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A MANAGEMENT RESEARCH PROJECT AS A REQUIREMENT OF THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

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## DECLARATION

I declare that this is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

## GATUNDU STEPHEN KAIRU

## D61/P/7124/04

SIGNED.


I confirm that I am the supervisor of this student and that I have read this final draft and I believe it to be the student's own original work.

Supervisor

MR. JAMES M. KARANJA
LECTURER

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## DEDICATION

To my friends, family working colleagues and lecturers in the University of Nairobi staff at the school of business.

To my wife and children for their moral support.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank all those that helped me to ensure the success of this project. This included the NSE that provided me with the data needed to carry out research for this project.

I would also like to thank my supervisor for the useful comments that he gave to me in carrying out the research.

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#### Abstract

Seasoned equity offerings are offerings of new shares in addition to a firm's already existing shares. As equity offerings are essentially the least preferable from management perspective (pecking order hypothesis) of attracting cash, companies will only be inclined to do so when the benefits outweigh the costs. Issue of secondary shares to the market may cause reactions in the market activity. This study therefore sought to determine the effects of secondary equity offering on stock returns of firms quoted on the Nairobi Stock Exchange.


The objectives of the study were to determine the effect of announcement of secondary equity offerings on stock prices of firms listed on the NSE as well as to investigate the impact of the announcement on trading volume before and after the secondary issue. The study adopted an event study methodology as its research design. This design was used to identify companies that had issued secondary shares to the market. This led to the involvement of ten companies that had been listed in the NSE and had issued secondary shares. Secondary data was used for this study and it was collected from the Nairobi Stock Exchange in Nairobi.

The result of the study showed that the direction of share price and abnormal returns after the announcement was inclusive. The market reacted differently for different types of stocks. The abnormal returns were however so small and this meant that the details of a secondary issue or rights issue does not shock the market in a significant way. However the amount of shares traded was more at the post announcement period than in the pre announcement period for most companies involved in the study. This provided an explanation that the announcement had an effect in increasing the volume of trade.

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

## 1. 1 Background of the Study:

### 1.1.1 Purpose of Equity stock offering

Equity financing involves the raising of funds through the sale of company equity stock. The funds that a firm receives from investors can expand business transactions for many reasons. There are several reasons why firms issue stock: firstly to alter ownership structure- issuing stocks provide new investors to the firm and therefore may alter ownership structure. Secondly, to finance investments- a firm may issue stock in order to finance new investments for example to develop new products. Thirdly, to alter leverage- a firm may issue stock in order to alter leverage. Listed companies typically raise additional equity from existing shareholders or new investors. In issuing equity companies can choose between private placements and a public issue. There are two types of public issues; i.e. initial public offers and seasoned equity offerings.

### 1.1.2 Seasoned Equity Offerings

Seasoned (secondary) equity offerings (SEO) are offerings of new shares in addition to a firm's already existing shares. As equity offerings are essentially the least preferable of attracting cash, companies will only be inclined to do so when the benefits outweigh the costs (Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996).

Event studies introduced by Fama et al. (1969) produce useful evidence on how stock prices respond to information. Several empirical studies have examined the effect of announcements of secondary equity offerings on stock price returns. It is well documented that investors react negatively to announcements of secondary equity offerings. One of the explanations for this
reaction is the Leland and Pyle (1977) signaling effect-sales of shares by better informed investors signal that they believe shares are overpriced. The other is that of Myers and Majluf (1984) adverse selection problem. that goes beyond the pure signaling effect. The mere act of issuing equity conveys a negative signal about the true value of the firm that leads to suboptimal investment decisions. These findings are consistent with several models in the literature that assume the existence of asymmetric information between the various participants in the capital markets. The implication of these models is that the unfavourable market reaction to equity offerings is the result of the release of unfavourable information regarding future earnings.

In the signaling model (also know as the asymmetric information model), managers possesses non public information about firm's true worth and act in the interests of current shareholders. They issue additional shares if and only if they consider the stock to be overvalued (Myers and Majluf, (1984)). Supporting this approach Masulis and Korwar (1986) report that firms tend to offer equity after a period of good performance.

The signaling approach interprets the finding that equity offerings tend to follow higher stock prices as evidence of exploitative market timing. While price exploitation may play a dominant role, this interpretation ignores the possibility that new investment opportunities may follow higher stock prices. Higher stock prices lower the cost of equity capital thus potentially increasing the number of projects with positive net present value.

In general. the typical results from event studies showed that security prices seemed to adjust to new information within a day of the event announcement. This is consistent with the efficient market hypotheses (EMH).

### 1.2 Statement of Problem.

Financial theory suggests that the financing by equity presents the most costly means of attracting capital. Decisions by the firms management to attract funds by issuing equity is therefore undertaken if funds cannot be attracted in any other way or if the shares of the firm are over valued such that the benefits of an issue outweigh the costs.

The government has also played a big part in its effort to divest from parastatals by off-loading its shares through the NSE either through IPO or through secondary equity offering. It is very clear that many changes have taken place in the stock exchange market. Shareholders and investors have become increasingly aware of the operations of the NSE. They are now more vigilant and informed on the companies they either are shareholders or wish to invest in. In Kenya stock offerings (primary or secondary) are not only influenced by corporations financing needs but also by the Kenyan government privatization program where all the monies raised goes directly to the Exchequer. Examples include Kenya Commercial Bank, National Bank, and Mumias.

Several empirical studies have found out that when management announces an offering of additional equity stock, the firms existing shares typically lose value. This is consistent with the signaling theory. However, these studies have not been done in the Kenyan stock market. There is a need to investigate whether there was an abnormal increase in share trading activity and how
prices were affected before, during and after the secondary equity issues that have taken place in the NSE.

Local studies in the area of public offerings have been undertaken by such researchers as Jumba (2002) on the initial public offer performance in Kenya, Njogu (2003) on the price impact of commercial paper issue announcements, Njoroge (2003) on the impact of rights issues on stock prices of companies listed on the NSE and Maina (2004) on the analysis of performance of IPOs at the NSE. This study will investigate the applicability of the signaling theory to the firms quoted in the Nairobi stock exchange. In this study, attempts were made to evaluate the performance of seasoned equity offerings over the period and how the announcement of the equity offering affected the stock prices of the issuing firms. There is no notable research that has been undertaken to date on this context. This therefore serves as a springboard for this study to investigate the effect of secondary equity offering on stock prices of firms quoted in the NSE

### 1.3 The Objectives of the study

The research will address the following two major objectives:
a) To determine the effect of the announcement of secondary equity offerings on stock returns of the firms quoted at the NSE.
b) To investigate the impact of the announcement on trading volume before and after the secondary issue.

### 1.4 Importance of the study

This study will be beneficial to the firms listed and trading at NSE as well as firms planning to be listed at NSE. Specifically it will be beneficial to the following;
a) Quoted firms.

These firms will be able to know how it will affect the prices at NSE when they want to issue secondary stock through the Nairobi stock exchange. Hence, will be able to plan on the correct price.
b) Current and prospective investors.

The study will also benefit them by helping them understand the effects of seasoned equity issues on the stock prices and thus help them make informed investment decisions.

## c) Regulatory bodies and government.

Other government parastatals planning to privatize can also use the information to its advantage. The capital markets authority will be able to make decisions and formulation of policies for future secondary stock offerings.

## d) Scholars and academic Researchers

The study information obtained will be of great help to scholars and academic researchers who will find the findings of this study important to enhance their understanding of the NSE.

## CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1 Introduction

### 2.1.1 The MM Capital Structure Irrelevant Theory

According to MM (1958) capital structure irrelevance theory the total cash flows company makes for all investors (debt holders and shareholders) are the same regardless of capital structure. Changing the capital structure does not change the total cash flows. Therefore the total value of the assets that give ownership of these cash flows should not change. The cash flows will be divided up differently so the total value of each class of security (e.g. shares and bonds) will change, but not the total of both added together.

Looking at this another way, if you wanted to buy a company free of its debt, you would have to buy the equity and buy, or pay off, the debt. Regardless of the capital structure you would end up owning the same streams of cash flows. Therefore the cost of acquiring the company free of debt should be the same regardless of capital structure.

Furthermore, it is possible for investors to mimic the effect of the company having a different capital structure. For example, if an investor would prefer a company to be more highly geared this can be simulated by buying shares and borrowing against them. An investor who would prefer the company to be less highly geared can simulate this by buying a combination of its debt and equity.

MM (1958) theory depends on simplifying assumptions such as ignoring the effects of taxes. However, it does provide a starting point that helps understand what is, and is not, relevant to why capital structure does seem to matter to an extent. The different tax treatments of debt and equity
are part of the answer, as are agency problems (conflicts of interest between shareholders, debt holders and management).

There are extensions to MM (1963) theory which suggest that the actions of market forces, together with the tax treatment of debt and equity income in the hands of investors, means that for most companies the gains that can be made by adjusting capital structure will be fairly small.

Given that companies would not deliberately adopt inefficient capital structures, we can assume that all companies have roughly equivalently good capital structures - so from a valuation point of view we can reasonably assume that capital structure is irrelevant

### 2.1.2 Asymmetric Information and Security Prices

Several information-based models of security issuance explain the consistently negative announcement-period stock price reaction. These models are based on the hypothesis that the information sets of managers and insiders do not perfectly overlap with those of investors. For example, Miller and Rock (1985) argue that since the firm's investment policy is fixed, the decision to issue equity signals poor earnings and cash flow. They predict a negative equity price reaction to the announcement of an equity issue. Similarly, Myers and Majluf (1984) contend that managers have superior information about the true value of the firm's assets in place and its future growth opportunities. They show that when managers believe their firm's equity is undervalued, they do not issue new equity. The decision not to issue maintains the value of existing shareholders' wealth. Therefore, managers issue equity when their firm's stock is overpriced, resulting in a wealth transfer from new to current shareholders. Myers (1984) notes that in the strict asymmetry model, a firm would issue equity only if it was overpriced or if it had exhausted its "safe" borrowing capacity.

The different reasons why a company issues equity predict a negative impact on the price level of the firm's shares. This is explained by the asymmetry in information between management of the firm and the shareholders.

Empirical evidence, such as that of Asquith and Mullins (1986), indicates that information asymmetry between managers and outside investors is a robust explanation for the pattern of announcement-period retums around a new equity offering. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) find that when there are low levels of information asymmetry (i.e., in hot markets) the announcementperiod returns are significantly higher than in cold markets. They conclude that firms try to take advantage of these "windows of opportunity" as they decide when to schedule a new equity issue. Jensen (1986) free cash flow theory predicts that announcement of equity offerings has a negative impact on stock prices. This is because the proportion of management ownership gets diluted and increases the resources available for any negative investment opportunities that managers may choose to undertake.

Jung et al (1996) argues that since managers are aware of negative stock price reactions to the announcement of a seasoned equity offering, they will time new offerings in order to reduce the information asymmetry which often coincides with periods of superior stock price performance. This period is referred to as the window of opportunity (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). The negative stock price performance at time of equity offerings announcement has also been linked to a shortage of cash within the firm. This originates from the Miller and Rock (1985) dividend policy theory. When a firm makes a dividend announcement, investors will infer a change in implied net operating cash flow. When this is generalized to seasoned equity offerings announcements, a
larger than expected cash in-flow through an equity offering implies there is a lower than expected implied net operating cash flow and therefore signals bad news to investors.

Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) show that Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) firms experience poor post issue stock performance. SEO stocks under perform various benchmarks by about $30 \%$ on average over a 5 year period. Loughran and Ritter (1995) suggest that their findings of post-issue underperformance is consistent with managers taking advantage of information and issuing equity when the firm is overvalued. They also suggest that their results regarding long run underperformance of SEO firms are consistent with equity markets in which misevaluations are important determinants of market prices and corporate financing choices.

Lee (1997) re-examines this hypothesis of managers taking advantage of information and after not finding support for this hypothesis, concludes that post issue underperformance is more consistent with the free cash flow problem. He shows that top executive trading before mainly primary issues (including less than $50 \%$ secondary issues) does not predict underperformance.

The pecking order theory developed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) is based on the idea that insiders know more about their firm's value and future projects than outside investors and maximize the wealth of old shareholders. The insiders/managers avoid issuing equity when they believe the firm to be undervalued. Consequently, new equity issue conveys unfavourable information. Lucas and McDonald (1990) show that a firm with undervalued stock tends to delay issuing equity until its stock price raises to its fair value. Therefore, when managers have private information about the firm value, they will avoid issuing equity at times when the stock is undervalued.

### 2.1.3 Market efficiency

Traditionally, economists and finance professionals believed that stock prices are influenced by economic "fundamentals" Haubrich (1997). The fundamental approach contends that investors value the income from stock, especially dividend payouts. The value of the dividend stream which consists of two components (i.e. the dividend stream itself and the associated risk premium) thus reflects the value of the share (Haubrich. 1997). This view has however changed in the recent past due to the collapse of stock markets and overreaction of markets such as the Great Bull Market of 1996-97. Scholars now question whether stock prices are influenced by market fundamentals or speculative "bubbles" especially where principally rational market players are involved.

The efficient markets view postulates that prices follow a random walk, though prices fluctuate to extremes, they are brought back (regression to the mean) to equilibrium in time. It thus supports the fundamental approach. The behavioral finance view contends that investors push prices to unsustainable levels in both directions. Investor optimists are disappointed and pessimists are surprised. Stock prices are future estimates, a forecast of what investors expect tomorrow's price to be, rather than an estimate of the present value of future payments streams (Hww.behaviouralfinance.net).

If the proponents of behavioural finance are correct, several implications concerning the behaviour of financial markets may emerge. These include the following: over or under-reaction to price changes or news, extrapolation of past trends into the future. lack of attention to fundamentals underlying a stock, Focus on popular stocks and seasonal price cycles. If such
pattems exist, there may be scope for investors to exploit the resulting pricing anomalies in order to obtain superior risk adjusted returns. On a theoretical level, if exploitable pricing anomalies exist, the current credibility of the Efficient Market Hypothesis is undermined (Brabazon, 2000).

The forces of demand and supply drive stock prices in financial markets. Market players create demand and supply. Key market players include domestic institutional investors, foreign institutional investors and the domestic general public. In Kenya, the domestic institutional investors are by far, the most influential investor group. They include banks, insurance or pension funds, fund management companies and wealthy individuals (www.galbithink.org/topics/ka/itypes.htm).

Since the inception of the Nairobi Stock Exchange, institutional investors have played an important role in the stock market and by extension, in determining equity prices.

### 2.1.4 Efficient Market Hypothesis and Capital Asset Pricing Model

Eugene Fama (1970) argued that in an efficient market, prices reflect the total information that relates to a share. Fama's efficient market hypothesis (EMH) was consequently refined to constitute three forms of informational efficiency as follows:

1. The weak form implies that one cannot take advantage of the knowledge of historical price movements to earn superior returns on investments. In other words, today's share price is a reflection of yesterday's share price.
2. The semi-strong form implies that today's share price incorporates all publicly available information.
3. The strong form implies that today's share price incorporates all information, whether public or private.

The Efficient Market Hypothesis transformed beliefs about the pricing and operation of capital markets. This is because it confirmed the belief that markets are a near-perfect allocational device i.e. markets are efficient (Frankfurter \& McGoun, 1995). Accordingly, governments should not attempt to interfere with market operations, as this would create inefficiency in markets.

Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972) generated the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). This is a statistically testable model that describes the pricing mechanism of securities. CAPM postulates that "beta" determines the risk for which investors must be compensated. Beta represents the relationship between a firm's returns and market returns. The Capital Asset Pricing Model is used to test the Efficient Market Hypothesis.

### 2.1.5 The Signaling Model

Explanations of market reactions to equity issues often rely on models of asymmetric information. In these models, management's internal information about the prospects of the company is inferred by investors from observable management actions. Miller and Rock (1985) argue that an unexpected equity issues signals bad news.

Equity issues by financial institutions are considered more predictable because of capital requirements regulation, and therefore should cause a less negative reaction. However, the model
implies similar reactions to equity and debt financing decision that cannot be observed empirically. Abnormal stock returns are significant for announcements of eternal debt financing, according to results Mikkelson and Partch (1986)

The signaling theory states that the markets will be more efficient if sellers provide more information to the buyers. This theory can be applied in the financial markets too; a company increasing its dividends is signaling that its prospects are better. In short. signals help in better market efficiency. Signaling theory is based on the assumption that information is not equally available to all parties at the same time, and that information asymmetry is the rule. Information asymmetries can result in very low valuations or a sub-optimum investment policy. Signaling theory states that corporate financial decisions are signals sent by the company's managers to investors in order to shake up these asymmetries. These signals are the cornerstone of financial communications policy.

Under priced new issues allow the firms and insiders to sell future offerings at a higher price. This argument was formalized in signaling models by Allen \& Faulhaber (1989), Welch (1989), and Grinblatt \& Hwang (1989). In these models, issuing firms have private information about whether they have high or low values. They follow a dynamic issue strategy, in which the IPO will be followed by a seasoned offering. Depending on the parameters, high value firms may choose to under price their IPOs as a way of signaling that they are high value. In order for this to be worthwhile, they must benefit sufficiently at the time of the seasoned offering. Welch (1989) presents evidence that roughly one third of the firms going public conduct a seasoned equity issue within the next few years.

### 2.1.6 Behavioral models and post issue returns

According to Barberies, Sheifer, Vishny (1998) investor sentiment model, investors under react to news of low strength but significant statistical weight and they over-react to consistent sequence of good (or bad) news. The model is motivated by two psychological phenomena; conservatism and representativeness heuristic. Conservatism means that individuals are slow to change their belief when faced with new evidence.

### 2.1.7 Information and price pressure effects

Miller and Rock (1985) predict a negative stock price reaction to equity issues because they are perceived as releasing negative information about the firm's cash flows. In contrast to the negative information effect, equity issues can also be interpreted as favorable news about the firm's investment opportunities. In particular, since the additional capital must be committed by the existing shareholders, rights issues attest to the shareholders' confidence in their own firm's future. Rights issues are perceived as a signal that the firm has discovered new positive net present value projects, causing a positive re-evaluation of firm's shares. In addition to the extent that larger rights offerings are associated with larger net present value projects, the stock price reaction should be related to the size of the offerings. McConnell and Muscarella (1985) find that stock prices rise about $1 \%$ at the announcement of corporate investment increase. Masulis and Korwar (1986) conjecture that the negative stock price reaction to equity offering announcements of capital expenditure increases.

The price pressure argument assumes that at any given instant, the demand curve for a firm's share is downward- slopping and that an increased supply of shares decreases their price (Loderer
and Zimmermann. 1988). However, the predication conflicts with the classical view, which holds that in capital markets. near perfect substitute for a firm's securities are always available. According to the latter the issuing firm's shares and their substitute must sell at the same price, implying a horizontal demand curve for a firm's stock (Scholes. 1972).

### 2.1.8. Design of event studies

The event study methodology is well accepted and extensively used in finance. Researchers have long been interested in using the event study methodology to detect the effects of events on stock performance (Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll 1969). Fama (1998) and Kothari and Warner (1997) document many issues inherent in such techniques including risk adjustment, aggregation of security specific abnormal returns and testing of the statistical significance of abnormal returns.

The price of a stock reflects the time and risk discounted present value of all future cash flows that are expected to accrue to the holder of that stock. According to the semi-strong version of efficient market hypothesis, all publicly available information is reflected completely in an unbiased manner in the price of the stock, such that it is not possible to earn economic profits on the basis of this information. Therefore an unanticipated event can change the price of a stock. This change should equal the expected changes in the future cash flows of the firm or the riskiness of these cash flows. Thus an event is said to have an impact on financial performance of a firm if it produces an abnormal movement in the price of a stock. Broad market movements are usually subtracted from the stock's price movement in estimating the abnormal return.

An event study has four components: defining the event and announcement day, measuring the stock's return during the announcement period, estimating the expected return of the stock during
this announcement period in the absence of the announcement, and computing the abnormal return (actual return less expected return) and measuring its statistical and economic significance.

## CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

### 3.1 Introduction

The chapter outlines the overall methodology used in the study. This includes the research design. population of the study, sample size, sample frame. data collection methods, research procedures and data analysis and presentation.

### 3.2 Research Design

The survey conducted an event study around the date of listing of seasoned equity issues and right issues of firms. Traditionally, event studies focus on outcomes of the firm affected by or initiating event. Event studies, introduced by Fama et al (1969) produce useful evidence on how stock prices respond to information. Many studies focus on returns in a short window around the event. The advantage of this approach is that because daily expected returns are close to zero. the model for expected returns does not have a big effect on inferences about expected return (any lag in the response of price to announcement is short lived).

In this study, the event window is defined as the day on which the announcement was made. Identification of the precise timing and thus use of one day event window makes it easier to detect any announcement related abnormal return. In order to capture any information about the equity issue that the market may have acquired before actual announcement, returns for an arbitrary 30 day period before the announcement was also computed. Similarly, the returns for the 30 day period following the announcement were also computed.

### 3.3 Population and Sample

The population of the study included all firms quoted in the NSE that have made equity issues. The sample was based on the 10 companies that have issued seasoned equity offerings and rights issues in the NSE between the period January 1996 through December 2006. These companies are:. Kenya Commercial Bank. EABL. ICDCI, Pan African Insurance, African Lakes, Unga Group. Standard Newspapers. Total Kenya, Uchumi Supermarkets, and CFC Group. For the purpose of this study rights issues offering were considered as secondary public equity offering.

### 3.4 Data collection

The data came from closing prices for stocks traded in the NSE exchange 30 days before and 30 days after announcement. These data relied on secondary data from published reports and figures from the Nairobi stock exchange from the 30 days before the issuing of the secondary offering or righs issue and 30 days after offering indicating that we undertook a short run performance of equity issues.

The data required for the purpose of the study was:
a) Price per share for all the firms quoted on the $30^{\text {th }}$ day before the announcement in the NSE.
b) Price per share for all the firms quoted on the $30^{\text {th }}$ day after the announcement in the NSE.

### 3.5 Data analysis

The study conducted an event study around the equity issue announcement by following the standard methodology of event studies. The study proceeded as follows:
i. A sample of firms quoted on the NSE that issued secondary equity offerings or rights issues for the period 1996 through 2006 were selected. The choice of quoted companies was because one could observe price changes since data was readily available.
ii. Announcement day was designated as day zero $(t=0)$.
iii. Definition of period to be studied- These were sixty one days; thirty days before the event, the event day and thirty days after the event. The reason for this is because it was assumed that before the announcement date, there was likely to be some information leakage by those with access to it and after the announcement there was some delayed reaction.
iv. For each of the firms in the sample, the return on each of the days studied was computed. Return was measured by the sum of changes in market price of a security plus any income received over a holding period divided by the price of a security at the beginning of holding period (Elton and Gruber 1995). This was computed using the following model:

$$
\mathrm{Rj}=\frac{(\mathrm{P} 1-\mathrm{Po}+\mathrm{D} 1)}{\mathrm{P}_{0}}
$$

Where:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{Rj}=\text { Return of security } \mathrm{j} \\
& \mathrm{Pl}=\text { Price at end of the holding period } \\
& \mathrm{Po}=\text { Price at beginning of period } \\
& \mathrm{D} 1=\text { Any income received over a holding period }
\end{aligned}
$$

v. The abnormal return for each of the days being studied for each of the firms in the sample was computed. Abnormal return was defined as actual return less expected return. According to the market model the returns on security $j$ are linearly related to returns on a
market portfolio (Copeland and Weston 1992). This model starts with simple linear relationship of returns and the market:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathbf{R i},=\mathbf{a} \mathbf{i}+\mathbf{b i R m}-\mathbf{e} \mathbf{i} \\
& \text { Where } \\
& \mathrm{Ri}=\text { expected return of the security in question } \\
& \text { a } \mathrm{i}=\text { the alpha (the intercept of the characteristic line on the vertical } \\
& \text { axis. } \\
& \text { bi }=\text { Beta (slope characteristic line) - depicts the sensitivity of the } \\
& \text { security's excess returns to that of the market portfolio. } \\
& \mathrm{Rm}=\text { Market return } . \\
& \text { ei }=\text { the unsystematic risk (avoidable risk). }
\end{aligned}
$$

The total risk of a portfolio is reduced by efficient diversification to the point where only systematic risk remains. Thus investors are only compensated for systematic risk, hence the equation is reduced to:

$$
R i=a i+b i R m
$$

The proportion of total risk explained by movements of the market is represented by $\mathrm{r}^{2}$ for the regression of excess returns for a stock against excess returns for the market portfolio ( $r^{2}$ measures the proportion of total variance of dependent variable that is explained by the independent variable). The proportion of systematic to total risk depends on the particular stock (Van Horne et. al 1995), hence there is no standard criteria for accepting the model.

The estimation period was to be 100 trading days prior to the announcement period in order to estimate the parameters used for calculating the normal returns in the absence of announcement. For the estimation period, expected return was calculated using the market model. Abnormal
returns were calculated as the difference between the market-model estimated daily stock returns and the actual returns on each day throughout the post-event period. Student $t$-tests were used to test the null of zero cross-sectional daily average cumulative abnormal return for the equallyweighted portfolio of these stocks each day in the post- event period.
vi. For each day in the event period, the average abnormal return for all firms in the sample was computed.
vii. The individual's day's abnormal return was added together to compute the cumulative abnormal return from the beginning of the period.

The average effect of the announcement was examined because other events were occurring and averaging across all firms, thus minimizing the effects of these other events thereby allowing a better examination of the events under study. Since tests with single event observation were not likely to be useful, the abnormal return observations were aggregated over the event window and across observations to obtain cumulative abnormal returns (CAR's).
viii. To determine whether the average abnormal returns were statistically different from zero, a $t$-test statistic was used with a significance level of $95 \%$.

The results of this study as well as recommendations are indicated in chapter four and five.

## CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

## 4. 1 Introduction

The objective of the study were to determine the effect of secondary equity offerings announcement on stock return of firms at the NSE as well as determine the announcement on trading volume before and after the secondary issue.

This led to the collection of data from ten firms that had listed seasoned equity issues and right issues. There was the need to determine the precise day of the announcement of seasoned shares issue or right issues. The magnitude of the equity issue was expected to vary across firm since the announcements were made by firms in different industries and at different times. Thus it is important to examine individual firm behavior. The pattern of abnormal returns around the announcement date and whether there were abnormal returns after the announcement were examined. The results of the data analysis are summarized below as well as carried in appendix 1 .

### 4.2 Unga Ltd

Figure 1: Share performance of Unga Ltd


## MPS is Market Price Per Share

The share price of the company was falling down in steps just before the announcement and hit the lowest mark just before the announcement. After the announcement the share price remained stagnant for a while before it started improving steadily though it did not reach the points achieved before the announcement period. In table 7 in the appendix I the average share price was lower in the post announcement period (42.68) than in the pre announcement period (44.52). The amount of shares traded in the post announcement period was less than those traded in the post announcement period. This goes ahead to show that the announcement had an effect on the volume of trade of shares for this company.

The $t$ statistics in table 7 shows that the pre announcement period t statistic was -11.95 while in the post announcement it was 12.53 indicating that the announcement had an impact on the share price of the company. The cumulative returns are negative both in the pre-announcement and post-announcement period.

### 4.3 Kenya Commercial Bank

Figure 2: Share performance Of Kenya Commercial Bank


The share price movements show that the price of the share slightly fell before the announcement. After the announcement period the share price remained intact but then began to increase some 10 days after the announcement. The abnormal return is more pronounced in the pre announcement period than the post announcement period. For this company the volume of shares traded around the announcement period showed an improvement as compared to other periods.

The return of the company is positive (0.19), this is higher than the market returns. It can be seen that the returns for the 30 days before the announcement period was lower than the returns for the same period after the announcement. The residual return is almost zero for both the preannouncement period and the post announcement period. On the other hand the t-statistic is negative for the whole period but the pre announcement period was more significant showing investor speculation.

Figure 3: Share price movement of Pan Africa Insurance


From the above graph it can be seen that before the announcement was made the share price exhibited erratic movements but after the announcement was made that the share price stabilized. The company's shares experienced reduced activity for periods surrounding the announcement. This goes to show that the announcement did not have a major impact for most shareholders. The residual returns for this company can be seen to be largely zero. It can be seen in table 3 in the appendix I that the average price of (24.02) after the announcement (23.30) is greater than the price before the announcement. This may indicate lack of insider trading.

Figure 4: Share price movement of East African Breweries Ltd


The share price movements show that the price of the share was stronger before the announcement period (55.41) than the post announcement period (50.85). This can be interpreted to mean that there could have been insider trading taking place for this company. The above graph shows that there was a decline in abnormal returns and share prices. The abnormal return is more pronounced in the pre announcement period than the post announcement period as indicated on table 2. The cumulative abnormal returns before the announcement $(-5.28)$ was higher than the post-announcement period (-19.8) For this company the volume of trade showed improvements after the announcement of rights issue.

In table 2 in the appendix I we see that the return of the company is negative $(-0.28)$, this is below the market returns. In the same table it can be seen that the returns for the 30 days before is negative for both the pre-announcement period and the post announcement period. On the other hand the $t$-statistic is negative for the whole period and is significant. On consideration of excess retums there is evidence of negative effect over the entire announcement period. There is evidence of pre announcement effect but post announcement effect is lacking.

### 4.6 Standard Media Group

Figure 5: Share performance of Standard Media Group


The above two graphs illustrate that the share price for the company started falling just before the announcement date, remained constant during the first few days of the announcement then it started peaking up slowly. The cumulative abnormal returns started falling just before the announcement period but continued picking up after the announcement period. The volume of shares traded after the announcement period was higher than in the pre announcement period.

In table 4 in the appendix I, the average share price of 7.05 in the post announcement period is greater than the average share price in the preannouncement period (6.45). This shows evidence of post announcement effect. The standard error of residual for this company is almost zero. The t-ratio of residual return before and after the announcement period are both statistically significant. The daily returns for the pre-announcement period was negative while the daily returns for the post announcement period is positive. During the preannouncement period, the company shares were out performed by the market but the shares out performed the market in the post announcement period

### 4.7 ICDC

Figure 6: Shares movement of ICDC


The above graph shows that the share price for this company improved for a short period before unnouncement before again falling down slightly just after announcement. It can also be seen iffer the announcement that the share price improved slightly then kept on varying slightly for the thole period. There was a slight improvement in the volume of activity for this company in terms
of shares traded after the announcement period. In table 5 in the appendix I, the share price just before announcement averaged 38.18 was higher than the post announcement average of 36.74 .

The daily returns shows that the company performed better than the market in the pre announcement period but the market outperformed it in the post announcement period. The post announcement $t$ statistic of -7.91 confirms that there was a high significance in the announcement in the movement of the share price. This is further confirmed by the $t$ statistic of -0.55 during the pre announcement period that is not very significant.

### 4.8 U'chumi Ltd

Figure 7: Share price movements for Uchumi Ltd


The share price for this company improved significantly for a short period before announcement nd maintained it for a short while after the announcement. This can be a good indicator of insider -ading. The company's average returns in the pre announcement period ( -1.26 ) was less than the larket returns $(0.009)$ while in the post announcement period the returns were higher ( 0.769 )
than the market returns $(-0.32)$. There was increased activity for the number of shares traded just before the announcement period and just after the announcement period for this company.

As shown in table 10 in appendix I the $t$ statistics for both the pre announcement period ( -15.51 ) and the post announcement $(-7.23)$ are significant, showing that there was significant effect of the announcement. The pre announcement $t$ statistic is higher than the post announcement $t$ statistics shouing that the shareholders may have been speculative or had some inside information.

### 4.9 African Lakes

Figure 8: Share price Movement of African Lakes


The share price of the company remained constant for almost the entire period of the study. It took some days after the announcement for the price of the share to react and the price went down after some time. The average returns for the stock for this company for the pre-announcement period (-1.02) was lower than that of the market (0.007). In the post-announcement period the average returns was higher ( 0.623 ) than the market $(-0.265)$. It can also be seen that $t$ statistic for both the pre announcement period $(-0.575)$ and the post announcement period $(-5.899)$ was not that significant. The reason that may be attributed for this counter is that it did not trade so much during its whole period and thus there could be no significance attached to the announcement of issue of rights issue.

### 4.10 CFC Bank

Figure 9: Movement of share prices for CFC Bank


For a period just before the announcement period, the share price of the company improved sightly and remained at that after a few days after the announcement. This slight improvement
may be because a few shareholders might have gained privileged information that would enable them take advantage of it. In table 11 of appendix I it can be seen that the average returns of the company for the pre-announcement was lower $(-1.314)$ than that of the market $(-0.228)$. For the pist-announcement period the average price was higher (1.088) than that of the market $(0.031)$. The t ratio for the company's share in the pre-announcement period ( -23.199 ) and post announcement (-11.277) are statistically relevant. This shows that the announcement had some effect on the price movement of the company.

## 4. 11 Total Kenya

Figure 10: Share price performance before for Total Kenya


From the graph above it can be seen that for a period just before the announcement period, the share price of the company fell down and continued briefly after the announcement period but then started picking momentum some few days after the announcement. Table 15 in appendix II shows that the number of shares traded improved after the announcement period. Table 6 in appendix I shows the average returns of the company in the pre-announcement period (0.049) outperformed the market $(-1.065)$, however in the announcement period it was lower $(0.103)$ than the market returns (0.882). The average share price in the post announcement period was higher than the average share price in the pre announcement period.

The average cumulative abnormal return was -8.45 before the announcement and 6.34 after the announcement. The $t$ statistic for the company's share in the pre-announcement period (6.45) was less than in the post-announcement period (7.05). However both the two statistics are significant showing significance of the announcement of the share issue. The price decline before the announcement and recovery just after the announcement period confirms the effect of the announcement on the effect of the share issue.

### 4.12 Analysis of Abnormal Returns

The cumulative average and residual for all the companies in the survey was calculated. The observation period extended from day -30 to 30 thus amounting to 61 days. Table 1 shows the results of this analysis.

Table 1: Analysis of Abnormal Returns (10 companies)

| Day's | Residual | Cumulative <br> Abnormal <br> Returns | T-statistics |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| - 30 | -0.14806 | -3.52933 | 0.325481 |
| -29 | 0.61448 | -0.83569 | 0.778014 |
| -28 | -1.1904 | -1.73077 | 0.874896 |
| -27 | 0.979 | -0.2623 | 0.617794 |
| -26 | 0.166 | -0.61654 | 0.842049 |
| -25 | -0.23943 | -0.43897 | 0.9935 |
| -24 | 0.3703 | 0.592302 | 0.906637 |
| -23 | -0.0442 | 0.775396 | 0.781573 |
| . 22 | 0.1902 | 2.78668 | 0.346626 |
| -21 | -4.5795 | -4.32205 | 0.869222 |
| -20 | -6.2577 | 2.207108 | 0.378327 |
| - 19 | -1.407 | -1.45726 | 0.969444 |
| -18 | -1.9309 | -2.10187 | 0.986777 |
| -17 | -1.8286 | -2.79821 | 0.905061 |
| -16 | -2.0203 | -2.1461 | 0.996229 |
| -15 | -0.9754 | -1.59821 | 0.975721 |
| -14 | -3.9655 | -2.34818 | 0.346985 |
| -13 | -5.994 | -5.17461 | 0.352336 |
| -12 | -1.082 | -10.3473 | 0.333461 |
| -11 | -1.4907 | -3.97578 | 0.798105 |
| -10 | -12.5462 | -3.19573 | 0.624248 |
| -9 | -5.0641 | -5.32037 | 0.990849 |
| 8 | -4.1529 | -5.23288 | 0.951218 |
| . 7 | -3.1585 | -4.57006 | 0.932586 |
| -6 | -3.3709 | -5.28049 | 0.899296 |
| - 5 | -3.3102 | -5.62637 | 0.875899 |
| -4 | -3.6851 | -9.30386 | 0.553976 |
| - 3 | -3.1824 | -8.87683 | 0.561373 |
| -2 | -3.67434 | -7.93012 | 0.68974 |
| -1 | -3.1204 | -8.64516 | 0.606887 |
| 0 | -4.772 | -12.3081 | 0.604701 |
| 1 | -2.5923 | -7.10273 | 0.819434 |
| 2 | -2.7533 | -7.35513 | 0.813452 |
| 3 | -1.8404 | -7.05282 | 0.765517 |
| 4 | 4.2203 | -1.40512 | 0.799848 |
| 5 | -1.2441 | -1.15178 | 0.85616 |
| 6 | -0.4364 | -10.03.49 | 0.347364 |
| 7 | -0.4238 | -0.38246 | 0.904825 |
| 8 | -0.4432 | 0.248054 | 0.847047 |
| 9 | -0.8708 | 0.673178 | 0.755533 |
| 10 | 1.958 | 2.000857 | 0.886219 |
| 11 | -2.7517 | 1.334912 | 0.574922 |
| 12 | 0.4417 | 1.520455 | 0.818754 |
| 13 | 0.0205 | 2.524501 | 0.671456 |
| 14 | -0.1027 | 1.693758 | 0.753996 |
| 15 | -2.2192 | 0.564924 | 0.745754 |


| 16 | -0.626 | 0.805508 | 0.81814 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 17 | -0.5303 | 0.045416 | 0.907165 |
| 18 | 1.9593 | 1.980252 | 0.947395 |
| 19 | -0.0373 | -9.71225 | 0.360601 |
| 20 | -0.37306 | 1.639496 | 0.788959 |
| 21 | 0.4129 | 1.941588 | 0.829356 |
| 22 | 0.6547 | 2.025256 | 0.842532 |
| 23 | 0.9082 | 2.626182 | 0.848175 |
| 24 | 0.9548 | 2.223247 | 0.888468 |
| 25 | -1.773 | 2.407384 | 0.676217 |
| 26 | -0.9773 | 0.700186 | 0.86224 |
| 27 | 1.838 | 1.775299 | 0.990003 |
| 28 | 1.9862 | 1.928479 | 0.970123 |
| 29 | -3.922 | -1.33684 | 0.86145 |
| 30 | 5.0168 | -1.95628 | 0.040399 |

Table 1 shows that there were a total of 24 days that recorded positive abnormal returns. The other 37 days recorded negative returns with day 0 recording the highest negative returns. Most of the days in the preannouncement period recorded results that were statistically significant.

## CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a summary of the findings, conclusions and recommendations into the effects of secondary equity offering on the stock returns of firms quoted on the Nairobi Stock Exchange.

## 52 Summary of findings and Conclusion

Though there was price change for most of the companies involved in the study just before announcement of a rights issue or a secondary issue, for some of the counters the price started reacting after the announcement either immediately or after a short delay. It was also established that the price movement in the periods prior to and after the announcement dates resulted in increased abnormal returns for the shareholders.

The direction of share price and abnormal returns after the announcement is inclusive. The market reacts differently for different types of stocks. The presence of information means that the price generally moves towards losing than gaining. The abnormal returns are however so small and this means that the details of a secondary issue or rights issue does not shock the market in a significant way. From the averages carried out the amount of shares traded was more at the post announcement period than in the pre announcement period for most companies involved in the study. This goes ahead to state the announcement had an effect in increasing the volume of trade.

### 5.3 Limitations of the study

Like any other studies this study experienced some limitations in conducting its research. The first limitation is that the number of companies involved in the study was too small. This means that with the small sample the study was subject to systematic bias that could distort the findings of the study. The NSE trading is limited to only a few companies unlike in developed nations where there are many companies trading.

The study also faced the limitations that the duration of study. The announcement day alone may not alone have a huge impact. There are other important days that were not involved in the study
liee for example, the day of start of trading, the subscription day, cum rights and ex-rights day and so on.

## 5. 4 Recommendations

Price movements are affected by the announcements made by a company. This may be the innouncement of secondary issue, a rights issue, a dividend issue, merger and acquisitions, annual rofits and so on. The leakage of sensitive information before time may cause distortion in the ietermination of prices and hence leading to some people gaining unfairly. There is need for :takeholders in the market mainly the NSE and the Capital Markets Authority to look into the issue of insider trading to ensure that it does not happen.

### 5.5 Recommendations for further research

There is need for future researchers to consider extending the duration of observation for any innouncements made by companies quoted in the stock market. In this case extension of the duration will ensure any trend due to the announcement may clearly be seen. This is important since for example the announcement of a company for a rights issue may be delayed until some few days after and before the rights issue begin trading in the stock market. In that time the share price may start reacting to the demand and supply of shares.

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Appendix I Analysis for results after and before the announcement
Table 2

| EABL ANALYSIS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| DATA RESULTS ANALYSIS FOR EABL FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFORE AND AFTER THE RIGHTS ANNOUNCEMENT |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Date Re | Market Re | $\begin{aligned} & \mathrm{EABL} \\ & \mathrm{Re} \end{aligned}$ | Fit | SE Fit | Residual | CAR | Statistic | MPS |
| Avenge For The Whole Period | 0.02 | -0.278 | 0.128 | 0.121 | -0.407 | -12.57 | -2.93 | 53.09 |
| Average For The 30 Days Period Before Announcement | 0.032 | -0.355 | 0.145 | 0.106 | -0.5 | -5.28 | -5.07 | 55.41 |
| Average For The 30 Days Period After Announcement | 0.072 | -0.145 | 0.202 | 0.131 | -0.347 | -19.8 | -0.98 | 50.85 |
| Standard Deviation For The Whole Period | 0.837 | 2.451 | 1.172 | 0.043 | 2.517 | 9.28 | 22.65 | 3.40 |
| Standard Deviation For The 30 Days Period Before Announcement | 0.613 | 1.745 | 0.858 | 0.029 | 1.985 | 4.12 | 18.49 | 1.65 |
| Standard Deviation <br> For The 30 Days <br> Period After <br> Announcement | 0.97 | 3.044 | 1.359 | 0.047 | 3.019 | 7.12 | 26.65 | 3.21 |

## Table 3

PAN AFRICA INSURANCE ANALYSIS
DATA RESULTS ANALYSIS FOR PAN AFRICA INSURANCE FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFORE AND AFTER THE RIGHTS ANNOUNCEMENT

| Date | Market <br> Re | PAN Re | Fit | SE Fit | Residual | CAR | t- <br> Statistic | MPS |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Average For The <br> Whole Period | 0.025 | 1.046 | -0.053 | 0.08 | 1.098 | 57.14 | 8.04 | 23.66 |
| Average For The 30 <br> Days Period Before <br> Announcement | 0.04 | 2.126 | -0.051 | 0.087 | 2.177 | 47.85 | 15.57 | 23.3 |
| Average For The <br> Whole Period After <br> Announcement | 0.016 | -0.034 | -0.054 | 0.074 | 0.054 | 66.14 | 0.74 | 24.02 |
| Standard Deviation <br> For The Whole <br> Period | 0.528 | 9.522 | 0.078 | 0.022 | 9.501 | 17.79 | 104.67 | 2.85 |
| Standard Deviation <br> For The 30 Days <br> Period Before <br> Announcement | 0.675 | 13.608 | 0.1 | 0.029 | 13.578 | 21.89 | 150.15 | 4.06 |
| Standard Deviation <br> For The 30 Days <br> period After <br> Announcement | 0.345 | 0.158 | 0.051 | 0.01 | 0.167 | 0.56 | 2.28 | 0.05 |

Table 4
STANDARD MEDIA ANALYSIS


## Table 5

ICDC ANALYSIS
DATA RESULTS ANALYSIS FOR ICDC FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFORE AND AFTER THE RIGHTS ANNOUNCEMENT

| Dare Re | Market <br> Re | ICDC <br> Re | Fit | SE Fit | Residual | CAR | t- <br> Statistic | MPS |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average For the <br> Whole Period | -0.063 | -0.312 | 0.026 | 0.086 | -0.339 | -3.61 | -5.14 | $\mathbf{3 7 . 4 7}$ |
| Average For The 30 <br> Days Period Before <br> Announcement | 0.033 | 0.117 | 0.07 | 0.085 | 0.046 | -2.12 | -0.55 | $\mathbf{3 8 . 1 8}$ |
| Average For The 30 <br> Days Period After <br> Announcement | -0.169 | -0.611 | -0.022 | 0.087 | -0.589 | -5.12 | -7.91 | $\mathbf{3 6 . 7 4}$ |
| Standard Deviation <br> For The Whole <br> Period | 0.563 | 3.172 | 0.257 | 0.025 | 3.141 | 4.66 | 41.02 | $\mathbf{1 . 8 1}$ |
| Standard Deviation <br> For The 30 Days <br> Period Before <br> Announcement | 0.534 | 1.499 | 0.244 | 0.018 | 1.578 | 1.37 | 17.69 | $\mathbf{0 . 4 7}$ |
| Standard Deviation <br> For The 30 Days <br> Period After <br> Announcement | $\mathbf{0 . 5 9}$ | $\mathbf{4 . 2 1 5}$ | $\mathbf{0 . 2 6 9}$ | $\mathbf{0 . 0 3 1}$ | $\mathbf{4 . 1 4}$ | $\mathbf{6 . 1 9}$ | $\mathbf{5 5 . 0 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 . 3 4}$ |

## Table 6

TOTAL ANALYSIS
DATA RESULTS ANALYSIS FOR TOTAL LTD FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFORE AND AFTER THE RIGHTS ANNOUNCEMENT

| Date Re | Market <br> Re | Total Re | Fit | SE Fit | Residual | Class | CAR | t- <br> Statistic |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Average For the Whole <br> Period | -0.09 | 0.078 | 0.151 | -0.168 | -0.037 | -14.29 | -1.06 | $\mathbf{6 . 7 3}$ |
| Average For The 30 Days <br> Period Before <br> Announcement | -1.065 | 0.049 | 0.148 | -1.114 | -0.248 | -18.8 | -8.45 | $\mathbf{6 . 4 5}$ |
| Average For The 30 Days <br> Period After <br> Announcement | 0.882 | 0.103 | 0.156 | 0.779 | 0.174 | -9.14 | 6.34 | $\mathbf{7 . 0 5}$ |
| Standard Deviation For <br> The Whole Period | 3.3 | 0.21 | 0.062 | 3.278 | 0.731 | 12.1 | 25.51 | $\mathbf{0 . 8 3}$ |
| Standard Deviation For <br> The 30 Days Period <br> Before Announcement | 3.123 | 0.19 | 0.053 | 3.145 | 0.701 | 13.02 | 24.55 | $\mathbf{0 . 8 8}$ |
| Standard Deviation For <br> The 30 Days Period <br> After Announcement | 3.29 | $\mathbf{0 . 2 3}$ | $\mathbf{0 . 0 7 1}$ | $\mathbf{3 . 2 3 9}$ | $\mathbf{0 . 7 2 2}$ | $\mathbf{8 . 4 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 5 . 1 2}$ | $\mathbf{0 . 6 4}$ |

## Table 7

UNGA LTD. ANALYSIS
DAIA RESULTS ANALYSIS FOR UNGA LTD FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFORE AND AFTER THE RIGHTS ANNOUNCEMENT

| Dise Re | Market Re | UNGA Re | Fit | SE Fit | Residual | CAR | tStatistic | MPS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Avenge For the Whole Period | -0.103 | -0.182 | -0.167 | 0.063 | -0.015 | -7.76 | -0.08 | 43.5 |
| Average For The 30 Days Penod Before tanouncement | 0.006 | -0.83 | -0.062 | 0.065 | -0.768 | -10.19 | -11.95 | 44.52 |
| Average For The 30 Days Period After Announcement | -0.215 | 0.505 | -0.274 | 0.063 | 0.779 | -4.78 | 12.53 | 42.68 |
| Standrd Deviation For The Whole Period | 0.366 | 2.538 | 0.351 | 0.009 | 2.554 | 8.72 | 41.31 | 3.4 |
| Standrd Deviation For The 30 Days Period Before Announcement | 0.424 | 2.63 | 0.407 | 0.01 | 2.621 | 8.51 | 40.61 | 3.83 |
| Standard Deviation For The 30 Days Period After Announcement | 0.268 | 2.323 | 0.257 | 0.008 | 2.311 | 7.76 | 39.44 | 2.53 |


| Table 8 <br> KCB ANALYSIS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| DATA RESULTS ANALYSIS FOR KCB FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFORE AND AFTER THE RIGHTS ANNOUNCEMENT |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dere Re | Market Re | KCBRe | Fit | SE Fit | CAR | tStatistic | MPS |
| Aienge For The Whole Period | -0.423 | 0.195 | 0.184 | -0.620 | -19.141 | -4.461 | 60.62 |
| Average For The 30 Dans Period Before Anhouncement | -0.541 | 0.220 | 0.161 | -0.761 | -8.040 | -7.720 | 58.68 |
| Average For The 30 Davs Period After tnnouncement | -0.221 | 0.308 | 0.199 | -0.528 | -30.151 | -1.492 | 62.58 |
| Sundard Deviation For The Whole Period | 3.732 | 1.785 | 0.0655 | 3.832 | 14.131 | 34.490 | 4.20 |
| Sandard Deviation Far The 30 Days Period Before Announcement | 2.657 | 1.307 | 0.044 | 3.022 | 6.274 | 28.156 | 3.14 |
| Standard Deviation <br> For The 30 Days <br> Period After <br> Anouncement | 4.635 | 2.069425 | 0.0716 | 4.597 | 10.842 | 40.581 | 4.33 |

Table 9
AFRICAN LAKES ANALYSIS
DATA RESLLTS ANALYSIS FOR AFRICAN LAKES FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFORE AND AFTER THE RIGHTS ANNOUNCEMENT

| Date Re | Market <br> Re | AFRI Re | Fit | SE Fit | Residual | CAR | t- <br> Statistic | MPS |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average For The Whole <br> Period | -0.127 | -0.225 | -0.206 | 0.078 | -0.019 | -0.007 | -0.576 | 34.19 |
| Average For The 30 Days <br> Period Before <br> Announcement |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average For The 30 Days <br> Period After <br> Announcement | 0.0074 | -1.024 | -0.0765 | 0.080 | -0.948 | -0.404 | -0.575 | 34.93 |
| Standard Deviation For <br> The Whole Period | -0.265 | 0.623 | -0.338 | 0.078 | 0.961 | 0.412 | -5.899 | 33.42 |
| Standard Deviation For <br> The 30 Days Period <br> Before Announcement | 0.452 | 3.132 | 0.433 | 0.011 | 3.151 | 1.348 | 10.760 | 1.50 |
| Standard Deviation For <br> The 30 Days Period After <br> Announcement | 0.523 | 3.245 | 0.502 | 0.012 | 3.234 | 1.383 | 10.501 | 0.17 |


| Table 10 <br> UCHUMI SUPERMARKETS ANALYSIS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| DATA RESULTS ANALYSIS FOR UCHUMI FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFORE AND AFTER THE RIGHTS <br> ANNOUNCEMENT |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Re |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Table 11

CFC ANALYSIS

## DATA RESULTS ANALYSIS FOR CFC FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFORE AND AFTER THE RIGHTS ANNOUNCEMENT

| Date Re | Market Re | UNGA <br> Re | Fit | SE Fit | Residual | CAR | Statistic | MPS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average For The Whole Period | -0.087 | -0.111 | 0.096 | 0.186 | -0.207 | -0.046 | -17.634 | 75.72 |
| Average For The 30 Days Period Before Announcement | -0.228 | -1.314 | 0.060 | 0.183 | -1.375 | -0.306 | -23.199 | 75.23 |
| Average For The 30 Days Period After Arnouncement | 0.031 | 1.088 | 0.127 | 0.193 | 0.961 | 0.215 | -11.277 | 76.13 |
| Sundard Deviation For The Whole Period | 1.002 | 4.072 | 0.259 | 0.077 | 4.045 | 0.902 | 14.931 | 1.82 |
| Standard Deviation For The 30 Days Period Before Announcement | 0.907 | 3.854 | 0.234 | 0.065 | 3.880 | 0.865 | 16.067 | 1.73 |
| Standard Deviation For The 30 Days Period After Announcement | 1.098 | 4.060 | 0.284 | 0.088 | 3.997 | 0.891 | 10.477 | 1.81 |

## Appendix II Summary of company's results

## Table 12

PAN AFRICA INSURANCE ANALYSIS
SUMMARY OF ABNORMAL RETURNS AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PAN AFRICA INSURANCE FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFORE AND AFTER THE RIGHTS ANNOUNCEMENT.

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Trade } \\ & \text { dis } \end{aligned}$ | Car | Residual | MPS | No of shares |  | 1 | 65.427 | -1.647 | 24 | 594 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| -30 | 0.036 | 1.813 | 16.667 | 0 |  | 2 | 65.519 | 0.046 | 24 |  |
| -29 | 23.954 | 2.868 | 16.667 | 1122 |  | 3 | 65.544 | -0.153 | 24 |  |
| -28 | 22.609 | 3.025 | 20.633 | 30255 |  | 4 | 65.564 | -0.08 | 24 |  |
| -27 | 22.778 | 8.518 | 20.34 | 2500 |  | 5 | 65.598 | -15.323 | 24 | 497 |
| -26 | 21.112 | 2.37 | 20.34 | 0 |  | 6 | 65.657 | -0.266 | 24 | 2700 |
| -25 | 21.133 | 0.321 | 20 | 9750 |  | 7 | 65.686 | 0.126 | 24 | 30450 |
| -24 | 27.901 | -0.35 | 20 | 0 |  | 8 | 65.742 | 0.15 | 24 | 52 |
| . 23 | 27.843 | 1.65 | 21.333 | 750 |  | 9 | 65.751 | 0.06 | 24 |  |
| -22 | 27.869 | 5.006 | 21.333 | 0 |  | 10 | 65.786 | -0.362 | 24 |  |
| -21 | 28.181 | -0.182 | 21.333 | 0 |  | 11 | 65.683 | 0.114 | 24 |  |
| -20 | 74.839 | -617 | 21.333 | 0 |  | 12 | 65.717 | -0.279 | 24 | 3723 |
| -19 | 43.897 | 0.543 | 31.333 | 900 |  | 13 | 65.750 | 0.001 | 24 | 2835 |
| -18 | 43.955 | -0.16 | 21.6 | 800 |  | 14 | 65.824 | 0.134 | 24 | 1800 |
| -17 | 43.907 | 0.033 | 21.6 | 0 |  | 15 | 65.976 | -8.461 | 24 | 1500 |
| -16 | 52.036 | 1.587 | 21.6 | 15975 |  | 16 | 65.965 | -0.111 | 24 |  |
| . 15 | 51.999 | -0.472 | 23.333 | 56382 |  | 17 | 66.059 | 0.111 | 24 |  |
| -14 | 52.153 | -0.264 | 23.333 | 10980 |  | 18 | 66.157 | 0.4 | 24 | 2400 |
| -13 | 52.214 | -5958 | 23.333 | 40200 |  | 19 | 66.248 | -0.237 | 24 | 2645 |
| -12 | 52.393 | 0.089 | 23.333 | 0 |  | 20 | 66.276 | -0.183 | 24 | 8436 |
| -11 | 57.708 | -0.103 | 23.333 | 0 |  | 21 | 66.365 | -0.19 | 24 | 4500 |
| -10 | 64.019 | -112 | 24.587 | 2450 |  | 22 | 66.764 | -0.024 | 24 |  |
| -9 | 80.041 | -0.182 | 26.167 | 1500 |  | 23 | 66.861 | -0.011 | 24.1 | 34073 |
| -8 | 78.893 | -0.303 | 30.333 | 1650 |  | 24 | 67.226 | -0.034 | 24.1 |  |
| -7 | 78.925 | 0.856 | 30.007 | 11550 |  | 25 | 67.280 | -14.954 | 24.1667 | 34073 |
| -6 | 79.019 | 0.163 | 30 | 150 |  | 26 | 66.608 | -2.808 | 24.1667 | 3890 |
| -5 | 79.080 | -0.049 | 30 | 0 |  | 27 | 66.666 | 0.032 | 24 | 12266 |
| -4 | 45.770 | -0.206 | 30 | 0 |  | 28 | 66.736 | -1.563 | 24 | 8550 |
| -3 | 50.862 | -0.552 | 20 | 11100 |  | 29 | 66.873 | -0.813 | 24 | 1847 |
| -2 | 65.149 | 0.17 | 21 | 6704 |  | 30 | 67.004 | -2.26 | 24 |  |
| -1 | 65.297 | -0.243 | 23.987 | 1200 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 0 | 65.377 | -0.075 | 24 | 4050 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| AV | 47.8524 | 0.635607 | 23.29527 | 6863.933 |  |  | 66.14373 | -1.6195 | 24.01778 | 6125.1 |

Table 13
STANDARD MEDIA ANALYSIS
SUMMARY OF ABNORMAL RETLRNS AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PAN AFRICA INSURANCE FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFORE AND AFTER THE RIGHTS ANNOUNCEMENT

| $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Trade } \\ & \text { Day } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | Car | Residual | MPS | No of shares | Trade Day | Car | Residual | MPS | No of shares |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| -30 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 7.7 | 0 | 1 | -33.611 | 0.027 | 5.5 | 0 |
| -29 | -0.036 | -0.076 | 7.7 | 1720 | 2 | -33.731 | -0.12 | 5.51 | 9110 |
| -28 | -3.819 | -3.783 | 7.7 | 0 | 3 | -26.432 | 7.299 | 5.51 | 0 |
| -27 | -3.771 | 0.048 | 7.4 | 46391 | 4 | -15.316 | 11.116 | 5.93 | 4605 |
| -26 | -3.619 | 0.152 | 7.4 | 0 | 5 | -15.911 | -0.595 | 6.6 | 7627 |
| -25 | -3.706 | -0.087 | 7.4 | 0 | 6 | -10.031 | 5.88 | 6.6 | 4140 |
| -24 | -3.629 | 0.077 | 7.4 | 14950 | 7 | -10.388 | -0.357 | 7 | 46690 |
| -23 | -3.561 | 0.068 | 7.4 | 0 | 8 | -6.474 | 3.914 | 7 | 0 |
| -22 | -3.567 | -0.006 | 7.4 | 1150 | 9 | -6.34 | 0.134 | 7.29 | 805 |
| -21 | -13.797 | -10.23 | 7.4 | 0 | 10 | -5.763 | 0.577 | 7.29 | 0 |
| -20 | -13.578 | 0.219 | 6.65 | 1380 | 11 | -5.781 | -0.018 | 7.29 | 0 |
| -19 | -13.443 | 0.135 | 6.65 | 0 | 12 | -6.013 | 0.232 | 7.3 | 5709 |
| 18 | -13.329 | 0.114 | 6.65 | 0 | 13 | -6.065 | -0.052 | 7.3 | 4347 |
| -17 | -13.415 | -0.086 | 6.65 | 0 | 14 | -10.201 | -4.136 | 7.3 | 2760 |
| -16 | -13.481 | -0.066 | 6.65 | 244962 | 15 | -9.919 | 0.238 | 7 | 2300 |
| -15 | -13.417 | 0.064 | 6.65 | 864529 | 16 | -10.22 | -0.301 | 7 | 0 |
| -14 | -23.467 | -10.05 | 6.65 | 168360 | 17 | -10.213 | 0.007 | 7 | 0 |
| -13 | -33.435 | -9.968 | 6 | 0 | 18 | -5.199 | 5.014 | 7 | 3680 |
| -12 | -31.524 | 1.911 | 5.4 | 61640 | 19 | -992 | 3.207 | 7.35 | 4055 |
| -11 | -31.6 | -0.076 | 5.5 | 3200 | 20 | -1.419 | 0.573 | 7.6 | 12935 |
| -10 | -31.781 | -0.181 | 5.5 | 0 | 21 | -1.392 | 0.027 | 7.65 | 6900 |
| -9 | -31.686 | 0.095 | 5.5 | 0 | 22 | -2.829 | -4.37 | 7.65 | 0 |
| -8 | -31.628 | 0.058 | 5.5 | 0 | 23 | -2.758 | 0.071 | 7.55 | 52245 |
| -7 | -31.893 | -0.265 | 5.5 | 17710 | 24 | -1.004 | 1.754 | 7.55 | 0 |
| -6 | -31.903 | -0.01 | 5.5 | 230 | 25 | -1.066 | -0.062 | 7.7 | 5220 |
| -5 | -32.087 | -0.184 | 5.5 | 0 | 26 | -5.715 | -4.649 | 7.7 | 5964 |
| -4 | -32.838 | -0.751 | 5.5 | 0 | 27 | -5.827 | -0.112 | 7.32 | 18807 |
| -3 | -33.122 | -0.284 | 5.5 | 17020 | 28 | -5.941 | -0.114 | 7.32 | 13110 |
| -2 | -33.384 | -0.262 | 5.5 | 10279 | 29 | -6.443 | -0.502 | 7.32 | 28322 |
| -1 | -33.416 | -0.032 | 5.5 | 1840 | 30 | -10.275 | -3.832 | 7.32 | 0 |
| 0 | -33.638 | -0.222 | 5.5 | 6210 |  |  |  |  |  |
| AV | -18.796 | -1.1138 | 6.445 | 48512.03 |  | -42.146 | 0.695 | 7.048333 | 7977.7 |

Table 14
ICDC ANALYSIS
SUMMARY OF ABNORMAL RETURNS AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL
RETU'RNS FOR PAN AFRICA INSURANCE FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFOR AND AFTER THE
RIGHTS ANNOUNCEMENT.

| Trade <br> Day | CAR | Residual | MPS | No of shares | Trade <br> Day | CAR | Residual | MPS | No of shares |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| -30 | -1.814 | -1.814 | 38.11 | 115346 | 1 | -3.522 | -0.554 | 37.86 | 2100 |
| -29 | 0.315 | 2.129 | 38.81 | 93180 | 2 | 2.01 | 5.528 | 39.99 | 116071 |
| -28 | -0.504 | -0.819 | 38.50 | 2530 | 3 | 1.115 | -0.891 | 39.59 | 15028 |
| -27 | -1.882 | -1.378 | 38.00 | 0 | 4 | -9.625 | -10.740 | 35.3 | 19209 |
| -26 | -1.134 | 0.748 | 38.16 | 2150 | 5 | -11.584 | -1.959 | 34.63 | 2100 |
| -25 | -2.007 | -0.8763 | 38.00 | 24976 | 6 | -7.486 | 4.098 | 36.07 | 1250 |
| -24 | 0.478 | 2.485 | 38.82 | 31089 | 7 | -7.0313 | 0.455 | 36.2 | 3510 |
| -23 | -1.785 | -2.262 | 38.38 | 36576 | 8 | -6.922 | 0.109 | 36 | 1240 |
| -22 | -2.169 | -0.385 | 38.00 | 26443 | 9 | -6.714 | 0.209 | 36.02 | 2170 |
| -21 | -2.140 | 0.029 | 38.11 | 2540 | 10 | -2.210 | 4.504 | 37.95 | 11585 |
| -20 | -2.031 | 0.109 | 37.90 | 2340 | 11 | -5.568 | -3.358 | 36.54 | 1750 |
| -19 | -1.794 | 0.237 | 38.73 | 39692 | 12 | 3.766 | 9.334 | 39.99 | 5065 |
| -18 | -2.597 | -0.803 | 37.62 | 2340 | 13 | -0.078 | -3.843 | 38.5 | 5522 |
| -17 | -0.397 | 2.200 | 38.73 | 387405 | 14 | 3.292 | 3.369 | 39.86 | 1230 |
| -16 | -3.546 | -3.149 | 37.62 | 102532 | 15 | 3.501 | 0.209 | 40 | 2530 |
| -15 | -1.966 | 1.581 | 38.25 | 6300 | 16 | 1.235 | -2.266 | 39 | 39745 |
| -14 | -3.507 | -1.542 | 37.60 | 2340 | 17 | 1.265 | 0.03 | 39 | 0 |
| -13 | -2.612 | 0.895 | 38.05 | 3200 | 18 | -2.118 | -3.383 | 37.66 | 6090 |
| -12 | -2.690 | -0.078 | 38.05 | 2240 | 19 | -3.263 | -1.145 | 37.25 | 2350 |
| -11 | -2.834 | -0.143 | 38.01 | 72182 | 20 | -3.689 | -0.426 | 37 | 13109 |
| -10 | -2.795 | 0.039 | 38.01 | 112091 | 21 | -3.716 | -0.027 | 37 | 0 |
| -9 | -2.957 | -0.162 | 38.00 | 24150 | 22 | -3.347 | 0.369 | 37.25 | 2350 |
| -8 | -3.520 | -0.563 | 37.91 | 3710 | 23 | -3.701 | -0.354 | 37.09 | 1155 |
| -7 | -3.698 | -0.178 | 37.89 | 2640 | 24 | -3.267 | 0.435 | 37.25 | 2340 |
| -6 | -4.449 | -0.751 | 37.74 | 2340 | 25 | -11.515 | -8.248 | 34.18 | 778 |
| -5 | -3.678 | 0.775 | 38.00 | 8995 | 26 | -12.156 | -0.641 | 33.96 | ! |
| -4 | -3.566 | 0.108 | 38.03 | 13808 | 27 | -16.488 | 4.332 | 32.5 |  |
| -3 | -1.082 | 2.484 | 38.77 | 257666 | 28 | -10.517 | 5.971 | 34.43 |  |
| -2 | -2.776 | -1.6944 | 38.25 | 204789 | 29 | -14.553 | -4.036 | 33.1 |  |
| -1 | 1.388 | 4.164 | 40.00 | 298827 | 30 | 1719.fafi | If 9 ¢9\%6 | 17 |  |
| 0 | -2.969 | -4.356 | 38.32 | 2630 |  |  |  |  |  |
| AV | -2.1249 | 0.046177 | 38.20167 | 62813.9 |  |  |  |  |  |

Table 20
AFRICAN LAKES
SUMMARY OF ABNORMAL RETURNS AND CUMLLATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PAN AFRICA INSURANCE FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFOR AND AFTER THE RIGHTS ANNOUNCEMENT.

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Trade } \\ & \text { Des: } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | CAR | Residual | MPS | No of shares |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| -30 | -0.086 | -0.772 | 34.5 | 0 |
| -29 | 0.111 | 0.176 | 34.5 | 0 |
| -28 | -0.366 | -0.425 | 34.5 | 0 |
| -27 | -0.147 | 0.195 | 34.5 | 0 |
| -26 | 0.639 | 0.702 | 35 | 550 |
| -25 | -0.229 | -0.774 | 35 | 0 |
| -24 | 0.430 | 0.587 | 35 | 0 |
| -23 | 0.368 | -0.055 | 35 | 0 |
| -22 | 0.935 | 0.506 | 35 | 0 |
| -21 | -10.114 | -9.858 | 35 | 0 |
| -20 | -8.017 | 1.871 | 35 | 0 |
| -19 | -8.601 | -0.521 | 35 | 0 |
| -18 | -10.682 | -1.857 | 35 | 0 |
| -17 | -11.938 | -1.120 | 35 | 0 |
| -16 | -11.945 | -0.007 | 35 | 0 |
| -15 | -11.851 | 0.084 | 35 | 0 |
| -14 | -11.483 | 0.328 | 35 | 0 |
| -13 | -11.107 | 0.335 | 35 | 0 |
| -12 | -10.672 | 0.388 | 35 | 0 |
| -11 | -10.886 | -0.191 | 35 | 0 |
| -10 | -11.257 | -0.330 | 35 | 0 |
| -9 | -21.632 | -9.257 | 35 | 0 |
| -8 | -24.533 | -2.589 | 35 | 0 |
| -7 | -22.063 | 2.204 | 35 | 0 |
| -6 | -24.101 | -1.818 | 35 | 0 |
| -5 | -24.254 | -0.136 | 35 | 0 |
| 4 | -24.088 | 0.147 | 35 | 0 |
| -3 | -23.708 | 0.340 | 35 | 0 |
| -2 | -23.189 | 0.462 | 35 | 0 |
| -1 | -25.649 | -2.194 | 35 | 0 |
| AV | -11.33717 | -0.78597 | 34.933 | 18.333333 |


| 0 | -21.291 | -1.372 | 35 |  |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | -20.409 | 0.389 | 35 |  |
| 2 | -20.487 | 0.631 | 35 |  |
| 3 | -19.859 | 0.797 | 35 |  |
| 4 | -11.879 | 10.127 | 35 |  |
| 5 | -8.3647 | 4.460 | 35 |  |
| 6 | -8.310 | 0.069 | 35 |  |
| 7 | -7.749 | 0.711 | 35 |  |
| 8 | -7.485 | 0.336 | 35 |  |
| 9 | -6.751 | 0.931 | 35 |  |
| 10 | -3.822 | 3.716 | 35 | 1 |
| 11 | -5.882 | -2.648 | 35 |  |
| 12 | -5.136 | 0.947 | 35 |  |
| 13 | -3.526 | 2.042 | 35 |  |
| 14 | -1.879 | 2.092 | 35 |  |
| 15 | -3.202 | -1.679 | 35 |  |
| 16 | -2.8566 | 0.438 | 35 |  |
| 17 | -2.453 | 0.513 | 35 |  |
| 18 | -0.588 | 2.366 | 31.5 | 43, |
| 19 | -0.938 | -0.444 | 31.5 |  |
| 20 | -0.904 | 0.0434 | 31.5 |  |
| 21 | -0.074 | 1.053 | 31.5 |  |
| 22 | 1.686 | 2.233 | 31.5 |  |
| 23 | 1.829 | 0.182 | 31.5 |  |
| 24 | 2.231 | 0.509 | 31.5 |  |
| 25 | 2.289 | 0.075 | 31.5 | 31 |
| 26 | 2.348 | 0.075 | 31.5 | 2, |
| 27 | 3.724 | 1.747 | 31 | 1, |
| 28 | 4.493 | 0.975 | 31 |  |
| 29 | -0.461 | -6.286 | 31 |  |
| 30 | -0.794 | -0.423 | 31 |  |
|  | -4.173643 | 0.8659133 | 33.416667 | 1635.5 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 |  |  |  |  |

## Table 16

UNGA LTD ANALYSIS
SUMMARY OF ABNORMAL RETURNS AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PAN AFRICA INSURANCE FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFOR AND AFTER THE RIGHTS ANNOUNCEMENT.

| Tride <br> Dry | CAR | Residual | MPS | No of <br> shares |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| -30 | -0.078 | -0.777 | 49 | 0 |
| -29 | 0.100 | 0.178 | 49 | 0 |
| -28 | -0.328 | -0.428 | 49 | 0 |
| -27 | -0.132 | 0.196 | 49 | 0 |
| -26 | 0.574 | 0.707 | 49 | 825 |
| -25 | -0.205 | -0.779 | 49 | 0 |
| -24 | 0.386 | 0.592 | 49 | 0 |
| -23 | 0.331 | -0.055 | 49 | 0 |
| -22 | 0.840 | 0.509 | 49 | 2450 |
| -21 | -9.087 | -9.927 | 49 | 0 |
| -20 | -7.203 | 1.884 | 44.01 | 3210 |
| -19 | -7.728 | -0.525 | 45.25 | 2560 |
| -18 | -9.598 | -1.870 | 45.25 | 0 |
| -17 | -10.726 | -1.128 | 44.31 | 2350 |
| -16 | -10.732 | -0.007 | 44 | 4250 |
| -15 | -10.648 | 0.084 | 44 | 0 |
| -14 | -10.317 | 0.331 | 44 | 1650 |
| -13 | -9.980 | 0.338 | 44 | 0 |
| -12 | -9.589 | 0.391 | 44 | 0 |
| -11 | -9.781 | -0.192 | 44 | 0 |
| -10 | -10.114 | -0.332 | 44 | 0 |
| -9 | -19.436 | -9.322 | 44 | 0 |
| -8 | -22.043 | -2.607 | 40.12 | 2350 |
| -7 | -19.823 | 2.219 | 39 | 2100 |
| -6 | -21.654 | -1.831 | 39.93 | 4265 |
| -5 | -21.791 | -0.137 | 39.27 | 23450 |
| -4 | -21.643 | 0.148 | 39.07 | 2345 |
| -3 | -21.301 | 0.342 | 39.07 | 0 |
| -2 | -20.835 | 0.466 | 39 | 2500 |
| -1 | -23.045 | -2.210 | 39 | 0 |
| AV | -10.186 | -0.7914 | 44.50933 | 1810.167 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| -10 |  |  |  |  |


| 0 | -24.277 | -1.232 | 37.75 | 2350 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | -23.272 | 0.350 | 37.25 | 2400 |
| 2 | -23.360 | 0.567 | 37.25 | 0 |
| 3 | -22.644 | 0.716 | 37.25 | 0 |
| 4 | -13.545 | 9.099 | 37.25 | 0 |
| 5 | -9.538 | 4.007 | 40.62 | 750 |
| 6 | -9.476 | 0.062 | 41.99 | 3650 |
| 7 | -8.836 | 0.639 | 41.93 | 3260 |
| 8 | -8.534 | 0.302 | 41.93 | 1500 |
| 9 | -7.698 | 0.837 | 41.93 | 0 |
| 10 | -4.359 | 3.339 | 41.93 | 0 |
| 11 | -6.707 | -2.379 | 43.25 | 4215 |
| 12 | -5.857 | 0.851 | 42.14 | 3260 |
| 13 | -4.021 | 1.835 | 42.59 | 4231 |
| 14 | -2.142 | 1.880 | 43.25 | 2300 |
| 15 | -3.651 | -1.509 | 44 | 1200 |
| 16 | -3.257 | 0.394 | 43.25 | 64889 |
| 17 | -2.797 | 0.461 | 43.08 | 1235 |
| 18 | -0.671 | 2.126 | 43.14 | 1000 |
| 19 | -1.070 | -0.399 | 44 | 2500 |
| 20 | -1.031 | 0.039 | 43.77 | 2350 |
| 21 | -0.085 | 0.946 | 43.75 | 4390 |
| 22 | 1.922 | 2.007 | 44.16 | 4250 |
| 23 | 2.086 | 0.164 | 45 | 4047 |
| 24 | 2.543 | 0.458 | 45.01 | 4091 |
| 25 | 2.610 | 0.067 | 45.25 | 2325 |
| 26 | 2.677 | 0.067 | 45.25 | 2500 |
| 27 | 4.247 | 1.569 | 45.25 | 42500 |
| 28 | 5.123 | 0.876 | 45.75 | 2670 |
| 29 | -0.525 | -5.648 | 46 | 4500 |
| 30 | -0.905 | -0.380 | 43.28 | 2540 |
|  | -4.7591 | 0.7781 | 42.68333 | 5751.767 |
|  |  |  |  |  |

Table 17 KCB ANALYSIS
SLMMARY OF ABNORMAL RETLRNS AND CLMLLATIVE ABNORMAL
LETRNS FOR PAN AFRICA INSURANCE FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFOR AND AFTER THE RIGHTS ANNOL'NCEMENT.

| Into Dis | MPS | Residua! | CAR | No of shares |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| .30 | 595 | -0.1166 | -1.1655 | 0 |
|  | 595 |  |  |  |
| . 29 |  | 0.1498 | 0.2664 | 21,302 |
| . 28 | 595 | -0.493 | -0.6425 | 148.647 |
| . 27 | 61 | -0.199 | 0.294 | 14,182 |
| . 26 | 62.5 | 0.861 | 1.05975 | 107,830 |
| . 25 | 62.5 | -0.308 | -1.1691 | 49.571 |
| . 24 | 62.5 | 0.579 | 0.88725 | 0 |
| -23 | 62.5 | 0.496 | -0.083 | 0 |
| . 22 | 62 | 1.26 | 0.76365 | 99,515 |
| -21 | 61.5 | . 13.61 | -14.891 | 108,398 |
| - 20 | 61 | -10.805 | 2.8257 | 26,505 |
| -19 | 60 | -11.592 | -0.7869 | 55,131 |
| -18 | 61 | -14.396 | -2.8044 | 141,727 |
| -17 | 61 | -16.089 | -1.6922 | 0 |
| -16 | 61 | -16.099 | -0.0101 | 0 |
| -15 | 61 | -15.972 | 0.12675 | 63.812 |
| -14 | 59 | -15476 | 04959 | 1,799 |
| -13 | 58.5 | -14.97 | 0.5064 | 4.705 |
| -12 | 57 | -14.383 | 0.5868 | 5,709 |
| -11 | 55 | -14.671 | -02885 | 6,542 |
| -10 | 53 | -15.171 | -0.498 | 7,097 |
| -9 | 53 | -29.154 | -13.983 | 10,667 |
| . 8 | 53 | -33.064 | -39102 | 11.343 |
| . 7 | 54 | -29.735 | 3.32895 | 7,568 |
| 6 | 56 | -32.481 | -2.7465 | 68,472 |
| - 5 | 56 | -32.687 | -0 2052 | 68.472 |
| -4 | 56 | -32.464 | 0.2226 | 0 |
| -3 | 57.5 | -31.951 | 0.51315 | 99.456 |
| -2 | 595 | -31.252 | 0.69885 | 59,551 |
| $\begin{array}{r}-1 \\ \text { AV } \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 5498 58.682667 | -34.567 -15.27866 | $\begin{array}{r} -3.3149 \\ -1.18716 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $39600.033$ |


| 0 | -36.42 | 60 | -1 849 | No of shan |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 0.525 | 56 | -34.908 | 1.20 |
| 2 | 0.851 | 56 | -35.04 | 9,42 |
| 3 | 1.074 | 56 | -33.966 | 37.81 |
| 4 | 13.649 | 56 | -20.317 |  |
| 5 | 6.010 | 57 | -14.307 |  |
| 6 | 0.093 | 56.5 | -14.214 | 6,59 |
| 7 | 0.959 | 57.5 | -13.254 | 14.51 |
| 8 | 0.453 | 58.5 | -12.801 | 23,58 |
| 9 | 1.255 | 59 | -11.546 | 44.28 |
| 10 | 5.008 | 59 | -6.538 | 26.59 |
| 11 | -3.568 | 59 | -10.061 |  |
| 12 | 1.276 | 59.5 | -8.785 |  |
| 13 | 2.7521 | 66 | -6.032 | 22,56 |
| 14 | 2.819 | 67 | -3.213 | 34,62 |
| 15 | -2.263 | 65.5 | -5.477 | 107,06 |
| 16 | 0.591 | 65.5 | -4.886 | 39.28 |
| 17 | 0.691 | 65.5 | -4.195 | 22,42 |
| 18 | 3189 | 65.5 | -1.006 |  |
| 19 | -0.599 | 66 | -1.605 |  |
| 20 | 0.059 | 66 | -1.546 | 17,16 |
| 21 | 1419 | 66.5 | -0.127 | 34.62 |
| 22 | 3.010 | 66 | 2.883 | 51,06 |
| 23 | 0.245 | 66 | 3.129 | 42.46 |
| 24 | 0.6866 | 66 | 3.815 | 30,36 |
| 25 | 0.101 | 66 | 3.916 |  |
| 26 | 0.101 | 65 | 4.016 |  |
| 27 | 2.354 | 66.5 | 6.370 | 12.79 |
| 28 | 1.314 | 66 | 7684 | 112,50 |
| 29 | -8.472 | 66 | -0.788 | 33,39 |
| 30 | $\begin{array}{r} -0.570 \\ 1.16709 \end{array}$ | 66.5 62.583333 | $\begin{array}{r} -1.358 \\ -7.1385667 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 28,43 \\ 25095.26 \end{array}$ |

Table 15
TOTAL (K) LTD ANALYSIS
SUMMARY OF ABNORMAL RETURNS AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL
RETURNS FOR PAN AFRICA INSURANCE FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFOR AND AFTER THE
RIGHTS ANNOUNCEMENT.

| Trade Das. | CAR | Residual | MPS | No of shares |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| -30 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 7.7 | 0 |
| -29 | -0.036 | -0.076 | 7.7 | 0 |
| -28 | -3.819 | -3.783 | 7.7 | 0 |
| -27 | -3.771 | 0.048 | 7.4 | 1100 |
| -26 | -3.619 | 0.152 | 7.4 | 0 |
| -25 | -3.706 | -0.087 | 7.4 | 0 |
| -24 | -3.629 | 0.077 | 7.4 | 0 |
| -23 | -3.561 | 0.068 | 7.4 | 0 |
| -22 | -3.567 | -0.006 | 7.4 | 800 |
| -21 | -13.797 | -10.23 | 7.4 | 0 |
| -20 | -13.578 | 0.219 | 6.65 | 1400 |
| -19 | -13.443 | 0.135 | 6.65 | 0 |
| -18 | -13.329 | 0.114 | 6.65 | 0 |
| -17 | -13.415 | -0.086 | 6.65 | 0 |
| -16 | -13.481 | -0.066 | 6.65 | 0 |
| -15 | -13.417 | 0.064 | 6.65 | 0 |
| -14 | -23467 | -10.05 | 6.65 | 0 |
| . 13 | -33.435 | -9.68 | 6 | 0 |
| -12 | -31.524 | 1.911 | 5.4 | 2450 |
| -11 | -31.6 | -0.076 | 5.5 | 0 |
| . 10 | -31.781 | -0.181 | 5.5 | 2600 |
| -9 | -31.686 | 0.095 | 5.5 | 0 |
| -8 | -31.628 | 0.058 | 5.5 | 0 |
| -7 | -31.893 | -0.265 | 5.5 | 0 |
| -6 | -31.903 | -0.01 | 5.5 | 0 |
| -5 | -32.087 | -0.184 | 5.5 | 0 |
| -4 | -32.838 | -0.751 | 5.5 | 2000 |
| -3 | -33.122 | -0.284 | 5.5 | 0 |
| -2 | -33.384 | -0.262 | 5.5 | 0 |
| -1 | -33.416 | -0.032 | 5.5 | 0 |
| AV | -80024 | -1.1042 | 6.445 | 345 |


| 0 | -33.638 | -0.222 | 5.5 | 0 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | -33.611 | 0.027 | 5.5 | 0 |
| 2 | -33.731 | -0.12 | 5.51 | 1000 |
| 3 | -26.432 | 7.299 | 5.51 | 0 |
| 4 | -15.316 | 11.116 | 5.93 | 2350 |
| 5 | -15.911 | -0.595 | 6.6 | 4521 |
| 6 | -10.031 | 5.88 | 6.6 | 0 |
| 7 | -10.388 | -0.357 | 7 | 2000 |
| 8 | -6.474 | 3.914 | 7 | 0 |
| 9 | -6.34 | 0.134 | 7.29 | 2350 |
| 10 | -5.763 | 0.57 | 7.29 | 0 |
| 11 | -5.781 | -0.018 | 7.29 | 0 |
| 12 | -6.013 | -0.232 | 7.3 | 4250 |
| 13 | -6.065 | -0.52 | 7.3 | 0 |
| 14 | -10.201 | -4.136 | 7.3 | 0 |
| 15 | -9.919 | 0.282 | 7 | 86518 |
| 16 | -10.22 | -0.301 | 7 | 0 |
| 17 | -10.213 | 0.007 | 7 | 0 |
| 18 | -5.199 | 5.014 | 7 | 0 |
| 19 | -1.992 | 3.207 | 7.35 | 2356 |
| 20 | -1.419 | 0.573 | 7.6 | 2952 |
| 21 | -1.392 | 0.027 | 7.65 | 3210 |
| 22 | -2.829 | -1.437 | 7.65 | 0 |
| 23 | -2.758 | 0.071 | 7.55 | 5454 |
| 24 | -1.004 | 1.754 | 7.55 | 0 |
| 25 | -1.066 | -0.062 | 7.7 | 3100 |
| 26 | -5.715 | -4.649 | 7.7 | 0 |
| 27 | -5.827 | -0.112 | 7.32 | 3560 |
| 28 | -5.941 | -0.114 | 7.32 | 0 |
| 29 | -6.443 | -0.502 | 7.32 | 0 |
| 30 | -10.275 | -3.832 | 7.32 | 0 |
|  | -9.1423 | 0.762933 | 7.048333 | 4120.7 |

Table 18
EAST AFRICAN BREWERIES LTD ANALYSIS
SUMMARY OF ABNORMAL RETURNS AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RITURNS FOR PAN AFRICA INSURANCE FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFOR AND AFTER THE RIGHTS ANNOUNCEMENT.

| Trade day | CAR | Residual | MPS | No of shares | Trade day | CAR | Residual | MPS | No of shares |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| -30 | 1.185 | 1.184 | 57.04 | 25600 | 1 | -5.255 | 9.129 | 51.00 | 28928 |
| -29 | 0.367 | -0.818 | 57.00 | 24500 | 2 | -6.329 | -1.074 | 50.00 | 27685 |
| -28 | -2.358 | -2.723 | 57.99 | 36500 | 3 | -8.421 | -2.092 | 54.99 | 41245 |
| -27 | -0.041 | 2.317 | 57.55 | 12458 | 4 | -9.415 | -0.994 | 54.97 | 14078 |
| -26 | -3.006 | -2.965 | 56.65 | 10000 | 5 | -12.021 | -2.606 | 54.96 | 11300 |
| -25 | -2.345 | 0.662 | 57.63 | 1250 | 6 | -18.117 | -6.097 | 54.03 | 1413 |
| -24 | -4.090 | -1.746 | 57.00 | 12350 | 7 | -12.628 | 5.490 | 53.31 | 13956 |
| -23 | -2.913 | 1.177 | 57.00 | 0 | 8 | -14.075 | -1.447 | 51.28 | 12500 |
| -22 | -5.771 | -2.857 | 56.53 | 12540 | 9 | -16.565 | -2.490 | 54.45 | 14170 |
| -21 | -0.687 | 5.084 | 56.97 | 6845 | 10 | -14.855 | 1.711 | 54.61 | 7735 |
| -20 | -2.913 | -1.3556 | 55.00 | 1250 | 11 | -15.409 | -0.555 | 53.50 | 1413 |
| -19 | -3.731 | -1.688 | 56.75 | 3658 | 12 | -16.135 | -0.725 | 54.46 | 4134 |
| -18 | -3.515 | 0.215 | 55.58 | 1236 | 13 | -15.990 | 0.145 | 54.26 | 1397 |
| -17 | -6.121 | -2.606 | 54.78 | 4528 | 14 | -19.798 | -3.807 | 53.54 | 5117 |
| -16 | -5.667 | 0.454 | 54.87 | 1369 | 15 | -20.14 | -0.344 | 53.22 | 1547 |
| -15 | -3.653 | 2.014 | 53.65 | 4890 | 16 | -20.791 | -0.650 | 51.95 | 5526 |
| -14 | -4.523 | -0.871 | 53.89 | 36250 | 17 | -24.692 | -3.901 | 51.15 | 40963 |
| -13 | -4.818 | -0.295 | 54.94 | 12500 | 18 | -23.311 | 1.381 | 51.00 | 14125 |
| -12 | -5.422 | -0.604 | 55.00 | 123650 | 19 | -24.826 | -1.515 | 46.70 | 139725 |
| -11 | -4.996 | 0.427 | 55.11 | 12580 | 20 | -27.77 | -2.946 | 50.00 | 14215 |
| -10 | -3.347 | 1.649 | 55.17 | 36800 | 21 | -28.77 | -0.998 | 47.62 | 41584 |
| -9 | -4.958 | -1.611 | 55.17 | 125800 | 22 | -31.134 | -2.364 | 47.24 | 142154 |
| -8 | -6.175 | -1.217 | 55.90 | 13500 | 23 | -25.89 | 5.239 | 46.40 | 15255 |
| -7 | -10.053 | -3.878 | 55.37 | 13650 | 24 | -26.823 | -0.797 | 45.00 | 15425 |
| -6 | -7.708 | 2.345 | 55.00 | 12500 | 25 | -24.800 | 1.295 | 47.03 | 14125 |
| -5 | -8.797 | -0.789 | 52.91 | 36500 | 26 | -26.8232 | -1.427 | 47.75 | 41245 |
| -4 | -10.478 | -1.981 | 54.03 | 1500 | 27 | -27.9394 | -1.116 | 47.40 | 1695 |
| -3 | -13.202 | -2.724 | 54.4 | 18000 | 28 | -24.9579 | 2.982 | 46.80 | 20340 |
| -2 | -14.872 | -1.670 | 52.37 | 36800 | 29 | -25.197 | -0.239 | 46.70 | 41584 |
| -1 | -15.012 | -0.14 | 51.00 | 15800 | 30 | -24.7997 | 0.397 | 48.00 | 17854 |
| 0 | -14.384 | 0.628 | 50.90 | 15800 |  |  |  |  |  |
| AV | -5.32066 | -0.50035 | 55.4083 | 21826.8 |  | -19.7892 | -0.34716 | 50.77733 | 25081.1 |

Table 19
UCHUMI SUPERMARKET ANALYSIS
SUMMARY OF ABNORMAL RETURNS AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PAN AFRICA INSLRANCE FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFOR AND AFTER THE RIGHTS ANNOUNCEMENT.

| $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Trade } \\ & \text { Day } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | CAR | Residual | MPS | No of shares |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| -30 | 0.746 | 0.723 | 16.500 | 164,780 |
| -29 | 0.231 | -0.499 | 16.150 | 133,114 |
| -28 | -1.486 | -1.662 | 16.150 | 0 |
| -27 | -0.026 | 1.413 | 16.150 | 0 |
| -26 | -1.894 | -1.809 | 16.150 | 174,190 |
| -25 | -1.477 | 0.404 | 16.000 | 35,680 |
| -24 | -2.577 | -1.065 | 16.050 | 44,413 |
| -23 | -1.835 | 0.718 | 16.000 | 52,252 |
| -22 | -3.635 | -1.743 | 15.850 | 37,775 |
| -21 | -0.433 | 3.101 | 15.850 | 0 |
| -20 | -1.835 | -0.827 | 15.850 | 0 |
| -19 | -2.350 | -1.030 | 15.900 | 56,703 |
| -18 | -2.215 | 0.131 | 15.950 | 15,553 |
| -17 | -3.856 | -1.589 | 16.000 | 553,435 |
| -16 | -3.570 | 0.277 | 16.000 | 146,474 |
| -15 | -2.301 | 1.229 | 16.000 | 9,000 |
| -14 | -2.850 | -0.531 | 16.000 | 0 |
| . 13 | -3.036 | -0.180 | 16.000 | 0 |
| -12 | -3.416 | -0.368 | 16.000 | 3,200 |
| .11 | -3.147 | 0.260 | 16.000 | 103,117 |
| -10 | -2.109 | 1.006 | 16.150 | 160.130 |
| -9 | -3.123 | -0.982 | 16.500 | 34.500 |
| -8 | -3.890 | -0.742 | 16.050 | 5.300 |
| -7 | -6.333 | -2.366 | 16.050 | 0 |
| -6 | -4.856 | 1.430 | 16.050 | 0 |
| -5 | -5.542 | -0.481 | 17.650 | 12,850 |
| -4 | -6.601 | -1.208 | 19.400 | 19,725 |
| -3 | -8.317 | -1.662 | 21.000 | 368,094 |
| -2 | -9.369 | -1.019 | 22.000 | 292,556 |
| -1 | -9.457 | -0.085 | 21.750 | 426,895 |
| Av | -3.3519 | -0.3052 | 16.771667 | 94991.2 |


| 0 | 0 | -36.416 | 22.00 | 165.81 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | -2.417 | 0.525 | 19.95 | 21,46 |
| 2 | -2.911 | 0.851 | 19.75 | 27,44 |
| 3 | -3.874 | 1.074 | 17.95 | 3,00 |
| 4 | -4.331 | 13.649 | 17.95 |  |
| 5 | -5.530 | 6.010 | 17.95 |  |
| 6 | -8.334 | 0.093 | 17.95 |  |
| 7 | -5.809 | 0.959 | 16.30 | 3,10 |
| 8 | -6.474 | 0.453 | 15.20 | 16,55 |
| 9 | -7.620 | 1.255 | 15.50 | 2,50 |
| 10 | -6.833 | 5.008 | 15.05 | 7,23 |
| 11 | -7.088 | -3.568 | 14.90 | 7.88 |
| 12 | -7.422 | 1.276 | 14.90 |  |
| 13 | -7.355 | 2.752 | 14.90 |  |
| 14 | -9.107 | 2.819 | 14.90 |  |
| 15 | -9.265 | -2.263 | 14.90 | 56,77 |
| 16 | -9.564 | 0.591 | 14.50 | 8,70 |
| 17 | -11.358 | 0.691 | 14.50 |  |
| 18 | -10.723 | 3.189 | 13.10 | 18,72 |
| 19 | -11.420 | -0.599 | 13.10 |  |
| 20 | -12.775 | 0.059 | 13.10 |  |
| 21 | -13.234 | 1.419 | 12.50 | 1,65 |
| 22 | -14.322 | 3.010 | 12.50 |  |
| 23 | -11.911 | 0.245 | 12.25 | 1,11 |
| 24 | -12.339 | 0.687 | 12.20 | 55 |
| 25 | -11.408 | 0.101 | 11.45 | 15,62 |
| 26 | -12.339 | 0.101 | 11.45 |  |
| 27 | -12.852 | 2.354 | 11.45 |  |
| 28 | -11.481 | 1.314 | 11.10 | 39,54 |
| 29 | -11.591 | -8.472 | 11.00 | 1,78 |
| 30 | $\begin{array}{r} -11.408 \\ -9.10317 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.570 \\ & 1.1671 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 11.00 \\ 14.441667 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 3,00 \\ 7888.333 \end{array}$ |

## Table 20

AFRICAN LAKES
SUMMARY OF ABNORMAL RETURNS AND CUMLLATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PAN AFRICA INSURANCE FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFOR AND AFTER THE RIGHTS ANNOUNCEMENT.

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Tade } \\ & \text { D3: } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | CAR | Residual | MPS | No of shares |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| -30 | -0.086 | -0.772 | 34.5 | 0 |
| -29 | 0.111 | 0.176 | 34.5 | 0 |
| -28 | -0.366 | -0.425 | 34.5 | 0 |
| -27 | -0.147 | 0.195 | 34.5 | 0 |
| -26 | 0.639 | 0.702 | 35 | 550 |
| -25 | -0.229 | -0.774 | 35 | 0 |
| -24 | 0.430 | 0.587 | 35 | 0 |
| -23 | 0.368 | -0.055 | 35 | 0 |
| -22 | 0.935 | 0.506 | 35 | 0 |
| -21 | -10.114 | -9.858 | 35 | 0 |
| -20 | -8.017 | 1.871 | 35 | 0 |
| -19 | -8.601 | -0.521 | 35 | 0 |
| -18 | -10.682 | -1.857 | 35 | 0 |
| -17 | -11.938 | -1.120 | 35 | 0 |
| -16 | -11.945 | -0.007 | 35 | 0 |
| -15 | -11.851 | 0.084 | 35 | 0 |
| -14 | -11.483 | 0.328 | 35 | 0 |
| -13 | -11.107 | 0.335 | 35 | 0 |
| -12 | -10.672 | 0.388 | 35 | 0 |
| -11 | -10.886 | -0.191 | 35 | 0 |
| -10 | -11.257 | -0.330 | 35 | 0 |
| -9 | -21.632 | -9.257 | 35 | 0 |
| -8 | -24.533 | -2.589 | 35 | 0 |
| -7 | -22.063 | 2.204 | 35 | 0 |
| -6 | -24.101 | -1.818 | 35 | 0 |
| -5 | -24.254 | -0.136 | 35 | 0 |
| -4 | -24.088 | 0.147 | 35 | 0 |
| -3 | -23.708 | 0.340 | 35 | 0 |
| -2 | -23.189 | 0.462 | 35 | 0 |
| -1 | -25.649 | -2.194 | 35 | 0 |
| AV | -11.33717 | -0.78597 | 34.933 | 18.333333 |


| 0 | -21.291 | -1.372 | 35 |  |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | -20.409 | 0.389 | 35 |  |
| 2 | -20.487 | 0.631 | 35 |  |
| 3 | -19.859 | 0.797 | 35 |  |
| 4 | -11.879 | 10.127 | 35 |  |
| 5 | -8.3647 | 4.460 | 35 |  |
| 6 | -8.310 | 0.069 | 35 |  |
| 7 | -7.749 | 0.711 | 35 |  |
| 8 | -7.485 | 0.336 | 35 |  |
| 9 | -6.751 | 0.931 | 35 |  |
| 10 | -3.822 | 3.716 | 35 | 1 |
| 11 | -5.882 | -2.648 | 35 |  |
| 12 | -5.136 | 0.947 | 35 |  |
| 13 | -3.526 | 2.042 | 35 |  |
| 14 | -1.879 | 2.092 | 35 |  |
| 15 | -3.202 | -1.679 | 35 |  |
| 16 | -2.8566 | 0.438 | 35 |  |
| 17 | -2.453 | 0.513 | 35 |  |
| 18 | -0.588 | 2.366 | 31.5 | 43, |
| 19 | -0.938 | -0.444 | 31.5 |  |
| 20 | -0.904 | 0.0434 | 31.5 |  |
| 21 | -0.074 | 1.053 | 31.5 |  |
| 22 | 1.686 | 2.233 | 31.5 |  |
| 23 | 1.829 | 0.182 | 31.5 |  |
| 24 | 2.231 | 0.509 | 31.5 |  |
| 25 | 2.289 | 0.075 | 31.5 | 3 |
| 26 | 2.348 | 0.075 | 31.5 | 2, |
| 27 | 3.724 | 1.747 | 31 | 1, |
| 28 | 4.493 | 0.975 | 31 |  |
| 29 | -0.461 | -6.286 | 31 |  |
| 30 | -0.794 | -0.423 | 31 |  |
|  | -4.173643 | 0.8659133 | 33.416667 | 1635.5 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 |  |  |  |  |

Table 21
CFC LTD ANALYSIS
SUMMARY OF ABNORMAL RETURNS AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR PAN AFRICA INSURANCE FOR THE PERIOD 30 DAYS BEFORE AND AFTER THE

RIGHTS ANNOUNCEMENT

| Trade Day | CAR | Residual | MPS | No of shares | 0 | -21.291 | -2.604 | 78 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| -30 | -2.399 | $\cdot 1.801$ | 73.5 | 0 | 1 | . 20.410 | 0.739 | 78 |  |
| -29 | 0.417 | 2.113 | 74.5 | 748 | 2 | -20.487 | 1.198 | 78 |  |
| . 28 | -0.666 | -0.813 | 72.5 | 20,170 | 3 | -19.859 | 1.513 | 78 | 3,31 |
| -27 | -2 489 | -1.368 |  |  | 4 | -11.879 | 19.227 | 78 | 1,80 |
| -26 | -1.501 | 0.742 | 72.5 | 0 | 5 | -8.365 | 8.467 | 76 | 20,30 |
| -25 | -2.655 | -0.870 |  |  | 6 | -8.310 | 0.131 | 76.5 | 35 |
| -24 | 0.632 | 2.467 | 74.5 | 6,500 | 7 | -7.749 | 1.350 | 75 |  |
| -23 | -2.361 | -2.247 | 74.5 | 0 | 8 | -7.485 | 0.638 | 75 |  |
| -22 | -2.870 | -0.382 | 75 | 500 | 9 | -6.751 | 1.768 | 75 |  |
| -21 | -2.832 | 0.028 | 75 | 0 | 10 | -3.822 | 7.055 | 75 | 2.482 |
| -20 | -2.688 | 0.109 | 75 | 600 | 11 | -5.882 | -5.026 | 74 | 1.890 |
| -19 | -2.373 | 0.236 | 75 | 0 | 12 | -5.136 | 1.798 | 76.5 | 1,20 |
| -18 | -3.436 | -0.797 | 75 | 0 | 13 | -3.526 | 3.877 | 79 | 1.00 |
| -17 | -0.525 | 2.185 | 75 | 0 | 14 | -1.878 | 3.971 | 79 |  |
| -16 | -4.692 | -3.127 | 74.5 | 106.505 | 15 | -3.202 | -3.188 | 79 |  |
| -15 | -2.601 | 1.570 | 76 | 375,882 | 16 | -2.857 | 0.832 | 79 | 1.600 |
| -14 | -4.640 | -1.530 | 75 | 73,200 | 17 | -2.452 | 0.973 | 79 | 1.76 |
| -13 | -3.456 | 0.889 | 75 | 26.800 | 18 | -0.588 | 4.492 | 77.5 | 5,62 |
| -12 | -3.559 | -0.077 | 75 | 0 | 19 | -0.938 | -0.843 | 75 | 3,00 |
| -11 | -3.749 | -0142 | 75 | 0 | 20 | -0.904 | 0.083 | 75 | 22,71 |
| -10 | -3.698 | 0.039 | 75 | 0 | 21 | -0.074 | 1.999 | 75 |  |
| -9 | -3.912 | -0161 | 75 | 0 | 22 | 1.686 | 4.240 | 75 |  |
| -8 | -4.657 | $-0.560$ | 75 | 0 | 23 | 1.829 | 0.346 | 75 | 22.71 |
| -7 | -4.892 | -0.177 | 76 | 7.700 | 24 | 2.231 | 0.967 | 75 | 2.59 |
| -6 | -5.887 | -0.746 | 78 | 100 | 25 | 2.290 | 0.142 | 73 | 8.17 |
| - 5 | -4.867 | 0.770 | 78 | 0 | 26 | 2.348 | 0.142 | 75 | 5.70 |
| 4 | -4.718 | 0.107 | 78 | 0 | 27 | 3.724 | 3.316 | 75 | 12.31 |
| -3 | -1.431 | 2.467 | 79 | 7.400 | 28 | 4.493 | 1.851 | 74.5 |  |
| -2 | -3.673 | -1.682 | 78 | 4.469 | 29 | -0.461 | -11.934 | 74.5 |  |
| -1 | 1.836 | 4.135 | 77.5 |  | 30 | -0.794 | -0.803 | 74.5 |  |

## Appendix III: Regression Analysis

1. Regression Analysis for: Total Returns $=-0.0670+0.96 \mathrm{Mkt}$

| Predictor | Coef | SE Coef | T | P |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Constant | -0.067 | 0.0567 | -1.18 | 0.237 |
| Mkt | 0.9615 | 0.0783 | 12.28 | 0.00 |

$\mathrm{S}=2.34 \quad \mathrm{r}^{2}=0.081$
2. Regression Analysis for: Unga

Returns $=0.063+0.302 \mathrm{Mkt}$

| Predictor | Coef | SE Coef | T | P |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Constant | 0.063 | 0.1447 | 0.43 | 0.664 |
| Mkt | 0.3025 | 0.1999 | 1.51 | 0.13 |

$S=5.97 \quad r^{2}=0.001$
3. Regression Analysis for: EABL

Returns $=0.100+1.40 \mathrm{Mkt}$

| Predictor | Coef | SE Coef | T | P |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Constant | 0.100 | 0.084 | 1.19 | 0.235 |
| Mkt | 1.399 | 0.1161 | 12.05 | 0.00 |

$\mathrm{S}=3.46 \quad \mathrm{r}^{2}=0.078$
4. Regression Analysis for: Standard Media

Returns $=0.097+0.26 \mathrm{Mkt}$

| Predictor | Coef | SE Coef | T | P |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Constant | 0.097 | 0.1089 | 0.89 | 0375 |
| Mkt | 0.2586 | 0.1504 | 1.72 | 0.086 |

$S=4.492$
$r^{2}=0.002$
5. Regression Analysis for: Pan African Insurance

Returns $=-0.057+0.149 \mathrm{Mkt}$

| Predictor | Coef | SE Coef | T | P |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Constant | -0.057 | 0.067 | -0.84 | 0.401 |
| Mkt | 0.1489 | 0.093 | 1.60 | 0.109 |
| $\mathrm{~S}=2.78$ | $\mathrm{r}^{2}=0.002$ |  |  |  |

6. Regression Analysis for: ICDC

Returns $=-0.055+0.456 \mathrm{Mkt}$

| Predictor | Coef | SE Coef | T | P |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Constant | -0.055 | 0.0702 | -0.78 | 0.436 |
| Mkt | 0.456 | 0.0969 | 4.70 | 0.00 |
|  |  |  |  |  |

7. Regression Analysis for: Uchumi Ltd

Returns $=-0.065+0.364 \mathrm{Mkt}$

| Predictor | Coef | SE Coef | T | P |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Constant | -0.065 | 0.0802 | -0.64 | 0.336 |
| Mkt | 0.364 | 0.0973 | 3.70 | 0.00 |

$S=4.90 \quad r^{2}=0.02$
8. Regression Analysis for: African Lakes

Returns $=0.0563+0.402 \mathrm{Mkt}$

| Predictor | Coef | SE Coef | T | P |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Constant | 0.0563 | 0.245 | 1.42 | 0.764 |
| Mkt | 0.402 | 0.268 | 0.53 | 0.23 |

$\mathrm{S}=2.97 \quad \mathrm{r}^{2}=0.0015$
9. Regression Analysis for: KCB

Returns $=0.202+0.40 \mathrm{Mkt}$

| Predictor | Coef | SE Coef | T | P |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Constant | 0.202 | 0.084 | 2.23 | 0.245 |
| Mkt | 0.353 | 0.2361 | 1.06 | 0.00 |

$S=2.46$
$r^{2}=0.028$
10. Regression Analysis for: CFC

Returns $=0.023+0.802 \mathrm{Mkt}$

| Predictor | Coef | SE Coef | T | P |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Constant | 0.023 | 0.245 | 2.43 | 0.684 |
| $M \mathrm{kt}$ | 0.8025 | 0.1999 | 4.51 | 0.126 |
| $S=4.02$ | $\mathrm{r}^{2}=0.021$ |  |  |  |

