

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**NON INCLUSIVE POST-WAR GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE: A
HINDRANCE TO PREDICTABLE POLITICAL SUCCESSION IN THE
GREAT LAKES REGION**

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(R50/80091/2012)

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented to any University for academic credit:

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Supervisor

This research project has been forwarded for examination with my approval as University supervisor.

Signed: Date.....

Dr. Patrick M. Maluki

DEDICATION

To all people who innocently suffer the consequences of post-war government structures and political succession in the Great Lakes Region.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My heartfelt acknowledgements to the University of Nairobi, particularly to Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies and its personnel for granting me a chance to study in the institution and, for providing me a holistic formation.

ABSTRACT

Empirical evidence shows that balance of power between nations in the Great Lakes Region is dependent on balance of power within the individual states in this region. However, internal balance of power is highly dependent on prevailing government structures. The government as structured influences the power balance and hence predictability of political succession. This study aimed at investigating this phenomenon using the DRC as a case study. It was instigated by the understanding that peace and stability prevail when a government is perceived to be fair, equitable, transparent and accountable. Herbert Weiss noted the challenge in many Great Lakes Region nations is how to accommodate the different interest groups within and without the borders in government. Like in the case of DRC, this has been an issue of concern since independence. The main aim was to establish whether established structures are likely to solve conflict triggers like exclusion, ethnic profiling, marginalization, and biased distribution of national resources. The objectives were to document the incidences of unpredictable political succession in the Great Lakes Region, to analyze post-war government structures and to examine the relation between post-war government structure and predictability of political succession in the DRC. This study was anchored on the Neo-realism theoretical foundation. The realist theory postulates that human nature is inherently selfish hence social systems as well as international system being anarchic. All states being rational actors, they engage in war or negotiations with clear goals and objectives. For most states in the Great Lakes Region, they sponsor conflict based on the friend of my enemy is my enemy and the enemy of my enemy is my friend principle. Consequently, from a realist point of view, unless my enemy is vanquished, the friend of my enemy remains my enemy. In this research work a qualitative design, which involved in-depth study of a phenomenon or element, was applied. The sources of primary data were publications and key informants drawn from various interest groups working in Congo. Such target groups include the UN, International Humanitarian Agencies in Congo, Civil Society Groups in Congo, Political Parties in Congo, Religious leaders, prominent community leaders and Government agencies representatives. The information gathered showed that in most countries in the Great Lakes Region, democratic ideals of equity, accountability, transparency and inclusivity are yet to be adopted. An examination of the post-war government structures in countries shows that decentralization has been adopted by as a way of ensuring locals participate in governance and increasing efficiency in government service delivery. However, decentralization units of government in this region remain susceptible to central government manipulation. It would be informative for a further research on the impact of the different decentralization models on future inter-state dynamics; especially for countries that have a shared history. Secondly, all the Great Lakes countries assessed in this study have a strong presidency and the presidents are in their last constitutional terms. It would be interesting to investigate the succession dynamics across the region to determine whether post war-government structures will be altered or will they be reinforced and strengthened. Finally, more research can be studied on the possibilities and opportunities of the Great Lakes as a regional bloc.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFDL	Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo/ Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo
AMP:	Alliance pour la Majorité Présidentielle
CNS:	Conference Nationale Souveraine
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FRNLA	National Front for the Libeation of Angola
FRODEBU:	Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi
GLPI	Great Lakes Peace Initiative
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (Africa)
LGA	Local Government Act
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army (Uganda)
MNC:	Movement National Congolais
MLC	Mouvement de Libération du Congo; Movement for the Liberation of Congo
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MSR:	Mouvement Social pour le Renouveau
NPRA	National Peace and Reconciliation Agreement
NGO(s):	Non-Governmental Organisation(s)

PALU:	Parti Lumbiste Unifié
PDC:	Parti des Démocrates Chrétiens
PPRD:	Parti de Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie; Congolese Rally for Democracy
RDC	Resident District Commissioner (Uganda)
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
UDEMO:	Union des Démocrates Mobutistes
UDPS:	Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

CHAPTER ONE

1. 0. Introduction

Geographically speaking, the Great Lakes Region is made up of sovereign nations surrounding the African great lakes. These lakes are situated in the east African great rift. The recognition of this region as a bloc can be linked to the conflict mainly in DR Congo, a country which, according to Bethuel Kiplagat, is presently the epicentre of conflict in the Great Lake Region and one of the three partly overlapping conflict systems in Africa;¹ and efforts at realizing lasting peace. Politically, the Great Lakes Regions is an intergovernmental organisation (ICGLR) whose creation initiative commenced in 2006 and became fully established and operational in 2008; and whose main purpose centres around *Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the entire region*. The 12 founding members of this regional bloc include Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. The co-opted members are Botswana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Zibwabwe. The ICGLR is overseen by Jose Edwardo do Santos of Angola, the chairperson, and by Mr. Ntumba Luaba of DRC, as the Executive Secretary.² One interesting thing about this bloc is most of these countries have been embroiled in civil strife or conflicts that are fueled by support from neighboring countries.

If not all of them, the majority of the countries in the Great Lakes region have experienced civil war and governance problems due to internal ethnic diversity and mental confinement which, according to some writers, are key to the social pathology that leads to political

¹See African conflict epicentres, by Raïs N. Boneza, 2006

²<http://icglr.org/index.php/en/>

instability.³ While some of these countries have faced greater civil strife than others, the stability of each of the Great Lakes countries is either directly or indirectly influenced by stability in her neighbours. The government structures in most countries of the Great Lakes regions (were) or being established after many years of war or military processes rather than civil processes.

This work project looked into the contribution of non-inclusive government structures to unpredictable political succession in the Great Lakes Region. This section of the study is a presentation of the background to the study, the research problem, the research objectives and questions, the significance of the study, the scope of the study and the limitations of the study.

1.1. Background to the Research Problem

The Democratic Republic of Congo has faced strife and conflict since independence. At independence, in 1960 July there was Congolese army mutinies when Moise Tshombé declared Katanga independent. This declaration resulted in Belgian troops' intervention in ostensibly to protect Belgian citizens and mining interests and at the same time the UN Security Council voted to send in troops to help establish order, but the troops were not allowed to intervene in internal affairs. Barely three months old, in September 1960, Kasavubu, the first president of the first republic, dismissed Lumumba as prime minister and appointed Tshombé as the prime minister in 1964. In 1965, Kasavubu and Tshombé were ousted in a coup led by Joseph Mobutu with the suspected help of an international power.⁴ For 32 years in power, the government of Mobutu was not popular, but it was sustained by the US government due to Cold War. For example, in 1977,

³Jackson Kennell, Review of Jean-Pierre Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History*. H-Africa, H-Net Reviews. May, 2004. Retrieved from: <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=9363>

⁴Herbert F. Weiss., *War and Peace in the Democratic Republic Of Congo*. American Diplomacy Publishers ChapelHill NC, 2012. www.americandiplomacy.org

Mobutu was victorious against the Angola-based rebels thanks to the French, Belgian and Moroccan troops. In 1993 the tyrannical regime of Mobutu resulted in an intense rivalry between pro- and anti-Mobutu, forming, in a sense, two governments within the government. And in May 1997, Tutsi and other anti-Mobutu rebels, aided principally by Rwanda, capture the capital, Kinshasa and Laurent-Desiré Kabila was installed as president. However, Kabila fell out with allies leading to new rebellion against his government. It was in 1998 August that rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda rose up against Kabila and advance on Kinshasa. Zimbabwe, Namibia sent troops to repel them. Angolan troops also sided with Kabila. As a matter of fact, in 1999, rifts emerged between Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) rebels supported by Uganda and Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) rebels backed by Rwanda. Both groups of rebels took control of much of the east of DR Congo.⁵ These new conflicts sucked in more neighbours, and consequently the whole country was lapped in a war. In January 2001, President Laurent Kabila was shot dead, and Joseph Kabila succeeded him.

Since the death of Mobutu Seseko, former Zaire has been embroiled in armed conflict. The battle has been long drawn and has so far claimed an estimated three million lives. Many have died directly due to exchange of fire and war related massacres but also due to devastation resulting from war conditions.⁶ Whenever, there is a war people cannot find shelter, food and other basic amenities like medical care. Consequently, they are ravaged by hunger, malnutrition, diseases and helplessness.

⁵<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13286306?print=true>

⁶Human Rights Watch. D.R. Congo: War Crimes in Bukavu. New York: Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, June 2004.

The conflict in Congo has been on-going for over a decade, and it has drawn in most international players and nearly all the Great Lakes nations. Rebellion is seen as a reaction to oppression, bad governance, injustice and alienation. The level of international involvement in the conflict has made the war to be described by some people as “Africa’s world war.”⁷ The war is fought by a government supported by neighbours against rebels that are supported by another set of neighboring countries. Due to involvement of the UN and negotiations that drew participants from various countries, a peace deal was struck in 2003 leading to formation of a transitional government. The efforts to stabilize the country have been numerous but the country remains shackled in conflicts with rebel groups engaging government in a circus of truce and back to war cycles. For example, in April 2002 April there was Peace talks in South Africa: Kinshasa signed a power-sharing deal with Ugandan-backed rebels, under which the MLC leader would be premier. Rwandan-backed RCD rebels reject the deal. Another illustration is, in September 2002, presidents of DR Congo and Uganda sign peace accord under which Ugandan troops would leave DR Congo. Two year later, September 2005, Uganda warned that its troops might re-enter DR Congo after a group of Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army rebels entered via Sudan.

The conflict in Congo is considered an international battle given the involvement of many of the Great Lakes nations either in seeking a solution to it or in contributing to its continuation. Congo is a vast county that is well endowed with natural resources. Consequently, on the face value of it, the conflict in Congo is often linked to the vast land hence diminishing

⁷Human Rights Watch. D.R. Congo: War Crimes in Bukavu. New York :Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, June 2004.

government control and interest in control of the immense natural resources both by national and international interest groups.

Therefore, the war in Congo is not just economic; it is highly a political war. Moreover, it is not just local economic issues or political issues but larger regional economic and political outcomes that determine the outcome of the hostilities.⁸Economically, the war in Congo is fuelled by the country's vast mineral wealth, with all sides taking advantage of the anarchy to plunder natural resources. There have been allegations that neighboring countries and international players have been supporting militias fight on in order to get a chance to plunder the resources in Congo. Despite a number of peace deals having been signed and the UN's biggest peacekeeping mission working alongside government forces, the conflict in Congo remains far from over.

Even with the signing of peace accords, the eastern parts of the country have remained volatile due to perceived involvement of Rwanda and Uganda. The Uganda government under Museveni justifies its presence in Congo by arguing that the Lords' Resistance Army has bases in Congo. Rwandan government rationalizes its involvement in Congo given Hutu rebels fighting against the Kagame regime operating from Congo. There seems to be a line of thinking that without Uganda and Rwanda interfering, the government of Congo would defeat the rebels and establish its full authority over the regions of the country. The signing of an agreement between government and M23 rebels in 2013 seems to signal an end to conflict. The DR Congo is slowly recovering from conflict but the state is far from stable. Congo remains volatile until

⁸Herbert F. Weiss., *War and Peace in the Democratic Republic Of Congo*. American Diplomacy Publishers ChapelHill NC, 2012. www.americandiplomacy.org

appropriate political solutions are arrived at. One such issue that the DR Congo has to assess is the post-war political structure.

The negotiations and peace deals on Congo have so far focused on sponsorship in insurgency within the Great Lakes Region. They have focused on role of external actors in strengthening insurgency and arming rebels. To a great extent this is a valid starting point. The United States has invested heavily in rounds of talks on the Great Lakes Region and a more recent achievement was the Lusaka Agreement that was facilitated by the president of Botswana in July 1999⁹. However, it emerges that the great rift conflicts can only be completely pacified if equilibrium in the balance of power in each Great Lakes state is achieved.

It is not enough to negotiate between the countries without focus on political structures in the individual states. Each post-war era has losers and gainers. What is critical is how the gainers engage the losers in such a way that the ensuing political architecture does not lead to further conflict.

There have been great achievements through negotiations leading to Sudan stopping its support for Ugandan Rebels who are also based in the Congo. On the other hand, Uganda is presumed to have stopped lending support to rebels in Sudan with the birth of South Sudan. Lack of Sudanese support for the LRA led to its dwindling fortunes and its shifting base from Congo forests to the Central African Republic. The challenge has been to reduce the enemy of my enemy is my friend fueled conflict in the Great Lakes Region. Increasingly, it is becoming clear that reducing enemies on home soil is the only sure way of reducing international enemies.

⁹<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13286306?print=true>

However, as most of the rebel groups have claimed, they are not fully engaged or involved in crafting of post-war road maps. For instance, after the Lusaka talks, The Mai Mai rebels in Eastern Congo claimed they were not included in the talks. After the Arusha talks, the Interahamwe (Hutu Rebels) claimed their grievances were not taken into account.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Empirical evidence shows that balance of power between nations in the Great Lakes Region is dependent on balance of power within the individual states in the Great Lakes Region.¹⁰ However, internal balance of power is highly dependent on prevailing government structures. The government as structured influences the power balance and hence predictability of political succession. This study aimed at investigating this phenomenon using the DRC as a case study. This study was instigated by the understanding that peace and stability prevail when a government is perceived to be fair, equitable, transparent and accountable. When all those elements characteristics of a democracy are achieved, most members of a state have faith in the regime. However, for all those elements to be felt and perceived to be existent in any regime, the existent political or government structure plays an important role.

As discussed by Herbert Weiss the challenge in many Great Lakes Region nations is how to accommodate the different interest groups within and without the borders in government.¹¹ Like in the case of DRC, this has been an issue of concern since independence. At independence, some provinces wanted a federal system while others sought a unitary state because they were deemed to safeguard given interests. Studies of conflict in the Great Lakes

¹⁰Hunnighton, 1991: Mohamed Salih, 1999: Vines and Weiner, 2011 and Barkan, 2011

¹¹Herbert Weiss and Georges Nzongola-ntalaja, *Decentralization and the DRC – An Overview. SSRIC, conflict resolution and peace forum, 2010*

Region point to resources, inclusion and historical factors as main reasons why the conflicts exist.¹² There are a number of peace deals that have been signed leading to relative calm in the Great Lakes Region. This study sought to explore how post-war government structures have been designed. The main aim was to establish whether established structures are likely to solve conflict triggers like exclusion, ethnic profiling, marginalization, and biased distribution of national resources.

1.3. Research Objectives

The overall objective was to examine the contribution of post-war government structures to unpredictable political succession in the Great Lakes Region.

1.3.1. Specific Objectives

1. To document the incidence of unpredictable political succession in the Great Lakes Region
2. To analyze post-war government structures in the Great Lakes Region
3. To examine the relation between post-war government structure and predictability of political succession in the DRC

1.4. Hypotheses

The study was guided by the following hypotheses:

1. Non-inclusion is the major contributor to unpredictable political succession in the Great Lakes Region

¹²M, Mwangi, *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, CCR Publications: Nairobi, 2006

2. Decentralization has significantly affected internal democratic processes in countries of the Great Lakes Region
3. Post-war political structures are a major determinant of predictable political succession in the Great Lakes Region

1.5. Justification of the Study

The proposed research was important because it directly informed a situation for which immediate solutions were required. As the Great Lakes Region begins to experience relative peace, it was important that the question of government structures and inclusion should be addressed. The region exploded with the genocide in Rwanda. The genesis of the genocide in Rwanda was the feeling by some ethnic group that another was being favored in government. Due to inter-border ethnic linkages the Rwanda conflict overflowed to the DRC. Unless the post-war government structures are responsive to the prevailing reality, the circle of violence can not be broken.

1.6. Literature Review

The proposed research project concentrated on non-inclusive government structures and how they contribute to unpredictable political succession in the Great Lakes Region. "Government is understood to refer to the formal and institutional processes which operate at the level of the nation state to maintain public order and facilitate collective action."¹³In this literature review, focus was centered on the role of government structures in attaining proper distribution or redistribution of resources and power in a state. Further, the

¹³Gerry Stoker, *Governance as theory: five propositions*, UNESCO 1998.

review looked into issues of inclusion and how proper inclusion could be attained. Finally, political succession was considered.

In his article *Governance as theory: five propositions*, Gerry Stoker considers governance as a reinvented form of government which is better managed.¹⁴ He sees governance, in the first proposition, as referring to complex set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond the government. This is in contrast with the constitutional/ formal understating of systems of government which for long time has portrayed the dominant image of a unitary stated directed and legitimated by the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. Stoker holds that the constitutional/institutional perspectives of state as unitary are limited and misleading because they fail to capture the complex architecture to systems of government.¹⁵

He goes on to say that government should not be viewed in terms of a unitary state where there is only one center of power, or as if it were a ‘stand-alone’ institution divorced from a wider societal forces, but it should instead be viewed in terms of a network where there are many centers and diverse links between its many agencies at local, national, regional and supranational levels.¹⁶ In other words, government should recognize and draw attention to the increasing involvement of private and voluntary sectors in service delivery and strategic decision-making with the aim to yield to contracting out and public-private partnership so that responsibilities that were previously the near exclusive duty of government should be shared.¹⁷ Quoting Kooiman 1991, Gerry Stoker asserts that governing from governance perspective is always interactive

¹⁴Gerry Stoker, *Governance as theory: five propositions*, UNESCO 1998.

¹⁵Idem

¹⁶Idem

¹⁷Idem

process because no single actor, public or private, has the knowledge and resource capacity to tackle problems unilaterally.¹⁸

The last proposition of Governance as theory talks about the reinvented form of government that acknowledges the ability to have things done which does not emanate from the power of government to command or to use its control. It sees the reinvented form of government as capable to utilize new tools and methods to direct and guide by implanting three important tasks of (de)composition and co-ordination; collaboration and steering; and integration and regulation. These three duties involve thinking and acting beyond individual sub-systems, avoiding unwanted side effects and establishing mechanisms for effective coordination. The first task concerns with defining a situation, identifying key stakeholders and then developing effective linkages between the relevant parties. The second duty involves influencing and steering relationships in order to achieve desired outcomes. The third is about system management.

1.6.1. Government Structure and the Distribution Agenda

Gerry Stoker observes: that “a welfare system that stimulates dependence is no longer acceptable to either the Right or Left of the political spectrum.”¹⁹ Government structures are critical due to the distribution facilitation done through them. They can marginalize some areas or empower all in an equitable manner. One way by which government structures influence distribution of national resources is the development planning process. Development planning in most countries happens through established structure of government. There is, therefore, need to

¹⁸Gerry Stoker, *Governance as theory: five propositions*, UNESCO 1998

¹⁹Idem.

design institutions that have a sustainable life but that are capable of evolution, learning and adaptation.²⁰

Development planning refers to effort to identify the most appropriate means and measures for achieving specific development goals.²¹ Its focus is to put in place procedures by which a development actor (such as a devolved unit of government) can direct, influence and control social economic change or transformation in a given society or community. The end goals of any development intervention are certain predetermined set of conditions deemed desirable for human welfare or for further transformation of society.

In development discourse, there is a great concern not just with economic value creation but also the power and social structures by which the economic value is generated, a surplus extracted and distributed in society.²² Therefore, development is about creation of economic surplus but also the social and political conditions that facilitate individuals a life they have reason to value. Bergdall writes: “Peoples participation is a popular theme in development circles.”²³ Participation has become a popular theme due to a paradigm shift from thinking that ‘leading agencies should do for the people’ to ‘people doing by and for selves’. According to Okumu, the new conception of development is “the process of a country moving towards greater inclusion, health, opportunity, justice, fairness, forgiveness and cultural expression”.²⁴ The new

²⁰Gerry Stoker, *Governance as theory: five propositions*, UNESCO 1998.

²¹Sen, A. *Development as Freedom*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

²²Ibid

²³Bergdall, T. D., *Methods for Active Participation: Experiences in Rural Development form East and Central Africa*, Oxford University Press, 1993.

²⁴Okumu, W. A. J. (2002). *The African Renaissance; History, Significance and Strategy*. Asmara: Africa World Press, 2002

emphasis on inclusion or participation was pegged on the understanding that when all are engaged, there is more likelihood of sustainable economic advancement.

People driven development, therefore, refers to an approach to development where people are the end and means of societal transformations. This means that development should start with the people and be controlled by the people to the benefit of the people. People driven development is better looked at in terms of individual's right, duty or opportunity to take part in decision-making. This right and duty or opportunity is dependent on existing political structures.²⁵ In practice, there has been a tendency to reduce individual citizens to actors of marginal influence and subordinate roles in planning and making of national decisions. As Bergdall notes:

There exists in Africa a strong tradition of centralized planning and administrative control. This tendency leads to strong concentration of power in government bureaucracies. The end result from concentration of power is that the elites continue to pursue narrow economic and political interests at the expense of the people.²⁶

In order to enhance people participation and ensure efficiency in delivery of services by government, decentralization is highly encouraged. Decentralization involves handing over administrative and managerial responsibility to sub national units.²⁷ Devolution is the highest form of decentralization because it involves the transfer of both authority and resources to

²⁵Bergdall, T. D. *Methods for Active Participation: Experiences in Rural Development form East and Central Africa*. Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1993.

²⁶Idem

²⁷Sen, A., *Development as Freedom*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

autonomous or semi-autonomous local government units. Devolution ought to enhance greater socio-economic and political participation of people at the grassroots in transformational processes.

1.6.2. Post-War Inclusion Agenda

In his book *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Paulo Freire makes an argument that frames what authentic or true liberation is. He argues that “all men and women and the world at large are one.”²⁸ Secondly, he argues that “all problems in the world have to do with a certain kind of consciousness.”²⁹ If such an assertion is true, it would follow that abuse of human rights happens due to a certain kind of consciousness. For Freire, “human liberation is in refining or changing consciousness and translating the same into action.”³⁰ In the context of entrenching a human rights approach to development, one would argue that it is only through helping the masses change their consciousness that they will appreciate human rights and take actions to promote human dignity for all.

To appreciate the argument by Paulo Freire, one has to understand the epistemological foundations of his arguments. At the heart of Freire’s theory, is the appreciation that human beings are subjects and should never be treated as mere objects. Paulo Freire argues that “the true human vocation is humanization.”³¹ By humanization, it should be understood as a process of helping others live as free radicals or subjects that they were created to be. To be human is to be

²⁸Freire, P., *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. London; Continuum press, 1993, p. 26.

²⁹Ibid, p.27.

³⁰Ibid, p. 28.

³¹Freire, P., *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. London; Continuum press, 1993, p. 26.

capable of choice and choices increase when one is allowed room to consider issues by oneself and decide.

According to Freire, history has proved that humanization is the only true human vocation. The more individuals have oppressed others and caused them pain, the more they brought to light the fact that treating others humanely is not a matter of choice but a matter of necessity. To believe that others are purely subjects and not objects makes a lot of difference. From such a standpoint, education would definitely have to turn from being anthropological to anthropocentric. Anthropological focus entails trying to unravel and understand humans thus manipulate human beings. On the other hand, anthropocentric means education is focused on human beings. Even when studying human beings, it should be for the benefit of human beings; the subjects. Appreciating others as subjects as opposed to objects, according to Freire, translates into praxis,³² that is, doing something about their situation based on love. Praxis in Freire's conception is closely linked to consciousness i.e. proper consciousness necessarily translates into action upon or on the same. Praxis consists in reflection and action. Praxis follows directly from a given level of consciousness.³³

The next important epistemological foundation of Freire's liberation education is his understanding of human consciousness. For Freire "Liberation is praxis: the action and reflection of men and women on their world in order to transform it."³⁴ This liberation is only realizable when a people's consciousness changes. Freire (1993) argues that all liberators have to believe that all human beings are conscious beings. Secondly, they have to appreciate the element of

³² Freire, P., *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. London; Continuum press, 1993, p. 31.

³³Ibid, p.32

³⁴Ibid p.60

intentionality in consciousness. The concept of intentionality can best be understood when one considers the attributes of knowledge and process of knowing. For one to know something, one has to intent to know i.e. one has to focus one's consciousness on the given subject or object to be able to perceive and reflect on it. The consciousness intent is determined by the beliefs that an individual holds. It has to be noted that one can only know that which he or she is ready to know. For instance, individuals pass by cars every day. However, only those who have a conscious intent take note of the different models and even shapes of the cars.

Considering the two ideas i.e. human beings as subjects and liberation as praxis, there are given ramifications that follow. One great ramification, which is well illustrated by Paulo Freire is that education should consist in conscientisation. Could it be that such an approach is that is lacking in the methodologies used by lead human rights agencies in Africa? Conscientisation as a process consists in helping the learners or locals towards "learning to perceive social, political and economic contradictions and take action against the oppressive elements of reality."³⁵ Through conscientisation, individuals are able to identify oppressive reality and articulate elements in social realities that are oppressive.

For Freire, subjective knowledge and objective knowledge are not opposed to each other. What is critical is appreciating the two and putting things in perspective. Giving the example of rightist and leftists, they are both two extremes that seem irreconcilable. When one considers the positions of the two sides, they both seem to be true by their own merit. This is truer when one considers the plight of the poor and marginalized in a country like Congo. The rich claim they worked hard and the poor are lazy while the poor argue that they were denied opportunity to

³⁵Freire, P. *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. London: Continuum Press, 1993, p.17

work hard and improve their livelihoods. However, the truth is somewhere between them i.e. in the form of a synthesis.

Considering Paulo Freire's premises, there is a clear correlation between liberation education and emancipation of the masses. In Congo, development actors and agencies have tried out many approaches to ensure stability and development. In development and political circles, it has become fashionable to talk in terms of empowering initiatives. It is argued that for people to participate, they need power, control and freedom. Therefore, empowerment consists in the state or other actors sharing power and control with the people through institutional and legal mechanisms. It is in the empowerment paradigm that devolution has become very relevant. Through devolution, individuals at the grassroots are given autonomy to make and implement decision without interference from the central government. For empowerment to be successful, there is need to change the thinking and collective identity of the people. This requires availing avenues for individuals to access knowledge and opening up space so that individual's views are heard and considered.

On empowerment, SonghaRoy says, "empowerment of marginalized groups thus involves not only the process of creation of political space for those groups by state and civil society but also the process of liberation from manmade bondage through sustained struggle and resistance."³⁶ In the given statement, one finds the element of an outside agency i.e. state or civil society either opening up space or liberating the marginalized groups. However, it is also mentioned that the groups have to continually struggle and resist.

³⁶SinghaRoy, K. D., *Social Development and the Empowerment of Marginalized Groups; Perspectives and Strategies*. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003.

The greatest criticism against empowerment hype is that it involves actors doing on behalf of the marginalized groups. To the extent that the power is only given to them, the marginalized groups do not own the power, as they are likely to lose it as soon as the giver withdraws it. The correct method or approach to participation consists in working by the side of the oppressed and not for the oppressed.³⁷ Working beside the oppressed consists in dialoguing and communicating with them thus appreciating things from their own point of view. A more liberating approach that leads to authentic participation of the oppressed is emancipation. Emancipation is defined by SinghaRoy as the “progressive movement towards freedom and equality.”³⁸ In most cases, when people have been oppressed for long, the oppressed are adapted to the structure of domination and are resigned to it. The oppressors on the other hand fear freedom because it is bound to deny them the trappings offered by the status quo³⁹.

To be liberated, therefore, both the oppressed and the oppressors have to shake off the shackles of dependency on status quo and perceive a social order that serves the interests of all human beings other than a privileged few. This requires significant and sincere engagement between the oppressed and the oppressors, such that their needs can be reflected in policies and programs of government. As AmartyaSen demonstrated, “providing instrumental freedom builds or strengthens people’s capacities. Consequently, they are able to take charge towards self-emancipation.”⁴⁰

³⁷Freire, P. *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. London: Continuum Press, 1993.

³⁸SinghaRoy, K. D. *Social Development and the Empowerment of Marginalized Groups; Perspectives and Strategies*. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003, p. 76.

³⁹Freire, P. *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. London: Continuum Press, 1993, p.29.

⁴⁰Sen, A. (1999). *Development as Freedom*. New York: Oxford University Press

1.7 Theoretical Framework

This study was anchored on the Neo-realism theoretical foundation. The realist theory postulates that human nature is inherently selfish hence social systems as well as international system being anarchic.⁴¹ In Hobbes belief, there is always need for a strong prince or state to control and regulate interactions. Left to itself, regional interaction is largely antagonistic with each actor (state) seeking self-perpetuation and hegemonic kind of presence.⁴² All states being rational actors, they engage in war or negotiations with clear goals and objectives. For most states in the Great Lakes Region, they sponsor conflict based on the friend of my enemy is my enemy and the enemy of my enemy is my friend principle. As a consequence, from a realist point of view, unless my enemy is vanquished, the friend of my enemy remains my enemy.⁴³ Also, from a realist perspective, there is no way conflict in the Congo can end until such a time when the self-interests of the various state regimes have been addressed. Through negotiations, some roadmap for collaboration has been achieved. However, until the internal enemies are dealt with through structural engagement and inclusion, the states in the Great Lakes Region will not acquire full control and rebellion will always simmer.

Traditionally, the state sought to achieve a controlling monopoly by building a strong military. In this era of deliberative democracy, a state achieves more control over its citizens through inclusion and empowerment. Therefore, the government structures in place have to facilitate use of coercive power but most critically soft power in making citizens submit to a regime. The traditional approach of trying to subdue militarily has proved not to work in the Great Lakes Region due to the inter-ethnic linkages and military alliances in the region.

⁴¹Ashley, Richard K. "Political Realism and the Human Interests," *International Studies Quarterly* (1981) 25: 204-236.

⁴²Ibid. pp. 235-237.

⁴³Molloy, Sean. *The Hidden History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power Politics*. New York: Palgrave, 2006

In international relations, from a realist understanding, states are the critical actors and the world system is maintained through a balance of power between different blocs or groups of nations. Any possibility of hegemonic power is quashed through a process of building alliances by the weaker states. In the Great Lakes Region, the process of building alliances to prevent say Rwanda's hegemonic like influence over Congo led to the bitter war that sucked in most of Congo's neighbours.

The dynamics in the Great Lakes Region are better captured by the neoclassical-realist school. This is because neo-classical realists do not only acknowledge the realists point of view but go further to acknowledge internal factors within a state as influencing its engagement in the international system.⁴⁴ A country's domestic circumstances that influence its foreign policies and actions towards other states are an important consideration in seeking regional peace in the Great Lakes Region. There is need to deal with domestic incentives that drive the various states to act in a given manner towards its neighbors or enemies of its neighbors.⁴⁵

1.8. Methodology of the Research

This section presents the research methodology adopted in the study. Research methodology is described by Kothari as the steps that are generally adopted by a researcher in studying the research problem as informed by logic.⁴⁶ The section looks into the research design, variables and location of the study, target population, sampling technique and sample

⁴⁴Barkin, J. Samuel *Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory* (Cambridge University Press; 2010)

⁴⁵ Williams, Michael C., *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations.*; London: Cambridge University Press, 2005

⁴⁶Kothari, C. R., *Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques.2nd Ed.*, New Delhi: New Age International Publishers (2004)

size, the research instrument, validity, reliability, data collection methods and data analysis procedures.

In this research work a qualitative design, which involved in-depth study of a phenomenon or element, was applied. The qualitative design or strategy is considered appropriate for this project since it allows the researcher to do an in-depth study of the issues.⁴⁷ In this endeavor, the qualitative approach was applied for the purposes of a comprehensive exploration and evaluation of a phenomenon.

The sources of primary data were publications and key informants drawn from various interest groups working in Congo. There are various stakeholders that have been affected by or have been working on the conflict in Congo for some time. Such target groups include The UN, International Humanitarian Agencies in Congo, Civil Society Groups in Congo, and Political Parties in Congo, Religious leaders, prominent community leaders and Government agencies representatives.

The research used purposive sampling procedure to determine the individuals to collect information from; as key informants. The researcher used his judgment to select cases that were deemed best sources of data to respond to the research questions and meet the research objectives. The key informants in this study are as shown in table 1

⁴⁷Yin, R. K., *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. London: Sage Inc, 2009.

Table 1: Key informants in the Study

Interest Group	Key Informant
Provinces	Governor, senator
Ruling Party	Members of parliament and senators
Opposition Party	Members of parliament and senators
Faith Based Organization	Archbishop of the Catholic diocese of Kinshasa, Secretary Gen. of Kimbanguiste Church and the Representative of Association of the Pentecostal Christian Churches of Congo
Local Non-Governmental Organization	Directors and Chief Executive Officers
MONUSCO (UN Mission in Congo)	MONUSCO national workers in Kinshasa
International NGOs	Human Rights Watch Agency in Congo
Civil Society	Chief Executive Officers and Representatives

Data collected from both secondary and primary sources was assembled for processing and analysis. The data was examined to ensure required information is included. Given the qualitative nature of the study, data collected were analyzed through summing up and generating summary narratives. Analyzed data were presented through thematic narratives; this means that the narratives were organized around given themes.

The study followed all laid down procedures and research guidelines by the university. No undue influence was used to collect information from unwilling individuals. Data collected from secondary sources was properly cited and referenced appropriately. All information collected was treated with utmost confidentiality and was used solely for the research purposes.

1.8. Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study focused on the contribution of non-inclusive post war government structures to unpredictable political succession in the Great Lakes Region. The Great Lakes Region has various nations but for the purposes of this study, main focus was on Congo and the protagonists in the conflict in Eastern Congo, Burundi, Angola, Rwanda and Uganda.

The researcher experienced a number of challenges or limitations in executing the research work. The first challenge has to do with resistance from institutions to release information about the given operations of government or the agencies. The researcher made a pre-visit and they promised to share the data once research tools are sent to their offices. The researcher was also bound to suffer some financial and time restriction given the fact that the research was self-sponsored and the he is a student with other academic commitments. However, he planned and managed his time well and used available resources diligently to ensure adequate data was collected and the research report written in time.

1.9. Chapter Outline

The whole research project has five the following chapters.

Chapter One: This chapter introduces the topic of our research study by first setting the broad context of our research study, the statement of the problem, justification, theoretical framework, literature review, hypotheses and the methodology of the study.

Chapter Two: The chapter documents the incidence of unpredictable political succession in the Great Lakes Region.

Chapter Three: This chapter provides data on the post-war government structures in the Great Lakes Region with special focus on Uganda, Burundi and DRC.

Chapter Four: This chapter is a presentation of data collected on Congo; largely the primary data. This data on how post-war political structures contribute to unpredictable political succession in DRC and the broader Great Lakes Region.

Chapter five: This chapter provides conclusions of the study, gives recommendations and provides suggestions on areas for further study.

CHAPTER TWO

INCIDENCES OF UNPREDICTABLE POLITICAL SUCCESSION IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

2.1. Introduction

This chapter documents the incidences of unpredictable political succession in selected countries of the Great Lakes Region. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section explores the political systems in Africa and the place of democracy. The second section documents the process towards expanding democratic space in the sampled Great Lakes nations.

2.2. Political Systems in Africa

There is no bigger problem that Africa has faced rather than conflicts. Most countries across Africa, there have experienced war or an armed conflict in the last two decades. A clan, a tribe, a nation or an individual seeking power, land, water, pastures, a share in the national cake or good governance takes to arms. To curb or stop the blood-letting across Africa, democracy has often been suggested as the remedy.⁴⁸ Democratisation in itself is very appealing; a government of the people, for the people is a desirable ideal. It means that each citizen is self-governing in the sense that his or her voice is put into consideration in the making of national policies.⁴⁹ Like any other ideal, concretising a democracy seems to be more complicated than African leaders have been ready to acknowledge.

In a state, each individual or group of people has its own unique and often selfish interests. As narrated by Amoako:

⁴⁸Mohamed Salih, M. A., *African Democracies and African Politics* London: Pluto, 1999.

⁴⁹Adekunle A et al., *Civil Society, Governance and Regional Integration in Africa*, Nairobi: Development Policy Management Forum, p. 214.

In African nations there are numerous sub-groups that people are loyal to. There is the clan, the tribe, the region, religion, party and ideology. Unlike in other regions of the world where manifestos matter, in Africa south of the Sahara, loyalty to own group or sub-group is what matters.⁵⁰

Further, Amoako observes that “In multi-ethnic countries, majority tribes (the largest or dominant ethnic group) tend to control political processes.”⁵¹In most African countries, political contests are about tribal supremacy and political alliances are formed along tribal lines. In a majority of cases, the elites make the pacts and whip their tribe mates into endorsing their decisions. Tribal chiefs are thus most instrumental in determining political processes in most African countries. The political pacts or alliances of tribes are often driven by the desire to control national resources at the expense of other tribes.⁵²With ethnicity playing a major role in national planning and policymaking, inclusion driven meritocracy is critical for stability in such nations.

Unfortunately, the forming of governments in Africa is not about what is best for the nation but about what is best for perpetuation of the individual in power.⁵³As evidenced in Kenya during the grand coalition government, inclusivity in government often implies creating all sorts of ministries to accommodate every king pin from the different clans. It does not matter how much is being spent or how much the citizen is being taxed. Issues of social welfare only feature as election pledges but once a government comes in power, the song changes and it is about how

⁵⁰Mohamed Salih, M. A., *African Democracies and African Politics* London: Pluto, 1999.

⁵¹Idem

⁵²Idem

⁵³Mohamed Salih, M. A., *African Democracies and African Politics*, London: Pluto, 1999.

to increase taxes, how to increase the salaries of the policy makers or of the law makers and how to set up elephant projects that are meant to attract votes come another elections.

For long, African regimes have been accused of corruption and favouritism. Subsequent to bad governance, government officials do whatever pleases them. The rule followed by political players is, get the chance and eat or wait for one then do your best eating. Once one has found an opportunity and another opportunity arises, the new opportunity is passed on to a kinsman or exchanged with some fraudulent gain. There are very few African countries that have not been on the world map of corruption.⁵⁴ Jobs are not offered on merit but privilege - the privilege of being known and connected to the big man or woman. The hardworking Africans' efforts are in vain because of the phenomena under discussion. Consequently, they give up and famously join them who are grabbing because they cannot defeat them. Once they have joined them, they try to beat them at their own game by becoming even more insidiously corrupt.

African governance challenges are not just caused by internal mechanisms but by international factors in equal measure as well. Africa South of the Sahara's interaction with other regions of the world is very problematic.⁵⁵ Least developed countries and the entire of the developing world are disadvantaged in comparison to the 'developed' world, as narrated by Martinussen.⁵⁶ Marxist of underdevelopment theories have demonstrated how the developed countries enriched themselves after bleeding the less advanced regions. They extracted and continue to extract cheap natural resources and even manpower from the developing nations and

⁵⁴World Bank, *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000)

⁵⁵Adekunle A et al., *Civil Society, Governance and Regional Integration in Africa*, Nairobi: Development Policy Management Forum, p. 214

⁵⁶Martinussen J., *Society, State and Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development*. London: Zed Books, 1997.

use the resources to develop goods sold expensively to the developing countries. In products where African would have bargaining power, economic supremacy is maintained by the privileged nations through use subsidies, taxation, quotas and other trade restricting measures that automatically lock African countries out of trade. Skewed commodity chains have ensured international players have a role to play in internal governance in African countries. International actors support leaders they deem support their exploitative or extractionist goals.

2.2.1. Political Parties and Political Succession in Africa

The debate on predictable succession in Africa is closely linked to adoption of multi-party democracy. Multi-party democracy has taken different forms across the world.⁵⁷ The exercise of democratic elections has always been context specific since inception of democratic ideals. Despite many countries adopting multi-party democracy, popular democracy is yet to take root especially in African countries⁵⁸. This situation arises when instead of political parties being formed to be vehicles for popular voice on national issues; political parties are used as structures to fool citizenry or to control citizens' behavior. In many countries, there are documented cases of political parties being used as well-oiled institutions for controlling citizen activities and behaviour⁵⁹. Once politicians win elections through a political party, they tend towards consolidating power through the party structures that they establish.

The drive to full-fledged democratic space is dependent on political and socio-economic processes within a country. Political parties and their functionality define how countries meet the

⁵⁷Huntington, S. P., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, Okla.: University 1991.

⁵⁸Weiner, M., *Party Building in a New Nation*, Chicago University Press, 1967.

⁵⁹Idem

democratic principles of equity, accountability, transparency, inclusion and participation. Internal balance of power within nations is dependent on existence or lack of political parties and the nature of political parties' actions on national issues. Just like in other regions, effective political parties are defined by the legal regulations and internal structures of the political parties. To attain predictable political succession, it is important to have strong institutional arrangements, which clearly empower political parties as the most significant political players in a political system.⁶⁰Such an institutional framework defines how political parties are regulated, how they are funded and how operations in parties are to be streamlined. Good political parties are responsive to the prevalent political climate within a state.

The stability of political parties is dependent on the national political party regulatory environment. Apart from the regulatory framework, there are other socio-economic factors that determine the operations of political parties. The ideal situation is when political parties are not restricted when it comes to engagement in electoral activities and political mandates. Nations with strong party systems have clearly defined processes of registering or founding political parties. There have to be legal stipulations defining political parties' role in elections, internal party functioning control, conduct of electioneering processes and inclusion in the political parties.

Internal political party operations are very important to entrenching democracy. Good parties have internal democracy that ensures fair and transparent processes of selecting

⁶⁰Adekunle A et al., *Civil Society, Governance and Regional Integration in Africa*, Nairobi: Development Policy Management Forum, p. 207.

candidates to run on the party ticket.⁶¹ Additionally, such parties have accounting mechanisms that ensure sources of party finances are known, the use of such funds is ratified by party members and full disclosure is made with regard to party expenditures. Political parties are supposed to be institutions of representation.⁶² Therefore, good parties have internal mechanisms of ensuring inclusivity and affirmative action for the vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society.

2.2.2. Civil Society and Political Succession in Africa

Due to lack of mature political parties in Africa and considering that political parties often push for partisan interests, civil societies have played a critical role in expanding the democratic space and ensuring popular participation in governance. Civil societies; both NGOs and Faith Based Organizations have played an important role in pushing for political freedoms.

There are local civil societies and international civil societies. Much of the activities of local or national civil societies in African countries are supported by international civil society groups. This has often implied that the agenda of local civil societies is dictated by international players. The first political parties in Africa were instigated by the colonialists in response to African's agitation for independence. The post-colonial political parties were an attempt by the colonialists to accommodate locals and minimize agitation.⁶³ In other cases, it was an effort by the colonialists to introduce institutionalized politics, which allows for democratic leadership before handing over leadership to Africans. The push for multi-party politics has also been

⁶¹Adekunle A et al., *Civil Society, Governance and Regional Integration in Africa*, Nairobi: Development Policy Management Forum, p. 207.

⁶²Idem.

⁶³Mohamed Salih, M. A., *African Democracies and African Politics*, London: Pluto, 1999.

linked to international political actors leading some Africans to consider democracy and multi-party politics as foreign exports from western European countries.⁶⁴ The African liberation movements, in many countries, turned into political parties with ethnicity being a major galvanizing factor. In many countries, instead of multi-party systems emerging, what appeared were one-party political system.⁶⁵ The single parties meant consolidation of power and tendencies towards authoritarianism. In such cases, only international political actors and civil societies provided an opposition to the ruling party.

Provision of aid with conditionality has been the mode of involvement of international political actors in national politics in African countries.⁶⁶ The political parties often rely on civil societies for funding. For state-controlled civil societies, the trend has been embezzling public finances to support political party activities. Normally, the party in power is synonymous with the state. Consequently, political parties in power tend to use state power to consolidate control over most facets of society.

The heavy control of the political party over the state reduces the space for private sector influence on the public sphere. Lessened private sector influence on public sphere diminishes individual actions in influencing national issues.⁶⁷ Weak private sector also leads to weak civil society organizations. The civil society organizations are strong when they form partnerships with private sector operators and receive requisite support from such networks⁶⁸ In strong

⁶⁴Mohamed Salih, M. A., *African Democracies and African Politics*, London: Pluto, 1999.

⁶⁵Leiserson, A., *Parties and Politics: An Institutional and Behavioral Approach*, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1955.

⁶⁶Robert I. Rotberg (ed), *China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence*, p. 4.

⁶⁷Coleman, J. S. and C. G. Rosberg, *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1966.

⁶⁸Gerry Stoker, *Public-Private Partnerships and Urban Governance*, London Sage, 87.

political party controlled states, business people tend to seek being in good favor with the political class to succeed. Lack of business people's support to civil societies leads to local civil societies being weak. Weak civil societies imply individual citizens have weakened capacity to make demands of their leaders.

2.3. Political Succession in the Great Lakes Region

2.3.1 Political Succession in Uganda

Uganda has had four Constitutions since acquisition of Independence in 1962. Every single one of these Constitutions contained elaborate provisions prescribing the procedure for transfer of governmental power from incumbent Heads of State and their governments to their successors in office. It is one of the bitter ironies of Uganda's existence as a nation that in spite of those constitutional provisions, this country has not had a peaceful transfer of power through the normal electoral process other than that from Paulo Muwanga's Military Commission to the Obote II Government in 1980. On all the other occasions, power was either literally grabbed at gun-point or was assumed in questionable ways.⁶⁹ Uganda is divided based on ethnicity. There is the Nilotic/ Nilo-Hamitic North and the Bantu inhabited south. The Bantu communities in the South had established kingdoms that were accommodated during the colonial rule. The most populous and most organized tribe in Uganda is the Baganda, who had a well-established monarch even before the coming of the colonialists. The establishment of the Ugandan state led to conflict between the Buganda affairs and state affairs. The challenge was how to accommodate the Kabaka (King) of Buganda kingdom while at the same time establish a unitary state. Milton Obote, a Langi from the north, was the first prime minister while Kabaka Muteesa of the Buganda Kingdom was a ceremonial head of state. From October 1962 to 1966, Obote, the

⁶⁹ Chris Maina P. and Fritz Kopsieker (eds). *Political Succession in East Africa: In Search for a Limited Leadership*, Friedrich Ebert: Kenya Office, p.84

Prime Minister and Head of Government, demonstrated preparedness to abide by and respect the constitutional provisions, but only as long as they served him.

In bid to reduce the influence of the Baganda in national issues, Obote chose to sideline and subdue the Kabaka of Buganda. This led to the first post-independence crack line. Uganda's experiment with democracy was short-lived. Obote, with the help of the military, abrogated the 1962 Constitution and replaced it with the 1966 Constitution which the Members of Parliament were bullied into passing before they had read it.⁸⁹ Obote then ordered the army to storm Kabaka Mutesa's Palace. The Kabaka who was then President, fled into exile where he died in misery.⁷⁰ Obote did not succeed in uniting the nation. Due to authoritarian tendencies and extraction of loyalty through force and financial inducements, in January 1971, the Obote regime was easily toppled by his own Army Commander whom he had used to get rid of Mutesa.⁷¹ After toppling Obote, Idi Amin sought to establish a more centralized political system with him as the unchallenged leader. Amin Dada used dictatorial leadership as a way of consolidating power. He is famed to have been the worst dictator in Africa's history. Using divide and rule tactics, he unleashed terror on would be enemies of his regime; especially the Baganda who were the biggest threat to any nationalist government and rule by a northerner. Any leader that was critical of his leadership was murdered in a series of political assassinations that did not spare anyone irrespective of affiliation.

Amin's supposed life presidency lasted only 8 years and in 1979 he was overthrown by an alliance of Uganda émigrés and the Tanzania Peoples' Defence Forces (TPDF). Professor

⁷⁰Karugire, S.R., *A Political History of Uganda*, Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980, p. 196.

⁷¹Chris Maina P. and Fritz Kopsieker (eds). *Political Succession in East Africa: In Search for a Limited Leadership*, Friedrich Ebert: Kenya Office, p.86.

Yusuf Lule, who was installed under the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) arrangement, ruled for the whole of 68 days, was voted out of office by the National Consultative Council which, in exercise of questionable authority, hand-picked Mr. Godfrey Binaisa. The later went out of office as easily as he had come in. In yet another coup, but mercifully a bloodless one this time, the Military Commission headed by Paulo Muwanga, with Yoweri Museveni as Vice Chairman, took over.⁷² Drunk of power, Idi Amin thought he could militarily intimidate neighboring Kenya and Tanzania. His invasion of Tanzania gave leeway for President Julius Nyerere to send his troops into Uganda and facilitated the ouster of Amin Dada. After the ouster of Amin, the power vacuum and turmoil that followed saw two provisional presidents assume power before Obote was re-established as the bona fide president. Unfortunately, President Obote (1981-1986) did not focus on reuniting the country but rather on subduing rebel or opposing elements through repression and dictatorship. It is argued that the Obote regime, after the ouster of Amin, killed as many Ugandans as did the Amin administration.⁷³ It is also argued that President Obote did not manage the army well, due to differences on how to subdue rebel elements and share national resources, which led to a faction of the army that was composed of and led by northerners to topple his government in 1986. Following the 1980 elections in which UPC was declared winner, Obote once again became President. A number of groups questioned the legitimacy of Obote's victory and launched guerrilla campaigns. The over-stretched army resorted to brutal tactics in order to contain the situation, but this only further alienated the populace. The army virtually disintegrated in Obote's hands and, in 1985, one faction overthrew

⁷²Chris Maina P. and Fritz Kopsieker (eds). *Political Succession in East Africa: In Search for a Limited Leadership*, Friedrich Ebert: Kenya Office, p.86-87

⁷³Barkan, D. J. *Uganda: Assessing Risks to Stability*, Washington DC: Center for Strategic Studies, 2011.

Obote for the second and, for sure, the last time in his life. Tito Okello was sworn in as Head of State.⁷⁴

After the ouster of Obote, the Army that was dominated by Northerners started battling the National Resistance Army, a rebel group of southerners. When the national resistance Army (NRA) led by Museveni defeated the northerner dominated army, Ugandans as well as the rest of the world sighed with relief. The National Resistance Army rebranded to National Resistance Movement (NRM). NRM was anchored on communist ideologies owing to the Ujamaa influence from Tanzania. The NRM has mutated from a communist leaning totalitarian party to a political party like many others in Uganda. Despite the changes over time, it remains the most dominant political institution in Uganda.

President Kaguta Museveni is credited for having brought stability in Uganda. However, he has failed in providing a transition from his rule to a more liberal democratic post liberation rule, which assured Ugandans of peace, stability and economic empowerment.⁷⁵ He has established a patronage based regime, whose survival is dependent on him. Uganda's stability going forward is dependent on how the president manages his succession. To stabilize the country, president Museveni established a military dominated NRM, later NRM transformed into a personalized autocratic ruling system and with the introduction of multiparty politics in 1996, the regime transformed into a hybrid of autocracy and democratic government.⁷⁶ However, due to military control on the public sphere with many senior officers in government being former

⁷⁴Chris Maina P. and Fritz Kopsieker (eds). *Political Succession in East Africa: In Search for a Limited Leadership*, Friedrich Ebert: Kenya Office, p.87.

⁷⁵Barkan, D. J, *Uganda: Assessing Risks to Stability*. Washington DC: Center for Strategic Studies, 2011.

⁷⁶ Ibid

military generals, Museveni established a well-oiled patronage system that does not provide for level playing ground in Uganda politics. The NRM thrives on the citizens' fear of war and its devastations. Many Ugandans would rather have Museveni perpetuate himself in power than contemplate going back to years of chaos.

There has been considerable movement towards multi-party politics in Uganda. However, the authoritarian nature of the Museveni Regime and the patronage the president exercises through NRM has made political succession in Uganda uncertain. For instance, after repealing the two terms in office clause for presidency through the Ugandan parliament, Museveni has had two resounding victories at elections. There is a section of the population that feels the president has done enough and should allow for other players to take Uganda to the next level. However, using the military, Museveni continues to rule by intimidating other politicians and bullying opposition. In the run up to the February 2011 elections, Museveni had the opposition leader thrown into jail and opposition rallies were marred by violence meted by state agencies and NRM hired goons.

The future of Uganda is tied to Museveni due to his personalized approach to governance. He is able to maintain loyalty through the NRM ranks through patronage based tactics. Loyalty is awarded and public resources are used to buy politicians; there are documented cases of members of parliament being bribed by the state.⁷⁷ To sustain the patronage, the NRM regime is accused of approaching Ugandan economy like a personal enterprise meant to benefit the President and his regime. Public funds are used in activities meant to perpetuate the NRM regime and Museveni stay in power.

⁷⁷Barkan, D. J, *Uganda: Assessing Risks to Stability*. Washington DC: Center for Strategic Studies, 2011.

2.3.2. Political Succession in Burundi

Burundi and Rwanda are like Siamese twins owing to the proximity to each other, shared or similar history and ethnic affiliations.⁷⁸ Just like in Rwanda, the majority ethnic groups in Burundi are the Hutu (85% of the total population) and the Tutsi (14% of the population).⁷⁹ The Tutsi and Hutu conflict both in Rwanda and Burundi led to mass massacres and genocide at different times in the history of the two countries.⁸⁰ The 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the coming to power of President Kagame has helped in stabilizing Rwanda. However, just like in the case of Uganda, where President Museveni has had to consolidate power and maintain strong control over state affairs, the same script has been followed by President Kagame of Rwanda. The post war structures in Rwanda, Uganda and Angola have similarities due to the centralizing of power and personalized leadership by presidents Kagame, Museveni and Dos Santos respectively.⁸¹

Burundi is among the smallest but also poorest countries in Africa. The economy of the country is agri-based with coffee and tea as major exports. Since independence in 1962, the political environment in Burundi was characterized by tension and conflict between the two main ethnic communities.⁸² Wolpe points out that the conflict in Burundi although appearing like an ethnic conflict was a structural conflict about inclusion or lack of inclusion in government.⁸³ At independence, the president was a Tutsi, which is a minority group compared to the 85% of the

⁷⁸Wolpe, H., "Making Peace after the Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process"; *Peaceworks*: United States, Institute of Peace, 2011.

⁷⁹Idem

⁸⁰Weissman, S. R., "Preventing Genocide in Burundi: Lessons in Diplomacy"; *Peaceworks* 22. Washington: Institute of Peace, 1998.

⁸¹Idem

⁸²Idem

⁸³Wolpe, H., "Making Peace after the Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process". *Peaceworks* 70. Washington: Institute of Peace, 2011.

population that are Hutu. Consequently, there were numerous coup attempts with the Hutu seeking to topple the Tutsi led government.

The first coup attempt was in October of 1965 but when it failed, the Tutsi regime took a radical decision and had all the Hutu leaders alongside their supporters executed.⁸⁴ This kind of approach to dealing with the Hutu uprising did not deter the Hutu. In 1972, another coup was attempted and again the regime executed all Hutu leaders and their close supporters.⁸⁵ In this case, the regime unleashed brutality on the Hutu nation butchering over two hundred thousand people. Additionally, the regime purged out of the national army any Hutu or individual sympathetic towards Hutus. This actions by the regime meant completely denying the Hutus any participation in the national government. Once Hutus had been eliminated from the political life of the country, internal rivalry among the Tutsi resulted in Major Pierre Buyoya successively toppling Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza in a coup d'état.⁸⁶ In bid to appease the Hutu, President Buyoya named a Hutu in his government in 1987 as prime minister.

The tribal animosity in Burundi continued to rise and in 1988 ethnic violence broke out in the north of the country and many Tutsi's were murdered. In response, the government sent the Tutsi dominated army to the area and many Hutus were massacred in revenge. After the Massacres of 1988, a national commission was established to recommend measures for national cohesion.⁸⁷ The recommendations by the commission were accepted in a referendum and this led

⁸⁴ Wolpe, H., "Making Peace after the Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process". *Peaceworks70*, Washington: Institute of Peace, 2011.

⁸⁵Ibid, p. 17.

⁸⁶Ibid, p. 18.

⁸⁷Wolpe, H., "Making Peace after the Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process". *Peaceworks70*, Washington: Institute of Peace, 2011.

to a new constitution being promulgated. With a new constitution, it ushered in multi-party politics and like it was expected, in the first elections of 1993, a Hutu president was elected.

President Ndabayе commenced by sacking most of the Tutsi in power and replacing them with his own supporters of Hutu origin.⁸⁸ He also started on a plan to reform the Burundian army from a Tutsi dominated to one that was acceptable. This move led to the army toppling Ndabayе's government leading to inter-ethnic massacres in a protracted civil war. President Cyprien Ntaryamira assumed the power during the civil strife but died in a plane crash while traveling with the Rwandan President in 1994.⁸⁹ Once again the ruling party nominated a Hutu; President Silvestre as interim president.

President Sylvester inherited a country deep into civil war between the Tutsi and Hutus. Militias from both communities had divided the country and established their control. The tensions in Burundi were exacerbated by the genocide that was going on in neighboring Rwanda.⁹⁰ The dynamics at play contributed to the national army in Burundi that was Tutsi dominated to topple president Silvestre in 1996 and president Buyoya made a comeback. To safeguard his regime, as president from minority ethnic group, president Buyoya suspended the constitution and abolished political parties.

Due to continued agitation, with Hutus Militia having transformed into rebel groups, president Buyoya initiated negotiations with the opposition that led to passage of a law that

⁸⁸Weissman, S. R., "Preventing Genocide in Burundi: Lessons in Diplomacy"; *Peace works* 22. Washington: Institute of Peace, 1998.

⁸⁹Ibid, p. 200.

⁹⁰Ibid, p. 210.

abolished the position of prime minister and instead provided for two vice presidents. In 1998, following talks brokered by retired president of Tanzania Julius Nyerere assisted by then Tanzanian President, Benjamin Mkapa and Nelson Mandela; an inclusive government was formed comprising both Tutsi and Hutu cabinet ministers.⁹¹ Despite a peace deal being signed in 1998, the Hutu rebels continued with their sabotage activities against president Buyoya. This led to protracted negotiations and in 2001 another peace deal was brokered by regional heads of government suggesting rotational or alternating presidency; as a solution to the Tutsi versus Hutu duel.⁹² In 2001, a number of coup attempts were made against the government of Buyoya. The negotiations of 2001 led to an agreement that would see Buyoya head a transitional government with a Hutu vice president and later hand over to Pierre Nkurunziza a Hutu with a Tutsi vice president.⁹³ The signing of the Arusha agreement in effect led to an end to a military regime led by Buyoya. The headache in Burundi has been how the two tribes can accommodate each other in government while allowing for popular democracy yet the Hutu are a majority.

2.3.3. Political Succession in Angola

Angola is one of the countries in Africa that has suffered protracted conflict.⁹⁴ Angola suffered through a 27 year civil war. The country was colonized by the Portuguese and agitation for independence began in 1961. There were a number of liberation movements fighting the Portuguese leading to attainment of independence in 1975. At independence, MPLA formed the government but was quickly opposed by two rebel movements; the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (NFLA) and National Union for the total Liberation of Angola

⁹¹Wolpe, H., "Making Peace after the Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process"; *Peace works*: United States, Institute of Peace, 2011.

⁹²Idem

⁹³Ibid, p. 16.

⁹⁴Carbonnier, G., "Conflict, Postwar Rebuilding and the Economy: A Critical Review of the Literature", *Occasional Paper No.2, UNRISD and War-Torn Societies Project*, Geneva, 1998.

(UNITA).⁹⁵ Just like in many other African countries, the problem in Angola is ethnic based. In order to manage the country, the Portuguese created regional divisions based on ethnicity. When national liberation movements were being formed, they were formed along ethnocentric lines.

The ethnic lines for the liberation movements played in the hands of cold war forces.⁹⁶ The first president, Agostinho Neto of MPLA was focused on establishing a stable country based on socialist ideals. This attracted a lot of support to MPLA from socialist countries. On the other hand, those seeking to establish a capitalist state in Angola funded NFLA and UNITA.⁹⁷ The MPLA did not have structures that accommodated the people of from rural area⁹⁸ Consequently, UNITA and NFLA enjoyed great support from rural folk in the different regions of affiliation.

To manage the war while endearing to the masses, President Neto adopted a centralized authoritarian system of government that ensured strict political control on all processes in the state. When president Neto died in 1979, Jose Dos Santos who was next in line in party hierarchy took over and continued with Neto's policies and legacy.⁹⁹ This meant consolidating power through MPLA structures. The ruling party MPLA has held on to power for long due to personalized power of the president. After having restored peace in a war torn country, the Angolans are weary of war and such fear sustains the ruling class. Through patronage exercised

⁹⁵Vines, A. & Weimer, M. *Angola, Assessing Risks and Stability Center for Strategic Studies*, 2011

⁹⁶Carbonnier, G., "Conflict, Postwar Rebuilding and the Economy: A Critical Review of the Literature", *Occasional Paper No.2*, UNRISD and War-Torn Societies Project, Geneva, 1998.p. 24.

⁹⁷Ibid, p. 2.

⁹⁸ Vines, A. & Weimer, M., *Angola: Assessing Risks and Stability*, Washington DC: Center for Strategic Studies, 2011.

⁹⁹Ibid, p. 7

using proceeds from sale of oil, the president is able to maintain loyal circles that keep the ruling party strong.¹⁰⁰

In 1991, through a constitutional change multiparty politics was introduced into Angola.¹⁰¹ Despite allowing for multiparty politics, the presidency retained executive powers and President Dos Santos has maintained a tight control over national affairs. To perpetuate itself in the multi-party dispensation, MPLA sold itself to Angolans as the nationalist party keen on uniting and ensuring an equitable Angola. UNITA intensified its military campaign and was nearly marching on the capital Luanda by 1993.¹⁰² Vines argues that UNITA was on verge of toppling the Dos Santos government, but the government enlisted help from mercenaries from military groups out of Angola and managed to defeat them.

The war raged on despite peace efforts and negotiations. The death of UNITA founding leader and subsequent death of his deputy led to weakening of UNITA.¹⁰³ A weakened UNITA with low bargaining power returned to the negotiation table and in 2002 a peace agreement was signed paving the way for disarmament of UNITA and its transformation into a political party. The resultant electioneering gave MPLA a resounding victory. As things stand, Angola is a multi-party democracy but with a very weak opposition. Consequently, national decision making processes are largely dependent on internal politicking and decision making processes within MPLA.¹⁰⁴ Consequently, the stability of Angola is tied to stability in MPLA as the dominating

¹⁰⁰Vines, A. & Weimer, M., *Angola: Assessing Risks and Stability*, Washington DC: Center for Strategic Studies, 2011.

¹⁰¹Ibid, p. 17.

¹⁰²Ibid, p. 18.

¹⁰³Ibid, p. 21.

¹⁰⁴Ibid, p. 28.

political party. For long, Dos Santos through paternalistic and clientilistic kind of politics has managed to maintain control and order in the party. However, a challenge remains in terms of how MPLA can remain strong to unite the nation.¹⁰⁵ If MPLA disintegrates; there is the danger of parochial interests of elites (especially desire to gain from oil proceeds) leading to civil war.

The main borne of contention in Angolan political space is unequal distribution of national resources¹⁰⁶. There is, on one hand, a high urban population living in squalid informal settlements due to poverty. On the other hand is a small group of elites that is affluent benefiting from the patronage of the president. To deal with growing poverty related disquiet; the regime has maintain tight security measures and a welfare system through which handouts are dished to the less fortunate. Poverty in the oil producing regions has led to insurgency in the form of a rebel group called Front for the Liberation of Enclave Cambida.¹⁰⁷

2.4. Chapter Summary

This chapter sought to explore political succession in the great lakes region and to document incidences of unpredictable political transition. An analysis of African political systems showed that in most countries, democratic ideal of equity, accountability, transparency and inclusivity are yet to be adopted. Many countries are suffering ills related to negative ethnicity, corruption, patronage, clientilism and despotism. Lack of democratic ideals also implies political parties are not properly constituted and regulated. Lack of strong political parties has often meant civil societies are left to play role of opposition to government. However,

¹⁰⁵Mats Berdal & David M. Malone (eds), *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, p.165

¹⁰⁶ Vines, A. & Weimer, M., *Angola: Assessing Risks and Stability*, Washington DC: Center for Strategic Studies, 2011.

¹⁰⁷Vines, A. & Weimer, M., *Angola: Assessing Risks and Stability*, Washington DC: Center for Strategic Studies, 2011.

without international support, local civil societies are very weak. The private sector that would support the civil society movement thrives depending on patronage from the ruling elite. Consequently, the private sector does not support civil society enough.

Looking at cases of transition in the three sample Great Lakes countries, ethnicity and inclusion are recurrent themes that determine stability of the nations. Political succession is dependent on inclusion of all ethnic groups in government. In cases of government systems that did not respect ethnic diversity, rebel groups emerged that were supported by ethnic based political constituencies. Repressive governments were supported by ethnic enclaves and did not just suppress their opponents; they also sought to suppress the ethnic communities of those leaders to minimize opposition. While democracy, may not be the answer to African problems considering the achievements by Museveni and Dos Santos in the post war era, the inclusivity of the post war structures are critical to national stability. Museveni succeeded by creating a unifying NRM thus forcing political competition to be about individual politicians more than about parties. MPLA is also a kind of totalitarian party whose internal inclusivity and structures ensure national stability. In the Burundi case, only formation of government structures that accommodate both Hutu and Tutsi has enabled the peace currently enjoyed in the country. The next chapter looks into how government structure formation in the post-war period is helping in addressing the identified issues. It is worth noting that constitutions as structure have served as means of transferring power from one person to another or from one government to the next.

CHAPTER THREE

POST-WAR GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

3.1. Introduction

This chapter provides data on the post-war government structures in the Great Lakes Region with focus on Uganda, Burundi and DRC. The chapter explores how the issue of government structure has been approached by the post-war regimes. From chapter two, it was established that inclusion, natural resources and ethnic affiliation explain the incidences of unpredictable political succession in the Great Lakes Region. This chapter examines how the issues of inclusion are tackled through post-war structures in selected Great Lakes countries.

3.2. Types of Government Structures

There are three main types of government structures; centralized, decentralized government and devolved government structures.¹⁰⁸ Centralization is the processes of concentrating government functions at the national level for tight control by the executive arm of government. Decentralization, on the other hand, is handing over functions and responsibilities to lower tiers of government for enhanced government effectiveness and efficiency. Decentralization differs from devolution. Devolution involves created semi-autonomous local government units. This implies that while for decentralized governments all power is delegated power, in devolved units of government there are issues on which they have original jurisdiction and mandate.¹⁰⁹ In a decentralized system, only functions are shared but power is retained by the central government. In devolution, the central government cedes certain powers to the devolved units of government. In a decentralized system power is not relinquished but rather shared or

¹⁰⁸Demante M.J. and Tyminsky I., *Decentralization and Local Governance in Africa: Processes, Experiences*, Paris: Corlet Publisher, 2008.

¹⁰⁹Herbert F. Weiss and Georges Nzongola-ntalaja, *Decentralization and the DRC—An Overview*. SSRIC: Conflict Resolution and Peace Forum, 2010.

delegated. Therefore, for decentralization to work, it matters with whom and how the power from central government is delegated or shared.

Decentralization and Devolution have been adopted by most African countries in post-war government structure.¹¹⁰ However, decentralization on its own does not entrench democratization and participation by all. In most cases, ethnic profiling and marginalization becomes decentralized or devolved given it happens in the lower tiers of government. The dominant ethnic communities in the local government often use their tyranny of numbers to in an authoritarian way deny minorities their rights. Therefore, despite decentralization, most countries remain in chaos due to lack of proper democracy in the devolved or decentralized units of government. The emergency of local dictators in the various decentralized units of government is a teething problem in most African countries.¹¹¹

The African government structures were for long centered on some personal rule by a big man. Constitutionalism or rule of law was not appreciated as personal rule was the dominant paradigm.¹¹² The Post-War government structures in the Great Lakes Region attest to this narrative.¹¹³ The various governments in the Great Lakes Region have been sustained by the charisma or personal dictates of individual leaders. In such governments, personal relationship with the leader and beliefs of the leader drive regional and national agenda more than

¹¹⁰Demante M.J. and Tyminsky I., *Decentralization and Local Governance in Africa: Processes, Experiences*, Paris: Corlet Publisher, 2008..

¹¹¹Herbert F. Weiss and Georges Nzongola-ntalaja. *Decentralization and the DRC – An Overview*.SSRC, conflict resolution and peace forum, 2010.

¹¹² Posner, D. N. and Young, D. J., *The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa*, 2006.

¹¹³Demante M.J. and Tyminsky I., *Decentralization and Local Governance in Africa: Processes, Experiences*, Paris: Corlet Publisher, 2008

constitutional and institutional processes.¹¹⁴ Political succession, in most African countries, is greatly affected by the independence of state institutions and separation of power between various arms of government. In bid to remain in power, most African leaders exercise a tight control over the state thus allowing little room for dissenting voices. The post-war political structures in Uganda, D.R. Congo, Burundi and Angola are all cases of efforts to decentralize while at the same time maintaining tight central government control in a post-war regime.¹¹⁵

3.3. Post-war Government Structure in DRC

The DRC has been an epicenter of conflict in the Great Lakes Region. Much of the strife in the country is associated with its size considering that the country can measure in size to the whole of Western Europe.¹¹⁶ The internal boundaries in the DRC were arbitrarily drawn by the Belgian colonial administrators. The entire 60 million plus population of DRC comprises of individuals from many ethnic groups. If there was anything Mobutu Seseseko achieved, it was to ensure Congolese identify more with their national identity and provincial identity rather than ethnic identities.

It is difficult to govern the DRC without properly decentralized structures. Decentralization refers to transfer of government functions to lower structures or local government tiers. In the DRC, decentralization has been geographic. This means that lower government tiers are created based on regions. However, considering the ethnic diversity in Congo, efforts have been put in place towards ensuring all ethnic communities get a share of the

¹¹⁴Ibid, p. 34.

¹¹⁵Demante M.J. and Tyminsky I., *Decentralization and Local Governance in Africa: Processes, Experiences*, Paris: Corlet Publisher, 2008.

¹¹⁶Herbert F. Weiss and Georges Nzongola-ntalaja. *Decentralization and the DRC – An Overview*, SSRC, conflict resolution and peace forum, 2010.

pie. Just like Kenya, which is multi-ethnic and faces ethnicity challenges, the DRC is vast and thus local government leaders are very powerful individuals. The tyrannical and authoritarian tendencies of local leaders explain much of the never ending conflicts in the country.¹¹⁷ DRC has experienced many instances where people of one ethnic group were chased from a province or minorities in a given province being denied room to participate in local government processes. A case in hand is the 2004-2005 sudden expulsion and even killing of any Tutsi-looking Congolese from Kinshasa and from the neighbouring provinces by Congolese of the central and western provinces, who claim to be ‘native and true sons and daughters of the Congo soil’

The desire to establish exclusive territories for people of given ethnic background has been used by local leaders to rally their people for political or economic reasons. In a multi-ethnic country with regional boundaries, decentralization only works when democratic principles are entrenched and exercised in the smallest unit of local government. The structure of national government institutions is critical if individual’s rights are to be safeguarded even in the devolved systems of government. There has to be a way of minorities and aggrieved individuals in local government units voicing their concerns and such concerns being tackled by the central government. The problem in DRC is that local government leaders are appointed by the central government and thus locals grievances cannot be channeled to the national government given it is identified with the local government officials. This leaves the challenge of how best to achieve dual authority: both national and local government penetrating to the grassroots and serving the citizenry.

¹¹⁷Herbert F. Weiss and Georges Nzongola-ntalaja. *Decentralization and the DRC – An Overview*, SSRIC, conflict resolution and peace forum, 2010.

Mobutu led a united Congo for a long time due to certain fundamentals.¹¹⁸ Immediately at independence in Congo, there was struggle between those who wanted a federal system of government and those who wanted a unitary state. The provinces that were mineral rich wanted a federal system while poor provinces wanted a unitary government that would centralize national wealth and redistribute national resources equitably. Patrice Lumumba supported a strong unitary state because he deemed federalism as a ploy by colonialists to weaken the independent state. This kind of division in opinion led to considerations in the independence constitution that were supposed to solve the centralization versus decentralization question. The provincial structure of government was instituted with all the territorial leaders elected by the assemblies.¹¹⁹ However, after independence, conflicts in the initial 6 provinces were heightened, prompting the government to divide the provinces further to create as many provinces of homogeneity as possible. A total of 21 provinces were created; in some provinces, total ethnic homogeneity was achieved while in others it was not possible.

When Mobutu took over power in 1965, he reduced the provinces from 21 to 12 for easier administration.¹²⁰ Additionally, the regional leaders were no longer to be elected by the locals but rather appointed by Mobutu. To ensure lack of favourism in the local governments, Mobutu instituted a system where no administrator was allowed to work in his home area. To ensure proper control of the country, Mobutu started initiatives aimed at rallying Congolese to reconstruct their nation and love their country. In 1967, Mobutu established the Mouvement

¹¹⁸Herbert F. Weiss and Georges Nzongola-ntalaja., *Decentralization and the DRC – An Overview*, SSRIC, conflict resolution and peace forum, 2010.

¹¹⁹Herbert F. Weiss and Georges Nzongola-ntalaja. *Decentralization and the DRC – an Overview*, SSRIC, conflict resolution and peace forum, 2010.

¹²⁰*Ibid*, p. 45.

Populaire de la Revolution (MPR),¹²¹ which was an all-encompassing political instrument that had structures up to the grassroots. Because of MPR, there existed the local government structure but also the MPR structures at the grassroots creating a dual system of national and local government that the people appreciated and identified with. The leaders in the local government and the leaders of MPR checked each other thus creating a balance of power at the grassroots.

In the current DRC Constitution, changes were introduced as part of the efforts to establish a governance structure that would ensure stability through proper state control. The constitution instituted a process of further re-dividing of the provinces from eleven to form a maximum of 26. While decentralization has been practiced since the colonial days, it did not translate into equitable distribution of resources in the country. The current constitution, promulgated after the signing of peace agreement ending the African world war, tries to encourage decentralization of administration as well as decentralization of resources.

Initially, provinces generated revenue and it was taken away by the central government, which then redistributed the resources. In the current post-war set up, the provinces keep 40% of revenue collected internally.¹²² Each of the decentralized levels of government has an elected assembly to foster local level participation in politics. There is the national assembly, the provincial or district assembly, and the local level assemblies. The only problem in this set up is that the locals do not elect territorial leaders over the province or districts, those leaders are appointed by the president. The central government has been slow in decentralizing the proposed new provinces but the process is underway. Additionally, the provincial and local elections

¹²¹Ibid, p. 48.

¹²²Herbert F. Weiss and Georges Nzongola-ntalaja .*Decentralization and the DRC – An Overview*, SSRC, conflict resolution and peace forum, 2010.

enshrined in the constitution are yet to be done to create provincial assemblies in the new provinces and to elect national senators. Power in the DRC remains concentrated in the presidency. However, the more power and political processes remain tied to the presidency rather than to the constitution; the more likely local politics will not change.

3.4. Post-War Government Structure in Burundi

Burundi suffered coup after coup until in 1996. Initially, the government structure was characterized by executive power vested in the president who had to be elected by universal suffrage. Considering the ethnicized politics, the Hutus and Tutsi made all effort to control the presidency.¹²³As a consequence, there were coups and civil wars as the two main tribes tried to wrestle state control from each other.¹²⁴The actions of President Pierre Buyoya after the 1996 coup attempt went along way in changing the political landscape of Burundi.¹²⁵In order to ensure proper representation for all the people of Burundi, Buyoya changed the structure of government by eliminating the position of prime minister and instead creating two positions of vice president.¹²⁶Further, the national assembly speaker was removed from the line of succession and the national assembly enlarged.

The two vice presidents were supposed to ensure two senior politicians from the two main tribes are in power. The national assembly was controlled by majority Hutus, thus prompting eliminating the national assembly speaker from line of succession to ensure he or she is not a threat especially to a Tutsi presidency. The change in constitution was supposed to

¹²³Mohamed Salih, M. A., *African Democracies and African Politics*, London: Pluto, 1999.

¹²⁴Herbert F. Weiss and Georges Nzongola-ntalaja. *Decentralization and the DRC – An Overview*, SSRIC, conflict resolution and peace forum, 2010.

¹²⁵Ibid, p. 29.

¹²⁶Wolpe, H., “Making Peace after the Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process”; *Peaceworks*: United States, Institute of Peace, 2011.

legitimize Pierre Buyoya's military regime.¹²⁷ Further negotiations led to changes in 1998 that allowed Buyoya to incorporate FRODEBU politicians (Hutu) into his cabinet. The current structure that requires that when president is Tutsi, vice-president has to be Hutu and vice versa. This was arrived at after negotiations leading to signing of an agreement in 2001.

Despite the signing of peace agreement and changing government structure to accommodate politicians, the Burundi government is not considered as accommodating enough, especially for majority Hutu.¹²⁸ While the Hutu dominate the national assembly, the judiciary and civil service are dominated by the Tutsi. This results from many years of unequal access to education. The Tutsi that dominated the post-independence government enjoyed access to education while the Hutu were marginalized. Although the Hutu are 85% of the total Burundian population, by 2006 they constituted only 10 to 15% of the entire civil service.¹²⁹ And by 2001, out of the total population of judges and magistrates in Burundi, the Hutu were only 5%. This implies a government that is not balanced.

In order to restore parity and build the capacity of youth across the country, the government introduced a mandatory civil service scheme for the youth. However, the civil service scheme for the youth is likened to military service than civilian service. This scheme is interpreted by many as training ground especially for Tutsi in military for the protection of Tutsi community. The security forces in Burundi are still dominated by the Tutsi community members. However, there has been a deliberate effort to move towards equitable representation in the

¹²⁷Wolpe, H., "Making Peace after the Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process"; *Peaceworks*: United States, Institute of Peace, 2011.

¹²⁸Ibid, p. 230.

¹²⁹Wolpe, H., "Making Peace after the Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process"; *Peaceworks*: United States, Institute of Peace, 2011.

security forces with 48% being reserved for Hutu and Tutsi each while the rest of the percentage is reserved for the Twa community¹³⁰.

Despite the signing of peace accords, the challenge for the post-war government in Burundi was how to create an all-inclusive government. The efforts at inclusion were hampered by various factors. For instance, there was a challenge in ensuring the different ethnic groups can co-exist in the same government without suspicions and work for the common good.¹³¹ Additionally, the initial imbalances caused by the Tutsi post-independence government could not be dealt with overnight. The Tutsi were more educated and more entrenched in the civil service thus creating a situation of inequality that could not easily be fixed.

In Burundi, territorial or regional decentralization was adopted in the post-government structure. This means that Burundi is divided into regions that are governed by local governments. The decentralized units of government are called communes, which are administrative entities endowed with legal, organizational and financial autonomy. This means that the Communes in Burundi are regional entities that control the revenue they collect, are involved in all affairs pertaining to the state. Each commune is a clearly defined geographical area within the nation, it has an elected council, it generates its own revenue and it has clear powers and mandate conferred on it constitutionally. The communes are legally autonomous given they have administrative and financial autonomy.

The 2005 constitution of the republic of Burundi defines the mode of decentralization in Burundi. However, a part from defining communes as devolved administrative entities, the

¹³⁰Wolpe, H., "Making Peace after the Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process"; *Peaceworks*: United States, Institute of Peace, 2011.

¹³¹Ibid, p. 12.

constitution did not define procedure and mechanism of establishing such communes. This issue was tackled through an act of parliament that was enacted in 2010. The communal law of 2010 explains that communes are decentralized local authorities that have a legal personality as well as financial autonomy.

The need for communes was necessitated by both political situations in Burundi as well as the desire to enhance administrative efficiency. From an administrative perspective, the communes are efficient units of government, closer to the people and thereby able to prioritise the needs of the people. From a political perspective, autonomous communes were supposed to contribute to the larger problem solving of ethnicity in national government. When each region; especially those with homogenous ethnic groups have their own autonomous kind of local government, they enjoy self-governance thus contributing to lessening of national political tensions. The communes have its budget, its own officials and responsibilities towards the public. This diffuses demands on the national government. Further, communes enhance locals' participation in governance through electing leaders and participating in local governance processes.

Burundi also had a civil service dominated by one ethnic group. Creation of communes was supposed to enhance and increase involvement of local communities in governance issues. The communes provide locals with avenues to priorities their issues and act on them in an

appropriate manner unlike in a centralized system of government.¹³² The communes are known to facilitate fast decision making as well as identification of local solutions to local problems.¹³³

Burundi is divided into 17 provinces and each of the provinces is headed by a governor who is appointed by the central government. The provinces are further divided into 129 communes that are run by locally elected councils consisting of 15 members and headed by a communal administrator. The administrator is the secretary to the commune council and is responsible for implementing commune decisions or deliberations. The communes are further divided into zones and the zones are divided into neighbourhoods or census hills that are also governed by an elected council of members.

Successive regimes in the post-independence era recognized communes but did not attach much relevance to them. These communes were used by central government as centres of control and did not accord them any autonomy. The importance of communes emerged during talks that led to the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement. The communes were seen as important entry points for stability and good governance in the country. They were recognized as forming a good basis for economic and social development in the conflict prone country. The Arusha Agreement had a raft of measures aimed at enhancing or improving the role of communes in Burundi's political space.

¹³²Melleray (g.), op. Cit., p.21.

¹³³Agawal, A. And Ostrom, E., *Collective Action, Property rights and Decentralization: comparing forest and protected area management in India and Nepal*, Ebauche Polycopiée, 1999.

While traditionally, the commune was headed by an administrator appointed by the central government, the 2005 constitution specifies that the administrator is to be elected by the elected representatives in the communal council. While initially, the commune was not a legal entity, the constitution of 2005 confers on it legal and financial autonomy. This in effect introduces political party democracy to the grassroots given political party representation in the different councils and determines governance decisions and processes at the local level.

The distribution of national resources based on communes is aimed at ensuring all people irrespective of ethnicity benefit from government or state development. The commune is tasked with delivering most of the basic services required by the citizenry. The political structure and processes of the communes are supposed to promote community development in all fronts. The state identifies the gaps and complements the communes in meeting the needs of the citizens. This in effect creates duality in governance hence people can benefit directly from commune as well as the local government.

Despite the advantages to the citizens due to decentralization in Burundi, electoral processes that determine election of local leaders are national agenda driven. Voters elect leaders based on national politics and affiliations. Consequently, some communes are dominated by inept individuals from the same political party due to national politics dictating local politics. The leaders at the commune level are not elected based on their agenda for the commune, but rather on their national political connection or affiliation. The second problem in most communes is that they have poorly trained communal administrators who can not set a development agenda. Additionally, the communal administrators are surrounded by poorly

trained, unmotivated, inefficient and insufficient technical staff.¹³⁴ While the communes are supposed to be financially autonomous, most of them do not raise enough revenue to run their operations. The net effect is that the country at large remains impoverished due to poor collection of revenue and inappropriate spending of collected revenue. This scenario makes communes more or less completely dependent on the central government even though they are supposed to be autonomous.

3.5. The Post War Government Structure in Uganda

After President Museveni took over in Uganda, he sought to establish a system of governance that would ensure all Ugandans feel part of his government, and not part of Uganda as a sovereign nation. He achieved this through establishment of the National Revolution Movement (NRM). Through NRM, president Museveni was able to centralize power and exercise control over all of Uganda. By allowing the southern kingdoms to have ceremonial kings, through a Federal system, he was able to appease most of the locals loyal to the traditional monarchies.¹³⁵ Additionally, to address local level politics, he established a local government system.

Therefore, the post-war government in Uganda has both a central government and a local government.¹³⁶ Uganda has a unicameral parliamentary system. This means that the president is directly elected by universal suffrage for a term of five years and he wields executive powers. Members of parliament are also elected for a one term of five years.

¹³⁴Barkan, Barkan, *Uganda: Assessing Risks to Stability*. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic Studies, 2011.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*

¹³⁶Government of Uganda, Constitution of Uganda. Accessed from www.parliament.go.ug/images/abridged_constitution_2006.pdf

The process of decentralization started with the enactment of the local governments Act of 1997.¹³⁷ The law provides for a five tier local government comprising of district councils, county and municipal councils, sub-county and town councils, parish councils and village or ward councils. The local councils exercise delegated governance and their main source of revenue is cash transfers from the national government. The councils are responsible for specific functions such as raising local revenue, transport control, environmental protection, provision of education, social welfare, and provision of public health. Socio-economic development in the various local areas is the responsibility of the local councils.¹³⁸

Oversight over local government units is exercised by the minister of local government. The local government ministry formulates policies and supervises the functions of local councils. Initially, there were only 56 district councils in the whole of Uganda; however, this number has continued to grow and currently the district councils are over 111.¹³⁹ District councils play a pivotal role in development. Each district council has an executive committee that implements council decisions. The council has standing committees in charge of education, finance, health, welfare, public works and sanitation. The chairperson of a district council is a politician elected through universal suffrage for a period of five years.¹⁴⁰ The structure of the local government is supposed to facilitate national government control over the nation while allowing for local politics. This is achieved through members of the different councils being elected by locals, but in terms of accountability, they report to the national government that exercises oversight over

¹³⁷ Uganda Local Governments Act Cap 243, Accessed from www.molg.go.ug/molgdocs/local%20government%20act.pdf

¹³⁸ Uganda Local Governments Act Cap 243, Accessed from www.molg.go.ug/molgdocs/local%20government%20act.pdf

¹³⁹ Uganda, ministry of local government, Accessed from www.molg.go.ug

¹⁴⁰ Uganda Local Government Act Cap 243

them all.¹⁴¹ Each district has a Resident District Commissioner (RDC) who is appointed by the president. The work of the RDC is to act as the central governments point man and to coordinate central government functions in the district.

Although Uganda adopted a Multi-party system of government, the NRM remains the dominant political party. It is only in some parts of the urban areas and northern Uganda that opposition enjoys some dominance. The NRM has been structured such that it allows for internal competition for political seats. Once nominated on the NRM ticket in given regions of the country, one is more or less the elected representative of the area. Community participation in council activities is encouraged by the local government act requiring that integrated and comprehensive development plans have to be done through a participatory process. This implies development planning starts in the lowest units of decentralization. At that level, communities are mobilized, educated and engaged in proposing development project for their area. Through participatory learning and action techniques, the community members' views are gathered and incorporated into the plans. These plans form basis for further planning up the ladder in the hierarchy of councils.

3.6 Chapter Summary

Political succession in Africa has been characterized by leaders using unconstitutional means to remain in power. Just like in the rest of Africa, political succession in the Great Lakes Region in the 1960s and 1970s was through violent coups, assassinations and forced exiles. This trend, however, changed in the 1990s where voluntary resignation at end of term or loosing election has become major means to political succession. With the entrenchment of multi-party

¹⁴¹Idem.

democracy thus elections becoming a major determinant of political transition; and manipulation of election as the major mechanism by which African leaders influence political succession. Most election contests in Africa are won by incumbents. This is because, government structures are still personalized leading to executive presidents having immense control over processes like elections in a country.

This chapter looked at the post-war government structures in DRC, Uganda and Burundi. The literature shows that the challenge for most governments is instituting a government structure that is all inclusive. Decentralization has been adopted by the majority of countries as a way of ensuring locals participates in governance and increasing efficiency in government service delivery. However, decentralization has to be worked properly. If not, decentralization remains susceptible to central government monopoly and manipulation of local governments or creation of authoritarian and tyrannical regimes at the local levels that deny locals, especially minorities, their rights. Where the system is personalized as is the case in Uganda, the national government bulldozes local government, hence minimizing the democratic space at the grassroots. The next chapter takes the case of DRC and explores succession politics in the country and how the current post-war government structure predisposes the country to unpredictable political succession or otherwise. In a nutshell, the historical circumstances surrounding the above political phenomena are likely to reoccur under the ongoing present conditions.

CHAPTER FOUR

POST-WAR GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES AND UNPREDICTABLE POLITICAL SUCCESSION IN CONGO

4.1. Introduction

This chapter is a presentation of data collected on Congo; largely the primary data. This data includes a collection of views on how post-war political structures contribute to unpredictable political succession in DRC and the broader Great Lakes Region. The chapter presents notions and opinions of key informants on the political processes in Congo.

4.2. Risk of Autocracy in the Great Lakes Region

After many years of war, the Great Lakes Region is enjoying relative peace and stability. In the countries that were completely entangled in the Congo conflict such as Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda, elections are now regularly held.¹⁴² However, just like in DRC, there are still tendencies towards authoritarianism as presidents in the various countries personalize the political process and centralize governance. Despite decentralization in all the countries of the Great Lakes Region, power is personalized and exercised in an authoritarian way by the executive president.¹⁴³ Due to political authoritarianism by the likes of President Kagame of Rwanda, Kabila of Congo and Museveni of Uganda, political fragmentation has intensified in the countries with given constituencies dissatisfied by the government in place.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴²Amoako, K.Y. 'Transforming Africa - Start Now, We Can't Wait', African Business, July 2011, 24-27.

¹⁴³ Ibid

¹⁴⁴ Demante M.J. And Tyminsky, *Decentralization and Local Governance in Africa: Processes and Experiences*. Paris: Corlet publisher, 2008.

A tight hold on reigns of power by individuals often leads to political freedoms and political space being minimized.¹⁴⁵ Patronage based political parties creates winners and losers. In the Great Lakes Region, there are clear winners and losers depending on whether a constituency or individual supports the president or not.¹⁴⁶ The trend is the same, to stabilize countries, given leaders have centralized power and even in cases of decentralization, it is done in a way that it serves the central leader.¹⁴⁷

In Angola, MPLA has been in power due to patronage of the presidency.¹⁴⁸ To survive and benefit from the country's governance systems, one has to be in MPLA and be seen to support MPLA. In Rwanda, President Kagame has instituted a vibrant autocratic regime where political processes are tightly controlled by his government. The president has been accused of using coercion to silence dissenting voices. In Uganda, president Museveni established the NRM and despite allowing multi-party politics, violence and intimidation of opposition coupled with NRM based patronage, his regime is very autocratic.¹⁴⁹

Most post-war regimes, in the Great Lakes Region, are sustained by the fear of war. In Uganda for instance, many people in rural areas continue to support President Museveni for fear that without Museveni the country would plunge back into the wars of 1970s and 1980s. In Rwanda, President Kagame holds an enviable and unchallenged position in society due to fear of and memories of the 1994 genocide. The MPLA in Angola entrenched itself by positioning itself

¹⁴⁵Mohamed Salih, M. A., *African Democracies and African Politics*, London: Pluto, 1999.

¹⁴⁶Mohamed Salih, M. A., *African Democracies and African Politics*, London: Pluto, 1999

¹⁴⁷Demante and Tyminsky, *Decentralization and Local Governance in Africa: Processes and Experiences*. Paris: Corlet publisher, 2008.

¹⁴⁸Vines and Weimer, *Angola: Assessing Risks and Stability*. Washington DC: Center for Strategic Studies, 2011

¹⁴⁹Barkan, *Uganda: Assessing Risks to Stability*. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic Studies, 2011.

as championing for a unitary state and togetherness of all Angolans. The rest of the political parties are seen as being separatists or representing partisan interests that fueled the war. The problem is that other political parties were crafted from war outfits like UNITA that were regional based.¹⁵⁰ Consequently, MPLA enjoys a perception that it is the only political party with the agenda of stabilizing the whole of Angola.

The Iron-hold on countries by the post-war presidents in the Great Lakes Region has helped create a situation of more government control on the countries. Additionally, fueled by patronage, the governments created systems through which parochial interests are pursued. In NRM, the elites have found a way of enriching themselves and thus the movement has provided a system of wealth distribution in Uganda that suits many elites.¹⁵¹ In Angola, the MPLA is a strong political party or a movement that serves political elites interested in benefiting from oil rents.

Unfortunately, despite the stabilizing effect of the autocratic regimes in most Great Lakes Region, new divisions and lines of political fragmentation are emerging.¹⁵² While previously, armed conflict fueled by ethnic marginalization defined wars or conflict in this regional bloc, the current nature of dissatisfaction and schisms are taking a political dimension; where political rather than ethnic dimensions define emerging conflicts in the Great Lakes Region.¹⁵³ Despite a

¹⁵⁰Vines and Weimer, *Angola: Assessing Risks and Stability*. (Washington DC: Center for Strategic Studies, 2011).

¹⁵¹Barkan, *Uganda: Assessing Risks to Stability*. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic Studies, 2011.

¹⁵²Weissman, *Preventing Genocide in Burundi: Lessons in Diplomacy*. *Peaceworks*22. Washington: Institute of Peace, 1998.

¹⁵³Wolpe, H. "Making Peace after the Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process". *Peaceworks*70. Washington: Institute of Peace, 2011.

few pockets of the countries being affected by armed conflict, the mainstay of conflict in the Great Lakes Region is interparty conflicts.

Autocratic or authoritarian regimes do not provide space for democratic processes. Such regimes deal harshly with the opposition and do not support the formation of strong opposition political parties.¹⁵⁴ In Uganda, for example, opposition politics has often suffered the brunt of violence instigated or perpetuated by NRM. A further illustration of how former political allies became foes is Col. (Rtd) Dr. Warren Kizza Besigye Kifeefe who served as Director of Medical Services in the National Resistance Army –NRA- (1985). He was later appointed minister of State for Internal Affairs and National Political Commissar in 1988. Pundits say that thereafter, Besigye’s standing in the Museveni government started taking a down word-spiral. In 1991, he was removed from Cabinet and appointed commander of the NRA Mechanised Regiment in Masaka, and later NRA’s Chief of Logistics and Engineering (1993-1998). The Colonel’s last office in the NRM was that of Senior Military Advisor to the Minister of Defence –who was then President Museveni – in 1998.¹⁵⁵ The trend is similar in Rwanda, Burundi, Angola and the DRC. In these countries, stability is celebrated as a priority over democratic concerns. Majority of the people in post-war countries are more concerned about security, stable leadership and economic performance than the actions of the ruling elites. Such a situation gives the ruling elites leeway to tend to abuse power, to concentrate power and to use high handed tactics when dealing with the opposition.¹⁵⁶ In autocratic regimes, as it is the case in the sampled Great Lakes Region, political considerations are superseded by desire for stability and economic gains or societal functionality.

¹⁵⁴Posner, D. N. and Young, D. J. *The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa*, 2006.

¹⁵⁵Macheal Mubangizi, Museveni vs Besigye. Retrieved from :
<http://semuwemba.com/museveni-and-besigye-fall-out/>

¹⁵⁶Posner, D. N. and Young, D. J. *The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa*, 2006.

The case of Uganda shows that unless political considerations are made part of the post-war organization, the country becomes personalized by individual leaders due to centralized power enjoyed and hence power to use tokens to establish patronage based systems. Systems based on patronage or personalities tend to be exclusionist, giving those in the system benefit while others lose. The case of Angola shows that many elites have benefited from oil and have become extremely rich while the countryside remains poor and city slums continue to grow.¹⁵⁷ In Uganda, extreme wealth has been accumulated by army generals and leading luminaries in the NRM. In such a system, the right of the citizenry is dependent on the benevolence of the ruling elite or elites.

The ruling parties in the countries of the Great Lakes Region are synonymous with the state.¹⁵⁸ They are, in a sense, closed systems that do not allow space for checks and balances. The opposition is suppressed and room for dissenting voices is not provided for even where opposition is represented in institutions like parliament or local authority assemblies. The result is that latently, society rather than becoming more united, harmonious and open becomes insidious, fragmented with many frustrated constituencies or sections of society. In such like societies or countries, elections become a formality. They are a formality because the ruling class in an authoritarian way manipulate election results or intimidate the citizenry into voting in a certain pattern. Without credible elections, the voice of the individual members of society in governance is muzzled. When such fundamental political rights are abrogated or denied, the end result is divisions in society that are building blocks for future conflict lines rather than prosperity.

¹⁵⁷ Vines and Weimer, *Angola: Assessing Risks and Stability*. Washington DC: Center for Strategic Studies, 2011.

¹⁵⁸ Herbert F. Weiss and Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja. *Decentralization and the DRC – An Overview*, SSRIC, conflict resolution and peace forum , 2010.

4.3. The Post-War in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The World Bank group describes the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as a country brimming with potential.¹⁵⁹ The DRC covers an area of 2.3million Km2. The whole of Congo is an equivalent of two thirds of Western Europe. The demographic characteristics of the DRC are as presented in table 2.

Table 2: DRC Demographics

POPULATION CHARACTERISTIC	SUB-CATEGORY	TOTAL NUMBER
TOTAL POPULATION		77, 433, 744
AGE STRUCTURE	0-14 years	16, 552, 685
	15-24	8, 248,326
	25-54	11, 405, 492
	55-64	1, 457, 499
	65 and above	1, 169, 679
Dependency Ration	Youth Dependency	85.6%
	Elderly Dependency	5.5%
Population Growth Rate		2.5%
Urbanization	Urban population	34.4% of population
Ethnicity		200 ethnic communities
Religion	Roman Catholic	50%
	Protestant	20%
	Kimbanguist	10%
	Sects and indigenous faiths	10%
	Muslim	10%
No of Refugees		324, 000

Source: World Bank Group, 2014

As shown in table 1, the DRC is vast in size with an equally large population. The age structure shows that dependency is very high given the high number of individuals below the working age. The elderly people are only 5% of the population but they also contribute to the dependence burden in the country.

¹⁵⁹World Bank Group, 2014.

A lot has changed in the DRC since the signing of the peace agreement in 2002. A new constitution of 2005 ushered in various economic and political reforms aimed at ensuring political stability and economic progress. On the economic front, the government has undertaken various measures to ensure positive economic development in the country.¹⁶⁰ With the help of the World Bank, the government has undertaken economic reforms and established an economic governance regime that is helping turn around the economy. Despite the economic reforms, there are issues of political governance that affect the stability of the DRC economy.

Some of the political governance issues that are affecting economic performance include lack of functional decentralized units of government, inefficient public administration system, poor fiscal policies and public finance management practices, lack of accountability and transparency in public institutions especially public enterprises, and insecurity due to deficiencies in re-integrating ex-combatants into society and engaging them in meaningful production activities.

Despite the challenges, the government has undertaken measures towards building private investor confidence. In regard to improving the business environment, the government has launched initiatives to reform the extractive sector (mainly mining and forestry) and providing incentives to investors. In the mining sector, measures have been taken to ensure mining contracts are issued in a transparent manner. Such transparency is achieved through making awarding of contracts competitive. Competitive awarding of contracts is pegged on an

¹⁶⁰Interview with a representative of Communauté Economique des Pays du Grand Lacs, Kinshasa, DRC, April 25, 2014.

elaborate public procurement policy and procedures. Records of excluding communities in managing affairs that concern their lives and development evoke attempts to decentralize the way power and resources are shared. Collective involvement of all stakeholders, fairness of rules to all, decent rules, accountability of actors, transparent decision making and efficient use of resources are the way forward.

The economic reforms are a promise to recovery of the economy. The transitional government of national unity helped the country to stem high inflation and begin the journey towards positive economic growth. The gains due to prudent macro-economic policies by the transitional government were eroded by the electioneering activities between 2005 and 2006.¹⁶¹ Due to political activities, the country did not follow up on roadmap developed with support from the World Bank. After the elections, the IMF and World Bank further supported an economic recovery plan. By 2011, the GDP of the country had improved from 2.8% in 2009 to 7% in 2011. The 2014 economic analysis shows that, buoyed by a strong extractive industrial base, the country has a positive economic outlook. However, pessimism in the country is occasioned by a fragile political situation. In an interview with the C.E.O of Bralima, he notes that “political will is of paramount importance to guarantee that economic reforms do not lose momentum while the benefits from national integration remain initially low.”¹⁶² In DRC, he goes on, “the political federation has eclipsed the debate on the national economic integration. The discourse on growth and development has stimulated the thinking about national integration, but reaching a census on routine rules across the nation has not been easy.”¹⁶³

¹⁶¹World Bank Group, 2014.

¹⁶²Interview with a CEO of Bralima, Kinshasa, DRC, April 17, 2014.

¹⁶³Interview with a CEO of Bralima, Kinshasa, DRC, April 17, 2014.

4.4. Political Actors in the Post-War DRC

There are three main political actors in the democratic republic of Congo: the state, the civil society and political parties. Since the signing of the 2002 peace deal, the DRC has experienced an explosion of political parties. The numerous political parties are associated with the post-war situation where many small groups existed and exercised control over given territories in the country. Political parties in DRC are thus not formed to advance any ideological perspective but rather to represent interests of politicians, regions and ethnic groups. Prior to independence, the ABAKO (then known as Alliance de Bakongo, but now known Alliance des Bâtisseurs du Kongo) which was the first Congolese political party, played the role of the principal ethno-religious organization for the Bakongo and became closely intertwined the Kimbanguist Church which was extremely popular in the south-west lower Congo. The emphasis on Kongo elements by ABAKO in Kinshasa came into conflict with a group of Lingala-speaking upriver people (UNIMO); in 1959 and 1960, the rivalry became a major trial of strength between the forces of ethno-regionalism and the claims of territorial nationalism. According to senior officers working in the ministry of internal affairs and the CENI in the DRC, there are over four hundred registered political parties, most of which are structured to launch political competition along ethnic or regional lines rather than national prosperity and peace.¹⁶⁴ The ruling party known by its coalition acronym, AMP (Alliance pour la Majorité Présidentielle/ Alliance for the presidential majority) is mainly made up of PPRD whose founder and head is at the same time the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo, MSR, PALU, UDEMO and PDC. The opposition, on the other hand is independently represented by MLC, MCC, UDPS and RCD. However, it is commonly believed that there are about hundred out of the four hundred registered political parties nationwide which are branches or satellites of the PPRD. These political parties

¹⁶⁴Interview with senior officials of the ministry of internal affairs and of Independent National Electoral Commission, Kinshasa, DRC, April 25, 2014.

are founded by politicians loyal to Joseph Kabila and are being remote-controlled by him to ensure he remains in power as long as he can. Reduce to crude mechanics of opposing forces that were driven by the calculus of power, security in the actual Congo's political arena anchors only in the accumulation of power. Hence, power, and not national interest, becomes the means and the end, a top priority sought by all means. The idea of lawful constitutional political competition become impossible and the ingredients of politics and effective governance by moderation and compromise are almost inexistent.

4.5. Post-War Political Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Since the ouster of Mobutu, DRC was plunged into a conflict that sapped in regional countries. The relative stability being enjoyed now resulted from negotiations that led to the National Peace and Reconciliation Agreement being signed in 2002.¹⁶⁵ The agreement led to establishment of a number of transitional institutions to manage the delicate post-war situation. One of the important institutions that were created by the peace agreement of 2002 was the government of national unity. This government was supposed to incorporate all interest groups and ensure that they are part of the national governance process. However, the prevailing situation demands more interventions both by local actors and international community.¹⁶⁶

The government seems to lack governmental capacity that would facilitate establishment of strong institutions and entrench the rule of law and constitutionalism in the country. According to one of the key informants, “state-actors have effectively scampered not only

¹⁶⁵ Report by Mary Robinson , former UN special envoy for the Great Lakes region of Africa, Kinshasa, DRC, January, 2010

¹⁶⁶Report by Mary Robinson, former UN special envoy for the Great Lakes region of Africa, Kinshasa, DRC, January, 2010.

genuine political participation in the democratic political process by constraining and limiting the scope of political space, but also by curtailing and restricting, instead of creating, avenues for citizens to express their demands without fear of vengeance.”¹⁶⁷ As the way a society should be organized outside the realm of the state, the actual condition of the civil society in DRC is paralytic due to the neo-patrimonial political nature of the country under the current leadership which does not give it the opportunity to begin to think more critically about its relationship with the state and how to engage it, with a view of making the whole country a cohesive truly national-centred.¹⁶⁸ The ongoing lack of political good will fueled by political fragmentations offering little or no space at all, civil society finds it hard to move its agenda forward. Unaware of its precarious existence, the fragmented civil society has not yet arrived and commenced to take phases to fuse itself in order to establish a solid position in the country.¹⁶⁹ Crushed to almost its annihilation during the 32 years of Mobutu’s regime and his MPR (the unique national political party), the civil society was circumstantially reawakened and acknowledged as a necessary actor with a role to play in the life of Congo as a nation only in 1991, thanks to the CNS.

Even after its revival, as Guy De Boeck observes, “...the civil society’s entry to national decision making arena would serve to confuse things even more compared to the political parties that were exhibiting chaos already. After having been the carrier of huge hopes, the civil society delayed not to appear as a suspect as politicians in the eyes of Congolese people.”¹⁷⁰ Therefore, the civil society in DRC exists in theory, nevertheless, in practice it is an instrument and vehicle by and through which politicians get to their selfish goals. It is a deplorable situation:

¹⁶⁷ Interview with an MP and head of Non-Aligned Movement, Kinshasa, DRC, April 20, 2014.

¹⁶⁸ Interview with an MP Chairperson of Non-Aligned Movement, Kinshasa, DRC, April 20, 2014.

¹⁶⁹ Interview with the CEO of the NGO (Save Congo), Kinshasa, DRC, April 17th, 2014.

¹⁷⁰ Guy De Boeck, *La vie difficile des Partis Politiques en RDC*, Congo Forum, 21/01/2007.

people from the civil society who are supposed to hold the leadership accountable are pre-occupied with the spoils of political power more than anything else. This situation continues to have profound governance consequences in the post-war government as the character of the state remained pretty much the same regardless who comes to power. Kabila's regime not only has fights to be totalistic in scope, it also presents itself as an apparatus of violence that relies on coercion rather than authority to govern.

In one of his encounters with the Congolese Association of Religious living in Nairobi, the head of Roman Catholic Church in Kinshasa made a remark in regard to the current political situation in Congo saying, "Political inclusiveness is a compulsory feature of good governance and political stability that has continued to elude DRC. It seeks to ensure that the national government echoes the profile of their people in regional, ethnic, racial and religious terms."¹⁷¹ Further, he observed that "in any pluralist society like DRC which is made up of various ethnic groups, the nominations of officers into unelected public offices must be done in a manner that reflects a mode of distribution of appointments that accommodates and represents the differing regional, ethnic, racial and religious colorations in the country."¹⁷²

According to one of the CENCO's secretaries, "in Congo, successive governments have not only failed to properly manage the country's diversity, but have actually intensified inter-group conflict and encouraged violent mobilization by groups to either protect their existing

¹⁷¹Observation made by the head of Roman Catholic Church during his encounter with Congolese Religious living in Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya, August 1st, 2012 .

¹⁷²Observation made by the head of Roman Catholic Church during his encounter with Congolese Religious living in Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya, August 1st, 2012 .

political and economic advantages or resist further marginalization.¹⁷³ In an interview, one of the prominent the opposition's officers noted that:

“...in DRC, the favorite game of the political party in power has been domination and to facilitate the fragmentation of any opposition to that project. The ruling party has used the civic arena as a stage for its hegemonic project, lessening popular sectors of civil society and frustrating any democratic deepening in the process. In Congo, the ruling party has been seeking to curtail the opposition's activities that dare existing power structures. In addition to constraining the space for opposition as well as the civil society's activities, the state also shrunk political space for the opposition, rendering political parties both ineffective and institutionally feeble.”¹⁷⁴

The present political system in DRC is, even after the creation of political party coalitions, in itself, undermining the democratic freedom of party members to hold independent views on specific issues different from those of the ruling party (president). A member of the parliament who is the MLC delegate to the CENI holds, in regard to the political structure in present Congo, “...because power is centering more and more on this one individual regardless of the official existence of constitution which may specify various limits, checks and balances, the president political party not only dominates the state apparatus, but, in many cases, controls and bullies and pushes everyone, allowing no room for dissent or debates through which well-structured decisions are arrived at and solutions to different problems proffered.”¹⁷⁵

Joseph Kabila has no respect for the rule of law. There are many cases whereby he has gone against constitutional stipulations. For example, the December 2011 presidential elections

¹⁷³Interview with a Secretary of the CENCO, Kinshasa, DRC, April 15th, 2014.

¹⁷⁴Interview with Secretary General of UDPS, Kinshasa, DRC, April 10th, 2014.

¹⁷⁵Interview with an MP, MLC delegate to the CENI, Kinshasa, DRC, April 8th, 2014

during which Kabila was re-elected for a second term as president were substantially tempered and there were lots of irregularities by the ruling political party. The official observers from the Carter Center reported that returns from almost 2,000 polling stations in areas where support for Tshisekedi was strong had been lost and not included in the official results. They described the election as lacking credibility.¹⁷⁶ In January 2012, Catholic Bishops in DR Congo also condemned the elections, complaining of *treachery, lies and terror*, and calling on the election commission to correct *serious errors*,¹⁷⁷ but these complains and longings for honesty, transparency and accountability fell on deaf hear of Kabila and his appointees.

An executive member of the non-aligned movement pointed out during an interview with him that:

“...Kabila and his entourage have not provided effective leadership on a number of essential issues, namely, the revision of the electoral commission, the revision of the mining code, the holding of provincial elections and the implementation of long-awaited projects to improve electricity supply in the country. As a matter of fact, the ongoing Kivu crisis has not only dominated analysis and news reporting on the country since the early months of 2012; it has also absorbed the attention of the President, Joseph Kabila, and proves a distraction from policy matters that are equally important to the country’s future.”¹⁷⁸

Without the rule of law, fundamental rights of the citizenry are trampled upon at the altar of expediency or to suit the whims and whimpers of the ruling elite(s).¹⁷⁹ In a post-war country

¹⁷⁶Report on 2011 DRC national elections by official observer from Carter Centre, Kinshasa, DRC, December, 2011.

¹⁷⁷The Voice of the Catholic Bishops of DRC, Kinshasa, January 2012.

¹⁷⁸Interview with an MP and member of MCC, Kinshasa, DRC, April 5th, m2014.

¹⁷⁹Report by Mary Robinson, former UN special envoy for the Great Lakes region of Africa, Kinshasa, DRC, January, 2010

like DRC, a situation of autocracy does not allow for proper healing processes that are anchored on well meditated reconciliation processes that lead to peace building being institutionalized.

The DRC government has managed to stabilize much of the country save for the eastern parts. This is because, while internal process matter, the stability of Congo is dependent on regional cooperation.¹⁸⁰ The countries of the Great Lakes Region, especially Rwanda, DR Congo, Uganda and Burundi are tied to each other due to high ethnic affiliations and history of war. Consequently, peace in either of the countries is dependent on the actions of the neighbours. This means that structural reforms in DRC have to go beyond internal processes to address structures that underpin foreign relations with neighbours.¹⁸¹

It is informative that conflict in the DRC reduced when eleven countries from the region signed a peace, security and cooperation framework of DRC. Such regional framework and approach to the stability of DRC has helped in ending Africa's most deadly war that led to a humanitarian crisis, mass deaths and immobilization of communities. The vicious cycle of conflict in the Eastern Congo has to do with DRC's relations with neighbouring countries in the East.¹⁸² Lack of proper accommodation of dissenting Hutu voices in Rwanda and Burundi led to growth of Hutu rebels operating in eastern Congo due to ethnic ties to the locals in Congo. In a bid to deal with the rebels and protect the Tutsi affiliated locals in the eastern part of DRC, the Rwanda government has had operations in the eastern Congo. Uganda, under Museveni a southerner, is seen not to fully accommodate the interests of northern Nilotic Ugandans. The

¹⁸⁰ Idem

¹⁸¹ Idem

¹⁸² Ramsbotham, O. et al, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts*, 3rd ed., p.201

result was rebellion by groups like the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) that for long has been operating in the DRC. Uganda has used the excuse to send its forces into DRC and is accused of plundering Eastern DRC in the pretense of pursuing rebel groups. Ending of the war in Eastern Congo is thus dependent on regional efforts. Pressure on Rwanda to withdraw support for the M23 rebels led to the rebel group being forced to negotiations and end of hostilities.¹⁸³

The international community has been instrumental in finding lasting peace in the DRC.¹⁸⁴ First, the neighbouring countries were forced, through international pressure, to stop supporting rebel groups and to end their military operations in eastern Congo. Secondly, the Security Council of the UN authorized an international brigade to conduct a military offensive against rebel groups such as M23. The government of DRC was encouraged into passing an amnesty law to encourage rebels to give up on hostilities without fear of being victimize.¹⁸⁵ Regional discussions have helped build relative confidence among the countries of the Great Lakes Region, thus promoting the peace efforts. On the other hand, the World Bank has provided funds to the government of Congo to provide basic services to the citizenry. Provision of basic services and amenities helps to enhance government legitimacy among the citizenry.

While regional efforts have largely depended on international pressure on Congo's neighbours, the challenge for the DRC government has been and still is how to extend and exert state authority to the east.¹⁸⁶ The peace framework called for reforms in security, economy and governances. One of the key issues from the framework was ensuring decentralization as a

¹⁸³Ibid, p. 289.

¹⁸⁴ G. Nzongola-Ntalaja, *From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of Congo: Current African Issues* No. 28, February, 2005.

¹⁸⁵ G. Nzongola Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History*, p25.

¹⁸⁶Human Rights Watch. *D.R. Congo: Peace and Reconciliation*. New York: Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, July, 2012.

determinant of state control over the huge sized country. The decentralization processes in DRC was supposed to be anchored on an electoral process that would ensure greater locals involvement in choice of leaders.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, through decentralized units of government, local level representation in government was to be enhanced and promoted.

According to the US special envoy for Africa, Carson, despite registered gains, the challenging problem in DRC is its weak democratic institutions.¹⁸⁸ The governance institutions are weak and much is dependent on the presidency. The rule of law has not been engrained and things are not done as per the constitution, but as per the wishes and concerns of the presidency. The president has established an autocratic governance structure based on patronage and military impunity.¹⁸⁹ Due to limited democratic space, participation in governance is limited. Corruption has been rooted in government institutions due to lack of checks and balance.¹⁹⁰ Such a situation continues to perpetuate economic underdevelopment for most of regions in the country. The people far away from the cities do not feel any changes due to the peace deal given the regime has not developed any facilitative infrastructure.¹⁹¹

Roger Meece, the longest serving US Diplomat in DR Congo, argues that the challenges in DRC are incomplete processes.¹⁹² This means that despite many actions being programmed and changes being instituted, the processes are not let to run full course. The peace deal had clear reform agenda to be executed by the government of national unity and later a popular

¹⁸⁷ Ibid

¹⁸⁸ Ibid

¹⁸⁹ Prendergast, John, and Colin Thomas-Jensen. *Averting the Nightmare Scenario in Eastern Congo*. Working Paper no.7. Washington D.C: Enough Project, 2007.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid

¹⁹¹ Ibid

¹⁹² G. Nzongola-Ntalaja, *From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of Congo*: Current African Issues No. 28, February, 2005

government after elections.¹⁹³ The new post-war regime, has managed to bring back the strong sense of nationality that people had during the early Mobutu Seseko regime years. However, the strong sense of national identity is not supported by strong cohesion and cooperation within the nation.¹⁹⁴ The provinces still have ethnic based challenges and political differences among political actors are high. The process of reconciliation has, for instance, reduced attacks on minority Tutsi in places like Kinshasa. However, tribal animosity and dominance due to certain ethnic dominance in provinces remains vivid.¹⁹⁵

Delays and national government interference in provincial and local elections have led to a strong sense of lack of good will from the central government.¹⁹⁶ President Joseph Kabila is seen to be keener on perpetuating his regime than rallying Congolese through building strong institutions and systems of governance. For the two terms that the president has been in office, he is seen to have failed in the quest to extend state authority to the east of Congo.¹⁹⁷ The political parties in Congo are accused of not working towards a common vision of a prosperous Congo. The politicians find relevance by championing regional and ethnic interests at the expense of national interests.¹⁹⁸ Equally, national governance structures are seen as advancing the interests of the ruling class and the dominant ethnic groups in the country.

The failure to expand state authority to the east has led to militias establishing illicit economies and working to undermine peace effort so that they continue plundering the resources

¹⁹³Ibid, p. 2.

¹⁹⁴Ibid, p. 3.

¹⁹⁵G. Nzongola Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History*, p30.

¹⁹⁶Ibid, p.32.

¹⁹⁷Ibid, p, 35.

¹⁹⁸Carlson, Anthony. "Mineral Wealth: The Cry from the DRC." *Harvard International Review* Summer 2006: 6.

in the region.¹⁹⁹ The mining sector in the east of Congo helps to sustain rebel groups and militias. Coupled with access to weaponry through neighboring countries, disarming processes do not achieve much. A militia group is disarmed and disbanded only for new ones to be formed. Despite efforts by the international community to cut off illicit minerals from reaching the markets, conflict in the eastern Congo persists due to dissatisfaction of locals and military with government processes and systems.²⁰⁰ For instance, in April 2012, there was a Mutiny in the Northeastern part of DRC. The mutiny was caused by poor working conditions for army men, inadequate supplies, poor equipment and unpaid salaries. The conditions are bad in eastern Congo due to lack of central government presence or structures.

Lack of central government control in provinces explains the various conflicts experienced, especially in eastern Congo. In Kinshasa, the local political leaders are said to perpetuate ethnic profiling and attacks especially against the Tutsi.²⁰¹ Such a situation can only be contained if the central government has strong presence and control over the provinces. To avoid excesses of central government, the structure should be complemented by a vibrant local government structures.²⁰² However, in eastern Congo, the central government structures as well as local government structures are either effectively weak, or simply inexistent. Lack or weakness of such political and governance structures make it easy for rebel groups or militias to form, and grow. Additionally, the high handedness of military in eastern Congo makes locals to support local militia over the army.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid

²⁰⁰ Ibid

²⁰¹ G. Nzongola Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History*, p25.

²⁰² Carlson, Anthony. "Mineral Wealth: The Cry from the DRC." *Harvard International Review Summer 2006*: 6

A lot has changed in DRC since the signing of the 2002 peace agreement. However, the central government failed in building the capacity of local communities and local authorities as proximate centers for sustainable stability and peace in the long run.²⁰³ The new constitution enacted after the signing of the peace agreement anticipated formation of vibrant local level structures through a process of decentralization. However, the government of President Joseph Kabila has not been very upbeat about formation of new provinces, local authorities and building their capacity such that they have the requisite stabilizing effect, especially in areas like Eastern Congo. There is need to build strong institutions through which the reform agenda can be channeled. Developing systems rather than centralizing power in the person of the president is important for local level empowerment of women, youth, and minorities to participate in processes for greater inclusivity in governance.

In the post-war Congo, a lot has been done to establish a viable state. However, some actions by the Joseph Kabila regime have undermined the state building process. According to Dr Musambayi Katumanga, the process of state building in the region as evaluated against indicators of state-ness has failed. Some key indicators of state-ness include the ability of the state to maintain sovereign authority over its territory; to provide a source of national identity; the capacity to mobilize resources and serve as an arena for politics; and to be the guarantor of security. For Dr. Katumanga, in the majority of Congolese regions, politics is not driven by ideology, but by the desire to control resources. Therefore, the focus of governments is not on building systems for posterity, but systems for grabbing or accessing national resources.

²⁰³ Ibid

Resource politics that are predatory in nature are about resource extraction.²⁰⁴ They are elitist, owned and driven by elites' agenda and involve us against them mobilization ideology. In such a political system, as it seems to be the case in Congo, centralization of power is used to ensure proper exclusion of others in sharing the national cake.²⁰⁵ Although there is a semblance of representation, it is often the elites representing the masses and eating or plundering national resources by grabbing and rent seeking behaviour. Such systems are not keen on popular participation models and do not benefit the wider society. The elite, to perpetuate themselves, use patronage to cement ethnic mobilization or sectarian mobilization to root themselves in power. Such resource allocation dynamics create conflict axis with the excluded seeking a way to the table for a share of the national cake. Lack of focus on participation and empowerment of locals has led to DRC politics denying nationals a role to play in the national politics, particularly women, youth and minority.²⁰⁶ The involvement of disadvantaged groups in national politics is limited due to closed nature of an autocratic regime.

4.6. Chapter Summary

This chapter explored the post-war structures in the Democratic Republic of Congo and how they are affecting the stability and the future of the country. Information covered from different sources points the two important facts. One, the stability of DR Congo is dependent on her relationship with the neighbours; especially how it interacts with Angola and Burundi, the allies of the regime and, on the other hand, Uganda and Rwanda the foes or antagonists to the regime. The activities of the neighbouring countries' armies in eastern Congo have contributed to

²⁰⁴Garrett, Nicholas. "State-building, Security and Development through Natural Resource Exploitation - The Case of North Kivu Province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." *Proc. of International Studies Association 2008 Annual Meeting*.

²⁰⁵Carlson, Anthony. "Mineral Wealth: The Cry from the DRC." *Harvard International Review Summer 2006*: 6

²⁰⁶Carlson, Anthony. "Mineral Wealth: The Cry from the DRC." *Harvard International Review Summer 2006*: 6

continued volatility in the region. Secondly and most importantly, extension of state authority or control to all parts of Congo is a major determining factor. As part of the post-war process, Congo under Joseph Kabila is not that committed to a reform agenda. Various reforms have been undertaken, but most of them remain incomplete processes to date. The president has established an autocratic regime that is not keen on citizens' participation in governance. The constitution required setting up and building capacity of decentralized units of government. The president, through unilateral decisions of delaying elections in the provinces and not creating decentralized units as per the constitution, sends wrong signals.

The lack of fully functional decentralized units and national government systems perpetuate a situation where patronage, nepotism, corruption, ethnic based mobilization and ethnic profiling are the norm. In areas like the eastern Congo, lack of state control has made militias powerful. The absence of infrastructure and amenities in the area has made life difficult even for government soldiers in the area. Consequently, mutinies like the one in April 2012 and flourishing of local militia continue to threaten the stability of the entire country. The political elites continue to mobilize masses regionally and ethnically leading to a high sense of national identity in Congo without much cohesion in the provinces. The next chapter provides study conclusions and recommendations based on the conclusions.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATIONS

5.1. Introduction

This study examined the contribution of post-war government structures to unpredictable political succession in the Great Lakes Region. The purpose of the study was to document the incidence of unpredictable political succession in the Great Lakes Region, to analyze post-war government structures in the Great Lakes Region and to examine the relation between post-war government structure and predictability of political succession in the DRC. The study was guided by three hypotheses. This chapter provides conclusions of the study give recommendations and provide suggestions on areas for further study.

5.2. Conclusion

The first hypothesis was that non-inclusion is the major contributor to unpredictable political succession in the Great Lakes Region. The study explored political succession in the Great Lakes Region and incidences of unpredictable political transition in the territory. The information gathered showed that in most countries in the Great Lakes Region, democratic ideals of equity, accountability, transparency and inclusivity are yet to be adopted. Many countries are suffering ills related to negative ethnicity, corruption, patronage, clientilism and despotism. Additionally, in the Great Lakes Region although multi-party politics has been embraced, the parties are not properly constituted and regulated. Looking at cases of transition in the three sample Great Lakes countries, ethnicity and inclusion are recurrent themes that determine stability of the nations. All the cases of unpredictable political successions in the sampled countries were occasioned by the existence of government systems that did not respect ethnic diversity. Consequently, the hypothesis that non-inclusion is the major contributor to

unpredictable political succession was accepted. However, inclusion is dependent on political structures and actors in place and the interests they pursue.

The second hypothesis was that decentralization has significantly affected internal democratic processes in countries of the Great Lakes Region. An examination of the post-war government structures in DRC, Uganda and Burundi shows that decentralization has been adopted by as a way of ensuring locals participate in governance and increasing efficiency in government service delivery. However, decentralization units of government in the Great Lakes Region remain susceptible to central government manipulation. In cases where autonomy has been granted to the local governments, some have turned into authoritarian and tyrannical regimes at the local levels that deny locals, especially minorities, their rights. Where the system is personalized as is the case in Uganda, the national government bulldozes local government hence minimizing the democratic space at the grassroots. Information gathered from various countries discredits and thus leads to rejection of hypothesis that decentralization has significantly affected internal democratic processes in Great Lakes countries. Decentralized units of government are heavily influenced by national politics and central government thus minimizing their contribution to internal democratic processes in these countries.

The third and final hypothesis was that Post-war political structures are a major determinant of predictable political succession in the Great Lakes Region. Information analyzed from different countries shows that political stability in the Great Lakes Region is dependent on relations with neighbouring countries and internal state control. Using the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, it was established that the stability of this country is dependent

on her relationship with the neighbours; especially how it interacts with Angola and Burundi, the allies of the regime on the one hand and, on the other hand, Uganda and Rwanda the foes or antagonists to the regime.

Additionally, setting up and building capacity of decentralized units of government in DR Congo was seen as the logical means of attaining state control and stability over the vast national area. Unfortunately, the president through unilateral decisions of delaying elections in the provinces and not creating decentralized units as per the constitution has led to state control over given regions in the country; especially the eastern part of Congo, remaining limited. The lack of fully functional decentralized units and national government systems perpetuate a situation where patronage, nepotism, corruption, ethnic based mobilization and ethnic profiling are the norm of the day. In areas like the eastern Congo, lack of state control has made militias powerful. In national politics, lack of systems has contributed to ethnic and regional mobilization as the focus of politicians. The analyzed information affirms the hypothesis that post-war government structures in the Great Lakes Region are shaping the countries for more conflicts and unpredictable succession.

5.3. Recommendations

The international community and national governments still have a lot of work to do to guarantee stable political succession in the Great Lakes Region. Stability in countries like Uganda was realized through creation of the NRM through which political competition was exercised without Balkanizing the country. However, the survival of NRM just like the survival of the ruling parties in Angola, Burundi, Rwanda and DRC are tied to the benevolent and autocratic leadership of present presidents. It is important that processes and mechanisms be put

in place to move away from personality and patronage based governance to a more system or institution based approach. This can only be realized if constitutionalism is entrenched and manipulation of constitutions minimized.

Decentralization and devolution have been seen as panacea for ethnicity related problems in the Great Lakes Region. However, decentralized units as currently established are prone to manipulation by central governments. These decentralized units have also been taken over by local tyrants who perpetuate abuse of human rights against minorities in the provinces or districts. It is thus important to develop systems through which national government structures run parallel to local political structures to ensure local authorities deliver on their mandate while the national government is checked by local authorities.

Capacity building programs are necessary in most of the Great Lake countries. This arises from many years of despotism in the countries that have led to fear of the unknown. Locals have to be encouraged to trust constitutional structures rather than personalities. Many post-war regimes are undemocratic but the people support them due to fear of another war. For the people to have a say in governance, there is need for locals, especially youth and women and minority groups, to be empowered through education, economic activities and making constitutional institutions user friendly.

Finally, predictability of political succession in the great lakes countries is dependent on stability in neighboring countries. This is especially true for Congo, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda whose national politics is closely influenced by political processes in neighboring

countries. Therefore, steps towards building a regional bloc to promote regional cooperation in the great lakes region will have great positive impacts

5. 4.Suggestions for Further Study

The countries of the Great Lakes Regions have adopted different decentralization models. It would be informative for a further research on the impact of the different decentralization models on future inter-state dynamics; especially for countries that have a shared history.

Secondly, all the Great Lakes countries assessed in this study have a strong presidency and the presidents are in their last constitutional terms. It would be interesting to investigate the succession dynamics across the region to determine whether post war-government structures will be altered or will they be reinforced and strengthened.

Finally, more research can be studied on the possibilities and opportunities of the Great Lakes as a regional bloc. What are the bottlenecks and opportunities that need to be addressed or harnessed if such a bloc is to be realized and actualized? What should it its objectives?

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Appendix 1: Interview Guide for Key Informants

My name is Liuta Ernest Is'aloluwa, an M.A. student of Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies at the University of Nairobi. I am carrying out a research on Non Inclusive Post-War Government Structure: A Hindrance to Predictable Political Succession in the Great Lakes Region, taking Democratic Republic of Congo as a case study. To objective of the study is to examine whether non inclusive post-war government structures lead to unpredictable political succession in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.

Kindly spare some of your cherished time to provide me with necessary answers to the questionnaire below. I assure you that all information provided are strictly for the purpose of this research and will be treated with utmost confidentially. Any information shall be used solely for academic purposes of this project.

1. Is DRC a multi-party democracy?
2. Is the democratic space in Congo sufficient for all actors?
3. What is the role of the ruling party in governance?
4. What is your evaluation of opposition politics in Congo?
5. How are the political party activities influencing succession politics in Congo?
6. Are the political reforms anticipated in the new constitution working or realized?
7. What is your evaluation of the decentralization process in Congo?
8. How do the relations between Congo and her neighbors affect succession politics in Congo?