TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF CONFLICT BETWEEN REFUGEES AND HOST COMMUNNITIES: A CASE STUDY OF DADAAB DISTRICT OF GARISSA COUNTY, KENYA 1991-2011.

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Registration No: C50/61483/2010

M.A RESEARCH PROJECT PAPER SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF ART DEGREE IN ARMED CONFLICT AND PEACE STUDIES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI.

OCTOBER, 2014.

DECLARATION

This is my original work and has not been presented for the award of a degree in any other university

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DEDICATION

This research project is dedicated to my Uncle Mzee Diis Mohamed Farah who participated enormously in my Education and all those who assisted me in completing this paper.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To begin with, I would like to thank God for enabling me to finish this paper successfully. My appreciation secondly goes to my family members. I also wish to express gratitude to the lecturers in the Department of History and Archaeology for their commitment and guidance. My deep and sincere gratitude are due to my supervisors, Prof. Godfrey Muriuki and Prof Milcah Amolo Achola who assisted me tirelessly to finish this paper. I am also indebted to all those who willingly shared their experience during the field research. Moreover, I want to express thanks to Ibrahim Ismail of UNHCR Gigiri for his invaluable help. He gave me continuous support during the interview session and beyond.

Thank you all!

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU	-	African Union.
CEWARN	-	Conflict Earlier Warning Network.
DRA	-	Department of Refugee Affairs
FAO	-	Food and Agricultural Organization
GDDP	-	Garissa District Development Plan
HRW	-	Human Right Watch
ICU	-	Islamic Courts Union
ICRC	-	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	-	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	-	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	-	Intergovernmental on Drought and Development
NGO	-	Non Governmental Organization
RCK	-	Refugee Consortium of Kenya
REC	-	Regional Economic Committee
RDF	-	Rapid Deployment Force
SNM	-	Somali National Movement
SPM	-	Somali Patriotic Movement
SSDF	-	Somali Salvation democratic Front
TFG	-	Transition Federal Government
TNG	-	Transition National Government.
UN	-	United Nation
UNHCR	-	United Nation High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	-	United Nation Children Fund
USC	-	United Somali Congress
USCR	-	United State Committee For Refugee.
UNITAF	-	United Nation Task Force
UNOSOM	-	United Nation Operation in Somalia
WHO	-	World Health Organization.



Source: Ministry of Planning and National Development.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

RUFEGEE:

(United Nations Convention of 1951, Article 1A, relating the status of refugee) is a person who owing to a well – founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.

Host

A person or community that provides hospitality to another person or group of people.

Fundamentalism

Usually a religious Movement or point of view characterized by a perceived return to fundamental principles, by rigid adherence to those principles, and often by intolerance of other views and by opposition to secularism.

Refoulement

The expulsion of persons who have the right to be recognized as refugees.

The principle of non- refoulement was first laid down in 1954 in the UN-Convention relating to the status of refugees (Article 33)(1).

Al-shabaab

‘It means youth movement’ or “movement of striving youth”), which joined the militant Islamic organization al-qaeda as a cell in 2013, it was a splinter group after the defeat of Islamic Courts Union in 2006 by the Ethiopia forces and the TFG.

ABSTRACT

Refugee-host conflict is not a recent phenomenon in Kenya. Its origin in the Kenyan history can be traced way back to the emergence of colonization. For long, Kenya was one of a few African States which have acted as home to many refugees. For instance since the late eighties, Kenya experienced an increasing influx of displaced people, as a result of the continued conflict in Uganda after 1986, and later in Ethiopia and Somalia 1990-91, saw the crossing of 400,000 Somalis Refugee combined with the arrival of a large group of Sudanese young men who came walking from Ethiopian camps after their stay there was no longer safe. Initially up to 1990, the attitude and response of national governments towards refugee presence consisted of active hostility and the passing of tough, stringent regulations to restrict refugee movement to designated camps. Since 1991/1992 however, governments were forced to acknowledge refugees because Kenya is a signatory to the UN conventions on rights of Refugees. The refugee had a right to being hosted in a safe environment where the international community can access them.

The continued existence of the problem of refugees has posed many questions to scholars regarding the mechanism of managing refugees in host countries like Kenya. This is, particularly, so considering the complex interactions between the local community and the refugees, land and housing markets as well as the legal, economic and cultural forces at play. Considering the fact that the refugees exist within the social structure of the host country, this study used available empirical evidence documented data, and the related experiences of informant on conflict between the refugees and the host community. Information particularly on land use helped in gaining an understanding of social, economic, racial or ethnic, legal, political and cultural divides that have contributed to conflict between the refugees and their hosts. The consequences of these dynamics and other implications of sustaining refugees as well as the challenges encountered in the sustainability of refugee's programmes and possible policy directions are highlighted. The study concludes that good land management is crucial for the achievement and promotion of effective functioning of relationship between refugees and their host in order to sustain and boost the social, economic, physical and cultural well being of all parties concerned

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction

The world is estimated to have around 20 to 25 million refugees and internally displaced persons.[1] According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (hereafter, UNHCR) Report of 2000, the largest refugee population then was in Asia with nearly 8.5 million, followed by Africa with 6.1 million while Europe had 5.6 million.[2] Somali refugees constituted the largest population of the refugees on the African continent. This is due to the civil war that has been fought in the country for more than decades. Since 1991, when the Somali dictator Major General Muhammad Siyyad Barre was overthrown Somalia has not experienced peace.[3]

Subsequent fighting among rival faction leaders resulted in the killing, dislocation and starvation of hundreds of thousands of Somalis. Conflict between rival warlords and their factions continued throughout the 1990s and Somalia failed to establish a stable government. Some negotiations to bring peace in Somalia were carried out in vain. For example, in May 2006, heavy fighting broke out in Mogadishu between the non Transitional Federal Government (hereafter, TFG) the affiliated Supreme Islamic Courts Union (hereafter, ICU) and TFG warlords hoping to find favour with the United States by fighting against supposed terrorist supporters.[4] The TFG of the Republic of Somalia was established in 2004 through various international conferences. It was an attempt to restore national institutions to the country.[5] It should be made clear that there were two distinct phases of the transitional government: the Transitional National Government (TNG) and the Transitional Federal Government. The Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed in April–May 2000 at the Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC) in Djibouti. It came up with the following recommendations: Election of members of parliament from every clan who intern elected president Abdiqasim salad Hassan. It also elected the National Commission for Reconciliation and Property Settlement.[6]

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[1] UNHCR, *Helping Refugees: An Introduction to UNHCR*, Geneva: UNHCR, 2000, p.9.
[2] UNHCR, *Refugees by Numbers*, Geneva: UNHCR, 2001, pp.4-5.
[3] Britannica Online Encyclopedia
[4] Mark Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland: Reconstructing a Failed State*, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2008, pp.10-30.
[5] Andre Le Sage, "Stateless Justice in Somalia", Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2005. Retrieved 2009-06-26
[6] *Ibid*

Although efforts had been made to establish a government Somalia remained one of the most insecure places in the world, with an unprecedented humanitarian crisis.[7] The situation was worsened by the rise of Islamist fundamentalist insurgents, namely Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam who intensified fighting displacing millions of people.[8] The majority of the displaced people found themselves in Kenya as refugees. Factions in the Somali Civil War which were fighting for the control of government were as follows; Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a, Al-Shabaab (militant group), Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, Allied Somali Forces, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia, Hizbul Islam, Islamic Courts Union, Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, Jabhatul Islamiya, Juba Valley Alliance, Somaliland Armed Forces and many others. They were settled in arid and semi-arid lands with environmental challenges therefore placing more pressure on the already limited resources.

A recent study has indicated that the region is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. In this region, climate change has extended periods of drought and made them more frequent, putting more and more stress on water resources and increasing competition between humans and wildlife. Most of the labour force depends on livestock for their livelihoods many of the people experience high levels of poverty.[9] The presence of refugees, therefore, makes the situation more worse. This led to conflict with the local host communities.

Historical Background to Dadaab Refugee Camp

As the war in Somalia intensified, the number of refugees crossing into Kenya increased. The increment forced UNHCR to set up the first camps in the Dadaab complex in 1991 to host up to 90,000 refugees. The camps were originally built to hold only 90,000 people, but grew over the years to nearly five times of the intended size.[10] Dadaab Refugee Camp is located in a semi-arid part of the former North Eastern province, with a fragile ecological system, sparse vegetation and no surface water. The camp is located at approximately 500 km from Nairobi and 80 km from the Kenya-Somali border. Dadaab Refugee Camp is a complex, covering a total area of more

[7] Jane Perlez, "Somalia Fighting Keeps Aid from a Suffering City," *The New York Times,* 11/12/ 1991.
[8] *Ibid*
[9] Mwaura, J., Tura, I., Raude, J., *Baseline Survey on Knowledge and Adaptation Strategies on Climate change Among Pastoralists and Agro-Pastoralists in Fafi and Dadaab District*, Nairobi: Kenya Agricultural Research Institute -Garissa, 2010
[10] UNHCR, *Kenya - Refugee Operation*, Nairobi: Sub Office Dadaab, September 2011

than 50 sq. km within an 18 km radius of Dadaab Town. Before the establishment of the camps, the area was used as rangeland by Kenyan Somali nomadic livestock owners.[11]

The 1991 refugee influx to Kenya and Ethiopia was catalyzed by the downfall of Major General Mohamed Siad Barre's regime and the onset of the Somali Civil War. The war forced the UNHCR established a Sub Office in Ifo to provide protection and assistance to civilians fleeing across the Kenyan border. In 1995, the Sub Office was moved to a new compound in Dadaab, though the residential compound had already been moved from Ifo to Dadaab in 1992. From 1992, the conflict intensified with the emergence of the clan warlords and later the Islamic Courts Union causing more displacement and refugees into Kenyan side. The emergence of the Islamic Courts did not go well with the Ethiopian government which launched attacks over the group.[12]

In 2006, fighting between the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Ethiopian government forces in Somalia for instance caused an influx of 34,111 new arrivals to Dadaab at an average rate of 100 per day (3,000 per month). Heavy flooding and water logging in October 2006 displaced some 14,000 refugees within and outside Ifo camp. Some 15,000 refugees were moved as a priority to what is now known as Ifo Camp Section N. In December 2006, the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), backed by Ethiopian troops with tanks and air support, defeated the ICU.[13] The civilian populations were on the receiving end of the friction between the rival groups and thus became victims of conflict and insecurity. Despite the closure of the Kenya Somalia border in January 2007, new influxes from Somalia into Kenya remained continuous since 2007 due to the porous borders. Drought in the Horn of Africa saw the push of an average 300 refugees daily out of Somalia and into Dadaab from January to May 2011. With the onset of famine in Somalia, the Dadaab refugee complex received an average of over 1,000 refugees daily, with 31,109 arriving in June, 40,434 in July and 37,051 in August. From January to 23 September, 140,753

[11] *Ibid*
[12] *Ibid*
[13] Catholic Relief Services, *CRS Report on Water, Sanitation and Hygiene promotion in Kambioos, Hagadera and the host communities*, Nairobi: CRS, 2011

refugees crossed into Kenya. Famine spread further across Somalia forcing over 1,000 refugees to cross into Dadaab per day by September 2011.[14]

Concentration of a large number of refugees in a small area has put an additional strain on the existing resources that led to frequent conflicts within themselves and the host communities. As such, meeting the minimum standards in the service sectors, such as access to water, shelter and sanitation has always been a challenge. Somali refugees make up 95.7% of the entire refugee population in the Dadaab camps, in addition to other hosted nationalities, including Ethiopians (17,329), Sudanese (898) and Congolese (97), as well as some refugees from Burundi, Uganda and Eritrea. Islam is the dominant religion while Christianity is largely practiced by non-Somali refugees.[15] Although the Somali refugee population comprises mainly nomadic pastoralists, this population also includes farmers from areas along the Southern Juba River valley, former civil servants, and traders. In all, 75% of the Somalis come from the Juba River valley and the Gedo regions, while 10% originate from Kismayo, Mogadishu and Bardera. The Darod clan and its numerous sub-clans including the Marehan, Majarten, Ogaden, Dolbahante and Warsengeli are prominent in all three camps.[16] It is such complexity that informs the frequent conflicts experienced in Dadaab.

1.1 Problem statement

The problem of Somali refugees in Kenya is associated with displacement of people from Somalia. Like all refugees they are stripped of some of their human and economic rights at the moment they flee their homes. Most refugees often place pressure on the resources in their new homes. As the refugee population surged between 1991 and 2011, competition became the order of daily life, resulting in frequent conflicts with locals.[17] Refugees were always supported by the UNHCR in terms of supplies and services, sometimes better than those that the host governments could provide for their citizens. This led to jealousy and other negative feelings by the local people against the refugees. To make matters worse, as the Somali refugee population swelled in

[14]Lutheran World Federation, *Primary education Hagadera Camp, camp management/camp coordination, community policing and camp planning, transit centres and safe havens,* Nairobi: LWF, 2012
[15] Relief Reconstruction and Development Organization, *Agro-forestry and environmental awareness creation in the host community – Lagdera District,* Nairobi: RRDO, 2012
[16] *Ibid*
[17] UNHCR, *Refugees 50th Anniversary: Everyone has the Right to seek and to enjoy in other countries Asylum from persecution , article 14 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,* Geneva : UNHCR 1998 p.18

Daadab camp they posed a security threat at local and national levels because they came with weapons. The Kenyan Government was forced to adopt the encampment policy.

Following a series of incidents of insecurity in Nairobi and near the border with Somalia, the government of Kenya announced a new policy of encampment requiring all refugees living in urban areas to relocate to camps. The government described the move as a response to the unbearable and uncontrollable threat to national security.[18] Through this policy, the government of Kenya required that once refugees have gone through the status determination procedures they are obliged to reside in a camp while awaiting a durable solution to their refugee hood problem.[19]

Some refugees did not wish to live in the camps because they could not tolerate the lifestyle and climate. Others sought access to jobs (albeit in the informal sector) and better education and medical services in Garissa town hence overstretching the little resources and ended up in conflict with the local urban people. A number also faced security problems within the camps, usually in connection with family or ethnic differences. According to the UNHCR a critical pull factor to host countries was the refugees hope to access resettlement where or one of the emigration channels operated by some host countries and western embassies.[20] Official policy required refugees to stay in remote areas like Daadab or Kakuma camps. Generally, the camps are located on land which is owned by local communities. Moreover, refugees were usually imposed on these communities without their consent and conflict was generated between the host and refugee communities. There is urgent need for research to investigate the conflict between refugees and their host with a view to finding solutions to the problem.

1.2 Study aims and objectives

The main objective of this study was to investigate the conflict between refugees and the host community in Dadaab District of Garissa County, 1991-2011. To achieve this following subsidiary objective were employed.

[18] Duncan Breen, *New Encampment Policy Fuels Xenophobia in Kenya*, Human Rights First, 805 15th Street, NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC 20005-2207

[19] The Refugee Consortium of Kenya, Refugee management in Kenya, Nairobi: The Refugee Consortium, 2008, www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=20160.

[20] Refugee Council of Kenya, "Briefing Notes for UNHCR and other Implementing Partners on Protection and Assistance for Urban Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Nairobi", Nairobi: RCK, March 2007

1. To examine the origin of conflict between refugees and the Somali host communities in Dadaab
2. To examine the nature of conflicts between the refugees and the Somali host communities in Dadaab.
3. To assess the social, economic and political impact of the conflict on both the Somali refugees and the host communities around Dadaab.

1.3 Justification of the Study

Although historically there were conflicts between displaced refugees and their Somali host, around Garissa, this conflict intensified after 1991. Warfare in Somaliland led to Somali refugees who flocked into Garissa County in Kenya. They settled with their livestock on grazing land and competed with local people for the already limited water supply. The resources of the local Kenyan Somali communities living in Garissa district were stretched to the utmost. This led to frequent conflicts between the refugees and the local host communities. The Kenya government and NGOs both local and international tried to mediate but the conflicts persisted. The local communities called for the repatriation of the refugees to their home country which Kenya as a signatory to the UN conventions on refugees could not do. Many researches done on these conflicts concentrate on refugees' rights verses those of the host communities;[21] perhaps this is because most of the research tends to be done by the international organizations concerned with refugee rights and assistance. Little scholarly work exists on conflict between refugees and host communities. This research will tackled this issue with respect to the Dadaad region of Garissa County.

1.4 Scope and Limitation of the Study

The years following the ouster of Siad Barre in 1991 have been characterized by persistent conflicts in Garissa between the local Somali community and the incoming refugees. In 2011 sensing increased insecurity, the government of Kenya launched *Operation Linda Nchi* which was meant to flush out the Al-shabaab insurgents in Somalia. A secure Somalia was seen as a lasting solution to Kenya's refugee problem.

[21] UNHCR, *Refugees 50th Anniversary: Everyone has the Right to seek and to enjoy in other Ccountries Asylum from Persecution , article 14 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,* Geneva : UNHCR 1998 p.18

The study was therefore confined to the 1991-2011 period. The study also focuses on Garissa County. The local community has a culture and religion that entrench conflict and which limits opening up to strangers. A serious limitation to the conduct of the research is that apart from the refugees who live in the camps most of the people in Garissa practice a nomadic way of life. Locating and following them was a problem. But since the researcher was born and brought up in Garissa it was easy to get links with the local leaders who introduced me to local and camp leaders. It was possible to get the required information.

1.5 Literature Review

The following is an annotated list of works that were reviewed, about relations between refugees and host communities. This review is not exhaustive. The objective is to examine the topics covered and the gaps that this research fills. Some books were reviewed starting from the global point of view to the local literature.

According to the Women's Commission on the Right of Women and Children (WCRWC) as more and more refugees increased in Pakistan in the early 1990s, there were frequent conflicts with the host communities. The local Pakistani people felt that numerous organizations that operated across the Afghan-Pakistan border favoured the refugees over and this exposed the refugees to jealousy from the host community leading to conflict because they felt that they were neglected by both the government and the organization. Whereas the WCRWC publication revealed that refugees had conflicts with their host communities, no similar study has been done to document the case of Dadaab Somali refugees and local communities in Garissa County.[22]

An Afghan Refugee Women's Associations publication argues that the Afghan refugees in Kazakhstan in their bid to adapt in their new environment devised income-generating activities which promoted their self-respect. This, however, led to competition with the locals leading to conflict. This article recognizes that refugees and host communities can have conflict due to economic issues.[23] Yet little is known about how refugees in Dadaab conflict with the locals.

[22] WCRWC, "Afghan Women's Organizations" http://www.womenscommission.org/projects/protection/afghanistan/NGOcapstate.php, accessed on 23/06/2012

[23] UNHCR, "Afghan Women Refugee Association, Almaty 1998 Refugees and Persons in Refugee-Like Situations in Kazakhstan, Central Asia and CIS 253", New York: UNHCR, Collection of Documents, 1998

Steen discusses the idea of refugee resettlement and observes that refugees must be viewed within the context of broader, international humanitarian policies addressing the causes of forced migration and the principles encapsulated in asylum. It is a notion that provides for both protection and durable solutions for individuals.[24] However, Steen does not discuss the concept of conflict between refugees and the host communities where they are to be settled. This is a big lapse in the scholar's case because settlement of refugees and conflict between them and host communities cannot be separated.

According to the Canadian Council for Refugees (1998) settlement generally refers to acclimatisation and the early stages of adaptation. This is when newcomers make the basic adjustments to life in a new country, including finding somewhere to live, beginning to learn the language, getting a job and learning to find their way round an unfamiliar society. Integration is the longer-term process through which newcomers become full and equal participants in all the various dimensions of society. Both settlement and integration are two-way, complex, long-term, both process and goal oriented, and a matter of individual choice for the newcomer.[25] However, the authors did not explain whether the process of settlement had some conflicts involved between the refugees and the host.

Valtonen draws a further distinction between assimilation and integration of refugees. Assimilation occurs when the group melts into the dominant society. Integration refers to the situation in which the group interacts with the larger society and also maintains its own identity.[26] Valtonen defines the integration of refugees into their adopted countries as a process by which immigrants and refugees engage with, and become part of their resettlement society, particularly with regard to the labour market and education, social interaction, organised activity, and cultural encounter. Immigrant integration implies full and unimpeded participation in society and the

[24] Steen, A. B. "The Conceptual Difference of Refugee Resettlement: Sri Lankan Tamils in Denmark and England". In M. Kjaerum and K. Slavensky (Eds.), *NGOs and Refugees: Reflections at the Turn of the Century - Essays in Honour of Arne Piel Christensen*, Denmark: Narayana Press, 1993

[25] Canadian Council for Refugees, Best Settlement Practices: Settlement Services for Refugees and Immigrants in Canada, 1998.

[26] Valtonen, K. The Adaptation of Vietnamese Refugees in Finland, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 7(1), 1994, pp. 63-78.

access or openness of institutions to all members of society.[27] In this context, was there any conflict involved in the process of integration?

Kunz argues that refugees' orientation to their country of origin also has a significant impact on resettlement. He identifies three different groups namely, majority-identified' refugees who identify with their nation but not with its government, events-alienated' refugees, who may include religious or racial minorities, who seldom entertain the hope of returning home and self-alienated' refugees, who for various reasons no longer wish to identify with their nation. This group may include revolutionaries. Refugee groups may also be 'reactive fate-groups' or 'purpose groups' depending on their attitude to displacement. Reactive fate-groups are typically made up of majority identified and events-alienated refugees fleeing from war or revolutionary change. Self alienated refugees are typically found in purpose groups.[28] Kunz makes good predictions, however he does not outline any conflict in the process.

Liev and Kezo also contend that the process of acculturation depends on the relative strengths of the host community identity and the refugee community identity. They argue that for mature refugee communities, such as the Cambodian, Lao and Vietnamese communities, the process of resettlement seems to incline towards the 'ethnic bias' where there is an emphasis on medium ethnic identity due to their cultural erosion on the one hand and weak integration with the host culture on the other. The nature of integration for refugees from areas such as the Middle East and Africa is still to be seen.[29] Does it inform conflict?

Bertrand found that, for refugees from cultures with a strong reliance on the extended family, the maintenance of such familial links within the new country was important for drawing strength to persevere and for guidance in difficult situations. This was particularly important for those who had difficulty with the language of the new country or other difficulties making new social

[27] Valtonen, K. Resettlement of Middle Eastern Refugees in Finland: The Elusiveness of Integration, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 11(1), 1998, pp. 39-60.
[28] Kunz, E. F. Exile and Resettlement: Refugee Theory, *International Migration Review*, 15(142), 1981, p. 51.
[29] Liev, M., and Kezo, T. *Refugee Resettlement Issues: An Ethiopian Perspective, the Sixth National Conference on Community Languages and ESOL*, Palmerston North, 1998, p. 7

contacts.[30] Somali people have long family links and experience the challenges that Bertrand outlines yet he does not mention any conflict involved.

Elizabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf argue that refugees are sometimes exposed to horrific "encounters" from the hosts such as rape and other forms of physical attacks. The authors believe that all this is caused by the refugees', hope, desire and determination to survive and rebuild their lives in new ways. The authors argue that the frequency of armed conflicts, political violence and civil unrest in the host countries in 1990s often led to further relocations of refugees. Although Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf's work discusses refugees' encounters in their new homes, they did not mention the horrific encounters from the locals.[31]

According to the Government of Kenya's Report the role of police in peace building in Kenya for sustainable human security was seriously being hampered by the presence of illegal arms in the country. The report goes further to state that these arms were concentrated in urban centres as well as among the pastoralist communities in northern, north eastern and eastern regions of Kenya. These arms found their way into the country mostly when the refugees from conflict ridden neighbouring countries in the Horn of Africa, crossed into the country.[32] Although the report acknowledged that refugees contributed to insecurity in Kenya, it did not mention the relationship between refugees and local communities.

Kamenju has argued that Kenya's neighbours, such as Uganda to the West, Sudan to the northwest and Ethiopia to the North, have had a history of serious internal conflict whose effects have reverberated across the region. Kamenju further contends that refugees, arms and contraband goods moved therefore with ease across the common borders. This movement was facilitated by the "porous nature" of the international borders.[33] From Kamenju's observation, the refugees contributed to the illegal arms movement into Kenya. However, he fails to discuss how this impacted on the local population.

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[30] Bertrand, D. (2000). Policies for reception and integration of refugees: a comparative study of the UK and France. Refugee Studies Centre: Research Updates. Retrieved October 16, 2000 from the World Wide Web: http://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/rsp/TextWeb/ongoing.html

[31] E. Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, *Women War Peace*, Washington: UNIFEM, 2002, pp.6-8

[32] GoK., *National Policy on Peace building and Conflict Management First Draft*, Nairobi: Government Printer, 2006, p. 21

[33] Kamenju, *Terrorised Citizens*, Nairobi: SRIC, 2000, p. 48

According to Monica Kathina, Kenya received about 500, 000 refugees between 1990 and 2000. Most of these refugees were settled in areas which were already facing scarcity in terms of resources. Kathina further observed that Kakuma refugee camp covering an area of 12 square kilometers by 2000, hosted more than 80,000 refugees.[34] The Dadaab camp complex had more than 420,000 in 1993. The author believes that the effect of such large populations on such fragile environments was momentous. Yet, humanitarian assistance, administered chiefly by international agencies, was designated only for refugees, ignoring the plight of the locals whose material condition was usually worse. Kathina held that the presence of humanitarian assistance resources for refugees in Kakuma, and other displaced populations in the Southern Sudan, for instance, has created oases in the middle of deprived local populations such as those in Kenya's Turkana County.[35]

Kathina further argues that this has caused conflicts between the locals and the refugees. As Dadaab camps continued to attract substantial resources, they developed and expanded into surrounding areas such as Hagdera and its environs. This encroachment also caused conflicts between the locals and refugees. Security in the camps and their surroundings was inadequate.[36] Although Kathina mentioned conflict between the refugees and the local people, it was just in passing. This research, therefore, hopefully engages in a deeper and more through study of the conflict between the refugees and the local communities.

This chapter looks at some of the literature on refugees and conflict with the host communities. The literature reviewed covers specific issues that lead to conflict, measures and the impact of conflict on the host local communities. The various books and articles assessed in the course of this review form the basis of the research on the conflict in the Dadaab region based on the case studies.

[34]Monica Kathina Juma, *Unveiling Women as Pillars of Peace Building in Communities Fractured by Conflict in Kenya,* New York: UNDP, 2000, p. 12
[35] *Ibid*
[36] *Ibid*

1.6 Theoretical Framework

This study is based on Karl Marx conflict theory, which argues that the competition of individuals and groups for wealth and power is the fundamental process shaping social structure. For conflict theories, basic questions about a social structure are who gets what and why? In the case of refugees verses the host communities get the feeling that the refugees are being better taken care of than the locals, this has created hatred and conflict between them.[37]

The status of refugee, verse vie the local host country can be seen as part of stratification. The local communities tend to see the refugees as a socially lower group of people. On their side, refugees may feel that they are protected by the international humanitarian laws and should not be segregated. Karl Marx believed that economic group stratification caused conflict between the concerned groups. The Marxist argument fits in this study.[38]

The Marxist theory is complemented in this study by the refugee economic theory. According to Guerin, the refugee economic theory states that refugees face a number of challenges in adapting to their new country, especially when that new country has socio-cultural, political and economic values different from those in the refugees country of origin. For instance, Kenya is more westernized and less Islamic than Somalia. This posed a real challenge to the refugees who were expected to fit in the system. The changes caused refugees to be segregate among themselves. Hence adapting the economic activities of the hosting country became cumbersome and made them to struggle for a while as most lacked basic education.

Secondly, most of the Somali refugees are primarily women and children. It is important that women be in their best health because most of them usually bore the responsibility of caring for community members and children, often in very difficult situations.[39] A number of economic initiatives were taken by the Somali local and refugee women to increase their economic opportunities. These economic initiatives can best be explained from the refugee economic theory perspective. The refugee economic theory is a theory that explains the commercial activities which refugees engage in such as the production and consumption of goods.

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[37] Emile Durkheim, *The Division of labor in Society*
[38] *ibid*
[39] Guerin, P. B., and Diiriye, R. O, "Physical Activity Programs for Refugee Somali Women: Working out in a New Country", *Women and Health*. 38(1), 2003, pp. 83-99

1.7 Research Hypotheses

Three hypotheses were tested by this research;

1. There were frequent conflicts between the host communities and the refugees in Garissa.
2. The cause of conflict between Somali refugees and their host had economic, social and political impact.
3. The nature of conflict between Somali refugees and their host had economic, social and political impact among the host Somali community.

1.8 Research methodology

In this study, the qualitative research method was used for collecting and analyzing the information gathered. This is a form of systematic empirical inquiry into meaning. Systematic research is planned, ordered and public and follows rules agreed upon by members of the qualitative research community. Empirical research means that this type of inquiry is grounded in the world of experience. Researchers try to understand how others make sense of their experience.[40] This method made possible to analyze and explain data from the targeted respondents in Daadab District of Garissa County. In order to come up with an adequately comprehensive study, the research used both secondary and primary data.

The sources from the secondary data were drawn from scholarly works related to the intended study. The written works were found in libraries within Nairobi and any other town with a library having relevant information. These libraries included the UNHCR library at Gigiri, World Vision Resource Centre, The Norwegian Refugee Council Resource Centre in Nairobi and Daadab, Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library of the University of Nairobi and Africa Peace Forum Library in Nairobi. Secondary data alone was not enough in understanding of the conflict. Primary data was therefore also used to provide some insights on the conflict. The two sources of data complemented each other. The gaps in these sources were filled by oral interviews carried out in Garissa County and in particular Daadab region.

During the field study, twenty five respondents were interviewed, a total of three focus group discuss were conducted of over ten people in the three major camps and several other

[40] Shank, G. *Qualitative Research: A Personal Skills Approach*, New Jersey: Merril Prentice Hall, 2002, pp. 5-7.

interviewees withheld their names due the sensitivity of the matter discussed this made the number to be over fifty . Among them were officials who deal with refugees from different non-governmental organizations. The target groups during my field study in Garissa included NGO leaders, elders, the youth, women and government workers stationed in the county. Key informants included opinion leaders, security personnel and traditional religious leaders among other people. I considered these groups knowledgeable in the conflict. To facilitate achieving my goal without deviating from the target, I used an interview guide. Questions were open ended to allow other relevant questions to arise during the interviews. The end result was to interview a wide range of people in order to achieve or get relevant information.

1.8.1 Methods of Data Collection

The primary data was collected using key informant interviews with the use of a structured questionnaire. This method of data collection was preferred to allow the researcher to probe further for clarity and accuracy of information. This was done through participatory observation and rephrasing the questions. Secondary data was gathered from content analysis of academic texts, journals, publications from the women's organizations, political party's constitution and manifestos, and the print media.

1.8.2 Sampling Method

According to Earl, "population is the theoretically specified aggregation of the study elements."[41] In this case, the population of study consisted of all the refugees and the host communities living around Dadaab Refugee Camps. For this research the sampling frame comprised of all the refugees and their host. Cluster sampling based on the objectives of the study narrowed down the sampling frame to twenty five respondents in Dadaab that have relevant information as one of their objective. Further, using purposive sampling based on the objective of the study, interviews were conducted with UNHCR leaders of the camps. Key informants who had experience and knowledge about the background and operations of the refugees were selected. The condition of the selection of the informants was that the informant must be refugees or must have related with them. A total of 25 respondents were selected and eventually interviewed.

[41] Earl Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research*, Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1989, p. 19

1.8.3 Data Collection, Analysis and Presentation

Data collection is the means by which information is obtained from the selected subjects of an investigation. Although various methods of collection exist, they depend on the sampling technique, time available, manpower and the cost, among other unforeseeable factors. In this study, data were collected through personal interviews and structured questionnaires. Personal interview is perhaps the most expensive method of data collection, but it has one advantage of completeness and accuracy. This method gave this study a uniform approach to issues given that I, the researcher, was the only interviewer. This method offered a flexibility of sensing whether the question had not been fully answered. In such a case, I was able to introduce a follow-up question on the spot. The use of structured questionnaires was a cheaper method of data collection and very convenient to most of my respondents who happened to be very busy most of the times. The challenge, however, was to ensure that the questions were clearly understood and correctly answered. This I did by designing a short questionnaire with simple, unambiguous and non-personal questions.

The above methods were supplemented by the use of secondary data; content analysis of the data from library research and available statistics. Due to lack of time and financial resources, secondary data proved to be very vital in this study. Because of the nature of the secondary data available, the main challenge was to choose what to use and what to ignore. This I did by picking the information that coincided with what the research required. This was out of the understanding that secondary data might have been collected originally for other purposes other than my current study. Thus, apart from government policy documents on refugees, I also relied on the professional publications by UNHCR. The secondary data from existing statistics and library research was analyzed, and together with the interview responses from key respondents, used to draw conclusions. However to uphold research ethics all scholarly document reviewed was capture as a reference to uphold research ethics.

CHAPTER TWO

THE GENESIS OF THE SOMALI REFUGEE PROBLEM IN GARISSA COUNTY, 1969-2011

2.1 Introduction

While refugees impose a variety of security, economic and environmental burdens on host countries, they also embody a significant flow of resources in the form of international humanitarian assistance, economic assets and human capital. Refugee camps become repositories of such resources as relief supplies and food aid, vehicles, communication equipment, employment and transport contracts with relief agencies, and other locally valued and scarce materials. The refugees also bring skills and entrepreneurship, as they are also conduits for remittance flows.[42]

Since most Somali refugees in Kenya stayed in the country for many years these resources are available to the host country for an extended period of time. In addition, refugees are if only for brief burst of international media attention; a highly visible phenomenon, capable of focusing attention on regions normally lost to the public eye. Dadaab area captured attention of international media for example in 2011 during a serious drought. Consequently, the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugee Mr. Antonio Gutierrez a very high ranking official visited the Dadaab refugees' camps and appealed for national and international assistance.[43] Refugees therefore represent political force for the actors, including the state itself.

2.2 Conflict-induced Displacement

The history of refugees and forced migration in Somalia is directly related to the armed conflict that began with the Ogaden war in 1977. Somalia changed from being a major refugee receiving country in the 1970s. The stream of refugees out of Somalia gained pace from 1988 onwards and escalated throughout the 1990s. Drought, floods, and the attendant famine have combined with warfare to cause the mass flight of refugees and the large scale displacement of Somalis outside

[42] UNHCR Uganda, *Strategy Paper: Self Reliance for Refugee Hosting areas,* Kampala: UNHCR Uganda, with Office of the Prime Minister, 1999, p. 71.
[43] "UN calls Somali Drought Worst Disaster", JULY 11 2011
http://www.presstv.com/detail/188558.html accessed on 7/3/2012

and inside the country. The main roots of the conflict born refugee problem in Somalia can be divided into three categories. First, it was created by those who rejected the political ideology of the successive governments in Somalia. The ideology was seen to favor some clans at the expense of others. For instance, Siyyad Barre is believed to have favoured members of his own Marehan clan. His regime used force to make many of the Somalis to choose between becoming exiles in foreign countries or to remain at home under various forms of disability laid down by the state.

The Barre government sometimes restricted the activities of leaders of some clans through detentions or house arrest for many years.[44] Those who were not arrested were unable to meet their livelihood needs because they were prevented from engaging in economic activities. They were also prohibited from leaving their areas of residence and sometimes attacked by the Somali military.[45] The only option for those who refused to accept the political ideology of the Siyyad Barre regime was to leave their home country permanently although there are usually many who cannot afford to leave.[46]

The Somali refugees were also made up of people who escaped for fear that they would be arrested or tortured. They took various escape routes to live with their kin in North Eastern Kenya. Some of them had earlier protested against the Siyyad Barre regime which reacted by trying to track them down and detain them. These refugees made Siyyad Barre claim erroneously in the 1960s that Kenya was harbouring militias fighting his government.[47]

Secondly, some Somali national's experienced environmental calamities that could not allow them reconcile their concept of life with the political atmosphere that existed. The elite and professionals could not accept to live in the environment created by the Siyyad Barre regime. They left their country voluntarily, to seek for asylum in a more conducive environment.[48] This

[44] Bayart, J.F., S. Ellis and B. Hibou, *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*. Oxford: James Currey, 1999, pp. 33.
[45] Christensen Asger and Niels Harild, *Forced Displacement, the Development Challenge*, Conflict, Crime and Violence Issues Note, Social Development Department, The World Bank, 2009, pp. 23-30.
[46] Jacobsen, Karen, *Livelihoods in Conflict: The Pursuit of Livelihoods by Refugees and the Impact on the Human Security of Host Communities*, Tuft University, USA, 2002, pp. 42-43.
[47] Alix-Garcia, Jennifer, *The Effects of Refugee Inflows on Host Country Populations: Evidence from Tanzania*, University of Montana, USA., 2007: Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=836147, accessed on 26/11/2013.
[48] Jacobsen, Karen, *Livelihoods in Conflict: The Pursuit of Livelihoods by Refugees and the Impact on the Human*

group is less important as refugees, because they are not found in the refugee camps as some have settled in urban areas while other managed to find asylum in Europe or USA. They however formed part of the Somali refugee class in Kenya and the world.

2.3 From the Ogaden War to Civil War (1977-88)

The period of armed opposition to Barre dates from the formation of the Majerteen and Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in 1978. The Majerteen and the SSDF were rapidly neutralised by Barre immediately after the Ogaden War. The Ogaden War of 1977 was between Ethiopia and Somalia. It was over the disputed Ogaden region which is largely inhabited by Ethiopian people of Somali origin.[49] The war was concluded with the defeat of Somali troops in 1978. This was to prove decisive for the Siyyad Barre regime's relations with the Isaq clans based in the north west of the Somali country. At the outset of the war, there was a massive influx of ethnic Somali and Oromo from Ethiopia into the northern border regions of Somalia. By 1979 there were officially 1.3 million refugees in the country. The arrival of refugees placed great strains upon limited resources, which in some cases caused tensions between local Somalis and the refugees. Many of the refugees were forced by Barre into government service as militias which were then used to repress the Isaq population in the North West.[50]

Barre then decided to replace members of the Isaq clan from the army. At that time, the Isaq were also being systematically weeded out from the Somali civil service. This led to the formation in the early 1980s of the SNM located in the Gulf States and Britain.[51] Government persecution of the Isaq escalated in 1981 after the Somali National Movement (SNM) re-located its headquarters in neighbouring Ethiopia.[52] This resulted in the imposition of a state of emergency in Somali's northern regions. This was followed by the operation of a curfew, confiscation of property, withdrawal of export licences, and the relocation of villages to the southern part of Somalia. Barre was faced with opposition from the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)

Security of Host Communities, Tuft University, USA, 2002, pp. 50-52.

[49] Lewis, I. M. *Understanding Somalia: Guide to Culture, History and Social Institutions*, London: Haan Associates, 1993, p. 35.

[50] Love, J. and P. Sederberg, "Euhony and Cacophony in Policy Implementation: SCF and the Somali Refugee Problem", *Policy Studies Review* 7 (1), 1988, p. 23.

[51] Lewis, I. M. "Misunderstanding the Somali Crisis", *Anthropology Today* 9 (4), 1993, p. 15.

[52] Magan, A., M. Warsame, A. Ali Salad and M. Toole, "An Outbreak of Scurvy in Somali Refugee Camps', *Disasters* 7 (2), 1983, pp. 7-11.

and the Somali National Movement (SNM), both of which led their operations from inside Ethiopia. This joint assault forced Barre to negotiate for peace with the then leader of Ethiopia, Mengistu Haille Mariam. He had to drop all previous territorial claims for the formation of a Greater Somalia in return for Mengistu's cessation of support for the SNM and SSDF. By 1988, therefore, Barre was free to concentrate on domestic issues. The scene was set for an all out war on the Ishaq clan in north-west Somalia.[53]

In May 1988 the SNM launched coordinated attacks on the northern cities of Hargeisa and Burao and succeeded in temporarily putting Barre's forces out of the region. By July of the same year Barre had regained both cities, having subjected them to heavy artillery and aerial bombardment. In total, an estimated 100,000 civilians lost their lives in the bombing of the northern towns. Another 365,000 Somalis sought refuge in Ethiopia and Kenya while another 50,000 were killed by government troops in Hargeisa alone. An additional 60,000 people became internally displaced.[54] Barre's forces' systematic destruction of livestock and the resources vital for the pastoral economy added to the pressure to migrate out of Somalia. The Persecution of the Isaq also spread to the south of the country.[55]

While the SNM was recovering from this assault, the Hawiye who were the largest and most powerful clan in the south founded the USC. Ogadeni refugees in Hargeisa, who had been used by Barre against the SNM, formed their own Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) which also opposed the regime. Although leaders attempted peaceful avenues of change, it was too late.[56] The Somali state was already on the verge of collapse.

2.4 State Collapse and Renewed Civil War (1991-2)

Having reached an accord in August 1990, the three liberation movements (the SPM, USC, and SNM) led a co-ordinated attack against Barre that resulted in his overthrow and flight from Mogadishu in January 1991. Barre continued to destabilise the south of the country through his army. This was reformed as the Darod affiliated Somali National Front (SNF), and had

[53]Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development, 'A Self-Portrait of Somaliland: Rebuilding from the Ruins', December 1999 http://wsp.dataweb.ch/wspfiles/somalia/SelfPortrait24.doc.
[54] Africa Watch 1990.
[55] Human Rights Watch, Somalia http://www.hrw.org/reports/world/somalia-pubs.php.
[56] *Ibid.*

devastating effects on the inhabitants, the majority of whom were from minority clans with no direct involvement in the conflict.[57]

The coalition of forces which overthrew Barre soon dissolved in factional disputes. The Manifesto Group hurriedly appointed Ali Mahdi Mohamed, of the Abgal sub-clan of the Hawiye, as interim president of a new Somali Republic. General Aideed, of the rival Habr Gedir sub-clan of the Hawiye, who had led the USC rout of Mogadishu, opposed Ali Mahdi on political, ideological, and personal grounds.[58] Thus final rupture occurred between two factions of the USC in September 1991, resulting in Ali Mahdi occupying the north of Mogadishu and Aideed the south. By this time, Aideed's faction along with the SPM had transmuted into the Somali National Alliance (SNA). Between December 1991 and March 1992, when the UN intervened to arrange a ceasefire, there was continuous conflict between the different factions of the USC. The USC and the SPM were also involved in a sustained war with SNF forces still loyal to Barre.[59]

The coastal regions of Brawa and Merca towns where the Benadiri population lives in general and the central agricultural regions were systematically looted and destroyed as the contending factions battled for resources and power. The agricultural belt was occupied by the clans Rahanweyn, Digil, Gosha and other minority clans and communities.[60] Hundreds of farmers were forced to flee to the regional capital of Baidoa. Others moved out to the neighbouring countries of Ethiopia and Kenya. Mogadishu became to be known as the city of the walking dead as its inhabitants became trapped between the different military factions in the region.[61] At the worst points of the conflict, an estimated 800,000 Somali were refugees in neighbouring countries. Some 400,000 went to Ethiopia, and over 200,000 went to Kenya. Approximately 2 million were

[57] Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development, 'A Self-Portrait of Somaliland: Rebuilding from the Ruins', December 1999 http://wsp.dataweb.ch/wspfiles/somalia/SelfPortrait24.doc. accessed on 22/11/2013
[58] Osman, Abdulahi A. *Governance and Internal Wars in sub Saharan Africa: Exploring the Relationship,* London: Adonis & Abbey, 2007, p. 43.
[59] Besteman, Catherina, *Unravelling Somalia: Race, Violence, and the Legacy of Slavery,* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999.
[60] Abdullahi, Ahrnednasir M. "Protection of,, Refugees under International Law and Kenya's Treatment of Somali Refugees: Compliance or Contrary? Unpublished Paper, University of Nairobi, Kenya, 1993, pp. 22-23.
[61] Mukhtar, Mohamed H. 1989. "The Emergence and the Role of Political Parties in the Inter- Riverine Region of Somalia from 1947 to 1960 (Independence)," *UFAHAMU: Journal of the African Activist Association* XVII (II), pp. 57-69.

internally displaced.[62] The war in the south resulted in a massive displacement of people involving an estimated third of the entire southern population.[63] Up to a quarter of a million people from rural areas flooded into Mogadishu relief camps organized by the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations. The conflicts were made worse by religious based discord which pitted traditional against Islamic religious beliefs.

2.5 Conflict within Islamic Sub-groups and Somali Refugee Problem

Islam came to Somalia through contacts with Persian and Arab merchants and seamen who settled along the Somali coast in the 8th C AD.[64] The new religion seems to have been intricately turned into a native religion. Not only did it complement existing cultural practices, but it also provides some of the Somali traditions with a divine source. The Somali could easily identify with the new religion as a reformed version of their culture and thus adopted it without much difficulty.[65]

Thus despite the adoption of Islam by the Somali centuries ago, their traditional culture has survived. However, the concurrent existence of a conflicting value system in the society was itself the source of perpetual conflict. This was further exacerbated by the adoption of contradicting or differing versions of Islam and traditional culture as evidenced by the divergent rituals of the different religious orders adopted by Somali.[66] For instance, Muslims living in the northern and central parts of Somalia reject veneration of saints and visitation of their graves. But the practice is deep rooted amongst the southerners. This controversy goes back to the prolonged disputes between Qadiriyah and Salihiyahain Islam.[67] The Somali have different cultures depending on the region they are hail from. The same applies to sects of Islam such as state Qadiriyah and the Salihiya beliefs of the Islamic faith.

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[62] US Committee for Refugees, USCR, 2002, http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/africa/somalia.htm
[63] Ahmed, Ali Jimale, "Daybreak is Near, Won't You Become Sour," in Ahmed, Ali Jimale (ed), *The Invention of Somalia*. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, Inc., 1995.
[64] A. H. Farah, "Historical Background to Somalia Conflict," http://www.hananews.org, Sunday, June, 24/2012.
[65] *Ibid.*
[66] Hasci, N. "Somali Refugee Policy and Development: An Analysis of Durable Solutions" (1979-1989) Ph.D. Thesis, the Johns Hopkins University, 1991, pp. 65-68.
[67] Oral interview, Bashir Farah Osman, Lagdera, Ifo Garissa, 15/07/2012.

The most important departure of Islamic and traditional value systems is in their views on expressive art. Islam prohibits performing art, more specifically drama. Yet the centrality of oral culture amongst the Somali is widely acknowledged and even facilitated the quick spread and adoption of Islam in Somalia.[68] One example is the dance performed during *mviko* and spirit-possession rituals which are viewed as repugnant and as improper behaviour by Islamists.[69] The resulting contradictions have often been a source of armed conflict between traditionalist and Islamist forces within the country and have produced large number of refugees.[70]

Another interesting aspect of such religious difference is there transformation or adoption to traditional clan difference. For instance, concepts of orthodoxy are based on the practices of a given area and used by its adherents as a litmus test for other practices from elsewhere. A good example is that of the litanies (*qasiido*) composed and regularly performed by the agro-pastoralists in the South in Somali language. These were regarded by pastoralist Somalis as un-Islamic.[71] Such regional differences are further entrenched by claims of orthodoxy by each group at times used to foster existing clan disputes and frequently escalating into full war pushing out many Somali people as refugees. The Majeerteen, a clan found predominantly in the Northeast, for example, who have been living in Kismayu and the surrounding areas do not show the same dismissive attitude towards the communities of the saints and their massive pilgrimages as their clan brethren in the north.

2.6 UN Interventions, 1992-1995

Although human rights organizations had clearly signaled that from 1990-1994 the impending disaster in Somalia, the international response was slow in coming. UN peacekeeping forces arrived in Somali in April 1992, as part of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (hereafter, UNOSOM). Their role was limited to overseeing a ceasefire between the different clan factions. Only a handful of aid agencies had remained in the country after Barre's departure from Mogadishu in 1991. As a result, adequate knowledge of local conditions was lacking among the humanitarian agencies when emergency food flowed into the regions. This food aid resulted in

[68] Oral interview, Dand Hassan, Lagdera, Garissa, 15/07/2012.
[69] Oral interview, Salah Abdi, Hagadera, Dadaab Garisa, 25/07/2012.
[70] Oral interview, Mohamed Roba Ahmed, Garissa, 25/ 07/2012.
[71] Oral interview, Ibrahim Ismail, Argantin, Karaan, 19/07/2012.

the destabilisation of food markets. Furthermore delivering humanitarian aid to the affected regions was particularly difficult for the agencies involved, many of which were forced to pay armed militia to distribute relief. This, in turn, encouraged a war economy, which quickly became dependent upon overseas cash flows and personnel. Moreover, the concentration of aid in and around Mogadishu drew increasing numbers of displaced people from rural areas to the relief camps in the city.[72]

The deteriorating situation inside Somalia led the US government under George Bush to intervene in December 1992. Operation Restore Hope committed 28,000 US troops to the US-led United Nations Task Force (UNITAF). This was formed under the UN Security Council Resolution 794, which justified intervention on the grounds that the condition of statelessness in Somalia posed a threat to 'international security and peace. The decision to intervene was due to a number of factors. Firstly, these were the last days of the Bush administration and the esteem of leading a humanitarian operation in Somalia may have seemed opportune to the departing president. Secondly, Somalia continued to be of strategic interest to the USA, with the stationing of the Rapid Deployment Force (hereafter, RDF) in Berbera allowing easy access to the Middle East. Finally, in the period of the New World Order after the fall of communism it seemed incumbent on the USA to demonstrate a lead role in the absence of a rival superpower.[73]

What may have begun as a humanitarian operation, to ensure that food supplies reached the victims of famine quickly degenerated into an exercise in nation-building under UNOSOM II in May 1993. This succeeded in alienating Somalia's powerful warlords, notably Aideed's SNA. The body of a US soldier was hauled through the streets of Mogadishu and this spectacle led to the decision by USA to withdraw its troops from Somalia. A deadline for US withdrawal from Somalia by March 1994 was finalised by March 1995.[74] The withdrawal of the troops of the Americans and their allies from Somalia led to increased conflict and the the surge of refugees.

[72] Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development, 'A Self-Portrait of Somaliland: Rebuilding from the Ruins', December 1999 http://wsp.dataweb.ch/wspfiles/somalia/SelfPortrait24.doc., accessed, 22/11/2013
[73] *Ibid*
[74] Human Rights Watch, "Somalia Report", http://www.hrw.org/reports/world/somalia-pubs.php. accessed 22/11/2013

UNOSOM had become a party to the conflict in Somalia and a contributor to the deaths of hundreds of Somali civilians. By contrast, the International Committee of the Red Cross (hereafter, ICRC), the UN Children's Fund (hereafter, UNICEF), and the World Food Programme provided emergency relief, which alleviated starvation for tens of thousands of individuals. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereafter, UNHCR) also began a series of cross-border operations from Kenya in September 1992.[75] Preventive zones were established in southern Somalia to assist people in areas affected by famine who might otherwise flee across the border to Kenya. Food and relief were supplied within Somalia with the aim of encouraging voluntary repatriation to safe areas. Criticism of UNHCR has been made for failing to monitor human rights abuses in the camps in Kenya and for returning refugees to areas where a lack of infrastructure and continuing conflict impeded successful reintegration.[76]

Conflict continued in different regions of the country in the latter half of the decade, causing continued local population displacement. Factional fighting continued in Mogadishu throughout 1996, despite the death of SNA leader, Mohamed Farah Aideed. A spate of peace conferences made little progress towards stabilising Mogadishu and the central and southern regions of the country. During 1998, conflict in the southern coastal areas forced an estimated 25,000 people to flee.[77] Up to 10,000 Somalis fled by boat to Yemen during that year, many hundreds of them drowning at sea. Violence during 1999 forced at least 50,000 people to flee their homes, either to neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia or internally to Mogadishu. Mogadishu housed an estimated 230,000 individuals in 200 camps during 1999. Thousands of residents from southern Somalia also fled to the north of the country.[78]

By 2000, the security conditions in Somalia varied enormously from region to region. While Somaliland and Puntland in the north were generally stable, violence and insecurity were commonplace in the south, east, and west of the country. Mogadishu and Merka continued to experience high levels of criminal and political violence. Approximately 4,000 Somalis fled to

[75] Samatar, Ahmed I. *The Somali Challenge from Catastrophe to Renewal,* Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994, p. 60.
[76] Hasci, N. Somali Refugee Policy and Development: An Analysis of Durable Solutions (1979-1989) Ph.D. thesis, the Johns Hopkins University, 1991, pp. 61-62.
[77] World Bank, *Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics*, Washington: World Bank, 2005, p. 38.
[78] Sorens, J.P. and Wantchekon, L: *Social Order without the State: The Case of Somalia*, Dept of Political Science, Yale University Press, p. 16.

Kenya and other neighbouring countries during 2000. Somalis affected by drought in the Bay and Bakool regions migrated towards urban areas. Some 11,000 Somalis migrated in and out of the Gedo region during 2000.[79]

A decade of civil war and the combined effects of calamities such as drought and famine had conspired to keep Somalia amongst the poorest of the world's nations. According to the UNICEF report of 2003 about 75 per cent of Somalis remained undernourished in 2000. The UN Food and Agricultural Organization (hereafter, FAO) estimated Somalia to be the world's hungriest nation. The UN World Food Programme, UNICEF, and the World Health Organization (hereafter, WHO) provided food and medical assistance to several million Somalis in 2000.[80]

Parallel to the continuing conflict was a process of halting reconstruction in particular regions of the former Somalia. Somaliland which operated as a separate entity from the rest of Somalia with a semi-autonomy government, for example, was regarded as safe by many returnees, but it still suffered from weak infrastructure and poor economic resources. Unreliable water infrastructures are an important obstacle to the safe return of refugees.[81] Although from February 1997 to October 2001 the UNHCR had facilitated the return of an estimated 170,000 refugees back to Somaliland, more than 350,000 Somalis remained in camps in Ethiopia and Kenya. The UNHCR forecasted an end to the return programme by 2004. UNHCR had presumed that the war would have come to the end. Returnees were concentrated in urban areas where the construction industry and telecommunications were prospering. Pressure on employment in urban areas was rising as a result. In Puntland reconstruction was based upon bottom-up initiatives and had been assisted in part by the Life and Peace Institute (Uppsala) and the UN War-torn Societies Project (Geneva). These projects assisted community representatives to identify priorities for reconstruction and rehabilitation prior to the establishment of Puntland in 1998.[82]

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[79] Ssereo, Florence, "Clanpolitics, Clan-democracy and Conflict Regulation in Africa: The Experience of Somalia", *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, Vol 2, No. 3-4 2003, pp. 21-23.
[80] US Committee for Refugees, USCR, 2002, http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/africa/somalia.htm.
[81] United States Committee for Refugees, " Somali Country Report", 2001, accessed 13/10/2013 http://www.uscr.org/world/countryrpt/africa/2001/somalia.htm.
[82] IDRC, "War-torn Societies Project", http://network.idrc.ca/ev.php?URL_ID=5215&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&reload=1057916979. Accessed on 14/10/2013

Although the projects described above seemed positive and were sometimes seen as a solution to the refugee problem, the war in Somali took another twist. This was the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union which was overthrown by Ethiopia and the Transitional Federal government. They were also supported by other IGAD member states and this exacerbated the outbreak of fresh fighting.[83] The establishment of the TNG in 2000 led to some of the worst fighting in recent years in Somalia. Combined with drought in 2001 in the Gedo, Bay, and Bakool regions this resulted in the displacement of 25,000 Somalis during the year. Continuing violence between the TNG and the factions opposed to it, largely in central and southern Somalia, pushed refugees into neighbouring Kenya, other neighbouring states, Western Europe, and the United States. During the course of 2002, approximately 305,000 Somalis were living as refugees in neighbouring countries, including an estimated 139,000 in Daadab in Kenya.[84]

At the height of the fighting in 1992, up to 2 million Somalis were internally displaced. By the end of 2002, rough estimates indicated that more than 350,000 Somalis were internally displaced, most of them women and children. This is approximately 5 per cent of the Somali population. About 150,000 of this number lived in Mogadishu, with approximately 15,000 in the port of Kismayu. The remainder were scattered throughout the country. An upsurge of inter-factional fighting during 2001-2003 and a third consecutive year of drought in 2002 then pushed Somalia into a further cycle of population displacement into Kenya.[85]

By 2003, the main causes of refugee and internal displacement in Somalia was looting, and the destruction of food stocks, grazing lands, and trading roads. The deliberate destruction of the livelihoods of opposing clan factions was also a major instrument of the conflicts. The areas most affected were in the south; namely, Gedo, Bay, Bakool, the Lower and Middle Juba, and the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo. Many refugees and IDPs came from the Bantu, Bajuni, and minority clans including the Rahanweyn. IDPs typically concentrated in urban areas, such as Hargeisa (Somaliland), Bossaso (Puntland), and Mogadishu, where they mixed with other

[83] Immigration and Refugee Services of America, "Welcome Home to Nothing: Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland", December 2001 http://www.refugees.org/pub/somaliland.cfm?item_id=137. Accessed on 14/10/2013
[84] *Ibid.*
[85] Global IDP Database, 'Internally displaced women and girls lack protection', 2003 http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpprojectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/SearchResults/D00777446A9FCC69C12569910053C25A?OpenDocument. Accessed on 11/10/2013

indigent groups and refugees. They tended to be located on the fringes of urban areas and were forced to make livelihoods through begging and casual work.[86] As refugees and IDPs were dispersed amongst other groups, their living conditions were difficult to estimate. The available evidence suggested high levels of undernourishment, disease, and vulnerability to human rights abuse. Most refugees and IDPs lacked the protection of clans and effective social support. In reality, the *de facto* authorities throughout Somalia failed to protect the displaced and often diverted humanitarian assistance intended for IDPs forcing them to cross the international border to become refugees.[87]

2.7 Disaster-induced Refugees

Degrading environments affect human migration, but this may results from external factors or decisions made by migrants. The decision to relocate, usually made at the individual or household level, characterizes voluntary migration. Voluntary migrants have a variety of motives. The common motive involves the desire for economic improvement. Other migrants are compelled by external forces to relocate. However, many important migratory flows are not easy to categorize as one or the other. Conceptually sandwiched between voluntary migrants and refugees are those compelled by deficiencies in the local social, economic, or environmental context. Environmental refugees are those pushed by deteriorating environmental factors to relocate. Environmental disruptions produce a broad range of constraints on human activities. Some changes directly expel populations, while others damage local economic opportunities as is discussed bellow.

In the 1990s Somalia became particularly vulnerable to climatic change and the effects of drought and flooding. Conventional means of risk-saving had been eroded by the disruption of traditional kin relations and the partial proletarianisation of labour. Ecological degradation left pastoralists vulnerable to climatic change. The 1974-5 Dabadheer drought showed the results of long-term environmental degradation. Traditional conflict management devices were no match for the effects of the overexploitation of grazing land. The 1974-5 drought permanently

[86] Heide, L. (no date) "The Refugee Health Unit of the Somali Ministry of Health: A History of an Extraordinarily Successful Somali Programme", (Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Somali Studies) (Held at the Documentation Centre, University of Oxford Refugee Studies Programme).

[87] Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council, "Somalia", June 2003 http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Somalia, accessed 10/12/2013

destroyed pastoralism for many nomads.

Twenty thousand died in the famine that followed the drought. Destitute pastoralists fled to relatives in the cities, further aggravating food shortages there.[88] Another major drought hit the inter-riverine area at the height of the civil war in 1991-2. As many as 300,000 to 500,000 Somalis lost their lives as a result of the ensuing famine, while 3 million were affected by it. The large number affected was the result of the spread of infectious diseases as large numbers gathered in relief camps. Drought further affected families in central and southern Somalia during 2000.[89] The inter-riverine areas on the other hand are particularly vulnerable to periodic flooding. In 1997 flooding brought on by heavy rains forced 122,000 mostly Somali refugees to flee their camps in north-eastern Kenya. Some 2,000 individuals were believed to have drowned in the floods.[90] More than 200,000 were made homeless. The floods harmed individuals who were already displaced by the country's warfare, wiping out many of the makeshift encampments in Mogadishu. A further 6,000 persons were displaced by flooding of the Shabelle River in 2000.[91]

Severe drought also resulted from the failure in 2001 of the Deyr rainy season, which normally takes place from mid-September to December. Although a little rainfall was sometimes reported in some areas, it was not adequate for a good harvest. The coastal areas from the Kenyan border to Mudug, and the southern regions of Bay, Bakool, Lower and Middle Shabelle, were the most severely affected by the drought. Water sources either completely dried up or were seriously depleted. Only deep boreholes and some wells provided water. Also affected were grazing lands.[92]

Thus very little grazing land was available, which seriously threatened livestock, especially cattle. An estimated 10 per cent of cows and five per cent of sheep and goats were reportedly killed by the severe drought. The drought forced the pastoralists to migrate towards the Kenyan

[88] Samatar, MS. *A study on Drought Induced Migration and its Impact on Land Tenure and Production in the Inter Riverine Region of Somalia, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations*, Rome, 1989, pp. 43-45

[89] Phil Nadeau, "The Somalis of Lewiston: Effects of Rapid Migration to a Homogeneous Maine City," *Southern Maine Review*, 1995, pp. 105-146.

[90] United States Committee for Refugees, "Somali Country Report", http://www.uscr.org/world/countryrpt/africa/1998/somalia.htm 1998, accessed on 23/12/2013

[91] Somalia Country Center, Famine Early Warning Systems Network http://fews.net/Somalia/, 23/12/2013

[92] Samatar, Ms. *Ibid*

side to graze and water their livestock. The harsh climate and recurrent droughts were an especially heavy burden for a population already exhausted by decades of armed conflict.

At the end of February 2011, troops of the transitional federal government launched an offensive in the capital Mogadishu, backed by the African Union, and in the central region along the border with Kenya against the Islamic Al-Shabaab. The fighting displaced thousands of people, many of whom temporarily crossed the border into Kenya in search of safety in camps near Mandera town and in Liboi.[93]

Apart from drought induced refugees, a further small number were displaced by development projects. Barre's socialist experiments in the 1970s included the wholesale nationalisation of the economy and the marginalisation of pastoral producers. The attempt to control pastoral production resulted in disruptions to the traditional means of conflict management. It was this factor which turned the 1974-5 drought into a major famine in the north and resulted in over 20,000 deaths. At the time, 10-15 per cent of the pastoral populations were forced to register in relief camps. Widespread crop failures contributed to the effects of the drought. In line with the aim of domesticating pastoral producers, the Barre government transferred over 100,000 nomads from relief camps in the north to three sites in the arable areas of southern Somalia.[94]

2.8 Refugee Situation in Kenya 1991- 2011

The Somali refugee population in Kenya stood at over 900,000 by the end of 2011 according to the UNHCR. This data might not represent the true number because some of them are not registered and live with their Kenyan kin. [95] It was possible to classify the Somali refugees into two categories. Firstly, were the elite political refugees of 1990s. Most were highly educated and had already been living in Kenya for a long period. The second groups were those who were unable to receive much education due to the prolonged state of war in Somali. Most of these

[93]Nadeau, Phil. "The Flawed US Refugee Workforce Development Strategy for Somali Economic Self-Sufficiency in Lewiston," also Gordana Rabrenovic, "When Hate Comes to Town: Community Response to Violence Against Immigrants," *American Behavioral Scientist* 5, no. 2. 2007, pp. 349-360.

[94] Heide, L. The Refugee Health Unit of the Somali Ministry of Health: A History of an Extraordinarily Successful Somali Programme, Held at the Documentation Centre, University of Oxford Refugee Studies Programme November, 1998.

[95] Oral interview, Daud Hassan, Garissa, 22/07/2012

refugees were living in Garissa, either in Daadab Camp or with their relatives in the rural areas because they cannot fit into the urban setup. Such refugees felt safe while in Kenya among the Kenyan Somali community. They however, often as compete over resources in most cases this lead to conflict with the local people.[96]

Many Somali refugees understandably have psychological problems. There are high rate of unemployment among Somalis because many of them have no recognised educational qualification.[97] Furthermore, they are not allowed to work in Kenya while on refugee status. Some of them participate in criminal and radical circles within the large Garissa County.[98] This was evident in 2011 when some of the international NGO staffs were abducted by the Al-Shabaab in this regard the refugee were contravening the AU convention of 1969 by working in cohorts with the terror groups for not forwarding vital information by the terror organizers . The social and economic problems among Somali refugees are so widespread that adults are unable to provide young people with proper support. Older Somalis have close ties with Somalia and with those left behind.[99]

The collapse of the Somali state also led to the emergence of many different militia groups led by war lords. Among them were Mohamed Farah Aideed, Osman Morgan, Barre Hirale and many others. After fighting for a decade the wars turned into religious conflict leading to the rise of the Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is a radical group in Somalia which supports the Saudi Arabian derived Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. Al-Shabaab's most extremist sections claim to be loyal to Al Qaida and they call for a worldwide jihad. The group was led by Sheikh Mukhtar Abdirahman 'Abu Zubeyr. The group organized a structure grouped around villages, clans or religious leaders who have a considerable degree of autonomy, and often do not share the group leaders' transnationalist ideology.[100] Many young people, who lacked resources, joined Al-Shabaab as a

[96] UNHCR, *Statistical Online Population database, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, New York: UNHCR, data derived on 12/01/2011
[97] Jacobsen, Karen, "Livelihoods in Conflict: The Pursuit of Livelihoods by Refugees and the Impact on the Human Security of Host Communities, Expert Working Paper, prepared for the Center for Development Research Study: Migration-Development, Evidence and Policy Options", Feinstein International Famine Center, Tuft University, USA. 2002.
[98] Oral interview, Daud Hassan, Garissa, 22/07/2012
[99] Jacobsen Karen *Op.cit*
[100] Mohamed Haji Mukhtar, *Historical Dictionary of Somalia*, 2003.

means of earning a living.

A large number of civilians were killed as a result of these clashes between the Somali governments and the terror gruops. All the parties committed human rights violations, such as the use of heavy weapons and improvised explosives devices in densely populated areas.[101] Every day people were reported killed as a result of bombs, shells and other types of violence.[102] Crime and banditry became rampant due to the lack of government authority. This pushed even more Somali people out of their country as refugees.[103] Due to the dangerous and unpredictable insurgencies, aid workers suspended humanitarian support to displaced persons in some areas of Somalia. Thus lack of food, forced more people to leave the country. It is these people who left the country who will be the subject of discussion in the sections that follow.

2.9 Conclusion

This Chapter on the forced migration has introduced the factors that underlie the current debate about the origins of refugee problem in Somalia. Particularly important in this chapter were the question of wars that resulted in the collapse of the Somali state, conflict within Islamic sub-groups, conflict between clans, conflict between Islam and traditional religion and natural disasters. The chapter also indicated that the refugee problem in Somalia has changed substantially over the last years. The increasing use of refugee camps as places to confine refugees, rather than help them become self-supporting has led to an increased burden being placed on the international and the host communities. Yet Somali refugees are characterised by their poverty and relative lack of services. These problems worsened the refugee conditions. The impact of such refugees on the host community will be dealt with in the next chapter.

[101] Human Rights Watch, "Somalia", http://www.hrw.org/reports/world/somalia-pubs.php. accessed 20/05/2013
[102] *Ibid*
[103] Suzanne Wolf, *Forum Factsheet: Somalis in the Netherlands*, Institute for Multicultural Affairs, February, 2011, pp. 1-4.

CHAPTER THREE

KENYA GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO SOMALI REFUGEE INFLUXES, 1991-2011

3.1 Introduction

As the number of refugees increased from 1991 the Kenyan government was forced to undertake important institutional changes that were not only meant to protect the citizens against the effects of refugee presence. Some of the effects were deforestation, cattle rustling and struggle for limited resources such as water and pasture which were there major causes of conflicts. The measures were also meant to protect refugees in Kenya. This chapter explores the dynamics of displacement and the responses of policy makers in Kenya and discusses emerging and potential policy approaches. It also examines the different political and humanitarian approaches undertaken by the Kenyan government to tackle the refugee situation. It analyses some improvements in the Kenyan Government's refugee protection capacity and independent monitoring to protect refugees' basic rights.

3.2 Response through Legal Measures

The refugee situation in Kenya has experienced important changes since 1991 when the country started experiencing high movement of refugees from the war torn Somalia. The country was forced develop responsive mechanisms to deal with the risks associated with the refugee intrusion into Kenya. The Kenyan government initiated a major shift away from a previously open laissez-faire approach to that of offering temporary protection to refugees. The government wanted refugees contained in remote areas of the country, such as Kakuma and Dadaab. Kenya is a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees together with its 1967 Protocols. Kenya also signed the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Yet it did not have national legislation for refugees until 2006.[104]

The first move towards the new approach by the Kenyan Government was to register the refugees. Kenya set up the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) which was mandated to

[104] 'UNHCR, "Frequently Asked Questions about Resettlement", UNHCR Publication, undated, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/ 4ac0873d6.html (last visited 8 Sep. 2011).

manage refugee and coordinate maintenance services. The department derived its mandate mainly from Refugee Act of 2006 and the 2009 Registration Regulations.

Somali refugees were registered *prima facie*, on the basis of which groups were offered temporary protection while in camps. The government also requested the UNHCR in the early 1990s to assist in managing the refugee camps.[105] The camps included Dadaab's constituent camps of Ifo, Ifo2, Hagadera, Dhagahaley and Kambi oos which was established in 2011 in the North Eastern Province (NEP) close to Somalia, and to a lesser extent Kakuma in the north west.[106] During the 1990s, the government with the assistance of the UNHCR relocated many refugees to these camps from other locations where they had initially settled. The NEP has a substantial indigenous Kenyan Somali population.[107] The relocation was meant to keep the Somali Refugees close to the Somali of Kenyan Origin.

However many refugees were moving and establishing themselves in Kenyan urban areas, in order to avoid the harsh camp conditions, such as scarce rations, recurrent sickness among children and insecurity. They also wanted to access better educational opportunities and health facilities for their children. They hoped to find work and build an improved future from that of their families, to get in contact with relatives abroad with a view to arranging onward migration to other countries or simply because they preferred city life to that of the camps.[108]

The Kenyan government's legal measures for refugees began with the Refugees Act, of 2006.[109] The Refugee Regulations came into force in 2009. A Department of Refugee Affairs (hereafter, DRA) was established within the Ministry of State for Immigration and Registration of Persons.

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[105] J. Milner, Refugees, *The State and the Politics of Asylum in Africa*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 73-76.
[106] B.J. Hansen, "Between Vulnerability and Assertiveness: Negotiating Resettlement in Kakuma Refugee Camp, Kenya", *African Affairs*, 107(429), pp. 2008, 569–587.
[107] J. Crisp and C. Long, "A Long and Winding Road", Background Paper for Regional Conference on Refugee Protection and International Migration: Mixed Movements and Irregular Migration from the East and Horn of Africa and Great Lakes Region to Southern Africa, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, UNHCR and IOM, Sep. 2010, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/4c7fa45b6.html (last visited 8 Sep. 2011).
[108] C. Horst, "Buufis amongst Somalis in Dadaab: The Transnational and Historical Logics Behind Resettlement Dreams", Journal of Refugee Studies, 19(2), 2006, pp. 143–157.
[109] M. Enghoff, B. Hansen, A. Umar, B. Gildestad, M. Owen and A. Obara, In Search of Protection and Livelihoods: Socio-economic and Environmental Impacts of Dadaab Refugee Camps on Host Communities, Report for the Royal Danish Embassy, the Republic of Kenya and the Norwegian Embassy, 2010, available at: http://www.ambnairobi.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/8E1CC5EB-6B25-4531-A7E0-CDC32A0961B7/0/ FinalReport30092010.pdf (last visited 8 Sep. 2011).

The UN Country Team (UNCT) therefore set up a joint mission to the refugee camps and established funding appeals for immigration of refugees.[110] As part of a three-year plan to assume from UNHCR the responsibility for key areas of refugee policy implementation, the DRA took over the reception and registration of refugees in March 2011. The DRA also chaired an active cross-governmental Refugee Affairs Committee, engaging officials from Foreign Affairs, Internal Security, Local Government, Public Health, and the National Registration Bureau in regular discussions of refugee issues.[111]

The Kenyan government also initiated key legal and policy frameworks. A new Refugees Bill and a Citizenship and Immigration Bill were drafted as part of the review of all legislation. This was prompted by the passing of a new Constitution in 2010. The Refugees Bill proposed modifications to the existing laws related to refugee status in Kenya. The modification appeared to focus on addressing security concerns by tightening bureaucratic control of the refugee population. This was brought to enforce immediate registration followed by penalties for non-compliance. It also elaborated offences and penalties relating to identification document fraud.[112] The Government of Kenya also initiated policy discussions with UNHCR and civil society stakeholders such as the Refugee Consortium of Kenya and Centre for Victims of Torture. The focus was on ways to improve the protection of urban refugees and ease their access to work permits.[113]

As the government strived to regulate refugee movement within Kenya, several lines of tension were drawn between United Nation High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian agencies in the context of the institutional changes initiated by the Kenyan

[110] UNHCR Internal Documents; interview with UNHCR Kenya (4).
[111] J. Moret, S. Baglioni and D. Efionayi Mader, The Path of Somali Refugees into Exile: A Comparative Analysis of Secondary Movements and Policy Responses, SFM Studies 46, Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies, 2006, available at: http://doc.rero.ch/lm.php?url¼1000,44,4,20070216150929-NK/s_46.pdf (last visited 8 Sep. 2011).
[112] Draft Refugee Bill 2011; see also KBC, "Kajwang' Receives Immigration Bills", KBC News, 15 Jul. 2011, http://www.kbc.co.ke/news.asp?nid¼71314 (last visited 6 Sep. 2011).
[113] A. Lime, "Improve Refugees' Lives, Urges Kajwang", Daily Nation, 20 Jun. 2011, available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201106220287.html (last visited 6 Sep. 2011); S. Konzolo, W. Crompton & S. Cechvala, "An Overview of the Refugee Status Determination Processes and Right of Refugees in Kenya, Paper Presented at the International Association for the Study of Forced Migration Conference, Kampala, 3–6 July 2011 (unavailable to the public).

government.[114] First, the DRA was dissatisfied with levels of support from donors. Yet donors and UNHCR were reluctant to be party to the creation of an externally funded public refugee bureaucracy. UNHCR feared that corruption would not allow success for such a programme.[115] Secondly, the UNHCR feared that Kenya was violating the rights of refugees by closing its borders with Somalia, forcing them to return to their home country. This allowed massive congestion of Dadaab camp in 2010.[116] The Government was quick to point out to the international community that the scale of Somali refugee arrivals, combined with domestic economic and political tensions in Kenya, made international support essential.[117] State security concerns in Kenya represented a major driver of central Government policy in relation to refugees. The Kenyan government took further security measures after the Al-Shabaab threats to its Security systems and the General public.[118]

3.3 Prevention of Refugee Invasion.

The prevention of displacement was a common goal for Kenya's policy makers. Threatened by political violence and hunger, the people of Somalia have tried to cope in various ways in their original place of residence. Often Kenyans have tried to encourage Somalis to adapt to the situation in their home country before they depart.[119] However, in 2011 there was a greater mass influx of Somali refugees to Kenya than ever before. There was growing political support in Kenya from the UNHCR and the UN General Assembly for the creation of a more secure buffer zone within southern Somalia for refugees. This region might then serve as an area where humanitarian aid could be provided under the supervision of the TFG government. This was meant to prevent further dislocation of Somali people from Somalia's southern region. It was

[114] Government of Kenya, Briefing on the Refugee and Drought Situation in the Country, 21 Jul. 2011, available at: http://reliefweb.int/node/435254 (last visited 6 Sep. 2011); W. Menya, "Raila in Plea to Donors for More Aid as He Releases Maize from Strategic Stocks", The Daily Nation, 22 Jul. 2011, available at: http://www .nation.co.ke/News/Railaþinþpleaþtoþdonorsþforþmoreþaid/-/1056/1205672/-/2p6vrwz/-/index.html (last visited 6 Sep. 2011).

[115] M. Bradbury and M. Kleinman, "Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Kenya", Boston, Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University, Press 2010, p. 95.

[116] UNHCR Dadaab, Briefing Note on Dadaab Refugee Camp – 21st of July, Briefing Note, Kenya, UNHCR Sub Office Dadaab, 21 Jul. 2011, available at: http://onpoint.wbur.org/files/2011/07/Briefing-Note_Dadaab-21-07-11.pdf (last visited 6 Sep. 2011).

[117] E.A. Gimode, "An Anatomy of Violent Crime and Insecurity in Kenya: The Case of Nairobi, 1985 – 1999", *Africa Development*, 26(1–2), 2001, p. 87.

[118] C. Holleman, "Conflict, Economic Crisis and Drought", *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine*, Oct. 2008.

[118] M. Karanja, "MPs Support Plans to Create a Buffer Zone", The Daily Nation, 8 May 2011,

[119] C. Holleman, "Conflict, Economic Crisis and Drought", *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine*, Oct. 2008.

also to assist in absorbing Somali internally displaced people, prevent arrivals of refugees in Kenya, and facilitate repatriation.[120] This came following the stand of the Transional Federal Government and various Somali politicians who were against the autonomy of Jubaland. Jubaland was to encompass Somalia's border districts of Gedo, Lower, and Middle Juba. The region was envisaged as a semi-autonomous area under the TFG. Kenya lent both security and political support for this cause. Kenya also increased military engagement on the Somali border and helped provide military training to troops recruited from among the refugees. These troops were reportedly put at the disposal of Professor Mohammed Abdi Mohammed, former Somali TFG Minister of Defense, in the offensive against Al-Shabaab.[121]

Efforts by Kenyan Government to create the potential of Jubaland to act as a buffer zone from continuous al-Shabab attacks were treated with considerable caution by the Somalia Transition Federal Government. This was particularly important in light of apparent efforts by Kenyan government which emphasized that people forming part of the refugee influx in 2011 were fleeing drought, rather than violence from Somalia. This was implicitly undermining their claim to refugee status. The Kenyan government suggested that the refugees may be more appropriately assisted inside Somalia.[122] The TFG's stand was that Kenya's spatial approaches of safe havens and preventive zones would appear to present particular moral hazards, tending to focus on interim containment rather than addressing the root causes of displacement.[123] Kenya was accused by the TFG for its increasing open efforts to establish a small buffer state inside Somalia. The state was to act as a buffer state, or security zone. This state was known as Jubaland and sits just inside Somalia on its border with Kenya.[124]

It was against this background, that Kenya tried to pursue the policy of voluntary repatriation which was viewed as a durable solution to displacement by involving the restoration of

[120] M. Karanja,*Op.cit*,
[121] Bradbury and Kleinman, "Dadaab Camp, Kenya, Briefing Notes", Nairobi; UNHCR, 2011
[122] Government of Kenya, "Briefing on the Refugee and Drought Situation; HRW, You Don't Know Who to Blame", Nairobi: HRW, 2011
[123] J. Zapater, "The Prevention of Forced Displacement: Inconsistencies of a Concept, New Issues in Refugee Research", Working Paper No. 186, Geneva, UNHCR, Apr. 2010, 16.
[124] Fredrick Nzwili, "Kenyan peacekeepers accused of creating buffer state inside Somalia: Mogadishu says Nairobi is creating an autonomous state of Jubaland on its border and backing a hand-picked warlord to run it. It's asking Kenyan troops to leave", *Reuters*, July 5, 2013

citizenship in the country of origin.[125] Between 1990 and 2005, it is estimated that there were over one million refugees returned to Somalia from the County. Half of them were assisted by UNHCR. Despite significant efforts to return Somali refugees back to their country, hundreds of thousands of refugees still crossed into Kenya to seek asylum. Kenya stationed the Administration Police, GSU and the Military at its border town of Liboi to monitor and regulate refugees' entry point. The result was many incidents of police harassing, arresting and detaining Somalis illegally entering Kenya.[126]

It is worth noting that, according to the UN and OAU/AU Refugee Conventions 1951 and 1969, refugees are to be protected by the host states. The Kenyan government made a considerable progress in dealing with refugee security in Dadaab in 2009. The Dadaab camps had become rife with banditry, looting, robbery, rape, and assault.[127] In response to the chronic insecurity in the camps, efforts were made by the Government and UNHCR to boost policing by deploying general service unit (GSU) in assisting other security agencies to maintain law and order at refugee camps. The Kenya Government also tried to improve access to justice with magistrate and Kadhi courts. There was a reduction in violent crime in and around Dadaab between 1998 and 2003.[128]

However, serious security problems persisted among Somali refugees. In response to a variety of situations, some involving specific threats which required specific police action, and others involving a need for non-violent political engagement, the Kenyan police responded with clumsy, heavy handed and militarised action against a wide section of the Somali population.[129] It was not surprising that bribery of police became rampant, as a key strategy used by Somali refugees to escape arrest and detention.[130]

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[125] Interview of UNHCR staff in Gigiri Nairobi , 11th july2012.(Name withheld).
[126] HRW, Welcome to Kenya: Police Abuse of Somali Refugees, Washington D.C., HRW, 2010, available at: http:// www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/09/kenya-police-abuse-somali-refugees (last visited 7 Sep. 2011).
[127] Oral interview, Omar Abdi, Dadaab refugee Camp, 12/06/2012.
[128] Oral interview with a UNHCR Official at Dadaab 12/06/2012.
[129] Lochery, Aliens; H.A. Mahamoud, "Livestock Trade in the Kenyan, Somali and Ethiopian Borderlands, Chatham House Briefing Paper", AFP BOP 2010/02, London, Chatham House, 2010, available at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109448 (last visited 7 Sep. 2011); UNHCR Dadaab, Briefing Notes.
[130] Focus group discuss at Dadaab District at Ifo Camp,12/06/2012.

However, UNHCR and other NGOs reported in 2009 that their efforts to sensitise the police and the judiciary regarding refugee rights and documentation, within the context of wider police reform, bore some fruit alongside this, convincing donors to invest in the Department of Refugee Affairs'. [131] The State security concerns often overshadowed the required protection for refugees. This took place through the secondment of national civil society protection specialists from places such as Centre for Victims of Torture, Refugee Consortium of Kenya and Department for Refugee Affairs. These bodies invested in the training of specialised cadre of long-contract Government Refugee Protection Officers. Alongside this, UNHCR supported by donors engaged in protection monitoring, particularly in the border areas of the NEP, and continued to fund legal support to refugees in urban areas, with a view to engaging in a more robust watchdog role on behalf of refugees in the future.[132]

However, the basic rights and safety of Somali refugees in Kenya still raised several concerns. These concerns included the threats encountered by new arrivals, registration backlogs, forcible repatriations, the lack of basic needs such as food, security, medicine and shelter in the refugee camps, and refugees' lack of access to justice. There was need for improved monitoring of the human rights situation, particularly in the border area, investments in DRA professional capacity, and better training in general coping mechanisms of refugees at the camps.[133] Meanwhile, since 2006 there were numerous reports of the government of Kenya forcing the return of refugees found outside the camps back into designated camps, particularly newly arrived refugees, in the NEP border area.[134] According to an NGO Refugee Consortium of Kenya (hereafter, RCK), police deported more than one hundred Somali, sometimes at night during a two week period in April 2011.[135]

[131] UNHCR Kenya (3); Campbell, Crisp and Kiragu, "Navigating Nairobi"; Pavanello, Elhawary and Pantuliano, "Hidden and Exposed", Nairobi: UNHCR, 2011.
[132] J. Crisp, "The Local Integration and Local Settlement of Refugees, New Issues in Refugee Research, ''Working Paper No. 102, Geneva, UNHCR, 2004.
[133] S. Banki, Refugee Integration in the Intermediate Term: A Journal on a Study of Nepal, Pakistan, and Kenya, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 108, Geneva, UNHCR, 2004.
[134] HRW, From Horror to Hopelessness: Kenya's Forgotten Somali Refugee Crises, Washington D.C., HRW, 2009, available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya0309web.pdf (last visited 7 Sep. 2011).
[135] HRW, "Stop Deporting Somalis Fleeing Conflict",BBC Focus on Africa and Press Release, 31 Mar. 2011.

The Refugee Consortium of Kenya further reported that a controversial incident happened in Mandera in March 2011 where refugees were involved in a conflict with the local people over grazing land, watering points during the dry seasons.[136] Following fighting between refugees and the locals in Beled Hawa, some 13,000 people both from the refugee population and the locals congregated in a temporary camp but dispersed after Government intervention. There were different accounts of what occurred.[137] It was argued that the Government proposed to register the refugees, and that they dispersed because many were Kenyan Somalis attracted by the assistance being provided in the temporary refugee camp set up by the Red Cross.[138] According to Human Rights Watch, however, the District Commissioner ordered the police to forcibly return the refugees to Somalia and ordered the Kenyan Red Cross to stop providing assistance.[139] Most non-governmental organization workers such as WFP, Kenya Red cross and RCK consulted were under the impression that a kind of soft refoulment took place on the Kenyan side. The displaced people were pressured to leave through Government threats and assurance that their homeland areas were safe following TFG takeover. The Government also withdrew assistance offer of asylum. The general view was that many refugees indeed returned, while the drought striken Kenyan Somalis dispersed into the urban areas in Garissa and Mandera or travelled to Dadaab.[140]

3.4 Action on Refugees' Basic physical needs

Although there were numerous infringements of refugees' civil, political, social, and economic rights in Kenya, the UNHCR, the Government of Kenya and other humanitarian partners struggled to cater for both the long standing and newer refugee populations.[141] By mid August 2011, the Dadaab camps, originally established to host 90,000 people, had a registered Somali refugee population of 387,077. In addition, tens of thousands of refugee people squated on the outskirts of the camp, on land belonging to the host community as they awaited intervention.[142]

[136] Interview with an official from Refugee Consortium of Kenya 10/06/2012.
[137] Oral interview with Aden Ali of UNHCR Dadaab, 12/06/2012.
[138] Ibid.
[139] HRW, "Stop Deporting Somalis Fleeing Conflict", Press release, 31 Mar. 2011.
[140] Group Discussions with refugees at Dadaab, Apr. and May 2012.
[141] Milner, Refugees; B. Harrell-Bond and G. Verdirame, Janus, *Faced Humanitarianism*, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2005.
[142] UNHCR, *East and Horn of Africa*, op., cit.

From May 2011, UNHCR in collaboration with the government of Kenya introduced adjustments to standard reception systems to try to ensure that aid reached recently arrived refugees promptly. Furthermore, the government tried preventive measures against the spread of disease. Blanket supplementary feeding for all children under five, and specific initiatives to assist survivors of sexual-and gender-based violence were carried out.[143] There were also efforts to address the overcrowding. An organized relocation of over 13,000 Somalis from Dadaab to Kakuma took place between 2009 and 2011, followed by a spate of informal relocations to Kakuma and urban areas. The government also responded by extending Ifo camp. Considerable progress was made in dealing with refugee security in Dadaab.[144]

3.5 Action on Local Integration

In the international refugee regime, integration describes the legal process by which a refugee becomes a full member of a new national community. More broadly, the term is used to describe the changing relationship between migrants and the host society, expressed through formal status and rights and other forms of social, political and economic participation.[145] For the Somali case, there have been protracted refugees situations, with examples of durable solutions of full legal integration. Discussions have focused on notions of localised integration, de facto/informal processes of integration, integration in the intermediate term, and secure settlement or accommodation.[146] In light of these notions, this section investigates issues of legal status, place of residence, economic strategies, and community relations and explores both the spaces for societal participation opened up by official policy, and those informally created by refugees themselves.

In Kenya, the chances of upgrading one's legal status from *prima facie* refugee to citizen are slim.[147] While obtaining citizenship through marriage is possible, legal specialists' report that it is not an easy process. There are also constitutional provisions for naturalization of people who have resided in Kenya since 1991 can speak Kiswahili, and are economically self reliant. But a

[143] Ibid.
[144] *Ibid*
[145] United Nations Convention on Refugee of 1951 and OAU of 1969.
[146] S. Banki, "Refugee Integration in the Intermediate Term" in *A Journal of a Study of Nepal, Pakistan, and Kenya,* No. 108, Geneva, UNHCR, 2004.
[147] Oral interview, Fatuma Abdi, Dadaab Garissa, 13/07/2012.

further condition is that the person must have entered Kenya legally, and this has been used as a reason to refuse refugees naturalisation. Although it is legally debatable, given that refugees have a right to seek asylum under international law, this position seems unlikely to change, given the large numbers of Somalis who would otherwise be eligible to become citizens. There is also state and public resistance to that prospect following the increasing population of the Somali in Kenya and their alleged threats to Kenya security.[148]

However, some refugees informally obtained legal status by obtaining Kenyan national ID cards from corrupt officials or through corrupt would be MPs who wanted their vote. However, the extent of this practice was being progressively uncovered. New processes cross-check refugee fingerprints against IDs, and it was reported to be difficult to delete the fingerprints once they are in the national ID database.[149] The issue is complicated by the fact that some local people register in the camps to access free food. It becomes hard to tell who was a refugee because they had national IDs.[150] This allowed the refugees to move more freely within Kenya, to live where they preferred, and to start businesses and access education and health services more easily. However, drawbacks emerged for some refugees who were excluded from resettlement processing back in Somalia because they held a Kenyan IDs. The challenge of double citizenship as a Kenyan and a Somali was created.

Offering citizenship or more secure resident status to large numbers of Somali refugees were politically unfeasible for the Kenyan Government, particularly in the situation of mass influx. Integration is a politically sensitive term. Although many refugees have spent as long as two decades in Kenya and are unlikely to return home in the absence of durable stability in Somalia, it would be advisable for Government actors to recognize this and formulate more proactive policy responses. Options for piecemeal approaches, such as identifying eligible subgroups like long-term refugees/qualified professionals or gradual approaches to integration, were tedious. This includes identifying progressive pathways to fuller legal status, contingent on the fulfillment of particular conditions in relation to refugee status hence they merit exploration. Civil society groups, NGOs and UNHCR had encouraged the Government to keep integration on

[148] Oral interview with UNHCR official, Nairobi, Kenya, 26/07/2012.
[149] *Ibid*
[150] *Ibid*

the agenda in policy discussions and engage in long-term thinking around policy options.[151]

However, the Somali perspective on integration is also complex. The very persistent displacement acts as a force for informal integration, as the second generation grew in Kenya, who had never seen Somalia. There is a cohort of Somali refugees who have studied in Kenyan schools alongside nationals, speak fluent Swahili and have thrown themselves into the fast paced matatu culture in Kenyan urban areas.[152] However, many refugees did not really see themselves as part of Kenyan society. They complained of local discrimination. Kenyan Somalis had a somewhat ambivalent position in relation to Somali refugees. This was due to the fact that the presence of Kenyan Somali had offered Somali refugees opportunities for a sort of segmented assimilation into a national minority, with its associated advantages and disadvantages. Cooperation with Kenyan Somali has been crucial for many refugees economically. However, there was also competition, with some Kenyan Somali complained about losing business to the money and the sharper business practices of Mogadishu Somalis since 2006.[153]

The treatment of Kenyan and refugee Somalis was closely intertwined with refugees entering a context in which Somali Kenyans were already subject to high levels of official suspicion and control. This further undermined position of Kenyan Somali.

In sum, legal integration in Kenya was blocked by the Government, which offered temporary protection in refugee camps. There are multiple examples of *de facto* economic integration resulting from a vibrant Somali business community. Meanwhile, there were various forces for and against integration, in the relationships between Kenyan, Somali and Kenyan Somali communities. The informal processes described are important in offering some refugees opportunities for fuller social participation, but it is important to underline that not all refugees are able to obtain Kenyan IDs, move to Nairobi, set up a business, or further their education.

[151] Oral interview with Hassan Abdulafadhir a lawyer Specialised in Refugee law, 21 Jul. 2012.
[152] A. Bainah, "A Dream Deferred: The Politics of Eastleigh", Nairobi, Draft paper, 2011.
[153] *ibid.*

3.6 Responding to Refugee Crisis through IGADD

3.6.1 Brief History of IGAD

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which was founded in 1986. The recurring and severe droughts and other natural disasters between 1974 and 1984 caused widespread famine, ecological degradation and economic hardship in the Eastern Africa region. Although individual countries made substantial efforts to cope with the situation and received generous support from the international community, the magnitude and extent of the problem argued strongly for a regional approach to supplement national efforts. In 1983 and 1984, six countries in the Horn of Africa namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda took action through the United Nations to establish an intergovernmental body for development and drought control in their region. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government met in Djibouti in January 1986 to sign the Agreement which officially launched IGADD with Headquarters in Djibouti. The State of Eritrea became the seventh member after attaining independence in 1993.[154]

In April 1995 in Addis Ababa, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government made a Declaration to revitalise IGADD and expand cooperation among member states. On 21 March 1996 in Nairobi the Assembly of Heads of State and Government signed the Letter of Instrument to Amend the IGADD Charter/ Agreement establishing the revitalised IGAD with a new name as The Intergovernmental Authority on Development. The Revitalised IGAD, with expanded areas of regional cooperation and a new organisational structure, was launched by the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on 25 November 1996 in Djibouti, the Republic of Djibouti.[155]

The revitalised IGADs mission was to assist and complement the efforts of the Member States to achieve, through increased cooperation the following objectives; food security and environmental protection, promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs, and economic cooperation and integration of the member states. Its vision was to be the

[154] The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), for Peace and Regional Coperation http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93%3Aabout-us&catid=49%3Aabout-us&Itemid=153&showall=1

[155] *Ibid*

premier regional organization for achieving peace, prosperity and regional integration in the IGAD region. The objectives of IGAD were to include; promotion of joint development strategies and gradually harmonize macro-economic policies and programmes in the social, technological and scientific fields, to harmonize policies with regard to trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture, and natural resources, and promote free movement of goods, services, and people within the region, to create an enabling environment for foreign, cross-border and domestic trade and investment, to achieve regional food security and encourage and assist efforts of member states to collectively combat drought and other natural and man-made disasters and their natural consequences.[156]

They also included to initiate and promote programmes and projects to achieve regional food security and sustainable development of natural resources and environment protection, and encourage and assist efforts of member states to collectively combat drought and other natural and man-made disasters and their consequences, to develop and improve a coordinated and complementary infrastructure, in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy in the region, to promote peace and stability in the region and create mechanisms within the region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter-state and intra-state conflicts through dialogue, to mobilize resources for the implementation of emergency, short-term, medium-term and long-term programmes within the framework of regional cooperation, to promote and realize the objectives of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the African Economic Community and to facilitate, promote and strengthen cooperation in research development and application in science and technology.[157]

3.6.2 IGAD Response to Refugee Crisis

The Kenyan government realizing that the Somali refugee problem could be best handled through regional cooperation, decided to address the problem through the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD). IGADD was established in 1986, with the

[156] *Ibid*

[157] The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), for Peace and Regional Coperation http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93%3Aabout-us&catid=49%3Aabout-us&Itemid=153&showall=1

objective of addressing environmental crises that led to food insecurity and famine in the Horn of Africa, one of the contributor factors to the Somali refugee problem.[158] Because of the prevailing inter-and intra-state conflicts, the impetus for the establishment of IGADD came from UN agencies, which saw the urgent need for a regional coordination agency to address problems of refugees, particularly through addressing the problem of famine and drought.[159]

The founding members were Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and Djibouti the headquarters. In 1993, Eritrea joined the Organization after its independence. IGADD is one of the African Union's (AU) recognized Regional Economic Communities (RECs), covering an area of 5,222,520 square kilometres with over 200 million people. Despite the organization's narrow initial scope, IGADD summits provided a venue for meetings between member states to solve issues of mutual concern, including peace and security. IGADD facilitated peace between Ethiopia and Somalia which, as discussed in the earlier chapters, contributed to the Somali refugee crisis. By 1994, the members of IGADD had come to realize that the developmental problems of the region extended beyond the impact of environmental degradation and conflict.[160]

The refugees were faced with infrastructure problem in Somali and IGADD developed a mechanism which involved reinforcing Somali national infrastructure necessary for implementing peace projects and policies.[161] IGADD come up with four directorates which are essential in addressing the causes of conflict not only in Somalia but also in member countries. Borrowing a leaf from the United Nations approach of addressing conflict through focusing on how people live and developing of the seven categories of human security-namely; economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security,[162] IGADD came up with economic, social, agricultural and

[158] Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGADD), IGADD Secretariat Annual Report 2008, Addis Ababa, 2009.
[159] United Nations Security Council, "Security Council Calls for Halt of Hostilities in Somalia, Cooperation with Regional Peace Initiatives." Press Release, February 27, 1997.
[160] Negussay, Ayele. 1984. "Somalia's Relations with her Neighbours: From Greater Somalia to Western Somalia to Somali Refugees," in *Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, edited by* Sven Rubenson, Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian Studies, 1984.
[161] Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGADD), IGADD Communiqué of the 33rd Extra Ordinary Session (Extra-Ord. No.1) of the IGADD Council of Ministers on the Security and Political Situation in Somalia, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 20th May, 2009.
[162] UNDP, *Human Development Report*, New York: UNDP, 1994.

environmental, peace and security and the administration and finance division.[163]

Conflict-induced refugees cross reference remained a concern to the states in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia. In addressing the issues related to conflict, IGAD established The Conflict Early Warning Network (hereafter, (CEWARN) with the objective of preventing conflicts, mainly in pastoral areas particularly among the clans of Somalis, in the region by facilitating the exchange of pertinent information among the member states. IGAD's security sector strived to build member states' national capacity against terrorism, and promote regional security cooperation by tightening border control and enhancing judicial measures against terrorism.[164] IGAD had liaison offices located in member states to monitor issues that threaten security and peace in the region. The office in Kenya is responsible for environmental issues. This is critical to the Somali refugee crisis because a large number of Somali refugees are natural disaster induced refugees. A liaison office was established in Mogadishu which is responsible for updating IGAD on day-to-day developments in Somalia. IGAD also set up a Facilitation Office for Somalia in Ethiopia to be able to follow the development in Somalia.[165]

3.7 Kenya's Role in Drafting Somali Peace and Security Strategy of IGAD

Kenya worked towards the integration efforts because it shares a border with Somalia. Kenya was threatened by the crisis in Somalia as the north eastern part of the country is inhabited by ethnic Somali. Like Ethiopia, Kenya is exposed to terrorist attacks from groups that operate from Somalia. The flow of Somali refugees is another source of concern for the government as most of the Somali refugees are in Kenya.

Kenya had carried the heaviest burden as a result of conflict in Somali as compared to other states neigbouring Somalia. Therefore, it remained at the front line in development of any strategy that would assist achieve peace in Somalia. The importance of regional peace and security strategy is indisputable to contain and manage conflicts that induced refugees in

[163] Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Communiqué of the IGAD Council of Ministers, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia"*IGAD frankly criticizes the TFG"* 2008.
[164] Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), IGAD Secretariat Annual Report 2008, Addis Ababa, 2009
[165] Oral interview, with IGAD official in Nairobi.

Somalia. Kenya is, therefore, playing a very important role in harmonizing and coordinating peacemaking and building activities in Somalia through IGAD. This follows IGAD endorsing its first peace and security strategy during the 2003 summit.[166] IGAD developed elements of peace and security architecture which were put in all member states. The starting point was the obligations of all member states imposed by the UN Charter and the Constitutive Act of the AU to participate in advancing the international collective security.[167]

There were also IGAD specific agreements and mechanisms that indicate the collective aspirations of member states for mutual security including the Agreement Establishing IGAD in (1996), Program on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, the Protocol on the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism,[168] (hereafter, CEWARN), IGAD Capacity Building Against Terrorism (hereafter, ICPAT), and the policy framework for the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (hereafter, EASBRIG).[169] The peace and security strategy accords the primary responsibility to governments to ensure peace and security to their citizens. The strategic objectives include strengthening conflict prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts consolidating preventive diplomacy; promoting cooperation to address common peace and security threats; and enhancing cooperation in other areas accidental to peace and security such as environment and trans-boundary resources.[170]

IGAD member states were to solve the refugee problem through respect for principles of international law, mutual respect, and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, rejection of use of force, respect for territorial integrity and equitable utilization of trans-boundary resources, and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty are the chief principles of

[166] International Crisis Group, *Negotiating a Blueprint for Peace in Somalia*, Africa Report No 59, 2003.
[167] El-Affend, Abdewahab, "Facing IGAD's Triple challenge: New Prospects for regional cooperation in the Horn of Africa." Paper presented at the Conference to launch an IGAD Strategy for Peace and Security in the sub-Region, Khartoum, Sudan, October 1–3, 2005.
[168] Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Agreement Establishing the IGAD, Addis Ababa, 1996.
[169] Farah, Ibrahim, Aisha Ahmad, and Daud Omar, "Small Arms and Border Controls in the Horn of Africa: The Case of Malkasufta, Ethiopia; Mandera, Kenya; and Bula Hawa, Somalia," In *Africa Peace Forum, Controlling Small Arms in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region: Supporting Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration.* Waterloo, Ontario: Africa Peace Forum and Project Ploughshares, 2006.
[170] El-Affend, Abdewahab, "Facing IGAD's Triple challenge: New Prospects for regional cooperation in the Horn of Africa." Paper presented at the Conference to launch an IGAD Strategy for Peace and Security in the sub-Region, Khartoum, Sudan, October 1–3, 2005.

the strategy that IGAD adopted to solve the crisis that led to creation of refugees.[171] The aim of the strategy is to enable IGAD member states, the IGAD Secretariat and citizens of the region to actively contribute to developing and maintaining peace and security.[172] For a long time, Kenya through IGAD's Secretariat and its member states has focused on the more pressing issues of peace and security in Somalia.

Although Kenya's efforts were directed towards peace and security in Somalia, it soon realized that peace could only be achieved through economic integration and cooperation.[173] The member states decided to revitalize IGAD to address peace through economic integration and cooperation in during the twelfth ordinary summit in June 2008.[174] The revitalization was mainly aimed at promoting regional integration to address common challenges such as infrastructure, food security, trade barriers, and conflict. Accordingly, Kenya through IGAD in collaboration with the ECA prepared a Minimum Regional Integration Plan (hereafter, MIP) in 2008. The MIP summarizes strategies and approaches adopted by IGAD since its inception and its achievements so far in the integration agenda. It also justifies the need for regional integration, given the current global economic challenges and regional challenges and opportunities. It also outlines an integration plan encompassing peace and security, infrastructure, trade, environment, agriculture, and natural resources in the region.[175]

3.8 Conclusion

The Kenyan government response to Somali refugee invasion kept on changing from 1991 to 2011 as noted above. This has contributed to increased cases of Refugee crisis in Kenya call for the government attention. It was therefore important for this chapter to discuss the legal measures held by the government of Kenya in handling the influxes of the Somali refugees into the country. It notes that the government of Kenya was guided by the 1951 UN convention

[171] Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), *IGAD Institutional Assessment*, Addis Ababa: IGAD, 2001, p. 41.
[172] *Ibid.*
[173] MOFA, "IGAD calls for Sanctions against Eritrea; it underlies its political and Economic Role in Somalia Peace Process," *Week in the Horn, 2009*.
[174] *Ibid.*
[175] Moller, Bjorn, "Africa's Sub-Regional Organizations: Seamless Web or Patchwork?" Danish Institute of International Studies, Working Paper No 56, 2009.

related to status of Refugees and the 1969 OAU convention governing specific Aspects of Refugee problem which it is a signatory. The chapter has also looked at the prevention of the Somali refugee influx in Kenya by encouraging them to return to their home country hence limiting the cases of conflict between the Somali refugees and the host communities which partially happened.

The Kenyan government also responded positively on refugees physical needs in collaboration with UNHCR and other implementing partners such as GTZ which provides firewood to the camps. This has helped reduce case of conflict between the Refugee and the Host community concerning basic needs available in Garissa County.

The chapter also discussed the important action of the government integrating the locals with the Somali refugees which has played a major role in building the relationship between the Host community and the refugees. It discusses on how IGAD has responded to refugee crisis in Kenya and the efforts it has made to handle the conflict between the Host communities and the Refugees. It goes further to elaborate on the role played by Kenyan government in drafting Somali peace and Security strategy of IGAD and how they have been of help in resolving the conflict between the Refugees and the host community in Garissa County.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONFLICT BETWEEN REFUGEES AND LOCAL SOMALIS IN DADAAB DISTRICT, 1991-2011

4.1 Introduction

The presence of refugees in an area can create development, friendship with their host, tensions and conflicts. Refugees are often well served by humanitarian agencies and enjoy better access to water, food, health and education than the host population. The deteriorating conditions of hosting refugees at the camps of Ifo, Hagadera, Dagahaley Kambi oos popularly known as the Dadaab complex in the semi-arid northeastern part of Kenya since 1991, have created complex problems. Though refugees' main aim has been to get asylum at the camps, the local people have in general perceived them negatively. The Kenyan Somalis have had a feeling that Somali refugees are more economically advantaged following the support they receive from aid agencies and their ownership of various businesses at the camps. This made them conclude that the refugees at the camps lead better lives as compared to them as they feel neglected by the state. This has made the relationship between the two communities sour up as the local community continued to suffer in abject poverty.[176]

Competition for the scarce resources in the impoverished semi-arid area has also fuelled the locals' dislike for the refugees. Hosting fatigue was developed due to the protracted refugee situation at Dadaab, which is compounded by a large refugee population that is commonly associated with public insecurity. On the same note, the physical separation that has existed between the two communities has at times been exaggerated hence causing tension between the two groups. This chapter will focus on instances that have resulted in conflict between the refugees and the host community.

4.2 Refugee and Host Conflict

According to Jennifer Hyndman, the term refugee camp connotes safety. Too often, though, it means intimidation, lawlessness and violence.[177] Camps do not naturally provide physical security to refugees and locals because refugees create challenges of insecurity as some of them

[176] Oral interview, Halima Abdi, Garissa, 22/07/2012

[177] Jennifer Hyndman, *Managing Displacement; Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), XXVII, pp. 20-29.

come with weapons. The camp organization itself often serves to exacerbate feelings of uncertainty and insecurity to the local host.[178] Sexual coercion torture and rape are relatively common occurrences against local residents in conflict and refugee inhabited zones such as Dadaab. Hyndman speaks of Dadaab as a bleak and insecure holding camp along the Kenyan-Somali border.[179]

The border area of north-east Kenya where Dadaab camp is located is insecure and characterized by banditry and insurgency, as well as violent clashes between the Kenyan security, the refugees and local armed groups.[180] While the areas of Dadaab have traditionally experienced high levels of insecurity, anyway, the establishments of the camp seems to have led to a geographical concentration of violence and the proliferation of weapons which evidently aggravates the security problems.[181] Life in the camps in Dadaab is very directly affected by the events which take place in the refugees' countries of origin.

Dadaab, for instance, provides recruits for the Al-Shabaab forces and acts as a safe refuge for the families of men who are fighting in Somalia.[182] In this section, the kind of threats to physical security that both local and refugee Somali faced in Dadaab region will be explored.[183] Camps often provide them with little protection.[184] The dislocation and violence experienced by refugee populations often destroys family and social structures, and with them, the norms and taboos that normally proscribe sexual violence.[185] Women and children outside refugee camps were often subjected to sexual abuse too.

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[178] Cindy Horst, "Refugee Life in the Camps: Providing Security or Sustaining Dependency," p.5 (accessed October 5, 2002); available from http://www.hiiraan.ca/may02/op/cindy2.htm.
[179] Jennifer Hyndman, *Managing Displacement*, *Ibid.*, p. 24.
[180] Jeff Crisp, "A State of Insecurity: the Political Economy of Violence in Refugee-Populated Areas of Kenya," *Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit of UNHCR*, Working Paper No.16, December 1999, p.14 (accessed September 22, 2002); available from http://www.jha.ac/articles/u016.htm.
[181] UN, *Note on International Protection*, by Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 44th session, A/AC.96/815, August 31, 1993, para.31.
[182] Information received from Marjorie a member of Granjon, UNHCR staff worked in Kakuma Camp in (1999), January 6, 2003, by phone with Geneva. See also Jeff Crisp, "A State of Insecurity: the Political Economy of Violence
in Refugee-Populated Areas of Kenya," *Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit of UNHCR*, Working Paper No.16, December 1999, p.17 (accessed September 22, 2002); available from
http://www.jha.ac/articles/u016.htm. op cit
[183] Oral interview, Marjorie Granjon, UNHCR staff working in Kakuma camp, January 6, 2013,
[184] Cindy Horst, "Refugee Life in the Camps"
[185] Human Rights Watch, *Protection of the Rights of Refugee Women*, p.1 (accessed October 5, 2002); available

UNHCR workers in Dadaab described Dadaab as a prison, where young, women are especially vulnerable.[186] Rape tended to occur when refugees, predominantly women and girls, left the relative security of the camp in order to collect firewood and to herd goats. Indeed, women who left the camps for hours at a time in search of firewood were vulnerable also to bandit attacks.[187] "Bandits" is a term used to describe wandering groups of men who engage in theft, cattle rustling and other criminal activities.[188] Bandits comprised both locals and refugees. Around 80% of the rapes involved female refugees from 12 to 50 years of age and took place during the hours of daylight in the bushes that surround the refugee camps.[189] Moreover, as lands surrounding the camps became more and more denuded, women were forced to go further and further to collect firewood.

This increased their chances of encountering bandits who threatened them, beat them, assaulted them sexually and sometimes abducted them.[190] In some instances rape cases happened at night. Unarmed households, especially those headed by women, remained the main target by bandits from within the camp itself. It is easy to access the camps without the police noticing because they do not have security fence. Also the number of police officers is inadequate as compared to the refugee population. This has made it difficult for the host community to mingle freely with the refugees. The two communities have become enemies with the refugees viewing the locals as rapist while the local people view refugees as people who ever used and destroyed their natural resources. According to Human Rights Watch, in the country of refuge, women refugees are targeted for rape because of their actual or perceived political or ethnic affiliations.[191] Women in refugee camps close to the site of the Somali conflict are frequently the object of attacks from

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from http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/gen3/General-04.htm, accessed on 30/11/2013

[186] Isabel Matheson, "The Lost Girls of Sudan," *BBC News World Edition*, June 7, 2002

[187] Jennifer Hyndman, *Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. 77.

[188] According to Crisp's report, bandits who plague the Dadaab area are a mixture of local Kenyans, Somali refugees and, less frequently, Somalia-based militia members engaged in cross-border raids. They move on foot in groups of 5 to 25 people, carrying arms and wearing masks.

[189] Jeff Crisp, "A State of Insecurity"

[190] Jennifer Hyndman, "*Managing Displacement"*

[191] Human Rights Watch, *Protection of the Rights of Refugee Women*, p.1 (accessed October 5, 2002); available from http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/gen3/General-04.htm.

factions that enter the camps in order to dominate and punish the refugees perceived to be supporting other factions.[192]

Human Rights Watch made visits to refugee camps in 1993, 1994 and 1996 and documented testimonies of rape survivors from within and without the camps.[193] Many of those interviewed had been gang raped at gunpoint, some by as many as seven men. In the vast majority of cases, rape victims were also robbed, severely beaten, stabbed or shot. A small portion of rapes were committed by Kenyan police and other refugees. The lack of adequate investigation and prosecution of rape contributed to the situation of impunity. Indeed, bringing suspects to trial is difficult, due to the lack of effective witness protection arrangements and to the fact that people fear revenge attacks.[194] Besides, rape is seen as a shameful experience and most incidents go unreported.[195] It is thus difficult to get a good idea of the exact magnitude of rape and other form of gender-based violence in and around the camps.[196]

Much of the sexual violence experienced by Somali refugee women was actually inflicted by members of the local community. Domestic violence by adult men, against women, children and adolescents was also common within the camps, although the exact scale of the problem was unknown. The increase of domestic violence was often associated with the fact that refugee men in camps are frustrated having lost the responsibilities, work, property and status they used to have.[197]

A question may arise that why the men don't go for the firewood as a way to save their women from being raped. Traditional authority and responsibilities are usually defined in the Somali communities with reference to their historic roots. These legitimize strict genders roles. Such definitions refer primarily to the socio-political and religious structures that are rooted in the pre-

[192] *Ibid*
[193] Human Rights Watch, *Protection of the Rights of Refugee Women*, p.1 (accessed October 5, 2002); available from http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/gen3/General-04.htm.
[194] Until recently, there was no courtroom for refugees to provide evidence in the camps and they had to travel long distances to get to a courtroom. Yet a court has been built in Dadaab camp (sometimes referred to as the "mobile court") which today spares refugees from having to travel long distances to give evidence.
[195] Jeff Crisp, *op cit.*
[196] Cindy Horst, *op cit*
[197] *ibid*

colonial period, rather than in the colonial and post-colonial states.[198].According to Aden Burale a refugee interviewed Hagadera camp, noted that women in some families are the bread winners. Their husbands died or were left behind after they joined militia groups.

4.3 Causes of conflict between the local people and refugees in Dadaab

The problems that were associated with the presence of refugees in Dadaab were compounded by armed groups of exiles actively engaged in warfare with political objectives. Refugees in Dadaab seemed to invite warriors from their host countries looking for military retaliation. Thus complicated relations as well as threatened the local people.[199] This led to conflict between the host community and the refugees. Some of the causes of conflict between these two groups are discussed below.

4.3.1 Proliferation of small arms and light weapons

According to Garissa District Development Plan (GDDP) 1994-1996, the influx of refugees into the district resulted into insecurity hence adversely affecting the supervision of development programmes. This point has been always stressed by the various government officials as manifested in the various Garissa District Development Plans. For example, the GDDP report of 1997-2001 reiterated the insecurity posed by the refugee influx noting that political instability in the Republic of Somalia and the resultant influx of more than 150,000 refugees led to insecurity in the district experienced by the local people.[200] As a result a lot of resources diverted to attending refugees. Furthermore, increased number of refugees in Dadaab camps, led to sophisticated weaponry finding their way into the district. This promoted banditry, cattle rustling and general violence in the district between the host community and the refugees.[201]

4.3.2 Banditry

Banditry, in addition of being one of the main causes of rapes, there were also often manifestations of armed robbery. The majority of armed robberies in Dadaab took place at night,

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[198] Joakim Gundel, *The Predicament of the 'Oday': The role of Traditional Structures in Security, Rights, Law and Development in Somalia,* Nairobi: Oxfam, 2006, pp. 34-40.
[199] GoK, *Ministry of Planning, Garissa District Development Plan, 2007*, Nairobi: Government Printer, 2008
[200] GoK, *Garissa District Development Plan* 1997-2001, Office of the Vice President and Ministry of Planning and National Development, (Nairobi: Government Printer), p. 59.
[201] *Ibid*

and was committed by the people not well known to the refugees**.**[202] These groups of armed robbers targeted refugees, especially those with businesses or a cash income. Their attacks inside the camps generally include robbing, beatings which sometimes resulted into killing.[203] Bandits sometimes verified the clan of their intended victim before proceeding with a robbery. The frequency with which the victims of robbery were subjected to severe and in some cases fatal beatings suggested that the bandits were eager to maintain fear and intimidation in Dadaab, thereby reinforcing the degree of impunity which they appear to enjoy.[204]

4.3.3 Cattle rustling

Cattle rustling remained common between the host communities and the refugees in Dadaab camps.[205] The local Somali believed that refugees cannot own cattle since they are in a refugee camp. They also had the notion that refugees overstretched the pasture available for the local people's animals. This perception was developed by the local people that raided cattle from the refugee so as to reduce the number of their Animals. They viewed Somali refugees as having no right of ownership of any cattle within the Dadaab region. The refugees were always ready to revenge by raiding more cattle from the locals and transporting them to Somalia which can easily get a ready market.

4.3.4 Social and cultural differences

Physical violence was also clan or sub-clan related. Indeed, refugee camps in Kenya were often the theater of violent clashes between exiles of the same nationality. Dadaab has been especially affected by this phenomenon.[206] For example, in June 1997, fighting between different Somali clans led to many deaths and injuries.[207] Clashes also took place between the different Somali clans and sub-clans living in Dadaab, for example between the majority Cushitic Somali refugees and the minority of Bantu Somali. In January 1999, violent clashes took place in Daadab between the Somali refugees and the Kenyan Somali.[208] Similarly, in April 2002, serious fights between refugee and their Kenyan Somali caused the death of around ten people and injured

[202] UNHCR, The Personal Security of Refugees, EC/1993/SCP/CRP.3, para.10
[203] Jennifer Hyndman, "*Managing Displacement*", p. 136
[204] Jeff Crisp, "*A State of Insecurity*"
[205] Cindy Horst, "Refugee Life in the Camps".
[206] Jeff Crisp,"Forms and Sources of Violence in Kenya's Refugee Camps,"
[207] *Ibid*
[208] Jeff Crisp, "A State of Insecurity"

around 200 others.[209] Violence within groups in the camps often followed incidents in Somalia and Ethiopia linked to their and political differences. In addition to violence within national groups, refugee camps are also affected by tension and conflict between the refugees from different countries. Examples are fights in Dadaab between Somali and Ethiopian refugees, or Somali and Sudanese refugees.[210]

In Dadaab, there was persistent suspicion between Somali refugees and local Kenyan Somali populations. Fighting often resulted from this tension, resulting in high number of injuries[211] and refugees faced intimidation, extortion and physical harassment.[212] Social differences that were experienced between the refugees and the local people caused conflict either in the camps or outside the camps. Cultural differences made it worse as within the camps there exists the Sudanees, the Ethiopian and the Somalis and the host communities around the camps have often clashed.

4.3.5 Mysterious murder cases

In 2010 there was a mysterious murder of a 13-year- old Somali boy. The incident resulted in fighting between the refugees and the host community. This left hundreds of Sudanese refugees homeless. In the early hours of 13/07/2010, Abdi Ali body was found on a path along Block K1 which is occupied by Sudanese refugees in Hagadera camp. He had been brutally attacked and parts of his intestines were out. It was reported that Abdi Ali a new arrival in the Dadaab Camp left his home where he was staying with his uncle and aunt to go to the mosque for prayers. Violence between Kenyan Somali and Sudanese refugees erupted before the police picked up the body from the scene.[213] Accusations and counter accusations followed with factions from the Somali Community accusing the Sudanese refugees of having killed the boy with the intentions of making use of some body parts.

[209] Kofi Mable, Head of UNHCR Sub-Office in Kenya responsible for Kakuma camp, October 24, 2002, Famine Center, Tufts University
[210] Jennifer Hyndman, *Managing Displacement*
[211] Jeff Crisp, "Forms and Sources of Violence in Kenya's Refugee Camps,"
[212] UN, *Note on International Protection*, by Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 52th session, A/AC.96/951, 13 September 2001, para.28.
[213] Oral interview, Yussuf Abdi, LWF Hagadera camp on 10/09/2012.

The Sudanese refugees claimed that the boy had been killed elsewhere and his body dumped in the camp. Crowd's gathered and a faction of Sudanese refugees attacked, looted, and burned their shops in the neighborhoods. The other refugees were equally not spared because they were also suspected to have played a role in the Childs death. UNHCR and partner agencies in conjunction with the police had to move in swiftly, police were deployed to take charge of the situation while UNHCR and other implementing partners came in to move the minority Sudanese/ other refugees to safety who were residing in that block. They were taken to the Ifo Transit Centre. At the Transit centre UNHCR had to provide tents and other essentials making life a little less or more uncomfortable for the refugees.[214]

4.3.6 Insecurity

The refugees have always been associated with possession of illicit firearms or to propagate their proliferation. The use of illicit small arms leads to widespread illegal activity and eventually undermines the legitimate authority of the state.[215] The international common borders are often not sufficiently policed and people easily cross the border on either side.

From the beginning of Kenya's incursion into Somalia on October, 16, 2011, Dadaab experienced a sharp rise in attacks by Al-Shabab sympathizers targeting Kenyan police and aid workers. They used gunfire, explosive devices. They also carried out abductions. The rising insecurity led to funding shortages and scaling down of relief efforts in the camps. In 2011, a group of seven aid agencies warned that at least 200,000 refugees risked being left without adequate supplies of water, shelter, healthcare and education due to a funding shortfall of US$25 million in 2011 alone.[216] Kellie Leeson, Deputy Regional Director for the International Rescue Committee stated that the funding situation did not improve in 2011 and that some donors had indicated their wish to further cut because of the attacks.[217]

[214] *Ibid*
[215] Jan Kamenju, Mwachofi Singo, and Francis Wairagu, *Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North rift Region of Kenya*, Nairobi: SRIC, 2003, p. 83.
[216] Yussuf Abdi, LWF Hagadera camp
[217] IRIN "Report on Somali Refugee Status", Nairobi: IRIN, 2012

4.3.7 Competition for scarce resources

The presence of refugees in Dadaab since 1991 led to environmental degradation by puting a strain on local resources such as water and firewood. The combined demand for firewood and building materials from the camps and the hosts was significant for both. Furthermore, both groups are engaged in buying and selling firewood. Firewood harvesters based in the camps were largely responsible for the supply of firewood to the camps. Good quality firewood was difficult to find close to the camps and nearby settlements, leaving only low-quality firewood for collection by women and children among the host.[218]

As the distance to good firewood sources increased, the collection process was taken over by men using donkey carts. It became commercialized. It has already been noted women were attacked while fetching firewood. The demand for energy for household use had grown with the increasing population in the area as a whole. The local collection of firewood was becoming more laborious, and the potential for conflict was ever increasing.

This was due to the fact that the forests and trees in Daadab were cut down by the two communities since the inception of the refugees as from 1991 to date, but the host community had taken more charge of the forests and trees than the refugees in the camps. Although there was need for wood by both communities the local people were free to cut trees from the forest without any question, but a refugee who was found cutting trees from the forest were mistreated by the host community who did not want them to clear the forest. This created conflict between the two communities conflict with the refugee feeling that they had right to cut trees in the forests to repair their tents in the camps or to use some as firewood.[219]

Competition for resources in the region has been high as the refugees have not fully received resources they wanted within the camps. As such, since the arrival of refugees to the Dadaab camp, the host community were already experiencing insufficient water supply which had severely affected them. The locals alleged that their women are forced to travel long distances to find water, resulting in health problems for them, such as back and chest pain. Lack of sufficient

[218] Montclos, M., and Kagwanja P., "Refugee Camps or Cities? The Socio-economic Dynamics of the Dadaab and Kakuma Camps in Northern Kenya." *Journal of Refugees Studies.*13.2(2000): 205-222.
[219] Oral interview Amina Aden, Dadaab, 10/6/2012.

water in the region has been caused by deforestation, and resultant soil erosion. This has threatened the food security of the locals, who depend on pasture and water for survival. The huge demands on the scarce local water resources between the refugee and the locals have therefore given rise to conflict between the refugees and the local communities.

On the same note, the refugees competing with the host community over grazing land for their livestock has also made matters challenging in the region. As Martin puts it, resource competition can engender both conflict and cooperative solutions.[220] In Dadaab the competition for resource caused conflict rather than cooperation between the two communities. In addition before the coming of the refugees the Ege and Hagadera Dam in Daadab used to last for an entire year. The rains normally occur in the month of November and December but due to the surge of the Animal numbers both from the refugees and the local people, the dams dried first than expected hence causing conflicts. The Somali community elders solved matters by charging the culprits regardless of the magnitude of the problem.[221]

4.3.8 Land

Land is an emotive issue worldwide and contributed numerous conflict world over as Hassan Aden, block leader at C-14 IFO camp narrated that their family arrived 1996. On arrival they were six brothers and sister but due to the number of years they stayed. It was impossible for them to reside the same area given to them by United Nations higher commission for refugees . The search for other space ensued and as a result of the number which surged due to the refugee influx at camp the neighboring location has been consumed for example labisigale and bulla kheir which were neighboring Ifo camp was engulfed by the camp and the same with Alinjugur and borehole five of Hagadera Camp. The local Somali objected the settlement of refugees in Kambi oos in Neighboring Fafi District Untill the intervention of the Kenya Government, Local Politician and the UNHCR officials in year 2011. This influx overstretched as the refugees numbers increased hence immensely

[220] Martin, A., 2005, 'Environmental Conflict Between Refugee and Host Communities', Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 329-346.
[221] Oral interview, Shukri,H. Elder, Resident Hagadera Camp, 12/06/2012.

4.3.9 Contracts

Refugees arrived from their states due to fear for their lives as result they never had leisure to carry with them their belonging if they had any and due the long stretch could not allow then ferry much wares. So it was the UN officials who took the responsibility and its implementing agencies to issue them with basic need such as shelter and food. However, in the previous instances the supply of food and non food items tenders were given out by implementing agencies to influential host community members but the refugees protested as from 2009 on several occasion where they demanded be given tenders for construction of schools, toilets and supply of non food item because they equally need to benefit because they were more vulnerable than the host these did not auger well with host which neseciated tension between the two community[222].

4.3.10 Perception of the Host Community

The conflict between the refugees and the host community was also caused by the perception of the host community towards the refugees. For instance in Dadaab, the Kenyan Somalis' felt that the refugees were given special attention than them because they received assistance from humanitarian organization like UNHCR and other NGO's. What annoyed the majority of Kenyan Somalis was the fact that most of them could not afford getting food, medical attention and education therefore viewed the refugees as enemies who were getting milk and honey while they starved in their motherland.[223] The UNHCR are however not to blame because according to international law, in order to receive international aid, a person must live outside the country of origin and without state protection. As a result, the UNHCR is not mandated to help the host community no matter how poor it is.[224] This has exacerbated the conflict between the host communities and the refugees as the host communities loot as well as raid cattle owned by the refugees.

[222] Oral interview, Bashir,A. Camp Manager, Dagahley. Kenya Red cross 13/06/2012.
[223] Kirui P. and Dr. J. Mwaruvie The Dilemma of Hosting Refugees: A Focus on the Insecurity in North-Eastern Kenya *International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 3 No. 8 [Special Issue - April 2012]* 161 p 164.
[224]Kirui P. and Dr. J. Mwaruvie The Dilemma of Hosting Refugees, *op.,cit*.

4.4 Conclusion

The chapter established that the institution of asylum has seriously deteriorated in Kenya due to various factors. The insecurity associated with the refugees, the general poverty of the locals that makes them perceive refugees as leading better social economic lives, and the protracted refugee situation that resulted in hosting fatigue contributed to the locals' negative perception of the refugees. Since the camps were occupied with refugees from different nationalities, social and cultural differences were experienced leading in the antagonistic relation.

Competition for the meager natural resources at Dadaab has also played a key role in influencing the negative local perception of the refugees. Most sentiments expressed by locals pertaining to the better economic status of refugees are actually inaccurate. The reality at Dadaab is that the majority of the refugees are generally poor since only a tiny percentage of refugees are entrepreneurs. This is illustrated by the sentiments of a Somali refugee leader who argued that it is actually the refugees' deprivation that has made their children malnourished and has often forced them to put their lives at risk by venturing into forests to look for firewood and construction poles.

Competition in business, although important, appears to be insignificant in shaping local attitudes toward refugees at Dadaab, as most locals were not opposed to refugee engagement in trade. This is contrary to other studies that attributed the closure of former refugee camps in Kenya to hostilities between locals and refugees due to competition in business. This appears to be a paradox since locals are not opposed to one of the sources of the refugee wealth (trade), yet they perceive refugees negatively for allegedly being richer. However, this ambivalence is not surprising, as the local reason for perceiving refugees negatively. A local elder argued that it is the feeling that aid agencies, not the refugees *per se,* were discriminating against the locals. Although the agencies have helped in improving local living standards in terms of improving infrastructure, sinking boreholes, and providing social services such as medical care, the hosting community at Dadaab appears to have increasingly felt discriminated against since they are not given food rations and other direct benefits that are currently being enjoyed by refugees.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE IMPACT OF REFUGEES ON HOST COMMUNITIES IN GARISSA COUNTY 1991-2011.

5.1 Introduction

From the moment of arrival in Garissa, Somali refugee presence increased the demands for education, health services, water supply, sanitation, transportation, and also in some cases, for natural resources, such as water, grazing land and firewood. Though these resources were provided, they were not enough to meet the demand of the refugee population. The refugee community therefore reacted by opening of tailoring, clothing, shoe making and electronic shops making them available at the camp as ways of generating income. This was contrary to the host expectation thinking their wares will get ready market when the refugees arrived at their neighborhoods.

In the 1998/1999 NGO's such as Care International set up business projects to assist refugees to develop their own economy. This was not a viable effort because there was no enough space to do the business, a result of the host viewing the refugees as threat to their business. Many refugees sold milk and other animal products. In spite of these minor economic activities, most of the refugees were unemployed. A greater number of the unemployed refugees become involved in anti-social and criminal behaviour. Most of the youth dreamt of resettling in the United States of America (USA) or any European country.[225] It was not easy to find work, for youth living in the camp, without assistance from within the camp or from relatives abroad.[226]

Communities in Garissa had both positive and negative attitudes regarding the refugees. Some local people benefited from the coming of the refugees by attaining well paying jobs from non-Governmental organizations.[227] The dynamics between positive and negative factors were complex depending on several factors, including the political economy of Garissa County, urban-rural interactions, and the nature of host-refugee relations. Furthermore, even when the Somali

[225] Gil Loescher, *Refugee Movements and International Security*, Brassey: The International Institute for Strategic Study, 1992, p. 53.
[226] UNHCR Standing Committee (2004), "Economic and Social Impact of Massive Refugee Populations on Host Developing Countries, as well as other Countries", 29th Meeting .http://www.unhcr.org/excom/EXCOM/3ae68d0e10.html. accessed on 13/7/2012
[227] UNHCR, 2004.

refugee situation created economic opportunities for both the displaced and their hosts, they latter were always negative. For example due to the rise of population prostitution increased and business improved compared to before the settlement of refugees. This was one of the impacts on both the host and the refugees. Although prostitution is seen by many as evil, interview with one of my respondents at Dadaab revealed that there are positive benefits in the practice. One lady (name withheld) said that;

We chose sex work after we did a lot of things to earn some money but we couldn't stand. Sex work is better. For me, sex work isn't my first choice of paying work. It just happens to be the best alternative available. It's better than being president of someone else's corporation. It's better than being a secretary. It is the most honest work I know of according to the interviewee it was the business she sure of getting her return after the act instantly.[228]

5.2 The Economic Impact

Large scale and protracted Somali refugee influxes into Garissa County had an economic impact on the local Somali economy. The situation of the Somali refugees at the camp in Dadaab can be understood around Workers' refugee economic theory which states that refugee camp economies are mostly influenced by the host government policies and humanitarian assistance. Initially, on arrival, the Somali refugees received assistance from civil society institutions, ordinary Kenyan Somalis, the UNHCR and its implementing partners. The theory further posits that, when this assistance stops, the refugees look for alternative means of survival.[229] According to Dick Shell, there were no restrictions on the economic activities of the Somali refugees living in Garissa and particularly around Dadaab.[230] The Somali refugees found it difficult to get employment in Kenya because they don't have work permits.[231] However, some well connected refugees use illegal means such bribing migration officials to acquire the documents.[232]

According to Jacobsen Somali refugees have connections with the surrounding society and

[228] Oral interview, Name withheld, Dadaab, 27/11/2013
[229] Werker Eric (2007), "The Economy of a Refugee Camp", *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 2007, pp. 461-480; doi:10.1093/jrs/fem001
[230] Dick Shell, "Responding to Protracted Refugee Situations: A Case Study of Liberian Refugees in Ghana", UNHCR-Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit. http://www.unhcr.chDick (2002).
[231] *Ibid*
[232] *Ibid*

refugee household, most of the times have their members living both inside and outside camps.[233] This allows the refugees to establish small shops and outdoor displays offering basic necessities like food and others for both locals and the refugees. The items are obtained from Nairobi and Mogadishu. These business activities were learnt from their host.[234] Some refugees went for training for income generation activities like sewing, tie and dye and batik skills. The trainings were offered to the refugees by the United Nation partnering agencies like among others, Care International. As from 1998 onwards the refugees to manage their resources well. This empowered refugees to get some jobs. Amongst the businesses was construction work that was continuously going on in the camp despite the competition constructors faced with local professionals. Many of the refugees were able to participate activities such as different manual work, supplying water and hawking to implement their little earning income.[235]

5.3 Education

Since children were among the Somali refugees who moved into Dadaab, the UNHCR started a programme of educational assistance for the refugees' children. In addition, the refugees themselves established primary schools on the camp, run entirely by residents although they lacked both resources and financial capacity.[236] In order for this viable initiative to be sustainable, NGOs, such as the Care International, the Norwegian Refugee Council and others, became the UNHCR's implementing partners in providing the schools with basic educational materials. The Central Board of Education coordinated all activities of education in the camp.[237]

The schools so far built include nursery, primary, junior secondary and senior secondary schools in 2006. There were also three adult schools run by individuals in the camp. In coming Somali students would be eligible to take up studies without necessarily having to join students at neighbouring Kenyan schools as was the practice before the large influx of refugees. In addition

[233] Jacobsen Karen, "The Economic Life of Refugees" in Nicholas Van Hear *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 19, Number 2, June 2006. pp. 258-260.
[234] Focus Group Discussion with Women in Dadaab Refugee Camp, 10/6/2012
[235] Jacobsen Karen, "The Economic Life of Refugees" *op., cit*
[236] Hampshire K, Gina Porter, "Social Resilience and Coping among Young Liberian Refugees in the Buduburam settlement, Ghana", Report of a Pilot Study, (Unpublished, 2006), Dar es Salam.
[237] Ndege, L. J., Piters, B.S., Nyanga, A., and Ngimbwa, L. "Tanzania/Netherlands
Farming Systems Research Project, Lake Zone: Diagnostic Survey of Karagwe District", Karagwe District Rural Development Programme, October, 1995.

to the camp schools, a proliferation of private primary schools run by Kenyans. Refugee organizations and individuals run these schools entirely on their own initiatives, charging fees to maintain the school and also pay teachers who were either Kenyans or Somalis. The situation in the Dadaab refugee camp was typical of refugee camps around the world since 1990s. Both qualified and unqualified refugee teachers helped to educate the young refugees in preparation for resettlement or repatriation to enable them to face future challenges.[238]

Among the many serious problems were classroom overcrowding and non-access to textbooks which made teaching and learning very difficult. The refugees were not the only ones in the camp schools. The community school, it emerged that the refugees form about 60 per cent of enrollment. This confirmed their seriousness when it comes to education. However, the records of external examination results in schools entirely run by the refugees were poor due to lack of facilities and language barrier by 2011. This can be attributed to inadequate teaching and learning materials and a high rate of untrained teachers. This was even though the conflicts were aggravated where the refugee enjoyed more benefits from humanitarian organizations than children from the local community.[239]

UNHCR was providing a wide range of community-based assistance through other humanitarian organizations e.g the sister agencies which were closely working to improve the standard of education inside and around the camp to make sure the refugees and, for that matter locals, who attend such schools benefit.[240] The UNCHR donated dual desks and textbooks to the schools. There was also construction work going on, sponsored by UNHCR, to expand the Dadaab Community Secondary School to ease congestion by 2011. The schools also received a number of desks from well wishes. The United Nation and other agencies such as CARE International promoted the schools since late nineties. The schools were also assisted by bodies such as the Lutheran World federation and Care International in Kenya.[241]

[238] Preston Rosemary, The Provision of Education to Refugees in Places of Temporary Asylum: Some Implications for Development, *Comparative Education*, Volume 27 No. 1991, pp. 61-81.
[239] Oral interview, Saliid Mohamed Osman, Dadaab Camp, 10/6/2012
[240] UNHCR Standing Committee,
[241] *Ibid*

5.4 Refugee Impact on the Infrastructure Situation in Garissa

Since the Dadaab camp has been in existence from early 1990s, there were some structures already in the camp when the influx of Somali refugees occurred in 1991 to 2010. The Somalis with encouragement from the UNHCR constructed their own houses with assistance only from their relatives abroad, especially the United States. The continuous influx of refugees into Dadaab and the movement of urban refugees into the camp put a lot of strain on accommodation and other infrastructure.[242]

New arrivals had to find money for rental houses in the surrounding areas because there were no clear fixed camp boundaries. Rent was determined by the owner of the house. Because demand for housing was high and supply limited and because many Somali have access to US dollars through remittances, higher rents were charged in areas surrounding Dadaab and other urban areas in Garissa County than is typical in other semi-arid areas of North Eastern. Some refugees have gone into agreement lease land from landowners in the Garissa community. They have then built one or two bedroom accommodation on the land. They agreed to pay rent if they were still in Garissa after the leasing period.[243]

The camp was served with electricity from both generators and solar power. This had placed pressure on the transformer because the energy requirement in the camp is more than the capacity of the transformer. According to the camp administrator, the management petitioned Kenya Power and Lightening Company (hereafter, KPLC) to assist them with another transformer but it had not happened by 2011. The UNHCR was responsible for the payment of the bills, but to some businessmen and women living in the neighbourhood, individuals are to pay their own bills with exception of bills from the police and the clinic, which are paid by UNHCR.[244]

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[242] Werker Eric, "The Economy of a Refugee Camp", *Journal of Refugee Studies,* 2007 20:461-480; doi:10.1093/jrs/fem001, 2007

[243] Sanjugta Vas Dev, "The Reluctant Host",

[244] Saugestad, Sidsel, "Contested Images: First Peoples' or Marginalized Minorities in Africa?" In Barnard, A. and J. Kenrick (eds.), *African's Indigenous Peoples: First People or Marginalized Minorities?* Edinburgh, Centre of African Studies, 2001, p. 30.

5.5 Impact of Somali refugees on Water Supply

During the rainy season, the Dadaab camp enjoyed the supply of pipe borne water. Water tanker services and boreholes at the camp supplemented this. The water supply was funded by UNHCR which continued the pumping of water to the camp. Of greater concern to the refugees was the maintenance of water taps. The provision of water has been one of the biggest challenges for the camp refugees and illustrated the degree to which refugees are capable of solving their own problems in spite of severe limitations. Due to the refugee presence, some Kenyan Somalis have won contracts from the UNHCR to drill boreholes, to bring water to the camp in trucks, build cement reservoirs and provide big black poly tanks that are used for water storage.[245]

Kenyan Somali truck drivers sometimes brought water to the camp. In the neighbourhoods, Somali water distributors purchase water by the tank load for storage and then resell it to other Somalis in Dadaab rural areas by bucket loads. Yet, drinking water was still particularly a problem. The sale of little bags of filtered water has become a primary solution to the water problem and it has grown into an important small business for many refugees and locals. The filtered water is bagged as far away Nairobi and transported all the way to the camp by trucks.[246] The water business enabled some Kenyan Somalis to earn a living and improved their economic status. The system was well organized and efficient and Kenyan Somali traders learned to conserve water since it was a valuable commodity at the camp.

5.6 Health

The camps at Dadaab had several clinics which were supervised by the UNHCR and her implementing partners (NGOs in humanitarian services) for example Care International and GTZ. The UNHCR has brought a lot of improvement to the camp's health situation since 1991. This was because the UNHCR was assisting the camp with all the basic needs to enable the officials to perform their professional duties these officials were either Government employees or employed by the implementing partners such as Medicines Sans Frontiers. Although most of the refugees were ill schooled due to their educational system in the country of origin, they were

[245] Dick Shelly, "Liberians in Ghana: Living without Humanitarian Assistance", *New Issues In Refugee Research*, Working Paper No. 57, UNHCR, 2002, p.17.
[246] Harrell-Bond, *Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees*, London: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 55-56.

sending their children to school. Thus they lacked significant number of professionals, among them also health officials. Kenyan government health officials and UNHCR staff were in charge in supervising the camp clinics. These workers were given orientation by the NGOs in the camps. The clinics were run by professional unlike the Educational sector. According to the health officer in charge, the presence of UNHCR improved the health situation not only to the camp dwellers, but also to the local host communities around Dadaab.[247]

The UNHCR also provided clinical services for 24 hours a day as well as the ambulance and laboratory services. Kenya government and UNHCR health officials at the clinic educated the refugees and the local host communities that lived around Dadaab, especially the women on prevention of the diahorea, the danger of sexual promiscuity and on family planning because statistically women are the most affected by HIV infections. When they were also left with the responsibility of taking care of their families since most of their husbands were either left behind or died as a result of conflict in their mother country. Similarly, it was the women who engaged in cooking among most of African communities and therefore required education on dangers and prevention of diarrhoea. HIV/AIDS seems to be a big problem facing many refugee camps.[248] Reported HIV/AIDS cases are on the rise among the refugees. For example a survey conducted by United Nation stated that by 2011 many young girls pretend to sell miraa in kiosk at same time engaged in commercial sex. At the Dadaab camp there are no reliable records of the numbers of people living with HIV/AIDS. But it was a big problem facing the camp and the entire Garissa County and its surroundings communities because of the level of commercial sex that was going on within the camp.[249] On the same note the disease has been aggravated by the commercial sex workers who have established themselves in the camps notable one in Ifo where a group of Gambela and Somali girls conducts business without any fear.[250].

[247] Hopper, E., "A Typology for the Classification of Educational System, cited in Preston Rosemary (1991), *The Provision of Education to Refugees in Places of Temporary Asylum: some implications for development,* Comparative Education, Volume 27 No, 1971, pp. 61-81.
[248] Whitaker E. Beth, "Refugees in Western Tanzania: The distribution of Burden and Benefits among Local Host". Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, NC, USA, *Journal of Refugee Studies* Vol. 15, No. 4, 2002.
[249]Preston Rosemary, The Provision of Education to Refugees in Places of Temporary Asylum: some implications for development, op. cit.,
[250] Oral Interview, Mohamed Saleban, Ifo Camp on 10/06/2010.

There are attempts by non-governmental organizations and some individual volunteers especially the Somali refugees themselves, to prevent the spread of HIV within and around the camp. They provided free counseling to people living with HIV/AIDS and give them condoms. There is a lot of education about the disease in schools, mosques, churches and other places on the prevention of HIV/AIDS. Stigmatization is making people having the disease not to come out and admit that they have the disease, making it difficult to control it.[251] Although camp clinics are doing well with the assistance from the UNHCR and other partners, they have not met to the demands of the population. From the HIV/AIDS observation the presence of refugees in Dadaab has led to an increase in HIV/AIDS infections in Garissa County.

Thus that in spite of the hardships the Somali refugees have gone through, the UNHCR, the Kenya Government and the refugee community put in place some measures in order to help refugees sustain themselves. There were many little shops, displays offering basic necessities and produce for the people everywhere in the camp. Restaurants, shops, bars and video centres are all over the camp. In fact, many refugees at the camp were going through hard times. But because of the lifestyle of some of them, it was not always easy to distinguish refugees who were in need. This is especially those who receive remittances from their relatives who are either in the United States of America and Europe.[252]

There was always tension amongst refugees as seen in the frequency of fights among them in the period between 1991 and 2011. It seemed that hardly a day passed without inter-personal fights, clashes over issues like theft among others.[253] In fact, living in the camp was going to be more difficult for such people in case the UNHCR stopped some of the operations. It was also important to mention that the way some of the Somali youth within and around the community dress, is a big challenge to the locals. Some locals appear to be very poor compared to the refugees.[254] This leads to conflict due to a feeling that the Kenyan government is concentrating more on making refugees very comfortable as compared to the host.

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[251] Gorman, R. F., "Refugee Aid and Development in Africa: Research and Policy Needs from the Local Perspective", in: Adelman, H. and Sorenson, J. (Ed.) *African Refugees: Development Aid and Repatriation*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 83-96.
[252] *Ibid*
[253] Oral Interview, Fatuma Ali Hussein, Dadaab Township, 10/6/2012.
[254] *Ibid*

5.7 Refugees as a Security threat

Fire service and police stations were also opened in the camp. Indeed these services were extensively used by the whole Dadaab community. With the help of UNHCR, the refugee and local people established a watch committee to enhance the desired capacity of the police patrol not only in the camp, but also in the community living in Dadaab in bide safeguarding the residents and their property. Notwithstanding these security-related activities, the refugees sporadically pose security risks to the community.[255] The UNHCR standing committee of 1997 observed that, there were many complaints that refugees have added to security problems in general and to crime rates, particularly theft and murder.[256]

The case in Dadaab is not peculiar compared to in other areas where the refugees have lived such as Turkana.[257] The Dadaab host community expressed serious concern about dangerous places such as the 'well jiiri' which around hagadeera camp where the locals and refugees go when looking for firewood and watering the livestock. The inadequacy furthermore of affordable or free sanitary and toilet facilities in the settlement has compelled residents to utilize the same area on the outskirt of the camp.[258]

Undefended and lawless refugee camps create security problems to the host Dadaab community. For instance, as drought pushed many Somali out to Garissa, Al-Shabaab began targeting the resources contained in Dadaab.[259] Political radicalism and militancy amongst refugees became a chronic problem for the host Garissa area. The Kenyan government finds it difficult to separate true refugees and war displaced people from combatants and criminals according to the group discussion we made. Military recruitment into Al-shabaab was a common problem both within and outside the Dadaab refugee camps.[260] In Dadaab camp, crimes went unpunished because there is in adequate police presence to back up with rule of law. Although the camp authority were organised to address these problems, since the camp was not closed, the problems of crime,

[255] UNHCR Standing Committee, *op., cit.*
[256] *Ibid*
[257] Martha Turuti, "Impact of Refugees on the Horst Community: Case of Kakuma", M.A Thesis's University of Nairobi, Department of History.
[258] Oral interview, Fatuma Ali Hussein, Dadaab Township, 10/6/2012.
[259] US-Government, *World Refugee Survey 2001*, Washington, DC: US Committee for Refugees, 2001
[260] Van Damme, W., "Do refugees belong in camps? Experiences from Goma and Guinea", in *The Lancet*, 1995, pp. 346- 366.

violence and militarisation reached out into the surrounding host community. The host Somali community had difficulty keeping refugees inside camps or designated areas. Thus, a large numbers of refugees are living outside camps, both in rural and urban areas. The problem of separating combatants and criminals from refugees enhances the public perception that all refugees are a problem.[261]

Another problem was that of the border control. The way in which economic migrants tried to pose as refugees, and to claim asylum in Kenya since the collapse of Siyyad Barre regime in 1991 posed a big problem to the host community and to the state.[262] And the host have struggled with this problem, to the detriment of refugee policies in Kenya. In an effort to control the movement of non-citizens into and within its territory, Kenya government has imposed more stringent requirements on proof of refugee status and have also sought to restrict refugees to camps. For instance, after a recent roundup of illegal migrants in Nairobi, the police spokesman said: "Refugees were not supposed to be in Nairobi. They were supposed to be in their designated camps, they are not authorized to be on the streets. The law is very clear. Who will take care of their needs if they are not in the refugee camps? It means they will be forced to steal for their survival therefore threatening the Kenyan security". These security problems and the subsequent response by the state complicate the state's task of accessing and managing refugee resources. Where the host population might benefit from refugee resources, security problems create significant obstacles.

Most of the people who were interviewed expressed their concern that they were unable to leave the relative safety of their villages to gather firewood, tend their cattle, or otherwise attend to their livelihoods. Insecurity had reduced the economic vitality of the community and was forced to offset any economic advantages that might accrued from refugee resources. Three key sets of challenges for the people of Garissa arose from the double impact of resources and security threats occurring due to protracted refugee situations. The first challenge increased demands on the state bureaucracy to manage the denser population and plethora of aid agencies in regions

[261] Jacobsen, K., "A Framework for Exposing the Political and Security Context of Refugee Populated Areas", *Refugee Studies Quarterly 19*, 2000, pp. 3-22
[262] Weiss, T. G. and C. Collins, *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention: World Politics and Dilemmas of Help*, Boulder, CO: West-view, 1996, p. 54.

where the state was absent or weakly represented. Secondly, there was an increased demand on the state apparatus to control and manage contested refugee resources, either for its own state building purposes, or to ensure that its citizens benefit from these resources. And lastly, there is an increased demand on the state's security apparatus to control its border and address security threats posed by the spill over of conflict and troublemakers entering with refugees.[263]

5.8 Sanitation and Environmental Impact on the Host Community

Sanitation and environmental suffered seriously among the Kenyan Somali community. The County of Garissa was facing a serious environmental hazard due to improper waste management system.[264] Both liquid and solid wastes are disposed of indiscriminately all over the township as it is in the camp. There are no well constructed drains to serve as outlets for liquid waste and continuous dumping of solid waste all over the town has created mountains of refuse. More so, there is a lot of pressure on sanitation facilities, such as the village public latrines and the few garbage containers.[265]

5.9 Conclusion

This chapter outlines the refugees' conditions at the camp. It is shown that the refugees and how refugees have related with local people socially and economically. This has been illustrated by interaction at different levels through attendance of social functions of each other and the clashes which are sometimes witnessed. Such frictions necessitated establishment of a police post at the camp. The primary purpose is to maintain law and order. This was supported by District peace committees in conflict resolutions between the two groups. They were helped by the efforts of the traditional leaders. The chapter also looks at the impact of the presence of the refugees in the camp. In this light, I captured benefits that have been derived by the host community as well as the negative impacts. The next chapter is the outlines of the findings of the research.

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[263] Hansen, A. "Refugee Self-Ssettlement Verses Settlement on Government Schemes", Discussion Paper 17, Geneva: UNRISD, 1990.
[264] *Ibid*
[265] Melissa Philips (2003), "The Role and Impact of Humanitarian Assets in Refugee-Hosting Countries", *New Issues in Refugee Research*, UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, Working Paper No. 84

CHAPTER SIX

6.0 CONCLUSION

Somalia is still in a protracted political limbo as it remains in statelessness condition. Despite the precarious situation of Somali refugees scattered across many parts of the world, both the country and the plight of its refugees remain off the radar of the world media. The atrocities committed in the process of the overthrow of Siyaad Barre's regime in 1991, and the clanistic power struggles that followed, led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Somalis. The refugees initially fled to the neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya, subsequently moving on to countries near and far. Those who were fortunate enough to escape the trials and tribulations inherent in exile in countries such as Kenya, where existing resources are barely able to meet the basic needs of the native population and where most refugees still remain in closed camps, moved on to more prosperous countries where they obtained refugee status. Most were not so fortunate, however.

The focus of this research has been the Somali refugees who remain in limbo in camps in the North Eastern Province of Kenya (NEP). Dadaab, a name given to three camps (Hagadera, Ifo, Ifo2, kambi oos and Dhagahley), is located about 100 kilometers from the Somali-Kenya border. These camps were created in mid-1992, after it became almost impossible for the international humanitarian regime to run the camps in Liboi, a border region too close to southern Somalia, where violence still occurred on a daily basis. Security concerns for international staff, refugees, and humanitarian supplies all led to the creation of new camps further inside Kenyan territory. The region where the Dadaab camps are located is semi-arid and was sparsely populated by nomadic Somali-Kenyans before the arrival of refugees fleeing the war. There have been hostilities between Kenya and Somalia ever since independence in the early 1960s, the latter claiming the Somali-inhabited Northern Frontier District (NFD) as a missing Somali territory and supporting regional independence movements. Due to this tension, Kenya kept the NFD, now known as the Northeastern Province of Kenya, and its population under a permanent state of emergency from independence until 1992.

The scale of refugee flight across the Kenyan border in the early 1990s overwhelmed both the small local nomadic population and the scarce natural resources of the area. The presence of

international organizations nevertheless brought this previously marginalized region some attention with the provision of services such as boreholes, hospitals, and schools. By March 2003, about 160,000 of the more than 400,000 Somali refugees who fled to Kenya at the height of the war remained there. Of these, 130,000 were in the three Dadaab camps, with smaller numbers in the Kakuma camps in Northwestern Kenya, and the remainder living in urban centers like Nairobi. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) administers the camps, with CARE responsible for social services, the World Food Program (WFP) for food, and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and International rescue committee (IRC) for health Care services.

The argument here is that encampment and protracted refugee situations leave thousands of men, women, and children living in limbo, resulting in wasted human capacity and acute diminution of human dignity. Research in Dadaab found that refugees are dismayed by their dependency on inadequate aid and express the loss of a sense of selfworth due to their inability to better their situation or to escape from the dire conditions of camp life. The failure of the host state and the international community to bring about any effective intervention to free refugees from such a condition is also examined. Here, the emphasis is on the neglect of the Kenyan Government, as a signatory state to many human rights and refugee covenants, to enforce the refugees' legal rights under international law.

Camps are often established in peripheral regions, which lead to segregation and marginalization of refugees. The international humanitarian organizations administering these camps have different cultural norms, linguistic backgrounds, and political concerns than the people under their care. To be sure, refugees in the crisis phase welcome the assistance strangers bestow upon them and remain acquiescent to camp regimentation. Resentment and conflict with the aid apparatus follows. Aggravating these inadequacies further is the prohibition of freedom of movement to which refugees in closed camps are subjected, a constraint that greatly hampers the ability to seek alternative livelihood strategies outside the camps. Coupled with the difficulties international humanitarian organizations experience in raising sufficient funds to administer the camps with adequate provisions beyond the emergency phase, this renders the camps domains of high material scarcity.

Data collected from Somalis in Dadaab confirms the deprivations refugees experience in protracted situations. Interviewees detailed the precariousness of their day-to-day existence, which is, unfortunately, substantiated by camp administration reports. Refugees expressed to this author their frustration with the situation. Foodstuffs distributed are actually often scorned. Many argued that the quality of the grains distributed is not fit for humans. Moreover, most research participants dwelled on the lack of variety in their rations and the cultural inappropriateness of maize as the main staple provided. Another theme often coupled with the dependency syndrome is the loss of self-worth that may result from protracted refugee situations. My investigations in Dadaab strongly support this point. For many, the implications of being and being called "refugees" were often very negative.

Instead of hospitality, refugees in limbo often experience exploitation, extreme insecurity, and constant harassment, not only from local populations, but also from national authorities, whose policies fuel unfavorable sentiments toward the newcomers. Such a situation may partially stem from the hard conditions persisting in refugee-hosting areas. Local populations in these regions often end up more marginalized than the refugees, who receive international humanitarian aid, which at least permits them to meet subsistence needs. When excluded from this aid, host populations tend to resent refugees and view the newcomers as "enemies" or competitors. Scarce resources, such as firewood and water, grazing areas and land become contested when the sudden population increase leads to high consumption of these limited resources.

The study was centred on conflict between the refugee and the host communities in Garissa County and more specifically the Dadaab Sub-County. It explored this by first detailing the Somali migration to Kenya and analyzing the factors that led to their movement and settlement in Garissa. It went further to explore how host communities and refugees managed to integrate economically, without legal status from the Government of Kenya. It looked at how the Somali refugee migrants engaged in various activities that resulted in their differences with the host community. The study revealed that law enforcement was of significance as it helped in the acquisition, management and sustenance of Somali refugee livelihoods. This was characterised with the response received from the local Somali in Garissa to the influx of large numbers of Somali refugees.

The study also found that the Somali refugees in Garissa depended on social networks as a livelihood strategy and that their affinity with the co-ethnic group (Kenyan Somali) boosted their hopes of staying away from the civil war in their country. From this point of view, the study critically looked at the civil wars in Somalia and showed how they resulted in the collapse of the Somali state. The study elaborated on how conflict within Islamic sub-groups, the natural disasters or environmental issues and ethnic rivalry were prompting factors. The study also indicated that the refugee problem in Somalia had changed substantially over the last years.

The increasing use of refugee camps as places to confine refugees, rather than help them become self-supporting has led to an increased burden being placed on the international community and the host community. Somali refugees are characterized by their impoverishment and the relative inadequacy of services provided to them. The refugees found themselves forced to get involved in various economic activities within the camps and their surroundings. This has been a spark to the conflicts that have existed between the refugees and the host community.

However, I argue that conflict with refugees in this situation should not be interpreted as hostility toward refugees per se. Rather; conflict in areas where water and pasture are scarce is often the norm. For example, in the Northeastern province of Kenya, where the Dadaab camps are located, local Somali-Kenyan populations historically and presently experience conflict due to a paucity of pasture and water. In such a context, for refugees to expect hospitality beyond the short-term is unrealistic, even if among a population of the same ethnic background. In an environment of scarcity, a survival-for-the-fittest mentality envelops all, with refugees often becoming victimized. The pervasive insecurity in the Dadaab camps therefore illustrates the often-tense relationship between locals and refugees. Highlighting the scale of this concern, UNHCR reported that, at the height of gender-based violence, there were 200 documented rapes in Dadaab in the year 1993. In the subsequent four years, the number of officially recorded rapes averaged between 70 and 105. But rapes again increased to 164 in 1998, fell to 71 in 1999, rose again to 108 in 2000, and dropped to 72 in 2001.29 Given the stigma attached to rape within the Somali culture, reported acts fall far short of the actual number of cases.

Most of the rapes in Dadaab occur in the outskirts of the camps, as the depletion of firewood in this semi-arid region obliges women to walk further and further in search of sources of energy for cooking. UNHCR documented over 100 rapes from February to August 2002. Another example of insecurity is the raiding of the camps by bandits. These incursions coincide with bimonthly ration distributions or when material donations such as tents are distributed to cover refugees' makeshift houses. The bandits often come to grab any valuables they might find, targeting particularly those suspected of owning material goods or receiving remittances and fresh rations. It was reported that, on certain occasions, shiftas use the women to transport the looted rations and, when the task is done, rape and at times kill them on the outskirts of the camps.

The institution of asylum seriously deteriorated in Kenya as a result of a number of factors. The study analyzed the social life and the insecurity experienced by the refugees and the host communities as well as the poverty of the locals that made them perceive refugees as leading better life than theirs. It is from this perspective that the study also noted that the host communities had developed a negative perception of the refugee whom they felt have become destructive to the environment. Thus it was also important to focus on competition for resources at Dadaab as key role in influencing the negative local perception to the refugees. Such sentiments expressed by locals concerning the better economic status of refugees were erroneous. The reality at Dadaab was that refugees were generally poor as majorities were not involved in any income generating activity.

The research also showed how competition in business has not been significant in shaping negative local attitudes toward refugees at Dadaab, as most locals were not opposed to refugee engagement in trade. This showed that in some aspects the refugees and the locals agreed while in others they were forced into conflict. However the various agencies such as CARE International, Lutheran World Federation and the Norwegian Refugee Council helped in improving local living standards in terms of improving infrastructure, sinking boreholes, and providing social services such as medical care. The study revealed that the hosting community at Dadaab felt discriminated against as they were not given food rations and other direct benefits that refugees enjoyed. Some were therefore forced to register as refugees.

This study outlined the refugees' conditions at the camp. It was made known how refugees related with local people socially and economically. It also elaborated on the role played by the law enforcers in maintain law and order in Dadaab particularly in cases when refugees engaged in conflict with the host communities. NGOs at the camp have also supported the refugees and helped in resolving the conflict between the two groups, and efforts of the traditional leaders. The study also looked at the positive and negative impacts of the presence of the refugees in the camp regarding some benefits that had been derived by the host community.

The Kenyan government response to Somali Refugee influxes had kept on changing since 1991 and 2011. It is argued that this contributed to increase of the refugee crisis in Kenya. It was therefore important that the study discuss the legal measures held by the government of Kenya in handling the influxes of the Somali refugees into the country. The Government of Kenya was being guided by the 1951 UN convention related to status of refugees and the 1969 OAU convention governing specific aspects of refugee problem. Kenya is a signatory to both. Kenya Government sometimes tried to prevent Somali refugee influx by encouraging them to return to their home country. This was a strategy to limit conflict between the Somali refugees and the host communities. It was partially successful.

The Kenyan government responded positively in providing refugees' physical needs in collaboration with UNHCR and other implementing partners such as GTZ which provides firewood to the camps. This also helped reduce cases of conflict between the refugee and the host community concerning basic needs available in Garissa County. The important action of the government in trying to integrate the locals with the Somali refugees has played a major role in building the relationship between the host community and the refugees. Furthermore, IGAD had responded to refugee crisis in Kenya and made efforts to handle the conflict between the host communities and the refugees. The role played by the Kenyan Government in drafting Somali peace and security strategy of IGAD has been of help in resolving the conflict between the refugees and the host community in Garissa County. The study therefore achieved its objectives after examining the origin and nature of conflict between refugees and the Somali host communities in Daadab and assessing the social, economic and political impact of the conflict on both the Somali refugees and the host communities around Dadaab.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX: 1 PHOTOS FROM DADAAB

SOURCE: PICTURE TAKEN BY YUSSUF ABDULLHI ON 06TH DECEMBER, 2012.
PICTURE 1: MOHAMED MUKTAR AT A DAM IN HAGADERA REFUGEE CAMP, ONE OF THE SEASONAL DAMS.

SOURCE: PICTURE TAKEN BY MOHAMED MUKTAR ON 06TH DECEMBER, 2012.
PICTURE 2: CAMEL WAITING AT A WATERING POINT FOR THEIR TURN AT EGE DAM WHICH IS ABOUT 6 KILOMETERS FROM DADAAB TOWN.

SOURCE: PICTURE TAKEN BY YUSSUF ABDULLAHI ON 06TH DECEMBER, 2012.
PICTURE 3: MOHAMED MUKTAR CONDUCTING AN INTERVEIW ON A FOCUS GROUP AT HAGADERA REFUGEE MARKET.

SOURCE: PICTURE TAKEN BY MOHAMED MUKTAR ON 06TH DECEMBER, 2012.
PICTURE 4: THE DEPLORABLE HOUSES AT KAMBII OOS WHERE REFUGEES ARE HOUSED.

SOURCE: PICTURE TAKEN BY MOHAMED MUKTAR ON 06TH DECEMBER, 2012.
PICTURE 5: HAGADERA DAM

APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE

Conflict between Refugees and the Host Communities in Daadab Division of Garissa County, 1991-2011

DIX 1: Interview Guide

Name…….

Sex……

Age……..

Marital Status……

County……..

District……..

Division……

Location…….

Clan……

Profession……..

1) Who are the residents' of Dadaab area?.....

2) How do the residents relate?.....

- Is there any conflict between residents? Yes ☐ No ☐

- If yes between which communities?.....

3) Do we have any refugees in Dadaab? Yes ☐ No ☐

- When do you think the refugees started coming to Dadaab?.....

-Where did they come from and why Dadaab?.....

4) When they came how did they relate with the locals?

.....

5) Where there any conflict between the host and the refugees?

…….

6) Why was there a conflict?

……

7) Who caused these conflicts?

…….

8) What is the impact of refugee on the host community?

……

REFUGEES

9) Where did you come from?.....

10) Why did you come to live in Dadaab ?.....

11) How is the life in the camp? What is your relationship with the indigenous people here?

……

……

12) How do you survive? For example how do you get your food and firewood?

……

……

13) How does the community around the camp react to your way of survival?

……

14) How does the host community treat you?

.....

15 Are you comfortable with the treatment?

…….....

16) What is the impact of the refugee on the host community?

…… ……..

17) What has been your experience living in Dadaab?

…….....

18) What has been your experience as a refugee?

…….....

19) What is your job? Do you have a business? What kind? Do you have any employees? Where is your place of business?

……

……

……

……

20) Is there anything else you would like to add?

……

……