

**THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC REFORMS ON HUMAN SECURITY: THE CASE  
OF POST-CONFLICT RWANDA, 1996 – 2013**

**BY  
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## DECLARATION

This is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree to any other university.

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## **DEDICATION.**

To my late mother and friend Saada Migdad Saad for your love and inspiration.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I would like to thank God for his blessings and inspiration that has seen me through life, my studies and enabled me successfully complete this cause.

Secondly, I would like to thank my late mother Saada Migdad Saad for her unconditional love and support, my father Haji Migdad Saad for his inspiration and resourcefulness and guidance while carrying out this research. I also wish to extend my sincere gratitude to my entire family for their support both spiritual and material during my research.

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## ABSTRACT

This study examines the economic reforms in Rwanda post genocide more specifically during the period study where Rwanda has greatly seen a culture of transformation from war to peace and economic growth. The main objective of the study is to critically assess how Rwanda's economic reforms have contributed towards Human Security in all aspects from absence of violence to sustainable peace. The key question that the study seeks to answer is what economic reform measures have been put in place within Rwanda and the impact they have had on human security. The study also seeks to examine critically how effective leadership policies and participation have contributed to Human Security in Rwanda. The study utilized the Human Needs theory. The study was further informed by the Human Needs theorists approach that peace is only sustainable when at the very least various aspects of Human Needs and satisfaction are achieved. The study solely utilized secondary data. Secondary data included textbooks, newspapers, magazines, archival records, online publications and reports. The Rwandan genocide remains one of the worst civil wars in Africa that had devastating effects on the social, economic and political structures. The Rwanda conflict had deep rooted ethnic causes, moreso economic due to imbalance in distribution of wealth and land, lack of proper formal education and unemployment also contributed to the conflict in Rwanda. Poor governance, impunity and lack of proper functioning institutions of government also greatly contributed to the violence in Rwanda. Rwanda's genocide was a big wake up call for Africa that explained why indeed deep rooted causes of conflict cannot be ignored. The lessons learnt by Rwanda became the inspiration that indeed the country needed to pick up its pieces. Through the able leadership of Paul Kagame, Rwanda's revolution began with a blue print in place, the Rwanda's Vision 2020 launched in July 2000 became a reference guide to measures Rwanda took towards economic reforms which substantially contributed towards improved Human Security in the country. Human rights policies and the participation by Non - governmental Organization greatly assisted Rwanda improve its level of respect for human needs and the satisfaction thereof. Rwanda's approach to economic reforms was two fold. One that was participatory and one that was policy formulated. The participatory approach was though "*Urugwire*" which is a consultative process that originates from the grassroots village level and the policy framework methodology that borrows from experts. Rwanda had adopted the Singaporean policy system and it is what has been dubbed Vision 2020. The Vision 2020 aims at improving all sectors of the economy and Human Security by envisaging key areas of concretization which are poverty, education, sustainable development, market driven economies, employment creation and investment freedom. In terms of what the Vision 2020 has set to achieve, Rwanda has made great progress but with challenges which this study has addressed at length. However, no regime or program succeeds fully without key ingredients of equality, transparency and cooperation and to achieve such depends on leadership, maturity commitment and a well transformed and organized political setup which many counties in Africa find challenging to achieve.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

#### 1.1 Introduction

Rwanda is a small, densely populated state in East Africa bordering Uganda, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The country consists of three distinct regions: the central plateau, the south-eastern basin and the continental divide between the Congo and Nile river systems, which extends from North to South along Lake Kivu. Most of the country is hilly, with a geography dominated by mountains in the west, savanna in the east, and numerous lakes throughout the country. The climate is temperate to subtropical, with two rainy seasons and two dry seasons every year<sup>1</sup>. Crook<sup>2</sup> illustrates that in 1994, Rwanda erupted into one of the most appalling cases of mass murder the world has witnessed since World War II. Many of the majority Hutu (about 85% of the population) turned on the Tutsi (about 12% of the population) and moderate Hutu, killing an estimated total of 800,000 people. Kanimba<sup>3</sup> remarks that on April 6 1994, preceding the death of president Juvenal Habyarimana, the state of Rwanda was launched into turmoil as genocides claimed the lives of at least half a million of its people. Initiated by the Hutu political elite and its military support, their prime targets were the Tutsi, as well as Hutu moderates. Many have purported “ethnic hatred” as the cause of the Rwanda Genocide and while an ethnic divide was indeed

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<sup>1</sup> The **Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)** is one of the principal intelligence-gathering agencies of the United States federal government. An executive agency, it reports to the Director of National Intelligence. The CIA's headquarters is in Langley, Virginia, a few miles west of Washington, D.C. Its employees operate from U.S. embassies and many other locations around the world

<sup>2</sup> Crook, J. (2006). Promoting peace and economic security in Rwanda through fair and equitable land rights. Economic Overview (2008). Rwanda Country Review. *California Law Review*, 94, 1487-1536.

<sup>3</sup> Kanimba F. (2004). Deepening the financial market in Rwanda. Internet power point presentation, September 2004. <http://www.bnr.rw/evenements/256.1>.

present in Rwanda around the time of the conflict, the reasons for the genocide are multiple and far more complex.

In analyzing the Rwanda Genocide as an ethnic conflict it is essential that ethnicity be examined as it influenced and was influenced by economic, political and social factors. The challenge for defining the violence in Rwanda as an ethnic conflict is that while, on the one hand, the atrocities were a clear cut case of genocide, committed with the criminal intent to destroy or to cripple permanently a human group Hain<sup>4</sup> adds that the lines along which the victims were grouped were not just ethnic but also political.

After Rwanda genocide came to a stop in July 1994, many things took place in the post war period to date<sup>5</sup>. Rwanda today has two public holidays commemorating the incident, with Genocide Memorial Day on April 7th marking the start, and Liberation Day on July 4th marking the end. The creation of the international Criminal Court was as a result of the Rwanda's genocide that claim millions lives .The ICC was created with an aim of ensuring that no ad-hoc tribunals for future incidence of genocide and crime against humanity. The ICC treaty was established under the Rome Statute adopted at a diplomatic conference in Rome on 17 July 1998<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> Hain, J. (2011) *The Rwandan Genocide: A case of Ethnic Conflict?* Brussels school of International Studies.

<sup>5</sup> Zagher, R. and Nankani, G.T. (2005). *Economic Growth in the 1990's: Learning from a Decade of Reform.* Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.

<sup>6</sup> Nishimizu, M. and Page, J. (2009). Trade policy, market orientation and productivity change in industry, in de Melo, J. and Sapier, A. (eds) *Trade theory and economic reform: essays in honour of Bela Belassa.* Oxford and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.

The Human Security aspect was first popularized by the United Nations Development Program<sup>7</sup> in the early 1990s as a way to link various humanitarian, economic, and social issues in order to alleviate human suffering and assure security. The issues Human Security addresses include, but are not limited to, the following: Organized Crime and Criminal Violence, Human Rights and Good Governance, Armed Conflict and Intervention, Genocide and Mass Crimes, Health and Development and Resources and Environment.

In this research the writer aims to contextualize Human Security mainly focusing on protecting people while promoting peace and assuring sustainable continuous development. It emphasizes aiding individuals by using a people-centered approach for resolving inequalities that affect security. The United Nations Millennium Development Goals, passed in 2000, were one attempt to codify the scope of Human Security and make it measurable<sup>8</sup>. Currently, Human Security has dominated the policy framing of government officials, military and non-government personnel, humanitarian aid workers, and policymakers. This research paper shall seek to establish how the Rwandan government has put in place a raft of economic reforms that are aimed at protecting human beings.

Briefly on economic background is that Rwanda is a rural country with about 90% of the population engaged in subsistence agriculture. This paper shall seek to identify how after the devastating 1994 genocide, how Rwanda has made progress in stabilizing and rehabilitating

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<sup>7</sup> The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the United Nations' global development network. It advocates for change and connects countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life. UNDP operates in 177 countries, working with nations on their own solutions to global and national development challenges. As they develop local capacity, they draw on the people of UNDP and its wide range of partners.

<sup>8</sup> Murenzi, R. and Hughes, M. (2006). Building a prosperous global knowledge economy in Africa: Rwanda as a case study. *International journal of technology and globalization*, 2(3/4), 252-267.

its economy. Rwanda's economy is market-based and primarily driven by the agricultural sector. More than 85% of the labor force is engaged in subsistence agriculture. In recent years, Rwanda's economy has been growing at a fast pace, especially the service sectors. This paper shall look into detail how this has been achieved and how such measures have led to the overall improvement of Human security in the Country. In a nut shell going through the reform processes the researcher seeks to establish how the humanitarian and social condition of Rwandese people must be impacted in a positively significant way by the said reforms albeit assessing the challenges way through such achievements.

## **1.2 Statement of the Research Problem**

Post-conflict states will often present many of the features of fragile and underdeveloped states but to a more extreme degree, and with particularly acute peace and security, law and order, and transitional justice concerns<sup>9</sup>. Key features of transitions from civil conflict include a devastated and dilapidated infrastructure, destroyed institutions, a lack of professional and bureaucratic capacity, an inflammatory and violent political culture, and a traumatized and highly divided society. In many cases the degree of capacity, physical infrastructure, and public trust in the government and its institutions will be dramatically lower than in stable developing countries.

Other common problems include a lack of political will, judicial independence, technical capacity, materials and finances, and government respect for human rights. In addition, in the post conflict context, a shadow or criminalized economy is likely to be entrenched and there

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<sup>9</sup> Ghosh, S. and Kraay, A. (2000). Measuring growth in total factor productivity, PREM Note 42; Washington DC: The World Bank.

is likely to be widespread access to small arms reflected in a high level of violence in the society. Given the lack of law and order, accountability and trust it is difficult to entrench major reform, and ultimately the reforms that are sustainable may be somewhat limited<sup>10</sup>.

This research is aimed at answering three very important questions which arise especially in relation to Human security vis a vis post conflict societies.

The first problem would be to identify the key elements causing conflict and understanding the root causes of conflict in Rwanda. These elements include ethnicity, corruption, poor leadership and systemic influence.

Upon understanding these key elements is to understand Rwanda's economic restructuring that addresses the issues that were highly likely to have caused conflict during the genocide. The aim is to establish how and to what extent these reforms brought stability in Rwanda. The other question that arises in this research would be to establish how certain reforms worked in solving major security concerns that led to the genocide. These included police reforms, justice reforms and generally social security apparatus put in place to ensure peace.

Lastly this research aims at establishing the relationship between Human Security and Economic reforms during the period 1996-2013 when Rwanda experienced relative economic growth, peace and stability in the region. The research aims at establishing how these gains have been achieved, measures in place to sustain them and how effectively the two are very much related in establishing stable countries especially post conflict.

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<sup>10</sup> Bougha-Hagbe J. (2006). Altruism and workers' remittance: evidence from selected countries in the Middle East and Central Asia, IMF working paper.

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

The overall objective of the study is to examine the impact of economic reforms on human security in post-conflict Rwanda.

More specifically, the study aims to:

- i) Provide an overview of post-conflict Rwanda;
- ii) Investigate the impact of economic reforms on human security in post-conflict Rwanda;
- iii) Explore the linkage between economic reforms and human security.

### **1.4 Justification of the Study**

This study seeks to identify whether such overwhelming support was consistent with the country's significant economic improvements or was it there or was little in terms of choice of leadership. Also in justifying the study is the inquiry as to whether the economic and security arrangements fall in place as a result of the administration or purely by default. Also in investigation would be to ventilate the economic progression strategy put up by the administration and assess its significance on human security. Furthermore, is to demystify the agenda that high handedness in administration leads to streamlined societies or again is it as a result of being unable to express any other alternative apart from the one chosen by their leaders.

This aspect is very important in really assessing whether the economic reforms in Rwanda meet the Human security agenda as set out by the United Nations or it's a fabrication of resilience by the populace who riddled by the past have no option but to live with what

appears better in their circumstances. Lastly in the example of study would be a well knit fabric of intervening factors that play a significant role in peace and stability, which again in line with economics, is the role played by the reforms in fostering better relations with the regional neighbors, where in most cases if ignored might definitely be a potential cause of conflict recycling. Some of these can be seen with the recent most significant engagements with its neighbors.

The study can help in understanding the main ingredients of economic reforms that would enhance Human Security.

#### **1.4.1 Leadership**

Understanding the relationship between human security and economic reforms in post conflict societies such as Rwanda helps leaders put in place economic reform strategies that would foster human security through the aspects of objective progression and development in all sectors of the economy. This research project can be very useful and efficient to conflict managers in Africa, especially those working in conflict prone areas, areas recovering from conflict and generally organizations that are tasked to prevent conflict or are involved in studying conflict patterns. This is mainly because the factors that affect human security was discussed in detail, the findings recorded and the recommendations submitted. Through this study the leadership can learn more practices needed to curb conflict by embarking on economic reform practices that foster economic security. Furthermore the leadership can learn the benefits of economic reform strategies, human security aspects tied to them and more so ways of sustaining stable peace.

### **1.4.2 Employees of Government**

Similarly current and prospective conflict researchers can have their share of benefits from this research paper. They can face issues they are familiar with and identify ways in which they can cope with them. Government employees can be able to find out the critical issues that affect human security in the Rwanda and surrounding countries. This can in turn enable them to know to which extent they can pull the variables.

### **1.4.3 Other Governments**

The study findings would be used by other government representatives to know the areas that need more attention in terms of human security. This will enable them to be well equipped in providing basic requirements for human security to be achieved.

### **1.4.4 Other Researchers**

Finally other researchers can benefit from this research paper since it can assist them to conduct more in depth research on this topic or to use this research paper as a reference.

## **1.5 Literature Review**

### **1.5.1 Major concerns of conflict in Rwanda**

#### **1.5.1.1 Failed Institutions**

According to Krueger, part of the main problem that caused conflict in Rwanda according to Rwanda Ministry of Justice, before the 1994 Tutsi<sup>11</sup> Genocide, was Rwanda's judicial apparatus which reflected the old allegiance to successive political regimes that were

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<sup>11</sup> The Tutsi or Abatutsi, are an ethnic group in East Africa. Historically, they were often referred to as the Watutsi, Watusi, or the Wahum



characterized by the systematic elimination of one part of population and by weak, ineffectual systems. The judicial institutions were marked by partisanship and corruption and staffed with many political appointees whose objective was not to adhere to the law, but to satisfy appointing authorities. The justice sector also suffered from the absence of well trained and qualified lawyers and magistrates, the deliberate obstruction of the establishment of a bar association, archaic and obsolete laws, and the institutional violation of the principle of the judicial independence by placing the Supreme Council<sup>12</sup> of the Judiciary under control of the executive. The absence of competent judicial organs in post-independence Rwanda was one of the factors that contributed significantly to lack of confidence on the part of the general population and to fostering the culture of impunity that led to the 1994 genocide<sup>13</sup>. Apart from the judiciary, other institutions also suffered a great set back due to corruption. Such include parastatals like Rwanda Coffee Board, the Bank of Rwanda, Rwanda Telecommunications Company just to mention a few.

#### **1.5.1.2 Control in Crime and threats to security.**

Post Conflict, the United States Department of state curiously notes that on a rating scale of low, medium, high, and critical, Rwanda is rated “medium” for crime<sup>14</sup>. The socio-economic factors in Rwanda are stable and improving, with incomes rising most quickly in the capital. Meanwhile, attempted home robberies, automobile break-ins, pick-pocketing, purse

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<sup>12</sup> The President and Vice-President of the Supreme Court are elected by the Senate for a single term of eight years by simple majority vote of members from two candidates in respect of each post proposed by the President of the Republic after consultation with the Cabinet and the Supreme Council of the Judiciary

<sup>13</sup> Krueger, A.O. and Tuncer, B. (2002). An empirical test for the infant industry argument. World Bank Reprint Series, 284, December.

<sup>14</sup> Condon T., Corbo V., and de Melo, J. (2005). Productivity growth, external shocks and capital flow in Chile 1977-81: a general equilibrium analysis. *The journal of policy modeling*, 329-406.

snatchings, and theft of vehicle accessories in Kigali do occur, but most crimes committed in Rwanda are non-violent<sup>15</sup>.

The Agency in its report however, additionally observes that since the 1994 genocide, political violence in Rwanda has been rare. However, the Congo-based Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)<sup>16</sup> rebel group continues to operate along Rwanda's western border and has been linked to grenade attacks throughout Rwanda, to include Kigali. Regional terrorism and organized crime: The terrorist group Al-Shabbab<sup>17</sup> too operates in the region, but has not targeted western interests in Rwanda. There are no known domestic organized crime groups in Rwanda. Terrorism is a threat throughout the world, including in East Africa. As in previous years, there were a number of grenade explosions in Rwanda, including Kigali. Typically, grenades were detonated in non-tourist, crowded areas where the attackers could easily escape by motorcycle. No one has claimed responsibility for these events, and investigations continue. There are no known international terrorism groups in Rwanda and the Government of Rwanda (GOR) does not support any terrorist organizations<sup>18</sup>. The United States Department of State rated the threat of transnational terrorism in Rwanda as "medium." The border regions are porous, making it easy to cross through Rwanda to another country. The United States Department of State rates the threat of

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<sup>15</sup> Ahmed, N. (2003). Trade liberalization and endogenous growth of manufacturing industries in Bangladesh: an empirical investigation. *Applied economics*, 35, 305- 314.

<sup>16</sup> The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda is the primary remnant Rwandan Hutu rebel group in the east of the of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is often referred to as simply the FDLR after its original French name: the *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda*

<sup>17</sup> The Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin—also known as al-Shabaab, Shabaab, the Youth, Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement, Mujahideen Youth Movement, and many other names and variations—was the militant wing of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts that took over most of southern Somalia in the second half of 2006

<sup>18</sup> Fred-Mensah, B.K. (2004). Social capital building as capacity for post-conflict development: the UNDP in Mozambique and Rwanda. *Global Governance* 10, 437-457.

political violence in Rwanda as “low.” Protests are generally peaceful and typically planned ahead of time. Despite professionalization and capability building initiatives, the RNP still lacks specialized skills such as investigation, counter-terrorism, bomb disposal, forensics, and interviewing skills. The RNP’s material resources are extremely limited, and police are unable to respond to an emergency call in a timely manner. A mix of defense and police elements conduct presence patrols in the city, but are more focused on preventing terrorism than crime. Community watch groups also patrol neighborhoods to prevent residential crime. Often the police will direct a victim to the nearest police station to register a complaint in person, as they are unable to respond to the caller. The RNP<sup>19</sup> management acknowledges these challenges and is striving to improve its operations and reputation. However notably over the years under research there has been no major threat to Security in Rwanda which is a remarkable achievement.

### **1.5.2 Political and Institutional Reform**

Sacerdoti et al.,<sup>20</sup> asserts that a considerable degree of anguish has arisen over the prospect of Rwanda joining the Commonwealth<sup>21</sup>, with non-governmental organizations ,human rights groups, and politicians claiming that the move will damage the union’s reputation for upholding human rights and the rule of law. The country applied to join in 2007, despite having previously been a Belgian colony and only recently switching from being French to

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<sup>19</sup> Rwanda National Police. The RNP Vision is to make the people living in Rwanda feel safe, involved and reassured. Our Mission is dedication to the delivery of high quality services, accountability and transparency, safeguard the rule of law and provide a safe and crime free environment for all.

<sup>20</sup> Sacerdoti, E., Brunschwig, S., and Tang, J. (1998). The impact of human capital on growth: evidence from West Africa, IMF working paper 98/162. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.

<sup>21</sup> The Commonwealth of Nations is an intergovernmental organisation of 53 member states that were mostly territories of the British Empire. The Commonwealth operates by intergovernmental consensus of the member states, organised through the Commonwealth Secretariat, and non-governmental organisations, organised through the Commonwealth Foundation

English-speaking. Although Rwanda claims to have improved her record on human rights and democracy since the 1994 genocide, the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative<sup>22</sup> (CHRI) insists that these accomplishments have been exaggerated by the Rwandan government's slick PR machine. Moreover, two reports released by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) and the Human Rights Watch statements indicates how the government perpetrates widespread censorship regarding the genocide, including harassing independent media outlets and journalists, as well as curtailing freedom of speech, which is undermining democratic rights and repeatedly making repeated incursions into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during the last 15 years<sup>23</sup>. Allegations that have been opposed by the President of Rwanda Paul Kagame , terming it mere propaganda with no basis, instead drawing attention to how the regime has been applauded in recent years for investing high amounts in health and education, reducing levels of corruption, and having 50% female MPs in its parliament.

Despite supporters claiming that allowing Rwanda to enter the Commonwealth, an integration which comprises only former British colonies with an exception of Portuguese and Mozambique, will encourage the government in Kigali to raise its standards, although detractors insist that the opposite will happen. Many players fears that, the move will make it harder for the group to exert pressure on states that do not conform to international standards such as Fiji, who have been excluded due to their refusal to hold elections, and will tarnish

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<sup>22</sup> The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative is an international non-governmental organisation formed to support Human Rights and particularly to support the implementation of the Harare Declaration in the countries of the Commonwealth of Nations

<sup>23</sup> Tsao, Y. (2005). Growth without productivity: Singapore manufacturing in the 1970s. *Journal of Development Economics*, 18, 25-38.

the reputation of the Commonwealth as an institution which promotes human rights<sup>24</sup>. Furthermore, there are also suspicions that this is merely a well-calculated gesture on the part of Rwandan officials to snub the French government, with whom its relations have become increasingly sour since 2006. The two nations have exchanged barbed remarks over France's supposed complicity in the 1994 genocide, with President Kagame facing accusations of playing an active role in the assassination of President Habyarimana, the event which was thought to have been a catalyst for the ensuing carnage in Rwanda.

This in return, the Rwandan government has insisted that France helped to train members of the Hutu paramilitary organization known as Interhamwe<sup>25</sup>, who were responsible for the majority of the 8,000,000 deaths that occurred during the conflict. Both governments deny the charges levied on them by the other side. Yet this has not prevented Rwanda from ostentatiously severing its ties with Francophone<sup>26</sup> Africa by publicly switching its official language from French to English.

The fact that so many developing countries see membership of the Commonwealth as something worth aspiring to may be a sign of it having continuing resonance beyond the negative connotations of its colonial legacy. The criteria for membership should perhaps be stricter if the union still wants to be recognized as an institution which respects human rights. Should one of Rwanda accede with questions over its method of governing hanging, it may become yet harder to maintain such a reputation as the literature suggests.

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<sup>24</sup> Pack H. (2007). Industrialization and trade. In Chenery H and Srinivasan TN eds., Handbook of development economics. Vol. I, B.V. Elsevier Science Publishers.

<sup>25</sup> Interahamwe - a terrorist organization that sought to overthrow the government dominated by Tutsi and to institute Hutu control again; "in 1999 ALIR guerrillas kidnapped and killed eight foreign tourists

<sup>26</sup> The adjective francophone means "French-speaking", typically as primary language, whether referring to individuals, groups, or places. The word is also often used as a noun to describe a natively French-speaking person

Chumacero and Fuentes <sup>27</sup> contend that Rwandan government has done a lot in the promotion of good governance in the Country. After the war and 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, Rwanda faced challenges in building good governance especially in aspects of human, financial, institutional and material resources. With considerable determination and enthusiasm from the government of national unity and its people, the country has made great strides in the direction of ensuring that not only good governance principles are deeply entrenched but also respected. Today, the Rwandan people, government, and development partners have space within which to begin dialogue with one another and search for new paths to good governance and development for the country. The Paper writes that it is worth to mention that good governance is the only viable alternative to promote sustainable socio-economic development. This in turn boosts national peace and reconciliation so as to empower the population to actively participate in decision making process with a view to sustainable development activities that directly impact on their livelihoods and to make the population increasingly self reliant.

As a result Rwandan people have developed self-confidence amongst them and liberated their minds. Promotion of peace and unity through reconciliation programs has been a key success to promote good governance in Rwanda. Justice regulatory mechanisms, such as have ever since their creation helped to promote unity and reconciliation, raise awareness among the population of the need and respect of human rights and the rule of law<sup>28</sup>. The program, helped to accelerate justice in the trial of genocide suspects that has led to great

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<sup>27</sup> Supra 43

<sup>28</sup> Page, J.M., Jr. (2010). Technical efficiency and economic performance: Some evidence from Ghana. *Oxford economic papers*, 32,19-39.

achievements on restoring security in all parts of the country. Indeed, many Rwandans who fled the country in 1994 and earlier have returned from exile few who have not yet returned are encouraged to return and contribute in the development of the new Rwanda. Institutions charged with security, law and order such as the police and the army are in place, operational, well organized and devoted to the service of the population and mediation committees such as Abunzi<sup>29</sup> at sector levels have been established.

In addition, the participation of the people of Rwanda in their governance is encouraging. Policies that facilitate the devolution of administrative and financial powers to local administrative units closer to the communities have been established by the government of the national unity<sup>30</sup>. The decentralization policy adopted in Rwanda as Verdroom (2007) suggests , has been a focal point to the nationwide democratization process as well as the poverty reduction strategy. This policy was developed and adopted on the principles of participation and empowerment of local governments to plan and execute their own development programs. The policy has motivated the local population to ignite its abilities so as to initiate and implement development activities based on locally identified needs. Promotion of private sector aiming for poverty eradication has been on the forefront in Rwanda. Various civil society organizations have been created and motivated to contribute to the nation's development. As a result, these organizations and institutions have been able to provide services such as education and health at a required standard. Moreover, the government of national unity is equipped with the legal frame work to play a positive role in

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<sup>29</sup> the Mediation Committees or ABUNZI were created with task to mediate on some categories of disputes that may arise among people living in same community

<sup>30</sup> Vedroom, P.J. (2007). An empirical test of the infant industry argument, World Bank reprint Series, 284, December. World Trade Organization: Trade Policy Review Rwanda. Report by the Secretariat WT/TPR/S/129 13 April 2004.

providing information to the population so as to promote transparency and accountability within the public<sup>31</sup>.

There is also a strong political will to fight against HIV/AIDS, since a population that is at the verge of being wiped out cannot meaningfully engage itself in economic activity. The government through the ministry of health has invested heavily in sensitization of the population about HIV/AIDS and its impact<sup>32</sup>. Additionally, the government of national unity is investing heavily on human resource development; this is because good governance cannot be achieved without the support of a reservoir of Rwandans who are knowledgeable, skilled, motivated and well informed. Most institutions that offer services in education, health and banking have been created and funded by the government. Good management of the environment is amongst the major issues in the social development of the nation. The monthly Umuganda<sup>33</sup> community work and planting of trees are important programs in the protection and management of the environment for present and future generations.

### **1.5.3 Social Security Apparatus**

The encyclopedia of the Nations<sup>34</sup> asserts that, social security programs aimed at meeting the individual's basic welfare needs have been established in law since independence. This

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<sup>31</sup> Sena, E., Sarr, A., Bouhga-Hagbe, J., and Vandenbussche, J. (2005). Morocco selected issues, Country report No. 05/419. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund

<sup>32</sup> Onjala, J.O. (2002). Total factor productivity in Kenya: The links with trade policy. AERC research paper 118, African economic research consortium, Nairobi, November.

<sup>33</sup> In Rwanda, there is a mandatory community service day from 8:00am to 11:00am, on the last Saturday of each month called Umuganda meaning community service. The day is called umunsi w'umuganda, meaning "contribution made by the community which is designed to be a day of contribution and building the country by citizens themselves

<sup>34</sup> Vera-Martin, M. (2009). Long-run growth for Mali, Niger and Senegal: Determinants and prospects. IMF WP/Preliminary. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.



includes; old age pensions for workers, sickness and maternity benefits, and payments for those injured on the job are provided for all wage earners. There are governments and missionary sponsored mutual aid societies, which increasingly supply the many social services once provided by the clan and family under Rwanda's traditional social structure. They note that in 1994, there was a total breakdown of all governmental services throughout the country which left most of the population living in poverty and engage in subsistence agriculture. Although sex discrimination is outlawed by the Rwanda's constitution, women have only limited property rights and are not treated equally in employment, education, and other areas. Men are designated as legal heads of households, and women do not have equal property rights. In 1999 the legislature passed a law allowing women to inherit property from their fathers and husbands and provides a choice of property arrangements for married couples. Domestic violence and wife beating are prevalent. Additionally, the security situation has improved dramatically since the genocide of 1994 though sporadic episodes of violence continue to erupt, and the government's human rights record remains poor. Rwandan troops have also committed excesses in the Democratic Republic of the Congo<sup>35</sup>.

According to President Paul Kagame's website, the use of innovative institutional reforms that have been put in place, the Rwandan government has managed to achieve unprecedented progress since 1994<sup>36</sup>. The Rwandan government is internationally recognized for its achievements in gender equality, reconstruction and reconciliation, universal primary education, access to health care and a continuous commitment to culturally based initiatives

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<sup>35</sup> The Democratic Republic of the Congo, sometimes referred to as DR Congo, Congo-Kinshasa or the DRC, is a country located in central Africa. It is the second largest country in Africa by area and the eleventh largest in the world. With a population of over 75 million

<sup>36</sup> Kajiwara H. (1994). The effects of trade and foreign investment liberalization policy on productivity in the Philippines. *The developing economies*, 32(4), 492-507

that deliver results for every Rwandan and the use of technology to improve the lives of every Rwandan. For President Kagame, the Government has made women's empowerment and inclusion a hallmark of recovery and reconstruction .An approach that has been globally hailed as novel in both intent and scope.

In May 2003, Rwanda adopted one of the world's most progressive constitutions in terms of its commitment to equal rights for all, gender equality and women's representation. With 56% female representation in Parliament, Rwanda has far exceeded the 30% constitutional requirement and has now become the first country in the world with the highest female representation in decision making institutions. President Kagame believes that, the vision of the Government of Rwanda is to become a knowledge-based economy with an educated population that can contribute to the social and economic development of Rwanda. In order to achieve this goal, education has become 18% of public expenditure for the continuous committed improvement of the quality and access to education<sup>37</sup>. In 1994, a three phase policy was elaborated to achieve these goals. The commitment of resources to rebuild the education system was followed by the Declaration and Implementation of Universal Primary Education (UPE) which led to the implementation of nine years Basic Education in 2007.

#### **1.5.4 Access to Basic Education and Healthcare**

Access to basic education has been made a reality when President Kagame announced a fourth phase of free twelve year basic education during his 2010 presidential campaign<sup>38</sup>. Since 1994, Rwanda has achieved universal primary education and increased the number of

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<sup>37</sup> Edwards, S. (2011). Trade orientation, distortions and growth in developing countries, *Journal of development economics*, 39(1).

<sup>38</sup> Collier, P. (2011). Development and conflict.  
<http://www.un.org/esa/documents/Development.and.Conflict2.pdf>

higher learning institutions from 1 to 29 and yearly graduates are now up to 50,000 showing a stark contrast with the 2000 graduates in the 30 years preceding 1994. With these policies, Rwanda has become a country where education is the right of every child. Moreover, in 1994, the Rwandan government was faced with a health sector problem where most of the health infrastructures were destroyed remaining with a very few health professionals.

Less than two decades later, the Rwandan health sector is globally recognized for its remarkable improvement in the quality and access to health services<sup>39</sup>. The introduction of community based health insurance transformed what was once a luxury into universal and affordable access to health. In addition to insuring access, the introduction of a performance based financing system has been put in place to ensure quality services. With these achievements, as Edwards (2011) posits, Rwanda is now on track to achieving the MDG<sup>40</sup> goals by 2015 as well as the ones outlined in Rwanda's Vision 2020 goals. Today, Rwanda once considered an insurmountable challenge has become one of the greatest examples of success stories in African continent.

The Ministry of Health report (2010) noted that the government and its partners have strongly promoted the Mutuelle de santé services, a community health insurance scheme that has proven to be a sustainable solution to the problem of access to quality health care in Rwanda<sup>41</sup>. Through the program, low income earners are able to access quality and expensive medical care that cannot be easily attained without health insurance coverage.

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<sup>39</sup> Bosworth, B., Collins, S.M., and Chen Y. (2009). Accounting for differences in economic growth. *Brookings discussion papers in international economics*, 115 (October), 1-63.

<sup>40</sup> The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are eight international development goals that were officially established following the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in 2000, following the adoption of the United Nations Millennium Declaration. All 189 United Nations member states and at least 23 international organizations have agreed to achieve these goals by the year 2015

<sup>41</sup> Atindehou, RB., Gueyie, J.P., and Amenounve, E.K. (2005). Financial intermediation and economic growth: evidence from western Africa. *Applied Financial Economics*, 15, 777-790.

People who live in countries without an extensive health insurance get fewer preventive and screening services and on a less timely basis. For example, massive health services such as screening for cervical and breast cancer, countrywide, would be expensive without health insurance because all people cannot afford the cost. Some conditions like most of cancer diseases are more likely to be diagnosed at a later stage of illness, when treatment is less important<sup>42</sup>. According to the report, access to healthcare has greatly contributed to the confidence the populace has in the government and subsequently enhances peace.

Chumacero and Fuentes<sup>43</sup> on their account say that Rwanda has learned from long history of segregation and division due to sources both external and internal that the only way forward is through complete inclusion of the fragmented population.. Therefore, before any single policy is implemented in all the essential services sector, all stakeholders are invited to participate in a process of true consultation. The often complex task of implementation and dissemination is rendered simple when all are engaged to participate from the beginning. But even policies that are formulated in the most open and inclusive manner will not succeed if they are not based on the highest quality of standards available.<sup>44</sup> As a requirement in development as the writer suggest is constant out of the box thinking, and a commitment to solidarity and shared improvement based on the immediate needs of the time<sup>45</sup>.

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<sup>42</sup> Adenikinju, A.F. and Alaba, O.B. (2010). Energy use and productivity performance in the Nigerian manufacturing sector (1970-90). *Opec review* (September). Organization of the petroleum exporting countries.

<sup>43</sup> Chumacero, A.R. and Fuentes, J.R. (2002). On the determinants of the Rwanda economic growth. Central bank of Rwanda, Working paper 134.

<sup>44</sup> The Ministry of Health (MOH, Kinyarwanda: Minisiteri y'Ubuzima, French: Ministère de la Santé) is a government ministry of Rwanda, headquartered in Kigali. As of 2013 Agnes Binagwaho is the minister.

<sup>45</sup> Chete, N.L. and Adenikinju, A.F. (2002). Productivity growth in Nigerian manufacturing and its correlation to trade policy regimes/indexes (1962-1985), African economic research consortium, Research paper 127, November.

### **1.5.5 Economic recovery path.**

The government of Rwanda most importantly has put in place measures to reform the economy after the ravages of the deadly clashes of 1990s<sup>46</sup>. Due to sustained government efforts to improve and regulate the business and investment climate, Rwanda has had impressive economic growth in terms of GDP and exports in the past ten years. However the translation of this economic growth into sustained economic transformation that increases income and employment for a large size of the population has been limited. According to Pack (2007) with the policies and reforms that have been implemented so far and following the Singaporean model, Rwanda is on the right path in terms of positioning and structuring the economy for long term economic transformation aimed at self-sustainability. However, these measures must be weighed against some challenges which still remain according to Pack, including a large trade deficit, low added value of manufacturing sector and dependency of external aid. Addressing these limitations is crucial in both the short and long term in order to achieve sustained economic transformation<sup>47</sup>. The model, the writer argues is one of the biggest contributors to stability in Rwanda, a great factor that enhances human security.

### **1.5.6 Literature Gap**

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<sup>46</sup> Pack H. (2007). Industrialization and trade. In Chenery H and Srinivasan TN eds., Handbook of development economics. Vol. I, B.V. Elsevier Science Publishers

<sup>47</sup> Urata, S. and Yokota, K. (2010). Trade liberalization and productivity growth in Thailand. *The developing economies*, 32 (4), 363-72.

Based on the Literature review that examines the policies and guidelines in place with the Rwandan Vision 2020, there is seen a consistent path to Economic recovery. The policies in place have contributed significantly towards peace and stability. A lot of the policies in place are in line with achieving the Human Security indices as earlier described under the United Nations ambit in line with empirical evaluation of the situation in Rwanda. What the writers fail to address in detail is the negative impacts the reforms strategies have towards the country's security situation post liberation in line with the Country's history and likely future trends. The strategy employed is that theoretically of a realist, positivist. However is that sustainable in post conflict countries using a perfect model? These are some of the inquiries in this research. The fashioning of reforms ignore key issues such as political space, systemic influence by neighboring countries, historical aspects of the conflict in the specific country and in a nutshell the importance of having a cohesive and robust political mindset sets a very important stage for Human security as this would form the basis of acceptance and adoption of common goals which only mature with time and political space but not forced implementation of policies and vision that might fall midway due to assumption of the considerations. The reforms must be holistic and realistic but not superficial in assessing absence of violence and infrastructural and economic progression, but the underlying tenets of human security that is political space, freedom of expression, consultative reforms, participation and consensus in the political and socio economic process.

### **1.6 Theoretical Framework**

This study will be informed by the human needs theory. In the human needs theorist's view, if an actor cannot fulfill his or her basic human needs one way, he or she will attempt to do

so in other ways. If they cannot do so within the existing, "status-quo" system, they may create parallel, "revolutionary" systems for doing so. Within a human needs framework, a conflict occurs over means chosen to achieve the common goals of survival, security and human development<sup>48</sup>. Conflicts, therefore, is over satisfiers, over means, and are a manifestation of unfulfilled basic human needs. These needs are ontological in nature, are indivisible and non-excludable. Human needs philosophy will be the best approach for analysis that would shape people's narrow focus, out of adversarial politics, and into a non-ideological problem solving approach to the conditions that destroy the environment, and also the quality of life and the development of ethnically maligned peoples<sup>49</sup>.

This study is informed by the human needs theorists approach that peace is only sustainable when at the very least various aspects of human needs and satisfaction are achieved. In post conflict societies the main societal need at the time is the guarantee to Human Security which not only emphasizes the absence of violence but several accompanying aspects such as access to food, shelter, healthcare and clean water and sanitation. Where domestic policies within Africa are not carefully adjusted to cater for the human developmental needs of immediate post conflict societies and unless such groups with a polluted history of hatred are able to meet their needs for survival, security and recognition and get busy with a sense of participation and commitment to nation building, there cannot be social harmony, and in the absence of that social harmony not only in the affected state but within states in the region, there will be a dangerous risk of spill-over of instability into the regional system. This brings

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<sup>48</sup> John W. Burton, Peace Begins at Home, *International Conflict: A Domestic Responsibility*; in *The International Journal of Peace Studies* Spring 2001 ISSN 1085-7494 Volume 6, Number 1

<sup>49</sup> Burton, John W. ed. 1966. *Non-alignment*. Treaty London: Andre Deutsch.

in the nexus between human needs and the important role it plays in stabilizing post conflict societies in Africa.

The destructive conflicts that are the subject of analysis in this study are conflicts that occur through the pursuit and denial of human needs - recognition, identity, survival, security and developmental needs generally - in relation to which there cannot be compromise. These conflicts are situations or processes in the course of which persons are prepared to sacrifice themselves as rebels become armed or even invent guerrilla tactics to achieve certain goals which they feel they are unjustifiably denied access to.

Also in looking at the positive aspects of moral authority in Rwanda, the idealist theory is of significant reference. Idealism is so widely defined that only certain basic tenets can be described. Idealists believe strongly in the affective power of ideas, in that it is possible to base a political system primarily on morality, and then the weaker and more selfish impulses of humans can be muted in order to build national and international norms of behavior that foment peace prosperity, cooperation and justice. Idealism is not only heavily reformist, but the tradition has often attracted those who feel that idealistic principles are the “next step in the evolution of the human character.

Lastly there is the liberalism theory in Africa’s current Approach to economic empowerment. This is a political theory founded on the natural goodness of humans and the autonomy of the individual. It favors civil and political liberties, government by law with the consent of the governed, and protection from arbitrary authority. In International Relations liberalism



covers a fairly broad perspective ranging from Wilsonian Idealism through to contemporary neo-liberal theories and the democratic peace thesis. Here states are but one actor in world politics, and even states cooperate together through institutional mechanisms and bargaining that undermine the prosperity to base interests simply in military terms. States are interdependent and other actors such as transnational corporations, the IMF and the United Nations play a role. Hence a hybrid of these theories explains the various approaches Rwanda has used in Post Violence Economic recovery especially during the second liberation period 2003-2012.

### **1.7 Hypotheses**

The study tested the following hypotheses:

- i) Economic reforms significantly contribute to improved human security;
- ii) There is a positive impact of economic reforms on human security in post-conflict Rwanda;
- iii) There is a direct link between economic reforms and human security in post-conflict Rwanda.

### **1.8 Research Methodology**

The research methodology deployed here encompasses the methodology and procedures employed to conduct socio- scientific research herein<sup>50</sup>. The design of a study also defines the study type and the sub-type of a statistical analysis. Qualitative research is a system of inquiry which seeks to build a holistic, largely narrative, description to inform the

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<sup>50</sup> Cooper, W. & Schindler, D. (2003) *Approaches to Social Research*. New York: Oxford University Press.

researcher's understanding of a social or cultural phenomenon. Qualitative research takes place in natural settings employing a combination of observations, interviews, and document reviews. In this study, the researcher will employ a judicious mix of both content analysis and explanatory research to fully understand and relate the impact of economic reforms on human security in Rwanda. The researcher understands that good content analysis is imperative in unraveling the many questions and therefore getting the best in this inquest. The objective method is therefore required in order to obtain useful information from the informants.

The choice of the methods for collecting data will depend on the variables to be measured, the source and the resources available. In many cases, there is a natural way to collect particular variables. With a clear understanding of the variables to be assessed, the researcher will make good use of relevant, appropriate and timely methods to deliver the objectives. The researcher will therefore use secondary sources of data available on the social economic status in Rwanda and the accompanying reforms. The researcher will also make use of selective but minimal interviews with specific persons cross cutting the major representation of the major social groups in Rwanda.

Both content analysis and explanatory research will be subject to in-depth examination in order to obtain the pertinent issues. The emphasis is on the attached experiences of the writers and participants on the stated meanings inferred from that information to other people, and to their environment. Qualitative research sometimes makes use of direct

quotations from the participants<sup>51</sup>. The data available from official records will be consolidated for analysis and compared objectively. The information obtained will be professionally studied and judgments given based on the testaments of the participants.

### **1.9 Chapter Outline**

The study is structured around five chapters:

Chapter One: Introduction to the Study

Chapter Two: Conflict in Rwanda: An Overview

Chapter Three: The Impact of Economic Reforms on Human Security: The Case of Post-Conflict Rwanda, 1996 - 2013

Chapter Four: The Impact of Economic Reforms on Human Security in Post-Conflict Rwanda: A Critical Analysis

Chapter Five: Conclusions

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<sup>51</sup> Kothari, C. (2004). Pretesting in questionnaire design: The impact of respondent characteristics on error detection. *Journal of the Market Research Society*, 36(October), 295–314.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **CONFLICT IN RWANDA: AN OVERVIEW**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

Chapter one has indicated how the study will be analyzed in details. The chapter has shown the problem to be researched as well as objectives of the study. In this chapter, a full analysis of the Rwanda's Historical and Political background shall be discussed in order to sketch in some major features of the context, particularly for those who may be unfamiliar with Rwandan history since its inception. A historical view and theories related to the study will be provided. Relevant aspects of theoretical and political historical arena will be addressed in terms of its relevance to the research topic. This chapter will establish the theoretical basis of the research. The potential of the theories to complement quantitative analysis has not been explored. The second section of this chapter will consider the use of the relevant theories and principles to develop typologies of public statements. Four theories that relate to the topic under study will be reviewed into details.

#### **2.2 Rwanda: An Overview**

Rwanda is a small, densely populated state in East Africa. It is landlocked between Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo with an area of 2.6 million hectares of which 1.4 million is suitable for cultivation. The country is characterized by an uneven mountainous land with an average height of 1,500 m above sea level. This topography has given Rwanda the name 'Country of a thousand hills'. The current population is 8.3 million of which 90% live on subsistence agriculture in rural areas. Over population is

a serious problem and 60% of Rwandans lives below the national poverty line of one dollar a day<sup>52</sup>.

The current population of Rwanda is more than 7 million people which is made up of three ethnic groups: the Hutu (who made up roughly 85% of the population), the Tutsi (14%) and the Twa (1%). Tutsis generally occupied the higher strata in the social system and the Hutus the lower prior to the colonial era,<sup>53</sup>. However, social mobility was possible, a Hutu who acquired a large number of cattle or other wealth could be assimilated into the Tutsi group and impoverished Tutsi would be regarded as Hutu. There existed a functional clan system , with the Tutsi clan known as the Nyinginya being the most powerful throughout the 1800s, the Nyingiya which expanded it's influence by conquest and by offering protection in return for tribute<sup>54</sup>.

Rwanda as a country has had an interesting history due to their two supposed ethnic groups, the Hutus, the majority, and the Tutsis, who consist of about 15-18% of the population. The Tutsis were more prominent in the royalty and hierarchy of the country but most of them were still peasants. The Hutus were the farmers and the Tutsis the herders. During the time of European Colonization, the Belgians came to Rwanda and decided to further the gap between the peaceful Hutus and Tutsis. The Belgians saw the Tutsis as more like themselves; therefore, they took them under their wing and educated them and brought them up to be the

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<sup>52</sup> Cook, Susan. *Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda New Perspectives*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006

<sup>53</sup> Sabuhoro, E. (2009), "Contribution of tourism to poverty reduction in Rwanda: A tour operator's Perspective," Presentation at the Delphe/EPA workshop, 6-7 July.

<sup>54</sup> Kaufman, Stuart J, "Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence," *International Security* 30.4 (2006) 45-86.

upper echelon of society<sup>55</sup>. The Europeans created tribal cards to differentiate between the two groups. The Belgians created a class system furthering what the Tutsis had created and hence Belgians presence propagated the discrimination between the two groups even though the Hutus and the Tutsis were still living peacefully together while the Hutus accepted the role of the oppressed since they did had no power .

Rwanda gained their independence from Belgium in 1962. The Europeans, however, left the country in a state of discord due to the majority of Hutus who were able to gain back their power from the Tutsis, who were viewed as feudal warlords<sup>56</sup>. Soon the Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARMEHUTU) came into power. The once oppressed Hutus decided to take revenge and many Tutsis were killed. 200,000 Tutsi refugees fled to neighboring country to escape the violence that was taking place in their country<sup>57</sup>. Juvenal Habyarimana came into power through a military coup in 1973 and undermined the PARMEHUTU; however, the new President still relied on Hutu Nationalism. The Rwandan refugees who had fled during the violence before Habyarimana took power tried coming back into the country. But were soon turned away and were told due to overpopulation they could not return to their homes. The refugees decided to form a rebel army mainly in Uganda called the Rwandese Patriotic Front, the RPF<sup>58</sup>. After many years of being exiled from their country and viewing the rise of Hutu extremists, in 1990 the RPF invaded Rwanda and forced President Habyarimana to sign an accord stating that the Hutus and Tutsis would share

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<sup>55</sup> Cook, Susan. *Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda New Perspectives*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006.

<sup>56</sup> Fisanick, Christina. *The Rwanda Genocide*. Farmington Hills, MI: Greenhaven Press, 2002.

<sup>57</sup> Kagura, Hassan Ngeze. First published in December, 1990, (Retrieved 1 November 2006) <http://www.onemancult.com/rwanda/hututen.html>.

<sup>58</sup> Melvern, Linda. *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide*. New York, NY: Zed Books, 2000

power in Rwanda. Soon after the attack, the Rwandan government staged false RPF attacks on the cities of Rwanda to raise fear in the Hutus.

The storm civil war struck Rwanda leaving an adverse impact in the country and its people. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was founded in Kampala, Uganda in the year 1988. as a political and military movement with the stated aims of securing repatriation of Rwandans in exile and reforming of the Rwandan government, including political power sharing.

The RPF was composed mainly of Tutsi exiles in Uganda, many of whom had served in President Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army, which had overthrown the previous Ugandan government in 1986. While the ranks of the RPF did include some Hutus, the majority, particularly those in leadership positions, were Tutsi refugees. On 1 October 1990, the RPF launched a major attack on Rwanda from Uganda with a force of 7,000 fighters. These RPF attacks displaced thousands of people which lead to a policy formulation by the government as propaganda tool with hidden agenda. Thereafter, all Tutsis inside the country were labeled accomplices of the RPF and Hutu members of the opposition parties were labeled as traitors. Media, particularly radio, continued to spread unfounded rumors, which exacerbated ethnic problems<sup>59</sup>.

All efforts were made to ensure peaceful coexistence in Rwanda. In August 1993, a peacemaking initiative by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the governments in the region, was reached by the signing of the Arusha peace agreements appeared to have brought an end to the conflict between the then Hutu dominated government and the opposition Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Thereafter in October 1993, the Security Council

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<sup>59</sup> Kaufman, Stuart J, "Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence," *International Security* 30.4 (2006) 45-86.

established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) with a mandate encompassing peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and general support for the peace process. From the outset, however, the will to achieve and sustain peace was subverted by some of the Rwandan political parties participating in the Agreement. With the ensuing delays in its implementation, violations of human rights became more widespread and the security situation deteriorated<sup>60</sup>. Later, evidence demonstrated irrefutably that extremist elements of the Hutu majority while talking peace were in fact planning a campaign to exterminate Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

### **2.3 Political Processes**

The post-independence Rwandan political landscape has been characterized by discrimination and division among the Rwandan people<sup>61</sup>. The political process in Rwanda has been mixed with a lot of challenges and thus it has never been possible to create a political leadership that would be inclusive and acceptable by all Rwandese. These challenges can be sited back during the colonial period. The colonial master's divide-and-rule instigated in its administration kept Rwandan's interests separate and discouraged national integration of the three identity groups<sup>62</sup>. Even though serious efforts were made under the transition government to promote an integrated and harmonious Rwanda, discrimination and divisionism is still a major factor of Rwandan life today<sup>63</sup>.

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Welch, D. (1993), "The Third Reich: politics and propaganda." London: Routledge

<sup>62</sup> Tilly, C. (2008), *The Politics of Collective Violence*. Cambridge

<sup>63</sup> Morris, S and Shin, H S. (2005), "Notes on Strategic Substitutes and Complements in Global Games", Princeton University. Unpublished paper.



The political leadership in Rwanda's history has witnessed Tutsi monarch dominating during the pre-colonial era -1962. During this time, a privileged status was conferred on the Tutsis both by the colonialists and the Roman Catholic Church .Rwanda later gained its independence on 1<sup>st</sup> July 1962 with Gregoire Kayibanda as President of the first republic (1962-1973). Under Kayibanda , Rwanda was a Hutu state first and foremost and that his regime maintained the view that Tutsi were aliens, outsiders, a different race, and this distinction justified their treatment, as resident aliens. The first republic came to an end with the coup d'état that saw Hutu, Juvenal Habyarimana as President of the second republic (1973-1994)<sup>64</sup>.

The Tutsi monarchy was abolished by the Habyarimana regime and established a one party state in Rwanda. Under this regime, the Tutsis were given a political identity as an ethnic group rather than an alien race that conferred on them status of a people indigenous to Rwanda. However, power was concentrated in the hands of the President and his close family allies<sup>65</sup>. This led to growing opposition, not only among the Tutsis, but also among the Hutus who did not come from the same region as the President and were therefore excluded from positions of authority. A chronic problem of refugees characterized the first and second republics, which both Kayibanda's and Habyarimana's regimes were unwilling to resolve citing the small size of Rwanda and "overpopulation" as the reasons for not repatriating over one million Rwandans, mainly Tutsis, in the Diaspora. Rwandan refugees, mainly in Uganda formed the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), whose goals were to secure the "repatriation of

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<sup>64</sup> International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ICTR (2003), Case No. ICTR-99-52-T Judgement. <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/judgement/Summary-Media.pdf>

<sup>65</sup> Staub, E. (1989), *the Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Rwandans in exile and to reform the government of Rwanda, including political power-sharing."<sup>66</sup>

The RPF launched incursions in 1991 that sent shock waves into Rwanda that which gave members of opposition parties within Rwanda an opportunity to have an informal alliance with the RPF so as to destabilize the regime of Habyarimana which they had were increasingly dissatisfied with. The pressure was so high that led to the signing of a cease-fire agreement known as the Arusha Peace Accords that provided for power sharing, democracy and rule of law<sup>67</sup>. Habyarimana accepted these accords only because he was compelled to do so, but had no intention of complying with what he himself regarded as “a scrap of paper.” Mirror politics and propaganda continued to be rife within Rwanda and the population was goaded to defend it’s self against fabricated attacks of the RPF infiltrators and to attack and kill their Tutsi neighbors<sup>68</sup>. Hence when Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on 6<sup>th</sup> April 1994 ,the Rwandan army and the *interahamwe* ethnic militia immediately erected roadblocks around the city of Kigali. Before dawn the following day the Presidential guard and ethnic militia started killing Tutsis as well as Hutu known to be in favor of the Arusha Accords that favored power sharing between Hutu and Tutsi. The killing of Tutsi spared neither women nor children and continued up to 18 July 1994 when the RPF triumphantly entered Kigali. Nearly 1 million Rwandans (mostly Tutsis) perished during this period<sup>69</sup>.

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<sup>66</sup> McLean-Hilker, L. (2010), "The Role of Education in Driving Conflict and Building Peace - The Case of Rwanda," EFA Global Monitoring Report 2011, The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education. UNESCO.

<sup>67</sup> Mullainathan, S and Shleifer, A. (2005), "The Market for News," American Economic Review, 95(4): 1031-53.

<sup>68</sup> Dube, O and Vargas J. (2007), "Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence From Colombia", Unpublished Working Paper, Harvard University and UCLA.

<sup>69</sup> Collier, P and Hoeffler, A. (2004), "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4):563-95

## **2.4 An Overview of the Rwandan Constitutions of 1962- 1991**

Rwanda had its first constitution on 24<sup>th</sup> November, 1962. During the period covered in this phase, the history and politics of constitution making was the sole responsibility of the colonial office acting by and through the colonial officials in Rwanda. The result was that the dominant ruling class of the country at that time the Hutu, was made to serve the interests of the colonizers. Rwandans had practically no part to play and were not even considered as entitled to be consulted<sup>70</sup>. Thus the history and politics of the constitution of 1962 was made by the colonialists with limited inputs from “Native experts.” Although the 1962 constitution envisaged a pluralist regime with various political parties to participate in elections, a single party system was quick to emerge in Rwandan political life.

The Constitution of 1962 was suspended after the coup of 1973, when President Habyarimana took over power. This situation continued until 1978. (E. Ntaganda, *Retrospectives du Constitutionalism Rwanda is: quelles leçons pour la nouvelle constitution Rwandaise 2002*, unpublished paper. 10 See art. 40 of the 1978 constitution).

In 1978, another constitution came into effect but did not make changes in terms of democracy. It is important to note that the 1978 constitution came into existence after Arusha Peace Agreement on Power-sharing article 6. Radio Rwanda and later the RTLM founded in 1993 by people close to President Habyarimana played anti-Tutsi propaganda<sup>71</sup>. There were also other propaganda Agents like Leon Mugesera, Vice President of the MRND and lecturer

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<sup>70</sup> Lazarsfeld P F, Berelson, B, Gaudet, H. (1944), *The People's Choice: How the voter makes up his mind in a presidential campaign*. New York: Columbia University Press

<sup>71</sup> Lasswell, H D. (1971), *Propaganda Technique in World War I*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

at the National University of Rwanda who published two pamphlets accusing the Tutsi of planning genocide against the Hutu years of absence of a constitution in Rwanda.

The provisions related to human rights survived, but other 31 articles of the constitution of 1962, including those regarding the judicial review were absent. Another characteristic of this constitution is the abolition of multi party system. Only the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND), the ruling party then, was allowed to operate in Rwanda and only the president of this party was allowed to run for presidential elections. This situation continued until 1991, when the pressure of both internal and external opposition obliged president Habyarimana to adopt a new constitution recognizing a multi party system. In the meantime, the war of 1990 was going on and lasted (with long periods of cease-fire) close to four years. Its final three months coincided with the period of the genocide, which was only halted by the ultimate triumph of RPF in July 1994<sup>72</sup>.

The third constitution was that of 1991 which was later amended by the Arusha Peace Accords essentially to re-introduced multiparty democracy and upheld the principle of separation of powers and rule of law. The 1991 constitution, together with the Arusha Peace Accord and additional Protocols on Rule of law constituted the Fundamental Law of Rwanda until the 2003 Constitution was adopted. Constitutional development ought to operate within social and cultural contexts. Where a society is culturally and ethnically divided, as is the case with Rwanda, constitutional legitimacy should involve striking a balance between the protection of the wider minority interests and the power of the central state authority

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<sup>72</sup> Lee, A M. (1945), "The analysis of propaganda: a clinical summary," *American Journal of Sociology*, 51 (2): 126-135.

although , this was not the case. For example, soon after Rwanda attained its independence, the principle of limited government that was embodied in the 1962 constitution was replaced by the practice of absolute government, which concentrated state power in the hands of the President<sup>73</sup>.

The 1991 Constitution was adopted on 30 May 1991. On 18 August 1992, the Protocol of Agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) on the Rule of Law was signed at Arusha. To replace or mitigate the 1991 Constitution of Rwanda flouted with impunity. The absence of constitutionalism in both the first and second republic governments of Rwanda is arguably, a direct consequence of the processes that were used to adopt those constitutions<sup>74</sup>.

## **2.5 Genocide in Rwanda: A Theoretical Explanation**

The problems in Rwanda escalated after the Hutu President, Melchior Ndadaye of Burundi, was assassinated in 1993. Ethnic tensions heightened quickly. 2,500 United Nations (UN) military officials from all over the world were sent to Rwanda to keep the peace between the Hutus and Tutsis. They were led by General Romeo Dallaire of Canada. The UN officials tried to keep peace as best they could, however the cease fire agreement was threatened by the *Interahamwe*, a group of extremists for Hutu nationalism who wished to exterminate all the Tutsis<sup>75</sup>.

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<sup>73</sup> Bethany, L and Gleditsch, N P. (2005), "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset

<sup>74</sup> Becker G. (1968), "Crime and punishment: An Economic Approach." *Journal of Political Economy*, 76(2):169-217.

<sup>75</sup> Moghalu, Kingsley C. *Rwanda's Genocide: The Politics of Global Justice*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana's plane was shot down while returning from a peace meeting with the Tutsi rebels in Tanzania. This horrific event was the catalyst for the Rwandan genocide and gave the Hutu extremists justification to kill the Tutsis, something they had been planning to do; it is possible that Hutu extremists shot down the President's plane in order to set their plan in motion. That night, the Hutus told all Rwandans to stay in their homes<sup>76</sup>. Little did the Tutsis know this was so the Hutus could find them and kill them. Hutus marched throughout the country with machetes, guns, grenades, and clubs, brutally murdering both Tutsis and Hutu moderates. The identification cards that had been put into action back in the days of the Belgians were now used to round up the Tutsis. A main tool during the genocide was the radio. The Hutu extremists controlled the radio and used it to play hate propaganda messages telling all Hutus to kill the Tutsis. The radio also pinpointed where Tutsis were hiding.

As the genocide was at peak 10 United Nations soldiers from Belgium were captured, tortured, and killed. Immediately the United States, France, Belgium, and Italy evacuated any personnel they had in Rwanda; however, they left the Tutsis and Hutu moderates to fend for themselves. The UN and United States refused to acknowledge the situation in Rwanda as genocide because that would then have called for an intervention. The rest of the world turned their backs on the helpless people of Rwanda who were being murdered. The UN Security Council unanimously voted to abandon Rwanda<sup>77</sup>. Only 200 UN soldiers were left as meager peace-keeping force instructed not to interfere except in self-defense. The Tutsis

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<sup>76</sup> Uvin, Peter, "Rwanda's Lack of Resources and Extreme Poverty Provided the Breeding Grounds for Genocide," in Christina Fisanick, *The Rwandan Genocide*, (Farmington Hills, MI: Greenhaven Press, 2004), 53

<sup>77</sup> Article 2 of Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948 (Retrieved 26 November 2006) [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev\\_genocide/convention.html](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_genocide/convention.html)

were told to take refuge in churches and schools, and yet those were the places where the biggest massacres happened. Hospitals were raided and patients were killed. People's houses were destroyed; items stolen, whole lives were destroyed by the Hutu extremists trying to exterminate Rwanda of the Tutsi "cockroaches" as they were termed. By mid May an estimated 500,000 Rwandans had already been killed. Thousands and thousands of bodies were floating down the Kigera River into Lake Victoria. Finally in July of 1994, three months after the genocide began; the RPF defeated the Hutus by invading from neighboring countries<sup>78</sup>. They were finally able to halt the genocide.

Mass distraction was evident at the end of the awful event of the mass killings and extermination of the Tutsi people, 1/10 of the population had been murdered; 800,000 people in close to 100 days. The genocide in Rwanda was the fastest and most prominently coordinated killing in history<sup>79</sup>. On 6<sup>th</sup> April, 1994 a significant occurrence took place when a plane carrying Habyarimana and Burundi's president Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down over Kigali, leaving no survivors. (It has never been conclusively determined who the culprits were. Some have blamed Hutu extremists, while others blamed leaders of the RPF.) Within an hour of the plane crash, the Presidential Guard together with members of the Rwandan armed forces (FAR) and Hutu militia groups known as the Interahamwe ("Those Who Attack Together") and Impuzamugambi ("Those Who Have the Same Goal") set up roadblocks and barricades and began slaughtering Tutsis and moderate Hutus with impunity. Among the first victims of the genocide were the moderate Hutu Prime Minister Agathe

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<sup>78</sup> Fearon, James D. and David D. Lai tin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity" *International Organization* 54, 4, (2000): 845–877.

<sup>79</sup> Uwingeli, P. (2009), Personal Communication, Chief Park Warden, Volcanoes National Park, 3 November 2009.

Uwilingiyimana and her 10 Belgian bodyguards, killed on April 7. This violence created a political vacuum, into which an interim government of extremist Hutu Power leaders from the military high command stepped on April 9<sup>th</sup> 1994<sup>80</sup>.

Rwanda was a war zone, with the mass killings quickly spreading from Kigali to the rest of the country, with some 800,000 people slaughtered over the next three months. All this period, local officials and government-sponsored radio stations called on ordinary Rwandan civilians to murder their neighbors. Meanwhile, the RPF resumed fighting, and civil war raged alongside the genocide. By early July, RPF forces had gained control over most of the country, including Kigali<sup>81</sup>. In response, more than 2 million people, nearly all Hutus, fled Rwanda, crowding into refugee camps in the Congo (then called Zaire) and other neighboring countries.

RPF emerged victors and established a coalition government similar to that agreed upon at Arusha, with Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, as president and Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, as vice president and defense minister. Habyarimana's NRMD party, which had played a key role in organizing the genocide, was outlawed, and a new constitution adopted in 2003 eliminated reference to ethnicity<sup>82</sup>. The new constitution was followed by Kagame's election to a 10-year term as Rwanda's president and the country's first-ever legislative elections. As in the case of atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia around the same time, the international community largely remained on the sidelines during the Rwandan genocide. A United

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<sup>80</sup> Anselin, L. (1988), *Spatial Econometrics: Methods and Models*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

<sup>81</sup> Higiyo, J V. (2007), "Rwandan Private Print Media on the Eve of the Genocide." In Thompson, Allan, (Ed.) *The Media and the Rwandan Genocide*. London: Pluto Press.

<sup>82</sup> Frohardt, M and Temin, J. (2007), "The Use and Abuse of Media in Vulnerable Societies." In Thompson, A, (Ed.) *The Media and the Rwandan Genocide*. London: Pluto Press



Nations Security Council vote in April 1994 led to the withdrawal of most of a United Nations peacekeeping operation (UNAMIR) created the previous fall to aid with governmental transition under the Arusha accord. As reports of the genocide spread, the Security Council voted in mid-May to supply a more robust force, including more than 5,000 troops. By the time that force arrived in full, however, the genocide had been over for months. In a separate French intervention approved by the U.N., French troops entered Rwanda from Zaire in late June. In the face of the RPF's rapid advance, they limited their intervention to a "humanitarian zone" set up in southwestern Rwanda, saving tens of thousands of Tutsi lives but also helping some of the genocide's plotters allies of the French during the Habyarimana administration to escape<sup>83</sup>.

In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, many prominent figures in the international community lamented the outside world's general obliviousness to the situation and its failure to act in order to prevent the atrocities from taking place. As former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali told the PBS news program "Frontline": The failure of Rwanda is 10 times greater than the failure of Yugoslavia. Because in Yugoslavia the international community was interested, was involved. In Rwanda nobody was interested.<sup>84</sup> Attempts were later made to rectify this passive approach. After the RFP victory, the UNAMIR operation was brought back up to strength; it remained in Rwanda until March 1996, as one of the largest humanitarian relief efforts in history<sup>85</sup>.

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<sup>83</sup> Kimani, M. (2007), "RTL: the Medium that Became a Tool for Mass Murder." In Thompson, Allan, (Ed.) *The Media and the Rwandan Genocide*. London: Pluto Press.

<sup>84</sup> Paluck, E L. (2009), "Reducing Intergroup Prejudice and Conflict Using the Media: A Field Experiment in Rwanda," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 96 (March): 574-587

<sup>85</sup> Stromberg, D and Snyder, J. (2010), "Press Coverage and Political Accountability," *Journal of Political Economy*, 118(2): 355-408.

## **2.6 Conclusion**

The genocide as clearly seen in this chapter was a result of a number of forces culminating from underlying ethnicity within the country's demographic set up. Coupled with historical underpinnings of inequality, poverty and deliberate divide between ethnic communities in Rwanda, the Genocide was the ultimate result. Through ethnicity other underlying theories played a conspicuous role such as propaganda, systemic conflict within the region and of course political gain was the most obvious cause of the genocide. In a nutshell, the genocide in Rwanda was inevitable at the point the country had taken a turn on the events unfolding in Arusha, and there seemed to be no consensus on any working political process. The epicenter of the genocide was the murder of President Habyarimana in April 1994. The genocide formed the backbone of all the transformations Rwanda has undergone over the years as discussed in the following chapters.

## CHAPTER THREE

### THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC REFORMS ON HUMAN SECURITY IN POST- CONFLICT RWANDA, 1996 - 2013

#### 3.1 Introduction

Chapter Two gave a historical background of Rwanda as a Country and its political institutions since independence. The chapter has shown how Rwanda's political set up has transformed over the years and the background of the conflict and political dynamics within the Country that culminated into the 1994 Genocide. This chapter of the study looks at the emerging issues which include the political, institutional and economic reforms post conflict and more specifically during the period of study. The first section of this chapter will identify the policy framework and action plan laid out for its economic reforms post conflict. The rest of the chapter deals with Rwanda's government's commitment to promoting and sustaining economic growth. It shows how Rwandans set up their policies with the vision of making a leap from Third World to First in a generation – or maybe in two – and to become the most advanced, knowledge-based economy in East Africa<sup>86</sup>.

#### 3.2 Background

##### 3.2.1 National Development Goals

Rwanda's overall national development strategy is defined in the government's policy documents, especially Vision 2020<sup>87</sup> and the EDPRS<sup>88</sup>. These two documents provide,

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<sup>86</sup> Rwanda (a), Vision 2020: A blue print on the major goals and transformation in Rwanda aimed at providing sustainable Development in all sectors of the Economy by the year 2020 and launched in July 2000

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Rwanda (b), Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategies (EDPRS).

respectively, the overarching development objectives of the country and the broad development policies, strategies and ambitions for moving the economy forward in the coming years. Vision 2020 provides the general development objectives and policy goals with the strategic ambition of moving Rwanda towards agricultural development and industrialization. The main objectives are: (a) in the short term, the promotion of macroeconomic stability and wealth creation to reduce aid dependency; (b) in the medium term, the transformation from an agrarian to a knowledge-based economy; and (c) in the long term, the creation of a productive middle class fostering entrepreneurship<sup>89</sup>.

The EDPRS acts as the operational document to Vision 2020<sup>90</sup>, providing accompanying strategic outcome indicators as well as actual outputs and activities to achieve the desired outputs. The main strategic outcomes envisioned are the development, promotion and improvement of (a) the economic infrastructure, including transport logistics and energy; (b) value added and market-driven agriculture; (c) science, technology and innovation for economic growth; (d) widening and strengthening the financial sector; (e) raising agricultural productivity and ensuring food security; (f) increasing the contribution of manufacturing to economic development; (g) increasing opportunities in the services sector; (h) improved governance; (i) private sector development; (j) human capital and skills development; (k) a knowledge-driven economy; (l) regional and international integration including market and product diversification; (m) trade facilitation; (n) gender in trade policy; and (o) coherence and coordination. The policy instruments to promote these

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<sup>89</sup> World Bank (2008). Rwanda Trade Brief

<sup>90</sup> Ibid 94

outcomes are both global and sectoral, and some of them are trade-related such as investment policy, competition policy and macroeconomic stability.

The national development plans emphasize social development issues such as health, education and rural sector development. This is logical in view of the historical evolution of the country and the extent of the challenges. With a view to promoting medium- to longer-term sustainable development, it is timely and equally important to apportion substantial commitment to trade (the economic sector) as an integral part of the overall development strategy. International trade has higher probabilities of generating, on a sustained basis, income, employment and capital for investment. A clear, user-friendly and implementable trade policy that responds to the development goals in Vision 2020 and the EDPRS can play a significant complementary role in integrating trade into national policies, strategies and plans. It can enable the country to focus on increasing and diversifying exports (and markets) as a powerful engine for economic development and poverty reduction<sup>91</sup>.

A well-articulated trade policy with buy-in from the trade policy community has higher probabilities of providing effective guidance for applying a holistic and coordinated approach to trade policy formulation, negotiations, implementation, monitoring and reporting. Since Rwanda has made clear its positive intentions about the role and importance of good governance, as firmly established in Vision 2020, this trade policy is also one exacting way to ensure transparency and accountability to its people. An unwritten trade policy does not

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<sup>91</sup> UNCTAD (2006a). Investment Policy Review of Rwanda. United Nations publication. New York and Geneva.

permeate to the public<sup>92</sup>. This one will be in the public domain and open to scrutiny. On the other hand, it will also allow the government to ably market and explain its trade policy to the people. A trade policy will also enable the government and other relevant players in trade to be more proactive, innovative and versatile in global trade negotiations, especially in the WTO under the Doha Round, with the European Union (EU) under Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and EAC, and regionally within Africa, as well as in other South–South trade agreements.

Trade negotiations start with identifying a country's own interests but, due to size impact, especially in global negotiations, economically weaker countries with similar but not always identical interests often work together to pursue their negotiating interests collectively. Strengthening the participation of Rwanda in international trade will be a medium- to long-term process. It is evident from Rwanda's current marginal trade performance that the main barrier to its progress in using trade as an engine of economic development and poverty reduction lies in the underdevelopment of its supply capacity. It is therefore logical that more work should be undertaken by the government to strengthen the country's competitive productive capacity and its trade-related infrastructure, while continuing to focus on the demand side in terms of securing more favorable market access conditions for its exports, especially in addressing non-tariff obstacles. Improving productive capacity for exports (as well as for national trade) will be a major challenge in the light of rapid globalization, the inclement global climate arising from the food, financing and economic crises, and the

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid 94

development financing needed to revitalize a country and economy still under recovery from a damaging internal conflict and civil war<sup>93</sup>.

### **3.2.2 Rwanda Vision 2020**

Rwanda's Vision is as a result of a national consultative process that took place in Village Urugwiro in 1998-99.<sup>94</sup> There was broad consensus on the necessity for Rwandans to clearly define the future of the country which formed the basis of the whole process which and the development of the vision. Today, Rwanda finds itself at a crossroads, moving from the humanitarian assistance phase associated with the 1994 genocide into one of sustainable development. Since 1994, the Government of Rwanda has stabilized the political situation, whilst putting the economy back on track with considerable assistance from development partners. However, the challenges remain daunting.

Numbers don't lie, the Rwandan population is expected to double to around 16 million by 2020. The main objective of Rwanda's vision 2020 is to transform Rwanda's economy into a middle income country (per capita income of about \$900 per year, from \$ 290 today), this will require an annual growth rate of at least 7%. This will not be achieved unless we transform from a subsistence agriculture economy to a knowledge-based society, with high levels of savings and private investment, thereby reducing the country's dependence on external aid. Economic growth, alone, is not sufficient to bring about the necessary rise in the standard of living of the population. To vanquish hunger and poverty, growth must be Pro-

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid 94

<sup>94</sup> *Urugwiro* is a consultative process that originated from the Village Elders and Statesmen by motivating and initiating discussions through educative measures that first dealt with the stigma of ethnicity in order to transform people's minds towards Nation Building and which culminated into the Blue Print of Vision 2020 launched in July 2000.

Poor; giving all Rwandan's the chance to gain from the new economic opportunities. Vision 2020 aspires for Rwanda to become a modern, strong and united nation, proud of its fundamental values, politically stable and without discrimination amongst its citizens.

In view to the above aspirations and challenges outlined , it is important for the government of Rwanda to develop a new vision and translate it into an achievable program based on the following pillars: reconstruction of the nation and its social capital anchored on good governance, underpinned by a capable state; transformation of agriculture into a productive, high value, market oriented sector, with forward linkages to other sectors; development of an efficient private sector spearheaded by competitiveness and entrepreneurship. Furthermore, comprehensive human resources development, encompassing education, health, and ICT skills aimed at public sector, private sector and civil society. To be integrated with demographic, health and gender issues; infrastructural development, entailing improved transport links, energy and water supplies and ICT networks; promotion of regional economic integration and cooperation. At all times, these will be affected by a number of cross-cutting issues including, gender equality and sustainable environmental and natural resource management. Vision 2020 is to be achieved in a spirit of social cohesion and equity, underpinned by a capable state. Rwanda's ongoing development will have, at its core, the Nation's principal asset - its people.

### **3.2.3 Areas of Reforms under Rwanda's Vision 2020**

The next to the pillars of the Vision, are the three cross-cutting areas of gender, natural resources & environment and culture, science & technology. These issues will not only be



affected by the economic transformation but will also play an important role in achieving the Vision's development goals.

#### **3.4.3.1 Gender Equality**

Statistics shows that women make up 53% of the population and participate in subsistence agriculture more than men. They usually feed and provide care for the children and ensure their fundamental education. But until recently, girls were the minority in secondary schools, women had little access to the opportunities available to men and they were poorly represented in decision-making positions. In order to achieve gender equality and equity, Rwanda has continuously updated and adapted its laws on gender. It will support education for all, eradicate all forms of discrimination, fight against poverty and practice a positive discrimination policy in favor of women. Gender will be integrated as a cross-cutting issue in all development policies and strategies<sup>95</sup>.

#### **3.4.3.2 Science, Technology and ICT**

It is evident that Rwandans are rightly proud of their cultural roots and the government will ensure that it takes advantage of this heritage in all facets of the development process (Rwanda, 2009). However, for this development process to be a success, Rwanda must embrace the future and exploit innovations in Science and technology to complement its cultural strengths. In Rwanda, the rate of adoption and integration of science and technology in socio-economic life is very low and the shortage of technically qualified professionals is visible at all levels. From now until 2020, Rwanda projects to have adequate, highly skilled scientists and technicians to satisfy the needs of the national economy. There is a need to

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid 80

generate, disseminate and acquire scientific skills as well as technological innovations, in addition to integrating them into the social and economic development drive. In order for Rwanda to achieve this objective, it will have to develop the teaching of science and technology at secondary and university levels. It will facilitate the creation of high and intermediate technology enterprises and develop access to ICT down to the administrative sector level, in accordance with the national ICT plan<sup>96</sup>

This study views the various planning processes so that the Vision is translated into implementable plans with strong linkages between set priorities and the allocation of resources. It also requires a mobilization of a substantial amount of financial resources from the state, the donor community and the private sector. If these resources can be efficiently allocated through the planning process, the goals set in Vision 2020 will become attainable. Furthermore it represents an ambitious plan to raise the people of Rwanda out of poverty and transform the country into a middle-income economy. Some will say that this is too ambitious and that the government of Rwanda is not being realistic when they set this goal. Others say that it is a dream. To remain in the current situation is simply unacceptable for the Rwandan people. Therefore, there is a need to devise and implement policies as well as mobilize resources to bring about the necessary transformation to achieve the Vision. This is realistic based on the fact that countries with similar unfavorable initial conditions have succeeded. The development experience of the East Asian ‘Tigers’ proves that this dream could be a reality<sup>97</sup>.

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<sup>96</sup> Rwanda (2009). Competition and Consumer Protection Policy.

<sup>97</sup> UNCTAD (2004a). The Least Developed Countries Report: Linking International Trade with Poverty Reduction; United Nations publication: New York and Geneva.

#### **3.4.3.4 Water Supply Infrastructure**

The water-sector strategy aims at increasing the supply of this vital public utility and access to it. Recent progress includes a draft law on water-resource protection as well as the establishment of a geographic information management system (GIS) for the water sector. The water supply system, however, still requires extensive upgrading and rehabilitation in order to be consistent with the government's long-term objective of increasing the current access rate to drinking water of nearly 60 per cent to 85 per cent in 2015. The government has started to contract private firms to ensure the long-term sustainability of the rural water-supply systems while strengthening the decentralization of water sources management. The Urban Water Supply and Sanitation (UWSS) program will increase urban coverage from 73 per cent to 78 per cent and is anticipated to reduce leakage from 43 per cent to 23 per cent by 2007. Another program aimed at increasing sanitation and hygiene education in schools and at home has also been initiated<sup>98</sup>.

#### **3.4.3.5 Energy Infrastructure**

In the energy sector, the chronic shortage of electricity was aggravated in 2004 and 2005 by sharply increasing oil prices. The government has undertaken measures to improve rural electrification through the development of micro-plants and/or the extension of the distribution network, including measures to facilitate the use of solar energy. There is recognition that the long-term solution to the chronic shortages is the increased production of electricity and the exploitation of new and renewable sources of energy. Meanwhile, in the short to medium term, Rwanda still depends on imports of energy and fuel at high prices. Although the current energy crisis was partially addressed through the purchase of generators

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid 109

in 2004, the purchase and storage of the fuel needed to run these generators will have continuing implications for the future. This is also expected to increase the cost of electricity, which will have implications for the rural-electrification policy. It is thus envisaged to subsidize a “lifeline” tariff for low-use customers. Wood energy represents approximately 94 per cent of Rwanda’s energy sources. It is the most accessible resource for the majority of the population, whose purchasing power is still very low. Negotiations with private companies on the extraction of methane gas are in the final stages, and production of electricity and related gas products is expected to begin by 2006. In March 2005, the government entered into a joint venture with a foreign consortium to exploit the considerable methane-gas reserves of Lake Kivu.<sup>99</sup>

#### **3.4.3.6 Transport Infrastructure**

Landlocked and covered by a hilly terrain, Rwanda’s transport infrastructure development is more challenging than that of most African countries, both for domestic and international links, especially since the 1994 war and genocide devastated the country’s transport infrastructure. Considering the four modes of transport – road, rail, air and water – Rwanda is heavily reliant on road transport. Rail is totally non-existent, while water and air modes are just marginally utilized. During the last ten years, Rwanda has undertaken tremendous policy reforms and investments that have laid a strong foundation to improve its transport infrastructure. While mainly donor-funded and concentrating on road construction and repairs, transport networks have improved national service delivery in the country and improved internal market access.

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid 190

Air transport in Rwanda plays the dual role of enhancing economic integration in regional and global markets and of promoting tourism. Air-transport infrastructure comprises one international airport, which serves the capital, Kigali, and five airfields, three of which are fully operational. The Kigali International Airport has a passenger capacity of up to 500,000 annually but currently handles an average of only 140,000. It is served by five international airlines as well as one national carrier. Owing to limited competition and a small market, the cost of Rwanda's air transport is higher than international averages. With a view to improve the country's air services, Rwanda has just completed an overhaul of the Kigali International Airport with a repaved and extended runway, a new taxiway, an increased aircraft parking area, new navigational aids, fire-fighting equipment and a refurbished lighting system. Plans to redevelop the Kamembe Airport in the south-west of the country are also underway, to make it the second international airport of the country. Within the framework of a new vision of the fast growing City of Kigali, the long-term plans include the construction of an alternative and larger international airport in Bugesera, some 50 km away from Kigali<sup>100</sup>.

Rwanda is endowed with several lakes and rivers, but only Lake Kivu is fully navigable by both passengers and goods. It covers a distance of 120 km and serves three towns: Gisenyi to the north, Kibuye to the centre and Cyangungu to the south. Following the improved security and promise of peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), water transport on Lake Kivu has sparked some interest, prompting the government to initiate a program to promote and encourage private-sector investment in its development. The main challenge to this strategy, however, is an absence of a boatyard for boat, tug, and barge maintenance and repair. A study on the economic viability of such an investment ought to be seen as a

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<sup>100</sup> Ibid, p.115.

prerequisite to exploiting the full potential of water transport on Lake Kivu. The same is underway.<sup>101</sup>

### **3.2.4 Private Sector Led Development**

Private sector led development is the way for spearheading Rwanda's development is the emergence of a viable private sector that can take over as the principle growth engine of the economy. Such a development has proven to be conducive for economic growth, and also ensured the emergence of a vibrant middle class of entrepreneurs, who help develop and embed the principles of democracy. Although foreign direct investment will be encouraged, a local-based business class remains a crucial component of development. The Government of Rwanda in the most part is not involved in providing services and products that can be delivered more efficiently by the private sector. It is, therefore, committed towards a comprehensive privatization policy that will help reduce costs and prices and widen consumer choice. The State will only act as a catalyst; ensuring that infrastructure, human resources and legal frameworks are geared towards stimulating economic activity and private investment.

Financial sector development has been crucial for any economic growth to be achieved, the current situation is faced with underdevelopment of the same and poorly adaptations to the economic needs of the country. The government has promoted local business through the introduction of export processing zones, in which foreign operators could have local partners. The development of Rwanda's private sector should not limit itself to the formal sector. The informal sector has also been developed, in such area as retail trade, repair workshops and

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid, p.192.

garages, handicrafts and metal works. Particular attention has been paid to the labor market. For the past 40 years of colonialism, the Rwandan economy has been able to generate only 200,000 jobs outside agriculture. If family planning services improve, the population is still projected to reach 16 million by 2020, of which 7 million people will be earning a living on off-farm activities. Therefore, the government is planning to create in the long term 1.4 million jobs outside agriculture. Given the trends of the Rwandan economy over the past decades, this is clearly a huge challenge, in which the private sector needs to play a pivotal role.<sup>102</sup>

Rwanda's list of objectives to be attained in the field of health within the next 20 years include: a reduction in the infant mortality rate from 107 to 50 per 1000 and the maternal mortality rate from 1070 to 200 per 100.000. Life expectancy will have increased from 49 to 55 years, malaria and other potential epidemic diseases will have been controlled and the AIDS prevalence will have been reduced from 11.2% to 8%. In order to achieve these improvements, health policies must be targeted at the poorest members of the population to improve access to healthcare, the quality of that healthcare and to reduce its cost. Family planning is crucial for reducing both birth rates and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS. Envisaged and current population policies should go hand in hand with strategies to overcome problems in the health sector. Indeed, poverty remains a major cause of poor health and vice versa.

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<sup>102</sup> 3rd General Census of Population and Housing, 2002

### **3.3 Human Security in the Rwandan Context**

According to the Oxford advanced Dictionary Human Security is the condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; safety. It adds that it's the freedom from care, anxiety or apprehension; a feeling of safety or freedom from or absence of danger. It further means in a wider aspect the ability to access basic human needs such as food, shelter, healthcare and clean water.

The United Nation Commission on Human Security defines Human security as protecting the vital core of all human lives in ways that embrace human freedoms and human fulfillment-protecting vital freedoms fundamental to human existence and development. Human Security means protecting people from severe and pervasive threats, both natural and societal and empowering individuals and communities to develop capabilities for making informed choices and acting on their own behalf.<sup>103</sup> It goes therefore that Human security not only encompasses the aspect of protection but also embraces many other perspectives which include economic governance, democratic linkages and accessibility to basic human rights and freedoms. There is established a linkage between the three key areas of this research as complementary to each other in many ways however not always as other scholars may define. Thad Dunning sees economic empowerment as a tool to progressive realization of basic Human Security agenda and subsequently peace.

#### **3.3.1 Definition and Background**

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<sup>103</sup> Human Security Now, Commission on Human Security Publication May 2003.



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### **3.3.2 Rwanda's Human Security Situation Post Genocide**

Looking at the history and evolution of the country, and from the analysis in chapter 2 which gives in depth discussion on the same, Rwanda has been prone to war throughout. The main theory advanced is that of rational choice as earlier discussed in chapter 2 and under which ethnicity has thrived. Politics is one of the avenues of advancing such ideologies. This chapter will focus in looking at the Political evolution in Rwanda and the contributions made

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

towards Human Security. The launch of the genocide pushed the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) to restart combat with the *Force Armée Rwandaises* (FAR) with the articulated goal of taking over the national territory and thus ending the genocide. By the start of July 1994 the RPA had routed the FAR as well as the Interahamwe militias, with this defeat signaling the effective end of the genocide.

As late as 1996, the forces of the ex-FAR and allies, based in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), had continued to carry out incursions into Rwanda with often deadly results. This continued situation of precarious security as well as the ethnic polarization induced by the genocide itself provoked serious tensions at the level of the transitional government. The RPF consistently emphasized the special character of the situation and used public security as the overriding justification for the exercise of what some saw as a very heavy political hand. The level of political control exercised by the RPF quickly led to serious disagreements with some of the strongest political figures among more independent minded factions in the government. Notably, Prime Minister Twagiramungu and the Minister of the Interior Sendashonga (RPF) demanded more administrative autonomy as well as more concerted action on the part of the RPF to crackdown on human rights abuses by RPA soldiers. They both left the government in 1995, along with three other Hutu ministers, after which the RPF tightened its control on the government<sup>105</sup>. Infiltrators loyal to the leaders of the genocide began an insurrection in northwest Rwanda in May 1997.

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid 47

In order to separate the civilian population from armed elements, the RPA used a host of repressive tactics, which to this day have alienated some communities from the RPF's political aims. Ultimately the RPA was successful in squelching this incursion, and since the middle of 1998, the country has known an extended period of relative security. The serious and widespread human rights violations that reportedly accompanied the 1998 insurrection are largely a thing of the past, although the legacy of division continues in some areas<sup>106</sup>.

### **3.3.3 Relative Stability In Political and Security Status 1998 and Beyond**

The increased level of basic security in the country has clearly been accompanied by what has been interpreted by many analysts as a gradual narrowing of the political space. The RPF, though nominally engaged in a government of national unity, remains in a very strong position in relation to any other politically relevant actors in the country today. The RPF maintains effective control over virtually all state institutions, exercises tight control over political debate, keeps a wary eye on the activities of independent civil society, and has largely re-integrated Rwandan Churches into the sphere of political control<sup>107</sup>. These developments are not necessarily negative, since the dramatic improvement of the security situation for a large majority of Rwandans as well as the ongoing rebuilding of administrative and physical infrastructure are both to be recognized and encouraged. Nonetheless, the current political situation, with a dynamic set of processes unfolding simultaneously (new

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<sup>106</sup> USAID/Rwanda. Undated. "USAID/Rwanda Civil Society in Rwanda: Assessment and Options". Prepared by ARD Inc. Burlington, Vermont. Mimeo.

<sup>107</sup> Teschner, Douglass P. 2002. "Analysis of the Legislative Process at the Rwanda Transitional National Assembly". Draft. Rwanda National Assembly Support Project, ARD/SUNY for USAID/Rwanda. Kigali, Rwanda. Mimeo.

constitution, evolution of decentralization, national elections, *gacaca*, land reform, media law, etc.), is certainly poised to evolve, perhaps dramatically, in the coming years.

### **3.3.4 The Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)**

Political power in Rwanda today is centered quite distinctly on the executive branch and more particularly in the office (and the person) of the President, Paul Kagame. Though the transitional government includes multiple parties, ostensibly governing in partnership, there is no serious dispute by any objective observer that the RPF is firmly in control. The RPF makes virtually all important policy decisions that are then handed down through the administrative structure of the Executive to the relevant ministries for implementation. The RPF itself (like all parties in the country) is organized only at the national level and has no formal “members”, although it does have an extensive network of supporters. There are two principle institutions of the party, the first is the Executive Committee, consisting of a core of 20 of the most influential party members and charged with the daily functioning of the party.

The Executive Committee meets regularly (at least weekly) and debates both issues of grand direction and policy implementation. On occasion the Executive Committee convenes meetings of the Political Bureau (approximately 200 members), which is, ostensibly, the governing organ of the party. The Executive Committee reports that the practice of decision making for major issues is normally as follows: The Executive Committee debates and comes to consensus then presents a set of arguments to the Political Bureau. The Political Bureau in turn considers debates and also comes to consensus on the decision to be taken. Reportedly decisions at both institutions are taken on the basis of “consensus”. However, the

actual mechanism for determining consensus is not entirely clear. Sometimes it seems that it may be voted and at others it was reported to be a general sense of agreement. In the later case, it is not clear who determines the sense of agreement or what mechanisms are used to objectively establish this agreement. What is clear is that after decisions are settled on, it is expected that the debate is over. Thus the principle of democratic centralism is followed in RPF decision-making.

Some observers have noted that the decision making at the level of the RPF has become increasingly insular with a smaller number of people in the inner circle that surrounds the president. Others point to the examples of broad consultation and more power given to institutions such as the Ministry of Local Government and the Constitutional Reform and the Unity and Reconciliation Commissions as counter evidence to this assertion. In either case, the main source of political power in the country remains clearly centered on the Executive Branch and in particular it is clear that the President exercises a great deal of personal power independent of the already considerable power vested in the office. Finally, the central role of the RPF as the guiding ideological power and source of virtually all policy innovation also seems to be supportable by most available evidence. Yet, a brief look at developments in the immediate post genocide help to understand the dynamics of power in the realm of both the Executive and at the level of the RPF.

### **3.3.5 Justice Restoration under the RPF**

In the first years after the genocide, the security situation of the nation was precarious. As noted above, the RPF thus took a somewhat heavy-handed, if arguably justified, approach

that allowed only a small cadre of decision makers who shared a common wartime experience to have any real impact on political decisions. This period was also marked by a distinct lack of transparency in political decision-making and indiscipline in regards to controlling the actions of some military personnel who engaged in violent repression and or looting of some civilian populations. This situation resulted in the development of a system of illicit enrichment as well as other corrupt practices. Recall that the RPF was at this time essentially bicephalic with Pasteur Bizimungu serving as the President of the Republic while the powerful Kagame served as Vice President and head of the military. This duality of leadership was also likely an important contributor to opaque decision-making and fuzzy identification of responsibility.<sup>108</sup>

From 1997, there were two important developments in the Executive. First, President Bizimungu initiated and managed a series of discussions that came to be known as the Village *Urugwiro* meetings after their location. These consultative discussions, which lasted more than a year, brought together the principle political and social actors of a variety of political backgrounds and tried to address some of the most troubling unanswered questions regarding what happened in 1994 and how to overcome this legacy. Included were discussions of the history of Hutu/Tutsi relations; the pressing problems of justice with a case back-log of over 100,000 overwhelming the struggling courts; and the hierarchical nature of Rwandan society through which the elite were able to engineer wide submission of the population during the genocide. During this consultation period, dozens of participants attempted to work out creative solutions to the pressing set of national problems. At the same time as these meetings, the radio program *Kubaza bitera kumenya* (questions help us to

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<sup>108</sup> Ibid 196

know) served as a public forum to reflect the content and thinking emerging out of the Village *Urugwiro*.<sup>109</sup>

It was in the context of these meetings and by the avenue of this program that the government floated the outlines of most of the major policy initiatives that they are pursuing today: these include *gacaca*, decentralization, and the creation of the various Commissions that had already been anticipated by Arusha (Human Rights and Unity and Reconciliation). From this pattern of consultation and managed transparency, the second major development also occurred. The tensions between the President and the Vice-President mounted and the President tried to get the upper hand by forming closer alliances with elements of different ethnic groups and political parties. The most important thing that this informal grouping seemed to have in common was a tendency for questionable business dealing and, some have argued, outright corruption. In the mid-ranks of the RPF there was a great deal of discontent with these developments and there was constant talk of the existence of an *Akazu* (the small house designed for a group surrounding a powerful king). In order to deal with this growing controversy, a set of extraordinary meetings of the RPF political bureau were planned for the end of 1997 with a second to follow in early 1998. These meetings were to reelect the leadership positions in the RPF and were touted as a means to clean the organization and clarify decision making with new National Executive Bureau members that was to take its leading role in the party.<sup>110</sup>

There was not unanimous consent in regards to these changes, and in particular President Bizimungu viewed them as a direct challenge. By the end of 1999, the Transitional National

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid 196

<sup>110</sup> Ibid 196.

Assembly (TNA) had released a report on the management of certain Ministries and found serious criticisms to be warranted in a number of instances, yet this exercise of independence was not well received. It seems that the investigations hit more broadly than initially intended including tarring RPF loyalists. The president of the TNA was soon (January 2000) forced to resign and fled the country to exile. By the start of 2000 a similar pattern had repeated itself at the highest levels of government, with the resignation of the Prime Minister in February 2000 and finally in late March the resignation of President Bizimungu himself. He viewed the changes as both a challenge to his leadership and capacity to maintain control over those who were engaged in corruption. Some also noted what was perceived to be an ethnic bias (in favor of Tutsi) in these purges, though both Hutu and Tutsi politicians were forced out.

All of these changes meant an increased level of RPF control over political life with a marked increase in limits on public expression and divergent ideas both within and outside the party. The RPF justified this in the name of national cohesion and unity. Some argued that this housecleaning was politically motivated, and in fact there was a significant exodus from the government in the wake of the house cleaning. Some former officials fled the country claiming to have been threatened. It was also at this time that the Political Party Forum became an effective mechanism for the RPF to coordinate and (according to some) control the other parties in the Government of National Unity.

### **3.3.6 Political Parties under the RPF**

The RPF and others, however, have used the constitutional reform process in particular to their advantage arguing that the population is clear on the point of limiting political party



activities at the local level. While the team itself found considerable apprehension on the issue of political parties, there was by no means unanimity on the issue among those in the countryside. In fact, it is notable that more than one respondent commented that while they did not want multiple parties dividing the people, they also had no desire to return to a single party state. It seems that most Rwandans do not see the notion of unity without debate as a reasonable political solution to problems of division.

### **3.3.7 Security and Administrative Measures**

In July 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the military branch that ended the genocide, established a “Government of National Unity” together with seven other political parties. In the years following the genocide, the government worked to rebuild Rwanda’s education, health, and economic systems. The Government of National Unity also created a Genocide Survivors Fund to support survivors of the genocide and a Human Rights Commission to ensure that all people in Rwanda get the basic rights they are entitled to. Rwanda’s success in fostering the rule of law is a result of at least three factors. First, political leaders have recognized that the rule of law begins with them. “You can’t fight corruption from the bottom, you have to fight it from the top, says President Kagame. Accountability is an important theme in Rwandan political culture. Governors and mayors sign annual performance contracts called *imihigo* with the President detailing what they intend to accomplish in the coming year<sup>111</sup>. If they fail to meet their targets, they can be removed from office. Several by-elections were held to replace such ousted mayors in 2010. Second, the government has implemented ‘best practice’ regulations within its own bureaucracy. The

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<sup>111</sup> Daniel Scher, “The Promise of Imihigo: Decentralised Service Delivery in Rwanda, 2006-2010,” Innovations for Successful Societies (Princeton University, 2010).

country has a state-of-the-art legislation on public procurement, copied from the guidelines of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. All tenders above one million Rwandan Francs (RWF), or USD 1,700, need to be advertised in two major newspapers, with clearly defined selection criteria. Interested firms have 30 days to submit their bids (45 in case of international tenders), which are evaluated by committees that follow very strict policies regarding the potential conflicts of interest. In contrast with other African countries, government officials and ministers can be dismissed or even imprisoned if they fail to disclose conflicts of interests. Among others, the former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the former State Minister for Education were sent to prison for flouting tender regulations.

Third, Rwanda has embarked on legal reforms that meet the needs of its population. In particular, conflicts over land were an important contributor to the 1994 genocide; today, an extensive program of land registration is currently under way, with support from the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). The aim is to formalize all land property claims, with 70 percent of all land titles issued by 2013. When the legal system meets the needs of the people, there is a weaker incentive to find a way around the legal system. A traveler crossing into Rwanda from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on the northern edge of Lake Kivu will notice a conspicuous billboard declaring "*Yes to Investment, No to Corruption.*" The political regime in Rwanda thus views economic growth and the fight against corruption as inextricably linked. Furthermore, law reforms such as the inception of commercial courts in 2008 helped to solve disputes related to commercial contracts faster in

an effort to signal more certainty to long-term investors. Rwanda recognizes its strong incentive to foster the rule of law. Ultimately it is that recognition which creates a credible commitment to reducing corruption and improving institutions.

### **3.3.8 Land Tenure Security and Poverty Reduction**

Some 92 percent of Rwanda's population live in rural areas and 90 percent depend on agriculture<sup>112</sup>. A majority of the poor are in rural areas. In Rwanda, as in other areas where land is a main source of livelihood, improving tenure security is an important approach to reducing poverty. There has been considerable evidence to demonstrate the link between land and poverty and subsequently a link between improving access to land and poverty reduction. Knowing that property rights are secure provides an incentive for agricultural investment and helps develop markets for renting and selling land. This also supports the common wisdom that securing land tenure is important for poverty reduction. It is in this vein that land reform, as a process, can be used to improve the tenure security of the poor. In fact, several countries' poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) have mainstreamed access to land as an approach to poverty reduction.

Land reform is undertaken in different parts of the world for different purposes. In those areas where land reform is geared to improving access and rights of poor groups, it is considered a means to reduce poverty and improve livelihoods. Land reform is generally defined as the redistribution of property or rights in land for the benefit of the landless, tenants and farm laborers; however, this is a narrow definition and a further distinction between land reform and agrarian reform, with agrarian reform including both land tenure

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<sup>112</sup> Musahara, H. 2001. *Land and Poverty in Rwanda*. Presented at RISD/OXFAM Conference, 13<sup>th</sup> August 2001

and agricultural organization. The real question that follows this argument concerns how land reform becomes a useful tool in poverty reduction. According to other studies, land reform can: aim at a more equitable pattern of land distribution to promote more equitable and possibly higher growth rates and improved security for land users operating under diverse forms of tenure; adopt a pluralistic approach that seeks convergence of customary and formal tenure systems to avoid overlapping and conflicting sets of rights; assist the poor in gaining access to land and natural resources through activities such as brokering negotiations among local communities, state agencies and the private sector; create an enabling policy and legal framework that promotes subsidiary and devolves authority to local and indigenous institutions while ensuring access and transparency in land administration and tribunal /judicial processes; strengthen the consultation processes within civil society and make access to official policy and legislative processes easier. The same linkage was pointed out with regard to Rwanda as early as the late 1980's<sup>113</sup>. Access to land can have several meanings that go beyond the strict legal definitions of land tenure. For the purpose of this study, access to land will be defined as: the right or opportunity to use, manage, and control land and its resources. It includes the ability to reach and make use of the resource.

### **3.3.9 Institutional Reforms and Governance**

The focus of the democratization process that started 1999 has been to decentralize the strongly hierarchical state from before the genocide. The promotion of trust, or social capital, through transparency and grass-root participation in both the design and implementation of programs, is considered to be a precondition for political stability and economic growth led

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<sup>113</sup> Blarel, B. 2001 Tenure Security and agricultural production under land scarcity: The case of Rwanda in J. & S Mighot-Adhola. *Searching for land tenure security in Africa*. Kendall/Hunt, Dubuque, USA.

by the private sector. Hence, the aim of many efforts connected to governance and institution-building is to create a credible political and financial system that will give economic agents faith in the development of the country and hence create an entrepreneurial atmosphere.

### **3.3.10 Decentralization and Participation**

The decentralization of the units of Rwandan government started in 2000 (Rwanda Economic Report 2000) with the aim of increasing broad-based participation in the design, implementation and monitoring of projects. Elections at the lowest levels, the sector and the cell, were held for the second time in 2002. An important institution in the decentralization efforts is the Community Development Fund (CDF), which was established to oversee and coordinate the administration of the districts. It is also a channel for distribution of the part of the budget (the goal is 10%) that is earmarked for projects or programs at the district levels, and the grants directly allocated to the district level. The priorities of the CDF are education projects, health projects and minor infrastructure projects. The decentralized political system will give the central government a new role. The idea is that the centre will have more of a monitoring role than a controlling role, or a role of giving advice instead of directions.

Rwanda's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was produced in November 2001 following extensive consultation with all stakeholders and based on participatory assessment and quantitative surveys on households living conditions. Moreover, there is an expressed goal that the representation and participation of the private sector in policy formulation and financial sector reform should increase. Corruption exists in Rwanda, but it is deemed to be

low relative to other African countries. The level is kept low by the decentralization of decisions and by the relative transparency in the budget process. Rwanda has made impressive progress when it comes to the latter. This has been a condition for international support but is also a part of the process of rebuilding social capital.

Data on government financial operations are timely published and a comprehensive reporting system is developing. From 2001 all ministries have an internal auditing service and are supposed to deliver quarterly reports from the beginning of 2003. The Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance will post data on government operations with a one month lag. Another well-functioning institution that is making progress is the Auditor General. Beginning 2003 the Auditor General conducts audits of public sector entities. It is also approaching a functioning system of annual auditing of all line ministries. Because of the limited liquidity and in an attempt to increase fiscal control, a cash budget system with quarterly ceilings has been implemented. All expenses must be approved by the Ministry of Finance and can be traced in a computerized payment system. This prevents the separate ministries from incurring excessive expenses, and it limits the possibilities for corruption.<sup>114</sup>

### **3.3.11 New Institutions and Legal Reforms**

The government and the National Assembly have already completed a remarkable amount of legislative work. In theory at least, in addition to the genocide law, all the judicial institutions suggested by the Arusha Accords have been set up. The Security Court has been abolished and the Supreme Court was established under a law passed in June 1996. This body, which is completely autonomous, comprises the Court of Final Appeal, the Council of State, the

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<sup>114</sup> Rwanda Economic Report 2006.

Accounting Office (*Cour des comptes*), the Constitutional Court and the Department of Courts and Tribunals. The Council of Magistrates, created under a law passed in March 1996, is responsible for matters relating to magistrates' careers and disciplinary measures; the government cannot intervene. Further legislation in April 1997 created an independent bar association. Another law covered the organization of the military justice system. Further draft bills are under study relative to bailiffs (*huissiers*), notaries, the creation of tribunals to deal with labor matters, commerce, etc. Sooner or later, Rwanda's constitutional law code (*la loi fondamentale*) will have to be revised. This comprises various texts, including the previous constitution and the Arusha Accords. At issue here is the whole question of Rwanda's political system.

### **3.4 Economic Reforms versus Human Security: A Sample Survey**

The increased growth in several economic sectors mentioned above stimulated an increase in the growth of private consumption in 2004 and 2005, but there was little growth in private investment. The balance on traded goods and non-factor services measured at constant prices improved in 2004 but showed little change in 2005, thus stimulating growth in 2004 but having little effect on demand in 2005. Meanwhile, the fiscal stance was expansionary in 2003 and 2004 but became restrictive in 2005. Compared with 2003, overall consumption increased by 2.5 per cent in real terms in 2004 owing to a strong increase in private-sector consumption, while public consumption contracted, even in nominal terms.<sup>115</sup> Thus, the share of consumption in GDP decreased to 97.6 per cent in 2004, though it was estimated to increase to 99.2 per cent in 2005 and projected to once again decrease after that. The share of total domestic investment increased from 18.4 per cent of GDP in 2003 to 20.5 per cent in

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid 82

2004, reflecting a more than 50 per cent increase in public investment, partially offset by a small contraction of private investment in real terms. The share of public investment in GDP was estimated to increase further in 2005, while the share of private investment in GDP was estimated to decrease further in 2005. Hence, the overall composition of expenditures has shifted considerably towards private and public investment and is projected to shift further in 2006 and 2007<sup>116</sup>.

As a government, Rwanda has made considerable progress in rebuilding its economic and social infrastructure since the end of the 1994 war. Its achievements towards establishing nationwide security and a less corrupt government are acknowledged by most international donors. Real GDP grew by, 6.3 per cent in 2005 and is estimated to have increased by 4.3 per cent in 2006. The sky is the limit with more robust growth being expected over the 2007-08 period based on strong performances in the mining and construction sectors. Besides Rwanda's recent economic performance has been encouraging, growth in output has not been strong enough to make a significant impact on poverty reduction. According to a preliminary report on poverty and living conditions in Rwanda, carried out in 2005/06, the proportion of individuals in abject poverty declined from 60.4 to 56.9 per cent over the 2000/01-2005/06 period. Access to health services has improved and the government is likely to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) aimed at reducing maternal and child mortality. In the education sector, increases in gross primary education and net primary school enrolment are contributing to making the target of universal primary education achievable by 2015.

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid 76



Rwanda's government has witnessed substantial success in reaching the MDGs related to gender parity in primary education and containment of the spread of HIV/AIDS. In order to accelerate growth and make a lasting impact on poverty, the government is in the midst of launching a new Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy, (EDPRS), which is to follow the just completed Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The EDPRS is expected to focus on ways to stimulate broad-based economic growth which are not covered in the PRSP. The EDPRS, which will be launched in 2007, provides a comprehensive analysis of the causes of poverty and focuses on six pillars: i) the transformation of the agricultural sector as an important objective to reduce poverty; ii) human development through improved education and health; iii) economic infrastructure; iv) human resources and capacity building; v) private sector development; and vi) good governance.

### **3.5 Recent Economic Developments**

The Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in 2006 was estimated to have been 4.3 per cent, down from 6.3 per cent in 2005. This GDP growth performance has been due to the healthy performance of the agricultural sector, which grew by 5.8 per cent in 2005. In 2006, agricultural output is expected to maintain its robust growth rate. This is particularly due to the fact that ample rainfall was expected in Rwanda. Growth in the economy has also been supported by the healthy performance of the mining sector and, to a lesser extent, the construction sector. Growth in the manufacturing sector on the other hand was not as strong as in 2005 due to a number of factors ranging from regional competition, to high electricity prices and interruptions in the supply of energy.

In 2005, growth in Rwanda's industrial sector was a strong 11.1 % and appears to have been robust in 2006 as well. Manufacturing has led the way in the industrial sector with 18 % growth in 2005. The largest sub-sector within manufacturing was the food beverages and tobacco sector which is estimated to have experienced strong growth in 2006 as well, due, in part, to the granting of additional licenses for the brewing of alcoholic products. The performance of the other sectors was mixed for several of the larger industries. In 2005, the production of sugar increased by a sizable 61.3 %, electricity by 28 %, soft drinks by 28.8 % beer by 19.3 %. On the other hand, cement production declined by 6.5 % while textiles decreased by 13.2 %. Cigarette production rose by 4.7 %. The production of beer and soft drinks accounted for over 70 % of total manufacturing output. The growth in these components was attributable to increased demand for these products. .

Moreover, the relative stability of the Rwandan franc during the year made it easier for producers to import raw materials. Growth in the services sector was estimated at about 6 per cent in 2005, primarily driven by the information, communication and technologies (ICT) sector and the finance and tourism sectors. In the finance subsector, growth in private sector credit was over 20 % during the year. Within the tourism sub-sector, the number of non-resident foreign visitors grew by 23 % in 2005. However, the total number of visitors to national parks fell in 2005, due to a reduction in the number of visits by Rwandan nationals. Nevertheless, the number of foreign visitors continued to increase. Tourism revenues grew by around 12 % in 2005. Total gross capital formation was 19 per cent of GDP in 2005 and is estimated to have increased by 4.8 % in 2006. Total domestic investment has recovered to its pre-war levels and is satisfactory when compared with that of the other countries within the

sub-Saharan region. Since long-term sustainable growth requires private investment, the strong growth in private gross capital formation registered in 2006 and expected for 2007 and 2008 augurs well for the future.

### **3.6 Conclusions**

The economic reforms in Rwanda during the period of study as seen have had a very significant impact on human security. Reforms ranged from agricultural sector to health and justice. They reforms have attempted to synchronize and mitigate the element of Human security in every aspect especially in food security and access to basic services. The vision 2020 has played a big role and the benchmarks setout therein has promised results. However overall not each and every aspect of reform is positively received by the populace albeit the positive gains they tend to describe. The Human needs theorists have also included self-actualization as a package among the basic human needs, which to a great extent seem to be ignored when such ambitions and goals are to be met. The concern that meets the eye is how well orchestrated are these gains are in terms of meeting the true expectations of the Rwandese is an issue that would be deeply discussed in the following chapters.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### **THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC REFORMS ON HUMAN SECURITY IN POST- CONFLICT RWANDA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

Chapter Three looked at the political and Economic transformation Rwanda has gone through post genocide and specifically during the period of study. The chapter has defined in detail the contents of Vision 2020 and looked at the political commitment to achieve results. This chapter seeks to identify key emerging issues arising from the approach towards economic reforms and how they embrace Human security concerns in Rwanda. The chapter seeks to analyze the cross cutting issues of concern within the framework under which reforms in Rwanda are carried out and identify whether such framework or policy guidelines have achieved their objectives. The chapter shall look into the models the country has adopted and within which have emerged issues that raise certain concerns within their implementation albeit foreseeable challenges.

#### **4.2 Emerging Issues**

##### **4.2.1 Barriers to Trade**

Natural Barriers to trade - Rwanda is land-locked, with long distances from ocean ports; this has resulted to high transportation costs for both exports and imports. The country lacks a link to regional railway networks, which means most trade is conducted by road. Poor road quality creates high transportation costs leading to inflated prices of domestically manufactured products, as raw materials used for manufacturing need to be imported. These natural barriers will continue to affect the industrialization and other forms of development

agenda for the country. The other issue is to do with the narrow economic base - It is clear that increases in the productivity and exports of coffee and tea alone, will not be sufficient to build the Rwandan economy. Therefore efforts need to be made to expand the economic base and especially exports. Although there are small pockets of various high value minerals in Rwanda, there is no single natural resource of sufficient quantity that will kick-start the economy. For several decades, the mining sector was largely based on the extraction and export of Cassiterite from several mines and numerous surface operations. Deposits of other minerals such as Wolfram, Colombo-tantalite and Gold do exist, but total reserves are not known. The country does have estimated reserves of 60 billion cubic meters of natural gas in Lake Kivu, but this sector has lacked investments both for effective exploration and profitable exploitation.

The current state of Rwanda's economy is characterized by internal (budget deficit) and external (Balance of Payments) macroeconomic disequilibria, alongside low savings and investment rates and high unemployment and underemployment. In addition, Rwanda's exports, composed mainly of tea and coffee – whose prices are subject to fluctuations on the international market – have not been able to cover export needs. The diminishing agricultural productivity and arable land distribution for agriculture accounts for more than 90% of the labor force, yet remains unproductive and largely on a subsistence level. The distribution of arable land now stands at one hectare for every 9 Rwandans and is diminishing due to high birth rates. The obvious consequence is that a substantial number of rural families who subsist on agriculture own less than 1 hectare, which is too small to earn a living. Available pastureland is 350,000 hectares most of which is of poor quality. This results in intense

exploitation of the land, with no simultaneous application of corrective measures, most notably through fertilizer use. The net result has been a decline in land productivity and massive environmental degradation, contributing to rampant malnutrition amongst the Rwandan population. Rwandans can no longer subsist on land and ways and means need to be devised to move the economy into the secondary and tertiary sectors, (Rwanda Private Sector Federation, 2008).

Another challenge is that Rwanda is land-locked, with long distances from ocean ports; a factor that raises transportation costs for both exports and imports. The country lacks a link to regional railway networks, which means most trade is conducted by road. Poor road quality creates high transportation costs leading to inflated prices of domestically manufactured products, as raw materials used for manufacturing need to be imported which will affect the development reforms agenda. Narrow economic base - It is clear that increases in the productivity and exports of Coffee and Tea alone, will not be sufficient to build the Rwandan economy. Therefore efforts need to be made to expand the economic base and especially exports. Although there are small pockets of various high value minerals in Rwanda, there is no single natural resource of sufficient quantity that will kick-start the economy. For several decades, the mining sector was largely based on the extraction and export of Cassiterite from several mines and numerous surface operations. Deposits of other minerals such as Wolfram, Colombo-tantalite and Gold do exist, but total reserves are not known. The country does have estimated reserves of 60 billion cubic meters of natural gas in Lake Kivu, but this sector has lacked investments both for effective exploration and profitable exploitation.

The weak institutional capacity in terms of governance which includes the management of public resources remains insufficient due to lack of sound institutions and competent personnel. Rather than develop sound systems themselves, past governments continued to rely on foreign technical assistance that was both costly, largely indifferent to domestic long term needs and failed to build local capacities. Although great progress has been made on this front, it still represents a significant hindrance to effective governance (Rwanda Private Sector Federation, 2008).

#### **4.2.2 Institutional Capacity and Private Sector Development**

The weak institutional capacity to handle issues to do with governance which includes the management of public resources remains insufficient due to lack of sound institutions and competent personnel. Rather than develop sound systems themselves, past governments continued to rely on foreign technical assistance that was both costly, largely indifferent to domestic long term needs and failed to build local capacities. Although great progress has been made on this front, it still represents a significant hindrance to effective governance<sup>117</sup>.

In recent years, Rwanda has actively attracted foreign direct investment by creating and sustaining a high conducive investment climate through radical reforms which make it easier for businesses to get started, get loans, pay taxes, etc. In the past, data on foreign capital flows relied on information provided by banks. However, it was noted that there were a number of challenges experienced in sourcing BOP data using information from banks for FPC purposes, particularly in respect of coverage and classification. It was not possible to capture non-cash types of investment such as investment in form of equipment, expertise and

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<sup>117</sup> Ibid 105

reinvested earnings. In addition, it was also observed that bank reporting was not always accurate and that there was no enforcement mechanism to ensure accuracy in the reporting of all bank transactions. As a consequence, there was misclassification of current, capital and financial accounts transactions in some instances.

This is mainly why efforts to use a census based approach of compiling statistics on FPC had been undertaken in 2007 by BNR jointly with the Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion Agency (RIEPA), now RDB, with a reasonable response rate of 58 percent from a sample of about 65 companies. In the meantime, Rwanda continues to work strongly on investment climate to attract foreign investments to complement internal resources. Currently, a whole package for investment promotion in general can be found within Rwanda Development Board.

The package includes among others: regulatory framework, registration facilities and requirements, change of registered businesses, closing businesses, disclosure requirements, and other facilities such as working permit, government's protection of investments, settlement of disputes, transfer of funds special economic zone facilitations, public private partnership (PPP) where RDB is chief negotiator between public and private. In order to track the FPC impact on economic growth in Rwanda and maintain conducive investment environment in pursuit of more investment, there is a need for a sound and consistent monitoring system to guide the formulation of national investment policies on one hand and to assess the effects and results of all efforts made in facilitating and attracting foreign investments.



To this end, an Inter-Institutional Agreement for monitoring and analyzing the situation of foreign assets and liabilities, investor perception, corporate social responsibility, and related data in Rwanda was made. This agreement led to the establishment of Rwanda Working Group (RWG) under the memorandum of understanding signed between the partner institutions: the National Bank of Rwanda (BNR), the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR), the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) and the Private Sector Federation (PSF). The responsibility of this working group includes among others, production of good quality statistics, compliant with international data reporting standards and meeting the needs of the various policy makers, and users. BNR and NISR collect this information for Balance of Payments and National Account compilation while RDB and PSF need it for monitoring purposes. The establishment of this joint working group avoids the duplication of Census on foreign private investment, reducing thus the burden on companies and the waste of country's resources.

Beside the inter-institutional commitment, the FPC data collection activity requires an important contribution of the respondents. An awareness campaign is therefore organized before the starting of each round, aiming at sensitizing companies on reporting of required information. The managers of companies are given explanations on the relevance of the exercise related to data collection so that an impact analysis of capital flow on economic development is assessed. They are also informed about results of the round that comes to the end. The Government of Rwanda resolves to improve the investment climate and attain desired levels of both local and foreign investment as a priority. The World Economic

Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 2012- 2013 ranked Rwanda the 3rd easiest place to do business in Africa and 2nd five years Top Global Reformer after Georgia and the first in EAC. Rwanda was ranked number eight globally in starting a business with only 2 procedures in span of 6 hours.

Rwanda as a country is considered as the most competitive place to do business in East Africa and 3rd in Sub- Saharan Region<sup>118</sup>. Rwanda moved from 43rd last two years to 25th easiest place to pay taxes in the world. For Rwanda's development, the emergence of a viable private sector that can take over as the principle growth engine of the economy is crucial<sup>119</sup>. Although foreign direct investment will be encouraged, local-based businesses remains a crucial component of economic development in Rwanda. The public sector will not be involved in providing services and products that can be delivered more efficiently by the private sector. The government of Rwanda is therefore committed towards a comprehensive privatization policy that will help reduce costs and prices and widen consumer choice. The State will only act as a catalyst; ensuring that infrastructure, human resources and legal frameworks are geared towards stimulating economic activity and private investment. Recently, RDB launched a powerful web base electronic link that potential investors can visit and get important information on Rwanda.

#### **4.2.3 Human Rights in Post- Conflict Rwanda**

Human rights conditions in Rwanda are still relatively poor, according to human rights groups and Rwanda experts. According to the State Department's Country Reports on

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<sup>118</sup> Republic of Rwanda (2000a), Rwanda Vision 2020, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Kigali July 2000.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid 118.

Human Rights Practices in 2008, “Significant human rights abuses occurred, although there were improvements in some areas. Citizens' right to change their government was restricted, and local defense forces (LDF) personnel were responsible for four killings during the year.” In 2001, the Government of Rwanda began to implement a local justice system known as *Gacaca* in order to deal with the large backlog of cases from the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Tens of thousands of suspects have been released under the *Gacaca* system, and the *Gacaca* courts were expected to complete their work by the end of 2008. In March 2008, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) signed an agreement with the government of Rwanda to transfer some of the genocide suspects to Rwanda to be tried locally.

What influence has the international humanitarian community had over these events? International agencies have been involved from the outset and played a major support role. UNHCR as the lead agency has been consistently supportive of government policies and programmes, though it has at times played a moderating influence. It clearly did not see land policy as part of its responsibility. The large number of relief and rehabilitation NGOs who worked to implement the UNHCR-coordinated shelter programme and other programmes for returnees also seem not to have focused on land issues in the first two years after the 1995 return. If they did, it did not leave much of a paper trail. A decade later, it was difficult to get details. Some development and human rights NGOs with more significant experience with land policy issues have been more discriminating in their support for government programmes, and have provided useful critical input. Finally, the international NGO

community has played a key role in support of the emergence of the civil society organisations working in the land policy area.<sup>120</sup>

In 1992, UNHCR was mandated in the Arusha Protocol on Refugee Return as the lead agency for organising the repatriation of refugees over a six-month period and to provide shelter and related social infrastructure in new villages for this caseload. UNHCR in collaboration with the UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) was mandated to prepare a socio-economic profile of the refugees and a study of the country's absorption capacity in order to facilitate reintegration and plan international development assistance. A UNHCR retrospective (2000) on its role in Rwanda stresses the size of the task: an old caseload consisting of 608,000 returnees in 1994, 146,476 in 1995 and another 40,000 in 1996–99, for a total of over 800,000; and a new case load of 600,000 returnees in 1994, 79,302 in 1995, 1,271,936 in 1996, and over 200,000, for a total of over two million<sup>121</sup>. The total number of returnees was over three million. Over six years, UNHCR spent \$183 million on projects to help basically reinstall the three million and reconstruct the country.<sup>122</sup>

The work began under difficult circumstances. In October 1993, UN Security Council Resolution 872 established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to assist with the implementation of the Peace Accords. Withdrawn six months later at the commencement of the genocide in early 1994, UNAMIR returned in July 1994, with a focus

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<sup>120</sup> Crook, J. (2006). Promoting peace and economic security in Rwanda through fair and equitable land rights.

<sup>121</sup> Republic of Rwanda, (2007) A Five Year Action Plan for Youth Employment Promotion.

<sup>122</sup> UNHCR report on Rwanda Refugee Status November 2000 pp40-50.

on the repatriation of Hutu refugees. In September 1994, the United Nations Human Rights Field Office in Rwanda (HRFOR) was established, and was in place through July 1998.<sup>17</sup> By the end of the year, UNHCR had begun organising repatriations and, at the end of December, through Operation Retour, UNHCR, with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and British Direct Aid (BDA), began to coordinate transport for internally displaced persons back to their communes of origin.

In November 1995, UNHCR embarked on a rural shelter programme with an initial target of 25,000 families, or 125,000 individuals. The target number was later increased to 100,000 houses to provide shelter for half a million people. In 1996, UNHCR through its shelter programme built and rehabilitated 17,276 houses for returnees. UNHCR helped with site identification and planning as well as technical and supervisory support during construction. UNHCR supported the construction or rehabilitation of around 100,000 houses over a five-year period between 1995 and 1999, providing shelter for half a million Rwandans. Of those, the 2000 report indicates, 27% were in resettlement sites, while 73% were in scattered or clustered locations throughout the country. The year 2000 UNHCR report (p.26) touches on land sharing. It remarks that, following the mass return of the refugees in 1996, there were conflicting claims and the government adopted different policies in different localities. While in some cases people were moved onto recently opened public land, in others 'land had to be shared by mutual consent'. It concludes: 'The latter worked fairly well in Kibungo Prefecture, for instance. After verifying that land was being shared by consent of the rightful

owners, UNHCR quickly proceeded to distribute shelter materials and helped returnees to build houses'.<sup>123</sup>

The same report (p 42) deals with the role of UNHCR in support of the *imidugudu* programme. It notes that 'the perceived involuntary nature' of some resettlement activities had caused several governments to withhold support. By 1999, it argues, the Rwandan government was taking pains to delineate the policy, to make its application more transparent, and pay more attention to respect for individual rights. UNHCR, the report suggests, made an effort to distinguish between cases of voluntary and coerced villagisation schemes, and in effect supported *imidugudu* when it appeared to be voluntary and with the consent and knowledge of the beneficiaries. The report stresses another part of UNHCR's strategy. Local authorities were encouraged to ensure that farm plots were allocated for each family near the villages. 'UNHCR facilitated the provision of farm plots to residents, but it was and continues to be the government responsibility to carry out the distribution process.' The report acknowledged that some beneficiaries had to walk up to several kilometres to their farm plots, and that this was 'indeed an inconvenience and an issue to be addressed'<sup>124</sup>.

UNHCR in the end remained a firm supporter of *imidugudu*. A draft report by a UNHCR-funded shelter evaluation team in December 1999 concluded: 'It is the opinion of the mission, that given the constraints faced by Rwanda (land availability, birth rate, influx of returnees, population density) there have been no viable alternatives proposed to the creation of *imidugudu*, although the policy remains controversial to a number of donors. Rather than

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<sup>123</sup> Ibid 122

<sup>124</sup> Republic of Rwanda (2000b), An Approach to the Poverty Reduction Action Plan for Rwanda: The Interim PRSP, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Kigali.

discussing the policy, the international community should ensure provision of the technical backstopping and training to allow the policy not to become a failure. More efforts should be placed constructively into how it is implemented rather than on discussion of what is being done'. Until 2000, the report suggests, UNHCR and other actors involved in the shelter programme had not considered a policy for or against villagisation in Rwanda.

In 2000 a Thematic Consultation on Resettlement was launched as a means of continuing the dialogue and reaching a consensus among the development partners. The Framework adopted in February 2000 contained a number of cautionary points but reaffirmed the UN commitment to support the programme. In 2000, the United Nations Community adopted a Framework for Assistance in the Context of the *Imidugudu* Policy, which encourages the government to continue a dialogue on the issue, to adopt a more participatory rights-based approach and to resolve legal issues related to land ownership and use. The retrospective concludes that the *imidugudu* contributed to the peaceful resolution of a number of land disputes between old caseload refugees, new caseload refugees and survivors of the genocide. It asks: 'Was the shelter program in Rwanda a success? So far, property-related conflict has been avoided, unlike in the former Yugoslavia'. This seems spurious. The absence of overt conflict in response to the *umudugudu* programme probably has less to do with the virtues of that programme, involving as it did substantial human rights abuses, than with the general atmosphere of fear and exhaustion.<sup>125</sup>

The extent of implementation of the Habitat Policy varied widely from province to province, but has been substantial in some provinces. A recent ISS report (Alusala, 2005) notes that

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid 122

90% of the population in Kibungo and Umutara prefectures lives in grouped villages, reflecting the large number of Tutsi who fled to Uganda and who, when they returned, were accommodated in the villages. Ruhengeri is third, with more than 50%, and Gisenyi fourth, with 13%. Only a very limited number of people live under this programme in other prefectures. Implementation of the Habitat Policy is in fact stalled. A recent NGO report (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2005) has called for renewed international attention to the consequences of the programme, and the redress of the inequities created in the north-west, where *imidugudu* became part of an anti-insurgency strategy and compulsion in the creation of *imidugudu* was most pronounced.

Despite UNHCR's consistent endorsement of the programme, UNHCR is no longer a major player in land policy in Rwanda. Other donors, such as USAID, DFID and the EC, who have stepped into its shoes as relief and reconstruction gave way to development programming, have been far more wary of *imidugudu*. In 2006, a Law on Habitat was proposed by the Ministry of Infrastructure (MININFRA) that might have revitalised the effort, but it contained substantial provisions that weakened property rights and was strongly opposed by MINITERE. It was withdrawn from parliamentary consideration in December 2006. Efforts now are concentrating on delivering long-overdue infrastructure and services to the *imidugudu*. A thorough examination of the *imidugudu* experience by Human Rights Watch concluded: 'In an ironic twist, the program which donors supported in the hopes of ending homelessness covered another which caused tens of thousands of Rwandans to lose their homes.'<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> Ibid 120



Praise for the generosity and promptness with which donors responded to the housing program must be tempered by criticism of their readiness to ignore the human rights abuses occasioned by the rural reorganization program that operated under its cover'. The facts seem clear enough and it is important to understand better why the mistakes were made, not in the interest of assigning blame but in the interest of avoiding them in the future. UNHCR's concern with the immediate needs of returnees for shelter appears to have overridden any qualms it may have had regarding the potential land problems of a resettlement programme. Recall the comment by a minister in the first government quoted earlier: 'The international community did not seem to understand the land issue. The claims were social and political.

The international community was preoccupied with the size of the return and how many would have to be accommodated'. This preoccupation is understandable, given the chaotic conditions in which it was initiated. Faced with the huge challenge of delivering shelter – which UNHCR documents repeatedly emphasise as its priority – the delivery of that housing is obviously far easier if it can be done in concentrations rather than in scattered hamlets. The simple logistical advantages of the approach the government proposed must have been very seductive to UNHCR. Why, when it became a major social engineering exercise – and in one part of the country became central to an anti-insurgency strategy – did the international humanitarian community not more critically examine its role? The Human Rights Watch report mentions a variety of early expressions of concern about both the technical soundness of the imidugudu concept and problems in its implementation, and even opposition to the policy on the part of individuals in the donor community. But it concludes that, ultimately,

human rights seem not to have been a priority of the donors, and donors failed to mount a serious critique of the policy<sup>127</sup>.

A number of factors may account for this failure. One is guilt over the international community's failure to mount an effective response to the events leading to the genocide. The new government had moral authority as the representative of those who had been brutalised, and a clear sense of what it wanted to do. That combination would not have been easy to resist, and with early information from the field patchy and inconsistent, it would have been easy to set aside misgivings. It might have been hoped that UNDP, which had theoretical authority for the coordination of UN activities, would have taken a broader view. The Human Rights Watch report notes early concern on the part of an UNDP representative, and points out that UNHCR and UNDP had different approaches to resettlement: UNHCR focused on building houses as fast as possible, while UNDP favoured more integrated programmes involving infrastructure, services and income-producing plans. Even though a Joint Reintegration Programming Unit was established by the two agencies to coordinate efforts, the report concludes that coordination remained poor, 'perhaps because they were similarly intent on using housing programs to maximize the amount of resources that come to their agencies.

Concern for human rights apparently drops from view in this competition'. On the one hand, lack of attention to land issues and human rights is not surprising given that UNHCR had not systematically built a core expertise in land policy and law. On the other hand, one might have expected it to have done better, given the level of institutional experience with refugee

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<sup>127</sup> GoR (2002b). Household Living Conditions Survey. MINECOFIN.Kigali

resettlement. The land issues that arose in resettlement in Rwanda were not qualitatively different from those that arise elsewhere. In fairness, UNHCR had in 1996 seen the *imidugudu* programme endorsed, though with qualifications, by a consultant provided to the government by FAO's Land Tenure Service. In the end, UNHCR seems to have provided little by way of a moderating influence. It was the NGOs working in rural development and human rights, and academic researchers, who raised concerns about its implementation, and provided critical intelligence.

By 1997 some systematic information was available in the form of an anonymous report funded by 'donors'<sup>128</sup>. It appears to have raised both technical concerns and concerns about compulsion, though it is not clear how widely this report was circulated. The Lutheran World Federation had already issued instructions to staff that it could only assist in resettlement where movement into the new villages was voluntary, where those who moved into the villages were not required to destroy their existing housing, and where there was a reasonable level of service provision. In April 1998 ACORD published its critique of the viability and technical soundness of the programme. A 1999 study from the Rural Development Sociology Group at Wageningen University also raised concerns. The first full documentation of the human rights abuses associated with the programme emerged in 2001, in the Human Rights Watch report. It is difficult at this remove in time to tell how aware most donors were of the issue, but a 1999 retrospective study by OECD, examining the ability of donors to influence policy in the pre- and post-conflict contexts, makes virtually no mention of the land issue.

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<sup>128</sup> Ibid 122

There is a further contribution by the NGO community in this area that deserves attention, and that is the facilitation of the creation of the first and most significant ‘Land NGO’, LandNet Rwanda. LandNet Rwanda was created in 1999 in connection with DFID-initiated work to establish an Africa-wide network of national chapters of LandNet Africa. It is itself a network of local and international NGOs dealing with land policy issues in Rwanda, and has strong DFID and Oxfam connections. In Rwanda, CARE International provided early support, detailing a staff member to work on setting up the organisation, providing initial office space and services and modest initial funding. Most of LandNet Rwanda’s constituent organisations are based in Kigali, but organizations in the field provide it with a strong understanding of land issues and rural issues generally. Its specialisation in land has made it a valuable player in policy discussions. Much of its input has been informal, through its membership and through occasional workshops. LandNet has an official of the Ministry of Lands as a member, which facilitates dialogue<sup>129</sup>.

LandNet has had to walk a fine line between procedural, formal dialogue with the government, and more direct “lobbying” tactics, such as writing directly to the President to seek an audience. A mix of tactics has been used while the relationship between LandNet and the government has generally been positive; tensions have been evident when the network has taken the initiative to lobby senior politicians’. The correct balance between independence and effectiveness is never easy to strike, but it is clear that the support from CARE International and other international NGOs have made a significant contribution in this regard. While selected NGOs have provided alerts and important information on land issues, they have not programmed significantly in this area. CARE has supported

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<sup>129</sup> Ibid 122

LandNet/Rwanda, and in the context of its other programmes is to a limited extent addressing land disputes resolution. IRC cosponsored with DFID and SIDA a 2005 opinion survey on 'Land, Property and Reconciliation'. Oxfam has engaged primarily through support of LandNet/Rwanda. The Norwegian Relief Association is providing funding to support studies by Africa Rights at several sites in Rwanda on the land access issues facing women, widows in particular, as well as monitoring by CAURWA of Batwa land access<sup>130</sup>.

### **4.3 Conclusion**

As seen in this chapter, after identifying the key emerging issues and finding out the key cross cutting issues of concern relating to the emerging issues arising out of the models and approach to reform in Rwanda, there is certainly great achievement overall empirical with what the participants observe. However there are certainly key areas that have not met the approval of all the participants and with reason some with reservations. Key among them is Land. It is a scarce resource and all efforts have been made in resolving Land issues which portend a great threat to conflict. They are definitely important issues to address in line with the conflict background that Rwanda relates to. In as much as there are positive gains made towards economic revival and Human security parameters, the theories within which the Rwandan historical background emanates cannot easily be ignored. The following chapter shall discuss these issues at length mitigating modern approach with the observations and positions maintaining on the ground.

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<sup>130</sup> GoR ( 2004). National Land Policy. MINITERE.Kigali

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

#### **5.1 Summary**

Chapter one introduced the research topic, statement of the research problem, objectives of the study, literature review, hypothesis, theoretical framework, methodology and Chapter outline. Chapter Two dealt with Rwanda's historical and political background and political institutions and politicians defining Rwanda's history of conflict that culminated into the 1994 genocide. Chapter Three dealt with Economic reforms in Rwanda during the period of study and the impact they had on Human Security in Rwanda during the period of study and more specifically the Vision 2020. Chapter Four dealt with a critical analysis of the topic of this research by discussing key emerging issues. In addition this chapter sort to apply the theoretical framework to examine the objectives and test the hypothesis as indicated in chapter one. The aim was to understand and evaluate the relevance of economic reforms in Rwanda during the period of study and the impact the same has had on human security.

Chapter five finally summarizes the research study by identifying key findings and making recommendations for further research and policy development and formulation.

#### **5.2 Key Findings**

The research has dealt extensively on issues affecting Human Security. The study demonstrates that Poverty reduction is one of the government's national priorities and a big contributor towards achieving Human Security. The priority programs are concentrated to sectors such as health, education and agriculture that are especially important for the poor.

Hence, most of the growth-promoting strategies presented above are simultaneously poverty reducing strategies. The poverty report has been an important input into the PRSP process as clearly outlined in chapter three. Chapter two identified poverty as one of the key causes of conflict in Rwanda and especially leading to the genocide. Unemployment, lack of education and lack of vision especially by the youth also was an equal contributor to the conflict. Chapter two also described the institutional and political set up in Rwanda as wanting with impunity at its helm during the early nineties and which substantially contributed to conflict.

Chapter three described the efforts made by the Rwandan Government post genocide in order to bring order, peace and stability in the country. Key discussions in this chapter revolved around measures taken by Rwanda and more particularly the Rwanda Vision 2020 envisaged by the president Paul Kagame under a pilot but extensive programme under the Ministry of Finance. The vision identified the major challenges that Rwanda faces in its attempts at generating poverty-reducing growth: increase agricultural productivity by new technologies, improved provision of fertilizers and rural public works to generate both infra-structure and incomes for the poor, commercialize the agricultural production by reducing transport costs and by developing marketing and credit channels for farmers, export-orientation of the economy with policy reforms from the macro-level and downwards; expansion of non-agricultural sectors - higher incomes in agriculture will stimulate demand and supply in other sectors, stimulate internal and external migration so that Rwandans could benefit from working in other countries and also from skilled labor immigration. However the study deduced that when it comes to the general macroeconomic stabilization programs, it is difficult to draw any straightforward conclusions about the effects on the poor. Still, some

remarks can be made. Basically the programs tend to have two components, namely contraction of public expenditures and changes in relative prices. The aim of the programs is to create a stable macroeconomic environment, which encourages investment and growth, and if one starts from an unbalanced situation one may have to cut back public expenditures, and this is likely to hurt the poor in the short-term.

Chapter three further demonstrated that political stability is a prerequisite for economic reconstruction. Chapter two dealt with the Historical and Political evolution of Rwanda that carried through the civil war and post war restructuring through government. The major challenge was to reconcile economic development with the rapid population growth of Rwanda that puts a strong pressure on arable land. What development model could be worked out to ensure food security for all and consequently an efficient poverty reduction policy? How to ensure good land management in order to limit conflicts related to it? The Government of National Unity has made commendable efforts in terms of human resources development. However, as deduced from the study strategies to create human resource disposition and utilization outlets in terms of job creation are still very weak.

Chapter four has given a surgery of the results by identifying key emerging issues resulting from this research. Ten years after the genocide that cost the lives of over one million persons and deeply disrupted the economy, Rwanda has recovered the level of production it had in the early nineties. In 2000, the GDP was equal to the GDP of 1990. Thanks to international aid and structural reforms to liberalize its economy, Rwanda has experienced growth rates higher than five percent since 2000 (6.8% in 2001 and 9.2% in



2002).<sup>131</sup> A restrictive monetary policy, coupled with measures to increase public revenues, has enabled the country to tackle inflation since 2000. Thus, inflation has decreased from 9.8 percent in 1999, to 4.3 percent in 2000 and 2.5 percent in 2002<sup>132</sup>. However, the Rwandan economy suffers from structural weaknesses and has still to manage the consequences of the genocide. The GDP per capita remains particularly low, at US\$220, among the lowest in the world. Around two thirds of its population lives in absolute poverty, with less than \$1 a day. Poverty, added to civil wars and a dramatic surge in HIV-AIDS pandemic have led to a reduced life expectancy of 39 years, and therefore in terms of human security the Rwandan government envisioned and wholly adopted the economic blue print dubbed Vision 2020<sup>133</sup> as a key guide to managing sustainable growth and stability in security.

Chapter four further demonstrates that in spite of the reforms of the tax system, public revenues do not cover public expenditures. The deficit was worsened by the cost of the civil war in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as well as the judiciary process following the genocide in 1994, reaching 11 percent of the GDP in 2002 and 12.1 percent in 2003<sup>134</sup>. Therefore, the Rwandan government highly depends on the international aid to balance its budget. The aid accounted for 9.2 percent of the GDP in 1999, equivalent to \$45 per capita<sup>135</sup>. Moreover the Rwandan economy suffers also from an insufficient diversification of

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<sup>131</sup> Statistics extracted from the Trade Policy Review undergone by the World Trade Organization and the Rwandan government in April 2004, and from the Economic Report on Africa 2003 issued by the Economic Commission for Africa. Data from other sources are referenced in the footnotes.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid 143

<sup>133</sup> Republic of Rwanda (2002a), “A Profile of Poverty in Rwanda – A Report Based on the Results of the Household Living Standards Survey”, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Kigali.

<sup>134</sup> African Trade Policy Centre. Assessing the Consequences of the Economic Partnership Agreement on the Rwandan Economy; By Romain Perez, Stephen Karingi and Hakim Ben Hammouda. March 2005. Work in Progress No. 13

<sup>135</sup> Ibid 146

its output and a lack of competitiveness. The lack of diversification of the Rwandan economy does not enable the country to cover the costs of imports by the revenues of exports. International aid transfers as well as long-term loans balance the payment imbalance and the foreign currency reserves. However, the structural deficit of trade raises concerns about the ability of Rwanda to reduce its indebtedness, which reached 1.4 billion dollars at the end of 2002.<sup>136</sup> Given its critical indebtedness, Rwanda has been invited to join the IMF-World Bank heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative.

This same chapter ideally demonstrates that in order to achieve the reconciliation process, Rwanda must spend large amounts of money on genocide trials, and on demobilization and reintegration. This comes along with other important social needs of the country. This specific situation is not fully taken into account by the IMF-World Bank HIPC initiative. The Rwandan government, as well as other African governments, call for more flexibility in terms of public spending and urges the international community to better take into account the post-conflict issues it is facing.

Chapter four has also extensively explored at measures done to improve economic stability through economic partnership agreements and other affiliates. The balance of payment of the Rwandan government is analyzed using EPA; therefore the EPA enables the EU and the ACP countries to continue their cooperation partnership in compliance with the WTO regulation, especially article 24 of the GATT. Due to the EPAs reform, exports from the EU to Rwanda will rise by 23 percent, therefore leading to partial prosperity of the people of Rwanda. This

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<sup>136</sup> Republic of Rwanda (2003a), “Annual Report 2002: Taxes for Growth and Development”, Rwanda Revenue Authority, Kigali

increase, which is not significant, at the level of the EU, changes the structures of imports of Rwanda: the share of the EU among exporters would increase from 27.4 percent to 32.2 percent to the detriment of other partners of Rwanda.<sup>137</sup> Even though the impact of the agreement would still be limited for Rwanda in terms of increase of its imports – the net increase would not exceed \$10 million, less than five percent of its level of import in 2002 - the bias introduced by the agreement appears to be unfavorable for at least two reasons: It weakens regional integration efforts, as COMESA countries are significantly losing from the agreement to the benefit of the EU countries (especially Belgium, France, Germany and Netherlands), it reinforces competitors that produce high technology value added goods, most products imported from EU relate to vehicles, electrical machinery and textiles, sectors that Rwanda and its COMESA partners could develop.

Chapter four has also further explored the usefulness of the Civil Society and Non-Governmental organizations as useful auxiliary for the State in its development initiatives. They may also serve as an anti-establishment force by bringing to surface the needs of the population and defending them against the potential arbitrary of the leadership. How could the Civil Society organize itself and become functional by getting rid of the heavy hand of developed countries and without being in the play of the political power? In this regard, the study recommends that the people of Rwanda use the civil society to address issues more objectively.

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<sup>137</sup> Republic of Rwanda (2003b), “Poverty Reduction Strategy – Progress Report”, Directorate of Strategic Planning and Poverty Reduction Monitoring, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Kigali.

The post-genocide period was characterized by an influx of CSOs, dominated mainly by international NGOs, although there was also a slow emergence of local associations which participated in the alleviation of the then social and economic crisis. Notably there was an emergence of dynamic women's groups and associations in all sectors of civil society, particularly at the national and regional levels. Women's groups have been particularly active in supporting the *Gacaca* justice initiatives; lobbying for assistance and justice for widows, orphans, and other vulnerable groups in Rwandan society; and providing credit for women's associations engaged in economic activities. The government has acknowledged the importance of women in Rwandan society and, through the Ministry for Gender and Family Promotion, has shown strong support for women's groups and associations.

The present Rwandan civil society involves mainly local and international NGOs and different charities affiliated to different religious organizations. Many associations and cooperatives and other social groups do not regard themselves as part of civil society, and it is therefore necessary to sensitize them to see themselves as active participants in civil society. Rwandan civil society has recently organized itself into the Rwandan Civil Society Platform, which comprises umbrella groups, and arrangements are underway to decentralize civil society structures to match administrative decentralized entities. This will facilitate effective advocacy, lobbying and monitoring of government actions.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

This research paper has taken Rwanda as an example as one of the most phenomenal examples of post war economic recoveries. There is great ambition in the leadership to forge

for unity and economic growth with various structures in place. However the entire process must be done collectively. This cannot be achieved through following conventional examples or other success stories. The historical perspectives of a country must be put into great consideration while forging for these reforms. The causes of conflict must be addressed not only in a symbolic absence of violence, but through addressing the root causes of the conflict in order to achieve success in the long term with minimal distraction. The example of Rwanda is a mix of success and failure at the same time. Success in addressing the economic recovery strategy as the key element in achieving Human Security, but Human Security as a wide concept encompasses many other issues, which include freedom of political expression and participation. The stride Rwanda has taken is positive but how does the country merge its reforms with the country's past with its future expectations without notably ignoring the country's past experiences is an area of further research. The theoretical underpinnings of the genocide explained in chapter two of this research should form the basis of such inquiry.

Finally from this study, an inquiry can be fully made in Rwanda's success and failure in various areas of Human Security *vis a vis* Economic Reforms and fully accredit it to the leadership or the system of governance. To the researcher there seems as in the case for Rwanda more weight attributed to the leadership and really very little to do with the system.

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