

**THE EFFECTIVENESS AND HYBRID NATURE OF PEACE -
KEEPING MISSIONS IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF DARFUR**

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BY

HARRY KITHINJI MURUGU

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DECLARATION

I declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

Sign: Date:

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor

Sign: Date:

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I would like to acknowledge my supervisor, Dr. Ibrahim Farah for his tireless support and guidance throughout the entire course. To my extended family members, classmates and friends who have offered their support in one way or the other. And above all, I give thanks to Almighty God for giving me this valuable opportunity and for enlightening me in believing and making my dream come true.

DEDICATION

This research project is dedicated to my wife and children. They have always been at my side throughout the period and their love and support has enabled me get to this far. May the

Almighty God bless them abundantly!

ABSTRACT

More than 50 peace operations have deployed in Africa since 2000, including multiple African-led or hybrid African Union/United Nations initiatives. The frequency of these deployments underscores the ongoing importance of these operations in the playbook of regional and multilateral bodies to prevent conflict, protect civilians, and enforce ceasefires and peace agreements. Recent operations have featured increasingly ambitious goals and complex institutional partnerships. The achievements and shortcomings of these operations offer vital lessons for optimizing this increasingly central but still evolving tool for addressing conflict and instability.

The paper presents a critical review of the concept of the mechanism of hybrid operations, as one of the emergent post-Cold War peacekeeping trends. While the experiential and diagnostic features of hybrid operations have previously appeared in some theatres, the dynamics of its use by the AU and the international community in the conflict in Darfur have raised considerable difficulties. The argument in this paper is that the proposed hybrid AU-UN operation in Darfur is a political construct that makes its practical application in Darfur extremely difficult. The paper concludes that the lessons should be learned from the experiences with the Darfur hybrid operation, for future operations, while giving recommendations for further effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.0 Introduction

Conflicts are a marked feature in the evolution of human societies and arise out of adversarial relations between individuals and groups. Violent conflicts has accounted for loss of human life, destruction of property, the collapse of the state, environmental degradation, refugee flows, internal displacements and generally lower levels of development in conflict prone zones. Africa has been one such zone. Koffi Annan noted that since the 1970's, 30 wars had erupted in Africa and in 1996 alone 4 out of 53 countries were afflicted by armed conflicts.¹

One such African country in which conflict has acquired an almost permanent feature is the Darfur Region in southern Sudan. Conflict management includes all the important strategies that are put in place in order to combat and eliminate the consequences that are caused by disagreements and misunderstandings between/among people. Conflict management methods applied should be very effective. In the Darfur, joint action by various bodies have to an extent been able to combat the conflicts and the same time starting strategies that are meant to promote peace in the nation. The main objectives of having effective conflict resolving methods are to develop and implement conflict prevention, peace building and reconciliation projects in conflict affected areas.²

Sudan like many African countries consists of numerous ethnic groups. There are a series of conflicts between Sudan and the mediators individually and between the mediators and this has

¹ Koffi Annan. *Keynote Address to the Conferences on Preventing Deadly Conflict Among Nations in the Twenty First Century*. 1998.

² Praeger Rahim. "Towards a Theory of Managing Organizational Conflict, Center for Advanced Studies in Management". *The International Journal of Conflict Management*, 2002.

affected the whole process showing the pitfalls of multiple mediation.³The government itself was concentrated on the ongoing civil war in the Southern Sudan and deployed all military and armed resources there. The suspicion of foreign influence behind Sudan's conflict has long existed. In Sudan west of Darfur, evidence has been found of weapons being provided by sources within Chad and Libya. Rebels travel virtually unchecked across the borders of countries gathering war machinery and financial support with the tribes of the area financially incapable of building such strong armed groups. Libya is eager to prevent Sudan from beginning oil exploration in this area as Libya would then share these oil resources with Sudan.

1.1 Background

Conflicts are a marked feature in the evolution of human societies and arise out of adversarial relations between individuals and groups. Violent conflicts has accounted for loss of human life, destruction of property, the collapse of the state, environmental degradation, refugee flows, internal displacements and generally lower levels of development in conflict prone zones. Africa has been one such zone. Koffi Annan noted that since the 1970's, 30 wars had erupted in Africa and in 1996 alone 4 out of 53 countries were afflicted by armed conflicts.⁴Africa has had its share of violent conflict, and at one point had the highest casualty rate in the world. In addition, conflict has almost acquired a fairly permanent feature in the continent with regional conflict formations such as those in East Africa experiencing protracted conflict. These conflicts have provided conflict practitioners and scholars a lot of experience in refining the theory and practice of conflict management.

³ Makumi Mwangi. *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi: CCR Publications, 2006), 51

⁴ Koffi Annan. Keynote Address to the Conferences on Preventing Deadly Conflict Among Nations in the Twenty First Century. 1998.

The importance of East Africa in the international political system cannot be gainsaid. In fact the continent has acted as a laboratory for the testing of several hypotheses in the field of conflict management by Western scholars and conflict managers. This also serves to explain why third party as conflict management remains the most popular mode of intervention⁵. The realization of the prohibitive and attendant cost of rebuilding conflict prone society has led to the emergence of more inclusive conflict management approaches mainly using top-bottom and bottom to top approaches, while integrating them with elements of peace-building which remains the wider goal of conflict transformation.

One realization which would be key to future conflict resolution not only in the region but in the world would be the realization that unless underlying structures which give rise to conflict are discovered and root causes addressed conflict will still remain a feature in the continent. But even with the identity of the structural causes appropriate methods may need to be incorporated towards the end of solving these conflicts. By and large a mix of some of these approaches has worked while others have performed dismally.⁶ But since practice is theory in progress, practitioners and scholars are constantly refining their methods to ensure their successes. The ongoing Southern Sudan conflict is thus an apt demonstration on what can work and what cannot work towards conflict resolution in a situation of multiple actors, issues and interests.⁷ Incompatibility is through separation, community values and systems role differentiation.⁸

Conflicts attract attention which has many effects. The more parties with stakes in the outcome, the more difficult it will be to arrive at settlements by means of negotiation, mediations or other

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Kenneth W. Thomas. Conflict and Conflict Management: Reflections and Update, *Journal of Organizational Behavior* (1986-1998), ABI/INFORM global, 13, no. 3(May 1992)

⁷ Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution* (2nded) London: Sage Publications, (2008)

⁸ Kenneth W. Thomas, Conflict and Conflict Management: Reflections and Update, *Journal of Organizational Behavior* (1986-1998), ABI/INFORM global, 13, no. 3(May 1992)

forms of intervention.⁹ According to Thomas, the five conflict handling modes: competing, collaborating, compromising, avoiding and accommodating are classified by the two underlying dimensions of assertiveness and cooperativeness. He distinguishes between conflict processes and the structure in which that process occurs.¹⁰ He concludes that the goals of conflict management (and thus the functionality of a given conflict handling mode for meeting this criteria) depend on two independent dimensions - ones choice of beneficiary and of a time frame .¹¹ With respect to beneficiary, one can try to optimize the welfare of one of the parties (a partisan choice), both parties (a joint welfare choice) or the larger system of which the parties are members (a system i.e. choice).

The crisis in Darfur is not unusual in the overall African scenario. The whole African continent is in fact still torn apart by many cases of conflict and civil unrest, which hinder the development of many African countries. Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Somalia are only some examples of the atrocities that afflict the African continent and make peace and stability impossible. The article by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan describes with pessimism the unsolved tragedy of Darfur. "... one thing is clear: Whatever external force is sent to Darfur can provide at best only temporary security to the people there. Only a political agreement among their leaders can secure their future and the return of 2 million of them to their homes."¹²

⁹Gabriella Blum: (2007) *Islands of Agreement: Managing Enduring Armed Rivalries*, Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press

¹⁰Kenneth W. Thomas. Conflict and Conflict Management: Reflections and Update, *Journal of Organizational Behavior* (1986-1998), ABI/INFORM global, 13, no. 3(May 1992)

¹¹ Ibid: 270

¹² Annan, Kofi, *Darfur Descending: No Time For Apathy on Sudan*, (The Washington Post, Wednesday, January 25, 2006): 19

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Crisis is inevitable and they are part and parcel of everyday life of humans. Political unrest, civil wars, unaccountability, violation of human rights, lack of respect to the rule of law among other reasons cause conflicts mostly in Africa continent. Sudan's conflict is complex because of the actors and processes involved in its management and that is why it is crucial to establish the relationships that exist between the conflict, actors and issues.¹³

A mediation paradigm has been suggested in which the environment of mediation does not just include the parties but also the mediator. The paradigm was broadened to include the sources of the benefits that the parties and especially the mediator derive from the whole process. In Darfur, the conflict is caused by climate change among other vulnerable and potential causes of conflict. In this section, the research problem will be best in light of Darfur history. Lying entirely in the vast Sahelian belt of desert and semi-desert, savannah and oasis make climate a decisive factor in its Darfur's history. To understand the current conflict, we need to look at the effects of ecological crises between 1970 and the mid-1980s when the civil war between the Arabs and the Fur broke out.

Expanding desertification forced the Arab nomads to migrate southwards in search of pasture and water. Whenever environmental effects became more severe and persistent, the migration became prolonged or even sometimes required permanent co-existence. However, when coupled with population growth, the strain became greater, building up tensions among the communities. Unfortunately, between the 1970s and the mid-1980s, this development occurred at a time when

¹³ Ibid: 80

demand for land was at its peak for the farmers and other agriculturalists who had started selling their produce to growing urban markets in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan.¹⁴

This migration of the Northern tribes southward in response to encroaching desertification occurred a time when Sudan's leader General Jaffar Nemeiri had abolished the native administration in the rural areas, but had yet to forge an effective alternative mode of governance. It is reported that in 1986 alone, a total of 384,010 people migrated south from north Darfur¹⁵. Conflicts and insecurity escalated in the rural areas as those with access to firearms took the law into their own hands and started resolving their disputes by force rather than by mediation.

Hassan Al Mangouri, in his study of the effects of desertification in Umm Kaddada district in Eastern Darfur has shown that the shift from traditional form of cultivation due to changing ecological conditions and population pressure served to accelerate desertification and the spread of sand dunes, which render it useless for farming¹⁶. This shift has led to a persistent circle of drought, deforestation, shorter fallow periods, less soil fertility and declining crop yields, which inevitably increase the tensions and conflicts among the tribes of Darfur.

Previous forms of livelihood involved crop rotations between millet, sorghum, groundnuts, sesame, watermelons, and gum Arabic productions. This practice allowed the farmers to earn income by selling gum Arabic for export, while benefiting from the nitrogen fixing and soil retaining properties of the trees, which restored fertility to the soil. With the advent of drought, aided by population growth, increased demand for fuel and pressure for more food production

¹⁴ H. D. Johnson. *Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*. Bloomington, (Indiana: Indiana University Press; 2006): 139

¹⁵ M. Mamdani *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror*, (Toronto: Pantheon Books; 2009): 237

¹⁶ A.H Al Mangouri, *Combating Desertification: Experience from Umm Kaddada District in Eastern Darfur*. In *Environmental Degradation as a Cause of Conflict in Darfur*, (University for Peace, 2004): 46-58

led to shortened periods of letting the land lie fallow, deforestation, and eventual soil degradation. These occurrences were further exacerbated by the in-migration of the northern nomads, thus speeding up the process of degradation.

This study examines the effectiveness of the hybrid nature of peace keeping mission in Darfur region (2003-2013). Sudan's conflict has mainly impacted the region and Sudan's neighbor and the conflict has claimed much international attention in the last couple of years¹⁷. The United States, United Nations and African Union are deeply involved in the comprehensive peace process to end the humanitarian crisis in Sudan. This has transformed a regional conflict into a pertinent and prominent international issue¹⁸.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of the study is to examine the effectiveness and hybrid nature of peacekeeping missions in Darfur.

More specifically, the study aims to:

- i) Provide an overview of the peacekeeping mission in Darfur;
- ii) Examine the effectiveness and hybrid nature of the AU/UN peacekeeping operations in Darfur;
- iii) Explore the challenges faced by the AU/UN peacekeeping mission in the Darfur.

1.4 Literature Review

This section analyses the transition of peace in solving the Darfur conflict with special focus on the United Nations – African union hybrid peace operations as discussed by various scholars and critically analyses their views under the three themes: the peace keeping mission in Darfur, the

¹⁷ Alex de wall, "*Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap*", (London: London Review Books, 2004), 15.

¹⁸ Ibid.

hybrid nature of peace keeping mission, and the effectiveness of the hybrid nature of peace keeping mission.

1.4.1 The Hybrid Nature of Peace Keeping Missions

According to the Sudan Tribune on the DPA, the Government of Sudan, being one of the belligerents in concert with its proxy Janjaweed militias, has been cited as responsible for many of the atrocities committed against the civilian population in Darfur.¹⁹ The motivation for the Janjaweed in joining the conflict on the government's side was the prospect of gaining land by systematically pushing non-Arab farmers out of their homes, a process which seems to have succeeded as currently most of the population lives as either refugees or IDPs. The various peace initiatives that have been undertaken have identified the imperative need to disarm these militia groups, but the onus of doing so has devolved to the Government of Sudan, which has proved time and again unable or unwilling to.

According to the Sudan Tribune, the Khartoum government has routinely shown that it cannot be relied upon to deliver or adhere to any agreement because it sides with Janjaweed and it makes agreements out of expediency.²⁰ For instance, though the CPA was signed in 2005 to end the North-South war, many of its provisions were rejected by the presiding National Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum. According to the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, the main obstacle to the peaceful solution to the Darfur conflict is the "lack of political will among all the parties to pursue a peaceful solution".

A study by International Crisis Group in 2006 on Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement, as negotiations unfold, the Sudanese government has been unwilling to cooperate and change its

¹⁹ Sudan Tribune. The Darfur Peace Agreement, (2008), Last modified from http://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/Darfur_Peace_Agreement-2.pdf

²⁰ Ibid

political position, the rebel movements has argued for the Darfur region to be represented at the national level by a Vice Presidency but the government delegation has refused this request, as it would affect the delicate power balance in the government of national unity (GNU) established following the signing of the CPA between the NCP and SPLA.²¹ In 2008, Gowan found that the Khartoum regime adopted a strategy of obstructionism concerning deployment of UN peacekeepers.²² The Sudanese regime's intransigence meant that the UN mission that was scheduled to start operations in 2006 was ultimately delayed, impacting the peace process. Despite having eventually accepted the deployment of a UN force in the form of UNAMID, Khartoum continued to manipulate and undermine the forces' operational machinery, first by refusing the participation of non-African troops, but also by restricting their having a free hand in the operation area. For example, Khartoum has required prior notice for flight operations and has restricted nighttime flights. These measures have not only impaired the mission's operational flexibility, but also denied UNAMID specialized assets from traditional UN troop-contributing countries such as Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan.

Ochieng's²³ study on Sudan rebel factions thick on the ground as hybrid force deploys in 2008 and revealed that the number of rebel factions has increased dramatically from the initial two groups, the JEM and the SLA, to approximately 27 separate factions. In a study on Unifying Darfur's Rebels, The International Crisis Group carried a study in 2005 and found that proposed causes for the rebels proliferation include: divisions between SLA leaders triggered by outside support from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), uneasy alliance between the

²¹ International Crisis Group, *Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement*, (Nairobi/Brussels: Africa Briefing No.39, 2006)

²² R. Gowan. The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in Crisis, 2006–08. *International Peacekeeping*, 15(4), (2008): 453–469.

²³ Z. Ochieng. Sudan, "Rebel Factions Thick On the Ground As Hybrid Force Deploys". (2008) Last modified on 18 April 2014, from <http://allafrica.com/stories/200801281522.html>

ethnic Fur and Zaghawa tribes, Sudanese government manipulation of SLA geographical and ethnic differences, generational clash between young field commanders and elder tribal intellectuals, and exiled leadership that exacerbated the power vacuum within the burgeoning SLA²⁴ Tanner and Tubiana²⁵. This proliferation of the rebel groups continues to complicate the peace process. For a peace process to be possible, the interests of all the affected parties must be represented, a daunting task given the nature of rebel proliferation.

An African Report by the International Crisis Group on Darfur's New Security Reality found that in addition to the challenge of rebel proliferation, there has been increased internal infighting over land and power, which has resulted in fragmentation within the Arab tribes. Some have gone so far as to distance themselves from the NCP²⁶. This presents both challenges and opportunities for the peace process. One challenge is that the NCP no longer seems able to control the Arab tribes who constitute the Janjaweed militias. On the other hand, this could present an opportunity if these groups can be engaged directly.

In his book on Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars, Johnson reveals that the Darfur crisis is there to stay as long as there are IDPs and refugees in Sudan. Since the conflict erupted approximately over 2.7 million Darfurians have been internally displaced. These stakeholders (refugees and IDPs) have a strong interest in returning to their land, and to a stable environment with access to water and food. They also have a claim to some form of compensation for the atrocities committed against them. Their return is prevented, however, by the continued insecurity coupled with the destruction of their means of livelihood following the scorch earth tactics used by the

²⁴International Crisis Group. "Unifying Darfur's Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace". Nairobi/Brussels: *ICG Africa Briefing* No.32. (2005)

²⁵ V. Tanner and Tubiana, J. *Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups*. (Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2007)

²⁶International Crisis Group, Darfur's New Security Reality. *African Report*, no.134 (2007)

GoS and the Janjaweed militias. Compounding these problems is the challenge presented by illegal squatters who have occupied their land with the blessing of the GoS, which is keen on changing the regional demographics in favor of its perceived supporters. More than six years of destruction have also altered the landscape in Darfur thanks to the chopping down of trees and removal of markers, making it impossible to identify land boundaries. This presents an additional challenge for resettlement, and will call for patient employment of local traditional reconciliation and conflict management mechanisms to re-establish property rights and boundaries.

The civil war between northern and southern Sudan, which lasted for 21 years, officially came to an end following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005. The north-south civil war and the peace process have had both direct and indirect effects on security and stability in Darfur. First, the government of Sudan (GoS) recruited militias from Darfur to fight in the south. For example, during the 1980s Nimeiri mobilized murahaleen (militias) that included the Baggarra Reseigat from southern Darfur²⁷. This resulted in the increased militarization of Darfur, with many Darfurians being trained in warfare and becoming accustomed to operating in a war economy. Another example of the north-south war spilling over into Darfur came in 1991 when the SPLA sponsored incursions led by Daoud Boulad, a Darfurian who was formerly a member of the Islamic movement. Boulad was arrested and eventually executed making the end of his movement. Madut²⁸ in his book on Race, Religion, and Violence in Sudan asserts that this increased the tension between the Arab vs. African tribes, leading to a massacre of the Dinka in El-Daein South Darfur in 1986. The Dinka, found predominantly in south Sudan, had fled the north-south civil war and sought refuge in South Darfur. Following Boulad's unsuccessful rebellion, they were seen as supporting the

²⁷H. D. Johnson. *Causes of Sudan's Civil War* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2006), 81–83

²⁸Madut. J. Jok. *Sudan: Race, Religion, and Violence*. (Oxford England: One World Publication, 2007), 239

southern rebellion, which the government now viewed as spreading to Darfur. Thus, the government mobilized the murahaleen militias against them.

Madut also found that the civil war drained development resources, leading to further marginalization of Darfur. Coupled with international economic sanctions and IMF suspension of aid to Sudan, no donor could provide any assistance besides relief aid. The peace process has also been viewed as having reduced the problems in Sudan to a single North-South problem, disregarding the claims of people in other peripheral regions such as Eastern Beja and Western Darfur. The peace process also signaled that the reward for armed struggle is negotiation. Indeed, this encouraged the rebellion in Darfur. This argument is in agreement with Allan Kuperman's thesis about "genocidal rebellion."²⁹ Kuperman sees the situation as one in which a rebel group was willing to risk the lives of its people by rising up against a relatively strong government in the hope that international humanitarian intervention would help facilitate their victory. According to such a view, the Darfur conflict can be considered to have resulted from the rebels calculating the expected benefits from humanitarian intervention.

Aboagye³⁰ revealed that in very broad terms, the UNAMID environment that is about to be inherited from AMIS will be anything but non-permissive. Coupled with this, the key parameters of UNAMID variously involve: i) at the policy level, the processes of mandate formulation, interpretation and transfer, including challenges to synergies between short-term military support operations and follow-on arrangements, ii) A command and control mechanism that is so unprecedented that it is difficult to fully understand its practical application, iii) a force mix that

²⁹J. A. Kuperman. "Suicidal Rebellions and the Moral Hazards of Humanitarian Intervention: Evidence from Western Sudan". *Ethnopolitics Journal*, 4(2), (2005), 149–173.

³⁰Festus Aboagye. The AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur: Challenges, Lessons and Implications for Regional Peacekeeping Training. Presented at the SADC workshop on peace support operations. SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, Harare, Zimbabwe. 3-5 NOVEMBER 2007

is predominantly African, with a sprinkle of UN LSP/HSP, with implications for an effective concept of operations. Aboagye revealed that this raises the possibility of inadequate civilian planning capacity on the one hand, and selective national deployments, or non-deployment and commitments gaps on the other. This will also lead to further gaps in mission capabilities.³¹

1.4.2 The Effectiveness of the Hybrid Nature of Peace Keeping Mission

In stopping atrocities in the Darfur region, the international organizations (UN, EU, and AU) were slow to react. International responses finally came in the wake pressure from aid agencies and the media. The pressure they exerted was sufficiently strong that the US brought the matter to the attention of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The slow response by the international community to the Darfur crisis was in part due to the ongoing North-South peace talks, which had reached a crucial phase. The participants felt that any act that would put pressure on the Khartoum government would run the risk of destabilizing the talks, which had achieved impressive progress towards ending the 21-year-old civil war.

De Waal³² did a study on Darfur and the failure of the responsibility to protect and concluded that the Khartoum regime accurately predicted that the international body was too preoccupied with the north-south peace process to take any notice of the western region, and that their counterinsurgency operation would achieve a quick victory, an assessment which in retrospect was wrong. In May 2004, the U.S. State Department, after a full investigation of the atrocities, declared the killings in Darfur to be “genocide.” Alex De Waal points out the importance of labeling the Darfur crisis genocide, “because it broadens the usage of the term “genocide” to include ethnically targeted killings, rapes and displacement perpetuated in the course of

³¹ Ibid

³² Alex De Waal. Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect [Electronic version], *International Affairs* 83(6), (2007): 1039–1054.

counterinsurgency, a significant expansion of the customary usage of the term to refer to the attempt to eliminate entire population”.

Reeves³³ observed that the EU and the AU could not agree on the use of the term genocide, though there was no dispute about the fact that atrocities were being perpetrated by the Khartoum government and its proxy Janjaweed militias, and many more lives and property were being lost or destroyed as the world debated about what to call the crisis. The United Nations Security Council passed several resolutions which added Darfur as an additional mandate under the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which was overseeing the north-south peace process³⁴ established a committee to monitor the implementation of the measure on Darfur.³⁵ In July 2007, UNSCR 1769 reflected consensus among all members of the Security Council concerning the UN/AU hybrid operation in Darfur, to be called the UN African Mission in Darfur.

Prendergast, Ismail and Fowler³⁶ found that the success of the CPA which has brought relative peace to South Sudan since it was signed in 2005 is the need for a strong coordinated action by the international community. The CPA was realized in large part because the international community demonstrated strong leadership, invested heavily in diplomacy, and applied coordinated leverage on the parties to the conflict. For the Darfur case, any peace process must receive backing from the core group of countries with the most leverage over the parties. In the case of Darfur, these should include the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, and China, backed by focused incentives and pressure from the UN Security Council through the AU mediation mechanisms already in place.

³³ Eric Reeves “Encouraging Khartoum: South Sudan Victimized by ‘Moral Equivalence,’” *The Sudan Tribune, Briefs and Advocacy*. December 21, 2010.

³⁴ UNSCR, The First Resolution 1564 (July 2004)

³⁵ UNSCR, The second Resolution 1590 passed in early 2005

³⁶ John Prendergast, Omer Ismail, and Jerry Fowler. “Memorandum to Djibril Bassolé: Building Blocks for Peace in Darfur”. Jul 9, 2008

Aboagye³⁷ found the following broad observations on the effectiveness of the hybrid nature of the peace keeping mission that impact on training: a) Increasing trends towards AU and regional deployments, well before the policy view of building organic African capacities for peace support interventions. b) Complexity of mandates, missions and end-states that are affected by new multidimensional and multidisciplinary actors and range of complex issues, such as DDR (and SSR), gender, sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), humanitarian assistance (and in other missions, transitional administration, mine action, etc.). c) Effect of spoilers and high Chapter VII ‘use of force’ threshold. d) In tandem with other external factors, a concomitant trend towards hybrid operations in its various interpretations, including a dependence on external assistance and support. e) In spite of these challenging developments, the AU System has lacked strategic management capability, and has been perceived as not being able to utilize donor funding for recruitment and establishment of such a capability. f) The dearth of planning and management capability was worsened by the AU’s preoccupation with numerous complex hot conflicts. g) Donor dependency syndrome (including multiplicity of donor support agendas: G8, EU, NATO, Arab League, etc.), coupled with lack of financial, logistical and strategic lift capacity, and regional ownership.

There has been a lot of literature on peace keeping in general. However, there has not been enough literature specifically on the issue of hybrid nature of peace keeping missions. This means that there is need for the study of the nature and characteristics of hybrid type of peace keeping. This study seeks to enlighten on the effectiveness or lack of it in regard to the operations of peace keeping missions.

³⁷ Festus Aboagye. The AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur: Challenges, Lessons and Implications for Regional Peacekeeping Training. Presented at the SADC workshop on peace support operations. *SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre*, Harare, Zimbabwe. 3-5 NOVEMBER 2007

1.4.3 The UN/AU Peace Keeping Mission in Darfur

Birech revealed that throughout history, groups that have lived side by side for many years without tension have turned on each other, resulting in slaughter and massacre, as witnessed for instance in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, East Timor, and now Darfur.³⁸ The history of Darfur was not without episodes of conflict and violence, the current levels are unprecedented. This is because the Darfur crisis has claimed millions of lives and still continues to with the presence of the African Union mission and the international community – the United Nations Mission in Sudan. The current events as they unfold in Darfur can only be understood in light of its history. A study done by International Crisis Group³⁹ found that the Darfur crisis levels have been reduced to almost pre-war, thanks to humanitarians' concerted and persistent efforts to assist the displaced. Still, violence remains at unacceptably high levels. One reason for the current lull is the DPA negotiated under AU auspices with assistance from the international community. The DPA was signed on May 5, 2006, by the GoS and only one rebel group, SLA/MM, led by Minni Minnawi. The agreement consists of three protocols: power sharing, wealth sharing, and a security arrangement. There is also an additional “chapter” laying out the framework for “Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC). Two rebel groups, the JEM and the SLA/AW, refused to sign the agreement, with Abdel Wahid, the leader of SLA/AW faction, citing two reasons: first, the need for more direct SLA participation in the implementation of the

³⁸ Robert T. Birech. *Giving Reconciliation A Chance In Sudan Seeking An Alternative Response To The Darfur Conflict*. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School (2009)12

³⁹ International Crisis Group, Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement. *ICG*. Nairobi/Brussels. Africa Briefing no.39 (2006)

security arrangement, and second, the agreement did not provide for adequate political representation or a victim's compensation fund.⁴⁰

The DPA is considered to be a triumph due to a number of reasons, among them, the government of Sudan lacks the political will to implement the objectives set out in the DPA. The proliferation of rebel groups has also led to a divided agenda, weakening their bargaining power in the negotiation process. The lack of a unified and coordinated effort by international community has similarly prevented sufficient pressure from being brought to bear on the parties to the conflict. Lastly, failure to involve all the stakeholders in the peace process has proved costly.⁴¹ For instance, the AU mediators failed to give the people of Darfur and the victims of the conflict an adequate voice at the talks. The AU tried to secure buy-in from the Darfurians through what it called the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) process. However, since the DPA was already dead on arrival, render the DDDC meaningless before it could begin.⁴² The longer a peace process in Darfur crisis dragged on, the more new challenges emerged, especially when a large part of the population remained displaced from their homes. For example, those who occupied the land of the displaced found it hard to revert back to their original landless status with the passage of time, especially in a situation where the senior members of the community passed on or became too old to be effective participants in the peace and reconciliation process. The generations which grew up in IDP camps and received aid will continue to lose the opportunity to learn the survival, subsistence, and coping strategies that will have to be passed on

⁴⁰A. H. Al Mangouri Combating Desertification: Experience from Umm Kaddada District in Eastern Darfur. In *Environmental Degradation as a Cause of Conflict in Darfur*, (University for Peace, 2004), 46-58

⁴¹ Ibid

⁴² Ibid

from generation to generation and which are so location-specific and necessary in Darfur's fragile and delicate environment.⁴³

In addition to factors that are affecting civilian stakeholders, the DPA face ongoing challenges since only two parties, Government of Sudan and SLA/MM, signed the agreement, with the other two factions, SLA/AW and JEM, failing to sign. Consequently, around the time of the signing, the peace process was greeted with a deteriorating situation on the ground in Darfur. There was a marked increase in violence directed at civilians, IDPs, members of the humanitarian community, and even the AU peacekeepers⁴⁴. Such a situation begs the question, what processes can be put in place to protect or quarantine the peace process from spoilers messing it up? It is evident that peace cannot be negotiated in an atmosphere of violence and insecurity, and thus there have been calls for a credible plan for the disarmament and demobilization of the Janjaweed militias and other rebel groups. However, the DPA was particularly weak in articulating and delineating how, and by whom, implementation of the agreements reached was to be undertaken. First, DPA relied heavily on the Khartoum government to carry out disarmament of the Janjaweed militias, a task that the GoS had failed to complete on two previous occasions. Also, the AU force which was tasked with providing protection to civilians and monitoring compliance with the provisions of the Agreement lacked the capacity to meet these requirements.⁴⁵

⁴³ Eric Reeves "Encouraging Khartoum: South Sudan Victimized by 'Moral Equivalence,'" *The Sudan Tribune, Briefs and Advocac*, December 21, 2010

⁴⁴ African Union, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Darfur. *PSC/Min/2(LVIII)*, (2006)

⁴⁵ Sudan Tribune 2012-06-17 <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article22430> Last modified 15 June 2014.

According to Salim and Eliasson⁴⁶ the AU as well as UN will work with all national, regional as well as international actors to ensure that all initiatives at present converge and are integrated in the broader AU-UN framework. The AU along with UN continues extensive consultations on the political process as well as parties' positions among all stakeholders inside plus outside Sudan. The AU and UN supports the ongoing efforts together with coordinating closely with the regional initiative of Eritrea, Chad in addition to Libya which intends to help the non-signatory movements with the progress of an organizational framework and facilitate their preparation on a common platform for the renewed talks.⁴⁷

The AU and UN also support and facilitate the work of the SPLM Task Force on Darfur to organize a conference of non-signatory movements. The conference is intended as a mechanism to bring together non-signatory movements, in an effort to foster cohesion among movements in preparation for negotiations. The AU and UN work closely together with non-government organizations which have expertise and capacity to contribute to the political process and intensify consultations with civil society, tribal leaders and representatives of IDPs, refugees and women's groups inter alia through the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation preparatory framework. This process intends to identify the concerns as well as positions of these groups in order to make sure that their views are taken into account in the pre-negotiation and negotiation phases as well as to consolidate support for the peace process. Salim and Eliasson reported that the AU and UN engage with DPA signatories to guarantee that their concerns with interests are included in the renewed political process. The AU and UN build up a negotiation plan,

⁴⁶ Salim Ahmed Salim and Jan Eliasson. "Joint AU-UN Road-map for Darfur Political Process. Stakeholders consultation on how to end the Darfur conflict on the basis of the Addis Ababa conclusions of 16 November 2007.

⁴⁷ Ibid

incorporating lessons learned from the Abuja peace talks continue to actively support the implementation of previous agreements with the goal of improving Chad-Sudan relations.⁴⁸

1.5 Justification of the Study

The specific time frame is picked as it gives me a one full decade. A series of costly civil wars many of them ethnic have dominated the national security agenda in the Southern Sudan. Alan and Tidwell⁴⁹ indicated that Global and regional governments should be concerned so that the trends of conflict in Southern Sudan should be stopped.⁵⁰ The mixed records of incomplete successes, failures and in some cases counterproductive interventions suggests an urgent need to extort lessons from these experiences with a view towards developing a better conceptual framework to guide future policy choices. Consequently this study has both academic and policy justifications. Therefore, it is important to assess the transition of peace in solving the Darfur conflict with special focus on the United Nations – African union hybrid peace operations and what lessons we as scholars and practitioners could learn from the experience to enhance Africa's conflict resolution skills.

Synder⁵¹ observed that the practical justification is motivated by a lack of an analysis of the existing framework and or piecemeal approach of analysis of the weaknesses of explicit approaches. Academically, the study is justified on the grounds that the Southern Sudan Conflict has had great implications on the regional and international system especially in conflict management which needs to be closely analyzed in order to institute successful measures for the management of conflicts. The study envisions that having knowledge of conflict spirals and

⁴⁸ Salim Ahmed Salim and Jan Eliasson - Joint AU-UN Road-map for Darfur Political Process. Stakeholders consultation on how to end the Darfur conflict on the basis of the Addis Ababa conclusions of 16 November 2007.

⁴⁹ Alan C. Tidwell. *Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution* (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 2008)

⁵⁰ Ibid

⁵¹ Jack Synder. *Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1999)

cycles is useful in designing adequate management strategies for conflict practitioners in prolonged conflicts and also add to existing knowledge and capabilities in the area of conflict management to enhance global security policy.

Scholars have done extensive studies on the Darfur crisis which has made a landmark on the entire United Nations peace keeping operations in terms of the personnel deployed and the time the security forces have stayed in Darfur all in vain. The avenue which has not been fully exploited is involvement of all parties to the conflict and the political good will of Al Bashir – the president of Sudan. The study will justify the peace operations attempts which have been applied by both the AU and the UNMID for the last six years since the signing of Darfur Peace Agreement in 2008.⁵²

1.6 Research Questions

The study is guided by the following research questions:

- i) What is the effects of the hybrid nature of the AU/UN peacekeeping missions in Africa; and more so in Darfur?
- ii) How effective is the mission?
- iii) Have hybrid peacekeeping operations been successful in managing conflict in Darfur?
- iv) What are the successes and failures of the A/UN mission?
- v) What lessons can be drawn for other similar missions in Africa?

1.7 Theoretical Framework

Theory is important in analyzing the role of regional and international community in peacekeeping by explaining how peacekeeping has become necessary, desirable and possible, despite its growing complexity. In this paper, theory therefore leads to an inquiry about the

⁵² Eric Reeves “Encouraging Khartoum: South Sudan Victimized by ‘Moral Equivalence,’” *The Sudan Tribune, Briefs and Advocacy* December 21, 2010

effectiveness of actual missions of peacekeeping as well as the response of the international community to global security threats and humanitarian crises in domestic systems. Therefore, in order to understand the role of the international community in peace keeping, the study highlights the views of the Zartman's ripeness theory.⁵³

Just as apples need to ripen in order to be 'good' for consumption⁵⁴, the ripeness theory specifies that only a ripe conflict is favorable for negotiated settlement. Founded by Zartman, the 'ripe time' refers to a dichotomous condition of mutual hurting stalemate and a mutually perceived way out. At this precipice conflicting parties try to find or are open to proposals that offer a way out⁵⁵. The theory states that an mutually hurting stalemate is induced by an actual or impending catastrophe as well as the way out cannot be ceased upon till all parties trust that their foes view the condition in the same way. Where ripeness is not present yet, then Zartman suggests coaxing methods to be engaged by third parties like arming the weaker fighters to make sure parity in weaponry as well as maintaining closer contact with the parties in conflict to help the identification of ripening. The idea behind this theory is that when the parties in conflict find themselves locked in a conflict from which they are unable to escalate to victory and deadlock is painful to them. They thus seek an alternative policy or a way out.⁵⁶

The notion of the ripe moment centers on the parties' insight of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS), associated with an imminent past or recently avoided disaster.⁵⁷ More importantly, for conflicts to be resolved, it is not essential that they only arrive at a ripe moment. John Paul

⁵³ William I. Zartman. "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond", in Stern, P. and Druckman, D., eds., *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*, (Washington, National Academy Press, 2000)

⁵⁴ M. Klieboer "Ripeness of Conflict: A Fruitful Notion?" in *Journal of Peace Research* 31, No.1 (1994):110.

⁵⁵ William I. Zartman 'Ripeness'. (August 2003). Last modified on 4th May 2009, from <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/ripeness/?nid=1280>

⁵⁶William I. Zartman "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments" in *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 1, no.1 (September 2001), 8

⁵⁷ William I.Zartman and Berman, M., *The Practical Negotiator*, (NewHaven, Yale University Press, 1982), 66-78

Lederach criticizes Zartman's ripeness theory as a limited metaphor.⁵⁸ He says that it is a limited metaphor in that it does not consider harmonizing efforts that could initiate peace negotiations. Peace efforts can occur while fighting goes on. For instance, in Darfur, humanitarian efforts, the peace related activities in IDP camps, elders' and tribal leaders peace initiatives; civic associations' and the civil societies peace initiatives can happen plus help start negotiations. These activities could take place in Darfur while fighting continues, as well as may assist to convince the parties to approach the negotiation table. If not, waiting until the conflict is ripe - it may even never be 'ripe', or till the warring parties reach a point of mutually hurting stalemate, could rise the conflict along with increasing human suffering. In the end, the 'ripe time' provides diplomacy with a metaphor to explain the moment where some conflict's ends can be envisioned.⁵⁹ As a theory, ripeness has been successful in explaining why certain situations have been favorable to negotiation and why others have not but it is not clear from academic research how much it is used as a day to day diplomatic tool.

1.8 Research Methodology

This section explored the methodology of the study which aimed at addressing the research objectives, the study sample and instruments for the study. In the study employed the method of content analysis with an emphasis of the Darfur crisis which has attracted peace keeping operations from the African Union which resulted to a hybrid type – involving the African Union and the United Nations peace keeping operations. Content analysis is a method in the social sciences for studying the content of those types of empirical documentation which Hodder

⁵⁸ John Paul Lederach, "Cultivating Peace: A Practitioner's View of Deadly Conflict and Negotiation," in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*, ed. John Darby and Roger MacGinty (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 14.

⁵⁹ I. Hodder. *The Interpretation of Documents and Material Culture*.(Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication, 1994), 154

referred to as mute evidence, that is written texts and artifacts.⁶⁰ Earl Babbie defines content analysis as the study of recorded human communications, such as books, websites, paintings and laws.⁶¹ Content analysis is considered a scholarly method in the humanities by which texts are studied as to authenticity, authorship or meaning.

This study used a process – tracing methodology to analyze the changes that have occurred in the Sudanese way of life with particular attention paid to the policies and strategies successive Sudanese regimes pursued that led to, and continue to sustain the current situation in Darfur, preventing any meaningful interventions from taking place. Only by understanding the historical, ecological, political, social, and economic structure of Darfur can we gain a better appreciation of the problem. This study will rely on secondary sources of data – books, journals, internet sources, and other written material on the Darfur case. It also draws on the author’s experiences serving as a Military Observer with the second mission - African Mission in Sudan from January, 2005 to January, 2006.⁶²

This study was therefore drawn from secondary sources of information. The secondary data was sourced from a collection and review of published and unpublished material, journals, academic papers and periodicals. These were taken through intensive and critical analysis.

1.9 Chapter Outline

Chapter one details the introduction, literature review, and conceptual framework, and problem statement, objectives of the study, justification of the study, hypothesis and the methodology.

Chapter two will present a discussion on the historical Overview of the Darfur Conflict, The comparison between a hybrid peace operation and a homogenous peace operation, the successes

⁶⁰ I.Hodder. *The interpretation of documents and material culture*.(Thousand Oaks, Sage Publication, 1994): 155

⁶¹Babbie, Earl R. *The Practice of Social Research* (12th Ed). (Wadsworth: Cengage Learning, 2010): 530

⁶² Earl R. Babbie. *The Practice of Social Research* (12th Ed). (Wadsworth: Cengage Learning, 2010): 531

and failures of Darfur (AU – UNAMID) peace operations and the challenges and opportunities of peace operations in Darfur. Chapter three will be concerned with comparative analysis of peace operations in Darfur and Central Republic of Africa and DRC. Chapter four will provide a critical analysis on the AU – UNAMID peace operations in Darfur and Africa as a continent. Chapter five will provide conclusions based on the study, give recommendation and then provide suggestions on areas of further research.

CHAPTER TWO

THE EFFECTIVENESS AND HYBRID NATURE OF PEACE KEEPING MISSIONS IN AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The name of the region “Darfur” comes from the Fur sultanate which was the first Muslim state in Darfur. It emerged in the middle of the seventeenth century. Darfur means the homeland (dar) of the Fur community. The Fur sultanate consisted mostly of non-Arab farmers who kept out Arab nomad herders, the Baggara. Since 1994, the region of Darfur was divided into three administrative zones - federal states. The north includes Arabs and a majority of non-Arabs (mainly Zaghawa) semi- nomads, the center is inhabited by a vast majority of non-Arab farmers such as the Fur and Masalit and the south is host of Arab speaking cattle nomads, the Baggara. There are many other tribes and communities living in Darfur but this paper will focus on the three main African tribes Masalit, Fur and Zaghawa.⁶³

Like many other countries in Africa, Sudan’s boundaries were drawn by the colonialist empires. They therefore do not respect the ethnic boundaries and force communities that may have no common interest to live together. The sultanate of Darfur was ruled by the Keira dynasty from the seventeenth century until 1874 when the sultanate fell under the control of the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁴ The brief period of Turco-Egyptian rule was marked by sporadic revolts by the Fur and the turbulent Baggara tribesmen to the south. In 1885 the sultanate was taken by the Mahdist forces who wanted to restore Islam in the region and fought against the Turco-Egyptian Empire.

⁶³ CIA- Information from the world factbook of the central intelligence agency:
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.htm>

⁶⁴Alex De Waal, "Briefing: Darfur, Sudan: Prospects for Peace", *Africa Affairs* 104, no 414 (2005): 127-135(9).

This lasted until 1898 when Ali Dinar, a Fur of the Keira dynasty restored the sultanate.⁶⁵ This short period of 24 years is known as umm kwakiyya (years of misery, burning and banditry) leaving the region with famine, local conflicts and a very weak economy. The downfall of the Fur sultanate came during the First World War. In 1916 the British killed Ali Dinar considering he had too close links with the Ottoman Empire. Darfur was then annexed to the Anglo-Egyptian condominium or Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (1898-1956).⁶⁶ But Darfur revealed not being a region of great interest for the development of Sudan for it had no exploitable resources and was inhabited by cultivators and impoverished herdsman. Darfur was then neglected, administered by a few British officers - who left the day-to-day governance to local chiefs.

2.2 Darfur in the 20th Century

Darfur had never been governed by the central government of Sudan and it did not change upon the independence of Sudan in 1956.⁶⁷ The central government has continued to neglect the region of Darfur and the construction of roads, schools, industries and medical facilities remain far behind the rest of the country, especially the Nile region where the capital Khartoum is situated. When the British left the country in 1956, the only strong institution they left behind was the army, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). Over the early post-independence period, the army conducted several “coup d’état” against democratically elected but incompetent or corrupted political leaders. However the military powers put in place were often close to tyranny and military dictatorship.⁶⁸

It is difficult to determine the origins of the current conflict. There are not one but several causes. Disputes over pasture and discrimination from the government in Khartoum towards Darfurian

⁶⁵ Ibid: 128

⁶⁶ Ibid: 126

⁶⁷A. El-Affendi, "Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemma for Sudan in Africa", *African Affairs*, 89 (2005):358

⁶⁸ Flint Julie and Alex De Waal, *Darfur, A New History of a Long War*, (Zed Books, London: 2008) 320

seem to have played an important role in the beginning of the conflict and authors tend to agree on both these aspects.

Historically, ethnic tensions between farmers (non-Arabs or Africans: Masalit, Fur and Zaghawa tribes) and nomad herders (Arab or Baggara) have always been latent due to the disputes over pasture, agricultural land and water. But those were exacerbated starting the late 70s due to the global, severe and repeated droughts that rarefied the resources in northern and central Darfur. Besides, the population of Darfur has more than double between 1973 and 2002⁶⁹ going from 3.6 to 6.5 million. Specifically, Arab tribes from neighboring countries had crossed the border, looking for land: “the strategy for livelihoods remained the same, based on small farmers and livestock”⁷⁰ while more and more people were looking for land and livelihoods in Darfur.

Land and wells disputes were however not exceptional and used to be settled by conferences of the traditional leaders. But this mechanism began to breakdown because from the 70s onwards, the central government of Khartoum began a political reform that aimed mainly at destroying political opposition. The region was first divided into two separate provinces in 1974 before becoming three separate states in 2003, further separating weakening the tribes and ethnic groups. The traditional powers lost their authority and were replaced by government-appointed leaders.⁷¹

The tensions increased even more when the president of Sudan Al 'Bashir and its government decided in the late mid-90s to impose an Islamist ideology and Arabic culture to the entire country while the population claiming to have Arab origins represented a minority within the population of Darfur. They injected an ideological and racist dimension to the conflict in

⁶⁹ Cockett Richard, *Sudan, Darfur and the Failure of an African State* (Yale University Press: 2010) 315

⁷⁰ Ibid:173

⁷¹ Africa Research Bulletin "Genocide in Darfur" *Political, Social and Cultural Series* 41, no. 4 (2004):15699-15742

defining who was “Arab” and who was “Zuruq” (black). While conducting research on the conflict and its origins, Dr. Richard Cockett from the interviews with rebel groups’ members, portrayed that the main reason of the conflict was not the shortage of land or resources but a political war.⁷² He was told: “Arabization was the new policy that created this conflict... The Arabs had lived with us side-by-side for years... and then started attacking us. We had been surrounded by the Arab militias in our village ... we decided to protect ourselves by any means”.⁷³

Between the late 80s and early 2000s the Arab population, Baggara, has been in conflict with each of the three non-Arab ethnic groups: the Fur in Jebel Marra region in 1987-1989, the Masalit in the West of Darfur in the second half of the 90s and repeated clashed in North Darfur in the late 90s and early 2000s. This increase of violence was supported by the introduction of automatic weapons, the GoS providing Arab tribes with weapons and the non-Arab tribes organizing self-defense groups and gathering weapons from neighboring countries. By the 1990s Darfur was short of water but awash of guns⁷⁴.

Darfur’s strategic position in Khartoum twisted into a deadly factor when Khartoum feared losing their power over the region to the Darfurian rebels. Khartoum’s exploitation and discrimination created resistance. The hostility in Darfur rose up as the disenfranchised population rose up. The African rebels justified their actions as a counter-marginalization movement that they take up arms to fight against the legacy of years of discrimination for more political power in addition to a share of Sudan’s \$1 million-per-day oil revenue.⁷⁵ The Darfur rebels’ assault on government military installation was an assault on Arab leadership.. Having

⁷² Ibid

⁷³ Ibid: 175

⁷⁴ O. Collins Robert, *Disaster in Darfur*, (University of California Santa Barbara, 2004), 5

⁷⁵ E. Wax, *Sudan Rebels Reach Accord on Darfur*, (The Washington Post, 10 November, 2004)

been threatened and challenged by the uprising populations throughout the greater Sudan, Khartoum used alternative Arab militias not only to strike back but to eliminate an rising threat it perceived from Darfur.

The government backed-militia was carrying out intentional attacks on Darfur civilians, with the order not only to destroy the rebellion but also to kill all the ‘slaves’. Decades of government structural violence got to the tipping point when Darfurian rebels – fighting in the name of the people of Darfur – feared their people were excluded in the nationwide power-sharing agreement signed only with Khartoum and the SPLA. For fear of total disenfranchisement, the rebels started their own revolution. In retaliation, with its weak military power as well as poor diplomatic capacity, the government sponsored in addition to prepared militia genocidal campaigns to secure its authority over Darfur.⁷⁶

Darfurian rebels along with the population - as resources for the rebels - remained a danger to Khartoum’s attempt to apply power over the region. When the rebels attacked the regime’s authority, they became the preeminent threat. Concerned that Darfur rebellion would cause the failure of the Arabization program, Khartoum began a ‘top down’ war with the calculation that eliminating that threat would secure ‘Arabization’ and control of Darfur as well as the expansion, power exertion and accumulation of wealth.⁷⁷ On one hand, the politics of “us” and “them” is the driving force of policy toward Darfur. Black Africans – as slaves - have been considered the ‘others’ who have been marginalized from Khartoum politics. In *Identity/Difference*, Connolly

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ Africa Research Bulletin "Genocide in Darfur" Political, *Social and Cultural Series* 41, no. 4 (2004) pp. 15699-15742

argued that “the threat is posed not merely by actions the other might take to injure or defeat the true identity but by the very visibility of its mode of being as other”.⁷⁸

In other words, as Campbell relates, “the mere existence of an alternative mode of being, the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible and thus denaturalizes the claim of a particular identity to be the true identity, is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.”⁷⁹ The existence of the ‘other’ Africans, who dominate the territory, has always been a challenge to Arab identity and supremacy in the Sudan. But more than a quiet existence or perceived threat, the African rebels’ action was a clear and preeminent threat to Khartoum. On the other hand, Khartoum did not seem to have a better alternative when encountering the immediate rebel challenge. In his study of “Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century”, Valentino suggests that a ‘final solution’ is best understood when the phenomenon is studied from a strategic perspective.⁸⁰ “The strategic perspective suggests that mass killing is most accurately viewed as an instrumental policy – a brutal strategy designed to accomplish leaders’ most important ideological or political objectives and counter what they see as their most dangerous threats.”⁸¹ The African rebels’ action challenged Arab leadership, its authority and identity. Given its decreasing authority and influence over the peripherals, self-preservation has become Khartoum’s first strategic priority. As a result, when the threats to its authority and power arose, ethnic cleansing and genocidal warfare became the ‘instrumental policy’. In addition, Valentino also attested “a ‘final solution’ is chosen when

⁷⁸ Ibid: 66

⁷⁹ D. Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity* (University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota: 1998), 3

⁸⁰ B. Valentino, *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*, (Cornell University Press, 2004) , 2-6: 5

⁸¹ Ibid: 3

leaders believe that their victims pose a threat that can be countered only by removing them from society or by permanently destroying their ability to organize politically and militarily.”⁸²

As the African population became the threatening ‘others’, permanently eliminate that threat was not only strategic goal but also an immediate and final solution for Khartoum to preserve its power. The Darfur rebels became the preeminent threat for several reasons under the Khartoum “politics of fear” calculation. First, a strong grip on Darfur is crucial for the Khartoum regime's power relationship with its other peripheral regions. The government fears that tribalism and regionalism in Darfur could become a roadblock to the "Arabization" program that is in process throughout the country. “Arabization” is Khartoum’s remedy for secessionism and separatism given the current situation with the south. The regime has long been at war with its rivals to exert control over the "Three Areas" of Abyei, the Nubian Mountains and the Southern Blue Nile.⁸³ The recent internationally mediated peace agreement in the Sudan already cost Khartoum’s control in the southern Sudan.

The government of Southern Sudan under the leadership of the SPLA was therefore established.⁸⁴ When the two Darfur rebel groups, Sudan’s Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), called for more Darfur representation in the central government, more investment and a larger share of national resources, they confirmed Khartoum’s failure to contain its peripherals. Losing a strong grip over Darfur would cause the loss of Khartoum’s influence and legitimacy over the country– which would result in the demise of government elites’ economic and political absolutism. Second, ceding Darfur to the rebels could be the end of the Arab-leadership and Khartoum’s legitimacy over the country. As the International Crisis

⁸² Ibid: 5

⁸³ R. Dallaire. *Looking at Darfur, Seeing Rwanda*, (The New York Times, New York: 2004)

⁸⁴ Ibid

Groups (ICG) reports, “such an event would send a clear signal to the Beja in the east, the Nubians in the North, and other disenfranchised communities on the periphery that armed revolt is the only mechanism available in Sudan for securing rights and freedom.”⁸⁵

Losing control of one region may cost the government another one.⁸⁶ For fear of a “domino effect”, Khartoum had to maintain an ‘upper hand’ in Darfur region. Third, the alleged Chadian links and support to SLA and JEM, and their incorporation with the SPLA, would exceed Khartoum’s military capability to handle the situation politically and militarily. Without the resources to maintain a strong national military and with 40 percent of its armed forces recruited from Darfur tribes, Khartoum feared that it is incapable of handling by itself and chose to recruit and support the murderous militias to eliminate both the rebels and its supporters and resources.⁸⁷

It was not only economic resources which Darfur contributes to the national wealth that was crucial to Khartoum but maintaining political power over Darfur helped illustrate the regime’s authority over Sudan. If the government lost control in Darfur, as it did, other regions will follow Darfur’s lead, and Khartoum would not have enough resources to maintain military superiority, economic security and political power. Dependent on resources and incapable of handling the perceived threats with its own political and military power, the predatory state used a proxy militia to carry out a ‘final solution’ on its people.

⁸⁵ International Crisis Group Africa Reports on Sudan Last modified <http://www.icg.org>

⁸⁶ Jannie Lilja, “Ripening Within? Strategies Used by Rebel Negotiators to End Ethnic War,” *Negotiation Journal*, 27, no 3 (2011): 311-342

⁸⁷ Ibid:312

2.3 Pre-deployment Conflict

While tensions had been rising since 1987, they became more important and when in 2001 and 2002, the Government of Sudan (GoS) backed attacks on non-Arab communities increased, especially around Jebel Marra and Dar Zaghawa.⁸⁸ It is difficult to establish a clear chronology of the escalation of violence and who from the rebels or the government started attacking the other party. Facing government policy, the tribes joined each other to attack the government bases. On 21 July 2001 a Fur/Zaghawa group met in Abu Gamra and agreed to fight against Arab Supremacist policies. The first joint Zaghawa-Fur operation took place in the south of Jebel Marra in February 2002. In November 2002, the different rebel groups organized a meeting in Jebel Marra to determine the repartition of power among the three groups of Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit. The starting point of the recent conflict is said to be the attack on 26 February 2003 of a police office in capital of Jabal Marra Province, Gulu, by a group of approximately 300 insurgents calling themselves the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) which changed its name two weeks later into the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A). As an answer to this attack, the Government of Sudan (GoS) attacked the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa populations.⁸⁹

After the first attack of a police office by Abdel Wahid SLA fighter in February 2003, violence between the rebel groups and the government escalated. The GoS first opened negotiations with the SLA forces as the number of governmental armed forces was insufficient and unprepared to intervene at the same time in Darfur and Southern Sudan. But the ceasefire collapsed no later than the 18 March when Arab militias linked to the government assassinated a Masalit leader, destroyed the Darfur town of Karnoi and the SLA forces started to fight back with success due to

⁸⁸ Hottinger Julian Thomas, 'The Darfur Peace Agreement: Expectations Unfulfilled', 2006, Last modified <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/dpa-unfulfilled.php> Accessed 8 May 2012

⁸⁹ Ibid

the incompetence of the Sudanese army. This was one of the first peace agreements of a, so far, “never ending” list of broken ceasefires.⁹⁰

On 25 April 2003 the SLA forces conducted an attack over El Fasher destroying helicopters, occupying army headquarters and capturing the air force Major General. In this attack, SLA was joined by the JEM. On the government side, violence against civilians from the supported Janjaweed is reported back in October 2002. One year after the official beginning of the insurgency, over 30 000 people had died, one million of Darfur were considered as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) while another 200 000 had crossed the Chad border to become refugees. In 2010 it is estimated that about 300 000 persons have died 41 and 3 million have been forced into refugees and IDP camps.⁹¹ This intensity and internationalization of the conflict in Darfur therefore called for intervention in terms of peacekeeping.

2.4 Hybrid Peace Operations vs Homogenous Peace Operations

In 2007, Jones and Cherif conducted a study in Canada on Hybridizing UN Peace Operations and found that peace operations are constantly evolving, adapting to the challenges of new security environments.⁹² Peacekeeping has undergone substantive transformation. Contemporary peace operations are now multidimensional, multifaceted, and multifunctional. They involve a range of organizations including the UN, regional organizations, NGOs and other non-state actors. Finally, they incorporate political, economic, social and/or cultural elements as well as military security components and cover a multitude of tasks including monitoring, enforcement,

⁹⁰ Jannie Lilja, “Ripening Within? Strategies Used by Rebel Negotiators to End Ethnic War,” *Negotiation Journal* 27, no 3 (2011): 311-342

⁹¹ Hottinger Julian Thomas, ‘The Darfur Peace Agreement: Expectations Unfulfilled’, 2006, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/dpa-unfulfilled.php> accessed 8 May 2010

⁹² Jones and Cherif; see also Kristine St-Pierre, “Hybridizing UN Peace Operations: The Role of the European Union and Canada,” *Review of European and Russian Affairs* 3, no. 2 (2007): 3-5. It should be noted that an operation authorized by the UN Security Council, but conducted by a regional organization refers to a Chapter VIII mission and is not considered a hybrid operation

protection of civilians, and security, and governance, rule of law, human rights, humanitarian assistance, and elections. Over the years, peace operations have been compelled to change and adapt to new environments at an unprecedented rate, translating in what is now referred to as ‘complex peace operations.’ Hybrid operations are not a new phenomenon; in fact, most missions deployed in the 1990s could be considered hybrids. Hybrid operations are operations in which UN and non-UN forces share, following different frameworks, peacekeeping or peace enforcement responsibilities.⁹³

In a 2004 report prepared for the UN DPKO’s Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, Jones and Cherif identified four types of hybrid frameworks: sequential, parallel, coordinated, and integrated. Each type exhibits a different level of integration between the UN and non-UN components. Further differentiation can be made by looking at the nature of the non-UN component (whether a regional organization, multinational force or individual state).⁹⁴

Gowan and Johnstone observed that hybrid operations are often looked upon as a better option for the future as they combine UN legitimacy with regional capability.⁹⁵ There is often disparity in the capacity level of regional actors. Nevertheless, as a tool for responding to conflict and for managing complexity in peace operations, hybrid operations portray a number of advantages. Regional actors in hybrid operations can ease UN responsibilities by taking on some or all peacekeeping and peace enforcement tasks; they can reinforce a UN mission at short-notice, for example, during elections or if violence breaks out; and they can provide the UN with more time to prepare for a mission by deploying in advance of the UN force. Notwithstanding these

⁹³ Ibid

⁹⁴ Independent Study Commissioned by the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office for the Coordination Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations, 2009.

⁹⁵ R. Gowan and I. Johnstone, *New Challenges for Peacekeeping: Protection, Peacebuilding and the War on Terror* (New York, NY: International Peace Academy). Accessed on 9/12/2011
http://www.ipacademy.org/media/pdf/publications/cwc_working_paper_peacekeeping_ijrg.pdf

advantages, the greatest added value of hybrid operations may be the fact that they are often more willing to deploy under a Chapter VII mandate, which allows for the use of force. Consequently, hybrid missions are often perceived as more robust and capable than UN forces acting alone.⁹⁶

According to Jones and Cherif, the concept of hybrid operations and what it means on the ground and in operational terms still imparts confusion, as they incorporate “personnel and missions from a range of organizational, national, and ad hoc origins.” Jones and Cherif argue that the real concern regarding the growing trend towards hybrid operations “should be with the quality of capacity provided for any given conflict responses, not the organizational framework through which the response is provided.”⁹⁷ St-Pierre revealed that greater flexibility does not guarantee that actions will be taken on issues such as national and security interests, or on issues of funding, personnel, and equipment which can significantly restrict the scope and duration of an operation.⁹⁸ As past operations have shown, regional actors are more likely to get involved in a hybrid operation if the intervention serves their interests.⁹⁹

2.5 The Successes of the AU/UNAMID Mission

A study conducted by Holt and Taylor on behalf of the UN found that the protection of civilians is a serious component for a sustaining political peace. When the UN sends in peacekeepers, it makes the statement that an international effort will work towards building a stable peace in that region.¹⁰⁰ Peacekeepers enter soon after the formal end of a conflict, at the time peace is often

⁹⁶ Ibid

⁹⁷ R. Gowan and I. Johnstone. “New Challenges for Peacekeeping: Protection, Peacebuilding and the War On Terror”. *Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 11.

⁹⁸ Duschene, LTC Pierre. SHAPE J1, Current Status and Future Update of Bi-SC Directive 40-1, presentation to NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP), 25-28 May 2010.

⁹⁹ Ibid

¹⁰⁰ Victoria K. Holt, and Glyn Taylor. “Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations, Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges. “Independent Study Commissioned by the Department of Peace

more of a goal than a reality, to facilitate prevention of a reoccurrence of violence plus to support the political process. Where civilians are still at risk, efforts to set up governance, security, as well as the rule of law may flounder and be unsustainable. Neither a legitimate state nor the efforts for a steady peace can be created upon a political settlement or government that leaves a population at risk of violence. As observed in Darfur, among other conflict-torn areas,¹⁰¹ peacekeeping operations that are not well prepared to deal with large-scale violence directed towards civilians will hesitate and may even crumble.

Holt and Taylor conclude therefore that successful missions are the ones that deal with the protection of civilians as an included part of their aims.¹⁰² Whether it is meant by the Security Council to support security and stability, to help build the rule of law, to organize elections or even to help put into practice a power-sharing agreement, the ability mission to appreciate the threats plus the vulnerabilities facing the civilian population is determined to strengthen its ability to deliver on these mandated tasks. Elections are only possible if the people are free and safe to travel in order to vote; political stability can be enhanced if insecurity is suppressed; as well as power-sharing can only succeed where stakeholders need not to fear for their lives.

2.6 Failures

The peace process in Darfur failed to bring a lasting peace to the violence-beset region of Darfur. Earlier in the introductory section, this paper identified five major factors that thwarted the Darfur peace process. The failures are thus discussed below.

2.6.1 Mutual Mistrust

Keeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office for the Coordination Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations, 2009.

¹⁰¹ DPKO/OCHA. *Protecting in the context of UN Peacekeeping Operations* (New York: United Nations, 2009)

¹⁰² Victoria K. Holt, and Glyn Taylor. *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations*, Successes, op cit.

In the situation of civil war or intrastate conflict, mutual trust is a vital factor for effective negotiations towards a sustainable peace agreement. Mutual trust makes sure that confidence between the actors, increases their willingness to negotiate as well as compromise, avoids the 'security dilemma', in addition to helping them feel secure with the results of the negotiations. According to Darby and MacGinty, a successful peace process requires that the protagonists are more willing to negotiate in good faith, and also that the negotiators are quite committed to a sustained process.¹⁰³ Roy Licklider also adds that a workable settlement requires flexibility and, compromise which in turn requires mutual trust.¹⁰⁴ Parties who lack mutual trust rarely reach an effective peace agreement. Adrian Guelke identifies factors that undermine peace negotiations, the pursuit of opposing aims by the major antagonists are among the main hindrances for a negotiated settlement.¹⁰⁵

In the Darfur peace process, confidence and trust involving the GoS and the rebel movements has been not noteworthy. From the very beginning, the parties did not negotiate seriously. Bad faith on all sides hindered the 2004 N'Djamena as well as Addis Ababa peace efforts.¹⁰⁶ In the same way, in the Abuja negotiations of 2005 also the 2006 that led to the signing of the DPA, the government and rebels continued to see each other with acute suspicion and loathing.¹⁰⁷ The parties did not engage in serious plus flexible negotiations or show any willingness to make compromise. Instead they rejected the claims of their adversaries, recriminations, accusations

¹⁰³J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty, "Conclusion: Peace Processes, Present and Future". In *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes* J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty eds, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 2

¹⁰⁴ Roy Licklider. "Obstacles to Peace Settlements". In *Turbulent*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, (Washington: United States of Institute Press, 2001), 697-718.

¹⁰⁵Adrian Guelke, "Negotiations and Peace Processes". In *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*, eds. John Darby and Roger MacGinty, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 53.

¹⁰⁶J. Flint, and A. De Waal. *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*. (New York: Zed Books, 2008), 120.

¹⁰⁷ Laurie Nathan, "The Failings of the DPA." *Accord*, Vol. 18 (2006)

and insults.¹⁰⁸ Accordingly the parties failed to reach a comprehensive and sustainable agreement in the Abuja negotiations.

There are two factors that created mistrust between the government and the rebels. First, is the appalling scale of the violence as well as atrocities that incited hatred plus broken relationships among various tribes in Darfur who previously had good relations. Characterizing internal conflicts - civil wars, Peter Wallensteen writes that such conflicts result in the breaking up of already existing social relationships¹⁰⁹ For example, Wallensteen argues that in such conflicts, families are divided, friendships are destroyed, and local communities are shattered.¹¹⁰ This social breakup often creates psychological wounds among communities that ultimately incite hatred and mutual distrust.

A report by the UN Commission of Inquiry for Darfur assert the Sudanese army and its proxy Arab militias continue to conduct indiscriminate attacks, including killing civilians, torture, pillaging, and forced displacement, throughout Darfur.¹¹¹ This actions of the government forces, destruction of villages, enforced disappearances, rape as well as other forms of sexual violence, and their Arab militias against African tribes made worse the social relationships plus created a social divide among the Darfur tribes along with diminished trust among the rebels, who represent the various tribes, as well as the government of Sudan.¹¹² Thus, this social divide may have diminished the willpower of actors to come to the negotiating table in good faith to finish the conflict.

¹⁰⁸ Laurie Nathan, "No Ownership, No Peace: The Darfur Peace Agreement", *Crisis State Research Centre*, 2 (2006)

¹⁰⁹ Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflict, 1989-2000." *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no 5 (2001): 629-644.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ United Nations, Report of the International Commission of the Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General, (January 2005), 3. Last modified <http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com-inq-darfur.pdf>

¹¹² Amir H. Idris, *Conflicts and Politics of Identity in Sudan* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 78-89.

The Government of Sudan lacked the political commitment to get a negotiated plus durable settlement to the conflict.¹¹³ The dire need of commitment may stem from the GoS' conviction that negotiated settlements that help rebels to have their demands met may encourage rebellion in other marginalized regions of Sudan so as to get their demands during negotiations.¹¹⁴

2.6.2 Weaknesses of the Mediation Process

In most peace process, mediators and external actors that influence the mediation process act a dominant role in its successes or failures. Even though often mediators and external actors have a positive role in the peace process, still there are times when they have aided to induce failure. As Licklider,¹¹⁵ states, mediators seem to be increasingly oriented towards bringing peace, which practically means some sort of negotiated settlement, though some sort of players want the settlement twisted in favor of one side. Licklider also adds, external pressure does not always promote peace, of course. Apparently, internal violence is often promoted or made possible by outside assistance of various sorts.¹¹⁶ Thus, mediators and external actors may complicate the outcome of a peace process by focusing on a quick outcome rather than a long-term solution-oriented process of mediation or by skewing the outcome to one side.

On the other hand Lederach argues that in mediation, adequacy and the clarity of the framework of the process determines the outcome.¹¹⁷ The aim of this argument is that a hasty and quick-fix-oriented process does not result in sustainable solutions acceptable to everyone.¹¹⁸ In the case of

¹¹³Fouad Ibrahim, "Strategies for a De-escalation of Violence in Darfur, Sudan." Special Issue of *Global Development Studies* 4 (Winter 2005-Spring 2006): 14-16.

¹¹⁴International Crisis Group, Darfur. "The Failure to Protect", op cit, 7

¹¹⁵ Roy Licklider, "Obstacles to Peace Settlements" In *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, eds. Chester A, Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall , eds, (Washington: United States of Institute Press): 697-718:700

¹¹⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁷John Paul Lederach. *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 21-22.

¹¹⁸Ibid

the Darfur peace process, mediators used ineffective mediation strategies. To a degree, if not exclusively, throughout the Darfur process two main factors related to the processes of mediation have undermined the result of the negotiations. These are incompetence of mediators as well as misguided mediation strategy.

2.6.3 Inconsistent Strategy of Participation

Whether the stakeholders in a conflict are properly represented as well as if the peace process is inclusive play a pivotal role in making or breaking the outcome of a peace settlement. Licklider¹¹⁹ observes that a workable settlement usually has to involve all major parties. MacGinty and Darby also say that one major criterion for a successful peace process is that all major actors in the conflict are included.¹²⁰ This means that a peace settlement that does not involve all stakeholders in a conflict cannot be sustainable. The peace process as well as the successive settlement lacks legitimacy amongst the excluded groups, and these groups outside the process may act as spoilers. Stedman's concept of spoilers supports this argument. As Stedman articulates, if one of the warring parties is skeptical about its security after the agreement or in the future government, certainly it would spoil the agreement.¹²¹ Licklider supports Stedman's argument saying, even a small but dedicated group can commit a series of violent acts that can bring about the collapse of the peace process.¹²² Thus, for any peace process to be thriving, it should include all affected parties as well as stakeholders in the conflict.

2.6.4 Fragmentation of the Rebel Movements

¹¹⁹ Roy Licklider, "Obstacles to Peace Settlements" In *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds. (Washington: United States of Institute Press): 697-718:701

¹²⁰ Darby, J. and R. Mac Ginty, "Conclusion: Peace Processes, Present and Future". In *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes* J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty eds, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 2

¹²¹ Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security* XXII 2 (1997)

¹²² Roy Licklider, "Obstacles to Peace Settlements" In *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds. (Washington: United States of Institute Press): 697-718:701

Hottinger¹²³ on a study on the Darfur Peace agreement finds that in Darfur, the fragmentation of rebels posed a serious challenge to the success of the peace process in Darfur. When the Darfur conflict broke out in 2002-2003, the SLM/A and the JEM rebel groups existed in Darfur. Yet, these two rebel groups gradually split into several factions. By November 2006, twelve rebel factions existed in Darfur.¹²⁴ Kelly Campbell¹²⁵ also observes that the amount of factions has since increased and as of January 2008, to around 27 rebel factions that now existed in Darfur, more than double the amount of rebel factions in 2006.

This is attributed to disagreements over political agendas for negotiations, power struggles among commanders, as well as ethnic affiliation¹²⁶ In order to undermine rebel unity, the government of Sudan also has incited rebel divisions by infiltrating the rank in addition to the files of the rebel groups. The government has also used buy-out tactics in separate deals with some factions, igniting more divisions as well as weakening organized rebel resistance.¹²⁷

The rebel fragmentations begun as early as 2004 after a group of commanders defected from JEM as well as established their own faction, the National Movement for Reform and Development. The group demanded their representation in the Abuja peace process, except for fear of further divisions with discord amongst rebels, the AU mediators refused to identify the

¹²³Julian Thomas Hottinger, "The Darfur Peace Agreement: Expectations Unfulfilled." *Accord* 18 (2006)

¹²⁴Human Security Baseline Assessment, "No Dialogue, No Commitment: The Perils of Deadline Diplomacy in Darfur," p. 5.

¹²⁵Kelly Campbell, "Negotiating Peace in Darfur," *United States Institute of Peace*, (January 2008), 4

¹²⁶M. W. Daly. *Darfur's Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 298-300:298

¹²⁷International Crisis Group, "Unifying Darfur's Rebels: A Pre-requisite for Peace," *Africa Briefing* 32 (6 October 2005)1-5:3

splinters.¹²⁸ Likewise, the Sudanese Liberation Army suffered fragmentations. The SLA dissidents raided the Arab villages in Sudan plus provoked the neutral Arab tribes¹²⁹

2.6.5 The Inability of the DPA

The DPA of May 2006 is the only chief agreement in the history of the Darfur peace process. The DPA agreement includes four key areas: security arrangements, wealth-sharing, power-sharing as well as the Darfur-Darfur dialogue.¹³⁰ The flaws and discrepancies in its provisions turned the DPA into a ‘self-defeating’ agreement. The agreement actually failed to achieve peace and also, its aftermath saw to the continued conflict, and worsened security as well as humanitarian crisis.¹³¹ The trouble with the DPA partly is due to its weak power along with resources-sharing provisions and also security arrangements that did not accomplish expectations of the rebels.

2.7 Challenges of Peace Operations in Darfur

The following challenges of peace operations in Darfur can be attributed to a study by the United Nations¹³² study on the African Union Mission in Darfur.

2.7.1 Infrastructure and Resource Inadequacies

The geography Darfur renders distribution of humanitarian support difficult. Darfur indeed has very few transportation routes as well as scarce water supplies. During the rainy period, railways and roads become nearly impenetrable, requiring UNAMID to employ aerial transportation to

¹²⁸M. W. Daly. *Darfur's Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 298-300: 299

¹²⁹ International Crisis Group, "Unifying Darfur's Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace," op. cit., p.1-5:3

¹³⁰ The Darfur Peace Agreement, May 5, 2006, by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Mini Menawi in Abuja, Nigeria, <http://allafrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/view/00010926.pdf>

¹³¹Laurie Nathan. "No Ownership, No Peace: The Darfur Peace Agreement." op cit., Also see International Crisis Group, "Darfur's New Security Reality," Africa Report, 134 (26 November 2007), 1-2.

¹³² "The UN - African Union Mission in Darfur". <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/html>. Last Modified December 2013

bring aid. In the 2013 rainy season, torrential downpours brought a heavy toll throughout Darfur, destroying and damaging the homes of more than 530,000 people. The United States supported UNAMID in relief efforts for flood with heavy equipment as well as air assistance.¹³³

2.7.2 The Government Interference

The Sudanese Government allowed UNAMID into Sudan in 2008, but since then has restricted the mission's access to certain areas of the region. In 2013 the Sudanese Government failed to approve custom clearances for UNAMID equipment on several occasions, leaving the mission without important infrastructure like helicopters.¹³⁴ Khartoum has also limited entry into the country as a whole by implementing stringent visa requirements for UN staff and other humanitarian workers. These types of restrictions further complicate UNAMID's task of delivering humanitarian aid to the ravaged region. UNAMID and the UN continue to negotiate issues of access with the government, but entry into certain locations is still being denied. On February 1st the government shut down the International Committee of the Red Cross within the country. History is repeating itself: Recall that it shut down 12 international organizations in Darfur in March 2009. UN peacekeeping - by its principles - can only operate with the cooperation of the government.¹³⁵

2.7.3 Ongoing Conflicts

Since mid-2013 violence has increased in Darfur at the hands of Arab militias who have caused the displacement of almost a half a million additional civilians. As it stands, 3.5 million

¹³³ Fleshman, Michael, "Darfur: an experiment in African Peacekeeping. Is African Union-UN hybrid a model for the future?" *Africa Renewal*. 2010.

¹³⁴ Ibid

¹³⁵ Ibid

Darfurians need humanitarian assistance.¹³⁶ Khartoum has responded to rebel groups in Darfur with its Rapid Response Force or Rapid Support Force (a reconstitution of the Janjaweed) armed with approximately 4,000 militia. This force is responsible for attacking civilians, terrorizing villages, and looting markets. Recently, the force burned more than 35 villages, raped women and girls, killed dozens of people, and forced thousands to flee. It is hauntingly similar to the attacks of 2003 to crush the rebels in Darfur.¹³⁷

2.7.4 Unstable Neighbors

There are usually concerns of a possible outbreak of violence owing to the movement of people from Sudan into South Sudan that could negatively impact security in Darfur. Both countries have been unsuccessful in agreeing on a concrete citizenship plan for persons of South Sudanese origin currently living in Sudan.¹³⁸ The UNHCR estimates that hundreds of thousands of the South Sudanese are threatened with becoming a stateless grouping unless the two countries reach an arrangement regarding their status. Additionally, crises in South Sudan as well as the Central African Republic threaten generally the stability of the region as well as Sudan as a whole.¹³⁹ In South Sudan, continuing fighting plus an influx of IDPs along with refugees pose a threat to Sudan's borders and the general security. In the Central African Republic (CAR), fighting and political demonstrations in the northern regions have created instability in Sudan; In March 2014, a number of militants from Sudan went into Central African Republic and demonstrated, beside Seleka forces, against the French Peacekeepers

2.7.5 Safety of Humanitarian Workers

¹³⁶ Michael Fleshman, "Darfur: an experiment in African Peacekeeping. Is African Union - UN hybrid a model for the future?" op cit.

¹³⁷ Ibid

¹³⁸ Africa Report, "Sudan's Spreading Conflict (I): War in South Kordofan, *Africa Report* no. 198 (14 February 2013)

¹³⁹ Africa Report, "Sudan's Spreading Conflict (II): War in Blue Nile", *Africa Report* no. 204 (18 June 2013)

Rebel groups have increasingly directed attacks at humanitarian workers and peacekeepers. Since UNAMID first deployed in 2008, more than 191 uniformed personnel have been killed as a result of insurgent attacks. Humanitarian workers have also been victims of abduction and car-jacking. In the last year, the UN has seen increased attacks on their personnel. In July 2013, a UN base in South Darfur was attacked, leaving 7 Peacekeepers dead and another 17 injured. In December of the same year, unidentified assailants in South Darfur attacked a UN Convoy, killing 2 peacekeepers.¹⁴⁰

2.7.6 Slow Implementation of the Doha Document

A number of measures in the Doha Document have not been met on schedule, including those related to the ceasefire and security arrangements. Disagreements among the government and the Liberation and Justice Movement, together with a lack of buy-in by non-signatory movements, are obstructing the implementation of the agreement.¹⁴¹ In addition, the Government of Sudan has not transferred funds to Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund, halting recovery efforts in the war-torn country. Fighting between the government forces and rebel factions, as well as among diverse tribal groups, also stand as hindrance to peace and stability in Darfur.

2.8 Opportunities of Peace Operations in Darfur

Fleshman¹⁴² conducted a study an experiment in African peacekeeping in Darfur and found that the Darfur mission marks the very first time in the United Nation's 60-year history that a command of peacekeeping mission has been shared with another international body. The extraordinary arrangement is a result of dire necessity, created only after the Sudanese

¹⁴⁰ Fleshman, Michael, "Darfur: an experiment in African Peacekeeping. Is African Union–UN hybrid a model for the future?" *Africa Renewal*. 2010.

¹⁴¹ International Crisis Group, "Sudan's Spreading Conflict (III): The Limits of Darfur's Peace Process", *Crisis Group Africa Report*, no. 211 (27 January 2014)

¹⁴²Fleshman, Michael, "Darfur: an experiment in African Peacekeeping. Is African Union–UN Hybrid a Model for the Future?" op cit.

government rejected proposals for a standard UN mission. Still, authorities only reluctantly accepted the joint operation, which replaced the previous, but weaker African Union force, after assurances that the new operation would preserve an ‘African character.’ The UNDPDPO provides logistical help for the mission in collaboration with the AU Peace as well as Security Directorate.¹⁴³

Fleshman¹⁴⁴ also found that since its deployment in late 2007 the mission has been hampered by shortages of personnel and a lack of aircraft and other equipment, much of which must be contributed by donor countries. The mission has also been the target of attacks on its staff and vehicles, and has been hamstrung by official restrictions on its movements in the vast region. Critics charge that despite some degree of success, the force has never been supplied with the military capacity and political backing needed to adequately protect the civilian population and support humanitarian efforts. Yet the mission, they argue, still absorbs significant resources, at a current annual budget of \$1.8 bn.¹⁴⁵

2.9 Conclusion

Even though the Darfur peace process has failed to bring lasting peace to the region, and although there is very little hope of resuming the peace efforts, the suffering of the innocent civilian population of Darfur shall not continue unabated. Indeed, the people of Darfur need peace and support to rebuild their lives. While hybrid operations can allocate different responsibilities to different actors, it is important to ensure that these responsibilities are well-defined and understood by all actors in the field. The study reveals that peacekeeping missions

¹⁴³ Desiree Nilsson, “Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace,” *International Interactions* 38, no. 2 (2012): 243-266:260

¹⁴⁴ Fleshman, Michael, “Darfur: an experiment in African Peacekeeping. Is African Union–UN hybrid a model for the future?” op cit.

¹⁴⁵ Fleshman, Michael, “Darfur: an experiment in African Peacekeeping. Is African Union–UN hybrid a model for the future?”

risk failure if they are unable to anticipate, mitigate, or halt extreme violence against the population. While all peacekeeping missions innately face hazards, it is the nature of the enterprise, the vulnerability of the population in so-called post-conflict environments is one area that all missions must take into consideration, and which can undermine the mission's own credibility and effectiveness in short order.

CHAPTER THREE

THE EFFECTIVENESS AND HYBRID NATURE OF PEACE- KEEPING MISSIONS IN AFRICA: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS STUDY OF DARFUR, (SUDAN), CAR AND DRC

3.1 Introduction

Over the last two decades, Africa has witnessed armed conflicts marked by systematic violence and mass atrocities against civilians, and has increasingly looked to the United Nations, and the African Union and in particular to their peacekeeping operations, to prevent and or to halt such crimes.¹⁴⁶ The failures of operations to give security in complex crises for example Somalia, and to protect civilians from serious atrocities in Rwanda as well as Bosnia, tested the fundamental capabilities and principles of the UN peacekeeping missions and demonstrated that change was urgently vital. Since then, notable efforts have worked to advance the overall effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions, including their capabilities to protect civilians. For about ten years, the UN Security Council has also shown its resolve to sustain more effective operations, for instance those of the AU as well as to put a greater attention on the protection of civilians, as seen by the series of resolutions and statements, and the demand that the Secretary-General issues regular reports on the protection of civilians in violent conflicts.¹⁴⁷

3.2 Conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR): An Overview

The Central African Republic (CAR), a landlocked, sparsely inhabited, and extremely under-developed country, is in crisis. CAR has never had an effective central government, and it has

¹⁴⁶ Paul D. Williams, “The African Union’s Peace Operations: A Comparative Analysis,” *African Security* 2, nos. 2/3 (2009), 97–118.

¹⁴⁷ Security General Report (S/PRST/2004/46); 21 June 2005 (S/PRST/2005/25) and 14 January 2009 (S/PRST/2009/1). The Secretary-General has submitted periodic reports on the protection of civilians, on 8 September 1999 (S/1999/957)

struggled with recurrent insurgencies and army mutinies since the late 1990s¹⁴⁸. In 2012, several primarily Muslim-led rebel groups formed a coalition called “Seleka” (alliance in the local lingua franca Sango). In March 2013, Seleka swept into the capital, Bangui, and seized control of the government, deposing President François Bozizé.¹⁴⁹ Once in power, Seleka leaders presided over the collapse of an already fragile state, and they oversaw brutal attacks on rural Christian communities in the northwest, Bozizé’s home region. Seleka fighters also targeted perceived Bozizé supporters in Bangui, including members of the national security forces, which largely disbanded. Mostly Christian-led militias known as “anti-balakas” (anti-machetes) then mobilized and have attacked Muslims.¹⁵⁰ Civilians have also taken up arms against each other.

A transitional government appointed in January 2014 has been unable to stop the violence.

In recent months, amid widespread anti-balaka attacks, tens of thousands of Muslims have fled their homes; Muslim-owned properties and businesses have been looted and seized; and mosques have been destroyed. The United Nations (U.N.) Secretary-General reported in March 2014 that “the ethnic and religious demography of the country has changed radically,” with many areas “emptied” of their Muslim populations.¹⁵¹ Seleka factions have also continued to attack civilians, in many cases targeting non-Muslims. Religious ideology was not the origin of the crisis, which appears to reflect a complex struggle over access to resources and national identity. Indeed, many CAR religious leaders have sought to calm tensions, often at great personal risk. However, overlapping and often localized sources of tension and mutual fears have coalesced into mass

¹⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch, “I Can Still Smell the Dead”: The forgotten human rights crisis in the Central African Republic, *HRW*, September 18

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*

¹⁵⁰ HRW, “They Came to Kill”: Escalating Atrocities in the Central African Republic, *HRW* December 19, 2013

¹⁵¹ Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, March 3, 2014, *United Nations* document S/2014/142.

violence, and many residents now appear to see themselves locked in an existential battle along ethno-religious lines.

Over 100,000 residents have fled CAR since December 2013, bringing the total number of CAR refugees in neighboring countries to about 350,000 as of April 2014.¹⁵² Some 600,000 more people are internally displaced within CAR. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has stated that the situation in CAR is outpacing the agency's capacity to provide assistance.¹⁵³ Some 2.5 million people in CAR, or at least half the population, are thought to need humanitarian aid. Humanitarian conditions prior to the current crisis were already poor due to past conflicts and a lack of basic social services. Rising violence since 2012—including attacks on aid workers - has further constrained humanitarian access. Farmers appear unprepared for the mid-year planting season, the flight of Muslim traders has led to severe shortages of basic goods, and many schools appear not to be functioning.¹⁵⁴ Separate in origin from the current crisis, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a militia of Ugandan origin, continues to attack civilians in southeast CAR, creating additional humanitarian needs

The situation in CAR has drawn international concern. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2127, adopted on December 5, 2013, authorized the French military, which has long had a presence in CAR, and an African Union (AU) operation, the African-led International Support Mission for CAR (MISCA), to protect civilians, enable humanitarian access, support the disarmament of militias, and contribute to security sector reform.¹⁵⁵ About 2,000 troops from France, the former colonial power and some 5,500 MISCA soldiers and police are conducting operations under this

¹⁵² U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "Central African Republic Emergency Situation", April 17, 2014; *UNHCR UNOCHA*, CAR Situation Report No. 22, April 23, 2014.

¹⁵³ UNHCR, "UNHCR and Partners Seeking \$US274 Million to Meet Acute Needs of Those Fleeing the Central African Republic," April 16, 2014.

¹⁵⁴ UN News Service, "WFP Chief Declares 'The Time Is Now' for Central African Republic," April 11, 2014; USAID, Central African Republic - Complex Emergency, FY2014, April 25, 2014.

¹⁵⁵ EU External Action, "Central African Republic," op. cit.

authorization. The European Union has also pledged to send up to 1,000 troops to secure the airport (thereby relieving French forces), but they have been slow to deploy.¹⁵⁶

3.3 Current New UN- led Peace-Keeping Operations in CAR

On April 10, 2014, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2149, authorizing a U.N. peacekeeping operation in CAR with up to 10,000 troops; 1,820 police; and a sizable civilian component. The U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) is authorized to start on September 15, 2014, subsuming MISCA (African-led International Support Mission for CAR) and a U.N. political mission.¹⁵⁷ The new led UN PKO has new features such as highlighted below. It features the deployment of 10,000 troops, including most of the 6,000 AU troops already in country. MISCA forces will go through a “re-hatting” process to ensure that they meet UN standards on training and equipment, which at minimum would take five months. A significant portion of the additional forces includes engineers, logisticians, and enablers. To expedite the re-hatting process, the UN has deployed a contingent to begin preparing camps and assisting with logistics for a full UN deployment to help with a transition from MISCA (African-led International Support Mission for CAR) to the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

The mandate to protect civilians from the threat of physical violence is highly upheld. MINUSCA’s protection mandate is especially focused on ensuring the safety of women and children, and will include the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors.¹⁵⁸ A UN police contingent of 1,800 including 1,400 formed police units, 400

¹⁵⁶ Ibid

¹⁵⁷ U.N. Security Council Resolution 2121 (2013) expanded the mandate of the U.N. Integrated Peacebuilding Office in CAR (BINUCA), a field office of the U.N. Department of Political Affairs and an initiative of the U.N. Peace building Commission.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid

individual police officers and 20 corrections officers. UN police thus address ongoing rule of law concerns in CAR and civilian-on-civilian violence between Muslims and Christians. This would represent a 150 percent increase over the number of police personnel currently deployed in CAR as part of MISCA (African-led International Support Mission for CAR). The UN police force will also help bolster, rebuild, and train the national police force.

A large contingent of civilian personnel to facilitate the political process, support the extension of state authority, promote mediation and national reconciliation, facilitate the rapid and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance, and support the holding of national elections by February 2015.¹⁵⁹ This large deployment is in contrast to the 35 civilians deployed with MISCA. Their mandate is to support community level mediations with religious and community leaders to broker discussions between Christians and Muslims. Civilian personnel are also mandated to help the government provide basic services.¹⁶⁰ The AU mission has not had the capacity or mobility to deploy throughout the country to help facilitate humanitarian access.

The deployment of civilian personnel with a greater ability to protect human rights and monitor, help investigate, and report on abuses of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law throughout the country is also key. The mission identifies in particular ex-Seleka and anti-Balaka and help facilitate their prosecution. At present, MISCA (African-led International Support Mission for CAR) only has four human rights observers, a UN mission would have significantly more.¹⁶¹ In addition, a UN mission would work in conjunction with the International Commission of Inquiry (COI) established by the UN Human Rights Council. The

¹⁵⁹ Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, March 3, 2014, op. cit.; Associated Press (AP), “France to Keep Troops in Africa Against Extremists,” (May 8, 2014).

¹⁶⁰ U.N. Security Council Resolution 2121 (2013) Expanded the Mandate of the U.N. Integrated Peacebuilding op cit.,

¹⁶¹ Graeme Wood, “Hell is an Understatement: A Report from the Bloody, Crumbling Central African Republic,” New Republic (April 30, 2014).

COI has a mandate to document abuses and human rights violations committed in country, help investigate reports of human rights violations, and compile information to identify the potential criminal liability of perpetrators. The establishment of the International Commission of Inquiry is quite important as it sends a strong message to perpetrators of violations and abuses that the international community is devoted to holding them responsible.

Another feature of the new UN led PKO is support and assistance to government efforts to develop as well as implementing a strategy for demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) with specific attention to child soldiers and repatriation of foreign fighters. The U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic intends to confiscate and destroy weapons, ammunition, and related material from armed groups or former groups.¹⁶²

Due to the country's large size, low population density, and lack of modern infrastructure, troops will likely be initially deployed to major population centers, including the capital of Bangui. But by the time the mission has its full contingent of troops, the goal would be for countrywide deployment.¹⁶³

3.4 Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): An Overview

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) emerged from seven years of civil and regional war in 2003, but continues to face stark challenges.¹⁶⁴ Despite international partners' hopes for increased democratization and reforms following landmark 2006 elections - the first relatively free and fair vote since independence from Belgium in 1960 - the state remains weak and

¹⁶² Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, March 3, 2014, op. cit.; Associated Press (AP), "France to Keep Troops in Africa Against Extremists," May 8, 2014.

¹⁶³ Peter Bouckaert (HRW), "The Central African Republic Has Become a Nightmare for Muslims," *The Washington Post*, (March 16, 2014).

¹⁶⁴ State Department, "U.S. Support to Regional Efforts to Counter the Lord's Resistance Army," (March 24, 2014).

dysfunctional. State actors often appear more focused on controlling resources and personal power than on establishing security, creating effective state institutions, and fostering socioeconomic development for the country's 75 million inhabitants.¹⁶⁵

In contrast to 2006, international observers characterized the 2011 elections that returned President Joseph Kabila to office as deeply flawed, underscoring the fragility of the government's legitimacy. Since early 2012, President Kabila has also struggled to quell a new rebellion in the restive eastern province of North Kivu, by a group known as the M23.¹⁶⁶ Recurrent conflict in the mineral-rich, agriculturally fertile, and densely inhabited east stems from deep tensions related to resources, land, ethnicity, citizenship, military reform, and regional geopolitics, as well as criminal motivations. It also reflects a complex pattern of state negligence, incapacity, and coercion throughout the country, most of which is not directly affected by conflict.

Economic growth, buoyed by high global commodity prices, has been relatively strong in recent years (7% in 2012). DRC also receives high levels of outside aid, with over \$5.5 billion in net official development assistance in 2011—equivalent to 35.3% of GDP.¹⁶⁷ Yet despite vast mineral riches, water resources, and agricultural potential, the majority of Congolese live in poverty, and food insecurity is widespread.¹⁶⁸ About 2.6 million Congolese are internally displaced, and nearly a half-million more have fled to nearby countries as refugees. The U.N. consolidated appeal for humanitarian aid for DRC is the fifth largest in the world.¹⁶⁹ DRC is tied for last place on the U.N. Human Development Index and has the world's lowest per-capita gross

¹⁶⁵ United Nations, "An Overview of Global Humanitarian Action at Mid-Year", *United Nations Publications*, 2013

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*

¹⁶⁷ Lawrence Devlin, "Chief of Station", *Congo, Public Affairs* (2008).

¹⁶⁸ United Nations "U.N. Peacekeeping Fact Sheet"

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml> Last Modified 28th August 2014

¹⁶⁹ United Nations, An Overview of Global Humanitarian Action at Mid-Year, 2013.

domestic product (GDP). As the 11th-largest country in the world by area, DRC exhibits great internal diversity; some areas, such as the mineral-rich Katanga province, have enjoyed comparative stability and prosperity. However, recent militia violence suggests that even this relative security is tenuous.¹⁷⁰

The United Nations (U.N.) Organization Stabilization Operation in DRC (known as MONUSCO, its French acronym), with some 17,000 military personnel, provides support for security and the extension of state authority in the east, with limited success according to many observers.¹⁷¹

With its resources, vast territory, and strategic position, DRC has long served as an arena of regional and international competition. “Congo Free State” was claimed in 1885 as the personal possession of Belgian King Leopold II. King Leopold’s administration became notorious for its plundering of Congo’s natural resources and its human rights abuses, leading the Belgian government to transition the territory into a formal colony in 1908.¹⁷²

In 1960, Congo gained independence, after parliamentary elections that led nationalist leader Patrice Lumumba to become prime minister. The country’s early years were plagued by instability, including an armed secession movement in Katanga and an army mutiny that culminated in Lumumba’s murder in early 1961.¹⁷³ One of the first U.N. peacekeeping operations deployed in response to the Katanga crisis in 1960 and stayed until 1964. In 1965, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, who had been involved in the mutiny against Lumumba, seized power in a coup, gradually instituting a more centralized and authoritarian form of government. Mobutu’s claims to promote a more “authentic,” indigenous Congolese national identity led him to rename himself Mobutu Sese Seko and the country Zaire.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid

¹⁷¹ United Nations “U.N. Peacekeeping Fact Sheet” op ciy.

¹⁷² Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold’s Ghost*, (Mariner Books: 2006).

¹⁷³ Lawrence Devlin, “Chief of Station”, Congo, *Public Affairs* (2008).

Domestic and international pressures on Mobutu mounted as the Cold War drew to a close, and as the aging president's health faltered. Mobutu agreed in principle to a multi-party democratic system in 1990, but elections were repeatedly delayed. State institutions and the military progressively deteriorated, while regional civil conflicts and the genocide in neighboring Rwanda spilled over the border, diverting state resources and destabilizing local communities. In the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, ethnic Hutu extremist forces fleeing the new Tutsi-dominated government in Rwanda used refugee camps in Zaire as bases to attack Rwanda, with reported backing from Mobutu. Partly in response, Rwanda and Uganda backed a rebellion against Mobutu led by an exiled Congolese militant, Laurent Désiré Kabila. This later became known as the "first" Congo war.¹⁷⁴

In 2001, President Laurent Kabila was assassinated by one of his bodyguards. His son Joseph Kabila assumed the presidency and continued a process of peace talks. A 2002 peace accord called for the withdrawal of foreign troops and the integration of rebel groups into the military and government. A transitional government was put in place from 2003 until national elections in 2006, which were largely funded and managed by international donors and the U.N. peacekeeping operation. President Kabila was returned to office in that election, following a tense and violent run-off against former rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba. He was re-elected in 2011.¹⁷⁵

In 1999, the U.N. Security Council established the U.N. Organization Mission in the Congo (MONUC) to monitor a ceasefire in DRC's civil-regional war. MONUC's mandate was gradually expanded to include a range of tasks, notably helping to organize the 2006 elections,

¹⁷⁴ Howard W. French, "Anatomy of an Autocracy: Mobutu's 32-Year Reign," *New York Times*, May 17, 1997.

¹⁷⁵ Jason Stearns, "Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa", *Public Affairs*: 2011.

monitoring a U.N. arms embargo and related sanctions, and supporting the Congolese military in operations against armed groups in the east. In 2010, the Security Council ended MONUC's mandate and established the U.N. Organization Stabilization Operation in Congo (MONUSCO) to replace it, emphasizing "stabilization" rather than a "peacekeeping" role, reportedly partly in response to DRC government concerns about sovereignty.¹⁷⁶ MONUSCO's current mandate authorizes its military component to take "all necessary measures" to protect civilians, pursue armed groups, and help monitor the arms embargo, and support DRC efforts to arrest and prosecute individuals responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Security Council has also tasked U.N. civilian officials to "encourage and accelerate" progress on security sector reform, promote political dialogue, improve state management of natural resources, support the extension of state authority, and monitor human rights, among other tasks.¹⁷⁷

In its most recent one-year extension of MONUSCO's mandate, under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2098, adopted in March 2013, the U.N. Security Council authorized a new "Intervention Brigade" within MONUSCO's authorized troop ceiling of 19,815.¹⁷⁸ The Brigade, expected to comprise 3,000 troops from South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania, is tasked with "neutralizing" non-state armed groups. While MONUSCO forces have regularly provided support to DRC-led military operations against rebel groups in the east under past mandates, the new mandate authorizes the Intervention Brigade to "carry out targeted offensive operations," including "unilaterally."¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ Jason Stearns, "Next Challenge for Congo: International Terrorism," *Christian Science Monitor/Africa Monitor*, July 28, 2010.

¹⁷⁷ ICG, "Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU's Lost Rebellion", *International Crisis Group* December 19, 2012.

¹⁷⁸ USAID Factsheet, Democratic Republic of the Congo – Complex Emergency, June 28, 2013.

¹⁷⁹ Welthungerhilfe, Concern Worldwide, and International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), "2011 Global Hunger Index, The Challenge of Hunger: Taming Price Spikes and Excessive Food Price Volatility," October 2011.

3.5 Conflict in Darfur

Darfur is home to an estimated seven million people and has more than 30 ethnic groups. These 30 groups fall into two major categories: African and Arab.¹⁸⁰ Both communities are Muslim, and years of intermarriages have made racial divisions indistinguishable. Nonetheless, fighting over resources is one of major factors that have intensified the conflict. African farmers and Arab wayfarers/nomads have long competed for limited resources in western Sudan's Darfur region, especially following the drought in 1983. The spread of local conflicts over land and other resources combined with the unwillingness of Khartoum to mediate are some of the major reasons that led the rebels to take up arms against the central government.¹⁸¹

The on-going crisis gained momentum in February 2003 when two rebel groups appeared on the scene and challenged the National Islamic Front (NIF) government. The Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement who declared to be the representatives of the Darfur black African community, asserted that the Sudanese government showed prejudice against Muslim African ethnic groups in Darfur and had systematically targeted them since the early 1990s. However, the government of Sudan rejected the claim of the SLA and the JEM. The conflict pitches three African ethnic groups; the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaleit; against nomadic Arab ethnic groups.¹⁸² Periodic tensions among the mostly African-Muslim ethnic groups as well as the Arab inhabitants of Darfur can be traced from the 1930s and most in recent times surfaced in the 1980s. Successive governments in Khartoum have disregarded the African ethnic groups in the region along with having not made any constructive and serious efforts to contain

¹⁸⁰ Elizabeth Ferris, "Internally Displaced Persons in Darfur: Taking Stock", Brookings, May 7, 2008. http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2008/0507_darfur_ferris.aspx

¹⁸¹ Ibid

¹⁸² Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), Report of UNHCHR Mission to Chad, April 2004. <http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/chr60/ECN420053.doc.html>

Arab militias“ attacks against non-Arabs in Darfur.¹⁸³ In the early 1990s, the NIF government, which came to power in 1989, began to arm Arab militias known as the Janjaweed in response to the non-Arabs“ taking up arms against the central government in Khartoum.

3.5.1 Peace Keeping Operations in Darfur

African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) originated in early July 2004, when both the African Union and European Union sent monitors to monitor the Darfur crisis cease-fire signed in April 2004. In August 2004, the African Union sent 150 Rwandan troops in to protect the ceasefire monitors. It, however, soon became apparent that 150 troops would not be enough, so they were joined by 150 Nigerian troops.¹⁸⁴ During April 2005, after the government of Sudan signed a ceasefire agreement with Sudan People's Liberation Army which led to the end of the Second Sudanese Civil War, the AMIS force was increased by 600 troops and 80 military observers.¹⁸⁵ In July 2005, the force was increased by about 3,300 (with a budget of 220 million dollars). In April 2005, AMIS was increased to about 7,000 (at a cost of over 450 million dollars) and as of January 2007, this remained its projected strength.¹⁸⁶ The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was an African Union peacekeeping force operating primarily in the country's western region of Darfur with the aim of performing peacekeeping operations related to the Darfur conflict. Originally founded in 2004, with a force of 150 troops, by mid-2005, its numbers were increased to about 7,000. Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1564, AMIS was to closely and continuously liaise and coordinate at all levels its work with the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). AMIS was the only external military force in Sudan's Darfur region

¹⁸³ Ibid

¹⁸⁴ S. Kathryn and Alissatou H. ‘The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: from design to reality’, in Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto, eds, *Africa’s new Peace and Security Architecture*, Farnham Ashgate, 69. (2010)

¹⁸⁵ Ibid: 70

¹⁸⁶ C. Christopher C. ‘Africa and trusteeship in the modern global order’, in James Mayall and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, eds, *The new protectorates: international tutelage and the making of liberal states*, London: 75. (2011)

until UNAMID was established.¹⁸⁷ It was not able to effectively contain the violence in Darfur. A more sizable, better equipped UN peacekeeping force was originally proposed for September 2006, but due to Sudanese government opposition, it was not implemented at that time. AMIS' mandate was extended repeatedly throughout 2006, while the situation in Darfur continued to escalate, until AMIS was finally replaced by UNAMID on December 31, 2007.¹⁸⁸

The Darfur situation has become the AU's most significant test to date and defies simplistic analysis. The root causes of the conflict extends back at least to the 17th century when Arab incursions led to the establishment of a sultanate amongst the indigenous Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa people of the region. A history of co-existence among the pastoralists and the agrarian societies in the region was put under pressure by drought. Social and economic marginalization of Darfurians by the ruling regime in Khartoum laid the foundations for the rebellion that was launched in February 2003. The government retaliated with a combination of its own military offensive and a proxy fighting force, today known as the infamous Janjaweed.¹⁸⁹ Darfur has become an unwilling and unlikely victim of the legacy of Sudan's history and culture of violence, notably the nearly 40 years of North/South conflict. This protracted conflict was interrupted between 1972, when the Addis Ababa peace agreement was signed, and 1983 when the South Sudanese People's Movement/Army (SPLM/A) launched their armed resistance.¹⁹⁰ The regional or continental perspective under the leadership of the AU seeks to find a political solution while undertaking peace operations to alleviate the suffering of Darfurians. The AU's monitoring mission leaves much to be desired and a more robust peacekeeping force is required

¹⁸⁷ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), Report of UNHCHR Mission to Chad, April 2004. <http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/chr60/ECN420053.doc>

¹⁸⁸ J. Cilliers . The African Standby Force, An Update on Progress", *Institute for Security Studies*, 2008

¹⁸⁹ Ibid"

¹⁹⁰ Alex de Waal, (ed.), War in Darfur; And the Search for Peace: "The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Darfur", by Adam Azzain Muhamed, Global Equity Initiative, Harvard University Justice Africa, London, 2007, p.199.

to effectively dissuade the silent genocide that is taking place in Darfur.¹⁹¹ However, the AU's peacemaking initiative in Abuja, Nigeria, under the tutelage of the former secretary-general of the OAU, Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, led to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006. That only the Minni Minnawi faction of the SLA signed the agreement means that the DPA was by no means a comprehensive peace agreement in the mould of the South Sudan agreement.

The failure of the peace talks convened in Tripoli, Libya, in October 2007 was a further indication that there is no peace to keep in Darfur. Essentially the conflict is not over since a durable ceasefire has not been established. The armed resistance groups have even begun to fight each other, and the situation has deteriorated into a military, political and diplomatic. In Darfur, the AU found itself with a test case that it was ill-equipped institutionally and under-resourced to resolve successfully.¹⁹² The politicization of the situation in Darfur means that there are now no easy answers. Certainly, it is right and proper for the AU to be in Darfur, or for some form of international peace operation to be staged there. Regrettably, while the AU's peacemaking efforts are to be applauded, its monitoring peace operation is floundering and enabling government forces, the Janjaweed, and the armed resistance groups to continue fighting amongst themselves and to continue the carnage and destruction of the lives and property of Darfurians.

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¹⁹¹ J. Cilliers. "Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa", *Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper Series* 102. (2005)

¹⁹² S. Kai. 'The Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership and African regional organizations', in Nicoletta Pirozzi, ed., *Strengthening the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security*, IAI research paper, Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali., (2012) 26-7.

¹⁹³ Timothy Murithi. "The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: The African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia", *African Security Review* 17, no.1(2008).

3.6 Peace Operations in Darfur, the Central Africa Republic (CAR) and the DRC: An

Analysis

The three missions examined here represent new opportunities and challenges for AU-UN policy and peacekeeping field operations. There is a growing necessity to take better account of regional factors, as regards both planning and executing mission mandates. Better coordination is valuable for assisting the missions to implement complementary and coherent approaches in their relations with critical regional partners, such as the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Inter- governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and with key countries in the region, like Libya, Uganda, Nigeria, and others. Importantly, effective inter-mission cooperation can be useful for facilitating more successful regional mediation initiatives – such as the Dakar Process, which is geared toward establishing diplomatic rapprochement between Sudan and Chad.

As understood here, the term ‘inter-mission cooperation’ refers to greater political coherence and enhanced effectiveness of peace operations at regional levels. A more focused and consolidated approach to inter-mission cooperation will not only benefit host governments and their populations, but will also enable better use of the financial resources of UN member states.¹⁹⁴

Six key issues bear on the operations of each mission. These are defined by mission experience and political analysis of the regional context. While the host countries in this region share some similar characteristics, they also have specific dynamics. Where relevant, these are discussed below.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ UN References on Inter-Mission Cooperation, see Security Council Resolution 1778, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/N0751615.pdf> ; and A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon or UN Peacekeeping, a joint report by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, July 2009, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf>

¹⁹⁵ Security Council Resolution 1861 http://minurcat.unmissions.org/Portals/MINURCAT/SCR1861_ENG.pdf;

Firstly are the aspects in relations to security. All three missions are faced with low-intensity threats to security. The military personnel of these missions have a protection mandate, to provide security for refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), host populations, the humanitarian community, and UN personnel and assets.¹⁹⁶ These threats include attacks from non- state armed groups, rebel and paramilitary groups, and national security forces, along with on-going criminal activities by many different types of heavily-armed bandits. Although a direct attack on UN troops and personnel by a large force is unlikely, there is a widespread and growing risk of hijacking, kidnapping and hit-and-run strikes on small groups of soldiers, foreigners and humanitarian workers. Weak state authority in the border of the host countries, especially in border regions, is also a security challenge. Hence, an integral part of all of the mission mandates is to help to strengthen and stabilize state authority at local levels. This includes building local capacity to resolve conflicts between communities in a peaceful manner so as to prevent escalation to armed confrontations.

Another shared aspect is that of insurgents that these states share. Non-state armed groups operate in all of the three countries examined here. And do frustrate the peace operations from time to time. The JEM in Darfur, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is also active in the region, particularly in Southern Sudan, the DRC and the CAR. The peace missions in these states experience these rebel movements. The LRA for instance is a persistent scourge for the entire region.¹⁹⁷ This group has attracted significant attention in some Western capitals because of the brutality of its operations, the threat it represents to isolated villages, and the risks to international NGO staff and religious missionaries. Moving around in the border areas between

¹⁹⁶ Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, <http://www.undemocracy.com/S-2009-398.pdf>

¹⁹⁷ A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon or UN Peacekeeping, a Joint Report by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, July 2009, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf>

Uganda, the DRC, Sudan and the CAR, small scattered LRA groups continue to terrorize local populations, causing displacement and undermining state authority.¹⁹⁸

Confidence-building measures are also closely linked to the task of strengthening and stabilizing national authority in fragile states, as reflected in the mandates of all peacekeeping missions in Central Africa and Sudan.¹⁹⁹ Such measures are equally crucial for creating local ownership for peace agreements and in supporting the capacity of locally- led peace building efforts. Where effective formal administration and state structures are weak, local populations rely more on traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution, including confidence-building.²⁰⁰ One of the primary concerns of inter-mission cooperation was to identify a set of initiatives that could be taken by the UN missions, or that the missions could advise the host governments to take, in order to generate a greater political confidence in the region. In the case of Chad–Sudan relations, for example, MINURCAT prepared a coherent set of proposals that were later discussed with UNAMID.²⁰¹

Resistance from host governments is another common issue shared amongst peace missions of the three case studies. As indicated in the overview of the political relations among these four states, some host governments have been highly suspicious of regional approaches, regional meetings, and joint work by the UN missions. They have sent very clear messages to mission leadership about their lack of enthusiasm for regional cooperation. This was particularly the case in Sudan when the government refused to issue visas to participants in an inter-mission meeting

¹⁹⁸ Report of the Secretary-General on inter-mission cooperation and possible cross-border operations between the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, <http://unipsil.unmissions.org/por-tals/unipsil/media/documents/script/sgrs116.pdf>.

¹⁹⁹ A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon or UN Peacekeeping, op cit.

²⁰⁰ Hannah Neumann, 'Looking at the Recipients: What Impact Do Peacebuilding Interventions Have on Rural Citizens?,' Paper presented at ECPR Graduate Conference, Dublin City University, 2010

²⁰¹ The Capstone Doctrine (2006), which lays the foundations for UN peacekeeping operations, does not mention inter-mission cooperation: http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbbs/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf

scheduled to be held in Khartoum. In general, Sudan has been the most active opponent of regional intermission cooperation because it saw United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) in terms of Western interference in its own internal affairs. The government viewed any attempt by MINURCAT to establish contact with the other missions, especially UNAMID, with great displeasure. Along similar lines, the government did not want to open space for any type of cooperation between UNMIS and UNAMID.²⁰² For the Sudanese leaders in Khartoum, these missions have their own specific genesis, along with separate mandates, and therefore should not share assets, collaborate or have structured contact. Experience indicates that the more fragile a host government is, the more suspicious it will be toward inter-mission cooperation, as well as any other type of regional initiatives (led by the UN or not).²⁰³ Weak governments easily feel threatened and come to regard efforts geared toward greater coordination among UN missions as part of an overall conspiracy against them. Governments that have fundamental difficulties in relationships with the UN missions they host also tend to have a significant degree of mistrust about inter-mission consultations. In such cases, inter-mission cooperation is largely regarded as strengthening the UN side of the equation, the effect of which is to create more leverage for the mission they are hosting and to which they have a difficult rapport. Although the CAR has been more amenable to UN intervention than some of its neighboring states, opportunities to utilize this goodwill in relation to mitigating suspicions from others are limited.

²⁰² Ambassador Olu Abeniji. Presentation at the Challenges of Peace Operations Conference, Abuja, Nigeria, 2 June 2004.

²⁰³ Festus Aboagye, Col. (ret.). "Challenges of Collective Regional Security: The SADC Experience in Initiating and Sustaining Regional Peace Operations," Presented at the Challenges of Peace Operations Conference, Abuja, Nigeria, 2 June 2004

3.7 The Brahimi Report

In 2000, the Brahimi Report identified areas where the United Nations and its member states should support regional and sub-regional organizations' development of peace operations tools: training, equipment, logistics and other resources.²⁰⁴ Five years later, that list is still apt. But it needs to expand to include support for closing key capabilities gaps – headquarters management and planning capacity, financing, mission leadership, and available and skilled military and civilian personnel – as well as building links to peace building capacities.²⁰⁵

Much has changed to affect this list of requirements. Current worldwide demand for peacekeepers is unprecedented, and African leaders are demonstrating a greater desire to help meet it. The trend toward UN peacekeepers coming primarily from developing, not developed, states has become more pronounced. Even as the number of peacekeepers has grown, the top 20 troop contributing countries are increasingly from Asia and Africa, which provide the majority of peacekeepers. Neither Europe nor the permanent members of the Security Council provide even a thousand of the more than 65,000 UN peacekeepers.²⁰⁶ At the same time, the cost of UN peacekeeping has ballooned, with bills paid primarily by EU countries, the United States and Japan.

Multinational organizations in Africa have reshaped themselves, setting out to organize more operational responses to post-conflict situations. The newly-created African Union is moving forward with an ambitious agenda, having deployed two peace operations since 2003, and is considering additional mission.²⁰⁷ ECOWAS has also retooled itself, sent out multiple

²⁰⁴ Ibid

²⁰⁵ A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon or UN Peacekeeping, op cit.

²⁰⁶ Mohammed Chabmas Ibn. Presentation at the Challenges of Peace Operations Conference, Abuja, Nigeria, 2 June 2004.

²⁰⁷ Ibid

peacekeeping forces, and moved forward with developing a task force for future missions. The AU and ECOWAS are both building more capable headquarters staff and peacekeeping forces, in concert with their member states, the United Nations and the international community.²⁰⁸

At the United Nations, views have shifted away from the Brahimi Report's caution against an over- emphasis on regional and sub-regional organizations for peace operations. While some fear the United Nations will devolve its responsibility to regional, sub-regional or multinational forces, others believe that UN collaboration will build a broader peacekeeping architecture, setting up capacities that are complementary to one another. The African organizations cast their role not as replacing UN actions but as supporting its multidimensional operations by leading immediate, if not long-term, peacekeeping missions²⁰⁹. UN member states acknowledge the importance of these regional efforts, especially in Africa, and praise the efforts of the AU and ECOWAS in Sudan and Burundi, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. The Security Council has authorized or welcomed their missions, recognized the need to improve peace operations capacity in Africa, and called for UN initiatives to work together.

3.8 Conclusion

Beyond this cooperative rhetoric, the United Nations faces hurdles in collaborating effectively with African organizations on more than an ad hoc basis. Fundamentally, the UN needs a device to activate on the very support urged by its own reports to enable regional and sub-regional groups to lead and manage peace operations successfully.²¹⁰ The Secretariat has established its working groups on African security, but they need a strategic vision and political support to set

²⁰⁸ Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed, 'In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation', in *Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 11.

²⁰⁹ Espen Barth Eide et al, Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations, Oslo: *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs* (2005): 14.

²¹⁰ AU - AMISOM, "Background and political developments"(2008) Accessed on May 20 12, http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/AMISOM/AMISOM_Background.htm

goals and priorities. The UN Security Council could cite Chapter VIII authority more consistently and effectively in regards to missions led by regional and sub-regional organizations, employing it to trigger real assistance in knowledge and systems (for example, planning and management), operational capacity such as logistics support, identification of trained units, and funding (assessed or voluntary contributions).²¹¹ In turn, such collaboration could increase the ability of the United Nations to organize effective peace operations and smoother hand-offs from regional leadership, to access trained pools of peacekeepers (military and civilian police), and to have regional capacities co-listed within UN databases such as UNSAS; on-call lists of personnel.²¹² Improved coordination of bilateral support offered by members could also help regional efforts complement, not compete with, UN goals. But these measures are not yet happening – they need to be adopted.

Peace operations in Africa have revealed some of the best and worst dimensions of peacekeeping. Despite a range of valid criticisms and serious imperfections, peace operations remain international society's principal tool of conflict management, and empirical evidence suggests they have contributed to the decline of conflict in numerous war-torn territories. To use a clichéd phrase, if peace operations did not exist, it would be wise to invent them. Like any good creation, however, reform is needed to reflect those elements that are working well and change those that have failed. Accordingly, policymakers and analysts alike should work to ensure peace operations are given sensible operational directives, clear mandates, and sufficient resources to fulfill the proposed objectives. The resulting success stories would contribute to

²¹¹ E. Svensson. "The African Mission in Burundi: lesson learned from the African Union's first peace operation", Swedish Defense Research Agency, Stockholm, (2009), 17

http://www.foi.se/upload/projects/Africa/FOI2561_AMIB.pdf

²¹² Center on International Cooperation and International Peace Institute, "Taking Stock and Looking Forward: A Strategic Review of the Peacebuilding Commission" *CICIPI*, New York, April (2008), 2.

the downward trend in the number and magnitude of African conflicts, reduce the human and economic cost of violence, and thereby open the door to more dynamic and sustained development.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE EFFECTIVENESS AND HYBRID NATURE OF PEACE KEEPING MISSIONS IN AFRICA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

Both the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) have a vested interest in conducting more effective peace operations in Africa. Both councils want to build on the various UN-AU peace and security coordination mechanisms that have been established since 2006 and support the implementation of the AU's principle of "non-indifference."²¹³ In many respects, considerable progress has been made with the UN and AU enjoying a deep, multidimensional and maturing relationship. Yet disagreements remain over how best to respond to particular peace and security challenges in Africa, and the AU still suffers from important capability gaps with respect to peace operations.²¹⁴

4.2 Emerging Issues

4.2.1 The Concept of Dependency

Collaboration in the area of peace operations was born out of the comparative advantages of both institutions, but it has suffered from several problems, including the AU's weak bureaucratic, logistical, and financial capabilities.²¹⁵ This has resulted in an unequal partnership where the AU's major peace operations remain dependent on the UN and other partners for support. Nevertheless, peace operations in Africa are once again in high demand with possible

²¹³ Communiqué of the consultative meeting between members of the Security Council of the United Nations and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, June 2012, para. 11.

²¹⁴ Arthur Boutellis, "Mali's Peacekeeping Mission," IPI Global Observatory, March 12, 2013, Last modified www.theglobalobservatory.org/component/myblog/malia-s-peacekeeping-mission-full-fledged-behemoth-or-have-lessons-been-learned-.html

²¹⁵ Linnéa Gelot, Ludwig Gelot, and Cedric de Coning, eds., *Supporting African Peace Operations*, Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute, 2012.

new deployments in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and Sudan. UN deployments in Africa remain steady with approximately 80 percent of all blue helmets deployed on the continent, although the UN is currently debating whether to deploy another large UN multidimensional peace operation to Mali.²¹⁶ AU deployments have also increased to an all-time high, largely due to AU-UN collaboration in the Somalia and Mali theaters. Nevertheless, in an important statement of its position on the relationship with the UN, in January 2012 the AU lamented that “while consultations (between the two councils) represent a significant step in the right direction, they are yet to translate into a common understanding of the foundation of the cooperation between these two organs.”²¹⁷ But this may be changing.

4.2.2 The Principle of Non- Indifference

Both councils want to move forward and build on the various UN-AU peace and security coordination mechanisms that have been established since 2006 and support the implementation of the AU’s principle of “non-indifference.” Of particular importance, in February 2012, the UN Security Council endorsed the expansion of the UN support package for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and an increase of its uniformed personnel from 12,000 to 17,731. This decision followed a joint AU- UN planning process, which both organizations praised. In late 2012 and early 2013, the UN and AU both conducted strategic reviews of their engagement with Somalia and in March 2013, UN Security Council Resolution 2093 extended AMISOM’s mandate for another year with the same UN logistical support package, but in tandem with a new

²¹⁶ Arthur Boutellis, “Mali’s Peacekeeping Mission,” op cit.

²¹⁷ AU Peace and Security Council, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership Between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security: Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence , AU Doc. PSC/PR/2. (CCCVII), January 9, 2012, para. 44.

expanded UN special political mission.²¹⁸ The Security Council's endorsement of an African-led Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in June 2012 was also the result of a collaborative approach that included joint UN-AU assessment missions. A similar collaborative AU-UN approach has since been replicated in responding to the crisis in Mali, together with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This led to the UN Security Council authorizing an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) in December 2012.

4.2.3 A New Peace and Security Architecture

Collaboration between the UN Security Council and the AU on the specific issues arising from peace operations does not take place in a political vacuum. Rather, it occurs within the broader context of the two institutions' efforts to address a wide range of peace and security challenges. The basis for such collaboration is mutual recognition of several important facts. The first is that over the last decade, the majority of the UN Security Council's agenda has been occupied by peace and security challenges in Africa.²¹⁹ Second, both institutions recognize that the UN Security Council has the primary, but not exclusive, responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, including in Africa.²²⁰ But, third, both institutions also acknowledge that no single organization alone can cope with the multitude of peace and security challenges on the African continent. In addition, both institutions recognize that while the AU is an important source of political authority for addressing peace and security challenges in Africa, it lacks the necessary material and financial capabilities to take decisive action alone to resolve these problems. It was the mutual recognition of these basic facts that influenced the evolution of

²¹⁸ Arthur Boutellis, "Mali's Peacekeeping Mission," *op cit*.

²¹⁹ Highlights of Security Council Practice (New York: UN Department of Political Affairs, June 2012), 2-3.

²²⁰ Article 17(1) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2002)

pragmatic and context-specific forms of collaboration between the two institutions.²²¹ This collaboration has grown to encompass a variety of mechanisms. The first step was the African Union's decision to create a new peace and security architecture (APSA) for the continent: this would establish a variety of institutions in order to address the entire spectrum of conflict management challenges from early warning and preventive diplomacy to peace operations and post-war peace building initiatives.²²² Shortly thereafter, the UN agreed to assist in that endeavor through its ten-year capacity-building program for the AU. Individual members of the UN Security Council have also helped with the development of the APSA through various mechanisms, perhaps most notably the G8++ Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the European Union's (EU) African Peace Facility, both of which started in 2004.²²³

4.2.4 Interrogating Hybridism: A Critique of UNAMID

There is good qualitative evidence to suggest that UNAMID has protected civilians, based on its actions in particular cases and reasonable inferences from its general activities. Perhaps the best evidence comes from the occasions on which civilians sought – and obtained – refuge from violence at UNAMID locations. For example, during the fighting in and around Muhajiriya in South Darfur in February 2009, the UNAMID presence provided physical protection to IDPs who congregated at the perimeter of the camp, and UNAMID helped negotiate a peaceful withdrawal of fighters from the Justice and Equality Movement, thereby preventing a potentially major battle.²²⁴ During 2009, the deployment of additional troops enabled the Mission to cover expanded territory and to increase its physical presence, including night patrols and a police

²²¹ Ibid: 3

²²² United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: DPKO/DFS, 2008), pp.49-51.

²²³ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia , UN Doc. S/2013/69, January 31, 2013.

²²⁴ Elizabeth Ferris, “Internally Displaced Persons in Darfur: Taking Stock”, Brookings, Accessed on May 7, 2013. http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2008/0507_darfur_ferris.aspx.

presence in more than fifteen IDP camps.²²⁵ However, the quantitative data for fatal incidents (of civilian population) as they exist do as an actual inference about the causes of patterns of violence or changes in them. In particular, these data do not permit for the conclusion that the presence and activities of UNAMID forces have led to a decrease in violence against civilians. The pattern of violence is too complex, the confounding factors too many, and the dataset is too small to allow any such conclusions to be drawn.

Moreover, assessing the causal impact of UNAMID (or anything else) on levels of violence in Darfur is not simply a matter of having accurate data on the right indicators.²²⁶ Even with complete data on every violent event, inferences about questions such as the effect of UNAMID deployment would remain very difficult to assess. Qualitative comparative analyses may be fruitful in this regard. Examining where and when UNAMID deploys within Darfur may offer some insights into its impact as well.²²⁷ However such a method would need to account for selection problems which could shed some much needed insight on any endogenous processes. For example, the UNAMID Force Commander regularly deploys troops based on his assessment of imminent risk of increased violence, or recent violence that he considers likely to recur without pre-emptive measures. At a minimum, reasonable causal inference on this basis would require developing an effective model for such deployment decisions (making the internal process external as well as somewhat verifiable), to account for selection effects.²²⁸ Developing

²²⁵ Ibid

²²⁶ Elrayah Hassan Khalifa, "Darfur: When will the sufferings end?", Sudan Tribune, March 29, 2009. <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article30683>

²²⁷ "Putting People First: The Protection Challenge Facing UNAMID in Darfur", The Darfur Consortium; An African and International Civil Society Action for Darfur, Accessed July 28, 2011. http://www.darfurconsortium.org/darfur_consortium_actions/reports/2008/Putting_People_First_UNAMID_reoort.pdf

²²⁸ UN Security Council, "Report of the UN Secretary General on the Deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur", Accessed June 9, 2009. <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/EN/N09/363/65/PDF/N0936365.pdf>

an analytical model that can measure the impact of a peace support mission, and obtaining the data to feed such a model, are important challenges for the future.

As far as UNAMID is concerned even though the nature of the AU-UN partnership appears to be evolving in a new direction, it is important to interrogate what this new relationship represents. Is the hybrid partnership in effect a hybrid form of paternalism - where AU troops and personnel do the basic and dangerous work on the ground guided by the all-wise and „fatherly“ coterie of UN advisors? Does UNAMID and this evolution in the AU-UN partnership represent a paradigm shift in relations between both organizations, or is it a case of old wine in new bottles? Certainly, it still remains an asymmetric relationship due to the fact that the UN is a much older institution, with more resources and experience compared to the AU.²²⁹ Therefore, in this relationship the advice and resources are more likely to be unidirectional – flowing from the U.N to the AU. Naturally, as the regional organization the AU has a comparative advantage in terms of being in close proximity to the continental crisis situations and therefore it has an important role to play in orienting efforts in a way that respects local sensibilities. However, it is not clear to which extent it can declare total ownership of the conceptualization, design, planning and implementation of its peace operations, when ‘collocated’ UN personnel maintain a dominant presence in its affairs.²³⁰ As of early January 2009, it is still too early to pass definitive judgment on this emerging hybrid partnership.²³¹ The AU has to remain vigilant to ensure that it does not descend into a form of hybrid paternalism. In particular, the AU should guard against allowing the UN’s

²²⁹ General Martin Agwai, UNAMID Force Commander ‘New Challenges for Missions; Hybrid Operations’ speech presented at the IAPTC conference in Abuja, October 2008.

²³⁰ Ian Johnston et al., “Annual Review of Global Peace Operations.” Briefing Paper, New York, Centre on International Cooperation, (2007): 2.

²³¹ AU Peace and Security Council, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership Between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security: Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence , AU Doc. PSC/PR/2. (CCCVII), January 9, 2012, para. 44

historical paternalism to re-manifest under a new guise, with UN brawn being used to direct African bodies on the ground.

The experiences of the hybrid mission in Darfur suggest that the UN “adoption” of an AU peace operation is not necessarily a panacea to the continent’s peacekeeping challenges. Using the Brahimi Criterion to assess the hybrid AU-UN hybrid operation in Darfur, reveals that the foundations for UNAMID are precarious not least because there is no peace to keep. While the hybrid construct offers useful insights into the AU’s attempt to undertake peacekeeping operations, albeit jointly with the UN, a strict application of the Brahimi criterion suggests that the hybrid operation falls short of what is expected in the planning, operationalization and execution of a peacekeeping mission²³². However, it is also the case that very few ongoing peacekeeping operations would meet the Brahimi Criterion, given the imperfect political processes that establish them. Evidently, this excuse cannot be used to perpetually permit a „business as usual“ approach within the peacekeeping field. It is worthwhile to note that the hybrid mission has rewritten some of the principles of peacekeeping. Specifically, the hybrid mission embodies a paradigm shift in the way peacekeeping operations are inaugurated, in terms of the joint AU and UN decision making process, and the way it is operationalized. There are nevertheless political constraints in ensuring an effective collaboration between the UN and the AU, particularly when there is insufficient communication between the political leadership of both organizations.²³³ If adopted as a future model of peacekeeping, particularly in Africa, it would herald a novel approach to managing the continent’s intractable crises. Ensuring that this conceptual paradigm shift coheres with the reality on the ground will be the challenge

²³² General Martin Agwai, UNAMID Force Commander ‘New Challenges for Missions; Hybrid Operations’ speech presented at the IAPTC conference in Abuja, October 2008.

²³³ Judith Vorrath. ‘Imbalances in the African Peace and Security Architecture’, *SWP Comments* , 29 (2012)1–2.

confronting future AU-UN partnerships in peacekeeping operations. In particular, at a strategic decision-making level there would need to be more dialogue and open communication between the AU and the UN.²³⁴ While at the tactical and operational level there would need to be a convergence in terms of in-house capacity to implement. In the absence of this conceptual and operational coherence the AU's foray into peacekeeping may continue to appear as a foraging exercise and an elusive quest for continental security.

4.2.5 Challenges to the Effectiveness of AU-UNAMID

The central challenges blocking more effective AU-UN collaboration on peace operations can be identified across three dimensions: the strategic, political relationship between the two councils; the bureaucratic and organizational interaction between the two councils; and intra-AU dynamics, namely, relations among the AU Commission, the Peace and Security Council, and AU member states. We offer practical recommendations designed to address each of these dimensions by the following: first is the harmonizing the decision-making processes of the two councils; secondly is filling some of the key capability gaps in the AU's representation in New York; and lastly is developing more efficient communication mechanisms between the elected African members of the UN Security Council and the AU's Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa.²³⁵

UNAMID was confronted with similar problems that beset AMIS I and AMIS II. Since July 2008 Darfur has experienced a deterioration of the security situation. In particular, the violence „included high levels of banditry, occasional military engagements, ethnic clashes and deadly

²³⁴ Centre on International Cooperation, 'Review of Global Peace Operations' 2007, Lynne Rienner, 2007.

²³⁵ Ibid

attacks on UNAMID forces on 8 July 2008 which resulted in the deaths of five peacekeepers.²³⁶

The Government of Sudan continues to send sorties on aerial bombardments to parts of Darfur and conduct military offensives which are resulting in the death of civilians. Gender based violence remains a common occurrence in the region. In addition, humanitarian workers are being abducted and reporting incidents of violence.²³⁷ The food security situation in the region remains precarious.

In addition, UNAMID faces key challenges in terms of its ability to transport personnel and equipment using ground transportation which is still limited in capacity. In addition, „the environment of heightened insecurity had a direct impact on UNAMID efforts to move contingent-owned equipment into Darfur.²³⁸ Air transportation is being provided under the auspices of the group known as the Friends of UNAMID, which is dominated by the logistical support from the United States government.²³⁹ The Friends of UNAMID have specifically been assisting with the airlifting of troops and contingent-owned equipment directly from troop-contributing countries into Darfur. According to the UN Secretary- General, Ban-Ki Moon, “UNAMID, despite its broad mandate for the protection of civilians and assistance to peace implementation, is not designed to create a sustainable solution to the Darfur crisis. That is the responsibility of the parties to the conflict”.²⁴⁰

On 14 July 2008, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant against President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan for war crimes, in line with the mandate of

²³⁶ United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Deployment of the African Union- United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, p.7.

²³⁷ Ibid

²³⁸ United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Deployment of the African Union- United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, p.3

²³⁹ Ibid

²⁴⁰ United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Deployment of the African Union- United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, S/2008/659, 17 October 2008, 14.

the body, following a request by the UN Security Council to assess whether war crimes had been committed in Darfur. The ramifications of this indictment on the operational effectiveness of UNAMID in terms of its impact on its working relationship with the Government of Sudan is yet to be quantified. Subsequently, in the 12 November 2008, the Sudanese Government declared a ceasefire in Darfur and pledged to disarm all of its allied militia, notably the Janjaweed. However this declaration was met with suspicion by the armed groups in Darfur. The Sudanese Government is notorious for using ceasefire periods to consolidate its position, regroup with a view to launching a subsequent military incursion. The situation in Darfur therefore remains fairly precarious.

Although China has provided the AU with an impressive new headquarters building in Addis Ababa, many challenges remain. The recommendations of the Audit of the African Union of 2007 and the 2010 assessment study, *Moving Africa forward: African Peace and Security Architecture*, vividly map the shortcomings.²⁴¹ They focused extensively on the functioning of the Commission, which the Audit panel described as a ‘malfunctioning body’ after only four years of existence. The single most important factor when considering the future of peace operations in Africa is cost, and how they are to be financed.²⁴² The U.S and Europe are also major financial contributors to AU peace operations and similarly African funding for the AU has come traditionally from the ‘big five’: Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Libya and Egypt. Following events in North Africa in 2011, there have been fears that the North Africans might

²⁴¹ V. Alex. “A Decade of African Peace and Security Architecture”, *The Royal Institutes of International affairs*, 89(1) (2013): 89-109.

²⁴² *Ibid*: 91

reduce their support and AU staff has sought increased support from states like Angola and Equatorial Guinea, flush as they are with petrodollars.²⁴³

The AU's first such operation, AMIB in Burundi, had an approved strength of just over 3,000 troops and an operational budget of approximately US\$130 million per year. In comparison, the annual budget of the AU Commission for 2003 was approximately US\$32 million. South Africa was the lead nation in this mission and it covered its own costs, while also contributing moderately to the cost of the other two participant states, Ethiopia and Mozambique.²⁴⁴ The total cost to the South African tax payer was approximately US\$110 million. The EU contributed approximately €45 million to the AU, whilst the United Kingdom and the US contributed another approximately US\$20 million directly to Ethiopia and Mozambique, to enable them to participate in AMIB. South Africa was willing to take on the lead-nation role – including its financial cost – in Burundi because it led the mediation effort that resulted in the peace process, and it was thus a matter of national interest to ensure that the peace process was supported with an African peace operation. However, it is unlikely that this will often be the case.²⁴⁵

The AU's second peace operation, AMIS in Darfur, was even larger, with approximately 6,500 military, police and civilian personnel and an annual budget of approximately US\$500 million.²⁴⁶

AMIS was almost entirely funded from voluntary contributions, mostly from the EU and the US. The EU contributed approximately €435 million to AMIS, and bilateral contributions by individual EU member states amounted to an additional approximately €115 million. The US contributed approximately US\$450 million towards the operation. Because of the size of the

²⁴³ Ibid :93

²⁴⁴ Ibid

²⁴⁵ CH De Coning. "The Emerging UN/AU Peacekeeping Partnership", *Conflict Trends* ,(2010a) 1.

²⁴⁶ Schaefer Kai. 'The Africa–EU Peace and Security Partnership and African Regional Organizations', in Nicoletta Pirozzi, ed., *Strengthening the Africa–EU Partnership on Peace and Security*, IAI research paper (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2012): 26–7.

funding required and the AU's lack of capacity to manage its own mission support, financial contributors like the US had to enter into direct arrangements with private contractors to provide AMIS with mission enablers like vehicles, camps, fuel and water. Each contribution had to be individually negotiated, and the funding was thus unpredictable and came in dribs and drabs. This made it extremely difficult to plan properly and sustain the mission. The UN's support packages, mentioned earlier, were thus a welcome relief and a highly meaningful contribution.²⁴⁷ AMISOM in Somalia, the AU's third large-scale peace operation, with approximately 8,000 military, police and civilian peacekeepers, was first deployed in 2007. AMISOM's cost has increased proportionally with the number of soldiers, from an initial approximately US\$250 million per year to now close to US\$500 million.²⁴⁸

The US and Europe have again contributed the bulk of the costs for AMISOM and, as mentioned earlier, the UN has now deployed a dedicated support mission to AMISOM called UNSOA, which provides it with the same kind of mission-support skill set that a similar-sized UN mission would need to sustain itself²⁴⁹. These also remain dependent on external funding. Between 2008 and 2011, African states provided only 2 per cent of the AU's Peace Fund to cover peace and security efforts; the rest came from international donors. The current AU mission in Somalia remains completely dependent on the EU and UN.²⁵⁰ As can be seen from these three mission experiences, AU peace operations are resourced from a combination of African military and police contributions, AU and voluntary contributions to the AU Peace Fund and support from the UN. This is problematic, but unavoidable, because the AU's dependency on external resources

²⁴⁷ CH De Coning. *The Emerging UN/AU Peacekeeping Partnership*, *Conflict Trends*, (2010a) 1.

Judith Vorrath (2012). 'Imbalances in the African Peace and Security Architecture', *SWP Comments*, 29, 1–2.

²⁴⁸ Judith Vorrath. 'Imbalances in the African Peace and Security Architecture', *SWP Comments*, 29 (2012)1–2.

²⁴⁹ CH De Coning. "The Emerging UN/AU Peacekeeping Partnership" *Conflict Trends* (2010a) 1.

²⁵⁰ Judith Vorrath. 'Imbalances in the African Peace and Security Architecture', *SWP Comments*, 29 (2012)1–2.

denies it the independent freedom to make decisions on some of the strategic, operational and even tactical aspects of the peace operations it may wish to undertake. The availability of funding determines the number of peacekeepers, the nature of their equipment and support, the duration of the mission and the level and intensity of their operations.²⁵¹

In addition, a lack of adequate leadership has also led to tension between some commissioners and the teams around them. The panel spoke of a lack of supervision owing to the repeated absences of commissioners and low morale among staff. The departments were described as working ‘in silos’²⁵². There is a management structure within the AU that shies away from delegation and seeks to micro-manage, slowing down the decision-making process and acting as a disincentive to initiative. A few people at the top of the pyramid are extremely busy, while those further down are forced to wait for direction.²⁵³ This makes responding to rapidly changing events difficult.²⁵⁴ In any organization, retaining experienced staff is crucial to building institutional memory. The AU’s capacity to recruit and retain skilled workers is weak; its human resources department is one that needs urgent attention. AU staff members often point out that they could earn several times more at the UN or in the private sector, and for some the AU serves only as a place to improve their curricula vitae before moving on to more lucrative fields. There are also accusations that some staff use generous travel allowances to boost their salaries and make unnecessary trips, further reducing their ability to carry out work in a timely

²⁵¹ Ibid

²⁵² ‘Audit of the African Union’. In Vines and Middleton, ‘Options for the EU to support the African Peace and Security Architecture’. [African-leaders-to-change-strategy--12-551072-20-lang1-index.html](#), accessed 29 Nov. 2012.

²⁵³ V. Alex. “A decade of African Peace and Security Architecture”, *The Royal Institutes of International affairs*, 89(1) (2013): 89-109.

²⁵⁴ ‘Audit of the African Union’ (2012). In Vines and Middleton, ‘Options for the EU to support the African Peace and Security Architecture’. [African-leaders-to-change-strategy--12-551072-20-lang1-index.html](#), accessed 29 Nov. 2012.

manner.²⁵⁵ At the centre of the AU's problems in delivering effective peace and security programmes is capacity constraint. Many people complained in interviews that support services such as the finance and human resources departments are simply not able to cope with their workloads.

Finally About three-quarters of UN peacekeeping personnel and budgets are deployed on the African continent. This is as a result of the complex conflict challenges that continue to pose a threat to peace and security in Africa.²⁵⁶ The AU is thus striving to ensure it maintains peace and security on the continent, amidst its capacity and resources deficit. As a result of the current conflict dynamics, peacekeeping missions have changed dramatically in size, scope, and nature. They are now often deployed in the context of conflicts within states, as opposed to conflict between states. Additional to the core security and stability functions, mandates have expanded to include enforcement of certain norms and the assumption of certain functions usually undertaken by state authorities (elections, administration of justice, law enforcement). Missions that have been created under such multidimensional and complex mandates require a varied array of tasks to be implemented by military, police and civilian personnel.²⁵⁷

4.2.6 Lessons Learned

The AU had a rather weak mandate in Darfur to effectively monitor the humanitarian crisis in the region and coordinate efforts to advance the cause of peace. A Technical Assessment Mission was conducted from 10 to 22 March 2005 with the participation of the UN, EU and United States. The mission concluded that AMIS should be strengthened. Therefore, a more enhanced mandate was issued and an expanded AU mission was authorized in October 2005 and includes

²⁵⁵ United Nations Peacekeeping (2012). "Department of Peacekeeping Operations(DPKO)". United Nations Peacekeeping Vines and Middleton, 'Options for the EU to support the African Peace and Security Architecture'.

²⁵⁶ V. Alex. "A decade of African Peace and Security Architecture", op cit.

²⁵⁷ Judith Vorrath, "Imbalances in the African Peace and Security Architecture", SWP Comments , 29 (2012), 1-2.

civilian police units to protect refugee camps.²⁵⁸ AMIS II consisted of 3,320 personnel including 2,341 military personnel, 450 observers, 815 and civilian police personnel. The number of AMIS II personnel increased to 6,170 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police by the end of 2005. AMIS II was similarly mandated to monitor and observe compliance with the ceasefire; provide security for humanitarian relief; and facilitate the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

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At the same time, the AU's peacemaking initiative in Abuja, Nigeria, under the tutelage of former Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, led to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006. On 5 May 2006 the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed, in Abuja, Nigeria, between the Sudanese government and the faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) led by Minni Minnawi.²⁶⁰ Other factions of the SLA refused to sign the agreement as well as the other armed resistance group the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The fact that only the Minni Minnawi faction of the SLA signed the agreement meant that the DPA was by no means a comprehensive peace agreement in the mould of the South Sudan agreement.²⁶¹ This also indicated that the conflict was not over and that there is no durable ceasefire. Subsequently, the various insurgencies and armed resistance groups began to fight each other, and the situation deteriorated into a military, political and diplomatic conundrum.

²⁵⁸ Paul D. Williams, "The African Union's Peace Operations: A Comparative Analysis," *African Security* 2, nos. 2/3 (2009), 97–118.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid*: 103

²⁶⁰ Robert Gowan, "The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in Crisis, 2006-08", *International Peacekeeping*, (2008): 454.

²⁶¹ Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahm., "In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation", in *Centre on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 11.

The AMIS operation was due to wind down and be replaced by a more robust UN peacekeeping operation. However, the Sudanese government had systematically rejected efforts to convert the AU mission into a UN mission and requested the AMIS mission to terminate its operations by 30 September 2006. The stubborn stance adopted by the Sudanese government based on its appeal to the strictures of sovereignty and the principle of non- intervention in the affairs of member states. Therefore the AU mission continued to struggle to maintain security in the region.²⁶²

The AU mission floundered primarily because the Sudanese government was obstructionist and prevented its effective functioning. The Government of Sudan was quite adept at maneuvering against the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force on its territory. The Khartoum regime under the tutelage of President Omar El-Bashir categorically stated that the presence of a UN force would be tantamount to the recolonization of Sudan.²⁶³ However, AMIS I and II also failed to fulfil their mandates because they had insufficient troops, inadequate equipment and training.²⁶⁴

The efficacy of AMIS was also due to the fact that since the conflict began in 2003, the situation in Darfur has descended into confusion with the increasing factionalisation of the initial armed resistance groups. The key armed factions include the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) – Abdul Wahid faction, SLA – Minni Minnawi faction, SLA – Free Wing faction, SLA-Unity faction, the United Resistance Front composed of a Justice Equality Movement Collective. The SLA – Minni Minnawi and the SLA – Free Wing factions signed up to the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006.²⁶⁵

²⁶² Roberta Cohen, „No Quick Fix for Darfur“, *Northwestern Journal of International Affairs*, Spring 2006, 1.

²⁶³ Ibid: 2

²⁶⁴ Richard Gowan, „The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in Crisis, 2006-08“, *International Peacekeeping*, 15, No.4 (August 2008): 453

²⁶⁵ Ibid: 454

4.7 Conclusion

Peacekeeper's responsibilities within this multi-dimensional context now range from: assisting in the implementation of peace agreements, to protecting and delivering humanitarian assistance; assisting with the demobilization of former fighters, and their return to civilian life, to supervising and conducting elections; training and restructuring local police forces, to monitoring respect of human rights and investigating alleged violations; building the capacity of state institutions to protecting civilians; and direct military combat, to facilitating inter-communal dialogue through confidence-building processes²⁶⁶.

Within this context, functions like civil affairs have gained importance in the implementation of peacekeeping mandates, particularly with the aim of increasing efficiency in addressing issues within the peacekeeping-peace building nexus and context. Considering that the success of peacekeeping operations is increasingly judged by its capacity to protect civilians and contribute to peace building, the Peacekeeping Unit and its Training for Fund (TfP) Programme thus support peacekeeping processes that aim to achieve this goal.²⁶⁷ It is increasingly becoming clearer that it will be almost impossible for just one actor, like the UN, to be able to appropriately respond to the kind of peace and security challenges experienced within this current context.

Key policy makers and researchers have highlighted the need for partnerships such as the joint deployment of UN peacekeepers with regional and security organizations; like the AU/UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN Support Office for the AU Mission in Somalia (UNSOA). Whilst implementing current operational endeavors such as UNAMID and the AU

²⁶⁶ 'Audit of the African Union' (2012). In Vines and Middleton, 'Options for the EU to support the African Peace and Security Architecture'. accessed 29 Nov. 2012 at <http://www.african-leaders-to-change-strategy--12-551072-20-lang1-index.html>

²⁶⁷ Richard Gowan, "The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in Crisis, 2006-08", *International Peacekeeping*, 15, No.4, (August 2008: 450

Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the AU is also strategically positioning itself to deal with peace and security challenges through the development the ASF that intends serving as Africa's peacekeeping capacity that can respond to conflict situations on the continent at short notice.²⁶⁸ It is however evident that whatever model is preferred as the better option, partnerships between the AU and UN as well as with regional and sub-regional organizations need to be pursued and realized. Such partnerships need to be extended beyond the global and regional levels to include the sub-regional and Member State-levels. This is in view of the fact that the development of the ASF is entirely dependent on the RECs and RMs.²⁶⁹ Thus there is need to ensure that partnership and support between the UN and the AU at the global and regional levels should trickle down to the RECs/RMs (sub-regional level) and Member State-levels to ensure the establishment of an effective relationship chain among these different levels to foster the optimization of the comparative advantages of each parts/levels of the international system.

²⁶⁸ Ibid

²⁶⁹ R. William. Warfare in independent Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011)

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

Summary

The study has analyzed and discussed the AU and UN hybrid peace operations in Africa, particularly Darfur and selected cases (CAR, and DRC). In these missions, there is limited success in deploying peacekeeping operations. The AU has made efforts to conduct peace operations, notably through Darfur, AMISOM in Somalia and in AMIB in Burundi, after which the UN took over the peace operation.²⁷⁰

In addition, there was an understanding that the considerable resources and experience of the UN would eventually be deployed to stabilize Burundi which is still the case with the involvement of the organization in the country. The limitations of the AU's fledgling institutions have been exposed by the entrapment and limited functionality of AMISOM in Somalia as well as in the complex humanitarian situation in the Darfur region of Sudan. The experiences of the hybrid mission in Darfur suggest that the UN 'adoption' of an AU peace operation is not necessarily a remedy to the continent's peacekeeping challenges.²⁷¹ Using the Brahimi Criterion to assess the hybrid AU-UN hybrid operation in Darfur, it shows that the foundations for UNAMID are precarious not least because there is no peace to keep. While the hybrid construct offers useful insights into the AU's attempt to undertake peacekeeping operations, albeit jointly with the UN, a strict application of the Brahimi criterion suggests that the hybrid operation falls short of what is expected in the planning, operationalization and execution of a peacekeeping mission.²⁷²

However, it is also the case that very few ongoing peacekeeping operations would meet the

²⁷⁰ Judith Vorrath, 'Imbalances in the African Peace and Security Architecture', *SWP Comments*, 29 (2012), 1–2.

²⁷¹ De Coning CH (2007b). "Peace Operations in Africa: The Next Decade", op cit.

²⁷² Ibid

Brahimi Criterion, given the imperfect political processes that establish them. Evidently, this excuse cannot be used to perpetually permit a ‘business as usual’ approach within the peacekeeping field. It is worthwhile to note that the hybrid mission has rewritten some of the principles of peacekeeping. Specifically, the hybrid mission embodies a paradigm shift in the way peacekeeping operations are inaugurated, in terms of the joint AU and UN decision making process, and the way it is operationalized.

There are nevertheless political constraints in ensuring an effective collaboration between the UN and the AU, particularly when there is insufficient communication between the political leadership of both organizations.²⁷³ If adopted as a future model of peacekeeping, particularly in Africa, it would herald a novel approach to managing the continent’s intractable crises. Ensuring that this conceptual paradigm shift coheres with the reality on the ground will be the challenge confronting future AU-UN partnerships in peacekeeping operations. In particular, at a strategic decision-making level there would need to be more dialogue and open communication between the AU and the UN. While at the tactical and operational level there would need to be a convergence in terms of in-house capacity to implement. In the absence of this conceptual and operational coherence the AU’s foray into peacekeeping may continue to appear as a foraging exercise and an elusive quest for continental security.²⁷⁴

Key Findings

In the analysis of the study, there are key findings thereof. One is that despite the current dedicated academia and practice in regards to PKOs, the reality is that, reducing the incidence of armed conflict remains a defining priority for Africa. The continent’s recent conflicts have killed

²⁷³ Alex de Waal. “War in Darfur; And the Search for Peace: The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Darfur

²⁷⁴ Ibid

millions and displaced many more, leaving them to run the gauntlet of violence, disease, and malnutrition. These conflicts have also traumatized destabilized nations, societies, a generation of children and young adults, broken bonds of trust and authority structures among and across local communities, shattered education and health care systems, disrupted transportation routes and infrastructure, and done untold damage to the continent's ecology from its land and waterways to its flora and fauna. In financial terms, the direct and indirect cost of these conflicts is well over \$700 billion.²⁷⁵

Additionally, peace operations in Africa have revealed some of the best and worst dimensions of peacekeeping. Despite a range of valid criticisms and serious imperfections, peace operations remain international society's principal tool of conflict management, and empirical evidence suggests they have contributed to the decline of conflict in numerous war-torn territories. To use a clichéd phrase, if peace operations did not exist, it would be wise to invent them. Like any good creation, however, reform is needed to reflect those elements that are working well and change those that have failed.²⁷⁶ The resulting success stories would contribute to the downward trend in the number and magnitude of African conflicts, reduce the human and economic cost of violence, and thereby open the door to more dynamic and sustained development.

Another finding is based on the idea that an effective political strategy is a prerequisite for successes. Peacekeeping is an instrument, not a strategy. To be successful, peace operations must be part of an effective political strategy and peace process, not a substitute for them. Without a viable political strategy, peace operations should not be an automatic response to all wars. First and foremost, they should not be deployed to active war zones unless they are part of a viable

²⁷⁵ Bruce Jones et al., *Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty* (New York: Center on International Cooperation, April 2009), 12.

²⁷⁶ Paul D. Williams, "The African Union's Peace Operations: A Comparative Analysis," *African Security* 2, nos. 2/3 (2009), 99

political process for managing or resolving the conflict. Nor should peacekeepers be deployed unless they have active cooperation from the host government(s) in question. They should generally avoid crossing what has been dubbed the “Darfur line”, “deploying where there is no (real) consent by the state.”²⁷⁷ If civilians are being systematically massacred by their own governments and international society wants to stop it, then a peace enforcement intervention rather than a peacekeeping operation is needed.

Recommendations

Strategic coordination is crucial for effective hybrid PKOs. Peace operations usually involve a variety of actors (states, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations -NGOs) working in the same environment. With hybrid missions it is further complex and therefore coordination is key.²⁷⁸ Strategic coordination among the hybridized missions is therefore crucial. It will be more likely to occur if policymakers recognize at least three things. First, since different organizations, UN and AU, will always maintain their own distinct agendas, coordination needs to be treated as a political, not just technical, exercise. Second, since the early 1990s, the UN has clearly been the single most important organization for conducting peacekeeping in Africa. Other institutions have also played important roles—particularly the AU, which has deployed over 15,000 peacekeepers, and even the EU, which has conducted seven peace operations on the continent.²⁷⁹ Consequently, strategic coordination in Africa should focus on developing sensible divisions of labor within the complicated UN–AU nexus; clarifying how the continent’s sub-regional arrangements, including the regional brigades of the African Standby Force, are supposed to relate to the AU; and ensuring that policymakers do not

²⁷⁷ Ibid

²⁷⁸ Paul D. Williams, “The African Union’s Peace Operations: A Comparative Analysis,” op cit.

²⁷⁹ UNHCR, “UNHCR and Partners Seeking \$US274 Million to Meet Acute Needs of Those Fleeing the Central African Republic,” April 16, 2014.

overestimate the AU's current capabilities.²⁸⁰ Third, policymakers need to work hard to ensure that the relevant actors—especially states contributing personnel and members of the authorizing institution—share a similar vision of the operation's purpose, mandate, and rules of engagement (ROEs).

The creation of a Joint Operations Center (comprised of military and civilian staff from both organizations) is highly recommended, as well as the exchange of liaison officers across their organizations. Leaders should decide upon roles, responsibilities, authorities, priorities, and division of labor between the “Blue” Force and the “Green” Force. This way a hybrid mission has high chances of being effective. There are two areas of study that this paper suggests for further research, one is on the involvement of international hybrid missions such as the incorporation and assistance from EU and China. This is due to the little literature obtainable and the inevitability of the assistance from the West and East into African peace keeping missions. Further study in this area will highlight the challenges as well as impact of such involvement. The second area is on Africa's capacity to self-finance its own missions as this will lessen its share of burden of being manipulated by the developed world under politics of aid and assistance.

²⁸⁰ Kathryn S and Alissatou H (2010). ‘The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: from design to reality’, in Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto, eds, *Africa's new Peace and Security Architecture*, Farnham Ashgate, 69.

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