

**Factors Influencing Management of Conflict in Kenya: A  
Case of Turkana and West Pokot Border**

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## DECLARATION

This project is my original work and has not been presented for any award in any other university.

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## **DEDICATION**

This work is dedicated to my parents Jane Chepor and late Ktum Lotiolo

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## **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

<b>CDF</b>	Constituency Development Fund
<b>CDFC</b>	Constituency Development Fund Committee
<b>CKRC</b>	Constitution of Kenya Review Commission
<b>IEA</b>	Institute of Economic Affairs
<b>NFD</b>	Northern Frontier District
<b>NPPP</b>	Northern Peoples Progressive Party
<b>SPSS</b>	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>USAID</b>	United States Aid

## ABSTRACT

The conflict between Turkana and Pokot communities has been occurring frequently for since independence. This has mostly been prevalent along the borders regions of the two areas. With the advent of new constitution, it was expected that the new county governance would help restore peace and cohesion among the two communities. It is one year down the line and it is not known whether devolution, religious groups' activities, civil societies, and culture have affected the management of cross-border conflict between the two regions. The purpose of this study was to investigate the factors influence the management of cross-border conflict between West Pokot and Turkana along Turkwel power station and Akwulo water reservoir. The objectives of the study were to determine the influence of culture and traditions, religious groups, civil societies and devolution on management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and West Pokot. The study theoretical framework was underpinned from conflict transformation model of Kumar Rupesinghe. Descriptive survey research design was used and the mixed method design was chosen to carry out the study. The target population comprised of 1553 residents living on the two sides of the border, 20 county security committee members and 4 chief security officers from the two counties. The sample size for residents was derived from Kathuri and Pals table for sample size determination. The residents sampled will be selected through stratified random sampling technique while the key informants were selected through purposive sampling technique. The study used questionnaires, interview schedules and documentary evidence as instruments for data collection. The instruments were tested for validity and reliability. Data collected was analysed descriptively for quantitative data and thematically for qualitative data. Data analysed was presented in tables, pie charts and graphs. The study findings showed that devolution, civil society, religious groups and cultural traditions and elders played a significant role in management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and West Pokot. For instance, the members of the clergy were found to be at the forefront in advocating for peace, giving hope to victims, they were involved in disarmament exercises and some of them organised regular peace meetings. Moreover, 77.2% believed that devolution has tried to resolve cross-border cross border conflict since coming into force in 2013. The study recommends that dialogue should be initiated between the two county government, religious leaders should be impartial, civil society should implement projects benefiting the two communities and the traditional elders decisions made during mediation meetings should be followed to the later to avoid future conflict occurrence. It is expected that the results of the study will be of beneficial to both the county governments, national governments, residents living across the border and future researchers.

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background to the Study

Studies have been conducted across the world to look at the factors facilitating management of cross border and armed conflict. At many cross border conflict management process, parallel hierarchies of traditional leadership, local government, line department-sponsored committees, religious groupings and civil societies exists (Shackleton, Campbell, Wollenberg, and Edmunds, 2002). Often these had unclear or overlapping jurisdictions and mandates in resource management that led to institutional conflict and struggles for power and revenues (South Africa, Lesotho, and India) (Shackleton and Campbell, 2001). Such conflicts tended to deflect focus away from local users, sidelining or rendering them invisible. In other cases, the influence of government and local élites over joint committees was strong (e.g. Zambia, India), and community representation and input severely diluted. NGOs, donors and the private sector further shaped outcomes by allying themselves with particular local groups or government officials (CIFOR, 2000).

Thailand's southern provinces have experienced intermittent spells of civil unrest for many generations and in recent years there has been a significant increase in violence. The majority of the totals of in excess of 3500 who have died in the conflict since 2004 have been civilians. Even after Belfast Agreement, had been reached and devolution had been launched residual bad faith between the parties over disarmament threatened to undermine the entire process which broke down on three occasions before a final re-launch in 2007. This scenario has shown that despite

Thailand coping the UK devolution model, lack of political will by the Thai government resulted to increased conflict in the southern regions (Leyland, 2010).

It is argued that Sub Saharan Africa has been plagued by conflicts for the past fifty years due to boundaries disputes among ethnic communities and nations in particular (Murithi. 2006). For example there is no homogenous ethnic country in Africa but majority are consisting of heterogeneous communities. Since most boundaries between states were drawn by colonial powers with little or no regard for existing cultural boundaries, African states are more ethnically diverse than any other region of the world (Katharina, 2005).

According to Okrah (2003), traditional societies resolved conflicts through internal and external social controls. Osei-Hwedie and Rankopo (2012) opines that traditional conflict resolution processes are part of a well-structured, time-proven social system geared towards reconciliation, maintenance and improvement of social relationships. Boege (2011) identifies three main features of traditional approaches to conflict transformation: its aim, which is the restoration of order and relationships, its methods, which are holistic and consensus-based, and the context in which they can be pursued, which is generally restricted to local communal conflicts. Cultural approaches to resolving and managing disputes play a vital role in promoting peace and social order in communities (Murithi, 2006).

Individuals and faith-based organisations from a variety of religious traditions are increasingly active in attempts to end conflicts and to foster post-conflict reconciliation between warring parties in various parts of the world (Bouta et al., 2005; Smock, 2006). This is a phenomenon gaining increased attention, although it is not a new one. Haynes, (2009) indicates that religious individuals and faith-based organisations, as carriers of religious ideas, can play important roles, not only as a

source of conflict but also as a tool for conflict resolution and peace-building, providing early warnings of conflict, good offices once conflict has erupted, and contributing to advocacy, mediation and reconciliation. Brief case studies (Harsch, 2003; Appleby, 2006; Bouta et al., 2005) of religious peacemakers from Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia – demonstrate attempts, characteristically partially successful, to reconcile previously warring communities, thereby helping to achieve greater social cohesion, and providing a crucial foundation for progress in enhancing human development.

Kidombo (2013) observed that civil society has the ability to contribute to conflict management, and facilitate the conditions necessary for building a sustainable peace. However, the relevance of civil society functions and hence the civil society's conflict management potential vary according to the phases of conflict. Paffenholtz (2010) present a model with seven functions of the civil society in conflict management as: protection of citizens against violence; monitoring of human rights violations focusing on the implementation of peace agreements; advocacy for peace and human rights; socialization to values of peace and democracy as well as to develop the in-group identity of marginalized groups; inter-group social cohesion by bringing people together from adversarial groups; facilitation of dialogue on the local and national level between all sorts of actors; service delivery to create entry points for peace building (World Bank, 2006). Paolucci (2012) writing from Sudan indicates that since the mid-1990s, civil society has been increasingly recognized as a legitimate actor in peace building, able to contribute to high-level negotiations, as well as dealing with grassroots reconciliation initiatives.

Katharina (2005) postulates that devolution and conflict management have been on the agenda of development cooperation for a longer time. The author further

indicates that devolution has been discussed as a way of enhancing economic development on the one side and participation, good governance and democratisation on the other side. Its contributions to these areas lead to the expectation that it would also contribute to management of conflict related to lack of economic development, participation, good governance or democratisation. Yet it has only recently received attention as a tool of conflict management. In Uganda, Katharina (2005) found out that contrary to the expectation, devolution and the increased participation have increased and created conflict rather than managing it. This has been attributed to the design of devolution policy. The electoral system in Uganda provide for the direct election of the chairman by plurality not of the majority of the population and in the position of district chairman, power is actually recentralised. Local government in that country is not sufficiently independent from central government, with constitutional clauses in case of a state of emergency allowing a high degree of control.

In Kenya, IEA (2010) argues that devolution has been advocated as a political response to the ills plaguing fragile and plural societies, such as, conflicts, inequalities, rent seeking, economic stagnation, corruption and inefficient use of public resources. The Institute of Economic Affairs [IEA] (2010) notes that since independence, Kenya has experienced episodes of political instability which have had adverse effect on the country's economic performance and social cohesion. For example, in 2007-2008, the country witnessed violence following the disputed national elections. The IEA (2010) further notes that the country is plagued with economic stagnation, corruption, inequalities and poverty. The instability and failures is directly linked to the governance structure(s) across the country (Kimenyi & Meagher, 2004 in IEA, 2010).

From the foregoing discussions in the background information to the study, it is clear that cross border conflict management has not been achieved yet and is an interesting field for both theoretical and empirical analysis. It is therefore important for this study to look at how different factors; religious groupings, cultural traditions, civil society and devolutions play in the management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and Pokot.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

The border of west Pokot and Turkana has, in the recent times (Daily Nation, 25th November 2013) experienced ethnic violence resulting to death, injury and displacement of people from their homes due to fear of attacks. The major issues are: on boundary and resources which include Turkwel power plant, Akwulo water resources, grazing fields and salt licks. Leaders from the two counties both at the gubernatorial level and ward level have been pointing fingers at each other. The sporadic violence experienced in the region indicates that enough has not been done to manage conflict which has claimed lives of thousands of people in the two counties.

Various actors on conflict management have been on the ground for some time to try and persuade the feuding communities to quell violence and seek peace. This has been spearheaded by religious groupings (especially the Church), traditional elders and other cultural mechanisms, civil society and devolved governments. However, the gist of the matter is that despite all these players being involved in management of conflict, it is not understood which one fairs well in minimising cross-border conflict between Turkana and Pokot. Furthermore, literature from other developed countries (UK, Canada and Spain) have shown success of civil society,



religious groupings, cultural traditions and devolution towards conflict management but inadequate studies have been conducted in Kenya and especially the Turkana-Pokot border to determine the factors influencing management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and West Pokot counties, Kenya.

### **1.3 Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of this study was to investigate the factors influencing management of cross-border conflict, a case of Turkana / Pokot counties boundary.

### **1.4 Objectives of the Study**

The specific objectives were:

1. To establish how culture influence management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and Pokot
2. To investigate how religious groups influence management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and Pokot
3. To identify to what extent do civil society influence management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and Pokot.
4. To establish how devolution influence management of cross border-conflict between Turkana and Pokot

### **1.5 Research Questions**

The following are the study research questions:

1. How does culture influence management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and Pokot?

2. How do religious groups influence management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and Pokot?
3. How do civil society activities influence management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and Pokot?
4. How does devolution influence management of cross border-conflict between Turkana and Pokot?

### **1.5 Significance of the Study**

The findings of the study might be beneficial to both the Turkana and West Pokot residents, the two county governments, the national government and future researchers. To the national and county governments, the complex analysis aims to put together all relevant factors of cross-border conflict in one coherent text and present as much a comprehensive and correct picture of the cross border conflict and the ways in which the authorities should address the root causes. The findings of this study will become a valuable basis for a deeper examination of each particular aspect of the cross border conflict. Concentration on different scenarios will be beneficial for understanding the dynamics of the conflict and especially for awareness of possible impact of this conflict on people livelihoods. For residents living on each side of the border, it is hoped that the findings of the study will help to detect areas crucial to the conflict resolution. In the scholarly world, it is believed that the findings of this study will contribute to the field of peace management because it intends to introduce the theory of conflict studies which is not widely spread in the Kenyan context with the advent of new constitution dispensation. Also, the findings of this study will be important to other future researchers in conflict management.

## **1.6 Delimitation of the Study**

The study investigated factors affecting management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and West Pokot boundary. Due to the expansive boundary between the two communities, the study concentrated on Turkwel Power Plant areas, Kainuk and Akwulo water points. Also the study involved only county security committees and the officials from the national government (county commissioners) thereby locking out politicians who could present unbalanced opinion thereby affecting the findings of the study.

## **1.7 Limitations of the Study**

During data collection, some participants were not be open and sincere in responding to the questionnaires, most of them may answered questionnaires after asking the researcher several questions. The participant's interactions also hindered by other factors such as culture and fear of participant being victimized. The study overcomes this limitation by presenting a letter of authority from university which states that the study is for academic purposes only.

## **1.8 Assumptions of the Study**

The study was based on the following assumptions, that the devolution, culture, religious groups and civil societies are key to management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and Pokot, the sample size was a true representative of the target population, the respondents were willing to elicit information requested by the researcher, the study was carried out within the allocated time using allocated resources and the study findings will be instrumental in improving relations between

the two tribes residing on the border regions and this would foster unit and cooperation amongst them.

### **1.9 Definition of Significant Terms**

**Civil society** - refers specifically to those indigenous groups that are staffed and run by indigenous in Kenya. These local civil society groups have three core characteristics that are of interest in this research.

**Conflict** – refers to a serious disagreement or argument which is prolonged and sometimes involved armed struggles between two neighbouring communities,

**Cross-border conflict** – refers to conflict between communities sharing a geographical border within or in different counties units. For example the border between Turkana and West Pokot counties is being focused on in this study.

**Devolution** – refers to devolving power by the national government to the county administration. This happened in Kenya after the 2013 general elections.

**Management** – refers the act of maintaining and controlling the occurrence of cross-border conflict between two neighbouring communities.

**Ngorokos**: they are youth/warriors who are usually engaged in cattle raiding and rustling.

**Security** – Refers to a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relative high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur.

### **1.10 Organisation of the Study**

This chapter provides the basis of the study. It outlines background of the study, problem statement, purpose of the study, research objectives, research

questions, significance of the study, assumptions of the study, limitations of the study, delimitations of the study and operational definition of significance terms. Chapter two presents a review of literature together with conceptual framework and theoretical framework. Chapter three presents research design and methodological procedures; chapter four presents the data analysis, presentation, discussion and interpretation while chapter five presents the summary of the major findings of the study, conclusions, recommendations and suggestions for further research.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter provides an account of the literature reviewed on factors influencing management of cross-border conflict. The purpose of this study is to present the effect of traditional practices, religious groups, civil society and devolution on conflict management internationally and in the sub Saharan Africa. The literature review also presents the current state of conflict in the Turkana/Pokot County boundary. The reviewed literature is mainly from primary sources, journals, secondary sources; education policy documents, articles, and newspapers.

#### **2.2 Influence of Culture on Management of Cross-border Conflict**

Zartman (2000) defines cultural conflict management practices in the African context as those that “have been practiced for an extended period and have evolved within African societies rather than being the product of external importation” (Zartman 2000:7). Of course, traditional conflict transformation in its “pure” form is hardly to find on the continent since traditional societies have been subject to modern external influences which have induced processes of assimilation and adaptation (Boege 2011).

In Finland Obiero (2012) established that community centres act as a pool for laying out grievances, ironing out community differences in a diplomatic, less punitive and agreeable manner in Helsinki. Asukastalo employed various facets of conflict resolution to enhance community livelihood through mediation, reconciliation, arbitration, negotiation, dialogue just to mention but a few, methods, tools and processes that were used in attaining peace.

In Africa, traditional approaches to conflict management were born in pre-colonial segmentary societies in which the means of violence and the legitimacy of using it were not vested within the state but in every unity of the society (clans, tribes, etc.). This segmentary character is still widely present in modern Africa and often difficult to deal with by modern conflict management tools. Besides political and economic motives, conflicts in Africa and in other parts of the global South are still driven by traditional concepts such as honour, revenge and the right to violent self-help. Such traditional motives and concerns cannot be neatly separated from more modern forms of political and economic considerations. As Menkhaus (2000) points out, “traditional conflict management mechanisms tend to be process-oriented, not product-oriented; that is, they focus on managing rather than resolving conflict. In this sense, they are somewhat more realistic than standard international diplomacy, with its emphasis on peace treaties that definitively end a conflict” (Menkhaus 2000:198). Traditional approaches to conflict management are generally based on an ongoing process of subsequent renegotiations that is in sharp contrast with modern approaches and their strict timetables aimed at quick results. Nevertheless, they may, in the long-run, achieve a more locally rooted and less superficial stability.

In almost all the African sites, traditional authorities continued to play a role in NRM with varying degrees of legitimacy and control. In Zambia and Lesotho, chiefs asserted disproportionate power as chairpersons of sub-district NRM structures and diverted some community-based (CB) NRM benefits to building their own power base. On the other hand, the exclusion of traditional leaders from conservancy committees in Namibia was counterproductive, resulting in conflict and delays, until these leaders were co-opted onto the committees.

Traditional authorities among the Miao people in China played an important role in limiting abuses of devolution policies by local bureaucrats and traders, and maintaining traditional forms of forest protection and access. In several cases, traditional leaders were provided an ex-officio or non-executive role, for instance as patrons on committees (Namibia). In others, such as Malawi, the NRM committees reported to traditional leaders who remained external to the committee. Another model was to leave communities to decide whether or not to elect hereditary leaders onto local committees. Where traditional leadership was strong and legitimate it had positive impacts in promoting local people's priorities (e.g. Malawi, Makuleke, Lesotho and Guizhou, China). Where it was weak or biased towards certain ethnic groupings, as in the Botswana case, lineage leaders had little support or role in new NRM structures (Shackleton et al., 2003).

In Darfur, a customary system of mediation exists which is called *Judiyya*. This process is "specifically designed to ensure peaceful coexistence despite resource competition and fragmentary alliances, such as those that characterize the Sahel and the Sahara" (Sansculotte-Greenidge 2009:75). It involves third-party mediators called 'Ajawid' (elders), who must be accepted by all involved parties on the basis of their reputation and their knowledge of traditions. Settlements achieved through *Judiyya* involve the payment of compensation in order to re-establish a degree of social harmony. The Ajawid are not neutral but make recommendations and pressure the parties to accept a settlement, thus acting, according to the circumstances, as facilitators, mediators or arbitrators.

Everyday forms of engagement consist of simple, routine interactions of life, such as whether families from different communities visit each other, eat together regularly, jointly participate in festivals, and allow their children to play together in



the neighbourhood. Both forms of engagement, if robust, promote peace; contrariwise, their absence or weakness opens up space for ethnic violence (Mkutu, 2006). Mkutu, (2006) reports that in recent decades have seen an escalation in interethnic resource conflicts and banditry among pastoralists in the Kenya-Uganda border region. Mkutu (2006) further propounds that state management has been largely unsuccessful and often counterproductive in reducing numbers of small arms. The creation of paramilitary institutions in rural Kenya and Uganda are an example of how legal arms are entering communities and intensifying the conflicts further.

Most communities are largely nomadic and pastoral, with cattle herding providing the main economy in this very arid region. Cattle rustling is a traditional activity among all plains pastoralists. Historically, it has been a method of wealth redistribution to ensure that all were fed at times of scarcity and also a means of payment for bride price and the making of alliances with other groups. For centuries, spears, bows and arrows were used in raids, deaths were treated seriously and compensated with cattle, and warriors rarely harmed women, children or the elderly. However, the last 25 years have seen a transformation of raiding into large-scale armed conflict, resulting in many deaths and the emergence of racketeers and bandits. Recent conflicts in the cross-border area have been characterized by a number of worrying developments. First, there have been an increased number of attacks on unarmed civilians, in particular women, elderly people and children (Mkutu, 2005).

### **2.3 Religious Groups and Management of Cross-border Conflict**

Appleby (2000) stated that one part of the world which is taking religious conflict resolution increasingly seriously, at least at the rhetorical level, is the United States. Religion has always played a role in US foreign policy, being indivisible from

American values and perceptions of its role in the world. During the Cold War According to Bercovith, (2000) America's self identification as 'leader of the free world' included the belief of its being a religious (Christian) nation against the forces of godless atheism represented by the Soviet bloc. In contrasting the human rights records of the bipolar powers Christian leaders emphasized the plight of the underground church behind the iron or bamboo curtains. After the Cold War concern for religious persecution continued with religious organizations and congressmen agitating for the protection of religious minorities around the world and for the implementation of the International Religious Freedom Act 1998, which mandates the State Department to provide a religious health appraisal for all countries and for special reports to be produced on countries of concern.

The discipline of international relations and its sub disciplines of security and strategic studies have been dominated by a positivist social scientific approach that reifies rational actors and has been largely unable to accommodate religion as a variable factor in the development and application of theory. The strict separation of church and state in both *de facto* and *de jure* secular states had enabled a state centric international relations discipline to ignore religion, despite its centrality in the lives of most of the world's inhabitants.

Dennis Hoover (2004) postulated that the old fault lines between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, Christianity and Islam would play out in violent conflict as the 1990s unfurled with the violent breakup of the former Yugoslavia into Slovenian, Croatian, Bosnia-Herzegovinian, Serbian-Montenegrin, and Macedonian components based substantially on religious identity. The Chechen Wars (1994–96, 1999–2009) and Kosovo (1999) along with ongoing conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria and Sudan, Hindus and Muslims in Kashmir, Sikhs, Muslims and Christians

in India and Buddhists and Hindus in Sri Lanka seemed to point to religion's capacity to antagonize and lead to conflict. Dennis Hoover (2004) are among an increasing number of faith based scholars who encourage the involvement of religious actors in the delivery of foreign policy, development, diplomacy and conflict resolution.

Religious conflict resolution began to emerge in the 1990s with an increasing awareness that, if religious tradition and teaching could encourage violence and conflict, so the same traditions could be applied to bring about the resolution of conflict. After all, religious traditions have scriptures, teaching and a historical memory of peace building, peacemaking, peacekeeping and conflict resolution. In very real sense religious actors – as individuals, movements or organizations have always been involved in resolving conflicts (Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009).

Appleby (2000) described religious ambivalence to violence but nonetheless argued persuasively that religious actors were essential to peace processes and deserved greater international support. Religious actors may have exacerbated conflict in Northern Ireland, with prominent Protestant clergy equating nationalist aspirations with a Papist plot; in South Africa the Dutch Reformed Church underpinned the apartheid system and in the former Yugoslavia the Serbian Orthodox church provided legitimation for the quest for a greater Serbia, and yet in all three instances a relatively peaceful resolution to conflict was brought about through the active involvement of religious actors in peacemaking and reconciliation. Such examples paved the way for a more serious engagement with religion's capacity to heal rather than divide.

Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson argue that traditional measures of dealing with conflict are becoming increasingly obsolete in an uncertain world where identity plays a central role: Such disputes tend to occur at the fault lines between

rival nationalities or in situations where societies are suffering from the strains of economic competition and rising expectations. These are the most intractable sources of conflicts, and they are the sources with which conventional diplomacy is least suited to deal (Johnston and Sampson, 1994). Those who, like Johnston and Sampson, urge a religious dimension to diplomacy and conflict resolution need government to take religion seriously and to use religious actors in bringing about peace and reconciliation.

Individuals and faith-based organisations from a variety of religious traditions are increasingly active in attempts to end conflicts and to foster post-conflict reconciliation between warring parties in various parts of the world (Bouta et al., 2005; Smock, 2006). This is a phenomenon gaining increased attention, although it is not a new one. Religious individuals, often as representatives of faith-based organisations, have for decades carried out mediation, striving to help resolve conflicts. Examples include: mediation undertaken by the Quakers and financed by the Ford foundation in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–70; the work of the World Council of Churches and the All Africa Conference of Churches in mediating a cessation to the Sudan conflict in 1972; efforts made by John Paul Lederach (Professor of International Peace-building at the University of Notre Dame) in Nicaragua in the 1980s; and the recent work of the Imam of Timbuktu in mediating various West African conflicts (Haynes, 2005c). This suggests that to focus single-mindedly on conflicts within and between religions not only oversimplifies causal interconnections between religion and conflict, in particular by disregarding important alternative variables, but also leads to an underestimation of attempts emerging from various religious traditions to help resolve conflicts and build peace. The point is that,

when successful, religion's role in helping to resolve conflicts and build peace is a crucial component in helping to achieve human development more generally.

'Religious peacemakers' are religious individuals or representatives of faith-based organisations that attempt to help resolve inter-group conflicts and build peace (Appleby, 2000, 2006; Gopin, 2000, 2005; Ellis & ter Haar, 2005). They are most likely to be successful when they: (1) have an international or transnational reach; (2) consistently emphasise peace and avoidance of the use of force in resolving conflict; and (3) have good relations between different religions in a conflict situation, as this will be the key to a positive input from them (Appleby, 2006). The world religions share a broadly similar set of theological and spiritual values and views and this potentially underpins their ability to provide positive contributions to conflict resolution and peace-building. Practical effects in this regard have increased in recent years, with growing numbers and types of religious peacemakers working to try to build peaceful coexistence in multi-faith societies, while advocating reconciliation and fairness in a world that often seems characterised by social and political strife and economic disparity (Bartoli, 2005).

Another step towards managing ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria is that government at all levels must encourage, in their domains, effective and functional platforms for ethno-religious leaders so that through them it would be possible to establish a network for conflict prevention and management (Ikelegbe, 2001). This proposal is necessary because in Nigeria, the various political, religious, traditional and ethnic leaders in most areas of conflict hardly sit together to discuss the causes of ethno-religious violence and how to prevent future conflicts (Imobighe, 2001). What this means is that in Nigeria, with a bad history of ethno-religious conflicts, leaders hardly met to build bridges of understanding that could lead to the establishment of

mutual confidence that could sustain a multi-ethnic society. Thus, rather than being part or initiators of the solution, they (leaders) often become part of the conflicts, which they suppose to resolve. The recent government resolution to establish a National Council of Traditional Rulers is a move in the right direction, which will go a long way in building bridges among religious and ethnic divides. It is however suggested here that such body should be expanded to include ethnic leaders, opinion leaders and religious leaders, while the government should strengthen the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIREC), which is already in existence.

#### **2.4 Civil Society and Management of Cross-Border Conflict**

Parver and Wolf (2008) indicate that many efforts have been employed around the world to build peace following a conflict. Some interventions have proven quite successful, while others have not. Notably, civil society involvement is one of the most important factors in determining whether a post-conflict peace building initiative will be successful. Efforts put forth by local government officials or the international community likely will be unsuccessful in post-conflict peace building absent civil involvement, and without a societal belief that these measures are beneficial. Further, an involved civil society is important to hold governments accountable for their actions, strengthen public policies, and develop the community following a conflict.

Experts define civil society as the voluntary actions of individuals who share common beliefs and values. This definition includes the voluntary actions of individuals as separate entities from the state, family and market, and other non-state actors and associations. While debate exists about whether the Western concept of civil society applies also to developing nations, common functions of civil society include: protecting citizens; holding government leaders accountable for their actions;

advocating public interest; socializing citizens' behaviour; building community; mediating between citizens and state actors; and delivering services necessary for the functioning of society.

Although civil society cannot fulfill all roles that a state plays in a post-conflict setting, civil society leaders and organizations provide an important perspective that sheds light on a particular community's needs and cultural characteristics. Studies have found that civil society involvement is one of the most important factors in determining whether post-conflict initiatives will be successful and sustainable (Kidombo, 2013).

Civil society organizations and local nongovernmental organizations play the most important role in building peace following a conflict. These players can most fully understand the underlying social components of the conflict. Civil society involvement provides the cultural context and understanding regarding steps that will be beneficial in peace building efforts. Including local players in peace building efforts will not take much extra work from international players; "listening to the resources that ordinary people may mobilize so as to pick up the threads of disrupted history," is all that is needed. "The objective should be to initiate a process in which local resources, knowledge and information are taken seriously, and then supported and valorised if they concur with the PCPB [post-conflict peace building] objectives, instead of being duplicated or simply ignored."

The civil society also has important roles to play in the management of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. Imobighe (2003) and Ikelegbe (2003) have stressed the need for the civil society to intervene in ethno-religious conflict. The civil society can effectively intervene by focusing attention on the social organization and structural patterns of interaction; the modes of violence employed the values of the parties in

conflict; the genesis of conflict, and the degree of incompatibility of goals among others (Omorogbe and Omohan, 2005). Just like the civil society, the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have special roles to play in conflict management in Nigeria. Therefore, governmental organizations or institutions at all levels should encourage the NGOs to embark on research and programmes of, environment, civic, religious, and peace education for neighbourhood communities (Enukara, 2005). In particular, the NGOs should be organized in such a way that they will serve as facilitators of dialogues between, conflicting groups.

NGOs played an important facilitatory and capacity building role in many of the cases, helping to bridge divergent views between local people and government agencies and manage conflict within or among communities. In some countries government departments used NGOs as project implementers. In India and the Philippines the state devolved services such as building technical and financial capacity, addressing equity concerns, and establishing communication networks to NGOs or service contracting organisations. In other instances, NGOs were the power brokers between communities and government (e.g. in Makuleke, where the community was up against the powerful South African National Parks Board).

NGOs generally displayed greater commitment to empowering communities than state agencies and worked better to integrate the development needs of local people with NRM concerns. They helped pioneer CBNRM in Namibia and the Philippines, and in Botswana NGOs were key players, assisting communities to prepare their management plans and lobbying to get trusts registered. NGOs offered different types of training, from legal rights to the use of fuel wood saving devices. In India and the Philippines, NGOs provided technical information about forest management and product marketing. NGOs also played a crucial role in promoting



gender equity and influenced outcomes through advocacy for poor resource users, which sometimes placed them in an adversarial position with the state (e.g. in Makuleke and Orissa). The influence of NGOs was not, however, always positive for local people. NGOs sometimes sided with the state or created dependency rather than empowerment, as in areas of Uttarakhand and Madhya Pradesh, India and Palawan, Philippines. Moreover, as local people's representatives and gatekeepers to the world, NGOs sometimes pushed communities into decisions they may otherwise not have taken.

At many sites, parallel hierarchies of traditional leadership, local government and line department-sponsored committees existed. Often these had unclear or overlapping jurisdictions and mandates in NRM that led to institutional conflict and struggles for power and revenues (e.g. South Africa, Lesotho, India). Such conflicts tended to deflect focus away from local users, sidelining or rendering them invisible. In other cases, the influence of government and local élites over joint committees was strong (e.g. Zambia, India), and community representation and input severely diluted. NGOs, donors and the private sector further shaped outcomes by allying themselves with particular local groups or government officials. The last two decades has witnessed a sharp rise in the number and profile of global civil society. Like Inter-governmental organizations, civil society organizations and networks have become indispensable pieces of governance and key actors that operate at all levels of the international system: global, sub-regional, national and local.

There has been a growing interest in how strengthening such groups can contribute to sustainable development and durable peace building. This enthusiasm has been partly driven by the fervent belief that civil society groups have an important stabilizing role to play in conflict-affected societies. Without any doubt the peace

processes in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mozambique, to name a few, would not have come about (at least in the manner in which they did) without the aggregated efforts of non-state actors, both local and international. In all three cases women, professionals, students, religious bodies and rural inhabitants utilized innovative approaches to make the processes more participatory (Jusu, 2004).

**Table 2.1 Seven Civil Society Functions in Peace building**

<b>Function</b>	<b>Activities</b>	<b>Typical actors</b>
Protection	Protecting citizen life, freedom and property against attacks from state and non-state actors	Membership organisations, human
Monitoring/early warning	Observing and monitoring the activities of government, state authorities and conflict actors	Rights, advocacy, NGOs
Advocacy/public communication	Articulation of specific interests	Think tanks, human rights NGOs, operational NGOs in conjunction with CBOs
Socialisation	Formation and practice of peaceful and democratic attitudes and values among citizens	Advocacy organisations, independent media, think tanks, networks
Social cohesion	Strengthening links among citizens	Membership organisations
Intermediation/facilitation	Establishing relationships	CBOs and other membership organisations
Service provision	Providing services to citizens or members can serve as entry points for peace building, if explicitly intended	Intermediary NGOs, CSO networks, advocacy organizations, faith based organisations, NGOs, self

**Source:** World Bank, (2006).

As useful as this analysis is, it does not fully capture the full range of functions and activities that these amorphous groups undertake both civil society and the international aid system have undergone rapid momentous changes over the last three decades (World Bank, 2006). The end of the Cold War, advancement in communications technology, emergence of globalization, coupled with the proliferation of civil conflicts amongst others, have led to an exponential increase in the number of local non-state actors and their financial backers in post-conflict. While most of this work has been commendable, there have been sharp criticisms about the manner in which donors and civil society interact and the ramifications for peace building. In this chapter I have outlined some of the common criticisms levelled against both donors and civil society actors in Sierra Leone. There is therefore the need to better understand the key actors and their behaviour in post-conflict societies. In spite of such dilemmas however, there seems to be a general consensus both amongst critics and proponents alike that foreign aid to societies emerging from conflict, whether to governments through bilateral agreements or channelled multilaterally or privately through civil society groups, is critical to such issues as conflict management and peace-building, sustainable development, good governance, protection of human.

On the influence of civil society in conflict management, Kidombo (2013) from inception of TeglaLoroupe Foundation, it has organized annual peace races that bring together warriors from the Pokot, Turkana and Sebei communities in Kenya and Karamoja in Uganda. Kidombo further noted that the TeglaLoroupe Peace Foundation chose sports as the entry point for peace building as it resonates well with the people from these communities. The various communities have produced world champions

such as Ben Jipcho from the Sebei, Paul Ereng from the Turkana and TeglaLorupe herself from the Pokot among others.

## **2.5 Devolution and Management of Cross Border-Conflict**

Odero (2011) informs that as from Chiapas to Chechnya, from India to Indonesia and from Algeria and Angola to Afghanistan, the world has and continues to witness the “cult of origins” where difference has often meant destruction, destitution, despair and death. Leyland (2010) reports that cross border conflict between the majorly Thai population and minority Muslim population have been witnessed for over 100 years now. Leyland posits that Thailand’s southern provinces have experienced intermittent spells of civil unrest for many generations and in recent years there has been a significant increase in violence. The majority of the totals of in excess of 3500 who have died in the conflict since 2004 have been civilians.

The outbreak of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland in 1969 can be attributed to a failure of the established political system which was then based on an elected assembly at Stormont (Bognador, 2002). These arrangements proved unable to safeguard the union while at the same time being in a position to address the institutionalised discrimination felt by Republican community. In Thailand the collapse of the existing structure was a significant factor in the escalation of violence which hitherto had continued at relatively low level. It has been noted above that Prime Minister Thaksin’s decision to seek a military solution appeared to add impetus to conflict and this was coupled with abolition of SBPAC, which had the effect of undermining the principal means of conciliation. In other words, it is not simply the fact borne out by wide experience that conflicts of this type cannot be resolved by force alone (Bognador, 2002), but that a link can be demonstrated between the

functioning of institutions under an agreed constitutional framework and a resumption of peaceful coexistence.

Equally, there are parallels in the complexity of the conflict. Northern Ireland was not simply a struggle between Protestant Unionists and Roman Catholic Republicans. The Provisional IRA was the major force on the Republican side but there were also splinter groups, including the Continuity IRA, the Real IRA and the Irish National Liberation Army. On the loyalist side the Ulster Defence Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force were the main para-military groups. In Thailand we have noted above how three separatist organisations of a previous generation have been largely transformed into various strands of a more nebulous radicalised Islam which tends to eschew any form of integration. A picture of similar complexity is apparent on the other side of the divide. On the one hand, a trend towards a defensive Buddhist nationalism has been identified as polarisation and threats has given rise to the training of local Buddhist militias such as the civil volunteers for village protection referred to as Or Ror Bor (McCargo, 2008). Temples have been turned into military strongholds and even the Sangha have received military training.

On the other hand, the King himself apparently alarmed by Thaksin's confrontational tactics preferred to emphasize 'accessibility, understanding and development' and there are prominent mainstream figures represented by current PM, Abhisit Vejjajiva, and, Anand Panyarachun, chair of the NRA, favouring negotiation towards peaceful reconciliation. As a prerequisite to a detailed formula which might include a form of devolution there is a formidable challenge ahead for those brokering any deal. In order to defuse the main source of conflict any negotiations will need to engage with a sufficiently broad spectrum of opinion, including representatives of the main groups responsible for terrorist outrages. A ceasefire may well become a

precondition for meaningful negotiation and this may only be achieved if talks are held under the aegis of a third party trusted by both sides (Clinton, 2000).

Fin surveying the context relating to Thailand, it is worth briefly turning to Wales in order to acknowledge the importance of recognising the equal adoption of local language and culture at an institutional level in these Thai provinces as part of any future agreement. Unlike the devolution on offer in Scotland and Northern Ireland, Welsh devolution recognises the central importance of the Welsh language as a living language of the law. Plaid Cymru the party of Welsh Nationalism was formed in 1925 to preserve the declining Welsh national language. As Rawlings remarks: ‘In the case of Wales, matters of the constitution and the language are inextricably linked. Notably, the active pursuit of Welsh as a living language of the law has been officially justified in terms of other possible constitutional developments’ (Rawlings, 2003).

In a policy document entitled a bilingual future the Welsh Assembly Government stated that it will provide strategic leadership to sustain and encourage the growth of the Welsh language within a tolerant, welcoming and open Wales. The Welsh language will be mainstreamed into the work of the Assembly government and its agencies. We will place greater emphasis on promoting language use and enabling individuals to use the language in all aspects of everyday life (Welsh Assembly Government, 2002). Given the distinct linguistic traditions in these southern provinces Thailand’s proposed devolution might formally incorporate a bi-lingual strategy equivalent to that of Welsh devolution.

Muia (2008) informs that devolution is a political arrangement where political, administrative and fiscal power is distributed to semi-autonomous territorial and sub-national units. In this regard, devolution is a broader than de-concentration as it encompasses more than just the transfer of administrative powers (IEA, 2010). The

authority to make public policy decisions in the political, administrative and fiscal spheres is conferred on the sub-national entities by law. The powers are, however, often determined by legislation rather than vested constitution (CKRC, 2002a). Therefore, while de-concentration manifests low autonomy and central accountability, devolution on the other hand is characterised by high autonomy and downward accountability (Oloo, 2006). This implies that devolution, the sub-national entities are not directly accountable to central government although they work within the status and rules set by it (Muia, 2008).

In Kenya, devolution creates sub-national entities which provide an additional accountability mechanism by reducing the concentration of power at the centre thus hindering its arbitrary exercise (IEA, 2010). Another key political advantage of a devolved system of government has over centralised system is that it is more inclusive. It provides channels for the expression of regional sentiments and encourages national policies to become more sensitive to regional variations. This, as has been illustrated in the case of Kenya, is a limitation of the centralised system. Further, devolution provides minorities parties which might otherwise be excluded from political power the opportunity to exercise policy influence.

## **2.6 Theoretical Framework**

It has often been said that theory is a construct which assists us in selecting and interpreting facts. In this sense, theory is intensely practical. Consequently, a the study on impact of devolution on conflict resolution will be of little practical utility unless this was contextualised within a broader theoretical framework which would assist us in determining the strengths and weaknesses of specific intervention efforts and allow us to draw conclusions which would have a wider applicability. For the

purposes of this study, the conflict transformation model of Kumar Rupesinghe will be employed. Several reasons may be advanced to justify the utility of such a model in the comparative study of conflict and conflict resolution attempts in Africa.

In the first place, unlike conflict resolution models, which cannot escape the label 'Made in the West' and a product of the Cold War's emphasis on inter-state rivalry; Rupesinghe's model lays its stress on internal conflicts and, as such, is more appropriate in a post- Cold War Third World environment where such intra-state conflicts is the norm. Secondly, because of the multi-dimensional nature of protracted social conflicts plaguing much of Africa.

Rupesinghe emphasises the need for an understanding of non-linear peace-building processes. Because of the complexity of many existing and emerging conflicts, a multi-sectoral approach to conflict transformation is needed. This multi-sectoral approach is a far more holistic approach to conflict transformation and, as such, allows it to be far more flexible in application than most conventional models which tend to be rigid resulting in a gap between theory and reality. This gap between words and actions adversely affects the quality of research findings.

This is an issue which Rupesinghe emphasises when he notes; we can speak of conflict processes—conflict transformation, conflict endurance and stagnation, and conflict transformation and renewal. However, as with human existence, conflict development is also solely linear and does not lend itself to neat compartmentalisation; it is rather a multi-dimensional, multi-faceted process". Thirdly, Rupesinghe's multi-sectoral approach also necessitates the number of actors involved in the peaceful transformation of a conflict needs to be increased to reflect all constituencies of broader society. This fact was crucial to the success of the Turkan/Pokot border case. Several factors account for this. Firstly, all constituencies



of society have a stake in peace and the peace process needs to be 'owned' by them if it is to succeed.

Secondly, it is these Turkana and west Pokot county governments which would be playing a key role in post-conflict reconstruction. This is an important point if one considers Rupesinghe's contention that the peaceful transfer of power is not meaningful transformation. Meaningful transformation also includes sustainable structural and attitudinal changes within broader society and the emergence of new institutions to address outstanding issues (Rupesinghe, nd).

Thirdly, the involvement of non-state actors is also vital in situations of cross-border conflicts where the state cannot play the role of non-partisan broker because the state may often be a party to the conflict. Finally, the inclusion of non-state actors also reflect a broader theoretical point that the dominant realist state-centric paradigm which so dominated International Relations during the Cold War era is under threat; that, ultimately issues of peace and security revolve around people as opposed to states. Therefore, in summary, the conflict transformation model of Rupesinghe argues that, coming to an agreement on outstanding issues is of secondary importance to addressing the overall conflict process and coming to terms with the temporal aspects of conflict.


## **2.7 Conceptual framework**

The conceptual framework for the study is shown in Figure 1.1. and depicts the relationship between the independent variable; factors influencing cross border conflict on dependent variable; management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and West Pokot border.

**Independent variables**

**Dépendent variable**

**Factors influencing cross border conflict**



**Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework**

The independent variables for the study involves determination of the status of cross-border conflict between Turkana and West Pokot borders, identifying factors influencing cross border conflict and are devolution, culture, religious groups and

activities of civil society. The four independent variables of the study have their own predictors that are measurable and therefore researcher. The dependent variable for the study is reflected through initiatives of the county government in management of conflict which could be indicated by the way in which the two regions or areas conduct their day to day economic activities (e.g. pastoralism, agriculture), transport and communication network, education progression and social, political and cultural cohesion.

## **2.8 Knowledge Gap**

This chapter has presented the review of related literature on factors influencing management of conflict from a global perspective, regional and then to the national and local perspective. Theoretical orientation has also been discussed together with the construction of the research conceptual model. The next chapter presents the methodological procedures to be used in conducting and collecting information from the field.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter describes the research design and research methodology that were employed in the study. It consists of the description of the research design, area of study, target population, sampling for the study, data collection instruments and procedures and finally techniques of data analysis.

#### **3.2 Research Design**

The present study was a descriptive survey research design. Abagi (1995) argues that a descriptive research attempts to describe what was or what is in a social system such as a school. Kerlinger (1978) argues for the use of surveys in fact-finding because they provide a great deal of information, which is accurate. Furthermore, Cohen and Manion (1980) stated that, ‘the intention of a survey research is to gather data at a particular point in time and use it to describe the nature of existing conditions.

Best and Kahn (2006) among others describe various research designs that a researcher can employ. These designs are: case studies, historical designs, experimental designs and survey designs among others. The mixed method design was chosen to carry out the factors influencing conflict management between Turkana and West Pokot border. Mixed method approaches are compatible and they can both be used in a single study.

### 3.3 Target Population

The study target population for the study involved residents living in the urban centres that are shared between Turkana and Pokot West Pokot counties. Table 3.1 gives the target population for the study.

**Table 3.1 Target Study Population**

<b>Strata</b>	<b>Target population</b>
Residents living in Turkana/West Pokot	1553
Border	
Turkana and West Pokot Counties	20 (10 from each side)
Security committees	
County government chief security officers	4 (2 per each county)
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,577</b>

### 3.4 Sampling Size and Sampling Procedures

Sampling is a unit that provides a practical and efficient means to collect data since it serves as a model of the population under study. According to Kothari (2004) sampling provides a valid alternative to a whole population because surveying an entire population may lead to budget constraints, time constraints and delay result analysis.

#### 3.4.1 Sample size

Kathuri and Pals (1993) table for sample size determination was used in selecting respondents to participate in the study (Appendix VI). From the table, 310 respondents (residents) from Turkana and West Pokot Boundary participated. This meant that 155 respondents from each side of the border participated in the study. For

key informants, purposive sampling was used to select them. This is because they held crucial information regarding the extent to which devolution influences conflict management at the border. Table 3.2 gives the sample designs procedures.

**Table 3.2 Sample size**

<b>Strata</b>	<b>Target population</b>	<b>Sample size</b>	<b>Sampling procedure</b>
Residents living in Turkana/West Pokot Border	1553	310 (155 for each side)	Stratified random sampling
Turkana and West Pokot Counties Security committees	20 (10 from each side)	20	Purposive sampling
County government chief security officers	4 (2 per each county)	4	Purposive sampling
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,577</b>	<b>334</b>	

### **3.4.1 Sampling Procedure**

The sampling methods that used for this study were stratified random sampling and purposive sampling technique. The residents were selected based on two major areas using stratified sampling methods (Turkana and Pokot).

### **3.5 Data Collection Instruments**

The instruments for data collection in this study were the questionnaires, and interview. Warwick and Lingher (1975) state that researchers should settle on instruments which provide high accuracy, generalizability and explanatory power with low cost, rapid speed and a minimum of management demands with high administrative convenience.

### **3.5.1 Questionnaires**

The questionnaires were prepared for residents living on the border between Turkana and Pokot. The researcher questionnaire was divided into five sections. Section (A) elicited information on their background characteristic while other sections captured information on various objectives of the study.

### **3.5.2 Interview Schedules**

Face to face interviews with security committee from both counties was conducted. They helped in triangulating information that was collected from residents regarding factors influencing management of cross-border conflict. The interview guide was structured according to the objectives of the study and was conducted during peace and security committee meetings. The researcher was guided by the interview schedule. During the interviews, the researcher asked questions and recorded the responses by the interviewees.

### **3.5.3 Pilot Testing**

In conducting the pilot study, the researcher was interested in establishing whether the respondent had the same understanding of the questions and thus would offer the information required. As (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003) argue "...even the most carefully constructed instrument cannot guarantee to obtain one hundred percent reliable data". The pilot study was conducted between the boundary of Elgeyo Marakwet County and West Pokot to familiarise with the research environment. The main purpose of the pilot study was to check on suitability and the clarity of the questions on the instruments designed, relevance of the information being sought, the

language used and the content validity of the instruments from the responses given by the respondent.

### **3.6 Validity and Reliability of Research Instruments**

The instruments used in the study were tested for validity and reliability.

#### **3.6.1 Validity of Research Instruments**

A test is valid if it measures what it claims to measure (Best, 2006). The idea of validity rests on the extent to which research data are deemed accurate, honest and on target (Best and Kahn, 2006). Validity addresses the question of whether one is measuring suitable indicators of the concept accuracy of the results and the extent to which an instrument measures what it was meant to measure. The questionnaires and interview schedule for this study was designed, developed and subjected to thorough appraisal and discussion with colleagues, supervisors and other experts both in research and in the field of project management. Their suggestions were used to make necessary corrections and implementations to ensure that the items of the tools elicited desired and valid responses.

#### **3.6.2 Reliability of Research Instruments**

Reliability is the degree to which tests agree with itself and free from random errors which normally occur through chance. As random error in the data decreases, reliability of the data increases (Mugenda, 2008). Tuckman (1978) says that one way to measure reliability is to give the same people the same test on more than one occasion and then compare each person's performance on both occasions. In order to ascertain the reliability of the instruments, a test re-test technique was used. The sample comprised of 12 residents from each side of the border between West Pokot



and Elgeyo-Marakwet. A reliability coefficient value of 0.856 was obtained making the research instrument to be reliable.

### **3.7 Data Collection Procedure**

After the instruments were cleared as valid and reliable, data administration process will begin. At first, research clearance and permit was obtained from National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) for research permit. Thereafter, permission was sought from both the Turkana and West Pokot County government to conduct research in their areas. After receiving permission from the authority, the residents were contacted upon to participate in the study. An informed consent was obtained from them prior to administration of questionnaires to them. The residents were given one week to answer the research instruments. For interviews, the researcher requested appointment with the key informants from both sides (county security committee members) to deliberate on the issues of research. The process of conducting interviews face by face took approximately two weeks (one week for the Pokot side and the other week for Turkana side).

### **3.8 Data Analysis and Presentation**

All completed questionnaires from the field were examined thoroughly by the researcher. They were coded and organized for analysis with the help of statistical Package for Social Sciences (IBM SPSS Version 20.0) computer software. The data entered was analysed using descriptive statistics; frequencies, percentages and measures of central tendency. Chi square test of independent was calculated to determine if there existed significant difference on the respondents' opinion and perception on factors influencing management of cross border conflict between

Turkana and West Pokot border. For qualitative data from interview, thematic content analysis were used to categories various responses and linked them to the objectives of the study. Data analysed form quantitative sources were presented using pie charts, frequency distribution tables, and column graphs while qualitative data from interviews were presented through use of narratives.

### **3.9 Ethical Consideration**

Research ethics is important when relating to questions about a research topic, research access, data collection and analysis (Mugenda, 2008). Ethical considerations have to do with the researcher ensuring ethical checks. According to Graziano and Raulin (1997), the researcher must ensure the respect, rights to privacy and to protection from physical and psychological harm of the respondents involved in the study. The researcher therefore ensured that each respondent understood what the study was all about. The respondents were given clear and sufficient background information on which to base their own decisions as to whether they would take part in the study or not. In each case a precise brief were given on the nature of information required from them by the researcher, confidentiality of the information provided was assured and they were asked to neither mention their personal names nor those of their specific schools anywhere on the questionnaires.

**Table 3.3 Operationalisation of Variables**

<b>Research questions</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Measuring Scale</b>	<b>Tools of data collection Survey</b>	<b>Tools of analysis</b>
To what extent does culture influence management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and Pokot	Transport & communication Education participation Number of economic activities	Ordinal	Questionnaires Interviews	Correlation
What is the influence of religious groups on management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and Pokot	Transport and communication Education participation Number of economic activities	Ordinal	Questionnaires Interviews	Correlation
To what extent do civil society activities influence management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and Pokot	Transport and communication Education participation Number of economic activities	Nominal	Questionnaires Interviews	Correlation
To what extent has devolution has influenced management of cross border-conflict between Turkana and Pokot	Economic activities Education Health	Ordinal	Questionnaires Interviews	Correlation

**CHAPTER FOUR**  
**DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND**  
**DISCUSSION**

**4.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the analysis, discussion and interpretation of data from the field on the factors influencing management of conflict in Kenya, a case of residents living within West Pokot/Turkana Counties Boundary. The first chapter covers the response rate and demographic information of respondents while the second and subsequent sections analyses the results of the study per objectives. The chapter starts by looking at the response rate.

**Table 4.1 Response rate**

<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Response rate</b>
Kainuk	26
Akulwo	32
Turkwel	21
Key informants	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>88</b>

The response rate was at 79 for residents living across the border against the sampled target which was 310. They came from Kainuk (26), Akulwo (32) and Turkwel (21). This was due to the fact that the communities are pastoralists and during the period of data collection (June 2014) majority of households living across the border had immigrated to other areas to look for pasture for their animals while some feared to answer the research instruments administered to them.

## 4.2 Background Information of the Respondents

The study first sought to investigate the personal data of the respondents participating in the study. This was sought because it would help to find out if the sample was really representative of the population. The study would use such findings to gauge the reliability of the data achieved. At first the study wanted to know the locations to which the respondents came from. The results are presented in Table 4.2.

**Table 4.2 Location of the respondent**

<b>County</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
West Pokot	38	48.1
Turkana	41	51.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100.0</b>

It is observed that half 41 (51.9%) of respondents who participated in the survey were of Turkana tribe while 38 (48.1%) came from West Pokot tribe. This ensured that the responses obtained for this research was balanced and therefore reflect the feelings and perception of both sides regarding factors influencing management of cross-border conflict between Pokot and Turkana.

### 4.2.1 Gender of Respondents

The study found it important to determine the gender of respondents who participated in the study. Their responses are given in Table 4.3.

**Table 4.3 Gender of respondents**

<b>Gender type</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Male	59	74.7
Female	20	25.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Findings reveal that most 59 (74.7%) of those who participated in the research were male while 20 (25.3%) were female. The reason for low participation of women in the research was due to the fact that most of them could not be able respond due to their commitments in looking after their families (children) and looking after their animals.

#### 4.2.2 Age Bracket of Respondents

The study also sought to find out the age bracket of respondents who answered the survey items in this study. Their responses are given in Table 4.4.

**Table 4.4 Age bracket**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Under 25	6	7.6
26-35	34	43.0
36-45	22	27.8
46-55	12	15.2
Above 56	5	6.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Majority 34 (43%) were found to be aged between 26-35 years, 22 (27.8%) were between 36-45 years, 12 (15.2%) were between 46-55 years, 6 (7.6%) were under 25 years, 5 (6.3%) were above 56 years. The residents were also asked to provide their education level as it could somehow determine their understanding of different conflict management methods employ to quell conflict at the border. The results are presented in Table 4.5.

**Table 4.5 4.1 Education level**

<b>Level</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Primary	20	25.3
Tertiary	16	20.3
High school	17	21.5
No education	26	32.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100.0</b>

It is observed that 26 (32.9%) of residents had no formal education, 20 (25.3%) had primary level of education, 17 (21.5%) had secondary level of education while only 16 (20.3%) reported to have tertiary level of education. This implies that literacy among residents living in the border is low and this could be attributed with the fact that during raids, schools and households are usually destroyed and this could be the main reason that explains why majority of respondents have no formal education despite the government providing primary education for free. Furthermore, they were asked to indicate the period to which they had lived at West Pokot/Turkana Border. Their responses are given in Table 4.6.

**Table 4.6 Period of living within the county boundary**

<b>Age range</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
1-5 years	6	7.6
6-10 years	6	7.6
16 and above years	67	84.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100.0</b>

It is evident that majority 67 (84.8%) have lived within the border for more than 16 years, 6 (7.6%) were found to have lived in the border between 6-10 years while 6 (7.6%) were found to have lived between 1-5 years. The result shows that

most of the respondents have experience of living in the area and therefore are capable of explaining various initiatives that have been carried out to quell the cross-border raids between the communities of the two counties.

### 4.2.3 Occurrence of Cross-border Conflict

Literature reviewed showed that cross-border conflict between Turkana and West Pokot counties are recurrent. Therefore, the study sought residents' opinion regarding the frequency of cross border conflict. The findings are presented in Table 4.7.

**Table 4.7 Occurrence of cross border conflict**

<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Regularly	67	84.8
Occasionally	12	15.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Findings shows that 67 (84.8%) said that the cross-border conflict occurs regularly while 12 (15.2%) said that conflict occurs on occasionally basis. This conflict is usually characterised by the following features presented in Table 4.8.

**Table 4.8 Characteristics of cross-border conflict**

<b>Characteristics</b>	<b>Yes</b>		<b>No</b>		<b>Total</b>	
	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Animals are raided	79	100.0	0	0.0	79	100.0
People are killed	76	96.2	3	3.8	79	100.0
Houses are burnt	25	31.6	54	68.4	79	100.0
Land is taken	25	31.6	54	68.4	79	100.0
People are captured	20	25.3	59	74.7	79	100.0
People are wounded	73	92.4	6	7.6	79	100.0



The results show that 79 (100%) cross border conflict feature cattle theft. This happens whereby raiders struck and move away to animals. It also shown that 76 (96.2%) of respondents indicated that people are killed during cross-border raids, 54 (68.4%) said that houses are usually burnt down during raids, 54 (68.4%) said that some people are displaced, 59 (74.7%) indicated that people are captured while 73 (92.4%) said that people are injured and wounded during cross-border conflict. Furthermore, the people involved in conflict are usually youth (*ngorokos*), 53 (67.1%) of respondents reported while 10 (12.7%) said that old men are involved in cattle raiding. The causes of the cross-border conflict are given in Table 4.9.

**Table 4.9 Causes of cross-border conflict**

<b>Cause</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Boundaries	3	3.8
Revenge	6	7.6
Prestige	23	29.1
Pasture for grazing	24	30.4
Incitement by political leaders	23	29.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100.0</b>

The result of the study shows that 24 (30.4%) of respondents said that cross-border conflicts occur because of fight for grazing land, 23 (29.4%) said that it is because leaders incite their kinsmen to attack other communities to settle political differences, 23 (29.1%) of respondents also said that raids occur because of cultural prestige in cases where young men have to go and steal livestock from the neighbouring community to settle marriage dowry, 6 (7.6%) said that conflicts occur as a result of revenge while 3 (3.8%) said that boundaries issues are sources of conflicts among the Turkana and Pokot.

### **4.3 Influence of Culture on Management of Cross-border Conflict between Turkana and Pokot**

Culture and traditions involve various practices that the society members use to manage conflict amongst households, clans and even tribes. This was the first objective of the research where the study wanted to establish whether certain culture and traditions practices by both communities were used to manage conflicts. At first, the respondents were asked whether they participated jointly in cultural activities along the border as a strategy of management of cross border conflict. The findings are illustrated in Table 4.10.

**Table 4.10 Participation in jointly cultural activities**

<b>Response</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	73	92.4
No	6	7.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Almost all 73 (92.4%) of respondents agreed they participated in joint cultural events as part of promoting peace along the border while 6 (7.6%) said that they do not participate in those events. The result reveals the importance of holding joint cultural ceremonies as part of cementing peace between the two neighbouring warring communities. Table 4.11 gives the cultural activities that the two usually participate as part of peace management initiatives.

**Table 4.11 Cultural activities that brings together Pokot and Turkana**

<b>Events</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Cultural activities and dances	25	31.6
Nomadic way of living	36	45.6
Inter-marriages	18	22.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100.0</b>

According to the results, 36 (45.6%) said that they do live together in the nomadic way as part of cultural exchange programme, 25 (31.6%) indicated that they do participate in cultural activities and dances while 18 (22.8%) noted that they do intermarry as cultural method of management of conflict amongst them. Table 4.12 presents respondents perception on effect of joint cultural events on management of cross-border conflict.

**Table 4.12 Effect of joint cultural activities and management of cross-border conflict**

<b>Effect</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	10	12.7
Somehow	64	81.0
No	5	6.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Most 64 (81.0%) agreed that joint cultural dances and ceremonies somehow managed to calm the conflict at Turkana/West Pokot border. A significant 10 (12.7%) were sure that the events restored conflict while 5 (6.3%) believed that the events do not help to restore peace among the two communities especially intermarriages helped to build relationship between families across the border. When asked whether the mentioned activities brought lasting solutions in managing conflicts, 37 (46.8%) said

that it has somehow helped, 30 (38%) believed that it will not bring lasting solution to the cross-border conflict while 12 (15.2%) said that they were hopeful that those events would bring a lasting peace to the area that has bore the brunt of violence for the past 50 years.

#### 4.3.1 Role of Traditional Elders in Management of Conflict

The study was also interested in determining the specific roles that traditional leaders played in management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and West Pokot counties. Through a scale of five (1-Never – 5 – Always), the respondents were asked to rate their responses on several statements related to specific role of elders in conflict management. The descriptive results of the analysis are as given in Table 4.13.

**Table 4.13 Role of traditional leaders and elders in management of conflict**

<b>Role of elders in peace mission</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>
They mediate in conflict	79	4.4684	.74825
They advise communities on the dangers of participating in conflict	79	4.0000	1.19829
They perform roles based on their potential, skills and feature of as well as conflict situation	79	3.4810	1.08440
They alleviate the conflict issues before sending them to court	79	3.3165	.98116
They stop problems and also change conflicts into positive ways through their authority	79	2.8101	.89265
<b>Valid N (Listwise)</b>	<b>79</b>		

The respondents indicated that the traditional elders always mediate conflict (M=4.46 and SD=0.74). The respondents also said that the elders occasionally (M=4 and SD=1.19) advise the communities on dangers of participating in conflict and they occasionally (M=3.48 and SD=1.08) perform roles based on their potential skills in conflict management. The results also show that the elders sometimes (M=3.31 and SD=0.98) alleviate the address the conflict issues amongst them before sending them to the court and they sometimes (M=2.81 and SD=0.89) stop problems and also change conflicts into positive ways through their authority.

The result implies that the traditional elders in the two communities play an important role as they mediate and help in settling the disputes amongst them. This shows that culture is an important factor in management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and Pokot.

#### **4.4 Influence of Religious Groups on Management of Cross-border Conflict between Turkana and Pokot**

This is the second objective of the research which sought to investigate the influence of religious groups (churches, organisations and clergy) towards management of cross-border conflicts between Turkana and West Pokot. Through a scale of five (1-Never, and 5-Always) the respondents were asked to indicate the frequency to which the religious organisations helped in mediating and preventing conflict between the two communities along the border. The summaries of findings are given in Table 4.14.

**Table 4.14 Influence of religious groups towards management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and Pokot**

<b>Role of religious group</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>	<b>Level</b>
Strengthen the ministry of reconciliation in churches through capacity building trainings	79	4.5570	.74673	<b>Always</b>
Engage church leadership through pastors' forums in healing, reconciliation and peace building in communities	79	4.3797	.95143	<b>Occasionally</b>
Give hope and offer material assistance to the victims of cross-border conflicts	79	4.3165	1.03210	
Organising abundant prayers calling for peace in the areas and more so in the ethnic clashes zones	79	4.2911	.87928	
Use church services to reach out to wider groups to spread messages of peace	79	4.2278	1.02469	
Reach out to wider levels of society to influence the region a leadership and policy processes to be friendly to pastoralists	79	4.1266	.85285	
Facilitate dialogue between youth, women leaders and elders	79	3.9747	.93335	
Engage the youth, women leaders elders and pastors in various social action projects aimed at building intercommunity trust and unity in peace building	79	3.8608	1.05896	
A conduit in pursuit of reconciliation, dialogue and disarmament and reintegration	79	3.5823	1.54926	
<b>Valid N (Listwise)</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>4.1463</b>	<b>1.0032</b>	

The results show that the main role of religious groups especially that the church undertakes always (M=4.55 and D=0.74) is through strengthening the ministry of reconciliation in churches through capacity building trainings on the importance of living as brothers and sisters by reflecting Christ love that is evident in the Bible. Average scores (M=4.14 and SD=1.0) shows that religious groups are fully and actively engaged in restoring peace between the two sides as they engage the Morans “*ngorokos*”, women and elders actively in agitating for peace amongst them. It is also seen that the religious groups are focused towards pursuing reconciliation, dialogue, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration which are usually difficult, tiresome but effective measures that restores hope, peace, unity, and trust among the warring communities in the area.

#### **4.5 Influence of Civil Society on Management of cross-border Conflict between Turkana and Pokot**

Civil society involves local community based organisations which are sectoral based (economic, social and political) groupings that perform their activities at village and community level. As the third objective of the study, the study sought to find out the activities of the civil society (NGOs, CSO, and CBOs) in management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and West Pokot. Through a scale of five (1-Never and 5-Always) the respondents were asked to indicate the frequency to which the civil societies helped in mediating and preventing conflict between the two communities along the border. The summaries of findings are given in Table 4.15.

**Table 4.15 Influence of civil society on management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and Pokot**

<b>Role of civil society in management of cross-border conflict</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>	<b>Extent</b>
Advocates for peace and human rights within the border	79	4.2785	1.04926	
Monitor human rights violations focusing on the implementation of conflict management	79	3.8481	.84866	
Mediate between communities in conflict across the border	79	3.8101	.90690	Occasionally
Promote education to assist transforming people across the borders	79	3.5823	.95552	
Organise peace races, singing, dancing competitions and recitation of poems	79	3.4684	1.17490	
Protects citizens on both sides of the border against violence	79	3.4177	1.11640	
Organise social events like sports matches and restocking programmes	79	3.4051	1.09215	Sometimes
<b>Valid N (Listwise)</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>3.6872</b>	<b>1.0205</b>	

Results shows that civil society working within the Turkana and Pokot boundary occasionally advocates for peace and human rights within the border (M=4.27 and SD=1.04), monitor human rights violations focusing on the implementation of conflict management (M=3.84 and SD=0.84), mediate



communities in conflict across the border (M=3.81 and SD=0.91), promote education to assist in transforming people across the border (M=3.58 and SD=0.95) and organise peace races, singing, dancing competitions and recitation of poems (M=3.46 and SD=1.17). For instance the annual Tegla Lorupe peace marathon (Kidombo, 2013) aims at quelling hostility among communities in Pokot, Turkana and Karamoja in Uganda.

The findings further revealed that civil societies sometimes; protects citizens on both sides of the border against violence (M=3.40 and SD=1.11) and organise social events like sports matches and restocking programmes (M=3.40 and SD=1.09). The result implies that civil societies have unique roles that they play towards management of conflict among Turkana/West Pokot boundary.

#### **4.6 Influence of Devolution on the Management of Cross-border Conflict between Turkana and Pokot**

This is the last objective of the study that seeks to determine how devolution influences management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and West Pokot counties. At first, the respondents were asked whether they knew about devolution. Their responses are given in Table 4.16.

**Table 4.16 Residents knowledge on devolution**

<b>Response</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	67	84.8
Somehow	12	15.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Most 67 (84.8%) of respondents understand devolution while 12 (15.2%) said that they do not understand devolution. They were further asked whether there are factors that influence devolution on management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and West Pokot counties. The results are presented in Table 4.17.

**Table 4.17 Factors that influence devolution in management of cross border conflict**

<b>Factors</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Improved allocation of resources	3	3.8
Government being closer to the people through county government	11	13.9
Historical injustices	6	7.6
Availability of resources along the borders	5	6.3
Administrative boundaries and land acquisition	6	7.6
Devolution aspects (governance and resources)	48	60.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100.0</b>

The responses shows that 48 (60.8) of respondents believed that aspects of devolution (county government and resource redistribution) is one of the factor of devolution that could influence the management of cross-border conflict. Furthermore, 11 (13.9%) observed that when the government is closer to the people, issues could be solved speedily and well, 6 (7.6%) said that devolution would address historical injustices that usually spurs conflict, 6 (7.6%) said that devolution would address issues surrounding administrative boundaries and land acquisition problems, 5 (3.8%) said that devolution would help in management of resources along the borders while 3 (3.8%) said that devolution will help to improve allocation and re-allocation of resources across the two counties that have fought for long.

#### 4.6.1 Devolution and Resolve of Cross-border Conflict

It is one year down the line since the people of both counties elected their county governments. Although a lot has not been done, the research was interested in getting the perspective of the residents living across the border of Turkana and West Pokot counties as to whether devolution has assisted in resolving cross-border conflict. The results are presented in Table 4.18.

**Table 4.18 Whether devolution has tried to resolve cross-border conflict since its initiation**

<b>Response</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	61	77.2
No	18	22.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Results shows that most 61 (77.2%) of respondents agreed that devolution has tried to manage cross-border conflict between Turkana and West Pokot while 18 (22.8%) indicated that devolution has not tried to resolve cross-border conflict. The ways in which devolution has assisted in solving the cross-border conflict is through organising of regular peace meetings, clarification of administrative boundary issues and initiating development projects along the border. However for those who said that devolution has not helped in restoring peace across the border, they remarked that unit among the two warring communities should be fostered to find a lasting solution to the problem. This is explained by the results that 69 (87.3%) of respondents said that the measures introduced had somehow managed cross-border conflict with only 10 (12.7%) found to be sure that the devolution has tried to manage cross-border conflict.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the summary of the findings of the study on factors influencing management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and West Pokot Counties, Kenya. The chapter also gives the major conclusions of the study, recommendations and suggestions for further studies.

#### **5.2 Summary of Findings**

The study involved participation of residents who are living within the Turkana/West Pokot boundary and key informants who provided secondary information to the research. Their participation rate in the study was equal and therefore the findings of the study have a balanced bearing. The study found out that majority of residents living across the border had lower education qualification levels and this was due to the fact that constant attacks made learning difficult and also majority of resident usually free their ancestral land and this discontinues their children education.

Most of the residents reported to have lived in the area for a longer period of time thereby making them and have had experienced violent cross-border raids. The study learnt that access to and use of renewable, common-pool resources essential to rural livelihoods are highly contested in the area and the study understood that improving cooperation in their management is increasingly seen as an important element in strategies for peace building, conflict prevention, and longer-term social-

ecological resilience among Turkana and Pokot. These strategies involved traditional and cultural approaches, devolution, civil society and religious groups.

For instance, in the case of devolution, its impact upon management of cross-border conflict between Pokot and Turkana has not been achieved bearing in mind that they have been one year less in office. However, this assumption cannot hold water because, the Northern Ireland conflict (1969-1998) was resolved after the British government established a devolved government in Belfast from London and the war ended. Since the introduction of county governments in the year 2013, cross-border raids have significantly reduces as a result of people feeling the government presence within their areas which provide channels for addressing their grievances. It was found that 77.2% of respondents supported the notion that devolution has helped in management of cross-border conflict.

Moreover, the study findings showed that the church is spearheading the peace building initiatives aimed at addressing the animosity, hatred and fear among the two communities by taking a bipartisan stand on the conflict. The study has also understood that religious affiliation and conviction often motivates religious groups within the two counties to advocate particular peace-related government policies. Religious groups also directly oppose repression and promote peace and reconciliation. The study also observed that the religious groups and leaders on most occasions mediated in conflict situations, they acted as communication link between the two communities while others provide training on peacekeeping. In another positive development regarding the role of religious leaders, it was evident that some of them even went further to press for dialogue among the warring communities, they were involved in disarmament exercises (although at a smaller scale), they gave hope and material assistance to the communities affected by the conflict.

Regarding the role of the civil society in management of cross-border conflict, most of them played an advocacy role in promoting justice and monitored human rights violations across the border. Most of them relied on donor funding for support of their activities and this made them to be active at certain period of times. Their activities were in management of peace were short-lived. On a positive side of view, the respondents indicated that some civil society like Tegla Lorupe foundation held annual peace marathons aimed at reforming the Morans who had abandoned cattle rustling for the sake of peace.

However, this event is held once a year but a positive observation is that the foundation has established a rescue centre through which girls and rehabilitated Morans are accommodated by being offered education. Some of them have started developmental projects aimed at diversifying the local people economic reliance on livestock as a source of livelihood to sustainable agriculture and other business enterprises. For instances, women have now formed groups that lend money for business start up and mixed farming techniques. The study has realised that civil society working in restoring peace at the Turkana/West Pokot border can effectively intervene by focusing attention on the social organization and structural patterns of interaction.

Lastly, the study found out that traditional leaders had an important role to play in quelling conflicts between the two communities. For instance, elders are seen at the forefront during peace meetings as they deemed to be the seniors' members of the community who are respected and therefore can make resolutions and decisions. It was also found out that some of them went further to become mediators during conflicts period. Despite all, the study found out that the two communities have developed certain practices that are aimed at uniting the two communities. These

initiatives were promotion of inter-marriages amongst them, participating joint cultural ceremonies and dances while others had exchange programmes like sharing of water points and grazing areas.

### **5.3 Conclusion**

The study has found out different mechanisms presented in the chapter influence the management of cross-border conflict between Turkana and West Pokot counties, Kenya. The initiatives made by religious leaders in mediating, disarmament, peace mission and reintegration were helpful in quelling the conflict between the two communities. Also, the introduction of county government has also reduced incidences of cattle rustling as leaders from both counties usually arrange for peace meeting through which issues surrounding them are discussed and mediated upon.

It was found out that most 77.2% of respondents on both sides of the border believed that devolution could try and help in restoring peace within their areas. This is because the resources can now reach all locations and villages that were unreached before, the government is now closer to the people and historical injustices committed by the previous government regimes that neglected the area for long are now being addressed with the coming of the new constitution dispensation.

Besides that, the results of the study showed that civil society members also played a significant role in management of conflict between Turkana and west Pokot counties. This was through promotion and advocacy of human rights, sponsoring peace meetings and seminars, building of schools to reform and educate the young children on the importance of peace, sponsoring games and dancing competition while others were found to be engaged in protection of citizens across the border from conflict.

Likewise, cultural practices and community elders also performed momentous roles in mediating, resolving and promoting peace across the border. This was through participation in peace meetings, elders acting as mediators during crisis meetings, promoting intermarriages amongst the two warring communities and offered advice and warning to “Ngorokos” against participating in cattle raiding.

#### **5.4 Recommendations**

The study has so far understood the four factors being studied has significant impact on restoration of peace across Turkana/West Pokot boundary. However, a lasting solution has not been found yet since people are constant living in fear because they feel that they are insecure and can be attacked at any time. This calls for every stakeholder to take his/her role seriously in averting mass destruction of property, livestock stealing, maiming among others not to happen. Therefore, the study makes the following recommendations:

- (i) There is need for religious leaders from both communities to be bipartisan and avoid siding with any of their community. The place that religious leaders and organisations hold in the society should be observed by ensuring that the members of clergy remain non-partisan for the sake offering spiritual and moral support to the victims of cross-border raids
- (ii) The community elders need to assert their authority in ensuring that the commands and decisions they make to young men “ngorokos” against attacking or raiding the neighbouring community are strictly followed and those found to violate should face be punished
- (iii) The county governments (Turkana and West Pokot) should bury their accusations and come for dialogue for the sake of peace and development.



Everyone party is wounded and a lasting solution would be the remedy for their survival.

- (iv) The civil society should initiate developmental projects that involve and target the two communities. This would be through initiating projects that benefit directly and indirectly the two communities other than focusing on individual ones

### 5.5 Suggestions for Further Research

The study suggests further research to be done on:

- (i) The impact of devolution on management of cross-border conflict
- (ii) The role of women in management of cross-border conflict

### 5.6 Contributions to the Body of Knowledge

The following are the contributions of the study to the body of knowledge in

Table 5.1.

**Table 5.1 Contributions to the Body of Knowledge**

<b>Objective</b>	<b>Contribution</b>
Culture influence management of cross-border conflict	Role of elders in mediation is key but there is need to ensure that follow up is made
Religious groups influence management of cross-border conflict	The church plays a significant role in management of conflict. Their programmes and activities in the process were the most effective
Extent do civil society influence management of cross-border conflict	Civil society activities need to be continuous to achieve lasting peace
Devolution influence management of cross border-conflict	The leaders should promote peace without putting pressure and demands

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX I: LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

**Timothy P. Ng'imor**

**P.O. Box 12**

**Chepareria**

**Dear respondents**

I am a student at University of Nairobi undertaking Masters' Degree in Project planning and Management. It is a requirement that a student writes a project report in the field of study. For that purpose I request you to spare your time to fill this questionnaire that is intended to find out **Factors influencing management of cross-border conflict along the West Pokot and Turkana Boundary**. Kindly spare some time to fill the attached questionnaire to enable me complete this study for which I will be very grateful. You are kindly requested to fill in the blank spaces at the end of each question or statement or simply put a tick where appropriate. This information will be used purely for academic purposes and will be treated in strict confidence. You need not include your name. Any additional information that you might feel is necessary for this study is welcome.

Your participation in this study will be valuable as it will contribute to the achievement of the study objectives. Please respond as honestly and truthfully as possible. Put a tick (√) on the appropriate answer on the statements below.

Thanks in advance for your support

Regards,

Timothy Ng'imor

## APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RESIDENTS IN THE BORDER

You are requested to fill in this questionnaire by giving your opinion. Please fill in the blanks provided by ticking against the most appropriate response. Do not indicate your name on the questionnaire booklet

### **Section A: Demographic Information**

1. Location of respondent

West Pokot [ ]      Turkana [ ]

2. What is your gender?

Male [ ]      Female [ ]

3. What is your age bracket?

Under 25 years [ ]      26-35 years [ ]      36-45 years [ ]

46-55 years [ ]      Above 56 years [ ]

4. What is your highest academic qualification?

No education [ ]      Primary [ ]      High School [ ]      Diploma [ ]

Graduate [ ]      Any other specify.....

5. How long have you lived in West Pokot/Turkana Border?

Less than 1 year [ ]      1 – 5 years [ ]      6 – 10 years [ ]

11-15 years [ ]      16 years and above [ ]

### **Section B: Status of Cross Border Conflict**

6. (a) Have you experienced any cross-border conflict

Yes [ ]      No [ ]

(b) If yes, how often does conflict occur?

Regularly [ ]      Occasionally [ ]      Do not know [ ]

7. What is the magnitude of the conflict?

Animals are raided      Yes [ ]      No [ ]

People are killed      Yes [ ]      No [ ]

Houses are burnt      Yes [ ]      No [ ]

Land is taken      Yes [ ]      No [ ]

People are captured      Yes [ ]      No [ ]

People are wounded      Yes [ ]      No [ ]

Any other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

8. Who are mostly involved in conflict? (You can tick more than one)

Youth      [ ]      Men      [ ]      Women      [ ]

9. What are the causes of conflict?

Incitement by political leaders      Yes [ ]      No [ ]

Neighbours      Yes [ ]      No [ ]

Others \_\_\_\_\_

**Section C: Factors influencing culture on management of cross-border conflict**

10. Do you Pokots and Turkanas participate together in cultural activities along the border?

Yes [ ]      No [ ]

11. If yes, what are these cultural activities that bring you together?

- Cultural ceremonies and dances      [ ] - Nomadic way of living      [ ]
- Initiation      [ ]
- Joint raids and cattle rustling      [ ]

12. Do you think this activity is concerned in managing cross-border conflict?

Yes [ ]      Somehow [ ]      No [ ]

13. If yes, in which ways? (Give reasons)

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14. Did these activities bring a lasting solution in managing cross-border conflict?

Yes [ ]      Somehow [ ]      No [ ]

15. On the following table, indicate whether elders and head men participate in management of cross-border conflict on the following scale: N-Never, R-Rarely, S-Sometimes, O-Occasionally and A-Always;

<b>Role of traditional elders and</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>S</b>	<b>O</b>	<b>A</b>
a. They stop problems and also change conflicts into positive ways through their authority					
b. They alleviate the conflict issues before sending them to the court					
c. They perform their roles based on their potential, skills, and feature of disputes as well as conflict situations					
d. They advise communities on the dangers of participating in conflict					
e. They mediate in conflict					



**Section D influence of religious groups on management of cross-border conflicts**

16. Indicate the extent to which religious groups (church) in your locality play the following functions in addressing cross-border conflict between Turkana and Pokot on the following scale: N-Never, R-Rarely, S-Sometimes, O-Occasionally and A-Always;

<b>Role of religious groups in conflict management</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>S</b>	<b>O</b>	<b>A</b>
a. Facilitate dialogue between youth (Morans), grassroots women leaders and elders from the Turkana, Pokot					
b. Strengthen the ministry of reconciliation in churches through capacity building trainings					
c. Engage church leaderships through pastors' forums in healing, reconciliation and peace building in communities					
d. Engage the youth (Morans), women leaders, elders and pastors in various social action projects aimed at building intercommunity trust and unity in peace building					
e. Religious use church services to reach out to wider groups to spread messages of peace					
f. Religious leaders reaching out to wider levels of society to influence the region a leadership and policy processes to be friendly to pastoralists					
g. Give hope and offer material assistance to the victims of cross-border conflict					
h. Organising abundant prayers calling for peace in the areas and more so in the ethnic clashes zones					
i. A conduit in pursuit of 'reconciliation, dialogue, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration					

**Section E influence of civil society on management of cross-border conflicts**

17. Indicate the extent to which civil societies in your locality play the following functions in addressing cross-border conflict between Turkana and Pokot on the following scale: N-Never, R-Rarely, S-Sometimes, O-Occasionally and A-Always.

	N	R	S	O	A
a. Civil society protects citizens on both sides of the border against violence					
b. Civil society monitor human rights violations focusing on the implementation of conflict management					
c. Civil society advocates for peace and human rights within the border					
d. Civil society organise social events like sports matches and restocking programmes					
e. Civil society organise peace races, singing, dancing competitions and recitation of poems					
f. Civil society mediate between communities in conflict across the border					
g. Civil society promotes education to assist transforming people across the borders					

**Section F influence of devolution on management of cross-border conflicts**

18. Do you know about devolution?

Yes [ ] No [ ] Somehow [ ]

19. If yes, what are the factors that influence devolution in management of cross-border conflict?

Improved allocation of resources [ ]

Government being closer to the people through county government [ ]

Peoples demand through constitution [ ]

Historical injustices [ ]

Loss of lives and properties [ ]

Availability of resources along the borders [ ]

Administrative boundary and land acquisition [ ]

20. Has devolution tried to resolve cross-border conflict since its initiation?

Yes [ ]      No [ ]

21. If yes, in which ways?

Organising regular peace meetings [ ]

Clarifying administrative boundary issue [ ]

Recruiting more KPRs [ ]

Initiating development projects along the border [ ]

Any other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

22. Were the measures introduced by devolution effective in managing cross-border conflict?

Yes [ ]      Somehow [ ]      No [ ]

23. If no, what are other effective ways required to manage the cross-border conflict?

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**The end**

**Thank you for participating**

**APPENDIX III: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR KEY INFORMANTS**

1. How long have you worked in that capacity in this region?

- Less than 1 year [ ]    1 – 5 years [ ]    6 – 10 years [ ]  
11-15 years [ ]    16 years and above [ ]

2. What role does culture play towards managing cross-border conflict between Pokot and Turkana?

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3. What do you think can be done to better these roles?

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4. What role do religious groups play towards managing cross-border conflict between Pokot and Turkana?

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5. What do you think can be done to better these roles?

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6. What role do civil societies play towards managing cross-border conflict between Pokot and Turkana?

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7. What do you think can be done to better these roles?

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**The end**  
**Thank you for participating**

## APPENDIX IV: SAMPLE SIZE DETERMINATION TABLE

### Required size for randomly chosen sample

Table for determining needed size of a random chosen sample from a given finite population n cases such that the sample proportion will be within plus or minus .05 of the population P with a 95 percent level of confidence

N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S
10	10	100	80	280	162	800	260	2800	338
15	14	110	86	290	165	850	265	3000	341
20	19	120	92	300	169	900	269	3500	246
25	24	130	97	320	175	950	274	4000	351
30	28	140	103	340	181	1000	278	4500	351
35	32	150	108	360	186	1100	285	5000	357
40	36	160	113	380	181	1200	291	6000	361
45	40	180	118	400	196	1300	297	7000	364
50	44	190	123	420	201	1400	302	8000	367
55	48	200	127	440	205	1500	306	9000	368
60	52	210	132	460	210	1600	310	10000	373
65	56	220	136	480	214	1700	313	15000	375
70	59	230	140	500	217	1800	317	20000	377
75	63	240	144	550	225	1900	320	30000	379
80	66	250	148	600	234	2000	322	40000	380
85	70	260	152	650	242	2200	327	50000	381
90	73	270	155	700	248	2400	331	75000	382
95	76	270	159	750	256	2600	335	100000	384

Note: "N" is population size

"S" is sample size.

**Source:** Kathuri and Pals (1993)



## **APPENDIX V: RESEARCH PERMITS**