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C50/9172/2006

A PROJECT REPORT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN ARMED CONFLICT AND PEACE STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
DECLARATION

BY CANDIDATE

I hereby declare that this project report is my original work and has not been presented for a degree or any other award in any other University.

Jane Nduta Wachira, Signature________________________ Date________

C50 /P/9172/2006

BY SUPERVISOR

This project report has been submitted with my approval as the University Supervisor

Professor Godfrey Muriuki, Signature __________________________ Date ______
DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to my family for their support, constant affirmation and encouragement that kept me focused as I pursued academic excellence. I am grateful to God for his providence and grace during this time.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I echo the declaration of King David, the ancient Jewish king (recorded in 2 Samuel 7), “Therefore you are great, O Lord God for there is none like you and there is no God beside you, according to all that we have heard with our ears.” I acknowledge God who gave me life, courage and resources to pursue an MA course.

I recognize my children, for their support and being there for me. I recognize the invaluable instruction and encouragement I got from my University Supervisor, Professor Godfrey Muriuki. I will live to cherish the patience of my husband who kept cheering me on as I burnt the midnight oil for countless nights in order to complete this project.
ABSTRACT

Generally, the aim of conflict early warning is to identify critical developments in a timely manner so that coherent response strategies can be formulated to either prevent violent conflict or limit its destructive effects. The Conflict Early Warning and Response Network was created by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development member states to systematically anticipate violent conflicts in the region and respond in a timely and effective manner.

However, Kenya and Uganda still experience non-cordial relations as a result of cross-border conflicts emanating from grazing and water points, livestock rustling, refugees, banditry, smuggling and illegal trade. It is against this backdrop that this research sought to assess the utilization CEWARN on Kenya-Uganda border relations.

The study addresses the Kenya-Uganda cross-border conflict issues which, if not curtailed, could plunge the two nations into violent conflicts. Its objectives were to investigate the utilization of CEWARN on Kenya-Uganda border conflict, to establish the role of political, social, historical, economic, environmental and cultural factors in causing conflict along the border, plus analyzing the practical intervention options available to IGAD decision makers for CEWARN implementation.

In undertaking the study, the descriptive survey design was used. The main purpose was to collect information on the use of CEWARN on the Kenya and Uganda border conflict. Also purposive sampling technique was used whereby the researcher purposely targeted a group of people believed to be knowledgeable about the topic. The sample comprised of NGOs, CBOs, FBOs, MoFAs, Government officials, District peace committees and opinion leaders from the communities. And data was collected using questionnaires and interview schedules.
Two theories were used to achieve the objective, human needs theory and conflict resolution theory by John Burton. He says that human beings have basic needs and if needs aren’t met, this can lead to conflict.

Along Kenya and Uganda border, conflict is caused by resource competition, cattle rustling and availability of small arms. The conflicts have had a negative impact and severe impact on the communities such as loss of human life, destruction of property, displacement of people and underdevelopment in these regions.

The study has shown that Civil Society Organisations Kenya and Uganda governments, African Union, Community Based Organisations and Churches have attempted to prevent and mitigate violent conflict along the border. This is by developing mediation and conflict prevention capacities of the communities involved, disarmament and establishing projects.

Also the study shows that CEWARN data has been very instrumental in conflict prevention along Kenya and Uganda border. The use of ICT4 peace project has led to faster transfer of information from region to another. The HF radios have been used to transmit early warning information. Consequently, there have been success stories of conflict prevention because of the timely information received through the radio and telephone calls.

The study had three hypothesis which were tested which were, low utilisation of CEWARN on Kenya and Uganda border has led to continued conflict, political, economic, cultural and environmental factors have contributed to conflict and practical intervention by IGAD decision makers in implementation of CEWARN is the key to peace along the border.
Conflict prevention and management is important for peace, security and development. There is an urgent need, therefore, for sustained cross-border co-operation that goes beyond security issues and tackles the root causes of conflict.
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LOCATION OF THE KENYA UGANDA BORDER AND THE AREA OF STUDY

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABEK</td>
<td>Alternative Basic Education for Karamoja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAL</td>
<td>Arid and Semi-Arid Lands</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organization</td>
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<td>CECORE</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution</td>
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<td>CEWARN</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWERU</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPMR</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMOCS</td>
<td>Civil Military Organization Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>ERC</td>
<td>Economic Recovery Credit</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRC</td>
<td>District Peace and Reconciliation Committee</td>
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<td>EW</td>
<td>Early Warning</td>
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<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td>Early Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of Red Cross</td>
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<td>FBO</td>
<td>Faith Based Organization</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>RRF</td>
<td>Rapid Response Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>JVC</td>
<td>Joint Venture Committee</td>
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<td>KPIU</td>
<td>Karamoja Project Initiative Unit</td>
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<td>KPR</td>
<td>Kenya Police Reserve</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDU</td>
<td>Lords Defence Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPRC</td>
<td>Location Peace and Reconciliation Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOFAS</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRM</td>
<td>National Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>POKATUSA</td>
<td>Pokot Karamoja Turkana Sabiny Peace Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNV</td>
<td>Netherlands Development Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
<td>Teso Initiative for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WV</td>
<td>World Vision</td>
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DEFINITION OF KEY WORDS

An aimer is a group of 5 to 10 kraals. In each kraal, there exists a council to monitor the movement of Karachunas (warriors) in Karamoja and enforce discipline, identify criminals and hand them over to the government, disarm the undisciplined Karachunas and practise traditional punishment.

Conflict management refers to the transformation of conflict, either in the short-term or long-term, into a less damaging form of interaction or searching for temporary solutions that can prevent (re-) escalation of tensions which may lead to conflict.

Conflict is a confrontation between two or more social groups with clashing interests and incompatible goals.

Conflict prevention can be defined as those actions and policies which seek to prevent the emergence of violent conflict, and the identification of non-violent means of resolving conflict. This can be through stopping on-going conflict from spreading and deterring the re-emergence of violence.

Conflict resolution refers to the transformation, termination, reduction of violence, management/settlement of conflictual relationships by using academic, activist and diplomatic approaches.

Early warning is a conflict prevention strategy which is based on information which has been collected and analyzed to predict future action.

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Kenya and Uganda are situated in East Africa. They share common things because both had been colonized by the British. The Equator passes through the countries and Lake Victoria covers part of both countries. However, Uganda is in the heart of the Great Lakes region, and is surrounded by three of them, Lake Edward, Lake Albert, and Lake Victoria. While much of its border with Kenya is lakeshore, Uganda is landlocked with no access to the sea. Kenya borders the Indian Ocean and hence Uganda imports and exports through Kilindini harbour in Mombasa.

Despite being on the equator, Uganda is more temperate than the surrounding areas due to its altitude. The country is mostly plateau with a rim of mountains. This has made it more suitable for agriculture and less prone to tropical diseases than other nations in the region. The climate is tropical, generally rainy with two dry seasons (December to February, June to August).\(^2\) Kenya experiences different climatic conditions, but along the Kenya-Uganda border has equatorial climate with high rainfall throughout the year, mainly conventional. Temperatures are high with an annual average of about 26\(^0\)C. It is semi-arid in the northern part of Kenya and Uganda with high temperatures throughout the year, 21\(^0\)C to 28\(^0\)C, and prolonged dry season of over six months\(^3\).

Along the Kenya Uganda border, most residents of Busia District are ethnically Luhya. There is also a substantial population of Luo and Iteso residents. The main economic activity is trade with neighbouring Uganda. Away from town, the district economy is heavily reliant on

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\(^3\) Ibid
fishing and agriculture, with cassava, millet, sweet potatoes, beans, and maize being the principal cash crops. The border under study is the north west of Kenya and north east of Uganda. The border runs through the territory of a number of mainly pastoral communities, including the Sebei, Teso, Pokot, Turkana and Karimojong.

The Ugandan side of the border is known as the Karamoja region, which is divided into three districts: Nakapiripirit, which is largely occupied by a mix of Upe (Ugandan) Pokot and the Pian clan of the Karimojong; and Kotido and Moroto, which are occupied predominantly by the Jie and Matheniko clans of the Karimojong, respectively. The Kenyan side of the border is divided into West Pokot district, which is occupied mainly by Pokot, and Turkana district, which is occupied mainly by Turkana. At its northern most point, the border adjoins Sudan. At that point, the Ethiopian border is also not far away.\(^4\) The indigenous languages are the same in Uganda and Kenya border. Their economic activities range from nomadic pastoralism, peasant farming, fishing and retail trading.

There has been considerable conflict between these three groups on both sides of the Uganda-Kenya border for a long period. The nature of the conflict involves raids and theft of cattle and other property and the killing of those who resist.\(^5\) The conflicts have been exacerbated by the increasing availability of guns in the region, as well as environmental factors, such as drought. The Karamojong have been most often mentioned as the aggressors and the Sebei as the victims, though Sebei have also been accused of raiding, killing and arms trafficking. Some Sebei communities are primarily pastoralists (cattle-keeping) and others are farmers. More significantly, cattle are the primary measure of wealth for the Sebei and many surrounding tribes, and the easiest way to increase the size of a herd is to raid the


\(^5\)Ibid.
neighbouring tribe’s stock. Thus, Sebei men are constantly on the defensive against the raiders. Sometimes they raid themselves. These tribes along the Kenya and Uganda are armed and an effort to disarm them has not been very successful.

The major concern of this study, therefore, is to analyze the utilization of the implementation of CEWARN on Kenya and Uganda border conflict.

1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The idea of conflict prevention is not new. It was a dominant theme at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which put into effect a number of measures, such as mutual consultations, the establishment of neutral states and demilitarized zones and peaceful settlement of conflicts.6

Early warning and response systems began to be developed in Africa in the 1970s in order to deal with droughts and ensure food supplies in a timely fashion to avoid humanitarian disaster. By the 1990s, accelerated by the Rwandan genocide, early warning efforts expanded beyond natural disasters to include food security and refugees. Most recently, early warning efforts have been used to address prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts.7 The Horn of Africa in particular, over the past decades, has been one of the most fragile crisis regions in the world. It is characterized by a chronic mixture of war, breakdown of states, poverty, hunger and human misery.


The Horn is characterized by regionalized civil wars, by the reciprocal destabilization of neighbouring countries through the support of rebel groups, clashes between communities across borders and low intensity conflicts, such as cattle rustling, which spread beyond national borders. Since the region is haunted by conflicts, ranging from intra-state and inter-state to cross-border community conflicts, the seven member states (Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan) of IGAD created CEWARN. In a meeting of the Council of Ministers held in Khartoum in 2000, a decision was taken to establish CEWARN. The Council of Ministers of IGAD endorsed the Protocol Agreement in 2002, providing CEWARN with a legal entity and operational framework. The Protocol entered into force in July 2003. The rationale of CEWARN is to systematically anticipate violent conflicts and respond in a timely and effective manner. However, within the IGAD region, we find Somalia as a failed state, Sudan with wars and defying international conflict moderating action, Ethiopia and Eritrea in a state of no-peace-no-war and Kenya-Uganda cross-border conflicts.

The CEWARN Protocol states that the mandate of CEWARN is “to receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreaks and escalation in the IGAD region including livestock rustling, conflicts over grazing and water points, nomadic movements, smuggling and illegal trade, refugees, landmines and banditry” CEWARN was mandated by the Member States to commence monitoring and reporting only on cross-border pastoral conflicts. Thus, the success of CEWARN is limited to covering only one type of conflict.

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The Kenya and Uganda governments are signatories to CEWARN that seeks to strengthen mechanisms for conflict early warning and response. Besides, these two states continue to witness several conflicts internally and externally. This calls for a peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts and a forum under which the states can participate in resolution of disputes within the region. The insufficient implementation of CEWARN leads to real or imagined threats to peace and security which undermine efforts aimed at eliminating conflict along Kenya and Uganda border.

1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Although CEWARN was established in the IGAD region to systematically anticipate violent conflicts and respond in a timely and effective manner, Kenya-Uganda relations still experience varied cross-border conflicts. Effective early warning involves the collection and analysis of data in a uniform and systemized way and according to a commonly shared methodology. This requires the formulation and communication of analysis and policy options to relevant end users.⁹ Operationally, CEWARN established a network of field monitors, country coordinators, national research institutes and conflict early warning units at the national level.¹⁰

CEWARN’s main areas of concern include: livestock rustling, conflicts over grazing and water points, refugees, landmines, nomadic movements, banditry, smuggling and illegal trade. If the conflicts are ongoing this greatly interferes with Kenya-Uganda cordial relations.¹¹ The CEWARN Protocol states that the mandate of CEWARN is to receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and

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¹⁰ Wulf, Herbert, and Debiel, Tobias, *Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism; Tools for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Regional Organisation*. Crisis Research Center, Destin, 2009, p. 12.
¹¹ Ibid.
escalation in the IGAD region. However CEWARN was mandated by the Member States to commence monitoring and reporting only on cross-border pastoral conflicts.

The cross-border pastoral conflict was an area where member states were willing to cooperate and share information that would mitigate and not fuel existing conflicts. The main aim of the study is to assess the utilization of the implementation of CEWARN on Kenya and Uganda border conflict.

1.4 OBJECTIVES

The overall objective of this study is to assess the utilization of the implementation of CEWARN on Kenya and Uganda border conflicts.

The specific objectives of the study are:

(i) To establish the role of political, social, historical, economic, environmental and cultural factors in causing conflicts along the Kenya Uganda border.

(ii) To investigate the utilization of CEWARN on Kenya-Uganda border conflict.

(iii) To look at the practical intervention options available to IGAD decision makers for CEWARN implementation on Kenya-Uganda border.

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

(i) What are the political, social, historical, economic, environmental and cultural factors that have led to conflict to the people along Kenya Uganda border?

(ii) What is the scope of utilization of CEWARN activity on Kenya-Uganda border conflict?

(iii) What are the practical intervention options available for IGAD decision makers for CEWARN implementation on Kenya-Uganda border?

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1.6 JUSTIFICATION

The ongoing intermittent non-cordial relationship between Kenya and Uganda on issues of their borders is of grave concern. If this is not curtailed, it could plunge the two nations into violent conflicts. The study assessed the utilisation of the implementation of CEWARN on Kenya and Uganda border. The study will also analyze and rank practical intervention options available to IGAD decision makers for CEWARN implementation on Kenya-Uganda cross-border conflicts. The findings will be of great importance to IGAD decision makers who will assess the success of CEWARN on Kenya-Uganda border. The recommendations given will help IGAD seek intervention options for CEWARN’s full implementation in order to ensure peaceful relations between the Kenya-Uganda border communities. Besides, the findings will be used as reference by academicians and researchers especially in the area of conflict prevention and peace studies.

1.7 SCOPE AND LIMITATION

This study has been carried out among the conflicting communities along the Kenya and Uganda border points, mainly inhabitants on the border of North Eastern Uganda and North Western Kenya who are Karamojong, Pokots, Sebei, and Turkana. Our interest in these communities was distinctively occasioned by the fact that they have been fighting over the years. The research examined the utilization of conflict early warning system on these communities along Kenya and Uganda border. CEWARN has been mandated to receive information and share information of potential conflict as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region, undertake analysis of the information as well as develop case scenarios and formulate options for quick response.13

In the course of the research, I encountered the following limitations; first, the language barrier. I overcame this by using a research assistant, who comes from the area, and have full knowledge of the local language. His job was to help in translation during the interview sessions. Other times i interviewed people who could speak kiswahili.

Two, the area is remote and condition of the roads is poor. Indeed, some parts of the region are inaccessible. However, I used bodaboda motorbikes, but where these couldn’t operate, I persevered and trekked in order to reach the respondents.

Thirdly, owing to the fact that people in this region are generally reserved and suspicious of strangers and unfamiliar visitors, they were reluctant and unwilling to freely give the desired information. To counter this problem, I sought the help of village elders and the provincial administration, such as the chiefs, assistant chiefs, as well as the church leaders. I also interviewed Non–Governmental Organisation leaders. Those who couldn’t avail time to be interviewed physically, I interviewed them through telephone calls. Where this wasn’t successful, I e-mailed the questionnaire after which I followed up in order to get the responses.

1.8 LITERATURE REVIEW

This section considers articles, reports and books that have content on CEWARN, armed conflict, and conflict prevention.

In an article, “Emerging dimension of security in the IGAD region”, Ludeki Chweya recognises that nomadic economic activities are an important source of conflict over pasture
Pastoral communities criss-cross national borders in search of water and pasture and hence provoke conflicts with each other over claims of ownership of disputed resources. According to him, this criss-crossing of borders comes with the infiltration of firearms in the affected pastoral areas and communities, thus increasing their magnitude, frequency and the scale of atrocities. Conflict along Kenya and Uganda frontier is a case in point. He attributes this to competition over scarce resources. But he has hasn’t written anything on CEWARN activity on conflict prevention on the Kenya and Uganda border.

Kassujja notes that early warning is meant to prevent conflict, manage and resolve violent conflict. The author adds that monitoring conflict is a major concern. The Organization of Africa Unity established the Central Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution charged with the anticipation and prevention of situations of armed conflict as well as with undertaking of peace making and peace building. Continental Early Warning System has become the pillar of peace and security. But he has said nothing on the use of CEWARN in solving Kenya and Uganda border conflict.

It is instructive that both Adan and Ruto affirm that the type of conflict found in ASAL is banditry, livestock rustling, and land and resource conflict. They point to the root causes of conflict in ASAL as being resource scarcity, political instigation and policy failure, criminal profiteering and socio-cultural causes. Their study established that these conflicts have led to the closure of major livestock markets leading to a decline in trade, poor school

15 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
attendance, diseases, human deaths and casualties, drop in food production, loss of animals to raids and displacement.\textsuperscript{19} Despite the study being on the root causes of border conflict no attempt has been made to answer how CEWARN has been involved in this conflict prevention.

Tom Woodhouse looks at various points of view on conflict resolution and peace keeping. He raises questions on the effectiveness and usefulness of conflict resolution. Looking at the Kenya–Uganda border conflict, he argues that the approach in conflict resolution is flawed because the communities have continued to have conflict.\textsuperscript{20} He asserts that the model for conflict resolution assumes that conflicting parties would have common values, thus making it easier to resolve their differences. He concludes by saying that in conflict resolution all agents of peace should be prepared to incorporate change in order to bring peace.\textsuperscript{21} He has not explained how CEWARN has been involved in solving Kenya and Uganda border conflict.

Makumi Mwagiru looks at conflict management mechanisms, practice and strategies in fourteen countries in Africa. He gives a breakdown with over 20\% of the causes of conflict arising from political and economic reasons. Other causes, such as scarcity of resources, take up 80\%.\textsuperscript{22} He also adds that negotiation and mediation are among the most preferred modes of conflict resolution having resulted in mutual agreements and cease fires. However, the use of CEWARN in solving Kenya and Uganda border conflict has insignificant role.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid p. 14,16,&10
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
Anita Kiamba and Attiya Waris noted that women are very crucial in conflict and peace management. The fourth world conference on women in Beijing in 1995 called for the increased access by women to conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, and raised the consciousness of international policymakers about women’s role in peace and in creating conditions of trust and confidence among conflicting parties. Further, Resolution 1325 (2000) of the United Nations Security Council reaffirmed that gender perspective in conflict and conflict prevention and resolution needs to include measures that support women’s peace initiatives. At the implementation level, their resolution calls for the involvement of women in all implementation mechanisms of peace agreements and ensuring that the human rights of women and girls, particularly those related to constitutions and electoral systems. This is a watershed resolution that calls on states and all actors to ensure women’s full participation in peace processes. Kiamba and Waris conclude by saying that women appear to have a more holistic approach towards peace. As victims, survivors and even wagers of armed conflict, women are the major stakeholders in the resolution of conflict.

The involvement of women is important to the use of early warning systems because they can, through numerous women’s organizations, persistently advocate for peace. Women are the hands, voices, eyes and ears of the community and as such their integration is important. The authors, however, do not delve into the question of how CEWARN has been involved to solve Kenya and Uganda border conflict.

Godfrey Okoth notes the role of CEWARN. He points out that IGAD was formed to respond to the emerging challenges that the founder members experienced. There was a need for the

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24 Ibid.

Horn of Africa countries to combat desertification and drought which they faced. According to the realists, each state has its own interests which it seeks to achieve either by peace or force. When these interests are shared, the processes of interdependence and integration are realized. African boundaries were largely drawn a result of the Berlin Conference of 1884/85. In the process, people and resources were also divided. On realization that development could not take place unless there was peace, IGAD was formed to embrace these new issues. IGAD has concerned itself with intra-state and inter-state conflicts. He has not explained, however, how CEWARN has been involved in Uganda and Kenya border conflict.

Ciru Mwaura has maintained that the phenomenon of livestock warlord rivalry has now emerged, most notably in the Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda border area (particularly in the Pokot and Turkana communities). In Kenya, the Pokot have raided the Tugen, Marakwet, and Keiyo. They have also raided the Turkana and Karamajong of Uganda and the Toposa of Ethiopia. The warlords command small and well-equipped armies and, as Osamba reports, “have acquired more sophisticated weapons [as bandits] than those of government security forces; bandits have become administrators in northern Kenya." Patterns of conflict in the Horn of Africa in Mwagiru's words pose serious questions about the practices of its management and centralize the debate about creative conflict management. The authors have noted how the combination of all this has adversely affected the development of this region.

28 Mwaura Ciuru , ”Border Frontiers and Conflict in the Horn of Africa “.(Center for Conflict Research and Friedrich Ebert Foundation Conference on Borders, Frontiers and Conflict in Africa, Conference Papers 2001.)
In their study, Lionel Cliffe and Philip White have noted that, when it comes to rebellions and civil war, military "solutions" do have a role to play in resolving internal conflicts, but sustainable resolution is likely to demand some reshaping of the political system. In relation to border disputes and cross-border inter-community clashes, the existing approaches to prevention and management should give way to more transparent and institutionalized processes that are accordingly more sustainable.\(^{29}\) The authors have identified the way IGAD must be prepared to play more of a role in preventing inter-state wars by providing a forum for resolving systematic pattern of mutual intervention between states that continues to underpin much of the conflict afflicting the Horn, but they have said nothing on the involvement of CEWARN.

Ciiru Mwaura, Susan Schmeidl and Howard Adelman have confirmed that despite the fact that there are no formal and official early warning systems for pastoral conflict in the region, case-study findings indicate that local communities are often aware of an impending raid before it occurs.\(^{30}\) As we have seen, governments are often unable to access this information. Thus, there is a need to develop a more effective system of gathering, processing, and analyzing such information. The key to an effective system depends on collaboration between communities and governments. While broad issues revolve around resource competition (particularly land, and the lack of livelihood-specific development initiatives that are sophisticated and holistic enough to navigate the cross-border dimension of this issue), many resources involve mediation efforts by provincial administration systems, local governments,


foreign ministries, and community-based as well as inter-state actors. The fact that the authors have identified various ways of conflict prevention is reason enough to unravel the use of CEWARN in conflict prevention along Kenya-Uganda border.

1.9 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Human Needs Theory

The study will be based on Human Needs Theory developed by John Burton as a generic or holistic theory of human behaviour. He states that human beings have basic needs that have to be met in order to have stable societies. According to him, human participants in conflict situations are compulsively struggling in their respective institutional environments at all social levels to satisfy primordial and universal needs, such as security, identity, recognition, and development. They strive increasingly to gain the control of their environment that is necessary to ensure the satisfaction of these needs. This struggle cannot be curbed; it is primordial.

Burton further notes that there are fundamental universal values or human needs that must be met if societies are to be stable. This provides a non-ideological basis for the establishment of institutions and policies. Unless identity needs are met in multi-ethnic societies, unless in every social system there is distributive justice, a sense of control and prospects for the pursuit of all other human societal developmental needs, instability and conflict are inevitable. Thus, lack of fulfilment of the needs may be a cause of conflict.

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According to Mwagiru, human needs are the heart and the centre of all conflicts.\textsuperscript{35} Cantril Handley, on the other hand, considers the interplay between the individual and the society in terms of meeting basic needs.\textsuperscript{36} Handley notes that a viable society must provide for survival needs, security and achievement of satisfaction. He adds that an effective society enables an individual to develop loyalties and aspiration compatible with social values while at the same time taking into account individual differences.\textsuperscript{37} This theory can be applied to explain the causes of conflict along Kenya –Uganda border. Thus if the needs of water, food, pasture and others are not met conflict would be inevitable along the border.

**Conflict Resolution Theory**

Conflict resolution theory by John Burton can be used too in this research. Burton states that, “Conflict avoidance is not conflict resolution.”\textsuperscript{38} He distinguishes between conflict resolution, management and settlement. Management is alternative dispute resolution skills and can confine or limit conflict settlement ‘by authoritative and legal processes' and can be imposed by elites.\textsuperscript{39}

This theory further states that conflict resolution means terminating conflict by methods that are analytical and that get to the root of the problem. Conflict resolution, as opposed to mere

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid, p. 73.
management or 'settlement', points to an outcome that, in the view of the parties involved, is a permanent solution to a problem.\textsuperscript{40}

Conflict resolution is, in the long term, a process of change in political, social, and economic systems. It is an analytical and problem solving process that takes into account such individual and group needs as identity and recognition, as well as institutional changes that are required to satisfy these needs.\textsuperscript{41} This theory is relevant to this study since, if CEWARN involves Kenya and Uganda in conflict resolution and getting to the root of the problem, this would prevent future conflict.

1.10 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

(i) Low utilisation of Conflict Early Warning and Response Network on Kenya and Uganda border has led to continued conflicts.

(ii) Political, social, historical, economic, environmental and cultural factors have contributed to continued conflict along the Kenya and Uganda border.

(iii) Practical intervention by IGAD decision makers in the implementation of CEWARN is key to peace along Kenya-Uganda border.

1.11 METHODOLOGY

This study utilised secondary and primary data.

SECONDARY DATA

Secondary data was collected from books, reports, articles from scholarly journals and periodicals as well as newspapers, such as the Daily Nation and the East African Standard.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid, p.72.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p.71.
These were sourced from the libraries, such as Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library, as well as reports, publications and documents from NGOs working along the Kenya and Uganda border, such as World Vision International, National Council for Churches, UNICEF and ABEK. Internet websites with the relevant material on the subject have also be utilized. Document analysis was done to obtain the secondary data.

**PRIMARY DATA**

Primary data collection was done at Kenya National Archives. This involved looking at various reports and records in relation to conflicts along Kenya and Uganda border.

**Study design.**

Descriptive survey was used in this study. It is a method of collecting information by interviewing or administering a questionnaire to a sample of individuals. It can be used when collecting information about people’s attitudes, opinions, habits or any of the variety of educational or social issues. For the purpose of this study, a descriptive survey was utilized which helped me in assessing and describing the utilization of the implementation of CEWARN on Kenya-Uganda relations.

**Sampling strategy**

Purposive snowballing technique was used to pick the NGOs, CBOs, FBOs, MOFAs, Government officials and opinion leaders from the communities. This is the method where initial informants name other people who have desired characteristics for interview until the researcher gets the number of cases required. I interviewed the informants by the help of a

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questionnaire. The advantage of this method is that it gave the respondents complete freedom of response, thus providing an insight into their feelings, background, hidden motivation, interests and decisions. I asked questions thus guiding the informant to stick to the research questions and avoid unnecessary answers.

The other category of people who were interviewed involved the general population. These included women, youth and elders. I used the observation method of data collection in order to capture the non-verbal communication deemed useful in this research.

**Data schedule**

The following instrument was used: questionnaires for CBOs, NGOs and Government officials. Interviews of community opinion leaders were carried out.

**Data analysis**

The study was largely qualitative in nature. The qualitative approach recognises that anybody is capable of giving important information. Information was obtained from anybody with desired characteristics. Qualitative approach enabled the researcher to make use of records that were not necessarily meant for historical analysis and other useful information from informants from diverse background.

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CHAPTER TWO

CAUSES OF KENYA UGANDA BORDER CONFLICT AND EFFECTS.

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter looks at the causes of conflict along Kenya and Uganda border and its effects on the communities. The conflicts have become increasingly destructive and less manageable. The major causes of conflict among the pastoralists include, but are not limited to, intensified cattle rustling, proliferation of illicit arms, inadequate policing and state security arrangements, diminishing role of traditional governance systems, competition over control and access to natural resources, such as pasture and water, land issues, political incitements, ethnocentrism, increasing levels of poverty and idleness among the youth.

2.1 CAUSES OF KENYA –UGANDA CONFLICT

The conflict along Kenya and Uganda border is as old as the history of settlement in the region. During pre-colonial period, the relations between Karamonjong, Sebei and other tribes along the border can be described as being partly friendly and partly hostile. During this period, there was free movement of people and livestock in the region. The coming of British colonial rule introduced administrative units which separated the communities by creating boundaries and native districts which, therefore, restricted movements. The colonial administration intended to partition the territories for easier administration and on the other side of the coin, to divide the Africans in order to weaken their resistance.

Another conflict along the Kenya and Uganda border is on ownership of Migingo Island. In June 2004, according to the Kenyan government, Ugandan marine police pitched tent on the island and raised the Ugandan flag and that of their police department. Ugandan and
Kenyan police have since occupied the island at various times.\textsuperscript{46} Also a dispute flared in February 2009 when Kenyans living on Migingo were required to purchase special permits from the Ugandan government, sparking a diplomatic row between the two countries.\textsuperscript{47}

However much, if not most of the Ugandan protests, revolve around the lucrative fishing rights, mostly for valuable Nile perch, since Ugandan waters come within about 510 meters’ (1,670 ft.) of the island. In July 2009, the Ugandan government shifted its official position, stating that while Migingo Island was in fact Kenyan, much of the waters near it were Ugandan.\textsuperscript{48} The island had been claimed by the Ugandan government in 2008-2009 until 11 May 2009 when Ugandan President Museveni conceded that the island is in Kenya, but continued to point out that Kenyan fishermen were illegally fishing in Ugandan waters which lie about 510 meters to the west of Migingo.\textsuperscript{49} The Ugandan flag was lowered. Uganda withdrew its military troops and agreed that all its police officers would leave the island.\textsuperscript{50} A joint re-demarcation line of the border was launched on 2 June 2009 to recover and to place survey markers on land, making delineation of the boundary on the lake more precise. The results were released in late July 2009 confirming that the islands falls 510M (1,670 ft.) on the Kenyan side of the line.\textsuperscript{51}


\textsuperscript{49} “Kenyan MPs’ fury over island row”. BBC News (Africa), 13 May, 2009.


\textsuperscript{51} “New Vision Online: Ugandan Surveyors Return to Migingo”. New vision.co.ug Downloaded on. 23/08/2009
Amidst concerns that the dispute may affect cooperation between the two countries and within the East African Community, both Museveni and Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki voiced confidence that the dispute, including fishing rights, would be resolved amicably\(^52\).

There is inadequate policing of pastoralist areas at both the national and district level along the Kenya and Uganda border. The transformation of cattle raiding into a commercial and entrepreneurial activity has increased the intensity of raiding. This is leading to major changes in economic, social and political structures in the border area. It is creating a black market for commercial cattle trading that straddles the localities, urban areas and the wider region. Access to small arms has become essential to successful commercial cattle raiding. Since the mid-1990s, the main form of cattle raiding is driven by commercial considerations. There is a lot of evidence linking businessmen and politicians to this raiding.\(^53\) Some have suggested that some of the raided cattle meat from Samburu could be sold as far away as South Africa and Saudi Arabia. This implies that those trading cartels on a transnational scale are operating, probably using Lorries.\(^54\) The increasingly organized and militarized nature of commercialized cattle raiding in the Kenya-Uganda border area and its links to wider trading networks, many of them frankly criminal in character, means that the authorities face an uphill struggle to combat it. This struggle has been rendered all the more difficult because some politicians and officials have become part of that trade themselves.

Security forces are either unable or unwilling to confront cattle rustlers who have more often than not struck with impunity. State obligation and duty to provide security to her citizens is conspicuously under siege on the Kenya and Uganda border. This has greatly contributed to


\(^{54}\) Ibid.
the spiraling gun culture, self-defence and retaliation missions. The state arming of local vigilante groups, popularly known as Home Guards, in response to security problems has exacerbated the cattle rustling conflict rather than easing the situation.\textsuperscript{55} Legal state arms issued to these groups have been used in criminal activities, including cattle raiding.

The majority of women encourage their sons or husbands to take part in cattle raiding. One teacher noted that: “The system is the one that causes the problem of insecurity. The man wants to marry and needs the livestock to marry, so he has to go livestock raiding”.\textsuperscript{56} Women, of course, usually wish to be married and so are unlikely to object to men going on cattle raids. As Natesho says,

““There is a traditional belief that when one wants to marry the cows must come from elsewhere but not from the family herd. This encourages young men to go for raiding. Compounding the problem is the steady inflation of bride price.”\textsuperscript{57}

According to a research conducted in 2001 and 2002, the bride price in Pokot ranged from 15 to 30 cows. In Karimojong areas, the rate at the time was 30 cows if you were poor and 60 cows if you were rich. But among the Jie it was as high as 130 cattle without including small stocks (goats).\textsuperscript{58}

Karamojong custom decree that when a man is officially committed to a girl, he may lead a full married life with her, but the girl remains in her parent’s village until the bride price is paid in cattle.\textsuperscript{59} As Alema said,

“On the woman’s part, the non-payment of bride price condemns her to an uncertain and vulnerable status that she is unlikely to want to prolong for

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Oral interview with Natesho, Dorris, Farmer, Lugane Village,16/05/2013.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
example being in her parents’ home. If a woman is not married with cows she is not valued, any man can collect her and therefore women are commodities of trade.”

If a man is poor, no woman will agree to marry him. Demand for dowry, is a source of raids. This confirms that women have a more active role, for better or for worse, in supporting cattle raiding.

On the Kenya and Uganda border, the area experiences low rainfall. The drought season marks an important part of the annual calendar. It is one of the causes of conflict. Many areas affected by drought are arid and semi-arid areas. Under normal circumstances, these areas are low in resources and under substantial ecological pressure. When drought occurs in such arid areas, the living conditions of local people become very difficult. In these conditions, the land yields no crops and water is insufficient for human consumption as well. People compete for the available resources. Pastoral communities are an example of this. Pastoralists depend on their livestock (camels, cattle, sheep, and goats) and move from place to place with their livestock to look for usable pasture land and water. During a drought, their movement increases. Sometime, different pastoral groups move to the same place and want to use the same scarce resources, which cause conflicts between the two communities. There is a history of pastoral communities fighting for scarce resources along Kenya and Uganda border. Most of the conflicts in those areas were manageable, and tend to be resolved by elderly leaders through traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. However, these conflicts are exacerbated and more difficult to resolve when drought occurs.

The present conflict in Turkana in Northern Kenya is a case in point. The region is badly affected by drought. According to a World Food Program report, 3.5 million people are

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60 Interview with Alema, Angonde Regional Center Expert, Mbale, Uganda, 04/04/2013.
61 Ibid.
affected every year. People there are fighting for scarce resources. Drought worsens the conflict because people die from starvation, and they are also dying from conflict, as they fight for water and food. Families lose their livestock, which is their main source of livelihood. Subsequently, drought-affected people migrate into other parts of the country. This spreads the pressure on resources and results in conflict spreading into other areas as well. In addition, nomadic groups take their cattle to farmlands in search of pasture. Often there is a conflict between farmers and cattle herders, a situation that is still happening along Kenya and Uganda border.

Policies pursued by successive post-colonial governments in the Horn of Africa have failed to reduce the marginalisation of pastoralists from mainstream national development in most countries of the region. This is certainly the case with regard to the Kenya-Uganda border area. There has been a tendency to neglect the needs of pastoralists and even to envisage the gradual eradication of pastoralism. More attention has been paid to the interests of agriculture and urban dwellers. For example, West Pokot district in Kenya has seen the loss of much land to agriculturalists in recent years.62

The availability of small arms and light weapons along border areas where pastoral communities reside also contribute greatly to conflict. “Small arms and light weapons proliferation has made conflict along the Kenya and Uganda border more deadly and severe. Small arms including automatic and semi-automatic weapons have become widely available and are increasingly used in the pastoralist’s districts. These weapons have come from a variety of sources, including conflict prone neighbouring countries (Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia

and Northern Uganda). Each community is trying to arm itself creating a local “arms races” for self-defense in case of any attack.” 63

Arms ownership is regarded as necessary for the protection of one's community and livelihood in such areas, as they are situated in remote regions, far from the protection of regular state security. But the prevalence of arms also means the prevalence of armed conflict. The wide availability of arms, apart from being devastating in human loss, has altered the cultural foundations of many communities and erosion of traditional conflict-resolution mechanism. Arms-bearing youth being one of the most significant examples. Given the livelihood insecurity of communities in border areas, availability of arms has provided the means for communities to seek alternative livelihoods (inevitably violent ones), such as livestock rustling and banditry. Some sources estimate that there are 150,000 to 200,000 firearms in the Karamoja region of Uganda alone.64 While the exact number of small arms in the hands of pastoral communities is difficult to assess, it is clear that the threat posed by them is enormous.

A demand in 1999 by some parliamentarians from Teso District in Uganda for the disarmament of the Karamojong was opposed by others, who argued that their constituents, who had borne the brunt of Karimojong raids, be given guns to defend themselves.65 On March 2000, President Museveni was reportedly present when assortments of weapons were given to the people of Teso district to defend themselves against Karamojong raiders. It was

63 Mkutu, Kennedy, Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms Kenya –Uganda Border Region. Safeworld Bradford University, pp. 29-33
64 Ibid
65 Ibid.
also reported that each district had been required to provide 700 youths for training by the army.

Border regions are characterized by weak state structures. As in the colonial days, security considerations dominated in official thinking traditional governance systems. The exception is Kenya where chiefs and community leaders are state appointed. The areas have few roads, rendering it extremely difficult if not hazardous to communicate between these authorities and the rest of the country on either side of the common borders. This situation has serious implications for security in general and maintenance of law and order. Social services, like education, health, and veterinary services are depleted. Communities along these borders suffer from the effects of severe social neglect and economic underdevelopment. As Stephen says,

“Children don’t go to School. They spend their time grazing their family herd from place to place, especially the boys, while the girls do home chores when there is no conflict. During war times they are forced to move away for safety with their family members.”

This is a double failure on the part of post-independence governments in Kenya and Uganda. Corruption is rife and officials are themselves sometimes involved in the illegal activities that they are supposed to be preventing. Paulin Isura, a Pokot living on the Ugandan side of the border, observed that:

“Government Administration and chiefs are involved; it is well know that some get 10 per cent of the loot, and so will not expose the culprits no matter how much the community identifies them. I am shocked at such activities by government administrators. Why can’t they have a rule so that if the communities point them out they will be sacked?”

Pokot living on the other side of the border confirmed in the same year that the situation was the same for them too. They claimed that most chiefs, who are government administrators,

66 Oral interview with Barasa, Stephen, Bridge Academy Manager, Kimilili, 04/04/2013.
colluded with members of their communities to conceal cattle raiders and used irregular methods to avoid the prosecution of any suspects. In some cases, chiefs took a share of the stolen animals.  

There is a high rate of unemployment among youths (Karacuna) caused by the lack of economic opportunities that attract the strong, energetic, tough and ready young men in Karamoja. This leads to insecurity. As Ogati says,

“The youth are the actual actors of conflict. Apart from the expected material gain, youth portray their heroism through raids. The community recognizes the ‘successful youth’. Cowardice is despised. Heroes are rewarded as follows: Samburu Traditional dances are performed in praise of the heroes. Special copper bangles are given to those who manage to kill the ‘enemy.’ Turkana heroes are given a rousing welcome and are showered with praises through traditional dances. Their bodies are tattooed in a special way. In some Turkana clans those who manage to kill an enemy are given a new name.”

Land privatization has pushed pastoralists into smaller areas, fuelling disputes and insecurity. Pressure on land and other resources has grown due to the increasing regularity and severity of drought, leaving many pastoralists dependent on food aid. Besides, cattle raiding is carried out on an increasingly large scale and has become commercialized. Some of the businessmen involved are assuming the characteristics of local warlords.

Adequate arrangements to enhance communities’ resilience to cope with severe droughts and other disasters have not been undertaken along Kenya and Uganda border. During droughts, pastoralist livelihoods become particularly precarious. There are worrying incidences of conflict over scarce water and pastures during dry spell, which could last for as long as eight months. Economic insecurity and deprivation during drought has increased the risk of

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69 Oral interview with Area chief, Ogati Agiatita, Malaba border, 4/04/2013.
violence and social breakdown. Approximately 2 million people are affected by conflict either directly or indirectly, the majority being the pastoralists.

The erosion of traditional governance institutions among the pastoralist communities along Kenya and Uganda border has weakened the ability of community elders to exercise control over young men. Indeed, ‘eldership’ can now be attained by wealth, and youth are often well positioned to attain wealth if they can gain access to guns. Elders now have to ‘negotiate’ with such youth in a way that has not been the case in the past. Thus, they have had limited effect and power to solve conflict. Governance structures since independence have usually been either entirely absent or weak. Police on both sides are poorly paid and unable effectively to control movements across the Kenya-Uganda border. Co-operation, collaboration and co-ordination are relatively uncommon unless a raid takes place.

Traditional structures have been undermined by the authorities without ‘modern ‘alternatives being established to replace them. In some cases, there is confusion because many Pokots have to face customary law of killing somebody at the same time as the modern legal system of the courts. They cannot come home because of lapai (the requirement to pay compensation of 60 cows) while under state law they face murder charges. Bishop Kewasis said that the administration must understand how the Pokot operate and how they obey the system in place because the youth and elders should never contradict each other.

The overarching issue is that of governance, and the key challenge is in addressing the manner in which states have responded (or in most cases not) to underlying causes of violent

70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
conflicts. Government responses have usually been reactive, characterized by use of force (indiscriminate in many cases) in the face of insecurity. This has gone hand in hand with systematic neglect of pastoral communities. How can the state manage population movements, mediate community relationships, and ease trade across borders? One needs a border regime of utmost flexibility that facilitates cross-border movement and trade while reducing the immense ecological problem.

2.2 EFFECTS OF CONFLICT ON THE COMMUNITIES LEAVING ALONG KENYA-UGANDA BORDER

Conflict along Kenya Uganda border has had a negative effect on the communities along the border. This has led to a great deal of suffering. Conflict along the Kenya and Uganda has a lasting effect on the inhabitants. Many people have been killed, leaving their families helpless. In some, a whole family is wiped out with no one to continue with the lineage.

By the same token, conflict has been a contributing factor to drought-led famine. A government that engages in armed conflict has a high military expenditure. Shifting scarce resources to the military budget always weakens critical development needs of a country. When the government's full attention is on the conflict, it cannot pursue drought leading to death of individuals and families. Conflict makes life a constant process of adapting to basic insecurity and permanent crises for the generations caught up in war. Besides, conflict along Kenya and Uganda border has prevented people from meeting their basic needs by destroying crops, land and the environment.

Civilians, mostly women and children, bear the brunt of conflict accounting for over 80 percent of war victims. Conflicts contribute to the "feminization of poverty." Women are not
as mobile as men, do not have the same access to credit and resources, and must assume
men’s responsibilities in addition to their own. Women have taken up the roles of being head
of the family, when their husbands are killed during conflict. As one informant said,

“During conflict only the men are killed and women are left. You can
find that only women and children are left in a village after the
conflict.”73

Conflict and militarization has imposed special burdens on children. When parents are killed
during the war, children are orphaned and others become homeless. We have child headed
families. War impairs physical and mental development of children, destroys schools, and
immerses children in a culture of violence, causing desperation that forces children to pick up
a gun before they reach adulthood. As Pastor Stephen says,

“A major effect of conflict is displacement of families. All the
displaced people squat at trading center before they know
their next move.”74

There is a historical trend in banditry and cattle rustling in Karamonjong, Sebei and Pokot.
This has resulted in large numbers of livestock being stolen, people being killed, families
being displaced and enmity between different communities. In most cases, there was little or
no effort by the government to compensate the losses resulting from raiding and banditry.
Armed cattle rustlers of the Karamojong ethnic group, pastoralists with a long tradition of
raiding cattle, conducted raids in 2003 in Katakwi, Kotido, Kumi, Nakapiripirit, Moroto,
Kaberamaido, Pader, Lira, and Kapchorwa Districts in the northeast. These raids resulted in
more than 1,800 deaths, including the deaths of relief workers, and the displacement of
30,000 persons.75 On May 30, Karamojong warriors killed World Vision Coordinator Davis
Chelangat along Moroto-Nakapiripirit Road. In an effort to stop the killing of civilians by

73 Oral Interview with Pastor Pius of the Lords Celebration Church, Miamba, Malaba county, 16/05/2013.
74 Interview with Pastor Stephen Opanga Fountain of Life Church, Malaba, 04/04/2013.
Karamojong warriors, the Government continued its Karamoja disarmament programme. UPDF forces killed numerous persons during clashes with armed Karamojong warriors, too. As well, Pokot warriors from Kenya killed more than 60 civilians.  

As Ronald says,

Many people have been displaced by conflicts and women have been Widowed, further increasing their vulnerabilities to poverty and human right abuses.

Rights of the displaced people have been grossly violated. There is a strong correlation between displacements and increased rape cases, physical assaults, prostitution, growing number of street urchins and child labour. Most of the people have been impoverished, leading to destitution and high dependence on relief food.

Conflict along the border has destroyed society’s social fabric and coping mechanisms. When civilians are direct targets or affected bystanders, returning to normal community life can take years following the deliberate destruction of social institutions and ways of life. War disrupts the support provided by wider family and kinship systems, exacerbates divisions between groups, increases intra-group insecurity and hostility, and disrupts inter-group economic relations.

War removes the resource base on which populations depend, leading to asset depletion and displacement which are especially debilitating to pastoral and farming communities. Conflict along Kenya and Uganda has led to the destruction of physical and social infrastructure,

76 Ibid.
human capital, and local economic institutions. Killings have led to insufficient labour for productive work. Besides, it has disrupted trade and economic activity.

Conflict sows bitterness amongst neighbours and division between communities. The Sebei staying along Kenya and Uganda are farmers and pastoralists. Cattle are the primary measure of their wealth. Sebei men are in constant defence against raiders and sometimes even raid amongst themselves. Enmity is so enormous that at times brothers become enemies. In the month of December 2010, a total of 71 violent incidents were recorded in the Karamoja Cluster, causing 103 deaths and loss of 6,290 livestock in Kenya. On the Ugandan side of the Karamoja Cluster there were 43 recorded violent incidents, 89 deaths and loss of 4,807 livestock. This leaves a lasting impact especially if their only form of wealth is stolen.

Conflict along the border has led to the destruction of social amenities already put in place. For example, the education system is affected when teachers are forced to withdraw from conflict stricken areas and the communities re-locate their settlements for fear of being invaded. Education for children and the youth is affected and interrupted both in the short and long run. Furthermore conflicts affect development and provision of essential services in pastoralist areas through disruption of the communities and livelihood systems by restricting access to natural resources and marketing systems. Conflict encourages the spread of diseases through raiding of infected animals. This is in addition to loss of livestock that is the main source of livelihood for the pastoralists.

There has been disruption of normal migratory patterns, leading to unsustainable utilization of natural resources as livestock tend to be concentrated in insecure areas resulting in environmental degradation. Well-watered areas with good pasture are avoided due to insecurity. The authoritarian approach to conflict resolution without understanding the real causes and disregarding the traditional methods for conflict resolution leads to escalation of the problem rather than reduction. There is an increase in diseases, e.g. malaria, diarrhea, amoebae, coughing, when people are exposed to cold weather outside, plus drinking of dirty and stagnant water. Conflicts result in hunger and because there is no food, problems like prostitution spring up as well. This of course leads to a rapid spread of HIV/AIDS, especially amongst young boys and girls. The raids also lead to congestion of people in a safe area resulting to disease outbreak, such as tuberculosis, dysentery, and kwashiorkor.

Conflict also acts as a disincentive to investment by the communities and development agencies, both in the long-term and short-term. At the local level, a lot of effort and funds go to contain conflicts and mitigate against conflict-related effects rather than being used for development work. At the regional level, conflicts act as a disincentive to inter-state integration and development. Conflict worsens political inequalities, for example, when the powerful are enriched by stealing assets or when poverty affects a group’s ability to exercise human rights. Democratic institutions are compromised when conflict suppresses press freedoms and civil rights.

Conflicts inflict costs on governments, donor institutions, and other outsiders. Conflicts divert scarce international resources into relief and reconstruction. The risky situation during conflict damages the local community development as the presence of road bandits affects
the construction of local infrastructures. It becomes difficult for children to go to school due to the conflict situation. Also mobile populations cannot access social services from government and national programmes. The quality of life of the population decreases. This fact is related with two main consequences of the conflict, spread of diseases through cattle raids and inability to travel to the markets due to road ambushes. 79

There is also a serious food shortage among the pastoral communities displaced by conflict along the border. Those hard hit are the displaced who live in the displacement camps. Women and children are the ones who bear the brunt of these forms of violence. Many of them go without food for days. They depend on wild fruits which are scarce and seasonal. Cases of malnutrition are rampant in these conflict prone districts, as communities' traditional diet consisting of meat, milk and blood becomes increasingly unavailable. Some have died of starvation.

2.3 CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated that violent conflicts have had very negative and severe impacts on the communities living along Kenya and Uganda border. These include loss of human life, destruction of property, displacements of large segments of the communities, disruption of socio-economic activities and livelihoods, Two, there is increased hatred between communities, environmental degradation and threat to water catchments areas. Increased economic hardships as a result of loss of livelihoods, high levels of starvation and malnutrition among the displaced groups and unprecedented dependency syndrome on relief food are the main negative impacts of the increasing and severe inter-ethnic armed conflicts on Kenya and Uganda border.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MANDATE OF CEWARN AND ACTORS WORKING WITH CEWARN.

3.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter looks at the mandate of CEWARN, various activities undertaken by CEWARN and the actors working with CEWARN. CSOs (including NGOs and community-based organisations) reach the poor or represent their needs and interest through various types of activities, including service delivery, representation of their interests, capacity building/strengthening, mobilization as well as sensitization.

3.1 CEWARN MANDATE AND ITS ACTIVITIES IN KENYA AND UGANDA.

CEWARN is a collaborative effort of the seven IGAD member states of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. One of IGAD’s programmes targeted mitigating and preventing violent conflicts in the sub-region. Since its establishment in 2002, CEWARN has been functioning with a particular focus on cross-border pastoralist and related conflicts.

CEWARN is guided by its vision of “Empowering stakeholders to prevent violent conflicts.” The mission is to establish itself as an effective and sustainable sub regional mechanism that undertakes conflict early warning and response, fostering cooperation among relevant stakeholders so as to respond to potential and actual violent conflicts in the IGAD region and contributing to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the sub region.

In January 2002 the Council of Ministers signed a Protocol agreement. CEWARN was mandated,
'To receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region, undertake analysis of the information and develop case scenarios and formulate options for response.'

Through its national network of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, CEWERUs, NRIs and FMs, CEWARN undertakes its conflict early warning and response function in three clusters or pilot areas. These are the Karamoja Cluster (covering the cross-border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda); the Somali Cluster (covering the cross-border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia) as well as the Dikhil Cluster (covering the cross-border areas of Djibouti and Ethiopia)

The Kenyan national Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism has a system of peace and conflict monitoring that allows it to receive and analyze information from its peace actors (local peace structures) that operate across the country as well as the media. The system uses innovative systems including SMS messages and use of social networking websites, such as twitter and face book, to get information from the public domain that could be used to avert crises. It also runs a website that allows the public to post information and multimedia content called Amani Kenya@108. The national Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit of Kenya held an official launching ceremony of the national Early Warning and Response System on 25th November, 2010 in Nairobi, Kenya.

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Rapid Response Fund (RRF) was rolled out in Kenya in August 2009. The RRF is a multi-donor basket fund setup by CEWARN to support local peace building initiatives to avert and or de-escalate pastoralist and related violent conflicts in CEWARN’s areas of reporting. The fund enables CEWARN to directly support specific categories of community-level early response projects including community dialogue as well as capacity building projects among others. As Irene Tulel said,

“Rapid response fund has been very helpful. The money is used for transport especially by elders when they are going for peace meeting, to buy them lunch and pay for accommodation if they are rescinding in a hotel”.

CEWARN in collaboration with INWENT (a German based NGO) conducted a training of trainers on Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution for the CEWARN Mechanism’s stakeholders from 24 -27 September 2009 in Addis Ababa. Twenty participants drawn from members of national CEWERU structures in the IGAD sub-region, Country and Assistant Country Coordinators as well as other professionals engaged in peace work in the sub region, were trained on CPMR related subjects including communication, conflict analysis, facilitation and mediation. This included the officials from Kenya.

USAID/EA provided USD 500,000 to support CEWARN’s sub-region to prevent cross-border pastoralist and related conflicts. Agreement relating to the support was signed by the USAID/East Africa’s Acting Regional Director, Larry Meserve, and the Inter-governmental Authority on Development’s Executive Secretary, Eng. Mahboub Maalim on 22 September 2009 in Nairobi. The aim was to ensure that the Horn of Africa Region has conflict mitigation and response policy options to decision-makers through national Conflict Early

82 Oral interview with Irene Tulel 6/12/2013 in Nairobi.
83 CEWARN Communication Unit, The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) “Empowering Stakeholders to Prevent Violent conflict” Participants of the 7th meeting of the Technical Committee on Early Warning and Response. Addis Ababa Ethiopia, 30 Nov-1 Dec’09, p.3.
84 Ibid.
Warning and Response Units in IGAD member states. CEWARN’s priority as well was to strengthen its national and local level structures (including national Conflict Early Warning and Response Units and District Peace Committees) that play a key role in conflict mitigation and response activities.

On November 16,\textsuperscript{th} 2009, the study on livestock identification, traceability and tracking was jointly commissioned by CEWARN and the Mifugo programme of the Security Studies in Nairobi Office.\textsuperscript{85} The objective of the study was to undertake a comprehensive study of livestock identification, traceability and tracking as a mechanism for preventing livestock raiding related to violent conflicts among pastoralist communities in the sub-region and Tanzania. The study also sought to investigate and consolidate the place of livestock identification (including branding) in preventing, combating and eradicating cattle rustling as stipulated in the recently signed “Protocol for the Prevention, Combating and Eradication of Cattle Rustling in Eastern Africa” by the Member States.\textsuperscript{86} The study recommended, amongst other things, harmonized regional approach for livestock identification and traceability systems that would take into consideration the various levels of development of the livestock industry as well as extensive public education campaigns on livestock identification and traceability. This would reduce the cattle rustling problem among the pastoral communities along Kenya and Uganda border.

CEWARN organised a training of trainers on use of radio equipment for trainees coming from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. These trainees were expected to conduct the same training in their respective countries to persons who will be using the equipment as part of

\textsuperscript{85} CEWARN Communication Unit, \textit{The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) “Empowering Stakeholders to Prevent Violent Conflict “Addis Ababa Ethiopia , October/November 2009 Bumper Issue 23, p.3.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
CEWARN’s ICT 4 Peace Project. The ICT for Peace project was aimed at improving communication amongst CEWARN’s key players at the community and national levels and, in turn, improving CEWARN’s conflict early warning and response work. Through this project, communications equipment, including HF radios, were provided to CEWARN’s Field Monitors and District Peace Committees with the aim of improving the flow of early warning and response information. The project was supported by USAID/EA targeting the Karamoja Cluster – covering cross border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. The training was conducted on 14th January 2010 in Nairobi in collaboration with Novacom Ltd. In conflict-prone areas in the Karamoja cluster and other CEWARN areas of operation had very poor communications infrastructure. In all the four countries in the Karamoja Cluster in particular, there was no telecommunications coverage including Turkana areas in Kenya and Karamoja areas in Uganda. As Raymond says,

Use of radio has been very significant in relying information of upcoming raids. The continuous gathering of field data, analysis and the monitoring of conflict and peace trends has enabled the production of regular reports which highlight on the causes and dynamic of conflicts and peace in the pilot areas and provides actionable response options to governments and non-governmental institutions.

CEWARN held a two-day consultative meeting with the national Steering Committee of Kenya/ national Conflict Early Warning Response Unit from 30 -31 March 2010 in Nairobi, Kenya. The consultative meeting was aimed at reviewing CEWARN/ Kenyan national CEWERU activities in the Karamoja and Somali Clusters and consulting on the way forward in terms of improved effectiveness in mitigation of cross-border pastoralist and related

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87 CEWARN Communication Unit, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) “Empowering Stakeholders to Prevent Violent Conflict” Addis Ababa Ethiopia, July/ August 2010 Issue no. 29, p. 3.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Oral interview with Raymond Kitevu 7/12/2013 in Nairobi.
conflicts. The Permanent Secretary for Provincial Administration and Internal Security in the Office of the President, Mr. Francis Kimemia, who was the guest of honour at the meeting, commended the efforts of CEWARN in peace building in the Karamoja and Somali Clusters in Kenya.\(^9\) He also informed the meeting that Kenya was at an advanced stage of developing a national Conflict Early Warning system model that would have a national scope and would cover all types of conflicts. He further stated that the system would be piloted in selected districts prior to its replication across the country.

CEWARN in collaboration with VRA based in USA conducted a two-day training on the CEWARN Reporter to CEWARN staff and CEWARN Country and Assistant Country Coordinators from Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda from 30 -31 August 2010 at the CEWARN Office in Addis Ababa.\(^9\) The CEWARN reporter is a software tool that serves in the systematic storage and analysis of CEWARN’s early warning data. The training involved reviewing the setting of the CEWARN Reporter in line with the current dynamics of pastoral and related conflicts in the sub-region. The training also touched on quality assurance of early warning data as well as utilization of the software’s new visual features including maps and graphs. According to Mr. Doug Bond and Mr. Sean Yeo from VRA, the tools would enable conflict analysts to make compelling presentation of conflict and peace trends in CEWARN’s areas of reporting to decision makers.\(^9\)

In Uganda the 6th Technical Committee on Early Warning and Response held a two day meeting from 24-25 November, 2008 and discussed a number of technical issues regarding the operations of the Mechanism. Technical experts from the national early warning units,

\(^{91}\) Ibid.


\(^{93}\) Ibid.
civil society representatives and country coordinators attended the meeting which reviewed CEWARN’s activities and received analyses of early warning information collected during the year. The meeting was officially opened by the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uganda, HE Ambassador James Mugume.

Training for trainers workshop was held on August 2008, where a pool of trainers were trained and introduced to the Manual. A planning meeting was held on November 26, 2008. CEWARN team paid a visit to USAID offices in Kampala, Uganda where they held fruitful discussions with the head, Randy Harris and his team on issues of mitigation of conflict in northern Uganda. In attendance was the Country Coordinator, Joseph Muhumuza, and the CEWERU head, Samuel Luuvuuma, Paul McDermott of the USAID EA regional office and CEWARN staff. There was sharing of information on the operations of the national CEWERU, the CEWARN early warning information networks in Uganda and the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme coordinated by the government of Uganda. In July 2009 Bukwo District Peace Committee handed to the Kenyan authorities over 280 cows of Pokot of Kenya which had strayed into Riwo sub-county, Bukwo district.  

CEWARN hosted the 4th Quarterly Technical Meeting on the operationalisation of the African Union’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) at the Sheraton Hotel in Kampala, Uganda from 24-25th November 2009. The meeting received progress reports from African Regional Economic Communities in terms of developing early warning systems and representatives consulted on how best they can enhance information sharing and harmonizing.

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their early warning systems. Other key items on the agenda included developing guidelines on how to share early warning information.

3.2 ACTORS WORKING WITH CEWARN

3.2.1 CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS

Various CSOs in Uganda and Kenya have been involved in a number of good economic policy debates with government officials. Donors have in some cases provided support for advocacy and conflict-resolution activities.

DANIDA through Health and Road Sector Support Programme supports the Moroto District Council to achieve its objectives in the area of healthcare delivery, financial management (capacity building), road network system in addition to managerial and information communication capacity building. UNICEF supports health services, education and child rights in Moroto district and operates in the selected sub-counties of Lopei, Nadunget, Lotome and Ngoleriet in the areas of: rights to child health and nutrition; rights to schools and community water, sanitation and hygiene; HIV/AIDS and rights to self protection; rights of children in armed conflict and child friendly basic education in particular, Alternative Basic Education participatory planning, and guinea worm eradication activities and ERC II in feeder roads.

Save the Children-Norway through ABEK and National Council for Children contribute to education and in child development, advocacy and participatory planning. World Vision International Uganda through POKATUSA dealt with conflict management and the Karamoja Agro-pastoral Development Programme has supported activities in food security, conflict resolution, water management, animal health and civil society
empowerment. World food programme is concerned with emergency food relief after conflict.

Some CSOs have entered into Tripartite Agreement with District Local Governments and one such agreement has been made between SNV and the Karamoja Programme for capacity building of the districts. This includes training and provision of logistical support to the district. CSO peace interventions include peace meetings in the region under the Office of the Resident District Commissioners of all six districts on the Ugandan side of the Karamoja Cluster. They support and facilitate disarmament meetings and review meetings both at district and regional levels as well as supporting NGOs/CBOs in peace education and training of peace teachers on mentality change. They train peace educators/facilitators and conduct peace crusades in all the sub-counties like in Moroto district, facilitate sporting events like bicycle and cross country rallies and football competitions among the youth in the entire sub-counties of Moroto. They offer prizes to the winning teams, support cross-border peace races under Tegla Loroupe Peace Foundation in both Moroto and Kapenguria in Kenya, plus supporting and facilitating peace exchange visits among Karimojong businessmen to the Turkana community of Kenya.

OXFAM has intervened in the areas of CPMR and pastoral development activities by building capacities of partner CBOs that are involved in the promotion of pastoral livelihoods, building capacities of community animal health workers, giving support in form of grants for income generating activities to the farmer groups, such as support given to the farmers Association and vulnerable groups. Rikitae Women’s Group in Panyangara Sub-county, Kotido district was provided with start-up capital for a communal shop, facilitated organizations in grain banking so that they start village and
parish grain stores to combat food insecurity. They also gave agricultural inputs, such as tools and seeds, to farmer groups to increase agricultural production.\textsuperscript{95} Oxfam supports district peace initiatives through organizing cross-border meetings, and inter-NGO peace coordination as well as supporting civil society groups in the county of Dodoth.

Action Aid International Uganda through its agency Kapchorwa/Bukwo Women in Peace Initiative has supported Sabiny and Pokot cross-border peace initiatives since 2003. At first Action Aid International engaged KWIPi in its activities without directly funding its activities. However, in 2004 Action Aid supported the administration component of KWIPi which included office establishment and the launch of KWIPi as a CSO. In 2005, Action Aid started direct funding of KWIPi. A Memorandum of understanding between Action Aid and KWIPi was subsequently officially signed in 2006. KWIPi’s activities in CPMR involve conducting peace education and awareness creation among the leaders on peace building and conflict resolution. Awareness creation was on the dangers of negative cultural and traditional practices leading to conflicts like revenge. KWIPi facilitated spiritual growth empowerment among communities affected by conflict for social transformation and capacity building of peace committees. Through Action Aid International, KWIPi has been able to collaborate with both political and civil leadership of Kenya and Uganda, hold peace meetings between the two communities, recruit and form peace operation committees, facilitate and design peaceful means of resolving conflicts in the affected communities.

Kotido Peace Initiative is a faith-based organization, registered under NGO Board in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Uganda in 2004. It covers three districts of Kotido, Abim and

\footnote{Muhunuza John and Tuhairwe Bataringaya, Dennis, \textit{Mapping of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) involved in Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Work in the Ugandan-side of the Karamoja Cluster.} Report Submitted to CEWARN/IGAD, Addis Ababa, October, 2009, p. 26.}
Kaabong. It has carried out a wide range of activities with regard to CPMR, such as capacity building of elders, conflict resolution skills, including sensitization of communities on the value of peace and organizing chattel mediation meetings between hostile groups. About 90 elders have acquired training of trainers skills in conflict resolution. Sports for peace was used by encouraging former armed warriors who were now disarmed to get involved in sports as a way of exercising their talents. Through sports, warriors interact with their neighbours for friendship and reconciliation. Drama group also involved the warriors, who were youth and women. They composed peace songs and drama to change the warriors attitudes.

KOPEIN has involved the communities in practically opening a road that connects Kotido district to Kenya. Here KOPEIN collaborated with a sister NGO called Lokado in Kenya. The road is meant to enhance interaction between the two cross-border ethnic groups through contacts and business. The communities were involved in the construction for payment, hence the road construction was a source of a complementary livelihood.

Centre for Conflict Resolution is an NGO registered in Uganda based in Kampala and was founded in 1995. It extends its services to the Ugandan side of Karamoja. It has a long history of pursing CPMR activities mainly through education and training in peace education and conflict prevention and resolution skills, media and peace building, capacity building, research documentation and information dissemination, among others. The organization has contributed towards consolidating peace efforts in Teso and Karamoja through its project “Hands across the Border.” CECORE with its partner organization Teso Initiative for Peace (hereafter TIP) and with support from GTZ held a series of

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96 Ibid, p.28.
consultative and training workshops for a cross-section of the communities in Teso and Karamoja. It also organized tour visits of the key cattle rustling commanders, kraal leaders and representatives from Teso and took them to the cross border neighbouring countries of DR Congo and Rwanda to witness how local communities interact peacefully in their day-to-day activities. It has trained the youth in schools in the whole of Karamoja region in peace-building and conflict transformation skills.

3.3 CONCLUSION

This chapter shows that CEWARN has created awareness among government, civil society actors and other stakeholders regarding the intensity and magnitude of cross border pastoral conflict. CSOs, including NGOs/CBOs and donors, have been contributing directly or indirectly to conflict prevention, management and resolution and also in improving the quality of life of people on the Ugandan side of Karamoja and Kenya. They are also involved in education, health, children’s rights, HIV/AIDS, hygiene and road construction.
CHAPTER FOUR
CEWARN DATA AND ITS UTILISATION

4.0 INTRODUCTION
CEWARN data has been very significant in conflict prevention along Kenya and Uganda border. This chapter assesses the challenges CEWARN is facing and the options available to CEWARN decision makers.

4.1 CEWARN DATA AND ITS UTILISATION
There are various incidences when CEWARN data has been used to prevent conflict.

On the 21st May, 2008 the Pokot elders of Horichor parish, Achorichor Sub-County, Pokot County, Nakapiripirit district got information that some Pokot young boys went to Moroto district and raided the Matheniko warriors. The captured Matheniko animals were 7 head of cattle and 3 donkeys. The elders, after learning of this incident, invited the CEWARN Field Monitor Pokot AOR to talk to the young warriors, commonly referred to as Karachuna, about the dangers involved in cattle rustling.

The CEWARN FM for Pokot AOR talked to the young raiders about the dangers involved in cattle rustling and how the Matheniko warriors were going to organize for a counter raid to re-stock their herd. The FM educated them on how this might lead to deaths and loss of property and above all, how this creates a vicious cycle of violence. The young Pokot warriors having listened attentively surrendered the raided animals voluntarily and promised not to engage again in cattle rustling. The recovered animals were handed back to the rightful

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Matheniko owners with the assistance of the army. Two guns that were used by the young Pokot warriors in the raid were also handed over to the army.

This was a successful story that was achieved through cooperation of the elders, young warriors, the army and CEWARN FM. This can work as a learning lesson that slowly through education and sensitization success can be achieved. The challenge however is how to keep the momentum going and how to make the young warriors, Karachuna, keep their word.

The CEWARN Field Monitor for Pokot area of reporting, Nakapiripirit district, on the 22nd September, 2008 received a telephone call from a UPDF soldier called Lieutenant Sunday Okot based in Nakoit. The message was that a large group of Pian warriors was seen crossing to Pokot area and their movement looked suspicious. The Field Monitor after receiving the information by telephone decided to call the chairpersons of the peace committees of Achorichor, Abiliyep and Loroo parishes informing them about the suspicious Pian warriors who were seen crossing to their areas. After getting the news, people started alerting the villager. Pian warriors were coming to attack them but they were ready.

The Pian warriors were overwhelmed and for once they seem to have known that their mission had failed and nothing happened. In the morning, the residents of Namosing village found the foot marks of the Pian warriors after they had gone back. The chairpersons of the peace committees thanked the Field Monitor for the information which helped them because the Pian warriors were not able to achieve their mission in the area. This was a successful story because the Pian never carried out an attack against the Pokot community that night.

98 Ibid.
On the 28th May, 2008 the Matheniko warriors from Moroto district raided Sokongor grazing area of the Pokot warriors 3kilometres west of Moruita Nakapiripirit junction. They drove away 102 head of cattle. In the process of raiding, one Pokot warrior was killed and the animals taken. CEWARN Field Monitor Pokot AOR learnt of the incident and quickly made a telephone call to the Country Coordinator of CEWARN in Kampala. The Country Coordinator informed the CEWERU head who quickly informed the chairperson District Peace Committee who also alerted the Resident District Commissioner Nakapiripirit district. The RDC quickly mobilized the army with the assistance of the local people. All the raided animals were recovered and handed back to the rightful owners. The local people were very happy with Ugandan side of the Karamoja Cluster.

On 9th September, 2010, a peace actor based in Loroo sub-county, Amudat district informed the CEWARN Field Monitor based in Nakapiripirit district about an impending raid by the Pokot warriors against the Pian community of Nabilatuk sub-county in Nakapiripirit district. The Field Monitor immediately relayed the information to the Brigade Intelligence Officer, 407 Battalion, the Operations and Training Officer, 33rd Battalion, and the District Peace Committee chairperson, who is also the Resident District commissioner of Nakapiripirit district. The Field Monitor then warned community members of Nabilatuk not to take their animals to far grazing areas where they would be vulnerable. The Pokot warriors launched the attack on the 10th September, 2010 but since the community was already aware of their intentions, they never had access to the animal.

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99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
In another development, on the 13th September, 2010, CEWARN Field Monitor based in Nakapiripirit district received information that the Jie warriors from Kotido district had crossed over to Pian in Nakapiripirit district with intention of raiding. The Field Monitor immediately passed on the information to the district peace committee chairperson who is also the Resident District Commissioner of Nakapiripirit district the Brigade commanders 407 and 33 battalions who alerted the Pian community to be on the lookout. The Jie warriors indeed came for the animals, but were not successful as they realized through their reconnaissance group that the army had heavily deployed and was only waiting for them. The Jie warriors retreated without making any attack which saved lives and livestock. The early warning information relayed and the quick response helped in preventing a raid and probably a counter revenge raid that has characterized the region for some time.

On 17th September 2010, Natilem, a reformed warrior based in Tapac parish, Katikekile sub-county, Matheniko county, Moroto district warned CEWARN Field Monitor based in Moroto district about a raid where 78 head of cattle belonging to the Tepeth community were driven away by the Matheniko warriors of Moroto district. This information was shared with the deputy District Internal Security Officer and the District Police Commander, who are members of the District Peace Committee, for action. The UPDF army based in Loputuk was informed through the Brigade Commander and soldiers were deployed to pursue the warriors. Given the pursuit by the UPDF soldiers, the Matheniko warriors were forced to abandon the raided animals at Natapar-akwanga. The army recovered all the 78 raided head of cattle that were given back to their rightful owners in the presence of the local leadership, thus averting an attack by the Tepeth against the Matheniko community. This rapid response was successful because of the provision of accurate and timely information that had been made possible through the ICT for peace project within the area of reporting.
The CEWARN Field Monitor based in Amudat district received a telephone call from the local council three chairperson of Karita sub-county on the 18th September, 2010 informing him of an impending raid by the Pokot warriors from Kapetawoi, Amudat sub-county against the Pian community of Namalu sub-county in Nakapiripirit district or the Sabiny of Kapchorwa/Bukwo district. The Pokot warriors had been seen mobilizing, buying biscuits and re-grouping for the evening attack. This was an early warning sign requiring a response. The Field Monitor called the UPDF commanders of Amudat, Nakapiripirit and Bukwo districts, the local council three chairperson of Namalu Sub County, the local council five chairperson Nakapiripirit district, the district peace committee chairperson Kapchorwa, the District Internal Security Officer Nakapiripirit district, the district peace committee chairperson Nakapiripirit district and the Country Coordinator CEWARN informing them of the impeding raid. The Field Monitor was advised by the district peace committee chairperson Nakapiripirit district to call Kapetawoi, where the raiders were coming from to let them know that the soldiers were already aware of their mission. The Field Monitor went to Kapetawoi where he met with the warriors whom he advised not to go as they would be killed since the army had been deployed and they were only waiting for them. A raid was prevented with everything that goes with it, including loss of life and livelihood, but above all reducing the cycle of revenge that feeds into the conflict and sustains it.

In Uganda conflict mitigation was successful due to the availability of HF radios in areas where there are no telephone networks or other communication infrastructure. On 21 April 2010 40 animals were raided from Rupa parish in Moroto District by a group of Jie raiders from Kotido District. The Field Monitor for Moroto District, Mr. Abura Stephen sent information through an HF radio to the Secretary of Moroto District Peace Committee. The secretary alerted the Ugandan national army, which in turn followed the raiders and
recovered all the 4O animals that had been raided.\textsuperscript{101} No injury or death was registered in the process of recovering the animals.

### 4.2 PROBLEMS FACING CEWARN.

However, understandably, CEWARN faces multiple challenges in fulfilling its mandate. These include poor infrastructure and inaccessibility of its areas of reporting as well as limitations in governments’ capability to ensure physical security throughout their territories. Furthermore, CEWARN’s long-term impact will depend less on local interventions and more on broad and implemented policy shifts, and stronger collaboration among member states in addressing the underlying structural causes of conflicts.

The financial, human, technical capacity, and technological infrastructure needed for successful early warning and early response are lacking. Without these, information is not easily accessible and responses cannot be rapid. For instance, CEWARN continues to be bogged down by inadequate information and the absence of a solid early response system\textsuperscript{102}.

The use of data and reports from early warning processes might not be allowed or encouraged based on the idea that some reports should not be publicly shared due to the information that they might hold. In addition, the issue of data ownership comes to the fore which limits the flexibility on the use and dissemination of the data collected.\textsuperscript{103} Also politicisation of the EWERS remains evident, specifically the control of political information in cases of national


\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
security. Information sharing is still lacking between CEWARN and the IGAD member states.¹⁰⁴

In all CEWARN areas of operation in the sub-region, the road infrastructure is very poor. Other telecommunications infrastructures are also weak or non-existent which makes timely reporting of impending conflict nearly impossible. ICT present a great potential for timely communication. In the short time that ICT4 Peace project has been operational, it has clearly demonstrated that rapid information is the cornerstone for success in conflict prevention and mitigation, which is the mission of CEWARN. With the system, Field Monitors are empowered to move information faster while the national Conflict Early Warning and Response Units and District Peace Committees are able to respond rapidly. Numerous success stories of effective response interventions based on timely information received through the radios to mitigate potential conflict in Uganda have been reported. In Kenya, the radios have been used to transmit early warning information on an impending health crisis. The main challenge so far in implementing the project has been delay, in some instances of securing licenses and frequencies for operation of the HF radios.

Conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms are governmental in nature, regulated by formal protocols and agreements. The role of early warning and early response, thus, becomes inextricably linked to the dynamics of the conflicts that affect the regions in which governmental institutions are key players in the conflicts. The institutions are complex and bureaucratic making it hard for CEWARN to carry out its mandate effectively.

Institutionally, CEWARN has such shortcomings as operating under inadequate secretariats such as offices, relatively weak capacities and blocked by internal dissent and limited capacity to enforce or implement peace agreements. Also, member states are not ready to concede the enormity of the political crises within their borders and CPMR is complicated due to the use of army personnel by national governments to respond to conflicts or crises. The armies more often complicate and escalate conflicts.

Additionally, member states are faced with too many crises and have become accustomed to crisis management, so that they pay little attention and are not ready to commit resources to the predictive nature of early warning information. The culture of cattle dependence syndrome on the part of local communities remains a stumbling block for changing local attitudes to alternative ways of life. Cell phones have complicated enforcement of disarmament, cattle raids, restocking and CPMR initiatives. It has been established that sometimes cattle is raided for sale. This has been facilitated by the advent of the mobile telephones which totally changed dynamics because warriors have themselves acquired mobile phones, which they use to plan, execute raids, and maintain contacts with accomplices who buy raided animals.  

Other shortcomings experienced by CEWARN are weak framework for conflict prevention, management and resolution. For instance, Uganda as a country does not have a peace policy. Consequently, there is poor coordination of state, intra-state, international and CSO stakeholder engagement in CEWARN activities.  

The poor state of social services in the Karamoja Cluster remains a bottleneck. For example, poor availability of safe water for

106 Ibid.
human and animal consumption, agricultural modernization, poor education, health, environmental and nutritional services are major predicaments in the region.

CEWARN has limited staff and operate under inadequate secretariats. This has forced CSO's to use other organizations as intermediaries on the ground, a situation that affects their effective implementation of work and achievement of targets. Other connected operational challenges include space, poor ICT, etc. There is also interference from local sectarian interests mainly by politicians and sometimes technocrats in ways that disorganises, distorts or even derails CSO operations. Additionally, competition for resources among local CSOs has bred the tendencies to conceal and falsify information, whereby even government institutions cannot access or are denied the right information. Local actors, e.g. powerful clan leaders and armed youth or warriors that benefit directly or indirectly from these conflicts, undermine CEWARN work.

Inadequate financial management skills hamper fundraising and accountability for donor funds, leading many CSOs to lose support. For example, many have been closed or denied funding, e.g. KISP in Moroto district. This makes it difficult for CEWARN to achieve its goals. Corruption is becoming widespread as many CSOs are forced to bribe their way into districts and CPMR activities by some local politicians who demand handouts which some CSOs claim is draining their budgets.

Donor rigidity is another problem in that many of these have funding limits, strict accounting modalities and vehicle operational guidelines, which some CSOs find constraining to their work. For many of these organizations, CPMR work needs some considerable flexibility in donor and CSO relations to meet local challenges. Sometimes there is incongruence between
CEWARN and donor priorities for CPMR activities in the area. For example, while some donors opt for supporting livelihood projects for peace, e.g. supporting income generating projects, CEWARN would prefer to have donors focused on sponsoring conflict prevention and resolution programmes.

Endemic poverty exacerbates local expectations from CEWARN, fuels cattle stealing, which greatly influences violence. Culture of cattle dependence syndrome remains a stumbling block for changing local attitudes and livelihoods to alternative ways of life, and conflict resolution.

**CONCLUSION**

ICT 4 Peace project introduced by CEWARN in conflict prone areas in Karamoja and other areas has been registering success in the capacity of CEWARN field monitors and Local Peace Committees in term of sharing early warning information. However, CEWARN faces a complicity of challenges which include poor infrastructure and accessibility of the pilot areas, among others.
CHAPTER FIVE
PRACTICAL INTERVENTIONS OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR IGAD DECISION MAKERS FOR CEWARN IMPLEMENTATION ON KENYA AND UGANDA BORDER CONFLICT.

5.0 INTRODUCTION
CEWARN’s experiences in trying to prevent conflict have shown that it requires much more co-operation and input of stakeholders at the local, national and regional levels both in information provision and implementation of responses linking the early warning to early response. There should be quick reactions to build the response devices, such as information sharing, communication and cooperation between various factors that could enable the mechanism to assess capacities and use available resources. This chapter looks at practical intervention available for IGAD decision makers on CEWARN implementation on Kenya and Uganda border conflict.

5.1 EFFORTS BY AFRICAN UNION
The African Union became involved through its Inter-Africa Bureau for Animal Research. IBAR’s mandate includes the control and eradication of epizootics, as well as the promotion of animal health across the African continent. IBAR has been drawn into conflict management and peace-building activities through its work to protect livestock health.\textsuperscript{107} IBAR has found that its work to eradicate rinder pest was being continually undermined by the high levels of insecurity in the Kenya-Uganda border area. Therefore it held a series of meetings with community elders, bringing together leaders from the different groups to explore ways and means of restoring peace and creating an environment that allows

\textsuperscript{107}Mkutu.Kennedy ,Pastoral conflict and small arms Kenya –Uganda border region ,Safe world Bradford University, 2003, p. 35.
for long-term planning and development. At a workshop held in Mbale, Uganda, in May 2001, participants developed action plans and identified key implementation partners to promote peace and development in the region. The major issues addressed included ensuring that the voices of pastoral communities were better heard. It was agreed that continued community-level dialogue was essential and that IBAR should identify ways to improve information flow and document best practice. The most recent initiatives by IBAR have been to support women’s ‘peace crusades’ in the cross-border area and a number of peace choirs to raise awareness on security issues. The limitation with the IBAR approach, like those of other civil society groups in Karamoja, including churches, NGOs and CBOs, is that they invested a huge amount of money in the organisation of peace meetings between warring groups. Chief Administrative Officer for Kotido noted that they have just been firefighting and not addressing the root causes. Terrace Achia, the Local Council five Moroto said, “We are tired of meetings that achieve nothing.”

5.2. COMMUNITY BASED INITIATIVES

The Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable Peace (KISP) Elders

KISP is a Ugandan community-based initiative by elders that has developed good ties with their counterparts on the Kenyan side of the border. Elders in the Karamoja region have decided to try and reclaim their traditional leadership role within their communities. KISP was formed in August 1998 by elders from the eight counties of the Karamoja region. The objectives of KISP include uniting Karimojong communities on the basis of their common cultural heritage, to establish peace within the Karamoja region and between the Karimojong

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108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid., p. 35.
113 The 8 counties comprise Chekwi, Pian, Bokora, Matheniko, Labwor, Pokot, Dodoth and Jie.
and its neighbours, including through cross-border initiatives, to revive the authority of councils of elders; and to promote and achieve development in the Karamoja region. Over 80 per cent of KISP’s funding came from the EU. The balance came from the Italian Government and from local contributions.

KISP played an important role in bringing peace between the Pokot of Kenya and Uganda, on one hand, and between the Turkana of Kenya and the Jie and Dodoth (clans of the Karimojong) of Uganda, on the other. Its activities have included advocacy to persuade aid agencies and donors to support conflict management and peace-building initiatives. It has also organized peace sensitization meetings.

5.3 THE KARAMOJA PROJECT INITIATIVE UNIT (KPIU)

KPIU was established in 1995 with EU support. More recently, it has also received funding from DFID. KPIU mainly works with communities in the Karamoja region, but it is also supporting initiatives by elders such as KISP. It has offices in Kotido and Moroto districts. The KPIU employs participatory approaches and gives communities the power to define their own priorities.

Five key sectors have been identified on this basis: water, livestock, agriculture, environment and community development. The KPIU has sought to support the following: the establishment of schools, micro-credit programmes, privately-owned tree nurseries and tree planting initiatives, and the building of dams and tanks to increase access to water.

The KPIU appears to have a positive reputation among those communities that it works with. Its emphasis on encouraging local ownership and sustainability is bearing fruit, as is its
realisation that insecurity can only be reduced in the long-term if there are economic incentives to pursue a peaceful path.

5.4 POKOT, KARAMOJA, TURKANA, SEBEI PEACE INITIATIVE (POKATUSA)

POKATUSA is a peace-building cross-border project originally established in June 1997, whose name is an acronym of the first two letters of Pokot, Karimojong, Turkana and Sebei. It operates in four districts in Kenya and two in Uganda. It is coordinated by World Vision and funded by DIFD. However, it lay relatively dormant until March 2001 and is a relatively new actor on the scene.

POKATUSA has two structures that deal with peace and security issues: the District Peace and Reconciliation Committee and the Location Peace and Reconciliation committee. Membership of the DPRC comprises local MPs, District Commissioners, teachers, senior fighters, traditional healers, women and church leaders. The LPRC comprises of the same membership less the MPs and District Commissioners.

The DPRCs and LRPCs acted as an early warning system when cattle raids were imminent and recovered raided cattle. POKATUSA has co-operated with KISP elders. POKATUSA has more recently established a Joint Venture Committee. It included representatives of national governments, MPs and religious leaders from Kenya and Uganda. The main objective of this committee is to influence policies through lobbying and advocacy. Committees have participated in a number of international conferences and peace meetings.
5.5 PEACE BUILDING ACTIVITIES BY CHURCHES

Churches have played an important role in the politics and development of Karamoja and, specifically, in the area of peace building. Some recent examples include efforts by the Nabilatuk Roman Catholic Church to address negative traditional practices. The Kotido Diocese works with kraal leaders to engage in dialogue and share resources with their neighbours. The Lutheran World Federation has been instrumental in sponsoring some peace meetings between warring Karamojong groups. The National Council of Churches of Kenya plays a key role here. It is engaged in a project in which local councilors play a prominent role. Councillors are viewed as a key component for the success of peace building initiatives as they have the advantage of being elected and have access to both the community and government administration. The Catholic Diocese of Torit is involved in resolving conflicts among the Toposa and between the Toposa and the Didinga/Boya communities.

The Catholic Diocese of Kotido offers services in the areas of health. It has built five health units in the sub-counties of Kapedo and Kaabong (now in Kaabong district), Morulem (now in Abim district and parishes of Losilang and Kanawat in Kotido sub-county Kotido district. It has also been involved in gender and development programmes plus sustainable agriculture and food security. It supports the girl-child in the area of education through sponsoring of a number of bright but needy girls and boys in school. It has interventions in disaster preparedness and emergency interventions, especially during famine situations in Kotido district.

Uganda Joint Christian Council is an ecumenical organization composed of the three mainstream Christian churches; the Roman Catholic Church, The Anglican Church and the Uganda Orthodox Church. It articulates issues of common concern, including issues on peace, health, education, gender, social and economic justice. UJCC has a head office in
Kampala City. It opened a branch office in Kotido Town in January 2009 which operates in the districts of Kotido, Kaabong and Moroto. It operates in 2 sub-counties per district. In Kotido, UJCC operates in Panyangara and Nakapelimoru sub-counties. In Kaabong it operates in Loyoro and Kalapata sub-counties, while in Moroto it operates in Rupa and Lopei sub-counties. UJCC works through the Karimojong traditional system to enhance community participation in decentralization for improved service delivery. One of the activities of the branch office is to carry out a training of trainers in poverty resource monitoring and tracking, conflict sensitivity and rights-based approach. The branch office is well facilitated by the main office in Kampala. It has a training space, training materials, computer facilities and a motorcycle for transport. The beneficiaries are derived from parishes. The beneficiaries are basically community leaders who include: kraal leaders, clan leaders, women leaders, religious leaders, and CSOs. People who participate in the activities at the parish level are derived from four villages per parish. UJCC also collects approved budgets for the three districts to inform the sub-counties what have been approved, hence involving people in district planning process.

5.6 EFFORTS BY THE KENYA AND UGANDA GOVERNMENT

Kenya and Uganda governments have attempted to curb the conflicts along the border. Among some measures used were disarmament efforts in the 1980s, which was heavily dependent upon the use of force. Despite this, relatively few arms were seized. Relations with pastoral communities were badly damaged in the process. This has led to a revised strategy by the Kenyan Government since 1995, when it decided to offer amnesty to anybody who handed over guns. This approach has been supplemented by attempts to engage communities in dialogue and continued threats of force. There have been disarmament initiatives on this
basis in most years since 1995. Offers of amnesty have not led to dramatically improved outcomes.

There was a disarmament initiative on the Kenyan side of the border from 2001 to 2002. President Daniel Arap Moi gave the residents of West Pokot, Marakwet and Baringo an ultimatum to hand over arms in exchange for amnesty. Pokot elders argued that, it was difficult for the Pokot to live without guns, while their neighbours, including the Karimojong of Uganda, were allowed to use guns like walking sticks. The amnesty period ran out without any arms being recovered. As a result, a public education campaign was launched to persuade the Pokot to surrender their weapons. Local leaders, in particular the chiefs, were used to educate their communities on the importance of giving up their arms.

The Kenyan Government developed a more sophisticated framework for co-operation with pastoral communities in pursuit of disarmament. National Steering Committee on Conflict Resolution was established in 2000. In March 2003 the new Kenyan Government announced that it was beginning to destroy the illicit weapons in its possession. Over 8,000 small arms collected from various parts of Kenya were destroyed.

In Uganda there was a UPD led campaign of forcible disarmament. In December 2001, some Upe Pokot fled with their cattle and guns to join their cousins in Kenya rather than be disarmed. According to a military commander, “These Pokot do not trust that the disarmament is for real, they think it is a trick from the government to take guns away from
them and leave them at the mercy of their perennial Karimojong enemies.”\textsuperscript{114} Karimojong in Jie County were reported to have fled to Kenya with their livestock to avoid disarmament. 7, 319 weapons had reportedly been handed in by 15 February 2002, the end of the voluntary disarmament phase.

By mid-May 2002, the total number of weapons collected had reportedly reached 9,329. In January 2003, the UPDF stated that the number of weapons collected during the first and second phase of the disarmament initiative had reached 10,686.\textsuperscript{115} In August 2005 disarmament programme in Kenya and Uganda, plus the presence of more security personnel, may have made communities reluctant to engage in open armed clashes for fear of being exposed with possession of arms. The phase of forcible disarmament continues to this day.

5.7 CONCLUSION

However, CEWARN has options that would make it very successful. African Union, community based organisations, the church, Kenya and Uganda governments have played significant role in conflict prevention along the border of Kenya and Uganda. CEWARN should develop civil society networks that explore a variety of network options with the regional, state and community-based early warning systems for early response rather than vertically wired, bureaucratic and resource intensive early warning systems with weak response mechanisms.


\textsuperscript{115} UPDF, ‘The Security Situation and Disarmament Programme in Karamoja Region’ (Briefing to Participants at the National Strategic Planning Workshop for Karamoja, 24 January 2003). Available at http://www.karamoja.org.
CHAPTER SIX

6.1 CONCLUSION

This study set out to examine the utilization of CEWARN on Kenya and Uganda border conflict. In order to achieve this, the study brought on board tribes involved in the conflict, causes of conflict and effects on the community. CEWARN mandate, activities in Kenya and Uganda, problems faced and efforts by various actors to solve the conflict have been examined.

To achieve its objectives two theories were applied; human needs theory and conflict resolution theory by John Burton. He states that human beings have basic needs that have to be met and lack of needs fulfillment may cause conflict. He adds that conflict avoidance isn’t conflict resolution. Hence if conflict has to end, CEWARN and governments should address the root causes and work on solutions to the problems.

The research has shown that the physical environment of the border region dictated the settlement pattern in the region. People are pastoralists because of low rainfall. They move from place to place in search of water and pasture. The geography of the region is important because it determines how these communities relate and the general economic activities. Most communities interacted through trade. Sometimes they forged lasting relationships that led to marriage and traded in arms, too.

The research revealed that conflict has led to the suffering of the weak gender and children that were once protected by every member of the society. There are many child headed families. Conflict had a negative effect on the people along the Kenya and Uganda border,
which include death of people, displacement of people, loss of domestic animals and development in this region.

In recent years, there have been many attempts to prevent and resolve conflict on the Kenya-Uganda border by the governments. Despite this, violence continues to flourish. Land privatisation has pushed pastoralists into smaller areas, fuelling disputes and insecurity. Pressure on land and other resources has grown due to the increasing regularity and severity of drought, leaving many pastoralists dependent on food aid. Since independence, the authority of traditional governance institutions has weakened, leaving them unable to control resources and younger, armed community members. Cattle raiding is carried out on an increasingly large scale and has become commercialised. Some of the businessmen involved are assuming the characteristics of local warlords. Inter-tribal conflict has increased the demand for small arms. An influx of weapons from neighbouring countries has reduced their price and disarmament initiatives have been heavily based on coercion and have provided few economic alternatives. Thus, they have had limited effect.

The research has revealed that technological advances have contributed to more concrete and rapid early warning responses in Kenya and Uganda. For example, the information communication technology for conflict prevention and the CEWARN Information Communications Technologies, ICT 4 Peace project, has been helpful in transmitting important early warning information. Success stories of effective response interventions, based on timely information received through the radios to mitigate potential conflict in Uganda, have been reported.
CSOs (including NGOs and Community Based Organizations), have played an important role in enhancing conflict management along the Kenya and Uganda border. Most of the CSOs in the area of CPMR in Karamoja target all populations irrespective of their age. However, the warriors, women, youth and children are the most targeted because of their direct and indirect involvement in the conflict and particularly cattle raids. The “warriors,” who are mainly the male youth, are the main target population.

The bulk of CSOs target these male youth, locally called Karachuna, for sensitization in areas of peaceful co-existence and development. The elders are targeted because they provide technical advice to the youth before they go for cattle rustling. They target children in order to discourage them from joining cattle rustling when they are of age. Conflict, mostly arising from dependence on the cattle for livelihood, are exposed and discouraged by encouraging male youth to live settled lives and adjust to alternative livelihoods, such as bee-keeping and farming promoted by Save the Children in Uganda.

Donors have in some cases provided support for advocacy and conflict-resolution activities in Uganda. The Karamoja Agro-pastoral Development Programme has supported activities in food security, conflict resolution, water management, animal health and civil society empowerment. The World Food Program is concerned with emergency food relief. Both support and facilitate disarmament meetings and review meetings both at district and regional levels as well as supporting NGOs/CBOs in peace education and training of peace teachers on mentality change.
OXFAM has intervened in the areas of CPMR and pastoral development activities. These include district peace initiatives through organizing cross border meetings and inter-NGO peace coordination. Oxfam is involved in water related activities by developing water community action plans and advocacy on water policy. It has trained and equipped pump mechanics and provided boreholes in Uganda. OXFAM has been involved in the area of disaster preparedness by providing support to the District Disaster Management Committee and emergency preparedness by undertaking food needs assessments in order to forecast the food security situation.

CSOs organize cross-border peace activities between Uganda, Sudan and Kenya. These peace initiatives have included peace dialogues, sports and resource exchanges, and the establishment of joint markets where communities at the cross-border areas meet for trade. Other cross-border activities have included organised exchange visits and familiarisation tours across district and country. Other activities of cross-border nature organised by CSOs are: construction of water sources for use by all communities; and peace races where warriors are brought together for running and are given prizes and other presents such as money, and seeds. At these rallies it was reported that illegal arms are surrendered, there is information exchange and warriors openly speak to and exchange experiences with their colleagues from other cross-border ethnic communities.

The study also found out that all the said areas are among the poorest districts in Kenya and Uganda in all the development indices. Turkana district has been rated the poorest. The new county ranking shows that 94% of their populations are considered to be living below the poverty line. The majorities of the people in the region depend on relief food and are malnourished. Mortality rate is high and so are poverty levels. Water and sanitary services are
inaccessible to the majority of the pastoralists. The area is inaccessible to medical facilities. The ten poorest districts in Kenya are pastoralist inhabited. In the neighbouring countries, the case is no better as Karamojong district in Uganda is a pastoralist regions are the worst performers in all development indicators.

CEWARN has done a lot for Kenya and Uganda which included, refresher training of Field Monitors in February 2009, peace meetings between kraal leaders from the districts of Moroto, Kaabong and Kotido in February 2009, review of the composition of the CEWERU National Steering Committee in May 2009, Sensitization Workshop marking the roll out of the RRF in Uganda and Kenya in June 2009, handover of 280 cows belonging to the Pokot of Kenya which strayed into Riwo Sub-County Bukwo district to Kenyan Authorities by Ugandan (Bukwo District Peace Committee) in July 2009, cross-border peace consultative meeting with Turkana community leaders at Lodwar from 6-9 August 2009, bilateral meeting of the border Peace Committees with Kenyan counterparts in Nairobi from 18-20 August 2009 and consultations with District Peace Committees to develop operational guidelines for CEWERU operations from August through September 2009.

CEWARN has been very successful since its establishment in 2002. Through the use of HF radio and ICT 4 Peace project, conflict has been avoided on Kenya and Uganda border and all the evils that go with it. This study has therefore achieved its objective. However there is a wide provision and opportunity for CEWARN to expand to other critical and bigger types of conflicts or security threats beyond pastoral conflicts that threaten peace in the IGAD region, namely, piracy, terrorism, insurgencies /insurrectionist group, violent electoral conflicts, drug trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking, transition justice for human rights violation and violent crimes, refugees and displaced persons.
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS ON RESEARCH FINDING

CEWARN should respond to structural causes of conflict on the Kenya and Uganda border which is characterized by slow-moving trends like environmental degradation, population pressure, large scale migrations, exclusionary policies or cultural shifts that create condition conducive for crisis. This reluctance to respond to early warning signs related to structural causes of conflict is directly linked to how issues are prioritized. This also impacts on the response to various conflict accelerants that escalate these crises and trigger factors, such as a dry spell, because pastoralists move from place to place looking for pasture, thus sparking the onset of violent conflict.

Most reports generated by early warning systems call on member states to address the root causes of the conflicts, rather than the short-term measures usually employed. The root causes of conflicts include poverty, colonial history, ethnicity, competition for resources, regional imbalance, interference in internal governance and the role of external actors. This may be governments or multinational corporations. States tend to find short-term measures expedient, though they only serve to aggravate the situation. Conflict suppression, use of force to weaken, divide and deter a conflict is usually applied by deploying the military to forcefully restore law and order. While this can deescalate the conflict, it is not a sustainable solution. It only addresses physical symptoms, but does not address the structural/root causes of the conflict. Unfortunately, this is the most commonly used intervention method in Africa. Using the military to suppress conflicts is the norm. There is need to focus more on conflict transformation. Addressing the root causes of the conflict includes attitudinal changes and the socio-economic development of most areas.
The core activity of any early warning and response mechanism is the monitoring of evolving situations so that trends that may escalate into violence can be identified early, assessed, and proactively addressed. Over the past four years, CEWARN has established a tool for systematic event monitoring and its resultant baseline database for cross-border pastoral conflicts. The data-based monitoring system, however, needs improvement in broadening its sources of information and in the ability to interpret and analyze the information it collects. The current mechanism depends solely on the Field Monitors and individual knowledge of Country Coordinators for its information and analysis. The tool does not yet integrate structural data (on ethnicity or culture, for example) that is required to contextualize and interpret the field events data.

The main channels currently employed for dissemination and sharing of early warning information produced by CEWARN includes the use of its website and dissemination of its reports to the members of the steering committees of the national CEWERU’s. As a result, save for some development partners with an interest in the development of CEWARN and a few academics and researchers, the work of CEWARN as a mechanism, designed to provide early warning and cause early response and thus promote peace and security, remains largely unknown in the member states, the region and most importantly, among local communities who are supposed to be the direct beneficiaries of the EW and ER function. Therefore, awareness among the recipients on the added value of the mechanism has to be widened to strengthen and build sustainable relations among stakeholders. Linkages with other regional bodies, like ECOWAS, SADC or the AU, are uncoordinated and limited to sharing of information at the occasional seminar or conference.
CEWARN’s scope of activities needs to engage the academic community as well as civil society organizations, leveraging its resources and extending its reach and influence within society more broadly. For the time being, there is no continuous backup in terms of operational research and training to inform and communicate to the relevant actors within the CEWARN Mechanism of underlying factors that drive pastoralists and related conflicts. Much greater effort and commitment need to be made to strengthen the response capacity and institutional and functional capacity of CEWARN.

CEWARN should have a fundraising plan. Solid funding and comprehensive resource mobilization are a precondition for the functioning of a reliable early warning and analytic system applicable to violent conflicts to enable timely and effective responses. An issue that is more often than not implicit in discussions about CEWARN is that of sustainability. If CEWARN is to be considered successful, those it serves must value it. The IGAD Member States have invested a great deal of effort into the design and establishment of the CEWARN mechanism. Several states have supported the CEWARN effort through dedicated contributions of individuals who have taken an active role in establishing the mechanism.

However, there needs to be a commensurate shift in orientation from a project dependent upon external funds to a sustainable programme financed and fully owned by Member States. So far the conceptual development, establishment and operation of CEWARN has been mainly funded by two core partners: USAID (60%) and GTZ (30%), whereas IGAD Member States contributed around 10% of the budget in kind.

Kenya and Uganda governments should develop an institutional, legal and policy framework for tackling the proliferation of small arms and their misuse. This should be based on existing
regional commitments, together with national action plans. They should promote disarmament initiatives in which the emphasis is on voluntary co-operation and community involvement. The Kenya and Uganda governments need to co-operate much more with the Sudanese and Ethiopian Governments too, both of whose territories have been used as routes for the illicit livestock and small arms trades. A regionally coordinated disarmament initiative is vital if the arms that are claimed in one part of the region are not simply to be routed to other parts of the region. Such co-ordination should embrace community-based initiatives too. This is currently lacking. If all communities are not disarmed simultaneously, those that have been willing inevitably feel vulnerable to attack as the on-going disarmament in Karamoja has proved. The result will be resistance to disarmament and re-armament.

Kenya and Uganda governments need to establish a programme of community-based policing in the border region. Uganda has a community policing policy that has not been widely implemented. There is an urgent need to build trust between security forces, law enforcement agencies and the public on both sides of the border. A new partnership approach to providing security and community safety is vital. Dialogue and peace-building initiatives should be promoted within and between communities in the border area, working closely with actors such as Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable Peace, Karamonja Project Initiative Unit and POKATUSA and supporting the full involvement of women in such initiatives.

Kenya and Uganda governments should develop community-based programmes, such as Karamanjong Project Initiative unit. KPIU focused on five key sectors: water, livestock, agriculture, environment and community development. The KPIU also supported the establishment of schools, micro-credit programmes, privately-owned tree nurseries and tree planting initiatives, building of dams and tanks to increase access to water. The KPIU have
had a positive reputation among those communities that it works with. Its emphasis on encouraging local ownership and sustainability has been bearing fruit, with realization that insecurity can only be reduced in the long-term, if there are economic incentives to pursue a peaceful path. The project should be replicated on the West Pokot side and other areas along the Kenya and Uganda border.

Early warning and preventive activities can be made more effective by using untapped potential of women (leaders), women’s networks, and women’s organisations as actors for peace. The role of women, either as perpetrators of violence or providers of emissaries for peace cannot be underestimated. The study recommends that specific activities that target women should be supported such as workshops, seminars, exchange programmes and other related activities. During these activities, the women should be equipped with skills to enable them play an active role in conflict transformation and peace building within their communities. Women, especially those displaced by conflicts, should also be provided with seed money to start income generating activities as a way of diversifying their livelihoods.

Kenya and Uganda governments should consistently involve community representatives in processes and mechanisms for cross-border co-operation. Government officials and community representatives on both sides of the border should develop ‘conflict management plans’ for each district. Crucial to peace-building is the provision of meaningful economic alternatives to cattle raiding and other illegal activities for the young men, mostly between 16–25 years old, who make up the bulk of the armed groups. Youths should be provided with jobs because unemployment and social exclusion, unless tackled effectively, will continue to undermine peace and security in the border area. The governments should provide alternative economic livelihoods to cattle raiding and other illegal activities for young men, who
dominate armed groups. This should be done as part of wider strategies for sustainable development.

Kenya and Uganda shouldn’t ignore awareness and sensitivity as key elements in building a culture of peace. All awareness creation tools and medium should be used as widely as possible so as to shed more light on the severity of inter-ethnic conflicts, emergent conflict dynamics, destruction on the society by conflicts and the need to uphold and embrace peace. Inter-community meetings, radio/print media, songs, poems, drama and exhibitions should be used to create awareness on conflicts. The expected impact of this awareness will be changes in attitudes, stereotypes, prejudice and a deeper understanding of conflict dynamics.

CEWARN, Kenya and Uganda governments should organize cross border conflict management meetings. These cross-border meetings are an untapped source of information and analysis for policy-makers engaged in pastoral conflicts in border areas. Yet, this process has remained largely outside official decision making and policy channels, and its impact is therefore minimized. Elders using traditional mechanisms should be used. Government resources should be deployed to support these traditional methods, for example, by providing transport to enable rapid response (immediate deployment of elders to unstable areas in the district). The secret of its success is the fact that all stakeholders are included in the process, such as the government (police and administration), civil society, elders, religious leaders, youth, and women.

Peace education in schools should be pursued at the policy level so that education policy entrenches peace education and activities in the education curriculum. In this initiative, teachers and pupils will be sensitized to do drama and develop songs, poetry, and puppetry
among others, to be used in peace rallies. Through this initiative, children will be engaged in drawing for peace competitions that will help in inculcating values of peace in their minds.
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Dear participant,

This is an academic exercise in partial fulfillment of requirement of a master of Art degree in Armed Conflict and peace studies at the University of Nairobi. The objective of the interview is to assess the Utilisation of CEWARN on Kenya and Uganda border conflict. Kindly provide answers to this questionnaire. The information obtained will be treated with confidence and used only for the purpose of this study.

Anonymity will be observed if requested because this is strictly a scholarly work.

Name

Name of the organization.

Department

1. How long have you worked in this organization?
2. Who are the indigenous communities along the border?
3. What is the relationship between the people along the border?
4. What is the economic activity of the people on Kenya Uganda border?
5. What causes conflict among the communities on Kenya Uganda border?
6. Have they ever engaged in War?
7. Who are the main actors?
8. What are the effects of these Conflicts?
9. What interventions have the Kenyan government and civil society played to prevent Conflict along the Kenya Uganda border?
10. What role has CEWARN played to prevent Kenya Uganda border Conflict?