DECLARATION

I, Pius Thuo Migue hereby declare this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

Signed………………………………………..     Date………………………………………..

PIUS THUO MIGUE

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as a University Supervisor.

Signed………………………………………….  Date………………………………………..

Dr Ochieng Kamudhayi
Dedication
This project is dedicated to; my wife Wanjiku, my sons Michuki and Macharia and daughter Nyambura for their support and understanding during the period of undertaking this Course.
Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge the Sponsorship accorded to me in order to attend the Course from the Ministry of State for Defence (MOSD). In the same vein, I also acknowledge my nomination for the Course by the Commander Kenya Army, Lieutenant General J Kasaon.

Let me recognize the Commandant NDC for his overall guidance and direction during the Course. In equal measure, I appreciate the contribution of the Faculty in ensuring that I remained focused on the Course. The entire NDC Staff also deserve mention for their support in various capacities in the realization of the Course objectives.

I would not fail to mention the invaluable contribution to this project by my supervisor Dr Ochieng Kamudhayi. His tireless guidance and expeditious approach to the exercise under review ensured the desired progress and eventual completion of the project. For this I am truly grateful.
Abstract

KDF’s entry into Somalia on October 2011 elicited a lot of interest at the local, sub-regional, regional and international levels. This was because in the history of independent Kenya, a 48 year period, the country had not gone to war. In fact the country was usually referred to as an island of peace in an otherwise unstable sub-region. Except for KDF’s engagements in the Shifta Campaign between 1963 and 1967, and also its involvement in United Nations Peace Keeping Operations within the region and in other parts of the world, KDF had not engaged in war per se.

The study therefore seeks to establish whether KDF’s entry into Somalia was a reflection of military diplomacy and if there is a relationship between military diplomacy and national interests.

The study will rely on both primary and secondary sources of data. The study will therefore rely on Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions to gather information from a selected number of Key personnel in the Ministries of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs.

The study’s hypotheses are based on seeking to establish whether military diplomacy enhances or does not enhance national interests. The hypotheses are therefore meant to establish if military diplomacy has any impact on national interests.

The study brings to the fore the finding that military diplomacy enhances a country’s national interests. The study indicates that KDF’s deployment to Somalia was in response to the threat to Kenya’s national interests and its very survival. The study concludes that a regional and multilateral practice of military diplomacy is a plausible approach to the mitigation of security threats to a country’s national interests.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Anno Domini</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Mission for Somalia</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>Africa Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>Africa Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central Africa Republic</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>Chief of Defence Forces</td>
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<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>ISDC</td>
<td>Inter State Defence and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAM</td>
<td>Kenya Association of Manufacturers</td>
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<td>KDF</td>
<td>Kenya Defence Forces</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interview</td>
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<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>MOSD</td>
<td>Ministry of State for Defence</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnerships for African Development</td>
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<td>NFD</td>
<td>Northern Frontier District</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>ONUB</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKOs</td>
<td>Peace Keeping Operations</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>PSOs</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<td>RCB</td>
<td>Ras Chamboni Brigade</td>
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<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
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<td>SADCBRIG</td>
<td>South African Development Cooperation Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>South Africa Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South Africa National Defence Forces</td>
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<td>SLOC</td>
<td>Sea Lanes of Communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCCs</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Countries</td>
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<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>United Nations International Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

AN INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY DIPLOMACY

1.0 Introduction

The concept of military diplomacy is to be contextualized not only within the realm of defence diplomacy, but also within the wider framework of a country’s diplomacy that is exemplified in its foreign policy. It can also be considered as one of the tools of a country’s diplomatic practice in furtherance of its foreign policy objectives.

From the foregoing, it does seem logical to argue that military diplomacy is to be seen within the confines of the traditional practice of diplomacy by states. And the question that does arise is, “Does the military conduct diplomacy?” In answering this question one is bound to bring to the fore the peculiar characteristics that define military diplomacy and distinguishes it from the normal traditional diplomacy alluded to earlier. One may also want to understand how military diplomacy has evolved over the years.

Military diplomacy also gains relevance considering that diplomacy has experienced a significant transformation particularly in the last decades of the 20th century. Specific reference has been made to the erosion of the barrier of sovereignty which has cushioned states against interference in their internal affairs by other states and non state actors.

Sovereignty may be the single most vital attribute of the state. The configuration of the present state system is credited to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. The attendant acquisition of sovereignty among states meant that these new units of political organization were equal with no overarching supreme authority to superintend over their relations with each other. In spite of their “equality” however, their relations have been characterized by competing self interests resulting in what has been called the anarchical international state system.
potential for conflict is therefore forever present in the international system due to the lack of a common authority. Indeed the main thrust of a state’s relations with another is to influence these relations for its own maximum leverage. It is within this influencing that diplomacy gains credence in what Barston calls, statecraft of force. This entails such actions as preventing aggression, building alliances, threatening or cautioning an enemy and soliciting for international support for legitimacy and use or control of force.

1.0.1 Statement of the Problem

Kenya Defence Forces’ (KDF) entry into Somalia on 14th October 2011 was unprecedented. Indeed it elicited a lot of interest at the local, sub-regional, regional and international levels. To say that this act was unexpected is a gross understatement. This is because in the history of independent Kenya, a 48 year period, the country had not ventured into such an expedition, if one may call it so. Indeed the country had earned itself a reputation as an island of peace within the sub-region that was otherwise characterized by periodical upheavals at least in a number of its countries. It was only during the post election violence of 2007/2008 that this perfect peace was severely tested albeit briefly.

While most of Kenya’s neighbours’ militaries could boast of having been engaged in action or better still, having been battle tested, Kenya’s military earned the tag of being a ceremonial Army. Indeed it had nothing to show in its forty eight years of its existence, save for its exploits in the Shifta Campaign conducted in the period immediately after independence, that is, from 1963 to 1967 when the insurgents for a Greater Somalia were contained. Besides this engagement, Kenya’s military has had a colourful career in Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs)

It is against this background that KDF’s entry into Somalia is to be contextualized. Like alluded to earlier, this entry not only elicited interest from various quarters, it also led to a number of interpretations in equal measure. It also raised more questions than answers on such issues as; the motivation behind the entry, the intended duration of the operation and the exit strategy among many other issues.

It is from the foregoing and the ongoing KDF’s operation in Somalia that this study has drawn interest. Specifically, the study seeks to investigate if KDF’s entry into Somalia was a reflection of military diplomacy in practice. The study also seeks to establish the relationship between the assumed KDF’s military diplomacy and Kenya’s National interests.

1.2 Objectives of the Study

- To examine and analyze the conduct of military diplomacy occasioned by KDF’s entry into Somalia.
- To examine the relationship between military diplomacy and national interests.
• To proffer research based recommendations aimed at recognizing the importance of military diplomacy in securing a country’s national interests.

1.3 Literature Review

The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) entry into Somalia in October 2011 was in response to the then prevalent security threats to the Kenyan State emanating from Somalia. This response elicited a lot of interest nationally, within the sub-region, regionally and also internationally. This study is therefore an attempt to understand the rationale for KDF’s entry into Somalia. Specifically the literature review contextualizes the event at three levels namely: at the level of diplomacy, that of the military and diplomacy and lastly the KDF’s entry to Somalia. In addition the study will examine various scholars to establish their views and the arguments that they advance with respect to the topic under study. In a nutshell the study seeks to establish whether KDF’s entry into Somalia was a reflection and practice of Military diplomacy in furtherance of national security objectives under the aegis of the wider National diplomacy prosecuted through a nation’s foreign policy.

White acknowledges the conceptual ambiguity of diplomacy. He cites definitional difficulties at two levels. One, at what he calls the macro level whose focus is diplomacy with regard to world politics as a whole and the challenge of identifying its constituent parts and how they fit in together. Secondly, at the micro level whose focus is the different but complementary roles of the actors involved. He argues therefore that the state-centered approach is no longer viable as it fails to address the wide range of actors. Hoffman seems to acknowledge Brian White’s school of thought and takes it to another level where he argues that the linkage of diplomacy to the state elicits considerable difficulties. He recommends that diplomacy should be redefined to accommodate social relationships that occur without the State’s undue influence. Hockings supports Hoffman’s central thesis by calling for the modifying of
traditional diplomacy as state sovereignty is increasingly being redefined in the wake of globalization and regionalizing effects. Barston re-echoes the conceptual ambiguity of diplomacy especially when he describes the relationship between Diplomacy and Security as complicated and evolving. He adopts three levels of analysis in evaluating the role of diplomacy and security. At the international level he posits that an actor’s interest can be accommodated through diplomacy without resorting to violence on the basis of such approaches as mediation and norm setting.

At the State level, he acknowledges a State’s responses to external threats through the traditional channels of statecraft. Indeed, he describes diplomacy as statecraft of force that entails a variety of actions like, deterring aggressions, building coalitions, threatening adversaries and soliciting international support for legitimacy for the employment of force. At the individual level he sees the interaction between the diplomat and the private citizen. Ultimately, he sees the aims of diplomacy as those of recognizing and identifying emerging interests at an appropriate stage through continuous assessments.

Plessis adds his voice by recognizing not only the complex nature of diplomacy but also in acknowledging the conceptual difficulty alluded to earlier. He introduces the term ‘Defence Diplomacy’ and argues that the concept has combined two incompatible extremes, one that is violent-coercive (armed force) and the other that is pacific-persuasive (diplomatic). Further, in diplomacy he sees the traditional peaceful and apparent instrument of foreign policy, and in the Military, an approach of last resort involving the employment of the armed forces in offensive, defensive and deterrent capacities.

Mohan also talks of military diplomacy and the attendant conceptual contention of the term. Indeed, he argues that the two words belong to two different realms because, while diplomacy
is the first line of defence among states, military is the last one and it entails the use of force. He also notes that military diplomacy as a term has gained usage in recent years particularly so after the Cold War era when Western powers started deploying armed forces on a wide range of new missions from peacekeeping, peace building to humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

From the foregoing, it is clear that military diplomacy is to be seen within the wider context of diplomacy. It is also true that the concept of military diplomacy has elicited conceptual difficulties as has been expressed by different scholars. Thirdly, diplomacy is constantly changing and new challenges are emerging that need addressing. There is need therefore to put diplomacy in a historical perspective to trace its evolution from its earliest possible dates of practice to date. This is critical as it will help shed light not only on the traditional diplomacy but also on the emerging new diplomacy and its nature.

The practice of diplomacy even from the earliest times reveals its complex nature. David Atkinson describes diplomacy as the "varied informal and formal processes of communication between and among states."

Indeed, evidence of what Atkinson calls proto-diplomatic practicewas apparent in ancient Egypt, Greece and in the Roman Empire. Linkage therefore between military practice and diplomacy can be traced back to centuries past. From the earliest recorded days of warfare, military theorists and practitioners, revealed the relationships of these elements and the need to coordinate them to realize maximum efficiency. Such reputed theorists and practitioner’s include: Sun Tzu, Fredrick the Great, Carl Von Clausewitz, and Alfred Thayer Mayer.

In his writings on “Offensive Strategy,” Sun Tzu avers: “For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without
fighting is the acme of skill.” The emphasis Sun Tzu places on the use of skill as opposed to force is apparent from the foregoing. Further, he talks of managing the environment in order to influence future outcomes, which he sees as the essence of military diplomacy. Fredrick the Great saw the vital relationship between military activities and diplomatic activities as integrated tools in a nation’s pool of power. While he practiced formal diplomacy extensively, he emphasized the importance of public and military diplomacy. Further, he underscored the need to appreciate the environment within which his generals operated in by making visits to:

“…..study the country where you are going to act, roads are examined, the mayors of the village, the butchers, farmers are talked to.” Fredrick therefore saw these visits by his generals as accomplishing multiple roles. They helped identify not only potential adversaries but also potential allies and potential assets thereby establishing vital relationships that helped prosecute his military and political objectives.

Clausewitz like Sun Tzu emphasized on the ability of a great Commander achieving an end state through varied means of influence. At one level he talks of the soldier-statesman whom he sees as the cornerstone of modern military diplomacy. The role of a soldier is first that of a fighter and also that of a statesman who deals with issues of policy. Clausewitz therefore draws the important linkage of military activities to those of policy. He advocates the need to synchronize military capabilities with other tools of policy implementation for the desired effects.

Samuel Huntington seems to agree with Clausewitz’s, basic idea of the soldier as a statesman. He however negates this duality and instead advocates for the soldier being always subordinate to the statesman. For according to him, war which is in the province of the soldier is only but an instrument, while policy which is in the province of the statesman is the
intelligent faculty. He goes on further and argues that the political object of war goes beyond the province of war to the field of the statesman.

Although Huntington relegates the role of the soldier to that of the statesman, he underscores the indispensability of the military in the prevailing power relations internationally. In what can be described as a realist approach to power relations, Huntington makes the following analysis: that the military recognizes the state as the basic unit of political organization, that there are continuous threats to the military security of the state, which calls therefore for the maintenance of strong and diverse military forces that can defend the state.

In a further advancement of his thesis, Huntington is critical of institutional devices that are meant to prevent war. He cites treaties, international law, The Hague Court, League of Nations and the United Nations as examples of these devices. He argues that these devices can only have meaning if they reflect the realities of international power. Indeed his contention is that diplomacy itself provides only a superficial sense of security because in the final analysis, the action of states is regulated through power and expediency. From the foregoing, diplomacy in general and military diplomacy in particular can only be relevant if it enhances the power of the state in its relations with others.

In the theory of Sea Power, Alfred Thayer Mahan demonstrates the means of achieving a variety of goals be they, informational, diplomatic, military and economic through what he calls maritime military diplomacy. The use of maritime power has also been referred to as “Gunboat Diplomacy.” Mahan therefore saw the maintenance of a naval fleet as a prerequisite to the advancement of economic interests by means of sheer presence. Gunboat diplomacy has therefore been described as the application of sea based power resources in the furtherance of national interests. This application can be either in the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign state. The concept of Gunboat diplomacy traces its origin to the
period of colonialism at the height of European imperialism. The European powers used demonstration of superior maritime military power to intimidate states into offering them concessions. Indeed the sight of a warship or fleet elicited the desired response. Although some maritime strategists associate Gunboat diplomacy with yesteryears of colonialism, it has significance in the contemporary age. In fact one of the objectives of this study will be to assess if the employment of KDF’s maritime military resources (Kenya Navy) both within the Kenya’s Coastal waters and that of Somalia, demonstrated military diplomacy.

1.3.1 The Evolution and Development of Diplomacy.

In order to appreciate the changing nature of diplomacy, it is important to trace its practice from the possible earliest times to the present. Like mentioned earlier in this review, diplomatic practice was evident in ancient Egypt, Greece and in the Roman Empire.

The use of envoys to articulate messages of rulers and kings was in medieval and modern Europe. The modern states of Europe began to institutionalize formal diplomatic practice during the 14th, 15th, and 16th centuries. Traditionally and especially after Renaissance, the practice of diplomacy became exclusive to ambassadors, consuls and professional diplomats who functioned as resident agents in foreign states on behalf of their respective governments.

It was during the same period that the use of service attaches gained currency. Machiavelli wrote of ambassadors being accompanied by military experts. Also, during the coalition wars of the 17th and 18th centuries, military observers acted as liaison officers between Commanders.

It was however during the reign of Napoleon I that the practice of Service Attaches was formalized. Indeed in 1806, Napoleon appointed an Army Captain as Second Secretary of the
French Embassy in Vienna. In 1809, Austria reciprocated by sending an officer to Paris. It was however not until 1860 that the practice of accrediting military attaches became widespread in Europe. By 1914, most European countries had adopted this practice while the United States and Russia followed suit. The real impact of military attaches was in their ability to keep their governments informed of military and strategic developments abroad. By the beginning of the 20th Century, the practice of traditional diplomacy was witnessed which was distinct from the previous one experienced during the ancient and medieval periods. The recognition of modern states and their interaction rather than other forum of political organization like the Catholic Church, underscored the changing nature of diplomacy. Diplomacy therefore became a state based activity that was institutionalized and professionalized. The emphasis though was bilateral diplomacy organized along a state to state basis and mutual agreement.

After World War I, a new form of diplomacy was evolving as a challenge to traditional diplomacy. Traditional diplomacy was accused of having failed to prevent War owing to its secretive nature. Other than the secrecy, the diplomats of traditional diplomacy were seen as members of a closed social elite tracing their roots to the aristocracy of medieval Europe. At another level, the establishment of international organization, the League of Nations, as an international forum for the peaceful settlement of disputes and deterrence against another War added to the challenges of traditional diplomacy. The state now envisaged a wider mandate of not only dealing with non-state actors in the form of international organizations both governmental and non-governmental, but also emerging issues outside the traditional ambit of physical security.
Multi-lateral diplomacy witnessed earlier in the 19th century by the great powers during the Congress of Europe, resurfaced as groups of states negotiated together through the League of Nations, its successor the United Nations and other international organizations.

Cold War diplomacy emerged after the Second World War and lasted between the 1940s and the 1980s. This diplomacy was characterized by the ‘East-West’ confrontation, a reflection of the bi-polar power arrangement. A significant aspect of this diplomacy was the absolute necessity to avoid a global nuclear conflict.

The diplomacy after the Cold War was global in scope as the bi-polar power arrangement ended with the collapse of the USSR. The focus of this diplomacy was on development. It was characterized by multiple actors, complex multi-lateral issues as well as bilateral processes at work. This optimism in the practice of diplomacy apparent after the end of the cold war was however short lived with the events of 9/11. The role of diplomacy on this new reality was to say the least, unclear.

The perpetrator of the 9/11 act was not a state actor or even a conventional non-state actor. It was rather a faceless transnational outfit with whom communication and negotiation would be difficult. The reaction of the United States, the victim of the 9/11 event is critical as it has significantly shaped the practice of diplomacy internationally since then. The declaration of the Global War on Terror, (GWOT) by the US on the so called Axis-of-Evil and its affiliated associates underscored the use of military force and other coercive measures as the instruments of choice. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the practice of unilateralism on the part of the USA and a clear indication of its rejection of both containment and deterrence the twin pillars of its diplomacy evident during the Cold War period.
This development is important as the war on terror has had its manifestations not only within
the Horn of Africa but also more specifically in East Africa. Indeed KDF’s entry into
Somalia is directed against the Al Shabaab group in Somalia, an outfit that is affiliated to Al
Qaeda, the outfit credited with authoring 9/11.

The scholars cited below have examined the changing nature of diplomacy and have come up
with varied analysis. Hocking talks of an evolutionary sense of diplomacy as opposed to the
categorization of the old and new diplomacy. Harold Nicholson identified the shift from old
style diplomacy of the cold war period, to a new diplomacy which is more open but complex.
In the 1990s Hamilton and Langhorne decried the use of diplomatic practice for undiplomatic
purposes particularly during periods of political upheavals. Adam Watson notes that the
essence of diplomacy is not just the management of order, but the management of change and
the maintenance of continued persuasion in the midst of change.

KDF’s entry to Somalia has to be contextualized within the historical relations between the
two states of Kenya on the one hand and Somalia on the other. One of the challenges that
cared Kenya on attainment of Independence was to deal with Somali’s irredentism.
Somalia’s irredentism was an attempt to actualize the agenda of Greater Somalia, that of
uniting all the Somalis living in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. While the Somalis living in
Kenya’s Northern Frontier District (NFD) had expressed their desire to join their brothers
across the border, Kenya evoked the doctrine of territorial integrity vis-a-vis the Somalia
greater Somalia initiative.

Consequently the Shifty War was born as emergency restrictions were imposed by the Kenya
Government in the NFD in a bid to contain Somali Nationalism. The Shifty Campaign lasted
from 1963 to 1967 although the emergency restrictions remained in place until 1991.
The reign of Said Barre in Somalia had significant implications to Kenya’s national security posture. The call of irredentism continued under his watch as the region became destabilized, following Somali’s military build-up from the East and the consequent Ogaden War. The failed state status of Somalia saw the deterioration of security and the paralysis of state functions in what Menkhaus calls, the tragedy in Five Acts.

The security vacuum saw the emergence of several warlords in charge of militia groups that fought for control of the capital Mogadishu and other parts of the country. The result was a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented proportions. Efforts to redeem Somalia spearheaded by the United Nations in a number of initiatives proved futile. Operation Restore Hope under the United Nations International Task Force (UNITAF) in 1992, the expanded UN role in Somalia in 1993 under United Nations Operation in Somalia UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II in 1995 failed to materialize as 24 peacekeepers from Pakistan and 18 Rangers from United States were killed and their bodies dragged in the streets of Mogadishu. Following this debacle, the UN withdrew from Somalia and the world forgot Somalia.

1.0.4 Hypotheses

- Military diplomacy enhances national interests.
- Military diplomacy does not enhance national interests.
- Military diplomacy has no impact on national interests.

1.5 Justification of the Study

The multi-faceted nature of security threats has challenged the strategic posture of states. New emerging security interests have therefore opened a wide array of concerns that include and
not limited to: food security, population control and even issues of environment. In this rapidly changing environment, there are security implications for diplomacy that are complex and evolving.

Security can therefore be viewed as the pursuit of policies through diplomatic and military means to confront such external threats as; regime maintenance, the attainment of a reasonable level of economic sustenance, ethnic cohesion, trans-boundary sources of instability and access to natural resources.

At another level, the UN financial crisis and global politics has diminished the linkages between diplomacy (military) and Peacekeeping. This has resulted in hampered Peacekeeping operations, some of which have been withdrawn or have not received desired expanded support at critical moments. Examples are given in Somalia and Bosnia. At the regional level, African states have found it difficult to establish viable security arrangements. This was particularly evident during the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) era whose preoccupation was mainly in the political and economic arena. The case of the African Union (AU) has not significantly changed the status of regional security arrangements in spite of the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

1.6 Methodology of the Research

The study will rely on both primary and secondary sources of data. The study will rely on Key Informant Interviews (KII) and Focused Group Discussions (FGD) to elicit information from a selected number of Key personnel in the Ministries of; State for Defence (MOSD) and that of Foreign Affairs. These will include senior civil servants in the said ministries involved in Policy formulation and implementation. The study will benefit from information drawn from the Military High Command to include the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) and the respective
Service Commanders that is: the Commander Kenya Army, the Commander Kenya Air Force, and the Commander Kenya Navy.

The study will also focus on the middle and lower cadre levels of commanders and especially those who participated in Operation Linda. The study will seek therefore to establish if Military Diplomacy was practiced before and during the Operation.

The study will then analyze the information so collected from the target groups to establish whether the assumptions laid down at the beginning of the study will hold validity.

1.6.1 Methods of Data Collection
The study will use the Interview schedule to guide the KII and the FGD. Respondents who will be senior civil servants from the ministries of State for Defence and those from Foreign Affairs coupled with the Military High Command of the KDF.

The interview schedule will be convenient as the respondents will have prior orientation with the researcher’s area of interest. The FGD will also be convenient as it brings together soldiers who worked together during the Operation and will help in sharing their experiences. The FGD will also allow the respondents a considerable degree of latitude in expressing their own views on the subject under inquiry. Questions will be tailored to elicit information pertinent to both the objectives and hypotheses.

1.6.2 Data Analysis Technique
Methodologically speaking the study will focus on a population that is an aggregate of all the cases that conform to some designated set of specifications. For instance, Key Informant Personnel will define a population consisting of senior government officials in the aforementioned ministries.

1.7 Limitations of the Study
The nature of this study and the study area will pose a challenge on account of the sensitivity of the information sought and its perceived security implications. The fact that the research problem involves a military operation which is still on-going underscores the formidable challenge facing the study especially in acquiring the required data. The need to interview military personnel in the operation area may be compromised due to security concerns.

Secondly, the Key Informant Personnel both in the civil service and in the military may be difficult to programme for due to the nature of their work, commitments and location of their places of work. The deployment of military personnel in the theatre (Somalia) and also within the military establishments spread across the country may pose a challenge in accessing them.

Thirdly, the issue of time constraints may also impact negatively on the study especially if the programmed appointments with the Key Informants Personnel are not honoured. All these activities are also to be contextualized within a specific timeframe available to conduct the study.

1.8 Conceptual Framework

This study will adopt the rational logic and deterrence theory approach to establish a basis for analyzing KDF’s entry into Somalia and its subsequent undertaking of Operation Linda Nchi. The rationale for this approach is informed by the conceptual and theoretical difficulty occasioned by the rubric of military diplomacy.

At the outset, ‘military diplomacy’ denotes a contradictory dichotomy for on the one hand, military implies coercion or the use of force while on the other, diplomacy denotes the use of peaceful means especially through negotiation to settle disputes. The study will endeavour to unravel the balance between the use of force and, or threats and the use of diplomacy by KDF’s troops in Somalia. The study will seek to demonstrate that both can reinforce each other as opposed to the advocacy of one opposed to the other.
The other reason for adopting a conceptual framework is the position proffered by some scholars to the effect that diplomacy is resistant to theory. Johnson argues that although diplomacy exists within international theory, its conceptual wealth is limited and to a great extent, divorced from the development of political theory. Indeed Johnson goes further to demonstrate the marginalization of diplomacy in the field of international relations.

Firstly, he argues that Morgenthau does not accord diplomacy due attention. Indeed it does not feature among his six principles of realism. His focus and emphasis is the state and diplomacy is only but a tool. The same perception or categorization is apparent in neo-realism and also in liberalism.

Kenneth Waltz sees diplomacy as a socializing agent based on the state, while liberalism sees diplomacy as a tool in the conduct of international rules, institutions and practices.

The story is not different with Structuralism (Marxism) and its place for diplomacy. Although the capitalist mode of production and reproduction has social connotations and in essence diplomatic nuances, the emphasis on the process of production and accumulation and the class struggles between the owners of the means of production and sellers of labour, forecloses the diplomatic agenda.

However, Johnson notes some positive attitudes with regard to diplomacy among the English School scholars, where it assumes the role of an institution structuring relations among polities (not states) and even elicits the highest level of abstraction in a dualism of mediation of Universalism and particularism. Alongside this positive trait, Johnson also cites diplomatic repertoire especially with regard to the aspects of communication and representation which can be described as the hallmark of diplomacy; that is, to moderate and manage the clash of conflicting interests as efficiently as possible.
It is against this background that the rational logic and deterrence theory finds relevance in the conceptual framework of this study. Through this approach the study attempts to assess the overall decision by the Kenya Government to send KDF to Somalia. The study will also seek to demonstrate that there was a rational logic behind KDF’s ‘military diplomacy’ which also needs to be contextualized within Kenya’s domestic scene and the events leading to the deployment of KDF to Somalia in October 2011.

Deterrence theory is concerned with the use of military action or threats to use force in an attempt to compel an adversary to do something (compellence) or prevent the adversary (deter) from doing something. Schelling in his scholarly appraisal, ‘Strategy of Conflict’ argues that the concept of military strategy may no longer be contextualized as victory only rather, it is more of an art of coercion, intimidation and deterrence. The application of power to hurt as a bargaining chip is the very basis of classical deterrence theory. Further, it seeks to demonstrate how governments attempt to behave rationally in calculations to assess relative gains to accrue from engaging in certain actions.

There are therefore critical factors to be considered in the application of the deterrent threat by the attacking state (read Kenya). They include; the state’s military capabilities to respond quickly, formidably and credibly, the state’s signaling and bargaining power to transmit the right signals to communicate the state’s credibility and resolve and the state’s national interests. The resolve is to be assessed within the context of the state’s past behavior or record. This is of essence considering KDF’s past record of having not been involved in any war.

Sartori’s reputational theory gains relevance here as KDF’s entry into Somalia also sought to shake off this incredibility tag. With regard to the national interests of the state, this study will seek to demonstrate that Al Shabaab threats and attacks were affecting the very core of the
Kenya state. That beyond the threats to the economic well being of the nation occasioned by the orchestrated kidnappings of a number of tourists, the then rampant and sporadic attacks on both the civil population and members of Kenya’s security agencies, put to question the veracity of the statehood of Kenya.

The rational logic also finds expression in what Freeman calls, ‘intervention to restore order.’ The study will demonstrate that state collapse, was the case with Somalia in 1991, and this laid ground for foreign intervention as civil strife and anarchy, is an anathema to the international body politic as it threatens the stability of the international system generally and that of the region specifically. Indeed segments of its population may destabilize states by seeking refuge there. The foregoing situation characterized the events leading to KDF’s entry into Somalia. Closely connected to this is the military’s ability to respond to disasters especially natural ones, to provide food, shelter and medical supplies to displaced populations. The study will demonstrate that KDF’s entry to Somalia found such circumstances.

1.9 Structure of the Study

Chapter One: Introduction: Chapter one introduces the topic on area of study, namely ‘Military diplomacy: A Case Study of Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia.’ It also captures the following aspects of the study: background to the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, literature review, the conceptual framework, justification or purpose of the study, hypotheses and the research methodology. The chapter also cites the limitations characterizing the study.

Chapter Two: Evolution and Historical Development of Diplomacy. The chapter offers a general historical background of diplomacy tracing its historical development over the years
and showing the linkages with military diplomacy. The chapter will also illustrate the changing nature of diplomacy over the years and therefore demonstrate the relevance of the topic under review.

Chapter Three: Case Study Perspective. The chapter will proffer a primary data perspective that will be derived from the interviews, focus group discussions, reports and other relevant sources.

Chapter Four: Data Analysis and Findings. This chapter will analyze the data collected and present the findings. The chapter will also illustrate the conduct of military diplomacy by the key informant personnel at the respective levels of operation.

Chapter Five: Conclusions and Recommendations. This chapter will present conclusions arrived at from the data analysis and then offer appropriate recommendations. The chapter will also provide a summary and discussion of the findings of the study in order to make informed conclusions that are based on the objectives and the hypotheses of the study.
The History of Diplomacy

2.0 Introduction

The history of diplomacy may be traced as far back as when man assumed the status of a social and political animal. Indeed one may add that when man tired of living in the Hobbesian state of nature and came into communion with others, to secure his own destiny, then the foundations of diplomacy had been laid. Further, the origins of diplomacy may also be contextualized within the confine of pre-recorded history when the first heralds carrying oral messages from one autonomous chief to another. Indeed in life of primitive societies as well as the relatively advanced ones, heralds and envoys enjoyed a perceived immunity. This was attributed not only to often deeply ingrained sense of religious taboo that curtailed men from harming an envoy, but also and more fundamentally, the need to send messages to the other side and also to know what the other side had to say. The importance of communication therefore cannot be gainsaid. Indeed regular exchange of information became institutionalized as civilizations developed and graduated into complex systems that desired to keep written records for kings and governments and to denote the relations between these entities.

From this general premise therefore, it is apparent that diplomacy entails a process of communication. The realist perspective inherent in an anarchical world underscores the import of diplomacy in attempts to manage conflict by dialogue and negotiation.

Two major perspectives have been identified with regard to diplomacy. They include; the macro and the micro-perspectives. At the macro level, the diplomatic focus attempts to make sense of the world of politics as a whole while at the micro level, diplomacy seeks to explain world politics from the various perspectives characteristic of the actors engaged in world
politics. This distinction is important as it helps reveal the essential features of the diplomatic process and also insights into the behavior of the various actors. The communication process also helps situate diplomacy in a historical perspective or in a continuum from the ancient times, through to the medieval period, the traditional period, old diplomacy, new diplomacy and total diplomacy.

2.1 Greek Diplomacy

The emergence of small city states in ancient Greece presupposed the compelling need for inter-city interactions. The relative polarity among the city states demonstrated the need to maintain communications as equals and this was enabled by the shared cultural, language and religion. Three types of representatives were apparent in this ancient diplomacy. They were; angelos or presbys, the keryx and proxenos. The first two were messenger and elder respectively and were envoys deployed for brief and specific missions. The second was a herald that had special rights of personal safety while the third was resident and informal similar to a present day consul. Further, the proxenos promoted the interests of the city that they represented together with their fellow citizens. They devised ways of harmonizing both the interests and policies of the two city states. For instance, they would articulate the concerns of their city states in the debates in their own assemblies accommodate visiting dignitaries from other city states and brief them on the political situations in their own city states. The concept of proxeny as an alternative to the later practice of sending resident embassies to other capitals worked well for the city states especially if they were not in conflict. In case there were conflicts, the loyalties of the proxenos were brought to the fore as they walked the tightrope of catering for the interests of their own cities. Around 700 BC,
examples of embassies that of, Menelaus and Odysseus to Troy have been attributed to Homeric descriptions.

Thucydides offers insights into the latter period particularly on the choice of Greek ambassadors that was usually done by the city assembly in an open and public manner. Other significant features of Greek diplomacy included; the number of ambassadors posted to a particular mission, they could have been as many as ten, which was a reflection of the different shades of opinion, the lack of consistency, continuity and confidentiality, as proof of the slow pace of Greek diplomacy. These flaws notwithstanding, the city states in ancient Greece, introduced a diplomatic system that boasted of many remarkable modern features.

2.2 The Roman Empire

Hamilton argues that the Roman Empire contributed little in the development of diplomacy as it was seen to be primarily legal in nature. In the early period of the Roman Republic a semblance of procedures akin to those of the Greeks were evident in keeping the original federation together. What also emerged were administrative ambiguities particularly with the conduct of foreign policy and maintenance of records. No central institution in Rome was accorded this responsibility. Policy therefore was to be found where the Emperor was and although he had staff whose duties included writing letters in Latin and Greek, it is strongly believed that he composed those letters himself.

This centralization of conduct of diplomacy was also noticed during the third century AD when the Emperor was directly involved in the defense of the empire against Sassanid Persians, where he negotiated himself. The issue of how ambassadors were selected and their actual responsibilities was relegated to the background, but they were a feature of the empire.
The administrative ambiguities aforementioned were re-echoed with regard to the internal organization of the Empire. Some of the borders were highly porous so that one was not certain when entering or leaving the jurisdiction of the empire. Even those areas under the empire did not have a uniform pattern of administration. It depended on how an area in question came to be under the empire. Some areas had belonged to subdued tribes, others were varieties of client kingdoms, yet others were provinces under senatorial authority as opposed to the imperial control. Lack of records seems to suggest the lack of development of diplomatic relationship with any other entity. Rome did not use diplomacy to maintain supremacy; rather it adopted methods of maintaining long distance legal and commercial business principally within the empire. However a system of legal principles, the code of Justinian became the foundation of diplomatic law. In the same token, Rome was very clear on the legality of warfare as there were procedures to denote war and peace. Indeed this aspect provided a legal distinction between just and unjust war or brigandage. The only institution that developed in Rome which had some function in international relations was the college of **Fetiales**. This college had a number of roles some of which included; according appropriate responses in cases of apparent threats, for instance, it could inform the adversary on issues under contestation and demand certain actions within a specified timeframe. When the time given elapsed and war was imminent, certain formulae had to be cited along the enemy’s border all in an attempt to prevent the escalation of hostilities. Indeed the onset of peace was marked by the sacrifice of a pig in what was an oathing ceremony sworn at the time and woe unto him who was the first to break it, for a curse would befall him. None of the twenty members of the college was bestowed any rights or duties in the formulation and implementation of policy.
This was evidence of how Rome handled diplomacy in what can be described as a mixed approach. While on one hand great efforts were put to prevent war, war did occur especially during the conquests that saw the expansion of the empire. The legal connotations of diplomacy may be seen to have been the hallmark of Roman Empire diplomacy.

2.3 The Byzantine Empire

The Byzantine culture thrived around Constantinople, Constantine’s new Rome and was a manifestation of the expanse of the Roman Empire. This linkage of the Byzantine Empire to the old Roman Empire is significant with regard to the development of diplomacy. The notion therefore of maintaining a monolithic, non-international posture was no longer tenable owing to the dynamics of the period, that is, the diplomatic predisposition and methods attributed to the Eastern Byzantine Empire.

The Byzantine response to the dynamics of the time sheds light on the importance of diplomatic activity. The multiplicity of techniques and its ambitious long interactions may be seen to have been a precursor to the modern diplomatic system. Indeed the close relations between Byzantine and Venice opened new avenues in the transmission and conduct of diplomacy in the western world.

The threat of invasion from several fronts demanded appropriate responses if the empire was to survive. Such threats included; a series of nomadic invasions from Central Asia in the North and Black Sea areas, from the Germanic peoples, the Slavs, the Hungarians, the Pechenegs, Russians, the Abasgians and the Khazars who emerged from the Steppes in waves around the six century. From the East came the Persians, the Turks, Seljuk and the Ottoman, from the South, and the Arabs under the drive of Islam. Closely related to these series of
threats was the realization that the international resources within the empire couldn’t sustain a military effort to mitigate these threats. In spite of possible weaknesses among the enemies, Byzantine had to adopt the most plausible means of survival, namely diplomatic.

Consequently, the Byzantine diplomatic maneuver was exercised to the full in a combination of both secular and divine aspects. The traditional historical ties with Rome were brought to the fore and were combined with a novel and sacred role of the Emperor as God’s representative. This combination gave both the emperor and the empire a limitless leverage in the conduct of diplomacy. The other rulers therefore played second fiddle to the emperor whose seat was at the centre of the universe, symbolized by Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire, a growing centre of Christianity and the idea of Rome. Constantine V11 exemplified this when he compared emperor’s power to the harmonious movement given to the universe by its creator.

The diplomatic stint therefore continued to characterize the empire especially in its strategic pursuits particularly in enhancing its longevity amid various threats. The Byzantines were keen to allude to their possession of “non-conventional” weapons and were cautious to keep all the physical signs of their unique superiority in evidence. Of particular significance was the ceremonial signing carried out at the offices at Saint Sophia, itself an architectural wonder. For instance, in the late ten century, when the visits by the envoys of Prince Vladimir of Russia, a classic choreographed display by wreaths of incense and the radiance of candles of young men floating above the heads of priests underscored the diplomatic exploits of the empire that bordered on the supernatural.
The treatment of envoys throughout such visits as meant to impress. The envoys were carefully guarded and were not allowed to associate with any undesirables or catch sight of any unpleasant episodes. Every effort was therefore made to maintain the position of the empire at the centre of the universe. Honour and gifts were given to both the visiting envoys and rulers from distant lands. Though such honour could be argued not to have been of no particular value, it was however gratifying. In equal measure was the terminology of the treaties that re-echoed the notion that the honour and the gifts were from none other than the emperor. Indeed it was quite interesting how the superior position of the empire was accepted by medieval rulers, both Christian and non Christian and their desire to be incorporated in the hierarchy of states in the empire both for practical and sentimental reasons.

From the foregoing, Byzantine diplomacy was couched in religious fervor and alongside it, a spread of a whole plethora of ideas, sentiments and customs, all of which illustrated that the empire was the source of not only religion but also political authority. This diplomacy was therefore characterized by patience, flattery and downright persuasion.

Other techniques used in the Byzantine diplomacy included; bribery, flattery, marriages and divide and rule. Though at the face of it they seem inimical to the ideas of diplomatic practice, they proved useful in the sustainability of the empire. Every ruler and tribe was evaluated and a price was attributed to each either through money or flattery and indeed the treasury at Constantinople was geared to the demands of such an eventuality, it was after all the financial centre of the world. Collosal sums were therefore disbursed to respective targets and the argument was that in the long run the cost was less than that of mounting a war with the very likelihood of losing. As one Steven Runciman put it, the target ruler be it a Tsar or a Calif, would call it a tribute, but to the emperor, it was a wise investment.
In the event that bribery and flattery failed to produce the desired results, the emperor had a series of options. One of these was the use of marriage. Byzantine princesses were married off to foreign potentates. This was particularly common during the tenth and eleventh centuries. Relations between the rulers were therefore solidified through generous dowries and wedding presents. The tactic of dividing the enemies and making them adversarial to each other played well to the schemes of the emperor. Indeed, such enemies were motivated to fight each other in wars that the emperor was only too willing to avoid.

The diplomatic developments witnessed in Byzantine were quite significant especially if evaluated against the far less developed diplomatic system that emerged in post Roman and Western Europe. It was not until the fourteenth century that similar developments were noticed especially in the Arab world and Medieval Europe.

2.4 Diplomacy in the Arab World

Diplomacy in the Arab World was determined by the Islamic world view. Keith argues that according to Islam, the world was divided into two broad areas or regions. One area was Islamic or it acknowledged Islamic sovereignty while the other did not which was the abode of war or dar al- Harb. Between these two worlds, there existed a state of perpetual war whether declared as in the form of holy war (jihad), or not, when hostilities were suspended. What is significant to note is that the situation was always fluid, for even in cases of suspension, it was just for convenience purposes. In the prevailing circumstances therefore some form of communication was imperative especially if actual warfare did take place and the end was imminent occasioning the need for safe passage across Islamic lands.

The issue of immunity among emissaries had been a common practice acknowledged by Islam even in the earliest days. Its reciprocal value had also come to be appreciated amongst
other rulers. Other features that shaped this early form of diplomacy included; the declaration of war, the exchange of prisoners and the arrangement for truces. It was only during the Abbasid dynasty at Baghdad between AD 750 and 1258 was significant stability was achieved to enable the inclusion of more sophisticated features of diplomacy. Though Islamic diplomacy did not develop in the line of establishing semi-permanent resident representatives, special emissaries were frequently sent and received to achieve short term objectives. Visiting envoys were accorded special reception in Baghdad, but as seen earlier in Byzantine, they were kept away from ordinary citizens and monitored due to the realization that the gathering of information was their most likely mission. Evidence of skilled diplomats was apparent in the mix of emissaries conducting diplomacy. They were usually three in number comprising of; a soldier, a scribe who acted as a secretary and a scholar. Important messages were delivered orally usually by a senior emissary while written accreditation was usually provided. Successful conduct of business was characterized by extravagant ceremonies where lavish gifts were exchanged. If the conduct was successful, a cool dismissal ensued and if hostilities broke out before the departure of the envoys, chance of their being held captive or even being executed were very real.

Another significant feature of Islamic diplomacy especially at the lower levels (below missions) was the aman or safe conduct. This guaranteed the bearer safe entry to Islamic lands and to obtain the protection of his person, property and his household. This could be attained either officially or unofficially. The official one was normally issued by the imam to a group of persons, the inhabitants of a city or even to a population of a territory. The concept of reciprocity was also apparent as this practice was common among the jurisdiction of rulers who had signed a peace treaty with Islamic authorities thereby according their subjects this privilege. This privilege could also be withdrawn if the bearer conducted himself in a manner
contrary to the edicts of Islam. Significant exchanges were evident from this form of Islamic diplomacy especially in the fields of science, medicine and literature.

2.4.1 Diplomacy in Ancient Middle East

Contrary to the seemingly “perpetual” state of war in the Arab world, ancient civilizations in the Middle East, reveal a more cautious approach. Watson argues that even imperial rulers who sought to expand their dominions far and wide, preferred to realize their ideals through persuasion and limited demonstrative use of might.

Indeed, the use of promises and threats before the actual use of force was apparent particularly if the costs were prohibitive and the risks uncertain.

Examples are cited however of the Assyrians who mistreated the kings they conquered ostensibly to send a message of fear to others to make them submit. Mention is also made when Assyrians encountered formidable resistance before the walls of Jerusalem resulting in the pursuit of diplomacy by the Assyrian Commander. Indeed, he is known to have pontificated to the Israelites the benefits of submission and the dire consequences of further resistance. A different approach was adopted by the Persians, the successors to the Assyrian empire. They are described as having been more humane and civilized in their conduct of diplomacy. Indeed even when their expansionist desires came to the fore, they went into great lengths to secure their objectives through negotiation while mobilizing requisite capabilities to have their way if negotiations failed.

2.4.2 Diplomacy in Ancient India

The practice of diplomacy in ancient India is captured in the great manual of statecraft, the Arthashastra. Besides the conduct of diplomacy, it also highlights advice on how to conduct
war and to establish a universal dominion. While much of this information was as a result of Alexander’s invasion of India, the manual also has traditional wisdom and aphorisms on the conduct of international relations. Much of the information was compiled a Brahmin minister, Kautilya. His thesis and advice bears striking semblance to that of Machiavelli especially in the advancement of such qualities as ambition and resourcefulness.

Indeed, Watson posits that, the Arthashastra compares well with Machiavelli’s Prince and the areas of convergence include the ideas and maxims of the Middle Ages while embracing the later theories on neutrality, diplomacy and international law. The Indian scenario boasted of traditional leaders, military adventurers who assumed the roles of kings and also republican states. Wars were a common feature in ancient India as states sought to become dominions. Those states that were inclined to survive as well as those that sought to expand, had to be wary of the dynamics involved. They had to be alive to developments in neighbouring states and consequently a series of alliances and treaties became necessary as no state felt strong enough to stand on its own. In such circumstances, regular communication and spying developed. Like the Greeks, the Indians did not have permanent residents, rather they depended on envoys who delivered messages, and negotiators who were given authority to negotiate and even modify arguments on behalf of their leaders. Both categories, that is, the envoys and negotiators, came from the high Indian caste of Brahmans. They enjoyed a degree of immunity and were considered the mouthpieces of the kings.

The Arthashastra also indicates the roles of envoys some of which correspond to those of today. They included; negotiation of treaties and the desire to see their adherence, to less legitimate roles, such as secrecy, spying and the bribery of enemy officials. It is evident therefore that Indian diplomacy was characterized by not only bilateral issues, but also
multilateral ones. Communication skills were a key requirement and an elaborate system of mediation was apparent.

2.4.3 Ancient Chinese Diplomacy

The period from 720-220 BC witnessed significant developments in the field of diplomacy. The political scenarios were characterized by a number of autonomous and intellectually vibrant states rather than a monolithic unified empire. The states in Central China recognized the Chou King as the nominal emperor in spite of having no direct authority over them. There were however two main leagues or alliance systems. The membership to these alliances often changed and relations between the respective states were often complex and constantly shifting. The period was also characterized by constant wars, struggles for domination and survival. The art of diplomatic bargaining was clearly a useful resource as was the prowess in spying. Increasingly every leader needed to know about other states and to keep in constant touch with them.

The Chinese diplomacy of the period therefore was highly formal. Unlike the Indian one that boasted of religious origins, the Chinese inherited useful skills from the Chou court ceremonials. Diplomatic communication was evident through the exchange of envoys. The kind of envoys sent and their respective ranks and also the nature of ceremony put in place for their reception, all served to denote the level of diplomatic engagement. Indeed, so frequent were these kinds of events, especially those of temporary embassies, that cases of overlap were not uncommon. However such absurdities were tolerated as rulers were well aware that it was in their interests to send and receive envoys.
However, with the era of independent states coming to an end, a decline in the art of diplomacy became apparent. The decline was not so much on the treatment of envoys, but rather in the violation of treaties and contracts hitherto negotiated. The increased practice of this anomaly further eroded diplomatic practice as exchanges and arguments lost credibility and the inevitability of war became more evident. The emergence of one state Chin which had vast resources conquered the rest in similar version to Macedon over the Greek city states.

### 2.4.4 Diplomacy in the Medieval World

Medieval diplomacy prides itself with interesting insights occasioned by several aspects characteristic of the period. After the fall of Rome and the subsequent decline of the Roman Empire, minimal diplomatic relations were witnessed in the West. Except for the Church, little in the way of communication could be discerned. One of the contributory factors to this state of affairs was the undeveloped nature of sovereignty prevailing during the period. In addition, there was also lack of a clear distinction between private and public activity and therefore of representation when the need arose. It was not until the sixteenth century that this state of limbo got redemption, but even then, not completely. This was attributed to the primitive situation of administration, the limited power of rulers and also poor communication.

Another significant factor was that, as late as the 1400, the Western world considered itself as one society in spite of wars, doctrinal disputes, and disagreements between the Pope and Emperor and class disparities. Indeed there thrived a belief in the unity of Christendom however loosely, something that was a fundamental condition of all medieval thought and activity. The act of representation therefore was only to assume clear droit d’ambassade at the end of the sixteenth century when in addition to rulers, commercial, provincial
ecclesiastical and personal envoys were sent and received as representatives of their respective leaders.

Two phases of medieval diplomacy were evident during the fifteenth century. The first or earlier phase was characterized by the nuncius (Latin) and depicted the less complex international society with the least diplomatic activity. Besides being the messenger for the principal, the nuncio could also receive and make oaths. He also enjoyed a fair amount of immunity and security based on religious grounds. However the nuncios had no power to negotiate or conclude a treaty unless in the case of an agreement that had already been drafted. In essence the nuncios was the most frequently used diplomatic agent during the first phase of the Middle Ages. His limited role coincided with the limited requirements of the period.

During the later Middle Ages, the practice of diplomacy became increasingly complex. This situation led to the development of a new official, the procurator resulting in the English terms of proctor and proxy. This was not an entirely new concept in the Middle Ages. Its significance was therefore drawn from a legal rather than a diplomatic standpoint. The procurators could enter into private contracts and also had authority to negotiate and conclude peace unlike the nuncius on behalf of the principal or emperor.

Despite these two phases in the period, the conduct of diplomacy in the Middle Ages proved to increasingly difficult. The poor means of communication, apparent delays, the weak sense of sovereignty, and the uncertainties of domestic administration were some of the factors responsible for the aforementioned difficulty.

2.4.5 The Diplomacy of Renaissance
Perhaps no other country saw the development of diplomacy in Europe as Italy. This was occasioned by the gradual evolution of the sovereign state which replaced the hitherto existing medieval order. This event saw the huge increase in the number of entities that needed to interact diplomatically. This was also referred to as the fluid hierarchical system of feudalism that crystallized into a number of states of different sizes from the expansive and elective Holy Roman Empire and great kingdoms of France and Spain to the city states such as Venice and Lubeck. In addition, the process also emphasized the collapse of the Universal Western Church during the Reformation and the resultant secularization of state governments and administration in Europe.

The impacts of these developments on the diplomatic front were quite significant and particularly so in the Renaissance Italy. Indeed it became apparent in the following century that sovereign rulers alone had the right to send envoys and that it was the representation of the rulers to each other that was of greater significance. While the emergence of the resident ambassador perhaps heralded the apex of this development, the demands of the period dictated that rulers needed information about their neighbours on a regular basis and also the ability to convey messages to them.

The transformation of the political organization in Europe from feudal organization to statehood had lasting ramifications on diplomacy and its practice. The introduction of the resident ambassador captured this new development.

The core preoccupation of the resident ambassador was to convey news contained in detailed reports that defined the increased volume of work. There was therefore increased diplomatic dialogue that called for assistance to the resident ambassador in terms of staff especially at the clerical level. The predominance for the need for and transmission of news constantly,
underscored the new challenges of the resident ambassador. This new diplomacy spread from Italy to the rest of Western Europe in what Martin Wight called, “the master-institution of the modern western states system.”

Another significant development of the period was that of diplomatic congresses that came to be held to negotiate on matters of peace particularly great and general wars in Europe. This was the situation obtaining when two principal congresses were negotiated in what became the agreements of Westphalia and Utrecht.

These events were characterized by long and complex processes of negotiations that were often held in different locations and were usually attended by the many princes or their senior ministers in person. Alongside this arrangement were a crop of expert negotiators who were conversant with the rules and objectives of the emerging institutions. These congresses assisted in mainstreaming diplomatic narrative and to bring negotiations to a decision.

It is instructive to note that in spite of this progress in diplomatic engagement, the voice of or risk to violence, was always lingering and was understood to be a permanent feature of the system. It manifested itself in the form of threats overt or implied, in the parlance of the treaties and in the commitments of funds for military expenditure by the respective statesmen. It was also an open secret that each and every prince was duly concerned on the military capacity of each state. In the final analysis, force as a last resort was the norm rather than the exception.

The period of the eighteenth century Europe and the Age of Enlightenment had insulated the independence of most states through the balance of power. The deliberate avoidance of war became attractive especially so to the thoughtful men. However, before diplomacy could
settle, the French Revolution was witnessed towards the end of the century. Clearly, France was assuming a near hegemonic posture boasting of a huge population and enormous energy. Consequently it did away with the cautious balance of power of the eighteenth century diplomatic republic, the old courts and kings to install not revolutionary democracies, but a Napoleonic empire.

The Vienna Settlement seemed to have been the diplomatic antidote to the pax napoleonica and a major achievement for the European diplomatic system. While it established the boundaries and governments of Europe to replace those done away with by Napoleon, it recognized the need for a collective machinery to sustain and rectify the settlement. This led to the emergence of Europe’s most significant phase of European diplomacy the “Concert of Europe.”

This scenario denoted the arrangement in Europe of a hegemonic authority that was based on the five great powers. The fact that the five included France, underscored the significance of the concert. The hegemony therefore was not going to be exercised by one hegemon, rather, it would be diffused among the five states with differing interests and thereby safeguarding the balance.

The Concert of Europe is credited with a century of peace in Europe. What followed were minor wars and campaigns that were conducted by professionals and for limited objectives. These did not interrupt the progress of society in any significant way. Indeed strides in civilization continued unabated as did European expansion and domination over the rest of the world. The balanced power structure that characterized the nineteenth century Europe can
be explained by the flexible dynamic of the concert of great powers resultant from the Congress of Vienna.

\section*{2.5 The Diplomacy of the Nineteenth Century}

The position prevailing at the advent of the nineteenth century saw European powers venture out of Europe to secure mercantilist interests. For instance the Iberians and the British had settled in the new world of the Americas and founded new states there. They also virtually excluded the other European powers from the American continent. During the same period, other European states established strategic stations in locations to be found in Africa and Asia. The new republics in the Americas sought greater autonomy from Europe. While they pursued a trend of maintaining cultural and trade ties with Europe, they developed policies geared to disassociation with the European balance of power in a bid to keep their spheres of influence free from the competition characteristic of European states. They therefore embraced international law and especially the conventions advocating neutrality particularly in times of war.

The narrative to the East was quite different and such constraints as were experienced in the Americas were markedly absent. The quest for markets and raw materials occasioned by the Industrial Revolution saw renewed expansion into Africa and Asia. In this pursuit, the European powers had an edge in terms of the goods, the military means of ensuring compliance and in their belief of their own moral and intellectual superiority. The Africans and Asians did not offer any formidable resistance. Indeed, the only serious setbacks were from each other manifested in the intensity of the Scramble for the colonies. This, it has been argued to be further evidence of the effectiveness of the Concert of Europe. Thus, even in the
quest for colonies, continuous diplomatic engagement was apparent in negotiations that lasted
during the entire century and the European powers secured agreed spheres of influence.

What is of interest is the way in which European diplomatic society’s influence spread on a
global scale. It had also dawned on the society on the need to accept new settler states in the
Americas and on occasion, pockets of non European states. This phenomenon was
particularly prevalent in the Eastern hemisphere sphere of influence. Indeed some non
European states were able to retain their independence alongside the expanding empires. Such
countries as China, Persia and Afghanistan were seen in Asia while Ethiopia and Morocco
were seen in Africa. Cases of the Ottoman Empire and Japan are also cited. The plausible
explanation for this was both the commercial and strategic importance attached to these
locations that made their control by a single imperial power untenable. Again the evidence of
diplomatic practice and understanding among the imperial powers is apparent.

2.5.1 Diplomacy in Transition

The outbreak of the First World War was a watershed in the European diplomatic narrative.
European civilization had developed for centuries in both power and prosperity especially in
the fields of sciences and arts. The war therefore put a mortal blow to Europe as forty three
years of peace among the great powers of Europe was brought to an end. The war was
therefore not only an indictment of the European civilization, but also a contributory factor to
the destruction albeit gradually, of the diplomatic Concert of Europe. During the period of
peace, European nations had come to appreciate their interdependence especially in the
economic, social and technological spheres. However the European peace was not without its
fair share of periodic crises. Colonial wars, conflict in the Balkans and the Far East were an
indication of the challenge of maintaining a precarious balance between competing military
alliances whose terms of reference remained largely secret to the public. There were also voices that advocated for reform in the way states dealt with each other. For instance, participants in the Socialist Second International argued for the establishment of a world revolution as a panacea to the problem of world peace. A contrary approach to this was also adopted by adherents to such organizations as the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Universal Peace Congress both founded in 1899 and whose preference were legalistic mechanisms to conflict resolution like in arbitration and mediation along with arms limitation and disarmament. Similar ideas had found expression with the disciples of the “new diplomacy” in the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 whose achievements was the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

The horror of World War One called for the reconfiguration of start relations generally and of diplomacy in particular. Both the statesmen and the public in Europe and elsewhere in the world reacted vehemently against international anarchy that had led to the Armageddon. The desire for international institutions with a collective character and more cohesive than the defunct Concert of Europe came to the fore. This heralded the establishment of the “new diplomacy.”

2.6 The New Diplomacy

The embracing of new diplomacy was imperative following the debacle of the orthodox diplomacy epitomized by the horrendous ramifications of the First World War. The functions of the modern state and as corollary, interstate relations, called for a redefinition and re-conceptualization of diplomacy. This was largely in part because of the occurrence of the
First World War and partly due to the emergence of non-state actors in the international arena.

It is against this background that Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points and Conference diplomacy gains credence. Wilson’s anxiety was evident from his advocacy for peace founded on the Principle of national self determination and the general association of nations. His emphasis though was his first point on, “open covenants for peace, openly arrived at with no private international understandings of any kind of diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.”

The Paris Peace Conference of 1919-1920 can be viewed to have a manifestation of Conference diplomacy. This particular conference had certain characteristic features some of which include; being the council of ten it excluded the press something that went against the grain of the openness postulated by Wilson, and Wilson’s attendance in person was itself a first since no previous American president had attended a conference to negotiate a treaty. Indeed Wilson’s participation in the conference had a number of effects. The European practice of moving rapidly from an armistice to the conclusion of a treaty was abandoned. Instead a two month delay between the armistice and the assembling of delegates in Paris was in essence determined by the president’s diary. In addition, his presence among the heads of European governments seemed to have actualized the concept of “Summit Diplomacy,” a term that was to find currency much later in the 1950s.

2.7 The League of Nations

The formation of the League of Nations may be said to have been a master stroke of diplomatic genius that sought to replace the failed Concert of Europe diplomacy. This was the
first time that a permanent political institution had emerged to enable the peaceful settlement of disputes. It was also a first time that saw the formation of new agencies of international cooperation, a new code of principles, rights and obligations that were instituted in order to regulate international behavior of states.

The League also epitomized the concept of Collective Security System among member states. Member states were now ostensibly under the obligation to settle their disputes peaceably and not to resort to war with each other until they had exhausted the mechanisms of arbitration and conciliation as was stipulated in the Covenant. States that violated this rule were considered to have committed an act of war against all other member states. They were therefore liable to punitive actions that included; economic sanctions, and preponderant military threat from the rest of the member states. The importance of the League was to be seen not only in its effect of broadening and universalizing the commitment of states in interstate relations, but also and more fundamentally, in its focus on the political and administrative machinery evident from the formation of the critical organs like: the Council, the Assembly and the Secretariat. While the Council could have been accused of being reminiscent of the old Concert of European powers, the Assembly was a breadth of fresh air as a theatre of multilateral diplomacy, which later brought forth the international civil servant.

The optimism and the diplomatic breakthrough associated with the League of Nations was however short lived. The outbreak of the Second World War became a constant reminder of the elusiveness of peace that is reliant on diplomacy. The major scapegoat for the war was undoubtedly the League of Nations. The League as a diplomatic institution had failed to
prevent another major war and was therefore seen as having been unprepared and unsuitable to deal with emerging security challenges.

The failure of the League was attributed to; its lack of universality due to the absence of major powers in its membership (Russia and the USA) and its lack of enforcement mechanisms to errant members states who violated its core principles. The need for a more responsive international institution to the threat of international peace and security is the background against which the United Nations was founded to try and exorcise the ghosts of two world wars.

2.7.1 The United Nations

The United Nations (UN) as a term should have been used in January 1942 to denote what was essentially an anti-Axis alliance. The new organization was established after the Dumbarton Oaks meeting between August and September 1944 and the San Francisco Conference which saw the acceptance of its charter by representatives of some fifty states. It bore an institutional semblance to the League in terms of structure, that is, it had a Security Council, a General Assembly and a permanent Secretariat with a Secretary General, and its executive was equipped with a mechanism of “enforcing” its will.

All members of the UN were under the obligation to obey its charter and to accept and to implement the Council’s decisions, especially those relating to the application of armed force. The first major institutional weakness that eroded the concept of Collective Security was the granting of its permanent members (Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union and the USA) the Veto to be used on all but procedural matters. This aspect was of great significance to the
practice of diplomacy by the new body. For instance the absence of the Soviet delegate saw the Security Council authorize the use of force under the UN auspices in Korea in 1950.

In spite of this structural challenge within the Security Council, the membership of the UN continued to grow enabling the organization to assume a more universal character. Membership drawn from Asia and Africa particularly was realized with the process of decolonization. For instance by 1986, the membership had grown to 158 states. Most of the new states however were weak and poor. In fact few embraced the American political and social ideals. Indeed most of them saw the Assembly as a forum through which they could vent their grievances against the USA and the then prevailing international order. Although the General Assembly has been described as a talking shop, it has nonetheless provided the under privileged with a platform through which their problems have received international attention. Also the near universality of its membership has accorded it unparalleled legitimacy. In an ideologically divided world, it availed itself as an arena for ideas. Blocs and interest groups emerged within the UN, its agencies and sponsored conferences. It was also characterized by lobby groups and caucuses all involved in a deliberative process. Some of the blocs include; the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) formed in Belgrade, the Group of 77 (G77) comprising of over 120 developing countries.

The growth of the UN and its attendant agencies gave a fresh impetus into multilateral diplomacy. The notion of international collective bargaining came to the fore. The interdependence between the highly industrialized powers and micro states became apparent. Indeed smaller countries with limited diplomatic resources found a voice in the multiplicity of international organizations under the UN umbrella.
In spite of the positive developments, the UN’s multilateral diplomacy has been plagued by problems of politicization of several of its technical agencies. The decision by some states to use these agencies for ideological and propaganda purposes has eroded their efficiency and discredited their roles. The foregoing notwithstanding, the UN offers a framework for multilateral diplomacy and avails standards for international conduct in an ideologically and culturally multi-faceted world.

2.8 Military Diplomacy

States over time came to the realization that persuasion (read diplomacy) was critical in their relations. Indeed states became aware that persuasion was usually more successful than the actual use of force. However, the use of the carrot and stick became a useful strategy in determining interstate relations. It is not uncommon therefore to find the employment of military force to give “muscle” to negotiation. Diplomacy and military force have been used by states for ages and can be seen as the traditional instruments of foreign policy.

Used this way, diplomacy is combined with other instruments besides the military to include economics and subversion in what has been labeled as “mixed” diplomacy. In this regard, diplomacy is a communication channel through which the use of threat to use other instruments is relayed to other parties.

2.8.1 India’s Perspective on the Practice of Military Diplomacy

India like other nations has a desire to pursue its national interests in furtherance of its foreign policy objectives. According to Rajagopalan, military diplomacy is considered as one of the tools to employ in the conduct of a country’s diplomacy. Although India has not engaged robustly in the past in this regard, the Indian authorities endeavour to adopt a more aggressive
posture to maximize relative gains. Rajagopalan goes further to offer what she considers to be a definition of military diplomacy. She avers that, military diplomacy is the conduct of foreign relations by the men in uniform or even the civilians working in the ministries of defence. In addition, its scope has been widened to include defense exchanges especially in joint training with militaries of foreign countries. The practice of military diplomacy has been more elaborate with the Chinese although their definition of military diplomacy is seemingly narrower, to include; foreign affairs conduct by defence institutions and armed forces. Indeed Yasuhiro writing on Chinese military diplomacy makes a distinction between military diplomacy and political or regular diplomacy. In fact he sees military diplomacy as encompassing all diplomatic activities relating to national security and military diplomatic activities.

The foregoing notwithstanding, a lot of common ground has been identified with regard to regular diplomacy and military diplomacy. Such common activities include; visits, meetings, exchanges, negotiations, participation in international conferences and exchanges of diplomatic documents. These activities conducted by both uniformed personnel and civilians in the ministries of defense, capture the general foreign and security guidelines as stipulated by the political leadership. They have strategic and military significance. Broadly speaking therefore, military diplomacy entails the following concerns; the training of the military to respond to emergency situations, the fostering of ties with other countries, the sale of weapons and military technologies and the establishment of spheres of influence, the knowledge of other militaries in terms of their equipment and way of working.

It is apparent from the foregoing therefore that through military diplomacy one may be able to discern a country’s national security interests and threats vis a vis its relations with other
countries. One is also able to identify a military’s organizational ethos, philosophies, culture, strengths and weaknesses. Military diplomacy also has a number of facets especially at the strategic level. These include; defense consultations, strategic dialogues, arms transfers and regional activities. Others include; state to state military protocols, opening of military establishments, engaging in bilateral and multilateral exercises, professional military educational exchanges that may include both Track 1.5 and Track 11 diplomacy. Military diplomacy also involves such aspects as sending armed forces to participate in counter terrorism exercises, United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, exchange of defense advisors, military studies abroad and military assistance to friendly countries. It also focuses on the need to co-opt surrounding countries and to ascertain those that have the potential to pose threats in the future.

Rajagopalan posits that India has remained behind in the effective use of military diplomacy. There are plans however to change this trend beyond the traditional level of bilateral joint exercises to include those of a multilateral nature focusing specifically on the neighboring countries like Pakistan and China. Efforts are also underway to go beyond India’s near abroad to include such countries as; Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam and Singapore. Indeed the signing of a defense pact with Singapore in 2004 was indicative of India’s more aggressive posture in engaging in military diplomacy.

India’s military diplomacy has also been witnessed in South East Asia with her involvement in the relief and rescue operations alongside other militaries, when a tsunami hit Japan recently. The sharing of intelligence especially on matters maritime, coordinated patrols and discussions on safety of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) underscore the growing significance of India’s military diplomacy. Other areas where this has been proven include;
participation in joint military exercises with friendly navies from France, the UK, China, Russia, Singapore and Japan.

India’s military relations with Myanmar have however elicited criticism especially with proposed arms sales to that country owing to her poor human rights record and authoritarian military rule. This position has been seen not so much as that of enhancing India’s sphere of influence, but rather that of checking China’s influence. In a nutshell, India’s military diplomacy is conducted as part of India’s overall diplomacy especially with regard to her commercial and strategic interests both within her sub-region and within the wider regional environment.

2.8.2 South Africa’s Defense Diplomacy

The South African National Defense Forces (SANDF) engages in what it calls Defense Diplomacy though a number of programmed activities. These include; bilateral and multilateral interactions, foreign visits, foreign military training, ship visits, equipment transfer to foreign recipients and African Standby Force (ASF). The significance of defense diplomacy is visualized as a medium to foster a number of critical goals that include those of; National foreign policy, New Partnerships for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the Africa Agenda as was stipulated by international interaction. Several agreements on defense cooperation and technical assistance have been signed between South Africa and countries from within the region and beyond. Countries involved from within the region include; Botswana, Central Africa Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho and Mozambique. Those from beyond the region include; France, Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
Defense diplomacy has also found expression in the participation of SANDF in regional structures such as in the South African Development Cooperation (SADC) and also in the Inter-State Defense and Security Committee (ISDC) in a bid to enhance multilateralism, cooperation and inter-operability among the member countries.

Foreign visits are among the tools ranked highly in South Africa’s defense diplomacy. They are known to foster confidence building among states and also within the operation areas. Specifically, visits have achieved the following; strengthening of the defense cooperation regionally especially at multilateral fora by providing capacity to support the structures of African Union (AU) and SADC in conformity with the government’s foreign policy, training with neighboring countries to promote and foster friendly relations, and visits to support security sector reforms to enhance the image the Republic of South Africa (RSA). Visits by naval ships to international ports are considered critical defense diplomacy techniques in the world of international relations. Within the period under review, RSA navy ships visited six foreign ports while twenty five foreign ships visited South Africa’s navy ports.

With regard to the African Standby Force SANDF ascertained the operational readiness and maintenance of the pledged Force Structure Elements for the South Africa Development Cooperation Brigade (SADCBRIG). The SADCBRIG was available for simple operations but was to be ready to conduct more robust operations as in peace enforcement, intervention and stabilization. To this end, SANDF provided military personnel in the field of medical and logistics to assist both at SADCBRIG and ASF levels.

In addition to the activities cited above, SANDF undertook specific actions in the establishing of relations, post conflict re-construction and assistance. For instance in both DRC and CAR, the hosting of the third Military Malaria Managers Meeting that saw the attendance of
representatives from several countries to include; Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

2.8.3 Kenya Defense Forces’ Military Diplomacy

This study contends that KDF has engaged in both defense diplomacy and military diplomacy over the years. For purposes of this study, a distinction has been made between defense diplomacy and military diplomacy. Defense diplomacy will refer to the kinds of interactions the Ministry for State for Defense (MOSD) engages in relation to other external organizations or even governments. The focus of defense diplomacy is on the role of the civilian component in the ministry. The more significant role played by the civilian component is that of oversight. The civilian oversight authority is defined by a number of key personnel that include; the president who is also the Commander in Chief of the KDF, the Cabinet Secretary Defense and the Principal Secretary Defense. There are other members of the civilian component who work under the Cabinet Secretary in the day to day operations of the ministry. This study therefore argues that the activities carried out by the civilian component of the ministry of defense constitute defense diplomacy.

Military diplomacy on the other hand will be confined to the kind of interactions or the conduct of military affairs by the men and women in uniform, the soldiers. Suffice it to say that there is a fair degree of overlap between these two categories of diplomacy. The reason for this is, is undoubtedly the aspect of oversight referred to earlier, namely that the military works under the general direction of the civilian component. It is also true to note that invariably some of the interactions may involve the participation of both the civilian and the military components. These observations notwithstanding, military diplomacy will refer to
those activities that are more of a military nature, where the military has leverage and consequently is the lead agent in the conduct of such activities.

One of the significant themes within the realm of military diplomacy with specific reference to the KDF is within the concept of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) also known as Peace Keeping Missions and what I will call war operations. Like noted earlier there is an interface between defense diplomacy and military diplomacy especially at the strategic level. This distinction is important as the focus of this study will be mainly military diplomacy. The study also posits that KDF’s involvement in PSOs over the years constitutes the practice of military diplomacy and further, that its engagement in Operation Linda Nchi also constitutes military diplomacy.

2.8.4 KDF’s Participation in Peace Support Operations

Kenya joined the community of nations on attaining independence on 12th December 1963. On 16th December 1963, Kenya became a member of the UN. Since then Kenya has been committed to supporting UN peace initiatives all over the world. Peace Support Operations (PSOs) within the KDF can be traced back to 1973 when the UN requested the Republic of Kenya to contribute forces for peace operations in the Middle East after the Israel-Arab war. However, in spite of Kenya acceding to the request, KDF troops were not deployed due to various logistical constraints. Later within the same decade, KDF started participation in UN PSOs in a career spanning twenty six missions in sixteen different countries in Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans and in Asia in a period covering over thirty years.

In Africa, KDF has participated in various UN PSOs as follows: in former Rhodesia in 1979, in an OAU peace support mission in Chad in 1982, in Angola between 1988 and 1997, in


While in these varied UN missions KDF undertakes various responsibilities. While each mission is unique in its own way, some responsibilities or tasks are cross cutting. These responsibilities include; operations planning, guarding UN installations, patrols in order to monitor activities in the mission area, escort duties for UN supplies to troops and refugees to destined locations and VIPs visiting the mission area, search and rescue operations of lost persons, and or kidnapped or hijacked UN staff . Evacuation is also done ranging from medical, that is, involving injured soldiers and civilians and also evacuation of civilian personnel to safe corridors.

Other tasks include; infrastructure improvement, demining for instance in Eritrea and in Sudan, disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration (DDR), the protection of civilians and the provision of essential services like medical, food and water. To this end KDF has been involved in Civil Military Cooperation Activities (CIMIC). These activities include; collaborating with NGOs and other UN agencies to improve the lives of the local population. The activities also involve coordination and information sharing between all the stakeholders
in the mission area. The activities are also aimed at re-establishing normalcy in the mission area through such peace building activities like sports and cultural events.

Visits by the KDF military leadership to the mission areas where KDF troops have been deployed is a common feature of the PSOs. These visits serve a number of purposes to include; boosting the troops’ confidence and fostering better relations not only between KDF and other UN troops from other countries in the mission area but also between KDF and parties to the conflict.

This study therefore argues that KDF’s engagement in various PSOs can be seen as the conduct on military diplomacy. This is because, the essence of PSOs is to manage and eventually resolve conflicts so that normalcy is restored among the parties to the conflict. Cases where conflicts have been managed with a measure of success include; the case of Namibia following its attainment of independence and cessation of hostilities, also in Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Eritrea-Ethiopia border situation to name but a few.

It is against this background that KDF’s military diplomacy in Operation Linda Nchi (2011-2012) is to be contextualized. Whereas KDF’s involvement in the aforementioned missions were PSOs, its engagement in Somalia in October 2011, ushered in a new dimension, that of Peace Enforcement under Chapter V11 of the UN Charter. While in these previous engagements KDF was a neutral arbiter promoting peace, in Somalia, KDF is an interested party to the conflict engaged in a war to secure and defend its national interests. This study also proffers that the events leading to the deployment of KDF into Somalia constitute defense diplomacy while KDF’s military engagement in Somalia in the period under review constitute military diplomacy.
2.8.5 Critique to the History of Diplomacy

The major criticism leveled against diplomacy and especially what has been called traditional diplomacy, has been its inability to prevent conflict evident from the past two world wars. On account of this peace violation, the diplomatic practices have been seen as inadequate for both their past failures and their perceived inability to also deal with future challenges. Consequently, there is a desire to come up with more responsive approaches and practices in the field of diplomacy.

Another substantive criticism also against traditional diplomacy, is the aspect of secrecy or what has been called secret diplomacy. Closely associated with this secrecy is the issue of private alliances that are devoid of allegiance to a universal entity that is open and more responsive to changing needs. This aspect of secrecy is characteristic of bilateral relations between states. The secrecy and privacy were accused of having been largely responsible for the deterioration of peace and the consequent outbreak of the War. This concern has gained credence by the development and spread of nuclear weapons since the Second World War.

A third criticism emanates from the development of technology which has had a tremendous impact on the practice of diplomacy. In fact it has been argued that modern technology has rendered certain institutions of modern diplomacy obsolete. This is particularly so with regard to professional diplomats and resident embassies.

The development of technology has eased communication challenges due to their nature of immediacy and instantaneousness. Indeed it is so very easy for experts or even principals, to deal with each other directly, thereby rendering a whole retinue of diplomatic staff irrelevant.
Perhaps the single most significant challenge confronting the practice of diplomacy is the ever evolving set of circumstances in all fields of human endeavor so that the diplomat par excellence has to keep abreast of these changes and adjust accordingly in order to remain relevant. This rebranding of the diplomat or diplomacy is not easy as the pace of change among some phenomena is quite rapid. Globalization is one such aspect that has redefined state relations and the practice of diplomacy. Besides eroding the sovereignty of states in the international arena, it has also, displayed the vulnerabilities of diplomatic practice as more players (even non-state actors) join the arena that is devoid of a regulatory umpire.

The old cliché of international anarchy continues unabated due to the lack of an international government or the so called Leviathan. The functionalist approach is no panacea to the power politics characteristic of the adherents of the realist world view. The impotence of international organization when confronted with super power dominance or interests has been demonstrated in the case of the USA invasion of Iraq without the blessings of the UN.

The practice of diplomacy is however an extremely complex affair. While the super power dominance is a reality, the growth of international organization and regimes has also had a significant impact on inter-state relations and also with relations between states and international organization especially in the post cold war era. States are therefore constrained in their behavior by issues of human rights and international law. The conduct of war is also regulated under international law regimes that render states accountable for their actions. It is against this background that military diplomacy is to be contextualized.

2.9 Conclusion
It is evident from the discussion in this chapter that diplomacy has been a constant feature of human civilization. Indeed, the very concept of civilization presupposes or denotes the desire by man to live in an organized society to be able to conquer the environment sustainably and to exploit his potential to the full in a bid for a better life. It is also apparent that throughout history, from ancient times to the present, man has been grappling with challenges of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. Due to the potential of destruction inherent in conflict, man has sought or desired peaceful means to conflict settlement. Diplomacy has been rated highly as a viable strategy in resolving conflicts especially through various means of communication.

Communication and its institutionalization has therefore been central in every society from pre-recorded times to the present. Indeed, the rationale for negating the Hobbesian state of nature is anchored on diplomacy as members of society came together to live in an arrangement made possible by the social contract. The conflictual nature of society therefore makes it imperative to notice the evolutionary or changing nature of diplomacy throughout the ages. While in the ancient period diplomacy involved simple forms of communication such as visits, delivery of verbal messages and exchanges of gifts, it later developed into increased levels of complexity that involved rules, commerce, contracts and making of treaties especially reminiscent of the medieval period. The transformation of the political organization in Europe from feudalism to statehood and the development of diplomatic concerts also had an impact on diplomacy and its practice. These arrangements were meant to avert the occurrence of war and were characterized by long complex processes and periods of negotiation. Some like the Concert of Europe were instrumental in fostering peace for long periods.
During the 19th century, the spread of European Diplomatic Society on a global scale was witnessed especially with the advent of colonialism and the Scramble for the colonies. The outbreak of the First World War was an indictment of European diplomacy and especially the concert of Europe. This was a demonstration of the need for a reconfiguration of state relations and therefore of diplomacy in transition.

The new diplomacy or conference diplomacy came to be with the establishment of the League of Nations. This was seen as an institutional and diplomatic breakthrough that also epitomized the concept of the collective security system among states. The failure of the League of Nations was marked by the outbreak of the Second World War and the consequent establishment of the United Nations. The UN was supposed to remedy the failures of the League and to strengthen the collective security system. Although it has a very high threshold in terms of its universality, as almost all nations are members, challenges to its practice of diplomacy persist particularly when confronted with super power hegemony coupled with its own structural problems.

Military diplomacy therefore needs to be examined within the framework of conference and multilateral diplomacy as exemplified in the UN system. The context of PSOs as for the KDF has to be seen within the challenges facing the UN. The dichotomy of the UN and the role of Regional organizations is also an important one and especially with regard to the issues of peace and security. The recurrence of violence or the resurgence of conflict in areas hitherto under the UN PSOs especially in Africa, underscores the challenges that continue to confront diplomacy in such areas as Western Sahara, DRC, Sudan, Somalia and more recently South Sudan. One of the plausible explanations for this diplomatic inertia is the failure of the UN diplomatic efforts to address the underlying issues to the conflicts. Whether KDF’s
military diplomacy in Somalia will be instrumental in establishing lasting peace remains to be seen. What is not in doubt is that KDF’s engagement in Operation Linda Nchi constitutes a form of military diplomacy as will be shown in the subsequent chapters of this study.
CHAPTER THREE

Case Study Perspective

3.0 Introduction

The data was collected through interviews of key informant personnel from relevant government ministries and organizations that included; Ministry of State for Defense (MOSD), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Organizations. The key informant personnel included both uniformed and civilian individuals from the aforementioned organizations.

3.1 Data Collected From Hon Yusuf Haji- Former Minister Ministry of State for Defense.

Hon Yusuf Haji was a key informant person owing to the fact that during the launch of Operation Linda Nchi he was the Minister for State for Defense. He was therefore involved in diplomatic shuttle activities especially within the sub-region to explain Kenya’s position. The interview was conducted in his office at Defense Headquarters on 5th February 2013. The information the minister provided during the interview has been tabulated below to indicate the nature of diplomatic activity he participated in, where and when and the outcomes of the engagements.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/NO</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>VENUE</th>
<th>EVENT/ACTORS</th>
<th>OUTCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>19th Oct 2011</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>Meeting Prime Minister Meles Zenawi seeking concurrence on Kenya’s reasons for entering Somalia</td>
<td>Concurrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>21st Oct 2011</td>
<td>Addis Ababa AU Headquarters</td>
<td>Meeting Head of AU Jean Ping to explain Kenya’s position to the AU</td>
<td>Concurrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>27 Oct 2011</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>IGAD Ministers of Defense briefing by Hon Haji on the matter</td>
<td>Concurrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>30th Oct 2011</td>
<td>Nairobi, Kenya</td>
<td>Somali Prime Minister called on Kenya’s Prime Minister</td>
<td>Concurrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>30th Oct 2011</td>
<td>Kampala, Uganda State House</td>
<td>Hon Haji, Hon Wetangula (defense &amp; foreign ministers) and Maj Gen (rtd) Mulinge, Kenya’s ambassador to Somalia briefed President Museveni on the same</td>
<td>Concurrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>31st Oct 2011</td>
<td>Bujumbura, Burundi</td>
<td>Same team in Ser. 5 met and briefed President Nkurunziza</td>
<td>Concurrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8 Nov 2011</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Hon Haji briefed Djibouti president</td>
<td>Concurrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>9 Nov 2011</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>Meeting of AU- PSC to discuss presence of KDF in Somalia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>13 - 15 Nov 2011</td>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>Meeting of CDFs from TCCs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>6 Dec 2011</td>
<td>Nairobi, Kenya</td>
<td>Cabinet Memo drawn on KDF operations in Somalia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>7 Dec 2011</td>
<td>Nairobi, Kenya</td>
<td>Cabinet Memo approved followed by that of parliament</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>28 - 29 Sep 2012</td>
<td>Kismayu</td>
<td>Capture of the city by KDF</td>
<td>Big boost for KDF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The table illustrates the nature of diplomatic activities that Hon Yussuf Haji Minister for State for Defence and Hon Moses Wetangula Minister for Foreign Affairs were engaged in, where these events took place and the personalities they talked to in their diplomatic efforts. It also shows the respective Heads of States and Governments that they talked to during their visits especially to the capitals within the sub-region and beyond and the kind of outcomes that the meetings generated.

3.2 Data Collected From Hon Moses Wetangula

Hon Wetangula was the minister for foreign affairs during the period that Operation Linda Nchi was launched. During the interview conducted on 23rd January 2013, the minister informed the interviewers of the diplomatic engagements that he undertook following KDF’s entry into Somalia. He underscored that KDF’s operation into Somalia was: “a culmination of a long and reluctant process.” This comment was informed by the inordinately long period that had characterized Somalia’s failed state status and the series of both bilateral and multilateral diplomatic initiatives that had been directed at Somalia with minimal degree of success.

He noted that previous IGAD resolutions had discouraged neighboring countries to Somalia from getting involved militarily in the Somali conflict. This particular resolution had been adopted by the AU. In spite of this resolution, the threat posed by the Al Shabaab coupled with their provocative and emboldened actions as was evident through various activities that included; the kidnapping of Spanish workers in Dadaab Refugee Camp, the attack of a police station in Liboi, the attack of the government administration in Mandera and the eventual tourist kidnapping and killing of a French woman in Lamu required a change of heart and approach.
As the former minister noted: “Kenya never intended to go into Somalia as such. It was now a threat to our national security and was in fact a declaration of an act of war”

There was need therefore to situate KDF’s entry into Somalia into the right perspective by referring or quoting the relevant UN resolutions and also AU resolutions, clauses and chapters on Acts of self defense. The minister also underscored the cabinet approval and a motion in parliament that was unanimously passed (with one against) to deploy KDF into Somalia.

Alongside this was the critical role of IGAD which proved instrumental especially with regard to diplomatic leverage. For instance, IGAD lobbied the following countries to support Kenya’s claim to self defense through the diplomatic efforts of the foreign minister. The countries included; Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Uganda. IGAD also amended the resolution to allow neighboring countries to Somalia to contribute troops to Somalia. The AU also approved this amendment and then sent it to the UNSC. The minister explained his engagement with the UNSC and said, “I twice addressed the United Nations Security Council in an attempt to convince it on Kenya’s case”

The minister noted that he was also engaged in Shuttle Diplomacy, first within the capitals of the sub-region that included; Bujumbura-Burundi, Dar es salaam-Tanzania, Juba-South Sudan, Kampala-Uganda and Khartoum in Sudan. Beyond the sub-region, the minister visited the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Qatar where he sought for these countries’ support for Kenya with regard to the operation in Somalia.

The minister also informed the interviewers that he also held frequent meetings with representatives of the diplomatic community in Nairobi and particularly the Contact Group to appraise them on the situation in Somalia. The countries represented included; Italy,
Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Canada and the United States. He noted that representatives from all these countries expressed tacit support for KDF’ operation in Somalia.

With regard to the impact of KDF’s entry into Somalia, the minister noted that the event was a game changer in three significant aspects. First, the forces from the initial Troop Contributing Countries, i.e Burundi and Uganda had been confined to Mogadishu since 2007. With KDF’s entry into Somalia, there was a feeling of new courage, a boost in morale and a desire to extend AMISON’s forces territorial coverage beyond Mogadishu. Second, cases of piracy within the Horn of Africa had been drastically reduced due to the activities of KDF both on land and at sea. In fact there was renewed desire to capture the port of Kismayu which was a major source of revenue for the Al Shabaab. Third, the KDF entry into Somalia demonstrated the interface between the military and political instruments in the desire to secure Kenya’s national interests especially the threats posed to tourism, one of the main economic life lines of the nation.

3.3 Ambassador Nancy Kirui’s Interview

The then permanent secretary in the MOSD was interviewed on 12th April 2013 at her office in Ulinzi House Defense Headquarters. She informed the interviewers that following KDF’s entry into Somalia, a high level of diplomatic activity was conducted to address this issue at the national, regional and international levels. She noted that several inter-ministerial discussions were held particularly between the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, internal security and information and communication. She also said that there were regular meetings that involved the respective government ministries and the ambassadors and members of the diplomatic corps to update them on matters pertaining to the operation. When it became
apparent that Kenya needed to address the problem of insecurity occasioned by the instability in Somalia, the Ambassador noted;

“Under international law the Ministry of State for Defence needed to be cleared at the national level and the international level at the United Nations Security Council. We needed to table before the United Nations Security Council our concerns about the Al Shabaab.”

With this in mind, the ambassador noted that there was a deliberate reaching out to the AU and the neighboring countries seeking their support as was exemplified by the Shuttle Diplomacy by the minister in the defense docket and the Chief of Defense Forces (CDF) as noted elsewhere in this chapter. At the international level, the concerns of the nation were articulated through the ministry of foreign affairs at the UNSC in New York with the singular purpose of soliciting for support from the international community.

With regard to the significance of the capture of Kismayu by the KDF, the ambassador reiterated that it was a game changer in various respects. First, it established Kenya’s position as a power house within the sub-region both economically and militarily. Second, it was also a boost to the national psyche, national pride and identity beyond the boundaries of tribe. Third, there was international recognition of the feat as the ambassador confirmed having received congratulatory messages from members of the diplomatic community and from other international friends. She added that: “Kismayu has always been a great challenge”

3.4 The Chief of Defence Forces’ Interview- General Julius Karangi

The CDF’s interview was conducted in his office on 25th April 2013 Ulinzi House Defense Headquarters. In explaining KDF’s entry into Somalia, the CDF underscored in a conceptual way, the national interests of the state. He emphasized that national interests were vital
interests that any state will pursue by any means including going to war in order to survive. He added:

“Any nation state irrespective of size and strength is endowed with certain resources and attributes...” and, he continued, “National interests are either vital, important or peripheral”

In an analogy of the elements of national power that comprise of; economic, political, technological, diplomatic and military powers, the CDF noted that nation states do not always resort to the use of force at the sign of any provocation. The use of other means, he averred were equally appropriate in resolving state disputes. There was need therefore to orchestrate the national elements of power in a balanced manner. He noted that the men and women in uniform were charged with the responsibility of securing Kenya’s interests when called upon to do so. He observed that this essentially defined Kenya’s defense policy and its mission statement.

The CDF said that the rationale for Operation Linda Nchi therefore was occasioned by serious provocation by the Al Shabaab militant group over a period of time that was characterized by a series of incidents that included the kidnap of persons, both locals and foreign nationals. These events had a significant impact on the economy especially through tourism that suffered immensely thereby denying the country much needed revenue.

It is against this background that KDF’s entry to Somalia was sanctioned through the nation’s constitutional mandate. This was actualized through the approvals of both the Cabinet on 4th October 2011 and also the National Assembly shortly thereafter. The CDF informed the interviewers that there were a series of inter-ministerial meetings and collaboration that
involved the ministries of defense, foreign affairs information and communication and internal security. Indeed after the launch of Operation Linda Nchi, media briefings were conducted on every Saturday by a team drawn from the said ministries to inform both the nationals and the international community on the developments of the operation.

On the actual diplomatic efforts, the CDF noted that it involved a process from the national or domestic level, through to the sub-region (EAC and IGAD), the region (AU) to the international (UN). At the domestic scene, parliamentary approval was critical as it is a requirement stated in the country’s constitution. Indeed it was imperative to have the citizens behind the operation as it were. The CDF noted that:

“A war effort that doesn’t have domestic support no matter how justified it could be, is likely to fail and there are many examples like in Vietnam.”

Like noted earlier in the minister’s interview (Hon Haji), cabinet approval and that of parliament met the domestic threshold. At the sub-regional and regional level, there need for unanimity in support of the operation. Again as it is evident from the Shuttle Diplomacy conducted by the respective ministers in defense and foreign affairs and in which the CDF participated, that there was general concurrence on Kenya’s reason for sending the KDF into Somalia. Equally significant was the concurrence of the international community. The CDF noted that Article 51 of the UN Charter was the decision point in explaining that Kenya acted in self defense on account of threats to her national interests. Again the shuttle diplomacy paid dividends at regional level and at the international. Of particular significance was the inroads made at the UNSC that saw the passing of resolution 2036. Also significant was the setting up of the London Conference on Somalia in February 2012 that was hosted by the UK and which attracted several other players.
In essence, the CDF noted, that the silver lining of Operation Linda Nchi was the winning the hearts and minds of the Somali nationals, the drastic reduction of piracy, the conduct of successful elections in Somalia and the passing of anti-terror legislation. In the same token, the CDF agreed that KDF’s entry into Somalia was a game changer. Indeed, due to the progress made by KDF, the AU requested Kenya to join AMISON (rehatting) and discussions were subsequently held to that effect after the official consultations through AU’s formal request letter to the Kenya’s embassy in Addis Ababa, through to the ministry of foreign affairs in Nairobi, to the MOSD and eventually to parliament for approval. Speaking during the rehatting ceremony, the transition of the KDF into AMISOM, the CDF noted:

“Today’s event marks the KDF’s formal rehatting to AMISOM having transitioned from Operation Linda Nchi following the declaration of the UN Security Council Resolution 2036….Following these successes by KDF, the African Union has acknowledged Kenya’s immense contribution in Somalia and saw the need of KDF to be part of an expanded AMISOM”

Asked about the prospects of peace in Somalia, the CDF expressed optimism due to the then ongoing initiatives that included; the IGAD Stabilization Plan, a scheduled meeting on Somalia on 7th May 2012 in London, and a meeting of CDFs from the sub-region that had been held on 7th January 2012 at Nairobi. Indeed the CDF added, there was a desire to come up with a Joint African Plan to address the crisis in Somalia.

3.5 Mr Mwencha’s Interview- Deputy Chairperson of the African Union
This interview was conducted on 16\textsuperscript{th} November 2012 in his office at the AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa Ethiopia. The deputy chairman noted that peace was an integral component of the AU’s strategic vision, one of its key programmes and also one of its critical pillars. He added that the AU worked closely with the UN because while AU’s central concern was regional peace, the UN addressed issues of pertaining to global peace.

At the AU level, he noted that there was the Peace and Security Council (PSC) which seeks to realize the Peace and Security Architecture that has several components that include; the Early Warning System, Africa’s Standby Force, the Council of the Wise and Conflict Mechanism that deals with post conflict reconstruction and conflict management.

The deputy chairman underscored the importance of the regional organizations and how they relate to the UN. Indeed he noted that with regard to the problem of Somalia, IGAD was the driving sub-regional body through the AU at the regional level and then through to the UN at the international level. He added that the AU cannot deploy forces without the authority of the UNSC. He noted;

\textit{“UN has now realized that it is always better to work with institutions and organizations and countries that are close to the problem. Just like when you talk of Somalia it is neighbouring states that moved in to solve that problem.”}

With regard to KDF’s deployment to Somalia, he noted that this was a blessing in disguise because troops of the initial contributing countries had been confined to Mogadishu apparently with no exit strategy. He added that Al Shabaab had also been weakened significantly and the need therefore to have a post conflict agenda and capacity. He noted that Somalia was not strictly a military problem, indeed it required a different or mixed approach
especially owing to the issue of funding of the mission that involved both bilateral and multilateral arrangements particularly with regard to with EU countries and the US which were the main sources of funding for AMISOM. Indeed the deputy commissioner observed that:

“UN was doing an assessment, we are doing our own assessment... in fact there are plans to call for a pledging conference. The question is modalities of where it should be held in order to mobilize resources.”

The deputy chairman also explained that there were many innovations in Africa and for the AU in particular, which helped in conflict management and resolution. He cited the example of the unique Peer Review Mechanism that practices quiet diplomacy through the use of elder statesmen as exemplified in the Panel of the Wise.

3.5.1 Interview with Mr Wane, Commissioner Peace and Security Council – AU

This interview was conducted on the 19th November 2012 in the office of Mr Wane Commissioner in the Peace and Security Council at the AU Headquarters Addis Ababa.

Mr Wane informed the interviewers that there were four key elements with regard to the issue of Somalia. The first was that the Peace and Security Council (PSC) desired a Pan-African Approach to AMISOM. In this regard, Uganda and Burundi had carried the African flag as it were, as they were the only Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) in AMISOM. There was need therefore for more representation of other African countries to corroborate this so called Pan-African effort. Kenya’s entry to Somalia therefore was a welcome gesture and the AU looked forward to the confirmation of other African countries that had indicated their willingness to join AMISOM, namely Djibouti and Sierra Leone.
The second element was the fact that on 5th January 2012, the UN at the request of AU had approved the expansion of AMISOM from the then troop levels of 10,000 to 17,731. This expansion was informed by the need to deploy troops in the four sectors that were to be occupied by the two initial TCCs, that is, Uganda and Burundi, and hopefully two others that had shown willingness to join namely, Kenya and Djibouti. The sectoral deployment was good as it brought greater focus and cohesion as every sector would have a lead nation spearheading the AMISOM operations.

The third element was the fact that KDF had brought in new assets and capabilities especially with regard to Air and Maritime assets. These assets were seen as critical in the overall efficiency of the mission and were seen to have been largely responsible to the considerable degrading of the Al Shabaab and also in the opening up of new fronts in terms of combat.

The fourth element was the renewed optimism in AMISOM to securing Somalia especially with the commitment of more African countries to ensure peace and security for Somalia. Indeed Mr Wane noted that there were also elements of the police in the mission from Uganda and Nigeria that were helping to re-establish a Somali Police Force. In his assessment therefore, the Commissioner underscored the:

“Pan African outlook to AMISOM with KDF’s entry to Somalia.....and the improvement in the overall efficiency of the mission.”

In addition, Mr Wane told the interviewers that the Somali problem had seen the combined efforts of the AU and the UN in a long engagement since the 1990s. The UNSC had also supported regional initiatives and especially through; logistic and financial support of the
operations, political support to AU efforts, securing UN support to deploy troops to Somalia in view of the hitherto existing arms embargo.

3.5.2 Ambassador Dr Monica Juma’s Interview-Principal Secretary Ministry of State for Defence Then Kenya’s Ambassador to Ethiopia and The AU

This interview was conducted on 13th November 2012 in her office at the Kenya Embassy, Addis Ababa Ethiopia. The ambassador’s comments gave a perspective and useful insights not only on the matter of KDF’s entry into Somalia, but also on the bigger picture. With regard to KDF, the ambassador noted that this was part of Africa’s contribution to Peace Support Operations (PSOs). Indeed, she averred that there was a need to evaluate Kenya’s contribution in terms of her GDP to various PSOs all over the world and per capita allocation of Kenya’s engagement in Peace Processes in Africa in such countries as Burundi, Somalia itself and the Horn of Africa in general. She added that there was consensus at the IGAD level with matters pertaining to Somalia and especially among the neighboring states that carried the disproportionate weight of the negative effects of the Somalia chaos. The ambassador noted what she called:

“a bigger debate around member states contribution to Peace Keeping Operations and the need to push for an analysis for contributions of Kenya in terms of its GDP because this is a story that’s not been told.”

Somalia, she noted, had been a subject of discussion at both the regional and international levels. She gave the example during the year 2010, when the PSC held a session on 15th October to address the problem of Somalia. Discussions were also held at the EU level in Brussels and at the UNSC where a resolution to discuss Somalia was also passed. In November 2010, IGAD endorsed the UNSC on Somalia and in June 2011, the IGAD Summit
paid significant attention to the problem of Somalia. Indeed there was an IGAD Stabilization Plan that adopted a multifaceted and sustained Phase 11 of AMISOM. This plan was meant to enable troops from Uganda and Burundi to fan out of Mogadishu through mission enablers.

The ambassador noted that between January 2011 and October 2011, the Al Shabaab engaged in daring and provocative attacks against targets in Kenya. It is against this background that the ambassador recalled having been called back to Nairobi on the 15th of October 2011. On the following day she accompanied the ministers of defense and foreign affairs in what was the first diplomatic initiative in Mogadishu where the team met the then Somalia President, the Prime Minister and the cabinet. The result of this diplomatic effort was the Mogadishu Communiqué in support of the Somali Government. The team also obtained consent and concurrence from the Somali government over KDF’s entry into Somalia.

The team then returned to Nairobi and then proceeded to Addis Ababa so as to extend the concurrence to the sub-region and also to the entire region. The team succeeded in briefing the following people; chair of IGAD, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia and the chairperson of the AU. Once this was done, there was concurrence both within IGAD and the AU and recognition of the inevitability of taking action against the Al Shabaab threat. The next level of the diplomatic effort was the UN. The ambassador through the concurrence of Ethiopia and also the Ambassador of France to Ethiopia planned on how the Kenya ambassador to the UN would brief the UNSC now that the region was in concurrence. This was done on 21st October 2011.

With regard to the issue as to whether KDF’s entry into Somalia was a game changer, the ambassador admitted that the speed with which KDF had advanced into Somalia had indeed opened new possibilities. On 16 November 2011, during the IGAD Summit, there was an
express request for KDF to integrate into AMISOM. What followed were discussions on the
possibilities and modalities of KDF’s rehatting. These included a framework of the
multinational force, the sectoral arrangement, troop levels and force structure. There was
therefore an evolving strategic concept down to the operational and tactical levels in a
comprehensive manner that was acceptable to the UN Department of Peace Keeping
Operations (DPKO).

In December 2011, the Cabinet and Parliament authorized KDF’s rehatting to AMISOM.
This development was also forwarded to the UNSC ON 22nd of December 2011. The UNSC
was to look at the proposals forwarded in terms of force structure and force headquarters and
to advise accordingly. On 5th January 2012, Kenya assumed the chair of the PSC. The PSC
sat and issued a communiqué that endorsed KDF’s rehatting. The PSC also adopted the
Strategic Concept Paper which was referred to the UNSC. On 11th January 2012, the AU
position was presented to the UNSC with specific reference to the strategic concept paper.
Force levels were to be elevated from the then number of 10,000 to 17,731. The inclusion of
the Marine and Air Force components was also considered. On 21st January 2012, the UNSC
passed a resolution without the maritime components. Meanwhile the IGAD Stabilization
Plan got a boost with a planned London Conference on Somalia.

The next preoccupation was the capture of Kismayu. This posed a challenge especially
without a maritime component. Several discussions were held towards modalities of this
operation. The presence of ATLANTA in the Indian Ocean and its posture was an aspect of
consideration. Indeed the US Counter Terrorism interests came to the fore. Also, the CDFs of
the TCCs held several discussions on modalities of the Kismayu operation. This initiative
however did not materialize and Kismayu operation became a KDF affair which it was later to execute successfully.

The ambassador noted therefore that on matters of national security, a nation relied on itself primarily. The KDF operation in Somalia upped the stakes and there was more involvement by an increased number of countries. For instance the involvement of Ethiopia, a key ally of Kenya was welcome as it made things much easier. In the same vein, Turkey’s involvement increased the number of interested parties while the UK led a core group on Somalia.

The ambassador noted therefore that the KDF operation in Somalia saw the evolvement of Kenya’s Defense Review and Strategic thinking. She emphasized on the vitality of having a repertoire of tools that elicit different capabilities at the disposal of the leaders not just in the military but also in other sectors. The ultimate purpose she noted was to learn how to prevent, de-escalate a crisis, managing conflict and restructuring society with the right tools.

3.6 Responses Received From Ambassador Macharia Kamau- Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations

A set of questions were sent to the ambassador in New York during the month of May 2013 and he sent back his answers also during the same month 2013. The highlights are discussed hereunder.

The ambassador put the role of the UN in Somalia into perspective. He noted that the core responsibility of the body is the maintenance of international peace and security. He noted that the UNSC is the primary instrument for the execution of this responsibility. With regard to Somalia, the ambassador noted that the UN in general and the UNSC in particular have
remained seized of the developments there and had continued to look for ways and means of bringing peace to war torn Somalia. He explained that:

“In all democratic societies and institutions, there is always a seamless interface between the political and the military instruments of power. The use of coercive force can only be legitimized if it is exposed to serve democratic arrived at political goals and objectives.”

He added that, when the AU, the regional continental multilateral authority in Africa, decided to pursue military peacemaking in Somalia, the UN was duty bound to avail its resources and expertise to support the efforts. Specifically, the UN through the UNSC gave AMISOM international legitimacy through sanction of AU Peace and Security Council. This was to seen in military endeavors in Mogadishu where the deployment of Uganda and Burundi troops was done. The UNSC also visited Somalia to accord moral and political support to AMISOM.

The ambassador indicated that no state however powerful, could take international military action without international political and multilateral cover. The only institution with such capabilities was the UN. The Kenya mission in New York has been involved in the political and strategic aspects of the management of the global and multilateral platform to accord legitimacy and political cover for KDF’s initial entry, rehatting and maintenance of its presence in Somalia.

Before KDF’s deployment, the mission had played a significant role in keeping the agenda on Somalia alive at the UN through statements, speeches and multiple side effects organized in New York to push for collective international action on Somalia. The mission had been on the task for the past 20 years.
The ambassador observed that the international mobilization towards peace and support for the military intervention in Somalia was slow in coming but was a necessary requirement for the success of the broader AMISOM Mission. The international Community through such organs as the UNSC and the EU provided legitimacy and financial support for military engagement. The coordination of the UN activities around the Somalia issues revolved around five key areas that include:

- The history of international action in Somalia was characterized by several formidable challenges and even failure. This posed a significant psychological barrier to the promotion of renewed action in Somalia.

- Somalia had been a failed state for over a period of twenty years. This presented a challenge as the international community had no legitimate national interlocutor to work with.

- The international community was coming out of a ten year period of a difficult international military experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Cote d’ivoire and DRC among others.

- The international financial crisis meant that resources were scarce. This state of affairs was fluid and in transition and posed strategic and operational difficulties.

The Kenya Mission in the UN worked closely with the Kenya Mission to the AU in Addis Ababa and through them IGAD as the regional platform for orchestrating AMISOM. The regional and international ramifications of a lawless Somalia were varied and devastating. The loss of life and livelihoods, the fall-out from refugee movements and the spread of arms and ammunition had been drastic and had found expression in crime, poaching and terrorism.
Huge refugee camps had been established in Kenya and Ethiopia with debilitating consequences. At the sea, the failure on land resulted in a surge in piracy and lawlessness at sea, that in turn had direct negative impacts on regional shipping, trade and tourism. The net effect of all these, was slow economic growth in the neighboring countries.

The international community has a stake in a peaceful Somalia not only in curbing the suffering and unnecessary loss of life, but also in the need to contain terrorists and their breeding grounds in Somalia. There was also a desire to secure the free movement in the sea to enhance international trade by ending piracy.

On Operation Sledge Hammer (the capture of Kismayu), the ambassador noted that it came as a welcome surprise to many and especially to the international community. Before this operation, he added, it was unimaginable that Kenya had the wherewithal, military might and intelligence to pull such a military operation hundreds of miles from its core base in foreign territory under hostile conditions and from the sea. Kenya’s standing and the KDF’s image in the world had been fundamentally transformed.

The ambassador also said that there were many competing interests in Somalia. Among those were criminal networks and terrorist entities that remained formidable. Many other countries including the UK, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and other Emirate states had an eye on the commercial and resource opportunities in Somalia. The internal dynamics with IGAD countries also added to the competing interests and the unfolding events.

The Kenya Mission in the UN also pushed and negotiated AMISOM (read KDF) rehatting and reimbursement arrangements on a number of levels that included;
• The mission held direct and sustained talks and negotiations with all the major financial contributing powers including the US and EU. The mission also worked directly with the UNSC and UN offices to manage these processes.

• The Air and Maritime reimbursements had been undermined by a number of factors; Somalia government, lack of support and overt hostility to KDF. This should be understood in the context of Somalia domestic competing forces and interests.

• Perception that Kenya was asking too much. This was driven by the clear lack of appreciation on the part of the international community as to the importance of such assets in the face of a challenge that KDF faced.

• Unfamiliarity with the support of such assets in Africa operations by the UN. Setting precedents is never easy.

• Financial resources related to costs of such assets and the competing demands from other missions that required resources, especially Mali.

Lastly the ambassador noted that the lessons learnt include that multilateral action requires seamless domestic coordination between capital and missions. The management of perceptions and media was also critical both in the country and abroad. Equally important is the realization that no international military action can be sustained or fully financed without partners. In addition ambassador shared his thoughts on KDF’s exit strategy. He noted:

“An exit strategy must be through in a manner that is consistent not only with our national interests but also our capability to sustain and avoid an embarrassing withdrawal brought on either by collapse in capability or collapse in international or domestic support.”
3.7 Interview of Lt Colonel Nkoimo- Commander, Southern Sub Sector

The team interviewed this Commanding Officer on 15th February 2013 after his deployment in Sector South. During the interview the team was able to come up with the following aspects regarding KDF operations. He noted that before the operation commenced he had briefed his troops on the Rules of Engagement (ROEs) that clearly defined the conduct of the operations that his troops would engage in. Also included in the briefing were issues of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) that spelt out the dos and don’ts while engaging the enemy.

The Commanding Officer also explained to the interviewers the way KDF related to the Somali Troops that were operating alongside KDF during Operation Linda Nchi namely troops of the Transition Federal Government (TFG) and those of the Ras Chamboni Brigade (RCB). He noted that the TFG and RCB helped in legitimizing the KDF campaign by countering the Al Shabaab propaganda to the effect that KDF was an occupational force. This was because whenever there was an operation, it was always joint, that is, involving both the KDF and both the TFG and RCB. In addition, the TFG and RCB helped in identifying the enemy from the ordinary Somali civilians. The Somali troops also helped in identifying the local administrators who were to assume the administrative functions (pacification) in the areas that were liberated during the joint operations. The Commanding Officer also revealed that the Somali people desired peace as they were tired of the long conflict that had plagued their country. Indeed he noted:
“When you interact with the local man… wherever you go, they tell you they want peace. That family is for peace given the right conditions.”

3.7.1 Interview of Lt Colonel Nyagah Commander- Central Sub Sector

This interview was conducted on 3rd January 2013 at Defence Headquarters. During the interview the following aspects on the operation with regard to KDF were highlighted. First, the Commanding Officer reiterated that KDF was in Somalia to defend the territorial integrity of Kenya. He observed that the central sector was of strategic value as it was where the main supply route of contraband goods from Somalia to Kenya was located. He added that the contraband goods, mainly sugar from Kismayu would find its way to Garissa and eventually to the Dadaab Refugee Camp and beyond to other parts of the country.

Like in the Southern Sector, the Commanding Officer noted that he also worked with the TFG and RCB troops that were under his command during his tour of duty in Somalia. He noted that these were cohesive fighting units that he deployed alongside KDF whenever there was an operation against the enemy. These troops, he observed had a high regard for KDF as was demonstrated by their acceptance to be under their (KDF) command. This relationship with KDF was critical as it defined in a very special way the manner in which KDF operated in Somalia. The TFG and RCB helped in building the confidence and support from the local population that was able to identify with their own fighters in the battle against the common enemy, the Al Shabaab. The KDF on its part reciprocated this goodwill by providing reasonable medical services, water and even food supplies to the local populace. The Commander noted that;
“The support of the locals was very critical. We took care not to antagonize the local population.”

The Commanding Officer also informed the interviewers that the embedding of the Kenya Media by KDF was important as the media told the KDF story to Kenyans on what was happening on the front line. This exercise helped to enhance the national interests besides creating a well deserved rapport between the KDF and the media.

3.7.2 Interview of Brigadier Kahariri(Then Colonel)- Marine Component Commander

This interview was carried out on 19 December 2012 in his office at the Kenya Navy Headquarters, Mombasa. The Marine Component Commander informed the interviewers that the presence of the Kenya Navy Ships at sea acted as deterrence to the piracy threat that had characterized the sea along Kenya’s coastal waters before Operation Linda Nchi. In addition the Commander noted that the Kenya Navy had also held consultative meetings with Kenyan fishermen to agree on the modalities of fishing due to the Al Shabaab threat. He noted that the fishermen together with representatives from the Ministry of Internal Security and the leadership of the Kenya Navy agreed on the designated areas for fishing and also the specific times within which the fishing was to be done. At the same time the fishermen were required to inform the Kenya Navy when they planned to go for fishing, the number of fishermen involved and the time they would leave for fishing and the time they would come back from the exercise. This arrangement was vital for the fishermen had complained of having had no access to their source of livelihood. The arrangement also enabled the Kenya Navy to conduct their operations successfully and to carry out their mission that of the control of the sea within Kenya’s territorial waters. The interactions between the fishermen and the KDF as represented by the Navy personnel is indicative of military diplomacy as the fishermen were
persuaded to appreciate the security role that the KDF naval personnel were engaged in. The involvement of the Ministry of internal security and especially the administrative elements is also indicative of the inter-ministerial approach to the security issues prevailing then. The adherence to the security arrangements agreed to especially by the fishermen marked the in-roads made by military diplomacy in the attempts to alleviate the security threats posed by the Al Shabaab who hitherto masqueraded as fishermen.

3.8 Interview of Ms Betty Maina - Chief Executive Officer Kenya Association of Manufacturers

This interview was carried in the office of Madam Betty Maina on 23rd February 2013.

The aim of the interview was establish what impact if any, Operation Linda Nchi had on the manufacturing sector in Kenya. It was also meant to establish what kind of linkages the Kenya Association of Manufacturers had developed with the KDF owing to the said operation.

The CEO informed the interviewers that the operation in Somalia was of interest to the manufacturers because a lawless Somalia had had several adverse effects on Kenya. One of these was the closure of the textile industries in Kenya due to the availability of ready-made textile goods from Somalia. Secondly, counterfeit products like sugar, electronic goods, pens and batteries flooded the Kenya market through established supply chains from Somalia. The issue of piracy also came to the fore as the cost of doing business had skyrocketed owing to this threat. This resulted in a number of effects some of which include; loss of goods or products, delay in the availability of products due to the change of shipping routes to safer but longer routes. This change resulted in additional costs as ship-owners surcharged owners of goods who in turn put these additional costs to the consumers.
The CEO noted that KDF had established rapport with industry especially after the trade benefits realized after the launch of Operation of Linda Nchi. Indeed the business community gained business confidence.

This interview therefore demonstrates the kind of rapport KDF managed to establish with industry courtesy of military diplomacy. KDF’s actions in Somalia had a direct impact on the lives of the business community in Kenya. In fact KDF’s operations reassured Kenyans in the different sectors of the economy that their business endeavours were not in vain. The security assurance offered at the coast did well to restore the tourist confidence which had been eroded by the provocative actions of kidnappings and abductions that had characterized the period before KDF’s entry to Somalia.

3.9 Conclusion

From the foregoing interviews it was apparent that the Al Shabaab incursions into Kenya had elicited robust diplomatic initiatives. Initially the task was to secure the Kenya national constituency in supporting KDF’s entry into Somalia. This feat was attained when the cabinet and parliament gave the authorization of Operation Linda Nchi. There was a need however to keep the citizens engaged and informed on the developments in Somalia. Consequently, inter-ministerial initiatives were undertaken for weekly briefings by the media and answers provided to emerging issues during the briefing. The lead ministries in this initiative included, foreign affairs, defence, internal security and information and communication. KDF took this opportunity to tell its story to the nation the security concerns notwithstanding. This platform was significant to KDF as it brought the Force closer to the citizens in a way hitherto unknown. The nation was engaged in a debate about the merits and demerits of the operation and the exit strategy.
Once this was secured the next level was the launch of diplomatic activities within the East African community member states. This was critical because there was need to bring the member states to a common understanding. It was no secret that there were competing interests among members of the East African Community occasioned by the circumstances obtaining in the sub-region and members positions regarding Somalia. Initially there were only two TCCs from the region namely Uganda and Burundi. With KDF’s entry this equation had inevitably changed and the two TCCs were apprehensive. Indeed Kenya was the only other neighbouring country after Ethiopia to have sent troops to Somalia. Tanzania and Rwanda don’t have troops in Somalia and they were important players that needed consulting and if possible their support.

It was not unusual therefore that the diplomatic efforts included visits to the capitals of the member countries of the EAC as indicated by the interviews of the then ministers for defence and foreign affairs Hon Yussuf Haji and Hon Wetangula respectively to seek the concurrence of the respective heads of state and government. The inclusion of the CDF from Kenya in the shuttle diplomacy was also instructive of the role of military diplomacy. The inclusion also of the ambassadors of Kenya in both Somalia and Ethiopia further reinforce the multilateral approach to the issues at hand.
CHAPTER FOUR

Discussion, Data Findings and Analysis

4.0 Introduction

The study collected data from interviews conducted between the period of January 2012 and May 2013. The target groups of the interviews included senior government officials in the ministries of State for Defense, Foreign Affairs, Internal Security and Information and Communication. Specifically with regard to the Ministry of State for Defence, the study focused on interviews of the former minister for Defense, former permanent secretary in the ministry, the Chief of the Defense Forces and other senior military officers who were involved in the Operation of Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia.

From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the study identified Honourable Moses Wetangula the former minister in the ministry for his role in the diplomatic efforts during the Operation. In addition, the study interviewed Ambassador Monica Juma, then Kenya’s ambassador to Ethiopia and the AU. The study also obtained valuable information through a response to a questionnaire that was sent to Ambassador Macharia Kamau Kenya’s Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations in New York. These two were involved in diplomatic efforts at the regional level (AU) and at the international level (UN). The study also elicited the views of Ms Betty Maina the Chief Executive of the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) to establish how the operation in Somalia affected the sector. In essence the study established that defense diplomacy and military diplomacy was carried out at various levels.
4.1 The Practice of Defense/Military Diplomacy at the National Level

The data available from the study indicates that Kenya was lured into Somalia by the daring and provocative and repeated incursions by the Al Shabaab on Kenya territory. Somalia presented a complex security matrix to Kenya that continued to threaten Kenya’s national interests on account of its failed state status. Indeed, Somalia had been described as a “black hole” and a “shattered state” and it consistently topped the failed state index. The KDF therefore in the exercise of the right to self defense stipulated under Article 51 of the UN Charter, crossed into Somalia on the 14th October 2011 to engage the Al Shabaab in a military engagement dubbed, “Operation Linda Nchi”.

Article 51 of the UN Charter illustrates a nation’s inherent right of individual or collective self defence in the event of an attack of a member of the United Nations until such a time that the Security Council has taken appropriate measures to maintain international peace and security. The article goes on to say that such measures taken by the state or states are reported to the Security Council. Other related articles to this include articles 52, 34 and 35.

Article 52 makes specific reference to the recognition of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security by the UNSC so long as such arrangements are in conformity with the purposes and principles of the UN. Indeed it goes further to add that these regional arrangements endeavour to achieve pacific settlement of the local disputes before referring then to the UNSC.

Article 34 refers to the fact that the UNSC may investigate any dispute or situation that may lead to international friction and thereby threaten international peace and security while
Article 35 indicates that a member of the UN may report any dispute or situation of the nature seen in article 34 to the UNSC or the UN General Assembly. It goes further and states that even a non-member state of the UN can report a grievance to the UNSC or the UNGA if it is a party to the dispute and it if agrees to the provisions of the Charter.

These articles find relevance to the problem under study because Kenya invoked article 51 to explain the circumstances surrounding KDF’s entry to Somalia. The challenge therefore confronting the government officials engaged in the diplomatic efforts was to prove or provide evidence that the Kenya case met the institutional threshold spelt out by the aforementioned articles at both the regional level (AU) and international level (UN). The regional level had also to cater for sub-regional arrangements and this was important due to the role of both the EAC and IGAD with regard to the Kenya case. From the articles cited above there is a sense in which the events or dispute in question has to graduate from the local, domestic and national scene to being extra-national so that it does attract sub-regional, regional and international qualification. The question arising therefore from these set of circumstances was whether indeed the Kenya case satisfied these requirements.

At the national level there was evidence that lawless Somalia had a direct negative impact on Kenya. Indeed the Al Shabaab activities constituted a threat not only to national security but also to Kenya’s national interests. From the data collected from the interviews of Honourable Wetangula, the Chief of Defence Forces General Karangi, the Marine Component Commander Brigadier Khahariri and Ms Betty Maina, the Chief Executive Officer of KAM, it is apparent that the Al Shabaab activities within Kenyan territory had become more frequent, more provocative, more lethal in scale and in fatalities. For instance, the kidnappings of both local and foreign nationals especially on locations along the Kenya
Somalia border including in tourist locations sent wrong signals about Kenya’s viability as a tourist destination. As Wetangula noted, these activities were not only a threat to the country’s national interests, they were actually a declaration of war. To this extent therefore the national threshold was realized.

The request by the AU for KDF to join AMISOM though raised at the regional level, had national implications in the sense that there were certain processes that required to be fulfilled before this request could be realized. Specifically, there was need for both cabinet and parliamentary approvals before KDF could be deployed outside the country as per Article 240 Section (8) sub section (a) (i) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.

The request by the AU was done on 25th November 2011. The cabinet under the chairmanship of President Kibaki approved the inclusion of KDF into AMISOM, on 5th December 2011. The request was then subjected to parliamentary debate on 7th December 2011. Parliament passed the motion supporting the AU request. There was only one objection from the Member of Parliament for Garsen Constituency, Hon Danson Mungatana. In his contribution, the member cited a number of reasons for his rejection of the motion. He noted that the move was contrary to an earlier position given to parliament that had indicated that the operation was to be a short mission. Indeed, he added that the government had explained to the nation that KDF’s entry to Somalia was in respect of hot pursuit of the Al Shabaab, after which the troops were supposed to be withdrawn back to Kenya. In his contribution in parliament, Honourable Mungatana said in part:

“Mr Deputy Speaker Sir, if you read this motion, you find that it goes against what the Government told this Parliament. The Government told this Parliament that they were going
to have a short mission. They said that they were going to Somalia in respect of hot pursuit, come back and finish this mission....”

This objection notwithstanding, the national debate on KDF’s inclusion into AMISOM reflects the interface between defense diplomacy and military diplomacy which was meant to further consolidate the gains of KDF’s Operation Linda Nchi. The sanction by the respective institutions, namely the cabinet and parliament accorded the process due legitimacy especially to the national constituency. The cabinet met on 5th December 2011 under the chairmanship of President Kibaki while parliament held its session on 7th December 2011. Like alluded to earlier the sanction by the two institutions had several implications on the debate on KDF’s entry into Somalia and the length anticipated for the then ongoing operation. The inclusion of KDF into AMISON indirectly gave an indication of a viable exit strategy. This was because AMISON mandate was reliant on the direction of the AU under the guidance or express approval of the UNSC. The normal timeframe of such operations is usually six months which is renewable by the UNSC with due consultation with the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). Within this arrangement therefore KDF’s exit could be contextualized. The debate on the matter can be seen to have been conclusively handled through the decisions arrived at through the cabinet and parliament. The other implication of the decisions was the easing of the financial burden of funding the war as the KDF under AMISOM was eligible for reimbursements through the AU and UN.

Another area where military diplomacy was practiced at the national level was with regard to the discussions that were held at the inter-ministerial level to address various aspects of the Operation in Somalia. From the interview it was apparent that regular meetings were held between the ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Internal Security and Information and
Communication. Meetings were also held with ambassadors and members of the diplomatic community in Kenya to brief them on the goings-on with the operation in Somalia. For instance on 18th November Hon Yusuf Haji held a meeting in Nairobi with the Heads of Missions in Kenya and he briefed them on Operation Linda Nchi. Military diplomacy was also apparent in the inter-ministerial media briefings that characterized the initial part of the Operation Linda Nchi. The study found out that the media briefings were initiated by the CDF at a breakfast meeting with the Chief Editors of the various media houses in the Officers’ Mess at the Defense Headquarters. This move was significant on two accounts. One, it informed the subsequent media briefings that were held every Saturday to give updates on the operation. In these briefings, the MOSD was the lead ministry in the provision of the information pertaining to the operation, while the ministry of internal security gave information on the security situation inside the country. The ministry of Foreign Affairs provided information on the diplomatic front while the ministry of Information and Communication, facilitated the media briefing by inviting the respective media houses to cover the event.

The second critical aspect of the media, was that for the first time in the history of KDF, the local media was embedded with the KDF to cover the operation. Like mentioned earlier, the Chief Editors of the mainstream local media were invited for a breakfast meeting by the CDF at Defence Headquarters soon after KDF’s entry into Somalia. In this meeting, the CDF briefed the media on Operation Linda Nchi and a common understanding was arrived at on how the media would cover the operation. It was imperative that both parties agreed in principle on the ground rules so as not to compromise the operation. It was the basis of this understanding that the local media was embedded with the KDF. For the Media it was an exciting experience, the demerits of operating within a war controlled security environment
notwithstanding. This brought real time news from the frontline to the citizens across the country. The study argues that these activities brought greater understanding and rapport not only within the various institutions of government, but also and more importantly among the citizenry by demystifying the KDF operation to the nation at large.

It is against this background that the media became a significant feature of KDF’s events both in the frontline and also back at home. For instance, after the approval of KDF to join AMISOM, a symbolic event called “rehatting” was held at Defense Headquarters on 6th July 2012. The event marked the formal integration of KDF into AMISOM. KDF had to re-hat, that is, change from their usual head dress, to AMISOM’s green berets. In doing so, KDF officially joined Uganda and Burundi troops in an expanded AMISOM force.

In attendance during this ceremony were; the special representative of the AU Commission, Ambassador Boubacer Gaoussou Diarra, the special representative of the UN, Ambassador Augustine Mahiga, Kenya’s Defense Minister, Hon Yussuf Haji, Somali Ambassador to Kenya Mohammed Ali, AMISOM Head of Mission Wafula Wamunyinyi, the CDF General Julius Karangi, the AMISOM Force Commander Lt General Andrew Guti, the Deputy Amisom Force Commander, Major General Karanja and other senior officers from the KDF.

In his address to the gathering, the CDF cited the significance of the event to the KDF. He also took the opportunity to inform the audience on the progress of the operation by KDF. He reiterated on the transition of the operation from a KDF one into an AMISOM one following the UNSC Resolution 2036 on 22nd February 2012. In addition he noted that, KDF had liberated a huge area in Somalia and had continued to offer limited humanitarian assistance in terms of food and medicines especially to the old and weak members of the Somali society.
This, the CDF noted was a clear indication that KDF was not an occupational force but rather a force that went to liberate innocent Somali people.

Another area where military diplomacy was witnessed being practiced by the KDF was at Kenya’s Coast province as was revealed by the Marine Component Commander during the interview. This was evident from the discussions held between the security agencies at the coast and the local fishermen to agree on the modalities of fishing owing to the threat that was posed by the Al Shabaab especially after the entry of KDF into Somalia. The security architecture at the Coast region is such that the Kenya Navy Commander is a member of the security committee. He is therefore normally represented by one of his senior naval officers whenever such meetings are held. It was during one such security meeting held after the launch of the operation, that this agenda was brought to the attention of the committee specifically on the need to regulate the fishing activities in the region due to the obvious Al Shabaab. The previous incidents of abduction and kidnappings of tourists in the area of Lamu was a clear manifestation of the vulnerabilities of the region. These incidents coupled with those of piracy made the regulation all the more necessary. The fishermen raised their concerns on the loss of the source of their livelihood owing to the ban on fishing effected after the start of the operation. Representatives of the fishermen met members of the security committee and agreed on the modalities of the regulation. The critical aspects included, the registration of the owners and their boats for ease of identification, the specified time for fishing and a designated area within which the fishermen would operate and the time for coming back from the exercise. With this arrangement, the fishermen were able to conduct their activities while KDF was able to conduct patrols along the Coastline conveniently. As the Marine Component Commander said:
“This was important because the KDF needed the support of the local population for the success of the operation.”

It is apparent that the engagement of both the civilian leadership in the ministries of foreign affairs and defense with the military leadership did pay diplomatic dividends. There was greater understanding not only between the various government ministries but also between the ministries and the citizens. It also emerged that there is need for an audit to evaluate respective countries contributions in terms of Peace Support Operations via a vis their GDP.

The operation was also able to galvanize the national pride and ethos in the wake of a common enemy. The concerns of the captains of industry so ably articulated through the CEO of KAM, is a manifestation that the diplomatic efforts were not in vain. She noted that KDF’s operation especially after the capture of Kismayu had:

“Demonstrated sufficient defence capacity and Kenyans expected the KDF to engage in domestic security.”

4.2 Military Diplomacy at the Sub-Regional Level

Diplomatic efforts were apparent at the sub-regional level through IGAD. IGAD provided diplomatic leverage with its declared support of Kenya’s military initiative in Somalia. The countries that were approached for this support included; Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Uganda. These diplomatic efforts were also evident at the East African Community (EAC) level as the respective ministers from Kenya visited the various capitals within the EAC including Juba in South Sudan. These countries offered support to KDF’s entry into Somalia after concurrence from the respective heads of state and government of the said countries.
The inter-ministerial approach that characterized diplomatic efforts at the national level was replicated at the sub-regional and regional levels. There was also an added injection of technical staff particularly from the ministry of foreign affairs. In the initial shuttle diplomacy, one sees not only the ministers of defense and foreign affairs, but also the inclusion of the CDF and ambassadors representing Kenya in their respective countries. This was particularly so with regard to Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti and the AU.

It is also important to note the various levels that the shuttle diplomacy assumed especially in the initial stages or immediately after KDF’s entry into Somalia in October 2011. For instance the Chiefs of Defense Staff from the respective Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) met regularly to address the various challenges that affected the AMISOM operation. The study noted that with the entry of KDF into the Somali equation, a lot of issues arose. Specifically the sectorisation of the areas of responsibility meant that troop levels needed increasing if the degrading of Al Shabaab was to be carried out to its logical conclusion, thereby denying the outfit militia the freedom of action and movement in the areas that it controlled. Another aspect that came out was the issue of force structure especially at the Force Headquarters in Mogadishu. The CDFs needed to evaluate and see what Command and Staff responsibilities were available, how they needed to be shared not only among the TCCs but also within the wider Pan African desired reflection of the AMISOM force.

These consultations by the CDFs were a critical component of military diplomacy because their decisions and recommendations would then be taken to higher levels of the respective bodies, that is, to the ministerial and Summit levels for approval and subsequent implementation. This approach was witnessed at the EAC, IGAD and AU levels. It also true to note that sometimes especially immediately after KDF’ entry into Somalia, the convening
of ministerial and summit meetings may not have been viable there and then. This explains why the diplomatic teams engaged in Shuttle diplomacy by visiting the respective capitals within the sub-region to brief the respective heads of state and government and to seek their concurrence on the matter of supporting KDF’s entry into Somalia.

Equally important to note is that there were mixed fortunes in these diplomatic initiatives. While by and large one may argue that the efforts bore positive results, it is also true to note that some of the issues did not translate into positive results. A significant example is with regard to the operation to capture Kismayu. Initially the CDFs’ had agreed that Kismayu was an AMISOM initiative, and that the respective TCCs would participate in its capture. Later on this approach proved untenable and Kismayu was left to the KDF as the argument went, that it fell squarely in KDF’s area of responsibility. This notwithstanding, it was also clear from the interviews that during the respective ministerial and summit meetings, it was not uncommon for the CDFs of the respective countries within the sub-region, to have sideline meetings to address issues of mutual interest.

The study also found out that the role of the minister for foreign affairs was instrumental in much of the gains accrued from the shuttle diplomacy. At the EAC level, the minister visited the respective capitals of East Africa and met and briefed the respective heads of state and government. It was also from the same minister that the study was able to trace the role of IGAD in seeking to resolve the problem of Somalia. He gave a background on previous IGAD initiatives which unfortunately had not borne fruit. For instance he cited previous IGAD resolutions that discouraged neighboring countries from getting involved militarily in Somalia. This had effectively eliminated Kenya and Ethiopia in spite of the two countries bearing the brunt of the unstable Somalia.
There was need therefore for a reassessment of this earlier held position, its merits notwithstanding, owing to the changing dynamics within the sub-region especially the increased security threats emanating from Somalia. Indeed there was growing concern that the resolution barring neighboring states from being militarily involved in Somalia was no longer tenable. This position however was not unanimous among the IGAD member states. IGAD as an institution therefore needed to bring this unanimity to all member countries. This explains why IGAD lobbied the following countries to support Kenya’s claim to self defense. These countries included; Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Uganda. In the same vein IGAD amended the resolution to allow neighboring states to be militarily involved. This amendment was forwarded to the AU where it was approved and subsequently sent to the UNSC seeking for further concurrence on this matter at the international level. From the study it is apparent that IGAD’s input on this matter resulted in the attaining of diplomatic leverage as consensus was achieved among the members.

The study also found out that consensus was not always forthcoming on all matters. In fact it was apparent that there were contestations or competing interests not only among the TCCs but also within the wider membership of IGAD. For instance although Ethiopia supported KDF’s entry to Somalia and was also engaged in fighting Al Shabaab, it nonetheless did not join AMISOM the amendment to the aforesaid resolution notwithstanding.

Another aspect that also showed the competing interests was with regard to the sectorisation of the areas of responsibility among the newly admitted TCCs and Ethiopia. In fact these TCCs felt that their sectors should fall alongside their respective borders. The logic for this was to be able to deal effectively with the Al Shabaab threat. This was true of Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia though not a TCC itself. These interests generated different
interpretations from various quarters not least from the Al Shabaab itself and other factions in Somalia. It was also not uncommon to hear of attempts to balkanize the country to suit various competing interests within the sub-region. It is against this background that IGAD’s diplomatic initiatives are to be contextualized.

These contestations notwithstanding, KDF’s military diplomacy had a measure of success especially with regard to events in Somalia itself. While it is true that the Al Shabaab continued to be a thorn in the flesh of the TCCs, significant inroads were made in the course of Operation Linda Nchi. One critical area involved the winning of the hearts and minds of the Somali population. From the interviews conducted it was apparent it was a critical component of the operation. The confidence the Somali nationals built with the KDF helped significantly. There was the added desire to remove the “occupational force” tag that the Al Shabaab propaganda had been able to project. The spearheading of the operation by the troops of Somali nationals namely the TFG and RCB alongside KDF worked well against the propaganda. The TFG and the RCB endeared the KDF to the Somali citizens. Like noted earlier in chapter three some of the Somali Forces had received training within the sub-region including Kenya, and were thus ready to liberate their country. Through the efforts TCCs troops generally and KDF in particular, the long awaited presidential elections were held including the nomination of members of parliament. In the liberated and pacified areas, administrative structures were established through consultation with the respective elders of the regions that were positively identified with the help of the TFG and RCB forces. KDF on its part offered humanitarian assistance in the form of medical supplies and food especially to the elderly and weak. KDF also provided water to the communities in the liberated areas before the international NGOs could return to the country once the security situation improved. There was also a substantial reduction in piracy on the coastal waters of both
Kenya and Somalia. This was realized through KDF’s maritime assets that were also instrumental in the capture of Kismayu. The naval presence in the coastal waters served as deterrence to the Al Shabaab in what could be seen as Gunboat diplomacy.
The study found out that at the AU level, a number of diplomatic gains were accrued as a result of KDF’s entry. The desire by the PSC for a Pan African approach to AMISOM was enhanced. The limited scope of the region as by the then only TCCs, got a boost with KDF’s entry. AU also used KDF’s entry to solicit for more African countries to join in the Pan African effort. It is against this background that Djibouti’s and Sierra Leone’s willingness to join AMISOM is to be contextualized. Like cited elsewhere in this study, the increased number of the TCCs, brought more focus and cohesion to the operation. In addition the sectorisation of the areas of responsibility became more realistic with every sector having a leading nation. In the same token, new assets (Air and Maritime) became critical in the overall efficiency of mission and in essence, the desired degradation of the Al Shabaab. The study also found that there was the targeting of diplomatic personalities to sustain the diplomatic impetus to secure desired gains. The immediacy of the operation once KDF had entered Somalia, brought to the fore the challenges of the formalities of diplomatic processes. This therefore called for creative ways of achieving the desired diplomatic results without necessarily following the diplomatic etiquette. This was apparent during the shuttle diplomacy when specific persons were earmarked to facilitate the diplomatic agenda. This was the case with the briefings of; the chair of IGAD, the then Prime minister of Ethiopia Meles Zenawi, and the chairperson of the AU. Once this was done there was concurrence at both IGAD and the AU.

The study also found that regional organizations were viable diplomatic instruments. From the sub-regional level through IGAD, much of the initial diplomatic challenges were sorted
out. The desired concurrence was easily achieved not only within the sub-region, but also at the regional level.

The other important aspect that was a derivative of the diplomatic effort was the realization that the problem of Somalia was not essentially a military problem. As revealed from the deputy chair of the AU, the problem required a mixed approach owing to its complexity. Besides requiring substantial resources both at the bilateral and multilateral levels, the problem is also political.

4.4  Military Diplomacy at the International Level

At the international level, the diplomatic efforts could be seen to have been twin pronged. There was the anticipated engagement of the UN through the regional efforts of the AU. There were also diplomatic efforts outside of the UN per se in a bid to capture the wider international community both at the bilateral and multilateral levels.

From the regional perspective the study found out that AU worked closely with the UN because the two bodies share a peace and strategic vision regionally and internationally respectively.

The linkages between the two bodies were also evident as the AU cannot possibly fulfill its mandate without the authority of the UNSC especially on matters security.

In addition, the study found out that, matters of funding that are critical to any mission are best articulated by the UN as it has well established institutional frameworks to engage the international community multilaterally. The UN also has the technical expertise to work out modalities of both Peacekeeping and Peacemaking.
The man charged with this level of diplomatic offensive was the Kenya ambassador to the UN. Having secured the regional concurrence on KDF’s entry into Somalia through the AU, it was only prudent for Kenya and the AU for that matter, to secure UN concurrence. The study found out that the briefing to the UNSC was done on the 21st of October, 2011. Like alluded to earlier, this was meant to explain the circumstance that led to KDF’s entry into Somalia. It should be noted that this was barely a week after the KDF crossed the border into Somalia. This was the initial briefing and a series of briefings to the UNSC followed to address a wide range of issues. For instance on 22nd December 2011, the rehatting of KDF into AMISOM was also forwarded to the UNSC for consideration. Decisions had to be made on such issues as force levels and structure especially at Force Headquarters.

The UNSC therefore accorded AMISOM, the international legitimacy, being the Custodian of international peace and security. International military action that had been undertaken by the KDF with regard to Somalia needed international political and multilateral cover.

The Kenya Mission in New York engaged in political and strategic aspects in the management of the global and multilateral platform to accord legitimacy and political cover to the KDF’s initial entry to Somalia, its rehatting into AMISOM and in the maintenance of its presence there.

Prior to the operation, the study found out that the Kenya mission in New York had kept the Somalia issue current at the UN for over a period of twenty years. It was also clear that keeping this agenda alive for that long, was plagued with several challenges. One of these is the fact that Somalia had become a forgotten story internationally. Seeking for renewed action was therefore a formidable task. Secondly, the failed state status of Somalia meant that there lacked a legitimate national interlocutor to work with the international level. Thirdly, the
international community was also fatigued by various conflicts that had characterized the previous ten year period, for instance in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Cote d’ivoire and the DRC among others. Even earlier, the UN had left Somalia after its mission (UNISOM 1 and 11) spearheaded by the US failed. Fourthly, the availability of financial resources to address the Somalia challenge was not readily available.

These problems notwithstanding, the Kenya Mission in New York worked closely with the Kenya Mission at the AU in Addis Ababa, as the regional platform to operationalise AMISOM.

The challenge for the Kenya Mission therefore was to convince the UNSC and the wider international community, that there was merit in pursuing and advocating for the Somalia agenda. That a peaceful Somalia was desirous to the achievement of international peace and security as a lawless Somalia had not only regional challenges but also international ramifications.

To what extent was the Kenya Mission able to do so? One may argue that the Kenya Mission achieved a respectable degree of success especially within the UNSC for the following reasons. First, the UNSC concurred with Kenya’s invocation of Article 51 of the UN Charter that meant that KDF’s entry into Somalia was informed by the desire to secure its territory acting in self defense in a bid to promote its national interests. Second, the UNSC also authorized the rehatting of KDF into AMISOM and the attendant consequences of this to include; the surge in troop levels from an initial 10,000 to 17731 with a force headquarters that was to reflect this reviewed deployment through the UNSC Resolution 2036. Thirdly, the UNSC also tacitly supported the wider efforts of the international community especially
with regard to multilateral donors who were to provide critical financial resources to fund AMISOM.

It is also true to note that not all requests to the UNSC received positive response. For instance, requests for the reimbursements for the use of KDF’s Naval and Air assets during the operation were not approved. This called for the re-scheduling of the issue and re-negotiation to see if the request could be re-looked at favourably in the future. These were setbacks that revealed the nature of the complexity of the UN system, the competing interests at the international level, and the seemingly lack of appreciation on the role of such assets in addressing the challenges that faced not only the KDF but also the whole of AMISOM.

Paradoxically, the success of capturing Kismayu in “Operation Sledge Hammer” may have had its downside. While it came as a welcome surprise to many, including the international community, it did prove a nation’s ability to pursue its national interests against several odds that included; operating hundreds of miles away in foreign hostile territory and from the sea, and using own resources as earlier efforts to include the rest of the TCCs did not materialize.

This notwithstanding, it is clear from the study that security challenges of this nature, elicited by an unstable Somalis, require multilateral efforts if they are to be addressed in any meaningful manner.

At the wider international level, several countries did indicate a willingness to play their role in securing Somalia. Diplomatic efforts from Kenya were carried out in many countries including, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Other nations that displayed particular interests in Somalia included, the UK which hosted a number of international conferences, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
4.5 Conclusion

From the foregoing, the study found out that military diplomacy was undertaken at the national, sub-regional, regional and international levels. At the national level, key informant personnel from the respective ministries were interviewed, namely, those from the ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence. A key informant was also interviewed from the private sector, which is the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) whose members were direct beneficiaries of the Military diplomacy by KDF.

It has also emerged from the study that the rationale and underlying reason for KDF’s entry into Somalia (read military diplomacy) was informed by the threat posed by the Al Shabaab militia outfit that bordered on national security and Kenya’s national interests. It is also apparent that from the outset that KDF sought to adhere with the legal and stipulated available options within the national and international jurisdiction. It is also true to note that some aspects of military diplomacy that KDF engaged in had national, sub-regional, regional and international ramifications. It was therefore in KDF’s interests and those of Kenya’s nation at large, that the measures KDF took were foolproof in terms of the anticipated negative repercussions.

The code name for KDF campaign dubbed “Operation Linda Nchi” was also part of military diplomacy as it resonated well with the national ethos. It had a unifying effect across the nation. As stated by Ambassador Nancy Kirui, the operation was, “a boost to the national psyche, national pride and identity beyond the boundaries of tribe.” Indeed from the feedback received from respective institutions, there was a common thread of citizens identifying with the nation and the war effort. Both the Cabinet and the National Assembly overwhelmingly approved the deployment of KDF into Somalia. This was also in adherence to the
constitutional requirement that the deployment of KDF in foreign territory has to be sanctioned by the respective institutions.

Military diplomacy was also evident during the inter-ministerial consultations between the various ministries that were directly involved in the operation namely defence, foreign affairs, internal security and information and communication. The role of the media was also instrumental in articulating the KDF narrative. The stories of both the successes and setbacks of the operation were transmitted to the nation and beyond for public consumption in the various media outlets and particularly during the scheduled media briefings that were carried out on a weekly basis.

At the sub-regional level, the support of member countries was critical in establishing a common position that was to be forwarded to the regional level for further approval and consensus.

From the study it is apparent that the shuttle diplomacy was conducted at the bilateral level in the respective capitals of the members of the sub-region. This bilateral approach served the country well especially due to the urgency of the matter at hand. The inter-ministerial approach so critical at the national level was also replicated at the sub-regional level in constituting a team that would convince the leadership in the various countries within the EAC and IGAD.

The study has also revealed that KDF’s entry elicited several issues particularly at the sub-regional level. The respective TCCs were initially apprehensive of KDF’s entry and what constituted Kenya’s national interests. To allay these fears, military diplomacy came in handy, first among the EAC member states and then within the members of the wider sub-region. It was apparent that there was need of harmonizing and reconciling different approaches and
perspectives of the TCCs and the respective countries within the sub-region in order to create greater understanding, common grounds or areas of convergence and common strategies of confronting the Al Shabaab menace.

It is also at the sub-regional level that fast tracking of military diplomacy was witnessed. While the normal practice required the conduct of diplomacy through inter-ministerial consultations with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the respective countries, the lead agents from Kenya went directly to the respective heads of state and governments and solicited for feedback during the visit. Indeed, the need for a council of ministers meeting to prepare a subsequent summit for heads of state and government was deliberately “overlooked” to facilitate the speedy movement of securing the necessary consensus from the desired quarters.

Once the sub-regional consensus was achieved, the diplomatic effort was directed at the regional level, that of the AU. The study reveals that KDF’s military diplomacy scored successes following the reactions emanating from the AU. The most significant outcome was twofold; one was the consensus secured from the AU membership on the legality of KDF’s entry into Somalia, and secondly, AU’s request to the Kenya government for KDF to join AMISOM. This request if favourably addressed by Kenya sought to enhance AU’s Pan African effort in the AMISOM with a wider representation of the African countries.

Once again the linkages between the regional, national and international reveal the complex nature of the diplomatic initiatives and the attendant implications. The AU’s request for KDF to join AMISOM had to be subordinated to the national level for consensus and subsequent approval. The same issue had to be elevated to the international level, at the UN, for consideration and subsequent approval.
The import of the diplomatic efforts at the international level cannot be gainsaid. Without the favourable consideration of Kenya’s position at the UNSC, both bilaterally and multilaterally through the region (AU), the diplomatic journey would have been in vain. The UNSC accorded the KDF’s entry the desired international recognition, legitimacy and multilateral cover.

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will present conclusions arrived at from the data analysis and then offer appropriate recommendations. The chapter will also provide a summary of the findings emanating from the study. The outcome of the problem under investigation will also be highlighted in an attempt to demonstrate whether the objectives of the study have been met. The recommendations made will be informed by the conclusion arrived at based on the objectives and hypotheses of the study.

5.2 Summary of the Findings

The study has shown that diplomacy has been an integral feature of human civilization since time immemorial. Once the human beings sought to engage in political organization, the seeds of diplomacy were sown. From the ancient civilizations be it in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Greece, India and China, one is able to identify traces of diplomatic practice.
The study also indicates that the emergence of diplomatic practice as a profession and field of study is a more recent development especially in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries. There has therefore been relative growth of the subject from what may be referred to as traditional diplomacy to the more modern practice of diplomacy.

It is also clear from the study that diplomacy as an area of study has been characterized by conceptual ambiguity as has been exemplified by various scholars from the rudimentary forms of social interactions akin to traditional societies to the more sophisticated forms of social intercourse evident in a globalised world. The development of diplomacy therefore has a lot of political influence leading to what referred to as state-centred approach to diplomacy. This approach has been known to have dominated the practice of diplomacy for quite a period of time and has been associated with the traditional approach to the practice of diplomacy especially with regard to the state and security. Indeed it is in this nexus of state and security that military diplomacy finds relevance.

This concept of military diplomacy has been of specific significance to the study in exemplifying the dichotomy of the two seemingly incompatible imperatives as advanced by Anton du Plessis, that of, violent-coercive (armed force) and that of pacific-persuasive (diplomatic). The two are contradictory because diplomacy presupposes peaceful settlements of disputes through such avenues as negotiations, conciliation, arbitration and mediation. It goes against the grain therefore to apply the use of force in what should be ideally a peaceful process.

The rationale for this contradiction however is premised on the relationship between diplomacy, state and security. National security concerns safeguard national interests to ensure the survival of the state. The threat to the national interests of a state therefore gives
The study has shown that the national interests of Kenya were compromised by the security threats emanating from an unstable Somalia otherwise described as a failed state. It is also clear from the study that the failed state status of Somalia has been in existence for a long time and Kenya has borne the brunt of this status over the years. The proximate effects of this instability were manifested by the Al Shabaab threats that had a direct effect on Kenya’s economy. The overall effect on the economy coupled with the increase in the incidents of attacks, kidnappings and abductions of local and foreign nationals elicited the KDF’s response in a bid to secure the country’s national interests thereby ensuring the nation’s survival.

5.3 Discussion of the findings based on the objectives and hypotheses

The study examined and analyzed the conduct of military diplomacy occasioned by KDF’s entry into Somalia. Various levels were identified through which military diplomacy was conducted namely, at the local or national level, at the sub-regional level, at the regional level and at the international level. At the national level, military diplomacy addressed the national constituency through various institutions. The use of the cabinet and parliament to approve the deployment of KDF into Somalia, was a demonstration of military diplomacy. From the study, it was indicated that the Ministry of State for Defence engaged the aforementioned two institutions having followed the laid down procedures to secure the stipulated constitutional mandate to allow KDF operations in Somalia. It was also evident that, inter-ministerial consultations took place between the lead ministries of government in addressing the challenges from KDF’s engagement in Somalia.
Once the national constituency was informed and a consensus built on the need for the operation, diplomatic efforts were directed to the sub-region. From the study, it is evident that Shuttle Diplomacy was spearheaded by key personnel in the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. The ministers in these two ministries, coupled with the military leadership represented by the Chief of Defence Forces, made several trips to the capitals within East Africa and the sub-region covering IGAD countries and to the AU Headquarters to brief the respective heads of states and government and AU officials, on Kenya’s action in response to the threats emanating from Somalia.

From the outset, it was important that the conduct of military diplomacy was anchored within the practice of international law and state practice for it to attract the requisite support and legitimacy regionally and internationally. To this end therefore military diplomacy through the ambit of the ministry of foreign affairs, invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter that authorizes the use of force by a state for self defence before informing the UNSC. The invocation of Article 51 was a clear demonstration of the threat to Kenya’s national interests and by extension, the threat to the very survival of the state.

The conduct of military diplomacy within East Africa and the greater sub-region and eventually to the regional level was also in line with recognition of the UN’s Chapter V111 on regional security arrangements and more specifically Article 52 in a bid to ensure the attainment of international peace and security as per the dictates of the UNSC. From the study the role of IGAD and the AU is clear.

The study also illustrated that the application of force as an aspect of military diplomacy, enhanced Kenya’s national interests and standing at the national, sub-regional, regional and international levels. The feedback received from these levels was a demonstration of this.
Like mentioned earlier, the national constituency gave the go ahead in the deployment of KDF to Somalia and in the rehatting of KDF’s troops to join the regional peace enforcement force of AMISOM. At the sub-region and within the EAC, there was concurrence that the deployment of KDF in Somalia was a positive initiative that sought to promote peace and security of the sub-region. The request by the AU to the Kenya Government for KDF to join AMISOM was a clear demonstration of the success of military diplomacy. In the same token, the authorization of the KDF to join AMISOM by the UNSC through resolution 2036 is to be understood within the successes of the conduct of military diplomacy. The study also indicated the need for a concerted multilateral approach in addressing the emerging security challenges. This desire is further informed by the realization of the interdependence of states in dealing with threats to security and in sharing the burden especially in terms of resources. The study therefore concludes that military diplomacy enhances a country’s national interests affirming the study’s first hypotheses. It is also apparent that the conduct of military diplomacy by KDF was done at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. At all these levels military diplomacy did not preclude other actors in spite of KDF being the lead element in its conduct. Indeed the decision to enable KDF’s entry to Somalia and thereby engaging in tactical and operational maneuvers was sanctioned at the highest levels of government namely, at cabinet and parliamentary levels respectively. The entry of KDF to Somalia elicited a lot of interest nationally, within the sub-region, regionally and internationally. The approval of KDF’s entry from the aforementioned quarters and subsequent performance once inside Somalia was a culmination a well orchestrated military diplomacy. The progressive and sustained operations in Somalia and the eventual capture of Kismayu helped to secure and liberate vast territory in KDF’s area of responsibility (AOR). The recognition of this achievement especially internationally was a clear manifestation the successful conduct of
military diplomacy.

The relationship between military diplomacy and national interests is also brought to the fore. Indeed it is clear from the study that the rationale for the conduct of military diplomacy was in the furtherance and safeguarding of Kenya’s national interests. The justification of KDF’s entry to Somalia finds legitimacy in the invocation of Article 51 of the UN Charter that allows a country to adopt self defence mechanisms once its national interests are under threat. The threat posed by the Al Shabaab struck at the very heart of the nation in terms of the economic challenges and provocations that compromised the national morale. The failure to address these threats would not have augured well for the Kenya nation and by extension the region at large. Indeed the linkages or association of the Al Shabaab outfit to Al Qaeda exemplifies the threat posed to international peace and security. Kenya’s standing at the community of nations was therefore at the risk of being greatly compromised. The decision by the international community to support Kenya’s initiative in Somalia as exemplified by the UN and the AU at the regional level was borne out of the realization of the threat to Kenya’s national interests.

5.4 Conclusion

The study has indicated that KDF’s entry into Somalia was an act of military diplomacy occasioned by threats to Kenya’s national interests. The study has also shown that Military diplomacy was conducted at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. These levels also translated into the conduct of military diplomacy at the local or national level, the sub-regional level, the regional and international levels.

The study also demonstrated that military diplomacy enhances a country’s national interests. The study therefore argues that Kenya’s national interests were enhanced by KDF’s entry into
Somalia and by the support Kenya received diplomatically at the national, regional and international levels.

The study has indicated that an unstable Somalia has been a source of instability in Kenya, the sub-region, in the region and internationally. It is also clear that initially there was lack of a common approach in dealing with the problem of Somalia and competing interests were apparent at the sub-regional, regional and international levels. The diplomatic engagements at these levels are a manifestation of this.

5.5 **Recommendations**

Arising from the study the following recommendations are made:

- There is need to reconfigure or to re-conceptualize Africa’s Peace and Security Architecture to make it more focused and responsive to the emerging security threats in the region in a timely and coordinated manner.

- There is also need to develop a comprehensive resource based security policy document anchored in strong institutions and legal frameworks.

- The issues of security should be incorporated into the agenda of regional economic cooperations as an integral part of regionalism. Indeed security should be the driver of economic and political integration. There should be strong military institutions that are able to secure the African state that is characterized by fragility especially in addressing intra-state conflicts in the exercise of military diplomacy.

- Military diplomacy as an area of study should be given more attention especially in Africa. Most of the existing academic literature on the subject is from the West.
Although useful insights are evident from South Africa and other countries like India and Pakistan, there is need to have an integrated regional approach involving research based institutes and think tanks with an African bias.
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