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A Comparative Assessment of Ethio-Kenya Diplomatic and Foreign Policy: 1991-2012

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This research project is submitted in partial fulfilment for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Conflict Management at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi.

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DECLARATION

I declare that this is my original work and has never been presented in any other university or examination body.

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This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the university of Nairobi Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies Supervisor.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the late Prime Minister MelesZenawi who led Ethiopia from 1991-2012. He was a philosopher by his own right and an architect of modern day Ethiopian Foreign Policy and Diplomacy. During his tenure he pioneered the renaissance of Ethiopia and the country became the voice of Africa.

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ABSTRACT

The sovereign Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Republic of Kenya are two independent states geographically located in the Horn of Africa; they share a common border, similar challenges and arguably common opportunities. The two states have had diplomatic relations for close to six decades. This study was guided by three objectives; to examine the factors that determine foreign and policy interests of the two countries, to analyse responses of Kenya and Ethiopia to the changing global environment, to examine the similarities and differences of the foreign policy and diplomatic styles of the two countries.

From the study it emerged that if security and conflict challenges from the region are factored in foreign policy of the two states towards each other, then they will be responsive. It also emerged that If the foreign and policy responses of Kenya and Ethiopia are not responsive to the global environment, then change will be of no essence. Moreover the research findings noted that foreign and diplomatic policies of Kenya and Ethiopia are similar but the implementation methods are different.

The study used the actor model theory, Allison's models of foreign policy decision making are based on three levels of foreign policy analysis. Allison argues that, these models are useful in decision making by states. Allison argues that, in foreign policy, states decisions are made by considering three main models namely, rational actor approach, organizational process and bureaucratic politics model. The rational actor approach contends that, governments are unified and rational entities, seeking to achieve well defined foreign policy goals in the international system.

The Rational Actor approach presumes that, individual actors have complete freedom of action to achieve goals that they have articulated through a careful process of rational analysis involving full and objective study of all pertinent information and alternatives. At the same time, it presumes that this central actor is so fully in control of the apparatus of government that a decision once made is as good as implemented. The rational actor model ignores the fact that the individual, say the president is surrounded by a bureaucratic from which he has to obtain information and discuss policy alternatives. Such a structure may influence decisions since it the same structure which is providing the information and alternative from which the rational leader is to make his choice from.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM – African Mission in Somalia

AU – African Union

COMESA – Common Market for East Southern Africa

EAC – East African Community

EPRDF – Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front

G77 – Group of Seventy Seven

IGAD – Intergovernmental Authority on Development

KADU – Kenya African Democratic Union

KANU – Kenya African National Union

KDF – Kenya Defence Forces

LAPPSET – Lamu Port-South Sudan and Ethiopia Transport Corridor

NARC – National Alliance Rainbow Coalition

NFD – Northern Frontier District

NFPPP – Northern Frontier People's Progressive Party

NIF – National Islamic Front

OAU – Organization of African Union

SALW – Small Arms and Light Weapons

SPLA – Sudan People's Liberation Army

SSA – Special Status Agreement

TFG – Transitional Federal Government

TPLF – Tigrayan People's Liberation Front

UN – United Nations

WPE – Workers' Party of Ethiopia

CHAPTER ONE

A COMPARATIVE ASSESMENT ON ETHIO-KENYA FOREIGN POLICYAND

DIPLOMATIC STRATEGIES: 1991-2012

1.1 Introduction

The sovereign Republic of Ethiopia and the Republic of Kenya are two independent states geographically located in the Horn of Africa; they share a common border, similar challenges and arguably common opportunities. The two states have had diplomatic relations for close to six decades. Notably, diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Kenyahave steadily increased since the year 1991 when the then head of state MelesZenawi came to power. On the one hand between the year 1991 and 2012 when Meles passed on, both Kenya and Ethiopia signed and entered into partnership on a number of issues which connote common national interests and maturity of their diplomatic relations. Subsequently, Ethiopia has maintained a vibrant foreign policy and diplomatic approach towards Kenya and Kenya has reciprocated.

On the other hand, states in the Horn of Africa region and which border Ethiopia and Kenya have experienced different levels of conflict. These conflicts compromise the pursuit of national goals and interests by both states. By virtue of the degree of political stability existent in both Ethiopia and Kenya, a number of attempts at solving them are bore by Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia and Kenya's foreign policy have to consider conflicts and security threats in the region.

Farah argues that national interests serve as an analytical tool to be employed in describing and explaining the thrust of nations' foreign policies and they are used to justify or

denounce the purpose by states.[1] In this case, national interests are aggregated into various policies which constitute the strategic objectives of the state at the international stage.

Diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Kenya were established to promote cooperation, development and growth between the two states. Since then, the relations have benefited both states in different ways, magnitude and directions, leading to growth of interactions, exchanges and cooperation between the two countries. However, considering that, Ethiopia and Kenya face common threats emerging from conflict, insecurity and instability makes a comparative analysis of their bilateral diplomatic and foreign policy an important area to investigate.

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[1] I. Farah, *Foreign Policy and Conflict in Somali*, 1960-1990, PhD Thesis p.12

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Ethiopia and Kenya have had diplomatic relation for a long period of time. This relation is founded on similar social, political and economic opportunities existent in both states. It is also founded at overcoming similar challenges posed by neighbouring states to Kenya and Ethiopia's national security.

As diplomatic and foreign policy relations advance, both states have had individual challenges to their national security.Conflictsfrom Somalia and Sudan pose particular challenge to both Kenya and Ethiopia. The challenges stem from refugees, immigration, availability of small arms and light weapons, terrorism among other security challenges. There have been opportunities for both states to advance relations especially on economic development, power supply and access to wider markets between Kenya and Ethiopia.

Despite of the above there is no study to date that has been conducted to investigate diplomatic relations and foreign policy of Ethiopia and Kenya. It is for this reason that, this research study seeks to compare, contrast, account for and documents the development of the diplomatic relationship between the two states. There are many areas where both states share similar opportunities and challenges within and outside the region. The thesis of this research study therefore is built on the assumption that, acknowledging and accounting for experiences in diplomatic relations will encourage more comparative foreign policy.

1.3 Objectives

1.3.1 **Secondary Objective**
To examine the impacts of diplomatic and foreign policy relationship between Ethiopia and the Republic of Kenya,

1.3.2 **Primary Objective**

i. To examine the factors that determine foreign and policy interests of the two countries.

ii. To analyse responses of Kenya and Ethiopia to the changing global environment

iii. To examine the similarities and differences of the foreign policy and diplomatic styles of the two countries.

1.4 Literature Review

This section reviews relevant literature on Ethiopia and Kenya's diplomatic and foreign policy. This section will be examined in three sections; the first section will examine the underpinnings of foreign policy as stipulated in mainstream academic discourse. The second section will review the basis of diplomatic relations between states and the third section will examine diplomatic and foreign policy relations of the two states.

On the one hand, diplomacy is defined as the art and science of conducting relations between two or more sovereign states. On the other hand, foreign policy is defined as policy guidelines and objectives around which states frame their relations with other states. There are also decision making procedures of one state, which stipulate how the entity intends to survive and relate with other states in the international system. Diplomacy is the strategy upon which a state pursues its national interest, foreign policy is the framework that guides states bilateral and multilateral behaviour in general.

Foreign policy has attracted different meanings and definitions from both scholars and practitioners. It is viewed by as the sum total of official external relations conducted by an independent actor who is usually a state in the international system. For some analysts, foreign policy, just like domestic policy, is formulated within the states unlike domestic policy; foreign policy is directed at and must be implemented in the environment external to the state.

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Altogether, foreign policy is a multi-faceted and dynamic exercise that entails constant flow of information as pertains to the security of the state be it military, political, economic, cultural and institutional integrity of the entity.

Herman observes that, the behaviour of a statein its regional backyard is determined by its foreign policy.[2] Herman describes foreign policy as a goal or problem oriented program, designed by decision makers and directed towards entities outside their political jurisdiction.[3] It is a program whose objective is directed towards addressing a certain problem or the pursuit of certain goals towards external entities.[4]Modelski notes that, foreign policy is a process through which the state minimizes adverse effects while maximizing on the advantageous ones.[5]

Policy, in this sense, is not a charted course but a calculated response to external challenges. Modelski describes foreign policy from a state perspective; he contends that, foreign policy of a state is the sum of its relations with other states and non-state actors in the international system.[6] In Modelski terms therefore, foreign policy of a state defines the character of the nation which is pursuing it, how the people perceive themselves and finally how they would like the international system to perceive them.

Plano and Olton argue that foreign policy is goal oriented and can be described as a strategy or planned course of action aimed at achieving specific goals.[7] Foreign policy refers to the actions and declarations that affect the external milieu that is the arena beyond a state's

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[2] C Herman, 1990, 'Changing Course: When Governments Choose to redirect Foreign Policy', *International Quarterly,* Vol: 3, No: 19, pp.2-7

[3] Ibid

[4] Ibid, p. 300-301

[5] G. Modelski,, 1962, *A Theory of Foreign Policy*, London: Pall Mall, p.3

[6] G. Modelski,, 1962, *A Theory of Foreign Policy*, London: Pall Mall, p.1

[7] J. C. Plano and R. Olton, 1969, *The International Relations Dictionary* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., p.127.

borders. Moreover, Mwambaobserves, foreign policy as an instrument through which a state seeks to influence the activities of another country.[8]

The premise of engaging in foreign policy is that, every state in the international system possesses national interests going beyond its international boundaries. These interests are collectively referred to as foreign policy. In this connection, Levin argues that, foreign policy is a combination of aims and interests pursued and defended by a given state and its ruling class in the relations with other states and the methods and means used by it for the achievement and defence of these purposes and interests[9]

The proponents of realism argue that the state is the appropriate unit of analysis and is seen as pursuing foreign policy to advance national interest. Furthermore, they observe that, a states power is an important component in determining how it pursues its foreign policy. Rourke argues that, powerful states can pursue and achieve their foreign policies even under conditions that are not favourable.[10] However, Menkhaus and Kegley argue that, realism overlooks the ability of weak states to bargain and manipulate stronger patrons in order to exercise constrained autonomy over their foreign policy.[11]

In the same vein, Modelski posits that the foreign policy pursued by a state is dependent on a number of factors chief of which are a state's economic power.[12] The premise of a state's economic power is hinged on the fact that, a state's foreign policy is aimed at securing its national interests. In this sense, foreign policy pursued by developed states is distinct and

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[8] Z. Mwamba, 1978, *Tanzania: Foreign Policy and International Politics,* Washington: University Press of America, ,p.iv.

[9] Levin cited in O. Olatunde et al, *African International Relations*. London: Longman publishers, 1985, p44

[10] T. J. Rourke, 1996, *International Politics on the World Stage*, Englewood, Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, p.230.

[11] K. Menkhaus, and C. W. Kegley, Jr., (October 1988), "The Compliant Foreign Policy of the Dependent State Revisited: Empirical Linkages and Lessons from the Case of Somali," *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 21, no. 3 pp. 315-46.

[12] G. Modelski,, 1962, *A Theory of Foreign Policy*, op, cit

different from foreign policy pursued by developing states. Moreover, foreign policies pursued by developed states are more likely to reflect and cover a wider geographical scope including their respective regions near abroad and global. Among most developing states, the near abroad region is significant to their foreign policy, because the stability, social and economic status of the region determines the kind of foreign policy they pursue.

Farah defines foreign policy as actions that a state takes in its relations to other states and other actors in the international system in order to defend or achieve its purpose.[13] Farah further characterizes foreign policy as actions of a state in reference to other bodies acting on the international stage in order to advance its goals for instance security, welfare and preservation and promotion of values.[14] States therefore seek particular foreign policies which are commensurate to their national interests. Reynolds notes that, states primarily seek to advance their national interests through the pursuit of foreign policy.[15] The foundation of seeking national interests through the pursuit of foreign policy is that no state is self sufficient.

National interests are critical in explaining and understanding state behaviour. Farah argues that national interests serve as an analytical tool to be employed in describing and explaining the thrust of nations' foreign policies and they are used to justify or denounce the purpose by states.[16] In this case, national interests are aggregated into various policies which constitute the strategic objectives of the state at the international stage.

The extent to which a country is able to achieve its set purposes and influences the actions and activities of others in the international system depends to a large extent on the power resources available to that state. The geographical location and size of a state, the resources

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[13] I. Farah, *Foreign Policy and Conflict in Somali*, 1960-1990, PhD Thesis, University of Nairobi, p.5
[14] Ibid
[15] P. A. Reynolds, 1994, *An Introduction to International Relations* 3rd Edition, London: Longman, p.39.

[16] I. Farah, *Foreign Policy and Conflict in Somali*, 1960-1990, op, cit, p.12

available to the state (both human and material), the extent to which these resources are harnessed or processed to serve the needs of the state, for instance, industrial production, its military arsenal, level of technological development or advancement are all critical to the kind of foreign policy the state pursues. In addition to these are such intangibles as leadership, the national character, patriotism, diplomacy, quality of government, and how these blend with the tangible resources to advance the country's purpose and external relations.

Historically, diplomacy was associated with the international system that constituted of the states as the sole actors for conducting diplomacy. In modern times, diplomacy was practiced largely by designated state officials behind closed doors. As a result, domestic constituents, interest groups, non-governmental organizations and other non state actors who are an important component of state relations were left out. By extension, it can be argued that, this segregation inhibited the growth of diplomatic relations between states. Therefore, there is need for states to permit growth of diplomacy. In contemporary times, the conduct of diplomacy is not a preserve of the state. This essay will argue that the media is an important component that, if well utilized, can promote diplomatic ties between states.

As mentioned above, diplomacy is a set of tools used within a framework of rules that enables a nation state to operationalize its foreign policy[17]. This operationalization has historically been achieved through bilateral communications and negotiations conducted between foreign offices and through multilateral meetings. The apical skills in this type of diplomacy are negotiation, political surveillance and reporting[18].

In traditional foreign policy, ambassadors and state representatives dominated several important areas of diplomacy; representing their countries, communicating their government

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[17]AEban, 1998, *Diplomacy for the Next Century*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, p 64.

[18] ibid

positions, negotiating and concluding agreements, gathering information in the countries they are resident and recommending actions to policy makers back home. But the communication and information revolutions have substantially eroded the ambassador's role as the states diplomatic mouth.

Diplomacy from the early ages to middle ages was a sole prerogative of nation states. It involved interaction between state actors through the ministry of foreign affairs and diplomatic missions in the receiving states. In the modern state however, new actors like non-governmental organizations have emerged and command diplomatic influence on the international system. Gathering information is regarded as a basic function of diplomacy some of the issues in which diplomatic embassies gather information on include; the state of the economy morale of armed forces[19], scientific research with military implications, balance of power within the government, likely result of any forthcoming elections, and issues of similar matter.

Various scholars have attempted to define, describe and explain the meanings of the terms Foreign policy, foreign policy analysis and diplomacy. Foreign policy has been variously defined in the study of international relations, with Farah viewing it as actions that a state takes in its relations to other states and other actors in the international system in order to defend or achieve its purpose.[20] Along the same lines, Farah further characterizes foreign policy as actions of a state in reference to other bodies acting on the international stage in order to advance its goals for instance security, welfare and preservation and promotion of values.[21]

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[19] ibid
[20] I. Farah, *Foreign Policy and Conflict in Somali*, 1960-1990, PhD Thesis, University of Nairobi, pp.7-10
[21] Ibid

Alons argues that, foreign policy is the study of the process, effects, causes, or outputs of foreign policy decision-making in either a comparative or case specific manner.[22]Foreign policy also means the array of the actions taken and strategies pursued by a given state towards other external states or actors in the system which, tightly or loosely, are related to it. Moreover, foreign policy analysis means the inquiry on the motives which lead a state to take a certain action, the decision-making process of how to define that action, the methods adopted by a state to carry out that action and the effects which that action has or had.

Herman describes foreign policy as a goal or problem oriented program, designed by decision makers and directed towards entities outside their political jurisdiction.[23] It is a program whose objective is directed towards addressing a certain problem or the pursuit of certain goals towards external entities.[24] In this regard, foreign policy is a means through which a state's national interest is pursued and achieved. Plano and Olton argue that foreign policy is goal oriented and can be described as a strategy or planned course of action aimed at achieving specific goals.[25] Foreign policy refers to the actions and declarations that affect the external milieu that is the arena beyond a state's borders.

Policies are typically thought of as the product of governments, and thus governments are the actors. Policy can include specific decisions to sign a treaty on climate change, for example, and general guidelines to support initiatives to address global warming. Policy can include observable behaviours by countries.

[22]Alons, G.C. (2007), Predicting a State's Foreign Policy: State Preferences between Domestic and International Constraints, Foreign Policy Analysis (2007) 3, 211–232

[23] Ibid

[24] Ibid, p. 300-301

[25] J. C. Plano and R. Olton, 1969, *The International Relations Dictionary,* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., p.127.

Kappeler*et al* note that,the term diplomacy means the practical use of skill or tact in managing communication and relationship between nations or groups of people. [26] They add that, diplomacy can only function where there are communities of people who exist independently of each other, and have to rely on designated representatives if they want to communicate without recourse to use of force. Mwagiru*et al* define diplomacy as the conduct of international relations by non violent means.[27]Keohane and Nye argue that, although states have traditionally dominated the conduct of diplomacy, non state and individual actors also are involved in the conduct of diplomacy. Although non state actors are involved, they have not in any way substituted states especially in the field of conflict management and diplomacy.28

Modelski argues that, the term foreign policy analysis concerns both the domestic level and the external level of analysis.29 The conceptualization of foreign policy analysis is framed within the precepts of theories. The theory of neo classical realism contends that, power cannot be just an underspecified term apt to embrace the whole dimension of politics, as classical realism suggests, nor just the synonym of material capabilities, as argued by neo-realists, since material capabilities are nothing if not mobilized and translated into the state apparatus. Baumann et al contend that, power in foreign policy terms must then be something more multifaceted, multidimensional, which can be viable and made viable on more than one single level of analysis.[30]

Jackson and Sorensen argue that, overall within the international system, the basis of states to engage in foreign policy is that, every state in the international system, be it developed

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[26] D. Kappeler, M. Mwagiru, J. Odera, *Diplomacy: The Concept, Actors, Organs, Rules and Process, I*nstitute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi, 1991, p.2

[27] Ibid

[28]R. O. Keohane, and J. S. Nye, Jr. ''Introduction.'' In: *Governance in a Globalizing World*, Joseph S. Nye, Jr and John D. Donahue, (Eds). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000, pp.1-6.

[29] G. Modelski,, 1962, *A Theory of Foreign Policy*, London: Pall Mall, p.1

[30]Baumann, R., Rittberger, V., Wolfgang, W. (2001), Noerealist foreign policy theory, in Rittberger, V.(ed), German foreign policy since unification: theories and case studies, Manchester: Manchester University Press

or developing possesses national interests going beyond its international boundaries.[31] Hence since states cannot use crude raw power to pursue those interests, they seek them through use of sought power, which is presented at this point as foreign policy.

In comparison, Rose argues that, the basis of many studies of foreign policy is the fundamental question of who did what to whom. For example, during the Nixon administration (1968-1974), the United States and the Soviet Union had a relaxation of diplomatic tensions known as the détente period. This was reflected in a variety of foreign policy actions, including arms control agreements, a decrease in hostile rhetoric, increased trade, and increased cooperation in resolving disputes.[32] A decision maker living during this period would have a general perception that the hostility between the two superpowers had decreased. However, Azar, notes that, this perception would be based on a general pattern of cooperative interaction, rather than on a single incident.[33]

To understand how states behave toward each other, it is important to understand the influence of systemic factors and the external actors and conditions outside the control of policy makers. For states with some capabilities but who are not global powers, such as Brazil and Great Britain, foreign policy often depends on the distribution of power in the international system, this is one systemic characteristic that realism sees as important determinant for foreign policy pursuit.

The worldwide distribution of economic wealth and military power and the actions of other powerful states, multinational corporations, and international and transnational

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[31] R Jackson and G. Sorensen, 2007, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, Oxford University Press, p 2

[32] Rose, G. (1998), Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy, World Politics, Vol. 51, 1, 144-172

[33] Azar, Edward E., and Thomas Sloan. 1975. *Dimensions of Interaction*. Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh

organizations often mean that states cannot pursue their preferred option in foreign policy. Factors that contribute to military strength include the size and sophistication of military forces, economic wealth to purchase military strength, and good leadership. Geopolitical factors, such as natural defenses and abundant resources, have also long figured into the calculation of military strength. If a state does not have much power, it must enter into an alliance with states that are more powerful and can protect it.[34]

Jackson and Sorensen further note that, foreign policy making in democracies is much more open with inputs from legislators, the media, public opinion, and opposition parties, as well as those foreign policy making factors that influence authoritarian government policy.[35] Semi authoritarian societies have wider access of foreign policy options than authoritarian governments; this is because domestic constituencies are bold in their criticism of government decisions. In democratic societies, domestic constituencies have more avenues to which they can express their opinion as well as the degree to which it constrains decision makers.[36] The structure of political and societal institutions is more open to influence and provides greater access and more contact points for interest groups and other societal actors to influence foreign policy decision making.

Allison argues that, the policy-making process also varies depending on the prevailing situations within a state.[37] For example, policy is made differently during crisis and non-crisis situations. A crisis situation occurs when decision makers are surprised by an event, feel

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[34] R Jackson and G. Sorensen, 2007, *Introduction to International Relations, op, cit,* p 5
[35] Ibid
[36] Rise-Kappen and Muller, 1993, *From the Outside In and From the Inside Out, International Relations, Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy* in The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formation, Editor, David Skidmore and Valeries Hudson, Boulder, CO: Westview Pressp.187
[37] G.Allison, Foreign Policy Decision Making; The Cuban Missile Crisis,1973

threatened especially militarily, and believe that they have only a short time to react. The more intense each of the three factors is, the more acute the sense of crisis.

Breuning contends that, foreign policy much as diplomacy is characterized by an actor-specific focus, based upon the argument that all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups.[38] One variable that affects the foreign policy process is the type of government a country has. These types range along a scale that has absolute authoritarian governments on one end and unfettered democratic governments on the other. The more authoritarian a government is, the more likely it is that foreign policy will be centered in a narrow segment of the government, even in the hands of the president or whatever the leader is called.

In diplomacy and foreign policy studies, these include, states, non state and individual actors. State actors are referred to as track one actors, non state actors are referred to as track two actors while individuals are referred to as track one and half actors.

1.5 Track One Actors of Foreign policy and Diplomacy

According to Berridge, the term track one, or official diplomacy, is used to refer to peacemaking activities conducted by officials who are appointed by the government or state, for instance diplomats, governmental agencies, diplomatic and defense organizations, and inter-governmental organizations.[39]Track one diplomacy is therefore usually conducted by properly appointed and empowered diplomats who meet openly at properly appointed venues and interact with each other according to established practices and properly adopted rules of procedure. Berridge adds that, Track one diplomacy focuses on states and international organizations as

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[38]MarjikeBreuning, 2007, *Foreign Policy Analysis: a Comparative Analysis*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, p.115
[39] G. R. Berridge, Diplomacy: theory and practice, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, Third edition, 2005, p. 21.

actors, international organizations are not sovereign entities, they derive their personality from member states such as the United Nations (U.N) or African Union (A.U).[40]

Track one diplomacy is therefore practiced by states and international organizations or actors that represent them, the definitive description feature for track one actors is that it is guided by both legal rules and practices, and also involves formal operating procedures which leads to formalized relationships.[41] For instance, Track one diplomacy in conflict management is oriented to the realist theory, this is because, track one is configured within the pillars of power and manipulation. Power and manipulation in the realist perspective bargains means that there will be a zero sum outcome; Zero sum outcomes is whereby, one states aims to gain all and the other state to lose everything. The problem with a zero-sum approach in conflict management is that it often leads to settlement of conflicts rather that resolution of conflicts. Mwagiru notes that this is so because a zero-sum scenario in conflict management leads to conflict settlements and not conflict resolution.

Berridge argues that, Track one diplomacy often takes place in areas that are known to the public, and exposed to public scrutiny; as a result, the public can become a critic of the process carried by the government.[42] In conflict management, track one diplomacy aim at negotiating for interests of parties at the detriment of values, conflicts have different values. Here, bargaining is arguably not the most suitable method of negotiating for values, some values are not negotiable, and hence when values are not managed properly conflict remains.

The dominance of track one in explaining state relations is the fact that, since the creation of modern state system, governments have dominated the conduct of state relation.[43] The need

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[40] Ibid
[41] Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne in The Practice of Diplomacy, Routledge, 1995, p.24.
[42] G. R. Berridge, Diplomacy: theory and practice, op, cit.
[43] Ibid

for power and protection of national interest has historically propounded states to engage in crude means to get their interests or to protect them. National interests are defined as goals or objectives that are considered important to the survival of a state, hence a state will employ all its capabilities to protect them.

1.6 Track One and Half Actors of Diplomacy

Berridge notes that, track one and half diplomacy typically involves unofficial actors such as former government officials, statesmen and religious figures, who intervene between official government representatives to promote a peaceful resolution of conflict. The main strength of track one and half interventions in conflict management is that they can bring together non official, but influential members of the parties for direct, private interaction with joint analysis and problem solving of the conflict.[44] Track one and half intermediaries are typically knowledgeable and skilled practitioners who are impartial and whose training and expertise enable them to facilitate productive dialogue and problem solving between the parties.

A country's foreign policy tends to reflect its political culture. This concept represents a society's widely held, traditional values and its fundamental practices that are slow to change. Leaders tend to formulate policies that are compatible with their society's political culture because the leaders share many or all of those values. Cox notes that, in most states, particularly developing states, the executive branch is the most important part of the policymaking process.[45] This is especially true in national security policy and foreign policy.

The most powerful figure in the executive branch is often a statesheadofgovernment.[46] The degree to which the head of government dominates foreign policy is based on numerous

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[44] Ibid
[45] R. Cox, 1986 "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory" in Keohane, R.O. (ed.) *Neorealism and Its Critics* Columbia University Press pp.5-11
[46] Ibid

factors. These include the type of government, the type of situation, the type of policy, the chief executive's formal powers, informal powers, and leadership capabilities. Formal powers are the specific grants of authority that a country's constitution and its statutory written laws give to various offices and institutions.

Leadership capabilities are the third factor that helps determine how much authority a specific chief executive has.[47] These capabilities include administrative skills, how well a president organizes and manages his or her immediate staff and the governments bureaucracy; legislative skills, the ability in a democratic system to win the support in the national legislature; public persuasion abilities, the ability to set forth a clear vision and to speak well and otherwise project a positive image that will win public support; and intellectual capacity, level of intelligence and ability to use it pragmatically to formulate policy.

Leaders try to anticipate the public's reaction to foreign policy decisions and also try to mould public opinion by presenting problems from a particular perspective.[48] The public's impact on foreign policy is dependent between decision maker's efforts to anticipate public opinion and efforts by the public to shape the set of options decision makers will perceive to be viable strategies.

On the one hand, although decision makers have greater role in defining the problem during a crisis, the public's attention builds steadily and is usually greatest during the implementation phase.[49] This means that decision makers have less freedom in selecting a policy response. On the other hand, the leaders' circle of advisors has most influence during the problem representation phase, because they are the ones who can define a problem as being a crisis.

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[47] Ibid, p.12
[48] Ibid
[49] M. Bruenning, 2007, *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Analysis,* op, cit,

Trumbore argues that, the spread of democracy and the increasingly intermestic nature of policy in an interdependent international system mean that, political leaders must often engage in a two-level game in which ach national leader plays both the international and domestic games simultaneously.[50] The strategy of a two-level game is based on the reality that to be successful, diplomats have to negotiate at the international level with representatives of other countries and at the domestic level with legislators, bureaucrats, interest groups, and the public in the diplomat's own country. The object is to produce a "win-win" agreement that satisfies both the international counterparts and the powerful domestic actors so that both are willing to support the accord.

James and Zhang contend that, decision makers are likely to choose policies that are acceptable to the public even if they consider such policies as being less optimal than alternative options. For most leaders, the ability to maintain public support for their policies is a critical dimension that options must be able to meet.[51]Breuning argues that, the most important determinant of states foreign policy is its domestic constituencies.[52] Domestic constituents take several different forms, but the main ones can be grouped into three classes, these include, interest groups, the media, and public opinion. The extent to which domestic constituents influence foreign policy is on one hand gauged by considering how decision makers are constrained by the pressures exerted by domestic constituencies, and on the other hand by how decision makers seek to set the agenda and shape attitudes of domestic constituencies.

Breuning further argues that, the relationship between decision makers and domestic constituencies is determined by the political institutions of the society. In this perspective, it is

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[50] E. Trumbore, Foreign Policy In the Globalized World, 1998, p.546

[51] Patrick James and Enyu Zhang, 2005, *Chinese Choices, A Poliheuristic Analysis of Foreign Policy Crises 1950-1996,* Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol:1, No: 1, pp.1-54:31

[52] M. Bruenning, 2007, *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Analysis,* op, cit, pp.119-122

argued that, authoritative governments provide very few avenues for domestic constituents to explicitly influence foreign policy. By extension, this means that, the role of the public in influencing foreign policy decision making is largely indirect. Breuning further notes that, authoritarian states face few explicit domestic constrains. Leaders in authoritarian governments do not seek to understand their publics, they present foreign policy decisions and problems in terms of verbal imagery that they believe will resonate with their domestic constituents. They also seek to convince their domestic constituents that their policies are in the national interest.

1.7 Track Two Actors of Diplomacy

Montville describes track two actors as those that include all other potential non state actors and stakeholders with an interest in the conflicted setting.[53] Track two intervention involves a variety of non-governmental and unofficial forms of conflict resolution activities between representatives of adversarial groups that aim to de-escalate conflict, hence, this intervention aims to improve communication and understanding between parties, and develop innovative ideas to be used in solving the conflict by track one actors.

However, although some track two processes can be closely related to, and sponsored by official diplomacy and officials may take part in some track two processes, such processes cannot substitute for official interactions between states.[54] In support of this claim, McDonald argues that track two diplomacy is not a substitute for track one but operates parallel or in support of it

Track two diplomacy deals with maters normally dealt with at the diplomatic level but by people who are not constrained by official ties. Burton says that track two diplomacy conflicts

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[53] W.D. Davidson and J.V Montville, "Foreign Policy According to Freud," in *Foreign Policy*, 45, Winter, 1982, pp. 1-4.
[54] Ibid

with track one diplomacy; track two diplomacy is not just about official methods within which the political realistic world of power politics is conducted. He adds that track two diplomacy is not about improving negotiating skills so that leverage and power can be employed more effectively, but it is about world politics and human behavior.

The objective of track two in conflict management is to construct supportive environments whereby non-state actors with an active interest in the issue can either initiate discussions on some issue which before were unapproachable by the track one diplomats, or initiate processes of clearing blockages preventing formal diplomatic discussions through informal dialogue, workshops, roundtables and other less than formal environments. McDonald adds that track-two diplomacy may include individuals or groups not associated with any government but who are engaged in processes of direct negotiation, mediation, or arbitration, when track two diplomacy involves individuals from the government they act in their private capacities.[55]

In conflict management track two diplomacy has two broad objectives. First, it aims to reduce conflict by improving communication, increasing level of understanding, lowering anger, tension, fear, and misunderstanding between adversary groups.[56] Track two diplomacy is based on the notion that power alone cannot explain the social relationship of actors who are in dispute. It therefore identifies the causes of conflict as, lack of satisfaction, limited participation and recognition. Farah argues that when these causes of conflict are not satisfied, there can be no legitimized relationship or solving of conflicts. McDonald argues that, Track two

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[55] J. McDonald, Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy, in Kriesberg, L. and Thorson, S. (Eds), *Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts*, Syracuse. New York, 1991, p. 219.
[56] H. Kelman, "The Interactive Problem-Solving Approach," in Constructive Conflicts: *From Escalation to Resolution*, C.A Crocker, and F.O. Kreisberg(Eds), New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996, p.82.

diplomacytranscends the narrow power based approaches of traditional diplomacy by replacing the nation state, as the primary referent of conflict, with all interest groups.[57]

This means that, instead of only having favorable discussions based on strategic interests with just heads of state, a fundamental characteristic of track one mission, track two diplomacy seeks to include all parties to the conflict that have interest in the outcome. In this way track two diplomacy contribute to conflict transformation by encouraging those involved in disputes to engage in constructive dialogue.[58]

Track Two diplomacy seeks to help all the parties involved in an issue of contention to change their way of thinking diplomatically, therefore, it entails processes such as problem solving workshops, dialogues, cultural exchanges and any other contacts established between parties that are engaged in a conflict. According to Mwagiru, track two diplomacy tends to stress interpersonal, social-psychological dynamics aimed at increasing each side's understanding of the underlying factors motivating the other's position, and its own, as a tool to open up possibilities for cooperative problem solving.

Track two activities concern efforts to develop new approaches to regional security where there is not necessarily a specific conflict being addressed by the Track Two process in question.[59]These are two main roles of track two interventions, these are, leverage and facilitation. Leverage is described as an approach where by utilized by third parties; it is described as the ability of a third party to persuade parties in a conflict that there is an alternative than fighting. Regarding facilitation, track two actors go through an analytical and exploration

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[57] J. McDonald, Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy, op, cit
[58] J.V. Montville, "Transnationalism and the role of Track Two Diplomacy," in *Approaches to Peace: An Intellectual Map*, W.S. Thompson and K.M. Jensen (Eds), Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1991, p.7-11.
[59] Ibid

exercise about the conflict or issue they are dealing with, this is because they belief that it is only parties who know what the problem is with their relationships.[60]

Every state, whatever its strength or type of government, is heavily influenced by its bureaucracy. Although political leaders legally command the bureaucracy, they find it difficult to control the vast understructures of their governments. Bureaucrats sometimes do not agree with their country's foreign policy. Instead they may favor another policy option based on their general sense of their unit's mission. How any given policy will affect the organization is also an important factor in creating bureaucratic perspective.

Filtering information is one way that bureaucracies influence policy. Decision makers depend on staff for information, and what they are told depends on what subordinates choose, consciously or not, to pass on.[61]Recommendations are another source of bureaucratic influence on foreign policy. Bureaucracies are the source of considerable expertise, which they use to push the agency's preferred position.

Interest groups are private associations of people who have similar policy views and who pressure the government to adopt those views as policy.[62] Traditionally, interest groups were generally considered to be less active and influential on foreign policy than on domestic policy issues. The increasingly intermestic nature of policy is changing that, and interest groups are becoming a more important part of the foreign policy making process. This can be seen by looking at several types of interest groups.[63] This include cultural group for example Muslim associations, economic groups who lobby their governments for favourable legislation and for support of their interests in other countries.

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[60] Ibid
[61] MarjikeBreuning, 2007, *Foreign Policy Analysis: a Comparative Analysis*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, p.115
[62] Ibid
[63] Ibid, p.42

1.8 The Link between Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

From above, it emerges that, diplomacy is conducted by three main actors, that diplomacy implements what foreign policy sets to do. Hence, foreign policy lays out the plan while diplomacy executes the strategy. Beneath this, it can be argued that, both diplomacy and foreign policy analysis have a symbiotic relationship. They each depend on the other, this relationship will further be illustrated by examining the centrality of foreign policy in the international system.

Foreign policy takes cognizance of the objectives the state seeks to pursue and the means it must have at its disposal to realize the same.Modelski notes that, foreign policy is a process through which the state minimizes adverse effects while maximizing on the advantageous ones.[64] Policy, in this sense, is not a charted course but a calculated response to external challenges. Reynolds posits that, states primarily seek to advance their national interests through the pursuit of foreign policy.[65]

Allison contends that, states foreign policies were solely a product of the international system, which by extension was seen as a mere reaction to external conditions and other actors.[66] This is the expectation derived from theories of international relations such as realism and variants of liberalism and constructivism. Thus, foreign policy analysts often use perspectives on the international system to infer the actions states are likely to take in their foreign policies.

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[64] G. Modelski,, 1962, *A Theory of Foreign Policy*, London: Pall Mall, p.3
[65] P. A. Reynolds, 1994, *An Introduction to International Relations* 3rd Edition, London: Longman, p.39.

[66] G. Allison, 1971, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, New York: Harper Collins, p.113

1.9 Theoretical Underpinnings of Foreign Policy

The analysis of foreign policy begins with theories that identify different factors and various forces that influence a state's foreign policy. Any explanation of foreign policy often involves multiple factors. These multiple factors can be grouped into two broad categories of explanations. The first group includes factors outside the state, and the second group includes those dealing with factors inside the state. The first category points to the international environment as the explanation for countries' foreign policy. Factors external to the state how the international system is organized, the characteristics of contemporary international relations, and the actions of others can lead the state to react in certain ways.

The proponents of realism argue that the state is the appropriate unit of analysis and is seen as pursuing foreign policy to advance national interest. Furthermore, they observe that, a states power is an important component in determining how it pursues its foreign policy. Rourke argues that, powerful states can pursue and achieve their foreign policies even under conditions that are not favourable.[67]

Morgenthau argues that, the lack of an overarching government in the international system is one of the most important external conditions that affects foreign policy.[68] Realist theory proposes that anarchy is the characteristic of the international environment that makes international politics so dramatically different from domestic politics. In the international political system, however, conflict is more likely because the absence of an overall system of law and enforcement means that each political actor must look out for itself.In addition, realists argue that power is a relative concept. In a condition of anarchy, any gain in power by one state

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[67] T. J. Rourke, 1996, *International Politics on the World Stage*, Englewood, Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, p.230.
[68] H. J. Morgenthau, 2004, *Politics Among Nations,* sixth edition, p.178

represents an inherent threat to its neighbors. Realists prescribe policies that maximize state interests in an effort to seek relative gains and preserve balances of power.[69]

Classical realism approach to foreign policy analysis is arguably vague and loose. This is because, it emphasizes the role of national power, the character of states and their relationship with the domestic environment, overlooking any systemic factors or sources of explanations. In light of this, Mwamba observes that, foreign policy is an instrument through which a state seeks to influence the activities of another country.[70] Foreign policy is not a static endeavor, but a dynamic process that changes with the needs of the state, as such policy can be economic, security, political or social oriented depending on the prevailing situation.

Alons contends that, neoclassical realism's suitability for foreign policy analysis may be the fact that it better helps to understand the concept of power, which it argues is so widely abused by the realist approaches. Foreign policy analysis concerns both the domestic level and the external one, it consequently follows that power cannot be just an underspecified term apt to embrace the whole dimension of politics, as classical realism suggests, nor just the synonym of material capabilities, as argued by neo-realists, since material capabilities are nothing if not mobilized and translated into the state apparatus.[71]

Another feature of neoclassical realism which renders it more suitable compared to structural realism is that states are given a face whereby the role of statesmanship, executives and decision-making elites is reaffirmed. Within neo-realism, states are considered as unitary actors, billiard balls of different size due to their different capabilities, impersonal units of a model.[72] In

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[69] Ibid

[70] Z. Mwamba, 1978, *Tanzania: Foreign Policy and International Politics,* Washington: University Press ofAmerica, p.iv.

[71] Alons, G.C. 2007, Predicting a State's Foreign Policy: State Preferences between Domestic and International Constraints, Foreign Policy Analysis, 3, 211–232

[72] obell, S.E., Ripsman, N.M., Taliaferro, J.W. (eds) 2009, Neoclassical realism, the state, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

neoclassical realism, on the contrary, the role of statesmen is important, necessary and functional to the model itself, since the intervening variable of domestic sets can intervene just if state executives and those concerned with foreign policy affairs, who are flesh and blood officials, are able to implement strategic calculations, to spark mobilization, to rightly assess power perceptions and to build up social support.

Another main contribution of neoclassical realism in enhancing foreign policy analysis is the rehabilitation of the middle dimension, this means that, it offers a renovated concern with middle powers and the middle term, discarded by both classical and neo-realism. As far as middle powers are concerned, the argument is consecrated as follows, since great powers enjoy a great portion of the material power within the system.[73]

A greater freedom in the system, they tend to be more concerned with their domestic constraints; conversely, small powers are more oriented towards their domestic dimension as well, since they cannot afford to pose a threat to great and middle powers. Thus, middle powers are the only concerned both with domestic and international constraints, and with how to balance them, since "contrary to the small powers, they are sufficiently powerful to influence events in the international system.74 Waltz argues that, the better viability of neo classical realism in explaining foreign policy is superior to that of realism, since it embeds both the systemic and the domestic level of analysis. Waltz argues that, the international system, without the auxiliary support of the domestic one, is obscure and cryptic to understand.[75]

by individual actors with a sole goal of attaining national interests. The importance of foreign

1.10 Economic Situation of a state and Foreign Policy Decision Making

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[73] Ibid, p.17
[74] Alons, G.C. (2007), Predicting a State's Foreign Policy, op,cit
[75] K. Waltz,

Modelski posits that the foreign policy pursued by a state is dependent on a number of factors chief of which are a states economic power.[76] The premise of a states economic power is hinged on the fact that, a states foreign policy is aimed at securing its national interests. In this sense, foreign policy pursued by developed states is distinct and different from foreign policy pursued by developing states. Moreover, foreign policies pursued by developed states are more likely to reflect and cover a wider geographical scope including their respective regions near abroad and global. Among most developing states, the near abroad region is significant to their foreign policy, because the stability, social and economic status of the region determines the kind of foreign policy they pursue.

Claphman contends that, system-level analysts contend that the economic realities of the international system help shape the choices that countries make. Interdependence is one of the economic facts of life that influences states behaviour.[77] For example, many studies conclude that increasing economic interdependence promotes peace as countries become more familiar with one another and need each other for their mutual prosperity. Foreign policy of the developed states is also driven by their pre-existing technological capabilities.[78] The intensified use of technological innovation as a tool for competitiveness tends to undercut developing states that are historically dependent on export of raw materials or trade in services like tourism that are linked to natural endowments.

1.11 Conclusion

From above, it emerges that, the pursuit of foreign policy is an endeavour by individual actors inside the state, in pursuit of the states national interest. Therefore, foreign policy creates

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[76] G. Modelski,, 1962, *A Theory of Foreign Policy*, op, cit
[77] C. Clapham, 1996, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 7
[78] Ibid

another layer of accountability against which the performance of a nation can be judged not only by the international system, but also by its own people. In this respect, foreign policy is a preserve of state actors but pursued policy to states operations is that, it can be useful in creating a coherent agenda to be pursued by the government.

1.12 Hypotheses

i.   If security and conflict challenges from the region are factored in foreign policy of the two states towards each other, then they will be responsive

ii.   If the foreign and policy responses of Kenya and Ethiopia are not responsive to the global environment, then change will be of no essence.

iii.   The foreign and diplomatic policies of Kenya and Ethiopia are similar but the implementation methods are different.

1.13 Justification of the Study

The study on Ethio-Kenya foreign policy and diplomatic relations can be justified from both policy and academic perspectives. While there is a substantial amount of material written on foreign policy of both countries, there is little literature on that has been published on the two . The existing literature on the foreign policy and diplomatic relations, has neglected research on the Ethio-Kenya foreign relations. This study seeks to assess the role impact and extent of relations between the two states.

A further key problem that this study seeks to address is the prevailing lack of knowledge and information on social-economic relations between the two countries. This study will un-ravel the genesis of diplomatic relations and potential growth of collaboration between the two states.

Finally, the study will contribute to the development of foreign policy and diplomatic relations theory which is adopted by this study by demonstrating the extent to which the theory can be held tenable. This is because by coming up with a framework for foreign policy and diplomatic analysis will help in understanding of the discipline. Hence the theory adopted by this study will be helpful in generating academic debates regarding the assumptions propounded by foreign policy and diplomacy.

1.14 Theoretical Framework

The conduct of foreign policy is often determined by decision making of the head of state, his cabinet and other influential actors in government. In general, it encompasses decisions that weigh to influence national interests and how to achieve them. It is for this reason that the models of decision making, as brought forward by Graham Allison that this study proposes to adopt as its theoretical framework. This study will use the foreign policy decision making models rational actor, bureaucratic and organizational model to analyse the data.

Allison's models of foreign policy decision making are based on three levels of foreign policy analysis. Allison argues that, these models are useful in decision making by states. Allison argues that, in foreign policy, states decisions are made by considering three main models namely, rational actor approach, organizational process and bureaucratic politics model. The rational actor approach contends that, governments are unified and rational entities, seeking to achieve well defined foreign policy goals in the international system.

Allison observes that governments are treated as the primary actors, who examine a set of goals, evaluate them according to their utility and then pick the one that has the highest payoff. The rational actor model uses a cost benefit analysis in choosing the policies to pursue. The Rational Actor approach presumes that, individual actors have complete freedom of action to

achieve goals that they have articulated through a careful process of rational analysis involving full and objective study of all pertinent information and alternatives.[79] At the same time, it presumes that this central actor is so fully in control of the apparatus of government that a decision once made is as good as implemented.

Methodology

This section provides the methodological framework that will underpin the study. The section begins with a description of the population. This is followed by the sample design and sampling technique. The justification of the sample size, description of the research site, research instruments, data collection methods and data analysis are also presented in this section.

Population

The population comprise of 100 adult males and females from Kenya and Ethiopia. The target population includes government officials and diplomatic missions and members of institutions of higher learning. These will be purposively selected.

Sample Design

A sample of individuals and groups at particular points in time of Ethio-Kenya diplomatic relations will be sampled. The Design target the diplomats, scholars and people with expert knowledge from the two countries. The broad area of survey research involves asking respondents questions that will make conclusions from the sample applicable to the entire population.[80] This correspondence between the sample and the larger population is very important since it ensures that the sample is representative of the larger population. This would make the conclusions valid and replicable. The researcher will also use probability sampling.

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[79] J. Bendor, and Thomas H. Hammond, 1992, Rethinking Allison's Models. *American Political Science Review* 86(2): p.300.

[80] Nachmias F.C. & C. Nachmias, Research Methods in the Social Sciences, (New York: St. Main's Press Inc., 1996) pp. 30-45.

This gives all elements (persons,) in the researched population equal opportunity of being included in the sample.[81]

Sampling Technique

Cluster sampling technique is commonly used when it is not possible to obtain a sample frame because the population is either very large or scattered over a large geographical area.[82] Cluster sampling is preferred for this study as it is economical and at the same time characteristics of a probability sample will be retained. In this sampling technique, it is the groups or clusters that are randomly selected and not the individuals.

Cluster sampling is a probability sampling technique because of either the random selection of the clusters or the random selection of the elements within each cluster. In this research the selection of the clusters will be judgemental. Five clusters will be selected for this case study.

1.15 Justification of the Size of the Sample

When calculating the sample size the researcher is be guided by the principles of representativeness and accuracy. The objective of the design in this research is to cover the target population sufficiently, taking into account the limited resources and the vast area of the two countries.

In order for research data to be meaningful, the sample size is 100 respondents, 50 from each side or 20 from 15 clusters. Such a size is large enough, and fulfils the recommendation required for representativeness. The researcher in deciding about the sample size will take into

[81]Blaxter L, Hughes. C, & Tight M, How to Research: Open up Study Skills, (New York: Open University Press, 2010) pp. 169-171.
[82]Mugenda O.M & A.G. Mugenda, Research Methods: Quantitative & Qualitative Approaches, (Nairobi: ACTS Press, 1999). Pp. 49-50.

account the following issues: the objectives of the research, geographical spacing, the question of an even statistical study, the response variable, the types of measurement, possibility of obstacles in data collection, the important sources of variation, the time frame and possible methods of data analysis.

Research Instruments

The researcher uses a questionnaire, comprising of closed-ended (generating quantitative data) and open-ended items (generating qualitative data), as it is a standard procedure for survey research. The researcher also administers interview schedules to government officials from the two countries. This will make it possible for the researcher to obtain data required to meet the study objectives.

A semi-structured interview schedule (also called an interview brief) is used as it is participatory and engages respondents in a conversation through a series of guided questions. It is flexible and will allow open-ended discussion with the government officials and people with expert knowledge of foreign policy analysis. Secondary data will be sought to inform the study. This will include data collection from journals, books, internet sources, and dissertations.

Data Collection Method

The data for this research is obtained from semi-structured questionnaires containing both open and closed-ended questions, conducted in face-to-face interviews. The questions vary slightly between the respondents depending on the information required. The questionnaires will be self-administered with help of translators. The mode of data collection is questionnaire interview conducted in the respondent's mother tongue. The interviewer respects cultural and gender sensitivities and ensuring unprejudiced representativeness.

Semi-structured interview schedule guides the researchers on asking respondents questions, will be another main data collection tool. The interviews are undertaken throughout the day and sometimes into early evening depending on the availability of the respondents. To facilitate the recording process, a magnetic tape recorder will be used to record responses. This will then be transcribed later and inter-checked with the written notes.

Data Analysis

The data collected is analysed using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods of statistical analysis. The analysis of the frequencies, percentages, and other quantitative values will pay special focus on determining the extent of causality between selected predictor and constant variables as well as the level of correlation between key variables. The analysed quantitative data is presented in graphs, charts and tables. Part of the qualitative data is categorised into similar groups after which the groups are coded then keyed in as quantitative data after which they will be analysed as quantitative data.

However, the qualitative data collected in a narrative form is used to explain the quantitative values which are generated from the quantitative analysis. The preliminary findings are discussed with key community members, NGOs and government officials. The final version is the output of such discussions.

1.16 Chapter Outline

Chapter One of this study reviews the introduction to the study, problem of the research study, objectives, literature review, justification, theoretical framework and methodology.

Chapter two of this research study is the conceptual chapter, it reviews relevant debates and issues on Ethiopia and Kenya foreign policy and the conduct of foreign policy between the

two states. This is done with a view to account for foreign policy and diplomacy as postulated in the academic fronts.

Chapter Three is the case study chapter, as such, the chapter utilizes raw data from primary documents, interviews and unpublished reports to structure the prevailing scenario in the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy between the two states.

Chapter Four is the critical analysis chapter, the chapter considers the emerging issues from chapter three, and compare the similarities while contrasting the differences with an aim to determining the factual precision of the data *vis a vis*the literature in chapter two and the theoretical framework in chapter one.

Chapter Five examines the conclusions, key findings and recommends areas of further research.

CHAPTER TWO

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN AND DIPLOMATIC POLICY OF

ETHIOPIA AND KENYA

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined aspects that lay the foundations for this research study, it introduced the topic of research, the statement of research problem, reviewed the objectives; both primary and secondary. The chapter also reviewed literature within the context of foreign policy debates, from this a theoretical framework was determined which will be used in the chapter four for critical analysis. Chapter one also examined the methodology, identified the hypotheses and concluded with a chapter outline. Chapter two is a conceptual chapter; it compares various issues informing foreign and diplomatic policy of Ethiopia and Kenya.

2.2 Kenya's Foreign Policy in the Horn of Africa Region

Every state tries to and must be able to demonstrate what its priorities are. In an international system of competing interests, scarce resources and threats to national security, the fundamental prerequisite is survival. Kenya's priorities and national interests have expanded to include other concerns, for instance, good neighbourliness, democratic development and good governance, economic diplomacy, regional integration to foster rapid economic development, the promotion of international peace and security, among others.

Kenya's foreign policy is best seen in terms of its political and economic moderation and of its continuing reliance on the Western world. Adar notes that from 1963 to 1983, Kenya's

most significant international affiliations are with the East African Community, the Organization of African Unity and the Commonwealth.[83]

Khadiagala argues that, African foreign policy decision making has always been the province of leading personalities including presidents and prime ministers who dovetailed with the post-colonial patterns of domestic power.[84] In addition, weak and manipulative bureaucratic structures compounded the lack of effective representative institutions affording ample opportunities for individual leaders to dabble in their countries internal affairs.

Adar argues that, Kenya's foreign policy was guided by election manifestos of the then ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU). After independence, Kenya's foreign policy stated that it would vigilantly safeguard national interests, including the protection of the security of its people by maintaining necessary military forces and by seeking cooperation and defence agreements with other states in the near abroad.[85]

Breuning notes that, for a state to achieve its foreign policies as highlighted above, it must have the capacity to respond appropriately to the prevailing situation way beyond its national borders, the means used must also be acceptable domestically within its borders.[86] Hence, when states pursue foreign policy options, decision makers should consider not only whether such options constitute effective and appropriate responses to the situation, but they must also evaluate how such options will be received by the domestic audience.

Adam notes that, although East Africa and the Horn are often considered as weak regional communities, Kenya plays a significant role, especially through IGAD in promoting

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[83] K. G Adar, *Kenya's Foreign Policy Behavior Towards Somalia: 1963 – 1983,* Laham New York and London, University Press, pp 130 - 134

[84] Gilbert M Khadiagala, African Foreign Policies: Power and Process, op, cit, p. 5

[85] K. G. Adar, 1994, *Kenya's Foreign Policy Behaviour towards Somali, 1963 – 1983,* Lanham, New York, University Press of America, p.131.

[86]MarjikeBreuning, 2007, *Foreign Policy Analysis: a Comparative Analysis*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, p.115

negotiations between the warring parties within different countries.[87] Since independence Kenya's foreign affiliations have been within the East African Community, the African Union and the United Nations.

Orwa argues that, Kenya's foreign policy was designed and guided by the following basic and universally recognized norms; first is the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states and preservation of national security. Second is good neighbourliness and peaceful co-existence with others and third is peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, non-alignment and national self-interest adherence to the Charters of the UN and AU.[88]

Ethiopia is one of the oldest states in the international system; it has long standing foreign relations with many states across the globe. A centralized foreign relation of Ethiopia began during the reign of Emperor Menelik II. The policy was geared to promoting Ethiopian foreign policy with states in Africa and beyond. The study of Ethiopian foreign policy is of particular importance and concern to the region. This is because Ethiopia is the only African country to have successfully resisted colonialism and despite having an ancient and proud civilization, it now trails far behind in the long list of countries when it comes to development. Ethiopian national interest is focused on democracy and development. Likewise her foreign and national security policies needs are geared towards promoting development and democracy.[89]

Ethiopia and Kenya have lived in mutual respect without interfering in the internal affairs of each other, and without threatening each other. Ethiopia has always attached great importance

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[87] H.M Adam, 1994, 'Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea' *Review of African Political Economy* No.59:pp.21-38
[88] K. Orwa, 'Foreign Relations and International Cooperation', op, cit
[89] Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy, report by Ministry of Education, pp.99-105

to its relations with Kenya and its people going back many years, though formal relations date to 1954 when Ethiopia established an Honorary Consulate General in Kenya.

The ideology of Greater Somalia was a threat directed at both Ethiopia and Kenya, this lead them to render each other support and to sign a mutual defence agreement. The basic problem manifested in the relationship with Kenya was the fact that no attention was given to the creation of a strong, legally based economic relationship. No significant effort was made to link the two countries economically.

The foreign policy Ethiopia towards Kenya should ideally be based on the important role Kenya can play regarding Ethiopian development and security, which are basic to Ethiopian fundamental national interest. The post liberation foreign policy of Ethiopia was pragmatic in approach.

2.3 Foreign Policy under Kenyatta

In the context of foreign policy, the most important policy formulation institution is the presidency, which is supported by the ministry of foreign affairs.[90] The conducting of foreign affairs is a prerogative of the Head of state. The head of state is the regarded as the initiator, articulator and director of foreign policy. Considering the centrality of the institution of the presidency, this section will trace the development of Kenya's foreign policy by considering the presidents in power since Kenya gained independence.

Murray-Brown argues that, after independence, Kenyatta's style of leadership was reflected in his foreign policy. Kenyatta assumed the presidency at a time when he had achieved

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[90] Robert Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, 1982, *Personal Rule in Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, p. 1.

hero status among Kenyans and condemnation as a leader *unto darkness and death* by the colonial government.[91]

Howell argues that newly independent Kenya's foreign policy was built on three pillars, which can be identified as nonalignment, the promotion of African unity and the eradication of colonialism in other parts of the continent, in line with the principles of the Organization of African Unity.

At independence, Kenyatta apparently had already made up his mind about Kenya's path in foreign affairs. Subsequent policy documents, such as the KANU Manifesto and the Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, clearly spelled out Kenyatta's foreign policy, that Kenya would be built along the lines of free enterprise, tied to the West, and that the accumulation of foreign capital would be necessary for economic growth, which led to the Foreign Investment Protection Act of 1964.[92]

Howell further notes that, radical politicians at the time like JaramogiOgingaOdinga claimed that independent Kenya's foreign policy was very much influenced by imperial powers. The claim was supported by the fact that Kenya had adopted a hardening attitude towards the Eastern bloc thus causing criticism among the radicals of the claims to adherence to the non alignment principle. He explains that the ruling party's response was that those making such claims were themselves influenced by foreign forces and did not represent the legitimate voice in Kenya.[93]

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[91] Jeremy Murray-Brown, 1973, *Kenyatta*, New York: E. P. Dutton, p.12
[92] Ibid
[93] Ibid

Howell continues to argue that foreign policy in Kenya was such that it would not damage relations with important states that were providing aid to Kenya. According to this analysis, support for liberation movements was managed carefully so as to avoid offending strategic trade partners.

Kenyatta pursued a foreign policy of good neighborliness with other East African states while protecting Kenya's territorial integrity. Orwa argues that, on territorial integrity, Kenyatta made it very clear that Kenya would not concede any of its territory.[94] In September 1963, he cautioned the British government against negotiating away the Northern Frontier District (NFD), which the Somali government was claiming. Kenyatta's pragmatic approach to issues meant that Kenya could cooperate with any country in the world as long as it was in the best interest of Kenya. Kenya's priority at independence was economic development and security.

2.4 Kenya's Foreign Policy under Moi

Foreign policy under the Moi administration was more of a presidential prerogative, more aggressive, and consequently more controversial. Foreign policy under Kenyatta, as discussed above, was noncommittal. Kenyatta often sent Vice President Moi or the foreign minister to represent him. In contrast, Moi was as active as any foreign minister.

Under Moi, Kenya's foreign policy of good neighbourliness was identified as his cornerstone policy in regard to nearby countries. Orwa observes that, this was a good strategy because Kenya stood to gain more because it was more economically advanced than its neighbours.[95]According to Ogot, in the 1980s Kenya went through a period of economic decline worsened by the oil crises of 1979, the collapse of the East African Community, drought

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[94]K. Orwa, 1988, 'Foreign Relations and International Cooperation', in Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (ed.), *Kenya: An Official Handbook*, Nairobi: Colourprint, p. 308.
[95] Ibid

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contributing to food shortages and fluctuating prices due to the poor economic conditions.[96] Kenya's response was to embrace structural adjustment policies to generally ensure self sufficiency in food production in the hope to deal with the financial crisis.

Kenya's relations with its neighbours to the north have been far less harmonious due to the yet unresolved irredentist claim by Somali's on Kenya's Northern Frontier District which is predominantly inhabited by Kenyan ethnic Somalis. This claim has continued to pose a serious threat to Kenya's territorial integrity since the 1960's.For four years, Somali guerrillas known as *shiftas*waged a campaign against the Kenyan police and army through incursions and by means of the Voice of Somali radio based in Mogadishu.[97] As earlier noted the predicament was exacerbated when Kenya seized an Egyptian plane transporting arms to the Somali forces. However, Moi made an unprecedented visit to Mogadishu in 1984 to negotiate border claims and promote trade cooperation.[98]

Although leaders may possess a vision that is not reflective of collective desires, Burns implies that during the process of realization, leaders must persuade followers that they are correct and should be supported.[99] Weatherford argues that, the ability of individual leaders to transform the politics in which they exist, through personal skilfulness or political skill, is thus heavily dependent on the regime they face.[100] For example, President Moi's decisions to surround himself with particular associates and staff contributed to an immediate environment of his own making which may have exaggerated certain Moi personality traits. For example, the

[96] B. Ogot. A and Ochieng, W.R. 1995, *Decolonisation and Independence in Kenya. 1940- 1993.* London, pp.4-14

[97] B. Helander, 1998, 'The emperor's new clothes removed: a critique of Besteman's 'Violent Politics and the Politics of Violence' *American Ethnologist* , op cit, Vol:3 pp.489-491

[98][98] Institute of Public Administration, *The Ethiopia-Somali-Kenya Dispute, 1960-67* (Dar es Salam, Tanzania: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Public Administration, University College, Dar es Salaam, 1969). Op cit

[99] James David Barber, 1992. *Presidential Character,* Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, p. 349.

[100] M. Stephen Weatherford, 1994, 'The Puzzle of Presidential Leadership: Persuasion, Bargaining and Policy Consistency', *Governance* Volume 7, Number 2, pp.135-136.

choice of BethuelKiplagat as his special envoy to Somalia likely reinforced Moi's desire for tact, skill and secrecy in responding to challenges of foreign policy decision making.

2.5 Kenya's Foreign Policy of Conflict Management

Foreign policy is founded on pre-determined conceptions of a states national interest, which aim at attaining specific or generalized goals in international affairs. The principal and sole subject of a country's foreign policy is the furtherance of its national interests. This principle underlies the actions of states as actors in international relations and is applicable to Kenya as it is to any other state. Whereas the perception of national interest may vary from state to state, there are certain discernible factors which remain constant. They include national security, economic advancement, preservation and enhancement of national power and national prestige.[101]

Every state has its own system of formulating and articulating its foreign policy. In some cases, the mechanism is highly institutionalized and predictable, while in others, it is personalized and quite unpredictable. However, irrespective of which avenue a country opts to pursue, certain factors play a pivotal role in this process. These include an evaluation of a state's position in relation to its neighbours, allies or competitors; consideration of the basic tenets to which the state adheres to and propagates in international relations, assessment of the resources and capabilities, actual and potential, that the state possesses, and an examination of effective strategies for achieving its set goals.[102]

In a February 2003 editorial, the Daily Nation newspaper argued that, although Kenya has had a long history of foreign policy pronouncements, it is an ideal foreign policy and not an actual foreign policy. This is because Kenya's foreign policy is more of what the article

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[101] Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, 2007, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, Oxford University Press, p. 12
[102] Ibid

describes as fence-sitting. This claim is premised on the argument that Kenya's Foreign Ministry has either hidden behind international organizations, particularly United Nations (UN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or African Union (AU) resolutions or taken coverbehind the policy of "non-alignment" or "non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Therefore, the article opines that, Kenya's foreign policy represents no particular interests, yet the foreign policy of any state is meant to protect and preserve the national interest of the state.[103]

Kenya's stewardship of the Somali Peace and Reconciliation process enjoyed great support among the international community. This is attributed mainly to the neutral, even impartial role Kenya has played in the conflict. Indeed, for the greater part, Kenya has demonstrated no interest in the internal affairs of Somalia, always embracing initiatives to bring about peace and stability in the war ravaged country only to safeguard its own security, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Paradoxically, among Somalia's neighbours, Kenya has borne the brunt of the estimated one million Somali refugees inside and outside designated camps.[104]

On the other hand, the Daily Nation editorial argued that, Kenya cannot entirely isolate itself from global and regional affairs. The article further identified the efforts to broker peace in the Sudan and Somalia as part of a tradition that goes back a long way to demonstrate Kenya's foreign policy as one that is oriented to conflict management. Since independence, Kenya has wholly subscribed to these broad principles both in theory and in practice. These are universally recognized and accepted norms in the propagation of any states foreign policy.

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[103] Editorial, Declare real stand on war, February 20, 2003, p.8
[104] H. Owuor, New foreign policy to boost Kenyan economy Daily Nation Posted Monday, October 19 2009

2.6 Ethiopia's Foreign Policy Relations in the Horn of Africa

The foreign policy of Ethiopia, like that of other countries, is based on certain goals and values, and determined by the dynamic interplay of domestic and external factors.[105] Although its formulation has been clearly influenced by Marxist concepts about the nature of society and the alignment of forces in the world, there are elements of continuity as well as change, not least because Ethiopia has maintained its core values while playing an important role from time to time in the international arena long before the 1974 revolution.

Greenfield notes that Ethiopia is one of the oldest states in the international system; it has long standing foreign relations with many states across the globe.[106] A centralized foreign relation of Ethiopia began during the reign of Emperor Menelik II. The policy was geared to promoting Ethiopian foreign policy with states in Africa and beyond. The study of Ethiopian foreign policy is of particular importance and concern to the region. This is because Ethiopia is the only African country to have successfully resisted colonialism and despite having an ancient and proud civilization, it now trails far behind in the long list of countries when it comes to development. Ethiopian national interest is focused on democracy and development. Likewise her foreign and national security policies needs are geared towards promoting development and democracy.[107]

The government of Ethiopia strongly believes that the national interest and security will be guaranteed if only rapid economic development is attained. That is why the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy, which is under implementation since 2002, is

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[105]Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives,
[106]Richard Greenfield, Ethiopia: a new political history, New York, 1965, p. 87.
[107] Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy, report by Ministry of Education, pp.99-105

designed to create a favorable atmosphere to safeguard the national interest and security of the nation, and should be centered on the economy.

Accordingly, Ethiopia's foreign policy is centered on development that benefits the people and creating such conducive development**.** Since the introduction and practical implementation of the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy has begun, the image of Ethiopia has been changing for the better from time to time over the last couple of years among the international community than it was before.

The Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy document, which is currently under implementation, was formulated and issued by the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 2002.[108]According to the policy, the relations the country has with a given country or group of countries is based on the protection of national interests and security, and as such, is linked to its democratization and development goals.

Its relations with countries in the Horn, therefore, should be seen from the vantage-point of how relations could help it promote its agenda of democracy and development.[109] Ethiopia's diplomatic work must aim at eliminating or at least reducing external security threats. Its policy should strive to widen the number of foreign friends that can help to ensure a regional and global atmosphere conducive for its peace and security. The country's diplomatic activity also aims forecasting potential threats and addressing them through dialogue and negotiation. The policy should also secure allies that can help the country withstand intractable challenges and threats.

As well as creating a favorable situation for the national development, the foreign policy aims at both individually and collectively lessening the negative effects that globalization could

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[108]BelachewYihun, Belete. "Ethiopia in African Politics, 1956–1991." Unpublished doctoral thesis in History, Addis Ababa University, 2012.

[109]LionelCliffe, "Regional dimensions of conflict in the Horn of Africa", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 20, n° 1, (February 1999), pp. 89-111.

have on development. This is another reason why Ethiopia's diplomacy is centered on economic activity.

The implementation of the Greater Somalia agenda entirely dictated the nature of Ethiopia's policies towards Somalia. After 1960, the intensification of Somalia's diplomatic offensive on the irredentist issue instead provoked a worsening of relations between the two neighbors. Frequent border clashes during the 1960s, and virulent anti-Ethiopian propaganda emanating from Mogadishu, reflected the irrevocable positions taken by leading Somali politicians.

Initially, the Derg pursued a policy of rapprochement with SiadBarre's government. With Soviet military and diplomatic support, Somalia represented a potentially dangerous foe.[110]Upon achieving power, the immediate objectives of the Government were to win the conflict in Eritrea and the war with Somalia, and to achieve internal political stability by firmly establishing its authority and creating a framework for 'socialist' development. This required immediate commitment to bolstering its military strength, which involved seeking alliances which would ensure the immediate and massive inflow of armaments.

The policy-frame was based on the principles of proletarian internationalism and non-alignment, reflected in all the basic documents of the Government and the ruling Workers' Party of Ethiopia (W.P.E.), including the new constitution.

2.7 Diplomatic Relations of Ethiopia towards Kenya

The government of Ethiopia strongly believes that ensuring national security and peace could be questionable unless supported in particular by the prevalence of regional peace and stability and by good relations and co-operations from the countries neighboring Ethiopia and other countries of the continent.

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[110] Ibid

One of the strategies that is instrumental in minimizing potential threats endangering the peace and security of the nation and in ensuring its sovereignty is establishing good diplomatic relations and friendly cooperation with neighboring countries based on mutual interest and benefits.From 1969, Ethiopia became diplomatically more isolated. In that year anti-Ethiopian regimes came to power through coups in Sudan (May), Libya (September), and Somalia (October).[111]

Ethiopia and Kenya have lived in mutual respect without interfering in the internal affairs of each other, and without threatening each other.[112] The ideology "Greater Somalia" was a threat directed at both countries, leading them to render each other support and to sign a mutual defence agreement.[113]

The policy pursued towards Kenya is based on the significant role Kenya can play regarding Ethiopia's development and security, which are basic to Ethiopia's fundamental national interest. In this regard, Ethiopia need to demonstrate to the people and government of Kenya that development and peace in Ethiopia will bring significant benefits to Kenya as well, and that there is nothing for Kenya to lose.

Ethiopia pursues a policy of promoting peaceful and good neighbourly relations into the future.[114]In this regard, on one hand, Ethiopia works together to avoid some of the sporadic incidents that occur along our common border. This calls for the curbing of cattle raiding and the related conflicts among the peoples of the region. Ethiopia works in cooperation with Kenya to stop northern Kenya from serving as a base for forces bent on violence. Ethiopia makes sure that

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[111]BelachewYihun, Belete. "Ethiopia in African Politics, 1956–1991.

[112]Boyd, Barron Jr. "The Origin of Boundary Conflict in Africa." In Aspects of International Relations in Africa, edited by Mark W. DeLancey, p.167. Bloomington: Indiana University,1979.

[113]Tom J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: the widening storm (New York, 1979 edn.), pp. I4-I5

[114]P. T. W. Baxter and Hector Blackhurst, 'Some Problems Arising from Levine's Inclusion of the Oromo in his Delineation of Ethiopia as a Cultural Area', in Vercingetorix in Ethiopian (Paris), 9, I978, p. I59.

the problems seen so far do not deteriorate and to resolve such problems, Ethiopia's policy and its implementation should aim at underlining our continuing friendly relations.

Ethiopia and Kenya have lived in mutual respect without interfering in the internal affairs of each other, and without threatening each other. Ethiopia has always attached great importance to its relations with Kenya and its people going back many years, though formal relations date to 1954 when Ethiopia established an Honorary Consulate General in Kenya.

Green further observes Ethiopia's unsatisfactory relationships with its neighbours, and especially the vulnerability of its two ports in Eritrea, help to explain why Haile Selassie had signed a mutual defence treaty with Kenya.[115] Although benefiting militarily, logistically, and diplomatically from this agreement during its last war with Somalia, Ethiopia's main goal was ready access to the Indian Ocean port of Mombasa, rather than direct intervention by Kenya. In contrast Legum notes that the I979 treaty of friendship and co-operation between Ethiopia and Kenya has hardly been implemented with much enthusiasm because of major differences in ideology and the nature of their respective political and military alliances.[116]

The ideology of Greater Somalia was a threat directed at both Ethiopia and Kenya, this lead them to render each other support and to sign a mutual defence agreement. The basic problem manifested in the relationship with Kenya was the fact that no attention was given to the creation of a strong, legally based economic relationship. No significant effort was made to link the two countries economically.

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[115] Green, op, cit.p.65

[116] Colin Legum, 'Ethiopia on the Eve of Becoming Africa's First Full-Blooded Communist State', in Third World Reports (London), 24 August 1984.

Ethiopia has a long diplomatic tradition. Tewodros II, who reigned in the mid-nineteenth century, was the first modern Ethiopian leader to try to develop a foreign policy that transcended the Horn region.[117]

2.8 Foreign Policy UnderMelesZenawi

MelesZenawiAsres (1955-2012) headed the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) which, allied with other groups, overthrew the Marxist Derg regime of MengistuHailemariam in 1991. Meles was also chair of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the umbrella movement created to govern Ethiopia post-Mengistu. Meles was President of Ethiopia from 1991 to 1995; thereafter he was Prime Minister until his untimely death in August 2012.

Since 1991, Ethiopia has often been described as a haven of relative stability in the Horn of Africa.[118] However, to describe Ethiopia as a *haven* is to overlook her own troubled past, not least the high number of conflicts in which Ethiopia has beenengaged during the last 50 years: she has experienced the greatest number of civil wars in the region.

Given this turmoil, Ethiopia's regional policy has been remarkably consistent over the last hundred years or so.[119] Despite the different ideological viewpoints of successive Ethiopian rulers, they have preserved the status quo, while minimising threats to stability. 'Ethiopia's security has been predicated on maintaining territorial integrity and building cohesion for its multi-national population'.Meles is considered to be the architect of the current foreign policy

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[117] Mesfin, "Ethiopia's role and foreign policy in the Horn of Africa", 94

[118] Ruth Iyob, "Regional Hegemony: Domination and Resistance in the Horn of Africa", *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* Vol. 31, No.2 (June 1993), 259.
[119] Ibid

under implementation since 2002.Meles aimed to contain Ethiopia's immediate security threats using a range of tool: diplomacy, including multilateralism, and military force.

2.9 Foreign Policy under Haileselasie

Haileselassie, Emperor from 1930-74, publicly proclaimed Ethiopia to be non-aligned during the Cold War. He took care to maintain 'cordial relations with the Soviet bloc'and the US were offered a strategic communications site in Eritrea in 1953, providing weapons in return.[120] When Haileselassie annexed Eritrea in 1962, after a UN resolution had federated Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952, the international community was largely silent, despite Eritrea's subsequent 30-year armed struggle for independence. Ethiopia's annexation of Eritrea may be seen as a move to consolidate national security, as well as guaranteeing access to the sea.

Haileselassie had improved relations with Sudan by facilitating the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which ended the war in southern Sudan. President Nimeiri had agreed that Sudan would be neutral towards Eritrea; Eritrean rebels had been using supply routes in eastern Sudan since the mid-1960s and, in turn, Ethiopia supported southern Sudanese Anya Nya rebels with arms, training and access to its territory.[121]

From a pan-African perspective, 'in the post-colonial era, Ethiopia emerged as the symbol of African nationalism and independence'.[122]Haileselassie played on Ethiopia's unique history to argue that Addis Ababa should host the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The AU, the OAU's successor, remains based in Addis today, which gives Ethiopia a higher degree of diplomatic access and international visibility than would otherwise be the case. Tekle cites

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[120]Tekle, "The Determinants of the Foreign Policy of Revolutionary Ethiopia", p.480.
[121] Ibid
[122]Iyob, "Regional Hegemony: Domination and Resistance in the Horn of Africa", 266.

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Haileselassie's diplomatic successes as 'brilliant examples of a weak state's ability to manoeuvre skilfully in, and manipulate, the global system.[123]

2.10 Foreign Policy undertheDerg

The foreign policy of Ethiopia did not change immediately upon the demise of the imperial regime. Initially, the country's new leaders maintained the general thrust of the foreign policy developed under Haileselassie and concentrated mainly on consolidating their rule. Nonetheless, the Marxist ideology of the Derg and its civilian allies made conflict with Ethiopia's superpower patron, the United States, inevitable.

The Derg regime, which overthrew the Emperor in a 1974 coup, had Marxist leanings but initially 'publicly pursued a foreign policy strangely similar to that of the diplomatically astute Haileselassie.[124]Mengistu lacked the Emperor's flair for diplomacy. At first, Ethiopia continued to depend on the US for military supplies, despite public rhetoric against the West. While the US was concerned about Derg human rights abuses, it was Washington's refusal to provide arms for Ethiopia's 1977-78 war with Somalia that made the break complete, particularly as Soviet assistance then helped tip the military balance in Ethiopia's favour. From 1977 onwards, the Derg forged deeper connections with the Communist bloc.[125]

The Derg's relations with Sudan deteriorated, not least because Nimeiri sympathised with Haileselassie.[126]Sudan provided support to Eritrean secessionists, while offering to mediate. In February 1976, Sudan accused Ethiopia of attacks against Eritreans inside Sudan; the rebel EPLF's supply lines from Port Sudan to Eritrea were well known.[127]When civil war in southern

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[123.] Tekle, "The Determinants of the Foreign Policy of Revolutionary Ethiopia", 481.

[124.] Legum and Lee, *Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, 66.

[125]Gorm Rye Olsen, "Domestic and International Causes of Instability in the Horn of Africa, with Special Emphasis on Ethiopia", *Nordic International Studies Association,* Sage (1991), 27.

[126] Woodward, *The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations*, p.121.

[127] Ibid

Sudan resumed in 1983, Sudan and Ethiopia's proxy support for each other's rebels escalated. Mengistu provided bases, training and weaponry to Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels in southern Sudan. Sudanese support to Meles' TPLF increased under the National Islamic Front (NIF) government, which had seized power in 1989, and included joint attacks with Sudanese forces.[128]

2.11 Conclusion

In conclusion therefore, it can be argued that, the conduct of foreign policy and the practice of diplomacy is a preserve of state actors. While there are other actors, the state remains the dominant primary actor. Individual actors however, in monarchies have a substantial influence in a states foreign policy. This is because; states are dependent on each other within the international system. Hence to avoid wars and conflicts in the pursuit of national interests, states opt for the most strategic foreign policy.

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[128]. De Waal, "The Politics of Destabilisation in the Horn" in *Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa,* (ed.) Alex de Waal, (London: Hurst and Company, 2004), 188.

CHAPTER THREE

ETHIO-KENYA'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY: DATA

FINDINGS

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined the evolution of Ethio-Kenya's diplomatic relations and foreign policies. The literature informing both aspects was reviewed in chronological order with an aim to demonstrating that diplomatic relations and foreign policy of Ethiopia and Kenya do complement one another. Kenya's foreign policy dating back to the period after independence was reviewed, and the literature paid particular emphasis on the diplomatic relations and foreign policy pursued under the leadership of MelesZenawi from the year 1991 to 2012.

Chapter three will utilize primary sources of data to build upon the case study of this research study. The chapter will use unpublished and published primary data including interviews, magazines, news articles, and unpublished specialized monograms to review relevant data. The data presented aims to present the extent of diplomatic relations and foreign policy situation in light of the secondary objectives of this research study within the limits of the timeline indicated in chapter one.

3.2 Irredentism in Ethiopia and Kenya Sovereignty

In an article on Daily Nation newspaper, Warigi observes that Ethiopia and Kenya have faced with similar sovereignty challenges, particularly irredentism claims from Somalia. In the case of Kenya, three fluid phases of violent contestations can be discerned.[129] These conflicts have revolved around questions of statehood, constitutionalism and democratic legitimacy. The

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[129]GitauWarigi, Maybe it's time Somalis tried the Swiss model of governance , Daily Nation , December 24, 2011

remarkable observation is that none of these conflicts have been substantively resolved; hence the cankerworm of deep resentment has continued to fester even when externalities of the conflict have more or less vanished.

In the lead-up to Kenya's independence from Britain in December 1963, the status of nearly a third of the country, then called the Northern Frontier District (NFD), was not clear. Political leaders of the Somali community in North Eastern and part of the Borana community in Isiolo, Marsabit and Moyale districts petitioned the British Government to allow them to secede to Somalia before granting independence to Kenya. But the major political parties of the time, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) opposed any suggestions of partitioning the country.

At the Lancaster House constitutional conferences, delegates also engaged in a hotly contested debate between those supporting *majimbo*(federalism) led by KADU and those for a unitary state, led by KANU. Those supporting federalisms won the day and started off with a federal constitution and six federal regions Central, Eastern, Coast, Rift Valley, and Nyanza and Nairobi Special area. Somali delegates at the Lancaster conferences, led by NFD Legislative Council member Rashid Abdikhaliff, refused to sign the final document because it failed to make provisions for the autonomy of the NFD.[130]

Apparently fearful that granting autonomy to the NFD would not only lay foundations for a potential civil war, but also create a precedent that would have encouraged Somalia to lay claims to other Somali occupied territories in Ethiopia and Djibouti; the British approached the matter with caution. The Somali Republic, which had attained its own independence in 1960, aggressively supported the irredentist bid by the NFD. The government in Mogadishu argued

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[130] Colonial Office, Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference,1962, p 29

that NFD belonged to the so-called Greater Somali Nation that extended to all territories where the Somalis lived in the region from Isiolo to Ogaden in Ethiopia. Somalia's Prime Minister Rashid Ali Shermarke led Parliament in Mogadishu to vote to cut relations with the British Government on March 19, 1963.[131]

The National Assembly of the Somali Republic, noting with deep regret that the foreign policy conducted by the United Kingdom damaged the interests of the Somali nation, supported the decision of the government to break relations with the United Kingdom, and consequently recommended that all means for the adequate protection of the Somali interests abroad be found.[132] It was in furtherance of Somali interests abroad that the Somali government supported the Shifta secessionist war that broke in 1965, led by Wako Hapi Taro, the President of the Northern Frontier People's Progressive Party (NFPPP) but which was defeated in 1967.[133]

3.3 Impact of the Somali Conflict on National Security of Ethiopia and Kenya

Wetangula noted during an interview that the Somalia conflict poses a threat to both Ethiopia and Kenya's national interest both internally and externally.[134]He observed for instance, that the prevailing conflict is a hindrance to achieving the Lamu Port- South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPPSET) project under the Vision 2030 which is projected to propel Kenya to a middle income state.

In contrast Brown asserts that compared to Ethiopia, the Kenyan government has not only failed to provide security to its people, but has actively participated and sometimes instigated much of the violence in the country. Ethnic clashes for instance have occurred and recurred since

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[131] J. Clark 1992/1993 "Debacle in Somalia" *Foreign Affairs* 1992/93: Vol:1, No: 3, pp.1-43:7
[132] Ibid
[133] GakuuMathenge, *Kenyan Somalis' Dream of Own State and Shifta War*, Sunday Nation / September 25, 2005, p.14
[134] Interview with Moses Wetangula, Former Foreign Affairs Minister Kenya,

1990 and resulted in the deaths and displacement of thousands of people within Kenyan borders. He argues that this has resulted in internal weaknesses; hence any attempt to secure Kenya's borders is frail. Consequently, the Somali conflict or not, Kenya's national security will be adversely affected.

In comparison, Ethiopian government has arguably had an upper hand in controlling and regulating inter-ethnic conflicts within its borders, safe for uprisings in the Southern part of the country. Subsequently, Kenya and Ethiopia have signed security agreements which are used to effectively control and regulate border insecurity threats.

3.4 Refugees and Proliferation of Illegal Arms

Wetangula noted that since the beginning of the civil war in Somalia in the year 1991, there has been considerable proliferation of illegal small arms and light weapons. This often leads to destabilization of social structures and intertribal conflicts in Kenya and Ethiopia.[135] Specifically, Wetangula points out the conflict between the Turkana and Borana in northern Kenya and the escalation of terrorism related activities as vivid examples to illustrate this. Moreover, he noted that the conflict in Somalia is the main cause of insecurity related incidents between the two countries, and this phenomenon acts as a catalyst leading to escalation of prices of goods in Kenya and the region at large.

Melaku echoes Wetangula's views and notes that, the main effect of the conflict has been the influx of refugees, proliferation of small arms and light weapons leading to in increased insecurity, coupled with the radicalization and recruitment of Muslim youth to fight alongside extremist groups in Somalia.[136] Moreover, he adds that piracy in the Indian Ocean has affected

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[135] Interview with Hon. Moses Wetangula
[136] Interview with MelakuDemelew, Addis Ababa University

the shipping industry and the security and economic threats against Ethiopia and Kenya has led to their military intervention in Somali conflict.[137]

In addition, Melaku concurs with the foregoing arguments and observes that the influx of refugees and insecurity are the main threats of the Somali conflict in Ethiopia and Kenya.[138] He notes on the one hand that, the large presence of Somali refugees that at one point peaked at nearly 700,000 is a point of concern. On the other hand, he notes that, increased insecurity for both countries emanates from the fact that, some refugees comprising former members of Somali Defence and security forces, crossed in to Ethiopia and Kenya with their arms.

Affey observes that, crime levels increased in Kenya because arms were acquired easily from Somalia.[139] Moreover, the upsurge of inter-clan conflicts coupled with the imminent threat of Al-Shabaab, especially along the Kenyan border, is not only a risk to Kenyans residing along the border, but also to Kenya's territorial integrity and national security in general.

While there is consensus that refugees have contributed to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and to an extent the threat of terrorism leading to increased insecurity in Kenya, Affey also observes that, the constant influx of refugees into the Dadaab refugee camps (Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley) has led to competition for resources with the local community leading to environmental degradation due to over-exploitation and a possible violent conflict arising from competition for scarce resources.[140]Illegal immigrants into Ethiopia and Kenya, a majority of who are from Somalia, put pressure on the government in the provision of basic amenities in urban areas and centres.

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[137] Ibid
[138] Interview with Mohamed Affey
[139] Mohamed Affey, Peace is at Hand Daily Nation, op, cit
[140] Ibid

Moreover, Fisseha also noted that the Somali conflict has resulted in an influx of refugees into Ethiopia and proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) and infiltration of terrorists propagating attacks on innocent citizens.[141]

Eskendir concurs that the conflict in Somalia contributes to the proliferation of illegal Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in Kenya because some of the refugees who are ex-combatants flee with their arms into Kenya, while others bring their arms into refugee camps for self-defence as an extension of the conflict in Somalia, while others are involved in arms trafficking. Fisseha in comparison observes thatdespite an arms embargo imposed in 1992, Somalia remains a key market for illegal small arms and light weapons that eventually infiltrate into Kenya through the porous borders.

The proliferation of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons has contributed to alarming levels of armed crime in both rural and urban areas. This has led to armed cattle rustling and conflict in pastoralist areas. Fissehanotes that, given the long porous border between Kenya and Somalia, the inflow of SALWs is difficult to control. He adds that, instability in Somalia also affords the gun-runners the opportunity to move arms to neighbouring states through unstable Somalia.[142]

Mohamed notes that the Somalia conflict has caused constant proliferation of small arms, cross-border raids, smuggling, banditry and general insecurity resulting in a security nightmare to Kenya's security apparatus.[143] To end this, Mohamed argues that both Ethiopia and Kenya should do everything to bring about peace in Somalia. He further notes that, Kenya regards and accords this issue priority, observing for instance that after the change of government in 2003,

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[141] Interview with FissehaShawel,

[142] Interview with EskendirYirga,

[143]Adan Mohamed, *Somali peace talks at a critical stage,* Daily Nation / Friday, April 25, 2003, p.9

the resolve to stop illegal smuggling was probably the only thing the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) Government inherited from the KANU Government without criticism, a clear pointer to the importance Kenya attaches to peaceful transition in Somalia.[144]

3.5 Terrorism

Wetangula notes thatthe conflict situation in Somalia has escalated with the increase in the number of militia outfits like Al-Shabaab.[145] The impact of Al-Shabaab on Ethiopia and Kenya's national interest can further be illustrated by considering that, Al-Shabaab poses a threat toaspects of national interests including social, economic, political, and military security. Specifically, the Somali conflict also poses a direct risk to Ethiopia and Kenya through trafficking of illicit weapons, transnational crimes, especially terrorism and maritime piracy.

In extreme cases, Wetangula argues that the radicalization of Kenyan Muslim youth to join the Somali conflict as part of jihad is gradually leading to home grown terrorism in Kenya, thus a great threat to both countries.[146]Affey contends that there is a very high probability that most terrorists responsible for attacks on Kenya have links with Somalia or their Al Qaeda associates.[147]

3.6 Impact of regional Conflicts on Ethio-Kenya's Economic Development

On the economic front, Affey contends that counterfeit goods are coming into Kenya through Somali ports, thus destabilizing Kenya's manufacturing industry. He therefore notes that, a strong central Government in Somalia could assist Ethiopia and Kenya in its endeavour to curb the movement of contraband merchandise across its border. In addition, a stable

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[144] Ibid
[145] Interview with Moses Wetangula, Op Cit
[146] Ibid
[147]Interview with Mohamed Affey

government would help manage this and handle economic crimes through a taxation regime. Kabii also notes that, the idea that Somalia is a potential strong economic and trading partner with the possibility to enhance economic opportunities for Ethiopia and Kenya is the main reason why both countries should invest in efforts to stabilize the country.

As such Affey notes that, Ethiopia and Kenya have every reason to formulate foreign policymechanismsaddressing issues that destabilize Somalia.[148] In this breath, Affey adopts both a pessimistic and optimistic view. In the pessimistic view he contends that, Kenya has a right to protect its borders against external threats for as long as the Somalia conflict persists, as such; Kenya should ensure that its near neighbourhood is stable to guarantee its own stability and prosperity.

In his optimistic view, Affey argues that when Somalia stabilizes and recovers from the prolonged conflict, it is Ethiopia and Kenya that stand to reap the main benefits of the resultant peace and stability. Affey's belief is based on the fact that, Ethiopians and Kenyans have for a long time borne the brunt of Somali conflict in many ways. In addition, Wamunyinyi notes that Kenya's security is likely to improve if there is restoration of peace in Somalia, as the warlords will surrender the illegal arms that are currently in their arms.[149]Ethiopia and Kenya have been engaged in training of Somalia security personnel and civil servants.[150]Wamunyinyi further notes that, with proper strategies, Ethiopia and Kenya will be central to Somalia's economic growth.[151]

Because of the instability in Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya are teeming with hundreds of thousands of refugees in camps and in major towns. On several occasions, Ethiopia and Kenya

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[148] Mohamed Affey, Peace is at Hand Daily Nation, op, cit
[149]WafulaWamunyinyi, *Exploit commercial chances in Somalia,* Daily Nation / Friday, June 17, 2005, p.9
[150] Professor Kabii
[151]WafulaWamunyinyi, *Exploit commercial chances in Somalia,* Daily Nation / Friday, June 17, 2005, p.9

have been forced to halt cross-border trade with Somalia because of security concerns. Former President Moi, in 200l, lamented that illegal weapons from the strife-torn country were fuelling cattle rustling, robberies and carjacking in Kenya. Leading him to impose a ban on flights to Somalia, which mainly transport *miraa* to Mogadishu. However, the ban was lifted after businessmen protested that the move had hurt their trade.[152]

3.7 Ethiopia and Kenya's Foreign Policy on Conflict Management

Foreign policy is founded on pre-determined conceptions of a states national interest, which aim at attaining specific or generalized goals in international affairs. The principal and sole subject of a country's foreign policy is the furtherance of its national interests. This principle underlies the actions of states as actors in international relations and is applicable to Kenya as it is to any other state. Whereas the perception of national interest may vary from state to state, there are certain discernible factors which remain constant. They include national security, economic advancement, preservation and enhancement of national power and national prestige.[153]

Every state has its own system of formulating and articulating its foreign policy. In some cases, the mechanism is highly institutionalized and predictable, while in others, it is personalized and quite unpredictable. However, irrespective of which avenue a country opts to pursue, certain factors play a pivotal role in this process. These include an evaluation of a state's position in relation to its neighbours, allies or competitors; consideration of the basic tenets to which the state adheres to and propagates in international relations, assessment of the resources

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[152]Peace dividends worth the dear cost of talks, Daily Nation! Thursday, October 14, 2004, p.2
[153] Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, 2007, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, Oxford University Press, p. 12

and capabilities, actual and potential, that the state possesses, and an examination of effective strategies for achieving its set goals.[154]

In a February 2003 editorial, the *Daily Nation* newspaper argued that, although Kenya has had a long history of foreign policy pronouncements, it is an ideal foreign policy and not an actual foreign policy. This is because Kenya's foreign policy is more of what the article describes as fence-sitting. This claim is premised on the argument that Kenya's Foreign Ministry has either hidden behind international organizations, particularly United Nations (UN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or African Union (AU) resolutions or taken coverbehind the policy of "non-alignment" or "non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Therefore, the article opines that, Kenya's foreign policy represents no particular interests, yet the foreign policy of any state is meant to protect and preserve the national interest of the state.[155]

Kenya's stewardship of the Somali Peace and Reconciliation process enjoyed great support among the international community. This is attributed mainly to the neutral, even impartial role Kenya has played in the conflict. Indeed, for the greater part, Kenya has demonstrated no interest in the internal affairs of Somalia, always embracing initiatives to bring about peace and stability in the war ravaged country only to safeguard its own security, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Paradoxically, among Somalia's neighbours, Kenya has borne the brunt of the estimated one million Somali refugees inside and outside designated camps.[156]

On the other hand, the Daily Nation editorial argued that, Kenya cannot entirely isolate itself from global and regional affairs. The article further identified the efforts to broker peace in the Sudan and Somalia as part of a tradition that goes back a long way to demonstrate Kenya's

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[154] Ibid
[155] Editorial, Declare real stand on war, February 20, 2003, p.8
[156] H. Owuor, New foreign policy to boost Kenyan economy Daily Nation Posted Monday, October 19 2009

foreign policy as one that is oriented to conflict management. Since independence, Kenya has wholly subscribed to these broad principles both in theory and in practice. These are universally recognized and accepted norms in the propagation of any states foreign policy.

There have been numerous attempts to resolve the Somali conflict; and on her part Kenya has hosted some of the conferences and process of negotiating for peace for Somalia. Despite all the efforts made, finding a solution has remained elusive. Zeynu notes that, this is because all attempts at finding a solution to the Somali conflict have concentrated on power sharing arrangements without interrogating the root causes of the collapse of the Somali state, especially under the dictatorial regime of Mohamed Siad Bare.[157]

An article in the daily Nation noted that, Kenya was set to have its first foreign policy document since independence in 2009. Wetangula is quoted in the article noting that, Kenya's foreign policy is contained in a document entitled "Draft Sessional paper on Kenya's Foreign Policy Framework." The document on Kenya foreign policy puts emphasize on and resolution of interstate conflicts and post conflict reconstruction.[158]

Abbas observes that Kenya's Foreign policy is founded on five of pillars, which are economic, peace, environmental, Diaspora, and cultural. He further argues that, the most important considerations that inform Kenya's foreign policy decision making processes are political and then economic considerations. He notes that peace diplomacy is often over-shadowed by economic and political issues.[159]Wetangula and Affey in addition note that, Kenya's foreign policy consists of the following pillars; Peace Diplomacy, Economic

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[157] Interview with ZeynuJemal,
[158]*Kenya Set to Have First Foreign Policy Document*, *Sunday Nation*, Nairobi, August 9 2009
[159]Interview with Amb. Ali Abbas, Director, Middle East Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Op Cit

Diplomacy, Environmental Diplomacy and Diaspora Diplomacy. They further argue that, the main significant considerations that inform Kenya's foreign policy decision making process are as follows; Peace diplomacy, which essentially connotes that the enhancement of peace and security in the region, is paramount to ensure stability in Kenya.

Wetangula finally observes that, the pillars of Kenya's foreign policy are founded on economic and political stability, good neighbourliness, peaceful coexistence, regional trade and prosperity at home. He argues that economic diplomacy translates into economic growth and development in Kenya and its neighbours to ensure a sustained link for growth. Environmental diplomacy in turn translates into engagement in environmental programs and initiatives at both regional and national level to improve living conditions, public health, and environmental protection and sustainable development. Diaspora diplomacy endeavours to harness the enormous expertise, skills and resources of the Kenyan Diaspora that can be deployed market and promote Kenya's interests abroad while also investing at home for national development.

From above, Wetangula notes that, the basic function of Kenya's foreign policy has been to guide Kenya in her relations with other nation states and other international actors.[160] In comparison, Gitau notes that, the main function of Kenya's foreign policy is geared towards managing bilateral, regional and multilateral relations with foreign countries and international organizations. Kenya's foreign policy is also geared to promote trade and investment while carrying out activities in order to project the country's image. Wetangula argues that, the main function of Kenya's foreign policy is to ensure economic prosperity at home, in the region and beyond, while simultaneously ensuring Kenya's territorial integrity and sovereignty are

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[160] Interview with Moses Wetangula, ibid

safeguarded. Affey argues that the most important function of Kenya's foreign policy is the ability to influence other states in order to achieve the objectives of Kenya's Foreign Policy.

Kenya's foreign policy addresses the challenges posed by the Somali conflict in the sense that, as part of Kenya's peace diplomacy initiatives, the country chaired and hosted the IGAD Somali Peace and Reconciliation Conference from 2002 to 2004. Fisseha adds that Kenya has sought to foster peace and stability within the sub-region through peace diplomacy. Kenya held peace talks that culminated in establishment of the TFG.[161] It is in this connection Eskendir observes that, there is need for Kenya to adopt a foreign policy framework which directly addresses the Somalia conflict.[162] For this reason, Eskendir argues that, the Kenya government has in various times and moments been at pains to adhere to its policy of non interference in other states internal affairs. This was particularly evident after the issue of intermittent maritime piracy and militia infiltration sprouted along the Kenya-Somalia coastline and Kenya-Somalia land border, respectively

Despite the above attempts, Gitau notes that, in the last 20 years Kenya's foreign policy towards Somalia has been very ineffective. On the other hand Gitau further notes that, Kenya's foreign policy towards the Somali conflict has evolved to deal with the dynamic situation in Somalia.[163] Both however, observe that the foreign policy needs to be looked at again as there are new trends emerging with mandate of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) coming to an end. Wetangula adds that, while the existing framework addresses political and security issues to some extent, Kenya needs to adequately address new and emerging threats and challenges from the Somali conflict, hence the Government needs to be more proactive on Somalia issues.

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[161] Interview with FissehaShawel, ibid
[162]Eskendiryirga- Kenya Desk Officer in MFA Addis Ababa
[163] Interview with GitauWarigi

Madoka notes that, Kenya has a predetermined and clearly defined notion of what her national interests are. It is these interests that Kenyan representatives seek to advance in all forums, whether national, regional or international. Kenya's strategy in conducting her foreign affairs has worked effectively. Kenya's foreign policy however, remains dynamic, given the increasingly globalized world.[164]

In comparison, Kabaji notes that, since independence Kenya had been rudderless in its relations with other states in the international system, hence there was need to adapt to a new foreign policy framework.[165]Owuor observes that, Kenya is fine-tuning a new enhanced foreign policy anchored on five pillars namely; economic, peace, environment, culture and Diaspora diplomacy as the drivers of foreign policy.[166] Under the peace diplomacy pillar, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be required to prioritize and speed up conflict resolution in the region.

As a neighbouring country, Kenya has closely observed Somali for the past twenty years, during which Somali has had no central government. Warigi notes that, since the lawless country has become a thorough nuisance to Kenya, the first step to ensuring security in Kenya would be to create a buffer state to serve as a strategic region beyond Kenya's border.[167] The only way out, so it would seem, is for Kenya to encourage quasi-autonomous units based on clans. Creation of the semi-autonomous area will boost peace efforts in North Eastern Province, leaders say.[168]

This perspective would explain the thinking behind Kenya's endeavour to carve out a buffer state in southern Somalia referred to as Jubaland. Jubaland was to be an entity akin to the

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[164]Marsden Madoka, Kenya hasn't Sacrificed its Sovereignty,*Daily Nation*, Wednesday, April 10; 2002, p.9
[165]Prof.EgaraKabaji, Director, Public and Communication, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interview on *Daily Nation*, July 29th 2009, Diplomats propose foreign policy shift.
[166] Henry Owuor, New foreign policy to boost Kenyan economy *Daily Nation* Posted Monday, October 19 2009
[167]GitauWarigi: Maybe its Time Somalis Tried the Swiss Model of Governance. Daily Nation, December 25th 2011
[168]MuchiriKaranja, Posted Sunday, May 8 2011

semi-autonomous state of Puntland or the self-declared independent state of Somaliland in the North. Owuor observes that, Somaliland and Puntland are good examples of how clan systems can be used, through use of traditional leaders to maintain political administrative units within the larger Somali.[169] The federal model represented by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has not been successful and hence a loose decentralized state model might be more suitable.

Shill argues that, The Jubaland initiative will be Kenya's first attempt to reassert her influence in a country that has posed a major social and security nightmare to Kenya.[170] He argues further that, Jubaland will help Kenya economically by opening a trade link between Kismayu and Garissa. The Jubaland initiative is also a possibility that can be pursued to help the Southern part of Somalia have order much like Puntland and Somaliland. Moreover, it will act as a buffer zone and an area to contain the refugees to stop their entry into Somalia. However Shill argues that for Kenya to succeed in the Jubaland initiative, it must formulate a proper foreign policy. Abdirahaman argues that, a semi-autonomous state in Jubaland will be of benefit to Kenyans, particularly among people living along the border towns of Garissa and Mandera.[171]

In contrast, Owuor observes that, the above stated issue of "relative stability" in Puntland and Somaliland are just but illusions. As such, owuor argues that, the best way of containing the conflict in Somalia is that Kenya should join hands with regional, continental and international forces to combat the conflict in Somali. International assistance to Somalia must also be

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[169] Henry Owuor, Ibid
[170] Former Fafi MP Elias Bare Shill, Interview on Nation Newspaper, Sunday May 8th 2011
[171] AbdisalimMalimAbdiRahaman, Resident of Garissa town, Interviewed posted on Sunday 8th August 2011

coordinated through the United Nations and should include training of Somali Security personnel.[172]

At present, Somali is facing daunting and massive economic and political crises in which many people are dying from hunger and many more are displaced by endless conflicts. In the midst of this misery the military invasion by Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) imposes new restrictions on the movement of refugees who are fleeing from these multiple threats which, if not eased immediately, may lead to significant loss of lives.[173] Similarly, Time magazine notes that, there is confusion in the Kenyan government over its decision to go into Somalia to root out terrorist insurgents. In one part, the Time magazine argues that, this confusion is due to deep divisions within the elites and on the other part is due to the fact that, different key international actors have divergent strategic objectives in the Horn of Africa that are designed to control the political decision-making processes in respect of Somalia.

Owuorcontends that Kenya has consistently put the Somalia's security agenda forward to the international community, especially the United Nations General Assembly and the UN Security Council. Recently, Kenya took a bold and unprecedented step forward to militarily engage the Al-shabaab extremists in order to protect its national security and territorial integrity.[174]Gitau argues that in this connection, the country has further called for support to the TFG and AMISOM to improve the security situation, and has expressed willingness to contribute troops to AMISOM.[175] Kenya's foreign policy has therefore tried to address the challenges posed by the Somali conflict, through national, regional and international initiatives. Owuor adds that,

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[172]Henry Owuor, Ibid
[173] Time Magazine, October 2011
[174] Henry Owuor, Ibid
[175]InterviGitauWarigi

the Eldoret Declaration in the lead up to the Mbagathi Peace process sponsored by IGAD is a case in point.

Gitau argues that, Kenya through the African Union should continue to lobby the UN Security Council, especially the five permanent members to take over AMISOM. Mwanzia adds that, Kenya as a member of IGAD, AU, UN and other intergovernmental bodies like G-77 can push the Somali agenda to ensure constant support. Kenya can also integrate its troops into AMISOM and also avail expert advisors to TFG in Somalia. Other neighbouring countries in the IGAD region should join Kenya and the African Union in lobbying the UN Security Council to take over AMISOM.

Affey further observes that,neighbouring countries should continue mediating and discussing with top leadership of the TFG to ensure implementation of the Kampala Accord.[176] The States can also provide troops to AMISOM to ensure the required troop levels to effectively stabilize Somalia. Affey posits that stability in the region can only be achieved through a genuine peace building initiative in Somalia in which the Somali people are assisted to pursue restoration of law and order, a free society characterized by a government accountable to its citizens, an independent media and judiciary.[177] Al-Shabaab is no match for a Somali people united for the common good, but this potential is weakened by the constant external interventions that continue to recreate and strengthen groups like Al-Shabab and the warlords who continually pose an existential threat to the Somali State. In contrast, a strong democratic Somali state poses no threat to international security and stability.[178]

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[176] Interview with FissehaShawel, ibid
[177] Mohamed Affey, op, cit
[178] Ibid

Fisseha notes that IGAD Member States, The African Union, United Nations Security Council and the Somali people should all be involved in resolving the Somali conflict. Others who may help are donors who should contribute in rebuilding infrastructure and humanitarian agencies to ensure the country remains conducive for economic activities. Owuor however observes that the UN Security Council has to pass a resolution under chapter seven and take over the African Union Mission in Somalia to resolve the conflict.

In this context, Owuor argues that the events in 2011 that saw Kenya invade Somali can only be explained in conjunction with the broader globalization agenda that informs particular foreign policy.[179] As Robinson explains, after the end of the Cold War diverse forces battled to reshape political and economic structures as a new world order emerged.[180] He argues that the focus increasingly shifted from power concepts to internationalization of civil wars and of political processes. This means that new political and social relations are formed to assist the emergence of a single global society in which no hostile elements or power vacuums like those operating in Somalia are tolerated. In this perspective, the invasion of Somalia by Kenya can also be understood as part of a broader process of the exercise of hegemonic influence where Kenya and Somalia are less significant in the overall geo-strategic objectives.

During the Somali Peace and reconciliation conference held in Kenya, many delegates appeared ready to ratify a federal system of government, as a way of healing long standing divisions and rivalries in the country. This would facilitate a process whereby Somalia is divided into several states, each with its own regional administration under a loose federal system of government in Mogadishu. Opala posits that Barre, a younger brother of former Somali

[179]Henry Owuor, Ibid
[180] Piers Robinson, Foreign Policy and Decision Making, McMillan, New York, 1989, pp.34-35

strongman SiadBarre, whose ouster in 1991 sparked the conflict that has claimed an estimated two million lives argues that federalism has to do with people who do not share anything and who have nothing in common, and who accept federalism to cover for their diversity.[181]Opala further notes that Barre is not alone; the Arab League wants the country to remain under a unitary government.

In conclusion it emerges from above that the foreign policy of Ethiopia and Kenya are similar. This is because of the similar challenges emanating from conflicts and insecurity threats in the region. This finding therefore agrees with the first objective that the factors leading up to foreign policy formulation are similar. The responses of the Ethiopia and Kenya foreign policy are also similar but the strategic approach to arresting them is different. Therefore the point is contrary to the third objective for this study.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the findings of this study. It has analyzed irredentism in Ethiopia and Kenya's sovereignty as a challenge to both states. Secondly it has analyzed the impact of Somali conflict on National Security of Ethiopia and Kenya. Thirdly, it has looked at the problem of refugees and proliferation of illegal arms and terrorism. Lastly, this chapter has examined the impact of regional conflicts on Ethio-Kenya's economic development and Ethiopia and Kenya's foreign policy on conflict management.

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[181] Ken Opala, Foreign powers stalk Somali talks, Daily Nationl Monday, July 21, 2003, p.11

CHAPTER FOUR

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ETHIO-KENYA'S DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN POLICY: DATA ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter utilized primary data to examine the topic of this research study. In the process a number of issues emerged that address the objectives raised in chapter one. As such, this chapter will critically examine the issues raised in chapter four in light of the objectives for this study research. Chapter four will therefore be sectioned into five main parts, corresponding to the main issues that emerged in chapter three. The first part will examine issues that have emerged in the course of this research study. The second part will examine the historical legacy of Pan-Somalism, the third part will review the unpredictability of the Somali conflict, the fourth part will review the nature of Kenya's foreign policy and in particular analyze whether it is reactive or proactive. The fifth part will examine the models of foreign policy decision making as suggested by Allison.

4.2 Emerging Issues

From a distance, the Somali conflict appears as a problem exclusively limited to the people and state of Somalia. This is because the Somali portrays characteristics of an internal conflict with internal ramifications, however, upon close analysis, it emerges that the internal conflict is internationalized and extends beyond the borders of Somalia. The states that are most affected by the Somalia conflict are those within its near abroad. From chapter three it can be argued that, the Somali conflict is internationalized via the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, influx of Somali refugees, terrorism, maritime piracy, and economic crimes, among others.

The following section will examine the historical legacy of the Somali conflict.

To confront the threat of Pan-Somalism, the Kenyan and Ethiopian governments agreed to cooperate with each other in the event of war with expansionist Somali. The foreign policies of both Kenya and Ethiopia have over the years shown consistency by cooperating whenever their territorial integrity has been threatened by Somalia. It is instructive that both countries have troops inside Somalia at the moment with a view to countering the threat posed by the conflict in Somalia, and specifically the threat emanating from the extremist Al-Shabaab militia group.

Mr. Mohamoud H. Ibrahim Egal, the Somali Prime Minister in the second government, seeing the economic stagnation and the political stalemate over the issue of Pan-Somalism, tried to ease the tensions with Kenya by diplomatic means. In 1967, he initiated an understanding with Kenya's President Jomo Kenyatta to the effect that Somalia intended to solve the issue of the NFD through peaceful means.[182] This laid the foundation for the shift from use of force to peaceful resolution of disputes between Kenya and subsequent Somali regimes. This trend held for over four decades, and more remarkably so after the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, where despite the persistent incursions into Kenya by various armed Somali groups allied to various factions and warlords, Kenya resisted the option of armed intervention into Somalia until Al-Shabaab escalated its hostilities by threatening the critical tourism sector by abducting foreign tourists in along the Kenya coast.

In a departure from its traditional foreign policy stance, Kenya Defense Forces invaded Somalia towards the end of 2011, in pursuit of Al-Shabaab, by invoking Article 51 of the UN

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[182] Institute of Public Administration, *The Ethiopia-Somali-Kenya Dispute, 1960-67* (Dar es Salam, Tanzania: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Public Administration, University College, Dar es Salaam, 1969, pp.52-55

Charter on the right to Self defense. Although Kenya's action appears to have the tacit support of the TFG, the armed invasion of Somali territory by Kenyan defense forces and the aggressive diplomatic activities to secure regional and international support for her actions point to a significant development in Kenya's foreign policy.

Since the collapse of the government of Somalia in 1991, the ensuing conflict has taken dramatic turns over the years. The Somali conflict has evolved from an internal conflict into an internationalized conflict with regional and global ramifications. The conflict has escalated and encompasses, military, political, social and economic threats that affect not only states in Somalia's near neighbourhood but also states beyond, but the entire international system through include maritime piracy and terrorism.

This Somali conflict has invariably been depicted as an internal, regional, proxy and even a global conflict in ideological terms.[183] The various terms used to refer to the conflict generally depict its unpredictability. From a far the conflict seems as one that broke out after the overthrow of SiyadBarre's military dictatorship. However upon closer examination it emerges that, the Somalia conflict is underpinned by a multiplicity of interrelated and complex political, social and economic factors that place it in the category of unpredictable conflicts.

The view that the Somali conflict is unpredictable assumes many dimension, For Alger, the conflict is intractable; because, its roots run deep into the economic, social and political structure of both Kenya and Somalia.[184] Understanding the intractable nature of the conflict requires the laying out of issues that have frozen progress towards a resolution over the decades.

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[183] Gary Gereffi, 1996, 'The Elusive Last Lap in the Quest for Developed-Country Status', in James H. Mittelman (ed.), *Globalization: Critical Reflections*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 53-81.

[184] C. Alger, 1996, Adult Education for Peacebuilding: A Challenge to Peace Research and Peace Eduication. In R.J. Burns and R. Aspeslagh (Eds.), *Three Decades of Peace Education around the World: An Anthology*. New York: Garland, pp. 263-272

According to Galtung intractability in conflicts has five phases within these dimensions, which help frame the cycle of intractability in the Somali case.[185]

An intractable conflict is characterized by ever present tension and violence. The victims of violence in intractable conflict include combatants as well as civilians.[186] There is a long set of unresolved or apparently irreconcilable issues at stake. The parties may reach temporary cessations of violence but they cannot reach a fundamental and genuine resolution of their issues.

Bar-Tal contends that, psychological manifestations of enmity and deep feelings of fear and hatred generally underlie the relationship between parties in an intractable conflict.[187] Continuous conflict tends to induce stereotypes and suspicions, and these reinforce antagonistic perceptions and behaviour of the parties in conflict. The role of clans and deep divisions of clan system in Somali is a case in point to illustrate this point.

Intractable conflict attracts many actors and institutions that want to deal with, treat, manage or resolve the conflict. Moreover, there are many futile attempts at management or resolution but only a few of these actors or institutions are successful.[188]Mwagiru notes that, when there are many interested parties engaged in the process of seeking for a resolution towards a conflict, their interests will also multiply, making the conflict more complex.[189] Hence, the more complex the Somali conflict gets, the more unpredictable it becomes.

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[185]Galtung, J. 1997, *Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (the Transcend Method*, Geneva: UN Disaster Management Training Programme, p.124

[186] Ibid

[187] D. Bar-Tal, 2002, The Elusive Nature of Peace Education. In G. Salomon and B. Nevo (Eds.), *Peace education: The Concept, Principles and Practice in the World,* pp. 27–36.

[188]Jacob Bercovitch, "Mediation in the Most Resistant Cases" in Pamela Aall, Chester A.Crocker, and Fen Osler Hampson, *Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of IntractableConflict*, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007, pp. 100-101

[189] Claude Ake, 1995, 'The New World Order: A View from Africa', in Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorensen (eds.), *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War*, Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 1-17.

Another dimension of Galtung's argument is that intractable conflicts present deep feelings of fear and hatred that generally underline the relationship between parties.[190] A closer look at the Somali conflict indicates that there is a myriad of different narratives from each side that include clanism, religion, corruption and struggle for resources. Every narrative has a different storyline and they are all different from each other, with each carrying their own truth.

Corruption is a major element in the Somali conflict, the form of corruption identified here is bribery and fraud. For instance the availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons that infiltrate into Kenya from Somali can be attributed to corruption among officials and fraud within. Corruption also extends to maritime piracy; maritime piracy is arguably the main source where contraband goods that are sold in the Kenyan market come from. When the goods find their way to the Kenyan border allegations of corrupt dealings abound in explaining how the contraband goods reach the Kenyan market.

Another issue that emerges due to the unpredictability of the Somali conflict is the use of clan politics to influence issues affecting the Somali conflict. This claim is premised on the fact that, the clan system in Somali is not merely the sum of its members hence, decisions emerging from the group are likely to be different from what a simple aggregation of individual preferences and abilities might suggest, and that group dynamics can have a significant impact on the substance and quality of decisions.[191] The existence of clan affinity between the Kenyan Somalis in North Eastern Province, (Mandera, Wajir and Garissa counties) further complicates the matter and makes it difficult to determine the possible trends it is likely to take.

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[190]Galtung, J. 1997, *Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (the Transcend Method)*. Geneva: UN Disaster Management Training Programme, op Cit p.125

[191] Michael Clough, *U.S. Policy Towards Africa and the End of the Cold War*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992, p.23

The clan system in Somali is arguably better in managing conflict than the governments that have ruled Somalia; the clans are also better equipped in coping with complex tasks owing to their diverse perspectives and talents, an effective division of labour, and high-quality debates on definitions of the situation and prescriptions for dealing with it. The clan system may also provide decision-makers with emotional and other types of support that may facilitate coping with conflict problems. Conversely, they may exert pressures for conformity to group norms, thereby inhibiting the search for information and policy options, ruling out the legitimacy of some options, curtailing independent evaluation, and suppressing some forms of intra-group conflict that might serve to clarify goals, values, and options. The fluid alliances of clan based militias and war lords coalesce and mutate as their interests shift creating a nightmare situation for foreign policy decision makers in the Horn of Africa as a whole.[192]

Moreover, the unpredictability of the Somali conflict can be described by considering the rise of insecurity caused sub-actors particularly, illegitimate actors engaged in insecurity like terrorism and maritime piracy inside Somali. For instance, the new development emerging from Somali that, the Al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda formally merged bringing in an entirely new dimension to the complex problem to the Somali conflict. This is in addition to the insecurity problem caused by maritime piracy along the Gulf of Eden and the Eastern Coast of Africa. It is feared that the problem is quickly spreading southwards and may soon be a problem in Southern Africa. The problem of maritime piracy off shore has exacerbated the conflict on land.

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[192]KassuGebremariam "Building Sustainable Peace" *Peace building in the Horn of Africa: The Role of Regional Organizations*, (United Nations Press, 2009) Op Cit p. 197

4.3 Kenya's foreign policy: Reactive or proactive?

In the conduct of foreign policy, Kenya projects different perceptions to state in the near abroad and international community at large. The different faces of Kenya are as a result of the country prioritization of issues that inform foreign policy decision making. Ideally, Schraeder notes that, foreign policy decision making should be informed by national interest and premised on medium and long term strategic and vital national interests.[193] The response of Kenya's foreign policy to the Somali conflict, highlight issues that will form the core of this section.

In global terms external policy has been markedly radical in nature and characterized by a strong sense of morality and idealism. Rarely does a major Kenyan foreign policy pronouncement fail to contain some allusion to the inequalities of the present international order or some reassertion of both the desirability and the attainability of a peaceful and just international community of nations, premised on rule based multilateralism. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Plan 2008 – 2012 states

> *"The underlying principles of Kenya's foreign policy have been a strong advocacy for a rule-based international system, environmentally sustainable and equitable development and a secure world. As a member of the United Nations, Kenya has remained firmly committed to the organization's underlying principles and objectives, particularly in ensuring global peace and security……"[194]*

In regional affairs, however, Kenya's foreign policy has often been governed by a rather more conservative and legitimist thinking, notably where any radical departure from the *status quo* is not contemplated. It is apparent that where foreign policy issues touch directly on Kenya's

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[193] Peter Schraeder, 1994, 'Trends in the United States Africa Policies After the End of the Cold War', *Journal of the Third World Spectrum*, Vol:1, No:2, pp. 1-14:4.

[194] Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Strategic Plan 2008 – 2012*: Turning Global challenges into Opportunities through Innovative Diplomacy*, GoK, 2011, p 8

vital interests say national security or national development, the implied radicalism of Kenya's broad foreign policy, especially manifested in United Nations meetings, is subject to considerable restraint.

This ambivalence in Kenya's foreign policy can probably be best explained by examining the basic pressures towards a broad radical policy internationally, and a more cautious and conservative approach towards the near abroad. This is policy is evident especially in the Horn of Africa affairs, where Kenya has consistently played the role of a neutral mediator in conflict management.

The Ministry's strategic plan 2008 – 2012 indicates that Kenya's future is inextricably linked to the African continent. In this regard, the principal focus of Kenya's diplomacy will remain the immediate neighbourhood and the sub-region. By virtue of her strategic location, Kenya is a major stabilizing force for regional peace and security in Eastern Africa and the Great Lakes Region. Kenya's engagement in the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) will deepen focus on peace, security, sustainable development and integration in Africa.[195] This perhaps explains Kenya's involvement in seeking to establish a stable government in Somali, culminating in the hosting and chairing the IGAD Somali Peace and Reconciliation Conference in Eldoret and Mbagathi, from 2002 to 2004.

However, Gebremariam notes that between 1965 and 1967, Somalia organized guerrilla forces that made harassing incursion into Kenya and Ethiopia, even after Sudanese President Ibrahim Aboud had intervened initially to calm the hostilities.[196] This prompted both Kenya and

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[195] Ibid p 9
[196] K Gebremariam 2004, "Peace building in the Horn of Africa: The Role of Regional Organizations," *in Building Sustainable Peace*, University of Alberta Press, Edmonton, Canada, Op Cit p 194

Ethiopia to adopt a deterrent foreign policy. They closed their borders to the Somali nomadic clans to curb intrusions into their respective territories. This forced closer cooperation between Kenya and Ethiopia on Somalia, especially on security issues. The impact forced Somalia to adopt some form of détente. The relations were improved following President Kaunda's personal diplomacy in 1967.[197]

The option of closing the border with Somalia as deterrence was carried into Moi's era when the border with Somalia was closed twice in the 1990s to curb the illegal entry of Small Arms and light Weapons. President Moi, in a 28 July 2001 presidential decree ordered the Kenya-Somali border closed. He explained that armed refugees were entering into Kenya and contributed to increased incidents of insecurity and crime in Nairobi. For him, the Somalis were to blame for the state of insecurity in Kenya.[198] The Kenya-Somali border was closed on 28 July 2001. President Moi argued that the move was aimed at curbing the inflow of small arms, which were believed to contribute to the growing wave of crime in the country. This ban came barely two years after the August 1999 border closure and ban of all flight between Kenya and Somalia, which was lifted six months into operation.[199]

A further analysis of Kenya's foreign policy should consider Kenya's foreign policy decision making organs. Historically, the Department of Foreign Affairs (today's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was established in the Office of the Prime Minister in 1964.[200] Its role was to plan how Kenya should survive and advance its national interests amidst a climate of anarchy and conflict that characterized the region and beyond. Mazrui notes that, in an endeavour to

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[197] Ibid
[198] *Sunday Standard* (Nairobi), 29 July 2001, 1.
[199] *Sunday Nation* (Nairobi), 29 July 2001, 1 and *Sunday Standard* (Nairobi), 29 July 2001, 1.
[200] Robert Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), p. 1.

achieve this goal, Kenya diplomats were trained either abroad, in Oxford, Washington, or Islamabad, among other places, or at the University of Nairobi's Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies. The reasoning being that, if they are trained properly, then they will be able to implement policies and deduce challenges to Kenya's national interest in a proactive manner.[201]

As yet, however, there is no diplomatic cadre separate from the ordinary civil service. Officers from other ministries often find their way into foreign affairs and vice versa. There has been a quiet debate on whether this is healthy; the debate exploded publicly in 1996 when potential investors complained that Kenyan diplomats abroad were not particularly concerned about informing their hosts on prevailing situations especial the conflict in the region.[202]

Although a detailed study of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is beyond the scope of this chapter, suffice to state that the ministry is involved almost on a daily basis in shaping and formulating Foreign Policy. The main thrust being the issues emerging from the region, including the Somali conflict. Moreover, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is a department dedicated to Horn of Africa and Somalia affairs. The Horn of Africa Division is relatively new having been established in 2005, at the height of the Somali crisis. In addition, Kenya has over 40 missions abroad which file reports that assist the Permanent Secretary and the ministry in advising the president on foreign policy matters. Of note is the Monday Senior Officials Meeting, held in the ministry's boardroom and this serves as a brainstorming session for foreign policy decision making.

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[201] Ali A. Mazrui, 1977, *Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change*, London, Heinemann, Op Cit p. 24

[202] Harry Ododa. 'Continuity and Change in Kenya's Foreign Policy: From Kenyatta to Moi Government", *Journal of African Studies*, will examine other issues of importance that have emerged in the course of this research study Vol:13, No:2, Summer 1986, pp. 47-57.

Moreover, seminars on various aspects of foreign policy are held and recommendations have been presented to the government. For instance, the biennial Kenyan Ambassadors and High Commissioners Conference serves as a useful forum for exchanging views on various foreign policy issues.[203] The recommendations of the conference are thereafter presented to the government for further action. Hence, it can be argued that, Kenya foreign policy decision making is a mixture of reactive as evidenced by the lack of a long term policy on the Somali conflict, and proactive as seen through strategic planning meetings and conferences.

4.4 Graham Allison's Models and Their Relevance

This section proceeds from the premise that using Graham Allison's models of foreign policy decision making processes, we can be able to draw the nexus between Kenya's diplomatic and foreign policy towards each other. This is in line with the theoretical framework suggested in chapter one as a tool to be used to critically assess the objectives and test the hypotheses identified. This section departs from the point that, what each model of Allison's model sees and judges to be important is a function not only of the evidence about what happened but also of the theoretical lenses through which the models capture in regard to the prevailing situation in Somali. The models will also utilize primary data collected in chapter three to capture the issues within the context of this research study. The principal purpose of this section is to critically assess explore some of the fundamental assumptions of Kenya's foreign policy decision making in respect of how to manage the Somali conflict as a way of securing Kenya's national interests within the framework postulated in Graham Allison's models of foreign policy decision making process.

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[203]Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, *Nailing Lies* (Nairobi, 1991).

Allison and Zelikow state that, in foreign policy and crisis management, the decisions between nation states are decided in the context of the states politics.[204] As such, they offer three models that they argue, can best help to explain the foreign policy decision making. These include rational actor, bureaucratic politics and organizational model.

4.5 Rational Actor Model

In Foreign Policy Analysis there are three models propagated by Allison and are used in examining foreign policy decision making in times of crisis, these are rational actor model, bureaucratic politics model and organizational model. Among this, the dominance of use of the Rational Actor Model to explain or account for Foreign Policy behaviour is a case in point in examining the Somali conflict.

Rational Actor Model explains Foreign Policy by seeing it as goal directed, resulting from conscious choices made by leaders or groups with clear goals. It is assumed that Foreign Policy decision is the product of rational behaviour. This is an assumption of the Rational Actor Model or the decision-making approach made popular by Graham Allison.[205] The decision maker, like any other rational individual, considers possible courses of action and evaluates the likely consequences of each in terms of cost and benefit. The decision maker then selects the course of action most likely to achieve the desired goal.[206] In using this approach the government is personified, and it is assumed to be like an individual making decisions based on a clear cost-benefit analysis.[207]

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[204] Allison, G.T. 1971, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Boston, Little, Brown, p. 23

[205] White, B., 1989, "Analyzing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches" in Clarke, M and White, B (Eds) Understanding Foreign Policy. *The Foreign Policy Systems Approach*, Aldershot, Hants, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 11

[206] GT Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, op, cit

[207] M. Mwagiru, 2004, *Diplomacy: Documents, Methods and Practice*, Nairobi, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, p.136.

Rational decision-making involves the selection of the alternative which will maximize the values of decision-makers, the selection being made following a comprehensive analysis of alternatives and their consequences.[208] In this respect, Kenya's foreign policy can arguably be said to be a preserve of the head of state. For instance, after the outbreak of the Somalia conflict, President Moi was actively engaged in efforts to find a solution and manage the conflict. This can further be expounded by considering that, Kenya hosted a number of conferences in Nairobi and Eldoret.

The role of the president can further be expounded considering the role the heads of state has played in efforts to manage the Somali conflict. Moi appointed special envoys to the Somali conflict that represented him during the various phases of negotiation. BethuelKiplagat and Elijah Mwangale served as special envoys to Somali, the role of special envoys in conflict management confirms the importance that the leader as a rational actor accords the conflict. Often special envoys have special access to the president; they communicate direct to the president and are arguably representing the views of the president.[209]

The limitation of the Rational Actor model of Foreign Policy decision-making can be found in the various criticisms directed at the model by various scholars including Allison himself who had to give other models to explain foreign policy decisions. One such criticism is advanced by Jones, R.E who contends that human behaviour is fallible. This contradicts a very central assumption in the model and that is the emphasis of the individual decision maker's rationality. This criticism is also emphasized by Brian White who is of the opinion that there are always distortions in the mind of the decision maker. To White, distortion can result from either paucity or an abundance of information, or it can arise from bias.

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[208] Allison, G.T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,op, cit
[209] Harry Ododa,1986, 'Continuity and Change in Kenya's Foreign Policy: From Kenyatta to Moi Government' *Journal of African Studies*, Vol:13, No:2, p. 50.

Michael Clark introduces the issue of environment in the decision-making process. He says that, we should realize that the idea decision-making does not refer only to making conscious choices but also to a range of personal, organizational, institutional and environmental factors which help account for the flow of events.[210] The behaviour or output of the decision-maker is conditioned by influences which operate outside the boundaries of the foreign policy system, but which can serve as significant input into the foreign policy system.

The rational actor model ignores the fact that the individual, say the president is surrounded by a bureaucratic from which he has to obtain information and discuss policy alternatives. Such a structure may influence decisions since it the same structure which is providing the information and alternative from which the rational leader is to make his choice from. It is not realistic that one can divorce the bureaucratic structure from the information and alternative choices it will give. The rational leader is dependent on this same structure which has its own and organizational interests.

Hollis and Smith also criticized the Rational Actor Model by starting with posing a question whether the rational decision-makers are of the kind proposed in the Game Theory or are a mere voices of the bureaucracy? [211] They argue that the Rational Actor Model developed from the Game Theory relies on astringent assumptions about the rationality of actors but two elements are excluded by those assumptions. These are the psychology of the individual human decision makers and how it functions in small decision making groups and the bureaucratic organization in the domestic process of making policy and translating it into decisions and implementation.

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[210] Clarke, M "The Foreign Policy System: A Framework of Analysis" op, cit, p. 27
[211] M Hollis, and Smith, S. 1991, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p.14

Further, they argue that the Rational Actor Framework relies on a misleading notion of perception. Actors see the world in a certain way because their perceptions are caused by societal, cultural, historical or economic factors. This view is also held by Jervis who posits that decision makers misperceive and make errors in judgment in assessing information.[212]

4.6 Bureaucratic and Organizational Politics Model

Smith argues that although Allison's account of the Cuban Missile Crisis may have been misleading, the Bureaucratic Politics Model remains the major alternative to the Rational Actor account of decision-making.[213] Traditional models of complex organizations and bureaucracy emphasized the benefits of a division of labour, hierarchy, and centralization, coupled with expertise, rationality, and obedience. They also assumed that clear boundaries should be maintained between politics and decision making, on the one hand, and administration and implementation on the other.

The central premise is that decision making in bureaucratic organizations is constrained only by the legal and formal norms that are intended to enhance the irrational and eliminate the capricious aspects of bureaucratic behaviour. There is an emphasisupon, rather than a denial of the political character of bureaucracies, as well as on other informal aspects of organizational behaviour.

Organizational norms and memories, prior policy commitments, inertia, and standard operating procedures may shape and perhaps distort the structuring of problems, channelling of information, use of expertise, the range of options that may be considered, and implementation

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[212] R. Jervis, 1976, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, Princeton University Press, p.11

[213] S. Smith, , 1980, "A*llison and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review of the Bureaucratic Politics Model of Foreign Policy Decision-Making"* Millennium Vol:9, No:1, pp21-40:24.

of executive decisions. Consequently, organizational decision making is essentially political in character, dominated by bargaining for resources, roles and missions, and by compromise rather than analysis.[214]

Hollis and Smith also commence by posing a question whether the rational decision-makers are of the kind proposed in the Game Theory or are mere voices of the bureaucracy? [215]They assert that crises may provide the motivation and means for reducing some of the non rational aspects of bureaucratic behaviour. Crises are likely to push decisions to the top of the organization where a higher quality of intelligence is available; information is more likely to enter the top of the hierarchy directly, reducing the distorting effects of information processing through several levels of the organization; and broader, less parochial values may be invoked. Short decision time in crises reduces the opportunities for decision making by bargaining, log rolling, lowest-common-denominator values and the like.

Critics of some organizational bureaucratic models have directed their attention to several points. They assert, for instance, that the emphasis on bureaucratic bargaining fails to differentiate adequately between the positions of the participants. Prior to the fall of SiyadBarre, the Somali government system was not just another player in a complex bureaucratic game. The president ultimately decided and selected who the other players were, a process that was crucial in shaping the ultimate decisions.

Also, the conception of bureaucratic bargaining tends to emphasize its non rational elements to the exclusion of genuine intellectual differences that may be rooted in broader concerns, including disagreements on what national interests, if any, are at stake in a situation. Indeed, properly managed, decision processes that promote and legitimize multiple advocacies

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[214] Ibid, p 38
[215] M Hollis, and S. Smith, 1991, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p.14

among officials may facilitate high quality decisions. These models may be especially useful for understanding the slippage between executive decisions and foreign policy actions that may arise during implementation, but they may be less valuable for explaining the decisions themselves. Policymakers have a propensity to assimilate and interpret information in ways that conform to rather than challenge existing beliefs, preferences, hopes, and expectations. They may deny the need to confront tradeoffs between values by persuading them that an option will satisfy all of them, and indulge in rationalizations to bolster the selected option while denigrating others.

Rothchild also illustrates the effect on decisions of policy makers on assumptions about order and predictability in the environment.[216] Whereas a policymaker may have an acute appreciation of the disorderly environment in which he or she operates, such as that obtaining in Somalia, there is a tendency to assume that others, especially adversaries, are free of such constraints. Graham Allison, Robert Jervis, and others have demonstrated that decision makers tend to believe that the realist unitary rational actor is the appropriate representation of the opponent's decision processes and, thus, whatever happens is the direct result of deliberate choices. The unpredictability of the Somali conflict, as earlier observed, may confound foreign policy decision makers, and Kenya appears to be no exception.

. Reynolds argues that logically the primary influence of foreign policy decision making lies in the goals that foreign policy seeks to achieve. These have been normally security. All foreign policies of all states are basically influenced by security considerations.[217] The emphasis on security aspects of foreign policy supports the stakes threat approach to foreign policy making, since this implies looking at threats and making decisions to minimize or neutralize the threat. It appears as if Kenya had been weighing the stakes and threats posed by the Somali

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[216]Harbeson and Donald Rothchild 1995, (eds.), *Africa in World Politics: Post-Cold War Challenges*, Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 250-277.

[217] Reynolds, P. A . 1994, *An Introduction to International Relations*, Longman Group, p 38

conflict, and as long as they stakes and threat were considered to be low, the possibility of armed responses to the Somali problem remained remote.

According to Astorino-Courtois, contrary to the notion that normative (rational) decision-making is more likely in less dramatic settings, the results indicate that elevated threat encourages rational decision processing, whereas heuristic processing was more prevalent in less threatening situations. He argues that, the added presence of high stakes tends to magnify threat effects.[218] Clearly the attack by Al-Shabaab on the sensitive but vital tourism sector of Kenya posed a threat to a vital sector, hence raising the stakes and culminating in a dramatic change in Kenya's foreign policy orientation that hitherto favoured peaceful resolution of the Somalia problem. The change led to invasion of Somalia territory by Kenya Defence forces in October 2011.

4.7 Conclusions

In conclusion, while foreign policy decision makers use different decision making strategies according to the decision task it is clear that this approach may not be applicable in all instances. Different situations and foreign policy problems call for different approaches and in most cases a combination of strategies are employed by foreign policy decision makers and strategists commensurate with the specific decision task and the circumstances and issues at stake. Moreover, the personal traits of the decision maker or the leader (idiosyncratic variable) often come into play and may affect the perception in respect of the issues, the stakes and threats and the foreign policy options available.

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[218]A. Courtois, *A Political Psychology,* Vol:21, No.3. 2000, pp. 470-499:489

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Summary

Chapter one examined aspects that lay the foundations for this research study, it introduced the topic of research, the statement of research problem, reviewed the objectives; both primary and secondary. The chapter also reviewed literature within the context of foreign policy debates, from this a theoretical framework was determined which will be used in the chapter four for critical analysis. Chapter one also examined the methodology, identified the hypotheses and concluded with a chapter outline.

Chapter three utilized primary sources of data to build upon the case study of this research study. The chapter will use unpublished and published primary data, including interviews, magazines, news articles and unpublished specialized monograms to review relevant data. The data presented, aims to present the extent of diplomatic relations and foreign policy situation, in light of the secondary objectives of this research study and within the limits of the timeline indicated in chapter one.

Chapter four is sectioned into five main parts, corresponding to the main issues that emerged in chapter three. The first part examines issues that have emerged in the course of this research study. The second part examines the historical legacy of Pan-Somalism, the third part reviews the unpredictability of the Somali conflict, the fourth part reviews the nature of Kenya's foreign policy and in particular analyze whether it is reactive or proactive. The fifth part examines the models of foreign policy decision making as suggested by Allison.

Chapter four was sectioned into five main parts, corresponding to the main issues that emerged in chapter three. The first part examined issues that had emerged in the course of this research study. The second part examined the historical legacy of Pan-Somalism, the third part reviewed the unpredictability of the Somali conflict, the fourth part reviewed the nature of Kenya's foreign policy and in particular analyzed whether it was reactive or proactive. The fifth part examined the models of foreign policy decision making as suggested by Allison.

5.2 Conclusion

The pursuit of foreign policy is an endeavour by individual actors inside the state, in pursuit of the states national interest. Therefore, foreign policy creates another layer of accountability against which the performance of a nation can be judged not only by the international system, but also by its own people. In this respect, foreign policy is a preserve of state actors but pursued policy to states operations is that, it can be useful in creating a coherent agenda to be pursued by the government.

The conduct of foreign policy and the practice of diplomacy is a preserve of state actors. While there are other actors, the state remains the dominant primary actor. Individual actors however, in monarchies have a substantial influence in a states foreign policy. This is because; states are dependent on each other within the international system. Hence to avoid wars and conflicts in the pursuit of national interests, states opt for the most strategic foreign policy.

The foreign policy of Ethiopia and Kenya are similar. This is because of the similar challenges emanating from conflicts and insecurity threats in the region. This finding therefore agrees with the first objective that the factors leading up to foreign policy formulation are similar. The responses of the Ethiopia and Kenya foreign policy are also similar but the strategic

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approach to arresting them is different. Therefore the point is contrary to the third objective for this study.

While foreign policy decision makers use different decision making strategies according to the decision task it is clear that this approach may not be applicable in all instances. Different situations and foreign policy problems call for different approaches and in most cases a combination of strategies are employed by foreign policy decision makers and strategists commensurate with the specific decision task and the circumstances and issues at stake. Moreover, the personal traits of the decision maker or the leader (idiosyncratic variable) often come into play and may affect the perception in respect of the issues, the stakes and threats and the foreign policy options available.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE

<u>Topic: AN ASSESMENT OF IMPACT OF ETHIO-KENYA FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMACY: 1991-2012</u>

This questionnaire is sectioned into two parts: the first part will seek to examine the theme of the Ethiopia and Kenya foreign Policy and the effect of regional challenges, while the second part will examine Ethio-Kenya's Foreign Policies since the establishment of diplomatic relations

SECTION I: The Regional Conflicts

QN 1 Conflict and insecurity threats have persisted for two decades despites regional and international attempts to resolve it. In your view, why has it taken long and what is the impact of these challenges to Ethiopia/Kenya's foreign policies?

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QN 2 What has been the impact of the protracted conflicts in the region to Ethiopia and Kenya foreign policy formulation?

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QN 3 Do the conflicts in Sudan (South Sudan) and Somalia pose any threat to Ethiopia and Kenya's National interests? <u>**Yes**</u>/ No **(Circle the appropriate answer)**

Please elaborate

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QN 4 Do you think the large population of South Sudanese and Somali refugees in Ethiopia and Kenya have any impact on foreign policy formulation? Yes/ No **(Circle the appropriate answer)**

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QN 5 Do the conflicts in South Sudan and Somalia contribute to the proliferation of illegal small arms and light weapons in both countries? <u>Yes</u>/ No **(Circle the appropriate answer)**

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QN 6 Is terrorism at large and Al-Shabab in specific a threat to Ethio-Kenya's national interests in the region?<u>Yes/</u> No **(Circle the appropriate answer)** If yes how

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QN 7 Is maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden a threat to Ethio-Kenya's national interest and stability? Yes/ No **(Circle the appropriate answer)**

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QN 8 In your opinion, how can the foreign policies of both states be formulated to respond better to regional security and economic challenges?

Please explain

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QN 9 Do you think the current foreign policy strategies of both Kenya and Ethiopia are adequate to respond to external security threats?

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QN 10 What role, if any, should Ethiopia and Kenya play in regional conflict management and security?

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QN11 What role, if any, should other neighboring states play in addressing the regional conflicts and security challenges?

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QN 12 Considering that Ethiopia is relatively stable, what lessons, if any, can Kenya learn and apply in respect of foreign policy formulation?

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QN 13 Any other Comment:

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SECTION II: Ethio-Kenya's Foreign Policies

QN 14 In your view, what are the pillars of Ethio-Kenya's foreign policy?

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QN 15 In order of priority, what in your view are the most important issues/ considerations that inform Ethio-Kenya's foreign policy decision making process?

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QNS 16 What do you consider to be the most important function of Ethiopia and Kenya's foreign policy?

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QN 17 In your opinion, do Ethiopia or Kenya's foreign policies address the challenges posed by the regional conflict? <u>Yes</u>/ No **(Circle the appropriate answer)**

Please explain your answer

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QN 18 Please cite any foreign policy initiatives by Ethiopia or Kenya that you are familiar with, designed to address the regional conflict and security threats

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QN 19 On a scale of 1 to 10 (10 being very effective) how effective has Ethio-Kenya's foreign policy towards each other?

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QN 20 In view of the continued evolution of conflicts and security threats, is the existing foreign policy framework adequate to deal with new/ emerging threats and challenges? <u>Yes</u>/ No. **(Circle the appropriate answer)**

Please elaborate

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QN 21 In your view, are new initiatives and policy options necessary to promote diplomatic relations? Yes/ No **(Circle the appropriate answer)**

If Yes, please elaborate: You may highlight the possible new initiatives

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QN 22 Any other comment (s):

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THANK YOU FOR YOU TIME

GOD BLESS YOU.