

**OIL POLITICS IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF CHINA IN SOUTHERN
SUDAN: 1990 - 2011**

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DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been submitted for another degree in any other University.

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DEDICATION

This research is dedicated to my late father, Duncan W. Wanene, my mother, and siblings, Wilson, Richard, Wanjiru and Njeri. I also want to dedicate this work to my adorable niece, Adora Wanjiku.

I would like to dedicate this work to the incredible men and women of courage in Africa who continue to ensure successful international conflict management and international relations.

In addition, to my calling of being a Kenyan representative in international relations.

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ABSTRACT

The research examines geo-politics of oil in Africa, with particular focus on the Sino-Sudan and Sino—Southern Sudan relations. It analyses the role of resource based conflicts in Africa, with reference to Sudan. The theoretical basis of the thesis is drawn from the Realism School of Thought, as stipulated in International Relations. Concepts of power, state centrism, national interests, and international politics [realpolitik] govern the general tenets of the Realism School. As a theory, it offers justification of the role of states in international relations, hegemony, and resource conflicts as evidenced in Southern Sudan, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nigeria. The study of politics of oil therefore, considers concepts of foreign policy, energy policy and governance, role of states, natural resources, power relations, and resource-based conflicts. Subsequently, it looks at the relationship and implications between politics and natural resources, especially oil in the Sino – Southern Sudan relations. Although the study focuses on Southern Sudan, it draws from literature on Sudan and utilizes the word Southern Sudan, given the period under study and the correlation of history, economics and politics of both north and Southern Sudan. The study, however, recognizes the independence of South Sudan in 2011.

ABBREVIATIONS

ABC:	Abyei Boundaries Commission
AGOA:	Africa Growth and Opportunity Act
AU:	African Union
BITS:	Bilateral Investment Treaties
BRICS:	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CCP:	Chinese Communist Party
CNOOC:	China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CNPC:	China National Petroleum Corporation
CPA:	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR:	Disarmament, Demobilization, Re-integration
DOP:	Declaration of Principles
EPA:	Economic Partnership Agreement [of the EU],
EU:	European Union
FDI:	Federal Direct Investment
FOCAC:	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
GOS:	Government of Sudan
GOSS:	Government of South Sudan
HAMAS:	Islamic Resistance Movement
IAEA:	International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA:	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC:	International Criminal Court
IEA:	International Energy Agency

IGAD:	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
JEM:	Justice and Equality Movement
LAPPSET:	Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport
LRA:	Lord's Resistance Army
NEPAD:	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NIF:	National Islamic Front
NILEPET:	Nile Petroleum Corporation
NRHP:	National Reconciliation and Healing Process
PCRD:	Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development
SAF:	Sudan Armed Forces
SINOPEC:	China Petrochemical Corporation
SPLM/A:	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army
SSLM:	Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement
UN:	United Nations
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council
US:	United States
USAID:	United States Agency for International Development

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

The presence and role of China in Africa's economic and political endeavours has raised numerous concerns. This is despite the presence of other international players in Africa's exploration and exportation of oil. A case in point concerns China's foreign policy, foreign relations and investments in Africa, raising questions regarding imbalanced power relations, and possibly China's neo-imperialism in Africa. Equal debates exist regarding the legitimacy of China's economic partnership with resource-rich Africa states, in light of the latter's development, resource based conflicts and unstable economies. The "look East policy" is now a considerably foreign policy concern, given the fast paced relationship between Africa and China. Whereas China's involvement is indicative of a growing socio-political partnership with certain Africa's countries, including Nigeria, Angola, South Sudan, Sudan and Kenya, it sheds light into the autonomy of African states, governance and leadership structures that define both domestic and international relations.

The above therefore begs the questions, Is the decision making process neutral, without coercion, and oil politics? Are they obscure as suggested by Power and Mohan?¹ Who is driving the developmental agenda, strategies, and foreign policy of Africa's oil rich countries? Are oil importing countries in competition over Africa's natural resources, including oil? Is poverty an overriding factor in the competition over scarce resources amongst ethnic groups in South Sudan? Are Africa states and China mutually seeking political and

¹. Marcus Power, et al, *China's Resource Diplomacy in Africa: Powering Development?*, (England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 22.

economic legitimacy with each other and with other states as a means of emancipation? What implications does oil extraction have on the long term use and availability of oil in oil –rich African states, including South Sudan?

Additional concern centre on the role of politics in oil and resource-based conflicts to oil-exporting countries, including Sudan and South Sudan. Since the end of the cold war in 1991 [primarily fought between the Western Block and Eastern Block], there has been a significant focus on natural resources as a tool of power over states. Scholars including Strange refer to this focus as the ‘New Scramble of Africa.’² The new or current scramble centres on key areas, including natural resources such as oil and gas.

Citing Kennedy [1987] et al, Carmody, argues in his book, “New Scramble of Africa” that the first scramble of Africa was initiated in the nineteenth century resulting from various reasons. Two reasons included German-French military rivalry and opening of new commercial markets centred on the cotton industry.

Countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Angola, and South Sudan are endowed with oil that provokes both interest and interaction within states and parties of interests [e.g. multinational oil corporations], providing new credence to oil politics and diplomacy. Oil also serves as the major economic instrument of interaction between Sudan and Southern Sudan.

². S. Strange, *Mad Money*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 116.

Southern Sudan gained independence on July 9, 2011, after years of protracted civil wars and a successful referendum in January 2011. It obtained a new name, the Republic of South Sudan. Significant issues surrounding the civil wars concerned resource allocation, political, economic and religious identity. Oil-based conflicts, and the politics of oil have been crucial in South Sudan's development, including its relations with its economic partners such as the People's Republic of China. Other issues concerned and ownership within disputed areas. These areas are Abyei, Blue Nile [including Heglig], and South Kordofan. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement [CPA], signed in 2005 and led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development [IGAD], mediated over contested issues, with promissory agreements including 50-50 wealth sharing, amongst others. Periodical ethnic clashes over water and land have also been experienced in the contested areas, including Abyei. The CPA, nor the government of South Sudan have been able to fully resolve the territorial disputes, including repeated conflicts over taxation, [transit fees], oil revenues, territorial ownership, and imbalanced oil quantities, amongst other concerns.

This leads to the other point. Arguably, natural resources and conflict are often times inter-related, as demonstrated in Nigeria, Sudan, Southern Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic. Collier suggests that states that are dependent on primary commodity export and a high degree of poorly educated young men are prone to civil wars than resource poor states.³ This raises questions regarding the strength of natural resources, including oil in intra-state and inter-state conflicts. It also raises questions of foreign policy, energy policy, and international conflict management, while at the same offering suggestions about the reasons of the imbalances of the noted. It also raises questions regarding the role of

³. Karen Ballenstein & Jake Sherman, "Introduction", in *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*, eds. Karen Ballenstein & Jake Sherman, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 1.

international actors in oil politics and conflicts [United States, India, Japan and China]. Questions also arise regarding the neutrality of the noted states [in matters of foreign policy and energy policy] with Africa's oil-rich countries. Is the "resource curse" concept adequate in addressing protracted conflicts in the Sudan-Southern Sudan relations?

Considerable debates also exist regarding Beijing's utilization of energy resources, leading to its relations and attachment to Africa. Although literature on Sino-Africa economic engagement differs, according to the World Bank, Sub Saharan Africa natural resources exportation to China has grown from U.S.\$3billion in 2001 to U.S.\$22 billion in 2006; petroleum accounted for 80% exportation from 2001 – 2006. Five percent of iron [40%], ore, timber, cobalt [60%], manganese [25-30%] and copper [25-30%] are other export goods to China.

In addition, from 2001 – 2006, over 40% of Africa's oil production went to United States of America, a further 17% to Europe and 14% to China. Growth of Africa's oil exportation to China rose from 23% to 29% from 2001 – 2006. From Sub Sahara, Sudan's 53% of oil exportation and Angola's 30% of oil exportation went to China.⁴ Scholars such as Rotberg argues that roughly 70% of Africa's oil goes to China, while 20% went to the United States of America.⁵ From the 1950s to 1990s the Daqing oil fields in Northern China served as the major oil reservoir aimed at meeting the country's oil demands. However, with a growing population, [and subsequent need to meet its domestic energy demands], China re-entered Africa. China's population has increased throughout the years; 1,334,50 [2009], 1,340.91 [2010], and 1,347, 35 [2011] and a birth rate of 11.9 [2009], 11.90% [2010], and 11.93% [

⁴. Vivien Foster et al, *Building Bridges: China's Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Sub Saharan Africa*, (Washington: World Bank Publications, 2009), 37.

⁵. Robert Rotberg, *Africa Emerges: Consummate Challenges, Abundant Opportunities*, (John Wiley & Sons, 2013).

2011].⁶ Its energy imports per 10,000 tons amounted to 29437.2 [2010], 17163.2 [2005], and exports at 4079.0 [2010] and 2888.1 [2005].⁷

In addition, Sudan exports 60% of its oil to China; Angola, as the second largest exporter of oil to China possessed 50% of Africa's crude oil in 2009. China's partnership with Sudan also involves interest-free loans for construction [1997, 2007] and U.S.\$2.8 million for humanitarian assistance.⁸ Other scholars such as Hongyi contends that although China's energy needs are set to rise, a specific policy and guideline was introduced as a measure for alternative energy sources [e.g., the 11th five year plan, 2006-2010]. For example, the National Development and Reform Commission [NDRC] recorded China's dependency on oil imports in 2005 as 42.9%; 2.2% lower than in 2004. China consumed 318 million tons of oil in 2005, 1.08 million tons less than in 2004.⁹ This, therefore, begs the questions, What implications does oil exploration have in African oil exporting countries for future reserves, as oil is not a renewable resource? Does China's reliance on Africa's oil translate into economic development and efficient energy policy formulation and governance for exporting countries [Sudan, South Sudan, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Congo Brazzaville and Nigeria]?

In recent years, policy groups have questioned the availability of small and light weapons in conflict countries or countries facing arms sanctions from the United Nations. The questions have centred on the role of seller and buyer, in particular whether direct sales have been exercised to rebel groups. Hanauer and Morris posit that China's five recipients of arms sales

⁶. See National Bureau of Statistics of China, "Population and Birth Rate", (China: China Statistical Year Book, 2012).

⁷. See National Bureau of Statistics of China "Petroleum Balance Sheet", (China: China Statistical Year Book, 2012).

⁸. W.A. C. Adie, "China's Foreign Policy", *The World Today*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Mar., 1968), 111.

⁹. Lai Hongyi, *The Domestic Sources of China's Foreign Policy: Regimes, Leadership, Priorities and Process*, (New York: Routledge: 2010), 131.

in Africa from 2009-2010 were among China's top nine recipients of Federal Direct Investment [FDI]. According to the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute in 2011, China made 25% of its arms sales to Africa [as cited by Hanauer]. Hanauer further contends that from 2009 – 2011, China spent U.S.\$1.4 billion in conventional weapons to sub Saharan Africa and US\$1.4 to North Africa, in addition to being a key source of small arms and light weapons to Africa.¹⁰ In defence, Chinese foreign Minister, Zhai Jun, in 2006, noted China's cautious stand with regards to the export of small arms.¹¹

Questions arising from the noted are, Do the sale of small arms by China end up in rebel hands? Do rebel groups gain politically and militarily from the arms sales? If yes, what implications does that have on the cessation of civil wars, ethnic clashes and retention of peace in conflict prone countries? Scholars such as Hoeymissen and Hongyi have postulated the inconsistencies of China's diplomacy. Two cases in question are the Darfurian crisis and the Iran nuclear program, both of which commenced in 2003. Both cases are still of interest given the magnitude of China's oil relations and diplomacy. This was partly due to China's decision making processes and results, and partly due to China's ambiguous foreign policy on matters of resources.

Starting with the Darfurian crisis, Hoeymissen posits the Darfurian conflict centred on the economic and political marginalization of Darfur by the government of Sudan, resulting in attacks of military installation by rebel groups and counter attacks by the government

¹⁰. Larry Hanauer and Lyle L. Morris, *Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions, and Implications for US Policy*, (California: Rand Corporation, 2014), 41-42.

¹¹. Ibid.

sponsored Janjaweed.¹² The Darfurian crisis led to internally displaced persons, deaths and human rights abuses that greatly undermined the very existence of the Darfur population in Sudan, leading to its discussion at the United Nations Security Council. To further complicate matters, Hoeymissen also asserts that China threatened to use its veto power to downplay resolutions [e.g. Resolution 1556] set by the Council from 2004 – 2005. In citing Voice of America, Wang 2004, Hoeymissen argues that China's agreement to abstain on Resolution 1564 resulted "after the threat of automatic imposition of sanctions was removed from the draft."¹³ Also citing Large [2008], Hoeymissen further argues that China's subsequently remarked expressed concern over Sudan's citizens. Hongyi contends that the Darfurian vote was not about China's obtaining Sudan's 6.9 % of its oil imports, but about China's \$3billion investment, including a corrupt and ineffective police force perpetuating crimes.¹⁴

The Iran nuclear crisis is another example. Pardo posits that the crisis began in 2003 after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) investigations revealed Iran's undeclared nuclear activities and evidence of uranium and UF6 gas, resulting in fears of Iran's usage of nuclear materials for military purposes from 2004 – 2005.¹⁵ China's initial refusal of UNSC Resolutions [citing respect for Iran's nuclear program], subsequently, changed after failure to address the issue by France, Germany and United Kingdom [EU-3] in 2006.

This leads us to certain questions; To what extent is Africa's governance structures on natural resources autonomous in light of China's financial aid? Is the post cold war Sino-Africa

¹². Sara van Hoeymissen "China, Sovereignty and Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Africa: the Emergence of a 'Third Paradigm' of International Intervention?" in *China and the European Union in Africa: Partners or Competitors*, eds. Jing Men, Mr Benjamin Barton, (England: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013), 153.

¹³. Ibid, 154.

¹⁴. Lai Hongyi, *The Domestic Sources of China's Foreign Policy: Regimes, Leadership, Priorities and Process*, (New York: Routledge: 2010), 127.

¹⁵. Ramon P. Pardo, "The Rise of China and the Discrepancy of Chinese Foreign Policy", in *Multidimensional Diplomacy of Contemporary China*, eds, Simon Shen and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2012), 76.

relationship based on new-imperialistic tendencies? Is Africa tolerant of corruption, conflict and mismanagement of natural resources? Transparency International, International Corruption Perceptions Index, illustrates the level of corruption across the globe, with major arguments stating the poor countries are more susceptible to corruption due to poor institutional policies and structures. The case of Southern Sudan begs a re-evaluation of the historical and present state of affairs in relation to resource identification, utilization and exportation in light of international relations.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

The control, access and utilisation of natural resources, including oil are a fundamental aspect of international politics. The nature of international politics rests on the use, control and struggle for power is determined by key factors, including resources; be they economic, political, or and military. Since feudal times, power politics have determined the nature and course of international relations through various faces. In the twenty first century and specifically after the cold war [1991], two key phenomena took place; a. the identification, control and utilisation of new tools of power; b. the advent of new actors in the field of political power and international relations.

Although the tools of power resources in the 20th century largely centred on technology, information, and economy, the new tools of power in the 21st century include natural resources. Some of the natural resources include oil, minerals, gold, copper, uranium. Power resources have been largely perceived as tools of power accumulation and control amongst states. They have also been relegated to instruments of international relations dictating foreign policy and domestic policy. The element of power [control, ownership and utilisation] in natural resources management has inevitably led to international conflicts.

Sudan and South Sudan are two examples of resource-rich states, but of which continued to experience intrastate and interstate conflicts based on resources [e.g., 1955 – 1972, 1983 – 2004, 2011 - to date].

The problem of inadequate management of natural resources and conflicts in Africa, including Southern Sudan lies with poor leadership [misuse of power, inadequate actions, distorted ethics] and geopolitics [“the practice of states controlling and competing for territory”¹⁶ or a way of perceiving the world; either objectively or neutral¹⁷]. Geo-politics and new actors on the scene, such as China have influenced the dynamics of international relations, natural resource management and resource based conflict management despite their non-interference policy of Africa. This inconsistency between resources, foreign policy, oil politics calls for an investigation into the subject matter

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study is to examine the relationship between geo-politics, oil and conflicts in Africa, with reference to Southern Sudan.

The sub objectives are:

- a. To investigate the role of China’s non-interference policy and oil diplomacy in Africa, with specific reference to Sino- Sudan, Sino-Southern Sudan relations and development.
- b. To analyse the models and policies regarding the management of natural resources and resource based conflicts in Southern Sudan.
- c. To examine the impact of oil production and exportation in Southern Sudan’s political framework.

¹⁶. Colin Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, (New York: Routledge, 2012), 31.

¹⁷. Klaus J. Dodds, *Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction*, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 2.

1.4 Literature Review

1.4.1 Introduction

The politics of oil is an evolving area of study, by virtue of its visibility and undertakings in resource-rich states, including Southern Sudan. Although not a new study, it calls into focus geopolitics, exemplified by progressive stages of politics, involving the West, East Africa and Horn of Africa regions. Scholars debate the merits and demerits of oil politics in changing times, with some arguing about the reliance of international relations and foreign policy; while others asserting the role of power, and hegemony in oil politics. Equally, socio-economic factors are pivotal, where economic development is concerned. The relationship between economic partnership between China and oil-rich African states is key particularly, where economic underdevelopment and poor governance is more evident than development. Thus, politics of oil is not merely about state power but also about conflict processes, political processes, and power relations crucial in policy formulation, governance and conflict management. In order to meet the objectives the research, the literature will deal with Sudan, Southern Sudan, and China.

1.4.2 Sudan and Southern Sudan

The word Sudan stems from the Arabic word, *bilad al-sudan*, meaning “the land of the blacks.”¹⁸ Sudan is located north-eastern Africa, bordering the Red Sea, between Egypt and Eritrea with Arabic as the official language. Sudan expected population as of 2012 is 35,055,538.¹⁹ Sudan and Southern Sudan share the Nile Basin and its territories. The Federal Republic of Sudan is ruled by the National Congress Party which commenced power by military coup in 1989. Sudan gained independence in 1956 from the United Kingdom and

¹⁸. Francis Mulu, *The Role of Regional Organizations In Conflict Management: IGAD and the Sudanese Civil War* (Nairobi: Catholic University of Eastern Africa, 2008), 24.

¹⁹. See Central Bureau of Statistics, “Summary of Projected Population: 2009 – 2018”, (Republic of Sudan: 2008).

Egypt. South Sudan is located East-Central Africa; north of Uganda and Kenya, west of Ethiopia. English and Arabic are the official languages. It has a population of 8,260,490 as of 2008.²⁰ The country is ruled by the Sudan People Liberation Movement, formed in 1983. Southern Sudan gained independence in July 9, 2011, renaming itself the Republic of South Sudan.

1.4.3 The Synthesis of the Civil Wars in Sudan

The roots of Sudan and Southern Sudan are rich, symbolising four significant periods illustrated through foreign invasion, colonialism, political and ideological struggles, arabization, and self governance. Mulu posits that the roots of the north and south dates back to the Turko-Egyptian administration from 1821-1881²¹, including the colonial Sudan [1899 – 1956] and post colonial Sudan [after1956], post independence South Sudan [July 9, 2011]. The pre-colonial period: Northern frontier: Characterized by systematic arabization and islamization, especially during the death of Prophet Mohammed in 632 A.D.²², resource identification and exportation [gold, copper and ivory], importation of slaves to Egypt, and developments in education, administrative structures, and military bases. The colonial period: Significantly illustrated by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Rule [1899-1955] and Southern Policy. The former governed the country as two distinct entities; while the latter rested on two major premises; the first premise on the de-arabization of the south and the adoption of the English language and Christianity.

²⁰. See National Baseline Household Survey, National Bureau of Statistics, (Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation: 2009), 8.

²¹. Op cit, Mulu, 26.

²². Ibid, 27.

The second premise, as stressed by Sarkesian centred on the integration of the Southern region into Uganda and the enactment of native administration Islam and Arabic.²³ Deng argues that the Condominium era failed to achieve its goal of creating an independent Southern Sudan largely due to political and economical advancement of the north and subsequent under development of the south.²⁴ Theo argues the post independence era, characterised by two civil wars [the first, 1955 – 1972, the second, 1983 – 2004] were fought primarily by the government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army [SPLA].

Both wars coupled with the coups in 1958, and 1959 symbolized systematic discrimination, arabization, political and institution isolation, resulting in a further rebellion by troops from the south, specifically, Equatorial Province. Although the southerners believed in the protection of Britain, the latter was more concerned with maintaining the passage to India through the Suez and Middle East oil fields.²⁵ The January 30, 1989 coup, Revolution of Salvation, led by The National Islamic Front further failed to cement both the south and north, leading to a civil war which ended in 2005 with the signing of the IGAD-led Comprehensive Peace Agreement on January 9, 2005 in Kenya. Post independence South Sudan: Characterised by the establishment of the government of South Sudan, recovery [humanitarian programs], policy formulation [Petroleum Act, 2012, and Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011], reconstruction [infrastructural development [of schools, roads], as well as conflicts between Southern Sudan and Sudan over territorial rights [Abyei].

²³. C.S Sarkesian, “*The Southern Sudan: A Reassessment*”, *Journal of African Studies Review*, Vol. 16, No. 1, (April, 1973), 5.

²⁴. Francis M. Deng, “A Nation in Turbulent Search of Itself”, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 603, (Jan., 2006), 156.

²⁵. T. Theo, *Ethnic Conflict and Religion*, (Geneva: World Council of Churches Publications, 1997), 34.

1.4.4 Natural Resource Based Conflicts

The interlinks between conflict and natural resources, including oil, is a subject that has generated curiosity and debate, primarily stemming from the 1990s, including the second half of the 20th century. Terms such as, "Resource Curse" and "Dutch Disease" has been applied to indicate the dynamic role between resources, development and conflict. In Africa, countries such as Sudan, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, and Nigeria have been used as examples of countries torn apart due to natural resources. The cost of war and conflict has played a significant role in the underdevelopment and security of these nations, rendering a closer look at the relationship between natural resources and conflict. Although studies in this subject area are non-conclusive, similarity of themes and trends dominate.

Africa is endowed with natural resources, yet it has been perceived as one of the driving forces of conflicts in Africa. Debates exist regarding whether natural resources are a direct or indirect cause of conflicts. Differences of ideology, religion, ethnicity and border [as found in Sudan-Southern Sudan history], exemplify the possibility of natural resources as both a direct and indirect issue, for these aspects were indicative of the reasons of conflicts stemming from the 1800's leading to the CPA in 2005. The emergence of armed groups such as Justice and Equality Movement [JEM] in Sudan is also indicative of the emergence of armed groups.

The start of this sub topic begins with the definition of conflict. Definitions of conflict vary providing a range of interpretations and understanding across the divide. This is partly due to the focus, categorisation, subject matter and context in question. James defines international conflict as any action deemed in time and space, involving two or more international entities [

whether states or transnational actors), which possess a non-identical preference orderings over one or more sets of alternative choices.”²⁶ This definition does not accommodate hybrid concepts of conflict. Conflict management refers to “any management process by which parties to the conflict are encouraged to come together and so something about their conflict.”²⁷ Oil is considered the most important commodity of trade in the world today; partly due to its economic and political strengths. There are various types of conflict, some of which include ethnic, religious, natural resource based and territorial. Equally, conflicts contain multi-leveled actors, politics, causes, sources, and roots, that seeks to provide a justification to the linkage between conflict and natural resources. In recent years politics of resources has centered on the ecology, depletion of natural resources, and resource based conflicts.

The causes of natural resource based conflict vary, depending on the context, history, dimensions, politics, value, and scope [regional, national, international]. Alao posits three ways in which natural resources are linked to conflicts in Africa in post cold war; a. natural resources constitute a direct or remote cause of conflicts [Sudan-Southern Sudan conflicts]; b. situations fueled by natural resources [armed movements: Nigeria and subsequent embargos leg United Nations embargo of diamonds from Angola]; c. situations in which natural resources have come into consideration in efforts to resolve conflicts [e.g. in peace agreements: CPA, Lome Peace Agreement, 1999].²⁸ He argues, however, that natural resources, do not constitute the sole reason of conflicts but serve as key driving component

²⁶. Patrick James, *International Relations and Scientific Progress: Structural Realism Reconsidered*, (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 2002), 56.

²⁷. Makumi Mwangi, *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, (Nairobi: Exscape Printers, 2003), 43.

²⁸. Abiodun Alao, *Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment*, (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2007), 4.

amongst warring parties, even if unspoken. This is evident in the post cold war era in Africa through Angola, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. The relationships between protracted wars and natural resources are also evident in recent times in the Democratic Republic of Congo; with subsequent sanctions from the United Nations. Arguably, natural resources, including oil are perceived to accelerate as opposed to decelerate wars or conflicts in Africa, including Southern Sudan.

The consequential effects of wars, whether resource-based or not rests on under development, including loss of lives, displacement of people, and human rights violations. Sudan pre and post-independence wars and conflicts resulted in catastrophes which debased the citizens, undermined the national fiber of the country, destabilized institutions and suffocated progress through retrogression. Measurements of conflict prevention and management are equally debatable, particularly where political environment, history and transitions are involved. Decades of unstable political environments, coupled with transitional periods negated Sudan and Southern Sudan's conflict prevention measures and instead produced a community centered on suspicion, doubt, and dislike of one another. Whether sanctions would have prevented wars and conflicts is equally debatable.

1.4.5 Geopolitics and Power

Coined by Rudolf Kjellen, 1899, Cohen defines geopolitics as the “analysis of the interaction, between, on the other hand, geographical settings and perspectives, and on the other hand political processes.”²⁹ Geopolitics is set on two spheres: geography and politics. Development of political geography stems back to the Greek models and seventeen century

²⁹. Saul Bernard Cohen, *Geopolitics of the World System*, (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 12.

Europe, with due regard of public policy in relation to geography. Flint argues that geopolitics is founded on three perspectives: classical, critical and feminist.³⁰

Classical geopolitics, founded during the European exploration in the 19th century, classified the world in hierarchical and spacial terms, terming some regions, barbaric, in need of civilisation. Exemplified by the British Empire, Japan, United States and Germany classical geopolitics aimed at formulating, directing and controlling political agendas for national interests.³¹ Proponents of classical geopolitics, Sir Halford Mackinder, (1861-1947), and Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) argued for state power as the dominant drive or hierarchy amongst states although a 19th century phenomena, the practice has been perpetuated into the cold war and post-modern period of the 2000s.³² In contrast, critical geopolitics served as a reaction or reclaiming geopolitics from the state. Critical geopolitics applied the tools of post modernism; which served as an anti-thesis of state policies and systems. In achieving this, classical geopolitics used the tool of analysis or criticism centred on government or state in matters such as politics and international relations. Feminist geopolitics regarded politics in terms of positions and roles that play in politics and international relations; thus, geopolitics is not seen in terms of state power, or analysis of systems but on the intricacies of people-relations.

The 1970's witnessed a re-emergence of geopolitics resulting from an interest in public policy at the intra-state level, concern for social welfare issues [e.g. equity, workings of political systems; development of scientific research methodology, and emergence of new

³⁰. Collins Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, (New York: Routledge: 2012), 3.

³¹. Ibid.

³². Ibid, 4.

theoretical models, e.g. political economy.³³ Geopolitics recognises the interests of states and subsequent conflicts resulting from interests; with concepts such as state, public policy, political culture, geographical aspects, legal stems, power and conflicts serving instrumental in geo-politics. Of analysis is the global, national, and local level of operation in understanding how the state, policy formulation, and international conflicts function.

The concept of power as stated earlier is central in geo-politics and holds various definitions. First, power has been frequently defined as the capacity to control or influence others.³⁴ Second, Haugaard contends power is perceived as a political concept [exemplified by Hans Morgenthau], and exercised by actors in observable conflict, and power resources [money and authority]. Lastly, it is used to control others and used to re-generate power regarding given aspects [exemplified by Bachrach, Baratz and Dahl].³⁵

Criticism of the noted views disregards integral concepts of power, including decision making processes, domination, behaviour, outcomes causation, ideological struggle, and class struggle [Marxism]. These concepts are vehicles of power exertion, not a commodity. Wrong argues that whereas intentionality and effectiveness of power are debatable given their conditionalities, effective and intended influence constitute power.³⁶ Thus, power is about influence, dependent on the relationship of two or more variables. It centres on the process and the costs of obtaining power. In relation to power relations, however, its meaning is significantly lost, where power amongst states is imbalanced as in the case of China and Southern Sudan over technology, science, military, and money.

³³ Michael Pacione, "Introduction", in *Progress in Political Geography*, eds. Michael Pacione, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 1.

³⁴ Dennis Hume Wrong, *Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses*, (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1980), 6.

³⁵ Mark Haugaard, *The Constitution of Power: A Theoretical Analysis of Power, Knowledge and Structure*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 11-12.

³⁶ *Ibid*, 4-5.

Arguably, the politics of oil in East Africa encompasses the relations with the West [North America and Europe], and East [Asia], governed by historical relations, partnerships and dependency perpetuated by national interests. The degree in which national interests of states merge is a matter of debate. Historical overview of West-East-Africa relations has been defined by significant stages or milestones characterised by pre-colonial, colonial, postcolonial [cold war, post-cold war], and independence. The case of Southern Sudan is indicative of these periods, leading up to succession and independence. Although relations have evolved, arguments exist regarding the hegemony of Sudan, China, and United States in Southern Sudan. This leads to certain questions: Does Southern Sudan maintain a distinct political identity in economic relations with the East and West? Does Southern Sudan have equal playing ground in international relations with states such as America and China? Can Southern Sudan exercise power conversion [power conversion is “the capability to convert potential power as measured by resources to realized power, as measured by the changed behaviour of others”].³⁷

The difficulty of addressing the noted questions arises on two fronts. One, assuming the strictest understanding of power relations, Southern Sudan is disfavoured where imbalances of development exist between itself and other states. Power resources are contextual; Sudan’s power resource is oil, the United States three power resources are technology, economy, and military. The United States and Sudan power conversion aids in influencing international relations [with other states]. Two, lacking is Southern Sudan’s indefinable foreign policy and institutional structures necessary to outline its economic agenda and resource management portfolios. Efforts such as constitution development, government structuring is key but not

³⁷. Joseph Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, (London: Longman, 1990), 61.

sufficient to address or outline the economic blueprint of the country. Compounding issues of educational, social and political development undermine the country's identity in power relations, rendering it vulnerable to hegemony and economic stifling. On-going conflicts between Sudan in oil-rich territories [Abyei], and the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005 poses additional challenges in the redefinition or creation of effective progress in matters of oil protection and exportations.

1.4.6 Sino –Africa Relations

The post-cold war period, 1990s has continued to see a gradual shift of “superpowers” of the United States, United Kingdom, and France to other giants such as India and China. India's presence in Africa stems as far back as the 1800s through trade, infrastructure and politics. The building of the East African railway, exemplifies this relation. The Sino-Africa relations stems from the 1950's primarily through diplomatic and economic ties.

Since the 1950's China has granted fifty three countries in Africa economic aid, interest-free loans and preferential loans. Since the restructuring of the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in 1998, China has been heavily interested and involved in some of African's oil rich states, including, Angola, Sudan and Tunisia, South Sudan, Nigeria and Gabon. Algeria, Chad, Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Morocco. In 1998, China-Africa bilateral trade reached US\$5.5billion.³⁸ In 2009, President Hu Jintao signed contracts with African countries. Some of them included US\$280 million with Mauritius to expand its port at Nouakchott, construction a hospital in Nairobi, and

³⁸. Sanusha Naidu, “China in Africa: A Maturing of Engagement?”, in *Chinese and African perspectives on China in Africa*, eds, Axel Harneit-Sievers, Stephen Marks, Sanusha Naidu, (Nairobi: Fahamu/Pambazuka, 2010), 59.

US\$1billion for revamp of a stadium in Angola.³⁹ Key meetings such as the Beijing Summit of the China-Africa Cooperation were pivotal in the Sino-Africa relations in matters of trade, international relations and politics. Africa's areas of exportation with China have been in oil, metals, ore, food and agricultural products. China's exports with Africa have been centred on machinery, communication equipment, electronics and transportation equipment.

The Sino-Africa relationship centred on trade has witnessed expansion within the last four decades. China's trade with sub Saharan Africa is growing at 50% per annum; of which has increased in value from \$10 billion [2000 to about \$50billion [2007]. In Kenya, for example China's trade doubled between 2005- 2006, reaching \$706 billion compared to Kenya's figure with United States and Britain in 2006.⁴⁰ What gains are there for China's involvement in Africa's oil rich states?

1.4.7 China and Sudan: Foreign Policy and Leadership

In line with the above section, China's relation with Africa is debatable. Arguably, Beijing's relations with oil rich African nations have not been without criticism. It is argued that China's international strategy, including Africa is based on a multipolarity/ non-interference policy. In practice this is exemplified by interest free, condition free loans, debt cancellation and international aid. Beijing's economic strategy has so far, served its national interest without overly regressions. China's non-stick approach to its foreign policy of Africa negates that of the United States, which predominantly use coercive diplomacy to gain access to natural and raw resources in Africa. In this sense, China is perceived as less of a threat in Africa, particularly when it assumes the role of friend rather than instigator. The role of the

³⁹. Ibid, 29.

⁴⁰. Robert I Rotberg, *China Into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence*, (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 3.

United States in the control and access of raw and natural resource in Africa is therefore limited and cowed down in China's shadow. In recent times, however, China's non-interference policy has been altered through shuttle diplomacy and "back door" negotiations where investments and energy insecurity are at stake. [e.g. Darfur, 2004, closure oil pipes, Sudan-South Sudan, 2011]. The end result is a relationship based on dependency and co-dependency, where Africa relies on Beijing for economic relief, and Beijing depends on Africa for energy sustainability. The contrasting arguments sees Beijing as predominantly focused on oil. It is also seen as a beneficiary of the noted arrangements, raising concern regarding their long term legitimacy. Questions exist whether China's oil exploration contracts still hold legitimacy in areas of concessions and privileges, and implication of those contracts in the present day South Sudan.

The role of China in both countries is indicative of the growing dependency and co-dependency these states with each other. With China's increasing oil demands, need for reliable suppliers of oil and Sudan and Southern Sudan demands for political and economic partnerships, oil, thereof, determines the quality and duration of the relationships. The role of Sudan in the Darfurian crisis resulted in calls for President Al Bashir's arrest at the International Criminal Court [ICC]. Yet, no arrests have been made, with equal measures, of periodic fighting in oil-rich territories. Bashir maintains his innocence over ethnic cleaning or /and genocidal incidences in Darfur. Varied reactions surround Bashir's warrant of arrest. Citing Reuters and Muhumuzu, Arieff et al indicates support of the arrest warrant by Darfurian rebel groups [Sudan Liberation Movement, Sudan Liberation Army and Justice and Equality Movement]. In addition, concern regarding the arrest warrant has been expressed by Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, Benin, Eritrea, among other states. In 2009, the African Union

expressed its disinterest in supporting the arrest warrant⁴¹, an indication of its discomfort over ICC's seemingly intrusion of African Heads of State and consequential implications of arrest warrants.

1.5 Justification of the Study

The role of China role in Africa has been received with both contempt and interests, given its growing influence and economic strength in the world. Its historical presence in Africa has evolved from oil exportation to education, science, health, culture, and politics. As the second largest economy outside of the United States of America, China's influence and dominance in various regions, including Africa provides insights into the integral connections exemplified through economic, political packages and agreements, in the form of loans, oil importation, establishment of businesses, educational scholarships and similar other deals.

The most visible presence in the Sino-Africa relationship centres on oil diplomacy [or politics of petroleum], with countries such as Nigeria, Sudan, Southern Sudan and Angola. Whereas China's has been instrumental in supporting or meeting the needs of African states, Africa has also served China's energy needs, specifically through oil and gas partnerships, although other natural resources are also considered.

China's permanent membership into the United Nations Security Council, coupled with its foreign policy [supported by its non-interference policy and five principles of peaceful coexistence], provides a critical analysis of its role in oil diplomacy with post conflict regions such as Southern Sudan and Sudan. Arguably, South Sudan's emergence as the world's

⁴¹. Alexis Arieff, Rhoda Margesson, Marjorie A Brown, *International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues*, (PA: Diane Publishing, 2010), 14-16.

youngest country following a successful referendum in January 2011 and its oil diplomacy begs questions regarding the impact of China's role in the politics of oil in reference to the former are present and future.

The interest in undertaking this study considers the history of China in Africa, its economic and political role in Southern Sudan, and the implications of oil exportation and diplomacy in Africa's political and economic development. Of interest will be the geopolitics of oil, China and United States foreign policy and relations to Africa, and natural resource based/armed conflicts. The study intends to inform policy and academic communities on policy formulation, governance of natural resources and resource based conflict management and transformation.

1.6 Hypotheses

The paper presents four hypotheses:

- Armed and protracted conflicts contribute to the underdevelopment of states despite the abundance of natural resources, including oil.
- Geo-politics of oil have causal factors in the national decision making processes of post conflict societies.
- Poor policy formulation and implementation on the petroleum sector has causal effects on the management and control of natural resources, including oil.
- Oil serves as a political and economic tool for China and Southern Sudan.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

There are a number of theories and paradigms utilized in examining issues of international relations and foreign policy; one such theory is Realism. Realism is a “political thought” but more so, it is an understanding of the way states relate to each other based on parameters provided below. Developed from the 1930’s and propagated by scholars such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Carr and Morgenthau. Realism is considered to be the dominant theory of International Relations. It serves as a guide to international politics, including conflict. Generally contrasted with liberalism, constructivism, or pluralism, Realism holds key tenets and paradigms that arguably present contrasting views about international relations. Chiaruzzi provides specific arguments regarding Realism. First, Realism maintains two core tenets, the state, international anarchy, and second, it is guided by three natures, sovereignty, international law and unipolarity. He asserts that “States are seen as the “fundamental units of organized, hierarchical power and their relations dominate world politics.”⁴²

Sovereignty includes the supreme power to make and enforce laws, and governance through exercising monopoly over internal and external instruments of legitimate violence [police and armed forces], states are territorial with boundaries. Although Realism recognizes other actors [international organizations, transnational and supranational organizations, they are considered less inferior to the state.⁴³ International law encompasses the will and practices of states.⁴⁴ Dominant states, for example, set the rules that shape international transactions and interactions [e.g. globalization. Unipolarity implies the supremacy of a state in the absence of an equal power [e.g. United States and its actions across the globe]. Realism also asserts the

⁴². Michele Chiaruzzi, “Realism”, in *An Introduction to International Relations*, eds. Richard Devetak, Anthony Burke and Jim George, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 43.

⁴³. Ibid.

⁴⁴. Ibid.

international anarchy illustrated through domination of states and in the absence of a common government, results in security dilemma, and conflicts.

International anarchy rests on fear and hostility among states.⁴⁵ According to Realism, fear is necessary for survival. The presence of hostility and resource scarcity is seen to be a recipe for conflict, negating peace amongst nations. Realism, therefore, regards the inevitability of conflicts and assumes the selfish interest of human nature and dominant role of states in the pursuit of their interests in the international arena of politics. Foreign policy, for example, is a critical tool for meeting the economic and political obligations and interests of states and subsequent interactions between states.

Hans Morgenthau posited six principles, four of which are: a. Politics is governed by objective law grounded on human nature; human nature is intrinsically selfish; driven by self-interests and over indulgence; b. Interests are the driving force of international politics; Interests are defined as power. In addition, Realists argue that the international system is predominantly focused on specific gains, i.e. their position vis-à-vis other states in the system⁴⁶; c. International politics [realpolitik] is centered on power. Power is seen in terms of influence, control and access to international instruments of change [be it oil, proper, wealth, military strength, economic strength]. The most recognizable tool of power is the Gross Domestic Product [GDP]. Hence, great states are characterized by economic [GDP], military, and political powers within the international system; d. Realism disregards the

⁴⁵. Ibid, 44.

⁴⁶. Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 4-15.

universality of religion and morality, for both is seen subjective to the powers within states, which control and manipulate their will on weaker states.⁴⁷

In contrast, Guzzini argues Morgenthau's concept of gathering and retention of power is the central factor in international relations, as opposed to Waltz' argument that the primary goal of states is not the maximization of power but the maximization of security, translated to imply the improvement of relative power position.⁴⁸ He further contends that the maximization or balance of power is seen as power in itself, not necessarily as a means to an end. This, however, does not answer the question of disequilibrium of power based on resources. If non-endowed states improved economically, the assumption is that the balance of power would be destabilized but given the various elements of power, money becomes the dominant commodity in the maximization or retention of power. Guzzini asserts that Waltz argues that money-power analogy was problematic in measurement, but not in terms of medium of exchange or economic value. He contends that non-fungibility of power cannot be transferred or interchanged with other sources of power; e.g. money, despite the arguments about the fungibility of power.⁴⁹

The above bears witness to China and the United States; both considered the two major economic giants of the world despite qualitative functionality of power. Where does this assertion leave oil rich regions such as Southern Sudan? Does the answer lie in quantitative power sources available per region or state? Do qualitative commodities such as human rights and democracy equate with quantitative power resources in the assessment of power strengths among nations?

⁴⁷. Ibid.

⁴⁸. Stefano Guzzini, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death*, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 135.

⁴⁹. Ibid, 137.

Where does China's human rights abuses feature [as exemplified in the Tiananmen Square revolt, 1989, one child policy, human rights abuses in partner countries e.g. Darfurian conflict, Sudan, 2004]?

Taken from the viewpoint of power, it can be argued that oil serves as a power tool, promoting global competition in an anarchical system of international politics. As an energy source, oil demands attention through ownership and utilization, making it a desirable element, unfortunately, leading to conflict. The case of the Sudan illustrates the dichotomy between oil and politics and residual effects of both. The history of north and South Sudan indicates evolving issues, while drawing significant attention on oil since its discovery in the 1970's. Arguably, the case of Southern Sudan begs a re-evaluation of this model in the midst of its independence. South Sudan's political and economic interests have not been articulated well through policy and strategy formulation and implementation. Equally, South Sudan's political and economic dispositions may serve as pawns within a wider or global political and economic system, undermining its very role in geo-politics.

This study critically analyses the politics of oil with reference to the role of China in Southern Sudan. It examines the relationship between geo-politics, oil and conflicts in Africa. It also looks at foreign policies, and management of natural resources and resource based conflicts in Southern Sudan. Realism theory will be utilised for the purpose of examining the role of geo-politics of oil.

1.8 Research Methodology

The study applies both primary and secondary for data collection. The primary data consists of open interviews with key respondents in the field of international relations/diplomacy, conflict and petroleum. The interviews were based on the research hypotheses. The secondary data consists of books, newspaper articles, and journals, government documents; newspapers published and unpublished materials, and magazines.

1.9 Chapter Outline

The research study is broken into five chapters, covering the following headings:

Chapter One: Introduction to the Study

Chapter Two: Historical Overview

Chapter Three: Case Study: Oil Politics in Africa: The Role of China in Southern Sudan

Chapter Four: Analysis of the Emerging Issues

Chapter Five: Summary, Key Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter provided an introduction to the research statement of the problem, objectives of the study, literature review, and justification of the study. It also provides the theoretical framework and research methodology. In so doing, the research highlighted the arguments surrounding these subtopics in light of the politics of oil in Africa, with reference to the role of China in Southern Sudan.

This chapter provides an account of the history of Sudan and Southern Sudan, given the interconnectedness of politics and economics. It begins with background information about both countries, including the history of Sudan. This is followed by the significance of the civil wars in Sudan and Southern Sudan, Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005. In addition, the history of the politics of oil between China, Sudan and Southern Sudan is also included. A summary of the text is also provided at the end of the chapter.

2.2 History of Sudan

The history of Sudan, including Southern Sudan is inundated with various interpretations, issues, politics, and accounts leaving room for debates, speculations and theories. Depending on the divide, literature is indicative of the differing views and thoughts about Africa and Sudan. “Africa is an enormous land mass, 12 million square meters, larger than North America and four times the size of the United States.”⁵⁰ The word Sudan stems from the Arabic word *bilad al-sudan*, meaning “the land of the blacks.”⁵¹ Sudan is located north-

⁵⁰. Collins, Robert and James M. Burns, *A History of Sub Sahara Africa*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 7.

⁵¹. Op cit, Mulu, 24.

eastern Africa, bordering the Red Sea, between Egypt and Eritrea with Arabic as the official language. Sudan and Southern Sudan share the Nile Basin and its territories. The Federal Republic of Sudan is ruled by the National Congress Party which commenced power by a military coup in 1989. Sudan gained independence in 1956 from the United Kingdom and Egypt.

Southern Sudan is located East-Central Africa; north of Uganda and Kenya, west of Ethiopia. English and Arabic are the official languages. It has a population of 8,260,490 as of 2008.⁵² The country is ruled by the Sudan People Liberation Movement, formed in 1983. Southern Sudan gained independence in July 9, 2011.

The history of the Sudan dates back as early as the 19th century with Kordofan under the control of Muhammad Ali, the Albanian adventurer. Mulu contends it dates back to the Turko-Egyptian administration from 1821-1881.⁵³ Okoth argues that prior to this date, Egypt had experienced a string of foreign masters, stemming with the Pharaonic dynasties [525BC], the Macedonia's, Greeks, the Romans, Ottoman Turks, and European [1798]. The latter demonstrated through the invasion led by General Napoleon Bonaparte. Through the Ottoman Sultan interception, Ali became governor of Egypt in 1805.⁵⁴ Ali's demise ushered in the rule of Muhammad Said [Suez Canal construction], and Khedive Ismail [commercialization of Egypt].

⁵². National Baseline Household Survey, National Bureau of Statistics, (Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation: 2009), 8.

⁵³. Op cit, Mulu, 26.

⁵⁴. Assa Okoth, *A History of Africa: Volume One: African Societies and the Establishment of Colonial Rule 1800-1915*, (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers 2006), 262.

With increasing foreign debt in an attempt to create an empire, the Khedives administration was inundated with foreign debts, including the cost of slave trade. As part of the structural programs, Ismail sold 44 percent of Egyptian shares of the Suez Canal to the British government, thereby reducing the political influence of the French.⁵⁵ Okoth further contends that before his ouster in 1879, Muhammad Ali's partial control of Sudan saw attempts at uniting different ethnic groups and political units, establishing Khartoum as Turko-Egyptian government headquarters in 1824. The rest of the provinces were under the noted administration with ambitions of utilizing Sudanese as soldiers for wars in Syria and slaves in Egypt and Arabic countries.

The Mahdist Revolt, 1881, headed by Muhammad Ahmad ibn Abdalla, was initially religious by nature but turned political through the overthrow of the Turko-Egyptian rule. Abdalla's influence in Sudan disfigured the status quo as a result of the abolition of foreign taxation rules and islamization. Subsequently, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1899-1914 was established, creating the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement [Condominium Agreement] for the administration of Sudan. Daly stipulates the boundaries of the Sudan territories had been "reconquered" by the British, including Wadi Halfa, and Suakin. For example, Article 2 [of the Agreement] cited provision for flying of both flags, Egypt and Britain.⁵⁶ Article 11 prohibited the exportation and importation of slaves into and from Sudan⁵⁷ the Suakin separation from the rest of the country was also addressed. Signed on January 9, 1899, the legitimacy of the agreement remained in force until 1956, after the independence of Sudan.⁵⁸

⁵⁵. Ibid.

⁵⁶. M.W Daly, *Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898-1934*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 15.

⁵⁷. Ibid, 18.

⁵⁸. Ibid.

2.3 The Synthesis of the Civil Wars in Sudan and Southern Sudan

Each period in Sudan's history marked strive and re-alignment rooted on political, social, religious and social issues as indicated following: *The pre-colonial period:* Northern frontier: This period was characterised by systematic arabization and islamization, especially during the death of Prophet Mohammed in 632 A.D.⁵⁹; resource identification and exportation [gold, copper and ivory], importation of slaves to Egypt, and developments in education, administrative structures, and military bases. *The colonial period:* This period was illustrated by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Rule [1899-1955] and Southern Policy. The former governed the country as two distinct entities; while the latter rested on two major premises; the first premise on the de-arabization of the south and the adoption of the English language and Christianity; the second premise on the integration of the Southern region into Uganda and the enactment of native administration Islam and Arabic.⁶⁰ *The post independence era: Sudan:* This period was symbolised by two civil wars [the first, 1955 – 1972, the second, 1983 – 2004] fought primarily by the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army [SPLM/A]. Both wars coupled with the coups in 1958, and 1959 symbolized systematic discrimination, arabization, political and institution isolation, resulting in a rebellion by southern troops in the Equatorial Province.

It can be argued that the Condominium era failed to achieve its goal of creating an independent Southern Sudan largely due to political and economic advancement of the north and subsequent under development of the south.⁶¹ Although the southerners believed in the protection of Britain, the latter was more concerned with maintaining the passage to India

⁵⁹. Op cit, Mulu, 7.

⁶⁰. C. S Sarkesian , "The Southern Sudan: A Reassessment", *Journal of African Studies Review*, Vol. 16, No. 1, (April, 1973): 5.

⁶¹. F.M Deng,, "A Nation in Turbulent Search of Itself", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 603, (Jan., 2006): 156.

through the Suez and Middle East oil fields.⁶² The role of Anyanya 1 and 2, Nimeiri, and that of Hassan al Turabi are also significant in Sudan's history, for they are indicative of the political dimensions of the day that continued to shape both the north and south. Ali, Elbadawi and Batahani argue the Anyanya movement was a "loose alliance between army mutineers and politically active Southern Sudanese, united on what they perceived as the hegemony of northern elites in newly independent Sudan."⁶³ The authors also state that the Anyanya's failures were caused by insufficient military strength, lack of regional support, factional conflicts, grievances, amongst other issues.

The 1970's was a turning point for the Anyanya movement, under the leadership of Joseph Lagu. Military support from Israel during this period and successful insurgency proved victorious for the Anyanya movement. Dialogue between the Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement [SSLM], and Gaafar Nimieri's regime led to the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement in 1972. The creation of Anyanya 2 resulted from failed fulfilments of the peace process in the 1980's. This led to civil unrest and the formation of the Sudanese People Liberation Movement/Army [SPLM/A].

As the leader of the Free Officers Movement and having gained power through a military coup in 1969 by ousting Sudan's first post-independence president, Ibrahim Abboud, Nimieri's tenure was characterized by radical changes. According to De Wit and Hatcher, some significant events that led to disintegration of the north and Southern Sudan included government's deployment in Bentiu in Southern Sudan, declaration of a state of emergency

⁶². T Theo, *Ethnic Conflict and Religion*, (Geneva: World Council of Churches Publications, 1997),

34.

⁶³. Ali G Ali, Ibrahim E. Elbadawi and Atta El-Batahani, "Sudan's Civil War: Why Has It Prevailed for So Long?", in *Understanding Civil War: Africa*, eds. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, (Washington: World Bank Publications, 2005), 199.

and subsequent introduction of *Shari'a law*, [under the Attorney General Hassan Al Turabi]. This contradicted the ideology of the Southerners leading to mutiny by the SPLM/A, subsequently, breaking of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement.⁶⁴ As stated by Basha, Nimeiri attempted to shift the north –south border resulting from the oil discovery in Bentiu state in 1978, Upper Nile, and Southern Kordofan, in 1979, Unity in 1980, and Heglig in 1982.⁶⁵

In addition, the period between the 1980s-2000s was also pivotal. Turabi and al Bashir's regimes were also seen pivotal in the 1990's. Shay argues that both regimes provided support or patronage to Osama bin Laden, the latter of whom was said to build a *Jihad* against the West.⁶⁶ In addition, the January 30, 1989 coup, "Revolution of Salvation", led by The National Islamic Front [NIF] failed to cement both the south and north. The NIF systemically waged conflicts with southerners, while ignoring calls for autonomy of the south. The signage of the IGAD-led Comprehensive Peace Agreement was achieved in 2005 in Kenya, culminating to the cessation of the war. The signage was witnessed by African heads of state, including Colin Powell, former U.S Secretary of State.⁶⁷

2.4 Comprehensive Peace Agreement: An Overview

The use of agreements has been contentious given their nature and interpretations. Primarily seen as instruments of conflict resolution, agreements serve both political and economic purpose by virtue of ownership and issues at stake. Scholars such as Zartman and Mutwol

⁶⁴. Paul de Wit and Jeffrey Hatcher, "Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: An Opportunity for Coherently Addressing the Housing, Land and Property Issues?", in *Housing, Land, and Property Rights in Post-Conflict United Nations and Other Peace Operations: A Comparative Survey and Proposal for Reform*, eds. Scott Leckie, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 267.

⁶⁵. Sara Basha, "Sudanese Civil Wars: Multiple Causes, Multiple Parties –One Comprehensive Peace Agreement?", in *Peace in the Balance: The Crisis in the Sudan*, eds. Brian Raftopoulos and Karin Alexander, (South Africa: African Minds, 2006), 12.

⁶⁶. Shaul Shay, *Somalia between Jihad and Restoration*, (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2011), 64.

⁶⁷. Ted Dagne, *Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement*, (PA: Diane Publishing, 2010), 15.

also argue about the legitimacy of agreements regarding issues of parties' interests, representation, and tradeoffs.⁶⁸ This was evidenced in the serial negotiations between the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A in matters of territorial rights, autonomy/succession, and political representation.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, [CPA] was initiated as early as 2002 under the leadership of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development [IGAD], General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, amongst others. Recognized for ending critical stalemates involving the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A, the CPA is pivotal in the history of Southern Sudan, for it illustrates the long road of the country and its people.

The background of the CPA takes into consideration previous attempts at peace initiatives and agreements, and civil wars between the Government of Sudan and Sudan's People's Liberation Army/Movement [SPLM/A]. The root causes or key determinants of the wars resulted from religiosity, political discrimination, and "economic marginalization of the south and near exclusion of the southerners from positions in government."⁶⁹ Several attempts at peace had been made. Some of them included the Juba Conference (1947), the Roundtable Conference [1965]⁷⁰, Jimmy Carter [1985, 1995, and 1997], Koka Dam Declaration [1986], Egypt-Libya Initiative [1999-2001],⁷¹ and Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005).

⁶⁸. Julius Mutwol, *Peace Agreements and Civil Wars in Africa*, (New York: Cambria Press, 2009), 15.

⁶⁹. Elke Grawert, *After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan*, (Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer, 2010), 1.

⁷⁰. Dunstan Wai, *The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration*, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 16-22.

⁷¹. Op cit, Basha, 16-20.

Guarak posits that “Sudan is known for two reasons, war tragedies and unrealistic peace agreements”⁷², perhaps due to other numerous signage of peace agreements. He argues that the Juba Conference, 1947, although the first official meeting between the north and south was a farce in principle and action, resulting from years of subjugation of the Arab to the Southern Sudanese on grounds of economic dominance and religiosity. The Juba Conference aimed at introducing and legitimizing Islam and Arab civilization in a seemingly naive people-group. The Arabs used the Conference “to fake the unity of the Sudan.”⁷³ With varying differences by the north and south on matters of religion, ideology, education, economics, and politics, the struggle for unification saw numerous attempts by the north to sway the south. Thus, different conference agendas were formed starting with the message of unification, moving to separatism, and power sharing. Southerners responded through resistance and wars and rejected a move by the South Unionist Party to unite states of Sudan and Egypt under one Arab republic. Guarak further argues that the Juba Conference, steered by the Arab Sudanese and Egyptian powers undermined the wishes of the Southern Sudanese and British administration during the Anglo-Egyptian rule. He sees the Conference as the “genesis of numerous wars that have been fought in the Sudan between Arab and Africans, Muslims versus non-Muslims.”⁷⁴

The Roundtable Conference, 1965, served as an extended platform regarding the issues aired during the Juba Conference. Guarak posits that the Roundtable Conference “was nothing other than deceiving the marginalised people to be subject to more oppression by the Arab elites of Khartoum.”⁷⁵ Nimieri’s government appointed Abel Alier [a Southern Sudanese] to

72. Mawut Achieccque Mach Guarak M, *Integration and Fragmentation of the Sudan: An African Renaissance*, (Indiana: AuthorHouse, 2011), 499.

73. Ibid.

⁷⁴. Ibid, 501.

⁷⁵. Ibid, 508.

represent the government of Sudan and convince the southerners regarding unification. The Conference failed in its mandate [unification of Sudan] due to differing views of the southerners on this matter. The northerners also rejected the southerners' demands for equality, parliamentary, political representation and decision making inclusion in government [e.g. police force, administration].

With regards to the Addis Ababa Peace Accords, Guarak states that, they were not strong enough to maintain promises of physical infrastructure for Southern Sudan. In addition, the Accords failed to maintain Nimeiri's *Sharia* laws, nor lead a referendum for independence. This is despite the Accords acknowledgement of the cultural and geographical linked areas of Southern Sudan [Nubba Mountains, Abyei, and Blue Nile].

The Carter Foundation, sponsored talks between NIF and SPLM/A in 1989, 1995, 1997. Al Bashir's rejected the talks by accusing Carter of being biased towards the three-month suspension of *Shari'a* laws.⁷⁶ Briedlid and Briedlid argue that the Herman Cohen Blue Print for Peace, 1990, provided suggestions regarding lasting peace, including constitutional conference, and evacuation of all forces from Southern Sudan. It also advocated for the exercise of free and fair elections for the restoration of democracy, ceasefire, and demilitarized zones [Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states]. The U.S. election and Gulf war superseded these suggestions resulting in its failure.⁷⁷

Abuja I and II [1992, 1993] aimed at addressing self-governance, Islamization, amongst other issues. Originally initiated by President Bashir under the leadership of former president of

⁷⁶. Anders Briedlid and Astrid Briedlid, *A Concise History of Southern Sudan*, eds, Anders Briedlid and Astrid Briedlid, (Oxford: African Books Collective, 2010), 310-312.

⁷⁷. Ibid.

Nigeria and OAU Chairman, Babangida, the talks reached a deadlock over a proposed agenda. In addition, internal wrangles within the SPLM/A [faction between Troi and Nassir] undermined SPLM/A determination. However, the talks are credited in providing interim agreements to mediation and ceasefire, in addition to the building of the “two emerging SPLM/A factions into a single delegation focusing on a common goal.”⁷⁸

The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development [IGADD], continued the momentum in 1993, 1995, and 1999 with composition from governments of Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia.⁷⁹ Subsequent support was provided from Norway, Holland, Germany, Japan, and United States. Basha also maintains that IGAD created a “Standing Committee on Peace” in Sudan in March 1994, which subsequently developed the Declaration of Principles [DOP] as a measure to counter act the influence of the Sudan.

2.4.1 Machakos Protocol, 20th July, 2002

This research will highlight two agreements; the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area, 26th May, 2004 and the Machakos Protocol, 20th July, 2002. The Machakos Protocol emerged after the fall of Torit, South-eastern Sudan under SPLA. Containing several components including, “Agreed Test on the Right to Determination for the people of Southern Sudan”, “Agreed test on State and Religion”, “Agreed Test on the Preamble, Principles and The Transition Process”,⁸⁰ the protocol stipulated key historical factors detrimental for both north and Southern Sudan. State and religion, self-determination and composition of a national government were key components in the protocol. Seen as pivotal the protocol “received Khartoum commitment to Southern self-determination”, with an

⁷⁸. Op cit, Basha, 17.

⁷⁹. Ibid, 17.

⁸⁰. Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Agreement, Machakos Protocol, 2003.

interim period of six years leading to a southern referendum, unity or independence.”⁸¹ The ICG report states that the motive of Government of Sudan’s was five-fold. First, the need to re-align itself with peace and expand its base at the expense of the Umma and Democratic Unionist parties. Second, the normalization of relations with the United States during post 9-11 period. Third, to untie much needed development assistance and debt relief from the International Monetary Fund [IMF], World Bank. Fourth, the control the oil reserves. Fifth, e positioning of Sudan as a major regional player in Africa and Middle East.⁸²

2.4.2 The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area, 26th May, 2004

The noted protocol contains nine sections, aspects of the protocol includes, “ Principles of Agreement on Abyei [section 1], Administrative Structure [section 2], Financial resources [section 3], Public participation Section 4], Determination of natural boundaries [Section 5], Residents of the Area [section 6], Security Arrangements [section 7], Abyei Referendum Commission [section 8], Reconciliation process [section 9].⁸³ Although controversies surround the resolution of the noted sections, a key contested issue is Abyei, [e.g. 2011 raid by the Sudan Armed Forces]. Key factors of Abyei concern oil reserves, oil revenue and subsequent control and ownership. With the first mention of a referendum in the Addis Ababa Agreement, 1972, the CPA, 2005 aimed at resuscitating the debate.

Taken from a historical view point the mediation team intended to resolve pending matters. The difficulty of achieving that rested on the fact that Abyei issue is historical, economic and political in nature. The issues date as far back as the Anglo – Egyptian Condominium, 1905,

⁸¹. Matthew LeRiche, and Matthew Arnold, *Southern Sudan: From Revolution to Independence*, (London: Hurst Publishers, 2012), 108.

⁸². *Sudan’s Best Chance for Peace: How Not to Lose It*: ICG Report No. 51, Sept 2002, 7.

⁸³. Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area, 26th May, 2004, Original Text 2004.

with “the transfer between Bahr el Ghazal Province and Kordofan Province Ngok Dinka...and the Humr Arabs.”⁸⁴

The noted protocol was not without controversies between the south, north, Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka. Contentious subject matter under the protocol consisted of oil, territorial rights, boundary outline and size [of Bahr al Arab River], original and secondary occupants. In response, Article 5.1 [of the Protocol] was agreed upon by the south and north. Article 5.1 stipulates, “There shall be established by the Presidency, Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) to define and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok-Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905, referred to herein as Abyei Area.”⁸⁵

Salman provides a detailed account of dispute. He asserts that in forming the ABC, preliminary modalities were established such as “Implementation Modalities on the Protocol and Resolution of the Abyei Conflict” in 2004. The “Rules of Procedure for the Abyei Boundaries Commission” were also established in 2005.⁸⁶ The ABC report [as cited by Salman] indicated some key findings. Some of them included, the lack of a map showing the inhabitant of the Ngok-Dinka in 1905, territorial legitimacy by the Ngok-Dinka [of the Kordofan–Bahr el Ghazal boundary; latitude, 10°10_ N], as well as shared territorial land between the Ngok-Dinka and Misseriya, as 10°10_ N to latitude 10°35_ N.⁸⁷ With rejection from the Government of Sudan and Misseriya and acceptance from the SPLM and Ngok-

⁸⁴. Coalter G. Lathrop, “Government of Sudan v. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (Abyei Arbitration)”, in *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 104, and No. 1 (January 2010): 66-73.

⁸⁵. Op cit, Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area.

⁸⁶. Salman M.A. Salman, “The Abyei Territorial Dispute Between North and South Sudan: Why has its Resolution Proven Difficult? “, in *Land and Post Conflict Peace Building*, eds, John Unruh, Rodri Williams, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 34-35.

⁸⁷. Ibid, 36.

Dinka, the CPA implementation proved difficult. Fresh area fighting emerged in 2008, leading to forwarding the Abyei case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration [PCA].

After extensive work, the tribunal under the PCA provided a number of conclusions. Three of which included, the delimitation of the Abyei area, 10,460 square kilometres under the PCA, and 18,559 square kilometres,⁸⁸ under the ABC. In addition, the release of oil fields [e.g. Heglig and Bamboo] back to the North. In addition, the provision of grazing rights and water and land rights for the Misseriya and SPLM respectively. These recommendations, however, did not stop the subsequent discontent and failed Abyei referendum in 2011, Kagudli agreements [including those of January 13, and 17, 2011], Southern Kordofan elections, and subsequent take over of Abyei by Government of Sudan in 2011.⁸⁹

The above leads to the question, Where did the Abyei protocol fail? Oil is a significant component of the dispute, including territorial and land rights, and ancestral regard. The issues are thus multifaceted. The conflicts over Abyei, freezing of oil pipelines [2012, 2013] illustrates the gaps of the CPA, and the need to resolve this and other outstanding issues through contextualised conflict transformation mechanisms.

Craze argues that the Abyei protocol failed on two grounds; first, it assumed a historical regard in the resolution of the conflict; second, absence of historical records [particularly in relating to the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms]; third, non-transfer of area but transfer of a people-group, with territorial implications” in 1905. He further states that the shifting of grazing routes undermines the latitude disputes, with subsequent implication of “traditional

⁸⁸. Ibid, 42.

⁸⁹Ibid, 45-54.

rights.” The logical solution to this dispute, therefore, rests on a referendum, in which the residents decide on the ownership of the area.⁹⁰

2.4.3 Other Protocols

Equally important were the Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements, 2004, the Agreement on Wealth Sharing, 7th January 2004, Protocol on Power Sharing, 26th May 2004, the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, 26th May, 2004. These protocols contain differing articles, indicating wealth and power sharing, security and territorial rights. Disputes exist regarding their legitimacy and time limitations after South Sudan’s independence, with increasing concern over unresolved issues between South Sudan and Sudan. Reasons rest on the policy delimitations, political, social, and economic instability of Southern Sudan and its frosty relations with Sudan.

2.5 Oil Politics in Africa: History, Theory and Engagement

2.5.1 History

Africa is endowed with natural resources, including oil. Some of African countries rich with natural resources include, Kenya, Nigeria, Libya, Ghana, South Sudan, Sudan, Angola, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad. This leads to the question, Is there a particular regard for African’s natural resources, including oil by non-African states? Does the interest translate to investment and development in Africa?

Arguments regarding interest in Africa’s resources have been an on-going phenomena. Oliveira argues that interests in Africa’s resources, particularly oil are not the reserve of

⁹⁰. Joshua Craze, “Unclear Lines; State and Non State Actors in Abyei”, in *The Borderlands of Southern Sudan: Authority and Identity in Contemporary and Historical Perspectives*, eds, Christopher Vaughan, Marieke Schomerus and Lotje De Vries, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 45-50.

China but that of other Asian countries such as Malaysia, India, Japan, and South Korea.⁹¹ Investments from Norway, Russia and Brazil are also noted. Oliviera states that the political economy of oil has been aligned to three players and relationships; oil producing countries, foreign oil companies [Western states], and oil importing states in the industrial world. Countries in the first category include Cameroon, Angola, Chad, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Congo-Brazzaville, and Equatorial Guinea. Commonality of these states rests on the pre-oil stage [of economic, political and social underdevelopment] to post oil production stage [of boom era, eliticism, patrimonial politics, corruption, and failed states]. Thus, is the transition economically viable? Arguably, Oliviera states that the re-modelling efforts such as “Publish What You Pay”, 2002, and “Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative” failed due to lack of good will from companies and governments. The non-effective result of reforms in Equatorial Guinea, for example, and realpolitik undermined policy formulation and economic and governance transformation in oil producing states. Conflicts in some African states have also undermined development. For example, In Sudan, oil production is traced back to the Egyptian administration, resulting in historical conflicts up to the present [e.g. Abyei].⁹²

2.6 Theoretical Framework

The marriage between theory and oil politics is an interesting one. If the argument takes the views of Morgenthau, Chiaruzzi, and classical Realism, information would indicate the interconnectedness of politics and energy resource control and accumulation. Realism centers on the notion of power and state centricism in the dynamics of international relations. It undermines the role of non state actors over the state and provides credence to power politics and domination of states. Chiaruzzi argues that Realism is defined by the state, and

⁹¹. Ricardo Soares De Oliviera, “Oil Politics”, in *Routledge Handbook of African Politics*, eds, David Anderson, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 180 -186.

⁹². Ariweriokuma, Soala, *The Political Economy of Oil and Gas in Africa: The Case of Nigeria*, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 1.

international anarchy. The state governs the domestic affairs within the international arena using rudimentary tactics and anarchical systems for survival. The security of states is determined by its military strengths and arrangements. Weak states are considered more vulnerable to the manipulations of bigger states.

Chiaruzzi's states three natures; sovereignty, international law, and unipolarity.⁹³ Essentially, sovereignty implies the supreme power to make and enforce laws, governance through exercising monopoly over internal and external instruments of legitimate violence [police and armed forces], and territorial nature of state [with boundaries]. Included also is the international law, which encompasses the will and practices of states.⁹⁴ Dominant states, for example, set the rules that shape international transactions and interactions [e.g. globalization]. Lastly, unipolarity implies the supremacy of a state in the absence of an equal power [e.g. United States and its actions across the globe]. If fear is recognized within Realism, then fear of states is a pre-requisite of anarchical states. The abundance or scarcity of resources is therefore an ingredient of international politics. This assumes natural resources; including oil is a power tool. Survival therefore is imperative. Regions such as Southern Sudan and Sudan require controlling and exercising survival tactics if they exist in an anarchical system.

The principles of Hans Morgenthau equate politics with the laws of human nature, implying the imperfection and inadequacies in international politics. Human beings are by nature terribly inadequate and hostile, rendering power and politics a self-centered phenomenon. Morgenthau credits power to international politics [realpolitik], where the rules of

⁹³. Op cit, Chiaruzzi, 43.

⁹⁴. Ibid.

engagement are predominantly state are centered as opposed to non-state entities. Southern Sudan is no exception. History of both Sudan and Southern Sudan illustrates this concept, as it also demonstrates the dichotomy between state, power and politics.

Guzzini contends that the maximization or balance of power is seen as power in itself, not necessary as a means to an end.⁹⁵ This, however, does not answer the question of disequilibrium of power based on resources. If non-endowed states improved economically, the assumption is that the balance of power would be destabilized but given the various component elements of power, money, therefore, becomes the dominant commodity in the maximization or retention of power. Guzzini argues that non-fungibility of power cannot be transferred or interchanged with other sources of power; e.g. money, despite the arguments about the fungibility of power.

Oil is regarded as a necessary commodity, applicable for meeting national interests, or if you like, a power tool used in the balance of power. Yet as argued by Levy the concept of power of balance is both strong and ambiguous. It is used to signify the division of power in international structures; it is also used as the ideal allocation of power or a particular kind of system.⁹⁶ Power is also seen as both a contributor of peace and war. Power conversion is “the capability to convert potential power as measured by resources to realized power, as measured by the changed behaviour of others.”⁹⁷ Power resources are contextual; Sudan and South Sudan power resources are oil. The three power resources of the United States are technology, economy, and military. The United States and Sudan power conversion aids in

⁹⁵. Op cit, Guzzini, 135.

⁹⁶. Jacks Levy, “What Do Great Powers Balance of Power Against and When?”, in *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, eds, T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, Michel Fortmann, (California: Stanford University Press, 2004), 29.

⁹⁷. Nye, J., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, (New York: Longman: 1990), 61.

influencing international relations [with other states]. States use either soft power [attracting states to want what one wants] or hard power [use of coercion, inducements and threats].

2.7 China-Africa Relations: An Overview of Sino –Sudan Engagement

Historians differ about the origins of China in Africa. Some suggest that the Sino-Africa relations started centuries ago. Jinyuan argues that Chinese historical account, *Shi ji*, written by Si Machien, over 100 BC years, records Emperor Wuti, Han Dynasty, sent envoys to the far west, including Likan, [Alexandria of Egypt]. This was reciprocated with a visit from an African magician to China. Other scholars like Qi Siho and Hirth refuted this equating Likan with Brzantium and Syria respectively.⁹⁸ He contends that products from both regions were said to have been exchanged; Africa, [elephant tusks] and China [silk] by Queen Cleopatria and Roman Emperor Antonias]. In contrast, Tull posits different dates regarding the entry of the Africa-China relations. Recent sources indicate the relations resurfaced in 1990s for two reasons; first, as a reaction to the U.S. and European embargo following the Tiananmen Square revolt in 1989; second, multipolarity, “defined as the construction of more or less flexible alliances to contain every form of hegemony and to build a new and just international order”; third, global foreign policy for national interests and economic growth.⁹⁹

The Chinese foreign policy on Africa emerged after decades of its re-definition, domestic politics, identity, and foreign relations. Adie posits the evolution of China’s policy can be categorized into “three periods of about five years each; “the period of the original ‘Bandung spirit’ with a focus on India, Egypt, and Algeria; a focus on sub Saharan Africa after the

⁹⁸. Gao Jinyuan, “China and Africa: The Development of Relations over Many Centuries”, *African Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 331 (Apr., 1984): 241-250.

⁹⁹. D.M Tull, “China's Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequence”, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Sep., 2006), 460 – 461.

1960 Sino-Soviet dispute; 1965 with the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution [which dethroned the leadership thinking the day], and escalation in Vietnam, 1965, and subsequent release of the 'Red Guards and calls for world-wide 'Vietnam wars.'¹⁰⁰ The Bandung Conference, 1955, accentuated the anti-colonial spirit and “tolerance of neutrality”¹⁰¹ with third world countries. Arguably, China’s foreign policy is largely seen as reactive, particularly after Mao Tse Tung, the development of the Asian Tigers, developing world [1960s], and United States [1970s].

In recent years, however, the Sino-Africa relation has received growing criticism, predominantly from the West. This is partly due to the political relations [issues of governance, poor decision making by African states], economic relations [issues of uneven trade relations resulting from the exchange of raw material with manufacture goods], and military relations [arms sale]. Despite the criticism, China has endeavoured to forge relations with Africa in line with its non –interference policy and national interests. For example, in 2009, President Hu Jintao signed contracts with African countries. Some of them included US\$280 million with Mauritius to expand its port at Nouakchott, construction a hospital in Nairobi, and US\$1billion for revamp of a stadium in Angola.¹⁰²

Subsequently, this leads to questions regarding the imbalance of power relations, political governance, and energy dependency [e.g., Sudan and Zimbabwe]. Africa’s areas of exportation with China have been in oil, metals, ore, food and agricultural products. China’s exports with Africa have centred on machinery, communication equipment, electronics and transportation equipment. Its cultural, medical and educational ties with African states have

¹⁰⁰. W.A. C. Adie, “China's Foreign Policy”, *The World Today*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Mar., 1968), 111.

¹⁰¹. Ibid.

¹⁰². Op cit, Naidu, 29.

also shaped its impact, creating avenues for further exchanges. The Sino-Africa trade relationship has witnessed increasing expansion within the last four decades.

2.8 China in Southern Sudan

The involvement of China in Southern Sudan is immensely tied with the two civil wars [the first, 1955 – 1972, the second, 1983 – 2004]. Both wars entailed a series of unresolved historical and emerging issues. The second civil war, commenced on the onset of issues including oil politics, leading to the 1989 military coup by the National Islamic Front [NIF], internal uprising in Southern Sudan and splits within the SPLA. This resulted in the disruption of oil production and exportation and compromises of allegiances. In keeping with its national interests, China aided Sudan through infrastructural development and military support; negating its non-interference policy. Tangible involvement with Southern Sudan emerged after the Ababa Peace Agreement, 1972, through medicinal and financial [aid] programs.

China is the largest investor of oil in Sudan. Sudan exports 60% of its oil to China. Second largest exporter of oil to China is Angola, which possessed 50% of crude oil in Africa in 2009. China's partnership with Sudan also involves interest-free loans for construction [1997, 2007] and US\$ 2.8 million for humanitarian assistance.¹⁰³ China's non-interference policy has seemingly appeared non-neutral as a result of the continuous involvement in Southern Sudan – Sudan's relations and its past political support of Sudan. China has to contend with the issue of the International Criminal Court [ICC] and President Bashir, despite its refusal to do so stating its non-signatory status to the ICC. Equally relevant are the genocidal actions exercised in the Darfurian crisis, and the implications on partnership with Southern Sudan.

¹⁰³. Ibid.

Recent attempts have been made by China to incorporate Southern Sudan in its economic agenda [despite its earlier issuance of aid in 1997, 2008, 2012 China- Southern Sudan talks by President Hu Jintao and President Kiir, and April 2013 visit by the Government of South Sudan to China]. During the April 2013 visit, both leaders agreed to “enhance pragmatic cooperation in all areas.”¹⁰⁴

With the evolving faces of the Sino-China relations, particularly in Sudan and Southern Sudan, this begs the questions, “What implications does politics of oil have in Sudan and Southern Sudan relations?” Is China’s non-interference foreign policy a justifiable tool where conflicts are concerned in Africa? Literature throughout this document indicates a general regard of Africa’s issues where investment and economics are concerned. China’s relations with Africa has been largely characterised by mutual respect and undertakings. This has been through economic packages [loans, infrastructural development] and trade arrangement [exportation of oil and other natural resources]. Whereas it is recognisable that China’s interactions lies with domestic or national interests [e.g. meeting their energy needs based on usage], its role in the Darfurian crisis, 2003, Iraq nuclear program, 2003, and deadlock of talks between Sudan and Southern Sudan, 2012, indicates discrepancies in its non-interference policy. If concessions are made, arguably, China’s involvement in Africa requires looking at core issues that negate development.

In contrast, Africa’s preference of the “Beijing Consensus” as opposed to the “Washington Consensus” provides new dynamics of resource politics. The original context of both Consensus has evolved since introduction. The “Beijing Consensus” popularized by John

¹⁰⁴. Sunday Tribune, “Chinese VP vows stronger ties with Southern Sudan”, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article46315> (accessed April 24, 2013).

Ramos, 2004, centres on three tenets, sustainable and equitable development, global integration, innovation and experimentation. The “Washington Consensus”, coined by John Williamson, 1989, indicates ten economic-based policies for developing countries, including privatization of government and private utilities, amongst eight other.¹⁰⁵ The latter were in support of the Structural Adjustment Programs. Although both informal policies are inundated with loopholes, the Washington consensus [term used non-conventionally], is less preferred by African states, largely due to perceptions of and relations with the United States. It is argued that the United States seemingly aloofness and anarchical tendencies with Africa throughout the years, has resulted in its ignorance of the continent, poor policies and relations despite its military presence. China offers attractive packages, not easily rejected. African states are well aware of this and exercise its prerogative where necessary, despite the fact that international politics is anarchical. In so doing, Africa has continued to assert its political interests.

2.9 Conclusion

The chapter presented the historical overview of the main subject matter while analysing the history of Sudan, as well as China’s relations with Sudan and Southern Sudan. The research also discussed the synthesis of the Sudan and Southern Sudan wars, Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with its sub sets. The chapter also discussed the politics of oil in relation to its history in Africa. The school of Realism was applied as the main instrument of analysis given the role of state-centrism in oil politics.

¹⁰⁵. David Zweig, China’s Political Economy”, in *Politics in China: An Introduction*, (New York: University Press, 2010), 212.

In view of this, the research illustrated the significant role of the Sino-Africa relations as concerns global and continental politics. This relationship begs questions regarding governance, accountability, leadership, natural resource based management, and conflicts.

CHAPTER THREE

CASE STUDY: OIL POLITICS AND THE ROLE OF CHINA IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the role of China in Sudan's oil sector through an understanding of the history of Sudan, Comprehensive Peace Agreement, synthesis of the wars in north and Southern Sudan. The Sino-Sudan political and economic engagement was also discussed. The chapter indicated the dynamics of the noted relations, while begging questions regarding the implications of the Sino-Africa, Sino-Southern Sudan relations.

This chapter draws from the literature found in chapter one and two. It seeks to provide an understanding of China's foreign policy, decision making processes, and relevance of the Sino-Africa, Sino-Sudan/Southern Sudan relations. It seeks to analyse these and similar concepts in light of oil diplomacy, energy demands and consumption.

3.2 Geopolitics of Oil within East Africa

3.2.1 China's Foreign Policy

Literature differs regarding the definition of foreign policy and evolution of China's foreign policy. China is situated in Eastern Asia, bordering fourteen countries. Wolfram asserts evidence indicates documents linking China's origins to 1300BC.¹⁰⁶ However, since 1949, China has evolved transforming itself from a "sleepy giant" to a global economic and

¹⁰⁶. Wolfram Eberhard, *A History of China*, (California: University of California Press, 1977), 2.

political player. African states are cordial to this development as evidenced through economic packages, while countries such as the United States are often wary of its continuous growth.

A definition of foreign policy is necessary. Walter Carlneas [2002, 335] as cited by Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne (2012) states foreign policy refers to,

"those actions, which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments, and/or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed towards objectives, conditions and actors—both governmental and nongovernmental, which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy."¹⁰⁷

Foreign policy refers to those decisions made within a country that are affected by and that in turn affect entities outside of the country.¹⁰⁸ Geopolitics refers to the practice of states controlling and competing for territory¹⁰⁹ or a way of perceiving the world; either objectively or neutral.¹¹⁰

The evolution of China's foreign policy is debatable. Literature indicates its failure and aloofness to exist. It also suggests its seemingly representative state of re-worked ideals expressed by varying leaders throughout the communist party. It also indicates China's foreign policy is centred on its fear of the United States. Yu argues that the foreign policy of China developments considers periods of dynasties. Specifically, Yuan, [1279–1368 A.D.], Qing, [1644–1911 A.D.], and the formation of the Chinese Communist party [1949]. Other periods include the Korean War [1950-1953], Sino-Soviet relations [1950's-1960's], and Sino-America relations. Included also is the Sino-Africa relations [1950's, 1960's], and Great

¹⁰⁷. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne, "Introduction", in *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, eds. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne, (UK: Oxford university Press, 2012), 2.

¹⁰⁸. P. Kaufman, *A Concise History of US Foreign Policy*, (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 8.

¹⁰⁹. Op cit, Flint, 31.

¹¹⁰. Op cit, Dodds, 2.

Proletariat Cultural revolution: [Wenhua Dageming], [1966-1976]. China became a United Nations member and Security Council member in 1971 and 1972 respectively. This was made possible by many factors including Africa's support. China's entry into Africa [beyond Asia and Communist bloc], during the noted period signified a crucial policy initiative.¹¹¹

In contrast, Lanteigne posits that China's foreign policy was shaped by two key events: 1. Its failure to gain a seat at the United Nations in 1949; 2. The 1950-1953 Korean war [involving the invasion of South Korea by the north].¹¹² The first event witnessed diplomatic isolation from the United States and allies in support of Kuomintang. It was not until the 1950's and 1960's when the isolation ceased after England favoured China due to its financial interests and colonies, including Hong Kong. This isolation served instrumental in shaping China's cold war foreign policy, including its relations with the Eastern Bloc. The latter period involved China's participation through military support of the north in defiance of America, exercised through the "Resist America and Assist Korea" campaign of 1950.¹¹³ The extent to which these events are considered successful is debatable; for example, the Sino-Soviet alliance deteriorated in the 1960's, leading into China's refocus into other regions, e.g. newly independent African states, nor the Cultural Revolution, of which resulted in millions of deaths.

Developed by the Chinese Communist Party [CCP], China's foreign policy is guided by five principles of peaceful co-existence. Jiang, 1995, [as cited by Roy] cites the five as, mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; mutual non-interference in

¹¹¹. George T. Yu, "Africa in Chinese Foreign Policy", in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 28, No. 8 (Aug., 1988), 850.

¹¹². Marc Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction*, (New York: Routledge, 2009), 1-8.

¹¹³. Ibid.

each other's intern affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.¹¹⁴ Richardson asserts that the principles were written from various platforms; first, from the "victims" mentality of the CCP leaders; second, from China's resurgence of its former "greatness" following several defeats including Versailles, third, from China's rejection of Western imperialism, international relations model of the United States, and domination by Russia, while reducing economic and military threats.¹¹⁵

The evolution of China's foreign policy is pivotally linked to key concepts. Essentially, five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence [mutual respect]: New Security Concept [established in 1997, indicating China's post-cold war international security order and conformity to the five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence]: Peaceful Rise/Peaceful Development [call for recognition of China's neighbours and the world about its significance]. Also included is the Period of Strategic Opportunity [introduced in 2002: illustrates China's interest in maintaining stable relations with other states including the United States], and Harmonious World, introduced by Hu Jintao at the World Summit and 60th General Assembly of the United Nations, 2005, underlines certain concepts. Guo posits that the concept serves four purposes, two of which include,

discrediting the threat hypothesis advocated by PRC policy makers and others in relations to China's seemingly military, political and economic stand against the United States, European Community, India and Japan. The other reason is based on Beijing's response to U.S. unilateral decisions and U.S.-centric international relations and subsequent appeal to the United States of its non threatening stand and call for tolerance of democratic international relations and distinct social systems.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴. Denny Roy, *China's Foreign Relations*, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 40.

¹¹⁵. Sophie Richardson, *China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*, (New York: [Columbia University Press, 2013], 6.

¹¹⁶. Sujian Guo, Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, *Harmonious World and China's New Foreign Policy*, (Maryland: Lexington Books, Jun 22, 2010), 4-5.

The noted pillars has been adopted in various government and non-government literature, as exemplified in China's White Paper on Peace Development, 2006, which under Hu Jintao defines the latter as,

“China should develop itself through upholding world peace and contribute to world peace through its own development,... it should open itself to the outside and learn from other countries...it should seek mutual benefit and common development with other countries in keeping with the trend of economic globalization ...this is a path of scientific, independent, open, peaceful, cooperative and common development.”¹¹⁷

Although the philosophy of peaceful development is state-centred, its regard on international interactions and atrocities screams inadequacy. China's oil diplomacy, for example, is subject to scrutiny due to its relations with rogue nations, including Sudan, and in particular, the 2004 Darfurian conflict, which led to the arrest warrant of President Omar Bashir. Equally, its reliance on oil is therefore relative, for common and peaceful development, seemingly based on natural resources rather than introspective diplomacy. In addition, China's call for conflict management and anti-hegemonic tendencies against bullish states provides additional scrutiny, in relation to its disregard of political, social and economic injustices exercised by its economic partners [e.g., Nigeria].

The decision making process of China's foreign policy is perceived through various angles. Whitling, 1975, indicated three angles, (as cited by Ng-Quinn, 1983). One, a disjointed set of series of events and patterns, rendering it distractive and unobservable. Two, an open system, seen as “a relatively stable continuity of foreign policy output can be identified.”¹¹⁸ Three, a list of variables set as ‘causes’ of Chinese foreign policy; therefore rendering it pointless.¹¹⁹ If the closed system clause is understood and accepted, then questions regarding neutrality of

¹¹⁷. See China's White Paper on Peace Development, 2006

¹¹⁸. Michael Ng-Quinn, “The Analytic Study of Chinese Foreign Policy”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Jun., 1983), 203-224.

¹¹⁹. Ibid.

decision making, intra-state conflicts, and leadership under the Chinese Communist Party requires focus, begging the question, who determines the foreign policy of China?

China's foreign policy reflects three structures. Namely, the People's Republic of China, Communist party, government and military. At the apex is the political bureau [politburo] of the Chinese Communist Party exemplified through its leadership [e.g. Mao Zedong]. Yet, all three levels are exercised within five levels, including centre province or army, prefecture or division, county or regiment, township or battalion.¹²⁰ A case in point is China's relation and history with Taiwan.

In view of the noted, scholars have debated whether Chinese foreign policy assumes an system-centred approach, [which Zhao states is "guided by logic of national interests , defined in terms of survival, security, power, and relative capabilities"].¹²¹ or domestic-centred approaches, [which refers to the henna's "ideologue preferences and objectives of key decision makers and their factional conflicts with bureaucratic cleavages"].¹²² Arguably, since the reforms of the 1970's and China's progressive attempts to primarily integrate with the world economic systems, its foreign policy provides significant credibility to its focus on key tenets, including security, survival and power. Thus China' foreign policy is not restricted to economic ties, but political, and militarily. China's history in communism and contrasting economic agenda is not based on neo-Marxism philosophies. Zhao asserts that Mao developed a non-Marxism international strategy based on the hierarchical structure of three worlds. It emphasised on cooperation with developing countries, relations with Japan

¹²⁰. David M Lampton, *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000*, (California: Stanford University Press, 2001), 39.

¹²¹. Suisheng Zhao, *Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 4.

¹²². Ibid.

and Western Europe, and appeasement with the United States. More so, a multipolarity world, serving as a counter balance to a single super power that would undermine justice, peace and fairness.

Where then does the Realism compliment China's foreign policy? The tenets of Realism are power, state-centrism, amoral, domestic development, militarism, and national interests.

Scholars such as Wohlforth assert that Realism is founded on three assumptions:

- a. Groupism [face to face interaction within a group setting, leading to group cohesion. Its negation consists of group conflict. The highest form of group cohesion is nationalism];
- b. Egoisms: self-interest drive/ political behaviour;
- c. Power centrism: fundamental backbone of politics. Control and resources are key.¹²³

Since states are driven by national interests, group cohesion and interaction [between states] proves strained at best and conflictual at worst; hegemonic tendencies in terms of application and control of power also proves significant. International systems are accommodative at best and archaic at best; thus internationalization of national interests serves counterproductive to state interests. Realism negates universal morality and is undermined by other schools including Liberalism. China's foreign policy aims to demonstrate classical realism, in contrast to its moralistic interests through its five principles of co-existence.

The rise of China's foreign policy has been translated into trade, investment, cultural exchange, social/health programs, and infrastructural development. The noted avenues have resulted in the expansion of China's economic interests, and the rise of China's political aspirations. According to Deng, China received US\$446 billion in foreign capital from 1979-2002, the second largest recipient of foreign investment [after the US]. He argues China's

¹²³. William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and Foreign Policy", in *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, eds, Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne (UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 39.

national power, [economic & military capabilities, governance, diplomatic influence, human and natural resources and ecological health], advanced from 8th to 7th from 1990 – 2000. Its economic and military power, ranked 3 & 4th respectively in 2000.¹²⁴ Equally, China is the second largest world economy, and a possible threat to the United States.

3.2.2 China and Africa

China's partnership with African states sends messages of curiosity, envy and imagination by competitors [United States, Europe] and partners alike [Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Kenya, Congo Brazzaville]. China's "non-interference policy" and "no political strings" policy has been received with equal measure of curiosity, relief and disdain from Western counterparts. Part of the reason stems from China's growing influence in world politics, while partly is due to the competitive nature amongst oil importing countries, oil companies and oil exporting countries following World War II.

Although China's modern day presence in Africa stems back centuries, the Bandung Conference, 1975 focused heavily of Sino-Africa policies, leading to its full recognition. Yu contends that the 1960's ushered in the independence of many African countries; providing a field ripe for interaction for West and East countries.¹²⁵ He further argues that China's interest in Africa during the Bandung Conference period resulted in three aspects: 1. Political and ideological expansion; 2. Legitimacy of the Chinese government [in contrast to its delegitimacy], 3. Sino-Soviet conflict which had heightened in the 1960's following poor relations of the two states].

¹²⁴. Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, *China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy*, (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 2.

¹²⁵. George T. Yu, "Africa in Chinese Foreign Policy", in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 28, No. 8 (Aug., 1988), 849-862.

Literature indicates that under Zhou, China attempted to support freshly independent states, while encouraging solidarity of non-independent African states. The Cultural Revolution, 1966 - 1976, eventually undermined the physical presence of China but efforts of economic and political partnership continued with countries such as Tanzania [Tanzania-Zambia railway], Guinea, Mali, and Zambia.

The 1970's – 1990's witnessed a concerted consistency of Sino-Africa relations, leading to the establishment of key forums, including Forum on China-Africa Cooperation [FOCAC], established in 2000. China-Africa Business Council [CABC] , established in 2005 under the auspices of the United Nations Development Program [UNDP], China Society of Promotion of the Guangcai Programme, and Chinese Ministry of Commerce. The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015) recognises key aspects, including the role of the African Union in promoting stability and peace and joint development of energy and respective resources.¹²⁶

China's White Paper, "China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation, 2006" recognizes the dual economic relations between China and Africa. China's export goods to Africa include food, chemical products, native produce and animal by-products, of machinery, automobiles and electronic items. Africa's export goods to China include cotton and phosphate, crude oil, steel, cop-per, chemical fertilizers and electronic items, agricultural products. The Paper also notes seasonal falls in trade [e.g. 2009], however, general status indicate a gradual increase in China-Africa bilateral trade from US\$12.14 million in 1950, US\$100 million in 1960, US \$1

¹²⁶. See Fifth Ministerial Conference Of The Forum On China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015). Also see literature on FOCAC, including Li Anshan et al.

billion in 1980 exceeding US\$10 billion in 2000, US\$100 billion in 2008 [of which US \$50.8 billion is China's exports to Africa and US\$56 billion is imports from Africa].¹²⁷

Referring to the above section, it is equally imperative to consider the role of the Brazil, Russia, India China and South Africa [BRICS] as concerns the role of emerging world economies in Africa's development. Having been coined in 2001 by Jim O'Neill, the BRICS symbolises multipolar [as opposed to unipolar] world systems that accommodates the economic, political strengths of its member states. Their specific role in Africa, like the rest of the world is arguably undefined. Bouelle and Chella, asserts that in comparison with G20's rise during the global financial crisis, the BRICS are "less specific in its motivating origins, arising more casually and organically"¹²⁸, demonstrating on one hand, interconnection of the states, yet on the other, the lack of a common criteria.

General characteristics within BRICS consist of diversity and economic strengths; for example, young population than the U.S, Europe and Japan [with the exception of Russia], availability of natural resources [Russia and Brazil], shared history [Russia and China].¹²⁹ O'Neill regards the economies of the BRICS as diverse. Brazil and Russia are perceived as "natural resources based economies," China and India as "labour resource based economies." Russia is viewed as an extracting country and supplier of natural resources. India as the "world's future intellectual workshop", and South Africa as the regional influence and leader in mining and agri-business.¹³⁰ Whether this assessment is correct or incorrect is debatable,

¹²⁷. See White Paper, "China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation, 2006".

¹²⁸. Laurence Bouelle and Jesse Chella, "Joining the BRICS: The Case of South Africa", in *The Rise of the BRICS in the Global Political Economy: Changing Paradigms?*, eds, Vai Io Lo and Mary Hiscock, (Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Jan 31, 2014), 100.

¹²⁹. Luciano Ciravegna, Robert Fitzgerald, Sumit Kundu, *Operating in Emerging Markets: A Guide to Management and Strategy in the New International Economy*, (New Jersey: FT Press, 2013), 313.

¹³⁰. Ibid.

considering the impact and economic interests in Africa. For example, South Africa's role in BRICS does not represent Africa in totality due to diversity. Despite the fact the BRICS members have maintained long standing economic partnership with African states, including interests and exportation of natural resources; it begs the question whether South Africa's membership is a ticket to expanding the interests of BRICS in Africa's natural resources.

Bouelle and Chella posit that South Africa's membership is not representative of Africa, given the historical, cultural, political and economic differences in existence. In fact, it can be argued that the BRICS members [India, China] have significant interests in African's natural resources. The membership of South Africa is still considerably at an early stage and therefore, difficult to ascertain its present impact holistic. However, the economic agenda of the BRICS will serve vital in Africa given the emerging dynamics of the East African region, including the evolving developmental nature of Southern Sudan.

Equally, the Beijing Consensus" and the "Washington Consensus" begs questions regarding their workings and relations with Africa. The "Beijing Consensus" presents a theory stating that China's development model is an alternative to the "Washington Consensus".¹³¹ Arguably, the theory requires further testing and observation, even though it is indicative of Sino-Africa developmental partnerships throughout the decades and the latter's growing preference of China over the West [in support of the "look East" approach]. Consideration of rivalry and competition between the East and West [particularly the United States] is of equal consideration, as the concepts of hegemony, power politics, geopolitics and conflicts gain prominence.

¹³¹. Bonnie S. Glaser and Melissa E. Murphy, "Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics the Ongoing Debate, in *Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States: Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World : a Report of the CSIS Smart Power Initiative*, eds, Carola McGiffert, (Canada: CSIS, 2009), 10.

3.2.3 Small Arms Sales in Africa

International arms sales are not a new exercise, with countries such as the United States, Russia, Italy and China as key arms dealers of the world. The justification of selling arms varies; some of which include, power politics, security enhancement, foreign relations enhancement, revenue collection, and natural resource accessibility. Arms sales to conflict and/or fragile regions, presents conflicts of interest, as exemplified in the Darfurian crisis, 2003 and Iran-Iraq war, 1980's. Thus, issues of ethics, boundaries, security governance, and conflict management become instrumental in analysing oil diplomacy and armed conflicts. Both developed and developing countries are the buyers of small and heavy arms depending on the security need in question. According to the CRS Report for Congress, 2009, the value of arms transfer agreements globally was US\$55.2 billion as compared to US\$25.4 billion. From 2005-2008, developing countries "accounted for 59.8% of the value of all international arms deliveries."¹³² Developing nations consists of countries in Asia, Near East, Africa, and Latin America. In addition, the United States, Italy and Russia were the top three arms sale suppliers to the world in 2008, with values amounting to US\$37.8 billion, US\$3.7 billion, and US\$3.5 billion respectively.

Authors such as Keating, and Hanauer and Morris posit concurring views about China's arms sales. For Keating, Chinese companies target developing countries, for both commercial and strategic purposes; e.g. Sudan and Iran both of which met China's energy imports, despite UNSC Resolution 1556 [2004] and 1591 [2005], of which called for prevention of small arms to Darfur.¹³³ Yet, the United States also provided military aid to the government of Sudan

¹³². Richard F. Grimmett, *Conventional Arms Transfer to Developing Nations, 2001-2008, CRS Report for Congress, 2009* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 4.

¹³³. Timothy Keating, *Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009: Annual Report to Congress by the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, (PA: Diane Publishing, 2009), 58.

despite wars between rebel groups and Khartoum in 1983.¹³⁴ Hanauer and Morris contend that China's five recipients of arms sales in Africa were among China's top nine recipients of Federal Direct Investment [FDI] from 2009-2010.¹³⁵ The above mentioned CRS Report for Congress, 2009 states that China's value of arms transfer agreements amounted to US\$1 billion annually from 2005 – 2008; the bulk of the amount consumed by the production of the J-17fighter. Africa and Asia preferred to buy smaller arms, resulting in smaller financial returns. Given the small returns, the Report argues that China's interest was not on arms sales but on their access to natural resources, including oil in Africa. The divide between natural resources and energy consumption is pivotal in understanding how international politics of oil is illustrated.

3.2.4 China's Energy Needs and Consumption

With its first discovery in 1800, the evolution of the oil industry in the world has detrimentally shifted in terms of focus and dimensions. Oil is one of the most lucrative resources in the world, amounting to billions of revenue and with various usages including electricity, heat, and transportation, among others. From the production stage to downstream phase, oil invites significant interconnection between states.

The politics of oil is determined by key factors, some of which include political economy, oil prices [1973-74 and 1979-80], oil control, and oil reserves. How significant is oil in China? The value of oil cannot be understated, for it is controlled by geographical, political and economic factors, most of which oil exporting countries cannot control. China's oil diplomacy is founded on two grounds; first, to secure its position as a key factor in

¹³⁴. Meghan L. O'Sullivan, *Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism*, (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 236.

¹³⁵. Larry Hanauer and Lyle L. Morris, *Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions, and Implications for US Policy*, (California: Rand Corporation, 2014), 41-42.

international relations or global politics; second, to secure its domestic interests and consumption needs on energy. China's thirst for oil enables it to manoeuvre its foreign policy through decision making processes and economic partnerships.

Andrews contends that since 1993, China's demand for oil imports has grown steadily reaching 150 million tonnes in 2004 and 22 million tonnes in 2009, with expectation of its rise to 400-500 million tonnes by 2020.¹³⁶ Gas, timber, rice, cereals, and soybeans are of important interest, indicating China's growing economy, soon to exceed that of the United States. China's other interests in Africa include manganese, copper, uranium, bauxite, uranium, and aluminium. The surge in commodity imports and expansion of China's exports of manufactured goods is an expression of China's emergent rise to great power status.¹³⁷ Andrews argues that coal is perceived more highly than oil; however oil is the main commodity in the transport industry. It is worth to ask whether China is strictly interested in natural resources or is it also interested in aiding Africa expand in the trade and economic opportunities to the world.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration [EIA], Africa's total oil supply [thousand barrels per day] from 1992 – 2011 was 7072.038 [1992], 9319.878 [2011], with Nigeria : 1950.609 [1992], 2554.488 [2011], Libya: 1470.459; [1992], 501.466 [2011], Algeria: 1341.177 [1992], 1862.965 [2011]; Sudan and Southern Sudan, 0.13407 [1992], 456.1249 [2011], Angola : 535.3725 [1992], 1799.887 [2011]; Petroleum Consumption: Africa: 2157.119 [1992], 3296.9 [2011]; Nigeria: 264.7199 [1992], 240 [2011].¹³⁸

¹³⁶. Philip Andrews - Speed and Roland Dannreuther, *China, Oil and Global Politics*, (New York: Routledge, 2011), 1.

¹³⁷. Ibid.

¹³⁸. See Oil Production figures by the U.S Energy Information Administration

Since 1998, the government of China maintains the following state owned fuel operations under the State Energy Administration, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). All are responsible for oil exploration and production, while the latter's activities are based on off shore categories. The noted state companies have gradually secured oil industries in Africa including Sudan through exploration and production, and the purchase of operating rights.

Oliveira argues that political economy of oil has been structured around three players and three systems: oil producing states [governing elite], foreign oil companies, and oil importing states in the industrial world [until the 1990's rested in the West].¹³⁹ Until recently, African oil producing countries consisted of Nigeria, Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, and Ghana [2010]. Oliveira further contends that characteristics that shape the Gulf of Guinea oil producing states include dependency on foreign technology for extraction of oil, dependency on oil revenues for the fiscal sustenance of the state, consistency of poor use of oil revenue, corruption and low development indicators. Sudan, although not part of the Gulf of Guinea demonstrates the noted factors.

Debates exist regarding oil consumption, China's oil diplomacy and local community and environmental concerns. As world population grow, so will the demand for natural resources, including gas and petroleum; China is no exception. International Energy Agency [IEA] suggests a demand of 120 million barrel day by 2030. Demand for natural gas estimated by IEA, will rise from 2.5 trillion cubic meters to 5 trillion in 2030. In order to satisfy domestic

¹³⁹. Ricardo de Soares Oliviera, "Oil Politics", in *Routledge Handbook of African Politics*, eds. David Anderson, Nicholas Cheeseman, Andrea Scheible, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 178 – 182.

needs, countries such as China will need to draw from its current partners such as Angola, while also identifying new partners, such as Kenya. Shelly argues,

OECD countries account for 60% of world's oil demand and 55% of natural oil demand. In addition, IEA states that European Union [EU] members' oil consumption was at 12.3 million barrels per day in 2000 with possible rising to 13.9 billion in 2030. From 1993 – 2002, proven oil reserves of the Middle East rose from 5% to 699 billion barrels. During the same periods, Africa's oil reserves rose from 45% to 94 billion. The Soviet Union increased from 35% to some 78 billion barrels, while the Middle East account for 65% of global proven oil reserves.¹⁴⁰

The above leads to issues of oil diplomacy. The oil diplomacy of China does not falter as concerns China's trading areas; instead, serves as the bedrock, to date, in trade relations between China and Africa. However, China's "silent" policy, in matters of trade and bilateral agreements with perceived corrupt African states illustrates contradictions in foreign policy and commitments of good governance. For example, countries such as Angola, Sudan [Darfurian crisis].

In reference to Sudan and Southern Sudan, Cisse argues both political and environmental challenges are evident for CPNC.¹⁴¹ He further contends that environmental challenges resulting from oil companies and activities were expressed by local inhabitants of oil areas, National Assembly, and the Southern Sudan legislative Assembly. Discontent grew among the locals regarding human development concerns, including unemployment in Paloich¹⁴² and waste, oil and mud dumping, including the existence of pollutants in 250,000 barrels of water resulting from oil extraction in Heglig.¹⁴³ Acknowledgement of oil spillage is evident by

¹⁴⁰. Toby Shelley *Oil: Politics, Poverty and the Planet*, (London: Zed Books: 2005), 7-13.

¹⁴¹. Doauda Cisse, "FDI in Africa: Chinese Enterprises and Their Business Strategies", in *The Routledge Companion to Business in Africa*, eds. Sonny Nwankwo, Kevin Ibeh, 298-314, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 303.

¹⁴². Leben Nelson Moro, "Displacement Environmental Impact Resettlement", in *Sudan Looks East: China, India & the Politics of Asian Alternatives*, eds, Daniel Large and Luke A. Patey, (Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer Ltd, 2011), 78.

¹⁴³. *Ibid*, 77.

geologists and oil managers, despite the legislation [Oil Resources Law, 1998 and Environmental Safety Act, 2000], which calls for compliance.

3.3 United States Foreign Policy on Africa

The foreign policy of the United States reads like a general mesh of ideas and tenets best described within specified periods such as the cold war, post cold war and post September 9 2001 terrorist attacks. The foreign policy of the United States dates back to 1777, after independence. Walton, Stevenson and Rosser argue that the U.S. foreign policy on Africa in the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's gained recognition through deliberate political actions, including, the presidential campaign of 1956 [as a political agenda to appease the African American voters], creation of Bureau of African Affairs, civil rights movement [e.g. Martin Luther King Jr], Pan Africanism ideology, US reaction to the cold war and possible influence of the Soviet Union in newly independent Africa states.¹⁴⁴ Like Schraede, Walton, Stevenson and Rosser contend that the U.S. foreign policy in the 1960's fell in line with African's colonial masters at the institutional and cultural levels.

The United States foreign policy of Zimbabwe and South Africa, for example, assumed a representative policy for the whole of Africa, due to racial tensions of the two countries which were deemed a continental threat to peace. Questions, however, exists regarding whether the U.S. foreign policy is reactive or proactive given the varying times and doctrines such as 1960 and the Bush Doctrine"; which stressed on curtailing potential threats. Modern U.S. policy framework dictates the latter, particularly after 9/11 bombings, which indicated

¹⁴⁴. Hans Walton, Louis Stevenson and James Bernard Rosser, eds, *The African Foreign Policy of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: A Documentary Analysis*, (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2010), x – 26.

the possible evolution and demonstration of terrorism in Africa and United States. In view of this, Kaufman argues that the portfolio of the U.S. foreign policy signifies key areas.

Thematically categorized as per leadership, theme and administration [e.g. Jefferson, Kennedy, Clinton, and Obama]. National interests, economics, democracy, security leadership, Monroe Doctrine, and developments from the developing world while considering varying paradigms including feminism, liberalism, realism¹⁴⁵. In addition it also includes, unilateralism and engagement starting from 1777, [with the exception of the period between the World War I and II] and stemming from George Washington and Thomas Jefferson downwards.

Arguably, given the four domains of foreign policy [unilateralism, engagement, neutrality and isolationism], that of the United States and China, for example, fall under unilateralism, engagement and neutrality respectively. In international relations, neutrality is best suited, for it is devoid of any military, political and security engagement between states. Relations between states, however, indicate the contradiction of this tenet.

This leads to questions regarding the U.S. political and economic interests in Africa. Equal concern rests on whether Africa is a non-issue in U.S foreign policy on Africa. Literature differs on the extent in which U.S. foreign policy either undermines or supports Africa. U.S.-Africa foreign policy and subsequently relations has been criticized as shallow, at best, and reactionary at best. Possible reasons include the latter's poor understanding of Africa and its strengths, or general disinterest in Africa in matters non-militaristic or threats. Schraede argues that although not exclusively restricted to the following areas, the evolution of the U.S. foreign policy towards Africa centres on key themes:

¹⁴⁵. Op cit, Kaufman, 11-16.

a. security, assumption about European responsibility [Africa is unequally intertwined with Europe resulting from its history of colonialism], resulting in U.S. regard and approach to former colonial masters in addressing issues with Africa. b. east west ideological differences [Africa in the 1960s was perceived as virgin territory of ideological and political influence by the Soviet Union; despite relative disinterest by U.S. presidents in Africa]; c. bureaucratic “incrementalism” [national bureaus involvement and engagement with countries exercised by government official, through joint programs such as military aid, etc .e.g. CIA, USAID]¹⁴⁶; d. militarization since World War II.

Arguably, the U.S. foreign policy for Africa and Bilateral Investment Treaties [BITs] are linear in their approach and presentation. The latter, for example, seek “to protect U.S. investments abroad, and encourage market-oriented domestic policies in host countries.”¹⁴⁷ National and/ or geopolitical interests are instrumental, at times serving more as a reactionary exercise towards threats [e.g., Sino-Africa relations; although this is disputed in U.S. state addresses].

Individual foreign policies exist, including that of Somalia and Sub Saharan Africa; however, cross cutting issues remain, including promoting democracy, security, peace, economic growth as exemplified in the U.S. 21st century foreign policy/strategy for Africa. For example, the 2012 policy for Sub Saharan Africa includes strengthening of democratic institutions, economic growth, trade and investment, advancement of peace and security for African continent, and promotion of opportunity and development.¹⁴⁸ The Foreign Assistance Act, introduced in 1961 provides aid packages to countries and meets U.S interests. The most visible presence of the United States in Africa rests on the promotion of democratic institutions; even during criticism by African Heads of State. For example, the

¹⁴⁶. Peter J. Schraede, *Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change*, (Cambridge: University Press, 1994), 14 -23.

¹⁴⁷. Vivian C. Jones, *US Trade and Investment Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa: The African Growth and Opportunity Act*, (PA: Diane Publishing: 2010), 26.

¹⁴⁸. See *U.S Strategy Towards Sub Saharan Africa*, June 2012, U.S. Department of State.

push for democracy in Kenya, in the 1990's which arguably, introduced multiparty systems. The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act [AGOA], equivalent to EU's Economic Partnership Agreement [EPA], and New Partnership for Africa's Development [NEPAD], supports economic growth and poverty reduction respectively.

The difference between the U.S. foreign policy for Africa and that of China rests on history, programs, and methodology. Apart from economic packages, China focuses on infrastructure, and is largely unconcerned about its partner's internal issues [e.g. Darfur, 2003/4]. The U.S. focuses on non-tangibles, [e.g. investments, democratic principles], at times through hegemonic tendencies [carrot and stick method], resulting in disfavour amongst African states. In view of this, Africa has tended to lose not only in terms of power relations but independence of thought, for decisions tend to disfavour Africa. Visits by American leaders to Africa have resulted in more questions than answers; for example, Jimmy Carter [1978], George H.W. Bush [1992], amongst others.

Although disguised as strategic operations, the U.S. interest in oil and other natural resources, has been continually evident in the world. The U.S. interest in oil is likened to that of China, given the strategic positioning, arrangements, and packages provided or established in oil rich regions. The United States has strategically managed to merge military power and dependency on oil as evidenced in the Persian gulf region [exemplified by the Roosevelt administration, and transitioning into the Carter [Carter Doctrine], and Caspian Sea region [enacted by the Bush and Clinton administration] both through the provision of armaments, military training, military infrastructure; with the assurance of "unimpeded flow of oil"¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁹. Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, "America, China & the Scramble for Africa's Oil", in

[e.g. Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan]. The Gulf war, 1991, Afghanistan war, 2001, Iraq invasion, 2003 are by-products of the noted operations.¹⁵⁰

As mentioned earlier, the U.S. – Africa relations has been characterised by a general disdain and aloofness. However, with initial interest in anti-soviet influence in sub Saharan Africa during the cold war period, the U.S. has gradually increased its focus on Africa, also merging oil and military operations, including security, health, armament, and training programs. According to the World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers, 1999 – 2000, world military expenditure rose from 51.6 billion in 1999, a rise and decline of 8.5% from 1997 and 1998 respectively. Equally, imports from developing countries dropped during the post cold war period, from an average annual of 13% since 1997 to 6% and 2% since 1995 and 1991 respectively.¹⁵¹

In 1999, the three top three countries of “military expenditure” [millions of dollars] were United States [281,000], China mainland [88,900], and Japan [43,200]. Included also were Congo [5150], and Sudan [424], Kenya [200], with number 24, 85, and 100 respectively. Equally, during the same period, the top three countries in the category of the “armed forces”, per 1000s, were China- mainland [2,400], United States [1490], and India [1300].¹⁵² In “Arms Experts” [millions of dollars], the top three countries were United States [33,000], United Kingdom [5,200], and Russia [3,100]. In “Arms Imports” category, millions of dollars, the top three countries were Saudi Arabia, 7,700], Turkey [3,200], and Japan [3,000]. China mainland [675], Sudan [10], Kenya [5] with number 25, 102 and 114 respectively. The

Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 33, No. 108, North Africa: Power, Politics & Promise (Jun., 2006), 298.

¹⁵⁰. Ibid.

¹⁵¹. World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers: Bureau of Verification and Compliance, 1999 – 2000 (Washington:US Department of State, 2002), 9.

¹⁵². Ibid, 38.

Gross National Product [GNP: millions of dollars] of the top three countries in 1999 were United States [9,260,000], Japan [4,400,000] and China – Mainland [3,930,000].¹⁵³ From 1999 to 2009, the global annual value of international arms transfer deliveries rose to “about one-third, from about \$85billion to about \$115billion, while averaging about \$98 billion. Seventy five percent of the arm sales was supplied by the United States, 13% by European Union, 6% by Russia, and less than 2% by China¹⁵⁴ The noted figures are indicative of the changing economic and political scenarios across the globe with the bulk of the arms sales high during the cold war period, with slight changes during the post-cold war period.

Scholars such as Schmidt argue the benefits of the cold war and post-cold war period in Africa.¹⁵⁵ Arguably, the cold war and post-cold war periods affected Africa, while raising questions about its sovereignty, governance, and prospects. Coming from the colonial period, Africa was both rife and "naive" in terms of its interactions with other states. It had not been given enough time to adjust to its new status as independent states. Starting with unequal balance of power, and colonial legacies, Africa's economic and political interaction with the Soviet Union and the West was inadequate. Schmidt asserts that economic packages from the financial organization, namely, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, for example, undermined the very growth African states were trying to achieve due to failed fulfilments of economic conditions, curtailed government involvement in national economies, price controls, tariffs, and currency control/devaluation, amongst other practices.¹⁵⁶ Corruption, conflicts, poor governance and leadership also aided into the demise of African

¹⁵³. Ibid, 39-40.

¹⁵⁴. *World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers: Bureau of Verification and Compliance, 1999 – 2000* (Washington: US department of State, 2012), 4-5.

¹⁵⁵. Elizabeth Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 10-11

¹⁵⁶. Elizabeth Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 10-11.

institutions. As evidenced in her work, Schmidt argues that Africa was left with not only debt but natural resources and a reservoir of arms from existing or previous conflicts. The effects of this continue to be demonstrated through economic and political reforms addressing historical debts, corruption and governance. Kenya's anti-corruption measures exemplify its efforts in dealing with inherited problems of past regimes.

3.3.1 United States - China Relations

The Sino-U.S. relation has been characterized by various periods, actions, reactions and rivalry that have resulted in periods of silence, agitation and restitution. Remarkably different in their ideological, political tenets and dispositions, both the United States and China continue to perceive each other with mutual distrust, at worst, and tolerance, at best. Various explanations can be provided in the Sino-U.S relations. One rests on China's growing economic, political and military strength in the world. The other explanation is based on the rivalry between the U.S and China over energy sources, including oil. Both states are major oil consumers, with estimated increase in years to come.

Since 1993, China's demand for oil imports has grown steadily reaching 150 million tonnes in 2004 and 22 million tonnes in 2009, with expectation of its rise to 400-500 million tonnes by 2020.¹⁵⁷ The United States net imports of crude oil, coupled with refined petroleum products and liquid fuels fell from 12.4 million barrels a day in 2005 [Mb/d] to 9.4 Mb/d in 2010 [OPEC, as cited by Nerurkar], with the main source channels coming from Canada, Mexico and members of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC].¹⁵⁸ Although disguised as strategic operations the U.S. interest in oil and other natural resources,

¹⁵⁷ Op cit, Speed and Dannreuther, 1.

¹⁵⁸ . Neelesh Nerurkar, *U.S. Oil Imports: Context and Considerations*, (PA: Diane Publishing, 2011),4.

has been continually evident in the world. The U.S. interest in oil is likened to that of China, given the strategic positioning, arrangements, and packages provided or established in oil rich regions. Evidence of this is seen in the merger of military power and dependency on oil in the Persian gulf region and Caspian Sea region both through the provision of armaments, military training, military infrastructure; with the assurance of “unimpeded flow of oil”¹⁵⁹ [e.g. Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan]. The Gulf war, 1991, Afghanistan war, 2001, Iraq invasion, 2003 are by-products of the noted operations.¹⁶⁰

Literature in previous sections indicates debates regarding fear by the United States over China’s energy policy and China’s complacent regard for the United States. Both have interests in Africa and both express their regard for the continent in differing fashions. Recent debates indicate a growing pull towards East China [Beijing Consensus], and India by African states based on preference and political interests. China is perceived to be less brash on matters of governance, conditionalities and corruption; they are also perceived to respect the sovereignty of its partners. On the contrary, the United States [Washington Consensus] is perceived as one with conditionalities, with interest in the governance and leadership structures of African states.

Debates also exist regarding the general disdain of the U.S foreign policy in Africa. Africa tends to take a “back seat” in U.S-Africa affairs, leading to a reciprocal disinterest by African states. Ifedi argues that the U.S. engages Africa in matters of oil wealth and when other foreign policy imperative compels it, for example, decolonization, strategic resources, leading

¹⁵⁹. Op cit, Klare and Volman.

¹⁶⁰. Ibid.

to the pull towards China and India.¹⁶¹ Global energy and terrorism are also pivotal themes in the U.S –Africa relations. In contrast, Obama and Biden, "New Energy for America."¹⁶² may contradict the above [as it focuses on renewable energy resources to counter act its reliance on international oil]. However, this has not stopped the United States from assuming a unilateral stand or unipolar dimension on world affairs, despite the general regard or pull of multipolarity.

The evolution of the Sino-US relations indicates an interesting phenomenon. Largely commenced as early as the 1800's during the Qing period, the relations consisted of trade of tea, furniture and other commodities. In modern times, the relations have continued to evolve, characterised under various administration, for example, cold war, period, and post cold war period. Guo argues that the U.S.–China relations in post modern period served three periods:

- a. 1979 – 1989 [characterised by official visits between the two states], b. 1989 – 1997 [characterised by low season resulting from the Tiananmen Square protests and People's Liberation Army missile firing near the Taiwan Strait in 1995, the latter leading to the breaking of the stalemate through Jian Zemin's visit in 1997 to the U.S. and a reciprocal visit by Bill Clinton to China in 1998]. The last stage, post 1999 [marked by agitation and success; the former brought by attacks of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by the United States through the Operation Allied Forces in Yugoslavia in 1999 and the latter by China's inclusion into the World Trade Organization after U.S. approval.¹⁶³

The U.S. regard of China in the 1990's and 2000s was varied, the former was perceived as competitor, while the latter as stakeholder [Bush], and as a bilateral partner, in "economic

¹⁶¹. John Ifedi, "Energy Policy" in *Stakes in Africa-United States Relations: Proposals for Equitable Partnership*, (Nebraska: iUniverse, 2007), 34.

¹⁶². A relatively new concept symbolising the new energy focus of the United States.

¹⁶³ Sujian Guo, Baogang Guo, "Introduction", in *Thirty Years of China-U.S. Relations: Analytical Approaches and Contemporary Issues*, eds, Sujian Guo, Baogang Guo, (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2010), 2-3.

recovery, environmental protection, nuclear non proliferation, and fight against transnational threats” [Obama].¹⁶⁴

In most recent times, the U.S – China bilateral trade reached US\$387 in 2007, with U.S. having 2 trillion dollars foreign currency in reserves, and a US\$ 600 billion as economic stimulus plan resulting in China being the largest trade partner of the U.S and aiding in the global economic freeze of 2008.¹⁶⁵

Thus, arguable, the complexities of the US-Sino relations far exceed history but dives keenly on the power struggles. The strengths that of the United States [military, economics, etc] are also weaknesses in the face of U.S-Sino relations, for both states are driven by the national interests [security, energy, etc] that shape their mutual relations and that of Africa. In the quest for improved US-Africa relations, the latter requires evaluating its regard of Africa and adjusting its unilateral stand.

3.3.2 United States and Sudan and Southern Sudan

The diplomatic relations of the United States with Sudan dates back to 1960s. Since then, the U.S-Sudan relations has been characterised by key milestones; some of which include, start and closure of diplomatic relations [resulting from US support of the Israeli war of 1967 and assignation of US ambassador to Khartoum].¹⁶⁶ Other periods include Sudan’s involvement in terrorism, the Darfurian crisis [including human rights abuses], and civil wars [exercised by groups including SPLM /A and the government of Khartoum, leading to the independence of South Sudan]. The United States response to these issues was varied. O’Sullivan asserts the

¹⁶⁴. Ibid., 2-3.

¹⁶⁵. Ibid, 4.

¹⁶⁶. Op cit, O’Sullivan, 236.

U.S strategy in Sudan was marked by poorly coordinated sanctions, penalties and punishment [e.g. cessation of foreign military financing, 1990, suspension of bilateral economic and military aid, 1988]. This was seen more from a moral viewpoint than a political strategic viewpoint. However, the 2001 bombing on U.S. buildings caused a re-evaluation of U.S. sanctions against Sudan, in light of new cooperation of the latter in the anti-terrorism campaigns.

Terrorism has continued to be of concern in the U.S.-Sudan relations, despite economic growth of the latter in the 1990's. The U.S. State department, "Country Reports on Terrorism [2004-2011]" indicates the presence of Al-Qaida elements, Islamic Resistance Movement [HAMAS], and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). This is despite Sudan's counter terrorism activities. Throughout the same period and with slight variations, other countries listed included Syria, Iran, and Cuba.¹⁶⁷ Ploch argues that although Sudan is a member of EARSL, it merely receives military training and not funding; with additional support given by the United States to Southern Sudan and SPLA in response to the disarmament, demobilisation, re-integration [DDR] processes.¹⁶⁸

The United States was equally instrumental in brokering a deal between SPLM and the Khartoum government, leading to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Knopf, 2001, [as cited by Ewoh], like other scholars posits that the U.S. foreign policy towards Southern Sudan, in relation to pre-2005 peace talks and future, includes consolidation of peace through the provision of billions of dollars in economic and humanitarian development;

¹⁶⁷. See United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2004 – 2011.

¹⁶⁸. Lauren Ploch, *Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U. S. Response*, (PA: Diane Publishing, 2011), 62-63.

leverage over SPLMA and Khartoum government; mediation over peace talks.¹⁶⁹ In relation to Kenya, the relations are unpredictable although set on historical collaboration.

3.4 Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda

In an attempt to address new oil discoveries, oil economies and infrastructure within the East African region, the Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPPSET) Corridor Project provides an avenue for the manageability and control of oil transportation within East Africa.¹⁷⁰ Equally, with the lack of infrastructural capacity to build the pipeline [without looking elsewhere], and presence of financial challenges for the port, the Project principal actors will require to consider the dynamics and politics of oil development, history and partnerships within the oil sector. Close scrutiny will also be needed with regards to the developmental trend of the East African community, in principle and cooperation, as well as its role in the international oil markets.

The Project proposes the development of a new transport corridor for crude oil in partnership with the governments of Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Southern Sudan. According to Vision 20:30, the project route will include a new port in Lamu through Garissa, Isiolo, Mararal, Lodwar and Lokichoggio unto Isiolo, Ethiopia and Southern Sudan.¹⁷¹ In Kenya, Presidential Order Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 51, No. 58 created the Project. It is also set in accordance to the Constitution, 2010. Listed as one of Kenya's flagship projects within the Vision 20:30 and subsequent Vision 20:30 strategic plan, one of its objectives is to “ Foster transport linkage between Kenya, Southern Sudan and Ethiopia” and “dynamic promotion of

¹⁶⁹. Andrew Ewoh, “United States Foreign Policy Responses to Africa's Transitional Conflicts”, in *Managing Conflicts in Africa's Democratic Transitions*, eds, Akanmu Gafari Adebayo, (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 181.

¹⁷⁰. See Lappset Project and Vision 20:30 under the [http:// www.lapsset.go.ke](http://www.lapsset.go.ke) and http://www.vision2030.go.ke/index.php/pillars/project/macro_enablers/181.

¹⁷¹. Ibid.

regional socio-economic development along the transport corridor especially in the Northern, Eastern, North-Eastern and Coastal parts of Kenya.”¹⁷² Additional benefits include employment creation across all participating states, and establishment of petrol and diesel stations. Two bi-lateral agreements have been signed between the governments of Kenya, Southern Sudan and Ethiopia on 4th January, 2012.

3.5 Sudan’s Foreign Policy

Prior to independence of Southern Sudan, the foreign policy of the country was representative, albeit protestation, of Sudan’s foreign policy. Largely seen as a draconian policy among southerners, Sudan’s foreign policy has evolved under different governments. The traditional foreign policy of Sudan was influenced by Egypt and the United Kingdom. Ismael posits that the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1899 – 1956, influenced Sudan’s foreign policy, as most decisions derived from England. In addition, the independence of Sudan in 1956, introduced more open and neutral relations with the international community, allowing for continued trade largely with the West and less with the Soviet Union.¹⁷³ Egypt’s role in Sudan has continued to centre on ideology and geopolitics of the Nile valley resulting in close interlinkages of culture, trade, politics, religion, economics and race.

In modern times, the Egypt – Sudan linkage has centred on the Nile River, through the contentious control and allocation of the Nile waters stemming pre-independence Sudan in 1952 to date. Examples include, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Egypt agreement, 1929 and Sudan and Egypt agreement, 1959. The latter of which allocated Cairo and Sudan 87% and

¹⁷². Ibid.

¹⁷³. Tareq Y. Ismael, “The Sudan's Foreign Policy Today”, in *International Journal*, Vol. 25, No. 3, (Summer, 1970), 566-567.

13% control of the Nile water respectively¹⁷⁴, despite the Nile's flow in other countries. Seen as a threat to the Nile river Riparian states, efforts have widened to address equitable distribution of the waters through initiatives such as the Nile Basin Initiative, established in 1999. Wai, asserts that,

under Gaafar M. el Nimeiri, rule, Wai argues that Sudan's foreign policy was characterised by confusion, poor ideological interlinkages, relations, and governance [as exemplified between the southerners and northerners], and domestic structures [political alliances, and groupings, inadequate developmental focus, shifting relations with the Soviet Union, particularly after the 1971 and West¹⁷⁵ and clientism.

In more recent times, however, Sudan's foreign policy has been influenced by China, with similar principles of non interference of domestic affairs of sovereign states, a testament to its historical relations of both states. In addition, Sudan's relationship with Egypt, and Riparian states, particular with regard to the Nile Basin also considers the possibility of gradual dynamics of this region and subsequent foreign policy implications.

3.5.1 Sudan and Southern Sudan Politics on Oil

Sudan and Southern Sudan perspectives on oil elicit both contempt and curiosity given the historical and present socio-political, economic and administrative issues. Although literature concentrates heavily on Sudan, due regard is needed for Southern Sudan, particularly in relation to its independence. Southern Sudan's perspective of oil takes into consideration policy formulation, CPA and energy governance.

¹⁷⁴. Korwa Gombe Adar, Nicasius A. Check, "Introduction: The Nile river Basin, An Introductory Context", in *Cooperative Diplomacy, Regional Stability and National Interests: The Nile River and the Riparian States*, (South Africa: African Books Collective, 2011), xviii.

¹⁷⁵. Dunstan M. Wai, *The Sudan: Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations under Nimeiri*, African Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 312 (Jul., 1979), 297 – 299.

Literature on governance varies in relation to scope, definition and application. Classification of governance varies from public, good and corporate. The World Bank, “Governance: The World Bank's Experience”, speaks of governance through political regimes, management procedures and methods of national economies, and government’s capacity to design, formulate, and implement policies World Bank].¹⁷⁶ “The New Public Governance?: Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice” explains public governance from various angles including socio-political, public policy and administrative governance. Difficulties therefore arise in assuming a wholehearted embrace of existing definitions, particularly where contributing factors and conditions exist. In the case of Southern Sudan, even after independence, governmental inhibition of policy formulation and implementation have continued to negate the territorial disputes over oil fields and CPA arrangements. Understanding the governance and policy formulation structures in Southern Sudan requires hindsight into the current situation.

Oil and gas are dominant natural resources across the globe due to their demand, asset value and utility. Due to this, fragile or weak oil-producing countries are likely to fail in energy governance. Arguably, the economic management of oil is determined by both domestic and international market prices, policy formulation and implementation, amongst other factors. States that manage their resources well ultimately determine their economic and political agendas [e.g. Norway]. In contrast, the “resource curse” illustrates the dichotomy between the abundance of resource and high dependency of natural resources. Dichotomy also exists on the economic underdevelopment, resulting from mismanagement of natural resources, conflicts, inflated taxation, corruption, and poor policies. The philosophy of the ‘Dutch

¹⁷⁶. World Bank, *Governance: The World Bank's Experience*, (Washington: World Bank Publications, 1994), xiv.

Disease” does not deviate greatly from the “resource curse”. Although the “resource curse” is widely argued, it negates the contributing factors of economic underdevelopment for resource rich countries such as poor policy, international global markets, and so on. In the case of Southern Sudan, arguments rest on whether or not it is rentier state or whether or not it suffers from the "resource curse". Empirical evidence indicates oil is the driving factor in the civil wars and the CPA. Arguably resource in its pure form cannot warrant a curse, for it generates wealth and revenue, and if managed well, is resourceful. Nonetheless, oil is a reference tool for militarization, conflicts, and power retention, where poor governance and accountability are concerned.

South Sudan’s overriding need for policy formulation cannot be overstated. This is equated with its sizable amount of oil production, its position as a land locked country, and oil refineries in the north. Contributing factors also include CPA’s inactive strategy for revenue and wealth sharing and contentious areas of Abyei, South Kordofan, Equally, revenue generated from oil is both tempting for regimes where militarization and personal gain are concerned. National leaders are tempted and often times abuse the energy regulations for veracious purposes include the retention of power. For example, Sudan, under Nimeiri, created a “Unity Province”, for the sake of retaining oil for the north, despite the facts that the bulk of the oil fields were in the south. Energy resource governance takes into consideration the international instruments of change, domestic policies and frameworks. However, difficulties arise where poor governance prevails over contract

The independence of South Sudan ushered in a number of commissions and polices aimed at addressing some of the contentious issues introduced before succession; one of which was the Petroleum Revenue Management Act; 2012. The Act assumes a “regulatory framework for

the development and management of petroleum activities and ancillary matters related to petroleum activities”, in accordance to the Transition Constitution.¹⁷⁷ The Act recognises the National Petroleum and Gas Commission mandated to develop policy for implementation. Nile Petroleum Corporation (NILEPET) is a state-owned company and subsidiary of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mining, with functions of oil exploration, importation and marketing. It provides clauses on contractual and importation, creating room for exploration of energy security.

The advent of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement gained prominence during the second civil war in north and Southern Sudan. The exacerbated conditions of both regions necessitated a discussion over the contentious issues, including oil production and sale. Amidst initial and seasonal struggles between the government of Sudan and SPLM/A both during and after the leadership of John Garang, agreements were signed, including the Agreement on Security Arrangements, 23rd September, 2003, the Agreement on Wealth Sharing, 7th January 2004, and the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area, 26th May, 2004. However, these agreements still hold unresolved issues, resulting in fierce exchanges between South Sudan and Sudan.

3.6 Conclusion

The chapter sought to discuss the politics of oil in Southern Sudan in reference to the geopolitics of oil within East Africa, China and Africa’s partnership in the energy sector, China’s national interests and energy needs, United States foreign policy, on Africa, the U-S – Sino relations. The research also discussed the United States – Sudan relations, East

¹⁷⁷. See Laws of Southern Sudan, Petroleum Act, 2012 Government of Southern Sudan, 1.

Africa's Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor [LAPPSET], as well as Southern Sudan and Sudan oil politics.

In view of the above the research identifies the significance of oil politics not only in East Africa but globally as well. Oil, as the key global energy source ignites and undermines international relations, for the latter is determined by the international systems, arrangements, regimes and patterns that have been prescribed throughout the centuries, creating parallel initiatives or theories [Beijing Consensus, BRICS]. The politics of oil is greatly shaped by the interactions amongst states, determined by history, political economy and power balances.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS OF THE EMERGING ISSUES

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the role of international and regional politics in matters of oil development. It analysed the role of China, East Africa, Sudan and Southern Sudan, and United States in energy politics and decision making processes. It addressed issues of concern that resulted from the noted interactions including the Beijing Consensus, Washington consensus, post-cold war engagement, and Africa's environmental issues.

This chapter seeks to highlight key emerging issues derived from the main topic and extracted from primary and secondary data. The analysis draws from the main objective of the study, "to examine the relationship between geo-politics, oil and conflicts in Africa, with reference to Southern Sudan" as well as from the sub objectives, namely, to investigate the role of China's non-interference policy and oil diplomacy in Africa, with specific reference to Sino-Sudan, Sino-Southern Sudan relations and development;. to analyse models and policies regarding the management of natural resources and conflicts in Southern Sudan; to examine the impact of oil production and exportation in Southern Sudan's political and economic developmental future.

4.2 Emerging Issues

4.2.1 The Role of History

In an attempt to analyse the emerging issues, it is imperative to provide an understanding of the role of history as concerns both Sudan and Southern Sudan. The history illustrates key foundational facts that have continued to shape oil development, including the politics of oil,

armed conflicts, natural resource based conflicts, Comprehensive Peace Agreement, oil policy, and governance of natural resources.

Southern Sudan has continued to wrestle with its history in an attempt to find its space and relevance in the midst of significant historical events and undertakings. Every significant period symbolised given operations and characteristics that defined southern Sudan, either by intent or default. Some of these periods included the Turko-Egyptian administration, 1821-1881¹⁷⁸, colonial Sudan [1899 – 1956], post independent Sudan, 1956 – 2005 and independence South Sudan, 2011. The pre-colonial period was characterised by systematic arabization and islamization, especially during the death of Prophet Mohammed in 632 A.D.¹⁷⁹ Resource identification and exportation [gold, copper and ivory], exportation of slaves to Egypt, and developments in education, administrative structures, and military bases. The period expanded the economic base of Sudan but undermined the very fabric of the country.

The colonial period was identifiable by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Rule [1899-1955] and Southern Policy. The former practiced through the governance of the country as two distinct entities; while the latter rested on two major premises; the first premise on the de-arabization of the south and second premise, the adoption of the English language and Christianity. The adaptation of the Policy by the southerners resulted in a general acceptance of Christianity, and animism, amongst other aspects. Yet, although some relief was expected in relation to freedom of worship, the southerners continued to experience significant periods of isolation from platforms of governance, leadership and ideology. Arguably, by virtue of

¹⁷⁸. Op cit, Mulu, 26.

¹⁷⁹. Ibid, 27.

this isolation, the southerners were not recognised as participatory members of the same country, rendering them voiceless and leading to the agitation for change.

The pre-independence period was equally thorny. On one hand, it was marked by operations to provide full independence of the country. On the other hand, it increased the isolation experienced by the southerners. LeRiche argues that,

attempts by the British administration to include the southerners in the independence process through the Juba Conference, [1947], only served superficial results, for Khartoum, in 1949. It only succeeded in removing the British Southern Policy in replacement of the “Sudanisation” policy. Essentially, the south was populated by northern Arab Sudanese and insignificant parliamentary representation of the southerners in government.¹⁸⁰

Bingo asserts that the policy used of “social confrontation” by the Arab Sudanese was counterproductive on development, for its categorised people into classes or stratification.¹⁸¹

South Sudan’s sense of identity, belonging and self-regard is crucial to consider, for the short period of independence cannot resolve these years. Instead, significant period and resources are needed to address the noted issues and others equally important for its survival and development.

The post-independence era did not differ significantly from the previous periods in areas of political, educational, social and economic marginalization. Arguably, through years of development, the northerners were more advanced than their counterparts in the south. The north was perceived as largely sophisticated, with increasing support from its Arab allies. Its regard of the south did not aid in the collective development as some had anticipated after independence. The residual indifferences, polarization, and marginalization between the north

¹⁸⁰. Matthew LeRichie and Matthew Arnold, *Southern Sudan: From Revolution to Independence*, (London: Hurst Publishers, 2012), 11.

¹⁸¹. Gideon Bingo, Second Secretary, Embassy of Southern Sudan, Interviewed by Caroline Wanene, August 25, 2014.

and south continued resulting in growing tensions, and eventually, culminating in two civil wars; the first war, [Anyanya 1], from 1955 – 1972 and second war, 1983 – 2004, [predominantly exercised by the SPLA]. In addition, two coups took place in the same period, 1958, and 1959.

It can be argued that the underdevelopment of the south is a by-product of colonialism. Deng asserts the Condominium era failed to achieve its goal of creating an independent Southern Sudan largely due to political and economic advancement of the north and subsequent under development of the south.¹⁸² Theo argues that although the southerners believed in the protection of Britain, the latter was more concerned with maintaining the passage to India through the Suez and Middle East oil fields.¹⁸³

Post-independence South Sudan cannot disregard the influence of colonial and post-colonial regimes that undermined the socio-political advancement of the country. Equally, it cannot ignore the leadership and influence of the late John Garang and SPLM/A. Historians assert that the basic governance of the SPLM areas lacked civil administration, despite SPLA's regard of its rudimentary governance. This resulted from SPLM's inability to address humanitarian and security needs of the population, resulting in the disillusionment of the Southerners, particularly those of Eastern Equatorial. The latter group perceived four enemies: SPLM famine, tribal militias, and government troops SPLM as a lesser of the two evils: North and South Sudan. The formation of South Sudan was tedious at worst and elating at best, involving leaders such as John Garang. The current political disposition of South Sudan calls for an evaluation into the developmental and political gaps that exists.

¹⁸². Op cit, Deng, 156.

¹⁸³. Op cit, Theo, 34.

The newly independent South Sudan inherited historical issues. These issues include oil development [revenue sharing, resource development], insecurity, ideology, and governance. The lack of progressive policy formulation and implementation, emergence of a post conflict society, coupled with its young economy, South Sudan is significantly volatile on these matters. However, it is at the point of re-defining itself both nationally and internationally. Attempts at re-defining itself are evident through efforts such as a new President [Salva Kiir], and currency development [Southern Sudan dollar/currency. Transitional Constitution, 2011, creation of key ministries [e.g. Petroleum and Mining], and infrastructural and policy development [Petroleum Act, 2012]. Southern Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission and Transitional Constitution of the Republic of Southern Sudan, 2011 could be cited as important developments.

The above latter two are two examples. First, the mandate of the Commission stems from the Peace and Reconciliation Commission Act of 2012, and aims to “promote peaceful co-existence amongst the people of Southern Sudan and to advise the government on matters related to peace.”¹⁸⁴ With history dating back to 2001 [Upper Nile Peace and Reconciliation Interim Liaison Office (SUNPRILO), SPLM Peace Desk, 2002, and Southern Sudan Peace Commission, 2006], the efforts were in response to the CPA’s call for community cohesion, leading to the formation of the Southern Sudan Peace Commission Strategic Plan 2007 – 2011, Southern Sudan Peace Commission 2007, and Revised Strategic Plan 2010 - 2011, Ministry of Peace and CPA Implementation (MoP & CPAI), 2010 and 2013 – 2015 Strategic

¹⁸⁴. See Peace Commission, Government of the Republic of Southern Sudan, at <http://www.goss.org/index.php/commissions/peace-commission> (accessed May 14, 2014).

Plan.¹⁸⁵ Peace within and without Southern Sudan is crucial, not only in relation to the political arrangements but also in terms of resource sharing.

The Transitional Constitution serves as the supreme tool or policy framework of a state. It is equally perceived as a tool that represents the political thought of the day [e.g. democratic,], while illustrating the state's profile in relation to values, principles, rights, rule of law, amongst other aspects. Teitel et al argue that constitutions are either the "state's fundamental political arrangements [classical view] or are the representation of the "normative limits on state power of a structural or individual rights nature" [modern constitutional theory].¹⁸⁶ A constitution starts out with a provincial one [like that of Southern Sudan] before its full adoption. A transitional constitution, as stipulated by Teitel et al emerges from an existing political rule and represents arrangements and/or processes that are fluid.

The Transitional Constitution of South Sudan is indicative of this, having developed from an authoritarian rule; the independence of the succession and subsequent independence of the country also necessitated this. Transitional Constitution of the Republic of Southern Sudan, 2011 recognizes all indigenous languages [6:1], separation of state and religion [8:1], territories including Abyei [1:1], land ownership [169:1], petroleum and gas development management [172-173], and revenue sources [175].¹⁸⁷ The Petroleum Act, introduced in 2012, supports the Constitution and primarily specifies the contractual agreements between the government of South Sudan and external parties. The success of the South Sudan's transitional constitution and developed documents and Acts will be based on its interpretation, context, adoption into a full constitution, subsequent development of laws and

¹⁸⁵. Strategic Plan 2013 – 2015, Southern Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission, (Juba: Republics Of Southern Sudan, 2013), 10-12.

¹⁸⁶. Ruti G. Teitel & Ernst C. Stiefel, *Transitional Justice*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 20009), 192.

¹⁸⁷. See Transitional Constitution of the Republic of Southern Sudan, 2011.

laws, amongst other factors. As they are now, most appear as standalone, with little impact or correlation to the realities on the ground.

4.2.2 Oil and Armed Conflicts in Sudan/Southern Sudan

Literature differs regarding the causes of natural resource based conflicts. Important aspect of inquiry is the advent of oil-based resources and conflict in Sudan, type of conflicts predominantly found between Sudan and southern Sudan and the correlation between natural resources and conflicts, including oil, especially ethnic and separatists' conflicts.

The situation of Sudan situation fits well into Buckles and Rusnak's argument on the causes of resource conflicts. Specifically, the interconnectedness of resources to the environment. In addition, the presence of natural resources within a shared social space characterised by unequal and complex relationships between social actors [e.g. oil companies and communities, ethnic groups]. In addition, the scarcity of natural resources due to unequal distribution, environmental change, and increasing demand [Sudan's oil regulation]; the symbolic use of natural resources [e.g., Upper Nile and Abyei populations and interconnection with oil and land, leading to a way of life, a source of identity, ideology that could ultimately lead to political and social conflicts].¹⁸⁸ Natural based resource conflicts also result from the notion of "who is befitting."¹⁸⁹

History indicates two key events that arguably may have shaped the evolution of the oil history of Sudan. One, the Yom Kippur war, 1973 [war against Israel by Arab states,

¹⁸⁸. Jacque M. Chevalier and Daniel Buckles, "Conflict Management: A Heterocultural Perspective", in: *Cultivating Peace: Conflict and Collaboration in Natural Resource Management*, (Washington: International Development Research Centre, 1999), 3-4.

¹⁸⁹. John Omenge, Chief Geologist, Ministry of Energy, Kenya, Interviewed by Caroline Wanene, 20th August, 2014.

including Egypt to reclaim Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights possessed by Israel]. Two, the oil crisis, 1973 [initiated Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC] countries in response to U.S. arms support to Israel during the Yom Kippur War. Kobayashi's argument rests on the same premise; that oil embargo of OPEC against the Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, and U.S. resulted in the rise of oil prices, which introduced new players the petroleum industry. First by Chevron, which gained a gas and oil exploration license from Sudan, leading to the discovery of oil in Southern Sudan? Subsequently, this led to the restructuring of the border outline, creation of a new "Unity State", and renouncing of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. Second by Canada, Sweden, Austria, China, Malaysia and India after the pull out of Chevron.¹⁹⁰

Evidence indicate the oil crisis not only undermined the economic strengths of given states, including United Kingdom and United States, but it also served as a call for regrouping amongst Western and Asian states regarding petroleum eventualities, leading to a search for new markets. Countries such as Sudan embraced China, through the provision of shares purchase and tax free exportation [the latter of which has been under contention in recent times].

Thus in relation to conflicts, this research reflects on the relationship between natural resources and conflicts emerged specifically, studies from Collier and Hoeffler [1998], Collier and Bannon [2003], amongst others. The main contention of their studies concerned the correlation between natural resources and conflicts, or "direct conflict" or by extension "indirect conflict." Bannon and Collier suggest three interlinkages between conflict and natural resources, including oil. Namely, income per capita; level of rate of economic growth;

¹⁹⁰. Audrey Kobayashi, *Geographies of Peace and Armed Conflict*, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 24

and structure of the economy [whether or not dependent on primary commodities; e.g. oil]. They argue that oil-centred conflicts are secessionist in general; in contrast, they argue that the improvement of the noted three aspects reduces the chances of conflicts.¹⁹¹ Ross suggests that various studies indicate four regularities, two of which include;

(1) “oil [primary commodity] dependence appears to be linked to the initiation of conflict, but not conflict duration”; (2) “Gemstones, opium, coca, and cannabis [“lootable” commodities] do not seem to be linked to the initiation of conflict, but they do seem to strengthen pre-existing wars.”¹⁹²

The case of the north – south Sudan conflicts is rather interesting. On one hand, complexities dictate the difficulties of categorizing the north –Southern Sudan conflicts into one box e.g. oil-oriented only, although this was and still is significant. Brosche and Rothbart argues,

history indicates a combination of factors, such as power control, historical issues, including revenue sharing [SPLM/A and government of Sudan, 2012], power retention [SPLM/A and Sudanese Armed Forces, and Khartoum militias and SPLM/A in 2006, 2008, and 2009 in Malakal and Abyei resulting in 150 deaths, ninety casualties and fifty fatalities respectively].¹⁹³

History also illustrates the importance of identity [arabization, islamization, Christianity], political and economic determination [succession], and most recently, from 1974, oil, particularly after its discovery by Chevron in 1974. The Human Rights Watch asserts,

that from 1999 – 2009, oil was the main objective of the civil wars in Sudan, while oil revenue was utilized for the purchase of ammunition and weapons used to displace and wage war against the principal inhabitants of the oil fields. “Cash military expenditure, which did not include domestic security expenditure rose from 45% from 1999- 2001.”¹⁹⁴

¹⁹¹. Ian Bannon and Paul Collier, “Natural Resources And Conflict: What We Can Do”, in *Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions*, eds, Ian Bannon and Paul Collier (Washington: World Bank Publications, 2003), 2-3.

¹⁹². Michael L. Ross, “What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?”, in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (May, 2004), 352.

¹⁹³. Johan Brosche & Daniel Rothbart, *Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding: The Continuing Crisis in Darfur*, (New York: Routledge, 2012), 98.

¹⁹⁴. Jerema Rone, *Human Rights Watch*, (Human Rights Watch: (New York, 2003), 80.

Oil revenue was not used for development of Sudan; a fact reminiscent of the historical neglect of the southerners in the equitable allocation of resources. Examples are given of the government of Sudan's expulsion of the inhabitants of Block 1, 2, and 4 in Western Upper Nile/Unity State [situated along the north-south border by the Baggara, nomads from Darfur and Kordofan¹⁹⁵] and block 5a. The Report also states,

2000 and 2001 also witnessed rebel retaliation of Block 5A, with counter retaliation from the government of Sudan. During the 1990's, the government of Sudan's also engaged a divide and rule tactic pitting south-south groups against each other , through arms supply, with the aim of clearing the oil areas for infrastructural development by Western and Asian oil conies.¹⁹⁶

Government of Sudan also used oil companies for military purposes and carrying out air bombardments on civilians targeted. Oil companies denied their involvement in these atrocities. Equal debates also centre on the role of state and non-state actors in Sudan and Southern Sudan's oil politics. In question are multinational companies, and countries such as China and India. The advent of oil companies and states in Sudan's oil dates back to Chevron, in the 1970's. Subsequent groups include the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), a conglomeration of Chinese Corporation, CNPC, China, Petronas [Malaysia], ONGC [India], Sudapet [Sudan], and post 2011, Nilepet [Southern Sudan]. Accusations of abuse by oil companies were identified by the Human Right Watch. In addition to the air bombardments, the Watch argue that international oil companies failed in fulfilling the "local content" through the employment of southerners in building the pipeline; thereby denying southerners of needy income. Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company [GNPCO] and Chinese CNPC were seen as the major culprits in this regard.

¹⁹⁵. Ibid, 48-50.

¹⁹⁶. Ibid.

In addition, the Watch asserts that United Sudanese African Parties [USAP], a regarded political group in Khartoum, singled out Talisman [a global oil and gas company formed in 1992 and based in Calgary, Canada] for its propaganda [with agents from Europe and North America] against the people of southern Sudan, for the latter's group failure to appreciate economic benefits of oil exploration.

Rone argues that Talisman was perceived as being knowledgeable of the brutality against the Dinka and Nuer through removal from their ancestral home.¹⁹⁷ As a result, oil exploration was largely perceived negatively by SPLM/A, particularly during the civil wars, leading to arms struggle and in-operational oilfields. Interestingly, oil revenue has also been seen as the basis of armament accumulation by both the SPLA and Sudan Armed forces [SAF].

This begs the question, what credibility do state oil companies have in Sudan and South Sudan? Hostetler doubts the sincerity of the National Congress Party, United Nations, African Union, China, India and Malaysia in resolving atrocities and conflicts in Sudan. She perceives the latter group as late comers to the oil industry, but willing buyers and consumers of oil. In order to "maintain the pace of economic growth, they solidify their place in the global economy, and satisfy domestic demand."¹⁹⁸ Using the example of China, Hostetler states China's packages [soft loans, weapons trade and military training agreements and political protection], are translated into Sudan's political protection, weaponry, transfer of arms, money to militias, loans, even at the cost of human lives. China's role in Africa, including Sudan, specifically, their inactiveness regarding the Darfurian conflict indicated the extent to which China's oil diplomacy is silent on matter of internal wars.

¹⁹⁷. Op cit, Rone, 85-86.

¹⁹⁸. Adrien Wing, Richard Goldstone, et al, "The Politics Of Sudan", Proceedings Of The Annual Meeting", in *American Society Of International Law*, Vol. 102, (April 9-12, 2008), 91.

In most recent times, periodic spate of violence and conflict over oil centred territories and oil fields [Blue Nile, Abyei, Heglig], have dominated the politics of Sudan and Southern Sudan. This led to numerous deaths, displacement of people, and uncertainty regarding the full unfulfilled enactment of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, e.g., Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area, [26th May, 2004].

Equally, criticism is levelled regarding conflicts within SPLM/A two major tribes, Dinka and Nuer, particularly since 1991. Although reconciliation of both Machar and Garang were arrived at after the 1991 conflict, persistent disgruntled emotions have prevailed where power and resources are in question.

Pelinka and Ronen assert that this sheds light into intra-national ethnic conflicts [or conflicts between ethnic groups within existing internationally recognized borders...without the international legal right of interference between another sovereign state...]¹⁹⁹ The results have been witnessed through the establishment of clientelism, ethnic groupings, tribalism, and nepotism.

This leads us to the greed vs. grievance perspective in conflict. Literature on greed and grievances concept as expounded by Collier indicates an evolving perspective that centres on causes of conflict. Although generally applied to explain causes of conflict, greed vs. grievance epitomises the general regard of public management of resources. Key assumption is that conflict is subject to multiple factors, including collective action, economic gains, and recruitment of human resources. The grievance perspective, Collier asserts, is based on

¹⁹⁹. Anton Pelinka & Dov Ronen, *The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict, Democracy and Self-determination in Central Europe*, (New York; Routledge, 2013), xxiii.

certain tenets, two of which are, lack of political rights and government economic incompetencies. Collier argues all of the noted are subjective and contingent of existing variables. Thus, temporal, justifiable in the case of injustices and unfulfilled needs; it is de-emphasized where fulfilment is achieved. Greed-oriented conflicts are evident through the exercise of wants as opposed to needs.²⁰⁰ He argues that greed propels individuals toward collective action, even without collective homogeneity due to the opportunities conflict presents itself where natural resources are concerned.

Whether greed or grievance, it is equally important to consider pre-interactions in Africa's resource rich countries. Countries such as Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo have experienced strife resulting from poor distributional and management of natural, political and economic resources. The persistent issues of resource management continue, almost becoming part of the national profile. Arguably, China's role in Southern Sudan does not suggest looting of resources but it does beg the question regarding China's role in the proliferation of small arms in Africa, including Sudan. That negates conflict management, peace, and instead encourages arms struggle resulting from the purchase and availability of small arms. Subsequently, residual effects of negative oil diplomacy, bad governance of natural resources, ineffective decision making of southerners [considering corruption and other vices] also serve as secondary effects of poor oil governance.

4.2.3 Geopolitics

Geopolitics acknowledges the dynamics of states within a region; in this case, within Africa, specifically, East Africa. The politics of oil surrounding Sudan and Southern Sudan promotes

²⁰⁰. Paul Collier, "Doing Well after War: An Economic Perspective", in *Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, eds, Mats R. Berdal, David Malone, 91-112 (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 94-101.

curiously and debates primarily due to the essential characteristics of the power relations between countries such as the United States, China, Malaysia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda.

Literature illustrates the ambiguous disposition of the U.S.-Africa relations, including its foreign policy on Africa. Authors such as Schraede argue that it has evolved throughout the years to include: security, assumptions about European responsibility; East-West ideological differences; bureaucratic “incrementalism” and militarization since World War II. Africa-U.S. relations have not significantly moved away from this premise. In recent times, for example, the U.S. foreign policy on Africa has centred on strengthening democratic institutions, economic growth, trade and investment, advancement of peace and security for African continent, and promotion of opportunity and development.²⁰¹ However, America's interests in Africa are still rather "colonial" [e.g. still rely on Africa's colonial masters for decision making], unilateral and seemingly rigid; providing justification for China's role in Africa, particularly where political and economic gaps exist. In contrast, China's foreign policy identifies its position and interests with other nations, based on five tenets [mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in other's international affairs; equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence]. China's foreign policy underpins their involvement in other countries including those in the African continent. Seen largely as a reactionary to the U.S. linear approach to international affairs, the Chinese government has continued to endear itself to states through a seemingly non-confrontational and non-threatening manner, while responding to the developmental needs of its partner countries.

²⁰¹. See U.S Strategy Towards Sub Saharan Africa, June 2012, U.S. Department of State.

Like the United States China's focus on Africa, including Southern Sudan was and still largely based on national interests. Arguably, China's history with the United States, Soviet Union and Asia seems like an attempt by China to attain political and economic credibility in the world. To accomplish this, China seemingly utilizes Africa as a tool. In this regard Africa is a pun in the hands of China [and the U.S.], despite increasing protestation of sovereignty by African countries. This leads to the concern over the East –West rivalry over Africa's natural resources.

The first scramble for Africa was initiated in the nineteenth century resulting from various reasons including German-French military rivalry and opening of new market of cotton industry.²⁰² The new scramble centres on key areas, including natural resources such as oil and gas wealth. Countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Angola, and Southern Sudan are endowed with oil that provokes both interest and interaction within states and parties of interests [multinational oil corporations], providing new credence to oil politics and diplomacy. The East –West dynamics with regards to Africa has progressively taken new dimensions. The cold war period and post-cold war period spotlighted both the foreign policies of both China and the United States. China moved strategically to cement new relations with Africa from the 1970's-1990, leading to key forums, specifically,

the forum on China-Africa Cooperation [FOCAC], established in 2000, China-Africa Business Council [CABC], established in 2005 by the United Nations Development Program [UNDP], China Society of Promotion of the Guangcai Programme, and Chinese Ministry of Commerce. Most recently, the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan recognised key aspects, including the role of the African Union in promoting stability and peace and joint development of energy and respective resources.²⁰³

²⁰². Op cit, Strange, 116.

²⁰³. See Fifth Ministerial Conference Of The Forum On China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015).

In contrast, Southern Sudan's interest in its own oil has predominantly evolved through the eyes of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, specifically in the Agreement on Security Arrangements, 23rd September, 2003, the Agreement on Wealth Sharing, 7th January 2004, and the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area, 26th May, 2004. The Petroleum Act 2012 was developed after independence, serving more as a contractual guideline. In the absence of agreed border outline, transit fees, among other issues, both South Sudan and Sudan demonstrates the interplays and politics determined in oil. The 2012 closure of oil fields by Southern Sudan was illustrative of the residual effects of the poor implementation of the CPA, despite tremendous loss of revenue during that period. The intervention of the Chinese government of the dispute, despite its non-interference policy was indicative of its national interests in oil importation and investments amounting to billions of dollars. Oil is estimated to contribute 98% of the national revenue of Southern Sudan, with little regard to other potential areas of national development. Yet, the underlining causal factor in oil politics stands at governance, rule of law, legislation.

The interplay of these dynamics sees an emerging Africa in the midst of China and the United States, resulting in power plays. On one hand, African states want to exert their sovereignty for reasons of identity and legitimacy. States such as Sudan, South Sudan, and Kenya are evolving from internal conflicts and diverse histories, calling for a new paradigm shift regarding domestic and international relations. For these and other countries, development is of priority, despite the presence or lack of natural resources. Employment, economic diversification, institutional development, and education are areas with significant focus. Friendly states are seemingly invited to partner with Africa. The pull towards the "Beijing Consensus" as opposed to the "Washington Consensus" is not only attractive but accommodating for African states.

Arguments indicate a key justification for this result from the non-threatening manner of China over issues [corruption, leadership and governance]. However, Africa may also be at the brink of re-defining itself in relation to its foreign policy, relations and governance; indicating a strong regard for complimentary as opposed to antagonism. Africa's redefinition rests on the political [governance; leadership], economic [GDP], socially [culturally], and educationally [focus on technology]. Africa's rate of change is both strength and a weakness. As strength, it calls for new paradigms and approaches. As a weakness, it negates the complexities of development in light of corruption, and poor leadership. Africa's choice over its development partners is equally based on its political and economic interests. In the case of East-West preference, China offers attractive packages, not easily rejected. African states are well aware of this and exercise their prerogative where necessary, despite the fact that international arrangements and politics are anarchical. The implications for all the regions are accumulative.

This leads to the fact that a re-emergence of the U.S. foreign policy and relations is in dire need. If it is to secure its future relations with Africa; the seemingly draconian approach requires re-dress, while accommodating the political, economic cultural disposition of African states and their people. While not undermining the principles of good governance, the U.S. foreign policy on Africa must be engaging. Arguably, it is reactionary and short lived. The themes that have dominated the policy have tended to be recaptured in subsequent policies, negating the concepts of free trade, and international relations. In contrast, China's foreign policy is contradictory in practice and philosophy[in view of its role of a permanent member of the UNSC, the Darfurian, Iran--Iraq war, arms sales to combatants, and South Sudan pipeline closure]. The seemingly lack of technological transfer and private investments is a key concern [e.g. Southern Sudan-China]. China's and America's reliance on external

sources for their energy needs is equally pivotal. This begs the question whether these needs counter act natural resource control and peace, where resources are commodities of wars by rebel groups. Is the noted reliance addressed through the Obama and Biden's "New Energy for America", of which focuses on renewable energy resources to counter act its reliance on international oil?

As South Sudan and East Africa continues to develop and attract international trade and politics, caution is given regarding poor monitoring and evaluation systems, coupled with poor polices, and conflicts. Bingo credits the geopolitics within East Africa as leading to economic development, but warns of inter-national conflicts resulting from greed.²⁰⁴ He calls for good governance over natural resources, including oil.

4.2.4 Policy: Management of Natural Resources

Literature on oil and management in Southern Sudan cannot discount history [of north and Southern Sudan], governance and post conflict societies. Equally, literature on management of natural resources in Africa is indicative of a continent riddled with corruption, poor policies and leadership; all of which negate the development of Africa. However, difficulty begins, in defining "conflict countries" and post conflict reconstruction. The World Bank defines "conflict country" as one that has recently experienced widespread violence, or where a main pre-occupation of the state is armed warfare, where the state has failed, or where a significant part of the population is engaged in armed struggle with the state.²⁰⁵ In the recent past, South Sudan protracted violence determines its status as conflict prone. It is equally important to define natural resources managements.

²⁰⁴. Gideon Bingo, Second Secretary, Embassy of Southern Sudan, Interviewed by Caroline Wanene, August 25, 2014.

²⁰⁵. Kreimer A., Ericksson, et al, *The World Bank Experience with Post Conflict Reconstruction*, (Washington: The World Bank; 1998), 2.

Saginga et al defines it as,

the scientific and technical principle that forms the basis of sustainable management and governances of natural resources; e.g., water, land, soil, plants, and animals, with concentration of effects of management on the quality of life concerning both present and future generations.²⁰⁶

Equally, definitions of governance vary depending on the context. The World Bank, 2007 defines governance as the ways public officials and public institutions acquire and exercise authority to provide public goods and services, including basic services, infrastructure and a sound investment climate.²⁰⁷ The Bank identifies three aspects of governance. Namely, 1.The form of the political regime; 2. The process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development and 3. The capacity of government to design, formulate and implement policies and discharge functions.²⁰⁸ Kaufmann et al defines governance as,

the customs and organizations exemplified in a country; including processes by which governments are selected and replaced, capacity of government to formulate and implement sound policies, esteem and regard for citizens, and organizations that determine socio-economic collaboration.²⁰⁹

“Management is the quintessential tool for development.”²¹⁰ Management sets the agenda for governance. Yet, “governance problems are symptoms”,²¹¹ deeper issues of mismanagement are normally complex and multifaceted. Southern Sudan's history illustrates decades of subjugation, state control over resources and governance manipulation by the north. The two civil wars after independence, [the first, 1955 – 1972, the second, 1983 – 2004] failed to

²⁰⁶ . P.C Saginga, I Bekalo, and W.C Ochola, “Introduction”, in *Managing Natural Resources for Development in Africa: A Resource Book*, eds, P.C Saginga, I Bekalo, and W.C Ochola, (IDRC, 2010), 12.

²⁰⁷ . Addis Ababa and Akongdit, Othow, *Impact of Political Stability on Economic Development: Case of South Sudan*, (Indiana: AuthorHouse, 2013), 186.

²⁰⁸ . Ibid.

²⁰⁹ . Ibid.

²¹⁰ . Felix Moses Edoho, *Management Challenges for Africa in the Twenty-first Century: Theoretical and Applied Perspectives*, (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001), 5.

²¹¹ . John Omenge, Chief Geologist, Ministry of Energy, Kenya, Interviewed by Caroline Wanene, 20th August, 2014.

provide long term solutions to the contentious issues, rendering the management of oil in Sudan nearly impossible to actualize. In most recent times, political influence was seen as instrumental in the underdevelopment of the new South Sudan. Efforts to address the noted concerns resulted in various agreements, while other issues of resource allocation and management were not satisfactorily solved. South Sudan has not enjoyed the privilege of managing the oil as wished or expressed through the CPA. Instead, South Sudan inherited the problems of its former brother, Sudan, without adequate structures and policies in place.

The management of natural resources is also pegged on local traditions/customs, religious edicts, national constitutions, and international agreements and obligations.²¹² It is also pegged on the restructuring of all key sectors such as health, education, agriculture, financial institutions, promotion of trade, public investment in infrastructure [roads, etc.], improving business and investment environment through governance structures.

Whereas Geology and Mining professionals differ on the major threats of oil management in Africa, including Southern Sudan and the new Sudan, those interviewed for this research asserted the three main impediments as corruption, skewed benefits, and political interferences [with variations in terms of importance].²¹³ The secondary issues concerned environmental degradation, lack of governance structures, lack of conducive environment [the latter two of which breed corruption/tribal discontent], poor energy policies or lack of legal and regulatory frameworks [modernization needed, including inclusion of the local content; inadequate capacity for the exploration, exploitation, and development of natural

²¹². Abiodun Alao, "Natural Resource Management and Human Security in Africa", in *Protecting Human Security in Africa*, eds, Ademola Abass, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 104.

²¹³. Samuel Too, David Irungu, Mining Engineers, Ministry of Mining, Kenya, Interviewed by Caroline Wanene, 15th and 18th August, 2014.

resources, exploitation], and lack of market penetration [lack of pricing control].²¹⁴ In contrast, development and marketing of natural resources was seen as by-products in the resolution of economic challenges in Africa. Surplus funds investment was also seen as crucial for national development. Africa's oil income can be utilized in this manner. A case in point is the Norwegian Government Pension Fund-Global. It aims to invest abroad the surplus of state income from Norway's oil activities through shares and interest bearing commercial papers.²¹⁵

Traditional oil companies have been viewed as the new imperialists in Africa's oil and contributors to the "resource curse." However, in most recent times, there has been some shift in the governance dialogue regarding the exploitation of African states by oil companies to the African politicians. This shift is seen as a blame game in managing natural resources. Thus, instead of referring to the "resource curse", oil companies see it as the "governance curse."²¹⁶ Thus, the focus becomes one of governance as opposed to resources. In doing so, focus is also placed on governments and national political structures. Yet Andambi contends the "resource curse" is based on greed as opposed to other factors. He sees this leading to poverty, mismanagement of natural resources in Africa, including Southern Sudan. He contends that countries that discover oil want to live beyond their means, while forgetting of the other income viable sectors; e.g. agriculture.²¹⁷ Kinyua, a petroleum engineer, concurs. He states that oil-rich countries such as South Sudan require exploring other development

²¹⁴. Gideon Meilli [Mining Engineer; Ministry of Mining, Kenya], Hudson Andambi [Snr Principal Superintending Geologist; Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, Kenya], and Daniel Ichangi [Registered Engineer; University of Nairobi, Kenya], Interviewed by Caroline Wanene, August 18, 20, 21, 2014.

²¹⁵. Janicke Rasmussen and Morten Huse, "Corporate Governance in Norway: Women and Employee Elected Board Members", in *Handbook on International Corporate Governance: Country Analyses*, eds. Christine A. Mallin, (Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), 133.

²¹⁶. Nicholas Shaxson, "Oil, Corruption and the Resource Curse", *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 83, No. 6, Africa and Security (Nov., 2007), 1125.

²¹⁷. Andambi, Interview, August 20, 2014.

options, including agriculture and oil reserve funds, the latter is exemplified in Norway's Government Pension Fund-Global.

Kinyua provides a three point solution to natural [oil] resource management,

value creation [extraction and optimization of resources], impact management [understanding of money, relations, livelihoods, national industries, employment opportunities] and revenue management [revenue collection methodologies and auditing, national investment avenues, and mitigation of the "oil curse"].²¹⁸

Kai, non-governmental personnel, notes that although there have been some areas of improvement in relation to oil production and sale, its manageability, however, is largely dependent on its transit route through Khartoum. This leads to mismanagement of the oil in relation to theft. He calls for the transparency of oil-oriented policies, one way of which would include providing the host community with oil revenue percentage and safety.²¹⁹ East Africa, including South Sudan also requires investing in capacity building and exploration of technology [the latter within geological parameters] in an attempt to de-emphasize the resource curse or poor resource management.²²⁰

4.3 Other Issues

4.3.1 Pending Issues from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The CPA had a six year interim period, with inclusion of a referendum. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement [CPA] provided provisions for development. The government of Sudan and government of South Sudan initiated measures to address the CPA guidelines, either

²¹⁸. Michael Kinyua, Petroleum Engineer, National Oil Corporation, Kenya, Interviewed by Caroline Wanene, September 9, 2014.

²¹⁹. James Kai, Capacity Development Officer, Pact South Sudan, Interviewed by Caroline Wanene, September 12, 2014. Kai's work involves extensive conflict mitigation trainings.

²²⁰. Christopher Nyamai, Chairman: Department of Geology; University of Nairobi, Interviewed by Caroline Wanene, August 21, 2014.

separately or collectively. Some measures by the government of South Sudan include the formation of the National Council for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) targeting ex-combatants, establishment of government ministries, and national healing and reconciliation initiative, 2011 [dissolved later] amongst others.

In addition, there is need to consider the issue of recovery [of relationships – e.g., reconciliation, attitudinal change through socialization geared by civil society]²²¹, or reconstruction [physical reconstruction [roads, hospitals, schools, etc]]. This is partly due to the intricate relationship between governance and leadership, which are tied to the developmental patterns of the country. Both serve various roles, including the rehabilitation and restoration of fallen states. In the case of Southern Sudan, both reconstruction and recovery are equally important. The management of natural based resources, be it over cattle routes, land, water and oil require re-dress. Saginga asserts that the management of natural resources require integrated, multi-sectoral, multi-institutional, multi-stakeholder, and inter-disciplinary approaches.²²² The approaches require reflecting the realities on the ground, even if adopted from other forums. Varying stakeholders bring on board differing abilities that if used properly, provide credence to natural resource management.

The problem, however, centers on poor perception of resource management. The other issues centers on poor policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Poverty is also a determinant of poor natural resource management. This de-limits national development efforts. Thus, political good will and concerted efforts from all stakeholders, including the civil society, investment partners and citizenry is required. Gideon Bingo asserts that the

²²¹. Anderson, K. & Rieff, D. “Global Civil Society’: A Sceptical View, in *Global Civil Society 2004/5*, eds, M. Glasius, M. Kaldor, & H. Anheier, (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2005), 28-29.

²²². Op cit, Saginga, Bekalo, and Ochola, 40.

CPA issues provide room for problem solving in areas of border disputes and territorial rights [Abyei].²²³ In addition, the absence of effective legislature, administrative structure, and security apparatus in Southern Sudan provides room for misuse and misdirection in matters of resource management and conflict alleviation. This leads to a closer scrutiny of the national agenda and direction of the country in light of its developmental track record, despite Southern Sudan's new independent state.

The rule of law, electoral processes and institutional capacity building are some of the key areas of interest by non-state actors in post conflict governance and leadership. However, governance is best supported where national identity and ownership is upheld. Arguably, South Sudan is a country grappling with security, socio-economic, political and identity issues, which undermine the progressive steps it takes in development. The December 15, 2013 alleged coup d'état in Juba, for example, serves to negate good governance and effective post conflict reconstruction and development [PCRD].

China's non-interference policy in Africa, particularly South Sudan and Sudan excludes itself from matters of sovereignty [governance, administration] but includes itself in trade. China's initial "hands off" approach to the Darfurian atrocities negated conflict resolution at the expense of oil exports. This view ultimately changed. In addition, China's mediation in the 2012 stalemate over oil pipelines between north and South Sudan provided a different angle to the geo-politics of the three states, with an overriding interest still being one of trade.

²²³. Gideon Bingo, Second Secretary, Embassy of Southern Sudan in Kenya, Interviewed by Caroline Wanene, August 25, 2014.

The South Sudan's governance and leadership models requires conceptualisation, for the absence of effective policies or legislature, provide room for abuse and invitation to conflicts, including natural based resources. Thus, transformational leadership is of consideration due to the concept of co-ownership of leadership. At this period in time, South Sudan balances two fronts: the subdued profile of the citizenry in leadership and the glaring profile of the government. A balance requires to be created where ownership and tenets of transformational leadership are understood, owned and practicalised within the restructuring of state. This requires concrete opportunities where citizens can participate, contribute, criticise and develop, thereby providing ownership to their country.

4.3.2 Oil Reserves vs. Oil Depletion

Are measures been taken by African oil rich states to reserve oil for future use or are oil depletion more evident in the continent? Oil is a politically charged commodity and the primary source of global energy supplies. Oil rich countries count on the amount of oil in use and reserve, yet depletion underrates the status of oil, particularly where poor energy policies exist. Economic booms such as the one witnessed in the mid-2000s, provides opportunities for oil-available African countries to produce and sell, thereby inviting development. Devlin and Ranawera argue that the economic boom in Africa in mid 2000s aided African countries, including those of Sub Sahara. The noted region holds 13% of worlds proven reserves outside of the Middle East, of which are exerted to generate a net present value of U.S \$300 billion.²²⁴ They argue that the economic boost is temporal calling for the reservation of resources. Given the uneven balance of trading power, African states require tools to aid steady development and fight exploitation as exemplified in trade agreements. Of the three

²²⁴. Julian Devin, Michael Lewin, and Thilankaratna Ranaweera, "Harnessing Oil Windfalls for Growth in the African Region", in *Africa at a Turning Point: Growth, Aid, and External Shocks*, Volume 955, eds. Delfin S. Go, John M. Pag, (Washington: World Bank Publications, 2008), 375 – 376.

types of oil markets, new, mature, and declining, Africa requires regulating new oil discoveries and fiscal management of the same. The case of South Sudan is no exception. Independence of the country has not produced lasting solutions to oil depletion. Oil depletion is curtailed by oil discoveries, including management practices that strengthen legislation.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter sought to provide an understanding of the emerging and secondary issues of oil politics with reference to the role of China in Southern Sudan. Key issues discussed involved, pending issues from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the role of history management of natural resources, oil and armed conflicts in Sudan/South Sudan. Also discussed were oil-centred conflicts, geopolitics, oil reserves vs. oil depletion, conflict: greed vs. grievance.

The chapter also dealt in this chapter was the imbalance of political, social and economic relations between the two noted states that continue to destabilize the oil industry. In so doing the research attempted to provide an analysis of the emerging issues of oil politics in South Sudan.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

Chapter one provided the introduction of the study in light of the variables of research. The justification of the research was drawn from the China's non-interference policy in light of politics of oil in Africa, including Southern Sudan. The literature review focused on key aspects of oil politics through the discussion of the geo-politics, Sino-Africa relations, Sudan-Southern Sudan relations and history.

Chapter two provides an account of the history of Sudan and Southern Sudan, given the interconnectedness of politics and economics. It begins with background information about the Sudan, followed by the significance of the civil wars, Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005 and Sino –Africa and Sino - Southern Sudan relations. A summary of the text is also provided at the end of the chapter.

Chapter three provides an understanding of China's foreign policy, types of decision making processes involved, and China's foreign policy relevance in Africa. The chapter also analyses these and similar concepts in light of oil diplomacy, energy demands, oil politics, and consumption. It looks at the current debates on oil diplomacy while drawing comparative notes on the United States, China, Sudan and Southern Sudan.

Chapter four seeks to analyse key emerging issues of oil politics, with regards to Southern Sudan and China. This is extracted from primary and secondary data collection, while considering the objectives of the study. Also discussed was the role of China's non-

interference policy and oil diplomacy in Africa, with specific reference to Sino- Sudan, Sino-Southern Sudan relations. An analysis of the tenets of the management of natural resources and conflicts in Southern Sudan was also highlighted. Included also was an examination of the impact of oil production and importation in Southern Sudan's political and economic developmental future.

5.2 Key Findings

At the start of this research, the researcher sought an understanding of contextualised materials on the subject particularly as they pertain to Southern Sudan. Although significant volume of literature is available on Sudan, insignificant volumes exist regarding policy formulation, natural resource management, energy management in Southern Sudan. The general assumption is that Southern Sudan's history mandates literature focus, yet arguably it is imperative for more local content in resource politics and management, including conflict management.

The hypotheses identified at the start of this research stated that oil serves as a political and economic tool for China, Sudan and Southern Sudan. The second hypothesis states that armed and protracted conflicts contribute to the underdevelopment of states despite policy formulation and abundance of natural resources including oil, while the third hypothesis states that poor policy formulation and implementation on the petroleum sector has causal effects on the management and control of natural resources, including oil.

The investigation revealed a link between armed conflicts and resources, where the former serves as a tool for aggrandisement, control, manipulation. These aides in the sale and proliferation of small arms, of which, results in abundance in post war periods, leading to

insecurity and readiness for war. Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration therefore becomes nearly impossible to accomplish without using community based education, re-deployment, and reconciliation. Arguably, the mind-set in post conflict society is rather fragile. The case of the South Sudan's 2013 conflict and previous ones begs the question whether conflict or war is an inherent issue. *New African Magazine* states the issue is not based on notion of DNA but on the environment of strife.²²⁵ As a result, the resumption of war is evident in times of threat, political and ideological struggles. Thus, conflict transformation or management is imperative for lasting solutions.

The Sino-Africa relations provide a dichotomy of interests, positions, politics and arrangements that to date, have been both controversial and supportive. China's foreign policy is based on five principles with the overall agenda of meeting national interests. Its partnerships in Africa, including Southern Sudan, beg questions regarding Africa's complacency of governance, resource management and conflict management, established by default or intent. Questions regarding poor policies, weak institutions, poor leadership dominate sectoral and national development, allowing room for closer scrutiny.

It is argued that China's growing interests in Africa may suffocate resource management if economic packages are devoid of revenue and resource management mechanisms. Arguably, China's non-interference policy does not intermarry with domestic affairs, yet, responsibility of resource is still crucial. The parameters are however, controversial. Interestingly, Africa prefers the "Beijing Consensus" as opposed to the "Washington Consensus" based on necessity of legitimacy, and freedoms, although Washington still maintains strong relations

²²⁵. Baffour Ankomah, "Southern Sudan Why Peace Remains Elusive", in *New African*, (August/September 2014), 22-23.

with Africa. China's history, interests and economic partnerships has endeared it to Africa, allowing for easy access to developmental trends. The political and economic influence of China in Africa is set to continue and subsequently, determine the governance of natural resources in Africa. Thus, Africa oil states and China require addressing issues of investment, governance and management of natural resources and resource based conflicts. The strengths of African states, including South Sudan will be better enhanced through effective policy formulation, paradigm shifts [that accommodate new forms of energy security and development], and effective leadership in foreign relations. Equally South Sudan's, governance models require moving from a militaristic one to a transformational one.

5.3 Conclusions

The work attempted to provide an analysis of the role of China in Southern Sudan. It looks at concepts such as resource based conflicts, foreign policy and energy policy. It also provided an analysis of the role of politics of oil. The School of Realism was utilized as the main theoretical framework in light of the concepts and practices of states, geopolitics, power relations. In so doing, the work highlighted the scramble and interest over natural resources including oil and gas, and the subsequent implications for resource-rich African countries with their global neighbors. The work also highlighted the significant role of governance, Africa's position in global politics of oil. As a way to resolving power imbalances and resource imbalances, a number of recommendations were provided. Four included the urgency for conflict transformation, policy formulation, citizenry ownership of South Sudan, and economic and institutional diversity of the country, enabling a re-focus of its strengths into other non-threatening avenues of development.

5.4 Recommendations

The information obtained in this study is indicative of suggestions and recommendations of the oil sector. It represents a summation of recommendations in key areas of oil politics, with reference to South Sudan. The recommendations are presented in light of post conflict reconstruction and development concept.

Transformational leadership and conflict transformation are key concepts to consider in light of the political, social and economic history of Southern Sudan. Whereas the two concepts and practices are crucial in post conflict societies, it is equally imperative to provide a foundational basis. Conflict transformation aims to change or convert conflict into viable means of peace, leading to the sustainability of peace and development. The need for South Sudan to undertake this is an understatement. Key to this process is the individuals paradigm shift [mindset] in matters of conflict, violence and peace.

According to the African Union, post conflict reconstruction and development [PCRD] refers to a comprehensive set of measures that seek to address the needs of countries emerging from conflict, including the needs of affected population, prevent the escalation of disputes, avoid relapse into violence, address the root causes of conflict, and consolidate sustainable peace.²²⁶

The New Partnership for Africa's Development [NEPAD] refers to the same as a complex system that provides for short, medium and long term programs to prevent dispute from escalating, avoid a relapse into violent conflict, and to build and consolidate sustainable peace.²²⁷

²²⁶. African Union, *Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development*, (Addis: Conflict Management Division, Peace and Security Department, Commission of the African Union, 2006), 4.

²²⁷. NEPAD, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework*, (NEPAD Secretariat: Governance, Peace and Security Programme: 2005), 5-6.

Post conflict reconstruction and development is crucial for South Sudan. The independence of South Sudan emerged at a time when multipolarity, unipolarity were at play; the three still are. These aspects have an impact on oil development and governance in South Sudan. In the case of South Sudan, PCRDR is crucial, for the avoidance of recurring conflicts. Crucial also is the creation of democratic institutions, stabilization of the peace process, and addressing root causes of conflicts/establishment of social justice foundations. The latter three are specified by NEPAD. Thus, the development agenda of South Sudan requires reconstructing the constitutional, social and political, economic domains as exemplified through the following ideas:

The current Transitional Constitution begs a re-alignment in light of the realities of South Sudan as a post conflict society. The development of a full constitution of South Sudan is a prerequisite into the development of other national policies and Acts. This includes an understanding and adoption of contextualized agendas that are indicative of the present and future direction of the country. Critical will be the Bill of Rights, natural resources, environment, and leadership, amongst others.

Economic development based on surplus funds reserve is crucial in the investment of oil revenue for South Sudan. Lessons from the Norwegian Government Pension Fund are key in understanding the oil investments in the 21st century, yet bearing the contextualization of the economic realities. Economic management and policy formulation are intricately connected to funds' investments.

Regulatory development and monitoring, specifically, policy formulation, revision and implementation are equal prerequisites in South Sudan, as all reflect the democratization

process both at the institutional level and community level. The expected outcome of the three will be translated into institutional re-defining and restructuring that elevates democracy over other forms of undesirable political rule. Key policies include foreign policy and energy policy. Both sets will determine its course based on history, existing foreign relations, regionalism, geo-politics, and security.

Good governance structures of public resource, including natural resources is equally important, both for standardization and safeguarding of resources. The creation of reserve funds, [based on oil and aimed at securing economic strengths for the future], monitoring and evaluation and assessments instruments of change are three tools for consideration. Political goodwill, anti-corruption measures and prosecution of persons found exercising corrupt practices are supportive essentials. Reconstruction of government organs, including ministries and human resources are the other measures needed in the practice of good governance. Electoral processes [in the selection of good leaders] are also important.

Citizenry ownership of South Sudan is equally important. Although there are numerous ways in which this is achievable, one is through the formation of a strong, democratically infused society national cohesion based on the principles of reconciliation and recovery. Exercises of sensitization, job creation, tertiary and university education, and parliamentary representation are key in actualizing the noted. The current dispensation in South Sudan is instrumental, for it is still undergoing post conflict ramifications and self-identification processes.

Diversification of the national economy bases is significant, as 98% of South Sudan's economy is based on oil. Agricultural development requires consideration. The diversification would ease the tensions and conflicts created within the oil industry both

within and along its borders. Foreign investments will be equally crucial based on country confidence, institutional development, peace, conflict management measures, and reciprocal investments. Conflict management measures will include the utilization of early warning apparatus, intensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration [DDR], oil benefit sharing, and the internationalization of oil development yet within controllable parameter of Southern Sudan; e.g. refinery development, Lappset Corridor Project.

5.5 Further Areas of Research

In an attempt to expand the research topic, this study suggests the following areas for further research; governance of natural resources in East Africa, human security in South Sudan, role of ethnic conflicts in natural resource based conflicts, policy implications of regional oil infrastructural projects [e.g LAPSSET, and future projects].

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List of Interviewees:

Mr. Hudson K. Andambi, Senior Principal Superintending Geologist [Petroleum], Kenya

Mr. Gideon Bingo, Second Secretary, Embassy of South Sudan in Kenya

Dr. Daniel Ichangi, OGW, Registered Geologist, University of Nairobi, Kenya

Dr. Christopher Nyamai, Chairman, Department of Geology, University of Nairobi, Kenya

Mr. Michael Kinyua, Petroleum Engineer, National Oil Corporation, Kenya

Mr. David Irungu, Mining Engineer, Ministry of Mining, Kenya

Mr. James Kai, Capacity Development Officer, Pact South Sudan

Mr. Gideon Meilli, Mining Engineer, Ministry of Mining, Kenya

Mr. John Omenge, Chief Geologist, Ministry of Energy, Kenya

Mr. Samuel Too, Mining Engineer, Ministry of Mining, Kenya

Appendix 1: Map of South Sudan

