

**THE PARADIGM SHIFT IN RETHINKING OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY IN EAST AFRICA**

BY

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**THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT
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DECLARATION

This PHD thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University

Signed _____ Date _____

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This PHD thesis has been submitted for examination with our approval as university supervisors;

Signed _____ Date _____

Prof. Maria Nzomo

Signed _____ Date _____

Dr. Adams Oloo

DEDICATION

To my daughter DIANA

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This has been a long and worthwhile endeavor during which I traversed the EAC capitals and interacted with several people, most of whom I'm greatly humbled to have interacted with given their caliber and the mystique that surrounds the subject matter of security. Some wondered why I selected "this peculiar subject" but opened their doors to engage on it. As came to the end, I have many people to thank but no amount of words can be enough to do so.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APSA –African Peace and Security Architecture

AU - African Union

CCM- Chama cha Mapinduzi

CEWARN – Conflict early warning mechanism

CNDD-FDD- National Defence of Democracy - Forces for Defence of Democracy

COMESA- Common Market for East and Southern Africa

CPRM-Conflict prevention and resolution mechanism

DRC- Democratic Republic of Kenya

EAC - East African community

EALA - East Africa Legislative Assembly

EAPCCO- Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation

EASF- East Africa Standby Force

ESAAMLG- Eastern and Southern Africa anti-Money Laundering Group

FND – National Defence forces

ICGLR- International Conference of the Great Lakes Region

ICTR – International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

IGAD- Inter-Governmental Authority

NEPAD- New Partnership for Africa’s Development

NRM- National Resistance Movement

NSC- National Security Council

NSS- National Security Strategy

PNB- National Police Force

PSC - Peace and Security Council

RECSA- Regional Centre on Small Arms

RPF- Rwandan Patriotic front

RSCT- Regional Security Complex Theory

SADC – Sothern Africa Development Community

UN- United Nations

VUCA – volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a case study conducted through the structured focused comparison approach. It focuses on the states of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda Tanzania and Uganda for the period 1999-2013. The objective of the study was to examine how paradigm shifts have shaped national and regional security strategies in the EAC Region and to assess the role played by decision makers in the security processes. It triangulates three data collection techniques; in-depth key informant interviews, content analysis of key government policy documents and archival research. The study observes that research on the subject matter of security is curtailed by bureaucratic bottlenecks and secrecy. This limits the study techniques that can be effectively applied in deriving primary data.

The thesis contributes to academia by developing and utilizing a model of the paradigm shift as the framework of analysis and proffers that this model can be replicated in other studies to analyze strategy and policy processes at the national and regional levels. The study also assesses the EAC region as an emerging regional security complex and lays a foundation for further research on the issue, specifically on the development of a theory that is applicable to the African regional institutions.

The thesis articulates national and regional security strategy processes in the EAC region; it outlines the converging and divergent security interests of the respective states, their securitizing frameworks and the multiplicity of actors who influence security strategy. The thesis discerns various paradigmatic shifts and some continuity in the rethinking and practice of security strategies in the region and observes that some aspects of security strategy have survived the rigors of the paradigmatic shifts. The thesis reveals both weakness and strengths in the securitizing frameworks of the respective states and

observes that the five states have been successful in formulating strategies at both the national and regional levels, but there are gaps when it comes to the implementation and coordination of these strategies.

Regarding, regional security strategy the thesis observes that a key challenge to the EAC is the lack a regional hegemon to provide leadership in the securitizing processes of the region. This leads to disunity in the approaches taken by each state in addressing security issues beyond their borders, some of which directly affect the partner states and their neighbors. The thesis also observes that the existing mistrust ad suspicion between the five states contributes to the lack of progress in implementing a regional security strategy. It notes that until the factors that lead to the uneasy in the relations between the states are overcome, the problems of implementation of security strategies will persist.

The thesis proffers key issues that may constitute areas for future research; it observes that the coordination of security strategy is the weakest link at both the national and regional levels. There is need to further appreciate ways in which the coordination function of security strategy can be enhanced. In addition, the thesis reveals the need to arrive at an agreement on how to construct common threats at the regional level. This is mainly because each state may perceive and prioritize different threats at any one given time. This becomes one of the key challenges in conceiving and articulating a regional security strategy.

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND ON THE PARADIGM SHIFT IN RETHINKING OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY IN EAST AFRICA

1.0 Introduction

The concept and practice of security strategy¹ have undergone a global redefinition particularly in the Post Cold War era. Security has become the driving force of all interactions between states and non-state actors; it has introduced new dimensions to many discourses including that of security studies. This has increased the targets of security by challenging the traditional /realist state centric view of security as regime or state security².The September 11 2001 attacks in the USA and the subsequent war on terror have had adverse effects on the conceptualization and practice of security strategy globally.

Traditionally, security was defined as the protection of a state or nation from threats emanating from outside its territorial boundaries and its main concern was on military capability. However, today the field of security studies has seen a major paradigm shift from regime and state security to human security and has encompassed issues previously not thought to be of security strategy concern. The individual is now seen as the referent for security in the broadened conceptualization of security that incorporates all sectors of society, which include, economic, political, social, environmental and military. These developments have witnessed divergent views and debates pitting those who seek to widen or deepen the scope of security the

¹ Security strategy as used in the thesis refers to plans of action by for maximizing a states' capacity to achieve security objectives at the national and regional levels

² See, literature review for a discussion on the traditional debates on the conception of security

‘wideners’ and deepeners versus those who want to retain the status quo the ‘narrowers’. The use of the term ‘‘human security’’ has also helped to introduce more controversy in the study and practice of security.

Complex interdependences in international relations have led to globalization and magnified the internationalization of national affairs and created ‘‘borderless’’ states whereas, liberalization in trade and services are being championed as a way to economic security of states. In addition globalization is increasing the security dilemma of both state and non state actors.

Despite the paradigm shift³ in perspective and the need for reformulation of security, the East African states of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi have remained bound to the traditional imperatives of state interests, power, military force and geopolitical instability. The pursuit for security conceived in developmental and human security terms has been frustrated for decades in the respective states. East Africans inputs have been absent from the international security agenda setting, this has in part frustrated the emergence of a serious East African perspective and contribution to the discourses and practice of security. This absence can also be attributed to the lack of a clear strategic foreign, defense and security strategies in the respective states. There is therefore need to reconsider the content and structure of national and regional security strategy so as to inform the formulation, implementation and coordination of security functions.

³ The term paradigm shift as used in this study, refers to replacing the former ways of thinking and practice of security with new approaches/ways due to the inevitable changing realities at the national, regional and global levels. See also literature review for a discussion on the concept of Paradigm shift

1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

The fundamental survival of all species hinges on security. The very essence of human existence cannot happen without security. This elevates it to a core concern that pre-occupies all individuals, states and non-state actors. The era of globalization has further complicated the security concerns of all states and has occasioned shifts in many sectors including that of security. This has impacted more on the vulnerable developing countries further confounding their insecurities. States seek to enhance their security through the formulation, implementation and coordination of viable security strategies individually at their national levels and collectively at the regional or international levels. These strategies are influenced by the internal and external environments in which the states operate. A key determinant is the paradigm shifts in the practice and thinking about security strategies that is taking place at the global level.

The East African Community Partner States (Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania) are passive participants that have embraced the paradigm shift as defined by the developed states. They have not been committed to reflecting these in the content and structures of their security strategies. As a result, attempts to address security problems are inadequate due to the ineffectiveness of the security strategies adopted by the five partner states. Consequently, insecurity persists in the region leading to growing political, societal, economic, environmental and military threats. These states continue to generate false hopes and unsustainable security priorities for their people through faulty strategies.

Currently, the East African states have their security strategies articulated in the traditional security paradigm, which are state-centric and military in orientation with

little regard to the new paradigms in contemporary security that are human security centric. In some instances, the strategies are formulated, implemented and coordinated in an ad hoc manner. This mainly stems from the inadequate understanding and conceptualization of the shift in defining security, in the formulation of security strategies, in implementation and in coordination of the security functions.

Additionally, the East African states lack homogeneity in terms of their security priorities and strategies. The perceptions and articulation of national security strategies differ, and is shrouded in secrecy and suspicions that characterizes the security relations of these states. This affects efforts to formulate, implement and coordinate collective security strategies by the region's states. As a result, what are currently referred to as regional security strategies are mainly discussions on regional security threats and not strategy.

This study examines the extent to which the five East African Community Partner States have adjusted to the "paradigm shift" in the conceptualization and practice of security strategy. The study also assesses how regional security strategy in East Africa has been shaped by the shift. Specifically, the study seeks to understand how the paradigm shift has shaped the content and structure of national and regional security strategy in the East Africa region. The study is guided by two questions:

1. How has the paradigm shift influenced national and regional security strategy in East Africa?
2. What impact do decision makers have on national and regional security strategy?

1.2 Research objectives

Broadly stated, the study examines the paradigm shift in defining security, and how it affects the content and structure of security strategy in East Africa. A case study of Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania.

The specific objectives were to:

- i. Examine how the paradigm shift shapes the national security strategies of Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania.
- ii. Establish how the paradigm shift shapes the regional security strategy in East Africa Community states.
- iii. Assess decision makers' roles in security strategy at the national and regional levels.

1.3 Significance of the Study

The study seeks to contribute to the academic and policy discourses of security strategy at the national and regional levels. At the academic level, the study contribution is three fold: firstly, it adds to the conceptual issues in the discipline by adapting a model on the paradigm shift. Adaptation of this model aimed to simplify and apply the ideals espoused by Thomas Kuhn to the study of security strategies in the region. This was inspired by the fact that, in their original form, language and accompanying terminologies Kuhn's works are complex and present challenges in application within the social sciences. As a result, despite their centrality in informing the epistemology of social science research, they are often shunned by researchers due to their perceived complexity. The study thus, presents a modified simple version articulated in five steps to assess security strategy processes. This model is replicable beyond this research in

studies that seek to assess processes and changes in security strategy in any state or region or any other policy processes.

Secondly, on research methodology, the study conducted a purely qualitative research and applied triangulation in collection and analysis of data. The study demonstrates the efficacy of triangulation in a study with different sets of data. In this study, triangulation is applied to analyze three sets of data collected through narratives, content analysis and archival research. The application of triangulation of methods in research is gaining prominence, because no one method of data collection can be effective in gathering information.

Thirdly, the study makes a modest contribution to the available source of references on security strategy in East Africa. The study also proffers areas for future research in the discourse of security strategy thus contributing to the debates on the issue. Specifically, it presents new perspectives in the thinking and practice of security strategy by demonstrating continuities as well as changes at the theoretical and practitioners levels. The study also assesses the EAC region as an emerging regional security complex and lays a foundation for further research on the issue, specifically on development of a theory or model that is applicable to the African regional institutions. Similarly, the literature review demonstrates levels of scarcity of African scholarship in the area of security strategy. Therefore, this study seeks to contribute to filling this gap.

The policy significance of the study rests on the appreciation of the findings on the study, and the key themes in national and regional security strategy processes. These lay a basis on which policy and decision makers can anchor future formulation, implementation and coordination of security strategies.

1.4 Literature review

The Literature review seeks to link three key components of the study: firstly, the paradigm shift that is a central pillar of the study which constitutes the framework of analysis. Secondly, is the conceptualization of security, mainly discussing the shift from traditional to contemporary understanding and practice of national and regional security strategy. Thirdly is appreciating the thinking and practice of security strategy generally and specifically in East Africa.

1.4.1 Concept of Paradigm Shift

The Post Cold War era has witnessed the emergence of viable competing paradigms in the conceptualization and practice of security akin to the scientific revolution articulated by Kuhn and contrasted against other competing perspectives by Lakatos and Popper in the natural sciences which are also applicable to security as discussed below;

Kuhn defines a paradigm as a great research tradition, which represents a whole spectrum of thinking and acting within a given field of study or worldview. A paradigm represents the totality of background information, the rules and theories thought to aspiring scientists as if they were true and which they must accept if they are in turn to be accepted into the scientific community.⁴ Therefore, a paradigm is made up of the general theoretical assumptions, laws and techniques that members of a scientific community

⁴ Kuhn Thomas, *History of Science and its Rational Reconstruction*, Boston, Dordrecht co,1971, pp. 91-136.

adopt. Kuhn thus, portrays science as a puzzle solving activity governed by rules of a paradigm, which guides and coordinates its activity.⁵

Whereas, Popper states that, problems arise when theories create difficulties or contradictions within one theory or between two different theories, these may be problems of reconciliation or, of how to conduct new observations. He argues that science progresses from theory to theory and consists of a sequence of better and better theories; He contends that science should always be growing, for if it ceases to, it may not be empirical and rational.⁶

According to Popper's concept of falsification, theories are speculative and tentative guesses freely created by the human mind in an attempt to give adequate account of some aspects of the universe. Once created theories are to be ruthlessly and rigorously tested by observation and experiments.⁷ Theories that fail to stand up to observational tests must be rejected and replaced by other speculative guesses. Therefore, according to Popper, the best test of a theory is one that aims at falsifying it. Some theories may seem to be good but when carefully examined are found to be falsifiable. The more falsifiable a theory is the better; hence, a good theory is one that is highly falsifiable. He argues that science begins with a problem for which an hypothesis is formulated, if it is good it will withstand falsification.

Lakatos attempted to improve on the limitations of Popper's falsificationism account of scientific growth by asserting that a research program is a developing theory that consists of, a hardcore, comprising of the assumptions of the program, which must be protected from refutation, a protective belt, which is a collection of auxiliary hypothesis,

⁵ Ibid pp. 112-118.

⁶ Popper Karl, *Conjectures and Refutations*, New York, Harper and Row, 1963, pp. 215-218.

⁷ Ibid. pp. 220-223.

which protects the hardcore from refutation. Modifications or additions to the belt must be independently testable and a research policy (heuristic) which suggests the type of hypotheses, problems and techniques to solve a problem.⁸

Kuhn in response to Popper maintained that the logic of falsification is not applicable to paradigm rejection and that a paradigm is not rejected based on a comparison of its consequences and empirical evidence, rather paradigm rejection is a three-term relation, which involves an established paradigm, a rival paradigm and observational evidence.⁹ Kuhn puts it that the creation of a theory is not a matter of speculation and guess work but a serious scientific endeavor to bring out the truth and change the way other people view the world, thus conjectures simply pass as myths on which science cannot rely. To be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must seem better than its competitors must, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted. As a paradigm grows in strength, and in the number of advocates, the other paradigms fade. Ultimately, Kuhn's position on paradigm replacement reduces the history of science to a mere succession of viewpoints.

On how knowledge grows and progresses, Popper talks of repeated overthrow of scientific theories and their replacement by better or more satisfactory ones. This involves the critical examination of their assertions during which errors are systematically criticized and corrected. He posits that theories progress by trial and error or by conjectures and refutations and only the fittest theories survives the process. If science or the pursuit for Knowledge followed Popper's assertions, science would have

⁸Chalmers,A.F.,*What is this thing called science?* Buckingham, Open University Press, 1980, pp.80-83.

⁹ *ibid*, pp.89-92.

lost some of its best theories, apparent refutations are, often ignored for fear that good theories may be lost in the process.¹⁰

Meanwhile, Lakatos argues that, a research program either progresses or degenerates. A program progresses if each change on the protective belt leads to some new and successful predictions and it will degenerate if it ceases to make and confirm unexpected predictions and instead accounts for new facts with ad-hoc hypothesis, unanticipated in the research policy. A degenerating program can still make a comeback; hence, it becomes difficult to predict when a program will be completely abandoned. For him, scientific methodology must be discussed from two points of view, one within a single research program and the other with comparison of the merits of other competing research programs.¹¹

For Kuhn a paradigm shift or a scientific revolution in shared assumptions will take place in a discipline when an anomaly undermines the basic tenets of the current scientific practice. This leads to the development of new paradigms that require the reconstruction of prior assumptions and the re-evaluation of prior facts. This is usually difficult, time consuming, and will be strongly resisted by the established community¹². Therefore, in such situations, science enters a revolutionary stage with the emergence of a viable competing paradigm. He describes a scientific revolution as a non-cumulative developmental episode in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one. A scientific revolution that results in paradigm change is comparable to a political revolution and happens when paradigmatic differences cannot be reconciled. When paradigms enter into a debate about fundamental questions and

¹⁰ Popper Karl, *Conjectures and Refutations* op.cit, p.226.

¹¹ Chalmers, A.F., *What is this thing called science?* op.cit, p.85.

¹² *ibid.* 95-98.

paradigm choice, each group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm's defense. The result is a circularity and inability to share a universe of discourse. A successful new paradigm permits predictions that are different from those derived from its predecessor. That difference could not occur if the two were logically compatible. In the process of being assimilated, the second must displace the first.¹³

A key feature of Kuhn's arguments is the emphasis placed on the revolutionary character of scientific progress, where a revolution involves the abandonment of one theoretical framework and its replacement by another. For Kuhn science progresses from pre-science - normal science - a crisis - a revolution - new normal science - a new crisis¹⁴. Whereas Popper asserts that, theories contribute to the growth of knowledge by raising new problems which will need to be resolved, this will in turn give rise to new problems. Therefore, for him knowledge will progress from one problem to another which will pre-occupy the members of the scientific community in looking for solutions.¹⁵

1.4.2 Conceptualization of security: Traditional versus Contemporary Paradigm Debates

The basic tenets of the traditional realist paradigms has been challenged by contemporary paradigms that assert that institutions and cooperation can emerge despite the anarchic nature of the international system, or that liberal democratic states do not behave as structural realist theories would predict. These challenges have been given new impetus by the emerging competing contemporary paradigms in the security studies

¹³ Kuhn Thomas, *History of Science and its Rational Reconstruction* opcit.pp122-138.

¹⁴ Kuhn Thomas, *The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions*, 1962.pp.92-109. See also Chalmers,A.F.,*What Is This Thing Called Science?* Opcit. pp.89-90.and ibid. 95-98.

¹⁵ Popper Karl, *Conjectures and Refutations*, New York, Harper and Row,1963.p.222. See also Popper Karl, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, Hutchison, London,1959,pp.40-42.

and practice in the Post Cold war era. This section links the debates between the realist paradigm and the competing paradigms of the broadeners (Copenhagen), the critical security and human security schools that signal the existence of a paradigm shift that has dominated the security discourse in the Post Cold war era.

Sean argues that realism has always provided the theoretical foundation for much, but not all of the work in security studies, both in its early postwar manifestations and its more modern "neorealist" reformulations. He contends that, realism will continue to define the Post Cold war era because, no other paradigm offers a richer set of theories and hypotheses, nor has been able to match realism ability to generate logically integrated theories that apply across time and space. He further posits that realism will endure because even its harshest pessimists still underscore the centrality of key issues like self-interest, conflict and power which are cardinal concerns for the realist¹⁶. In contrast, Kegley¹⁷, Kapstein¹⁸ and Zakaria¹⁹ claim to have refuted realism by asserting that realism is dead, inadequate or irrelevant.

Mogenthau underscores that what needs to be secured is the state, and the mechanisms by which security can be achieved is by the state's manipulation of its military capability in relation to actual or potential adversaries. For him the most important actor in the realist system is the sovereign state governed by rational decision makers and institutions. States are also seen as unitary rational actors with the capability

¹⁶ Sean Lynn-Jones, *Realism and Security Studies*, In Craig A Snyder, *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, Routledge, New York 1999, pp.53-71.

¹⁷ Kegley C.W, *The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities*, *International Quarterly*, Vol.37.no.2, 1993, pp.131-146.

¹⁸ Kapstein EB, *Is Realism Dead? International Organizations*, vol. 49, no.41995, pp. 751-754.

¹⁹ Zakaria F, *Is Realism Finished*, *The National Interest* no.301992, pp. 21-32.

to calculate the risks and advantages of different policies aimed at amassing power in an anarchic environment.²⁰

Whereas, Krause et.al, contend that realist focus on military threats to the state that emanate from outside its borders, is no longer a sufficient means for determining what, or who is being secured, what these threats look like and where they originate. In concurrence, Crawford²¹ describes the study of security as a product of Machiavelli and Hobbesian realism. He further asserts that from the late 1930 up to 1970s the working definition of security was a limited one, concerned with military power and the subject of these concerns being the state or national security which meant, the need for the states to maintain their political independence and freedom in decision making. The instruments for maintaining this included the armed forces, the diplomatic service and the intelligence service.²²

In contrast, Renner asserts that many of today's security challenges cannot be resolved by traditional security policies. Unlike traditional military threats emanating from a determined adversary, today's challenges are risks and vulnerabilities shared across borders. He further argues that this has challenged the orthodox assumptions about national security, deepening it 'upward' from national to global security and 'downwards' from state security focused on states and governments to people security focused on individuals and communities.²³

²⁰Mogenthau H.J, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Knopf 1948, pp.117-122.

²¹ Crawford, Neta Once and Future Security Studies, *Security Studies*,no.412. p.292.

²² Krause K & Williams , *Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies : Politics and Methods* ,Mershon International Studies Review, vol.40, 1996. p.230.

²³ Renner Michael, *State of the World Report 2005: Redefining Global Security*, New York, W.W Norton & Co.2005.pp.23-48.

On his part, Buzan posits that debates in the 1980s and 1990s opened the concept of security to deepening and widening, and to exploration of its meaning and application to a broader range of areas. He states that the ‘wide’ versus ‘narrow’ debate about conceptualization of security grew out of the dissatisfaction with the narrowing of security to military and nuclear obsessions of the cold war. It set out to transcend the previous fixation with state security by restoring the centrality of individuals, groups and societies as the referent objects of security. He argues that security should be looked at in five sectors; the military, environmental, economic, societal and political sectors. He further contends that identifying security issues is easy for the traditionalists who equate security with military issues and the use of force, but is more difficult when security is moved out of the military sector. The move to elaborate security in terms of sectors is essentially quantitative.²⁴

In contrast Booth argues that what is required is not just, broadening of the concept of security to embrace new domains but also a deeper understanding of the meaning of security. He argues that individual humans are the ultimate referent for security and rejects the state as the principle referent object of security. Whereas there is an overlap between the broadened agenda and the critical security school, the deepeners are based in a different epistemology and ontology that advocate for both the broadening and deepening of the study.²⁵ However, Sheehan disagrees by stating that, critical theory as an approach to understanding security made little impact in the 1960s when dependency theorists introduced it to the study of security.²⁶

²⁴ Renner Michael, *State of the World Report 2005: Redefining Global Security*, opcit, 12-16.

²⁵ Booth Ken, *Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist* “in Keith Krause and Michael William, (eds), *Critical Security Studies*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, pp.83-119.

²⁶ Sheehan Michael, *International security: An Analytical Survey*, Lynne Rienner, 2006, pp.5-24.

Dalby asserts that security has traditionally been given a very specific meaning with negative connotations associated with threats to the state. It is a term limited in usefulness for denoting desirable political situations, because it is formulated as a protection from some threat or danger rather than as promoting a desirable situation²⁷. In contrast, Walt argues that security studies is about the phenomenon of war and that widening the security agenda outside the military domain would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of its problems. He further cautions that expanding the security agenda is not a simple act, of just tacking the word security into the economic, environment or societal sectors. For him the wider security agenda tends to elevate security into a kind of universal good thing based on false causal assumptions for, in making all individuals a security priority none actually benefits. These make the venture to attain security unattainable.²⁸

In agreement, Buzan observes that security falls within the category of contested concepts characterized by unsolvable debates about its meaning and application. During the cold war the prevailing western conception shifted from national security to international security. International organizations now operate with a definition of security that is multi sectoral and embraces the broader agenda not just the military dimension. This represents a major shift from earlier debates where emphasis was on force projection, deterrence and the maintenance of balance of power.²⁹

²⁷Dalby Simon, *Security Modernity Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post Cold War Security Discourse Alternatives*, 1992,p.97.

²⁸Walt Stephen, *The Renaissance of Security Studies*, *International Studies Quarterly*,vol.35.pp.211-239.

²⁹Buzan Barry, *People States and Fear, An Agenda for International Security Studies in Post Cold War Era*, Lynne Rienner, 1991, p.7. The beginning of genuine debate about security begun in the 1980s through the writings of Buzan and other members of the Copenhagen school who include Ole Weaver, Wilde, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre. They ignited the debate in their publications on European security after the cold war that attempted to develop alternative conceptions of security.

In concurrence, Booth sees security as a discursive and contested concept and states that it is the inadequacies of realism that gave rise to the critical security studies whose agenda is four fold: critiquing traditional theory, exploring the meaning and possible implications of critical theories, investigating security issues and rethinking security in the specific regions of the world. This provides a rather different approach linking it to the ideals of human emancipation that include human rights and economic justice.³⁰

Wolfers on his part, draws a distinction between objective (the absence of threats to acquired values) and subjective security (against the absence of fear that such values will be attacked)³¹. Similarly, the 1994 Human Development Report defined human security as entailing seven distinct categories: economic security, food security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. It further argues that for most people a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a catastrophic world event. Job security, income security, health security, and security from crime is of more concern.³²

In concurrence, the Kampala Document asserts that the concept of security goes beyond military considerations: it embraces all aspects of the society including economic, political and social dimensions of the individual, family and community, local and national life. The security of a nation must be construed in terms of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to necessities of life while fully

³⁰ Booth Ken, *The New Thinking about Strategy and International Security*, London, Harper Collins 1991, p.105

³¹ Wolfers Arnold, *National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol*, *Political Science Quarterly*, vol.67. 1992, pp.481-502

³² United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report 1994*, New York, Oxford University Press 1994, p.4-6

participating in the affairs of his/her family society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights³³. Relatedly, the Commission on Human Security defines human security as the protection of the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and fulfillments. It states that human security means protecting fundamental freedoms that are of essence of life. It claims that this entails the protection of people from critical and pervasive threats and the use of processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations.³⁴

Elsewhere, Thomas says that security is about the fulfillment of basic material needs and human dignity and is engaged with discussions of democracy at all levels from the local to the global³⁵. For Edward security entails taking seriously the perspectives of the poor, the disadvantaged, the unrepresented and how to enhance the security of those Africans who remain unfavoured by their political regimes³⁶. Whereas Oloo contends that human security sits side by side with the traditional state centric security that is pre occupied with protecting the national interest through power projection.³⁷

Herz argues that states cannot escape the “security dilemma”, because military power is not inherently defensive, it will always appear offensive to other states regardless of whether or not it is being acquired for offensive purposes. The security dilemma is a fundamental element of the realist security due to the self –help attempts of states to look after their security needs regardless of whether the intentions led to

³³Africa Leadership Forum, *The Kampala Document Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa*, Kampala, May 1991.

³⁴ Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People*, New York, 2003, p.4.

³⁵Thomas Caroline, Peter Wilken, *Globalization, Human Security and the African Experience*, Boulder, Co., Lynne Rienner, 1999, p.3.

³⁶ Edward Said, *Representation of the Intellectual*, London, Vintage, 1994, p.84.

³⁷Oloo A, *Regional Institutions and the Quest for Security in the Horn of Africa* in Mwangi M, ed, *Human Security: Setting The Agenda For The Horn of Africa*. Africa Peace Forum, Nairobi, 2008, pp. 177-208.

insecurity for others. Offensive versions of structural realism see security as a scarce resource, which states pursue in a threat-filled environment whereas defensive realism argues that the external environment may not be threatening to states in terms of the state military agenda. The realist conception of power in relation to security is located in the idea of international anarchy meaning violent unstructured international order³⁸. In agreement, Wheeler et.al define security dilemma in terms of irresolvable uncertainty that exists in the minds of one set of decision makers as to whether the intentions of the other are benign or malign. Any state will desire a military posture that resembles that of an aggressor.³⁹

Weaver introduces the concepts of securitization and de-securitization, by asking what really makes something a security issue? Nothing is necessarily a security problem, but it is made so by calling it so, in naming a certain development as a security problem the state can claim a special right and allows a state to take extra ordinary measures to combat whatever threat is thereby identified. De –securitization involves the progressive removal of issues from the agenda of security rather than introducing new issues and objects.⁴⁰

Mearsheimer predicts that after the cold war the world would return to the pattern of instability that had shaped the pre- Second World War period, and witness the resurgence of ethnic conflict and violence. He asserts that more efforts will be directed towards understanding the economic determinants of war and the nature of economically

³⁸ Herz John, *Ideal Internationalism and the Security Dilemma*, World Politics, Vol 2.p.157.

³⁹ Wheeler N & Booth K, *Logics of Security*, British International Studies Association Conference, 1996.

⁴⁰ Weaver in Buzan Barry, Ole Weaver & Wilde de Jaap, *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*, Lynne Rienner, 1998.pp.21-28.

fragile regimes affected by the global trends of the 1990s.⁴¹ Similarly, Kaldor argues that the nature of the global economy facilitates war, the opening up of economies to global competition through liberalization programs has resulted in significant increases in unemployment, inequalities and the rise of informal economies. This precarious nature of the economy has provided an impetus for criminal activities as the only way of earning money and hence aggravating insecurity in many states.⁴² As a result Reno argues that with increasing privatization of all services within capitalist societies and the idea that private companies can provide better ,cheaper and more efficient services than the state, security like any other service can be purchased and war and armies have been privatized giving a new dimension to understanding of security.⁴³

Hugh contends that global change includes a wide range of phenomena such as trade, finance, development, demographics and migration, democratization and communications and environmental change and thus the central challenge is in global change as distinct from international change or change in the international system. He further argues that global issues dislocate conventional points of reference in state security and national interest. The point of reference for security becomes uncertain because the traditional notion of national security becomes confused when there is internal instability or insecurity and when a source of insecurity is not recognized as normally belonging to the international security agenda.⁴⁴

⁴¹Mearsheimer John, Back to the Future: Instability In Europe After The Cold War, *International Security*, 15,1 Summer 1990, pp.5- 56.

⁴²Kaldor Mary, Security In Post Cold War Era in Craig Snyder, (ed), *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, Routledge, New York 1999, p.112.

⁴³ Reno Clive Jones, *International Security in a Global Age Security in the Twenty First Century*, Cambridge, UK, 2000, p.98.

⁴⁴ Hugh, in Craig Snyder, ed, *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, Routledge, New York, 1999, p.213.

Pipe argues that the cold war distorted and narrowed understanding of the nature of global politics and perceptions of war. Conflict and peace become focused upon a nuclear war that did not take place. Whereas, any analysis of civil war and ethnic conflicts did not fit into the realist or neorealist perspectives that posit a clear distinction between high and low politics, the post cold war era has demonstrated that many wars and conflicts take place within states, as well as over the nature of the state.⁴⁵

1.4.3 National and Regional Security Strategy

In Africa, national security is often threatened not by conventional threats of armed attack from other states but by dangers that are more insidious. Most of which arise from the weakness of the states themselves. The causes and dynamics of Africa's conflicts hold important lessons for how security strategies ought to be designed. This is because their sources are in domestic state- society relations. Threats to violence remain the focus of the region's threat agenda but neither, its extent nor its dynamics are adequately understood by the state- centric paradigm.

Security strategy is traditionally defined as the military means that actors in the international system employ to gain their political objectives or ends. Liddell-Hart defined it as the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill ends of policy. Hedley Bull saw it as the exploitation of military force to attain given objects of policy. For Colin Gray strategy meant the relationship between military power and political purpose.⁴⁶ However, since the Second World War civil institutions, business

⁴⁵ Pipe- Caroline Kennedy, *From Cold Wars to New Wars*, in Reno Clive Jones, *International Security in a Global Age Security in the Twenty First Century*, Cambridge, UK, 2000,pp.34-65.

⁴⁶ Liddell-Hart, Hedley Bull and Colin Gray, in Buzan B, *An Introduction to Strategic Studies : Military Technology and International Relations*, London, 1987, p.4.

corporations, universities and non-military government institutions have embraced the use of the word strategy in development of their policies. This has revolutionized the concept to mean; policy planning of any kind not just the sole province of the military.

Palit argues that strategy or "grand strategy" in the post cold war era is the art of mobilizing and directing the total resources of a state ,community ,nations including the military to safe guard and promote its interests against its enemies, actual or potential⁴⁷. In agreement, Katzenstein says that the construction of security is influenced by national and regional culture that shape how actors understand security and the threats they believe exist and the responses they adopt to address them.⁴⁸

On regional security strategy, Mearsheimer states that state cooperation is limited because of the dominating logic of security competition ,which no amount of cooperation can eliminate because states operate in an environment of intense competition, they are generally inclined to cooperate with other states unless there are compelling reasons to do so.⁴⁹ Whereas Fucks contends that combating poverty, protecting the environment and democracy are the "Big Three" of a visionary security strategy. These ought to be accompanied by global economic reforms, which provide poor societies with better opportunities for development.⁵⁰ On his part, McSweeney argues that it is from the human need to protect human values that the term security derives its meaning and security strategy derive sits legitimacy and power to mobilize

⁴⁷Palit D.K, *War in the Deterrent Age*, London, 1966, pp.32-35.

⁴⁸Katzenstein P.J, *The Culture of National Security; Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York, 1996, Columbia University Press,pp.1-2.

⁴⁹Mearsheimer John, Back to the Future: Instability In Europe After The Cold War, *International Security*, 15,1 Summer 1990, pp.5- 56.

⁵⁰Fucks R., Security in one world, in Thomas Caroline, Peter Wilken, *Globalization, Human Security and the African Experience*, pp 42.

resources. Security must make sense at the basic level of the individual for it to make sense at the international level.⁵¹

For Snow security is defined according to economic “tiers”. The first tier consists of advanced capitalists economies, the second consists those economies that appear poised to attain economic progress and the third tier consists of those economies that are not progressing and are mainly third world economies. He tries to link the incidence of civil wars to levels of economic development and highlights a clear linkage between poverty and violence in those states where per capita income is low and economic activity consists of primarily substance agriculture.⁵²

Williams observes that constructing images of Africa has always been popular among western scholars and politicians. Such images reveal different scenarios in Africa. Firstly, there is Africa depicted as a scar on the world conscience in need of charity, secondly, there is Africa seen as an haven for terrorists and in need of order and good governance. Thirdly, there is Africa which is a source of threats, risks and problems of war, famine, drought etc that need to be fixed before they spill over and lastly but positively, Africa can be viewed as a source of riches and opportunity that is in need of stability and investment. Each image serves various purposes for particular audience. By these images, Africa is judged as the most insecure region.⁵³

Similarly, Mwangi traces the absence of African perspectives from the international security agenda setting to the suspicious relationship between the academia

⁵¹ Mc Sweeney Bill, *Security, Identity And Interest : A Sociology of International Relations*, Cambridge 1991, pp.33.

⁵² Snow Donald, *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflict*, London, Lynne Rienner, 1996, pp.11-23.

⁵³ Williams Paul D, Thinking about security in Africa, in *International Affairs*, vol.83, no.6, November 2007, pp.1021-1038.

and the practitioners. This he argues has frustrated the emergence of a serious African perspective about the African role in and contribution to the discourses of security. The absence can also be attributed to the lack of a clear strategic foreign, defense and security policies in many countries.⁵⁴ He also contends that if the cold war marked a paradigm shift in the discourse it should have been in redefining new contours and identifying new configurations of actors and their roles in the new security setting. He further posits that Africa should be a central participant in the debate in rethinking security during which it can define ways to benefit from it, otherwise the content will continue to be defined and re defined without African flavors.⁵⁵

In concurrence, Chweya asserts that the African continent is depicted as one in a security crisis where the realist paradigm provides a view of interstate suspicions, conflicts, military build up and war. The contemporary paradigms show a continent with minimal success in regional and sub regional cooperation in peace and security, whereas the human security school shows a region characterized by poverty and unemployment amongst other obstacles to development.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, Makinda argues that due to Africa's precarious financial, scientific and technological base, it does not have the capacity to monitor effectively the current global security problems and make reliable predictions about future threats, thus it is difficult for Africa to determine the objects and subjects of security and to prescribe the strategies that are needed to address them. He further asserts that African intellectuals and academic institutions are net consumers, rather than producers of knowledge in many

⁵⁴Mwagiru Makumi(ed), *Human Security Setting the Agenda for the Horn Of Africa*, Africa Peace Forum ,Nairobi,2008, pp.1-10.

⁵⁵ ibid p.5.

⁵⁶Chweya L, Sources of African security condition and agenda setting, in Makumi Mwagiru, ed, *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, Heinrich Boll, Nairobi,2004.pp.36-42.

disciplines and that security is a political construction that can be understood differently in various theoretical paradigms.⁵⁷

In contrast Ngoma argues that although the new conceptualization of security goes beyond military security, as a paradigm it remains state-centric in character, especially in the Africa where the state continues to be the major provider of security. He also contends that most African states have failed to provide their people with security, making many Africans victims of powerful warped up versions of regime security.⁵⁸

Relatedly, Chabal and Daloz argue that in Africa the true destitutes are those without political/regime patrons. Consequently, individuals shunned or actively persecuted by their governments turn to insurgency movements and religious associations for their basic needs of recognition, security and identity.⁵⁹ Whereas, Jean Fracois Bayart contends that although Africa is depicted as the marginalized continent that globalization forgot, it is not immune from the wider processes driving world politics. Of concern is the continuing destruction of ecosystems and the inability of the people to stop a variety of processes such as climate change, deforestation, desertification and land degradation as well as the increasing water and food scarcity.⁶⁰

Obasanjo states that the security and stability of each African state is inseparably linked with the security of all African states and that Africa cannot make any significant progress on any other front without creating collectively, a lasting solution to its problems and security and stability. Relatedly, Berman et.al state that regional

⁵⁷Makinda S., African thinkers and global security, in Makumi Mwagiru, Okello Oculil, *Rethinking Global Security, An African Perspective*, Heinrich Boll, Nairobi, 2006,pp.61-63.

⁵⁸Ngoma Naison, *Prospects for A Security Community in Southern Africa, An Analysis of Regional Security in Southern Africa Development Community*, Institute of Security Studies, 2005,Pretoria p.18.

⁵⁹Chabal Patrick & Jean Pascal Daloz, *Africa works Disorder As A Political Instrument*, Oxford, 1999,pp.45-52.

⁶⁰ Jean Fracois Bayart, Africa in the World, History of Extroversion; African Affairs vol.99, no.395 , 2000,pp. 217-267.

institutions in Africa have made substantial progress in assuming the primary responsibility for promoting peace and security in the continent by embracing issues of conflict management to their agenda.⁶¹ For instance AU security architecture advocates for cooperation with regional institutions in implementing its Peace and Security Committee programs. As such, the AU underscores that security is the primary responsibility of Regional Economic Communities.⁶²

Towards this end, the 2004 Non- Aggression and Common Defense Pact states that in Africa security means the protection of the individuals with respect to the satisfaction of the basic needs of life and encompasses the creation of the social, political, economic ,military, environment and cultural conditions necessary for survival⁶³. The pact underscores that actors within civil society hold the key to both rethinking and remaking security strategies in Africa as some ideas about what should constitute peace and security have been generated in such forums. However, the elites within the state regimes are unlikely to be tolerant to such endeavors.⁶⁴

Consequently, Africa has developed a complex set of overlapping regional security institutions at the sub regional and continental levels. This raises challenges in coordination and priorities when there is an overlap. One such institution is the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is tasked with the responsibility to promote peace, security and stability in Africa. Since its establishment, it has held meetings on matters of conflict management and issued several communiqués and statements on developments relating to conflict in many African states. The PSC has on some occasions authorized

⁶¹ Berman B,et.al.(eds), *Democracy and ethnicity in Africa*, Ohio University Press, Ohio, 2004, pp.44-53.

⁶²Obasanjo O, *Africa rise to challenge*: Paper presented at a conference on security ,stability ,development and cooperation in Africa, June 1993.

⁶³ African Union, *Non- Aggression and Common Defense Pact*, 2004.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

the deployment of armed peace operations(Sudan, Comoros and Somalia). Despite the progress the PSC faces challenges relating to lack of human and financial resources, and by varying political will and priorities of its members.⁶⁵

Langivanio et.al. articulate four reasons that necessitate regional and sub-regional organizations involvement in peace and security; one is that regional economic communities are more familiar with their conflict problems and close cultural, social and historical affinity, second is that their geographical proximity can facilitate faster and cheaper responses to violent conflict, third conflicts are more regionalized and need to be dealt at their roots/origin and lastly that warring parties will be more willing to address issues at the regional level than with international third parties as regional actors will be more flexible. Also to be considered are personal idiosyncratic attributes, political interests and commitment of the leaders and how they will influence conflict management.⁶⁶

The Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC recognizes the need for peace and security in the region and spells out strategies for implementation to attain a stable and secure East Africa region.⁶⁷ Towards this end the EAC secretariat has embarked on several initiatives that include; the EAC Strategy for Regional Peace and Security⁶⁸,The

⁶⁵ Protocol relating to the establishment of the peace and security council of the African union 9,july,2002, article 6(a) came into force on 26th December 2003.

⁶⁶ Langivanio,M.&J.D.Yeses, Building Peace and Security Capabilities in Africa : The Role of African Union and its Partnership with African Regional Economic Communities and the European Union(CMI Background Papers), 2006.

⁶⁷The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, Article 124.

⁶⁸The EAC Strategy for Regional Peace and Security, Arusha, 17 January 2012.

Draft EAC Protocol on Peace and Security.⁶⁹ EAC Framework for Early Warning⁷⁰ and the EAC Draft Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPRM) Framework.⁷¹

Similarly, IGAD has undertaken various initiatives to address security concerns in the region through the IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) through the collection, collation and analysis of data in order to detect and identify pending conflicts, and forestall their development into violent conflict. However most regional institutions are composed of members that engage in sovereignty-first politics posing a challenge to the responsive capacity to act, on many occasions, there is also lack of clear linkages with other regional blocks with similar objectives.⁷²

1.4.4 Literature Gap

Traditionally, security studies neglected third world security issues, except when they were linked to superpower competition. As the literature demonstrates much of the earlier works and the bulk of contemporary schools have focused on security strategies of the first world. However more recently, several studies have offered general conclusions about security strategy in the developing world⁷³. The literature illustrates that most works are concerned with security issues and instances with little emphasis on the formulation, implementation and coordination of security strategies. At the regional level, the literature has concentrated on peace and conflict management of incidences across the continent with no clear security strategies for the respective regions. There is

⁶⁹The Draft EAC Protocol on Peace and Security, Arusha, 17 January 2012.

⁷⁰ The EAC Draft Early Warning Mechanism, Arusha, 17 January 2012.

⁷¹ The EAC Draft Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR) Mechanism, Arusha ,17 January 2012.

⁷² IGAD, Conflict Early Warning System.

⁷³Yezid Sayigh, *Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries*, Adelphi Paper no.251, London, IISS, Summer, 1990, See also, Mohammed Ayub, *The Security Problematic of the Third World*, *World Politics*, vol. 43, no.2. January, 1991, pp.257-283.

also limited literature on security strategy in East Africa most works have concentrated on Africa generally.

The study therefore aims to contribute to the discourse and literature on security strategy on the East African security architecture. The study is premised on the assertion that, Security strategy research ought to focus a greater proportion of its intellectual input to the problems of security in developing countries, which are seen as the sources of most of the threats and problems of international security. National and regional security questions ought to be examined without the distortion imposed by viewing them through the lenses of purely euro-centric paradigms.

Lastly, the rethinking of security strategy, needs to capture three broad issues; security as a goal, the means of pursuing it and its relationship with domestic, regional and international affairs. It ought also to address concerns about formulation, implementation and coordination at the national and regional levels. These issues form the basis for research and discussion in this study.

1.5 Framework for Analysis

The study utilizes the concept of “paradigm shift” as articulated by Kuhn⁷⁴ who contends that, to be accepted as a paradigm, a perspective must seem better than its competitors. However, it need not, and it never does, explain all the issue with which it can be confronted. Similarly, as a paradigm grows in strength, and gains acceptance with an increase in the number of advocates who share its ideals, the other paradigms tend to fade away.

⁷⁴ See earlier discussion on the concept of paradigm shift.

The study and practice of security strategy has undergone a paradigm shift from the traditional to the contemporary understanding, which encompasses several paradigms. Two dominant schools of thought currently exist; the traditionalists who want to maintain the status quo and restrict the subject to political-military issues and the wideners/deepeners who want to change the thinking and practice of security strategy.

The study utilizes the concept of the paradigm shift to analyze the on going developments/debates in the study and practice of security strategy. The study assesses the content and structure of the paradigm shifts and explains the continued presence of the state- centric views, despite the emergence of new paradigms. The study is guided by current debates and events taking place in the discourse, with different arguments put forward in defense of the prevailing paradigms, each providing viewpoints at variance with the rival paradigm.

This study asserts that in the Post Cold War era, the paradigms of the Cold War have developed significant anomalies, which have rendered them ineffective in explaining and resolving the new dynamics of the Post Cold war security. In Kuhnian terms, the discipline of security studies has entered a revolutionary stage with the emergence of viable competing paradigms. These paradigms are gaining acceptance within the discipline and have in part replaced the older paradigms. The study seeks to test the veracity of these assertions.

Likewise, Mwangi contends that for Africa to participate effectively in the discourse on international security, it must go methodologically relativist. He also argues that there have been fears about Africa individually or collectively going relativist by earlier pushes towards Pan Africanism, which reflected a negative relativism mainly due


to fears of the West. This study seeks to assess the methodological orientation of studying security within the African perspective.⁷⁵

The study adapts a model from Kuhn's Paradigm shift concept. This model specifically represents Kuhn's three term relations or process of how a paradigm rejection/replacement takes place. This comprises of an established paradigm, rival paradigm and available evidence. The model represents five steps in the process of paradigm shift. It assumes that there is always a prevailing paradigm at any one time, which eventually develops anomalies. As a result, rival competing paradigms emerge to address the existing anomalies. The rival paradigms may either lead to rejection of the prevailing one or occasion replacements or additions to parts of it. The process then leads to the development of new paradigms, which for this study are new security strategies.

The process is cyclic and continuous, as the new paradigm becomes the prevailing one. The five steps are illustrated below.

⁷⁵Mwagiru M, ed, *Human Security: Setting The Agenda For The Horn of Africa*. Africa Peace Forum, Nairobi, 2008,p.4

Illustration 1. Model of the paradigm shift



Source: Developed by author, deriving from Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigm rejection.

1.6 Hypothesis

1. There are changes and continuities in the content and structure of national security strategies in East Africa.
2. The paradigm shift has influenced the content and structure of a regional security strategy in East African Community.
3. The impact of the paradigm shift on security strategies at the national and regional levels is dependent on decision makers' interests.

1.7 Study Methodology

The study entails a case study analysis conducted through the structured focused comparison approach. This is a qualitative method used to study a group of cases. It involves more than one case at a time (five states for this study) to derive comparable data across the cases which can then be generalized to constitute one case(the EAC) . It entails the development of general research questions that reflect the research objectives, which are administered uniformly to each case. This helps to standardize data collection and make systematic comparisons and analysis of the findings. It is focused to deal with certain aspects of the cases.⁷⁶

The study covers the five East African Community states of Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania. The study design involves an exploration of the subject matter over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection from multiple sources of information. The periods elected straddles from the date of revival of the East African Community (1999) when the membership was the three states of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. It also includes the date of admission of Rwanda and Burundi (2007) up to 2013 when the data collection and analysis was completed. However, reference is made to events in history that have a bearing on the objectives of the study.

The sampling technique applied is purposive aimed at studying states of close geographic proximity with similar characteristics that include; similar security concerns, close diplomatic and trade ties, and belonging to one regional security community. This facilitates the analysis of national and regional security dynamics and security cooperation of the states. The five states comprise both inclusive and contradictory

⁷⁶Alexander L.G.& Andrew B, *Case Studies Development in the Social Sciences*, MIT Press, Cambridge,2005,pp.67-73.

samples. The inclusive sample comprises of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania that have a long history of security cooperation and similar British colonial heritage, whereas, the contradictory sample are Rwanda and Burundi that have short history of formal cooperation with the other three states and are of a different colonial heritage. However, at times, reference is made to states beyond the sample due to the complex interdependent nature of states relations.

1.7.1 Data Collection

The subject matter of security draws a lot of suspicions and secrecy, which limits the study techniques that can be effectively applied in data collection. Consequently, this study was conducted through the triangulation of three data collection techniques; in-depth key informant interviews, content analysis of key government policy documents and archival research. Triangulation refers to the application of more than one method to examine research questions to enhance the validity of the findings. It helps to address the biases of using one method of study and to counter check data collected from each method.⁷⁷

Primary Techniques and Sources

The in-depth key informant interviews aimed to gather expert information, through elicitation of views and opinions of sampled persons from the five countries. The sample targeted informants working or previously worked in the security sector in their official and unofficial capacities. The informants constituted those with practical experience and knowledge on security strategy at the national and regional levels. They include security personnel, diplomats and other relevant government technocrats. At the East African

⁷⁷ Sabina Y., Khan F.R., Triangulation Research Method as a Tool of Social Science Research, *BUP Journal*, vol.1.issue.1,September,2012,pp 1-10.

Community, the target was staff working in the peace and security department within the EAC Secretariat.

The second category of key informants targeted non-government independent sources whose information was to test the veracity of the information from official sources. This category includes; academics, researchers, think tanks and activists. The sampling of the key informants combined both purposeful and snowballing techniques. Whereby, the sampled informants at times referred the researcher to other persons with knowledge in the issues.

The data was collected through qualitative methods, bearing in mind that the research sought mainly expert knowledge and the caliber of the informants would not be confined to yes or no questions. The study developed and utilized a key informant discussion guide for deriving research questions that were administered during face-to-face discussion with the sampled informants drawn from the five East African Community states.

During the data collection, consideration was given to the lack of homogeneity in the practice and thinking of security strategy in the sampled states. This entailed the development of standardized open-ended questions that reflected the study's conceptual framework and the research objectives to ensure that both comparable and exclusive data was obtained. This were necessary to facilitate comparisons/contrasts and systematic analysis of the data across the five states. The in-depth interview guide was structured into two sections; the first part covered national security strategy whereas the other part covered regional security strategy.⁷⁸

Forty- seven (47) key informants were interviewed for the study, Eight (8) from each of the five EAC Partner states. In each state five informants were drawn from security

⁷⁸ See annexed in-depth interview guide.

practitioners within government and the others from independent sources⁷⁹. Most of the key informants requested for non-attribution as a condition for participating in the study.

The study also collected data through content analysis⁸⁰ of security policy and strategy documents at the national level and those of the EAC. The sampling of the documents at the national level was purposefully restricted to covering similar official government texts and policy documents in the five states. The documents studied included; the countries constitutions, national security acts, national security strategies or policies, foreign policies, defense policies, economic policies/visions and Acts of various security agencies. In addition, available official speeches of key government policy and decision makers on security issues were analyzed.

On EAC regional security strategy, all available documents developed by the EAC Secretariat relating to peace and security were assessed. These include; the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC, the Strategy for EAC Regional Peace and Security, EAC Protocol on Peace and Security, EAC Early Warning Mechanism and the EAC Draft Conflict Prevention, Managements and Resolution Mechanism. In addition, EAC meeting/conference/workshop reports contributed to the data. These were cross-referenced with African Union Peace and Security Architecture Frameworks from which regional organizations draw their mandate on issues of peace and security.

Data was also derived from joint agreements and treaties ratified by the EAC Partner states and where necessary linked or compared with documents of other regional and international organizations. This is because of the overlapping memberships to regional

⁷⁹ See Bibliography for list of the key informants.

⁸⁰Alexander L.G.& Andrew B, *Case Studies Development in the Social Science*, opcit.p.127.

originations by the EAC Partner States and the complex interdependence of security cooperation that straddles beyond the EAC region.

Secondary Sources

This entailed archival review of secondary sources published and unpublished. These included; academic books, journals, periodicals, reports and internet sources. Similarly, print media coverage, conference/workshop reports provided data for the study. Review of publications of key non -governmental organizations, think tanks and research organizations was also undertaken.

1.7.2 Data analysis Techniques and Presentation

The data analysis entailed triangulation of the three forms of data collected; the narratives, the content analysis of primary documents and archival analysis from secondary sources.

The data collected from the in-depth interviews was in the form of narratives recorded verbatim in both audio and written format. The data analysis process was broken down into three steps; firstly, it involved transcribing the audio data into written form and arranging the data in order of the research questions and the corresponding responses. This step involved the sorting of data into various categories and themes. The second step entailed comparing the data from the five states to arrive at similarities and differences. This was achieved through open coding by collating the data and identifying categories with similar or different properties and dimensions.

The third step utilized the axial coding technique to make the connections between the different identified categories after which the data was compiled. The fourth step involved linking the two sets of primary data from the in-depth interviews with data

from the content analysis, which were further enriched with the data collected from the secondary sources. This data is presented in various themes in the six chapters, where each chapter addresses a key study objective. The data is presented mainly in narrative form, tables and illustrations are used where necessary to show relationships and comparisons of the variables.

1.7.3 Ethical Considerations

The research adheres to the principle of informed consent from all its key informants as an important guide in research ethics throughout the study from data collection to the presentation of the research findings. Similarly, the study gives due diligence and maintains the confidentiality of records and identities of participants who required such protection.

Additionally, the study sought authority to use relevant official documents, including the acquisition of relevant research licenses. The research was guided by existing legislations on the conduct of research in the five countries of study. This study also adheres to academic honesty and objectivity by acknowledging the authors/sources of all materials and references that are cited throughout the study. This is done to the best knowledge of this researcher.

1.8 Chapter Outline

Chapter one is the revised proposal that discussed the background to the study of the paradigm shift in rethinking of national and regional security strategy in East Africa. It stated the research problem and outlined the research objectives. The chapter then examined the literature on the concept of the paradigm shift, both the traditional and

contemporary paradigmatic debates in conceptualization of security and literature on national and regional security strategy. The chapter outlined the literature gap, the framework of analysis that this study will adopt,(the paradigm shift model adopted from Thomas Kuhn). The chapter elaborated the study methodology, study hypothesis and explained the chapter outline.

Chapter two surveys the conceptual issues of security strategy at the national and regional levels; it contextualizes the paradigm shifts in rethinking strategy at the two levels of national and regional. This chapter discusses what constitutes contemporary national and regional security strategies, actors and factors that blur their thinking and practice. The chapter utilizes the paradigmatic shift model developed in chapter one to assess the conceptual shift in thinking and practice of both national and regional security strategies. The chapter establishes that this shift is occasioned by the perceived anomalies within the traditional security paradigms that render them ineffective to explain the changing dynamics within the security discourse. This is necessitating their rejection or replacement by their non-traditional competitors who offer more viable theorizing in the changing times. At the regional level the chapter articulated the shift in the models for assessing regional security strategy that are drifting from the security community to the regional security complex model.

Chapter three examines the main issues state considers in formulation, implementation and coordination of national and regional security strategies. It explores those aspects of security strategy that appear to have universal application. These discussions laid the foundation for chapter four which examines the factors that influence national security strategy and how the East African states of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda,

Tanzania, and Uganda formulate, implement and coordinate their national and regional security strategies.

Chapter four examines securitization and national security strategy processes in the five EAC Partner States. It assesses the security interests of each state and analyzes their existing securitization frameworks. Specifically the Chapter assesses key factors that influence security strategy processes including the national interests, securitization frameworks, the multiplicity of actors, the prevailing environment in the states and in the international system. The study reveals similarities as well as some differences. The states of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda share several security concerns at the national, regional and global levels but also have some peculiar security interests unique to some of them and not envisaged by the other states.

This Chapter is a collation and analysis of data collected during in-depth discussions with key informants in the five EAC states. Similarly, the Chapter undertook a content analysis of key government documents including the Countries Constitutions, National Security Acts, National Security Policies and Strategies, Defence, Police and Intelligence Acts and Foreign policies available in the respective countries. In addition, the chapter cross-referenced the data collected with secondary sources of information.

Chapter five examines the formulation, coordination and implementation of EAC Regional security strategy as articulated in the EAC Frameworks for peace and security. The Chapter applies the Regional Security Complex Theory to the EAC Region and confirms its utility in understanding the security interdependence of the states. The chapter discusses key themes that are vital in envisioning a security strategy at the regional level.

Chapter Six seeks to tie all the five Chapters together. It assesses the key themes flowing through the Chapters and tests the research objectives and hypothesis. The chapter also applies the model of the paradigmatic shift developed in Chapter one which is the central pillar of the research to demonstrate continuities and changes in security strategy at the national and regional levels. Finally, chapter seven provides the conclusions and areas for future research.

CHAPTER TWO

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

2.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the conceptual issues of what constitutes contemporary national and regional security strategies and the main actors. It also addresses the factors that blur the thinking and practice of security strategies. A key concern is the lack of a comprehensive theory to guide these processes in the light of key transformations within the discourse. This includes the tendency to embrace non-traditional aspects of security and non-state actors in national and regional security strategy processes.

At the regional levels, the security concerns of states are increasingly becoming interdependent making it impossible for a state to consider its security in isolation. This compels states to formulate cooperation strategies on matters of mutual interest. It is at the regional levels where security mechanisms have been developed and precedents on security cooperation set in the post-cold war era.

The chapter utilizes the paradigmatic model developed in chapter one to assess the conceptual shift in thinking and practice of both security strategies. This shift has been occasioned by the perceived anomalies within the traditional paradigms that have rendered them ineffective to explain the changing dynamics within the discourse. This necessitates their rejection or replacement by their competitors that offer more viable alternatives for application in the changing times with the evolving security challenges facing states.

The chapter demonstrates the conceptual shift due to the inherent anomalies in the three-legged stool model for understanding national security strategy which leads to its

rejection and modifications to a four-legged stool with a band that is more comprehensive model for contemporary national security strategy. The chapter also lays the foundation for the discussion on the formulation, implementation and coordination of national and regional security strategies in chapter three.

2.1 Conceptualizing National Security Strategy

Like many other social science terms, national security strategy is a contested concept. In recent times, purely military thinking on national security strategy have been disputed by non-military security professionals, resulting in numerous definitions of the term that seek to expand it beyond the military doctrine and to reflect the evolving realities within the security sector. In general, terms national security strategy comprises of all plans designed to protect the state and its citizens from internal and external threats. It also refers to a variety of continuous activities which states undertake to enhance their national security that include organizing, mobilizing and deploying resources to address specific threats¹.

National security strategy also referred to as grand strategy is the art and science of developing, applying and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Generally, national security strategy is concerned with the use of a state's capabilities and requires the development and application of all the states elements of national power comprising both internal and external components of the state. National security strategy lays out broad objectives and directions for the use of all the instruments of power that guide the development of

¹Sarkesian S., et.al. (eds) *United States Domestic and National Security Agenda into the Twenty First Century*, Greenwood Press, London, 1994, pp.3-5

subordinate strategies and implementation plans. Grand strategy is a vision of how a state intends to protect its national interests and to survive in the external environment².

States and non-state actors have their own interests that they pursue. These are broadly categorized in terms of those interest that ensure their survival, economic well-being, a favorable world order and the promotion of national values. Therefore, the role of a national security strategy is to ensure the pursuit, protection and advancement of these national interests in an organized and optimal manner. National security strategy is concerned with choices that reflect a specific preference for an option over another and this determines the type of plans implemented to achieve the set security objectives. A sound national security strategy will aim to address concerns regarding the specific states' adversaries, its allies and other actors. It ought to also adequately, address resource allocation and the organizational skills vital for the successful implementation of strategies that will protect and enhance the national interests of the state.

Besides its definition, the thinking and practice of national security strategy is evolving over time. The term national security strategy has a military heritage, originating from a Greek word *strategos*, which gave a strictly military connotation to strategy. This is because its classical usage referred to the deployment of military maneuvers and tactics in waging war. This traditional military orientation is gradually giving way to more inclusive interpretations. Contemporary strategists include not only the military element of power but also other elements of power that include economics, diplomacy and politics. With this inevitable inclusiveness, the term national security strategy is increasingly applied outside the military context. It is therefore imperative that

² Boone Bartholomees, (eds) *US War College Guide to National Security: Theory of War and Strategy*, vol.1, Strategic Studies Institute, 2012, p.13-17. www.studiesinstitute.army.mil

the contemporary definition, thinking and practice reflect this new usage. Its interpretation ought to include both military and non- military elements of national power. The term security strategy should be equally applicable during times of peace and in wartime³.

National security strategy presents a state's plan on how it will coordinate the use of all its instruments of state power. These include military and non-military instruments or both the tangible and intangible aspects to pursue national objectives, to defend and advance its national interests. This is also a process that is intended to result in a state's declaration of how it intends to achieve national security objectives at the domestic and external security environments⁴. Caudle contends that a state's grand strategy refers to the thinking that describes how that state views the world, envisions how it should be and describes a set of policy options that can help to achieve that vision. Therefore, a state's grand strategy links its long-term objectives to the short and medium term ones and prioritizes among the many competing threats and opportunities that are often contradictory goals. Grand strategy also offers trade-offs between the various competing interests and priorities.⁵

Therefore, national security strategy entails more than the use of military forces and requires the development and application of all states elements of national power. Security strategy has both internal and external components. This means national security strategy can either focus inwards seeking to reduce the vulnerability of the state caused

³ Williamson Murray et.al., *Introduction on Strategy; In Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War*, Cambridge University Press,1997,pp.21-24.

⁴ Richard B. Doherty, The USA National Security Strategy: Policy, Process and Problems, *Public Administration Review*., No.67.vol.4,July/ Aug 2007, pp.624-643.

⁵ Caudle Sharon, National Security Strategies: Security from what, for whom and by what means, *Journal for Homeland Security and Emergency Management*, Vol.6. Issue.1, 2009 pp.9-18.

by its internal dynamics or it may focus outwards seeking to reduce external threats by addressing their sources.⁶ Jablonsky sees national security strategy as the employment of specific instruments of power to achieve the state's political, economic, diplomatic and military objectives in cooperation or in competition with other states and non-state actors pursuing their own interest possibly conflicting interests. At all levels national security strategy will be defined as the calculation of national objectives, concepts and resources which are then deployed within the acceptable bounds to safeguard the national interests. It also entails undertaking a risk assessment to create a more favorable outcome with fewer risks than might otherwise exist by chance or at the hands of other actors.⁷

Therefore, the role of national security strategy is to ensure that the pursuit, protection or advancement of the national interests of the state is accomplished in a coherent, efficient and optimal manner. A state will formulate and implement its national security strategy based on its national goals, a vision of its future, an understanding of its place in the international system now and in future and an assessment of the alternatives available and its given resources.⁸

Snider asserts that a combination of the national interests, strategic culture and an understanding of a state's security concerns is vital in arriving at its national security strategy and therefore security strategies are specifically designed to cause security⁹. For Doyle national security strategy represents a state's plan for the coordinated use of all the instruments of state power to pursue objectives that defend and advance the national

⁶Buzan B., *People States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security in the Post-Cold War Era*, Britain, Harvester Wheat sheaf, 1991, pp. 112-140.

⁷Jablonsky David, *Why Is Strategy Difficult?* Carlisle Barracks, PA, Strategic Studies Institute , 1992, p.10.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹Snider M. Don, *The National Security Strategy , Documenting Strategic Vision*, Carlisle, PA Strategic Studies Institute, USA, March, 1995.p.2.

interest. National security strategy describes a planned systematic and rational process shaped by organizations culture, governmental structures and leaders. This process results in a states written public, authoritative declaration about the manner in which it intends to achieve its security objectives within both the international system and its domestic security environment.¹⁰

Similarly, Krasner sees grand strategy as the conceptual framing that describes how the world is, envisions how it ought to be and specifies sets of policies that can help to achieve that strategy. Grand strategy is also a unifying concept that guides or directs all other national security related policies. It may also be viewed as a state's national intent. National Security strategy is about making choices, which also presupposes a sound judgment from those concerned so as to arrive at the best available option. Therefore the concept of rationality is a central pillar in national security strategy.¹¹ Bull agrees by stating that many governments' decisions regarding peace and war are not always a product of careful weighing of priorities or events and selecting the best available option/strategy that is cost effective. In reality most government decisions and actions are preoccupied with the day to day survival of the governments that they are lacking in long term considerations and planning. Thus, questioning the use of rationality in arriving at national security strategy and implementing its objectives. National security strategy will therefore be affected by the shortcomings of decision maker's rationality in formulation, implementation and coordination of security strategy mainly because, strategic policy

¹⁰ Doyle Richard, The USA National Security Strategy: Policy, Process, Problems, *Public Administration Review*, No.67, Vol.4 July 2007, P.624.

¹¹ Krasner Stephen, An Orienting Principle of Foreign Policy, *Policy Review*, No.163, October, 2010. p.1.

makers are not always capable of ordering their security priorities in the right manner and are at times also incapable of making rational choices.¹²

There are also other factors that undermine the state's ability to choose national security strategies that would maximize their security priorities. For instance, national security strategy lacks a comprehensive theory to guide the process of its design, implementation and coordination. As a consequence, national security strategy is viewed in various ways depending on the perspectives that is of focus at any one time. National Security strategy is often thought of in relation to national security policy and security planning. There are two broad views of national security strategy in relation to national security policy; first is the view that strategy is a foundation of policy and second is the contention that strategy directs policy. Deibel supports the first assertion by viewing strategy as an input to the policy process that guides plans to direct policy and determines what the government says and does.¹³ In contrast Gray states that strategy is what directs policy and defines strategy as the use of force and the threat to use force for the ends of policy. He further advocates for permanent dialogue between the policy maker and the strategist which is not often the case in the actual practice in formulation and articulation of national security strategy.¹⁴ In agreement, Marcella and Fought describe strategy as the art of applying power to achieve objectives within the limits of a particular policy and that policy often limits strategy. They contend that national security strategy is developed

¹² Hedley Bull, *Strategic Studies and Its Critics*, World Politics,20,No.4,July 1968,p.597.

¹³Deibel Terry, *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic For American State Craft* ,New York, Cambridge University Press,2007,p.10.

¹⁴Colin S.G, *Modern Strategy*, New York, Oxford University Press,1999, pp.17-23.

and exists at various levels: the tactical, operational and the strategic level and is always accompanied with limitations to freedoms and actions.¹⁵

On his part, Yarger distinguishes between national security policy and strategy when he states that policy and strategy give purpose and direction to any state. However, policy is derived through a political process, while, strategy is formulated from a disciplined strategic thought process founded on theory and practice. The practice of both will vary from state to another and even within the state organs in one state¹⁶. Regarding this relationship, Lykke draws a distinction between the two by asserting that national security policy constitutes the guiding principles that justify the application of national resources to achieve objectives that can promote the national interests of a state. In contrast national security strategy is the art of applying military, economic and diplomatic power to achieve objectives within the limits of a states' policy. He asserts that policy outlines the issues that a state sets out to address, whereas strategy will lay out how the issues will be dealt with.¹⁷ Similarly, Andre Beaufre contends that overall national security strategy should incorporate and coordinate the political, economic and military instruments of policy. On his part Kissinger argued that at every stage of strategy formulation, consideration should be given to a combination of political, economic and military factors to replace traditional consideration of purely military and political issues for there is no policy that can be purely military. Therefore he states that a separation of security strategy and policy can only be achieved to the detriment of both since they are

¹⁵Gabriel Marcella & Stephen Fought, *Teaching Strategy in the 21st Century*, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue no.52,1st,2009,p.57.

¹⁶Yarger R Harry, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, Westport, Praeger, 2008, p.15.

¹⁷Lykke Arthur, *Towards an Undertaking of Military Strategy*: In *Military Strategy; Theory and Application*, Carlisle Barracks, PA, USA Army War College, 1989,pp.3-8.

all characterized by an overlap of political, economic, psychological and military factors.¹⁸

Likewise, Clausewitz wrote that strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of war and that war was continuation of policy, in his thinking strategy refers to the use made of military force and the threat of force to achieve specific objectives of policy¹⁹. On his part, Sun Tzu did not directly define strategy but outlined aspects of its practice, for Sun Tzu war, was a matter of vital importance to any state but he advocated for the use of deception as a way to win a war without armed combat between adversaries.²⁰ In this case Sun Tzu's deception was all about good strategy.

In terms of hierarchy, Yarger states that national security policy will rank above national security strategy if they are addressing the same state interests or issues on the same level, but policy may also be subordinate to grand strategy depending on the context. He further asserts that, both strategy and policy will be formulated through the same process but serves different purposes within the state. However, policy doesn't have to be in conformity with any theory, while strategy must adhere to theory. Strategy will be subordinate to political guidance but can be a source of policy. Consequently, policy may require a new strategy, modification on an existing one, or provide for new guidelines to some aspects of strategy.²¹

Separately, Posen et.al categorize national security strategy as either offensive or defensive and seek to examine the reasons a state chooses one or the other. A state's

¹⁸ Kissinger Henry, *Diplomacy*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994, pp.804-836.

¹⁹ Clausewitz, *On War*, Translation By Michael Howard & Peter Paret, (eds) Princeton University Press, USA, 1976, p.177.

²⁰ Sun Tzu, *The Art Of War*, Translation By Samuel Griffith, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp.73.

²¹ Yarger R Harry, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, Westport, Praeger, 2008, p.25.

security strategy may be defensive or inward looking seeking to reduce the states vulnerabilities from security threats coming from outside its state territory and within its boundaries. Such a national security strategy will aim for instance, to improve the social, political environment and address the causes of its internal and external threats. National security strategy is offensive when it seeks to confront actual threats and to recover from injury caused by other actors that may be localized within state boundaries or from outside its territory. For strategy to be complete it should incorporate both aspects. Consequently, a state's national security strategy whether offensive or defensive will seek cooperation or lead to competition or result to conflict with the state and non state actors involved or affected in the process.²²

In terms of its formulation national security strategy will take two forms; either as an art or as a science. Yarger distinguishes between strategy as an art from strategy as a science by stating that, as an art strategy entails the ability to appreciate the strategic dots and be able to connect them in a consequential manner. Whereas, the science of strategy encompasses the body of knowledge in history, international relations, diplomacy, economics, ethics, psychology among others that will always inform the strategic art. The science of strategy entails understanding of strategy formulation, coordination, implementation, theorizing and better understanding of the processes involved. National security strategy is thus perceived to be synonymous with the art and science of developing and using all the elements of national power during peace and war to secure the national interests²³. In concurrence, Foster contends that as an art, national security

²² Posen Barry, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars* New York, Cornell University Press, 1984, p.68.

²³ Harry Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, Westport, Praeger, 2008, p.6.

strategy is a realm where talented leaders intuitively arrive at grand solutions to complex issues of foreign policy and war, this is rather idealistic. As a science, national security strategy is that which is observable, can be theorized and can be improved through more study and practice, therefore national security strategy becomes the art or science of developing and using the political, social, economic, socio-psychological and military powers available to a state in accordance with policy objectives to achieve results and set out conditions to protect and advance a states national interests, in relation to other states, non-state actors and the prevailing circumstances.²⁴ Jomini following the same trend, saw national security strategy as the art of making war, and elaborated that strategy decides where to wage the war, whereas, logistics will bring the troops to the war front, good tactics will decide the manner of employment and execution of a successful war²⁵. Similarly, Betts defines national security strategy as a plan for using military means to meet political objectives. Strategy is the essential ingredient for making war politically or morally tenable. It is also the link between political ends and military means. Without a national security strategy there is no rationale for how force or other state resources will achieve intended objectives.²⁶

In contrast Hart who wrote at a time when the concept was undergoing transformation to include non-military aspects defined national security strategy as the art of distributing and applying military or other means to fulfill the ends of policy. He asserted that the success of policy depended on the accurate calculation and coordination

²⁴Foster Gregory D., A Conceptual Foundation for a Theory of Strategy *'The Washington Quarterly*, Winter, 1990, p.43-56.

²⁵Antoine Henri Jomini, *The Art Of War*, translated By Mendell G.H. & Craighill W.P., Greenwood Press, USA, 1971, p.62.

²⁶Richard Betts, Is Strategy An Illusion ? *International Security*, Vol.25, No.2, Fall 2000, p.5-18.

of the ends and the means. Hart was talking mainly of military strategy.²⁷ At variance is Gray who sees national security strategy as the use of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy.²⁸ This definition ends up linking strategy to force and assuming that war is the same as strategy, hence inadequate in covering all aspects of security strategy.

Similarly, Eccles describes strategy as the comprehensive direction of states national power to control situations and areas in order to attain national objectives. Its main purpose is to control and national security strategy is mainly concerned with the application of power.²⁹ For Yarger national security strategy is the pursuit, protection and advancement of the national interests through the application of the instruments of power. National security strategy is a choice that reflects a preference for a certain future condition. It is also about how a state's leadership will use the power available to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve goals that support the particular states objectives. National security strategy provides direction for the coercive or persuasive use of power to achieve specified objectives. It seeks to control the environment as opposed to reacting to it. It is both proactive and anticipatory.³⁰

In contrast national security strategy is seen as the calculation of national objectives, concepts and resources within acceptable bounds of risks to create favorable outcomes that may otherwise exist by chance. It is also a prudent idea or set of ideals for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated way to enhance theater, national and multinational objectives.³¹ Similarly, Kugler sees national

²⁷Lindel Hart, *The Art Of War*, Translation By Samuel Griffith, Oxford University Press, 1973, p.366

²⁸ Gray Colin, *Modern Strategy*, New York, Oxford University Press,1999,p.17.

²⁹Henry Eccles ,*Military Concepts and Philosophy*, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press,1965, p.48.

³⁰Yarger, In Henry Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy*.,op.cit.

³¹*Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington DC, USA Joint Staff, April, 12, 2002, p.518.

security strategy as a disciplined process with clearly defined outputs that serve a national political purpose formulated and implemented in a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment. National security strategy is futuristic and seeks to define security problems and ways to avoid them, it does so through appraising the existing conditions so as to determine and select key factors that must be addressed to achieve that states particular interests³². In contrast United States War College states that national security strategy is a problem solving process and also a common logical approach to any issue of military or national security nature.³³

On his part Foster contends that national security strategy is the purview of political leaders and is a world view that represents both the national consensus and a specific comprehensive direction through which the leadership ensures and maintains its control and influence through the hierarchical nature of strategy. National security strategy cascades from the national level through stated policy statements and national security strategies down to the lowest levels. This hierarchical nature of strategy represents a means of delegating responsibility and authority among senior leadership. The above debates help to demonstrate in part the shift in the thinking of security strategy.³⁴

On his part, Betts sees strategy as a multilayered chain of relationships linking policy and power that covers grand strategy, foreign policy, military strategy among others. Grand strategy is associated with actions at the state level or a country's broadest

³²Kugler Richard, *Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs*, Washington DC; National Defense University Press, 2006, pp.12-16.

³³Boone Bartholomees, (eds) *US War College Guide To National Security: Theory Of War And Strategy*, Vol.1., Strategic Studies Institute, 2012, p.17. www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.Army.Mil.

³⁴Gregory D. Foster, A Conceptual Foundation for a Theory on Strategy, *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter, 1990, p.43.

approach to the pursuit of its national objectives.³⁵ A successful strategy considers all elements of national power, even if some elements contribute minimally to the grand strategy.³⁶ In concurrence, Marshall states that national security strategy implies a planned, systematic and rational process where considerations of national interests, values and priorities decide policy objectives, while the analysis of the available resources and external security environment will determine the strategy to achieve these objectives.³⁷

2.2 Conceptualizing Regional Security Strategy

A region may be defined as a group of states which are located in a geographical proximity to one another and have security interactions between each other directly or indirectly. The general appreciation of what constitutes a region will reflect the desires, perceptions and at times prejudices of those states that are within a core group of regional initiatives. Ultimately, regional security strategy is a culmination of deliberate policy choices that are key to increasing the economic and political activity among a group of states. These choices are carefully selected, negotiated and agreed upon through long drawn diplomatic initiatives as constituting mutual interests or threats of concerns of the group of states to necessitate security cooperation.³⁸

Underlying regional security strategy is the assumption that regional states share geographic proximity and a degree of interdependence that compels them to cooperate on issues of mutual interest. These states can easily and more effectively address common

³⁵ Richard Betts, Is Strategy An Illusion ? International Security, Vol.25, No.2,Fall 2000,p.5.

³⁶ Robert Dorff H, *A Primer In Strategy Development*, In USA Army War College Guide To Strategy

³⁷ Marshall George, *National Security Strategy : Processes And Structures* ,2003, European Centre For Security Studies. [Http://www.Marshallcenter.Org/Site](http://www.Marshallcenter.Org/Site), Accessed 28.08.12.

³⁸ Buzan B.& Weaver O., *Regions and Powers, The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2003,pp.40-43.

problems because they are closer to the problems and are presumed to share the same background and approaches. Craig supports this assertion by stating that states within a geographic region look at their neighbors as potential sources of threats or protection and have hence sought to devise rules and norms to regulate the behavior of states within their particular localities. States also fear their neighbors more and are likely to ally with other regional actors to address their fears.³⁹

Several other factors have a bearing on regional security strategy including; firstly, political issues such as, identity or shared perceptions of a region, either, internal within a state or externally shared by the states of the region. Regional security strategy is driven more by the external perceptions of member states, for instance a common security or economic threat will compel states to devise a joint strategy. Buzan et.al see the region as the most appropriate level for understanding issues relating to both international security and politics. They contend that the relational nature of security threats renders it ineffective to understand a states' national security patterns without consideration of the patterns of regional security interdependence of that particular state. They posit that the regional level is where most successful security arrangements have been achieved and are currently taking place. The region is where most security mechanisms have been developed and precedents for solutions have been set. In the post-cold war era the region stands out as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states and as the level of analysis for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security issues. They illustrate that security threats were the most common form of external threat along which states entered into regional initiatives, until the 1990s when two other concerns merged;

³⁹Craig Snyder, Regional Security Structures, In Craig Snyder *Contemporary Security and Strategy* Routledge, New York,1999,p.102.

that of fear of creation of rival trade blocs that would limit market access and to lobby against marginalization in world affairs.⁴⁰

Buzan observes that threats travel more easily over short distances than over long distances, hence the need for regional security strategy to address localized threats within a region. He also asserts that global threats can have different effects in specific regions. For instance, at times such threats may lead to conflict in some regions and cause increased cooperation in other regions. Therefore regions are likely to suffer the same consequences from global threats necessitating the need to cooperation amongst states within a region because, their national securities cannot be considered separate from each other. Physical adjacency tends to generate interactions among neighbors than among states located in different regions and the impact of geo-proximity on security interactions is strongest in the military, political and the environmental sectors than in the economic sectors.⁴¹

2.3 Paradigmatic Shift in the thinking and Practice of National Security Strategy

Currently, there are two prevailing broad categories of thinking about national security strategy; the traditional and contemporary⁴². The shift from one perspective to the other is premised on the contemporary schools perspectives assertions that the traditional schools have developed serious anomalies and can therefore not be viable perspectives in thinking and practicing national security strategy in an era of globalization.

⁴⁰Buzan Barry& Ole Weaver, *Regions and Powers; The Structure Of International Security*, Cambridge University Press, 200, pp. 27-37.

⁴¹Buzan Barry , *People States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era*, (2nded) Harvester Wheatsheaf,1991, pp. 187-188.

⁴² A comprehensive literature on the traditional and contemporary security is in chapter one.

Consequently, purely military thinking and applications of national security strategy are fading away due to their incapacity to incorporate the emerging issues, expanding scope and practice of security that straddles across periods of war and peace and involves non-traditional actors in formulation, implementation and coordination processes. As the thinking of national security strategy has widened to consider political, military, societal, environmental and economic components the monopoly of the subject to military personnel has also tended to disappear. In concurrence, Garnet observes that since the Second World War most security strategic thought has not been generated by military officers but by civilians from universities and research institutions, and that the modern age places emphasis on non-violent approaches to conflict situations as opposed to military strategies.⁴³ This is a major departure, from the traditional perspectives that were generated by military strategists.

In applying Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigm shift, anomalies inherent in the traditional military centric perspectives have rendered them ineffective in addressing contemporary security concerns. As a result new perspectives have arisen that seek to incorporate some aspects of the traditional thinking as well as, to broaden and deepen the thinking of national security strategy. These perspectives seem better than their competitors and their new thinking is gradually being embraced by more practitioners and academics. These rival perspectives target to replace the traditional thinking in totality with new perspectives. This is akin to replacing or rejecting the key traditional assumptions with new thinking or in Kuhnian thinking a paradigmatic shift is taking place in the national security strategy process.⁴⁴

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Chapter one described the conceptual framework of the paradigm shift.

Similarly, national security strategy is increasingly becoming more concerned with the attainment and maintenance of peace than it is about military maneuvers and tactics for waging successful wars. Increasingly, national security strategies are being formulated, implemented and coordinated for the purposes of managing peace amongst communities and states so as to avert war as opposed to the traditional strategies which were developed to wage successful war. Clearly then, there has been a shift in thinking from formulating strategies to win wars, to developing strategies to prevent wars. Despite the above, modern strategists are still alive to the fact that failure to maintain the peace will resort to the formulation of strategies to wage war, which should be as a last resort, not the main objective of national security strategy.⁴⁵ Consequently, the practice of national security strategy should utilize the peacetime applications of national security strategy and locate military force within the general context of security policy making to take care of failure of the former.

The shift to new thinking is however confronted with continued stay of some key concepts from the traditional perspectives or what Kuhn calls paradigmatic defense. This is because some traditional key assumptions continue to guide contemporary national security strategy. For instance, in the post-cold war era, the primacy of some of the assumptions of realism, have withstood the rigors of paradigmatic shift and have been incorporated into contemporary national security strategy. Among the factors that account for this situation is the indisputable role and use of key realist concepts that include the elements of national power, national interest, and grand strategy among

⁴⁵Garnet John, Strategic Studies and its Assumptions: In *Contemporary Strategy I: Theories and Concepts*, New York, Routledge, pp. 4-7.

others.⁴⁶ The assumption that every state will be guided by its national interest in the formulation, articulation and implementation of its national security strategy is core to the realist view of states relations.⁴⁷

Despite the survival of some concepts of the traditional thinking, the differences in the key assumptions of the traditional and contemporary perspectives are unreconcilable. This will ultimately lead to the replacement or rejection of parts of the traditional thinking. This is in line with Kuhn's thinking that a paradigm may be replaced in whole or in part by a new competing paradigm that seems better in terms of explaining the prevailing situation. Consequently the replacement in part or whole of the traditional perspectives will necessitate the development of new strategies that reflecting the paradigmatic shift. These strategies must reflect the new thinking and guide the practice of formulation, implementation and articulation of the national security strategy.

In thinking about national security strategy, Lykke articulates a framework for explaining national security strategy based on a three legged stool model. The three legs represent means, ways and ends. The means consists of the available national resources for implementing a national security strategy; the ways represent the concepts for achieving the set objectives of security strategy whereas the ends comprise the objectives of the strategy. A valid strategy should have an appropriate balance of the above objectives, concepts and resources or its success will be at risk. Lykke argues that if any leg of the stool is out of balance there will be risks to the strategy, which will necessitate making necessary amendments to the legs (means, ends and ways). This may require the

⁴⁶Chapter four assesses the East Africa states national security strategies to demonstrate the continued use of these concepts of national interests and elements of national power.

⁴⁷Chapter three gives a detailed account on national security strategy formulation, implementation and coordination processes and actors.

addition of more resources, the use of different concepts, changing the objectives of the strategy or accepting the inherent risks and preparing to address their consequences. Lykke offers a paradigm which describes the basic questions to ask and the rules to follow in security strategy formulation and implementation. Lykke's model best explains security in the traditional security paradigm that is military centric and may be of limited value in explaining contemporary security strategy. The model requires either replacement or modifications to be of utility.⁴⁸

In contrast, Mwangi articulates a paradigmatic shift of thinking and practice from the traditional three legged stool to a four legged stool model. His three-legged stool represents three bases for national power; the economic, military and diplomatic which are vital for formulation and implementation of national security strategy. Mwangi contends that despite its utility the model is formulated in the traditional paradigm that is military centric ignoring emerging contemporary security concerns especially those of the third world states and does not provide for a coordination mechanism for national security strategy. These inherent anomalies in the three-legged model necessitate its rejection or modifications by firstly, adding a fourth leg to represent the contemporary security concerns including societal, environmental among other concerns. The second modification is to include a band running round the stool to hold the four legs firmly together to ensure its stability. This band represents the coordination mechanism that should be inbuilt within national security strategy, a shift from the traditional thinking where coordination was assumed and not articulated. In the Kuhnian sense the four

⁴⁸Lykke Arthur, Towards an Undertaking of Military Strategy: In *Military Strategy; Theory and Application*, Carlisle Barracks, PA, USA Army War College, 1989,pp.45-52.

legged stool represents a conceptual shift to modify a paradigm that develops anomalies and replace it with a new one that can better explain emerging concerns.⁴⁹

2.4 Paradigmatic Shift in thinking and practice of Regional Security Strategy

Paradigmatic shift within regional security strategy can be demonstrated by tracing the evolving developments that have spanned changes in thinking and practice from the traditional purely regional economic communities to security communities to the ongoing shift to regional security complexes. Similarly, in contemplating a modern regional security strategy within the paradigmatic shift, it is vital to appreciate the cold war pattern of international politics. This is because, most existing strategies and concepts were developed in response to the bipolar system and reflect the Western versus Eastern blocs' rivalries and considerations. These included ideals of deterrence, arms control and crisis management which were informed by the prevailing polarity at the time and which are now facing waning prominence as they have developed anomalies and are ineffective in explaining post -cold war era security dynamics..

The development and shifts in the thinking and practice of regional security strategy can be analyzed in three main waves; firstly, is the traditional wave that accompanied the initial stages of European integration, a period during which other regions across the world, unsuccessfully tried to emulate Europe by initiating regional integration initiatives. Most prospects for regionalism were deemed by the 1970s economic crises that lead many states to abandon regional cooperation for the adoption of protectionist policies to cushion their threatened economies from collapse. The second shift of regionalism came in the late 1980s, fueled mainly by the global economic changes that

⁴⁹Makumi Mwangi, Coordination of National Security Strategy: Perspectives on Grand Strategy Formulation in Kenya, *NDC Occasional Papers on Security*, No.1,2008,pp.1-27.

included; the transformations of the Soviet Union, the deepening and enlargement of the European Union, fear of emerging trading bloc and the new attitudes towards international cooperation. During this period, the end of the cold war opened up political space for international cooperation by freeing many former soviet allies to begin reshaping new alignments and policies within their regions devoid of interferences.⁵⁰

The advent of the era of globalization marked the start of the third shift of thinking of regionalism. Contemporary regional security strategies are multi- dimensional with economic security remaining predominant followed by security-political goals and transnational issues such as drug trafficking, environmental concerns, refugees among other issues that pose demands for collective regional management. There is also the tendency for more recent regional schemes to be driven by fears of increased protectionism. Increasingly regionalism is seen as a means to forestall states isolation or marginalization, and it has also shaped the economic relations of many states by eliminating barriers to trade and creating larger markets through the proliferation of regional trade agreements across the world.⁵¹ The paradigmatic shift is also well captured by Hettne et.al, who differentiates between new regionalism which arose in the 1980s, which is multifaceted, multidimensional and a comprehensive process focusing on culture, security, economic policies and political regimes from the old regionalism which arose in the 1950s and diminished in the 1970s with the main focus being narrow and simply on free trade arrangements and security alliances.⁵²

⁵⁰ See, Ravenhill John, *APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism*, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.35.

⁵¹Karns Margaret & Karen Mingist, *International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance*, Mumbai, Viva Books, p.53.

⁵²Hettne B & Soderbaum, *The New Regionalism Approach* 1998, *Politica*, Vol.17,1998,p.3.

Further, regional security strategies can be analyzed using three key paradigmatic shifts: one is the traditional approaches that dominated regional security strategies during the cold war. These include; alliances or collective defense arrangements. The second shift can be analyzed using the global collective security structures of the United Nations (UN) and concert security based on the concert of Europe of the 19th century. Lastly, regional security can be understood using alternative approaches that include; common security, cooperative security and comprehensive security.⁵³ The traditional and the global collective security structures focus on the narrow realist definition of security that concentrates on military threats , whereas, the latter involves a broader definition that includes non military threats to the well being of a state and its people. The above developments illustrate a shift in the conceptualization of regional security through the various historical periods leading up to the current era where regionalism stands out as the center of regional security interactions and solutions of several member states security concerns and is in tandem with the paradigmatic shift in the nature and practice of security.

Thirdly, paradigmatic shift can be demonstrated in two competing perspectives in the theorizing of regional security strategies. The thinking of regional security within a security community and the shift towards regional security complex perspectives. Deutsch defines a security community as a group of people who have become integrated or attained a sense of security with strong institutions and whose practices are widespread and can give assurances that the expectations of peace can achieve. This process may take as long as two to three generations to be achieved. A security community assumes

⁵³Craig Snyder, *Regional Security Structures*, In Craig Snyder Contemporary Security And Strategy Routledge, New York,1999,p.102.

the possibility of conflict or war between actors and also recognizes the interdependent nature of states relations within a region. Deutsch sees states as prioritizing their national interests but also maintaining cooperation amongst states for mutual benefits.⁵⁴ Rosamond agrees that a security community is a group of states amongst whom the prospects of war have been eradicated and that a security community is a zone of peace.⁵⁵

Similarly, Russett et.al argue that a security community has a desire to reap mutual rewards by assuming that there exist a reasonably equal and symmetrical relationship between states in which their interests are harmonized as their differences are resolved through necessary compromises.⁵⁶ Likewise, Asberg et.al characterizes the concept of security community as an agreement by states to share some values amongst which are democratic ideals. The security community is driven by the survival of the states and protection of their sovereignty. The state is still viewed as the provider of security and it must focus on its structural stability and attitudinal change. Though the primary concern of states is security, other issues like human rights, national unity, trade liberalization and environment will be relevant factors for consideration within the security community.⁵⁷

The security community model is grounded on the constructivist assumptions of the social character of global politics, the relevance of state identities and the sources of states interests. It also recognizes the cultural similarities among states.⁵⁸ A security community will arise when states which are structurally interdependent will not target each other for war or use military force against each other. States within a community are

⁵⁴ Deutsch Karl, *Nationalism And Social Communication*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1953,p.91.

⁵⁵Rosamond B., *Theories of European Integration*, Palgrave, New York, 2005, p.12.

⁵⁶ Russett B. Star et.al., *World Politics : The Menu of Choice*, Boston, Bedford Press,2002 p.68.

⁵⁷Asberg , *New Threats and New Security : The Post-Cold War Debate Revisited*, In Wallenstein P, (ed) *Preventing Violent Conflicts in Past Record and Future Challenges*, Report No.48. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 1994, pp 5-6.

⁵⁸Adler And Barnnet,(eds), *Security Communities* ,Cambridge University Press,1998, pp.10-12.

also assumed to have compatible values and predictable interests which will require holding of similar policy objectives. Within such a community is also the expectation that it will protect its member's natural security and make it possible for other developmental activities to take place, thus advancing for the expansion of security from its military dimension to other areas.

In a conceptual shift to replace the concept of regional security communities, Buzan et.al introduce the concept of regional security complexes which they define as durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of sub-regional, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence. For a region to qualify as a regional security complex, its members (states and other entities) must possess some degree of security interdependence to establish them as a linked set and to differentiate them from other security complexes. Regional security complexes are also seen as conflict formations or security regimes in which the region is defined by a pattern of rivalries, balances, alliances and or concerts and friendships.⁵⁹

Security complexes are also defined as regions seen through the lens of security and they may or may not be regions in other known senses. These regions are composed of clustered sets of states; the clusters must be embedded into the larger international system which has its own structure, regions are therefore sub structures. These clusters of states are united because their security concerns are very closely linked as their national security interests cannot be divorced from each other; they are also independent entities whose aim is only cooperation on issues of mutual concern. The particular character of

⁵⁹Buzan Barry& Ole Weaver, *Regions and Powers; The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 40-77

regional security complex will be affected by historical consideration of war or peace and other common cultural interactions.⁶⁰

These regional security complexes are identifiable, by four main variables; First, a geographic boundary which defines and differentiates one regional security complex from the others. Second, is an anarchic structure which must be composed of two or more autonomous states and third, a regional security complex must be characterized by polarity, which will describe the distribution of power within and among the states of the region, and the last attribute, is that each security complex must be socially constructed hence defining the patterns of enmity and amity.

Regional Security complex theory is a descriptive method for explaining the security dynamics of states within a geographical area; it attempts to link the study of internal dynamics of states, their relations with other states in the region, relations between various regions and the interplay between regional dynamics with the international system. The aim of the theory is to establish a bench mark for identifying and assessing changes at the regional levels. Security regions form subsystems in which all the interaction is internal within the specific region.⁶¹

The formulation of regional security complexes encompasses the relationships between the anarchic structure and the balance of power within the international system and the pressures they impose on states situated within a region. Therefore the anarchical structure and geographic proximity of states will result in patterns of regional based clusters, where security interdependence is more intense between the states inside that complex than with those states outside the complex. Though the assumption is that

⁶⁰ ibid

⁶¹ ibid

security interdependence tends to be regional and is mediated by its actors, in some instances, regional rivalries will provide opportunities for interventions from outside the regions, as local rivals are likely to call for outside assistance and by so doing link regional concerns to the international system.

Like the security community, the regional security complex is rooted in the constructivist theory and sees security cooperation as corresponding to the natural cultural, geographic and historical boundaries. It also sees security interactions as being informed by actions and interpretations of the actors in the region. Chapter five will seek to demonstrate if the EAC region has over the period of study achieved a level to warrant reference as a regional security complex.

In describing types of regional strategies, Deutsch describes two types for security communities; first is the amalgamated community which entails the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit with some form of common government characterized by identical values, communication between states and the different social strata's and political mobility, for example the united states of America.⁶² A second type is the pluralistic security community, which will comprise of unified states which remain under their own government and therefore retain their legal existence and independence. This is a looser form of association which is driven by compatible common institutions, communication between different social groups and decision makers with compatible values who will behave in a predictable manner.⁶³ The second description may be most appropriate for application within the East Africa regional dynamics.

⁶²Deutsch K.W, *Nationalism And Social Communication*, MIT Press, Cambridge,1953 p. 286.

⁶³Buzan Barry& Ole Weaver, *Regions and Powers; The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press, 2000,Pp. 40-77.

At variance, Buzan formulates three types of regional security complexes: firstly is the standard complex characterized by two or more powers predominantly with a military security agenda. They are anarchic in structure and their polarity is defined by regional hegemonic powers and would vary from uni-polar to multi-polar. Such regions will not have global level powers. Second is the centered regional security complex, such complexes are uni-polar centered on a regional power or a super power. Third, defines a region integrated by institutions rather than by a single power. In a given complex the main determinants of security are the relationships among regional powers inside the region and their relations set the terms for the minor powers and for the engagement within the international system.⁶⁴

Further Buzan states that at any given time there are three possible forms that a regional security complex will take; First, a security complex may maintain the status quo by remaining the same over time and therefore no significant changes take place within its essential structures and polarity. Second, a security complex may undergo internal transformation leading to substantial changes in its anarchical structure, or in polarity due to for instance, disintegration, mergers ,conquest or differential growth rates of members of the complex. A regional complex may also experience changes in the prevailing patterns of amity or enmity due to ideological shifts in states, changes in leadership or even war weariness that will affect the characteristics of the complex. Lastly there may be external transformations within a security complex, leading to expansion or contraction of the security complex by either the addition of new members or reduction in membership. There may also be cases where two regional security

⁶⁴ibid

complexes may merge or two or more complexes split out of one.⁶⁵ Chapter five will assess the evolution of the East Africa region as a security complex, as one that may be oscillating between maintaining the status quo or facing external transformation by admitting more states to its membership.

On their part, Adler and Barnnet see the emergence of security communities in three tiers, the first tier relates to the casual factors that stimulate states to cooperate. These factors are endogenous as well as exogenous factors and will motivate states to form a security community. The second tier comprises those factors that will facilitate the development of mutual trust and collective identity. This requires the identification of various power capabilities of the main state or states that will be expected to spearhead the activities of the community. The third tier will be concerned with the formation trust and collective identity that will bind and sustain the various states to the community.⁶⁶

Further, Adler and Barnnet articulate the development of security communities in three phases; first is the nascent phase which entails the expression of the desire of the member states to coordinate interstate relations through increased exchanges and interactions, establishment of structures driven by mutual security threats and the homogeneity of culture, political social, ideological ideals and economic stability. During this phase of development the role of the powerful states within the region in providing leadership is core for the community to take off. At this level, strategic alliances will emerge centered on modest coordination of security policies, development of refined threat analysis, identification of areas of likely conflict between the states and possible structuring of security programs for mutual benefit. At this level also the pre-occupation

⁶⁵Buzan Barry& Ole Weaver, *Regions and Powers; The Structure Of International Security*, Cambridge University Press, 2000,pp. 70-77.

⁶⁶Adler E,&Barnnet M, (eds), *Security Communities*, Cambridge University Press,1998,p.7.

is with seeking cooperative security and focusing on the development of trust amongst the actors concerned.⁶⁷

Second, is the ascendant phase characterized by intensive and extensive patterns and networks of security cooperation between states within a region. These ultimately leads to the emergence of institutions and organizations at the regional level geared towards security, economic and other cooperation and the establishment of structures, reduction of suspicions amongst states, the deepening of mutual respect and a collective identity acceptable to all. During this phase the realization of uniformity of views on economic development, security needs and other areas of common concern are actualized which will reflect reciprocity, shared interests and collective identity. Lastly is the mature phase where regional actors will share an identity, belief in peaceful co-existence and pave way for the ultimate formation of a security community, that would take two forms either loosely coupled or tightly coupled communities.⁶⁸

The security community models at their formulation did not recognize application to the African continent; their focus was on Europe, South East Asia, the Americas, the Gulf and Australia. Chapter five will seek to fill this existing analytical gap of assessing its applicability to the East Africa region and also appreciating that EAC member states can demonstrate a shared identity, common history that can presuppose a shared identity and a desire for achieving a stable and peaceful region. The people of the region have maintained a sufficiently close relationship with one another beyond the desire for trade and no major war has been fought between the member states. These may constitute basic ingredients for a security community. In contrast the regional security complexes have

⁶⁷ *ibid* 50-51.

⁶⁸ Adler E,&Barnnet M, (Eds), *Security Communities*, Cambridge University Press,1998, p.53.

evolved with the African situation in mind as Buzan et.al. discuss sub-Saharan Africa security dynamics as they relate to regional security complexes.⁶⁹

Chapter five will assess what model best fits the case study of the East Africa region. In assessing the type of security complex the key issues of the security dynamics of East African region its dominant power and the type of hegemony established will influence the type of complexes that can be formed. It is also important to underscore, that there may be regions that may not fall into any of the descriptions, therefore creating the need for construction of other types of complexes. The way regional security complexes have evolved including their dynamics will be affected by the types of states found in a particular region. Regions composed of entirely strong states will have different dynamics in comparison with regions with weak states or a mixture of both.⁷⁰

2.5 Conclusion

This Chapter has surveyed the conceptual issues of security strategy at the national and regional levels; it has also contextualized the paradigm shifts in rethinking strategy at the two levels of national and regional and the shift in the models for assessing security strategy that is drifting from the security community to the regional security complex model. These issues will be revisited in subsequent chapters to test their applicability to the East Africa region's states. This chapter has laid the foundation for discussing the formulation, implementation and coordination of both national and regional strategy that will be the focus of chapter three.

⁶⁹B Buzan Barry & Ole Weaver, *Regions and Powers; The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 219-252.

⁷⁰Morgan P.M, Lake David, *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, University Park, Penn State University Press, 1997, pp.153

CHAPTER THREE

FORMULATION, IMPLEMENTATION AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the main issues states consider in the formulation, implementation and coordination of their national and regional security strategies. It explores those aspects of these strategies that tend to have universal application. The study contends that, to succeed strategists and decision makers ought to comprehend the nature of the strategic environment in which the strategy will be implemented and construct a strategy that is consistent with it. However, in cases where the environment presents challenges, states formulate strategies to ensure their survival.

Additionally, national security strategy must be consistent with the national interest/values of states. It should also be appropriate in advancing, projecting and protecting these interests of the states at all times. National security strategy ought to be in compliance with acceptable international law and norms and should not clash with other nationally established cultures and societal values. A state's interests are what are referred to as its national interests whereas the methods and actions that a state employs to achieve these interests are the national security strategies and policies.¹

The chapter observes that there is need to enhance security and its institutionalization into national and regional security strategies. This is becoming a key concern for many states in the 21st century. Consequently, the Post-Cold War era is witnessing the formulation and articulation of comprehensive national security strategies

¹ Snider M. Don, *The National Security Strategy : Documenting Strategic Vision*, Carlisle, PA Strategic Studies Institute, USA, March, 1995.p.2.

by states that aim at directing the thinking and practice of security strategies. This entails the development of national level strategies whose objectives if attained can help to ensure that all conditions necessary for the security of a given state in the international system are achieved.

In the thinking and practice of national security strategy, states that are considered great powers and superpowers view their national security on a global basis whereas, other less powerful states conceptualize theirs from the regional lenses. Most developing states tend to focus on their immediate borders and their internal domestic security issues to formulate national security strategies. This applies to the EAC Partner states that are the focus of this study.

3.1 Formulation of national and regional security strategies

There are three key issues that any state will consider while formulating its national security strategy. These are; the states national interest, the internal and external environment and the historical imperatives that inform a state's core values from which the strategy ought to be implemented at the internal and the external levels. Specifically, national security strategies are formulated in consideration of the prevailing situation in the state internally and externally, bearing in mind the key events taking place and the key personalities involved. This undertaking requires a shared understanding and adherence to concepts of national security strategy and levels of creativity of those involved in the process.

Traditionally, the security strategies processes were articulated in a sequence of five interconnected stages: the first action involved the determination of the national security objectives, the second undertook the formulation of the strategy, whereas the

third stage developed the security policies. These were then followed by the design of operational plans and lastly the implementation of the tactics and contingency plans².

Generally, national security strategy formulation considers a state's strategic vision, its current and future security environment, its national values, range of threats and opportunities and consolidates various national security goals and objectives. This process is undertaken through a multi-agency collaboration involving several actors, both state and non-state who ensure inclusivity and ultimately wide ownership of the national security strategy processes.³

The process of national security strategy formulation entails several steps. The starting point in formulating national security strategy is to determine a state's national interests. These are broadly classified into diplomatic, social, military and economic aspects that are specific to each state. Second is to categorize these national interests in accordance to their significance and contribution to the stability and prosperity of the state. Different states choose different expressions of these intensities to articulate their interests. Broadly stated there are three intensities; national interests are viewed as being either vital, important or peripheral.⁴ The third step entails the assessment of the internal and external environments and how they impact on the state's national interests. This assessment aims to establish the trends, opportunities and threats to the national interest that come from the two environments and device ways to address them.⁵

²Boinnet W.A., *National Foreign and Security Policies: Way Forward in Strengthening Regional Integration*, Paper presented at the East African Community Peace And Security Conference, 5-7th October 2009, Kampala, Uganda.

³Yarger R Harry, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, Westport, Praeger, 2008, pp.27-38.

⁴Yarger R Harry, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, Westport, Praeger, 2008, pp.34-37.

⁵ ibid

Another approach to formulation of national security strategy is through the securitization process articulated in three steps. Any issue of security concern should go through these steps before it can be considered of a national security importance and the necessary measures taken by a state to address it, either as a threat or an opportunity. The first step begins with the portrayal of an issue, person or entities as a potential threat or opportunity to a state's national interest. This is usually initiated by either a state agency, the elite or non- state actors. The second stage entails efforts of lobbying and persuasion put in place by those presenting the issues and their success in convincing the relevant public opinion and key decision makers or government agencies of the threat or opportunities posed to a specific national interest. The third stage will be for the issue to be securitized; meaning that necessary and extraordinary measures are put in place to address it. This measures would entail formulation and articulation of national security strategies.⁶

On the actors involved in the formulation process of national security strategy, Carnes contends that national security strategy formulation should be a multi-disciplinary and an inter-departmental undertaking. This is because no single government department or agency possesses all the required skills, knowledge and resources to monopolize the formulation, implementation or coordination process of a national security strategy. He continues to outline the inherent risks in over involvement of stakeholders, which may lead to bureaucratic bottlenecks, and competitions as each department will seek to incorporate its interests. There are also risks in having a few departments working on the strategy as it will deny it the legitimacy and ownership necessary for the success of the

⁶Buzan B. Is International Security Possible?, In K. Booth, *New Thinking about Strategy and International Security* , London: Harper Collins,1991,pp.31-55

strategy. Ultimately, successful strategy will depend on the involvement of professionals, leaders and an informed public at all levels.⁷

Separately, the securitization school divides the many actors involved in the formulation process into four main categories; The first group are the securitizing agents which refers to those actors who articulate and lobby on the existence of potential threats or opportunities to the national interest that need to be addressed. These include the government /political elite and civil society. The second group consists of the referent objects, or those entities that have a legitimate claim to survival but whose existence is threatened and hence need to be protected from those threats. These referent objects include issues of state sovereignty, economy and the environment. In this category are also individuals and groups whose human rights are threatened. The third group is referred to as functional actors; they are those actors whose activities and intentions cause potential threats or create opportunities for the security of individuals, groups or entities. They are the reasons the securitizing agents act.⁸

National security strategy can be formulated at different levels; at the national level it will be concerned with maintaining the internal dynamics of a state in balance with one another, while ensuring the effects from the external environment will be in favor of the state and its national interests are protected. At the lower state levels, security strategy will deal with specific issues and is a case of generalization.

Models for national security strategy formulation are of two main categories that demonstrate a paradigmatic shift from the traditional to the contemporary appreciations.

⁷ Carnes Lord, *Strategy and Organization at the National Level, Grand Strategy and the Decision Making Process*, Washington DC, National Defense University Press, 1991, p. 143.

⁸ Buzan B., Hansen L., *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p.22.

This pits the linear model or rational actor model with the non-linear model or the securitization model. National Security strategy formulation is about making choices to determine a state's national interests, their intensities and the internal and external variables that will provide opportunities or represent threats to the interests at stake. This therefore, presupposes the capacity to make sound judgments from those involved in the process so as to arrive at the best available option that will protect and project the national interest as well as tap into the opportunities available for the betterment of the state.

The rational actor model is a realist perspective that is most common in explaining how states conduct their decision making processes. The model makes several assumptions. It assumes that the state is a unified actor that will always act rationally when faced with an issue and that the state actors will always do a cost-benefit analysis of the strategy choices before responding to threats and opportunities to their national interests. It also assumes that those involved will choose the best option that will have the highest pay off and enhance a states' national interest.⁹ The rational actor model views states as power seekers who pursue their national interests and arrive at their decisions in a pre- determined sequence that starts with the identification of problems, objectives and goals. This is followed by the listing of all possible solutions available and a systematic cost – benefit analysis of each available option. The next step in the model is the identification of all possible and likely consequences both negative or positive, after which a choice is made on the most efficient, cheapest, and most beneficial with least

⁹ Graham T.Allison et.al. *Essence of Decision Making: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd Edition, New York, Addison-Wesley Education Publishing, 1999. .pp.1-11.

consequences.¹⁰As a result the process of national security strategy formulation is assumed to go through this elaborate process to identify the national interest, their intensities as well as internal and external consequences to the strategy choices employed.

The anomalies inherent in the rational actor model have occasioned a paradigmatic shift in thinking of a better model for national security strategy formulation. For instance, the model assumes that those involved in the process do not have interests and that they will always be in agreement on the options at hand and choose the best option in the national interest. The model also assumes that all information regarding the issues at hand is available and puts too much faith in the human mind to think of all available options. It overlooks the fact that decision makers cannot always be rational because sometimes decisions are arrived at spontaneously or the decision maker's biases play a role in the choices made. Therefore in the kuhnian thinking the rational actor model has developed serious anomalies necessitating a rejection or replacement by a better paradigm.

3.2 Determining the National Interests and the Securitization Processes

The underlying assumption of national security strategy formulation is that all states and non- state actors have interests which they derive from their national values and motivate a state's actions which it pursues at all costs. National interests are a state's perceived needs and aspirations in relation to the external environment; these interests determine how a state conducts itself at the regional or international arena and forms the basis for the formulation of a national security strategy. States ought to always be guided

¹⁰ James Dougherty, Robert Pfatzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relation, A Comprehensive Survey*.pp.571-573.

by their national interests in the formulation and articulation of their national security strategies. National interests are therefore, a fundamental consideration for any state as it interacts with the international system.¹¹

National interests are what states value and is the reason for their continued existence and interaction with other states and non-state actors in the international system. These interests may be designed to either advance or project the power of a state or to attain greater security that is economic, diplomatic, political or military for the state at the national level. At the regional or international level national interests guide values and ethics for the good of the international system through collaboration and coordination with other actors in the system. This at times entails the subordination of certain national interests for the sake of other interests that have a greater value to more actors for the security of the international system.¹² However, a state may choose to support the cause of other states but does not take them as seriously as its own causes. In other instances, states are reluctant to subordinate their national interests for the collective interests and will only do so if it doesn't fundamentally affect their interests.¹³

National interests are essential in establishing the objectives that serve as the goals for national security strategy. National interests are seen as that which is deemed by a state to be its desired goal and a particular state believes that the attainment of this goal will have a positive impact on its national security and other developmental concerns. The realization of the national interest enhances the political, economic, security and well-being of peoples and the state itself. National interests also help to determine the

¹¹ Benjamin Frankel et.al.(ed) *The Origins of National Interest*, London ,Frank Cass:1999,pp.99-144.

¹² *ibid*

¹³ Clausewitz Carl, *On War*, (ed) Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p.605.

types and amounts of national power employed as the means to implement national security strategy objectives.¹⁴

Consequently, there is no one national interest but many competing and conflicting interests for any one state that need to be determined and prioritized. These interests define national security strategy. Therefore, states must determine which interests are more vital or core for their survival and which ones are just important or peripheral. States should also define the existing threats and opportunities to these interests and prioritize those that are the most urgent so as to deploy the available resources in a timely and efficient manner to address them. This determination is critical because no single state has infinite resources or the capacity to deal with all possible threats and opportunities to its many national interests.¹⁵

A systematic process of determining the national interests of a state at any one time should be undertaken before it formulates its national security strategy and reviewed during the implementation period. Once the national interests have been determined they are then securitized. The concept of securitization developed by the Copenhagen school provides a framework to determine how as well as by whom an issue or national interests become securitized or de-securitized¹⁶. Securitization refers to the accepted classification of certain phenomena, persons or entities as potential threats hence giving them a sense of urgency and importance to legitimize the use of special measures outside the usual political process to address it including sustained mobilization of political support and

¹⁴ Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the 21st Century*, New York, Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003,p.3-6.

¹⁵ Robert H. Dorff, *Strategy, Grand Strategy, and the Search for Security, in the Search for Security: A USA Grand Strategy for the Twenty First Century*, (ed). Max G. Manwaring, Edwin. G. Corr, and Dorff, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003, pp. 128-135.

¹⁶ The Copenhagen school is represented by the works of Barry Buzan, Ole weaver, Jaap de Wilde among others who have developed substantial works on the re-thinking, broadening and deepening of security among these concepts are the notions of securitization and de- securitization.

deployment of resources. De-securitization refers to the reverse process that involves the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into normal process.¹⁷

At the core of the thinking and practice of the Copenhagen school is the assertion that any issues or national interest falls within a broad spectrum ranging from non-politicized to politicized to securitized and to de-securitized. When a national interest is non-politicized it means that it is not a matter of state action and is not part of public debate. Therefore, it cannot be prioritized for government attention or resources allocation. When a national interest becomes politicized it means threats or opportunities against it have been identified. It becomes a concern in the public domain requiring a government decision on it and appropriate resource allocation. A national interest becomes a securitized issue when it requires emergency action beyond the states normal routine or programmatic procedures. This is an issue that has moved from being politicized to being framed as a security issue and necessary resources deployed to address it.¹⁸ This movement of an issue through the above four stages can be adopted by a state as a viable process to determine its national interests and also in implementation and coordination of national security strategy.

Within a single state different individuals and groups define the national interest in different ways depending on their perceptions and priorities. Despite this, the concept provides a tool with which to assess the objectives that states seek in their relations with other states at the regional or international levels. National interest is also viewed as the fundamental prerequisite of any state to survive in the international system necessitating a

¹⁷Buzan B., Hansen L., *The Evolution Of International Security Studies*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p.17-18.

¹⁸Ibid

state to mobilize enough power by itself or join with other states to attain its national interests.¹⁹

Spanier asserts that traditionally, national interests of any state were seen in five elements; firstly, was security which was defined in the traditional paradigm referring mainly to the preservation of a state's territorial sovereignty and political independence. Consequently, many states asserted and pursued the policy of non- interference in their internal affairs from other states as their guiding national interest in the external environment. The second national interest was the welfare of all citizens within a state. Third was peace and power, which meant the ability of one state to influence and determine the behavior of others by granting or denying rewards or punishing offending states in accordance with its wishes and the capability to defend itself from external threats. Power was seen from the economic, political, military and diplomatic perspectives. The fourth national interest was the state's ideology which was the rallying consideration during the cold war when the reigning ideologies of capitalism and communism influenced national security strategy formulation. A state's ideology is a system of beliefs that explains and justifies a preferred sociopolitical order and offers a strategy for its attainment. Lastly was the issue of prestige which is referred to as a state's reputation for power among fellow states. It depended on perception and was closely related to military power.²⁰

In recent times there has been a shift in thinking as states have devised different parameters for determining their national interests in a globalizing world order, not following strictly with the traditional notion of national interests. For instance, the United

¹⁹Spanier John and Robert I. Wendzel, *Games Nations Play*, 9th (ed), Washington DC, Congressional Quarterly, 1996, pp.10 -16.

²⁰ *ibid*

States of America (USA) outlines its national interests as defense of the homeland, economic wellbeing, favorable world order and promotion of values²¹. The Copenhagen school refers to national interests as referent objects, which are seen to be threatened and have a legitimate claim to survival and include; states, species, collectivities, the economy, environment among others.²²

The national interests can be further categorized in order of priority into four; firstly are those national interests necessary for the survival of the state or the core national interests. This implies that if they are not protected and advanced, there will be dire consequences or destruction of one or more aspects of the core national interests. It is assumed that no state is willing to compromise this category of interests and is prepared to defend them at all costs including the use of force or threats to use force. The second category are those referred to as vital interests, it is assumed that if they are not fulfilled or projected they have immediate negative effects on the core interests. Thirdly, are those interests that are important and have the capacity to eventually affect the core interest if they are not fulfilled but have no immediate urgency to be acted upon. Lastly are the peripheral interests which if unattended to will result in consequences which are unlikely to affect the core interests.²³ Similarly, Singer argues that the national interests of a state can be categorized into greater interest and lesser interests. Certain interest must be defended at all times and costs. Whereas, others should be safeguarded under particular

²¹ Don M. Snider and John A. Nagi, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*. USA, Army College, 2001. p.128.

²² Buzan B., Hansen L., *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p.30.

²³ The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, Washington DC –USA Government Press, Dec. 2002.

circumstances, others interests although desirable cannot be defended. These interests are unique to every state and reflect its particular internal and external environment.²⁴

Therefore, in determining their national interests, states will endeavor to rank order them into the above categories to help in deciding which interest are more urgent necessitating the deployment of resources to defend or project.

Determination of the national interests is influenced by considering the human elements within a state that include several factors; firstly, the quality personality and ideals of the decision makers will define the national interests of a state. The government officials and other political elites will have an advantage over other actors in seeking to influence the national interests in their official or unofficial positions. They can at times ignore input from other actors in the formulation process. Therefore, their idiosyncratic variables including their knowledge and biases will account for the choices of national interests. Secondly, the type of political system, governmental structures and processes in a state will be vital and shape what a state defines as its national interest. In a democratic system, the process is more inclusive and open to more actor participation whereas in undemocratic systems it is more closed and centralized in a small number of political elite.²⁵ Whether a state is weak or strong will also define their national interests and ultimately their national security strategies. Most African countries are classified as weak states and this will influence their national interest.

Other determinants include; a state's geopolitical location, size, topography, natural resources endowment relative to other states within the international system.

²⁴ Singer N.R., The Foreign Policies of Small Developing States, in Rosonem J.M., et.al(ed), *World Politics: An Introduction*, New York, Free Press, 1976, pp.285- 289.

²⁵Spanier John and Robert I. Wendzel, *Games Nations Play*, 9th (ed), Washington DC, Congressional Quartely, 1996, pp.22 -42.

These will present constraints and opportunities for a state. Geography is the most stable factor upon which the power of a state depends; however location must be of international significance to account as a national interest. The capabilities of other states and the challenges or pressures that each country faces from neighbors, great powers and international organizations will also be considered when determining a state's national interest. These issues will be key considerations in the process of security strategy formulation which starts in determining the national interest.²⁶

Glenn argues that national interests portray a compelling ring that conveys a sense of urgency, importance, threat and concreteness, these interests are not easily defined and often raises questions over their definition and whether they should be treated as an objective measurable asset or as a normative political symbol.²⁷ In contrast the White House defines the national interests as expressions of a state's values projected into the international and domestic arenas, whose purpose includes the creation and perpetuation of an international environment that is favorable to the peaceful pursuit of USA's values. Further, the USA national interests are categorized in order of priority as the vital interests, the critical interests, the serious interests and the peripheral interests.²⁸

In contrast, the neo- Marxist are cautious of using the national interest as a key determinant of national security strategy formulation. They contend that these national interests are those of a few state elite and are not necessarily those of the state. This is because the elite distort the national interests to reflect their individual concerns. As a result, national interests only help to secure the dominant class. Despite its critics and

²⁶Spykman N., *The Geography of the Peace*, New York, Harcourt Brace and Company, 1944, pp. 23-66.

²⁷Glenn Hastedt et.al, *Towards the Twenty First Century: A Reader in World Politics*, New York, Pretence Hall, 1994, p.142.

²⁸ White House, *National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, Washington DC, USA Government Press Dec, 2002. www.whitehouse.gov/accessed March 2013.

ambiguities, national interest remains a viable concept to describe, explain, predict and prescribe international behavior.²⁹

3.3 Appraisal of the domestic and external environments

The environment consists of human and non-human, visible and invisible, the tangible and intangible elements that have positive or negative effects in national security strategy formulation. The environment can constrain or provide opportunities for formulation of national security strategy and therefore determines what can be done. The environment limits what states can or cannot do. This environment also consists of the physical and metaphysical attributes that are either internal or external components of a state. The environment includes the prevailing conditions, relationships, trends, issues, threats, opportunities and interactions and effects that influence the success of the state in relation to the physical world, other states, actors and the possible future.³⁰

The internal components consist of the physical realities, domestic actors, individuals, institutions and organizations with a national security role within the state. The external components are the physical geography, the international system and other external actors, their cultures, beliefs and actions. The strategic environment for any state is the realm in which its leadership interacts internally and externally with other states and non-state actors to advance the well-being of the state³¹. A national security strategy therefore seeks to protect and advance the interests of states within the strategic environment. To succeed, those who undertake formulation must comprehend the nature

²⁹Sarkesian S., et.al. (eds) *United States: Domestic and National Security Agenda into the Twenty First Century*, Green Wood Press, London, 1994, pp.32-41.

³⁰ Harold & Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs with Special Reference to International Politics*, Princeton University Press, 1965, p.18.

³¹Yarger R Harry, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, Westport, Praeger, 2008, p.27.

of the environment internally and externally and construct a strategy that is consistent with it.³²

The strategic environment is composed of elements representing both continuity and change. It is also interactive and adoptive as states and other actors have the capacity to respond individually and collectively through bilateral or multi-lateral relationships to new challenges. When interests are threatened states and the other actors will seek to re-organize their patterns of behavior afresh to either restore the status quo or to obtain changes favorable to their national interests. Hence a state's strategic environment functions as a self regulating system that seeks to maintain its relative stability and find new acceptable balance between its national interests.³³

In the strategic environment, some things are known, some are probable, some possible and others remain unknown. The environment may also produce both the intended and the unintended outcomes. This thinking is captured by Sprout who states that the environment is multi-dimensional and provides either opportunities or constrains decision-making. The environment presents three types of situations; firstly is environment possibilism, meaning the environment is seen as a set of constraints that determine what is possible and limits capabilities. Second is environmental probabilism which means that the environment provides a decision maker with several options from which a choice can be made. It makes some actions or options more likely than others. Lastly, is cognitive behavior, meaning that a decision maker responds to the environment

³²ibid

³³ ibid

depending on perceptions, erroneous perceptions are as influential as the accurate perceptions.³⁴

Similarly, Russett compares the strategic environment and national security strategy formulation to a set menu that provides a decision maker with a number of available options from which to choose from. The menu determines what is possible or available. One can only choose what is provided for on the menu, therefore constraining one to what is available. This also affects the type of choice that one makes in that given environment. Therefore the types of national security strategies formulated are a reflection of the menu in the environment confronting the actors and the choices available.³⁵ The 21st century environment presents both challenges and opportunities to the national security interests of states. States are faced with an environment that is much more complex and unpredictable due to the dynamics of globalization and its derivatives which have introduced new threats and opportunities. Globalization has also led to the re-emergence of old threats including, religious terrorism, international criminal networks, resurgent nationalism, emboldened adversaries and contrarian allies and friends. All these constitute the internal and external environment in which national security strategy has to be formulated, a conceptual shift from the cold war when the threats and opportunities were well defined.

The current strategic environment is marked by a world order, where the threats are both diffuse and uncertain, where conflict is inherent yet unpredictable and where a state's capability to defend and promote its national interests may be restricted by material and personnel resources constraints. This environment is always in a greater or

³⁴ Harold & Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs with Special Reference to International Politics*, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp.25-27.

³⁵ Russett Bruce, *World Politics: The Menu of Choice*, Starr Harvey, USA, 2002, pp.40-43.

less state of dynamic and interdependent instability or chaos³⁶. This strategic environment is depicted as volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA). In the VUCA thinking, the environment is volatile, meaning that it is subject to rapid and explosive reaction and change that may be characterized by conflict. The uncertainty is because of the inherently problematic and unstable world in which new issues appear and old problems repeat or reveal themselves in new ways, such that past solutions become irreverent and the past truths are invalidated. Thus everything is subject to change. The environment is complex because it is composed of many parts that are intricately linked, making understanding them collectively or separately difficult and often improbable. The environment is ambiguous because it can be interpreted from multiple perspectives with various conclusions that may suggest a variety of equally attractive solutions. In national security strategy formulation, not all knowledge will be available to the participants; their various intentions also are hidden.³⁷

Therefore, in the formulation and implementation process the strategist must put into consideration how national interests will be advanced and projected within the volatile environment, how the uncertainty will be managed or controlled, how the complexities will be simplified and overcome and how the ambiguities will be resolved in the national interests of the affected state. Similarly, it is imperative to conduct a risk assessment to establish the suitability, feasibility and acceptability of the national security strategy. This will ascertain that the strategy will achieve the set objectives, that the available resources are adequate and that it is justifiable in the public opinion. It should

³⁶ Roderick R. Magee (ed) *Strategic Leadership*, Primer, PA, 1998, pp. 1-18.

³⁷ Yarger R Harry, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, West Port, Praeger, 2008, p.28.

also anticipate the reaction to the strategy by all other state and non-states actors whether positive and negative and have adequate measures to respond appropriately.

3.3.1 Key factors in the Internal Environment

A state has a domestic or internal environment that interacts with itself, determines how a state conducts its international relations and will influence the formulation of its national security strategy. The internal environment consists of natural and human elements that define national power, values and interests and will dictate how a state chooses to act within the international system. Natural elements include geographical location, topography, weather and natural resources whereas the human elements are population, governmental institutions, and economic, military, political and informational aspects. These elements measure a state's capability to act internally and externally and will be key consideration in national security strategy formulation.³⁸

Key human factors for consideration in the domestic environment include; national values, various arms of government and the inter-agency nature of the national security strategy formulation process. Firstly, national security strategy formulation is founded on a state's national values. These national values vary from state to state depending on the type of political system in place in any one state. National values are generally defined as expressions of the collective vision about what people believe represents a good life. The national values influence, dictate decisions and public support on issues of policy and strategy. National values are often articulated in a state's constitution and will determine a state's interests. A most common national value is democratic principles, which guides and shape interactions within the state. In strategy

³⁸ David Jablonsky, *National Power, USA Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy Formulation*, Carlisle, PA, USA Army College, June 2006, pp.127-142.

formulation a state will also be concerned about the national values of other states in relation to their own.³⁹

The second internal factor for consideration in formulation of national security strategy is the three arms of government and their designated role in the strategy formulation process. The constitution of a state confers duties and authority for the conduct and management of national security to various arms of government. The executive arm in many states sets the agenda for national security strategy formulation.⁴⁰ The legislature acts as a check and balance to executive power by performing the roles of law making and oversight. The judiciary has an adjudication role to hear cases that challenge or seek interpretation of the constitution or of laws passed. It also has the responsibility to review overlapping, complex jurisdictions among laws and executive directives. The judiciary may broaden or extend an interpretation that it can nullify key aspects of strategy.⁴¹

The third internal consideration is the various government departments/ agencies involved in the formulation which help to ensure diversity, broad consultation and ownership of the process. However, this inter-agency process at any level of government poses challenges that have an impact in the outcome of the national security strategy and the process. For instance; these departments are organized differently, have diverse organizational culture, beliefs and perceptions about issues of national security strategy which will find their way into the process. The lines of authority are not clear because each participant comes from an autonomous entity which has its own interests; it also

³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁰ Frankel J., et.al., *The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of the Decision Making*, Britain, Oxford University Press, 1967, 32-36.

⁴¹ ibid

takes time to build a working relationship and trust amongst the participants who represent the interests of their agencies. The selection of participants may not have specific subject matter expertise that is vital for undertaking the process of strategy formulation.⁴²

The fourth, internal factor that will impact on the end product of formulation is the personalities of those involved in the process. Individual attributes, over protection of departmental viewpoints and disputes over who guides the process, the degree of competition and bureaucratic jealousies among departments and among the participants will impact on the process. Lastly, a wide range of non-governmental actors play an essential role in national security strategy formulation by actively informing or influencing the policy makers, and the different publics. They include; academia, interest /lobby groups, media and think tanks. Their role needs to be understood and their knowledge base and expertise tapped into so as to improve the process.⁴³

3.3.2 Key factors in the External Environment

This is where a state and its entire internal elements interact with the international system, which is closely interconnected making it impossible for any state to operate in isolation, particularly in the era of continued globalization. Therefore, the key considerations in the external environment are the existing polarity and stability in the international system and the multiplicity of actors in the international system.

Firstly, the stability of the international system depends on the distribution of power capabilities or polarity among actors which conditions international behavior. The

⁴²Mary Jo Hatch, *Organizational Theory: Modern, Symbolic and Post Modern Perspectives*, New York, Oxford, 1997, pp.210-236.

⁴³Donald M. Snow & Eugene Brown, *Puzzles, Palaces and Foggy Bottom: USA Foreign and Defense Policy making in the 1990s*, New York, St. Martin's Press. 1994, pp.213-214.

end state of relations between states is to ensure a stable international environment, defined as one with no major wars but with minimal violence where disputes are settled peacefully and where actors desire continuity and will be of great consideration in strategy formulation. The type of existing polarity impacts on the stability of the international system. An unstable international system is one that is prone to violence, there exists a threat from a predominant single power and it represents a risk to the survival of other member states. The current structure of the international system in the post-cold war era is unipolar; with the United States of America the only superpower with overhanging economic, military, diplomatic and other capabilities which she exercises across the globe. At the regional levels the states considered to have hegemonic capabilities will impact on the strategies of the other states in that region. Therefore polarity at the global or regional levels will provide opportunities or constrain the type of national security strategies that states formulate. Formulators of these strategies must be alive to and align their national security strategy objectives to the existing polarity.⁴⁴

Depending on a state's power capability while pursuing its national interests, it may choose different strategies that have diverse outcomes externally. One, a state can act unilaterally, meaning it takes full control of its actions and strategies having assessed its threats and opportunities without consultation with other actors. In such cases a state may be viewed with suspicions by other actors or seen to be pursuing hegemonic ambitions; this can also ignite a security dilemma as other actors will feel insecure and strive to react to the situation. National security strategy formulation must therefore strive

⁴⁴Spanier John and Robert I. Wendzel, *Games Nations Play*, 9th (ed), Washington DC, Congressional Quarterly, 1996, pp.119-124.

to avoid security dilemmas and consider the reactions of and impacts of its security strategies to other members of the international community which can curtail or enhance its national interests.⁴⁵

Similarly, a state may opt to act bilaterally, through its government to another government relations negotiating with other actors to arrive at an agreed strategy. This option limits the level of flexibility and freedom for actions. Lastly a state may opt for a multilateral action which obligates accountability and sharing of authority of the actors for their actions. This option is not viable in situations when other members do not share the same interests and motivations for action on a specific issue. The bilateral and multilateral options are more appealing to strategy formulators because they provide a sense of legitimacy and influence amongst more actors besides pooling together more resources to address an interest.⁴⁶

The second consideration in the external environment is the multiplicity of actors in the external environment that have a bearing on national security strategy formulation and articulation. Traditionally, states were considered the main actors in formulation however its role and power are increasingly being challenged and in other instances have been supplemented by non-state actors. For instance Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGO's) like UN and IGAD are increasingly playing a key role at the regional and global levels respectively on issues relating to security strategy. States participate in these organizations because they perceive them as avenues through which to protect and project some of their national interests. The existence of these IGO's at the regional and

⁴⁵ Frankel J., et.al., *The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of The Decision Making* , Britain Oxford University, 1967, pp. 32-36.

⁴⁶ Seyom Brown, *Multilateral Constraints on the Use of Force. A Re-assessment*, Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006, pp.4-14.

international levels indicate the possibility of member states having common interests and therefore creating the need for common strategies in pursuant of those interests regionally or globally. Increasingly sovereign states are voluntarily forming structures and institutions to implement various security strategies to resolve contentious issues and provide viable options. However, in this endeavor, a state will support another state's cause but it will not subordinate its own causes.⁴⁷

Thirdly, the external environment is also conditioned by the existence of international legal, social, political and social institutions, alliances and regimes that are vital in regulating the conduct of relations among states and amongst a state's citizens. These will constrain or provide opportunities for national security strategy formulation. These systemic variables will constrain more directly the strategies made by small and powerless states than they do for the great powers and superpowers.⁴⁸

3.4 The role of history in national security strategy formulation

History is important in the formulation of national security strategy because all states learn and borrow from experience and international good practices. For instance most Africa state's national security strategies are influenced by their colonial legacies or the rejection of the same. Similarly, international treaty obligations entered by states, alliances created, membership to regional and international bodies determine the posture and shape of national security strategy of any state.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *On war*, Michael Howard & Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1976, p.605.

⁴⁸ Singer N.R., *The Foreign Policies of Small Developing States*, in Rosonem J.m., et.al. (ed) *World Politics: An Introduction*, 1976, New York, Free Press, p. 289.

⁴⁹ John G, *Defence Policy Making*, in Baylis J., *Contemporary Strategy II Theories and Concepts*, 1987, New York, Holmes and Meier, pp.7-14.

States have for centuries developed a variety of national security strategies, which exist in formal government documents that were classified and not open to public scrutiny, such strategies mainly focused on foreign and national security and on other more specified strategies designed to guide military operations. In some democracies aspects of national security strategies were unclassified, and found mainly in senior leaders speeches, testimonies before parliaments, interviews or press conferences provided to the media. This history will influence the type of national security strategy and its process for any state.⁵⁰

Interactions between states also help to shape a state's identities and national interests. In this respect the social patterns of enmity and amity are essential in national security strategy formulation. Competition and conflict between the states will lead to distrust amongst states and affect their security interactions, thus influencing the type of security strategies formulated. Historical factors such as unresolved disputes and cultural diversities will enhance or spoil security interactions. Cooperation will only be possible where there exist patterns of amity between the states and significant trust amongst them, which will guarantee that no state will use force to resolve their disputes. In such cases national security strategy formulation will aim to consolidate, maintain the peace and use diplomatic means to settle disputes. In instances where there are patterns of enmity national security strategy will aim to reconcile the differences between the enemies and restrain them from going to war, at the same time each state may be suspicious of the

⁵⁰ *ibid*

other and be always preparing for war rendering the implementation of a regional security strategy unattainable.⁵¹

Similarly, historical experiences of extensive interaction and cooperation in trade or uniting against a common enemy may create shared identity and grounds for future cooperation. This will tend towards, high levels of economic interdependence; trade flows and complementarity of economies and policies. The need to attract direct foreign investment through the creation of a larger market are likely pull factors towards friendly relations between states and ultimately influence national security strategy⁵². Likewise, democratic political systems or similarities in types of political systems in a group of states may help to build a stable security interactions and impact on regional governance. Closely linked to the above is the crucial role of leadership by individuals or by one or more states in shaping national security strategy for a group of states.⁵³

Inter –Governmental organizations help to overcome the international anarchy generated by self- help, by helping to shape the states individual national interests and practices, where economic and political security are as important as the military security. States are bound to accept limitations to their actions when they believe that the benefits of such limitations will serve to attain their national interests.⁵⁴ However there is need to be cautious of self -interested actors or states who build institutions through pre-given interests and the exclusion of the shared identities by the people of a states or a region. From the realist perspective, states are power or security maximizers, who may choose to

⁵¹Buzan Barry& Ole Weaver, *Regions and Powers; The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

⁵²Hurrell Andrew, Regionalism in the Americas” *In Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order*, (eds) Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, New York, Oxford, pp. 250-282.

⁵³Deutsch Karl, Sidney A Burrell & Robert A Kann ,*Political Community and North Atlantic Area* , Princeton, 1957.

⁵⁴Bull Hedley, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, London, 1977, p.47.

cooperate or not, with each other even when they share common interests because of the self- help nature of the international system which makes cooperation problematic. The realists are the most pessimistic about the creation of institutions by a group of states to ensure peace; they also see multilateral organizations to be generating false promises for peace. For realist issues of values and identities are weak foundations on which to anchor the national security strategy of states.⁵⁵

Patterns of reciprocity, in relations between states is also important in assessing the historical imperatives in formulating national security strategy. Reciprocity rests on two principles; one is the principle of contingency which means rewarding states for their positive deeds and meting punishment for their undesirable actions or omissions. Therefore, states cooperation is rewarded whereas non-cooperation is met with deterrence and threats that make it unattractive to any state. The second principle is that of reciprocity which means returning evil deeds with evil and good deeds with rewards. Closely linked to reciprocity is equivalence which refers to equality in levels of reward exchanged between the state whereby in case of unequal power capabilities equivalence will often generate reciprocity of goods and services that have mutual value to both states but may be incompatible in value⁵⁶. The above principles will govern the security interactions of states within a region and at the international level. This also generates a form of polarity within each region determining the states capabilities to offer rewards or dispense sanctions on other members.

⁵⁵ John G., *Defence Policy Making*, In Baylis J.,(ed) *Contemporary Strategy II Theories and Concepts*,1987, New York, Holmes and Meier,p.7.

⁵⁶Keohane R.O, *Reciprocity in International Relations: International Organizations*, Vol.40 ,No.1,1998 pp.5-8.

3.5 Implementation and coordination of national security strategy

The success of national security strategy depends on the proper and efficient coordination among the actors to implement its objectives. The process is not always smooth as the national security strategy will be confronted with constraints and other issues that may be beyond the control or that may have been unforeseen.⁵⁷ Implementation entails actualizing the actions and plans designed to protect a state's national interests. It comprises a variety of continuous activities to be undertaken and the deployment of resources. All these require synergy amongst the implementers. This phase is about how leadership uses power and resources at their disposal to exercise control over sets of circumstances in the external and internal environment so as to achieve objectives in accordance with its national security strategy to support the national interest. Implementation provides for the coercive or persuasive use of this power and resources.

National security strategy implementation and coordination is undertaken through inter-agency collaboration, because no single government department has the capacity to perform the task on its own. It is therefore, a bureaucratic process incorporating various departments which will vary from one state to another. The inter-agency participation brings diversity into the process and taps into the various knowledge and skills from the various departments. However, like in the formulation process this has its own shortcomings rendering the implementation and coordination phases the weakest link in national security strategy. There are often misunderstandings on the roles, missions and the capabilities of the various departments engaged in the process. Different

⁵⁷Gregory D.Foster, A Conceptual Foundation for a Theory of Strategy, *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter,1990, pp.37-48.

procedures and security considerations also form points of divergence among the implementers. There also exist rivalries and competitions within and amongst the departments involved regarding their power and resource contributions which further complicate the processes.

Most states national security strategies are formulated in the traditional military centric paradigm and their implementation and coordination undertaken only by security agencies and the ministries of foreign affairs. It is also highly centralized in a few leading state elite with the exclusion of other actors and contemporary concerns of broadening and deepening of the thinking and practice of national security strategy. These strategies often are lacking in adequate implementation and coordination mechanisms.⁵⁸ There is therefore a need to relook the formulation, implementation and coordination phases of these strategies

Coordination is key in the implementation of national security strategy because it serves several purposes. Firstly, it is central in ensuring the allocation and utilization of all resources, tangible and intangible in achieving the objectives of strategy. Through coordination duplication and wastage of resources and specialization can be addressed. Secondly, it plays a central role in long range planning and thirdly, coordination helps in the harmonization of conflicting policies and programs helping to address the tensions and suspicions between different agencies and personalities involved in the process.⁵⁹

Implementation and coordination presupposes the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the strategy which should be formalized in the various agencies involved

⁵⁸Makumi Mwangi, *Coordination of National Security Strategy: Perspectives on Grand Strategy Formulation In Kenya*, NDC Occasional Papers on Security, no.1,2008,pp.1-27.

⁵⁹Yarger R Harry, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, West Port, Praeger,2008,pp.141-147.

and done throughout the life of a strategy. Monitoring and evaluation of the strategy assesses the risks inherent in the strategy and its probability to succeed or fail and the consequences of either failure or success. Therefore through institutionalized monitoring and evaluation mechanisms the risks of implementing a strategy can be minimized whereas the negative consequences can be addressed in a timely manner at any time of the implementation phase. Effective evaluation should assess the factors that might change in the strategic environment and their impact on the national security strategy. This will entail looking at the adoptability of the strategy to the envisioned changes that may lead to modifications or rejection of the strategy, such modifications can be done whenever the need arises.

Implementation requires understanding of the dynamic nature of the strategic environment and the national interest that can change and necessitates an orientation of the existing strategy. There is need to always monitor the changing or new realities and check for indicators for success, failure, modifications and progress in achieving the set objectives of national security strategy. The success of a strategy presents opportunities that may lead to the making of new strategies while failure leads to rejection and replacement.⁶⁰

3.6 Conclusion

The chapter discusses key issues that states consider when formulating, implementing and coordinating national and regional security strategy. It also assesses key factors that influence these processes, including the national interests, the multiplicity of actors, the prevailing situation in the international system and the conceptual shift in

⁶⁰ *ibid*

the procedures that are necessary of successful formulation and articulation of these strategies. These discussions are revisited in chapter four and five to examine how the East African states of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi formulate, implement and coordinate their national and regional security strategies.

CHAPTER FOUR

SECURITIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY IN EAST AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BURUNDI, KENYA, RWANDA, TANZANIA AND UGANDA

4.0 Introduction

Chapter three examined the main issues states consider in formulation, implementation and coordination of national and regional security strategies. It explored those aspects of security strategy that appear to have universal application and contended that to succeed, strategists must comprehend the nature of the environment in which the strategy will be implemented and therefore must construct a strategy that is consistent with it. Chapter three concluded that National security strategy must be consistent with national interest/values and should be appropriate in advancing, projecting and protecting these interests of the states at all times. The strategy should be in compliance with acceptable international norms and culture.

This chapter examines the factors that influence national security strategy and how the East African states of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda formulate, implement and coordinate their national and regional security strategies. Specifically the Chapter assesses key factors that influence security strategy processes including the national interests, securitization frameworks, the multiplicity of actors, the prevailing environment in the states and in the international system.

This Chapter is a collation and analysis of data collected during in-depth discussions with key informants in the five EAC states. The sample consisted of persons working or who previously worked in their respective government's security sector in their official and un-official capacities and independent sources drawn from various non

–state actors¹. In addition the Chapter reviewed key government documents including: the respective countries Constitutions, National Security Acts, National Security Policies and Strategies, Defence, Police and Intelligence Acts and Foreign policies available in the respective countries.

The in-depth discussions explored the actual processes the East Africa Community Partner States undertake to craft their national security strategies. The discussions also delved into the content and thinking that influence security strategies in the respective countries. Core in the discussions was what the national security interests for each state are; the available legal and other frameworks to ensure inter-agency coordination and inclusion of all relevant stake holders to the processes. The discussions also covered the effectiveness of oversight mechanisms and challenges in the formulation, implementation and coordination of the security strategies.²

The Chapter affirms that, national security strategy is one area of public policy that is shrouded in secrecy and sensitivities within the EAC region and beyond. As a result public debate and academic research on matters of security is curtailed, due to sketchy available information and restrictions placed on access to this information which is considered the preserve of a few authorized individuals and group of technocrats within government. This leads to the exclusion of all other stakeholders from the security domain. This mainly stems from the fact that the thinking and practice of national security strategy is still held back by the traditional state-centric paradigms.³

¹ A detailed account of the study methodology is in Chapter One

² The in-depth study guide used during the discussions is annexed

³ Most of the key informants in the study requested for non- attribution and use of the Chatham House rules as a condition for participating in the discussions. This illustrates the sensitivity and risks associated with venturing into the subject matter of security shared across the five countries.

However, in the recent past there have been shifts in the regions countries that have ushered in a renewal and re-directed efforts to develop comprehensive security strategies at the national and regional levels. One key indicator is that the states in the region have adopted new constitutions or are in the process of reviewing their respective constitutions: Burundi (2005), Kenya (2010), Rwanda (2003), Uganda (1995 amended 2006) and Tanzania is currently undertaking a constitutional review. This is important because the new Constitutions have re-considered the new thinking about security and provide progressive frameworks for the national security strategy processes. This chapter examines these frameworks and efforts to develop security strategies at the national level.

4.1 Securitization and National Security Strategy in Burundi

4.1.1 Background

Burundi is emerging from cycles of violent conflicts and crisis that straddled four decades starting from its independence in 1962 up to the signing of the Arusha Agreement in 2000.⁴ The implementation of the Arusha agreement experienced initial delays occasioned by continued hostilities in most parts of the country by those rebel groups that were not signatories to the agreement. The signing of a ceasefire agreement between the government and the main rebel group in 2003 paved way for the eventual implementation of the agreement.

Since then, the country has made progress in implementing key provisions of the agreement and enhancing its security and stability. However, the country faces a number of social, economic and political challenges that include; ethnic problems and lack of unity amongst the citizens, rebuilding of institutions and infrastructure that was destroyed

⁴ Republic of Burundi, *Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement*, Arusha, August 28, 2000. Signed by 19 signatories but the main armed groups did not participate.

during the war, border management and threats from rebels operating from outside its borders.⁵

Prior to the start of implementation of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in 2003 security sector management in Burundi lacked transparency and accountability and had few ineffective internal and external oversight. This rendered access to national security processes and content difficult. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement underscored one of its key pillars as police and military reforms to ensure decrease in Tutsi dominance and professionalism. The country with international support begun the process and has made tremendous progress in reforms in the defence and security sectors, these efforts have led to a period of peace and stability in the country.⁶

In addition, Burundi adopted a new post-transition Constitution in 2005 that created key institutions and included provisions to ensure comprehensive reforms of the defense and security forces and provided for the creation of strong oversight mechanisms.⁷ The country also developed a strategic plan for the Ministry of Public Safety and conducted a defence review for the Ministry of Defence. Other institutions that have successively been established, include; the National Security Council (2008), the Anti-Corruption Brigade (2006) and the Anti-Corruption Court (2006), the National Communications Council (2007), the Permanent Forum for Dialogue among the Political Parties (2010) and the National Independent Human Rights Commission (2011). Similarly in 2011, Burundi formulated a number of strategies to address national governance

⁵ Interview with key informant, a security practitioner, June, 2013.

⁶ Interview with Ambassador Gabriel Sabushi, Nairobi, June, 2013.

⁷ *De La Republique du Burundi, Portant promulgation de la constitution, Du 18 Mars, 2005, Titre X, des corps de defense et securite.*

priorities, for instance, the National Strategy on Good Governance and the Fight against Corruption, creation of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Burundi Revenue Authority.

An interview with a key informant showed that, Burundi continues the process of carrying out sector wide reforms within the defence and security forces, as a key component of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and other ceasefire agreements that outlined modalities for undertaking the reforms. As a result, the country has been able to complete the integration of former combatants into the armed forces and police, the rightsizing of the defence forces and observing ethnic proportionality between the Hutu and Tutsi to ensure equity within its security forces. These efforts have greatly contributed to the existing peace, security and stability and will need to be sustained. However, the alleged involvement of some members of security forces in human rights abuses in 2010 and 2011 have highlighted the need for continued professionalization and enhanced civilian oversight. Consequently, the country is in the process of instituting civilian oversight mechanisms over the security and defence forces in compliance with the current constitution, laws and regulations.

4.1.2 Securitizing Framework

The 2005 post-transition Constitution outlines the functions and responsibilities for each security agency; The National Defence Force (FDN) is responsible for ensuring the territorial integrity, sovereignty and the independence of Burundi. The National Intelligence Service (SNR) is responsible for the collection, managing and utilization of intelligence to maintain the security of the country. The National Police (PNB) is

entrusted to re-establish and maintain security and order in the country.⁸ The Constitution stipulates the separation of powers between the President and the Parliament. The President is the commander of the defence forces and security services and has the powers to deploy the forces to defend the state and also to international obligations and peace keeping operations.⁹ The Constitution creates the National Security Council (NSC) whose members are appointed by the President. The NSC responsibilities are to develop government policies and strategies for national defense and security, maintaining and evaluating the security situation in the country, coordinating activities of all security agencies and defining their roles. The NSC also formulates national security strategies and ensures inter-agency coordination in times of disasters.¹⁰

An interview with a key informant¹¹ established that despite the Constitutional Provisions for the creation of the National Security Council the setting up of the Council was delayed for three years (2005-2008). The Council was established on August 31 2008, nine (9) out of the stipulated seventeen (17) members were appointed in November the same year. Unfortunately, the President, two vice Presidents, the Ministers for National Defence, Public Safety, Interior, Justice and Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation were made ex-official members through a presidential declaration contrary to the NSC Act. Even after its setting up the impact of the NSC is yet to be felt because it has remained dormant. The informant stressed that the inclusion of members of the Executive whom the Council is supposed to advise is a source of contradiction and conflict of interest. The establishment of the Permanent Secretariat charged with the day

⁸*De La Republique du Burundi, Portant promulgation de la constitution, Du 18 Mars, 2005, Article 245.*

⁹*De La Republique du Burundi, Portant promulgation de la constitution, Du 18 Mars, 2005, Article 110.*

¹⁰ Government of the Republic of Burundi, *National Security Council Act*, 2008.

¹¹ Interview with key informant, Prof. Pascal Nyonizigiye, University of Burundi, Bujumbura, Burundi, September, 2013.

to day running of the secretariat of the National Security Council was also delayed further affecting the operations of the NSC.

Burundi's security sector has several oversight mechanisms; internally both the defence and security forces have Inspectorates General whose performance has not been effective partly due to limited resources. In 2009 the Inspectorate General of Public Security was established to conduct oversight over the Ministry of Public Security and the police in particular. In addition, separate Inspectorate General of the Ministry of Defence and veterans was set up to oversee the Defence forces on matters of training, budget, operations and logistics but not the conduct of the officers corps, which is under the military courts.

Externally, independent oversights are provided through the office of the Ombudsman, the judiciary, Human Rights Commission and parliamentary Commissions. The Constitution creates the Defence and Security Commission for the parliament and a Permanent Commission on Political, Diplomatic, Defence and Security to oversee the Defence and Security forces in the senate.¹² The parliamentary oversight commission on defence and security has the responsibility to supervise and monitor the activities of the defence and security agencies. So far, it has not been effective in addressing human rights violations committed. This situation is partly attributed to the strong political allegiance to the ruling party by those who are responsible for dealing with the issues.¹³

An interview with a key informant attributed the weakness of oversight mechanisms to several issues; Firstly, the government has been reluctant to support these mechanisms at their formative stages but succumbed due to pressure from external

¹² Centre for International Governance innovation, (CIGI), *Security Sector Reform Monitor: Burundi*, No.3. Waterloo, 2009.

¹³ Interview with a member of the committee of Defence and Security, September, 2013.

partners, therefore government commitment is in doubt. Secondly, the government deliberately under resources these Commissions, an excuse to justify their incapacity. Thirdly, political considerations have guided the participation of members in these Commissions with most of them being cautious not to upset the status quo. The past relationships between members of the Commissions and heads of the security forces and ministers have also blurred effective oversight.¹⁴ Though not effective, oversights are also supposed to be provided through civil society and media monitoring.

The process of developing the first post transition national security strategy commenced in 2012 and was completed in June 2013. The strategy states that peace and security in Burundi is the responsibility of all citizens who have a responsibility to work towards achieving and consolidating security and stability. The strategy encompasses human security and state security as the focus of its objectives. It highlights key security threats, issues and opportunities and prescribes appropriate responses to deal with the threats and opportunities. The strategy invokes the participation and cooperation of both state and non state actors in the national security strategy processes.¹⁵

4.1.3 Burundi's National Security Interests

Internal Environment

Burundi remains one of the poorest countries in Africa¹⁶, and one in which poverty poses a great challenge to efforts in post-conflict reconciliation and construction. Not only does it represent a human insecurity crisis, but is likely to trigger disillusionment among the populace which exposes the country to a heightened risk of

¹⁴ Interview with key informant, human rights activist, September 2013, Bujumbura, Burundi.

¹⁵ Republic of Burundi, National Security Strategy, June, 2003.

¹⁶ United Nations Development Program, Human development Index, 2012, <http://hdi.undp.org/en/accessed28.10.13>.

recurrence of violence.¹⁷ The food insecurity situation is critical, with an estimated 58 per cent of children under five years being malnourished. The price of essential products and some foodstuffs increased by an estimated 20-25 per cent over the first six months of 2012, leading to popular discontent and a day of demonstrations on 27 March 2012. Increasing land scarcity triggered by a high birth rate and returning refugees, together with land degradation, is further aggravating food insecurity in the country.¹⁸ Burundi also experiences the challenges of high population density and high unemployment rates, particularly among youth which constitute its key concerns. Without access to jobs and incomes, youth in Burundi remain susceptible to remobilization in youth militias, with obvious risks for peace and stability.¹⁹

A key informant observed that, the full reintegration of internally displaced persons and returnees including the latest repatriation of 35,000 former Burundian refugees from Mtabila camp in the United Republic of Tanzania into their communities of origin will be a long-term process that will have to be well handled as it has the potential to be a source of new conflict. Other challenges associated with the refugees and returnees are the envisaged land disputes, joblessness, and the fact that the majority of the returnees were born in Tanzania and have never lived in Burundi, therefore adjusting to the new environment will take some time.

On the political front the above key informant stated that there is growing distrust and confrontation between the Government and the opposition which needs to be addressed before the scheduled 2015 elections. The impact of the 2010 general elections

¹⁷ Interview with key informant, opcit

¹⁸ Africa Development Bank, *Burundi Country Strategy Paper, 2012-2016*, March, 2011

¹⁹The World Bank poverty head-count ratio at the national poverty line was 66.9 per cent in 2006 and although Burundi's Human Development Index has constantly increased since 2000(0.245 in 2000 to 0.316 in 2011), the country still ranked 185th of 187 countries in 2011.

boycott by major opposition parties and the unresolved political tensions that followed those elections between the Government and extra-parliamentary opposition parties pose a challenge to the political stability of the country. In addition, opposition and civil society activists are complaining about diminishing political space, calling into question the frequent prohibition or interruption of opposition party meetings and new draft laws concerning the status of the opposition, the media and civil society. This has led to mobilization on both sides, with the Government using its prerogatives and dominance in Parliament to enact tighter laws, further shrinking political space, and the opposition taking steps to confront the Government. If not properly addressed, this situation, which runs counter to the spirit of the Arusha Accords, could undermine the country's democratic progress.

Similarly, hardliners among the members of the National Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and ruling party youth league pose a challenge with their continued activities and acts of repression, intimidation and violence across the country, in particular in Bubanza, Cibitoke and Ngozi provinces in the pretext of providing security in their neighborhoods. This culture of impunity amongst the youth league and the security forces and cases of extra judicial killings poses challenges to security.²⁰ Other key security interests for Burundi include: increased criminality attributed to widespread circulation of small arms and light weapons, cross-border incursions by armed groups especially in the north-west, notably Cibitoke and Bubanza, and in the south, close to Nyanza-Lac. There are also cases of armed clashes with Burundian security forces Forces de défense nationale/Police nationale du Burundi

²⁰ Interview with key informant, a human rights activist, Bujumbura, September 2013.

(FDN/PNB), lack of adherence to the rule of law, corruption, lack of social consensus among other challenges.²¹

External Environment

The country's Vision 2025 describes regional integration as one of its eight pillars and a key catalyst for economic growth and stability. It also features prominently in other government policy documents.²² Burundi joined the EAC in 2009, but remained inactive until 2011, when President Pierre Nkurunziza was the Chairperson of the EAC that Burundi engaged in sustained efforts to improve economic and political ties with the other Partner States. Burundi's key interest at the EAC is increasing and ensuring favorable balance of trade with the region's Partner States. Deepening engagements in regional integration process is vital in lifting Burundi out of the post-conflict poverty trap. Burundi has increased its trade within the EAC by 15 per cent and enhanced political and commercial negotiations and interactions with Partner States of regional economic communities.²³ To foster the region's integration efforts Burundi conducted a study on the strategic participation of Burundi in the different regional and international structures and began designing a national strategy on regional integration in July 2012. This aimed to establish among other issues; the role the country should play within the region, and prioritize key areas for integration.

Burundi is contributing to peacekeeping efforts in Somalia with the African Union Mission in Somalia and elsewhere. As a result the country faces terrorist threats due to its participation in Somalia from the Al shabaab terrorist group. This has

²¹ *ibid*

²² Republic of Burundi, Vision 2025 .

²³ Burundi's share of EAC trade has been on the increase (2.6 per cent in 2010 to 4.3 per cent in 2011), Society for International Development, *EAC Integration Dynamics Of Equity In Trade, Education, Media And Labour*, 2011, pp.16-34.

made the country prioritize anti- terrorism efforts at the national, regional and international levels.

The continuing instability in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo poses a serious threat across countries of the region and beyond. Stability in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo is vital for Burundi due to its post-conflict situation, cross-border linkages and interdependency. Therefore, the successful implementation of the 2006 Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region is an important commitment for the entire region, including for Burundi. Towards this end, Burundi has actively participated in several summits of Heads of State of the members of International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) devoted to the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and, on several occasions, reaffirmed its commitment to the restoration of peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The table below summarizes the intensities of Burundi’s national security interests.²⁴

Table 1: Intensities of Burundi’s national security interests

Survival	Vital	Important	Peripheral
Ensure a stable, peaceful, united Country	Economic development	Respect for ethnic diversity	National prestige
Maintain independence, territorial integrity and national sovereignty	Adherence to democratic ideals	Spill-over effects from regional conflict	
Welfare of its people	Poverty eradication and other Human security issues	address crimes such as terrorism and other organized crimes	
Post conflict reconciliation and reconstruction	Re-integration of returnees and IDPs	Exploitation of natural resources	
Sustaining Constitutionalism	Sustainable exploitation of natural resources	Resolution of mistrust between opposition and government	
Survival as a land locked country	Good neighborliness	Adherence to justice, respect for human rights	

Source: Author, collaborated from interviews with key informants

²⁴See Annex 2, Eight key in-depth discussions were held, survival interest are those mentioned by all informants, vital interests are those mentioned by over six informants, important interest were mentioned by half the informants and peripheral interest were mentioned by less than half the informants.

4.2 Securitization and National Security Strategy in Kenya

4.2.1 Background

Before the passage of a new constitution in 2010, Kenya's national security strategy formulation, implementation and coordination process was hazy and not articulated in any legislation or regulatory framework. The process was ad hoc, highly centralized within the office of the presidency and unknown to many citizens. Traces of aspects of national security strategy can be gathered from various presidential decrees, speeches by the president and other government officials and unclassified government documents. Most sectoral policies especially security, foreign and defence policies were regarded as the prerogative of the President. For instance; Godana stated that Kenya's foreign policy was the prerogative of the president who is the initiator, articulator and shapes all government policies. Consequently, foreign policy is not written in any document and is dependent on what the president at the time articulates. It tends to shift depending on the whims and interests of the regime at any one time or depended on the issues and how politically expedient they are. Government ministries and agencies are relegated to be facilitators and stewards of these policies. This helps to illustrate the thinking and practice of how all state policies and strategies processes are conducted overtime in Kenya.²⁵

Similarly, General Sumbeiyu observed that Kenya has developed several defence strategies since independence based on the assessment of threats at any particular time. These strategies are defensive in nature and are initiated by the President. For instance;

²⁵Godana Bonaya, *Kenya's foreign policy*, Speech delivered at the Law society of Kenya Luncheon, August, 2000. He was then the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in Kenya. Collaborated in www.mfa.go.ke, accessed 15.08.13.

in the 1960s the strategies mainly addressed the Somalia claim over the north eastern province and later shifted to address Idd Amin's aggression over parts of Kenya.²⁶

Discussion with a key informant revealed that, Kenya for most part of her post-independence existence has pursued regime security where the security organs served the interests of the ruling elite and it was highly tribalised. Most of the security chiefs were trusted members from the ethnic community of the President. Public trust and confidence of the security forces is divided; with those from the ruling ethnic community being supportive whereas the others have no confidence in the security sector. The tendency towards highly centralized and controlled administrative system during the one party rule cultivated elaborate state-centric security systems. The Lancaster Constitution bestowed security management within the executive branch of government which designed and operationalized security strategies, which are merely presidential decrees.²⁷

Another key informant stated that the institutions charged with the national security responsibilities are inadequate and lack the legal and administrative capacity to be effective. Security agencies have adopted unilateral approaches in dealing with key security issues on an ad hoc manner limiting their impact and at times becoming counter-productive and oppressive to the citizens. The security agencies tend to assert and propagate regime security at all costs.²⁸

Therefore, a fundamental concern in responding to security issues in Kenya has been lack of clear policies and strategies that would provide guidelines and a coordinated approach for all stakeholders and decision makers. As a result, Kenya's responses to

²⁶ Interview with General Lazaro Sumbeiyu, Special Envoy to the Sudan Peace Process and Director of the defunct Liaison Department, Nairobi, November 2013.

²⁷ Interview with key informant a long serving politician, Nairobi, Kenya, October, 2013.

²⁸ Interview with key informant a retired security practitioner, Nairobi, Kenya, February 2013.

many humanitarian and security issues has been reactionary and mainly through crisis management largely due to a lack of shared national values, principles and norms to guide security strategy. The past institutional and administrative frameworks have been of little utility in addressing the security problems. However, despite their shortcomings past strategies provide vital lessons that can help shape the future processes in national security strategy processes.²⁹

With the promulgation of a new constitution in August 2010 Kenya has progressive provisions in the Constitution and other derivative legislations that articulate the processes and actors in the national security strategy formulation and implementation process³⁰. These include Kenya's vision 2030; the Constitution 2010, the National Security Council Act 2012, Kenya Defence Forces Act 2012, National Police Service Act 2011, National Intelligence Service Act 2012 and the County Government Act 2012. Kenya has for the first time embarked on the process of developing a national security policy which will provide a framework of security management.

4.2.2 Securitizing Framework

Brigadier Boinnet stated that attempts to draft a national security strategy over time were never implemented, due to lack of commitment from the political leadership and inter-agency rivalries and suspicions. Therefore what existed was a regulatory framework for coordinating the various security agencies, ministries and other stakeholders. This was referred to as the Kenya Intelligence and Security Machinery. It had structures running from the national level, to the province then to the district. Its

²⁹ Interview with key informant a technocrat in the Government of Kenya.

³⁰ Government of the Republic of Kenya, *Constitution of Kenya*, August 2010, Chapter 14(238).

membership was drawn from the security organs, provincial administration and relevant government ministries.³¹

The 2010 Constitution establishes a National Security Council and outlines its members and functions. The members include the President and the deputy President, Cabinet secretaries for Defence, Foreign Affairs, Internal Security, the Attorney General, and Heads of the Defence Forces, National Intelligence Service and National Police Service. Among its key functions is to integrate domestic, foreign and military policies so as to enable security organs to operate and function effectively. The Council also has the responsibility to assess and appraise potential and actual risks to the state and national security capabilities to address them. Following approval by the parliament the Council may deploy the Defence Forces within and outside Kenya.³²

The National Security Council (NSC) Act 2012 operationalizes Article 240 of the 2010 Constitution and spells out key functions of the NSC to include; the development and review of national security policy, identification and development of strategies to enable security agencies respond to internal and external threats and to annually review the internal, foreign and defence priorities of the country.³³ In essence the National Security Council has the responsibility to ensure effective formulation of national security strategy and its periodic review and implementation.

The President is expected to provide leadership throughout the security strategy process and relies on professional advice from members of the National Security Council who represent various state organs and security agencies. He presides over the Council's

³¹ Interview with Brigadier Wilson Boinnet, former Director General, National Security Intelligence Service, Kenya, November, 2013.

³² Government of the Republic of Kenya, *Constitution of Kenya*, August, 2010, Chapter 14, Article 240.

³³ Government of the Republic of Kenya, National Security Council Act, 2012.

meetings and has key executive responsibilities under the Constitution as the commander in chief of the Defence Forces who is empowered to declare a state of emergency under Article 58. The state agencies have their roles clearly spelt out in various legislations and regulations. Similarly, Dindi stated that Kenya's national security strategy is informed by the current political leadership. It is anchored in the Constitution, other legislations and policies. The main actors and their mandate are anchored in the national Security Council which provides mechanisms for review, monitoring and evaluation.³⁴

Kenya's security organs have since 2010 been undertaking institutional and legislative reforms to conform to the new constitutional arrangement. Each security organ's mandate and operations are anchored in legislation meant to facilitate the organs reforms and delineate the unique roles of each in security strategy processes.³⁵ In addition the Attorney General facilitates the strategy process by drafting and reviewing security legislation, advising on regional and international legal instruments on peace and security and representing the government in related judicial processes.

The Constitution gives the people of Kenya a special place by bestowing the sovereign power on them and making all security organs subordinate to the people. Consequently, the participation and concurrence of the Kenyan people in what constitutes national security strategies is inevitable, meaning that security matters can no longer be a preserve of the security organs. Thus, all citizens have a responsibility to contribute to the enhancement of peace and security.³⁶ Similarly the role of non –state actors like the civil society and private sector cannot be overlooked; they have earned their place by

³⁴ Interview with Brigadier Kenneth Dindi, Kenya Defence Forces, Nairobi, Kenya, June, 2013.

³⁵ These are the Defence Forces Act 2012, National Intelligence Act 2012 and the National Police service act 2011.

³⁶ Interview with key informant a legal and security consultant, November, 2012.

providing timely interventions during conflicts and crisis. They have also helped to define security as a shared responsibility in which they are players. However, there exists a gap in establishing sustainable partnerships with the non-state actors; the current situation entails working on an ad hoc basis depending on the issues at hand. Another challenge that affects the relationship is the suspicion between the government and the non-state actors.³⁷

Oversight over the implementation of national security strategy is provided through parliament which has mandate to enact, amend and deliberate on laws touching on national security issues. The parliament determines the budgetary allocations and appropriates funds for expenditure to the security sector agencies. Parliament also has the role of approving the declaration of war, deployment of the Defence forces and extensions of a state of emergency. However, in-depth discussion with a key informant asserted that oversight bodies are held hostage by the public opinion or tribal interests as members make decisions based on political expediency. For parliamentary oversight, the quality of members of parliament determines the type of oversight possible, tribal, party and personal interests often decide on how effective they can be. Parliamentary oversight also lacks means of enforcement to ensure compliance. There are no sanctions or punishments for members of parliament for non- performance. This creates a culture of impunity with those charged with the responsibility of oversight and the security sector at large.³⁸

³⁷ Interview with key informant a civil society activist involved in monitoring the security sector compliance with new constitution requirements, June, 2012, Nairobi, Kenya.

³⁸ Interview with Brigadier retired, Wilson A. Boinnet, Former, Director General, National Security Intelligence Service, Nairobi, Kenya, and October, 2013.

In 2012, Kenya embarked on the formulation of a national security policy that offers a road map on how the government will provide security for the citizens and protect the state from internal and external threats. The Draft policy also provides guidelines for the design of security strategies by other government agencies. The policy was as a result of a consultative process that brought together key state and non-state actors at various stages of its development including various ministries /departments, security practitioners and experts from the academia, think tanks and civil society members who participated and sent written memorandas and opinions.³⁹

The Draft policy's main objective is to provide a foundation and framework to ensure a secure, peaceful and prosperous environment in which Kenya will pursue her national interests for the welfare of its people. The policy presents key principles to guide security strategies formulation by the national government agencies and the county governments. It outlines Kenya's national interests and opportunities, threats to national security, national security policy instruments and monitoring and evaluation architecture⁴⁰. Similarly, the government developed a Peace building and conflict management policy and national disaster management policy amongst other frameworks to respond to its security challenges.

4.2.3 Kenya's National Security Interests Internal Environment

Domestically, Kenya's key challenge following the 2008 post- election violence is to address negative ethnicity that is prevalent in the society and which remains a key

³⁹ The researcher participated in three(3) sessions during the formulation of the National Security Policy , during the months of February 2012 in Nairobi, Kenya June 2012 Nairobi, Kenya and November 2012 Mombasa, Kenya.

⁴⁰ Government of the Republic of Kenya, *Draft National Security Policy*, June 2013.

source of Kenya's security concerns. Access to resources and opportunities is often skewed by ethnic considerations, despite frameworks and legislations that spell out requirements for ethnic and equity considerations in the distribution and management of public resources.⁴¹ For instance, the constitution provides a framework for building and strengthening national cohesion and respect for equity and balance. It also articulates national values and principles of public service.⁴² Overall, ethnic disenchantment if not adequately addressed will continue to be a security concern.

A key security concern for Kenya is to uphold and respect constitutionalism. Kenyans have since the 1990's struggled to have a constitution that addresses the past injustices. The struggle led to the loss of lives, many heroes and careers were made out of the struggle, commonly referred by Kenyans as "the dark days". The constitution passed in 2010 gives hope to many Kenyans due to its ambitious yet progressive provisions. It also creates independent institutions, oversight mechanisms and public participation to the civilians never allowed before. Ordinary Kenyans are increasingly demonstrating high levels of civic awareness of their rights as enshrined in the Constitution. The civil society, media and academia have also been vibrant in overseeing the constitution is upheld at all times. Therefore, any signs of deviation from the new constitution provisions are a recipe for chaos and constitute a key security dilemma for the government of the day.⁴³

Similarly, Kenya strives to promote democratic principles, good governance and respect for the rule of law. Mainly because, the struggle for multi-party democracy, the

⁴¹ Government of the Republic of Kenya, *National Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Management*, Office of the President, Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security, June 2012.

⁴² Government of the Republic of Kenya, *Constitution of Kenya*, August 2010, Article 10.

⁴³ Interview with key informant a human rights activist, June 2012, Nairobi, Kenya.

electoral processes and its outcomes have been a key security threat in Kenya. Violence and deaths have characterized Kenyans elections over time, therefore a key interest is to ensure that those issues that contribute to electoral disputes are addressed and that Kenyans have confidence in the government institutions. Reforms in various institutions are ongoing to ensure compliance to international best practices in the areas of good governance, respect for the rule of law and democracy⁴⁴. Despite these there are challenges in the reform processes that need to be addressed.

Some parts of Kenya experience insecurities associated with many threats including cattle rustling, inter-ethnic tensions, land disputes, terrorism, conflict over resources such as pasture and water, human wildlife conflicts, poaching among others. Therefore, the government strives to ensure a peaceful and secure environment in the country where all people feel secure and can peacefully coexist. Towards this end the government formulated a national policy for peace building and conflict management which outlined the various security threats and inter-agency collaboration to address the threats.⁴⁵

Another key security interest for Kenya is to ensure robust economic growth and diversification by providing an enabling environment with the requisite investment climate for both local and foreign investors. Similarly, economic growth is achievable through sustainable exploitation and management of natural resources and the environment. Towards this end the country has re-oriented its foreign policy and diplomacy to emphasize economic diplomacy which aims to market Kenya's goods and

⁴⁴ Interview with an academic, conducting research on the Security-Democracy Nexus in Africa, November 2012, Nairobi, Kenya.

⁴⁵ Government of the Republic of Kenya, *National Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Management*, Office of the President, Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security, June 2012.

services across the world. The government has also developed blue prints to guide in enhancing its economic prosperity key among these is Kenya's Vision 2030.⁴⁶

A key impediment to economic growth is corruption which thrives in Kenya affecting service delivery, revenue collection and negatively impacting on the government's image. Kenya is often ranked poorly when it comes to corruption and other parameters for assessing easy of doing business.⁴⁷ The culture of corruption is slowly becoming part of the Kenyan society where citizens often accept it as a way of life. This has far reaching effects on investment climate. Despite sustained efforts to address corruption by establishing the Ethic and Anti-Corruption Commission the vice remains a key concern.

Human security concerns also feature in the security interests of Kenya, addressing the issues of poverty, food insecurity, youth bulge, unemployment, HIV-AIDS, resettlement of IDPs, proliferation of small arms and light weapons among other social issues remain a challenge.⁴⁸ There have been efforts to address these concerns through policy documents and initiatives including; PRSP, establishment of youth and women funds among other initiatives.

Other traditional security concerns for Kenya include: to defend and safeguard her independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity from both internal and external threats. Kenya has porous borders with her neighbors which contributes to her insecurity concerns. Therefore, enhanced border management ranks high in the security interest of Kenya.

⁴⁶ Government of the Republic of Kenya, Vision 2030 .

⁴⁷ Mo.Ibrahim foundation , <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/download> accessed 30.10.13.

⁴⁸ National Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Management, opcit.

External Environment

Kenya is desirous of peaceful co-existence with her neighbors and the international community at large. These relationships will be based on mutual respect and shared interests that contribute to the enhancement of her interests. This informs her interest to continue playing a vital role in peace and security efforts within the region and beyond and therefore participation in key peace keeping missions continues to shape and inform Kenya's external security concerns and priorities.⁴⁹ Specifically, Kenya remains at the forefront of stabilization efforts in Somalia which is a key source of terrorism and other threats to Kenya and the region. A stable Somalia will contribute to enhancing the security of her neighbors, the region and the international community at large. Kenya has directed significant resources to keep her troops in Somalia for as long as the problem persists. This is despite attacks from the Al-Shabaab terrorist group and continued threats for more threats.⁵⁰

Similarly, Kenya hosts Dadaab the largest refugee camp in the world and is home to many refugees from neighboring countries. The security concerns emanating from the refugee menace include the camp being used as a training camp for terrorists and other criminal activities, creating social tensions with host communities and environmental degradation. Kenya has an interest to ensure the return of these refugees back to their countries, but the process has been slow as the host countries like Somalia are not ready

⁴⁹ Speech by President Uhuru Kenyatta, in address to the Nation during Heros day celebrations , 20.10.2013.

⁵⁰ Speech by President Uhuru Kenyatta at a prayer service for the victims of the west gate terrorist attack, Nairobi, Kenya, September 2013.

to receive them. The refugees have also integrated with the Kenyan communities and invested in the economy and will thus be reluctant to relocate.⁵¹

In addition, Kenya experiences cross border conflicts among communities that live across the borders. This is prevalent along her common border with Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania. Kenya has potent border disputes with South Sudan over the Elemi Triangle, Uganda over the Migingo Island, Somalia over parts of northern Kenya. Kenya is also an actor in the Nile basin which is a potential for conflict over the shared waters. These constitute key security concerns in Kenya's relationship with her neighbors.⁵²

In pursuit for economic prosperity, Kenya aims to enhance access to key markets for goods and services within the region and beyond. Kenya continues to play a vital role as a member of several economic communities including the East African Community (EAC), Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and in the ongoing negotiations within the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) Framework. Kenya pursues a two-track approach multilaterally through the regional economic community and through bilateral arrangements with countries of economic interest.

Kenya is a member of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and Inter Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) due to the interdependent nature of the security threats coming from countries of the region. The continued instability within the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa has also contributed to the security problems in Kenya. Consequently, Kenya is also a signatory to other regional interstate initiatives including, Africa Union (AU), and New Partnership

⁵¹ Interview with key informant a technocrat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya, September, 2013.

⁵² Ibid

for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Kenya is also party to regional and international treaties and protocols on peace and security including the United Nations charter, African Union Constitutive Act, Treaty of the establishment of the EAC, Conflict Early Warning (CEWARN) protocol and the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms among others. Kenya has made progress in implementing the provisions of these instruments and participating in their activities.

Beyond the region Kenya’s security concerns revolve around globalization and its impact to international peace and security. Other issues include; Narco trafficking, human trafficking piracy, illegal exploitation of the exclusive economic zone, cyber and other technological crimes which necessitate communal governance. Following is a summary of Kenya’s national security interests as collaborated from interviews with key informants. **Table 2: Summary of Intensities of Kenya’s national security interests.**⁵³

Survival	Vital	Important	Peripheral
Ensure a stable, peaceful, united Country	Economic development	Respect for ethnic diversity	National prestige
Maintain independence, territorial integrity and national sovereignty	Adherence to democratic ideals	Spill-over effects from regional conflict	Become a regional hegemony
Welfare of its people	Adherence to justice, respect for human rights	Poverty eradication	
Adherence to constitutionalism	address crimes such as terrorism and other organized crimes	Exploitation of natural resources	
	Sustainable exploitation of natural resources	Human security issues	
	Good neighborliness		

Source: Author, as collaborated from interviews with key informants

⁵³See Annex 2, Thirteen key in-depth discussions were held, survival interest are those mentioned by all the informants, vital interests are those mentioned by over ten informants, important interest were mentioned by half the informants and peripheral interest were mentioned by less than half the informants

4.3 Securitization and National Security Strategy in Rwanda

4.3.1 Background

Rwanda's post-independence period has been marked by a history of repeated cyclic conflicts between the Tutsi and Hutu communities over state control. The bloodiest of all was the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi community during which over 800,000 Tutsi were killed. Prior to the genocide, the 1993 Arusha Accord signed between the then Government of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front ended a three year civil war and facilitated the process for security sector reforms through the merging of the government security forces and rebel armed groups.⁵⁴ After the merger the government set out to reform and professionalize the security organs of the police, secret service and the military. Emphasis was placed in training the security personnel in human rights, and community partnership programs. The government also prioritized the justice sector so as to address issues of law and order.

However, this was short lived due to the occurrence of the 1994 genocide which destroyed the key fundamentals of the Rwandese society including its human capital, infrastructure, institutions and social cohesion. This also affected the maintenance of state security, law and order in the post genocide period. Consequently, the government of national unity which was formed in July 1994 faced numerous challenges in state building, ensuring social cohesion, good governance and economic prosperity. When President Paul Kagame took over leadership in 2000 he embarked on a process to draft a new constitution which came into force in 2003. The Constitution was expected to lay a firm foundation for state building and democratic consolidation. Other policy documents were developed including the vision 2020 and poverty reduction strategies.

⁵⁴ The Republic of Rwanda, Arusha Accords 1993.

An interview with a key informant revealed that the reforms in the security and administrative sectors in the post- genocide period created a strong government presence at all levels of government from the national to the village levels. As a result the country has a strong police, military and secret service that have facilitated tight security control across the country. This can be attributed to tight government security controls and policies in the country. Similarly, the constitution gives the President unlimited powers in the security and foreign policy matters. The President and his confidants possess and use the monopoly of violence, with non-existence checks and balances from other institutions. In the short term these strict controls of the population have enhanced security and helped in post conflict reconstruction, they have also minimized threats to the ruling elite that have been able to consolidate power and move the country forward.⁵⁵

An in-depth discussion revealed that the constitution provides a legal frame work for massive repression and suppression of human rights and freedoms in the pretext of protecting national unity and abolishing ethnicity. In particular, the constitutional prohibition of *divisionism* has been used to silence political opposition, NGO's, Media trade unions and other critics. All these are justified as necessary to ensure the country does not degenerate into genocide.⁵⁶

4.3.2 Securitizing Framework

Defence Minister Kabareba articulated that the formulation, implementation and coordination of any government policy in Rwanda must take into consideration the history of genocide against the Tutsi community. These policies must address the fight

⁵⁵ Interview with key informant, an academic, October, 2013, Bujumbura, Burundi in the sidelines of EAC workshop.

⁵⁶ In-depth discussion with Rwandan delegate, at the sidelines of EAC workshop, Bujumbura, Burundi, October, 2013.

against genocide and ensure it never reoccurs. At the national level all national security interests revolve around the prevention and management of any threats and vulnerabilities that may ignite genocide tendencies.⁵⁷ The 2003 constitution provides a guide for the national security strategy framework; Chapter VII discusses National Defence and Security. It spells out the functions of the State security organs that include the police, national security service and the military.⁵⁸

In 2008 Rwanda formulated its internal security policy, which serves as a guideline and strategy to ensure security management. It envisages security cooperation between citizens and the security agencies. The policy outlines a structure for collaboration with key institutions at the national, regional and international levels to foster security and development. It anticipates a multi -agency approach in its implementation, where the security organs and all government ministries work together to each fulfill their different mandates as they relate to national security. The policy is formulated in the new security paradigm and prioritizes issues of governance, disasters, welfare and diseases alongside the traditional security issues.⁵⁹

Security coordination is envisaged with all stake holders starting with the citizens, civil society, private sector, security bodies and government institutions. This will enhance the implementation of the security strategies at all levels of governance. The inclusion of the citizens in contributing to their security is underscored and strategies outlined including creating awareness of security threats so that they can effectively

⁵⁷ Speech of the Minister of Defence Gen. James Kabarebe, at the National University of Rwanda (NUR) where he was addressing the community during the 19th commemoration of the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi. 2008.

⁵⁸ Republic of Rwanda, *Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda* 2003, Chapter VII, article 169-172

⁵⁹ Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Internal Security, Internal Security Policy, 09 July 2008.

contribute. Private security companies are also included in the pursuit of all inclusivity as they have a critical role and their collaboration with state agencies is essential.⁶⁰

The Internal Security Policy also addresses itself on how Rwanda will survive in the external environment. It entrusts the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the responsibility of enhancing cooperation between Rwandan security agencies and similar agencies from foreign countries. This cooperation aims to prevent and to identify crimes and perpetrators in those threats that transcend its national boundaries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also has the responsibility to comply with international conventions especially those related to internal security. It also has the responsibility to ensure cooperation in training, peace keeping and information sharing.⁶¹ The policy also outlines that this cooperation is critical within EAC Partner States and the Central African regional states that share borders with Rwanda due to the interconnected nature of contemporary crime especially the threat of international terrorism.

This policy bestows executive powers for its implementation on the Ministry of Internal Security. The Ministry is charged with responsibility to restore security as outlined in all development programs, it also monitors the implementation and dissemination of the internal security policy countrywide. The ministry is also expected to analyze and recommend appropriate security strategies, supervise and advice all other agencies entrusted with the implementing security strategies. The ministry also updates the cabinet on draft laws and orders relating to security and assists the grass root administrations to improve security. Additionally the ministry of internal security is

⁶⁰ *ibid*

⁶¹ Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Internal Security, Internal Security Policy, 09 July 2008.

⁶¹ *ibid*

expected to work closely with the ministry of foreign affairs to promote international partnership and cooperation on matters security.⁶²

4.3.3 Rwanda National Security Interests Internal Environment

Domestically, the highest priority is addressing the causes of the 1994 genocide and its aftermath, which produced a highly polarized society characterized by distrust amongst different social groups. A key interest for Rwanda thus, has been to build a modern, strong and united country that is politically stable.⁶³ Similarly, the 2003 Constitution, states that among its key principles is to defeat the ideology of genocide, promote national unity and eradicate ethnic and regional divisions. Rwanda also strives to ensure equitable sharing of power, espousal of democratic ideals, equality and consensus.⁶⁴ The Constitution also creates independent commissions including the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission and the National Commission for the fight against Genocide that have different mandates geared towards contributing to national unity and security.

A key informant asserted that, successful conclusion of the prosecutions of the 1994 genocide suspects and bringing closure and justice for the victims and the entire Rwandan society, remains a key interest for Rwanda. The local Gacaca courts convicted about 800,000 people in the country. However, there are doubts, if these courts contributed to justice, reconciliation and unifying the Rwandese people or were just a victors justice. Sections of the society feel that these courts, resulted in intimidation of the population that has deeply divided the society. These divisions revolve around

⁶² ibid

⁶³ Republic of Rwanda ,Vision 2020, 2004

⁶⁴ Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda 2003, Principles

perceptions of fairness of the trials , false accusations, revenge and corruption by the court officials. In addition, Rwanda’s cooperation with the ICTR has been riddled with some challenges due to the different views taken by the government on the courts’ judgments and the conduct of the whole justice process. Therefore prudent management of the post ICTR phase will be crucial for Rwanda’s future and ensuring that the fall outs emanating from the processes are addressed expeditiously and satisfactorily to all parties.⁶⁵

Similarly, another key informant stated that Rwanda seeks to learn from her history of repeated ethnic conflicts and to overcome existing threats and vulnerabilities. The country strives for self –reliance following the lessons learnt from the failure of the UN peace keeping mission to forestall the 1994 Genocide. Rwanda therefore is investing in building the capacity of its security agencies and government institutions to enable them protect its people and territory and to reduce reliance on external support in core issues relating to national security.⁶⁶ The same key informant observed that in the aftermath of the genocide, the international community provided assistance to enable the rebuilding of the country without conditionality⁶⁷. The lack of conditionality for Rwanda may be attributed to two issues; one is that the international community was feeling guilty for its inability to intervene in time to stop the genocide and second was a genuine priority to concentrate in restoring law and order which was more important than aid conditionality.⁶⁸ However, this is likely to change because donors have begun demanding

⁶⁵ Interview with key informant, an academic, September, 2013, Nairobi, Kenya.

⁶⁶ Interview with key informant, a security practitioner, June, 2013, Nairobi, Kenya.

⁶⁷ *ibid*

⁶⁸ Interview with key informant an academic, October, 2013.

for good governance and human rights standards among others as conditions for continued engagement.

Economically, Rwanda is making progress in transforming from a humanitarian assistance country to one of sustainable development and is often show cased as a success story in post conflict re-construction. Rwanda is smallest in size compared to the other EAC Partner States; it is a densely populated territory. The main economic activity is subsistence agriculture with a small formal sector of industries and services. Rwanda is classified as one of the poorest countries.⁶⁹ There is increase in land scarcity due to large population growths and a deliberate government policy to restrict migration to urban centres, so as to control the growth of slums and unplanned settlements in urban areas.⁷⁰ Despite this, Rwanda is the only country in the EAC region where public safety is considered satisfactory, with no incidents of uncontrolled small and light weapons and very low crime rates.⁷¹

Rwanda is overly donor dependant a key threat to the national security interests. The economy is characterized by internal budget deficits and unfavorable external balance of payments leading to chronic reliance on donor support to offset trade deficit and budgetary requirements. In addition, fifty percent(50%) of her budget is sourced from external funding. This puts to risk the implementation of key blue prints including, the vision 2020 and other development plans . Similarly, Rwanda is classified among the underdeveloped countries with an underdeveloped agrarian economy, sixty percent (60%) of her population lives below the poverty line.⁷²

⁶⁹Global Peace Index, <http://www.doing business.org/media> accessed 30.10.13.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹Mo.Ibrahim foundation, <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/download> accessed 30.10.13

⁷²<http://www.doing business.org/media> accessed 30.10.13.

To achieve economic growth, the government imposed a policy of economic liberalization and modernization that aims to transform the society into a middle income country with a knowledge base economy. In the country's vision 2020, a key priority is to reduce the population growth and create a service oriented business middle class. However, an interview with a key informant revealed that Rwanda has tended to implement authoritarian capitalism, assuming that this will foster economic prosperity and see Rwanda's transform into a middle income economy by the year 2020. The policy has made modest success so far, but its sustainability in the long run is not assured.⁷³

Another informant observed that there is a tendency, at the official level to project Rwanda as a democratic country in which citizens exercise their freedoms and has progressive democratic institutions with clear separation of functions and powers and oversight mechanisms.⁷⁴ However, this key informant was of the view that the government skillfully suppresses voices of dissent and disguises its authoritarian character within government institutions that are subservient to the President. These institutions are expected to have unquestioned loyalty, failure to which the consequences are dire. This has led to a culture, where the political discourse in Rwanda is about who praises the President and government most. All institutions are formally supposed to be independent but in reality they have been subordinated to and operate at the whims of the executive. The restrictions imposed on competitive democratic processes is justified by stating that political competition is a recipe for creating ethnic divisions or at worst spread of genocide ideology.

⁷³ Interview with key informant, an academic, October, 2013.

⁷⁴ Interview with key informant, working with international organization, October, 2013.

Likewise, the Rwandan society is described by a key informant as one where political competition is absent and the state machinery has total control in the society by imposing restrictions on personal liberties. The government claims to be practicing a power-sharing consensus democracy; however, in reality the government is seen as repressive and authoritarian. It uses some provisions in the constitution to justify its actions. For instance, any mention of ethnicity is considered criminal and is punishable as an offence referred to as divisionism. The government does not entertain any forms of criticism, arguing that this is likely to ignite divisions in the society. Therefore, the leadership validates authoritarian rule as a way to transform the society. Ensuing from the above, it can be deduced that there are two Rwandas': the official Rwanda, which the government projects as open and democratic and the actual Rwanda that has closed political space, is oppressive and averse to criticism.⁷⁵

Rwanda is a monolingual country but has sharp divisions between the various social economic groups and competition between the elite groups for control of state power. Group identities still prevail over the national identity, a serious concern that poses an obstacle to national unity and reconciliation. A key informant⁷⁶ stated that the government uses the constitutional prohibition on divisionism as a basis for restricting and silencing NGOs, media and trade unions. These players always face the threat of prosecution for causing divisions whenever they articulate a position centrally to the government ideals. As a result these entities have been forced into self-censorship.

⁷⁵ Interview with key informant an academic, October, 2013.

⁷⁶ Interview with key informant working with the media, October 2013.

External Environment

Beyond her borders, President Kagame states that, Rwanda aspires to develop good relations and foster cooperation starting with her immediate neighboring countries in the EAC and Great Lakes Regions and looking out to all other countries of the international community. Thus, Rwanda strives to peacefully co-exist with her neighbors and foster trade ties that will help to improve the living conditions of the people of Rwanda and the region.⁷⁷

Rwanda's neighbors all have a history of conflict, some of which Rwanda has been actively involved in. For instance, relations with Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been hostile because of Rwanda's support for liberations movements in Eastern DRC as it pursued its national security interests to force Rwandan refugees based there to return home and to destroy suspected remnants of the former Rwandese army and militias accused of participating in the genocide. Rwanda also sought to gain access to the natural resources in eastern DRC. Additionally, the volatile nature of the great lakes region threatens the survival of Rwanda. Changes within the neighboring states have impact on Rwanda, for instance, the fall of the Habyarimana regime was as a result of the civil war in Uganda. Therefore, the stability of the region is of vital concern for Rwanda. This has led to improved relations with DRC after Rwanda reduced her military involvement in eastern DRC moving towards friendly relations between the two countries.⁷⁸

Rwanda is a land locked country; this poses a natural barrier to trade and conditions her relations with regional countries that have access to the sea. The long

⁷⁷ President Kagame's inaugural speech on 12.09.2003 during his swearing in ceremony following his election as president for a second term. www.minister.gov.rw, Accessed 23 July 2013.

⁷⁸ *ibid*

distances to the ocean ports of Kenya and Tanzania increase the cost of both imports and exports. As a result, Rwanda's economic success is dependent on her regional environment. Therefore a key interest for Rwanda's survival is regional integration. Since joining the EAC in 2007 Rwanda has aggressively pursued integration to enhance her economic security.

Beyond the region, Rwanda has had troubled relationships with her former colonial master France relating to responsibility for the 1994 genocide. These frictions have been settled and diplomatic relations restored and will need to be sustained in the face of existing suspicions between Rwanda and France. Separately, Rwanda has in 2013 been admitted to membership of the Commonwealth (an organization mainly for former British colonies) and is fast embracing the English language. In addition, Rwanda's economic strategy is one that is increasingly turning to the East. This indicates Rwanda's resolve to break from the past and forge new partnerships to ensure her survival in the external environment. Rwanda is a member of New Partnership for Africa's Development, United Nations, African Union, IGLR, among other organizations.

Following is a summary of Rwanda's national security interests as collaborated from interviews with key informants

Table 3: Summary of Intensities of Rwanda's national security interests.⁷⁹

Survival	Vital	Important	Peripheral
End genocide ideology	Economic development	Human security issues	National prestige
Maintain independence, territorial integrity and national sovereignty	Welfare of its people	Spill-over effects from regional conflict	Become a regional hegemony
Ensure a stable, peaceful, united Country	Adherence to justice, respect for human rights	Exploitation of natural resources	

⁷⁹See Annex 2, Nine key in-depth discussions were held, survival interest are those mentioned by all informants, vital interests are those mentioned by over seven informants, important interest were mentioned by half the informants and peripheral interest were mentioned by less than half the informants

Adherence to constitutionalism	Good neighborliness		
Survival as land locked country			

Source: Author, collaborated from interviews with key informants

4.4 Securitization and National Security Strategy in Tanzania

4.4.1 Background

Discussion with key informants revealed that security matters in Tanzania are highly classified and policy documents not easily available. Researchers are treated with suspicion and are likely to be deliberately misinformed, a situation attributed to the closed nature of the Tanzania community. This is a big challenge in studying the discourse in the country. However it was stated that with the on -going constitutional review these often hazy areas will be anchored in the constitution and other legal and institutional frameworks that will make the subject more open.

A key informant observed that, Tanzania first formulated a national defense and security strategy in 1971. This was articulated and integrated into the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi's (CCM) policies and documents. Tanzania's national security strategy was shaped considerably by the idiosyncratic variables of President Nyerere that included his African socialist orientation, Pan-Africanism ideals and his charismatic leadership that was seldom questioned by Tanzanian people. These ideals still shape the content and thinking of security strategy in the country to date. The strategy had both internal and external components.⁸⁰

Internally, national security strategies and policies were guided by the Socialist ideology and tailored at building internal social cohesion, equality and equity. The

⁸⁰ Interview with key informant, a former military officer with extensive experience in UN peacekeeping missions.

Strategies steered the articulation and implementation of the Ujamaa policies as the organizing principle of governance and socialization for the Tanzanian society. These were infused in structures of the ruling party that were hierarchical from the national level to the local village levels.

Externally the strategies were oriented towards assisting independence struggles across Africa. President Nyerere espoused and projected a Pan-Africanist spirit and oriented the external policies towards this end. Tanzania was at the forefront in assisting freedom struggles in southern Africa countries. They found refuge in Tanzania from where they launched their fight for independence. The Tanzania People Defence Forces intervened in the continent to restore democratic government; such Cases include intervention in Uganda in 1970s to overthrow Iddi Amin and interventions in Burundi and the Great Lakes Region.⁸¹

This National Security strategy was later reviewed with the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1992 and with the demise of President Nyerere to reflect key changes in a new constitution that excluded the security forces from involvement in party politics amongst other reforms in the security sector and governance sectors. A key informant observed that since 2010, there have been attempts to merge the powers of the President and those of the Prime Minister so as to address inherent difficulties in articulating national security issues by the two offices. The problem was occasioned by the uneasy relationship between the two offices especially after the election of President Kikwete for his second term. This was triggered by the perception that former Prime Minister Edward Lowassa was increasingly becoming powerful and had over shadowed the President leading to conflict in articulating the national defense and security

⁸¹ ibid

strategy. Even after leaving the Prime Ministers portfolio Lowassa become Chairman of a key oversight Committee in parliament, the Foreign Relations Committee further complicating the problem. Tanzania is currently undertaking a constitution review that has proposed key provisions that are central to resolving the above problem and ensure the key responsibility for security rests with the president and that there is effective coordination among the security forces and the citizens.⁸²

4.4.2 Securitizing Framework

The Draft Constitution states that matters of peace and security shall be guided by the constitution and the parliament and will be implemented in accordance to the law; this includes local and international laws and respect for human rights⁸³. Security agencies are expected to respect the cultural diversity of the people while performing their functions. These agencies are supposed to carry out their duties without any discrimination, political affiliations and are to implement only lawful orders⁸⁴. The security organs are spelled out as the military, police and intelligence. Their main role is to protect the citizens, property, freedoms, rights, peace, unity and the territorial integrity of the state. The security agencies are under the command and direction of the presidency.⁸⁵

The Draft Constitution also establishes the National Security Council (NSC).⁸⁶ This envisaged NSC will repeal the existing one which was established by the National Security Council Act 2011, but faced implementation challenges and was not fully

⁸²Interview with key informant an academic, Arusha, Tanzania, October 2013.

⁸³*Toleo la Rasimu ya Katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania ya mwaka 2013*, Juni 2013, Dar es Salaam Tanzania, Chapter 15

⁸⁴.Ibid

⁸⁵*Toleo la Rasimu ya Katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania ya mwaka 2013*, Juni 2013,Article 220

⁸⁶*Toleo la Rasimu ya Katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania ya mwaka 2013*, Juni 2013,Article 222

operationalized. The members of the NSC are; the Union President, the President of Zanzibar, The two Vice-Presidents, Ministers for Interior, Foreign Affairs, Security, Defence, Finance, the Attorney General and the heads of security agencies.⁸⁷ The President is the Commander in Chief of the Defense Forces and Chairman of the National Security Council. He has powers to appoint members of the NSC, to review the organization of the security agencies and approves all national security strategies.

The Council has a permanent secretariat headed by a Permanent Secretary in charge of the day to day running of the Council. The functions of the NSC include; harmonizing the internal, external and defence policies and strategies to ensure that the security organs are well coordinated in the performance of their functions. NSC also has responsibility to assess and investigate threats to the security of Tanzania and oversees the performance of the security organs. The President is expected to consult the NSC before making appointments of the heads of the security organs.⁸⁸ Additionally, there are other legal frameworks to provide for oversight mechanisms through; the National Defence Council, various Ministerial Committees, Policy and Financial Oversight Committees and Parliamentary Committees including those in charge of Foreign Affairs, Internal Security and Defence.⁸⁹

Besides the above, legal framework there are regulatory frameworks that provide general guidelines to direct all security agencies in the formulation of their various institutions strategies and policies. Therefore there are sectoral security policies including

⁸⁷ Interview with key informant, a former military officer with extensive experience in UN Peacekeeping Missions.

⁸⁸ *Toleo la Rasimu ya Katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania ya mwaka 2013*, Juni 2013, Chapter 221.

⁸⁹ Interview with key informant, opcit.

internal, foreign and defence policies to guide the security agencies. Tanzania has not developed a comprehensive national security strategy.

Despite the elaborate framework, in reality security strategy processes are secretive and highly centralized within the office of the president and the security agencies. Tanzania's security interests are articulated and implemented through the ruling party Chama cha Mapinduzi's structures that run parallel with the government bureaucracy from the national level to the local levels.⁹⁰ These have existed since independence, when Tanzania developed peace and security committees whose role is to ensure peace and security, manage disasters, and emergencies and any threats to the peace and security. These structures exist from the national levels to the local villages. These serve various functions including ensuring security, at the village, ward, division, district, region and national levels. They are also replicated at the Local Government District Councils and in Parliament. A key informant contended that Tanzania enjoys peace and security due to the existence of the committees that are mobilized and well coordinated to respond to various threats. They also enhance the working relationships between civilians, administrators and security forces. Membership of the Committees is drawn from diverse actors ranging from administrators, police, military, intelligence and civil society actors.⁹¹

However, these Committees are not anchored in any law, they operate outside the framework of peace and security. Their close working relationship with the ruling party structures denies them their independence and credibility amongst some citizens mainly those from the opposition. Their capacity to deal with security threats, is at times wanting

⁹⁰ Interview with Prof . Severine M. Rugumamu, Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es salaam also Presidential advisor, September 20 2013.

⁹¹ Interview with key informant an academic, September 2013.

as they rely on the government institutions for implementation of security strategies. Despite their shortcomings if well adopted these Committees model can help to solve the security problematic in countries.⁹²

4.4.3 Tanzania's National Security Interests

Internal Environment

Domestically, the core security interests for Tanzania are based on her national values which are articulated in the Constitution and other government policies that include her foreign, defense and economic policies. These interests include protection of territorial independence and sovereignty and the security of her people. Other interests are protection of human rights, promotion of national unity, equality, integrity and patriotism. In addition, the Draft Constitution 2013 states that peace and security in Tanzania is about the security of the borders, its airspace, seas, people and their property. It is also about the protection of independence and welfare of Tanzania from internal and external threats. It also states that peace and security is the responsibility of all the citizens.⁹³

Tanzania is currently undertaking a constitutional review that aims at addressing key constitutional and legal challenges inherent in the 1977 Constitution. Key informants contended that the constitutional review process is a source of potential threats to security if not handled well. Firstly they highlighted the status of the Union government between Zanzibar and Mainland which has been a contested issue over time and often a source of friction. The debate pits those who support the status quo of a two tier government and those who want changes to include a three tier government. The mainland favors the

⁹² Ibid

⁹³ *Toleo la Rasimu ya Katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania ya Mwaka 2013*, June 2013, Dar-es salaam Tanzania, Chapter fifteen

status quo of two governments; the Union and Zanzibar government, whereas those from Zanzibar favor a three tier to include a federal government, the revolutionary Zanzibar government and a government for mainland⁹⁴. Other issues include decentralization of power from the presidency that is very powerful to a more independent judiciary and parliament.⁹⁵

The promotion of national identity and the elimination of tribalism is a key interest for Tanzania .This is addressed through the promotion of Kiswahili language, which is the national and official language. It is also the medium of instruction in schools and public communication including parliamentary deliberations. Tanzania adopted a deliberate language policy at independence to foster national unity and end tribalism. A key informant stated that Tanzania is witnessing identity tensions between Christians and Muslims. The Muslim community feels marginalized due to the perception that Christians dominate politics and the economy. Increasingly political mobilization is tending towards religious affiliations. The Muslim community feels entitled to seek more from the government claiming that they are the ones who fought for independence; clashes between the two groups were witnessed during the 2010 elections when each group issued a different elections manifesto urging supporters to support one from their faith. There have also been regular clashes between the police and Muslim demonstrators and an increase in trends in inter-faith and intra- faith violence . In addition, Tanzania strives to ensure the separation of the state from religion and the issue of concern is how

⁹⁴Interview with key informant, a researcher, Arusha, Tanzania, October,2013

⁹⁵ Interview with key informant an academic, September 2012, and collaborated by MP opposition in October 2013

the state interacts with the religious institutions without conflict, given that the religious leaders were instrumental in the implementation of the socialist policies.⁹⁶

Despite the perceived failures of the socialist Ujamaa policy, the promotion of socialism is core in the Tanzanian society and this dates back to the 1967 Arusha Declaration on Socialism and self-reliance that led to the nationalization of all means of production including land and industries to ensure public ownership and access to services. This nationalization became a way of life, and has persisted despite government pronouncement of the end and review of the Ujamaa policy.⁹⁷ Through socialism Tanzania unlike the other EAC Partner States has had human security as the basis for its policies since independence. This enhanced the people-centered approaches in all sectors of the economy. However, in-depth discussions with key informants revealed the fact that Tanzania is only 'socialist on paper' because the modern Tanzania society ascribes to most capitalist ideals.⁹⁸

The promotion of democracy, transparency and accountability is of interest to Tanzania. This features prominently in its policy documents including the TANU Decree to promote democracy and combat corruption, discrimination and exploitation.⁹⁹ Tanzanians like the other partner states share a common concern of the threat of corruption which is endemic and creates challenges in the effectiveness of public service and the delivery of services to the people. In response the government has commissioned

⁹⁶ Interview with key informant an academic, Arusha, Tanzania, October 2013.

⁹⁷ United Republic of Tanzania, Arusha Declaration on Socialism and Self-Reliance, 1967

⁹⁸ Interview with key informant an academic, October, 2013.

⁹⁹ TANU Decree to promote democracy and combat corruption, discrimination and exploitation

reports, established institutions and enacted laws to address the issues. Despite the efforts challenges of addressing corruption remain a key interest for Tanzania.¹⁰⁰

Promotion of democracy through the multi party system of governance is a priority stated in the constitution. However, a key informant argued that the dominance of the Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) rule since independence and the unlikely chances of vibrant opposition parties remain a stumbling block to enhancing transparency and accountability in governance issues. In addition management of the political crisis in Zanzibar often poses security challenges that need to be addressed in a wholesome manner. This informant refers to the current situation as artificial peace and stability characterized by political intolerance, nepotism and lack of space to develop viable opposition. This may not be sustained in the absence of a dominant CCM. These impede the enjoyment of democratic freedoms in the country.¹⁰¹

In the socio- economic front the key interest is to address poverty, ignorance, disease, population pressure, youth unemployment among other social issues outlined in vision 2015, National Poverty Strategy Paper, 2010. The promotion and protection of human rights especially of the disadvantaged groups remains a challenge in Tanzania. For instance the upsurge of the killings of people living with albinism threatens their survival as a group that needs protection as endangered minorities. These and other related human security concerns feature prominently in the security concerns of Tanzania. Tanzania also aims to address issues of donor dependency, the government has on occasions proclaimed its intentions to reduce this dependency and efforts have been put in place but are slow in producing the desired results.

¹⁰⁰ Anti-Corruption Act No.11 of 2007, on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau.

¹⁰¹ Interview with key informant, an opposition MP, CHADEMA party, Arusha, Tanzania, October 2013.

External Environment

Beyond her borders, Tanzania's survival interests include good neighborliness and the end of suspicions with her immediate neighbors. In 2013 Tanzania experienced isolation from Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya when they forged a coalition of the willing to undertake various projects and excluded Tanzania which was not party to these agreements. Increasingly Tanzania has been criticized for lacking commitment towards the EAC integration process. In contrast President Kikwete¹⁰² reassured Tanzania's resolve to be part of the EAC and its interests in participating in regional integration initiatives beyond the EAC region. Tanzania is a member of the SADC; this has also been contested by her EAC partners. However Tanzania states that joining SADC was in pursuit of some of her national interests and that there are no rules that deter a country from joining any REC.

A key informant observed that another point of friction between Tanzania and Rwanda and Burundi is the March 2013 repatriation of over 35 0000 refugees from the two countries back home. Rwanda and Burundi have protested the treatment of their nationals by Tanzania and this has resulted in uneasy relations particularly with Rwanda. In addition Tanzania has been involved in the resolution of conflicts within the Great Lakes region. Her involvement in Rwanda and Burundi has been a long journey with both agreements that ended conflicts in the two countries being signed in Arusha: the Arusha Accords for Rwanda in 1993 and the Arusha peace and reconciliation agreements for Burundi in 2000. Tanzania continues to be a guarantor of those two peace agreements. Tanzania also has been involved in resolution of conflict in the eastern DRC. Its

¹⁰² United Republic of Tanzania, President Jakaya Kikwete's address to parliament on Tanzania position on the EAC, Dodoma, Tanzania, 06.11.13.

involvement in the above countries is to forestall spill over effects in case of relapse back to war and due to the interconnected nature of security relations with her neighbors.¹⁰³

Tanzania has interest to enhance diplomatic relations at the bilateral and multilateral levels. It is a member of the AU, SADC, and COMESA among other organizations in the continent. Beyond the region, Tanzania has good relations with the USA and western countries unlike the other EAC Partner States whose relations oscillate between hot and cold. Tanzania also has established relations with the East specifically China. Below is a summary of Tanzania’s national security interests as articulated during in-depth interviews with key informants.

Table 4: Summary of Intensities of Tanzania’s national security interests¹⁰⁴

Survival	Vital	Important	Peripheral
Ensure a stable, peaceful, united Country	Economic development	Human security issues	National prestige
Maintain independence, territorial integrity and national sovereignty	Welfare of its people	Spill-over effects from regional conflict	Become a regional hegemony
End identity tensions between Muslims and Christians	Adherence to justice, democracy, accountability and respect for human rights	Repatriation of refugees and illegal immigrants.	
Completion of constitutionalism review	Good neighborliness		
Status of Union government	Overcome isolation by other EAC countries		
	Exploitation of natural resources		

Source: Author, collaborated from interviews with key informants

¹⁰³ Interview with Professor Severine M. Rugumamu, Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es salaam also a Presidential Advisor, September 20 2013.

¹⁰⁴See Annex 2, Nine key in-depth discussions were held, survival interest are those mentioned by all informants, vital interests are those mentioned by over seven informants, important interest were mentioned by half the informants and peripheral interest were mentioned by less than half the informants

4.5 Securitization and National Security Strategy in Uganda

4.5.1 Background

Uganda's post-independence period has been eventful and characterized by protracted conflict that witnessed frequent regime changes through military counter coups from independence up to 1986 when President Museveni came to power. Since then there has been marked stability in most parts of the country despite prolonged conflict in the northern and western parts of the country. The most notable being the insurgency in the northern parts by the Lords Resistance Army led by Joseph Kony.¹⁰⁵ A key informant observed that the military has since independence been at the centre and played an active role in the politics of the country. Successive presidents embraced the army and used it to ensure survival and as an instrument of oppression to defeat dissent. As a result the military has over the years been ethnicized and used to ensure the interests of the president and his ethnic community. To date separation of the military from politics remain a challenge, for instance some members of the cabinet are serving military officers who alternate their ministerial roles with military portfolios. The national security strategy of Uganda has therefore been military centric to ensure regime survival. The national interest has thus been that of the ruling regime.¹⁰⁶

The Ugandan government currently doesn't have a holistic national security strategy, but has several national strategy documents that outline its military, foreign and economic strategies and policies. These strategies include; Uganda's vision 2025, the National Security Council Act of 2000, the White Paper on Defense Transformation

¹⁰⁵ 1971 Idi Amin overthrew Milton Obote, 1979 Amin was overthrown by rebels assisted by Tanzanian army, Yusuf Lule ruled for 2 months, Godfrey Binaisa for less than a year, Milton Obote bounced back in 1980 he was later toppled in 1985, Yoweri Museveni took charge in 1986 to date .

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Peter Edopu, Executive Director, Peace and Security Institute of Africa, Kampala, Uganda, September 2013

amongst other documents. These documents are shaped considerably by key principles of the Ugandan Constitution and other international conventions and agreements to which the country is a signatory.

In 2001 Uganda undertook a Defence review during which the national and regional security interests were formulated and the roles and responsibilities of various government agencies and departments realigned to protect and project the country's national interests. The process was led by the Ministry of Defence, the Department of the Prime Minister, the National Security Committee of the Cabinet and the Permanent Secretaries Committee on National Security. Other participants were drawn from parliament, government departments /agencies and representatives of civil society organizations.¹⁰⁷

The key objectives of the review process were to advance a common appreciation of Uganda's national security concerns, outline the relevant security actors/agencies and their responsibilities in addressing these security concerns. The review also set out to address how the coordination of security functions would be conducted effectively. The review operationalized the national Security Council which was established in 2000 with the mandate to advise the president on national security.¹⁰⁸ Currently, the defence review documents are the principal references for Uganda's national security strategy formulation and articulation; they provide an overall framework that other derivative strategy documents can be based on.

¹⁰⁷ Government of the Republic of Uganda, *White paper for Defence transformation*, 2001.

¹⁰⁸ Government of the Republic of Uganda, Defence Reform Unit, *The Government of Uganda's Security Policy Framework Consultative Document*, December 2002. Also collaborated during interview with Peter Edopu, Executive Director, Peace and Security Institute of Africa, Kampala, Uganda, September, 2013.

4.5.2 Securitizing Framework

Uganda's national security strategy formulation processes are articulated in Article 219 of the Constitution of Uganda.¹⁰⁹ It establishes the National Security Council (NSC) as an advisory body to the President on all matters relating to national security. The NSC Act which came into force in June 2000 spells out its functions to include among others; informing and advising the president on matters relating to national security, coordinating and advising on policy matters relating to intelligence and security, reviewing national security needs and goals, brief the Cabinet regularly on matters relating to national security. The Act also states that the NSC shall coordinate with any security agency involved in security or other related fields in the performance of its functions.¹¹⁰

Membership to the NSC include; the President who is the chairman, the Vice President, the Minister responsible for internal affairs, the Minister responsible for finance, the Attorney General, the Minister responsible for Foreign Affairs, the Minister responsible for Security, the Minister responsible for Defence, other members not exceeding five appointed by the President and approved by Parliament. The Act also provides for ex officio members of the NSC as the Inspector General of Police, the Army Commander, the Director General of Internal Security Organization, the director General of External Security Organization, the Director of Special Branch, the Director of the Criminal Investigations Department, the Chief of Military Intelligence and the Commissioner of Prisons.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Government of the Republic of Uganda, *Constitution of Uganda* 1995 Article 219.

¹¹⁰ Republic of Uganda, *National Security Council Act*, Cap.3, Article.301.

¹¹¹ Republic of Uganda, *National Security Council Act*, 2000 Cap.3, Article.301.

The NSC Act states that Uganda's national security strategy will be based on a systematic assessment of the national interests and factors that threaten the projection and protection of those interests. The actors/agencies involved in the systematic threat assessment are members of the National Security Committee chaired by the Minister for Internal Affairs and draws membership from the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Uganda People's Defence Forces, the police and intelligence. There is no provision for civil society and other public participation.¹¹²

An interview with a key informant observed that the office of the president has overarching powers in the initiation, formulation, coordination and monitoring of all public policies/strategies and in enhancing external relations that are beneficial to Uganda's national interests. Similarly, the office of the Prime Minister is the coordinator of implementation of all government policies including the management of disasters, refugees and pacification programs in the conflict prone areas in the country. This office works closely with all line ministries and departments to address threats and opportunities to Uganda's national interests.¹¹³

The security functions are implemented at various hierarchical levels starting from the national level down to the grassroots. The members and functions are duplicated, as those at the national Security Council but with lower representation and lesser roles depending on the threats in the area. For instance, every district has a security and intelligence committee whose main function is to inform and advise the National Security Council on matters relating to security in the district. Followed by Sub county intelligence committees whose main function is to inform and advise the district security

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Interview with key informant a technocrat in the security sector in the government of Uganda, October, 2013.

committee on matters relating to security in the sub county. The Minister in charge of internal affairs makes regulations and guidelines for the operations and meetings of the district security committees, the district intelligence committees and the sub-county security committees.

However, interviews with key informants revealed that despite existing clear legislation, in practice national security strategy formulation and implementation is ad-hoc and uncoordinated in nature. It tends to favor addressing single security threats as they occur through quick fix solutions as opposed to implementing long term national security strategies.¹¹⁴ Similarly, another key informant observed that Uganda's National security strategy is currently considered the prerogative of the President. It is highly institutionalized within the office of the presidency. It is also shaped considerably by the Pan Africanist ideals espoused by the President and geared towards ensuring the country's survival in the external environment. The president's approach is informed by Uganda's past experiences of instability and his own management style. This is a system prone to patronage and personalization of national security strategy which has its own disadvantages. For instance it reduces accountability and public participation; it is also vulnerable to errors due to human shortcomings.¹¹⁵

In addition, a key informant asserted that national security strategy in Uganda is contentious, not well articulated and understood by the majority of the citizens. It is articulated by the President mainly during his address to parliament, in his manifestos, speeches, statements, decrees and interviews to various forums. It is therefore, through

¹¹⁴ Interview with key informant a career public servant, May, 2013.

¹¹⁵ Interview with key informant an academic, June, 2013 and collaborated with key informant a career public servant, May, 2013.

the analysis of these sources of bits of information that one can begin to construct the national security strategy.¹¹⁶

4.5.3 Uganda's National Security Interests Internal Environment

Domestically, most parts of Uganda enjoy adequate security and development; however some parts in the north and west are characterized by insecurity and high levels of poverty. The government has been implementing various reconstruction programs that have not been effective in addressing the root causes of the conflict and regional imbalances. A key priority therefore is to manage the causes of instability in the affected areas. Uganda's key national security interest is to ensure a secure, peaceful, stable and united country and provide a conducive environment to foster the welfare and economic development of its people most of whom are peasant farmers.¹¹⁷ Similarly, Uganda strives to enhance her capacity to defend against any aggression and maintain her independence, territorial integrity and national sovereignty among other external threats.

Secondly, successive phases of political instability occasioned by a legacy of negative military intervention in politics in the 1960s up to 1980s destabilized the social fabric, general infrastructure and frustrated efforts of building strong institutions. This history to a great extent impacts on the National security strategy which strives to avoid military consolidation and expansion. The military remains a key obstacle to the flourishing of democratic governance. Thus the issue of removal of the military from

¹¹⁶ Interview with key informant ,an academic, June 2013.

¹¹⁷ Government of the Republic of Uganda,*Constitution of Uganda* ,1985.

politics and creating “apolitical”, professional, de-ethnicized military and other security organs ranks among key priorities to ensure return to civilian rule.¹¹⁸

In addition, the government of Uganda strives to work towards attaining a society that espouses the principles of justice, respect for the rule of law and one that promotes fundamental human rights and freedoms. Core to the national interest is to create a political environment where democracy is the guiding principle and power is exercised by a civilian elected government.¹¹⁹ This should also address the uneasy relations that have existed since independence between the government and the traditional monarchies of Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole. This is often a cause of political discord or unsustainable coalitions that characterize the politics of Uganda. Therefore there exist challenges in defining the roles of the monarchies in the current system of government. Uganda strives for a state where all citizens actively participate in the governance processes, where elections are free and fair and there is open political space to exercise and enjoy other political rights.

In the socio- economic front, Uganda is characterized by high degree of ethnic diversity and an ever growing gap between the rich and the poor as well as the rural urban divide among other human development concerns. These pose challenges of social cohesion and if not well addressed are likely sources of tensions and insecurity. The economy is mainly peasant subsistence agriculture which constitutes fifty percent (50%) of the GDP and employs eighty eight percent(88%) of the work force. An estimated thirty five (35%) of Ugandans live below the poverty line. This poverty creates fertile

¹¹⁸Mpisi Kenneth, *Uganda Country Report*, Paper presented at EAC Validation workshop on A Study on Threats, Challenges and Opportunities to Peace and Security in the EAC region, **22-25**, October 2013, Bujumbura, Burundi.

¹¹⁹ Government of Uganda, *White Paper on Defence Transformation*, opcit. & collaborated in interview with key informant an academic, June 2013.

environment for crime and violence. In addition, fifty percent (50%) of Uganda's public expenditure depends on external donor funding making her vulnerable to aid cuts, foreign manipulation and influences.¹²⁰ Therefore the diversification of trade, industrialization and enlargement of markets is a key consideration for economic security.

An interview with a key informant asserted that the discovery and exploitation of oil and gas in the country poses both challenges and opportunities. If well managed the resources will enhance the economic prosperity of the country but if not well managed this is likely to open new fronts for conflict and other associated problems. Uganda will need to draw lessons from other countries and set put effective management policies to overcome the problem. Meanwhile, the sector faces the challenges of underfunding, mismanagement and corruption.¹²¹

Uganda is a land locked country, this creates vulnerability due to its reliance on neighbors that are not landlocked, and this constrains her economic activities due to high costs of importing and exporting through third states. How to gain access to sea trade routes is a key survival interest for Uganda. Therefore good relations with her neighbors and sustainable regional cooperation is essential to foster economic, diplomatic, military and other forms of cooperation to enhance her security.¹²²

External Environment

Beyond its borders, geography and environmental constraints influence the national security strategy that Uganda articulates. In terms of size Uganda is small (93sq

¹²⁰Mo.Ibrahim foundation, <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/download> accessed 30.10.13

¹²¹ Interview with key informant an academic , September, 2013.

¹²²Mpisi Kenneth, *Uganda Country Report*, Paper presented at EAC Validation workshop on A Study on Threats, Challenges and Opportunities to Peace and Security in the EAC region, **22-25**, October 2013, Bujumbura, Burundi.

kms) compared to her neighbors and most of her borders are porous due to lack of natural barriers like mountains and rivers. Thus a key interest is to ensure peace with her neighbors and support efforts at regional and global security. Uganda has border disputes with Southern Sudan and another with Kenya over the Migingo Island. These remain a major concern for the affected states, amicable resolution of the disputes and enhanced border management is critical for the relations of these countries.

Uganda is situated within a conflict zone in the Great Lakes Region and as a consequence, Uganda experiences spillover effects from the regional conflicts and is home to refugees and illegal migrants from the affected countries. Hence Uganda dedicates a substantial amount of resources to address the regional security concerns. Uganda also shares common natural resources with her neighbors and key among these are the Nile river basin, Lake Victoria, the Ruwenzori Mountains and oil reserves in the western border regions. These resources necessitate communal management and utilization; they also present bones of contention with other states and constitute key national security concerns for Uganda and the other states.¹²³

Uganda has unresolved issues with her neighbors: it has a dispute with Kenya over migingo island on lake victoria, tensions with Rwanda over operations in Kisiangani, issues with DRC in eastern DRC and suspicions with south- Sudan. These influence her relations with these countries. Uganda is a member of the African Union, East Africa Community, IGAD, ICGRL and is a troop contributing country to African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). At the global level it is member of United Nations as well as the Common Wealth among other organizations.

¹²³ ibid

Below is a summary of Uganda’s national security interests as articulated by key informants.

Table 5: Intensities of Uganda national security interests

	Survival	Vital	Important	Peripheral
	Ensure a stable, peaceful, united Country	Economic development	Respect for ethnic diversity	National prestige
	Maintain independence, territorial integrity and national sovereignty	Adherence to democratic ideals	Spill-over effects from regional conflict	Become a regional hegemony
	Removal of military from politics	Adherence to justice, respect for human rights	Human security issues	
	Survival as landlocked country	Ending Rebellions and insurgencies.	Improve relations with traditions kingdoms	
	End external donor reliance	Exploitation of natural resources		
	Management of the exploitation of natural resources	Pan-African ideology		
		Good neighborliness		

Source: Author, collaborated from interviews with key informants¹²⁴

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has surveyed securitization and national security strategy processes in the five EAC Partner States. It has examined the security interests of each state and analyzed their existing securitization frameworks. This has revealed similarities as well as some differences. The states of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda share several security concerns at the national, regional and global levels but also have some peculiar security interests unique to some of them and not envisaged by the other states. These issues are revisited in chapter six in the critical analysis; the shared interests

¹²⁴ See Annex 2, eight key in-depth discussions were held, survival interest are those mentioned by all informants, vital interests are those mentioned by over six informants, important interest were mentioned by half the informants and peripheral interest were mentioned by less than half the informants.

constitute the common security threats for the region whereas their peculiar interest ought to remain as national security threats of the respective states.

This chapter lays the foundation for Chapter five that will discuss the EAC as a regional security complex. Chapter five will discuss the common interests that the states share at the regional level and how the states ensure their survival as a region in the strategic environment beyond the region and in the international system. The chapter will examine key components that constitute a regional security complex and how the East African Community Partner States can be studied within the parameters of the security complex thinking. This includes a definite territory/ boundary that define the complex, patterns of amity and enmity, polarity and different transformations that lead to continuity and change within the EAC security complex.

CHAPTER FIVE:

ENVISAGING REGIONAL STRATEGY WITHIN THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY SECURITY COMPLEX

5.0 Introduction

Chapter four surveyed securitization and national security strategy processes in the five EAC Partner States. It examined the national security interests of each state and analyzed their existing Securitization Frameworks. The Chapter revealed similarities as well as some differences. The states of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda share several security concerns at the national, regional and global levels but also have some peculiar security interests unique to some of them and that are not envisaged by the other states. Towards this end, chapter four, collated and analyzed data collected from in-depth discussions with key informants and reviewed key government security policy and strategy documents in the five EAC states.

This Chapter proceeds to discuss security strategy at the regional level by exploring the EAC as a regional security complex and the securitizing frameworks in place in the region in three sections. Firstly, the Chapter examines the application of key tenets of the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) in the EAC region. Specifically, the Chapter assesses geographic proximity as a driver for security interdependence, continuity and shifts in patterns of enmity and amity in security relations of the region's states and polarity within the EAC Security Complex. These assessments are derived mainly from collated and analyzed data collected from key informant discussions with EAC Secretariat Staff, East African Legislative Assembly,(EALA) members, academics and various independent sources.¹

¹ Chapter One contains the detailed research methodology

Secondly, the chapter undertakes a content analysis of the existing EAC securitizing frameworks, specifically those that aim to enhance regional peace and security; including the EAC Treaty, EAC Protocol on Peace and Security, the EAC Regional Security Strategy, the EAC Conflict Early Warning Mechanism, the EAC Conflict Prevention and Resolution Mechanism among other policy documents. The Chapter contends that despite the existence of elaborate legal and institutional frameworks, there has been a problem in implementation, so far none of the peace and security policy and strategy documents have been executed by the Partner States since the inception of the EAC.

5.1 Foundations of the EAC regional security strategy

Appreciation of the EAC regional security strategy is guided by the historical background of the five states, specifically in relation to their security cooperation over time. This history provides opportunities in cases where such cooperation has been successful. It will also pose challenges in the regional security processes if the states have more security concerns of divergence than convergence.²

The five EAC states of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda lack homogeneity in their economic, political, social and security spheres. They are also characterized by different levels of development in their infrastructure, human resource, democratization processes and state's institutional capacities as articulated in chapter four. Their varying contexts inevitably, define the thinking, content and posturing of their security strategies at the national level and this impacts on regional security strategy within the EAC region security complex.

² Chapter Three discussed the role of history in security strategy processes.

The EAC Partner States can be broadly divided into two categories; firstly are Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania who are fairly similar in historical and cultural outlook mainly attributable to their shared colonial heritage as former British colonies. The three countries have a long history of regional cooperation dating back to the colonial period. The colonial heritage has been a driver for integration processes over the years. The beginning of EAC integration is traceable to the British colonial policy that aimed to promote a unified administration over its three colonies of Kenya Uganda and Tanzania. They first established a High Commission comprising of the colonial governors of the three states and a secretariat that coordinated the common services.³

At independence Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania inherited and transformed the East African High Commission to become the defunct EAC (1967-1977). These states also spearheaded the revival of the current EAC among other regional integration efforts⁴. The three states not only inherited a common infrastructure and similarities in the social–culture spheres but also inequalities in the different levels of development among the three countries. Kenya enjoyed the highest levels of development whereas Tanzania inherited the lowest⁵. These differences were compounded after independence due to the different policies adopted by the three states. Kenya pursued market oriented approaches which enabled her economy to integrate faster into the capitalist international system giving it an advantage over the others. Meanwhile, Tanzania opted for African socialism which later failed and perpetrated her least developed status in the Region. Uganda

³Olotude J.C.B., et.al, *African International Relations*, Longman, London, 1985, p.168.

⁴ These include: Kenya & Uganda Customs Union of 1917 which Tanganyika joined in 1927. East Africa High Commission 1961-1967, East Africa Community Common Market 1967-1977 and the revival of the EAC 1999 which Rwanda and Burundi joined in 2009.

⁵Tanzania was formerly a Germany territory, Britain took over after the defeat of Germany in the WWI, and hence it has a shorter history of British control hence the least developed then.

experienced protracted periods of economic and political crisis due to military coups that led to instability until 1986 when reconstruction and recovery efforts have been sustained.⁶

The second category comprises of Rwanda and Burundi that also have a similar heritage as former Belgian colonies. They have homogeneity in social-cultural characteristics in terms of sharing one ethnic language. They also have geographical similarities of being both small in size Burundi (26,338 sq km) and Rwanda (27834 sq km). These states are classified amongst the poorest states compared to the other EAC Partner States. The two states share a common history of long periods of cyclic ethnic conflicts spanning four decades of their post -independence period. The conflicts in the two states all ended in the signing of the Arusha agreements; in 1993 for Rwanda and in 2000 for Burundi.⁷ Both countries are classified as post conflict re-construction states that have in the recent years undertaken security sector reforms with significant successes.

In addition, the involvement of the other three EAC states in the resolution of the conflicts has been historical and laid the foundation for the current security cooperation in the Region. Rwanda and Burundi are gradually shading their association with the Central African states and gravitating towards the EAC region though, their main challenge is the shorter spun in regional cooperation with the other EAC states. The two states economies are increasingly depending on the sea routes of the EAC Partner states, which is a key pull factor compelling them to join the economic bloc. Therefore, their

⁶Otieno A. et.al. *Old Visions –New Plans: Stakeholders Opinions on the Revival of the East African Community*, Occasional Papers, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2001, Nairobi, Kenya, pp.11-20.

⁷ Chapter Four has detailed discussion on the two Arusha agreements.

association with the region is due to necessity, dependence and currently in their best interest.

However, discussion on the five countries cannot be equal; The first category of states comprising Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have a longer history of cooperation, providing clearer trends for analyzing their security relations. Meanwhile, trends of Rwanda and Burundi with the other states are shorter. They also joined the Community when most of the frameworks for security cooperation had been formulated; lack of their input into the original frameworks has partly contributed to the slow forward march of the Region in matters of security cooperation.

Consequently, security cooperation in the Region is guided by the national security interests of the individual states and the shared interests which they can pursue collectively to ensure their survival as independent states and as a region. This is also dependant on how effectively Rwanda and Burundi and those other states intending to join the Community get integrated into the EAC by the three founding states.

5.2 Theoretical grounding for a EAC Regional Security Complex

Chapter three discussed the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) as a basis for understanding security relations between states at the regional level. Chapter four demonstrated that EAC Partner states in principle are interdependent, such that their security problems cannot be reasonably analyzed or resolved apart from one another. Additionally, actions by one state, or a significant security developments inside one Partner State has impact on the others. This leads to high levels of security interdependence that necessitates a shared process of constructing security concerns and strategies for dealing with the problems amongst Partner States. This ultimately creates a

security complex. For instance, the post-election violence in Kenya of 2007/2008 brought to light the economic security interdependence of the EAC states; the states of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi that depend on the Port of Mombasa for their export and import were adversely affected during this period. Thus, an internal political issue in Kenya had repercussions on the other states, informing their efforts to ensure a quick solution to the conflict.

A number of components account for the interdependence of security relationships of the EAC Partner states. These components are central to the regional security complex theorizing and include; First, a definite territory/ boundary that define the security complex and the different or possible transformations of those boundaries over time. Second, are the existing patterns of amity and enmity amongst the region's states which constitute the perceptions and content of a region's security strategy. Lastly is the existing polarity within the security complex which determines leadership and interaction within the region and at the global level. These three components will constrain or provide opportunities for security cooperation among the states to ensure their survival as a region and within the international system.⁸ They also define continuity and shifts within the security relations in the EAC complex as discussed below;

5.2.1 Geographic proximity and Security interdependence within the EAC Region

Defining the boundaries of the EAC states in relation to security interdependence is challenging, mainly because of the possibilities of the boundaries either expanding or contracting depending on the security threats at hand at any one given time. These

⁸ Chapter Three has a detailed discussion on the Regional Security Complex Theory(RSCT)

boundaries also become blurred due to the internationalization of conflicts and crises. The porous nature of the state's boundaries also contributes in exporting the security problems within and outside the region. However what is indisputable is the role geographic proximity plays in influencing their security relationships. The states are compelled to liaise despite their divergent interests for the sake of the common security problems.⁹

The geographical boundaries that define the EAC security complex have been transformed over time. Initially the membership constituted Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. These boundaries were transformed in 2009 through the expansion of membership following the admission of Rwanda and Burundi to the EAC. There are also possibilities that the Region's boundaries will expand to include other states that have shown interest in joining the EAC. These include; South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan.¹⁰

Similarly, an interview with a key informant¹¹ confirmed that during the EAC Heads of States Summit of 2003 the Partner States projected that once Rwanda and Burundi were admitted into the Community, Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea would follow. The Summit also observed that the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan had expressed interests in joining the EAC. Each of these states have their own security interests for joining the EAC. The informant argued that DRC is more inclined towards the EAC region due to its increasing reliance on the sea ports of Mombasa and Dar-es-salaam for its economic lifeline. South Sudan's socio –economic dependence on

⁹ Interview with key informant an academic, Nairobi, Kenya, 10th December 2013.


¹⁰ The East African 2010, *Southern Sudan and DRC come knocking*, <http://www.the-east-african.co.ke/news/index> accessed 20.11.13., <http://the-eastern-african.co.ke>, (2007) Ethiopia atrocities a challenge to the state joining the EAC, accessed 20.11.13.

¹¹ Interview with Member of the EAC Secretariat, 14, November, 2013.

Kenya informs its interest to join the EAC. South Sudan initially sought observer status as it awaited its independence. Likewise, the Partner States projected that by admitting Somalia it would be easy to develop and implement strategies to deal with the long protracted war which affects their economies. On its part, Sudan seeks to cut south Sudan's influence in the Region by also expressing interest in being an EAC Partner. Ethiopia's interests have not been clearly articulated so far.

The EAC boundaries also get distorted with the duplication of membership by the Partner States to other extra regional organizations. The states of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania have diverse memberships to regional and international organizations that deal with the maintenance of peace and security. All the Partner States are members of the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)¹² and Eastern African Police Chiefs Cooperation (EAPCCO).¹³ Membership of the above organizations extends beyond members of the EAC Region.

Illustration 2: The overlapping membership to continental organizations by the EAC partner states.



¹² ICGRL was established in 2004 as a forum for addressing peace, security, stability and post conflict reconstruction concerns in the Great Lakes Region. Member states are Angola, Burundi, Central Africa Republic, DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

¹³ EAPCCO formed in 2000 to enhance police cooperation in fighting cross-border crimes. It's members are the five EAC Partner States, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Seychelles, Somalia and Sudan.

Source: Author, based on observations on geographic proximity and security interdependence of the EAC states.

Separately, Kenya and Uganda are the only Partner states that are members of IGAD. Tanzania is the only member of SADC and is not a member of the East African Standby Force (EASF) to which the other states are members. Similarly, Rwanda and Burundi are not members of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG).¹⁴ Whereas all four EAC Partner States are members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Tanzania is not a member. The lack of a clear framework to address the duplication of membership or belonging to diverse organizations provides both opportunities and challenges in articulating a purely EAC regions security strategy.

Besides overlapping membership, geographic proximity contributes to security interdependence in the EAC Region and beyond, as most traditional security threats in the political and military sectors travel faster over the short distances across the regions borders than over long distances. For example, the proximity of the EAC regions states to the conflict zones in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa can be attributed to their shared borders that facilitate spillovers. The Region experiences most of the spill -over effects that include; refugees, illicit small arms proliferation, terrorism, cross border crimes among other security threats that emanate from their unstable neighbors. This necessitates common strategies to effectively address the security concerns of the region.

Specifically, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda are surrounded by insecure and unstable neighbors who contribute to and complicate the security problems of the EAC security complex. Each of the five states has at least one unstable neighbor;

¹⁴ ESAAMLG was formed in 1999 by Commonwealth Countries to implement recommendations on combating money laundering. Members include Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi and Lesotho. Rwanda and Burundi are not members.

Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania border DRC. As a consequence all the four states are actively involved in the stabilization efforts in the eastern DRC. Their involvement has been a source of tension between the states. An interview with a key informant revealed that during the operation against the M23 rebels the states were accused of supporting either side. Tanzania was alleged to be fighting with the DRC government side whereas Uganda and Rwanda were said to be supportive of the M23. The tensions in the DRC operation found their way into the EAC further heightening the tension between members¹⁵.

In addition, Kenya and Uganda border South Sudan and were active in the peace processes that lead to the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement that ended years of war between Sudan and south Sudan and provided for the referendum that ushered in the independence of south Sudan. The two states experience cross border incursions along their common borders that are of low intensity and easily addressed through the bilateral engagements. This has contributed to peaceful co-existence between the neighbors. However as south Sudan gears to join the EAC the border dispute with Kenya over the Elemi triangle is likely to be a bone of contention that will add to the security problems of the EAC complex.¹⁶

Separately, Kenya also neighbors Somalia a country that has experienced instability for over two decades. Somalia is a key source of threats including, terrorism, maritime piracy, refugees and money laundering not only to Kenya but the Region at large. The EAC Partner States except Tanzania are currently involved in stabilization efforts in Somalia. Uganda and Burundi are troop contributing countries to the African


¹⁵ Interview with former military office involved in UN peace keeping Mission in eastern DRC.

¹⁶ Interview with a technocrat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nairobi, Kenya, 13 November 2013.

Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) whereas Kenya unilaterally intervened in Somalia to safe guard its national interests that were at stake after several incursions by the Al Shabaab terrorist group. The Kenya Defence Forces were later integrated into AMISOM.

There have also been efforts to address the Somalia problem through the IGAD, an organization to which Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan and Djibouti belong. The IGAD initiative mostly spearheaded by Ethiopia further expands the participation in the Somalia conflict beyond the EAC security complex due to the interlinked nature of the security dynamics that transcend to colonial boundaries.¹⁷ Lastly, the security interests of the region may not be confined to the geographical boundaries. Therefore the security interdependence transcends the region and should be seen as spiraling from the national level to the regional, the continental and the global levels.

Illustration 3: Security interdependence of EAC states beyond the region



¹⁷ Peter Edopu, *Report of Study to Assess Threats, Challenges and Opportunities to Peace and Security in the EAC Region*, Presented at the 2nd EAC Peace and Security Conference, Bujumbura, Burundi, 13-15 November 2013

Source: Author, based on observations of geographic proximity and security interdependence beyond the EAC region.

5.2.2 Continuity and shifts in patterns of enmity and amity in security relations in the Region

The research set out to establish key issues of convergence and divergence between the Partner States through the key informant discussions. Forty-seven key informants were interviewed. The issues tabulated constitute those which inform the content and structure of the EAC Region's security strategy as articulated by the key informants.¹⁸

Table 6: Patterns of amity and enmity of EAC Partner states

	Points of Enmity	Points of Amity
1.	Uneven benefits from the EAC processes	Addressing transnational and cross border crimes threats (terrorism, human trafficking, maritime piracy, drug trafficking, money laundering (etc.))
2.	Different levels of development,	Cooperate in regional conflict prevention and management
3.	Differences between the Presidents and their ambitions	Cooperate in disaster management
4.	Lack of political will, commitment and mistrust	Cooperation within the Nile Basin Initiative
5.	Exploitation and Management of shared natural resources and boundaries	Participation in peace keeping and support operations
6.	Pace of regional integration (fast tracking versus gradual process)	Sustainable Diplomatic relations
7.	Differences in constitutions, policies and strategies	Sustaining cooperation within the EAC framework
8.	Perceptions of each other's power capabilities.	Implementing the AU- Peace and Security Architecture
9.	Lack of shared understanding of common regional security strategy	Adherence to international law obligations on peace and security
10.	Willingness to sacrifice national interests for regional interests	

Source: Author, collaborated from interviews with key informants

Friction between EAC Partner States is historic and dates back to the independence period. Over time there have been continuities as well as changes in the

¹⁸ The issues numbered 1-10 are tabulated from key informant interviews: 1 is highest and 10 lowest: I= 45-47 informants mentioning issue, 2=41-45, 3=34-40, 4=31-35, 5=24-30, 6=21-25, 7=16-20, 8=11-15, 9=6-10 and 10=0-5. (See also Annex 2)

issues that threaten the peaceful relations between the Region's states. Therefore, the viability of a regional security strategy will be determined by how the states resolve and manage these areas of divergence that tend to persist and at times mutate and how they respond to new areas of contention that arise in their security interactions. This process entails appreciating the root causes of these frictions, their persistence and how they can be overcome for the benefit of security cooperation in the region.

The first cracks in the relations between the states emerged soon after the formation of the defunct EAC (1967-1977). A key informant asserted that the genesis of the enmities within the region trace back to the different development plans adopted by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania at independence.¹⁹ Kenya adopted a free market economy and encouraged foreign direct investment.²⁰ In contrast Tanzania proclaimed African socialism and introduced a controlled economy that de-emphasized the role of foreign direct investments.²¹ Similarly, Uganda formulated the Common Man's Charter anchored on socialist principles akin to Tanzania's socialism. As a result Kenya became capitalist, which enabled it to attract investment and reap the benefits of the defunct EAC(1967-1977) as most foreign companies set up their bases in Kenya. In contrast, socialism disrupted the socio-economic development of Tanzania where foreign investors were uncomfortable to invest in the socialist economy. Uganda besides taking the socialist path, entered into periods of instability from 1971 when Milton Obote was ousted in a

¹⁹ Interview with professor Charles Okello, op.cit., Collaborated in Olotude JCB, et.al. *African International Relations*, Longman, London, 1985, pp.157-168

²⁰ Republic of Kenya, *African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*, Sessional Paper No.10.1965, Government Printer

²¹United Republic of Tanzania, *Arusha Declaration on Socialism and Self-Reliance*,1967

military coup up to 1986 when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) of Yoweri Museveni took over power in 1986.²²

Consequently, in the economic front, Kenya dominated the intra EAC trade. By 1974 Kenya's share of the trade was 77%, Tanzania had 17% and Uganda had declined from 26% to about 6%. This mainly constituted exports within the Partner States²³. Prospects for EAC integration dimmed as Uganda and Tanzania got frustrated in their efforts to tame Kenya's dominance and what followed were public spats between Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere who accused Kenya of greed in the EAC referring to Kenya as *a man eat man society*. Tanzania sought to prevent the advent of capitalist values and to end exploitation of the Tanzanian market by Kenya. In response, Kenya's President Jomo Kenyatta was unbowed and stayed the course of advancing a capitalist economy, he responded by calling Tanzania a *man eat nothing society*. This row led to the closure of the Kenya-Tanzania borders halting all economic activity and ushered the eventual collapse of the EAC.²⁴ This history of enmity between Kenya and Tanzania continues with Tanzania applying protectionist policies to guard off Kenya's access to its markets.

In the political front, tensions between Uganda and Tanzania developed after the ouster of Milton Obote by Idi Amin in a military coup in 1971. Tanzania hosted the deposed Obote leading to strained relations with the Amin regime. In addition, Tanzania and Uganda engaged in border disputes that culminated into a war in 1978-79 during which Obote assisted by Tanzania ousted Amin from power. Similarly, Kenya-Uganda

²² Republic of Uganda, *The Common Man's Charter: On the move to the left in Uganda*, 1969

²³ Adar K & Ngunyi M, *The Politics of Integration in the EAC Since Independence*; in Oyugi. W., *Politics and Administration in East Africa*, EAP, p.405.

²⁴ Olotude J.C.B et.al, *African International Relations*, Longman London, 1985, pp.157-168.

relations were strained in 1976 after Idi Amin made claims over parts of Kenya and Sudan territories which he justified were historically part of Uganda. What followed was a military show of might between the two states. President Kenyatta closed the border effectively blocking all exports to Uganda and warned of dire consequences if Uganda attempted to annex Kenya's territory. Ultimately Amin was forced to apologize, but the suspicions remained.²⁵

The above political developments worked to heighten the personal differences between the Presidents of the three states. It is during the tenure of Idi Amin that the cracks between the states widened both at the bilateral level and within the EAC leading to paralysis. During this period the EAC Heads of States Summit did not meet due to the irreconcilable differences paving way for the eventual collapse.²⁶ However, another key informant²⁷ argued that it was not the personality differences between the Presidents but the widening economic gaps and the resultant economic nationalism projected by the states which hardened their uncompromising positions that lead to the collapse of the first EAC.

The divergent positions created more friction that resurfaced years later in 1984 during the division of the assets and liabilities of the defunct EAC. These steered perceptions that the gains amassed were not equal and the distribution of the properties and liabilities was inequitable²⁸. Tanzania and Uganda felt shortchanged by Kenya. Attempts to implement compensatory and corrective measures to address the inequalities

²⁵ The Standard Newspaper, *50 Years of Making the Great Nation*, Kenya at 50 Supplement, Decemebr,12,2013.

²⁶Olotude J.C.B et.al, *African International Relations*, op cit

²⁷ Interview with key informant professor Charles Ayai Okello, Gulu University, Uganda, September 22 2013.

²⁸ Society for International Development (SID), *East African Integration, dynamics of equity in trade, education, media and labour*, SID, 2011,pp.16-18and collaborated during Interview with General retired Lazarus Sumbeiyo, former Special Envoy to Sudan peace process,04 November 2013.

were unachievable and characterized by acrimony and frustrations, in the end the Partner States were dissatisfied and remained with whatever assets were domiciled in their territory.

The quest for regional integration was to be revived in 1993 despite the bitter experiences of the defunct EAC (1967-1977). This renewal was informed more by necessity of the EAC states to manage and respond to challenges posed by globalization and due to the interdependent nature of the region's economies. Regional integration was perceived as the panacea for the states to act collectively to increase market access and development. The second driver to re-integrate was that the Regions' states had different Presidents who sought to remedy the mistakes made by their predecessors. These efforts led to the signing of the EAC Treaty 1999 under the leadership of Presidents' Daniel Arap Moi, Benjamin Mkapa and Yoweri Museveni. Rwanda and Burundi joined in 2007.

A key informant stated that though the core objective of the revived EAC was economic integration, issues of regional peace and security were underscored and brought to prominence, heralding a new thinking that without peace and stability the region's vision of integration was at risk. This thinking was also informed by the environment in which the Partner States found themselves, surrounded by insecure states.²⁹

In terms of continuity in patterns of enmity within the region under the revived EAC, some old rivalries have continued whereas new frontiers have also been opened up. The old rivalries were to find expression during negotiations for the revival of the EAC and the implementation of the Customs Union and the Common Market where Kenya was forced to accept non preferential treatment for its exports to the other Partner states in the implementation of the Customs Union, these were to be gradually eliminated as

²⁹ Interview with informant EAC Secretariat, 14 November 2013.

the Union took shape. The decision was made due to Kenya's perceived more developed status compared to the other Partner States.

There is also continuity in disaffection about the uneven benefits accruing from the regional integration process being implemented. The old problem of Kenya's dominance has been carried to the current EAC. Kenya is treated with the same suspicion of the defunct EAC (1967-1977). For instance, an interview with a key informant revealed that Tanzanians are cautious on the issues of liberalization of land and the free movement of labour because of their fear of Kenyans flooding their labour market and exporting their land tenure practices to Tanzania.³⁰ Despite the suspicion, Kenya is a declining player in the EAC exports, since the inception of the Common market in 2005. Kenya's export share has dropped from 60% in the 1990's to 40%. Uganda and Tanzania's share of the EAC exports have been on the increase. Uganda's has increased its share from 13% to 20% and is projected to be the greatest beneficiary. Tanzania's increase is a modest 6% to 8%, whereas Burundi and Rwanda account for less than 1% of the EAC exports.³¹

Similarly, Partner States are uncomfortable with the current distribution of the EAC common services. There is agitation to decentralize the EAC institutions and organs to ensure all members benefit and host them equitably. The concern has been that some states host several organs of the EAC whereas others do not host any. Uganda and Tanzania host most of the organs and institutions, Kenya hosts only one; the Lake Victoria Environmental Program, Rwanda and Burundi do not host any. Kenya, Rwanda

³⁰ Interview with Severene Rugamamo, Institute Of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam, 20 September 2013.

³¹ Society for International Development (SID), *East African Integration, dynamics of equity in trade, education, media and labour*, SID, 2011, pp.9-21.

and Burundi are at the forefront urging amendment of the Treaty to facilitate the equitable re-distribution.³²

Additionally, interstate tensions and disputes are characteristic of the patterns of enmity in the EAC region. Each state has bones of contention with a member state or states. Firstly, Tanzania has had suspicious relations with Uganda dating to the border wars of 1978/79 between the two states. This escalated following Tanzania's support to overthrow the Idi Amin regime. A key informant observed that the current tensions revolve around the divergent positions taken by the two countries on the EAC integration process. Uganda supports the fast tracking of the process whereas Tanzania urges for a slow gradual process. Tanzania argues that implementation of the Customs Union and the Common Market face challenges that need to be addressed before the EAC region can progress to other levels of integration; this position is opposed by Uganda and Rwanda.³³

Another informant posited that contention between Rwanda and Tanzania stems from the fact that Tanzania showed reluctance to accept the admission of Rwanda and Burundi into the EAC stating that the two states needed more time to reconstruct and deal with their internal security situations before being allowed into the Community. Tanzania was also cautious that the differences in colonial heritage of the two states and the other EAC states would pose challenges in integrating them. Tanzania holds similar position on the admission of South Sudan, Ethiopia and Sudan.³⁴

Similarly, Tanzania faces hostilities from Rwanda and Burundi regarding the March 2013 expulsion of refugees from the two countries. The two countries have

³² Interview with key informant, EAC Secretariat, November 16, 2013.

³³ Interview with Prof. Severene M. Rugamamu, *opcit.*

³⁴ Interview with Tanzania EALA MP, 21 November 2013, Nairobi, Kenya, on the sidelines of EALA session held in Nairobi, 19-27 November 2013.

publicly accused Tanzania of violating the relations by expelling their citizens. In response, Tanzania states that the action was guided by its national interest which was threatened by the criminal activities of the refugees. This has created uneasy relationships between the states, and has impacted on the EAC relations. A key informant contends that integration can not proceed if citizens of the Partner States are not allowed to move freely across the region. The expulsion of EAC citizens demonstrates Tanzania's efforts to frustrate the EAC process besides straining bilateral relations with Rwanda. However, Tanzania enjoys cordial relations with Burundi despite the expulsion of refugees, this stems from Tanzania's involvement and support for Burundi peace processes over time. Burundi is dependent on Tanzania for its security and stability.³⁵

Meanwhile, Uganda has potent friction with Kenya over the disputed Migingo Island on Lake Victoria; public spats have characterized the dispute with both states claiming ownership of the territory. The 2009 moratorium to engage efforts to determine the ownership of the island temporary quelled the tensions. This however remains a point of friction between the two states. Interviews with a key informant³⁶ revealed that the citizens and the media of the two states during the period of tension took nationalistic positions and supported their leaders and castigated the opposing side. The media in the two states turned patriotic and used negative language to address the other side. Similarly the views of the elite reflected those of the masses in the region regarding the issue. Clearly, there were no EAC level efforts to address the tension between the two Partner States, who sought intervention beyond the region for interpretation of the colonial maps

³⁵ Interview with Rwandan EALA MP, 21, November, 2013, Nairobi, Kenya, on the sidelines of EALA session held in Nairobi 19-27 November 2013

³⁶ Interview with a journalist, 30 November, 2013 and collaborated from http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Uganda_surrenders_Migingo_Island, accessed 28.11.2013

from the former British colonial master. This particular case exposed the failure of the existing EAC regional frameworks on peace and security to settle disputes between members or to facilitate the process of mediation.

In concurrence, Boinnet observes that suspicions between Kenya and Uganda have persisted and continue to define the relationship between the two states. For instance, friction that started during Idi Amin's reign was carried on by President Yoweri Museveni on suspicion that President Arap Moi's government was training mercenaries with the help of Libya to overthrow him. President Moi on his part was uncomfortable with Museveni given his revolutionary background and tended to fashion himself as a democrat who did not share the same ideals as Museveni. These suspicions grew hot and cold depending on issues at hand, for example, during the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya President Museveni would not be accepted as a mediator because the public opinion strongly expressed suspicion that Uganda security forces were participants in the violence in parts of Kenya.³⁷

On Kenya's relationship with Tanzania, Boinnet adds that the disagreements over the division of assets of the defunct EAC in 1984 left a lot of bitterness and suspicion between Kenya and Tanzania which characterizes their relationships to date. Their points of divergence are mainly economic in nature, for instance there is potent tension over the Serengeti-Masaai Mara ecosystem which is vital for the tourists industries of the two states. Kenya is opposed to Tanzania's intention to build a road network through the Serengeti arguing that it will affect the migration routes of the wildlife. Though Tanzania shelved the proposal it remains a point of friction. However, Kenya's relationship with

³⁷ Interview with Brigadier Wilson Boinnet, Former Director General, National Intelligence and Security Service, Kenya, 31 October 2013.

Rwanda and Burundi are cordial dating back to Kenya's involvement in the peace processes of the two countries and more recently their open economies have attracted Kenyan investors in various sectors. This has enhanced interdependence between Kenya and the states of Rwanda and Burundi.³⁸

Meanwhile, Uganda has had conflict with Rwanda over control of Kisangani area a territory in DRC. They have waged two wars over the deployment of their troops in parts of the territory and administration of its natural resources. This also heightened tension between the two states and the DRC that renounced their activities in its territory. The conflict was amicably resolved and cordial relations have been restored between the three states. This however remains a potent area of tensions given the interests of the actors. In addition, historically Uganda hosted and supported rebels fighting successive Rwandan regimes including President Kagame's Rwanda Patriotic Front to launch attacks that propelled him to power. This past continues to define their security relationship which at times is characterized by suspicions and a sense of entitlement for the support accorded during the armed struggles.

A new front for enmity in the region was opened in 2013 when three Partner states; Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda entered into a tripartite agreement to enhance cooperation in the development of key infrastructure projects that excluded Tanzania and Burundi but included South Sudan. This initiative which is referred to as the coalition of the willing has ignited diplomatic tension that casts doubts on the viability of the EAC. The coalition of the willing accused Tanzania of lacking commitment and frustrating the EAC, whereas Tanzania asserted it was firmly in the EAC. These ongoing developments have attracted disquiet amongst the Partner States and its key donors and if not well

³⁸ *ibid*

addressed are likely to undo the EAC integration process.³⁹ Once more the EAC frameworks on peaceful resolution of conflicts failed to demonstrate capacity to address conflicts arising between the Partner States.

Some of the region's states are in the process of discovery and exploitation of natural resources especially oil and gas. Uganda discovered oil in the Albertan belt, Kenya in Turkana area and Tanzania discovered natural gas and oil in Mtwara Region.⁴⁰ There are efforts to enhance cooperation amongst the states in ensuring effective management of the natural resources which are instrumental in enhancing economic prosperity of the Region's states. However, this is also a likely area of future conflicts within the states and with neighbors who share the resources.

Despite the above patterns of enmity, The East Africa Community Partner States share common security concerns and threats to their peace and security. Chapter Four discussed the converging and divergent security interests of the Partner States and articulated the common and shared security interests both traditional and contemporary at the national, regional and international levels.⁴¹ Key among the interests identified was enhancing regional peace and stability. The states have sought security cooperation so as to address the problems emanating from within their regions and beyond. The EAC states seek to ensure their survival as independent states and also as a region within the anarchy in the international system.

³⁹Interview with EALA MP, 22 November 2013 Collaborated in www.theeastafrican.co.ke/oped/comment/Dar-es/index, www.eaststandard.net/tanzania-governemnt-officially-renounces-coalition-of-the-willing, accessed 09.11.13.

⁴⁰ www.ogj.com, Oil Discoveries News: Exploration and Development /discoveries.html., accessed 11.12.13

⁴¹ Chapter Four p.57

The EAC states address their insecurity through membership to various international, continental and regional organizations that are concerned with the maintenance of peace and security. All the five states at the global level are members of the United Nations; continentally they are members of the African Union and regionally they subscribe to the East African community. These states have also formed alliances with other states to enhance their security.⁴²

Similarly, the five states enjoy good bilateral diplomatic relations with each other and with most African countries; each state has diplomatic missions in all the EAC member states. Multilateral relations with continental organizations have been enhanced through relations with the African union and other African regional integration blocs. Likewise, the states have cooperated in enhancing communal management and utilization of shared resources specifically regarding the Nile waters. The EAC states are all signatories to the new Nile Basin initiative. The states took a nearly common position in the discussions to repeal the 1929 Nile Treaty that had given exclusive rights to Egypt and Sudan to utilize the waters and prohibited other riparian states from doing the same. Despite threats and intimidation from Egypt the states ratified the new Nile initiative opening way for them to utilize the waters, Burundi initially delayed its signature rescheduling its coming to force.⁴³

Lastly, the Partner States have demonstrated their resolve to address transnational crimes through both bilateral and multilateral arrangements with other states. The crimes of concern include; terrorism, piracy, money laundering, human trafficking and drug trafficking. The Partner States are signatories to international conventions and regional

⁴² See earlier discussions in this chapter , pp 9-10.

⁴³ www.nilebasin.org/newsite/index accessed 18.12.2013.

arrangements that seek to address these concerns which need effective collective actions.⁴⁴

5.2.3 Polarity within the EAC Security Complex

The national power capabilities in the political, economic, social, military and diplomatic sectors possessed by each Partner State relative to others in the EAC region defines the Regions’ polarity. This is reflected in the perceptions of how states view each other’s capabilities and how other states respond to these capabilities. Polarity also concerns state views of themselves in terms of their power potential and how such power is used to influence the actions of the other states.

This research sought to understand the perceptions of key informants on the power capabilities of the five EAC Partner States in the military, political, economic, social and diplomatic sectors. A key output was to establish a regional power in the Region. Below is a summary of the perceptions collated from key informants’ rankings of the states in five sectors which ultimately confirmed that the region lacks a state which can perform the roles of a regional power within the context of security complex theorizing;

Table 7: Perceptions of power capabilities of the EAC Partner states

Rank	Military	Political stability and acceptability of the leadership	Economic	Social Cohesion	Diplomatic
1	Uganda	Tanzania	Kenya	Tanzania	Tanzania
2	Tanzania	Rwanda	Tanzania	Rwanda	Rwanda
3	Kenya	Uganda	Uganda	Uganda	Uganda
4	Rwanda	Kenya	Rwanda	Kenya	Burundi
5	Burundi	Burundi	Burundi	Burundi	Kenya

Source: Author based on observations from key informant interviews⁴⁵

⁴⁴ These are articulated in various EAC peace and security Frameworks discussed later in this chapter, pp.26-32

In concurrence, Baregu stated that the EAC region has unstructured security order and lacks an obvious regional hegemon in terms of relative capabilities across the political, social and economic sectors. The absence of a regional power in the region to play power roles across the range of security issues confronting the region presents a challenge. This leads to lack of leadership, custodianship and protection within the region. Baregu also argued that the perception that Kenya is a regional power cannot be quantified in terms of power capabilities and leadership that the country has provided in the resolution of the current security challenges facing the Region. The same can be said of Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi.⁴⁶

Similarly, Baregu stated that the tensions generated by the 2013 coalition of the willing by some EAC states, can be attributed to lack of a regional leader to bridge the existing differences between the Partner states and offer the desired leadership to forestall further differences within the region's states. This he argues is because when states face challenges that require solutions beyond unilateral approaches, leadership is required to guide coordinated efforts to effectively address the issue. A regional power is expected to act and influence the other states towards specific security policy directions and be responsible for initiating agreements and directing shifts in security strategy preferences that will ensure the survival of the Region. This is absent in the EAC.

In contrast another informant asserted that the possession of power capabilities is not sufficient to determine if a state will emerge or act as a region's power. For instance,

⁴⁵Forty-seven (47) key informants were interviewed. 1 represents highest rank of over 40 informants perceiving a state to be the most powerful in the sector. 2 represents 30-39 informants, 3 represents 20-29 informants, 4 represents 10-19 informant and 5 represents 0-9 informants

⁴⁶ Interview with Mwesiga Baregu, Professor of Politics and International Relations, St. Augustine University, Dar es Salaam November. 15. 2013

in the EAC region the states of Rwanda and Uganda which tend to project power capabilities are not the ones that possess the broad spectrum of capabilities in all sectors. Similarly the states of Kenya and Tanzania that are perceived or expected to project and utilize their power capabilities have not been able to emerge as undisputed regional hegemons. The informant illustrates the case of Uganda's President Museveni who has tended to project leadership and spearhead the integration process, including the contentious coalition of the willing within the region whereas, Uganda does not have the sufficient power capabilities in economic, social, political and diplomatic sectors to earn the position.⁴⁷

The informant further posits⁴⁸ that a regional power should be mutually recognized and acceptable to all members based on amiable interactions, capabilities and the maintenance of friendly relations with other states. This would then translate to legitimacy for the region's leadership. For instance, Kenya which had demonstrated viable prospects of attaining such leadership in the 1990's has tended to regress with the turn of the millennium due to its internal dynamics characterized by ethnic divisions and poor governance standards denying it legitimacy in the eyes of the other Partner States. Tanzania is denied such leadership legitimacy due to suspicions of its lack of commitment to the region. Rwanda and Burundi on the other hand, are yet to demonstrate power capabilities sufficient to propel them to regional power status. Therefore, the EAC region suffers from a regional power vacuum to spearhead and sustain security interactions.

⁴⁷ Interview with a Political Scientist, University of Dodoma, Tanzania, October, 14, 2013

⁴⁸ *ibid*

Similarly, Boinnet observed that the EAC Partner states are friendly and yet suspicious of any attempts by one state to become a regional power. This is because a region's leadership role will affect the security order within the region and no state wants to be subservient to another. The suspicions between the states, is manifested in the mistrust between the Presidents of the region. For instance Boinnet stated that former President Daniel Arap Moi and President Yoweri Museveni were always suspicious of each other's intentions and deployed a lot of resources to check each other's power capabilities. This included the deployment of spies from both sides across the region. However in public the two Presidents' appeared cordial and friendly as they worked to revive the defunct EAC and other bilateral initiatives.⁴⁹

Lastly, Edopu asserted that the lack of leadership within the EAC bloc has impacted on its negative image amongst the other REC's. The EAC is perceived as weak relative to the other regional institutions in Africa. This has been witnessed when lobbying of issues at the AU; the southern African and western African states always have a unified position when articulating issues which they frame as regional issues. This approach has enhanced their unity and success in addressing and getting support for security issues affecting their Regions. In contrast the EAC has not demonstrated cohesion and focus in articulating issues at such forums, often each state with issues of interest will approach the other states independently to seek their support with no assurance of a regional position or support.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Interview with Brigadier Wilson Boinnet ,op.cit

⁵⁰ Interview with Peter Edopu, Executive Director, Peace and Security Institute of Africa, Kampala, Uganda, 20 September 2013.(Former Director, Institute of Security Studies in Nairobi.).

5.3 East African Community's Securitizing Frameworks

Arising from the above discussion this section assesses the frameworks that have been put in place within the EAC to enhance peace and security. The section focuses on cooperation on matters of regional security and the accompanying Protocols and Mechanisms developed to actualize peace and security objectives. It also examines various agencies that are important securitizing actors at the regional level. The section will not assess other EAC frameworks for cooperation in trade, infrastructure, monetary and financial sectors among many other frameworks as these are beyond the research scope which aims to understand security sector cooperation in the Region.

The region's securitizing frameworks are derived from the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community which was signed on 30th November 1999 and came into force on July 7th 2000. It was later acceded to by Rwanda and Burundi on 1st July 2007. This Treaty identifies peace and security as key pre-requisites for the success of all the EAC integration processes. It appreciates that without regional peace and stability the benefits of the integration will be unattainable. This is captured in the EAC vision that focuses on a prosperous, competitive, secure, stable and politically united East Africa.⁵¹

Bearing in mind, the problems that led to the collapse of the defunct EAC (1967-1977) the Treaty emphasizes equity as a key principle of regional integration. This is based on the assumption that not all members may benefit equally and therefore any perceptions of skewed distribution of benefits and costs are likely to undermine the objectives of the Community.

⁵¹ East African Community, the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, EAC Secretariat, 2002.

The Treaty articulates several areas of cooperation that the Partner States engage in their integration efforts. These broad areas of cooperation include the economic, political, social, defence among other sectors. The EAC Treaty spells out the need for peace and security and obligates Partner States to establish common foreign and security policies whose objectives should aim to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and the independence of the Community. These policies aim to strengthen and preserve the security of the Partner States at their national levels and as a region to ensure survival and sustain the integration efforts. The Partner States are expected to implement their security objectives through systematic cooperation and coordination. They also need to define common positions on security threats applicable to all the Partners, foster peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts between and within Partner states and promote cooperation among the national assemblies and the EALA.⁵²

The Treaty specifically addresses regional peace and security in Article 124. States are required to foster and maintain a conducive environment that promotes peace and security. This is to be achieved through cooperation and consultations to enhance the prevention, management and resolution of disputes and conflicts among Partner States. The states are obligated to maintain good neighborliness, to establish regional disaster management mechanisms, and enhance cooperation in cross border crimes. They also have the responsibility to review the Region's security and specifically to formulate measures to combat terrorism. Other concerns addressed in the Treaty include: cooperation and exchange in criminal intelligence and security information, border

⁵²East African Community, the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, EAC Secretariat, 2002, Arusha, Tanzania, Chapter 123, Cooperation in Political Affairs.

security, conclude a protocol on drug trafficking, mechanisms for refugee management and cooperation on trainings and joint security operations.⁵³

To operationalize Article 124, EAC Strategy for Regional Peace and Security⁵⁴ was developed and adopted in 2006. An implementation plan was adopted in 2010 that identified security sector development priorities for a ten year period.⁵⁵ A key informant observed that the regional strategy was not implemented by the Partner States, because the strategy was developed before the East African Community Protocol (EAC) Protocol on Peace and Security from which it ought to draw its mandate. This technicality rendered its implementation problematic. The strategy is undergoing review to align it to the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security and to reflect contemporary security challenges and areas of cooperation that were not anticipated when it was first developed. The review will also incorporate other stake holders/actors (both state and non-state) who are critical in the implementation process but were not included in earlier Strategy.⁵⁶

Additionally, the development of the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security has been slower than envisaged, mainly because of the mystique surrounding the subject matter of security and the challenges in agreeing to a cooperation arrangement at the regional level. Another informant⁵⁷ stated that the work to develop the Protocol started in 2007 spearheaded by the Defence sector. Later the Sectoral Council on Interstate Security took over after it was established. However due to the crosscutting nature of the security issues the Defence and Foreign Policy Sectors were enjoined to work together with on the

⁵³East African Community, the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, EAC Secretariat, 2002, Arusha, Tanzania, Article 124: Regional Peace and Security.

⁵⁴ East African Community, Strategy for EAC Regional Peace and Security, adopted by the 13th Meeting of the Council of Ministers 2006 Arusha, Tanzania.

⁵⁵ East African Community, EAC Development Strategy 2011-2016, EAC Secretariat, Arusha, Tanzania, 2011.

⁵⁶Interview with L.M. Onyonyi, Peace and Security Expert, EAC Secretariat, November 13, 2013.

⁵⁷ Interview with Benoit Bihamiriza, Early Warning Expert, EAC Secretariat, October 16 2013.

formulation of the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security. The process dragged on in efforts to build consensus between the various security sector actors drawn from all the Partner states, for six (6) years up-to 2013 when the Protocol was signed by the Partner States. Furthermore, the states have up to 2014 to ratify the Protocol and pave way for its implementation extending the wait.

A security practitioner observed that a key challenge during the deliberations for the Protocol was that the security organs from the various states have different structures and mandates at their national levels which would not easily be reconciled at the EAC level. These security organs also carried their bureaucratic competitions, jealousies and supremacy contests from their national levels to the regional level further complicating the consensus building. There were also feelings that the Defence Sector sought to dominate the process whereas the intelligence community refused to participate in the meetings stating that their *mundus oparandi* were covert and not possible within the Protocol. Additionally, a proposal to have a Peace and Security Directorate at the EAC almost collapsed the deliberations due to disagreements on the command, control and reporting procedures. The proposal was deferred indefinitely. The end result of the long process was a watered down consensus Protocol that struck out most of the provisions articulated in earlier Drafts, in essence most of the progressive thinking necessary to anchor a robust contemporary regional security strategy were lost from the onset.⁵⁸

Baregu observed that the difficulty associated with negotiating the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security stems from the fact that the security agencies in the region are still held back by traditional or militaristic thinking and practices of security. This explains

⁵⁸ Interview with security practitioner who participated in the EAC Joint Sectoral Council Meetings , 06 November, 2013.

the defence sector's attempt to hijack the deliberations and the exclusion of non-state actors in the processes. The informant attributes the watered down Protocol to the give and take practices of the diplomatic processes, whereby the end product may not help to address the security problems of the Region.⁵⁹

The EAC Protocol whose main objective is to promote peace, security, stability and good neighborliness, articulates that Partner states shall cooperate amongst themselves and work with international and regional organizations to enhance peace and security. In implementing the Protocol the states commit to develop common measures, strategies, programs and agreements so as to achieve their security objectives. The Protocol spells out eleven(11) areas of security cooperation that include; conflict prevention, management and resolution, prevention of genocide, combating terrorism, piracy, transnational and cross border crimes, peace support operations, disaster risk reduction, crisis response, management of refugees, cattle , control of proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons, and prisons and correctional services. The Partner states also set out to establish early warning mechanisms so as to help in anticipating, preparing, responding, preventing and managing conflicts, crisis and disasters.⁶⁰

The EAC Secretariat also formulated a Conflict Prevention and Resolution Mechanism (CPRM)⁶¹ and a Conflict Early Warning Mechanism (CEWM).⁶² Similar to the EAC Regional Peace and Security Strategy these mechanisms were developed before the Protocol and therefore, would not be implemented due to technical hitches; they will

⁵⁹ Interview with MwesigaBareguop.cit.

⁶⁰East African Community, EAC Protocol on Peace and Security, Article 2, Scope of Cooperation signed in Dar-es salaam, Tanzania, 15th February, 2013.

⁶¹ East African Community, EAC Draft conflict prevention, management and resolution (CPRM) Mechanism, Arusha ,17 January 2012.

⁶² East African Community, EAC Early Warning Mechanism.

have to be aligned to the EAC Protocol when it comes to force then gradually be implemented. Other initiatives in the EAC peace and security sector include the development of the modalities for the establishment and functioning of the East African Community Panel of Eminent Person.⁶³

The EAC frameworks envisage several institutions and security organs that constitute the main securitizing actors in the security sector. At inception of the EAC in 2000, peace and security matters were administratively handled by the office of the Counsel to the Community until 2006 when the Department of Political Federation was formed and these functions transferred there. The peace and security unit was later formed within the department and took charge of the issues. The Sectoral Council for Interstate Security is charged with the responsibility of providing policy direction for the sector. However, there are proposals to establish the EAC Peace and Security Council as a top policy advisory organ to be accountable to the Heads of States Summit.⁶⁴


Other securitizing actors include the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) which should legislate on regional security strategy. The EAC Summit which has the role of reviewing the state of peace, security and good governance within the Community, the Council Ministers which plays a key role in making policy decisions and the Coordination Committees composed of Permanent Secretaries responsible for the East African Community that provides technical expertise to the Council and appoint Sectoral Committees to assist in the execution of their work.

⁶³ East Africa Community , Draft Modality for the Establishment and Functioning of the East Africa Community Panel of Eminent Persons, Bujumbura,Burundi,24.02.2012.

⁶⁴ Interview with Benoit Bihamiriza, op.cit.

To facilitate the work of the security sector several specialized thematic groups were established to provide technical input.⁶⁵ These include; the forums for the Police Chiefs under the East Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO), the forum for Intelligence Chiefs, Heads of Prisons and Corrective Services, Heads of Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Agencies, Heads of National Counter Terrorism Coordination Agencies and Coordinators of National Focal Points on Small Arms And Light Weapons (SALW). The process to operationalize these forums is picking up with the exception of the forum for the Intelligence Chiefs which has never met. The other forums have developed action plans and participated in meetings to establish working modalities which when successfully implemented will signal the start of security cooperation at the EAC region.⁶⁶

Illustration 4: The securitizing process and actors at the regional level:



Source: Author, based on observations of key informants and content analysis of EAC securitizing frameworks.

⁶⁵ EAC, Report of the 3rd Meeting of the Sectoral Council on Interstate Security ,April 2011

⁶⁶ Interview with Benoit op.cit.

A comparison with the national level decision making process discussed in Chapter Four where the President and his advisors have overarching powers in security decision making, at the regional level the Heads of States Summit though legally expected to play the same role have been ineffective because of the subordination of the regional interests for national interests. Despite the clear actors and roles the execution of regional security strategy is problematic. The non- state actors though outlined have not been adequately incorporated in the activities of the security sector.

Beyond the region, the EAC Treaty provides for regional and international cooperation to enhance peace and security. Towards attaining this objective the EAC entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the African Union (AU)⁶⁷ that provides guidelines for implementing the continental peace and security initiatives. The AU's Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) assigns responsibility to the regional economic blocs to promote and coordinate security initiatives at the regional level. Through this agreement the EAC benefits from APSA support programs and established the EAC Liaison office to the AU to facilitate the cooperation. The AU has provided support to the EAC in its efforts to develop the Early Warning Mechanism, in establishing a Mediation Framework among other administrative assistance⁶⁸. In addition the EAC as a region works closely with other intra and extra-regional organizations that have converging interests. These include; The Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), The International Conference On The Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), The Eastern and

⁶⁷Memorandum of Understanding between the African Union and the East African Community, 2008.

⁶⁸Onyonyi L.M., The EAC Peace and Security Sector Cooperation, Paper presented at the 2nd east African community peace and security conference, Bujumbura, Burundi, 13th -15th November 2013.

Southern Africa Money Laundering Group(ESAAMLG)and the Common Wealth Human Rights Initiatives (CHRI).⁶⁹

5.4 Conclusion

This Chapter has examined the formulation, coordination and implementation of EAC Regional security strategy as articulated in the EAC Frameworks for peace and security. The Chapter has also applied the Regional Security Complex Theory to the Region and confirmed its utility in understanding the security interdependence of the states. The chapter discussed key themes that are vital in envisioning a security strategy at the regional level. The Chapter concludes the case study and makes way for Chapter six, the critical analysis. This seeks to tie all the five Chapters together. It will assess the key themes flowing through the Chapters and test the research objectives. The chapter will also apply the model of the paradigmatic shift developed in Chapter One which is the central pillar of the research to demonstrate continuities and changes in security strategy at the national and regional levels. The Chapter will conclude with key recommendations arising from the research.

⁶⁹ Ibid

CHAPTER SIX

THE PARADIGM SHIFT IN THINKING OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY IN EAST AFRICA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

6.0 Introduction

Chapter one discussed the background to the study of the paradigm shift in rethinking of national and regional security strategy in East Africa. It stated the research problem and outlined the study objectives. The main objective of the study was to examine how the paradigm shifts have shaped national and regional security strategies in the EAC Region. The study set out to assess the states of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda Tanzania and Uganda. The literature review demonstrated limited emphasis on formulation, implementation and coordination of security strategies in Africa and specifically in East Africa. It also revealed that the theorizing and practice of security strategy is dominated by Euro- centric approaches and curtailed by secrecy and traditional state- centric attitudes adopted by African countries.

Chapter one also observed that the study and practice of security strategy is evolving from state centric approaches to contemporary broadened definitions and human security perspectives. This is because the traditional approaches have been rendered ineffective to address new emerging security concerns. The Chapter thus develops a model based on the concept of Paradigm shift articulated by Thomas Kuhn to assess the continuities and changes in the security discourse of EAC states. This model forms the basis for a critical analysis of key themes flowing through the study.

Chapter Two surveyed the conceptual issues of security strategy at the national and regional levels. The Chapter discussed the content of contemporary national and regional security strategies, actors and the factors that blur thinking and practice of the discourse.

The Chapter utilized the paradigmatic shift model developed in Chapter One to assess the conceptual shift in thinking and practice of both national and regional security strategies. The chapter established that the shift is occasioned by the perceived anomalies within the traditional security paradigms that impede their efficacy to explain the changing dynamics within the security discourse. This is necessitating their rejection or replacement by non-traditional competitors who offer more viable theorizing in the changing times. At the regional level the chapter articulated the shift in the models for assessing regional security strategy that are drifting from the security community to the regional security complex model that is gaining ground.

Chapter Three examined the main issues states consider in formulation, implementation and coordination of national and regional security strategies. It explored those aspects of security strategy that appear to have universal application and contended that to succeed, strategists must comprehend the nature of the environment in which the strategy will be implemented and therefore construct a strategy that is consistent with it. Chapter three also observed that national security strategy must be consistent with a state's national interest/values and be effective in advancing, projecting and protecting these interests at all times. Security strategies should be in compliance with acceptable international norms and culture.

Chapter four surveyed securitization and national security strategy processes in the five EAC Partner States. It examined the security interests of each state and analyzed their existing securitization frameworks. Specifically the Chapter assessed key factors that influence security strategy processes including the national interests, securitization frameworks, the multiplicity of actors and the prevailing environment in the states and in

the international system. The Chapter revealed similarities as well as differences. The states of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda share several security concerns at the national, regional and global levels but also have some peculiar security interests unique to some of them and not envisaged by the other states.

Chapter Five discussed those common interests that the EAC Partner states share at the regional level and how the states ensure their survival as a region in the strategic environment beyond the region and in the international system. The chapter also examined key components that constitute a regional security complex and how the East African Community Partner States can be studied within the parameters of the security complex thinking.

This Chapter constitutes the critical analysis of the study that synthesizes the key themes focusing on issues that flow throughout the study in the five chapters. Firstly, it examines and analyses the key findings emerging out of the study of national and regional security strategy processes in EAC as spelt out in the study's objectives. Secondly, it utilizes the model of the paradigmatic shift, which constitutes the framework of analysis to test the research objectives and hypotheses.


6.1 Key Themes in the National Security Strategy Processes of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda

Three key issues arose throughout the research in relation to the National Security Strategy (NSS) processes in the five countries. These are: Firstly, the similarities in the structures of NSS decision making processes. Secondly, the concurrence in the securitizing frameworks and thirdly, the converging and divergent security interests of the five states.

6.1.1 The Structure of National Security Strategy Decision Making

The comparative assessment revealed similarities in the central role-played by the president and his security advisors in national security strategy processes in all the five countries. It noted that the interests of the president and his advisors or their ethnic communities shape the content of national security strategies. National security strategy processes are institutionalized within the office of the president in the five states, and lack transparency and accountability. The public are seldom allowed to participate in the processes and when they do so, their engagement is superficial whereas, their inputs are not included in the actual strategies. However, in the five states rhetoric upholds that the processes are open and participatory.

Illustration 5: National security strategy, structure and factors that shape decision making in the five states



Source: Author based on observations on the structure of decision making at the national and regional levels.

The President and his key security advisors are at the top of the national security strategy process. They make strategic security decisions, define and prioritize the states' national interests by considering both the internal and external environments¹ in which

¹ See Chapter Three for detailed discussion on the role of the internal and external environment in NSS

the strategy is implemented. Another consideration is the survival and security of the states. The environment depends on the perceptions of the President and his advisors and may not reflect the actual situation. This is in conformity with Sprouts' who underscore the importance of perceptions in decision-making and observe that decision makers respond to issues depending on perceptions and that erroneous perceptions are as influential as the accurate perceptions. This is mainly because both the accurate and erroneous perceptions influence decision making equally. Their impact can only be determined after a decision has been taken and the consequences experienced.²

In addition, the personal attributes, biases and capabilities of the decision makers define national security strategy processes. Chapter five discussed the impact the personalities differences of the Presidents in the five states have in determining the security relations within the states and in relating to other states. The chapter also explained that security strategies change whenever there is change in leadership in these five states. This situation continues to be a major impediment in articulating comprehensive national security strategies in these states.

The study posits that an issue becomes securitized only when the decision makers decide that it is of national security interest, depending on their perceptions. This is mainly based on ensuring the regime survival and not necessarily the welfare of the people and the security of the states. As a result, the study observes that, issues of concern in the five states do not necessarily go through the processes articulated by the securitization school to qualify to be of security concern. In reality therefore, national security processes are ad hoc and intuitive in practice, as opposed to being structured and

² Harold & Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs with Special Reference to International Politics*, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp.18-26

formalized in accordance to theoretical appreciations of the same. This elaborates the research's concern that the theorizing and the actual practice of national security strategy are not evolving in unison. The practice remains state-centric whereas the theorizing has transformed over time.³

Similarly, Mwagiru observes that the lack of harmony in the development of the discourse of national security strategy is due to the suspicious relationship that exists between the academia and the security practitioners. In concurrence, Ngoma⁴ asserts that in Africa the practice of security remains state-centric despite the emerging developments in the academic sphere, this he attributes to the fact that the state in Africa continues to be the major provider of both physical and human security.⁵

The study also demonstrates the lack of input arising from the public opinion on issues relating to security. This is mainly attributable to the assumption that because, the five Presidents of the EAC Partner states are democratically elected by a majority vote. Therefore, the political elite assume that the public opinion is in favor of the decisions they make deriving from their electoral mandate to rule and reign. They use this to justify their choice of security strategies and lack of public involvement. The thinking of the security practitioners that is prevalent in the five states assumes that the leadership has the support of the public, inspires them, acts in their best interests and takes the public pulse rate before taking the NSS decisions. The study contends these are premised on erroneous perceptions and constitute a challenge to the formulation, implementation and

³ Weaver in Buzan Barry, Ole Weaver & Wilde de Jaap, *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*, Lynne Rienner, 1998. pp.21-28

⁴Ngoma Naison, *Prospects for A Security Community in Southern Africa, An Analysis of Regional Security in Southern Africa Development Community*, Institute of Security Studies, 2005, Pretoria p.18

⁵Mwagiru Makumi(ed), *Human Security Setting the Agenda for the Horn Of Africa*, Africa Peace Forum ,Nairobi, 2008, pp.1-10

coordination of NSS in the region. The decision-making processes of these states are similar to others states beyond the region except for variations in implementation and priorities.⁶

6.1.2 Similarities in Securitizing Frameworks

The second issue that arose in the study is the striking similarities in the securitizing frameworks of the five states. These states all have legal and institutional frameworks that guide their national security strategy processes. These processes are anchored in the states' constitutions and various Acts of Parliament in the respective states. These frameworks outline the roles and mandates of the multiple actors and agencies involved in the processes.

Similarly, there are also non-legal frameworks that guide National security strategies in these states. Specifically, Burundi formulated a National Security Strategy in 2013 that awaits implementation. Rwanda is implementing its Internal Security Policy that was developed in 2008. Uganda developed a White Paper on Defence Transformation to guide the development of other security sector policies in 2001. Similarly, Kenya formulated a Draft National Security Policy in 2012. Whereas, Tanzania's Draft Constitution 2013 envisions and articulates the processes for formulation of national security policy and strategies.⁷

In addition, each state has other sectoral policies that contribute to the national security frameworks. These include; Defence and Foreign policies, legislation governing the various security agencies, development plans and /or country visions and blue prints

⁶ Dixon H. J., *National Security Management, National Security Policy Formulation: Institutions, Processes and Issues*, National Defense University, Washington DC, 1984, pp.3-16.

⁷ See discussions in chapter four concerning these frameworks.

spanning twenty years⁸ and poverty eradication strategies amongst other government initiatives.

The study reveals that the frameworks of the five states are formulated in the new security paradigms. They incorporate non-traditional aspects of security with human security concerns clearly articulated. These frameworks also provide for the participation of non-state actors in the security sectors. Unfortunately, there are gaps between the written intentions in the frameworks and the actualization of the same that should translate to comprehensive NSS in the five states.

The table below illustrates a general comparison of the concurrence in the securitization frameworks of the EAC Partner states studied.

Table 8: Concurrence in the Securitizing Frameworks of the five states

Issue	Burundi	Kenya	Rwanda	Tanzania	Uganda
1. NSS is anchored in Constitution	Article 245 (COB 2005)	Article 240 (COK 2010)	Article 167 (COR 2003)	Article 222 (Draft 2013)	Article 219 (COU 1995)
2. Existence of specific Acts of parliament (National Security Council Act)	NSC Act(2008)	NSC Act (2012)		NSC Act (1970)	NSC Act 2000
3. Central role played by the president and advisors in NSS	Chairs NSC Advisors are NSC members	Chairs NSC Advisors are NSC members	President has constitutional Executive power	Chairs NSC Advisors are NSC members	Chairs NSC Advisors are NSC members
4. Actors in NSS processes are clearly defined	Security agencies, Ministries, other state and non state actors	Security agencies Ministries, other state actors	Ministry of internal Security has executive power over the security agencies Ministries, other state actors	Security agencies Ministries, other state actors	Security agencies Ministries, other state actors
5. Coordination between agencies and stake holders in the processes	inter-agency structures from national to village levels	inter-agency structures and from national to county to village levels	inter-agency structures from national to village levels	Inter-agency structures from national to village levels. (Peace and security committees)	inter-agency structures from national to village levels
6. Existence of internal and	Parliament,	Parliament,	Parliament,	Parliament,	Parliament,

⁸These are Kenya's Vision 2030, Uganda's Vision 2025, Rwanda's Vision 2020, Tanzania's Vision 2015 and Burundi's Vision 2020.

external oversight mechanisms	ombudsman and others	Ombudsman and others	Ombudsman and others	Ombudsman and others	Ombudsman and others
7. Existence of monitoring and evaluation procedures	Not clear	Not clear	Not clear	Not clear	Not clear
8. Has comprehensive NSS	NSS (2013)	Draft NSP (2012)	NSP(2008)	Sectorial policies	sectorial policies
9. Incorporates public participation and non-state actors	Civil society, media	Civil society, media	Civil society, media	Civil society, media	Civil society, media

Source: Author, based on content analysis of securitizing frameworks of the five states

The table illustrates more similarities than differences. It reveals that the securitizing frameworks of Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have more similarities, whereas Rwanda's has slight deviations from the rest. For instance whereas the other four states have National Security Council Acts that operationalize the relevant constitutional provisions and have their functions coordinated through their respective national security Councils, Rwanda's has a different arrangement where all the security functions, agencies and other actors are coordinated through one government ministry, the ministry for interior. This ministry has executive power over all the security actors. In the other four states each security agency is autonomous with a clear mandate and functions, they do not report to or are not subordinate to any government ministry.

The study asserts that the specifics and approaches for implementation and coordination of these frameworks differ in the five states. Similarly, the mere existence of the frameworks does not mean that they are effective in the discharge of their functions. For instance, the study established that all the five states have ineffective oversight mechanisms, both internal and external. This is because oversight mechanisms are deliberately conditioned to suit the interests of the presidency and the ruling elite. This begins from the selection of members to perform functions in the oversight bodies; they are selected depending on their levels of loyalty to the regimes or based on their

capabilities to subvert or frustrate these oversight functions. In addition the oversight bodies are held hostage by the public opinion or tribal interests. Therefore, members make decisions based on political expediency and their survival instincts. This necessitates a need for the five countries to shift towards enhancing effective oversights in the security sector.

The study also observes that in implementing parliamentary oversight, the quality of members of parliament determines the type of oversight possible. Tribal, party and personal interest often decide on how effective these over sights can be. Another problem is that parliamentary oversights lack a means of enforcement to ensure compliance by the parliamentarians. There are no sanctions or punishments for members of parliament for non- performance or for subverting such processes. This creates a culture of impunity prevalent in the oversight mechanisms and the security sectors of the five states. In concurrence, Baregu in his assessment of parliamentary oversight in Tanzania underscores the problems that are inherent in the defence and security oversights; key of which is the political patronage to the ruling party and the political culture of lack of transparency and accountability of the political class.⁹

6.1.3 Converging and Divergence of National Security Interests

The third issue revealed by the study is the assumed centrality of national interests in security strategy processes. In the five states, most government documents analyzed outline the respective state's national interests and national values. However, in reality these interests are not permanent and change depending on the

⁹Baregu Mwesiga, *Parliamentary Oversight of Defence and Security in Tanzania's Multiparty Parliament, Guarding the Guardians*,

president in power and the ideals they espouse. They are not shared amongst the populace. This is because most key informants did not approach the discussion in the same way or prioritize the national security interests as espoused in their states policies and strategies. The table below presents an analysis of those security interests that are common to the five countries as assessed from the discussions in chapter four.

Table: 9: Core Security Interests of East Africa Community Partner states

	Security Interests
	National security interests
1.	Traditional security interests
	Maintain territorial integrity
	Sovereignty and independence
	Ensure a stable, peaceful, united Country
2.	Emerging security interests
	Human security issues
	Economic development and industrialization
	Environmental protection and sustenance
	Food security
	Poverty eradication, youth bulge, women empowerment and employment
	Upholding Democracy, Respect for rule of law and Constitutionalism.
	National unity and cohesion
	Health issues
	Governance issues
3.	Regional security interests
	Good relations with neighbors
	Regional economic integration
	Regional peace and stability
	Peaceful resolution of conflicts
4.	Global security interests
	Respect for international law
	International peace and security contribute to collective security
	Ending international threats (terrorism, effects of climate change, piracy, trafficking drugs and human etc)
	Favorable international environment for trade and investment.
	Benefit from membership in international organization

Source: Author based on observations on the security interests of the five states in chapter four¹⁰.

¹⁰ This table is summarized from the data presented in Chapter four in Tables 1-5.

This analysis also delineates some security interests that are security interests in some states but not shared by all the other states as illustrated in the table below:

Table 10: Divergence in National Security Interests of the EAC Partner States

Burundi	Kenya	Rwanda	Tanzania	Uganda
Security sector reforms	End Negative ethnicity	End genocide	Survival of the Union with Zanzibar	Removal of military from politics
End armed Rebellions and insurgencies	ICC issues	Sustain Social cohesion	End religious tensions between Muslims and Christians	Role of traditional kingdoms

Source: Author, based on observations on security interests of the five states

The study proffers that each of the five states also has unique security interests that are important to them but not shared by the other EAC Partner states. Specifically, Uganda in her internal security pursuits is guided prominently by the desire to minimize the role of the military in politics. This is informed by a history of past negative military intervention in the state’s affairs. Likewise, Uganda also has a unique problem of frequent frictions between the traditional kingdoms and the national government. This influences the national politics in the country.

Whereas, a key security concern for Rwanda is to end the genocide ideology among its people. This is central in promoting national unity and cohesion. This is shared to some extent with Burundi especially on the issues of ethnic balance within the security and defence forces. This is a key principle in undertaking security sector reform program in the two states. The issue of genocide is not considered in the national security threats of other EAC Partner states. In relation to these, Burundi’s key priority is to successfully implement reforms within her security forces to end Tutsi dominance. Its other key

concern is to eliminate rebellions and insurgencies that threaten her stability. The other Partner states may not consider these as part of their key concerns.

Kenya has two unique concerns, Firstly; it faces a challenge in ending negative ethnicity that is permeating the core of its society threatening the peaceful co-existence of its multi-ethnic communities. This is also promoting a culture of exclusion of the minority tribes by the larger ones. Secondly, the International Criminal Court cases against the President and his deputy have put a strain on Kenya's relations with the western countries and elevated the cases to a key concern for the country.

Tanzania's main concerns revolve around sustaining the union government between the mainland and Zanzibar. This is due to the uneasy relations between the two. The constitutional review process presents an opportunity to address the problem. In addition, religious tensions between Muslims and Christians are increasingly becoming a concern for Tanzania.

6.2 Key themes in Regional Security Strategy for the EAC Region

The study reveals that the endeavor to implement a regional security strategy in the region has not been successful. For instance, chapter five observed that the process to formulate and implement EAC Protocol on Peace and Security has been slower than anticipated. The formulation process took six years (2007-2013) and its implementation has not yet commenced. This is attributed to the challenges inherent in agreeing to security cooperation at a multilateral level. Chapter five also discussed the technical issues that have delayed the process; key among this derives from the fact that the other EAC regional security strategy was formulated without the enabling EAC Protocol on Peace and Security from which it draws its Mandate. This failure to implement the

security strategy and other frameworks in the peace and security sector necessitate a refocus on its processes and actors.

This study delineates three key concerns, which are at the core of frustrating the efforts to formulate and implement a regional security strategy. These concerns inform the pursuit to actualize a future regional security strategy. They include: the need for a regional power within the EAC Region, commitment to implement regional security strategy and reduction of donor dependence for resourcing and funding for the security sector.

6.2.1 Need for Regional power within the EAC

Chapter four¹¹ analyzed the structure of national security strategy decision making and revealed the critical role played by the presidency and key security advisors, and concluded that the responsibility for NSS should be assigned a specific actor and institution. A content analysis of the EAC documents on peace and security and the synthesis of the in-depth interviews show that at the regional level the responsibility lies with the EAC Summit, which comprises of the five Heads of States.

This poses a key challenge in implementing regional security strategy because, the Heads of States are not homogeneous; they have personality differences and are guided by their respective national interests which are not necessarily the EAC's interests. The rotational basis of the chairmanship of the EAC Summit plays its role in compounding the problem; the frequency of the rotation annually doesn't afford one the opportunity to implement sustainable regional security strategy. These pose challenges

¹¹ Chapter four pp.53-54

Therefore, the study proffers that the EAC region needs an hegemon to guide and engage in efforts to maintain the existing security order and to address the regions' security challenges. Without clear leadership the formulation, coordination and implementation of regional security strategy will be stillborn. This is evident from the fact that, despite the development of various frameworks within the EAC to guide its security strategy, no progress has been made to actualize them.

Similarly, chapter four underscored that the EAC states prefer unilateral and bilateral approaches in addressing their security problems. The region's states are increasingly taking unilaterally security decisions based on their national interests; they are hardly based on a regional position, though the threats are crosscutting in the Partner States. The closest the states have come to regional security cooperation is issuing statements to condemn acts that constitute threats in the region or in neighboring states.

A case in point is the protracted war in Somalia that has spill -over effects on all the Partner States. The region lacks a common strategy to confront the threats emanating from Somalia; each Partner State has intervened on their own motivations and interests. These are normally based on patriotism and nationalistic security interests as opposed to the regional interests. Regional efforts to address the common threats from Somalia have often been rhetorical statements during EAC sessions and no common practical strategies have been taken by the Partner states.

The study observes that a regional hegemon will move the region from unilateral to multilateral approaches in addressing security threats. In concurrence, Fraizer¹² expounds on the role of regional powers in the development and maintenance of security orders

¹² Frazier D.,et.al, *Regional Powers and Security: A Framework for Understanding Order Within Regional Security Complexes*, European Journal of International Relations, Sage,vol.16. Issue 731, April 2010, pp.731-753

within regional security complexes. He argues that security orders are driven by among other issues, the regional power roles, where leaders act to influence the region's members is a specific security policy direction. The regional leaders take responsibility for initiating security agreements and leading the region in choosing preferences and coordinated sets of strategies.

Therefore, an EAC regional power is vital in spearheading the implementation of frameworks on peace and security as well as mediating common positions and strategies. This model works in regional institutions across the worlds that have hegemons that help to captain their respective security complexes. However, the big challenge is that currently no state in the EAC Region has been able to command the acceptance and compliance of all the other Partner states and emerge to the regional leadership position.

Without a regional power, the problems of leadership for implementation of security strategy will recur. Likewise, Buzan et.al observe that the EAC region's polarity is difficult to assess due to the lack of a clear regional leader. They assert that the South African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have clear regional powers in South Africa and Nigeria that shape the security interactions of their regional security complexes. They conclude that security interactions in Africa have been generated by weaknesses rather than by strengths. Therefore, their security interdependence revolves around attempts at addressing spillover effects from domestic security issues. This has inhibited the evolution of regional security complexes with comprehensive security strategies.¹³

¹³Buzan Barry & Ole Weaver, *Regions and Powers; The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 243- 247.

6.2.2 Commitment to Implementation of Regional Security Strategy

The study also reveals that the EAC Partner States do not subscribe to a shared understanding about the common threats to their security and survival, for which to device security strategies to address. Although these security interests are to some extent articulated in the EAC frameworks, they are unknown and not shared amongst the citizens of the region's five states. The study posits that, ownership of the security interests by all stakeholders is critical in contributing to collective securitization of the issues of concern. This contributes to determining and advancing the extent to which the different states perceive same threats and derive strategies to address them. To support this, Williams et.al observe that, how states construct and respond to security threats within regional security arrangements depends on the participation by all relevant actors. However, they argue that participation in most regional institutions is currently limited to the state representatives that exclude all other non-state actors. This inhibits the processes of collective securitization in regional institutions.¹⁴

In addition, the Partner States should be willing to arrive at and implement regional security interests. This entails making sacrifices by surrendering some of their autonomy and national interests. The states currently, offer to host EAC institutions and activities based on their national interests and use the regional platform to get leverage to enhance their local issues. There is a tendency to import local issues from the national level to the region and impose them as regional interests. This partly contributes to the problem of lack of common definition of security threats.

¹⁴ Williams D.P., Haacke J., *Regional Arrangements ,Securitization and Transnational Security Challenges: The African Union and the Association of South East Asian Nations Compared*, Security Studies, Routledge, 17, 2008, pp.755-809.

For instance, the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security articulates the prevention of genocide as a common threat in the region, whereas not all the Partner States define genocide as a national security threat. Therefore, in this case it puts to question the process of arriving at the common threats and distinguishing them from national security threats of the Partner states. This study argues that, there has to be a clear demarcation between the national security interests of the respective five states and the regional interests on which a regional strategy is anchored.

On his part, Waltz captures the problem of defining security threats in regional organizations in the balance of threat theory. He contends that states strive to address their security problems through the formation of alliances by coalescing on specific issues. This depends on the perceived threat and the impact on the states in the alliance. The states choose either balancing or bandwagoning as strategies to address the perceived threat. In his assessment, there is no clear formula through which states will define common threats within the regional settings. This therefore becomes a dilemma for states seeking to implement regional security strategy.¹⁵

The process of arriving at the regional security interests ultimately becomes more complex than one at the national levels of the individual states where the actors and their responsibilities are anchored in law. In most instances, the national level actors tend to continue the execution of their national mandates at the regional level, creating more obstacles for the realization of a regional security strategy. Chapter five assessed how the inter-agency supremacy posturing and the different mandates of the various security

¹⁵ Walt Stephen, Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power, *International Security*, 1985,9,No.4,pp3-43.

agencies in their national jurisdictions affected negotiations for the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security.

Similarly, the study observes that, the lack of effective institutions to execute the security functions of the EAC compounds the problem. The security actors/agencies lack cooperation and cohesion while working at their national level. They tend to import this disunity to the regional level adding to the already difficult situation. Likewise, the EAC Secretariat in its current form lacks capacity to implement the multiple frameworks envisioned in the peace and security sector.

In addition, confidence building measures need to be adopted by the Partner States to address the continued mistrust and suspicion between the states. Chapter five examined how continued mistrust between the leaderships of the five states undermines the EAC processes. It also appreciated the difficulties in ending the mistrust and suspicions. Likewise, the outcome of the EAC research that collected views on fast tracking of the formation of the EAC political federation underscored the uneasy relationship that characterizes and frustrates the Community's efforts.¹⁶ The study outlines this as one area for future research.

The study noted that the EAC has demonstrated sustained commitment in implementing the economic sector objectives, specifically the Common Market and Customs Union. However, such efforts have not been dedicated to the security sector objectives. Chapter five observed that the EAC Treaty underscores the importance of security and stability as key requirements for attaining the Community's objectives. Consequently, this study contends that the commitments seen in the other sectors needs to

¹⁶ United Republic Of Tanzania, *Report of the National Committee for Gathering Views on Fast Tracking the Formation of the East African Community Political Federation*, Dar es Salaam, June, 2007.

be replicated in the security sector. This need to be accompanied by practical security strategies by the Partner states to enhance the implementation of the objectives of the EAC frameworks on peace and security frameworks.

6.2.3 Resourcing and funding of Regional Security Strategy

The study posits that without assured, sustainable and independent source of funding for the peace and security sector, implementation of the regional security strategy faces challenges. Currently, 95% of the financing for the EAC programs and activities on security are funded by external donors. Mainly the European Union (EU) through the AU- African Peace and Security Architecture support program and the German Technical Cooperation (GIZ). The AU program provides assistance for the development of the EAC Peace and Security Frameworks including; Peace and Security Sector Policy, EAC Early Warning Mechanism, Establishment of Mechanisms for Mediation, and administrative support to the EAC Secretariat among others.¹⁷

The EAC region's donor dependency is attributed to the reluctance of the Partner states to commit sufficient funds towards the objectives of peace and security , which they claim to be committed to implementing. The reliance of foreign funds to enhance security continues to perpetuate the weak states dilemma and exposes the region to security vulnerabilities associated with dependency. Chapter four and five observed that security is considered a core interest for survival at the national and regional levels which should not be left to external machinations. All the Partner States underscore the

¹⁷Onyonyi L.M., The EAC Peace and Security Sector Cooperation, Paper presented at the 2nd East African Community Peace and Security Conference, Bujumbura, Burundi, 13th -15th November 2013.

importance of ending security dependency in their policies and strategies, therefore, it can be deduced that what they lack is commitment to go beyond the rhetoric.

In addition, there seems to be a contradiction, because at the national level the security sectors are heavily funded in the five partner states, enjoying huge budgetary allocations, highly trained manpower and the state of the art equipment. This national prioritizing and financing of the security sector should also be replicated at the regional level. Therefore, the study contends that there is need for the region's states to take control of their security by enhancing funding to the sector at the regional level. It is not the lack of resources to fund the sector but the lack of commitment by the States in the regional security agenda.

This situation can also be explained in terms of the existing mistrust and suspicion between the partner states and actors in the security agencies. This is compounded when it comes to the subject matter of security where, the gatekeepers are reluctant to change, despite the progress made in formulating the regions security frameworks in the new human security paradigm. The states are reluctant to actualize security cooperation despite public pronouncements to do the same. They are also unwilling to implement the region's security agenda. As long as this situation prevails the implementation of the regional security frameworks remains a mirage.


6.3 Application of the Paradigm Shift Model to National and Regional Security Strategies

The broad objective of the study was to examine how the paradigm shifts have shaped national and regional security strategies in the EAC Region. The first objective of the study was to establish the impact of the paradigmatic shift on national security strategy

processes of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The study examined national security strategy processes in the five states and observed some changes and continuities. It also demonstrated similarities as well as differences in approaches and actors in the security discourse. Therefore, the study confirms the research hypothesis that paradigmatic shifts have shaped the content and structure of national security strategy in the five states. To elaborate these the section utilizes the paradigm model developed in chapter one to illustrate the shifts in the national security strategies of these states.

6.3.1 Key Shifts in National Security Strategies in Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda

The model below analyses the on-going developments/debates in the study and practice of security strategy. This model, developed in chapter one represents five steps in the process of paradigm shift; **Illustration 6: Key shifts in NSS of five EAC states**



The above model assumes that there is always a prevailing paradigm at any one time in assessing security strategies. This paradigm develops anomalies with time and as a result, rival competing paradigms emerge to address the existing anomalies. The rival paradigms may either lead to rejection of the prevailing one or occasion replacements or additions to parts of it. The process then leads to the development of new paradigms, which for this study are new security strategies.

For this study, the first step reveals that the prevailing paradigm in national security strategy processes of the five states have been guided by state-centric approaches. These have mainly been influenced by the traditional definition of security that is political-military inclined. This is also because the term security strategy has a military heritage, which has influenced the thinking and practice in these states. Traditionally, the main objective of national security strategies was to develop military tactics to ensure success in the battle field. Similarly, the actors were limited to the military and a few political elite.

Additionally, the study observes that for most of the post-independence period the national security strategies of EAC partner states were anchored on the neo-colonial constitutions that perpetuated the state-centric nature of the discourse. National security dealt mainly with the offensive and defensive capabilities of the states to defend their independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty from external intervention. The assumption was that, security threats emanate from the external environment. Therefore, social, economic, political and environmental issues within the states were not considered as of security value.

Similarly, the five states gained independence during the cold war period when the reigning paradigm was realism. Thus, externally their national security strategies reflected the realist ideologies developed to survive during that period. This entailed alliance building either with the Eastern, Western or non- allied blocs. In this case, security strategy formulation was an easy task of duplicating the strategies of the alliance to which a state belonged. The security discourses within the African states thus became dormant. In concurrence, Olotunde et.al¹⁸ assert that during the cold war African states tended to implement ideologies depending on the bloc they subscribed to, based on their perceived national interests. Their relations with the superpowers depended on the degree to which their policies advanced or injured their own perceived interests. On their part the superpowers were able to extract greater advantages from the relationship due to their dominant power capabilities.

The study also posits that the national security strategy processes in the five states are shrouded in secrecy. Access to security information is considered the preserve of a few elite rendering research on the subject matter problematic. The actors and stakeholders are exclusively state actors from the state's security agencies; non state actors' participation remains negligible in some states, whereas in others they are totally excluded from the discourse. Similarly, chapter one demonstrated in the literature gap that most theorizing in security studies discourse is spearheaded by euro-centric scholars with minimal contribution from the African academics. In addition, African security problems are often ignored except when they are linked or affect great powers interests.

The second step, notes that these prevailing paradigms in the five states have in the Kuhnian thinking developed significant anomalies. The anomalies are demonstrated

¹⁸Olotunde J.C.B., et.al, African *International Relations*, Longman, London, 1985, pp157-168.

in the continuity of insecurity within the various states, the emerging new security challenges coupled with the resurgence of old problems that persist. Therefore, the existing national security strategies and policies in these states have proved ineffective in addressing the security problems. Chapter four assessed the securitizing frameworks and decision making processes in the states and revealed that despite the elaborate frameworks that are anchored in the constitutions and other legislations the problems of insecurity persists. The anomalies therefore, are traced to the approaches adopted by the states, the ineffective institutions and the lack of commitment from the ruling elite to address the issues. Chapter four also observed that corruption and other governance deficits in the five states constitute security threats to the states from which the security sector is not insulated.

These anomalies lead to the third step, which outlines the sustained efforts by the states to address the prevailing insecurity. Rival competing perspectives are advanced as prescriptions to end insecurity. These include; efforts to reform the ineffective security frameworks that are charged with the responsibility of enhancing security at the national levels. For instance, chapter four observes that the five states have undertaken constitutional reviews that have provided for clear processes for national security strategy formulation, implementation and coordination. This has introduced reforms in the security sectors most of whose implementation is ongoing. The states have in the process shifted their security strategy documents from being state-centric to both the human security and broadened security agenda focus. Issues that were not considered security concerns are finding expression in national security documents. For instance, chapter four discussed the national security interests of the five states and revealed that,

issues of food security, environment, and governance, women and youth empowerment feature prominently in the national security discourse. This signals a shift to reject purely traditional referent objects of security and embrace the broadened and deepened perspectives in the thinking and practice of security strategy.¹⁹

Additionally, the national security strategy frameworks assessed articulate inter-agency approaches and collaboration between various stake holders in the national security process. A key addition observed is the inclusion of non-state actors as players in the security arena. These actors who were previously ignored have their functions spelt out in the security strategy documents. This marks a departure from the past, however despite their clearly spelt roles they are yet to find space to operate effectively in the discourse. As chapter three observed there is a gap between the implementation and coordination of national security strategy, where the various actors fail to act in harmony. The inter-agency competitions coupled with bureaucratic bottle necks stifle these processes. This is likely to be further complicated by the addition of new actors who come with their different organizational cultures.

Step four, exposes aspects of replacements and rejection of some aspects of the traditional state-centric paradigms. The replacements have taken place through the repeal of the neo-colonial constitutions, formulation of new legislations in the security sector and the inclusion of the non- traditional security threats and actors to the security agenda. The five states are increasingly formulating their security strategies in the contemporary security paradigms that are more human centric and adhere to international best practices.

¹⁹ Weaver in Buzan Barry, Ole Weaver & Wilde de Jaap, *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*, Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp.21-28

This fourth step, also nuances the continuities of some aspects of the traditional state-centric security approaches that have withstood the rigors of paradigmatic shifts. These include key realist concepts. For instance chapter four elaborated the centrality of the national security interests; specifically the prominence of the protection of state sovereignty, integrity and independence as a survival interest of all the five states. Though considered traditional security interest, they are still relevant in contemporary security strategy. In essence, the paradigmatic shifts have left some aspects of the traditional security intact, but have incorporated the broad security agenda that includes; human security, environment, economic, societal and political aspects. This addition has increased the number of security referent objects and shifted the focus of security from the state to the individual and societal levels of analysis. Chapter three observed the primacy of the state in the provision security; it asserted that one of the key functions of a state is to ensure the security and welfare of the people and its geographic territory.²⁰ Clearly this study indicates there are both changes and continuities of key aspects of realism in the on-going shifts.


The last step, discerns that these continuities and changes give rise to the formulation and articulation of new security strategies that reflect the emerging realities. Chapter four discussed the endeavors by the five states to develop national security strategies or policies. It also demonstrated that the states were moving from ad-hoc security strategies to more comprehensive security strategy processes. The secrecy and mystery surrounding the subject matter of security are being subjected to oversight mechanisms. Chapter four also elaborated that the five states have established both

²⁰Yarger R Harry, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, Westport, Praeger, 2008, p.15-24

parliamentary oversight mechanisms and institutions that have clear mandates to oversight over the security sectors. Though these mechanisms have their inherent weaknesses and have not been effective in their performance, their existence signals a shift to enhance accountability and transparency in the national security strategy processes of the five states.

6.3.2 Key Shifts in Regional Security Strategy in East African Community

The second objective of the study was to establish the impact of the paradigmatic shift on regional security strategy processes within the East African Community. Consequently, chapter five assessed the five states as constituting a regional security complex and demonstrated their security interdependency. It also discussed the security relations between the EAC Partner States and the various initiatives at regional securitizing. The chapter revealed continuities as well as shifts in the security relations of the states and confirmed the hypothesis; that the paradigmatic shifts have influenced the content and structure of the region’s security strategy as the five steps below illustrate.



Step one, observes that the prevailing paradigm in EAC regional security strategy processes is mainly through ad-hoc security cooperation. States tend to cooperate depending on how their national security interests are affected by an occurrence within or outside the region. Their security relationships are informed by imperatives such as good neighborliness, non-interference in the internal affairs of the EAC Partner states and enhancing and sustaining diplomatic relations.²¹ These help to illustrate that the thinking and practice of the regions security strategy is still held back by traditional aspects and practices. This is despite the evolution of international regimes that have rendered some of these imperatives superfluous.

Additionally, security cooperation in the region is characterized by suspicions and mistrusts. The states tend to be more agreeable to cooperation in the economic sector whose benefits are more understood, whereas cooperation in the security sector has been the slowest and most misunderstood. The negotiations to formulate the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security have been slow and prospects of its implementation uncertain. Chapter five observed that since the signing of the EAC Treaty in 2000, consensus of the discussions on the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security was arrived on in 2013. This is mainly attributed to the mistrust and suspicions between the Partner states.

Chapter five observed the various patterns of enmity between the states that influence these relationships. It also examined the lack of homogeneity between the states that further complicates the security cooperation. The chapter observed that at the bilateral level these states have animosities with each other relating to border disputes, utilization of shared natural resources, economic disparities and lack of consensus in the

²¹ East African Community, the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, EAC Secretariat, 2002.

regional integration processes among other issues. These points of how the divergences pose challenges to efforts at security cooperation at the EAC level. The five states are at different levels of development; therefore their priorities and participation at the region are not uniform. There are also perceptions of unequal benefits and distribution of EAC gains. These perceptions shape the nature of security cooperation in the region.

Step two, indicates that the anomalies in security relations at the EAC derive from several issues; firstly is the reluctance of the states to surrender the national security interests for the EAC region's interests. The literature review revealed that states are driven by their national interests as they conduct their international relations. The essence of such relationships is to ensure a state's survival in the external environment. It follows therefore, that states face a dilemma in regional security cooperation regarding which interests they pursue, no state will sacrifice its national interests for other extra state interests.²² In relation to this chapter three, underscored that the driving force for formulation and articulation of regional security strategy is to ensure the survival of a region in the international environment. Therefore, the assumption is that a region has interests to pursue which includes its relationship with other regions in the continent and beyond.²³ However, states will prioritize their individual survival before considering the region's survival. This ultimately becomes an irreconcilable issue for regional security cooperation endeavors.

The second anomaly is the non-implementation of EAC regional security strategy due to lack of commitment from the partner states. This is further compounded by the

²² Craig Snyder, *Regional Security Structures*, In Craig Snyder *Contemporary Security and Strategy* Routledge, New York, 1999, pp.94-102

²³ Makumi Mwangi, *Coordination of National Security Strategy: Perspectives on Grand Strategy Formulation In Kenya*, NDC Occasional Papers on Security, no.1, 2008, pp.1-27

formulation of ineffective security frameworks. Chapter five revealed that the EAC Regional Security Strategy, the EAC Conflict Early Warning Mechanism and the EAC Conflict Management and Resolution Mechanism were developed long before the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security from which they draw their Mandate. It is difficult to comprehend how the EAC Secretariat would have undertaken such efforts without the enabling Protocol rendering them redundant.

The third anomaly is the continuity of old rivalries between the states. Chapter five elaborated that the security relations of the EAC states have been characterized by friction. The problems that led to the collapse of the defunct EAC (1967-1977) have re-emerged and continue to frustrate efforts at regional cooperation as new areas of contention arise. These frictions are endemic in the region and pose obstacles to implementing a regional strategy. In addition, the personality differences between the Presidents of the five states influence the nature of cooperation.

The last anomaly is that the current paradigms have not generated regional solutions to the security problems that arise between the partner states or those that threaten to break the EAC. For example, the failure of the EAC securitizing frameworks to address the tensions; between Kenya and Uganda over the Migingo Island, or to mediate for Rwanda and Burundi over the expulsion of its refugees from Tanzania demonstrates the weaknesses of regional initiatives that are only in rhetoric. Likewise, EAC mechanisms for settlement of disputes over the integration process were not invoked to resolve the stalemate generated by the coalition of the willing that excluded Tanzania and Burundi.

Step three notes that, due to these anomalies, rival paradigms are gaining momentum at the international level, where more emphasis is placed on the region as the preferred level of assessing and resolving security problems. This is both at the academic and policy levels. As a result and with the advent of globalization, states are increasingly turning to regional institutions for the resolution of their security problems. Similarly, in the era of globalization several paradigms compete for dominance including; the Copenhagen perspectives²⁴, the critical security schools²⁵ and the human security schools²⁶. More significant as discussed in chapter two for regional security is the continued acceptance of the regional security complex theory²⁷, articulated by the Copenhagen school in assessing security within the regional institutions. This is competing against the older security community paradigm²⁸ that are equally useful in explaining regional integration processes..

Step four, traces the replacement or rejection of the traditional regional security schools. Similarly, this is observable in the continuity of aspects to realism still relevant in studying regional security.²⁹ The shifts in this respect are demonstrated in the appreciation of the role non-state actors' play in regional security. Step five, is captured in the emerging trends and efforts to develop regional security strategies. States are

²⁴Buzan Barry, *People States and Fear, An Agenda for International Security Studies in Post Cold War Era*, Lynne Rienner, 1991, p.7-82.

²⁵ Krause K & Williams, Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods, *Mershon International Studies Review*, vol.40, 1996. p.230.

²⁶ Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People*, New York, 2003, pp.4-36.

²⁷Buzan B.& Weaver O., *Regions and Powers, The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2003, pp.40-43.

²⁸Adler And Barnnet,(eds), *Security Communities* ,Cambridge University Press,1998, Pp.10-12.

²⁹ Sean Lynn-Jones, *Realism and Security Studies*, In Craig A Snyder, *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, Routledge, New York 1999, pp.53-71.

increasingly attempting to define common security agendas, entering into security agreements and implementing some security strategies.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

7.0 Conclusion

This study set out to contribute to the discourse and literature on security strategy; specifically to East African security architecture. The study has examined: Firstly, security strategies as the means of pursuing national and regional security goals and secondly, the centrality of security cooperation in national, regional and international security. This study examines national and regional security strategy processes in the EAC region and articulates the converging and divergent security interests that inform the two levels of security strategy. It also outlines the securitizing frameworks and the various actors at the two levels.

The study notes various paradigmatic shifts in the rethinking and practice of security strategies. Key among these include; firstly, it underscores the change of focus from traditional security referent objects of the state to the broadened and human security perspectives, which currently characterize the discourse of security for both the academics and the practitioners. Secondly, the study observes that the five states have repealed their neo-colonial constitutions and heralded new constitutions that reflect the realities of the era of globalization. These new constitutions have boosted the shift in articulation of security strategies by providing progressive provisions on which to anchor contemporary strategies and include non -state actors on the security sector. Thirdly, the study notes that some aspects of security strategy have survived the rigors of the

paradigmatic shifts. These include some key aspects of the realist thinking like the concept of national interests, which though considered traditional remains relevant when assessing security strategies. Therefore, the study deduces that there have been changes as well as continuities in the discourse and that the academics and practitioners have not been harmonious in their responses to the shifts in terms of security strategy

This study adapted and utilized a model of the paradigm shift as the framework of analyzing the changes and continuities that characterize security strategy in the East African region. Adaptation of this model aimed to simplify and apply the ideals espoused by Thomas Kuhn to the study of security strategies in the region. This was greatly inspired by the fact that, in their original form, language and accompanying terminologies Kuhn's works are complex and present challenges in application within the social sciences. As a result, these works despite their centrality in informing the epistemology of social science research, they are often shunned by researchers due to their perceived complexity. The study thus, presents a modified simple version articulated in five steps to assess security strategy processes. The study proffers that this model can be replicated in other studies to analyze strategy and policy processes. The five steps can be applied at both the national and regional levels.

Based on its hypotheses the study has confirmed that the paradigm shifts within the discourse of security plays a role in shaping the content and practice of national and regional security strategy in the five states. The study set out to assess the role played by decision makers in the security processes of the respective states. It confirms that, the president and his key advisors play a central role in formulating and implementing security strategies and deciding on the security interests of the five states at both the

national and regional levels of security strategy. The study further, demonstrates that any issue only becomes of security concern when the president and his advisors perceive it as posing a threat to the regimes survival or to their interests. Therefore, national interests of the respective states are often synonymous with the regime interests.

The study reveals both weakness and strengths in the securitizing frameworks of the respective states. A key weakness is observed in the ineffectiveness of the parliamentary and institutional oversights to ensure accountability of the security sector in the states of the region. This is partly attributable to the culture of political patronage that characterizes the public issues and the culture of political expediency. A major strength is that all the five states have formulated their security frameworks within the contemporary understanding of security with emphasis on non- traditional security challenges and a focus on human security.

The study notes that the five states have been successful in formulating strategies at both the national and regional levels, but there are gaps when it comes to the implementation and coordination of these strategies. Therefore, more efforts need to be dedicated towards addressing these two issues by overcoming the challenges articulated in this study.

Regarding, regional security strategy the study revealed several concerns. Firstly, that the EAC states lack a regional hegemon to provide leadership in the securitizing processes of the region. This leads to disunity in the approaches taken by each state in addressing security issues beyond their borders, some of which directly affect the partner states and their neighbors. The study appreciates that the issue of a hegemon is not a simple issue and requires a state to attain power capabilities that are superior to the other

states and be accepted as a power by the other states. In view of the current regional dynamics, this remains a key challenge for the region.

Secondly, the study observes that the EAC region's states lack a shared understanding about what constitutes common threats to their survival as a region for which there is need to device viable security strategies to address. The regional threats and interests articulated in the various frameworks remain largely unknown and not shared amongst the populace of the five states. Thirdly, the study notes a tendency by the partner states to import their local security concerns to the EAC and attempt to impose/ pass them as regional threats. There is therefore, need to have a clear demarcation between the national security interests of the respective states and the region's security interest on which EAC regional security strategy can be directed. However, on this issue a key challenge arises because there is no known formula through which states define common threats within their regional institutions.

Fourthly, the study contends that the EAC Secretariat as is currently constituted lacks the capacity to implement and coordinate the multiple security frameworks envisioned in the peace and security sector. This situation contributes to the gap that exists between the formulation of the frameworks and their implementation and coordination. Fifthly, the study observes that the existing mistrust and suspicion between the five states contributes to the lack of progress in implementing a regional security strategy. It notes that until the factors that lead to the uneasy in the relations between the states are overcome, the problems of implementation of security strategies will persist.

Sixthly, the study posits that at the national levels in the five states the security sectors enjoy heavy funding compared to the other sectors. This is not replicated at the

regional level where the states are reluctant to channel adequate resources to support the peace and security sector. As a result, the EAC is reliant on donor funding to undertake its security objectives. This reliance perpetrates the weak states dilemma and exposes the region to vulnerabilities associated with external donor dependence.

Lastly, on regional security strategy the study observes that the five states lack commitment to the regional security objectives. This is because compared to the dedication and resources put into implementing the customs union and other economic sector projects little efforts have been undertaken on matters of peace and security.

This study demonstrates the possibility of using purely qualitative methods in social science research. This derives from the fact that qualitative methods are often criticized and many researchers opt to use them alongside the quantitative methods. This study was conducted through the triangulation of three data collection techniques; in-depth key informant interviews, content analysis of key government policy documents and archival research. The study also notes that research on the subject matter of security is curtailed by bureaucratic bottlenecks and secrecy. This limits the study techniques that can be effectively applied in deriving primary data.

7.1 Issues for future research

The study proffers that, there are four issues that may constitute areas for future research in the discourse of national and regional security strategy in the EAC region. Firstly, the study observed that security is one area of public policy that is shrouded in secrecy and mystique. Consequently, there is need to device ways to end the mistrust and suspicions that exists between different actors in the security strategy processes. These include: the mistrusts between the different security agencies that impacts on

interagency cooperation, the uneasy relationships between the leaders within the EAC region that threaten to un-do the regional integration processes and bridging the gap between the academics and the practitioners. Similarly is the peripheral role assigned to the public opinion in security strategy within the EAC region that will need to be addressed.

Secondly, the study concludes that the coordination of security strategy is the weakest link at both the national and regional levels. There is therefore, need to further appreciate ways in which the coordination function of security strategy can be enhanced to improve the implementation of peace and security frameworks. In addition, the decision-making processes at the regional level are blurred and will need to be addressed.

Thirdly, the study reveals the need to arrive at an agreement on how to construct common threats at the regional levels. This is mainly because each state may perceive and prioritize different threats at any one given time. This becomes one of the key challenges in conceiving and articulating regional security strategies.

The fourth concern revolves around the continued dependency of EAC states on donor funding to undertake their security strategy processes. Efforts need to be directed to improving the individual capacities of each state to handle its security concerns and collectively at the regional level to cut down on external dependency. These are the key concerns that have affected the formulation, implementation and coordination of security strategy within the region.

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ANNEX 1

INDEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. Does your country have a national security strategy?
2. How and when was it formulated?
3. Who are the main stake holders in the formulation, implementation and coordination of national security strategy?
4. What role is played by the national leadership? Government departments?
5. What are the main issues that inform the current national security strategy?
6. What are your country's National Interests – how were they determined? (Survival, vital, important etc)
7. What were the internal/ external factors considered in formulating the strategy?
8. What main assumptions were made in the strategy?
9. What are the main objectives and how were they identified?
10. Are there measures to ensure effectiveness? (Monitoring, evaluation and coordination mechanisms?)
11. Is there oversight in the process?(by whom and why)
12. What are the constraints, threats or opportunities for the strategy?
13. Are there formal feed- back mechanisms to review progress on a regular basis and make adjustments?
14. What factors or issues may lead to changes in the strategy? Does it have shortcomings?
15. Does your strategy address emerging security concerns(societal, environmental, technological etc)
16. How does your country relate with the other EAC Partner States?
17. What are the areas of conflict and cooperation between the states?
18. What are the security challenges facing the EAC Region?

19. How does the EAC address these security challenges?
20. Does the EAC have a regional security strategy? (What are the key objectives and who are the main actors)
21. How is it formulated, implemented and coordinated?
22. What in your view should constitute a regional security strategy?
23. How does the current strategy address East African regions security concerns?
24. Does the EAC Region have a regional power/hegemony?
25. What in your view can help to improve the national and regional security strategy processes? (formulation, implementation and coordination)

ANNEX 2: List of Key Informants (coded and un-coded)

Burundi

Member of the parliamentary Committee of Defence and Security, September, 2013.
Prof. Pascal Nyonizigiye, University of Burundi, Bujumbura, Burundi, September, 2013.
Benoit Bihamiriza, Early Warning Expert, EAC Secretariat, October 16 2013.
A security practitioner, June, 2013.
An Ambassador, Nairobi, June, 2013.
A Human rights activist Bujumbura, September 2013.
An academic, September 2013, Bujumbura, Burundi.
Civil society activist, Bujumbura, Burundi, October 2013.

Kenya

A Civil Society Activist involved in monitoring the security sector compliance with new constitution requirements, June, 2012, Nairobi, Kenya.
A human rights activist, May 2012, Nairobi, Kenya.
A legal and security consultant, November, 2012.
A retired security practitioner, Nairobi, Kenya, February 2013,
A technocrat in the Office of the President, Government of Kenya, May 2012
A technocrat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya, September, 2013.
An Academic, November 2012, Nairobi, Kenya.
Brigadier (rtd) Wilson Boinnet, former Director General, National Security Intelligence Service, Kenya, November, 2013.
Brigadier Kenneth Dindi, Kenya Defence Forces, Nairobi, Kenya, June, 2013.
General Lazarous Sumbeiyu, Special Envoy to the Sudan Peace Process and Director of the defunct Liaison Department, Nairobi, November 2013.
L.M. Onyonyi, Peace and Security Expert, EAC Secretariat, November 13, 2013.
Security practitioner who participated in the EAC Joint Sectoral Council Meetings, November, 2013.
Serving politician, Nairobi, Kenya, October, 2013,

Rwanda

Jean Bosco Butera, Director UPEACE Africa Programme, June, 2013
An Academic, October, 2013, Bujumbura, Burundi in the sidelines of EAC workshop.
An Academic, September, 2013, Nairobi, Kenya.
A security practitioner, June, 2013, Nairobi, Kenya.
An academic, October, 2013, Kigali, Rwanda.
Technocrat working with a regional organization, October, 2013.
A diplomat, October, 2013, Kigali, Rwanda
A Journalist, November, 2013, Nairobi, Kenya
Interview with EALA MP, 22 November 2013.

Tanzania

Professor Severine M. Rugumamu, Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es salaam also Presidential advisor, September, 2013.

A former military officer with extensive experience in UN peacekeeping missions

MwesigaBaregu, Professor of Politics and International Relations, St. Augustine University, Dar es Salaam November. 15. 2013

An civil society advocate, September, 2012,

An academic, September, 2013.

A researcher, Arusha, Tanzania, October, 2013.

An Member of Parliament, Arusha, Tanzania, October 2013.

An academic, Arusha, Tanzania, December, 2013.

Political Scientist, University of Dodoma, Tanzania, October, 14, 2013.

Uganda

A career public servant, May, 2013

A technocrat in the security sector in the Government of Uganda, October, 2013.

An academic, June 2013

civil society activist, May, 2013.

Historian, Nairobi, Kenya, December 2013.

Peter Edopu, Executive Director, Peace and Security Institute of Africa, Kampala, Uganda, September 2013.

Professor Charles AyaiOkello, Gulu University, Uganda, September 2013

Member of Parliament November 2013, Nairobi, Kenya.