MANAGING ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN SOUTH SUDAN: A CASE STUDY OF JONGLEI STATE (2011-2013)

BY PIOK MABIL KACHUOL

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DECLARATION

This project is my original work and has not been submitted for the award of a degree in any other University.

Signature…………………………..   Date………………………….

PIOK MABIL KACHUOL

C50/80163/2012

This project report has been submitted for examination with my approval as University supervisor

Signature……………………..   Date…………………………..

Dr Richard M. Bosire

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to all my siblings for their enduring support throughout my academic journey.

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ABSTRACT

Despite achieving her independence two years ago, South Sudan is affected by internal security challenges. The inter-communal violence in Jonglei State continues to deteriorate unabated with devastating effects in terms of human lives and destruction of property.

Given the fore mentioned, the study examines the underlying factors that allow for the continuing unabated ethnic conflicts despite South Sudan attaining independence. The findings of this study attribute escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei state to the acute level of distance decay which informs the skewed force to space-ration as the main contributing factors to the state inability to police the periphery. This has engendered proliferation of non-state actors in form of militia groups, and cattle bandits who assumed the role of the state-security provision-in areas neglected by the state.

Furthermore, current responses to reduce inter-communal violence in Jonglei State through disarmaments and peace conferences have failed because they have been narrowed towards addressing insecurity. The study focused on the escalation of ethnic conflicts in the period between 2011 and 2013. The study recommends that to address these challenges, it is imperative, that the government percolates to the local levels through credible and effective institutions, so as to orientate the local populace with alternative conflict mitigating mechanisms.

TABLE OF CONTENT

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CES	Center for European Studies
CIA	Central Investigation Agency
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECS	Episcopal Church of the Sudan
FNLA	Front for National Liberation of Angola
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
ICG	International Crisis Group
MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
UNITA	Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
US	United States
SSDM	South Sudan Democratic Movement
SSDA	South Sudan Democratic Army
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM/A-in-O	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition
SSPS	South Sudan Police Service
TJ	Transitional Justice

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background

In most post-conflict states, there is an acute shortage of an encompassing idea of the state that could bind all competing identities to the nation state. This is as accentuated during the decolonization period in Africa and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe where the challenge of establishing viable states, strong enough to bind various identities to the state (Fukuyama, 2012:107) was vividly pronounced. For instance, the state of Yugoslavia disintegrated because of competing identities within the state (Center for European Studies (CES), 2004: 2-3).

In Africa, the decolonization and the end of the Cold War left behind bifurcated states, with different identities within the state competing for control of state power (Mamdani, 1996:15; Schwab, 2001:12). For Rwanda and Burundi, decolonization left a void that was filled by competing identities between ethnic Hutu and Tutsis. Tutsis, having been the privileged ethnic group under the colonial rule were viewed as enemies by Hutus in both countries (Mamdani, 2001: 60).

A critical analysis of the ongoing South Sudan reveals that the crises as being similar to the challenges faced by a majority of post-independent states in Africa, a challenge characterized by the bringing together of politicized and militarized identities. For instance, in the course of the protracted civil war,(Anyanya I& Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army SPLM/A struggles), there were increased episodes of political alignments and realignments as a result of political interests and actions that molded interethnic relations. Hutchinson, 1996:9).[1]

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[1] the SPLM/A rebellion of 1983, and it subsequent split in to two factions, one headed by Dr Riek Machar, (Nasir Faction) and the mainstream (Torit Faction) headed by Dr John Garang,

Subsequently, this impacted negatively on the traditional animosities between Dinka, Murle and Nuer communities as Rands and Le Rich aptly observe (2012:9)

Given the forgoing, fomenting these divergent politically sharpened and militarized identities together in one state has transcended into the foremost formidable challenge for the newly independent state. Thus, this study seeks to examine the factors underpinning escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei state after the attainment of South Sudan's independence. Similarly, by extension, it seeks to proffer appropriate mechanisms of deescalating ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State which may be replicated in South Sudan where applicable.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

As Anya Anya I[2] and the Sudan People's liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), waged a protracted civil war against the central government in Khartoum over the right of self-determination (Willems & Rouw, 2011:8; Skinner, 2012: 2-3), parallel micro-conflicts amongst Southern ethnic groups, particularly in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei , lakes, Unity and Upper Nile states emerged. To a large extent, these conflicts centered over resources such as grazing lands, water, cattle, raged on unabated (Willems & Rouw, 2011: 7). Meanwhile, Within the SPLM/A, there were power struggles that pitted factions allied to John Garang and Riek Machar. With time, the power struggles manifested themselves along ethnic lines and proxy wars waged against the SPLA by forces loyal to Khartoum (Legassicke, 2013:2).

Notably, it was assumed that the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA in 2005) and the subsequent birth of an independent state (the Republic of South Sudan) would mark the end of micro-conflicts in South Sudan and in particular Jonglei state (Legassicke, 2012: 2).

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[2] Anya Nya I was the first South Sudanese movement. Anya Nya is a Madi word for poisonous snake. Madi is a tribe in Eastern Equatoria state, Nimule paym, Magwi County.

After independence, efforts towards the realization of this end-state included disarmament exercises and peace conferences that sought inclusivity in governance by bringing chiefs, youth representatives and politicians from all over Jonglei state together. For instance, the first disarmament exercise was launched in January December 2005 to May 2006, with a second process being launched in June 2008 by the government of South Sudan (GoSS) with the support of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) (International Crisis Group, 2009: 11). The third and the fourth disarmament exercises where conducted in early 2011 and 2012 following presidential decrees, ordering forceful civilian disarmament to bring stability to Jonglei state (O'Brien, 2009:14).

Despite the foregoing efforts, violent ethnic conflicts still raged on with heavy causalities and massive death tolls as explained below (Skinner, 2012:2-3), on 28th of August, 2009, Lou-Nuer attacked Weryol in Twic East County killing 42, wounding 60, and displacing hundreds. On 20th of September, the same groups of attackers estimated to be more than 1000 attacked Duk-padiet Payam in Duk County killing 167 (ICG, 2009:3). The nature of these attacks marked a departure from traditional cattle raiding in regards to intensity and purpose.

The conflict between *Lou-Nuer* and *Murle* has been the most lethal (ICG, 2009:5). In August 2011, thousands of armed men from Murle tribe launched an attack on the remote area of the northern part of the state killing 640 people and 750 left wounded; tens of thousands of cattle were stolen (UNMISS, 2012: 8-10). December 2011 to February 2012, Lou-Nuer mobilized around 8000 armed men and attacked an estimated 21 settlements of the Murle community around Pibor town, which resulted to 612 fatalities on the side of Murle, and the abduction of 42 children and women, and thousands were displaced (UNMISS, 2012:10).

In October 2013, armed Murle youth affiliated to rebel leader, David Yau Yau attacked Pakeer and Ajuong payams of Twic East County killing over 70 people, 88 wounded and 24 children and women abducted (Sudan Tribune, October, 22:2013).

The December 15 alleged coup attempt by forces loyal to the former Vice President, Dr Riek Machar has animated instability in Jonglei state because of the revival of the White Army. The death toll is reported to be above 10,000, and the subsequent displacement of an estimated one and half million persons in South Sudan and over half a million persons in Jonglei state thus far though it is projected that these numbers may rise as fighting is still ongoing (UNMISS, 2014: 6).

This study, therefore attempts to answer the following three questions. First, what factors underpin the escalation of armed conflicts in Jonglei state between 2011 and 2013? What is the nexus between state responses and escalation of armed conflicts in Jonglei state? How best can stability be achieved?

1.2 Research Objectives

Overall Objective

The overall objective is to examine the security challenges in post-war state of South Sudan. The underpinning assumption here is that post-conflict states often are faced with challenges of identity crisis.

Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study are:

1. To examine the main factors underpinning escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State.

2. To find out the nexus between state responses and the escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State

3. To propose viable solutions towards managing the above conflicts

1.3 Justification of Study

Academic Justification

On the academic level, ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State have been attributed to number of factors. (Asamoah, Sharmo, & Mwanzia, 2011: 4-5) argued that the escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei state is a legacy of the long standing political splits in the South, such as the 1991 split of the SPLM/A. However, their argument failed to contemplate that historical grievances are only invoked by political entrepreneurs to serve their interests in the absence of institutions that constrained individuals from making arbitrary decisions (Acemoglu, 2012: 75- 79). Hutchinson, 2000:10; Jok 2012:71 and Legassicke, 2010:10, argue that the breakdown of traditional systems of governance, a militarized society and competition of scarce resources such as water and pasture as the catalysts of the rampant ethnic violence across South Sudan.

Though the above arguments identify important causal factors of the ethnic conflict, they do not address the essential discourse of how state weakness has been a dominant phenomenon in contributing to the proliferation of non-state agents that perpetrate ethnic conflicts. The state 'retreat'/ decay, in the interior has not only provided a fertile environment for the militia groups and insurgency groups but also provides them with sanctuary. This serves to accentuate Weber's view, if a particular state does not have monopoly over the instruments of violence, many other

actors will exploit the vacuum through the possession of those instruments to advance their interests (Rosen &Wolff, 1999: 54).

Hence, this study seeks to fill the above gaps by examining how the absence of inclusive institutions that are able to penetrate the society or bind citizens to the state, leads to the occurrences of ethnic conflicts.

Policy Justification

This study proffered appropriate policies that will mitigate escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State. Since policies employed to end the escalations of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei state and in the broader South Sudan have not sufficiently been able to mitigate or abate the escalation of ethnic conflicts. For instance, the Operational Order No.1/2008 was issued by president Kiir to have all the civilians in the ten states surrender any kind of firearms in their possession to the state authorities and SPLA forces (O'brien, 2008:14).

Second policy adopted after the wake of lethal clashes between Nuer and the Murle in 2011, was the establishment of church led committee headed by Archbishop of the Episcopal Church of the Sudan (ECS), Daniel Deng Bul to reconcile the warring communities (Rands and LeRich, 2012: 10).

These orders have been deficient in that they are 'half baked initiatives' flawed by design to address a portion of the issue at hand. Of interest to note is that these directives were issued on the assumption that the proliferation of small arms is the core causal factor or driver of ethnic violence in South Sudan. As a consequence, the initiatives disregarded crucial factors such as the conditions (supply side) within the state that necessitated arms' acquisition. This study has attempted to recommend the adoption of sound policies that will enhance state-society relations

through effective institutions. For instance, construction of infrastructure such as road networks to link counties will expedite movement of regular forces in order to quell down inter-communal violence at it early stages. Secondly, infrastructural development will spur auxiliary income generating processes by making it easier for the local population to access market opportunities. As a result alternative and sustainable economic ventures that reduce the dependence of conflict related economic initiatives such as cattle rustling and banditry would be established. The key here is to increase the stakes of violent related economic activities into a scenario where costs outweigh the profits.

1.4 The Scope, Limitations, Delimitations and Assumptions

This study examined the post-independence (2011-2013) security challenges facing Jonglei State. The choice of the period was informed by the frequency of occurrences and magnitude of fatalities of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei state despite attainment of independence. In post-independent South Sudan, inter-communal violence in Jonglei state is reported to have claimed thousand lives and thousands more displaced between 2011 and 2013. The magnitude of the ongoing crisis has not yet been assessed clearly but UNMISS reports put the death tolls at over ten thousands.

Covering an area of 120,000 km2, Jonglei is the largest of the ten states in South Sudan[3], with a population of about 1.3 million, composed of six ethnic groups including Anyuak, Dinka, Jieh, Kachipo, Murle and Nuer (Legassicke, 2013:1-2). Jonglei State is largely underdeveloped; most areas are inaccessible from the state capital, Bor. However, this study only focused on the inter-

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[3] Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Lakes, Western Bhar al Ghazal, Northern Bhar al ghazal, Warrap, Unity , and Upper Nile States.

communal violence between the Dinka, Murle and Nuer[4] because these communities have experienced deadly violence between 2011 and 2013.

The conduct of this study encountered numerous challenges because Jonglei state being largely underdeveloped and highly insecure, with some parts of it[5] under control of the insurgent groups, such as the David Yau Yau's SSDM/A and SPLM/A-in-O, access to all the areas was difficult because reaching the interiors required finances, security and logistics. Owing to the above challenges, the study heavily relied on the existing documentary sources and interviews with members of the three ethnic groups available in Juba, the Capital City of South Sudan.

1.5. Definition and Operationalization of Key Terms

Conflict

Conflict has been defined as a situation where two or more parties strive to acquire the same scarce resource at the same time. This definition is wanting because it focused on economic aspects of conflict; it has excluded normative disputes that involved values, religion and beliefs (Swanstrom, 2005:20).

As a result, this study adopted Peter Wallersteen (2002:1) definition of conflict as perceived differences in issue positions between two or more parties at the same moment in time. This definition encompassed all various dimensions of conflicts unlike the first definition that focused on economic aspects of conflicts

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[4] Anyuak, Kachipo, and Jie

[5] Akobo, Uror, and Nyirol

Conflict Management

Fred Tanner (2000:1) defines Conflict Management as the limitation, mitigation and containment of conflict without necessarily solving it. However, this definition focuses too much on solving current conflict and does not seek to address the underlying incompatibilities.

Thus this study adopted William.I.Zartman (Swanstrom and Weissman, 2005:25) definition of Conflict Management as elimination of violence and violent-related actions and leaving the conflict to be dealt with on political level. This definition is appropriate for this study because it encompasses both short-term and long-term measures and mechanism of resolving conflict.

Ethnic Conflict: Collier (Chretien, 2008:16) defines ethnic conflicts as conflicts occurring due to greed. Shale (2004:2) defines ethnic conflicts as conflicts occurring due to social, economic, and political issues (resources, identity, and border oppression). Thus this study adopts constructivists' definition of ethnic conflict as conflicts that occur when the state is weak or doesn't have monopoly over the instruments of violence (Williams, 2008:60). Prevalence of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State can largely be attributed to state weakness.

Conflict Prevention

This study adopted Michael Lund's (Stranstrome and Weissman, 2005: 20) definition of Conflict Prevention as any structural or intercessory means to keep intrastate or interstate tension and disputes from escalating into significant violence and use of armed forces, to strengthen the capabilities of potential parties to violent conflict for resolving such disputes peacefully, and to progressively reduce the underlying problems that produce these issues and disputes. Because this definition encompasses measures that prevent violent conflicts and strengthen the capacity of

the concerned actors to act structurally to reduce the possibility of conflict unlike the definitions that focus on preventing short term potential escalation of conflict (Stranstrome and Weisman, 2005:21).

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0. Introduction

This study reviewed the literature on the nature of administration and interethnic relations in South Sudan since the Pre-Colonial period through Turko-Egyptian rule in the Sudan and Anglo-Egyptian (Condominium) rule in the Sudan and their legacies on the current inter-ethnic conflicts in South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular.

It is apparent that historical events continue to impact on contemporary interethnic relations in Jonglei State. Land marking phenomena such as the slave trade, colonialism, Cold War politics and Post-Cold War politics have significantly shaped perspectives on the genealogies of ethnic conflicts in most developing countries in general and Africa in particular.

These events have all segued in to each other with devastating effects on establishment of authorities in Africa. Thus, prevalence of ethnic conflicts in South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular is largely a function of perennial absence of legitimate administration that binds citizenry to the state.

2.1 Inter- ethnic Relations in the Pre-Colonial Southern Sudan

In the Pre-Colonial Southern Sudan, the genesis of ethnic conflicts can be traced back to the rise of powerful Islamic Kingdom in Central Sudan (The Kingdom of Sennar), which displaced most of the Nilotic communities (particularly, the Anyuak, Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk) from Central Sudan Southward. As these communities moved southerly they came in to conflicts with the inhabitants of the lands (Beswick, 2004:16-18).

Beswick further argues that these conflicts are often as a result of contest over scarce resources such as grazing lands, water, and areas for settlement since the Nilotic communities got displaced from their ancient lands in the Central Sudan. However, contests for these resources by communities remain unabated due to the absence of the strong authority that can distribute and regulate the consumption of these resources.

Another land marking event mentioned by Beswick (2004:169), was theslave raids organized by the Baggara Arab tribe (who crossed over in to the Sudan from West Africa,Chad) against the Western Nuer (present day Unity State), forced them to cross over to the east of the River Nile (Present day Jonglei and Upper Nile States). As a result they came in to conflicts with the Anyuak, Dinka, Murle, and the Shilluk in their search for areas of settlements. This processes of settlement led to the assimilation and displacement of the Dinka and Anyuak .

Furthermore, the inter-ethnic relationships between these tribes were further strained by activities of the slave merchants. The slave merchants would establish alliances with some elements of the Nuer and organize slave raids against the Dinka or Nuer.   The manipulation of slave merchants by elements of Dinka or Nuer against each other significantly soured interethnic relations between the Dinka and the Nuer. This marked the beginning of the unrelenting ethnic conflicts between the Dinka and the Nuer in Jonglei State

Finally, the Turko-Egyptian rule in the Sudan established through conquests (1874-1883) was unable to consolidate control over the South and other peripheries. Instead, a pattern of economic exploitation was established, with the South subject to periodic raids (including slave-raids) by the government-supported forces and excluded from developing political community (Battahani, 2006:2).

2.2 Inter-ethnic Relations in Colonial and Post-Colonial Time

(Schwab, 2001: 10-11; Mamdani, 1996: 16 & 190) have traced the origins of these waves of ethnic conflicts in Africa to slave trade, colonialism, and cold War politics. They link the current ethnic conflicts in Africa to the emergence of lucrative slave trade that pitted kingdoms, tribes and cultures against each other for slave raids. And also to the legacies of the colonial regimes which erected up predatory institutions, which continue to subjugate the common man

The Anglo-condominium administration (1899-1955) in the Sudan through a policy which was popularly known as ''the Southern Policy,'' enacted in the 1930s, held the then Southern Sudan under closed district, separately from the north to prevent the rise of Arab influence in the South (Hoehne, 2008: 14-15). This policy clearly undermined the civilizing processes of the Sudanese state, it instead bifurcated the state, which has just culminated in the split of the Sudan.

Equally in the South, indirect rule, with its basic principle dictated that the local administration of colonial people should be conducted through indigenous structures of authority, employing indigenous laws or customs as far as this was consistent with the British idea of good governance and justice (Hoehne, 2008:14-15). Customary laws of course were different at the local level. Uniformity regarding local laws could not be achieved.

Indirect rule greatly inhibited free interactions between various ethnic groups. In a nutshell, the above policy has a significant bearing on the currently volatile inter-ethnic relations among the Dinka, Nuer, and Murle in Jonglei state because it only helped in engendering ethnicity as the basis of administration. The practice has been adopted by various administrations that have ruled Sudan; even the autonomous government of Southern Sudan replicated it as the basic principle for establishing counties.

Furthermore, the colonial administration in the South created hereditary traditional authorities among a cephalous (stateless) society like Dinka, Nuer and Murle in Jonglei State. The appointments of chiefs were based on loyalty to the administration. Those chiefs who collaborated with the colonial administration got elevated. This has great effects in the current inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic relations among the Dinka, Nuer and Murle (Hoehne, 2008: 15).

After the independence of South Sudan there have been attempts to restructure traditional systems of governance. As enshrined in the constitution, the chiefs, and the paramount chiefs are to be elected. This challenged the hereditary systems instituted by the colonial administration in the South and Jonglei state in particular because the heirs of the former colonial chiefs are resisting restructuring of the traditional system of governance. This is exacerbating intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State.

Also, after independence, the SPLM led government perpetuated the old practice by marginalizing the chiefs that collaborated with Khartoum and favoured the ones that were loyal to it during liberation struggles. This patronage system of rewarding loyalists has greatly fueled intra and inter-ethnic conflicts at the local levels and has indeed prompted the chiefs who were loyal to Khartoum then to maintain their allegiances to Khartoum. They still get material support in terms of finance and arms from Khartoum to assert their authority and continue to destabilize the new nation in the interest of Khartoum.

In what was known as the Upper Nile Province (present day Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei State), Nuer and the Dinka were not allowed to live together (Johnson, 1975:2). The colonial administration established settlement areas for the Nuer and moved the Dinkas to designated areas despite protest by the latter against the policy (ibid: 3), this policy was largely informed by

the fear that Nuer *Kujurs* (prophets) were rebellious against the administration and would proselytize the Dinka in to opposition (ibid: 4-5).

This policy erected up native institutions that were basically meant to extract tributes from the societies at the expense of promoting unity between the two ethnic groups. Indirect rule indeed did make existing divisions less flexible because people were confined to their localities as tribesmen not as natives because customary laws were defined as rules of the tribes not as that of the native (Richens, 2000: 5-7). South Sudan after independence inherited these predatory institutions that continue to hinder national unity.

Despite separately administering the South and the North, the two regions were later haphazardly merged in to one country, the republic of the Sudan in 1956. This was largely done against the will of the people of Southern Sudan who wanted a federation. This led to Torit Mutiny in 1955 and subsequent outbreak of full scale war against the government by the Anya Nya in 1963 (Battahani, 2006:.3), which culminated in the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972.Its abrogation later and continuous neglect of the South by the regime of Jaffar Nimeiri led to the second civil war (1983-2005) between the governments in Khartoum and the SPLM/A under John Garang.

The post-independence governments of the Sudan adopted the divide and rule policy from the colonial government and used it as the basis for organization of the modern Sudanese state. The result was skewed patterns of socio-economic and political development that were characterized by exclusion, marginalization and violent conflicts (ibid: 3-4). The post-independent government of the Sudan adopted Islam and Arabism as the ideological basis for building Sudanese state.

Islamization and Arabization of the Sudan were largely opposed in the South because the two policies were alien to the Southern Sudanese (ibid: 5).

Continued use of these divisive policies as the basis for organizing the Sudanese state constituted the fundamental cause of the protracted Sudanese Civil Wars. Thus this study attributes the endemic ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State in particular to the perennial absence of inclusive institutions that organize state such that its reflects the diverse socio-economic, political and cultural backgrounds of the society.

2.3 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Ethnic Conflicts in Jonglei State

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was an agreement signed between the government of the Sudan headed by the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in 2005 in Naivasha, Kenya, that brought to an end the long protracted North-South war. The agreement culminated in the breakaway of South Sudan in 2011 through a referendum.

Despite ending the over two decades war between the North and the South, the CPA made no attempts in resolving the internal/inter-communal conflicts that raged on in the South (Brosche, 2009: pp 17-23). Furthermore, the CPA process was not inclusive, in that it largely focused on the two parties that dominated the conflict, the SPLM/A on one hand and the National Congress Party[6] (NCP or GoS) on the other[7].

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[6] NCP refers to the National Congress Party, famously known as the NIF (National Islamic Front) which ascended to power through a military coup organized by the President of the Sudan, Field Marshal Omer Hassan Al Bashir. NCP used Islam and Arabism as ideologies to organize the Sudanese state.

[7] SPLM is an initial for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement founded in 1983 by Dr John Garang de Mabior. The SPLM's vision was reestablishment of New Sudan of inclusivity.

Concentration of power and oil rents in the hands of the two parties-the signatories to the CPA-led to frequent switching of sides by individuals from other parties, to the SPLM/A in the South and NCP in the North. The defections from other parties were largely influenced by the quest for resource rents, which ended up making SPLM/A ungovernable and subsequently spilled over to other sectors of the society (Ahmed, 2009:134-135). And herein lays the original sin as the frequency of defections served to undermine institutional development in the South because oil revenues were diverted for buying in to the SPLM members of other political parties.

In the South, it turned out to be a contest for resources which engendered a lot of patrimonialism and ceaseless power struggles within the SPLM/A as accentuated by the unfolding of events on December 15th 2013, an incident that was precipitated by the intense and negative incidents of *realpolitik* maneuvers within the SPLM/A.

In regards to the armed groups, the CPA outlawed Other Armed Groups (OAGs) except the SPLA and the SAF. All the militias in the South were asked to either join the SPLA or SAF. Their exclusion in the peace processes fanned interethnic conflicts in South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular (Young, 2006:23-24).

Most of the SSDF commanders who opted not to join the SPLA and still maintained allegiances to Khartoum antagonized local communities in the most parts of the Greater Upper Nile (ICG, 2009:8). Thus, exclusion of other stakeholders such as the SSDF in the CPA process has largely served as an impediment in attaining and establishing sustainable peace and continues to engineer violence as most groups view violence and military force as the only strategy to attain power and political recognition. (Young,2006:24). With the forgoing, increased levels of

manipulations and militarization of the local identities by remnants of the SSDF and other dissatisfied groups try to assert their authority has been witnessed.

These dynamics that were not contemplated by the CPA continue to foster socio-economic and political marginalization at the local levels. They segued in to ethnic animosities engendered by the long protracted civil wars. Identities within the South were politically charged in an anarchic environment, where government monopoly of instruments of violence was outsourced to armed militia groups with limited control over them (Rolandsen, 2000: 4-5). These activities pitted one ethnic group against the other, and did an unprecedented damage to the traditional authorities and social capitals (Rolandsen, O.H., 2011: 4-5).

From the above accounts of events from the Turco-Egyptian rule to Anglo-Condominium rule, to independent Sudan and subsequently to the independent state of South Sudan, there is constant absence of credible and inclusive institutions that bind peasantry to the state and enhance legitimacy of the government. Modus operandi between the society and the state has been extractive/exploitative, predatory and victimizing, i.e the citizenry has never been stakeholders in matters of governance. Thus this study approached crisis in Jonglei State from the absence of Hobbesian state.

2.4 Perspectives on Escalations of Ethnic Conflicts in Jonglei State

Legacy of Long Civil Wars

The protracted civil war (1983-2005) impacted differently on different ethnic groups. The domination of the SPLM/A by the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups meant that only they were more powerful, and suffered the greatest loses during the conflict whilst on the other they were in a political domination amongst themselves (Hoehne, 2008:14). Inter-ethnic relations between the

two groups were severely damaged by the breakdown of traditional system which had in the past, mitigated the manifestation of interethnic rivalries into violent confrontations in the absence of the state.

Domination of the SPLA by the Dinka and the Nuer made other ethnic groups such as the Murle, and Anyuak view it as a vehicle for revenge by the Dinka and Nuer against their erstwhile rivals. This perception provoked resistance to attempts by the government to disarm them in 2011 and 2012. It also engendered unceasing contest for power within the SPLA between the Dinka and Nuer which invariably leads to series of splits and clashes along ethnic lines.

War induced displacements also undermined the authority of the chiefs. This was as a result of the emergence of parallel centers of power and competing authorities that was occasioned by the appointment of different chiefs by persons in internally displaced camps, by the SPLA and by the government of the Sudan (Ibid: 16). These interferences led to conflicts of loyalty after the return of the people and their chiefs to their old clan territories (ibid: 14).

Since attaining independence, chiefs associated with Khartoum have largely been excluded in the local government affairs by the SPLM/A whilst the local communities do not recognize their authority as they are viewed as collaborators. To maintain relevance, these chiefs were forced to maintain their allegiance to Khartoum by mobilizing insurgent militia groups against rival chiefs within and against neighboring communities. This practice continues to exacerbate inter-ethnic violence in Jonglei state and South Sudan as a whole.

The continued use of proxy militia groups within the Jonglei State by the Khartoum government to destabilize South Sudan has also been a major causal escalation factor of inter-ethnic violence in Jonglei state (Young, 2006:14). Militias (such as the SSDF) recruited locally, with covert ties

to Khartoum, have engaged in mass murder, sexual violence, looting and displacement at little expense to Khartoum (Mc Evoy and LeBrun, 2010:13).

In Southern Sudan, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) previously employed massive use of tactics of proxies following the SPLM/A split in 1991. In this period, Dr Riek Machar and Dr Lam Akol defected and formed the SPLM/A-Nasir Faction, citing autocratic leadership style of Dr John Garang; Garang's support for a United New Sudan and the SPLA abuses against civilians (Evoy and LeBrun, 2010:13).

According to Mc Evoy and LeBrun, this splitting of the SPLA intensified intra-southern fighting. Khartoum successfully exploited ethnic and political divisions in the South, buying loyalty with material goods, arms and ammunition (ibid, 2010:14). Even the recent incidence of December 15, 2013 has renewed relations between Khartoum and its former militia leaders like James Gatdet, Mabor Dhoal, Gatwech Dual and Gabriel Tanginye among others.

The 1991 split occasioned the proliferation of local armed groups in an attempt to protect the local communities against the marauding rival soldiers of SPLA, and cattle bandits from rival communities. The White Army, Murle's Pibor Defense Forces, *Dukey/ Gelweng (Titweng)* of the Dinka were formed against the above backdrop. Given the foregoing communities became increasingly militarized as they mobilized against each other in intense conflicts as evidenced in the Bor Massacre, where over 2000 Bor Dinkas were killed by forces loyal to Machar-the White Army (Young, 2006:13).

All these militia groups were lumped together by the National Islamic Front (NIF) during the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement, which promised the right of self-determination to South

Sudanese through a referendum. This resulted in an intensified period of conflict against the mainstream SPLA under John Garang it abrogation later led to defection of militia commanders like Riek Machar to the mainstream SPLM/A in 2002 (Mc Evoy & LeBrun, 2010:15).

However, attributing the escalation of armed conflicts in Jonglei state to legacies of the civil wars and fragmentation of the Southern Sudan is not sufficient because identities and interests are forged over time. Thus it's rather the failure of institutions to bind the diverse identities to the state that explains the escalation of inter-communal violence. Thus this study asserts that escalation of armed conflicts in Jonglei state is a function of weak institutions or the non-existence of institutions.

Competition over Resources and Economic Interests

Other perspectives attribute escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State to competition over scarce resources such as water and grazing lands, and unprecedented increase in bride price, (Small Arm Survey, 2012: 6). According to Lacey (2013:9), after the signing of the CPA, the bride-price increased by 44% (from 30-60 cows) due to increased need to marry many wives who would give birth to more daughters and bring more cattle. Furthermore, wealthy men based in Juba inflated the bride price, as they would offer about 200 herds of cattle for the revered traditional event. This increase in bride price led to high demand for cattle, hence increase in inter-community and intra-community raiding (ibid: 10-11).

However, the above perspective focused so much on social aspect of cattle raiding and disregarded the relevance of economic and political factors in cattle raiding. Increase in cattle raiding could also be a function of limited economic opportunities and political manipulations. Given the extent of mobilization and types of weapons used during cattle raiding, it is apparent

that it is not only the demand for cattle that drives these conflicts but also vested political interests behind the scenes.

According to Rolandsen and Breidlid (2013:8), violence in Jonglei State should be viewed as a response to dynamic of political and socio-economic post-war environment. That is to say, youth participation in violence in Jonglei State should not only be seen as a consequence of their social role and responsibilities as protectors of the community but also of the political economy of civil war and large scale violence.

For instance, insurgent groups such as David Yau Yau's SSDM/A, late George Athor's forces and remnants of SSDF in Jonglei State are massively involved in cattle raiding in order to get food supplies (ibid :10). Thus escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State becomes a confluence of social, economic and political factors. Thus pegging it on a single factor is misleading, it has multiple causes.

(Mc Evoy &LeBrun, 2010:19) argued that competition for territories, water points, and grazing lands has heightened because of change in climatic conditions which has forced pastoralist communities to move to areas where they can have access to the limited resources. This has exacerbated inter-communal violence between the Dinka and the Nuer on one hand and Nuer and Murle on the other (ICG, 2009:8). The Lou-Nuer often clashed with Dinka of Duk County, Jikany-Nuer and Murle over water points and grazing areas because the Lou-Nuer is geographically disadvantaged (ibid: 9).

Also huge non-skilled, illiterate population largely disconnected from the center, with limited market opportunities formed a force of willing recruits for the insurgent groups. This isolation of

the locals has alienated them and engendered anti-regime sentiments across the vast country side (Lacey, 2013:20)

The above perspectives have not sufficiently explained the fundamental causes of escalation of ethnic conflicts. Resources such as grazing land, cattle, and increase in bride price do not constitute fundamental drivers of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State. Rather it is the absence of overarching authority that sufficiently provides security and punishes wrong doings, and regulates consumption of scarce resources that underpins the escalation of ethnic conflicts in South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular.

2.5 Existing Mechanisms for Managing Ethnic Conflicts
Small Arms and Civilian Disarmament

(Jok, 2013: 72; Hutchinson, 1996:10, and Garfield, 2007:12) attributed escalation of armed conflicts to proliferation of small arms. Mc Evoy & LeBrun (2010:20) further asserted that the belief surrounding the power of the gun has fuelled inter-communal violence.

According to Lacey (2013:15-17), there is about 1.9-3.2 millions arms circulating in private hands, excluding what is in possession of the regular armed forces and militias. This militarization poses a threat to civil population in Jonglei State, a society where gun and force is equated to power and entitlements.

The prevalence of guns has led to erosion of traditional authority that played *sine qua non* role time immemorial in mitigation and limitation of disputes between communities. This has resulted to escalation of inter-communal violence across Jonglei state because traditional leaders wield no power to control the youths (Mc Evoy &LeBrun, 2010:20).

GoSS's attempts to disarm communities from Jonglei State did not yield the expected results. Government perceptions about escalation of ethnic conflicts had greatly been informed by proliferation of small arms as the fundamental cause of the problem but did not seek to address factors underpinning escalations of ethnic conflicts. Furthermore, the disarmament does not make a clear distinction between a civilian and a soldier, i.e who is to be disarmed and who should not (Lacey, 2013:19-20)?

Instead civilian disarmament exercises have always led to escalation of violence due to endemic distrust between the state and the society. The Dinka and Nuer communities have complained about lack of protection from the government after disarmament whilst the Murle have cited gross human right abuses during the exercise (Lacey, 2013:19). Hence contrary to its intended results, disarmament exercises result in society and state fragmentation along ethnic lines.

The underlying causal factors of inter-communal tensions in Jonglei state have rendered Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration incoherent initiatives of redress. Absence of physical infrastructure, lack of employment opportunities into a regular economy and breakdown of social networks are greater impediments to stability in Jonglei State and engender political economy of civil war. It is not the proliferation of small arms per se that underpins escalations of ethnic conflicts in South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular, but it is compounded by state weakness.

The above views are wanting in several aspects: Firstly arms do not constitute fundamental cause of inter-communal violence, but rather tools of executing grievances-socio-economic and

political conditions-within the state that have engendered arms acquisition. Secondly, non-existent of a hollow state characterized by civil institutions located at the periphery, such as the police, court halls, and inadequate basic services like the health and education facilities edges insurgent groups over the government.

Political Accommodation

SPLM/A during the years of liberation had a comprehensive blueprint beyond the struggle period. In 1994 Convention, the party developed structures of governance, which proves ideas of a sovereign state before the CPA and the referendum. The Convention established various administrative commissions: military affairs, foreign affairs and international cooperation, and civil affairs and interior/law enforcement (LeRich &Arnold, 2012:144).

However, post -CPA, and the untimely death of the SPLM/A founder-Dr John Garang- Kiir's administration adopted a mechanism of buying off warlords to end ethnic conflicts and rebellions (Copnall, 2014:167). This dates back to the signing of Juba Declaration between Salva Kiir and former militia leader, Paulino Matip in January 2006 and continued to 2012, 2013, and 2014 when the government issued comprehensive amnesties to SSLA/M leaders, Peter Gatdet, Bapiny Monytuil and David Yau Yau (SSDM/A) (ibid:167).

 Kiir's 'large Tent Strategy' as referred to by some scholars, integrated even most ardent opponents of SPLM/A during the pre-independence war into government. Though political calculation temporarily helped in engendering semblance of peace it to a large extent proved detrimental towards institutional development, because convoluted and inflated payrolls were

created as a result of massive integration of Other Armed groups (OAGs) (LeRich &Arnold, 2012:146).

By appeasing other parties, Kiir, was unable to implement a cohesive national building policy or to use the state to improve to key national infrastructure and economy because the overwhelming bulk of budget was spent on salaries leaving insignificant amount for development.

This policy of rewarding those who have taken up arms against the state with prestigious financial incentives, jobs, and ranks in the government and in the army has increased proliferation of insurgent groups in South Sudan (ibid:159). Kiir's ' Big Tent Strategy' has been manipulated by those who are accustomed to using violence to gain concessions, which in effect has immensely destabilized the country instead of a constructive contributions to nation-building (ibid:160).

Although Kiir's 'Big Tent Strategy' was a positive gesture towards cementing sustainable peace, its execution was massively flawed because it did not prioritize force development in terms building capacity of the personnel, providing necessary equipment, and providing orientation about the philosophy of the SPLA to the newly integrated forces. Furthermore, integration should have been preceded by accountability for the previous injustices done by both sides.

In conclusion, the above mechanisms are inappropriate means to managing ethnic conflicts in South Sudan. Disarming communities without providing security and alternative sources of livelihood is self-defeat approach. Also buying off warlords, and co-opting corrupt bureaucracy that was used as part and parcel of counter-insurgency warfare by Khartoum has stifled institutional development in South Sudan. It is a perpetuation of Khartoum style of

centralization of power by other means. Thus state weakness to capture the peasantry has created willing recruits for insurgent groups as witnessed throughout the interim period and post-referendum period.

Owing to the absence of the state in the far-flung areas, non-state actors assumed the roles of the state, for instance provision of security for the local community. The government only comes in to disarm these local armed groups and leave them vulnerable to armed militia such as the cattle bandits. State absence in the peripheries has provoked strong resistance to GoSS's disarmament programs across Jonglei State. Disarmament must always be a part and parcel of the wider objective but should not be the sole security response to escalation of inter-communal violence.

2.6 Theoretical Framework

Theory of instrumentalism

Instrumentalists opposed the primordialists' arguments which attribute ethnic conflicts to ancient hatreds (Chretein & Banegas, 2008:17). Instead they argue that identities are shaped by the political entrepreneurs who often invoke historical grievances to advance their personal interests. Instrumentalists' argument was further reiterated by Buzan (1979:172) who asserted that when institutions fail to give an encompassing identity to the society, individuals retreat to their ethnic cocoons for protection.

Instrumentalists' view was also echoed by Zartman (2000:141) when he argued that conflicts occur only when need is unevenly and unfairly distributed, allowing the targeted group to identify and mobilize and then to compete for resources for the resistance movement and for its political entrepreneurs.

Similarly, Crawford & Lipscuts (1998:25) argued that in those societies whose institutions politicized ethnic or sectarian cleavages, political entrepreneurs emerge who have both the incentive and the opportunity to exploit cultural cleavages and perceived inequalities in an effort to mobilize popular support.

By attributing ethnic conflicts to manipulations of identities by political entrepreneurs, instrumentalism has a role to play in explaining ethnic conflicts. However, it is not substantial enough on its own and a more robustly synthesized perspective is needed to explain ethnic conflicts. Constructivism provides the necessary historical backgrounds (Weir, 2012:10).

Instrumentalists and constructivists' arguments are widely reflected in South Sudan's ethnic conflicts in general, and in Jonglei State in particular. The ongoing crisis and the endemic ethnic rivalries in Jonglei state are largely a function of reproduction of ancient hatreds by political entrepreneurs in order to advance their individual interests. This is epitomized by the previous and the ongoing wars between the government and opposition loyal to the former VP-Riek Machar.

By and large, reproduction of ancient hatreds by political entrepreneurs is also underpinned by absence of inclusive institutions which constrain the arbitrary decisions by political leaders who often disadvantage certain sections of the society. Institutions organize the physical base (people) by giving them identity that binds them to the state. In other words institutions embody social contract between the society and the state, and in the event that the state reneges on basic principles of social contract such as the provision of security, it is always engendered massive retreat to ethnic cocoons where safety of the society is guaranteed.

2.7 Research Hypotheses

1   Escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State is a function of manipulation of historical grievances.

2   Escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State is a function of poor policy approaches.

3   To abate ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State, the state must penetrate the society.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the research methodology used while conducting the study and in obtaining, organizing and analyzing data. It outlined the area of study, the target population, methods of data collection, sampling techniques and data analysis procedures.

3.2. Site Description and Scope

Jonglei State is the largest of the ten states in South Sudan with an area of about 120,000km2 and a population of about 1.2 million (Legassicke, 2013:1). It is home to six ethnic groups, namely; Anyuak, Dinka, Jieh, Kachipo, Murle and the Nuer. However this study proposes to examine the inter-ethnic conflicts between the Dinka, Murle and the Nuer communities. This is informed by the nature, frequency and intensity of inter-ethnic conflicts between these communities, which have mutated significantly since the attaining independence.

This study recognized the challenges encountered in the area of study. Most citizens of Jonglei State have been displaced within the country and beyond the borders of South Sudan; thus, there was a huge challenge in accessing respondents. Consequently, the study was partially a desktop study although corroborated with limited primary data gathered from interviews with opinion leaders, residents of Jonglei State in Juba and online questionnaire sent to Jonglei State respondents within and without Jonglei State.

3.3 Sampling Techniques

The study employed stratified sampling technique in selecting respondents. Thirty respondents were selected from the three ethnic groups: Dinka, Murle, and Nuer because these are the only ethnic groups in records locked up in violent conflicts for years. 10 respondents were selected from each stratum in order to ensure data representation.

In order to gather views from all strata within the society, the study further employed purposive sampling. Three representatives were drawn from the youth, women, and traditional leaders respectively across each of the three ethnic groups. The choice of the youth, traditional and women leaders was largely influenced by the need for accurate information because they are conversant with issues affecting their respective groups. Finally, three respondents were drawn from experts on South Sudan's conflicts in order to get comprehensive views about the underlying factors in Jonglei State conflicts.

3.4 Methods of Data Collection

The study collected data from both primary and secondary sources. The study mainly used secondary data from written sources such as books, journals, magazines and newspapers among others. The choice of secondary data was informed by the availability of academic literature and policy documents on ethnic conflicts in South Sudan in general and Jonglei state in particular.

The study took cognizance of the fluidity and changing circumstances on the ground. However, the study focused on period from 2011-2013 as this period marked the birth of the Republic of South Sudan. In the interest of academic rigor, this study tried to update information by corroborating primary sourced data and secondary sourced data on the issues of concerns. The

study used in-depth interviews with the conflict experts, government officials, humanitarian aid workers in South Sudan, women and youth leaders from the three ethnic groups were of special interest to this study.

3.5 Data Analysis

Data collected from documentary sources was subjected to content analysis guided by research questions. This was done by grouping them in to thematic areas or recurring variables. The outcomes of content analysis were presented in table form to produce descriptive statistics for discussion.

CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH FINDINGS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the findings of the study based on research objectives. The findings are responding to the research objectives and the hypotheses by examining the dynamics of escalations of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State, the nexus between security responses and escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State, the effects of the inability of the state to penetrate the society on escalation of ethnic conflict, and sought to proffer the appropriate mechanisms for addressing ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State.

After the conclusion of the personal, phone and questionnaire interviews with respondents, critical analysis of the data commenced from which a certain pattern of factors emerged which was easily grouped in to thematic areas. Due to the multiplicity and relatedness of the factors, the findings of the study were grouped in to political, economic and social drivers of ethnic conflicts.

Thus this chapter has the following sections: Summary and presentation of the main findings and critical analysis of the data. Under summary and presentation of the main findings the researcher organized and gave extensive description of the findings in table forms. While under critical

analysis of the findings, the mass of data was put in to perspectives in order to explain factors underpinning the escalation of violent conflicts in Jonglei State.

4.1 Summary of the Main Findings

4.1.1 The Dynamics of Escalation of Ethnic Conflicts in Jonglei State

Table 1.0 Factors underpinning escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State

In the table below, the initials SD= means strongly disagree, D= means disagree, A= means agree, SA= means strongly agree and NS= means not sure.

Description	Responses				
	SD (1)	D (2)	A (3)	SA (4)	NS (5)
1. Escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State is a function of historical grievances	2 (6.8%)	1 (3.3%)	15 (50%)	10 (33.3%)	2 (6.8%)
2. Escalation in Jonglei State is driven by resources	1 (3.3%)	3 (10%)	10 (33.3%)	16 (53.3%)	0 0
3. Escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State is due to the inability of the state to provide security to the society	2 (6.67%)	2 (6.67%)	10 (33.3%)	15 (50%)	1 (3.3%)
4. Escalation of ethnic conflict in Jonglei State is a function of proliferation of	1 (3.3%)	1 (3.3%)	10 (33.3%)	18 (60%)	0 0

small arms					
5. Escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State is because of the absence of infrastructure	1 (3.3%)	2 (6.67)	13 (43.3%)	14 (46.7%)	0 0
6. Escalation of ethnic conflict is a function of relative deprivation	7 (23.3%)	10 (33.3%)	3 (10%)	2 (6.67)	8 (26.7%)
7. ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State is exacerbated by poor policy approaches	3 (10%)	2 (6.67%)	8 (26.7%)	16 (53.3%)	1 (3.3%)

Source: Author (2014)

4.1.2 Interpretation of the Table

The findings as shown in the above table largely link escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State to proliferation of small arms. 18 respondents (60% strongly agree) while 10 respondents (33.3% agree). This confirms the assumptions of the theory of ethnic security dilemma which links arm race at the local level to the absence of an overarching authority. Further the findings also support the central hypothesis that attributed escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei state to weak institutions.

Secondly, competition for scarce resources is strongly found to have contributed to escalations of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State as shown by the findings (16=50.3% strongly agree and 10=33%

agree). According to Prof Pauline[8], competition for scarce resources such as water, and lands do not fundamentally exacerbate violent ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State but rather it is the inability of the state to provide basic services to its rural based population.

Thirdly, escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State is a function of the inability of the state to provide security to the society as shown above by the research findings. 15 respondents, which are equal to 50% strongly, agree whilst 10 respondents which equals to 33.3% agree. The findings confirm the central objective of the study which asserts that escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State is a function of the inability of the state to penetrate the society. Prof Pauline further argued that poverty ridden peasantry has been disconnected from the urban centers by poor governance which leaves them without other options but to get indulged in cattle rustlings or join the insurgent groups waging war against the state.

Another factor with significant links to the escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State according to the findings is poor policy responses adopted by the state. 16 respondents (53.3% strongly agree) while 8 respondents (26.7% agree). According to Kaka[9], a Murle youth leader, disarmament exercise failed to abate ethnic conflicts because it only sought to address the problem of insecurity but not the root causes. As long as the basic services are not provided, manipulations of identities and cattle banditry will persist. Kaka attributed Murle's resistance of disarmament exercise to abuses in forms of torture, and raping meted against them by the SPLA.

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[8] Prof Pauline Riak is the executive Director of The Sudd Institute, a Policy Research Center based in Juba, South Sudan, was interviewed by the researcher at the Institute in Juba Raha.

[9] Kaka, is a Murle youth leader and a student of Applied Sciences at the University of Juba was interviewed on phone by the researcher in Juba.

Fourthly, historical grievances and absence of infrastructure also play significant role in escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State. They make up 46.3% and 33.3% respectively. Resurrection of historical grievances between different ethnic groups in Jonglei State largely vindicate the central hypothesis of this study which attribute the escalation of ethnic conflicts to weak institutions which are basically predatory and exclusive. Furthermore absence of infrastructure such as road networks and communication facilities play a significant role in hindering accessibility of the areas affected by conflicts by the organized forces.

Finally but not the least, other factors widely mentioned by the respondents as directly exacerbating ethnic conflicts include Poverty, illiteracy and tribalism in public institutions. From the questionnaires filled by the respondents, escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State has been linked to poverty, illiteracy and prevalence of tribalism in the public institutions. These views were supplemented by arguments presented by Prof Pauline during personal interview. She argued that due to lack of alternative sources of livelihood because of lack of infrastructure which would offer market opportunities for survival, consequently youths revert to cattle raiding, insurgent groups and child abductions to meet the soaring bride price and other socio-economic demands.

4.1.3 Suggested Solutions by the Respondents

On whether the existing policies adequately addressed the underlying drivers of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State, respondents (24) who had filled the questionnaires and those personally interviewed by the researcher cited that the policy approaches adopted were largely incoherent

and undermined their success. According to Samuel[10], a youth leader from the Jie community, permanent deployment of troops in the hotspots and border areas would reduce the proliferation of small arms.

Garangdit[11], an elder from Bor County, reiterated this view point when he asserted that the provision of security by deploying troops at hot spots and creation of buffer zones between rival communities would abate the escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State. He went further and blamed the escalation of violent ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State on lack of political will from the central government.

Majority of the respondents (70%) who had filled questionnaires recommended provision of social services such as health facilities, schools and development of infrastructure such as road networks that will link the peasantry and the urban areas through flow of goods and services as the appropriate mechanisms to abate escalation of ethnic conflicts. Infrastructure will reduce the level of deprivation among various ethnic groups and will also enhance quick responses to violent conflicts.

According to Kaka, a Murle youth leader, inclusive reconciliation and dialogues among communities will enhance trust. He faulted previous peace conferences on their lack of inclusivity; he argued that women and youth voices were not adequately heard, despite the fact that they are always the immediate victims of the violence. Thus he recommended that the

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[10] Samuel is Jie community youth leaders and was personally interviewed in Juba at Millenium Hotel

[11] Garangdit is a Dinka elder from Bor County who was interviewed by the researcher on 17th of July at Thongpiny Business Center in Juba.

processes of reconciliation must be inclusive in the sense that it should not only targets politicians and elites but must also involve the youths, women and elders at the villages.

4.2 Discussions of the Findings

This section gives the detailed presentation of the findings by grouping them in to three major thematic areas. The major thematic areas include political, social and economic drivers of inter-communal violence in Jonglei State. A comprehensive explanation of how each particular factor contributes to the escalation of violent conflicts is discussed below.

4.2.1 The Economic Drivers of Ethnic conflicts

Interviews revealed that majority of the respondents who had filled questionnaires (53.3% strongly agree and 33.3% agree) in Jonglei State complained about unfair distribution of resources in terms of both political positions and revenues. In particular were respondents from the Murle and *Jie* communities who lamented the lack of representation in the state and central government in Bor and Juba respectively.

Further interviews between the researcher and three humanitarian workers stationed in *pibor* echoed similar views as the fore mentioned. They asserted that lack of basic facilities such as health and learning facilities have engendered feelings of alienation in the entire Pibor County. The above perceptions confirm the findings of the study conducted by The Sudd Institute in 2012 which reported that over 80% of the national budget is spent in Juba by the central government (Mayai, 2012:2).

Furthermore funds that go to the states are not allocated in a manner prorate to the population or level of per capita income. Previously, equal block transfer of funds was the allocation formula, however after protests from under-sourced states like Jonglei,both Fiscal and Financial, Monitoring Allocation Commission (FMAC) and the Ministry of Finance adjusted block transfer allocation formula to 60% to all the states and additional 40% based on population and per capita income[12]. However, Jonglei State being the largest of the ten states with the population of over 1 million is still cash starved.

In a nutshell what goes to the states and down to the counties, *Payams*[13]and *Bomas*[14] is not commensurate to the socio-economic demands of the populace which make up three-quarter of the country's population as shown below by the results of the Fifth Sudan Population Census

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[12] Personal interview with Moro, director for Finance and Administration at the Fiscal and Financial and Monitoring Allocation Commission (FFMAC) in Juba at their premise at Hai Malakal.

[13] Payam refers to a unit of administration below the county

[14] Boma refers to unit of administration below the payam (Village)

Table 2.0 selected demographic indicators by place of residence

	South Sudan	Urban	Rural
Total Population	8,260,490	1,405,186	6,855,304
Male	4,287,300	754,086	3,533,214
Female	3,973,190	651,100	3,322,090
Averaged Household Size	7	9	7

Source: 5th Sudan Population and Housing Census (2008:5).

As shown in the above table, huge population of South Sudan is rural based. In Jonglei, about 1 Million people (Census, 2008:9) live in rural areas that are detached from the state capital, Bor, by the absence of transport and communication infrastructure that would otherwise connect them to the town. These have had the undesired results of denying them access to external market opportunities.

According to Alex De Waal (2014:348), huge section of the budget at the central level goes to financing political patronage and private security spending, and as a result little is left for public services, development and institution building. Alex De Waal went further and attributed previous and current rebellions to rent-seeking (he refers to them as rent-seeking rebellions).

The case in point is the creation of Greater Pibor Administrative Area and nomination of David Yau Yau as its head. The leader of SSDM/A waged a rebellion against the government after losing out to an SPLM candidate during the 2010 elections which he contested as an independent candidate. David Yau Yau said he was fighting for the rights of the *Murle* who are underrepresented at both levels of government. Three quarters of the questionnaire respondents believed that such political rewards and accommodations have exacerbated violent conflicts in Jonglei State since the signing of the CPA in 2005 because they have predisposed opposition to adopt violent approaches.

It is thus the exclusion of peasantry from the national cake that has made them susceptible to the appeals made by the insurgencies because it has created a feeling of socially and materially derived inequalities among communities. This echoes the basic assumption of economic theory of civil war advanced by economists like Paul Collier. According to Collier (2006:4), civil wars are caused by greed or what he calls the feasibility of predation but not grievances. He argued that grievances are devised to drum up the support for the insurgency.

According to a member of parliament, representing Pibor County in the Council of States[15], lack of alternative sources of livelihoods has exacerbated cattle raiding amongst ethnic groups and recruitment to armed movements such as David Yau Yau's South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A)-Cobra Faction in Jonglei State.

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[15] Kennedy is a *Murle* member of parliament in the council, representing Pibor Constituency. He was interviwed in Juba at the Council of State on June 23rd.

About eight youths[16], interviewed on mobile phones, blamed Murle's support for David Yau Yau's insurgency on continued underrepresentation of the Murle in the public institutions. They all argued that employment is not about meritocracy in Jonglei State but about whom you know. This affirms the centrality of Acemoglu's (2013:75) thesis which attributes outbreak of civil wars to predatory institutions-institutions which advance the interests of particular ethnic groups or elites and exclude other parameters of the society.

The findings largely confirm the underpinning thesis of this study which links the escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State to continued isolation of the peasantry. This is what Mamdani refers to as 'state suspended above the society' (Mamdani, 1996:p.16).

4.2.2 The Social Drivers of Ethnic Conflicts

Most social drivers of ethnic conflicts mentioned repeatedly during the interviews [17] include high illiteracy rate, poverty, water, grazing lands, and cattle raiding. However, the relevance of these factors in escalation of ethnic conflicts is largely underpinned by the weakness of the state's institutions to penetrate the society. Existing data show that South Sudan has literacy rate of 27% while Jonglei State in particular has literacy rate of 16%, the least in comparison to other nine states (South Sudan Statistical Year Book 2013:8).

Literally about over 80% percent of Jonglei State's population is unskilled and hence cannot get employment opportunities both in the private and public sectors (South Sudan Statistical Year

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[16] The eight youths from *Murle* ethnic group were interviewed in Juba on the 4th of July via mobile phones

[17] Interview with the Vice Chancellor of John Garang Memorial University of Science and Technology, Prof Aker Duany and Dean of Student at GMUST, David Malual Wuor .

Book, 2012:8). Thus the only areas where they can exact their faculties are the areas of cattle raiding and being foot soldiers for the insurgent groups, said Prof Pauline Riak of The Sudd Institute. The impact of this high rate of illiteracy and poverty is predisposition toward violent ethnic conflicts.

The bulk of this population is made up of unskilled cattle camps' youth joined by those who have just returned from neighboring countries after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA, 2005). A lot of optimism about the prospects of more opportunities in terms of jobs which would be availed after the attainment of independence in 2011 could not be translated in to reality as that prospect was drastically diminished by post-independent challenges.

According to Alex De Waal (2014:347), the decision to shutdown oil led to increase in escalation of ethnic conflicts and proliferation of insurgencies because the government cannot afford to meet the demands of political patronages and private security. Even the current crisis which started in 2013 is attributed by experts to inability of the regime to maintain allegiances of the former militia groups.

Thus cattle raiding remained the only viable strategy for survival or means of predation following the drastic reduction of oil rents. Cattle raiding were further compounded by post-elections rebellions launched by Renegade George Athor, elements of former SSDF and David Yau Yau's SSDM/A, which resurrected ethnic animosities in an environment, not manned by the state.

Despite being a long traditional practice amongst communities in Jonglei, the culture of cattle raiding has mutated in terms of targets and levels of devastation. In the past, it was unethical to kill women and children. But today, killing of the infirm has gained currency because of the long

civil wars. This mutation came as a result of a breakdown of traditional system of governance, which used to mediate issues of cattle raiding.

Another social driver mentioned during interviews[18], is the competition for inadequate resources such as water, and lands has reignited historical grievances and heightened mistrust among communities. Communities such as the Lou-Nuer are geographically disadvantaged and moved to Dinka, Jikany-Nuer and Murle territories during the dry seasons to graze their animals. This always put them at confrontation paths with the *Dinka*, *Jikany-Nuer* and the *Murle.*

Finally, revenge seeking groups are said to be behind the escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State. 2012 was the year in which interethnic violence has mutated unprecedentedly particularly between the *Murle* and the *Nuer* following series of revenge attacks which targeted sources of livelihoods, children, women, old people, and burning down of huts unlike in the past where the attackers on take away cattle.

The findings also confirm the thesis of the study that it is the inability of the state to penetrate the society that revenge seeking groups are carrying out revenge attacks in a territory not dominated by the state. If the state does not dominate the instruments of violence in the state, this gives room to non-state actors to threaten the existence of the state in the unmanned terrains.

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[18]Interviews with Martha Nyagoah and Susan Nyuon Sebit, both advocates at South Sudan Law Society in Juba through questionnaires on 20th July .

The Political Drivers of Ethnic Conflicts in Jonglei State

Interviews through questionnaires sent to respondents[19] both in Juba and outside South Sudan revealed that escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State is to a larger extent politically motivated. Respondents linked the proliferation of post-election insurgencies headed by George Athor and David Yau Yau in Jonglei State to power struggles within the SPLM, Particularly respondents from the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups.

Another political driver that featured in the interviews was the civil war between the North and South that exacerbating interethnic violence in Jonglei State. Most respondents blamed the recurrences of ethnic animosities on the lack of nation-wide reconciliations aimed at healing the wounds of the civil wars since the signing of the CPA and after the attainment of independence.

The findings support the argument made by prof Jok madut (2013:pp.6-8) where he argued that identities were politically charged as different ethnic groups pledged their allegiances to different parties to the conflicts. This politicization and militarization of identities remains a source of conflicts. This argument is in line with the theory of social constructivism, which attributes prevalence of ethnic conflicts to manipulations of identities as cited in the literature review.

Intra-South conflicts have significantly shaped and exacerbated traditional animosities between diverse ethnic groups in Jonglei State. For instance the *Murle* since 1980s have supported Khartoum governments and waged continuous attacks against the Nuer and the Dinka who were predominantly the center of gravity for the Anya Nya I and the SPLM/A (Young, 2006:pp.17-18).

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[19] Nyagoah, Gatluak Michael and Thon Jacob Kuany were sent copies of questionnaires via e-mail addresses in Nairobi, Addis Ababa and Wau respectively.

According to most respondents contacted through questionnaires (70%) from the *Dinka* and *Nuer*, the split of the SPLM/A in 1991 exacerbated ethnic rivalries between the *Nuer* and the *Dinka* in Jonglei State. The *Nuer* was largely in support of Machar's SPLM-Nasir Faction against the SPLM/A mainstream under Garang, who enjoyed the support of his ethnic group- the Dinka. Garang's SPLM/A fought Machar who had enlisted his support to Khartoum based regime. This generated continued use of negative words such as '*nyagat*[20]' against the Nuer (leaders) and certain sections of the Dinka whose leaders had supported Machar in his quest to oust Garang as the SPLM/A chairman as well as against those who had enlisted their support to Khartoum.

During interviews with Lou-Nuer youth leaders[21] , they argued that since the signing of the CPA which led to the inception of the autonomous Government of South Sudan (GoSS), appointments to key positions have entirely been influenced by allegiance to the SPLM/A. Majority of the political and military leadership of the SSDF that were integrated in to the SPLM/A were mostly marginalized in terms of appointments to prestigious political positions. This is evidenced in a song sung by Nuer artist, a former combatant, Michael Pal:

That we are being called 'not confirmed' during the integration in to the SPLA despite our tireless participation in the struggles for independence of South Sudan. We leave everything to the almighty God to judge whoever is championing this divisive policy.

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[20] Nyagat is said to be an Ethiopian word which means a traitor, it is reported to have first been used by Cdr William Nyuon at the inception of the SPLM/A in Bonga against former leaders of Anyanya II which include Akuot Atem, Gai Tut and Abdalla Chuol Deng among others.

[21] Personal interviews with Samuel Gatluak and Gatpan Lul in Juba on the 5th of July

Even the December 15th incident which tore the country apart in less than one month is largely attributed to reproduction of hatreds by political entrepreneurs by most respondents[22]. Particularly the security experts linked it to inflammatory statements issued by prominent SPLM political leaders during the December 6th and 8th in the Conference for the SPLM's National Liberation Council (NLC)-where president Kiir and his Vice President, James Wani Igga are said to have referred to 1991 SPLM/A split repeatedly.

The same views were echoed by an MP[23], representing *Duk* County in the Council of State, he argued that because of prevalence of mistrust, each community has been amassing arms in anticipation of pending attacks from its arch rivals. The formation of *Nuer*'s White Army, *Murle*'s Pibor Defence Forces and *Dinka's Dukey* (Duk County) were basically influenced by existential threats from SPLA, SAF, SSDF and rival ethnic groups that used to attack ethnic groups which did not pledge allegiance to them.

According to Kennedy, an MP representing Pibor County, the inability of the government of South Sudan to dominate ground in rural areas accelerated mistrust and led to an upshot of several non-state actors, including remnants of the SSDF loyal to Gen Tang-Ginye , Thomas Mabior and David Yau Yau amongst others to control the peasantry by instilling fear or through intimidation.

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[22] Among those personally interviewed by the researcher were John Chol Daau, a priest at the ECS in Juba.

[23] During an interview with representative of Duk County in the Council of States-Deng Lual Anyang on 25th of June 2014 in Juba

According to *Murle* and *Jie* youth leaders[24], prevalence of arms has persistently undermined the traditional authorities which have long epoch of mitigating bloody interethnic conflicts such as the ones witnessed since the attainment of independence. However, this tendency of youth clinging to their arms is largely informed by the absence of an overarching state authority that penetrates the society.

According to an officer[25] working for military intelligence, Khartoum has been the major supplier of arms to various insurgent groups such as South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF), Renegade George Athor's forces, and David Yau Yau's SSDM/A-Cobra faction in Jonglei State. This was entirely a contravention of the CPA-which outlawed Other Armed Groups (OAGs), other than the SPLA and the SAF.

According to Young (2006: pp.26-28), SAF persuaded forces loyal to Gen Tang-Ginye, Thomas Mabior and Ismael Konye not to joined the SPLA and promised them to form part of 6000 of the 12000 Joint Integrated Unit (JIUs) members of the SAF that were stationed in the South. Most of these forces remained in the rural areas to ensure antagonistic relations with the local communities in order to undermine the legitimacy of the Semi-autonomous Government of South Sudan.

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[24] Samuel, David and Lonyigan personally interviewed by the researcher in Juba

[25] Mayen, K. interviwed in Juba by the researcher

According to an old man from Bor County[26], 'these conflicts are politically motivated. If David Yau Yau was demanding a separate state, why did his forces attack and raid cattle and abduct children and women from other communities?' said the old man.

Finally, another political driver of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State in the views of most respondents is the ethnicization of institutions. Respondents[27] from Murle and Nuer ethnic groups have repeatedly mentioned nepotism, and tribalism as the basis for recruiting people in to public offices, this is an excerpt from a Murle respondent interviewed through a questionnaires: 'In any department if chairman is not your ethnic and you applied your qualification is not considered because of nepotism. You may get all institution is occupy by one ethnic groups because chairman is from their ethnicity.'

In South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular, minorities have bitterly complained of underrepresentation in the public institutions. Members of Murle and Jie communities interviewed by the researcher have repeatedly complained about their marginalization at both the state and national levels.

4.3 Security Responses and the Escalation of Ethnic Conflicts in Jonglei State

This section explains the reasons behind the ineffectiveness of policy responses adopted by the government aimed at resolving the spiraling ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State. The policies range

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[26] Kur Aguto, a displaced person from Bor, was interviewed in Juba at Shirkat where most the people displaced from Bor by December 15th incident are currently putting up.

[27] Kaka and three other Murle youths were interviewed on phone and through questionnaires in Juba on July 6th

from forceful disarmament, peace conferences, and amnesties granted to armed oppositions, political accommodation and re-creation of new administrative areas.

Most of the respondents (60%) interviewed through questionnaires argued that there is a strong nexus between policy responses and escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei state. The local population identified a variety of reasons for the ineffectiveness and hostile reception of state response from the locals. Key amongst this was the incoherence between policy and instruments of implementation of the (grand strategy) arraigned to realize stability

It is apparent that there was no orchestration of civil-military counterinsurgency measures in Jonglei State. It is common currency that insurgents waged war on the government because of unfavorable socio-economic and political environments. And they articulate these grievances to win the minds and hearts of the population. Thus there is a great need in orchestrating both civil and military counterinsurgency measures because military gains must be propped up by civil measures in order to realize permanent stability.

4.3.1 Disarmament and the Escalation of Ethnic Conflicts in Jonglei State

Cycles of forceful civilian disarmament exercises have been launched in Jonglei State immediately after the signing of the CPA 2005 but have all failed to achieve the desired end-states. In this study, their failure is examined through the lenses of poorly crafted military strategy that is deficient of sound civil counterinsurgency policies.

According to Snow and Drew (2002:81-87), force employment refers to the use of forces in a broad national sense. Employment decisions are to a greater extent influenced by perceived threats. Where forces would be employed? Against whom would they be employed? With regard to South Sudan in general and the SPLA in particular, the perceptions about threats have largely been informed by north-south rivalries to the extent of disregarding internal challenges that posed immense threats to the existence of the state. These include internally armed oppositions, armed cattle bandits, and armed urban bandits.

Secondly, South Sudan has not envisaged the nature of her threats and how to counter them. According to Drew and Snow (2002:85) two factors always remain relevant in military strategy: geography and technology. These factors are more relevant in South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular. South Sudan's enemy-the Sudan-has a strong Air Force that frequently carries out incursions into the South with ease to bomb civilian areas.

As stated by an officer from the South Sudan military Intelligence[28], Khartoum supplied armed oppositions in the South with arms and food using military jets, which land anywhere unfettered in far-flung remote areas that are unmonitored such as Jonglei state. During the war years, society in Jonglei state was largely divided due to the fact that not all ethnic communities identified with or supported the SPLM/A.

For instance, the Murle are in record as all time supporters of successive regimes in Khartoum. The 1991 split of the SPLM/A in to forces loyal to Machar and Garang also led to switching of allegiances. Majority of the Nuer in Jonglei under Machar enlisted their support to Khartoum.

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[28] Mayen, K was interview in Juba by the researcher

This led to infamous Bor Massacre in 1991 against the Bor Dinka that killed over 2000 people (Hutchinson, 1996:20).

Consequently, accorded by the long historical mistrust, the SPLA is viewed as a partisan army by some ethnic groups. To accentuate this, virtually all respondents[29] from Murle, asserted that the Murle resisted disarmament because they perceived the SPLA to be an armed entity predominantly composed of the Dinka and Nuer. Thus, a disarmament enforced by a Dinka-Nuer dominated army leaves them in a precarious and vulnerable position than the Dinka and Nuer communities because the government seldom provides security to disarmed communities.

The above views were echoed by respondents[30] from Dinka and Nuer[31], who cited prevalence of tribalism amongst the organized forces. Tribalism has eroded public confidence in the organized forces, hence various ethnic groups perceived the SPLA and SSPS as threats rather than protectors. Below is a statement from a Dinka respondent, a resident of Twic East County:

'The communities do think that the responses of the government to insecurity in Jonglei State have always been sluggish. This sluggish response by the government has been resented by the communities in Jonglei State. The communities want the government to do more to end the cycle of violence in Jonglei state which has kept the state lagging in terms of development, even at the time of peace and independence of South Sudan.'

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[29] Samuel Korok, a Murle from Pibor County said during an interview that SPLA is not a neutral army but a force dominated by the Dinka and Nuer

[30] Deng Akech, a dinka and an advocate was interviewed by the researcher in Juba.

[31] Gatkuoth, Nuer and a student at the University of Juba was also interviewed in Juba by the researcher.

Korok from Murle said during a personal interview that people resisted disarmament because the state does not provide protection and alternative sources of livelihood. He asserted that they have carried these guns for years, what will be the alternative sources of livelihood and power without our guns? He argued that without guns, our cattle will be taken away by our enemies. Thus guns matter in protecting our sources of livelihood. Here is an excerpt from another respondent from Murle[32] affirming the above sentiments:

'Because disarmament without reintegration. Since broke out of SPLA 1983-2005, small arms were been use as a mean of getting resources. Disarming without substitution is not fair because someone who hold arm can create insecurity to the rest. Disarmament must engulf state as a whole.'

The respondent had further indicted the SPLA and South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) of gross abuses of human rights. According to the respondent, women were raped, tortured, and villages were looted, pillaged, and huts (tukuls) were burned to ashes. 'What would you do if your sisters, mum, and other relatives are raped, killed or tortured in your presence? He retorted. 'You will definitely find avenues to revenge, he answered himself.' 70% of respondents particularly, from Murle ethnic group questioned the motives of the 2012 disarmament. They complained that they have been unfairly targeted and victimized for historical grievances. Most of them have repeatedly said that the SPLA aided cattle raiders from other communities against the Murle. They have mentioned the December 2011 and 2012 incidents when some soldiers joined the

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[32] John Kengen was interviewed in Juba at the University of Juba on 26th of July

8000 White Army against the Murle. According to the Human Rights Advocate in Jonglei, Peter Guzulu[33]:

'Even the government knows that this [civilian disarmament] is not the solution. But they just want to bring it as a tool for punishing communities. But when you translate it, they are just saying: 'we are going to that community to punish that community through disarmament'. They are coming with a white curtain, but behind the curtain it is something else. This is not about bringing the real solution. It is about politics and it is about punishment (Lacey, 2013:p.18).' From all the above sentiments, it is apparent that force development has not been given a priority by the GOSS and the SPLA. SPLA lacks equipment and the expertise to detect and counter threats from the air. Furthermore, it is evidenced above that the SPLA has little professional and ethic capacity as accentuated by the number of atrocities alleged to have been committed.

The above gaps call for the orchestration of civil and military counterinsurgency measures. As repeatedly mentioned by most respondents, lack of alternative sources of livelihoods had been a reason for hostile reception toward disarmament exercises. Thus it is paramount for the government to replace arms with employment opportunities and provide protection to all communities. It is the inability of the government to provide protection to disarmed communities that engendered a situation of ethnic security dilemma. This has affirmed Lacey's findings, Lacey (2013: PP 17-18) linked hostile reactions to civilian disarmament exercises to historical grievances. She asserted that the 1991 split of the SPLM/A have wider implications in 2006 clashes between the SPLA and the White Army. The SPLA also had historical grievances

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[33] Peter Guzulu is a Murle and a human rights activist in Jonglei, he was interviewed by Lacey in 2013.

against the Murle who were largely supported by the Khartoum against the insurgency. Although some respondents (60%) from Nuer ethnic group, particularly the old people, the chiefs and women, applauded the government initiatives to disarm civilians, they all blamed the government for not providing security to the disarmed communities, referring to 2006 disarmament which left the Lou-Nuer vulnerable to their rivals.

According to Lacey (2013: P 19), disarmament exercises in Jonglei State are hampered by lack of viable alternative means of economic survival to cattle raiding and the challenge of disarming a large number of civilians in possession of small arms while raiders, militias and the SPLA still pose a threat to security in Jonglei State.

4.3.2 Challenges to Demobilization and Reintegration

Demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants has failed to bore fruit owing to number of factors. According to Dean[34] of students from Dr John Garang University of Science and Technology, demobilized soldiers refused to dispense with their guns or leave the army or organized forces in general if financial packages pledged by South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC) and its partners are not attractive.

The respondent went further and stated that most of the ex-combatants lack necessary skills to engage in alternative employment opportunities. Hence, if the financial packages offered by the SSDDRC and its partners cannot sustain them, there is little incentives for them to leave the

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[34] David Malual was interviewed on 6th of July in Juba about the challenges to demobilization and reintegration.

army. This has further been compounded further by absence of infrastructure such as roads that can link the ex-combatants involved in small businesses to the market opportunities.

Security integration has been severely hampered by the nature of fractured socio-political and economic levels of state-society relations. According to Brefield (2010:p.32), the over two decades war between the SPLM/A and the Khartoum has also strained inter-ethnic relations in the South. The endemic ethnic rivalries exacerbated by competition for scarce resources and historical grievances made these militarized communities unfriendly environment for the ex-combatants.

The above views were also repeated by security advisor[35] to the governor of Jonglei state who said that the SPLA during the war used to attack communities perceived to have enlisted their support to the government in Khartoum. Amongst these communities were Murle and Nuer in Jonglei State who had organized their militia groups against the SPLA. Reintegration of ex-combatants in to these communities would ignite historical animosities against the ex-combatants.

Furthermore, ex-combatants are reluctant to leave the organized forces because they are expecting pension benefits from the army that will be more attractive than the current benefits offered by SSDDR and its partners. DDR programs will not have effective impacts if it does not outmatch the benefits soldiers get from the SPLA in terms of monthly salaries.

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[35] Malual, M. is security advisor to the governor of Jonglei State, he was interviewed in Juba.

4.3.3 The Ineffectiveness of Peace Conferences

Several peace conferences have been convened in the state headquarters, Bor, but failed to end ethnic violent conflicts in Jonglei State. Several factors have been widely mentioned by respondents as the fundamental causes of their failure/ineffectiveness.

Majority of the respondents (over 50%) have mentioned absence of inclusivity in the peace processes. The targeted groups have less influence and involvement in cattle raiding. Peace conferences have largely been dominated by old men and politicians, neglecting the youths who are actively involved in cattle rustlings. This is well described by Peter Guzulu[36] during an interview with Lacey:

'Chiefs are not raiding. They are too old to go around. So why don't you bring the youth themselves to Come and talk? We know, like in Murle we have one [buul], we call it Acheps, we give them different names. Now the Acheps, which are very active in these raids, we know them by names. We know them by villages. In any village, who are those who are very active in raiding? And ask for them and so on, and then go and collect them and bring them to the conference to speak, to convince them. And then when they go back, they will convince the rest, they will follow us. You bring chiefs who are 70 years, they have never even gone out [on raids], and to attend the conference in Bor…with his weak hearing power…it will not do anything (Lacey, 2013: P 24).'

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[36] Peter Guzulu, a human rights activist was interviewed by Lacey in 2013. Thus the above excerpt was extracted from Lacey's work.

The same views were echoed by 60% of respondents from Nuer ethnic groups. They asserted that for a meaningful peace to be realized, the mediators must engage the youths from the three warring communities-youth-on youth-dialogue-other than assembling chiefs and politicians who have little connections with the youths.

Furthermore, in a patriarchal society like South Sudan, women have always not been involved in the negotiation processes. This exclusionary syndrome dates back to the CPA negotiation processes, where women were underrepresented, through to the recently signed agreement between the government and SSDM/A of David Yau Yau.

According to Mayen (2013:5-8), exclusion of women in the negotiation processes has been a function of several factors. Firstly, peacemaking processes are often highly militarized and politicized and tend to look at conflicts only from the perspective of armed groups struggling over power and resources rather than equally considering the social structures and dynamics underlying inter-group relations from whence conflict arises. Secondly, lack of women pressure/interest groups to advocate for women's participation in public issues is a cause for their exclusion from important matters pertaining society.

These conspiracies against women amount to direct contravention of fundamental international laws such as UN Convention on Elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, the protocol on rights of women in African Union Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women in peace and security.

Inclusivity of the peace processes is important because it is a way of accommodating experiences and concerns of all segments of the society. Particularly, in South Sudan, women participation is of paramount important because women sometimes are seen in boosting the moral of warring factions, and chastising men for cowardice in the face of eminent conflicts, they remind them of the socially sanctioned models of manhood and impress them upon their sons, brothers, and husbands (Mayen, 2013: p.8). Therefore their participation in peacemaking processes is pivotal to finding sustainable resolutions to conflicts.

Fundamentally, credibility of the peaceful processes has largely been hampered by gross mistrust of the government by the local communities. 60% of the respondents from Murle asserted they do not trust the government. Similarly they emphasize the choice of Bor as the venue for peace conferences as being counterproductive since it geographically isolates the youths, who are meant to be the main participants due to their involvement in ethnic conflicts in Jonglei. The repeatedly mentioned factor that is a hindrance to peace in Jonglei State is the inability of the state to provide security and justice to citizens. Most respondents (60%) argued that even if community and youth leaders agreed to cease hostilities, it is the responsibility of the government to bring the violators to book. Thus state weakness to arraign the perpetrators of violence has exacerbated the cycles of impunity and revenge attacks.

Finally, according to a member of the Church committee[37] nominated by the president to handle Jonglei Peace Initiative, lack of follow up on resolutions and tight timeframe hampered the success of the initiative. He also said that reconciliation unaccompanied by tangible peace

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[37] John Chol Daau, is a pastor at the Episcopal Church of the Sudan (ECS) was a member of the church led committee headed by the archbishop of the ECs. He was personally interviewed by the researcher on 20th July in Juba.

dividends such as infrastructure, health centers, education, and security is inevitably on the road to failure.

4.4 Critical Analysis of the Findings

This section gives in-depth analysis of the findings in the sense that it puts the mass of data collected during the study into perspective in line with the theories discussed in the literature review and researcher's experiences about the drivers of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State. The section tries to explain conditions mediating violent conflicts in Jonglei State in particular and South Sudan in general in relation to state capacity.

As shown in the findings, generalization of the findings cannot be put on a single factor as the fundamental cause of violent ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State, but all can be aggregated in to function of weak institutions. The existing institutions have largely been captured by informal competing vested interests to advance their own interests, which are totally incompatible with public interest.

Thus this section explains the conditions under which socio-economic and political drivers of violent conflicts come in to play in Jonglei State. This will be done in line with various theories discussed in the literature review section. Among these include security dilemmas, economic causes of civil wars, and relative deprivation.

4.4.1 Conflict Trap: A Function of Weak Institutions

Escalation of violent conflicts in Jonglei State based on the research findings and extensive review of secondary data is undoubtedly mediated by weakness of the state. South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular had never had an encompassing and inclusive

administration since the establishment of Turko-Egyptian rule through Anglo-condominium rule and the post-independent Sudan and to independent South Sudan respectively. Instead all the previous administrations have only resurrected predatory institutions that perpetuated exclusion of certain parameters of the society, particularly the peasantry.

Despite achieving independence on July 9, 2011, according to Prof Pauline the peripheries have not yet seen tangible peace dividends. Jonglei State in particular continues to witness deadly violent conflicts in territories unmanned by the state. This clearly evinces the absence of Weberian state that has monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. In other words that means a state that has no relevant rivals to its claim to authority.

Escalation of violent conflicts in Jonglei State is not significantly a function of proliferation of small arms, competition for scarce resources, tribalism, historical grievances, or cattle raiding per se as shown in the findings but largely a failure of state making processes. According to Ayoob (Chester, Hampson, & Aall, 2007:96), state making must include the expansion and consolidation of the territorial and demographic domain under a political authority, including the imposition of order on contested territorial and demographic space.

Secondly, maintenance of order in the territory where, and over the population on whom, such order has been imposed (policing), in order to enhance extraction of resources from the territory and population under the control of the state. (ibid: 96).

According to Buzan (1979:25), civil war or disorder is always a result of falling out between the citizens and government arising where a maximal state has pursued its own interests to the excessive detriment of the mass of individual interests within it or a failure of minimal state to

contain contradictions among its citizens. Buzan (ibid: 26) argues that threats to individual can occur as a result of inadequate or excessive policing or prosecution practices. It can also arise over political disorder-the struggle for control over the state's institutions.

All the above perspectives confirm the relevance of the theory of ethnic security dilemma used in the literature review section. The theory links escalation of violent conflicts to absence of overarching authority that can provide security to the society and constrain arbitrary actions that may be deemed appropriate by non-state actors. In Jonglei State, presence of the state at far-flung areas is hardly felt. According to Kennedy, MP representing Pibor County in the Council of States, during an interview said that the few SPLA and SSPS deployed in Pibor and Akobo have no capacity to deter cattle raiding. They have been overrun on several occasions by the cattle bandits and forced them to remain in their barracks.

The above situation (ethnic security dilemma) was engendered by the inability of the state to employ, develop and deploy her forces to counter upsurge of banditry and insurgency at the periphery. Had the state deployed adequately developed forces at the hotspots proliferation of social bandits and insurgencies at the peripheries would have been stifled before they find conducive sanctuaries at the periphery. Since 80% of the national budget is spent in Juba as revealed by the assessment carried out by The Sudd Institute (Mayai, 2012:9), institutions like the SPLA, SSPS, judiciary and local government board among others have been constricted by a lack of resources and are unable to reach the periphery.

Similarly, institutions in South Sudan have been held at ransom by massive neopatrimonial and patronage networks that have institutionalized corruption. Instead of appropriating oil rents for organization of the state (physical base) through institutions that embody the idea of the state, the

institutions are used to advance the self -serving interests of elites who are obsessed with power. This has prompted proliferation of non-state actors such as insurgent groups and cattle bandits in South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular.

Neopatrimonial and patronage networks have been cemented in the system through the concentration of power in the hands of the executive both at the national, the state and down to the county levels. President, ministers, governors, and county commissioners' appointees are not subjected to vetting to guard against employing incompetent personnel and cronies. Instead appointment by decrees is the norm for appointing public officials. These practices have undermined meritocracy and independence in the public sector because civil servants owe their existence in the system not to the law but to their masters.

These practices of neo-patrimonialism and patronage have engendered ethno-fractionalization of the state because the existing institutions do not reflect the diverse interests. Even the ongoing crisis was just an expression of frustrations which have been brewing all along since the signing of the CPA, through to independence as a result of failure of the state to meet the long held expectations.

These perspectives are largely reflected in the argument made by Reno, Bayart, Chabal, and Jean-Pascal (Cited by Granahl, 2013:143) who argued that African Politics take place in the realm of informal, uncodified and unpoliced-that is in a world that is not ordered in a sense of western politics that are purely governed by institutions. In other words it is characterized by the absence of what Weber called rational-legal authority, which, is underpinned, by system of the rule of law.

In South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular absence of the rule of law has engendered tendencies to revenge seeking which, is one of the fundamental factors exacerbating violent conflicts in Jonglei State in particular and South Sudan in general. The lethal clashes between the Murle and Lou-Nuer between 2012 and 2013 were largely revenge attacks because the state did not accord the first victims justice hence communities took the laws in to their own hands and organized revenge attacks against each other.

4.4.2 Power Struggles and the Manipulation of Identities

The quest for power by political entrepreneurs at various levels of the state has significantly contributed to the escalation of violent conflicts in South Sudan in Jonglei state. Most of the rebellions that have taken place in Jonglei State since the split of the SPLM/A in 1991 have largely been driven by unscrupulous quest for power.

The dominant modus operandi for one to ascend to power is by mobilizing your ethnic group against the state or other ethnic groups in order to force the state to cede ground for power sharing. This strategy has been employed in pre and post- independent South Sudan. The situation in South Sudan is not different from the politics of Sub-Saharan Africa described as rhizome states by Bayart (Cited by Granahl, 2013:155). According to Bayart, political power gives political leaders unbridled access to economic resources. In other words, political power blurs the lines between public and private spheres; political power becomes a tool of generating private benefits in the markets.

Politicians who have been commissioned to serve public interests have instead ended up abusing their power in order to line up their pockets. This is what Bayart (Cited by Granahl, 2013:152) popularly refers to as 'politics of the belly' , which means a rush for the spoils that come with power. This confirms the validity of Collier's thesis of economic theory of civil war that attributes ignition of rebellions to greed rather than grievances. Collier argues that it is the feasibility of predation that drives civil wars.

In South Sudan different types of rebellions have been largely linked to marginalization and dictatorial tendencies of the regime. For instance David Yau Yau's rebellions have been linked to marginalization of the Murle while December 15th incident that tore the country apart has been linked to the quest for democracy. But the haste with which an agreement was signed between the government and David Yau Yau's SSDM/A and subsequent establishment of Greater Pibor Administrative Area can largely be interpreted as a mere quest for power and economic resources that come with it.

The ongoing negotiations in Addis Ababa are running behind schedules because of political gimmicks aimed at amassing enough power. Various actors have been collapsed together in Addis to find peaceful solutions to the current crisis that has caused the worst humanitarian crisis in the country. But the question of who should get what in terms of power remains a wedge to realization of permanent solutions to violent conflicts.

Thus it is apparent that the primordial theory, which, attributes ethnic conflicts to ancient hatreds, has largely been invalidated by the findings of this study. It evidenced that political entrepreneurs mobilize identities in order to achieve their political desires-power and it accompaniments. The findings lend credence to the theory of social constructivism, which,

asserts that identities are socially constructed based on the underlying circumstances. The theory of social constructivism disputes any argument that links violent conflicts to ancient hatred and instead assert that violent is a function of manipulation of identities by political entrepreneurs.

4.4.3 The Un-captured Peasantry and the social banditry

According to Eric Hobsbawm (1959:13), social banditry is a protest at the local levels against injustices committed by the central authority. He argued that the society protects bandits because they provide them with security than the distant state and that bandits take to the bush and resist attempts by authorities to arrest them because they do not know what the absent authorities that they seldom fathom will do to them.

In Jonglei State , the acts of social banditry such as cattle raiding and support for insurgencies are underpinned by the state's inability to provide basic services like security and other social amenities to the communities. The communities become complicit in social banditry because the cattle bandits share with them the spoils and provide security. Because of the protection they provide and spoils reaped from raiding activities, and compounded by fear of reprisal attacks from bandits in the absence of the state, the communities refuse to cooperate with the state and therefore act as conduits and sanctuaries for the bandits.

Hobsbawm (ibid: 26) went further and labeled social banditry as a means of agitation against extreme oppression in a pre-political and pre-industrial societies. Lack of political consciousness among the bandits in order to help them organize the peasants effectively in to a formidable

revolutionary force always make them end up in the hands of political entrepreneurs who use them for their own gains.

In Jonglei State, cattle raiding have mutated in to organized crime because of political manipulations by the insurgents such as the remnants of the SSDF, George Athor and David Yau Yau's SSDM/A who have been agitating for political power.

This section confirms the assumptions of the theory of ethnic security dilemma, which attributes escalation of ethnic conflicts to absence of overarching authority that would deter violence. This is always a function of the absence of institutions that bind the citizenry to the state. In other words it is the absence of Weberian rational-legal authority that has the monopoly over the use of violence that mediate wave of revenge attacks at the periphery.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

The overriding purpose of this study was to determine factors undermining escalation of inter-communal violence in Jonglei State, even after the attainment of South Sudan independence. This chapter summarizes the study by responding to four tasks. The first task is the summary of the core objectives by examining the extent to which each objective has been addressed.

The objectives were as follows: First to examine factors underpinning escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei state; Secondly, to examine the nexus between policy responses and the escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State; Thirdly, to examine the extent to which the inability of the state to penetrate the society mediate escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State, and Fourthly, to proffer the appropriate mechanisms of addressing ethnic conflicts in South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular.

The study employed both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection. Quantitative data was generated through instruments such as interviews and questionnaires. Questionnaires were sent to respondents within and outside the country, and personal interviews were conducted with humanitarian workers, security and conflict experts, women, community and youth leaders and phone interviews were also done under circumstances that the researcher could not get an easy access to the respondents due to their commitments.

Qualitative data was generated from written sources such as magazines, books, newspapers, journal articles and policy documents about conflicts in South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular. Furthermore, data analysis was done manually by grouping major findings in to

thematic areas and presented in table forms as shown in the section on critical analysis of the research findings.

The major findings were later grouped in to three major thematic areas of social, economic and political drivers of ethnic conflicts. Dominant findings under social drivers were cattle raiding, small arms, illiteracy, poverty, bride price and breakdown of traditional systems of governance among others. Major economic drivers of ethnic conflicts in South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular include unequal distribution of political and economic resources, absence of infrastructure such as road networks, and communication facilities, and poverty.

Political drivers on the other hand include power struggles, lack of security which has engendered revenge killings, and finally, poor policy responses like disarmament, concentration of power in the hand of the executive and political accommodation have significantly exacerbated ethnic conflict in South Sudan and Jonglei State in particular.

However, escalation of inter-communal violence in Jonglei State cannot be wholesomely appended on single factor because all the above factors (social, political and economic drivers) segued in to each other. In other words, political drivers have significant influence on economic and social drivers and the vice versa. And this should not be construed as lack of significant finding, the encompassing issue here is the state weakness to expand beyond states and national capitals. Finally, the last task is to give comprehensive conclusion and elaborate appropriate recommendations to various stakeholders in South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular. Recommendations will be addressed to government, regional organizations, and the United Nations mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

5.1 Conclusions

Introduction

In determining factors underpinning escalations of inter-communal violence in South Sudan in general, and Jonglei State in particular even after the attainment of independence. This study, in response to the above task, through interviews established that the inability of the state to penetrate the society has immensely exacerbated inter-communal violence in South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular.

The second argument of the study is that escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State is a function of poor policy response. To the extent that policies are still aimed at regime consolidation and not on genuine nation and state building, there shall continue to be inter-communal violence and rebellions. Policies such as political accommodation meant to entrench centralization of power do not accommodate local demands; instead they deny larger sections of society access to political power and economic resources.

The third argument is that prevention and de-escalation of inter-communal violence in Jonglei State is a function of establishing inclusive institutions that will accommodate diverse ethnic or group interests at the local levels. Devolution of resources, both economic and human resources to the local levels will help in enhancing legitimacy of the state to the groups that feel marginalized by the state. It is the feelings of marginalization that make society susceptible to the appeals of the insurgent groups and political entrepreneurs.

As views at the local levels point to the proliferation of small arms, competition for resources, inequitable distribution of resources, power struggles and poverty among others as factors escalating inter-communal violence as shown at the critical analysis of the findings in Chapter

Four, this study synthesized the findings to answer the two main research questions: what factors underpin escalation of inter-communal violence in Jonglei State; what is the nexus between the policy responses and escalation of inter-communal violence in Jonglei State?

Therefore, escalation of inter-communal violence in Jonglei state is a function of the inability of the state to provide security, which is largely a function of weak institutions that do not accommodate diverse interests. And also most policies adopted such as disarmament, amnesties, and political accommodation only seek to address the insecurity but do not address the root causes of the conflicts.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, however, have largely been supported by international organizations and donors as appropriate instruments for peacemaking and peace-building in post-conflict societies. Although, evidence from several studies, including (Arnold, & LeRich, 2012:143; Legassicke, 2013:80-81)), and this study seems to point to the fact that these policy responses cannot be effective in a highly polarized, militarized, and poverty ridden society like South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular.

Although the methodologies were different, an interesting comparison of the findings of this study and the work done by Legassicke (2013:78-79) can be made. Legassicke's thesis blamed escalation of inter-communal violence in Jonglei State on apparent disregard of the local mechanisms of solving conflicts and unduly imposing formal mechanisms that totally remain insensitive to local issues.

Thus the central argument of this study is that escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State is largely mediated by the inability of the state to dominate grounds. Absence of the state at the far-flung areas like Pibor, Uror, Akobo, Pochalla, and Duk, among others has created conducive

sanctuaries for the non-state actors such as the insurgent groups and cattle bandits. Had state established its authority in the mentioned areas, insurgent groups would not persuade, intimidate or terrorize the peasantry to submission.

5.2 Policy Recommendations

Introduction

This section outlines appropriate mechanisms to address escalation of inter-communal violence in Jonglei state and in South Sudan in general. This is a response to the fourth objective of this study as outlined in Chapter One. The recommendations are addressed to various stakeholders involved in bringing peace to South Sudan, and Jonglei State in particular. These actors include the government of South Sudan, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

5.2.1 Recommendations to the Government of South Sudan

Dismantling Conflicts Traps in Jonglei State

To dismantle the ethnic conflict traps in South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular, it is important for the government and other stakeholders to address the underlying socio-political and economic drivers of ethnic conflicts by adopting appropriate mechanisms. However, the first section outlines appropriate mechanisms that ought to be adopted by the government both in the short and long run.

5.2.2 Dismantling Social Drivers

For the government to dismantle social drivers of inter-communal violence in Jonglei State in particular, it is important for the government to reduce inequalities in resource and power distribution; address historical grievances, and restore the sanctity of traditional authorities. Reducing the urban-rural distance is crucial for enhancing state legitimacy in the peripheries. This can be done through provision of basic services such as health, infrastructures such as road networks, educational facilities, and telecommunication facilities to the local population. This, if done will help in reducing participation of the youth in cattle banditry and recruitment in to insurgencies.

Banditry or rebellion is a social protest by the excluded. To apprehend a bandit, the state must conquer his sanctuaries. The sanctuaries here refer to where banditry thrives, which is invariably in the society. Thus for the case of Jonglei State, cattle bandits, and rebels are provided protection by the disenfranchised society. In order to end cattle raiding and rebellions in South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular it is incumbent on the state to provide basic services to society that nurtures banditry.

Also restoring the sanctity of traditional authority at the local level would be complementary to state's endeavors for stability at the local level. This can be done only when the state supports, coordinates, and consults traditional authorities on policy responses to issues at the local levels. In other words, integrating customary laws in to formal institutions would help reduce escalation of inter-communal violence. For instance, adopting traditional mechanisms of addressing conflicts such as blood compensation and dialogue among chiefs would significantly reduce occurrences of inter-communal violence.

In the past, traditional authorities had proper mechanisms of handling conflicts generated by cattle raiding, water, and killings. It is not only the prevalence of the guns that has eroded the influence of the traditional systems but also political interferences from political heavyweights who have enough resources to spend in order to undermine the traditional authorities. Thus guaranteeing independence of the customary laws at the local levels would avoid legal deficit at the lowest level of the society.

Finally, addressing historical grievances that were generated during the long civil wars where different ethnic groups pledged their allegiances to various parties in conflicts is important for realization of permanent peace in South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular. Historical injustices such as the infamous Bor-massacre, and atrocities committed by the SPLA and SSPS against the Lou-Nuer and Murle during 2006 and 2012 disarmament exercise are still vivid in their minds.

The above injustices call for an establishment of transitional justice to address them once and for all. This can be done by constituting an independent commission of inquiry to investigate the cases and refer them to a tribunal within or outside the country. This can be done in collaboration with the regional and international organizations such as the IGAD and the UN.

5.2.3 Dismantling Economic Drivers

Dismantling economic drivers of conflicts in Jonglei can be achieved through proper allocation of resources, reducing illiteracy rate, and establishment of infrastructures by the government particularly by increasing, the percentage that goes to the state in a manner prorate to the population.

It is therefore important for the government to devolve more funds to the states, counties, Payams, and down to Bomas such that peasantry can have access to adequate basic facilities. Jonglei State, being the largest, with the population of 1.3 million, according to the 5th Sudan population census should get commensurate amount of money during budget allocations.

Secondly, opening more schools and vocational training centers would reduce youth participation in cattle raiding and rebellions in the short run, while in the long run, it will create financially independent and taxable population which will not be susceptible to political entrepreneurs.

Finally, establishing infrastructures such as road network will connect counties such as Pibor, Akobo, Uror, Duk and Twic East to the state capital, Bor, to facilitate easy movement of troops, goods and services to far-flung areas. There is also a need to install telecommunication communication facilities like mobile networks and internet service providers such that sharing of information can be expedited.

5.2.4 Dismantling political Drivers

At the political level, as evinced by the findings, political marginalization of minorities like Murle, and Jie among others has been widely mentioned during interviews. Thus, to reduce the level of political marginalization of the minorities, there is a need to revisit existing policies that only seem to consolidate the regime but continue to perpetuate political marginalization of various ethnic groups at the expense of nation and state building.

Therefore, it is important for the government to embark on state and nation-building programs such as equitable distribution of political power. Murle and Jie in Jonglei State have largely complained about their marginalization in public institutions. Thus establishing what Acemoglu called inclusive institutions is a prerequisite to establishment of sustainable peace in South Sudan in general and Jonglei State in particular.

Secondly, reforms in Judiciary, parliament, executive, army, police and other public service institutions would enhance the ability of the state to expand rapidly to the peripheries. For instance, judiciary is one of the most dysfunctional institutions in South Sudan because it is not executing its mandate in a timely manner. During an assessment made by the Sudd Institute on the accountability institutions in South Sudan, it was established that most of the cardinal bills such as the Anti-Corruption Bill, and Fiscal, and Financial and Monitoring Allocation Bill among others were still in the custody of the Ministry of Justice not yet reviewed.

In the same study, it was established that most of these institutions were inadequately staffed, cash-starved, and lack capacity to execute their mandates. It is therefore important for the government and international organizations to offer funds and capacity building to most institutions in South Sudan to enable them deliver on their mandates.

5.3 Policy Recommendations to IGAD, TROIKA, and the United Nations

The ongoing negotiations in Addis Ababa must sanction the need for transitional justice (TJ). This will help in deterring future atrocities and will as well contribute to building a viable state in South Sudan and Jonglei State by extension. The December 15th Crisis is a legacy of the CPA, in the sense that transitional justice was not guaranteed in the CPA and the old dogs of war got back to their business in 2013.

IGAD must ensure that process is inclusive to avoid monopoly of power by one party to avoid the replication of the CPA which gave SPLM monopoly of power in the South and NCP in the North. This will ensure adequate checks and balances in place. Furthermore, presence of local community representatives (chiefs, cattle camps' youth and women leaders) in the ongoing negotiations in Addis will incorporate the local level dynamics and will ease building of sustainable peace in South Sudan.

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APPENDIX I: MAP OF JONGLEI STATE SHOWING COUNTIES

Source: Conflict dynamic international (2012:1). Building the house of governance in Jonglei State.

Appendix II: Interview Guide

University Of Nairobi

Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Managing ethnic conflicts in South Sudan: A case of Jonglei State (2011-2013)

BY Piok Mabil Kachuol: C50/80163/2012

Interview Guide

My name is Piok **Mabil Kachuol**. I am an MA student in the Department of Political Science and Public AdministrationAs part of the requirements for the award of Degree of Masters in International Relations, Iam conducting a study on this topic. 'Managing Ethnic Conflicts in South Sudan: A Case Study of Jonglei State (2011-2013).

I am requesting for an interview with you to discuss and have better understanding on issues affecting the people of Jonglei State. Kindly answer for me the following questions in writing.

This information will help inform policies aimed at bringing stability to Jonglei State. Confidentiality will be adhered to by the researcher.

Section A: Demographic Questions

1. How old are you?
   a) 18---29
   b) 30---39
   c) 40---49
   d) 50 and above.
2. Gender
   a) Male
   b) Female
3. Ethnic group
   a) Dinka
   b) Murle
   c) Nuer
   d) Other
4. Your occupation
   a) Community leader
   b) Government official
   c) Aid worker
   d) Security sector

    e) No job

    f) Other

Section B: The Dynamics of Escalations of Ethnic Conflicts in Jonglei State

On a scale of 1-5, where 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=agree, 4=strongly agree, 5=not sure, state the extent to which you agree with the following factors in relation to escalation of violent conflicts in Jonglei State.

Description	Responses				
Escalation of ethnic conflicts in jonglei State is a function of historical grievances.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State is driven by resources.					
Escalations of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State is a function of the inability of the state to provide security to the society.					
Escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State is a function of proliferation of small arms.					
Escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State is a function of absence of infrastructure					
Escalation of escalation in Jonglei State is a function of relative deprivation					
Escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State has been exacerbated by poor policy approaches					

Section C: Security Challenges

1. Do you think tribalism is a challenge to stability in Jonglei State?

2. What do you think explain the inability of the SPLA and the South Sudan police Service (SPSS) to stop escalation of ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State?

3. What do you think makes Jonglei State attractive to rebellions?

Section D: Security Responses

1. Do you think disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs have contributed to stability in anyway? If No, what do you think account for their ineffectiveness?

2. How did communities react to government responses to insecurity in Jonglei State, hostile or receptive? What explains the type of reaction?

3. In your opinion, what are the best mechanisms of ending these conflicts in Jonglei State?

Thank You for your contribution!!!