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THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ECOMOG MILITARY INTERVENTION IN ECOWAS

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DECLARATION

This research project is my personal original work and has not been submitted for a Degree Program in anyotherUniversity.

Signature …………………………..…Date…………………………………….

Christopher Lianyang Ogwang Aria

This project has been submitted for examination with my permission as the University supervisor

Signature…………………………...Date…………………………………

Mr. Martin Nguru

DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to my wonderful wife **Sieaday Ogwang**, my great children Helen Alum, Victoria Tino and Master Kelly Omuge. My family has been a source of encouragement and inspiration when working on this project in a very insecure conflict environment such as Mogadishu, Somalia.

The study and project took too much of my time which could have otherwise been dedicated to my family particularly during my leave period. Their encouragement and understanding facilitated the completion of this project within the stipulated time frame. I thank my wonderful family most sincerely for their understanding.

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THE ACRONYMS

ACOTA   African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance

ACRI   African Crisis Response Initiative

ACSS   African Center for Strategic Studies

AFL   Armed Forces of Liberia

AMISOM   African Union Mission in Somalia

AOFR   American Operation Force Relief

AU   African Union

BMATT   British Military Advisory and Training Teams

CPMM   Crisis Prevention Management Mechanism

COPAX   Council for Peace and Security for Central Africa

DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo

EASBRIG   Eastern Africa Standby Brigade

ECCAS   Economic Community of Central African States

ECCASBRIG   Economic Community of Central African States Brigade

ECOBRIG   Economic Community of West African States Brigade

ECOMOG   Economic Community of Cease-fire Monitoring Group

ECOWAS   Economic Community of West African States

FGS   Federal Government of Somalia

IGAD   Inter-Government Authority on Development

IMET   International Military Education and Training

JCET   Joint/Combined Exchange Training

MSC   Mediation and Security Council

NASBRIG   North African Standby Brigade

NGOs   Non-Governmental Organizations

NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
PAE	Pacific Architect Engineers
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PKO	Peace Keeping Operation
PSOD	Peace and Security Operations Division
RECAMP	*Reinforcement des Capacities Africanes de Maintien de la Paix*
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SADCBRIG	Southern African Development Community Brigade
SMC	Standing Mediation Committee
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations African Mission in Darfur
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone

ABSTRACT

This study explores the role of regional organizations in regional peace and security with emphasis on ECOMOG intervention in West African States. The objectives of this study were (1) To investigate why ECOWAS continues to deploy the intervention force as a conflict resolution mechanism during intrastate conflicts in West Africa; (2) To examine the possibility of the force becoming a standing force; (3) To examine the policy implications of having the force in the sub-region. The study employed qualitative approach; it sought to cover the exploratory, descriptive and explanatory elements of the research process. The first part of the study gives a background of ECOMOG intervention in West Africa region conflicts. In the second part a presentation of a theoretical overview of peacekeeping of different authors, the role of peacebuilding in civil conflicts, the birth of regional conflict resolution mechanism with a bias to ECOMOG. In the third part, ECOMOG intervention is contextualized highlighting its weaknesses and challenges, in addition, some of its successes are given, in the fourth part of the paper.

Contents

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.0 Background to the study

The end of the Cold War witnessed intensification of intrastate conflicts in the West African sub-region. Prior to this era, the West African sub-regional body, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), had used traditional conflict resolution mechanisms to resolve conflicts. These notwithstanding, with the outbreak of conflict in Liberia in November 1989, ECOWAS employed ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a military intervention force, in August 1990 as another conflict resolution mechanism. The end-state of ECOMOG was to stop the carnage, destruction of property, and create the conditions for diplomacy and dialogue to be employed hopefully resulting in a long-term political settlement. Since then, ECOMOG has been employed on four subsequent intervention operations in the countries of Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Côte d'Iviore, and Liberia for a second time. This study analyses why ECOWAS continues to employ ECOMOG as a key element of the conflict resolution process, the possibility of ECOMOG becoming a standing force, the policy implications and examines ways of making the force more effective and relevant to the subregion.

The demise of the Cold War saw an upsurge of conflicts throughout the world. However, there was a shift away from ideologically-based conflict, as witnessed in Namibia, Angola and

Mozambique.[1] In West Africa, ethnicity and religion flared up many of these intra-state conflicts. The democratic winds of change that emerged on the subregion in the early nineties pitted the then ruling dictators against numerous freedom groups arising from civil society. Many leaders in the subregion tried to impose national unity by consolidating political and economic power in the state resulting in bloated governments, inefficient bureaucracies and rampant corruption.[2] There were numerous coups and countercoups in almost all the West African countries. All these accounted for an upsurge in civil strife and intrastate conflicts in the subregion. The countries in the West African subregion, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Côte d' Iviore, Niger and Mali, have all had their share of intra-state conflicts since end of the Cold War. These conflicts have been very costly in terms of lives and property and have inhibited economic growth, integration and development throughout the entire subregion.

Despite immense human rights abuses and the loss of lives and property during these intra-state conflicts in West Africa, the United Nations has not been very responsive in intervening. The international community's response to ECOMOG's foray into Liberia was one of wait and see.[3] Again in Liberia, "although the United Nations contributed significantly to emergency relief, the UN did not address the Liberian crises in political terms until November 1992, almost three years after the crises erupted".[4]It was not until October 1992 that the UN retrospectively approved

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[1] Guy, M., *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, (California: Sage Publication, 1998) pp 1
[2] Berman, E., and Sam, K., *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, United Nations Publications, 2000) pp. 16
[3] Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W., *Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict*: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia, *International Peacekeeping* 1, no. 3 (1994) pp. 270

[4] Human Rights Watch, *Waging War to Keep the Peace: The ECOMOG Intervention and Human Rights.* Human Rights watch Publications Volume 5, no.6 (June), (1993) pp. 21

ECOMOG's actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.[5] Interestingly, the United States of America (US), as the world's only remaining superpower, has also not been very proactive in intervening directly in West African subregion. Rather, the US has been willing to provide humanitarian assistance and military aid (equipment, training, strategic airlift, etc.) to the subregion for its peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. For instance, in 1993, in addition to humanitarian assistance, the US provided $8.6 million to ECOWAS for peacekeeping and $18.75 million in Foreign Military Financing and Department of Defense (DOD) drawdown funds for ECOWAS peacekeeping activities.

Apart from the UN and US, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU), has not been able to initiate such interventions during crises in the subregion. In addition to a lack of willpower, as a third world regional body, the AU has insufficient financial means to invest in these operations. Indeed, during the Liberian conflict in 1990, the OAU did not play a significant role. It did not immediately show concern towards the conflict as it lacked the financial capacity and will power to do so.[6]

1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

The last twenty-five years have witnessed intensification of intrastate conflicts in West Africa. The subregion's leaders have tried to resolve these conflicts using various traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. These mechanisms have included commissions of mediation, ad-hoc committees, mediation by African Heads of State and the use of the Chieftaincy Institution.

[5] Tuck, C.,"*Every Car or Moving Object Gone: The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia*. African Studies Quarterly, (2000) pp. 4.Article on-line. Available from http://web.africa.ufl.Edu/asp/v4/v 4i1a1.htm.Accessed 4 March 2013.

[6] Scheepers, C., *Intervention Operations in Africa: Lessons Learnt from Liberia with Regards to Command, Control and Logistics*, July, (1999) pp. 15. Article on-line. Available from http://www.mil.za/CSANDF/CJSupp/TrainingFormation/ArmyCollege/ ArmyCollege2001/1.Internet.Accessed 4 March 2014.

Recent conflicts in the region have, however, revealed that the use of these mechanisms alone has not helped much in resolving the conflicts and preventing the outbreak of violence. Since 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has resorted to employing military intervention forces as a major part of its conflict resolution mechanisms. These interventions have created an atmosphere conducive for diplomatic means and the traditional conflict resolution means to be employed to resolve conflicts in the West Africa sub-region. The ECOWAS intervention force, known as the Economic Community Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), is a non-standing force whose troops are contributed by West African militaries.

ECOMOG has intervened in intrastate conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Côte d' Iviore. Even though these interventions did little to eradicate the root cause of the conflicts in these countries, the interventions halted the carnage and created an atmosphere for peace to be restored and political dialogue to begin. In particular, the ECOMOG operation in Liberia has been widely acclaimed as one of the most successful and unprecedented in the history of this very peacekeeping.[7]Given the background of ECOWAS as an economic union designed to promote economic growth and its performance to date, expanding its mission to include security responsibilities presents numerous political, legal, military, and logistical challenges that have adversely affect ECOWAS prospects for sub-regional security. This study seeks to answer why ECOWAS continues to employ the ECOMOG force as a conflict resolution mechanism during intrastate conflicts in West Africa? Can ECOMOG become a standing force in the region? What are the policy implications of having the force in the sub-region?

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[7] Dowyaro, E., *ECOMOG Operations in West Africa, Principles and Praxis: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations*, February, (2000) pp. 7. Available from http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/ECOMOG Praxis.html. Internet Accessed 7 March 2014.

1.2 Objectives of the Study

The major portion of this research project will also examine how ECOMOG can become more effective and relevant for the West Africa sub-region as a whole. However, the main objectives include;

i. To investigate why ECOWAS continues to employ the ECOMOG force as a conflict resolution mechanism during intrastate conflicts in West Africa

ii. To examine the possibility of the force becoming a standing force

iii. To examine the policy implications of having the force in the sub-region

1.3 Literature Review

1.3.1 Causes of the Conflict in the Sub-region

Sub-Saharan Africa is a region best known for its history of instability and violence. This widespread and permeating conflict is one of the reasons that my research question is so pertinent. After achieving independence from their colonial governments in the 1960s, most African countries experienced decades of rule by strong patrimonial leaders often called the "Big Men" of Africa.[8] These rulers led governments characterized by wasteful spending, failing economic policies, and ethnic tension. Rather than implementing principles of democratic rule, the "Big Men" of Africa maintained control by playing ethnic groups off of one another and exploiting long-standing hostilities. Their governments were focused on, "seeking personal gain, often precipitating violence for their own ends."[9]

As poverty on the continent increased so did civil unrest as the "Big Men" began to lose their grip on power. Economic frustration and ethnic strain reached a peak in the 1980s, as the level of

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[8] Meredith, Martin. *The Fate of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence.* Public Affairs: New York, 2005.

[9] Ibid

violence in Africa increased rapidly. Conflicts became both inter- and intra- state in nature. Countries including Angola and the Nigeria descended into chaotic and deadly civil wars. The widespread proliferation of arms and the Cold War proxy status of many of these conflicts guaranteed the civil clashes would be especially violent. These wars also created a variety of spillover effects, including the forced migration of refugees and involvement of external forces, both threatening the stability of entire regions. Tribal strife surfaced across the continent gripping countries like the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, and Cote d'Ivoire.

These civil conflicts are not a just a distant memory in sub-Saharan Africa. Their devastating effects still play an important role in region's current instability. Many of the aforementioned conflicts occurred primarily in the late 1980's and into the 1990s.

Civil unrest is not the only type of military problem facing Africa. Inter-state conflicts have also become a source of instability. Border wars like those in Ethiopian and Eritrea have claimed many lives and destabilized relations between nations. The Ethiopian and Eritrean war continued throughout the 1980s and did not conclude until 1991 when Eritrea achieved independence. The war took a great toll on the populations of both countries, resulting in more than 100,000 deaths and over one-third of Eritrean citizens being displaced.[10] Inter-state conflicts have also resulted in violence in other countries including Senegal and Mauritania. Many domestic conflicts in Africa have also overrun national boundaries and caused violence in neighboring countries.

The causes of the Liberian conflict in 1990 can be traced back further than that year. The Justice and Peace Commission in Liberia trace this in their book *The Liberian Crisis*. The conflict is

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[10] Ibid

described as one of the most destructive and senseless civil wars recorded in history. The cause of the conflict is traced to both remote and immediate reasons. The book recounts the remote causes to historical tension that existed between the indigenous population and descendants of the settlers, the total absence of development of the rural areas, corruption in the country and the indiscipline of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The book also identifies the immediate cause of the conflict, such as the introduction of multi party politics into the country by late President William Tolbert in 1971, and his subsequent overthrow in a coup d` etat in 1980 by, then, Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe.

1.3.2 ECOMOG Operations
The inception of ECOMOG and its operations have been seen as a positive contribution to the West African subregional body in its effort at resolving intra-state conflicts. In his book, *The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa*, Ricardo Rene Laremont hails the ECOWAS move in using ECOMOG to intervene in intra-state conflicts. The writer adds that it is only the creation of effective security arrangements for conflict resolutions that could ensure Africa's stability and development. Laremont believes that developed countries are no longer willing to directly contribute troops as part of military intervention forces in Africa. In his book he suggests that the U.S and France's proposal of ACRI and Reinforcement des Capacities Africanes de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP), respectively, are indirect ways of asking the African continent to be ready to resolve its own conflicts. These programs were aimed at training selected African militaries to improving their capacity at peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

He argues that despite the initial problems of ECOMOG in Liberia in 1990, the intervention force has become a model for all subregions to emulate.[11]

In a paper, "Every Car or Moving Object Gone: The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia," the *African Studies Quarterly Journal* discussed the creation of ECOMOG through to its exit from Liberia in 1998. It describes the Liberian conflict as an off-shoot of the demise of the Cold War in which about 200,000 civilians died and 1.2 million people were displaced, out of a prewar population of 2.5 million. It touches on the reasons for ECOMOG's deployment and the difficulties it faced. The paper also deliberates on the peculiar situation that confronted ECOMOG at its inception. These include the fact that the force was first created for peacekeeping but had to metamorphose into an enforcement force due to the opposition it faced from the main warring faction (NPFL) during the initial days in Liberia. ECOMOG's strong points and weaknesses are also mentioned in the paper. The final part of the paper subscribes to the school of thought that despite ECOMOG's difficulties, the outcome in Liberia (as of 1997) was commendable since it halted the senseless carnage in the country that began in 1990.

The creation of ECOMOG is also seen as an emerging indigenous African peacekeeping capability.[12]Rasheed Draman and David Carment side with this school of thought in their paper, "Managing Chaos in the West African Subregion: Assessing the Role of ECOMOG in Liberia." The first section of their paper traces the birth of ECOMOG. In the second section, the authors argue that the course of ECOWAS diplomacy in Liberia was fraught with problems and resulted in many short comings. The paper concludes with the thought that ECOMOG's efforts in Liberia helped stabilized the subregion as a whole. In their document, *Waging War to Keep Peace*, the

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[11] Laremont, R.,*The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa*. (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002) pp. 16

[12] Dramaini, R., and Carment D., *Managing Chaos in the West African Subregion*: Assessing the Role of ECOMOG in Liberia, N0 26-2001, (Ottawa, Ontario: Centre for Security and Defense Studies, 2001) pp. 124

Human Rights Organization revisits the background of the Liberian conflict. The document enumerates the events in Liberia from 1990 to 1998, including discussions about the warring factions and the various accords signed during the period. The apathy, or unwillingness, of US and the UN to respond promptly and directly to the conflict in the subregion are also discussed. The document ends with a section recounting lessons learned and recommendations for ECOWAS, the UN, and the US.

1.3.3 Peacekeeping Including Intervention Operations by UN and Sub-regional Bodies

In his book, *Understanding United Nations System and Second Generation Peacekeeping,* Mr. Frank Adu-Amanfoh stresses the shift from the traditional means of peacekeeping missions since the end of the Cold War. He explains that second generation peacekeeping has gained such importance that it is crucial for conventional forces to be conversant with its concepts and principles. He argues that the natures of conflicts since the collapse of the former Soviet Union have taken a very different form and these demand more than traditional means of conflict resolution. Adu-Amanfoh recounts that recent conflicts in the subregion are more intra-state than inter-state. The conflicts are therefore, value based, deep rooted, and less amenable to conciliation with a higher possibility of spreading into other territories, if not checked.[13] The author, in his conclusion, asserts that peace enforcement or military intervention as a tool for resolving intra-state conflicts has come to stay.

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[13] Adu-Amanfoh, F., *Understanding the United Nations System and Second Generation Peacekeeping,* (Accra, Ghana: Adwinsa Publications, 1997) pp. 90

International Intervention: Sovereignty versus Responsibility, written by Michael Keren and Donald A Sylvan, is another book that examines the need for military interventions. The writers question whether sovereignty of a country must be respected under all conditions or overlooked for the sake of preventing catastrophic humanitarian disasters. The book outlines the role of such military intervention forces and how their activities can be distinguished from forceful occupation or breach of sovereignty. The UN and other sub-regional bodies experience in some intervention operations are also discussed. The book further outlines principles covering whether, when and how to intervene.[14]

Thomas R. Mockaiti also writes about the changing paradigm in civil conflict and the need to counter or resolve it *with* equally new ways of peacekeeping. In his book, *Peace Operations and Intra-state Conflict*, he states that "civil conflict intervention has come to stay; the time for a new approach has come" (1999). The book reviews intervention operations in Congo, Somalia and former Yugoslavia and explains that they were peculiar and unique in their own rights. The author emphasizes that the nature of the conflicts in those areas required intervention operations just as much as current intra-state conflicts.[15]

"The Security Imperatives of the Crises in West Africa: Preliminary Thoughts" is another monograph about ECOMOG operations. It was written by Dr. Abubakar Momoh. In his monograph, Dr. Momoh describes the various forms of conflict in the subregion and emphasizes that almost all the countries in the subregion have faced one form of conflict or the other since the end of the Cold War. He praises the efforts of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone since

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[14] Keren, M., and Sylvan, D., International *Intervention: Sovereignty versus Responsibility,* (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 2002) pp.45-208
[15] Mockaitis, T.,*Peace Operations and Intra-state Conflict*, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1999) pp. 125

the interventions prevented spillover effects in the subregion. Dr. Momoh also touches on the apparent schism that existed between Anglophone and Francophone countries in ECOWAS in 1990 prior to the creation of the force. Finally, the lessons from the intervention strategy are also discussed.[16]

The reviewed literature so far, focuses on current political economy of peacebuilding, in the West Africa subregion in general, highlighting the peacekeeping missions that have been deployed to restore peace in the subregion. This far, the importance of ECOWAS in the subregion as regard peace cannot be over emphasized; rather, the questions that remains unanswered and that this paper seeks to address is why ECOWAS continue to deploy ECOMOG force in the resolution of the subregion conflict and if ECOMOG can be a standby force. Further, the reviewed literature seems not to have addressed the policy implication of having the ECOMOG force in the subregion.

1.4 Justification of the Study

The African continent has witnessed several peacekeeping operations deployed in various conflict zones. Apart from ECOMOG that has been uploaded for achieving partial success, it seems that majority of these PKO have failed to achieve the desired result, thus suggesting that the need for a robust standby force that has enhanced capability to swiftly respond to emerging conflicts in the region. Lending credence to this, the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan pointed to the need for peacekeeping forces to find new capabilities for what he refers to as "positive inducements" to gain support for peacekeeping mandates amongst populations in

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[16] Momoh, A., *The Security Imperatives of the Crises in West Africa: Preliminary Thoughts. Monograph No 50, Franco-South African Dialogue Sustainable in Africa*, (2000) pp.125 Available from http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ Monographs/No50/Chap10.html. Internet Accessed 9 April 2014

conflict areas. It is against this background that ECOWAS has made efforts to make ECOMOG promote lasting and durable peace and sustainable solution to the West Africa subregion.

The study will therefore determine the relevance and importance and future role of ECOMOG in West Africa. The project will seek to establish the need for ECOWAS to continue employing ECOMOG by reviewing its security protocol, to include establishing a standing headquarters for the force. Since the evolution of ECOMOG, it has been hailed as a model for sub regional intervention operations. It has also served as a stop-gap in containing conflicts in the subregion before the U.N. gets involved. Against this background, the research will determine how ECOWAS can overcome its problems and continue to play that vital role in the subregion.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

Theoretical approaches to international relations theory are the ones that are dominant approaches to security and understanding of military interventions in sub-saharan Africa. The nature of security has become one of the most widely discussed elements in the intellectual ferment that has been triggered by the end of cold war. Optimists have declared that the end of the century was ushering in a new era of peace and cooperation, based variously on liberal democracy, transnational capitalism, international organizations, or a combination of the above.[17] Realism, idealism, constructivism and pluralism have challenged this dominant conceptualization in numerous forms. This section examines the theoretical challenges of these security studies approaches. The theoretical analysis of this security situation is critical because

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[17]Keith K., and Williams, M., "*From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies*": In Keith Krause and Michael C Williams, eds. Critical Security Studies, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) pp. 38

theory is useful in academic discourse for guiding research in various disciplines, especially in international relations where the study is seeking to explain underlying reasons for military interventions.

On the other hand, in recent years, research on the political economy of "civil wars" or "intra-state conflict" has produced important findings on how the rise in combatant self-financing – mainly through trade in natural resources – affects intra-state conflicts around the world. Among different alternative explanations to realism, political economy of conflict has been able to shed light in regard to some of the root causes of intra-state conflicts.

1.5.1 The Political Economy of Civil Wars/ Intra-state Conflict

Much of the academic debate on the economic causes of contemporary armed conflict has become polarized around the greed versus grievance dichotomy, juxtaposing "loot-seeking" with "justice-seeking" rebellion, and, more generally, the significance of economic as opposed to socio-political drivers of civil war. In most cases, policy perspectives have been significantly shaped by the controversial "greed theory", which posits that economic resources are pursued by rebels not simply to sustain war, but rather that war is pursued to obtain resources. The so-called "resource wars" in Angola, Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which were fuelled by diamonds and other valuable resources, are often-cited examples.

Recent explanations on the political economy of civil wars or intrastate conflicts present greed rather than grievance as a driving force of many conflicts in Africa. They have linked the availability of lootable resources as one major triggers of military intervention in intrastate conflicts. Conflict is seen as driven more by rationally calculated action rather than by irrational grievance, particularly identifying state-level factors, such as the availability of natural resources.

While supply-side measures of regulations have been identified as necessary these were seen as inadequate as long as structural issues which drive demand-side factors of state weaknesses and underdevelopment are not addressed any intervention efforts by the international community will continue to treat symptom rather than the actual root causes of armed conflict in most developing countries more especially in sub-Saharan Africa. There have been many alternative explanations that have been used to explain these conflicts. These approaches include and not limited to; The Collier-Hoeffler model, Rebel-Centric, State-Centric and the Natural resource scarcity model.

1.5.2 The Collier-Hoeffler Model

Many explanations have been used to explain the greedy behavior, which leads to intrastate conflict. Collier and Associates have developed a model that explicitly links rebellion to the availability of 'loot'[18]. They argued that Civil war or intrastate conflict can be modeled as 'loot-seeking' wars, or as 'justice-seeking' wars[19]. The first model is based on the notion that rebellion forms because it is viable. Large-scale rebellion resembles organized crime but because they generate large numbers of battle deaths, they are classified as wars. Large-scale banditry/war must have access to manpower and finances. Individuals join rebellions according to their expected utility calculations. Rebels have an incentive to challenge governments because of private gain, which explains how groups overcome their collective action problems. Therefore, the pay off comes in the form of Loot able income. The higher the per capita wealth and human capital, the less likely individuals will engage in risky behavior, but this is dependent on the size of the payoff, which they proxy as the availability of natural resources, measured as the ratio of

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[18] Collier, P., '*Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity*, Journal of Conflict Resolution', 44, 6, (2000), pp. 839-853.

[19] ibid

primary commodity exports to total exports. Primary commodities are "capturable" and offer the opportunity for financing war[20].

The second model is of justice-seeking wars. In this model aggrieved groups seeks to topple the grievance-causing government (political system) and ending injustice. These rebellious groups have to be large in order to be able to topple the existing government. Uganda and its allies perceived both the Rwandan and the DRC governments in this manner as it become clear in chapter three and four below. While in the case of loot seekers, these groups are invariably small. Nonetheless, justice seeking groups which allude to discrimination within multi-ethnic societies like in the DRC and Rwanda will experience more problems related to galvanizing their support base because they are invariably small. In order to escape these hurdles, "they proxy the level of grievance and the likelihood of overcoming collective action problems with social variables, such as ethno-linguistic and religious fractionalization and the degree of political repression, and economic variables, such as per capita economic growth and income and land inequality"[21].

According to Collier and Hoeffler (2000) both greed and grievance predict conflict considerably. They also argued that greed in most cases serve as the main trigger to conflict more especially where the availability of natural resources (measured as the share of primary commodity exports in total exports) has one of the strongest effects on the incidence of conflict, holding the other factors constant in the model. They concluded that countries with huge deposit of natural resources are more likely to experience conflict than resource-poor ones. This has been the case

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[20]Indira, S., '*New World (Dis) Order? Testing the Effects of Trade & FDI on New Models of Civil Conflict, 1989-1999*', Paper prepared for the presentation at the International Studies Association (ISA) meeting on 'Globalisation'4: In http://www.isanet.org/archives/soysa.html [21June 2006].
[21]Collier, P., and Hoeffler, A., '*Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War*'. A paper presented at World Bank Conference on Civil War, Crime & Violence, February 17-18, 1999, Washington DC: World Bank, Development Research Group.

in point with the DRC conflict, which took more than four decades since independence in 1960.[22]

1.5.3. Rebel-Centric Model

This approach seeks to explain why and how people rebel.[23] The model sees violent conflict over natural resources as playing a dominant role in shaping our understanding of conflict in countries like, the DRC and Lesotho. According to this model, the conflict in the above countries is seen as triggered by greed of intervening states for abundance of resources. This provides an opportunity for an emergence of different groups as in the DRC and rebel against the state. The armed conflict is explained by rebel aspirations for self-enrichment and or by the opportunity for rebellion in order to gain access to natural resources by the insurgents.

In relations to the DRC rebellion in Goma, "Cater suggests that these insurgents were not undertaken simply to capture lucrative economic assets for self-enrichment. Rather, resources exploitation was also a means to finance insurgencies driven by socio-economic and political grievances"[24]. It can be argued that the capturing of the Inga Hydroelectric dam was not only to cut power supply to the nearly DRC Towns but to exploit this resource and other Loot able natural resources available in this area.

1.5.4.State-Centric Model

This approach focuses on the role of and the weakness of the state. The DRC has been at war with itself since independence. The country has never been able to establish a strong state

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[22] ibid

[23]Karen Ballentine, Heiko Nitzschke, '*Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict*.' The PA Policy Report, October 2003.

[24] ibid

throughout its massive land. This weakness of the DRC state has always been blamed for creating security problems for other neighboring state as it will become in chapter four. The State-Centric explanation see "conflict as a result of state weakness, which is characterized by the lack of ability to monopolize force, maintain order within its territory, and generate resources to provide public goods, which can lead to the erosion of legitimate authority and capacity for effective governance"[25].

According to this economic explanation of civil conflict, the endemic corruption coupled with Mobutu misrule in the former Zaire and his patronage system of government, made the country to easily fall prey to armed warlords, since the government could not no longer able to provide law and order. The country was incapable to control the channels of wealth accumulation and distribution. These events led to the ultimate violent collapse of the state in 1997. The other explanation of intrastate conflict related to natural resources.

1.5.5. Natural Resource Scarcity

Among other explanations of civil conflict, has been that of environmental scarcity, as a result of population pressures on land such as in Rwanda. This explanation is more popular among the donor communities and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). According to this approach 'environmental scarcity' drives violence because increasing population pressure and a rapidly degrading planet necessitate the fight for 'survival. This conflict can take place in many ways, but for the purpose of this paper one will suffice. The elites capture resources and marginalize powerless groups whose livelihoods depend on these resources.

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[25] ibid

Conversely, realism is not the only theory in international relation that has the capacity to explain these interventions. There are numerous theories in international relations that have an equal capacity to provide similar explanation. For the purpose of this dissertation, realism will be used to explain these interventions. Needless to say that the theory's serious limitation has been its strong emphasis on state as an actor to the detriment of human security and other issues like health, water, environment and unemployment. The powerless groups are in turn forced to use force to defend this action. This capture of resources usually takes place when the degradation and depletion of renewable resources interact with population growth to encourage powerful groups within a society to shift resource distribution in their favor. The intrastate conflict in Rwanda is a good example in this case.

It would be important to note that it seem realist theory provides the most compelling explanation for the state of war in the world.[26] The realist perspective assumes that states always act in their own interest, according to the principle of self-interest. The theory also argues that states follow international rules only when it suits them. Conversely, pluralists argue that cooperation is much more intrinsic to the world state system than realism will allow. For idealists, it is the institutions, which must be examined because human beings are essentially cooperative and given the right institutions, peace will prevail in international relations.

Constructivists, on the other hand, would say that the way in which norms and values are constructed are constantly being reinvented by international dynamics. One must know the prevailing norms, rules, procedures, culture and the interveners' social practices as actors. This is because knowledge is constructed based on past events. Therefore, military interventions perpetuated the international inter-subjective understanding of interveners as countries, which

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[26]Time D., and Schmidt, B., Realism: In John Baylis and Steve Smith, 2nd ed. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to international relations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) pp. 124

wield military power against weak states. In this case it is essential to best understand how international politics works.

1.6Research Methodology

This section outlines the research design method that wasused during the conduct of this research. The methodology that was used is the historical method. It aimed at evaluating the case study by using both primary and secondary sources of data and information to establish the reason why ECOWAS continues employing ECOMOG as a mechanism to attain peace and security during intra-state conflicts in the West Africa sub-region. The method used in gathering data for the study is mainly library research and discourse with some informed individuals on the subject matter.

The secondary sources of data collection were obtained through scholarly works on Conflict Resolution and PKO, Journals and other documents of historical and political significance.

1.7. Chapter Outline

The remaining sections in this study are presented over the course of four chapters. As the title would suggest, Chapter 2 will present a theoretical review of peacekeeping and the birth of a regional conflict resolution force in West Africa.

Chapter 3aims to contextualization ECOMOG Military intervention in the West African states

Chapter 4 represents the crux of the study and is dedicated to the objectives outlined in chapter one. It presents an analysis of why ECOWAS continues to deploy intervention force in the West Africa sub-region; the possibility of the force becoming a stand by force and the policy implication of having the force in the sub-region.

Chapter 5 is an evaluation of the study. It presents a summary of what has been discussed within the previous chapters and then aims to highlight the key findings that were made.

THEORETICAL REVIEW OF PEACEKEEPING AND THE BIRTH OF A REGIONAL INTERVENTION FORCE IN WEST AFRICA

1.0 Introduction

The previous chapter highlighted a background to this study; it presented the research problem, the objectives of the study, justification of the study and literature review. This chapter highlights a theoretical perspective of peacekeeping by different authors, the role of peacebuilding in civil conflicts and the birth of regional conflict resolution mechanism with a bias to ECOMOG.

2.1 Theoretical Approach to Peacekeeping

ECOMOG operations were first initiated in Liberia. To understand how it came into being; this section details the events that led to its creation. The international response to the wave of conflicts in the post-cold war epoch is articulated through the structural mechanism of the United Nations peacekeeping intervention. Notwithstanding the successes and failures associated with such interventions, the growing numbers of studies spawned by this quest have posited that international peacekeeping is under-theorised[27], as the UN does not apply any theoretical approach capable of shaping its operation. Nevertheless, the trends of peacekeeping operations during and after the cold war have actually proved this argument to be controversial, not because there is no lack of theoretical approaches to peacekeeping, but because there is no consensus

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[27]Michael Pugh, '*Peacekeeping and International Relation theory: Phantom of the opera. International Peacekeeping*, 10 (4) 2003, Pp104-112; Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams, '*Thinking Anew about peace operations' International Peacekeeping* 11(1) 2004, Pp1-15; and Eli stamens, '*Critical Security studies and the United nations Preventive Deployment in Macedonia*', International peacekeeping, 11(1)2004, pp.161-81

among scholars as to a general theoretical model viable to explain the roles of international peacekeeping operations.

Robert Cox and Mark Duffield's names are mentioned whenever there is a debate on the theoretical underpinnings of International peacekeeping. These two have been at the forefront of critical approach in this area, since the peaceful days of classical approaches— Pluralism and Solidarism, and post-modern thinking in the discipline. Further, the contribution of other scholars such as Pugh (2004), Linklater (1990), and Bellamy and Williams (2004) to the critical theory marked a decisive step in developing the approach as a full-fledged paradigm in rethinking international peacekeeping operations. It is however, important to take a cursory review of this approach lest it falls into ritual of caps or into restricted fixed of reference as far as theoretical elaboration or empirical development is concerned. Whilst critical theory continues to serve as an important reference point in the areas of peacekeeping, it needs rethinking not only in its nature and scope, but also in application and future direction in the international peacekeeping system.

2.2. Civil Conflict and Peacebuilding

The UN involvement in many conflict resolution processes shaped its peacebuilding strategy. The political strategy of a peace enforcement mandate is the concept of operations embodied in its design. Just as civil wars are usually about failures of legitimate state authority, sustainable civil peace relies on successful reconstruction of legitimate state authority. Peacebuilding is about what needs to happen in between. Civil wars arise when groups and factions discover that a policeman, judge, soldier or politician no longer speaks and acts for them. When the

disaffected mobilize, acquire the resources needed to risk an armed contest, and judge that they can win, civil war encroaches.[28]

The confusion, "noise," violence, and changing identification that characterize the onslaught and conduct of civil war do not seem to be promising circumstances for rational cooperation among factions. Rather the establishment of civil peace seems to require addressing directly both the defensive and aggressive incentives that motivate faction leaders (and sometimes their followers). Defensive incentives arise in the domestic "security dilemma." Under emerging conditions of anarchy each faction seeks to arm itself in order to be protected; but, as in interstate anarchy, each defensive armament constitutes a threat to other factions.[29] Offensive incentives arise because factions and their leaders will want to impose their ideology or culture, to reap the spoils of state power, to seize the property of rivals, or to exploit public resources for private gain, or all of the above. Establishing peace will thus according to Stedman[30] require the elimination, management or control of "spoilers" or war entrepreneurs as Rui[31] et al note.

Peace through agreement aims at employing the separation of populations and territorial partition to address war-prone incentives,[32] but partition is often not successful in preventing war

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[28] Harry Eckstein, *Internal War: Problems and Approaches* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1964); Ted Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, DC: USIP, 1993)
[29] Barry Posen, "*The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict*," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 103-125.
[30] Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security* 22 (Fall 1997), 5-53.
[31] Rui De Figueiredo and Barry Weingast, "*The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict*," in Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
[32] Chaim Kaufmann, "*Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars*," International Security 20 (Spring 1996), 136-175.

recurrence.[33] Hobbes's Leviathan – state sovereignty, or authority – fills that role, restoring "legitimate power." The specific motivations that shape the behavior of combatants are thus varied. The classical, Thucydidean and Hobbesian trinity of motives (fear, honor, interest) are present in modern variations –security dilemmas, ethnic identity and/or ideological fervor, and loot-seeking— and each of them is complicated by potential differences between leaders and followers, and factions and patrons. Thus, the decision to organize or participate in a rebellion and then attempt to achieve a viable peace is not a straight-forward matter and may differ greatly across actors. What each motivated actor shares, however, is a political environment in which success in achieving peace depends on the degree of harm sustained, the resources available for development, and the international assistance to overcome gaps. We map that environment as a function of local capacities, hostility, and international capacities.

2.3. Peacekeeping as Underpinned in the Cox 1981 Critical Theory

Critical theory unlike other peacekeeping theories looks at the framework of global politics within which peacekeeping unfolded and argues that peacekeeping operations serve a narrow, problem-solving purpose—to sustain a particular representation of global governance norms under the auspices of liberal imperialism.[34] Critical theorists in contrast to realism and neorealism that places much emphasis on structures, international system and institutions as the object of analysis, stresses the need for emancipatory knowledge and an ethic of liberation from structures and processes of domination.[35] While recognizing the potency of neorealism in terms

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[33] Nicholas Sambanis, "*Partition as a solution to ethnic war: an empirical critique of the theoretical literature*," World Politics52, No. 4 (2000), 437-83.
[34]Michael Pugh, *Peacekeeping and Critical theory. International Peacekeeping*, Vol.11, No.1, Spring2004, pp.39
[35]Reus-Smit, *TheMoral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations.* Princeton University Press.

of its hegemonic rationalization of the structure of the international relations system; a structure that is evident in West Africa and one that cannot be avoided in analyzing the Liberian conflict, critical theorists sought to break from overt recognition to class and sectoral issues—which are directly congruent with state interest and legitimation, which Ashley[36] laid at the door step of neorealist theory.

Critical theory views peacekeeping as a counter-insurgency operation, funded technically as a means of achieving political and military dominance and interest.[37] Cox adopted the intellectual traditions of the Frankfurt school of social sciences to deconstruct the nature of the modern international system by positing that the mainstream theories such as liberalism/neoliberalism and realism/neorealism are ideologies meant to accommodate the dynamics of injustices, instabilities and inequalities within a world order that is itself dysfunctional, and thus these theoretical approaches tend to affirm and maintain existing status quo by not questioning the prevailing international order and framework [38]

Against this backdrop, Cox postulates critical approach as a channel for unraveling injustices emanating from these ideologies and analyze structural transformation to liberate human beings or societies from a condition that enslave them.[39] Cox assertions underscores the dominance of an ideological mindset, as Pugh (2004)notes that conceive peacekeeping as a deliberate ploy of serving the hegemony interest of an existing international system. The ideologies stems from a

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[36]Richard A. *The Poverty of Neorealism*: International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2. (Spring, 1984), pp. 225-286.

[37]Michael Pugh, *Peacekeeping and Critical theory. International Peacekeeping*, Vol.11, No.1, Spring2004, pp.39
[38]Robert Cox, '*Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory'*, Millennium, Vol.10, No.2, 1981, pp.128–9
[39] Horkheimer, M.(1982). *Critical Theory*. New York: Seabury Press p. 244

particular global system that is entirely bourgeoisie or status quo bar, and seeks to resolve conflicts that are anathema to its interest in crisis-prone zones. additionally, peacekeeping is designed to cope with living in an 'anarchical society', however such peacekeeping operations are not deployed or executed for the sake of maintaining peace in the affected conflict zones of the world, but rather to protect the ideological interest of a specific order within the international or regional system whose goal is to resolve conflict under the dictate of the existing status quo in the world. Conflicts, anarchy and war are experiences which blew out of the existing structures of global society, and are sometimes taken-for granted until they become enigmatic to the international community. Most conflicts witnessed are carry-over of power tussle implicit in the colonial days to post-colonial era, whose fabric seems to shake the foundation of modern state system in newly independent states. Africa was left in a crisis prone situation by the colonialist. The colonialist left newly African states in a fragile atmosphere in which different local actors are at loggerheads over political power, sharing of political positions and economic interest.

Due to the fact that the foundation of Africa's superstructure rest on external economic interest, the more the conflicts occur at slight provocation among actors, the more the interest of colonial masters becomes threatening, the more the conflicts in the affected region is internationalised. Given the logical repercussion of non-intervention and reciprocal recognition of the sovereignty of each state as the core norms upon which International order and coexistence depends, external intervention in the affected states may compromise international legal obligation (for example the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Charter, the 1948 Genocide Convention) which outline the national interest of the affected state over its jurisdiction and authority over its internal affairs. Resolving those conflicts, might require the intervention of a non-partisan body

at the pace of the external actors.[40] In this respect, the question of the process and nature of peacekeeping in relations to when or whether to intervene, guidelines for determining when intervention is appropriate, what the appropriate channels for approving an intervention are and how the intervention itself should be carried out, depends on the balance of political force and the dialectics of national interest of the super-powers in the Security Council of the deciding body. In the case of Liberia for example, the political interests of Anglophone and Francophone countries played a major role in either delaying or hastening the peace enforcement process. The Cox's critical approach thus, provides a vivid understanding of the nature of the world in respect to how socio-economic cleavages associated with the contradictions of the global capitalist system paved way for protracted armed and violent conflicts, which warranted neoliberal peacekeeping interventions[41] Furthermore, his idea was later articulated by Mark Duffield, whose review of the Cox's work tends to link the structural imbalance in the contemporary global society as the nexus of the origin of the violent conflicts that gave rise to peacekeeping. Duffield contends that violent disorder which arises out of the multiplicity of brutal competition among warring factions in the peripheral economies of the world defies the logic of the Westphalia sovereign state model[42]

He further asserts that the 'metropolitan capitalist centers are reluctant to police this disorder at great cost in their own soldiers' lives, but attempts to govern peripheries by projecting authority through UN administrators, external 'peace support' forces, team of monitor, outside civilian police, judges, International financial institutions and regional bodies as a way of controlling

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[40]Robert Cox, '*Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory*', Millennium, Vol.10, No.2, 1981, pp.128–9
[41] Ibid
[42] Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*, London: Zed Books, 2001. pp. 42

territory, economic resources and public policy. Duffield's critical approach is anti status quo theorists as suggested by the above discussion which is a useful theoretical synthesis, which sheds light on the nature of peacekeeping in a unipolar capitalist-world order. The peacekeeping process often confines itself within the bureaucratic structure of the UN system, which ensures conflicts in the troubled zone are brought into international limelight by retinues of organization which in Duffield's view are issues which requires urgent humanitarian intervention or as crisis capable of causing instability in a particular region of the world. The Liberian conflict for instance, posed a different standing in her quest for peace contrary to Duffield's assertion, despite the country being a darling to the US, the international community did not intervene swiftly to solve the conflict. Duffield's assertion are supported by for example, by UN's intervention in Congolese crisis, particularly in Post-Mobutu violent conflicts that caused the killing of civilians in refugee camps and the displacement of thousands of civilians in the conflict zones. The reason for the swift intervention in this case is explained by the strategic importance of the DRC not only as economic interest of the west but as strategic Washington allies in Franco-American rivalry in Central Africa. Therefore, Duffield's critical analysis of UN peacekeeping as a form of violent control mechanism directed against unstable parts of the world, with an overriding objective of upholding neo-liberal peace does not seem relevant in West Africa situation but relevant in the Congolese situation.

Bellamy and Williams'[43] recent attempt in reviewing critical tradition supports Cox's assertions. in the discourse of contemporary problems facing peacekeeping operations. In their[44] view theory reflects upon the characteristics and structures of the prevailing world order and how that

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[43]Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams, '*Thinking Anew about peace operations' International Peacekeeping* 11(1) 2004
[44] Ibid

order came into existence. Their[45] assertion illustrates the ontological and epistemological knowledge that underpins the critical approach, asking such questions as: who benefits from certain types of peacekeeping practices? What are the linkages that exist between local actors and global structures? And how do the existing social and power relations shape the process and dynamics of peacekeeping missions? In this respect, Bellamy and Williams's[46] position further reflect Cox's critique of the ontology and epistemology of mainstream heroes that do not only allows for a normative choice in favor of a social and political order different from the prevailing order, but tend to limit the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world.

From the ontological epistemological perspective, it can be deduced that the reality of peacekeeping is not independent on its own accord but initiated by the established global institution to ensure conformity to the already given structures. Hence, understanding the operations of the international peacekeeping system is incomplete without having the knowledge of the global structure that produced the pattern of hostile and unruly relationship, and the mechanism through which these hostile relationships are curtailed. The armed conflicts which characterize the unruly part of the universe are pattern of events that emerged out of the network of relation between actors. Peacekeeping therefore ensue as a product of the cognitive resources global actors brings to the violent episodes in specific region. This mechanism is nothing more than the tendencies of external actors to act in a particular ways—to ensure that parties in conflict must reach a ceasefire, signed peace agreement , and consent to the deployment of a peacekeeping mission before the Security Council deliberates on whether to establish

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[45] Ibid
[46] ibid

peacekeeping mission there or not.[47] Knowledge about the structures that produces violent conflict and mechanism to curtail these structures can only be known by understanding the underlying ideas about them. Its domain of inquiry into the normative characteristics of contemporary global politics—in relation to how it sustains peacekeeping in unruly parts of the world, determines its success and failure in hegemonic and problem-solving mechanism. Therefore, the geopolitical importance behind intervention, national interest of the super-powers and the ideological composition of the Security Council are crucial in relating international peacekeeping to concrete political realities today. Critical theory therefore, offers a viable insight into the conservative disciplines of international relations by providing a vivid understanding of how socioeconomic cleavages associated with the contradictions of the global capitalist system paved way for protracted armed and violent conflicts, which warranted neoliberal peacekeeping missions.

2.4. The Birth of a Regional Intervention Force

The intervention of ECOMOG in Liberia is traceable to two factors. First, despite the Liberian conflict break out corresponding to the end of the Cold War, the end of the East-West rivalry did not result in greater attention by the West to Africa's problems. Rather, as observed by Ignatieff, "huge sections of the world's population have won the right of self-determination on the cruelest possible terms: they have been simply left to fend for themselves. Not surprisingly, their nation states are collapsing." Kaplan's article on "The Coming Anarchy" offered a more bleak assessment of state failure in Africa. In this neo-Malthusian perspective, the world, especially the South, is beset by increasing crises generated by fast growing populations and weakening state capacity to regulate conflict. The second factor is related to the first point, the absence of

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[47]Marrack, G. (1993), 'Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping'. *International Affairs*, 69(3):451-460

superpower competition in the region created an opportunity for regional organizations to act proactively.[48]

Liberian case is one that is interesting owing to the fact that one of the superpowers – the United States had 'special' ties with its peoples and had invested in the area during the Cold War. The US for example had strategic interests in Liberia including the Omega navigation station and the Voice of America's largest transmitting station in Africa. Liberia was also a major African recipient of US aid, with the regime led by Doe receiving about $500 million in US aid between 1980 and 1985.[49]

In 1980, senior military officers planned coup to terminate the oligarchic government of President William Tolbert in Liberia. After President Tolbert was assassinated, the senior military officers who had planned the execution ran out of the country. On realizing the disappearance of the senior military officers, Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe took advantage and declared himself the head of state. Doe legitimized his rule by organizing a general election in 1985 and declared that he had won the election. Meanwhile, Charles Taylor who was his subordinate had embezzled government funds and escaped to the United States. In 1989, Taylor with the support of late President of Côte d'Ivoire, Felix Houphet-Boigny spearheaded an insurgent movement, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) to overthrow Doe's government.[50]

[48] Ibid
[49] African Union, *Draft Framework for a Common African Defense and Security Policy*, adopted by the African Ministers of Defense and Security (Addis Ababa: Ethiopia, January 20-21, 2004), pp. 4, 13, 20. See also African Union, *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union* (Durban: South Africa, July 9, 2002).
[50] Michael Hough, "Military Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa", in *Managing African Conflicts: The Challenge of Military Intervention*, Louis du Plessis and Michael Hough, *eds.* (Pretoria: HCRC Publishers, 2000), p. 184.

By mid 1990, the NPFL had made military gains and were fighting in the vicinity of the Liberian capital, Monrovia. The combatants killed Liberian nationals and foreigners indiscriminately, they particularly targeted civilians. These events resulted in a massive refugee problem as thousands of civilians fled to neighboring countries. The county's security further worsened when the commander of the advance unit of the NPFL Prince Yormie Johnson, revolted against Charles Taylor and formed his own armed movement. These events weakened president Doe's capacity to protect life and property, enforce law and order, or even to carry out the normal routine of administration.[51]

Under the devastating situation, president Doe called on ECOWAS to assist him to restore normality in his country. Doe's government was unpopular at home and was at the verge of military defeat. Further, Doe on one hand was in bad terms with his neighbors particularly Côte d'lvoire, an influential country among Francophone members of the Community, while on the other hand was a friend of General Ibrahim Babaginda, the president of Nigeria and the most powerful country in the Community.[52]

Liberia's request for assistance split the community; the Francophone countries were opposed to military intervention preferring dialogue and negotiations instead, while the Anglophone countries, led by Nigeria, were prepared to assist. In 1990, the Anglophone countries under the auspices of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee met in Banjul, the capital of The Gambia and took a decision to send a military force to intervene in the conflict in Liberia. A move that was justified by Salim Ahmed Salim, the then Secretary-General of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) in stating that: "Africans are one people. It is hence unacceptable that a

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[51] Roland Paris: *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), 15.
[52] Ibid

part of that people should stand in silence and in seeming helplessness when another part is suffering." The Francophone members of the Community except Guinea were opposed to the military intervention.[53]

The intervention force was dabbed ECOMOG and troops were contributed by Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, and The Gambia. The force was placed under the command of a Ghanaian general, while the bulk of the land and naval forces and the entire air force was contributed by Nigeria. The force's mandate was to create an environment that will allow humanitarian operations, and to secure a peaceful atmosphere that will facilitate cease-fire negotiations.[54]

Upon landing in Liberia, ECOMOG forces quickly secured the Freeport in Monrovia with the co-operation of Prince Yormie Johnson and President Samuel Doe and his Armed Forces of Liberia. NPFL opposed the force, accusing it from its inception of a lack of neutrality. Yormie Johnson and President Doe each welcomed ECOMOG with a view to use it to advance his own political objectives. While Doe wanted the force to restore his political authority, which would involve military action against Charles Taylor and Prince Yormie Johnson. Prince Yormie Johnson, on the other hand, wanted the force to relieve the military pressure on him from Taylor's forces, giving him the opportunity to reorganize and consolidate while waiting for an opportune moment to eliminate both President Doe and Charles Taylor.

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[53] Fumni Olonisakin, "Conflict and Conflict Resolution", in *Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa*, Patrick McGowan and Phillip Nel, *eds*. (UCT Press: Cape Town, 2002), 243.

[54] Vanessa Kent and Mark Malan, "The African Standby Force: Progress and Prospects", *African Security Review* 12/3 (2003), p. 73.

2.5.Past efforts to create a Conflict Resolution Mechanism in the sub-Region by ECOWAS

As already stated in chapter one, ECOWAS was founded to promote economic cooperation and integration among member states. Upon realization that peace could not be achieved amidst endless conflict that the region was experiencing, ECOWAS took an additional mandate to prevent, manage, and support the resolution of conflicts in the region. A mandate that saw the organization play a mediation role in the conflicts in the region and one that culminated to peacekeeping operations in a number of West African countries.

To understand the peacekeeping strategies employed in the region by ECOWAS, it was important to give the history of conflict in the region as presented in the introduction to help in outlining the root causes of the conflicts. The root causes of conflict are better understood by undertaking a contextual analysis of the economic interests at stake.[55]The peculiar nature of African conflicts requires a rapid, responsive, robust, and neutral standby force with adequate resources and deterrence capabilities. The focus of the response to the conflicts should be on conflict prevention by timely deployment of multinational forces to potential trouble spots in the sub-region.[56]

In Erskine examination of the experiences of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Chad and ECOWAS in Liberia against the backdrop of UN peacemaking experiences since 1948 and contends that peacekeeping forces will be required in Africa for some time to come, since most of the factors generating interstate and intrastate insecurity are endemic on the continent and may continue to persist for some time.[57] He further suggests that the African Union (AU), and the

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[55]Richard, Amponsem-Boateng, Maj. 2006. "Prospects of the economic community of West African states standby force." Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
[56]Audu, JE, Maj. 2006. *Conflict resolution in Africa*: *The need for a standby force*. Thesis, Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Jaji, Kaduna.
[57]Richard, Amponsem-Boateng, Maj. 2006. "Prospects of the economic community of West African states standby force." Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS should assume more responsibility in the management of conflict since the UN and non-African members of the international community are allegedly suffering from African peacekeeping fatigue.[58]

The end of the Cold War witnessed intensification of intrastate conflicts in the West Africa sub-region. Prior to this era, the West African sub-regional body, ECOWAS, had used traditional conflict resolution mechanisms to resolve conflicts. Notwithstanding the traditional mechanisms, ECOWAS deployed ECOMOG to Liberia in August 1990 to dampen the conflict.[59]

According to Berman and Sams ECOWAS peace initiatives are arguably deeply flawed, they argue that the organization lacks an institutionalized Crisis Prevention and Management Mechanism (CPMM). Citing ECOMOG intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone, they argue that there was no formal decision-making mechanism to intervene.[60] The lack of a formal decision-making mechanism and the willingness of ECOWAS to retroactively authorize the use of force have raised questions about who controls ECOMOG.[61]

While African interventions can make a useful contribution in conflict resolution, there are also many pitfalls.[62] He notes that the trend towards greater regional intervention was most evident in four countries: Burundi, Ivory Coast, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo; all of these interventions were prompted by conflict that caused massive suffering to civilian

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[58] Ibid

[59]William, Agyapong, Maj. 2005. "*Military intervention in intrastate conflicts in West Africa*: Economic community of West African states monitoring group as a case study." Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

[60]Berman, Eric G., and Katie E. Sams. 1998. *Limitations of African peacekeeping efforts*. In Monograph No 33: Constructive disengagement – Western efforts to develop African peacekeeping. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

[61] Ibid

[62]Nowrojee Binaifer. 2004. "Africa on its own: Regional intervention and human rights." *Human Rights Watch World Report*.

populations yet, their human rights component remained negligible.[63] Despite the human rights violation in the Burundi, the peacekeeping mission remained silent on civilian protection but instead placed emphasis on protecting government buildings, facilitating rebel demobilization, and paving way for the election in 2004.[64] In the same spirit, the ECOWAS-brokered Liberian peace agreement did not establish any justice mechanism to address crimes committed during the war. The same silence on civilian protection is seen in Ivory Coast where despite international recognition of the serious abuses that took place during the conflict, no significant steps were taken to bring perpetrators of abuses to justice.[65]

2.6. ECOWAS Collective Security Mechanism

Experiences in West Africa underscored the need for ECOWAS to pursue a security agenda to ensure peace and security in the region as a development program. To achieve peace and stability entrenchment of good governance and democracy in a region is essential. Despite the enormous difficulty bedeviling the region, the West African peoples continue to manifest their determination to build new, open societies founded on the values of democratic accountability, respect for human rights and the rule of law. Past ECOWAS peace initiatives encountered many challenges, and thus failed to achieve the much needed stability. The operations were run almost entirely by the military, and were set up largely by military governments making it difficult to sell its achievements. As a result, there was little public understanding of the Force's mandate, and ECOMOG received much bad press while the chief villain of the Liberian tragedy, Charles

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[63] Ibid
[64] Ibid
[65] Ibid

Taylor, effectively utilized the international media to undermine ECOMOG and project himself as a victorious liberator.[66]

In the context of the challenges ECOMOG experienced in their earlier interventions where member states took sides with factions in the conflict that the idea of the ESF – which later became an integrated force undergoing joint training, with quotas set for each member state – was born.

The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, adopted by ECOWAS in 1999, is the Organization's constitution on collective security in the West African sub-region. It is the main legal framework within which the sub-regional Organization's involvement in collective security must be regulated; the Mechanism embodies detailed and comprehensive provisions and structures. The Mechanism empowers ECOWAS to intervene in internal conflicts of member states, contrary to its traditional principle of non-intervention an action that can be triggered, not only by massive violation of human rights, but also by the breakdown of the rule of law.[67]

The substantive regulation of peace and security of the West African sub-region by ECOWAS is outlined in the Mechanism. Chapter I of the Mechanism introduces the Protocol in clear terms: "There is hereby established within the ECOWAS, a mechanism for collective security and peace to be known as "Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security".[68] Chapter II deals with various organs of the Mechanism that have authority to implement relevant provisions of the Protocol. Under Chapter VI of the Mechanism;

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[66]Report of ECOWAS workshop.Koffi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, Accra, Ghana.
[67]Ademola, Abass. 2000. "The new collective security mechanism of ECOWAS: Innovations and problems." *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 5, no. 2: 211-229.
[68]ECOWAS 1999. "Protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace-keeping, and security." http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity _to_union/ECOWAS.html

"Member States agree to make available to the ESF adequate resources from the army, navy, gendarme, police, and all other military and paramilitary or civil formations necessary for the accomplishment of the mission".[69] Not only does the new Protocol establish a standing force, but it also goes further to spell out its role under the new dispensation. It is charged, among other things, with the task of observing and monitoring, peacekeeping and restoration of peace, enforcement of sanctions, including embargo, preventive deployment, peace-building, disarmament and demobilization, policing activities including the control of organized fraud and crime, and any other operations as may be mandated by the Mediation and Security Council (MSC).

The military vision of ECOWAS is anchored on the need to:

> Define, build, organize, and maintain an ECOWAS stand-by regional military capability in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance to a level of self-sustenance in the in the areas of troops and logistics support in order to respond to internal or external regional crises or threats to peace and security, including terrorist and/or environmental threats.[70]

The ECOWAS Protocol, which legalizes the use of force in dealing with conflict within the sub-region, is in contravention with the provisions of collective security by regional organizations as contained in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. ECOWAS has demonstrated the willingness to depart from peacekeeping to peace enforcement operations without UN authorization.[71] Unlike the relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council under the UN Charter, there is no distinction between actions, which the Authority of Heads of State and Governments may take and those that the Mediation and Security Council could ordinarily take under the Mechanism.

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[69]Ibid
[70]ECOWAS Secretariat. 2004. *ECOWAS stand-by units: Proposed concept and structures*. Abuja, Nigeria.
[71]Dala, Mohammed Bala. 2007. *The ECOWAS standby force*: *Prospects and challenges for sub-regional security*. United Kingdom: Lancaster University.

Although the Authority of Heads of State and Governments is the primary organ responsible for the general direction and control of the Community, in Article VII of the Protocol it delegated all its power to the MSC.[72] The challenges associated with bringing multi-national forces together are many; differences in language, military culture, and training standard between member states among others continue to pose challenges to ECOWAS peace operations. Furthermore, ECOWAS has a limited ability to mobilize adequate resources and sustain a high level of operational readiness.

2.7.International Community reaction to ECOWAS Peace Initiatives

An examination of various regional conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa by Magosi supports the assertion that African leaders have shown willingness to contribute towards a better Africa through commitment of forces at various levels, he however adds that without international assistance, the dream of a peaceful Africa will never come true.

> For this reason, the G8 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) leaders made a commitment to develop African capacity to promote peace and security through development of a Joint Africa/ G8 Plan to mobilize technical and financial assistance that will give Africa the ability to engage more effectively in peace support operations by 2010. Toward that end military assistance continues to be provided bilaterally and at regional levels.[73]

France through a program called Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) is offering training to soldiers, while Great Britain is contributing through developing African military staff colleges into regional peacekeeping centers of excellence. Britain also provides military advisory and training teams (BMATT) that are based in Zimbabwe for the Southern Africa region and based in Ghana for the West African region. United States

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[72]Ademola, Abass. 2000. "The new collective security mechanism of ECOWAS: Innovations and problems." *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 5, no. 2: 211-229.
[73]Magosi, Peter, Col. 2007. "*What are the challenges facing the future of African Standby Force*?" Thesis, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

provides training and long-term capacity building programs through the Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCET) Program, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, and the African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS).

Canada through the Canada-West Africa Peace and Security Initiative has contributed $4.5 million over three years to ECOWAS with an aim of enhancing ECOWAS capacity to manage peace support operations, to support the creation of a regional small arms unit within ECOWAS, and to assist in the creation of a scholarship fund to facilitate regional participation in peacekeeping training at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana.[74]

As describe above, international support for ECOWAS operations has varied over time. The late Maxwell Khobe, former Nigerian Army General and one-time Chief of Defense Staff, Republic of Sierra Leone, opined that although the Francophone countries of Africa were opposed to military intervention in Liberia in 1990, the United States supported the initiative of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, which favored the deployment of ECOMOG. He suggested that the United States then assisted ECOMOG operations, through a private company, Pacific Architect Engineers (PAE), with transport helicopter services, communication facilities, vehicles, and general repairs and maintenance.[75]

The international community response to African conflicts has sometimes been disappointing, as was the case in the Liberian civil war of 2003. Given the historic ties between Liberia and the United States, it seemed obvious that the US would be the first country to lead an international

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[74] British Broadcasting Company. 2004. *Profile of the African union*.
[75] Khobe, Maxwell. 2000. "The evolution and conduct of ECOMOG operations in West Africa." In Monograph No. 44 "Boundaries of peace support operations." http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/ECOWAS.html

peacekeeping mission, yet the U.S. refused to assume responsibility to end the crisis in Liberia. It was only after much debate that the U.S. made a weak, largely symbolic intervention; by sending some 2,000 U.S. Marines stationed on vessels off-shore, with a mere 200 landing in Monrovia. The landing of the 200 troops was only after ECOMOG had taken control of Monrovia

2.8. Conclusion
In conclusion, there have certainly been notable shifts in the peacebuilding debates. Literature reviewed in this chapter has shown that liberal peace has come under constant pressure from both critiques and failures in practice that has resulted in pragmatic shifts, to some extent towards pro-poor and emancipatory engagement with local populations. Even after the review of the literature, there seems to be no consensus of what peacebuilding is and what purpose does it serve.

The process through which good life is attained is a function of debates and policy frameworks dominated by specific capitalist interests represented as shared, inevitable, commonsensical or the only available option when they correspond to the prevailing mode of ownership. In essence, economic wisdom resides with the 'who is who' in the society. As Murphy contends, political inequality leaves many with no control over the major decisions that affect their lives.[76]Cox, view that whereas the *right* of self-assertion is celebrated, in a social and economic context the individual's capacity to exert control over the systemic factors that determine its *implementation* is removed in agreement with Murphy's position.

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[76]Craig Murphy, *Global Institutions, Marginalization, and Development*, Routledge, 2005, esp. ch.6.

CHAPTER THREE

CONTEXTUALIZATION ECOMOG INTERVENTION IN THE WEST AFRICAN STATES

3.0. Introduction

The previous chapter presented a theoretical perspective to peacekeeping and the birth of a regional conflict resolution force in West Africa. This chapter contextualizes ECOMOG intervention highlighting its weaknesses and challenges. In addition, the successes of ECOMOG are also presented in this chapter.

3.1. ECOMOG Military Interventions

The birth of ECOMOG and its operations have been seen as a positive contribution to the West African sub-regional body in its effort at resolving intra-state conflicts. Ricardo hails the ECOWAS move in using ECOMOG to intervene in intra-state conflicts.[77] He contends that it is only the creation of effective security arrangements for conflict resolutions that could ensure Africa's stability and development.[78] He further opines that developed countries are no longer willing to directly contribute troops as part of military intervention forces in Africa.[79] He suggests that the U.S and France's proposal of ACRI and *Renforcement des Capacities Africanes de Maintien de la Paix* (RECAMP), respectively, are indirect ways of asking the African continent to be ready to resolve its own conflicts, of a way of supporting Africa's quest to resolve its own conflict. The programs by the US and France were aimed at training selected African militaries to improving their capacity at peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Laremont

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[77] Laremont, Ricardo R. 2002. *The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa*. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
[78] Ibid
[79] Ibid

argues that despite the initial problems of ECOMOG in Liberia in 1990, the intervention force has become a model for all subregions to emulate.[80]

Liberian conflict was an off-shoot of the demise of the Cold War in which about 200,000 civilians died and 1.2 million[81] people were displaced, out of a prewar population of 2.5 million. The creation of ECOMOG is also seen as an emerging indigenous African peacekeeping capability[82], "Managing Chaos in the West African Subregion: Assessing the Role of ECOMOG in Liberia."

3.2.Weaknesses in ECOMOG Operations

This section addresses weaknesses in ECOMOG operations

3.2.1.Institutional Structures

ECOWAS was originally formed to promote economic cooperation between member states. The member states vested authority on ECOWAS that provided for the necessary institutions to fulfill its goal as a regional economic organization in West Africa.[83] At the beginning of the Liberian conflict, ECOWAS opted to deviate from economic to dealing with security issues on the premise that security is a function in regional economic development. it is however important to note that at initiation, ECOWAS did not foresee itself engaging in regional conflict and as such was ill prepared for this task. Until the creation of ECOMOG in 1990, ECOWAS was unable to reach a regional consensus on the establishment of an institutionalized sub-regional organ for security issues and conflict management; this partly was due to the fact that its charter lacked the

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[80] Ibid

[81] Adebajo, Adekeye. 2002a. *Building Peace in West Africa*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

[82]Dramaini, Rasheed, and Carment David. 2001.Managing Chaos in the West African Subregion: Assessing the Role of ECOMOG in Liberia, N0 26-2001. Ottawa, Ontario: Centre for Security and Defense Studies.

[83] Economic Community of West African States Charter ,

<http:// www.sec.ecowas.int/sitecedeao/english/ap101299.htm>

legal prerogative permitting it to intervene in the internal affairs of member states. On the premise of the forgoing reason, the deployment of armed forces in Liberia by ECOWAS was considered by the francophone member states as violation of its organizational charter and, thus, an illegal extension of its mandate. ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was therefore not supported by all the states in the sub-region, and the states that supported were experiencing economic challenges thus making the financial support of the ECOMOG difficult to sustain.

Until the creation of ECOMOG, ECOWAS did not have a special institution within itself to financially support actions related to security. Additionally, member states did not pay their contributions regularly leading to financial insufficiency for ECOWAS to sustain its normal activities. Due to lack of institutional structures, ECOWAS improvised a shaky series of ad hoc structure to deal with security issues, including the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), the ECOMOG, the Special Emergency Fund, and later the Committees of Five, and Nine.[84] At its inception, the SMC was composed of Ghana, Gambia, Mali, Nigeria and Togo. SMC was assigned the mission to mediate the Liberian conflict and address other regional security issues. Over time, the SMC became the only institution within ECOWAS to monitor the implementation of ECOWAS peace processes and, consequently, played an active role in managing the deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia.

Representatives of ECOWAS in Liberia were entrusted with all administrative and financial tasks, though the command of the forces on the ground was assigned to the Force Commander. To give more credibility to the improvised structure of ECOMOG, at the same time temporarily decreasing the dominant role of Nigeria, the SMC decided that the command of forces would be

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[84] Klaas Van Walraven:*Containing conflict in ECONOMIC Community of West African States: Lessons from the intervention in Liberia 1990-1997.*< http://www.clingendael.nl/cru/pdf/ecomog.pdf>

established in such a way that the contributing countries could play a more significant role. On that understanding the Force Commander's role was entrusted to Ghana, the deputy force commander's role to Guinea, and the chief of staff's role to Nigeria. The SMC stipulated that "the commander was to have full command authority over ECOMOG, which he would derive from the chairman of the ECOWAS Authority through the Executive Secretary."[85]

Discord among the member states of ECOWAS as to the appropriate role of various organs within the structure contributed to most shortcoming and difficulties related to the management of ECOMOG. Additionally, the political and legal advisory positions in ECOMOG were not filled due to financial difficulties. [86]Therefore, deficiencies at the structural level often exacerbated the dominance within ECOMOG of a single country. Berman and Sams, capitalizing on the lack of a functioning security framework, contend that Nigeria pushed through the creation of an entirely new structure-one that would better serve its purposes, the Authority's decision to establish the SMC with a very broad mandate, and to make Nigeria a member of that body provided Lagos with an opportunity to influence ECOWAS policy on Liberia.[87] The ad hoc structure of ECOMOG made it not to function effectively thereby making the SMC, acting under the influence of Nigeria, continue to be the sole authority supervising ECOMOG's deployment in Liberia.

The ECOMOG deployment in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau was without structures making it a subject to abuse and manipulation by some of its member states. For example, the ECOMOG forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone were dominated by Nigeria, and thus causing a

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[85] Ibid
[86] Eric G.Berman & Katie E. Sams: *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*. (Geneva, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000) ,107
[87] Ibid

lack of sub regional unity and depriving the force of important legitimacy in fulfilling its tasks,[88] while that Guinea Bissau, under a Togolese commander, reported directly to the Togolese leader Gnassingbe Eyadema, the ECOWAS chairman.[89]

3.2.2. Operational challenges

Assessment of the efficiency of ECOMOG as a regional peacekeeping and peace enforcement force can be premised upon its operational performance with the key pointers including in its ability to ensure a favorable environment for political resolution of the three civil wars; its propensity to decrease violence; its ability to monitor ceasefires and its ability to deal impartially with all parties in a conflict. Initially, ECOMOG entered Liberia to monitor the ceasefire between fighting factions. However, ECOMOG was attacked when they landed in Liberia by the NPFL, who then controlled almost all of the country outside the capital city. This unexpected action made ECOMOG to transform from being mere monitor of ceasefire to peace enforcer a move that was literally beyond its means at the time, due primarily to the lacks of having sufficient troops on the ground and enough expertise.

When President Doe was captured by the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) in ECOMOG headquarters, the situation grew worse. To repulse NPFL forces and create a buffer zone around the capital ECOMOG allied itself with the INPFL and the AFL. The move to ally itself with factions was a clear demonstration of its inability to deal with the factions neutrally.

In its structure, ECOMOG was designed in such a way as to accommodate the interest of all contributing countries. Operationally their seemed to be challenges in the assignments; for

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[88] Adekeye Adebajo: *Building Peace in West Africa*, (London: Boulder, 2002), 82.
[89] Ibid

instance, all forces were formally under the authority of the Forces Commander and was the sole authority, designating the sectors of the mission area to the respective contingents yet within this structure, each country's contingent maintained its own command structure under its Contingent Commander. The presence of two chains of command was in itself a challenge that caused enormous operational difficulties. The contingent commander could not make decisions, or take part in combat or offensive operations, without the approval of his home government. In essence, before any tactical decision could be implemented by ECOMOG, each contingent commander had to consult his own government, resulting in delays in implementation of missions, thereby reducing their effectiveness on the ground. The high level of control from the contributing country meant that the contingent commander was not absolutely answerable to the force commander; this often resulted in disciplinary problems and jeopardizing ECOMOG's act as a unified force.[90]

Guttieri[91] contends that the troops from contributing countries often served under vastly different conditions. He further adds that a discrepancy in the quality of supplies, wages, and personal equipment was evident causing some peacekeeping troops to behave badly.

A military operation requires synchronicity and homogeneity for its success on the ground. Due to the fact that ECOMOG prior to deployment in Liberia, the contributing countries had never had a joint exercise as a single, cohesive force, it lacked the basic requirements for success. There were communications difficulties between Francophone and Anglophone forces, and an overall lack training in counterinsurgency.

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[90] Mitikishe Maxwell Khobe: *The evolution and control of ECOMOG operations in West Africa*, <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/ECOMOG.html>
[91] Karen Guttieri: *Civil-Military Relations in Peace building*. Sicherheitspolitik und Friedensforschunc, Vol 22.iss2, 2004.

In Sierra Leone ECOMOG suffered similar operational problems. In the framework of its peace enforcement mission, and in an attempt to secure the country, ECOMOG engaged in attacks against the AFRC and the RUF. Notwithstanding the deployment of thousands of troops "ECOMOG's ill-equipped peacekeepers were unable to defeat the AFRC/RUF alliance in a guerilla war in the densely forested countryside for which their conventional armies were not trained."[92] Eventually ECOMOG forces were pushed by the rebels back to Freetown where it has successfully removed the junta from power and restored the elected government, and a battle for control of the capital ensued.

On the tactical level, ECOMOG did not to apply the lessons of Liberia to Sierra Leone. Their inexperience was exacerbated in this case by inadequate knowledge of the forest terrain, and incapacity to counter the guerrilla tactics employed so efficiently by the RUF.[93] Mitikishe[94] adds that some contingents lacked motivation to engage in vigorous combat against the rebels, and insufficient allowances, low wages, and long periods of deployment led to low morale. Disciplinary issues related to poor living conditions were again in evidence. A significant number of officers were reportedly involved in the illicit diamond trade for personal gain.[95]Just like the situation in the Liberian intervention, coordination between forces was inefficient because of a diversity of equipment and doctrines. "Both Anglophone and Francophone

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[92] Adekeye Adebajo: *Liberia's Civil War Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa* (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers), 90.
[93] Mitikishe Maxwell Khobe: *The evolution and control of ECOMOG operations in West Africa*, <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/ECOMOG.html>
[94] Ibid
[95] Eric G.Berman & KatieE.Sams*: Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*. (Geneva, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000) ,107

countries failed to provide bilingual officers, and communication between national contingents was therefore often difficult."[96]

The situation in Guinea Bissau was different because the two parties to the conflict agreed in advance to the deployment of an ECOMOG force to monitor the cease-fire, and facilitate a formal end to the conflict. In a situation where there is agreement for deployment of missions, the prospects for success is more than where there is no prior agreement like was in the previous two missions. However, contrary to the expectation, ECOMOG forces failed to sustain the cease-fire, and its 600 troops were then unable to effectively carry out the mission. The speed of disarmament, and the control of the belligerents, was slow, which contributed to the resumption of violence between the two parties. While many countries had criticized the dominant role of Nigeria in Liberia and Sierra Leone, its absence from the intervention in Guinea Bissau meant that ECOMOG was unable to provide sufficient peacekeepers, leading to complete failure of the mission. Moreover, "without substantial French assistance, ECOWAS would have been hard-pressed to field ECOMOG force on its own."[97] Most ECOMOG operational shortcomings, witnessed were generated by the lack of homogeneity of forces and the deficiency of military professionalism. In addition, it was not well equipped to deal with peace operations in a hostile environment.

3.2.3. Logistical and Financial Problems

From the time of its initiation, ECOMOG lacked reliable financial and logistical support. The arrangement at the initial stages of ECOMOG was that each country had to support its troops for

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[96] Adekeye Adebajo: *Liberia's Civil War Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa* (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers), 91

[97] Eric G. Berman & Katie E.Sams*: Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*. (Geneva, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000) 133.

the first three months. ECOWAS had anticipated that three months was enough to consolidate funding to sustain the mission for the period of intervention. However, meeting this expectation was not possible for ECOWAS because most of ECOMOG's contributing countries had limited resources; therefore they were often unable to respond, even to the urgent needs of their own forces at home. ECOWAS member states were unable to sustain the high cost of military operations, this caused financial and logistical problems for ECOMOG operation. Contributing countries to ECOMOG continued to support their own forces due to lack of sustainable funding to support ECOMOG. The cost of the mission was borne mainly by Nigeria, because this country was the only country within ECOWAS that had, relatively speaking, adequate means and capacities to support such forces. In the absence of unified logistical structure, most of ECOMOG's other contingents suffered from logistical problems throughout the period of their deployment in Liberia, they depended on their own government for transportation, uniforms, foods, weapons and ammunition, although Nigeria provided all participants with fuel and lubricants. [98]

ECOMOG deployment in Sierra Leone was not any different; it faced similar challenges as those in Liberia. Financial and logistical deficiencies again like in Liberia kept ECOMOG from pursuing its mission of peace enforcement resulting in limited ECOMOG's effectiveness in the field. Contributing countries were also unable to cover the cost of the mission in Sierra Leone; once again ECOWAS was unable to fulfill its commitment to ensure adequate and permanent funding to sustain ECOMOG in the Sierra Leonean mission. Another difference of the Sierra Leonean mission form the Liberian mission was availability of the pledge from the UN and the international community even though this was not sufficient to respond to the increasing needs of ECOMOG to pursue its mission.

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[98] Ibid

During the Guinea Bissau conflict, ECOWAS adopted a different approach, ECOMOG delayed its intervention until the UN and the international community contributed financially to support its mission. However, despite the precaution, the deployment of ECOMOG in Guinea Bissau was very slow, and "repeated some of the mistakes of the Liberia and Sierra Leone interventions. The peacekeepers were logistically ill-equipped for the Guinea Bissau mission; the number of troops was grossly insufficient to maintain security in the country. Additionally, the funding for the mission depended entirely on France, which was an external power that had its own interest in the outcome of the conflict in Guinea-Bissau."[99]

3.3. Security Framework at Regional Level

The lack of a regional standing security framework equipped to deal with peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions at the time of intervention in the Liberian civil war was a significant weakness. At the time of Liberian intervention, the ECOWAS charter did not embrace any clear provisions dealing with security matters. The protocols adopted by ECOWAS previously lacked provisions for the prevention of conflict, were none operational and did not empower the organization to intervene in internal conflicts in this region:

1. The protocol of Non-Aggression adopted and signed in Lagos on April 22, 1978 mandated to ECOWAS member states not to use force in their interstate differences, but to solve their problems peacefully.[100]

2. The Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense, adopted and signed in Freetown, on May 29, 1981, stipulated, among other important propositions, that each state provide aid and assistance in cases where other states were subject to threat or aggression.

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[99]Adekeye Adebajo: *Building Peace in West Africa*, (London: Boulder, 2002), 82.
[100] The protocol of Non-Aggression of ECOWAS, < http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/ pdfs/ecowas/14ProtNonAggre.pdf,>

Despite this provision, at the inception of ECOMOG, it lacked structural organization, reliable budget earmarked for its missions, and ready trained forces to be deployed on the ground. The structure and composition of the forces were hastily made to respond to the Liberian crisis. The first contingents of ECOMOG were committed by member states of SMC, plus Sierra Leone and Guinea to anticipate the generation of forces. In the meantime the ECOWAS Authority explicitly appealed to other member states to contribute contingents in the course of intervention to participate in the force's operation.[101]

After deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia for seven years, it continued to be deployed in ad hoc manner in Guinea Bissau and Sierra Leone. Unfortunately, years after the creation of ECOMOG, ECOWAS had failed to learn from the Liberian experience. Consequently, it failed to establish a standing security framework with the necessary structure for the task at hand, thereby denying ECOMOG the needed capabilities to sustain the other two missions more efficiently.

3.4. Regional Politics and ECOMOG

Regional politics has since the advent of ECOMOG been an issue that influenced its operation.[102] Francophone countries in the region, such as Togo, Mali, Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso initially rejected the ECOWAS peace plan for Liberia and ironically supported one or another of the fighting factions, both militarily and politically. The political struggle between the Francophone and the Anglophones stems from the earliest days of the independence. This struggle has always been among the obstacles to the economic and political integration of this

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[101]Klaas van Walraven: *The pretence of Peace-keeping ECOMOG, West Africa and Liberia (1990-1998),* <http://www.clingendael.nl/cru/pdf/ecom.pdf>

[102] George Klay Kieh, Jr., "The Obstacles to the Peaceful Resolution of the Liberian Civil Conflict," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 17 (1994), pp. 97-108.

region, and has had a major influence on security issues in West Africa as well. The West Africa region is considered a zone of French influence, where the French still have vital interests and a conspicuous military presence. Many independent Francophone countries still depend on the French presence in the region for their own security, which often irritates Nigeria's sensitivities, and presents a challenge in its quest for regional hegemony.

Afraid of losing its influence in West Africa due to the increasing role of Nigeria, France instigated the rivalry between Francophone countries, led by Côte d'Ivoire, and Anglophone states, led by Nigeria. Accordingly, the political struggle between Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire for regional leadership became intense. The political rivalry between the Francophone and the Anglophones was fueled by the adoption of the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense by ECOWAS. Initially, some Francophone countries opposed the adoption of this protocol, "fearing the potentially overbearing influence of Nigeria."[103] For its part,"Nigeria regarded the protocol as a further chance to weaken France's grip on its former colonies by making them more dependent on Nigeria in the military sphere, as it has tried to do in the economic sphere through ECOWAS."[104]

The decision to create ECOMOG and intervene in Liberia fueled the political confrontation between the two blocs in general, and between Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire in particular. While the Nigeria supported the military intervention, Côte d'Ivoire advocated for a diplomatic process. When the SMC made the decision to intervene in Liberia, the dominance of Anglophone countries in ECOMOG, along with the commitment of Nigeria to solve the Liberian crisis by military means, further inflamed regional rivalries and suspicions.

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[103] Adekeye Adebajo: *Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa* (London, Lynne Riennier Publishers, 2002), 35
[104] Ibid

TheFrancophone countries were apprehensive that Nigeria, among the leading English-speaking countries in the SMC, would impose its hegemony over the entire region. There was no agreement within the region about the preferable outcome of the conflict in Liberia.

This division had very serious repercussions not only for the performance of ECOMOG in Liberia, but also its stance as a neutral force working to restore peace to the beleaguered country. Howe contends that political tensions and ineffectiveness within regional organizations like ECOWAS are often a reflection of linguistic and political rivalries.[105]In the ECOWAS case Mortimer argues that "the multilateral, but Nigerian-dominated force is more a classic study of competing national interests in the West African sub-region than a case study in regional peacekeeping."[106] Within ECOWAS two sub-regional cleavages – the Francophone/Anglophone divide – and Nigeria's quest for hegemony created difficulties for ECOMOG.[107]

The Francophone countries in West Africa as noted above opposed the intervention in Liberia, which they viewed as a tool for furthering Anglophone domination in the region, further, they argued that the Anglophone bloc had not allowed enough time for the political option, preferring, instead, the use of force in order to press the fighting parties into a peace process brokered by ECOWAS. According to de Costa, the Francophone countries saw the ECOWAS Peace Plan as an "Anglophone road show."[108] Consequently, the two leading Francophone countries in West Africa – the Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso – covertly supported Taylor's NPFL. Burkina Faso has been alleged to have supplied arms to Taylor's rebels while the Ivory Coast is said to have

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[105] Ibid
[106] Robert Mortimer, "ECOMOG, Liberia, and Regional Security," in *Africa in the New International Order,* Ed Keller and Don Rothchild, eds., (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 162.
[107] George Klay Kieh, Jr., "The Obstacles to the Peaceful Resolution of the Liberian Civil Conflict," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 17 (1994), pp. 97-108.
[108] Peter de Costa, "Confused State," *West Africa,* 1-7 October 1990, p. 255.

allowed the rebels free transit across its border into Nimba County in Liberia.[109] Wippman, contends that attempts made in 1990 to place the Liberian crisis on the Security Council's agenda failed, partly because of the Ivory Coast's opposition and partly because the Council members shared the US view that the problem should be solved by Africans.[110] For instance, on 13 August 1990, in a terse message to ECOWAS members, President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso declared his country's "total disagreement" with the intervention stating that the SMC had "no competence to interfere in member-states' internal conflicts, but only in conflicts breaking out between member-countries." He cautioned of "an eventual expansion of the internal conflict, which could break out among member countries if an intervention force is sent to Liberia against the will of the Liberian people."[111] Côte d'Ivoire's and Burkina Faso's continued to support of the NPFL to sustain the conflict, and undermined ECOWAS efforts to bring the main fighting parties to the negotiation table early in the intervention. Lack of political agreements within ECOWAS prevented a number of member states from contributing forces to the ECOMOG, or financially supporting the mission in Liberia. The lack of political consensus with regard to the Liberian crisis also prevented ECOMOG from building an adequate environment for political resolution of civil war in this country.

Therefore, without full political support and unity of purpose from the members of the sub-regional organization, the diplomatic initiative of ECOWAS was destined to encounter serious difficulties as it did. In Sierra Leone, the political rivalry was less pronounced, despite disagreement on the use of the military option against the AFRC/RUF, by Nigeria's unilateral

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[109] Herbert Howe, "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping," *International Security* 21:3 (Winter 1997), pp. 145-176

[110] David Wippman, "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War," in *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts,* Lori F. Damrosch, ed., (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), p. 165.

[111] BBC Monitoring Report, 15 August 1990, "Report: Taylor to Visit Banjul; Burkinabe Leader Rejects ECOWAS Intervention, 13 August 1990," cited in Weller, *Regional Peace-Keeping and International Enforcement*, p. 85.

attempt, to drive the junta out of power. Notwithstanding the opposition of Burkina Faso, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia to the Sierra Leone mission, unlike the Liberian intervention, there was a relative degree of political consensus upon the Sierra Leonean crisis, among ECOWAS member states regarding the ECOMOG mandate. For a while, this political consensus was threatened because of the ambivalence role of Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso and the Nigerian's unilateral action upon the interpretation of the ECOMOG mandate, but that changed with the political development in Nigeria.[112]

In Guinea Bissau there was evidence for the first time of regional consensus. The consensus was apparently reached due to the fact that the political rivalry between Anglophone and Francophone countries had been improving in the years immediately preceding the conflict; the region was already suffering from protracted conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, where the antagonism between the two blocs made resolution to the crises difficult; the negative consequences associated with the continual competition between the two sides were apparent to the member states of ECOWAS, as a result, they had joined in the effort to mediate between the belligerents, with hopes of convincing them of the necessity of reaching a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The majority of member states of ECOWAS condemned both the coup attempt and the unilateral military interventions of Senegal and Guinea by Nigeria. The political rivalry between the two blocs was also attenuated by the fact that lusophone Guinea Bissau belonged to neither of the two main linguistic blocs. Additionally, the active role played by Portugal and other Portuguese-speaking countries in brokering a peace plan for Guinea Bissau, pressed ECOWAS member states to reach a consensus in order to prevent external powers from

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[112] Eric G.Berman & KatieE.Sams: *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*. (Geneva, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000) ,90.

intervening in their region. Finally, the volatility of the West Africa subregion and the threat of contagion to other countries, prompted ECOWAS member states to address this conflict before the regional security situation deteriorated further.

3.5. The Peacemaking Challenges ECOMOG Faced in its Operation

During the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia, the main problem it faced was the proliferation of fighting factions. During the first five years of ECOMOG's intervention, ECOWAS sponsored a series of peace agreements, all of which ultimately failed due to ECOMOG's inability to deal impartially with different factions in the conflict.

As political stand-off and military stalemate continued to block efforts to resolve the conflict, with new warring movements emerged, driven by looting and illegal exploitation of natural resources. The mission became overloaded with the responsibility of securing a fragmented country that was under the control of many warlords. ECOMOG did not achieve its original goal of defeating the main faction, nor did it succeed in convincing the parties to the conflict to adhere to a peace pact. ECOMOG's failure to attain peace in Liberia prompted the joining of the United Nations after the Cotonou Peace Agreement of July 1993, sponsored by ECOWAS. The Security Council, through Resolution 866, established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). The collaborative effort was established to aid in supervising and monitoring the implementation of the signed peace plans, and to restore ECOMOG's neutrality and legitimacy. The United Nations was invited to join the search for peace effort in Liberia only after ECOWAS had failed to make any appreciable progress towards conflict resolution.[113]

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[113] Clement Adibe: the Liberian conflict and the ECOWAS partnership. The third World Quarterly, Vol 18. No3, pp 471- 488, 1997.

ECOMOG's approach in the Liberian crisis by bringing the fighting elements under control was fruitless. On regular occasions, peace plans were violated by the fighting parties because of the presence of "spoilers." The criminal exploitation of natural resources had flourished, existing in a climate of competition between the warlords during the civil war in Liberia. Each fighting movement aimed at building more strength in order to eliminate the others, and in order to realize a comfortable position during the negotiation over power. Based on the aims of the fighting movements, a race toward the capture of more exploited resources became an incentive to continue to "spoil" all peace plans that did not correspond to the aspiration of the fighting parties. As the conflict advanced, the ambition of most of the Liberian fighting factions was the rise to power by the means of fighting. This circumstances precipitated complexities in much of ECOWAS' peacemaking actions as is usually the case when disputes are over power and resources.[114]

With the continued frustration in attainment of peace in Liberia, ECOMOG changed tactics by allowing the warlords to serve on the Council of State without being disqualified from contesting elections.[115] At the regional level, the change of tact was tied to the domestic political situation in some contributing countries of ECOMOG. "Some of the participant countries, including Ghana and Nigeria, began to show some political fatigue with regard to continuing the intervention and finding a mediated solution."[116]

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[114] Ricardo R. 2002. *The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa*, 143-169, (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1997)

[115] Adekeye Adebajo: *Liberia's Civil War Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West* Africa.(London, Lynne Rienner Publishers.), 155.

[116] Klaas van Walraven: *The pretence of Peace-keeping ECOMOG, West Africa and Liberia (1990-1998),* <http://www.clingendael.nl/cru/pdf/ecom.pdf>

Following the Abuja peace agreement sponsored by the UN and ECOWAS, and signed on August 19, 1995, a cease-fire was reached between the different factions. The peace accord marked the beginnings of the resolution of Liberian civil war. Accordingly ECOMOG and UNOMIL were deployed throughout the country to monitor the cease-fire and disarm the combatants.[117]

The provision of the Abuja agreement broadened the responsibilities of ECOMOG, particularly in calling for it to disarm and demobilize fighters throughout the Liberian territory. Implementation of this agreement required more peacekeepers on the ground. As the political situation in Liberia evolved, the UN became more involved in the conflict. Alongside the ECOMOG forces three hundred UN peacekeepers were deployed to supervise the cease-fire and peace process until the execution of the legislative and presidential elections. After this agreement, ECOMOG succeeded to a great extent in disarming and demobilizing fighters by collecting massive quantities of weapons.

In Sierra Leone contrary to the Liberian approach, ECOMOG tried to negotiate with the AFRC/RUF for the settlement of the conflict via political means before resorting to the use of force. The diplomatic approach failed prompting the intervention of Nigeria on June 1, 1997, who equally failed to drive the junta out of power. After the failed attempt by Nigeria, ECOWAS, with the cooperation of the OAU, convened a meeting on 26 June 1997, in Guinea upon the Sierra Leonean crisis, following the degradation of the security situation in this country. During this meeting, member states of ECOWAS reached a consensus about the Sierra Leonean crisis and called for the reinstatement of the legitimate government, the initiation of a dialogue with the rebels, the imposition of sanctions and enforcement of an embargo, and the use of force

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[117] Klaas van Walraven: *The pretence of Peace-keeping ECOMOG, West Africa and Liberia (1990-1998),* <http://www.clingendael.nl/cru/pdf/ecom.pdf>

in case of non-compliance. With the failure of the diplomatic efforts tension in the country escalated prompting Nigeria to intervene militarily for a second time in February 1998, and succeeded to oust the AFRC/RUF from power.

After the reinstatement of the elected president, the UN became actively involved in this conflict: "in June 1998, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for an initial period of six months. With Special Envoy named as Special Representative and Chief of Mission.[118] ECOMOG was mandated by the UN to remain in the country in order to deploy its own forces to secure the countryside and contribute alongside the UNOMSIL in disarming and demobilizing combatants, as well as forming and training the new Sierra Leonean army. Fighting continued with the rebel forces in the hinterlands despite being overthrown from power. To secure the country, ECOMOG engaged in offensive attacks against the AFRC and the RUF in attempt to secure the country.

In the Guinea Bissau case, ECOWAS attempted to mediate between the two belligerents in order to solve the conflict following the outbreak of violence. ECOWAS efforts were diluted by external mediation efforts. "Following consultations with the lusophone CPLP, consisting of Portugal, Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Mozambique, São Tome and Principé, Guinea Bissau's warring factions signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a Portuguese frigate, Corte-Real, on 26 July 1998 calling for withdrawal of Senegalese and Guinean troops from Guinea-Bissau and their replacement by military observers from lusophone states."[119] ECOWAS reacted by holding a meeting in Abuja on November 1st, 1998 to negotiate a cease-fire between the two antagonists, and brokering a peace plan for the conflict. The resolution in the meeting forced

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[118] Adekeye Adebajo: *Liberia's Civil War Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West* Africa.(London, Lynne Rienner Publishers.), 155.
[119] Ibid

president Joao Bernardo Vieira and General Mane to sign a peace agreement that called for a cease-fire, the establishment of a unified national government, ordering the withdrawal of Senegal and Guinea's military forces from the country and a simultaneous call came for the deployment of ECOMOG.

In Guinea Bissau therefore, ECOWAS mediation successfully negotiated a cease-fire and a peace accord between the belligerents. It also mandated ECOMOG to interpose its own forces in a mission of peacekeeping. Despite the efforts of ECOWAS to resolve this conflict, just like in the Liberian and Sierra Leone cases financial and logistical hardships again prevented the successful implementation of the peace process. In addition to the burden being borne by ECOMOG simultaneously in Liberia and Sierra Leone, their mission in Guinea Bissau became overwhelmed, prompting its premature withdrawal from Guinea Bissau without achieving all of its assigned goals.

3.6.International Cooperation in the West African Peacemaking Process

Following the failure and frustration of ECOMOG in Liberia and the demonstrated interest of African countries to handle regional security issues, the international community has become increasingly involved in the training and the equipment of African forces for peacekeeping missions.

> USA, the UK and France joined efforts in order to help build African capabilities in peace operations, with the cooperation of the UN. In May 1997, they announced their "P-3 Initiative, which sought to begin dialogue with African countries as to how to best promote peace and security on the continent."[120]

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[120] Eric G .Berman and Katie E.Sams :*Keeping the Peace in Africa.*
http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art129.pdf

In 1997, the USA set up the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) with an objective of enhancing the capacity of African nations to better perform peacekeeping and relief tasks thereby encourage regional self-reliance. This policy initiative aims at promoting common doctrine, interoperability and standard communications technology among African forces.[121]Simultaneously with the ACRI, the American Operation Focus Relief (OFR) program was created to contribute to the training of African forces to intervene in complex peace operations.

"OFR was more particularly a response to the needs of ECOWAS countries engaged in Sierra Leone through the ECOMOG force and the UN mission. France through the *Renforcement des Capacites Africaines de Maintien de la Paix* (RECAMP) program e was more active in training the military from many countries in Africa, particularly those that were Francophone. Côte d'Ivoire with French support has developed, a Peace-Keeping Training Center in Zambakro.*[122]*

3.7.The Success of ECOMOG

The notion that ECOMOG force has been relatively successful with its operations in the subregion is very controversial. Success, in this context, does not consider human rights issues that were leveled against the force. It also overlooks the time lapse between the initial entry and the exit of the force that spanned a period of over eight years (1990−1998) in the first Liberian operation. The success of ECOMOG has been seen in the light of the humanitarian catastrophes that were allegedly committed by the warring factions. ECOMOG helped to contain the conflict in the various battlefields even though there were some spillover effects into some neighboring countries in the subregion. ECOMOG's intervention efforts returned democratic rule to Liberia

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[121] US Department of state, African Crisis Response Initiative .
<http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/acri/fact0500.htm>
[122] Reinforcement of African Peace-keeping Capacities .
<htpp://www.un.int/france/frame_anglais/france_and_un/france_and_peacekeeping/recamp_eng.htm>.(

in 1997 when free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections saw Charles Taylor elected president.

Though the intervention in Sierra Leone did not resolve the crisis, the timely involvement of ECOMOG enabled the UN to smoothly take over the operations. Notwithstanding the fact that the entire subregion is relatively unstable due to turmoil in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone, no one knows what the situation would have been like in the subregion without the numerous ECOMOG operations in the past. Indeed, ECOMOG's objective in all these intervention operations has not been to resolve the conflict but to stop the humanitarian sufferings and create the conditions for a long-term political settlement peace. Since these were achieved in all the operations, ECOMOG can be said to have been successful. This probably justifies why the subregional body, ECOWAS, continues to employ it as part of its conflict resolution mechanisms.

3.8 Conclusion

The establishment of a peacekeeping-cum-peace enforcement capacity within ECOWAS gives practical expression to the co-operation envisaged by the UN. The ECOMOG interventions were fully endorsed, not just by an international community that could no longer find solutions to African conflicts, but by Africans who wanted to break the dependence on outside military assistance in responding to African conflicts. In the aftermath of Cold War interference by the major Western powers in Africa, the desire of Africans not only to keep their own peace, but to define their security apparatus is welcomed.

This chapter has presented an appraisal of ECOMOG, challenging assertions that it could be a model for Africa. It might be necessary to conclude on a more optimistic note, pointing to the

positive successes of ECOMOG. Leaving aside questions about the quality of the intervention and the peace and stability ECOMOG tried to achieve, ECOMOG did shed light on the potential for African regions to develop mechanisms for managing conflicts. As security in the 21st century will largely be an African responsibility, the advent of subregional conflict management in various parts of Africa should not be overlooked. ECOMOG has opened the door for Africans to determine the future of security; the task is for the rest of Africa to build upon its various trials and tribulations. However, it cannot be overstated that a degree of caution is needed by all who wish to promote ECOMOG as a model for Africa. Throughout its nine years of operating in difficult circumstances, the simple fact cannot be overlooked that ECOMOG fell victim to the geopolitical machinations of Nigeria, a powerful regional hegemon. Now that this hegemon has embarked on the road to democratisation, seasoned observers of ECOMOG can only hope that it uses ECOMOG as a 'force for good', not only in managing West African security dilemmas, but in informing other sub regional organizations as they attempt to respond to conflicts.

CHAPTER FOUR

JUSTIFICATION FOR POSSIBILITY OF ECOMOG BECOMING A STANDBY FORCE

4.0 Introduction

This chapter seeks to analyze the objectives outlined in chapter one. It will give analysis of why ECOWAS continues to employ ECOMOG in the West Africa sub-region; the possibility of the force becoming a stand by force and the policy implication of having the force in the sub-region.

4.1 Justification for continued deployment of ECOMOG by ECOWAS in West Africa

States are expected to protect their citizens against genocide or ethnic cleansing. Where a country is deemed to have failed in the provision of these basic human rights to its citizens then the doctrine of responsibility to protect is enforced. Military intervention in a sovereign country's internal conflict is a very sensitive subject that has attracted criticism and support in equal measure. Sovereignty has been used by critics to military intervention operations as a key blocking point. The threshold for outside intervention should be the grave breach of humanitarian law, such as genocide or ethnic cleansing according to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Military intervention should be enforced as a last resort by any regional body. Chapter VII of the UN Charter deals with "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of Peace, and Acts of Aggression."[123]Parts of the charter authorize the UN to undertake military intervention in situations where threats or breaches of peace exist in the face of humanitarian disaster. On some occasions, military intervention

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[123] African Union, *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and Military Staff Committee*, adopted by the African Chiefs of Defense Staff (Addis Ababa: Ethiopia, May 15-16, 2003), p. 3.

operations have been carried out where not only humanitarian, but moral and ethical issues were at stake as well. Other than the efforts by the UN to restore peace and order, some countries, like the US and regional bodies like NATO, have, on their own, intervened in conflict situations elsewhere operating under the banner of humanitarian crises and threat to stability and have been criticized by the international community for taking such actions.

ECOMOG interventions in the subregion, have not been spared either, in equal measure it has been criticized. Despite these criticisms, in addition to the challenges outlined in the previous chapter, ECOWAS continued to deploy ECOMOG on four subsequent intervention operations in the subregion after the initial one in Liberia. A number of factors have been cited as reasons for this continued employment.

After the US's experience in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope where nineteen US soldiers lost their lives, the will to participate directly in African conflicts by the developed countries subsided. The Somalia incident prompted the US to review circumstances that could enable it to be directly involved in intervention operations outside their country. This review resulted in President Clinton in May 1994signing Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which established strict conditions for US participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions.[124] The events in Somalia have been cited as one of the factors that have forced ECOWAS to continue using military intervention operations in the subregion. These events negatively influenced the international community response to Rwanda's conflict. With Somalia fresh on their minds, American policy makers and the international community were slow to respond to the events in Rwanda. This was recognized by Secretary of State Madeline Albright when she said, "We, the international community should have been more active during the early

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[124]U.S Department of State, Bureau of International Organizational Affairs. 1996, 1-2

days of the atrocities in Rwanda in 1994 and called them what there were: genocide".[125] This indicated a shift in American foreign policy towards Africa, which aimed at placing the responsibility of African political and humanitarian problems in African hands. This development scared the sub regional body to be proactive if it was to avert the Rwanda-like situations where the international community acted too late.

The foreign policy moves by the developed countries notably, US, France and Britain send clear signals that developed countries will no longer be directly involved in military intervention operations in West Africa. The moves have seen these countries introduce foreign assistance training programs aimed at building the peacekeeping capacities of selected African countries. The first of such program the "African Crisis Response Initiative" (ACRI) started by the US. Their focus was to develop the affected countries' military capacity to manage conflict on the continent. The US government concluded agreements with five countries and completed the three-year program from Battalion to Brigade level, by November 2002. Some of the countries that benefited include Ghana, Benin, Mali, Uganda, Malawi, Kenya and Senegal. Under Operation Focused Relief, more battalions from Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal were trained by the US. Six of these battalions were later to be part of the troops that deployed in Sierra Leone.[126]

The non-direct involvement policy started by President Clinton was continued by President George W. Bush by introducing ACOTA. France also followed in the footsteps of the US by introducing RECAMP with the intention to also build the peacekeeping capabilities especially of

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[125] Laremont, R.,*The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa*. (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002) pp. 16
[126] Cedric de Coning, "Peacekeeping Trends", *Conflict Trends* 4 (2003), pp 30-31.

the Francophone militaries in Africa. At least 32 African countries received training under RECAMP with eight from West Africa.[127]

Britain on the other hand adopted a different approach but still in congruence with the change in foreign policy towards Africa. Unlike US and France, it focused its packages on peace support training for African military officers. The central goal of their program is to assist and develop national military staff colleges into centers of excellence for regional and sub regional training. Two African based British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATTs), BMATT Southern Africa (in Zimbabwe) and BMATT West Africa (in Ghana), have since the early nineties, been providing annual instruction to officers from host countries as well as other African countries.[128] These policies of the developed countries are indicative to the fact that Africa in general would have to resolve its own conflicts. ECOWAS therefore has no option but to use ECOMOG to re-establish peace in order to potentially resolve its own conflicts.

The moves by these developed countries to capacity build the military of African countries is no doubt a laudable idea. For the efforts to be effective in West Africa region, the programs need to be tailored to suit the West African environment by involving the countries to benefit in the planning stage and including equipment as part of the package. Without the equipment, the effectiveness of the participating countries in the field will still be elusive. Further, in relation to the challenges outlined in chapter three, the training must not only cover operations but also logistics planning and multinational and interagency coordination. It must, however, be noted that, France despite its training initiatives continue to directly participate in the intervention operations in Africa.

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[127]Eric G. Berman and Katie E.Sams. Keeping the Peace in Africa.http://www.unidir.ch/ pdf/articles/pdf-art129.pdf (8 February 2005).

[128] Eric G.Berman & KatieE.Sams: Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities.
(Geneva, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000), 107.

ECOWAS' continued deployment of ECOMOG in West Africa can also be due to conclusion by powerful Security Council members, like US and UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, by 1994 that the UN itself should not seek to conduct large- scale enforcement activities. Subsequently, for enforcement of its decisions, the Security Council increasingly resorted to "coalitions of the willing" such as Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994.[129] The pronouncement by the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali that, "it is increasingly apparent that UN cannot address every potential and actual conflict troubling the world and that sub regional bodies must take the lead role during such crises"[130] also show support for the involvement of sub regional bodies notably, ECOMOG in enforcement activities by the Security Council. Boutros Ghali's assertions were supported by his successor, in another report to the Security Council, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, on 13 April 1998, stated that, "within the context of the United Nations primary responsibility for matters of international peace and security, providing support for regional and sub regional initiatives in Africa is both necessary and desirable. Such support is necessary because the United Nations lack the capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that may arise in Africa".[131] This policy saw relaxation by the UN in reaction to conflicts in the subregion. Since the Liberian conflict in 1990, the UN has always looked to ECOWAS to intervene in conflicts in the subregion before getting involved. In Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d' Iviore, ECOWAS had to deploy ECOMOG before the UN got involved later on after almost three years (November 1992), eight months (October 1999) and sixteen months (February 2004) respectively. The failure of the UN to exhibit more commitment in Rwanda in 1994, during UNAMIR Operations, is also an additional reason for continued

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[129] Adekeye Adebajo: Building Peace in West Africa, (London: Boulder, 2002), 82.
[130] United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire Côte d'Ivoire – MINUCI.
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home.shtml>. (5 February 2005).
[131] Ibid

deployment of ECOMOG by ECOWAS as a key component of conflict resolution in the subregion. UN's demonstrated lack of commitment was very glaring as it reduced the authorized strength of the force by almost 90 percent (from 2548 to 270) when the violence in Rwanda escalated.[132]

Collective responsibility at regional level is equally another contributing factor to the continued deployment of ECOMOG by ECOWAS as a key element of conflict resolution. Regional bodies have been more concerned about conflicts or world issues that affect them in common. NATO intervened in Kosovo, but not in Rwanda. This is because the situation in Kosovo threatened the stability of Europe at the time while the genocide in Rwanda did not have any direct impact on Europe. In the same spirit then, African sub regional organizations have taken up the task of planning and coordinating security matters. This explains why sub regional organizations like the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and in East Africa the Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD), which were initially established as economic bodies, have now added a security function within their charters.[133] In 1999, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) established a similar mechanism known as Council for Peace and Security for Central Africa (COPAX), while in the year 2000, the East African Cooperation actively discussed the possibility of concluding a defense treaty that would provide sub regional peacekeeping operations.[134] With the responsibility of security being, by default, the task of African subregional organizations, ECOWAS continues to use ECOMOG in order to maintain the collective responsibility for stability in the subregion.

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[132] Ibid

[133] International Crisis Group report on 28 November 2004 :Cote d'Ivoire the war is not yet over<http;//www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=238981=1>.(14 February 2005).

[134]Eric Berman and Katie Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000), 99.

The sub regional conflicts are cruel, protracted, make no distinction between combatants and civilians, often have no discernable political agenda (unlike the Cold war insurgencies), and are relatively resistant to external pressure.[135]due to their nature, these types of conflicts require a prompt response to avert escalation.

Conflicts in any country in the subregion invariably affect its neighbors, especially considering the ECOWAS protocol that allows foreigners within the subregion to travel without visas to any ECOWAS member country for ninety days of the start of a conflict. The existence of such an intervention force would provide the capacity for the sub regional body to evacuate non-combatants in the conflict affected zones. Further, ECOWAS continues to use ECOMOG since it is almost always readily available to attend to conflicts in the subregion. Prompt response to these situations is very important in the West African since conflicts in the subregion, if not curtailed promptly, conflicts have the potential to spill over or affect other countries in the subregion. Having and maintaining the capacity to intervene is thus a way of saving other nationals who would be trapped in any intra-state conflict in the subregion.

The continued deployment of ECOMOG forces by ECOWAS can also be explained by the need to have troops who understand the culture of the people. The people of the West Africa subregion, despite their differences, have a high degree of recognition and respect for their clan leaders, village heads and chiefs.[136] The cultural practices call for more tolerance and diligence in dealing with these societal leaders and have the tendency to slow the dialogue process. Troops from other regions may not be familiar with the culture of the subregion and could be perceived

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[135]Hutchful, Eboe. 1998. The ECOMOG Experience in West Africa. Article on-line. Available from http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No36/ECOMOG Praxis.html.
[136]Tuck, Christopher. 2000. Every Car or Moving Object Gone: The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia. *African Studies Quarterly.* Article on-line. Available from http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asp/v4/v 4i1a1.htm. Internet.

as not having the tolerance and temper to contain the locals during these conflicts.[137] The threat of peace in the subregion normally comes from sub state actors or no-state actors and units. Belligerent parties constantly go against accords or agreements which prolong the conflicts.[138] This was evident for instance, in the first Liberian conflict where the rebel groups increased from the initial three to nine major and many minor factions eventually requiring nine separate peace or cease-fire agreements.[139] The indecisive culture in the subregion may not be tolerated for example by the US military who a culture of decisiveness during military intervention operations. The experience of the US in Somalia is a clear example of the need for troops who operate in the subregion to know about the culture, geography, terrain, and lifestyle of the people to yield positive results. The need for rapid economic development is also another factors cited as a reason that cause the subregion's leaders to use ECOMOG as a conflict resolution mechanism in intervention operations.

4.2.Possibility of ECOMOG becoming a Standby Force

On the issue of need for a standby force, in Africa, it was revealed that Africa remains arguably the most conflict-prone continent in the world today and as such having a standby force would be handy in quick resolution of conflicts. The presence of constant conflict was justified by citation of present and recent conflicts in the continent; in North Africa the ructions of the Arab Spring have brought not just democracy in the case of Tunisia but the potential of greater civil-military strife in Egypt and the potential for Libya to slide into inter-clan warfare were outlined. In West Africa, the violent Islamist Boko Haram in Nigeria continues its murderous attacks on churches, government institutions and recently the abduction of secondary school girls, whilst the Tuareg

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[137] Ibid
[138] Ibid
[139] Ibid

and radical Islamist Ansar Din in northern Mali were noted to have forged closer ties to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb demonstrating a potential for greater trouble. These developments are also mirrored in the Horn of Africa where Islamic extremists in the form of Al Shabab continue to do battle with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and African Union Mission (AMISOM) troops in Somalia. The scar of al-Shabab has lately spread into the region with countries like Kenya facing a constant challenge of removing them within its borders.

 The findings revealed that the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues to deteriorate as rebel troops, allegedly with Rwandan assistance, continue to challenge the sovereignty of Kinshasa. Elections was mentioned severally by the respondents as a major cause of conflicts in the continent; though elections, long meant to demonstrate the popular will of citizens have brought new challenges as incumbents refuse to accept the popular mandate of citizens. Cases that were pointed out include the Ivory Coast and Laurent Gbagbo and Kenya with contestation between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga that ended in conflict.

The opinions of the majority of responses reflected that all over this blighted continent we are witnessing the resurgence of the politics of identity: for instance, in Kenya between Kikuyu and Luo, in Nigeria between Hausa-Fulani and Igbo, in Algeria a resurgence of Berber identity, in central Africa a virulent ethnocentric nationalism in the form of Banyamulenge Tutsi identity, in Mozambique between Shangaan and Ndau, in Angola between Ovimbundu and Mbundu, and in South Africa rising tides of xenophobia pitting a narrow South African nationalism against the proverbial other.[140]

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[140] Ibid

The findings revealed that now more than ever before, there is an urgent need for robust responses to the challenge of peace and security on the African continent. Unlike its moribund predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the African Union's (AU) Constitutive Act does provide for such a robust response. Article 4h of the AU's Constitutive Act creates not only a legal basis for intervention but also imposes an obligation for the AU to intervene in grave circumstances which includes genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.[141] Such an approach is in keeping with international thinking on the 'Responsibility to Protect'. Whilst the AU's Constitutive Act recognizes the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states, it also mooted the principle of non-indifference to the plight of those suffering under the yoke of an oppressive government. In this way a fine balance was created between the twin principles of sovereignty and responsibility to protect.

It seems that at its inception, the Peace and Security Council of the AU understood the complexity of the security context in which African peacekeepers are to be deployed and insisted that the ASF should not only include military elements but also civilian police and other capabilities on account of the multiplicity of roles they saw the ASF playing. These included preventive deployment, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace building, post-conflict disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed combatants, and humanitarian assistance.[142] In the language of the United Nations, then, the ASF was envisaged to be both a Chapter 6 traditional peacekeeping mission and a more robust Chapter 7 peace enforcement mission.

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[141] Dersso, S. (2010)'The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture', *ISS Paper 209*, January 2010,Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
[142] Cilliers, J. (2008)'The African Standby Force: An update on progress',*ISS Paper 160*,March 2008,Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

The establishment of the ASF is also in peacekeeping with Chapter 8 of the United Nations which allows for regional arrangements to establish peace and security in their specific region.[143] The AU standby force was to be organised into five regional brigades: the Southern African Development Community Brigade (SADCBRIG), the East African Peace and Security Mechanism known more commonly as the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), the North African Regional Capability Brigade, better known as the North African Standby Brigade (NASBRIG), the Economic Community of West African States Brigade (ECOBRIG), and the Economic Community of Central African States Brigade (ECCASBRIG) also known as the Multinational Force of Central Africa –each comprising 5,000 personnel, bringing the total to 25,000 personnel.[144]

There was an attempt then to co-locate the ASF with each of the existing five Regional Economic Communities (RECs) on the continent thereby reinforcing a common sub-regional identity. Such an approach, however seemed to have some problems especially in the form of overlapping regional membership. For instance, Angola and the DRC, both members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) REC are part of both the central region and the southern region from the perspective of the ASF. Likewise both Madagascar and Mauritius who are members of SADC, from the perspective of the ASF are members of both the southern and eastern regions.[145] From an operational point of view this leaves such countries overstretched and mechanisms of coordination that need to be worked out between the respective regional brigades in order to ensure that overlapping memberships do not hinder the deployment of a

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[143] Vanessa Kent and Mark Malan, "The African Standby Force: Progress and Prospects", *African Security Review* 12/3 (2003), p. 73.

[144] Dersso, S. (2010)'The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture', *ISS Paper 209*, January 2010,Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

[145] African Union(2003)*Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and Military Staff Committee*. Addis Ababa: African Union.

brigade in times of crisis. In theory, such overlapping memberships should not be a problem given the coordination between the AU and the respective regional brigade.

Conceptually, once a peace and security operation has been launched, the Peace and Security Operations Division (PSOD) of the AU becomes the strategic headquarters whilst the regional planning element becomes the operational headquarters with constant communication between the two.[146] Discussions with various security officials within the AU and the regional structures however, revealed that there continues to be a lack of clarity as to where the PSOD lines of authority end and where those of the REC begin. Further, smaller countries like Mauritius, feel themselves overburdened by belonging to two such regional command structures.

Quick deployment is an effort to prevent anymore Rwanda's; the ASF is called upon to be able to deploy within two weeks from the provision of a mandate by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU.[147] In practice, the lack of a strategic airlift capability on the African continent prevents such rapid deployment. A case in point is the deployment of AU troops to Sudan's troubled Darfur region. Months after the PSC mandated troops in 2007 to go there, Rwandan and Nigerian troops waited in their respective countries whilst the conflict in Darfur claimed more lives. Eventually in 2008 the United States Air Force transported these troops in C-130 Hercules transport planes. Once on the ground the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assisted in equipping these peacekeepers. The deduction of this study therefore, is that unless the ASF is adequately resourced, it will remain a nice idea impossible to truly implement.

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[146]Correspondence from South African Naval Captain Kobus Maasdorp (currently attached to the Peace and Security Operations Division of the AU in Addis Ababa), 26 June 2012.
[147] Cilliers, J. (2008)'The African Standby Force: An update on progress',*ISS Paper 160*,March 2008,Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies

Other than overlapping memberships and scant resources, a third problem relates to the manner in which the ASF was conceptualized. At its conceptualization it was assumed that any ASF mission would be deployed for a period of between one and two years after which a UN mission would replace the force.[148] In practice we have seen AU missions lasting much longer –consider here the length of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Moreover, instead of an AU mission leading to a UN one, we are increasingly witnessing hybrid UN-AU peace missions such as that of the United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and that in the DRC. On both these counts, it is imperative that the PSC go back to the drawing board –taking on board these new realities.

Another problem in regard to how the ASF was conceived is the sub-regional nature of the AU's peace and security architecture together with issues of a practical nature, such as the lack of a strategic airlift capability, meaning that the regional brigades will be utilised for crises pertaining to their respective region as opposed to engaging in extra-regional peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. Whilst such an approach has certain advantages such as increased knowledge of local conditions (language, culture, terrain), there is an overwhelming disadvantage in that neighboring states may have a vested interest in who is victorious at the end of a conflict or who gets to be president as was witnessed in the case of Liberia where there was a contestation between Anglophone and Francophone countries. In other words, national interest considerations may well thwart regional considerations. Consider here the case of Kenya, a key member of the AMISOM mission. Given its own restive Somali population in the North-East, Nairobi has been eager to intervene and create a buffer zone between itself and Somalia in the

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[148] Dersso, S. (2010)'The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture', *ISS Paper 209*, January 2010,Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Juba valley.[149] It is, however, doing this under the cover of an AMISOM mission. Whilst this mission is aiming to defeat Al Shabab terrorists and to strengthen the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in Mogadishu, Nairobi's interests are in a balkanized Somalia, not one united Somalia under central government control.

Against the grim backdrop of conflicts in Africa, African leaders have come to the realization that the international community and the United Nations cannot be depended upon to stop the suffering of Africans. One clear and lasting lesson for the continent is that the cost of being dependent on others for intervention is unacceptably high. With this in mind, African Union (AU) leaders have called for the creation of the African Standby Force (ASF), a multinational armed force comprised solely of African soldiers capable of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations—an African solution for African problems.

The ASF brigades are to be formed by the countries within the respective regions. Since these brigades are to reside in the regions that they serve and protect, the standby force, in theory, will be able to quickly organize, deploy, and intervene to stem early violence before it erupts into full-scale war. The development of the African Standby Force is to occur in two phases.

Even though the concept of a standing force is impressive, there are a lot of conditions and issues which needed to be resolved before the concept could be realized in the subregion. The first issue that was to be dealt with is funding. The setting up of such a force required that troops and equipment of various countries remain uncommitted and available for training. This condition was a serious drain on the countries in the subregion in terms of personnel, equipment, and finance. From past ECOMOG operations, it is quite clear that most of the countries in the

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[149] Solomon, H. (2012)'The Changing Nature of the Terrorist Threat in Africa and the AU's Response',*Journal of African Union Studies*1(1): 93-102.

subregion, apart from Nigeria and Ghana, found it very difficult to devote battalion strength of troops and equipment for that purpose. In addition, continuous training of these troops was very costly for the countries. Another problem that the subregion faced is the question of where to locate the force. Even though on the surface it never seemed to be a problem, a thorough understanding of the culture of the subregion revealed real problems associated with it.

While analyzing the conflict situations on the African continent, Terry[150] opines that AU is recalling the dream of its pioneers, like Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (first president of Ghana), to establish an African Stand-by Force (ASF) to be used by the organization to assist during conflict situations. The AU has thus developed a common security policy that was established in 2010, an ASF capable of rapid deployment to either keep or enforce the peace. The ASF comprise one brigade in each of the five African regions and incorporate a police and civilian capacity as well.

ECOMOG became formally established as a standby force for the community and, reflecting the changing nature of peacekeeping, its role was expanded to cover conflict prevention, humanitarian intervention, enforcement, peacebuilding and the control of organized crime. In June 2004, the ECOWAS Defense and Security Commission renamed ECOMOG as the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). The realization of ECOMOG as a standby force has meant that there is always an immediate force with the right number of troops to intervene in conflict situations as and when they occur. The force is made up of 6500 highly trained soldiers drawn from national units. It includes a rapid reaction Task Force of 1500 troops which have the capability to be deployed within 14 days (instead of the 30 days previously planned in line with

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[150]Terry, Mays M. 2003. African Solutions for African problems: The Changing Face of African-Mandated Peace Operations. *The Journal of Conflict Studies* 23, no.1 (spring). Article on-line. Available from http://www..lib.unb.ca/Text/JSC/ bin/get.cgi?directory=spring03/&filenamemays.htm.

African Union Standard), whilst the entire brigade could be deployed within 90 days. The ESF forms one of the components of the African Standby Force and is under the operational control of the African Union.[151]

This force is deemed to be more efficient since it has more time to train when not in theatre. ECOWAS has implemented a training program. The program involves a series of specialized modules consistent with UN standards to be delivered in three designated Centers of Excellence: Nigerian War College in Abuja, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre in Accra, Ghana, and the Ecole du Maintien de la Paix in Bamako, Mali. This is aimed at reducing the problem of interoperability as the troops from different countries train with their counterparts on basic tactics, techniques, and standing operating procedures (SOPs). A standing ECOMOG force is an effective deterrent to would-be rebels and coup plotters in the subregion and gives the right leverage to governments to manage the affairs of their respective countries.

ECOWAS is also in the process of organizing military exercises with the aim of enhancing the peacekeeping capacity of troops and harmonizing strategies and equipment. Some of the exercises held so far include the Command Post exercise in Dakar and Accra in June 2006 and December 2007 respectively; the West Battalion Exercise in Thies, Senegal, December 2007, the Command Post Exercise in Bamako, Mali, June 2008 and 'Operation Cohesion' in Benin in April 2010. To address the perennial problem of logistics, ECOWAS has designated two logistics depots – a Coastal base just outside Freetown, Sierra Leone; and inland base in Mali.[152]

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[151] Mike Denning, "A Prayer for Marie: Creating an Effective African Standby Force", *Parameters* xxxiv/4 (Winter 2004-05), p. 108.
[152] Ibid

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4.3.Policy Implications for having a standby force in the West Africa region

Protracted violent conflict and the development crisis in sub-Saharan Africa led to two important African economic and security initiatives: the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU). Both institutions were launched to facilitate 'African solutions to African problems'. The OAU had been the stronghold for upholding state sovereignty. When it was launched by the African heads of state in 1999, the AU committed itself to promote peace, security and stability of the continent, to promote democracy and good governance, due process, the rule of law and human rights, as well to engage in effective intervention under grave circumstances. At the same time the vision of the AU upholds defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its members.[153]

In its charter, the AU claims far-reaching competencies. Article 4 opened up the possibility of military intervention under two circumstances: first, 'pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity'; and second, upon request of a member state 'in order to restore peace and security'[154]

On the basis of this charter the AU has engaged in several peace operations and has adopted an interventionist policy. It seems that a rudimentary African security architecture to address African security needs is emerging. At its top is the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), the political decision-making body, consisting of fifteen rotating members, as an organ 'for the

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[153]African Union, "Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force", *ReliefWeb* (March 22-23, 2005), www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVIU-6BDJHH?OpenDocument.
[154] Ibid

prevention, management and resolution of conflicts'. It is intended to be 'a collective security

and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis

situations in Africa'.[155]

A major influence on the AU has been the operations of the Economic Community of West

African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in West African conflict situations. ECOMOG

was the first African regional initiative on peacekeeping and was deployed in Liberia, Sierra

Leone and Guinea Bissau. ECOMOG is seen as a model since, according to a study by the

European Parliament [156]

> '[it] shows that a committed and robust regional force can bring an end to complicated
> conflicts. Indeed, the experience of ECOWAS in the field of peace and security offers
> much that the rest of Africa can learn from.'[157]

The existence of ECOMOG has varied policy implications: Policies vary in their appropriateness

at different phases of conflict intractability. Six phases are particularly significant:

• conflict emergence,

• conflict escalation,

• failed peacemaking efforts,

• institutionalization of destructive conflict,

• de-escalation leading to transformation, and

• termination of the intractable character of the conflict.

These six phases are only loosely sequential, since some occur simultaneously and conflicts

often return to an earlier phase. For each setting, one can identify policies that

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[155] Ibid
[156] Ibid
[157] PANA, "West African Commission Endorses Standing Force", *Panapress* (June 19, 2004),
www.panapress.com/freenews.asp?code=eng046289&dte=19/06/2004.

- help prevent conflicts from becoming intractable;

- help stop the prolongation and escalation of intractable conflicts, and

- help transform and resolve intractable conflicts.

Internal policies: Policies that may help modify identities so as to reduce conflict intractability may be conducted by a great variety of persons within each adversary camp, differing in rank and in arena of activity. A standby force in the region would therefore enhance the modification of identities by introducing inclusive strategies to the conflicting parties.

Preventive Policies: All may be engaged in preventive policies, which help to prevent conflicts from becoming intractable. Within all communities and countries, being peaceful and loving is part of respect for all. Parents, schoolteachers, religious leaders, artists, entertainers, and many others can foster those qualities in their children, students, congregants, and audiences. Furthermore, school texts, films, and news reports can convey the humanity and perspectives of groups with whom conflicts have occurred. The presence of a standby force will create room for introduction of initiatives that will help prevent recurrence of conflict. The standby force may help alleviate deteriorating living conditions that otherwise might exacerbate ethnic antagonisms and ignite fights that become intractable. This may include alerting people inside and outside the areas affected about the risks of pursuing conflicts destructively, further imperiling lives.

The standby force can also foster norms and institutions that help develop nondestructive ways of handling the inevitable disputes of social life. The standby force may engage in training and consultations to support such methods. Indeed, the world climate may be more or less supportive of various methods of struggle, whether it be armed struggle, democratic elections, terrorism, or nonviolent resistance. Groups resorting to one of these methods may get assistance from particular allies or face external opposition for doing so.

Interruptive Policies: The modified conceptions of themselves and of other groups and peoples can support additional actions that reduce the likelihood of destructive conflicts arising. These actions may be initiatives to reduce grievances felt by adversaries or reciprocations of peaceful gestures by the other side. The growth of organized dissent from the uncompromising policies of the dominant leadership is also helpful in interrupting intractable conflicts. Rival leadership factions, middle-level leaders (e.g. community or organizational leaders), or grass roots organizations may undertake dissent, as sometimes occurs in peace movement mobilizations. The dissenters may appeal to aspects of the prevailing identity that pertain to relations within the group rather than antagonisms with outsiders.

Once a conflict has already become protracted and destructive, the standby force is particularly needed to stop further deterioration. Domestically, this is often recognized as a primary obligation of the central government, which tries to manage internal conflicts rather than exacerbate them as a party in the fight. Regionally, ECOMOG increasingly undertake intermediary interventions. Outside intervention sometimes may even use force to stop violence. The standby force may also halt further deterioration by constraining one or both sides in a conflict. One such constraint is economic sanctions, directed to stop gross violations of human rights. Sanctions can affect the self-conceptions of some parties to an intractable conflict. Transformational Policies: Many other internal policies are relevant for the fundamental transformation of an intractable conflict. One approach is acting to change the ideologies and belief systems that sustain the conflict. Much public and scholarly attention is now given to revealing the truth about past injustices and human rights violations in order to build a secure peace. Knowledge of past and ongoing oppression by people within the oppressor community or

country can alter their self-identity. They may come to see themselves as being complicit in wrongly harming others. -- Once they accept that responsibility, they would be more likely to apologize and to offer some degree of compensation for past injuries.

ECOMOG may also undertake a variety of mediating roles to help stop and even transform an intractable conflict. Mediation generally entails according some legitimacy to the antagonistic sides in a conflict and treating the representatives with human regard, even when the parties themselves do not. In such circumstances, participating in the mediation may prompt each side to modify its conception of the other and also of itself. The social context also affects the long-term transformation of intractable conflicts and the establishment of enduring peaceful accommodations. ECOMOG can be important agents in ensuring compliance to agreements, which helps build trust between former adversaries. Experiences providing grounds for mutual trust affect self-identities and also conceptions of the other side that help transform intractable conflicts. ECOMOG may also contribute resources that help fulfill the terms of agreements and overcome threats to the conflict's transformation and enduring resolution. The resources may include emergency food, assistance in rebuilding infrastructure, aid in training and education, and protection against violent acts by opponents of stability.

4.4 Conclusion

The above findings reveal that the AU has made progress in the development of a comprehensive and cohesive peace and security policy framework in recent times. The advancement towards a common defense and security policy represents a meaningful development in conceptual thinking concerning the parameters and principles of regional or coalition peace operations in Africa. billion citizens. Given constraints at the UN level –both resource and political (the use of

the veto), the establishment of the ASF was truly ground-breaking in that it operationalized the norm Responsibility to Protect or in traditional African parlance concretizing the notion of our common humanity. Despite problems from sourcing funding, developing common command and control, improving communications, overlapping memberships of the regional brigades and the danger of one state dominating the regional brigade, military officers across nations and regions have demonstrated tremendous leadership in moving the concept of the ASF from the drawing board and into military academies and onto the battlefield.

Notwithstanding the formation of a regional standby force, it is not clear whether the force will be able to achieve its intended goals under the current regime of observation and monitoring systems. It is further unlikely that civil servants loyal to an undemocratic regime will be able to effectively monitor and report human rights situations, press freedom and civil–military relations in their country or its allies.

Usually, not only are the governments aware of acute or emerging major conflicts in the region, but they themselves are the cause of these conflicts. Sophisticated early warning indicators are not needed to warn about such conflicts. At the same time, there is a remarkable gap – not only between warning and response, but also between the high ambitions and far-reaching goals of EWR projects and the status of their actual implementation. This gap is not least mirrored in the relatively poorly developed early warning systems of the AU and ECOWAS that obviously need more than time to fully materialize. Besides political and bureaucratic hurdles, a major factor could be the predominance of institutional logics of international organizations that prefer the establishment of their 'own' systems – even though that leads to the misallocation of human and financial resources and to the high transaction costs that result from complicated coordination procedures.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1   Summary

The perception of peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations has changed substantially over the last two decades. Rivalry between US and USSR regarding security issues subsided with the end of cold war; subsequently the end of cold war triggered the appearance of new actors at the regional level in dealing with regional security matters. Africa is not left out when it comes to regional security matters; bodies like ECOWAS which was initially meant to address regional economic issues has evolved from being purely an economic entity to embracing a desire to secure regional peace and stability. On security matters, ECOWAS and its regional peacebuilding wing 'ECOMOG' represented an ambitious regional initiative in face of the recrudescence of violence and regional instability in West African conflicts. ECOMOG interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire have secured a place for ECOWAS/ECOMOG among the organizations dealing with the preservation of international peace and security.

5.2   Conclusions

ECOMOG in its Military interventions in the West African States conflicts succeeded in achieving the settlements to conflicts and the reduction of violence in the region. Despite the challenges outline in this study, ECOMOG has undergone significant transformation to overcome the challenges presented by security matters and regional political developments. The transition from operating in merely an ad hoc manner when coping with regional conflict, into one having a more standing framework to manage those crises, has often demonstrated the

ability of ECOMOG to consolidate its institutions. Notwithstanding the lack of means and experience in peacebuilding, ECOMOG was always determined to respond to regional armed conflicts, to ensure regional stability. Aware of the prominent role of regional stability, ECOWAS aimed at ensuring a security environment that was suitable for economic development and social progress.

From the reviewed literature, ECOMOG has been involved in the area of peacekeeping and peacemaking this region in two phases. The first phase was in the 1990's when ECOMOG first intervened in Liberia, and subsequently in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, to mediate violent civil wars and reduce violence and the humanitarian crises in the affected countries. In the phase, two ECOMOG intervened to bring peace again in Liberia, and to stabilize the security situation in Côte d'Ivoire. From the study, it has been revealed that the first three interventions turned out to be much more difficult than the last two. During the first interventions the study has shown that, ECOMOG lacked the necessary organizational structure and experience to deal with peacekeeping operations in highly unstable regions. Additionally, the lack of financial and logistical means on one hand, combined with the lack of support of the international community on the other, complicated most of ECOMOG tasks. Regardless of these difficulties, ECOMOG has made considerable accomplishments during its interventions.

The transformation of ECOWAS from being merely focused on regional economic development and integration to being an important actor in dealing with security issues at the regional level.in West Africa are, is considered as being its first greatest achievement. Second, fifteen years of suffering casualties from financial and logistical problems and yet sustaining the deployment of its forces has demonstrated its resilience and commitment to the peace process.

Thirdly, ECOWAS has demonstrated an ability to put end to conflict and to prevent the escalation of conflicts to inter-state confrontations that would destabilize all regions.

Finally, after many years of political disagreement and regional rivalry upon false problems, it has demonstrated an ability to achieve a regional consensus upon security issues.

From the beginning of its deployment in Liberia in 1990, ECOMOG was engaged in ensuring security and order in this country and searching for a peaceful resolution to civil war. Over the period of the intervention, it participated in the protection of civilian populations to alleviate their suffering. Also, it joined with others in their efforts to broker numerous peace plans, urging fighting factions to comply with the provisions of peace agreements. ECOMOG convened peace talks among the fighting parties in Liberia, which, after seven years of fighting, culminated with the peaceful resolution of the protracted conflict. Following this peace agreement, ECOMOG actively contributed to monitoring the cease-fire, disarmament, and demobilization of combatants. With the cooperation of the UN, ECOMOG helped to implement a peace process, particularly the preparation and supervision of elections in Liberia.

In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG managed to reinstate the constitutional order and legality by restoring the elected president to power and evicting rebels from the capital city. This was a first step by ECOWAS, aimed at deterring other insurgents from altering the democratic path in this region, and to halting the phenomena of coup d'état. Through ECOMOG's peace enforcement actions, it also contributed significantly to the reduction of humanitarian crisis. ECOWAS while acting in parallel with its military actions showed its commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict by sponsoring many peace talks.

After the involvement of the UN, ECOMOG contributed to stabilizing and training the new Sierra Leonean military. Those interventions were, at the time, an improvised response to conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, in the absence of a necessary structure to deal with such crises, leading to ECOWAS/ECOMOG experiencing numerous obstacles and difficulties in carrying out its mission. The regional political division and organizational, financial and logistical challenges were amongst the most intractable shortcomings and weaknesses of ECOWAS during this period as per the findings of this study.

5.3. Recommendations

The study has deduced that regional political divisions were among the more serious problems that ECOWAS faced during its attempt to resolve the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Opposition of ECOWAS military options from many West African against the fighting parties and, instead supported these countries in fighting ECOMOG. This lack of regional consensus upon security issues and the rivalries between the Francophone and Anglophone countries negatively influenced the role of ECOWAS and ECOMOG in their peacemaking and peacebuilding missions. ECOWAS' ad hoc manner of responding to regional conflicts in West Africa was revealed to be a source of organizational problems. In the absence of an institutional organization and standing security framework, ECOMOG improvised all their actions in dealing with those conflicts, in term of organization and deployment of forces and decision-making.

In past interventions, the high cost of military operations seemed unsustainable for ECOWAS. The reliance on voluntary contributions by ECOWAS on its member states in covering the costs of the military intervention further complicated the situation.

Unfortunately, ECOWAS/ECOMOG's limited resources left them unable to respond, even to the urgent needs of their own forces.

In the second interventions, ECOMOG had at least learned some lessons from the past mistakes. To prevent ad hoc responses and maintaining ways of negotiations, while creating an environment ECOWAS developed a regional mechanism and structure through which member states could resolve their internal problems. ECOWAS further, introduced an important change by creating a standing structure to overcome the regional political division with regard to security issues. ECOWAS, with the cooperation of the international community, played an important role in achieving some breakthroughs in peacemaking in Liberia.

In the Côte d'Ivoire intervention, ECOWAS became progressively involved in mediation between the parties to the conflict since the outbreak of violence. Its efforts were successful to convince the two sides to adhere to a cease-fire pending a political solution to the conflict. Here ECOMOG was deployed to monitor the cease-fire. Despite its delay in the generation of forces for the operation, it has efficiently contributed the stabilization of this country by separating the belligerents and halting the fighting.

In August 2004, ECOMOG was deployed in Liberia as a vanguard force to October 1, 2004, during this time it transfer authority to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The first ECOMOG peacekeepers were drawn from the UN Mission in Sierra Leone and used the UN resources for their initial deployment in Liberia. In this time, ECOMOG had contributed efficiently to the stabilization of key areas in this country. It had secured the ceasefire between the fighting parties, assisted to the handover of power by Charles Taylor and contributed in ensuring a secure environment for the transit and delivery of humanitarian assistance in a devastated country. During these interventions, other than the financial and logistical problems,

ECOMOG overcame most of structural and organizational shortcomings witnessed during the first interventions. In Côte d'Ivoire, the problem of generation of forces and the delay of their deployment were caused mainly by the lack of financial and logistical resources

Over the time of its existence, ECOWAS had steadily evolved, through the two phases of its military interventions, to respond to regional crises more efficiently. The role of ECOMOG in peacemaking and peacekeeping at the regional level dictated its sharing some responsibilities with the United Nations.

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THE MAP OF 15 ECOWAS MEMBER STATES

The Republic of BENIN

BUKINA FASO

The Republic of CAPE VERDE

The Republic of COTE D'IVOIRE

The Republic of GAMBIA

The Republic of GHANA

The Republic of GUINEA

The Republic of GUINEA BISSAU

The Republic of LIBERIA

The Republic of MALI

The Republic of NIGER

The Federal Republic of NIGERIA

The Republic SENEGAL

The Republic SIERRA LEONE

The Republic of TOGO

THE MAP OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES