UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INDIVIDUAL - LEVEL MOTIVATIONS FOR CORRUPTION IN THE PROCESS OF PROVIDING GOVERNMENT SERVICES. A CASE STUDY OF PASSPORT SECTION EMPLOYEES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION SERVICES HEADQUARTERS, NAIROBI.

BY

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2014

DECLARATION AND APPROVAL

DECLARATION

I, Robinson Mutunga Masua, declare that this project paper is my original work and was completed unaided. It is being submitted for the fulfilment of Degree of Masters of Arts, Sociology in Criminology and Social Order. I declare that the work has never been submitted before for any other examination or degree in any institution.

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APPROVAL

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Abstract.

This research project comprehends and analyses the individual-level motivations for corruption in the process of providing government services in an urban public offices setting in Kenya. The project employed survey approach through "self reporting and hypothetical choices" derived from experience and understanding of the service providers. This research project seeks to make contribution by presenting for a data and analysis to criminology and study of corruption that is individually focused and practicable. The main focus is the key individual-level motivations for corruption specifically definitions, habitus, dispositions and predispositions.

The research project defends the argument that corruption is ultimately the direct result of decisions, choices and behaviour at the level of an individual. For public officials the decision to engage in corrupt behaviour is primarily influenced by a personal definition of corruption, individual perceptions of how widespread corrupt activities are (imitation), belonging to a certain habitus and having certain dispositions and predispositions. Thus apart from devoting a lot of energy to explaining structural features in the level of perceived corruption which provides less effective remedy for corruption in public sector understanding individual-level motivations for corruption could provide more practical and effective way of dealing with corruption in public sector in Kenya.

The research data analysis shows that petty corruption is practised in forms of extortion, straddling, influence peddling and kinship/nepotism. It also found that the specific individual-level motivations for corruption that makes public officials more prone to corrupt behaviour than others are positive or favourable definition, positive/favourable attitude, wide engagement, approvals, positive work lifestyle, values, expectations and extraordinary dispositions. In addition the study shows that corruption control and prevention in the section is moderate effective but more needs to be done especially on individual level motivations for corruption.

The study recommends equal efforts should be both to reform the structures/institutions and as well as individuals' interpretations, perceptions and dispositions towards corruption. Therefore a pragmatic approach is needed to curb corruption in Kenya.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the problem

According to Tanzi (2002), corruption is not a new phenomenon in our society. Around 2000 years ago, Kautilya discussed corruption in a book titled *Arthashastra*. The topic of corruption has also attracted other scholars like Dante and Shakespeare. Surprisingly in ancient Egypt, the pharaohs searched for ways to reduce corruption of their tax collectors (called *Scribes*). The scribes were paid high salaries to reduce the incentive to enrich themselves by cheating taxpayers. In addition, scribes working in the field were controlled by a group of special scribes from head office (Adams, 1993).

Transparency International, an integrity-ranking group based in Germany has declared that the continent of Africa has the most corrupt nations in the world (TI, 2011). Denmark, New Zealand and Singapore are seen as having the least corruption in the world, based on the Corruption Perception Index, or CPI, published annually. Somalia is viewed as the most corrupt country. "The surveys and assessments used to compile the index include questions relating to bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds and questions that probe the strength and effectiveness of public sector anti-corruption efforts," said Transparency International (2011) report.

Countries with the highest scores on the index are viewed as having the least corruption while countries with the lowest scores, the most. Rounding out the 10 highest scores were New Zealand scoring 9.5, Denmark and Finland 9.4, Sweden 9.3, Singapore 9.2, Netherland 8.9, Australia and Switzerland 8.8, Canada 8.7, Luxemburg 8.5 and tenth place Hong Kong with a score of 8.4. (TI, 2011).

Japan was 17th on the list with a score of 8, the United Kingdom 20th (7.8) and the United States 22nd (7.1). At the bottom of the 178 countries, Somalia scored 1, below Afghanistan and Myanmar (1.5) and Uzbekistan (1.6) respectively. Five other African nations joined Somalia; Sudan, Chad, Burundi, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. Forty-four of the 47 African nations scored less than five on the index, meaning they have serious levels of corruption. Botswana was ranked as the least corrupt African country, with a score of 6.1.

According to Transparency International (2011), "these results indicate a serious corruption problem."With governments committing huge sums to tackle the world's most pressing problems, from the instability of financial markets to climate change and poverty, corruption remains an obstacle to achieving much needed progress."

Kenya still ranks as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, as this latest index shows. According to the Corruption Perception Index 2011 released by Transparency International, Kenya ranked 154 out of 182 countries that were surveyed with CPI of 2.2, which shares the same score as President Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe, is among 27 low scoring countries in corruption which include the Somalia (182), North Korea (182), Afghanistan (180), Sudan (177), Equatorial Guinea (172), Burundi (172) and Libya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola and Chad all taking position 168.

The survey results, which were released by the Berlin-based anti-corruption watch-dog, show that the publicly stated zero-tolerance policy fight against corruption by the Grand Coalition Government only improved Kenya's score of 2.1 per cent in the year 2010 marginally to 2.2 per cent in the year 2011 (TI- Kenya, 2012).

The Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) 2013 shows more than half of people believe the level of corruption in their countries has increased over the past two years (TI, 2013). The report which was released by TI on 9th July 2013 surveyed 114,270 people in 107 countries. Unlike the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which relies on expert opinion, this survey used the public views and experience of corruption. The key findings of this research is that more than four respondents (27%) said they paid a bribe over the past 12 months when accessing key public institutions and services. Of those who reported paying bribe, 40% said they did so "to speed things up", 27 % said "it was the only way to obtain service", while 21 % said they paid bribe "as a gift, or to express gratitude". The remaining 12% of respondents said it was "to get a cheaper service". The report shows Denmark, Finland, Japan and Australia tied for the least bribe-ridden country with only 1% of respondents in each country admitting paying bribes. Mongolia is rated as the most corrupt nation in the world in this report with 86% of respondents admitting paying bribes.

The picture painted by the report is poor record of some African nations on bribery stands out. Sierra Leone has the highest number of respondents admitting to have paid bribe- 84% and seven out of the 9 countries with the highest reported bribery rate are in sub-Saharan Africa.

Kenya in this report is ranked number four with 70% of the respondents admitting having paid bribes in the last two years. Top on the list in Africa is number two Liberia (75%) and number one Sierra Leone (84%). In East Africa and in the whole African continent Rwanda is ranked the least corrupt country with a bribery rate standing at 13%.

Across all the 105 countries surveyed in this report, politicians, judges and police head the list of the public institutions people seen as the most corrupt. In almost half of those countries surveyed politicians were pointed out as the least trustworthy. Religious bodies and businesses had the lowest corruption rating.

It also goes all the way to show that the implementation of the Constitution and the wide ranging reforms being put in place at the moment are yet to change the thieving ways of the past.

According to The Star News paper, 22nd October, 2011, the Kenya police was the only corrupt institution in the top ten within EAC institutions member states. In the total 115 institutions listed, Kenya had 35 including the Kenya police, the report said. In the top ten most corrupt institutions Burundi had three, Uganda five and Tanzania two. This was derived from Transparency International (TI) Kenya (2012) East Africa Bribery Index report.

According to the same report in Kenya, the police index of corruption increased from 77.7 per cent year 2010 to 81 per cent year 2011, although there was a reduction in the number of police asking for bribes. In all the five EAC countries the police ranked number one in corruption. Transparency International Kenya reported that the study did not seek to establish the rank of police asking for bribes. "The fact that the police and judiciary are among corrupt institutions in the region meant that governments needed to do more to bring back public confidence,"

After the police the ministry of defence and Nairobi city council were among the top three. Institutions that exited the corruption index ranking in Kenya were the KPA, ministries of forestry and wildlife, youth affairs, labour and agriculture. The new that joined the corruption list are Mombasa city council, ministry of public works, IIEC, Banks and private schools.

According to The Daily Nation 17th August 2012, Kenyans say corruption has increased compared to previous years, a new report by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) (2012) shows.

This report on a survey conducted 2011 by Anti-Corruption Commission in Kenya shows that seeking employment and accessing government services are the main avenues through which Kenyans engage in corruption. Police (34.6 per cent), immigration officers (14.3 per cent) and provincial administrators (11.8 per cent) are mentioned as those mostly likely to demand bribes. "Nearly 40 per cent of the respondents indicated that they would engage in corruption while seeking employment while 30.9 per cent would corrupt to obtain government services," the report dates May 2012 and released on Friday 17th August 2012 to the public states. The Ministry of Provincial Administration and Internal Security is perceived as the most corrupt followed by the Ministry of Lands and that of Education. The report also says that regular police are more corrupt than their traffic counterparts.

Therefore corruption in accessing government services in Kenya remains a major issue of concern. Passport section where immigration officers provide services to members of the public is one of the government departments which have experienced corruption in the process of accessing government services as per EACC (2012) report which is the major concern of this research project.

1.2 Statement of the problem

According to the Transparency International (TI) mission statement it is committed to works at home and abroad to combat corruption and promote transparency and integrity in government, business and development assistance. Coming closer home in Kenya the Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission (EACC) mission is to combat corruption and economic crime through law enforcement, prevention and public education. Consequently several corrupt government officers have been prosecuted and charged of corruption in public offices including recent case of Kenya Tourist Board tender scandal this is according to The Daily Business news paper August 27, 2012.

However at the same time many government officers who are corrupt go unidentified and therefore are not prosecuted or charged. High corruption rates in government offices among officers and public continue to be a major challenge in Kenyan public sector as The Daily Nation 17th August 2012 reported that Kenyans say corruption has increased compared to previous years a picture painted by a new report by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) (2012). This report on a survey conducted 2011 shows that seeking employment and accessing government services are the main avenues through which Kenyans

engage in corruption. Police (34.6 per cent), immigration officers (14.3 per cent) and provincial administrators (11.8 per cent) are mentioned as those mostly likely to demand bribes. From this report what we see is that corruption is analysed only at the top level even in the process of accessing government services. For example in the immigration department and specifically in the Passport Section there are other low cadre categories of workers which the EACC (2012) report did not capture. These include clerical officers and support staffs that also may provide more insight on what are motivations for corruptions in the process of accessing government services.

Corruption is synonymous to a limp in the walk of human progress. This social vice is not a new phenomenon; it is as old as the history of mankind itself. According to Kaufmann (1997) corruption made itself visible when the institution of the government was founded. Additionally Glynn et al. (1997) saw that no region, and hardly any country, has been immune from corruption. Like a cancer, it strikes almost all parts of the society; argument put forward by Amundsen (1999), that corruption "eats the cultural, political and economic fabric of society, and destroys the functioning of vital organs"; all these was proved by the major corruption scandals of France, Italy, Japan, Philippine, South Korea, Mexico United States and etc. It is out of these corruption scandals that brought the corruption problem on the agenda of major international institutions like, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization, Transparency International and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. According to World Bank, corruption is "the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development. It undermines development by distorting the rule of law and weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth depends. The Transparency International take it as, "... one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world. It undermines good government, fundamentally distorts public policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the private sector and private sector development and particularly hurts the poor".

The motivation of this study derives from the widespread concern about corruption particularly in the context of developing countries like Kenya and in public sector. Specifically the EACC (2012) report which ranked immigration officers as the second corrupt public officials after police in Kenya and the Transparency International (TI), (2013) the Global Corruption Barometer survey that shows more than half of people believe the level of corruption in their countries has increased over the past two years. Recent empirical research

on the consequences of corruption shows its detrimental effects which leads to the consensus that it is one of the central issues in the development policies. It weakens a country's institutional foundations, investment and decision making which consequently, contribute to lower economic growth. However research on what are the individual- level motivations for corruption in public sector and why some individuals are more corrupt than others is rather scanty. Given its large impact much stands to be gained from understanding the individual-level motivation for corruption and the way it can be reduced. This is one of the major motivations of this research.

Political scientists and economists alike have devoted a lot of energy to explaining cross-national and cross-institutional differences in the level of perceived corruption. This body of research has focused mostly on structural features. However, corruption is ultimately the direct result of decisions, choices and behaviour at the level of an individual. One can restructure institutions or political systems, but if individual level motivations for corrupt behaviour are not understood, these restructurings may not be effective.

Therefore in response to this problem this research tried to understand and analyse individual-level motivations for corrupt behaviour in the process of accessing government services. The argument is that for the public officials, the decision to engage in corrupt behaviour is primarily influenced by a personal definition of corruption and a perception of how widespread corrupt activities are (imitation). Also a public official being in certain habitus, and having certain dispositions and predispositions is triggered into corruption. This explanation borrows from the social learning theory (Akers, 1998) and Pierre Bourdieu's (1998) theory of social action developed by sociologists to explain various sorts of deviant and criminal behaviour**.**

1.3 Research Questions

The research project tried to answer the following questions;

I. What are the major patterns/forms and types of corruption in the process of accessing government services specifically in acquiring travel documents in Kenya?

II. What are specific individual-level motivations for corruption that makes public officials more prone to corrupt behaviour than other officials?

III. How effective or adequate are the corruption control and prevention mechanisms and measures in the process of accessing government services in Kenya?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

1.4.1 General Objective

The general objective of the study was to understand and analyse the individual – level motivation for corruption in the process of providing government services with specific focus on Passport Section, Headquarters in Nairobi, in the Department of Immigration Services, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government.

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives will be;

I. To establish the patterns/forms and types of corruption in Passport Section Headquarters in Nairobi, in the Department of Immigration Services.
II. To determine whether the decision to engage in corrupt behaviour is primarily influenced by a personal interpretation of corruption.
III. To determine whether individual perceptions and dispositions lead to corrupt practices.
IV. To assess the adequacy of anti-corruption measures and mechanisms in Passport Section Headquarters Nairobi, in the Department of Immigration Services.

1.5 Justification of the study

It is hoped that stakeholders in fighting corruption in public sector including senior officials in the Department of Immigration Services, Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) and members of the public can use the information contained in this report to raise public awareness on nature, extent and individual - level motivations for corruption in the process of accessing government services and to develop effective prevention and control strategies especially at this time when Kenyan government is at the dawn of implementing the new constitution and in line with The Vision 2030, all build on paramount objective to restore integrity, accountability, effectiveness, efficiency and quality service delivery in public sector.

1.6 Scope and limitation of the Study

The research assumes that corruption is the outcome of self reinforcing social processes and downplays the unidirectional causal role of institutions or structures. The assumption in this study is that people are the one who are corrupt and not institutions or structures. Also in the context of the theoretical background of the study, the importance of agency is paramount in understanding any social aspect. This means that the two- structure and agency- influences each other. Individual are not there to be shaped by structures but also manoeuvre themselves within these systems therefore constantly shaping the systems.

The definition of corruption is wide with different types of corruption in public sector. For the purposes of this study corruption only include corruption in accessing government services (bureaucratic corruption or petty corruption) i.e. corruption which involves handling of income or finance like embezzlement is not included in the scope of this study.

The study is limited to Passport Section in Headquarters in Nairobi where survey was conducted to a few selected respondents because of limitation of time and financial resources. The reason behind this scope is that Passport Section is located at the heart of the capital city of Kenya, Nairobi and serves as the face of the Department of Immigration Services in the country since this is where most Kenyans process their travel documents.

Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

A literature review is a conceptual analysis of the body of knowledge as written by others on the subject, and a critical examination of the approach and methods used to conduct such research. With the additional aim of positioning the topic being researched within this larger body of knowledge, this chapter will provide an extensive and comprehensive literature review in order to synthesize and analyze what has already been written on the subject and identify strength and weaknesses of such research. It will also compare and contrast various definitions and conceptualizations of corruption in the process of accessing government services, bearing in mind that there are no generally accepted definitions of the concepts by contributors. Instead, the study will conceptualize them based on what has already been written on the topic.

This chapter aims at bridging the gap between what has been written on the topic, in such a way that it is conceptually and methodologically insufficient, and what has not been written, and so clarify the gaps, shortcomings and weaknesses of the existing knowledge (Auriacombe, 2001:22). For this purpose, the literature review is an indispensible as well as undisputable part of any research, meaningful study or proposal.

Since the study centres on individual level motivations for corruption in the process of accessing government services in Kenya, with particular reference to the Passport Section in the Department of Immigration services, and in order to achieve the objectives of the study, the chapter will be divided into two sections: Section 2.1.1 will deal with literature on corruption in public service in Africa and Kenya, while section 2.1.2 will provide an extensive review of literature on causes and mitigation of corruption in public service with emphasis on identifying gap that still exits specifically individual level motivations for corruption in the process of accessing government services.

2.1.1 Corruption and Public Service.

Corruption can be defined as dishonest or illegal behaviour, especially of people in authority, the act or effect of making somebody change from moral to immoral standards of behaviour (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2000). Corruption is a persistent feature of human societies over time and space. The term "corruption" has been given a lot of attention,

especially at the onset of the 21st century, as the phenomenon has increasingly come to affect the social and economic performances of nations and institutions, particularly in the developing countries.

Around the world, corruption and government services have continued to attract the attention of individuals, leaders, governments, and organizations (international, regional and local), including governmental and non-governmental like Transparency International (TI), the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006; Médard 2002). It is evident that the African continent is the major target of this movement (Szeftel 1998; Médard 2002; Kpundeh 2004; Lawson 2009).

Most states and regional organization, be it a super power or economy, middle class or third world, face a dilemma in handling corruption in the process of accessing government services, therefore it is not surprising that they have frequently reviewed policies and guidelines. In such a move the United States of America (USA), the world's strongest and largest economy, initiated a proposal to reform her corruption policy in September, 2011, the President Obama administration launched an Open Government Partnership to support national efforts that promote transparency, fight corruption and empower citizens.

According to Transparency International (TI; 2009), 10% of the world's GDP (or $390 billion each year) had been lost to corruption, primarily in developing economies. In sub-Sahara Africa, corruption costs an estimated $148 billion each year (Anassi, 2004). Officials at the United Nations have estimated corruption costs most sub-Sahara African countries over 25% of their GDP (Atuobi, 2007; Tamene, 2008).

Africa is a continent with a notorious experience of corruption in public sector from activities associated with bribery, favouritism, embezzlement, straddling, fraud, extortion, nepotism, imperialism among other corrupt behaviours. These have led to resources wasted on unproductive expenditure (such as bribes) and misallocated to those with power or money, public official effort diverted from the public interest to self-dealing and, at the political level, unstable government and alienated citizens (Klitgaard 1988: 46). Also these lead to increased costs of doing business, unfair allocation of public entitlements, poor quality consumer products and reduced public safety (Rose-Ackerman 1998: 3-4). As a result, the continent is characterised by weak societies, ruined lives and impeded socio-economic development.

Generally speaking it is the poor and the vulnerable who suffer the most due to public sector corruption as they are more reliant on government services and public services to satisfy their most basic needs and services.

Africa, a continent with over 50 nations and population of more than 900 million, many of the institutions such as legislature and judiciary are weak, the rule of law is not strictly enforced, political patronage is the norm, the independence and professionals of the public sector have been eroded and civil society lacks the means to hold the perpetrators to account (Lawa, 2007).

The last few decades have witnessed the highest levels of public sector corruption in Africa largely because of lack of transparency, integrity and accountability in public sector. The number of corruption cases in Africa has continued to grow.

The Global Corruption Barometer 2013 discussed earlier is basically based on public views and experiences of the service sickers (public). Although public views and experience of corruption is important in understanding corruption in public service the back stops at who really accepts the bribe. If the public official completely disregard and don't accept bribe then the public sector cannot experience corruption. This forms the strong base of this study that it is key to understand individual-level motivations for corruption in the process of providing government services through the public official perspective and at the lowest cadre or worker together with that of the high level or purely expert opinion. Also this report does not provide why the respondents were motivated to accept bribes or engage in the corrupt activities.

According to Standard newspaper December 20th 2012, Kenya is losing over a quarter a million jobs every year to corruption, with employers in both private sector and the Government spending over Sh104 billion that could be directed to create positions paid as kickbacks to get things done. However, in different studies and reports there is no single one that tries to estimate the amount lost through petty or bureaucratic corruption in the process of accessing government services. The reason being is very hard to monatarize corruption in the process of accessing government services.

According to the Corruption Perception Index 2011 released by Transparency International, "these results indicate a serious corruption problem."With governments committing huge sums to tackle the world's most pressing problems, from the instability of financial markets to

climate change and poverty, corruption remains an obstacle to achieving much needed progress."

High corruption rates in government offices among officers and public continue to be a major challenge in Kenyan public sector as Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) (2012) report indicates. The gap which this report did not address is why are specific individuals are motivated to engage in such corrupt acts while others are not motivated. Also it did not address the question why some departments are more prone to corruption that others putting into consideration the difference in the working contexts of the departments.

A lot of literature emphasizes on causes and consequences of corruption (Pavarla, 1996) other than how the phenomenon is practised. For the purpose of this study to fill this gap in the literature it focuses on the persons who practice corruption in Kenya and especially in the process of accessing government services. Kibwana et al (1996) and Justice (2002) identify major cause of corruption in public service in Kenya as the existing public institutions being weak and are as vulnerable to corruption as public officials themselves. In Kenya there has been great efforts to strengthen this public institutions but corruption still continue to thrive. The best answer why such efforts to fight corruption in Kenya public service failed is by Kibwana (1996) assertions that these efforts have been left to some of the most corrupt institutions in the government. To address this shortcoming, this study recognises that persons are the one who are corrupt and not institutions and therefore the importance of an individual approach to corruption.

The nature of corruption in Kenya and especially in public service as portrayed by literature is said to reside within state apparatus that essentially determine distribution of public resources and dissemination of power in the society (Mbaku, 2000). But in this picture much of research effort is on grand scale corruption and looting and there is little emphasis on petty corruption like corruption in the process of accessing government services. That's why this study will emphasize on petty corruption in public service because besides little attention paid to it in Kenya it has great socio-economic impact to citizens especially the poor and network of individuals and groups with no access to enormous wealth, power and influence in both the public and private sector.

Besides on the debate of nature of corruption Jos (1993), Smith (2001) and Andvig and Fjeldstad (2001) argue that corruption needs to be studied within specific context. In line to

this suggestion this research will focus on corruption in the process of accessing government services in the Passport Section Nairobi. In addition, Olive de Sardan (2001) argues as much as corruption is conspicuous and generalised it has to be studied from the viewpoint of the participants. That why this research will focus on public officials as participants.

This type of prioritization may arise from the policy question of which type of corruption is important studying or curbing, but as Wrong (2009) and Wamwere (2003) put it, both types of corruption in Kenya partly stems from the fact that petty and grand corruption tend to feed each other in public administration.

Some analysts have argued that corruption has adverse impact on Africa socio-economic development while other argues in favour of corruption as enhancing development process. For example it speeds up the development machinery (Frisch, 1995) and thus a benefit to the economy. With respect to the latter viewpoint, the most bandied benefit of corruption is that it effectively 'lubricates' the wheels of an otherwise rigid bureaucracy, thereby making it more responsive to the needs of clients, be they entrepreneurs or ordinary citizens, seeking the services of a public agency. Corruption is said to minimize bureaucratic red tape, eliminating bottlenecks and facilitating a more efficient, flexible, and responsive system. But this widely held viewpoint has been faulted. For example, corruption has not improved access to the bureaucracy for historically marginalized groups, such as poor rural dwellers and the vast majority of the urban working-poor (Mbaku, 1998).

More importantly, the notion that corruption is beneficial and functions to grease a rigid bureaucracy raises the question of *qui bono*? Certainly, corruption may be beneficial, but only to the privileged elites. For example in the process of accessing government services only the well up economically will be able to access the government services as they are able to pay kick-backs, bribes for the services they are seeking to be first tracked.

Further, the notion that corruption enhances economic growth by channelling scarce capital resources to the most enterprising individuals in society is not consistent with the evidence, at least, in the case of Africa. For example the public servants who have largely acquired wealth through corrupt means in public offices are not purely hardworking, efficient and productive but most are "don't caring" civil servants who don't care about others as Mojtabal (2006:1) has argued, "such corruption creates a culture of self service and disregard for the situations of others. One of the supposed benefits of corruption is that it facilitates bureaucratic procedures, making the system more efficient, flexible, and responsive to the demands of various clienteles or persons

who seek services from government. This beneficial effect is, at best, dubious. The bureaucrats probably mount many of the bottlenecks in the bureaucratic structures in the process of accessing government services intentionally for the purpose of using them as bargaining chips to extract bribes from clients seeking government services. Certainly bureaucratic bottlenecks make efficient operations difficult and represent needless additional costs to business enterprises. Entrepreneurs are willing to pay bribes to bureaucrats in a bid to minimize these costs on their business. Institutional reforms are required otherwise bureaucratic roadblocks may become institutionalized as a permanent source of extra-legal income for corrupt public officials (Mbaku 1998).

Regardless of the benefits of corruption, certainly, its negative effects dwarf the supposed benefits. The corroding effects of corruption impact the development process at several levels: administrative, economic, political, and social (Hope and Chikulo 2000; World Bank 1997; 1996; 1979). But this study recognizes there is scanty research in the administrative level especially petty or bureaucratic corruption and that's the reason this study zeroes in on the corruption in the process of accessing government services.

2.1.2 Causes and Mitigation of Corruption in Public Service.

Classical explanations of corruption are "dominated by economic treatments that focus on identifying structures of incentives that make corruption likely and assessing the impact of corruption on economic efficiency" (Granovetter, 2004:152). Such explanations assumes for corruption to occur there is principal-agent relationship (or incentive) and therefore existence of a superior principal who supervises an agent carrying out delegations and directives that should serve the interests of the principal. In this context corruption arises when an agent (junior civil servant); who has advantage over access to critical administrative information more than the principal (senior civil servants and government officers), this goes against the wishes of the principal to solicit extra payoffs of which s/he never forwards to the principal (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Granovetter, 2004).

This explanation of corruption in public service does not go without criticism. Rose-Ackerman (1978) points out that; agency explanation of corruption tends to focus largely on the organizational relationship between the agent and the principal leaving out the third party (e.g. service/favour-seeker); who for example through unspecified payments may influence an agent's judgment or decisions to act in ways that may benefit the third party. Therefore this model explanation can be applicable in analyzing specific forms of corruption (e.g. fraud,

kickbacks, and favouritism) that can be primarily executed by an agent alone. Therefore, it ignores the functionality of other informal payoffs, as well as showing how such payoffs affect delivery of public services which this study will address.

In addition this model shortcoming in explaining corruption in public service is by defining all informal payoffs not forwarded to the principal, as corrupt. Whilst such payoffs are by legal standards illegal, and may as well contradict principles guarding or outlining how the public sector should work. They do not address the contextual legitimacy or informal values that may be attached to informal payoffs or even undo their symbolic relevance to actors (Granovetter, 2004). According to Aidt (2003), there are possibilities that the principal (whether as a citizen or as a senior public official) may be corrupt. We may as well have a corrupt principal and uncorrupt agent or corrupt agent, a non-corrupt principal and non/corrupt third party. Corruption literature and studies like Wrong, (2009) and Wade, (1982) shows, that in situations where the principal (senior public officials) are corrupt, agents (junior public officials) or the third party (service seekers) may be forced to follow suit fearing they lose their positions or fail to access essential public resources. If that happens, we may experience a cycle of corruption running from top to down and vice-versa.

Besides all economists' principal-agent relationship has been essential in understanding institutional incentives of public sector corruption. But, as Sociologists like Granovetter (2004), asserts; whilst analyzing corruption within economic frameworks like incentives approach may be necessary, "in practice they undermine outcomes because they abstract away from the social aspects that require analysis of social, cultural, and historical elements" (ibid). Therefore, to capture various aspects of corruption, a researcher needs to bring on board other perspectives that looks beyond principal-agent relationship. This remedy can be provided by perspective of this study which uses individual level motivations for corruption in accessing government services.

The second perspective in explaining corruption in public service is through moralists perspective that see corruption as "an immoral and unethical phenomenon that contains a set of moral aberrations from moral standards of society, causing loss of respect for and confidence in duly constituted authority" (Gould, 1991:468; cited by Mohammad Mohabbat Khan (n.d.) in a paper prepared for TI. Bangladesh). Montinola and Jackman, (2002:148) argue that moralists assert that corruption "stems from the social norms that emphasize gift-giving and loyalty to family or clan, rather than the rule of law." Thus, corruption as an

immoral practice is harmful to socio-economic and political development of any society (Mauro, 1995).

For the purpose of the main objective of this study, moralists view is of importance because it is unlikely that many studies on corruption in public service in Kenya lack insight in to these elements. In particular, concerning a phenomenon where main concerns have been focused towards its impacts on socio-economic and political development of societies in Kenya. But, among other reasons that will be seen in the research objectives, moralists' perspective is important for this study based on its recognition of complexity of corruption especially at the lower levels in public service- level of service provision.

Moralists approach shortcoming in explaining corruption in public service comes from the fact to try and treat corruption as an independent variable just like weak institutions and social, economic and political structures of the society. Whereas, at the same time, some of these moralists (e.g. Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Mbaku, 2000; Tanzi, 1998) subscribe to the view that corruption is a product of some underlying socio-economic and political structures in a given society. It is also dangerous to base our understanding of corruption on the dichotomy of morality and immorality. This is because; morality definitions tend to blame or overlook the legitimacy of social practices. Morality based definitions are somehow problematic since Anthropologists like Blundo and Oliver de Sardan (2006) questions the boundary between morality and immorality of corruption amidst its contested content that vary from place to place. It may be better to first understand how corruption takes place and how it is perceived before we can blame public policy failures or inefficient delivery of public services on corruption (Pavarala, 1996). That's why this study puts great emphasises on understanding the individual level motivations of corruption in the process of accessing government services.

Another perspective which can be used to explain corruption in public service is functionalists or grease the wheels approach, which contradicts the above moralistic view of corruption, and instead looks at the role of corruption in creating efficiency in the distribution of public resources. The assumption here is that corruption can be necessary in some circumstances, especially, in situations where public institutions do not function as they are supposed to (Khan, 1996). In the words of Johnston (1986:459), functionalists "point to possible benefits of corruption, suggesting that it can speed up cumbersome procedures, buy political access for the excluded, and perhaps even produce de facto policies more effective than those emerging

from legitimate channels." Thus, functionalists base their analysis of corruption on the effectiveness of existing institutional structures or political system.

The proponents in this approach look at institutional capacity in ensuring indiscriminative distribution of public resources and efficient delivery of public services. They do not, however, disagree that weak institutions are prone to acts of corruption (Fjeldstad, 2005, Tanzi, 1998). Their argument is that, corruption is not as dangerous as moralists say it is. They instead assert that corruption greases wheels of an inefficient bureaucracy (Khan, 1998; 1996). Even though moralists' view has tended to carry the day in the standoff concerning consequences of corruption, but empirically speaking, the contestation between moralists and functionalist seems to be a little settled. This is because scholars like Heidenheimer and Johnston (2002), observe that consequences of corruption are not easy to ascertain because other factors may lead to a similar situation or a policy failure as corruption is said to do.

At this juncture, blaming ineffective public sector on corruption as moralists tend to may be misleading. Probably, moralists tend to overlook institutional organization, and other environmental factors (e.g. informal networks), because; there are evidences that it is primarily upon environmental/contextual factors that public sectors in the Sub-Saharan Africa practically function (Jamil, 2007; Hyden, 2006).

After all, there seems to be an inter-disciplinary consensus that corruption is endogenous to existing socio-political and economic structures of a given society. Moreover, studying corruption involves a study of social structures, economic organization and political systems of a particular society (Pavarala, 1996; Ruud, 2000). This observation justifies this study position of viewing corruption as a result of multivariate factors, and as a consequence of socio-economic and political structures of in the society. This is contextualised in the Social action theory specifically the habitus concept. The concept here is that corruption study should not be based on duality of social system but reflexivity, each structure influencing and shaping the other.

However, even though functionalists approach is necessary, it is criticized for neglecting "the political significance of deviance and lack any consideration of power, interest and social structure and at the same time the whole question of the origins of corruption is not considered" (ibid). In other words, awareness on possible interactions between values, norms, power-relations, nature of institutions, and political system, may influence collective perceptions and/or motivation towards acts of corruption (Granovetter 2004), in a country

with diverse societal settings like Kenya. Therefore, a researcher should try to locate corruption within such interactions so as to unravel various aspects of its practice in the public sector. This is the major strength of this study as it will involve bridging perceptions and interpretations of various actors in the study the setting.

Another popular explanation of corruption in public service is patronage or clientelism. This approach analyzes corruption by looking at the institutional structures and the nature of a political system in place. Accordingly, it follows a patron-client relationship which emphasizes existence of active informal networks that tend to overshadow functionality of public institutions and systems in place (Hyden, 2006; Fjeldstad, 2009). Thus, how public resources are distributed in the society is primarily determined by the informal interactions based on mutual material gain (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002)

The idea here is that the patron's networks run from the top to down in the grassroots (Heidenheimer and Johnston, 2002). The patron (e.g. a politician or a civil servant) gives resources or creates opportunities (money, jobs) to clients (e.g. villagers) in return for their support and cooperation (votes, attendance at rallies etc.) (Khan, 1998). In this way, the network extends further to create various sites of patrons, sub-patrons, clients and brokers or middlemen (Amundsen, 1999). Personalized exchanges or transactions and rewards are promoted within these networks. In addition, the nature or type of these exchanges can be influenced by status and power of the patron that may also "vary across a broad range" (Khan, 1998:23).

According to Amundsen, (1999) and Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002), this approach has been commonly used in analyzing grand corruption in Africa but little has been done on petty corruption which this study will research on to address this gap.

Whilst pointing out the role of informal networks in how public administration is carried out, this approach does not explain the origin of patron-client relationship and why it actively dominates over formal structures of government. It also ignores the existence of other incentives outside patron/client relationship that may motivate public officials to practice corruption. For example, the approach fails to recognize issues like; civil service wage and the possibility that formal institutions, if appropriately organized, can censure discriminative practices in resource distribution that comes with patronage/clientelism. This is one of the strength of this study where individual level motivations like definitions, values, beliefs and dispositions are important in terms of explaining corruption in public service in Kenya. A

good example is that of Wrong (2009)'s work titled; *It's our Turn to Eat* concerning the Kenyan story of grand corruption and tribalism in the government. Although Wrong hypothesis has not been tested on petty corruption like corruption in the process of accessing government service which this study will undertake.

According to Agbakoba (2007) modern public sector (or *alien Public Service* as he calls it) suffers from the problem of *identification without commitment* by public officials. That is, public officials and members of the public simply identify themselves with the state or public sector to enjoy privileges and opportunities that may arise from belonging to it. Agbakoba asserts that; identification without commitment by public officials results to: "perfunctory attitude to work, non-responsiveness, lethargy, inefficiency and corruption. It is therefore very easy for employees to constitute themselves into working groups with group loyalties and goals that diametrically opposed to that of the public service and the state" (p, 5). These working groups can be used in the allocation of public resources either legally or illegally. This thought can be attributed to the circumstances under which public service and the state in Africa were created (imposition by colonizers); public sector is seen as foreign concept (Hyden, 2006; Ekeh, 1975; Abgakoba, 2007).

Reflecting in the Kenyan context the mentality among public officials is that; that which belongs to the public belongs to none "*Mali ya Uma"* and that corruption is a victimless crime because no one is stolen from as PLO Lumumba Director of the defunct KACC attributed in one of his televised speeches in Kenya). This may encourage embezzlement of public resources in the public sector.

Drawing from all the previous explanation of corruption in public service we can agree at this point that corruption need to be understood in a holistic manner because of its complexity and fluidness. This kind of understanding is in social perspective of corruption in public service. Such insight is by sociologists and anthropologist who argue that acts of corruption can be better understood within a specific social context (Lancaster and Montinola, 2001). This is because some forms of corruption like bribery are "morally loaded terms" (ibid, p.93) that can be appropriately defined within a socio-economic and political setting. That is, these scholars say that; corruption like other socio-economic and political practices is part of or is as a result of societal power-relations, interests, stakes in the system and norms practiced and learned by a given group of people (Pavarala, 1996; Agbakoba, 2007; Ruud, 2000; Blundo and Oliver de Sardan, 2006; Smith, 2001; Fjeldstad, 2009).

According to Pavarala (1996) in his study of elite perception of corruption in India's Andhra Pradesh this approach can be termed as "*social construction of corruption",* a view supported by Granovetter (2004). According to this approach Granovetter (2004), argues that studying corruption as a social problem as well as actors involved should be related to the "contextual information on actors, social positions, interests and stakes in the system as well as on the political, economic and social conditions within which they function" (p. 25). The point here is that understanding corruption cannot be through one group of people in society for example elites. However, there are also indications that elites or public official may not likely to be independent of popularly practiced societal norms or values (Jamil, 2002; 2007).

In society elites or public officials are likely to pose inherently similar perceptions to those other members of the community and Jamil (2007) observes elites or public officials have various sources of information – traditional and non-traditional sources – that may shape their views/actions towards a particular socio-economic and political condition.

Therefore a researcher on corruption should try to put into consideration these societal norms and environmental factors that may influence how public officials behave. This is because it is said that, elites undergo socialization processes posed by such cultural norms, societal practices as well as other environmental factors. In this way, perceptions and actions towards corrupt practices by elites or public officials and members of the public may stem from similar environmental factors or even from the same logics of societal interactions like definitions, imitations, values, beliefs, attitudes and dispositions common in the study setting for example in the Passport Section in this case.

Other scholars like Kibwana et al (1996:138) also make an interesting sociological dimension analysis of corruption in their study: *The Anatomy of Corruption in Kenya*. They say that, corruption has been an element of every human society and it stems from and is sustained by a social environment of disequilibrium. This is because, at a social level, humans are driven by two attributes which are: individual self and social self- this is what is referred in this research as individual level motivations for corruption in public service. Thus, to discourage an anti-social aspect like corruption, a fusion of individual self and social self attributes is needed. Otherwise, anti-social practices such as corruption arises when there is predominance of individual self in one's response towards particular situations (e.g. low income, or weak institutional capacity to allow adequate monitoring system).

Sociological perspective has weakness too in explaining corruption in public service. Kibwana *et al*., (1996) explained its weakness may be traced to lack of recognition of the redistributive aspect of corruption that to some extent can be justified by the social self-attribute of actors. That is, actors can use both individual self (e.g. inadequate wages) and social self (e.g. giving back to relatives and/or clan members) attributes to justify corrupt practices.

Having all these in mind, placing corruption within a dichotomy of social and anti-social behaviours may be as well simplistic and can be tantamount to making unwise generalization of a complex phenomenon like corruption. Thus basing on complexity of corruption, as well as recognizing the inadequacy of this perspective, Kibwana (1996) and his colleagues incorporate other theoretical arguments that cut across legal, political, historical and economic perspectives of corruption in their study. This is reflected in this study by incorporating practice theory or social action theory which sees corruption in the context of not only duality but reflexivity of corruption in Kenyan public service.

In spite of social reflexivity (what this research sees as various interconnections to social action), a shortcoming presented by the assumptions of some approaches shown above (principal-agent, and patron-client) lies on their tendency of answering the why or what aspects of corruption. That is, most approaches used in studying corruption tend to either focus on explaining why or what leads to corrupt practices in the public sector and effects of corruption, but not how corruption takes place taking both importance and roles of both structure and agent or individual. Even though, focusing on why aspect of corruption tends to be unavoidable when talking about or studying corruption, we should try to describe how it lies in the system if we are to design effective anti-corruption strategies. The argument here is that, the outstanding emphasis on causes and consequences of corruption in the larger section of corruption literature seem to stem from the covertness/secrecy, and illegality of corruption that limits data on how it actually takes place (Andvig and Fjeldstad, 2001). The fact that corruption takes place in different forms (some of which are contestable) and differ from place to place, may have also contributed to the difficulty in understanding how corruption takes place in the public sector.

Therefore it is through a sociological approach coupled with individual level interpretations, perceptions and dispositions which can give us more insight on corruption in the process of accessing government services which is illegal, secretive and covert.

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.2.1 Social Learning Theory

Akers developed social learning theory as an extension of Sutherland's differential association theory to explain acts that violate social norms (Akers 1998, 2000). The basic assumption behind social learning theory is that the same learning process can produce both conforming and deviant or delinquent behaviour.

Like most theories the differential association theory not only received support but also criticism. An important objection is that the theory ignores the individual differences that exist between people. Personality traits, differences in amenability and differences in ability to learn do not play a role in the theory but are indeed important in practice. A major objection put forward by many critics is that the theory does not accurately define the presented concepts and that it is hardly possible to test it empirically. An overview by Bruinsma (1985) of empirical research into the differential association theory shows that since 1947 no single study can be identified in which the entire theory of Sutherland is subject to review. In the research conducted by Bruinsma himself into the applicability of the theory among Dutch youth, he found a lot of support for Sutherland's theory, moreover in the derived form (Bruinsma, 1985).

These critics led Akers reformulate the theory of Sutherland in terms of modern learning theory based on his own research into criminal behaviour. According to Akers (1985) criminal behaviour arises as the result of either operant conditioning or imitation. The imitated behaviour is derived from the family circle and friends but also from the media and other cultural information resources. The (social) response to delinquent behaviour will – depending on the nature of the reaction – reinforce the corresponding behaviour in a positive or negative way apart from the impact that it has on feelings of pride and self esteem. This results in an adjustment of the elements of Sutherland's model by Burgess and Akers (1966, p. 146) in their model of 'differential reinforcement.'

A possible explanation of individual motivation to engage in corrupt behaviour is offered by the social learning theory (Akers 1998) developed within sociology to explain deviant behaviour. The theory is based on four interrelated concepts that operate to promote or undermine conformity: differential association, definitions, differential reinforcement and imitation. These concepts are overlapping and also mutually reinforcing. The basic

mechanism of the social learning theory works as follows: behaviour is acquired and sustained (1) through adopting definitions favourable to illegal behaviour via differential association with one's peers, (2) through imitating such behaviour by peers, and (3) through the positive reinforcement provided by rewards for such behaviour (Akers 1998). Given the reciprocal relationships between these variables, the causal order between them is not determined (Akers 1998, Akers et al. 1979, Lanza-Kaduce et al. 1982). Furthermore, as the measures of different concepts of social learning theory are likely to overlap empirically (Akers et al. 1979, Krohn et al. 1985). For the purpose of this study we focus on key variables that can be more or less clearly distinguished: definitions and models of behaviour (or imitation).

Definitions constitute normative attitudes toward certain behaviour. The more individuals define behaviour as good ("positive" definition) or as justified ("neutralizing" definition) rather than bad ("negative" definition) the more likely they are to engage in it (Akers et al. 1979, Akers 1998). There is a strong and consistent empirical relationship between individual's definitions and attitudes toward the behaviour in question and misbehaviour in a wide variety of contexts such as substance abuse, sexual aggression, white collar crimes, and police misconduct including police corruption (Krohn et al. 1985, Akers 1998). Furthermore, in their recent study on corruption on Eastern Europe, Miller et al. (2001) argue that values, i.e. condemnation of bribery, increased resistance to both accepting and paying bribes has negative empirical relationship with corruption.

Social behaviour is also acquired and sustained through conditioning and imitation or modelling of others' behaviour. If people perceive that behaviour as widespread and that there is an approval of problem behaviour, then they are more likely to engage in such behaviour.

Definitions and imitation are mutually reinforcing in their effect on individual's behaviour. By using others' behaviours as models, a person learns "evaluative" definitions of behaviour as good or bad, right or wrong. To an extent, these definitions are themselves verbal and cognitive behaviour, which can be directly reinforced and can act as discriminative stimuli for other behaviour (Akers 1985, Krohn et al. 1985). Again, a body of evidence supports the argument that models and approval are the major predictors of problem behaviour (Jessor and Jessor 1977, Akers 1998).

In sum, individuals learn from their own past behaviour and from their association with peers, both of which condition their evaluative definitions and reinforce imitation. Applying these arguments to situations of corruption, the theory would propose that a willingness to engage in corrupt behaviour can be expected to the extent that one does not define corruption as morally or situationally wrong, but rather that it is a justified and acceptable mode for exchange; and that one has been exposed to corrupt behaviour or at least perceives that such a behaviour is widespread and, thus, approved.

The combination of the arguments based on social learning (social learning theory) allows the formulation of the following three hypotheses to be tested on individual level motivation to engage in corrupt behaviour: **H1:** The more positively people define a corrupt behaviour the more likely they are to engage in it. **H2:** The more widespread people perceive a corrupt behaviour to be, the more likely they are to engage in it. **H3:** The more people approve a corrupt behaviour at work the more likely they are to engage in it.

2.2.2 Social Action Theory.

Social learning theory although provides best insight on corruption is basically anchored on survey based research and directional or causal relationship of variables. Survey-based research on corruption ends up with conclusions about correlations between variables. For social scientists we need more insight in corruption and therefore a call for multidirectional relationship of variables. The solution to this problem can only be through reflexivity approach in studying corruption which is multidirectional. The assumption here is that social institutions do not only shape the individuals (agents) but also the individuals shape the social institutions and therefore exist various interconnections to social action.

In the causation tradition, it is seen as something that ‘actually’ happened. Since in social science this is often hard to identify, this is also unhelpful in corruption research. Bourdieu is an a good example of someone who cautioned against ascribing intrinsic aspects to social phenomena since it would amount to naturalization of what is socially constructed (Schinkel 2004: 14). A general problem for corruption research, as noted before, is that rarely are individual-level motivations for corruption cases studied.

The aim here is not to criticize all theoretical models on causation in corruption research for not having a hard causal criterion from the philosophy of causation. The idea here is merely to wish to reflect on the claims made when we talk about the causes of corruption; general

problems with causality and explanation cannot be ignored. In some cases it is perhaps better to speak of studies trying to 'understand' corruption rather than 'explaining' it (Weber 1921). For example poverty probably has something to do with corruption. Such a macro variable has its influence on an individual level. We should nonetheless be careful with the assumed causality of poverty on corruption. And, more importantly, there seems to be a need for close analyses and studies of actual corruption cases along with the many existing studies on macro variables. This is main idea behind social action approach.

Therefore more research is needed in actual corruption cases with special attention to the necessary and sufficient conditions of corruption in a particular case. Based on a multiple case study research design, theory can be built on the causes of corruption (Herriott and Firestone 1983; Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1989). It important to focus on understanding the dynamics present within single cases. Case studies offer the advantage of richer details of actual cases and their contextuality. Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996: 198) showed that "Using focus groups and case studies would generate a mass of data that, when analyzed and organized, will probably provide a way to move forward with policy experiments." In case studies, attention can be paid to the individuals within their culture and organization. For instance looking at what are the rationalizations and justifications of those who are labelled 'corrupt'? It is evident that the lack of a concrete victim in most corruption cases is often mentioned as mitigating circumstances by the corrupt officials, just as 'economical necessity' is often mentioned to develop a tight network of relations in which a 'necessity' exists for 'wheeling and dealing' (Nelen and Nieuwendijk 2003, Dohmen (1996: 218).

Social action theory and especially the reflexivity concept in sociology is best placed to provide solution to all above mentioned theoretical challenges in studying corruption in contemporary societies.

Pierre Bourdieu's theory of social action (1977; 1990; 1992; 1998) is one promising alternative. By combining macro and micro factors and everything in between, it would be well suited as a theoretical model for corruption case studies. Bourdieu asserts that a person within a certain habitus, and having certain dispositions and predispositions is triggered into corruption. In this perspective, contingency of individual cases is central. Bourdieu dismisses both methodological individualism (like much of the rational actor theories in corruption research (Wacquant 1992) and holism; micro and macro is to Bourdieu a false antimony. Instead he uses a relational perspective. Bourdieu's theory of action or elsewhere referred as

social action theory provides a means of linking the otherwise isolated factors of the micro, meso and macro level. Bourdieu's theory of action establishes an incorporation of macro and micro levels.

In summary, Bourdieu's Social Action theory formular is **[(habitus)\(capital)]+field = practice.** This means action is the outcome of a relationship between habitus, capital and field. For the purpose of the objective of this study, the main concern will be on the Habitus. Habitus is the mediating link between social structure (macro) and individual action (micro).

In his own words Bourdieu said "Habitus is a system of dispositions, that is of permanent manners of being, seeing, acting and thinking, or a system of long-lasting (rather than permanent) schemes or structures of perception, conception and action" (Bourdieu 1990). Habitus produces and reproduces regularities but also as it is constantly subjected to experiences it generates diversity. Despite its apparent determinism Bourdieu is adamant that habitus represents an escape from the structure/agency binary and encompasses the possibilities of improvisation and invention; 'this degree of indeterminacy, of openness, of uncertainty, means that one cannot depend on it entirely in critical, dangerous situations' (Bourdieu 1990 p. 78). The crucial point about habitus is that it is 'durable but not eternal' (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992 p. 133).

Habitus integrate past experiences and enable individuals to cope with a diversity of unforeseen situation.

The research on corruption using Bourdieu's theory of action should focus on the categories of perception, appreciation and the lived experience (Wacquant 1992: 7- 9) of corrupt officials. This can be called a disposition analysis, in which the habitus of the corrupt official is analyzed. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 105).

Making dispositional analysis of a corruptee in this case civil servant, we would first of all listen to his/her stories. His reasons, habitus, and dispositions would become clearer from the way he thinks. We would then study his dossier to see what mental schemata of dispositions towards corruption were present. In other words, what field of considerations was present in this case? We would also look for the more or less favourable opportunities that actualized the corruption on this case. What triggered it? By studying more of such cases we will come to an understanding of what dispositions, under what specific circumstances, lead to corruption.

How was the susceptibility towards corruption and under what a circumstance was it triggered? A predisposing factor could be a cup of coffee. Out of multiple (dispositional) case analyses will come regularities about and understandings of the causes of corruption. A view will present itself of predispositional factors, a scheme of dispositions. Causality will then be of such a nature that certain determining factors will not always leads to corruption. In that sense, we cannot speak of causality in the strictest sense of the word. These are what the study tries to call individual - level motivations for corruption.

For the purpose of this study, the relationship between habitus and corruption in accessing government services is contextualized in terms of lifestyle, values, the dispositions and expectations of social group (Passport Section) all of which are acquired through the activities and experiences of everyday life while facilitating provision of government services to the public.

The habitus of a group of persons occupying a nieghbouring position in social space has a systematicity - 'style' practical unity speaking, saving, loving, music, food, art, cinema, dress e.t.c. Habitus has to be considered in relation to field - actions stem from the confrontations between dispositions and position (match, mismatch, tension and contradictions - comfort/discomfort habitus is a practical rather than a rational or reflexive logic - a modus operandi beware of imposing the scholastic bias.

In his own words Bourdieu says that "Those who occupy the same positions have every chance of having the same habitus, at least insofar as the trajectories which have brought them to these positions are themselves similar….The dispositions acquired in the position occupied involve a sense of adjustment to this position – what Erving Goffman calls the 'sense of one's place'" (Bourdieu 1987: 5).

At this point we cannot fail to 'explain' something about corrupt cultures. This is an aspect closely related to the concept of habitus. Dispositions can be so strongly determined by the social context that it is hard to escape the behaviour of that context. When consistently reinforced in certain ideas and acts, it is difficult for an agent to step outside that culture. This can be compared to sub-cultural delinquency theory: once individuals live in a group culture where violence is the norm, it is hard for them to not become violent themselves.

In summary social agents are endowed with habitus, inscribed in their bodies by past experiences and everyday experiences. These systems of schemes of perception, appreciation,

and action enable them to perform acts of practical knowledge, based on the identification and recognition of conditional, conventional Stimuli to which they are predisposed to react; and, without any explicit definition of ends or rational calculation of means, to generate appropriate and endlessly renew strategies, but within the limits of the structural constraints of which they are the product and which define them. This is the context in which corruption may thrive or strongly condemned. This research will try to test whether habitus can explain corruption in the process of accessing government services in the Passport Section Nairobi.

Based on the argument of Social Action theory and specifically on the concept of habitus in explaining corruption as human behavior, the study will try to test the following three hypotheses; **H4:** The more negative work attitude the higher chances of public official to engage in corrupt behaviour. **H5:** The more negative the work lifestyle the higher the chances of a public official engaging in corrupt behaviour. **H6:** The more extraordinary a work disposition or personality the higher the chances of an individual public official engaging in corrupt behaviour.

2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The conceptual framework of this research is based on social action theory specifically the concept of habitus. The argument behind this framework is to introduce the agency and actions of individuals into analysis of social systems. This framework recognises that 'the system' has a powerful effect on shaping human action, but it is also interested in how individuals manoeuvre within these systems in relation to corruption in the process of accessing government services. It is interested in how the system is produced and reproduced, and how change can occur, and the influence of individual action in this system. The main concern in this framework is with the relation between structure and agency, a central concern of the contemporary social scientists in explaining social phenomenon.

The following diagram represents an assumption of this study where promotion or undermining conformity through interpretation of socio-economic world- differential association, definitions, differential reinforcement and imitation- together with individual perceptions and dispositions- shared attitude, lifestyle, values and evaluations and expectations at work and intrinsic personality (i.e. Habitus) are assumed to be key motivations to act in corrupt behaviour in public office or in the process of accessing government services.

Figure 1: Individual Level Factors and Corruption



2.4 DEFINITION OF VARIABLES

For the purposes of this study, corruption means petty or bureaucratic corruption. Petty or bureaucratic corruption in this study means behaviour, acts or transactions where officers experience payment in money or kind/gift, favour their relatives and tribesmen, influence from senior government and political leaders to fast track applications in the process of issuing travel document or passports in Passport Section in Nairobi. This definition only includes bribery, extortion, kickbacks, favouritism, nepotism, and other misuse of public office or authority in the process of accessing government services in Passport Section for the benefit of the individual civil servant.

Corruption in this study is the dependent variable. This research tried to measure only subjective or perceived corruption in the process of accessing government services. The research used four aspects to measure the extent of perceived corruption or misuse of public office/authority for private gains. These include prevalence, level of pressure to engage in corruption or misuse of public office/authority for private gains, tolerance to corruption or misuse of public office/authority for private gains and individual corruptibility or ability to misuse public office/authority for private gains. Respondents were asked question on how they can rate the extend and or prevalence of corruption or misuse public office/authority for private gains in the Passport Section in three levels -very high, moderate and low through individual responses. In addition, they were asked to estimate level of pressure to engage in corruption or misuse public office/authority for private gains in the passport section in four ranking scales - No pressure, A little pressure, A fair amount of pressure and A lot of pressure. Tolerance to corruption or misuse public office/authority for private gains in the process of accessing government services in Passport section was measured in terms individual responses of I don't tolerate at all, I am tolerant to some extent, and I just give in. Lastly the extend of corruption by corruptibility or ability to misuse public office/authority for private gains was measured through levels agreement –Likert Scale- with specific statements derived from being corrupt or able to misuse public office/authority for private gains ranging from Strongly Agree to Completely Disagree.

For the both patterns/forms and types of corruption or misuse public office/authority for private gains in the Passport Section the study tried to establish their perceived levels of prevalence. Respondents were asked to rate carefully and specifically selected behaviour in categories of patterns/forms and types of corruption or misuse public office/authority for

private gains they perceive to be prevalent in the Passport Section in terms of - very high, moderate and low.

The independent variables in this study are **social learning** and **habitus**. Social learning for the purposes of this study means the acquisition, maintenance, and change in criminal and deviant behaviour that embraces social, non-social, and cultural factors operating to both motivate and control criminal behaviour and both to promote and undermine conformity in formal workplace and for persons above 18 years of age i.e. working persons. Social learning in this study is conceptualized as personal interpretation of corruption.

For the purposes of this study, personal interpretations of corruption will be measured using definitions and imitations/widespread engagement/approvals in relation to corrupt practices in the Passport Section.

Definitions in this study are one's own orientations, rationalizations, justifications, excuses, and other interpretations that define the commission of an act as relatively more right or wrong, good or bad, desirable or undesirable, justified or unjustified, appropriate or inappropriate. This involves seeing behaviour as good ("positive" definition), as justified ("neutralizing" definition) or bad ("negative" definition). Also Likert Scale -five scales from Strongly Agree to Completely Disagree- where level of agreement with statements based on different definitions of corruption or misuse public office/authority for private gains were used. For the purpose of this study definitions include those learned from socialization into general formal working social environment, moral, and other conventional values and norms that are favourable to conforming behaviour and unfavourable to committing any deviant or criminal acts (or general beliefs or worldviews that support deviant acts in social environment at formal work).

Imitations in this study refers to the engagement in behaviour after the direct or indirect (e.g. in media, other people depictions) observation of similar behaviour by others. For the purpose of this study, the imitation is in the context of formal work environment where persons (civil servants) engage in behaviour after the direct or indirect observation of similar behaviour by others in the process of work. Imitation in this study was measured in terms of levels of engagement of a bahaviour in a working environment with individual responses categorized as engaged, fairly engaged, few engaged and not engaged at all. Approvals of behaviour in the working environment in terms of approved by many, by few, and by none were used to measure imitation of the corrupt practices. Also Likert Scale -five scales from Strongly Agree

to Completely Disagree - where level of agreement with statements based on imitations of corruption or misuse public office/authority for private gains was used.

Habitus for the purpose of this study is durable and enduring set of acquired patterns of thought, behaviour, and taste. In this study habitus is conceptualised as individual perceptions and dispositions that lead to corrupt practices or misuse public office/authority for private gains. For the purposes of this research acquiring patterns of thought, behaviour and taste is in formal work place i.e. work environment and only in the context of accessing government services. Habitus or individual perceptions and disposition for the purposes of this study included work attitude/belief, work lifestyle- work values/evaluations, work expectations- and specific characters or personalities and only in the context of formal work.

For purpose of this study, attitude means the way someone thinks, behaves and feels towards something. For the purposes of this research, work attitude was measured specifically through job satisfaction in aspects of love for the job, salary, responsibilities at job, relations with others at the work. The respondents were asked to rate their level of job satisfaction in three levels- satisfied, somewhat satisfied and dissatisfied.

Work lifestyle in this study involves work values, evaluations and work expectations. Work lifestyle for the purpose of this study means the way a person or group of people live, what they value and perceptions of their work or job. Statements derived from individual perceptions on the basis of work achievement, work independence, recognition at work, relation with other colleagues at work, support from the institution and working conditions were provided for the respondents to rate their level of agreements using five scales- Likert Scales from Strongly Agree to Completely Disagree.

Dispositions in this study are natural qualities, character or condition of a person for example tendency to behave in a particular way. Carefully selected statements on natural qualities, character and conditions of a person perceived to be corrupt or have tendency to misuse public office/authority for private gains which include dominant and strong personalities, “get things done” personality, persons who take or get the freedom to do thinks independently, persons who overstep formal boundaries of authority, persons who are more of “business type” people and persons who show a lot friendship or love, status and are of making an impression (showing off) on colleagues and friends were used against Likert Scale -five scales from Strongly Agree to Completely Disagree- where individual responses were ranked .

In the measurement of adequacy of general anti-corruption mechanisms and measures it was through level of awareness, effectiveness of the anti-corruption process and level of performance of the major institutions tasked to fight (control or prevent) corruption in the Passport Section.

Level of awareness was measured using Yes and No responses. The effectiveness of the anti-corruption process was measured through level of agreement with five scale ranking- Likert scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The level of performance of the major institutions tasked to fight corruption in the passport section was measured through four point assessment- very well, Well, Not Well and Poor.

Specifically, corruption control mechanisms and measures in the passport section were rated in terms of level of awareness and knowledge. Effectiveness of the reporting process was assessed through Likert Scale – five scales from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree. Effectiveness of handling of the reported cases was assessed in terms of very well, well, not well and poor individual responses. Specific corruption control institutions in the Passport Section was assessed in terms of their effectiveness through ranking of individual responses in terms of very effective, moderate effective, least effective and not effective at all.

In terms of corruption prevention in the Passport Section Nairobi, it was assessed through awareness and knowledge on corruption prevention mechanisms and measures. Effectiveness of specific prevention measures was measured through ranking of individual responses in terms of very effective, moderate effective, least effective and not effective at all.

Lastly on corruption measures and mechanisms the study assessed government fight on corruption in Passport Section Nairobi in terms of Very successful, Moderate successful, Least successful and Not successful at all through individual responses.

Success and failures of government fight on corruption specifically in the Passport Section in Headquarters, Nairobi were assessed through level of agreement through Likert Scale –Five Scales from Strongly Agree to Completely Disagree- with statements based on why government measures and mechanisms has succeeded or failed.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The research was conducted between November 2012 and October 2013. The research gathered data from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data were collected from respondents who are civil servants working in the Passport Section in Nairobi in the Department of Immigration Services Headquarters in the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government. Secondary data were collected from books, research reports, journal articles, magazines, and unpublished materials through a literature review and analysis. These included EACC reports and records, and reports on corruption on Kenyan government and specifically on the Department of Immigration Services. Both quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis methods were employed in the study.

Therefore the unit of observation in this study is at individual level (civil servants working in the Passport Section) where the data points are perceived levels of corruption, personal interpretations of corruption including attitude towards corruption, definition of corruption, imitations and involvement/approvals, work attitude, corrupt prone dispositions and individual level of assessment of effectiveness of anticorruption measures and mechanisms. The unit of analysis is at the group level, that the average statistical value represents the characteristics of the group (Passport Section in Nairobi), where conclusions are drawn on group characteristics from data collected from individuals.

3.2 LOCATION OF THE STUDY

The main objective of this study was to describe and understand the individual – level motivations for corruption in accessing government services with specific focus on Passport Section Headquarters in Nairobi, the Department of Immigration Services in the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government. The Passport Section is based at Nyayo House Ground Floor Northern Wing in Nairobi and doubles as Headquarters for issuance of all Kenyan travel documents and Physical counters where all inquiries and customer relations on Kenyan travel documents are handled. The travel documents which the section issues include Kenyan Ordinary Passport, Kenyan Diplomatic Passport, East African Passport, Temporary Passport, Temporary Permit and Certificates of Identity for the purposes to

facilitate international travel for Kenyan citizens. The Passport Section Headquarters in Nairobi was chosen because it is located at the heart of the Nairobi City and serves as the face of the Department of Immigration Services in the country since this is where most Kenyans process their travel documents. Hence it was chosen as it projects the image of the Kenya Immigration Services to the Kenyans.

3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

This study used survey design for the purposes of achieving its objective. Survey is a self-report study which requires the collection of quantifiable information from the sample (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). Survey design is best situated for the purposes of this research because this is a descriptive and explanatory study towards understanding individual – level motivations for corruption in accessing government services. This design fits well in the context of this research such that a large number of respondents will be chosen through probability sampling procedure to represent the large and diverse population in public service in Kenya. In addition, it was possible to use structured questionnaire or interviews procedures to elicit information from the people in a reliable and unbiased manner. Lastly, information acquired from this design can utilize sophisticated statistical techniques in analyzing the data.

Specifically the study used cross-sectional survey design where respondents are chosen to represent the larger population of interest, which are public servants to gather information at one point in time. The advantage of this being less costly, feasible and therefore it permits one to describe large and heterogeneous populations accurately and economically.

3.4 POPULATION AND SAMPLE

3.4.1 Population

According to Mugenda & Mugenda (2003) population is an entire group of individuals, events or objects having a common observable characteristic. This study involves the civil servants working in the Passport Section Headquarters, Nairobi in the Department of Immigration Services. The civil servants in the Passport Section Headquarters in Nairobi involve three strata based on the level of qualifications or civil servants job categories. These include immigration officers, clerical officers and support staff.

Table 1: Target Population.

Designation	Total population	Percentage
Immigration Officers	95	68
Clerical officers	38	27
Support staff	7	5
Total	**140**	**100**

Source: from the Head of Section Passport Section in Nairobi.

The services provided by this study population are facilitating application, processing the applications and issuing travel documents like Kenyan ordinary passport, Kenyan Diplomatic Passport, East African Passport, Temporary Passport, Temporary Permit and Certificates of Identity and Nationality to Kenyan citizens. The study population in general is heterogeneous in terms of tribes, education and economic abilities but to large extend it is average educated population.

3.4.2 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure

The sample was drawn from the population using both probabilistic and nonprobabilistic sampling procedures.

The research used proportionate random sampling followed by systematic random sampling. The researcher used list of all officers in the Passport Section in Nairobi. From this list, the researcher derived three strata as per job designation- immigration officers, clerical officers and support staff. From each stratum, the researcher compiled list of all officers. Each stratum comprised list of following numbers of officers.

Table 2: List of officers per stratum

Designation	Number of officers in the list
Immigration Officers	95
Clerical officers	38
Support staff	7
Total	**140**

To get proportionate sample from each stratum total number of officers in each stratum was multiplied by the intended sample and then divided that by the total number of officers in the entire section. The intended total sample in this population was 100 respondents. To get the intended sample a conservative method based on the amount of error wiling or expected to

tolerate in the study of calculating sample was used where sample (N) = 1 divided by 0.1 or 10% squared error expected to be tolerated in the study. N= 1/ $(0.1)^2$), N= 1/ 0.01, N= 100.

Table 3: Sample frame per Stratum

Designation	Total Population	Ratio	Sample frame per stratum
Immigration Officers	95	95*100/140	68
Clerical officers	38	38*100/140	27
Support Staff	7	7*100/140	5
Total	**140**		**100**

This is for the purposes of representiveness of the sample in terms of the job category and responsibilities. By using proportionate random sampling, the study was certain of objectivity having in mind limits of error that the attributes, opinions, or behavior of the sample accurately describes the larger population from which it was drawn.

In each stratum to avoid bias in selecting the respondents and enhancing reliability and validity of the data from respondents, the researcher used simple systematic random sampling procedure. For the immigration officers list the (k=N/n, k=95/68, k=1.4) officer, the researcher chose 1^{st}, 3^{rd}, 4^{th}, $6^{th,}$ 7^{th}, 8^{th}, 10^{th}… until the 68^{th}. For the clerical officers the (k=38/27, k= 1.4) officer, the researcher chose 1^{st}, 3^{rd}, 4^{th}, $6^{th,}$ 7^{th}, 8^{th}, 10^{th}…until the 27^{th} and for the support staff (k=7/5, k=1.4) five staff were chosen i.e. $1^{th,}$ $3^{rd,}$ 4^{th}, 6th, and 7^{th}. All the officers derived from this list were the true sample where the questionnaires were administered.

A total of 100 civil servants working in the section were randomly selected using proportionate random followed by systematic random sampling from the three strata as follows, 68 Immigration Officers, 27 Clerical Officers and 5 Support Staff, where standard questionnaires were self- administered.

On the other hand, purposive sampling was used to select five (5) senior officers in the Passport Section where key informant interviews or unstructured questionnaire was administered. The reason behind this being purposive sample provided in-depth understanding of corruption in the process of accessing government services and also the sample represented the most experienced staff in the section. The purposive sampling was of great importance to this study because it will add more qualitative and subjective data that stratified proportionate

random sampling might fail to provide. In summary, the total selected sample for the study was 105 respondents.

3.5 DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES

The data was collected between 19th August 2013 and 30th September 2013.

3.5.1 Questionnaire

Questionnaires are commonly used to obtain important information about the population. Each item in questionnaire is developed to address a specific objective, research question or hypothesis of the study. Questionnaires use two broad categories of questions- open- ended and closed- ended. Closed-ended involve questions that are accompanied by list of all possible alternatives from which respondents select the answer that best describes their situation. These questions were useful because the aim of the study is to get personal perspective on individual-level motivations for corruption in the process of accessing government services.

On the other hand, open-ended questions include situation where respondents will have complete freedom of response in his or her own words. This type of questions were useful in this case, because they permitted greater in- depth of response, gave insight in the personal feelings, background, hidden motivations, interests and decisions, which all are useful towards, understanding individual level motivations for corruption.

The study employed standard questionnaire to get information from the civil servants working in the Passport Section in Nairobi. The questionnaire was self-administered to 99 respondents selected through stratified proportionately randomly because the issue of corruption is secretive, covert, hard and sensitive to talk to anyone. Self-administration of the questionnaires by the respondents without presence of the researcher enhanced validity and reliability of the responses. This method of data collection is relevant in this case because for the procedures and responses being standardized for all respondents, the data obtained is of high reliability.

The questionnaire was pre-tested for the purposes of subjecting the instrument to test of validity and reliability with about 3% (3 respondents) of the size of the actual sample. These respondents were not to be included in the actual sample.

Given sensitivity of corruption in public offices, the questionnaire used more subtle questions and specifically description of hypothetical situation in order to get at the extent to which public officials are susceptible to corruption. In addition this ensured validity of the responses. In the process of collecting data, questionnaire respondents were guaranteed confidentiality of the information they provided and also anonymity of their identity. All these measures decreased bias in response and also the respondent selection.

3.5.2 Interviews/Unstructured questionnaire

An interview is an oral administration of a questionnaire or interview schedule. This is a face to face encounter. This was advantageous for this study because the researcher being a civil servant working in the section has established a friendly relationship with most of the respondents prior to conducting the interviews. The purpose for using this technique in this study is to provide in-depth data and an insider's perspective on corruption, which was not possible to get through the questionnaires. For the purposes of ensuring validity and reliability, clarifications were sought from the key informant interviewees and also if they wanted more time to consult on the issues it was be allowed.

The researcher conducted key informant interviews on the 5 senior and experienced staff in the Passport Section in Nairobi who were purposively selected. The guidance of the interviews was through a semi-structured interview schedule where the interviewer standardized the interview situations asking the same questions in the same manner. Where the respondents was not be able to have time for interviews alternatively unstructured questionnaire was given to the respondents and enough time allowed responding to the questions. The unstructured questionnaire included open-ended questions derived from the objectives of the study. The unstructured questionnaires were collected later and the researcher sought clarifications before he collected them.

In the process of collecting data key informants/unstructured questionnaire respondents were guaranteed confidentiality of the information they provided and also anonymity of their identity. Both of these measures worked towards decreasing bias in response and, also in the selection bias.

3.5.3 Secondary sources

Secondary data were sought from books, reports, records, internet, and newspapers during the literature review and analyzed for coherence, meaning and patterns.

3.6 DATA ANALYSIS

Data analysis was done between 1st October 2013 and 16th October 2013. Both quantitative and qualitative data analysis techniques were utilized in this study. Quantitatively, descriptive statistical methods where means, mode and frequencies were computed to establish patterns and regularities in the collected data. This basically provided the description of the phenomenon as per objectives. Originally the research expected to use Chi-Square to test the Association between variable but after tabulating the responses it was realized that some observations or responses were less than five (5) and therefore the researcher opted for Phi and Cramer's V test and Goodman's and Kruskal's Gamma where applicable depending on the type of the variable.

Inferential statistics by use of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) to determine whether there is existence of some definite association, strength and direction of the relationship between corruption in the process of accessing government services and individual background information were used. Phi and Cramer's V test were used to test the association for gender, marital status and corruption, and Goodman's and Kruskal's Gamma was used to test association between age, level of education, type of duty/work performed, length/duration of service in public service/in a single section or working station and corruption.

This method is suitable for this research because these variables can be measured at ordinal and or interval level and the responses can be ranked in a small i.e. limited in number of response of categories for example not more than five or six. Also the data on these variables have extremely large number of observation that are tied in the overall rankings or when being analysed can be collapsed. In addition, attitude scale (likert scale) is incorporated in correlation tests of these variables.

Goodman's and Krusal's Gamma tests (at both 0.05 and 0.01 levels of confidence) for dependence and or association between corruption definition, imitation/widespread perception, approvals, work attitude, work lifestyle (values and expectations), individual

dispositions and corruption is used. This helps the research to accept or reject the research hypothesis as stated in chapter two subsection 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.1.2; **H1:** The more positively people define a corrupt behaviour the more likely they are to engage in it. **H2:** The more widespread people perceive a corrupt behaviour to be, the more likely they are to engage in it. **H3:** The more people approve a corrupt behaviour at work the more likely they are to engage in it. **H4:** The more negative work attitude the higher chances of public official to engage in corrupt behaviour. **H5:** The more negative the work lifestyle the higher the chances of a public official engaging in corrupt behaviour. **H6:** The more extraordinary a work disposition or personality the higher the chances of an individual public official engaging in corrupt behaviour. Reason for using this method is that all these variables can only be measured at least by ordinal level and therefore Chi-square or Krusal's Gamma tests are the appropriate methods to test the association between the variables.

Data and information collected were also analyzed qualitatively where there is description of facts observed, recorded and stated by respondents to define their own situations and explain their motives in the unstructured questions. The research classifies the data into specific categories that will allow comparison of the observations. From the conceptualization, the researcher uses criminological knowledge and literature to make meaningful analysis.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the data presented followed by a data analysis and interpretation of the research findings. The findings relate to the research questions that guided the study. Data were analyzed to understand and analyse the individual – level motivation for corruption in the process of accessing government services with specific focus on Passport Section in Nairobi. Data were obtained from self-administered questionnaires, completed by 61 civil servants (n=61), which is 61% response rate and by 4 key informant interviews all of them being civil servants working in the Passport Section in Nairobi in the Department of Immigration Services. Assuming that all of the total population of 140 civil servants in the Passport Section Headquarters in Nairobi, are involved in the provision of services to the public, a population size of 100 was expected (n=100). This is also supported by the fact that some of the civil servants in the Passport Section in Nairobi are involved in different duties like immigration officers, clerical officers and support staff positions that all which are involved in the process of accessing government services. The self administered questionnaire response rates (successful) per stratum were as follows, Immigration Officers 46 (60%), Clerical Officers 12 (44%) and Support Staff 3 (60%).

A total of 74 questionnaires were received, however, only 61 questionnaires were usable for this study and met the required inclusion criteria which is at least complete part of the each five sections of the questionnaire. This represented 61 % of the expected population. Although neither the reasons for refusal to participate nor the characteristics of the non-respondents are known, the typically low response to surveys about corruption in public offices may be a partial explanation for the low response rate in this study.

Of the received 13 questionnaires deemed unusable, 8 respondents did not complete the questionnaire in that two or more sections of the questionnaires were omitted. Five respondents only completed section one of the questionnaire or background and thus did not meet the inclusion criteria for this study. The questionnaire comprised of five sections and data generated is presented herein in two sections as follows;

The first section comprises of data presentation where sample is described in terms of sex, age, marital status, level of education, type of duties/work performed, and duration of work or experience in both public service and in Passport Section in Nairobi.

The second section comprises of data analysis and interpretation. This section is divided further into five sub-sections.

The first subsection includes analysis and interpretation of demographic variables and their influence on the study i.e. individual-level motivations for corruption. The main focus here is association of demographic variables and individual-level motivations for corruption with specific focus to level of perceived corruption, level of pressure to engage in corruption, tolerance to corruption, individual corruptibility, definition of corruption and attitude towards corruption. Percentages and frequencies of the responses are presented, analysed and interpreted to come up with differences, meaning and patterns. Also to test whether there is significant statistical association and its direction, lambda, Phi and Cramer's V or Goodman's and Kruskal's Gamma is used where applicable.

The second subsection includes description and analysis of the the major patterns/forms and types of corruption in the process of accessing government services in correlation to the objective of the study. The main aim here is to answer research questions 1 "What are the major patterns/forms and types of corruption in the process of accessing government services specifically in acquiring travel documents in Kenya?" and objective one "To establish the patterns/forms and types of corruption in Passport Section Headquarters in Nairobi, in the Department of Immigration Services" simultaneously. Percentages and frequencies of the responses are presented, analysed and interpreted to come up with differences, meaning and patterns.

In third subsection there is analysis and interpretation of the data obtained from the questions on influence of a personal interpretation of corruption to decision to engage in corrupt behaviour. This will try to answer research question 2 "What are specific individual-level motivations for corruption that makes public officials more prone to corrupt behaviour than other officials?" and objective two "To determine whether the decision to engage in corrupt behaviour is primarily influenced by a personal interpretation of corruption" simultaneously. Percentages and frequencies of the responses are presented, analysed and interpreted to come up with differences, meaning and patterns. Also Goodman's and Kruskal's Gamma test at both 0.05 level of significance is used to test any significant statistical association and its direction between the variables.

The fourth subsection includes analysis and interpretation of individual perceptions and dispositions which can lead to corrupt practices. This will try also to answer research question 2 "What are specific individual-level motivations for corruption that makes public officials more prone to corrupt behaviour than other officials?" and objective three "To determine whether individual perceptions and dispositions lead to corrupt practices" simultaneously. Percentages and frequencies of the responses are presented, analysed and interpreted to come up with differences, meaning and patterns. Also Goodman's and Kruskal's Gamma at both 0.05 level of significance is used to test any significant statistical association and its direction between the variables.

Lastly the fifth subsection includes description, analysis and interpretations of the adequacy of anti-corruption measures and mechanisms in Passport Section Headquarters in Nairobi, in the Department of Immigration Services. This will try to answer research question three "How effective or adequate are the corruption control and prevention mechanisms and measures in the process of accessing government services in Kenya?" and objective four "To assess the adequacy of anti-corruption measures and mechanisms in Passport Section Headquarters Nairobi, in the Department of Immigration Services" simultaneously. Percentages and frequencies of the responses are presented, analysed and interpreted come up with differences, meaning and patterns.

4.2 DATA PRESENTATION

4.2.1. Gender Distribution

Questionnaire participants were asked to indicate their sex by placing a tick next to the relevant option provided Male (1) or Female (2). All 61 participants (100%) responded. Of the 61 respondents 34 (56%) were Male and 27 (44%) were Female. Per each stratum 46 of Immigration officers, 26 were males and 20 were females, 12 of the Clerical Officers 8 were males and 4 were females, of 3 Support Staff all were females. Historically immigration like police has been a male dominated profession although more females are joining this profession in current trends as we can see in this data. The summary of the responses are as follows;

Table 4: Gender Distribution of the Participants

Gender	Frequency	Percent
Male	34	55.7
Female	27	44.3
Total	61	100.0

4.2.2 Age Distribution

Questionnaire respondents were asked to tick age bracket where their age falls. There were six age brackets options to tick against. The minimum option started at 19 years because in Kenya the legal age to work is 18 years and the respondents were government workers. The maximum age was 59 because the current public service retirement age is at 60 years. The age brackets were as follows; 19-25 (1), 26-32 (2), 33-39 (3), 40-45 (4), 46-52 (5), and 53-59 (6). The summary of the responses were as follows;

Table 5: Age ranges of the participants

Age in Years	Frequency	Percent
26-32	10	16.4
33-39	28	45.9
40-45	17	27.9
53-59	6	9.8
Total	61	100.0

From the **Table 5** above we can see that the age range is from 26-59 with majority falling within the age bracket of 33-39(50%). This means the workforce in this section is relatively young.

4.2.3 Marital Status

Respondents of the questionnaire were asked to tick their marital status. There were five marital categories to tick against - married (1), single (2), divorced (3), separated (4), and widowed (5). The summary of the responses were as follows;

Table 6: Marital status of the respondents.

Marital status	Frequency	Percent
Married	50	82.0
Single	8	13.1
Divorced	3	4.9
Total	61	100.0

Majority of the respondents were married (82%) and few were single (13%) and divorced (3%).

4.2.4 Level of education

Respondents of the questionnaire were asked to tick their level of education. There were six level of education to tick against- primary (1), O-level/form four (2), A-Level/form six (3), College (4), Undergraduate (5) and Postgraduate (6). The summary of the responses were as follows;

Table 7: Level of education of the respondents.

Level of Education	Frequency	Percent
O-level/form four	18	29.5
College	3	4.9
Undergraduate	27	44.3
Postgraduate	13	21.3
Total	61	100.0

From **Table 7** above, we can see that majority of the respondents have undergraduate degree (44%), followed by form four (30%), postgraduate (21%) and then college (5%).

4.2.5 Type of duties/work performed

Respondents of the questionnaire were asked to tick one of the five categories in terms of their duties or work they perform. The categories were support staff/work (1), clerical work (2), immigration officer technical/operation work (3), immigration officer supervision (4) and immigration officer management (5). The responses generated the following cross tabulation.

Table 8: Job categories/cadres of the participants

Type of duties/work performed	Frequency	Percent
Support work/staff	3	4.9
Clerical	12	19.7
Immigration Technical/operation	36	59.0
Immigration supervision	10	16.4
Total	61	100.0

From **Table 8 above,** we can see that the majority of the respondents (59%) are Immigration Officers especially the cadre of technical or operation.

4.2.6 Duration of Work

Questionnaire respondents were asked to tick one of the four categories in terms of their length service (in years) in both public service and in Passport Section in Nairobi. The categories were 0-2. (1), 3-5 (2), 6-8 (3), 9 and more (4). The responses generated the following cross tabulation.

Table 9: Duration of work in public service

Number of years worked	Frequency	Percent
3-5	16	26.2
6-8	17	27.9
9 and above	28	45.9
Total	61	100.0

Table 10: Duration of work in Passport Section in Nairobi

Number of years worked	Frequency	Percent
0-2	16	26.2
3-5	36	59.0
6-8	1	1.6
9 and above	8	13.1
Total	61	100.0

From **Table 9** we can see majority (46%) of the respondents have worked in public service for more than 9 years. In **table 10** majority of the respondents (59%) of the respondents have worked within Passport Section in Nairobi for period between 3 -5 years and therefore they are well informed about the section to be included in this study.

4.3 DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.3.1 Introduction

Descriptive and inferential statistical analyses are used to identify frequencies, patterns and statistical meaning/significance towards answering the research questions. For both nominal and categorical data in this analysis and interpretations, frequencies and percentages are used to identify and report differences and patterns. Where statistical significance or association strength is required to answer the research questions for nominal variable Lambda and Phi and Cramer's V tests value are used at $P<0.05$. On the other hand for categorical/ordinal data Gamma test value at $P<0.05$ is used. For nominal data the statistical value is between 0 and 1 while for ordinal/interval data the statistical value is between -1 and +1 meaning we can

establish both strength and direction of the association. Therefore a value of zero means no statistical association or relationship can be detected between the variables. Consequently a value of 1 (either positive or negative) means perfect association (strong positive or negative association) between the variables. The interpretation of statistical significance or association strength between variables through Lambda, Phi and Cramer's V and Gamma test are interpreted throughout this study are as follows;

Table 11: Association strength and interpretation for Lambda, Phi and Cramer's V and Gamma value.

Value Range	Statistical Meaning
0.00	No relationship
0.01 - 0.09 (- or +)	Weak association
0.10 - 0.29 (- or +)	Moderate Association
0.30 - 0.99 (- or +)	Evidence of strong association
1.00 (- or +)	Perfect association or strong relationship/association

4.3.2 Demographic variables and corruption.

Although it was not part of the purpose of the study, to assess for any influence on individual-level motivations for corruption by this set of data (demographic variables) is crucial for research findings of this study. The demographic data consisted of age, sex, marital status, level of education, types of duties/work performed, and duration or years of work experience. Respondents largely answered the questions in this section of the questionnaire.

4.3.2.1 Gender and corruption

To show the association between gender and corruption responses from question on sex and variables used to measure extend and levels of corruption in this research were cross tabulated through SPSS and the associations established. Variables used in this research to measure extent and levels of corruption are perceived prevalence of corruption, pressure to engage in corruption, tolerance to engage in corruption, individual corruptibility, definition of corruption and attitude towards corruption. For how each of these variables were measured see subsection 4.3.3.1 (perceived prevalence), 4.3.3.2 (Pressure to engage, 4.3.3.3 (Tolerance to corruption), 4.3.3.4 (Individual corruptibility), 4.3.4.1 (Definition of corruption), 4.3.4.2 (Attitude towards corruption)

The association between gender and corruption is of interest especially by criminologists. To determine this, statistical test was done using SPSS. The test was done to test whether there is

any statistical significant between sex and perceived prevalence of corruption, pressure to engage in corruption, tolerance to engage in corruption, individual corruptibility, definition of corruption and attitude towards corruption.

Table 12: Gender and definition of corruption

Response rating on level of agreement												
Favourably define Corruption	**Strongly Disagree**		**Disagree**		**Neither Disagree nor Agree**		**Agree**		**Strongly Agree**		**Total**	
	Freq	**%**	**Freq**	**%**	**Freq**	**%**	**Freq**	**%**	**Freq**	**%**	**N**	**%**
Male	10	16.4	7	11.5	13	21.3	2	3.3	2	3.3	34	55.7
Female	6	9.8	5	8.2	4	6.6	6	9.8	6	9.8	27	44.3
	16	26.2	12	19.7	17	27.9	8	13.1	8	13.1	61	100

When the lambda and Phi and Cramer's V test (because gender is a nominal variable) were run through SPSS, statistical association which is significant is only confirmed with definitions of corruption as shown in the table below.

The statistical test value were as follows; Phi and Cramer's V= .393 (evidence of strong association) at P= .051, therefore P< 0.05, meaning there is statistical significance). So relationship between gender and definition of corruption is statistically significant at P<0.05 and is generalizable to the entire population. The responses in this research indicate that 16% males and 10% of females define corruption as favourable (Strongly disagree). In terms of defining corruption as unfavourable 3% of males and 10% females who strongly agreed meaning they consider the corrupt act unfavourable. Therefore in this research the differences in gender and definition of corruption confirm one reported in many previous studies discussed below. That corruption definition is more favourable in males than females.

There was no significant statistical association between gender and perceived prevalence of corruption, pressure to engage in corruption, tolerance to engage in corruption, individual corruptibility and attitude towards corruption other variables used to measure extent and levels of corruption in passport section as Lambda and Phi and Cramer's V test P-value (significant levels) were as follows. Gender and perceived levels of corruption statistical test results, Phi and Cramer's V= .165 at P= .436. Gender and Pressure to engage in Corruption,

Phi and Cramer's V= .287 at P= .171. Gender and tolerance to corruption, Phi and Cramer's V= .118 at P= .355. Gender and individual corruptibility, Phi and Cramer's V= .147 at P= .725. Gender and attitude toward corruption, Phi and Cramer's V= .064 at P= .884. Therefore, these relationships are not statistically significant at P<0. 05 as P>0.05.

In terms of gender and corruption previous studies has shown that corruption to be lower in countries with a higher degree of female participation to public life (Dollar et al., 2001). Also, Swamy et al. (2001) shows that women have on average a less tolerant attitude towards corruption. Esarey and Gina (2013) finds that women are less tolerant to corrupt behaviour but only in democratic governments where appropriating public policy for private gain is typically punished by voters and courts.

Steffmeier and Allan (1996) criticize that satisfactory unified theoretical framework has yet been developed for explaining female criminality and gender differences in crime (p.473). Social psychological research suggests that women are more compliant and less self-reliant than men (Title, 1980). Guerrero and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2008), for example, find that men are more prone to corrupt behaviour than women.

It is common belief that an increase in women's representations in public organizations may reduce corruption. For example According to TI, Press Release (2000) in Mexico in 1999, a program was set up of new female ununiformed patrols and increased number of women police officers to reduce corruption. Similar policies have been introduced in Peru and Lima (Swamy et al, 2001).
Mocan (2004) , using international crime victimization survey and through risk exposure and bribery as determinant of corruption (having been asked for a bribe by government official) indicated that men are more likely to be asked for a bribe than women.

According to Wane (2008), in professional settings women are less likely to engage in corruption for fear of being caught and losing their jobs. Also Laboratory corruption experiments confirmed this hypothesis, finding that women tend to react more strongly to the risk of detection (ibid).

This project research confirms that, civil servants' affinity towards corruption largely lies on their gender. Therefore, male officers are more likely to engage in corruption than their female counterparts are.

4.3.2.2 Age and corruption.

The association between age and corruption is of interest especially by criminologists. To determine this statistical test was done using SPSS through Gamma (because age is Ordinal variable). The test was done to test whether there is any statistical significant between age and perceived prevalence of corruption, pressure to engage in corruption, tolerance to engage in corruption, individual corruptibility, definition of corruption and attitude towards corruption.

When the Gamma test was run through SPSS, no significant statistical association was confirmed between age and corruption variables. The test results were as follows. Age and perceived levels of corruption, Gamma= .052 at P= .734. Age and pressure to engage in corruption, Gamma= -.078, at P= .665. Age and tolerance to corruption, Gamma= .113, at P= .601. Age and individual corruptibility, Gamma= .056, at P= .752. Age and definition of corruption, Gamma= .197 at P= .167. Age and attitude towards corruption statistical test results, Gamma= .126 at P= .477. Therefore, relationship is not statistically significant at $P<0.05$.

Criminology finds that age is negatively correlated to rule breaking (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 2000). Mocan (2004), using micro data shows effect of age on corruption and concludes that individuals at the age of 20 to 54 years are more likely to be asked for bribe compared to group young than 20 years. Gatti, Paternostro and Rigolini (2003), find that employed, less wealthy, and older people appear to be more averse to corruption. Among other reasons, it is suggested that older people are less prone to corruption because they are less involved in bureaucratic procedures in daily life (Cabelkova & Hanousek, 2004).

4.3.2.3 Marital status and corruption

To determine association between marital status and corruption a statistical test was done using SPSS through Phi and Cramer's V (because marital status is nominal). The test was done to test whether there is any statistical significant between marital status and perceived prevalence of corruption, pressure to engage in corruption, tolerance to engage in corruption, individual corruptibility, definition of corruption and attitude towards corruption. For the purposes of statistical analysis the coding was that "married "=1 and "other wise" 0.

When the Phi and Cramer's V were run through SPSS, no significant statistical association was confirmed between marital status and corruption at $P<0.05$. The test results were as follows. Marital status and perceived levels of corruption, Phi =.284 and Cramer's V= .201 at

P= .295, Marital status and pressure to engage in corruption, Phi = .448 and Cramer's V= .317 at P= .056 (denotes marginal significance). Marital status and tolerance to corruption, Phi =.031 and Cramer's V= .167 at P= .427. Marital status and individual corruptibility, Phi = .208 and Cramer's V= .147 at P= .854. Marital status and definition of corruption, Phi = .370 and Cramer's V= .262 at P= .399. Marital status and attitude towards corruption, Phi = .197 and Cramer's V= .139, at P= .669. Therefore, relationship is not statistically significant at P<0.05.

Previous studies show that married people may be compliant than others, especially compared to single people because they are more constrained by their social network (Tittle, 1980). It is also argued that marriage alters public behaviour (Swamy et al. 2001). But Tittle (1980) finds significant differences between the various marital statuses. In this case (Tittle, 1980) controlling for age, the results show that the association between deviance and marital status is a reflection of age difference, as older persons are more likely to be married or widowed and age is a strong predictor of deviance. Gottfredson and Hirsch (1990) also point out in literature on crime that marital status does not seem to have impact on likelihood of crime.

4.3.2.4 Level of Education and Corruption.

To determine association between level of education and corruption a statistical test was done using SPSS through Gamma (because level of education is ordinal). The test was done to test whether there is any statistical significant association between level of education and perceived prevalence of corruption, pressure to engage in corruption, tolerance to engage in corruption, individual corruptibility, definition of corruption, and attitude towards corruption.

When the Gamma was run through SPSS, no significant statistical association was confirmed between level of education and the corruption variables this is because the significant level (P) is more than 0.05 (P>0.05) . The test results were as follows. Level of education and perceived levels, Gamma= .019, at P= .916. Level of education and pressure to engage in corruption, Gamma= -.085, at P= .629. Level of education and tolerance to corruption, Gamma= -.093, at P= .663. Level of education and individual corruptibility, Gamma= -.060, at P= .720. Level of education and definition of corruption, Gamma= -.091, at P= .562. Level of education and attitude towards corruption, Gamma= -.133, at P= .420. Therefore, relationship is not statistically significant at P<0.05.

Mixed results exist regarding level of education and corruption. For example Swamy et al. (2001) do not include an education variable in the corruption analysis. Mocan (2004) also finds that higher level of education leads to higher probability of being targeted for bribes. Guerrero and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2008) suggest that the higher a person's education level, the more likely (s)he will pay a bribe. They argue that education is a proxy for opportunity costs and that the higher the opportunity costs, the higher the probability of paying a bribe.

The argument from these studies is that better educated individuals might know more about the government's activities and thus would be in a better position to assess the degree of corruption, depending on how government respondents. On the other hand they may be more strongly involved in corruption by understanding better opportunities of corruption. Therefore this could have contributed to failure of this study to find any significant association between corruption and level of education.

4.3.2.5 Duties/work Performed and Corruption

To determine association between duties/work performed and corruption a statistical test was done using SPSS through Gamma (because duties/work performed is categorical). The test was done to test whether there is any s significant statistical association between duties/work performed (1 meaning low cadre and 5 highest cadre) and perceived prevalence of corruption, pressure to engage in corruption, tolerance to engage in corruption, individual corruptibility, definition of corruption, and attitude towards corruption.

When the Gamma was run through SPSS, no significant statistical association was confirmed between duties/work performed and corruption variables this is because the significant level (P) is more than 0.05 (P>0.05). The test results were as follows. Duties/work performed and perceived levels of corruption, Gamma= .033, at P= .856. Duties/work performed and pressure to engage in corruption, Gamma= .315, at P= .112. Duties/work performed and tolerance to corruption, Gamma= .120, at P= .599. Duties/work performed and individual corruptibility, Gamma= .253, at P= .169. Duties/work performed and definition of corruption, Gamma= -.109, at P= .543. Duties/work performed and attitude towards corruption, Gamma= .167, at P= .371. Therefore, relationship is not statistically significant at P<0.05.

Management literature emphasizes the importance of work experience for the design of a firm's strategy (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Canella, 2009). Experience or high level duty might

influence the likelihood of bribery because more mobile, short-tenured workers are more likely to engage in high-risk activities such as bribery. Work experience or high level duty is associated with moral development, deliberateness in decision-making and more accurate diagnosis of information. Work experience or high level duty allows employees to develop more (tacit) knowledge about corruption or particular experience with bribery as well as adequate shared information through social networks (Lam, 2000). This may increase bribe efficacy, reduce the risk of being asked for bribes, increase the ability to understand optimal levels of bribes per particular event, or to develop competencies that increase bribe refusals. For that reason, employees with much work experience or high level job level are expected to engage less likely in bribery activities.

4.3.2.6 Duration of work experience and corruption

4.3.2.6.1 Duration of work experience in public service and corruption.

To determine association between length service (in years) in public service and corruption a statistical test was done using SPSS through Gamma (because work experience is interval). The test was done to test whether there is any statistical significant between length service (in years) in public service and perceived prevalence of corruption, pressure to engage in corruption, tolerance to engage in corruption, individual corruptibility, definition of corruption, and attitude towards corruption.

When the Gamma was run through SPSS, no statistical association was confirmed between length service (in years) in public service and corruption variables. The test results were as follows. Length service (in years) in public service and perceived levels of corruption, Gamma= .036, at P= .845. Length service (in years) in public service and pressure to engage in corruption, Gamma= -.177, at P= .365. Length service (in years) in public service and tolerance to corruption, Gamma= .357, at P= .096. Length service (in years) in public service and individual corruptibility, Gamma= .131, at P= .434. Length service (in years) in public service and definition of corruption, Gamma= .192, at P= .218. Length service (in years) in public service and attitude towards corruption, Gamma= .229, at P= .177. Therefore, relationship is not statistically significant at $P<0.05$.

4.3.2.6.2 Duration of work experience in passport section and corruption.

To determine association between length service (in years) in Passport Section in Nairobi and corruption a statistical test was done using SPSS through Gamma (because work experience is interval). The test was done to test whether there is any statistical significant between length service (in years) in passport section in Nairobi and perceived prevalence of corruption, pressure to engage in corruption, tolerance to engage in corruption, individual corruptibility, definition of corruption, and attitude towards corruption.

When the Gamma was run through SPSS, no statistical association was confirmed between length service (in years) in passport section in Nairobi and corruption variables. This is because the significant level (P) is more than 0.05 (P>0.05). the test results are as follows. Length service (in years) in passport section in Nairobi and perceived levels of corruption, Gamma= -.114, at P= .571. Length service (in years) in passport section in Nairobi and pressure to engage in corruption, Gamma= -.097, at P= .622. Length service (in years) in passport section in Nairobi and tolerance to corruption, Gamma= .045, at P= .849. Length service (in years) in passport section in Nairobi and individual corruptibility, Gamma= .034, at P= .849. Length service (in years) in passport section in Nairobi and definition of corruption, Gamma= .151, at P= .335. Length service (in years) in passport section in Nairobi and attitude towards corruption, Gamma= .037, at P= .834. Therefore, relationship is not statistically significant at P<0.05.

4.3.2.7 Conclusion.

Length of experience as a determinant of corruption in an organization is largely not investigated. The only close analysis is that of Gatti, Paternostro and Rigolini (2003) which find that employed, less wealthy, and older people appear to be more averse to corruption. Among other reasons, it is suggested that older people are less prone to corruption because they are less involved in bureaucratic procedures in daily life (Cabelkova & Hanousek, 2004). This means experience is closely related to age (employee having served for long in the organization). But also long experience or older people may have strong and wide networks which can contribute to high levels of corruption. Also long serving individual employees might know more about the government's activities and thus would be in a better position to assess the degree of corruption, depending on how government respondents. On the other

hand they may be more strongly involved in corruption by understanding better opportunities and risks of corruption.

This research confirms the only association in this context is between sex and definitions of corruption. In conclusion the method and questions used in this study (*self –reporting and hypothetical choices*) could have contributed to failure to confirm any correlation between age, marital status, level of education, level of duties/work performed, length of experience and corruption. The possibility is that an individual who has been involved in corruption in the past tend to excuse such behaviour declaring a low likelihood of being corrupt (Torgler and Schneider, 2007).

4.3.3 Patterns/forms and types of corruption

4.3.3.1 Perceived levels of corruption

Questionnaire respondents were asked to generally rate levels of behaviour, acts or transactions where officers get paid in money of kind/gift, favour their relatives and tribesmen, experience influence from senior government and political leaders to fast track applications in the process of issuing travel document on passports in passport section in Nairobi (question 8). The rating was in three scales, Low (1), Moderate (2) and High (3). The individual respondents were asked to tick relevant option (low, moderate, high), 100% (61 responses) response rate was achieved (61) responses. This was intended to measure the perceived levels of corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi from the insider's perspective. The responses were as follows;

Table 13: Perceived levels of corruption

Perceived levels of corruption in passport section	Frequency	Percent
low	22	36.1
Moderate	27	44.3
High	12	19.7
Total	61	100.0

As we can see from Table 13, 44% rated the prevalence of these corruption related behaviour as moderate, 36% as low and 20% as high. Therefore **one out of five (1/5)** perceive that corruption practice is high in the Passport Section in Nairobi. This is close to the figure given by Global Corruption Barometer (2013) of one out of four say they have paid bribe in the past 2 years globally.

4.3.3.2 Pressure to engage in corruption

Questionnaire respondents were asked to tick option on how they rate their pressure to engage in corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi (question 9). The options were in four scales, No pressure (0), A little pressure (1), A fair amount of pressure (2) and A lot of Pressure (3). A large part of the respondents (56%) (See **Table 14)** reported that they experience a lot of pressure to engage in corruption in Passport section in Nairobi. Therefore there is a lot of pressure to engage in corruption in the section. Asked why, the respondents highlighted that some applicants of passports and travel documents prefer their applications fast tracked because they are travelling very urgent. This urgent cases for some applicants leads to a lot of pressure while some applicants are ready to part with something even without being asked for, for their application to be processed between one and two days. This means that such instances make individual officers to have high likelihood to agree or forced to act corruptly.

In the key informant interviews, one of the key informants told the researcher that pressure to engage in corruption is from those whose applications don't qualify to be urgent. The applications that qualify to be urgent are like those travelling for medical, studies, religious e.g. Hajj, conferences or government official business. Hence other that don't fall in this official category as urgent they opt to pay some officers something for their application to be fast tracked.

Table 14: Pressure to engage in corruption

Level of felt Pressure	Frequency	Percent
No pressure	6	9.8
Little pressure	1	1.6
Fair pressure	20	32.8
A lot of pressure	34	55.7
Total	61	100.0

4.3.3.3 Tolerance to Corruption

Questionnaire respondents were asked to tick the extent they personally tolerate the pressure to engage in corrupt related behaviour in the Passport Section in Nairobi (question 10). The rating was in three levels, I don't tolerate at all (1), I am tolerant to some extent (2) and I just give in (3). A score of 1 (I don't tolerate at all) means low tolerance or not giving in easily to corruption. On the other end a score of 3 (I just give in) elicits high tolerance to corruption or easily accepting or giving in to corruption. A total of 61 responses (100% response rate) were received. **Table 15** below shows that 34% of the participants don't tolerate at all, while 66%

say they are tolerant to some extent. Therefore if 66% of the respondents report that they tolerate to some extent meaning there is likelihood of officers engaging in corrupt behaviour or acts. This means one is likely to easily give in or engage in corruption.

Table 15: Tolerance to corruption

Whether Tolerant		Frequency	Percent
	I don't tolerate	21	34.4
	I am tolerant to some extent	40	65.6
	Total	61	100.0

Reasons for high tolerance or many respondents giving in to accept corruption revolved around low salary, lack of clear and accountable reward system and personal characters. This was highlighted in the discussions with the key informants.

4.3.3.4 Individual corruptibility

To test individual corruptibility questionnaire respondents were asked to rate in a scale of five the level of agreement with five statements based on decision made from corrupt view point (question 11(a). The scale was Strongly disagree (1), Disagree (2), Neither disagree nor agree (3), Agree (4) and Strongly agree (5). A score of 1 (Strongly disagree) elicits less corruptibility while score of 5 (Strongly agree) elicits high level of corruptibility or likelihood of making corrupt decisions. The five statements which were agreed or disagreed are 1. I would decide in favour of the application as it would be impolite to refuse the offer 2. I would decide in favour of the application as there is little chance of getting caught 3. I would decide in favour of the application as it would be a good economic gain 4. I would decide in favour of the application as such a counter-favour would be harmless – nobody would suffer 5. I would decide in favour of the application as it is a rather widespread practice.

The individual scores were summed up and an average was computed to determine where one views fall in terms of making corrupt decision in relation to the services offered in Passport Section in Nairobi. From **Table 16** we can see that majority (34%) Strongly disagreed meaning low individual corruptibility. Also 31% of the respondents agreed with the statements meaning there is individual corruptibility but very average.

Table 16: Individual corruptibility

Level of agreement to act corruptly	Frequency	Percent
Strongly disagree	21	34.4
Disagree	20	32.8
Neither disagree nor agree	1	1.6
Agree	19	31.1
Total	61	100.0

4.3.3.5 Prevalence of forms of corruption

Questionnaire respondents were asked to rate levels of existence of seven forms of corruption through statements explaining each form (question12 (a)). The rating was in a scale of three-Low with score of 1, Moderate with a score value of 2 and High with a score value of 3. **Bribery** was stated as "The payment (in money or kind/gift) that is given or taken in appreciating officer's assistance to acquire travel documents or passport". **Straddling** as "Some officers systematically use their office to enter into, secure and expand their private business interests", **Fraud** as "Manipulation or distortion of information, facts and expertise, by officers providing services, who seeks to draw their personal gain", **Extortion** as "Officers charges extra fee to fast track passport applications", **Kinship and nepotism** as "Officers favour their relatives and tribesmen in issuance of passports", **Influence peddling** as "Influence from senior government and political leaders to fast track specific passport applications". The following are summary of the responses.

Table 17: Responses for the rating of levels of forms of corruption

	Response Rating						Total	
	Low		Moderate		High		N	Percent
Form of Corruption	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%		
Bribery	34	**55.7**	20	**32.8**	7	**11.5**	61	100
Straddling	44	**75.9**	8	**13.8**	6	**10.3**	58	100
Fraud	42	**72.4**	12	**20.7**	4	**6.9**	58	100
Extortion	20	**33.9**	16	**27.1**	23	**39.0**	59	100
Kinship/Nepotism	8	**13.6**	16	**27.1**	35	**59.3**	59	100
Influence Peddling	10	**16.7**	17	**28.3**	33	**55.0**	60	100

From **Table 17** above we can see that the most prevalent forms of corruption in Passport section in Nairobi are extortion, kinship/nepotism and influence peddling. Where 38% of the respondents rated extortion as high and 33% rated it as low, 57% rated kinship/nepotism as

high compared to 13% as low and influence peddling was rated high by 54% of the respondents compared to 16% low. 12% rated bribery as high and 56% it as low, 10% of the respondents rated straddling as high and 72% it as low, 7% rated fraud as high will 69% rated it as low.

This is due to the fact that as we saw through key informant interviews, the people who want their application to be processed urgently and they don't qualify to be urgent, so that can be officially processed urgently within one day they turn up to individual officers and pay extra unofficial fee and their case is processed faster. On kinship and nepotism, everyone who has relative or friend in the Passport Section will seek their assistance and therefore their application processed faster. Surprisingly the others see it as corruption.

4.3.3.6 Prevalence of types of corruption

Questionnaire respondents were asked to rate levels of existence of three major types of corruption through statements explaining each type (question 13(a)). The rating is in a scale of three- Low with score of 1, Moderate with a score value of 2 and High with a score value of 3. Petty corruption is stated as "Public officials demanding bribes and kickbacks, or awarding favours in return for personal considerations". State capture/influence is stated as "Collusion between private sector and public officials or politicians for their mutual private benefit", and grand corruption as "Theft or misuse of large amounts of public resources by state officials". The following is the summary of the responses;

Table 18: Responses for the rate of levels of types of corruption

	Response Rating						Total	
	Low		Moderate		High		N	Percent
Type of Corruption	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%		
Petty corruption	12	**19.7**	33	**54.1**	16	**26.2**	61	100
State capture/influence	40	**67.8**	17	**28.8**	2	**3.4**	59	100
Grand corruption	46	**76.7**	12	**20.0**	2	**3.3**	60	100

From **Table 18**, we can see that the type of corruption which has highest rating is petty corruption with 26% of the respondents rating its prevalence in Passport Section in Nairobi as high. This supports the belief which guided this research that in the process of accessing

government services like in Passport Section the prevalent type of corruption is petty corruption.

4.3.3.7 Conclusion

In conclusion and to answer research question 1, What are the major patterns/forms and types of corruption in the process of accessing government services specifically in acquiring travel documents in Kenya?. From the data presented above, we can therefore report that **25% or one out of five** of the respondents perceived levels of corruption as high in Passport Section in Nairobi. Fifty six percent (56%) of the respondents reported that they experience a lot of pressure to engage in corruption while working in the Passport Section in Nairobi. Sixty six percent (66%) of the respondents reported that they are able to tolerate to some extent pressure to engage in corruption. When the individual respondents tested on individual corruptibly through a scale, 31% of the respondents elicited high corruptibility.

In terms of the most prevalent forms and types of corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi, the research found out that the most prevalent forms of corruption are extortion, kinship/nepotism and influence peddling. Thirty nine Percent (39%) of the respondents reported that extortion is high, 57% reporting kinship/nepotism as high, and 54% reporting influence peddling as high within the section.

The most prevalent type of corruption prevalent in Passport Section was reported to be petty corruption with 26% of the respondents saying is high. This is because this is a service provision agency of the government and therefore other types like grand corruption are not present.

4.3.4 Personal interpretations and corruption

This section presents data in the section 3 of the questionnaire and tried to answer research question two that "What are specific individual-level motivations for corruption that makes public officials more prone to corrupt behaviour than other officials?" The section also tries to achieve research objective two, that "to determine whether the decision to engage in corrupt behaviour is primarily influenced by a personal interpretation of corruption. Also the research hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 are tested in this section.The specific focus in this section is on definition of corruption, attitude towards corruption, imitations, engagement and approvals as

key individual level motivations for corruption in the process of accessing government services in Passport Section in Nairobi.

4.3.4.1 Definitions and attitude towards of corruption

4.3.4.1.1 Definitions of corruption

Questionnaire respondents were asked to state level of agreement with three statements based on favourable definitions towards corrupt behaviour or acts (question 14(a). The responses were put on a scale of five, Strongly disagree (1), Disagree (2) Neither disagree nor agree (3), Agree (4) and Strongly agree (5). The scoring of Strongly disagree (1) means more favourable or positive definition towards corruption (see corrupt behavior as good) and on the other end Strongly agree (5) denotes more unfavourable or negative definition towards (see corrupt behaviour as bad. The statements were 1. "If a public official accepts a gift for a personal favour then it is misuse of public office" 2. "If a public official accepts a bribe or a gift in exchange for fast-tracking passport or any other travel document processing then it is misuse of public office" 3. "If a public official charges a fee on classified information on passport or travel documents processing, then it is misuse of public office".

The analysis was at scale level where each participant responses were summed up and average calculated to determine ones direction of definition of corruption.

The following cross table summarizes the responses;

Table 19: Definitions of corruption

Agreement to corruption favourable statements	Frequency	Percent
Strongly agree	16	26.2
Agree	12	19.7
Neither agree nor Disagree	17	27.9
Disagree	8	13.1
Strongly disagree	8	13.1
Total	61	100.0

From the responses **see Table 19**, definitions of corruption was not much favorable with only 26% falling on the favourable side (combining disagree and strongly disagree, (13.1+13.1). Combining strongly agree and agree, (26.2+19.7), 46 % elicited unfavorable definition to corruption. Therefore majority, 46% defined the stated bahaviour as unfavourable.

To get much insight on definitions the research tested definition of corruption by being good (positive definition), justified (neutralizing definition) or bad (negative definition), (question 15(a). Respondents were asked to rate in a scale of three, bad (1), justified (2) and good (3), on statements depicting corrupt behaviour. The scores were averaged to place the respondent on a scale of 1-3. The following cross table summarizes the responses.

Table 20: Definitions of corruption by acceptance- Good, Bad or Justified

Definition of corruption as Good, Justified or Bad	Frequency	Percent (%)
Bad	20	32.8
Justified	21	34.4
Good	20	32.8
Total	61	100.0

Surprisingly there was no much difference in the responses, but as we can see from Table 20, 33% of the responses were ranked to rate corrupt acts as good (positive definition), and 34% as justified (neutralizing definition) while 33 % saw corrupt practices as bad(negative definition) . Generally civil servants tend to have justified definition of corruption. There is general agreement among themselves that they engage in corruption because of low salary, low welfare as it was elicited in any open comments (question 14(b)).

4.3.4.1.2 Attitude towards corruption.

Questionnaire respondents were asked to state level of agreement with statements derived on attitude towards corruption to get more insight on corruption definition (question 19 (a). Seven statements based on negative attitudes towards corruption closely related to the services and corruption in Passport Section was used. The statements were: 1. Most misuse of public office in Passport Section is petty to be worthy reported, 2. Misuse of public office in passport section is beneficial provided you are not caught, 3. There is nothing wrong with an immigration officer acquiring wealth through misuse of public office provided s/he uses it to help or assist the community, 4. Misuse of public office in passport section is a fact of life, 5. it is the normal way of doing things, people who report misuse of public office in passport section are likely to suffer, 6. There is no point in reporting misuse of public office in passport section because no action will be taken, 7. A person who accepts Ksh 10,000 bribe is more corrupt than a person who accepts Ksh 2000 bribe.

A five level scale ranging from strongly agree (5) meaning more positive attitude towards corruption or attitude favourable to corruption (corruption behaviour being good), and strongly disagree (1) which means more negative attitude towards corruption and therefore attitude unfavourable to corruption (corruption being bad behaviour). The following cross table is summary of the responses.

Table 21: Attitude towards corruption

Agreement with statements on attitude towards corruption	Frequency	Percent
Strongly disagree	21	34.4
Disagree	20	32.8
Neither disagree nor agree	20	32.8
Total	61	100.0

As we can see in **table 21**, majority of the responses fall at the end or side eliciting positive or unfavourable attitude towards corruption. Combining both Strongly Disagree and Disagree then 67% of the respondents have positive or unfavourable attitude to corrupt behaviour or acts. This means they don't agree that petty corruption go unreported, that corruption is beneficial provided you are not caught, that corruption is normal way of doing things, that a person who accepts Ksh 10,000 bribe is more corrupt than who accepts Kshs 200 bribe among other commonly held practises that abet corruption. The point is that majority agree corruption whether is petty of grand is bad and has negative social impact and should not be encouraged.

4.3.4.1.3 Positive definition of corrupt behaviour and engagement.

To test the research hypothesis one, chi-square or Gamma test was used to show whether there is relationship between definition of corruption (question 14 (a)) and perceived level of corruption (question 8), pressure to engage in corruption (question 9), individual corruptibility (question 11 (a)) and tolerance to corruption (question 10). Chi-square test proved to be difficult in this test because there were some cells with recorded count of less than five. Therefore Gamma test for association is used in this case.

When statistical significance was tested to see whether there is association between definition and corruption, only one variable for corruption confirmed significant association with definition of corruption. The variable which confirmed significant association with definition is individual corruptibility as shown below;

Table 22: Definition of corruption and individual corruptibility

Definition												
Individual corruptibility	**Strongly Disagree**		**Disagree**		**Neither Disagree nor Agree**		**Agree**		**Strongly Agree**		**Total**	
	Freq	**%**	**Freq**	**%**	**Freq**	**%**	**Freq**	**%**	**Freq**	**%**	**N**	**%**
Strongly disagree	5	**8.2**	0	**0**	10	**16.4**	2	**3.3**	4	**6.6**	21	**34.4**
Disagree	5	**8.2**	5	**8.2**	3	**4.9**	4	**6.5**	3	**4.9**	20	**32.8**
Neither disagree nor agree	0	**0**	0	**0**	0	**0**	0	**0**	1	**1.6**	1	**1.7**
Agree	6	**9.8**	7	**11.5**	4	**6.6**	2	**3.3**	0	**0**	19	**31.1**
Total	**16**	**26.2**	**12**	**19.7**	**17**	**27.9**	**8**	**13.1**	**8**	**13.1**	**61**	**100**

The test result indicated, Gamma= -.271 (moderate negative association) meaning as definition of corruption tends to be more positive (favourable to corruption, corruption seen as good or justified behaviour) (responses goes towards strongly disagree or 1), the individual corruptibility increases (responses goes towards strongly agree or 5,), this means one is able to make corruption prone decisions, don't care, less likely to follow procedures and rules, at P= .038, therefore P<0.05, (meaning there is statistical significance). So relationship between definition of corruption and individual corruptibility is statistically significant at P<0.05.

For the rest of the corruption variables- perceived level of corruption, pressure to engage in corruption and tolerance there was no significant association confirmed between each and definition of corruption by individuals. The Gamma test P-values were as follows; Definition of corruption and perceived levels of corruption, Gamma= .182 at P= .218. Definition of corruption and pressure to engage in corruption, Gamma= -.283 at P= .186, therefore P>0.05. Definition of corruption and tolerance to corruption, Gamma= -.341 at P= .056 (denoting marginal significance).The reason being the significance level (P) for all of them in the test was more than 0.05 meaning (P>0.05). Therefore, relationship is not statistically significant at P<0.05.

4.3.4.1.4 Conclusion

Previous studies shows that no matter their positions in the government, public officials are a product of the society, and they may hardly detach themselves from the underlying or informal socio-political economy of their societies (Ekeh, 1975; Agbakoba, 2007; Jamil, 2002; Fjeldstad, 2009). How corruption is perceived and practiced at the low level of service provision is likely to shape how the majority public official at all cadres will react (total or divided condemnation, tolerance or indecisiveness) to cases of other types of corruption in the government. Consequently, this determines the prevalence of corruption or effectiveness of the existing anti-corruption strategies. I base this on an observation that how a system of perception, interpretation and dispositions practices prevail at the service provision level, may be replicated in the high places of government (cf. Kibwana, et al., 1996; Smith, 2001; Anassi, 2004).

Therefore we can confirm the association between definition of corruption and engagement in it. In the above analysis it has been statistically confirmed that the more positively people define corruption, the more people will be involved or engage in corruption (see it as good or justified). This is through Gamma analysis in **Table 22** confirming that as definition of corruption tends to be more positive (favourable to corruption, corruption seen as good or justified behaviour), the individual corruptibility increases (one is able to make corruption prone decisions, don't care, less likely to follow procedures and rules). Therefore we can accept the research hypothesis one **(H1)** that **"The more positively people define a corrupt behaviour the more likely they are to engage in it"**.

4.3.4. 2 Imitations and corruption

The other concept in explaining influence of personal interpretations on corruption is imitation. In this research, imitation was conceptualized in terms of how widespread corrupt behavior is, how common such behaviors are, and their levels of approvals/involvement.

Questionnaire respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement (question 16 (a), 17 (a), 18 (a)) on a five scale from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) and average computed to determine the where one's response falls in the scale. This is a common technique in social sciences (Chappell and Piquero 2004, Nagin and Paternoster 1993, Weber 1992).

Respondents were asked to rate extent of agreement with five statements based on how corrupt behaviors are imitated in passport section in Nairobi (question 16 (a). The rating is in a scale of five Strongly disagree (1), Disagree (2), Neither disagree nor agree (3), Agree (4) and Strongly agree (5). Strongly disagree (1) elicits low imitation and strongly agree (5) elicits high levels of imitating corrupt practices. The statements were 1. There is misuse of public office because others engage in it. 2. There is misuse of public office because no one sees as a wrong or bad behaviour. 3. There is misuse of public office because is learnt from the staff that has been in service for long. 4. There is misuse of public office because is learnt from senior officers. 5. There is misuse of public office because no one has been punished. The summary of the responses were as follows;

Table 23: Imitation of the corruption behaviours

Level of agreement with statements on imitation of corrupt behaviours	Frequency	Percent
Strongly disagree	20	32.8
Disagree	21	34.4
Neither disagree nor agree	20	32.8
Total	61	100.0

From table **23** we can see that generally imitation of corruption behaviour is not elicited by the responses as majority (67%) combining strongly disagree and disagree fall on the side of low imitation.

4.3.4. 2.1 Widespread perception of corrupt behaviour and engagement.

When statistical significance was tested to see whether there is association between imitation and corruption, only three variables for corruption confirmed significant association with imitation practices. These variables which confirmed significant association with imitation are pressure to engage in corruption, tolerance to corruption and individual corruptibility as shown below;

Table 24: Imitations and Pressure to engage in corruption

Level of pressure to engage in corruption		Level of agreement with statements on corruption widespread imitations: strongly disagree	disagree	neither disagree nor agree	Total
No pressure	Count	6	0	0	6
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% within generations- imitations	30.0%	.0%	.0%	9.8%
	% of Total	9.8%	.0%	.0%	9.8%
Little pressure	Count	0	1	0	1
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% within generations- imitations	.0%	4.8%	.0%	1.6%
	% of Total	.0%	1.6%	.0%	1.6%
Fair pressure	Count	0	20	0	20
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% within generations- imitations	.0%	95.2%	.0%	32.8%
	% of Total	.0%	32.8%	.0%	32.8%
A lot of pressure	Count	14	0	20	34
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	41.2%	.0%	58.8%	100.0%
	% within generations- imitations	70.0%	.0%	100.0%	55.7%
	% of Total	23.0%	.0%	32.8%	55.7%
Total	Count	20	21	20	61
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	32.8%	34.4%	32.8%	100.0%
	% within generations- imitations	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	32.8%	34.4%	32.8%	100.0%

Since there were 8 cells with valid counts less than 5 we could not use Chi-square and therefore Gamma test was instead used.

The test result is, Gamma= .388 (*evidence of strong positive association*) meaning as imitation of corruption tends to increase i.e. goes towards strongly agree (5) pressure to engage in corruption increases (*individual officers experience a lot of force to act corruptly*), at P= .018, therefore P<0.05, (meaning there is strong statistical significance). Therefore, relationship between imitation of corruption and pressure to engage in corruption is statistically significant at P<0.05 and is generalizable to the entire population.

Table 25: Imitations and tolerance to corruption.

Level of tolerance to corruption		Level of agreement with Imitations statements			Total
		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither disagree nor agree	
I don't tolerate	Count	20	1	0	21
	% within tolerance to corruption	95.2%	4.8%	.0%	100.0%
	% within generations- imitations	100.0%	4.8%	.0%	34.4%
	% of Total	32.8%	1.6%	.0%	34.4%
I am tolerant to some extent	Count	0	20	20	40
	% within tolerance to corruption	.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
	% within generations- imitations	.0%	95.2%	100.0%	65.6%
	% of Total	.0%	32.8%	32.8%	65.6%
Total	Count	20	21	20	61
	% within tolerance to corruption	32.8%	34.4%	32.8%	100.0%
	% within generations- imitations	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	32.8%	34.4%	32.8%	100.0%

Since there were 3 cells with valid counts less than 5 we could not use Chi-square and therefore Gamma was instead used.

The test result is, Gamma= 1.000 (*perfect strong positive association*) meaning as imitation of corruption tends to increase i.e. goes towards strongly agree (5) tolerance to engage in corruption increases (*individual officers easily give in or accept to be corrupted*), at P= .000, therefore P<0.05, (meaning there is strong statistical significance). Therefore, the relationship between imitation of corruption and tolerance to engage in corruption is statistically significant at P<0.05 and is generalizable to the entire population.

Table 26: Imitation and individual corruptibility

Level of agreement with Individual corrupt related statements		Level of agreement with Imitations statements			Total
		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither disagree nor agree	
Strongly disagree	Count	19	1	1	21
	% within individual corruptibility (a)	90.5%	4.8%	4.8%	100.0%
	% within generations- imitations	95.0%	4.8%	5.0%	34.4%
	% of Total	31.1%	1.6%	1.6%	34.4%
Disagree	Count	0	20	0	20
	% within individual corruptibility (a)	.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% within generations- imitations	.0%	95.2%	.0%	32.8%
	% of Total	.0%	32.8%	.0%	32.8%
Neither disagree nor agree	Count	1	0	0	1
	% within individual corruptibility (a)	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% within generations- imitations	5.0%	.0%	.0%	1.6%
	% of Total	1.6%	.0%	.0%	1.6%
Agree	Count	0	0	19	19
	% within individual corruptibility (a)	.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% within generations- imitations	.0%	.0%	95.0%	31.1%
	% of Total	.0%	.0%	31.1%	31.1%
Total	Count	20	21	20	61
	% within individual corruptibility (a)	32.8%	34.4%	32.8%	100.0%
	% within generations- imitations	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	32.8%	34.4%	32.8%	100.0%

Since there were some cells with valid counts less than 5 we could not use Chi-square and therefore Gamma was instead used.

The test result is, Gamma= .930 (*evidence of strong positive association*) meaning as imitation of corruption tends to increase i.e. goes towards strongly agree (5) individual corruptibility increases, (*meaning individuals officers are more prone to making corrupt decisions*), at P= .000, therefore P<0.05, (meaning there is strong statistical significance). So relationship between imitation of corruption and individual corruptibility is statistically significant at P<0.05 and is generalizable to the entire population.

For the perceived level of corruption there was no significant association confirmed between it and imitation of corruption by individuals. The reason being the significance level (P) of the test result was more than 0.05 meaning (P>0.05) as Gamma test P-values is as follows; Imitation and perceived level of corruption, Gamma= .026, at P= .874. Therefore, the relationship is not statistically significant at P<0.05.

4.3.4. 2.2 Conclusion

Previous studies show that the individual incentive to be corrupt is higher the more corruption is widespread, because it is easier to both find corruptible officials as well as to escape punishment (Andvig and Moene (1990). In the same vein, Tirole (1996) shows that, because of information asymmetries, individuals from a group with a bad reputation have less of an incentive to behave honestly.

Therefore from the analysis above in **Tables 24, 25 and 26**, we can accept the research hypothesis two **(H2)** that **"the more widespread people perceive a corrupt behaviour to be (imitation), the more likely they are to engage in it"**. 1. As imitation of corruption tends to increase, pressure to engage in corruption increases (*individual officers have likelihood to agree or forced to act corruptly*). 2. As imitation of corruption tends to increase, tolerance to engage in corruption increases (*individual officers easily give in or accept to be corrupted*), 3. As imitation of corruption tends to increase, individual corruptibility increases, (*individuals are more prone to making corrupt decisions*).

4.3.4.3 Involvement/Approvals and corruption

To get more insight on relationship between imitation of corruption and specifically approvals or involvement in corrupt behaviors. The respondents were asked to rate approvals on a scale;

on engagement of corrupt behavior in Passport Section in Nairobi. A four level scale is used- not engaged at all (0), few engage (1), fairly engaged (2) and widely engaged (3) against individual responses (question 17 (a)). On approvals a four scale is also used - No one approves (0), approve by few (1), and approved by many (2) (question 18 (a)) against individual responses. The summary of the responses from the two questions were as follows;

Table 27: Rate of engagement of corrupt practices

Rate of engagement of corrupt practices	Frequency	Percent
Few engage	2	3.3
Fairly engaged	26	42.6
Widely engaged	33	54.1
Total	61	100.0

Table 28: Rate of approvals of corrupt practices

Rate of approval of corrupt practices	Frequency	Valid Percent
No one approves	20	32.8
Approved by few	16	26.2
Approved by many	25	41.0
Total	61	100.0

From table 27 above we can see that engagement of corrupt practices is rated fairly high with 54% rating the practices as widely engaged. In addition, approval (informally approved) is fairly rated high with 41% of the respondents rating the practices as approved by many.

4.3.4.3.1 Approval of corrupt behaviour and engagement.

When statistical significance was tested to see whether there is association between involvement/ approval and corruption, only one variable for corruption confirmed significant association with involvement or level engagement- pressure to engage in corruption. In relation to the association between corruption and approval only two variables- pressure to engage in corruption and individual corruptibility confirmed significant association. The significant associations are shown below;

Table 29: Levels of engagement and pressure to engage in corruption

Level of pressure to engage in corruption		Levels of engagement in corruption			Total
		Few engage	Fairly engaged	Widely engaged	
No pressure	Count	0	6	0	6
	Expected Count	.2	2.6	3.2	6.0
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% within imitations by engagement	.0%	23.1%	.0%	9.8%
	% of Total	.0%	9.8%	.0%	9.8%
Little pressure	Count	1	0	0	1
	Expected Count	.0	.4	.5	1.0
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% within imitations by engagement	50.0%	.0%	.0%	1.6%
	% of Total	1.6%	.0%	.0%	1.6%
Fair pressure	Count	0	20	0	20
	Expected Count	.7	8.5	10.8	20.0
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% within imitations by engagement	.0%	76.9%	.0%	32.8%
	% of Total	.0%	32.8%	.0%	32.8%
A lot of pressure	Count	1	0	33	34
	Expected Count	1.1	14.5	18.4	34.0
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	2.9%	.0%	97.1%	100.0%
	% within imitations by engagement	50.0%	.0%	100.0%	55.7%
	% of Total	1.6%	.0%	54.1%	55.7%
Total	Count	2	26	33	61
	Expected Count	2.0	26.0	33.0	61.0
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	3.3%	42.6%	54.1%	100.0%
	% within imitations by engagement	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	3.3%	42.6%	54.1%	100.0%

Since there were some cells with valid counts less than 5 we could not use Chi-square and therefore Gamma was instead used.

The test result is Gamma= .932 (evidence of strong positive association) meaning as engagement of corruption tends to increase i.e. goes towards widely engaged, pressure to engage in corruption increases (*individual officers are more likely to agree or forced to act corruptly, because the force or persuasion is from many persons*) at P= .000, therefore P<0.05, (meaning there is strong statistical significance). So relationship between engagement in corruption and pressure to engage in corruption is statistically significant at P<0.05 and is generalizable to the entire population.

Table 30: Approvals and pressure to engage in corruption

Level of pressure to engage in corruption		Level of approvals of corruption			Total
		No one approves	Approved by few	Approved by many	
No pressure	Count	0	0	6	6
	Expected Count	2.0	1.6	2.5	6.0
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% within imitation by approvals	.0%	.0%	24.0%	9.8%
	% of Total	.0%	.0%	9.8%	9.8%
Little pressure	Count	0	1	0	1
	Expected Count	.3	.3	.4	1.0
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% within imitation by approvals	.0%	6.3%	.0%	1.6%
	% of Total	.0%	1.6%	.0%	1.6%
Fair pressure	Count	0	1	19	20
	Expected Count	6.6	5.2	8.2	20.0
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	.0%	5.0%	95.0%	100.0%
	% within imitation by approvals	.0%	6.3%	76.0%	32.8%
	% of Total	.0%	1.6%	31.1%	32.8%
A lot of pressure	Count	20	14	0	34
	Expected Count	11.1	8.9	13.9	34.0
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	58.8%	41.2%	.0%	100.0%
	% within imitation by approvals	100.0%	87.5%	.0%	55.7%
	% of Total	32.8%	23.0%	.0%	55.7%
Total	Count	20	16	25	61
	Expected Count	20.0	16.0	25.0	61.0
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	32.8%	26.2%	41.0%	100.0%
	% within imitation by approvals	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	32.8%	26.2%	41.0%	100.0%

Since there were some cells with valid counts less than 5 we could not use Chi-square and therefore Gamma was instead used.

The test result is Gamma= -.958 (evidence of strong negative association) meaning as level of approval tends to increase i.e. goes towards approved by many, pressure to engage in corruption decreases (goes towards zero) *(individual officers are less likely to be forced to act corruptly because they don't see it as a problem, they don't resist*), at P= .000, therefore P<0.05, (meaning there is strong statistical significance). So relationship between level of approval and pressure to engage in corruption is statistically significant at P<0.05 and is generalizable to the entire population.

Table 31: Level of approvals and individual corruptibility.

Level of agreement with Individual corrupt related statements			Imitation by approvals of corruption			Total
			No one approves	Approved by few	Approved by many	
	Strongly disagree	Count	1	14	6	21
		Expected Count	6.9	5.5	8.6	21.0
		% within individual corruptibility (a)	4.8%	66.7%	28.6%	100.0%
		% within imitation by approvals	5.0%	87.5%	24.0%	34.4%
		% of Total	1.6%	23.0%	9.8%	34.4%
	Disagree	Count	0	1	19	20
		Expected Count	6.6	5.2	8.2	20.0
		% within individual corruptibility (a)	.0%	5.0%	95.0%	100.0%
		% within imitation by approvals	.0%	6.3%	76.0%	32.8%
		% of Total	.0%	1.6%	31.1%	32.8%
	Neither disagree nor agree	Count	0	1	0	1
		Expected Count	.3	.3	.4	1.0
		% within individual corruptibility (a)	.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
		% within imitation by approvals	.0%	6.3%	.0%	1.6%
		% of Total	.0%	1.6%	.0%	1.6%
	Agree	Count	19	0	0	19
		Expected Count	6.2	5.0	7.8	19.0
		% within individual corruptibility (a)	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
		% within imitation by approvals	95.0%	.0%	.0%	31.1%
		% of Total	31.1%	.0%	.0%	31.1%
Total		Count	20	16	25	61
		Expected Count	20.0	16.0	25.0	61.0
		% within individual corruptibility (a)	32.8%	26.2%	41.0%	100.0%
		% within imitation by approvals	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	32.8%	26.2%	41.0%	100.0%

Since there were some cells with valid counts less than 5 we could not use Chi-square and therefore Gamma was instead used.

The test result is Gamma= -.477 (evidence of strong negative association) meaning as level of approval (informal) of corruption tends to increase i.e. goes towards approved by many , individual corruptibility decreases (*everyone in that group sees corruption as normal and not bad*, *few see others or themselves as corrupt*), at P= .000, therefore P<0.05, (meaning there is strong statistical significance). So relationship between engagement in corruption and pressure to engage in corruption is statistically significant at P<0.05 and is generalizable to the entire population.

For the rest of the corruption variables- perceived level of corruption and tolerance to corruption there was no significant association confirmed between each and level of engagement/approval in the passport section. The reason being the significance level (P) for all of them in the test was more than 0.05 meaning (P>0.05) as Gamma test P-value are as follows. Level of engagement and perceived levels of corruption, Gamma= .039 at P= .841. Level of engagement and tolerance to corruption, Gamma= -.197 at P= .443. Level of engagement Individual corruptibility, Gamma= .266 at P= .117. Level of approval and perceived level of corruption, Gamma= -.026, at P= .895. Level of approval and Tolerance to corruption, Gamma= -.198 at P= .241. Therefore P>0.05, and the relationship is not statistically significant at P<0.05.

4.3.4.3.2 Conclusion.

Previous studies by Andvig and Moene (1990) argue that the higher the frequency of bureaucratic corruption, the higher is the propensity for a bureaucrat to be corrupted; hence, multiple equilibria with various levels of corruption may arise. They conclude that the higher the proportion of corrupted government officials, the easier it is for an agent to find a corruptible official. They also point out that the more corruption is perceived to be widespread the easier to find corruptible officials as well as to escape punishment. In addition, they say that individuals from a group with bad reputation have less of incentive to behave honestly.

From the analysis above in **tables 29, 30 and 31**, we can accept the research hypothesis three **(H3)** that "**The more people approve a corrupt behaviour at work the more likely they are to engage in it". 1.** As engagement of corruption tends to increase i.e. goes towards widely engaged, the pressure to engage in corruption increases (*individual officers are more likely to agree or forced to act corruptly*) **2.** As level of approval tends to increase i.e. goes towards approved by many, the pressure to engage in corruption decreases (goes towards zero) *(individual officers are less likely to be forced to act corruptly because they don't see it as a problem, they don't resist*) 3. As level of approval of corruption tends to increase i.e. goes towards approved by many, individual corruptibility decreases (*everyone in that group sees corruption as normal and not bad*, *few hardly see others or themselves as corrupt*.

4.3.5 Individual perception, dispositions and corruption

4.3.5.1 Work attitude and corruption

To determine whether individual perceptions and dispositions lead to corrupt practices the questionnaire respondents were asked to respond to questions related to work attitude especially job satistifaction in terms of love for their job, salary, responsibilities and work relations with other officers (question 21(a)). Their responses were rated on a four scale- Very dissatisfied (1), Dissastified (2), Satisfied (3) and very satisfied (4). The responses were as follows:

Table 32: Work attitude/satisfaction

Work Attitude/ Satisfaction Aspect	Level of Satisfaction								Total	
	Very Satisfied		Satisfied		Somewhat Satisfied		Dissatisfied			
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	N	%
Love of the job	0	**0**	6	**10.0**	49	**81.7**	5	**8.3**	60	100
Salary	12	**20.3**	46	**78.0**	1	**1.7**	0	**0**	59	100
Responsibilities	1	**1.7**	20	**33.9**	38	**64.4**	0	**0**	59	100
Relationship with others	1	**1.7**	3	**5.2**	45	**77.6**	9	**15.5**	58	100

From **Table 32** we can see that majority (82%) of the respondents rated "somewhat satisfied" the love of the job, majority (78%) rated salary as "satisfied", majority of the respondents (64%) rated responsibilities as "somewhat satisfied" and 78% of the respondents rated relations with other colleagues at passport section as "somewhat satisfied". To determine the relationship between work attitude /satstifaction research hypothesis 4 was tested in next subsection.

4.3.5.2 Negative work attitude and engagement in corrupt behaviour.

4.3.5.2.1 Relationship between work attitude and corruption

When statistical tests were conducted to test association between corruption and love for the job, salary, responsibilities, and work relations with others, the association was found not to be significant at $P<0.05$, the significance levels of all were more than 0.05 and therefore the association could into be generalized into the entire population. Because there were some

cells with count, less than five Chi-square test was not appropriate and Gamma instead was used. The Gamma test P-values are as follows;

Work attitude and perceived levels of corruption, Gamma= -.294, at P= .200, therefore P>0.05. Work attitude and pressure to engage in corruption, Gamma= .393, at P= .417. Work attitude and tolerance to corruption, Gamma= .608, at P= .308. Work attitude and individual corruptibility, Gamma= .126 at P= .709. Work attitude and definition of corruption statistical test, Gamma= -.808 (*evidence of strong negative association, meaning as work attitude becomes positive, one is satisfied, the definition of corruption becomes unfavourable (negative), sees corruption as unacceptable*), at P= .096 (slightly significant). Work attitude and attitude towards corruption statistical test, Gamma= .675, at P= .143. Therefore P>0.05, meaning relationship is not statistically significant at P<0.05.

4.3.5.2.2 Conclusion

Previous studies have shown that the effects of group reputation on the individual's incentives to be corrupted (Tirole, 1996). He shows that, if the behaviour of an individual can only be imperfectly observed and the individual's reputation depends in part on the reputation of the group the individual belongs to, agents from groups that had a bad reputation in the past may have strong incentives to continue behaving badly. This branch of the literature suggests that social effects can have a strong effect on individual behaviour. The general attitude towards immigration from the past is that is it corrupt and this could contribute to current corruption in the department.

Therefore, we cannot accept the hypothesis four **(H4) "The more negative work attitude the higher chances of public official to engage in corrupt behaviour".** This means not just work attitude that leads to corruption but entire societal values and attitudes shared in a society that can determine individual level motivations to corruption.

4.3.5.3 Negative the work lifestyle and engagement in corrupt behaviour.

4.3.5.3.1 Work lifestyle, values, expectations and corruption

Questionnaire respondents were asked to rate general work lifestyle (question 22(a) in Passport Section in a scale of five -strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), Neither disagree nor agree (3), agree (4) and strongly agree (5) on good or supportive work lifestyle aspects or

statements on 1. Best use of one's abilities, 2. Seeing results of one's effort, 3. Having feeling of accomplishment, 4. Doing things by owns initiative, 5. Making decisions on their own, 6. Good possibilities for achievement, 7. Friendlinliness of co-workers, 8.organozational support/concern and 9. Having good pay, working condition and job security. Strongly Disagree (1) elicited negative and Strongly Agree (5) elicited positive work lifestyle, value and expectations. The analysis of this question is at scale level and therefore summation and average is used to determine the one's work lifestyle, values and expectations.

When statistical test was conducted through SPSS to test association between good/ positive work lifestyle, values, expectations and variables in corruption for this study statistical significant association is confirmed in pressure to engage in corruption, individual corruptibility, definitions of corruption, and attitudes towards corruption. The following are summary of the test;

Table 33: Pressure to engage in corruption and work lifestyle, values and expectations.

Level of pressure to engage in corruption		Level of agreement with good/positive Work lifestyle, values and expectations					Total
		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	
No pressure	Count	0	0	6	0	0	6
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	.0%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% within work lifestyle, values and expectations	.0%	.0%	23.1%	.0%	.0%	9.8%
	% of Total	.0%	.0%	9.8%	.0%	.0%	9.8%
Little pressure	Count	0	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% within work lifestyle, values and expectations	.0%	50.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.6%
	% of Total	.0%	1.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.6%
Fair pressure	Count	1	0	19	0	0	20
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	5.0%	.0%	95.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% within work lifestyle, values and expectations	100.0%	.0%	73.1%	.0%	.0%	32.8%
	% of Total	1.6%	.0%	31.1%	.0%	.0%	32.8%
A lot of pressure	Count	0	1	1	13	19	34
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	.0%	2.9%	2.9%	38.2%	55.9%	100.0%
	% within work lifestyle, values and expectations	.0%	50.0%	3.8%	100.0%	100.0%	55.7%
	% of Total	.0%	1.6%	1.6%	21.3%	31.1%	55.7%
Total	Count	1	2	26	13	19	61
	% within Pressure to engage in corruption	1.6%	3.3%	42.6%	21.3%	31.1%	100.0%
	% within work lifestyle, values and expectations	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	1.6%	3.3%	42.6%	21.3%	31.1%	100.0%

Pressure to engage in corruption and work lifestyle, values, expectations (Gamma= .918 (*evidence of strong association, meaning as work lifestyle, value and expectation tends to be good/positive pressure to engage in corruption increases, when employees are more satisfied, best use of one abilities, e.t.c. less likely to agree and therefore experience a lot of force to act corruptly*.), at P= 0.000). Therefore P<0.05, (meaning there is a statistical significance). So relationship between work lifestyle, values, expectations and pressure to engage in corruption is statistically significant at P<0.05 and is generalizable to the entire population. The question is whether pressure alone can lead to engagement in corruption. This can be answered by the variable of individual corruptibility.

Table 34: Individual corruptibility and work lifestyle, values and expectations

Level of agreement with Individual corrupt related statements		Level of agreement with good/positive Work lifestyle, values and expectations					Total
		Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Strongly disagree	Count	0	1	7	13	0	21
	% within individual corruptibility (a)	.0%	4.8%	33.3%	61.9%	.0%	100.0 %
	% within work lifestyle, values and expectations	.0%	50.0%	26.9%	100.0%	.0%	34.4%
	% of Total	.0%	1.6%	11.5%	21.3%	.0%	34.4%
Disagree	Count	1	0	19	0	0	20
	% within individual corruptibility (a)	5.0%	.0%	95.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0 %
	% within work lifestyle, values and expectations	100.0%	.0%	73.1%	.0%	.0%	32.8%
	% of Total	1.6%	.0%	31.1%	.0%	.0%	32.8%
Neither Disagree nor Agree	Count	0	1	0	0	0	1
	% within individual corruptibility (a)	.0%	100.0 %	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0 %
	% within work lifestyle, values and expectations	.0%	50.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.6%
	% of Total	.0%	1.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.6%
Agree	Count	0	0	0	0	19	19
	% within individual corruptibility (a)	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0 %
	% within work lifestyle, values and expectations	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	31.1%
	% of Total	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	31.1%	31.1%
Total	Count	1	2	26	13	19	61
	% within individual corruptibility (a)	1.6%	3.3%	42.6%	21.3%	31.1%	100.0 %
	% within work lifestyle, values and expectations	100.0%	100.0 %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0 %
	% of Total	1.6%	3.3%	42.6%	21.3%	31.1%	100.0 %

Individual corruptibility and work lifestyle, values, expectations (Gamma= .454 (*evidence of strong positive association, meaning as work lifestyle, value and expectation tends to be*

good/positive individual corruptibility increases, when employees are more satisfied, best use of one abilities, e.t.c. the ability to make corrupt favourable decisions is high/cannot assist for free or little favour), at P= 0.000). Therefore P<0.05, (meaning there is a statistical significance). So relationship between work lifestyle, values, expectations and Individual corruptibility is statistically significant at P<0.05 and is generalizable to the entire population. Therefore an employee with pressure to engage and having high individual corruptibility is likely to engage in corruption.

Table 35: Work lifestyle, values and expectations and definitions of corruption

Level of agreement with definitions of corruption		Level of agreement with good/positive Work lifestyle, values and expectations					Total
		Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Strongly Agree	Count	0	0	8	2	6	16
	% within general definitions	.0%	.0%	50.0%	12.5%	37.5%	100.0%
	% within work lifestyle, values and expectations	.0%	.0%	30.8%	15.4%	31.6%	26.2%
	% of Total	.0%	.0%	13.1%	3.3%	9.8%	26.2%
Agree	Count	0	0	5	0	7	12
	% within general definitions	.0%	.0%	41.7%	.0%	58.3%	100.0%
	% within work lifestyle, values and expectations	.0%	.0%	19.2%	.0%	36.8%	19.7%
	% of Total	.0%	.0%	8.2%	.0%	11.5%	19.7%
Neither Agree nor Disagree	Count	1	0	3	9	4	17
	% within general definitions	5.9%	.0%	17.6%	52.9%	23.5%	100.0%
	% within work lifestyle, values and expectations	100.0%	.0%	11.5%	69.2%	21.1%	27.9%
	% of Total	1.6%	.0%	4.9%	14.8%	6.6%	27.9%
Disagree	Count	0	0	4	2	2	8
	% within general definitions	.0%	.0%	50.0%	25.0%	25.0%	100.0%
	% within work lifestyle, values and expectations	.0%	.0%	15.4%	15.4%	10.5%	13.1%
	% of Total	.0%	.0%	6.6%	3.3%	3.3%	13.1%
Strongly Disagree	Count	0	2	6	0	0	8
	% within general definitions	.0%	25.0%	75.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% within work lifestyle, values and expectations	.0%	100.0%	23.1%	.0%	.0%	13.1%
	% of Total	.0%	3.3%	9.8%	.0%	.0%	13.1%
Total	Count	1	2	26	13	19	61
	% within general definitions	1.6%	3.3%	42.6%	21.3%	31.1%	100.0%
	% within work lifestyle, values and expectations	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	1.6%	3.3%	42.6%	21.3%	31.1%	100.0%

Since there were some cells with valid counts less than 5 we could not use Chi-square and therefore Gamma was instead used.

The test result is Gamma= -.316 (*evidence of strong negative association, meaning as work lifestyle, value and expectation tends to be good/positive definition of corruption becomes unfavourable, when employees are more satisfied, best use of one abilities, e.t.c. the they are likely to define corruption unfavuorably, as wrong against the law/norms.*), at P= 0.000). Therefore P<0.05, (meaning there is a statistical significance). So relationship between work lifestyle, values, expectations and Individual corruptibility is statistically significant at P<0.05 and is generalizable to the entire population.

Table 36: Work lifestyle, values and expectations and attitude towards corruption

Level of agreement with statements on attitudes towards corruption			work lifestyle, values and expectations					
			strongly agre	agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree	strongly disagree	Total
Attitude towards corruption	strongly disagree	Count	1	1	6	13	0	21
		% within attitude towards corruption	4.8%	4.8%	28.6%	61.9%	.0%	100.0%
		% within work lifestlyle, values and expectations	100.0%	50.0%	23.1%	100.0%	.0%	34.4%
		% of Total	1.6%	1.6%	9.8%	21.3%	.0%	34.4%
	disagree	Count	0	1	19	0	0	20
		% within attitude towards corruption	.0%	5.0%	95.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
		% within work lifestlyle, values and expectations	.0%	50.0%	73.1%	.0%	.0%	32.8%
		% of Total	.0%	1.6%	31.1%	.0%	.0%	32.8%
	neither disagree nor agree	Count	0	0	1	0	19	20
		% within attitude towards corruption	.0%	.0%	5.0%	.0%	95.0%	100.0%
		% within work lifestlyle, values and expectations	.0%	.0%	3.8%	.0%	100.0%	32.8%
		% of Total	.0%	.0%	1.6%	.0%	31.1%	32.8%
Total		Count	1	2	26	13	19	61
		% within attitude towards corruption	1.6%	3.3%	42.6%	21.3%	31.1%	100.0%
		% within work lifestlyle, values and expectations	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	1.6%	3.3%	42.6%	21.3%	31.1%	100.0%

Since there were some cells with valid counts less than 5 we could not use Chi-square and therefore Gamma was instead used.

The test result is Gamma= .493 (evidence of strong positive association, meaning as work lifestyle, value and expectation tends to be good/positive attitude towards corruption becomes positive, when employees are more satisfied, best use of one abilities, e.t.c. they perceive corruption positively, see corruption as good and not bad or justified cant assist for free.), at P= 0.000). Therefore P<0.05, (meaning there is a statistical significance). So relationship

between work lifestyle, values, expectations and attitude towards corruption is statistically significant at P<0.05 and is generalizable to the entire population.

The statistical tests of the other variables were not significant at P<0.05, the significance of all were more than 0.05 and therefore the association could into be generalized into the entire population. The results were as follows; perceived level of corruption and work lifestyle, values, expectations (Gamma= -.028, at P= .871); tolerance to corruption and work lifestyle, values, expectations (Gamma= .224at P= .182.

4.3.5.3.2 Conclusion

Therefore from the analysis above, we cannot accept the research hypothesis five **(H5)** that **"The more negative the work lifestyle the higher the chances of a public official engaging in corrupt behaviour."** the way it is but it can be "**The more positive the work lifestyle the higher the chances of a public official engaging in corrupt behaviour**". **1.** As work lifestyle, value and expectation tends to be good/positive pressure to engage in corruption increases, when employees are more satisfied, best use of one ability, e.t.c. they are less likely to agree to be corrupted and therefore experience a lot of force to act corruptly hence actually having higher chances of engaging in corrupt behaviour. **2.** As work lifestyle, value and expectation tends to be good/positive individual corruptibility increases, when employees are more satisfied, best use of one abilities, e.t.c. the ability to make corrupt favourable decisions is high/cannot assist for free or little favour. 3. As work lifestyle, value and expectation tends to be good/positive, attitude towards corruption becomes positive, when employees are more satisfied, best use of one abilities, e.t.c. they perceive corruption positively, see corruption as good and not bad or justified they can't assist for free.

4.3.5.4 Extraordinary work disposition or personality and engagement in corrupt behaviour.

4.3.5.4.1 Relationship between Dispositions and corruption

Questionnaire respondents were asked to rate level of agreement with statements based on extra-ordinary dispositions of a hypothesized "corrupt officer" in a five scale (question 23(a)) from strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), Neither disagree nor agree (3), agree (4) and strongly agree (5). Response of Strongly disagree means less extraordinary dispositions while strongly agree means more extraordinary disposition. The extra-ordinary dispositions rated include

dominant and strong personalities, "get things done", freedom to do things independently, overstepping formal boundaries of authority, "business type" people/worker, showing a lot of friendship or love, and showing off to colleagues and friends. Average was used to determine individual score of the respondents.

When statistical tests were conducted to test association between dispositions and the research variables in corruption statistical significant association is confirmed in tolerance to corruption, individual corruptibility, and attitude towards corruption. The result of the test is as follows;

Table 37: Dispositions and tolerance to corruption

Level of tolerance to corruption		Dispositions				Total
		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither disagree nor agree	Agree	
I don't tolerate	Count	2	6	0	13	21
	% within tolerance to corruption	9.5%	28.6%	.0%	61.9%	100.0%
	% within dispositions	66.7%	23.1%	.0%	100.0%	34.4%
	% of Total	3.3%	9.8%	.0%	21.3%	34.4%
I am tolerant to some extent	Count	1	20	19	0	40
	% within tolerance to corruption	2.5%	50.0%	47.5%	.0%	100.0%
	% within dispositions	33.3%	76.9%	100.0%	.0%	65.6%
	% of Total	1.6%	32.8%	31.1%	.0%	65.6%
Total	Count	3	26	19	13	61
	% within tolerance to corruption	4.9%	42.6%	31.1%	21.3%	100.0%
	% within dispositions	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	4.9%	42.6%	31.1%	21.3%	100.0%

Since there were some cells with valid counts less than 5 we could not use Chi-square and therefore Gamma was instead used.

The test result is Gamma= -.465 (evidence of strong negative association, meaning as dispositions becomes more extraordinary, tolerance to corruption decreases, one is not likely to give in or easily engage in or allow corruption, hence less likely to engage on corruption), at P= .023). Therefore $P<0.05$, (meaning there is a statistical significance). So relationship between dispositions and tolerance to corruption is statistically significant at $P<0.05$ and is generalizable to the entire population.

Table 38: Dispositions and Individual corruptibility

Level of agreement with Individual corrupt related statements		Level of agreement to statements on dispositions				Total
		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither disagree nor agree	Agree	
strongly disagree	Count	1	7	0	13	21
	% within individual corruptibility (a)	4.8%	33.3%	.0%	61.9%	100.0%
	% within dispositions	33.3%	26.9%	.0%	100.0%	34.4%
	% of Total	1.6%	11.5%	.0%	21.3%	34.4%
disagree	Count	1	0	19	0	20
	% within individual corruptibility (a)	5.0%	.0%	95.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% within dispositions	33.3%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	32.8%
	% of Total	1.6%	.0%	31.1%	.0%	32.8%
neither disagree nor agree	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within individual corruptibility (a)	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% within dispositions	33.3%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.6%
	% of Total	1.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.6%
agree	Count	0	19	0	0	19
	% within individual corruptibility (a)	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% within dispositions	.0%	73.1%	.0%	.0%	31.1%
	% of Total	.0%	31.1%	.0%	.0%	31.1%
Total	Count	3	26	19	13	61
	% within individual corruptibility (a)	4.9%	42.6%	31.1%	21.3%	100.0%
	% within dispositions	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	4.9%	42.6%	31.1%	21.3%	100.0%

Since there were some cells with valid counts less than 5 we could not use Chi-square and therefore Gamma was instead used.

The test result is Gamma= -.623 *(evidence of strong negative association, meaning as dispositions becomes more extraordinary, individual corruptibility decreases, one is not likely to make corruption prone decisions, but assist through acquaintances, care for friends and colleagues)* at P= .000). Therefore P<0.05, (meaning there is a statistical significance). So relationship between dispositions and individual corruptibility is statistically significant at P<0.05 and is generalizable to the entire population.

Table 39: Disposition and attitude towards corruption

Level of agreement with statements on attitude towards corruption		Dispositions				Total
		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither disagree nor agree	Agree	
Strongly disagree	Count	1	7	0	13	21
	% within attitude towards corruption	4.8%	33.3%	.0%	61.9%	100.0%
	% within dispositions	33.3%	26.9%	.0%	100.0%	34.4%
	% of Total	1.6%	11.5%	.0%	21.3%	34.4%
Disagree	Count	1	0	19	0	20
	% within attitude towards corruption	5.0%	.0%	95.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% within dispositions	33.3%	.0%	100.0%	.0%	32.8%
	% of Total	1.6%	.0%	31.1%	.0%	32.8%
Neither disagree nor agree	Count	1	19	0	0	20
	% within attitude towards corruption	5.0%	95.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% within dispositions	33.3%	73.1%	.0%	.0%	32.8%
	% of Total	1.6%	31.1%	.0%	.0%	32.8%
Total	Count	3	26	19	13	61
	% within attitude towards corruption	4.9%	42.6%	31.1%	21.3%	100.0%
	% within dispositions	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	4.9%	42.6%	31.1%	21.3%	100.0%

Since there were some cells with valid counts less than 5 we could not use Chi-square and therefore Gamma was instead used.

The test result is Gamma= -.656 *(evidence of strong negative association, meaning as dispositions becomes more extraordinary, attitude towards corruption becomes more negative or unfavourable, see corruption as bad*), at P= .000). Therefore P<0.05, (meaning there is a statistical significance). So relationship between dispositions and attitude towards corruption is statistically significant at P<0.05 and is generalizable to the entire population.

The statistical tests of the other variables were not significant at P<0.05, the significance of all were more than 0.05 (P> 0.05) and therefore the association could into be generalized into the entire population. The results were as follows; perceived level of corruption and dispositions (Gamma= .155 (moderate association), at P= .246); pressure to engage in corruption and dispositions (Gamma= .090 (weak association), at P= .585.

4.3.5.4.2 Conclusion

Therefore from the analysis above, we cannot accept the research hypothesis six **(H6)** that **"The more extraordinary a work disposition or personality the higher the chances of an individual public official engaging in corrupt behaviour."** This could be explained by the fact that the individuals with extraordinary dispositions like dominant and strong

personalities, “get things done”, freedom to do things independently, overstepping formal boundaries of authority, “business type” people/worker, showing a lot of friendship or love, and showing off to colleagues and friends are very hard to elicit vices through questions or through observation. This aspect could actually conceal what they do in terms of deviance.

4.3.6 Adequacy of anti-corruption mechanisms and measures.

4.3.6.1 Corruption control in passport section

4.3.6.1.1 Awareness and knowledge

To establish the extend of awareness and knowledge on corruption control mechanisms and measures in Passport Section in Nairobi, the questionnaire respondents were asked to tick either Yes or No (question 24 (a)) whether they are aware where they can report corruption cases in the section. In addition open ended question (question 24 (b)) asked them to mention few agencies or institutions where they can report such cases in the section. The responses were as follows for yes and no questions.

Table 40: Corruption control awareness

Being aware of corruption control measures	Frequency	Percent
No	20	32.8
Yes	41	67.2
Total	61	100.0

From Table 40s, we can see that the awareness of corruption control mechanisms and measures is high with 67% of the respondents being aware.

On the open-ended question to test knowledge, some agencies or offices named by the respondents are EACC, Investigation and prosecution section in immigration department, administration in immigration department and senior officers in the department. On knowledge just few agencies were reported and some officers even mentioned some defunct agencies like KACC. Surprisingly no one mentioned Ombudsman and police.

4.3.6.1.2 Effectiveness of the reporting process

To measure effectiveness of the corruption control mechanism or measures in Passport Section in Nairobi, respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of the anti-corruption reporting process in Passport Section (question 25(a), in a five scale level of agreement based

on statements depicting the process as very effective, very simple, reporter protected from potential harassment, process being long, no action is taken on reported cases, and can't afford the expenses in the process of reporting. The rating was that Strongly disagree (1), Disagree (2), Neither disagree nor agree (3), Agree (4) and Strongly agree (5). Strongly agree means the process is effective and strongly disagree means is not effective. For statements 4-6 the scoring was reversed (strongly agree meaning not effective and strongly disagree meaning is effective) to be in line with the scoring of effectiveness or not effective.

The results of the responses were as follows;

Table 41: Adequacy of anti-corruption reporting process

Adequacy of the corruption reporting process	Level of Agreement										Total	
	Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Neither Disagree nor Agree		Agree		Strongly Agree			
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	N	%
Very Effective	11	**18.6**	28	**47.5**	18	**30.5**	2	**3.4**	0	**0**	59	100
Very Simple	25	**42.4**	30	**50.8**	4	**6.8**	0	**0**	0	**0**	59	100
Reporter Well Protected	33	**56.9**	17	**29.3**	8	**13.8**	0	**0**	0	**0**	58	100
Very long	0	**0**	0	**0**	9	**16.4**	32	**58.2**	14	**25**	55	100
No action taken on reported cases	0	**0**	4	**7.1**	46	**82.1**	6	**10.7**	0	**0**	56	100
Reporting process is expensive	15	**26.8**	36	**64.3**	4	**7.1**	1	**1.8**	0	**0**	56	100

(Freq =Frequency)

In summary and by combining Strongly Disagree and Disagree to get the level of effectiveness, 66% of the respondents Disagreed the process is effective, 93% Disagreed that the process is simple, 86% Disagreed the reporter is well protected, 83% Agreed that the process is long, 11% Agreed no action is taken on reported cases, 91% Disagreed that there are a lot of expenses in the process of reporting.

Therefore, we can report that respondents rated highly contribution of less effectiveness of the reporting process is due to not being simple (93%), reporter not well protected (86%), and the process being long (83%). From discussions with key informants the reason behind this was reported as shown in following dialogue box.

One of the key informants highlighted that in terms of reporting corruption cases there are no clearly laid down procedures for both public and officials. Therefore, most of the people fail to report because they don't know the reporting process. In addition, it was highlighted there is fear of victimization of the reporters.

4.3.6.1.3 Effectiveness of handling of reported cases by specific institutions

Respondents were asked to rate effectiveness of handling of reported cases of corruption by specific institution in a four scale (question 26 (a) - very poor (1), poor (2), well (3) and very well (4). The analysis here was at the level of item or per institution. The responses were as follows;

Table 42: Effectiveness of handling of reported cases by specific institutions

Institution Handling reported cases of corruption	Response rating on effectiveness								Total	
	Very poor		Poor		Well		Very well			
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	N	%
Immigration Department	4	**6.7**	34	**56.7**	17	**28.3**	5	**8.3**	60	100
EACC	4	**6.9**	38	**65.5**	15	**25.9**	1	**1.7**	58	100
Police	30	**51.7**	27	**46.6**	1	**1.7**	0	**0**	58	100
Media	0	**0**	22	**36.7**	35	**58.3**	3	**5**	60	100
Civil society	1	**1.7**	3	**5.2**	45	**77.6**	9	**16**	58	100

Among institution rated "very poor" by majority of the respondents in effectiveness of handling of reported cases of corruption is police, 52% of the respondents rating its handling of reported cases as "Very Poor". Rated as Poor in handling of reported cases are Immigration Department (57%), EACC (66%), Police (47%), and Media (37%).

Among institution rated "well" by majority of the respondents in effectiveness of handling of reported cases of corruption are Immigration Department (28%), EACC (26%), Media (58%) and Civil society with 78% of respondents rating it as doing well.

Therefore the institution rated the most effective in handling of reported cases of corruption is Civil society by 16% and immigration department by 8% of the respondents rating it as 'Very Well' effective.

4.3.6.1.4 Suggestions on how to improve corruption reporting in the passport section in Nairobi.

Almost all respondents ticked all multiple responses (question 28(a) and therefore agreed that there is need to sensitize members of the public where to report such cases, have an EACC desk in the Department of Immigration Services, introduce hotlines, introduce functional suggestions boxes and maintain confidentiality.

4.3.6.2 Corruption prevention in Passport Section

4.3.6.2.1 Awareness and knowledge

To establish the extent of awareness and knowledge on corruption prevention mechanisms and measures in Passport Section in Nairobi, the questionnaire respondents were asked to tick either yes or no, question 29(a), whether they are aware of any corruption prevention mechanism and measures in the section. In addition open ended question asked for them to mention such measures and mechanisms in the section. The responses were as follows for Yes and No questions.

Table 43: Awareness/knowledge of corruption prevention

Whether Aware of Prevention mechanisms in Passport Section in Nairobi	Frequency	Percent
No	21	34.4
Yes	40	65.6
Total	61	100.0

From table 43 above, we can see that the awareness is high with 66% of the respondents being aware.

On the open-ended question to test knowledge, question 29(b), some corruption prevention mechanisms and measures named by the respondents are immigration officers to be in full uniforms when they are in duty, CCTVS, suggestion boxes. Only few respondents know the mechanisms by the name and therefore majority left the question blank. Surprisingly no one mentioned service charter, digitization of the passport management and issuing system which all of them have drastically prevented corruption in the section.

4.3.6.2.2 Effectiveness of specific prevention mechanisms

Questionnaire respondents were asked to rate effectiveness specific corruption prevention mechanisms and measures (question 30(a)), in a five scale- not effective at all (0), least effective (1), moderate effective (2), effective (3) and very effective (4). The analysis here was at item level or per measure/mechanism. The responses were as follows;

Table 44: Effectiveness of specific prevention mechanisms

Effectiveness of specific prevention mechanisms	Response rating on effectiveness										Total	
	Not Effective at all		Least Effective		Moderate effective		Effective		Very effective			
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	N	%
Investigations	3	**5**	1	**1.7**	2	**3.3**	22	36.7	32	**53**	60	100
Prosecutions	1	**1.7**	1	**1.7**	6	**10.2**	31	52.5	20	**34**	59	100
Disciplinary actions	3	**5.3**	1	**1.8**	11	**19.3**	24	42.1	18	**32**	57	100
CCTVS	2	**3.4**	3	**5.1**	24	**40.7**	27	45.8	3	**5.1**	59	100
Public Sensitization and education	1	**1.8**	7	**12.3**	38	**66.7**	10	17.5	1	**1.8**	57	100
Compliance to service charter	3	**5.1**	1	**1.7**	1	**1.7**	21	35.6	33	**56**	59	100
Visible Offices/working desk	10	**17.2**	0	**0**	28	**48.3**	17	29.3	3	**5.2**	58	100

Through item analysis we can see that 53% and 56% of the respondents reported that investigations and compliance to service charter respectively are Very Effective. The reason why the investigations are effective in preventing corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi were identified through key informant interview on the question "How effective and or adequate are the corruption control mechanisms and prevention measures in Passport Section in the Department of Immigration Services?" this is summarised in the following dialogue box;

One of the key informants explaining how effective are corruption prevention mechanisms in Passport Section and referring to the role of Investigation and prosecution section in immigration department reported that the investigations have established the cartels even involving officers in the section. Dismantling of these cartels has done a great deal in preventing occurrence of corruption and fraud in the section. He gave example of cartels where officers colluded with foreign nationals to acquire Kenyan passport.

On the disciplinary and civil society valid answers in relation to their effective were not identified. The effectiveness of CCTVS was discussed also in the key informant interviews. One of the key informants reported as follows.

CCTVS has played great role in management other than prevention of corruption in the passport section. The informant gave the reason that corruption transaction does not necessarily take place within the passport section. The accomplices meet in hotels, bars and finish transaction there.

Generally when Key informants were asked "How effective and or adequate are the corruption control mechanisms and prevention measures in Passport Section in the Department of Immigration Services?" The picture created is that there has been tremendous improvement in the Passport Section and today the corruption prevention mechanism are in place and effective. One of the experienced key informant in the section reiterated that you cannot compare the "old" immigration Department and today's. The reasons behind such improvements were summarised in the following dialogue box from the response of one Key informant.

One of the senior officers through key informant interview reported that the services in the Passport Section has improved greatly with the current service charter making timeline for processing of passport application to be five days. In addition, service delivery has improved because of the digitization of the passport issuance process and therefore accountability and transparency is enhanced in the process the key informant reported.

4.3.6.2.3 Suggestions

Questionnaire respondents were asked in an open-ended question in their own opinion to suggest how effectively corruption can be prevented in Passport Section in Nairobi (question 30(b)). They suggested that big, visible and strategically positioned posters of "corruption free zone" in Nyayo House, better salary, synergistic relationship among the staff, immigration officers in full uniform all time and clerical and other officers who are not uniformed, the department find uniform for them or quit to leave immigration officers work alone (all officer in passport section to be in full uniform all time while in duty).

4.3.6.3 Government fight on corruption in Passport Section

4.3.6.3.1 Extent and levels of success by government.

To determine the extent and levels of success by the government on fighting corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi, questionnaire respondents were asked to rate the government effort in a four scale- not successful at all (0), Least successful (1), moderate successful (2) and very successful (3) (question 31(a)). The responses were as follows;

Table 45: Government success in fighting corruption

Level of success by Government in fighting corruption in Passport section in Nairobi	Frequency	Percent
Not successful at all	1	1.6
Least successful	22	36.1
Moderate successful	32	52.5
Very successful	6	9.8
Total	61	100.0

Generally rate of success by government in fighting corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi was rated moderate successful by 53 % of the respondents.

4.3.6.3.2 Effectiveness of Key institutions in fighting corruption

Questionnaire respondents were asked to rate specific institutions- media, immigration department administration, EACC, police, and civil society- in their effort of fighting corruption in the process of accessing government services in Passport Section in Nairobi (question 27 (a)). The rate was in a scale of five- Not effective at all (0), least effective (1), moderate effective (2), effective (3), very effective(4). The level of analysis was at item scale. The responses were as follows;

Table 46: Effectiveness of Key institutions in fighting corruption.

Effectiveness of Key institutions in fighting corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi	Response rating on effectiveness										Total	
	Not effective at all		Least effective		Moderate effective		Effective		Very effective			
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	N	%
Media	0	**0**	0	**0**	4	**6.7**	32	**53.3**	24	**40**	60	100
Immigration Department	0	**0**	4	**7.0**	28	**49.1**	23	**40.4**	2	**3.5**	57	100
EACC	0	**0**	0	**0**	10	**16.9**	46	**78.0**	3	**5.1**	59	100
Police	0	**0**	13	**22.0**	45	**76.3**	1	**1.7**	0	**0**	59	100
Civil Society	1	**1.7**	0	**0**	3	**5.1**	28	**47.5**	27	**46**	59	100

(Freq= Frequency)

In summary media is rated effective by (53%), Immigration department Administration by (38%), EACC (75%), Police (2%), and Civil society (50%) of the respondents.

Therefore majority of the respondents rated EACC (75%), media (53%) and civil society (50%) as the very effective fighting corruption in passport section in Nairobi.

The reason behind this was to be captured on the open-ended question where respondents were to comment on the effectiveness of the institutions (question 27(b)). All questionnaire respondents did not respondent or comment. But in the key informants discussions it was highlighted that all corruption cases purseud by EACC in the Passport Section in Nairobi, has been dealt with conclusively and accomplices reprimanded. Some of the members of the staff have been dismissed from the department through cases pursed by EACC.

4.3.6.3.3 Why government has succeeded in fighting.

To determine why government has succeeded in fighting corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi, there was a question (question 32(a)) on specific reasons put in statements why government could have succeeded rated in a scale of five- strongly disagree(1), disagree (2), neither disagree nor agree (3), agree (4) and strongly agree (5). Strongly disagreeing (1) with a statement means that aspect has contributed minimally to the success, and strongly agreeing (5) with a statement means that the aspect has contributed greatly to the success. The aspects

which their contribution to success was tested are punishing of the corrupt officials, increased awareness on corruption, accountability and transparency, improved government services, effective corruption reporting, decentralization of EACC to ministries and departments, implementation of new Kenyan constitution and good political leadership. The responses were as follows;

Table 47: Reasons why Government has succeeded in fighting corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi.

Reasons why government has succeeded in fighting corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi.	Response rating on level of agreement										Total	
	Strongly disagree		Disagree		Neither Disagree nor agree		Agree		Strongly Agree			
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	N	%
Punishing the corrupt	6	**9.8**	22	**36.1**	31	**50.8**	2	**3.3**	0	**0**	61	100
Increased Awareness on corruption	0	**0**	0	**0**	7	**11.7**	45	**75.0**	8	**13.0**	60	100
Accountability and transparency	0	**0**	25	**43.1**	23	**39.7**	*10*	**17.2**	0	**0**	58	100
Improved Government services	0	**0**	0	**0**	4	**6.7**	45	**75.0**	11	**18.3**	60	100
Effective reporting of corruption	33	**56.9**	17	**29.3**	7	**12.1**	1	**1.7**	0	**0**	58	100
Decentralization of EACC to Ministries	19	**31.1**	41	**67.2**	0	**0**	1	**1.6**	0	**0**	61	100
Implementation of new constitution	6	**10.7**	9	**16.1**	32	**57.1**	9	**16.1**	0	**0**	56	100
Good political leadership	3	**5.4**	22	**39.3**	23	**41.1**	7	**12.5**	1	**1.8**	56	100

(Fre = Frequency)

In summary the specific aspects that respondents pointed to have contributed greatly to the government success are increased awareness on corruption by (13%), improved government services by (18%), and good political leadership by (2%) of the respondents.

Combining strongly agree and agree, we can report that increased awareness on corruption (88%) and improved government services (93%), was rated to have contributed greatly to the success of government in fighting corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi. As discussed earlier this is due to the services in the Passport Section improving greatly with the current service charter making timeline for processing of passport application to be five days. In

addition, the key informant reported service delivery has improved because of the digitization of the passport issuance process and therefore accountability and transparency is enhanced in the process.

Respondents were asked in an open-ended question in their own opinion to suggest why government is successful in fighting corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi (question 32(b)). They suggested that this is due to the implementation of new constitutions (bill of rights and integrity), reduction of bureaucracy, decentralized services for passports in region/counties currently we have in Embu Office, Nakuru Office, Eldoret Office and plans are under way to establish in Kisii, Mackakos, and Bungoma. Remuneration for officers is currently better than years ago, appointment and transfers based on merit and not political good will, passport application has been made easier, computerization of passport processing system/procedures, recruitment of more qualified officers.

4.3.6.3.4 Why government has failed in fighting corruption in passport section in Nairobi.

To determine why government has failed in fighting corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi, there was a question (question 33(a)) on specific reasons why government could have failed rated in a scale of five- strongly disagree(1), disagree (2), neither disagree nor agree (3), agree (4) and strongly agree (5). Strongly disagreeing (1) with a statement means that the aspect has contributed minimally to the failure, and strongly agreeing (5) with a statement means that the aspect has contributed greatly to the failure. The aspects which their contribution to failure was tested are lack of responsibility by public officials, poor service delivery, selective justice, corruption within the judicial system, rising poverty levels, government interference with the policies. The responses were as follows;

Table 48: Reasons why government has failed in fighting corruption in Passport section in Nairobi.

Reasons why government has failed in fighting corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi.	Response rating on level of agreement										Total	
	Strongly disagree		Disagree		Neither Disagree nor agree		Agree		Strongly Agree			
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	N	%
Lack of responsibility by public officials	0	**0**	6	**10.7**	27	**48.2**	22	**39.3**	1	**1.8**	56	100
Poor service delivery	2	**3.5**	34	**59.6**	21	**36.8**	0	**0**	0	**0**	57	100
Selective Justice	13	**22.0**	39	**66.1**	2	**3.4**	3	**5.1**	2	**3.4**	59	100
Corruption in judicial system	32	**58.2**	19	**34.5**	0	**0**	1	**1.8**	3	**5.5**	55	100
Rising poverty levels	0	**0**	6	**11.5**	42	**80.8**	4	**7.7**	0	**0**	52	100
Government interference with policies	17	**28.8**	41	**69.5**	1	**1.7**	0	**0**	0	**0**	59	100

Therefore (combining Strongly agree and Agree) increased lack of responsibility by public officials (41%), selective justice (9%), corruption within the judicial system (7%) and rising poverty levels (7%) was rated to have greatly contributed to the failure of government in fighting corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi. The answer to this as to why was not captured in both questionnaires and key informants. Only a few questionnaire respondents highlighted that there is selective justice with dealing with corruption cases where in some cases officers having committed the same offence in corruption, one is dismissed and another is vindicated.

Respondents were asked in an open-ended question (question 33(b)) in their own opinion to suggest why government has failed in fighting corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi. They suggested that the reason is that government addresses cosmetic issues other than root cause, e.g. unmet expectations and weak corporate leadership.

4.3.6.4 Suggestions on how to best fight corruption in passport section

Respondents were asked in an open-ended question (question 34) in their own opinion to suggest how to best fight corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi. They suggested transformational leadership, discouraging double standards in dealing with corruption, nurture trust in government processes through citizenship participation in policy formulation, harmonize working hours with ILO standards, reduction of work load, reduce favouritism among officers- statement by one respondent—"some officers feel as if they own Passport Section", open/transparent offices for officers, sensitisation of the public on corruption, better remuneration, provision of lunch, tea and welfare, payment of government revenues through banks or electronic payments, promotion reduced to 2 years instead of three years and make the immigration department semi-autonomus.ie service (minimize political influence).

4.3.6.5 Conclusion

In summary to answer research question three "How effective or adequate are the corruption control and prevention mechanisms and measures in the process of accessing government services in Kenya?" we can report that corruption control mechanisms and measures awareness by the employees in the Passport Section in Nairobi is high with 67% of the respondents being aware. But on knowledge on the same is low for example only few agencies were reported by respondents and some officers even mentioned some defunct agencies like KACC. Surprisingly no one mentioned Ombudsman and police.

The corruption reporting process in the section was reported to be is less effective, 34% of the respondents reported this. The respondents reported the reason behind this is that the reporting process is simple (90%), reporter not well protected (82%), and the process being long (76%).

The institution rated the most effective in handling of reported cases of corruption is immigration department with 10% responses rating it as 'very well' effective. The most ineffective institution is police with 49% responses rating it as "very poor".

As best corruption control mechanisms respondents suggested that there is need to sensitize members of the public where to report such cases, have an EACC desk in the department of immigration services, introduce hotlines, introduce functional suggestions boxes and maintain confidentiality.

On the corruption prevention mechanisms and measures in Passport Section in Nairobi, we can report that the awareness is high with 66% of the respondents being aware. But on knowledge on the same just few measures and mechanisms are mentioned. Surprisingly no one mentioned service charter that has drastically prevented corruption in the section.

The most effective mechanisms in corruption prevention in the section are investigations and service charter. The least effective being public sensitization. The reason for respondents rating investigations and service charter was identified through key informant interviews that the services in the Passport Section has improved greatly with the current service charter making timeline for processing of passport application to be five days. In addition, service delivery has improved because of the digitization of the passport issuance process and therefore accountability and transparency is enhanced in the process as reported by key informants.

The respondents suggested that to effectively prevention corruption in the section there is need such mechanisms as big, visible and strategically positioned posters of "corruption free zone" in Nyayo house, better salary, synergistic relationship, immigration officers in full uniform all time and clerical officers having their uniforms can have great impact.

Generally rate of success by government in fighting corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi was rated moderate successful by 32% of the respondents. The specific institutions rated as high effective in fighting corruption in passport section in Nairobi by respondents are media (53%), EACC (75%), and civil society (50%). On why government has succeeded in fighting corruption in the section, increased awareness on corruption (87%) and improved government services (92%), was rated to have contributed greatly to the success of government in fighting corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi. As discussed earlier this is due to the services in the Passport Section improving greatly with the current service charter making timeline for processing of passport application to be five days. In addition, service delivery has improved because of the digitization of the passport issuance process and therefore accountability and transparency is enhanced as reported by the key informants.

On the other hand the respondents reported why government has failed in fighting corruption in Passport Section in Nairobi. They cited increased lack of responsibility by public officials (38%), selective justice (8%), and corruption within the judicial system (7%) as main contributors to the failure.

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is divided into three sections: The first section summarises the outstanding issues discussed in this research. The second section points major conclusion based on the research finding. The third section outlines out contributions of the research project to corruption and criminological research and recommendations for further research.

5.2 SUMMARY

The general purpose of this research project was to understand and analyze the individual-level motivation for corruption in the process of accessing government services with specific focus on Passport Section in Nairobi. To achieve this it was through establishing the patterns/forms and types of corruption in Passport Section Headquarters in Nairobi, determine whether the decision to engage in corrupt behaviour is primarily influenced by a personal interpretation of corruption, determine whether individual perceptions and dispositions lead to corrupt practices and assess the adequacy of anti-corruption measures and mechanisms in Passport Section Headquarters in Nairobi, in the Department of Immigration Services. To fulfill these purposes, Nye (1967)'s definition of corruption was used together with public opinion definitions (perceptions, tolerance, individual corruptibility, attitudes, opinions and stories from key informants) to generate data on corruption. Therefore, this research project addressed major issues in a perspective of three broad study questions. These are; what are the major patterns/forms and types of corruption in the process of accessing government services specifically in acquiring travel documents in Kenya? What are specific individual-level motivations for corruption that makes public officials more prone to corrupt behaviour than other officials? and How effective or adequate are the corruption control and prevention mechanisms and measures in the process of accessing government services in Kenya?

The first description focused on the of analysis of demographic variables of the respondents and how they are related to corruption in the process of accessing government services. This was to specifically give an inside practice of corruption in a public sector from the perspective of public officials. Gender or sex is confirmed to have significant association with corruption

incentive. That men have more favourable definition of corruption compared to women and therefore high likelihood of being corrupt.

The second description and analysis focused on major patterns/forms and types of corruption in the process of accessing government services specifically in Passport Section in Nairobi. This was specifically to give picture of the practice of corruption from the perspective of the people who practice or experience corruption (public officials).). In the same chapter, some possibilities for acts of forms and types of corruption to occur in Passport Section are pointed out. These mainly revolved around the officials experiencing petty corruption. The key patterns being experience of a lot of pressure to engage in corruption while working in the Passport Section, tolerance to engage in corruption and individual corruptibly stimulating practices such as extortion, influence peddling, nepotism/kinship, and favoritism.

The other two section of the research project were interpretive and analytical to great extent. The first interpretive section focused on what are specific individual-level motivations that make public officials more prone to corrupt behaviour than other officials. Here individual interpretations, perceptions and dispositions including definition of corruption, imitation, engagement, approval, attitude towards corruption, work satisfaction, work lifestyle, values, expectations and dispositions were tested whether they lead to corrupt practices. In this section some possibilities of the individual-level motivations for corruption are pointed out. These mainly revolved around positive or favourable definition of corruption, widespread of corruption, approvals (informally) of corruption, positive work lifestyle and extraordinary work dispositions be major or key motivations for public officials to be corrupt.

The last section is an evaluative one, which focused on assessing the adequacy of anti-corruption measures and mechanisms in Passport Section Headquarters, Nairobi, in the Department of Immigration Services. Here effectiveness of corruption control measures and mechanism was assessed. Also effectiveness of major institutions tasked with fighting corruption in the section was assessed. The effectiveness of anti-corruption measures revolved around services in the Passport Section having improved greatly with the current service charter making timeline for processing of passport application to be five days. In addition, service delivery has improved because of the digitization of the passport issuance process and therefore accountability and transparency is enhanced in the process.

Finally government success and failure to fight corruption in the section was assessed. The success by government revolved around services in the Passport Section improving greatly with the current service charter making timeline for processing of passport application to be five days. In addition, service delivery has improved because of the digitization of the passport issuance process and therefore accountability and transparency is enhanced in the process. The failure of the government revolved around increased lack of responsibility by public officials, selective justice and corruption within the judicial system.

5.3 CONCLUSION

Data presented shows how social structural (interpretations) and agency/individual elements (habitus-individual perceptions and dispositions) exist among employees in the process of accessing government services in Passport Section in Nairobi. However, despite the fact that the personal interpretations and individual perceptions and dispositions can be effective in its own way – in terms of motivation for corruption – it denies the public sector access to quality and efficient services. This instead exacerbates or sustains the practice corruption in the process of accessing government services. Because, the more positively people define corruption (define corruption as good or justified), the more they perceive corruption as wide spread, the more the group informally approves corrupt behavior, the more positive work lifestyle and the more extra-ordinary the dispositions of the officials are, the more individual incentive to be corrupt.

Weak or poor personal interpretations, perceptions and dispositions capacity or individual level motivations create the individual level motivations for corruption in the public sector.

The research findings show that through personal interpretations, perceptions and dispositions, any phenomenon of interest is best understood from the perspective of actors within a specific context (Oliver de Sardan, 1999; Lancaster and Montinola, 2001). This research project recognizes that some acts of corruption emerge from contextually instigated practices like acquaintances, friendship, reciprocity, nepotism and favoritism that tend to legitimize the system of patronage, friendship, kinship, tribalism and sectarianism in the society. Such system determines who gets what and how confirms the weak or biased personal interpretations, perceptions and dispositions capacity in the distribution of public resources and opportunities. Therefore, if social structure and agency/actor elements are well organized, the negative implications of socio-economic practices may not infiltrate the public

sector through individuals to determine how public resources are managed, or who accesses public services. In addition, effective social structure and agency/actor capacity may reduce forms of corruption that are likely to arise from weak or biased personal interpretations, perceptions and dispositions in the public sector.

In relation to both policy and theory the findings of this study have important implications. First, the results suggest that there are significant individual level differences in willingness to engage in corrupt exchange. Therefore, the level of corruption is not exclusively a structural phenomenon hence within similar structural circumstances some people are more prone to corruption than others. The results also suggest that intervention strategies designed to reduce the petty or low-level corruption should target the social processes through which public officials learn that corrupt behaviour is acceptable or not condoned. Primary effort should be on raising awareness of acceptable and unacceptable (or illegal) behaviour, because, as the strong influence of definitions indicated, it is not necessarily that people purposely break the law, but they may just not be aware that what they are doing is corrupt. This is especially important in the case of public officials, for example in this case being in the position to either promote or stop a corrupt practice. Furthermore, the analysis uncovered important linkages between the attitudes and behaviours of public officials; these attitudes may translate directly into petty corrupt behaviour or daily transactions. In total, individual level reasons for corruption could more easily be combated by developing a supportive subculture among public officials and by educating them than the much more unproductive process of changing institutional structures, including leadership and the staff dismissal as suggested by previous studies.

Secondly, these individual level differences can't work alone to actualise an individual participating in corrupt behaviour. The context or what is referred in this study as habitus is very important in understanding and curbing corruption. Therefore for corrupt behaviour to be actualised both individual and macro context need to be put in consideration. The results of this study shows how the process of internalization of the regularities of corruption, or how the mental schemata of officials are constituted. The study shows that if other people around you define corruption as favourable, their attitude towards corruption is favourable, if they largely approve corrupt related behaviours and the rules and laws are weak in dealing with corrupt practices there is high inducement to corruption of an individual in that context. This means that what happens around an individual everyday plays a crucial role in shaping his/her

behaviour. Therefore, the policy implication is that there is need for specific studies on several case studies in their contexts. Each directed at a developing specific and contextual course of action. Therefore, corruption in public service should not be tackled as similar in different departments, ministries and corporations but each entity needs a contextualized effort.

5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

5.4.1 Recommendations for practioners.

As noted earlier in the problem statement that corruption is ultimately the direct result of decisions, choices and behaviour at the level of an individual. One can restructure institutions or political systems, but if individual level motivations for corrupt behaviour are not understood, these restructurings may not be effective. The assumption of theoretical base of this study informs us that individual don't just conform to rules of the structure (strong institutions) but they manoeuvre themselves within this structures. It is recommended equal efforts should be both to reform the structures/institutions and individuals. Therefore a pragmatic approach is needed to curb corruption in Kenya.

Based on the findings of this research, a proactive agenda designed to discourage corruption and entrench ethical standards and accountability in public service in Kenya should include the following measures;

Fostering and promoting enabling conditions of service to enhance professional and ethical standards. Education curriculum in Kenya should integrate corruption in all levels. May be having a common course/subject at university level on corruption or ethics and integrity.

Implementing sound policies on recruitment, training and public personnel management especially introduce corruption attitude test together with integrity test periodically.

Institutionalization of professional values in Kenyan public service, promoting a psychology of service in public service life that you work in public service to serve and not to loot.

Upholding the integrity of public institutions of accountability and fostering popular participation of the public and private sector for example best lessons learned in different organisations about integrity to ensure the accountability of governance.

5.4.2 Recommendations for improving this study/ Area of further study.

This study used survey method to gather information on what are individual level motivations for corruption in the process of accessing government services in Kenya. Corruption is secretive and complicated issue to talk about especially if you are involved in it. The greatest challenge for this research was that the questions used "*self-reporting and hypothetical choices"* is limited to produce valid and reliable responses. This is because the possibility is that an individual who has been involved in corruption in the past tend to excuse such behaviour declaring a low likelihood of being corrupt (Torgler and Schneider, 2007).

Therefore a combination of "*self-reporting and hypothetical choices"* for both public official (professionals) and members of the society (victims) who access services from government is believed to provide more informative, valid and reliable findings on what are individual level motivations for corruption in the process of accessing government services in Kenya in future. In addition, more research on different types of services provided by government other than issuance of travel documents and in different contexts like in rural areas other than cities or headquarters is recommended.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Questionnaire for employees in the Passport Section

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to seek knowledge on management of public services and measure the extent to which public accountability and transparency is observed in the process of accessing government services. The questions are purely for research purposes and of which you are not required to state your names or any detail that might unveil your identification. This is so to ensure your anonymity and confidentiality in this study. The information you provide will only and strictly be accessed by the researcher and no one else is allowed to ensure that the principle of confidentiality is followed. You are free to provide information as much as you can in the options or spaces provided as long as you think it is relevant to the question asked. You are also free to terminate the answering the questions anytime as well as chose not to answer any question.

Guideline in answering questions

Tick in the boxes provided for, e.g.

Circle one of the options provided for, e.g. **1** **2** **3** **4** **5**

SECTION ONE: BACKGROUND INFORMATION.

1. Sex Male ☐ Female ☐
2. Age in years **(Tick only one).**

   19 – 25 ☐ 26 – 32 ☐ 33 – 39 ☐ 40 – 45 ☐ 46 – 52 ☐ 53 – 59 ☐

3. Marital status **(Tick only one).**
   Married ☐ Single ☐ Divorced ☐ Separated ☐ Widowed ☐

4. Level of education **(Tick only one).**

   Primary ☐ O – Level/Form four ☐ A level/ Form Six ☐ College ☐ Undergraduate ☐
   Post Graduate ☐

5. What type of duties/work do you perform? **(Tick only one).**
   Support staff/work ☐ Clerical work ☐ Immigration officer Technical/ operation work ☐
   Immigration officer- Supervision ☐ Immigration officer- Management ☐

6. How many years have you worked in public service or government? **(Tick only one).**
   0 – 2 years ☐ 3 – 5 years ☐ 6 – 8 years ☐ More than 9 years ☐

7. How many years have you worked in Passport Section Headquarters in Nairobi? **(Tick only one).**
   0 – 2 years ☐ 3 – 5 years ☐ 6 – 8 years ☐ More than 9 years ☐

SECTION TWO: PATTERNS/FORMS AND TYPES OF CORRUPTION.

8. How can you generally rate levels of behaviour, acts or transactions where officers get paid in money or kind/gift, favour their relatives and tribesmen, experience influence from senior government and political leaders to fast track applications in the process of issuing travel document or passports here in Passport Section in Nairobi? **(Tick only one)**

   High ☐ Moderate ☐ Low ☐

9. How can you rate pressure to engage in such behaviour, acts or transactions? **(Tick only one).**

   No pressure ☐ A little pressure ☐ A fair amount of pressure ☐ A lot of pressure ☐

10. To what extend do you personally tolerate pressure of such behaviour, acts or transactions. **(Tick only one).**

    I don't tolerate ☐ I am tolerant to some extent ☐ I just give in ☐

11. (a) Imagine that you are an official, who decides upon whether or not to give approval for immigration travel documents in Passport Section. One of the applicants for immigration travel documents offers you a trip to a summer resort or any other favour in case you decide in favour of the application through an oversight of the key requirements. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? **(Circle one value for each statement according to your level of agreement).**

(Strongly Disagree = 1, Disagree =2, Neither disagree nor Agree = 3, Agree = 4, Strongly Agree = 5)	
I would decide in favour of the application as it would be impolite to refuse the offer	**1 2 3 4 5**
I would decide in favour of the application as there is little chance of getting caught	**1 2 3 4 5**
I would decide in favour of the application as it would be a good economic gain	**1 2 3 4 5**
I would decide in favour of the application as such a counter-favour would be harmless – nobody would suffer	**1 2 3 4 5**
I would decide in favour of the application as it is a rather widespread practice	**1 2 3 4 5**

(b) Give any other comments on the decision you can make in question 11 (a) above……

……

12. (a) To what extend do you rate levels of existence of the following behaviours in the Passport Section Headquarters in Nairobi? **(Circle one value for each statement)**

Low =1, Moderate =2, High= 3	
The payment (in money or kind/gift) that is given or taken in appreciating officers assistance to acquire travel documents or passport	**1 2 3**
Some officers systematically use their office to enter into, secure and expand their private business interests	**1 2 3**
Manipulation or distortion of information, facts and expertise, by officers providing services, who seeks to draw their personal gain	**1 2 3**
Officers charges extra fee to fast track passport applications	**1 2 3**
Officers favour their relatives and tribesmen in issuance of passports	**1 2 3**
Influence from senior government and political leaders to fast track specific passport applications	**1 2 3**

(b) Give any comments in relation to your answers in question 12 (a) above……

……..

13. (a) How can you rate the following practices in the process of accessing services in the Passport Section Headquarters' Nairobi? **(Circle one value for each statement)**

Low =1, Moderate =2, High= 3)	
Public officials demanding bribes and kickbacks, or awarding favours in return for personal considerations	**1 2 3**
Collusion between private sector and public officials or politicians for their mutual private benefit.	**1 2 3**
Theft or misuse of large amounts of public resources by state officials	**1 2 3**

(b) Give any comments in relation to your answers in question 13 (a) above……...
……
……..

SECTION THREE: PERSONAL INTERPRETATIONS AND CORRUPTION

14. (a) To what extend do you agree with the following statements? **(Circle option for each statement according to your level of agreement).**

(Strongly Disagree = 1, Disagree =2, Neither disagree nor Agree = 3, Agree = 4, Strongly Agree = 5)	
"If a public official accepts a gift for a personal favour then it is misuse of public office"	**1 2 3 4 5**
"If a public official accepts a bribe or a gift in exchange for fast-tracking passport or any other travel document processing then it is misuse of public office"	**1 2 3 4 5**
"If a public official charges a fee on classified information on passport or travel documents processing , then it is misuse of public office"	**1 2 3 4 5**

(b) Give any comments in relation to your answers in question 14(a) above……
……
……

15. (a) I will now describe situations that may sometimes happen. Please, indicate the extent you find the following situations good, justified or bad? **Good**- means there is no problem, **Justified**- means there are reasons behind it although it is illegal, **Bad**- means it is unacceptable at all circumstances **(Circle one option for each statement).**

(Bad = 1, Justified = 2, Good = 3)	
A passport applicant offers an immigration officer a good or a service by his or her firm at a discount price in order for his/her application to be processed faster;	**1 2 3**
A passport applicant offers the immigration officer in the Passport Section Nairobi a trip to a summer resort for assisting to fast track his/her passport application;	**1 2 3**
An immigration officer in Passport Section in Nairobi uses the official work hours for private purposes;	**1 2 3**
An immigration officer in Passport Section offers, for a fee, information/service on the area of his or her work-related expertise;	**1 2 3**
An entrepreneur calls up a immigration official who he or she knows for fast tracking passport application;	**1 2 3**

(b) Give any comments in relation to your answers in question 15(a) above.....

……

……..

16. (a) To what extend do you agree with the following statements in relation to Passport Section in Nairobi? **(Circle one option for each statement according to your level of agreement).**

(Strongly Disagree = 1, Disagree =2, Neither disagree nor Agree = 3, Agree = 4, Strongly Agree = 5)	
There is misuse of public office because others engage in it.	**1 2 3 4 5**
There is misuse of public office because no one sees as a wrong or bad behaviour.	**1 2 3 4 5**
There is misuse of public office because is learnt from the staff who have been in service for long	**1 2 3 4 5**
There is misuse of public office because is learnt from senior officers.	**1 2 3 4 5**
There is misuse of public office because no one has been punished.	**1 2 3 4 5**

(b) Give any comments in relation to your answers in question 16 (a) above……

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……

17. (a) To what extend can you rate the engagement of the following behaviour in Passport Section in Nairobi? **(Circle one option for each statement)**

(Not Engaged at all =1, Few engage = 2, Fairly Engaged = 3, Widely Engaged = 4)	
Acquiring a public service or good through acquaintances or friendship	**1 2 3 4**
Fast-tracking passport application processing through acquaintances with a public official	**1 2 3 4**
Offering a gift to a public official in return of any assistance	**1 2 3 4**
A public official uses official information for his or her own benefit	**1 2 3 4**
A public official does a favour in return for a counter-favour;	**1 2 3 4**
An official makes a business contract on behalf of his or her institution with a company owned by his or her relative;	**1 2 3 4**

(b) Give any comments in relation to your answers in question 17 (a) above……

……

……

18. (a) How can you rate the approval of the following behaviour in Passport Section in Nairobi?

(Circle one option for each statement)

(No one approves =1, Approved by few =2, Approved by many = 3)	
Acquiring a passport through acquaintances	**1 2 3**
Fast-tracking passport processing through acquaintances with a public official	**1 2 3**
Offering a gift to a public official after fastracking passport application	**1 2 3**
A public official uses official information for his or her own benefit	**1 2 3**
A public official does a favour in return for a counter-favour;	**1 2 3**
An official makes a business contract on behalf of his or her institution with a company owned by his or her relative;	**1 2 3**
A political party agrees to pass a decision favourable to a company if the latter agreed to make a sizable donation to the party"	**1 2 3**

(b) Give any comments in relation to your answers in question 18 (a) above……

……

……

19. (a) To what extent do you agree with the following statements as concerns the process of accessing services in the Passport Section Headquarters in Nairobi?**(Circle one option for each statement according to your level of agreement).**

(Strongly Disagree = 1, Disagree =2, Neither disagree nor Agree = 3, Agree = 4, Strongly Agree = 5)	
Most misuse of public office in Passport Section is petty to be worthy reported	**1 2 3 4 5**
Misuse of public office in passport section is beneficial provided you are not caught	**1 2 3 4 5**
There is nothing wrong with an immigration officer acquiring wealth through misuse of public office provided s/he uses it to help or assist the community	**1 2 3 4 5**
Misuse of public office in passport section is a fact of life, it is the normal way of doing things	**1 2 3 4 5**
People who report misuse of public office in passport section are likely to suffer	**1 2 3 4 5**
There is no point in reporting misuse of public office in passport section because no action will be taken	**1 2 3 4 5**
A person who accepts Ksh 10,000 bribe is more corrupt than a person who accepts ksh 2000 bribe	**1 2 3 4 5**

(b) Give any comments in relation to your answers in question 19 (a) above……

……

……

20. (a) To what extend can you rate your trust for the following persons in Passport Section Nairobi? **(Circle only one level of trust per each category of people)**

(No trust = 1, Very Little =2, Little=3, Much =4, Very much = 5)	
Immigration officers	**1 2 3 4 5**
Members of the public accessing services in the passport section	**1 2 3 4 5**
Services in the passport section	**1 2 3 4 5**

(b) Please explain your answer in question 20 (a) above…….....

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SECTION FOUR: INDIVIDUAL PERCEPTION, DISPOSITIONS AND CORRUPTION

21. (a) How can you generally rate your level of Job satisfaction in the following aspects here in Passport Section? **(Circle only one option per category).**

(Very Dissatisfied = 1, Dissatisfied= 2, Satisfied = 3, Very Satisfied = 4)	
Love for my job	**1 2 3 4**
Salary	**1 2 3 4**
Responsibilities	**1 2 3 4**
Work relations with other officers	**1 2 3 4**

(b) Give examples/reasons relating to your answers in question 21 (a)……
……..

22. (a) To what extent do you agree with the following statements? **(Circle one option for each statement according to your level of agreement).**

(Strongly Disagree = 1, Disagree =2, Neither disagree nor Agree = 3, Agree = 4, Strongly Agree = 5)	
Our work here in the Passport Section in Nairobi allows best use of one's abilities.	**1 2 3 4 5**
Our work here in the Passport Section in Nairobi makes one see results of their effort	**1 2 3 4 5**
Our work here in the Passport Section in Nairobi makes one have feeling of accomplishment	**1 2 3 4 5**
Our work here in Passport Section allows one to do things by their owns initiative	**1 2 3 4 5**
Our work here in Passport Section allows one to make decisions on their own.	**1 2 3 4 5**
Working in Passport Section makes one have good possibilities for advancement	**1 2 3 4 5**
Co-workers in Passport Section in Nairobi are friendly	**1 2 3 4 5**
Passport Section in Nairobi is a section which stands behind its workers	**1 2 3 4 5**
Being a worker in the Passport Section in Nairobi has a good pay, good working condition and job security	**1 2 3 4 5**

(b) Give any comments in relation to your answers in question 22 (a) above…….

……

23. (a) To what extend to do agree with the following statements? **(Circle one option for each statement according to your level of agreement).**

(Strongly Disagree = 1, Disagree =2, Neither disagree nor Agree = 3, Agree = 4, Strongly Agree = 5)	
Often corrupt officials have dominant and strong personalities.	**1 2 3 4 5**
Corrupt officers Know how to "get things done",	**1 2 3 4 5**
Corrupt officers take or get the freedom to do thinks independently,	**1 2 3 4 5**
Corrupt officers overstep formal boundaries of authority.	**1 2 3 4 5**
Corrupt officers are more of "business type" people.	**1 2 3 4 5**
Most officers who become corrupt show a lot friendship or love, status and are of making an impression (showing off) on colleagues and friends.	**1 2 3 4 5**

(b) Give any comments in relation to your answers in question 23 (a) above…….
……
……
……...

SECTION FIVE: ADQUACY OF ANTI-CORRUPTION MECHANISMS AND MEASURES

24. (a) Are you aware where you can report corruption cases in the Passport Section in Nairobi? **(Tick only one).**

YES ☐ NO ☐

(b) If **YES** name agencies or institutions you know where you can report corruption cases in the Passport Section Nairobi……
……
……
(If No skip to question 25)

25. (a) Using the following statements how can you rate the anti- corruption reporting process in the Passport Section in Nairobi? **(Circle one option for each statement according to your level of agreement).**

(Strongly Disagree =1, Disagree =2, Neither disagree nor Agree = 3, Agree = 4, Strongly Agree = 5)	
The process is very effective	**1 2 3 4 5**
The process is very simple	**1 2 3 4 5**
The reporter is well protected from potential harassment	**1 2 3 4 5**
The process is long	**1 2 3 4 5**
No action is taken on reported cases	**1 2 3 4 5**
Can't afford the expenses in the process of reporting corruption in Passport Section	**1 2 3 4 5**

(b) Give any comments in relation to your answers in question 25 (a) above…….
……
……
…….

26. (a) How can you rate handling of reported corruption cases in the process of accessing government services in the Passport Section in Nairobi by following institutions/offices? **(Circle one option for each category)**

(Very Poor = 1, Poor = 2, Well =3, Very well = 4)	
Immigration department Reporting office	**1 2 3 4**
Ethics and Anti – Corruption Commission	**1 2 3 4**
POLICE	**1 2 3 4**
Media	**1 2 3 4**
Civil society	**1 2 3 4**

(b) Give any comments in relation to your answers in question 26 (a) above……
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…….....

27. (a) How can you rate the following institutions in their effort in fighting corruption in the process of accessing services in the Passport Section Headquarters in Nairobi? **(Circle one option for each category)**

Not effective at all = 1, Least effective = 2, Moderate effective = 3, Effective=4, Very effective = 5	
Media	**1 2 3 4 5**
Immigration Administration	**1 2 3 4 5**
Ethics and Anti – Corruption Commission	**1 2 3 4 5**
Police	**1 2 3 4 5**
Civil society	**1 2 3 4 5**

(b) Name any other institutions if any effective in fighting corruption in the process of accessing services in the passport section in ……

……..

28. (a) What can you suggest to be done to improve corruption reporting process in the Passport Section in Nairobi**? (Tick all that applies).**

Sensitize the members of the public where to report	
Have EACC desk in the Department of Immigration Services	
Introduce hotlines	
Introduce suggestion boxes	
Maintain confidentiality	

(b) Others (specify)……...

29. (a) Are you aware of any corruption prevention mechanisms and measures in the Passport Section in Nairobi? **(Tick only one).**

YES ☐ NO ☐

(b) If **YES** name some of the corruption prevention mechanisms and measures you know in the Passport Section Nairobi……

…… (If NO Skip to Question 30)

30. (a) How can you rate the following measures and mechanisms toward preventing corruption in Passport Section Headquarters in Nairobi? **(Tick one option for each category).**

(Not effective at all = 1, Least effective = 2, Moderate effective = 3, Effective=4, Very effective = 5)					
Investigations	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Prosecutions of corruption cases	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Disciplinary actions	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Prevention through CCTVS	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Public sensitization and education	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Compliance to the Service charter	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Visible offices/working desks	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**

(b) Name any other corruption prevention measures or mechanisms which you think can be effective towards fighting corruption in the process of accessing services in the Passport Section in Nairobi Headquarters…….

……..

31. (a) How can you generally rate the level of success by the government in fighting corruption in the process of accessing services in Passport Section Headquarters in Nairobi? **(Tick only one).**

Very successful ☐ Moderate successful ☐ Least successful ☐

Not successful at all ☐

(b) Explain your answer in 31 (a) above……

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……

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32. (a) In relation to the process of accessing services in the Passport Section in Nairobi, to what level do you agree with the following statements? **(Circle one option for each statement according to your level of agreement).**

(Strongly Disagree = 1, Disagree =2, Neither disagree nor Agree = 3, Agree = 4, Strongly Agree = 5)					
Government is successful in fighting corruption because of punishing the corrupt officials	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Government is successful in fighting corruption because of its increased awareness on corruption	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Government is successful in fighting corruption because of its accountability and transparency	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Government is successful in fighting corruption because of its improved government services	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Government is successful in fighting corruption because of effective corruption reporting	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Government is successful in fighting corruption because of decentralization of EACC to ministries and departments	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Government is successful in fighting corruption because of implementation of the new constitution	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Government is successful in fighting corruption because of having good political leadership	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**

(b) Give any other reasons why the government is successful in fighting corruption in the process of accessing services in the Passport Section in Nairobi…….....

……
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33. (a) In relation to the process of accessing services in the Passport Section in Nairobi, to what level do you agree with the following statements? **(Circle one option for each statement according to your level of agreement).**

(**Strongly Disagree = 1, Disagree =2, Neither disagree nor Agree = 3, Agree = 4, Strongly Agree = 5**)	
Government has failed in fighting corruption because of lack of responsibility by public officials	**1 2 3 4 5**
Government has failed in fighting corruption because of poor service delivery	**1 2 3 4 5**
Government has failed in fighting corruption because of selective justice	**1 2 3 4 5**
Government has failed in fighting corruption because of corruption within judicial system	**1 2 3 4 5**
Government has failed in fighting corruption because of rising poverty levels	**1 2 3 4 5**
Government has failed in fighting corruption because of lack of responsibility by public officials	**1 2 3 4 5**
Government has failed in fighting corruption because of government interference with the policies	**1 2 3 4 5**

(b) (b) Give any other reasons why the government has failed in fighting corruption in the process of accessing services in the Passport Section in Nairobi……

……
……..

34. What can you suggest as the best way to fight corruption in the Passport Section in Nairobi……
……
……
……
……
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Thank you so much for taking time to answer the questions, God Bless you.

Appendix 2: Interview Schedule/Unstructured Questionnaire for Key Informants

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to seek knowledge on management of public services and measure the extent to which public accountability and transparency is observed in the process of accessing government services. The questions are purely for research purposes and of which you are not required to state your names or any detail that might unveil your identification. This is so to ensure your anonymity and confidentiality in this study. The information you provide will only and strictly be accessed by the researcher and no one else is allowed to ensure that the principle of confidentiality is followed. You are free to provide information as much as you can in the oral questions asked or separate sheets provided as long as you think it is relevant to the question asked. You are also free to terminate answering the questions anytime as well as chose not to answer any question. **(Separate Sheets will be provided for your answers)**

Sex……..Age……
Job Designation (e.g. Immigration officer)……
Education Level ……

1. How can you generally rate levels of behaviour, acts or transactions where officers experience payment in money or kind/gift, favour their relatives and tribesmen, influence from senior government and political leaders to fast track applications in the process of issuing travel document or passports here in Passport Section in Nairobi? (Please explain your answer with examples).
2. Which types and forms of corruption are prevalent in the process of accessing government services in the Passport Section Headquarters Nairobi? (Please explain).
3. Why do you think these corruption practises in the process of accessing government services in the Passport Section Headquarters Nairobi are persistent?
4. In your own opinion what are the individual-level motivations for corruption that makes public officials more prone to corrupt behaviour than other officials in the process of accessing government services in the Passport Section Nairobi?
5. How effective and or adequate are the corruption control mechanisms and prevention measures in Passport Section in the Department of Immigration Services? (Please specify how).
6. What can you suggest as the best way to fight corruption in the Passport Section in Nairobi?