

FACTORS INFLUENCING MONITORING OF FOOD SECURITY PROJECTS IN
CENTRAL SOMALIA: THE CASE OF INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE (IRC) IN
SOUTH MUDUG REGION.

ABDIRAHMAN ADEN ALI

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A RESEARCH PROJECT REPORT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
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DECLARATION

This research project report is my original work except where due reference has been made. It has not been submitted for the award of a degree to any other university.

Signature  Date 30/07/12

ABDIRAHMAN A.ALI

L50/64231/2010

This project report has been submitted for examination with my approval as the supervisor.

Signature  Date 30/7/12

DR PETER KEIYORO

SCHOOL OF CONTINUEING AND DISTANCE EDUCATION

DEPARTMENT OF EXTRA MURAL STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

DEDICATION

This research report is dedicated to the people of Somalia who continue to suffer from the double effects of the civil war and cyclic droughts. In particular, it is dedicated to the residents of south Mudug region of central Somalia.

The report is further dedicated to the Somali national staff of the International Rescue Committee who despite the harsh working environment, continue to provide the much needed humanitarian assistance to the affected population in south Mudug region of Central Somalia.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

IRC	International Rescue Committee
UN	United Nations
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activity
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
AUSAID	Australian Government Overseas AID program
DFID	Department for International Development
UKaid	United Kingdom Aid
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
INGO	International Non Governmental Organizations
LNGO	Local Non Governmental Organizations
NASA	National Space Agency
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
TI	Transparency International
PMBOK	Project Management Body of Knowledge
USA	United States of America
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition

SMART	Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transition
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Science

ABSTRACT

After twenty years of conflict, Somalia has been classified as the world's most fragile state. The causes of conflict in Somalia are deep and complex. Multiple levels of armed conflict and insecurity exist. These include localized communal clashes over resources, political conflicts over control of the state, regional proxy wars, and conflicts fuelled by global agendas and ideology. These conflicts not only cause instability in Somalia, but also threaten the ability of aid organizations to effectively monitor and deliver humanitarian assistance to the needy population. Approximately half of the population is in need of assistance. The need for humanitarian organizations to ensure aid reaches those most in need by adopting strategies to deal with the enormous challenges facing them, remains a top priority. In this regard, this report examines how security, skills and capacity of aid organization personnel as well as organization structure impact on effective monitoring of humanitarian aid. The study provides a detailed analysis of each of these parameters and provides key recommendations for improving monitoring of projects. This study was carried out in south Mudug region of central Somalia and primary focused on the International Rescue Committee's (IRC) food security projects in south Mudug region. The study employed a descriptive survey design in order to collect adequate and relevant data for analyzing the topic under study. The primary data collection was preceded by extensive literature review of the research topic. Primary data was collected by use of questionnaires and standardized interview guides and analyzed using both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Main findings, conclusions and recommendations of the study have been presented in chapter four and five of the report. The study found out that insecurity is not a major factor influencing monitoring of food security projects in central Somalia. It was also found that capacity of national staff and strategies employed by the IRC in monitoring of its food security project are weak and need improvements. The findings of the study will be found useful by the employees of the IRC and other aid organizations operating in Somalia. It will also be of significance importance to academics, practitioners in the humanitarian sector as well as the donor community.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The humanitarian and security situation in Somalia has been deteriorating severely since the collapse of its central government in 1991(IRC, 2011).Over the past several years various reports have pointed to ongoing violence, targeted killings, and civilian casualties committed by all parties to the conflict.

The depth and severity of the displaced person's crisis in Somalia is increasing. It is now estimated that more than 1.5 million people are displaced and scattered throughout the country.. Half the country's population (or 3.64 million people), are in desperate need of humanitarian assistance with 20% having Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates for children under 5yrs due to lack of food and diseases. The largest number (75%) of the affected population is concentrated in South and Central regions where access to basic services such as food, health care and safe water is seriously lacking.

The security situation, combined with the current reduced amount of humanitarian resources available could very well lead not only to further conflict within the country, but also to an increase in the number of Somalis fleeing their country and taking refuge in Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen. These population movements could have negative ramifications on the wider security situation in the region.

The situation is worsening because of extreme insecurity, massive displacement of the population, over seven consecutive years of failed rains. This has resulted in deepening and spreading of the drought in large parts of the country and a lack of access by aid agencies to those in need.

As of 2012, Somalia continued to face the effects of its worst droughts in over a decade with fears of flooding during the rainy seasons with serious consequences for nutrition, livelihoods, and access to food. The crisis is compounded by extremely limited access to those in need, insecurity, sometime targeted assassinations, kidnappings and threats against international and national staff of National and International humanitarian organizations. This prevailing condition has consequently reduced the ability of these

agencies to operate leading to many of the agencies to modify ways of working in order to adapt to the current context.

Effective monitoring of aid programs remains a top priority for many aid agencies in Somalia. Monitoring and evaluation are the primary mechanisms to assess whether a project or programme is meeting its targets and objectives. Monitoring is an ongoing process that allows managers and supervisors to identify changes and trends over time so that they can assess whether project interventions are achieving their goals. Effective Monitoring will show whether a particular undertaking has been successful in achieving its stated goals. Much of the information generated from monitoring activities can be used effectively in communications and fundraising work for most organizations. When done effectively, the process of monitoring can provide an early warning system, giving vital and timely information, so that the project can adapt to changing conditions. The lessons learned may be of value to similar projects either within or outside of the organization. Monitoring is an effective way of testing project hypotheses or assessing the effectiveness of a pilot activity. Regular monitoring of any project provides the information needed for successful evaluations.

Monitoring is the process of systematically collecting data in order to provide information for all stakeholders (managers, funders, participants) on the progress of implementation and the achievement of desired outcomes. Critical functions of monitoring are to gather feedback from participants; analyse contextual changes; and provide an early warning system of potential challenges. The analysis of monitoring data is critical to making informed mid-term programmatic changes.

Project monitoring is a continuous and periodic review, and overseeing of the project to ensure that input deliveries, work schedules, target outputs and other required action proceed according to plan (UNFPA, 1990).

Monitoring is also a continuous process of collecting information at regular intervals about on-going projects or programmes concerning the nature and level of their performance. Monitoring is an on-going activity to track project progress against planned tasks to ensure that the project is moving towards the right direction at the right speed so as to achieve its initial self objectives.

In Somalia, operations by most western-based aid agencies have been limited due to insecurity, threats, and donors' restrictions aimed at avoiding the risk of funds being diverted to terrorist groups. In response, the INGO have struggled to find ways to meet the vast critical needs of the affected populations.

Many of the INGO have invested in the capacity of Somali partners, but the dangerous environment has meant that monitoring and ensuring that aid reaches those in need is inevitably difficult. Though aid agencies have developed numerous strategies to try and ensure that all aid is effectively monitored, the challenge of doing so remains high.

International Rescue Committee (IRC) is an International Nongovernmental Organization (INGO) founded in 1933 to rescue survivors of Nazi oppression in Europe and help settle them in free countries (Bonn and Baker, 2000). According to Carland and Faber (2008), the work of IRC evolved over 75 years to include provision of emergency relief services to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees resettled in the United States.

The International Rescue Committee became operational in Somalia in November 2007 in response to Internally Displaced Person's (IDP) crisis and droughts that affected the lives of thousands of Somali people in the Mudug Region of Central Somalia. The IRC program's focus is to improve household food security as well as better access to primary health care and water and environmental health services.

The agency's head office at country level is in Nairobi where most of the coordination and donor interactions take place. However, the IRC in Somalia operates from two of its field offices in Mudug Region and the city of Mogadishu which ensures program support for all of its in country programs (*IRC Somalia, 2012*). Direct implementation of IRC programs are carried and supervised by Somali national staff and the local communities in the locations where activity implementation take place. The head office in Nairobi where expatriate staff are usually based provides technical management oversight to the field office based national staff and also serves as the primary link between the global headquarters in New York (USA) and the donors.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

This study sought to assess the key challenges facing effective monitoring of food security projects in South Mudug region of central Somalia. The lack of central government and

ever increasing security conditions in central Somalia has severely weakened the ability of aid organizations to effectively monitor delivery of services to starving Somali population most of who are women and children. In this regard, most humanitarian organizations have resorted to "remote monitoring " systems mainly from Nairobi Kenya and other safer locations in Somalia such as the autonomous region of Somaliland. In the face of the donor fatigue in Somalia particularly American and European donors, this approach though serves the interest of aid agencies, is raising growing concerns among the donor community. The fear that aid may be benefiting terrorist groups such as the Al-Qaeda linked Al-Shabab and other clan based militia causing destabilization in most parts of South and Central Somalia is also a another factor of great concern (IRC Somalia,2012).

Globally, the term "remote monitoring" has been coined to describe situations of poor access with high exposure of aid organizations' staff to security risks. This usually limits capacity to monitor implementation directly. In most such situations the choice for remote monitoring is driven by the lack of data, or the lack of credible data, that inform funding and implementing organizations on the efficiency and effectiveness of aid delivery. Rather than withdrawing aid from insecure environments, many agencies have moved towards more remote (or removed) monitoring systems (Nordic Consulting Group ,June 2011).The use of these means of monitoring often coincides with a decrease in the regularity and comprehensiveness of impact-level surveys. In general, these systems are usually a fix for poor overall access. Such systems, although viable, produce a very limited view on the situation and the results on the ground.

1.3 Purpose of the study:

The purpose of this study was to analyze the key challenges facing monitoring of food security project in South Mudug region of Central Somalia.

1.4 Objectives of the study

The objectives of the study were:

- i. To assess the extent to which security influences the level of monitoring of food security projects in South Mudug region of Central Somalia
- ii. To establish how humanitarian aid workers skills and capacity affects the quality of monitoring of food security projects in South Mudug region of Central Somalia

- iii. To explore and recommend the strategies that humanitarian organizations can use to improve quality of monitoring of food security projects in South Mudug region of Central Somalia

1.5 Research Questions

- i. To what extent does security influence the level of monitoring of food security projects in South Mudug region of Central Somalia?
- ii. How do skills and capacities of humanitarian aid workers affect the quality of monitoring of food security projects in South Mudug region of Central Somalia?
- iii. What strategies can humanitarian organizations use to improve the quality of monitoring of food security projects in South Mudug region of Central Somalia?

1.6 Significance of the Study

The findings of this study were expected to greatly benefit the management and employees of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Somalia as it will provide them the opportunity to understand and appreciate the key challenges facing effective monitoring of not only their food security projects but also any other humanitarian interventions being planned or implemented. It will also assist the IRC management and staff to develop and operationalize effective strategies that will improve the quality of their project monitoring systems in the field. Other international aid organizations and the United Nations bodies providing assistance to crisis affected Somali population in South Mudug and beyond will also benefit from the findings of this study.

The Somalia donor community particularly European and American donors will also find the outcome of this study very useful as it will contribute significantly to providing answers to their concerns of misuse of aid money in Somalia. This will build their confidence and ensure their continued financial support to conflict and drought affected population in Somalia, majority of who are vulnerable women and children. Finally, the outcome of this study will provide the initial platform for academics and practitioners in the humanitarian world to make reference to the findings as well as explore deeper on how to improve monitoring of humanitarian aid in the face of the complex and dynamic conditions in Somalia and other similar countries in Africa and beyond.

1.7 Delimitation of the study

Although there were many challenges facing monitoring of food security projects in central Somalia, the study was limited to only security, staff skills and capacity and organizational structure. The study was only undertaken in South Mudug region of Central Somalia even though the International Rescue Committee (IRC) implements similar projects in Galgudud and North Mudug regions of Central Somalia. In addition, the target populations of the study were limited to the IRC key management staff, Somalia based field staff and selected community representatives despite the presence of other International Humanitarian Organizations implementing food security projects in the same study region.

1.8 Limitations of the study

The availability of the community leaders at the village level who were expected to be part of the study respondents was envisaged be a challenge. This targeted population of the study were pastoralists who sometimes moved with their animals from one location to another. However, the researcher was able to conduct the data collection from this group during the months of May which fell during the rainy season when most people have returned to the villages. Due to the context and frequent insecurity, respondents from the communities at the village level were feared to be suspicious during the interviews. The researcher however managed to explain the purpose of the study before commencement of the interviews and also translated the letter of transmittal of the data collection instruments in the local Somali language. This allayed any concerns' the respondents had on the study.

1.9 Assumptions of the study

This study was undertaken based on some key assumptions. The researcher assumed that all the respondents in the selected sample will provide complete and honest feedback within the specified study time frame. It was also assumed that the general security of the target study site will not deteriorate significantly as to restrict questionnaire administration by the researcher and his enumeration team during data collection. The security situation remained stable during the data collection period. This allowed the data collection team to access all the locations targeted.

In addition, the researcher was a full time employee of the International Rescue Committee and assumed that the required duration of leave of absence will be granted by the supervisor in order to have adequate time to conduct data collection in the field. The management of organization provided two weeks leave of absence to the researcher. This enabled the researcher to travel to the field and train the local enumerators on questionnaire administration and data collection techniques.

1.10 Definitions of significant terms

Food security projects: Refers to projects supported and implemented by the IRC in South Mudug region.

Aid organizations: Refers to both local and international NGOs and United Nations bodies providing humanitarian assistance in Somalia. It will also be used interchangeably with the terms humanitarian organization.

Affected population: This refers to all people who have been directly or indirectly impacted by the civil conflicts in Somalia.

Donor community: Refers to all governmental and nongovernmental organizations, foundations, and charities providing financial support to aid organizations working in Somalia.

Local community: These refer to all persons residing in South Mudug region and are targeted by the IRC food security projects.

Host community: Refers to individuals who originally hail from Mudug region and hosting persons displaced from other regions in Somalia.

1.11 Summary of the chapter

This chapter began by providing an in depth background to the study. It gives an analysis of the context under which the study was undertaken, the need for the study as well as put the topic of study into perspective. It also described the purpose of the study, key objectives, and research questions, significance of the study and the limitations and

delimitations of the research topic. Finally, the chapter concluded by highlighting major assumptions of the study and how the researcher was able to deal with the same. Finally it provided definitions of key terms used frequently in this study.

CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The chapter provides an in depth review and analysis of the literature related to the research topic. It has been sub divided in to the following thematic sub sections.

2.2 Definition of monitoring

Monitoring is an important process in the management of any humanitarian projects. It is the foundation upon which relevant data is collected and documented for evaluation of the project's overall impact. Monitoring is a continuous process of collecting information at regular intervals about on-going projects or programmes concerning the nature and level of their performance. Monitoring is an on-going activity to track project progress against planned tasks to ensure that the project is moving towards the right direction at the right speed so as to achieve its initial self objectives. Monitoring should be consistent with the logic of planning, organizing, directing and motivating systems on the project. Monitoring means to make sufficient intelligence is gained on the status of the project so that an accurate and timely evaluation of the project can be conducted. (Cleland & Ireland, 2007). Project monitoring is a continuous and periodic review, and overseeing of the project to ensure that input deliveries, work schedules, target outputs and other required action proceed according to plan (UNFPA, 1990). Over time, different authors including humanitarian organizations and practitioners have defined the term monitoring in different ways.

McCoy *et al.* (2005) defines monitoring as the routine tracking of the key elements of project implementation performance, usually inputs, activities and outputs, through recordkeeping, regular reporting and surveillance. Project inputs need to be tracked in order to ensure that all activities planned are implemented according to schedule. Inputs to be tracked include financial resources, human resources, equipment used on the project and any other input that goes into project implementation. The financial resources are tracked with a budget and performance is analyzed by comparing planned expenditure against actual expenditure so as to determine the variance. Activities or processes are tracked using a schedule, which is planned schedule against actual schedule of the

activities i.e. what activities have been done versus what should have been done according to the planned schedule.

Crawford & Bryce (2003) argue that monitoring is an ongoing process of data capture and analysis for primarily project control with an internally driven emphasis on efficiency of project. Great emphasis has been put on project control for efficiency. The authors definition spell out the need for project managers to ensure project cost is controlled in order to avoid over expenditures and shortage of resources. The success of the monitoring process is measured by how well the resources have been utilized for the intended purpose.

Uitto (2004) on the other hand defines monitoring briefly as a continuous function that aims primarily to provide management and stakeholders with early indicators of project performance of a project and progress (or lack thereof) in achievement of the results. This definition emphasis that monitoring is a continuous process of tracking achievements as opposed to tracking of what was planned against what has been achieved.

UNFPA (2004) defines monitoring as a process that continuously tracks performance against planned deliverables by collecting and analyzing data indicators established for monitoring and evaluation purposes. In this regard, monitoring is seen as a continuous process that endeavors to ensure project planned interventions are moving towards the achievement of the desired results.


From the forgoing definitions, it can be concluded that monitoring is a continuous process that endeavors to ensure planned project activities are implemented as per schedule so as to achieve desired results. Monitoring is a day the day business of a project team and forms an integral part of project management processes. The process of monitoring has to be defined and understood prior to the start of implementation of project activities. Each project activity may have a specific monitoring approach and has to be in line with the prevailing project context at any given time.

2.3 Monitoring as a project management process

According to the Project Management Body of Knowledge Guide (2000 edition), projects are composed of processes. It goes further to define a process as a series of actions bringing about a result. It also organizes project management processes into five groups of one and more processes. These groups are initiating, planning, executing, controlling and

closing processes. The controlling process is a very critical component that ensures project objectives are met by monitoring and measuring progress regularly to identify variances from plan so that corrective actions can be taken when necessary. Monitoring occupies the heart of the entire project cycle. Ogula (2002) proposes five stages of the project life cycle as shown below

Figure 2.1: The project life cycle:



Source: Ogula (2002):Monitoring and Evaluation of Educational Projects and Programmes, Nairobi.

The Project Management Body of Knowledge views monitoring is a function that happens during the implementation Stage of the project life cycle. Information from monitoring facilitates the control function of the project (Project Management Institute, 2004). It is important that the monitoring happens continuously and effectively thought out the project implementation process to enable the project team to adequately control the project. This is very important if the project management team is to quickly identify the problems that may hinder project success and hence seek remedy.

Project management must keep track of how the project is progressing in terms of expenditure, resource use, implementation of activities, and delivery of results and the management of risks. This is achieved through 'monitoring', which is the systematic and continuous collection, analysis and use of management information to support effective decision-making. Monitoring is an internal management responsibility, although it may be complemented by 'external 'monitoring inputs. These external monitoring inputs can be useful in providing objective verification of results, additional technical advice and a 'big-picture' view for senior management.(European Commission, 2004).

Monitoring information is very helpful in determining how the project progressed in terms of schedule, cost and any hindering problems encountered during implementation. It is important to note that when assessing how project progressed during evaluation, information from monitoring is very relevant and useful (Shapiro, 2004) hence there should be safe keeping of monitoring data.

2.4. Participatory approaches to monitoring

In contrast to conventional monitoring techniques - which often focus on indicators of success determined by external experts (typically cost and material outputs), participatory monitoring emphasizes beneficiary satisfaction with aid outcomes. By focusing on end-results from the perspective of aid 'users', such approaches can empower beneficiaries to initiate corrective action where corruption is suspected or has already taken place. Participatory monitoring approaches may also help reduce opportunities for corruption in the first place by allowing for open and immediate sharing of performance results with beneficiaries and other stakeholders. To be effective, it is important that such approaches be complemented by accessible grievance procedures including corruption reporting channels and protection for whistleblowers. The use of participatory approaches in monitoring of humanitarian aid in fragile states such as Somalia remains an effective technique to ensure that aid is delivered to those intended for and in the appropriate manner in line with common humanitarian practice.

Recent literature on humanitarian accountability indicates an increasing awareness that, in addition to the 'conventional' mechanisms, more could be done to minimize misuse of aid in humanitarian projects by increasing the involvement of intended aid beneficiaries. This is sometimes referred to as promoting 'forwards accountability' from agencies to

beneficiaries, or increasing beneficiary 'ownership' of aid. Involving beneficiaries meaningfully in project planning, implementation, evaluation and reporting can contribute to minimizing corruption by increasing both beneficiaries' awareness of their entitlements and their stake in the success of aid programmes. A number of initiatives have recently attempted to improve humanitarian action in this regard. Though these initiatives are to be welcomed, it would appear that a significant gap still exists between humanitarian accountability policy and practice (Transparency International 2006).

Ensuring public access to information about aid activities is an essential first step for enabling beneficiary involvement. Without access to information relating to aid targets, entitlements, mechanisms and intended recipients, beneficiaries and those acting on their behalf will be unable to take part in relief efforts and act as a check on potential corruption and misuse of humanitarian aid. On the other hand, the implementation of comprehensive information strategies on the part of humanitarian agencies and local/national authorities can improve aid effectiveness by providing beneficiaries with the means to engage with and oversee aid activities. Such strategies should ensure the accessibility of information to all sections of crisis-affected populations, using the most appropriate formats, languages and communication methods.

The active participation of beneficiaries in designing and implementing aid projects is an important means for reducing opportunities for corruption. Projects designed without such participation risk being irrelevant to actual needs, potentially creating over or undersupplies of aid. A lack of participation can also limit aid agencies' understanding of the often dynamic context in which aid is given, potentially leading them to ignore important social, political and economic relations, in turn increasing opportunities for corruption. The involvement of beneficiaries can, on the other hand, empower affected communities to take ownership of aid efforts. If such efforts promote and utilise the economic capacity and expertise of beneficiaries, it is likely that this will positively contribute to reducing corruption opportunities.

The issue of corruption in humanitarian assistance due to poor or weak monitoring is a key concern for practitioners, who devote much energy to trying to minimize the risks of diversion. It has, however, barely been discussed in policy terms and little researched.

2.5 Project logical frame work approach to monitoring

According to the European Commission Project Cycle Management Guide 2004, the Logical Framework Approach was developed in the late 1960's to assist the US Agency of International Development (USAID) to improve its project planning and evaluation system. It was designed to address three basic concerns, namely that:

- i. Planning was too vague, without clearly defined objectives that could be used to monitor and evaluate the success (or failure) of a project;
- ii. Management responsibilities were unclear; and
- iii. Monitoring and Evaluation was often an adversarial process, because there was no common agreement as to what the project was really trying to achieve

Over time, the LFA continued to be used and modified by different organizations in the design and implementation of humanitarian programs. It served as a guiding tool to monitor and evaluate project success and impacts. It is an analytical process and set of tools used to support project planning and management.

The logical framework approach continues to play a critical role in the planning and management of development and aid interventions including food security projects in Somalia over the past twenty years. It remains the most widely used approach particularly for European and American funded projects. Its origins lie in a planning approach for the United States military, which was then adapted by the National Space Agency before being adopted by USAID for development projects over thirty years ago. It was then adopted by European development organizations in the 1980s and by the end of the 1990s the LFA had become the standard approach required by many donors for grant applications (Aune, 2000; Kaplan & Garent, 2005; Reidar, 2003).

A majority of aid organizations implementing food security projects use the logical framework approach in planning, designing and aiding monitoring and evaluation of their projects. Despite the wide use and wide requirement by donors, it is not clear how skilled the aid workers are in the use of this approach. The inability to effectively be able to use this tool means that the aid workers cannot optimally benefit from it. The result of the logical framework approach is usually a 4X4 matrix that shows the relationship of activities, results, purpose (specific objective) and overall objective (goal) of the project plus underlying assumptions.

Figure 2.2: Typical structure of a log frame matrix

Project description	Indicators	Source of verification	Assumptions
Overall Objective – The project’s contribution to policy or programme objectives (impact)	How the OO is to be measured Including Quantity, Quality, Time?	How will the information be collected, when and by whom?	
Purpose – Direct benefits to the target group(s)	How the Purpose is to be measured including Quantity, Quality, Time	As above	If the Purpose is achieved, what assumptions must hold true to achieve the OO?
Results – Tangible products or services delivered by the project	How the results are to be measured including Quantity, Quality, Time	As above	If Results are achieved, what assumptions must hold true to achieve the Purpose?
Activities – Tasks that have to be undertaken to deliver the desired results			If Activities are completed, what assumptions must hold true to deliver the results?

Source: European Commission Project Cycle Management Guide 2004

According to the framework adapted from International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC), different monitoring questions are asked at different levels of the project log frame (IFRC, 2001). The diagram below illustrates the different questions at each level of the log frame.




Figure 2.3: Monitoring using elements of log frame
 Source: adapted from IFRC, 2001

2.6 Indicators and project monitoring

The identification and use of relevant indicators is a crucial part of determining the progress and impact of an intervention. The OECD/DAC defines indicators as the 'quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievements, to reflect the changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a development actor' (OECD/DAC, 2002). Although the terminology varies, the literature generally distinguishes between two types of indicator: those that relate to the implementation of programmes (input, process and output indicators); and those concerned with the effects of programmes (outcome and impact indicators).

Humanitarian agencies tend to use a mix of indicators, depending on their own monitoring and reporting systems and the particular function of the indicators collected. Documenting the impact of a programme is only one of many reasons why indicators are collected; others include monitoring the implementation of activities, determining when aspects of a programme are off-track, or to inform decision-making. Both types of indicator (process and impact) are important. A humanitarian project manager needs to know if activities are being carried out according to plan, and whether they are having any impact. Similarly, a donor wants to know whether the project being funded has been implemented, and whether the decision to fund this particular approach was the correct one. That said, many agencies tend to collect process rather than impact indicators (Roberts, 2004; Shoham, 2004). Roberts (2004) found that many organizations use process indicators (such as drug doses supplied, clinics supported or staff trained) or outcome indicators (such as clinic attendance) to justify general health programmes designed to reduce mortality. Similarly, the Sphere project, probably the most comprehensive attempt to define standards and indicators for most areas of humanitarian aid (Sphere, 2004), focuses largely on process, and its indicators are not designed to show impact. There are several reasons why process/output indicators, rather than impact indicators, tend to be collected. Despite the introduction of results-based management systems, donors tend to favour process/output indicators, and funding proposals and reporting formats are not necessarily geared towards a concern for impact. The collection of impact indicators is sometimes seen as too difficult; mortality indicators, for instance, are known to be hard to gather. It is easier for humanitarian agencies to monitor their own activities than to monitor or assess the effect these activities have on the populations they are helping. This is not a justification in itself, and it is arguable that greater incentives and/or training may encourage the collection of this information in a more systematic way. Initiatives such as the inter-agency Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transition (SMART) may lead to more routine collection of impact indicators.

Given the apparent emphasis on process/output indicators by agencies and donors, one can clearly conclude that effective monitoring is critical for any organization implementing aid programs particularly those operating in conflict regions such as Somalia.

2.7 The relationship between monitoring and evaluation

Are monitoring and evaluation such distinctly different functions, serving distinctly different users that they should be considered independently of each other? ... We disapprove of the use of the universal acronym M&E as it implies that we are dealing with a single function” (Casley and Kumar 1988).

Monitoring and evaluation are words that are often linked and termed M&E. This is appropriate particularly in relation to benefit monitoring, where the outputs of the monitoring program are a direct input to post-evaluation. Other aspects of monitoring also link to evaluation, since it is difficult to evaluate projects for which basic monitoring aspects such as input, cost and output recording are inadequate.

According to UNDP (1997a) “monitoring and evaluation differ yet are closely related. They are mutually supportive and equally important. Monitoring can provide quantitative and qualitative data using selected indicators, data that can serve as inputs to evaluation exercises”. Evaluation also supports monitoring, serving as a source of lessons that can be applied in the development of conceptual or methodological innovations for use in refining the monitoring function, for instance by devising appropriate indicators for future projects.

Organizations whose projects have poor or weak monitoring strategies often fail to meet the intended impacts. This is particularly common in insecure environment where access by expatriate staff and consultants is limited due to insecurity. Effective Monitoring produces adequate and reliable data for project evaluations. This in turn helps organizations and policy makers to make informed decisions on the current and future programs.

2.8. Current practice

Operating with reduced international staff presence and relying on others for implementation is by no means a new phenomenon. It has been utilized in conflict areas throughout the 1980s and 1990s in many of the same contexts as today, including Somalia, Afghanistan, and Sudan. Despite the long history, little has been documented on the subject, partly because agencies see remote management as a temporary measure that is not their norm in programming. Yet recent analysis suggests that remote monitoring management of aid projects occurs frequently, for considerable periods of time, and in

such a variety of locations that a strategic approach is necessary (Stoddard, Harmer, and Haver 2006).

For the UN, working through national staff when security requires it is a long-established practice. There are special procedures for continuity, such as three-month salary advances, relocation of families, and commodity-support plans. Local partners and contractors, however, are not covered by these protocols. The UN's Field Security Handbook guides staff to maintain the highest possible level of support in terms of logistics and security inputs, but it is recognized that this is often very difficult. The UN's humanitarian agencies themselves, however, have no internal organizational policy or guidelines on remote monitoring and management of projects.

In Somalia, Remotely managed aid operations can be implemented and monitored by national or local staff, national or local partner organizations, locally hired commercial contractors, or any combination of these. While particulars can vary widely, the common defining feature is continued international ownership and responsibility over the programme without permanent international ground presence, due to insecurity.

The level of direct monitoring an agency's international staff has also varies. At one end of the spectrum, nearly all decision-making remains in the hands of the relocated international staff; project site visits are undertaken on a regular basis (often multiple times a week, but never overnight); and there is face-to-face communication with project staff, contractors, government officials, and even beneficiaries. This practice is sometimes called semi-remote management. At the other end of the spectrum, international personnel rarely or never visit the field sites and decision-making is passed to national or local staff. Monitoring is conducted by remote means such as digital photographs and third-party verification.

Remote management can be undertaken by degrees, as a mix of practices such as a combination of direct implementation by the agency with logistical services provided by an LNNGO or private contractor. In other circumstances, an organization may directly manage its projects in a given area, but may remotely manage them in another area within

the same country, with limited visits by the international or even the national staff to monitor the remotely managed field sites.

Coordinating agencies such as UNICEF, for example, note that shifting to remote management is a significant policy decision because it takes away one of the most important added values the agency provides: direct monitoring of project implementation against agreed outcomes, and coordination with similar projects it oversees.

Compared with the UN, INGO generally are more flexible in making decisions regarding implementation approaches, partly because they are not constrained in the same way by security phases and staff movement. NGO have pursued different approaches to remote management in an attempt to understand what works best.

Most organizations in countries like Somalia have no formal policy on remote monitoring and management of projects instead any policy or good practice guidance that exists has been driven by the field. Some agencies, however, have begun to examine the issue at headquarters because of the monitoring and other challenges raised in the field. All note that, where possible, they are attempting to draw lessons from other contexts. Somalia, in particular, has been a focus in these efforts.

In the face of the complex monitoring challenges many International organizations and United Nations bodies have devised varying ways of monitoring humanitarian projects particularly in South and Central Somalia. The complexities of the working environment necessitated context specific monitoring techniques some of which have proved to be successful. The most favored ones include the use of local nongovernmental organizations (LNGO), use of digital cameras and Global positioning systems and progressive photographing of milestone achievements. The example below illustrates how different organizations have modified their approaches to monitor delivery of aid.


2.8 Case of Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery in Somalia

In Somalia, the Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery is funded by DFID and other donors and delivered by the UN. DFID staff and consultants have little or no access to the areas where the programme is being implemented and the UN system itself works mainly remotely or via local partners.

Several different monitoring approaches have been combined to overcome these constraints. The programme funds local development initiatives through a participatory planning process. Financial and contract monitoring is done by project staff on a monthly basis, with dispersal offends for community initiatives tracked through a dedicated financial and information management system. Disbursements are conditional on delivery of the outputs linked to the previous disbursement, and require joint sign-off by UN staff, local government officials (engineers in the case of construction projects) and community representatives. Contractors are required to produce photographs of construction sites in their monthly reports. Implementation data is aggregated on a central data base by the programme management team, against log frame indicators. Where the data reveals a problem with implementation, the management team seeks and budgets are respected. This aggregated data is also used for progress reports to quarterly donor Steering Committee meetings. (Adapted from UKaid's Department for International Development: Interim guidance note on Measuring and managing for results In fragile and conflict-affected states and situation)

2.9 The conceptual Framework

The study was guided by the following conceptual framework.



Independent variables

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the proposed research methodology to be used in undertaking the study. It outlines in details how the research was conducted and the justification of the methodology adopted. The chapter specifically focuses on research design, target population, sampling and sampling procedures, research instruments, validity and reliability of the instruments, data collection procedures and data analysis techniques. It concludes by giving a summary of the main aspects discussed under this chapter.

3.2 Research Design.

A research design is a plan and strategy of investigating a phenomenon and it seeks to obtain answers to various questions (Kerlinger, 1973).

The study employed a descriptive survey design in order to collect adequate and relevant data for analyzing the topic under study. The choice of the design was informed by the fact that both qualitative and quantitative data can be collected through questionnaires through a descriptive survey design. Descriptive research is designed to obtain data that describes the characteristics of the topic of interest in the research (Hair, Money, Samouel and Page, 2007). According to Cooper and Schindler (2003), descriptive statistics discover and measure cause and effect relationships among variables. As Gay (1981) argues, the findings of descriptive survey investigation help researchers explain a social phenomenon with confidence and authenticity.

3.3: Target Population.

Population is a group of knowledgeable people also known as universe (Hair et al., 2007). According to Cooper and Schindler (2003), a population is the total collection of elements about which we wish to make inferences.

The total target population for this study was 154 persons and was categorized into three different target groups namely IRC Senior Management Team (SMT) ,IRC field based program staff and community project implementation committees (PICs) at the village level. The sample was therefore drawn from 12 Senior Management Team members, 52

field based program staff and 90 project implementation committees in eighteen locations where IRC's food security projects were implemented.

The senior management team was chosen since they were directly responsible for the formulation and execution of the country program strategic guidelines and policies and were thus expected to provide useful information for the study. The IRC field based program staff were mainly Somali nationals directly responsible for the day to day implementation and monitoring of the IRC project in South Mudug region. Finally, the project implementation committees who were also beneficiaries themselves and represent the community in implementation and monitoring of the project formed an important target population for the study.

3.4. Sample selection procedure

A purposive sampling technique was applied in the selection of the sample from the IRC senior management staff and field based program staff. Purposive sampling is the most popular in qualitative research and subjects are selected because of some characteristic (Patton, 1990). The senior management team and field program staff provided both qualitative and quantitative data from an organizational perspective both at field and Nairobi level. The study selected 4 locations from which a total of 12 project implementation committees were identified and interviewed. This represented approximately 20% of the 18 food security project locations the IRC worked in south Mudug region.

According to (Mulusa 1998), 20% of the target population is an ideal sample size to work with since it ensures that the sample is representative of the population and hence both the internal and external validity is attained.

3.5 Sample size:

A sample is a subject of a particular population (Mugenda 1999). According to Coopers and Schindler (2003) the sample must be carefully selected to be representative of the population and the researcher needs to ensure that the subdivisions entailed in the analysis are accurately catered for. In this study a sample size of 42 was selected from a total population of 154 persons. The sample selected was based on the fact the study needed to

gather information from a cross section of people involved in the monitoring of the food security project in South Mudug region at different levels. Table 3.1 below gives the sampling matrix.

Table 3.1: Sampling matrix

Category	Population size	Percentage (%)	Sample size
Senior Management Team	12	7.8	12
Field based program staff	52	33.8	18
Project implementation committees	90	58.4	12
Total	154	100	42

3.6 Methods of Data collection

The study collected primary data using the questionnaire and the interview guide as the main instruments. Shao (1997) defines a questionnaire as a formal set of questions or statements designed to gather information from respondents. The use of the questionnaire ensured faster collection of data and also led to a high return rate. Indeed a total of 40 respondents representing approximately 95% of target successfully responded to the survey.

Standardized interview guide was also used to collect data from the community based project implementation committees. This approach helped gather adequate qualitative information from the community beneficiaries and representatives. The standardized interview guide was meant to reduce bias from the interviewer as well as produce consistent data easy to compare and analyze.

For both IRC senior management and field based program staff, a self administered questionnaire was provided. This was done to ensure that individual staff members took the time they needed to understand and objectively respond to the questions. The senior management team based in Nairobi were provided printed copies of the questionnaires and

collected from them upon completion. However, field based program staff received emailed copies upon which they completed and returned electronically.

The interview guide for the community based project implementation committees was administered by two local research assistants who were identified and trained by the researcher. The research assistants were individuals who were able to fluently speak both English and the local Somali language and who had very good understanding of the region and the specific villages selected for the study. The choice of local trainers facilitated easy access to the locations and also reduced suspicion among the community members

3.7 Validity of the instruments

A content related validity of the data collection instruments was ascertained by conducting a pilot test of the questionnaires and the standardized interview guides on five respondents. This was designed to help identify any form of ambiguities or difficulties in responding to the questions besides establishing whether the questionnaires and the interview guide have been properly developed as to capture the required data for the topic under study. None of the pilot respondents reported any issues relating these instruments.

3.8 Reliability of the instruments.

In order to improve the reliability of the instruments, the self administered questionnaires for both the senior management team and the field based staff were standardized so that the information collected could be triangulated for consistency and accuracy. The interview guides for the community based project implementation committees were also standardized to reduce any bias from the interviewer as well as ensure consistency of the questions being asked. In addition, the research assistants who were responsible for administering the interview guides undertook one day training on how to engage communities during the interviews. The training covered key aspects on community engagement and questionnaire administration .Each of the research assistants was paid thirty United States dollars at the end of the data collection period.

3.9 Operational definition of variables

Table 3.2: Operational definition of variables

Variable	Indicators	Scale of measurement	Tools of Analysis
National staff access to project sites	Frequency of field visits	Interval	Descriptive
	Reduced incidences of insecurity	Ordinal	Descriptive
Expert staff access to project sites	Frequency of field visits	Interval	Descriptive
Community security arrangements	Level of support to project staff	Ordinal	Descriptive
National staff monitoring skills set	Level of understanding of monitoring strategies.	Ordinal	Descriptive
Organizational monitoring strategy	Availability of specific strategies	Ordinal	Descriptive
	Structured approach to monitoring	Ordinal	Descriptive

3.10 Techniques of data analysis

In the analysis of the data, quantitative analysis was applied using descriptive statistics. According to Coopers and Schindler (2003) descriptive statistics involves a process of transforming a mass of raw data into tables, charts, with frequency distribution and percentages which are a vital part of making sense of the data. The raw data was analyzed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) program and presented using frequency distribution tables so as to give a clear picture of the research findings at a glance. Findings of the research were then summarized and presented in percentages. All questionnaires were thoroughly checked for completeness and coded accordingly before making entries into the SPSS system. The qualitative data was analyzed by grouping relevant information together and appropriate summaries and conclusions drawn.

3.11 Summary of the chapter

This chapter described the methodology employed in undertaking this study. It was been organized into sub sections each dealing with specific aspect of the methodology. The chapter presented nature of the research designs applied and how the sample was chosen from the target population. It further explained the data collection methods and how the validity and reliability of the data collection instruments were established. Finally, it concluded by describing the techniques used to analyze the data collected from the field for making appropriate conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the analysis and presentation of the research findings based on the data collected and analyzed. The main sections covered include respondent return rate, distribution of the respondents by gender, IRC staff response analysis by job title, security and level of monitoring of food security projects, capacity and skills of national staff in effective monitoring of food security projects as well as strategies for improving effective monitoring of food security projects.

4.2 Respondent return rate

The return rate of the questionnaires distributed to the various categories of the respondents was high. A total of 42 questionnaires were distributed to 12 IRC senior management staff, 18 national staff based in Somalia and 12 community based project implementation committees. The total number received and analyzed was 40, representing a 95.24% return rate. The information was summarized in the table below.

Table 4.1: Respondents return rate

Category	Questionnaires issued	Number returned	Return rate (Percentage)
Senior Management Team	12	12	100
Field based program staff	18	16	88.9
Project implementation committees	12	12	100
Total	42	40	

The results presented in table 4.1 above indicate a very high response rate. In particular, the response rate from the senior management team and the project implementation

committees was exceptional as a 100% return rate was realized. All respondents except the project implementation committees were able to complete and return the questionnaires electronically. The relevance of the research topic to the respondents was also key in ensuring a strong willingness and desire by the respondents to fully participate in the survey.

4.3 Distribution of respondent by gender

Understanding of the various responses by gender was an important element in this study. For this reason, the respondents who participated in the study were asked to state their gender. This was important to enable the analysis of the variables. The responses were summarized in Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2: Demographic characteristics of respondents

Category	Gender		Frequency	Percentage
	M	F		
Senior management staff	8	4	12	100
Field based program staff	12	4	16	88.9
Project implementation committees	8	4	12	100
Total	28	12	40	

The analysis of table 4.2 above shows that a majority of the respondents were male .Only a third (30%) of the respondents were female. This lower percentage of female respondents was attributed to the fact that Somalis are generally a conservative society in which women are discouraged from engaging in employment especially in humanitarian work which requires long hours of working and travelling to many remote locations. Women are also shy away from mingling with men during project monitoring exercises and this explains why there are fewer women respondents even among the project implementation committees.

4.3. IRC staff response analysis by job title

The study sought to understand the level of responsibility of each of each of the respondents in order to gauge their level of involvement in monitoring IRC's projects. To this end, respondents were requested to state their job titles within the organization. Table 4.3 below gives the response and corresponding percentage by job title.

Table 4.3: Responses by job title

Job title	Frequency	Percentage
Program coordinator	7	25
Program manager	5	17.9
Program officer	7	25
Program assistant	9	32.1
Total	28	100

The above table (4.3) shows how respondents in various levels of the organization responded to the survey. A large percentage of the respondents (57.1%) constituted program officers and program assistants who were based in Somalia and were directly responsible for the day to day monitoring of the project. The table also shows a good representation from higher levels of the management as well. The data obtained from these respondents provided reliable information to make appropriate conclusions on the variables under study.

4.5. Security and level of monitoring of food security projects.

The context in which the study was conducted was one characterized by over two decades of conflict and massive displacements of population. Access by aid organizations has been a challenge over the years leading to continued humanitarian crisis and chronic food insecurity. To this end, one of the objectives of the study was to assess the extent to which security influences the level of monitoring of food security projects in South Mudug region of Central Somalia. The study respondents were asked to state their responses against statements regarding accessibility of IRCs project locations in relation to monitoring of the projects. The table below summarizes these responses.

Table 4.4: Security and level of monitoring of food security projects

Question	Response				
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	disagree	Strongly disagree
Q5	0	13	8	7	0
Q6	6	15	4	3	0
Q7	5	8	9	6	0
Q8	3	11	1	10	3
Q9	15	6	2	3	2
Q10	4	10	7	6	1
Total	33	63	31	35	6

The table above shows how IRC staffs (both senior management and program staff) have responded to questions related to security and how it influences effective monitoring of food security projects. When asked if IRC's access to food security projects have

improved over the past three years, 53.6% responded “agreed” while 21.4 % responded “strongly agreed”. This therefore implied that 75% of the respondents are generally convinced that access to project sites has indeed improved over the past three years. In addition the project implementation committees have expressed the same feeling. When asked whether there has been any instance when they could not monitor project activities due to insecurity, 83.3% of the project implementation committees responded in the negative. All the project implementation committees interviewed also indicated that the current security situation does not any way affect implementation and monitoring of project activities.

The results of table 4.4 above were further tabulated below using a 5-point scale rater where (f) =Frequency, (x) = scale values in 5 –point numerical values of likert scale ranked as x= (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and $\sum (fx)$ = sum product of cumulative sum of (f) and (x).

Table 4.5: Level of influence of security in monitoring of food security projects.

	(f)	(x)	(fx)
Strongly agree	33	1	31
Agree	63	2	126
Neutral	31	3	93
Disagree	35	4	140
Strongly disagree	6	5	30
Total	168		420

From table 5.5 above, the mean calculated was $\sum (fx)/\sum f = 420/168 = 2.5$. Therefore the calculated mean fell between the likert scale 2 and 3. These findings have been interpreted to mean that half that of the respondents agreed that security does not significantly affect effective monitoring of food security projects while the remaining half were not sure of

whether security has an influence on effective monitoring of food security projects in south Mudug region.

4.6: Capacity and skills of national staff in effective monitoring of projects.

Many aid organizations operating in Somalia are heavily dependent on their national staff based in Somalia to implement their projects as well as conduct day to day monitoring of projects. Concerns have however been raised over the capacity in terms of skills and knowledge of these employees to deliver projects as required. There have been lots of discussions around misuse of aid money and lack of general accountability to both donors and project beneficiaries. To this end the study sought to establish how the skills of aid workers in central Somalia affect the quality of project monitoring. The table below summarizes the distribution of the responses from the study respondents.

Table 4.6: Aid workers skills (national staff) in monitoring of food security projects

Question	Response				
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	disagree	Strongly disagree
Q11	4	9	5	10	0
Q12	0	9	8	9	2
Q13	3	8	7	8	2
Q14	2	6	11	8	1
Q15	14	13	1	0	0
Q16	1	16	5	6	0
Q17	6	12	3	7	0
Q18	7	9	7	5	0
Total	37	82	47	53	5

The study revealed that for the case of the IRC's projects in central Somalia, the national staff skills is a challenge affecting the quality of project monitoring. A considerable proportion of the respondents either disagreed or were not sure that IRC's staff have the necessary expertise to undertake effective monitoring of projects. The analysis indicates that 53.6% of the respondents have expressed this view. The study further revealed that IRC's monitoring of food security projects in central Somalia have been compromised by low skilled manpower and that national staff based in Somalia have a lower monitoring capacity than the Nairobi based international staff. The analysis of the data in table 4.6 above revealed that 60.7% of the respondents disagreed or are not sure (neutral) that the national staffs have the skills needed to undertake effective monitoring of food security projects.

Table 4.7: Capacity of national staff in monitoring of food security projects

	(f)	(x)	(fx)
Strongly agree	37	1	37
Agree	82	2	164
Neutral	47	3	141
Disagree	53	4	212
Strongly disagree	5	5	25
Total	224		579

From Table 4.7 above, the calculated mean was $\sum fx / \sum f = 579 / 224 = 2.58$. This average fell between the likert scales 2 and 3, where 2 indicated agree and 3 indicated neutral. Therefore this result was interpreted to mean that majority of the respondents either disagreed or

were not sure that national staff in Somalia have the necessary capacity and skills to undertake effective monitoring of security projects.

4.7. Strategies for improving effective monitoring of food security projects

Over the past two decades, the delivery of aid in central Somalia remained a major challenge for a majority of humanitarian organizations operating in Somalia. The region continued to be what the United Nations described as the ‘epicentre’ of humanitarian crisis. Aid organizations have therefore devised varied strategies to ensure that their projects are effectively monitored so that aid reaches those most in need. To this end, a third objective of the study was to explore and recommend strategies aid organizations can use to improve monitoring of projects. The table below presents summarized data from IRC’s senior management and field based program staff.

Table 4.8: strategies for improving monitoring of food security projects

Question	Response				
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	disagree	Strongly disagree
Q19	3	9	4	12	0
Q20	6	14	6	2	0
Q21	3	9	8	7	1
Q22	5	5	13	5	0
Q23	5	14	6	3	0
Q24	1	11	8	6	2
Q25	4	13	7	4	0
Q26	3	8	10	7	0

Q27	6	11	6	4	1
Total	36	94	68	50	5

An analysis of the data in table 4.6 above revealed that majority of IRC's senior management and field based program staff do not believe or are not sure that the organization has strong monitoring system which is understood by all staff. Overall, 57.3% of the respondents expressed these views. Given that a number of other organizations operate in the region, respondents were asked whether IRC's current monitoring strategy is stronger as compared to other organizations.

The study established that 64.3% do not agree or were not sure that IRC has a stronger monitoring strategy than other actors in the region. The study further revealed that there was weak structured or scheduled monitoring system even by the Nairobi based expert staff. Half of the respondents (50%) are either not sure or out rightly disagreed that scheduled monitoring is conducted by the expert staff based in Nairobi. This meant that the entire organization has overall weaknesses in terms of its monitoring strategies. Further analysis of the data revealed that 71.4% of all the respondents drawn from the senior management and field program team are of the view that there is a greater need for improving and strengthening IRC's current monitoring strategies.

The project implementation committees did however feel that IRC's monitoring of projects is good though more could be done to improve. They also felt that they are adequately engaged in the monitoring of projects within their localities.

Table 4.9: strategies for effective monitoring of food security projects.

	(f)	(x)	(fx)
Strongly agree	36	1	36
Agree	94	2	188
Neutral	68	3	204
Disagree	50	4	200
Strongly disagree	5	5	25
Total	253		653

The study results were further analyzed as indicated in table 4.9 above. The calculated mean was $\sum fx / \sum f = 653 / 253 = 2.58$. This average fell between the likert scale 2 and 3. Therefore this result was interpreted to mean that that majority of the respondents either felt that the current monitoring strategy of the IRC is not strong or were not sure were sure of the effectiveness of the current strategies.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a summary of the main findings, conclusions, recommendations and contribution to the body of knowledge.

5.2 Summary of findings

The following are the key findings of the study presented by objective.

The first objective of the study was to assess the extent to which security influences the level of monitoring of food security projects in south Mudug region of central Somalia. To this end 75% of the IRC's senior management and field based program staff felt that access to project sites have significantly improved over the past three years and that insecurity is no longer a major challenge in monitoring of projects in south Mudug region. Similar views were shared by the project implementation committees representing the community members.

The second objective of the study was to establish how humanitarian aid workers skills and capacity affects the quality of monitoring of food security projects in south Mudug region of central Somalia. The study revealed that a significant proportion of the respondents from the IRC's senior management and field based program staff were convinced that national staff based in Somalia do not have the necessary skills to undertake effective monitoring of projects as opposed to the Nairobi based expert staff. The results of the analysis indicated that 53.6% expressed this view.

The study's third objective was to explore and recommend the strategies that humanitarian organizations can use to improve quality of monitoring of food security projects in South Mudug region of Central Somalia. It was established that the IRC has a weak monitoring strategy of its food security projects both at field and headquarter level in Nairobi. More than half (57.3%) of the respondents expressed this view. The study went further to reveal that the IRC's expert staff based in Nairobi responsible for strategy and policy formulation do not have a clear and structured mechanism to monitor projects in country.

5.3 Conclusions

With regards to objective one, the study concludes that insecurity does not significantly affect effective monitoring of food security projects in south Mudug region and central Somalia in general. These findings are contrary to the long held belief by most humanitarian actors which often identified this region with frequent insecurity which mainly limited access by expert staff and impact evaluation of projects.

In reference to the second objective, it can also be concluded that national staff have limited or low capacity and skills to undertake effective monitoring of food security projects. This continued to affect quality implementation of projects and led to poor data collection for reliable impact evaluation and decision making for future programming. There is therefore need to invest in national staff capacity building for quality and effective monitoring be realized.

Finally, with regards to objective three, the study concludes that the IRC and other aid organizations in Somalia need to re evaluate their monitoring strategies and come up with context specific monitoring systems capable of generating informed decisions for their current and future programs.

5.4 Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study under chapter four, the researcher makes the following recommendations. It is expected that these recommendations will go a long way in improving effective monitoring of aid projects not only in the study region but also the entire country.

Somalia is a country that continues to face complex emergencies resulting from conflicts and droughts and as such monitoring techniques ought to be flexible and continue to adapt to the changing situations. Aid organizations should be able to conduct continued analysis of the prevailing situations, understand local dynamics and regularly update their monitoring strategies instead of heavily relying on strategies and tools developed at their headquarter levels.

More often than not, aid organizations do hire monitoring and evaluation 'experts' based at their headquarters to design their strategies and tools. These 'experts' have no

contextual understanding of the project areas and also rely and third party information or secondary information to develop these strategies .Working closely with local communities and experienced national staff in the development of these tools will ensure practicability of these strategies and too

There is need for aid organizations to identify key program staff from their field teams, train them and provide continued support so that they are able to provide accurate and reliable data for impact evaluation.

Aid organizations need to realize that most parts of Somalia are controlled by weak local administrations incapable of performing their roles. For this reason community committees need to be involved in joint project monitoring initiatives and where possible provided incentives to undertake their role. For instance, organizations can facilitate their transportation and daily costs when conducting joint project monitoring with them.

Most organizations assume that their staff understand documents written in the English language including email communications from the headquarters. However, this is not the case. Translating these documents in the local Somali language will ensure national staff understand what is expected of them and will also help them provide useful suggestions to improve the strategy and tools. This is particularly relevant to the organizations working in central Somalia regions.

5.5. Suggestions for further research

This study primarily focused on the challenges facing food security projects in south Mudug region of central Somalia. The researcher recommends further research and understanding on the impacts of remote management of projects on effective delivery of aid in Somalia and in particular south and central regions.

5.6 Contribution to the body of knowledge

In this section, the researcher presents how each of the three objectives of the study contributes to the overall body of knowledge.

Table 5.1: Contribution to the body of knowledge

Objectives	Contribution to body of knowledge
<p>1: To assess the extent to which security influences the level of monitoring of food security projects in south Mudug region of Central Somalia.</p>	<p>Aid organizations need to explore creative ways of improving their monitoring strategies. Although insecurity is an issue in Somalia, there are acceptable ways to ensure aid is benefiting those intended for.</p>
<p>2: To establish how humanitarian aid workers skills and capacity affects The quality of monitoring of food security projects in south Mudug region of Central Somalia.</p>	<p>Policy makers in humanitarian organizations ought to appreciate the importance of contextual expertise of local staff in improving monitoring of projects.</p>
<p>3: To explore and recommend the strategies that humanitarian organizations can use to improve quality of monitoring of food security projects in south Mudug region of central Somalia.</p>	<p>Monitoring strategies have to be flexible and largely take into consideration local contexts.</p>

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7. APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL OF DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

Abdirahman Aden

To

University of Nairobi.

The study respondent

Dear sir/madam,

REF: LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL OF DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

I am a post graduate student at the University of Nairobi undertaking an academic research on the factors influencing facing monitoring of food security projects in south Mudug region of central Somalia This study is being carried out in partial fulfillment for the award of Masters Degree in Project Planning and Management of the University of Nairobi.

You have been selected as one of my target respondent so as to generate reliable data for my final report. This is purely an academic research and as such any information you will provide will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

Thank you in advance.

Yours sincerely,

Abdirahman Aden Ali

APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNAIRES FOR IRC STAFF

PART ONE: GENERAL INFORMATION

Please tick as appropriate

1. **Position Title:** Director Program Coordinator Program Manager Program Officer Program assistant other (specify).....

2. **Gender:** Male Female

3. **Duty station:** Nairobi Somalia other (specify).....

4. **Duration of employment with the IRC Somalia:** Less than one year 1-2 years 3-5 years more than 5 years

PART TWO: SECURITY AND LEVEL OF MONITORING OF FOOD SECURITY PROJECTS

Please tick the numeric value corresponding to your selected response

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	disagree	Strongly disagree
5	The security situation in south Mudug region has been deteriorating for the past 3 years	①	②	③	④	⑤
6	IRC's access to most food security project sites has improved over the past 3 years.	①	②	③	④	⑤
7	Security remains the single most challenge facing monitoring of food security projects in south Mudug region.	①	②	③	④	⑤
8	The current security situation only limits monitoring of food security projects by international staff.	①	②	③	④	⑤

9	Somali national staff have adequate access to all project locations to monitor activity implementation	①	②	③	④	⑤
10	Local communities in Mudug region provide adequate security to aid workers during monitoring of aid projects.	①	②	③	④	⑤
		①	②	③	④	⑤

Do you think insecurity is the major impediment to effective implementation of IRC's food security projects in south Mudug region? **Yes /No.** Kindly explain your response.

.....

Please list the top three (3) forms of insecurity impeding implementation of IRC's projects in south Mudug region.

.....

PART THREE: AID WORKERS CAPACITY IN MONITORING FOOD SECURITY PROJECTS

Please tick the numeric value corresponding to your selected response

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	disagree
11	All current IRC staff have the necessary expertise to undertake effective monitoring of projects	①	②	③	④
12	Effective monitoring of IRC's food security projects have generally been compromised by low skilled man power	①	②	③	④
13	The capacity of national staff to monitor projects is generally lower than that of international staff	①	②	③	④
14	Discrepancies in project implementation at the field are often identified by expert staff whenever they conduct a monitoring mission.	①	②	③	④
15	Continuous skill transfer to national staff will significantly improve the effectiveness of IRC's project monitoring at the field level	①	②	③	④
16	The current capacity and skills of the IRC staff responsible for project monitoring is satisfactory	①	②	③	④
17	Most IRC staff have clear understanding of the monitoring approaches to each funded project.	①	②	③	④
18	The IRC considers experience in project monitoring when undertaking recruitment of its national staff.	①	②	③	④

Do you believe that the ability of national staff to effectively monitor projects is the major challenge the IRC faces in the implementation of its projects in south Mudug region? Yes/No

.....

If yes, kindly highlight what other measures you think the IRC needs to put in place in order to improve the ability of its field based national staff to effectively monitor projects?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

PART FOUR: MONITORING STRATEGIES

Please tick the numeric value corresponding to your selected response

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	disagree	Strongly disagree
19	Project monitoring system is in place and understood by all staff	①	②	③	④	⑤
20	There is a need to improve and strengthen the current monitoring systems for the IRC food security project	①	②	③	④	⑤
21	There exists both headquarter level and field specific monitoring guidelines for all IRC projects	①	②	③	④	⑤
22	The IRC's monitoring strategy is generally stronger and more effective than other NGOs operating in south Mudug region.	①	②	③	④	⑤
23	IRC's monitoring strategies are built into each project at the proposal stage before submitting to the donors for funding.	①	②	③	④	⑤
24	IRC conducts scheduled internal monitoring of all its projects which is mainly undertaken by its Nairobi based expert staff.	①	②	③	④	⑤
25	Community members /project beneficiaries are usually involved in regular monitoring of projects in their	①	②	③	④	⑤

	respective locations.					
26	Communities/project beneficiaries generally feel they are adequately involved in monitoring of all projects implemented by the IRC.	①	②	③	④	⑤
27	Involving other organizations to conduct joint monitoring of projects will greatly improve IRC,s current monitoring strategies	①	②	③	④	⑤

Do you believe the IRC's current monitoring strategy is satisfactory? **Yes/No.** Please explain your response.

.....

Please suggest other strategies the IRC could adopt in order to improve current monitoring of its projects

.....

End.

Thank you.

**APPENDIX III: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR IRC PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
COMMITTEES**

SECTION 1: GENERAL INFORMATION

Location

.....

Gender (Male/Female)

.....

Date of interview

.....

How long have you lived in this location/village? State in years/months.

.....

How long have you been IRC's project implementation committee member? State in years /months.....

.....

SECTION TWO: SECURITY

Kindly tick against the box corresponding to your response

Q1. Kindly state how you will describe the overall security situation in this location.

Very bad Bad Fair Good Very Good

Q2. Do you think the current security situation affects your normal duty as a project implementation committee member?

Yes No

Q3. Has there been any instance(s) when you could not monitor project activities due to insecurity? Kindly explain the nature of the insecurity.

Yes No

.....

Q4. Do you believe insecurity is a major constraint in the monitoring of IRC projects in this location?

Yes No

SECTION THREE: EMPLOYEES CAPACITY

Q5. How often did you find IRC employees monitoring projects implemented in this location in the past 3 months?

Weekly Monthly Quarterly other (specify)
.....

Q6. Do you often conduct joint monitoring with IRC employees?

Yes No

Q7. How will you rate the quality of project monitoring conducted by IRC employees in this location? Please explain your response

Very good Good Satisfactory Poor
.....
.....
.....

Q8. Do you feel that IRC employees who monitor projects in this location fully engage you in all monitoring exercises? If no, please explain.

Yes No
.....
.....
.....

SECTION FOUR: MONITORING STRATEGIES

Q9. How will you rate the current approach IRC uses in monitoring of its projects in this location? Kindly explain your response.

Very good Good Satisfactory Poor
.....

Q10. What strategies or approaches will you recommend to IRC in order to improve its current monitoring strategy?
.....
.....

SOMALIA: MUDUG REGION

