforestation. The narrative ends with her election to Parliament, in December 2002, when a new government came to power, and her reception of the Nobel Award in September 2004. Interestingly, Maathai avoids relating her impressions of post-2002 Kenya.

Maathai’s memoir has several strengths. For one, it espouses the linkage between localised environmental issues and the broader national developmental issues. Two, it captures the double oppression of women, as part of the oppressed population and specifically as women, and provides useful insights on their mobilisation, particularly rural women. Three, it underscores the point that it is not enough to have ideas; ideas must be backed by conviction and action. And four, the book presents the Green Belt Movement as a model; the model may not be replicated elsewhere as it is, but at least it offers important generic lessons.

These strengths notwithstanding, *Unbowed: One Woman’s Story* leaves readers, particularly those well versed with Kenya’s political issues, with many unanswered questions. While one can forgive her romantic views of pre-colonial Kenya, and her thinking on Kenya of the 1950s, Prof. Maathai’s analysis of Kenya’s post-independence political era could be further developed.

The dynamics of Kenya’s political system are complex and deeply inter-linked, yet Prof. Maathai’s critique of the political and identity issues in Kenya comes across as simplistic.

Moreover, the attitude of Kenya’s post-independence elite towards fundamental issues such as nationhood, national identity and socio-economic policies was to a large extent influenced by the global ideological rivalries between the Cold War warriors and continental political movements such as Pan-Africanism. Similarly, the end of the Cold War caused fundamental changes in different parts of the world, including one-party states in Africa such as Kenya.

However, Prof. Maathai’s analysis of the link between these issues and her own world-views, the Green Belt Movement and the dominant political thinking in Kenya comes across as incomplete and lacking full analysis. These are issues that Maathai will do well to reconsider in subsequent editions or future books.

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