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RESEARCH PROJECT

**TITLE: “POTENTIALS AND PITFALLS OF CIVILIAN COMPONENT IN
AFRICAN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS – A CASE STUDY OF AFRICAN
UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM)”**

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2014

Declaration

I declare that this Master Thesis is my original work and has not been presented for another academic award in any other University or Institution. Any thoughts from others or literal quotations are clearly acknowledged.

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to my husband Kevin Matundura and our two beloved children Melissa Moraa and Nathan Jomo from whose inspiration and motivation to work harder and make this world a better place for them and their children's children have been a source of energy during this study. It is my prayer and hope that they will take some vital life lessons from me, starting with hard work pays, truth prevails and true love is innate.

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believing in me but most importantly praying for me. My two treasures Melissa and Jomo for inspiring me to greatness. I treasure you all!

Abstract

Since the establishment of the African Union in 2002, the Commission has taken an active role in addressing protracted conflicts in the continent as well as ventured in conflict zones that other multilateral organisations such as the United Nations would not be willing to deploy peace operations. The role of the civilian component in peace operations has become a major contributing success factor towards achieving the mission mandate and in particular addressing root causes of conflict. To this end, this study examined the role of the civilian component in AU led PSOs using the AMISOM case study. The study scrutinized previous peace operations in Somalia undertaken by UN and regional organisations and sought to extract the lessons learnt from those operations and investigate whether they have been incorporated in the AMISOM operation. In order to extract the potentials and pitfalls of the civilian component in AU PSOs, the study conducted an in-depth analysis of the AMISOM civilian component and interrogated the mission mandate, mission composition and considered other players such as UN and international organisations all aiming towards stabilising Somalia.

Based on the nature of the study, a large part of the research findings was derived from systematic literature review of AU/ UN official reports, scholarly contributions on AU PSOs and other literal works published on the subject matter. Further, the study was complimented by focused group discussions of AMISOM employees attending training at International Peace Support Training Centre and interviews with key persons with expertise on the subject matter from academic and policy circles. The research methodology was also complimented by questionnaire responses from Somali population.

The study relied on constructivism theory of international relations complimented by structural functionalism in placing the role of the civilian component in AU peace operations. The study established that even though the role of the civilian component is well captured on the AU PSOs doctrine reflected by many key policy documents, the actual implementation on the ground is dismal. AU PSOs are military focused thereby concentrating on the security paradigm and negating key components of development, humanitarian, political and social aspects which are of absolute importance in attaining sustainable peace. Moreover, the study revealed that some key functions which the civilians' component can play a significant role in enhancing sustainable peace in Somalia such as Rule of Law were missing from the mission structure. Finally, the study exposed coordination and overlap of functions between UNSOM and AMISOM civilian components and called for coherence and harmonisation of processes to avoid duplication of effort and ensure that the few resources availed to Somalia are utilised in a result oriented manner.

Based on these findings the study has made some key recommendations, starting with the actualisation of the policy guidelines and strengthening of the civilian capacity through systemic organisational learning processes and ensuring the rostering of the civilian capacities is done in a systematic and coherent manner between the AU, RECs and member states. The study also recommended that AU and RECs involved in identification of the civilian capacities should employ a deliberate effort to include qualified non-state actors. The cooperation experienced in international peace and security can be fostered by AU through regular exchanges of best practises in PSOs especially concerning the dynamics and recruitment of the civilians in peace operations.

Abbreviations

AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APF	African Peace Facility
APF	African Peace Fund
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CAR	Central Africa Republic
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CFAB	Chief of Finance, Accounting and Budget
CONOPs	Concept of Operations
DPA	Department of Political Authority
EAC	East Africa Community
EASF	East Africa Standby Force
EU	European Union
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
ICGLR	International Conference for Great Lakes Region
IDPs	Internal Displaced Persons
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority in Development
IGADD	Inter-Governmental Authority Agency Drought and Desertification
IGASOM	IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia
IHL	International Humanitarian Law

IMTC	Integrated Mission Training Centre
IPP	Integrated Planning Process
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
MAC	Mission Analysis Centre
MPEC	Mission Planning and Evaluation Centre
MSC	Military Staff Committee
QIPS	Quick Impact Projects
PO	Peace Operations
PoC	Protection of Civilians
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSOs	Peace Support Operations
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
REC	Regional Economic Communities
RM	Regional Mechanisms
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SNA	Somalia National Army
SRCC	Special Representative to AU Commission Chairman
SRSG	Special Representative to UN Secretary General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TCCs	Troops Contributing Countries
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	Transitional National Government

UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNITAF	United Tasks Force
UNOSOM	UN Operation in Somalia I
UNOSOM II	UN Operation in Somalia II
UNPOS	UN Political Office in Somalia
UNSC	UN Security Council
UNSG	UN Secretary General
UNSOA	UN Support to AMISOM
UNSOM	UN Assistance Mission in Somalia
WFP	World Food Program
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
ZIF	German Center for International Peace Operations

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Chapter One

Introduction and Background of the Study

1. Introduction

One of the distinctive characteristic that marked the transformation of the Organisational of African Unity (OAU) to African Union (AU) in 2002 was the paradigm shift from the principle of non-interference to principle of non-indifference; which allows African countries to intervene in internal affairs of Member States in cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.¹ The adoption of this approach reflected the global debate on reconceptualization of security from a state-centric power based concept of international “high politics” to a normative based concept that revolves around “human security”.² The weightiness of the AU commission stance was underpinned through the formation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) a comprehensive security agenda that sought African Solutions to African Problems.³ APSA is comprised of six components which include the Peace and Security Council (PSC), African Standby Force (ASF), Panel of the Wise, Military Staff Committee (MSC), Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and African Peace Fund (APF.)⁴

The ASF is the operational arm of the architecture with a clear mandate to deploy peace operations in conflict zones and expected to attain its Full Operational Capability

¹ Article 4 (h), *Constitutive Act Of African Union*, (adopted in 2000 at the Lome Summit (Togo), and entered into force in 2001.)

² Ramesh Thakur and Edward Newman. *New Millennium New Perspectives: The United Nations, Security, and Governance* - UNU Millennium Series. (Tokyo, New York et Paris: UN University Press, 2000) Pg. 17

³ Bjorn Moller, *The African Union as a Security Actor: African Solutions to African Problems?* Crisis States Research Centre working papers series 2, 57. Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.(2009).

⁴Article 2 (2) – *The Protocol Establishing the AU Peace and Security Council*, (Addis Ababa , http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol_peace_and_security.pdf, accessed 1 Aug 2014)

by 2015.⁵ African approach to peace operations complements the United Nations (UN) the main organisation tasked to maintain international peace and security following the principle of subsidiarity as expounded by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Whilst, ASF is not yet operational, the AU launched its first peace operation in 2003 – notably two years after its formation in Burundi – the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). This has been followed by four more operations in Sudan, Somalia, Mali and Central Africa Republic (CAR) initiated, planned and deployed solely by AU attesting the commitment of African member states in responding to crisis.⁶ The AU has also been lauded for its different peacekeeping doctrine; instead of waiting for a peace to keep, the AU views peacekeeping as an opportunity to establish peace before keeping it.⁷

Makunda and Okumu⁸ explain that the AU broad approach to security incorporates military and non-military factors partly influenced by the recommendations of the 2000 Brahimi report⁹ in practise which argued for a broader approach to UN peacekeeping with bigger and better equipped missions. Despite the efforts employed by the AU in deployment of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) the laid down doctrine that encompasses a multidimensional approach to conflict is evidenced by one dimensional approach in reality – that of the military focus. The military concentration defies the empirical reality that conflicts in Africa are deeply entrenched and cannot be addressed in isolation or through narrowly framed policies and strategies; but must be understood from

⁵ African Standby Force Road Map III, (Addis Ababa, PSOD, 2007)

⁶Paul D. Williams, *The African Union's Conflict Management Capabilities*, Working Paper (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, October 2011).

⁷ Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security: *Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence* (AU doc. PSC/PR/2. (CCCVII), January 9, 2012), 19.

⁸Samuel Makunda & Francis Okumu, *The African Union – Challenges of Globalization , Security and Governance* (GreatBritain: Routledge 2008) Pp 75 - 93

⁹Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, (also called Brahimi report, New York- August 2000)

a broad perspective, recognizing deep historical and political roots, the complex web of many interlinked issues and, hence, the necessity of long-term strategies, involving the military, political and developmental actors.¹⁰

The realization that restoring sustainable peace in African conflicts requires more than just ending overt fighting has generated a growing interest on the nature and character of African PSOs. This study focuses on the AU authorized PSOs and their impact on peace by concentrating on the civilian component. It examines the functional role of the civilian side cognizant of the evolvement of peacekeeping from the traditional peacekeeping that was premised on the military interposition and observance of buffer zones to the complex multidimensional PSOs which combines the efforts of peacekeeping and other elements of capacity for long-term recovery that contain the social, economic, welfare and political dimension primarily led by the civilian personnel in the mission.

This study will adopt the understanding of sustainable peace expounded by Johan Galtung¹¹ where “peace” is defined not just as the absence of war (negative peace), but also the presence of the conditions for a just and sustainable peace, including access to food and clean drinking water, education for women and children, security from physical harm, and other inviolable human rights (positive peace). This idea is rooted in the understanding that a “just peace” is the only sustainable kind of peace; an approach that seeks merely to “stop the guns” while ignoring the denial of human rights and unjust social and political conditions will not work in the long run.

¹⁰Adreas Vogt, *Towards a Comprehensive Self-Sufficient African Peace Operations Capacity, Fact or Fiction?* In *Conflict Trends*, 2005 Issue 4 (South Africa, Accord 2005) pp. 24- 29

¹¹Johan Galtung, *Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peace-Making and Peacebuilding. In Peace, War and Defence: Essays in Peace Research* vol.2, (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1975)pp 282-304.

1.1 AMISOM Case Study

The aim of this section is to introduce the case study and illustrate relevance of AMISOM in understanding the approach of “African Solutions to African Problems” adopted by AU. The case study of African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) provides important lessons and insights on AU led PSOs given that the peace operation has been on ground for seven years - the longest intervention undertaken by AU since its establishment in 2001.

Further, AMISOM follows the well documented botches of UN commissioned missions in Somalia in the 1990s namely the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and UNOSOM II. One of the guiding question for this study is to examine if the lessons of the 1990s missions have been assimilated in the concept of operations for AMISOM as well as mission structures to achieve the mission mandate in the short- run and sustainable peace in Somalia in the long run.

As illustrated in the map in Figure 1, Somalia is located in the eastern most point of the Horn of Africa, bounded to the east and southeast by the Indian Ocean, to the north and northeast by the Gulf of Aden and the Republic of Djibouti, to the south and southwest by Kenya, and to the west by Ethiopia. The country has a coastline of 3,200 kilometres, extending from Loyadde on the Gulf of Aden to Ras Kiyambone on the Indian Ocean. According to historical records, during the scramble for Africa by the European powers in the 1880s, the British, Italians and the French all carved up for a part of Somali territory. The Italians took control of the South including Mogadishu, the French claimed the present Djibouti, and the British controlled the Northern portion

along the Gulf of Aden as well as the Northern frontier district of then Kenyan colony. Ethiopia also claimed a section of the Western border ruling the Somali speaking territory of the Ogaden.

Figure 2: Map of Somalia



Source: UN (www.un.org/depts/Cartographic/map/, accessed 1 August 2014)

Upon gaining independence in 1960, the British Somalia and the Italian Somalia merged to become one republic causing divisive tensions in the fledgling republic based on the different styles of administration doctrines adopted by the different colonial

masters.¹²Nine years after independence Major General Said Barre seized power in a bloodless coup where he formed the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) and declared an end to "tribalism, nepotism, corruption, and misrule." Since it was at the height of the cold war, the SRC aligned itself with the Soviet Union and denounced U.S. African policy as imperialist.¹³

Somalia has been without a legitimized, recognized and effective central government since 1991, when its last President, Mohamed Siad Barre was deposed in a civil war that had erupted in 1988. The Somalia conflict is unique, unlike other conflicts in Africa that are underpinned by diverse ethnic interests, Somalia is deemed to be one of the most homogenous nation in the Africa.

The nation is made up of many different, pastoral and nomadic clans all of whom share a common language (Somali), same religion (Islam) and same ethnic background.¹⁴Clans can serve as a source of conflict or solidarity. They often form alliances for protection, access to water and political power. The ethnic Somalis are divided into six major clan families the Dir, Darood, Isaaq, Hawiye, Digil and Rahanwayn each with other smaller clan groups. Their numerical composition based on World Bank estimates¹⁵ is as reflected in figure 2 below:


¹² Catherine Besteman, *Unravelling Somalia: Race, Violence, and the Legacy of Slavery*. (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999.) pg. 22

¹³ Helen Chapin Metz, *Somalia: A Country Study*., (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1992) pg. 18

¹⁴ Michael Brown, *Ethnic and Internal Conflicts*, In Chester Crocker, Hampson Fen Osler, and Pamela R. all, eds. *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*. (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001) pp 210

¹⁵<http://data.worldbank.org/country/somalia> accessed 30 July 2014

Figure 3: Somalia Clan Distribution Chart



Source: World Bank – Somalia Country Profiles, 2003.

The civil war in Somalia can be traced from the Said Barre autocratic, exploitative and manipulative regime which successfully alienated and manipulated the clans and sub-clans, over militarised the society that eventually simplified the economic, social and political problems to militarized problems and by extension required military solutions. His drive for a unified Somali nation fuelled by Pan-Somalism ideology which sought to create a Pan-Somali State that transcended the colonial borders and henceforth united French Somaliland (Djibouti), Kenyan Somaliland (North Eastern Kenya) and the Ethiopian Somaliland (Ogaden) ¹⁶ was a major factor in balkanising the Somalia state. Following the defeat by Ethiopia during the Ogaden war, Barre lost the population support which disintegrated his army and most of his army officers defected to form insurgent groups. Further his exclusionary politics side-lined some of the clans from

¹⁶ Pan – Somali ideology was advanced by the Somali Republic after attainment of independence in 1960 and sought to unite all the ethnic Somali from the French Somaliland (Djibouti), Kenyan Somaliland (North Eastern Kenya) and the Ethiopian Somaliland (Ogaden)

power and by extension denied economic and political gains from the state lead to opposition from the excluded clans. According to Isabelle Duyvesteyn¹⁷ the Barre's ruling circle consisted of a small group of clan favourites summarized by the abbreviation MOD, which stood for Marehan (Barre's clan), Ogadeni (the clan of Barre's mother) and Dolbahante (the clan of his son-in-law Ahmed Suleyman Abdullah, head of the security service). These three clans occupied the important positions in the state bureaucracy, army and business.¹⁸

From the various scholars and analysts of the Somalia such as Adam M. Hussein¹⁹, Kenneth Bush²⁰ and report of Sally Healy²¹ all indicate the phenomena of clan politics and competition for power, wealth and status as the main underlying causes of conflict in Somalia, compounded by other factors such as environmental scarcity phenomena, internalization of conflict across the Horn of Africa and globalization negative effects such as international terrorism and skewed international political economy that can explain the overfishing of the Somali coast by multinational companies as well as high levels of piracy.

According to a study done by the World Bank²², clannism and clan cleavages are main causes of conflict in Somalia which fuel endemic clashes over resources and power and used to mobilize militia, and make broad-based reconciliation very difficult to

¹⁷Isabelle Duyvesteyn, *Clausewitz and African War: Politics and Strategy in Liberia and Somalia*. (Routledge, 2004.) pg 24

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ Adam Muktar Hussein, *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution*. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill & Queens University Press, 1999) pg. 170-175.

²⁰ Kenneth Bush, *When Two Anarchies Meet*, In Wirick and Miller et al, *Canada and Missions for Peace – Lessons from Nicaragua, Cambodia and Somalia* (Ottawa, International Development Research Centre) 1998 pg. 71

²¹ Sally, Healy *Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa – How conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel – A Horn of Africa Report* (London, Chatham House, 2008) pp 20 - 30

²² World Bank, *Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics*. (World Bank January 2005)

achieve. The interplay of these factors and deliberate manipulation started by the government of Siad Barre and consequently warlords in Somalia for personal interests has magnified the Somalia challenges and the dream of sustainable peace has been increasingly become elusive. Despite the overthrow of Barre, peace was not found in Somalia, as Muktar²³ explains the opposition front common goal was to oust Barre but beyond that they hated each other as much as they hated Siad Barre.²⁴

Makumi Mwangiri²⁵ observes that conflicts are dynamic, organic and have a life of their own which changes from one day to another. This assertion applies so well in the context of the Somalia considering the degeneration or transformation of the conflict actors from the military dissidents to the mushrooming of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and eventually to the Al-Shabaab militant.

By the time of international intervention to the crisis in Somalia it was estimated that 200,000 people had starved to death of famine, while 30,000 - 50,000 civilians had been killed in fighting from November 1991 to March 1992.²⁶ The war and famine in Somalia received a lot of attention by the media and vociferous human rights organizations which created public apathy of Western Europe and America population consequently creating interest of the UNSC. This followed three peacekeeping operations to Somalia: UNOSOM 1 (April 1992 – March 1993)²⁷, UNITAF (December 1992 – May

²³Hussein Muktar Mohamed, *Somalia: Between Self-Determination and Chaos*, in *Mending Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali Communities in the 21st Century*, ed. Hussein M. Adam and Richard Ford (Lawrenceville, N.J. Red Sea, 1997) pg. 55.

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵Makumi Mwangiri, *The Water's Edge – Mediation of Violent Electoral Conflict in Kenya*, (Nairobi, IDIS 2008) pg.5

²⁶Ken Menkhaus, *International Peace Building and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in Somalia - In Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Intervention*, ed.W. Clarke and J.Herbst. (Boulder: Westview Press.1997)pg. 55

²⁷<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosomi.htm>, accessed 2nd June 2014)

1993) and UNOSOM II (March 1993 – May 1995)²⁸ all authorized by UNSC. Chapter three on peacekeeping interventions in Somalia will expound in depth on these missions and discuss from a civilian perspective their successes and failures, thus justify the call for an integrated comprehensive approach in Somalia.

After the exit of UN in Somalia, the regional organization for conflict resolution and management the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) with massive international support continued to pursue peace in the troubled nation. According to Nduwimana²⁹ a total of seventeen peace conferences have been conducted at different times and places to seek a tangible peace solution for Somalia without any success. While, one of the key advantage of regional organizations such as IGAD to conflict resolution lies in the quick intervention as well as some understanding of the conflict due to proximity with neighbouring countries³⁰; the opposite effect can be said of IGAD peace initiatives in Somalia. Sally³¹ explains the challenge of convincing Somalia populace of IGAD objectivity as they viewed the peace initiatives with suspicion, coated by hidden interests of Ethiopia. In the end, these multiplicity of factors inhibited the deployment of IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) designed to take off in 2005, thereby leading to the authorization of deployment of the AMISOM in March 2007 by the UNSC.³² AMISOM was authorized to operate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,

²⁸<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2.htm>, accessed 2nd June 2014)

²⁹ Donathien Nduwimana, *AMISOM in Somalia – A Ray of Hope?- IPSTC, Occasional paper 4 No 4* (Nairobi, IPSTC, 2013)Pg. 10

³⁰ Makumi Mwagiru, *Conflict in Africa – Theories, Processes and Institutions of Management*, (Nairobi, Centre for Conflict Research, 2006) pg. 28

³¹ Sally Healy, *Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa – How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel – A Horn of Africa Report*(London, Chatham House, 2008) pp 20 - 30

³² UNSC Resolution 1744 (2007), (<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8960.doc.htm> - accessed 20 June 2014)

chapter four of this study will take a profound analysis on the mandate of the mission from a civilian lens to assess the potentials and pitfalls of AMISOM.

1.2 Problem Statement

The AU has formulated a comprehensive – broad approach to security that incorporates military and non-military factors. In particular, the AU Peace Support Operations Doctrine expressly recognises the universal norm of the mutually supporting roles that the civilian and military play from the inception of peace missions to their liquidation. The evolving nature of security from state-centric concept to the human security phenomena requires an all-inclusive multidimensional approach to the causes of conflict in order to achieve sustainable peace and prevent relapse of conflict. To this effect, the conceptual and policy framework of AU PSO is embodied on the understanding of holistic interventions in conflict torn countries. Hence political, security and developmental elements are intertwined in the doctrine and practise of PSO, clearly highlighting the importance of military and non-military aspects in attaining the mission mandate as an initial objective and attainment of positive peace as a long term strategy.

Despite this preponderance recognition, the AU PSOs conducted since 2003 indicate a dismal representation of the civilian component in theatre of operations. Deployment of personnel to PSO points to military concentration even though a closer look on the mission mandates reflect significant roles of civilian and police in nature. Further, the AU PSOs have taken a peace stabilisation character whereby the PSOs have aimed at peacekeeping - containing the violence and negated the important aspect of peace building as recommended for by the Brahimi report. As a result of this, solutions

and recommendations made are inadequate since the whole spectrum of mission components are not considered as integral elements of success in the initial prescription.

1.3 Research Objectives

The overall objective of this study is to investigate the potentials and pitfalls of integrating the civilian component in AU led peace operations.

1.3.1 Specific Objectives

- i. To analyse the role and evolvement of the civilian component in international peace operations.
- ii. To examine previous peacekeeping interventions in Somalia by UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II with special focus on the civilian dimension.
- iii. To examine possible potentials and pitfalls of the civilian component in AU led peace operations.
- iv. To recommend areas of improvement for policy framework.

1.4 Research Questions

In order to achieve the laid down objectives the study was guided by the following questions:

- i. What is the role and evolvement of the civilian functions in international peace operations?
- ii. What lessons can be learnt from the previous peace interventions in Somalia by UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II regarding civilian dimension?
- iii. What are the potentials and pitfalls of AU led peace operations?
- iv. From the findings of the study, what are the lessons and recommendations to AU PSO policy framework?

1.5 Hypotheses

The study is directed by the following two hypotheses:

Firstly, inclusion and integration of the civilian component dimension from the design of a peace mission to its liquidation partly increases the potential of achieving a sustainable outcome of the peace support operation. Secondly, sustained organizational learning culture from conducted peace missions increases the potential of successful sustainable outcomes in consecutive peace operations.

1.6 Justification of the Study

1.6.1 Academic Justification

From the premise of the academic field this study will promote a better understanding of the civilian component in the AU PSOs, a largely unexplored area in the academic field evidenced by limited academic work on the subject matter. The study will shed some light on the character of the civilian component along the broad spectrum of changing nature of security and especially from the traditional peacekeeping guise which places a premium on the associated norms of state sovereignty and non-interference. Roland Paris³³ observes that though peace operations have flourished since the end of the cold war, they are policy relevant heavy and are largely cut off from disciplines such as political science and international relations completely ignoring external environments which act as drivers to interventions in conflict zones. By linking the civilian component to the constructivist approach the study opens a door for further analysis and academic research that delves further on the civilian dimension in peace operations. Constructivism theory seeks an understanding of the context, issues and actors of conflicting state and

³³ Roland Paris, *Broadening the Study of Peace Operations*. (*International Studies Review* 2, No. 3, 2000) pp. 27-44.

expound on how the societal norms shape the international behaviour of the interventionists as well as the recipients of the intervention.

The question of civilian component inclusion in multidimensional peace keeping can be traced from the Brahimi³⁴ evaluation report of the UN peacekeeping in 2000 which highlighted for the first time the centrality of the civilian contribution to the effectiveness of UN peace operations and called for a strengthened UN capacity in this area. The recent mushrooming interest in the subject is a further indicator of the freshness of the topic in the academic circles. Through this case study a needed focus on the AU led peace operations offers deeper analytical evidence of how these roles can be strengthened from institutional and policy framework.

Unlike the military component which is anchored on the premise of the realist school of thought, proposers and proponents of the civilian component embrace normative paradigms such as Responsibility to Protect (R2P) that reflect liberal as well as cosmopolitan school of thoughts with greater emphasis on human security. By focusing on the civilian component and its broader emphasis on human security explained by the constructivist theory of international relations, this study offers a new dimension on study of individual component effectiveness in the mission area, furthermore it confirms the individual or people on a collective frame as the referent of security. Newman Edward³⁵ advances this thought by arguing that the evolving global norms relating to security and governance challenges mainstream conceptions of security by embracing a range of alliances, actors, and agendas that have taken peace keeping beyond the traditional scope of international politics and diplomacy.

³⁴Op Cit Brahimi Report 2000.

³⁵ Edward Newman, *Human Security and Constructivism*. (International studies perspectives 2, No. 3, 2001) pp. 239-251

Further, the study contributes to academic discourse on AU and regional organisations interventions in peace and security by offering the civilian component perspective. Peace and security as various studies show is not a static concept³⁶; neither are the tools and strategies for conflict management and conflict transformation. Hence the study will contribute to further the knowledge and theory on tools and measures that enhance PSO effectiveness through analysis of individual components in the PSO structure. Consequently, the study will expand existing knowledge in academics on the roles and functions of the civilian component in African PSOs.

1.6.2 Policy Justification

Research has traditionally played a significant role in understanding and creating effective means of conflict management and resolution. Schnabel³⁷ notes that research if well understood provides opportunities for analysts to provide and recommend solutions to suitable actors who are in a position to initiate change. While African civil conflicts and consecutive institutional response to these conflicts have certainly seen a plethora of studies, few studies have concentrated on the impact and effective functioning or otherwise of the AU Civilian Component in theatre of operations.

Hence in practical terms the study is highly relevant and timely for the policy makers to extricate the factors that ensure the effectiveness of the civilian component as a contributing factor to the entire mission success. The AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) or Regional Mechanisms (RMs) such as the Eastern African Standby Force (EASF) especially stands to gain from this study as it contributes concrete

³⁶ The Challenges Project, *Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century – Concluding Report 1997 – 2001* (Stockholm, Elanders Gotab, 2002)pp. 35 - 48

³⁷ Annabel Schnabel et al, *Researching Conflict in Africa: Insights and Experiences* (New York: UN Press, 2005) pg. 29

recommendations that can be adopted in the construction of policy and best practises of the Civilian Dimension of the ASF. Ultimately, this ensures comprehensive and holistic interventions on complex conflicts in Africa further enhancing solutions to international peace and security.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

Based on the fluidity and complexity character of peace operations there is no overarching theory that can explain with precision the role of the civilian component in PSO. The study will however, rely on the constructivism theory and borrow some tenets on structural functionalism to explain the civilian component in PSOs. Constructivism's foundational assertion is that social norms shape interests and interests determine state behavior. This is especially relevant with weak states such as Somalia that are unable to project their power beyond their capitals. Christopher Clapham³⁸ describes this phenomenon by explaining that less solid states require a new lens that goes beyond the classical definition of a state and demands a closer examination on the interactions of other elements if the society in an attempt to explain the role of that particular state in an international system. In other words, weak state structures understand better their role in the international system based in the populace's norms. Constructivism argues that society creates the norms of each state; norms then define identities and identities are the synthesis of common views and values that form a group conscience that thereafter sets behavior.

³⁸ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pg. 377

According to Roland Paris³⁹ constructivists argue that international norms do not merely constrain actors by changing the incentives that shape the behavior but also help to constitute the very actors behavior. The peace missions through which the civilian component works on concentrates on very normative framework e.g. state building, elections, democratic political institutions, respect for civil liberties, liberal market democracy etc. As Paris Roland notes they are not normatively blind.⁴⁰ Constructivism dissociates itself from the state as a black box and focuses on individuals. In this sense constructivism emphasizes understanding and not necessarily explanation. Most of peace operations in Africa have largely been characterized by a language of power, exclusion and prioritization of the security of the state rather than human security. By embracing the constructivist approach as an important framework the role of the civilian component in AMISOM becomes clearer as it gives insights on people-centred approach in Somalia, a country which didn't have a functioning state for over two decades but still managed to secure some aspects of governance structure.

Structural functionalist theory complements the study by exploring the functions which the civilian component concentrates on – the technical roles. The functionalist perspective can be traced back to Emile Durkheim⁴¹ and Talcott Parsons⁴² and has its roots in anthropology. According to the functionalist perspective, societies are understood to function like organisms or entities, and the innumerable social institutions working together like body organs to maintain and reproduce them. The various parts of society are assumed to work together naturally and automatically to maintain overall social

³⁹Op Cit Roland Paris. pp. 27-44.

⁴⁰ Roland Paris, *Peace building and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism*, International Security 22, No. 2 1997 pp.54-89

⁴¹ Antony Giddens, *Durkheim Emile: Selected Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

⁴² Parsons, Talcott. *The social system*. (Psychology Press, 1991)

equilibrium.⁴³ This perspective focuses on social systems as a whole, how they operate, how they change, and the social consequences they produce.

Peace missions are highly structural systems with five levels of analysis as described by Alex Bellamy⁴⁴: the macro/ structural level (all levels combined), global level (authorising entity of the mandate either the UN, AU or other regional organisation); national level (host nation of the peace operation), mission level (military, police, civilian and other international agencies) and the local level (the population).⁴⁵ No single level is necessarily better or more accurate than the others, and a comprehensive theory of peace operations would have to take account for each level and the relations between them.


This study focuses on the civilian component at the mission level and its impact to all the other levels as described in Figure 3 in the next page. The structural functionalism theory will offer a needed lenses on how these interactions achieve effectiveness and equilibrium in the entire mission but its crystal clear that no one theory can account for all the levels under analysis.

⁴³ Junk, Julian. "*Function Follows Form: The Organizational Design of Peace Operations.*" *Journal of Intervention and State building* 6, no. 3 (2012): 299-324.

⁴⁴Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010) pg. 13

⁴⁵ Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. "*International Peace Building: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis.*" *American political science review* (2000): 779-801.

Figure 3: Civilian Component Levels of Analysis



Source: Alex Bellamy⁴⁶ et al, book on Understanding Peacekeeping, 2010.

1.8 Research Methodology

1. 8.1 Research Design

Data to examine the research questions and hypotheses are through a mixed method case study. According to Bryman⁴⁷ a research mixed method integrates both the qualitative and quantitative research within a single project. This means that the quantitative and qualitative data are mutually illuminating. The research design used assesses the role of the civilian component in AU PSO by catechising the AMISOM case study. The quantitative approach allows the study to control the independent variable of the first hypothesis namely the *civilian component* while the dependent variable being the *outcome and sustainability of the peace operation* which influence and affect the peace operations respectively. The second hypothesis independent variable is the *lessons*

⁴⁶Op Cit Alex and Paul, pg. 13

⁴⁷Allan Bryman , *Social Research Methods 3rd Edition*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 603- 626

identified in previous peace operations while the dependent variable is the *outcome and sustainability of the peace operation*. The mixed research method main advantage is the complementary approach as well as opportunity to compensate each other's weaknesses.

The case study method is a very popular form of qualitative analysis and involves a careful and complete observation of the civilian component. According to Kothari⁴⁸ the case method is known for its depth rather than breadth. The case study places more emphasis on the full analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and their interrelations. The case study deals with the processes that take place and their interrelationship. Thus, case study is essentially an intensive investigation of the civilian component which locates the factors that account for the behaviour-patterns as an integrated totality.⁴⁹

1.8.2 Sampling Design

The sample design relies on non-probable sampling techniques such as convenience sampling and snowball sampling. Convenience sampling plays a prominent role in organisational research because its opponents critique the fact that it's not generalizable. As indicated earlier conflict varies and cannot be generalised even though key lessons identified in previous peace missions can be assimilated during the design of the mission. The authorising organs for peace operations should avoid best fit interventions as the dynamics varies from one place to another. Hence the choice for convenience sampling. Snowball sampling in this particular study was used when a small group relevant to the subject matter was used to reach out widely to the network to make more contacts.

⁴⁸Chakravanti Kothari R, *Research Methodology – Methods and Techniques 3rd Ed.* (India, New Age International Publishers, 2004) pp 113 - 115

⁴⁹ Ibid

1.8.3 Data Collection

Primary data was collected through structured interviews from AMISOM officials, Federal Government of Somalia officials, and local population. UNSC and PSC resolutions also constitute large percentage of the primary data. Further this study depended on primary data acquired through secondary data analysis. Secondary data analysis is a method that involves analysis of data that has been collected by other researchers and also through official statistics. According to Bryman⁵⁰ the advantages of the secondary data analysis is the cost and time involved is less than what could have been incurred if student was to collect the data. The disadvantage lies with the lack of credibility and lack of familiarity with data. Official statistics nonetheless was highly considered. The study banked on both primary and secondary sources of data to examine the civilian component roles and function in the AMISOM mandate against the actual practise on the ground.

Sources of primary data was derived from structured interviews and structured questionnaires. According to Kombo and Tromp⁵¹, structured interview method is a systematic interviewing technique which subjects every informant in a sample to the same stimuli. Kvale⁵² guide on the nine questions asked in qualitative interviews was highly useful in this study. The systematic technique was favourable and most preferred because of its systematic, comprehensive, reliable, and time saving advantage. However, its weakness was its rigidity and formal status which sometimes made the respondents limited to the questions asked rather than open up without constrains. This was overcome

⁵⁰ Bryman A, *Social Research Methods 3rd Edition*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 183 - 190

⁵¹ Kombo DK, Tromp DLA; *Proposal and Thesis Writing: An Introduction*. (Nairobi Kenya, Paulines Publications Africa, Don Bosco Printing Press, 2009).

⁵²Kvale S, *Interviews and Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing* (Thousand Oaks, Calif Sage, 1996)

through the questionnaire method which contained as many choices as possible, having open ended questions, following up in case an issue is not clear giving respondents adequate time and guidance to answer the questions freely. Sources of secondary data were newspapers, government publications, website sources and other scholarly work on civilian component in PSOs.

1.8.4 Data Analysis

Qualitative data gauged the potentials and pitfalls of the civilian component AU led PSOs through the perceptions of the recipients and policy analysts. The data was analysed through procedures prescribed by Bogdan and Biklen⁵³ "*working with data, organizing it, breaking it into manageable units, synthesizing it, searching for patterns, discovering what is important and what is to be learned, and deciding what you will tell others*"

1.8.5 Data Presentation

The research findings are presented through charts and diagrams to demonstrate relationships and figures emanated from quantitative data. For qualitative data a narrative description which connects findings to hypothesis and research questions is employed. Quotes from interviewees are used to demonstrate, inform and support findings. Care is however employed to ensure reliability and validity of each quote.

1.9 Chapter Outline

The study is comprised of five chapters as outlined below:

⁵³Robert Bogdan, C., and Biklen Sari K. "*Qualitative Research for Education.*" InJ. Wellington,*Educational Research: Contemporary Issues and Practical Research*, London: Continuum (1982). pg. 145

1.9.1 Chapter One: Introduction and Background

This chapter discusses the background and brief introduction of the study. The section covers an introductory to the civilian component in African led PSOs and explicates the logic of the study by locating the importance of incorporating the civilian component in the broader spectrum of African PSOs. Moreover, the section discusses the statement of the problem, the research objectives and questions, research hypotheses as well as the academic and policy justification of the study. The first chapter has elaborated on the research methodology and justification of the choice of the methodology used. Finally the theoretical framework is benched on constructivism theory and tenets of structural functionalism to explain the role of the AMISOM civilian component and its impact and interactions with the other levels of peace operations analysis.

1.9.2 Chapter Two: Discourses on International Peace Operations

The second chapter outlines the literature review which examines specifically the evolvement of the civilian functions and its effect on AU peace interventions. The aim of the literature review is to demonstrate how the civilian functions in peace operations fit in the broader context of peacekeeping as well as how they have developed over the years. Further it illustrates the sequence and growth of knowledge in this area and identify key areas of existing gaps on the subject matter.

1.9.3 Chapter Three: An Overview of Peacekeeping Interventions in Somalia

This chapter provides an in-depth descriptive narrative of the Somalia previous interventions from UNOSOM 1, UNITAF and UNISOM 11 from a civilian perspective. By analysing the lessons identified and what led to the failure of the missions from a

civilian lens, the chapter explored whether these lessons have been assimilated in the current AMISOM PSO deployment and mission mandate. This section links to chapter two by specifically considering the actual practise of the civilian deployment and function in African led PSOs against the current trends of the civilian dimension worldwide.

1.9.4 Chapter Four: Potential and Pitfalls of AU Peace Operations

This chapter offers an overview of deployment of the AMISOM PSO since February 2007 by critically assessing its mandate and perceived success so far from a civilian perspective. This section will comprise data analysis based on respondent's feedback from the questionnaires and the interview responses with main aim of answering research questions and testing the hypotheses.

From the data analysis chapter four discusses the main findings by clustering them under the potentials and pitfalls of incorporating the civilian component in the design, start-up and implementation of the African led PSOs based on the findings of AMISOM case study. The section also incorporates the other lessons identified from the literature review. Moreover, the section exposes the gaps between the doctrine and actual practise in the field of deployment and functions of the civilian component. The study is careful not to generalise the Somalia case study, however key lessons on customising AU responses to conflict zones are employed as the main guiding factor.

1.9.5 Chapter Five: Recommendations and Study Conclusion

This chapter is the culmination of the study to tangible policy recommendations based on the findings discussed. The discussion indicates whether the results confirm,

totally or in part, the study hypotheses. The section demonstrates whether the hypotheses are supported and gives thorough explanations for that.

Chapter Two

Discourses on International Peace Support Operations

2. Introduction

Since 1948, when UN launched the first peacekeeping mission in Middle East, peacekeeping has proved to be a valuable and indispensable instrument for preventing and managing violent conflicts between and within states. The vision of peacekeeping as a tool of maintaining international peace and security is well captured in the UN charter with the broad objective of saving successive generations from effects of war and violent conflict.¹ In particular, chapter 1 articulates the purposes and principles of UN to provide a secure world free from aggressions of any kind.² Peacekeeping remains a work in progress, with ongoing pressure to adapt and modernise.

Ever since the first launch of a UN peacekeeping mission, peacekeeping has evolved rapidly just as the conflict dynamics and international security landscape has changed from issues facing the world after Second World War, to the periods during and after Cold War. Most notable, a proliferation of regional and multinational force responses to the internal conflicts in countries has shifted the focus from the UN as the sole provider of international peace and security and generated a debate on the applicability of the principle of subsidiarity that exists between the UN and Regional Organisations as envisioned by Chapter eight of the UN charter.

This section will explore the trends in international peace operations by analysing the role of the civilian component in AU peace operations along three dimensions. First, it will examine the changing landscape in the international arena shaped by among other

¹UN Charter Preamble , (<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml>, accessed 2nd June 2014)

² Op Cit UN Charter , Chapter 1 Article 1

factors such as complex security environment thereby prompting an involvement of civilian functions – including civilian-led political missions and regional deployments. Secondly the section will explore how the change of issues has forced increasing dynamic approach for the AU Peace Operations. Thirdly, it will analyse the institutional and functional relationships between AU, UN and other regional blocs such as European Union (EU) and African regional organizations in the theatre of operations. Finally, the section will discuss the gaps existing in the policy framework of peace operations and illustrate how this study contributes to sealing the loopholes identified.

2.1 Evolving Peace Operations and increasing Civilian Functions

Not only is the literature on civilian dimension of PSO surprisingly underdeveloped theoretically but also the entire study of peacekeeping and peace operations in general is marked by conceptual imprecision as Michael Butler³ observes. The poor grasp of the concept and disparity of application ultimately leads to blurred lines on what is expected in the field of operations. For 40 years since the first deployment of UN observer missions in Palestine (1948) and Kashmir (1949) through to first full-fledged Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) with the deployment of the UN Emergency Force to the Suez crisis (1956), the triad principles of peacekeeping developed by then UN Secretary General (SG) Dan Hammarskjöld prevailed.⁴ The triad principles namely *consent of operations*, *impartiality of the peacekeepers* and *minimum use of force* according to many scholars formed the backbone of traditional peacekeeping. These operations were predominantly military, and their function was to monitor buffer zones after negotiated ceasefires for inter-state conflicts. The operations were typically

³ Michael J. Butler, *International Conflict Management*, (London, Routledge 2009) pg. 69

⁴Ibid., pg. 91

composed of lightly armed national troop contingents from small and neutral UN member states. The triad principles worked well during the Cold War based on possibility to clearly identify buffers. At the end of the Cold War however, a shift from the traditional peacekeeping was necessitated by two critical factors. The first factor was the change of attitude by the “Permanent Five” agreeing upon “a more active and central role for the UN in the management and resolution of internal conflicts.”⁵ This in terms of numbers translated to 18 new peacekeeping missions in the period 1988-93 (5 years) in contrast to the 13 from 1945-88 (43 years), no doubt a reflection of changing intent and the problems of the new era.⁶ The second factor was the emergence of new tactics of warfare and intra-conflicts. Salman Ahmed et al.⁷ advance that many conflicts appearing in the last decade of the twentieth century were characterised by persistent challenge of the state by armed groups with arms and the environment was marked by lack of consensus of all the conflicting parties and many situations with no peace to keep. Therefore, the instruments and tools used in the traditional conception of peacekeeping couldn't be the same tools and strategies employed in the new environment.

On the same line of thought Peter Wallesteen and Margaretha Sollenberg⁸ analysed conflicts since the end of Cold War and shown that 94% of the 108 conflicts around the world were intra-state in nature. Not a surprising indicator reading the global and local headlines on increasing casualties of populations in the hands of militia, coup

⁵AhmedSalman, Paul Keating, and Ugo Solinas, *Shaping the Future of UN Peace Operations: Is There a Doctrine in the House?* Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20, No. 1 (2007): 5 pg. 13

⁶Janet E. Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia* (New York, NY: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994) pg. 67

⁷Op Cit Ahmed Salman et al, pg. 14.

⁸Peter Wallenstein and Margaretha Sollenberg, *Armed Conflicts 1989 – 1998*, Journal of Peace Research 36 (1999); pp. 593-606.

de tats and electoral violence all happening at the onus of the state. Roland Paris⁹ further exemplifies the changing nature of conflict by recognising the “new threats” that he refers to as “*pervasive and pernicious* internal wars” that pose magnitude humanitarian and strategic concerns. The increase of the intra-wars signified to the world that the approach of conflict management and resolution warranted some changes since it was embodied on the respect of the internal integrity of state represented by article 2 (7) of the UN charter.

Whilst, traditional diplomacy major assumption on armed conflict is primarily motivated and sustained by substantive interests, historically understood as "national interests", the contemporary conflicts are intense based on issues of identity, recognition and participation in the affairs of the state. This phenomena is further analysed by Mary Kaldor¹⁰ through her conception of ‘*new wars*’ to refer to the conflicts that were taking place in the Balkans and Africa in the 1990’s characterized by fragmentation and decentralization of the state. According to Kaldor¹¹, the war effort is heavily dependent on local predation and the aim of the perpetrators is not to win a war but to gain political prominence through perpetuating fear and polarization so that they can extract revenue through economic predation. She argues out that the main objective of the perpetrators of the conflict is not to win the war but to gain from the war enterprise or war economy.¹² In summary Kaldor extricates “new wars from old wars” by analysing four main distinctive characters. The first key difference is whereas the main actors of the old wars

⁹Roland Paris , *At War’s end : Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004) pg. 1

¹⁰ Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars 3rd Edition: Organised Violence in a Global Era*. (John Wiley & Sons, 2013.) pp. 3 - 9

¹¹Ibid

¹² Ibid

were regular armed forces, the new wars are fought by varying combinations of networks of state and non-state actors for example mercenaries, private security service providers, regular armed military, jihadists, paramilitaries etc.”¹³ Secondly the goals or end state of the wars are so immeasurably stirred. Unlike the old wars which were fought for ideological purposes such as democracy, private ownership or socialism coupled with geo-political interests, new wars are fought in the name of identity and distinctiveness in the social settings such as ethnic wars, tribal wars, resource conflicts or religious extremism¹⁴. Thirdly, the techniques of the feuds are poles apart in that old wars were motivated by capturing the territory through military means was the main tactic employed, but the new wars the target is control and total subsuming of the population. Finally, she discusses the forms of finance used in old wars was through the state coffers and tax revenue, but new wars are mainly funded through predatory private finance that significantly includes illegal tendencies such as looting, drugs, blood diamonds, compulsory protection levies etc.¹⁵

Kaldor’s theory of new wars exemplify clearly that the old conflict resolution and management should be rethought so that methods used to transform this new type of conflict can match the problem and hence resolve the conflict effectively. The new threats, new dimension of conflicts challenged the applicability of the triad cardinal principles of peacekeeping. Whilst they worked well in inter-state conflicts; the intra-state dynamics are increasingly complex. The geographical buffers cannot clearly be demarcated, belligerents are not easy to identify and the legitimacy of the state was

¹³Mary Kaldor. *In Defence of New Wars. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 2(1):4 2013, (DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.at>), last accessed 29 Aug 2014)

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Ibid

increasingly defied. As a response to these challenges the UN undertook internal reform and in 1992 released the “*An Agenda for Peace*”¹⁶ which redefined peace operations to include preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peacekeeping and the newly emerging category of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding.

The timing of the release of the “Agenda for Peace” by then UNSG Boutros – Ghali is very significant given it was aftermath of the widely much-celebrated triumph against the aggression of the Gulf War by the international community in the year 1990 - 1991.¹⁷ The Gulf War was a war waged by coalition forces from 34 nations led by the United States against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait.¹⁸ The victory of this war reawakened the belief that indeed the UN can effectively manage international conflict. This entry point strengthened Boutros-Ghali in redefining the UN peace operations. Specifically for this study, the “Agenda for Peace” outlined a case for the involvement of the civilian component in paragraph 52:

“Increasingly, peace-keeping requires that civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists and police play as central a role as the military..... I recommend that arrangements be reviewed and improved for training peace-keeping personnel - civilian, police, or military - using the varied capabilities of Member State Governments, of non-governmental organizations and the facilities of the Secretariat.”¹⁹

Further, the report in Paragraph 55²⁰ recognized the need for comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a

¹⁶Boutros-Ghali, “*An Agenda for Peace*” (UN, New York, 1992) http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf, accessed 27.08.2014)

¹⁷ Op Cit Michael Butler , pg. 165

¹⁸ Peter Jakobsen Viggo, “*National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What triggers UN peace Enforcement After the Cold War?*” *Journal of Peace research* (1996): 205-215.

¹⁹ Op Cit Boutros-Ghali, Para 52

²⁰ Ibid, Para 55

sense of confidence and well-being among people. Unfortunately, the after effects of UN peace operations after the release of the “agenda for peace” were ultimate failures starting with the Somalia interventions which Chapter 3 discusses in-depth, the Rwanda genocide in 1994 and the Bosnia challenges in 1995 prompted the UNSG Kofi Annan to request a high profile group of experts to assess the UN system’s shortcomings and to make frank and realistic recommendations for change. The result of this evaluation was the “Brahimi report” issued in August 2000. This report offered a comprehensive roadmap for reforming UN peacekeeping operations and acknowledged candidly the need for such measures.²¹ Among many other recommendations, Brahimi report also commended the maintenance of a roster of civilian candidates, which “*pre-vetted, interviewed, pre-selected, medically cleared and provided with the basic orientation material applicable to field mission service in general, and who have indicated their availability on short notice*”²²

To capture the emerging doctrine and the criticality of the civilian dimensions, there have been a proliferation of definitions with an attempt to describe the new concept of peace operations, Marten Zwanenburg points out, “the terms ‘peace operations’, ‘peace support operations’ or ‘peacekeeping’ do not appear in the UN Charter” but are developed as “an improvised and practical response to the failure of the United Nations Charter system of collective security.”²³ The PSO umbrella incorporates the wide mission spectrum and bridges both Chapters VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and VII (Action

²¹For example in Brahimi Report, Article 127 on Civilian Specialists clearly noted that UN peace operations had failed to “identify, recruit and deploy suitably qualified civilian personnel in substantive and support functions either at the right time or in the numbers required. (<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/55/a55305.pdf>, accessed 29 Aug 2014)

²²Ibid, Article 131

²³Marten Zwanenburg, *Accountability of Peace Support Operations* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 1.

with Respect to Threats to Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter. Zwanenburg²⁴ offers a comprehensive definition of a PSO as:

“Multifunctional operations, conducted impartially, normally in support of an internationally recognized organization such as the UN ... involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. PSO are designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specified conditions. They include Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peace-making, peace-building and humanitarian relief.”²⁵

This PSO model originates from Johan Galtung²⁶ model of resolving structural conflict through a three dimensional triangle that took the peacekeeping, peace-making and peace building strategies concurrently in resolving conflict. Galtung described peacekeeping as an approach to reduce the limit of destructiveness through the use of impartial and neutral third-party military forces. By contrast, peace-making, involves mediation and negotiation as means to reconcile the opposing goals and interests that incited the conflict in the first place, while peace-building reflects an even more comprehensive approach characterized by —the practical implementation of peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development and emphasizes the long-term and sustainable transformation of structural conflict causes and patterns in all societal sectors, including military, civilian, police , political and economic structures.²⁷

²⁴ Op Cit Zwanenburg, pg. 30

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Johan Galtung, *Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peace-making and Peacebuilding*. In *Peace, War and Defence: Essays in Peace Research* vol.2, 282-304. (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers)

²⁷ Ibid

Warnecke and Franke²⁸ advance that the idea of traditional peacekeeping solely conducted by the military emanated from thinking that sustainable peace is achieved in clear sequential steps that called for achievement of security first then other peace making and peace building initiatives followed. While this can be true for the inter-state conflict, it's widely recognised now that it can't work for the intra-state conflict since the approach overlooks the socio-economic conflict causes and effects, thereby neglecting the constructive engagement of civil society.²⁹ The shift of the peace keeping operations from the first mission therefore underlines that contemporary missions are thus no longer purely a military undertaking, but predicated on a symbiotic and mutually reinforcing civilian, police and military partnership for mission success.

Brahimi report³⁰ has been a point of reference for the centrality of the civilian component in peace operations as well as specific call to UN to strengthen capacity in that area. Among the many reasons for this paradigm shift is the fact that despite the rating of some previous peace missions being rated as successful such as Namibia (April 1989 to March 1990), Cambodia (March 1992 to May 1993), Mozambique (December 1992 to January 1995) and El Salvador (July 1991 to April 1995), overtime it became obvious that success was often proclaimed prematurely connoted by the understanding of absence of violence and not an end result of sustainable peace.³¹

²⁸Warnecke and Franke, *Sustainable Conflict Transformation an Analytical Model for Assessing the Contribution of Development Activities to Peacebuilding*, (International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 15, Number 1, Spring/Summer 2010) pg.5

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰Op Cit Brahimi Report. Articles 76 – 83, 127 – 145.

³¹ Op Cit Ahmed Salman et al., Pg. 14.

Michael Doyle³² recognises that the shift from the traditional peacekeeping on one hand can be explained by the functions undertaken by the peacekeepers which go beyond the traditional conceptions and plug into the areas thought to be exclusive domain of the domestic jurisdiction. These functions that include institutional reform, elections, human rights, international monitoring are in the domain of the civilian component of the peace mission. David Malone³³ advances the same argument by recognising that the most striking features of the new generational peacekeeping operations were not so much the larger numbers of the military personnel involved but rather the important role and substantive diversity of the mission civilian and police components. The reasons for this model is explained by Winrich Kuehne³⁴ who provides insights on the political challenges which peacekeeping forces encountered in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s which revealed conception problems of traditional peacekeeping dealing with intra-conflict, thereby calling for operations which were multidimensional, dynamic and complex in terms of conflict resolution. Goulding³⁵ emphasis that the militaristic peace operations has now changed and now they frequently contain the civilian aspects. He points out the lessons from Congo indicate that peace operations are extremely messy affairs in which the success is hard to achieve and more than military skills are required.³⁶ Most recently the work of Virginia Fortna³⁷ inquisition of whether

³²Michael Doyle, *War Making Peace Making and the United Nations*, In Crocker Chester et al, *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington D.C, US Institute of Peace Press 2001) pp. 529-560

³³Ramesh Thakur and Edward Newman. *New Millennium New Perspectives: The United Nations, Security, and Governance* - UNU Millennium Series. (Tokyo, New York et Paris: UN University Press, 2000)pg. 23

³⁴Winrich Kuehne, *Peace Support Operations: How to make them Succeed*, IPG 4/99 (http://www.fes.de/ipg/ipg4_99/ARTKUEHNE.PDF, accessed 1 Aug 2014)

³⁵Michael Goulding, *The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping*, *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1993), 69(3): pp. 451-464.

³⁶ Ibid

peacekeeping works, argued that the civilian tasks help to move conflicts from the battlefield to more peaceful institutions of dispute settlement.

Despite the adoption of the thinking on civilian dimension importance in PSOs the practise on the ground is different. In 2009 the UN SG released a report³⁸ on peacebuilding immediately after conflict and emphasizes the need to clarify roles for civilians, strengthen leadership teams in host countries and institutional harmonization within the UN system and recognizes that more needs to be done. This reflects the complexity of PSOs given the long period that UN has been involved in peace operations and manages expectations of regional institutions in achieving the mission coherence expected in achieving peace mandates.

2.2 AU Approach to Peace Operations

An analysis of AU approach to peace operations would start with an overarching situation lens in the continent that has propelled a system-wide approach to conflicts management and resolution. African leaders in 2000 resolved to systematically transform the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into AU with social, political, economic and security structures that enabled the continent cope with steep and deepened socio-economic and political crisis, destructive civil wars, sustained refugees crisis, widespread poverty, disease, socio-economic injustices and iniquities and other national, regional and global challenges. Despite the OAU Charter providing for a role for the OAU in finding African solutions to conflict situations on the continent through the creation of the

³⁷Virginia Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work – Shaping Belligerents Choices after Civil War*, (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2008) Pg. 98

³⁸ Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of Conflict, 11 June 2009, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/881 (accessed 1 Aug 2014)

Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration³⁹, this body was never used and there was no real role formulated for the OAU in internal conflict. Although the OAU had consistently stressed the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, it had a poor record in terms of involvement in Africa's conflicts. This was attributed to the non-intervention clause in the OAU Charter, and the fact that it was never intended to be a peacekeeper but a body to promote African unity.⁴⁰

According to Sam Makinda⁴¹, security was a major concern for the founders of the OAU, but they viewed it primarily in terms of state interests, especially territorial integrity, state sovereignty, and the protection of state boundaries. This explains the inadequacy of the organization to effectively respond to the internal conflict dimension that mushroomed after the cold war. Amidst all these internal wars, new threats confronted Africa characterised by national, religious and other forms of extremism, drug trafficking and organized crime, regional conflicts and the threat of the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), financial and economic crises, ecological disasters and epidemics as expounded by Mary Kaldor.⁴²

The change of OAU to AU therefore meant that AU institutional and legal framework was better equipped to effectively and efficiently deal with the new threats and new forms of insecurities that emanated from governance related situations in Africa. Makunda and Okumu⁴³ advance that Africa has experienced more wars, conflicts, and crises than any other continent. Many of these have taken place within, rather than

³⁹OAU Charter, Article 19. (http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/OAU_Charter_1963_0.pdf, last accessed 1 Aug 2014)

⁴⁰J. O. C. Jonah, 'The OAU: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution', in El-Ayouty (ed.), *OAU after Thirty Years* 3–14, at 9.

⁴¹Samuel Makunda & Francis Okumu, *The African Union – Challenges of Globalization, Security and Governance* (London, Routledge 2008) pg. 12.

⁴²Op Cit Kaldor, (2009), pp 2 -7

⁴³Op Cit Samuel Makunda & Francis Okumu, pg. 12.

between, states. Owing to the fragility of African state boundaries, some intra-state conflicts have spilt over the borders and exerted pressure on neighbouring countries. The nature of the conflicts in Africa can be classified from the thinking of Johan Galtung⁴⁴ on structural violence which explore how political, economic and cultural structures result in the occurrence of avoidable violence, most commonly seen as the deprivation of basic human needs. Galtung's original definition included a lack of human agency; that is the violence is not a direct act of any decision or action made by a particular person but a result of an unequal distribution of resources.

Coupled with the UN institutional failures to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and failures in Somalia, the African leadership came up with a comprehensive security agenda that encompassed all dimensions of security – state security but most importantly the human security. The AU vision reflected by its legal framework articulates the union objective to promote peace, security and stability in the continent.⁴⁵ In addition, one of the unions' principles is the peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states including the mandate to intervene in a member state in respect to grave situation such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.⁴⁶ Thus, the AU has a mandate to help resolve inter-state and intrastate conflicts, deal with terrorist threats and engage in peace building and reconstruction activities.

More specifically, the AU PSO doctrine describes peace operations to be “*multifunctional operations that may include conflict prevention, peace-making, peace*

⁴⁴Johan Galtung , “*Structural Violence*” ,([www.galtung-institut.de/ structural-violence](http://www.galtung-institut.de/structural-violence); accessed 4 June 2014)

⁴⁵ African Union Constitutive Act - Article 3(f)

⁴⁶ Ibid article 4 (e) and article 4 (h)

*enforcement, peacekeeping, peace building and/or humanitarian operations.”*⁴⁷ A clear policy underpinning by the AU consolidates the importance of the civilian component, in accordance to the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Stand-by Force,⁴⁸ which provides for the establishment of the African multidimensional peace operation capability recognises the need for a comprehensive inclusion of all the components at all levels i.e.” *A legitimate political capacity to mandate a mission under the UN Charter, a multidimensional strategic level management capability and a mission HQ level multidimensional management capability.”*⁴⁹ AU adaptation of the PSO concept encompasses all the three dimensions as proposed by Galtung, albeit in varying degrees. Notwithstanding these explicit aspirations the implementation of the doctrine is dismal and contradictory variants exist. Peace missions deployed by the AU lurk behind the comprehensive approach as Andrea Vogt⁵⁰ demonstrates through empirical study of the deployed AU missions. She argues that the African governmental and intergovernmental institutions continue to lag behind in developing and deploying comprehensive peace operation capacities including the military, police and civilians. According to Vogt, the assessment of the few AU led operations conducted to date have indeed been significantly limited in terms of meeting the necessary comprehensive demands.⁵¹

Further exploration of the AU experiences in PSO results on immense findings on general challenges and opportunities faced by AU in the peacekeeping field, as

⁴⁷Chapter 3 - AU ASF PSO Doctrine 2006 , (AU PSOD, Addis Ababa)

⁴⁸ Chapter 2.1 - Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee. Adopted by the Third Meeting of African Chiefs of Defence Staff (May 2003)

⁴⁹Ibid

⁵⁰Adreas Vogt, *Towards a Comprehensive Self-Sufficient African Peace Operations Capacity, Fact or Fiction?* In Conflict Tends, 2005 Issue 4 (South Africa, Accord,2005) pp. 24- 29

⁵¹Ibid

expounded by Murithi⁵², Adebayo⁵³ and Boulden⁵⁴ that include and are not limited to the mission components coordination, operational capabilities, funding shortfalls etc. but fall short in delving on the character, setup and operational capabilities of the civilian component within the mission level but also with the community and state authorities who are the prime beneficiaries of the peace mission. Whereas Vogt points out to the civilian representation at AU peace mission's state of affairs, the questions on how the in-house civilian component is organised remain unanswered. Vogt⁵⁵ argues against applying military capability in isolation, regardless of strength and security-related effectiveness, since this can only serve as a temporary "band aid" and result in patches of peace instead of sustainable peace.⁵⁶ To exemplify further the vital role of the civilian component, Madlala-Routledge and Liebenberg⁵⁷ advance that Africa needs a new "developmental peacekeeping" doctrine. They argue that the main drivers of conflict in Africa are resource-based whereby an overly military approach to peace-keeping ought to be replaced by a more multidimensional, developmental approach. Elaborating on the nature of African conflicts, they stress that many societies have become "war economies", where the expulsion of populations, killing and large-scale human rights violations are a means of accumulating resources. The authors claim UN peacekeeping in Africa has largely ignored this dynamic.

⁵² Tim Murithi, *The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: The African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia* (African Security Review 17.1 Institute for Security Studies, 2008)

⁵³ Adekeye Adebajo, *From Cape to Casablanca: Africa's Evolving Security Architecture*, (in *Favorita Papers of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna*, No. 3, 2004).

⁵⁴ Jane Boulden, *Dealing with Conflict in Africa – the UN and Regional organisation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2003)

⁵⁵ Op Cit Vogt A, pp. 24- 29

⁵⁶ Ibid

⁵⁷ Madlala-Routledge Nozizwe and Liebenberg Sybert, *Developmental Peacekeeping: What are the Advantages for Africa?* African Security Review Vol. 13(2), 2004), pp. 125-31.

Whilst these studies have presented a convincing advocacy for the incorporation of the civilian component in PSOs, this study aims to use the complex Somalia conflict that is vastly different and longer than most of the other conflicts in the Horn of Africa to argue for effectiveness and potential of the civilian component in transforming protracted conflict. The study recognizes that the conflict in Somalia is peculiar given the terrorist dimension posed by the Al-Shabaab group and may not be won using conventional means that are employed by the military component. Since the enemy is an elusive, determined and operates outside the framework of the nation-state and in the unconventional environment.

A recent challenge on the AU multidimensional approach emanate from the adoption of concept of the African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity (AICRC) which is a strictly military capacity with high reactivity to respond swiftly to emergency situations upon political decisions to intervene in conflict situations within the continent.⁵⁸ While the concept is a transitional measure towards the full operationalization of the ASF, the concentration on using militaristic means to conflicts in Africa cannot be overlooked. The APSA framework entails conflict preventive institutions such as the Panel of the Wise which are cheaper in implementation than military solutions. The AU PSOs exist in the broad framework and school of thought of interventionist stance⁵⁹. The practise of peacekeeping since end of Second World War was framed in its traditional guise that placed the premium on state sovereignty and non-

⁵⁸ Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the operationalization of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the African Standby Force and the establishment of an “*African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises*” Addis Ababa 2013 (<http://cpauc.au.int/en/content/report-chairperson-commission-operationalisation-rapid-deployment-capability-african-standby> accessed 11 Aug 2014)

⁵⁹AU Constitutive Act , Article 4 (h)

interference and was oriented on the principles of consent, impartiality and non-coercive rules of engagement.

The paradigm shift of non-indifference by AU is particularly significant for the study of civilian dimension in AU PSOs because it recognises that PSOs as Alex Bellamy⁶⁰ argues do not happen in a vacuum. But they are international political decisions, entire products of international politics, interests and negotiations. Whilst, scholars such as Roland Paris⁶¹, Alex Bellamy⁶² have argued for incorporation of wider processes of global politics in the analysis, study and implementation of PSOs, the AU PSOs just like the UN peace operations haven't systematically addressed the structural issues that can better inform the interventions. Hence, there is opportunity for this study to seek answers on how the civilian mandates within the larger context of issuance of PSO mandate can be analysed and hence answer the research questions as expressed.

Finally there is a very interesting un-explored area in this study - perceptions and view of the local populations. According to Bercovitch⁶³; interventions from international community and regional organisations can be said to be objective through assessment of the conflicting parties and the population. Since the establishment of the OAU, transiting to AU the voice of the African citizenship has been ignored and that of its leaders has over been magnified. According to Warsame Burhaan⁶⁴, the optimism that the change to AU with the new institutions have progressively declined, and measures to salvage the support of the African citizens should be engaged. Non-state participation in AU's policy

⁶⁰ Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010) pg. 1

⁶¹ Roland Paris, "Broadening the study of peace operations." *International Studies Review* 2, no. 3 (2000): 27-44.

⁶² Op Cit Alex and Paul, pp. 1 - 30

⁶³ Jacob Bercovitch, Ed, and Jeffrey Rubin Z., *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management*. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994) pp. 22 -25

⁶⁴ Fridah Kibuko, interview with Warsame Burhaan – Director ASEP, Addis Ababa (3rd August 2014)

development processes has given way to a more closed stance, according to a report released by Afrimap in 2007 recognized that there are still considerable difficulties in obtaining access to information about policies and documents under discussion by AU organs, preventing effective participation by Africa's citizens in continental decision-making processes including towards its peace and security vision.⁶⁵

This is interesting in the study of the civilian component in PSOs since the component has a large engagement with the population. Most of the roles played by the civilians include political advice to the state, civil affairs with the local population. They are the bridge between the mission and the population. Beatrice Pouligny's⁶⁶ work aims at this direction where she advances that even though the principles that govern PSOs are critical from the start-up of the mission; the peace mission is judged per se by results, on what the peacekeepers say, do, and on how they behave and face up their responsibilities. At the micro level, AU PSO furthermore represent a most interesting area on the encounter of global values as mitigated by the civilian component versus local views and the challenges involved in localizing universal values such as human rights, liberal markets in such contexts. From that viewpoint an important question on the arrangement of the AU PSOs civilian component with the local actors should further be explored.

2.3 Institutional and Functional Relationships in Africa's Peace Operations

As stated at the introduction of this chapter, the UN has the overall objective in maintaining international peace and security, however amidst the changing international landscape on peace operations, a new phenomenon has also emerged – that of division of

⁶⁵Afrimap et al, *Towards a People-Driven African Union, Current Obstacles New Opportunities*(http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/AU_People-DrivenNov07.pdf accessed 28 July 2014)

⁶⁶ Beatrice Pouligny, *Peace Operations Seen from Below – UN Missions and Local People* (UK, C.Hurst & Co Publishers, 2006) pg179

labour between the UN, AU and EU in African peace operations. A vital lesson from the UN failures in Somalia and Rwanda in the early nineties was that UN needed partners to achieve its vision of international peace and security. UN Charter Chapter VIII recognise the importance of the regional arrangements as a complimentary action to maintenance of international peace and security.⁶⁷ Further Article 53 underpin the coordination role and authority of the UNSC in utilisation of the regional arrangements.⁶⁸

Cedric de Coning⁶⁹ offers insights on the comparative advantages that exist between the AU and UN in Africa peace operations. He explains that AU has proven an ability to venture into areas “too risky” evidenced by “no peace to keep” which the 2000 Brahimi report cautioned the UN not to take up missions in such areas. The fact that UN can’t venture into such areas complements the international approach for peace and security. On the other hand AU lacks the institutional capacity to sustain these missions based on lack of sustainable funding mechanisms. Further, AU lacks in house capacity needed to backstop these missions with the logistics, personnel and financial systems for PSO managements. The gaps experienced by AU are compensated by the long experience of UN in mission sustainment based on capability of UN to fundraise for peacekeeping from all the member states in proportion to their Gross Domestic Product (GDP).⁷⁰ Adekayo Adebajo⁷¹ argues out in the events of UN failures in Somalia in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994 have given the AU the necessary muscle to act in areas that the international community would not venture out.

⁶⁷ Chapter VIII Article 52 - *Charter of United Nations*, (UN New York, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml>, accessed 2nd June 2014)

⁶⁸ Ibid

⁶⁹ Cedric De Coning, *The Emerging UN/AU Peacekeeping Partnership*. (ConflictTrends 1 (2010): 3-10.

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹ Adekeye Adebajo, *From Cape to Casablanca: Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture*, (in *Favorita Papers of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna*, No. 3, 2004.

Based on this symbiotic relationship, since 2003 on the launch of the first PSO under the AU mandate in Burundi – AU has been undertaking the stabilization of the peace missions closely followed by UN for peacebuilding and reconstruction of the state. The trend started with the deployment of AMIB in 2003 followed by a UN operation (ONUB) in 2004⁷²; and repeated in Liberia, where ECOWAS deployed ECOMIL in 2003, followed by a UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)⁷³ later in the same year. In 2006 however, the partnership between the UN and AU changed based on the political context in Sudan that foresaw the first hybrid mission between UN and AU namely the United Nations / African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)⁷⁴. In 2013, the African Mission in Mali (AFISMA) was re-hatted into the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) through resolution 2100 of the UNSC.⁷⁵

For AMISOM the UN - AU - EU requires another lens of analysis based on new approaches to the joint implementation of the AMISOM mandate. On the deployment of AMISOM in February 2007 the initial mandate was given as six months with the expectation that when conditions permitted, the UN Security Council would deploy a UN peacekeeping operation that would subsume or replace the AU effort. Seven years later, those conditions have not yet been achieved and the UNSC has continued to rely upon AU AMISOM⁷⁶ as the lead international peace operation for Somalia. Nonetheless, the UN has progressively deployed three missions in Somalia namely the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) on 15th April 1995 under the supervision of the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) with the sole mandate of support towards the reconciliation in

⁷²<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onub/> (accessed 23 July 2014)

⁷³<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/> (accessed 23 July 2014)

⁷⁴<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/> accessed 23 July 2014)

⁷⁵<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.shtml> (accessed 23 July 2014)

⁷⁶<http://amisom-au.org/> (accessed 23 July 2014)

Somalia.⁷⁷ Upon the election and assumption to office of the new government of Somalia the UNPOS was handed over to UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)⁷⁸ with a mandate to help build the Federal Government's capacity to promote respect for human rights and women's empowerment, promote child protection, prevent conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, and strengthen justice institutions. To support the logistics and assist AMISOM in achieving its operational effectiveness, UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) is a field support operation led by the UN Department of Field Support.

All the above missions exemplify the AU mind-set and expectations that AU stability operations will be followed by UN peace operations. Despite the cooperation, there has been bottlenecks in the relationship which is discussed in depth by Boutellis and Williams⁷⁹ on the strategic relationship between the UNSC and the AU PSC on conflict management and resolution in Africa. They have identified central challenges blocking more effective AU-UN collaboration across three main dimensions namely: the strategic, political relationship between the two councils; the bureaucratic and organizational interaction between the two councils; and intra-AU dynamics, namely, relations among the AU Commission, the Peace and Security Council, and AU member states.⁸⁰ Even if the legal frameworks are clear on how these relationships are governed coherence is still a big challenge. The doctrine and intent is clear on paper but the actual implementation requires more joint understanding and harmonisation of procedures.

⁷⁷UNDP, <http://unpos.unmissions.org/> (accessed 23 July 2014)

⁷⁸ Ibid

⁷⁹Arthur Boutellis and Paul Williams , *“Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships in Peace Operations,”* (New York: International Peace Institute, April 2013)

⁸⁰Ibid

The trend to re-hat the AU stabilized missions into UN pose a serious question on the AU PSO multidimensional approach. Stabilization missions are largely military operations with a minimal civilian political advisory team and therefore challenge the vision of peacebuilding and reconstruction as envisaged by AU. According to Ludwig Kirchner,⁸¹ AU should focus on the opportunities of implementing the entire spectrum of peace and security architecture from the preventive measures to post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. This in turn will be useful in terms of gaining experience in the continent at all conflict phases and apply “African Solutions to African problems” at all the levels of the society.

Besides the partnership with the UN, AU has also cooperated with EU in peace operations in Africa. According to Malte Brosig⁸² EU deployed first support mission in Congo dubbed “*Operation Artemis*” in 2003. Since then EU has deployed in Guinea Bissau, Somalia – the Indian Ocean “*Operation Atlanta*” in containing the piracy challenge, support mission to AU in African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2006, EUFOR mission in Central Africa Republic (CAR) and also in Chad. All the missions have been support packages to compliment and meet the shortfalls experienced in AU. Within the framework of the Africa– EU partnership, the EU commitment to support the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has been exemplified by the consistent support to the African Peace Fund (APF) the main fund utilized in supporting the AU PSOs. In the recent joint Summit strategic meeting in Brussels, the Roadmap 2014 – 2017 spelt out the priority areas, top on the list was the Peace and Security. The leaders committed to:

⁸¹Fridah Kibuko, Interview with Kirchner Ludwig – GIZ EASF Team Leader , Nairobi (12 August 2014)

⁸²Malte Brosig, *The Emerging Peace and Security Regime in Africa: The Role of the EU*. European Foreign Affairs Review 16, no. 1 (2011): 107-122. http://www.academia.edu/7364499/Modeling_Cooperative_Peacekeeping_Exchange_Theory_and_the_African_Peace_and_Security_Regime, accessed 23 July 2014)

“Strengthen the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), in particular by supporting the African Standby Force and its capacity to be deployed, supported and managed in a sustainable way. We will support training and capacity building of African forces, including police and civilian components. In addition, we will support the African institutional capacity building, for instance in the area of crisis prevention, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction including by providing advice, training and equipment”⁸³

Whilst the complimentary and the principle of subsidiarity between the players should be emphasized the danger of multiplicity of actors in the peacekeeping arena emanate from duplication of roles hence redundancy and at the end a loss for the population who are expected to benefit from the interventions. In 2012 a seminal conducted in Uppsala⁸⁴ in evaluating the AU – UN relationship concluded that for effectiveness of these dual relationship there is need for more institutionalization; bringing prepared positions to joint meetings; more strategic discussion; sending one’s best people to consultations, exchanges, trainings in order to optimise synergies.

Finally, the existence and ability of AU to implement its security agenda is fuelled by the existence of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) such as Economic Communities of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority Development Countries (IGAD), and Southern Africa Development Cooperation (SADC) among others. Article 16⁸⁵ of the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union recognises the

⁸³http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/142094.pdf, accessed 8 Aug 2014)

⁸⁴ AU – UN Peace Missions Evaluated, (Uppsala University Jan 2012, www.nai.uu.se > *News* > *News archive*, accessed 8 Aug 2014)

⁸⁵ Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, (Addis Ababa, <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf> last accessed 7 July 2014)

regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution as part of the overall security architecture of the Union, which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa.

While the legal framework constituting the AU is clear on paper, in practise however, the implementation of the security agenda is problematic and competition on who should take the lead as experienced in 2013 in Mali is very clear. Especially for RECs such as ECOWAS which have more peacekeeping experience and stronger decision making and mandating processes than the AU. Ideally the cooperation between AU and RECs just like the relationships of AU, UN and EU should also be guided by the principle of subsidiarity and comparative advantages. Evidently AU has been taking lead in regions without clear lead nation or hegemon, e.g. the intervention in Burundi and Somalia.⁸⁶ For coherence and effectiveness in its peace operations, the vertical and horizontal relationships between UN, AU and RECs as well as across other international organisations should be streamlined to ensure the population benefit from the interventions. For this to happen AU and RECs must clearly prioritise their needs and build formidable institutions that can easily adapt to the changing needs of peace and security.

2.4 Existing Literature Gaps and Opportunities

In summary the literature review reveal certain shortfalls which can be complimented by this study. Firstly it is evident that the civilian component in AU PSO remain ignored, unincorporated in the wider PSO even though the policy framework

⁸⁶Jones, Bruce D., Shepard Forman, and Richard Gowan, eds. *Cooperating for Peace and Security: Evolving Institutions and Arrangements in a Context of Changing US Security Policy.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.)

expressly recognises their vital contribution. Secondly, the literature doesn't answer the question on how the civilian component functions are conceived, and specifically if they adapt to the required needs on the ground. Thirdly, the discourses on peace operations have revealed the challenges of coordination based on the plethora of actors, agencies, institutions who carry particular interests and ideologies in the theatre of the operations. In Somalia for example, UNSOA, UNSOM and AMISOM are present in the same operation albeit with different mandates. Chapter four will examine in depth how the potentials and effectiveness of these organisations amongst other international organisations working for attainment of sustainable peace in Somalia. In particular the study elucidates the factors for success from a civilian dimension lens. Finally based on the changing conflict dimension an in-depth examination on how the AMISOM has adopted based on the factors discussed in this chapter will be expounded.

Chapter Three

An Overview of Peacekeeping Interventions in Somalia

3. Introduction

From the beginning of the Somalia civil war in 1978, many people have lost their lives as a direct or indirect consequence of the conflict. While, many countries that experienced civil war over the same period in Africa such as Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Namibia, Angola, Sierra Leone amongst others are on the path of conflict recovery, reconciliation and reconstruction, Somalia conflict has persisted and most of the interventions to restore it into a functioning state have been met by mixed signs of progress. Ken Menkhaus,¹ argues that the defining characteristic of the Somalia conflict is “protracted state collapse” which has consequently “bedevilled the best humanitarian, diplomatic, development and peacekeeping efforts of the international community.”²

This chapter illustrates how this assertion applies to the Somalia peacekeeping by firstly critically assessing the UN interventions by UNOSOM I (April 1992 – March 1993), UNITAF (December 1992 – May 1993) and UNOSOM II (March 1993 – May 1995).³ Secondly, the chapter will briefly examine the attempted peacekeeping initiative of the Regional Organisation – Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) dubbed as IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM)⁴ designed to take off in 2005 but failed for reasons that the section will exemplify. The study is limited to peacekeeping operations only but recognises the peace-making efforts made by

¹ Ken Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*. (London and New York, Routledge 2006)Pg. 1

²Ibid

³ Previous UN Peace Keeping Operations, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/htm>, accessed 2nd June 2014)

⁴ Background on AMISOM, <http://amisom-au.org/amisom-background/>, accessed 14 July 2014)

international community to resolve the Somalia impasse. The chapter will culminate with a conclusion on the lessons identified and how best they can be integrated to the AMISOM intervention from the civilian component point of view.

3.1 Developments Leading to Peacekeeping Interventions in Somalia

The year 1960 was a significant year in the history of Africa and in particular for Somalia. Seventeen African territories gained independence from the strong arm of European colonial rule, among these states was Somalia. Martin Meredith⁵ describes the euphoria, crest of popularity for the African leaders and the honeymoon of African states independence though brief but memorable. Yet Somalia as recounted in chapter one faced a serious structural problem caused by the “Berlin Curse”⁶ of African scramble that carved Somalia into five separate territories.

In 1960 – the independence of Somalia, the Italian Somalia and the British Somaliland were joined to form the Somalia republic, but the desire for Somali unification remained reflected by provision of unification in the constitution and emblazonment on the Somalia of the five-point star representing the five segment of the Somali people.⁷ According to Durch,⁸ the Somali state enjoyed a short-lived parliamentary democracy from 1960 – 1969 giving way to bloodless coup by Gen Siad Barre led by his own Marehan clan and excluding other important sub-clans.

In pursuit of the Pan-Somalism ideology, the new Somalia state found itself occupied to liberate the other ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia the Ogaden area and the North-

⁵ Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa – A History of Fifty Years of Independence*, (Britain, Free Press 2005)p. 143

⁶ Adebajo, Adekeye. *The Curse of Berlin: Africa's Security Dilemmas. Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* 4 (2005): 83-98.

⁷ John Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia: A Tale of Tragic Blunders*. (London, Haan Associates 1994) pg. 8

⁸ William Durch J, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping : Case Studies and Comparative Analyses*. (New York , St Martin's Press, 1996) pg. 319

Eastern Kenya thereby in constant confrontation with the Ethiopian and Kenyan authorities respectively. This culminated to the Ogaden war which saw the embarrassing defeat of the Somali leadership. While the Pan-Somalism was the major uniting factor for the Somali people, the clan allegiance and family lineage was the basis of political allegiance and hence the clan came before the nation. As Martin Meredith recognises “*as long as the goal of the Greater Somalia seemed attainable, clan rivalries were held in check*”⁹

Upon the humiliating military defeat, military officers from rival clan factions attempted to overthrow Barre regime. Two major insurgent factions emerged, the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) with their bases in Ethiopia in 1981. By 1990, several armed political clans within Somalia had emerged that sought to challenge Siad Barre’s rule, the most powerful of which, the Hawiye Habr Gedr, was led by Aideed.¹⁰ In January 1991, Siad Barre fled the country and the central government collapsed entirely. Mohamed Ali Mahdi, was declared interim leader during a peace conference in Djibouti in July 1991.¹¹ However instead of this development quelling the war, the conflict escalated when Aideed rejected the nomination of Mahdi.

Aideed felt short changed since he had played an important role in defeating Barre yet he was not invited in the reconciliation conference. Mutual resentment and

⁹Op Cit Martin Meredith, pg. 446

¹⁰Isabelle Duyvesteyn, *Clausewitz and African War: Politics and Strategy in Liberia and Somalia*.(Routledge, 2004) pg. 41

¹¹Op Cit Durch 1996, pg. 315.

political ambition saw a crush between the forces of Aideed and Mahdi causing more than 30,000 to 50,000 casualties and turned Mogadishu into a war zone.¹²

Not only did the war completely destroy the infrastructure but also contributed to the collapse of the agricultural sector and set perfect conditions for the devastating famine. According to the account of Doyle and Sambanis¹³, the 1991- 92 famine in Somalia affected the urban and the rural populace giving way to disease and potential of 2 million people dying of hunger, and food prices skyrocketing up by 800 – 1200 percent.

3.2 UN Peacekeeping Interventions in Somalia

The Somalia plight attracted the attention of the new UNSG, Boutros-Ghali who strongly believed that the UN was the “central instrument for the prevention and the resolution of conflicts and the preservation of peace”, Somalia was the new opportunity for the UN liberated from its Cold War constraints to restore order in the troubled country. Boutros-Ghali saw the potential for UN to employ the preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping spelt out in the “*An Agenda for Peace*”¹⁴ discussed in length in chapter 2. The ideology held by the Boutros-Ghali for UN was that the sanctity of the national sovereignty held in the preceding years had a potential to be overridden by the UNSC in cases deemed necessary for the peace enforcement. Yet there was a challenge – the UN lacked the institutional capacity and structure to implement the new vision.¹⁵

¹²Clarke Walter, *Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia*. In *Learning from Somalia*, edited by Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (Boulder CO, Westview Press, 1997) 3 - 19

¹³Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*(Princeton University Press, 2006) pg. 147

¹⁴Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: UN 1992)

¹⁵Op Cit Martin Meredith, pg. 471

In the Boutros-Ghali first report¹⁶ to the UNSC about Somalia, doctrinal and procedural difficulties that were to plague the UN operation were apparent beginning with the issues of representational of the factional groups to the venue of the conduct of the talks. According to Makumi Mwangi,¹⁷ for any negotiation to be successful, the “*negotiations about negotiations*” (pre-negotiation stage) are important pointers to the success of the negotiations. The case of Somalia presented challenges since the identification of the representatives proved to be difficult from the onset even with the difficulties of agreeing on a neutral venue for the discussions.

3.2.1 United Nations Operation in Somalia 1 (UNOSOM 1)

On 3rd March 1992, a ceasefire agreement that satisfied the desires of both sides to maintain an armed status quo was signed presenting an opportunity for intervention. On 24 April 1992, the UNSC established the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM),¹⁸ the mandate of UNOSOM was to provide humanitarian relief and address the main threat of famine and the difficulties associated with delivery of the relief food by NGO workers who were impeded by the clan warfare. Mohammed Sahnoun was appointed as the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to Somalia, alongside a force of fifty UN technical observers to monitor the ceasefire. Ray Murphy¹⁹ noted that the deployment of UNOSOM 1 was pegged on the three traditional cardinal rules including the consent of the belligerents. Yet Somalia was a failed state at that time and needed another strategy that departed from conventional thinking. Immediately after his

¹⁶ Boutros-Ghali, *Report of the Secretary General on the Situation on Somalia* (S/23693). p. 12

¹⁷ Mwangi, Makumi. *The Water's Edge: Mediation of Violent Electoral Conflict in Kenya. Vol. 3.* (Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, Nairobi 2008.) pg. 95

¹⁸UNSC Resolution 751 - 1992, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1mandate.html>, accessed 11 Aug 2014)

¹⁹ Ray Murphy, *UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal issues in Practice* (Cambridge University Press, 2007.) Pg. 51

appointment, Sahnoun arrived in Mogadishu on 4 May 1992. Meredith notes that despite the dire need of the Somalia nation at that given time, the SRSG came with no resources in Somalia. He had no budget, no staff and a dearth of background knowledge and intelligence materials.²⁰ Most authors²¹ who have written about this time in Somalia acknowledge that Mohamed Sahnoun approach to the conflict in Somalia was encompassing since he sought to reconcile all the clans and the factions and establish an inclusive peace process. Sahnoun's strategy was to negotiate with the various clans and sub-clans; he also had the ear of Aideed, which no subsequent negotiator would enjoy.²² While Sahnoun worked to build the confidence of the various factions, he was dismayed by the lax approach of the UN Secretariat in taking the initiative during several opportunities to establish peace, and he was angry about the flagrant abuses of some UN relief agencies; moreover, he was not silent in his criticism of the UN both on the ground and at headquarters.²³

Some of the Somali nationals said this about Sahnoun's approach:

“He was the first who came and saw there were alternative. He was the first to meet the elders of the Hawiye clans, the neutral clans, who are not involved in the fighting. Also he was talking to the women. He used to reason like Somalis”²⁴.

²⁰ Op Cit Martin Meredith, pg. 472

²¹Nat Colletta and Michelle L. Cullen. *Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia*. Vol. 795. World Bank Publications, 2000. Also see, Ken Menkhaus, *State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts*. *Review of African Political Economy* 30, no. 97 (2003): 405-422.

²² Lise Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008)pg. 25

²³ Ibid

²⁴Op Cit Martin Meredith, pg. 473

Walter and Jeffrey²⁵ reinforce this view by acknowledging that Sahnoun believed that the Somalis problems could be resolved through effective diplomacy. Despite Sahnoun efforts, the UN operation was plagued by lots of bureaucratic infighting, endless delays, a phenomena that Howard refers to as “*UN organizational dysfunction*” which resulted in mandate implementation failure. By June 1992, Somalia erupted once again brought about by resistance of the people of the South over their new overlords. UNSC reacted by issuing resolution 767 on July 27 which added 450 military forces. From the beginning of the UN intervention Aideed had resisted every kind of move that the UN made, since he believed that he had the resources and the ability to defeat the Mahdi forces given some extra time. Hence the deployment of the additional forces was met by a raucous actions such as the blockading of Pakistani peacekeepers within the airport premises.²⁶

The thinking of Aideed has been a point of reference in International Mediation attracting key scholarly contribution by William Zartman among others about the “Ripeness of Intervention” in conflict zone. Zartman argues that successful conflict resolution lies in the timing of efforts for resolution. Parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so—when alternative, usually unilateral, means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties find themselves in an uncomfortable and costly predicament.²⁷ Based on this claim, it’s clear that Somalia resolution strategy at that given time was not ripe for any type of intervention. The breaking point of the UN dysfunctional system came to bear through the dismissal of Sahnoun by the UNSG based

²⁵Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst, eds. *Learning from Somalia – The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Boulder, Westview Press) Pg. 7

²⁶Ibid, Pg. 8

²⁷ William Zartman. *Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond - International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*(2000): 225-250. Also see: Op Cit Mwangi, pp. 87 - 94

on their numerous disagreements. In place of his “soft” approach, Boutros-Ghali appointed an Iraqi diplomat, Ismat Kittani who from all scholarly accounts adopted a confrontational approach from the start. Howard sums up the Kittani’s approach as being impetuous and quick solutions oriented rather than the active listening employed by Sahnoun.²⁸

3.2.2 United Task Force (UNITAF)

In view of the deteriorating conditions in Somalia, on 3rd December 1992 UNSCacting under Chapter VII, unanimously adopted Resolution 794 which gave the US the command and the control of the UN mission.²⁹ The mission of UNITAF was similar to UNOSOM 1 with an addition of “use of necessary force” to attain the mandate objectives. Further, UNITAF was tasked to consolidate the security framework so that it could be handed over to regular UN forces.

UNITAF had deployed approximately 37,000 troops in southern and central Somalia, with 28,000 US military and other troop contributions from France, Belgium, Canada, Italy and Nigeria among other countries³⁰. The operation was led in part by former US Ambassador to Somalia Robert Oakley. Unlike, UNOSOM 1 the mission was well oiled in terms of personnel and the material resources. But one critical characteristic of importance to this study, was the US led intervention was purely a military operation. Walter and Jeffrey³¹ note that Central Command (CENTCOM) – the agency that was offering the political guidance removed the civil affairs and the military police training

²⁸ Op Cit Lise Howard, pg. 26

²⁹Robert Oakley B, ”*Humanitarian Response: The Consequences of Intervention*, 1997, p.7

³⁰ Op Cit Martin Meredith, pg. 476

³¹Op Cit Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst, pg. 9

components from the initial package. Howard³² shares the same opinion by admitting that the US plans for UNITAF were mainly devised at the pentagon with almost no input from the civilian diplomatic organs. An important pointer which indicate a plan devoid of political strategy which was highly desired in Somalia at that given time. John Fox³³ advanced that decision-makers in CENTCOM should have realized from the outset that in order to end the starvation it would be necessary to strike a blow to the power of the warlords and their militias as well as to aid the development of some sort of civilian political structures that would encourage an alternative to the politics of the gun. He argues that the U.S. military action should have been dictated by a definitive set of political goals to succeed in the mission and probably this could have saved Somalia from the anarchies experienced in successive years.³⁴

The second challenge that UNITAF faced was the disagreement of the mandate between Boutros-Ghali and the US government. Boutros argued that the disarmament of the militias was essential since without that function the secure environment advocated for by the UNSC couldn't be attained.³⁵ The clash of opinion between the US government and the UNSG emanated from the fact that the Pentagon was committed to “zero-casualty” and hence they had no intention to disarm the militias. Despite the fact that this mission was well equipped and possessed the capacity to conduct this function, political considerations were embraced than a long-term solution for Somalia.³⁶ More importantly, the optimism of the Somalia people upon the arrival of the US force expected them to

³² Op Cit Lise Howard , pg. 28

³³ John G. Fox, *Approaching Humanitarian Intervention Strategically: The Case of Somalia*. SAIS Review 21, no. 1 (2001): 147-158.

³⁴ Ibid

³⁵ Kent J. Kille, ed. *The UN Secretary-General and Moral Authority: Ethics and Religion in International Leadership*. (Georgetown University Press, 2007.) pg. 275

³⁶ Curtis Wiley, “*Could Lessons Learned in Somalia be beneficial to Africa Command*” (AFRICOM) (Marine Corps Command and Staff coll quantico VA, 2008).

disarm the factions. By failure to do so, they lost the support of the people which was critical in achieving a long-term solution in the country.

Thirdly, the “zero-casualty” policy reinforced the status quo of the warring parties, the American command structure accorded Aideed and Mahdi a prominent role, treating them as partners in the exercise and by extension conferring them legitimacy and status which they had started to lose from the population.³⁷ Meredith explain that Aideed and Mahdi accepted the presence of the Americans as a *“fait accompli”* looking out for opportunities to maximise their advantage. In conflict studies this approach solidifies impunity of actors involved in crimes against humanity. Prior, to the intervention of UNITAF, humanitarian agencies such as ICRC and international had played a significant role in calling for a humanitarian intervention. In particular, an article by Leslie Gelb in Washington Post on 19 November, entitled *“Shoot to Feed Somalia”* had created massive public empathy and at the same stroke dislike for the inhumanity character of the warlords.³⁸ Therefore, it was confusing that the UNITAF mission embraced the same warlords who had made it impossible for UNOSOM 1 to implement their mandate. Subsequently, this approach reduced effectiveness of the mission and opportunity to create conditions for peace recovery and reconciliation.

Robert Oakley came to rely on the warlords for the protection of humanitarian aid, which furthered the control the warlords already had over aid deliveries. As a result, the warlords’ political control was strengthened and by extension got more resources for

³⁷Robert G. Patman, *Beyond the Mogadishu Line: Some Australian Lessons for Managing Intra-State Conflicts. Small Wars and Insurgencies* 12, no. 1 (2001): 59-75. See also Martin Meredith, pg. 477 and Bryden, Matt, and Jeremy Brickhill. "Disarming Somalia: Lessons in Stabilization from a Collapsed State: Analysis." *Conflict, Security & Development* 10, no. 2 (2010): 239-262.

³⁸ Piers Robinson, *The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention*. (Routledge, 2005.) pg. 52

arms acquisition thereby waiting for the opportunity. For Robert Oakley and the US policy makers the mandate of the US force was to provide humanitarian aid, a perspective that John Fox refers to as a “fundamentally strategic error” which viewed the problem of the Somalia crisis in humanitarian lenses alone and ignored the conflict dimension. This consequently led to missteps in the response by the military means alone without recognizing the political angle.

While the UNITAF was successful in provision of the much needed humanitarian aid in Somalia, the well-resourced mission didn't make any progress in recreating a Somali Republic. In defence of the UNITAF successes, Chester Crocker³⁹ notes that based on the standards set by then President Bush the mission was a success as it averted deaths of up to 250,000. According to Chester Crocker⁴⁰, *Somalia was ill fortunate to experience first-hand the full effects of a U.S. political transition: the steep learning curve of an inexperienced administration in Washington and an idiosyncratic U.N. leadership*". More remarkably, UNITAF presence created an opportunity for political negotiations. In March 1993, in Addis Ababa leading warlords and clan representatives signed an agreement, committing themselves to disarmament under UN authority. Three months later, after securing some supply routes and delivering much needed aid, operations were handed back over to the UN under the name of UNOSOM II. In the aftermath of the intervention of UNITAF General Anthony Zinni⁴¹(retired U.S. Marine Corps), summed it up as follows:

³⁹ Chester Crocker, *The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong*. Foreign Affairs. June 1995 Issue (<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50967/chester-a-crocker/the-lessons-of-somalia-not-everything-went-wrong>, Accessed August 30, 2014.)

⁴⁰ Ibid

⁴¹ Zinni, Anthony, and Tom Clancy. *Battle Ready*. (New York: GP Putnam's, Sons 2004) pg. 18

“Everything is connected to everything else,” - Security requires the rule of law, essential services require governance, the rule of law is dependent on security, sustainable economies are dependent on the rule of law, ownership requires capacity, and meeting basic human needs requires all of the above. It is a spider web of interdependence that requires as much integration from all missions’ components as possible.⁴²

The military approach was not sufficient to address the multiple complex challenges of the Somali conflict.

3.2.3 United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)

In May 1993 the UNSC mandated UNOSOM II through adoption of resolution 814⁴³ which empowered the mission with peace enforcement functions from the protection of the humanitarian relief supplies “consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia”⁴⁴ The focus was on rebuilding a nation through rehabilitating the destroyed social and economic infrastructure by creating indigenous police force and judicial system. A closer look at the UNOSOM II mandate reflects the intent and purpose of AMISOM mandate.

The then US Ambassador UN Madeleine Albright called the UN operation a new era of aggressive multilateralism. The strength of the mission included 20,000 peacekeeping troops, 8,000 logistical staff and some 3,000 civilian personnel from twenty three nations.⁴⁵ The mission command was given to Jonathan Howe a former US admiral and security adviser to George Bush. From the onset of the mission, Aideed was convinced that the new mandate that included the disarmament targeted his militia than

⁴²Ibid

⁴³UN Res, 844 <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2b.htm>, accessed 13 Aug 2014)

⁴⁴Ken Rutherford, *Humanitarianism Under Fire: the US and UN intervention in Somalia*. (Kumarian Press, 2008.) pg. 5

⁴⁵ Op Cit Martin Meredith, pg. 478

any other. Hence the cooperation he had given UNITAF was missing in UNOSOM II. Further, according to Hirsch and Oakley,⁴⁶ UNOSOM II was not given commensurate resources to the mandate issued by the UN, and the troops and the mission personnel in general lacked training and a clear strategy to achieve the mandate. These fundamental challenges became evident when twenty-four Pakistan peacekeepers were killed after they fired on a Somali crowd while trying to inspect Aideed's weapon storage site in Mogadishu on 5th June.⁴⁷ Following this attack, the UNSC issued Resolution 837⁴⁸ directing the use of force to all responsible including arrest and trial, this directive was targeted to Aideed and his man-hunt brought more calamities to UNOSOM II. On 3 October of the same year, the US military forces were ambushed suffering one of their most grave casualties in mission area starting with the shooting of the two US Hawk helicopters and killing and injury of US troops. Following the uproar of the American citizens, President Clinton called off the search for Aideed and terminated US involvement in Somalia.

Other Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) for UNOSOM II arranged for their contingents to depart and the mission was abandoned. After an investment of four million dollars with the hope of rebuilding Somalia the UN abandoned Somalia with the dream of reconstruction in paper but in reality the war factions remained in control of the country.

3.3 Lessons from the UN Intervention in Somalia

The UN Intervention in Somalia has attracted a plethora of books, journals and research on the character and form of the UN peacekeeping and has been a point of

⁴⁶ John L. Hirsch , and Robert Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope* (Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace) pg. 111

⁴⁷ Ibid, also see Op Cit Martin Meredith Pg. 479, Michael Doyle & Sambanis Pg. 152

⁴⁸<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2b.htm>, accessed 13 Aug 2014)

reference that has influenced the transformation of UN Peace Operations, for the purposes of the study the lessons identified emanate from a civilian perspective. The time of the peace operation was the same time that UNSG Boutros-Ghali had released his report on “An Agenda for Peace” in June 1992. The Agenda for Peace was a landmark document since it recognized the need to overhaul the UN’s peace operations architecture so that it might better respond to the changing security environment prevalent immediately at the end of the cold war.

While Boutros-Ghali succeeded in convincing the UNSC and US of the peace enforcement the timing of implementing the innovation as well as the context wasn’t aligned to the resources needed for such an ambitious mandate. There are many lessons that the world has been learning since the intervention on Somalia, this study doesn’t attempt to divulge them all but will briefly discuss the key ones as pertains the civilian dimension of PSOs.

The first lesson as demonstrated in this study is that stopping war or transformation from conflict to peace cannot be achieved by a military operation alone. Doyle and Sambanis⁴⁹ advocate for a strategy that is trustee –like, a transitional authority that is geared towards an end-state of self-determination. The interventions generally lacked a set of cohesive, congruent, mutually reinforcing strategies that would have allowed success of UNOSOM II mandate. The reliance on the security angle alone wasn’t sufficient to transform the conflict. The enforcement model in Somalia further illustrate that Chapter VII operations cannot be military only interventions but should also be complemented by a civilian component that can build a basis for local sustainable peace.

⁴⁹ Op Cit Michael Doyle & Sambanis Pg. 153

Secondly, a common critique held by the majority of scholars who have contributed to the Somalia conflict recognize that all the three UN initiatives revealed a poor understanding of Somali political culture and did not utilize the conflict resolution mechanisms that would have sustained a locally supported peace. Ambassador Sahanoun had started the reconciliation process from a bottom- up strategy that included all the clans including the neutral ones. Consecutive SRSG's didn't pursue that strategy. Paul Lederach⁵⁰ model of conflict transformation advocate for peace centred and rooted in the quality of relationships. This includes the ways in which social, political, economic, and cultural relationships are structured. In this sense, peace is a "process-structure," a phenomenon that is simultaneously dynamic, adaptive, and changing. With a collapsed government, no political legitimate institutions, the UN had no footholds for peacebuilding as captured in the UNOSOM II mandate. John Drysdale⁵¹ concludes this insight by arguing out that in cases where humanitarian, peace-making becomes a necessity interaction between the proposed military command and local militia commanders is sine qua non – an indispensable action that requires diplomacy to be conducted in full knowledge of the local politics, social and cultural norms.

Thirdly, the incentives to the warlords to gain their cooperation for the humanitarian relief access, strengthened their positions and intensified their competition after UNITAF's departure. Embracing the warlords with blooded hands contradicted the spirit and letter of UN human rights dispensation especially on the question of transitional justice. Further, UN's overwhelming emphasis on brokering deals between powerful military leaders, to the detriment of those in Somali society seeking

⁵⁰John Paul Lederach, and Michelle Maiese. *"Conflict transformation." Beyond Intractability* (2003).

⁵¹Op CitJohn Drysdale, pg. 18

reconstruction and reconciliation without holding these claimants to authority and legitimacy accountable for their actions against any consistent standard. Human rights abuses on an enormous scale were, after all, the principal cause of the famine which triggered the intervention. A part of the role of the intervention force was to protect relief convoys; the UN was also to assist in political and economic reconstruction in order to remove the need for future assistance, while allowing hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees to return home. To that end, the U.N. should have helped restore guarantees of Somalis' basic human rights so that they could fully participate in rebuilding their society. The UN did not, however, consider human rights monitoring or protection to be among its mission priorities in Somalia, this in turn led to undermining the function of the UN as a moral custodian of human rights standards designed at the international arena such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Hence, based on this conclusion in the Brahimi report the function of human rights monitoring and protection was emphasised.⁵²

Fourthly, the frequent changes of SRSGs resulted into a general weakness of the command and control structure. The Head of the mission was changed five times within a three year period, with each change came a new leadership and peace making strategy.⁵³ This in turn affected the cooperation and coordination of the humanitarian, military and civil mandates of UNOSOM II. Doyle and Sambanis recognise that this incongruence affected the planning and better integration of the response of the units in the mission

⁵² Op Cit Brahimi report , Paragraph 77 provides “In addition to such tasks, these missions must also try to rebuild civil society and promote respect for human rights, in places where grievance is widespread and grudges run deep” See also Paragraph 127 - 145

⁵³ Op Cit Durch 1996, 315. See also: <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2b.htm>, accessed 13 Aug 2014)

resulting into deaths of relief workers and thereby increasing the suspicions and mistrust between the military and the humanitarian agencies.⁵⁴

Finally but most important the resources allocated to the mission did not match the problems, neither could they fulfil the ambitious mandate given by the UNSC. Romeo Dallaire⁵⁵ in the aftermath of Rwanda genocide remarked, “*Mandates without resources needed are nothing more than frustrations and a guarantee of failure*”

3.4 Peacekeeping Initiative by IGAD

Despite the fact that literature has demonstrated that post cold -war conflicts occur within the states, neighbouring countries and regional organizations play a significant role in initiating or perpetuating conflict, a phenomena Mwagiru⁵⁶ describes as the internationalisation of conflict. Michael Brown⁵⁷ argues that countries intervene in neighbouring countries for opportunistic reasons or for their own geopolitical interests. Others contend that civil conflicts affect the neighbouring countries by producing refugees, destabilising border regions therefore they intervene for self – defence. This section examines the peacekeeping initiatives of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and AU in Somalia.

In 1986, six Eastern African countries namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda signed up to form the Inter-Governmental Authority against Drought and Desertification (IGADD). The regional organization aspirations were confined to functional co-ordination on environmental protection, food security strategies and natural

⁵⁴Op Cit Michael Doyle & Sambanis pg. 155

⁵⁵Lessons of Rwanda unheeded” Toronto Star, May 17 2000

(<http://www.unwomen.org/media/Headquarters/Media/Stories/en/Reportrowandagenocidepdf.pdf>)

⁵⁶Mwagiru, Makumi, *The Greater Horn of Africa Conflict System: Conflict Patterns, Strategies and Management Practices.* USAID Project on Conflict and Conflict Management in the Greater Horn of Africa (1997).

⁵⁷Michael E. Brown, ed. *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict.* (Cambridge, No. 10. Mit Press, 1996.) pg. 124

resource management. With the accession of newly independent Eritrea to IGADD in 1993 the membership grew to seven. By then, Somalia was no longer a functioning state hence the engagement was left to the six other states.

Sally Heally⁵⁸ argues that the regime changes in the Horn Africa was generally achieved through violent rather than peaceful means, just as political grievances were typically addressed through armed rebellion. In addition to this inequitable sharing of national resources, nepotism, corruption and embezzlement of public resources and lack of representation in the structures of government lay at the root of many of the internal conflicts. To overcome this situation a decision to expand IGADD to undertake more functions than earlier stipulated in its mandate was taken at an extraordinary summit of heads of state and government held in Addis Ababa in April 1995 even though Somalia was not represented due to lack of government.⁵⁹

A ministerial committee was constituted to propose amendments to the IGADD charter and make recommendations on the restructuring of the organization. In addition to enhancing co-operation in existing areas of food security, agriculture and environmental protection, they were asked to develop proposals for 'increasing the capacity of countries of the sub-region in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, both inter and intra-state through dialogue. In 1996 IGAD Agreement was signed by the six member states and consequently changed its name from IGADD.⁶⁰ Its

⁵⁸Sally Healy, *Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel*,

(Chatham House Report. London: RIIA 2008.)

⁵⁹Sally Healy, *Peace-making in the Midst of War, An assessment of IGADs Contribution to Regional Security (Royal Institute of International Affairs, ISSN 1749- 1800) pg. 5*

⁶⁰Agreement Establishing Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Djibouti 1996)

principles provided for the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security, and the protection of human and people's rights.⁶¹

Further, the revision of IGADs mandate resonated with the changing international security context following the release of the "An Agenda for Peace" by Boutros-Ghali in 1992 which had set out a vision for securing peace and security in the post-cold war world that highlighted the role that regional organizations could play in conflict prevention and peace-making.⁶² It articulated a new collaborative relationship between the UN and regional bodies for the management of regional crises that is now firmly established in international practice. IGAD has played a pivotal role towards reconciliation and peace-making in Somalia after the departure of the UN Peacekeeping interventions.

Planning for a peacekeeping mission in Somalia became more serious in 2004 with the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG) and later the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia on Kenyan soil. Planning for a movement of the TFG from Kenya to Somalia included the formation of an African regional peacekeeping mission to support the government.

To this end the AU approached IGAD and requested the organization to assemble the operation. In February 2005, a meeting of the AU's Peace and Security Council officially mandated a peacekeeping operation for Somalia and requested IGAD to plan and deploy it in support of the TFG. In March 2005, IGAD agreed to field the peacekeeping operation called the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM).

⁶¹ Op Cit IGAD, Article 7 (g) "to promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-State conflicts through dialogue"

⁶² Op Cit, Boutros-Ghali (Agenda for Peace)

Despite the organization working consistently for one year to deploy, the mission failed to take off for a number of reasons discussed in the subheadings below.

3.4.1 Lack of Legal and Political Framework for Peacekeeping Intervention

According to Tim Murithi,⁶³ the IGAD charter lacked a legal provision empowering the organization to deploy a peacekeeping operation. The APSA framework provides for the formation of the ASF whose mandate is to provide a multi-dimensional force comprising of the civilian, police and military force is emanating from the five regions as designed for the AU. For the Eastern region, the peculiar challenge is that the region belongs to more than one regional organization namely the IGAD, EAC, ICGLR, EASF and COMESA. The only organization with the powers to deploy a peacekeeping operation is the EASF which also encompasses all the IGAD member states but not yet operational. For this reason, at the given time to deploy a peacekeeping mission, IGAD ought to have legal provisions to deploy and sustain a peacekeeping operation which existed outside the scope of its major peace making activities. Some analysts have argued that Article 7(g) which might be sufficient for the deployment of a peace operation, but the fact that IGAD has never deployed under this provision raised pertinent questions on the sustainment of the mission.

3.4.2 Lack of Coherent Peacekeeping Strategy from UN, AU and IGAD

IGAD peace and security architecture is anchored on the AU and UN conflict management and resolution framework. The chapter VIII of the UN charter as discussed in the previous chapter provides for the intervention of the regional arrangements. In theory therefore IGAD is subordinate to the UN and AU in matters of resolution of

⁶³ Tim Murithi, *Inter-Governmental Authority on Development on the Ground: Comparing Interventions in Sudan and Somalia*, (African Security, 2:2-3, 136-157, DOI: 10.1080/19362200903362067, 2009 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19362200903362067>, accessed 21 August 2014)

disputes. In practice however, based on the principle of subsidiarity and comparative advantage it can and does take the lead as witnessed in the negotiation of the Sudan internal crisis in 2005. The success of the intervention is based on a coherent strategy that as much as possible eliminates points of overlapping, duplication or undermining each other's institutional mandate and capabilities. In the case of the IGASOM, the duplication and overlap of the mandates was one of the hindrance that prevented a successful deployment from IGAD. According to Terry Mays, amongst the various reasons that the peacekeeping operation failed was the existence of a UN arms embargo on Somalia.⁶⁴ Despite various diplomatic action directed to UNSC by AU and IGAD to lift the arms embargo, the embargo remained and the organization announced its inability to deploy. The entire question on arms embargo portrays disjointed, un-harmonized efforts towards maintaining international peace and security. UNSC had approved the IGASOM mandate on December 6, 2006, hence it's perturbing that they couldn't remove the hindrance identified by the AU and IGAD.⁶⁵

The fact that UN refused to lift the arm embargo further exemplify the difficulties of coordination experienced by UN, AU and other Sub-regional organizations such as IGAD in matters of peace and security. The inability of the organizations to jointly plan for the interventions and thereby enabling an opportunity to maximize their individual comparative strengths was clear in the IGASOM situation. Further probing reveal that some of the members of UNSC in particular, the US was not fully convinced about IGAD deployment in Somalia for the third reason discussed below.

⁶⁴Terry Mays. *"The African Union's African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Why did it successfully deploy following the failure of the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM)."* 2009 pg. 7

⁶⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1725. S/RES/1725 (<http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/>)

3.4.3 IGAD Member States' Political Complexities

In understanding the barriers of IGAD effective deployment in Somalia it is important to apprehend the political dynamics existing in the regional organization since its inception especially has pertains the Somalia conflict. Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti all members of IGAD have played pivotal roles in the reconciliation of Somalia after the collapse of the government in 1991. The table below illustrates some of the peace-making initiatives spearheaded and hosted by the neighbours towards a peaceful Somalia. From 1994 to 2004 the major conferences with the exception of Cairo Conference, were all hosted by members of IGAD and indeed the Mbagathi conference was sponsored by IGAD. Table 1 demonstrates that besides the peacekeeping initiative IGAD has systematically employed a diplomatic approach to a large degree to the problem of Somalia.

Table 1: International Peace-making Efforts by Somalia's Neighbours

Name of Conference	Date	Sponsored	Outcome
Djibouti Conference, Djibouti	August 1991	Djibouti	Accord
Addis Ababa Conference, Ethiopia	March 1993	UN	Peace Accord
Cairo Conference , Egypt	December 1997	Egypt	Peace Accord
Arta Conference, Djibouti	May- August 2000	Djibouti	Charter
Mbagathi's Conference, Kenya	Oct 2002 – Oct 2004	IGAD	Charter

Source: Elmi Abdi Afyare⁶⁶, in *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration*, 2010.

⁶⁶Afyare Abdi Elmi, *Understanding The Somalia Conflagration- Identity, Political Islam and Peacebuilding* (New York, Pluto Press, 2010) pg. 1001

Despite the intentions of the neighbours towards a peaceful Somalia, some of the interventions of the neighbours have been seen to protract the conflict rather than resolve it. In particular the involvement of Ethiopia and to a lesser extent Kenya based on their historical differences with Somalia. In 1963, Kenya and Ethiopia signed a mutual defence-pact against Somalia arguing that the Somalia Republic was irredentist and sought to unite all Somalis in the region. The genesis of this fear was prompted by the argument of Somalia's first president Aden Abdulle Osman who rejected the proposition of the OAU in recognizing the colonial borders as left by the colonialists arguing if Africans revisited this issue it would open a Pandora's Box.⁶⁷ Aden advanced that the approach of OAU was "defeatist", and he declared his stance that the Somali government had no intention or claims for territorial puffery. Nonetheless, he expressed that the Somali government wouldn't be indifferent to the appeal of inhabitants of the Somali areas adjacent to the Somali Republic for their self-determination.⁶⁸

Based on this perception, Kenya and Ethiopia capitalized on the idea that they faced a common enemy and since then have been supporting each other in issues that relate to Somalia. The lack of a neutral ground, has largely done more harm than good to Somalia. Afware⁶⁹ has argued that Ethiopia and Kenya have therefore used their status to influence policies in IGAD that are not Somali interest driven but their own national interests. It's therefore not surprising that IGASOM faced Somali opposition immediately upon receiving its mandate, most of the factions including those participating in the TFG, stated they would not accept any regional peacekeeping

⁶⁷Article III, *Charter of the Organization of African Unity*, (http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/OAU_Charter_1963_0.pdf, accessed 21 Aug 2014)

⁶⁸Catherine Hoskyns, *Case Studies in African Diplomacy*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press) pg. 32-33

⁶⁹Op Cit Afyare Abdi Elmi, pg. 100

operations on Somali soil that contained soldiers from the neighbouring states. A joint statement of TFG factions declared their preference in deployment of troops from the international community but excluding the immediate Somalia's neighbours.⁷⁰ This automatically became a big challenge for IGAD since the majority of the constituent members are immediate neighbours of Somalia with exception of Uganda. The fact that IGAD took role in the Somali process by delegating the lead role to Ethiopia was seen by many like "putting the fox in charge of the hen-house"⁷¹ Conflict is about perceptions, according to Paul Lederach⁷² "*social conflict emerges and develops on the basis of the meaning and interpretation people involved attach to action and events*".⁷³ From this viewpoint, the social construction and mind-set of the Somali people has been opposed to the externalities and ideology represented by Ethiopia and by extension to IGAD. Earlier on this study observed that during the Ogaden war the entire Somali people were united against Ethiopia and for that moment the clan divisions were inconsequential. In an interview with a Somalia officer, during a recent visit in Addis Ababa while undertaking this study, when I asked him about the challenges of IGAD mounting a peacekeeping operation the officer responded by claiming that the IGAD move was thwarted by mistrust and suspicion of another Ethiopian intervention, which in their words leaves Somalia worse off than its initial state. Further the 2006 Ethiopia intervention acted as

⁷⁰Trouble Looms as Somali Warlords Warn Government Over Plan for Troops, The East African Standard, 12 March 2005, Reported by Africa News. In LexisNexis.(www.lexisnexis.com, accessed 21 Aug 2014)

⁷¹ Op Cit Afyare, pg. 102

⁷²John Paul Lederach, *In Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures*. (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995), pp 3-23.

⁷³Ibid

midwife to the birth of Islamic militants' al-Shabaab as a national force and ended in bloodied retreat.⁷⁴

From the perspective of many Somali academicians and politicians the involvement of Ethiopia in any designed intervention in Somalia, strengthens rather than weakens the Al-Shabaab⁷⁵. On the other hand, the concerns of Ethiopia regarding Islamist attacks launched into its territory from Somalia in the 1990s and the ICU's territorial designs on the Ogaden region cannot be overlooked. Moreover, Ethiopia and Kenya have hosted hundreds of thousands of Somalia refugees as well as cope with spill-over of weapons flows, armed banditry and bases of insurgent groups.⁷⁶

3.4.4 Lack of Sufficient Resources for the Operation

Whilst, deficiency of funding for most peace operations including those mounted by UN or EU is a constant concern, in the case of IGAD the situation is dire due to the dependency of external funding's for most of its core operations and activities. On agreeing to deploy, IGAD members requested the then IGAD Chairman, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, to secure funding and technical support for the mission from countries in the region, AU members, and states outside the continent. Within two weeks Uganda officially offered soldiers to IGAD for inclusion in the peacekeeping operation, however the government made it crystal clear that they couldn't afford the cost of the deployment and required external funding.⁷⁷ Lack of self-sustaining funding

⁷⁴ Daniel Howden, Decades of interference – and not a single success (<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/daniel-howden-decades-of-interference--and-not-a-single-success-6280397.html>, accessed 24 Aug 2014)

⁷⁵ Fridah Kibuko, interview with Abdi Rashid Aden – Head of Civilian Component – EASF, Addis Ababa (3 Aug 2014)

⁷⁶ Op Cit Ken Menkhaus , Pg. 9

⁷⁷ *Uganda Defense Minister Repeats Offer of Peacekeepers despite Protests,* Africa News, 17 February 2005. In LexisNexis. (http://allafrica.com/search/index.html?search_string=Uganda%20deploys , accessed 22 Aug 2014)

mechanism inhibits the vision of the AU and by a large extension the regional mechanisms in achieving the vision of deploying a force in fourteen days.

In February 2005, IGAD established a fund for funding IGASOM with an initial request to UN to provide initial demand of \$10.3 million to fund the costs of airlifting the first two battalions of peacekeepers to Somalia, but by June that year there was no provision of that cash.⁷⁸ Many scholars have written on the issue of lack of sustainability of many African regional organizations and over dependency for African peace operations. Thierry⁷⁹ advances that for any contributing country or institution, the ability to finance its own operations is a precondition for both a certain level of effectiveness and some degree of political autonomy. The opposite side warrants mention, the African leadership argue that peace and security is a global common good that shouldn't be left on the burden of the African continent alone.

While both arguments hold water the question of priorities for the African leadership remain to be answered. According to Chairman of the African Union Advisory Board on Anti-Corruption (AU-ABC) Edward Hoseah,⁸⁰ the continent loses approximately \$148 billion dollars each year to corruption and negligence. Hoseah said 50% of tax revenue and \$30 billion in aid are lost to corruption. Effective use of the available resources and assignment to peace initiatives by the political leadership would tilt the balance of power experienced in the North-South debate during question of

⁷⁸Op Cit Mays, Terry, pg. 8

⁷⁹ Tardy Thierry, *Funding Peace Operations: Better value for EU money*. (Brussels, European Union Institute for Security Studies 2011)

⁸⁰ AU-ABC report on African Annual corruption, (http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/06/20/newsbrief-06, accessed 25 Aug 2014)

funding for peace operations and ultimately lead to balanced partnership for international peace and security.

3.4.5 Lack of Civilian Component in the Planning for the Intervention

As noted from the UN interventions in Somalia, the lack of civilian component in the design and planning of the intervention by IGAD is a constant misstep in the international and regional peace enforcement missions, as they assume the security angle only. While peace support operations in areas where there is “no peace to keep” will largely depend on the military strength a commensurate civilian political and humanitarian perspective will be important for a successful intervention.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has undertaken an in-depth analysis of previous interventions in Somalia and discussed comprehensively lessons which led to the failures of the peacekeeping interventions. This in turn assists to scrutinize the potentials and pitfalls of the AU civilian component contribution from the AMISOM case study. What has come out clear is miss-diagnosis of the type of ailment affecting Somalia, resulting to flawed and counterproductive policies.

David Keen has called to attention on the costs of misinterpretations, he advocates for accurate understanding of conflict *“for anyone thinking of “policy prescriptions” that might facilitate a lasting peace: A good doctor will need to get some idea of the nature of the disease before rushing to the medicine cabinet to pull out a remedy.”*⁸¹ Overall, the combination of limited participation of bonafide Somalia nationals , lack of a political strategy and lost opportunities inculcating deeper peacebuilding roots have all resulted

⁸¹ David Keen, *“Incentives and Disincentives for Violence,”* In Berdal, Mats R., and David Malone, eds. *“Greed & grievance: Economic agendas in civil wars”*. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.) p. 20

into a shallow benefit for Somalia. The next chapter will explore how the AMISOM mission is capitalizing on the potentials of the civilian component to increase its effectiveness and at the same time hopefully minimizing the challenges encountered in previous missions.

Chapter Four

Potentials & Pitfalls of Civilian Component in AU PSOs

4. Introduction

This chapter provides an account of the potentials and pitfalls of the civilian component in AU led peace operations through the lenses of the AMISOM force. In order to facilitate an understanding of what has actually been achieved and the challenges that face the civilian component in AU PSOs, the chapter will outline the inception and evolution of AMISOM by analysing the mandates issued by the UNSC but more importantly rely on the interviews, official AU reports and questionnaire responses from the ground.

The fact that AMISOM has been on ground for seven years, within which a legitimate government has since been established exemplify the pertinent role and contribution of the civilian component to a peaceful Somalia. To this end, this chapter explores the mission set-up by highlighting the UN institutions in Somalia, the military component and a bigger focus on the civilian leadership, substantive functions and mission support.

4.1 AMISOM Mandate

After the failure of IGASOM to deploy in Somalia and support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the AU PSC issued Communique in January 2007¹, closely followed up by UNSC resolution 1744 in February 2007², supporting the deployment of AU forces in Somalia since this time the UNSC has repeatedly extended the mandate.

¹ AU Communique of 69th meeting of the PSC on 19 Jan 2007, (<http://www.ausitroom-psd.org/Documents/PSC2007/69th/Communique/CommuniqueEng.pdf>, accessed 30 Aug 2014)

² UNSC Resolution 1744, <http://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Resolution%201744%20%282007%29.pdf>, accessed 28 Aug 2014)

While the primary role of the AU PSC mandate reflected the will of the organization in protecting the TFG which, represented an important, but embryonic opportunity for a new government for the whole of Somalia, the intent of establishing an all-inclusive reconciliation process for all the stakeholders for a peaceful Somalia were well implied. The Communique articulated three main areas of focus for AMISOM which was stabilization, provision of humanitarian assistance and creation of conducive environment for reconstruction and recovery of Somalia. ³

The original mandate provided for 8,000 peacekeepers⁴. However, force generation came to be a slow process. Only two Ugandan battalions in early 2007 were deployed followed by soldiers from Burundi who arrived at the end of the year. A year after the mission's inception, its strength numbered 2,613, a meagre 30% of the approved troop strength troops. Whereas, the mandate clearly spelt out the security, social and political objectives on paper, in practise however the implementation of mandate indicate one sided, over –reliance on the security parameter provided by the military component. The slow deployment of troops was partly a consequence of a lack of resources among potential troop contributors, as well as within the AU itself.⁵

³AU Communique of 69th meeting of the PSC on 19 Jan 2007. Under Reference 8 the mandate is stipulated as follows: “Decides to authorize the deployment of AMISOM, for a period of 6 months, with the mandate (i) to provide support to the TFIs in their efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation, (ii) to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and (iii) to create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia. In this respect, AMISOM, which shall be adequately equipped to project the appropriate posture.”(<http://www.ausitroom-psd.org/Documents/PSC2007/69th/Communique/CommuniqueEng.pdf>, accessed 30 Aug 2014)

⁴Ibid

⁵Fridah Kibuko, phone interview with James Gadin – Political Officer AMISOM, (Nairobi, 28 Aug 2014)

Since the 2007 mandate, the AMISOM has evolved gradually reflected by a number of factors such as over twenty UNSC resolutions and AU PSC Communiqués.⁶ Whilst, the mandate has not changed significantly from the 2007 mandate, the UNSC resolution 2073 issued two years ago reflected the changes and progress made in Somalia including the assumption of Office of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).

The current mandate that AMISOM is operating with is therefore an amalgamation of UNSCR⁷ resolutions. The mandate contains eight-point focus which exemplifies the complexity of Somalia situation.⁸ Further, the mandate indicate that AMISOM and other actors must advance concurrently on many tracks - political, humanitarian, development, human rights and security in addressing multiple, interdependent challenges.

4.2 Institutional and Functional Partnership of AU – UN

The design of the AMISOM mandate was conceived with the intent of AU stabilisation of the country and then hand over the mission to UN for peacebuilding and reconstruction functions, but till now the conditions for this transfer have not been

⁶ Communiqué adopted by the PSC on 18th July 2007, 18th January 2008, 29th April 2008, 29th June 2008, 5th January 2012. (<http://amisom-au.org/key-documents/au-statements-reports/>, accessed 30 Aug 2014)

⁷ UNSCR 1722 (2007), 2010 (2011), 2036 (2012) , 2073 (2012), 2093 (2013) ,2124 (2013) , (www.un.org/ UNSC resolutions, accessed 2 Sept 2014)

⁸ The current AMISOM mandate is provided as follows: 1) take all necessary measures, as appropriate, and in coordination with the Somalia National Defence and Public Safety Institutions, to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, 2) assist in consolidating and expanding the control of the FGS over its national territory, 3) assist the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, through support, as appropriate, in the areas of security, including the protection of Somali institutions and key infrastructure, governance, rule of law and delivery of basic services, 4) provide, within its capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support for the enhancement of the capacity of the Somalia State institutions, particularly the National Defence, Public Safety and Public Service Institutions, 5) support the FGS in establishing the required institutions and conducive conditions for the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections by 2016, in accordance with the Provisional Constitution, 6) liaise with humanitarian actors and facilitate, as may be required and within its capabilities, humanitarian assistance in Somalia, as well as the resettlement of internally displaced persons and the return of refugees, 7) facilitate coordinated support by relevant AU institutions and structures towards the stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia, and 8) Provide protection to AU and UN personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defence;" AMISOM mandate, <http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/>, accessed 2 Sept 2014)

actualised.⁹ Nonetheless, a new cooperation was fostered which foresaw the UN providing the logistics support package to AMISOM called the UN Support to AMISOM (UNSOA).¹⁰ The main mission of UNSOA was to provide the logistics support to AMISOM in terms of equipment, technical support but didn't include any monetary support.¹¹

Accordingly, AMISOM was complimented by the presence of United Nations Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS) which had been established by the UNSG in 1995, under the charge of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA).¹² The main mandate of UNPOS was to support reconciliation efforts in Somalia guided by the peace-making initiatives by IGAD. On 2nd May 2013, the UNSC passed resolution 2102 establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), which replaced the UNPOS mission. The UNSOM mandate illustrate the supporting role of the mission to the Somalia government as well as to other UN and international partners.¹³ The deployment of UNSOM presents another angle of analysis given that the structures of the mission are replica of the AMISOM civilian component consisting of the political, human rights & protection and humanitarian units. The main question remains how the division of labour between AMISOM and UNSOM on the joint tasks in order to minimise duplication of effort. For effective analysis of AMISOM there is therefore need

⁹Paul Williams, *AMISOM in transition: The future of the African Union Mission in Somalia*. RVI Briefing Paper (2012).

¹⁰ United Nations Support to AMISOM, (<http://unpos.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=9731&language=en-US>, accessed 30 Aug 2014)

¹¹AU-PSC/PR/COM, (CCCXCIX), Communique of 399 session 10 Oct 2013, Addis Ababa. (<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.com.399.amisom.10-10-2013.pdf>, accessed 30 Aug 2014)

¹² Background UNPOS, (<http://unpos.unmissions.org/>, accessed 30 Aug 2014)

¹³UNSOM mandate is provided as follows, “act as an enabler, helping to create and galvanize the political and strategic environment in which stabilization and peacebuilding can proceed, including by leveraging other parts of the UN system and international partners.” (www.unsom.unmissions.org, accessed 30 Aug 2014)

to look closely at the UN packages that have been designed to support AMISOM in achieving their ultimate mandate of fostering sustainable peace in Somalia. All the agencies functionality depend on the effective working of the other. Figure 4 clearly demonstrates this reliance and symbiotic relationship.

The presence and support of other UN agencies such as Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program (WFP), UN Women and other International donors such as EU through the African Peace Facility (APF) exemplify the complexity of coordination between all these agencies and the new Federal government which is yet to get a proper footing and legitimacy from the populace.¹⁴ To this end, the effectiveness and achievements of the AMISOM civilian component have also to be examined through the coordination they undertake with the UN and other international agencies to attain impact. According to the Focused Group Discussion of AMISOM participants attending the UN Logistics Course at IPSTC¹⁵, the participants expressed their thoughts regarding the overlapping mandates of UN and AMISOM on the ground. One participant summed it as follows:

“The challenges on the ground as I see it from the UN and AMISOM is competition on the ground with team components asserting themselves to the Somalia government to be seen as more relevant. This is not healthy, we are not at competition but at war with an insurgency group. Moreover, the peace operations disease of bureaucracy is at dual play in Mogadishu. If you talk to AMISOM officers they tell you to wait as they are also waiting for a response from Addis Ababa. If you talk to UN they tell you they are awaiting a response from New York”¹⁶


¹⁴Ibid, also Interview with Aden Mohammed, J5 Military Advisor to Eastern Africa Standby Force, on 2nd September, Karen)

¹⁵Fridah Kibuko, Response during Focused Group Discussion held with participants from AMISOM Logistics Course conducted at IPSTC, on 4 Sept 2014, Karen Nairobi.

¹⁶Ibid

While the mandate of UNSOM and UNSOA are meant to compliment AMISOM and make the mandate achievable this position is not translated on the ground. From the focused group discussion it was evident that even the logistics support that is provided for by UNSOA to AMISOM is increasingly becoming split between AMISOM and UNSOM. A clearer division of labour between all these organisations is seen to be desired. The fact that all these organisations illustrated in figure 4 below have different reporting lines also complicate the equation. Clear coordination strategies and mechanisms must be developed by the AMISOM head of mission, to ensure unity of effort, coherence and coordination in the implementation of the AMISOM’s mandate. In particular, AMISOM’s roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis UNSOM and humanitarian organisations must be clearly established, and constantly re-assessed, to ensure coherence in the development and delivery of an overall security and political strategy for Somalia.

Figure 4: Partners of the Federal Government of Somalia



Source: Author’s compilation, 2014.

4.3 AMISOM Set-up and Progress

Since the establishment of AMISOM in 2007 to date, the mission has gradually transformed evidenced by increase of the Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) which has expanded from Uganda and Burundi to include Kenya, Djibouti, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia. Further, the transformation from the TFG to a legitimately elected government has changed the dynamics on negotiations of AMISOM with the newly established government a situation which was not existing beforehand. The swearing in of Mr Hassan Sheikh as President of the Federal Republic of Somalia on 10th September 2012 has increased the international optimism of recovery of Somalia but more importantly for this study increased the opportunity for the civilian component of AMISOM.

4.3.1 Military Setup

According to the revised Concept of Operations (CONOPs) of 2014, the increase of the military component was to ensure that the government of Somalia was able to re-establish state authority in Somalia and assist the Somalia National Army (SNA) gain grip of providing the necessary security to its country. The numbers represented by TCCs are as follows: 5,432 troops from Burundi, 1000 troops from Djibouti, 3,664 from Kenya, 850 Sierra Leone, Ethiopia 4,395 and 6,223 troops from Uganda. AMISOM current strength of uniformed personnel stands at 22,126,¹⁷ These Forces are deployed in six sectors as follows¹⁸

¹⁷AMISOM troop strength as at 31st August 2014 (<http://amisom-au.org/> accessed 1 September 2014)

¹⁸ AMISOM sectors (<http://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/AMISOM-Sectors.pdf>, accessed 1 September 14)


Table 2: AMISOM Sector Troops Distribution

SECTOR	AREA COVERED	CONTINGENT COMAND
1	Lower Shabelle and its environs	Uganda contingent
2	Dhobley and its environs	Kenya
3	Bay & Bakool Region	Ethiopia
4	Hiraan	Djibouti
5	Middle Shabelle	Burundi
Kismayo Sector	Multinational Force of Sierra Leone, Burundi and Kenya	Commanded by Sierra Leone

Source: Author’s compilation based on Literature Review, 2014.

The percentages for the troops are represented in the Figure 5 below:

Figure 5: AMISOM Troop Contributing Countries Statistics



Source: Author’s compilation based on AMISOM Troop’s numbers, 2014.

From Table 5 the percentages demonstrate that 41 % of the TACCs are immediate neighbours of Somalia, with long embedded rivalry history. Niccolo Machiavelli noted several centuries ago “*When one asks a powerful neighbour to come to aid and defend one with his forces...These forces may be good in themselves, but they are always dangerous for those who borrow them, for if they lose you are defeated, and if they conquer you remain their prisoner*” This has been the constant fear and criticism of the Somalia opponents to the AMISOM deployment.

One respondent underscored this opinion when asked what he thought about the AMISOM intervention by asking “*which AMISOM are you talking about, Is it the Kenyan, Ugandan or Ethiopian AMISOM?*”¹⁹ In other words, the respondent didn’t see AMISOM as a cohesive - unified force under the umbrella of AU African solutions to African problems philosophy, but as individual national countries in pursuit of own goals. An expert on Horn of Africa conflict system further solidified this view by emphasizing that AMISOM should be seen as an amalgamation of national interests.²⁰

Consequently, Ambassador Abubakar Arman in an article in paper observed that “*Somalia is held in a nasty headlock by a neighbourhood tag-team unmistakably motivated by zero-sum objective.*”²¹ It should be noted that AU was initially reluctant for neighbouring countries to contribute troops, concerned about potential conflicts of interest and narrow national agendas.

The reality, however, is that, without their involvement, AMISOM would have struggled to meet its mandated strength – and without the requisite force numbers, would

¹⁹Fridah Kibuko, Interview with Aden Abdirashid – Head of Civilian Component – EASF, Nairobi.

²⁰ Fridah Kibuko, Interview with a Renowned Professor on the AMISOM intervention in Somalia, Nairobi on 1st Aug 2014

²¹ Ambassador Abubakar Arman – *Interventions from AMISOM have not Brought the Promised Peace.* (<http://www.geeskaafrika.com/3081/>, accessed 1 Sept 2014)

not have been able to secure key towns in south-central Somalia, including Mogadishu. The local perception clearly indicate that frictions exist, yet these originate from a far more complex Somali dilemma around sovereignty, power sharing and control of resources. Until Somalis resolve these issues, such frictions will remain. AMISOM troops, whether Burundian, Djiboutian, Ethiopian, Kenyan, Sierra Leonean or Ugandan, would be in an impossible position if they attempted to fight local authorities to enforce a central government agenda.

Whilst, 59% of the AMISOM troops as illustrated from the chart are represented by countries not neighbouring Somalia such as Uganda, Burundi and Sierra Leone the support expected for them from the critics of the neighbourhood intervention is not manifested. Therefore the question remains unanswered of whether Somalia people are committed to the peaceful process through AMISOM or they are using the intervention as a constant excuse to reject outside intervention.²²

Recent studies and current situation in Somalia display that AMISOM has made considerable gains in liberating Somalia from the grasp of Al-Shabaab. In a recent policy brief by the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) on AMISOM gains in Somalia, Nduwimana²³ findings indicate that AMISOM has succeeded in liberating areas such as Afgooye , Merka , Jowhar, Baidoa , Beletweyne and the key port city of Kismayo thus bringing large areas in South – Central Somalia under Government control.²⁴ Amidst these outstanding gains however, as past experience has shown,

²²Op Cit Ken Rutherford, Ken. Pg. 41

²³ Donathien Nduwimana, *AMISOM in Somalia – A Ray of Hope?- IPSTC, Occasional paper 4 No 4* (Nairobi, IPSTC, 2013) Pg. 26

²⁴ Ibid

renewed conflict is likely to occur unless the military action is quickly followed by a cohesive political process to consolidate security in the newly liberated areas.

4.3.2 AMISOM Civilian Component Status

The Civilian component of AMISOM was set-up in 2008 comprising of vital structures such as the political affairs, civil affairs and the humanitarian liaison but due to the security challenges that existed in Mogadishu at that given time, the component was situated in Nairobi. James Gadin²⁵, the AMISOM political officer confirms this by recalling that the civilian component officers while conducting their functions in Somalia, put a lot of strain to the resources of AMISOM since they needed to be escorted by military convoys to fulfill their core functions and therefore diverted important resources that could be employed by the mission. Nonetheless, on 16th May 2011 the civilian component and police officers were relocated to Mogadishu, Somalia to compliment the efforts of the military component in achieving the broad political, security and developmental objectives of mission.

The AMISOM civilian structure reflects the conceived AU PSO structure of the civilian component as spelt out in the AU Civilian policy framework²⁶, albeit with minor alterations. To start with the policy framework foresaw a gradual deployment of the civilian experts starting with the key positions of 15 personnel mainly consisting of the political element, humanitarian advisory and the human right capability. In 2008, these were the main functions that AU PSOD deployed to accompany the SRCC even though the work stations remained in Nairobi with frequent travel to Somalia depending on the

²⁵ Op Cit, Fridah Kibuko phone interview, James Gadin

²⁶ ACCORD & PSOD, *The Civilian Dimension of African Standby Force*, (Addis Ababa , 2010)

security situation. According, to Jide Okeke,²⁷ deployment of the first wave wasn't in accordance to the policy framework based on the peculiarity situation in Somalia and lack of civilian interest to work in Mogadishu at that time.

However, the change of the security conditions coupled with the optimism represented by international community towards recovery of Somalia has seen a change of heart with many civilian applications for AMISOM jobs and current deployment of 78 civilian staff. The current AMISOM structure illustrating the aspired civilian strength is represented in figure 6. Other detailed organograms for the military, police and mission support specificities were also accessible from the SRCC office but this study relies on the below structure to understand how the civilian component is organized.²⁸ Overall, the mission is led by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) who oversees the entire mission components deputised by the deputy SRCC who is in charge of the civilian component.

While from the structure it appears that the Force commander and the Police commissioner are two levels lower in the structure, the actual position on the ground indicate that the force commander and the police commissioner have very autonomous mandates with the development of the military and police campaign plans respectively and actually the military forms the backbone of the mission. The position of SRCC is purely political but fundamental since he provides the strategic direction of the mission. During the focused group discussion with the AMISOM participants at IPSTC, Lt Col Kwabena Atiemo, a Ghanaian officer serving with AMISOM air capability held some reservations with the structure that ensures the SRCC is directly embedded to the civilian


²⁷Fridah Kibuko, email response from Okeke Jide – Senior Civilian Planning Officer – AUC on 10 Sept 2014.

²⁸AMISOM Proposed organigram, (Mogadishu, Somalia accessed from SRCC office)

component and was of view that a detached political oversight structure from all the components could be effective in AU PSOs. He further elaborated as follows:

“Political leadership should be isolated from the civilian component, since you can’t quite differentiate the SRCC and the rest of the staff in the component. This will reduce the inter-component rivalry and competition that foresees the civilians feeling more dominant in the mission than the police and the military. In my view, the SRCC is embroiled in the day to day operations dealing with budgets and mediation tasks of this office thereby negating the important primary role of providing strategic leadership and political direction of the mission”²⁹

Figure 6: AMISOM Organogram



Source: Office of AMISOM SRCC, 2014.

²⁹ Op Cit, Focused Group Discussion, Respondent – Lt Col Atiemo Kwabena

Ms Harriet Byarugaba³⁰ disagreed with this opinion, from her point of view it all boiled down to civilian work culture and ethics. She pointed out that the SRCC shouldn't be personalised but looked at from a holistic package that contains the SRCC himself and his advisors such as the legal advisor, political affairs and human rights & protection. In order for the SRCC to perform the envisaged tasks partly depended on the quality of the advice he was receiving and therefore there was need to examine the qualifications and expertise of his/ her advisors. Wariara Mbugua³¹ a long serving Civilian in UNAMID, opposed the proposal to detach the SRCC office from the civilian component. Her point of view was as follows:

“It is extremely risky to partially take away the authority of the SRCC because this will weaken the command and control of the mission and undermine the SRCC and thus the mission. In reality if the SRCC is not supported by competent people, then the tendency will be to overload him with operational issues which are not his to deal with. It is incredible to hear that an SRCC is dealing with budgets!! Where is Mission Support? It appears to me that the problem is either one of lack of clarity or competency, at the operational level at the mission, not one of unclear strategic directives at the level of the AU PSOD. It is difficult to imagine that the long mandating process undertaken by the AU PSOD would get it wrong.”³²

Even though the entire debate on structure of SRCC offices to make it more effective cannot be fully exhausted, it remains clear that the advisors that surround this top office are catalysts for entire effectiveness of the mission and great care should be employed in their appointment.

³⁰ Op Cit, Focused Group Discussion, Respondent – Byarugaba Harriet

³¹ Fridah Kibuko, email response from Dr Wariara Mbugua – International Consultant and former Chief of Civil Affairs, UNAMID, in Nairobi, 13 Sept 2014

³² Ibid

The SRCC is the eyes, the mouth and the ears of the AU Chairperson on the ground.³³ The office of the SRCC, is also in charge of integrated mission components such as the Mission Analysis Cell (MAC), Mission Planning and Evaluation Cell (MPEC), Integrated Mission Training Centre (IMTC), Conduct and discipline, Legal affairs, Internal audit and, safety and security. Further the SRCC has a direct administrative supervision of the Chief of Finance, Accounting and Budget (CFAB) as illustrated in the organogram.

4.3.3 Civilian Substantive Functions

The civilian component is coordinated by the Deputy SRCC. Ideally, a fully staffed component should comprise of the political affairs, the civil affairs, humanitarian liaison, Protection officer, Human Rights and Gender, Security Sector and Public Information Sections as reflected in figure 6. The Deputy SRCC receives political direction from the SRCC. The tasks of the substantive civilian component are explained in the Civilian CONOPS in the revised AMISOM 2014 CONOPS a document not yet released to the public domain. However, inquiries on the ground revealed that the main civilian tasks are on four main areas of operation.

The first one is the political unit which has done considerable work towards stabilisation efforts of Somalia and creating enablers for service provision to the people of Somalia and supporting the government in creating interfaces with partners. A progress report released by the political unit indicate that their success has mainly been

³³The SRCC position in AMISOM is held by Ambassador Mahamet Saleh Annadif a Chadian diplomat since November 2012 to date. Ambassador Annadif had previously served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in Chad from 1997 to 2003, as well as Permanent Representative of the African Union to the European Union in May 2006 and a Member of the International Advisory Board of the African Press Organization (APO). (Profile of Ambassador Mahamet Saleh Annadif, (amisom-au.org, accessed 4 Sept 2014)

the support rendered to the AU PSC in the review on AMISOM which resulted to UNSCR 2093.³⁴

Amongst the most significant decision made by the UNSCR 2093, is the dissolving of the UNPOS mission and consequently deploying an expanded Political Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). Article 18 of the resolution reads as follows “*Agrees with the Secretary - General that UNPOS has fulfilled its mandate and should now be dissolved, and further agrees that UNPOS should be replaced by a new expanded Special Political Mission as soon as possible*”³⁵ Instead of AMISOM political unit lobbying for expanded engagement in Somalia and actively promoting the African solutions ideology, they instead advocated and advised for take-over or duplication of a similar structures by UN. This position exemplify the thinking of AU on civilian dimension. While it’s a fact that the processes for deployment of civilian experts are slow at AUC level, opportunities to improve these procedures should be explored rather than advocacy for complete overhaul of the system. The future of AU civilian dimension therefore remains mixed based on these trends.

The political affairs has also overseen training of the civil servants of the FOS on different topics such as the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), conduct of workshop for Parliament Committee on Interior, National Security and Governance focusing on local governments, security and oversight, and support with ICT equipment. Further, they have facilitated legal and technical advice on draft Local Government Act.³⁶ Given that the political unit is only staffed with three personnel, the progress made is remarkable. The challenge has cited from the ground is few human resources but with a big mandate.

³⁴UNSCR 2093, <http://unpos.unmissions.org/> , accessed on 4 Sept 2014)

³⁵Article 18 of UNSCR 2093, (<http://unpos.unmissions.org/>, accessed 4 Sept 2014)

³⁶Profile of AMISOM Political Unit 2013, documents from SRCC office.

The second civilian component is the public information office. Most of the respondents attested that the public information unit was the most visible and had more impact in AMISOM. The main tasks of this unit is to ensure that accurate information about the mandate, objectives and operations of AMISOM is disseminated as widely as possible, both within Somalia and beyond. The work of public information is seen through the advocacy role of AMISOM on social networks and official web page.³⁷ Indeed most of the information for this study was also retrieved from that site. Further, the ability of the public information to counter the Al-shabaab propaganda has been seen as one of the contribution to the effectiveness and expansion of AMISOM in Somalia. According to Aria³⁸, AMISOM plans to co-locate its public information capacity with the AU-UN information capability to ensure joint effort and the maximum use of resources available. This in turn will increase the outreach of the department, and ensure that the operations of the joint team are under the overall leadership and in support of the operational requirements of AMISOM.

The third civilian component functional unit is the civil affairs, which is tasked to provide cross-mission representation, monitoring and facilitation at the local level; confidence-building activities, conflict management, support to reconciliation; and engaging in supporting the restoration and extension of state authority. Wariara³⁹ highlighted the key role of the civil affairs in peace operations. She referred to the civil affairs as the main catalyst for conflict transformation in the mission since it is the main interlocutor between the mission and the population. Wariara explained that effective

³⁷ For example: <https://twitter.com/amisomsomalia>, <https://www.facebook.com/amisom.somalia>, and amisom-au.org.

³⁸ Kibuko F, Interview with Chris Aria – a Civil Affairs officer, Nairobi 4th September 2014.

³⁹ Op Cit, Kibuko F, Interview with Wariara Mbugua, 24 August 2014

civil affairs work has the potential to reduce the conflict dynamics and promote dialogue and reconciliation among the population. The Somalia conflict is complex as explained by Kwabena Atiemo⁴⁰ who had this to say:

“To understand the Somalia conflict dynamics it is important to note that Al-Shabaab is not the only armed group undermining the authority of the government but the strongest and notably with a religious connotation that it uses to rally the people behind its ideology. AMISOM must also take note of these other armed clan militias as they have the potential to undermine gains made. Their issues must be understood and resolved to foster long-term reconciliation in Somalia”⁴¹

In order for civil affairs unit to be effective according to Wariara⁴², they must possess strong analytical capability which is able to articulate root causes of the conflict and distinguish them from triggering factors of the conflict to allow for correct remedy of the conflict. The study established that the civil affairs unit ideally should be in charge of the Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) that AMISOM is using in ensuring that the civilian population in Somalia receives tangible peace dividends, and supports the operations of AMISOM. For QIPs to have impact, there is need for a proper systematic needs analysis that should be undertaken by civil affairs to ensure that priorities of the communities are considered in the decision of what projects to be undertaken. In particular, the QIPs in areas coming under AMISOM control are important towards ensuring that AMISOM operations are succeeded by service-delivery and governance initiatives.

The focused group discussion identified the main weakness of the civil affairs being the reactive nature rather than the pro-active outreach strategy. Coupled with the

⁴⁰ Kibuko F, Interview with Kwabena Atiemo – AMISOM Military Component – Air Capability, Nairobi 4th September 2014.

⁴¹ Ibid

⁴² Op Cit, interview with Dr Wariara Mbugua

understaffing experienced by all the units. Okeke⁴³ explained that AU was rectifying this challenge by recruiting more Somali nationals in the civilian component and ensure they are deployed in the sectors and area which need civilian presence but has not been attained due to the security challenge.

The fourth civilian substantive function focuses on the gender, human rights, conduct and discipline and protection. These functions are grouped together due to the cross-cutting issues which spill over to other mission components and hence should ensure common understanding and approach. For example the gender unit has an advisory role to the SRCC on all matters that relate to gender in the mission as well as ensure AMISOM mainstream gender considerations into its own staffing strategy, its operations, and its engagements with other actors in the Mission's area of operations. Further, they are tasked on developing a gender strategy.

The gender unit has been commended for development of draft policy on prevention and response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) which also outlines the personnel standards and stipulates the accepted code of conduct.⁴⁴ However, the implementation of the response and zero tolerance to the SEA remains questionable especially after the release of report findings of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the AU forces in Somalia by Human Rights Watch on 8th September.⁴⁵ The report provides detailed accounts of sexual exploitation and abuses cases by AMISOM forces to vulnerable IDPs women in Somalia and provides concrete recommendations to various

⁴³ Op Cit, email response from Okeke

⁴⁴Policy on Prevention and Response to SEA,http://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Easy-to-read-guide_AMISOM-SEA-POLICY.pdf, accessed 8 September 2014)

⁴⁵ Human Rights Watch, "*The Power these men have over us – Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by AU Forces in Somalia, released on 8 Sept 2014*", (<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2014/09/08/power-these-men-have-over-us>, accessed 10 Sept 2014)

agencies such as AU PSC, AMISOM TCCs, AMISOM, Donors etc. on measures that can be undertaken to minimize such human rights violations.⁴⁶

As a response to the report, AMISOM issued a press release rejecting the conclusions of the report but at the same time reaffirmed its commitment to uphold the zero tolerance policy on misconduct and abuses in peace support operations.⁴⁷ This incident underpins the importance of gender and human rights unit as failure to mainstream principles and policies of gender mainstreaming can have serious consequences to the work of any peace operation and have potential to undermine the gains made.

The unit has developed AMISOM gender policy⁴⁸ and principles for gender sensitive organization. The fact that the unit is only manned by one personnel exemplify the challenges in effectiveness and impact of the work in the mission and also support to the government of Somalia. While the guidelines for gender mainstreaming are available even though in draft form, the deployment of women in all the structures is very low. The study didn't succeed in getting the breakdown of the exact number of women in AMISOM, but based on a policy brief by Ingvild Gjølvska⁴⁹ in 2013 observed the following about women representation in AMISOM forces:

“In accordance with Resolution 1325, AMISOM strives to increase the number of female personnel; however, today only 1.49% of AMISOM’s military personnel are women. Uganda, which contributes the highest number of military personnel, has a percentage of 3.1

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ AMISOM Press Release, *The African Union strongly rejects the conclusions contained in the Report of the Human Rights Watch on allegations on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse* (8 September, <http://amisom-au.org/>, accessed 10 Sept 2014)

⁴⁸ Draft AMISOM Gender Policy, <http://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/EASY-TO-READ-GUIDE-GENDER-POLICY.pdf>, accessed 11 Sept 2014)

⁴⁹ Ingvild Gjølvska, *Women Peace and Security in Somalia – A Study of AMISOM*. (NUPI Policy Brief 6, 2003) pg. 2

women in its deployed forces in Somalia, while the other contributing countries have less than one per cent. Even though AMISOM aims to increase the number of female's staff it is the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) who decide whom to send to Somalia.”⁵⁰

The above assertion clearly indicate that there is still more work for the gender unit with support from AUC to educate and sensitize the TCCs on importance of women in peace operations. The opportunity that AMISOM has and can influence to a greater extent is the deployment of the civilian women experts since they have a direct control over that.

The human rights function is also embedded in this unit and has a mandate of advising the SRCC on all matters regarding human rights observance by the mission personnel as well as advisory on building capacities for the government in area of human rights instruments, principles and standards. Just like the gender component the human rights is also manned by one person and the work has mainly been advisory to the SRCC on issues of human rights.⁵¹

In the same group as illustrated in Figure 6, is the function of Protection of Civilians (PoC) advisor, while AMISOM does not have an explicit protection mandate, the mission is obliged to respect and uphold International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in its operations.⁵² The work of the protection advisor is to advise the SRCC so that the support rendered to the Federal government of Somalia does not impinge on the protection of the civilian population. To this end, the advisor has a specific task of developing a mission-wide protection of civilian's strategy. Information on the status of this strategy was not

⁵⁰ Ibid

⁵¹ AMISOM Human Rights Internal Documents, <http://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads>, accessed 11 Sept 2014)

⁵² Lotze, Walter, and Yvonne Kasumba. *AMISOM and the Protection of Civilians in Somalia*. (Accord, Conflict Trends 2 (2012): 17-24.)

availed to ascertain the progress or status of the protection of civilians. What remains unclear however, is whether the AU agreed with the 2000 “Brahimi Report” on UN peace operations which concluded that regardless of whether any peace operation has an explicit PoC mandate, “*peacekeepers — troops or police — who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United Nations principles*”⁵³ Further the stance of AMISOM, on PoC mandate contradicts the AU Peace and Security Council released press statement based on its 326th meeting where it stressed the importance of “mainstreaming” PoC issues “in standard operating procedures of AU peace support operations,” and that “PoC must form part of the mandate of future AU missions.”⁵⁴

The fifth substantive function as illustrated by Figure 6 is the Humanitarian Liaison. Just like the protection mandate, it is important to note that AMISOM does not have a mandate to provide humanitarian assistance, and therefore the mission refrains from taking on any humanitarian role, or from delivering life-saving humanitarian assistance where other actors can provide this given the lead role of OCHA.⁵⁵ Rather, AMISOM role is to create an environment conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and is to provide support for the delivery of such „assistance on request. In this regard, the Humanitarian Liaison Section of AMISOM is responsible for monitoring the humanitarian situation in the mission’s area of operations, and for liaison and coordination with humanitarian actors as required.

⁵³Brahimi, Lakhdar. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations [Brahimi Report]*. (New York, United Nations, 2000) Article 62

⁵⁴ AU PSC Press Briefing at its 326th Meeting Held on 26 June 2012, (<http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/326th%20FINAL%20PSC%20Press%20statement%20EN.pdf>, accessed 10 Sept 2014)

⁵⁵ Lotze, Walter, and Yvonne Kasumba. *AMISOM and the Protection of Civilians in Somalia*. (Accord, conflict trends 2 (2012): 17-24.)

Finally the sixth civilian substantive function, as illustrated in Fig 6 is the Security Sector function. Efforts to secure information on the envisaged role of the security sector from the AMISOM mission were not fruitful, but based on an advert on this position from AU, the envisioned role of the security sector officer is to act as the focal point for AMISOM on all security sector matters vis-à-vis the relevant host state authorities, the United Nations System in Somalia, partner organizations and other actors. Further, from the AU PSO logic and more so the AU ASF framework the security sector function was seen an advisory role to SRCC, Force Commander, Commissioner of Police and other relevant components on issues or initiatives associated with Security Sector Reform (SSR)⁵⁶. The fact that this position is not manned clearly indicate a gap on comprehensive approach especially of securing the security gains made by AMISOM to date.

4.3.4 Mission Support Component

The AU PSOs civilian component also contains a distinct mission support component that is closely coordinated with the military and the police component. The AMISOM mission support component, headed by the Head Mission Support (HMS) comprises the Logistics, Transport, Supply, Engineering, Information and Communications Technology, Finance, Personnel, Procurement, General Services, Medical, Travel and Protocol, Asset Management and Verification, and Contingent Owned Equipment functions of the mission, among others.⁵⁷

Mission support is an integrated cell of military, civilian and contracted resources. The mission support component is responsible for the overall management and coordination of all support functions for AMISOM. Organizational structure of

⁵⁶Cedric Coning & Yvonne Kasumba - AU PSOD, *The Civilian Dimension of ASF*, Addis Ababa, 2010) pg. 44

⁵⁷ AMISOM internal documents on proposed structure for Mission Support

AMISOM Mission Support is illustrated by Fig 7 below. The structure represents the ideal situation of a functioning AMISOM mission support. According to Harriet Byarugaba⁵⁸ the structure is on paper but not on practice. It expresses the intent of AUC and efforts are on gear to ensure that the entire structure is fully staffed. Harriet stresses that the biggest chronic challenge in AMISOM civilian component is the short staffing and hence overload and inability to meet all the demands expected on the ground.


Further, inquiries on the relationship between the UNSOA and the Mission Support unit indicate rather an ad hoc functioning since both organizations have distinct reporting procedures. According to James Gadin⁵⁹, this is one of the key areas that AMISOM seeks to improve since the mission continues to operate with limited resources, and duplication or overlap of efforts and resources must be minimized, if not avoided, as best as possible. Wariara⁶⁰ singled out the mission support component as the most misunderstood yet critical components for functioning of PSOs. Based on her experience in UNAMID, she explains that the effective delivery of the mandate of mission support is a clear indicator of a successful mission. If the procurement and supply is not working well this means that even the military and police activities are hampered. In her opinion, the AU can learn from the UN pre- deployment training for the mission support functions such as IT, Admin, Finance, Procurement etc. Finally, AMISOM mission has tinted the preparedness and cast doubts on ability of the AU capacity in provision of Logistics for AU PSOs.

Figure 7: AMISOM Mission Support Structure

⁵⁸Fridah Kibuko, interview with Byarugaba Harriet – Head of Travel Unit in AMISOM, (4 Sept 2014, Karen Nairobi)

⁵⁹Op Cit, Interview with James Gadin

⁶⁰Op Cit, Kibuko Fridah, Interview with Dr Wariara Mbugua



Source: AMISOM SRCC office, 2014.

4.3.5 Observations from the Status of the AMISOM Civilian Component

The civilian component substantive functions conspicuously missed the Rule of Law function, the assumption that rule of law in a peace operation can be carried out by the political affairs office in AMISOM would not be realistic since the analysis indicate that the political office is understaffed. Inquiries on this oversight were explained by complimentary function of UNSOM mandate which expressly provides for:

“Support to the Government’s priority objectives of transforming and building Somalia’s security and justice institutions by providing technical advice and align security sector reform, rule of law (including police, justice and corrections), disengagement of combatants, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, maritime security and mine action”⁶¹

⁶¹ UNSOM mandate and focus areas, (<http://www.unsom.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=6269&language=en-US>)

While the UN has undertaken this important function, the lack of planning and anticipation for the rule of law function by AMISOM civilian component points to a lack of comprehensive strategy for impact of the African solutions ideology. The second observation, which will be further expounded in the pitfalls section, is the long time taken to fully staff the civilian structure. Whilst, the importance of the civilian component on the linkages between the FGS and the mission are widely acknowledged the same significance is not accorded in the recruitment and staffing of the civilians in the mission.

4.4 Potentials of Civilian Component in AU PSOs

This section discusses the potentials that exist on the ground for the effective utilization of the civilian component in the AU PSOs based on responses from the interviews and the twenty questionnaire responses received.

4.4.1 Civilian Component Easier Access to the Population

The starting point on the potential of the civilian component emanate from the wide recognition of the integral role played by the civilians in peace operations. One of the questions asked to respondents was whether they see a need for the civilians in peace operations. All the responses from the questionnaires indicated the need for the civilian component in PSOs. Some of the qualified responses on why they thought so were as follows:

“Modern PSOs have a significant role for the civilians. Usually the civilians are the first to be affected by conflict. This makes it imperative for them to be involved in all plans for conflict management and peace building. Civilian component perform crucial role of linking with the community and the political actors. In the mine action where I worked, civilians in mine action coordinating cell (MACC) provided crucial technical knowledge and linked the military with UN Mine Action Standards (UNMAS) which we didn’t have a clue about”⁶²

⁶² Q3 - Questionnaire respondent, September 2014

Other responses captured the comparative advantage of the civilian experts in regard to easier access to the population and understanding how the population function. One of the respondent advanced this point by mentioning one of unique methods of the civilians in calling for “barazas” or public gathering a method other components wouldn’t have experience in. During and after intra-conflict, suspicion and lack of trust reigns in rivalling communities, more so for a country that has experienced long protracted conflict like Somalia. In order to foster cooperation and look for opportunities for dialogue and reconciliation employment of the civilian unique resources is a clear opportunity. Even though the Military Component remains the backbone of African PSOs by drawing its strength from the effective coercive influence it can exercise over belligerents, the civilian component’s power is mainly diplomatic, economic, ideological, scientific and technical, humanitarian, legal or a combination of all these factors.⁶³

4.4.2 Civilian Component Perceived Neutrality

The second potential that AU PSOs can maximize with the civilian component, is the perceived neutrality presented by the civilian component. From the TCCs in AMISOM, the dilemma of balancing the national interests represented by the neighboring countries is quite clear. The civilian component however, has a unique feature since the personnel are recruited on merit from all the AU member states. This exceptional character then can be utilized to make inroads especially by the political affairs department to the government and the civil affairs to the population. According to

⁶³Hawks & Doves, *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, in (http://www.berghof-handhandbook.net/documents/publications/hansen_etal_handbook.pdf) last accessed on 3 May 2014

Warsame⁶⁴, the civilian component has made remarkable steps towards this direction and should be strengthened to ensure they win hearts and minds of the people and gain public support for the intervention.

4.4.3 Civilian Expertise on Key Issues during Peacemaking and Peacebuilding

Recalling Johan Galtung⁶⁵ conception of the conflict triangle and purpose of a peace support mission in addressing all the issues in the conflict triangle simultaneously, thereby tackling peacemaking that aims to change the attitudes of the main protagonists; peacekeeping that aims to lower the level of destructive behavior; and peacebuilding that tries to overcome the contradictions which lie at the root of the conflict, the expertise of the civilian component at all the levels is critical.

None of these can be accomplished without the interconnectedness of all the pillars and components in the PSO. Wariara Mbugua⁶⁶ also places some emphasis on this point. According to her effective utilization of the expertise in the civilian component has potential to alter the conflict. For example in the political affairs and civil affairs units the personnel have key expertise in different conflict management techniques such as conflict stakeholder mapping which assist in identifying actors key to the conflict who should be involved in all the conflict resolution processes.

Further, the civilian component has expertise on rule of law dimension and can assist the transitioning government to self-sustained peace upon successful implementation of civilian transition activities, involving the political, security, humanitarian, human rights, and development dimensions. Ultimately, a PSO's nation-

⁶⁴Fridah Kibuko, Interview with Warsame Burhaan – Director ASEP, Somalia in Addis Ababa(3rd August 2014)

⁶⁵ Johan Galtung, *Violence, Peace and Peace Research*. Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167-191.

⁶⁶ Op Cit – Kibuko F interview with Wariara Mbugua

building tasks will revive a nation/society's rule of law, education, commerce, humanitarian and health management, information (media) industry, military/defense, economy, and governance, based upon endogenous cultures and values. Therefore these expertise on the reform processes is important and shouldn't be overlooked during the entire spectrum of a PSO, since at every phase there are unique roles that can only be undertaken by the civilian component.

4.4.4 Mandate Implementation

A closer look on AMISOM mandate in Somalia reveal aspects such as, “*assist the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, support enhancement of the Somali state institutions, establish conditions for conduct of free, fair and transparent elections by 2016, support resettlement of IDPs and return of refugees*”⁶⁷ among other tasks such as security sector reform (SSR); public information and justice components.

For many of these aforementioned activities, the deployment of troops is neither appropriate nor relevant. Moreover, the functions require specific expertise that is predominantly found in the civilian sphere. To achieve the AU PSOs mandate, the role of the civilian component not as a stand-alone component but a major success factor should be enhanced.

4.4.5 Opportunities to Increase the Women Participation in Peace Processes

The role women play in peace processes and particularly in the transformation process of conflict to peace is now widely recognized, evidenced by UN and other multilateral international organizations emphasis on inclusion of women at all levels of

⁶⁷ AMISOM mandate, <http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/>, accessed 8 Sept 2014)

peace processes. UNSCR 1325⁶⁸ and UNSCR 1820⁶⁹ are strategic point of references for advocacy and incorporation of the women and gender perspectives in the design of PSOs.

To this end, the AU PSOs have an entry point through the gender office in the civilian component to ensure that women issues are mainstreamed from the strategic, operational and tactical level of a mission. By extension, they support the government or transitional institutions to ensure inclusive processes during the reconciliation processes that ensure women voices are integrated in the recovery programs of the country.

4.5 Pitfalls of Civilian Component in AU PSOs

This section discusses the pitfalls that face the AU PSOs in the operationalization of the civilian dimension in the theater of the peace operations.

4.5.1 Delayed Recruitment of the Desired Civilian Expertise

Most of the respondents and interviewees singled out one of the major challenges of the AU PSOs is the slow deployment of the civilian capacities in the field. While the same condition applies for the military and the police, the availability of the civilian capacity is pegged on recruitment procedures and not the pledged troops or political willingness of member states in availing their troops for a peace operation. The AMISOM civilian capacity stands at 76 personnel in total of which 30 represents the internationally African deployed and 46 Somalia nationals. Jide Okeke⁷⁰ confirmed that AUC hasn't yet achieved the optimal numbers but recruitment processes are on-going to address the gaps. It is worth noting that UN peace operations also suffer from the same challenge of identification of the civilian expertise for peace operations, Cedric de

⁶⁸ UNSCR 1325, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1325%282000%29, accessed 13 Sept 2014)

⁶⁹ UNSCR 1820, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1820%282008%29, accessed 13 Sept 2014)

⁷⁰Op Cit - email response from J Okeke

Coning⁷¹ in a policy brief notes the following about the deployment of civilians in UN peace operations,

“Despite the high number of people eager to serve in UN missions, the UN suffers from high vacancy rates in its missions. The average vacancy rate of international civilian staff for UN operations between 2005 and 2008 has been around 22%. In some missions the figures are much higher, especially during the start-up phase. The approximate 200 days that it takes the UN recruitment system to fill a vacancy, indicates that the system is slow and bureaucratic, and not meeting the deployment needs of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions context. Despite the large number of applicants, there are also persistent complaints from within the system about the quality and appropriateness of the candidates that are short-listed for selection.”⁷²

Given the long outstanding experience of the UN in area of peace operations and the specified factors above on the recruitment of the civilians, it leaves no doubts about the challenges witnessed by AUC. In its policy framework for the civilian dimension in PSOs, the AU has developed staffing and recruitment⁷³ guidelines which have now been approved and shared with the Regional Organizations working towards the operationalization of the ASF. To overcome these challenges the AUC should work more with the RECs and ensure functionality of the National Focal Points working at the member state understand clearly the requirements of the civilian experts to avoid the backlog of unqualified applications to the system.

4.5.2 Capacities of the Recruited Civilian Experts

The second critical challenge that the AU is facing regarding the civilian component is the competency gap between the desired profiles and the actual recruited

⁷¹ De Coning, Cedric. *Civilian Capacity in United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Missions*. NUPI Policy Brief (2010).

⁷² Ibid

⁷³ Op Cit, Kibuko F email response from - Okeke J

personnel. Kwabena Atiemo⁷⁴ pointed out that competence of the staff fails to manifest in the field and often is overshadowed by bureaucratic responses. One other questionnaire response indicated that lack of civilian capacity and expertise required in operations such as AMISOM, has in turn led to an over reliance on military forces.

The AU approach in PSOs is based on six scenarios for intervention ranging from Scenario 1 to Scenario 6.⁷⁵ The shortest conceived deployment of a force is 2 weeks under Scenario 6, to achieve this ambitious but necessary goal especially in cases of genocide, there is need to mainstream a recruitment system that can identify the right qualified personnel within the shortest time possible. The progress made in the development of the civilian roster is a good sign to this direction. Sebastien⁷⁶ a leading expert from German Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), who is advising and offering technical expertise towards the development and establishment of the AU Civilian Standby Roster, explains that when operational the roster will be an important tool that will assist the AU in rapid deployment of the civilian capacities. In addition ZIF, is assisting the AU in development of workflows and human resource policies in the area of selection, recruitment and deployment of civilian personnel for peace operations.

4.5.3 Analytical Capability in Identifying Needed Capacities for Civilian Component

One of the biggest gaps in the AU PSOs for the civilian capabilities is lack of in-depth assessments and analysis on the needed profiles for the civilian component both in terms of numbers and functions. While the AU decision-making and mandating process provides clear guidelines that envisage Integrated Planning Process (IPP) that involve the

⁷⁴ Op Cit, Kibuko F interview with Kwabena

⁷⁵ASF Scenarios, *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee*. (Addis Ababa, 2007)

⁷⁶Kibuko Fridah, Interview with Sebastien Dworack – A roster expert with ZIF, Mombasa on 14 May 2014

right people and ensure that the right considerations are put on table, the results of the planning process do not reflect this holistic approach. The mandating process clearly articulates the following principle,

“Integration is the guiding principle for the planning, design and implementation of complex AU PSOs in conflict and post-conflict situations, for linking the different dimensions of peace support operations (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security), and integrating the imperatives of each dimension into its strategic thinking and design.”⁷⁷

The implication of the AU decision and mandating process is inclusion of all the stakeholders and components in the design of PSOs. While some civilians in AUC, who didn't want to be mentioned in this study confirmed that they are partly involved in some decision-making, the entire structure of AUC impedes contribution of the civilians in the final outcome of the mission. This can be explained by the fact that AU PSOD is military dominant with only six civilian experts, and the work load of AU peace operations is fully stretched with the Somalia, Mali and Central Africa challenges amongst other peacemaking processes. This in turn has led to structures of PSOs which are again military dominant and the needed capacities for the civilians are not clearly captured. One interviewee raised this observation by wondering why the AMISOM civilian structure didn't provide for a civilian terrorist expert who is able to advise the mission on the social aspects of unconventional warfare tactics. Further, under the section on the observations of the AMISOM structure was the fact that the rule of law which is necessary in reconstruction of Somalia was missing. These factors epitomize the shortfalls of lack of comprehensive approach in the design of the mission.

⁷⁷ Aide memoire, *the African Union's Planning and Decision-making process, Version 4*, 2010 (http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/capabilities/eu-support-african-capabilities/documents/aide_memoire_en.pdf, accessed 14 Sept 2014)

4.5.4 Knowledge Management and Best Practices Unit in AU PSOs

AU PSOs lack a unit or division that systematically records lessons learnt and best practices that can be consequently fed in the development and implementation of new mandates. Inquiries on mechanisms that AU has secured to ensure that lessons identified are not lost in the system were met with the response “we are working on it”. The AU can learn from the UN best practices units, which possesses resources of staff and finances to document the lessons identified and ensure they are main-streamed in consecutive missions. AU PSOD certainly has developed lots of policies, procedures and technical documents but most of them are in draft form. According to one of the respondent, the AU knowledge management is puzzling since you don’t know which draft of the policy is finalized. A case to point is the Aide Memoire on Mandating and Decision-making process which is still in draft form even though AU has now commissioned over 6 peace missions in Africa.

Effective knowledge management can be useful for all the components including the civilians to ensure that lessons and best practices they have secured in the field are well documented and can be used by others as a point of reference.

4.6 Conclusion

AMISOM continuous success in Somalia will largely depend on effective optimization of the civilian component that ensures trust and confidence building with the population rather than entire focus on Al-Shabaab and security paradigm. Somalia conflict is vastly different and longer than most of the other conflicts in the Horn of Africa, given the terrorist dimension posed by the Al-Shabaab group and may not be won

using conventional means that are employed by the military component, which is necessary but not one-off solution.

The enemy is an elusive, determined and operates outside the framework of the nation-state and in the unconventional milieu. Therefore, AMISOM leadership has the opportunities to maximize on the potentials discussed in this study, while simultaneously addressing the pitfalls identified. Finally, there are many actors and institutions at play in Somalia. AMISOM coordination and at the same time maximizing on the resources that these other actors presents will ensure a comprehensive, holistic approach that for the first time since the fall of Somalia in 1991 offers the chance for a peaceful sustainable Somalia.

Chapter Five

Study Summary and Recommendations

5. Introduction

This study sought to establish the potentials and pitfalls of civilian component in AU led PSOs. In order to achieve this broad objective the study aimed to achieve four main objectives. To start with the study explored the role of the civilian component in peace operations, this objective was tied up to the first hypothesis which expressly specified that the incorporation of the civilian component in peace operations partly increased the likelihood of achieving a successful outcome of the operation. Secondly, the study considered whether lessons identified in previous peace operations were integrated in on-going AU peace operations.

The second objective was linked to the second hypothesis which stated that sustained organizational learning culture from previous peace operations increased the potential of attaining positive outcomes in current operations. The third study objective was to examine the AMISOM case study in depth and thereby extracted some of the potentials and pitfalls of the civilian component in AU led peace operations. The zenith of the study was captured by the final objective which was to provide recommendations for both policy and academic purposes on areas to improve the participation and contribution of the civilian component in peace operations, further expounded in this chapter under section 5.3.

These objectives and hypotheses were examined through the theoretical framework of constructivism and structural functionalism theory. The constructivist approach assisted the study to seek understanding on the role of the civilians in a peace

operation that can be best understood through the impact of ideas and identities, how they can be created, how they evolve and the potential they have in shaping the states to respond to situations. The constructivist theory is a powerful model in the context of the work of the civilian component in peace operations because it calls for understanding and negotiation to the population and the transitional authority. The structural functionalism theory complemented the constructivism theory since the civilian component doesn't work in isolation but backs up other components and international players in the theatre of operations.

5.1 Chapter Summaries

This section offers the individual chapters summaries and conclusions.

5.1.1 Chapter One: Introduction and Background to the Study

Chapter one provided the study layout starting with a background to the study which pointed out that the contemporary peace operations are different from the traditional peace operations based among many factors on the role that the civilians play in these operations. The chapter also considered the statement of the study problem through which motivated the conduct of the study.

Chapter one offered a glimpse on the case study of AMISOM by discussing brief conflict history and previous interventions made in the country. The section underscored that the AU policy framework on African Peace Operations was embedded on the principle of multidimensionality which encompassed the involvement of the civilians, police and the military in peace operations but actual practice demonstrated the reliance of the military component backing on the security pillar alone. To this end the chapter highlighted the study objectives, guiding questions and hypotheses through which the

research was framed. Further, the section expounded on the theoretical framework by discussing in-depth the constructivist theory and structural- functionalism, in this manner linking up the significance of these theories to the subject matter. Further, the chapter offered academic and policy justification through highlighting the unique features of the study and its contribution to the academia and policy makers. Finally, the chapter illuminated in detail the methodology used to attain the envisaged goal and objectives.

5.1.2 Chapter Two: Discourses on Peace Support Operations

Chapter two undertook a comprehensive literature review on the peace operations in general and narrowed it to the roles of the civilian component in peace operations and how these roles have been evolving overtime. The chapter looked at landmark peace operations developments at UN for example the Boutros-Ghali “An Agenda for Peace”¹ released in 1992 and introduction of terms such as preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Moreover, the Brahimi report² released in 2000 provided the base of which the centrality of the civilian component in peace operations was highlighted and consequently gained prominence.

Further, the chapter analysed the phenomena of “new wars” discussed by leading authors such as Mary Kaldor³ and Paul Lederach⁴ among others, through which conceptualization has precipitated new developments on how conflict management and resolution should be addressed. The work of Johan Galtung⁵ was insightful in handling

¹ Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*(UN, New York, 1992)

² Holt, Victoria K., Caroline R. Earle, and Moira K. Shanahan. “*The Brahimi report and the future of UN peace operations*” (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003).

³Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars 3rd edition: Organised Violence in a Global Era.* (John Wiley & Sons, 2013.)

⁴John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies.* Washington DC (1997): 4.

⁵Johan Galtung, *Three approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peace-Making and Peacebuilding.* In *Peace, War and Defence: Essays in Peace Research* vol.2, 282-304. (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers)

the peace-making, peacekeeping and peace building simultaneously and this chapter identified the role of the civilian component in this framework.

Based on these developments the chapter considered the effects of the institutional and functional relationships between the UN, AU and EU and how the shared responsibility based on the Chapter VIII of the UN charter was shaped. The chapter also discussed the role of the regional organizations and principle of subsidiarity between AU and the RECs, and observed areas of synergy and cooperation especially in Somalia between the UNSOA, UNSOM and AMISOM.

5.1.3 Chapter Three: An Overview of Peacekeeping Interventions in Somalia

Chapter three offered a detailed analysis on the previous peacekeeping interventions in Somalia by the UN and the regional organizations with the aim of extracting lessons identified regarding the civilian dimension in peace operations. This chapter was linked to second hypothesis which associates the variable of organizational learning to successful outcome of peace operations.

The chapter outlined the lessons from the UN missions of the 1990s namely the UNSOM I, UNITAF and UNSOM II, and discussed in depth the lessons identified for the civilian component. The most important lesson in the UN interventions in Somalia was that the military operation without a commensurate political objectives led by the civilian component was doomed to fail. Secondly, the chapter established that planning for peace operations required the diplomatic and political agencies combined to the broad expertise of the military in this area. But planning for a peace operation without this combination was planning for failure. The chapter established that even though the UN intervention was successful in providing the critical humanitarian aid needed by the population in

Somalia, the UN missions failed to create the necessary conditions for a sustainable peace.

The chapter also discussed the peacekeeping operation planned by the regional organization IGAD dubbed IGASOM which didn't take off because of lack of legal framework coupled with shortage of funding for the mission. Further, political complexities of the neighbouring countries that included long historical rivalries between Somalia and its neighbours Kenya and Ethiopia compromised the neutrality and impartiality of the mission with the Somalia Transitional authorities viewing the Somalia intervention more as Ethiopian agenda than a Somalia agenda. The chapter exclusively discussed peacekeeping interventions noting that there were many other peace-making interventions championed by the neighbouring countries and IGAD but since the focus of the paper was on peacekeeping interventions, analysis on peace-making interventions were not considered.

5.1.4 Chapter Four: Potential and Pitfalls of Civilian Component in AU PSOs

Chapter four presented the findings about the civilian potentials and pitfalls in peace operations. In order to provide the big picture on the AMISOM peace operation the chapter outlined the mission mandate since the inception of the mission to date, the functional and institutional relationship between the AU and UN, more so because of the parallel structures that both organization have in Somalia. The section sought to clarify how the coordination, cooperation and synergies of both organizations were utilized to achieve the mission mandate. The chapter also discussed the mission setup by describing the military troop strength and how these were allocated in the six sectors in Somalia.

The focus of the chapter was on the civilian component, thereby discussing in-depth the mission leadership by the SRCC, the substantive functions covered by the civilians and the mission support. The study found out that the major potentials that AU can exploit regarding the civilian component was the comparative advantage of easier access to the population, the expertise of civilian personnel in various fields that other components didn't have experience on, opportunity for the civilian component to mainstream gender issues – more specifically the women participation in peace processes as stipulated in the UNSCR 1325 and 1820.

The chapter also discussed the potential for optimizing the civilian component during mandate implementation. The study noted that the mandate of most of AU PSOs contained all the pillars of security, development and rule of law components. As thus, effective mandate interpretation had the potentials to include all the components in the mandate implementation.

On the pitfalls the study observed that the major impediments to civilian participation in AU PSOs started with the delayed deployment of the needed capacities of the civilian experts in PSOs. The study noted that seven years down the line the AU had not achieved the optimal mission staff in the civilian component which was marked by a 50% vacancy rate. Further, the staff deployed suffered a capacity gap evidenced by the deficit between the competency desired and the actual profiles of deployed staff. The third pitfall discussed was tied up to the knowledge management capability of the AU in PSOs. The study noted that the AU has developed major landmark policy documents describing the challenges and solutions for peace and security in the continent. Notwithstanding these remarkable thought process, most of the documents are in draft

form and have not been approved. Further, the AU lacks a best practice mechanism that identifies lessons and ensures they are incorporated progressively in development of new operations because of the ad-hoc nature of approaching peace operations.

5.2 Study Conclusions

This chapter brings to end this study by revisiting the two main hypotheses that are tied to chapter two and three consecutively. Chapter two discussed the role of the civilian component in peace operations which was closely linked to the first hypothesis that stated *“Inclusion and integration of the civilian component dimension from the design of a peace mission to its liquidation partly increases the potential of achieving a sustainable outcome of the peace support operation”* Based on the recent trends of AU in Somalia, Mali, Central Africa Republic, the AU PSOs is taking up stabilization missions, characterized by “no peace to keep” phenomena. While the dominance of the military component in these type of missions is expected, the role of the civilian component has a major contributing success factor is of paramount importance.

The study established that the design of peace operations has majorly been security centred negating the importance of the other pillars such as political, humanitarian, development and reconciliation efforts which are at main scope of the civilian component. The study therefore confirmed the hypothesis and the linkage between incorporation of the civilian component to the successful outcome of the peace operation following the interviews and the questionnaire responses. The case of AMISOM exemplified the success of the military in liberating areas such as Afgooye, Merka, Jowhar, Baidoa, Beletweyne and the key port city of Kismayo thus bringing large areas in South – Central Somalia under Government control. At the same time the study

demonstrated the urgent need of rebuilding and consolidating these gains by constructing governance and local political structures mainly safeguarded by the civilian's civil affairs unit. The main argument of this research is that the civilians are not stand alone elements for success. In other words there is no imperatives of arguing for civilian component in zero-sum terms. This can be equally misleading. It is clearly time to move beyond this zero-sum of balancing the military versus the civilians in the theatre of operations and place a much needed emphasis on potential synergetic effects between all the mission components.

The fact that peace operations have become very complex undertakings based on the nature of the intra – state conflict requires a simultaneous interlinked component intervention that doesn't repudiate any single component from contributing to the success of the mission. This study has established that the very nature of contemporary peace operations which combine a wide range of interrelated civilian and military activities requires an integrated and coordinated approach as a condition of coherence and success.

To this end, the role of the civilian component should be considered at all levels from the inception, design, implementation and liquidation of the mission as specified in the AU Policy guidelines for the establishment of the ASF as well as the Aide Memoire for the decision-making and mandating process of the African Union. Further, the expectation of AU in handing over the missions to UN after stabilization may not be realistic. The study established that even though AU expected to hand over the mission to UN after six months, seven years down the line the conditions for this handover haven't been fully actualized even though a new partnership was fostered. Therefore there is need for AU to strengthen its own civilian capacity based on the approved ASF civilian

framework and be ready to undertake the entire functions under the conflict spectrum as spelt out by the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

The second objective was to investigate whether the lessons learnt from the previous operations are integrated in the current AU missions. This objective was linked to the second hypothesis which stated as follows, “*Sustained organizational learning culture from conducted peace missions increases the potential of successful sustainable outcomes in consecutive peace operations.*” This study has established that AU is not learning the lessons from previous operations. The previous operations by UN in Somalia exemplified the difficulties of dealing with the security paradigm only without incorporating the political dimension. While the study established the AU efforts in the political dimension, observations were made on the chronic shortage of key mission personnel as well as understaffed components. Further, the study recognized missing components such as the rule of law units as well as programs for disarmament demobilization and reintegration of surrendered al-shabaab fighters. The study noted this was the main challenge with the UN missions and wondered why the same mistake was repeated by AU. The lack of best practices and lessons learnt unit was observed as an institutional weakness which if not addressed will see a cycle of the same mistakes in consecutive operations. Whilst, conflict dynamics will vary from one place to another and there is need to adapt interventions in accordance to the needs on the ground, common principles of success such as timely intervention, willingness of the warring parties to alter violence tactics among encompassing different actors in finding a sustainable integrated solutions will always remain constant in the initial stages of a peace operation.

5.3 Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study and the discourses of contemporary peace operations this section presents some recommendations that can improve the incorporation and integration of the civilian dimension in AU led peace operations.

5.3.1 Actualization of Continental Policies on Civilian Dimension in PSO

At the AU level the realization for incorporation of civilian dimension is captured by various policy documents that include: the AU PSC Protocol⁶ that provides the broad framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture, the ASF Civilian Dimension Policy Handbook⁷, Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy⁸, the ASF policy framework⁹, AU mandating and decision-making process¹⁰ among many other guidelines and assessment reports. All these policies and conceptual guidelines form the doctrine of the AU PSOs. From the interviews and discussions with key AU officials the question of what forms the doctrine or the organizational culture of the AU PSOs was not so clear to most of the people. Yet the concepts and the policies mentioned above, are rich with values, beliefs, norms and clear vision of what the AU PSOs should look like and how they should be approached. One aspect of this vision is the

⁶ Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, adopted by AU member states in Durban, South Africa on 9 July 2002, (http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol_peace_and_security.pdf, accessed 18 Sept 2014)

⁷The Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force Handbook, (<http://www.accord.org.za/our-work/peacekeeping/publications/771-the-civilian-dimension-of-the-african-standby-force>, accessed 18 Sept 2014)

⁸ AU Peace Conflict and Reconstruction Development Policy adopted in 2006 in Banjul, (<http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/70-post-conflict-reconstruction-and-development-pcrd>, accessed 18 Sept 2014)

⁹ Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee, adopted by 3rd meeting of the African Chiefs of Defense staff 15 – 16 May 2003 , Addis Ababa (<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/asf-policy-framework-en.pdf>, accessed 18 Sept 2014)

¹⁰ African Union Mandating Process for Peace Support Operations – Aide Memoire of AU Planning and Decision-making process,(http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/capabilities/eu-support-african-capabilities/documents/aide_memoire_en.pdf, accessed 18 Sept 2014)

multidimensional, inclusion and participation of all the people of Africa in seeking a sustainable solutions in the continent.

In particular the ASF civilian dimension has provided broad recommendations and systemic approach in training, employment and deployment of civilian capacities in AU led PSOs. The policy document recognizes the challenges and provides realistic solutions in handling these obstacles. Whereas most of the policy documents are still in draft form they reflect the strategic thinking and guidelines through which the PSOs should be led.

In this regard, the first recommendation emanating from this study is the actualization and completion of these policy documents including the possibility of revising them based on the needs and realities on the ground. This study has established one of the biggest challenges of AU PSOs is activating interventions even before finalizing the guidelines and the policies for such processes. In other words, the organization is implementing policies and agenda without finalizing the concepts and often times the doctrine is developed in the field. Further, the AU is venturing into operations with no peace to keep which means the cardinal principles for peacekeeping as discussed in Chapter 2 such as consent of parties, impartiality and non-use of force are not applicable.

5.3.2 Institutionalization of Lessons Learnt

The experiences of AU in PSOs should be documented and the lessons learnt institutionalized for posterity. Wiseman ¹¹ defines organizational learning “*as a cyclical process through which knowledge that is learned on an individual or group level is*

¹¹Erica Wiseman, “*The Institutionalization of Organizational Learning – a Neo-Institutional Perspective*”, (Montreal, McGill University 2007)

objectified on the organizational level, institutionalized and embedded in the organizational memory.”Institutionalization therefore involves a deliberate effort to incorporate knowledge at the organizational level so that it may persist and be available for future re-use. Increasingly, the AU is attempting firsts and exploiting its comparative advantage in peace operations by deploying in areas of high complexity. There have been lessons learnt in these processes and the ability to plug them would be an added advantage. For the civilian component areas such as development of applicable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) from the office of the SRCC, substantive functions and mission support would be a starting point. Further, mechanisms employed by the civilian experts in the reconciliation and government support would be helpful to access best practices to avoid reinventing the wheel during initial start-up of the missions.

5.3.3 Strengthening the Capacities of the Civilian in PSOs

One of the weaknesses established by the study concerning the civilian component is the lack of competency and expertise in certain thematic areas. Based on the experiences of UN on the civilian capacities and the approach of the AU in developing the rosters for identification, management and recruitment of the civilian’s experts in PSOs, key focus area on strengthening the capacities for the civilians should be prioritized. As an example, while the military and the police have elaborated pre-deployment training packages for PSOs, there is no pre- deployment training concept for the civilians to date.

Most of the civilians employed in AMISOM did not partake of a specified in-mission training that expounded on their key areas of focus and interlink ages with other mission components. While there are training centres of excellence such as the

International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, the Bamako Training Centre in Mali among others in the continent, harmonization of the training for the civilians is still lacking and can be improved.

The second area to strengthen civilian capacities in the PSOs is incorporation of the civilian political actors in the technical planning and decision-making structure of AU PSOs. The study established that the structure for the AU peace operations is marked by heavy strong presence of the military personnel. Indeed even some key posts for the civilians are occupied by retired military civilians¹² . Hence the thinking and the philosophy of militarization remains heavy making it difficult to mainstream civilian perspectives. From the civilian policy guidelines, there is an explicit proposal to incorporate the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the ASF structure at the council of ministers level and hence ensure the multi –sector perspectives are incorporated at the highest echelons of decision making. During the time that ASF is not yet operational the inclusion of diplomatic agencies led by ministry of foreign affairs during the inception of the missions is of utmost importance. According to Makumi Mwangiri¹³, the incursion of the Kenyan forces in Somalia lacked the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since it was devised purely by the military agencies thereby missing a critical insight and contribution on the landscape of Somalia from a diplomatic angle. This exemplifies the need to incorporate the civilian diplomatic and political perspectives in the entire structure of developing and implementing mandates by the AU in future.

¹²Fridah Kibuko , email response from key AU civilian Personnel on the challenges of mainstreaming civilians in AU PSOs, 16 Sept 2014)

¹³Fridah Kibuko , interview with Prof Mwangiri Makumi – a leading authority on Peace Processes and International Relations in Africa, Karen Nairobi on 1 Aug 2014.

5.3.4. Increase Awareness on the Role of the Civilians in PSOs

There are many civilians who are well trained and qualified in international relations, political science, finance, human resources etc. who meet the requirements and the qualifications of majority of peace operations profiles for the civilians. Yet, the vacancy rate of both UN and AU missions remains high compared to the rest of the components. The question of why this remains so was partly answered by this study which recognized the high number of applications that the recruitment system can't handle thereby leading to constant delays and backlog of the system.

The deployment of civilian capacities by AU will be undertaken through the rosters of the experts maintained at the RECs/RM levels and a continental roster at the AU level. According to the staffing and recruitment guidelines, generic TORs for the civilian specialists have been developed and the RECs are expected to adhere to these specifications while identifying potential civilians for peace operations. Consequently, the mandate of training, screening the candidates and decision to maintain them at the roster lies entirely with the RECs while the function of the recruitment and employment of the civilians is maintained at the AUC level. Whilst the division of labour is clearly stipulated in the rostering process, the main challenge as spelt out by AU rostering manager is that the profiles maintained at the regional levels do not meet the specifications.

From the Eastern region level for example the Rostering manager¹⁴ explained that the challenges facing the civilians in the identification processes was the nominated candidates by member states didn't adhere to the specified criteria, yet there is no

¹⁴ Fridah Kibuko , interview with Arthur Kamyia – the Civilian Training and Rostering Manager at EASF, 12 Aug 2014 in Karen, Nairobi

mechanism to enforce these standards on member states due to the sovereignty of individual member's considerations. Unlike the military and the police candidates the civilians needed for peace operations cannot only be seconded from the civil service but will include array of expertise and specialties from civil society and other non-state actors. To this end, the solution for AU and RECs/ RMs is to open the roster to all the qualified personnel and not limiting it to the civil servants. In order to achieve this goal the AU together with RECs should massively invest in marketing the Roster, sensitization about the civilian's jobs in the peace operations and emphasizing on the criteria needed for rostering.

5.3.5 Policy Exchange with UN and other Multi-lateral Organizations

AU compared to UN and other multilateral organizations such as EU or OSCE is relatively new in the business of peace support operations encompassing the multidimensional approach. Conversely, the UN and EU have wide experience including operations in the African context and essentially since the approach is multi-actor including the military, civilians and police in the operations.

To this end, there are many lessons that AU can learn from these agencies including areas to improve in civilian recruitments on short time basis. One way to do this is during policy development to invite these organizations to share their experiences and thereby enrich the processes. Since peace and security is a shared responsibility, and as far as the ownership of African processes is secured, adoption of better methods and way to do things should be embraced.

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