

**ROLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN PURSUIT OF KENYA'S NATIONAL  
INTEREST**

**BY**

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UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

**2014**

## **DECLARATION**

### **DECLARATION BY STUDENT**

This research study is my original work and has not been presented to any other examination body. No part of this research should be reproduced without my consent or that of the University of Nairobi.

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R51/80331/2012

### **DECLARATION BY SUPERVISOR**

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University of Nairobi Supervisor.

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this project to my family for the support and encouragement they have accorded me, even with the stresses of work and on the verge of giving up, mom and dad your words of encouragement anchored me to success.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

Glory first be to God who provided the opportunity and resources to carry out this academic research paper. I also take this opportunity to give my sincerest gratitude to my parents and mentor/supervisor Dr. Patrick Maluki, who all played key roles in ensuring that I remained committed and motivated throughout my research.

## **ABSTRACT**

The attitudes and perceptions of foreign publics affect the ability of the country to form and maintain alliances in pursuit of common policy objectives; impact the cost and the effectiveness of military operations; influence local populations to either cooperate, support or be hostile as the nation pursues foreign policy and/or military objectives in that other country; affect the ability to secure support on issues of particular concern in multilateral fora; and dampen foreign publics' enthusiasm for business services and products. The main purpose of the study was to establish the role of Public Diplomacy in pursuit of Kenya's National Interest. The study sought to establish the role of Public Diplomacy in the War against Terrorism in Kenya, Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Kenya and in the challenge of nation-branding in Kenya. The study employed a rational choice perspective concerning public diplomacy which suggests that there is a continuum of costs and benefits that form the basis for the calculus of states that practice public diplomacy. Descriptive research design was used in the study where both primary and secondary sources were used to collect data. Interviews were conducted and data was analysed qualitatively using content analysis. The study found out that public diplomacy and information campaigns were key aspects of counterterrorism measures and that public diplomacy could be seen as part of nation branding, in which case concepts of branding and marketing are applied to public policy. The study also found out that image building was an effective strategy aimed to attract investors that are in early stages of decision - making. The study finally recommended that the government should further embark on an aggressive information campaign to educate the populace on terrorism, nation-branding and foreign direct investment using public diplomacy.

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## ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
CSOs	Civil society organizations
EACTI	East African Counterterrorism Initiative
FDI	Foreign direct investment
GoK	Government of Kenya
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
PD	Public diplomacy
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SVI	Shared Values Initiative
UN	United Nations



# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background of the study

In the present contemporary world with the spread of democracy has created a new environment in the international system to win hearts and minds of people by governments. This is what public diplomacy does by trying to influence foreign nationals and the public with values, policies and actions of their governments to be supported<sup>1</sup>. Public diplomacy can be defined as the efforts of one nation to influence public or elites of the next nation for the purpose of using foreign policy to its target. Governments always attempt to communicate with foreign public to export their ideas, its institutions and culture, as well as national goals and current policies.<sup>2</sup>

The Edward Murrow Center at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy offers a well-cited definition of public diplomacy that contrasts public diplomacy with “traditional diplomacy”:

*Public diplomacy ... deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one state with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications.*<sup>3</sup>

Central to this concept of public diplomacy is the communication between nations, peoples, and cultures. Public diplomacy is the task of many including journalists who would

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<sup>1</sup> Melissen, Jan, ed. (2007) *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>2</sup> Smith, P.H. *Public diplomacy*, by Minister-Counsellor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy, London. Retrieved on 26/04/2010. From: <http://www.diplomact.edu/books/mdiplomacy-book/smith/p.h.%20smith.htm>

<sup>3</sup> Gilboa, Eytan. (2008) “Searching for a theory of public diplomacy”. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616 (1).

share the experiences of other states with their audiences. While the idealism of such a definition of public diplomacy is obvious, it also brings up the necessity of communication and interaction for the practice of public diplomacy.<sup>4</sup>

Public diplomacy looks at promoting its culture for long term aims while short-term when it comes to current foreign policies and can also be looked at as propaganda for a nation state by improving its image abroad which will be favourable to the state.<sup>5</sup> The importance of foreign public diplomacy is that it is influenced by soft power rather than use of force or hard power and has brought dependency of citizens on their governments and the local press for information on foreign events and increased potential targets for direct communication of diplomatic messages.<sup>6</sup>

Another important point is that distribution of information around the globe is not restricted due to new technology that can transmit messages around the world in seconds like with fighting terrorism in an age of global real-time television and the internet. Public diplomacy also serves both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in the sense that they are intended for national interest like in the quest of investment, promotion of trade, and international tourism which is also referred to as branding and also creates cooperation and interaction.<sup>7</sup>

National interests for Kenya are envisioned in its foreign policy which for a long time had not been documented. It is only as recent as August 2009 that Kenya put down a written

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<sup>4</sup> Kennan, George. (1984) "Diplomacy in the Modern World". *American Diplomacy*. University of Chicago Press, 1984.

<sup>5</sup> Berridge, G.R. (2005) *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan

<sup>6</sup> Ibid (1984).

<sup>7</sup> Melissen, Jan, ed. (2007) *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

document for its foreign policy<sup>8</sup>. This is against the background of the fact that it has used its foreign policy as the compass for pursuing its national interests in its quest for economic prosperity. In addition, Kenya has used its foreign policy as a guide for its investment agenda as well as it is reference point as far as international relations are concerned. Kenya's foreign policy advances national interests through innovative diplomacy and is anchored on peaceful coexistence with its neighbors.<sup>9</sup>

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Individual communicators now have the ability to influence large numbers of people on a global scale through social networking, providing a direct challenge to the importance of traditional information media and actors. It is in this ever expanding and accelerating global communications environment that public diplomacy and international broadcasting must operate, competing for attention and for credibility in a time when rumors can spark riots, and information, whether it's true or false, quickly spreads across the world, across the internet, in literally instants.

The attitudes and perceptions of foreign publics created in this new environment are often as important as reality, and sometimes can even trump reality. These attitudes affect the ability of the country to form and maintain alliances in pursuit of common policy objectives; impact the cost and the effectiveness of military operations; influence local populations to either cooperate, support or be hostile as the nation pursues foreign policy and/or military objectives in that other country; affect the ability to secure support on issues of particular concern in multilateral fora; and dampen foreign publics' enthusiasm for business services and products.

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<sup>8</sup> Kenya's foreign policy dated August 2009

<sup>9</sup> See Kenya's foreign Policy August 2009 Preamble

Despite the fact that Public diplomacy (PD) has been experienced for decades, it has just attracted much interest of scholars since the post Cold War, especially post 9/11. There are numerous researches on PD practices of great powers like the U.S., UK, Germany, and emerging powers like China, Russia, and India. The display of PD by emerging powers and small countries, and the subsequent stimulation of researches on these variants have helped de-westernize the mainstream literature of PD with different perspectives. However, the domination of researches on western PD in the mainstream, especially the U.S. and UK, has not been finished.<sup>10</sup> There are few researches on PD by other practitioners, especially small countries and political organizations. Gilboa pointed out four weaknesses of existing researches on PD, which one of them is the intensive focus on experiences of the U.S. during the Cold War, while lack researches on PD activities of countries other than the U.S. and of other new actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), and individuals. Against this backdrop it may not be surprising to see that most students of diplomacy have given little systematic attention to public diplomacy. It is in this spirit that this study sought to investigate the role of Public Diplomacy in pursuit of Kenya's National Interest.

### **1.3 Objective of the Study**

The general objective of the study is to establish the role of Public Diplomacy in pursuit of Kenya's National Interest.

#### **1.3.1 Specific Objectives**

- i. To analyse the role of Public Diplomacy in the War against Terrorism in Kenya

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<sup>10</sup> Tuch, H. N. (1990). *Communicating with the world: U.S. public diplomacy overseas*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

- ii. To establish the role of Public Diplomacy and the challenge of nation-branding in Kenya.
- iii. To establish the role of Public Diplomacy in Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Kenya.

#### **1.4 Hypotheses of the Study**

The study proposes the following hypotheses:

- i. Public Diplomacy on its own plays a role in the war against terrorism in Kenya
- ii. Public Diplomacy plays a role in nation-branding in Kenya.
- iii. Public Diplomacy has a significant effect in foreign direct investment (FDI) in Kenya.

#### **1.5 Justification of the study**

Kenya, as a state, must project and protect its “national interests” in a hostile international environment and be able to know the points of convergence and divergence with the interests of any other country. It is also necessary to make a distinction between primary or core and secondary interests.<sup>11</sup> While secondary interests can be negotiated, the primary should not. The challenge is to know the difference so as not to give away primary interests while protecting secondary ones. A study that analyses the role of public diplomacy is of great importance, as it will not only help in achieving national interests but also regional one.<sup>12</sup> This study is therefore significant that it will provide facts on the role of public diplomacy in pursuit of Kenya’s national interest.

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<sup>11</sup> Macharia Munene (2011).Reflections on Kenya’s national and security interests. *Journal of Language, Technology & Entrepreneurship in Africa* Vol. 3 No. 1

<sup>12</sup> Ibid (2011).

The finding of this study would be of great importance to a number of actors. First and foremost, the Kenyan government, more so the public diplomacy policy makers would use the study findings as a benchmark for evaluating the role of public diplomacy in pursuit of Kenya's national interest. Secondly, study findings and recommendations would aid policy makers in designing and redesigning public diplomacy policies towards national interests. Last but not least, study findings will contribute to the body of literature on roles of public diplomacy on national interests besides making suggestions for further researches in the area.

## **1.6 Literature Reviews**

### **1.6.1 Introduction**

Recent events, especially those surrounding how Kenya projects itself in the region, have attracted attention that is not necessarily favourable. This calls for a reflection on what constitutes national as well as security interests and how to protect and advance them in the midst of potentially hostile environment.<sup>13</sup> The assumption by other countries that they have the right to instruct Kenya on how it should conduct its affairs is understandable in the sense that it may be in the interests of those countries to do so. That, however, is not necessarily in Kenya's interests and Kenyan officialdom should guard against falling into the trap of sacrificing national interests in order to please powerful external forces.<sup>14</sup>

### **1.6.2 The concept of National Interest**

In early human history the national interest was usually viewed as secondary to that of religion or morality. To engage in a war rulers needed to justify the action in these contexts. Today, the

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<sup>13</sup> Kenya's foreign policy dated August 2009

<sup>14</sup> Macharia Munene (2011). Reflections on Kenya's national and security interests. *Journal of Language, Technology & Entrepreneurship in Africa* Vol. 3 No. 1

concept of "the national interest" is often associated with political Realists who wish to differentiate their policies from "idealistic" policies that seek either to inject morality into foreign policy or promote solutions that rely on multilateral institutions which might weaken the independence of the state.<sup>15</sup>

As considerable disagreement exists in every country over what is or is not in "the national interest," the term is as often invoked to justify isolationist and pacifistic policies as to justify interventionist or warlike policies. The majority of the jurists consider that the "national interest" is incompatible with the "rule of law".<sup>16</sup>

While the notion of state reason comes first as a theme of study in political science, it is a very vague concept in law and has never been an object of systematic study. This obvious lack of interest is due to a deliberate epistemological choice - a form of positivism applied to legal science; and as a result legal science affirms its autonomy regarding other social sciences while constituting with exactness its own object - law - in order to describe it. In doing so it implies deterministic causes which have an influence on its descriptive function.<sup>17</sup> This method which puts aside state reason is not without any consequence: the fact that state reason is not taken into account by legal science is to be integrated within a global rejection of a description of law as presented in political science. A fundamental dynamic in modern constitutionalism, "the seizure of the political phenomenon by law" is all the more remarkable when it claims a scientific value, thus a neutrality aiming at preventing all objection. This convergence of legal science and constitutionalism has the tautological character of a rhetorical discourse in which law is

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<sup>15</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, (1952) *Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States*. The American Political Science Review, 46: 972.

<sup>16</sup> Gvosdev, Nikolas K. (2004), *Russia in the national Interest* (1st ed.), Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.).

<sup>17</sup> Ibid

simultaneously the subject and the object of the discourse on law. Having as a basis state reason, it allows a reflection on the legitimacy of power and authority of modern Western societies; this in connection with the representations which make it and which it makes "state reason and public law."<sup>18</sup>

Thus the idea of the national interest has two factors. One is rationally demanded and, therefore, of necessity. The other is changeable and decided by situations. In a world consisting of many competing and opposing nations for power, their survivals are their necessary and minimum requisites. "Thus all nations do what they cannot help but do: protect their physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations." <sup>19</sup>

While the concept of interest is indeed the substance of politics and is, therefore, perpetual and uninfluenced by time and place, the national state is a historical product and is not anything but changing. So the relation between interest and the national state is changing with vicissitude of time and place. "As long as the world is politically organized into nations," the necessary element of the national interest, that is, the survival, is "the last word in world politics. In other words, the foreign policy based on the survival is easily supported by bipartisanship."<sup>20</sup>

The situation is not the same concerning the changeable factors of the national interest. "All cross currents of personalities, public opinion, sectional interests, partisan politics, and political and moral folkways are brought" to exert influence upon their decision.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, (1950). The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions, *The American Political Science Review*, 45:243.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid

<sup>20</sup> Lavy, George (1996), *Germany and Israel: Moral Debt and National Interest* (1st ed.), Frank Cass & Co Ltd, London,

<sup>21</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, (1952) Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States. *The American Political Science Review* , 46: 972.



### 1.6.3 The concept of National Prestige

States often forgo their direct interests for the sake of prestige, investing in projects that display their modernity, engaging in conflicts over symbols of prestige, or building grand but impractical weapons. Especially in private or after leaving office, leaders admit that prestige is a motive but international relations scholars have generally ignored it as an explanatory concept. Prestige is often regarded as a matter of emotion and attitude, but the focus here is its strategic importance. Early realist writers like Herz, Morgenthau, Nicholson and Niebuhr were right to emphasize it.<sup>22</sup> It comes into play especially in bandwagoning situations, when a state wants support from other states whose actions are strategic complements -- the potential supporters find an alliance more attractive the more of them that are in it. If prestige-seeking is strategically sensible, it cannot be banished by sophisticated thinking. The hope is to channel it into constructive areas.<sup>23</sup>

Prestige is often spoken of as if it were a tangible commodity: it is “acquired,” “held” by a “bearer,” “granted,” “saved,” or “squandered.” The analysis here shows that the metaphor is only partly valid. Since prestige arises from the interaction of beliefs spread over the whole group, it is a social construction, different in this regard from bread or land, for example, but somewhat like money, which is largely social and reflexive in nature, and is a common metaphor for prestige.<sup>24</sup> Because prestige is not literally a commodity, because it involves not just what one does but how onlookers interpret why one does it and how they expect each other to interpret that, the world community has some non-obvious ways of inducing parties to choose nuclear restraint. A formal game will show that a state can sometimes increase its technological prestige. This result does not turn on one kind of prestige prevailing over another, e.g., it is not that good

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<sup>22</sup> Markey, Daniel. 1999. Prestige and the Origins of War: Returning to Realism’s Roots. *Security Studies*. 8 (4):128-32.

<sup>23</sup> Mercer, Jonathan. 1996. *Reputation and International Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

<sup>24</sup> McGinn, Robert. 1972. Prestige and the Logic of Political Argument. *Monist*. 56 (1):100-15.

world citizenship overbalances technological skill. Instead proliferators lose prestige for technological skill itself, the same quality the weapons were meant to demonstrate. The idea of showing you can do something by not doing it is counterintuitive, but it arises in real contexts and it can be understood by following the logic of the game's equilibrium.<sup>25</sup>

Several national programs have had prestige as a significant motive, one piece of the evidence being that their leaders have stated that. Saddam Hussein's interrogators found that he was ready to explain himself: he was interested in weapons of mass destruction for three reasons, their capability to deter or wage war, their cost relative to other kinds of weapons, and their benefits for his prestige among the Arab states. In the words of the CIA's Duelfer Report, he saw nuclear weapons as "both a symbol and a normal process of modernity."

*He aspired to the prestige associated with the advanced arts and sciences. In his view the most advanced and potent were nuclear science and technology. By all accounts and by the evidence of the massive effort expended by the Regime, nuclear programs were seen by Saddam as both a powerful lever and symbol of prestige.*<sup>26</sup>

In the common view Saddam meant to challenge the West in the name of Arab nationalism, but the report suggested that he was more concerned with prestige: "To the extent that you assume some of the stature of your enemy, Saddam derived prestige by being an enemy of the United States. Conversely it would have been equally prestigious for him to be an ally of the United States and regular entreaties were made during the last decade to explore this alternative." If an opportunity to avoid war was lost, this provides evidence of importance of prestige and the need to appreciate its importance.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid

<sup>26</sup> US Central Intelligence Agency 2004, transmittal letter, no pagination.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid

States pursue prestige for a variety of traits such as democratic ideals or sports accomplishments, but when nuclear weapons are sought the traits are most often military power or modernity and national competence. A U.S. State Department memo on the consequences of a Chinese test feared that many Asians would raise their estimate of Chinese military power and would see the Communist method as a better way to organize the resources of developing states.<sup>28</sup>

#### **1.6.4 Public Diplomacy**

Public diplomacy is now part of a global conversation. But it has many different meanings. The term strategic communication also has gained traction in recent years. Some see it as more inclusive than public diplomacy and more descriptive of a multi-stakeholder environment. Public diplomacy differs from education, journalism, advertising, branding, and public relations.<sup>29</sup> However, it imports methods and discourse norms from civil society – and it depends on deep and diverse relationships with civil society to succeed. Public diplomacy operates through actions, relationships, images, and words in three time frames: 24/7 news streams, medium range campaigns on high value policies, and long-term engagement. Its tools range from electronic media to cultural diplomacy to “the last three feet” of personal communication.<sup>30</sup>

The mainstay of the Public Diplomacy is the promotion of the country's national interests by providing correct understanding of its goals, policies and activities to the domestic and foreign audience. This goal is usually achieved by dialogue with individual citizens and other groups and institutions within the country and abroad. By supplying the right understanding of

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<sup>28</sup> Mutimer, David. 2000. *The Weapon State: Proliferation and the Framing of Security*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

<sup>29</sup> Leonard, M. (2002) *Public Diplomacy*, The Foreign Policy Centre: London

<sup>30</sup> Ross, C. (2002) Public Diplomacy Comes of Age, *The Washington Quarterly*, spring 2002, 25:2, pp. 75-83

the country's policy public diplomacy seeks to reduce the degree to which misperceptions and misunderstandings complicate its relations not only with other countries but also with domestic actors.<sup>31</sup> Public diplomacy differs from traditional diplomacy in that public diplomacy deals not only with governments but primarily with non-governmental individuals and organizations, i.e. the public diplomacy primarily engages many diverse non-government elements of a society. Public diplomacy addresses the domestic and international media in order to foster the understanding of country's goals, policy and activities. Publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television are most usually used tool for influencing the public opinion.<sup>32</sup>

The diplomatic practice has always been centered on official bilateral or multilateral channels of communication between states and has usually been shrouded in secrecy. While this traditional diplomacy will continue to be essential for states to conduct their foreign relations, several governments have begun to realize that it is necessary not only to target foreign governments in their efforts to reach foreign policy goals. One of the most notable products of this realization has been the growth of public diplomacy – i.e. diplomacy targeted not at foreign governments but rather at selected segments of foreign publics. The practitioners of public diplomacy will utilize several tools in their efforts to clarify the policies of their government to avoid misunderstandings based on propaganda or lack of information in the hope of eventually winning the *hearts and minds* of foreign publics.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid

<sup>32</sup> Leonard, M. (2002) *Public Diplomacy*, The Foreign Policy Centre: London

<sup>33</sup> Ross, C. (2002) Public Diplomacy Comes of Age, *The Washington Quarterly*, spring 2002, 25:2, pp. 75-83

#### 1.6.4.1 Goals of public diplomacy

Public diplomacy can make impacts on several levels depending on how successful the public diplomacy initiatives are conducted, for how long they run and how many resources are invested in them. The possible achievements for public diplomacy are listed below in a hierarchical order: Increasing people's familiarity with one's country (making them think about it, updating their images, turning around unfavourable opinions); Increasing people's appreciation of one's country (creating positive perceptions, getting others to see issues of global importance from the same perspective); Engaging people with one's country (strengthening ties – from education reform to scientific co-operation; encouraging people to see us as an attractive destination for tourism, study, distance learning; getting them to buy our products; getting to understand and subscribe to our values); Influencing people (getting companies to invest, publics to back our positions or politicians to turn to us as a favoured partner)"<sup>34</sup>

So the goals of public diplomacy can span a vast area from basically introducing the country to targeted audiences or dispelling any misperceptions they might have about it to actively engaging people with the country by attracting people there for sightseeing, studies or making investments or political deals. The hopes of what to expect of public diplomacy initiatives relies on how the relations already are and in which areas mainly are sought strengthened – be it political, economic or cultural relations.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Leonard, M. (2002b) Diplomacy by Other Means, *Foreign Policy* September/October 132, pp. 48-56

<sup>35</sup> Ibid

#### 1.6.4.2 Public diplomacy and propaganda

It can be tempting to see public diplomacy as a more easily digestible term for what has always gone under the name of propaganda. Although the concepts are related in that they both seek to affect the opinions of foreign publics they are, needless to say, very different too.<sup>36</sup> Generally speaking, propaganda seeks to narrow down the horizon of people by trying to mould their minds through any means necessary while public diplomacy strives to open the minds of people through information and education.<sup>37</sup> Public diplomacy of course has the motives to broaden the minds of people in what they see as the right direction and has a specific agenda but it can be more helpful to see it as counter-propaganda or the breaking down of prejudices the receiver has of the sender. Public diplomacy has furthermore borrowed crucial experiences from the conventional diplomacy – namely lies and disinformation is in the long run very counter-productive and should never be done. As soon as diplomatic practitioners are caught in spreading disinformation in any area it undermines all their work and the messages they have been trying to send out.<sup>38</sup>

A final distinction between propaganda and public diplomacy is, while propaganda continuously spreads messages to its targeted audiences public diplomacy utilizes a two-way communication strategy. Practitioners of public diplomacy has to listen to what their audiences thinks and has to say about them and their governments, since this will provide them more credibility and opportunity to continuously tailor the messages they are sending out to have the biggest positive impact. The key is not the amount of information sent out but rather finding out

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<sup>36</sup> Berridge, G.R. (2005) *Diplomacy – Theory and Practice*, Palgrave Macmillan: New York

<sup>37</sup> Ibid

<sup>38</sup> Melissen, J. (2007) *Between Theory and Practice, The New Public Diplomacy – Soft Power in International Relations*, Jan Melissen (ed.) pp. 3-27, Palgrave Macmillan: London

the most effective way to deliver the correct message by the right means to achieve the best result. An understanding of the situation and general viewpoints of different segments of the target population has to be developed in order to achieve these results.<sup>39</sup>

#### **1.6.4.3 The established diplomacy and public diplomacy**

The emergence of the new public diplomacy has created a vast array of conundrums for the established diplomatic community and their ministries of foreign affairs. One of the biggest challenges in this regard is how to integrate this new area in the diplomatic organization. The very nature of public diplomacy is to seem open and outreaching which historically has not been one of the strongest suits of the diplomatic corps – who always has had an aura of secrecy and inapproachability about it. This is because as mentioned earlier partly because it has previously been necessary for them to conduct negotiations with counterparts and to investigate situations of the countries they are stationed in – neither of which is an area conducive to a culture of openness.<sup>40</sup>

The reason openness is a necessity for successful public diplomacy is not only that it targets foreign publics but also that it is useful to include other organizations in parts of the public diplomacy strategies. Cooperation with NGOs, the private sector (including mass media) or other state organizations (i.e. ministries of education, trade/economy or culture) are all obvious means of enhancing the impacts of the strategies as the ministries of foreign affairs will inevitably have limited resources and connections.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Leonard, M. (2002b) *Diplomacy by Other Means*, Foreign Policy September/October 132, pp. 48-56

<sup>40</sup> Hocking, B. (2007) *Rethinking the 'New' Public Diplomacy*, *The New Public Diplomacy – Soft Power in International Relations*, Jan Melissen (ed.) pp. 28-46, Palgrave Macmillan: London

<sup>41</sup> Riordan, S. (2007) *Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy*, *The New Public Diplomacy – Soft Power in International Relations*, Jan Melissen (ed.) pp. 180-195, Palgrave Macmillan: London

These groupings and organizations are necessary to include in any public diplomacy strategy as they have expertise knowledge in areas the ministry of foreign affairs and their staff lacks. Furthermore the incorporation of NGOs and civil society can give an aura of credibility to public diplomacy initiatives which government officials would never be able to do – especially towards potentially hostile population segments.<sup>42</sup> The involvement of non-governmental actors should both include people and organizations in the sending and receiving countries and could include journalists, universities, individual academics, businessmen or artists just to mention a few. The most interesting for public diplomacy planners are to get people and organizations involved with the strategy in the receiving country, but it will often be necessary to recruit people in the sending country first to give the initiative credibility. One of the big challenges for the traditional diplomacy will therefore be to include more actors and begin to show more openness.<sup>43</sup>

### **1.6.5 Three dimensions of public diplomacy**

Public diplomacy activities can roughly be divided in to three dimensions depending on the specific needs in different scenarios. These three dimensions are reactive, proactive and relationship building – and can be directed towards the political/military, economic or societal/cultural areas or any combination of these.<sup>44</sup> The reactive variation of public diplomacy practice centers on news management and is a very short term strategy to spread the official opinion of the government about any news affecting it in any way. The proactive approach is a medium term strategy to actively create positive news regarding any messages governments want

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid

<sup>43</sup> Riordan, S. (2007) *Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy*, The New Public Diplomacy – Soft Power in International Relations, Jan Melissen (ed.) pp. 180-195, Palgrave Macmillan: London

<sup>44</sup> Berridge, G.R., Maurice Keens-Soper and T.G. Otte (2001) *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, Palgrave: New York



to send out – for example through the organization of events and activities. Finally the relationship building approach is the long term strategy to create, maintain and improve relations between foreign people and the sending country. This takes years of funding of programs of for example scholarship sponsoring. Below follows a more in depth presentation of the three dimensions.<sup>45</sup>

### **1.6.5.1 News management**

This dimension of public diplomacy includes a short term rapid response strategy. The main idea behind this approach is that when something happens in the world which might affect people's perception of a government it is necessary to react fast and ensure the government's official positions are explained and clarified to the public.<sup>46</sup> One major obstacle for this approach is that it is very difficult to tailor a message to a certain group of people as most people around the world will have access to more or less the same information and will also hear what government officials has to say about an issue. This can be illustrated very well with following quote of Colin Powell about his time in the Gulf War where he told his staff:

*“Remember, when we are out there on television, communicating instantaneously around the world, we're talking to five audiences.’ One, the reporters who ask the question – important audience. Second audience, the American people who are watching. The third audience, 170 capitals who may have an interest in what the subject is. Fourth, you are talking to your enemy. It was a unique situation to know that your enemy was getting the clearest indication of your intentions by watching you on television at the same time you were giving that message. And fifth, you were talking to the troops. Their lives were on the line.”<sup>47</sup>*

This illustrates the dilemma practitioners of public diplomacy faces when confronted with conventional mass media. It is problematic to convey a message in a rhetoric which will not be

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<sup>45</sup> Leonard, M. (2002) *Public Diplomacy*, The Foreign Policy Centre: London

<sup>46</sup> Gvosdev, Nikolas K. (2004), *Russia in the national Interest* (1st ed.), Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.).

<sup>47</sup> Leonard, M. (2002) *Public Diplomacy*, The Foreign Policy Centre: London

misconstrued by some of the audience. The public diplomacy plans can easily be scrapped in favor of pleasing domestic crowds.<sup>48</sup>

A way to direct the correct communication to a chosen foreign public or grouping in another country to the fullest effect is to increase support and potentially funding for local media. By funneling the messages which is in correlation with the public diplomacy strategy through local media with a limited audience, it is easier to tailor a message which will provide a satisfactory result in relation to this local audience. This approach can be enhanced further if one of the locals convey this message as the audience will believe more in one of their own than in foreign government representatives – especially in areas hostile towards the sending government.<sup>49</sup>

### **1.6.5.2 Strategic communications**

This dimension of public diplomacy represents the medium-term strategy which lasts for months at a time. This approach emphasizes on setting the news agenda instead of just responding to what is happening and can be done through events or organizing advertisement campaigns – where public diplomacy begins to overlap towards its related concept of nation branding. The strategic communication strategy can be aimed at improving relations in either political, economical and cultural areas or any combination of these. Events could be anything from hosting the Olympics or a summit on global warming depending on what image a country would like to promote.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid

<sup>49</sup> Hoffman, D. (2002) *Beyond Public Diplomacy*, Foreign Affairs Mar/Apr 2002 vol. 81 issue 2, pp. 83-95

<sup>50</sup> Nye, J.S. (2002) *The Paradox of American Power – why the world's only superpower can't go it alone*, Oxford University Press: Oxford

The main difference from the first dimension here is thereby that it in the second dimension is possible for the actor to put more planning and consideration in to the messages they send out and can more easily target the people and organizations they would like to affect with the message or image they send out. A problem within this area in the meantime is that different state organizations will often have diverging interests in what image they want to promote. An example here could be whether to promote a country's more traditional sides to promote tourism or the more modern sides to promote investments.<sup>51</sup>

A first hand example of this was the dilemma the commercial section of the Danish embassy in Japan was standing in when they had they were publishing the magazine *Hello Denmark* to the Japanese public. As the two main interests for the Danish strategy towards Japan was to attract investments and to increase tourism, they had to promote an image of an idyllic country with small villages and a highly technologically modern country well worthwhile investing in.<sup>52</sup>

### **1.6.5.3 Relationship building**

The third and last dimension of public diplomacy is relationship building – this is the most long term strategy used and is potentially the most significant. The relationship building programs stretches over years and is aimed at giving deep insight to a select group of people of one's country through various schemes such as scholarships and network creation. A notable element to this approach is that the planning governmental organization plays a secondary/facilitating role as the approach is mainly focused on establishing networks between likeminded people

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid (2002)

<sup>52</sup> Andreasen, U. (2007) *Diplomati og Globalisering – En introduktion til Public Diplomacy*, Museum Tusulanums Forlag Københavns Universitet: Copenhagen

across borders – be it politicians, academics, artists or businessmen. A truly successful relationship building public diplomacy effort will be very costly as it will have to administer, plan and sponsor the exchange of a significant amount of people in order for it to have a decent impact.<sup>53</sup>

Probably the most important relationship building scheme is educational exchange. If governments set up beneficial conditions for foreigners to come to their country to study for months or years they are sure to get a nuanced picture of the country they are staying. These will possibly then function as de facto ambassadors for the country they had been towards their friends or families. An added bonus is that some of these people who had been enjoying the benefits of such an exchange program might rise to prominent positions within their own countries. It is estimated that 1500 cabinet-level ministers and 200 current and former heads of state has been participating in the American International Visitors Program.<sup>54</sup>

A potentially very important area to create ties and foster communication is between political parties across borders. Facilitating meetings between members of similar political parties and not just government officials and cabinet members will likely provide increased understanding both between politicians but could secondarily affect the message these politicians send out to their respective constituencies. An example of this is Konrad Adenauer Stiftung which is a German organization which promotes contact between Christian Democrat parties in different countries and is funded by the state.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid (2002)

<sup>54</sup> Ross, C. (2003) *Pillars of Public Diplomacy – Grappling with International Public Opinion*, Harvard International Review, summer 2003 pp. 22-27

<sup>55</sup> Leonard, M. (2002b) Diplomacy by Other Means, *Foreign Policy* September/October 132, pp. 48-56

### 1.6.6 Kenya's National Interests

Discussing national security interests requires a thorough understanding of what the national interests to be secured are. The interplay between interest and security at any level is at the centre of any political unit, irrespective of the size of that unit. The entities in operation are geopolitical units that have defined borders called states which, over time, have acquired a self-justification that make them appear, and are then assumed, to be natural. By their very nature, states seek to protect themselves from all types of threats whether the danger is internal or external. They have become instruments through which peoples are administered and conduct their socio-economic affairs, and struggle to survive as viable entities in the midst of many challenges.<sup>56</sup>

States are then “sovereign” units and each is considered to be a “nation” that has “interests” which need “security”. “Security” can refer to the survival of that unit as a political entity while “interest” can refer to the values that distinguish that unit from any other. The two concepts compliment each other. Of the two, however, it is “interest” that takes precedence in the sense that the purpose of “security” is to secure “interests” that define a given political unit. The capacity of various political entities to provide “security” for their “interests” varies and depends on numerous factors.<sup>57</sup>

Subsequently, “national interests” and “national security” are concepts that are ever present in international discourse as countries try to short-change each other. How well a country does affects its ability to secure its interests. In doing so, there appears to be roughly three elements that should be considered and that help to make clear what a country's position should

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<sup>56</sup> Ken Menkhaus, “What the Deadly Attack on a Kenya Mall was Really About.” <http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/09/22/2662191/deadly-attack-kenya-mall-sign-desperation/>

<sup>57</sup> Macharia Munene (2011). Reflections on Kenya's national and security interests. *Journal of Language, Technology & Entrepreneurship in Africa* Vol. 3 No. 1

be in relations to others. These include thorough knowledge of its own national philosophy and ideals, thorough knowledge of the national ideals and philosophies in other countries that might affect it, and knowledge of the points of convergence and divergence that a country has with other countries.<sup>58</sup>

Kenya, as a state, must project and protect its “national interests” in a hostile international environment and be able to know the points of convergence and divergence with the interests of any other country. It is also necessary to make a distinction between primary or core and secondary interests. While secondary interests can be negotiated, the primary should not. The challenge is to know the difference so as not to give away primary interests while protecting secondary ones. Among the core interests are the sovereignty of the state and the right of the citizens to have ultimate authority on what happens, the governing structure or the constitution from which all activities including diplomacy are derived, and the security of that state.<sup>59</sup>

In addition, there are other vital interests that shape the character of state. Among these is the economic well being and ability to be self-reliant. Excessive dependency on others is detrimental to national interests and tends to erode a country’s its ability to act in a sovereign manner.<sup>60</sup> It makes it difficult for Kenya to demand reciprocity, which is vital to national interest and sense of national security. This implies relative equality of states and entails demanding that a country’s citizens are treated with as much respect in other places as they accord to foreigners. It is a belief that a given country is not a lesser country and that its citizens are not lesser human beings than others. Inability to demand reciprocity also affects Kenya’s image. Protecting the

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<sup>58</sup> Kenya’s foreign policy dated August 2009

<sup>59</sup> Ojo Olatunde J.C.B, (1985). *African International Relations*. Longman Group (FE) Ltd Hong Kong.pg 160

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, (2011).

image of a country is an important national interest and this might call for occasional engagement in acts of symbolic toughness.<sup>61</sup>

Kenya's strategic national interests are largely economic with a view to finding markets for its industrial products as well as employment opportunities for its burgeoning labor force. In addition, it seeks to ensure that its labor force does not miss out on employment opportunities in the region. With its strong economy Kenya have continued to advance leading to a backwash effect in contrast to the spread effect where the latter would lead to resources moving from the richer area to accelerate growth in the poorer areas<sup>62</sup>

## **1.7 Theoretical Framework**

### **Rational choice model**

Rational choice theory is a framework for understanding and often formally modeling social and economic behavior.<sup>63</sup> Rationality, interpreted as "wanting more rather than less of a good", is widely used as an assumption of the behavior of individuals in microeconomic models and analysis and appears in almost all economics textbook treatments of human decision-making. It is also central to some of modern political science, sociology, and philosophy.<sup>64</sup> It attaches "wanting more" to instrumental rationality, which involves seeking the most cost-effective means to achieve a specific goal without reflecting on the worthiness of that goal. Gary Becker was an early proponent of applying rational actor models more widely.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid (2011).

<sup>62</sup> Ojo Olatunde J.C.B, (1985). *African International Relations*. Longman Group (FE) Ltd Hong Kong.pg 160

<sup>63</sup> Anand, P. (1993). "Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk", Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid

<sup>65</sup> Allingham, Michael (2002). *Choice Theory: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford

A rational choice perspective concerning public diplomacy would suggest that there is a continuum of costs and benefits that form the basis for the calculus of states that practice public diplomacy. <sup>66</sup>A rational theory then would find that states practice public diplomacy out of national interests, usually a complex measurement of immediate and future gains. These interests could range from prestige (a key indicator in the quantitative study) to tangible economic benefits perhaps including increased tourism or greater proclivity for outside states to trade with the state. The obvious advantages of public diplomacy and improving a state's international image contrast the more opaque interest of convincing other states to a state's national narrative.

The rational, cost-benefit analysis that might predict the practice of public diplomacy also includes a relevant cost: capacity including wealth and development. In this way, a state practices public diplomacy out of national interests but the possibility of practicing public diplomacy may be limited by capacity. In evaluating the rational motivations behind the practice of public diplomacy it will be central to understand factors such as prestige and wealth.<sup>67</sup>

While the rational explanation for motivations concerning public diplomacy holds great sway in this study, there is a central criticism to the rational perspective. The critique of rational choice public diplomacy motivations comes from the concept of "credible public diplomacy".<sup>68</sup>

Murrow argues that for public diplomacy to be effective it must be credible and, necessarily, truthful. If the motivations behind the practice of public diplomacy are purely rational, self interest, then there is a distinct possibility that the perceived credibility of public

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<sup>66</sup> Shoemaker, P. J. & Reese, S.D. (1996). *Mediating the message: Theories of influence on mass media content* (2nd ed.). White Plains, NY: Longman.

<sup>67</sup> Kinoshita, Y., & Mody, A. (2001, May). Private information for foreign investment in emerging economies. *The Canadian Journal of Economics*, 34(2), 448-464.

<sup>68</sup> Gilboa, E. (2001). Diplomacy in the media age: *Three models of uses and effects, Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol.12, 2, 1-28.



diplomacy is diminished. States may decide it is in their interest to project their ideals and image abroad; however, the practice would be undermined if the foreign public thought that the public diplomacy narrative being projected is contrived and a vehicle for manipulation. In this way, self-interest can run counter to the efficacy of public diplomacy<sup>69</sup>.

Beyond the limitation of rational motivations as potentially limiting the efficacy of public diplomacy, there is also the persistent concern of rational choice involving an impossible or, at least, unidentifiable calculus.<sup>70</sup> Even if they desire to act rationally, states may not appropriately distribute their resources or otherwise miscalculate the cost-benefit analysis. In this way, rational analysis of the motivations behind public diplomacy practice offers a base to theoretically explain public diplomacy but not definitive explanation.

## **1.8 Research Methodology**

The research design used in this study was the descriptive survey method.<sup>71</sup> This method was preferred because it allowed for prudent comparison of the research findings. The qualitative design chosen for this research was theory grounded, or natural inquiry. Grounded theory research unfolds and emerges empirically from the data and is more responsive to contextual values rather than researcher values.<sup>72</sup> The study primary research entailed visits to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government to conduct personal interviews with the staff. This enabled the researcher get a snapshot understanding of the various roles of public diplomacy in pursuing Kenya's national interest as

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid (2001)

<sup>70</sup> Ibid (2011)

<sup>71</sup> D. R. Cooper and P. S. Schindler, *Research Methods* (7th ed. New York: Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 2000) p 112

<sup>72</sup> A. D. Jankowicz, *Research Projects* (6th ed. London: Thomson Learning, 2002) p 87

well as the steps being undertaken towards achieving that. Therefore purposive sampling was used to choose those to be interviewed to help get the right information.

Data was mainly derived from secondary and primary sources. For the primary data open ended interviews were used. The study used an interview guide to collect the required data. An interview guide is a set of questions that the interviewer asks when interviewing.<sup>73</sup> It makes it possible to obtain data required to meet specific objectives of the study. The data collection tool for the secondary data that was used was an in-depth information gathering, and document analysis. This technique mainly involved literature research. Data collected in this procedure included quotations, opinions and specific knowledge and background information relating to the role of Public Diplomacy in pursuit of Kenya's National Interest.

Data collected was purely qualitative and it was analyzed by means of content analysis. Content analysis involves observation and detailed description of phenomena that comprise the object of study.<sup>74</sup> This method was preferred because the information collected was qualitative and therefore required analytical understanding. When human coders are used in content analysis, reliability translates to the amount of agreement or correspondence among two or more coders.<sup>75</sup> Reliability in content analysis was ensured by analyzing the amount of agreement or correspondence among the key informants. The primary data was supplemented by secondary data on public diplomacy and national interest. The secondary data was collected from electronic journals, book, periodic reviews and articles.

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<sup>73</sup> Mugenda, O. M., & Mugenda, A. G., *“Research methods: Quantitative and qualitative approaches”*, (Nairobi: Acts Press Siegel, N. 2003), Research methods for managers, A skill building approaches (2nd ed.).( New York: Wiley Publishers, 2003). Pp. 71

<sup>74</sup> Holsti, O.R., *“Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities”*, (MA: Addison-Wesley 1980) pp, 7

<sup>75</sup> Neuendorf, K. A., *“The Content Analysis Guidebook Thousand Oaks”*, (CA: Sage Publications, 2002) pp. 56

The data was also analyzed by making connections to existing, and integrating it with relevant concepts and theoretical framework. Data was analyzed interpretatively. This was done by synthesizing, categorizing and organizing the data into patterns that produced the description of the phenomena or a narrative of the synthesis. It then proceeded from the belief that all meaning was situational in the particular context or perspective.<sup>76</sup> Since it was a qualitative research the hypothesis was generated after the data was collected. This entailed evaluating and analyzing the data to determine the adequacy of its information and its credibility, usefulness consistency and validation of the hypothesis. This was the final step and entailed giving a vivid descriptive account of the situation under study. It gave an analytical view citing the significance and implications of the findings.<sup>77</sup>

Permission to carry out the study was sought from the relevant bodies including the university, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government and media houses. Participants of the study were also assured of their anonymity and confidentiality and that the study was for academic purposes only and no intimidation whatsoever could arise from participating in the study. The study was carried out in Nairobi where the ministries headquarters are located. The study was constrained by time and finances.

## **1.9 Chapter outline**

The study is presented in the following five chapters: chapter one presents the background information, statement of the problem, objectives and research questions, literature review, justification and hypotheses of the study, study assumptions, theoretical review as well as the

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<sup>76</sup> Hsieh, H.F., & Shannon, S.E. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. *Qualitative Health Research*, 15(9), 1277-1288.

<sup>77</sup> E. Burrow, H Gichohi & M. Infield, “*Rhetoric or Reality; a review of Community Conservation Policy and Practice in East Africa*, Nairobi.” (2001) p. 48.

methodology that were be used to carry data presentation. Chapter two presents the role of public diplomacy in the war against terrorism globally and also here in Kenya. Chapter three clearly outlines the rise of nation branding and its relationship with public diplomacy. It also discusses nation branding in Kenya. Chapter four entails details regarding the relationship between public diplomacy and the foreign direct investment in Kenya. Finally, chapter five presents the research findings from the sample population and present analysis. It also looks at whether this research approves or disapproves the hypothesis. Conclusions are also arrived at as well as study recommendations.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM IN KENYA

#### 2.1 Introduction

On Sunday, September 22, 2013, *al-Shabab*, a Somali-based al Qaeda cell unleashed gunfire on a Kenyan shopping mall, murdering 72 people and injuring over 200 others. The deadliest terrorist attack in Kenya since the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, the Kenyan mall shooting temporarily brought Africa to the forefront of international news organizations like CNN, MSNBC, and Fox, who typically ignore the continent. While the gravity of this event cannot be overstated, it also serves as the latest example of how Western media attention to Africa is too often born out of the exigencies of crisis.<sup>78</sup> However, the range of YouTube videos, tweets, and phone calls originating almost instantaneously from the victims of the attack provide evidence of the ways in which new technologies offer new opportunities for content distribution. This allows for the circulation of events both within and outside of the mainstream media and between Western and African journalists. With so many sources of information, African stories are now easier to cover and African voices are more accessible.

#### 2.2 Public diplomacy and mediatic diplomacy

Public diplomacy is an international political communication activity. Teresa La Porte, for example, has defined it as “the art of cultivating public opinion in order to achieve foreign policy goals”.<sup>79</sup> From this more instrumental perspective, which prevails in the practice of traditional public diplomacy, the activity is understood as a tool to serve the image and foreign policy

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<sup>78</sup> Pillar, Paul. 2013. *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

<sup>79</sup> CULL, Nicholas J, “Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past”, CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, Figueroa Press, Los Angeles, 2009.

interests of those who perform it (mainly states and international organizations, like the European Union). It is understood that those who perform it are worried about the opinions and behaviors of other countries' citizens because of their importance for their interests, since other countries' citizens influence the decision-making and actions related to foreign policy of their respective governments or organizations.<sup>80</sup>

The allusions to a “new public diplomacy” come up in parallel with the evolution that traditional public diplomacy experiences to adapt itself to the new global context. Some innovative traits attributed to “new public diplomacy” are the incorporation of new technologies, the further promotion of dialogue, the active involvement of non-governmental agents, the aim of encouraging nation-building and the incorporation of practices from marketing and public relations.<sup>81</sup> Regarding this last trait, it is important to note Juan Luis Manfredi's contribution. Aware of the changes in the international arena affecting public diplomacy, Manfredi bets on the development of communicative strategies in line with foreign policy and that correspond to an ordered pattern with mission, vision, objectives and results measurement. This includes the identification and analysis of relevant audiences, the design of campaigns and construction of messages, the execution of campaigns and an evaluation of results<sup>82</sup>. The process is very similar to the process followed in marketing and public relations campaigns.

For Kathy P. Fitzpatrick, the most prominent feature of “new public diplomacy” is its more discursive perspective of the activity itself: the emphasis would be placed on cooperation, understanding and mutual benefit. Accordingly, Fitzpatrick has defined “new public diplomacy”

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid

<sup>81</sup> Alonso, Gabriel, Manfredi, Juan Luis., Rubio, Rafael (eds.), Retos de nuestra acción exterior: Diplomacia pública y Marca España. Colección Escuela Diplomática, 2012

<sup>82</sup> Botes, Marina, The Public Diplomacy of the United States of America in the War on Terror, Dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2007.

as “the management function that establishes and maintains mutually beneficial relationships between an organization and the publics on whom its success or failure depends”<sup>83</sup>. Contributions like that of Fitzpatrick raise a number of questions about the basis that should guide public diplomacy (or “new public diplomacy”): Should public diplomacy look for the achievement of foreign policy interests (instrumental perspective) or the aim should be to achieve a network cooperation in which relations were managed to obtain mutual benefit (discursive perspective)? Is it possible to combine both perspectives?<sup>84</sup>

Beyond the distinction between traditional public diplomacy and “new public diplomacy”, or between the instrumental and discursive perspective, it is important to note that there are different types or variants of public diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy and mediatic diplomacy are present since the beginning of public diplomacy; nation branding and niche diplomacy are more recent. Cultural diplomacy is characterized by the realization of cultural and educative activities; mediatic diplomacy resorts to the media as the main channel to promote political discourse; nation branding tries to convey a favorable image of a country<sup>85</sup> and niche diplomacy develops strategies aimed to influence or to acquire prominence in specific ideas or themes, as well as in specific audiences.

Mediatic diplomacy<sup>86</sup>, object of interest in this article, resorts to the media as the main instrument to ensure that political discourse has an echo and is transmitted abroad in a favorable way, be it in a direct way (through them, in the case of institutional media) or in an indirect way (influencing or having a positive coverage on them, in the case of foreign public and private

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<sup>83</sup> Seib, Philip, *Toward a New Public Diplomacy. Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009

<sup>84</sup> Ibid

<sup>85</sup> Blinken, Antony J., “From Preemption to Engagement”, *Survival*, vol. 45, n° 4, 2003, pp. 33-60.

<sup>86</sup> Melissen, Jan, *The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005.

media). Mediatic diplomacy is an activity that works in the short and medium term, and whose traditional actors are political personalities and diplomatic representatives.<sup>87</sup> Among its most characteristic actions are the speeches, press conferences, interviews, comments to the media, media events and the organization of specific informative activities. The object of these actions is to promote a specific view of actuality, to defend political decisions and to provide information. In conclusion, the political message that receives media coverage abroad could be considered as mediatic diplomacy. And, if the coverage is positive, it could be considered as successful mediatic diplomacy. So, mediatic diplomacy can be understood as an essentially instrumental public diplomacy variant. However, the current generalization of new technologies and social networks, and their repercussion in traditional media, could modify the understanding and practice of mediatic diplomacy, resulting in a more discursive activity.

Returning to the previous questions it could be stated that, in reality, the instrumental and discursive perspectives of public diplomacy coexist from the beginnings of public diplomacy. Traditional public diplomacy includes activities of discursive nature, such as cultural diplomacy activities. And, while the “new public diplomacy” can give more weight to the discursive perspective, the strength and impact of political discourse is still an important element. The fact that public diplomacy serves the interests of a country or organization necessarily implies that it is an instrumental activity, but this is not incompatible with the adoption of strategies and actions typical of the “new public diplomacy” or of a more discursive perspective of the activity.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid

<sup>88</sup> Nye, J. S. 1990. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. Basic Books, New York, NY.



### **2.3 The “War on Terror” and the role of public diplomacy**

As stated, 9/11 made the United States’ interest in public diplomacy reappear. So, the “War on Terror” was accompanied by public diplomacy strategies, whose message relied on the Bush Doctrine. The term Bush Doctrine is employed to refer to the ideas on security and foreign policy that supported the “War on Terror” actions and the United States’ public diplomacy message<sup>89</sup>. It can be summarized in three premises. First, the United States does not make distinctions between terrorists and those who support or harbor them: nations will have to choose between fighting terrorists or sharing their fate<sup>90</sup>. This gives place to a fight against an enemy that may include both terrorist groups and states. The second premise is based on the National Security Strategy of September 2002, which was applied to the Iraq War. The document containing the strategy suggests the possibility that the United States conduct “preemptive strikes”<sup>91</sup> if it is necessary for security reasons, so is must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist allies before they are able to threaten or to use weapons of mass destruction against the country and their allies and friends<sup>92</sup>. That is to say, the “War on Terror” would be done on the offensive and not on the defensive, attacking enemies abroad before they could attack at home. The third premise of the Bush Doctrine is based on the same document, which also links terrorism to the lack of elements like freedom, democracy and free enterprise. A governance model based on these elements would be the only sustainable model and the one the United States should promote in order to achieve national success, to end terrorism and to secure peace.

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<sup>89</sup> Bush, George W., *Decision Points*, Virgin, London, 2010

<sup>90</sup> Castells, Manuel, “The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance”, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 616, n° 1, 2008, pp. 78-93.

<sup>91</sup> Cull, Nicholas J, “Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past”, *CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy*, Figueroa Press, Los Angeles, 2009.

<sup>92</sup> Cutlip, Scott M., CENTER, Allen H., BROOM, Glen M., *Effective Public Relations*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1985.

The “War of Ideas” (2001-2005), the first public diplomacy strategy of the “War on Terror”, tried to improve the image of the United States abroad in order to conquer “the hearts and minds” of the moderate Muslims against terrorism messages, as well as to achieve international cooperation in the “War on Terror”. In order to do that, it was necessary to design the United States’ message properly, spreading the values of its culture in a successful way and explaining its policies<sup>93</sup>.

The second one, the “Transformational Diplomacy” (2005-2009), is developed after the military intervention in Iraq in the spring of 2003 and after the outbreak of scandals such as the torture of prisoners in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo or the knowledge of the existence of secret prisons and CIA flights in Europe. Therefore, the aim was to transform global attitudes towards the United States and its policies, promoting understanding among cultures and religions and convincing about the success and convenience of the “War on Terror”.<sup>94</sup> The strategies also pleaded for a democratic transformation of countries, especially in the Middle East, and to accomplish this transformation through the development of civil society and the collaboration with it (nation building).

## **2.4 The Power Structure of the War on Terrorism**

In the war on terrorism, public diplomacy is a part of a broader network of power. Joseph Nye describes the space for agency in international issues with the metaphor ‘three dimensional chess game of world politics’. In this game, one can win “only by playing vertically as well as horizontally”<sup>95</sup>. The top of the board represents classic interstate military issues, where the

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<sup>93</sup> Entman, Robert M., “Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. Case”, *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, vol. 13, n° 2, 2008, pp. 87-102.

<sup>94</sup> Entman, Robert M, *Projections of Power. Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2004

<sup>95</sup> Nye, J. S. 2004. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Public Affairs*, New York, NY.

United States is the only superpower with global military reach. At this level, the distribution of power can be understood in traditional terms of unipolarity or hegemony. The middle board represents interstate economic issues; and at this level, the distribution of power is multipolar and requires cooperation between different actors for desired outcomes to be obtained. The bottom board represents transnational issues like terrorism, international crime, climate change, and the spread of infectious diseases. At this level, Nye argues, “power is widely distributed and chaotically organized among state and nonstate actors”<sup>96</sup>. The new challenge of international terrorism affects the space for American power at each of the three levels.

Nye argues that the distribution of power resources in the information age varies greatly on different issues. Influence can be achieved in different ways: coercion with threats; payments; or attraction and co-optation of people’s preferences. The last means is what Nye calls soft power, a term he first coined in 1990 in the book *Bound to Lead*, when he disputed the idea that the American hegemony was in decline. Soft power is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments”<sup>97</sup>. Attraction is a substantial power resource because it shapes the preferences of others. However, the effect of soft power is far less tangible than hard power, creating general influence rather than producing an easily observable specific action. The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources that produce such attraction: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to it at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)”<sup>98</sup>. Public diplomacy can be both a soft power resource and a tool for communicating attractive power.

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid

<sup>97</sup> Ibid, (2004)p 9

<sup>98</sup> Ibid, (2004)p 21

The term ‘soft power’ does not relate consistently to the metaphorical chessboard. Nye categorizes power in three dimensions as ‘military, economic and soft’, but also stresses the ‘soft’ dimensions of military and economic issues. Hard and soft powers can sometimes reinforce each other, and sometimes interfere<sup>99</sup>. Especially post-industrial democracies demand legitimacy of warfare, which affects the role of military power, and war affects the trust necessary for the flows of capital in a globalised economy. Likewise, issues like terrorism have economic and military aspects, but the success of these resources, for both terrorists and counterterrorist practices, depends on soft power.

#### **2.4.1 The Soft Power of Terrorism**

In the three-dimensional game, Nye argues, “you will lose if you focus only on one board and fail to notice the other boards and the vertical connections among them”<sup>100</sup>. He exemplifies this with the military actions in the war on terrorism on the top board of the chessboard, which simultaneously on the bottom board increased the ability of the Al Qaeda network to recruit more members. The bottom board requires a different set of resources where military and economic resources are insufficient. This relates to Telhami’s (2002) distinction between the supply- and the demand sides of terrorism. Telhami argues that the US has pursued a ‘supply side-only’ approach by “regarding terrorism as the product of organized groups that could be confronted and destroyed, without regard to their aims or to the reasons that they succeed in recruiting many willing members”<sup>101</sup>. Targeting the demand side is equally important for the terrorism phenomenon to be contained, because suppliers will continue to arise to exploit the persistent demand.

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid, (2004)p 25

<sup>100</sup> Ibid, (2004)p 137

<sup>101</sup> Telhami, S. 2002. *The Stakes: America in the Middle East. The Consequences of Power and the Choice for Peace*. Westview Press, Oxford.

The war on terrorism is not conducted against terrorists in general, but against a specific kind of terrorism with a global reach rooted in a radical Islamist movement. Muslims, however, have historically not been a group associated with terrorism. Due to their reputation of accepting problems as “God’s will”, Muslims have been regarded as a rather predictable and favourable business partner<sup>102</sup>. Likewise, the United States was not very high on jihadis’ lists of targets throughout the Cold War and until mid-1990s. American foreign policy and political Islam rather aligned in a marriage of convenience to prevent the further expansion of Communism and radical secularism<sup>103</sup>. Since 9/11, Gerges argues, relations between the United States and Islamists have been portrayed as having always been on a collision course and fated to a military clash<sup>104</sup>. Because this idea has become established, it has guided several geopolitical practices under the label ‘war on terrorism’. Gerges argues that the Bush administration through rhetoric and actions has played into Al Qaeda’s hands by lashing out militarily against the ummah (the Muslim community worldwide).

The three-dimensional chess game is an appropriate metaphor also for Al Qaeda’s power resources: it depends on soft power for financial support and recruitment of warriors. Al Qaeda only represents a tiny minority among jihadis, jihadis only a tiny minority among Islamists, and because it is widely rejected by the ummah, the mobilizing potential is meagre. In order to mobilise support, Al Qaeda employed a strategy of winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the ummah by portraying them in an alliance against a common enemy. They adopted the slogan of “liberating the ummah of its foreign enemies” and portrayed it “as a battle between Islam and

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid (2002)

<sup>103</sup> Gerges, F. A. 2005. *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid (2005)

kufr [impiety] and kufar [infidels]”<sup>105</sup>. The 9/11 attacks were according to Fawaz Gerges an act of desperation that aimed to save the crippling jihadist movement by precipitating a ‘clash of civilizations’ with the West that would bring the ummah into the battle on the jihadist side. When measured by this standard, the 9/11 attacks were an utter failure: Islamic opinion after the 9/11 attacks was almost universally critical of Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Nevertheless, the ‘clash’-discourse has been mirrored by the West, and is a source of the discursive struggle about public diplomacy in the war on terrorism.

## **2.5 Public Diplomacy against Terrorism**

A source of much ridicule in international press since 9/11 is the idea that public diplomacy is supposed to “fix it all”, often expressed as “to know us is to love us”, or that simple persuasive efforts are supposed to turn terrorists into friends. However, there does not seem to be a customary belief in public diplomacy circles that the threat of terrorism can solely be countered with public diplomacy. It is rather regarded as a tool for (re-)framing the image of the US’ culture and policy that together with other actions can turn the unfavourable public opinion. Much frustration in public diplomacy circles is vented towards military and political actions in the war on terrorism that are perceived to interfere with rather than reinforce nation’s soft power.<sup>106</sup>

The target audience of public diplomacy in the war on terrorism is not the terrorists, but the people they might influence. In order to succeed, terrorist organisations need to recruit willing members, raise funds, and appeal to public opinion in pursuit of their political

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid (2005)p26

<sup>106</sup> U.S. Department of State Library. 2007. Dictionary of International Relations Terms. 3rd ed. Dept. of State Library, Washington, D.C.

objectives.<sup>107</sup> Public diplomacy efforts are designed to reach the same public opinion ahead of a potential radicalisation, and create an understanding or acceptance for the American point of view. But even though 9/11 was the catalyst that brought public diplomacy back on the agenda, only a small amount of public diplomacy efforts in the war on terrorism era have been specifically designated to counter terrorism, and those who are, usually have a broader purpose.<sup>108</sup>

A rare example of a public diplomacy effort directly targeted to counter terrorism is Charlotte Beers' 2001 revival of the SD communication program Rewards for Justice, which started running already in 1984. The program includes a website ([www.rewardsforjustice.net](http://www.rewardsforjustice.net)), posters and leaflets. Prior to Beers' involvement, Rewards for Justice looked like Wanted posters, featuring mug shots of terrorists with biographical data and information about how to call in tips and collect awards. Beers recommended that the campaign should be directed towards those who are most likely to have information about terrorists and turn them in, which according to her panel of counter-terrorist experts were women. Based on that recommendation, the posters were replaced with subtle ads that should appeal to the desire for safety, such as one ad featuring the headline "Can a woman stop terrorism?"<sup>109</sup>. This campaign is an overt attempt to make an alliance with Muslim women against terrorists.

Most public diplomacy efforts, however, are more indirectly targeted to countering terrorism. The Shared Values Initiative (SVI), is an example of such. It aims to reach out to the

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid

<sup>108</sup> Ibid

<sup>109</sup> Fullerton, J. & Kendrick, A. 2006. *Advertising's War on Terrorism: The Story of the U.S. State Department Shared Values Initiative*. Marquette Books, Washington.

critical middle by claiming that Muslims and Americans live in peaceful coexistence, but does not explicitly state that it is an effort against terrorism.<sup>110</sup>

## **2.6 Counter-Extremism Programs in East Africa**

Efforts to counter the spread of violent Islamist extremism in East Africa include development interventions that aim to reduce identified drivers and may also, or instead, aim to improve local attitudes toward the domestic authorities. Relevant programs include those aimed at fostering opportunities among at-risk Muslim youth for employment and positive social interaction, and those focused on the political and economic inclusion of minorities and marginalized populations.<sup>111</sup> Some programs have a geographic focus (e.g., the Kenyan coast), and some aim to distribute assistance across communities and, among ethnic Somalis, across clans. Outreach to the Somali diaspora is increasingly being emphasized. Where possible, USAID guidance stresses, the need for community involvement in the identification and implementation of projects in an effort to take into account a potential mistrust of outsiders' intentions.<sup>112</sup>

### **2.6.1 Public Diplomacy Efforts to Counter Terrorism in Kenya**

*'Diplomatic exchanges promote counterterrorism cooperation with friendly nations that serve each other's mutual interests. Transnational terrorism has no boundaries and requires governments to reach out to their neighbors and allies to forge a multilateral approach in the fight against the threat.'*<sup>113</sup> Diplomacy supports the other instruments of national power in numerous ways. For example, extradition treaties help in the application of criminal law by

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<sup>110</sup> Ibid

<sup>111</sup> Mickolus, Edward F., and Susan L. Simmons. 2002. *Terrorism 1996-2001: A Chronology*. Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press

<sup>112</sup> Ibid

<sup>113</sup> Interview with an officer from the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government on use of public diplomacy in counterterrorism where he said that transnational terrorism has no boundaries and requires governments to reach out to their neighbors and allies to forge a multilateral approach in the fight against the threat.



facilitating the transfer of fugitive terrorist suspects. Intelligence sharing among nations potentially discourages terrorists from operating in those countries and facilitates the monitoring of groups operating in the region. After the 1998 US Embassy bombing, the GoK fully cooperated with the US government in intelligence sharing and in giving US investigators access to investigate the incident. The government also helped apprehend and hand over the suspects to US investigators to stand trial in the United States. Apart from the United States, the GoK approached the Israeli government to obtain its assistance in rescue operations. This was followed by the dispatch of rescue teams and intelligence agencies to help track those responsible for the attacks.<sup>114</sup>

*Kenya took center stage internationally because of what was perceived as the terrorists' change in operations to focus on soft targets in countries where the phenomenon of terrorism had not yet been experienced.*<sup>115</sup> The GoK allowed the United States to use Kenya for logistical support as it investigated the terrorist incident, which resulted from the perceived notion that Kenya was a victim of terrorism because of US interests in the country, and that the United States had to play a major role in investigating the attacks. However, the GoK did not apply much effort to incorporating the countries in the Horn of Africa region in a unified regional counterterrorism strategy because of the belief that Kenya was a victim rather than a source of international terrorism. This denial was tied to the inability to acknowledge the wider context that led to the growth of terrorism--the erosion of the structure of governance, notably weak intelligence capabilities and law enforcement<sup>116</sup>. Furthermore, the government was afraid to alienate Kenya's Muslims who often complained of perceived marginalization. It was feared this

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<sup>114</sup> Mutinga, Murithi. 2004. How Terrorist Attack was Planned and Executed. *The East Africa Sunday Standard*, Nairobi, 27 November

<sup>115</sup> Interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on measures taken by the government in combating terror threats in Kenya.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid

group would bear the brunt of any counterterrorism efforts, since most of the terrorist suspects were from the Muslim community.

The government was in a precarious position from the fears that there could be political risks if it engaged in a full-scale counterterrorism campaign. Within Kenya, several groups, some of which already felt marginalized and aggrieved by the former Kenyatta and Moi regimes, were reluctant to accept open-ended military and law enforcement cooperation with the US. These groups openly urged the government to deny the use of Kenyan bases to the US government<sup>117</sup>. In Mombasa and other coastal towns, where the population is largely Muslim, there were protests against American FBI agents sent to hunt down suspected terrorists. There was also the feeling that full cooperation with the United States in the counterterrorism campaign might lead to the country being targeted again. Effective counterterrorism measures could potentially have destabilized the country. Despite evidence of the presence of terrorist cells and the involvement of Kenyans in terrorist activities, the hostility toward the government's counterterrorism measures and diplomatic cooperation with the United States still exists. For example, in early 2004, Muslims leaders asked the government to expel the FBI from the country to allow Kenya to conduct its own investigations of terrorist activities in the country.<sup>118</sup>

The Muslims' concerns might be justifiable since they bear the brunt of counterterrorism measures. However, Muslim leaders are using counterterrorism measures as a veil. The real issue is that the communities depended on Islamic organizations for social welfare (medical, food relief, and Islamic education) and socioeconomic support to marginalized communities, which

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<sup>117</sup> Barkan, Joel D., and Jennifer G. Cooke. 2001. U.S. Policy Towards Kenya in the Wake of September 11, Can Antiterrorist Imperatives be Reconciled with Enduring U.S. Foreign Policy Goals? Africa Center for Strategic Studies

<sup>118</sup> Packard, Gabriel. 2004. Muslim Leaders Want FBI Thrown Out of Kenya. *The New York Amsterdam News*, 29 January-2 February.

the GoK is either incapable of or unwilling to give.<sup>119</sup> There were also several Islamic institutions that were being sponsored by individuals and other Arab Muslim countries. As a result of the terrorist incident, there was focus on these Muslim NGOs. While some, such as Al Haramain, were deregistered by the government, others closed after sponsoring nations stopped funding them when the US launched the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Many communities, including teachers and some Muslim clerics who worked for these organizations, were left without any other support, and the government did not come in to fill the gap. This denial of support contributes to the dissent.<sup>120</sup>

The presence of the threat and the need to secure the borders pressed the government to enlist the support of other countries in the region, through the East African Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) (established after the 11 September 2001), which coordinates counterterrorism capabilities in the East African countries of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, to improve police and judicial counterterrorist capabilities in the region.<sup>121</sup>

This cooperation has realized intelligence sharing among nations in the region for the purpose of law enforcement to combat the transnational threat of terrorism. Kenya has shown further diplomatic efforts by ratifying the twelve international UN counterterrorism conventions and protocols, which shows the government is taking the transnational terrorism threat seriously and does not intend to be left behind.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Netanyahu, Benjamin. 2001. *Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies can Defeat the International Terrorist Network*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid

<sup>121</sup> US Department of State. 2004. *Patterns of Global Terrorism Africa Overview*. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 29 April. Article on-line. Available from [www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31578.htm](http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31578.htm). Internet. Accessed January 2005.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid

Kenya also joined the US in the GWOT, playing a pivotal role in the Horn of Africa region by allowing the United States to use Kenya as a launching pad for counterterrorism efforts in the region. By being a member of the willing nations, the country has benefited from intelligence sharing. In an effort to bring peace to the region and to reduce conditions for terrorist breeding grounds in the surrounding failed and failing states, Kenya is deeply involved in both Somalia and Sudan Peace Processes, which are within the Intergovernmental Authority and Development framework, to achieve stability and functioning institutions in these countries. Stability in these countries will reduce their use as potential safe havens and recruiting grounds for terrorists.<sup>123</sup>

The longstanding mistrust among the countries in the region, however, could easily hinder intelligence sharing. For example, it is Ethiopia's perception that Kenya supports the Oromo Liberation Front that fights the Ethiopian government, which has resulted in constant border skirmishes and international border violations by Ethiopian security forces into Kenya. In 2004, eight Ethiopian soldiers serving along the volatile Eritrean-Ethiopian border fled into Kenya seeking political asylum, which further soured the relationship.<sup>124</sup> The government is maintaining high-level contact to alleviate the mistrust. US assistance to the countries in East Africa and the Horn of Africa region also is a cause of complaints from countries in the region. For example, Uganda claims it is being shortchanged in financial assistance because it has dealt successfully with the international terrorist threat on its own. However, Uganda's priority is dealing with local terrorists groups, such as the Lords Resistance Army and the Allied Democratic Front, while US financial assistance focuses on international terrorists, such as Al

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<sup>123</sup> US Department of State. 2003. Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Washington, DC, 16 July.

<sup>124</sup> Kwamboka, Evelyn. 2004. Eight Fleeing Ethiopian Soldiers in Police Custody, *East Africa Standard*, Nairobi, 21 December.

Qaeda. In addition, Eritrea offered the US access to its port facilities and joined the coalition of the willing against Iraq. However, it finds itself frozen out of counterterrorism assistance because of human rights issues.<sup>125</sup> This complaint might hinder intelligence sharing in the region because most of the countries have joined the coalition of the willing nations through a desire to gain financial favours from the United States.

The present threat calls for countries in the region to cultivate good will and mutual trust in order to have a common goal of fighting transnational terrorism. Their cooperation would facilitate intelligence sharing and joint security operations to combat the threat. These should, in the long run, lead to the good intentions behind the establishment of the EACTI.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> Shinn, David. 2004. Fighting Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn: Six Years After the Bombing of Our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, US Counterterrorism Efforts in the Region Do Not Yet Measure Up to the Threat. *Foreign Service Journal*, September.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid

## CHAPTER THREE

### PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND NATION BRANDING IN KENYA

#### 3.1 Introduction

Nation branding is all about positioning a particular country/nation in the minds of people. Those people are consumers, potential tourists, and, most importantly, potential investors. They are all actively participating in the country's growth process. An effective nation branding campaign accelerates the country's economic growth; and the citizens feel dignified. It must be remembered that there are around 195 nations in the world; all are aggressively competing for the attention of investors, tourists, and citizens. Therefore, a well-planned nation branding campaign is crucial.<sup>127</sup>

Nation branding is a field of theory and practice which aims to measure, build, and manage the reputation of countries (closely related to place branding). An increasing importance of the symbolic value of products has led countries to emphasise their distinctive characteristics. The branding and image of a nation-state "and the successful transference of this image to its exports is just as important as what they actually produce and sell."<sup>128</sup>

Nation branding appears to be practiced by many developed states, where it is often officially referred to as public diplomacy.<sup>129</sup> There is an increasing interest in the concept from developing states on the grounds that an enhanced image might create more favourable conditions for foreign direct investment, tourism, trade, and even political relations with other states. Large countries like China and Russia have also taken measures for building a "new

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<sup>127</sup> Aronczyk, Melissa. "“Living the Brand”: Nationality, Globality and the Identity Strategies of Nation Branding Consultants." *International Journal of Communication* 2 (2008): 41-65.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid

<sup>129</sup> Dinnie, Keith. *Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice*. Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, 2008. Print.

image." The concept of nation-building has become an integral part of public diplomacy. Therefore, any effort by the government to support the nation branding mechanism -- either directly or indirectly -- becomes public diplomacy.<sup>130</sup>

### **3.2 The Rise of Nation Branding**

Nation branding is seen as the means by which countries can optimize their assets and gain power in international relations through the force of attraction. The thing about nation branding that makes it such an interesting concept in international relations is that it is a technique borrowed from the corporate business world – where marketing is used to sell products, increase customer loyalty and broaden consumer markets.<sup>131</sup> That being said, what place does this consumption-driven practice have when we are talking about the manner in which countries relate with each other, and how is it changing the international political sphere?

Leslie de Chertanony, a professor of Brand Marketing, states that there are three main reasons a country would want to engage in nation branding: to attract tourists, to stimulate inward investments, and to boost exports.<sup>132</sup> In other words, a country wants to be admired, which can be measured (to a certain extent) by the number of tourists it receives on an annual basis; it wants economic stability, evidenced through people's confidence in investments; and it wishes to make a distinctive contribution to the global market, which can be proven by the global demands for the country's exports. These three objectives, however, seem to be very market-driven, and they therefore do not seem to capture the entire scope of international relations. In an

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<sup>130</sup> Ibid

<sup>131</sup> Fetscherin, Marc, Marmier, Pascal (2010) Switzerland 's nation branding initiative to foster science and technology, higher education and innovation: A case study. Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1751-8040 Place Branding and Public Diplomacy Vol. 6, 1, 58–67

<sup>132</sup> Dinnie, Keith. *Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice*. Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, 2008. Print.

advanced country which already sits comfortably at a high level of economic and technological development, there must be other motives behind the need to portray a nation in a positive light.

Other peripheral aims that de Chernatony brings to light, which go beyond economic incentives, are the need to attract talent – highly educated and skilled workers. Several developed countries are faced with the problem of an aging population, and there is need to recruit labor from overseas.<sup>133</sup> Transitional countries, such as the former Soviet territories of Central and Eastern Europe, use nation branding as a tool to highlight their new image, thus distancing themselves from their former economic and political associations, and differentiate themselves from other countries in terms of culture and production.<sup>134</sup>

One of the points previously brought up about public diplomacy and nation branding, and perhaps a point that arguably differentiates nation branding from corporate marketing, is the fact it needs to be transparent in order for it to be a successful campaign. Although nation branding is regarded as an image-promotion practice, the increasingly growing efficiency of global news broadcasting and the universal availability of information does not really allow for the spread of one-sided exaggerated information and falsehood. Simon Anholt,<sup>135</sup> the first scholar and a leading world consultant on the nation branding practice, spoke about the reality of nation branding. It is not a quick-fix for a nation's image problems, and simply pumping money into a marketing campaign is nothing more than a waste of money:

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<sup>133</sup> Geddes, Andrew. "Europe's Ageing Workforce." BBC News. BBC.com, 20 June 2002. Web. 26 Apr. 2012. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2053581.stm>>.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid

<sup>135</sup> Anholt, Simon. "AllAboutBranding.com : Brands as Vectors of National Image." AllAboutBranding.com. DNA Designed Communications, New Zealand. Web. 15 Feb. 2012. <<http://www.allaboutbranding.com/index.lasso?article=246>>..



*"I am dumbstruck by the naiveté of governments who think that people are going to change their minds about a country they are totally indifferent to just because of some... advertisement."*<sup>136</sup>

Nation branding must not be confused with propaganda; it is only successful when the "brand" is lived by the citizens of that country. The freedom of the press and the efficiency of today's communication technologies do not allow for governments and private public relations agencies to promulgate exaggeratedly positive information, especially when reality does not reflect the message accurately. Again, Anholt defends this point of view:

*"Country branding occurs when the public speaks to the public; when a substantial proportion of the population of the country – not just civil servants and paid figureheads – gets behind the strategy and lives it out in their everyday dealing with the outside world."*<sup>137</sup>

That being said, and in regard to the previous example of Sub-Saharan African countries not being able to effectively make use of their natural resources to project a positive nation brand, these less-developed countries must target their nation branding inwards, in order to boost morale and enhance nation building by encouraging unity, pride and development. The societal problems plaguing a vast majority of the Sub Saharan African population clearly go beyond what a simple nation branding campaign can fix, but this absence of a nation brand is definitely one of the reasons why these countries fail to establish strong national identities like those recognized in North America and Europe.<sup>138</sup>

If we look at the effects of nation branding in terms of its contribution to a country's increased revenue and/or favorable global perception, it may be quite difficult to identify the extent to which a country's brand actually affects these variables. However, borrowing from the

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<sup>136</sup> Rice, Andy. "A Pre-Olympic Bid Reality Check: You Can't Just Buy a Nation's Brand." *Daily Maverick*. Daily Maverick, 20 July 2010.

<sup>137</sup> Szondi, Gyorgy. "Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences." *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy* (2008): 1-42.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid

corporate business field, a number of parallels can be drawn. A product's country of origin plays quite an important role in its global demand and supply, as evidenced by a detailed study carried out at the Copenhagen Business School<sup>139</sup> which revealed that products labeled "Made in Germany" have higher sales and are more attractive to consumers due to Germany's reputation of economic efficiency, quality production and financial security – as contrasted with other countries such as China, which is known for its cheaper production costs and quality. Beyond its effect on production and exports, however, nation branding capitalizes on the entirety of a country's identity.

Nation branding can be interpreted as the practical application of the imagined national identity. As a matter of fact, it can be argued that long before the active practice of nation branding, countries were already de facto brands, constantly subjected to the opinions and reputations created by the general public.<sup>140</sup> The only difference is that now, governmental efforts are being made to participate in the public discussion, in order to contribute a hand at molding and controlling the national image.

*"Interestingly there is nothing particularly novel about the concept of branding the nation. Only the word 'brand' is new. National image, national identity, [and] national reputation are all words traditionally used in this arena and they don't seem to provoke the same visceral hostility as the word 'brand.' Although the technologies are new and infinitely more powerful and pervasive than ever before, and the word 'brand' is also new, the concepts which it encompasses are as old as the nation itself."<sup>141</sup>*

Given this particular understanding of nation branding, it is clear that a country's brand is not the responsibility of one entity alone – whether that entity is the government, non-governmental organizations, PR firms or individuals. However, in calling the branding process a

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<sup>139</sup> Jaffe, Eugene D., and Israel D. Nebenzahl. *National Image and Competitive Advantage: The Theory and Practice of Country-of-origin Effect*. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School/Handelshøjskolens Forlag, 2001. Print.

<sup>140</sup> Aronczyk, Melissa. "'Living the Brand': Nationality, Globality and the Identity Strategies of Nation Branding Consultants." *International Journal of Communication* 2 (2008): 41-65.

<sup>141</sup> Olins, Wally. *On Brand*. London: Thames & Hudson, 2003. Print.

“practice,” we insinuate that concrete actions are being taken, which means that we need to understand the process by which a nation branding campaign takes place.<sup>142</sup>

The interest in the nation branding campaign is a diffusion process. It begins at the concentrated government level, which identifies the need for a change in perception. This then moves to the private and/or public sector, which drafts the marketing campaign plan. Private PR companies that specialize in country brands are known to be hired for this planning process, although, government offices and organizations are capable of making meaningful contributions to this process as well. As the marketing plan is executed, the branding process moves to the hands of the people. “The people” are subdivided into the country’s citizens, who validate, perpetuate and live the brand (provided the marketing plan truly reflects the nation’s true qualities), and the rest of the international community, whose change in perception indicates the ultimate success of the branding campaign.<sup>143</sup>

### **3.3 Relationship between Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding**

As if the debate over the unanimous definitions of public diplomacy and traditional diplomacy is not enough, there are also various theories and understandings of the relationship between public diplomacy and nation branding.<sup>144</sup> Although both terms are concerned with managing a nation’s international images, public diplomacy and nation branding seem to have issues with their own images, and the manner in which different international relations scholars understand each of these terms in relation to each other. Are nation branding and public diplomacy basically the

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<sup>142</sup> Jaffe, Eugene D., and Israel D. Nebenzahl. *National Image and Competitive Advantage: The Theory and Practice of Country-of-origin Effect*. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School/Handelshøjskolens Forlag, 2001. Print.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid

<sup>144</sup> Russell, Ruby. "Beyond ‘Borat’: Kazakhstan Hopes to Rebrand through Movies." *The Washington Times*. The Washington Times, 23 Mar. 2012.

same concept, or do they concern themselves with completely different areas of study? And if they are different, in what nature and to what extent do they overlap, if at all? The different theories and viewpoints are outlined by international public relations expert, Gyorgy Szondi<sup>145</sup> and clarified as follows.

### **3.3.1 Nation Branding and Public Diplomacy as completely different concepts**

From this point of view, public diplomacy is viewed as a two-way communication between countries on political grounds, while nation branding is the unilateral information dissemination from one entity to a global audience, primarily with the aim of economic maximization.<sup>146</sup>

According to this understanding, nation branding tends to the final aim of economic profit maximization, which is done by differentiating a certain country from others, in the hopes of gaining a competitive advantage in the global market. By creating awareness of the uniqueness of a country's culture, people and economic strengths through branding, there is a greater chance for increased consumer demand, leading to the country's specialization in particular market sectors of tourism and trade.<sup>147</sup>

Public diplomacy, on the other hand, functions in direct opposition to nation branding. While nation branding capitalizes on a country's unique differences, public diplomacy attempts to identify similarities and parallels between a certain country and the rest of the global sphere, in order to ease political bilateral relations and allow for access to the benefits of international partnerships. A great example of this was seen when Eastern European countries were attempting

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<sup>145</sup> Szondi, Gyorgy. "Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences." *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy* (2008): 1-42.

<sup>146</sup> Ham, Peter van. 2001. The rise of the brand state. *Foreign Affairs* 80 (5): 2-6.

<sup>147</sup> Gilboa, E. (2001): Diplomacy in the media age: Three models of uses and effects, *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 12:2, 1-28

to gain access to the European Union, by trying to conform to the societal and economic standards set by the Western European nations.<sup>148</sup>

### **3.3.2 Nation Branding and Public Diplomacy as overlapping concepts**

There are varying ways in which this view can be conceived. Public diplomacy can be seen as part of nation branding, in which case concepts of branding and marketing are applied to public policy. From this point of view, a nation brand uses the political aspect of public diplomacy as only one part of the entire branding campaign.<sup>149</sup> Practical applications of this approach can be seen through national governments' hiring of branding consultants, who specialize in country promotion, in order to introduce a concrete strategy to an international relations agenda and to provide a broader audience for input as well as feedback on a nation's public diplomacy programs, which can be analyzed through market research. However, it should be kept in mind that narrowing public diplomacy down to the slogans and symbolisms associated with nation branding may be too much of an oversimplification of what is actually a much broader concept.<sup>150</sup>

From another point of view, the roles are reversed, and nation branding can be seen as an instrument of public diplomacy – basically serving as the branch of public diplomacy that is accessible to the general public, as opposed to the privacy of issues that are analyzed and solved at the governmental level. The fact that branding campaigns have a higher degree of visibility allows for countries to turn to nation branding in situations where they need to quickly raise

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<sup>148</sup> Ibid

<sup>149</sup>Malone, Gifford. (1985). Managing public diplomacy. *Washington Quarterly* 8 (3): 199-213.

<sup>150</sup> Melissen, J. (2005). The new public diplomacy: Between theory and practice. In *The new public diplomacy*, ed. Jan Melissen, 3-27. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

international awareness or attempt to influence public opinion on particular issues.<sup>151</sup> A contemporary example of this situation is illustrated by the rigorous nation branding campaigns adopted by Kazakhstan, following the release of the Sascha Baron Cohen's international mock documentary film blockbuster "Borat". Despite the fact that the nation is blessed with rich natural resources and a relatively stable government, the stereotypes shown in the film had a detrimental effect on Kazakhstan's image due to the fact that the nation had neither developed a strong brand nor an easily-recognizable positive reputation. As a result of "Borat," the Kazakh government and film industry attempted to rebrand itself by exporting movies that portrayed Kazakh society in a more realistic and positive light<sup>152</sup>

### **3.3.3 Nation Branding and Public Diplomacy as synonymous concepts**

This model is arguably the most simplified of all three, due to the argument that by regarding both terms as the exact same concepts, one can easily overlook the differences in the nature and scope of both nation branding and public diplomacy. Public diplomacy has always had a more political connotation, while nation branding can be associated with the similar practices in the corporate business world. By simplifying these two terms and merging them under one common definition, it is harder to appreciate each concept in its fullness.<sup>153</sup>

In an attempt to introduce a more advanced thought to this point of view, some scholars see nation branding the evolved product of public diplomacy, as opposed to the two terms being simply synonymous. This perspective argues that with the increased availability of media and

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<sup>151</sup> Bátor, Jozef. (2006). Public diplomacy between home and abroad: Norway and Canada. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 1 (1): 53-80.

<sup>152</sup> Russell, Ruby. "Beyond 'Borat': Kazakhstan Hopes to Rebrand through Movies." *The Washington Times*. The Washington Times, 23 Mar. 2012.

<sup>153</sup> Gilboa, E. (2008): Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 55-77.

communications, the general public now plays as much of an important role as national governments in shaping public policy, so there is need for a new term that takes into account the role of the general public in the formation of national identity.<sup>154</sup>

### **3.4 Public Diplomacy and “Nation Branding” Establishing**

A new state have been created the end of bilateral Cold War era, beginning of new multi-polar international system, rapid changes in communication and information technologies, globalization of product, solving the nation state structure, fluid finance across the world, increasing uncertainty and competition. There is no more relative “security” of the Cold War era. On Contrary, there is a world, experiencing rapid changes, having economic, social and cultural results, impossible to predict and competitive. It is not really simple to exist, survive, compete and keep the power in such a world. It is not the guarantee of future and security to produce, sell or earn much in the new multi-polar international system as the conditions can change in any time. Furthermore, convincing the public opinion was not cared in old wars but dominant actor in the new world order plays an important strategic role.<sup>155</sup>

On this point, the topic of “branding” of countries reveals as distinguishing countries from the others in the competition, communication, technological innovations and creation of morality. In the new international system in which strategic communication, perception, image, prestige and trust become prominent, countries, like trademarks, requires to rebuild and reposition themselves before the public opinion<sup>156</sup>. These are important for creating public opinion’s perception to accurate and reliable informing, effective communication, clear channels

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<sup>154</sup> Fischer, M. (2012, 10 27). How do you measure the strength of a country’s ‘brand’?. The Washington Post.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid

<sup>156</sup> Szondi, G. (2009). Central and Eastern European Public Diplomacy. Nancy Snow & Philip M.Taylor. (Eds.) Handbook of Public Diplomacy, New York: Routledge

of feedback and effective design of messages. For establishing a reliable, powerful and prestigious perception of a country a strategic branding road map should be followed.

### **3.4.1 The role of “Soft Power” in Nation-Branding Establishment**

The elements of “soft power” are really important in nation-branding establishment. Some of the soft power sources such as culture, science, art, sport, education and etc have assisted to establish effective and long term communication and interaction with the public opinion.<sup>157</sup> As a result of the relation established by these instruments has both created a positive perception of country and established new relations and corporation on a different area. In the new international system, the most important perception of a country is a prestigious, powerful, reliable and honest country image. This perception is a branding having very important strategic value for countries. Countries, building and improving their nation-branding in this way will become desired countries for investment, building relation on notably political, social and cultural areas and even living there.<sup>158</sup>

Public diplomacy has an important role in countries’ nation-branding with its instruments and techniques. Public diplomacy, mobilizing the countries’ “soft power” effective use of this power against the public opinion, meeting NGOs, media, opinion leaders and universities on specific goals have an effect on establishing nation-branding. Such countries which establish nation-branding by using techniques and methods of public diplomacy have created a powerful image and perception in the new international system.<sup>159</sup> The tourism, brand export and foreign direct investment have contributed to the nation branding establishment. This strengthens the prestige of countries to export their own brands. The countries are remembered with their

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<sup>157</sup> Tuch, H. (1990). *Communicating with the World: US public diplomacy overseas*. New York: St. Martin’s. 161.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid

<sup>159</sup> Nye, S.J. (2005). *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs



powerful brands and the positive perception in the customers' mind reflects this prestige.<sup>160</sup> The country promotions are thought as a goal of attracting tourism and investors. However, the country promotions should be realized together with the public diplomacy and handle an integrative approach with values of the world such as science, art, culture, sport, business world, universities and etc. When it is realized, it will increasingly contribute to either country promotion or branding.

### **3.5 Nation Branding in Kenya**

In March 2008 Kenya took a bold step to put in place a National Branding program. By so doing Kenya joined a small circle of nations that have dared to undertake this awesome and challenging journey. The Brand Kenya Board was put in place to steer the process. Two years down the line the Board completed the National Brand Master Plan. In the development of the master plan a rigorous country diagnostic was conducted along the structure of five pillars; People, Place, Product, Politics and Economy.<sup>161</sup>

The results of this diagnostic revealed several insights for positioning and building the Kenya brand. These insights informed the development of brand opportunities for each of the four pillars on which the Kenya brand needed to be based i.e. Tourism, FDI, Exports and Citizens. The plan details the key components of the Kenya Brand.<sup>162</sup> The National Brand vision which is a statement of the country's aspired position going into the future. It is a vision of a balance between our quest for modernity and the respect for our heritage and values. These values are what have seen us become the Nation we are today and we must guard, treasure and

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<sup>160</sup> Ibid

<sup>161</sup> Mary Kimonye, (2013) Country Branding: Key lessons and challenges. *Capital FM News*.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid

be proud of. The National Positioning Statement captures the position Kenya wishes to occupy in the family of Nations it wishes to be seen.<sup>163</sup>

The National Brand Proposition or what is commonly called the brand promise or essence. This captures that one characteristic of Kenya that is authentic, believable and that which comes naturally to Kenyans and hence is not disputable. That characteristic is the warm hospital and welcoming nature of Kenyans, simply captured in one word generosity. Hence the national proposition is “Kenya bursting with generosity, rewarding beyond imagination.” The National Brand Values are the ideals that drives our interactions with others and which should be demonstrated in our relationships, institutions, business and public service.<sup>164</sup>

The three fundamental brand values that resulted from the brand research were “optimism” “character “and “generosity”. The Kenya Brand personality traits of handwork, resilience, entrepreneurship are very evident across all sectors of our country. They confirm that we have the capability in ourselves to move Kenya forward to the aspired middle income status.

The National Tagline, “Make it here!” for citizens and it can also be executed in its lip nature “Make it Kenya!” (for foreigners). It elicits a compelling message that we wish to stamp on the minds of others and helps believably execute the brand proposition. For Kenya the tagline is a simple invitation to both the citizens to choose Kenya as their preferred destination for residence, corporate head quarters, holiday trade, investment and leisure.<sup>165</sup>

The Visual Identity (National Brand logo), which most countries construct around their national colours and their most iconic image. For Kenya the shield in our flag was isolated as the

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<sup>163</sup> Ibid

<sup>164</sup> Mary Kimonye, (2013) Managing a nation brand during crisis. *Capital News*.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid

most compelling image that communicates Kenya's past, present and future. The shield was modernized in line with Kenya's youthfulness, hence the Icon Kenya.

With a Brand Master Plan in place the next step is to execute it across all platforms. The first critical lesson learnt from other countries that have embarked on this journey, is that it is suicidal to start promoting your Country brand, if it is not real. Identity Kenya has going through a massive brand cleaning process; the reforms, new constitution, infrastructure, new leadership, all these should eject new life in the brand. The "substance" is the most important issue.<sup>166</sup>

Secondly as the country brand goes through the cleaning process, promotion must be focused on the components of the brand that are going really well. For Kenya, the success of the our sportsmen and women, performance of the capital market, performance of the private sector and individuals in the global arena, our climate, location, top quality exports, Safari, our cultural diversity and strides in the ICT sector remain the spring board of our global marketing. Thirdly, the Country's core essence and brand message must differ from those of competing Nations.<sup>167</sup>

Countries often make the mistake of promising similar generic things like educated work force, youthful population, great sites and locations without regard to how potential customers perceive the country. Most potential customers want more than these. They want stability, security, ease of movement, acceptance, respect etc. Finally, Country branding needs coordination and cooperation across all levels and sectors: trade, tourism, public diplomacy culture, investment, FDI and citizens. This will usually prevail in a situation of visionary leadership at all levels. As a country we have the benefit of a compelling vision and a forward

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<sup>166</sup> Ibid

<sup>167</sup> The Brand Kenya Board (2013).

thinking leadership. There is no excuse why we should not position ourselves impact fully in the global arena.<sup>168</sup>

Noting the complexity of Nation branding, Kenya needs to stand proud that we embarked on this journey and in three short years have been able to agree on a road map for the long-term development of the Kenya brand. What we must bear in mind as we forge forward is the responsibility of changing the image of Kenya, lies with all of us, singularly and collectively.<sup>169</sup>

The reputation of a country is comparable to the brand images of companies and products and it's very essential for its progress and prosperity. The need to understand and embrace nation branding is therefore very critical. Subsequently, managing a country brand is about national, regional and international identity and the politics and economics of competitiveness.

According to Simon Anholt, a branding expert, building the reputation of a country takes between 5 to 20 years.<sup>170</sup> All countries have their brand images, and they get their brands from public opinion. Hence France is about style, Japan about technology and Brazil about football. As they say, "perception is reality". Perceptions are developed over time through events and actions. Often times, disastrous events take place, which if not well managed can ruin a country's reputation. As Warren Buffet said, it takes five minutes to ruin a reputation. How nations manage these issues affects how the world views them.<sup>171</sup>

In a time of crisis, internal communications takes precedence. Communicating early is often the best strategy for mitigating a brand crisis. Those impacted by the crisis want answers fast. Channels of communication include websites, social media platforms, media releases,

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<sup>168</sup> Interview with an officer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on nation branding in Kenya

<sup>169</sup> Ibid

<sup>170</sup> Anholt, Simon. "AllAboutBranding.com : Brands as Vectors of National Image." AllAboutBranding.com. DNA Designed Communications, New Zealand. Web. 15 Feb. 2012.

<sup>171</sup> Fetscherin, Marc, Marmier, Pascal (2010) Switzerland ' s nation branding initiative to foster science and technology, higher education and innovation: A case study. Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1751-8040 Place Branding and Public Diplomacy Vol. 6, 1, 58-67

testimonials and endorsements. Dissemination and sharing of positive content with citizens is very critical. This applies to traditional mass media and social media as well. Capitalizing on the brand strengths helps to guard the status of the brand.<sup>172</sup>

Media forms an integral part of nations. They have power as a trusted source of information and therefore ought to be viewed as allies. It's important to harness this power. In a time of crisis, a variety of media outlets and tactics must be used to reach various audiences to maximize reach and frequency of the message. A blended approach that incorporates digital and print ensures that audiences are reached strategically via their preferred channels of communication. In a crisis, citizens take their cue from the local media. Subsequently, the international media takes a cue from local media. Engaging the media is therefore not an option.<sup>173</sup>

Social media makes it easy for users to share and shape opinions. When a crisis occurs, it is human nature to want to connect, offer support and heal together. That's the power of social media; it provides a place to congregate and share comfort, a virtual "community centre." This provides the opportunity to react in real time to crises, correcting any reported mistruths and managing bad word of mouth. Looking for opportunities, locally, regionally and nationally to showcase the nation, helps to rebuild a reputation. Mega sporting events, business forums and cultural exhibitions offer classic platforms to engage the world.<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> <http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/eblog/2014/08/13/managing-a-nation-brand-during-crisis/>

<sup>173</sup> Ibid

<sup>174</sup> <http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/eblog/2014/08/13/managing-a-nation-brand-during-crisis/>

## CHAPTER FOUR

### PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN KENYA

#### 4.1 Introduction

Foreign direct investment (FDI) constitutes long-term investment by a foreign direct investor in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that in which the foreign direct investor is based<sup>175</sup>. Various motives account for FDI. These include attraction of new sources of demand for their products, penetration of markets where excessive profits are available, full benefit from economies of scale, use of cheap foreign factors of production such as labour and land<sup>176</sup>. Others according to Czinkota et al. (2005) include international diversification, reaction to trade restrictions and volatility of foreign currency, existence of stable political environment. In a report by Tian (2007), many Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries including Kenya, have considered FDI as an engine of economic growth<sup>177</sup>.

To be attractive for foreign investors, the country should have property protection legislation. Special economic zones involve policies favorable for foreign investment. In order to be efficient, incentives (like tax holidays) should be supported by political stability and good infrastructure.<sup>178</sup>

There are three major elements identified of a country's FDI strategy. They are the product, price, and promotion. The product is described as "the intrinsic advantages and disadvantages of investing in the country, ranging from the country's general attractiveness to a

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<sup>175</sup> Salvatore, D. (2004). *International Economics*, 8th ed., U.S.A.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

<sup>176</sup> Czinkota, M. R. et al (2005). *International Business*, 7th ed., U.S.A.: Thomson South-Western

<sup>177</sup> Tian, X., (2007). Accounting for sources of FDI technology spillovers: evidence from China, *Journal of international business studies* 38(1): 147-159

<sup>178</sup> Kinoshita, Y., & Mody, A. (2001, May). Private information for foreign investment in emerging economies. *The Canadian Journal of Economics*, 34(2), 448-464

specific investment site's attractiveness. The price is defined as tax incentives, capital and training grants, tariff protection, and similar price mechanisms. The "promotion" includes activities that disseminate information about, or attempt to create a favorable image of, the investment site". Promotion process used by the states is one of the key controllable factors that influence the success of the states in attracting FDI developed a model for marketing a region internationally.<sup>179</sup>

#### **4.2 Public Diplomacy & Attracting Foreign Direct Investment**

One of the goals of the country's public diplomacy efforts is attracting foreign investment. Investment is defined as expenditure for purposes other than immediate consumption. One of the forms of foreign investment is foreign direct investment (FDI), which enables an enterprise to effectively control the management of a legal entity located in a foreign country<sup>180</sup>. Foreign investors bring to the country new business practices, technology innovations and capital flow. According to Fischer, FDI can supplement and activate other forms of finance and offers multiple advantages over local and international donor funding.

The main types of FDI are greenfield investments (maximum control of the enterprise), transplants (assembly locations for exporting to other areas), strategic alliances and joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions of an existing company<sup>181</sup>. Fischer (2000)<sup>182</sup> also differentiates between different types of FDI by investment motivations including resource-seeking FDI, cost –minimizing FDI, and market – driven FDI.

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<sup>179</sup> Ibid (2001).

<sup>180</sup> Fischer, P. (2000). Foreign direct investment in Russia: A strategy for industrial recovery. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid

<sup>182</sup> Ibid

Foreign investors bring to the country new business practices, technology innovations and capital flow. According to Fischer (2000), FDI can supplement and activate other forms of finance and offers multiple advantages over local and international donor funding. FDI combines capital inflow with skill transfer, managerial input and mutually beneficial exchange of know-how. Its multiplier effect can launch a virtuous investment cycle. It could bring more competition and lead to the development of small – size and medium – size enterprises<sup>183</sup>. It promotes productive investments in tangible assets (machinery, equipment, process technologies) as opposed to portfolio investments in financial markets, which can be withdrawn quickly in case of an economic downturn. FDI stimulates industrial development and export growth through its contribution to economic transformation, modernization and job creation. FDI also reduces dependence on international donor bureaucracies such as IMF, World Bank and UN<sup>184</sup>.

The success of the country's FDI policy is determined by progress made in the country's macro-systems: the legal system, socioeconomic system, political system, financial system, education system, cultural system, and administrative system. They must be supplemented by: Special incentives for FDI in designed industries and regions; Creation of special development zones to promote particular regions or technologies; Establishment of an investor information system; Promotion and image building campaigns; Advisory services; financial engineering and Creation of the FDI agency, which serves the regions<sup>185</sup>.

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<sup>183</sup> Ibid

<sup>184</sup> Ibid

<sup>185</sup> Foreign Investment Advisory Council. (n.d.). About FIAC. In Foreign Investment Advisory Council. <http://www.fiac.ru/about.php>



Kotler, Jatusripitak and Maesince (1997)<sup>186</sup> outlined four attributes of a country's investment attractiveness such as its comparative and competitive advantages; its domestic and political stability; property rights protection; and foreign trade zones. The authors defined the country's comparative and competitive advantages in terms of Porter's (1990) attributes: factor conditions (natural resources, location, skilled and unskilled labor, and basic infrastructure), demand conditions (home demand for the industry's product or service), related and supporting industries, firm strategy, structure and rivalry (the intensity of domestic rivalry).

“Domestic economic and political stability” are divided into two groups such as asset protection/investment recovery risk (direct action by the government or people to destroy, expropriate or limit transfer of invested resources) and operational profitability/cash-flow risk (arises from economic downturns, strikes, currency devaluation, etc.)<sup>187</sup> To be attractive for foreign investors, the country should also have property protection legislation. Special economic zones involve policies favorable for foreign investment. In order to be efficient, incentives (like tax holidays) should be supported by political stability and good infrastructure<sup>188</sup>.

According to Gaster (1992)<sup>189</sup>, if a nation accepts FDI as beneficial for its development, it should establish FDI policies that meet two main objectives, such as developing a sound FDI strategy that would seek to attract foreign investment, thus adding capital inflow into the nation, as well as directing those investment flows in such a way to maximize the long-term benefit of

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<sup>186</sup> Kotler, P., Jatusripitak, S., & Maesince, S. (1997). *The marketing of nations: A strategic approach to building national wealth*. New York, NY: Free Press.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid

<sup>188</sup> Leonard, M. (2002). Diplomacy by other means. *Foreign Policy*, 132, 48 – 56.

<sup>189</sup> Gaster, R. (1992). Protectionism with purpose: Guiding foreign investment. *Foreign Policy*, (88), 91. Retrieved from EBSCOhost.

the host nation's economy. Shastitko, Plaksin, and Yakovleva (2007) <sup>190</sup>differentiate between the concepts of investment climate and investment image. Investment climate is a set of objective factors for investment (natural, human resources, political and economic factors). Investment image is the perception of the investment climate in the minds of investors<sup>191</sup>.

Kotler, Jatusripitak and Maesince (1997) identified three major elements of a country's FDI strategy. They are the "product", "price", and "promotion." The product is described as "the intrinsic advantages and disadvantages of investing in the country, ranging from the country's general attractiveness to a specific investment site's attractiveness. The "price" is defined as "tax incentives, capital and training grants, tariff protection, and similar price mechanisms. The "promotion" includes "activities that disseminate information about, or attempt to create a favorable image of, the investment site" <sup>192</sup>

Promotion process used by the states is one of the key controllable factors that influence the success of the states in attracting FDI. Schuster, Samli and Bodkin (1987) developed a model for marketing a region internationally<sup>193</sup>. Tuch (1990) developed a Composite Strategy for Attracting Reverse Foreign Investment.<sup>194</sup>

Kotler, Jatusripitak and Maesince (1997) identified three objectives that should be accomplished through investment promotion: to promote the country's image within the investment community as a favorable location for investment, to generate specific investments,

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<sup>190</sup> Shastitko, A., Plaksin, S., & Yakovleva, Y. (2007, April). Russia's investment image [Electronic version]. *The Strategy of Russia*, 4.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid

<sup>192</sup> Ibid

<sup>193</sup> Schuster; Camille P., A. Coskun Samli, and Charies Bodkin (1987). Marketing a region in the international arena, Emerging International Strategic Frontiers. Proceedings of the American Marketing Association International Marketing Conference. *American Marketing Association*, 268-72.

<sup>194</sup> Tuch, H.N. (1990). *Communicating with the world: U.S. public diplomacy overseas*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

and to provide services to prospective and current investors. According to the authors, image building is the effective strategy aimed to attract investors that are in early stages of decision - making. Tactics for this strategy include advertising in general financial media, participating in trade and investment exhibitions, advertising in industry- or sector-specific media, conducting general investment missions from a source country to a host country or from a host country to a source country, and conducting general information seminars on investment opportunities.<sup>195</sup>

Recommended information products for this strategy are: general publications on the state of the economy, sectoral reports, reports on regions, information on potential investment projects, approval processes, incentives and legal conditions<sup>196</sup>. Kinoshita and Moody (2001)<sup>197</sup> though emphasized the importance of private information. A firm's investment decisions are positively correlated to its own previous investment in the country and with current / planned investments by competitors. Investment by competitors comes less important when the firm already has experience in the market<sup>198</sup>.

Generating specific investments objective is more suitable for the later stages of investment promotion. The appropriate promotion techniques for the investment generation strategy include direct-mail or telemarketing campaigns, conducting industry- or sector-specific investment missions from a host country to a source country and vice versa, organizing industry- or sector-specific information seminars, conducting a firm-specific research, establishing personal contact with the company and giving investment presentations. The third objective for

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<sup>195</sup> Ibid

<sup>196</sup> Ibid

<sup>197</sup> Kinoshita, Y., & Mody, A. (2001, May). Private information for foreign investment in emerging economies. *The Canadian Journal of Economics*, 34(2), 448-464.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid

investment promotion includes providing investment counseling services and post-investment services, processing of applications and permits<sup>199</sup>.

### **4.3 Public Diplomacy and Foreign Direct Investment in Kenya**

#### **4.3.1 Cultural Diplomacy**

According to one interviewee from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cultural diplomacy is the linchpin of public diplomacy; for it is through cultural activities that a nation's idea of itself is best represented. Cultural diplomacy is uniquely able to reach out to people of all walks of life; young people, to non-elites, to broad audiences with a much reduced language barrier. Cultural diplomacy enable us to: Reach influential members of foreign societies who cannot be accessed through traditional embassy functions; Provide a positive agenda for cooperation in spite of policy differences; Create a neutral platform for people-to-people contact; Serve as a flexible, universally acceptable vehicle for engagement with countries where diplomatic relations have been strained or are absent; Provide awareness of cultural richness of our nation and generate interest in Kenya's cultural heritage.<sup>200</sup>

A fundamental practice of Cultural diplomacy is the exchange and sharing of ideas, information, art, lifestyles, value systems, traditions, beliefs, languages and other aspects of cultures. More than ever before, culture is playing a vital role in international relations and the struggle for space and cultural influence has taken centre stage in the global context. As cultural diplomacy exerts a great influence on domestic and international exchanges, it provides a potential forum for negotiation and is a medium of exchange of shared solutions.<sup>201</sup> Further,

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<sup>199</sup> Ibid

<sup>200</sup> Interview with an officer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he viewed cultural diplomacy as the linchpin of public diplomacy; for it is through cultural activities that a nation's idea of itself is best represented.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid

cultural contact provides a forum for unofficial political relationship building: it keeps open negotiating channels with countries where political connections are in jeopardy, and helps readjust relationships with emerging powers. Clearly alliances are now being forged along lines of cultural understanding as they are on economic or geographic ones.

*'The most remarkable practice of cultural diplomacy has been displayed by the impact of Kenyan Athletes at the global sporting arena since Independence. No other activity has contributed more to projecting Kenya's image positively like the performance of Kenyan athletes. Further, the influence of Kenyan music with genres of Benga on East and Central African Radio Stations is very noticeable. Furthermore, the counterpart traditional flavours and dance cannot leave any music lover indifferent. All these help in marketing Kenya abroad and thereby attract investors in our country.'*<sup>202</sup>

Through Cultural diplomacy Kenyan culture plays a decisive part in international relations through winning hearts and minds and in creating an empathetic understanding of our circumstances. When Kenyan cultural icons tour the globe or when Kenyan athletes perform at the world stage or Kenyan literature is read, they create a buzz of economic and political interest in Kenya that goes beyond the cultural event or artifact, to generate economic gain. Kenya's strategic marketing of its sports, arts and culture will transform the globe, at best into a consumer of its cultural productions.<sup>203</sup> To this end, Kenya must be more aggressive in marketing some of its literature, theatre, film, culinary art, visual art, cultural tourism, folklore and folk media, traditional song and dance, tropical and indigenous architecture and knowledge systems.

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<sup>202</sup> One interviewee from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who views that Kenyan Athletes at the global sporting arena and the genres of Kenya music also contribute in wooing foreign direct investment in Kenya

<sup>203</sup> Ibid

### 4.3.2 ‘Diaspora’ Diplomacy

The concept of ‘Diaspora’ in Kenya’s diplomatic thinking demands innovative interrogation to bring out its diverse aspects, dynamics and potential. In its narrow sense, this concept has been used to refer to Kenyans living and working abroad. In the broader sense, the concept is derived from the Constitutive Act of the African Union which defines the Diaspora as peoples of African descent particularly in Europe and the Americas. The Statutes of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union (ECOSOC, 2004), provides for the participation of the Diaspora in all its activities (article 2 (2)). Africa is also beginning to draw huge investments, technology transfer, cultural linkages and even diplomatic engagements from this Diaspora. Indeed, the African Union recognises the African Diaspora as the sixth region of its components.

*‘As a starting point, Kenya’s foreign policy will focus on Kenyans in the Diaspora, tapping into its potential to facilitate the country’s political, economic and cultural regeneration and development. Kenya is a signatory to the AU’s Constitutive Act (2001), which promotes the participation of African professionals within the continent and in the Diaspora. Kenya’s Diaspora diplomacy will seek to advance this agenda. Kenya also recognizes ECOSOC as a useful channel for advancing the cultural, economic and social role of the wider African Diaspora.’<sup>204</sup>*

According to an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recognizing that the Diaspora has emerged as a potentially important resource for the realization of the country’s national development goals, Kenya will creatively explore the various ways and frameworks of

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<sup>204</sup> Interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nairobi where he explained that public diplomacy must incorporate ‘diaspora’ diplomacy so as to realise its potential to facilitate the country’s political, economic and cultural regeneration and development.

effectively promoting, utilizing and enhancing the contribution of this important resource. These will include:<sup>205</sup>

**Promoting the access by Kenyans to the international labour market:** This policy promotes access of Kenyan professionals to the expanding international labour market. In pursuit of this goal, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established a dedicated office which will develop and manage a databank of Kenyan professionals, business people and other experts in various fields for the purpose of disseminating the relevant information on new international job opportunities. It will also enhance the capacity of its diplomatic missions to give requisite diplomatic backing to Kenyans pursuing such openings;

**Utilizing outstanding Kenyans:** Kenya's missions abroad will enhance their capacity to provide support and consular services to Kenya's world class athletes and its significant repertoire of eminent nationals who have earned international repute in different fields. As a matter of policy, Kenya's strategy is to invite distinguished nationals to serve as goodwill ambassadors to pursue its foreign policy objectives;

**Tapping into the skills and resources of the Diaspora:** The Ministry of Foreign Affairs work with other ministries to invite nationals in the Diaspora to invest their skills and resources in the various sectors of national development. Kenya will create incentives and policies to encourage them to invest in the country.

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<sup>205</sup> One interviewee from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who views that Kenyan Athletes at the global sporting arena and the genres of Kenya music also contribute in wooing foreign direct investment in Kenya

### 4.3.3 New ways of conducting diplomacy in Kenya

If it is becoming more difficult to coerce other states into doing what you want then it is possible to utilize the more subtle approach to power – namely to persuade them to think that your goal is identical with their goal. Public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy can then be seen as tools of increasing other publics understanding and sympathy of one's cause and thereby in turn make these people pressure their governments to act favourable towards the sending state – or at least not hostile.<sup>206</sup>

In accordance with the theory of soft power the increased focus on public diplomacy can signify a more efficient way of reaching foreign policy goals assuming that these goals are fairly standard ones such as improving one's economy, international standing and political positioning. These initiatives cannot stand alone as it is just one part of a bigger soft power picture and one could fear that this is not always realized.<sup>207</sup> Complementary areas to increase soft power could include generous contributions of development aid, strong profile in peacekeeping operations or a tolerant and fair treatment of domestic minorities. Areas such as these will more often be guided by either domestic or hard power (economic) concerns rather than soft power concerns – development aid will be cut due to budget concerns, domestic minorities will experience high levels of intolerance in order to increase support amongst more nationalist minded segments of the electorate etc. This can easily result in public diplomacy not being able to achieve results to its fullest potential as it does not receive the backing it needs in other areas.<sup>208</sup>

It has been established that public diplomacy cannot reach its potential due to other factors such as remaining hard power concerns, domestic concerns and the counter productive

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<sup>206</sup> Riordan, S. (2007) *Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy, The New Public Diplomacy – Soft Power in International Relations*, Jan Melissen (ed.) pp. 180-195, Palgrave Macmillan: London

<sup>207</sup> Ibid

<sup>208</sup> Ibid



element, the introduction of public diplomacy does not constitute a breakthrough in the basic principles in international relations – it rather seems like an initiative taken with all the best intentions but to limited effect.

When viewing public diplomacy in Kenya through the lens of the theory of soft power it explains that public diplomacy has come to existence because the state actors see soft power as real power and therefore worthwhile competing over. But as public diplomacy often will stand alone without the necessary support of other policy areas, it does not at the moment signify a more efficient means of reaching foreign policy goals or constitute a fundamental breakthrough in international relations.<sup>209</sup>

*If public diplomacy in Kenya at one time receives the necessary backing of other areas and focus on soft power will rise to prominence alongside economic, domestic and military concerns it can potentially be a very important competitive tool of power in Kenya. It is still unlikely though that there will be any significant change in the basic principles of international relations.*<sup>210</sup>

The respective roles of the public and private sectors have evolved since independence in 1963, with a shift in emphasis from public investment to private sector-led investment. The Kenyan government has introduced market-based reforms and provided more incentives for both local and foreign private investment.<sup>211</sup> Foreign investors seeking to establish a presence in Kenya generally receive the same treatment as local investors, and multinational companies make up a large percentage of Kenya's industrial sector. Furthermore, there is no discrimination

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<sup>209</sup> Interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nairobi where he explained viewing public diplomacy in Kenya through the lens of the theory of soft power.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid

<sup>211</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Republic of Kenya). Foreign Policy Framework (2012).

against foreign investors in access to government-financed research, and the government's export promotion programs do not distinguish between local and foreign-owned goods.<sup>212</sup> Although there is no specific legislation preventing foreigners from owning land, the ability of foreigners to own or lease land classified as agricultural is restricted by the Land Control Act. Hence, the Land Control Act serves as a barrier to any agro-processing investment that may require land. Exemption from this act can be acquired via a presidential waiver, but the opaque process has led to complaints about excessive bureaucracy and patronage. The new constitution states that non-citizens may not own land, but may lease land for a maximum period of 99 years.<sup>213</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> Kinaro, E.O (2011) “*Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Kenya*” Institute African de Development Economique et de planification. Dakar.

<sup>213</sup> Ibid

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Summary of Findings

Public diplomacy and information campaigns are key aspects of counterterrorism measures. Pillar examines the major fronts on which to fight terrorism, looking at the root causes and issues that give rise to terrorist groups. One official interviewed from the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government examined what motivates individuals to join such groups and the ability of such groups to conduct terrorist attacks. According to him, any sound policy toward a terrorist group requires an understanding of what is and what is not important to that group, what drives its leaders and members, what stimulates it to attack, and what it would take to give up terrorism.<sup>214</sup> Governments should place increased emphasis on this area to counter terrorists' propaganda, demystify terrorism, and correct the misperception that governments are hostile to Islam, since most counterterrorism efforts are directed at the Muslim community. This campaign can be successful if it addresses the concerns of Islamic leaders and scholars.<sup>215</sup>

Terrorism is defined by the U.S. FBI as acts, "intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coerce a civilian population, or affect the conduct of a government."<sup>216</sup> The attacks in 2013 at Westgate Mall, Nairobi by the Al-Shabaab bore a striking resemblance to public diplomacy, with an evil twist.<sup>217</sup> The rise of social media has given terrorist organizations a seat at the agenda-setting table; they now have

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<sup>214</sup> Interview with an official from the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government who examined what motivates individuals to join such groups and the ability of such groups to conduct terrorist attacks.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid.

<sup>216</sup> <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition>

<sup>217</sup> <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/kenya-somalis-fear-westgate-backlash>

the ability to directly feed messages to the national and international media and publics. They can control what the world hears through platforms like Twitter, YouTube, and Skype. This new access has significant relevance to the potential success of this terrorist campaign in Kenya.<sup>218</sup>

The idea behind nation or location branding is to give an added value to a country, to a region or to an organization. The added value comes from the general perception people around the world has about the country. They might see it as an environmentally friendly country, technologically developed country or a very artistic country. Nation branding is the conscious effort of state officials to define/redefine peoples' understanding and view of their country.

There are three major elements identified of a country's FDI strategy. They are the product, price, and promotion. The product is described as "the intrinsic advantages and disadvantages of investing in the country, ranging from the country's general attractiveness to a specific investment site's attractiveness. The price is defined as tax incentives, capital and training grants, tariff protection, and similar price mechanisms. The "promotion" includes activities that disseminate information about, or attempt to create a favorable image of, the investment site". Promotion process used by the states is one of the key controllable factors that influence the success of the states in attracting FDI developed a model for marketing a region internationally.<sup>219</sup> Image building is the effective strategy aimed to attract investors that are in early stages of decision - making. Tactics for this strategy include advertising in general financial media, participating in trade and investment exhibitions, advertising in industry- or sector-specific media, conducting general investment missions from a source country to a host country

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<sup>218</sup> <http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/22/world/meast/kenya-mall-al-shabaab-analysis/>

<sup>219</sup> Ibid (2001).

or from a host country to a source country, and conducting general information seminars on investment opportunities.<sup>220</sup>

### 5.3 Conclusions

Public diplomacy can make impacts on several levels depending on how successful the public diplomacy initiatives are conducted, for how long they run and how many resources are invested in them. The importance of foreign public diplomacy is that it is influenced by soft power rather than use of force or hard power and has brought dependency of citizens on their governments and the local press for information on foreign events and increased potential targets for direct communication of diplomatic messages.<sup>221</sup> Distribution of information around the globe is not restricted due to new technology that can transmit messages around the world in seconds like with fighting terrorism in an age of global real-time television and the internet. Public diplomacy serves both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in the sense that they are intended for national interest like in the quest of investment, promotion of trade, and international tourism which is also referred to as branding and also creates cooperation and interaction.<sup>222</sup>

Public diplomacy can be seen as part of nation branding, in which case concepts of branding and marketing are be applied to public policy. From this point of view, a nation brand uses the political aspect of public diplomacy as only one part of the entire branding campaign.<sup>223</sup> Practical applications of this approach can be seen through national governments' hiring of branding consultants, who specialize in country promotion, in order to introduce a concrete strategy to an international relations agenda and to provide a broader audience for input as well

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<sup>220</sup> Ibid (1997).

<sup>221</sup> Berridge, G.R. (2005) *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan

<sup>222</sup> Melissen, Jan, ed. (2007) *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>223</sup> Interview with an officer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on public diplomacy and nation branding in Kenya.

as feedback on a nation's public diplomacy programs, which can be analyzed through market research. This proves the hypothesis that public diplomacy has a role in nation branding in Kenya.

Public diplomacy has larger roles, including as a valuable counterterrorism tool. One of the essential tasks of public diplomacy is to provide counterprogramming to offset the messages of proponents of hatred and violence.<sup>224</sup> Establishing dialogue that involves peers, respected leaders, moderate clerics, and others is part of this. But an argument is convincing only if it is backed up by policy that can ensure that the promises made in such dialogue become reality. This underscores the importance of bringing public diplomacy into the heart of foreign policy, not leaving it as a satellite in distant orbit, glimpsed only occasionally.<sup>225</sup> If terrorist organizations draw their support from a large public, they should not be allowed to access that public without competition from those who want to bring terrorism to an end. Conventional diplomacy operates on too narrow a wavelength to compete in this way, but well-designed public diplomacy can reach large numbers of the political public and can challenge terrorism at its base.<sup>226</sup> This proves the hypothesis that public diplomacy has a role to play as a counterterrorism tool in Kenya.

Three objectives have been identified that should be accomplished through investment promotion: to promote the country's image within the investment community as a favorable location for investment, to generate specific investments, and to provide services to prospective

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<sup>224</sup> Joseph S. Nye, "How To Counter Terrorism's Online Generation," *Financial Times*, October 13, 2005.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid

<sup>226</sup> Views from an interviewee at the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government on using public diplomacy as a counterterrorism tool

and current investors.<sup>227</sup> According to the authors, image building is the effective strategy aimed to attract investors that are in early stages of decision - making. Tactics for this strategy include advertising in general financial media, participating in trade and investment exhibitions, advertising in industry- or sector-specific media, conducting general investment missions from a source country to a host country or from a host country to a source country, and conducting general information seminars on investment opportunities. This indeed supports the hypothesis that public diplomacy has a significant effect in foreign direct investment (FDI) in Kenya.

Cultural diplomacy is the linchpin of public diplomacy; for it is through cultural activities that a nation's idea of itself is best represented. Cultural diplomacy is uniquely able to reach out to people of all walks of life; young people, to non-elites, to broad audiences with a much reduced language barrier. Cultural diplomacy enable us to: Reach influential members of foreign societies who cannot be accessed through traditional embassy functions; Provide a positive agenda for cooperation in spite of policy differences; Create a neutral platform for people-to-people contact; Serve as a flexible, universally acceptable vehicle for engagement with countries where diplomatic relations have been strained or are absent; Provide awareness of cultural richness of our nation and generate interest in Kenya's cultural heritage.<sup>228</sup> This helps in attracting foreign direct investment in the country.

#### **5.4 Recommendations**

The study recommends that the government should further embark on an aggressive information campaign to educate the populace on terrorism using public diplomacy. The campaign should be

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<sup>227</sup> Kotler, P., Jatusripitak, S., & Maesincee, S. (1997). *The marketing of nations: A strategic approach to building national wealth*. New York, NY: Free Press.!

<sup>228</sup> Interview with an officer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he viewed cultural diplomacy as the linchpin of public diplomacy; for it is through cultural activities that a nation's idea of itself is best represented.

aimed at sensitizing the public about the fact that terrorist attacks do not only affect the targeted victim but everyone, either directly or indirectly, not just as potential victims, but also as taxpayers because most of the government resources that would have been invested in development are being diverted to fight terrorism. This information campaign should focus on areas where terrorists have penetrated the community. For the campaign to be effective, the government should enlist the support of prominent Islamic scholars and Islamic organizations, such as the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya, the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, the Kenya Assembly of Ulamaa, and the National Union of Kenya Muslims, with a view to incorporating the clerics as a platform to launch antiterrorism appeals and to build a consensus on an antiterrorism bill. The Muslim clerics are in a better position to educate their followers on the issue of terrorism.<sup>229</sup>

The study recommends for openness and the reason why openness is a necessity for successful public diplomacy is not only that it targets foreign publics but also that it is useful to include other organizations in parts of the public diplomacy strategies. Cooperation with NGOs, the private sector (including mass media) or other state organizations (i.e. ministries of education, trade/economy or culture) are all obvious means of enhancing the impacts of the strategies as the ministries of foreign affairs will inevitably have limited resources and connections.

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<sup>229</sup> Ringa, Mathias. 2004. France and Kenya to Collaborate in Terror War. *The East Africa Standard*, Nairobi, 5 October



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## **APPENDICES**

### **Interview Guide**

1. What is the general role of public diplomacy in Kenya?
2. What role does public diplomacy play in pursuit of Kenya national interests?
3. What is the role of Public Diplomacy in the war against terrorism in Kenya?
4. What role does public diplomacy play in nation-branding in Kenya?
5. What challenges are experienced while using public diplomacy in nation-branding in Kenya?
6. What is the role of Public Diplomacy in Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Kenya?
7. What is your view on the relationship between public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy in Kenya?
8. What is your opinion on what should be done to improve public diplomacy in Kenya in order to pursue national interests?