The Challenges of Peacekeeping in Complex Intrastate Conflicts; Lessons Learnt


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DECLARATION

I, Vivian Bonareri Okioga hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

Signed…………………………………… Date…………………………

Vivian Bonareri Okioga

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor;

Signed…………………………………… Date…………………………

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Last but not least I thank my parents, brother and sisters for believing in me. They have been on my side through good and bad times. I can always count on them.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this research project to my parents. Thank you for always being there for me.
ABSTRACT

As of 2014, it is over two decades since Somalia has been persistently ravaged by war following the fall of President Siad Barre’s regime. The nature of the Somali civil crisis and the international context within which it has been occurring has been continuously mutating. It transformed from a civil war in the 1980’s, clanisim and warlordism in the 1990’s; to a globalized ideological conflict in the new millennium. On the peacekeeping front, Somalia remains one of the most challenging endeavors faced by the African Union and the United Nations. Following the Cold War, peacekeeping operations have continuously evolved in response to dynamic and complex security environments. Contemporary peacekeepers remain confronted by intra-state conflicts where the proclaimed peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force may be unfavorable to the implementation of critically required mandates. This Research Project focused on the challenges faced by peacekeepers and particularly by the African Union in Somalia in terms of responding to complex intra-state conflicts. The project also sought to establish the lessons learnt in Somalia in order to provide recommendations for future peacekeeping operations. The main methodology deployed was the collection of materials from secondary sources. To-date, the study findings indicate that traditional peacekeeping remains the most developed response mechanism to conflict. In principle, peacekeeping is more likely to succeed when there is an agreement to keep; when there is consent, impartiality and when there is non-use of force reigns except in self-defense. Enforcement measures are extremely complex and should be employed with caution under very exceptional circumstances. The common challenges contemporary peacekeepers face include the lack of: clear mandates, adequate troop contribution, funding, communicating the purpose of the mission to the local community, troop contributing countries preparing their citizens psychologically for some of the high risks in peacekeeping operations and lack of a unified command. Overall, peacekeeping operations in Africa suffer from lack of the political will. Peacekeepers in Somalia are particularly confronted with faceless and irregular forces that can easily blend in with the local communities and employs guerilla as well as asymmetrical tactics. Much of the focus on Somalia has been aimed at addressing the symptoms of the conflicts rather than focusing on the causes. The Peacekeeping efforts in Somalia need to be accompanied by a political framework; otherwise the mission will eventually be ineffective and unsustainable. It is not possible to solely depend on a military solution to resolve the crisis in Somalia no matter how militarily powerful or technically superior the intervener is; the mission can only bear fruit if accompanied by an inclusive political process. The general conclusion reached is that, peace enforcement efforts in Somalia have temporarily managed to restrain the violence. The presence of peacekeeping forces will not guarantee lasting peace. The peacekeepers have created a window of opportunity for the government, diplomatic, development and humanitarian actors to address the underlying causes of the conflict.
# ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Burundi</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>ARS</td>
<td>Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia</td>
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<td>ASWH</td>
<td>Ahlu Sunaa Wal Jama'a</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Cooperation</td>
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<td>CADSP</td>
<td>Common African Defence and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Union Courts</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Devices</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operations In Mozambique</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Supportive Operations</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>SNM</td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<td>Transitional Federal Institutions</td>
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<td>Transitional National Assembly</td>
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<td>Transitional National Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UN DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
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<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operations in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>United Nations Operations in Somalia II</td>
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<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>United Nations Standby Arrangement System</td>
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<td>UNSOA</td>
<td>United Nations Support Office for AMISOM</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
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<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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Map of Somalia
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

It has been over two decades since Somalia has been ravaged by war that involves clan militias, international intervention forces, and militant Islamists. Consequently, the Somali crisis has ceased to become an internal affair as it concerns other states in the Horn of Africa and further abroad.\(^1\) The African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) have continuously strived to put this African ‘humpty-dumpty’ back together again.\(^2\)

The root of the Somali conflict has many complex dynamics: clanism, terrorism and piracy.\(^3\) In addition, Somalia just like the rest of the horn of Africa is ecologically and economically fragile. The country depends on rain-fell agriculture and regular droughts trigger cyclical famines.\(^4\) The institutional capacity of the Federal Government remains weak and has so far been unable to extend control or protection over the population residing within the capital, Mogadishu where it continues to face armed resistance from several opposition groups. In contrast, the semi-autonomous areas of Puntland in the north-east, and to an increasing extent, the unilaterally declared independent Somaliland in the north-west, have experienced progressively greater stability.\(^5\) Somalia earned the reputation of being the most extreme case of ‘state-failure’.\(^6\) The younger generation of Somalis have had no memory of a functional state and have been socialized to the environment of state collapse.\(^7\)

\(^6\)Cornelissen Scarlett, CheruFatu et al. (eds), Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) p. 94
\(^7\)Menkhaus K., Conflict Analysis: Somalia, (unpublished) October 2012, p. 31
“Even among failed states—those countries unable to exercise authority over their territory and provide the most basic services to their people—Somalia stands apart. A country of some nine million, poverty and insecurity are endemic. Less than 40 percent of Somalis are literate, more than one in ten children dies before turning five, and a person born in Somalia today cannot assume with any confidence that he or she will reach the age of fifty.”

Failed states risk the danger of providing an enabling ground for terrorism, drug trafficking, and the infiltration of illegal arms that threatened to spill beyond boarders. Thus the situation is Somalia is not just a problem for Somalia but for the whole region as well as the world.

On the peacekeeping front, Somalia has demonstrated some of the most harrowing challenges that face peacekeepers in on-going civil wars in Africa. For instance, in March 1995, when the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM-II) force left Somalia, it resembled more a ‘retreat’ than a withdrawal. The UNOSOM-II left behind the Somali-war-lords’ supremacy; which it had hoped to tame initially. Instantly, this exodus was marked by extensive looting in Mogadishu. A few months after the evacuation, Southern Somalia slipped, once again, into chaos; the foundations of the $160 million UN Headquarters disappeared; and events preceded much as before the UN-intervention.

Following the humanitarian crisis and continued factional clashes, now Somalia unexpectedly found itself caught-up in world events in connection to the September-11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City. On the main, as a failed state, Somalia was seen as a safe haven for escaping international guerrillas of Osama bin Laden.

Likewise, the lack of civil-order internally has seen the rise of a hard-line-Islamist-groups; most, notably, the Al-Shabaab, which purports to be committed to global Jihadist mission; and professed its connections to Al-Qaeda. These groups captured vast territories of the South-central region of Somalia; especially posing critical threat; not only to the Federal Government inside Somalia; but also to

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11Ibid, pp. 304-305
Somalia’s neighboring countries; and to the broader global communities; particularly with a focus put on the United States of America (USA) and other western countries.\textsuperscript{12} Research has shown that globally there has been a steady decline in every form of violence except terrorism since the end of the cold war.\textsuperscript{13}

In response to Somalia’s challenges, on 19\textsuperscript{th} January, 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was launched by the AU; with the ultimate agreement by the UN. Basically, AMISOM is mandated to conduct Peace supportive operations in Somalia; in order to stabilize the situation in the country; by creating conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities; and immediate take over by the UN.\textsuperscript{14}

The AU has an interest in Somalia’s peace and stability as it finds Somalia’s conflict as a wound in the continent; which can infect the region. Particularly, viewed from regional peace and stability perspectives, Somalia’s conflict remains as one of the major challenges faced by the AU as it pertains to resolving the conflict; and maintaining its relevance as a Union.

To date, more AU member countries have sent peacekeeping troops to Somalia; as a result of which, the militant, group Al-Shabaab, is clearly on the retreat; and it might finally appear that prospects for Somalia’s stability is reachable. However, much of Somalia still remains vulnerable to famine and national unification. For the most part, its coastline is a heaven for pirates, smugglers, and criminal gangs.

Notwithstanding the problems indicated above, after years of neglect, Somalia is finally getting diplomatic and military attention; and this situation in itself provides some hope for the anticipated

\textsuperscript{13} Coning C., ’The Emerging AU/UN Peacekeeping Partnership,’ \textit{Norwegian Institute of International Affairs}, (May, 2010) p. 10
\textsuperscript{14} \texttt{http://amisom-au.org/about/amisom-mandate/} accessed on 4\textsuperscript{th} April, 2013
recovery of Somalia out of protracted civil war, anarchy, and dysfunctions. In this respect, the greatest activity appears to be on the military front.\textsuperscript{15} On the flip side, the other question is whether the peacekeeping force will do more harm than good.\textsuperscript{16}

This research therefore aimed to identify the challenges peacekeepers and particularly the AU faces in dealing with internal conflicts. The research also sought to establish the lessons that have been learnt and applied from AMISOM as well as previous peacekeeping operations in Somalia; more specifically, Unified Task Force (UNITAF), UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II. Finally the research provided recommendations for future peacekeeping mission particularly in relation to intra-sate conflicts, which is the most common form of conflict in Africa.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Insecurity and the lack of a stable Federal Government in Somalia has resulted in creating civil strife; including: lack of the rule of law, the loss of lives, and prevented access for humanitarian support. Since the outbreak of the civil war in 1991, peacekeeping forces have been deployed in Somalia on four separate occasions; the most recent being the deployment of AMISOM. Therefore, this study’s aim was to identify the challenges peacekeepers and particularly the AU faces in dealing with intra-sate conflicts as well as sought the lessons that have been learnt.

1.3 Research Questions

The research aimed to satisfy certain begging questions which will help in the understanding of the topic and more specifically:

1) What are the common challenges that peacekeepers face and what can be done to overcome them?


2) What are the lessons learnt from previous peacekeeping initiatives in Somalia?

3) Based on the lessons learnt, what are the recommendations for future AU peacekeeping forces?

1.4 Objectives of the Research

The overall objective of this research was to identify the challenges peacekeepers and particularly the AU faces in dealing with intra-state conflicts as well as identify the lessons learnt. Intrastate instability has emerged as one of the most significant issues in the post war era and has been linked directly or indirectly to global problems. Most of these conflicts occur in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and raise questions as to whether rich states should be involved.\(^\text{17}\)

Somalia was identified as the case study as the country has been in a protracted intra-state conflict for over two decades and there have been four different peacekeeping missions deployed in the country during the period 1992 to 1995 and 2007-to-date. With this in mind, there are many lessons that one can be drawn from the Somalia experience.

The specific objectives of this research were:

1. To determine whether the presence of a peacekeeping force will contribute towards resolving the conflict situation in Somalia.

2. To identify the challenges peacekeeping forces face in Somalia.

3. To identify the lessons learnt from the Somalia experience in order to improve the outcome of future peace keeping missions.

In particular, in this study looked at the actual lessons learnt from the AMISOM mission; as well as from previous peacekeeping operations in Somalia; more specifically, UNITAF, UNOSOM-I

and UNOSOM-II; and analyzed which of the likely attributes can be replicable for other AU peace keeping missions inside Africa.

1.5 Hypotheses of the Study

1. The lessons learnt from Somalia serves as a relevant case study on how better manage peacekeeping operations.

2. The presence of peacekeeping forces in Somalia will contribute towards resolving the conflict situation in Somalia.

1.6 Literature Review

1.6.1 Conceptual Analysis of Peacekeeping

From the outset, usually, there is a challenge in providing a comprehensive functional definition of peacekeeping. As peacekeeping takes on more functions; the definition of peacekeeping gets longer. “In the broadest sense, peacekeeping is the deployment of other multilateral personnel on the field; as a tool for conflict prevention, management or resolution.”

Peacekeeping has not been guided by established theory or doctrine as such. Similarly, peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN-Charter. There is lack of a specific definition of what it entails. It lacks clear guidelines on how to plan and deploy peacekeeping forces. In connection to this, preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping had not been envisaged when the UN Charter was being drafted initially. In the past, the UN defined peacekeeping operation as one involving military personnel; but without enforcement powers to help and maintain and restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. UN-Peacekeeping operations

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were usually deployed in the aftermath of an inter-state conflict; simply to monitor and facilitate a peace agreement.\textsuperscript{21}

To date, there have been two generations of peacekeeping forces\textsuperscript{22}. The first generation of peacekeeping forces had the following three characteristics: (a) operations needed the consent of all parties before embarking on the mission; (b) operation forces were required to be impartial in their dealings with the parties and there was minimum use of force; (c) force was to be used as a last resort in self-defense; or to defend the carrying out of a given mission. Such missions were established under Chapter VI of the UN-Charter which relates to the pacific settlement of disputes.

The Second generation of Peacekeeping forces emerged in 1989. This came about after the cold war; where previously the UN’s ability to engage in collective action was seen to have been impeded by East-West divisions; which effectively limited the possibility of cooperation inside the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{23} Retaining consent of all parties and the issue of state sovereignty was challenged by the UN. With the end of the cold war, the UN action plan for Peace and Security quickly expanded. With the growing disregard for global standards of human rights; the UN-witnessed conditions where it was necessary to override on domestic sovereignty. Eventually, the second generation of peacekeeping started to involve complex, multidimensional peace agreements. More so to the military functions, where peacekeepers are often engaged with various police, civilian and infrastructural support tasks; during which time, the long-term peacekeeping goal remained for the settlement of the underlying conflict.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{22} Findlay Trevor, \textit{Challenges for the New Peace Keepers}, op. cit., pp. 12-13
\end{flushleft}
In contrast, to the first Generation of peacekeeping, the second Generation focused on the use of military force by the UN for enforcement of peace. This action is seen as deriving its legality from Chapter VII of the UN Charter.\(^{25}\) Despite this development, the UN Security Council resolutions, which envisage the use of force, never specifically mention it. Rather the Security Council resolutions usually mandate the mission to simply use ‘all necessary means’ to accomplish its mandate. Hence they refrain from specifying in advance the appropriate level of force to be used.’\(^{26}\)

As witnessed in the past, in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda contextual cases; the traditional principles of peacekeeping have since been forfeited mainly for the sake of humanitarian intervention; and international security. In some cases, the new peacekeeping missions have witnessed a greater propensity of use of force.

Contemporary peacekeepers now intervene in intra-state wars. Intra-state conflicts refers to what international lawyers prefer to term as ‘non-international conflicts’ This term refers to conflicts that are largely internal to a state.\(^{27}\) After decades of focusing on the cold war, the international community is now focusing on the security threats posed by weak states in intrastate conflicts.\(^{28}\) This is a type of conflict in which the UN has traditionally not been involved in previously. To date, operations have been characterized by diminishing or even lack of consent of the parties to the involvement of peacekeeping forces. After the end of the cold war, the UN has been willing to ignore the consent rule; mainly because of the strategic importance of a particular conflict; how the conflict threatens international security and stability. Sometimes the UN needs to be seen as acting to a crisis due to the level of public awareness and pressure; and see on how the international community is reacting to a conflict. This side of the debate has been dominated by demands that the UN should, unlike in

traditional peacekeeping operations, act more effectively by ‘becoming less reliant on the consent of parties to the conflict, less impartial, more forceful and coercive.’\textsuperscript{29}

In most of the cases, the UN-Security Council’s response to conflicts in Africa has been to authorize a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation. However, many of the situations rarely fit to the descriptive criteria of traditional peacekeeping mission. In most cases, conflicts are internal. The warring parties have not all given consent to the operation; cease-fires are broken; and conflict remains ongoing; or it resumes after the operation is in place. Overall, there have only been few instances; in which the UN Security Council has used chapter VII to authorize the use of force beyond self-defense in Africa; as have been seen in the cases of: Somalia, Congo and Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{30}

\textbf{1.6.2 Literature Review on Proponents and Opponents of Peacekeeping}

Peacekeeping had not been positively perceived during the 1990’s.\textsuperscript{31} There were published reports coming from the UN-exposed inquiries which marked its lowest points in the pursuit of resolving conflicts. Under the eyes of UN peacekeeping contingents, approximately 800,000 people were killed during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda alone; which was described as the most horrid events of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century. A year later the worst war crime since the end of the second world war was committed in the Bosnia Muslim town of Srebrenica when it feel siege by Serb militias, during which it was reported that 8,000 Muslims were killed despite the presence of peacekeeping forces. These reports concluded that in the light of extraditial killings, genocide, marginalization and the terrorizing of entre populations, the neutral, impartial and mediating role of the UN was inadequate. Ultimately, these reports recommend that mistakes that were committed by the peacekeeping missions should be

\textsuperscript{29} Biermann Wolfgang and Vadset Martin (eds), \textit{UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from Former Yugoslavia,} (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1998) p. 19
\textsuperscript{31} Woodhouse Tom and Ramsbotham Oliver, \textit{Peace Keeping and Conflict Resolution,} \textit{op.cit.}, p. 1
corrected by the end of the century; as the future of peacekeeping mission is dependent on the capability and willingness to reform.\textsuperscript{32}

It has been argued that peace enforcement can restrain violence temporarily; and so it cannot guarantee lasting peace; as it only buys time. Moreover, military activities tend to reduce the damage of the crisis; while at the same time, creating room for diplomatic and humanitarian actors to address the underlying causes of the conflict. International forces can use coercive means to gain stability; but attaining real peace rests mainly on the locals. Military personnel cannot guarantee real peace; but they can establish a framework; in order to allow the local and international community to do what is necessary to resolve conflicts.\textsuperscript{33}

It should also be acknowledged that warlords, in certain cases, are resistant to resolutions by consent and negotiations. In these situations, the role of a military force may be explored; and its needs must be better understood. It is important to note that civil-wars, in general, end-up with a military victory; rather than through mediation or political negotiation. In connection to this, peacekeeping forces are usually mandated to protect civilians; and to provide security; necessary for the delivery of humanitarian aid; which is an integral part of conflict resolution in war zones. This provides ample-room for political mediation and humanitarian workers; when pressure to intervene is at an extreme.\textsuperscript{34}

Military personnel are most suited to provide security for three reasons: (1) they arrive in organized groups; well equipped with vehicles and communication equipment; (2) they are able to cover large areas with a systematic command; and (3) they are able to contain violence; thus permitting cooperation to take route.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, p. 2
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, p. 17
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid, p. 9
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, pp. 90-91
There are also arguments that peacekeeping and military intervention ‘freezes’ the actual problem; and does very little to resolve the underlying causes in a conflict.\(^{36}\)

On the other hand studies have shown that the presence of peacekeepers following civil wars is a contributing factor to the stability or peace. When the international community deploys peacekeepers, the risk of another round of fighting tends to be reduced. In support of this contention, opponents of peace keeping tend to emphasis on the failures that dominate the media coverage; without carefully noting the success stories; that do not usually attract the media attention. On the other hand, peacekeeping is harder to maintain when war ends in a stalemate; or in a compromised settlement; rather than when only one side achieves military victory. War that ends in a draw leaves questions; as to which side would win should there be another round of fighting. In countries with large government armies (i.e. military strong states), the international community is most unlikely to intervene.\(^{37}\)

Supporters of the traditional peacekeeping who consent to the use of force only in self-defense; argue that Peace enforcement will erode the spirit of consent and impartiality; and draws peacekeeping forces into armed conflict with local parties. It is for this reason that traditionalist see peace enforcement as simply war by proxy or by another name.\(^{38}\)

There are also arguments that peacekeepers should, to a certain extent, use more force than traditional peacekeepers; but still maintain some essential characteristics. This kind of peacekeeping has been described as ‘wider peacekeeping’. This can be done by using force to the maximum extent in self-defense; to the maximum degree permitted especially in cases when faced with human rights abuses of civilians. Actually, in support of such peace enforcement measures, there is widespread


criticism of the UN and the UN Security Council; that peacekeeping on the ground, is too weak, reluctant, and ready to capitulate in the face of criminal warlords. Hence, the Wider peacekeepers group supports a peacekeeping mission (whether traditional or wider); or based on an all-out enforcement. This group asserts that, as long as some level of consent is maintained and force is appropriately used; and to the right degree; then, the peace enforcement operation would not be drawn to full scale combat.\textsuperscript{39}

On the extreme, those who support all-out enforcement argue that by presenting a credible military threat, the parties to the conflict are convinced that violence will not succeed. The military objective is, therefore, to deter, dissuade, and deny. In a nutshell, proponents of peace enforcement recognize that effective military presence is necessary to obtain the desired outcome.\textsuperscript{40}

\textbf{1.6.3 Literature Review on the African Union and Peacekeeping}

The AU which took over the mantle of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed in 2002. From the start, the AU aims: (i) to promote market oriented developments across Africa; (ii) to end-corruption and replace it with good governance; and (iii) to increase security for Africa’s people.\textsuperscript{41}

By the end of the cold war, African States recognized that structural weaknesses of the OAU prevented the organization from effectively responding to intrastate conflicts. At the same time, it also became clear that the UN Security Council were not responding promptly to African problems; particularly as it pertains to African security matters. It was for this reason that the Cairo declaration of 1993; established the OAU’s mechanism for Conflict prevention, Management and resolution. It was through this mechanism that the OAU reacted to various conflicts in Africa; including those incidences in: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid, pp. 155-157
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid, p. 159
(DRC), Ethiopia and Eritrea wars, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone. However, due to OAU’s structural incapacity and inadequacy, there was a realization that Africa needed a new organization that would; unlike the OAU; be willing to take risks and responsibilities of promoting development, peace and security. Against this background; following an OAU extraordinary summit was held in September, 1999 in Sirte, Libya; where member states agreed on the establishment of the AU. Thereafter, in July 2000 in Lome, Togo, the constitutive act to establish the AU was signed at an OAU summit.  

The AU and its constitutive act are framed to include the new peacekeeping and security challenges. Accordingly, under article 4(h) of the AU, it has the right to intervene without consent; (a) to a member state in order to restore peace and stability; (b) to prevent war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; and (c) to respond to situations that constitute a serious threat to legitimate order.  

According to chapter eight of the UN-Charter, the Security Council may further engage with regional arrangements; or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. As per the UN-Charter, the AU or any sub-regional organization that intends to undertake enforcement action must seek prior authorization of the UN Security Council.  

The Peace and Security Council of the AU is charged with the responsibility of promoting peace, security and stability. As such, it has been conceived as a tool for promoting collective peace and security in Africa. The AU-Peace and Security Council consists of 15 members elected on the basis of equal rights. These include, ten-member-states serving for a two year term; and five-member-states serving for a three year term. Some of the main criteria for the AU-Peace and Security Council

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42 Ibid, p. 29
membership (hereafter called as PSC) are: (a) a member-country’s contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa; (b) the respect of constitutional governance and the rule of law; and (c) human rights.

The PSC functions include promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. This is done by anticipating conflicts; and undertaking preventive diplomacy; making peace through the use of good-offices, mediation, conciliation and enquiry. The PSC may also undertake Peace Supportive Operations (PSO) and intervention, pursuant of AU’s Article 4(j) of the constitutive act: engage in peace building and post-conflict reconstruction; and undertake humanitarian action and disaster management. It has the power to institute sanctions whenever unconstitutional change of government takes place in a member state. The PSC also has the mandate to promote and implement the common African defense and security policy; as well as the conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament. It may also take appropriate action to defend the national independence and sovereignty of a member state that is threatened by acts of aggression, such as mercenaries.

The creation of the AU raised hopes that African governments and Civil Society Organizations (CSO) would have the opportunity to address issues of security and peace; which have thus far been, and remain to be, the scarcest commodities in Africa. However, with continued conflict in parts of Sudan like Darfur, Zimbabwe and Somalia questions have been raised about AU’s capacity to bring out rapid change. Since the 1980’s Africa has gone through a series of wars and conflict situations than any other continent on the globe. Many of these have been intrastate in nature. Africa has also not been spared by terrorism acts. In line with this the AU has been mandated to solve intra and interstate conflicts, deal with terrorism, and undertake peace building initiatives.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{45}Makinda Samuel M and Okumu Wafula F., \textit{The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security and Governance}, op.cit., p. 76
“The AU’s Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP) claims that security includes human rights, the right to participate fully in the process of governance, the right to development, education and health and the right to protection against poverty, marginalization and natural disasters.”

AU’s approach to solving peace and security issues is to find African solutions to African problems; which was a similar approach that its predecessor, the OAU adopted; where it puts in place mechanisms for mediation, conciliation and arbitration. Thus, the African leadership of the 1960, as of now, is concerned with building the capacity for self-pacification. African solutions to African problems imply that Africans should design their agendas for peace and security as well as own the processes for creating such agendas and their implementation. Africans are best suited to understanding their unique conditions; and therefore, are best suited to becoming the architects of their own peace and security agendas.

That said, however, Africa has thus far lacked both financial resources; and institutional mechanisms; to achieve its goals. Moreover, with bad governance, power struggles, and lack of political will, security in Africa has continued to be shaped by external forces; such as former colonials; and global powers such as USA, Russia and China; that have played a major role in shaping the direction of African wars and conflicts. Critics of the AU believe that the AU has failed to prove that it is capable of maintaining peace and security; especially as it failed to declare the situation in Darfur as a ‘grave circumstance’.

The AU deployment in African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) faced many problems. The member-countries that contributed forces had few soldiers trained in peace keeping operations of the Darfur nature; in which there was no peace-agreement to maintain; or implement. There was reluctance

46 Ibid, p. 77
among most member-countries to deploy peace enforcement measures; as they preferred traditional peacekeeping principles; which put the troops on the ground at higher risk.

The AU also lacked the equipment needed for operations; the main shortages observed were: inadequate number of vehicles, tents, and lack of aircrafts to deploy. In addition, there were delays by the donor community in providing their pledges to donate equipment; and when the equipment arrived, most were incompatible. Furthermore, when countries like Nigeria and Rwanda contributed troops, they experienced difficulties in transporting troops to Darfur. And when Rwanda was ready to send 300 troops in October, 2004, it had to delay its programme because preparations were not made on the ground to accommodate the incoming troops.

On top of all the above mentioned difficulties, due to its very limited mandate, AMIS was not accorded to take coercive actions to deal with violent militias; who were guilty of committing crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. Under its mandate, AMIS could only undertake traditional peace keeping which as mentioned earlier respect the principles of impartiality, neutrality, and consent. Also AMIS personnel lacked peace-building skills; particularly in confidence building, which was a crucial component for the success of the mission. The troops failed to provide access for humanitarian-aid or to protect humanitarian convoys. The force was also unable to protect vulnerable civilians in the rural areas who were beyond the reach of humanitarian actors.

Notwithstanding the difficulties mentioned above, it is acknowledged that the presence of AMIS brought security to some of the most vulnerable civilian populations in some camp areas. For instance, it is clear that the 7,000 AMIS force was not an appropriate size for guaranteeing the protection of civilians in a region of Darfur’s size. An appropriate force for Darfur region would require up to 44,000 troops.\(^{49}\) This was the second peace operation that was undertaken by the AU; and

\(^{49}\) Ibid, pp. 84-86
contrary to the desired outcome; it seems a few lessons were learnt from the previous African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) where many lesson could have been drawn.\textsuperscript{50}

Apart from experiencing financing, logistical and support, the AU is heavily reliant on the UN and on South Africa. This hinders its development into an independent organization. Overall, the AU weaknesses as it pertains to security and conflict management; may suggest that Africa’s arrangement for security remains an impossible task. Also, this is attributed to the fact that Africa is a vast continent with diverse economic disparities. This being the reality; a holistic security undertaking remains not only costly; but also difficult to manage\textsuperscript{51}

Counter arguments against the view that Africa has weak and poor military financial capabilities can be presented as follows: Firstly, the military issue should not arise; since African troops serve on equal footing with all other contingents of the UN-Peace keeping operations; be it inside Africa or elsewhere. The key problem is specifically that of logistics and financial resources. Also, the assumption that African does not have adequate resources is questionable. On the contrary, Africa seems to lack genuine political will; nothing more. It is interesting to note that no African country has ever avoided going to war; because it lacked resources. So, why not, when it comes to peace-keeping or conflict prevention? If Africans do not have necessary resources it is justifiable to watch fellow African civilians die as was the case in Rwanda; just because they are waiting for a reluctant international community to come forward will millions of dollars? Instead, Africans should take the lead role in conflict management and conflict resolution activities on the continent; as Europeans do in Europe.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, p. 87
Nevertheless “Unlike its predecessor, AU is more professional; and less toothless outfit; and has attributes that place it in good stead to fulfill its objectives.” The AU will be able to experience more success if it gains full cooperation from its member states and should be able to resolve the conflicts that have plagued the continent. Caution must also be taken not to be dismissive of being overly negative about what the AU has achieved. The UN, has far more resources than any African regional organization; and also it has experienced similar shortcomings as it has also in some instances failed to deploy its missions on time; accompanied with ill trained, ill equipped and ill prepared troops.

1.6.4 Literature Review on Characteristics of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission

There have been efforts to define when a Peace Keeping operation is a success. Most experts cannot agree how to do it. One of the most significant discussions for such criteria is only being able to conclude that different actors and constituencies have different objectives and criteria for evaluating success. In his view, the most comprehensive definition on how to measure the success of a peacekeeping mission has been listed in four distinct criteria as follows: (a) completion of mandate, (b) facilitation of conflict resolution, (c) containment of the conflict and (d) limitation of casualties.

In order to succeed, a peacekeeping force seeking to maintain peace must be superior to the combined forces of the warring factions. Only then, can it be sure of attaining its objectives. Such as military superiority must undoubtedly entail amongst other things, numerically superior and well trained men, efficient command and control system, efficient administration of logistics and re-supply channels.

The mandate can set the peacekeeping operation for failure if it sets objectives that cannot be achieved, especially if it is unaccompanied by sufficient resources to achieve those objectives.

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54 Boulden Jane, Dealing with Conflict in Africa: the United Nations and Regional Organizations, op.cit., p. 65
55 OtunnuOlara A. and Doyle Michael W., Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century, op.cit., p. 3
56 Ibid, p. 3
Mandates can also suffer from too much ambiguity or from leaving the parties themselves with too much to accomplish on their own. A mandate can suffer from being unrealistic, unsupported, too vague, or too weak.\footnote{Jett Dennis, \textit{Why Peace Keeping Fails}, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999) pp. 40-43}

Speaking in purely military terms, success may be measured by a reduction in of the military profile; and by the handover of the security functions to an international police force; or to indigenous authorities. “Lowering the military operation’s profile; or the cessation of military activities, however, is unlikely to signal the end of an operation, simply, a switch in main effort to a civilian peace building activities.”\footnote{Ramsbotham Oliver and Woodhouse, \textit{Contemporary conflict Resolution; The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts}, op.cit., pp. 68-69}

Hence, the definition of those conditions that constitute military success must be specified in the mandate; and in the operational directives; and it must be refined in the head of mission’s estimate and mission plan.

1.7 Justification of the Study

This study was anticipated to provide an analysis of challenges peacekeeping operations face in intra-sate conflicts whether the presence of peacekeeping forces in Somalia has contributed towards the stabilization of Somalia. It was expected that the study would to provide indication of whether lessons learnt can be used as viable attributes for resolving intrastate conflicts, especially with regards to the African context. Likewise, it was expected that the study would provide insight into the complexities of conducting peace enforcement operations. Especially, based on the lessons learnt from AMISOM operations, the study would provide the basis for scholars to conduct an in-depth research on conflict resolutions and related issues; in order to gain greater insight into, and come up with, sustainable and adoptable working tools for best practices in future peacekeeping operations management.
1.8 Conceptual Framework of Peacekeeping

Very often the question of a military intervention is the first item presented as an option of responding to political and humanitarian deterioration. Peacekeeping is not the only option for addressing intra-state conflicts but it is one of the most visible and newsworthy ones.

The conceptual framework diagrammatically presented above illustrates that complex conflicts have varied origin emanating from economic, cultural or ethical factors. These types of conflicts are not experienced suddenly; rather a crisis is presented when local authorities are unable to resolve contain the situation; and additionally, donor funded development programmes have limited effectiveness. The vertical axis represents the symptoms whereas the horizontal axis present times in

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59 Bellamy Alex J., Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect, op.cit., p. 188
60 AksuEsref, The United Nations, Intra-State Peacekeeping and Normative Change, op.cit., p. 21
61 Woodhouse Tom and Ramsbotham Oliver, Peace Keeping and Conflict Resolution, op.cit., pp. 66-67
terms of pre-conflict, conflict, and post conflict situations although in reality these will overlap and in reality the whole process may be cyclical.

Peacekeepers are important stakeholders of a conflict resolution process in war zones. In principle, the peacekeepers are mandated to protect civilians; and provide the security necessary for the delivery of humanitarian-aid. Also, they give a platform; from which both the political and humanitarian intervention can be conducted under the most extreme pressures.62

Working within a conflict zone presents a complex presence of strategically balancing coercive action and positive inducements, of supplementary military containment and humanitarian relief roles; and the effort to rebuild communities economically, politically and socially.63

It is not to say that no armed conflict is simple, but post-cold war in Africa has produced the world’s most prolonged and complex conflicts which makes it particularly challenging for peacekeepers. There are few reasons for this. Firstly, Africa wars to not fall distinctly within state boarders. Secondly, the peace agreements are often not comprehensive as they are not signed by all the warring factions and they do not address the root causes of the conflict. In some cases the war may not have stopped making the peacekeepers viewed as hostile elements who attempt to impose peace. The complex nature of the disputes is also accompanied by long standing hatreds and resentments that easily provoke disputes and that make it a challenge for the mediator. Thirdly the warring factions often made up of un-professional forces comprising of militia and criminals who do not respect the laws of war and to do not always follow the chain of command. This creates a high risk of the armed group targeting civilians either because they are viewed as supporting their rivals or because they possess resources that the fighters can forcefully take.

62 Ibid, p.15
63 Ibid, p 2
The fighting factions also tend to shift alliances and it becomes difficult for the peacekeepers to know which side to support. Finally the fighters benefit economically from the conflict and tend to resent peacekeepers.64

It should also be noted that in an effort to ‘Do Something’ the international intervention in an intra-state conflict can led to extravagant expenditures in an attempt to resolve the situation. If the crisis not properly managed intervention could worsen the situation.65

1.9 Research Methodology

From methodological perspectives, this study, made use of both primary and secondary information sources on the subject matter under discussion. The study focused on collecting useful information from various secondary sources. The major topics sought were with regards to peacekeeping, the Somali Conflict, the AU and Peacekeeping and peacekeeping efforts that have taken place in Somalia from the period 1992 to date. With this regard, the main secondary sources included: (a) Books, (b) the UN Security Council Communiqués and Resolutions on the Somali Peace keeping process, (c) Reports of the Secretary General, (d) newspapers (e) journals, (f) reports from meetings, and (g) unpublished dissertations and publications of academic proceedings; were also widely reviewed.

To generate comments and contributions, some of the preliminary findings of the study were circulated to fellow students, academicians and Somali citizens for their comments and viewpoints.

1.10 Limitations of the Study

This was a qualitative study that focused on three major areas with regards to peacekeeping. Firstly, the study sort to understand the origins as well as the concept peacekeeping and how it contributes to resolving conflicts. Secondly the study explored the challenges of peacekeeping

especially within the context of intrastate conflict where Somalia was selected as a case study. Finally the study provided recommendations on how to overcome the challenges peacekeepers face with a particular focus on Somalia.

1.11 Outline of Chapters

This study is comprised of five chapters; where the main substantive issues were depicted in Chapter Three and Chapter Four.

In Chapter One: Introduction provides the overall introduction into the study; the concept of peacekeeping; the arguments for and against the use of peacekeeping forces; and a general introduction into the AU and its peacekeeping initiatives. In addition, in this Chapter, the statement of the problem, hypotheses, justification for the conceptual framework and the methodology of the study are explained.

Chapter Two, The Origin and Evolution of Peacekeeping explains the meaning and rational of peacekeeping. This chapter also explains the origins and evolution of peacekeeping as well as the complexities associated with its implementation. This chapter also provides detailed explanation of terminologies used in peacekeeping and how peacekeeping is linked to the broader theoretical framework of collective security.

Chapter Three, Peacekeeping in Somalia: Lessons Learnt (April 1992-March 1995) provides an overview of the Somali conflict and the need for peacekeeping. This chapter examines the peacekeeping operations; and related activities; conducted in Somalia. Actually, this Chapter covers the operations conducted prior to the deployment of the AMISOM-forces. Here we critically examine the impact; as well as at the weaknesses and strengths of the peacekeeping operations of: UNITAF, UNOSOM-I and UNOSOM-II; and the lessons learnt by these operations; in order to ensure the likelihood of replicating the attributes picked from success-stories for future peacekeeping initiatives.
**In Chapter Four, Peacekeeping and Reconciliation Efforts in Somalia 1995-2012,** provides a background of the political processes that took place in Somalia after the withdrawal of the UN Troops. It also provides a critical analyses of the impact of AMISOM-peacekeeping-forces’ presence in Somalia; and how effective the impact has been in conducting the overall peacekeeping mission. Based on the findings from *Chapter Three*, in this section, aims to find out whether the lessons learnt from previous peacekeeping operations in Somalia have been applied within the context of AMISOM.

**Chapter Five, Conclusions and Recommendations,** summarizes the main arguments of the study. This Chapter highlights the major findings of this study; the lessons to be learnt from peacekeeper’s presence in Somalia; and ultimately, provides recommendations.
CHAPTER TWO
THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING

2.0 Introduction

This chapter sets off by explaining the meaning of terminologies that the readers should be familiar with in order to fully grasp the various arguments that will be presented in the study. The chapter then expounds on the origins of peacekeeping, the principles of peacekeeping, and how the same principles have been influenced from the Cold-War period to the Post-Cold-War era; giving rise to what is now generally termed as the Second Generation of peacekeeping.

This Chapter also examines how peacekeeping can be viewed as a broader theoretical framework based on collective security while at the same time acknowledging the limitations of fully adopting collective security within the current international political system. The chapter further explains the reasons as to why nations to choose to participate or not participate in peacekeeping efforts as well as the main complexities peacekeepers face especially when confronted by intra-state conflicts. Finally the chapter provides an introduction to regional peacekeeping; how it relates to the UN Charter while paying particular attention to Africa and the continent’s challenges in managing regional peacekeeping.

2.1 Meaning of Terminologies

As mentioned in the previous chapter, it has not been possible to give the term peacekeeping a fixed and detailed meaning as this term lacks a universally accepted definition. Rather, the term ‘peace’ is often associated with a range of terms, such as: peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, peace maintenance, and preventive diplomacy. However, these terms have different meanings that demand us to pay particular attention in their usage.
While it is important to critically examine these terminologies; it should also be noted that definitions of peacekeeping has evolved with time.\(^1\) In this respect, peacekeeping operations have continuously adopted to their work milieu to the challenges of newly evolving security environments. Currently, peacekeeping operations are characterized by a mix of military, police and civilians who are deployed in hazardous situations\(^2\).

Overall, peacekeeping is regarded as an optimistic term, because in many cases, there is really no peace to ‘keep’ and even though peace has been achieved, peacekeeping forces have neither the means nor authority to ‘keep’ it.\(^3\) In essence, peacekeeping is an instrument that was not mentioned in the UN-Charter and has become the world’s most expensive, most visible and riskiest ongoing activity.\(^4\) The lack of its mention in the UN-Charter has not hindered its development. In fact, this may have provided opportunity for peacekeeping to be flexible tool in responding to international crisis, while at the same time contributing to debate regarding its true nature.\(^5\) Notwithstanding, the global communities’ ultimate goal is for peacekeeping to no longer be necessary.\(^6\)

In principle, peacekeeping has developed through time in the spirit of the UN Charter.\(^7\) Such operations are sometimes called Chapter VI ½ missions which falls between chapter VI (with regards to the pacific settlement of disputes) and Chapter VII (actions with respect to threats of peace including

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\(^1\) O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, op.cit., p. 5


\(^3\) Ibid, p. 7


\(^5\) MurphyRay, *UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues*, op.cit., p. 5


\(^7\) OtunnuOlara A. and Doyle Michael W., *Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century*, op.cit., p. 297
forceful means and such sanctions of military force). Peace enforcement operations are duly referred as Chapter VI and three quarters.\textsuperscript{8}

Peace enforcement is the intervention of troops from an external state or states into a situation of conflict with the purpose of imposing peace. There is usually the absence of consent to maintain a ceasefire by the parties involved in the conflict and consequently, it has been argued that this may be regarded as being synonymous with war-fighting.\textsuperscript{9}

Peacemaking is an action whereby parties in conflict are brought together by peaceful means; as determined in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{10} Article 33 of Chapter VI of the UN-Charter lists: negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement and the resort to regional agencies or arrangements as peacemaking techniques.\textsuperscript{11} A peacemaking political process may accompany either peacekeeping or peace enforcement.\textsuperscript{12}

Peace building is a post conflict action, which ensures that violence does not re-occur. It also aims at identify support structures that will strengthen peace.\textsuperscript{13} In essence Peace building involves a wide range of sequential activities; proceeding from a cease-fire, to the establishment of a new government; and physical as well as institutional infrastructure.\textsuperscript{14}

Peace maintenance is also derived from the principle purpose of the UN-Charter; and it is concerned with the establishment of flexible administrative control mechanism; especially during post-

\textsuperscript{9}Furley Oliver and May Roy (eds), \textit{Peace Keeping in Africa} (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1998) p. 4
\textsuperscript{10}O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era}, op.cit., p. 6
\textsuperscript{11}OtunnuOlara A. and Doyle Michael W.,\textit{Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century}, op.cit., p. 90
\textsuperscript{12}Furley Oliver and May Roy, \textit{Peace Keeping in Africa}, op.cit., p. 5
\textsuperscript{13}O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas,\textit{United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era},op.cit., p. 6
conflict transitional phases; with the aim of achieving internal conflict resolution, establishing order and providing access to justice.\textsuperscript{15}

Preventive diplomacy is action taken to prevent disputes from arising between parties; to preventing existing disputes from escalating into conflict. In the event that conflict does occur, Preventive Diplomacy aims to limit its spread.\textsuperscript{16} It is important to take action before a conflict breaks out; or once it has broken out, in an effort to resolve it peacefully. This is more cost-effective than major peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations as money is saved and human suffering is prevented.\textsuperscript{17}

A Mandate is the official instruction given to a peacekeeping mission by an authority.\textsuperscript{18} The legitimacy of a peacekeeping mission is recognized when it obtains a mandate from the UN Security Council; which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.\textsuperscript{19} ‘This authorization adds legitimacy and credibility to the operation.’\textsuperscript{20}

In order to establish a peacekeeping mission or change the mandate of an existing mission, nine of the Security Council’s 15 Member States must vote in favor. However, if any one of the five permanent members who hold veto power namely: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the USA votes against the proposal, it fails.\textsuperscript{21} This demonstrates that no peacekeeping operation can be

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid, p. 89
\textsuperscript{18}Furley Oliver and May Roy, \textit{Peace Keeping in Africa}, op.cit., p. 5
\textsuperscript{21}United Nations, \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping:The Challenges Ahead}, (Paper Presented during the Parliamentary hearing from 20\textsuperscript{th} to 21\textsuperscript{st} November, 2008, United Nations, New York) p. 2
established without the broad consensus of stakeholders within the international community; who dictate that it is indeed the right thing to do.\textsuperscript{22}

Humanitarian Intervention is the provision of safe zones or camps for refuges and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’s). Shelter, food and medical supplies are also provided. This usually takes place with the consent of the majority of the parties involved in the conflict. If not all parties give their consent, a level of force may be needed to protect the beneficiaries and aid workers.\textsuperscript{23}

2.2 Emergence of Peacekeeping

During the period of the Cold war, the situation made it impossible for the permanent members of the UN Security Council to agree on effective joint action.\textsuperscript{24} At some point during this period the UN appeared to provide an arena for debate and conflict; rather than, as intended, a forum for cooperation.\textsuperscript{25} Many of the wars that erupted after 1945 were not classic wars between states; but rather were based on ideological differences that cut across state boundaries.\textsuperscript{26}

The UN’s role in international security become more and more confined to assisting in the negotiation of cease-fires or handling other disputes where the superpower interests were not compromised. In the course of playing this role, the UN gradually developed a new kind of military activity known as peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{27} This arrangement called for putting in place a military force that would act reasonably effectively; and be competent; but at the same time not too effectively. This

\textsuperscript{23}Furley Oliver and May Roy, \textit{Peace Keeping in Africa}, op.cit., p. 5
\textsuperscript{24}MurphyRay, \textit{UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues}, op.cit., p. 2
\textsuperscript{25}Macqueen Norrie, \textit{The United Nations Since 1945: Peace Keeping and The Cold War}, op.cit., p. VII
\textsuperscript{26}OtunnuOlara A. and Doyle Michael W., \textit{Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century}, op.cit., p. 112
\textsuperscript{27}Ibid, p. 113
authorization of a competent force’s authority would however be strictly controlled. This technique of peacekeeping was developed in order to compromise the then divided Security Council.

The first peacekeeping operation was the June 1948 United Nations Truce Supervision (UNTSO) which was established in Palestine. It functioned as an Observer Mission; which meant that UNTSO consisted of unarmed military personnel whose function was to monitor the implementation of a case-fire agreement; which was negotiated by Count Bernadotte of Sweden in the first war between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The first to deploy troops and explicitly labeled peacekeeping was the United Nations Emergency force (UNEF 1) which was dispatched to Sinai Peninsula during the Suez crisis in 1956.

The use of the term peacekeeping is credited to Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden who served as the UN-Secretary General from 10 April 1953 until 18 September 1961. In a report known as ‘The Summary Report’ he provided an outline of the role of the UN Secretariat, especially with regards to peacekeeping operations. This in turn provided a baseline for working modes and administrative practices for future peacekeeping operations.

In this regard, there were three prerequisites that became associated with peacekeeping namely: (1) The peacekeeping forces were to be impartial in their dealings; They had the consent of the parties involved in the conflict; and (3) They had to ensure that there was minimal use of force. This generation of peacekeeping operations defined what is now termed as traditional peacekeeping.

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33OtunnuOlara A. and Doyle Michael W.,*Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century*,op.cit., p. 297
Overall, Peacekeeping operations were recognized as being lightly armed, but visible neutral forces; with white painted vehicles and blue helmets or berets baring the UN crest; and their primary role was to support both parties to maintain a ceasefire; with each of them confident that the other could not violate its provision without being noticed.\(^3^4\)

It was not clear how impartiality was to be defined; but the general purpose was to show that the UN was an honest broker with no interest other than assisting the warring parties towards attaining conflict resolution. However, with some situations, impartiality was regarded as being impartial in carrying out the UN-Security Council’s decision.

More than half of the peacekeeping forces that were deployed during the cold war consisted of unarmed military personnel observers. On any occasion when peacekeepers were armed, they were to use open fire only in self-defense circumstances. It was argued at the time that the real strength of a peacekeeping force was not its capacity to use force, but rather in its not using force. Thus, peacekeepers were seen as instruments of diplomacy and not of combat. It is however obvious that peacekeepers were and are still mainly made up military forces.\(^3^5\)

Notwithstanding, there are several reasons for drawing peacekeepers from those who had military training. Such people were readily available for immediate deployment to trouble spots and in theory; they were acceptable to the local military with whom they were likely to have a common understanding. Tight discipline was also required in order to be conflict sensitive and the authoritative approach (which military officers possess) was considered a further advantage.\(^3^6\) In situations of crisis,

\(^{3^4}\)Ibid, p. 113
\(^{3^5}\)O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, op.cit., pp. 33-34
troops remain essential for securing as well as providing access to sea, and airport facilities, other major installations and food distribution centers.\textsuperscript{37}

2.3 Peacekeeping and Collective Security

Peacekeeping operations should be seen as part of a broader theoretical framework based on collective human security. In this regard, the UN vision is that human security should be viewed as well as intervened in collective terms.\textsuperscript{38}

Collective Security assumes that the interest of sovereign states is in maintaining peace; and that they are willing to respond with other states to jointly thwart to threats of peace. In the event that threats to peace do occur, all sovereign states must be willing to collectively respond in an organized manner so as to ensure peace is properly restored.\textsuperscript{39}

Ideal collective security also calls for to sovereign states to utilize as many tools of international politics available to them. In this respect, they must be prepared to employ both economic and military sanctions. However, this action does not suggest that collective security rejects non-military forms of conflict resolution; but rather it seeks to provide viable mechanisms for pacific settlement of disputes. In the event that using military force is required, then those military force contributing sovereign states need to able to provide a joint military force with sufficient strength; either to deter or oppose; any likely uprising of military aggression.\textsuperscript{40}

Specifically, Article 41 and 42 of the UN-Charter highlights what was envisaged with regards to collective security. Collective security and its key provision can only work if there is full agreement

\textsuperscript{37}Jeong Ho-Won, \textit{Peace-Building in Post conflict Societies: Strategy and Process}, op.cit., p. 52
\textsuperscript{38}Newman Edward and Schnabel Albrecht, \textit{Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation Peace and Development}, op.cit.,p. 51
\textsuperscript{39}O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas,\textit{United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era},op.cit., p. 4
\textsuperscript{40}McCoubreyHilaire and Morris Justin, \textit{Regional Peacekeeping in Post-Cold War Era}, (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000) pp. 3-4
and cooperation among the permanent members.\textsuperscript{41} Ironically evidence shows the wealthy states have become less politically and financially at the forefront since the end to the cold war, despite their tendencies to dominate the UN system.\textsuperscript{42}

Among the challenges human collective security; one is the fact it rests on the international community; and in particular it has to rely on the cooperation of powerful states. The second challenge is the ‘free-rider-syndrome’. States are therefore unwilling to take collective action at their own expense for the sake of the security of citizens of other states.\textsuperscript{43}

The third challenge emerges from incidences of terrorism occurring in recent years. Several of the world’s most powerful nations are heavily committed to the fight against terrorist actions; and this recent terrorism phenomenon has diverted attention of powerful nations from being the world police; to defending their own domestic people and national interest against terrorist actions.\textsuperscript{44}

\textbf{2.4 Evolution of Peacekeeping}

In total, during the period ranging between 1947 and 1985, the UN was engaged in only thirteen peacekeeping operations. During the cold-war, the permanent members of the Security Council; especially USA and Russia did not play a significant role in peacekeeping needs. Rather, the main countries that contributed during the cold war included: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Senegal, Sweden, and Netherlands.\textsuperscript{45}

The end of the cold war led to the termination of the well-known super power rivalry and bipolarity, which raised likely prospects for collective security as a viable approach. In tandem, with

\textsuperscript{41}United Nations, ‘The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping,’ op.cit., p. 4
\textsuperscript{42}Newman Edward and Schnabel Albrecht,Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation Peace and Development, op.cit., p. 60
\textsuperscript{43}Ibid, p. 61
\textsuperscript{44}Yilmaz M. E, ‘UN Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era,’ International Journal on World Peace, Vol.22 (June 2005) p. 13
\textsuperscript{45}O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas,United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era,op.cit., p. 23
relations between USA and Russia improving; this positive move facilitated the cooperation between states to enforce the will of the Security Council on a state that had broken peace.\(^\text{46}\) This was also clearly manifested by the decline of the use of the veto at the UN Security Council.\(^\text{47}\)

In due time, this positive progress further led to the increased deployment of peacekeeping operations which attributed to the increased capacity of the UN Security Council to agree on the action to take in a particular crisis. Freed from ideological deadlock, the super powers had the ability to share the burden of peacekeeping with other nations.\(^\text{48}\) There was also increased optimism that the UN could play a more central role in the maintenance of international security and preventing development of any likely conflict.\(^\text{49}\)

Eventually, the main contributors were no longer small neutral nations traditionally associated with peacekeeping; but increasingly some of the five permanent members of the Security Council and above all, nations in Asia and Africa.\(^\text{50}\)

In September 1988, the UN-provision in terms of peacekeeping became recognized when the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded its Nobel Peace Prize for that year to the peacekeeping forces of the UN; recognizing their contribution to conflict-resolution around the world.\(^\text{51}\) By 1989 just over a year after obtaining the Nobel Peace Prize, the UN-peacekeeping budget grew drastically to almost as great as the organization’s regular budget.\(^\text{52}\)

\(^\text{46}\)Ibid, p. 170
\(^\text{47}\) Yilmaz M. E, ‘UN Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era,’ op.cit., p. 17
\(^\text{52}\) Ibid, p. VII
Similarly there was also an increase in the number of sovereign states involved in peacekeeping. For instance, in 1988, just before the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) peacekeeping mission in Namibia (Between April 1989 and March 1990), only twenty six countries were involved in peacekeeping operations. This number increased to seventy six by 1994.53

No other world leader was a stronger advocate of supporting the UN than USA President George Bush who’s theme throughout the period was that the world was witnessing the drawing of a new world order which would allow for the relations among states to be governed by the rule of law as the initial creators of the UN had intended.54 In addition, the popularized the success of UNTAG and to a certain extent the triumph of the 1990-1991 Gulf war; delivered a new feeling of confidence in the UN as a responsible organization, thereby creating enlarged expectations about what the UN could accomplish.55

Media interest in peacekeeping also increased; and with this media interest, it created public expectations that the UN would always step-up its involvement in solving global problems. This was especially the case when the UN was faced with humanitarian crisis, as well as instances where conflicts and instability undermined democratic governments. There were expectations cropping up, that operations would be better resourced; but more importantly operate with greater authority. This situation marked the era where the super power interests were no longer an impediment to collective security action and ‘everything’ seemed possible.56

The Security Council’s authority to order military attention was not from expectations that it would often do so. Rather, it was believed that the threat of using military action would become

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53 Findlay Trevor, Challenges for the New Peace keepers, op.cit., p. 2
55 OtunnuOlara A. and Doyle Michael W., Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century, op.cit., p. 297
deterrence; and in so doing persuade states to adhere to measures deemed appropriate by the Security Council in order to maintain and restore international peace.\textsuperscript{57}

However, with the end of cold-war, Africa was no longer a stage where the east and west could play their rivalries. Instead, conflicts multiplied within the African region due to the lack of control by external influences. Likewise, there was lack of political will to thwart conflicts. Even if countries contributed to peacekeeping, they did so with slow moving progress in providing troops, logistic equipment and sufficient funds. \textsuperscript{58}

The removal of regional interest and associated ideological pressure also opened room for new local and regional conflicts to emerge which was often associated with the fragmentation of sovereign states.\textsuperscript{59} Sometimes the fighting was between groups that were neither defined by ethnicity or tribe and the government, or lack of it was an impediment.\textsuperscript{60} These conflicts often involved guerrilla forces instead of national armies and resulted to high civilian casualties. This was also usually accompanied by the collapse of state institutions.\textsuperscript{61}

Besides, peacekeepers were often denied freedom of movement and had little influence with regards to their deployment to a particular site. For example during the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL) presence, it was not the UN but the Israel, the state whose aggression is believed to have led to the presence of the UN; dictated exactly where the peacekeepers would be deployed.\textsuperscript{62}

The proclaimed principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force sometimes did not work out as intended as their strict application may have been unfavorable to the implementation of mandates. The consent principle in particular proved to be one of peacekeeping’s major weaknesses.

\textsuperscript{57} MurphyRay, \textit{UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues}, op.cit., p. 14
\textsuperscript{58} Furley Oliver and May Roy (eds), \textit{Peace Keeping in Africa}, op.cit., p. 6
\textsuperscript{59} Woodhouse Tom and Ramsbotham Oliver, \textit{Peace Keeping and Conflict Resolution}, op.cit. p. 64
\textsuperscript{60} Yilmaz M. E, ‘UN Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era,’ op.cit., p. 13
\textsuperscript{61} OtunnuOlara A and Doyle Michael W, \textit{Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century}, op.cit., p. 21
\textsuperscript{62} O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era}, op.cit., p. 25
As demonstrated by the UNEF I, consent once given could be later withdrawn; thereby negating all the efforts of peacekeeping. It is however the use of force or its perceived non-use that created confusion on how peacekeeping should be conducted in the first place. There was the unanswered question of how much armament peacekeepers should possess. Secondly, what constituted as powerful was not defined. So even though the forces were composed of soldiers, they were never proper military corps.\textsuperscript{63} Rather than keeping peace their role was limited to observing it.\textsuperscript{64}

Impartiality was essential to the well-being and presence of peacekeeper but its strict observance also created serious operational challenges. Peacekeepers were prevented from regarding any party to the conflict as the ‘enemy’ and in so doing it prevented them from officially gathering intelligence. This policy resulted in two major consequences: (1) as it denied the military personnel access to one of their essential tools of trade placing them at a disadvantage in hostile conditions and (2) convinced those of the ground that their superiors at the Headquarters were out of touch with the realities on the ground. The weakness in this impartiality policy would later be acknowledged by the Secretary General who realized that intelligence was essential to conduct any future operations.

Peacekeepers were prohibited from opening fire except in circumstances when protecting UN installations or in self-defense. However, commanders in the field would be reluctant to open fire; firstly, because of their reliance on the continued cooperation of the parties involved; secondly, due to the fact that they were usually lightly armed; and thirdly and consequently, they could be easily be outnumbered on the fire lines.\textsuperscript{65}

Traditional peacekeeping was an impediment to peacekeeping forces if the peacekeeping mission anticipated resistance from one or more local belligerents. This restricted the forces access and

\textsuperscript{63}Ibid, p. 29
\textsuperscript{64}Ibid, p. 30
\textsuperscript{65}O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas,\textit{United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era}, op.cit., p. 34
complicated their tasks. In this regard, a case in point is the scenario that occurred during the first UN mission to Somalia, UNSOM I, when 50 Pakistan peacekeepers remained in the Mogadishu port for months afraid to venture out on their own as the mandate of the mission prevented them from engaging in active combat except in self-defense. The Somali militia was also more militarily powered.66

From the onset, Peacekeeping was supposed to create conditions for peace but this became a rare occurrence. The peacekeepers presence may have not provided a clear solution to the underlying problems and in so doing prolonged conflicts by removing any incentives for settling them.67

Traditional peacekeeping principles became inadequate in responding to these kinds of conflicts and these new developments called for the need to refine the concept of peacekeeping in order to address the changes within the international community. More so, traditional peacekeeping became a challenge to conduct without addressing humanitarian disasters resulting from many societal conflicts.68

Eventually, the Security Council requested the Secretary General to provide it with detailed proposals of how the UN should deal with peace and international security in the new conflict environment. In response to the Council’s request, the Secretary General in 1992 produced a report known as ‘The Agenda of Peace’. In the report, the UN provided its justification for the use of force.69

The report also included proposals for possible ways in responding to swiftly as well as effectively to threats of international peace and security in the post-cold war era. Four major areas were identified

66 Findlay Trevor, Challenges for the New Peacekeepers, op.cit., p. 24
68 Olonisakin Funmi, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and legal issues in ECOMOG Operations, op.cit., p. 22
which were: (1) preventive diplomacy, (2) peacemaking, (3) peacekeeping, and (4) post-conflict peace building processes.\textsuperscript{70}

The UN peacekeeping forces began to intervene in situations where conflicts were still ongoing\textsuperscript{71}; where they distinctly moved beyond the traditional principles of peacekeeping with the view that consent-prerequisites need to be relaxed; so as to allow peacekeeping operations to be deployed; even in situations where warring parties had not agreed to UN intervention.\textsuperscript{72} This also came at a time when there was increased criticism of the UN and specifically the Security Council; claiming that peacekeeping on the ground was too weak and reluctant to take adequate military action in the face of criminal war lords.\textsuperscript{73} This indeed revealed not only the end of superpower rivalry; but also the situation where the two superpowers did not guarantee the success of peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{74}

Through time, UN member states became increasingly willing to authorize the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{75} Hence, the concept of peacekeeping shifted from the monitoring of agreements between relatively sovereign, consenting and responsible parties to a larger number of belligerent groups who were less than sovereign and sometimes non-consenting and irresponsible.\textsuperscript{76} In doing so, the UN vision for world peace challenged the conventional value or order which rejected interventionism and instead chose to promote universal values such as social justice, democracy, human rights and humanitarian intervention.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{71}O’Neill John T. and Rees Nicholas,\textit{United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era}, op.cit., p. 30
\textsuperscript{72}Ibid, p. 6
\textsuperscript{73}Biermann Wolfgang and Vadset Martin, \textit{UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from Former Yugoslavia}, op.cit., p. 20
\textsuperscript{74}Ibid, p. 289
\textsuperscript{75}O’Neill John T. and Rees Nicholas,\textit{United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era}, op.cit., p. 35
\textsuperscript{77}Newman Edward and Schnabel Albrecht,\textit{Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation Peace and Development}, op.cit., p. 52
In the 1990s, the increase in the number of peacekeeping operations was accompanied by fundamental changes in their nature, function and their composition. This is what has been termed as the second generation peacekeeping. Consequently, their general mandate for the observation and maintenance of cease fire; which was associated with traditional peacekeeping evolved into a multiplicity of tasks involving security, humanitarian and political objectives.

The scope of work done by peacekeepers was expanded to include the implementation of complex peace agreements; including but not limited to, overseeing the transition to democratic governance, detailed and carefully devised supervision and observation frameworks in the process of elections; demobilization and integration of previously opposing armed factions; rehabilitation of collapsed state-structures; provision of broader support to humanitarian missions; including the protection of “safe areas” and escort of relief convoys; and removal of antipersonnel mines from contaminated country sides.\(^{78}\)

Through time, peacekeeping operations also became diverse and complex. This time the peacekeepers were drawn from a wider variety of sources which included the military, civilian police, and diplomatic corps.\(^{79}\) This complex peacekeeping operation method is commonly referred to as multidimensional peacekeeping.\(^{80}\) The emphasis exerted on broader activities associated with peacekeeping reflected that the UN had eventually come to the realization that simply preventing or halting a conflict was not sufficient. Instead, there was need to put in greater emphasis on both peacemaking and peace building processes simultaneously in order to ensure longer-term sustainable success.\(^{81}\) Consequently, during the 1990’s multidimensional peacekeeping operations deployed in

\(^{78}\) OtunnuOlara A. and Doyle Michael W., *Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century*, op.cit., p. 298
\(^{79}\) Ramsbotham Oliver and Woodhouse Tom, *Contemporary conflict Resolution; The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, op.cit., p. 149
\(^{81}\) Ibid, p. 6
conflict states went to prove that peacekeepers could do more than merely establishing symbolic presence.  

With the end of the cold-war, there was optimism about an upcoming era of peace that would be enjoyed; and people’s rights would be respected. However, the expectations of more effective post-cold war peacekeeping operations were not realized. The UN peacekeeping efforts done in trouble nations like Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia simply exposed the weaknesses existing within the UN as a global organization. To add insult to injury, the initial successful UN operation in Angola had been followed by the resumption of domestic warfare. The UN seemed to do little to address the underlying causes of the conflict. Such UN operational setbacks came at the time when there was confidence on the UN; expecting that it could play more central roles responding to international security requirements and that its peacekeeping roles could be able to tackle a wide range of problems arising from lack of domestic security.

However, in October 1993 when 18 USA soldiers were killed and publicly dragged in the streets of Mogadishu; this incidence humiliated UNOSOM II mission in Somalia. This ended the mission as well as the possibility of future of USA troops actively participating in UN-led missions. One other experience worsened the confidence in UN peacekeeping operations; The Peacekeeping mission (UNAMIR) which was already in Rwanda had its force severely reduced because the Security Council was reluctant to intervene soon after the Somalia disaster. The force commander made pleas to the Security Council’s intervention to no avail and consequently the international community was unable to prevent the 1994 Rwanda Genocide. On top of this, funding towards peacekeeping dropped

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82 Newman Edward and Schnabel Albrecht, *Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation Peace and Development*, op.cit., p. 68
down and peacekeeping forces exposed themselves to danger and remained powerless to protect civilians and humanitarian workers.⁸³

At the same time, several European states were also reluctant to participate in peacekeeping operations; because they deemed them as dangerous and even feared that such operations may be prolonged and could even lead to heavy casualties and deaths of their armed forces if sent to participate in UN-missions. However, such reluctance in cooperating with was less prevalent among developing nations; although they found themselves in situations where their armed forces were inadequately trained and less prepared for peacekeeping operations.⁸⁴

In 2000, the Brahimi Report was commissioned by the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. The aim of the report was to examine lessons learnt from peacekeeping and provide the recommendations on the way forward. The report arose out of a fundamental concern that a significant number of peacekeeping operations undertaken in the 1990’s had failed. In some instances it claimed that the presence of UN personnel may have prolonged conflicts which in turn led to more violence. There was doubt that the UN was learning anything from it practical experience in the ground.⁸⁵

The UN needed to improve its lack of communication duplication in efforts and adapt to new strategies of dealing with belligerents. This caused others to point their fingers at the UN; with criticisms the organization was ineffective and the lack of communication, coordination and standardization was contributing to the lack of control and consequent spread of conflict.⁸⁶

In essence the Brahimi Report called for states to be more responsible when designing, organizing and launching peace operations. It also recommended that states have clear, credible and

⁸³Ramsbotham Oliver and Woodhouse Tom, *Contemporary conflict Resolution; The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, op.cit., p. 150
⁸⁵Ibid, p. 24
realistic mandates and with that, equip the army personnel appropriately for quick deployment of forces; and invite regional and sub-regional organizations to participate actively; by championing on utilizing peacekeeping and peace building activities. The report further called for reforms in the UN Department of peacekeeping operations (UN DPKO) in order to facilitate room for undertaking bigger and more complex missions.87 This proposal was applauded by most member states with enthusiastic support coming from smaller nations and some major European Powers.88

As UN peacekeeping missions became more peace building oriented, the participation in various roles by civilian staff became more important. Hence, the civilian component took as much attention as that of the military component. The civilian components in most peacekeeping operations include political affairs, civil affairs, public information, policy and planning, human rights and gender mainstreaming.89

In situations where the main task was to assist in the restoration of law and order, it could be argued that the police would have been more suited to the role rather than troops who were involved in military related tasks. Police were also seen to present less of a threat to sovereignty in and therefore this involved a less likelihood of a misunderstanding of UN intent. It is noted that the civilian police played an important role in the monitoring of UNTAG which involved the presence of 1,500 monitors.90 However, the conflict sensitive circumstances in which the police were directly in contact with the local authorities and population required that they would be well trained, diplomatic and disciplined.91

In due time, women too began to take increasingly important roles within peacekeeping. With their growing numbers, more and more have become represented in the military, police and civilian

89 Mancini Francesco and Smith Adam C., Partnerships - A New Horizon for Peacekeeping, op.cit., p. 579
91 O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, op.cit., p. 35
components of peacekeeping operations. The first ever all female contingent to serve in a peacekeeping operation was deployed in 2007, when a 125-strong formed police unit from India arrived in Liberia. Their presence served to demonstrate the special contributions that women can make to law enforcement.  

2.5 Motivations for Participation in Peacekeeping Operations

Some of the ‘old’ peacekeepers like Canada, Norway, and Sweden have regarded participation in peacekeeping a sign of good international citizenship. This was especially true in the era when peacekeeping was neither popular and nor was it publicized much as opposed to its popularity today. However, altruism is today more likely to be eclipsed by other motivating factors.

A higher proportion of new comers may be participating in peacekeeping operations because of outside pressure from their allies; or influence directly coming from the UN Secretary General; or from the secretariat; or from some other international organizations.

Some other newcomers view peacekeeping as contributing to their national security and/or to their national interest. Some nations may view peacekeeping operations as a down payment made in the event that there will come a time when they will also need the intervention of a peacekeeping force. For other nations such as Egypt, El-Salvador, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Namibia, South Korea and Zimbabwe, participation in peacekeeping is a way of paying back in kind for previous peacekeeping operations; from which they themselves were beneficiaries.

A less defying motivation for some new peacekeepers; brought from the economically less-developed nations, may be seen as the desire to benefit financially from the reimbursements of deployment costs incurred for sending troops to troubled areas. For such developing nations, the costs

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incurred in troop deployment may be over and above the costs that they would have nationally spent if their forces remained home.

The armed forces of some countries may also benefit from deployment; by way of receiving military equipment from better equipped force contributing nations. For instance, this situation occurred with UNSOM II in Somalia.

Perhaps the most important benefit to all nations contributing militaries forces; whether they come from developing or developed nations is the valuable oversees experience that peacekeeping provides during periods of peacetime in their countries. The other benefit they gain is the exchange of information and skills as a result of their contacts with other military forces.93

2.6 Challenges of Peacekeeping

The new generation of peacekeeping is facing multiple difficulties due to mix of capabilities, procedure, equipment, language, customs and ideology existing within the mission groups.94 All these considerations not only make new peacekeeping complex but also more dangerous than traditional peacekeeping. The UN military lost ten times the number of casualties between 1991 and 1994 although the number deployed only increased eight times.95

If there many fatalities among peacekeepers, it can trigger demands for withdrawal. Actual withdrawals are not common but sometimes they do happen. The best known withdrawal is that of USA from Somalia, which was soon followed by most of the USA allies following the killings of several troops in 1993 in Mogadishu.96

93 Findlay Trevor, Challenges for the New Peace Keepers, op.cit., pp. 7-10
94 Ibid, p. 20
96 Findlay Trevor, Challenges for the New Peacekeepers, op.cit., p. 23
Under the UN Charter, there is no formal reference made for the provision of troops; UN member states remain under no obligations to supply the UN-Security Council with troops. Usually, troop-contribution is done on voluntary basis.97 Even though a majority of sovereign states approve the mandate of a peacekeeping operation, none of them are obligated to contribute troops or equipment to support any operation.98 Particularly, an operation is seriously undermined, when countries vote in favor of the deployment of a peacekeeping mission; and yet they fail to send armed-forces, or make financial contributions.99

As a rule the UN does not have a standing army that can be quickly deployed at a time when a conflict breaks out and instantly be contained. Rapid deployment would be possible only if troop contributing countries would have a reserve army trained for peacekeeping purposes. However, this comes, if at all it occurs, with its own and political implications.100

Every time a peacekeeping operation is established, a force has to be built from scratch while relying on the good will of member states to provide troops and equipment. Moreover some states are willing to provide equipment but not troops and those that are willing to provide troops may not have the required equipment. The operation finds itself trying to match troops provided by one state with logistics provided by another. It can therefore take a number of months to get the necessary troops and equipment on the ground.101

One solution which was adopted by the UN was the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) introduced in 1993 with a view to increasing speed in troop deployment. UNSAS is a database which contains details of member states available to provide troops to the UN at short notice.

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97MurphyRay, _UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues_, op.cit., p. 12
100United Nations, _United Nations Peacekeeping:The Challenges Ahead_, op.cit., p. 3
101Furley Oliver and May Roy (eds), _Peace Keeping in Africa_,op.cit., p. 16
However, when fighting broke out in Rwanda in 1994, none agreed to provide their services instantly.\textsuperscript{102}

In most cases, funding usually remains inadequate and as a result there is a lack of assets. Budgetary inefficiencies can best be addressed by member states collectively. However it may be too optimistic or naïve; to simply believe the General assembly will resolve the funding issues because a number of countries are still behind their contribution payments. At the same time, it is worth noting that developed countries have paid most of the bills needed for peacekeeping operations; although they have paid far less since the 1990’s and the USA remains categorized among the so called ‘financial delinquent UN members.’\textsuperscript{103}

Nevertheless, most member-states have funding available and rapid deployment is possible, provided that states respond to political decisions rapidly and contribute what is needed. On top of this, the UN mandates stipulates that forces should maintain a high degree of readiness to participate in peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{104} The problems arising from shortfalls in financial contributions usually demonstrate that there exists a serious the division of opinion among member states, rather than financial constraints they face.\textsuperscript{105}

The trend so far has revealed that the UN has become increasingly active in a wide range of operations in selective countries but often to in response to international media exposure, and also due to the influence of the members of the Security Council who have had a particular interest in different conflicts.\textsuperscript{106} The altruistic nature of peacekeeping can be abused when states that are concerned with

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{102} Ibid, p. 292
\item \textsuperscript{103} Newman Edward and Schnabel Albrecht, \textit{Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation Peace and Development}, op.cit., p. 61
\item \textsuperscript{104} Biermann Wolfgang and Vadset Martin (eds), \textit{UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from Former Yugoslavia}, op.cit., p. 287
\item \textsuperscript{105} Murphy Ray, \textit{UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues}, op.cit., p. 13
\item \textsuperscript{106} O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era}, op.cit., p. 41
\end{itemize}
public opinion and compliance with legal requirements intervene militarily in controversial situations and then justify their actions as a peacekeeping operation.\textsuperscript{107}

The witnessing of genocides or starvation in front of television screens to global audiences demonstrated the capacity of the media to stir world opinion. It was not until the ‘CNN’ factor created pressure by broadcasting pictures of disaster and human suffering that forced governments step in and step-up their peacekeeping actions through spending large sums of money.\textsuperscript{108}

The media has at the same time has also acted as a medium of exposure that quickly portrayed some peacekeeping operations as outright failures and putting the blame on the UN system. However, other operations have worked well but have not featured on the media spotlight. The UNTAG operation in Namibia, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) could have been described as UN peacekeeping success stories.\textsuperscript{109}

Sometimes the presence of peacekeeping forces delays the process of resolving conflicts. This happens because the pressure to reach agreement is reduced on one or both sides of the conflicting parties. Consequently instead of resolving the conflict, they prolong the military stalemates. In fact, such an incidence was witnessed in Cyprus; where the UN-forces found themselves kept in the conflict site for decades. Yet, the presence of peacekeeping forces also helped prevent further bloodshed and allowed the civilian communities to resume relatively normal livelihoods.\textsuperscript{110}

In all mission areas, the national staff employed by the peacekeeping missions earns higher salary than the prevailing local rates. This opportunity has been widely perceived as causing brain

\textsuperscript{107}MurphyRay, \textit{UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues}, op.cit., p. 1
\textsuperscript{109}Ibid, p. 204
\textsuperscript{110}Ibid, p. 113
drain of skilled manpower; as some of the national staff are given responsibilities that are below their skill, qualification and experience level; simply to earn higher payments.\textsuperscript{111}

During the overwhelming increase in the number and size of peacekeeping operations, staff and troops lacked proper peacekeeping training and experience.\textsuperscript{112} When military forces are at home, sometimes they are called upon to assist national authorities to in disaster relief. However, very few forces have the experience and training with regards to responding to humanitarian disasters which require relief supplies to millions of people who are starving as was the case in Somalia, and of dealing with terrified masses fleeing from killings as was witnessed in Rwanda, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{113}

Until recently most peacekeeping training centers have focused their training on military roles as well as military support personnel. This situation has changed over the last decade where a number of centers in Africa, Asia, Europe and North America have provided training for civilians. In February 2009, AMISOM commissioned the African Center for Constructive Resolutions of Disputes to facilitate an induction course for its entire headquarter staff.\textsuperscript{114}

Overall, peacekeeping operations suffer from a lack of political-will; which becomes evident because of: (a) inadequacy of contingents; as regards to their numbers and the amount of financial contributions raised by those contributing sovereign states; (b) inability of headquarters to provide adequate and timely logistical-support; (c) mismatched contingent sizes and logistical-equipment; and

\textsuperscript{111} Carnahan W., ‘Economic Impact of Peacekeeping,’ \textit{Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations, March Issue} (2006) p. 4
\textsuperscript{112}Biermann Wolfgang and Vadset Martin (eds), \textit{UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from Former Yugoslavia}, op.cit., p. 287
\textsuperscript{113}Findlay Trevor, \textit{Challenges for the New Peace Keepers}, op.cit., p. 19
\textsuperscript{114}Mancini Francesco and Smith Adam C,\textit{Partnerships - A New Horizon for Peacekeeping}, op.cit., p. 587
(d) complexity of peacekeeping-missions that are mismatched with the existing capabilities needed on the ground.\footnote{Ibid, p. 519}

When consent breaks down completely, peacekeeping-forces are left with the options of: either (i) withdrawing the peacekeeping-troops; or (ii) converting soldiers to become peace-enforcement forces. Converting ordinary soldiers to peace-enforcement tasks must be well-planned and deliberated (rather than being the result of a 'mission-creep'). Further, peace-enforcement must be accompanied by infrastructural-changes, dependent of the mandate, capability, and commitment, of the force assigned for the peace-enforcement.\footnote{Findlay Trevor, \textit{Challenges for the New Peacekeepers}, op.cit., p. 26} ‘Mission-Creep’ is an unplanned move from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement. This can be very dangerous to the troops involved in such missions; as peacekeeping-forces need to be trained and adequately equipped for different types of missions.\footnote{Furley Oliver and May Roy (eds), \textit{Peace Keeping in Africa}, op.cit., p. 5}

Enforcement should only be contemplated as a last resort solution; when all other options have been exhausted.\footnote{OtunnuOlara A and Doyle Michael W, \textit{Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century}, op.cit., p. 207} Full scale peace-enforcements are usually very costly. In 1993, in Somalia, for example, for every dollar spent on humanitarian assistance, ten dollars was paid for military protection purposes.\footnote{Ibid, p. 210}

In principle, enforcement is legitimized; if the UN-Security-Council decides that the nature of a given conflict constitutes threats to international peace and security.\footnote{Ibid, p. 208} Any peacekeeping-force that causes terror; or intimidates masses by using force is likely to fail. Likewise, it runs the risk of being regarded as an occupation-force. Therefore, at a time when peace-enforcement is considered as the best optional approach; it is essential to ensure that this force is perceived by the civilian-population as an
entity organized for: (a) providing humanitarian-aid; (b) disarming-combats to end any perpetuating violence; and (c) provide viable room for diplomatic-intervention.\textsuperscript{121}

Before an enforcement-action is taken, at least the following four preconditions must be met: (i) to show a political will to cooperate by those troop contributing nations; (ii) to accept and bear the human-costs for their respective military-forces deployed for a given enforcement-action; (iii) to show the will and to have the capability of meeting the financial costs; and lastly (iv) to readily avail troops that will be adequately prepared and equipped for the enforcement-action. In any case, all of the above four preconditions are very costly.\textsuperscript{122}

Where there is limited or no consent, a peacekeeping-mission can be considered to be very close to actual military combat. However, at times, use of a capable military force becomes a necessary precondition in order to pressure conflicting parties to resolve their differences; through non-violent means.\textsuperscript{123}

Some nations will only contribute to peacekeeping with the condition that it is not a peace-enforcement-operation. When use of force is expected, then military officers usually plan for a reserve-force; which can be used when extra-reinforcement is needed within the bounds of a conflict area. However this is a concept that is unheard of within the UN-operations to date.\textsuperscript{124}

A force also needs to be able to carry out its mandate. The mandate also needs to be realistic and clear. Challenges will be faced when external political alliances and internal political circumstances and military realities causes the troops actions to shift from the mandate.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{121}OlonisakinFunmi, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and legal Issues in ECOMOG Operations, op.cit., p. 6
\textsuperscript{122}OtunnuOlara A and Doyle Michael W, Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century,op.cit., pp. 305-306
\textsuperscript{123}Oliver G,'The other side of Peacekeeping: Peace Enforcement and Who Should Do It?,’op.cit., p. 101
\textsuperscript{124}Ibid, pp. 113 - 114
\textsuperscript{125}Furley Oliver and May Roy (eds), Peace Keeping in Africa,op.cit.,p. 5
In the course of fulfilling their mandate, some peacekeeping operations have evolved and found themselves in a situation known as the ‘gray zone’. A grey zone is the space between traditional peacekeeping and all-out war fighting. The tendency to slide from peacekeeping to enforcement actions and then back again has proved to be very dangerous with disastrous consequences as was seen in the case of Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. No effective mechanisms have been devised to respond to the challenge of the gray zone.\textsuperscript{126}

When peacekeepers find themselves in the vulnerable position of the gray zone, it is usually complicated by sentiments of the public opinion; who usually do not understand why peacekeeping military contingents are not responding to aggressive actions and acts of violence towards innocent civilians.\textsuperscript{127}

With this regard, to date, traditional peacekeeping remains the most developed response mechanism to conflict situations. Peacekeeping is more likely to succeed then there is an agreement to keep peace and when there is consent, impartiality and non-use of force; except in self-defense.\textsuperscript{128} Peace enforcement operations due to their associated costs are more dependent on major powers than were traditional operations.\textsuperscript{129}

At times, when seeking consent, public-support becomes an important ingredient to be considered. In fact, the public must be convinced and won; through creative and professional information campaigns. In fact gaining consent from the public can further help maintain a likely consent from any conflicting-parties.\textsuperscript{130}

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\textsuperscript{126}OtunnuOlara A and Doyle Michael W, \textit{Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century}, op.cit., p. 306
\textsuperscript{127}Ibid, p. 307
\textsuperscript{128}Ibid, p. 305
\textsuperscript{129}Bowen N, ‘The future of United Nations Peacekeeping,’ op.cit., p. 15
In addition, the structures of the UN are more suited for small-observer and peacekeeping missions but have had shortcomings with larger and more robust operations that require quick-decisions put in place.\textsuperscript{131} Yet, some even argue that the UN should not conduct any peace enforcement operations because the essence of the UN charter is peaceful in nature.\textsuperscript{132}

Nevertheless, even though a force strictly adheres to self-defense there may be ambiguities. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) may lack the required detail, or may change over time or vary from the national contingents. For example the right to self-defense is dependent on its interpretation by the military commander as it also includes the right to prevent an attack if peacekeepers believe a strike against them is imminent. A similar problem happened in Somalia when the Italians were much more willing than the USA forces to negotiate rather than respond aggressively to provocation. There is no ROE that can be formulated to cover all situations.\textsuperscript{133}

Additionally, when it comes to giving consent, governments fear that this would infringe upon their sovereignty and is an acknowledgment that they cannot handle their internal problems themselves. There are also fears that intervention would allow opposition groups to obtain international recognition and be regarded as legitimate parties to the conflict.\textsuperscript{134} It is also a challenge to measure consent. Even though parties agree to the terms of a peace agreement the general population may not be committed to it and violence will persist. The leader who signed the peace agreement may also buy time reinforce his military for the next campaign.\textsuperscript{135}

The need for peace enforcement depends on the respective degrees of the parties’ commitment to the agreement. If one of the party results to violence, enforcement may be used to prevent the

\textsuperscript{131}Schmidl Erwin A. and Oakley Robert B., \textit{Peace Operations Between War and Peace}, op.cit, p. 11
\textsuperscript{132}Oliver G,'The other side of Peacekeeping: Peace Enforcement and Who Should Do It?,' op.cit., p. 113
\textsuperscript{133}Findlay Trevor, \textit{Challenges for the New Peace Keepers}, op.cit., p. 29
\textsuperscript{134}OtunnuOlara A and Doyle Michael W, \textit{Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century}, op.cit., p. 208
\textsuperscript{135}Oliver G,'The other side of Peacekeeping: Peace Enforcement and Who Should Do It?,' op.cit., p. 113
breakdown of law and order.\textsuperscript{136} The risk of renewed conflict is still high even after the fighting has been stopped through military intervention. Delivery of food and medical supplies cannot be disbursed if the security situation remains fluid. Full scale military intervention has been used to prevent the escalation of violence and humanitarian emergencies such as the famine in Somalia in the early 1990’s.\textsuperscript{137}

There have been calls to clarify the scope of Security Council. Under the UN Charter the primary role of the Security Council is the maintenance of international peace and security. In the past, the threat of international peace and security was usually taken from the context of interstate or regional conflict. In reality the international community has witnessed more intrastate conflicts. Questions have been raised as to whether internal conflicts fall truly within the meaning of a threat to international peace and security as was envisaged in the UN Charter. There is therefore need for the Security Council to interpret what constitutes as threat to international peace and security.\textsuperscript{138}

With the implementation of multi-dimensional peacekeeping, there was confusion with regards to the roles and responsibilities between civilian and military agencies. Before the 1990’s institutions had fairly distinct, roles, identities and modes of behavior.\textsuperscript{139}

Over the years, there occurred growing tensions created; mainly owing to the attention given by the UN to: peace-operations verses development-activities. Resources allotted to peacekeeping and relief-operations have begun to outstrip the resources for long term peace-building efforts. Over the years, a number of governments and donor institutions have diverted resources from their development budget to peacekeeping-operations and humanitarian-relief. This trend needs to be re-examined; as


\textsuperscript{137} Ibid, p.52

\textsuperscript{138} Otunnu Olara A and Doyle Michael W, \textit{Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century}, op.cit., pp. 311 -312

\textsuperscript{139} Woodhouse Tom and Ramsbotham Oliver, \textit{Peace Keeping and Conflict Resolution}, op.cit., p. 123
social and economic development issues matter; and remain essential as bases towards a long-term peace within and between sovereign-states.140

During the last decade, peacekeepers and humanitarian workers have been under fire due to issues of misconduct and this has been taken as a serious problem. Shocking reports emerged revealing that sexual exploitation, rape and human trafficking are a common problems which are executed by peacekeeping troops and civilian police forces. These are ironically and unfortunately the very same people who were entrusted to protect vulnerable communities.141 However, the UN does not have the authority to prosecute such offenders. The most possible action the UN can take is to repatriate the peacekeeper to their country but cannot follow up to see that they are prosecuted once they are home.142

In order to mitigate such behavior among peacekeepers the UN office of the High Commissioner for human rights has developed a human rights training programme for peacekeepers which is important in promoting the human rights agenda within peacekeeping.143

2.7 Regional Peacekeeping

When the UN was being established, it had been anticipated that regional organizations would play a significant role in the maintenance of peace and security. There was a debate between the globalist and regionalist vision on how to provide security soon after the Second World War. Eventually, in structuring the UN, globalist approach was adopted.144

The legitimacy of regional peacekeeping arrangements is recognized under article 52 of the UN Charter which recognizes their role in the maintenance of security. However, in the same article, a clarification is made stating that the establishment of such regional arrangements is dependent on the approval of the UN Security Council.

140 Otunnu Olara A and Doyle Michael W, Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century, op.cit., p. 299
141 Murphy Ray, UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues, op.cit., pp. 230-231
142 Ibid, p. 232
143 Ibid, p. 238
144 McCoubrey Hilaire and Morris Justin, Regional Peacekeeping in Post-Cold War Era, op.cit., p. 34
Regional organizations did not play major roles in peacekeeping operations during the cold-war. However, after the cold war, increased demands where made for peacekeeping contingents which in turn threatened to outstrip the supply available from the UN. Due to these challenges, regional organizations assertively sought legitimacy from the UN to establish peacekeeping operations. By 1999 the number of peacekeeping forces dropped from 70,000 to 20,000. Ironically while this was happening, regional and sub-regional peacekeepers grew in numbers.

There have been several approaches that have been used in implementing this. One method is to deploy peacekeeping missions in two phases. During the first phase a regional organization is given an ad-hoc mandate by the UN Security Council that usually entails securing a safe environment for further activities. In the second phase, the operation is handed over to a UN force.

Regional organizations are also more flexible and use less formality in their dealings. In addition they are able to respond more quickly to unfolding events than the UN itself. In fact, this is an important advantage for the purposes of undertaking preventive diplomacy, mediation and confidence building among its members. In addition Regional organizations are able to exert pressure in a way that the UN cannot. For this reason they are perceived as being less intrusive than the UN. Since they are more affected by the conflict they are more likely to have the political will to take immediate measures to address the conflict. Neighboring countries may also be motivated to contribute to peacekeeping operations within their region as to avoid the spill-over effects of conflict as well as the desire to demonstrate good regional citizenship.

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146 Coulon J. and Liègeois M., ‘Whatever Happened to Peacekeeping?: The Future of a Tradition,’ op.cit., p. 15
148 Ibid, p. 304
149 Boulden Jane, *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: the United Nations and Regional Organizations*, op.cit., p. 1
There is the issue of proximity and speed as early intervention is a key element for a successful peacekeeping operation. Regional organizations are also more likely to share cultural similarities unlike in the UN where cultural differences in the past have prevented the Security Council from managing crisis situations. It is easier to obtain consent from a party that shares common regional culture.\textsuperscript{151}

Regional peacekeepers may be more readily accepted by local parties because of their cultural ties and similarities. However, their historical and actual involvement in the region and the perceived implications of such an involvement can also make the forces less welcome.\textsuperscript{152}

When placing the importance of the role of regional organizations, one must be careful not to fall on ‘tribalism-led-peacekeeping’ activities, whereby for example conflicts in Europe are viewed as the responsibility of Europeans and African conflicts are taken as the domain for Africans. This goes against the principles of the UN which sees peace and security as a worldwide responsibility. Moreover, the capabilities and strengths of regional organizations vary considerably. Therefore, members of regional organizations should not only be encouraged to take the lead in responding to conflict within their region but also be involved in wider international efforts towards attaining global stability.\textsuperscript{153} Despite their potential most regional organizations are still far from fully functioning as instrument for maintenance of peace and security as was envisaged in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{154} The UN charter does not specify to manner and extent to which regional organizations should develop their security role.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{151}Coulon J. and Liègeois M, ‘Whatever Happened to Peacekeeping?: The Future of a Tradition,’ op.cit., p. 19
\textsuperscript{152}Mancini Francesco and Smith Adam C, Partnerships - A New Horizon for Peacekeeping, op.cit., p. 525
\textsuperscript{153}OtunnuOlara A and Doyle Michael W, Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century,op.cit., p. 304
\textsuperscript{154}Ibid, p. 303
\textsuperscript{155}Ibid, p. 73
2.8 Conclusion

To date, peacekeeping operations continue to be deployed in hostile environments where the political process has failed or been suspended and where consent of the parties involved in the conflict to accept the presence of a multilateral peacekeeping force is questionable.  

Peacekeeping can prove its worth if it is done properly and will in turn confirm is place as a primary tool of conflict prevention, management and resolution when the circumstance calls for it. It is therefore likely to remain for the foreseeable future. Evidence has shown that military intervention alone cannot prevent violence and promote human security. Peacekeeping operations are meant to be temporary measures and can never resolve conflicts in isolation. They are meant to control hostilities and are therefore useful to create conditions to facilitate peacemaking. This is especially needed when conflicts have caused destructive behavior or is likely to do so.  

Ceasefire allows the parties in conflict to ‘cool off’ and lessen the hostilities. When a conflict is prolonged, leaders and the civilian populations tend to be habituated to the status quo and become psychologically committed to the conflict. Some of the population profits politically and economically from such fighting. In the event the diplomatic intervention fails, the mediator is dependent on military action for the creation on an environment in which negotiations can take place. Similarly, military operations rely on the mediator’s ability to obtain agreement for conflicting parties to address their differences through non-violent means.  

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156 Mancini Francesco and Smith Adam C, *Partnerships - A New Horizon for Peacekeeping*, op. cit., p. 519  
157 Findlay Trevor, *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, op. cit., p. 31  
Peacekeeping with a certain modifications is likely to remain at the forefront of multilateral intervention due to the absence of an effective system of collective enforcement. It remains, as the most suitable form of international military involvement in the effort to seize and prevent conflict. Peacekeeping operations will continue to experience challenges and the difference between occupation and enforcement will always remain blur. With regards to intra-state conflicts, the presence of an international force will always have an impact on the local politics and the separation of conflict from national crisis and international and regional interests will often be impossible. Peacekeeping still remains where it was in the cold war; a junction between what is possible and what’s most desirable.
CHAPTER THREE

3.0 Introduction

Chapter Three provides a brief history of Somalia since it gained its independence to become a republic up to the outbreak of the civil war. The Chapter also provides an analysis of the root causes of the conflict, what effect it had on its citizens, how it was addressed by the Somali Government and how the international community intervened through diplomatic means and military intervention.

The Chapter then focuses on the three UN peacekeeping operations that were deployed in Somalia in response to the intrastate conflict from 1992 to 1995 namely: United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I), Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). Chapter further explains why the UN suddenly withdrew its peacekeeping forces and has not had peacekeeping presence since March 1995.

The challenges UN peacekeepers faced in their effort to address the conflict in Somalia is analysed with a view of finding out what lessons have can be learnt and how similar challenges can be overcome and more importantly how they can be avoided in future peacekeeping missions particularly with regards to the ongoing conflict in South-Central Somalia. Finally the chapter concludes by highlighting achievements UN peacekeepers made during their intervention despite the identified challenges and provides recommendations on how the UN and particularly global hegemons can better support future peacekeeping initiatives.

3.1 Background to the Conflict in Somalia

The Republic of Somalia was formed on 1st July 1960 following the merger of former colonies of British North Somaliland and Italian South Somaliland. However, from an institutional point of view, the south and the north were de facto separate countries. Their administrative, legal and
education systems were conducted according to different procedures and in different languages (English and Italian) and economic contact between the two regions were virtually non-existent.¹

The colonial era imposed a modern centralized state on Somalia society. The new form of governance conflicted with the traditional structure of Somalis.² For example, whereas Somalia is usually considered a nation with a common language and religion and common social traditions, it has a political history determined by its highly segmented clan structures. Somalia’s social structure is subdivided into dozens of sub-clan groups and hundreds of smaller units.³ It follows that shortly after independence, political associations developed along clan-based lines; and groups sought positions that were not based on the national interest.⁴

On October 21 1969, General Siad Barre seized power through a military coup. At first his government claimed that its aim was to completely change the Somali society for the better. A one party system was introduced and clan loyalty was denounced. However what followed was an authoritarian, over-centralized government system. The Siad Barre government found itself strongly clan-based. Ultimately it became more and more narrowly clan-based over the years. Siad Barre’s clan enjoyed numerous privileges and profited most from the country’s development-aid and foreign assistance.⁵ Moreover, under Said Barre’s jurisdiction many of the national institutions had already been in decay for years. Consequently, Somali ceased to function as state⁶ and was scored poorly on the global standard economic indicators factored among the developing countries in the world.⁷

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¹Dualeh Hussein A., From Barre to Aideed Somalia: Agony of a Nation, (Nairobi: Stellagraphics Ltd, 1994) pp. 15-16
Said Barre’s regime had been able to exist for many years only because other governments recognised the despotic regime and supported it regardless of its systemic and massive violation of human rights. As a result, Somali citizens increasingly experienced the state as a repressive system offering no framework for identification. Following this, the Somalis re-identified with their clan groups for their survival rather than relying on the state.\(^8\)

Somalia had known several instances of unrest since its independence. The first notable significant uprising was held in Northern Somalia in May and June 1998, which had been fuelled by clan-based and political rivalries and over the distribution of resources. The northern region that produced herds of livestock accounting for the largest share of Somali export were discontent; as they felt it was not benefitting them primarily; and because there was basically no equitable regional economic development.

The unrest in the north was organized and led by the SNM (Somali National Movement). The government responded to the unrest by using excessive force in a bloody effort to repress the population. An estimated 5,000 civilian members were killed in May 1988 alone.\(^9\)

In 1991, General Mohammed Siad Barre, was ousted from power by several Somali armed groups. When Siad Barre’s government fled the country, the alliance of armed groups that had fought the government was unprepared for the new situation. Immediately the leaders of the opposition quarrelled over whom should be in control of the state power and its resources.\(^10\) This led to the disintegration of Somalis into clan-fiefdoms in the midst of a ruthless civil warfare never witnessed before in the history of Somalia.\(^11\)

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\(^8\) Hippler Jochen, *Nation Building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation?* op.cit., p. 62
\(^10\) Heinrich Wolfgang, *Building the Peace: Experiences and Reflections of Collaborative Peace Building: The Case of Somalia*, op.cit., p. xiv
\(^11\) Dualeh Hussein A., *From Barre to Aideed Somalia: Agony of a Nation*, op.cit., p. 125
The Hawiye Clan took over Mogadishu and much of South-Central. However, two Hawiye Leaders Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mohamed Mahdi could not agree on how to share power. Both claimed the right to presidency. Mohamed Farah Aideed assumed that he was going to be the president since he was directly responsible for Siad Barre’s defeat. However to his dismay, Ali Mohamed Mahdi was elected as the interim president.12

Following this, the Hawiye leadership was split into two camps and Mogadishu was quickly turned into a bloody war zone which continued fiercely throughout 1991 and 1992. Approximately 30,000 deaths and 27,000 injuries were reported between November 1991 and March 1992. The conflict also exacerbated a famine stricken Somalia where 1.5 million were in the brink of death as farming activities could not continue.13 The ensuing two-year drought further complicated the situation.14 At the peak of the famine; in August 1992, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimated that 4.5 million Somalis were affected.15

At the peak of the conflict, an estimated 500,000 people lost their lives from violence, starvation, and disease.16 The two warring factions were also responsible for much of the destruction of the city.17

Violence continued to spread due to an oversupply of heavy weapons that remained from the cold war and so all the warlords were well armed. In order to increase their power, the factions hired uneducated teenagers from the countryside, feed them and gave them Khat, an amphetamine drug to keep them fighting.18

13O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, op.cit., p. 108
14Ibid, p. 109
15Stevenson, J, ‘Hope Restored in Somalia?’ Foreign Policy, No. 91, (Summer, 1993) p. 138
17Clarke Walter and Herbst Jeffery, Learning Form Somalis: the lessons of armed humanitarian Intervention, op.cit., p. 5
3.2 International Community Interventions

It took a year after the war broke out in 1991 for the international community to focus its attention on the failed state of Somalia and on the humanitarian crisis that emerged from the civil war.19

At first, no government, regional or international organization was willing to be involved in or spend its resources for the sake of a failed state that had little economic importance; additionally, following the end of the cold war, the country was becoming of less strategic importance.20

At the time, the international communities' attention was focused on the former Yugoslavia conflict. Due to the inability to concentrate on more than one conflict and due to some extent the divisions between the OAU, the international community did nothing other than pass several resolutions and conduct two major conferences in 1992.21 Another factor that shifted the attention away from the Somali crisis at the time was the break-up of the Soviet Union.22

At the regional front, Africa and the Arab League largely ignored Somalia. The only sub-Saharan President who visited Somalia was President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda; and no other African country delivered food except Sudan. The only neighbourly help to Somalia consisted of Kenyan and Ethiopia’s passive acceptance of refugees.23

There was a slow humanitarian and military assistance that led to the loss of opportunity for mediation and for preventive diplomacy at an earlier stage. Furthermore, in early 1991, the decision by the International community to evacuate from Somalia due to security concerns was detrimental to the people of Somalia; as this resulted to the spread of famine; that was not as widespread prior to their withdrawal.24

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20 Thomashausen Sophie, *Humanitarian Intervention in an Evolving World Order*, op.cit., p. 57
22 Murphy Ray, *UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues*, op.cit., p. 36
23 Stevenson, J, ‘Hope Restored in Somalia?’ op.cit., p. 145
After the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, the international community’s intervention concentrated mainly on humanitarian and rehabilitation aid. During most of the 1990’s Somalia continued to remain in a state of anarchy; where it was not accorded serious attention until September 11th 2001. Somalia has come under intensive scrutiny as a safe haven for terrorist networks, putting Somalia in a triple crisis of collapsed central government, lawlessness, and armed-conflict. Conflict, humanitarian concerns, and economic stagnation still persist. Most recently, piracy taking places off the country’s shore remains a serious challenge.

It should be noted that violent conflict is most common and vicious in those parts of Somalia, where it is crucial for control of the routes of movements of external resources: especially ports, where agricultural production for export (banana plantation) move out; through most significantly, Mogadishu.

Although there are instances of sporadic violence over two decades ensuing the fall of the Siad Barre regime, there are still some communities that have continued to live in harmony; where local and semi-state authorities are functioning effectively. In the north, two autonomous regional entities have emerged; the republic of Somaliland and Puntland.

Overall, there have been more than a dozen peace conferences that took place since 1992 with international assistance. Some were facilitated with financial and technical support from the UN or governments in the horn of Africa. However, most of these proceedings did not manage to bring any lasting peace in Somalia partly due to the fact that Somali warlords often violated agreements.

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28 HipplerJochen, *Nation Building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation?*, op.cit., p. 63
29 Ibid, p. 65
30 Hoffmann Elias P.,*Somalia: Economic Political and Social Issues*, op.cit., p. 204
It is only in Mogadishu and in the southern parts of Somalia that are still affected by the conflict due to the fact that there is a capital to fight for and the control over aid and other resources coming from external sources.³²

3.3 Peacekeeping Efforts in Somalia; April 1992-March 1995

3.3.1 United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)I

As permanent members of the Security Council and hegemons at the time, both Russia and the USA ran significant arrears in their peacekeeping schemes even before the Somali crisis emerged on the Security Council’s agenda. Hence both governments influenced the decision that the intervention in early 1992 be limited to humanitarian assistance.³³

The UN Secretary General, Boutros- Ghali did not hide his disappointment with regards to the slow response and reiterated his calls for more tangible UN action through the deployment of a peacekeeping force. He accused developing countries on focusing their attention on fighting a rich man’s war in Yugoslavia and not bothering with the Somalia plight.³⁴

As a result of the mounting pressure from the Secretary General, the UN Security Council on 24th April 1992 unanimously passed resolution 751 which established UNOSOM. However, it took nearly 3 months for the first 50 unarmed observers to arrive in Mogadishu in order to monitor the cease fire that was agreed by the warring Somali clans. While these developments took place, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) relief supplies were still being looted by bandits and extorted by militia and the unarmed UN-military observers could not stop them.³⁵

Under the direction of the Special Representative for Somalia, Mohamed Shanoun, the force of 50 technical observers was authorized to monitor a ceasefire in Mogadishu. He was also to act as a

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³² Thomashausen Sophie, *Humanitarian Intervention in an Evolving World Order*, op.cit., p. 311
³³ Ibid, p. 58
mediator between the clan leaders and negotiate the flow of humanitarian assistance by the UN and NGOs. The observers arrived in Mogadishu on 2nd July 1992. Due to this delay the cease-fire had already been broken by both factions. In addition, Somali warlords un-intimidated continued to loot food convoys; and the UNOSOM I unarmed military observers were unable to stop them.

Following this, Mohamed Shanoun managed to convince a reluctant Mohamed Aideed to allow UNOSOM to deploy 500 traditional peacekeepers from Pakistan. Being a traditional peacekeeping operation, UNOSOM deployment could not take place until August 1992 when the de facto political leaders gave their consent.

The peacekeeping troops were to escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies and provide security for personnel. Although the UN acknowledged that the civil war was the main cause of the famine in Mogadishu, UNOSOM I did not take the responsibility of ending the fighting; or resolving the political stalemate but instead chose to focus on the ceasefire, which only covered the Mogadishu area.

Another complication arose when Mohamed Farah Aideed’s consent was withdrawn after a Russia plane with UN markings delivered military hardware and newly printed Somali currency to his rival Ali Mohamed Mahdi. The Russian crew’s contract with the UN for air services had since expired but the UN lacked a ready explanation for this massive blunder. Mohamed Farah Aideed was outraged by this and accused the UN of supporting Ali Mohamed Mahdi and consequently opposed the deployment of the 50 UN observers as well as the 500 armed peacekeepers.

Already agitated, Mohamed Farah Aideed was eventually convinced by Mohamed Sahnoun to agree to the deployment of the 500 UNOSOM I troops but was once again angered when the UN

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37 Thomashausen Sophie, *Humanitarian Intervention in an Evolving World Order*, op.cit., p. 61
38 AdebajoAdekeye and Lekha Chandra), *Managing Armed Conflict in the 21st Century*, op.cit., p. 171
41 Ibid, p. 110
42 Stevenson, J, ‘Hope Restored in Somalia?’ op.cit., p. 145
Security Council authorized an additional 3,000 troops without consulting with Him or Mohamed Shanoun.\textsuperscript{43} In fact, Shanoun came to hear about this decision through the British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC) radio.\textsuperscript{44}

In his defence, the UN Secretary General explained that although the cease-fire was being respected, Mogadishu was still insecure due to banditry and looting and that the main challenge was the protection on convoys delivering humanitarian aid to distribution centres. This prompted the Security Council to adapt Resolution 775 that called for additional troops. In addition to this, UNOSOM would carry out demobilization and disarmament and assist national reconciliation.\textsuperscript{45}

The USA assisted in airlifting the Pakistani contingent in early September 1992; but the troops were prevented from leaving the airport by the warring factions and consequently were unable to execute any of the mandates objectives.\textsuperscript{46} During the same period, the Security Council had authorized the deployment of 4,219 troops but by the time only 900 had arrived in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{47} The proposed additional troops never arrived although is argued that it was unlikely that they would have made any difference to the status quo.\textsuperscript{48}

By November, 1992 the Pakistani troops were regarded as adversaries by Mohamed Farah Aideed’s force and came under heavy fire. The security situation became so fluid that the troops had to hire 1,000 armed Somalis for ‘protection’ of the airport. The Security Council acknowledged the traditional peace keeping were not suited for Somali context.\textsuperscript{49}

This prompted the Security Council to agree that the situation in Mogadishu had gotten out of hand and that the use of force under Chapter VII of the charter to deliver humanitarian aid needed to be

\textsuperscript{43}O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era}, op.cit., pp. 111 -112
\textsuperscript{44}Thomashausen Sophie, \textit{Humanitarian Intervention in an Evolving World Order}, op.cit., p. 62
\textsuperscript{46}Thomashausen Sophie, \textit{Humanitarian Intervention in an Evolving World Order}, op.cit., p. 62
\textsuperscript{48}O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era}, op.cit., pp. 111 -112
\textsuperscript{49}Thomashausen Sophie, \textit{Humanitarian Intervention in an Evolving World Order}, op.cit., p. 63
explored.\textsuperscript{50} Even though the warring parties did not explicitly withdraw consent, Mohamed Farah Aideed’s actions provided justification for the Security Council to consider using enforcement measures to address the situation before the entire mission failed. USA made it known that it was ready to take the lead in organizing the peace enforcement mission.\textsuperscript{51} The UN members did not object to the USA proposal as the UN had not succeeded in the deployment of the additional 3,000 troops and felt that the USA provided a workable alternative solution.\textsuperscript{52}

Due to the lack of a functioning government, at least a dozen or more factions struggled over power. Neither Mohamed Farah Aideed nor Ali Mohamed Mahdi could control the situation. The political chaos that ensued continued to prevent the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Somali authorities began to compete for any resources perceived as being valuable and international aid assumed its place as a major source of income. Looting of warehouses and convoys became a daily norm. A significant amount of relief food was available but they could not be distributed due to security fears.\textsuperscript{53}

3.3.2 Unified Task Force (UNITAF)

When the public distress in the US grew over the plight of Somalia, on December 4th 1992, President George Bush announced the initiation of ‘Operation Restore Hope.’ USA was authorized by the Security Council to provide military forces to multinational coalition to be known as the Unified Task Force or UNITAF. The rational was that as soon as the security situation stabilizes, UNITAF would be handed over to a permanent UN peacekeeping mission.\textsuperscript{54}

During the planning phase, the USA government was of the opinion that the risk of losing troops in Somalia was relatively low. In fact, in a briefing to the president on the military’s concept, it

\textsuperscript{50}O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era}, op.cit., p. 112
\textsuperscript{51}Phillip C., ‘Somalia: A very Special Case,’ op.cit., p. 532
\textsuperscript{52}O’Neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era}, op.cit., p. 120
\textsuperscript{53}Phillip C., ‘Somalia: A very Special Case,’ op.cit., p. 530
was estimated that the number of USA fatalities would be about 20.\(^{55}\) According to a poll 85% of the public was in support of sending the troops to Somalia while 70% agreed that it was worth the risk undertaking the mission even at the potential loss of American lives.\(^{56}\)

Presidents Bush’s action was related to his perception of the role of USA as global humanitarian watchdog for victims of bullies following its successful role in the gulf war, where Saddam Hussein was defeated. Bush was responding to the sympathy of the American citizens who witnessed through the media starving Somali Children and Somali militia looting food before this food reached its intended beneficiaries.\(^{57}\)

Another motivating factor is that George Bush had just lost the elections may have wanted to leave office on a high note as well as preserve his legacy as a great foreign policy president.\(^{58}\) The following day (after losing the elections) President Bush made the announcement regarding the deployment of troops to Somalia and the President-elect, Bill Clinton immediately endorsed it. On December 8\(^{th}\), 1992 the first USA forces landed in Mogadishu.\(^{59}\)

Operation Restore Hope’s mandate was to use USA military to protect Non-governmental Organizations (NGO’s) to enable them to gain access to providing humanitarian relief to the suffering Somali civilian population.\(^{60}\) In order to achieve this objective, UNITAF was required to liaison with humanitarian organizations in order to effectively carry out relief operations.\(^{61}\)

Although the UN facilitated the establishment of UNITAF, it had no role in the organizing of or commanding the troops that were deployed to fulfil its mandate. USA had the largest share of troops

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\(^{56}\) Thomashausen Sophie, *Humanitarian Intervention in an Evolving World Order*, op.cit., p. 64


\(^{58}\) Baum M., ’How Public Opinion Constraints the Use of Force: The Case of Operation Restore Hope,’ op.cit., p. 199

\(^{59}\) Ibid, p. 201


and assumed operational command although in essence they were to cooperate with the UN headquarters as well as UNOSOM staff in Mogadishu.  

The Security Council authorized this peace enforcement mission through the adoption of resolution 749 which unambiguously authorized the USA and other troop contributing countries to ‘use all necessary means’ to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. Under ‘Operation Restore Hope’, the USA agreed to provide 28,000 troops and following troop contributions from other countries, UNITAF had 37,000 troops when at full strength.  

UNITAF’s action was often described as a prime example of the ‘CNN effect.’ In the end 26,000 Americans were deployed and more than 20 other nations jointly contributed an additional 11,000 troops. UNITAF’s first units arrived in Mogadishu along with live press coverage to no opposition from the factions and were generally welcomed by the citizens. This time round, the faction leaders were not consulted but they did not object to the deployment. Mohamed Farah Aideed in particular believed that the Americans did not share the UN’s intention of colonizing Somalia.

Many of the citizens in need of assistance viewed the Americans as champions that would bring back normalcy to their lives and re-build the country. Somalis also had high expectations for UNITAF to solve the root causes of insecurity and disarm the warlords. However with time, the operation was unable to disarm the perpetuators of the conflict. Consequently, Somalis gradually placed less hope on the UN and the gunmen became more confident.

The Secretary General submitted a letter to President Bush advising that if UNITAF was to be effective in light of the prevailing situation it should ensure heavy weapons of the organized factions be

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62 Phillips C., ‘Somalia: A very Special Case,’ op.cit., p. 535
63 O’Neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, op.cit., p. 113
64 Wess Thomas G., Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crisis, op.cit., p. 82
65 Ibid, p. 83
66 Ibid, p. 84
67 O’Neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, op.cit., 113
69 O’Neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, op.cit., p. 114
under the control of the international community. Also the militia forces and gangs should be disarmed before UNITAF withdraws. Secondly the letter recommended that UNITAF’s mandate should be applied to the whole of Somalia and not just Mogadishu and its surroundings.\textsuperscript{70}

However the USA government’s position was that disarmament was not part of the mission; and Somali warlords were informed that they could keep their weapons as long as they moved outside Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{71} USA insisted in a narrower interpretation of the mandate in order to avoid any action that would prolong the mission.\textsuperscript{72}

In May 1993, UNITAF concluded its operation and handed over its responsibilities to the UN. The UN peacekeeping force was known as UNOSOM II.\textsuperscript{73} On May 4\textsuperscript{th} 1993, UNITAF operationally closed as a peacekeeping mission; while at the same time UNOSOM II took over.\textsuperscript{74} This episode left Somalia far from being secure.\textsuperscript{75} Although they had maximum military strength, in the end, the Americans did a minimum job. The American force left without addressing all the underlying issues.\textsuperscript{76}

3.3.3 United Nations Operation In Somalia (UNOSOM) II

On 26\textsuperscript{th} March 1993, through the UN Security Council resolution number 814 UNOSOM II was officially authorized to take over UNITAF on 3\textsuperscript{rd} May 1993. Its mandate was to protect UN, NGO and ICRC personnel and equipment; continue demining; protect all ports and airports; and assist in the repatriation of refugees and the displaced.\textsuperscript{77}

UNOSOM II was the first UN peacekeeping mission in the UN history to be given a mandate to use force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In addition, UNOSOM II was mandated to disarm

\textsuperscript{70}Phillip C., ‘Somalia: A very Special Case,’op.cit., p. 535  
\textsuperscript{71}Ibid, p. 532  
\textsuperscript{72}Woodhouse Tom and Ramsbotham Oliver, \textit{Peace Keeping and Conflict Resolution}, op.cit., p. 40  
\textsuperscript{73}Hoffmann Elias P., \textit{Somalia: Economic Political and Social Issues}, op.cit. p. 204  
\textsuperscript{74}Walter Clark and Jeffery Herbst, \textit{Learning From Somalia: Lessons of Armed and Humanitarian Intervention}, op.cit., p. 99  
\textsuperscript{76}O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era},op.cit., p. 125  
\textsuperscript{77}Wess Thomas G., \textit{Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crisis},op.cit., p. 88
Somali militias unlike UNITAF. Also, contained in its mandate was a nation-building element; as well as enforcing security throughout the country. UNOSOM II was under the direct control of the UN Secretary General. The Security Council authorized twenty thousand soldiers to be deployed. However UNOSOM II’s maximum strength reached only sixteen thousand.

On June 5th 1993, a major incident made it difficult to envisage any further peaceful developments. While the UNOSOM II troops were inspecting an arms-depot that belonged to Mohamed Farah Aideed, SNA supporters launched an attack against them. They claimed the attack was in response to the UN attempts to destroy the SNA radio station. During the bloody confrontation 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed as well as 35 Somalis (including women and children). The death of the Pakistani troops marked the highest number of casualties in a single day in the UN peacekeeping history.

The UN Security Council had the option of holding an independent inquiry but instead chose to marginalize Mohamed Farah Aideed politically and in effect declared war though the passing of resolution 837 on June 6th 1993. The resolution 837 strongly condemned the action further stating that it was well calculated and it aimed at intimidating UNOSOM II from carrying out its mandate. In the resolution the UN Security Council also affirmed that it would take all necessary actions against the attackers. The Council finally called for the rapid deployment of additional troops to meet the full requirement of 28,000 personnel.

UNOSOM II launched aerial and ground attacks with the aim of targeting SNA leader’s Residences. In retaliation, in early July the SNA aggressively attacked the UN forces with a variety of weapons including propelled grenades. On 3rd October 1993 Mohamed Farah Aideed’s forces

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78 Richmond Oliver P., *Maintaining Order, Making Peace*, op.cit., p. 115
80 Phillip C., ‘Somalia: A very Special Case,’ op.cit., p. 541
82 Thomashausen Sophie, *Humanitarian Intervention in an Evolving World Order*, op.cit., p. 107
84 Phillip C., ‘Somalia: A very Special Case,’ op.cit., p. 541
succeeded in shooting down two American helicopters and captured an American airman. (18 USA marines lost their lives 1 Malaysian killed, 78 USA, 9 Malaysian and 3 Pakistani wounded). The ‘CNN factor’ that led to the USA involvement also ended; when images of a dead American soldier being dragged in the streets of Mogadishu was broadcasted. Consequently, American’s could not justify why they were in Somalia. Following a public out-cry, President Clinton announced on October 7th 1993 that all the USA troops would withdraw from Somalia by 31st March 1994. The dragging of the dead-American-soldier was an episode that marked the end of the ‘New World Order.’

In order to avoid the backlash of the public, following the killings of the American soldiers and the humiliation of the dragged soldier through the streets of Mogadishu, the American media blamed the UN; yet the blotched mission was planned and executed under American command. ‘Operation Restore Hope’ had now become ‘Operation Return Home’.

In February 1994, the Security Council established a Commission of Inquiry by following the withdrawal of the United States. Also it concluded that both USA and Mohamed Farah Aideed were to be blamed for the vicious confrontation in the streets of Mogadishu. The UN Commission of inquiry further established that UNOSOM II was incapable of overcoming the challenges it faced; due to the limited size of its force and limited scope of its mandate. The commission agreed that the ambition to disarm the militia should be discontinued. In addition it recommended that the UN should support; but not insist in a particular methodology for resolving the Somali conflict. It emphasised that if a solution was to be formulated it should not contradict the framework of the UN Charter.

The commission recommended that the UN should refrain from undertaking peace enforcement actions within internal conflicts. Instead it suggested increasing the use of preventive diplomacy and

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85 O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, op.cit., p. 117
86 OtunnuOlara A. and Doyle Michael W., Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century, op.cit., p. 132
87 Wess Thomas G., Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crisis, op.cit., p. 172
88 Thakur R., ‘Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia,’ op.cit., p. 388
89 O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, op.cit., p. 121
90 Ibid, p. 123
peace building. However, if all peaceful means of resolving the conflict were explored and found to be ineffective; then enforcement actions was deemed necessary it should be accompanied with a clear mandate.91

When developed countries followed suite and withdrew their forces by leaving Asian, African and Arab troops, these contingents were left with minimum modern military equipment; and the violence against the UN escalated.92

By the end of March 1994 Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mohamed Mahdi signed an agreement to disarm, end the violence, and form an interim government but this did not happen. The UN Security Council Resolution 897 revised the UNOSOM II mandate from a peace-enforcement to a peacekeeping mission with the aim to reduce the military contingent to 22,000 troops; basically to be drawn from developing countries. However, with the inability of the faction leaders to reach a pacific agreement, the security situation on the ground continued to deteriorate. In September 1994, the UN announced that the entire operation would end.93 Somalia was left as anarchic as they had found it.94 It was literally left without a central government; and divided into several regions controlled by clan-based factions.95

The unresolved conflict in Somalia was eventually passed on to IGAD; and East African states who sponsored mediation talksamong the fighting factions. This continued throughout the mid 1990’s to mid-2005; and when the time came, ‘one more’ reconciliation conference was organized; but little was accomplished in Mogadishu and South Central regions.96

91 Findlay Trevor, Challenges for the New Peacekeepers, op.cit., p. 28
93 O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era,op.cit., p. 118
94 OtunnuOlara A. and Doyle Michael W., Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century,op.cit., p. 172
95 Hoffmann Elias P., Somalia: Economic Political and Social Issues, op.cit., p. 204
96 Gassim Mariam A., Somalia: Clan Vs. Nation,op.cit., p. 95
3.4 Lessons Learnt From UNITAF and UNOSOM I and II

Somalia’s experience with regards to peacekeeping missions highlighted some fundamental and perennial aspects of peacekeeping that needed to be urgently addressed. Examined from a feasible international system’s context; the UN operations in Somalia namely: UNITAF and UNOSOM I and II demonstrated the challenges of embarking upon rehabilitation and reconstruction in failed or failing states. For instance, by November, 1992, it was evident that the crisis situation in Somalia was getting worse off; and the peacekeeping force was in desperate need of assistance; that demonstrated it did not contribute to the realization of a ‘new world order’. There are questions as to whether the international community’s involvement in Somalia can be considered an outright failure; and if so, what went wrong. It is also important to explore what lessons can be learnt from the peacekeeping experience in Somalia.

The lessons learnt from UNITAF and UNOSOM I and II are but not limited to: (a) matching mandates to needs, (b) communicating the purpose of the mission to the local community and the international media, (c) the need for troop contributing countries to focus on preparing their citizens psychologically for some of the high risks in peacekeeping operations, (d) the importance of a unified command, and (e) using the appropriate response for circumstances where the use of force is inevitable in self-defence or where the use of force may be counterproductive.

The above points are further explained as follows:

IMPORTANCE OF CLEAR MANDATES

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98 Richmond Oliver P., Maintaining Order, Making Peace, op.cit., pp. 161-162
99 Thomashausen Sophie, Humanitarian Intervention in an Evolving World Order, op.cit., p. 56
An evaluation on UNOSOM II actions that was conducted by the UN itself revealed that the peacekeeping mission had vague mandates that were open to different interpretations; and changed frequently during its operational period. The mandates evolved from the delivery of humanitarian assistance, assisting political reconciliation, establishing a secure environment, to the capturing of Mohamed Farah Aideed; and later inviting him to negotiate with other faction leaders. These mandates were contradictory. The changes were more often implemented without providing clear explanation to: (a) member states, (b) troop contributing countries, (c) the humanitarian community in Somalia and (d) the Somali people. Consequently UNOSOM II was bombarded with disagreements from the stakeholders which eventually led to clashes between UNOSOM II and some elements of the Somali community.

Therefore the evaluation concluded that the mandate of a peacekeeping operation should be clearly spelled out; in order to leave no ambiguity. In addition, troop contributing countries should be consulted during the formulation phase and have their responsibilities explained so that they do not seek contradictory directives directly from their governments.\textsuperscript{101}

While it is the responsibility of the Security Council to formulate mandates, the Secretariat should provide a comprehensive baseline assessment of the political, military and humanitarian situation so that a practical mandate that reflects the realities on the ground can be developed or even determine in the first place whether a peacekeeping operation should be established to deal with a particular crisis. If there are limited human and financial resources for the implementation of the mandate then the council should revise the objectives accordingly.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid, p. 5
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid, p. 6
The Somali experience brought to light the dangers of a mission’s mandate going beyond the political will of troop contributors. It even led to countries (notably the USA) adopting the policy of not contributing peacekeeping troops to African countries.103

**SIGNIFICANCE OF PLANNING**

Every peacekeeping mission should have a detailed plan based on reliable information and sound assessment as it is critical to the success of the mission. Such plans should include but not limited to: (a) clear mission statement, (b) command relations, (c) rules of engagement, (d) coordination procedures, (d) standard operating procedures, (e) intelligence management, and (d) administrative and logistics policy procedures. This was not done for UNOSOM II ultimately leading its actions to undesirable consequences104.

Even from the onset, the technical team that was sent to assess the situation in Somalia prior to the arrival of UNOSOM I was drawn from other peacekeeping operations and was not available for consultation. In addition the UN’s findings with regard to the security situation proved to be an underestimation of the challenges the UN mission would face.105 Generally, the Somalia intervention was not based on a concrete plan but instead it evolved as a result of ad hoc directives in the form of coercive arms embargos; humanitarian access and disarmament; while in pursuit of reconciliation, local endorsements were hurriedly sought by singing of agreements at peace conferences.106

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It is important to recognize that a force cannot be deployed under a peace enforcement mandate and then later change its roles to a traditional peacekeeping force. This was the case when USA carried out an offensive operation as part of UNOSOM II mission.\textsuperscript{107}

Although peacekeeping missions’ operational period is implied in its mandate, there should be an entry and exit strategy put in place. Although UNITAF forces were withdrawn on schedule it lacked an effective transition phase, which affected the performance of UNOSOM II.\textsuperscript{108}

**SIGNIFICANCE OF TIMELY DEPLOYMENT**

Timely deployment of troops from contributing countries is another critical factor. This was a major impediment UNOSOM II. Some national contingents arrived months later than was initially anticipated; which greatly affected the performance of the mission. Compliance of commitments made by members-states is an issue that should be clearly addressed.\textsuperscript{109}

Likewise, Mohamed Shanoun believed that had the UNOSOM 500 Pakistani peacekeepers been deployed before September 1992, it would have made a significant positive impact of the situation.\textsuperscript{110} The security and humanitarian situation worsened as it could not keep up with the demands that needed to be addressed as a result of the internal UN bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{111}

**LOSS OF OPPORTUNITIES AND KEEPING THE MOMENTUM**

The failure to disarm the war lords proved to be a tragic error. Disarmament would have sent an early and strong signal indicating that USA and the UN were keen on restoring peace and order. Many of the warlords who were expecting to be disarmed were surprised by UNITAF. The warlords waited

\textsuperscript{107} Murphy Ray, *UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues*, op.cit., p. 59
\textsuperscript{110} O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, op.cit., p. 111
\textsuperscript{111} Murphy Ray, *UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues*, op.cit., p. 52
until the USA left Somalia and challenged UNOSOM II, which had fewer arms and a more delicate command structure.\textsuperscript{112}

UNITAF’s credibility, which it had gained during the first weeks of its operation, was seriously undermined by its inconsistency with regards to disarmament. Heavy weapons remained in the arms of the warlords and smalls arms were confiscated leaving petty traders, drivers and farmers without protection.\textsuperscript{113} This was done in order to secure the delivery of food and medicine.\textsuperscript{114}

Although the Security Council imposed an arms embargo in Somalia in the 1992 UN Security Council Resolution 733, the Sanctions Committee rarely met and worse, it did not take any action to ensure that it was being enforced. Warlords and private militias continued to acquire weapons that were readily available in the local markets.\textsuperscript{115}

However, it can also be argued that disarmament would have increased the fears that one party would be disadvantaged over the other in an attempt to disarm one group and not all. Even though the UN would have been successful in disarmament it would have not guaranteed the cessation of hostilities as seen in the case of Rwanda, where sophisticated weapons were not required during the spread of the conflict. The conflict resolution required more consultation and consensus rather than enforcement.\textsuperscript{116} Disarmament is also not practical in the absence of alternative economic opportunities.\textsuperscript{117}

In addition a complete disarmament would have required huge resources and efforts and possibly the UN might have had to provide protection for Somalia for a period of years.\textsuperscript{118} If there was the presence of a functioning police force, the Somalis may have been willing to disarm but only a handful

\textsuperscript{113}Brons Maria, \textit{Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia: From Statelessness to Statelessness}, op.cit., p. 234
\textsuperscript{114}Gassim Mariam A., \textit{Somalia: Clan Vs. Nation}, op.cit., p. 90
\textsuperscript{116}O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era}, op.cit., p. 133
\textsuperscript{117}Ibid, pp. 123-124
\textsuperscript{118}Ibid, p. 125
of member states provided the police training and the equipment required. UNITAF’s unilateral decision to disarm selectively left weapons to the hardened bandits; which only made the latter more inclined to shoot first as they feared that an attempt would be made to also disarm them.\textsuperscript{119}

**SIGNIFICANCE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS**

There was no information dissemination strategy in the case of UNOSOM II. Whenever an information campaign was attempted, it lacked adequate resources. When something goes wrong with an operation there should be damage control put into effect by explaining why it occurred and by giving an assurance of what will be done in the future to avoid it. In countries such as Somalia where the literacy levels are low and where an emphasis on oral tradition is the only traditional tool; information dissemination by radio should have played the most effective medium. Instead newspapers and leaflets were issued which in turn had a minimal impact since only a handful of locals could read them.

“UNOSOM II lacked the proper machinery to explain as to why it was in Somalia; what its mandates were; and why these mandates were being changed; what was expected of the Somali people and what they could expect from the UN.”\textsuperscript{120}

The faction leaders took advantage of the blunders made by the UN. They exploited the feelings of frustrations among the locals by holding public rallies, political slogans and radio and other communication mechanisms against the UN; portraying the organization as a quasi-UN-trusteeship. Some locals also perceived the UN soldiers as an occupation army. All these seemed to provoke the Somalis yearning for sovereignty despite their inability to control the conflict.\textsuperscript{121}

The growing tension between UNOSOM II and Mohamed Farah Aideed increased with anti UN broadcasts disseminated on the radio with such accusations that the UN was too aggressive and its aim

\textsuperscript{119}Stevenson, J, ‘Hope Restored in Somalia?’ op.cit., p. 139

\textsuperscript{120}Eisele M., *The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)*, op.cit., p. 18

\textsuperscript{121}Brons Maria, *Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia: From Statelessness to Statelessness?* op.cit., p. 235
was to colonize Somalia. Contrary to this Mohamed Farah Aideed was at a vantage point as he was up-to-date with the UN’s intentions and therefore was able to organize demonstrations, create roadblocks and strategically stationed military forces at very short notice.

Most Somalis possess radios which they listen to diligently with almost the same attentions they give to their daily Muslim prayers. Instead the UN chose to drop leaflets unknown to the locals; as it was prepared in pigeon Somali that read: “Slave nations have come to help you” (instead of ‘United Nations’). Although minor, this oversight had serious implications.

**IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING PEACEKEEPERS**

Training is essential for all personnel in UN peacekeeping operations as it has a direct bearing on the effectiveness of the operations. The training of peacekeeping troops should be conducted before deployment and if necessary in collaboration with the UN. Many of the contingents arrived in Somalia with no background knowledge of its history and culture and that of the realities on the ground. It however should be noted that some contingents such as the ones from Australia made an effort to understand some cultural aspects of the Somalis.

Positive relationships with the local population are fostered when cultural traditions and social norms are respected. The Somali society has a deep rooted clan structure. That means it would have been more effective to work with the clan elders; and involve them in the peace making processes rather than cooperate with the main faction leaders. In trying to find a quick fix through holding highly

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123 Ibid, p. 131
124 Woodhouse Tom and Ramsbotham Oliver, *Peace Keeping and Conflict Resolution*, op.cit., p. 160
125 Ibid, p. 160
127 Woodhouse Tom and Ramsbotham Oliver, *Peace Keeping and Conflict Resolution*, op.cit., p. 157
funded peace conferences in the ‘western style’, the reconciliation efforts did not bear fruits, as they did not take time to understand the problem by looking at the Somali context.\textsuperscript{129}

‘Somalis’ rich history of traditional mechanisms for dealing with inter-clan disputes makes them as experienced in peace making and conflict resolution as they are at making war. Traditional means of resolving conflict were available. However, the enormous potential for a bottom-up approach, as well as grassroots approach to the Somali conflict was ignored by the UN in favour of hierarchical political structures and formal, highly publicized and costly peace conferences.\textsuperscript{130}

Due to ignorance, the peacekeepers were engaged into looking for translators to ask local populations to take them to their leader yet in effect there was no single leader in the clan set-up.\textsuperscript{131}

\textbf{SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPARTIALITY IN PEACEKEEPING}

A peacekeeping force should be impartial. The peacekeepers also require local support so that they are not perceived as being neo-colonialists.\textsuperscript{132} However to ensure impartiality in a conflict that involves many parties is a challenge.\textsuperscript{133} In 1993, the increasing number of unprovoked attacks made by various faction fighters targeted at UN personnel marked a critical change in the relationships between the two warring parties.\textsuperscript{134}

In order to remain impartial, peacekeeping forces should not take sides in disputes. Through the attempt to capture Mohamed Farah Aideed the peacekeepers forfeited pretences of impartiality and became part of the conflict.\textsuperscript{135} While on the other hand Mohamed Farah Aideed was of the view that the UN was supporting his rival Ali Mohamed Mahdi.\textsuperscript{136} Mohamed Farah Aideed also believed that

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\textsuperscript{129}Phillip C., ‘Somalia: A very Special Case,’ op.cit., p. 533
\textsuperscript{130}Woodhouse Tom and Ramsbotham Oliver, \textit{Peace Keeping and Conflict Resolution}, op.cit., p. 160\textsuperscript{131}Francis David J. and Faal Mohammed et al, \textit{The Dangers of Co-deployment, UN Co-operative Peacekeeping in Africa}, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2005) p. 96
\textsuperscript{132}Richmond Oliver P., \textit{Maintaining Order, Making Peace}, op.cit., p. 162
\textsuperscript{134}Brons Maria, \textit{Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia: From Statelessness to Statelessness?}, op.cit., p. 234
\textsuperscript{135}Allen R., ‘Lessons Learned From Somalia: The Dilemma of Peace Enforcement,’ \textit{CSC}, (1997) p. 31
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Boutros-Ghali was an alley of Said Barre and this reduced the influence of the UN events on the ground.\textsuperscript{137}

UNSOM II forces focused so much on the street patrolling in the search for Mohamed Farah Aideed supporters and neglected the safety of ordinary citizens. Air strikes targeted at suspected hideouts caused hundreds of uninvolved Somali people. At the same time there was resentment of the UN soldiers who were accused of treating Somali citizens in inhumane manners.\textsuperscript{138} It is also believed that the behaviour of the American troops towards Somalis significantly changed when they moved operationally from UNITAF to UNISOM II. During the former they operated with restraint however once with UNOSOM II, they were more aggressive. This was a manifestation of the ‘mission creep’.\textsuperscript{139}

The perceived obsession with the UN to protect its force was not well received by the Somalis. The USA troops were always heavily armed; wore flak jackets and helmets; and were under constant guard of helicopters and other protection forces. The Somalis gave them the nick name ‘human tanks’ and it is believed that this could have been a factor creating the aggression towards the Americans in 1993.\textsuperscript{140}

There were at least two reported incidents in which the blue helmets opened fire on Anti-UN demonstrations. Somalis were also detained without trial for up to 45 days and this were documented and openly admitted during press conferences.\textsuperscript{141} There should have been an ombudsman specifically assigned for the Somali people in order to address these shortcomings and win back the confidence of the civilians whom they were supposed to be protecting. Regardless of whether troops come in as

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\item[]AdebajoAdekeye and Lekha Chandra, \textit{Managing Armed Conflict in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century}, op.cit., p. 181
\item[]Brons Maria, \textit{Society,Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia: From Statelessness to Statelessness?}, op.cit., p. 234
\item[]O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era}, op.cit., p. 130
\item[]Chesterman Simon, \textit{You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building}, op.cit., p. 123
\item[]Brons Maria, \textit{Society,Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia: From Statelessness to Statelessness?} op.cit., p. 238
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
peacekeepers or as peace enforcers’ support from all the parties involved in the conflict is essential.\textsuperscript{142} However, enforcement measures are extremely complex and should only been employed with caution under very exceptional circumstances.\textsuperscript{143}

**IMPORTANCE OF ADEQUATE FUNDING AND COMMITMENT TO PEACEKEEPING**

One of the major challenges in peacekeeping is that the Security Council usually approves a mission before its budget is submitted for approval. That means, the full costs of the mission are not yet known when it is approved.\textsuperscript{144}

The best scenario is that once the peacekeeping force is authorized, the number of the authorized forces should match the actual numbers needed on the ground. If not done, it impacts on the ability of the mission in ceasing the hostilities before they escalate. This also sends an un-intended message to the local parties to the conflict that there is lack of political will within the authorising organization.\textsuperscript{145} Equally when countries contributed their troops to UNOSOM II they did not fully consider the consequences of involving themselves with peace enforcement. Some contingents even lacked proper equipment or were unwilling to provide it.\textsuperscript{146}

On the one hand, UNOSOM II Demonstrated the disconnect between the mandates provided by the Security Council and the lack of political will of member states to provide financial and human resources needed to implement them.\textsuperscript{147} On the other hand, the USA deployed its huge and well-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{142}United States General Accounting office, ‘UN Peacekeeping: lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions,’ (December 1993) p. 6
  \item \textsuperscript{144}United States General Accounting office, ‘UN Peacekeeping: lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions,’ op.cit., p. 16
  \item \textsuperscript{145} Williams P., ‘Lessons Learned From Peace Operations in Africa,’ *Africa Security Brief*, No. 3 (March 2010) p. 3
  \item \textsuperscript{146}Phillip C., ‘Somalia: A very Special Case,’ op.cit., p. 551
  \item \textsuperscript{147} O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, op.cit., p. 124
\end{itemize}
equipped force so as to intimidate potential spoilers. In so doing, it raised expectations on what would be accomplished.\textsuperscript{148}

It also seems the UN cannot count on the commitment of troop contributing countries to remain resilient and ‘stay on course’ when faced by serious challenges. It has been noted that African and Asian states have taken causalities with no complaints. However, this has not been true for western developed countries.\textsuperscript{149} UNOSOM I did not succeed because they were not able to deploy the troops in time.\textsuperscript{150}

UNOSOM I had a shortage of vehicles communication and engineering equipment. Troops from developed countries were generally well equipped and they were self-sufficient but contingents from developing countries relied heavily on UN logistical support. There was also the issue of not having proper equipment needed for protection in such a volatile environment as Somalia. A case in point is when the 24 Pakistani soldiers were brutally attacked. The causalities were higher due to the fact that the Pakistani troops travelled in soft skinned vehicles and were not heavily armed. It was easy at the time to blame the UN for this blunder but it was also the responsibility of the member states to protect their respective troops.

Even with the USA, pleas for better equipment in the form of tanks, armoured fighting vehicles and artillery did not get seal of approval from the Defence Secretary and Chiefs of Staff. At his time, policy makers were not in full support of UNOSOM II.\textsuperscript{151} Meanwhile, the Somalis were heavily equipped and had no hesitation to use their equipment to the maximum extent. Whereas UNOSOM II had a mixture of contingents from those states that either lacked proper equipment; or were unwilling to provide it.\textsuperscript{152}

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\textsuperscript{148}Ibid, p. 120  
\textsuperscript{149}Otunnu Olaya A. and Doyle Michael W, Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century, op.cit. p. 284  
\textsuperscript{150}United States General Accounting office, ‘UN Peacekeeping: lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions,’ op.cit., p. 3  
\textsuperscript{151}O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, op.cit., p. 131  
\textsuperscript{152}Ibid, p. 132
\end{flushright}
The experience in Somalia impacted on the willingness of states to contribute to future operations. One serious implication as a result of this was also the international community’s reluctance to intervene in Rwanda’s internal conflict and consequently failed to prevent the 1994 genocide.153

**IMPORTANCE OF COORDINATION**

From the beginning, there was lack of communication between New York and the UNOSOM headquarters (that were based in Nairobi) and the personnel in Somalia. This was partly attributed to ideological differences between the Secretary General, the SRSG, as well as the organizational weaknesses of the UN. Additionally communication between the humanitarian community and peacekeepers was poor.154 One of the weaknesses in UNOSOM II was the command of control. Many of the contingents followed orders directly from their governments rather than from the UNOSOM II command. Countries were reluctant to have their lightly armed troops following directives from UN with the fear that a UN commander of any other nationality than their own would be less risk averse.155 The contingents also came in with different Rules of Engagement.156 Some like the Germans came under a traditional peacekeeping mandate; while others simply under the peace-enforcement mandate; which resulted to an awkward situation when shooting began.157

While it is essential for troop contributing countries to work together to work towards a common goal, it is important to liaise the humanitarian and civil components in order to develop functional synergies.158

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155 OtunnuOlara A. and Doyle Michael W., *Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century*, op.cit., p. 8
3.5 Conclusion

Somalia became a testing laboratory for approaches to peacekeeping; where the UN faced one of its greatest challenges. Despite the number of efforts made in the quest to resolve the conflict situations; the international community was widely criticized.\footnote{Woodhouse Tom and Ramsbotham Oliver, Peace Keeping and Conflict Resolution, op. cit., p. 153}

On the one hand, there was no doubt that during the 5-month mission, UNITAF created access for the Somalia population to receive humanitarian aid; that might have saved approximately 100,000 lives.\footnote{George, J, ‘The Politics of Peace: The Challenge of Civil-Military Cooperation in Somalia’ op. cit., p. 166} UNITAF protected installations such as ports airfields facilitated humanitarian organizations to carry out their mandates more efficiently\footnote{Clarke Walter and Herbst Jeffery, Learning Form Somalis: the lessons of armed humanitarian Intervention, op. cit., p. 105} . In addition UNITAF was successful in reducing banditry. It was instrumental in re-building roads and facilitating the return of refugees from neighbouring countries.\footnote{Adebajo Adekeye and Lekha Chandra, Managing Armed Conflict in the 21st Century, op. cit., p.171} The USA led task force also managed to subdue hostilities between warlords and armed factions.\footnote{Maner A., ‘Somalia is a Humanitarian Success Story’. ‘Insight on the News’, (April, 1994) p. 34}

On the other hand, UNOSOM provoked doubt as to whether the UN had the capacity to implement the activities necessary for second generation peacekeeping; namely: conflict prevention, humanitarian relief and nation building.\footnote{O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, op.cit., p. 133}

Despite its imperfections through the presence UNOSOM II, starvation had been significantly eradicated. Immunization programmes reduced the number of deaths caused by diseases; and schools that were closed for three years due to disease, hunger, and conflicts reopened. The district councils assumed responsibility of local governance and five thousand police were hired and trained by the UN. Many rehabilitation schemes that were sponsored by the UN and NGO’s had been launched.\footnote{Otunnu Olara A. and Doyle Michael W., Peacemaking and Peace Keeping for the New Century, op.cit., p. 283}

The ultimate goal of a peacekeeping operation should be to enforce compliance by the parties to the terms of a peace agreement; or create a stable environment in order to enable the warring parties to com-
dialogue. A peacekeeping operation should not aim to achieve military victory. This is an important lesson to learn from the UNOSOM II for future peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{166} When peacekeeping does not meet its objectives it damages the credibility of the organization(s) involved. The population is left worse off than they were previously. This draws scepticism with regard to the notion of peacekeeping. Therefore, when a decision is taken to deploy troops, the international community should be fully committed to ensure that it succeeds.\textsuperscript{167}

When UNOSOM II departed from Somalia in 1995, the international community was fatigued with the situation and gradually isolated Somalia. This became an expression of disappointment with Somalia’s intractable political crisis and endless need for donor support. Following this, the modest attention given to Somalia was almost entirely limited to humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation aid.\textsuperscript{168} UNOSOM II demonstrated that if a peacekeeping operation is orphaned by powerful member states like the USA then it is likely to fail.\textsuperscript{169}

It is common for citizens to pressure their governments to intervene during humanitarian crisis. But they are not in a position to objectively judge where and to what extent their involvement should be. Due to ignorance the public may react emotionally and sometimes irrationally. With the Somalia experience, the decision to intervene was supported by the emotional wave caused by television images of a starving population. However the public was unprepared to accept the level of force that was needed to stop the starvation.

When a peacekeeping mission fails, the permanent members are usually quick to look for the weaknesses within the mission; and intentionally they deflect attention away from themselves.

\textsuperscript{166} Francis David J. and Faal Mohammed, \textit{The Dangers of Co-deployment, UN Co-operative Peacekeeping in Africa}, op.cit., p. 42
\textsuperscript{168} Menkhaus K., ‘Conflict Analysis: Somalia,’op.cit., p.49
However peacekeeping missions can only succeed if they are given the required timely support and the means to act appropriately.
CHAPTER FOUR

PEACEKEEPING AND RECONCILIATION EFFORTS IN SOMALIA 1995-2012

4.0 Introduction

Chapter Four highlights the peace-making processes that took place in Somalia following the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping forces in 1995 until the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004. The Chapter then examines the challenges the TFG faced in trying to establish its authority in South Central Somalia and the opposition it faced from some Somali citizens which eventually led to the rise of the Islamic Union Courts (ICU). The military intervention of the Ethiopian Troops in aid of the TFG in 2006 is also covered in the chapter and explains how the Ethiopian intervention led to the rise of insurgents one of them being the Harakat Shabaab Al Mujahidin, also known as the Al-Shabaab.

The chapter then focuses on the AU peacekeeping efforts in Somalia from 2007, when the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) was deployed in Mogadishu to 2011 with a view of establishing the progress that was made and the challenges the peacekeeping mission faced during its first four years in Somalia. Kenya’s intervention in Somalia also analysed with a view to determine the motivation behind Kenya’s decision to intervene militarily and how the country was officially designated as part of AMISOM.

Finally the chapter focuses on the major achievements that AMISOM has made with regards to its peacekeeping activities in Somalia up to 2012. It also explain the lessons learnt with a view to provide recommendations on how the challenges, if possible can be overcome by the AU and other peacekeeping operations.

When the UNOSOM II withdrew from Somalia in 1995, the UN’s efforts to achieve a ceasefire and reconstruct Somalia’s Political system were put on hold and left in the hands of African nations.¹

In 1996 the Ethiopian government convened a peace process in the resort town of Sodere; where most political actors and factions leaders from Somalia participated in the talks but the process was unsuccessful. The following year, the government of Egypt organized a peace conference in Cairo; where participants agreed to a ceasefire but failed to honour the pledge. In 1998, another unsuccessful conference was convened in Bossaso, Somalia.

In February 2000 following the approval of a peace plan that was proposed by Djibouti IGAD stepped in; and by May 2000, the reconciliation process was initiated in Arta, Djibouti, and it lasted for several months. However, visibly absent were the powerful warlords and self-declared autonomous administrations of Puntland and Somaliland.²By August 13th 2000, the Arta participants agreed to a Transitional National Government (TNG) and the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and Abdulqassim Salad Hassan was appointed as President of the TNG. However the security stability in Somalia did not hold. This is because the TNA failed to secure its authority.³

Following several attempts made to put an end to the Somali crisis, in 2002, a notable effort was further made by IGAD with support provided by the OAU. A conference was held in Eldoret, Kenya. Yet, Somaliland boycotted the conference; while 350 delegates signed a temporary cease-fire agreement and agreed to honour the outcome of the conference. It was agreed that a federal system of government would be adopted; and the participants also made a commitment to fight terrorism.⁴

³ Mifsud M., ‘Civil and Food Insecurity in Somalia: An Analysis,’ JSTO, (September, 2007) p. 440
⁴ Hoffman Elias P. (ed), Somalia: Economic, Political and Social Issues, op.cit., p. 204
This time round the Eldoret reconciliation efforts engaged representatives from of warring factions that led to the agreement of the Transitional National Charter in 2003. Following this conference, an inauguration of 275-member transitional parliament took place in Nairobi in 2004. The transitional parliament in turn elected former warlord Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as the new president of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG).\(^5\) This occurred after signing several consecutive agreements.\(^6\)

### 4.2 The Rise and Fall of the Transitional Federal Government

After more than 13 years since the civil war broke out following the fall of Siad Barre, the TFG was the only hope for bringing peace and stability to Somalia.\(^7\) Contrary to the expectations of the international community as well as Somalis, the TFG failed to invest in a national reconciliation effort. From its inception it was consumed by infighting and failed to formulate a strategy for this important priority.\(^8\) In addition, the civil service was not functional and the TFG authorities were unable to provide services to the people.\(^9\)

Other challenges that the TFG experienced included: lack of funding, lack of coordination among its departments and across ministries, and corruption among senior officials.\(^10\) Following the failure to establish proper governance structures, internal divisions and dissatisfaction from the locals, the TFG leadership was opposed by the ICU, an Islamist organization; which in 2006 took much of the control of Southern and Central Somalia.\(^11\)

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\(^6\) Mifsud M., ‘Civil and Food Insecurity in Somalia: An Analysis,’ op.cit., p. 440

\(^7\) Swan J., *US Policy in the Horn of Africa*, op.cit., p. 1

\(^8\) International Crisis Group, ‘Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State,’ *Africa Report No. 147 (23rd December, 2008)* p. 8


\(^11\) Ibid, p. 2
Ironically, the rapid rise of power of the ICU in 2006 brought a sense of stability in Somalia. This was not seen during the Tenure of the war lord dominated TFG; and or the Tansitional National Government; who were unwilling and unable to provide it.\textsuperscript{12} When the ICU forcefully took over much of South and Central Somalia it managed to improve the civilian security and reopened the national ports and airports. The Arab league and Sudan attempted to hold mediation talks between the TFG and the ICU but both parties declined because each group believed that they were militarily superior over the other.\textsuperscript{13}

In 2006 several thousand Ethiopian troops with the approval from the TFG, entered Somalia to repulse the Islamic Courts militia that had taken over Mogadishu and were moving towards Baidoa which was the remaining strong hold for the TFG. The Ethiopian troops were successful in halting the advance and pushed the Islamic Courts out of Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{14} The Ethiopian intervention also received backing from the USA.\textsuperscript{15} Ethiopia’s armed forces ultimate goal was to hand over the control of Southern Somalia back to the TFG.\textsuperscript{16} The Ethiopian forces continued to remain in Mogadishu until January, 2009.\textsuperscript{17}

The Ethiopian main national interest in this intervention was to support a Somali government that would be Ethiopian-friendly.\textsuperscript{18} Secondly, Ethiopia supported the TFG due to fears that Islamists support insurgency groups in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and would spread their ideology across the wider parts of the region.\textsuperscript{19} The USA on the other hand was weary of the possibility that the Al-Qaeda may

\textsuperscript{12} Culmell Scarlett, CheruFatu et al., \textit{Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century}, op.cit., p. 94
\textsuperscript{13} Omar M., ‘Intervention in the Somali Conflict,’ \textit{Institute of Peace and Security Studies}, (December, 2012) p. 1
\textsuperscript{14} Shinn D., ‘International Efforts to Counter AL-Shabaab,’ \textit{E-International Relations}, (20\textsuperscript{th} February, 2012) p. 1
\textsuperscript{17} Shinn D., ‘International Efforts to Counter AL-Shabaab,’ op.cit. p. 1
\textsuperscript{19} Sharamo R. and Mesfin B., ‘Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa,’ \textit{Monograph, No. 178} (April, 2011) p. 103
take advantage of the authority vacuum in Somalia and would re-establish the facilities that it lost in Afghanistan.20

4.3 The Emergence of the Al-Shabaab

The Ethiopian intervention caused the ICU to break away into smaller groups; and ultimately this caused the advancement and growth of a few groups, one of them being the Harakat Shabaab Al Mujahidin, also known as the Al-Shabaab.21 Consequently, a new challenge emerged when the Al-Shabaab i.e. remnants of the militia wing of the ICU as well as clan militias continued to impose the TFG authority.22 The Al-Shabaab claimed the TFG leadership was a ‘puppet’ of western powers and allies of occupying forces. Other Islamists that were active in Somalia included Hisbul al-Islam, Ras Kamboni and Ahlu Sunaa Wal Jama’a (ASWH).23

The Al-Shabaab became particularly aggressive towards international aid workers through killings and kidnappings, and further causing some agencies and experts who were offering their support to the Somalis to leave the country due to security concerns.24 AL-Shabaab also took control of important sea ports which were of vital importance for Somalia’s economy.25

AL-Shabaab exploited the presence of the Ethiopian troops by rallying a cry for support within Somalia as well as Somalis living in the diaspora.26 Ensuing this, the motivation behind the recruitment of the Al-Shabaab varied. There were those within the group that genuinely supported the ideology of

20 Bellamy Alex J., Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect, op.cit., p. 174
25 Ibid, p. 27
26 Shinn D., ‘International Efforts to Counter AL-Shabaab,’ op.cit., p. 1
radical Islam while others joined as a means for acquiring political and economic empowerment and in the process vowed to fight against the government and foreign interveners.  


Due to reputation Somalia has with regards to the fighting external interveners as well as the complexity of the conflict, many international actors, especially from the developed countries strayed away from peacekeeping in Somalia. As a result no peacekeeping operation was conducted between March 1995; when the UN withdrew their forces and 2007. Nonetheless, as early as 2005, the AU peace and Security Council had been considering the deployment of a regional peacekeeping operation in Somalia. This was in response to the request made by the Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni in October, 2004.

At the request of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, in March 2005, IGAD approved the deployment of 10,000 peacekeepers. However, its members did not have the political will to see the initiative through; above all it was argued that IGAD did not have the provision for the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. The UN Security Council Resolution 1725 of 2006 followed when the UN Security Council reaffirmed its commitment to support the TFG to engage in an all-inclusive political process as was envisaged in the Transitional Federal Charter. In accordance to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council authorized IGAD and the AU to establish a ‘Protection Training Mission in Somalia.’ By early 2007, with approval from the UN Security Council, the AU authorized the deployment of a peacekeeping force in Mogadishu. This force was to replace the Ethiopians. The first countries to

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30 Ibid, p. 148
contribute to this force were Uganda and Burundi; but the forces were not quickly deployed; which explains why the Ethiopian troops remained for so long in Mogadishu.\footnote{Shinn D., ‘International Efforts to Counter AL-Shabaab,’ op.cit., p. 1}

AMISOM was created in January 19th 2007 through UN Security Council Resolution 1744; by following the decision made by the AU and UN Security Council.\footnote{Ferras P., ‘Security Stakes and Challenges in the Horn of Africa,’ Center for African Studies, University Institute of Lisbon (2013) p. 52} The resolution welcomed the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops and reaffirmed its commitment for the TFIs; and gave its authorization to establish a peacekeeping mission in Somalia with the understanding that a UN mission would take over after six months.\footnote{Oder, S. and Lisa P (eds.), Seeking Peace in Somalia: A Review of the Impact of AMISOM Police, op.cit., pp. 2-3}

However at the time there was no consensus in the UN Security Council making it firm that the UN would take over the peacekeeping force. Therefore, for the reference of the UN taking over was a statement made by the AU to pressure the UN Security Council to move towards that direction. This was seen as arguably as the most pressure a regional organization has put on the UN to deploy a peacekeeping operation. However the UN stood by the Secretary General repeatedly stating that the conditions were not viable for UN a peacekeeping operation.\footnote{Bellamy Alex J., Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect, op.cit., p. 178}

Nigeria, Malawi and Ghana pledged to contribute their troops for the mission but for a number of reasons this was also delayed.\footnote{Miyandazi L., ‘Kenya’s Military Intervention in Somalia: An Intricate Process,’ op.cit., p. 20} Ultimately, Uganda and Burundi were the only countries to honour their pledge toward troop contributions.\footnote{Oder, S. and Lisa P (eds.), Seeking Peace in Somalia: A Review of the Impact of AMISOM Police, op.cit., p. 3} During its inception the AU Authorized 7,500 troops and by February 2008 approximately 1,600 Ugandan and 800 Burundian troops were deployed.\footnote{Hoffman Elias P. Somalia: Economic, Political and Social Issues,op.cit., p. 152}

AMISOM’s overall mandate was to:
1. Support the reconciliation efforts in Somalia by working with all stakeholders.

2. Provide protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) and their key installations in order to enable them to carry out their functions.

3. Assist in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan of Somalia with emphasis on the re-building and training of all inclusive Somali security forces; while at the same time taking note of synergies with efforts being made by Somalia’s bilateral and multilateral partners.

4. Provide technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts.

5. Monitor the security situation in areas where troops are deployed.

6. Facilitate, as may be required, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of IDP’s.

7. Protect its personnel, installations and equipment, including exercising its right to self-defence.38

When AMISOM was initiated the Al-Shabaab described its move to launch peacekeeping operations in Somalia as imperialism and colonisation; and used this same message as a means of rallying sympathy and support.39

The Al-Shabaab also prevented humanitarian organizations from reaching to Somali people in need of help; and it caused the closure of a number of UN and INGO offices in Somalia due to security concerns.40 A fear among the international community was that the Al-Shabaab would establish a Taliban-style government. However, the peacekeeping efforts that were aimed at preventing the Al-Shabaab from taking power had also been used by the group to discredit the TFG and present

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40 Le Sage A., ‘Somalia’s Endless Transition: Breaking the Deadlock,’ op.cit., p. 3
themselves as freedom fighters with the aim of making the TFG and AMISOM seem like foreign impositions.\textsuperscript{41}

Instead of the TFG using the international support to fight the militias they were engaged in infighting, the international community responded by sending out a clear message indicating that the warring factions should resolve their differences; or else risk losing financial support. It was clear at this point that without AMISOM support the TFG would fall in hours. Indeed, AMISOM was the only thing preventing the TFG from collapsing and in the process the mission kept on coming under attack from AL-Shabaab and other insurgents. The peacekeepers responded by firing back at where the enemy fire came from; and in the process ended up bombarding civilian neighbourhoods.\textsuperscript{42} After pressure from the UN, the TFG organized a reconciliation conference that lasted from July to August, 2007. A cease fire was also agreed by clan elders; but it did not translate into action.\textsuperscript{43}

Further allegations of corruption caused the UN to halt the payment of police stipends in 2008 and this caused a rush of defections.\textsuperscript{44} At one point the price of an AK-47 bullet in Mogadishu fell sharply. This trend seemed to indicate that some of the ammunition that was supplied by donors to the TFG found its way into the black market. There were also reports indicating that Somali troops were selling their weapons to AL-Shabaab.\textsuperscript{45}

Neighbouring countries and the EU provided financial and technical support to the Transitional federal forces; but at the same time, troop desertions were numerous due to the lack of incentives, clear

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\textsuperscript{43} Bellamy Alex J., \textit{Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect}, op.cit., p. 180
\textsuperscript{44} Bruton B., ‘Somalia: A New Approach,’ op.cit., p. 13
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid, p. 14
\end{flushright}
command and control structures, equipment and accountability.\textsuperscript{46} At this point, the insurgents became technically stronger and more equipped than the TFG military.\textsuperscript{47}

On 29th February 2008, the AL-Shabaab was formally designated as a terrorist organization by the USA. In fact, prior to this, a few countries such as Norway, Canada, Australia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom were aware of the group’s activities and included them in their terrorism list. Due to this, the AL-Shabaab was now compared to the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{48}

On 18th August, 2008 a glimmer of hope for Somalia was experienced with the TFG having signed an agreement with the moderate Islamist group known as the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) in Djibouti. The major peace agreement reached at the reconciliation efforts called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops.\textsuperscript{49} The Djibouti agreement also called for a cessation of hostilities, and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force.\textsuperscript{50} The TFG parliament was expanded in order to include ARS representation and then elected the former ARS Chairman, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed as the president of Somalia in January, 2009.\textsuperscript{51} Meanwhile the AL-Shabaab and the Hizbul Islam joined their forces, refused to recognize the newly formed transitional government and declared Jihad against AMISOM and the TFG.\textsuperscript{52}

Soon after this episode suicide attacks were undertaken by AL-Shabaab in Somalia that targeted AMISOM, government officials, civilians, and key infrastructures such as the airports, the national theatre, and the presidential palace. The radicalization caused by these insurgents also increased their attacks on humanitarian workers.\textsuperscript{53} On October, 28th 2008 the AL-Shabaab were solely responsible for

\textsuperscript{47}Tadesse M., ‘Somalia: Bailing Out the TFG’, \textit{Issues on the Horn of Africa}, (December, 2009) p. 5
\textsuperscript{48}Tase P., ‘Terrorism, War and Conflict: An Analysis into the Horn of Africa, AL-Shabaab in Somalia; US and UN Efforts to Reduce Violence,’ op.cit., p. 28
\textsuperscript{50}Tadesse M., ‘Somalia: Bailing Out the TFG’, op.cit., p. 3
\textsuperscript{52}Omar M., ‘Intervention in the Somali Conflict,’ op.cit., p. 2
\textsuperscript{53}Bellamy Alex J., \textit{Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect}, op.cit., p. 179
simultaneously bombing the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) office and the Ethiopian consulate in Hargeisa and the UNDP office in Puntland.\textsuperscript{54}

The Al-Shabaab’s relevance was challenged following the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops in 2009 and the resignation of TFG President Yusuf and the subsequent creation of a unity government. The group then changed their tactics and identified two new enemies: (a) President Sheikh Ahmed Sheikh Sharif by portraying him as an infidel; and (b) the AMISOM troops whom they claimed supported him.\textsuperscript{55} President Sharif introduced the Islamist Sharia Law, which challenged the Al-Shabaab Islamic ideology.\textsuperscript{56} Despite this opposing move Sheikh Sharif did not prove to be a strong leader. Much of the political power was yielded by his subordinates who could not make any significant change compared to his predecessors.\textsuperscript{57}

On 22\textsuperscript{nd} February, 2009 the Al-Shabaab launched an attack at the Burundi contingent camp, killed 15 AMISOM troops, and injured 15 others. Another major attack occurred on 17\textsuperscript{th} September, 2009 when the Al-Shabaab used a UN vehicle that they previously looted; to enter an AMISOM base in Mogadishu and killed seventeen AMISOM troops, including the deputy chief commander.\textsuperscript{58} The 2009 attack on the AMISOM base in Mogadishu suggested that insurgents had deeply infiltrated the Somali security forces.\textsuperscript{59}

Following these two major incidents, the AU reached out to the UN to launch a UN peacekeeping mission in order to relieve the peacekeeping burden in Somalia. But the UN-Secretary General reiterated his statement by providing the following five conditions as a prerequisite for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force: (1) the establishment of an inclusive government, (2) the strengthening of

\textsuperscript{54} Omar M., ‘Intervention in the Somali Conflict,’ op.cit., p. 19
\textsuperscript{55} Roque P., ‘Somalia: Understanding Al-Shabaab,’ op.cit., p.3
\textsuperscript{56} Dersso S., ‘Somalia Dilemmas,’ op.cit., p. 6
\textsuperscript{57} Le Sage A., ‘Somalia’s Endless Transition: Breaking the Deadlock,’ op.cit., p. 1
\textsuperscript{58} Dersso S., ‘Somalia Dilemmas,’ op.cit., p. 7
the Government security forces, (3) a credible ceasefire, (4) the consent of all the main parties with regards to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, and (5) sufficient pledges in troops as well as equipment.\textsuperscript{60}

The same words had been previously echoed by the UN Former Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Annan in 2008; when he stated that the UN was overstretched in conflict areas; and should avoid taking on new responsibilities for as long as the major powers were unwilling to the support them.\textsuperscript{61}

While struggling to protect themselves from insurgents the AMISOM forces slightly grew to 5,200 by 2010; however being three years since its inception; the mission was far from achieving its mandate.\textsuperscript{62} Due to the limited number of troops AMISOM was limited to conducting patrols and providing the flow of humanitarian assistance into Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{63}

In 2011, AMISOM managed to attain considerable success in Somalia.\textsuperscript{64} A major milestone on the part of TFG as well as AMISOM occurred on 6\textsuperscript{th} August 2011 when the joint forces succeeded in overpowering and causing the AL-Shabaab to withdraw from Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{65} The mission managed to secure Mogadishu Airport, the presidential residence, and the Port of Mogadishu including the roads that connected these points. Unfortunately, this milestone was realized at a high cost in terms of troop casualties being killed or wounded.\textsuperscript{66}

At the same time, however, major parts of South Central and Central Somalia were largely controlled by Al-Shabaab. Both Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam remained adamantly in their quest to

\textsuperscript{60} Bellamy Alex J., \textit{Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect}, op.cit., p. 185
\textsuperscript{62} Bellamy Alex J., \textit{Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect}, op.cit., p. 180
\textsuperscript{63} Hoffman Elias P. \textit{Somalia: Economic, Political and Social Issues}, op.cit., p. 152
\textsuperscript{64}Wiklund C., ‘AMISOM: A model for a Peace Operation in Mali?’ op.cit., p. 1
\textsuperscript{65} Omar M., ‘Intervention in the Somali Conflict,’ op.cit., p. 10
\textsuperscript{66}Wiklund C., ‘AMISOM: A model for a Peace Operation in Mali?’ op.cit., p. 2
attack, the TFG, Somali civilians and AMISOM. In addition, the Al-Shabaab employed a new tactic in 2011 by way of increased use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicidal bombers. Civilians were also used as human-shields during cross fires made against AMISOM; which led to the accusation that AMISOM was indiscriminately shelling civilian populated regions.

The AL-Shabaab took advantage of the collateral damage that affected civilians to spread its propaganda in order to affect the credibility of AMISOM. However, with time, the AL-Shabaab began to lose its credibility among the Somalis. Consequently, whenever the AL-Shabaab captured an area and imposed its authority on the locals, it did not receive much welcome. A particular incident that did not go well with the Somalis was when the AL-Shabaab launched its suicide attack during a graduation ceremony of Benadir University killing the best and brightest youth in the Somali society. The TFG could have capitalized on the loss of support toward AL-Shabaab from the locals; but the infighting among senior officials continued. Two decisions that were made in 2011 caused international sponsors and actors to perceive the TFG as a self-serving authority that lacked the willingness to consolidate peace. Firstly, the TFG extended its terms of office responsibility for an additional year when it was due to expire in August 2011; and parliament sought to increase its term for an additional three years. Secondly, due to the lack of the TFG in controlling the political environment it was unable to provide cover for AMISOM which led the mission to be viewed as a combatant rather than a neutral peacekeeping force.

68 Lotze W., and Kasumba Y., ‘AMISOM and the Protection of Civilians,’ op.cit., p. 21
69 Ibid, p. 21
70 Le Sage A., ‘Somalia’s Endless Transition: Breaking the Deadlock,’ op.cit., p. 3
71 Ibid, p. 3
73 Bruton B., ‘Somalia: A New Approach,’ op.cit., p. 23
4.5 Kenya’s Military Intervention

In October 2011, Kenya with little consultations suddenly launched an attack in Somalia. The USA also claimed that it was not involved in the decision making processes. There were also conflicting reports from the TFG in Somalia where some officials were stating that there had been consultations made while others denied it.\textsuperscript{74}

The Kenyan Government had considered intervening in Somalia prior to this episode; but it was accelerated by cross-border kidnappings targeted at Kenyan tourists and aid workers operating at the Dabaab Refugee Camp. Obviously, Kenya’s economy relies heavily on the tourism industry and it has numerous international humanitarian relief agencies operating from Nairobi with some servicing inside Somalia.\textsuperscript{75} The cross border kidnappings had posed a critical economic and social threat to Kenyan tourists as well investors were reluctant to visit the country. Kenyan citizens along the Kenya-Somalia border also become weary of their security.\textsuperscript{76}

The intervention was announced by the Late Internal Security Minister Professor George Saitoti along with the Defence Minister Haji, on 16\textsuperscript{th} October, 2011; but President Mwai Kibaki made it known to the public two days later.\textsuperscript{77} The Kenyan operation was named: 'Operation Linda Nchi' (Protect the country).\textsuperscript{78}

Kenya claimed the episode as its sole right to self-defence under article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognizes the right to individual of collective defence in the wake of an armed attack against a member of the UN.\textsuperscript{79} From the onset it was not clear why Kenya decided to intervene militarily. Early in the campaign the Kenyan government claimed it intended to seize the port of Kismayo from the AL-

\textsuperscript{74} Shinn D., ‘International Efforts to Counter AL-Shabaab,’ op.cit., p. 1
\textsuperscript{76} Miyandazi L., ‘Kenya’s Military Intervention in Somalia: An Intricate Process,’ op.cit., p. 1
\textsuperscript{77} International Crisis Group, ‘The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia,’ op.cit., p. 3
\textsuperscript{78} Miyandazi L., ‘Kenya’s Military Intervention in Somalia: An Intricate Process,’ op.cit., p. 1
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid, p. 3
Shabaab and create a buffer zone along the Kenya-Somalia border. But its military efforts were hampered due to the onset of the rainy season and the Kenyan government did little to report on its military goals and progress.\(^\text{80}\)

Kenya may also have some economic interest in Somalia as one of the African countries that are keen on oil exploration. Some reports to this effect indicate the potential areas of exploration that lie in Somalia’s waters. That means, an advance into Somalia would ensure the sites are available for Kenya’s exploration.\(^\text{81}\)

In December, 2011 the AU approved the participation of the Kenyan troops\(^\text{82}\) and by early January, 2012 Kenya made its official request for its troops to become part of the AMISOM operation with the aim to defeat the AL-Shabaab and al-Qaeda networks in Somalia. The Kenyan Defence Spokesman further added that Kenya would not leave Somalia until it regained its status as a Nation. On 22\(^\text{nd}\) February, 2012 Kenyan troops were officially designated as part of the operation.\(^\text{83}\) The increase in troops made the AMISOM the largest AU military intervention to-date.\(^\text{84}\)

4.6 Establishment of Somali Federal Government and AMISOM’S Progress in 2012

By early 2012 AMISOM’s intention was to expand their area of coverage and control into other parts of Southern Somalia. Thus, AMISOM coordinated its operations with the Kenyan and Ethiopian forces; and jointly they were successful in fighting against the AL-Shabaab.\(^\text{85}\) The Ethiopian troops periodically crossed the Ethiopian-Somalia boarder to seize the opportunity to launch attacks against

\(^{80}\) Shinn D., ‘International Efforts to Counter AL-Shabaab,’ op.cit., p. 1
\(^{82}\) International Crisis Group, ‘The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia,’ op.cit., p. 4
\(^{83}\) Shinn D., ‘International Efforts to Counter AL-Shabaab,’ op.cit., p. 1
\(^{85}\) Lotze W., and Kasumba Y., ‘AMISOM and the Protection of Civilians,’ op.cit., p. 18
the AL-Shabaab. This activity was intensified at a time when a larger Ethiopian force together with the TFG seized the trading centre at Beledweyne from the AL-Shabaab.\textsuperscript{86}

At the same time, the insurgents moved into the outskirts of the city by claiming that is was their tactical withdrawal; and changed their tactics by increasing the frequency of suicidal bombings in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{87} By and large, AMISOM managed to attain it full strength of forces in 2012 when it authorized 17,731 uniformed personnel to operate with a view of expanding its operational coverage into the remaining parts of Southern Somalia.\textsuperscript{88} The security situation in Somalia greatly improved; and this in turn allowed for the establishment of a new government and a relatively functioning state.\textsuperscript{89}

The new federal government was formed in August 2012 at which time Somalia underwent a National peace process resulting in the new post transitional administration and the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud by members of the parliament. The post-transitional period was a critical milestone for the new government paving the way to increase efforts to stabilize the country.\textsuperscript{90}

On 29\textsuperscript{th} September, 2012 Kenya managed to liberate the last stronghold of Al-Shabaab, the city of Kismayo. However, there were unanswered questions on Kenya’s plan of action following this important milestone.\textsuperscript{91} Amidst all these efforts, the political and military advancements did not stop the AL-Shabaab from fighting back. The insurgent groups managed to rally behind them hundreds of foreign fighters including veteran insurgents coming from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan to join in their fight.\textsuperscript{92} The AL-Shabaab made an estimated total of $70-100 million annually through collection of taxes and by extorting Somali entrepreneurs by claiming it’s their “religious obligation.” There are also claims that the AL-Shabaab collected contributions from the Somali diaspora and International

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Shinn D., ‘International Efforts to Counter AL-Shabaab,’ op.cit., p. 2
\item Ibid, p. 1
\item Lotze W., and Kasumba Y., ‘AMISOM and the Protection of Civilians,’ op.cit., p. 19
\item Wiklund C., ‘AMISOM: A model for a Peace Operation in Mali?’ op.cit., p. 1
\item Miyandazi L., ‘Kenya’s Military Intervention in Somalia: An Intricate Process,’ op.cit., p. 6
\item Ibid, p. 2
\item Dersso S., ‘Somalia Dilemmas,’ op.cit., p. 8
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Islamic charities. The Al-Shabaab has even spread its ideology to Somali diaspora; and in the process, it has managed to raise funds through remittances. Also it convinced some of the young ethnic Somali living abroad to join the group.

It is also believed that the AL-Shabaab and other Terrorist groups including the Hizbul Islam received financial, political and military support from Eritrea. Eritrea supported the Islamist Extremist groups in opposition to the Ethiopian government's denial and for a not complete recognition of its boarders. So it sent weapons to Mogadishu via the sea. Yet Eritrea has on several occasions strongly denied this claim.

4.7 AMISOM'S Challenges

Despite a successfully conducted military intervention in South Central Somalia, AMISOM has faced numerous challenges. Some are similar to those challenges faced by its predecessors including: UNITAF and UNOSOM I and II. In what follows further elaboration is provided.

4.7.1 AMISOM'S MANDATE

AMISOM presented a very complex set of mandates which were impossible to achieve in the short term. The mandates have also been too ambitious to implement while operating in dangerous environment with a limited number of troops. The weak mandate coupled with its limited capability both in size and equipment made AMISOM an easy target for insurgents numerous attacks.

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94 Dersso S., ‘Somalia Dilemmas,’ op.cit., p. 9
96 Mifsud M., ‘Civil and Food Insecurity in Somalia: An Analysis,’ op.cit., p. 440
97 Bruton B., ‘Somalia: A New Approach,’ op.cit., p. 17
98 Williams P., ‘Pathways for Peace in the Horn of Africa,’ op.cit., p. 8
99 Dersso S., ‘Somalia Dilemmas,’ op.cit., p. 9
AMISOM was deployed as a peacekeeping force in the middle of a war zone; and the AL-Shabaab and other armed militia believed that AMISOM was not being neutral but was instead siding with the TFG. In fact, the Ugandan troops were immediately shelled upon their arrival at Mogadishu International Airport.\textsuperscript{101} This pulled the peacekeeping mission into the conflict with its forces already suffering attacks form the AL-Shabaab.\textsuperscript{102} By explicitly mentioning the TFG in its mandate it appeared to lack two main principles of peacekeeping; i.e. impartiality and neutrality.\textsuperscript{103}

The mission's mandate lacked the provision for the protection of civilians; instead it clearly mentioned the protection of the TFG and TFIs.\textsuperscript{104} Some peace operations do include the issue of human rights on their mandate but very few operations incorporate the protection of civilians as core part their mandate.\textsuperscript{105} Military interveners tend to prioritize on their own security primarily and second on the population.\textsuperscript{106} Peacekeepers and observers can take a crucial role to ensure the protection of population groups\textsuperscript{107}

The perceived excessive force used by the Ethiopian, TFG and AMISOM forces collectively made some observers comment stating that all sides were committing crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{108} As witnessed in Somalia, abuses of civilians undermined the legitimacy of peace operations.\textsuperscript{109}

When AMISOM was established it was not provided with clear set of mandates for the protection of civilians. This was attributed to the fact that there was an implicit understanding that the mission was to be taken over by a larger and a more capable UN- peacekeeping force.\textsuperscript{110} It took a while

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\bibitem{101} Omar M., ‘Intervention in the Somali Conflict,’ op.cit., p. 30
\bibitem{103} Dersso S., ‘Somalia Dilemmas,’ op.cit., p. 14
\bibitem{105} Bellamy Alex J., \textit{Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect}, op.cit., p. 190
\bibitem{108} Bellamy Alex J., \textit{Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect}, op.cit., p. 179
\bibitem{109} Ibid, p. 3
\bibitem{110} Lotze W., and Kasumba Y., ‘AMISOM and the Protection of Civilians,’ op.cit., p. 19
\end{thebibliography}
for AMISOM to realise the graveness of its operations and as well as acknowledge responsibility for the loss of civilians lives due to its use of mortar artillery and rocket fire. As a result, AMISOM changed its rules of military engagement with the aim to accommodate minimized civilian casualties.\textsuperscript{111}

In late 2010 the AU began to focus its attention on the protection of civilians. Consequently, the civilian casualties dropped significantly as the AU incorporated the protection of civilians in its operations. However significant gaps still remained and these gaps required timely attention from the AU in order for its operations to attain credibility from Somalis.\textsuperscript{112} It should however be acknowledged that it was a challenge for AMISOM to provide protection to civilians while at the same time continuing its fight against the insurgents. Also, despite the increase of its troops by 2012, AMISOM still remained under-staffed as well as under-funded; and it actually needed additional resources to implement a protection mandate.\textsuperscript{113}

4.7.2. FUNDING

AMISOM has been unable to sustain itself with contributions coming from its member states. Consequently, it remained heavily dependent on external support.\textsuperscript{114} Likewise, the AU remains heavily dependent on international donors. With or without their support, its peace and security architecture will not be sustainable.\textsuperscript{115} There have also been problems in obtaining ammunition and military hardware.\textsuperscript{116} AU therefore is unable to completely eliminate the influence of outsiders due to the fact that it is dependent on external resources.\textsuperscript{117} Even when donors have made pledges the funding has not been received on time. There is also a tedious process of clearing funds. Besides, the AMISOM’s


\textsuperscript{112}Lotze W., and Kasumba Y., ‘AMISOM and the Protection of Civilians,’ op.cit., p. 18

\textsuperscript{113}Ibid, p. 20


\textsuperscript{115}Ferras P., ‘Security Stakes and Challenges in the Horn of Africa,’ op.cit., p. 56

\textsuperscript{116}Dersso S., ‘Somalia Dilemmas,’ op.cit., p. 15

\textsuperscript{117}Coning C., ‘The Emerging AU/UN Peacekeeping Partnership,’ op.cit., p. 5
management involves too many actors. This has affected the mission’s ability to conduct its operations according to initially laid out plans.\textsuperscript{118}

In essence, lack of funding limits the number of peacekeepers that can be deployed, the type of equipment that the mission will possess, the duration of the mission, and the level and intensity of the operations.\textsuperscript{119} Chances are that when funding comes on time, peacekeeping operations are more likely to perform better.\textsuperscript{120} To address this critical issue the UN has established a voluntary trust fund to reimburse contingents for equipment used for each of the operations; as well as match allowances to those of UN peacekeepers. However the funding process has been irregular and not adequate; and thus left the reimbursements in arrears. This has disrupted the supply of maintenance of essential equipment.\textsuperscript{121}

The UN has established a dedicated trust fund to support AMISOM and its Support office for AMISOM (UNSOA) that is dedicated to provide support to the AU to address AU’s Gaps which include, among others, access to UN’s peacekeeping budget, operational and logistical support, and technical support drawn from experts with relevant experience. This action has been an innovative way of providing support to the AU.\textsuperscript{122} From the outset, UNSOA’s aim is to provide the same support that a UN operation of similar size would require.\textsuperscript{123} Currently, the largest donors of AMISOM are the UN, the EU and USA.\textsuperscript{124} Actually, USA is also the largest bilateral donor for humanitarian assistance in Somalia.\textsuperscript{125}

4.7.3. Troop Contributions

\textsuperscript{118} Dersso S., ‘Somalia Dilemmas,’ op.cit., p. 16
\textsuperscript{119} Coning C., ‘The Emerging AU/UN Peacekeeping Partnership,’ op.cit., p. 9
\textsuperscript{120} Boulden Jane, \textit{Dealing with Conflict in Africa: the United Nations and Regional Organizations}, op.cit. p. 67
\textsuperscript{121} Freear M. and De Coning C., ‘Lessons From The African Union Mission For Somalia (AMISOM) for Peace Operations in Mali,’op.cit., p. 6
\textsuperscript{122} Coning C., ‘The Emerging AU/UN Peacekeeping Partnership,’ op.cit., p. 5
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid, p. 9
\textsuperscript{124} Wiklund C., ‘AMISOM: A model for a Peace Operation in Mali?’op.cit., p. 1
\textsuperscript{125} Swan J., \textit{US Policy in the Horn of Africa},op.cit., p. 4
Military Force size has often been an issue when launching peacekeeping operations. The peacekeeping force is concerned with providing enough man-power to increase the chances of success while those who have to pay the tab are eager to get by cheap. Nevertheless, African armies are still not fully developed operationally and remain reluctant to be involved in militaristic operations in the African continent. The ‘free rider syndrome’ could also be a factor that refrain states from taking action in the hopes that another actor will take the risk of ending the violence. Therefore, it is no surprise that countries are reluctant to contribute their forces to AMISOM when insurgency leaders have made it clear that they will exclusively target peacekeepers.

AU member states have sighted shortage of funds and equipment and the lack of a significant political reconciliation or cease fire agreement and the erratic security situation as reasons for not contributing troops. Some other countries have also mentioned that they have other peacekeeping obligations elsewhere (such as in Sudan) and are unable to provide additional troops.

By 2012 it was estimated that more than 500 AMISOM troops had lost their lives in Mogadishu. Due to the high casualties and direct targeting of the military forces by the insurgents, there was no willingness from other African nations to commit troops. The AU has been fortunate enough that the Kenyan, Burundi, and Ugandan forces have persistently continued to keep their forces on the ground; despite the loss of lives of troops and the relentless attacks coming from the Al-Shabaab. However, this has come with a price. For fear of pushing away the Ugandan troops, little action has been made due to the fact that there are occasions when Uganda did fail to avail some of it troops for verification purposes before deployment; and have gone ahead to follow directives given

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127 Ferras P., ‘Security Stakes and Challenges in the Horn of Africa,’ op.cit., p. 48
131 Omar M., ‘Intervention in the Somali Conflict,’ op.cit., p. 30
132 Wiklund C., ‘AMISOM: A model for a Peace Operation in Mali?’ op.cit., p. 1
directly from Kampala without consulting the AMISOM leadership. The Ugandan government has already delivered threats about withdrawing their troops from Somalia. This happened in October, 2011 when Uganda was accused of war crimes in Congo.

Uganda has not been spared from domestic attacks for which Al Shabaab openly claimed responsibility. The suicidal bombings that occurred in Kampala in 2010 was also aimed at determining the endurance of the Ugandan troop and also dissuading any other African country that would be keen to contribute further troops. Similarly the suicide and grenade attacks on Kenyan soil fuelled resentments among the locals who claimed that the government was focusing more on Somalia at the cost of Kenya's internal security. If the attacks continue the government could receive more pressure from Kenyans to stay away from Somali politics.

The Kenyan decision to intervene did expose its citizens to face retaliation attacks and put the national security at risk. More so, because the Al-Shabaab lost its military base, Kismayo. Among Somalia’s neighbouring countries, Kenya is the most prone for terrorist attacks due to its porous borders. Since Kenyan forces intervened in Somalia it has already experienced more than 100 insurgent attacks on the home soil linked to the AL-Shabaab. The first attacks were mainly targeted at bars and nightclubs and later on directed on churches. There have been many reports of al-Shabaab inspired terrorist attacks that occurred in Kenya and there are some Kenyan Muslim minorities being radicalized to join the AL-Shabaab insurgents.

\[133\] Dersso S., ‘Somalia Dilemmas,’ op.cit., p. 16
\[137\] Ibid, p. 4
\[138\] Menkhaus K., ‘Conflict Analysis: Somalia,’op.cit., p. 28
\[139\] International Crisis Group, ‘The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia,’ op.cit., p. 8
\[140\] Shinn D., ‘International Efforts to Counter AL-Shabaab,’ op.cit., p. 1
The Burundi opposition is also of the opinion that the government neither has the expertise nor the financial capabilities to get involved in such a dangerous undertaking. The high casualties that occurred in September, 2009 provided more argument to this particular group.\textsuperscript{141} The opposition parties in Burundi have repeatedly called for the repatriation of the Burundi contingent terming their presence in Somalia as the “suicide mission.”\textsuperscript{142}

Meanwhile, AMISOM does not seem to have a credible exit. There is also mistrust between the various government forces.\textsuperscript{143} AMISOM seems committed to remain in Somalia but we cannot ignore calls from citizens of troop contributing countries questioning why their troops are in Somalia.\textsuperscript{144}

4.7.4. Lack of Coordination and Intelligence Gathering

Problems of coordination between the different troop contributing countries and between the AU headquarters and the major global hegemonies have made the support provided to AMISOM quite a challenge.\textsuperscript{145} For instance, the Kenyan troops have been accused of working independently from AMISOM’s central command.\textsuperscript{146} The Ugandan troops have been accused for lack of proper coordination with other troop contributing countries and for not always sharing critical intelligence.\textsuperscript{147} AMISOM lacks adequate intelligence, critical analysis as well as strategic focus and planning. ‘It went to Somalia with its heart and not its head.’\textsuperscript{148}

AMISOM’s tasks eventually became complicated since it was engaging in confrontation with a faceless and irregular Al-Shabaab which employs guerrilla and asymmetrical tactics.\textsuperscript{149} The terrorist groups have also opened training sites that specialize in bomb and explosive making, Kidnapping, and

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item Sharamo R. and Mesfin B., ‘Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa,’ op.cit., p. 390
  \item Bruton B., ‘Somalia: A New Approach,’ op.cit., p. 20
  \item Bruton B., ‘Somalia: A New Approach,’ op.cit., p. 20
  \item Tadesse M., ‘Somalia: Bailing Out the TFG’, op.cit., p. 7
  \item Miyandazi L., ‘Kenya’s Military Intervention in Somalia: An Intricate Process,’ op.cit., p. 6
  \item Dersso S., ‘Somalia Dilemmas,’ op.cit., p. 16
  \item Tadesse M., ‘Somalia: Bailing Out the TFG’, op.cit., p. 7
\end{enumerate}
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suicide attacks and are believed to be managed by AL-Qaeda trainers.\textsuperscript{150} Intelligence gathering is critical rather than fighting with the Al-Shabaab in the forefront; because Al-Shabaab has gone into hiding where it can easily blend with the local communities and be able to distribute weapons. It understands the local dynamics better than any international force.\textsuperscript{151}

Other challenges: language barrier, the ever improving IED technology by the Al Shabaab, and the negative propaganda spread against AMISOM.\textsuperscript{152}

The Somali government provided AMISOM with the much needed intelligence services; and connected AMISOM with the Somali population; although its forces' dependence on the AMISOM is still remains high because of its low capacity.\textsuperscript{153}

4.7.5. Proxy Wars

Global powers will continue to influence peacekeeping operations as USA remains the largest contributor and most influential member of the Security Council.\textsuperscript{154} Since 2007, the USA Special Forces, by using aircrafts, have conducted more than half a dozen missile raids on the AL-Shabaab inside Somalia. The USA also conducts intelligence surveillance of Somalia through drones coming from installations in Ethiopia, Djibouti and the Seychelles.\textsuperscript{155} Since the USA troops withdrawal from Somalia in 1993 it is reluctant to directly get involved in Somalia. Some of its fears being that the AL-Shabaab with its strong networks in the region will launch terrorist attacks on the Western World.

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\item\textsuperscript{150} Omar M., ‘Intervention in the Somali Conflict,’ op.cit., p. 20
\item\textsuperscript{151} International Crisis Group, ‘The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia,’ op.cit., p. 7
\item\textsuperscript{152} Observatoire de L’Afrique, ‘Challenges and Opportunities for the AU Mission in Somalia,’ \textit{Africa Briefing Report} (March, 2011) p. 2
\item\textsuperscript{153} Freear M. and De Coning C., ‘Lessons From The African Union Mission For Somalia (AMISOM) for Peace Operations in Mali,’ op.cit., p. 8
\item\textsuperscript{154} Bellamy Alex J.\textit{Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect}, op.cit., p. 402
\item\textsuperscript{155} Shinn D., ‘International Efforts to Counter AL-Shabaab,’ op.cit., p. 2
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Therefore during the last two decades, the USA has outsourced its presence through African soldiers and private companies.\textsuperscript{156}

“The USA has often preferred to use proxy African states, such as the recent case of Ethiopian incursions into Somalia to pursue some of its military objectives in Africa. The use of key member states in the PSC as proxies has had a negative long-term effect on the AU security.”\textsuperscript{157}

The Ethiopian occupation which was supported by major powers as a critical step towards the war on terror instead produced the violent extremism which they had ironically set to combat.\textsuperscript{158} The proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea has also provided an opportunity for external parties to get involved in Somalia in the way they pleased and deemed it necessary. Those that rally behind Al-Shabaab insurgents have been siding with the government of Eritrea and those that have been supporting the Somali government have sided with the government of Ethiopia. This goes to show that the two neighbouring countries are not playing positive roles. Instead, they are keeping Somalia engaged in damaging war as they fight each other indirectly inside Somalia.\textsuperscript{159}

Unfortunately, the horn of Africa lacks a hegemonic state that is ready to take political and military responsibilities for making peace and security endeavours in the region. The absence of such a hegemonic actor has had negative impacts on the Somali conflict and this may explain why the conflict has lasted for so long.\textsuperscript{160}

4.8 Achievements of AMISOM

Whether by design or not the AU has proved capable of managing high risk peacekeeping missions before a ceasefire or before a peace agreement has been reached. This is an area the UN has

\textsuperscript{156} Tase P., ‘Terrorism, War and Conflict: An Analysis into the Horn of Africa, AL-Shabaab in Somalia; US and UN Efforts to Reduce Violence,’ op.cit., p. 32
\textsuperscript{158} Cornelissen Scarlett, CheruFatu et al., \textit{Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century}, op.cit., p. 95
\textsuperscript{159} Sharamo R. and Mesfin B., ‘Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa,’ op.cit., p. 132
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid, p. 397
experienced roadblocks. The military campaign that brought unexpected success in 2011 provided room for the establishment of a new federal government. The IDP’s began to return home and relative peace was being enjoyed by Mogadishu inhabitants as they were able to walk freely and conduct their day to day activities.

Mogadishu has now become more peaceful than it has ever been in years and there is a glimmer of hope in the air. This is evident due to the increased number of diaspora Somalis returning home to reunite with their families and search for opportunities. Despite such progress, however, there remains the spread of propaganda campaign aimed at discrediting AMISOM. Yet, the AL-Shabaab has not been successful in its campaign to create a substantial opposition force from among the Somali people against the peacekeeping force. AMISOM was also quick to take advantage of AL-Shabaab’s inability to respond to the 2010-2011 famine period in Somalia by stepping up their support to delivering humanitarian relief.

AMISOM managed to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid either directly or indirectly to the vulnerable. Up to 12,000 Somalis received medical treatment per month by the courtesy of AMISOM medical facilities in Mogadishu. AMISOM has also been providing clean water to the Somali people; this has helped to win the support and confidence of the people and Somali political leaders. Mogadishu now has better street lighting by the courtesy of AMISOM.

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161 Coning C., ‘The Emerging AU/UN Peacekeeping Partnership,’ op.cit., p. 5
162 Freear M. and De Coning C., ‘Lessons From The African Union Mission For Somalia (AMISOM) for Peace Operations in Mali,’ op.cit., p. 1
163 Omar M., ‘Intervention in the Somali Conflict,’ op.cit., p. 10
165 Freear M. and De Coning C., ‘Lessons From The African Union Mission For Somalia (AMISOM) for Peace Operations in Mali,’ op.cit., p. 9
166 Omar M., ‘Intervention in the Somali Conflict,’ op.cit., p. 10
The AU with funding coming from the Italian government has also sponsored a capacity building programmes for institutions of the Somali civil service societies as well as key ministries. AMISOM has also provided training courses to over 2000 Somali Police and trained 500 new recruits in Djibouti and 200 junior and middle-level managers in Kenya.\textsuperscript{168} The Somali Security forces have also undergone refresher training courses at the Al-Jazeera Military Training Centre which is being managed by AMISOM.\textsuperscript{169}

AMISOM did not stand alone in the fight against insurgent militias. At times both Kenya and Ethiopia stepped in and launched separate interventions in Somalia. The EU has also provided training for the Somali Army since 2010. The training forces have in turn teamed up with AMISOM to fight the Al-Shabaab. The EU has also contributed to the payment of Somali forces. This has helped to ensure that the trained forces are not recruited by Al-Shabaab.

Kenya and Uganda, being the two main troop contributing countries have remained instrumental against the Al-Shabaab. The USA government has also provided AMISOM with counterterrorist training as well as equipment. However, despite being ejected from the Mogadishu city Al-Shabaab still has a significant presence in the rural areas.\textsuperscript{170}

\subsection*{4.9 Lessons Learnt from AMISOM}

Lots of gains have been achieved operationally by AMISOM troops; but this has not been matched with a political and reconciliation process.\textsuperscript{171} Another complication is that there was no peace to keep in Somalia and no peace agreement to be enforced.\textsuperscript{172}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{169} Omar M., ‘Intervention in the Somali Conflict,’ op.cit., p. 19
\item \textsuperscript{170} Wiklund C., ‘AMISOM: A model for a Peace Operation in Mali?’ op.cit., p. 2
\item \textsuperscript{171} Omar M., ‘Intervention in the Somali Conflict,’ op.cit., p. 24
\item \textsuperscript{172} Cilliers J. and Boshoffet H. et al., ‘Somalia: The Intervention Dilemma,’ op.cit., p. 7
\end{itemize}
Experience from AMISOM operations has taught that peacekeepers should avoid intervening in areas that lack a viable political process. AMISOM, like any other peacekeeping force, is not designed to resolve the Somali conflict. But unfortunately the TFG with support from AMISOM and the international community opted for a military action ahead of a political process.

The 2006 Ethiopian intervention serves as a lesson that has been overlooked. Ethiopian forces increased their troops number to 20,000 in order to deal with the ICU; but they did not succeed in eliminating jihadists because of lack of acceptance of the TFG and due to the fact that Somalis viewed Ethiopians as foreign invaders. The question then is what has really changed in the current context; and why would an increase in AMISOM’s troops ensure a more stabilized Somalia?

Apart from this, matching force to need is important and that coercion is undertaken in a responsible and neutral manner. Past experiences form UNITAF also show that Somalis resented the presence of large contingent troops; and instead of the government strengthening its support base, it further opted to marginalize the Somalis.

Overall, the Somalia situation is very similar to that of Afghanistan. The USA and NATO forces had been engaged in fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2001 and the increase in peacekeeping forces has had the opposite effect against what was initially intended. So instead of improving the security situation in Afghanistan, it led to attacks targeted on the peacekeeping forces and national government officials. Just as in Somalia, killings of civilians have intensively been

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173 Omar M., ‘Intervention in the Somali Conflict,’ op.cit., p. 30
174 Dersso S., ‘Somalia Dilemmas,’ op.cit., p. 14
175 Le Sage A., ‘Somalia’s Endless Transition: Breaking the Deadlock,’ op.cit., p. 4
176 Cilliers J. and Boshoffet H. et al., ‘Somalia: The Intervention Dilemma,’ op.cit., p. 6
177 Schmidl Erwin Aand Oakley Robert B., Peace Operations Between War and Peace, op.cit, p. 37
178 Bruton B., ‘Somalia: A New Approach,’ op.cit., p. 21
capitalized by the Taliban. The Al-Shabaab and the Taliban have strived to turn the population against the coalition forces.\textsuperscript{179}

Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq have also shown beyond a shadow of doubt that complex conflicts cannot be solved by force alone; no matter how militarily powerful or technically superior the intervener is, but only through a politically driven peace process.\textsuperscript{180} Much of the focus on Somalia has been aimed at addressing the symptoms of the conflicts rather than the causes.\textsuperscript{181} Foreign fighters are indeed capable of reducing the strength of the AL-Shabaab; but they cannot completely eradicate them. It is not possible to depend on a military solution to resolve the crisis in Somalia; it can only be done by a political process with the people of Somalia on the driver’s seat.\textsuperscript{182}

On the other hand, when a reconciliation effort was undertaken, the Somali population including community leaders, intellectuals, and traditional leaders were marginalized and faction leaders quickly learnt how to manipulate international diplomats. By doing so they were assured of access to resources without necessarily doing much to create peace and national stability. Hence international intervention fuelled warlords and inter-clan power struggles; and it prevented local communities from gaining resources to promote reconciliation.\textsuperscript{183}

The Somalia experience has shown that peace processes that involve faction leaders are highly inadequate. There is also need to consider critically needed transformative approaches that can provide viable options for institutional building, arms control, involvement of the community in grass root

\textsuperscript{179} Cilliers J. and Boshoffet H. et al., 'Somalia: The Intervention Dilemma,' op.cit., p. 6
\textsuperscript{180} Coning C., 'The Emerging AU/UN Peacekeeping Partnership,' op.cit., p. 10
\textsuperscript{181} Dersso S., \textit{Somalia: The Quest for Peacemaking and Peacekeeping}, (Paper Presented in a Workshop from 10\textsuperscript{th} to 11\textsuperscript{th} December, 2008, Hilton Hotel, Nairobi) p. 4
\textsuperscript{182} Shinn D., 'International Efforts to Counter AL-Shabaab,' op.cit., p. 2
\textsuperscript{183} Cornelissen Scarlett, CheruFatu et al., \textit{Africa and International Relations in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century}, op.cit., p. 94
reconciliation and their assistance in the denouncement of ‘clanisim’. There is also need for the reconfiguration of the Somali war economy.  

In addition the experience of Somalia vividly shows that a peace agreement is more than signing a document. It is about signing an agreement that identifies and addresses the main causes of the conflict; addresses local concerns and provides feasible mechanisms for sustaining the agreement.

AMISOM has demonstrated that moral authority of an operation is important in order to obtain local legitimacy. When an operation is perceived to lack moral authority, it may affect a country's decisions to deploy personnel. Peacekeeping operations need adequate number of personnel; otherwise legitimacy issues might be raised; since lack of sufficient staff can hamper the accomplishment of the mission’s mandate.

“For example failures to match resources and mandates have had tragic consequences. One may question what more could have been done in Rwanda to prevent the catastrophe of if more could have been done in Bosnia to prevent the safe areas from falling to protect the population of Srebrenica? Answers are most certainly yes. However it is doubtful that in any of these cases, more could have been done without the means and a mandate at hand.”

The Experience of AMISOM once again has proved that hurriedly deploying troops without clear management structures put in place lessens the impact. In the case of AMISOM, troops were deployed prior to the actual Planning and Management unit being established. In other words, the lack of a

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185 Williams P., ‘Pathways for Peace in the Horn of Africa,’ op.cit., p. 11
186 Sheehan Nadege, Economics of UN Peacekeeping, (New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2011) p. 188
peace process, a fully equipped force and a mandate that is not fit to fight insurgents made AMISOM tasks a challenge.\textsuperscript{188}

AMISOM is important for facilitating the conditions for national reconciliation. It was also instrumental for ensuring the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops. However, military intervention is not a lasting solution. For in order to create lasting peace and security, there must be a political dialogue that should include all Somalis, institutional capacity development, and the training of the Somali Security forces.\textsuperscript{189}

One of the lessons learnt from the Ethiopian intervention is that it is possible to win a military battle but end up being confronted by insurgency tactics and risk suffering casualties through guerrilla tactics. It is complicated when AMISOM is trying to contribute towards the stability of Somalia; yet its neighbours are engaged in proxy wars at the expense of the Somali population.\textsuperscript{190}

Peacekeepers need to fully exploit the power of communication with the locals. This is not optional but an operational requirement. Peacekeepers therefore need the population on their side to know who they are, why they are there, what to expect of the population and their leaders, and what the population should expect from them. The peacekeeping operation must also take measure to hear the views of the people they serve as cordial relations cannot be achieved without a two-way communication.\textsuperscript{191} The agreement should be spread to the wider public so that the local communities can participate in ensuring its compliance. It is not correct to assume that because national leaders have reached a consensus local endorsement will follow. Misinformation can destroy a mission. Radio broadcast reach the greatest number of Somalis.\textsuperscript{192}

\textsuperscript{188} Observatoire de L’Afrique, ‘Challenges and Opportunities for the AU Mission in Somalia,’ op.cit., p. 2
\textsuperscript{189} Swan J., \textit{US Policy in the Horn of Africa}, op.cit., p. 4
\textsuperscript{191} Kranso Jean, Hayes Bradd et al., op.cit., p. 230
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid, p. 239
Nevertheless, it seems that AMISOM has succeeded where the USA and UN had failed. It goes to prove that a lot can be achieved when Africa is put in the driver’s seat. Through great sacrifice and dedication African problems can be solved by Africans themselves.\textsuperscript{193}

\textbf{4.10 Conclusion}

When AMISOM was initially deployed, it was anticipated to last a period of six months and it would then be re-hatted as a UN operation. However this didn't happen. Besides, it took almost 4 years for AMISOM to get the resources needed to make a difference. The AU couldn’t afford to wait that long again.

AMISOM’s mandates are yet to be implemented in full; which causes the Council to have divergent views on the capacity of regional organizations as well as the UN itself to implement mandates effectively.\textsuperscript{194} One question remains, what if the UN decides that Somalia remains too unstable for it to take over as an AU operation? This is a major challenge in Somalia.

The likelihood of African countries contributing their troops to AMISOM continues to diminish as it has been a challenge for the AU to get adequate funding and equipment and the willingness to support this.\textsuperscript{195} Some observers have argued that the West has transferred the burden of peacekeeping to the AU as their forces are unwilling to deploy in complex conflicts thus forcing Africa to stretch itself beyond its capacities.\textsuperscript{196}

AMISOM’s success is dependent on a political support from the region and the international community. As Western powers gradually disengaged themselves from Somali politics the AU has since assumed the leadership role and indeed attempting to find African Solutions to African Problems.

\textsuperscript{193} Omar M., ‘Intervention in the Somali Conflict,’ op.cit., p. 31
\textsuperscript{194} Bellamy Alex J., \textit{Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect}, op.cit., p. 189
\textsuperscript{195} Sharamo R. and Mesfin B., ‘Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa,’ op.cit., p. 100
Africans have assumed the role of ‘spilling blood’ while the international community and especially the Western countries have assumed the role of simply donating the money.

As seen in the previous chapters of this study, we cannot ignore the fact that there is a high risk involved that foreign forces will eventually withdraw from Somalia sighting the cost of operation and causing it to come to an end. Unless more support is provided to AMISOM this scenario is likely to occur: AMISOM will either resiliently remain in Somalia in an increasingly hostile environment or simply withdraw.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Conclusion.

The objective of the research project was to identify the challenges peacekeepers and particularly the AU faces in dealing with intra-state conflicts. With Somalia as the case study, the research sought to determine whether the presence of peacekeeping forces will contribute towards resolving the conflict situation in Somalia as well as to identify the lessons learnt from the Somalia experience in order to improve the outcome of future peacekeeping missions. In particular, the study examined at the actual lessons learnt from the AMISOM mission; as well as previous peacekeeping operations in Somalia; more specifically, UNITAF, UNOSOM-I and UNOSOM-II. The objectives of the study were fully met as further explained in this chapter.

The study proposed two hypotheses for testing: (1) The lessons learnt from Somalia serves as a relevant case study on how better manage peacekeeping operations (2) The presence of peacekeeping forces in Somalia will contribute towards resolving the conflict situation in Somalia. This section examines the validity of these hypotheses.

Hypothesis One: The lessons learnt from Somalia serves as a relevant case study on how better manage peacekeeping operations.

The evidences put forward by the study confirm this assumption. The lessons learnt from UNITAF and UNOSOM I & II and AMISOM revealed that peacekeeping can be better managed by: (a) matching mandates to needs, (b) communicating the purpose of the mission to the local community and the international media, (c) troop contributing countries focusing on preparing their citizens psychologically for some of the high risks in peacekeeping operations, (d) Having a unified command (e) using the appropriate response for circumstances where the use of force is inevitable in self-defence or where the use of force may be counterproductive. (e) Ensuring the timely troop deployment and, (f)
Proper planning and coordination. Overall, peacekeeping operations will not be managed successfully if there is lack of the political will.

The findings further demonstrated that traditional peacekeeping remains the most developed response mechanism to conflict. In principle, peacekeeping is more likely to succeed when there is an agreement to keep; when there is consent, impartiality and when non-use of force reigns except in self-defence. Enforcement measures are extremely complex and should be employed with caution under very exceptional circumstances. Enforcement should only be contemplated as a last resort solution; when all other options have been exhausted. Full scale peace-enforcements are usually very costly.

Hypothesis Two: The presence of peacekeeping forces in Somalia will contribute towards resolving the conflict situation in Somalia.

Peacekeeping after civil wars was found to be a contributing factor to attaining peace and stability. However, peacekeeping cannot guarantee real peace. The risk of renewed conflict is still high even after the fighting has been stopped through military intervention. Military activities tend to reduce the damage of the crisis; while at the same time, creating room for diplomatic and humanitarian actors to address the underlying causes of the conflict. International forces can use coercive means to gain stability; but attaining real peace rests mainly on the locals. Military personnel cannot guarantee real peace; but they can establish a framework; in order to allow the local and international community to do what is necessary to resolve conflicts.

Much of the focus on Somalia has been aimed at addressing the symptoms of the conflicts rather than focusing on the causes. The Peacekeeping efforts in Somalia need to be accompanied by a political framework; otherwise the mission will eventually be ineffective and unsustainable. It is not possible to solely depend on a military solution to resolve the crisis in Somalia no matter how militarily powerful or technically superior the intervener is; the mission can only bear fruit if accompanied by an
inclusive political process. Peace enforcement efforts in Somalia have temporarily managed to restrain the violence. The peacekeepers have created a window of opportunity for the government, diplomatic, development and humanitarian actors to address the underlying causes of the conflict. The findings in relation to this hypothesis conform to the conceptual framework of the study.

5.1 Recommendations

If it were not for AU peacekeeping forces and the Ethiopian troops, AL-Shabaab would not be in its weak position. Nonetheless, the youth who are the future hope for Somalia are turning their hands to weapons and losing confidence with the government. In addition the Al-Shabaab militant jihadist ideology is quickly spreading among the Somali youth both locally and abroad. The sooner the government is able to take control over the security situation, the more beneficial it will be for the country as well as for the region. The AL-Shabaab has retreated but has not yet been defeated. The group is still capable of operating from outside Mogadishu and has since increased its suicide bombings and assassinations.

The time has come when the international community needs to let Somalis take charge of their political determination. The international community can however assist by providing training to the police force as well as to the military troops; and finance development and humanitarian projects whose funds are accounted for. The Somali government needs to step up and do what meets the expectations of good governance. When Somali population stabilizes business people can invest; which will lead to economic growth; which will in turn enable ordinary Somalis to improve their livelihoods in peace.

During a military confrontation victory over the opponent is the aim and sometimes it can result in bringing a stable outcome. However victory never settles the reason why the conflict took place.¹ A

¹ Williams P., ‘Pathways for Peace in the Horn of Africa,’ op.cit., p. 11
holistic approach is crucial in seeking peace. It should incorporate military, diplomatic as well as peace building initiatives. Learning from the experiences of the ICU, it now seems logical that if the international community intends to stabilize Somalia it needs to strategize ways of reaching out to some of the leadership of the Al-Shabaab; the way it has been done in Afghanistan with Taliban; and also dissuade the group from embracing extremist tendencies. The alternative of continuing with the fight will be far worse as ‘Peace sometimes comes by dining with your enemy’. In addition, a unified nation remains a desire for majority of Somalis including some of the more nationalist members of Al-Shabaab. The Government should also consider the carrot and stick negotiation tactics. The carrot could be a cabinet position in government, public private partnership for the management of port revenues and share out post conflict reconstruction contracts. Potential sticks would include the targeting of spoilers of the peace process, supporters of insurgency and military operations.

During the first year in office the President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud informed the press that he was willing to open negotiations with the AL-Shabaab; but they have since turned down his offer. While many doubt if it is proper to talk to jihadists, there are some elements within the AL-Shabaab who may be willing to do so. The merger of the AL-Shabaab with the al-Qaeda in February, 2012 further complicated any chances of a reconciliation process; but it is hoped that this will cause a wider split within the Al-Shabaab leadership, which eventually facilitate a discussion. The other option to be explored is to adopt a policy of incremental containment; – this aims to actively challenge the extremist ideologies of the movement and discrediting its legitimacy at the community level. However, this will be a lengthy process.

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3 Ibid, p. 5
4 Walls M., ‘Where to for Somali State-building Since London and Istanbul Conference?’ op.cit., p. 4
5 Shinn D., ‘International Efforts to Counter AL-Shabaab,’ op.cit., p. 2
6 Roque P., ‘Somalia: Understanding Al-Shabaab,’ op.cit., p. 4
The government will need to separate the Al-Shabaab from the Somali society and reverse the wave of propaganda that the group has spread. Another way of dealing with the Jihadist movement would be to expose its contradictions and deviant ideology by giving religious leaders and elders the political space and responsibility for conducting the exercise.\textsuperscript{7} This could weaken the group as the government capture’s areas that are under AL-Shabaab control.\textsuperscript{8}

If the government of Somalia only focuses on security issues it will be fruitless unless it concurrently improves its governance. It has to start at the top level of government and extend the process throughout all institutions. It should be a priority to focus on national unity and the provision of basic services and put aside personal interest and power.\textsuperscript{9} The government should ensure that it builds an inclusive federal government that has the support of all clans. Otherwise, another group similar to the AL-Shabaab will take up arms to take advantage of the dissatisfaction of Somalis.\textsuperscript{10} Also Somalia Government should stray away from ‘negative sovereignty’ meaning holding formal sovereignty but unwilling or unable to discharge its duties and offer its services to its people.\textsuperscript{11}

If this issue is not addressed Somalia will see itself returning to the pre-2006 configuration of clan territories. The AU, the USA and the UN need to make a decisive change about their strategic approach towards Somalia. Otherwise continuous meddling into the county’s affairs will only further radicalize the population and increase the likelihood of extremist groups finding a safe haven in Somalia.\textsuperscript{12}

Individuals’ response to authority is influenced by self-interests that vary. But a common interest is security and economic empowerment. Therefore it goes to say that individual’s make decisions based

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid, p.4
\textsuperscript{8} International Crisis Group, ‘Somalia: An Opportunity That Should Not be Missed,’ op.cit., p. 2
\textsuperscript{9} Shinn D., ‘International Efforts to Counter AL-Shabaab,’ op.cit., p. 2
\textsuperscript{10} International Crisis Group, ‘Somalia: An Opportunity That Should Not be Missed,’ op.cit., p. 1
\textsuperscript{11} Cornelissen Scarlett, CheruFatu et al., \textit{Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century}, op.cit., p. 92
\textsuperscript{12} Bruton B., ‘Somalia: A New Approach,’ op.cit., p. 5
on their interest. Hence, it should be no surprise that a young Somali will escort a UN humanitarian convoy as well as gang of looters in exchange for goods or cash in order to maintain himself and his family.\textsuperscript{13} The government and international community should therefore conduct programmes aimed at rehabilitating the youth, through training and employment in order to inhibit Al-Shabaab’s recruitment pool.\textsuperscript{14} Spoilers such as war lords should be made aware that they can continue to realise their economic interest in a peaceful Somalia as well.\textsuperscript{15}

A number of youth fighters and high profile supporters are gradually abandoning the AL-Shabaab; and returning to join the Somali government troops and with some retreating back to sub-clan territories. The Somali government must show willingness to welcome these groups and politically work towards peace with those willing to renounce terrorism.\textsuperscript{16}

It is important to launch a campaign to counteract the Al-Shabaab’s radical teachings. Countries hosting Somali youth should also reach out to them and encourage them to engage with Somalia elders, community leaders, youth associations and religious leaders.\textsuperscript{17}

With the security situation improving in Mogadishu and in south central, International aid agencies should step up their support in developing income generating activities and life supporting assistance to reduce mortality and restore the livelihoods of Somalis.\textsuperscript{18} It is also crucial to make adequate preparations for returning refugees as their arrival could potentially spur clashes over land and other resources.\textsuperscript{19} UNDP and World Bank should be ready at hand to support the government with regards to institutional development and public administration; to ensure they are accountable for the

\textsuperscript{13}Schmidl Erwin Aand Oakley Robert B., \textit{Peace Operations Between War and Peace}, op.cit., p. 36
\textsuperscript{14}Roque P., ‘Somalia: Understanding Al-Shabaab,’ op.cit., p.4
\textsuperscript{16}Omar M., ‘Intervention in the Somali Conflict,’ op.cit., p. 33
\textsuperscript{17}Dersso S., ‘Somalia Dilemmas,’ op.cit., p. 9
\textsuperscript{18}Omar M., ‘Intervention in the Somali Conflict,’ op.cit., p. 35
\textsuperscript{19}Menkhaus K., ‘Conflict Analysis: Somalia,’ op.cit., p. 14
use of funds and also deliver the services to the people.\textsuperscript{20} If institutions are strengthened they in turn may give peacekeepers as reason to exit and leave behind a country that is in peace.\textsuperscript{21} Furthermore the vast resources that are currently being used to maintain the peacekeeping forces in Somalia could be spent on reconstruction, generating employment for young men who don't have alternative source of income other than becoming foot soldiers for warlords.\textsuperscript{22}

Somalia should also be allowed to achieve the above recommendations at its own pace. This is typically slower than most external experts expect and are uncomfortable with. As was seen in the past, rushing talks with Somalis guarantees failure.\textsuperscript{23} Most of the conferences convened by external actors have generally relied on conventional diplomatic procedures, on the ground that traditional Somali methods were far too time consuming lasting for months rather than days or weeks.\textsuperscript{24} Donors have been hopelessly optimistic and increasingly disappointed.\textsuperscript{25}

Though locally driven peace processes work better they also need to involve external actors who can be important for taking the mediators role and sometimes provide technical assistance, or logistical support.\textsuperscript{26} One of the options that can be put on the table is for the AU to take charge of the peace-making process with the main parties involved in the conflict.\textsuperscript{27} The role of Turkey and other Muslim countries should be strengthened so as to win the confidence of Somalis.\textsuperscript{28}

The never-ending animosity between Eritrea and Ethiopia and subsequently by them supporting different sides of the Somali conflict continues to negatively influence further destabilization in the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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\bibitem{27} Sharamo R. and Mesfin B., ‘Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa,’ op.cit., p. 390
\bibitem{28} International Crisis Group, ‘Somalia: An Opportunity That Should Not be Missed,’ op.cit., p. 1
\end{thebibliography}
Horn of Africa; causing ripple effects throughout the region. Therefore IGAD and the AU should focus on facilitation of the normalization of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea.29

The Government as well as peacekeeping forces should maintain the current pressure on the AL-Shabaab while concurrently building the capacity of the Somali Security Forces to take over the security responsibility within an agreed time period.30 The issue Troop dissertation needs to be addressed; if there is lack of loyalty among Somali forces it would seriously undermine efforts to build an effective national army.31 Sealing Somalia’s sea, land and airspace should also be a priority in order to prevent the infiltration of Jihadists.32 In summary once the Somali Military is strengthened it will be possible to remove unlawful foreign military presence.33 Somalis will be likely to accept peacekeepers if they perceive that they offer to improve security and access to economic opportunities otherwise international presence will be challenged.34

Peacekeepers should be given adequate resources so that they maintain the momentum and increase the gains they have made thus far. The troops contributing countries should also continue to work closely with the Somali allies.35 It is however likely that the AU peacekeepers will continue to be under-resourced and expectations from the international community as well as the citizens of Somalia will continue to rise, as the Somali population is the most affected by this crisis. It is therefore important that the mission effectively communicates its shortcomings and limitations to the host population.36

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29 Sharamo R. and Mesfin B., ‘Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa,’ op.cit., p. 112  
30 Omar M., ‘Intervention in the Somali Conflict,’ op.cit., p. 32  
32 Shay Shaul, Somalia: Between Jihad and Restoration, op.cit., p. 197  
33 Ibid, p. 196  
34 Schmidl Erwin Aand Oakley Robert B., Peace Operations Between War and Peace, op.cit, p. 37  
An option to consider is the creation of an AU-UN hybrid mission in Somalia. However, experience from the first Hybrid mission in Darfur has shown that it is highly likely that there will be challenges in managing and supervising such a mission. If this option is to be implemented, the AU must appoint leaders who understand the importance of coordination and have experience in managing peacekeeping organizations. The fact that the concept of peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN charter is an indication that the UN can accommodate and explore creative new approaches of peacekeeping without making revisions to the charter.

The AU should strengthen its partnership as well as coordination efforts with major stakeholders in the international community so as to ensure that Somalia remains as a priority country on the agenda for the search for peace. The challenges AMISOM has experienced so far demonstrate that regional organizations should be partners of the UN; not alternatives.

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