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
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RESERVE

TANZANIA'S RETREAT FROM STATISM IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

By

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ABSTRACT

The paper is a product of a recent brief trip to Tanzania and discusses the circumstances and implications of the revival of district councils and cooperatives. The change is viewed against a background of long-term economic crisis and rising peasant political complaint and marks the reversal of a 15 year rise of statism in the countryside. Reasons for the earlier demise of councils and cooperatives are examined as well as the inadequacies of subsequent "participatory" policy. The nature and design of the reincarnated institutions are reviewed and several questions about their operation are raised. Reasons for the likely revival of peasant initiative in self-help are also discussed. In conclusion, although there has been no widespread public discussion of these changes and their implication for a transition to socialism, and although there is an air of "muddling through" a difficult situation, there are good reasons to see these moves as logical and quite positive steps on a democratic socialist and more productive path.

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By

Frank Holmquist⁽¹⁾

"The government has been stolen from us and we want it back." According to an informal observer this was the essence of collective complaint by villagers to President Julius Nyerere and other leaders when they toured the countryside in 1979. The complaint was not in vain, however, as three years later (April 1982) legislation was passed to bring "government" back -- to revive district councils and cooperatives which had been abolished in the 1970s.⁽²⁾ These and related moves can be seen as a significant reversal of a 15 year (1967-1982) trend toward statist policy in the countryside, portions of which have proved to be unpopular and unproductive. The term "statism" is here used to connote state policy that puts an expanding array of economic activity under central government control, while diminishing avenues of popular participation. This paper will describe these institutional changes as well as attempt to explain and assess their significance in light of Tanzania's recent history.

The Economic Context of Institutional Change

The revival of district councils must be seen against a background of long-term economic crisis that inevitably threatens the political legitimacy of the regime. A comprehensive 1982 International Labour Organization report, points to the vicious cycle that Tanzania has, to some degree, entered.⁽³⁾ With stagnant to slowly rising export volume over a number of years, coupled with the rising cost of necessary imports, there is a serious shortage of foreign exchange -- and this despite the state's historical ability to obtain large amounts of foreign aid on concessionary terms, and despite historically tight import controls. With many necessary inputs to industry lacking, industry runs at 20% to 30% of capacity, and this means there are spot shortages of virtually all basic consumer items in the countryside with correspondingly less incentive for producers to produce exports hence the cycle is complete.⁽⁴⁾

A bright spot on the horizon is a projected good 1983 cotton crop, but economic trends and the most recent data for 1982 do not paint an optimistic picture.⁽⁵⁾ Real GDP dropped by 3.2% while the manufacturing

sector recorded a 25.4% fall in volume which follows successive drops of 27.4% and 18.8%. It also appears that the special National Economic Survival Program met only 58% of its 1982 export earnings target, while the public foreign debt is now estimated at about \$2.5 billion. As of the end of July 1983, talks with the IMF that could yield a long-term IMF and World Bank loan of about \$600 million are stalled. Government has devalued the Tanzanian shilling by 20% against the dollar and raised prices of major export crops about 40% in July 1983, but the IMF reportedly wants a devaluation of up to 75%, a 45% export crop price rise, a 25% rise for food crops, a ceiling on government borrowing, and a doubling of interest rates. President Nyerere has balked particularly against the measures which will hurt the urban poor and also pose a grave short run political risk for the regime.

The economic situation is severe, and although most third world countries are experiencing analogous problems in the face of world economic crisis, most observers agree with the basically sympathetic ILO report that Tanzania's problems are internal as well as external. In these times of duress regimes may respond by tightening controls at the center. But this regime decided that prior policies along those lines had proved counter-productive economically and politically and hence something different was in order. Part of the regime's solution to its internal problems is a revival of district councils and cooperatives.

The Rise of Statism in the Countryside

In order to understand the current retreat from statism in the countryside we need a basic understanding of the rise of statism and subsequent difficulties. Those familiar with the writings of President Nyerere and Party documents are also familiar with their participatory rather than statist thrust. Nyerere has, after all, virtually defined development in terms of mass involvement. The 1971 Guidelines of the Party made this point in extreme fashion.

Any action that gives them (the people) more control of their own affairs is an action of development even if it does not offer them better health or bread.

The irony is that while the Tanzanian state has brought extraordinary progress in the realm of basic needs, esp. primary education, health, and water supply, few would argue that it provided the people with "...more control of their own affairs..." and hence the growing volume of complaint reaching the President's ears by the late 1970s.⁽⁶⁾

But why, we might ask, were district councils and cooperatives abolished in the first place and in the context of an ideology of participation? We should note at the outset that both institutions did not suffer sudden death so much as slow attrition in the face of state intrusion which made their abolition somewhat anti-climatic. Many district councils evolved chronic debts in the 1960s, and there were frequent allegations of inefficiency and corruption.⁽⁷⁾ There was also considerable tension between councillors, council staff, and functional officers of ministries in the districts. The state explained its escalating intrusion into council affairs in terms of both dealing with these problems and of asserting the power of the center over subordinate units of government. Central control primarily through regional and area commissioners whose clout was considerable because they were presidential appointees and representatives of both party and government. The Local Government Service Commission acted as the recruiting agent for council staff and hence councils were no longer able to hire and fire their employees. In 1965 the power of the ruling party was inserted into council affairs by making the elected district party chairperson the automatic chairperson of the council. And in the same year technical ministry personnel were brought into the councils' planning committee. From 1966 the party vetted the nominations of district councillors much as it did with elections to the National Assembly. In 1969 responsibility for education, health, and district roads was taken away from councils and, with these responsibilities removed, local tax rates and produce cesses were later abolished. It was mere formality to abolish the councils altogether in 1972.

Cooperatives were similarly accused of fostering corruption and inefficiency and of being run by, and primarily for, wealthy peasants. Some argued, that they were simply exploiting institutions.⁽⁸⁾ Cooperative unions, led by the rural petty bourgeoisie, were also something of a political treat in post-Arusha Declaration Tanzania. As with the experience of district councils, a variety of government intrusions did not rectify the situation and all the while the state rather surprisingly mandated more roles for cooperatives to perform. Increasingly, cooperatives became agents of state institutions and member involvement and commitment declined. In May 1976 Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa abolished cooperative unions while primary societies were already redundant by 1975 because newly created villages were designated basic collection points for specialized crop authorities.

But while district councils and cooperatives were on their way out, two new state thrusts were supposed to expand mass participation. A highly touted 1972 government decentralization -- bringing government to the people -- did just that, but did not augment participation. Virtually every observer has noted that the basic structure was dominated by a more numerous, if better coordinated, bureaucracy. A great deal of effort was put into bottom-up planning which usually meant that villages forwarded lengthy "wish lists" of projects in hopes that they might get one or two. Usually after a considerable period of time government would indicate its choices (not necessarily village priorities) and villagers were then expected to contribute labor, and perhaps material and money. Villagers thus became auxiliaries of government projects. As a result there was little incentive for locally initiated self-help activity because government was seen to give what it decided to give when it wanted to give. The chairperson of one village summed it up as follows: "It is better we wait for them (government) to plan things for us rather than (we) plan things they do not want".⁽¹⁰⁾

A second participatory thrust came in the aftermath of a frankly coercive effort to create villages in the years 1973-1975 after ujamaa vijijini failed to develop a popular dynamic. Under the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of July 1975 all adult members of a village constitute the Village Assembly which elects a Village Council while the chairperson and secretary of the local party branch serve respectively as chairperson and secretary of the council.⁽¹¹⁾ The Councils now meet regularly and, coupled with the party cell system, the result is a highly organized countryside with an embryo socialized sector. Roughly two-thirds of the villages have small communal farms and usually other communal activity like a shop or a maize grinding mill.⁽¹²⁾ The structure is fine as far as it goes but the atomized character of villages, and the lack of significant higher level participatory structures, means that peasants did not gain the tactical autonomy vis a vis the state that some wanted, while their influence could not really aggregate and make itself felt at higher levels. Elected Party officials and M.P.s act as village advocates in self-help activities, but their power is hemmed in by the planning structure and they are primarily expected to implement higher level policy.

Crop authorities and regional trading corporations took over the marketing and distributing roles of the cooperative structure. But it was one thing to service 1300 primary societies and another to service the now

over 8600 villages. And this had to be accomplished with limited capital and management resources. For these reasons, and those associated with a deteriorating economy, the system frequently broke down as produce was occasionally not collected, nor inputs provided on time; and payment to producers were delayed. Meanwhile producers had no structures through which to voice complaints,⁽¹³⁾ and allegations of mismanagement and misappropriation of funds in crop authorities soon rivaled their predecessors.⁽¹⁴⁾

The Retreat From Statism in The Countryside

By the arrival of the 1980s a minimal consensus-- though not without continuing opposition-- emerged at the highest level of the regime and found statist policy in the countryside wanting. Complaints from below eventually did get through and the very fiscal poverty of the state prompted rethinking about ways of raising revenues for public purposes which the state was unable to mobilize. For these reasons district councils and cooperatives appeared to offer an answer. They may have presented problems in the past, but they would probably be an improvement over their successors.

At the same time that these changes were on the drawing board another important legal measure was taken to divorce the government and party roles which were formerly combined in the area and regional commissioners. This move, was advocated by some intellectuals at the top as an important shift toward democracy. When the commissioners wore two hats there was considerable opportunity for abuse of power. The party was also implicated in all major decisions in the countryside and hence it could not act as a "watchdog" to criticize those decisions if necessary. The separation will, it is argued, foster a more "pure" Party that can be better used as an avenue of complaint and critique from below.¹⁵

But what will the reincarnated institutions look like? The revival of district council is officially explained as an extension of "incomplete decentralization." Explaining the change in terms of continuity is partly a face-saving device but the councils will in fact build upon the administrative changes of decentralization in 1972 and result in a far more radical devolution of power than existed in the post-colonial council system. The new councils will be responsible for all major ministry functions except law and order. If, for example the Ministry of Agriculture has a nationwide projects on rinderpest control, each council will have to be convinced to support the program. Although senior ministry personnel will be recruited and allocated by the Local Government Service Commission, they will be employees of councils and will be hired and fired by them.

Councils will also raise their own revenue (rates subject to central government approval) probably mainly by poll taxes, and the central government will also contribute a portion of the total budget with an eye to encouraging regional equity.¹⁶ In other words districts with a limited economic base will receive a greater portion of their budget from the central government.

Although the new council system has officially gone into effect July 1, 1983, several crucial questions remain. How will the districts quickly raise funds without alienating the population? How will the central government contribution be calculated? Can the apparently extreme divorce of local officers from parent ministries-- a problem cited in prior decentralization arrangements -- be dealt with under a structure that appears to divorce the relationship even further?¹⁷ And will councils be as frugal as some officials hope? In other words will the councils have an interest in saving money because the money is "theirs" and not the "central government's", or will they hire brothers, sisters, and friends to the point of redundancy? Also, if many of the councils were financially weak in the past there is no particular reason to suppose they will not similar problems in the future unless perhaps, as Gelase Mutahaba suggests, government devolves functions differentially according to a locality's capacity to sustain various activities.¹⁸

In the proposed cooperative structure primary societies will service one or more villages while second tier cooperative unions will service primary societies by marketing products, providing inputs, credit, financial advise, etc. The structure is capped by an apex organization of union representatives. The legislation, it should be said, gives considerable latitude for the state to intervene in cooperative affairs if it so desires. The relevant Minister or Registrar Cooperatives may appoint party members in key cooperative positions; the Registrar must approve cooperative appointments and may fire employees as well; and the Registrar may direct a cooperative committee to invest in cooperative funds. Although the details of marketing arrangements are being debated within the state, the major export crops will probably be sold to crop authorities, while non-controlled crops will be sold however the cooperatives wish.¹⁹ Another vital detail that has yet to be worked out is whether cooperative

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membership will be voluntary or not. At the start there was an agreement that voluntarism was necessary in order to garner peasant commitment. This position was supported by the Commission looking into the re-establishment of cooperatives, the Cabinet, the National Executive Committee of the party, and by Scandinavian donors and a post-legislation team from the U.S.A. Then, to the surprise of all, a hot Parliamentary debate resulted in a change making cooperative membership compulsory. But the last word on the issue is still to come.

The practical problems of re-establishing the cooperative structure are, of course, formidable. It is unclear how the cooperatives will be capitalized when the debts of the pre-1976 ones have yet to be settled. And since the crop authorities took over much of the capital of the earlier cooperative unions, will some of it be returned? And how will trained staff be quickly recruited? The former staff was absorbed into a variety of governmental structures and it is unclear whether they can be enticed back to autonomous cooperatives especially when they may be currently remunerated at a higher rate than cooperatives can afford.

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The revived district councils and cooperatives are the formal institutional focus of what I have termed Tanzania's retreat from statism in the countryside. But there is an important third arena that is likely to be revived in its wake, and that is self-help. Indeed some proponents of the formal institutional changes explicitly hope, and expect, that self-help processes will take on a new vitality.²⁰ The core reason for Tanzania's somewhat lacklustre self-help performance is related to the structure of power in the countryside. The bureaucratic, and geographically mobile, element of the petty bourgeoisie gradually consolidated their position in party and state apparatus and effectively dominated public life to the detriment of the locally rooted rural petty bourgeoisie.²¹ Tanzania's bureaucracy was, of course, led by a socialist ideology which delivered on that ideology in the form of an extraordinary amount of social amenity expenditure. But unlike the rural petty bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy in the late 1960s and 1970s did not as we have argued, welcome self-help outside "the plan".²² Although there is some merit to bureaucratic complaints about self-help waste, duplication, inferior quality, regional inequality, etc., reserving initiative to the bureaucracy of party or state fundamentally undermined the participatory thrust of regime ideology. As the state vigorously pushed its own agenda in what is often termed a "campaign style" from the late 1960s on -- i.e. ujamaa vijijini, decentralization and planning, villagization, and universal primary education -- bureaucratic initiative inevitably pre-empted peasant initiative. Indications of that shift are found in the late 1960s demise of the Department of Community Development in favor of a department servicing ujamaa production and cooperatives, and in the diversion of the Regional Development Fund from assisting locally initiated self-help to assisting usually bureaucratically initiated ujamaa activity.

There are several reasons why self-help is likely to re-emerge with some vigor. First, the rise of district councils and cooperatives are likely to shift the balance of power in the countryside. In other words the power of the state and party machinery will be somewhat diminished as the power of the rural petty bourgeoisie rises accordingly. Regular elections for the

councils and cooperatives will provide incentives for that element to lead and support the most popular form of rural development which is social amenities in the domain of self-help. In other words on top of M.P's and elected Party officials who have, though not always very effectively, been the natural allies of peasant initiated self-help, there are now many more that will be involved in the same game. This expanded rural petty bourgeoisie leadership will control council and cooperative money that will almost certainly be used in support of peasant initiated self-help as it was in the past. The entire process will help "free" self-help from the bureaucratic planning apparatus whose prior monopoly of extra-village funds insured the imposition of it's development agenda.

A second reason self-help will probably revive is the weak financial position of the state coupled with high popular demand for something to happen. If the government cannot afford construction costs, then only self-help remains.

At the present time there is an enormous pent-up demand for secondary education in the aftermath of the push for universal primary education.²³ Only 2.2% of primary school leavers go to 85 government aided heavily foreign supported, and tuition free secondary schools. With the 61 so-called "private" (but better termed, self-help) secondary schools which charge fees, plus 23 seminaries, only 4.2% will go to secondary school. Since government revenue is so precarious at the moment it's attitude toward village initiative in the building of secondary schools will be more permissive.²⁴ The situation applies to primary schools and other amenities as well. A Member of the National Assembly recently, asked if government planned to increase the standard (and over the years, deflated) government grant of shs. 10,000/- and shs. 12,000/- to villages building one classroom and a teacher's house respectively. The Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office replied that the government was well aware of the rising costs of building materials "... but due to the present economic difficulties, it was not possible to increase assistance. The responsibility for building classrooms and teacher's

quarters lies with the people themselves. The Minister went on to urge people to work harder to provide essential services for their own development.²⁵ Conversations with other government officials suggest that the self-help ideology will be elevated and I suspect it will conflict with prior interpretations of the planning ideology as a vehicle of control.

A third reason to anticipate a self-help revival lies in the 1981 re-establishment of the Department of Community Development located in the Prime Minister's Office. For the first time since 1972 there is deployment of extension staff emphasizing an ideology of local initiative. Also Rural Development Fund monies, which were all diverted to ujamaa vijijini activity under Regional Development Directors after 1972, are now targeted to support general self-help under Regional Community Development Officers.

CONCLUSION

The institutional changes discussed here have been termed a retreat from statist policy, a movement away from something. But one may also see these changes as a positive move toward something. Although there has been no public debate about the implications of these moves for a transition to socialism, and although there is an element of "muddling through" a difficult situation, the changes are a logical and positive step along a democratic socialist path that will probably yield economic dividends as well. The councils, cooperatives, and a likely revival of self-help, all invite the peasantry to exert somewhat greater management and control over their own affairs. The change will expand the number of elective, competitive, and partially accountable political roles that will enhance to some degree the peasantry's bargaining power with the state across a range of issues. The revived institutions will help overcome village atomization and fill some of the political void between the very participatory village councils and the higher levels of the bureaucracy.²⁶ The institutions are, then, valuable peasant political space.²⁷ The cooperatives and self-help are among the few mass-based, if not mass-led, institutions oriented toward state policy that have potential influence over a variety of key everyday policies such as crop pricing, agricultural input and marketing services, as well as the amount, design, timing, location, and maintenance of social amenities.²⁸ And the fact of peasant self-help initiative may over time create a somewhat more responsive bureaucracy and a more aggressive and capable local leadership structure.²⁹ District Councils are not mass-based but they can be mass-influenced and they are likely to be important support structures for peasant defined needs.

But the reader may ask if all this institutional experimentation in Tanzania has not simply brought them back to square one and the basic rural institutions inherited at independence. There is of course an element of "return" to the "retreat". But things are not the same as they were before.

This is true in several areas but may be particularly significant in the realm of leadership. The changes mark a resurgence of the rural petty bourgeoisie, but the Leadership Code barring capitalists from political office has made a difference. Although it is dodged by some through family and friends, it has tended to take the most wealthy at all levels of the political system out of formal political roles. Thus the return to councils (I am less clear about cooperatives, and I doubt self-help) does not necessarily mean a return to old style leadership. This time around the leadership may be a bit more petty than bourgeois.

And then there is the illusive factor of peasant consciousness. Several observers mentioned the current comparatively "high" level of peasant consciousness although it was difficult to pin down concrete attributes. Samuel Mushi's is one of the few attempts to do so in the context of two lengthy village case studies in Morogoro District. In his opinion:


There is little doubt that the post-Arusha period has seen many changes in political attitudes amongst the workers and the peasantry. These changes have resulted from policy and demographic factors. At the policy level, the norms of 'popular participation' have been emphasized in various party documents and speeches of the central leadership... Although these norms may not greatly have altered official behavior, there is some evidence of greater self-confidence in the villages and more courage to confront or bargain with the authorities than in the sixties. This courage has been reinforced by the radio -- which has often reported cases of leaders who have been expelled for bad leadership or for mistreating the people.³⁰

Mushi goes on to say that electoral participation has steadily risen where there are opportunities such as in village and national elections. This pattern is attributed to the party mobilizational capacity and also to villagization that brought together once isolated homesteads.³¹ Other factors might also include the rapid expansion of primary education and a very successful adult literacy program. With the peasantry's consciousness and apparent eagerness to vote and voice their opinion, the return of councils, cooperatives, and a more vigorous

self-help will greatly expand the areas of participation and may bring forth a leadership more representative of the majority than in the past.

Despite the promise of these changes, however, one should interpret them with a degree of caution. The fairly lengthy delay getting these measures off the ground no doubt reflects the great complexity of the enterprise, but it may also reflect several references to those with "vested interests" in the former institutions who will be asked to give ground to councils and cooperatives. Regional Development Directors will probably lose much of their coordinating role to the councils; regional trading corporations will find their formerly dominant position in distribution threatened by cooperatives; and crop authority functions will be peeled off or cut back.

A great deal depends upon both the final details that are worked out, and upon the general spirit in which they are implemented. But at the very least the new rural institutional structures mark a decided shift away from an almost linear move toward statism in the countryside. The changes indicate a shift of intellectual breeze away from the state as almost the sole institution of initiative, accumulation, and regulation in the socialist collectivity, to a recognition of the value of non-state collectivities in production and politics. There is also the implied recognition that these institutions are fully compatible, indeed necessary, for democratic socialism as President Nyerere has argued so eloquently. A long term observer of his country's rural development process cautioned me not to view the changes as a kind of "new Jerusalem." They are in his view, small but significant steps forward. But after along conversation it was also clear that he had not felt so optimistic in years.



1. This paper is an attempt to report and broadly interpret some observations made during a brief trip to Tanzania (June 27 - July 19, 1983). It is clearly not intended to be a piece of polished research, but the paper may have its place in lieu of any written discussion of the package of events may turn out to be as significant as previously recognized benchmark policy such as ujamaa vijijini, decentralization, and villagization.
2. The main legislation is the Local Government (District Authorities) Act 1982, and the Cooperative Societies Act 1982.
3. Basic Needs in Danger: A Basic Needs Oriented Development Strategy for Tanzania. Report to the Government of Tanzania by a Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa Basic Needs Mission. Addis Ababa: International Labour Organization, 1982.
4. There has been a rather vigorous parallel market which has been attacked by the current anti-economic-saboteur campaign. While the move is broadly popular ("something had to be done about it") it begs a long-term solution to the situation that gave rise to the behavior in the first place. And in the short-run, and in certain places, it exacerbated shortages that were partially relieved by the parallel market.
5. The following data is taken from the Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mozambique, No. 3, 1983.
6. Louise Fortmann, p. 117, concludes her judicious and well documented study of state and peasant relations in the following manner: "The most obvious conclusion from this study is that the policy of participatory socialism has not really been implemented in Tanzania. To be sure certain formal structures of participation have been established. But it has been shown that these structures at best provide pro forma participation. Indeed, they sometimes serve primarily as a tool of a central government in directing village activities." Peasants, Officials and Participation in Rural Tanzania: Experience with Villagization and Decentralization. Ithaca, N.Y.: Rural Development Committee, Center for International Studies, 1980.
7. This discussion of the history of district councils follows the very useful paper by Gelase Mutahaba, "Organization for Development: Tanzania's Search for Appropriate Local Level Organizational Forms", mimeo, n.d.
8. The "Report of the Prime Minister's Commission of Inquiry into the Possibility of Re-establishing Comparative Unions, May 1981," which I have not seen, allegedly suggests that cooperatives were not so bad after all, or that alongside their liabilities were several assets: cooperative unions were useful links between crop authorities, peasants and corporations for the provision of services; the cooperative structure gave peasants a chance to know the market situation, discuss economic issues, and voice their complaints and points of view; and cooperatives were usually well-prepared in advance of crop collection and hence there were few problems with the collection of produce and payment to peasants.
9. The political motive for the dissolution of cooperatives is mentioned in Goran Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective. London: Zed Press, 1983, p. 116. There is other opinion, however, which suggests that cumulative state intervention had effectively undermined any political threat. The rural petty bourgeoisie here connotes wealthy peasants, African trading and commercial elements, and local immobile civil servants.
10. Cited on p. 18 of Frederick E.G. Mallya, "Decentralization and Population Participation: The Case of Ilala District, Dar es Salaam Region," unpublished B.A. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam, 1977.

11. The Act is reprinted in Fortmann, op. cit. Village managers with at least Form IV education were recruited and sent to villages beginning in 1977 but they apparently have not made much of an impact and may be phased out, perhaps when cooperatives are operational. A good history and assessment of the impact of village manager policy in Singida Region is Robert Magaka Mayaya, "Public Policy Implementation in Tanzania: The Case of Village Managers Policy," unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam, September, 1981. The story illustrates the worst aspects of overly hasty policy formation and implementation. The first phase of 4000 managers could not refuse their appointment and were sent without training and without consultation with receiving villages -- and all in three weeks. The author argues that the managers augmented state power in villages; but his description of the distance between managers and their villages makes the former appear more irrelevant than effective arms of state power.
12. Report on Village Survey 1981. Dodoma: Cooperative Development Department, Office of the Prime Minister and Nordic Project for Cooperatives and Rural Development in Tanzania, August 1982.
13. The lack of complaint structures and its multiple effects including, he argues, lower prices to producers, are documented in Edwin H. Moshi, "Peasants' Participation Under the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU) and the Coffee Authority of Tanzania (CAT)," unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam, July 1980.
14. Koenraad Verhagen, "Change in Tanzanian Rural Development Policy, 1975-1978," Development and Change 11 (1980), p. 293. A valuable theoretical discussion of African parastatals in general with illustrative material from Tanzania is in Goran Hyden, op. cit.
15. Verhagen, op. cit., p. 294, poses the dangers of rising statism and the general absence of avenues of redress. After arguing that village administration allows for widespread participation at that level he then suggests that "...familiarity with the law and with actual events show that the Party and Government have appropriated such a degree of authority to themselves that little opportunity remains for participation in policy making at the base. The people also have virtually no protection against misuse of power from above."
16. The world economic crisis, subsequent fiscal crises in African states, and low prices to peasant producers make it likely that peasants will partially withdraw from the market thereby depriving states of revenue derived from state marketing of produce. As a result there is an incentive for states to return to poll taxes that were previously abolished as political liabilities and colonial relics. The new poll tax will, like the old, serve as a stimulus to cash crop production. The best discussion of peasant withdrawal in Tanzania is Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
17. Louis Picard, "Socialism and the Field Administrator: Decentralization in Tanzania," Comparative Politics 12:4 (July 1980).
18. Mutahaba, op. cit., p. 31.
19. The cooperatives may act as a kind of insurance against having peasants shoulder the burden of occasional crop authority breakdowns and interruptions of services. If for example, crop authorities fail to pick up the produce, by hook or by crook the cooperatives, with their transport capacity, will probably sell the produce in a timely fashion rather than see it spoil.

20. The ILO report, op. cit., Chapter 14, "Popular Participation and Decentralization," argues that self-help performance has been what it could be and makes a strong case for its revitalization.
21. This argument is sketched out in more detail in my, "Class Structure, Peasant Participation and Rural Self-Help," in Joel Barkan with John Okumu (eds.), Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania. New York: Praeger, 1979, and in a revised edition forthcoming.
22. Aside from the question of whether there really were sufficiently disaggregated plans in the 1960s and early 1970s, by the middle 1970s infrastructure decay, institutional uncertainties, and a growing internal budgetary crisis made it less likely that the government would keep its plan promises. There are hints that the very unreliability of the state made a mockery of plans and increasingly upset the peasantry. Examples of villager disillusion in one area is found in D.D. Peterson and T.T. Peterson, "The Village Profile Exercise: Background Information, Impressions and Perceptions," for the Arusha Planning and Village Development Project and the Regional Development Directorate, Arusha. Arusha: Regional Commissioner's Office, 1980. Fiscal unpredictability has also clearly upset the smooth provision of the expanded social services. The lack of a full complement of medical and school supplies is frequently mentioned.
23. Ministry of National Education figures indicate that 71.4% of eligible children were enrolled in primary schools in 1981. One is reminded that the leading edge of the explosion of self-help in post-independence Kenya was in secondary schools.
24. The figures and the prediction come from officials in the Ministry of National Education. In July 1983, a directive from the Ministry was imminent on how to start "private" secondary schools.
25. Daily News, July 18, 1983.
26. The political vacuum between the base and higher levels of the political system is unfortunately rather common in socialist practice (though hardly restricted to socialism), while socialist theory of the socialist state has tended to ignore the democratic necessity of intermediate representative institutions.
27. I try to make a case for the utility for peasants of cooperatives as political space in the face of almost continent-wide post-independence political demobilization. "Defending Peasant Political Space in Independent Africa," Canadian Journal of African Studies 14:1 (1980).
28. Contrary to the opinion of some Tanzanian civil servants, I doubt that expanded self-help will be a cost-saving device for the state. While self-help may allow the state to save on construction costs, the state will be hit hard with rising recurrent costs for teachers, nurses, medicine, etc. After the state has gone to great lengths to meet basic needs, a more vigorous self-help is likely to force the state to spend more rather than less.
29. I believe this has happened to some extent in Kenya.
30. Samuel S. Mushi, "Community Development in Tanzania," in Ronald Dore and Zoe Mars (eds.), Community Development: Comparative Case Studies. London: Croom Helm and Paris: UNESCO, 1981, p. 220.
31. Ibid., p. 221.

