

**AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL  
ORGANIZATIONS IN AFRICA**

**BY**

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## DECLARATION

This project is my original work and has not been presented for award of degree in any other University.

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This research Project has been Submitted for Examination with my approval as the University Supervisor.

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## **DEDICATION**

This text is dedicated to my all my family members who have been a pillar of strength and hope throughout my academic career and in my daily life challenges.

May the almighty bless you greatly.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

My gratitude goes to all the staff at Institute of Diplomacy and International studies at the University of Nairobi. I would also like to appreciate the archivists and the staff at the University of Nairobi Archives and at the Kenya National Archives as well as the staff at the Africana section at Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library. Equally, I wish to say ‘thank you’ to the Diplomacy class of 2013 for their support and encouragement throughout the project.

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I however remain solely responsible for any errors of omissions or commissions and any weakness that may be found in this submission.

## ABSTRACT

The debate about international organizations rages on. In many fronts scholars and students of international disciplines hold diverse views on the precise functions of these organizations. Particularly, opinion is divided on whether these institutions influence policies, domestic and foreign, of states. Scholars in the realist school of thought feel that the organizations bear no effect because states are too 'guarded' and would never cede substantial powers to a supranational body to give it strong ability to influence, shape or even enforce policy. On the other hand liberal institutionalists credit international organizations with the introduction of efficiency through information sharing and reduction of transactional costs while raising the costs of non-compliance.

Many organizations have set up shop in the third world countries. It is intriguing to note that these organizations owe their origins elsewhere. They have nonetheless had extensive operations and interests in the Third World countries. The question that lingers is; whose interests do the international organizations advance? There have been assertions that the organizations have contributed greatly to the eroding of economic, social and political space in the Third World countries. At the same time some have contended that the organizations have continued to advance imperialistic manners of their originating countries. The United Nation which has been looked at for provision of leadership has had its fair share of criticism for its part in pushing for more involvement of private sector in governance issues, a move seen by many as promoting interests of transnational capitalists.

Scrutinies of texts commenting on this topic reveal very scant and superficial address of these issues. Literature on the specific contributions of international organizations and assessments thereto are few and far between. It is the view of this author that this is an area that needs urgent redress both from academic and practitioner points of view. This project endeavors to bridge this gap and seek to prove, disprove and clarify whether international organizations are a blessing or curse in the Third World countries with a keen interest in the impacts they have had African states and the African individual.

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## **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
BWI	Bretton Woods Institution
CBP	Capacity Building Programme
CEGE	Center for European Governance and Economic Development
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
EDM	Energie du Mali
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FPE	Free Primary Education
G8	Group of 8 Nations
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
ICC	International Crimes Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IGAD	Inter Governmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organizations
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OAU	Organization of African Unity
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SAC	Structural Adjustment Credit
SADC	South African Development Community
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
UN	United Nations
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background of the Study

The study international organization is by no means a new phenomenon in international relations scholarship. There are many reasons for this. International organizations are the central units of international life. It is difficult for instance to talk about the sovereignty of a state without it being accredited by the United Nations. This kind of sovereignty is what has been referred as 'juridical sovereignty'<sup>1</sup>. The study of international organizations however dates back to the 1800 albeit as a legal discipline when Professor of law at Edinburgh University, J. Lorimer, coined the term 'international organization.' The study of international organizations has grown to such importance that other disciplines have embraced its inputs and thus taken keen interest of its contribution in their respective areas. Economists, sociologists and anthropologists have taken a distinct taste to the serving of international organizations study. The close relationship between international relations and law is affirmed through the works of Clive Archer who 'gives particular consideration to the constitutions of international organizations, their legal personalities and institutional problems.'<sup>2</sup>

The debate about international institutions has been marred by lack of one unifying definition of what international organizations are. Thomas Risse notes that there are as many definitions of international organizations as there are theoretical perspectives.<sup>3</sup> Yet

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<sup>1</sup>Rochester, J. M. (1986). The rise and fall of international organization as a field of study. *International Organization*, 40(04), 777-813.

<sup>2</sup>Archer, C. (2001). *International organizations* (Vol. 1). Psychology Press.

<sup>3</sup>Risse, T. (2002). Constructivism and international institutions: Toward conversations across paradigms. *Political science: The state of the discipline*, 597-623.

other scholars like Keohane observe that International Organizations (IO's) are often discussed without being defined at all or after having been defined casually.<sup>4</sup>This state of affairs has hindered advancement in the area of International Organizations. Elinor Ostrom captures this view. She argues that 'no scientific field can advance far if the participants do not share a common understanding of key terms'. This discussion will refrain from providing a common definition of international Organizations. It however bears a strong appreciation of Steve Weber's assertion that scholarly approaches are different making it difficult to develop a definition that cuts across all of them. In its stead an attempt will be made to inspect the common features that are in international organizations to provide an acceptable working understanding of what international institutions are. In this respect Duffield's definition provides an invaluable point of reference as to what international organizations are. Duffield proposes that international institutions be defined as relatively stable sets of related constitutive, regulative and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the international system(including states as well as nonstate actors), and their activities.<sup>5</sup>

International Organizations have different objects that they pursue. Such objects vary from political interests, economic interests, social interests or even environmental interests. In the African situation, international organizations are seen to propagate their own agendas sometimes disregarding needs of the people they seek to affect. The post-cold war era has seen a proliferation of international organizations making their entry into Africa. Besides the obvious richness in raw materials, Africa is now touted to be the

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<sup>4</sup>Keohane,R.O (1988) International Institutions: Two Approaches. *International Studies Quarterly*. p382.:379-396

<sup>5</sup>Duffield, J. (2007). What Are International Institutions? 1. *International Studies Review*, 9(1), 1-22.

fastest growing continent in the world in terms of both population and wealth creation. Undoubtedly, these factors have informed the objects of international organizations in Africa. An upsurge has been witnessed in formation of regional international organizations. These mostly seek to consolidate gains occasioned by economies of scale in markets and expand their voice and influence at the international stage.

A great number of practitioners and scholars have commented on the international organizations phenomena. Texts have addressed their effects on diplomacy, impacts on environment, law and justice, interactions with governments, policy impacts, international relations as well as international law. What remains un-addressed is the exact manner in which all these activities of International Organizations affect the daily operations and eking of livelihood by the ordinary person. This paper will isolate the exact ways and means that the ordinary individual in Africa has been affected by the operations of international organizations. It will also give its propositions to remedy the impacts.

In carrying out its review many examples and comparisons used in the paper have been drawn from the experiences of the World Bank and the IMF. This is partly due to their far reaching presence in the African countries and their robust financial resources. Also the two are credible pace setters in the world of international organizations with many organizations aligning themselves to them and/or requiring states to meet some certain minimum requirements to access these organizations services. Later in the paper we see how even bilateral lending and relationships are being affected by requirements to conform to some set IMF standards. These two organizations although widely used in the reviews in this text should only be treated as representative of other organizations. The

study appreciates the existence of other international organizations that may be significantly different in operations but concedes of the unavoidable influence of the two organizations.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

After 1970, there has been a surge in the number of International Organizations in Africa. Many regional international organizations have also sprung up as states seek to strengthen their ability to deal with the emerging challenges of the international system. This study realizes the stellar efforts made by the sponsors of these organizations and seeks to understand the prize at which such efforts are expended. The study expects to establish the cost, if any, at which the originators of key international organizations in Africa get their return on investment. This cost is presumed to be borne by the citizens of a particular state that the international organization is operating in. It therefore is imperative that the eventual impacts of these international organizations be gauged on a measuring scale to establish the precise level of impact they have had on the African people. More specifically, how the policies that have been effected because of international organization influence and how these have affected the people.

The premise of this investigation is centered on the assertion or promise offered by International Organizations and institutions. Generally, these organizations promise an improved livelihood for the African person and a free and peaceful environment<sup>6</sup>. It is against this background that the author of this research project finds it necessary to inspect how for instance International Organizations have contributed to the attainment of

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<sup>6</sup> Daniela, A. W. Considering the International Monetary Fund and World Bank: Lending Effectiveness in Sub Saharan Africa. Topical Review Digest: Human Rights in Sub Saharan Africa.

peace and the role such organizations play in its maintenance. The Kantian peace tripod is subjected to an evaluation and its contribution to peace in the African case through International Organizations.<sup>7</sup>

This text is cognizant of the influence some international organizations wield in the setting of international meetings in an effort to affect or influence policy.<sup>8</sup> Regard is paid to their ability to mobilize resources and often arm twist recipient countries into adoption of policies that often have been detrimental or non-beneficial to the receiving states.<sup>9</sup> This argument has been advanced in this research project with support of case study of Mali. Owing to the colossal amounts of money spent in financing the organizations and their programmes, the need to examine the impact of these organizations to the economies of countries they operate and thus the daily lifestyles of the citizens therein has become imperative. For instance, the annual budget of the United Nations is about USD 5 billion. Contributing this amount is an obligation prorated among member states depending on the sizes of their economy. Although the United States takes the lions share at 22% of the whole budget, members hold one vote in the general assembly, which is pegged on member contributions. Naturally, contributors would expect some sort of accountability or at least evidence that indeed the funds are put into proper and intended use. In a similar manner the IMF and World Bank, the two biggest international financial organizations are funded by their member states through quotas and bond issuances respectively. Again voting is pegged to member contributions and in IMF's case states

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<sup>7</sup>Russett, B., Oneal, J. R., & Davis, D. R. (1998). The third leg of the Kantian tripod for peace: International organizations and militarized disputes, 1950–85. *International Organization*, 52(03), 441-467.

<sup>8</sup>Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (1998). Why states act through formal international organizations. *Journal of conflict resolution*, 42(1), 3-32.

<sup>9</sup>Kovach, H., & Fourmy, S. (2006). Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic policy conditions to aid.

contributing more wield higher voting powers. This need is the thrust behind the inspection carried out by this study.

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

This study seeks to:

- i) Unpack the specific impacts of international organizations on the African states with specific reference to the individual person.
- ii) Appraise the major international organizations that have a wide spread reach on the African Continent. Inspect their policy influence vis a vis the impact of those policies on the individual person in Africa.
- iii) Check if the participation of International Organizations in policy matters has affected leadership within the African states and what effect(s) it has had on the individual African.

### **1.4 Literature Review**

As already clearly established the study of international organizations is an integral part of many areas of international life as it underpins the very fabric of international engagements. The African scene being part of the international system is not any different from the situation described above. It is against this background that various authors have added their opinions and analysis of international organizations action in Africa. This study samples some of these scholars thinking.

The arena of International politics is vast and unpredictable. Allies become foes and foes become allies in short spaces of time. The relationship between international organizations and states fits perfectly well in this description. This better illustrated by a

case of Kenya and the International Criminal Court (ICC) where Kenya quickly changed the tables and sought a motion in its parliament to exit from the Court despite having been among the first states to ratify the Rome Statute.<sup>10</sup> A peculiar situation is however witnessed in the dealings between the African state and international Organizations. This is one of master servant relationship as described by Mali president Toumani Toure. Consistently scholars seeking to understand the relationship between the state in Africa and International Organizations have dedicated much time and effort in the conditionalities imposed on the states by the international organizations. Many scholarly writings dwell more on the fiscal impacts of conditionalities rather than their human impacts. Criticism has been laid on International Financial Institutions (IFIs) aid and loans to African states that they fail to improve the situation of the countries but rather perpetuate debt accumulation without economic growth to show for it.<sup>11</sup>

The World bank in its own admission has a two-thirds failure rate in Africa.<sup>12</sup> Given, as will be illustrated later in this submission, that even bi-lateral and multi-lateral aid is often being channeled through the bank, a lot is left to be desired on the actual effectiveness of International organization impacts. This is worrying about Africa which has been a recipient of close to 2.5 trillion dollars and yet continues to struggle with the highest levels of poverty in the world owing to crippling unemployment, rising populations and draught among other factors. Diverse texts illuminating the challenges of IMF and World Bank interventions center their arguments on different issues. This

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<sup>10</sup>BBC website.(2010).world-africaon 23rd December (news).From <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12066667>.Accessed 28th July 2013 at 2351 Hrs.

<sup>11</sup>Eiras, A. (2003). IMF and World Bank Intervention: A Problem, Not a Solution. Backgrounder, 1689(17), 1-8.

<sup>12</sup>Eiras, A. (2003). IMF and World Bank Intervention: A Problem, Not a Solution. Backgrounder, 1689(17), 1-8.

author enters those discussions paying attention to their advancements with a view to establish the eventual difference made to the individual living in Africa.

One interesting argument that is brought forth is by B.S. Chimni. He makes a case that International organizations are constituted by the First World states to basically promote their interests at the disadvantage of the Third World states.<sup>13</sup> As such, an economic relationship consisting of the transnational capitalists, the bourgeoisie, and their functionaries on one end and the state on the other exist. These owners of capital arm-twist, coax and use other means to achieve their agenda. The scholastic arguments of Chimni lay claim that international organizations possess neo-imperial character by acting for the interests of the first world at the expense of the third world. Central to his argument also is the role International Organizations are playing in undermining the sovereignty of the nascent global state. The shifting of decision making authorities and structure to international organizations coupled with new state responsibilities in the protection of human rights further support this position.

Chimni's arguments describe an almost parasitic relationship between International Organizations and the nascent global state. This may not be necessarily the case as International Organizations are known to benefit states by facilitating flow of information and cultivating an atmosphere of trust amongst states conducive for good relations and therefore good for conducting business. The study however does not pay much regard to the actual impacts of the relationship.

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<sup>13</sup>Chimni, B. S. (2002). International Organizations Today: An Old Fashioned View From The Third World. Online paper.

The importance of human rights in today's world cannot be overemphasized. As noted by Chimni, the advent of extended rights has stripped the state of some of its traditional powers. Daniela Wohlwend inspects how human rights in Africa have been affected by International Organization action in Africa. Specifically she gives an appreciation the colossal amounts advanced to African countries by the Bretton Woods institution, World Bank and the IMF. That academic journey ends with the conclusion that the human rights situation in Africa has not improved due to IO-led interventions.<sup>14</sup> The obvious gap of Ms. Daniela's study is its focal point which falls in variance with the one adopted by this study. While she focuses on effects of international organization on human rights, this text would wish to understand the specific human impacts occasioned by the changing positions of human rights.

A detailed study on the influence of international organizations on education in Africa beams on Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi and Uganda in their quest to attain Universal Primary Education. A similar study also shares lessons from Ghana, Ethiopia and Mozambique in addition.<sup>15</sup> These studies address issues in the education development and the roles played by the World Bank in Financing and the formulation of policy to build capacity and general preparedness of the states where the programmes are carried out. The study fails to concern itself with the daily living of the average person in Africa, something this text will grapple with in the coming chapters.

Neither human rights nor education can be enjoyed in a situation of conflict. Perhaps this is why a considerable amount of time has been devoted by scholars on this subject. The

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<sup>14</sup>Daniella, A. W. Considering the International Monetary Fund and World Bank: Lending Effectiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa. Topical Review Digest: Human Rights in Sub Saharan Africa.

<sup>15</sup>Roger, Avenstrup, Xiaoyan Liang and Soren Noleman (2004) Scaling up Poverty Reduction: A Global Learning process and Conference. Shangai.

Kantian Peace tripod for instance holds that International Organizations are one of the three pillars on a three legged peace stool. The others being democracy and economic interdependence. In his theory, of triangulation of peace Kant holds that multilateralism is one way of achieving international peace and security. The gist of his arguments is provision of an arena to conduct multilateral diplomacy by international organizations. The African situation unfortunately fails to reflect these claims as continued conflicts have rocked the continent every so often. A classic example is the unrest in Somalia which seems to have been neglected by the international community. Despite IGAD's insistence and persistence the organization simply lacked the capacity to end the violence.<sup>16</sup>

Again, the question of human impacts is not given as much attention as it should, observes this author. Scholars such as Mulugeta who have attempted to unravel the conflict question in Africa have hardly explored past the areas of conflict resolution yet with the conflict come a myriad of human impacts including interrupted lifestyles, stunted populations and dwarfed economies.

Still, other commenter's of international organizations dwell on general usefulness of their intervention in Africa. Eras Ana is one of the writers of this view. The writer cites improper lending practices arresting economic growth and breeding corruption in Africa states. Other criticism leveled against IMF and World Bank includes giving of incorrect

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<sup>16</sup>Mulugeta, K. (2009). The Role of Regional and International Organizations in Resolving the Somali Conflict: The Case of IGAD.

advice to states and lack of concern about the financial structures. Also the IOs slow response in situations of need does not serve to improve its already deteriorating image.<sup>17</sup>

Contemporary works exhibit the same divergence in thinking and emphasis placement. Dafflon and Madies examine the intricacies of political economy decentralization in the sub Saharan Africa. Using the new implementation model adopted by Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya and Senegal the authors illuminate key fiscal decentralization issues and the challenges of their implementation.<sup>18</sup> International organizations push for less decentralization and privatization of many government bodies is an important component of this study. Myriad of examples exist in this regard including the privatization of Mali electricity company, Energie du Mali, which adversely affected Mali economy dipping about 3.9 percentage points.<sup>19</sup> Such studies however remain largely fixated to the core macro issues overlooking the critical aspects of the direct effects of the issues to the individual in the short medium and long term.

Similarly Chowdy and Islam present the economic growth challenges experienced by countries in Africa and Latin America in achieving the so called Millennium Development Goals, MDGs. Most of these countries' economies were harmed by the adjustment programmes prescribed by IMF and World Bank during the 1980s. This led to decline in earnings in the 1990's compared to the 1960's. The authors take is that unsound macroeconomic practices have persisted in most African countries that have

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<sup>17</sup>Eiras, A. (2003). IMF and World Bank Intervention: A Problem, Not a Solution. Background, 1689(17), 1-8.

<sup>18</sup>Dafflon, B., & Madies, T. (Eds.). (2012). The Political Economy of Decentralization in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Implementation Model in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal. World Bank Publications.

<sup>19</sup>Kovach, Hetty, and Sébastien Fourmy."Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic policy conditions to aid." (2006): 36.

hindered progress in attaining the MDG's. The paper dissects the role of international lenders, World Bank and IMF, in poverty reduction noting that with exception of China the number of people living below a dollar a day rose significantly between 1990 and 2005. The authors argue that a total change in the orientation of current macroeconomic policies is necessary to incorporate full and productive employment as core macroeconomic policy goals.<sup>20</sup>

Other studies suggest that efforts to reform the World Bank and IMF are aesthetic at best. Scholars and practitioners thinking along this line argue that the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s represent a lost decade for most African countries. After thorough assessment and admission that indeed the programmes as crafted by the two organizations were ill suited for African countries, the World Bank and IMF steered the formation of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), and Poverty Reduction Support Papers (PRSPs) to help the now debt ridden states reduce debt through debt cancellations. This again proved to be a failure as by the year 2000, four years after their formation, only 8% debt reduction had been experienced. Some cases like Mali recorded an increase in debt.

Comparing HIPC and PRSPs to SAPs John Page of the world BANK remarked "The PRSP is a compulsory process wherein the people with the money tell the people without the money what to do to get the money."<sup>21</sup>The arguments of Chimni that International organizations advance imperialistic tendencies of colonial masters gain support in AsadIsmi's submissions. He holds that the IMF and World Bank are Instruments of the

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<sup>20</sup> Chowdhury, Anis, and IyanatullIslam."Attaining the Millennium Development Goals: the role of macroeconomic policies." International Journal of Social Economics 38.12 (2011): 930-952.

<sup>21</sup>Ismi, A. (2004). Impoverishing a continent: The World Bank and the IMF in Africa.Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.

United States of America designed to colonize Africa and developing countries. Here, foreign debt is termed as ‘well organized’ tool of colonial re-conquest. President Sankara of Burkina Faso who adopted this rhetoric was assassinated in 1986 shortly after his ‘Cant Pay, Won’t Pay’ speech at the Organization of African Unity Summit meeting in Addis Ababa.<sup>22</sup>

Korir and Kioko write about how fiscal and monetary policies prescribed by World Bank and IMF have impacted on the scourge of HIV and AIDs in Kenya. They provide this review with a different angle of analysis.<sup>23</sup> Their main argument is that IMF fiscal policies capping national budget allocations to health by placing restrictive budgetary ceilings are detrimental to the fight against the scourge of HIV/AIDS. The study observes that such practices happen in an opaque manner not sensitive to national requirements. Such IO-imposed macro-economic policies have hurt the progress of battle against the HIV/AIDS scourge which was declared a national disaster by the second president of Kenya Daniel Moi.<sup>24</sup> This commentary on international organizations influence addresses impacts at macro-level. It enlists the government of Kenya inability to respond sufficiently to the scourge as a major impact of improper international organization influence in the Kenya situation. A similar investigation on reproductive health shows that global gags have equally adversely affected progress and access.

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Korir, J., & Kioko, U. (2009). EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT OF IMF FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES ON THE CAPACITY TO ADDRESS HIV/AIDS AND TB CRISES IN KENYA.

<sup>24</sup>BBC.(2013). Hi Africa (news).retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/538071.stm> Accessed on 26 July 2013. At 1721Hrs.

Rono and Kioko's study receive support from Christopher Richins account on the Impacts of International Organizations on the Aids Epidemic in Sub Saharan Africa.<sup>25</sup> This account examines various roles played specifically by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Joint UN Programme on AIDS but fails to explain how the individual is affected by those impacts.

A different angle of International Organizations impact in Africa is seen vide the foreign direct investment against the state membership in an international organizations. Dreher, Mikosch and Voight make an account of the privileges that states in certain international organizations enjoy owing to their membership in those organizations. Central to these claims is the perception that such states in International organizations posses considerably lower political risk than the states which are not members.<sup>26</sup> This perception coupled with internal enhanced bi-lateral diplomatic understandings has a snow ball effect in FDI in a given state. Fitting examples are membership of a state in the UN Security Council and the World Bank Board. Members of these organizations generally receive larger loans from the US and have more of their programs funded by the IMF and World Bank.<sup>27</sup> A networking advantage or just plain bribery? Perhaps further scholarly inquests will shed more light to the question.

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<sup>25</sup>Richins, C. (2008). Impact of International Organization on the AIDS Epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa, *The J. Int'l Bus. & L.*, 7, 115.

<sup>26</sup>Dreher, A., Mikosch, H., & Voigt, S. (2010). Membership has its privileges: The effect of membership in international organizations on FDI (No. 114). Discussion Papers, Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research.

<sup>27</sup>Dreher, A., Mikosch, H., & Voigt, S. (2010). Membership has its privileges: The effect of membership in international organizations on FDI (No. 114). Discussion Papers, Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research.

Critics of UNEP, the only UN agency headquartered in Africa argue that the presence of the UN programme, upgraded into a specialized agency in Rio 2012 has not had visible positive impacts on the environment. Africa's desertification rate is spreading at an alarming rate, sea water levels are rising at worrying speeds, while pollution continues to choke major ecosystems in Africa. In addition draughts are the order of the day in Africa while environmental based conflicts are on the rise. Such is the environmental situation in Africa. In Nairobi where the agency is situated, acute water shortages continue to bite and strain the operations of the city. Outside the city deforestation and unchecked felling of trees continues unabated. This has led to erratic and insufficient rainfalls occasioning marooning of desert in Kenya.

The story is similar in the other African countries begging the question what then are the impacts of UNEP in Africa. Having been accused of concentrating in administrative work rather than generation of new ideas, the Agency points out that it is underfunded and lacks capacity in both staff quality and quantity. All the same, besides few noble partnerships, for example the partnership to fence and conserve the Mau water catchment area, the agency has not achieved much in its 40 year tenor. This analysis walks into the perspectives that many writings and analysis have walked, that is one of inspecting the overall fiscal achievements of UNEP as an organization rather than how those achievements have impacted the lives of ordinary citizens. Such is the distinction in focus between this text and numerous others and it provides the thrust to proceed with inquest into the topic.

Rono's account of 'impacts of structural adjustment programmes in Kenya' is well detailed. He explores the economic, social and political situation in Kenya just after independence. The ten years after independence representing a period of economic boom, favourable balances of trade and improved welfare of a people coming out of colonial oppression. The period is commonly referred to as 'the golden years.' However the period between 1980 and 1990 marked a steady decline and reversal of the gains made in the golden years. This was sparked by increases in oil prices of 1973 and exacerbated by the introduction of structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s. Rono's well spelt out account gives the details of the effects of structural adjustment programmes in Kenya. It indeed comes closest to the objects of this study save for the fact that; first he concentrates his efforts purely on one state of interest, Kenya. Secondly his account does not necessarily inquire on the impacts of international organizations and also fails to explicitly connect the impacts to the international organizations IMF and World Bank. This text will therefore seek to further his findings putting them to the African states radar to find out their experiences of engagement with international organizations rather than just how the structural adjustment programmes affected them. The study will concern itself with a holistic view of the impacts of international organization activity on the African individual and draw conclusions on their overall effect as later advanced by the hypotheses.

International organizations have also impacted on the leadership in Africa. Rono illustrates this in his text on structural adjustments (SAPs) in Kenya. He posits that SAPs 'have attenuated national leaders into tribal chiefs.' As a result tribalism then became one of the biggest obstacles to national development having permeated all sectors of

development.<sup>28</sup> This report also receives later backing in an Oxfam report that gives an account that links rising corruption of leaders in Mali with aid funds.<sup>29</sup>

There's is also evidence of African countries leaders modifying policies or changing them altogether because of International Organization push for modern concepts such as human rights. In Malawi for instance a court ruling by Judge Nyakwawa Usiwa – Usiwa was reversed ruling against a gay couple after international organization and donor countries put pressure on the Southern Africa country. The current president Joyce Banda has pledged to legalize homosexuality in order to normalize relations with “our traditional development partners who were uncomfortable with our bad laws”.<sup>30</sup> The same push is seen in Uganda when president Museveni sets up a special committee to investigate a proposed law which provided death and life imprisonment punishments for people involved in gay or lesbian acts. The committee's recommendation is against the proposed law giving evidence that international organizations have direct influence on African leaders and the decisions that they make.<sup>31</sup>

Whether from realist lenses or institutionalism views the accounts of various practitioners and scholars bring forth one way or the other how international Organizations impact the African state. As illustrated in the reviews by this commenter, varying ranges of impact can be extracted. From poverty reduction strategies, health intervention programmes,

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<sup>28</sup>Rono, J. K. (2002). The impact of the structural adjustment programmes on Kenyan society. *Journal of Social Development in Africa*, 17(1), 81-98.

<sup>29</sup>Kovach, H., &Fourmy, S. (2006). Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic policy conditions to aid.

<sup>30</sup> David, S., & Godfrey, M.(2012).Malawi president vows to legalize homosexuality. *The Guardian* <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/18/malawi-president-vows-legalise-homosexuality>. Accessed on 19th August 1400 hrs

<sup>31</sup>Jjuuko, A. (2013). The incremental approach: Uganda's struggle for the decriminalisation of homosexuality. *Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity in The Commonwealth: Struggles for decriminalisation and change*, 381-408.

environmental concerns to macro-economic recommendations the impacts of international organizations in the African state are far and reaching. However, the specific impact on the African individual has not received adequate attention. Texts attempting to sieve these from the generalized impacts are superficial and haphazard. This observation brings to the fore the opportunity to comprehensively address the gap left by writers on the subject of impacts of international organizations. This study will delve into the impacts of international organization action in Africa and assess if such involvement has been a beneficial or detrimental one for the average African individual.

### **1.5 Justification of the Study**

A scrutiny of various texts on the subject of International Organizations impacts in Africa and particularly the human impact reveals haphazard attention to the matter. Seemingly the subject matter either does not attract sufficient interest or is just generally not well explored. The few scholarships that attempt to dwell in the subject matter are either too general or fail to address the human impact occasioned by International Organizations in Africa altogether. This study finds its basis along these contours. It seeks to provide the necessary explanation, support or condemnation to the programmes and policies prescribed by international organizations in Africa from the perspective of resulting human impacts.

Although international organizations and donor agencies in Africa operate independently many times they have attached a requirement to adherence to IMF guidelines as a base qualification for their kinds of various aids.<sup>32</sup> Even some rich states have also tended to

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<sup>32</sup>Stein, H. (2004). The World Bank and the IMF in Africa: Strategy and routine in the generation of a failed agenda. Ann Arbor, 1001, 48109-1092.

have this requirement for bilateral support.<sup>33</sup>The European Union, although not a state, has needed compliance with IMF guidelines for aid disbursement. These kinds of requirements underline the importance of international organizations particularly the IMF, and World Bank. This study finds it necessary to investigate the effects of these requirements while attempting to make out how other independent organizations have also contributed.

A key concern of the author of this text is to find the link between international organizations programmes and prescriptions and the improvement of economies and lives of African individual people. Efforts are not spared in testing the ‘before aid’ situation of a country and its people’s welfare and the ‘after aid’ situation of the same scenario. This is looked at through a prism to separate the impoverishment and/or improvement directly or indirectly attributable to the influence wielded by the international organizations. This is especially so in the case for Africa.

Questions linger on the roles that IO’s claim versus the actual situation and how the IO’s have affected this situation. A major claim as per of the Kantian Peace tripod is that International Organizations are a key ingredient for peaceful coexistence among nation states.<sup>34</sup>Before acceding to this ‘allegation’ the study will assess the African situation to find out whether the African continent is still ridden with conflicts. The Congo for instance has never known total tranquility despite numerous operations of major

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<sup>33</sup>Kovach, H., &Fourmy, S. (2006). Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic policy conditions to aid.

<sup>34</sup>Russett, B., Oneal, J. R., & Davis, D. R. (1998). The third leg of the Kantian tripod for peace: International organizations and militarized disputes, 1950–85. *International Organization*, 52(03), 441-467.

international organizations including the biggest peacekeeping the UN in the world.<sup>35</sup> The volatility of West African states such as Ivory Coast, Mali and recently Boko Haram-hit Nigeria also poses more questions than it offers answers. The quiet role played by NATO in the events leading to the killing of former Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi also makes for a fascinating subject. Additionally the existence of Somali's first elected government in more than twenty years and its control plus the peace being experienced in Somalia today needs objective evaluation. Still, it is in order to question the relative quiescence in Somalia to establish whether it is a product of International Organization action and why this product has taken more than twenty years to materialize despite the heavy presence of international organizations in Somali backed by numerous international workshops and high profile conferences.

The economies of African states have in many cases been affected by the input of foreign aid often channeled through international organizations. Daniela A. Wohlwend notes that between 1955 and 2005, African states have been recipient to about 2.3 trillion dollars yet the effects of this funding can hardly be recognized as states continue to fall deeper into the poverty trap.<sup>36</sup> She notes that although IMF and World Bank have tools to help the people living in sub Saharan states live a healthy, productive life that has not been the case as they continue to live in 'hell of the world's most impoverished conditions.'

Lastly this study finds it necessary to inspect the claim that IO's have contributed to a robust political life through organization of seminars and improving ways of information sharing amongst states. It's therefore critical to test these assertions especially in the

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<sup>35</sup>Un.(2013).Peacekeeping operations. accessed on [www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml). 27th July 2013. 1415hrs.

<sup>36</sup> Daniela, A. W. Considering the International Monetary Fund and World Bank: Lending Effectiveness in Sub Saharan Africa. Topical Review Digest: Human Rights in Sub Saharan Africa

backdrop of the highest number of coup de tats in West Africa, perpetual political strife of the Somali, Challenges between the Sudan and South Sudan and most recently protests against African strongmen leadership pioneered by Tunisia in the Arab spring. Cases of election and post election violence have been a common feature in Africa despite heavy presence of international organization in those elections and observers and advisors.<sup>37</sup>

This study is therefore important in taking stock of the amalgam of impacts claimed by international Organizations against the actual human impact experienced by the ordinary person in the various states under its lenses. For the purposes of pragmatism the study will inspect two key International Organizations; World Bank and IMF. Conclusions drawn from this experiment will be presumed to be representative of the international organization's influence since these organizations practically dominate proceedings international dealings. Regard will however be paid to other IO's that cut across the African continent. Here environmental IO's shall be examined as will be the UN. The author will be seeking answers on progress made by these IO's and how this progress has improved the livelihood of the ordinary person. Attention will also be accorded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its impact so far on the African continent.

These explanations make a sufficient case for the importance of this study and represent a relatively uncultivated ground in international politics and relations.

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<sup>37</sup>Kelley, J. (2009). The more the merrier? The effects of having multiple international election monitoring organizations. *Perspectives on Politics*, 7(01), 59-64.

## **1.6 Research Questions**

1. Do International Organizations contribute to the economic, social and political ranking of African countries?
2. How do these organizations affect or influence policy?
3. How does the policy affect the economy of the involved state?
4. What is the impact of these policies on the African Individual?

## **1.7 Hypotheses**

1. International Organizations have an impact on the African continent.
2. International Organizations have no impact on the African continent.

## **1.8 Theoretical Framework**

The realist theory is one the main theories illuminated in this research paper. Studies advanced by realist writers like Hans Morgenthau are renowned for their astute support of this theory. Morgenthau like other realist thinkers provides that the state will always put their interests first no matter the circumstances<sup>38</sup>. The position views states as being inherently selfish and that even seemingly modest actions like joining of an international organization will only be done when a state is convinced of the benefits of doing so. The realist perspective seems to gain support from Rationalists who advice that a state will join an international organization if according to its assessment the value of the prospective functions outweigh associated costs.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>38</sup>Morgenthau, H., & Nations, P. A. (1948).The struggle for power and peace. Nova York: Alfred Knopf.

<sup>39</sup> Scott, J. (2000). Rational Choice Theory.Sage publications.

Realist theory is illustrated in this study as a double edged sword cutting both ways. On one hand this text will acknowledge the need and drive for states to exhibit realistic tendencies in their relations with international organizations. On the other hand the appreciation will be accorded to international organizations, that is, any realistic norms seen in international organizations in their operations in the African arena.

Primarily realism dispute that international Organizations can have any meaningful influence or impact on the policy making process of a state. This is because the state is guarded and is reluctant to cede any of its powers to an international or supranational body. Mearsheimer advances this position in his account; *The False Promise of International Organizations*.<sup>40</sup> Similarly, B.S. Chimni explains that international Organizations are formed to act on behalf of their trans-national capitalist owners who breed expansionist influence and ultimately advance the interests of their sponsors in the nascent global state.<sup>41</sup> Chimni's arguments will be important to the claim made in this research paper. The paper will however devote considerable time in getting to understand the exact manner in which the theory has advised how various states behave in dealing with international organizations and vice versa. More importantly how the resultant relationship has affected the subsistence of the ordinary African individual which remains the focus of this research paper.

Liberal institutionalism is mentioned in this paper for comparison purposes only. It is used as a prism to look at the issues raised in this discourse and offer a divergent view from that of realists. This theory sharply contrasts with the realist theory. Its central claim

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<sup>40</sup>Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994). The false promise of international institutions. *International security*, 5-49.

<sup>41</sup>Chimni, B. S. (2002). *International Organizations Today: An Old Fashioned View From The Third World*. Online paper.

is that it is easier for states to co-operate, collaborate and act within the international organization framework because the organization provides an institution for doing so. The theory cites clear structures, predictable bureaucracy and autonomy of international organizations as being major incentives for states to Act through international organizations.<sup>42</sup>

Scholars like Keohane also make a case for liberal institutionalists. Keohane advances that international organizations are instrumental in helping states reach specific agreements by reducing transaction costs, improving information sharing while at the same time raising the costs of violations.<sup>43</sup>

The Realism theory is empirically tested with the running thread of this paper to establish the extent of their practical application on the African situation and the bearing they have on the livelihoods on the ordinary citizen(s).

## **1.9 Research Methodology**

Research is an integral part of this paper as it provides proof/disproof to the various arguments advanced by the study. Its importance cannot therefore be overemphasized. This study employed the use of a qualitative research approach where secondary sources of information formed the basis for the study.

Desk top research is used as an important source of information for this study. It provided critical knowledge of the intricacies of international organizations right from their

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<sup>42</sup>Abbott, K. W., &Snidal, D. (1998). Why states act through formal international organizations. *Journal of conflict resolution*, 42(1), 3-32.

<sup>43</sup>Keohane, R. O. (1982). The demand for international regimes. *International organization*, 36(02), 325-355.

conception through their operations. Scientific articles, online-newspapers, databases, journals, publications, academic papers and books were used and all sources and references acknowledged accordingly. They are scrutinized thoroughly and information cross-checked for correctness and comparison.

The internet proved a valuable resource in the moulding of this paper. Internet was particularly useful where data relating to extremely topical issues were concerned. Very recent phenomena which may still be under academic lenses are addressed by the raw data available in the wild wide web. Caution was taken in verifying the reliability and factual state of the information. Still, this resource was used minimally in this text.

## **1.10 Organization of the Study**

### **Chapter One**

In this chapter, the author grapples with introduction of the subject matter, definitions and cause for the study. The author endeavors to make a case for the necessity of the study articulating clearly the knowledge gap that the study seeks to fulfill.

### **Chapter Two**

Devotion in this chapter is made to a discussion that puts together the theoretical aspects of the study to a more practical perspective. Although the chapter dwells on the historical views to advance its pronouncements, regard will be paid to contemporary linkages between theory and practice. Questions will be raised on the effect or role of International Organizations. Some examples used to illustrate include; the Arab Spring revolts, Kenya's Uhuru Kenyatta administration IMF imposed value added tax on foodstuffs and other essential services including banking services. A quick glance will be given to

UNEP as the key environmental International Organization and stock taken on its achievements vis a vis the investment that has been made in it.

### **Chapter Three**

This chapter grapples with the comparative studies. An exam of happenings in Mali is put in context. The results are then tested against UN Human Development Index to gauge the effectiveness of work undertaken by various International Organizations in its wake. Through keen collection and collation of data, the chapter will empirically test the hypotheses and prove or disprove them.

### **Chapter Four**

Identification and discussion of emerging issues is addressed in this chapter. The study isolates and grapples with the emerging issues. At the same time, an attempt of a critical analysis of the said issues is made.

### **Chapter Five**

This chapter provides a summary of the key findings and makes general recommendations. It also mentions the issues beyond the scope of this paper will be singling them out as areas that need further research.

## CHAPTER TWO

### INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN AFRICA

#### 2.1 Introduction

Since the Conference of Vienna in 1814 which culminated in the formation of the first international organization (IO), The International Telegraph Union in 1865 (ITU). The study of international organizations and their consequent appreciation has grown phenomenally. The period before formation of the first formal IO saw Congresses and Conferences govern much of international relations order. These however proved inadequate because of subjectivity related to the Congresses. Their short term nature also meant that new congresses had to be convened to solve new problems in the international system.

Moreover discomforts arose as to who would convene the congresses and where they would be held. Archer's *International Organizations* gives a clear chronology of International Organizations emergence.<sup>44</sup> The need for permanent international organizations became unavoidable. Today over 400 international organizations have taken active roles in the various sectors of society. From environment to the high seas and the outer space IO's have played undeniable roles in shaping and influencing policy. Many scholars and international relations practitioners as well as diplomats have coined different theories attempting to explain the phenomenon of international organizations.

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<sup>44</sup>Archer, C. (2001). *International organizations* (Vol. 1). Psychology Press.

Despite this growing number of scholars and their innovative research, the empirical study of international co-operation has not kept pace with theoretical developments.<sup>45</sup>

In equal measure, there have been attempts by scholars and practitioners to link the international cooperation theories to practice. Studies have concerned themselves with the different possibilities of how each of the theories of international organizations are in practice. This chapter enters this debate with the goal of helping clarify how some of the key theories of international relations and specifically international organizations realistically are in application in the international system. The researcher will lean towards the African scene of this play given that as an overall objective the research paper is desirous of creating a better understanding of the African situation.

It has been said that the realism is the image of international relations.<sup>46</sup> The premise provides an apt starting point of our analysis. A full appreciation of realism is employed in this text in a multi-faceted approach to provide state behaviour to international stimuli and behaviors of international organizations towards the African state. Realism is perhaps the oldest school of thought in international relations. Although definitions of realism will vary in form and stature, some key elements always seem to be retained. That as a study realism focuses on state as the principal actors in international relations. Other non-state actors such as international organizations, multinational organizations, nongovernmental organizations and the civil society are seen as less important and consequently not having the ability to significantly affect relations at the international stage. According to the proponents of this school of thought, international organizations

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<sup>45</sup>Frieden, J., & Martin, L. L. (2002). International political economy: Global and domestic interactions. *Political science: The state of the discipline*, 118-146.

<sup>46</sup>See *Images of International Relations*; Chapter 2: The State and the balance of power.

do not have real impact on their own because they are made of independent states that ultimately determine what the International organizations will do. Put differently, realism is state centric and focuses only on state and interstate relations<sup>47</sup>.

Organizations actions therefore either render support or provide criticism to the theory as will become apparent. To investigate these claims the author will put forth different arguments accompanied by relevant examples to show cause and provide justification for the said arguments. Although IO's are products of international agreements that in many cases give the members equal voting powers and hence wield direct influence in the organizations, this chapter will partly illuminate the manner in which rich western powers have use their economic and sometimes military superiority to arm-twist, control and advance their narrow interests against the broad objectives of the international organizations. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provide good examples of illustrating this point. A question that remain unaddressed is whether the organizations themselves, although not states, exhibit realist tendencies in their operations? Perhaps that puzzle requires a separate study different from the scope of this research project.

Immanuel Kant, the German scholar, in his Kantian peace tripod advancements claimed that for there to be peace in the world more states must be democratic, more countries must depend on each other and more countries must join international organizations.<sup>48</sup>

This declaration explicitly credits the operations of international organizations to the

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<sup>47</sup>Montgomery, E. B. (2006). Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty. *International Security*, 31(2), 151-185.

<sup>48</sup>Russett, B., Oneal, J. R., & Davis, D. R. (1998). The third leg of the Kantian tripod for peace: International organizations and militarized disputes, 1950–85. *International Organization*, 52(03), 441-467.

presence or absence of peace. Let us look more carefully at this argument in the context of this study. In the African context, has there been peace and can this peace be attributed to the presence or absence of international organizations in Africa?

One cannot possibly claim to understand Africa without appreciating its history. As such, this study inspects the role played by international organizations in Africa's struggle for liberation from its former colonies with a close fascination. Majority of African countries became independent in the late 1950' and 1960's. Besides the liberation movements, what role did international organizations play in attainment of the independence? There is not much documentation of this phenomena but the Pan African movement does indeed deserve a mention if not credit for their gallant efforts in assisting African countries attain knowledge and orderliness in self-determination. The Pan African movement was made up of young, mostly western educated elites who facilitated sharing of information amongst the African leadership and sharing of experiences to strengthen the resolve of fighting for independence in their respective countries. On the frontline were such leaders as Julius Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta and Patrice Lumumba. In many ways the workings of the Pan African movement was similar to that of an International organization. It facilitated sharing of information, provision of meeting facilities and effectively lowered costs of those meetings. Although rudimentary in its approach, the Pan African movement did have an impact on the African countries attainment of independence from their colonial masters.<sup>49</sup>

A more recent example is the case of South Africa. South Africa continued to be under the oppressive Boer rule until 1994. Up until then, the native South Africans who

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<sup>49</sup>Shivji, I. G. (2009).Pan-Africanism in Mwalimu Nyerere has thought Third World Resurgence.

constituted over 90 per cent of the population remained oppressed by the apartheid rule. The rights of black South Africans were virtually nonexistent with little or no access to education or jobs and therefore the majority remaining in abject poverty. In an effort to remedy this situation the international community led by the United Nations imposed trade sanctions on the republic of South Africa to apply pressure to the regime of F.W. de Clerk. Eventually this paid dividends with South Africa becoming independent in 1994 after the abolishment of the apartheid rule. Nelson Mandela was installed as president marking what can termed as the single biggest achievement of an international organization at in the fight against imperialism.

However the works or scholars such as Chimni later advance that International organizations are now agents of neo-colonialism acting for the interests of trans-national capitalists to propagate and safeguard their investments.<sup>50</sup> It will be very interesting to see future scholars give this issue more attention and make conclusive discernments about which side of engagements tilts the scale in international organizations and their stand in neo-colonialism. Contemporary studies put forward by realist scholars however maintain that international organizations remain vehicles of modern day colonialism in Africa arguing that all the tenets of colonialism albeit indirectly are enabled by international organizations in today's Africa. In support of certain these views this writer compares the purported gains made as a result of international organizations intervention in Africa against the continued loading of debts and exploitation of African resources and finds the situation heavily tilted to the favour of the realist.

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<sup>50</sup>Chimni, B. S. (2002). International Organizations Today: An Old Fashioned View From The Third World. Online paper.

Returning to the debate about the causal effect of international organizations on peace, the debate is split right down the middle between realist scholars and liberal institutionalists. On one hand realists posit that international organizations cannot substantially alter a state's behavior in a manner to cause peace.<sup>51</sup> This argument is extensively articulated by Mearsheimer in his accounts; *The False Promise of International Organizations* and 'A Realist Reply' where he responds to various criticisms to his previous works. Liberal institutionalists on the other hand argue that international organizations play a key role in the creation and maintenance of peace.<sup>52</sup> This discussion will save the empirical testing of these specific aspects of international organizations and concentrate on the actual situation in Africa as it has happened and continues to happen. It is on the basis of these findings the text hopes to illuminate the African situation and show whether or not the extensive work of international organizations has contributed to peace on African soil.

Africa is no stranger to conflicts and wars. The Ogaden war between Eritrea and Somalia, Biafra war in Nigeria, Sudan - South Sudan conflicts and the ongoing war in Somalia against terrorist group Al Shabaab are just some of the wars that can be mentioned for illustration purposes. The conflict in Somalia has literally ravaged the nation; leading to the country being classified as the world's top failed state.<sup>53</sup> Equally, internal strife in Darfur and the Democratic republic of Congo's perpetual war against rebels most recently the M23 rebels further demonstrate the challenges that confront peace in Africa.

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<sup>51</sup>Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994). The false promise of international institutions. *International security*, 5-49.

<sup>52</sup>Duffield, J. (2007). What Are International Institutions? 1. *International Studies Review*, 9(1), 1-22.

<sup>53</sup>CNN. (2012). Somalia tops failed states index for the fifth year (Data file). Retrieved from <http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/18/somalia-tops-failed-states-index-for-fifth-year/> Jason Hanna..

A close inspection will reveal the internal strife in Congo continues on in the background of UN's largest and most expensive mission.<sup>54</sup> Such a scenario is reminiscent of the atrocities that happened in Rwanda where the Tutsi ethnic tribe turned on and butchered the Hutu's almost to extinction inside a period of three months<sup>55</sup>. All the while the UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) remained sterile. It was only after the genocide did the UN act to save face. Nonetheless their belated actions did not salvage the deaths of 800,000 Rwandese.

Millions of Africans in the Darfur region and the South Sudan have died in a protracted civil unrest. The UN's practical presence in these situations was at best provision of humanitarian aid. Similarly, the battles in West African countries against internal uprisings have been fought without international organizations intervention. Mali provides a good example where the only intervention that came in as the Al-Qaeda backed Islamist extremists closed in on the capital Bamako came not from an international organization but its former colonial master France. In the Nigerian government fight with the Boko Haram extremists no international organization participation has so far been recorded. The Africa Union's and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) role in Mali rebuilding process thereafter must not go un-noticed but theirs appear reactionary after the onslaught launched by the French troops. Nonetheless, the very fact that the war broke up in Mali and was sustained for a long period of time is testimony that international organizations operations/or existence have not significantly affected conflicts and their outcomes in Africa. It therefore

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<sup>54</sup> United Nations.(2013).Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo(Data file). (Accessed on 14<sup>th</sup> August 2013 from<http://monusco.unmissions.org/> MUNUSCO

<sup>55</sup>Hintjens, H. M. (1999). Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 37(02), 241-286.

becomes very difficult to directly link international organizations to the existence of direct peace in the African scenario.

The situation in Kenya post-election violence in 2007- 2008 perhaps offers a different dimension to the arguments above. A UN sponsored delegation of eminent personalities led by its former Secretary General Kofi Annan successfully mediated an enduring peace agreement between opposition frontrunner Mr. Odinga and Mr. Kibaki, the incumbent president. Lessons from Somalia where the current fragile Somalia government is supported by Africa Union's Amison troops also provide something to think about in as far as international organizations contribution to peace is concerned.<sup>56</sup> In the same thinking one cannot imagine what would have become of the internal uprisings in DRC that have been sustained for years but kept at bay by the UN's largest peace mission, MONUSCO.

Traditional realism is premised on assumptions that the national security of a state takes precedence over all other state concerns. This view treats military as a key enhancer of this national security. Military is therefore classified as high politics whereas other aspects fall further below the cadre and are classified as low politics. Neo realists have however preferred to concern themselves with the overall power distribution among states in the international society.<sup>57</sup> Such thinkers are very skeptical about any contribution claimed by international organizations in shaping the states behavior towards international relations. The neorealist school of thought is not convinced that international organization can substantially influence international relations through

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<sup>56</sup> See AMISOM bulletin. (2011). Issue 30. 1 August

<sup>57</sup> Buzan, B., Jones, C. A., & Little, R. (1993). *The logic of anarchy: neorealism to structural realism*. Columbia University Press.

creation of norms and advocacy.<sup>58</sup> Our African situation provides an interesting frame of reference to put some of these arguments under the radar.

International trade has obviously grown in the post-cold war era because of increased interactions between states and interdependency occasioned by globalization fanned by better communication and transportation channels. Consequently, trade international organizations and agreements have grown to match the needs. Notwithstanding this growth the relations situation on the ground speak of realist interactions where states aim to maximize their national interests sometimes even at the expense of other states. Let's dissect some examples in the African scene. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) as an international agreement has not translated in substantial increments in exports from Africa to the United States as initially envisaged. The republic of Chad is among the countable states in Africa that has recorded increase in its exports to the United States following the signing of AGOA. Even in its case the growth numbers are caused by exports of oil products. Such a case points analysts to the USA's quest to access Chad oil resources as has been the trend in the last two decades following unrests of magnanimous scales in the Middle East that put future access of its oil at risk.<sup>59</sup> The AGOA agreement is riddled with conditions that qualify or disqualify products from Africa as fit or unfit for export to the American market. It therefore continues to promote American trade interests at the expense of African countries interest it purports to promote. Data for the period 2000 to 2005 shows that exports from Africa to the USA in

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<sup>58</sup>Waltz, K. N. (2010). Theory of international politics. Waveland Press.

<sup>59</sup>Allen, F. (2012). Oil and Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Reflections on the External and Domestic Linkages. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, 5(4), p132.

fact increased but as alluded earlier the increases can only be attributed to oil products exports mostly from Chad and Namibia.<sup>60</sup>

Trade liberalization as envisioned by the World Trade Organization(WTO) brokered Doha Rounds has also not done much to improve the balance of trade between African countries and the West.<sup>61</sup> A quick review of balance of trade of most of the African states will reveal that it tilts heavily in the favour of the West. The European Union for instance keeps on revising conditions to be met by African countries wishing to export horticultural produce to the European bloc.<sup>62</sup> This situation has adversely affected trade volumes with the bloc in favour of Europe.

Regional trade international organizations in Africa such as ECOWAS, SADC and COMESA have not exhibited much desire in tackling issues outside their trading blocs by taking advantage of their strengthened negotiation powers. As such they contribute minimally to the impact made by their members in the global or international trade. These excerpts of trading as conducted by African countries are in total agreement with realist perspective that ultimately international organizations prescription of norms in international relations and therefore international trade does little to alter states behavior which is skewed towards protection of national interests and national security.

Closely tied to the aspect of international trade is the question of foreign direct investments (FDI). The Center for European Governance and Economic Development

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<sup>60</sup>Ndalikokule, V., Biwa, B., &Kaakunga, E. (2006).BANK OF NAMIBIA RESEARCH DEPARTMENT.

<sup>61</sup>Meyn, M. (2008). The WTO Doha round impasse: implications for Africa. Overseas Development Institute.

<sup>62</sup>Barno, A., Ondanje, B., & Ngwiri, J. (2009, August). Dynamics of Horticultural Export to European Union Market: Challenges and Opportunities in Sub-Saharan Africa. In I All Africa Horticultural Congress 911 (pp. 61-72).

Research (CEGE) discussion paper 114 of 2010 reveal that membership in certain International Organizations indeed has its privileges. The discussion illustrates empirically using data collected over a 35 year period that states which belong to certain international organizations tend to receive more FDI than their opposite counterparts.<sup>63</sup>

There is evidence that countries which occupy temporary membership in the UN Security Council receive substantially larger loans from the USA and more programs funding from both the World Bank and the IMF.<sup>64</sup> The argument is that some organizations restrict states from pursuing policies that are harmful to investors signaling low political risk. Creation of such an environment can only serve to buoy foreign investments. This new environment is normally communicated to the international system when a country joins an international organization. This idea gels well with realist argument that states would only align themselves or join those organizations that increase their influence. One reason for a state to do this is to raise its economic profile. This normally translates to more funds available to the state and its citizens to pursue other goals. The presence of UN mission in a country for instance drastically raises its profile as an investment destination.

This position is not strongly shown by African states. However perhaps Tanzania provides a talking point in as far as FDI and International Organization is concerned. For the most part of its post-independence existence Tanzania held the Ujamaa policy that hampered FDI. This was pioneered by the late Mwalimu Nyerere's socialist philosophy that sought to preserve and distribute economic gains and benefits to the local

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<sup>63</sup>Dreher, A., Mikosch, H., & Voigt, S. (2010). Membership has its privileges: The effect of membership in international organizations on FDI (No. 114). Discussion Papers, Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research.

<sup>64</sup>Kuziemko, I., & Werker, E. (2006). How much is a seat on the Security Council worth? Foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations. *Journal of Political Economy*, 114(5), 905-930.

Tanzanians. This policy is believed to have caused Tanzania's 'discomfort' within first East African Community (EAC) leading to the eventual collapse of the EAC<sup>65</sup>. However later presidents entered Tanzania in international organizations like South African Development Community (SADC) and the new EAC. These initiatives may have served to inspire confidence to prospective investors evidenced by the surge of investors in Tanzania in the last decade.<sup>66</sup> The fact that Tanzania is now a member to the EAC and SADC confirms the state realist behavior seeking to maximize gains from both blocs.

At broader levels states which are members of IMF and World Bank provide comfort of compliance to certain standards to prospective investors. This is especially so in the case of non-democracies which use membership in these institutions as a commitment device.<sup>67</sup> Numerous states in Africa have had to receive IMF 'clearance' before bi-lateral or multi-lateral aid is given. Prime examples are Mali, Senegal, Botswana, Ghana and Kenya. This requirement must have advised the engineering of structural adjustment programmes which led to massive impoverishment of many African states.

Activities of International Organizations as seen in the previous chapter advance the interests of the countries of origin of those IO's. This happens in a myriad of ways. The World Bank and IMF flex their financial muscles to dictate policies in Africa. It is at the recommendation of World Bank that African states like Kenya have set budget roof for health allocations. Health gags have also adversely affected the quality and quantity of

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<sup>65</sup>Mngomezulu, B. R. (2006). An assessment of the role played by political leaders, nationalism and sub-nationalism in the establishment and collapse of the East African community, 1960-1977 (Dissertation project for M.A. Degree University of South Africa)

<sup>66</sup> Gibbon, P. (1999). Privatisation and foreign direct investment in mainland Tanzania, 1992-98. Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research.

<sup>67</sup> Fang, S., & Owen, E. 2009. Subtle Signals. Limited Device: International Institutions and Credible Commitment of Nondemocracies, Rice University.

life in Africa.<sup>68</sup> The fight against scourge of HIV/AIDS is seriously threatened by shrinking government budget compared to swelling numbers of people in need of treatment. Reproductive health treatment has equally been affected by the global health gags.<sup>69</sup> Other areas like election funds and tax policies are also be influenced by international organizations. The August 2013 Zimbabwe elections funded through the World Bank after the government said it was broke exhibits one of the latest beneficiaries of international organization funding. It has also been alleged that the Value Added Tax 2013 bill introduced by Uhuru Kenyatta's administration in Kenya is instigated by forces in the IMF and World Bank seeking reassurance that the government would be able to meet its loan repayment obligations.<sup>70</sup>

It is clear from the analysis above that states and governments will always seek to advance and protect their own interests. The Realist argument provides that states will always be concerned by the balance of power.<sup>71</sup> When a state joins an international organization its primary purpose is therefore to guard its interests and expand its influence. In fact this is best done through formal international organization as is illustrated by the USA activity in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Through NATO the USA successfully balanced the Soviet Republic burgeoning power consolidated in the Warsaw Pact. In Africa, international organizations have largely acted in realist manner seeking to preserve the investments of their sponsors. On their part

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<sup>68</sup>Ismi, A. (2004). Impoverishing a continent: The World Bank and the IMF in Africa. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.

<sup>69</sup>Pathfinder International. (2007). ACCESS DENIED: The Impact of Global Gag Rule in Kenya; Population Action International

<sup>70</sup>Consumers Federation of Kenya. (2013)Federation link to letters exchanged between IMF and Kenya (Data file). Retrieved from <http://www.cofek.co.ke/index.php/14-news/110-details-of-imf-kenya-government-pacts-which-include-the-contentious-value-added-tax-bill-2013>. Accessed 2338hrs 28<sup>th</sup> July 2013.

<sup>71</sup>Mearsheimer, J. J. (1995). A realist reply. *International Security*, 82-93.

African states are seen to make rational choices when dealing with these organizations in their day to day operations

## **2.2 Liberal Institutionalism**

Liberal Institutionalism sharply contrasts the theory realism in international studies. This theory basically posits that formal international organizations are important and can inspire behavior change of the state to adopt certain norms.<sup>72</sup> Accordingly liberal institutionalists believe in the importance of roles played by international organizations at almost an indispensable degree.

This brief introduction of liberal institutionalism is to highlight the fundamental difference in thought and application as compared to the realism theory's look at international organizations and their alleged influence. It provides a launching pad into the discussion hereunder which employs examples to illustrate its tenets.

In Africa the role played by Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and later African Union (AU) in pacification and stabilization of Somalia cannot be overemphasized. After the initial push of IGAD to pacify Somalia, the AU sponsored Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) finally aided in the setting up of the first Somali government, since the fall of Said Barre in 1991, elected on Somali soil.<sup>73</sup> This was after the Al Shabab militia had been vanquished and pushed out of the capital Mogadishu and their economic stronghold of Kismayu apprehended. It must be appreciated though that all these efforts were

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<sup>72</sup>Keohane, R. O., & Martin, L. L. (1995). The promise of institutionalist theory. *International Security*, 20(1), 39-51.

<sup>73</sup> Kumar, A. S. (2013). US Officially recognizes first Somali government since 1991. *The Washington Post* January 17, 2013.

happening under the support of an international community that was growing weary with Somalia's statelessness and the consequent menace caused by piracy on the East coast of Africa carried out by the Al Shabaab Militia. The London Conference on Somalia of 2012 for instance congregated under the auspices of the United Nations.<sup>74</sup> In the conference the big powers of the world, notably G8, pledged their support for the AU led peace process in Somalia.

The brief discussion above on Somalia lends the liberal institutional theory support insofar as the relevance of international Organizations is put in question. The role played by AU in the pacification of Somalia is undeniable. Fruits of its success are witnessed in form of the present Somalia government which was formed after about 22 years of civil strife.<sup>75</sup> International Organization, the UN, role is seen in the peace build up process by organizing of conferences and numerous Security Council directives on the Somalia position.<sup>76</sup> Moreover the coordination of military exercises and the requisite rebuilding of Somalia institutions are supervised by these international organizations. To this extent the claim by liberal institutionalists that International organizations contribute to peace can thus be said to be affirmative.

Other examples of successes of international organization action in Africa include; the successful mediation of a power sharing deals between opposition candidate Mr. Odinga and incumbent president Mwai Kibaki, Kenya 2008.<sup>77</sup> The same was later replicated in

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<sup>74</sup> London Conference on Somalia. (2013).somalia-conference (Data file).Retrieved from <https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/somalia-conference-2013>. site accessed 0046hrs 15th August 2013

<sup>75</sup>Kumar, A. S. (2013). US Officially recognizes first Somali government since 1991.The Washington Post January 17, 2013.

<sup>76</sup> UNSC Documents on Somalia.(2013). Retrieved from<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/somalia/>. Site Accessed 0055hrs 15<sup>th</sup> August 2013

<sup>77</sup>Chege, M. (2008). Kenya: back from the brink?. Journal of Democracy, 19(4), 125-139.

Zimbabwe between long serving President Robert Mugabe and leading Opposition candidate Morgan Tsvangirai.<sup>78</sup> The Sudan – South Sudan 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that led to the secession of South Sudan was adjudicated by an international organization, IGAD<sup>79</sup>. Interventions in Darfur, and Congo may not have been apt examples of success but definitely deserve a mention in this conversation. In the Congo for instance the Laurent Kabila’s government is largely able to operate because of the protection provided by the more than 15000 strong UN peacekeeping forces present in the country.<sup>80</sup>

One of the major lamentations of Mearsheimer is that under the guise of human rights intervention by international organizations states sovereignty has been seriously eroded. Let us investigate this under the African umbrella. According to the UN Human rights Council that came into force in 2006 replacing the United Nations Commission for human rights, the UN may not necessarily require the permission of a host country to intervene in a situation deemed to be against international human rights convention.<sup>81</sup> This provision in itself implies unlimited powers for the UN to intervene in what in its assessment it believes is a representation of human rights violation of such scales that require intervention. What is even more baffling is that the definition of what human rights violation and the extents which require intervention has been coined by the same

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<sup>78</sup>Matlosa, K. (2009). The role of the Southern African development community in the management of Zimbabwe's post-election crisis. *Journal of African Elections*, 8(2), 46-73.

<sup>79</sup>See Comprehensive Peace Agreement between government of Republic of Sudan and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 31<sup>st</sup> December 2004, Naivasha Kenya.

<sup>80</sup>Paddon,E., and Junior ,R.(2013). The Perils of Peacekeeping without politics; MONUC and MONUSCO in the DRC. Rift Valley Institute Briefing April 2013

<sup>81</sup>Chimni, B. S. (2002). International Organizations Today: An Old Fashioned View From The Third World. Online paper.

organization, the UN. This provision is therefore consistent with liberal institutional theory claim that international Organizations are critical set-ups to the modern state.

Proponents of the liberal institutional theory also posit that international organizations are key agents in the re-ordering of norms in the international system. Among the norms that have been championed by international organizations include; the humanitarian treatment of prisoners of war and safe passage of civilians in case of war, the reciprocal conduct and issuance of diplomatic privileges, adoption of international election observers in national elections and the use of non-violent and non-coercive methods in resolution of conflicts.<sup>82</sup> Acceptable environmental practices have been championed by environmental international organizations while issues of trade fairness in the international system have been advanced by trade international organizations. It therefore is crystal clear that norm formation is an inescapable influence dispensed by international organization for the states to adopt. Failure to comply with some of these norms usually attract penalties, deterrents and even sanctions.<sup>83</sup>

The last and possibly most prominent intervention or action of international organization in Africa is through financial bail outs and funding of government projects by way of grants and loans. Although the cases of structural adjustment programmes and their ills will forever remain a stain in their work, lending done by international organizations cannot be taken lightly or wished away. As a matter of fact the periods that necessitated borrowing from these institutions by African states were the financially difficult ones. In some cases state functions were almost at standstill because of the inability of

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<sup>82</sup>See UN Charter. Article 33(2)

<sup>83</sup>Abbott, K. W., &Snidal, D. (1998). Why states act through formal international organizations. *Journal of conflict resolution*, 42(1), 3-32.

governments to meet their financial obligations. Of note also is that even the impressive growth record registered by most African countries between 1960s and 1980 was not without external funding. This funding in almost all cases was channeled through international organizations.

As such international organizations contribution in the African setting which is the concern of this text remains unquestioned.

### **2.2.2 International Regimes**

Krasner, a neo-realist defined regimes as ‘sets of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge.’<sup>84</sup>

The gist of international regimes is that they are less formal than international organizations but take on similar objectives as international organizations. That is they may not have permanent physical headquarters as may be the requirement of international organizations. Regimes act as umbrella ‘bodies’ setting expectations on norms, rules and mode of behavior. International organizations therefore are embedded in the larger international regimes. For instance; the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the UN international tribunals of Yugoslavia and Rwanda are part of ‘international law regime’ which is in fact a recent norm in international relations and politics. These are consistent with adherence to norms, attested by concept of individual responsibility for international crimes, rules, decision making procedures and other requirements for international regimes. Another example of international regimes is international trade regimes. Regime theorists such as Oran Young argue that ‘behavioral regularities, when they are coinciding with convergent expectations, generated social conventions with which states

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<sup>84</sup>Krasner, S. D. (Ed.). (1983). International regimes. Cornell University Press.

and other actors in international politics occasionally comply out of habit rather than in response to instrumental calculation.<sup>85</sup> This gives weight to the claim by regime theorists that states do not always act as a result of selfish rationalist calculations but also give consideration to expectations within international regimes in which they operate. A fitting example of this is the 2011 Kenya's parliament vote to exit from the Rome Statute in an effort to return cases of six Kenyans in trial at the ICC to the local judicial process.<sup>86</sup> The efforts stalled after it emerged that Kenya had no choice but to bear the full brunt of international law whether or not it pulled out of the binding statute. This meant that withdrawal from the Rome statute would not have halted the cases that had already been opened.

### **2.3 Conclusion**

International organizations study still requires intensive research and empirical testing. This chapter has carefully assessed the arguments brought forth by both the realist school and mirrored them against liberal institutionalism school with a particular emphasis placed on the African experiences. There is no shortage of rich examples showcasing state and international organization action in Africa. To this end this study finds that both international organizations and states action is always in pursuit of their set agendas. The actor in question must weigh the attainment of such an agenda against the option best suited to achieve it. It therefore emerges that states as well as international organizations appear to follow the rational actor model, deciding each time, on a case by case basis the

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<sup>85</sup>Young, O. R. (2002). Are institutions intervening variables or basic causal forces? Causal clusters vs. causal chains in international society. *Reflections on International Studies at the Dawn of the Millenium*, Ann Arbor, MI, 176-191.

<sup>86</sup>Mueller, S. D. (2014). Kenya and the International Criminal Court (ICC): politics, the election and the law. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8(1), 25-42.

philosophies to follow in pursuit of customized agendas advised by the actors' set goals.<sup>87</sup> It would therefore be a fallacy to make blanket generalizations that a state's engagement with an international organization will always be predictable based on its past behavior. Similarly an international organization relationship with a state is bound to change to suit its changing mandate, short term goals, and medium and long term agendas. This is best exemplified by the World Bank's prioritization of education funding in Africa. In its formative engagements with African countries in this respect, the World Bank placed importance in tertiary level education specifically university education. As such its numerous education programmes concentrated on the funding of university education. This model was borrowed from the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere philosophy of early 1970's.<sup>88</sup> However the approach took a dramatic turnaround in the late 1990's to present date. The bank now prioritizes primary school education with the object of raising literacy levels and supporting the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which aims at provision of universal primary education by the year 2015.<sup>89</sup> This demonstration of the extent of malleability of international organization's policies is discussed in the paper; '*Conditions, Coalitions & Influence: The World Bank and Higher Education in Africa.*'<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>87</sup>Krasner, S. D. (Ed.). (1983). International regimes. Cornell University Press.

<sup>88</sup>Nielsen, H. D. (2006). From schooling access to learning outcomes, an unfinished agenda: an evaluation of World Bank support to primary education. World Bank Publications.

<sup>89</sup>Avenstrup, R., Liang, X., & Nellemann, S. (2004). Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi and Uganda: Universal primary education and poverty reduction.

<sup>90</sup>Samoff, J., & Carrol, B. (2004). Conditions, coalitions and influence: The World Bank and higher education in Africa. Institute of development studies.

## CHAPTER THREE

# INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN AFRICA; A CASE STUDY OF MALI

### 3.0 Introduction

The previous chapter addressed theoretical perspectives of international organizations engagement in Africa. Concerted efforts were made to reveal ways which can be pinpointed in international organizations activity and how those ways affect and/or align with various theories that have been advanced and employed in international relations. The present chapter builds on the foundations laid in the hard and fast examples that were presented. The chapter singles out the West African country of Mali and incisively looks at the state, the policies that it has made over the years and how those policies were shaped or influenced by international organizations. The IMF and World Bank features prominently in this study which is not surprising owing to their huge financial muscle, global recognition, benchmarking and endorsement of policies not only in the developing countries but also in the wealthier developed countries. The African Union, ECOWAS and the UN will also be highlighted albeit not in the same intensity of the financial organizations mentioned above.

The chapter hopes to bestow a practical understanding of the hands on influence by an international organization on African countries policy making processes.

The introduction gives an overview of Mali to acquaint the reader with the country and paint a picture of not only its physical location but also its economics, politics and

international affairs. This better positions the reader to comprehend the predicament of the West African country. A map of the Mali is also provided for pictorial reference.

### 3.1 The Case of Mali

The figure below shows the administrative map of Mali.

**Figure 3.1 Map of Mali**



Source: Maps of the world.

The *République du Mali* or Republic of Mali is a West African landlocked country fondly known just as Mali. The country shares its border with an astounding eight countries. In its North lies Algeria, in the East lies Niger, Burkina Faso and while Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory

Coast) lies in the South. The republic of Guinea lies on its South West while Senegal and Mauritania are found in its West.<sup>91</sup> It is the 24th largest country in the world in terms of physical size. The country is however sparsely populated with only about 15 Million Malians being its inhabitant. Of these only about 46.4% can read and/or write. This percentage figure is considerably lower in the case of women. Perhaps the low population can be attributed to the vast barren lands in the North. Still, Mali is largely food secure thanks to the fertile Niger River basin in the south. Mali's economic mainstay is agriculture although gold and livestock are also key exports. The country's government is described as semi presidential with a president who holds the executive powers and a minister who serves as the head of government.

Mali endured a 23 year military dictator rule that came to an end in 1992 with the election and installation of Alpha Oumar Konare as president. The Political and economic fortunes of Mali remained upbeat until 2007 when an insurgency gathered pace in the traditionally unstable Tuareg North. This was exacerbated by influx of arms from the Libyan Civil war. The Al Qaeda Saran Branch noticing the volatility took advantage of the lawless North managing to effectively secede it from the rest of Mali. In 2012 after the capture of Konna town the government was alarmed and sought help of the French which came in the shape of military hardware that overrun the insurgents and restored government rule. However this did not mark the end of Mali's challenges as its government was overthrown by renegade soldiers. Mali was colonized by the French who have continued to have intimate ties with the West African country and attested by their swift intervention when called upon. After independence from the French in 1960 Mali

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<sup>91</sup> See Maps of the World. Facts on Mali see (map).From <http://www.mapsofworld.com/mali/facts.html> accessed on 24th August 2013 1439hrs.

and Senegal, formerly part of the French Sudan formed the Sudanese Federation which was not to last as barely two years into the arrangement Senegal pulled out to become a republic in its own right.

The challenges for Mali are immense. Mali is ranked among the world poorest countries. Out of its 14.5 million people more than 90% live below two dollars a day<sup>92</sup> and over 70% subsist below the international poverty measure of 1.25 dollars a day. Infant mortality figures are among the highest in the world. About twenty percent of children never make it past the fifth birthday.<sup>93</sup> At the same time close to 15% of these children cannot read or write.<sup>94</sup>

As expected the challenges facing Mali in fighting poverty are daunting. Still, Mali has had a democratically elected government until 2012 when the army staged a coup. The government continuously was concerned by the rising poverty levels and to express these concerns it developed a national poverty plan. To support these plans the government streamlined its systems of financial accountability. As a result a stable macroeconomic environment was created earning Mali a relative high position in the books of World Bank and IMF in an assessment carried out of all Heavily Indebted Countries (HIPC) on the soundness of its public financial management system.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> See UNDP. (2005). World Human Development Report

<sup>93</sup> See UNDP. (2005). World Human Development Report

<sup>94</sup> See World Bank.(2006). 'Mali at a Glance'

<sup>95</sup> World Bank.IMF. (2006) 'Comparaison des resultants du suivi-evaluation des depenses en faveur des PPTTE en 2001 et 2004'

A comparison of Mali with its peers shows that Mali is a step ahead in governance and accountability. It therefore comes as a puzzle that despite such high recognition and accolades relative to similar countries Mali still lags behind in virtually every sector. Could the answer be in foreign aid or IMF & World Bank loans? Statistics however show that Mali is seriously under aided. Its neighbour Senegal whose records of fiscal prudence is not as accomplished as Mali has consistently received more aid funds than Mali.<sup>96</sup> Senegal's people to funds ratio outnumber that of Mali by more than two to one. This comparison of aid demographics between Mali and Senegal is used to highlight the special position Mali occupies in terms of needs and to explain why this study has chosen to focus on the country as opposed to any other in the African continent.

Below is a tabulation of the data described comparing Mali and Senegal.

**Table 1: Under-aided: Senegal versus Mali aid flows Senegal**

	Senegal	Mali
Population in millions	11	13
Aid Flows/ Net overseas development assistance in \$ millions	1052	567
Percentage of population living on less than \$1 a day	26%	72%
Under Five Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births)	137	220
UNDP Human Development Index Ranking out of 177 countries (177 being the least developed country)	157	174
Public Expenditure Management / number of the 14 benchmarks met 2004	7	11

**Source:** World Bank (CFP Working Paper 7), 2010

<sup>96</sup>World Bank, IMF. (2006) 'Comparaison des resultants du suivi-evaluation des depenses en faveur des PPTE en 2001 et 2004'

### **3.2 Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in Mali**

This period was generally marked by rapid growth by many African countries as they disentangled themselves from the rule of their colonial masters. Mali was no exception in this regard. The key drivers of the economy were agricultural exports that are raw materials, which followed pretty much the same pattern that had taken root in the colonial times. There also existed a lot of goodwill especially from former colonial masters along with other developed nations who were keen to continue accessing the raw material from African countries to continue supporting their industrialization agenda and seeking new markets to some of their finished products.

After the early seventies, 1973, oil prices shock, many developing countries started experiencing economic difficulties. Debts soared as they struggled to pay for their states recurrent expenditures let alone fund the development agenda. Many Africa countries turned to IMF to help them address their unfavorable balance of trade as the imports far exceeded the exports. At the same time the World Bank which was supposed to offer advisory help and projects funding was resulted to. This is how both the IMF and World Bank became heavily involved in the affairs of African countries. Mali was no exception. In fact, as expounded in this text, Mali provides a classic example where an African country's affairs are dictated by international organizations through structural adjustment credits (SAC) that are conditionalities ridden.

In the early 1980s Mali faced a serious economic and financial crisis due to recurring droughts, a decline in the terms of trade, and inappropriate economic policies. The government launched a series of stabilization and adjustment programs in 1982. There was tangible initial progress but this was eroded in 1986 after the world price of cotton

dropped sharply almost overnight. This situation deteriorated further into a major economic crisis in 1987. Citing very poor macroeconomic sector, the World Bank froze lending operations to Mali between 1985 and mid 1988. As such Malian government was forced to resume its adjustment efforts in order to satisfy the World Bank that enough was being done to turn around the poor macroeconomic policies.<sup>97</sup> This happened in 1988. In 1990 Mali prepared a PFP that covered the period between 1988 and 1990. It was followed by a second World Bank and Fund assisted PFP that covered years 1990 to 1992. The PFP focus was five key areas:

- i. The incentives system for private sector development.
- ii. Public resource management.
- iii. Reform of the cotton sector.
- iv. Restructuring of the PE sector
- v. Reform of the financial sector.

The net effect of the second PFP would be progress in public finance and fiscal accountability. Compared to its peers like Senegal, Mali posted impressive governance and accountability placing it at the top of LDC's log in public financial management.

It would be appear that under the circumstances of good fiscal governance and accountability donors should be competing with each other to provide aid for Mali. That is not the case. The reasons for this peculiar behavior are beyond the scope of this inquest and require separate in-depth investigations. The fact is Mali has remained chronically under-aided in comparison to countries tiered in the same category with it. Particularly

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<sup>97</sup>Johnson, A., Martin, M., & Bargawi, H. (2004). The Effectiveness of Aid to Africa Since the HIPC Initiative: Issues, Evidence and Possible Areas for Action. *Development Finance International*.

the IMF and World Bank, which are the lead donor organizations, have called on Mali to implement a number of what is seen as controversial and counterproductive economic conditions. These adjustment programs continued to impoverish the West African Nation. In this text a closer examination is done for particular sectors of Mali and the adjustment that was inspired by the IMF and World Bank. What is sad is that even bi-lateral lending is seen to be largely affected by the two institutions which act as the standard gauge of a countries fiscal health. The IMF which was originally designed to help countries with unfavourable balance of payments has assumed this policing role.<sup>98</sup> The chapter later compares the Mali experience with brief episodes from Kenya, Malawi and Libya.

As alluded earlier in this submission agriculture is the mainstay of Mali. Although cereals such as maize and sorghum make for some of the exports from Mali, cotton is the principal export crop from Mali. This section of study inspects how the adjustment programmes have affected cotton production and marketing and how in turn that has impacted on the livelihood of the ordinary Malian citizen.

Upon realization that the SAPs of the 1980s and the early 90's failed, the World Bank and IMF formulated yet another way of delivering aid. This came in the shape of Policy Reduction strategy Papers approach (PRSP) in 1999<sup>99</sup>. The three main principles that were meant to differentiate PRSP from the previous adjustment were poverty reduction, country ownership, and evidence-based policy-making. In particular Poverty reduction was made a central objective of World Bank and IMF lending. This was in recognition to

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<sup>98</sup>Kovach, H., & Fourmy, S. (2006). Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic policy conditions to aid.

<sup>99</sup>Dante, I., Gautier, J. F., Marouani, M. A., & Raffinot, M. (2003).Mali. *Development Policy Review*, 21(2), 217-234.

the realization that growth although important was not in no way sufficient to ensure poverty reduction. Developing countries were to be put in the driving seat. They would originate and formulate their own development policies domestically. The World Bank and IMF would then only involve themselves in the implementation of those policies rather than in the process of devising them. Such policies had also to be evidence-based. Policies made from ideological standpoints were discouraged by PRSPs which advocated for consideration of national economic realities that suited the distinct countries. The PRSPs approach also placed emphasis on the kind of impacts those policies would have on the poor people upon their application. In this study on Mali, a lot of referencing made tests the adjustment programmes and conditionality against the recommendations of PRS. First in line is the cotton case.

Mali may not be a big producer of cotton as to singly affect the price movements in the world markets but it is one of the biggest producers of the commodity in Africa. Cotton farming supports approximately one quarter of then Malian population.<sup>100</sup> The structural adjustment period of the 1980's saw reduced spending of government in agriculture in line with the austerity measures prescribed by the Fund and the World Bank. As such the cost of inputs rose significantly. The effect of this is that Malian cotton became uncompetitive as its western counterpart, particularly; the United States produced much cheaper cotton because of the heavy investment by government in the sector by way of subsidies.<sup>101</sup> Being the second largest foreign exchange earner for the Western African country the effects of uncompetitive cotton prices hence exports not only affect

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<sup>100</sup> Bingen, R. J. (1998). Cotton, democracy and development in Mali. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36(02), 265-285.

<sup>101</sup> Alston, J. M., Sumner, D., & Brunke, H. (2007). Impacts of Reduction in US Cotton Subsidies on West African Cotton Producers.

government service delivery but also the economic and social fabric of the country as a whole.<sup>102</sup>

Mali's fiscal prudence earned it a rightful place in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) list of the World Bank. However since 1998 the World Bank and the IMF made all their budget aid and debt relief to Mali conditional on the country privatizing its cotton sector and liberalizing the price of cotton so that it better reflects world market prices. These conditions have been attached to all subsequent lending from the World Bank and the IMF and remain in place today, demonstrating that they have not really changed their ways on conditionality.

The introduction of aid conditions on liberalization of the cotton sector and demand that the sector be privatized led to severe financial crises. Granted that the factors causing these financial crises were an array of factors the key one remained the sharp decline of world cotton prices occasioned by trade distorting subsidy's paid by the rich countries to their own farmers.<sup>103</sup>

Subsidies to agricultural producers in the United States and Europe are the single biggest force driving down world prices and sub-Saharan Africa has been most deeply affected. If rich countries did not subsidize their own farmers so heavily, Mali would be reaping far greater developmental rewards from its cotton production than it currently does. Cotton farmers of Western and Central Africa are among the lowest-cost producers in the world. Still even after increasing the cotton acreage leading to production increase from

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<sup>102</sup>Bingen, R. J. (1998). Cotton, democracy and development in Mali. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36(02), 265-285.

<sup>103</sup>Kovach, H., &Fourmy, S. (2006). Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic policy conditions to aid.

5000 tons in the 1960s to over half a million tons in the 90's the cotton industry in Mali like the rest of Africa has continued to struggle. It has missed out on potential returns because of the unfair Western subsidies. An analysis by the IMF and World Bank and International Cotton Advisory Committee show that cotton producers in developing countries face annual losses of about USD 9.5 billion. These are staggering figures by any standard that undoubtedly would play pivotal role in lifting the African populace out of the yoke of poverty. IMF and World Bank prevented Mali from supporting its own farmers only exposed them to the low world market prices distorted by subsidies to farmers in rich nations.

Starting 1998 the IMF and World Bank began to press for reforms in Mali's cotton industry. The thrust behind this push was the argument that that reducing or altogether eliminating the involvement of government in the management of the sector would free up funds that could be channeled in other areas of development such as health, education and infrastructure. The Breton woods institutions also claimed that price liberalization and privatization of the sector would enhance competitiveness and efficiency. As noted by various assessors and evaluators of these recommendations including the World Bank itself, this was not to be.<sup>104</sup>

Instances of the World Bank and IMF's push for Mali to adjust the cotton sector do not come in short supply. In 1998 the reform of the cotton sector became an official condition for Mali to receiving debt relief. Three years on, in its progress assessment the World Bank was not satisfied that enough was being done by the government of Mali towards

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<sup>104</sup>Kovach, H., &Fourmy, S. (2006). Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic policy conditions to aid.

the reform agenda. What followed was a further condition specifically for a USD 70 million SAC Mali had sought to privatize the cotton sector. Equally the IMF was participatory in the administering of these conditions through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). This loan can be said to be the pinnacle of conditionalities. This situation for Mali was so glaring that other development partners noticed that the country was stifled and with little options. Included in this group are the European Commission and the Dutch government. This was in recognition of the crises occasioned by poor international cotton prices. The cash crop up until then was the largest foreign exchange earner for Mali and sustained a sizeable number of Malians. However, even in such cases the powerful hand of the IMF is seen in that these donors attach or tie their development aid to IMF and World Bank conditions. Clarifying this position is the credit ranking given by the World Bank every three years. Mali has consistently featured at the bottom of this ranking. Its consequence is that the country can only receive limited amount of finding compared to countries in the upper tier credit classification. Such was the wisdom behind the Banks capping of aid to Mali at USD390 million, a figure which is USD 72 million behind top tier credit rated countries.<sup>105</sup>

Malian government expectedly caved in to the pressures of the WorldBank and the IMF. This was because of the very specific manner in which these two international organizations applied such pressure and as mentioned the dwindling options of the West African country. For instance the year saw a world loan of USD 50 million reduced by one half citing the lack of progress in reforming the cotton sector. Due to slow progress

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<sup>105</sup>Kovach, H., & Fourmy, S. (2006). Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic policy conditions to aid.

in the cotton sector. SAC IV was reduced to a US\$25 million, single-tranche operation, potentially to be followed by another US\$25 million single'<sup>106</sup>

*.... 'slow progress with cotton sector reform has held the country from accessing[a] larger volume of Bank support'*<sup>107</sup>

This extract from the World Bank's fourth Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC) loan agreement aptly illustrates this position. It must be noted however that the government of Mali had unsuccessfully tried to sell the Compagnie Malienne pour le Developpement du textile (CMDT) or Mali Textile Company severally. One of the main reasons cited is lack of interest by international investors. When bids for the company finally came in they were considered by the government impractically low hence the decision not to sell. For example in 2002 only two bids were received from international investors with one of them promptly pulling out. The remaining bid by an American company called Dunvant S.A. fell into the 'too low' category therefore obstructing the sale. On the other hand the cotton seed processing plant was sold out to private investors without much hassle.

The little complication of unavailable buyers for CMDT must however not coax anyone into thinking that all is well in the cotton industry of Mali. As seen earlier in this text the government of Mali gave in and agreed to remove its direct support to cotton farmers in Mali. The culmination of this was the signing of the liberalized agreements with the World Bank that led to disbursement of the second tranche of the USD 50 million loan.

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<sup>106</sup>Kovach, H., & Fourmy, S. (2006). Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic policy conditions to aid

<sup>107</sup>*Ibid*

The 'new' cotton price reflected the artificially maneuvered low international prices. Its immediate result was a twenty percent drop in the Malian cotton prices.<sup>108</sup>

The impacts of privatization of Mali cotton sector affected one quarter of the population which directly depended on it. Some scholars and analysts argue that the World Bank underestimated the impact that this would have on the population. Others hold that the World Bank and IMF lacked long range planning therefore failed to account for the short term impacts occasioned by their adjustment programmes. Yet others are of the view that such guidelines would have worked under different conditions in different countries albeit not in the African continent that was riddled with inefficiencies, corruption and less than candid political will. Still others see these as just a ploy to create markets for their finished goods while cheaply procuring the requisite raw materials.<sup>109</sup> Whichever way one may choose to analyze the situations, the impacts of the adjustment programmes and credits remain real and must be addressed from a realistic perspective.

Initial impacts of the dip in cotton prices include food insecurity problems, sharp rise in debts and increasing poverty levels. Reduced income meant that households are robbed of purchasing power, lacked sufficient money to buy food and pay for other necessities such as health and education. These findings of Kita and Fana regions of Mali serve to confirm the situation of more than 3 million Malians.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>108</sup>Kovach, H., &Fourmy, S. (2006). Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic policy conditions to aid.

<sup>109</sup>Rono, J. K. (2002). The impact of the structural adjustment programmes on Kenyan society. *Journal of Social Development in Africa*, 17(1), 81-98.

<sup>110</sup>Traore, A. (2006). Effetspreliminaires de la baisse du prix du cotonsur le revenuet les conditions de vie des exploitations cotonnieres au Mali. Study commissioned by Oxfam America, October.

The importance of cotton as a crop and foreign exchange earner is underlined by the overall effect the price adjustment of 2005 had on the economy. Mali's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) lost 1.9 percentage points. It was feared that should the farmers decrease production due to low price incentive or takes up different type of crop husbandry the economy would shrink by up to 4 percentage points. This situation would condemn the already struggling Mali subsistence farmers to an even poorer life. A Kola Bamanan woman, Mariko paints a picture of this situation:

*'When our husbands' incomes increase, the whole household benefits. Previously our husbands used to ask us to help with the cotton harvest and they gave us funds during the dry season to enable us to cover household expenses. Today, we are forced to sell our goats to repay the credit on input for the cotton and in order to feed ourselves'.<sup>111</sup>*

There is no question as to the extent in which the so called liberalization of the cotton sector in Mali had impoverished millions of Malians and dented growth of the Malian economy. It also comes out clear that Malian administrations have not supported the manner in which World bank and the IMF have forced upon them policies some of which are inappropriate for the nation. President Amadou Toumani Toure's remarks at an opening speech of the Carter Centre's Development Cooperation Forum in 2005 most clearly captures this.

*True partnership supposes autonomy of beneficiary countries in requesting aid and in determining its objectives. Often programmes are imposed on us, and we are told it is our programme... People who have never seen cotton come to give us lessons on cotton... No one can*

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<sup>111</sup>Traore, A. (2006). Effetspreliminaires de la baisse du prix du cotonsur le revenuet les conditions de vie des exploitations cotonnieres au Mali. Study commissioned by Oxfam America, October.

*respect the conditionalities of certain donors. They are so complicated that they themselves have difficulty getting us to understand them. This is not a partnership. This is a master relating to his student'.<sup>112</sup>*

As such the adjustment policies in Mali much like in other African and Third World countries were often ill suited for the specific challenges that the countries went through at the time. Observers have also cited lack of alternative exploration as a major drawback in the potential benefits that could be reaped from the adjustment programmes. In the case of Mali it remains a puzzle why various donors including the Bretton Woods institutions would not midwife the birth of a Cotton Support Fund yet such a concept had been successfully applied in Mali's neighbour countries such as Burkina Faso and the Cameroon.<sup>113</sup> Such a fund would cushion cotton farmers against cotton price fluctuations by ensuring that the farmers access a minimum guaranteed price essentially by redistributing revenues between the years of surplus and those of deficit. Such stabilization funds often require hefty investments that may elude most African governments and especially a Mali government whose country ranks 170 out of 175 in the World's poor countries list.

In sum, the case of IMF and World Bank intervention in Mali cotton sector can only be said to have aggravated the poverty levels by taking the purchasing power of millions of ordinary Malians off their hands. Such a feat effectively rendered their destinies out of their control and condemned them to very low quality of life. These findings are

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<sup>112</sup> See Amadou Toumani Touré, President of the Republic of Mali, opening remarks at the Fourth Development Cooperation Forum, Washington Carter Centre Discussion 2005

<sup>113</sup> Kovach, Hetty, and Sébastien Fourmy. "Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic policy conditions to aid." (2006): 36.

consistent with the broad goals of this text that seeks to decipher the actual impacts of international organizations in Africa.

The study will now turn its lenses to the electricity situation in Mali seeking an understanding of the role played by international organizations in adjustment policies and testing not only their effectiveness but also their real impacts on the average Malian citizen.

The provision and access of essential services in Mali is alarmingly low. Nothing illustrates this fact better in Mali than Electricity. Mali's electricity penetration in the rural areas is less than 1%. National connectivity coverage of 17% does not change this grim outlook anyhow. Majority of connections in fact exist only around the capital Bamako which contains more than 10% of the population.<sup>114</sup>

This quest is aided by a brief look of how electricity is generated in Mali to know who is responsible for this generation, its funding and the subsequent distribution. The production and distribution burden is rested upon the State Corporation Energie du Mali. About 80% of all Mali's electricity is hydro or water produced by the Manantali dam on River Senegal. The rest is obtained from thermal sources which have in the recent times been encouraged by Indian investors. That however has attracted opposition from donors who fiercely contest the position citing potential increases of the national debt in the event international oil prices surge. In its stead the donors have urged making more

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<sup>114</sup>Boccanfuso, D., Estache, A., & Savard, L. (2006). Electricity reforms in Mali: a macro-micro analysis of the effects on poverty and distribution. *Cahier de recherche/Working Paper*, 7, 10.

investment in realizing hydro electricity's potential as well as enabling interconnections with Ivorian and Guinea electricity grids.<sup>115</sup>

Besides the challenge of distribution the other key challenge of electricity Mali is price. This research will inspect these twin issues of distribution and pricing of electricity in Mali in the context of Energie du Mali (EDM), the state's electricity company, privatization push by the World Bank and the IMF. The research pays regard to the envisaged benefits and sheds light on the reasons behind World Bank and IMF privatization proposals. It then highlights the reasons for their failure while suggesting remedial measures that could have been taken to salvage the attempted privatization of EDM.<sup>116</sup>

Although the legal framework for the privatization of EDM was drawn in 1998, the idea was first considered in the year 1994. It however was predictably not well received by the Mali Public who envisaged a Western multinational takeover motivated by the need to make profits as opposed to the traditional duty bestowed upon the state of service delivery to its nationals. This sadly was to pass in November 2000 when the government relinquished sixty percent of EDM ownership to a French company known as SAUR. EDM relationship with Mali government though was not to last. In 2005 SAUR pulled out of the 'union' having not achieved the terms of its contract including electricity distribution and lowering the cost of electricity to Malians. This anecdote does not however give proper feel of the events in between the seven years or so space of time that EDM ownership had been 'privatized' and therefore its operations controlled by an

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<sup>115</sup> Boccanfuso, D., Estache, A., & Savard, L. (2006). Electricity reforms in Mali: a macro-micro analysis of the effects on poverty and distribution. *Cahier de recherche/Working Paper*, 7, 10.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*

external entity. The following paragraphs revisits the EDM privatization process and also gives a scorecard to this process in regard to core service delivery as per the terms of contract between EDM and the State noting the impacts of the scorecard thereof.

The push to privatize EDM was made formal by the World Bank and IMF when they included EDM privatization as a condition for Mali to qualify for debt relief under the then introduced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries programme (HIPC).<sup>117</sup> This effectively put the last nail in the coffin of Mali's resistance and saw the state develop a legal regime to accommodate the new changes in EDM's ownership in 1998. Analysts protested the breakneck speed at which the normally lengthy process was undertaken in Mali. Two years later the government ceded 60% percent ownership of EDM to a private French firm called SAUR. The world Bank and IMF's prescription of this was premised on two principles; that the action would free the government participation in day to day running of EDM to concentrate on development matters, that EDM would be put in the hands of professionals enhancing efficiency and thereby driving down the tariffs, that privatization would attract the much needed injection of investment into the firm to grow not only electricity production but also meet distribution challenges which had until then dogged the energy firm.

World Bank's and IMF's rosy picture of a privatized EDM was just to remain as that, a picture. The reality that came with privatization of EDM included rising costs of electricity and unimproved distribution of electricity contrary to the terms of contract

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<sup>117</sup>Kovach, Hetty, and SébastienFourmy."Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic policy conditions to aid." (2006): 36.

between the state and SAUR. The costs of electricity rose so much that the essential service was now regarded as ostentatious. The excerpt below illustrates;

*"I am living in a council flat in Bamako with my wife and my two kids. People are really poor around but I have a good job and I cannot complain. Work brings me around 60,000 CFA Francs. Nevertheless I have to pay 25,000 CFA for my flat and can only put by 6,000 CFA for electricity and water. Energy prices increased so much with privatization, that we now often use gaslight. I am one of the better off in Mali, if I cannot pay, who can? This situation is distressing, especially for the majority of the population who simply cannot afford access to water and electricity".*  
*Boubacar, Bamako, October 2006<sup>118</sup>*

Electricity and water budget accounted for more than one fifth of an ordinary household's budget. It must also be brought to the fore that EDM was also the body tasked with distribution of water to Malians. These twin responsibilities for two of the most essential goods meant that by relegating control of EDM to a private organization, the government gambled with provision of essential services which primarily rests with the state. That said it must be noted that the push for privatization emanated from the Breton Woods Institutions and that the notion was strongly opposed by both the Malian government and the Malian public.<sup>119</sup> It therefore comes as no surprise when later the attempts to privatize EDM fail miserably. Studies show that the government was left devoid of alternatives after the World Bank and IMF placed the privatization of EDM along with liberalization of the cotton sector, as earlier seen in this sector as HIPC

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<sup>118</sup>Kovach, Hetty, and SébastienFourmy."Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic policy conditions to aid." (2006): 36.

<sup>119</sup>Guillaumont, P., GuillaumontJeanneney, S., Amprou, J., &CheickSidibé, O. (2001). Mali. Aid and Reform in Africa: Lessons from Ten Case Studies, 227-86.

conditionality. However later inquests conducted by the some institutions reveal that those adjustment conditions that failed to garner the government's support had little or no chance of success no matter how philosophically well founded they were.<sup>120</sup> Later PRSP papers have also highlighted this fact alluding to the fact country ownership is the most critical aspect that determines the success of adjustment credits.<sup>121</sup>

Keen to see a continuing privatization programme the World Bank and IMF in negotiations with the government the institutions government asked for the 'expansion of the privatization programme to include the power and water utility (EdM), and the airport authority (AdM)'.<sup>122</sup> EDM's privatization was characterized by many challenges that eventually led to French Company SAUR pulling out of the deal. CREE(Commission de Régulation de l'Électricité et de l'Eau) the energy regulation body was formed in the year 2000 and is on record accusing SAUR of impropriety and falsifying results to post fictitious losses in order to continue to fleece the government. The French company filed a 7.2bn CFA Francs deficit, while the CREE calculated a 3bn surplus.<sup>123</sup> As seen earlier in this text at some point the government had to release funds for subsidizing electricity costs to avoid a crisis owing to very high electricity prices.

While addressing the impacts of privatizations in Mali one may very easily also forget to note that during the five or so year stint that SAUR held the controls of EDM from the government electricity connections increased from 80,000 in 2000 to 131,000 in 2003. Still, this increment has been subject to criticism that it happened in the areas around

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<sup>120</sup> See The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. Public Sector Governance and Accountability SERIES: Budgeting and Budgetary. Washington, D.C.

<sup>121</sup> See IMF. (2013). Mali: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. IMF Country Report No. 13/111

<sup>122</sup> See IMF., & IDA.(1998) 'Final Decision Point Document on the Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)'.

<sup>123</sup> See CREE. (2004). 'Rapport d'activité de la CREE pour l'année 2004'.

Bamako and did not significantly result from new area connections. By 2003 electricity connection in Mali still stood at a 13%. In spite of the increased connections Malian electricity consumers did not benefit from the economies of scale as electricity prices continued to rise. The sharp increases in prices made Malian electricity the most expensive in the region.<sup>124</sup> Studies by organizations such as the CAD (a Malian Civil Society Organization) showed that classes of people who previously could afford electricity had either to reduce consumptions of other basic commodities or to stop using the service altogether<sup>125</sup>. Such punitive price increases came despite state subsidies for the facility in form of tax rebates and sometimes cash injections.

Needless to say that provision of steady, predictable, quality and affordable electricity is the bedrock of industrialization. Industries whether budding or established cannot operate cost effectively without electricity. As such there is an almost direct linkage between electricity costs and that of products processed in factories that use electricity. Higher electricity tariffs obviously translate to higher prices of consumables and even essential commodities. This contributes to further pushing an already struggling population further down the poverty line. Mali's situation is a classic example. High electricity tariffs presented Malian's with a tough choice of increasing electricity budget to the detriment of other household commodities or forfeiting the luxuries offered by electricity in order to meet other household obligations. This should not be the case. The cost of energy, particularly electricity is so low in the West that it taken for granted by households as they plan.

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<sup>124</sup>See UNDP.(2004). 'Etat de la Gouvernance au Mali, Rapport Final', February 2004.

<sup>125</sup>See CAD MALI. (2006). 'Etude d'Impactsur l'Accesal'Eauetal'Electricite en milieu Urbain (Bamako) suite a la Privatisation de l'Eau et de l'Electricite'.

### **3.3 Conclusion**

Mali is a classic example of how international organizations push their agenda in poor African and Third World countries. In the formative chapters of this study it's apparent that such is the objective of international organizations from the outset. B.S. Chimni equates this to neo-colonialism arguing that the organizations continue to drive the interests of their sponsor countries at the expense of poorer states which they often operate in. Such sentiments have been shared by the famous modern realist Mearsheimer. This study uses the Mali situation to dissect the realities of international organization participation in African countries analyzing what is arguably one of poorest states in the world. Questions surrounding the participation of the international organizations include the failure to uplift the poverty levels of Malian people as alleged in the various structural adjustment credit loans and the lack of growth by the government to a level that is able to fund a substantial portion of its budget but rather remaining reliant on the loans to carry out its mandate. This is underscored by the nature of the adjustment credits from SAC I to SAC 3. Yet the Mali economy remains vulnerable to external shocks and over reliant to external funding.

Any promises of aid in developing and poor countries like Mali must see quality and quantity converge to achieve results for the poor people in terms of delivering sustainable access to services like education, health care, food security and water. This was unfortunately not the case for Mali where the numbers of people accessing these services dropped sharply as poverty levels rose up with as high as four percentage points.

In addition aid should not be used as an opportunity for donors and development partners to push specific economic policies on developing countries. By so doing they engage in unnecessary wrangles of internal affairs seemingly micro-managing reforms from the outside. This is beyond the mandate and/or expertise of donors and also seriously undermines country ownership of the prescribed programmes. The result? Inappropriate and unsustainable reforms that have negative impacts on the life of the common citizen hurting his/her daily subsistence

Although the World Bank and the IMF have committed to reform themselves and reduce conditionality lending, not much progress has been noted practically. The two are still attaching inappropriate economic conditions to their lending. In the case of Mali, the World Bank and the IMF's predictable reaction to privatize the Malian water and electricity company (EDM) failed to deliver results. Electricity coverage did not expand and prices increased to the highest in the region. Similarly the World Bank and IMF's insistence on cotton sector liberalization and a new price setting mechanism resulted in a 20 per cent drop in the price of cotton. Cotton sustains the livelihoods of three million Malians. Estimates by the Bank specialists show that in the long run this drop resulted in a 4.6 per cent increase in poverty across the country. These figures represent writings on the wall for the readers to see and make a call on whether international organization action has been good for Mali, specifically the Malian people.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **THE QUESTION OF AID EFFECTIVENESS IN AFRICA**

#### **4.0 Introduction**

In the previous chapter, a lot of attention has been paid on the specific manner in which international organizations; specifically the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) have continued to affect the livelihood of the ordinary Mali citizen. The case study revealed among other things the harms of BWIs instigated privatization of essential services and how application of the so called ‘Washington consensus’ that presume a one size fits all remedy for challenges facing African states. The present chapter will anecdote some of the emerging issues from that debate as well as explore other key items discussed in this text. Once again the BWIs will provide the lenses through which international organization action is viewed obviously because of their sheer sizes and the enormous amounts of resources at their disposal that countries, especially third world and African states, seek for to stabilize their ailing economies or undertake projects of huge sizes.

The chapter enters the debate of quality versus quantity aid progressing to actual examples and attempting to provide clarity in such concepts as loans and grants. At the same time a quick assessment of other ways in which International Organizations have played various other roles not necessarily covered in the BWI’s analysis is done. Particularly the nature and manner of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) is explored having contributed very significantly to 1980’s period of economic nosedive in many African countries popularly known as the lost decade.

It is common practice for international organizations to adopt a ‘copy and paste’ approach to challenges that face different states. This is not only erroneous in its philosophy but also not realistic or practical. Even in instances where the state challenges are similar there exist differences in terms of geography, economic mainstays, cultures and population demographics. As such what might perfectly remedy a situation in one state may not necessarily do so in another state facing the same or similar challenges. The uniqueness of individual states thus requires application of unique tailor made solutions for each individual state. This text will bring to the surface how international organizations have erred in the blanket application of would-be solutions to African states. Further the cost of such errors is analyzed in the backdrop of practical erosion of people in the same states.

#### **4.1 Ownership**

It is also a claim of this study that country ownership is central to the success of whatever programmes and policy agendas that an international organization may wish to pursue in any given state.<sup>126</sup> Authors and practitioners have extensively commented on this issue returning constantly the same verdict i.e. that it is impossible to divorce country ownership from implementation of any international organization programme. This issue is discussed closely with the previous argument of the ‘copy and paste’ approach adopted by many international organizations particularly the World Bank and IMF. Both arguments give the country where programmes are carried out no chance to participate in their policy making and are therefore imposive in their nature.

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<sup>126</sup>Bergamaschi, I. (2008). Mali: Patterns and limits of donor-driven ownership. *The Politics of Aid*, 217

This study therefore singles out these two issues as comprising a broad phenomenon of international organizations contribution to African states that need to be closely inspected with view of provision of alternative more engaging procedures. The following text will examine this as an emerging perspective from the contributions of the said organizations in Africa. The World Bank and IMF are referenced extensively because the two organizations have had engagement with virtually all states in the African continent. At the time this submission was written when interesting scenario's in the international arena are at play. The US government partial shutdown occasioned by budget disagreement between President Obama led Democrats and the Republicans were predicted to snowball into an economic shutdown of the United States. The IMF in a rare address to the US urged a quick resolution of the standoff to avert a global crisis 'as bad as 2008 or worse' says Christine Lagarde the managing director of the Fund. In reality such a call by the IMF to the US is likely to remain just that, 'a call' to sort its financial woes.

The situation however would have been stark different if the same challenges were being experienced in a third world country more specifically an African country. Returning to the thinking and claim of this paper however, the so called Washington consensus is faulted by critics of the World Bank and the IMF as being inappropriate for developing countries.<sup>127</sup> As revealed later in this chapter, the one size fits all perspective did not work in the African context which remains the focus of author. But what is the Washington Consensus? The Washington Consensus refers to the economic growth strategy that was exported from the United States to the developed countries because of

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<sup>127</sup>See ISUU. (2013). Financing the global sharing economy.

its success in the US. It involved market liberalization strategies, privatization, fiscal austerity and free trade.<sup>128</sup>

Country ownership of international organization's programmes has now been mentioned as being central to the success of those programmes in any given state. International organizations operating in Africa are yet to appreciate this. From broad examples like human rights which in some instances fail to recognize cultural practices hence gain little depth in the society and the nation to very specific and deliberate attempts to influence policy for example SAPs insufficient or absence of country ownership spells doom for whatever project or programme that an international organization wishes to implement.

It is only in order now to employ some practical examples to shed light to this argument. This text discusses in detail some isolated examples to illustrate the arguments raised. As extensively highlighted in the previous chapter Mali has endured harsh conditionalities from the IMF and World Bank. These organizations pushed the government of Mali to privatize essential services like electricity and water. The cotton sector which supports a close to one third of the Malian population was not left either. SAC 3 had special conditions that Mali liberalizes its cotton sector and delinks government support to cotton farmers. The Malian government was strongly opposed to this but in the end caved in under pressure of BWI conditions for the SAC it so badly needed. President Toumani best captures the cotton picture;

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<sup>128</sup>Greenwald, B., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2013). Learning and Industrial Policy: Implications for Africa1. The Industrial Policy Revolution II: Africa in the Twenty-first Century, 25.

*'True partnership supposes autonomy of beneficiary countries in requesting aid and in determining its objectives... Often programmes are imposed on us, and we are told it is our programme... People who have never seen cotton come to give us lessons on cotton... No one can respect the conditionalities of certain donors. They are so complicated that they themselves have difficulty getting us to understand them. This is not a partnership. This is a master relating to his student'.<sup>58</sup> President Amadou Toumani Touré, 2005.*

The president's remarks represent the epitome of lack of country support and ownership in implementation of international organization programmes.<sup>129</sup> Despite such outright resentment to the manner in which IMF and World Bank administered adjustments, the two organizations never relented and pushed on with their agenda to liberalize the cotton sector in Mali. It is no wonder that critics have sighted this kind of insensitiveness to the position of the governments in which programmes are run as being arrogant. Yet other critics say that the IMF is an opaque organization that thrived on secrecy and instilling fear both on its staff and that of governments expectant of adjustments loans. Joseph Stiglitz, a former chief economist at the Fund and a decorated Nobel Prize winner notes that the failure to open itself up to criticism or public oversight led to arrogance and lack of connection to reality on the ground. Stiglitz tells of how agreements between the IMF and borrower countries were kept secret from general public in those countries. He laments that such agreements were at times kept from him and his colleagues at the World Bank when working on joint projects. This created a situation of powerlessness for

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<sup>129</sup>Bergamaschi, I. (2008). Mali: Patterns and limits of donor-driven ownership. *The Politics of Aid*, 217.

government officials of borrowing countries who inevitably created a view that questioning the Fund's authority would jeopardize its expected loans.<sup>130</sup>

The relationship therefore between the borrowing country and the IMF and World is characterized by fear rather than trust. The public and governments of borrower countries felt left out in the shaping and making decisions that would shape their future. Under such an environment it would be absurd to expect that a country would cheerfully own the programmes suggested and guided by the two organizations.

Privatization of state firms and general reduction of state involvement in parastatals is particularly one of the areas that to date has failed to muster country ownership. When Mali transferred the control of Energie du Mali, the state firm involved in electricity generation and distribution alongside water supply, these essential commodities became so dear that ordinary families had to either forego the luxuries of electricity or restrict its usage. In Kenya the story was not any different. Kiprono's account of the impacts of structural adjustments attracted condemnation from the then President Moi. Understandably many Kenyan's lost their jobs while commodities prices rose. This situation drove very many people into the trap of poverty, the very challenge that the BWI's had sought to address in the first place.

In a similar fashion the late president of Burkina Faso who was overthrown after refusing to pay his countries debt remarked as below during the 1986 Organization of Africa Union (OAU) summit.

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<sup>130</sup>Greenwald, B., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2013). Learning and Industrial Policy: Implications for Africa. The Industrial Policy Revolution II: Africa in the Twenty-first Century, 25.

*'The Debt problem needs to be analyzed starting from its origins. Those who lent money to us are the same people who colonized us, are the same who so long managed our states and our economies; they indebted Afrika with 'donations' of money. We were not involved in the creation of this Debt, so we should not pay it.'*<sup>131</sup>

#### **4.2 Neo Imperialism**

Further African countries have accused their western counterparts of using lending to indebt them and primarily to continue their imperialistic appetite.<sup>132</sup> This argument agrees with Chimni's assertions that international organizations are used as vehicles that carry the interests of former colonial masters.

Still, questions have been raised to the relevance of International Organizations programmes in Africa. While the Organizations on their part have pledged the 'Dutch disease' on the part of African countries, the issues of relevance remains largely outstanding. Dutch disease in this regard refers to the lack of capacity to absorb aid inflows.<sup>133</sup> Many African countries remain deficient of strong structures and operate mainly on leader's personality strengths. Consequently there has remained a reluctance by the leaders to enable the institutions acquire necessary capacity to dispense their duties and obligations effectively. This is what has led to the developing of the Dutch disease in Africa. Nonetheless this justification does not in any way reduce the onus of responsibility for international organizations as far as programmes relevance is

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<sup>131</sup> Greenwald, B., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2013). Learning and Industrial Policy: Implications for Africa. The Industrial Policy Revolution II: Africa in the Twenty-first Century, 25.

<sup>132</sup> Ismi, A. (2004). Impoverishing a continent: The World Bank and the IMF in Africa. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.

<sup>133</sup> Ashford, L. S. (2007). Addressing population in poverty reduction strategies. Policy Brief. Washington DC: Population Reference Bureau.

concerned. The continued application of Washington Consensus policies is in total disregard of country specific needs and represents a big lesson and change area for the World Bank and IMF as well as other international organizations that have actively plugged in the continent.

The IMF and World Bank as leading organizations have failed to ensure that their programmes and policy conditions are truly country-owned. They have tended to rely on presence or absence of the policy conditions in the national poverty reduction strategies. While there is no question of the space opened up by the policy development of the national poverty reduction strategies, civil society and parliament participation still remains weak. Additionally the strategies have also been too broad making it easy for the Bank to claim alignment. Moreover, any crafted Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is often influenced by the two organizations. For instance the Bank assesses adequacy of the PRSP as a basis for support.<sup>134</sup> A World Bank conditionality survey, for example, showed that 50 per cent of governments surveyed felt that *'the Bank introduced elements that were not part of the country's program'*. In addition, *'37 per cent of respondents said that negotiations with the World Bank significantly modified their original policy program'*.<sup>135</sup>

### **4.3 Quality and Quantity of Aid**

Another issue that is of concern is the quality and quantity of aid and programmes initiated by international organizations. Both these parameters reveal serious need to re-design the engagement of international organizations to give the African countries more

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<sup>134</sup>Ashford, L. S. (2007). Addressing population in poverty reduction strategies. Policy Brief. Washington DC: Population Reference Bureau.

<sup>135</sup>Ashford, L. S. (2007). Addressing population in poverty reduction strategies. Policy Brief. Washington DC: Population Reference Bureau.

participation in the process that is determinant of the kind of programmes and aid given. The HIPC Capacity building Programme (CBP) is the closest African states have come in placing themselves at a place where they can be able to assess the quality of Aid they receive. The HIPC CBP tests policies and procedures adopted by donor organizations as well as multi and bilateral donors. Some of the areas that the HIPC CBP looks at are policy conditionalities, disbursement procedures, programme channels and the coordination between the government and the donor organization. This said, it must be noted that to date there exists no serious systematic monitoring of assistance lent to African countries. This can be attributed to the lack of capacity to carry out the necessary monitoring and evaluation procedures for international aid.<sup>136</sup> In addition the majority of the African states are too poor to want to engage in any activity that they may deem as being detrimental to the prospective loans or assistance.

Quantity of aid impacts directly on the completion of a programme or project undertaken by an international organization. This means that its desired community change is dependent on there being the right amount of aid. Too little will often not lead to any substantial change while too much if disbursed in one tranche may lead to laxity, again potentially hurting the desired project completion, operation or day to day running. The need therefore to strike the right balance of aid quantity cannot be overemphasized.

This aspect of quantity is seen in many instances in the African continent. Mali, a country whose engagement with BWI's is discussed at length in the previous chapter, is one of the states that best brings out the issue of inadequate aid as a crippling factor to the

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<sup>136</sup>Johnson, A., Martin, M., & Bargawi, H. (2004). The Effectiveness of Aid to Africa Since the HIPC Initiative: Issues, Evidence and Possible Areas for Action. Development Finance International.

original intentions of the aid and the development agenda of the country as a whole. Compared to its neighbor Senegal Mali is seen to receive substantially lesser aid from international organizations, donors and bi-lateral development partners. It only takes astute financial management of the little resources coming its way for Mali to make some meaningful strides and earn itself a position amongst Africa's HIPC states. Even then, the challenges that Mali faced in distribution of insufficient funds to the various sectors of economy is daunting to say the least. Important sectors like the agricultural and energy sectors have been adversely affected. In turn these sectors have affected the quality of life of millions of Malians lowering it to drastic levels. In fact, Agriculture which is the mainstay of Mali's economy has seen almost one third of Mali's already poor population slide even further down the poverty ladder.<sup>137</sup> These situations could have been forestalled if the aid given to Mali was of such quantities to enable the West African country meet its development needs and subsidize its cotton farmers to remain competitive at the international markets where western subsidies have completely distorted the market prices. The fact that in virtually all the African countries adjustment loans were given repeatedly may also point to inadequacies of aid initially given.

Quality of aid or assistance given is very essential to the attainment of a programmes goal(s). African aid is rocked by a number of quality complaints including; excess conditionalities. Perhaps this is the one factor that most affects the quality of aid given to African states. Often the providers of aid attach too many conditionalities to the extent that the aid tends to more or less just serve their interests as opposed to the interests of the government being assisted and hence the people or citizens on whose behalf the

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<sup>137</sup>Alison J., Matthew M., and Hannah B., (2004).the effectiveness of aid to Africa since The HIPC Initiative: Issues, Evidence and possible areas for action. Development Finance International

government acts. It is understandable that a loaning agency will want to place some conditions for the funds but these must not exceed the need to secure repayment of the funds. This unfortunately is not the case in Africa as some of the conditions imposed seek an about turn in policy changes in government. In the same breath the lenders have not reduced conditionalities. The IMF and World Bank still have over 30 conditionalities that must be met before a loan may be disbursed.<sup>138</sup>

The quality of funds is also affected by the inflexibility or flexibility of funds advanced. Often donors and creditors are not willing to provide additional funds to meet exogenous shocks. Such funds can then be used to meet unexpected financing gaps or re-channeled to new and more pressing government priorities. The trend that is largely taking shape is that donors and international organizations are leaning towards project financing which tend to be highly specific and do not significantly affect policy in the long run hence create limited impact on the livelihoods of ordinary people.<sup>139</sup> Equally it is now the preference of donors to circumvent government channels in funding of the said projects preferring instead to use channels that are not the official government budget. Donors have cited graft, government bureaucracies and inefficiencies as some of the key reasons why they opt for non-budget channels of disbursement of aid. In Kenya the free primary education programme (FPE) is funded by bi-lateral donor support. FPE initially kicked off as a mainstream government budget funded programme but after reports of misappropriation of funds that saw about 1.2 Billion Kenya Shillings go unaccounted for

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<sup>138</sup>Oxfam International (2006)Kovach, H., &Fourmy, S. (2006). Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic policy conditions to aid.

<sup>139</sup>ColcloughC, and Webb A. (2010). The Impact of Aid on Education Policy in Kenya. RECOUP Working Paper No. 36. DFID

donor jitters set in and funds were now channeled off budget besides drastic reduction on the amount pledged.<sup>140</sup>

Still, a lot of funds and international organization support can be said to go to non-priority sectors. This waters down the eventual overall impacts of the support to the people's livelihood and the quality of life. Non priority sectors do not directly lift masses of people out of the poverty trap, which is what every government in Africa is trying, at least on paper, to do. Although there has been great strides made in harmonization of donor practices and PRSP partnerships there lacks a systematic country to country monitoring of aid across all recipient countries. There also lacks a method of ensuring or holding accountable donor organizations to ensure pledges made under PRSP framework are honoured. More worrying is the lack of empowerment to lead to a monitoring of a process that checks improvement of the quality of aid given.

Predictability of funds also remains a key concern in the quality of aid discussions. There have been moments when donors have failed to disburse pledged funds in good time or disburse as per agreement. Sighted in the case study of this submission is the instance where the World Bank and IMF withheld a SAC loan in order to push for liberalization in the cotton sector in Mali. A USD 50 million loan was withheld by the World Bank from its agreed date of disbursement in December 2004 to February 2005.<sup>141</sup> Even then the amount released was only half of the initial amount after the bank cited unsatisfactory progress in liberalization of the sector. This constitute ripe an example of erratic international organization aid around which if built, government programmes may be

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<sup>140</sup> Colclough C, and Webb A. (2010). The Impact of Aid on Education Policy in Kenya. RECOUP Working Paper No. 36. DFID

<sup>141</sup> Kovach, H., & Fourmy, S. (2006). Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic policy conditions to aid.

destined to, for less than expected results if not total failure. International organizations as well as multi-lateral development partners and donors have now resulted to disbursement outside the government official timetables. To effect these new methods of funding, they employ a variety of ways including use of their own programme aid. These new methods of aid have affected government debt sustainability. Overall the issue of quality of aid is a weighty matter that needs swift address and redress if African countries are to gain from the association or engagements with international organizations.

#### **4.4 Internal Affairs Interference**

This script has brought to the surface the thin line between international affairs interventions in African and third world countries and what the leaders in those countries have referred to as meddling of internal affairs. Time and again African leaders have protested to this kind of interventions by international organizations in their distinct rights and when acting as proxies for the so called development partners. Zimbabwe's long serving President Robert Mugabe has been on the collision path with Britain and the USA for his very vocal positions this issue. Mugabe's insistence that Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans and his consequence 'attack' on white farms has attracted retribution from the mentioned states along with their allies. The country has endured runaway inflation in the wake of stinging sanctions at the behest of United Nations and the Group of Rich Nations referring themselves as the G8. The Zimbabwean cases represent just one contemporary example.

In Kenya during the 1980's Structural Adjustment Period the government found itself at addressing matters of political nature rather than what the adjustment had pledged; economic. Furthermore, the World Bank and the IMF at whose supervision the

adjustment exercise was being carried out involved itself heavily in the daily decision and policy making of the country at the pretext of checking for compliance. Records suggest that these institutions would have an official from their programmes stationed in the finance ministry to monitor the manner in which the adjustment recommendations were being carried out.<sup>142</sup> This practice happened in other African countries as well and amounts to direct influence on policy making which is in effect meddling in internal affairs of a sovereign state contrary to international law on non-interference in internal affairs.<sup>143</sup>

#### **4.4.1 Internationalization of Human rights**

Today's world has become an international village. Rules and norms adopted by the international community affect all irrespective of their accession to them. Human rights for instance have been internationalized. As such no state can abuse the rights of its citizens and expect to get away with any atrocities. There is a strong claim especially by African countries that international organizations have exploited the grey areas of the international laws to advance narrow gains and interfere in the day to day running of the countries. At the 2013 African Union Summit in Addis Ababa African leaders took a unified position that the International Criminal Court (ICC) had poked its nose too far into African states justice system. This was in reference to the numerous African leaders who had been charged with various crimes at the court against none from the western countries. The debate was courtesy of Kenya's president and deputy president who had lobbied intensively prior to the conference to rally the continent against The Hague based

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<sup>142</sup>See IMF. & WB.(2006).

<sup>143</sup>See IMF.,&WB. (2006).

court.<sup>144</sup> In far too similar circumstances, President El Bashir of Sudan governs with an arrest warrant over his head after the same court advised that he be arrested in accordance to its statutes. This is in spite of the fact that Sudan is not a signatory of the Rome statute and therefore in principle is excluded from its declarations. Similarly the USA despite its hegemonic status has had to conduct shuttle diplomacy dangling the carrot and as well as threatening a stick to states that may arrest its citizens for whatever reason. Again a noteworthy point is that even the USA is not a signatory of the ICC.<sup>145</sup> These examples confirm the claim that norms and human rights have been internationalized. Irrespective of where the crimes are committed the perpetrators are expected to be brought to account in accordance with international law. International organizations like the International Crimes Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice act as channels through which justice can be attained in the event crimes against humanity are committed. However the claims that the ICC is meddling in internal affairs of African countries have been rampant.<sup>146</sup> African leaders have lamented the fact that of since its inception ICC has only handled African matters. Specifically they have raised an issue that the ICC is only after African leaders. This notwithstanding the influence of international organizations in justice matters cannot be overemphasized. It therefore continues to be proof that because of human rights internationalization international organizations will continue to wield power over and in African countries. The assistance given to refugees and respect given to prisoners of war are further examples that cement these claims.

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<sup>144</sup>Jacob, N. (2013).Duale lobbying 18 African leaders to stop ICC. The Standard, October 12<sup>th</sup>.

<sup>145</sup>Carr Center for Human Rights Policy. (2012). The United States and the International Criminal Court. Working Paper T-00-02

<sup>146</sup>Carr Center for Human Rights Policy. (2012). The United States and the International Criminal Court. Working Paper T-00-02

#### 4.4.2 Many and Unrealistic Conditionalities

It is normal practice for one person lending money to another to demand that the borrower meets some conditions to assure him/her that the monies will be refunded. However when it comes to the World Bank and IMF lending to African countries the conditionalities laid down are appalling. The nature and manner in which they are imposed upon African countries also leaves a lot to be desired. First, the conditionalities are too many that for them to be properly executed an insider from the BWI's is set up in the various ministries of finance ensure compliance. This in itself amounts to micro management and interference of internal affairs of a country. Conditionalities to African states have continued to exist and even increase. This is in spite of the numerous promises that the organizations have made to reform. A 2006 Norwegian government study showed that out of 40 poor countries studied 26 still had privatization and liberalization attached to their policy conditions.<sup>147</sup> However another study by the World Bank indicates a remarkable decline in policy conditions from 32 per loan to just 11 on Average per loan.<sup>148</sup> This figure is deceptive though because it does not include policy benchmarks attached to World Bank aid since the year 2000. Data from the world's bank show a 300 percent jump of policy benchmarks from 8 to 27. But the Bank does not consider policy benchmarks as full conditions. Instead it terms them as 'prior actions', 'tranche release' and triggers because if recipient counties fail to implement them aid cannot be stopped. However, while policy benchmarks are not as powerful as full conditions they are very influential. They therefore constitute a form of conditionality in

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<sup>147</sup>Kovach, H., &Fourmy, S. (2006). Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic policy conditions to aid.

<sup>148</sup>Koeberle, S., &Walliser, J. (2006). World Bank conditionality: Trends, lessons, and good practice principles. Budget Support as More Effective Aid?, 267.

this respect. The banks' board must be assured of satisfactory progress in the implementation of policy benchmarks before disbursement of a loan. Taking this in consideration we find that the policy conditions of the World Bank have risen from 20 per loan to 38.<sup>149</sup> The sheer number of these condition demand constant engagement and even participation in the policy making of the borrowing country. This in effect is unnecessary meddling in the internal affairs of the borrowing country. The case of Kenya 2013 Value added tax policy is an example of how international organizations influence policy.

Scholars from the realist school of thought see the activities discussed here as a continuation of imperialistic appetite of the strong nations to dominate and continue exploiting the natural resources in the poor countries. The accounts of B.S Chimni clearly articulate this way of thinking also adding that the luminaries of the rich nation operate as transnational capitalist companies to further exploit whatever economic gains there may be for the betterment of their nations. Classified here also are international organizations which are formed by the rich nations to further their interests and used as vehicles for domination by the western powers. The World Bank and IMF have perhaps stood out the most in this regard. They are not however the only ones. The UN has experienced situations where it has been used to rubberstamp actions of the powerful countries. The instance that led to Libyan incursion culminating to the murder of Libyan leader Muamar Gaddafi's is a fresh example. The 1990 war seeking to clean out weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is yet another. Both these instances, as in many other, involve the United States acting unilaterally and then turning to the International Organization called

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<sup>149</sup>See World Bank (2006)

UN to ratify their actions. They remain proof that in the end the rich countries still wield immense control over the organizations. The US also retains a lion's share of funding to the UN and other major international Organizations hence maintain a control over the same. Asad Asmi elaborates on this connection stressing that the US wants to subordinate African and Third world countries to the position of raw a material suppliers.<sup>150</sup> The current 'scramble' for oil products in the gulf of guinea by the US after realization that an unstable middle east does not secure their future oil needs stands as a contemporary example of this assertion.

Opponents of the structural adjustment programmes view the slow infiltration of the lenders into the policy making as being intrusive and harboring more than just the need to secure the funds lent. The hawk eye kept on programmes sponsored by the Word Bank and the IMF by its officials raises questions of what their interest are and whose the interest represent. IT is expected and acceptable that a lender will need assurance that funds will be repaid but following the excruciating details of programme implementation calls for different analysis of the lender. This is especially so if in the first place those programmes were imposed on a country through punitive conditionalities. The deduction therefore is that this is the shortest path to advance political interests of the sponsor nations. Given the export oriented nature of SAPs, this reasoning fits perfectly with the notion that export-facing economies would only export raw materials to western and US industries since value addition capacity of raw materials has not been developed. The BWI's interest in developing local capacity and know-how remains low and uninspiring.

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<sup>150</sup>Ismi, A. (2004). Impoverishing a continent: The World Bank and the IMF in Africa.Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.

In a nutshell, meddling in internal affairs of a country whether directly or indirectly creates an atmosphere of resentment and diminishes the ownership of programmes introduced by the international organizations. Such programmes only have an outside chance at best to realize their goals and objectives.

#### **4.5 Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)**

Structural Adjustments Programmes (SAPs) have been mentioned hand in hand with the World Bank and the IMF. While there have been a myriad of opponent to the programmes some scholars posit that whatever African countries went through was inevitable and that reference to the BWI institutions is but a scapegoat for non performing African governments. In fact the scapegoat argument comes out as one of the defenses of SAPs. They are the ones used by government leaders when they wanted to implement unpopular policies. Killick (1992) makes this argument and notes that majority of African leaders have employed that strategy.

Some scholars argue that conditionality was inevitable. The main thrust behind this argument is that the lender needs assurance that the borrower would repay funds. As such conditionalities was the only collateral that the BWI had. Mr. John Hill, Senior Officer at IMF says, "Conditionality is legitimate. You can't expect to borrow and use somebody else's money and not pay back".<sup>151</sup> This thinking is informed intrinsically by a dominating mindset that is expected to continue espousing master – slave relationship explained by President Toumani earlier in this presentation. Some religious doctrines also categorically state the nature of a relationship between a borrower and a lender.

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<sup>151</sup> John, H. (2010). "Conditionality is legitimate. You can't expect to borrow and use somebody else's money and not pay back".

Specifically, the Bible talks of the borrower being a slave to the lender. International Organizations are mainly the vehicles that are used to carry out these mandates.

Nonetheless a section of scholars albeit the minority have advanced counter arguments against some of the arguments that IMF and World Bank inspired structural adjustment programmes are to blame for the economic, political and social hardships that African countries went through during since the early 1980's. Surprisingly among these thinkers is Zambian Scholar Gerry N. Muuka a professor at Murray State University with extensive hand-on experience with the so called BWI's.

On re-colonization or implicit need to re-colonize Africa the defenders of SAPs argue that there is no substantial evidence that the World Bank and IMF had any imperial interests on any African country. That besides production of raw materials African interest by the west has been altered drastically by the end of the cold war and territorial conquest was no longer a motivation to get involved. That said, it must be noted that Africa continues to be a vital source of market for western goods and technology. It would therefore be appropriate and correct to note that neither the IMF nor the World Bank has harbored any territorial appetite for any African state.

Any defense of SAPs would not be complete without a reference to the 'counter factual.' This is an hypothetical projection of what economies and life without structural adjustment credits would have been like. The proponents argue that although African economies continued to perform poorly under SAPs they would have performed even poorer without them. The gist therefore is that SAPs may not have salvaged the situation

as planned but prevented total collapses of the African economies.<sup>152</sup> This may be a debatable position but there cannot be any running away from the fact that the African countries had little choice at the time. Intense and sustained economic distress led them to the doorstep of the BWI's. Still, the opponents of this thinking will fault the intrusive manner in which the conditionalities were applied across the African continent. These protests are met by claims for SAPs defenders that the conditionalities were necessary because African countries needed to adjust. Edward Jaycox, a long-serving World Bank Vice-President in charge of Africa, makes this argument saying that African countries had "their backs to the wall". Further, Jaycox claim confirms that most countries did not introduce SAPs enthusiastically:

*"They entered into SAPs because they were desperate and when they did so there were no goods on the shelves, no spare parts, no trucks, no batteries and no tires...no drugs in the clinics, no chalk and books in their schools."*<sup>153</sup>

SAPs are seen as just another necessary step towards an inevitable process of a rational allocation of resources. That despite external pressures internal mismanagement and too much government spending on recurrent expenditure hampered any meaningful growth in African economies. To reverse this trend adjustment was not only necessary but also inevitable.

Contributions to these arguments also see SAPs as having a positive effect on the evolution of policy in Africa. Factors such as export expansion, fiscal discipline, and

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<sup>152</sup>Briggs, J., &Yeboah, I. E. (2001). Structural adjustment and the contemporary sub-Saharan African city. *Area*, 33(1), 18-26.

<sup>153</sup>See World Bank. (2005).

prudent management of public enterprises and adjustment of agricultural prices are thought to have developed because of SAPs. By imposing conditionalities on improved agricultural prices the World Bank played a key role in motivating African farmers to raise production, an action that raised their disposable incomes and improved food security in the African countries. Avramovic sees actions such as devaluation of currencies for example aimed at making a given countries exports more attractive on the world markets therefore making them more attractive to exporters.<sup>154</sup> Fiscal indiscipline and mismanagement of public enterprises were occasioned by management skills weaknesses, corruption and need to pay political patronage. The only way to overcome these was by building strong institutions and although unpopular recommending and pushing through privatization of state owned enterprises.

Moore and Scarritt defend political conditionality on three essential and interdependent elements.<sup>155</sup> Institutions and procedures for citizens to express their preferences about alternative policies and leaders, institutionalized constraints on exercise of power by the executive and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in both their ordinary lives and in acts of political participation make the three elements. Whilst there cannot be a shortage of contestation to these assertions, their value in a mostly authoritarian or semi-authoritarian Africa remains very much clear.

There is no doubting that IMF and the World Bank have played lead roles in international organization action in Africa. This text is cognizant of this fact and has borrowed heavily on their influences and programmes to understand the kind of impacts that International

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<sup>154</sup>Briggs, J., &Yeboah, I. E. (2001). Structural adjustment and the contemporary sub-Saharan African city. *Area*, 33(1), 18-26.

<sup>155</sup>Moore, W. H., &Scarritt, J. R. (1990). IMF Conditionality & Polity Characteristics in Black Africa: An Exploratory Analysis. *Africa Today*, 39-60.

Organizations have had in Africa. In closing it is worth noting that the two organizations have been alive to the criticisms leveled against them and that they have put themselves on the reform path, at least on paper. Among some of the areas seen as needing reforms are; the manner of lending, imposition of myriads of conditionalities and interference on the borrowing states internal affairs. The development of World Bank's PRSP is touted as one strategy that fits this reform bill. However even the PRSP has been criticized as not being inclusive to the extent that members of parliament and the civil society participate in its formation by being informed of its existence rather than a purposeful two way communication.<sup>156</sup> The Malian first PRSP produced in 2002 illustrates this assertion.

*'Civil society participation in the production of the first PRSP was extremely weak. It was limited to the government giving civil society information rather than any genuine two-way participative process, with civil society inputting into the strategy'.*

*Sekou Sangare, Conseil National de la Société Civile du Mali<sup>157</sup>*

This notwithstanding represents a first step towards the much needed reform at the World Bank. Afro-Optimists view it as a building block for dialogues and greater participation in policy making for African leadership and that of International Organizations like the World Bank.

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<sup>156</sup> Moore, W. H., & Scarritt, J. R. (1990). IMF Conditionality & Polity Characteristics in Black Africa: An Exploratory Analysis. *Africa Today*, 39-60.

<sup>157</sup> Moore, W. H., & Scarritt, J. R. (1990). IMF Conditionality & Polity Characteristics in Black Africa: An Exploratory Analysis. *Africa Today*, 39-60.

#### 4.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter discusses various issues brought to the surface by the arguments made in this submission. First among these is the huge and growing influence of the World Bank and the IMF. The example given of Kenya 2013 VAT Bill is a contemporary example of how these organizations continue to influence policy with the African stage. The VAT Bill has led to increase of commodity prices including that of electricity. The net effect is a more expensive livelihood that the ordinary Kenyan citizen must endure with static or decreasing incomes. As a result more Kenyans have been relegated to the poverty trap, the very trap that the government has pledged to address in order to improve the quality of life of the average Kenyan. This generally represents the engagement of International Organizations in the African continent where high level deals between the governments and the organizations often lead to the hurting of the livelihood of the ordinary people. The picture is however gradually changing with the emergence of Eastern powers ready to invest and lend African states funds under different conditionalities spelt out in China-Africa white paper(s). The white paper provides for the terms of engagement between China and the continent. Among the notable change in terms is the strict policy of non-interference in African internal issues. This has proved popular in Africa leading to boosted trade partnership that has seen China become Africa's largest trading partner.<sup>158</sup> With seemingly a shift in economic hegemonic power it will be interesting to see how the West reacts to the new found wealth of China. This debate is however beyond the scope of these submissions but is recommended for inquest by other scholars.

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<sup>158</sup>Taylor, I. (2009). China's new role in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

The chapter has unpacked the various issues impeding a success of international Organizations led programmes in Africa and attempted to enhance understanding of the various interests that exist when these organization seek liaison with African states. The unique sets of challenges and situations make it crystal clear that they require different remedies rather than the blanket application of solutions by organizations. Therefore the principle of 'one size fits all' has been watered down and in its place customized solutions must be installed to ensure sustained progress and success in curing the ailing African economies that then will be able to cascade the benefits of growth and development to their citizens who are the primary focus of this study.

It is interesting to note that the issue of interests is part and parcel of engagements between International organizations and African states. Accordingly each pursues the engagement to preserve and advance their interests. This text exposes the how African countries have constantly compromised on the bargaining table at the mercy of sturdy international organizations that possess huge financial muscles as well as political power at the international stage. As such the African countries have time and again been arm twisted into accepting programmes that were clearly unfit or ill-suited for them. Under these arrangements African countries have recorded poor and declining economic growth while conflict disease and general quality of life has not improved much either. Afro-optimists wait with baited breath for a drastic change in the manner of engagements between Africa and the international Organizations.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.0 Conclusion**

There is no doubt that international organizations have had major impact on the African political, economical and social arena. It has been the concern of this text to find out the exact manner in which international organizations have played this role and the extent to which they have successfully influenced policy and thus impacted on the livelihoods of ordinary citizens in various African countries. Nothing clarifies this as the Mali case study espoused in the chapter three. The challenges that the landlocked West African Country goes through as a result of international organization action are seen to directly affect the life of the common Malian. The next few paragraphs will enlist International Organizations Impacts discussed herewith in order to provide quick glance information to the reader. The impacts are categorized under five sub-headings; poverty, Fiscal Discipline and Management of State resources, Conflict and security, Aids Scourge and Disease, Economic growth.

#### **5.1 Impact on Poverty**

Poverty is one of the biggest if not the biggest challenges in Africa. The continent has the most widespread and the most intense poverty. Statistics on poverty in Africa are appalling. More than 300 million people in Africa are living in poverty with over 40 percent living below the one dollar a day estimated 700,000 children die before their first birthday. Other surprising statistics are; one child die every minute due to measles while one child dies every three seconds due to AIDS and extreme poverty. Statistics also

suggest that about 800 million Africans go to bed on an empty stomach and that close to 300,000 West Africans and Somali's are on the brink of starvation.<sup>159</sup>

The engagement of international organizations in the continent has done little to improve the situation. In Mali for instance poverty levels rose after the World Bank and IMF adjustment policies that affected cotton sector and led about a quarter of the population deeper into poverty. Countries in the South Sahara are most affected. In Kenya introduction of SAPs had an overnight of increasing poverty. Weakened Kenya shilling, retrenchments and low government spending are some of the contributing factors. Rono notes;

*'...there is also evidence to show that the gap between the rich and the poor increased just as the income gap between the urban and the rural population.'*<sup>160</sup>

These two further aggravated the poverty problem in Kenya.

In Zaire (now Congo, D.R) and Nigeria the situation was similar. These confirmations go to show that the actions on international organizations have not helped tackle the poverty trap in Africa.

## **5.2 Impact on Fiscal Discipline**

African leadership has been characterized by strongmaship and authoritarian rule. A number of states, especially in the western part of Africa have also endured experienced lengthy periods of military coups and hence military rule. These conditions weaken

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<sup>159</sup>Sachs, J. D., & McArthur, J. W. (2005). The millennium project: a plan for meeting the millennium development goals. *The Lancet*, 365(9456), 347-353.

<sup>160</sup>Rono, J. K. (2002). The impact of the structural adjustment programmes on Kenyan society. *Journal of Social Development in Africa*, 17(1), 81-98.

government institutions and provide a fertile ground for breeding corruption, misappropriation of funds and misdirecting of government funds. These coupled with management gaps have consistently placed African leadership fiscal discipline to question.

This situation has improved however with the entry of international organizations to the picture. Constant screening, project monitoring and evaluation exercises have left the governments with little but to amend the less than acceptable fiscal policies. The IMF and World Bank would have an official place in the finance ministry of a given country to forestall any financial malpractices that might occur.<sup>161</sup> This has been labeled as interference in internal affairs but from a pragmatic point of view is probably the only way to have gotten the African governments to radically abandon the fiscal indiscipline as well as stem corruption.

It is therefore in order to give international organizations credit for improved fiscal discipline and management skills.

### **5.3 Conflicts and Security**

Concerning security and conflicts, Africa remains a continent with the bloodiest conflicts and is generally the most unsafe. Credit must be paid to the United Nations for the roles they have played in the pacification of the Congo, Somali and neutralization of Darfur among others. However the question that lingers is why there has not been a significant reduction of conflicts in Africa even after so many years of engagement. The MONUSCO is perhaps the largest and most expensive to maintain UN peacekeeping

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<sup>161</sup>Helleiner, G. K. (1983). The IMF and Africa in the 1980s. *Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue canadienne des études africaines*, 17(1), 17-33.

force in the World. The force has literally played the police role that has kept president Kabila in office shielding his government from the marauding rebels. As much as this should be appreciated the continued presence of the force confirms continued conflict, this text questions this manner of engagement and notes that it does not end the conflict *per se*.

Noting the history making achievements by the Africa Union's Amisom in Somalia, the successes of international Organizations cannot be taken away from them. However these are few and far between. The reality on the ground is that conflicts in Africa persist with internal conflicts becoming more pronounced. The waves of change dubbed *Arab Spring* in Libya and Egypt have their ripple effects still being felt to date. Political stability is yet to return to these states since 2011<sup>162</sup>. In similar accounts to strengthen this view, Mali and Nigeria have seen Muslim extremists cause untold havoc and deaths in their territories. The terror group Boko Haram remains a fresh thorn in the flesh of the Nigerian government.

Terrorism is a new threat to African Security but one that bears international dimensions. African states have proved soft targets to terror groups seeking to attack Western Interests. Numerous examples exist in this regard. The latest being Kenya's Westgate Shopping Mall in August 2013.<sup>163</sup> There is still a lack of clarity as to the role if any played by international organizations in combating terrorism in Africa. It is noteworthy

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<sup>162</sup>Anderson, L. (2011). Demystifying the Arab Spring: parsing the differences between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. *Foreign Aff.*, 90, 2.

<sup>163</sup>Onuoha, F. (2013). Westgate Attack: Al-Shabab's Renewed Transnational Jihadism. *Al-Jazeera Center for Studies*, November, 10.

though to mention that the UN Security Council recognition of terrorism as a global threat to security in 2002 by setting up a Counter Terrorism Committee.<sup>164</sup>

#### **5.4 Impacts in Diseases and the Aids Scourge**

Reports show that there has been a mixed progress in this end. Although the AIDS scourge is still a menace in Africa, its severity and spread is not in the same magnitude as it was in the earlier years. Some diseases have almost altogether been eliminated from the face of the continent save for a few war torn pockets where International Organization reach is limited or nonexistent.<sup>165</sup> The work of international organizations such as the World Health Organization has been relentless even in the war torn zones. However, by and large Africa continues to have the least access to healthcare services.

#### **5.5 Economic Growth**

Africa harbours prospects for growth and opportunities in the 21<sup>st</sup> century given the stagnation or plateau stage of growth in the western world. But how has international Organization action affected Africa's growth? In terms of direct impact possibly the most effect has been generated by the adjustment lending heavily discussed in this text.

It comes out clear that the result of the lending is in variance with its initial intentions. Most of the countries receiving adjustment loans did not record reasonable gains in economic growth. In some cases like Mali there are records or a negative economic growth.<sup>166</sup>

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<sup>164</sup>Foot, R. (2007). The United Nations, counter terrorism and human rights: institutional adaptation and embedded ideas. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 29(2), 489-514.

<sup>165</sup>Biellik, R., Madema, S., Taole, A., Kutsulukuta, A., Allies, E., Eggers, R., ...& Okwo-Bele, J. M. (2002). First 5 years of measles elimination in southern Africa: 1996–2000. *The Lancet*, 359(9317), 1564-1568.

<sup>166</sup>Devarajan, S., Dollar, D., & Holmgren, T. (Eds.). (2001). *Aid and reform in Africa: Lessons from ten case studies*. World Bank Publications.

## **5.6 Proliferation of International Organizations**

This text has been able to establish that international organizations have proliferated after the 1980's. The study notes that particularly there has been a rise in the number of regional international organizations. The reasons for their formations are varied. However the extent of their achievements in relation to their objects remains largely uninspected. The UNEP for instance although is not a regional organization has been questioned over its contributions to the stoppage of environmental degradation, desertification, and even pollution of the ozone layer.<sup>167</sup> The objects and achievements notwithstanding there is no denying that the numbers of International organizations have phenomenally increased since the beginning of the cold war. Some cold war organizations died after the end of the war but many survived and remain institutions of policy and strategy. The Warsaw Pact and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) are two respective examples.

### **5.6.1 International Organization Funding**

International organizations are run on serious budgets. The United Nations spends no less than USD 5 billion a year. On its part the World Bank disburses over USD 30 billion in assistance and development loans every year. The IMF has an equally large budget providing short term bailout for both developing and the relatively developed countries. The fundamental question raised by this investigation is who meets the costs of running the international organizations and what their motivation to do so is?

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<sup>167</sup>Andersen, S. O., &Sarma, K. M. (2012). *Protecting the ozone layer: the United Nations history*. Earthscan.

This text has established that international organizations in Africa act in realist tendencies to protect their interests and those of their sponsor countries. Strong proposers of this school of thinking include B.S. Chimni who asserts that International Organizations further the interests of transnational capitalists and perpetuate modern imperialism.

Therefore such international organizations already have set agenda's which scarcely has the interests of the countries in which they operate at their core. It is these promoter countries that bear the brunt of costs of running these international organizations. However, these costs can be seen as investments rather than costs because ultimately the promoter countries recoup their monies and rake in handsome profits. Research has shown that although Africa is treated as an aid recipient continent it spends more money servicing its BWI loans than the actual funds received.<sup>168</sup> Put differently, the net loans repayments by African countries far exceed the loans coming into the countries over any given period of time.

### **5.6.2 International Organization Promise**

The promises of international organizations generally include improved economies, livelihoods, security and ecosystems. This investigation has been able to establish that the promises given are hardly the driving force in their day to day activities. These are normally superimposed by underlying interests. Moreover these promises have not been realized in the African continent where economies are either struggling with negative growth, stagnation or growing with very slender margins. The livelihoods of individuals and security has not improved much either. Far too many Africans cannot access clean

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<sup>168</sup>Ismi, A. (2004). *Impoverishing a continent: The World Bank and the IMF in Africa*. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.

drinking water or good health facilities. Security remains volatile in almost every African country with the new state security headaches being terrorism. African targets have proved soft targets. Nigeria's Boko Haram and Al-Qaida linked Al Shabaab are the two main notable threats in this regard.

On ecosystems African countries are still battling desertification and food security. This goes to confirm deteriorating ecosystems against the International Organizations, specifically UN's UNEP, promise of improved ecosystems. J. Mearsheimer aptly captures this deceit by international organizations in his account, *The False Promise of International Institutions*.<sup>169</sup>

### **5.7 Impacts of Privatization**

The IMF and World Bank prescribed privatization programmes adversely hampered the livelihoods of many Africans. In Kenya the programmes saw tens of thousands lose their jobs relegating them to immediate poverty overnight. Families whose breadwinners were re-trenched during privatizations programmes endured untold hunger and suffering due to inability to afford basic commodities. Privatization of essential commodities in Mali condemned almost one quarter of Malians to immediate poverty. Runaway electricity prices meant that only a handful of Malians would afford the commodity. Such are the stories of International organizations inspired privatization programmes in Africa.

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<sup>169</sup>Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994). The false promise of international institutions. *International security*, 5-49.

### **5.7.1 Currency Devaluations**

Devaluation of currencies as suggested by various international organizations served to erode the wealth and purchasing power of people overnight. This happened notably in Malawi and Nigeria under the BWI instigated SAPs.<sup>170</sup>

### **5.7.2 Export Oriented Economies**

International organizations pushed for export oriented economies not considering that African countries basically exported raw materials. This situation ensured that local industrialization did not take off because the materials were shipped off to the west. Although the initial idea was noble to increase dollar inflows and reduce the balance trade which was ailing most African countries, the situation could not improve because many African Countries had one or two raw materials, mostly cash crops to export. This set the tone of what is today's style of trade by African countries with the rest of the world. I.e. exporting raw materials with little or no value addition. It is a sad spectacle that the exported raw materials are processed and sold back to the African markets at exorbitant prices.

## **5.8 Recommendations**

This study recommends that:

International Organizations involved in lending funds to African Countries should require minimum conditionalities to their loans if they must attach them to the lending. Policy benchmarks must be considered as conditionalities in this respect.

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<sup>170</sup>Fadahunsi, A. (1993). Devaluation: Implications for Employment, Inflation, Growth and Development. *The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria*, 33.

Lending organizations should procure sufficient mileage in terms of policy acceptance and country ownership. Research has consistently showed that policies that receive insufficient backing from local government do not eventually succeed. This often comes at a huge cost by both the lending organization and the recipient state.

International organizations must desist from using their financial muscles and influence to interfere in the internal affairs of African countries. Such actions breed resentment against the policies suggested by the organizations and general lack of co-operation with their programmes. Thus, they severely limit chances of acceptance, ownership and eventual implementation and accomplishment of the policies.

Adopt a country specific approach to the challenges that African countries face. The one-size-fits all strategy is lazy and assuming. In addition the diversity of African countries demand nothing less than a dedicated unique approach to the various challenges that present themselves in the African continent.

International organizations should assist African governments in developing capacity in order to properly analyze their own policies to churn out the best policy reform options. At the same time African governments are must widen their ability to collect relevant poverty and statistical data in order to enable making of factual recommendations.

The African governments must also ensure a transparent policy making process that allow participation of the civil society, parliamentarians and even international organizations. This inclusivity will likely build consensus and therefore acceptance leading to the smooth implementation of agreed policies.

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