

**THE DETERMINANTS OF KENYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY SINCE INDEPENDENCE**

BY

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DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for the award of any degree in any university.

FRANCIS OMONDI OGOLLA.

Signature.....Date.....

This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as University supervisor.

PROFESSOR PHILIP NYING'URO.

Signature.....Date.....

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DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to my wife Kathambi, daughter Achieng, son Rabuku and to my late mother Damaris who asked me, when I joined the military, to leave and pursue further studies.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------|--|
| AMISOM | African Mission in Somalia |
| ASCU | Agricultural Sector Coordination Unit |
| ASDS | Agricultural Sector Development Strategy |
| ASEAN | Association of South East Asian Nations |
| AU | African Union |
| CPA | Comprehensive Peace Agreement |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| EAC | East African Community |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| ERS | Economic Recovery Strategy |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| HDI | Human Development Index |
| HDR | Human Development Report |
| HMS | Her Majesty Services |
| ICCFN | Inter-ministerial Coordinating Committee on Food and Nutrition |
| ICGLR | International Conference on Great Lakes Region |
| IGAD | Inter Governmental Authority on Development |
| KANU | Kenya African National Union |
| KADU | Kenya African Democratic Union |
| KFSM | Kenya Food Security Meeting |
| LCD | Least Developed Countries |
| LRA | Lord's Resistance Army |
| MRC | Mombasa Republican Council |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NCPB | National Cereals and Produce Board |
| NFD | Northern Frontier District |
| NFSCC | National Food Safety Coordinating Committee |
| NGO | Non Governmental Organization |
| NRM | National Resistance Movement |

| | |
|------|--|
| NSAC | National Security Advisory Council |
| NSC | National Security Council |
| NSIS | National Security Intelligence Service |
| OAU | Organization of African Unity |
| ODM | Orange Democratic Party |
| OECD | Organization for Cooperation and Development |
| PNU | Party of National Unity |
| PRSP | Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper |
| PTA | Preferential Trade Area |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| USA | United States of America |

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ABSTRACT

Kenya has faced and continues to face numerous security challenges that appear to be on the increase. This study examines the determinants of Kenya's national security policy since independence. The scope covers a historical background of the main issues that influence Kenya's security, the national security policy formulation process and an assessment of the impact of the various national security policy choices.

The study has been guided by three research questions namely; 1) What are the factors that have influenced Kenya's national security policy since independence? 2) What constitute threat to Kenya's national security and 3) How has Kenya responded to these threats and with what results? Primary data was collected from oral interviews and discussions with key government officials involved in security policy formulation and conduct. Secondary data was sourced from relevant publications and media reports.

The study tested two hypotheses namely; that the determinants of Kenya's national security policy are not aligned fully with the threats to national security and secondly that Kenya's national security policy has been reactive rather than proactive. The study found out that Kenya's national security policy formulation is largely state-centric and hence ignores non state-centric threats, which receive less emphasis in the security policy formulation process and this may be a contributing factor to the existing and continued insecurity in the country. Secondly, it found out that Kenya's national security policy has been to a large extent reactive rather than proactive. The study recommends a more inclusive structured process of national security policy formulation based on the broadened scope of security definition.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The issue of national security policy is not unique to Kenya only but is common in most states that operate with structured systems of governance. Every state most often develops policies that guide its functions in every sector. The security policy is therefore developed by states to provide general guidelines on how the state is to be secured. To examine the determinants of the country's national security policy since independence it is important to appreciate the historical context of Kenya's policies and the role of the colonial legacy and its impact on post-independent Kenya.

Kenya's policies during the colonial period were aimed at serving the colonial interests. Security policy that existed was therefore meant to provide security in the colonized state in the interest of colonial powers. It is to be appreciated that the borders that form the present day Kenya was a creation of European powers that partitioned Africa for colonial domination. It had no regard of the local inhabiting nations that had their Kingdoms and structures of administration in the area that later became Kenya. Kenya in its present form was carved out in the 1884 Berlin Conference as part of the British protectorate in East Africa and later became a colony and was ruled by the British to serve their interest.

During the colonial period, several policies touching on security were brought about by the colonial authorities in the exclusive service of their own interest. Unfortunately, many were carried over into the post colonial Kenya. The new government at independence inherited the

colonial government structure with policies that were formulated to serve colonial interests. For example, during the colonial period, the people's ethnic distinction was the primary focus in the natives' relations with the colonial regime. It served the colonial government to propagate their rule. The policy was to divide and rule through the maintenance of a system of local administration based on ethnically distinct locations and districts¹. Ethnicity therefore got imbedded in the administration system as a policy. This administrative structure and its policies encouraged socio-economic inequalities in the development of the country. At independence the new government adopted that same administrative structure with its original form largely unchanged.

At independence on 12 December 1963, Kenya therefore needed to define its interests and strategize on how to defend itself as a sovereign state. Unfortunately, it had inherited a structure that did not support its interests and faced immediate challenges. It lacked both the human and financial resources that would have enabled an immediate and complete transformation of the administration. The new administration therefore depended on the goodwill of the exiting colonial regime for a transitional administration where the colonial government progressively transferred administration structure to the new state. The security organs for example, were still headed by the British officers appointed by the colonial regime and were only able to be transferred to the Africans some years later.

The immediate questions that come to mind are; how were individuals in a structure which before independence was serving the interest of colonial powers able to abruptly change to serve the interest of the new state? Were the interests of the new government clearly defined? How was the transition managed in the security sector?

¹ Robert M. Maxon, *The Colonial Roots in Politics and Administration in East Africa* ed., Walter O. Oyugi, (Nairobi: East Africa Publishers Ltd, 1994). Pg 35.

Even so, within the structures that it inherited, the new government developed various security policies that guided its survival strategies. But the rise in insecurity and many security challenges that the country faced in post independence period such as like the Shifta uprising, tribal clashes, labour unrests and perennial violence during elections, raises the question on the efficacy of these policies. It raises the question of what determines the national security policy then and now or could it be argued that there is a disconnect between the security policy determinants and the general threats to national security?

On the question of security, the debate on the concept of security itself is a matter of ongoing discourse. The perennial questions in any academic security discourses always come along these lines; 1) What does it mean to be secure? 2) What is it to be secured and 3) What constitute a threat? The very nature of secrecy and sensitivity that surrounds matters of security has made specific study on this subject matter, especially on Kenya's security to be limited. This study is therefore informed by the interest of the researcher as a security practitioner to contribute in improving national security policy process and functioning. The study aims to find out the determinants of Kenya's security policy since independence, the process of security policy formulation and the impact of the formulated security policies with a view to recommending how national security policy formulation could be re-structured to be more effective in addressing security concerns in the country and hence secure the legitimate interests of the state.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Every sovereign state will in one way or another have strategies for survival in what the realists refer to as the anarchic international system. Kenya is a sovereign state and attained its

independence on 12 December 1963. As an independent state it develops from time to time security policies that ensure its survival in the international system. However, in the years of its existence, Kenya has faced many security challenges. These security challenges could be classified broadly as external and internal.

After independence, externally Kenya faced a challenge on its sovereignty with the emergence of Shifita insurgents fuelled by Somalia irredentism and supported by the state of Somalia which wanted to annex Northern Eastern Province of Kenya. Somalia later disintegrated after the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991 and its lack of stability has remained a security challenge for Kenya to present day. Proliferation of small arms from the conflicts inside Somalia has fuelled crime in Kenya. Incursions into Kenya by militants who hijack and take tourists and aid workers for ransom became a prominent feature of security threat in 2010/2011.

Further, globalization has encouraged trans-border interactions and in the process international organized crime in forms of human and drug trafficking, money laundering cannot be ruled out in Kenya. Kenya has also suffered terrorist attacks in the 1980s, the late 1990s and more recently in 2013 in the heart of Nairobi. The transnational nature of these criminal phenomenon affects not only one country but many countries owing to their spill-over effect. Kenya therefore must lay strategies to counter such spill-overs.

Internally, tribal tensions that sometimes have erupted into open clashes, perennial violence associated with political elections, cattle rustling, conflicts among pastoralists, urban crimes and land clashes has been a constant security challenge to Kenya.

Security policies have existed but their efficacy has been doubted. This raises the question as to what are the factors that have influenced Kenya's national security policies since independence? Secondly, what does Kenya consider to constitute threat to its national security

and how has government responded to these threats and with what results? The fact that Kenya's security challenges are perennial and on the increase, despite existing security policies is the main problem of this research.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this study is to examine the factors that have determined Kenya's national security policy since independence. Secondly, the study will attempt to identify threats to Kenya's national security and policy measures that Kenya has put in place to address insecurity and with what results. The two objectives will assist in the analysis to find out if there is a disconnect between the determinants of Kenya's national security policy and threats to national security which will then aid in explaining the constant and increasing insecurity that the country has faced and continue to face since independence.

1.4 Research Questions

In the pursuit of the research objectives, the following three research questions have been formulated to guide the study. 1) What are the factors that have influenced Kenya's national security policies since independence? 2) What constitute threat to Kenya's national security and 3) How has Kenya responded to these threats and with what results?

1.5 Justification of the study

In a world of startling change, the first duty of the Government remains: that of providing security to the people of the country.² Kenya has faced several security challenges since independence. Despite existing security policies, these challenges appear to be on the increase and are emerging in new forms. No study has been undertaken to solely examine the factors that influence security policy in Kenya. The factors that determine security policy should emanate from threats to national security and should be aimed at securing national interests.

When national interests and threats are not well articulated, a state risks formulating weak policies that do not address the problem. When there is a disconnect between the determinants of security policies and threats, formulated policies are likely to be ineffective. This study therefore aims to make a contribution to the national security policy formulation process by explaining the determinants of Kenya's national security policies and their utility in addressing security threats. In this way policy makers may use the information to ensure that the national security policy formulated is comprehensive enough to address all the security threats that the country faces.

1.6 Hypotheses

The two hypotheses of this study are derived from the harmonization of the interaction between the identification of national interests, the assessment of threats to national interests and the formulation of national security policies to counter these threats and to secure national interests. It is based on the premise that national interests are the primary criterion of formulating national security and that threats to these interests ought to be the primary determinant of national security policy formulation. Secondly, that the effectiveness of the policies are

² Her Majesty Services, *A strong Britain in the age of uncertainty – National Security Strategy* (London: Cabinet Office, 2010) p1.

dependent on their proactive nature in anticipating threats rather than being reactionary once the national interests being secured has been challenged by the threat.

Hypothesis 1 – The determinants of Kenya’s national security policy are not aligned fully with the threats to national security.

Hypothesis 2 – Kenya’s national security policy has been reactive rather than proactive.

1.7 Literature Review

The literature review will cover two broad areas that are related to the study. First, will be the review of studies that focus on the security conditions in the international system globally. This will provide a global perspective on the existing threats from in the international system that crosscut states from which individual states determine their security policies. Second area of literature will cover studies that have been conducted on factors that have influenced various states’ security policies in various parts of the world in recent history. Focus will be on determining the interaction between determinants of security policy choices and threats to national security.

1.7.1 Threats to Security in the International System

In this section, literature is reviewed on threats in the international system in recent history (post-World War II) and how these threats have in general have influenced the behavior of states’ security policies. The aspect of colonialism made many colonized states to view the world system from the perspective of their colonial masters. One argument by Hatch is that the situations in the various African territories in 1945 were strongly conditioned by the different

forms of European rule practiced over the past fifty years.³ At the end of the Second World War, most of Africa was still largely under colonial domination. Britain and France had the most colonies while Portuguese had retained their colonies in Angola, Mozambique and western enclave of Portuguese Guinea.

Therefore, When Cold War emerged in the period after World War II, the influence of colonialists on the African states was continuing and it only brought on stage new influencing actors in the international system. According to Snow, the distribution of power after the World War II defined the international system as bi-polar in nature. The United States and the Soviet Union stood as two remaining powers (or poles) around which other states congregated and could be controlled or influenced.⁴ Even though Britain, France and China became nuclear powers shortly after the war and hence were regarded as major powers, the United States and the Soviet Union remained the dominant super powers. Hence, the world system became characterized by a bi-polar standoff involving nuclear arsenals and competing core ideologies of these two super powers.⁵

The rivalry between the two super powers played out in their quest for allies. Many African countries were under Britain and France as colonies. Chweya argues that the Soviet Union's strategy against the West was in attacking their colonial empire through support for nationalist revolt and agitation for independence. The logic of this strategy was that African countries that achieved independence through Soviet support were more likely to establish

³John Hatch, *A History of Post War Africa*, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1965) 35

⁴ Donald M. Snow, *National Security for a New Era, Globalization and Geopolitics*, (New York: Pearson Education Inc., 2004), p. 105.

⁵ Michael Renner, et al, *State of the World: Redefining Global Security (Forward by Michael Gorbachev)*, (New York: W W Norton & Co, 2005) p. 4.

communist governments after independence.⁶ Therefore, as African states started gaining independence, the rivalry played out in heightened competition for allies. This rivalry also created tensions among their allies, divided by ideology and supported by the superpowers. The result was the accumulation of military power that was often viewed as threatening to the other states and hence creating a situation of security dilemma.

The alignment with the super powers was a major source of security concern and it dominated security policy in most states. The existence of an ideologically different state as a neighbor constituted an existential threat to a state at the time. Although many African countries at independence joined the non-alignment movement, in reality their alignment to either the East or the West was always evident. According to Snow, “the Cold War made military affairs – national security to be defined in largely military terms – a central reality in American peace time life.”⁷ Every state’s strength was determined largely by the physical size of its army and the composition of its military materiel.

To appreciate the influence Cold War had on other states security policies, Isaacs asserts that; “The United States and the Soviet Union were the major protagonists, but almost every nation in the world was affected in some way”.⁸ It shaped security co-operations such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), influenced security policies in the Middle East and influenced Israel’s relations with the Arab world. As each super power sought to expand its sphere of influence by gaining allies in the geo-strategically positioned states, tensions were created among the allies. As Nyinguro explains, “In order to gain geo-strategic advantage over

⁶ Ludeki Chweya, Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region, in *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, ed., Makumi Mwagiru, (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004) pp. 42-52.

⁷ Donald M. Snow, *National Security for a New Era, Globalization and Geopolitics after Iraq (3rd Ed)*, (New York: Pearson Education Inc. 2008) p. 90.

⁸ Isaacs J. and Downing T., *Cold War;-An Illustrated History 1945-1991* (New York: Little Brown and Co. 1998) p. ix.

the Soviet bloc (read USA), it had to ensure that countries that were geographically strategic became its allies”.⁹ Cold War became a reference in security policies for almost every state.

The geo-strategic positions of states also influenced the extent to which the state’s got affected by Cold War politics. In Europe, most states were already aligned to the either one or the other super power, but in Africa every emerging new states became the attractive new ally to be sought. Most countries especially those which had coastal strips were considered to be geo-strategically positioned therefore became targets for the super powers and they used this as a bargaining tool for support especially to the third world countries. It can therefore be argued that most policies and specifically security policies of these states were made with reference to the alignment with the super powers.

After the Cold War, the focus on security began to gradually shift from state to society. The security definition was broadened as new threats emerged. The emergence of the concept of human security in the late 1980s and early 1990s further expanded the scope of security. It originated from the thinking that throughout history, people have been killed by other things other than soldiers and weapons, and states have been weakened or destroyed by things other than military conflict.¹⁰ Even before the end of the Cold War, this argument had stated gaining prominence. According to Sheehan, the United Nations Brant’s Commission whose 1980 report *North-South: A program for Survival* had “called for a new concept of security that would transcend the narrow notions of military defence and look more towards the logic of a broader independence”.¹¹

⁹ Philip O. Nyinguro, *United States Policy and the Transition to Democracy in Kenya 1990-1992*, PhD. Thesis, (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1999), pp.103-104.

¹⁰ Dannreuther R., *International Security, The contemporary Agenda* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), p. 7.

¹¹ Michael Sheehan, *International Security, An Analytical Survey*, (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2005), p. 43.

The debate on the expansion of the scope of security was accelerated after the end of the Cold War. Dannreuther argues that the end of Cold War has created three major shifts in the understanding and conceptualization of international security; the significant reduction in the expectation of a major war between the great powers, the shift of global focus and attention from the East-West to the North-South axis and creation of new dynamics of international cooperation in a uni-polar international system¹². This argument supports the view that new forms of threat will dominate the international system away from the expected military confrontations between major powers. Buzan shares the view that the fading of military threats (after the end of Cold War) naturally causes other types of threats to come more clearly into view, but it is also true that other types of threats are rising in importance regardless of the decline in military concerns.¹³

To support this argument further Ayoob, commenting on security concerns of the third world countries in the 1990s has highlighted that internal rather than external threats were the principal security concerns for the Least Developed Countries (LDC)¹⁴ in the post Cold War era. This new approach came to be characterized as the ‘Copenhagen School’. The Copenhagen School facilitated the consideration of non-military issues, even if they had no military dimension so long as they represented existential threats and hence determinants of security policies. It places particular emphasis upon the social aspects of security as opposed to military and state.

¹² Dannreuther R., Op. cit. p. 3.

¹³ Barry Buzan, *People State & Fear, - An Agenda for Post International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era* 2nd ed, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1991), p. 9.

¹⁴ Ayoob M. “Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective”, in K. Krause and M Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 121-146.

Secondly, the approach partially deepened the meaning of security by arguing that issues can be considered matters of security even if they are not threatening states.¹⁵ After all hunger, and disease were identified as principal enemies of Kenya at independence ahead of military threats. The example of Yugoslavia is provided as a post-Cold War scenario where conflict and the disintegration of the state occurred not as a result of state security dilemma but because of internal societal security dilemmas.

The concept of human security gained prominence as part of the holistic paradigm of human development cultivated at the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 1994 Human Development Report (HDR). It proposed the shifting of focus of security from the protection of the state and its borders by military means to the protection of individuals from a wider range of threats to their well-being and security. The report defined human security as including "...safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression, and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily lives, whether in homes, jobs or communities." Subsequent UN reports have lauded the strength and appeal of human security as not only in its new elements but in the growing inability of traditional concepts of security to generate adequate responses to many of the new causes of insecurity in the world today, particularly in the post-cold war situation.¹⁶

According to Hataley and Nossal enthusiasts of human security argue that what is needed in the post-Cold-War period is a foreign policy agenda that is more 'people-centered' than the state-centered focus of security policy during the Cold War period. Among the most enthusiastic proponents of the human security paradigm in the 1990s was the Canadian government, which, in partnership with a number of other like-minded governments, sought to press the human

¹⁵ Hough P., *Understanding Global Security 2nd ed.* (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2008), p. 20.

¹⁶ Richard Jolly and Deepayan Basu Ray, *The Human Security Framework and National Human Development Reports: A Review of Experiences and Current Debates*. UNHDR Occasional Paper 5, 2006.

security agenda, taking a number of human security initiatives.¹⁷ This concept has largely defined the security policies of many states in the post-Cold War era.

Further, the broadened security definition has been widely embraced and it continues to define national security policies of many states. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, describes the drastic changes in the task of defending the nation as follows; “Today the task of defending the nation has changed drastically. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank”.¹⁸ The strategy acknowledges new threats in the forms of terrorism, cybercrime, drug and human trafficking among others.

Secondly, the other significant changes have occurred in the process that affects the concept of security is the material transformations linked to globalization. The end of the Cold War encouraged and opened new opportunities for the process of globalization.¹⁹ The effect of globalization has resulted in significant changes in international politics and attracted a lot of scholarly work. The globalization theorists suggest that national security of states have weakened under the impact of powerful global social forces. These forces have manifested themselves in several forms including absence of major inter-state wars, a decline in military spending, the rise of transnational actors and proliferation of non-traditional security challenges in the areas of transnational terrorism, the environment and drug trafficking.

Others argue that the challenges brought about by the changes that took place after the end of the Cold War are global in nature and require collective action. They contend that

¹⁷Hataley T. S and Nossal K. R., *The Limits of the Human Security Agenda: The Case of Canada's Response to the Timor Crisis*, Global Change, Peace & Security, Volume 16, Number 1, February 2004. pp. 1-17.

¹⁸ White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington DC: White House, 2002) Preface.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 14.

traditional state centered approaches to security planning are ill suited to deal with such pressures. As such, they argued that states have responded to new threats by altering the architecture of their national security establishments and by pursuing cooperation both nationally and internationally.²⁰

The inadequacy of the Cold War framework for national security policy formulation is acknowledged widely. Snow (an authority on international security) acknowledges this in his work in 2004 in relation to national security analysis that “times have changed sufficiently that the old ways of looking at things contained in my earlier book and its various editions seem woefully inadequate to understand current and future realities.”²¹ It may be argued that non-military competitors for attention as threats to security include environmental degradation, economic disparities, chronic poverty, diseases such as HIV/Aids, transnational crimes and international migration as witnessed in many places in the world. This position is supported by Renner who argues that today’s security problems “are rooted in societal instabilities that are paired with complex array of phenomena-from poverty and disease to population growth and environmental degradation to religious fundamentalism and ethnic hatred.”²²

The aspect of the broadening of security has its origins in the very contentious debate of its definition. Buzan puts this debate in perspective as follows; “Wolfers warned about the ambiguity of security and Charles Shulzte argues that; “the concept of national security does not lend itself to neat and precise formulation. It deals with a wide variety of risks about whose probabilities we have little knowledge and of contingencies whose nature we can only dimly

²⁰ Ripsman N M and Paul T V, *Globalization and National Security State: A framework of Analysis*, International Studies Review (2005), pp. 199-227.

²¹ Snow D M, *National Security for a New Era, Globalization and Geopolitics*, (New York: Pearson Education Inc. 2004), p. x.

²² Michael Renner M., et al, *State of the World: Redefining Global Security (Forward by Michael Gorbachev)* (New York: W W Norton & Co, 2005), p. 161.

perceive”.²³ Buzan asserts that the security of human collectivities is affected by factors in five major sectors; military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. Evidence of this can be found in the conflicts even at the most basic level that arise from scramble for resources, crimes aggravated by poverty and clashes in political elections among opposing parties.

Brant’s report of 1980 that reviewed international development issues called for a new concept of security that would transcend the narrow notions of military defense and look more towards the logic of broader interdependence.²⁴ This was part of the initial thinking that broadened the view on security. Mathew highlighted the need for states to give proper concern to the newly apparent threats posed by environmental problems such as ozone depletion and global warming.²⁵

However, it is to be noted that there are critics to the expanded scope of security. Traditionalists, seeking to defend gains of strategic studies in the Cold War period, condemn the excessive expansion of the field of security studies which threaten to ‘destroy its intellectual coherence and make it difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems’.²⁶ There are other schools of thought that hold that the effects of these changes could have been overstated. Ripsman and Paul examined globalization school’s main propositions by analyzing national security strategies of four categories of states; 1) major powers 2) states in stable regions 3) states in regions of enduring rivalries 4) weak and failed states. They concluded that globalizations school’s claims are overstated given that states of all types pursue more traditional security policies than they would expect. To the extent that globalization has affected the pursuit

²³ Barry Buzan, *People State & Fear, - An Agenda for Post International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era* (2nd ed) (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1991), p. 14.

²⁴ Barant W., *North – South A program for Survival, A Report of the Brant Commission*, (London: Pan, 1980), p. 124.

²⁵ Hough P., *Understanding Global Security 2nd Ed*, (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2008), p. 20.

²⁶ *Ibid.* p. 7.

of national security, it has done so unevenly. They found out that states in stable regions appear to have embraced the changes rendered by globalization the most, states in regions of enduring rivalries the least and the weak states also showed signs of having been affected by globalization, many of the symptoms they manifested had more to do with internal difficulties than external challenges.²⁷

A third argument that has dominated security debate after the end of Cold War is Samuel Huntington's thesis that the era of ideological conflict in the international system has been replaced with an era of clash of civilization. In this argument Huntington aims to explain the emergence of international terrorism. Irrespective of the merits or demerits of Huntington's thesis, terrorism has progressively become a dominant threat to international security and states have to develop strategies of countering it. In response to this argument Chweya, asserts that Africa must now adjust from having to deal with the insecurity that the Cold War posed to one that is a product of conflicting interpretations of freedom and democracy by parties outside of Africa.²⁸ Even though international terrorism largely targets Western interests, many third world countries in which the attacks takes place often finds themselves victims of such attacks. Today, international terrorism is a security concern on which specific policy requirement cannot be ignored.

A survey of several studies on specific countries around the world confirms the similarities or differences in the factors that determine security policies for every state. The following are areas of studies that have been undertaken on from which factors that determine security policy of various states can be derived.

²⁷ Ripsman N M and Paul T V, *Globalization and National Security State: A framework of Analysis*, International Studies Review (2005), pp. 199-227.

²⁸ Ludeki Chweya, Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region, in *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, ed., Makumi Mwangiru, (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004) pp. 42-52.

1.7.2 Studies on determinants of Security Policies of various States

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Frank Moller posed the question, “Why do the security policies of the Baltic states still reflect the thinking of security as military security rather than as security community? The explanation which he gave on conclusion of his study on the subject question, which focused on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, is that the security policy of these states, especially in the 1990s has had more to do with the construction of the nation-state than with security. He noted that thinking of security in terms of national security and equating national security with the security of the state and the capability to defend it militarily are approaches that are increasingly marginalized in many theoretical writings on security but still enjoy popularity among decision makers and prevents the change in security policies from military and alliance based conceptions to civilian and community based conceptions.²⁹

In each of these countries, he noted, had their security policies determined largely by their relationship in the alliance with the Soviet Union. When the West remained a threat to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the Soviet troops were stationed and remained in the Baltics. The reunification of Germany and the subsequent reduction of western troops in Germany, coupled with the United States’ desire to engage the Soviet Union as Gorbachev developed new policies towards the United States triggered a chain of events that led to the pullout of Soviet troops in the Baltics.

This happened in 1990s and created conditions for the change in security policy for the Baltic States, from state based to civilian and community based conceptions of security. In the process, the security policies for each of the Baltic States became influenced by factors of common regional interests and requirements under Council of the Baltic States. Internal factors

²⁹ Frank Moller, *Thinking Peaceful Change : Baltic Security Policies and Security Community Building*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2007), p. 1-2.

were equally at play and the Baltic States were even “accused” that “the security policy during the 1990s was a reflection of the self-interest of the newly created armed forces as an organized interest group rather than an expression of an abstract national interest.”³⁰

Individually each state developed national security concepts that broadly outlined their security policies. In Lithuania, the determinants of security policies were identified as external risks, challenges, potential challenges and potential dangers conditioned by the geographical environment.³¹ In Latvia, security issues did not rank paramount in national policies, they emphasized demilitarization of Latvian republic’s territory and main agenda were economic, cultural and political issues. It endorsed neutrality as a national security policy. The determinants of their security policy therefore comprised of the countering threats from the presence of an alien army in the country, the uncontrolled operations of foreign espionage and counter-espionage units, the presence of extremists activities of various Communists and anti-independence organizations, high levels of crime involving activities of armed, international, and organized criminal groups; economic instability and the country’s dependence on foreign energy resources.³²

In Estonia, security policy remains state-centered and military threats are the main determinants of security policy. It did not change much from the perspective it had in the Union. According to its national security policy guidelines, national defense aims to guarantee the preservation of the independence and sovereignty of the state, the indivisible integrity of its land, territorial waters and airspace, its constitutional order and the vitality of its people.³³

³⁰ Ibid, p. 130.

³¹ Ibid, p. 152.

³² Ibid, p 155.

³³ <http://www.vm.ee/eng/nato/def.policy.html> 23 August 2013

Another study that covered security policies of a few countries in South East Asia by Allan Collins contends that security during Cold War focused almost exclusively on military defence and deterrence. The study covered Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore and found that security was determined on the basis of military and political concerns. However, since the end of Cold War he asserts that security has broadened and deepened with emphasis on new approaches. These approaches include the concept of securitization and human security. It brings in the aspect societal security that is determined by many factors.

For example; in post colonial period, the three states adopted policies intended to help create strong nation-states. The internal security challenges arose from the diverse ethnic populations that resisted these nation-state building approaches.³⁴ The case of civil war in Myanmar since independence is a case of the peripheral ethnics resisting assimilation in to the Burman group.

Other factors that have caused security concerns in the countries of South East Asia include for example; forest fires in Indonesia that created security problems in terms of both health and lost tourists revenue, and led to diplomatic squabbles between states.³⁵ The region is home to a host of other nontraditional security problems, such as tsunamis, drug trafficking, human trafficking (slavery) and organized crime.

Further, the broadening of security, Collins argues that it ensures that non military security matters are analyzed thus providing a comprehensive or holistic account of security problems facing South East Asia.³⁶ Analysts now look beyond the state as the referent object of

³⁴ Allan Collins, *Security and South East Asia; Domestic, Regional and Global Issues*, (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2003), p. 1-2.

³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 23.

³⁶ *Ibid*, p. 23.

security (that is unit to be secured) and consider other factors such as environmental, societal and economic security.

The collective responsibility of membership in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) makes regional concerns to become determinants of the national security policies. The region has security concepts including security communities and regimes, comprehensive, cooperative and common security.³⁷ The cooperative nature of security arrangement was to achieve a closeness that would encourage trust limit suspicion hence reducing security threats. The concern for extra-regional powers also played a role in their security policies. Understanding the potential of intervention by the two superpowers and China in South East Asia, the ASEAN in its early period adopted “a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality” which essentially sought to limit extra-regional intervention in South East Asia.³⁸

The idea here appears to suggest that the ASEAN states opted for a policy that would not only limit the influence of the super powers in the region but also reduce their bi-lateral involvement with individual states that would result in or encourage an alignment with one super power. The relations with the super powers and China therefore was one the factors that informed their security policies. For example, according to Collins, engaging with China would help lessen the threat by tying Beijing into cooperative undertakings, and keeping the United States involved should help balance China should such undertakings fail to contain it.³⁹

In the Horn of Africa, in the countries of Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Eretria and Uganda insecurity has been a major handicap to development. The security concerns of these countries emanate from factors that are associated with the states’ shared geography, cultural and

³⁷ Ibid, p. 127.

³⁸ Ibid, p. 161.

³⁹ Ibid, p. 170.

historical similarities. The region has faced several security challenges over time and various scholars have presented diverse views on the factors that have led to the insecurity.

First, according to Ofuho, the dilemma of consolidating the state in this region has been a source of conflict.⁴⁰ The political competitions that often turn violent have its roots in colonialism. Other than Ethiopia, the rest of the states in the Horn of Africa have a history of colonialism. After independence the new independent states instituted administrations which inherited colonial administrations structures and share similarities in terms of bureaucratic authoritarian, patronage and clientelism and ethnic fragmentation. Those who came to power used the colonial structure to consolidate their own power and in some cases led to personal rule. It is this practice that often led to resentment among the communities in a state and finally fuel conflict. Chweya supports this view and expands it as he argues that the state framework that was arguably the most important colonial legacy became the greatest source of insecurity between states in the light of numerous borders disputes, irredentism, secessionism and ethnicity within the states.⁴¹

It is to be noted that in the Horn of Africa, there is not a single state that has had no security challenge. Except for Tanzania that has remained relatively peaceful after independence, each state in the Horn of Africa has been involved in some sort of internal tensions or conflict associated with politics. It is what Pearce associates with political greed when she argues that crisis in the third world countries have emerged overtime because of patterns of political practice that led to growing dysfunction of the state as an instrument for organizing and exercising power,

⁴⁰ Cirino Iteng Ofuho, Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa, in *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, ed., Makumi Mwagiru, (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004) pg 10.

⁴¹ Ludeki Chweya, Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region, in *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, Makumi Mwagiru ed., (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004), p. 38.

counterproductive efforts to squeeze the peasantry and the unproductive built up of wealth in the hands of the ruling strata.⁴²

This is often expressed in ethnic terms where the ethnic group of the ruler is viewed as favored while others are marginalized in terms of access and control of resources. The same state of affairs is described by Samuel Huntington as mode of governance characterized by corruption, rigged elections leading the installation of illegitimate and unpopular leaders and governments, personalization of power leading to institutional and political decay. The conflict in Uganda between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the government of Uganda provides an example as it stated out of fear by the Acholis (northerners) of being marginalized by the National Resistance Movement government of President Museveni (southerner).

A second factor that has been fronted as a source of security concern is the aspect of contested borders. Contested borders remain potentially one the most likely sources of interstate insecurity now and for many years to come. Although Organization of African Unity at its inception resolved that African states are to maintain and respect borders as they existed at independence, the reality in many parts of Africa was different. Katete Orwa identifies some of these disputed borders that remain potential threat to security.⁴³

As early as 1961, Somalia, sighting historical, cultural and racial reasons, claimed parts of the territories of Kenya's north eastern and of the Ogaden region in Ethiopia. This in effect was to alter the boundaries of Somalia to create a greater Somalia. In 1976, Uganda's Idi Amin, attempted to claim large parts of Western Kenya which he claimed were historically parts of

⁴² Jenny Pearce, "Peace Building in the Periphery: Lessons from Central America", *Third World Quarterly* 20 no.1 (1999), p. 53.

⁴³ Katete Orwa, Continuity and Change: Kenya's Foreign Policy from Kenyatta to Moi, in *Politics and Administration in East Africa*, ed. Walter Oyugi, (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1994), p. 303.

Uganda.⁴⁴ Sudan's border with Kenya around Lokichogio (Elemi triangle) was contested before the South Sudan broke away. The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea which remains unresolved to date revolves around deputed border boundary. Although Chweya asserts that other than the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, most of the border disputes in the Horn of Africa have arguably been consigned to history, it has however, recently emerged that between Kenya and Somalia, the maritime boundary line in the Indian Ocean and the Elemi triangle between Kenya and now South Sudan are contested and hence both cases are areas of potential conflict.

The third aspect of security concern that is associated with each of these states in the Horn of Africa is military power and particularly during the Cold War. Two arguments are presented here. One argument by Ofuho is that super power interests in the region fuelled the emergence of military Juntas and regimes to take over power through unconstitutional means.⁴⁵ This is seen in the coup d'états in 1969 in Somalia that brought Siad Barre to power, in Sudan in 1969 which brought Gaafar Nimery and later 1989 Omar Al Bashir to power, in 1976 in Ethiopia which brought Mengistu Haile Mariam to power, and in 1971 in Uganda which brought Idi Amin to power. The coups reflected the exploitation of restless large military powers in a climate that was often poisoned by resentments and antagonistic inter-communal relations for political ends. In this respect the militaries are argued to have become sources of insecurity by themselves especially when coups came with blood shade.

The second argument is linked to security dilemma. This is a state where the continued arming of one state is viewed as a threat by its neighbors who arm in turn to balance that threat. The arming and re-arming leads to a militarized situation that remains potentially volatile for war. The rivalry of the super powers in one aspect was played in the arming of its allies. Ojo

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 303.

⁴⁵ Cirino Iteng Ofuho, Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa, in *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, Makumi Mwangi ed., (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004), p. 11.

argues that the interstate armed conflict in the Horn of Africa appear to correspond to the level of growth in military strength.⁴⁶ The rapid growth of Somali army may be argued to have contributed to Ogaden war. Ofuho argues that with the assistance of the Soviet Union, the Somali army increased from about 2,000-3,000 men in 1969 to about 23,000 in early 1970s out of a population of 4 million.⁴⁷ Somalia's march to Ogaden in Ethiopia in 1977 was therefore on the basis of its confidence in the level of military power it had accumulated to be able to capture Ogaden.

The next factors which influence security in each of the states in the Horn of Africa emanate from the effects of widespread proliferation of conflicts. The associated security concerns in one aspect comes from the uncontrolled movement of people from one country to another and the problem of large numbers of refugees, which make trafficking of illegal arms easy thus increase the security vulnerabilities within and between communities and across borders. When conflict raged in Somalia and Sudan Kenya at one point was hosting more than 600,000 refugees. The presence of refugees became a source of security concern as small arms were proliferating through refugee camps aiding crimes in urban areas.

On the same point, conflicts often have negative effects on the socio-political and economic development of a state. Ofuho argues that there is a direct correlation between a war situation and the prevalence of poverty. Poverty itself is a security concern. The poverty in Ethiopia is partly attributable to its long standing conflict with Eritrea. Uganda's northern population is relatively poorer than the south as a result of its many years of war with the rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in that region. Poor people with no basic needs, living in a state

⁴⁶ Ojo O. et. al., *African International Relations* (London: Longman, 1985), p. 131.

⁴⁷ Cirino Iteng Ofuho, Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa, in *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, ed. Makumi Mwangi, (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004), p. 11.

of near or pure anarchy, will pose a threat to the security of the state and its neighbors.⁴⁸ In Buzan's classification, this threat is found in the cluster of economic security which is concerned with access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power.⁴⁹

The other aspect of security concerns that affect each of the state mentioned above emanates from religious fundamentalism. The aspect of religious fundamentalism has affected several states in the Horn of Africa is associated with the tension between the Arab world and the West and as well as the Arab-Israel war.⁵⁰ The emergence of militant groups backed by some religious fundamentalist ideologies has become a source of security concern. These groups in targeting Western nation's interests in the region endanger the lives of the peoples in many states. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in the Horn of Africa have been targets of terrorism. The bombing of United States' embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-alaam in August of 1998 could be explained from this perspective.

Thirdly, is the aspect of ethnic conflicts. Many states in Africa have suffered and continue to suffer insecurities associated with ethnic conflicts. Kenya's post election violence of 2008 was politically instigated but fuelled by ethnicity. Kenya's new constitution of 2010 recognized the potential security challenge that arise from ethnicity and hence made ethnic balance in major state appointments as not only a policy measure but a constitutional requirement to mitigate against resentments that would fuel ethnic tensions and hence compromise national security. A parallel can be drawn by how ethnic conflicts saw the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia to highlight the potential danger of ethnicity as a source

⁴⁸ Ibid 12

⁴⁹ Buzan B., *People, States and Fear 2nd ed.* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991) pp 19-20

⁵⁰ Ibid p. 13.

of security concern in many countries. In the state of Somalia, ethnic conflict played in the form of clans that led to the disintegration and collapse of Somalia as a state.⁵¹

A fourth aspect of sources of security concerns identified in a study covering the Horn of Africa in regard to the cross border insecurity is banditry and cattle rustling. Originating from long history of cultural practices, most pastoralist communities raided neighboring tribes even across borders for cattle but with minimum human casualties. However, the recent proliferation of arms and light weapons has militarized these raids thus making it a security threat. Modern cattle rustling today involve raiders armed with modern weapons and the casualties are often many. To support this, Rupeshinge observes that it is no surprise to come across a young Karamojong, Toposa, Turkana girl or boy herding their flock with an A-K 47 rifles on their backs.⁵² In recent times, conflict between raiders and defending communities are often violent confrontations involving small arms and light weapons resulting in many casualties. This security concern affects Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia and each country requires strategies of combating this aspect of security challenge.

A study that provides light into security challenges and how they are dealt with in some countries of West Africa is found in studies which covered the wider West Africa region rather than individual countries. A number of security concerns were found common to most countries in West Africa. Though some could be explained from colonial legacy and Cold War perspective, many are related to the changing dynamics in the socio-political and economic variables as well as changing relationships in the international system.

Almost every country in West Africa has a history of post independence internal conflict. One of the reasons for internal conflict as found by the study of Organization for Economic

⁵¹ Cirino Iteng Ofuho, Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa, in *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, Makumi Mwangi ed., (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004), p. 13.

⁵² Kumar Rupeshinge ed., *Conflict Resolution in Uganda* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989) p 40.

Cooperation and Development (OECD) is that these conflict lies in the structural weakening of governments since 1990s. The narrative goes like this; during the Cold War, regional conflicts in Africa were essentially an extension of the confrontation between the super powers. As the super powers sought allies by supporting various regimes in Africa with military and financial aid, they countered the influence of the other super power by destabilizing the rival's allies. Africa therefore for decades received and built up large armies from handouts of the super powers.

However, when the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, most African countries lost their strategic importance and aid stopped almost overnight. In slashing the aid meant that most of these countries had to deal with their internal security and economic development challenges on their own. The study concludes that “no longer able to exercise authority in their own country, riddled with corruption and nepotism, many of them began to unravel from inside paving way to civil wars, unchecked violence and lawlessness as seen in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s”.⁵³

Related to this, Michael Olisa introduces the aspect of race and ethnicity as factors that influence internal conflicts. He argues that unarmed or armed conflict will explode over time where two or more ethnic groups constituting a territorial sovereign state live in mutual suspicion or distrust arising from prolonged or perceived monopoly of political power by one or more such groups at exclusion of other from such power.⁵⁴ The aspect of ethnicity was encouraged by the colonial regimes to divide and rule Africa. Ethnicity or clanism becomes a source of security challenge in many African states when it is used as a basis for political exclusion.

⁵³ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, (OECD), *West African Studies: Global Security Risks and West African Development Challenges*, Philipp Heinrigs and Marie Tremolieres ed., (Berlin: OECD Publishing, 2012), p. 100.

⁵⁴ Michael Olisa, *Standing on Sinking Sand: ECOMOG and the Liberian Internal Conflict*, in *Arms and Daggers in the Heart of Africa, Studies on Internal conflicts*, Anyang' Nyong'o ed., (Nairobi: Academy Science 1993), p. 269.

The presence of repeated internal conflicts in Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Mali among others is an indication that the strategies developed by these states to counter this aspect of insecurity were either weak or ineffective. Given the nature of secrecy associated with security strategies, research could not locate specific strategies that individual states developed. However, use of military to quell conflicts as they came up is found common among these states.

The same study by OECD mentioned above also identified, Jihadists terrorism and the spread of criminal activities as other key security concerns in most counties of West Africa. The Jihadists terrorism is associated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb in the Sahel region. The OECD study indicates that they originated from a branch of Algerian terrorist group which has intensified its activities and is considered a threat to regional security, stability and development. Some critics have down played the significance of them as a security threat arguing that the United States and France have exaggerated the threat and even been complicit in terrorists' activities to extend their influence in the Sahara and in particular control the regions oil and gas resources and stymie China's advance in Africa.⁵⁵

This view of exaggerating terrorism was first put forth by Michael Rothschild after September 2001 attacks in the United States when he argued that frequent repetition of stories about terrorist threats may lead people to overestimate the threat of terrorism⁵⁶. However, evidence indicate that terrorism is considered a legitimate threat to security in West Africa and a state like Bukina Faso has singled it out as a key threat in its national security strategy.⁵⁷ Being a crosscutting problem many states have joined the global agenda of cooperation in war on terror. Strategies employed though not documented are a multifaceted approach involving different

⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 100.

⁵⁶ Michael Rothschild, The Terrorist Threat has Been Exaggerated in *National Security: Opposing Viewpoints*, Helen Cothran ed., (San Diego: Greenhaven Press 2004), p. 51.

⁵⁷ Ministry of Security – Bukina Faso, *National Security Strategy on Internal Security*, November 2009.

branches of security agencies and collaboration with other countries especially the United States, Britain and France.

On the issue of climate change, although projections by climatologists are contradictory particularly with regard to precipitation, most experts agree on a general increase in temperature and climate variability. Just bordering the large Sahara desert to its north, climate variability is a concern to most states in West Africa. In this regard, climate change and speculations over its security implications pervade political and public discourse in most parts of West Africa. The study by OECD showed that the climate of Sahel features extreme variability in precipitation from one season or decade to another. The cause-and-effect relationship between climate and security is viewed in the expanded dimension of security (human security) in particular by focusing on food security.

The study suggested future policies that would optimize the management of climate variability.⁵⁸ Each government today struggles with the implementation of policies to mitigate the effects of climate change in the framework of global agenda on climate change concerns. Abdel Fatau Musah argues that erratic climate change visited a heavy toll on human life, food security, and health across the West African region in recent years. Heavy rainfall in the Sahel region of West Africa in 2003 was accompanied by increased breeding by desert locusts that devastated thousands of hectares of crops in Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger in 2004.⁵⁹ These are but documented effects of climate change that ultimately impact national security.

The spread of criminal activities include human, diamonds and drug trafficking, proliferation of small arm and light weapons and cross border crimes. These crimes cut across

⁵⁸ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, (OECD), *West African Studies: Global Security Risks and West African Development Challenges*, Philipp Heinrigs and Marie Tremolieres ed., (Berlin: OECD Publishing, 2012),p. 100.

⁵⁹ Abdel-Fatau Musah, *West Africa: Governance and Security in A Changing Region in Africa Program Working Paper Series*, (New York: International Peace Institute, 2009), p. 1.

most states in West Africa. The study identified the existence of criminal networks and drug cartels with bases in Guinea-Bissau as a transit zone for drugs via North Africa to Europe. This is confirmed by other sources. According to international anti-trafficking agencies, a growing criminal network is being forged between Latin American drug barons and European (mostly Spanish and Italian) and African criminal gangs to facilitate the triangular trade in narcotics.⁶⁰ Criminal network therefore becomes a security concern in these countries and require specific strategies to counter.

Besides these, there are other security threats that are unique to specific states as well. For example, Bukina Faso's main threats to national security are assessed as; rapid population growth, galloping urbanization, xenophobia, foreign interference, human and drug trafficking, money laundering, inter-community conflicts, road insecurity, corruption, cyber crime, violation of morals and movement of poor quality goods.⁶¹ The persistence of these challenges indicate that policies formulated to counter them may not be very effective.

A study by Abdel-Fatau Musah confirmed some of the findings of OECD study and concluded that West Africa's complex security challenges are a function of three broad factors. The first set incorporates the region's natural resource endowments, the vulnerabilities inherent in its geographical location, and environmental and demographic factors. The second source of insecurity relates to internal and international governance processes. The third is related to how regional and external geopolitics exert distinct pressures on the region's security architecture.⁶²

The external influences are associated with the competing interests of the multinational corporations with roots in the states of colonial masters who in the process of exploitation of

⁶⁰ United States Drug Enforcement Administration, "Statement before the House Judiciary Committee," September 21, 2006, available at www.dea.gov/pubs/cngrtest/ct092106.html. Retrieved on 12 November 2013.

⁶¹ Ministry of Security – Bukina Faso, *National Security Strategy on Internal Security*, November 2009

⁶² Abdel-Fatau Musah, *West Africa: Governance and Security in A Changing Region in Africa Program Working Paper Series*, (New York: International Peace Institute, 2009) pg 1

resources exert pressure on governments sometimes against the interest of the indigenous peoples as in the case of the Niger Delta.

Further, a comparative study of the developed countries also indicate that there are security concerns associated with developed states while some concerns are cross cutting and are similar to those concerns of the third world countries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States remained the sole super power in the international system. A look at United States security threats and security policy formulation process brings in the idea of the influence of the leaders character in his view of threats and policy formulation.

According to James Dixon, the United States has been and continues to be faced with numerous multifaceted, complex national security problems. To deal with these problems, each president tailored a national security policy-making system that represented his “world view” or his concept of threats to the United States interests,⁶³ and came up with polices that reflected his preferences and choices of action.

These issues that have been considered as threats to the United States have been varied. Internally, The USA existed in relative peace during the Cold War apart from the civil rights demonstrations in the 1960s and its security threats were largely associated with threats to its interests in other parts of the world.

However, in the post-Cold War era and specifically following the September 11, 2001 terrorists attack inside the United States, a lot of studies have been undertaken to explain the changing security threats to the United States. Debates have seen opposing views expressed on the matter of threats. For example; Antony Flew argues that Islam is a threat to national security

⁶³ James Dixon, *National Security Policy Formulation: Institutions, Processes and Issues*, (New York: University of America, 1984), p. 163.

while Antony Sullivan argues that Islam is not a threat to national security.⁶⁴ Terrorism has been identified as the single most important threat to the United States security while others have argued that the threat of terrorism has been over exaggerated. Associated with terrorism are biological weapons or weapon of mass destruction that have been identified as threats to national security with reference to their falling into the hands of terrorists.⁶⁵

In an article in *National Defence Magazine, November 2012*, Sandra Erwin et.al., articulate some of the latest challenges to the US and global security in the coming years.⁶⁶ In their analysis biological threats rank top and is associated with the threat of the possibility of biological weapons eventually will be used in a terrorist attack. The United States has one of the most elaborate policy formulation processes when it comes to dealing with threats. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency for example is reported to have a team of researchers working these problems. From the finding of these researches policy formulation is achieved and the effectiveness of these policies are tested and revised with every threat encountered.

Second, among threats to national security is the threat of large stockpiles of nuclear weapons that are tempting targets for nation-states or groups set on attacking the United States and its allies. Third, is the aspect of the cyber-warfare. In the argument, network intrusions are widely viewed as one of the most serious potential national security, public safety and economic challenges. In this way technology is viewed as a double-edge sword which empowers people to lead and create and also empower individual criminal hackers, organized criminal groups,

⁶⁴ Hellen Cothran (ed.), *National Security, Opposing Viewpoints*, (Farmington Hills: Greenhaven Press, 2004), pp 27-37.

⁶⁵ Veronique de Rugy and Charles Pena, "Biological Weapons Threaten National Security" in *National Security Opposing Viewpoints*, Hellen Cothran ed., (Farmington Hills: Greenhaven, 2004), p. 44.

⁶⁶ Sandra I. Erwin, Stew Magnuson, Dan Parsons and Yasmin Tadjeh, Top Five Threats to National Security in the Coming Decade, in *National Defence Magazine*, November, 2012.

terrorist networks to disrupt the same creations. It is no secret that the United States spends a large sum of money of cyber crime research to develop strategies of countering cyber crime.

Climate Change is also considered as a national security threat. It is recognized in the United States that climate change can impact national security in ways ranging from rising sea levels, to severe droughts, to the melting of the polar caps, to more frequent and devastating natural disasters that raise demand for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.”⁶⁷ The United States also considers transnational crime involving criminal networks as a national security challenge. They involve the drug trade, arms smuggling, human trafficking, and other illicit activities. Their response to these challenges and a lesson in this study is the United States formulated policies that has enhanced homeland security, tightened immigration laws and invested in technology for surveillance.

Next, is a look at the security challenges that the United Kingdom faces and how they have dealt with them. The United Kingdom has been a major world power with a long history of conquests and colonial domination. Like all empires in human history, they rise and eventually progressively diminish with time and their strategic importance in the international system also changes. Although Britain today is not a super power it has immense influence in world politics and security given its historical background as a colonial master. It too has its security challenges and its 2010 national security strategy entitled; A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:-The National Security Strategy outlined what Britain considers as threat today and what determines their security strategy or policies which guide their defence.

Britain, like the United States, faces a different and more complex range of threats as compared to the third world countries. It recognizes terrorism, cyber attack, unconventional attacks using chemical, nuclear or biological weapons, as well as large scale accidents or natural

⁶⁷ Ibid.

hazards as the main threats that could do grave damage to Britain.⁶⁸ In addition it takes cognizance that these new threats could emanate not only from states but also from non-state actors.

The security of energy supplies, nuclear proliferations are also recognized as growing dangers. Like the United States, the United Kingdom developed strategy that weighs up the threats matches them with appropriate tools to implement the strategy. This is done in form of a National Security Strategy Published as a Strategic Defence and Security Review that outlines how it shall equip its Armed Forces, police and intelligence agencies to tackle current and future threats as effectively as possible.

Further, Britain also notes that its security is vulnerable to the effects of climate change which ultimately impacts on its food and water supply. This aspect is equally shared by other European states as found in a study by Chad Briggs and Stacy Van Deever who allude that Europe's climate related security concerns are associated with environmental migration from neighboring regions, the impacts of water and energy insecurity on the stability of extra-Europe states, sea level rise and changes to the geopolitics of the Arctic.⁶⁹ Even though both the United States and European Union both consider climate change as a potential threat to security, critics have accused them both of being responsible for the vast majority of the greenhouse gas emissions that are responsible for the climate change. In effect, they bear greater responsibility and hence have the solution on the overall problem of climate change. Britain strategy in addressing climate change is cooperation with all states and spearhead consensus toward a global deal.

⁶⁸ Her Majesty's Services, *A strong Britain in the age of uncertainty – National Security Strategy* London: Cabinet Office, 2010.

⁶⁹ Chad Briggs and Stacy Van Deever, European Union Climate Concerns, in *Climate Change and National Security: A Country-level Analysis*, Daniel Moran ed., (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp 44-57.

1.7.3 Conclusion on Literature Review

It has been observed that the factors that influence security and hence determine security policies vary from country to country, but they broadly fall in two categories; either external or internal factors. Some are crosscutting or spill-over among states while others are largely confined within a state. There are significant similarities as well as differences in what constitutes threats in various regions and among the different states. Countries that appear to have contained their threats, which suffered less insecurity, appear to have evidence of documented strategies of combating threats. Countries with perennial insecurity challenges lacked evidence of strategies or if such strategies existed it can be concluded that they have been weak and ineffective. Generally, the Cold War appear to have been a major security determinant when it existed and states security policies of most states were state-centric were largely defined on the basis of military threats.

When Cold War ended the scope of security appear to have been broadened ushering new threats. The effect of globalization made new threats such as climate change, cyber crime, terrorism cut to across boundaries of states and hence requirement for common policies and strategies. The review of these factors which influence security in the various countries around the world has aided the study in identifying areas where Kenya shares similar threats with other states and therefore draws appropriate parallels in Kenya's security policy formulation. Further, it has provided a broader understanding of threats systems, shown various aspects of threat forms and the various security policy choices that states make.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

This study is based on an eclectic approach and draws from three theories, realism liberalism and constructivism. The choice of these theories is based on the perceived oscillatory

behavior of Kenya's policy under the various regimes and coupled with the varied influences from domestically and externally in the various periods since independence. Most of Kenya's policy, like most young democracies, has been determined with great influence of the leader rather than an institutional process based on national interests. Given the strong influence of leadership on national security policies, leaders from independence to date have exhibited both realism and liberalism ideals which have influenced the country's policies in equal measures, hence the choice of the realism and liberalism theories. The domestic factors that have influenced security since independence involve complex interactions based on constructed relationships that have largely determined the politics, security and economics, hence the choice of constructivism.

Two underlying assumptions of realism theory are that of international anarchy and self interest. Realism believes that the international system is anarchic and that interactions are guided by the concept of self interests which is defined in terms of power. It maintains that moral principles cannot be applied in the actions of states. Realism gained prominence in the Cold War era when security was viewed in terms of power balance and deterrence. Inter-states relations were informed by Cold War politics and security was viewed on the basis of military power. However, in the post-Cold War, realism has been criticized that self help is not an inevitable consequence of a world government; it is a logic that states have selected as there are historical evidence where states have preferred collective security systems.⁷⁰

Liberalism on the other hand has its roots in Immanuel Kant's thesis on "Perpetual Peace" which holds that man has great moral disposition to master the evil principle in him.⁷¹ It is a paradigm predicated on hope that application of reason and universal ethics to international

⁷⁰ Baylis J., Smith S., and Owens P., *The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International relations 5th Ed.* (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2011) p 96.

⁷¹ <http://hhh.gavilan.edu/mturetzky/pols4/TheoreticalPerspectivesLiberalismRealism.htm> 28 August 2013.

relations can lead to a more orderly, just and cooperative world and international anarchy and war can be policed by international reforms that empowers international organizations and laws.⁷² Liberalism therefore is distinguished from realism by two unique assumptions about world politics: 1) States represent social groups, whose views constitute state preferences; and 2) Interdependence among state preferences influences state policy.⁷³ Kenya attained independence at the peak of Cold War rivalry and William Ochieng as quoted by Katete Orwa, describes the first two years after independence as years of political adjustment and thus idealism competed with realism”.⁷⁴ This competition between the two theories has characterized Kenya’s policies in many aspects of its socio-political interactions in the years after independence. John Howell indicated in 1968 that Kenya’s foreign policy rotated between the theory of realism and idealism, where realism operated with respect to objectives in East Africa while continentally and internationally Kenya was guided by idealism.⁷⁵

The end of Cold War opened up the world system and developments in technology facilitated the rapid process of globalization. States have become more interdependent, relationships got closer and democracy expanded. Regional organizations have emerged globally and possibilities of interstate war have diminished. Liberalists argue that the universal condition of world politics is based on globalization. States are, and always have been, embedded in a domestic and transnational society, which creates incentives for economic, social and cultural interaction across borders.⁷⁶ States themselves make policies that either facilitate or block such interactions. Liberalism is weak in its optimism while realists’ over reliance on power can be

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Andrew Moravcsik, *Liberal Theories of International Relations: A Primer*, (Princeton: Princeton University, 2010), p. 10.

⁷⁴ Katete Orwa, *Continuity and Change: Kenya’s Foreign Policy from Kenyatta to Moi* in *Politics and Administration in East Africa*, Walter Oyugi ed., (Nairobi: East African Educational publishers, 1994), p. 299.

⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 300.

⁷⁶ Andrew Moravcsik, *Liberal Theories of International Relations: A Primer*, (Princeton: Princeton University, 2010), p. 10.

deceptive especially in Kenya or other former colonies in which real power is exercised from elsewhere. It is believed that the overall effect of these weaknesses will counter one other so that their effect on the study would be minimal.

Constructivism on the other hand is concerned with human consciousness, ideas and their dynamic relationship with material forces. It acknowledges how knowledge shapes social reality and how meanings are not always fixed but are shaped by underlying culture, norms and traditions. Its utility in this study is based on the pretext that constructivists have demonstrated that attention to norms and states' identities could help uncover important issues neglected by neo-realism and neo-liberalism.⁷⁷

Besides the consideration of idiosyncratic variables of various leaders that have influenced Kenya's policies, the fundamental change in the conditions in the international system, which changed the overall orientation of security at the end of the Cold War, the broadened scope of security and the emerging new forms of threats has necessitated the choice of the utility of the first two theories. Kenya's multi-ethnic community has been characterized by socially constructed relationships based on complex variables that have defined interests and meaning hence the choice of constructivism as a third lens with which to view the interaction of Kenya's internal dynamics and how they determine national security policy.

1.9 Methodology

This study has utilized qualitative research method. Kenya's national security policy as a "security strategy" has been examined as an end product from a chain actions that starts from

⁷⁷ Baylis J., Smith S., and Owens P., *The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International relations 5th Ed*, (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2011) p. 154.

identifying the determinants of policy choices which emanate from national interests to be secured, threat assessment and ends up with a national security policy choice to be implemented.

The study has relied mainly on data obtained from primary sources and secondary sources. Primary data has been obtained from interviews with serving and former government officials in the security sector and from government publications. The researcher was able to interview two members who served in the former National Security Advisory Council (NSAC), a current member of the National Security Council and a staff at the National Security Council Secretariat and a few former senior government officers who served in various capacities in the security sector. The questions which guided the interviews and discussions were on two main areas; what were or what are considered to be threats to Kenya national security? and what strategies were or have been formulated to deal with these threats and with what results?

Information obtained from these interviews was limited in scope as interviewees cited sensitivity of security information. An interview was also conducted with one senior retired senior military and a senior police officer who served in the years just after independence. One Kenya Ambassador who served in the United States in the 1990s was also interviewed and was able to provide valuable information on how the super power (the United States) viewed Kenya's security especially following the terrorist attack in Nairobi in 1998.

Secondary data was sourced mainly from journals, scholarly publications and unclassified document at the National Security Advisory Council and newspaper sources. It must be mentioned here that despite the passage of time, most documents at the National Security Council (former NSAC) dating as far back as 1970s which were available in archives but were still considered secret.

The data from individuals interviewed though were not detailed or exhaustive given the seniority of the interviewees and the limited time they were able to give. However, the number interviewed and information collected was sufficient for the required analysis and conclusion to be made on the basis of the objectives of the study.

The study equally had limitations. World over, matters of security are often considered secret and access to information is limited by security classification. It is therefore acknowledged that whereas data was collected from interviewees who have been linked to the national security policy formulation the scope and depth of information collected have been limited to unclassified documents that have to a certain degree limited the depth of the study. However, the data collected is considered sufficient to make generalization on the desired outcome on the basis of the objectives of the study. For the national security policies may be secret but the effect, results or impact are all clearly visible and assessable.

Secondly, the interviewees having been at the core of security policy formulation would naturally be less willing to accept policy failures or accept that there are areas that lack policy. Thirdly, most old government records regarding matters of security were found to be still classified and were not available for scrutiny even for the purpose of research. To maintain academic integrity, access was only be made to those documents which were officially authorized and this limited the amount of information which the researcher accessed.

1.10 Definition of Concepts

These terms as applied in this study will mean the following:

Cold War: A state of political tension and military rivalry between nations that stops short of full-scale war, especially the situation which existed between the United States and Soviet Union following end of World War II and lasted till around 1990.

Deterrence: Measures taken by a state or an alliance of states to prevent hostile action by another state.

Polarity: The distribution of power in the international system. The existence of two super powers defines the world power structure as bi-polar and in single super power situation the world is defined as uni-polar.

National Interests: That which a state values and considers important for its survival whether economic, political, economic, military or cultural.

National Security: The ability of the state to defend its values from internal or external aggression and includes non-military actions to ensure the state's capacity to survive as a political entity in order to exert influence and carry out its internal and international objectives.

Security: The absence of threat to a human as the referent object.

State-centric security: A realist perspective that views security in its traditional context where the state is the referent object of security and is the most central item of focus in security policy formulation and implementation.

National Security Policy: A framework that outlines the strategy for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve national security.

Threat: That which has the ability or capacity to deny a state or an individual to attain its objectives and undermine its sovereignty or his dignity and poses in such a manner that it is likely to do so.

1.11 Organization of the study

This study is organized in five chapters. Chapter 1 contain introduction, statement of the problem, research objectives, justification of the study, definition of concepts, methodology, and review of literature which aided understanding of factors that influence security policies in other countries of the world. Chapter two has an outline on the background of the issues that affect Kenya's national security. It provides the historical context that aids in the appreciation and understanding of the various dynamics that have influenced Kenya's security since independence. Chapter three examines the domestic factors that have influenced Kenya's security and how the country has dealt with them and an analysis of the outcomes. Chapter four examines external factors that influenced Kenya's security since independence and how they were dealt with and with what results. Chapter five contains summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND TO KENYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

2.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines key features of Kenya's security system, the issues, actors, interests and the institutions that form the security architecture. It examines the main issues that have influenced Kenya's security over the various periods of Kenya history from colonial era, through to independence and post-independence period to the present day. It explains the sources of these issues and how they have influenced Kenya's security. It provides a broad security survey or what might be referred to as an overview of the history of Kenya's security situation.

2.2 Pre-Colonial and Colonial Period

Britain's colonization of Kenya was a gradual and incremental process that started in the later part of the nineteenth century. The desire for commercial penetration of the region led to increased immigration of merchants and British settlers into Kenya. Following the partitioning of Africa in the Berlin conference of 1884, Kenya was "allocated" to the British and gradually became part of East African protectorate in 1895. Kenya was maintained as part of that Protectorate (a British sphere of influence), until 1920 when it officially became a British colony.

This part of the study examines and explains the issues in the colonial period that became factors that influenced and continue to influence security in Kenya in the post-independence period. The two main themes explored are in relation to tensions arising from geopolitics of the Nile and features of colonization which influenced security. There are many reasons which

scholars have fronted to explain colonization. However, of interest in this study is the strategic consideration linked to Britain's interest to safeguard the Nile, in order to enhance commerce and trade. This consideration created geopolitical tension which continued to influence national security policy of Kenya well after independence.

The idea the British had was to acquire Mombasa as a sea port and create linkage with the interior of Kenya up to Lake Victoria, the source of the Nile, hence control the Nile from its source, which is the lifeline of Egypt. Once the control of Egypt was established, specific interest lay on the control of the Suez Canal. The control of Suez Canal would grant the British the means to control trade in the Middle East with Europe as well as the control of trade routes through the canal to the Indian Ocean. Thus, Kenya was partly colonized because of this strategic consideration.

In examining this strategic consideration, Kenya is seen to have become effectively part of the states' whose policy considerations in the utility of the Lake Victoria waters would become tied to the interests of the Nile's riparian states particularly Egypt from then henceforth. The consideration later led to the Nile Agreement of 1929 between Egypt and the British government. This agreement created two fundamental security concerns. First, the agreement gave Egypt monopolistic access to the Nile with little obligation to other riparian states which is considered a situation of potential conflict. Following independence, Kenya, accepted with stipulations of all bilateral treaties, which were signed by UK on her behalf and did not specifically challenge the devolution of the Nile Agreement.⁷⁸

However, the resentment of Egypt's monopolistic use of the Nile has led to more recently demands by other riparian states for a re-negotiation and a revision of the Nile Agreement.

⁷⁸ Joseph Kieya, *The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement: Legal and Economic Analysis*, October 2007. Retrieved from <http://works.bepress.com> 8 November 2013.

According to Kieya, (as at 2007) it is expected that the population in the Nile basin is expected to double in the next 25 years, further constraining water scarcity and other resources.⁷⁹ The basin's recurrent droughts and desertification occasioned by the global climate change have strained the availability of the water creating a scarcity which increases possibilities of a conflict between upper and lower riparian countries. Kenya's Mau Forests that is water shed for the rivers that feed into Lake Victoria has increasingly been threatened with deforestation thus reducing water that feed Lake Victoria. The conservation of Mau forest itself in Kenya has generated political tensions with regard to demand for the relocation of inhabitants of the forest. The volatility of the conservation process remains a security issue in itself. The second issue is regarding the Nile agreement is its contested legality in the post-independent states. For as long as the other riparian states consider the Nile agreement unfair, the issue will remain a potential security concern to all riparian states.

2.2.1 Features of Colonialism

This section examines the features of colonialism which impact Kenya's security system. The main features of colonization that influenced security as examined in this study are: land alienation, stereo-typing and ethnic polarization, authoritative administrative structure and skewed economic development. The argument presented is that these features were a creation of the colonial government to serve their interest but were carried over after independence into the new state and served the interests of the ruling elite.

Before the arrival of the colonialists land was an important factor for all communities in Kenya. Although the population was relatively low and land expansive, the population was

⁷⁹ Joseph Kieya, *The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement: Legal and Economic Analysis*, October 2007. Retrieved from <http://works.bepress.com> 8 November 2013.

raising in most areas especially in the Central Highlands, the Rift Valley and Western Kenya and therefore land was gradually changing from communal to private or controlled within the family units. Most communities had little commercial activities and depended mostly on land for their livelihoods either as pastoralists or as farmers.

According to Ndege, communities such as the Agikuyu and the Miji Kenda developed agricultural economies. Others, including the Maasai and the Samburu practiced pastoralist forms of production. The majority such as the Luo and the Abagusii adapted themselves to a mixture of crop cultivation and livestock keeping. Besides, there were other communities like the Ogiek who thrived on hunting and gathering.⁸⁰ Production was primarily for collective subsistence rather than individual accumulation. The kinship system was the basis of ownership of factors of production which included land, livestock and labor.⁸¹

Therefore, when the colonialists arrived and started displacing these communities from their lands, their system of sustenance was disrupted and the communities' means of livelihood were threatened. Kimani Njogu, explains this process that, the British imperial ambitions engendered a process of violent enclosures beginning in the 1890s in which large swathes of fertile land covering 8 million acres were carved out from the native land.⁸² The process involved alienating African land for European settlers and for the colonial administration as well. The process saw many communities mainly in Central Kenya and the Rift Valley like the Kikuyu, Masaai, and Nandi among others lose their land.

Tom Parkinson captures this process in his *History of Kenya*, and states that, with the completion of the railway line, the headquarters of the colonial administration was moved from

⁸⁰ Peter O Ndege, *Colonialism and its Legacies in Kenya*, Lecture delivered during Fulbright – Hays Group project abroad program: July 5th to August 6th 2009 at the Moi University Main Campus.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Kimani Njogu, ed., *Ethnic Diversity in Eastern Africa: Opportunities and Challenges*, (Nairobi: Africans Books Collective, 2010), p. 202.

Mombasa to the cooler highlands of Nairobi and the white settler began to occupy the fertile highlands north of Nairobi. In the process their interest clashed with those of the Maasai prompting the colonial authorities to pressure Olonana into restricting the Maasai to two reserves, one on either side of the new railway line.

He further states that soon after, the white settlers wanted the northern reserves as well and in 1910 and 1911 the Maasai who lived there were forced to trek further south despite Olonana's objections and the alienation continued northerly into the Kikuyu lands as well. He further explains that, although the Maasai suffered the worst land annexation, the Kikuyu around Mount Kenya and the Aberdares equally lost a lot of land and came to nurse particular grievance about their alienation from the land.⁸³

The issue of land became the rallying point for colonial resistance. The displacement caused the Kikuyu's who were already becoming land scarce to move further in to the Rift Valley. This displacement is also confirmed by Sheldon Gellar that in Kenya, the white settlers expropriated the best farmlands from the Kikuyu.⁸⁴ In Rift Valley, mainly populated by the Kalenjin and the Maasai, who had also been displaced by the settlers, the incursion by the Kikuyu not only displaced them more but also created enmity that would become volatile in the post independence period when it got embedded with politics resulting in ethnic clashes. This is elaborated further later in the study.

The second aspect of colonial features was the stress on ethnic distinction. It was a colonial policy meant to divide and rule the Africans. The colonial administrative districts were created with distinct ethnic identities or tribes. As a result, ethnicity and tribal identity became

⁸³ Tom Parkinson et. al., *Kenya*, (London: Lonely Planets, 2006), p. 28.

⁸⁴ Sheldon Gellar, *The Colonial Era*, in *Africa 2nd ed.* Phyllis Martin and Patrick O'meara ed., (Nairobi: Macmillan Publisher Ltd, 1987), p. 134.

essential attributes of the colonial experience⁸⁵. Maxon argues that, developed and solidified in the initial years of colonial rule, ethnicity would form the basic framework for African political activity for decades to come as the colonial states continued to practice a policy of divide and rule through the maintenance of a system of local administration based on ethnically distinct locations and districts. Such ethnic identity was based on the differentiation on the basis of language. This linguistic division provided a readymade dug lines of cleavage along which other conflicts would be politicized as it became more important to the ordinary people that lever of social action should be in “friendly hands”.⁸⁶

Tribalism and ethnicity therefore got embedded in the administrative system and equally into the politics right at the beginning of the colonial rule and would influence Kenya’s politics many years after independence. The tribes were socialized to think and remain distinctly as separate tribes isolated from each other and hence inter-tribal relations grew progressively with suspicion.

The system identified “reserves” where the various tribes occupied and were generally restricted in these parts with requirements of a *Kipande* – the colonial identity cards in which the tribe of the holder was inscribed. This ethnic consciousness encouraged divisions among the various tribes of Kenya in three ways. First, the consciousness of tribes created inter-tribal enmity which was encouraged by the administration and this later came to play out in politics of ethnic rivalry and enmity in post independence Kenya.

Secondly, the colonialists formed stereotypes about Africans in general then about certain tribes or ethnic groups. The mentality of the colonialist about Africans and general stereotyping

⁸⁵ Robert M. Maxon, The Colonial Roots, in *Politics and Administration in East Africa*, ed., Walter Oyugi, (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1994), p. 34.

⁸⁶ Rober M. Maxon Social and Cultural Changes, in *Decolonization and Independence in Kenya 1940-93*, B. A. Ogot and W. R. Ochieng eds., (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1996), p. 121.

is captured in the writing of Eliot who claimed that, “The African is greedy and covetous... he is too indolent in his ways, and too disconnected in his ideas, to make any attempt to better himself, or to undertake any labor which does not produce speedy visible results.”⁸⁷ This gives an indication of how the white man stereotyped and viewed Africans in general.

Lord Lugard’s book, *The Dual Mandate for British Tropical Africa*, which according to Maloba was a must read for any colonial administrator, for example, described the Bantu as “a happy, thriftless, excitable person, lacking in self control, discipline and foresight, and who although courageous, had his thoughts concentrated on the events and feelings of the moment and suffers little apprehension for the future or grief for the past”.⁸⁸

This aspect of stereotyping determined several things. It determined access to government jobs, economic opportunities or military service. Those who were hired as farm hands, house servants and guards were determined on the basis of their ethnicity (from oral accounts of a former servant). Some tribes were considered more loyal and hence got these jobs while those who were considered less loyal found it difficult to secure these jobs.

Thirdly, economic development favored certain regions and therefore at independence some areas were more developed than others. The road network and general infrastructure were developed mainly in areas where the white settlements were, while other areas were largely neglected. These developments gave advantage to the tribes that lived in these areas as it gave them better chances for economic and social advancement. The net effect made Kenya to be a state with forty two tribes sharply divided along tribal lines to the extent that inter-tribal enmity exceeded inter-tribal cooperation. This conflictual relation would become a security challenge, as soon as after independence, inter-tribal enmity undermined national security, cohesion and

⁸⁷ Sir Charles Eliot, *East Africa Protectorate*, (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966), p. 92.

⁸⁸ Wunyambari Maloba, Decolonization: A Theoretical Perspective, in *Decolonization and Independence in Kenya 1940-93* B. A. Ogot and W. R. Ochieng eds., (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1996), p. 11.

therefore slowed the general economic and developmental agenda as will be explained further in the next chapter.

The next colonial feature is the structure and functioning of the administrative system and its relation to the future security systems. The colonial state was administered as an extension of the colonizing state. It was the intent and motives of colonization that informed the structure of the administration. According to Shaldon Gellar, the colonial state was not meant to lay a foundation for the development of a modern African nation state. It had more modest goals: to maintain law and order, to foster obedience and loyalty to the colonial authorities and to defend and promote the political and economic interest of the colonizing state.⁸⁹

Maloba summarizes the practice of colonial administration as follows; “politically, colonialism was a dictatorship. It was imposed by violence and maintained by violence. Ruling with utter indifference to the opinion of the governed – the Africans – colonialism perfected a reign of terror by silencing its opponents through detentions, exile or even outright extermination.”⁹⁰ This aided the colonial government in maintenance of power and it may be argued that in a way it influenced the pro-independence nationalists who were fighting for independence on the methods of maintaining state power.

It is generally accepted that Kenya did not change much ideologically after independence, nor did it make any structural break from the colonial state and that all that changed was the color of the leaders and an expansion of the same state system with new faces. Therefore, the new state borrowed substantially from the features of the colonial state. That is why after independence, the intolerance and atrocities of the colonial regime were carried

⁸⁹ Sheldon Gellar, *The Colonial Era*, in *Africa 2nd ed.* Phyllis Martin and Patrick O’meara ed., (Nairobi: Macmillan Publisher Ltd, 1987), p. 130.

⁹⁰ Wunyabari Maloba, *Decolonization: A Theoretical Perspective*, in *Decolonization and Independence in Kenya 1940-93* B. A. Ogot and W. R. Ochieng eds., (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1996), p. 9.

forward to the new regime and became common features of the political system. Therefore this structure put the rulers and the ruled on the opposite sides and they viewed each other as enemies, reducing trust among them and further undermining national cohesion and security. The specific acts of intolerance and how they undermined national security are discussed in detail in the next chapter.

2.2.2 Transition Challenges and Security

The period before independence was characterized by internal conflict pitting the Mau Mau fighters against the colonial administration's forces. The Mau Mau rebellion had started earlier but reached its peak sometimes in 1952 necessitating the declaration of a state of emergency. When the state of emergency came into force, the high-intensity of government repression and low intensity guerrilla activities continued for the next three years. Although this rebellion did not lead to immediate political independence for Kenya, it did set the independence wheels in motion.⁹¹ With the mounting losses and the rising costs of the suppressing the rebellion, the colonial government gave in and slowly set in motion the negotiations for independence.

However, it is to be noted that the political class who were engaged in the negotiations for independence did not identify directly with the Mau Mau fighters. Mau Mau was neither the fighting arm of any of the main political parties in the period preceding independence nor did it have representation in the independence negotiations. This situation was bound to become sensitive and delicate and could compromise stability of the nation after independence depending on how the fighters were treated or integrated into the society. The question would be; how were

⁹¹ Edmond Keller, *Decolonization, Independence, and Beyond, in Africa*, Phyllis Martin and Patrick O'meara eds., (Nairobi: Macmillan Publisher Ltd, 1987), p. 147.

the Mau Mau leaders and fighters going to be integrated in the new government? This is the question that remained unanswered and the eventual dispersion and the fading away of Mau Mau leaders soon after independence would haunt the country for many years in the post-independence period. Their recognition only came more than 40 years later when the government erected a statue in the capital city (Nairobi) in honor of Dedan Kimathi – the Mau Mau leader. Others like his deputy Bai Mungi faded away without recognition.

Therefore, it may be argued that the neglect of the Mau Mau fighters created to some extent, resentment, distrust of the regime by some sections of communities from where the fighters originated. It was a latent resentment that remained so for many years and was always a potential security problem. But the narratives of the militancy of the Mau Mau, their heroic exploits in their war against the colonialist, as told by the ex-fighters to their children and grandchildren created a militant culture that remained potent in the areas that Mau Mau predominated for many years.

The culture of violent resistance to authorities to achieve an aim became embedded in the psyche of the people especially the young as they grew up. The socialization through oral literature facilitated this process. The expression of this militant culture became evident in riots that occurred during Kenya's "second liberation struggle" in the early 1990s and was also evident in the rise of criminal groups such as *Mungiki* (outlawed criminal group mainly found in central Kenya associated with oaths taking and killings as its *modus-operandi*) around the same period who sought to use violence to express their demands. Their long dreadlock hairstyle, as was kept by the Mau Mau fighter confirmed the parallel with the Mau Mau that they wanted to express. Their existence in later days although low keyed remained a potential internal security threat.

As the country moved closer to independence political rivalry along ethnic lines were already creating a potentially volatile atmosphere. Jomo Kenyatta though was with Tom Mboya is KANU party and both in the government in 1962, held a latent distrust of this young Luo lieutenant. Mboya was active in government and prominent in public eye as a minister for labour while Kenyatta held a low-key role as a minister for state for economic planning. David Goldsworthy observes that this latent rivalry came to the public domain in August 1962 when Kenyatta set out deliberately to undercut Mboya. On 12th, August 1962, when Mboya was overseas on one of his ministerial fundraising missions, some KANU officials set up a public rally at Nairobi, where before a crowd of about 50,000 people, Kenyatta reviled politicians who accepted imperialists money as “insects”, creating a violent class before Nairobi youth wingers (mainly Luo-led) and up-country Kikuyu youth wingers.⁹²

These were the seeds of ethnic animosity that would become part of a security challenge in later inter-ethnic tensions. What was the term “insect” supposed to mean? And more so in Africa where insects are associated with nuisance, could it not be interpreted that such nuisance should be gotten rid of? Was it not in Rwanda in 1994 that Hutus referred to Tutsis as cockroaches in run up to the historic genocide where cockroaches were to be eliminated? The point here is that ethnic rivalry was being driven deeper and it cultivated ethnic distrust and further polarization, setting stage for future ethnic violence.

2.3 Security Issues in post-Independence Kenya

The Constitution of Kenya 2010 outlines the principles of national security in section 238 (1) mainly as the protection against internal and external threats to Kenya’s territorial integrity

⁹² David Goldsworthy, *Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget*, (Nairobi: East African Educational Publisher, 1982), pp. 208-209.

and sovereignty, its people, their rights, freedoms, property, peace, stability and prosperity, and other national interests. Although this text presents the provisions of the current constitution, the content outlines the principles that have guided the country's security framework since independence. This section of the study traces the major threats to Kenya's national security from independence during the various regimes to the present day. It will focus on issues and events which impacted Kenya's security and how they have been carried along to the present day. It will examine security events that occurred and how they were dealt with and with what results.

When Kenya gained independence, the celebrations did not last long and the experience of the new African state was a face to face reality of the challenges of nation-building. Katete Orwa states that until then, Britain had assumed responsibility for the security of the colony. However, when the Union Jack was lowered at midnight of 12 December 1963, the new leaders under Jomo Kenyatta had to identify national interests, formulate an appropriate foreign policy and establish machinery for managing its relations with other states.⁹³ Several challenges faced the young nation of Kenya. This part of the study focuses on the ethnic rivalries that characterized the immediate post-independence period and its security implications.

Initially, the main issues that confronted the government were issues that revolved around building national cohesion between the forty two or so tribes of Kenya, calming political rivalry, dealing with poverty, disease, labor unrest, disquiet that cropped up in the military, while focusing on economic development. Externally, the potential threats were diverse. First, Kenya had to identify its national interests and develop mechanisms of protecting these interests from external threats. It was known to the leaders then that national security was essential in

⁹³ Katete Orwa "Diplomacy and International Relations" in *Themes in Kenyan History*, William R. Ochieng ed., (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1990), p. 222.

participation in international relations and that without security there would be no independence or sovereignty. Therefore, the protection of the sovereignty of the state, that is, achieving security of the state became the foremost priority.

The policies that were to be formulated were to be guided by (according to Katete Orwa), the basic principles of good neighborliness, pan-Africanism and non-alignment.⁹⁴ Good neighborliness policies were to focus on attaining and maintaining regional peace and stability. Pan-Africanism policies were to focus on supporting decolonization and attaining continental unity while non-alignment policy was to oppose the polarization of the world between the two superpowers. These policies were underpinned in the words of President Kenyatta shortly after independence when he said that: “We will covet no inch of our neighbor’s territory. We will yield no inch of ours. We stand loyal to OAU and its solemn decision that all African states shall adhere to the boundaries inherited at independence.”⁹⁵

Therefore, it can be argued that as early as right after independence, Kenya shunned territorial expansionist’s ambitions and sought peace and harmony with its neighbors. Kenya’s policy favored respect for territorial integrity of other states, peaceful resolution of disputes and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

2.3.1 Ethnicity and Security

Kenya’s politics and by extension socio-economic dynamics cannot often be explained without appreciating the influence of ethnicity. Ethnicity in Kenya is a key determinant of internal political relations therefore to understand the dynamics that influenced Kenya’s national security policy after independence, it is important to provide a background of Kenya’s

⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 224.

⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 225.

demography and later will show how ethnicity created political relations that affected national policies including security.




Figure 1 Kenya’s Demographic distribution in percentages.

The majority ethnic group in Kenya is the Kikuyu followed by the Luos, Luhyas, Kalenjins, Kambas and others as shown on figure 1. Although these figures are often disputed depending on the source, the idea in this study is to show that competition among the dominant ethnic groups often play in undermining national cohesion and hence affects most aspects of Kenya’s development and policy choices.

In analyzing the security situation in the first decade after independence, the most evident threat to national security emanated from ethnic political rivalry. At independence, two main political parties dominated the scene, Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). Although the two parties differed in ideology, that was not the main distinguishing factor. The main distinction was on the ethnicity. KANU was dominated by the Luos and Kikuyus while KADU was dominated by other tribes, essentially formed to

safeguard the interests of the country's minority communities from the possible oppression by the dominant tribes.

Secondly, the ideological difference created division on the type of government and power structure that the new government would take. KADU preferred regionalism while KANU preferred central government. When the independence constitution was negotiated KANU conceded and agreed to a regional type of government since the constitution provided for a procedure for constitutional amendment if that was so desired. In essence as the country was heading towards independence it was already divided along what on the surface appeared ideological but was in reality ethnic division.

The ethnic factor became the basis for support mobilization for the parties and this would further heighten rivalry in the years that followed. Even though shortly after independence, there was a renewed sense of national unity when KADU which had formed the opposition crossed the floor to join the government, this sense of unity did not last long. The ethnic rivalry continued well after independence. Kenyatta and Odinga soon parted company in an acrimonious manner that led to the detention of Odinga further fueling ethnic rivalry between the Luo and the Kikuyu. Odinga's close allies like Pio Gama Pinto was assassinated, Bildad Kaggia and Achieng Oneko among others were equally detained.

The country became ethnically polarized. Children got socialized into these ethnic differences, new ethnic stereotypes were reinforced and these would later influence inter-ethnic relations in the country many years after. Behind the scenes, it is to be noted that this rivalry and the eventual parting of company between Odinga and Kenyatta was fuelled and encouraged by the Americans, for it is on record that in 1967 when Odinga had been humiliated out of KANU to form Kenya People's Union (KPU), Attwood published his book and admitted that US was

behind what had happened.⁹⁶ This is to be explained as an extension of Cold War politics, as Odinga promoted socialist ideals supported by the Soviet Union while Kenyatta was aligned to capitalist ideals supported by the United States.

Tom Mboya (a Luo) who remained with Kenyatta in KANU had been considered leading figure in Kenya's politics and because of his successes many politicians regarded him with much fear and jealousy. Towards the end of the 1960s his enemies within the party, particularly Mbiyu Koinange, Charles Njonjo and Njoroge Mungai were worried about him as he was visibly a clear successor of Kenyatta.⁹⁷ Kenyatta himself became worried of Mboya and William Attwood the American ambassador to Kenya then noted that Kenyatta had expressed his concern over America's financial support for Mboya saying "I want to see to it that the flow of these funds is stopped."⁹⁸ Mboya was shortly thereafter assassinated and ethnic enmity between the Luo and the Kikuyu reached its peak. Riots rocked many parts of the country and politicians retreated to their ethnic cocoons for support.

In the second decade of Kenya after independence, analysts reported that with the taming of Odinga and the death of Mboya, the Cold War politics appear to wane in the 1970s.⁹⁹ Internally, the ethnic polarization remained largely latent. There was no effort or strategy by the government to address ethnicity as a national security problem. In the 1970s with ethnicity still a threat to national security, succession politics dominated internal affairs. The sudden death of Kenyatta in 1978 forestalled ethnic tensions and possible ethnic violence as the unexpected smooth transition of power caught a group that had vowed to retain power among the Kikuyu by

⁹⁶ Daily Nation, *Diplomatic Collisions that Shaped Foreign Policy*, Nairobi: 25 November, 2013.

⁹⁷ William Ochieng, "Structural and Political Changes" in *Decolonization and Independence in Kenya 1940-1993*, B. A. Ogot and W. R. Ochieng eds., (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1995), p. 101.

⁹⁸ Henry Repel, "The Extent and Nature of Population Movement into Towns" in R. A. Obudho (ed.), *Urbanization and Development Planning in Kenya* (Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1981), p. 86.

⁹⁹ Daily Nation, *Diplomatic Collisions that Shaped Foreign Policy*, Nairobi: Nation Media Group, 25 November, 2013.

surprise (aborted *Ngoroko* plans and change the constitution movement groups). The change the constitution movement group were politicians mainly from Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association (GEMA) who sought to amend the constitution to prevent the vice president from automatically taking over power in the event of the death of the president. As it gradually became evident that Moi was likely to succeed Kenyatta, his political foes became desperate and organized an armed gang (*Ngorokos*) of would-be assassins in Nakuru who were to prevent such an eventuality.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, when Kenyatta died and Moi was sworn and their plan was seen to have failed. The potential security threat of clashes for control of state was averted by chance.

2.3.2 Background to the Conflict in Somalia

The second issue that threatened Kenya's security in the first decade of independence was on the question of Somalia irredentism. At its independence in 1960, Somalia was a union of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. The entire area was predominantly occupied almost 100 percent by ethnic Somalis who were also predominately Muslims. But besides that area, more than one million ethnic Somalis lived outside this territory. Some lived in Kenya's North Eastern province, others in Ogaden Ethiopia while others in French Somaliland (later Djibouti). While other African countries struggled with uniting the various ethnic groups, languages and religions in the new independent states, Somalia got absorbed into a quest of uniting the Somali people into one "Greater Somalia" hence the origin of Somali irredentism. The new Somalia government took up the issue with Kenya's colonial administration and during independence negotiations at the Lancaster Conference in 1962 they put a request for a plebiscite in the

¹⁰⁰ B. A. Ogot, "The Politics of Populism: The Making of President – the Succession Story" in *Decolonization and Independence in Kenya, 1943-93*. Ogot B. A. and Ochieng W. R. eds., (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1996), p. 189.

Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya which was denied. The expression of intent of uniting the Somalis defined the independent Somali's foreign policy and its desired end state. The question that remained was never what but rather when and by what means was the unification of Somalis would be achieved. The denial of NFD at the Lancaster Conference closed the diplomatic channel and that meant that the Somalis could choose other options. If they chose the use of force, then Kenya's territorial integrity and its security was threatened.

The other aspect that made the question of Somali irredentism a threat to Kenya was the influence of superpowers. As mentioned earlier in this study, as the superpowers sought allies in the newly independent African states, they covertly also sought to destabilize those who did not support them. Somalia's inclination to the Eastern block and its alignment with the Soviet Union, who openly provided it with military assistance, would only have encouraged the Soviet Union to see Kenya destabilized. Even though there is no evidence to suggest that they encouraged Somalis irredentism, it is safe to conclude that their support that enlarged Somali's army in the first few years after independence provided the confidence with which Somalia may have been able to consider a military option to achieve a greater Somalia. When Somalia later in the 1970s switched its alignment to the United States of America and Ethiopia to the Soviet Union, Kenya resisted the United States' pressure to downgrade its relations with Ethiopia and upgrade the same with Somalia as Somalia's territorial claim over Ethiopia's Ogaden and Kenya's NFD still remained as existential threat to Kenya's national security.

Through the years that followed, the issue of Somalia as a threat to Kenya's national security remained latent. Following the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1992, internal fighting continued for more than fifteen years, largely confined within Somalia. However, with time the influx of refugees from the war torn state, constant incursions by bandits and kidnappers became

a security challenge to Kenya. When the multinational force that had been deployed in Somalia failed to make an impact and the incursions of Somalia militia into Kenya, hijacking and killing tourists, capturing government officials, continued, Kenya's sovereignty was challenged. It made Kenya appear insecure and it began to affect tourism especially along the coast.

Meanwhile, piracy had become a menace in the Indian Ocean, raising the cost of maritime shipment and made the Gulf of Aden an insecure sea route for maritime trade. In response, on 14 October 2011, Kenya moved its forces into Somalia in pursuit of the militants. An act of self defence as provided for in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This incursion into Somalia created other internal security problems for Kenya. The Al Shabaab militia who ruled most of Somalia and were the target of the incursion developed new tactics. Despite Kenya's military gains and dominance in Somalia, the militia reacted by sponsoring terrorism, more kidnapping and hijacking inside Kenya. The war is still on-going the insecurity created by the possibility of terrorist attacks inside Kenya present the single most threatening security challenge that the country faces. The strategy of dealing with Al Shabaab is a current subject at the National Security Council and can only be speculated on the basis of occasional security actions or statement made in open forum.

2.3.3 Economy and Security

The third aspect that would be considered to impact security was on general dependence and more so economic dependency on the colonial masters. At independence, even though the country became sovereign, it soon found itself tied to the former colonial master in many ways. Its structures of government, economic base, unifying language were still colonial. This created a

relationship of dependency. The colonial economy was meant to support colonial interests. The very aim of colonization was the exploitation of raw materials for the industries in Europe.

Therefore, although Kenya had attained political independence, it was in no way economically independent. Its economy still depended on raw materials it would be exporting, light industries which were foreign owned and inflow of foreign capital from the colonial master as investment, giving the colonial master control over the former colony. This aspect of external control became known as neo-colonialism. It meant the survival of the colonial system despite formal recognition of independence. It was characterized by indirect and subtle form of political, economic, social, military or technical domination. The infrastructure was still largely underdeveloped and the country lacked the technical skills to effect economic independence.

Even though the country was economically growing at annual average of 6.6% from 1963 to 1973,¹⁰¹ it remained dependent on the colonial master.




Figure 2 Kenya's GDP Growth Rate Trends 1965-2003 (Adopted From: "Delivering on Vision 2030" by Wahome Gakuru, March 2007)

¹⁰¹ <http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/kenya/economy> 12 November 2013

The overall decline in GDP growth rate meant the economy continued to decline, less jobs were created over time as population grew. This resulted in socio-economic challenges which impacted various aspects of the states development including security. The rise in unemployment especially aggravated poverty and hence raised crimes especially in the urban areas.

Fourthly, and related to economy is the question of land as a resource for production. The quest for independence was based on land alienation and with rising population, the issue of land tenure would soon become a problem. The land ownership in the pre-colonial era was based on communal and group based ownership where expansion in population was catered for through re-arrangements in communities. During the colonial era the settlers created individual primary control and access to land, modeled on the English way of land holding, which became the genesis of landlessness.

This policy of private ownership of land, a capitalized tenet, was carried over after independence and customary communal land was progressively converted into individual tenure. As the policy was implemented more people became landless. According to Kibwana, the major dilemma arising from individualization of land tenure is that it necessarily renders large sections of the community landless.¹⁰² Landlessness aggravates poverty and creates resentment which in turn becomes a security threat. The most affected region with policy was later found to be Kenya's coastal strip. The 1978 *Report of Select Committee on the issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya* pointed out that individualization of land tenure in the former native reserves had led to rural landlessness which in turn aggravated urban landlessness. This issue later created a separatist group 40 years later, in 2000s, in the name of Mombasa

¹⁰² K. Kibwana "Land Tenure" in *Themes in Kenyan History*, William R. Ochieng ed., (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1990), p. 238.

Republican Council (MRC) that sought to undermine national territorial integrity on the basis of this historical policy.

2.3.4 Background to External Influences on Kenya's National Security

In the second decade of independence, internally the country's security situation remained vulnerable and could have been exploited by external agents to undermine national security. The illusion of independence benefits was creeping in even as the Africanization of the state seemed complete. Indigenous Kenyans were now in charge of all security agencies and most of key positions in the government were held by indigenous Kenyans. It appeared to many people that fruit of independence was evidently elusive as rate of unemployment rose and poverty was still evident. Disease control and illiteracy also still dominant in the national agenda. Even though the government was more or less wholly in the hands of Africans these issues still remained unaddressed and the population became susceptible to external manipulation in various forms.

Externally, the Somalia issue remained unsolved. The Soviet Union continued to openly support Somalia while the United States were keen on supporting Ethiopia. However, when Somalia went to war with Ethiopia over Ogaden in 1977, this only confirmed that its claim on Kenya's NFD remained a potential threat to national security. This was confirmed by the Somali Ambassador to Kenya Hussein Haji Dualeh, who defected and said that "I have always tried to convince Siad Barre that Kenya and Somalia can co-exist..., I believe that Barre's ego is such that after the Ogaden, he will certainly wage another war against Kenya."¹⁰³ Kenya reaction was to maintain a security zone in the North Eastern Province that was initiated during the campaign

¹⁰³ Daily Nation, *Diplomatic Collisions that Shaped Foreign Policy*, Nairobi: Nation media Group, 25 November, 2013.

against the Shifta insurgents in 1960s, deployed the military to keep a presence there for deterrence and assist in maintenance of law and order.

A second issue that caused external security concern was the rise of Idi Amin in Uganda as the head of state. Kenya's support for Israeli's in the 1976 Entebbe raid enraged Amin. Tension increased between Kenya and Uganda in the same year when President Amin claimed large chunk of Kenyan land.¹⁰⁴ Uganda posed a security challenge to Kenya and an inter-state war was imminent. Kenya's security agencies were put on high alert as Amin remained unpredictable. This was confirmed when President Kenyatta addressing a rally at Uhuru Park said in relation to Uganda's threat that "We Kenyans shall defend our country with all our blood and shall teach a lesson never to be forgotten to anyone who tries to play with our country and government."¹⁰⁵ Tension between the two countries remained high throughout that decade. Even though Uganda did not fight with Kenya, the actions of Amin made Kenya believe that war with Uganda remained a possibility. In reaction, the Air Force was enhanced with more modern F5 jet fighters and the Kenya Army was increased in numerical strength.

In addition, during the 1970s a predominant theme that largely influenced Kenya's foreign policy was the issue of regional integration. Whether it was by design or coincidence the quest for enhanced integration was an excellent strategy for attaining regional collective security. By maintaining close cooperation with other East African countries, an alliance would be created that would deter any external threat from outside the membership block.

The East African unity was natured in this period but unfortunately it eventually collapsed in 1977 influencing Kenya's policies in many ways. The East African Community

¹⁰⁴ Godfrey Okoth "Foreign Policy of Uganda since Independence toward Kenya a and Tanzania in *Politics and Administration in East Africa*, Walter Oyugi ed.,(Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1994), p. 370.

¹⁰⁵ Daily Nation, *Diplomatic Collisions that Shaped Foreign Policy*, Nairobi: Nation Media Group, 25 November, 2013.

first came to being after a treaty that was signed in 1967 between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The treaty was meant to create closer ties between the East African countries, to foster economic development and share in the benefits of the union. Whereas scholars have eluded several factors to have contributed to the disintegration of the union, the concern of this study is the security implication of the disintegration.

Whereas when the union existed closer ties removed the elements of suspicion and facilitated better security relations between the countries, the break up meant rise in tensions and possibility of war. As it were, soon after the union collapsed, Kenya-Tanzania border was closed, Tanzania and Uganda got engaged in cross border clashes resulting in a full scale war in 1978-79. As the union died, an atmosphere of hostility emerged and each state viewed its neighbor as a potential enemy. The ideological differences of the states and the divergent policies pursued by each state further distanced them from each other, straining the relations even more in the early part of 1980s. Between Kenya and Uganda, although there was no armed conflict, there were heightened mad-slinging, name-calling, confrontation of politics.¹⁰⁶ The situation remained relatively tense between the three East African states up to when the revival of the union commenced in the mid 1990s.

The issue of South Sudan became prominent in the regional agenda in this period. Kenyan led peace talks ended in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between South Sudan represented by the South Sudan Peoples Movement (SPLM) leaders and the Khartoum government in 2005. It provided for the autonomy of South Sudan and provided for a referendum that was held and eventually led to the independence of South Sudan in 2011.

¹⁰⁶ Godfrey Okoth “Foreign Policy of Uganda since Independence toward Kenya and Tanzania in *Politics and Administration in East Africa*, ed., Walter Oyugi,(Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1994) pg 373

However, when South Sudan gained independence in 2011, the question of the disputed border with Kenya at the Eleme triangle was brought to the limelight almost immediately. Even though it was brought up in the correct diplomatic manner to follow the peaceful process of resolving disputes, it cannot escape any strategic planner the wisdom of Clausewitz assertion that “war is an extension of politics by other means” and hence view it as a potential security threat.

However, besides the question of Eleme triangle the tribes of South Sudan and the emergence of ethnic divisions in the politics of South Sudan was also a potential security challenge. Ethnic divisions in African politics have the potential of leading to civil war. In a newspaper report on this matter one analyst put it as follows:

South Sudan has a complex ethnic makeup because it shares tribes with several countries. There are Nuer, Anyuak, Suri, Kachipo in Ethiopia and South Sudan. There are Turkana in Kenya and South Sudan. There are Langi, Acholi, Madi, Kakwa and Lugbwara in Uganda and South Sudan. There are Kakwa, Logo, Kaliko, Avokaya, Mundu, Pojulu, Zande in Congo and South Sudan. There are Zande and Bongo in Central African Republic and South Sudan. These tribes are separated by colonial borders created by the consequence of the Berlin Conference of 1884/5. There is a strong bond between the people separated by these colonial borders – prior to the separation they were under the same tribal leadership. So any problem in South Sudan if viewed from an ethnic angle becomes an African problem with implication for global security. In short, what now looks like a tiny problem has the potential to become an international problem.¹⁰⁷

It is therefore in the interest of the countries neighboring South Sudan that South Sudan remains at peace and in ethnic harmony. Internal conflict in South Sudan is likely to spillover and spread to other states in the region hence endangering regional peace and security.

¹⁰⁷ <http://www.southsudannation.com/category/national/> 25 November 2013.

2.3.5 Internal Instability and Security Challenges

The theme of continuity, referred to as *nyayo* (footsteps) marked the first decade of Moi era between 1978 and 1988. Moi took over against the wishes of the ruling elite following the death of Kenyatta although the power transition was relatively peaceful. Internally, the first challenges were economical in nature. After experiencing moderately high growth rates during the 1960s and 1970s, Kenya's economic performance during the 1980s faced serious setbacks. First, the 1982 coup attempt negatively impacted investment climate and tourism.

Secondly, international recession coupled by prolonged draught lowered production and led to serious financial crisis. This manifested itself in balance of payments difficulties and budgetary shortfalls that necessitated indebtedness. This led to increased unemployment which came with its side effects such as poverty, crime and insecurity. Although peace largely prevailed after the abortive coup attempt had been dealt with and security restored, latent discontentment remained. Despondency existed in the early years of Moi era and the first signs of opposition to the political establishment became evident when some groups formed opposition parties before a constitutional amendment was effected to make Kenya a single party state. Inter-ethnic tensions remained latent. President Moi concentrated in consolidating his power and appointments to the top security agencies reflected personality bias towards his Kalenjin community. This practice inevitably created and entrenched resentment. Even though nothing significant was visible in terms of general population reaction, occasional commentaries in the media that reflected the general mood of the population showed negativity towards the government. Again, there is no evidence that the government became sensitive to the feelings of the people to do anything that would reverse the situation.

Then, the impact of the end of Cold War brought in several security challenges. Towards the end of the 1980s, the Cold War came to an abrupt end. The result was a general neglect of African states by the only remaining superpower, the United States of America. The world agenda changed from promotion of ideology to promotion of democracy. Encouraged by the events that were happening in Eastern Europe and fuelled by Non Governmental Organization (NGOs) as part of a global agenda, the pro-democratic movements emerged and led sometimes violent demonstrations which threatened internal security. For the first time since independence, the power of the masses in placing demands to the state using violence became a reality. The country seemed less prepared to deal with the revolt and soon gave in. Their aims were achieved and these demonstrations resulted in the eventual re-introduction of pluralistic politics in Kenya.

In the neighboring Somali security problem remained unresolved and with the collapse of the East African Community Kenya remained vulnerable without a neighbor to support it in case of a spillover of the Somalia conflict. The security situation in Uganda also became volatile during this period as Uganda experienced constant political instability. The over-throw of Milton Obote in 1985 by General Tito Okello reflected the continued state crisis in Uganda. Kenya played host to thousands of refugees who fled out of Uganda besides hosting peace talks between the military regime and National Resistance Movement (NRM) fighters led by Yoweri Museveni.

The fighting in Uganda was a threat to Kenya's national security in two ways. First, there was the possibility of conflict spillover into Kenya and secondly there was the security problem associated with influx of refugees. There was also the fear of the possibility of proliferation of small arms and associated crimes. Even when NRM came to power, tension did not reduce. In 1987 after a week of fighting between Kenya Police and National Resistance Army along Kenya-

Uganda border, Kenya expelled Uganda High Commissioner, Charles Katungi and his deputy.¹⁰⁸ Kenya had accused Uganda and Libya of undermining its sovereignty when open media reports indicated that Uganda and Libya were training dissidents to destabilize the government of Kenya.

2.3.6 Post Cold War Security Challenges

In the third decade after independence after the end of the Cold War, there were significant developments in the international system that created new security challenges. The Cold War politics virtually came to an end all at once and states all over the world had to reassess their strategies in the new world order. Kenya's security situation was equally impacted by this event. The impact touched on economic, social and political spheres and it all influenced security. The effect appears to have generated more internal consciousness in all socio-political areas.

Internally, from 1991 to 1993, Kenya had its worst economic performance since independence. Growth in GDP stagnated, and agricultural production shrank at an annual rate of 3.9%. Inflation reached a record 100% in August 1993¹⁰⁹ and unemployment soared. In the mid-1990s, the government implemented economic reform measures to stabilize the economy and restore sustainable growth, including lifting nearly all administrative controls on producer and retail prices, imports, foreign exchange, and grain marketing. Nevertheless, the economy grew by an annual average of only 1.5% between 1997 and 2002, which was below the population growth estimated at 2.5% per annum, leading to a decline in per capita income.

¹⁰⁸ Daily Nation, *Diplomatic Collisions that Shaped Foreign Policy*, Nairobi: Nation Media Group, 25 November, 2013.

¹⁰⁹ Godfrey Okoth "Foreign Policy of Uganda since Independence toward Kenya and Tanzania in *Politics and Administration in East Africa*, Walter Oyugi ed.,(Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1994), p. 373.

There are various schools of thought that explain why the economic performance was this dismal. One school of thought argues that the poor economic performance was largely due to inappropriate agricultural, land, and industrial policies compounded by poor international terms of trade and governance weaknesses. Increased government intrusion into the private sector and import substitution policies made the manufacturing sector uncompetitive. The policy environment, along with tight import controls and foreign exchange controls, made the domestic environment for investment unattractive for both foreign and domestic investors.

Another school of thought argue that during the Cold War most African states, Kenya included relied on financial, technical and military support from the superpowers. This worked well as long as these states supported the interests of the super power states in the international system. However, when the Cold War ended, the sole remaining superpower, the United States of America and by extension the Western powers, found no need to continue with their support to Africa. The international agenda changed from pursuit of allies and ideology to democratization. The focus shifted to first to Eastern Europe where the west stated to support democratization processes.

Meanwhile, the countries which had relied on the support from the superpowers found it extremely challenging to bear the burden of funding their own budgets and hence entered into economic crisis. It may be argued that the poor economic performance of Kenya and that of many other African states during this period could be explained by a combination of both these theories or plus other factors. The result was that the low incomes and high unemployment exacerbated poverty and it associated effects including increased crimes.

In the early part of 1990s the unexplained death of John Robert Ouko, the then foreign affairs minister reawakened ethnic consciousness. The Luos found themselves besieged and

alienated having lost Tom Mboya, one of their prominent leaders to an assassin, and now Ouko's murder which the government system was appearing to be covering up. The tension it created though did not last long but left lasting memory of unending circle of injustice towards the Luos. The scenario of a theory of what might have happened in the death of Ouko, which fuelled the tensions and resentment, as captured by Smith Hemstone in his book "*Rogue Ambassador*" is a horrific tale of an atrocious murder that easily opens sore wounds of ethnic hatred. Although the government expected a backlash from demonstrators, this happened in a relatively small scale as security was heavily deployed during his burial especially in Kisumu and his home village of Koru.

This came at a time when the wave of democratization was sweeping the continent. In Kenya, pro-democratic groups emerged as mentioned earlier and through demonstrations, some of which often turned violent, became prominent and managed to influence constitutional change to allow for pluralistic politics. The media space was opened and the society generally became more open. All these quests for reforms were supported by the West, whose agenda in the new world order had changed from Cold War rivalry to promotion of democracy. Smith Hempstone, the journalist and American Ambassador to Kenya is credited to have helped push the agenda. There was inherent fear of opposition coming to power or tensions rising to levels that would lead to civil war. This fear was explained by Hempstone when he expressed reservations of British support that "Britain had large investments in Kenya and did not want 40,000 Indians dumped on them if things went as they did in Uganda."¹¹⁰

A third internal issue that existed in the 1990s and still remains a security challenge to Kenya is the perennial conflict among the pastoral communities in northern Kenya. Most of the

¹¹⁰ Daily Nation, *Diplomatic Collisions that Shaped Foreign Policy*, Nairobi: Nation Media Group, 25 November, 2013.

conflicts among pastoral communities of East Africa and in the Great Lakes region in general are usually clashes as a result of scarcity and hence scramble pastoral resources of water, pasture and land.¹¹¹

The conflict between pastoral communities has historical background that is linked to traditional cultures of cattle raids and banditry. However, with increase in population and the pressure on earth's resources and scarcity occasioned by global warming, conflict has generally boiled down to fighting over access to resources. Others argue that this is never the sole reason behind the clashes in northern Kenya. A study conducted on conflict between the pastoral communities of the Great Lakes region concluded that these conflicts between the different ethnic groups or clans often involve numerous actors with varied interests¹¹². Cross border incursions and skirmishes sometimes involve politics beyond ethnic conflict and may well be as a result of influence at state level.

In Kenya, these pastoral conflicts have involved Boranas and Turkana, Samburu and Turkana, Turkana and Pokots, Borana and Burje, Turkana and Karamojong, Mirile and Turkana or even between Somali clans of Degodia and Ajuhran among others. Their widespread and escalation that result in the displacement of several families and loss of lives is often feared could easily result in a much bigger and destructive conflict. It is often feared that if left unchecked it could draw in more communities hence becoming a more serious internal if not regional security challenge.

Externally, talks of the revival of regional cooperation dominated the agenda. The creation of Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern African states to foster economic cooperation paved way for closer ties among East African countries. Eventually,

¹¹¹ Hussein Mahmoud, "Conflicts and Constraints to Peace among Pastoralists in Northern Kenyan" in *Understanding Obstacles to Peace*, Mwesiga Baragu ed., (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2011), p. 147.

¹¹² Ibid, p. 147.

Kenya, Uganda and the Tanzania signed a treaty that brought forth again the East African Community on 30th November 1999 and its subsequent coming to force on 7th July 2000. The formation of the East African Community again eased tensions and created in the region an atmosphere of trust, confidence and security was possible. The EAC became a forum that provided for an opportunity for the countries of the region to deal with common problems like security.

The free movement of people and goods in these regional economic zones facilitated easy access to trans-border criminals gangs, drug trafficking and money laundering as new security challenges. However, within the regional organizations a forum existed in which these new security challenges were able to be addressed. The region was able to deal with shared threats and it also opened an opportunity for the region to collectively strategize on the region's security challenges. Further, this regional grouping was able also to allow the stable governments in the region to assist their neighboring fragile countries strengthen their institutions in an effort of to improve the regional security situation and generally prevent the insecurity from spilling over from one country to another.

Kenya, in this decade also attracted world attention and sympathy when it suffered a terrorist attack in 1998 at the US embassy in Nairobi, where 252 people were killed. The terrorists were targeting Western interests and Kenya was only a victim. The emergence of terrorism as a weapon of terror and fear created a new dimension in security. This was a new type of security challenge and required reforms in the security sector to combat the new threat. It led to reforms in the wider security sector that saw a new Act of Parliament establish the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) to replace the former Directorate of Security

Intelligence. Other reforms were effected in the military and the police service to cope with these new developments in approach to security.

The other internal new security challenge came in form of elections violence. On 29 December 2002, the opposition party triumphed in an electoral victory that ousted KANU which had ruled Kenya since independence. A new era was ushered and all the latent ethnic animosity that had been part of Kenyan history seemed to have disappeared. The new government took over power in a relatively secure environment and peace and tranquility prevailed. It did not take long before a pre-election Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which had brought together major opposition parties was not honored and started creating dissent and tensions from the ruling amalgamation of parties.

Ethnic animosity was again re-awakened when a group from Mount Kenya region coalescing around the president was accused shielding the president from access by others and favoring their region in government appointments. Whereas the dissent created by such issues may appear mundane, the security implication is that they create resentments which build up and could easily erupt in a civil conflict. These tensions if left to continue could be potentially Kenya's most challenging internal security threat ever since independence.

The latent ethnic animosity created in the un-honored MOU after the 2002 elections would later fuel the post-elections violence in 2007/8. The 2007 elections were held on the presumption that Kenya had attained a level of democratic maturity that enabled it to hold free and fair elections. Although political parties could still be identified with ethnic blocks, they had showed signs of progressively moving toward a national outlook. The main political parties before the elections were President Kibaki's led Party of National Unity (PNU) and Raila Odinga's led Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). When the elections were held, several

version of the outcome have been reported. One version is that the elections were too close and hence the outright winner could not be established and hence the announcement of Kibaki's victory prompted violence as a reaction. Another version is that PNU manipulated the electoral staff to rig the elections by incorporating figures that favored PNU's victory and this prompted simultaneous demonstrations that became violent and led to the widespread post-elections violence.

Whatever the truth may be, the interest of this study is the security situation that prevailed and the potential risk of violence relapsing in the post-elections period. The post-elections violence proved three facts. First, that party political alignment in Kenya was and still is on the basis of ethnicity. Secondly, that there exist many un-dealt with historical issues which have the potential to lead to country into a civil war and thirdly, Kenya like many other African countries are vulnerable to violence and civil war could only be a "political statement" or an election step away. To date the issues around Kenya's post-election violence of 2007/2008 have not been comprehensively dealt with. It may well be fair to conclude that the latent grievances that led to the simultaneous violence experienced after the 2007 polls still remain latent in Kenya and have the potential of taking the country into a civil war. This ought to be viewed as a potential security threat.

2.4 Conclusion

Kenya's security landscape since independence has broadly been defined by a number of external security threats and several internal factors that have informed security policy and responses. The external factors emanate from regional political instabilities and conflicts spillovers. They mainly revolved around the issue of Somali irredentism, superpowers

propagating their ideologies and interests in the region and tensions caused by the character of individual leaders.

Internally, Kenya has existed with latent ethnic animosity rooted in injustices that spanned from colonial times to post colonial period. These latent animosities have in the course of Kenya's history been ignited into ethnic conflicts albeit to a smaller scale. They, however, remain a potential threat to internal security and could well be a source of civil war if not contained. The government has recognized this and a part from policy, has embedded it in the constitution as a legal requirement for government appointments to reflect ethnic diversity as a way of averting ethnic resentment.

Other environmental factors such as resource depletion also pose a threat to national security. There is ample evidence of cyclic conflicts between pastoralists communities who have fought and are likely to continue to fight over pasture and water resources. Evidence of a long term strategy to address this security challenge is not easily evident. The constant reaction whenever the conflicts occurs point to a reactionary policy. Kenya's association with the West and its expression of its foreign policy especially the recent incursion into Somalia in defence of its sovereignty has exposed it to new threats of terrorism.

New challenges emanating from national development such as rapid population growth, drug trafficking, money laundering, urbanization and technology (cyber crime) has created new security concerns as well. Kenya's security policy is determined on the basis of these threats. What these policies are and how they have been implemented and with what results since independence is the subject of the next two chapters of this study.

CHAPTER 3

DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS OF KENYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

3.1 Introduction

The preceding chapter provided an over view of the roots security threats have Kenya has faced since independence. It provided a historical perspective highlighting events and issues that have influenced security in Kenya. This chapter addresses the determinants of national security highlighting specific threats as variables that influence national security and then explaining the corresponding policy choice that was formulated in response and with what results.

Traditional approach to national security held a perspective that only identified military issues with national security. Barry Buzan, however, argued that in the real world of everyday human existence, people were affected by threats in political economic, societal and environmental areas and hence national security problems needed to be seen in these domains. This chapter adopts this approach and examines the internal security policy determinants in the four domains, namely; political, economic and socio-cultural. It is to be appreciated that these variables are cross cutting and interact influencing each other and the distinction in the domains in this study is only introduced to help in policy assessment as most national policies of Kenya appear to be classified along these domains. For example, political violence impacts economy which in turn leads to poverty thus affecting social welfare and raises insecurity as a consequence.

3.2 National Interests as the Focus of National Security Policy

In academic discourse the question in security studies is always - what is it be secured? There is convergence of thought that in the international system according to realists that the

states are the main focus or the referent objects of security and hence the interests' of the state becomes what is to be secured. The second issue that elicits even greater debate is what constitutes national interests. Every state defines its own interests differently and it is the methods or the processes used in identifying national interests coupled with the uniqueness of every state that account for the varied nature of national interests among states.

The challenges in defining national interests for many states arise from the difficulty in harmonizing the interests as defined by the various organs involved in policy formulation and sometimes the interests of the individual personalities involved in the process. For example, this process in the United States, the decision process unfolds not as a rationalized, dignified, elegantly logical matching of available means to agreed and obvious ends, but as a series of contests in which alternative preferences clash and contend.¹¹³

In Kenya the same dilemma and contests exist. There is no consensus on what national interests are and what are defined as national interest often change with regime and personalities. There is no evidence of the existence of a formal process of national interests identification and this could be contributing to lack of consensus. Due to this, there is risk of individuals or committees or ministries pushing partisan, individual or sectoral issues to national level as national interest while in fact they are not. According to Mwagiru, national interests are not often what politicians say they are, instead national interests entails a process of identifying wide variety of issues, isolating those that are non-politicized (those that can be dealt with by non-state agencies), those that are politicized (those that require state allocation of resources) and those that need to be securitized (those that threaten the security of the country). These categories of issues that threaten the security of the country become core national interests.

¹¹³ Dixon J., *National Security Policy Formulation: Institutions, Processes and Issues*, (New York: University of America, 1984), P. 217.

It ought to be appreciated that this process is dynamic and not stationary. Issues which today may not need to be securitized may require to be securitized tomorrow. In this regard national security policy formulation needs to remain dynamic and the review of national interests done regularly. The study has therefore tried to ascertain what has Kenya's national interest been at different stages in its history as defined by its expressions in various forms and tried to harmonize these with corresponding identifiable policies.

3.3 Economic Determinants

First, economic security is concerned with access to resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power.¹¹⁴ Economic insecurity in the context of this study is viewed as threats to the economic instrument of power of the state. Economy supports security and when weakened the state is insecure. Economic security therefore requires an assured basic income for individuals, usually from productive and remunerative work or, as a last resort, from a publicly financed safety net as welfare. Unemployment, diseases, low food productions, low incomes, high interest rates are problems that constitute economic insecurity.

3.3.1 Industry and Security

Since independence, Kenya's economy has been the most dominant economy in East Africa. It has been based on Kenya's industrial growth which was focused on the promotion of small and medium size enterprises. Kenya's industries grew progressively after independence and trade expanded to the region's market and beyond. The country enjoys a very large positive balance of trade with Uganda and Tanzania. Kenya has got an arguably strongest middle class in

¹¹⁴ Sheehan M., *International Security An Analytical Survey*, (London: Lynne Boulder Publishers, 2005), p. 47.

the region and its currency is the most favored in terms of exchange. By 1997, 47 percent of Kenya's exports went to its neighbors.¹¹⁵ This makes Kenya's economy a key pillar in its development strategy and strategies to maintain economic security ought to be in the overall national security strategy. The threat to economic security therefore lay on events or phenomenon that would interrupt the economic progress. The question that follows is that what has Kenya done to ensure economic security is maintained?

Kenya, right from independence has produced policy documents that guide its development. Evidence collected during the course of the study show that most of these policies center on economic development and social progress. The first major such policy document after independence was Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 entitled *African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*. This paper outlined what was referred to as measures that would ensure rapid economic development and social progress. This policy was aimed at achieving progressive economic development through improving education, agriculture and industry and in turn improve individual incomes and hence alleviates poverty.

Subsequently, Kenya produced periodic economic development plans through the years. These economic and sometimes referred to as national development plans were in medium and long term forms and were further broken down to District Development Plans, Sector Plans, Specific Sector frameworks, Community Action Plans, Strategic Plans and Annual work plans. These plans came in forms of periodic 5 year National Development plans and some in specific strategy plans more recently such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (2001-2004), Economic Recovery Strategy (2003-2007) and the latest Vision 2030.

¹¹⁵ Wachira C., A paper entitled "Multiple Regional Bodies Block Economic Cooperation in East Africa," 1999. <http://www.twinside.org.sg/title/1935-cn.htm>, (accessed on 27 December 2013), P.20.

These policies addressed issues that were aimed at making the country achieve food security, reduce poverty and improve social welfare. There is a link between the economic factors that these policies aim to address and security. Weak economy will not support security policy and its byproducts such as poverty, hunger, and lack of adequate social welfare breeds insecurity. Economic marginalization and inequalities leads to discontentment and tensions that combine to threaten peace and slows overall development agenda and growth.

Next, is the question that what has been the results of these strategies? Katherine Muoki of Ministry of Planning, National Development and Vision 2030 – Kenya in her presentation entitled “*Development Planning and Equality in Kenya, Opportunities and Challenges*” commented that “inequality and poverty persist despite the Government’s efforts since independence. She further stated that “though poverty has reduced – 56% in 2000 to 46% in 2006 inequalities remain even where poverty level are low and in high potential areas there are still pockets of the poor.”¹¹⁶ Comments on the same subject from those interviewed indicated that it is likely that rising poverty is contributing to insecurity especially in urban areas. The identified reason for the failure of these policies is linked to a disconnect between policy, planning and budgeting at lower levels. At lower levels the interpretation of the policies, skilled personnel to follow up and funding seem unavailable to aid the implementation of these policies.

3.3.2 Economic Inequalities

There is enough evidence that disparities between rich and poor continue to persist if not on the increase, inequitable distribution of public resources/services between individuals, regions, along gender lines or income disparities among rural areas and within major cities and

¹¹⁶ Katherine Muoki, “*Development Planning and Equality in Kenya, Opportunities and Challenges*” <http://www.oecd.org/dev/poverty/44282750.pdf> retrieved on 8 January 2014.

other towns. However, the new constitution's devolution structure of governance and its provisions on resource distribution may be argued to be an attempt to remedy the inequalities among regions. The specific provision to an equalization fund is meant to correct imbalance in national economic and social development and its functioning and results are yet to be seen.

3.4 Political Determinants

Political threats are aimed at disrupting the organizational structure of governance of the state. They involve actions that are intended to weaken the political system of a state in a manner that would not allow the expression of a political agenda. To achieve political security means to achieve a stable social order and cater for threats to state sovereignty. In general, according to Buzan, political threats stem from the great diversity of ideas and traditions which is the key underlying justification for international anarchy.¹¹⁷

3.4.1 Ethnicity and Insecurity

Insecurity related to politics in Kenya has two dimensions; one is in regard to ethnic politics that fuel ethnic violence especially during the election period and the second is in relation to the politically sponsored gangs that create conditions of insecurity. A third rare one is insecurity associated with violent demonstrations or riots by supporters of various political parties. This section examines how these issues have influenced security in Kenya since independence and what has been done and with what results.

Kenya is acknowledged to have 42 different ethnic groups and balancing the interests of these ethnic groups has been a political challenge since independence. Politics being associated

¹¹⁷ Buzan B., *People State & Fear, - An Agenda for Post International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era 2nd ed.*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 119.

with allocation of resources, the presidency in multi-ethnic states especially in Africa have been associated with opportunity of the president's ethnic group to "eat". Buzan supports the political challenge associated with varied ethnicities and asserts that delicate ethnic balances can lead to systematic political discrimination and even civil war.¹¹⁸

Kenya's current ethnic fighting is traceable to the colonial period. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the colonial ideology of divide-and-rule was ethnic based and was effectively employed in Kenya for colonial interest. The colonial administration divided the country's ethnic groups with a strategy to create a smooth colonial dominance but created inequalities among the various ethnic groups. As in many post-colonial African states, Kenya inherited colonial inequalities as far as ethnic groups and regions were concerned in terms of power-sharing and wealth-sharing¹¹⁹. The areas around Central Kenya and the Rift Valley where the colonialist established settlements were more developed, the groups had opportunities for schools and economic advancements. Areas such as the Northern Kenya, Nyanza and large parts of the Coast were largely ignored and were least developed.

After independence, ethnicity remained a feature in Kenya politics. Elections have been largely determined by ethnic block voting and violence related to ethnic rivalry, animosity, claims of marginalization and exclusion in the distribution of resources has dominated Kenya's elections since independence. This tendency of exclusion of members of certain targeted ethnic groups from key state resources became a norm in Kenya's political system and thus electoral related disputes came as no surprise in Kenya.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ Ibid, p. 123.

¹¹⁹ Omolo, K. 'Political Ethnicity in the Democratization Process in Kenya,' African Studies, Volume 61, Number 2, 2002, pp.213-223.

¹²⁰ Ajulu, R. 'Politicised Ethnicity, Competitive Politics and Conflict in Kenya: A Historical Perspective,' African Studies, Volume 61, Number 2, 2002, pp. 262-272.

According to Justice Mkhabela, in less than a decade of independence, the Kikuyu wrestled and dominated political and economic strength at the expense of citizens of other ethnic origins. In this respect, Jomo Kenyatta turned the status of the Kikuyu into that of true heirs of state resources where they were highly favored in terms of accessing government jobs and loans. This system of discrimination along ethnic lines went on for long even during Moi's presidency where Kalenjins dominated government positions.¹²¹ He concludes that Kenya has so far failed to have a soul-searching exercise in terms of nation-building fundamentals as far as ethnicity is concerned. He asserts that this failure has been responsible for ethnic conflicts and skewed access to the state's scarce resources.

Even though for many years the political class preached ethnic tolerance and abhorred tribalism, the practice was different. There was no policy or law that targeted ethnic discrimination. The latest attempt to address the issue of ethnicity came after the post elections violence of 2008 when the new constitution made it a requirement for state officers to represent the face of Kenya. The actual manner in which this will play out, its impact in reducing ethnicity is yet to be seen given that this new constitution was only promulgated in year 2010.

3.4.2 Politics and Crime

The second insecurity associated with politics is in regard to politically sponsored violence. For example, prior to the 1997 elections, Kenya witnessed one of its worst elections related violence since independence. This had been witnessed by the "Saba Saba Day" incident where thousands were injured and scores killed. This violent episode resulted in the displacement

¹²¹ Justice Mkhabela, "Kenya: From Democratic and Economic Engine To Security and Economic Crisis" in *The African Executive*, Issue 330 August 17- 23, 2011, Nairobi, 2011.

of members of the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups.¹²² This kind of violence was in fact aimed at discouraging voter turn outs by the majority of Kikuyu in the Coastal Provinces. The outcome brought Moi into power as the ruling KANU did manage to win a coalition of minority ethnic groups against the Luo and Kikuyu.

Following these episodes of political violence in the 1990s, there is no evidence that a security policy was put in place to deal with these politically instigated insecurity. What exists and is supported by responses from interviewees is that the government considered these violence as normal crimes and those who instigated them were held individually responsible as having violated the penal code. A survey of the cases that went to court during these period show no prominent person in a political party to have been jailed in connection with election or political violence.

3.4.3 Skewed National Interests and Insecurity

A further observation, as pointed earlier showed that key positions in the security sector were held by a majority of people whose ethnicity reflected a bias towards ethnicity of the ruling president. This could mean a sense of insecurity of the regime and hence trusting more their own ethnicity with the leadership of security organs. Could this have compromised the lenses with which these key leaders in security sector viewed threats to national security and instead concentrated more on the protection of the regime rather than the protection of national interests?

There is often a thin line between the definition of national interests and individual interests given that these interests are defined by officers whose loyalty may be more to the appointing authority more than the state. The study observed that there were no specific security

¹²² Ibid.

policies that were put in place to tackle political insecurity instead political insecurity was regarded in the same category as insecurity associated with social crimes.

3.5 Social Determinants

Societal security has been defined by Buzan as the sustainability within conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom.¹²³ This definition is wide and covers a large domain of activities of human existence. The logic of examining the societal security stems from the approach of the expanded definition of security that is grounded on the individual rather than the state. It is based on the premise that there are other things in society that create insecurity and cause people to die other than from military threats. The various aspects of the constituents of societal security are hereunder examined one by one.

3.5.1 Food Insecurity

During an interview with a member of the National Security Advisory Council (NSAC), a question was asked that what issues the member considered to be today's Kenya's national security threat. His response was "food insecurity". Food cuts across both economic and social and for the purpose of this study it will be considered under social domain. To be able to explain the extent to which food insecurity is a threat to national security, the researcher sought first to examine what food security means and then to find out what policies or strategies exist in Kenya to achieve and maintain food security and then find the extent to which these policies have been successful or have failed.

¹²³ Buzan Barry and Weaver Ole and De Wilde Jaap, *Security: A Framework for Analysis*. (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1998), p. 8.

Article 238 (1) of the Constitution provides that one of the principles of national security is the protection of all the citizens of Kenya, their rights, freedoms, property, peace, stability, prosperity and other national interests. Some of the rights of all Kenyans that are protected include the right to be free from hunger, to have adequate food of acceptable quality and uninterrupted supply of clean and safe water in adequate quantities at all times.

In the National Food and Nutrition Security Policy it is noted that “When Kenyans suffer from hunger and malnutrition, peace cannot be guaranteed as this could lead to food riots. When access to food and safe water is guaranteed to all Kenyans at all times, this would enhance national security and Kenyans would attend to other national issues on national development”.¹²⁴

Kenya has had elaborate food security policies since independence. These include Kenya’s first National Food Policy (Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1981), later consolidated into Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 on Economic Management for Renewed Growth, then Kenya’s second National Food Policy (Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1994). Later, there was Kenya’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of 2001, Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) for Wealth and Employment Creation, 2003-2007 and the Kenya Vision 2030, all incorporated food policy and ranked agriculture and rural development as the top most Government priority, with food security listed as one of five key sub-sectors.

Food security is defined as when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.¹²⁵ The framework of the food policy includes the four dimensions of food security: availability, accessibility, stability, and meeting nutritional requirements. Kenya’s approach to food security combines longer-term action to enhance productive potential and

¹²⁴ Ministry of Agriculture - Kenya, *National Food and Nutrition Security Policy*, (Nairobi: Government Printer 2011), p. 12.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 34.

incomes, with programs and policies that respond to immediate needs of the poor and food insecure.

The next question is how well has these policies worked and what are the current parameters to evaluate food security? Has the existing food security policy worked? Evidence from government reports and newspapers articles paints a picture that shows these policies despite their excellent presentation, have registered little success. In Kenya, food availability has over time been understood in terms of cereal supply, and food security in terms of having enough maize. The National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) has a grain storage capacity of 28 million bags of maize (1 bag = 90kg), but this remains largely under-utilized with the current use of about 13%. There is little on-farm and off-farm processing of products in rural areas. Kenya lacks sufficient infrastructure for effective transport, storage, refinement, preservation, distribution and marketing of many foodstuffs.

The dismal performance of these policies is proved by the following example. In January 2011, Kenya Red Cross Society reported that it was seeking 1.43 billion shillings (\$17.2 million) in aid to fight the effects of a drought which had already affected 1.86 million people and more than 20 million livestock. At that time, the national grain storage reserve stood at 3.1 million bags and the Prime Minister's office announced that country will boost reserves to 8 million, 90-kilogram (198-pound) bags by December 2011.¹²⁶

The second issue that may account for the disconnect between the food security policy and its implementation as a national security threat is in its institutional arrangements and its presentation as a security agenda. The current existing Kenyan institutions that are involved in coordinating food security and nutrition matters are; 1) Kenya Food Security Meeting (KFSM). This body is established and housed in the Office of the President and is responsible for food

¹²⁶ Nation Media Group, *Daily Nation*, March 31, 2011 (Nairobi: Nation Media Group, 2011), p. 32.

security monitoring and for advising on emergency response. 2) Inter-ministerial Coordinating Committee on Food and Nutrition (ICCFN). This is a body housed in the Ministry of Planning and National Development responsible mainly for nutrition issues in development planning. 3) The Agricultural Sector Coordination Unit (ASCU). This is the committee responsible for coordination and spearheading of policy, legal and institutional reforms across ten agricultural sector ministries as provided for by the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS). It also coordinates development partners and non-state actors in the implementation of the ASDS. 4) National Food Safety Coordinating Committee (NFSCC). This is yet another committee responsible for increasing awareness and advising on food safety and quality related issues.

Under this framework, it is evident that despite the many bodies and committees dealing with Food Security there is no representation of Food Security agenda at the National Security Council (NSC) where all threats to national security are addressed and corresponding security policies are adopted. In the process of formulating national security policy, the concept of securitization is what enables an issue to be brought the level where it is recognized as a threat and hence be removed from the normal domain and its status lifted to where extra-ordinary measures are instituted to address the issue as a threat to national security. It involves the prioritization of an issue and giving it an increased political attention.

Shehaan defines securitization as the process of challenging the society to promote an issue to a higher scale of values and commit greater resources solving the related problem.¹²⁷ This happens at the National Security Council (NSC). The fact that food security agenda has no direct representative at the National Security Council (NSC) means that however serious the issue of food insecurity gets it will continue to be dealt with within the normal government bureaucracy process and timelines and the justification for exceptional measures, priority and

¹²⁷ Sheehan M., *International Security An Analytical Survey*, (London: Lynne Boulder Publishers, 2005), p. 53.

more resources gets little attention. This has been the fate of food insecurity in Kenya despite its assessment to pose an existential threat to national security.

3.5.2 Criminal Gangs

The second issue in social domain of security policy determinants found during the research is the emergence of organized criminal gangs as a threat to national security. Various views were found to explain the emergence of these organized criminal gangs. Three views were commonly shared among most of those interviewed. These were; criminal gangs arose from desperation with poverty and hence jobless youths formed gangs and used crime for economic survival. The second theory was that some criminal gangs were created by politicians to serve political purposes and thirdly, that some gangs evolved from vigilante groups (local groups formed to provide security) and later turned to be criminal gangs.

First, it is true that the government has done a great deal of work in researching and mapping out these criminal gangs. Information of the extent of these gangs is available even to the media. Nongovernmental organizations have also researched on these groups and produced reports accessible by the public. For example, a research conducted in 2013 by the National Crime Research Centre showed that there are 46 criminal gangs in Kenya.¹²⁸ Overview of the findings of this research showed that the majority of these groups – at 50.2 percent – engaged in illicit drug trafficking while 34.4 percent engaged in extortion of money and related activities. The report further indicates 33.2 percent engage in kidnapping for ransom and also noted 12.7 percent engage in environmental crimes.¹²⁹ The nature of the activities of these gangs point to gangs out to gain economically, they seem to be in these gangs to escape poverty and to survive.

¹²⁸ <http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/08/46-criminal-gangs-operate-in-kenya-report/>

¹²⁹ Ibid

The report also acknowledged and supported the view that the government was doing much to address this problem as noted in the amount of resources put into addressing the problem of organized criminal gangs. This is evident from the annual recruitment of police officers, purchase of equipments such as motor vehicles and the enactment of the Prevention of Organized Crimes Act in 2010.¹³⁰ These efforts are supported by the reduction in the activities of the previously notorious gangs such as the *Mungiki* and *Jeshi la Mzee* among others.

However, the continued existence of other criminal gangs indicates that these measures either need to be reinforced or the enforcement is weak. It was also found that no policy exist specifically to address criminal gangs other than outlawing the gangs which have been identified with criminal activities. However, the enhanced legislation in the new constitution now enables charging of members of gangs who are arrested under the Prevention of Organized Crimes Act of 2010 as opposed to before when they would either be charged with being members of an outlawed gang (which was normally problematic to prove in court) or were charged for a specific acts of crime they committed under the penal code.

3.5.3 Graft and Corruption

Graft and Corruption was identified as a threat to internal security and undermines security enhancement efforts in several ways. Corruption in Kenya is traced from the post independent period during Kenyatta era just after independence to the present day. Smith Hempstone in his book *Rogue Ambassador* describes the state of corruption in 1970s as follows: “corruption, nepotism, favoritism and inequity grew like a choking creeper over every aspect of

¹³⁰ Ibid

the failing Kenyatta's administration in its last tarnished years."¹³¹ Although this may sound exaggerated it nonetheless highlights the existence of corruption in Kenya then.

To underscore the relationship between corruption and insecurity we shall draw from the findings of a study that was conducted by Musa Idris in Nigeria in 2013. It concluded that the major cause of insecurity in Nigeria is corruption and failure of governance to achieve the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy. The study revealed that there exist a perfect correlation between corruption and insecurity in Nigeria.¹³² It affirmed that greed and corruption by public officials caused deprivation, alienation, conflict and insecurity in Nigeria. The study recommended improvement in the quality of governance in order to reduce the incidence of corruption and insecurity in Nigeria.

Kenya has acknowledged corruption as a problem that not only undermines security but undermines the entire development agenda. To deal with it Kenya instituted a framework under Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission to handle issues of corruption through preventive measures and litigation of offenders. The extent of the success of this body is doubtful as the commission has not successfully handled and concluded a graft case of a meaningful amount, many of which still continue to be reported as pending.

3.5.4 Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons

The origins of small arms and light weapons are largely external but these arms are a source of internal security challenge in Kenya. The collapse of the state of Somalia in 1991, the Civil War that raged in Sudan in the 1990s up to 2005, recent conflicts in Burundi, the instability Democratic Republic of Congo following the Rwanda genocide of 1994 that saw former many

¹³¹ Smith Hempstone *Rogue Ambassador*, (Sewanee: University of the South Press, 1997), p. 33.

¹³² Musa Idris Corruption and Insecurity in Nigeria, *Public Administration Research; Vol. 2, No. 1; 2013* (Toronto: Canadian Center of Science and Education), pp. 59-66.

former Rwanda Army flee in to the Democratic Republic of Congo, all have created a constant stream of refugees into Kenya. The inflow of these refugees into Kenya has been linked to the proliferation of small arms which aid criminal gangs and fuel insecurity.

The long and porous borders have not made work for security agencies easy. The security agencies low numbers, lack of capacity, coupled with resource limitations, have made the control of influx of small arms and light weapons to be difficult. There is no evidence of a long term strategy by the government to curb this problem beyond regular police roadblocks to check of vehicle contents which is normally not effective and is often undermined by ineptitude and corruption. This has made proliferation of small arms a constant threat to Kenya's internal security and will continue to pose a threat to internal security.

Immigration laws that are meant to control entry and weed out unwanted immigrants face challenge in implementation due to lack of resources and capacity to man the long porous borders. The existence of same ethnic groups across the borders even makes sifting immigrants or refugees even more difficult. The new constitutional provision of dual citizenship will in future compound this problem even more. This makes proliferation of small arms a real threat to national security now and into the future.

3.5.5 Health Insecurity

Poor health in general weakens the productive age group of a population that forms the economic workforce and hence affects national production. The very deaths that diseases cause are the existential threats to national security and the essence of the required corresponding policies is to prevent these deaths. The effect of the diseases has a direct negative impact on economy. Besides affecting the productive workforce, the health budget goes up and the impact

on social welfare, care and consequences to the families are high. Secondly, when more funds are diverted to health it means less funds will be available for development which in turn slows the economy, reduces incomes in general leads to poverty, desperation and crimes are the resultants.

Kenya, since independence had prioritized education, health and poverty eradication as key issues in its developmental agenda. However, the emergence of HIV/AIDS as a disease in the early 1980s, its rapid spread and lack of cure made it to be declared a national disaster in 1999. To date, more than 1.5 million people have died of HIV/AIDS and over 2 million are infected cases living with HIV/AIDS of who 600,000 are children and women.¹³³ The result is an increasing number of HIV/AIDS orphans as parents die of the disease and the country losing about 300 people daily from HIV/AIDS.¹³⁴ This number per day is higher than the number Kenya has lost in all its military engagements since the Shifta campaign in 1960s to those it has lost in Somalia since its incursion in 2011. This is therefore a security threat to Kenyan which cannot be ignored.

Kenya's response to this threat was the formation of the National Aids Control Council (NACC) that was established to coordinate all Aids programs in the country. The council developed long term strategies that were aimed at expanding preventive education and promoting comprehensive health care. These strategies have been credited with notable successes in areas such as creating national awareness of HIV/AIDS and improved health care management. The national infection rate has dropped and continues to reduce. However, despite it being a national

¹³³ Janet Kawewa, a Paper on *Situational Analysis on HIV/AIDS in Kenya (Department of Adult Education)* Nairobi: Ministry of Education, 2012.

¹³⁴ Ibid

disaster, the corresponding allocation of resources does not seem to match what has been securitized as a national threat. Much of the funding is dependent on external aid and donors who may be donating for their own interests. To assess the scope of the impact and success of the HIV/AIDS or health security intervention strategies is beyond the scope of this study. But it is suffice to generalize that there is to a large extent, in so far as awareness is concerned that much has been achieved.

3.5.6 Conflicts Among Pastoralists

Conflicts among pastoralist communities in Northern Kenya come in many forms. The one form of cattle rustling has its origins in the traditional cultural raiding practices among the pastoralist communities and dates back to the pre-colonial years. It is a cyclic process where communities would steal cattle from each other to build up their wealth, but sometimes involves violent confrontations. Today, in the advent of modern weapons and the proliferation of small arms, the conflicts have been more violent and are a security concern. The recent (April 2013) conflict in Baragoi (Kenya) between *Samburus* and *Turkanas* that resulted in the death and injury of several police officers is a case in point. Other conflicts come in the form of struggle among these communities to control water and pasture resources that continue to diminish.

These conflicts have been taking place regularly since independence without a lasting solution. Some view the marginalization of Northern Kenya from colonial year, carried through in the post independence period as a contribution factor in exacerbating the problem. Hussein Mohamed states that Kenya has not made any efforts to integrate northern and northeastern

Kenya into the country's mainstream economic and political fabric, thus allowing numerous actors and interests to thrive and generate conflicts.¹³⁵

From an interviews with one who served in the National Security Advisory Council in the 1990s, cattle rustling and banditry has been one of the enduring security problems in North Rift and North Eastern Kenya since independence. This view is supported by other research findings. For example, according to Markadis, the major source of these conflicts is resource scarcity, fuelled by an array of underlying factors such as changing consumption patterns, high incidences of drought, increased pastoralists involvement in trade and intrusion of commercial agriculture.¹³⁶

The response by the government to this situation has been little and void of a long term strategy. Since cattle rustling sometimes involved pastoralists from other countries across the border, the initial measures that the government instituted included arming of police reservists among the pastoralist communities to provide protection in case they are raided from outside. But these armed police later became cattle rustlers for the interior communities who equally sought armed protection and this created a cycle of perennial security problem.

The second measures involved the deployed of security forces as a reaction whenever raids took place, to pursue the raiders. These reactions often produced little results. When these two methods failed to yield positive results and the arming of the police reservists was found to fuel acquisition of illegal arms, the government resorted to a disarmament strategy. This involved searching and disarming pastoralists who had acquired illegal arms. The failure of this strategy was due to the perceived presence of armed communities across the borders who posed

¹³⁵ Hussein A. Mohamed, Conflicts and Constraints to Peace among Pastoralists in Northern Kenya, in *Understanding Obstacles to Peace: Actors, Interests and Strategies in Africa's Great Lakes Region*, Mwesiga Baregu, ed., (Kampala: Fountain Publishers 2011), p. 155.

¹³⁶ Markakis, J., *Pastoralism and the Margin*, (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2004), p. 26.

as a threat to the Kenyan pastoralists when they believed that security forces could not guarantee them security. Locally, the process was politicized as discriminatory and targeting only certain communities and hence was received with skepticism and lacked popular support. Its success was therefore little.

3.6 Conclusion

The internal determinants of Kenya's national security policies since independence have been explained from political, economic and societal perspectives. Political threats are largely linked to the fragility of ethnic cohesion given that ethnicity has been the focus of Kenya's politics since independence. Economic determinants cover a wide range of economic variables that ultimately create tensions that are associated with scarcity, incomes and access that leads to insecurity. Societal insecurity also cover a wide range of issues that focus on human security and define security vulnerabilities away from military threats. Kenya's focus on security at the policy formulation level has been found to be skewed towards state security more than human security. The protection of government institutions and state functions receive more attention than societal issues.

CHAPTER 4

EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS OF KENYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

4.1 Introduction

The external determinants include factors that explain threats to security that are induced by forces from outside Kenya's territory. These external threats emanate from the traditional concept of security which views international system as anarchic and security is military oriented and state centered. However the expanded scope of security in the contemporary times coupled with impact of globalization add new security challenges from the external domain to include international terrorism, environmental concerns, money laundering, international organized crimes, arms, humans and drug trafficking, piracy, instabilities from neighboring states causing refugees and proliferation of arms which lead to more crimes.



Figure 3 Map of Kenya

To appreciate the external influences to Kenya's national security, the above Map shows Kenya's neighboring states and the extent of the lengths of the borders and their proximity to

main towns in Kenya will be appreciated in understanding issues such as refugees, proliferation of small arms and light weapons and cross border crimes. In the study, the following were identified as external threats to Kenya's security.

4.2 Military Threats

Military power essentially exists to protect the state against external threats. These threats formed the basis of state security in Kenya during the Cold War. The structure of Kenya's national security policy formulation process was constituted at independence and evolved during the Cold War period and was primarily concerned with external threats. Due to the potential danger posed by military threats to a state's nationhood, its sovereignty and integrity, most states traditionally accord military threats the highest priority. Buzan, underscores the fear that makes most state's security policies state-centric in that a defeated state is totally vulnerable to the conquerors' power which can be applied to ends ranging from restructuring the government, through pillage and rape to massacre of the population and resettlement of the land.¹³⁷

Kenya's military threats emanate from the instability in the regions with a possibility of conflict spillover and the question of Somali irredentism that dates back to independence period. As earlier enumerated in the origins of issues in Kenya's security situation, Somali's claim on Kenya's North Eastern province has been an existential military threat to Kenya since the 1960s. Since Ethiopia shared similar concerns with respect to their region of Ogaden which is inhabited predominantly by ethnic Somalis, Kenya's interests with Ethiopia came to a convergence. Kenya's strategy therefore on the issue of Somalia irredentism has been to sign and maintain a

¹³⁷ Buzan B., *People State & Fear, - An Agenda for Post International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era* 2nd ed, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 117.

defence pact (read security pact) with Ethiopia for mutual support and assistance in the event of an attack from Somalia.

This strategy has had twofold results. First, the common interest between Kenya and Ethiopia has brought the two states together into an alliance that has ensured trust and security between the two states, removing any suspicion that may lead to tensions between the two states. Apart from cattle rustlers and occasional incursions by the Oromo militia, the security situation between Kenya and Ethiopia has been relatively peaceful. Secondly, the pact has created a collective security arrangement that has acted as deterrence to Somalia from attacking either state.

In 2011, when Somali militias and Al Shabaab heightened their provocation to Kenya through kidnappings and other acts of terrorism, Kenya evoked the United Nation's provision for self defence and pursued Al Shabaab well into Somalia and had remained in Somalia to date. The action by Kenya can be viewed in two ways. The incursion, as a defensive strategy (or may be considered as a security policy) received overwhelming parliamentary and public support. This goes to prove the importance and weight that the nation places on state security. It points to a highly state-centric approach to security. This is supported by reactions that can often be observed whenever other threats to individual Kenyans lives such as hunger, famine, floods, banditry occur and does not elicit such massive security response. A state-centric security approach considers national security as the highest security priority at any one time and negates other forms of insecurity to the periphery.

The second issues in military threats that have affected Kenya are in relation to conflict spillovers. This has not been to any significant degree even though minor incursions during Uganda's internal conflicts in the 1980s elicited military preparedness and deployment along the

border to control possible conflict spillover. The same happened between the border with South Sudan when sometimes in early 1990s, Sudan's pursuit of the SPLA then ended up in bombing territories which were inside Kenya eliciting a military reaction which almost brought Kenya into the conflict.

Today, Kenya's military, which had not had much military engagements especially during the Cold War, is at the center of national attention due to its role in Somalia and the expected performance in the preservation of state security. This is largely due to the general view, that state security means security for all, a very state-centric approach to security held by Kenyan and security policy formulators.

4.3 International Terrorism

The origin of terrorism as concept of warfare is as old as human history. It is a tactic employed by an inferior force largely targeting non combatants to cause panic, fear or to gain attention by its destructive effects. It has been employed by many groups in recent history largely targeting Western interests scattered across the world. Kenya recognizes terrorism as an existential threat to national security. The bombing of Norfolk Hotel in 1980 in retaliation for Kenya's support to Israel in the 1976 Entebbe raid, the 1998 bombing of United States embassy in Nairobi, the 2002 attacks on Paradise Hotel (owned by an Israeli) in Kikambala and the 2013 Westgate attack among others are evidence of terrorism threat in Kenya.

Kenya's entry into Somalia in 2011 and the presence of Western interests in the country continues to give terrorism a "legitimate" excuse to target Kenya and thus terrorism today is one of the biggest threats to Kenya's security. By 2008 there was evidence within the security sector that terrorist group Al Qaeda East Africa has been conducting training in the areas of Ras

Chiamboni in Somalia close the Kenya – Somali border. The emergence of Al Shabbab in Somali with its confessed linkage to the Al Qaeda group and given the large areas which they still hold in Somalia makes Somalia a haven for terrorists. Evidence collected from security reports indicate that they do recruit and train individuals, and send them over to Kenya to carry out terror attacks. This makes Kenya vulnerable and at risk of terrorists' attacks.

Kenya's assessment therefore is that international terrorism will remain a threat to Kenya national interests in short and medium term. The current strategy is in the establishment of local anti-terrorism institutions and empowering them to cooperate with other international counter terrorism agencies. The strategy involves the coordination of a multi-agency counter terrorism network, with wide range of a network of information exchange to curb the threat. The assessment of how well this strategy has worked is debatable. There are claims that through it many potential terrorist's attacks have been foiled while others have succeeded. The efficacy of the strategy may be considered as average. This is purely a subjective guess as available information is insufficient for an objective generalization.

4.4 Regional Instability

Kenya among the East African countries has been relatively peaceful since independence except for the post-election violence of 2007/8. However, most of the countries in the region, except for Tanzania, have suffered conflicts that have generated social disorder, internally displaced people, refugees and these conflicts have had implications in Kenya's security. The area of Great Lakes region has been widely referred to as conflict zone. Evidence exists of efforts by the leaders in this region to have a lasting solution.

Under the framework of International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), a pact on Security, Stability and Development was signed in December, 2006 by Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia.¹³⁸ The pact envisioned the transformation of the region from a zone of hostilities, conflict and underdevelopment to a zone of security, stability and partnership. It is evident from the conflicts that have been going on especially in the Democratic Republic of Congo since 2006 that the pact has had little success. The implication of regional stability on Kenya's security is discussed hereunder on the basis of impact of the conflicts country by country.

4.4.1 Conflict in Somalia

Since the fall of President Siad Barre in 1991, there has been no functional central government in that country for any reasonable period of time. The conflicts between the various warring factions led by factional War Lords in the 1990s, followed by emergence of political cum religious parties in the 2000s that included Islamic Court Union, then the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) have all but failed to bring stability in Somalia.

The efforts to bring peace in Somalia has also had international interventions starting the United States led Operation Restore Hope, United Nations Operation in Somalia I and II (UNOSOM I and II) to American led Unified Task Force (UNITAF). These interventions were all aimed at creating a secure enough environment to facilitate humanitarian aid efforts but all had little success. Later around 2005, there came the military intervention of Ethiopia that equally had little success. In 2007, the UN approved the deployment of African Union Peacekeeping Force known as AMISOM. This saw the entry of two battalions from Uganda and

¹³⁸ Liberata Mulamula, *Forward DRC and its Neighbors: Policy Options for the Great Lakes Region and the International Community in Understanding Obstacles to Peace, Actors, Interests and Strategies in Africa's Great Lakes Region*, Mwesiga Baregu ed. (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2011), p. XV-XXIII.

one Burundi deployed to secure Mogadishu and facilitate the security of the government of the day. The impact of these three battalions never went beyond the environment of Mogadishu town. In 2011, Kenyan forces entered Somalia in pursuit of Al Shabaab who had threatened Kenya's security through frequent incursions with attacks and kidnappings from Kenyan territories. Somalia became a melting pot of a multi-national security forces all in pursuit of an international security agenda, that is; to create a stable Somalia.

The effect of the instability in Somalia on Kenya's security is twofold. First, the conditions in Somalia made it a conducive breeding ground and haven for terrorists which in turn became a threat to Kenya national security and beyond. In addition, the entry of Kenyan forces into Somalia made Kenya an obvious "legitimate" terrorists target for the Al Shabaab. Secondly, the conflict in Somalia has created influx of a large number of refugees that account for proliferation of small arms and light weapons that fuel crime in Kenya. The existence of ethnic Somalis on the Kenyan side along the Kenya-Somalia border further complicates the security arrangements along the border as identification of foreigners without accusation of harassing locals becomes difficult. Further, clan ties may elicit local sympathy and support of Al Shabaab and this would compromise security efforts.

Kenya's current strategy is in the form of joining with international efforts in a strategy that seeks a political solution for Somalia but aided by a military effort. It believes that effective counterterrorism strategy for Kenya is one that which seeks to establish a politically stable government in Somalia, with full control of all regions and authority over any other security arrangements in the country. This strategy involves a joint operation effort with AMISOM forces in neutralizing Al Shabaab forces inside Somalia as a military line of operation while creating conditions for political stability and introduction of national security forces in Somalia.

It is believed that in this strategy lies the long term solution of reducing terrorism threat to Kenya's national security. The debate on the efficacy of this strategy is still on. However, in drawing a parallel with the American experience in Afghanistan, a few lessons can be learnt and hence a possible prediction of the effectiveness of the strategy may be made. In Afghanistan, Americans have been unable to vet recruits into the security forces and completely discriminate Taliban loyalists. The often swing in loyalty makes many recruits to have the potential of turning against the Americans – their trainers.

In Somalia, things are not any different. Loyalty often swings between the organization (either government or Al Shabaab) and the clan. Loyalty to clan is extremely strong and is likely to undermine loyalty to the national government. Where a captured Al Shabaab belongs to the same clan as the security officer, how he is treated will be influenced by clan ties. This will dilute cohesion of the national force, encourage defections and undermines overall security efforts.

Secondly, when Al Shabaab is labeled terrorists and the policy of the international security agencies is that of no negotiating with terrorists, it closes the diplomatic door and military remains the only option. The Al Shabaab remains as outsiders and the political process excludes them, leaving them with no option but quest for power through use of force. Political exclusion itself often fuels resistance and conflicts and it is a major factor in many conflicts especially in Africa.

Al Shabaab uses the indoctrination both for recruitment and retention of its membership. A military attrition of the group will only harden them and may even elicit sympathy among clan members for it is virtually impossible to kill a people and what they believe in. If this is the case, then Al Shabaab are likely to use time to wear down the foreign forces in Somalia, reduce their

national public opinion on the viability of a military engagement without a decisive victory and eventually make military involvement in Somalia too costly to maintain. If this is so and coupled with endless periodic terrorist attacks, it is highly likely that the resolve to have the forces remain indefinitely in Somalia will reduce.

Thirdly, this strategy lacks time-bound limits and is depended on foreign resources for sustainment. This makes the strategy process weak and limited. The process is subject to conditionalities of the donors and hence lacks latitudes in freedom of action. Force levels are determined by donors, equipment and weaponry are limited to those authorized and operations are subjected civil and international scrutiny. These are highly limiting factors.

First, it ought to be appreciated that since the enemy is fighting an unconventional warfare to employ conventional process may have immediate results but may not succeed in all fronts. Secondly, the conditionality that limits force levels restricts the extent of military deployment and hence limit the capacity of the mission. For these reasons it can be argued that the gains that have so far been made by the mission in Somalia are short term and success of the mission will depend on developing a much longer term strategy with time bound limits. The latitude to have force levels determined by the military leaders of the forces inside and to have the resource to support is key in achieving a decisive victory. The Americans went through a similar debate for Afghanistan mission until a strategy that allowed the optimum force levels was adopted before they started seeing positive results. Otherwise the mission in Somalia as it organized with current force levels will continue to face challenges of an elusive invisible enemy inside Somalia. Al Shabaab is likely to avoid military confrontation inside Somalia and instead engage in terrorist attacks on civilians in undefended social areas inside the countries of the troop contributing countries to Somalia. This is where Al Shabaab's threat to Kenya is likely to shift.

4.4.2 Piracy in Indian Ocean

Incidents of piracy along the Indian Ocean became very prevalent around the year 2008/9 whereby over 46 ships had been attacked by pirates in a span of one year. This made the Somali waters to be declared by the International Maritime Bureau as the most dangerous waters for shipping in the world today. This adversely affected commerce in the region, and interfered with the sea lanes of communications. Coalition forces from many nations teamed up to address the piracy issue and their effort contributed to the reduction of incidents, but they were still occurring.

Kenya's strategy to piracy was through engagement with force. The policy provided for Kenya Navy and Kenya Air Force to conduct maritime patrols and aerial surveillance along our coastline and into Kenya's territorial waters. When Kenya moved into Somalia in 2011 and heightened these patrols with two engagements in which two piracy skiffs were sunk, the piracy stopped almost completely. This strategy appeared to have been most effective in counter-piracy strategy. The results were effective and immediate. To date, the Indian Ocean waters in the Gulf of Aden are relatively safe, thanks to the efforts of Kenya Defence Forces in anti-piracy campaign.

4.4.3 Conflict in South Sudan

Before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, the north-south dichotomy was the dominant paradigm for explaining the conflict in Sudan. In 2011, Lokuji suggested that the explosion of the conflict in Dafur and the problems in the East (Beja), as well as in the Nuba mountains, and Southern Blue Nile forms the initial indication that Sudan's problems may be far

deeper and wider than the historical north-south divide suggest.¹³⁹ This fear was confirmed in December 2013, when fighting broke out in Juba between the government forces and forces loyal to Riek Machar, the former vice president who had been sacked four months earlier. By late January 2014, the fighting appeared to be still going on even as a ceasefire between the representatives of the rebel groups and the government got signed sometimes in mid January 2014.

How does this conflict affect Kenya's security? The conflict remains in the domain of societal and economic insecurity. Although there remains a latent unresolved border dispute on Elemi triangle that may constitute a military threat should diplomacy fail in resolving it. Conflict in South Sudan in the social realm means likelihood of refugees, small arms proliferation and increased crimes. In economic terms, the refugees would exert pressure on local resources, and the Kenya's construction companies and financial institutions that operate in South Sudan would end up losing out and hence negatively impacting the Kenyan economy.

Internally, local manufacturers who target South Sudan as a market also lose out in the process. The overall effect is likely to create slow economic growth, job cuts, unemployment, poverty and associated crimes. Kenya's overall security is tied to the security of its neighbors. Peace and stability in South Sudan means peace for Kenya and conflict in South Sudan has a destabilizing effect not only in Kenya but in the entire region. It is therefore in Kenya's interest that peace in South Sudan is achieved and maintained. Kenya's strategy in the process is to remain neutral and play a mediatory role in bringing together the parties in conflict and through the regional mechanisms for conflict resolution under the IGAD framework achieves sustainable

¹³⁹ Alfred Sebit Lokuji, Beyond the North-South Dichotomy in Sudan: Issues, Actors and Interests in *Understanding Obstacles to Peace, Actors, Interests and Strategies in Africa's Great Lakes Region*, Mwesiga Baregu ed. (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2011), pp. 170-221.

peace. So far this strategy is gaining acceptance and bearing results. As at when this study was being conducted, a ceasefire agreement had been reached and mediation process was ongoing.

4.4.4 Conflicts in Great Lakes

Conflicts in the great lakes regions is made with reference to conflicts in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and northern Uganda involving government forces and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The conflicts in the Great Lakes have been described as a pattern of conflict system. Starting with 1994 conflict in Rwanda that resulted in the genocide, then the Burundi conflict that was initially thought to be an internal matter until its spillage raised international concern. The conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo is associated with interests on resources, ethnicity and power involving neighboring states. The result is that the conflict system in the Great Lakes region is based on a pattern of interconnecting relationships.¹⁴⁰

The overall security implications for Kenya in these conflicts are twofold. First, is the influx of refugees with their associated outcomes such as proliferation of small arms, money laundering among others things that exacerbate crime. Democratic Republic of Congo being a resource rich region is likely to attract many foreigners who would use Kenya's stability as a launching base. This is likely to lead to influx of illegal immigrants, money laundering and may encourage international crimes. Kenya has weak immigration laws that are often undermined by corruption and hence still faces a challenge in dealing with trans-border crimes of economic nature. The current strategy is to work together with other regional states within the framework

¹⁴⁰ Makumi Mwangi, *Conflict in Africa, Theory Processes and Institutions of Management*, (Nairobi: CCR Publications, 2006), p. 83.

of the various regional organizations to achieve peace and stability in the regions. The results have been positive albeit slow.

4.5 Transnational Organized Crimes

It is generally accepted that crime always represents a threat to security of ordinary people in all countries and occasionally to state institutions to some extent. In recent time crimes have evolved in magnitude and scope, transcending state boundaries, aided by technology and improved communication system to the extent that they undermine the capacity of governments and their institutions. Kenya is not the only affected country. In Italy for example, during the Cold War, the domestic threat posed by the political violence (notably the Red Brigades) and criminal violence (notably by the mafia) dominated state security policy to much the same extent as Soviet threat preoccupied the rest of Western Europe.¹⁴¹

In 2008, Kenya noted and recognized increased activities of drug trafficking transiting along the Kenyan coast to Europe that posed a security challenge to the state. Huge hauls of drugs were netted by the police while under transportation at the Coast. The existence of a network of transnational criminals operating from Kenya could not be ruled out. Kenya therefore recognized the threat to its citizens and institutions that was posed by these transnational crimes.

The expansive economic, transportation, and information networks that define today's world provide greater opportunities for these criminal actors to move illicit commodities, illegally generate revenue, and globally project their influence. The threats they pose are transnational and insecurity caused affects all states. These threats cover a wide range of sectors such as the penetration of state institutions, resulting in corruption and a threat to governance, threats to the economy, terrorism, drug trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking small

¹⁴¹ Peter Hough, *Understanding Global Security 2nd ed.*, (New York: Routledge 2008), p. 230.

arms trafficking and cybercrime. Sometimes they are also associated with disappearances of persons, prostitution rings and sexual bondages, illegal arms dealings, money laundering and criminal gangs.

Whereas every country develops strategies for combating these crimes, effectiveness of these strategies lies in cooperation and coordination with various regional and international organizations that deal with the same matter. It is now universally accepted, as noted by the Secretary General of InterPol in 2003, that “no one country can effectively fight transnational crimes within or outside its borders”. To effectively combat transnational crime require that states cooperate in efforts that might require them to relinquish some of their procedural sovereignty in support of collective action.

Kenya’s strategy in combating transnational crimes is identified as multiple approaches. They involve national effort through domestic law enforcement and collaboration with regional and other international agencies involved in combating these crimes. It is difficult to assess how these strategies have either succeeded or failed but it is suffice to say that since the efforts are global, Kenya shares the general assessment of war against international crimes which in Peter Hough’s assessment, is that the global efforts has increased in recent years but remains insufficient in tackling this problem that is gradually getting beyond the control of conventional inter-state approaches. Transnational crimes will therefore remain an active agenda in the national security policy formulation process for some time.

4.6 Regionalism in Post-Cold War

Faced with transnational challenges to insecurity and the need to synergize efforts to accelerate economic development, the East African countries have moved closer towards

integration after the end of the Cold War. This has taken place under the auspices of the East African Community. The community was formed as a co-operation at the sub-regional level for the member countries to collaborate in all fields of human endeavor to raise the standards of living of the East African people, maintain and enhance the economic stability, foster close and peaceful relations among the member states and accelerate the successive stages in the realization of the Community's objectives and Political Union.

Whereas it may be argued that the integration has security challenges when free flow of goods and people is realized, the accruing benefits and the resultant synergy in countering any negatives far outweigh the challenges. The integration is imbedded with a security collaboration framework that not only mitigates transnational crimes but also empowers national institutions in combating national crimes. Besides, the collaboration between the member countries in other non-security fields creates confidence and help reduce any tensions that would otherwise generate into a security threat.

4.7 Environmental Insecurity

The emergence of concerns of security threats emanating from changes in the environment is a recent phenomenon. The subject is still under debate and the scale of the threat to humanity is difficult to assess but is undoubtedly significant. Although awareness regarding changes in environment was brought to fore as early as 1860s (George Parkins works on *Man and Nature*) and the sensitivity of these concerns over these changes only came to limelight from 1970s. In the 1990s environmental issues have received greater attention in foreign policy making circles and among international organizations. The most significant issues that are today associated with environmental security is the resource scarcity due to population growth, ozone depletion and global warming.

Globally the competition for non-renewable resources is a new destabilizing trend. In Kenya, conflicts among the pastoralists are directly linked to depletion of pasture and water sources and hence conflict over the scarcity of these resources as a result of environmental degradation. Besides scarcity, poor agricultural practices, deforestation, overgrazing, soil degradation and erosion, natural disasters, air and water pollution, bio-diversity threats, all undermine the natural resource base and further worsens the insecurity threat associated with the environment.

The environment is one of man's shared global commons that require collective and cooperative action to protect. The origins of International policy on the issue of environmental change can be traced as far back as 1889 with international convention to prevent the spread of the disease *phylloxera* in grapes.¹⁴² In recent times, there have been considerable global efforts to mitigate environmental degradation. The 1987 Montreal Protocol on cuts to chloroflourocarbons emissions, 1992 Earth Summit in Rio De Janiro, and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol are all but collective efforts to mitigate environmental and climate changes.

The Kenya government in its policy documents has expressed both determination and commitment to the efficient and effective utilization and management of natural resources at a national level but equally as part of the global efforts on environmental conservation. Institutions such as National Environmental Authority (NEMA) are part of the domestic efforts that address the environmental agenda. The challenge that the government faces is in the actualization of these policies to ensure that the exploitation and utilization of the resources is made in a sustainable manner.

How successful Kenya has been in environmental conservation is debatable. While the environmental agenda has been institutionalized in Kenya and relevant conservation polices exists, the actual implementation of these polices is often undermined by political considerations. For example in 2008 national policy required people living in Forests that were water tower to be evicted. When eviction of squatters in the Mau Forests commenced, it immediately faced political resistance despite the adverse environmental consequences that would result with the continued deforestation. It can therefore be said that the environmental agenda in Kenya has received both the awareness and governmental attention as a

¹⁴² Peter Hough, *Understanding Global Security 2ed*, (New York: Routledge 2008), p. 145.

security threat, however, actualization of associated policies to mitigate its effects that is the securitization of the environment is yet to be achieved.

4.8 Conclusion

The external determinants of Kenya's national security policy have seen to emanate from the domains of military, societal and environmental threats. Military threats have received central treatment at policy formulation level and rank high among security priorities pointing to a state-centric approach to security. Terrorism today is considered one of the most imminent threats to national security followed by the effects of regional conflicts while societal issues such as international organized crimes which are a cause of concern but are not fully appreciated or given the securitization label. Environmental security is a modern security concern but for Kenya it accounts to much of the inter-tribal conflicts among the pastoral communities in the North Rift and North Eastern Kenya.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The premise upon which these findings, conclusions and recommendations are made is on the appreciation that it is not possible to achieve total security. No single country has achieved it and it would be naïve to think that there is a template for total security. As long as the international system remains anarchic and man's nature remains unpredictable, insecurity at the human and state levels will continue to be there. It is therefore appreciated that security policy formulated will only control, reduce or minimize insecurity but shall not eliminate it.

Secondly, the process of national security formulation, like in most countries, notably the United States whose documented processes in available in most literature, involves an interaction between people and various organizations whose varied interests are often representative of the challenges in policy formulation. To divorce or minimize these interests is part of the strategy in the suggested recommendations.

5.2 Findings

First, the study found that Kenya has a well structured national security formulation process that is anchored in the constitution and its membership and mandate are clearly spelt out. It first operated as the National Security Advisory Council (NSAC) in the previous constitution and now exists as National Security Council (NSC) in the new Constitution of Kenya 2010. This council is the top organ that formulates security policies and has a structured downward framework of security committees that goes down to county and ward

level. It is supported by a joint secretariat with various technical staff who provide both the analysis and technical information to facilitate decision making at the council.

This structure resembles the United States' state-centric structure during President Reagan tenure. It was a highly state-centric framework influenced by the Cold War rivalry and the center of gravity of security policy formulation oscillated between the departments of defence to state (foreign affairs office). It was reported that Secretary of State then Alexander Haig, during his term influenced the center of gravity of national security policy formulation to shift from department of defence to state department.¹⁴³

Secondly, the study found that the national security policy formulation process in Kenya in terms of the definition of national interests and the determination of strategies to deal with threats is highly state-centric. This argument is supported by analysis of the membership and issues that take center stage at the National Security Council. First, state-centric approach is a realist perspective that views state as the referent object of security and the sovereignty of the state, its survival, integrity are the primary focus of security. The security is defined by military power and focus is on the survival of the state. The dominant agencies are military, internal security agencies and foreign affairs with a corresponding economic power or an appropriate funding to support the strategies. This view presumes that if the state is secure, then so too will those that live within it.

The composition of the National Security Council (NSC) as outlined in the Constitution of Kenya 2010 consist of the following; the President, the Deputy President, the Cabinet Secretary responsible for defence, the Cabinet Secretary responsible for foreign affairs, the Cabinet Secretary responsible for internal security, the Attorney-General, the Chief of Kenya Defence Forces, the Director-General of the National Intelligence Service and the Inspector-

¹⁴³ James H. Dixon, *National Security Policy Formulation*, (New York: University Press of America, 1984) p. 28.

General of the National Police Service. This composition reflects representation that would address external threats and internally related threats of violence.

The main functions of the NSC as per the constitution are to integrate the domestic, foreign and military policies relating to national security in order to enable the national security organs to co-operate and function effectively. Secondly, NSC is to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments and risks to the Republic in respect of actual and potential national security capabilities.

The National Security Advisory Council still exists (though not defined in the constitution) to advise the NSC and its composition is similar to the NSC except with representation of the Principal Secretaries instead of Cabinet Secretaries and its chaired by the secretary to the cabinet and has the Principal Secretary from the treasury as a member. It has provision of co-opting members when need arises and this is seldom the case.

A close examination of this structure shows its state-centeredness approach to security in that threat are viewed as either external or violent internal threats as represented by the presence of the head of police service. The main issues that dominate discussion in both councils are matters pertaining to internal violence or external incursions that threaten state sovereignty and integrity.

Today, Kenya views food insecurity and terrorism as its most pertinent threats. To enable these two to be securitized, they both need to have a presentation at every level of the security policy formulating level and their issues debated on and appropriate security policy recommendation to the NSC be considered for adoption. To securitize, as earlier defined means taking an item from its normal domain and lifting it to a level where extraordinary measures and resources are applied to address it with urgency. Terrorism can be presented by both the agencies

of defence and intelligence at both NSAC and NSC. Food security on the other hand has no agency representation both as NSAC and NSC and would therefore receive less attention and emphasis if it were to be addressed as an agenda item.

This would explain why despite the very elaborate and comprehensive national food policy (one of the best written policy papers in Kenya, according to the researcher) Kenya still suffers perennial food shortage and food insecurity. As long as the implementation of food policy is not securitized, it will remain in the normal political discourse. This explains why strategies or proclamations such as “encouraging proper land use, encouraging farmers to diversify crops and encouraging irrigation” are common phrases with little results.

Thirdly, the study found that the structure and composition of NSAC and NSC and the dominant issues of discussion in these two councils are mainly related to military threats and internal security threats associated with immediate threats of violence. This supports the state-centric view to national security as earlier eluded to that views security from the traditional concept of security. This traditional concept views the state as the referent object of security and security is analyzed in the political, military and economic sectors.

However, the traditional approach to security was challenged at the end of Cold War. In 1980s, the traditional view of security started to be altered. Barry Buzan tried to broaden the scope of security, arguing that the security studies should not be limited to military. There are many aspects that are important to state security such as politics, economy, society and environment.¹⁴⁴ In this broadened form, security can therefore be analyzed in the military, political, economic, societal and environmental sectors. This new scope recognizes the existence of threats which equally threaten lives of human beings outside the traditional domain of security. It is human centered and to achieve a policy choice that embodies this concept, each sector requires equal

¹⁴⁴ Buzan, B., *People, State and Fear*. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983), p. 45.

representation in the policy formulation process. It is only when an agenda item is well presented that it will be able to achieve its securitization status.

Even in the United States security policies are developed through interactions and debates and policy choices are adopted on the basis of consensus as to what constitutes a threat and what does not constitute a threat to national security. The balance always tilts towards how well an agenda is presented to the council as a security threat.

Fourthly, the study found that issues that dominate the agenda of the security policy formulating bodies are largely from intelligence analysis and reports and ongoing security challenges as presented from grassroots. This method has both advantages and disadvantages. First, it enables the council to address security challenges promptly as they occur. The results are immediate and the impact instantaneous. It is likely to have wide public support as well. However, it may be considered as reactive and may lack the required resources due to its urgency. It gives the councils less time to develop more comprehensive strategies. It is also a short term and may obscure medium and long term threats in the process.

Fifthly, the study found that emphasis on security policy was weighted more towards threats from internal violence that threatened national security, terrorism and external aggression such incursions by Al Shabaab between 2010 and 2011. Issues such as food insecurity, environmental degradation, poor health and sanitation which are human centered, although threaten security, they receive less emphasis at the national security policy formulation level. A disease such as HIV/AIDs although was declared a national disaster, the corresponding response coupled with limited capacity and resource challenges does not reflect measures of a securitized issue.

Environmental degradation, overgrazing, poor land use are issues with security implication but their limited representation at the security policy formulation bodies gives them little emphasis as threats to national security. Strategies which address food insecurity are largely short term and strategic grain reserve has never been able to be stored to even half its capacity in the last 20 years.

The sixth finding in the study was that the performance or the outcomes of the national security policies had mixed results. Some performed well while other did not. For example, strategies of dealing with Al Shabaab incursion, though not documented, is evident in the gains Kenya Defence Forces has made in Somalia, it reduced if not eliminated piracy and cross border abductions. On the other hand, strategies and policies that has been developed over the years to deal with cattle rustling in the North Rift and among the pastoralists in Northern Kenya has had little success as the problem remain perennial and recur every so often. The reasons that explain why some strategies performed well and other did not were beyond the scope of this study and could be a subject of a future or another research.

5.3 Conclusions

This study has examined the determinants of Kenya national security policy since independence utilizing realists and liberalist perspectives. It looked at the historical origins of main issues in Kenya's security theme. It then examined both internal and external determinants of security policy viewed from perspective of the broadened security definition. It also looked at the organs that are involved in national security policy formulation, the decision making process and the main issues that mostly form the agenda of security policy formulation debates.

Key in the findings is that Kenya's national security policy is determined on the basis of traditional concept of security which is state-centric. This concept focuses largely on military threats and internal security challenges of violent nature. It considers the state as the referent object of security and focus and emphasis of policy are biased towards state security. State-centric security tends to overlook the individuals and this causes a blind spot in pursuit of human security. In state-centric security, too much focus is put on state sovereignty that other security threats such as environmental and societal are considered in the periphery.

Consequently, other threats defined from the broadened scope of security such as societal and environmental threats are given less emphasis and are largely excluded from the securitization debates. On the contrary, these non-traditional threats pose existential threats to national security in real terms. They have the potential to erode state sovereignty and undermine economic development and democratic stability. The nature of these non-traditional threats is such that they can be more harmful than military threats. They affect not only states but are human focused and can destroy societies and communities.

The structure, composition of the main national security policy formulating organs and their main agendas, encourages state centrism and hence the lack of attention and emphasis that other non-traditional security threats receive. In this way, insecurity related to non-traditional threats is exacerbated. This, in the opinion of the researcher may be the reason that account for the existing and increasing state of insecurity in Kenya. This insecurity is related food scarcity, high rate of unemployment creating restless youth vulnerable to violence, pastoralists' conflicts and cattle rustling, ethnic conflicts, electoral violence, poor health and sanitation and environmental degradation. Accordingly, to address this gap security policy formulation framework

should address security threats with equal emphasis on the basis of the broadened scope of security.

5.4 Recommendations

The recommendation of this study is made with the realization that it is not possible to achieve 100 percent security. These recommendations are therefore meant to achieve; 1) a reduction in general insecurity 2) a policy that addresses security in its broadened scope 3) a broader framework for policy formulation to achieve a more comprehensive national security policy 4) a more proactive policy.

First, it is recommended that the structure of National Security Council Advisory Council (NSAC) which advises the NSC be expanded to include principal secretaries who would present both the environmental and societal aspects of security. These would include representations from; Agriculture, Health, Environment and Youth and Social Affairs. The representation from these sectors would provide the necessary technical knowledge, details and the emphasis of the impact of the issues of these sectors on security that would enable their agendas to qualify as national security issues to enable them to be securitized.

Secondly, it is recommended that national security policy formulation be metamorphosed into a process that is integrated with the necessary capacity for assessment, analysis and forecasting of threats in the broadened scope of security. This would reduce the state-centric approach and focus of the current process and would make the process broader and more inclusive.

Thirdly, it is recommended that a documented periodic national policy be produced based on the lessons learnt from previous policies, to include projected threats and strategies for

combating expected threats. This would remove the reactive nature of the current process. It would de-link formulated policies from reacting to current and emerging threats. This system is practiced by most developed countries such as Britain and United States. For example, when the United States was confronted with a terrorist attack in 2001 that caused massive devastation and undermined national internal security, the United States revised and produced a new National Security Policy 2002, which reconfigured the homeland security and provided the new approach to global war on terror that has defined United States foreign policy in the decade of 2000.

Fourthly, it is recommended that national security policy once formulated on the basis of the broadened scope of security must not remain in the domain of security practitioners only. The policy should be integral to all government agencies and planning at all levels. Except for those aspects which are classified, others especially non-traditional threats ought to be shared by all government sectors for planning. In this way, the awareness of the national security policy is made to all government agencies at all levels and synergy is created in the implementation of these policies. Plans and activities will be able to be supported by resources as all government agencies will be aware of the policies and the expected results. The resulting synergy should achieve an immediate reduction in insecurity.

Fifthly, it is recommended for further research the determination of the relationship between national security policy orientation (that is state-centric or human-centered policy) and the success or failure of such policy in Kenya since independence.

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Appendix A to:
Research Proposal on
The determinants of Kenya's national
security policies since independence

Questions to guide interviews and discussions with serving or ex-members of National Security Advisory Council (NSAC) and National Security Council (NSC) of Kenya

These questions are part of the data collection tools for the academic research on the subject of “*The determinants of Kenya's national security policy since independence*”. They are designed to guide discussions with senior government officials in the security sector with special focus on those who served in NSAC or are serving in NSC.

1. During your term as a member of the NSAC or NSC, what issues were considered as threats to Kenya's national security, internally and externally?
2. How did/does Kenya strategize to confront these threats and what were the results?
3. Explain briefly the decision making process at NSAC or NSC of arriving at national security policy?
4. How has Kenya's security policy been influenced by regional cooperation arrangements?
5. How has Kenya's security policy been influenced by world's super power (s)?
6. What changes (if any) were there in Kenya's threat assessment after the end of the Cold War and if there were, how did it influence the national security policy?
7. What issues does NSC consider today to be Kenya's national security threat?
8. Which areas of security (if any) do you think Kenya lacks comprehensive national policy?

Appendix B to:
Research Proposal on
The determinants of Kenya's national
security policies since independence

To Member of NSC

Dear Sir,

REQUEST FOR RESEARCH INTERVIEW

Sir, I am currently pursuing an MA Program with the University of Nairobi in International Studies with bias on Security Studies.

My research topic in "*Determinants of Kenya National Policies Since Independence*".

As a member of NSC (former NSAC), I wish to draw from your experience and knowledge in this research process.

Sir, I am kindly requesting for a few minutes interview with you to get your views along the lines of the proposed questions attached within the limits of security of information.

The research hopes to contribute to knowledge in the area of National Security Policy formation process.

Sir, your knowledge and experience is considered invaluable in this research process, kindly advice.

Yours sincerely,

F O OGOLLA

Brigadier

