

PEACE BUILDING FUNCTIONS IN PEACE KEEPING OPERATION: THE
CASE OF AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA, 2007 - 2013

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DECLARATION

This thesis is a product of my own work and is not the result of anything done in collaboration. It has not been previously presented to any other institution. I agree that this thesis may be available for reference and photocopying, at the discretion of the University.

Signature of Student..... Date.....

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This Research Project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University Supervisor.

SignatureDate.....

Dr. IbrahimFarah

DEDICATION

To my loving wife Martha Wanja Nyaga, for being there for me, her sacrifice, time and resources.

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I would like to register my appreciation to Almighty God who has greatly facilitated my breakthrough. I owe particular thanks to my supervisor Dr. Farah Ibrahim who has been there for me and through His instructions and directions I have managed to carry this research. Special thanks are owed to my wife for her encouragement and moral support while undertaking this research. I wish to acknowledge the encouragement and friendship of fellow students. I am indebted to my friends who have supported me morally in the course of undertaking the research. Finally I recognize my lecturers at IDIS who through their insights and inspiration in a way helped me to develop this thesis and consequently conduct the research. May God bless all of You. Amen.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACJ	-	Africa Court of Justice
AU	-	Africa Union
ASF	-	African Standby Force
AMISOM	-	Africa Union Mission in Somalia
AMIS	-	Africa Union Mission in Sudan
AMIB	-	Africa Union Mission in Burundi
AOU	-	Africa Organization of Unity
DPA	-	Darfur Peace Agreement
DRC	-	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	-	European Union
ECOWAS	-	Community of West African States
FAN	-	Forces of the North
GOS	-	Government of Somalia
IGAD	-	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	-	Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Somalia
JEM	-	Justice and Equality Movement
MNF	-	Multinational Force of American
NGO	-	Non Governmental Organization
ONUC	-	United Nations Operation in Congo
ONUB	-	United Nations operation in Burundi
PLO	-	Palestine Liberation Organization

PCRD	-	Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
SCC	-	Standing Committee on Chad (SCC)
SADC	-	Southern African Development Community
SLMA	-	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
SPMAGTF-12	-	Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force 12
SPU	-	Special Protection Unit
TFG	-	Transitional Federal Government
UN	-	United Nation
UNSOM	-	United Nation in Somalia
USA	-	United States of America
UK	-	United Kingdom
UNSC	-	United Nations Security Council
US	-	United States
UNHCR	-	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIS	-	UN Mission in Sudan

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ABSTRACT

The peace building functions by Africa Union is one of the good efforts towards retaining peace in Somalia. Somalia has experienced turmoil's for so many decades. The peace buildings by AU are caught up by many challenges. The main one been funds to facilitate the functions. Though those challenges are there, the study has found out that, the AU has really tried to calm down the war. The research also wanted to find out the intentions of AU towards those functions, but it can ascertain that they are positive. The objectives of the study are to investigate the role of AU in peace building in Somalia. The roles of AU can be classified as positive. If the AU had enough funds towards these functions it could have done tremendous job. The other objective is to examine if the citizens of Somalia are benefiting out of these functions by African Union, the answer to that is yes, because it has been witnessed as majority of Somalia citizens who were refugees going back to their country. The linkage between peace building functions and peace keeping operations. So the study can conclude by saying, unlike other Unions with hidden agendas in aiding other nation the African Union has none. The study used structural conflict theory as a theoretical framework. The bases of this theoretical framework are on issues of competition of resources. Every individual is struggling to have resources. This issue led to people fighting each other because of resources, as result they ended up killing each other. This issue of competition for resources it has made the functions of peace building by African Union very complicated. Those who acquired resources unjustly are against peace building for the fear their resources will be taken away. The key finding of the study is that the institutions of Somalia need to be strengthening if not to re-made a new. These institutions like Judiciary they must be there to collect the injustices which are there in Somalia. To add on that the issue of funding also needs to be looked at. Issues of funds have made the functions of peace building in Somalia complicated. All nations need to be supporting the nations in conflicts like Somalia Finally the research conclusions are that, for the peace building functions to be successive they need the contribution of every individual, that is the individual from Somalia and also the outside countries.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1Background

This study focuses on the role of AU in peace building functions in nation of Somalia. It also focuses briefly on peacekeeping operations. The study investigates the willingness of AU in undertaking peace building functions. The main concern of study is to examine the real intentions of AU and whether those intentions are benefiting the citizens of Somalia. The other concern of the study is to investigate the advantages and disadvantages of the functions to the neighboring countries like Kenya and also citizens of Somalia. During the time when these functions are undertaken, we have heard of Somalia citizens complaining of torture by the forces undertaking the functions. Finally, the other argument is finding out whether the methodologies used by AU will gain any positive results. Will AU have the final say to stabilizing the nation of Somalia?

The nation of Somalia has not experienced peace for the last two decades plus. This has been as result of civil war which has engulfed Somalia. Due to these instabilities and wars the country has gone down in terms of developments, economically and socially. The citizens have sought refuge from the neighboring countries, for example in camp Daadab in Kenya; it contains more refugees from Somalia. The United Nations and United States of American (USA) have put a lot of efforts to stop conflicts in Somalia. The UN intervention in Somalia has its origin in which to provide desperately needed food and other relief supplies to war torn famine stricken country. The United nation operation in Somalia (known as Unisom) was established to provide security for

unitednation personnel and supplies and escort humanitarian supplies to distribution centers. That is to show the United nation has tried to aid the Somalia but all in vain. Due to that, the African Union under the umbrella of united nation is trying to build peace and keep peace in Somalia. The operations started by Kenya defense force that got to Somalia land due to threats posed to its people and territory.

Thereafter through interventions of UN the operation of peace building in Somalia is in progress. In doing that there are so many other operations which have been done and this study will be analyzing them. The challenges which have resulted in process of these operations will also be looked onto. In February 2007 the united nation Security Council gave the African Union mandate and authority to deploy peace keeping mission in support of Somalia transitory federal institutions. This peace keeping also involves the issue of peace building. All operations starts with peace keeping, as scholar by the name Gaya says, peace keeping entails the use of peacekeepers to keep conflicting parties apart and keep conflict at current low levels¹. That is to say cease fire, humanitarian aids and any aids the conflicts parties may need. After peacekeeping, the issue of building peace arises. The term Peace building has been defined by Akerlund who says "the focus is taken away from the warring parties, their behavior, their attitudes and the dispute and is placed instead of community².

This involves building structures both social and the one which boast the economics. The process is not easy and so the study will be analyzing if the AU has done anything of significance in Somalia towards peace building.

¹ Gaya Shadrack, (1992) *Introduction to peace studies and conflicts studies in west Africa*, Ibadan, Spectrum books limited, pp. 13.

² Akerlund Anna (2005) *Transformation conflicts and building peace*, Swedish peace team forum and forum syd, pp 52.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

The large percentages of most nations in the whole world have experienced conflicts or wars. Narrowing down to Africa, one third of its nations has experienced violence. Most of these violence's are as result of natural resources. Instead of bringing blessings to those nations they are bringing curses. Apart from natural resources the political arena has also been a source of conflicts. This has to do with the issues of struggling to be or to remain in power. Everyone wish to be in power in which is not possible.

Somalia has been fighting for so many years, hence lack of developments due to conflicts. The AU has been involved in Somalia to keep peace and build it. This study seeks to investigate whether the AU has successes in doing so. The study ask, do the citizens of Somalia benefits from the operations? In addition, the study will also be examining the operation if it was done out of good faith or the AU has any hidden agenda, like benefiting out of the operations. So in simple terms the study will be investigating if the citizens of Somalia are benefiting from the operations of peace building.

The functions of peace building are very difficulties to handle. The challenges had been lack of strategies to handle them. Anything to be done well needs to be planned before it starts. The problem with most of peace building functions is lack of proper planning. The funds limitation is also another challenge to reckon with. For example the peace building in Somalia the big threats is challenge of funds. The AU Nations do not want to contribute funds to help other African Nations.

The African Union is used by under outs from other Unions like United Nations and European Union. Its high time Africa Union learns to be self-independent. There is also need to note that, the issues of some local not owning the functions of peace building by African Union is also a challenge. Some are against because of self-interest. They benefits out of problems in Somalia.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of study is to analyze peace-building functions in peacekeeping operations; with a case study on African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Morespecifically the study aims to:

- i) Provide an overview of peace-building functions in peacekeeping operations;
- ii) Interrogate peace-building functions in AMISOM'S peace keeping mission in Somalia;
- iii) Explore the linkage between peace-building and peacekeeping operations.

1.4 Literature Review

This section seeks to analyze the literature review on peace building functions. Is peace building really worthy doing? Does it benefit the citizens? It will also be analyzing other peace Building functions which the UN and AU has ever done, focusing on challenges their Experienced. To start with the word peace stand for an extremely nebulous concept, the lowest common denominator of peace is the absence of war and

Armed conflict³ by Arklund. He continues to say it is not possible to speak of peace without justice for human rights. This concept talks about even if one has to maintain peace the respect for human rights must be achieved. Some of these concepts of respecting human rights make it very difficult to achieve peace, because whether one like it or not human rights have to be deny as one look for peace. These word peace, been absence of wars has been define by a scholar Gaya who says “peace is defined as absence of war, and by logical extension, war is absence of peace⁴. So with either have wars or peace. To add on that when we have peace all forms of violence can’t be experienced.

Galtung has defined Peace by giving two ideas. He says peace is classified as negative and positive peace. Negative peace is “is a situation where there is absence of violence and war while positive peace is a situation where open conflict as well as threat of conflict is absent; the causes of conflict have been removed from the situation⁵. Though the ideas of Galtung are good but it is difficult because it is hard to eliminate all threats of conflicts

1.4.1 Definitions

Boutros Ghali defined peacekeeping as a technique which expands possibilities for prevention and the making of peace however after peacekeeping failures in during the Rwandan Genocide, Lester Pearson Peacekeeping Centre argued that the peace keeping operations were undertaken by the military, interested agencies civilian or through humanitarian purposes either cooperatively or individually to enhance international

³ Ibid

⁴ Galtung, J (1995) *Peace by peaceful means, peace and conflicts, development and civilization*, (international peace research institute, Pri, osho) pp.2

⁵ Ibid

security and peace, this definition encompasses the increasing involvement of peacekeeping operations in Africa⁶.The term peace keeping has been used as an action aimed mainly at resolving or cooling down the international conflicts. Gaya denotes, that peace keeping in UN is the stationing of neutral, lightly armed troops as an interposition force following a ceasefire to separate combatants and promote an environment suitable for conflicts resolution.... Prerequisite is notion of consent based on desire of warring party for peace⁷.Following the above statement the UN charter do not allow use of force except in self-defense.

The International Peace Academy defines peacekeeping as: the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of Hostilities between or within states through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention, Organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police, and Civilians to restore and maintain peace.⁸This simply means cooling down the temperatures in areas where conflicts or wars as escalated. To summarize, the peace keeping operations are meant to halt armed conflicts or prevent it from occurring again. This can only be achieved by it acting as a barrier between the warring parties from fighting and monitoring their military movements. It also acts as a purpose of creating a stable environment for negation or mediation, which can possibly lead to a solution to the existing conflicts. The operation can also reduce tensions between the warring parties by giving them time to prepare for talks without worrying of other party attacks. So this facilitates the elimination of

⁶ Boutros, Ghali (1992) *Agenda for peace*, New york, United nation department of public information.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Diel, T, Paul (autumn 1988),*The academic of political science*, vol 103, No 3.stable url (<http://www.jstor.org/stable2105760>).

conflicts without bloodshed. This led us to some of the examples of peace keeping operations by UN.

1.4.2 Peace Keeping Operations

The followings are some of examples of UN peace keeping operations. They are narrated by a scholar by the name Gaya and others. He describes them as follows: This was established by Security Council resolution 143 (1960) of 14th July. As Gaya says the initial mandate of ONUC was to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces from republic of Congo, assist the government in maintain law and order and to provide technical assistance. The real function of ONUC was subsequently modified to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrences of civil war and securing the removal from Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations command, and all mercenaries. Finally, the maximum strength as at July 1961 was 19,828 all ranks, supported by international civilian and locally recruited staff. At withdrawal, 30th December 1963 the number stood at 5871 all ranks, supported by international civilian and locally staff. As for definition the above statement gave it more weight, the role of ONUC was to cool down the conflicts for negotiations to take place. The other focus is peace keeping operation in UNEFI.

This has been narrated by Diel. It's one of successful operation which the UN has ever done. He start by saying it grew out of suez crisis in 1956, when a means was needed

to stop war between Britain, France, Israel and Egypt⁹. He continues to say, there was a peace keeping force which was set up to separate the combatants and supervise the withdrawal of British and French troops in the area. Looking at that force it acted as a barrier to Arab-Israel engagement, patrolling of Sinai Peninsula and Gaza strip despite many terrorist attacks and threats against Israel from other parts of Middle East; the area patrolled by UNEFI was comparatively calm, to that extent operation was quite successful. With calm in the area the negotiations were to take place.

This narration is by Diel, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, beside all but destroying UNIFIL, created a new opportunity for peacekeeping in Beirut. Israel demanded that all Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters leave the city, but was opposed to UN supervision of the exodus. A multinational force of American, French, and Italian troops was sent in to supervise the withdrawal. The short-term operation was highly successful, and the MNF quickly withdrew. A series of events occurred, however, that precipitated the redeployment of MNF troops. Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel was assassinated, the IDF moved into West Beirut, and a massacre occurred in two Palestinian refugee camps. The MNF was sent back into Beirut to act as an interim position force between competing militias and to aid the central government in establishing control over the country. British forces soon joined the effort. The MNF mission is by most accounts a complete failure. The civil war escalated during MNF's presence, so much so that the peacekeeping troops had to be withdrawn because their safety could no longer be guaranteed and the political costs were judged to be too great.

⁹Diel, T, Paul (autumn 1988), *The academic of political science*, vol 103, No 3. stable url (<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2105760>)

Many lives were lost in the exchange of fire between the troops and rival militias; suicide terrorist attacks also took their toll on the peacekeeping forces. The problems in Lebanon continue today, and the MNF was apparently little help in alleviating the conflict. Indeed, the MNF was itself a point of contention between various Lebanese factions, and its mere presence was another stumbling block to agreement¹⁰.

This is a clear indication of a failed peace keeping operation. So in conclusion it can be said that peace keeping operations are mainly the gate way to negotiations, It has its own advantages and disadvantages, but its worthy doing. Majority have loosed their lives as a result of peace keeping while others have retained their lives due to peace keeping operations. So in simple terms if it is conducted in good faith it can heal good fruits. Lederach a scholar argues that, Peace building occurs after the slowing down of hostile activity or even resolution of a conflict, and involves restoring faith and trust amongst the differing sides, rebuilding infrastructure, restoring economic activity, repatriating refugees and reestablishing the dignity and esteem of the affected people¹¹. It is a long term process that is associated with capacity building, reconciliation and societal transformation, is preceded by peace keeping and has sometimes been referred to as integrated community development or conflict resolution.

Broadly speaking, peace building seeks to help people recover from, prevent, reduce, and transform violence. As such, the broad nature of peace building often leads to its use as a catch-all concept for many of the so called conflict management activities.

¹⁰ Diel, T, Paul (autumn 1988),The academic of political science, vol 103, No 3.stable url (<http://www.jstor.org/stable2105760>)

¹¹Ledrach, J (1997) *Building peace, sustainable reconciliation in divided societies*, Washington Dc, United States institute of peace press

Peace building involves concepts of conflict prevention, management and transformation, all of which must be undertaken to address comprehensively conflicts that arise in post-conflict settings, but should also aim to transform the conflict system as a whole, preventing violent conflict from arising in the future. Peace building is an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strength and solidify peace to avoid or elapse into conflict¹²Bures. These structures must be strong such that, they won't be destroyed that easily. They may include social, economic, judiciary and so many others.

According to Akerlund, peace building means that the focus is taken away from the warring communities, their behavior, their attitudes and dispute, and is placed instead on the community¹³. He continue to says, this concept of peace building today is used to refer to structures for peace in all phases of conflict, not merely after a violent has been replaced by a fragile peace. These structures should be a form of institutions which offers peaceful conflicts resolutions or those which can prevent violence. According to Ghali the term peace building emerged from the former UN secretary general, in his report an agenda for peace.

He defines peace building as an action in order to avoid a relapse into conflicts''¹⁴. He observed that peace building often commences prior to the end of conflict; this is the period in which tasks to alleviate the effects of war are undertaken. The former general secretary Kofi Annan, denotes 'peace building to be identification of support structures which will strengthen and solidify peace¹⁵. The most widely accepted

¹²Bures, Oldric (2007) *A mid-range of intentions peacekeeping*, Wiley on behalf of the international studies association, international studies review vol 9, No 3, pp. 407-436

¹³ Ibid

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Annan, Kofi (1998) *The quotable Kofi Annan*, United nation department of information, New York

understanding of what peace building is assert that international community must place achieved peace in a durable foundation and to prevent the crisis from recurring by dealing with the underlying economic.Social, cultural and humanitarian problems that created conflict¹⁶by scholar Han. It's also good to note that, An agenda for peace cities the aim of peace building as to embody, comprehensive efforts to identify as support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people¹⁷ by scholar Sollenberg.

So it aims at not allowing conflicts to resume again as it deal clearly with situation newly released from violence or war.Cockell is of opinion that peace building it tries to prevent future conflicts in war torn societies and work to establish greater human security¹⁸.Finally, the goal of peace building is to enhance the indigenous capacity of society to manage conflicts without any violence. It also encourages non-violent violence, it goes beyond crisis intervention to ensure sustainable peace, which is about trust, relationship and empowering the societies.In conclusion, Boyce says, to a certain extent, peace building can be viewed as democratization process, since democracy not only opens the space for non-violent, political competition, but also helps to sustain the balanced distribution of power that under pins the peace process¹⁹.

¹⁶Ibid

¹⁷Sollenberg, Margareta, and Peter, Wallenstein (1998) *Major armed conflicts*, London, Stock Holm international peace research institute

¹⁸Cockell, John G. (1998) *Peace building and human security*, Uppsala, Frame work for international response to international conflict in Wallenstein peter (Ed) preventing violent conflicts. Past records and future challenge: Uppsala university department of peace and conflicts studies.

¹⁹Boyce, James K (2000) *Beyond good intentions*,London,External assistance and peace building in forman,sherperd/Patrick Stewart (eds) .good intentions; pledges of aid for post conflict recovery, Lynne Rienner

1.4.3 The Africa Union (AU)

Cedric has described the AU and its efforts in peace building. It is worth noting the AU has not done much in peace building, but it has tried. He start by saying, “the AU is primarily a political and security organization with very limited capacity to play a meaningful role in the humanitarian, developmental and peace building areas, except for mustering political support and participating in enabling frameworks’²⁰.He continue to say, the three peace operations that the AU has undertaken to date, in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia, have been primarily military operations. Although the mission in Darfur (AMIS) eventually had a sizeable police component, and although all three missions had small civilian components, these missions were dominated by their military aspects. This can be seen to be both because the civilian dimension of peace operations is still underdeveloped in the AU, and because these have all been stabilization-type operations where there is less scope for civilian roles than in, for instance, post conflict reconstruction missions.

In the African Standby Force (ASF) context there is a concerted effort underway to develop the civilian dimension of the ASF, but these efforts have to be understood in an environment where peacekeeping is still viewed primarily as a military Responsibility. For instance, the ASF initiative is steered by the AU Ministers of Defense and Security, and whilst they are broadly supportive of the civilian dimension, their natural interest and focus lies with the military dimension of Peace operations. Cedrich says “the AU has developed and adopted a policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development

²⁰ Coning, De Cedrick and Carvacho Gustavo,2013,*Accord peace building handbook*, The Africa Centre for the constructive resolution of disputes,Umgla rocks,4320

(PCRD), but this policy has not yet resulted in the AU playing a significant peace building role²¹. This is mainly for the reasons highlighted in the first point raised above namely; that the AU is not a significant development actor. To add on that it lacks personality with technical knowledge to handle peace building functions.

In conclusion, a strong body with knowledge about peace building must be put in place to handle any matters involving peace building. The AU also needs to address the challenges which make it not to progress when it comes to peace building. One of the main challenges is finance. The union has no power to control any peace building functions independently and in most cases their do has contributor of funds says. If the members of AU can be funding their own activities then they can be in a position to function in a better ways.

1.5 Justification of the Study

This research investigates the role of AU to the peace building in Somalia. The Nation of Somalia has experienced wars and violence for the last two decades. The UN, for example has tried to calm the conflicts in Somalia all in vain. The United State of America has also put a lot of effort to reduce the violence but all in vain. So this study will be investigating the methodologies the AU is using to eliminate or to bring sustainable peace in Somalia. In addition these kinds of operations need a lot of funds to be operated, so the research will be evaluating the source of funds for AU. Will AU be benefiting from these functions of peace building? The research will also examine the hidden agendas behind AU sacrifice to building peace in Somalia. Most of the functions

²¹Ibid

which are done by these unions they do benefit much at the end of the day. The research will also examine the advantages and disadvantages which Somalia is getting out of the functions and also the surroundings states. In the academic justification, it will aid the researchers on approach which should be employed when starting such functions. It will also bring out the challenges the AU is undergoing, so in future they can be avoided. Finally, the finding of this study which will be published for social study to encourage the peace builders. It will also contribute to literature in this field of study and other related research work and provides basis for further investigation.

1.6 Hypotheses

The study tested the following hypotheses

- i) Well planned peace- building functions can lead to elimination of conflicts;
- ii) Lack of cooperation and absence of political will can hamper effective peace-building in peacekeeping operations;
- iii) There is strong link between effective peace-building and successful peacekeeping operations.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

This study has used the structural conflict theory as the theoretical framework. The proponent of this theory has two main sub-orientation. The first is the radical structural theory represented by the Marxist dialectical school with exponents like Marx and Engels, I Lenin. The second is liberal structuralism represented by Ross, Scarborough and famous work of reknown Author Galtung on structural violence. Collier notes that, it

further (theory) sees incompatible interests based on competition for resources, which in most cases are assumed to be scarce, as being responsible for social conflicts²².

Gaya says, Theories like Marxism, in its thesis on historical materialism presents conflicts as mostly tied to economic structures and social institutions²³. He continues to say, the main argument of structural theory is that conflict is built into particular ways societies are structured and organized. So that to mean the structural theory deal with challenges to do with social problems for example, political and economic exclusion, poverty, diseases, exploitation and also injustice, and more so inequality mostly towards women and children. This theory maintains that conflicts occur because of what we can call exploitation and in just nature of human societies, domination of class by another.

According to Sollenberg, in situations where existing structures are tilted in favor of one group while putting the others at a disadvantage as amply illustrated in Khotari's unequal axes above; where cultures are seen as exclusive; where holders of certain powers or privileges are unwilling to acknowledge the rights of others to be different; or where people find it difficult to identify with political and economic ideas of a political regime, the chances are the conflict will emerge and escalate if nothing is done to correct such anomalies²⁴. The above statement corresponds to the situation in Somalia. There has been a conflict which has prevailed for so long. These conflicts are as result of weak

²² Collier, Paul (2000) *Policy for post conflict societies, reducing the risks of renewed conflict*. Paper prepared for economics of political violence and conference, Princeton university Centre of international studies, Princeton university, and development research group, world bank

²³ Ibid

²⁴ Sollenberg, Margareta, and Peter, Wallenstein (1998) *Major armed conflicts*, London, Stock Holm international peace research institute

structures and everyone wanting to be in power. To add on that, those in powers tend to own it by putting people they are related to power. This makes other to be dissatisfied hence causes of conflicts. These conflicts have led the country of Somalia to have peace building functions undertaken by AU. This theory will inform the study on the need to have stable structures in order to prevent future conflicts.

1.8 Research Methodology

This study has adopted a case study design which employs qualitative methods. This study which focuses on peace building functions by AU, Somalia serving as the case study, requires an in-depth descriptive study which will reveal the true scenario, therefore the case study design is the most suitable for the study of the singular, the particular, and the unique and involves data collecting methods such as document analysis and the focus on studying a single case in depth interpreted in a specific socio, cultural and political setting. For this study, descriptive research will be appropriate because the process seeks to find the factors associated with a certain occurrence. This method will also be used to explain social economic phenomena in terms of the conditions for relationships that exist. In this research qualitative case study will be the major design because of the historical and cultural nature of the topic. It allows the researcher to collect data through participation, observation in naturally occurring circumstances and in real life scenarios.

The research has used secondary data. The research therefore gathers data from the other literature materials written by scholars, newspaper, internet searches which have lot of information regarding the study. In addition literature review from library books, Journals and other relevant research material serves better on determining the gaps in the

study and suggest the possible thoughts to fill them, more so bringing in new thoughts that could probably provoke further research on the same.

The main concentration in this research is on impact of peace building by AU and if it will be in a position to stabilize the nation of Somalia. In this research the author will concentrate on Somalia as the case study. This will be the area of focus for the purpose of being effective and doing the research within the given time. The following would be the foreseen challenges; due to time constraints and financial implication reliance on secondary data may be wanting. However, in depth search for knowledge on this study and keen observation of the current trends will try to serve in filling knowledge gaps.

1.9Chapter Outline

The study is structured on five chapters as detailed below:

- i. Chapter one introduces the topic of our research study by first setting the broad context of our research study, the statement of the problem, justification, theoretical framework, literature review, hypotheses and methodology of the study.
- ii. Chapter two deals with peace building functions in peace keeping operations.
- iii. Chapter three, peace building functions in peace keeping operation: The case of African Union mission in Somali 2007-2013.
- iv. Chapter four, peace building functions in peace keeping operations in Somalia.
- v. Chapter five it deals with conclusions.

CHAPTER TWO

PEACE BUILDING FUNCTIONS IN PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS: AN OVERVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Chapter one of this study gives brief historical issues in literature review. Some of issues discussed were the definition of peace keeping. The definition was highlighted by Boutros who said peace keeping aim at making peace and preventing conflicts to arise. On the same note the study also discussed the issue of peace building. Peace building entails the functions of aiding people to recover from conflicts which engulfed them, This study also gives some examples of where peace keeping and peace building have been undertaken. In that point, chapter one direct us to the next chapter which will focus on historical issues in Somalia.

Chapter two of this study includes the followings: the history of peace keeping in Africa. The main focus will be, to look at how the functions of peace keeping started in Africa., the genesis of these functions, and the challenges AU undergoes has it takes these functions. The AU mission in Somalia will also be looked at, the challenges the AU undergoes in Somalia has it deliberate its mission. Other mission which AU has undertaken in Africa will also be discussed. Finally the study will also focus on peace building functions in peace keeping in Somalia, the challenges within these peace buildings and lastly conclusion.

2.2 Peace Keeping Operations in Africa: African Union Mission

The continent of Africa has been challenged by variety of complex political, economic, environmental and social up heals which make most of the state unstable. These challenges have launched the continent into a series of recurring conflicts experienced in this continent unlike the other continents. Herbst says that, eight of fifteen complex emerges declared by the United Nations department of humanitarian affairs were declared by United Nations department affairs were in Africa. Conflicts erupted into ethnic warfare in central Africa Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda. There was armed uprising in Northern Uganda, civil war in Sudan and border conflicts between Ethiopia and Eriteria.Somalia has remained a collapsed state in spite of attempts to resuscitate it.He continues to says, in Southern Africa, Lesotho witnessed an armed uprising. Angola was also in turmoil.

In West Africa, Liberia was almost a collapsed state, even as rebels embattled Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. While the Cote d'Ivoire experiences armed rebellion, Sudan is encountering humanitarian catastrophe arising from a bitter intra state conflict, almost of genocide proportion²⁵.The big percentage of these conflicts were neglected by other Africa countries. This may be as result of other Africa countries assuming them or going by the policy that all states are sovereign and the other state cannot interfere with other states business. Due to these conflicts escalating each and every other time the United Nations thought it was wise to start peace keeping operations to save Africa countries and its citizen from turmoil of conflicts. It has to be noted that even though

²⁵ .Herbst, Jeffrey, 1998, securing *peace in Africa, an analysis of peace keeping and peace enforcement potential*, world peace foundation reports number 17, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

United Nation was offering aid, they were very slow in their respond. This may be caused by lack of funds or the affected states refusal to cooperate with the United Nations peace keepers. According to United Nations, due to frequency of intra state conflicts on the continent, Africa has undoubtedly become a key challenge to United Nations efforts in peace operations in the 21st century. The number of peace keepers operations has grown dramatically in the last five years. It continues to say, the Africa peace keeping missions account for over 80 percent of all UN peacekeepers deployed in worldwide. For example of the eight missions in Africa, seven began after 1990, supported by 49,000UN peacekeepers.²⁶.According to above statement of UN, African states are mostly affected by conflicts, so most of peace keeping functions are done in Africa.

These operations are costly and hence Africa states contribute very little in terms of funds and also the officers. So this can justify why the UN is slow in responding to Africa conflicts. Apart from that, in the same years of 2000s there was need of deployment of officers in Sudan. These deployments are making the costs to increase dramatically giving the UN huge challenges. In year 2004-2005 the projected 70 percent of UN peacekeeping costs were directed to Africa peacekeeping missions. These challenges has led to new developments including the trends towards the regionalization of peace operations, especially as regional groupings are emerging as legitimate conflicts managers The practice of external interventions by internal affair is evolving, but in a manner that is neither consistent nor controlled.

The Security Council is mandating the regional organization to operate peacekeeping functions. This study is giving a good example of such regional

²⁶ Undpko,<http://www.un.org/depts/dpko>

organizations which the UN gave mandate. Gaya narrates that, many recent Africa operations are hybrids, where multiple organizations have played a lead role in peacekeeping mission in concert with UN. In Liberia the economic community of west Africa states (Ecowas) deployed troops in the summer of 2003, assisted by Us, and then transitioned the mission to UN in October 2003. In Burundi the Africa Union (AU) led a peacekeeping force with a deployment of 2870 peacekeepers primarily from south Africa. Ethiopia and Mozambique before the UN took over in June 2004. In recent peace operations in Africa absorption of operation has typically followed initial regional actor engagement. This pattern is evident, for example, in operation in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote D'Ivoire, and Burundi. All these operations began as regional-organisations' led interventions that were later transformed into UN-managed operations²⁷. These interventions by regional organizations most of them have been successive. The reason been that, the regional organization fathom well the conflicts in their surrounding countries and they know where to start in order to keep peace. For example the US and UN have been to Somalia for so many years and yet no touchable solutions have been yield.

When the AU intervened through AMISOM at least temporary solutions have been acquired and even in future a permanent one will be acquired. Gaya continues to say, a very disturbing dimension of peace operations in Africa is the increasing complexity of the conflicts zones with attendant vulnerability of peace keepers to physical harm. The peacekeepers are compelled not only to deal with irregular forces and

²⁷ .Gaya shadrack, 2004, *introduction to peace and conflicts studies in West Africa*, Ibadan, spectrum books limited.

rogue elements but also armed militia with ill-defined hierarchy and leadership structures. Many of these elements hold tenaciously unto territories that are not instantly recognizable and could change rapidly depending on the balance of terror in their possession. These rag tag armies usually have very sophisticated firepower that often tantalizes the peacekeepers²⁸. This is very common where the rebels have stronger and powerful weapons than the peacekeepers. Has Gaya has said the issue of leadership and hierarchy makes the rebels to take advantage over peacekeeper, before the peacekeeper do the arrangement the rebels continues with their atrocities. To add on that there are several cases where the peacekeepers do not get any support from the local leaders and national leaders which make the operations very difficult. Next the study will give the narration of other peacekeeping missions by Africa Union.

2.3 African Union Peacekeeping Operations

Neethling says that, Africa regional and sub-regional groups, especially the AU and ECOWAS are actively providing peacekeeping and leadership in responding to conflicts, as well providing support to UN operations outside Africa. The only pan Africa framework that had the task of conflict resolution as its raison was the AOU, now transformed to AU, but it did not have the capacity and financial means to conduct major peace operations²⁹. He continues to say, the 23 Africa led missions have been undertaken in Africa in which 17 have been initiated by regional organizations, ten operations by

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Neethling, T, 1999, towards *joint ventures, use of UN observer missions in Africa*, in Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (Eds) from peacekeeping to complex emergencies: peace support missions in Africa. The South Africa institute of international Affairs Johannesburg and institute of security studies, Pretoria (SALLA AND ISS).

OAU, four operations by ECOWAS; two operations by the southern African Development Community (SADC) and one operation by the Treaty of non-aggression, Assistance and Mutual defense (ANAD)³⁰. These four organizations have to all extent be said are the decision makers, mission and support mechanisms. If it was due to lack of finances they could perform very well. The African states need to give funds to these regional organizations and they can be of much help to the continent of Africa. The followings will be the peacekeeping operations which the Africa Union has done in Africa.

2.4 Peacekeeping Operations in Chad

The Chadian conflict started roughly in 1965 and initially posed a serious challenge and threat only to the integrity of the regime in power in the country. With time, however, even the integrity of the Chadian state came under serious threat. In 1975, the President of Chad, Francois Tombalbaye, who had earlier invited French troops to prop his tottering regime, was toppled in a bloody coup led by Felix Malloum. Efforts by Malloum to restore peace in the country failed and in 1989, full scale civil war broke out³¹. Then there was a sudden withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad in November 1981, was another factor that led to the decision to send a Pan-African force to that country. Indeed, the withdrawal took many observers by surprise and posed some serious strategic problems for the OAU, the Chadian government, and those extra-African powers which were calling for their replacement. First, the withdrawal created a security

³⁰ Ibid, pp 316

³¹ Fesehun, Orobola and Amadu Sesay 1980. *The OAU and Conflict Control*. Ife: Department of International Relations, mimeograph. Guardian (Lagos).

vacuum in the country since the OAU peace force had not been assembled, because Habre's men had regrouped along the Chad/Sudan border ready to march into Ndjamena. Second, to prevent an out- break of civil war and the possible collapse of Wed- deye's administration, the Pan-African force had to be raised quickly to separate the two armies.³²

Kupolati observes that, the OAU deployed a peacekeeping force in chad in November 1981 in an attempt to the Chadian tragedy. The OAU had its first practical experience in peacekeeping in chad in 1982. The most unfortunate is that most of OAU states did not honor their commitment of deploying the troops to the mission. The force at its maximum strength consisted of only five maneuvers battalions, which was extremely inadequate to cover the area of 501,000 square miles³³. This has been a big challenge to these kinds of peacekeeping operations where the agreements are not honored. This makes these operations to fail. On the same Elaigwu also observes that, the first Africa initiative in intervention, which had been taken by the Organization of Africa Unity in 1982 during the Chadian civil war, ended in fisco³⁴.

Sesay notes that, in less than a year the operation terminated, amidst general failure, being unable to stop the fighting and soon become the object of attack. It did little to promote peacemaking, as conflict continued in various violent forms³⁵. It was even better if these interventions were not started because there were no good results achieved.

⁸Ibid

³³Kupolati, R. 1996, *The Nigerian contingent in OAU peacekeeping operation in Chad*, M.A, Vogt and L.S, Aminu (ed), *Peacekeeping as security Strategy in Africa: Chad and Liberia as case studies*, Enugu: Fourth dimension publishing co. Ltd

³⁴Elaigwu, J, Isawa, 1996, *Africa security in changing international environment*, in M.A. Vogt and L.S, Aminu (Ed) *peacekeeping as security strategy in Africa: Chad and Liberia as a case study*, Enugu, Fourth dimension publishing Ltd.

³⁵sesay, ahmadu, 1991, *the limits of peacekeeping by regional organization, The OAU peacekeeping force in Chad*, in conflict quarley NO, 11 winter pp7-16

The peace keepers need to be careful before they embark on any operations. The strategies need to be observed and revised well before anything is done.

For analytical clarity and ease, these problems can be grouped into three inter-related categories: They are narrated by Africa Research bulletin. These categories are: The first one is theoretical, that is, those which are related to the whole concept of peace-keeping in an African environment and by an African organization. The second is Institutional problems. These relate to the OAU itself as an international. A second institutional problem relates to the newness of the venture itself. The OAU had never before embarked upon any peace-keeping activity. The lack of experience was evident in the way the Organization treated the factions in the conflict. For instance, the Standing Committee on Chad (SCC) met in Nairobi, Kenya, in early February, 1982 ostensibly to arrange for a ceasefire in the territory, without the representative of Weddeye. This poses the question why can people meet to discuss about a situation and the owners who know what the problems are not available. Again, the resolution passed at the close of the meeting simply called on all the factions in the conflict to observe a ceasefire and open negotiations aimed at national reconciliation by the 28 of the month.

The resolution had several implications for the success and even future of the Force in Chad. First, it marked the beginning of a process which eventually saw the de facto withdrawal of OAU recognition from Weddeye. Second, by asking all factions to come to the peace table, it was apparent that Weddeye, who until that time was the interim President of Chad, was regarded as just the head of a faction in the conflict. By the same token, Habre was recognized a major force in the Chad political game. Third, it was tactic- knowledge by the OAU that it was losing hope of ever finding a lasting

peaceful solution to the conflict. Another result of the lack of experience was the failure to arrange a ceasefire in the territory before the deployment of the Force. The entry of the Force was delayed by several weeks, in part, because of the fierce fighting between the forces of the gunt.

Transitional Government of National Unity, led by Weddeye and those of Habre. The first thing was to bring these leaders together and come up with the way forward together with them, The case of Sudan, the president and the leader of rebels that is His vice president were brought together face to face and were able to sought the way forward together, This compared poorly with UN experience. For instance, it took the UN only two weeks to raise and deploy its Force in Suez in 1956. Aside from the delay and inability to arrange a ceasefire, the mandate of the Force was also ambiguous. Suffice it to say here, that the different interpretations of the mandate by Habre and Weddeye, in particular, added greatly to the problems of the Force. A third institutional issue deals with the lack of salience by the OAU.

The organization scored very low on this. Some of its members, especially Egypt and Sudan, did not believe that they should be bound by either its resolutions or identify with its peace-keeping efforts in Chad which they were busy undermining. Khartoum did not only act as a conduit for external assistance to Habre, but also provided rear bases for his Armed Forces of the North (FAN). This was largely responsible for his triumphant entry into. This operation by Africa Union can be classifieds as the one which failure

completely. It may be said it was their first one but that is not a sound reason because they could have learned from UN who had performed so many operations.³⁶

2.4 Peacekeeping Operations in Burundi

Gaya narrates that, in 2001, after the Arusha peace accord had been signed, the Africa Union deployed a 2,870 strong AU peacekeeping force in Burundi, composed mostly of South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique peacekeepers. This Africa Union mission in Burundi was the first such peacekeeping mission carried out under the auspices of the AU. He continues to narrate that, this AU mission was financed and backed by United States as well as the European Union. The year 2004 June 1st, with a final peace agreement seemingly within a reach, the UN mission in Burundi took over from AU peacekeeping mission, with chapter vii mandate, and the force that is expected to build up to some 5,650, UN peacekeepers. The UN mission in Burundi was still in its initial buildup of peacekeepers consisting of much of the same Africa peacekeepers that was in Burundi.

As of June 2004, ONUB, consisted of 2,415 troops and 57 military observers, totaling 2,472 peacekeepers, On 1st June 2004, at the AU-UN transition ceremony, UN secretary general Kofi Annan praised the creation of new UN mission in Burundi as well as UN-AU joint peacekeeping efforts stating, the success of AMIB is evident and has laid a solid foundation on which to further advance the peace process³⁷. Gauging this operation it can be seen as success. Unlike the one the peacekeeping operation in Chad

³⁶ Africa Research Bulletin, 1981-1982. *Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation* 1989. Addis Ababa: ECA

³⁷ Vogt and LS, Aminu (ed), *Peacekeeping as security Strategy in Africa; Chad and Liberia as case studies*, Enugu: Fourth dimension publishing co. Ltd

atleast this one seems to be more organized and well planned. Financially they were well equipped and that why they were able to perform in a perfect ways, To add on that, been a first operation by AU it did try. If all peacekeeping could have a good organization then they can lead to beautiful fruits ever.

2.6The Work of ECOMOG in Liberia

This report is adapted from Vogt. He start by saying, the ECOMOG was created consequently, with troops from Nigeria, Ghana, and Gambia ND Sierra Leone. It was first task with responsibility of facilitating the evacuation of citizens mainly women and children of member of state and other Liberians that were trapped in war zones. The force was also to establish some of order through policing action especially in Monrovia while arrangements were made for the establishment of interim Government. Unable to get cease-fire from warring parties in Liberia, the ECOMOG landed in Monrovia on 24th august 1990 under heavy attack from Charles Taylor's NPFL. ECOMOG fought its way into Monrovia to create a beachhead that enabled the evacuation of many trapped civilians of various nationalities³⁸. That was the best agenda done by ECOMOG first to secure the safety of common civilians. On the same BBC monitoring report says, within a month landing, ECOMOG's strategy had evolved into conventional offensive, with aim of driving Taylor's troops from Monrovia and created a protected buffer zone around capital city. By November 1990, ECOMOG controlled Monrovia and a cease fire was consequently established. Although ECOMOG'S actual mission bordered on peace

³⁸ Vogt and LS ,Aminu (ed),*Peacekeeping as security Strategy in Africa*; Chad and Liberia as case studies,Enugu:Fourth dimension publishing co.Ltd

making and peace enforcement, a major departure from original mandate, ECOMOG remained as enforcement unit for at least six months after its deployment. Finally, ECOMOG succeeded only on July 1997, after 12 years failed peace accords, to end the conflicts in Liberia. For eight years, the force suffered a huge loss both in materials and in men in hands of an intransigent rebel movement.

2.7 The African Union Mission in the Sudan

Muriithi a senior researcher in conflict prevention programme in Ethiopia note that, the AU is also involved in promoting peace in the Darfur region of Sudan through its African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). In February 2003 the Darfur region (situated In western Sudan on the border with Chad) was afflicted by violent conflict between the Sudanese government and pro-government militia referred to as the Janjaweed and two rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (Mans 2005). The conflict resulted in widespread atrocities against civilians and displaced populations. Neighboring Chad at one point hosted close to 110 000 refugees from Darfur. On 8 April 2004 a ceasefire rebrokered with the assistance of the AU, came into effect for a period of 45 days in order to enable humanitarian aid to reach the affected populations (IRIN, 2004). Throughout, the Chadian mediation team, which initiated talks on a political solution to the conflict act in N'djamena, had been working closely with the AU.

The AU was subsequently charged with establishing and financing a ceasefire re verification commission. The ability of the AU to achieve its mission in Darfur will depend on its capacity to mobilize the political Will of its member states. The AU has a

rather weak mandate in Darfur, namely to monitor the humanitarian crisis in the region effectively and to coordinate efforts to advance the cause of peace. However, this narrow mandate does not provide the AU with the leeway to implement Peace building neither initiative, nor does the organization have the where with all to finance Comprehensive peace building operations.

The regional or continental perspective under the leadership of the AU seeks to find a political solution while undertaking peace operations to alleviate the suffering of the African. The AU's monitoring mission leaves much to be desired; a more robust Peacekeeping force is required to dissuade the silent genocide that is taking place in Darfur. However, the AU's peacemaking initiative in Abuja, Nigeria, under the tutelage of a former Secretary-General of the OAU, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, led to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006. The fact that only the Minni Minnawi faction of the SLA signed the agreement means that the DPA was by no means a comprehensive peace agreement in the mould of the South Sudan agreement.

The conflict is not over, nor is there a durable ceasefire. The armed resistance groups have even begun to fight each other, and the situation has deteriorated into a military, political and diplomatic conundrum. In Darfur, the AU found itself with a test case that it was ill-equipped and under resourced to resolve. The politicization of the situation in Darfur means that there are now no easy answers. Certainly, it is right and proper for the AU to be in Darfur, or for some form of international peace operation to be staged there. Regrettably, while the AU's peacemaking efforts are to be applauded, its monitoring peace operation is floundering and enabling government forces, the Janjaweed, and armed resistance groups to continue fighting amongst themselves and

continue the carnage and destruction of the lives and property of Darfurians. On 31 August 2006 the UN passed Security Council Resolution 1706, which called for the deployment of a UN peace operation in Sudan on 1 October 2006. It also stated that the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) would take over from AMIS the responsibility for implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement upon the expiry of AMIS's mandate and at the very latest by 31 December 2006.

The Sudanese government is still cautious about the inclusion of non-African troops in a potential peacekeeping operation in Darfur. This is due to the fact that there are strong sentiments particularly with the political elite in Khartoum such an attempt to deploy non-African troops might represent an attempt to re-colonize Sudan³⁹. The study agrees with that statement if the UN was to be involved then the whole scenario changes. When they join the functions of peacekeeping their interest may overtake that of the African Union and the two may start conflicting.

2.8 Conclusion

Conflicts are the worse issues to deal with or to leave with. Most of states which had conflicts are behind in terms of development. For example the state of Rwanda is somehow behind due to conflicts which engulfed them in 1994 Genocide. Somalia is not exceptional in this; it's also behind due to conflicts which are still there. The way the conflicts is complicated the same magnitude is to erase it. The Nation of Somalia is trying to building its Nation but all in vain. Some of issues which make state building very

³⁹ Tim Murithi, *African Security Review 16.3 Institute for Security Studies The responsibility to protect*, as enshrined in article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union

difficult are individual interest. Those who benefits from conflicts, do all what they can to make the Nation remain in state of anarchy. This is happening in state building in Somalia. The United Nation needs to come up with strong laws to eliminate those kinds of personalities. Also the citizens of Somalia also need to keep up their game in order to be supported. That means they need to expose the escalators of conflicts no matter who they are.

CHAPTER THREE

PEACE BUILDING FUNCTIONS IN PEACE KEEPING OPERATION: THE CASE OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM) 2007– 2013

3.1 Introduction

Chapter Two deals with the historical background of this study. This gives the study the bases. The focus falls on, history of peace keeping in Africa, the challenges of Africa Union in its functions in Somalia and how it handles them. The next chapter that is three deals with the case study through use of secondary data's.

The nation of Somalia has never experienced peace for the last two decades or so. The conflicts in that country have made the citizens so desperate and majority lives in foreign countries as a refugees. This chapter seeks to focus on peace building functions by Africa union, the case study been the Somalia. To start with the study will focus on some of the followings issues. It will give the definition of Africa union, the background of AMISOM, and the challenges it is experiencing in it functions. Finally it will look at the external and internal Actors in peace building functions in Somalia.

The understanding of what Africa Union is helps this study to elaborate its role in building peace in Somalia. John a scholar says, the African Union, which came into existence in 2002, seems in some ways to be a copy of the European Union. First of all, there is the obvious use of "Union" in the name. Secondly, the institutions of the African Union parallel those of the European Union. Specifically, the African Union has a Pan-African Parliament, an executive African Commission, an African Court of Justice(ACJ), an Executive Council (to match the European Union's Council of Ministers), and at the

apex the Assembly of the African Union, grouping its political leaders and meeting at summits (as per the European Council).

Third and finally, the future plans of the African Union include other parallels, in particular an African Central Bank. Yet the African Union as an historical-political expression differs in three key ways from the European Union: it united almost all of (independent) Africa from its roots in the Organization of African Unity, it has a clear, geographical sense of where is Africa, and it lacks democratic cohesion, the occasional suspension of a member notwithstanding⁴⁰. This statement of John depicts well what the Africa Union is. It was formed out of duplication of other Union no wonder its performance are questionable. If it was formed out of agenda then it would be performing better than the way it does. The vision of union is given by Africa commission who says, Popularize the AU and make its vision of the future widely shared⁴¹. The vision is so attractive but the worries are it is just there to be seen and not to be acted upon. The Africa union needs to act well in order to popularize itself.

3.2 The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Background

This background of African Union Mission gives this study the bases of Somalia mission. The UN Security Council resolution says, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations in Somalia. It is mandated to support transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security

⁴⁰John McCormick, *Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction*, third edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 37.

⁴¹ Strategic plan of the commission of the Africa Union volume 3:2004-2007 plan of action

forces, and to assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid⁴². As part of its duties, AMISOM also supports the Federal Government of Somalia's forces in their battle against Al-Shabaab militants.

The 69th meeting of UN security council also notes that, AMISOM was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007 with an initial six-month mandate⁴³. The six month mandate could not be maintained due to the work force or threats posed by Al-Shabaab. Those who had suggested six months had not done thorough research to know what was to be done. The United Nations has to approve any mission before it takes off. So On 21 February 2007 the United Nations Security Council approved the mission's mandate. Subsequent six-monthly renewals of AMISOM's mandate by the African Union Peace and Security Council have also been authorized by the United Nations Security Council⁴⁴. When they realized that six months mandate can't be enough, AMISOM's UN mandate was extended for an additional six months in August 2008 by UNSCR 1831.

AMISOM's mandate has been extended each period that it has been up for review. It is currently set to be reviewed again on 28 February 2014, following the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2093⁴⁵. On 21 February 2007; the United Nations Security Council authorized the African Union to deploy a peacekeeping mission with a mandate of six months. In March 2007; Ugandan military officials arrived on the ground in

⁴²United Nations Security Council Resolution 1772 S-RES-1772(2007) page 3 in 2007 (retrieved 2008-03-13)

⁴³69th meeting of the peace and Security Council". Agence de Presse Africaine. 2007-01-22. Retrieved 2007-02-09

⁴⁴United Nations Security Council Resolution 1772 S-RES-1772(2007) in 2007 (retrieved 2008-03-13)

⁴⁵United Nations Security Council Resolution 2093". S/RES/2093 (2013), 6 March 2013

Somalia⁴⁶. Kasasira on the same notes says the followings, On 20 August 2007; the United Nations Security Council extended the African Union's authorization to continue deploying AMISOM for a further six months and requested the Secretary-General to explore the option of replacing AMISOM with a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation to Somalia. An American officer inspecting troops from Sierra Leone prior to deployment to Somalia, 2012IGASOM was expected to eventually reach 8,000 troops, with an expected cost of \$335 million for the first year. According to UN Security Council Resolution 1725, states bordering Somalia would not be eligible to deploy troops under IGASOM. The remaining (non-bordering) IGAD member nations include Sudan, Eritrea, and Uganda.

Because of the objection of the burden falling on these three nations alone (and the rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea), the mission was expanded to include other Member States of the African Union .AMISOM has a different composition. As proposed, it is to comprise an initial 3 battalions, growing to a total of 9 battalions of 850 troops each, which would serve for an initial stabilization period of 6 months. The mission was to be modeled after the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB). In a closed door meeting in Kampala on 22 July 2010, AU ministers agreed to expand the mission's mandate from a peacekeeping focus to a peace-enforcement focus that would engage al-Shabaab more directly.

The decision came soon after deadly bomb attacks in the Ugandan capital. A few days later in response to UN pressure, the AU agreed not to expand the mandate but did allow preemptive strikes against Al-Shabaab and promised more troops from other

⁴⁶. Progress Reports of the Chairperson on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2036 (2012)

African countries⁴⁷.The following state promised to give troops to the mission in Somalia. On July 23, 2010, Djibouti and Guinea pledged troops to AMISOM⁴⁸.In March 2011 Burundi sent 1,000 extra soldiers to AMISOM, bringing the total number of Burundi troops deployed to 4,400⁴⁹.In February 2012, the U.N. Security Council boosted the amount of troops deployed from 12,000 to 17,731. The approval comes after a series of recent successes against al-Shabaab fighters who had previous positions throughout the central and southern areas of the country⁵⁰.This issues of deploying troops by phases can be a delay of attacks against the enemies. They need to be deployed at once so that operation can give good results. When the operation succeeded many state put up they efforts in order to be counted, For example, due to the successful military operations against the Islamists, the United States has also been stepping up efforts to train and equip the AMISOM troops in a bid to stamp out the Al-Shabaab insurgency and limit its influence⁵¹.What the United State did was okay and in order but why do that only when the operation succeeded, if they were really genuine they could have done that at the beginning of operation.

In October 2011, a coordinated operation between the Somali military and the Kenyan military began against the Al-Shabaab group of militants in southern Somalia. The mission is officially being led by the Somali army, with the Kenyan forces providing a support role. On 12 November, the Kenyan government agreed to rehat its forces under the AMISOM general command, and later announced in March 2012 that it would be

⁴⁷Kasasira, Risdell; Solomon Muyita (2010-07-28). "Africa: United Nations Blocks Change of AMISOM Mandate". AllAfrica.com. Archived from the original on 31 July 2010. Retrieved 2010-07-29.

⁴⁸"AU nations to boost Somalia force". Al Jazeera. July 23, 2010.

⁴⁹"Burundi sends 1,000 extra AU troops to Somalia". Reuters. March 12, 2011.

⁵⁰"UN council approves increase in AU Somalia force". Reuters. 22 February 2012.

⁵¹"U.S. steps up training for African force in Somalia". Chicago Tribune. 1 May 2012

sending 5,000 troops to join the coalition. Analysts expect the additional AU troop reinforcements to help the Somali authorities gradually expand their territorial control⁵².

Following the terrible un opportunity Westgate shooting in Nairobi by Al Shabaab operatives, the Ethiopian government halted its plans to withdraw completely out of Somalia. It instead indicated that it would continue to support the Somali armed forces and their AMISOM allies. In November 2013, the Ethiopian government announced that it would integrate its troops that are deployed in Somalia into the AMISOM multinational force. Somalia's Foreign Minister Fowzia Haji Yusuf welcomed the decision, stating that the move would galvanize AMISOM's campaign against the insurgent group. She also emphasized the importance of collaboration between Somalia and Ethiopia⁵³. Though the miserable attack of Westgate was not okay but to some extent saved the situation, because due to it the Ethiopia did not withdraw its troops. The Ethiopian authorities' announcement came a month after a failed October bombing attempt by Al-Shabaab in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, and a week after Ethiopia received a renewed terrorism threat from the insurgent group.

According to Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Ambassador Dina Mufti, the Ethiopian military's decision to join AMISOM is intended to render the peacekeeping operation more secure. Analysts also suggested that the move was primarily motivated by financial considerations, with the Ethiopian forces' operational costs now slated to be under AMISOM's allowance budget. It is believed that the Ethiopian military's long experience in Somali territory, its equipment such as

⁵²Kenya agrees to join AMISOM

⁵³Somali government welcomes Ethiopia AMISOM integration

helicopters, and the potential for closer coordination will help the allied forces advance their territorial gains⁵⁴.

In December 2013, the U.S. government established a military coordination cell in Mogadishu at the request of AMISOM and the Somali government. The unit consists of a small team of fewer than five advisers, including planners and communicators between AMISOM and the Somali authorities. It is intended to provide consultative and planning support to the allied forces in order to enhance their capacity and to promote peace and security throughout the country and wider region⁵⁵. The effort by United State can be terms as good one. The United States has provided extensive training for contingents headed for Somalia. In the first half of 2012, Force Recon Marines from Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force 12 (SPMAGTF-12) trained soldiers from the Uganda People's Defense Force⁵⁶. In the northern spring of 2012 [March–April–May], Marines from SPMAGTF-12 also trained Burundian soldiers. In April and May, members of Task Force Raptor, 3rd Squadron, 124th Cavalry Regiment of the Texas Army National Guard, took part in a separate training mission with the BNDF in Mudubugu, Burundi.

SPMAGTF-12 has also sent its trainers to Djibouti, another nation involved in the Somali mission, to work with an army unit there. At the same time, U.S. troops have assisted in training the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces in preparation for their deployment to Somalia later this year[when?]. In June 2012, U.S. Army Africa

⁵⁴Hiiraan Online: Somali war expertise and superior combat kits to boost anti-terror campaign

⁵⁵Martinez, Luis (10 January 2014). "U.S. Military Advisers Deployed to Somalia: First Time Since Blackhawk Down". ABC News. Retrieved 12 January 2

⁵⁶Nick Turse, The Election Year Outsourcing No One's Talking About: The U.S. Fighting Proxy Wars Around the Globe TomDespatch.com/Alternet.org, August 13, 201

commander Major General David R. Hogg spoke encouragingly of the future of Sierra Leone's forces in conjunction with Kenya. As of June 2012, the RSLAF troops have not yet deployed; the Sierra Leonean defense minister said on June 23, 2012, that the battalion might depart for the Horn 'sometime in September [2012]⁵⁷.

In addition, a significant amount of support to AMISOM has been provided by private companies. "Bancroft Global Development, headquartered on Washington's Embassy Row, employs about 40 South African and European trainers who work with [AMISOM's] Ugandan and Burundian troops"⁵⁸. Bancroft director Michael Stock told The East African that these mentors are embedded with AMISOM units in Mogadishu and southern and central Somalia. They coach commanders on how to predict and defeat the tactics which foreign fighters bring from outside East Africa and teach to al-Shabaab." Bancroft "does not receive funding directly from the US government but is instead paid by AMISOM, which is then reimbursed by the State Department for these outlays." The Associated Press reports that Bancroft has been paid \$12.5 million for its work in Somalia since 2008. A security analyst in Somalia listed three primary private security companies/private military companies operating in Mogadishu⁵⁹. This kind of oneness is very healthy can eliminate the conflicts very easily.

3.2.1 Peace-Building Functions in Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia

This portion of study analyzes the peace buildings functions in peacekeeping in Somalia, the challenges facing those functions. Menkhaus states that, one needs to be prepared for

⁵⁷"Sierra Leone Defense Minister denies reports of killings in Somalia", Awareness Times, June 23, 2012

⁵⁸Kevin J. Kelley, Somalia: How 'Quiet Americans' Helped Defeat Al Shabaab, Garoweonline.com, Aug 22, 2011.

⁵⁹Khadija Patel, 'SA's guns-for-hire in Somalia - what happens now?', 26 July 2012

political struggle around state-building. The process of state-building consistently seems to exacerbate instability and armed conflict in Somalia⁶⁰. The report of panel of experts on Somalia also says, this is especially significant in the south-central region. The revival of a state structure tends to be viewed as a zero-sum game, creating winners and losers over potentially high stakes. Control over a central government by specific clan groups would offer them opportunities to accrue economic resources at the expense of other groups, as well as to use the law and security forces to dominate politically. The political maneuvering and violent clashes Somalia that preceded the 2002 peace talks in Kenya provides a reminder of the potentially high stakes linked to such a process.

Whatever formula is used to establish the cabinet and other transitional institutions, one should expect a difficult and possibly extended bargaining process among the different office holders to clarify and demarcate roles, responsibilities and potential resources. The country of Somalia needs institutions in order to match forward, On that note the report says, while the country needs state institutions, and a successful peace process puts the building of such institutions higher on the agenda for northeastern and South-central Somalia, it is important to distinguish between state institutions that, if controlled, can provide opportunities for specific groups to access increased economic and political power, and those that offer fewer or no such opportunities.

While political institutions and public service institutions can be seen to represent opposing ends of such a specter, careful thought needs to be given to mechanisms that can provide nonpartisan oversight of institutions responsible for key functions such as

⁶⁰ Menkhaus, Ken. 2003. *Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment*. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Protection Information Section, Department of International Protection.

customs, taxation, and other revenue collection, and those in the judiciary, law enforcement, and internal and external security. Given the country's modest revenue base, any future central government needs to be Minimalist and focus on the most essential functions, while leaving other tasks to local Authorities and the private sector⁶¹. Though the national government needs reconciliation it should be careful not to fill ministerial post to all constituencies which will be another burden to handle. They should consider their income and expenses and balance the both. Menkhaus observes that, State building in Somalia has consistently been pursued via power sharing accords without serious attempts at reconciliation of issues such as territorial occupation and conquest in southern Somalia. This may partially account for the high failure rate of these accords fourth; a major obstacle to state building in Somalia is the extremely modest revenues that a government can secure from taxes.

Most efforts at state revival have relied on external sources of funding, which have been unpredictable and unsustainable. Externally funded state building has also created a disincentive to govern, reduced government accountability to the Somali people, and tended to promote unrealistically expansive, patronage-based visions of the state that are out of line with Somalia's very weak tax base. Barring a major discovery of energy reserves or other windfall profit to the state, in the near term a successful state structure in Somalia will have to be minimalist in size and mandate, and will hence not be an especially useful tool of political patronage. Consensus building, rather than mere purchasing of political allegiance and co-opting of rivals, will be required to hold the

⁶¹Menkhaus, Ken. 2003. *Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment*. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Protection Information Section, Department of International Protection.

state together. That makes the task for Somali political leaders even harder. The external funding from sponsors in the Gulf that the Mogadishu-based Islamists have received has temporarily helped them overcome this resource constraint, but that external assistance will eventually ebb, forcing the SCIC to keep its political agenda modest in scope⁶².

3.2.2 Challenges of AMISOM in Peace Building

There is no operation which has ever been undertaken without challenges. The study focuses on challenges the AMISOM have in its functions of building peace. These Challenges are Based on the information from the three components, it is clear that AMISOM is faced with the following challenges: (a) Al Shabaab change of tactics from conventional to asymmetric strains the Force as more troops are required in counter insurgency operations. (b) Fledgling Statutory Institutions. Weak administrative structures in liberated areas, to support the military gains. (c) Slow pace of deployment of approved personnel, assets and resources. Insufficient mission enablers and multipliers. (d) Lack of policy directive for implementation of community support programmes. (e) Lack of a comprehensive programme for the management of Disengaged Fighters that is relevant to Somalia. Unpredictable and unreliable funding. (f) Lack of de-confliction between AMISOM activities with those of other actors in Somalia (particularly AMISOM Civilian component activities). (g) Inadequacies of UN logistical support package in relation to AMISOM peculiarities. (h) The general lack of sustainable funding and support from AMISOM partners as well as the lack of coordination to synergise the

⁶² Menkhaus, Ken. 2003. *Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment*. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Protection Information Section, Department of International Protection.

support available. Capacity Building of State Institutions⁶³. AMISOM End State is tied to the development of the FGS in all sectors from political, military, police, justice and correctional services in line with mission mandate. Following decades of collapsed state in Somalia, FGS capacity in all these sectors remains low⁶⁴.

The letter from Chairperson of Africa commission notes that, Emphasis should therefore be placed on building the institutional capacity of those key statutory institutions necessary to facilitate justice, rule of law, effective governance especially through public service delivery. This will contribute also to enhanced public confidence in the FGS. Based on the priorities already outlined by the FGS, a detailed capacity building Plan of Action for the civil service should be developed and implemented by the Political Affairs and Civil Affairs units including the training of civil servants, facilitating their on-the-job mentoring in other AU member states, provision of requisite working tools and improved office accommodation⁶⁵.The above noted challenges cant lack in any operation but they can be reduced if the preliminary arrangements can be done seriously. The state funding the operations should also give the required funds without delay

Building a state is functions which are not easy to tackle. There are many challenges which come across because the builders deal with all kind of personalities. There are those who oppose the state building because of the benefits they were enjoying out of anarchy nation. Somalia is not exception in facing state building challenges. The Somalia challenges will be narrated by a scholar Mankhaus.He start by saying, Somalia also faces specific state-building challenges, some of which will re-quire difficult

⁶³Progress Reports of the Chairperson on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2036 (2012)

⁶⁴Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia (2012)

⁶⁵Letter from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to the United Nations Secretary General (18 October 2012)

decisions and which have the potential to trigger serious armed conflict. The first focus is Government of national unity. Somalia's failed efforts at state building have produced governments that appear on paper to be governments of national unity but that are in fact coalitions of a small number of clans and factions. That has instantly produced spoilers with often legitimate grievances. In a context where power is diffused, and where the centrifugal forces of clannish can make the maintenance of coalitions especially difficult, spoilers can easily sabotage efforts to revive governments that marginalize them.

The TFG is no exception. Although the transitional federal parliament is formally based on proportional representation by clan, that formula is in no way synonymous with a government of national unity. The TFG's top leadership and national security forces are dominated by a narrow coalition of two clans. Powerful clans, including many that form the core support for the SCIC, are largely excluded from the TFG. Achieving a sustainable process of state revival in Somalia will require as a point of departure a commitment to a true government of national unity, one that ensures that all potential spoilers are minimally satisfied with the deal. For the Government to be stable it must contain the full representation of everyone. The Government of national unity of Somalia as it is called; it should not be named so because it represents the only keys members of two clan.

The minority clan will always complain and as result they will start fighting other clans which result to wars. In order to overcome this challenge, the Government should be inclusive of everyone no matter how small the clan is. The next focus is the ownership of national/regional asserts. Menkhous continues to say, much is at stake over who controls

tax and customs revenues. Some regions of Somalia enjoy income-generating seaports; others do not.

Regions or militias controlling income-generating seaports and airports may be unwilling to see those revenues redistributed to other regions, or even to cede control over port revenues to a national government, and may fight to maintain control over what they perceive to be their asset. Whether controlled locally or nationally, tax or customs revenue collection capacity and accountability will need strengthening. Future initiatives to extract natural gas and oil from areas of the country suspected to have such energy deposits will also trigger this debate⁶⁶. This challenge is being affected by the first one of formation of inclusive national Government. If everyone was represented in the Government which was formed they could have sat down and plan how they will share the national wealth. This can only be done by bring the wealth together and then share to all through devolution. For example the case of Kenya the wealth is collected by National Government and it's devolved to all. The other challenge is the issue of outstanding reconciliation issues.

The TFG is the result of state building without reconciliation; delegates at the Kenyan peace talks found conflict issues too sensitive and too divisive to manage, and opted to postpone addressing them in favor of moving directly to power sharing talks. As a result, extremely sensitive issues such as the return of stolen or occupied real estate, political control over towns and regions by military force, the right of all clans to return to live safely in Mogadishu, and the handling of charges of war crimes must be dealt with

⁶⁶ Menkhous, Ken, (2003), *State collapse in Somalia: second thought*, Tayhars Francis Ltd, Review of Africa political economy, vol 30, No 97, The horn of Africa, pp 405-422, www.org/stabl 84

by the transitional government. Failure to address these issues will almost certainly derail the state-building enterprise: the creation of legitimate regional administrations in Lower Shebelle or Kismayo, for instance, cannot proceed until the conflicts are resolved over land occupation in those areas. Likewise, a government of national unity will be virtually impossible to maintain if long-standing conflicts divide members of the cabinet. To its credit, the SCIC leadership has pressed for the return of stolen or occupied property in Mogadishu, perhaps paving the way for other outstanding reconciliation issues to be addressed⁶⁷. This issues of landing to conclusions without deliberating the small disturbing issue s has made Somalia a complicated nation. If first of all dealt with these small issues this nation could be better off than today. This issue of reconciliation should always start before anything else is done.

The federalism/decentralization is the other challenge. The charter drafted at the 2004 Kenya peace talks enshrines the principle of de-centralization in the very title of the transitional federal government. But little if any consensus exists inside Somalia about the merits and meaning of federalism, and none of the key details of federalism has been resolved. Almost all of these unresolved issues have the potential to trigger armed conflict. The delineation of boundaries of regional states is one example. Will the TFG fall back on the prewar regions as the basis of federalism, or draw up new regions to better reflect current political realities? Many of the prewar regions are poor, remote, and not viable; some are also riven by clan conflicts. But any attempt to draw up new regions (or recognize existing ones such as Puntland runs the risk of triggering disputes over

⁶⁷ Menkhous, Ken, (2003), *State collapse in Somalia: second thought*, Tayhars Francis Ltd, Review of Africa political economy, vol 30, No 97, The horn of Africa, pp 405-422, www.org/stabl 84

valuable real estate such as port towns, or even causing ethnic cleansing. What is intended as an exercise in political devolution could quickly degenerate into a violent struggle to carve out separate clanustans. The scope of devolution of power to federal states is another flashpoint of conflict. Some Somali clans-such as the Digil-Mirifle-are force-full advocates of regional autonomy, fueled by resentment of political domination and land expropriation by stronger clans.

Others, such as the Haber Gedir clan, hail from the arid and remote central regions of Somalia but now control much of Mogadishu, and are fierce advocates of a more unified system of government. The controversy over residency and political rights in Somalia is also linked to federalism. Who may claim residency, property ownership, and full legal rights in regional states? Inside Somalia, a lively debate exists over residency and rights, a debate premised on the notion that clans have "home area's" where "guests" do not enjoy the same rights to representation, power, and protection. Given that Somalia's Islamists reject the concept of federalism and are in a position to dictate the terms of the country's future government, the federalism debate may be moot. But the broader issue of local rights versus the rights of outsiders and "guests" will remain an enduring challenge. These challenges are just the matter of agreement within these clans, they should also choose representative who will sit down and agree on issues.

Finally there is challenge of democratization and rule of law. One of the TFG's principal state-building tasks during its five-year mandate is to craft and agree on a constitution. The constitution is critical to Somalia's future, providing the framework for a return to rule of law, for the safeguarding of civil liberties, and for democratic governance in Somalia. With the rapid rise of the Islamists, the central constitutional

debate in the years ahead will be the role of Islam and sharia law in the constitution. In addition, one of the many other contentious issues the constitution will need to address is the structure and principles for democratic representation in Somalia. The current, temporary practice is "consociational"-that is, political representation based on fixed clan and sub clan proportional representation. Somalis may opt to adapt the consociational model to democratic practices by holding elections within lineage groups (as occurs in Lebanon).

Alternatively, they may opt for the more common practice of district- or region-based representation. The latter will raise important questions about district residency, district borders, voting rights, and voter registration-all of which can produce conflict, and all of which will require a trusted and effective national electoral commission. Presuming regional administrations are democratically elected; these issues will be revisited at the regional level as well⁶⁸. For any state to stand on its own it must come up with a constitution to guide them, This constitution should again involve all stake holders when it is been prepared and if possible it should be voted in all out as in case of Kenya. The citizens need also to be taught to obey and respect the constitution.

3.3 Peace Building Functions: Actors in Somalia

According to Cedric, when considering the range of actors engaged in peace building, a distinction between internal and external actors can be made. Internal refers to those actors those are indigenous to the conflict system. For example, in South Sudan, the

⁶⁸ Menkhous, Ken, (2003), *State collapse in Somalia: second thought*, Tayhars Francis Ltd, Review of Africa political economy, vol 30, No 97, The horn of Africa, pp 405-422, www.org/stabl 84

internal Actors are all of the South Sudanese actors, the political parties and other political Actors, government institutions, civil society, the private sector, traditional leaders, etc. He says, External refers to those actors that are engaged in a given conflict system, but which are outside or international actors, in other words, they are neighboring states, they are international organizations like the UN, or regional organizations like the AU, international NGOs, donor countries or countries that have commercial interests, the international private sector, etc.⁶⁹. These Actors they normally go where they interest will be met. Some even do withdrawal if they find out that there are no benefits. Cedric continues to give the different between internal actors and external actors. He states that, the first or macro-level distinction is thus between actors that are local and those that are international. International actors come and go, and many are professional peace builders, in other words, they do peace building for a living wherever it is needed. Internal actors, on the other hand, have lived through the conflict and their future will be shaped by its legacy and the transformative power of the peace process.

They have become peace builders by necessity. The internal actors own the space and should own the process, because they will suffer, or benefit from, its consequences. Local actors also have the greatest cultural, regional and national understanding, placing them in the best strategic position to develop a relevant and appropriate peace building process. Only they can make peace, and only they can take responsibility for its

⁶⁹ Cedric de Coning and Gustavo de Carvalho: *The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)*, Private Bag X012, Umhlanga Rocks, 4320, South Africa.
<<http://www.accord.org.za/our-work/peacebuilding/peacebuilding-handbook>.

outcome⁷⁰. That Scholar has said it very well; the internal actors should be given the first priority when I come to peace building because they understand the conflicts very well. Most of operations which have ever be done they were done in the opposite and that why they do not succeeded. However, in addition He also notes that, External actors have an important role to play in supporting facilitation. They are interested parties because they stand to gain or lose from a lapse into violent conflict, sustained instability and fragility, or a successful and sustainable peace. They have the agency to influence the process, but they cannot make peace on behalf of the internal actors. Their role is thus influential but limited. An important principle that is emphasized throughout this Handbook is that external actors need to be self-aware of their limited agency External actors thus have to limit their role to providing a broad secure space within which local actors can find a safe grip to regain their footing. Their role should be limited to capacity and to providing support, with the aim of assisting the internal actors to manage themselves. Unfortunately, many external actors have failed to uphold these principles.

Many external actors try to direct and control the conflict systems in which they are engaged. Some do so by intent, others through ignorance. Some believe that it is only by adopting certain characteristics, such as Western-style democracy and rule of law, that a society will avoid lapsing into conflict. This is the so-called neo-liberal state model and it has been the prevailing approach to peace building since the end of the cold war. Others are simply eager to provide assistance, and their own lack of self-discipline ends-up substituting, or eroding local capacity for example, by hiring local expertise to serve

⁷⁰Cedric de Coning and Gustavo de Carvalho: *The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes(ACCORD)*, Private Bag X012, Umhlanga Rocks, 4320, South Africa.
<<http://www.accord.org.za/our-work/peacebuilding/peacebuilding-handbook>

external actors, rather than internal actors' needs. This undermines the very local institutions and capacities they intended to support, and perversely contributes to the very fragility they intended to counter. A major theme in the second generation approach to peace building is thus to find the optimal balance between the role of the external and internal actors⁷¹. The external actors need to be taught or agree with the internal actors about their roles. By doing so, the work of peace building will be easier. The big problem with this is that most of these functions are funded by external actors and that's why they want to control everything. The next focus is internal and external actors in the case of Somalia, what are their roles in peace building in Somalia.

3.3.1 The Role of External Actors in Peace Building in Somalia

Coning describe various number of external actors that need to be considered in the peace building context typically, a core group that is dedicated to the peace building effort. These usually include international or regional peacekeeping operations, a number of UN agencies, organized as the UN Country Team, a large range of international NGOs organized around a number of clusters such as food security, health, etc. and a number of interested governments, including neighbors, countries with commercial interests and donor agencies.

In many post-conflict situations the UN, the AU or sub-regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern

⁷¹ De Coning, C. 2010b. '*Mediation and peace building*: the role of SRSGs in UN integrated missions. De Carvalho, G and Ettang, D. 2011. 'Contextualizing the Peacekeeping and Peace building Nexus', in Conflict Trends, 3. Available from :< http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2011_3.pdf>.

African Development Community (SADC), or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa deploy a peace operation to stabilize the situation and to monitor and support the peace process. The bulk of a peace operations effort and resources are focused on ensuring a safe and secure environment so that the rest of the peace building can be carried out without fear of disruption⁷². These external actors are very worthy in the matter of peace building. The functions they play can't go unnoticed. The study will now focus some of those external actors and the roles they are playing in the ongoing peace building in Somalia. Dokken start by saying. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was originally a forum for dealing with issues related to drought and development, established by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda in 1986.

Today the organization can also be considered a security-political actor⁷³. On the same note, Sabala also notes that, IGAD played an important role in the Eldoret Mbagathi Peace Process which started in October 2002. The most important outcome of this process was the development and adoption of the Federal Charter which led to the formation of the TFG. Since 2002 IGAD has maintained a strong focus on Somalia, especially through the IGAD Office of the Facilitator for Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation. The main task of this political office has been to follow up the implementation of the Eldoret-Mbagathi Process.

The office has dedicated itself to mobilize resources for the TFG and has sought to play a coordinating role (Informant O01.02.2013). The African Union Mission in

⁷² Ibid

⁷³ Dokken, Karin (2008), *African Security Politics Redefined*. London: Palgrave Macmillan

Somalia (AMISOM) has had UN approval under Resolution 1744. The mission was deployed in February 2007, first for a period of six months up until 2011⁷⁴. This external actor it had played a good role but the problem in most of these functions is implementations, if some of these issues can be implemented to the last letter then improvement can be noted in Somalia. Sabala continues to say, AMISOM deployed troops only from Uganda and Burundi and until 2010 the combined force in Mogadishu consisted of 5250 soldiers, which was 3000 fewer than the minimum number required. Several countries have trained AMISOM soldiers, including Kenya, Djibouti, Turkey and Sudan⁷⁵. This is also part of facilitating peace building. The trained soldiers will also train the Somalia Soldiers who will be of much aid to Somalia citizens. In late November 2011 Kenyan and Ethiopian forces were sent into Somalia, as these neighboring countries felt the unease of the situation. AMISOM assumed official command over the Kenyan troops on 6 July 2012⁷⁶. The other actor to focus on is the European Union.

The European Union's engagement in Somalia has political, diplomatic, civilian, military, humanitarian and developmental dimensions. Together these constitute the EU Comprehensive Approach. The EU is one of the largest financial donors to AMISOM

⁷⁴ Sabala, Kizito (2011), 'Regional and extra-regional inputs in promoting (in)security in Somalia', in Roba Sharamo and Berouk Mesfin (Eds) *Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.⁷⁴ De Coning, C. 2010b. 'Mediation and peace building: the role of De Carvalho, G and Ettang, D. 2011. 'Contextualizing the Peacekeeping and Peace building Nexus', in *Conflict Trends*, 3. Available from : <http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2011_3.pdf>.

⁷⁴ Dokken, Karin (2008), *African Security Politics Redefined*. London: Palgrave Macmillan

⁷⁴ Sabala, Kizito (2011), 'Regional and extra-regional inputs in promoting (in)security in Somalia', in Roba Sharamo and Berouk Mesfin (eds)

⁷⁵ Sabala, Kizito (2011), 'Regional and extra-regional inputs in promoting (in)security in Somalia', in Roba Sharamo and Berouk Mesfin (Eds) *Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

⁷⁶ AMISOM (2012b), Press Release: 'AMISOM Assumes Formal Command of Kenyan Forces in Somalia', <<http://amisom.au.org/2012/07/amisom-assumes-formal-command-of-kenyan-forces-in-somalia/>> [Downloaded 04.03.2013]

through the African Peace Facility. In March 2012 the EU allocated €67 million to support AMISOM (European Commission 2012a), bringing the total contribution to AMISOM through the peace Facility up to €25 million. This funding issued to cover allowances for soldiers, operational running costs, transportation, medical expenses, housing, and fuel and communication equipment⁷⁷. The EU Training Mission also trains Somali Security Forces. In early 2013 the training mission's mandate was extended until March 2015 (East African2013).

The EU is present in Somali waters through the European Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atlanta (EU NAVFOR Atlanta) The operation, launched in December 2008, is provided with a UN mandate to protect vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP), and shipping related to AMISOM's activities (EU NAVFOR) The United States suffered the loss of 18 of its soldiers in the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993 in the incident which has become known as 'Black Hawk Down' This has influenced the US approach towards Somalia ever since, and has resulted in statements like that made by the Obama administration's top State Department official for Africa, Johnnie Carson, who said: "We do not want an American footprint or boot on the ground",⁷⁸.

Specifically the United State has also played a big role in peace building in Somalia. Though it can't be counted as direct but its role is admirable. However, the United States is active in the region through the military programme Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa, which was established in 2002 and is based in Djibouti. In

⁷⁷ European Commission (2012a), 'AMISOM', published 12.06.2012
<[http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/peace support operations/amisom_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/peace%20support%20operations/amisom_en.htm)> [Downloaded 19.03.2013]

⁷⁸ New York Times (2011a), 'U.S. Relies on Contractors in Somalia Conflict', published 10.08.2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/11/world/africa/11somalia.html?_r=1&hpw> [Downloaded 19.03.2013]

June 2012 the Obama administration acknowledged for the first time that the US military have conducted drone strikes in Somalia.⁷⁹ Not much is known about the extents and depth of the US counterterror involvement in Somalia. However, the United States is a large player in Somalia in other areas as well USAID Conducts projects in the spheres of governance, food security, education and economic growth (USAID 2013), and the United States also supports AMISOM and UNSOA. Since 2007, the United States has provided \$340 million in assistance to AMISOM Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), and provided approximately \$150 million for its share of assessed costs for UNSOA⁸⁰. That contribution by United State is a tremendous to Somalia peace building. If those funds can be used usefully then is a big boast to Somalia peace building.

3.3.2 The Role of Internal Actors

Coning notes that, internal actors are the ones who have the most to benefit or lose from peace building processes. They are the ones that benefit directly from it and should thus have the highest degree of ownership within the process. The internal actors are comprised of a wide variety of stakeholders, as every element of society is affected by the conflict and has a stake in the peace process. Examples of these internal stakeholders include; the government of the day, the parties to the conflict, the private sector and civil society in all of its different varieties.

⁷⁹ Wall Street Journal(2012), 'U.S. Acknowledges Its Drone Strikes,' published 15.06.2012 <<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303410404577468981916011456.html>> [Downloaded 19.03.2013] USAID (2013), 'Somalia. About,' published 27.02.2013, USAID <[http://www.usaid.gov/where we work/Africa/Somalia](http://www.usaid.gov/where%20we%20work/Africa/Somalia)> [Downloaded 19.03.2013]

⁸⁰ Swan, James (2012), Press release: 'Statement by the United States Special Representative for Somalia', 21.02.2012, Nairobi: Embassy of the United States of America <http://nairobi.usembassy.gov/pr_20120221.html> [Downloaded 19.03.2013]

The internal actors represent all elements of society: political parties, social movements, traditional leaders, religious organizations, the private sector, professional associations, youth and women's movements, trade unions, NGOs, universities and research institutes, families, farmers, schools, the judiciary, and the media. Most external peace building actors specialize in one or a few of these dimensions, and their engagement with the peace building process thus primarily takes place through the lens of the specific area they are engaged in, for instance SSR and RoL. Internal actors on the other hand, in their individual and family contexts, experience peace building as a whole-of-system effect. They feel safe enough to send their children to school, or to return to their places of origin, and they have confidence enough to invest in building a home or investing in the economy, or not, based on their overall sense of the peace process, and their assessment of the likelihood of a lapse or re-lapse into violent conflict. In their professional capacities some may work in a specific sector, such as SSR and RoL, but they also have a deep-rooted stake in the overall outcome of the process⁸¹. Disarmament of groups that control the weapons is also important if security is to be established. But one must be clear about the types of weapons that have to be collected. There are heavy and light guns. We believe that it is not practical to collect all the light weapons from the Somali people.

However, the heavy weapons have to be collected and placed under the control of the transitional government. As far as we know, there are three groups that are armed

⁸¹De Coning, C. 2010b. *Mediation and peace building: the role of SRSGs in UN integrated missions*. De Carvalho, G and Ettang, D. 2011. 'Contextualizing the Peacekeeping and Peace building Nexus', in Conflict Trends, 3. Available from :< http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2011_3.pdf>.

with heavy weapons. The warlords constitute the first group. This group's motive in stockpiling and using these weapons is to achieve political power. Most, if not all, of the warlords are members of the current transitional government that was established in Nairobi. In fact, most of them are in the cabinet. Therefore, warlords are expected to voluntarily give up their weapons since they have achieved their goal. Unfortunately, this is not happening at all; Somalia's warlords are rearming themselves even after they became cabinet ministers.

The second group that has amassed a significant amount of heavy weapons is the Somali merchants, who have heavy weapons in order to protect their properties and businesses. Although they are one of the groups that have been marginalized from playing a role in the Kenyan-hosted peace process, they are expected to cooperate if their businesses and properties are protected. Finally, the local security groups and sharia's courts control a significant number of the heavy weapons in the country. They have collected these weapons in order to provide the security services that no one else supplies. These local security forces and sharia's courts were not invited to the peace Conference in Kenya.

Therefore, the transitional government must negotiate with these groups like other stakeholders, such as the business community and the warlords, and address their political and security concerns. With respect to international forces, we believe that using international peacekeeping forces to monitor and train the Somalis during the implementation period would be necessary to build the confidence of the various groups. These forces must not include Somalia's neighbors, however, as these countries have vested interests in the conflict. President Abdullahi Yusuf has asked for a 20,000-strong

African peace enforcement force (including units from Somalia's neighbors)⁸². These are some of the issues which are challenging the peace building in Somalia.

There is now way the functions of peace building can be successive without involvement of all actors in that process. Riechmann also notes that, we have reservations about the utility of bringing in African forces, including Ethiopian and Kenyan troops.

First, all of the warlords are officially in the government and parliament, and they control most of the weapons. If the warlords cooperate, a peaceful environment can be created with little outside support. Moreover, the AU has limited capacity; right now the UN Secretary-General is actively lobbying to replace the African forces in Darfur with international peacekeeping forces because of capacity-related problems. Besides, there are questions of neutrality, particularly with Ethiopia and Kenya. Many Somalis believe that allowing Ethiopian and Kenyan armies into Somalia would exacerbate the whole problem⁸³. The issue of involvement arises again. These warlords need to be consulted through negotiation, and these can make the functions of peace building in Somalia easier.

3.4 Conclusion

Anything which is done by more than one person and it needs decision it always possess challenges. This term peace whenever it's mentioned the issue of conflict has to arise. The functions to do with peace are very complicated because of Actors involved. The big challenge is the personal interest with these Actors. For example in case of Somalia there

⁸² New Somali leader calls on UN to back peace force, 19 November 2004, Reuters, Nairobi

⁸³ See an article written by Deb Riechmann of Associated Press, Bush, Annan discuss Darfur peacekeeping, <<http://www.forbes.com/entrepreneurs/feeds/>

are those who benefit out of conflict in that Nation. So if these Actors are involved in building peace then they will bring all sought of complications to make sure that peace is not found so as not to lose their interest. The other challenge observed in peace building in Somalia is lack of involvement of some of Actors in the functions. The left out will fight for the down fall of the functions..

CHAPTER FOUR

**PEACE BUILDING FUNCTIONS IN PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS IN
SOMALIA:A CRITICAL ANALYSIS**

4.1.Introduction

Chapter Three deals with the case study. In this case study, secondary data are used, that is internet, newspapers, journals various Somalia publications and other available relevant material to gather information. To add on that the study did examine the challenges faced by AMISOM in their process of building peace and also role of external actors and internal actors in peace building. This chapter will critically look at analyses of key emerging issues.

This chapter presents a critical analysis of key emerging issues. These key emerging issues includes, the role of Islam peace education in peace building functions in Somalia, analyzing Diasporas engagement in peace building in Somalia, lack of resources as a factor in peace building functions in Somalia, warlords and warmongers as a factor in peace building functions in Somalia and finally the study we examine how the Governance is a factor in peace building in Somalia.

4.2. Emerging Issues

4.4.1The Work of AMISOM

For the most of its existence, AMISOM has operated with just two troop contributing countries, and under the strong leadership of Uganda. The role Uganda played, initially as lead nation, and throughout as the bedrock of the mission, and the backing President

Museveni of Uganda was able to mobilize for the mission from the AU & UN, the USA and the EU, resulted in the AMISOM having a very solid political and military anchor. In contrast, there is no one country in West Africa that has stepped up to play such a strong leadership role. Historically Nigeria played this role, but it is currently consumed by its own internal Boko Haram insurrection, and it is thus not able to play a similar leading role in AFISMA. After Kenya crossed the Somali border on 16 October 2011 and mustered diplomatic support to join AMISOMorganisations involve their Troop and Police contributing countries in a similar manner, but the degree to which this resulted in political commitment and the provision of technical support for the mission shows that it has been very effective in the case of AMISOM.

The AU and ECOWAS should consider how to similarly engage the Troop and Police contributing countries in the strategic direction and support of AFISMA. On the battlefield, interoperability of equipment and doctrine, and communication between the two longest-serving AMISOM contingents, English-speaking Ugandans and French-speaking Burundi's, took time to work efficiently. AFISMA will face similar language, and other interoperability challenges, and it will do well to dedicate some of its mission and sector HQ assets to regularly review and adjust its operating procedures to create mission and context specific solutions as the force composition develops⁸⁴. The strategies used by Amisom is excellence. That issue of working together can bring very successive results in Somalia. The next focus is peace education in peace building functions in Somalia.

⁸⁴Freear, M and de Coning, C 2013 *Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for Peace Operations in Mali*. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 23, pp. 1-11, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.bj>

The peace study can't be ignored because it has played a vital role. The international conference of Islam notes the followings, as a result of the civil war, de facto clan borders exist all over Somalia. After safety became dependent on clan membership, people moved to areas where they thought they would be safest. Creating a secure environment, establishing the appropriate political institutions, addressing justice-related issues and revitalizing economic development are necessary but not sufficient to rebuild trust and confidence among Somali groups and individuals. The current de facto clan borders will help create and maintain stereotypes and prejudices between clans. In this context, Islam-informed peace education programmes become necessary. Since the overwhelming majority of Somalis are Muslims, any peace education efforts should draw upon Islam, which revolves around peace.

According to the teachings of Islam, a Muslim consciously submits to the will of God and subsequently gains internal and external harmony, synchronicity and peace. 'Internal peace' refers to one's psychological wellbeing as a result of lack of conflict within the self, while 'external peace' stems from a harmonious and loving relationship with God as well as the social, physical and spiritual environment. Continues to says, Islam-informed peace education would stress the kinds of values and behaviors that would unite the Somalis as Muslims in a bond of brotherhood, mutual love, sympathy, help, care and fellow feeling. These are some of the important social rights among Muslims. Being a Muslim thus obliges one to avoid transgressing boundaries and infringing on the rights of the self and others⁸⁵. These kinds of teaching are of much help

⁸⁵ A Barise, The effect of cultural globalization on Muslim families and socio-cultural unity, Proceedings of the International Conference on Muslim Unity in the 21st Century: Opportunities and Challenges, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1–2 October 2003, V 1, pp 241–258.

to building peace it is only that majority do not put them into perspective. Islam-informed peace education would also aim at eradicating Thulm (oppression or aggression). As the above analyses indicate, Somalis have failed to respect the above unifying Islamic values, and the rights of fellow Somalis have been violated. Social values and behaviors that damage Muslim social unity include fighting, unlawful competition for resources and power, mutual envy, jealousy, suspicion, stereotyping, spying, hostility, oppression, hatred, humiliation, despising, prejudice, discrimination, exploitation and abuse⁸⁶.

This is very true the Muslims as the study had said above have ignored this unifying teachings, If every Muslim can agree to this teaching then the issues of conflicts in Somalia would stop at once. Mohhamed Abu also notes that, any peace-building efforts that attempt to address the Somali conflict should draw upon Islamic teachings. Islam provides one of the identities that unify Somali clans. It also has conflict-resolution mechanisms that resonate with the conflicting parties. Abu-Nimer identified 17 Islamic values that can be used for peace education programmes, including the pursuit of justice, social empowerment by doing good (Ihsan), the universality of dignity and humanity, equality, sacredness of human life, a quest for peace (peacemaking), knowledge and reason, creativity and innovation, forgiveness, importance of deeds and actions, involvement through individual responsibility, patience (Sabar), collaborative actions and solidarity, the concept of Ummah, inclusivity and participatory processes, as well as pluralism and diversity⁸⁷. If people of Somalia can pour down their differences, that is to say the hatred brought by the wish to acquire resources and power then the peace

⁸⁶ Ibid pp 242

⁸⁷ Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Non-violence and peace building

building functions will be easy. The values if followed to the letter then peace will endure.

The concept of Ummah refers to the world-wide community of Muslims; it transcends tribe, race, ethnicity, nationality, and class. Somali culture and literature can offer useful tools and techniques for attaining and sustaining peace. For instance, Somalia's poet and composer Mohamed I War same 'Hadrawi' launched his peace caravan on 1 July 2003. Hadrawi told the Somali media that he wanted to travel to as many cities and towns as he could. He stressed that he would like to share a message of peace with his people, regardless of the part of the country in which they are living. The Somalia media covered the Hadrawi caravan and it states the following. Start by saying, Hadrawi is known for his bravery and principled position against the former military regime. He was imprisoned for composing poems and plays that criticized former military leaders. Hadrawi's peace caravan came at a time that the Somali conflict was 'ripe for resolution'⁸⁸. This kind of personality needs to be eliminated if not to be secluded from other citizens. Why should He incite other citizen to hate the former regime and yet He is not producing any solutions.

Zartman notes that on same, He employed relevant and homegrown values and delivered his message through poems and speech⁸⁹. The peace caravan had all the necessary features because it addressed the important issues that Somalis face in a way

⁸⁸ Somali media covered Hadrawi's peace caravan. Hiiraan Online, Himilo Online and Horn Africa radio extensively covered the programme.

⁸⁹ Zartman defines 'ripe for resolution' as the stage when the conflict reaches a mutually hurting stalemate. See William I Zartman, *Elusive peace: Negotiating an end to civil wars*, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1995, Introduction.

that did not provoke or invite violence. Building on the strengths of the peace caravan is important.

Hadrawi has shown that if the content and the pedagogy of peace education programmes are consistent with Islamic values and Somali culture, these programmes will succeed. This lesson is very important, because the perceptions of local groups are crucial. In addition, as anthropologists and historians have documented, Somalis put a high value on literature, particularly poems. The Somali people have been called “the nation of poets”. Literature has been an important tool in Somalia for wars of liberation and for peace activists. Using literature as the pedagogy of peace is helpful in changing the Somali people’s attitudes and behaviors. Finally, we believe that peace education programmes promoting Islamic values such as tolerance, respect, care and empathy that employ an appropriate pedagogy might produce positive results⁹⁰. So in conclusion; the tool of education is very useful to peace building in Somalia. The only challenge is that citizens have not embraced it as tool to aid the peace building in Somalia.

4.4.2 Analyzing Diaspora Engagement in Peace Building in Somalia

The Diaspora groups, these are people who live outside their countries. For example the Somalia citizens who live in the Kenya. They may be out of their country out their own wish or circumstances like conflicts may have forced them to run away. Some of these people have bigger influences in the event happening in their countries. There are those who make sure the conflict escalating due to benefits they have in the country. Pirkkalainen notes that, Diaspora groups around the world play an important,

⁹⁰B W Andrzejewski and I M Lewis, Somali poetry: An introduction, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964, p 3.

albeit sometimes controversial role in conflict in their home countries. The view in the literature on the role of diaspora in conflicting their home countries is divided. One dominant viewpoint holds that diaspora prolong conflicts through economic and political support without the same risks run by locals on the ground. Other literature highlights how diaspora groups play a role in conflict resolution⁹¹. So that to say there is those good and bad Diaspora groups. For the negative groups the government in those countries needs to deal with them and makes sure they curb their activities which makes conflicts to escalate. The aim of study is to analyze the Somalia Diaspora group. ICD says the following about them, Somaliland's diaspora, as described in the previous sections, contributes in multiple ways to reconstruction and development in Somaliland.

However, what is less clear is how these engagements sending remittances, constructing schools, social assistance are contributing to peace. An analysis about the contributions and how they relate to peace first requires a general conceptualization of the term 'peace building'. Here the definition of peace building is nonviolent efforts to bring about positive conflict transformation, which can change or transform the violent relationship between conflicting parties into something constructive rather than destructive⁹². This would demand a range of nonviolent initiatives during the different phases of a violent conflict.

With the growing interest on how diaspora groups can contribute to peace, the following case studies analyze in which ways the Somali diaspora's economic and social engagement have contributed to nonviolent, positive conflict transformation that is

⁹¹Pirkkalainen, Päivi and Abdile, Mahdi (2009) 'The Diaspora–Conflict Peace Nexus: A Literature Review'. DIASPEACE Working Paper no. 1. <http://www.diaspeace.org>.

⁹²International Cooperation for Development (ICD) (1996) Building Partnership for Peace and Development report of a workshop held in Boroma, Somaliland

changing or influencing people's positions, perceptions, attitudes and behavior about the conflict. The study examines some of the diaspora's economic engagements in Somaliland, particularly focusing on two huge hotel complexes built in Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, during the past 15 years.

The study looks first at the diaspora's perspective on these investments: how they were conceived, their motivations to invest such huge sums of money, their major concerns, and the kind of obstacles they have overcome. Then the study looks at the local perspective on these investments at the outset and after completion. The second part of the study discusses the impact of these hotel investments and other diaspora investments on Somaliland's post conflict peace building process from both the local and diaspora perspectives, and highlights the possibilities and restrictions of diaspora investment in Somaliland. Finally, it examines the local perception about diaspora engagement in Somaliland and its influence within the society. Hargeisa is the capital city of Somaliland. The city and its surrounding are dominated by particular Isaaq clans mainly the CiSacad Muuse of HabarAwal and Cidagale of Garhajis and Arap, though various clans live in the city. It is divided by a dry riverbed which generally serves as a line of demarcation for clan settlements.

The HabarAwal of SacadMuuse is predominant in the north and North West (daan) banks of the river bed, Garhajis of Cidagale reside in the south and south east sides, and Arap are mainly in the south side of the river. An enduring rivalry between the (daanaha) banks, which has led each side to develop its own stereotypes of the other,

greatly influences the city's politics, economics and stability⁹³. What these Diaspora need was something constructive to boost the Somalia economy. The only problem is the local who diverted the good initiative to bad one. So it may be said the Diaspora are positive following the above case. The next focus is to link the Diaspora investment and peace building in Somalia.

Amin Farah who conducted an interview on March 2009, observed the followings. She starts by saying, besides these two major investments, members of the diaspora were responsible for a host of other economic engagements in the country. In general these economic activities have helped to underpin the peace and stability that has largely prevailed in the territory since 1998. Economic investments have influenced the attitudes and behaviors of both the diaspora and locals, by redistributing resources, especially in urban centers, and by creating peace constituents willing to speak for the peace. While members of the diaspora living abroad tend to take radical and extreme positions in decision making and in times of conflict, those who have returned from abroad and invested in Somaliland are generally more moderate as their investments link them to the country and its people.

Peace protects their properties; conflict endangers them. One female diaspora investor said “When one makes an investment naturally this person will protect it. They will work hard to sustain peace. Those who own properties would be very cautious about taking arms⁹⁴. On the same Khade Ali also conducted interview on April 2009 and notes that. Such members of the diaspora are more likely to promote actions that lead to peace

⁹³ International Cooperation for Development (ICD) (1996) Building Partnership for Peace and Development. A report of a workshop held in Boroma, Somaliland

⁹⁴ Amina Farah Arhse Interview, March 2009

and resolution than others. One high profile conflict in 2007 around the Ethiopian town of Daror near the Somaliland border, had repercussions in Hargeisa. The conflict was between rival sub clans within the Garxajis, who dominated the south side of Hargeisa, and thus the conflict also threatened the city's security. The owner of the Ambassador Hotel played a critical role in the efforts to contain and end the conflict, because peaceful resolution of the conflict had a direct bearing on his interests and his people. In his own words: "This conflict concerned me personally. It was like my own cloth burning me. It was an internal conflict between my people so I had to act. I was able to contribute and we succeeded with the help of Allah. I was not the only one involved; there were many others who contributed⁹⁵. So far from these two interviews the issue of self-interest arises again.

The Diasporas are training their level best to prevent conflicts not because of the citizens but to protect their interest. An elder from the south side who closely followed the efforts to address the conflict described the role played by the owner of the Ambassador Hotel: "I believe that he spent more than a hundred thousand dollars in these efforts. He held several meetings with both sides of the conflict, bringing their respective elders to Hargeisa. Though he did contribute to the resolution of the conflict, the amount of money he spent was much more than what the government spent. He did that because it was an internal conflict and he saw it as his duty to extinguish it. Moreover, if the conflict had continued it would have engulfed Hargeisa [where he has huge investments]. Those who live in houses made of glass would advise people not to throw stones and they, too, would not throw stones. Therefore, he values peace more. In another incident,

⁹⁵ Khader Ali Hussein. Interview, April 2009

an official from the Hargeisa water agency cut off the water supply to the Maansoor Hotel in 1998⁹⁶.

According to the owner of Maansoor Hotel, the man cut off the pipes because he had differences with his brother who was once the mayor of Hargeisa. The hotel owner's response was quite unusual. Rather than taking action himself to restore the water or mobilizing his clansmen to retaliate, he chose to resolve the issue peacefully. The owner explained how he was able to resolve the issue: "During the incident there were a large number of journalists residing in the hotel. We went to the house of the man who cut off the water, and told him that these journalists would write about these awful incidents which damage the credibility of the country if he doesn't supply water and that I would take the journalists to the Presidential Palace. The man was swayed, he provided the water through water tank trucks, and then in the next morning he welded the pipes which he had cut off⁹⁷. Despite some Diasporas been bad there are still those with sense of peace in the .As the above case if all people can be solving their issue as it was done then then the issue of conflict in Somalia would end at once.

The diaspora's economic engagement in post-conflict society encourages further engagement and investment, which contribute to the peace-building process. Firstly, their activities and presence help to promote a perception of peace and normality for other diaspora Members who might have security concerns, encouraging them to join the rebuilding process. In Somaliland, the level of their engagements in the economic sector is expanding. Numerous multi-million dollar facilities are being built, including one very

⁹⁶ Muse Ali Farur. Interview, December 2008

⁹⁷ Khader Ali Hussein. Interview, March 2009

modern detergent factory a leather tannery planting Burco, a fishing factory in Lasqoray, and a gas plant in Hargeisa. The last mentioned would reduce charcoal production that claims millions of trees each year by Secondly, some diaspora members actively encourage others to invest back in the home country. They usually start with their relatives and friends before they move to the broader community. Their campaign is to encourage those abroad and to remove any lingering doubts about the security of their home country. That is exactly what the owner of the Ambassador did. In the words of the president of a research institution:”

He [the owner of Ambassador Hotel] is a dynamic person. He would go around and collect money from relatives and friends. Then he would tell them ‘just give me some money and I will build whatever you want for you. In that way the surrounding of the hotel was constructed⁹⁸.The hotel owner explained how he encouraged others to do the same: “It is true that I asked others to invest, because it is obligatory to share my experience with others. When I go back and meet the diaspora members I encourage them, telling them to imitate me and invest in our home country. I try to remove the deep concerns that usually occupy their minds, by telling them that nothing happened to my huge investment and that I’m making money. We gain social status and other benefits since we are contributing to our society. I make concerted efforts to encourage them and have had some success as 40 percent or more of those I speak to accept my encouragement. Members of the diaspora also sponsor other community activities that promote development, providing additional resources to community reconstruction and development projects.

⁹⁸ Mohamed Osman Fadal. *Interview*, April 2009

Most of them maintain that they are regular contributors to community development projects. Some of their contributions, which are also done for publicity, are covered in the local news media. But the extent of their involvement in these development projects is not known. Other members of the diaspora were instrumental in mobilizing the local community to establish basic infrastructure in their respective neighborhoods. For example, in one neighborhood in one of the least developed districts in Hargeisa, a diaspora member from Canada created a development committee that forged a partnership between the community and the municipality to build a five kilometer long asphalt road.

The committee is now working on other community projects in partnership with the local officials. His work sparked similar partnership projects between the community and city of Hargeisa to build roads in different neighborhoods. The presence of diaspora members in the home country helps to encourage those remaining abroad to get involved in community development activities. Successful diaspora investors are able to promote the diaspora's contribution to local community development because they are viewed as both trustworthy and successful. For example, the owner of Hadhwanaag restaurant in Hargeisa has persuaded many of his colleagues living abroad to channel funds and other contributions through him to improve the community's access to education by building schools and providing financial assistance to students from low income households to attend local universities. On certain occasions, these facilities help to strengthen relations within the community and sub-clans. This happens when a place serves as a focal point for the community to meet. Such development is seen as community empowerment. One place that provides this sense of empowerment is the Hadhwanaag restaurant.

The restaurant owner articulated an observation shared by many analysts: “It is a place where they [his community] meet, exchange news, and come together”⁹⁹. In the process they are able to deal with some community development issues in a collective manner. The country’s return to normalcy has generated some level of competition among the Somalia leaders abroad to develop their respective regions or clan areas. Sometimes they also cooperate on a regional scale, as they have established such facilities as higher education institutions and general hospitals.

However, diaspora constructions are mainly geared towards their respective clan areas. Residential buildings, hotels, supermarkets, restaurants, medical facilities, and other small services are usually built in their clan territories. A large segment of the society sees this phenomenon as something that is positive for peace building and the stability of the country, because it entails some balancing and a kind of resource distribution¹⁰⁰. From all the above interviews it is clear that the citizens of Somalia are not that complicated for peace to be built. All what is lacking is someone who understands them and the functions of peace building will be complete. However Hopkins Ali also notes the followings which are good boast to this study. He observes that the,

Fieldwork data also indicates that there are numerous challenges that could potentially limitDiaspora engagement in Somalia. Research shows that diaspora’s ability to interact with their original homeland is subject to limitations. Interviewees reiterated that security was a Major challenge faced by the diaspora. Even in relatively peaceful

⁹⁹ Khader Ali Hussein. Interview, April 2009

¹⁰⁰ Khader Ali Hussein. Interview, April 2009

areas such as Somaliland and Puntland, there are restrictions on expatriates' (such as the PIP team) movements within main Towns such Hargeisa and Bosaso; the restrictions are even tougher when traveling outside main towns where security guards are needed especially those diaspora working for international Organizations (IOs) in Somaliland and Puntland have to follow strict security guidelines.

In Somaliland there is a strict requirement that at least one security car with an armed Special Protection Unit (SPU) car has to accompany diaspora expatriates visiting program areas. In Puntland two SPU cars are required. Since the number plate of IO cars is different (red), there are fears that diaspora members working for IOs can be an easy target. Some INGO's operating in Somaliland and Puntland have also a requirement that the organizations and sometimes as another embedded challenge derives from the fact that the Somali are deeply divided along clan lines. The wounds of Somalia's interclan conflict are still fresh, and the bitter memories is still standing in the way of the Somali diaspora's wished to unite and speak with one voice.

This problem is aggravated by the fact that a sizable number of Somalis in the diaspora have personally experienced the civil war and thus retain memories of clan atrocities making it difficult for them to trust other clans. Suspicion, hatred, and rivalries between clan members in Somalia continue to affect Somalis in the diaspora in a manner making it difficult for them to plant the seeds of any viable diaspora networks or institutions. As a result, there are few lobbies or pressure groups that can effectively organize, address, and work on behalf of peace either in the host or the home country.

The Somali are yet to form effective diaspora pressure groups along the lines of the Irish American, Jewish, Armenian and other diaspora communities' lobbies that

empower activists to mobilize and increase the voice of the respective Diasporas. Therefore, if they are to play a more positive role in the conflict in Somalia, the Somali diaspora needs to find ways and means to overcome their divisions, mobilize their potential, and unite their voices¹⁰¹. The issue of security should not be an issue since the AMISOM is there to provide. The AMISOM needs to have a sitting with the Diaspora and locals in order to facilitate the peace building. The other issue to put into perspective is the issue of Diasporas and locals carrying with them the burden of what the other clan did to them. Everyone was affected and they should forget all that for peace to prevail.

4.4.3 Issues of Resources

One issue to do with resources, besides Ethiopia and the warlords, the most important factor that has prolonged the conflict in Somalia is a lack of resources. Menkhaus (1998) wrote: “It is not simply a lack of goodwill on the part of the factions that prevents implementation—it is a lack of capacity¹⁰². Somalia has never had an effective, self-sufficient government. Most of the state’s resources have come from foreign aid, mainly as bilateral or multilateral assistance. The civil war has not only destroyed the internal domestic sources that generated an already insufficient income, but has made the whole country dependent on foreign aid and remittances.

The Cairo Conference and the Arta peace process in Djibouti both had significant financial problems. To build peace in Somalia state institutions must be created, but doing so requires resources. For the first few decades, generating significant internal

¹⁰¹ Hopkins, Gail (2006). Somali community organizations in London and Toronto: Collaboration and effectiveness, *Journal of Refugee Studies* 19 (3). Available online November 2010

¹⁰² Ken Menkhaus, Stateless Somalia, <<http://meltingpot.fortunecity.com/lebanon/254/marchal.htm>> (1998

revenues such as those from taxes and fees will be out of the question, as most of Somalia's people are Studies refugees (some are in neighboring countries, while most are displaced internally). To implement any peace accord, the international community and the Somalis, particularly those living overseas, must address this problem. The problem of lack of resources comes with control by the states or entities giving the finances. The complicated issue is that they cannot give enough funds if they are not benefitting fully.

The other problem is what William notes , Absence of major-power interest Winston Tubman, the UN Secretary-General's political representative to the Somali peace conference in Kenya, was quoted as saying: "One of the five permanent members of the UN security Council – China, Britain, France, the US and Russia – could make a difference in Somalia... The African Union can be interested, the European Union can help, but what you need is some driving force (by a big power) in my experience¹⁰³. On the same point, Stephen observes that, Many experts on peace-building agree with Tubman's observation that Somalia has no friends internationally¹⁰⁴.

The issue of Somalia lacking friend should not arising because not the burden of Somalia citizens to choose who to be their friend or not. During the Cold War, the US had strategic interests in Somalia. While ignoring its human rights record, the US deliberately supported the former military regime that led the country into this protracted civil war. Lyons and Samatar noted that "[f]rom 1983 to 1990, the US committed almost \$500 million worth of military resources to Somalia¹⁰⁵.

¹⁰³ William Maclean, Somalia needs big power involvement UN official, Reuters, Nairobi, 4 September 2003<www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/a06883c85607167ec1256d97003fa2c9>.

¹⁰⁴ See Stephen John Stedman, Policy implications, in Stedman et al, op cit, p 667.

¹⁰⁵ Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I Samatar, Somalia: State collapse, multilateral intervention, and strategies for political reconciliation, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1994, p 7.

The US also led an international intervention into Somalia in early 1992, when the combination of civil war and drought caused tens of thousands of deaths from starvation. However, after General Aided's faction killed eighteen American troops and wounded another hundred, the US decided to withdraw from Somalia. Afterwards, the US position on Somalia was not clear, for it has adopted a 'wait and see' attitude. Since the attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, the US has again shown an interest in Somalia. It has frozen the assets of the largest money transfer and telecommunication company (Al-Barakaat) in Somalia, even though an investigation by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States did not find evidence that linked this company to terrorist organizations¹⁰⁶. The US has also listed about twenty Somali companies and individuals as 'terrorists' and repeatedly said that it is interested in Somalia because of the war on terrorism.

However, the Bush administration's actions and the statements are obviously contradictory. The US argues that without a functioning state, Somalia could become a breeding ground for terrorism, yet the US supports the forces that created and perpetuated the chaos in the first place. The level of American commitment to helping create a stable regime in Somalia is not sufficient. Somalis widely believe that Ethiopia had a green light from Washington to spoil Somalia's peace efforts. Most Somalis believe that if the US commits itself to Somalia again, it will have an easier time than before for two reasons.

First, most Somalis are tired of the senseless civil war. Warlords and faction leaders have failed to bring peace and development. Second, Ethiopia, which receives

¹⁰⁶ See the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Al-Barakaat case study: The Somali community and al-Barakaat, 2004, <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Ch5.pdf>

American assistance, is the most important factor that undermines peace-building efforts in Somalia. US pressure on Ethiopia to stay out of Somalia's internal affairs would solve much of the problem. Overall, Ethiopia's hostile policies, the warlords' unwillingness to accept the popular will, lack of resources and the absence of major-power interest are major factors that have perpetuated the Somali conflict¹⁰⁷. Unless the citizens of Somalia agrees to do away with conflicts within and without then they may live with their conflicts forever, since the international communities are not interested with them. Furthermore they are the one who started the conflicts and so be it the same people to eliminate it.

The warlords and warmongers have played a major role in peace building in Somalia. Though the roles they played are not positive, but it is wise to put them into perspective and analyze their contributions. The Dalka, the Somalia government newspaper notes that, Somalia has been engulfed by a surfeit of factional and clan conflict. But this is not strictly the result of Barre's fall from power. Conflict in Somalia has been around since its independence. Not everybody agrees with this assessment. Dalka (June, 2006) is of the opinion that the problems in Somalia are caused by the warlords. The argument put forth officially is that warlords in Somalia resemble what happens to a sick person, personified by the Somali society, when his disease is misdiagnosed. More specifically, Dalka believes that initial attempts to diagnose the problems in Somali society wrongly concluded that tribalism, spawned by Siad's dictatorial regime, was the disease. On the contrary, asserts Dalka, the disease is not

¹⁰⁷ Executive Order 13224, 2001, <www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/16181.htm> (January 2002).

tribalism, but rather warlordism and colonization by proxy¹⁰⁸. This is what we call blame game, no one want to carry the responsibility. This game of blame makes the conflict even to stay for long. This can only be solved when the responsible persons agree to carry the blames. Dalkas's assessment points to tribalism and modern forms of international business.

Warlordism became famous after the demise of Barre's regime in 1991. Immediately following his ouster, anarchy spread and fighting intensified. Faction leaders centered their war against opposing clans in a struggle for dominance and survival. Warlords, employing guerrilla tactics, quickly gained control of the cities, harbors, and airports. In turn, warlords expanded their personal fiefdoms, carved out their own sections of the country and completely gutted the infrastructure. Compounding the problem, Somalia was in the midst of three years of drought which had dried up wells and rivers.

When the United Nations peacekeeping force attempted to relieve the suffering, the warlords frustrated their attempts to distribute food and aid. Up until June 2006, the warlords and their private militias continued to undermine efforts to pacify the country through the establishment of an effective national government¹⁰⁹. The reason why they didn't want peace was due to the benefits or interests they were gaining out of anarchy countries. Also the issue of selfish gains surfaced everything at expense of anyone else. This kind of attitude is very bad and it makes the country to lead behind in terms of development. This has caused the functions of peace building very impossible since these

¹⁰⁸ Dalka (2006, June). Warlordism: Colonization by proxy. Retrieved June 24, 2006 from <http://www.dalkaonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=74>

¹⁰⁹ Dalka (2006, June). Warlordism: Colonization by proxy. Retrieved June 24, 2006 from <http://www.dalkaonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=74>

people do not trust each other and now this becomes impossible to build peace in Somalia.

Most warlords had neither an ideology nor a political agenda. Typically, they are motivated by the pursuit of money and war booty. The individual fiefdoms they carved out were used as bases for the exploitation of confiscated properties, as well as arms and drug trafficking. Clearly, warlordism is a successful business in Somalia - a source of income and employment. Warlords' armed militias are responsible for the death of thousands of innocent people, and warlords carry the primary responsibility for the agony of the people.

The first few warlords to rise to power after the fall of Dictator Muhammad SiadBarre made huge fortunes for themselves. Consequently, their numbers increased in the last few years. They led successful "Mafia-style" businesses. Having money allowed them to acquire a large number of followers who viewed them as tribal employers not warlords. With money changing hands, tribal leadership shifted from traditional tribal leaders to warlords who bought tribal loyalty with foreign currency. Treating the disease of warlordism will be difficult. The treatment will be even more complicated if foreign governments interfere, especially those who desire warlords to continue to rule.

Worth remembering is the situation in Somalia in the early 1990s, when Somalis themselves refused assistance from the international community. Little has changed since then; many Somalis remain problems. Clearly, the situation in Somalia is dynamic. Most recently, with the emergence of Islamic fundamentalists, the power of the warlords has been significantly reduced. Before discussing the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism, I

will discuss the warlords' closest friends and partner's¹¹⁰. This issue of Warlords needs a keen attention. There is need to talk to them softly and reconcile them and by doing so the situation can change dramatically. The other group to look at and analyze them is the Warmongers.

The high point to note is that, majority of Somalia's warlords were military officers in the government of SiadBarre. Today, they are simple fighters who have little, if any, connection with the outside world. As a result, they receive no external support. Abdullah Yusuf (2004) writes that during the civil war after the fall of SiadBarre, the warlords had to turn to their closest partners, the warmongers, in order to be connected to the outside world. These were the financiers and business allies of the warlords. The warmongers represent the nexus of power and influence. Arguably, they have become the most powerful entity in Somalia. On behalf of the warlords, they controlled many profit-making activities. They ran the plantations and managed and collected taxes from the seaports and airports. Other additional illicit business endeavors included drug-trafficking and the arms trade¹¹¹.

The warmongers served as the middlemen between the warlords and the outside world by establishing contacts with foreign companies. For almost a decade, the Mogadishu warmongers dealt with the lack of government and security by paying taxes to the warlords in return for protection. Beginning in about 1999, however, they decided to forego their security arrangement with the warlords. In place of warlord protection, the warmongers turned to the militant arm of the sharia court system, which is run by the

¹¹⁰ Dalka (2006, June). Warlordism: Colonization by proxy. Retrieved June 24, 2006 from <http://www.dalkaonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=74>

¹¹¹ Emathe Francis December 2006 Somalia. I gad's attempt to restore Somalia's transitional Federal Government Thesis

ICC. This shift in support might have been a precipitant to the recent clashes between the warlords and the Islamic clerics.

The warlords, unable to pay their militias, became weaker and weaker as more members of their militias defected to the ICC, which could afford to pay their salaries. For the warlords, losing their primary source of funding drastically shifted the power calculus within Somalia. Meanwhile, from outside of Somalia, external support to the ICC further weakened the position of the warlord's¹¹². These sources of funds for these criminals need to be destroyed completely without mercy. Though they can be eliminated but those who will remain maybe their relatives will revenge which will make the war in Somalia to ever be there. So this study suggests dialogue as former Kenyan Prime minister suggested to Government of Kenya. This dialogue should involve all parties either small or big and then reconciliation.

4.4.4 Government plans

This study analyzes how poor governance in Somalia has facilitated the peace building in Somalia. Menkaus says that, Struggle for control of the state, which brings political and economic power, has been a continuing source of conflict. Absences of good governance, and experience with a repressive state, have made Somalis suspicious of government. Many Somalis see the state as “an instrument of accumulation and domination, enriching and empowering those who control it and exploiting and harassing the rest of the population . This view grows from their experience with Barre’s government, which made

¹¹² Emathe Francis December 2006 Somalia. Igad’s attempt to restore Somalia’s transitional Federal Government Thesis

them inherently distrustful of a strong central state. The military regime of Siyad Barre was primarily dominated by small elite of the Marehaan sub clan of the Darood, who used their sub clan identity to control the state and exploit valuable resources¹¹³.

That is a misleading idea. The very and main role of Government is to put protect its Citizen. That idea which was planted in people of Somalia of selfish gains is making the agenda of peace building very difficulties. The actors who are supposed to build peace they do not want because they know when there is peace their benefits would no longer be there. Barre's authoritarian government also systematically manipulated clan identities and politicized clan cleavages by favoring clans that would enable it to maintain authority. These policies have had far-reaching effects and have produced sharp fissures and deep suspicion among the clans and sub clans that define Somalia today. Barre's government also followed a meticulous policy of oppression of the Issaq in the northwest section of the country, which sowed the seeds of Issaq secessionism and led to the unilateral declaration of independence by Somaliland after the state collapsed¹¹⁴.

The regime collapsed in 1991, yet the legacy of deep clan divisions, poor governance, and myopic political leadership continues to haunt the country and prevent the formation of a government of national unity¹¹⁵. Instead, subaltern entities have gained prominence, with some faring better than others. The three regions of the former Republic of Somalia have followed different trajectories since 1991. Somaliland has made impressive efforts in consolidating peace and creating a stable regional administration.

¹¹³ Menkhaus, Ken.2003. "Protracted State Collapse: A Rediagnosis." Review of African Political Economy

¹¹⁴ Gassim Mariam Asif. 2003. Somalia: Clan versus Nation. United Arab Emirates

¹¹⁵ Center for Creative Solutions (CCS). 2004. Conflict Analysis Regional Report – Somaliland.

This feat is all the more creditable because Hargeysa, the capital city, was totally destroyed in the early stages of the civil war. Puntland also has been able to establish a stable regional administration that has maintained peace in the region. Unfortunately, the south-central region has met with a much worse fate. The TNG established at the 2000 Arta Peace Conference, proved impotent and had limited authority beyond some parts of Mogadishu¹¹⁶.

These clans also need to reconcile among themselves and this will ease the functions of peace building. In the absence of an accountable central state, the region has witnessed periods of anarchy and ferocious armed conflict. It appears that, in recent years, faction leaders' attempts to claim control of the region and forge alliances were made mainly to increase their bargaining power in the reconciliation process rather than to advance common interests. This political vacuum has forced residents to depend on the Sharia courts, local authorities, and CSOs to provide some degree of governance¹¹⁷. Though these alliances, the mediator should have power to realize this a control that, which should be done in good manner.

4.3 Conclusion

It's good to note that there are so many emerging issues from the study, but study only established the key one. These key emerging issues have affected peace building functions directly or indirectly. Focusing on issue of education, majority of Islam

¹¹⁶ Menkhaus, Ken. 2003. 2003. Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment. United Nations High Commi Menkhaus, Ken. 2003. 2003. Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Protection Information Section, Department of International Protection

¹¹⁷ TNG mandate officially expired in July 2003

followers have ignored its teaching. It teaches about unity with everyone but they do not recognize that. If this concept of unit is followed to the letter then the conflicts in Somalia could not be there. The roles played by the Diasporas are unique. Though they are safeguarding their interest it's a good effort to bring peace and build it in Somalia. The issue of Governance is a challenge not only to Somalia but to most states of the whole world. The representation in the Government is an issue. This matter should be considered and made an agenda in peace building because this study feels it as a major challenge or a factor.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary

This chapter presents the summary, discussion of the key findings and the recommendations arrived at. It also gives suggestion for further studies.

The functions of peace building in Somalia as seen in the study are not easy to undertake. This study gives the definition of peace building as means where people are aided to recover from violence, prevent and reduce and transfer violence, see chapter one. To do all that, it seeks for sacrifices and resources. It's on that note, the functions of peace building becomes very complicated.

The purpose of this study was to investigate the role of AU in peace building functions in Somalia. The study notes that the effort of AU is something recognizable because it has really tried. Though its effort can be observed mainly by Somalia citizens, but to achieve that they passed through tremendous challenges. The study notes the followings as the achievements, the capturing of many economic gains of Somalia nation from the militia Men, capturing of cities which were controlled by Militia Men and also issues of pirates in the sea which was also source of resources used by Al-shaabab to do their evil acts. However, some of challenges faced by the AU are lack of resources, little supply of peace keepers and less interest by international community to support Somalia. To add on that, there are some local actors who do not support these functions. The reasons why they do not support is because of benefits they gain out of violence in the Somalia.

The next focus is on the hypothesis of the study. The main been that, a well-planned peace building functions by AU and leaders of Somalia will eliminate the conflicts in Somalia and build and strong states. For these functions to succeeded the peace builders and the locals need to work hand by hand. The functions are a bit efficient due to cooperation of local leaders. They give aid to peace builders by giving ideas on where to start and what to do. The theoretical frame work talks about competition of resources as one of issues which has escalated violence in Somalia. Every individual is safe guarding His or Her interest.

This makes the functions of peace building very difficult. Those who have acquired resources illegally they do all what they can to see to it there is no peace in order not to lose they resources. In many occasions majority of these individuals are the leaders, they oppose any engagement of bringing peace. Finally, the study observed that issue of Governance is also a challenge to peace building. The representation of citizens of Somalia in Government is not equal or wanting. There are those whose representation is very low and hence exploitation by the big clans whose there representation is very high. They exploit them by only enhancing themselves and they people. These injustices make the minority to keep on fighting the majority as search of justices.

5.2 Key Findings

There are so many key finding which this study has established but it will highlight only the key findings. To start with, the Militias Men by the name Al-shabaab have changed tactics n on how they perform their evil acts. The new tactics they are using is to revenge to the countries that have send their peace keeper's soldiers in Somalia. A good example

is the revenge they did to the state of Kenya in the west gate mall. They attacked and killed more than sixty innocent citizens. They claimed the responsibility reason been or warning Kenyan Government to withdraw its soldiers from Somalia. These acts could have made Kenya government if it was coward to withdraw its KDF from Somalia. Apart from that the Al-shabaab have also done other violence acts on the ground that the Kenyan Government to withdrawal its soldiers. If Kenyan Government did withdrawal its soldiers then all efforts done by AU could have been a waste.

There is something called exit strategy; they cannot exit before the Government of Somalia is strong enough to protect its citizens and entire Nation. It's also in order to note that these unwanted acts by Al-shabaab have made some of Kenyan leaders to also call for withdrawal of KDF from Somalia. A good example been the former Prime minister Honorable Raila Odinga. On the same note the study did find out the issue of institutions of Somalia are weak and need to be strengthened. After the violence of 2007-2008 the Kenyan violence one of recommendations given to make the violence not to occur again was the issue of strengthening of institutions.

The Somalia institutions the way they are won't be able to handle the violence in Somalia. The Judiciary is one of institutions which needs to be strengthened, the executives also need to be strengthen. This is possible if the international community is willing to give ideas and resources to undertake that role. The other finding is that .the international communities are not interested by peace building functions in Somalia. This can be associated by lack of anything they can benefit from the Nation of Somalia. The international community needs to aid all State equally without any discrimination. Finally on findings, lack of resources to funds the functions of peace building in Somalia have

made very difficult to do anything useful. Some state did promise to give monies and Soldiers for the functions but it was an empty promises. This makes the functions to go slow due to lack of funds. There needs to be rules governing such promises when broken action should be taken against the state which has broken it.

5.3 Recommendations

According to this study there are so many recommendations which it can suggest. Few of them will be highlighted. The role of surrounding countries needs to be clarified. Due to weakness of Government of Somalia some surroundings countries are tasking advantage and want to do all even what pertains to Somalia Government and its citizens. For example when it comes to issue of mediations the surrounding countries are not giving the owners a chance to contribute. Since they are the one affected and been involved in conflicts they are in a position to solve it and bring peace in their countries. So the Somalia people should be given more chance to contribute when it comes to these kinds of issues. There other recommendation is issue of central Government should be inclusive not Government of one or two clans. These few clans represented in Government when making decisions makes them in their favors and end up neglecting the minority clans.

The central Government needs to be reshaped again and give equal representations and this will make every citizen of Somalia represented and this will ease if not eliminate the conflicts. The equal distribution of resources is also issue which this study recommends. The resources of Somalia are owned by some few individuals mostly those who were in Government of Siad Barre's regime. They keep on acquiring resources

for themselves and they people, hence the poor continues to be poor and rich continues to be rich. The distribution of resources can be done by bringing taxes to central Government and then distributed to all regions of the Nation according to the needs. All those acquired resources illegally needs to return them through Judiciary involvements hence the need of strong Judiciary has the study had suggest in its findings. The AMISOM needs to be strengthening by supply of funds in order to fulfill its mandate. The UN needs to use if powers to see to it that the functions of peace building in Somalia are complete as soon as possible.

Finally the study also recommends for following. AL-shabaab is a force which needs keen attention. This force once commanded all Humanitarians groups to vacate Somalia and it was done. The peace builders need to recognize this force. They can give them a chance to air out they grievances and who knows they can agree to reconcile and form a coalition government has it happened to Kenya in 2007-2008. If that is not possible they can sub divide the Nation and them to be given some part to control as it was done in the Sudan. The followings are some of research questions for further research, do Somalia conflicts have any impact in horn of Africa? Can Africa Union be in a position to handle its own problems without involvement of other Unions?

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