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“DUAL APPROACHES OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF KARAMOJA, UGANDA”

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DECLARATION

Student’s Declaration

I declare that this research thesis proposal is my original work and that it has not been presented in any other university or institution for academic credit.

Laureta Madegwa

Reg. No.: R50/6296/10

Signed: …………………… Date: ………………………

Supervisor’s Declaration

This research thesis proposal is submitted for examination with my approval as university supervisor.

Prof. Maria Nzomo and Dr. Wanjiku Kaniaru

Signed: …………………… Date: ………………………

Signed …………………………… Date: ………………………
Dedication

I celebrate the life of great women in my life. Lucia Litwaji my great grandma you always wanted me to be a successful learned and lady of character. I am still working at it. Grandma Juliana Lumonye and your daughter auntie Claire Khamali for taking care of my early school days. That was a great foundation for this work.
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ABSTRACT

It is fifty years since Uganda as other East African countries are celebrating independence. Independence is a beacon of self-rule and management of internal state affairs. However, this golden jubilee era since independence has led to African states experiencing positive and backtracking steps in ensuring peace and stability. This study aimed to examine the role of track one (state actors) and track two (non-state actors) approaches in management of conflict in East Africa. With Karamaja cluster as the case study. The study makes three key conclusions on current causes, issues and actors in Karamoja conflict provides key understanding of who conflict management actors their approaches both track one and track two actors in management of conflict are involved.

There are a myriad of approaches by both track one and two. Co-operation and condition of track one and two is therefore imperative for conflict management and sustained peace. Co-operation and coordination calls for partnership model in conflict management especially where both track one and track two is involve.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Blind and repressive government policies to particular factions and regions of the society have always been blamed as a major causal factor for internal conflicts in Africa, interminable conflicts either civil strife and ethnic divisions are patterns of conflict in Uganda since independence in 1962 (Easterly, 2001). Central to this criticism is the entry and justification of non-state actors’ management of both intra and inter-state conflicts and thus the development of track two diplomacy of conflict management. The state as a key responsibility holder has the mandate to ensure internal stability and security of its citizens but by and large the presence of non-state actors as third party and or peace support providers has led to a more complex and integrated approach to contemporary conflict management.

According to Butler (2009), the key measurable indicator for a successful conflict management indicator is the provision of public collective security. The author further states that it includes assessing political, economic and social forces driving the conflict. Mbote (2004) explored shaping of security agenda in Africa context by categorizing security into three aspects; issues, institutional framework basis and regional security framework basis. One of the key questions is, are our current intra and inter-state conflict management approaches responding to the needs of the changing environment leading us to examine the modes of conflict management processes and approach effectiveness.

Scholars and practitioners such as Sandole and Merwe H (1993)\(^1\), Burton and Dukes (1990)\(^2\), Butler (2009)\(^3\), Ramsbotham Woodhouse and Miall (2011)\(^5\) provided accounting of

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conflict management approaches, theory, processes and institutions at international level and distinctive approaches from an international perspective. This research is examining transition of track one only to the inclusion of track two diplomacy of conflict management at local, national and regional level within a conflict system. It is important to clarify whether actors in track one and track two collaborate or cooperate, which should be the ideal situation in this case. A collaboration of the two has emerged. It is important to be clear on the role of track two, its limits and develop better mechanisms in which track two and track one operate with greater effectiveness and integrity.

The aim of this study is to examine the role of track one and track two approaches of conflict management in East Africa. This research will enquire whether both track one and track two actors were relevant in the diplomacy of conflict resolution and conflict management in Karamoja Uganda. The study will also contribute to theoretical development and offer an analysis of transition from state centric conflict management to non-state actors’ involvement and engagement in conflict management processes and consequently actors in the management of conflict.

1.2 Statement of Research Problem

Conflict, conflict management and peace building is a key agenda within East Africa scholarly debate. Revolutionary scholars such as Mwagiru (2006) in building on de Reuck’s (Banks, 1984) argument on “the logic of conflict”, have changed the mindsets of practitioners and students in international studies and diplomacy discipline that conflict is not necessarily bad but can serve useful function in changing the society. Mwagiru (2006) underscores the importance of conflict management and states:

In this sense, the challenge that societies and even individuals face is not to eradicate conflict but to manage it properly. The proper management of conflict should remove its negative and dysfunctional effects that are dangerous. These are the things that conflict management should aim at removing.

Current discussions and government priorities have emphasized a bird’s eye view on conflict management as either regional or international peace processes (Haynes, 2008). There is less review of the cooperation between the role of the state and non-state actors in intra-state peace and stability for sustainable regional stability and development leading to international peace (Karns P. M. and Minst A. K, 2010).

Fostering reconciliation and creating peace has not been a successful process for the region. Despite continued reconciliation, relief and development efforts in Karamoja area there is minimal change. Conflict within the region is hampering access to social services and redundant development. The main challenges for the region are to achieve peace and reconciliation, coordination of relief and development activities, coordinated and harmonized approaches by the actors within the region.

This research will examine track one and track two diplomacy of conflict management as a dual approach in contemporary African conflict management with a focus on Karamoja cluster as an intra-state and intra regional conflict. This study will examine roles and cooperation of track one as state centric approach to conflict management processes, and track two as non-state actors approach in managing Karamoja cluster conflict.
1.3 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study are:

(i) To examine approaches and institutions of conflict management processes in East Africa,

(ii) To analyze actors in track one & track two and their capacity to deal with the conflict, and

(iii) To identify the key challenges in strategies adopted in conflict management in Karamoja.

1.4 Literature Review

1.4.1 Literature Review on Conflict

Scholars from different disciplines Coser (1956), Mitchell (1989) have interrogated conflict as a phenomenon. Coser (1956:151) defines conflict as a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources. Some definitions explain conflict as the exhibition of inconsistencies (1989:10). Quincy Wright (2005) further elaborates inconsistencies for social beings as survival for the fittest where he compares social beings to herbivores who strive to dominate.

According to Yambo (2012) psychologists have on the other hand related conflict to competition and sum up competition as a necessary factor for human survival. Competition and cooperation are a necessity for human survival (Deustch, Coleman and Marcus, 2006). Satisfaction of individual and group needs is based on competition, opposition or cooperation functions in a system. The behavior is typical of human race with its institutions from family levels where family duels, inter – clan conflict, to societal levels, strikes between employees and employers and at state level the struggle for power and influence are experienced. The international system is characterized by cooperation and competition
between states and regional blocks for hegemony and control, thus external state affairs have an impact on the internal state policies and directives (Mistchke, 2008). However, same competition is experienced at intra state level; different parts of the state cooperate and compete for control and use of resources and leadership.

Conflicts in Africa, including East Africa emanates at two levels and in different forms; it is either at state (national) or local (ethnic and clan based), resource-based, ethnic or politically instigated conflict types (Eaton, 2008). However illustrates arms circulation, ethnic and resource availability and utilization as factors and regime style rather political processes determining internal state stability and a region (Tukaswiibe 2008).

Gurr’s (1991) complex typology of African conflicts has identified the central issues of conflict as a primary basis of group mobilization, policies and distributional issues, positions and structures of authority and integrity of the state on a continuum. The model counteracts what commentators offered in explanation as communal, class and political interpretations (Gurr, 1991). Across this continuum, communal violence is experienced as ethnic identification persisting to tensions, communal riots and clashes and communal warfare (Kaufman, 2005). This can further lead to irredentist or autonomist rebellions as a cluster of conflict types.

System analysis can be used to elaborate on conflict systems within the East Africa region. The system analysis illustrates the importance of understanding issues and actors within a conflict system for a comprehensive solution and appropriate conflict handling mechanisms. Further, conflict systems illustrate the realities in a conflict context and influences the conflict management approach (Garance, 2002).
Gambari argues socioeconomic, political imbalance and underdevelopment within states are a threat to states domestic stability, social cohesion and economic development at national and regional levels. Gambari and Mwagiru (2004) agree with most international conflict scholars on African security reinvention to match the continued need for survival in international development increasingly harsh international environment.

The relationship of factors of conflict in Karamoja include ethnicity, cultural practices competition for scarce resources and regional needs exceeding state capacity to perpetuate conflict and state legal and policy processes that led to the marginalization of Karamoja cluster (Mkutu, 2008). Conflict in Karamoja has taken different phases with social change. Karamoja cluster conflict is two tier, conflict on ethnic related confrontation rather intergroup conflicts where groups within have historically strived to sub-due and dominate (Wepundi 2011). Perceptions inform groups of their role in societal strata, sub groups perceive themselves as superior within a group. The first tier is conflict at local level. The second is tier is related states system in view of legal and policy processes Wepundi (2011: 31) Here Karamoja cluster community has viewed itself as a marginalized community excluded historically by government policies and actions thus the strive for self rule rather than rule of law prevailed for a long time.

According to Anyang (1991) many African policies have been as a result of either blind or repressive policies to particular factions and regions of the society accompanied at times by political excesses on the part of the government depending on the regime. Ethnic identity and social stratification is associated with regime types and management of internal affairs of a state. Karamoja area of Northern Uganda is a marginalized area stemming from the divide and rule colonial system of rule. International Institute of
Environment Issue paper 137(2005) highlights Karamoja and Karamojong community was emphasized as a “naturally war like” that needs to be tamed (Grahn, 2005). Subsequent Kampala regimes were engrossed in regime ousting and dominance sustaining internal turmoil in Karamoja region.

Traditional way of life has persisted in Karamoja more than other communities within Uganda and the East African region. The world has changed and traditional lives in modernity and formal setting, Karamoja in post independence era, traditional way of life has thrived in comparison to other regions of Uganda (Nannojo, 2005). Post cold war African states have employed various strategies in containing and managing internal conflict through coercion, persuasion, extortion and administrative control (Rothchild, 1997). Central to any of these strategies is the ability of the state and its subject’s to legitimize or mutual acceptance of conflict management processes. Where legitimacy fails, inadequacies or shortfalls are prevalent, non-state actors and intermediaries step in to fill this gap and therefore entry of track two diplomacy of conflict management.

Ayoob (1991:262) in providing a developing world perspective to understanding conflict and conflict management has argued states conflict management should be analysed in three ways legitimacy, integration and policy capacity. Three dimensions of state security “threats”, “security environment” as the hardware and capabilities as the software. Is it relevant for the state and non state actors to have structural and policy incentives to encourage cooperation between different warring groups as well as cooperation between communities and state in Karamoja?
1.4.2 Literature on Conflict Management

Pastoralist inter group conflict is an illustration of self assertiveness based on different identities competition for dominance on ethnic, cultural and community resources utilization. This self assertiveness through hostile competition and violent confrontation distracted the Karamoja community from participating in states central decision making processes and thus overshadowed and or by passed by nation building processes where resources are allocated. In essence legal and policy directions, political and socio-economic factors are central tenets and a cause for internal civil strife and conflicts in Africa. This therefore, calls for a sustainable conflict management approach that both state and non state actors need to consider. Deng and Zartman (1991:321) highlights it as a delicate balance between individualism and social consciousness, communal responsibility self assertiveness with respect for dialogue confrontation with consensus building. Parties in conflict have to also concede in order to resolve conflicts while actors in conflict management have to work against the triggers and mitigating the core causes of conflict.

Contemporary conflict management entails an elaborate interaction of actors on issues, complex linkages in internal conflict contexts and external factors resulting in interaction and interdependence. According to Nye . (2004) there are two dimensions to understanding the causes and effects of conflicts as either internal or external contemporary African conflicts in post independence Africa. Uwazie (2003:78) adds historical factors of colonial regimes on conflict, domestic and regional operational aspects, geographical and cultural setting of conflict context, financial base and arms circulation to fuel and sustain the conflict. Therefore, any conflict management process ought to be informed by concurrent and correlative understanding of internal causes of conflict and external factors for effective
resolution. This understanding will lead to devising effective approaches and strategies by both state and non state actors in a conflict system.

Studies have shown Karamoja cluster conflict causes are on ethnic stratifications and historical marginalization by subsequent regimes in Uganda. Karamoja cluster conflict triangle is intertwined with other conflict systems within Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) regional block. Communities within this cluster originally did not have boundaries prior modern administrative function of demarcating countries. Arms circulation increased with conflicts in Somalia and Sudan. Post cold war of the 1990’s policy formulation and state actions within the region emphasized justification of traditional African values. The policy structures as a result were characteristic of market monopoly due to centralized planning by governments hence failure to consolidate the likes of Karamoja cluster whose cultural values and patterns of behavior were over looked by states central planning Grahn (2005:3).

Dual approach to conflict management should ensure collectiveness of the processes for a sustained resolution. This may mean analyzing structured and institutionalized responses to conflict management, understanding and analyzing decision making units of processes, vesting responsibility to state and actors to ensure internal stability of the state. Centrality of state in conflict management processes is imperative therefore track one diplomacy in conflict management is preliminary. Butler (2009) illustrates by exploring conflict management in relation to sovereignty and use of force recognizes state as key actor proposes track one diplomacy of conflict management.

According to Butler (2009:51) conflict management approaches such as peacekeeping requires maximum use of force. Adjudication and mediation require minimum force but
maximum observation of sovereignty in the processes, here for negotiation parties to conflict seek mutual processes of reaching a consensus and resolution Deng, Sadikiel, Lyons Rothchild and Zartman (1996:222) Peace building and peace education does not require minimum force and sovereignty. They are merely seen as a supportive process to other conflict management processes rather than a conflict management typology.

1.4.3 Track one and Track two diplomacy of Conflict Management

The notion of states as the only actors has been challenged. According to Mwagiru (2006) conflict systems theory illustrates there are different causes of conflict. Contemporary conflict management entails an elaborate interaction of actors on issues, complex linkages in internal conflict contexts and external factors resulting in interaction and interdependence (Chatway 1998). From a realist perspective the world system is centered around states, scholars like Butler (2009) contend sovereignty and power forms operating structures and define structures. This argument augments the role of track 1 diplomacy of conflict management by use of force and coercion to reach a settlement. Unlike track 1 actors in diplomacy of conflict management that is formal and subjective, its anticipation of a zero sum outcome becomes a short term solution to the conflict and not necessarily resolve conflict.

Track two diplomacy is also referred to as interactive conflict resolution (Thiessen 2011). The reasons for conflict are as many as issues concerned and not necessarily settled or resolved by diplomacy of coercion threats including military threats. What is rather necessary is the identification of issues, and at times necessary to fractionate the issues, actors and relationships in the conflict. Analysis of conflict will inform appropriate conflict management approaches and the actors in conflict management Thiessen (2011:20). Examination of other than state actors is necessary within a conflict system. Track two
diplomacy of conflict management power relations are deemed with entry of non-state actors in conflict management processes. A web of transactions is created within this system and parties to conflict are empowered to take responsibility in finding a solution. There is lack of clarity in approaches undertaken by track two and non official diplomacy of conflict management Chataway (2003). There is therefore a need for track two to define its approach to conflict management distinctively from track one approach; secondly formulation of a collaborative and cooperative approach is important as a guide to dual approach within a conflict system Thomas (1992). With lack of clear distinction of track two approaches could there be limits of dual approaches in conflict management within the same conflict system?

Capie (2010) while referring to track two as unofficial diplomacy and unofficial points out that less scholarly debate and evidence has paid insufficient conditions for unofficial diplomacy to affect policy change. The key question here is do domestic and transnational forces shape national interests and actions of government behaviors? To what extend is the states preference open to change by nongovernmental actors? Capie (2010:311) suggests that unofficial diplomacy is waning and becoming less common. Morrison (2006) while referring to Track one as Champions, Track two as validators argues that track two agents in management of conflict provide novel ideas, approaches and institutional memory. Morrison (2006:560) provides an interesting summary of a web relationship:

Track one cooperation simply would never have developed as it did without the ideas and the consensus and support building activities of track two. Track two would have been a sterile exercise but for its impact on Track one. In fact almost by definition Track two cannot exist without track one. However despite symbiosis between tracks one and two, there are often tensions within the relationship while in some ways Track one gives Track two continuing life, in other ways it sucks the resources and attention away leaving little space for truly independent Track two processes. Track
two provides Track one with valuable intellectual resources but it can also crowd Track one, demanding a pace of action that is difficult for track one to deliver and then criticizing the results. Track one also protects its prerogatives as the official relationship among governments

Chataway (1998) notes that collaboration between track one and two as a two way process that needs a) respectful dialogue process, b) Greater effectiveness and integrity through a mechanism in which skills and insights of track two can be fed into track one.

1.5 Theoretical Framework
Conflict research provides a bird’s eye view while proposing for a inclusiveness in conflict management processes with theory of problem solving as an instrument of conflict resolution Easterly (2001: 702). States are not the only actors as conflict arises from environment where non state actors are present. This study relies on theory of problem solving devised by John Burton (1990) and advanced by various scholars, de Reuck, Kelman in Davies and Kaufman (2003). The key principle is transforming conflict into a positive sum and effect change in the conflict system.

Andrews (2013:59) exemplifies the fact that theories have human touch, especially those that are self critical, meaningful and continually relevant to human experiences. Andrews therefore, proposes problem solving suitable for the following three reasons: Problem solving takes the world as it is, it is non-historical or a historical, and with a purpose of simple and direct response particular problems. Duke and Burton (1990) argue that conflict resolution by problem solving takes cognizance of parties’ issues and accommodation. Parties understand themselves, their issues, and work towards reaching by collaboration for a win-win solution.
Rothchild (1997:11) argues that conflict management processes should be based on deep evaluation of sources of conflict and relationships. Rothschild agrees with Burton (1990) with regard to problem solving recognizing human needs as the core issue of reference in understanding a conflict by third parties. Fulfillment of needs necessitates probing on quality of life, resource availability and access and utilization for particular groups. Problem solving informs the role of third parties as aiding decision makers on unfulfilled needs and parties to a conflict on the need for cooperation in meeting these needs (Mwagiru 2006).

Mwagiru elaborates problem solving as the main tool in track two diplomacy of conflict management (Dietrich, Mwagiru and Odera Undated). In track two conflicts are attached to value system and relationships that need to be examined. Butler (2009) discusses conflict management and its various applications; mediation adjudication, peace enforcement and peacekeeping are embedded in international relations theories. These theories provide a realist perspective, counter realist and security debate. A realist perspective is based on traditional theory where states are viewed as the only actors in the international system, relying on extend of using power other than other variables such as motives and information Glaser (2010). Security debate has emerged as a paradigm shift interrogating political, social, economic and cultural factors (Mwagiru et al, 2008) of conflict to be concurrently addressed in conflict management processes. Post cold war era intra-state conflicts were prevalent with a spillover effect in the region than interstate conflicts. In 2001 International Commission Intervention and state sovereignty proposed responsibility to protect principle (Orford, 2011). States, regional bodies, international institutions and civil society have a responsibility to guard citizens against genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. As a norm embedded in international law, responsibility to protect provides a framework in managing conflict through peaceful means such as mediation, early warning and even
sanctions. For African security architecture, this meant commitment to improve capacity in security; governance and resources mitigate humanitarian tragedies

According to Dijkstral, Beersman and Evers (2011:171) problem solving is seen as the most constructive conflict management strategy by juxtaposing two strategies as forcing and problem solving. This provides us with a dual model of conflict management outcome analysis. This dual model illustrates high or low concern for desired outcomes, secondly, high or low concern for other parties’ desired outcomes. Problem solving entails a high concern for outcomes, here information exchange about priorities and preferences in searching for a mutually satisfactory solutions, taking control over conflict situation and respecting social relationships. Forcing entails low concern for others’ outcomes implying lack of consideration of other parties’ interests and desired outcome (Dijkstral, Beersman and Evers 2011: 172).

Use of problem solving theory leads us to ask why and what led to the situation. Core principle of problem solving is analysis of root causes. Problem solving is applicable in management of protracted conflicts both interstate and intra-state conflict management like Africa’s ethnic conflicts to avoid future conflict Rothchild (1997:117). Aggrieved parties tend to solve conflicts rather than settle.

1.6 Justification of the Study

Scholars, state institutions and non state actors have devoted resources to manage and resolve conflicts. State entities have a responsibility to protect where asnon state actors process is less informal without necessarily being underpinned by a framework of engagement in the processes Vayrynen (2001:81). Successful processes and efficient use of resources calls for more than collaboration to cooperation and coordination of conflict management processes within the region. This study seeks to review conflict management
approaches by track I and track II in Karamoja cluster Uganda. While contributing to the existing body of knowledge, it is anticipated that this study will form a basis for recommendations to conflict management practitioners within and without the state system.

1.7 Hypothesis

I. A dual Approach facilitates a conducive environment in resolving a conflict. The conflict in Karamoja has persisted due to lack of commitment by parties to the conflict and an inadequate coordinated management framework.

1.8 Methodology

1.8.1. About Methodology

To analyse track one and track two approaches in the management of conflict within Karamoja, an analysis of actors within this conflict system is necessary. This section highlights techniques and approaches employed in collecting data from the subjects and the procedure for collecting the information in Karamoja. Descriptive research design was used in this study. Descriptive research does not fit neatly into the definition of either quantitative or qualitative research methodologies, but instead it can employ elements of both, often within the same study. The term descriptive research refers to the type of research question, design, and data analysis that will be applied to a given topic (AECT, 2012).

The descriptive research design was used with a questionnaire as the key data collection instrument. The key informant questionnaire was designed to respond to the research questions and was pretested to ensure accuracy and adequacy before being distributed to selected government and non-governmental officers. Further qualitative information was gathered through two focussed group discussions one in northern Karamoja and southern Karamoja. Probability sampling technique was used so that the chance for each case being selected from the population was equal for all cases (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003).
1.8.2 Sampling Procedure and Sample Size

The quality of any research is influenced by the appropriateness of methodology, instrumentation and suitability of the sampling strategy that has been adopted (Manion, 2001). The full set of cases from which a sample is taken is called the population (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2003). Cooper and Schindler (2001) define a population as the total collection of elements about which inferences can be made. The target population of this study was 50 technical staff from government and nongovernmental officers working in Karamoja and on management of Karamoja conflict at local, national and regional levels. The choice of officers was made on the basis that target population of the study, are engaged in management of Karamoja conflict. They formed a homogenous group, a fact that made the study economical for the researcher.

A sampling frame is the list of elements from which the sample is actually drawn (Cooper and Schindler, 2001). Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003) define a sampling frame as a complete list of all the cases in the population from which the sample will be drawn.

In this study, the sampling frame consisted of a list of all employees working in departments or programmes related to management of the programme related to management of conflict. The list of officers was obtained from minutes of stakeholder meetings and key contacts in peace and development sector. The sampling frame include government officers at local, national level and non governmental officers at local, national and regional levels. At community elders, local council members, youth and women.

Probability sampling technique was used in this study. Cooper and Schindler (2001) put forward that probability sampling is based on the concept of random selection. According to
Cooper and Schindler (2001), it as a controlled procedure that assures that each population element is given a known nonzero chance of selection.

Stratified random sampling was used to select the sample size. Cooper and Schindler (2001) noted that most populations can be segregated into several mutually exclusive subpopulations or strata. Stratified random sampling is the process by which the sample is constrained to include elements from each of the strata or subpopulations.

The population of study is categorized into two: community as recipients of conflict managements and central to seeking solution, secondly, actors’ state (government) and non state (nongovernmental). Stratified sampling made it easier to assess whether there is actually a dual (more than one type) approach in management of Karamoja conflict. The principle behind the classification into subpopulations was levels of interventions though intertwined involved local national and regional efforts in management of Karamoja conflict by both state and non state actors. Stratified random sampling guaranteed that each of these subpopulations would be represented in the final sample and that an assortment of opinions would be obtained.

The community will form strata upon which simple random selection of respondents will be done from the zones for two focussed group discussions. One focussed group discussion covering Northern Karamoja in Kotido and a second for southern Karamoja in Moroto. Community members share a common culture as Karamoja people, have a common livelihood opportunity of livestock keeping and communally own land where they graze their livestock and share resources such water, pasture from which conflicts emerge. Social services and processes by government or nongovernmental organizations are also shared by
the communities in a locality. The second stratum was made up of government and non
governmental agencies officers at local, national and regional level.

1.8.3 Data Analysis Methods

Data analysis usually involves reducing accumulated data to manageable size, developing
summaries, looking for patterns, and applying statistical techniques (Cooper and Schindler,
2001). The overall method was descriptive statistics.

For the qualitative data, the information was listed and employed to pencil in conclusions on
the research questions in the study. The information from the questionnaires was tabulated to
compute the frequency distribution of the event under study. Statistical Package for Social
Science (SPSS) was used as a data analysis tool to generate percentages, frequencies and
appropriate tables. The relationships among variables was measured by way of inferential
statistics and presented as correlation. Microsoft Excel was used for data cleaning and
applicable analysis.

Chapter Outline

This study is divided into the following sections

Chapter 1; Introduction to the Study

This chapter entails background to the study, objectives, hypothesis, and literature review and
research methodology. Literature review is derived from both international and local
scholarly view in defining track one and track two conflict management efforts and identifies
a nexus between both tracks by placing it in a problem solving theoretical framework.
Chapter 2; Analysis of Karamoja Conflict

This chapter seeks to understand nature, sources causes and actors in Karamoja conflict. Secondly it identifies and analyses conflict management efforts and conflict management actors.

Chapter 3; Management of Conflict in East Africa Region

This chapter places management of Karamoja conflict within the context of the East African region. Therefore, conflict management approaches and institutions in relation to different types of conflict in East Africa conflict system are examined.

Chapter 4; Critical Analysis of the Dual Approach to Conflict Management

This chapter presents on findings from key informant interviews and focused group discussion on dual approaches of conflict management in Karamoja

Chapter 5; Conclusions and Recommendations

Based on literature review, and findings in chapter 4, this chapter draws conclusions and recommendations. This chapter will seek to propose a suitable model entailing a dual approach to conflict.
CHAPTER TWO: ANALYSIS OF KARAMOJA CONFLICT

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will provide a synopsis of Karamoja conflict by exploring four aspects 1) Geographical and historical phases, 2) Issues and dynamics of Karamoja 3) Some of interventions in management of this conflict 3) Issues and actors within this conflict. Further extrapolate Karamoja conflict as a conflict within East Africa conflict system. Track one refers to conflict management efforts by the (state) government of Uganda. For track two of conflict management refers to (non state actors) nongovernmental organizations interventions.

2.2 Conflict Analysis of Karamoja

A conflict analysis examines context, actors, issues and dynamics. This study adopts Paul Wehr’s five aspects of conflict analysis, conflict context, and history of conflict, conflict parties, issues and dynamics in conflict (Austin 2003).

2.2.1 Geographical Location of Karamoja and Conflict Context

Karamoja is predominantly occupied by Karamojong community in North Eastern Uganda commonly referred to as Karamoja cluster. Karamojong cluster spreads across South Eastern Sudan Nilotic speaking group. Karamojong community lies in Karamoja cluster spread across four countries Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia. Therefore, the Karamojong cluster comprises one of the three conflict triangles within the IGAD\(^6\) region. Within this cluster are seven ethnic groups. Though distinct are culturally and linguistically related Dodoth, Toposa, Nyakwai, Nyangatom, Teso and Karamojong. Although other population is extrapolated from

\(^6\) Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is a regional body within the Horn and Great Lakes region in Africa Member states are Kenya, Uganda Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan as founding members, and South Sudan admitted in 2011. IGAD's headquarters is in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
the 2002 census report Karamoja covers five administrative districts within an area of 27000 sq km.

2.2.2 Nature and History of Karamoja conflict
Karamoja conflict has spanned over a century, it is therefore critical to analyze various phases of conflict the changing time. This study has clustered these phases as pre-colonial era, colonial period and post colonial to present day Karamoja

**Pre-colonial era:** Karamoja community new no boundaries, unrestricted access to land free migration routes, all season’s pasture and water. Before arrival of Europeans culture and modernization raiding was a means to prepare for any environmental uncertainty (Hendrickson 1998) and contest of the mighty among the communities. Cattle raids were to build a reservoir food and bride price. Raiding was a communal preparation for a foreseen drought or marriage ceremonies or entertainment and rites of passage. The levels of violence were synonymous to use of crude weapons and intelligence defined within this traditional setting. Conflict was thus defined by competition between communities to own more rather than to kill more. The loss of property in the form of cattle and sometimes women and children was reiterated by revenge raid missions to regain more cattle, women and children. Raiding and conflict across the seven ethnic groups was managed to avoid devastating effects such minimal loss of life and irreversible hatred. Raiding was a way of life with communal consent blessed by custodians of culture (elders).

**Colonial period (1888-1962)** Just like Kenya’s and Sudan’s Nilotes colonialism settlement disregard pastoralist reinforcing its economic and geographical from the rest of Uganda

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(Gray, 2007). Karamoja and pastoralists community were not prioritized for development leading to its marginalization. By simple observation for any traveler, it is evident the region lags behind in infrastructure development. Simple measures of development such as modern roads, number of schools and hospitals initiated by government and missionary are fewer compared to other regions.

**Post Colonial to present day Karamoja.** Adjustments of system of governance from traditional self rule of kingdoms and chiefdoms brought in changes to allocation of boundaries and natural resources. Freelance access to migration routes and vast land for pasture and water was minimized whereas use of primitive weapons was replaced by introduction of guns. The nature of conflicts in Karamoja indeed did shift from inter clan conflict. African modernization and independence opened up communication and markets. Cattle raids were not just for food reserves and bride price. Increase in availability of arms and commercialization of cattle rustling (Beevan 2008). Rise of middlemen for cattle supply chain to markets outside Karamoja replaced the value of cattle as currency. This has been the state of affairs since modern time.

What makes the difference between pre colonial rather purely traditional Karamoja conflicts different from modern day Karamoja conflict? Tools, rules and behavior definition for the two periods are different. Though unsophisticated but still deadly, bows and arrows even with mass raids catastrophe is outnumbered by introduction of AK47 and other guns. Catastrophe caused by power of gun is incomparable. Fatalities by traditional weapons was far less than the gun and target did not include women and children Stites (2007). Miljkovic (2010) adds that use of arrows and bows was accompanied by rules of combat in the traditional setting but use of guns disregarded traditional leaders and seers defined behaviors and rules.
2.2.3 Issues and Dynamics in Karamoja conflict

The implication of investigating security and conflict in Karamoja is that it presents issues and dynamics that actors have to acknowledge in interventions. Conflict can be addressed by long-term measures by working on root causes whereas short term and medium term measures to counter causes of insecurity. In the long run the implication is call to multiple approaches to conflict management. Whether pre colonial or modern Karamoja, conflict issue has remained livestock. What changes is the nature of actors in the conflict.

There are three types of actors in Karamoja conflict; Karamoja ethnic speaking groups, security agents from Uganda Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF), Kenya Administration Police and Sudan People’s Liberation Army. The ethnic groups include the Toposa of Sudan, Matheniko, Tepeth, Matheniko of Uganda and Pokot from both Uganda and Kenya in addition to Turkana of Kenya. The third category are traders and middlemen dealing with livestock, they also form the elite.

All the above actors have different levels of power depending on their situation. Mburu (2006) suggests the power of the gun introduced a new dynamic to the conflict to power relations among the community and other actors in the conflict in Karamoja. Security agents have the monopoly of use of force “legally” as they “legally” posses’ fire arms. From the role of Turkana as an actor that defines alliance among raiding and counter raiding events, communities with more fire arms predisposes them as more powerful. The community that is able to conquer and subdue the other is seen as more powerful. Traders and middlemen form the elite group and are powerful due to passion of means of exchange for goods and services “money” and are more informed Bevan (2008)

In addition to power within actors, interest of each defines the network and alliances among and within actors. Each of these actors form a network with different interests. For local
Karamojong like other pastoralists community in the context were interested in immersing more livestock. The more livestock you have, the more prestigious and wealthy enough to afford more wives. Ethnic groups would therefore work towards increasing livestock numbers in their Kraals to earn respect and prestige among peers and foes. Traders and middlemen are more interested in cheap and easily available livestock for bigger profit margins. Karamoja community and ensuing conflict would in this case provide a ripe source of business commodity for the Karamoja community. The interest of the regions governments is to ensure territorial protection, law and order. Law and order for these governments is pre requisite to implement development agenda for its citizens. Hagmann and Mulungeta (2008:30). Jabs ( 2003) argues that climatic and environmental factors affected interests of all the above actors. Communities are pre disposed to the need to control scarce and reducing pasture and water. Conflicts present situations where two or more perceive and act on competing interests on one or various issues Azam, (2002). In Karamoja competition over diminishing natural resources has made conflict inevitable. This indeed presents the notion whether conflict should and or can indeed be resolved. Insecurity is a specific manifestation of conflict in Karamoja and therefore a more real and immediate problem in Karamoja.

Divergence of interests within a cluster of actors defined the alliances and relationships created. For example where as Uganda Peoples Defense Forces and Kenya Administration Police were interested in keeping low and order, use of force was applied indiscriminately to all ethnic groups. Sudan People’s Liberation Army on the other hand backed Toposa from Sudan in raiding perceived arch enemies Turkana (Herrera 2013).

Availability of guns in this conflict cannot be under estimated as it defined intensity of violence and played a key role in alliance between actors. Gun defined the kind of alliance
for Turkana as a central and uniting ethnic group in these alliances with Karamojong and Pokot. Before 1979 and Karamojong armed themselves by breaking in an amour in Moroto, Turkana were better armed. They sold arms to Pokot, formed an alliance with Pokot for joint raiding activities. Pokot on the other hand allowed Turkana to stay amidst their territory as they formed a front line for the raids. This rendered Matheniko destitute compared to Pokot. Mathiniko redefined the alliance by enticing Turkana to marry their girls and live amongst the Mathenikos. With availability of fire arms the Turkana living with Matheniko formed an alliance that raided Pokot. What ensued was raids and counter raids Beavan (2008:32).

2.3 Management of Karamoja Conflict

2.3.1 Issues and Actors in Management of Conflict

Actors in conflict management should seek to prevent, resolve, manage conflicts when responding to conflict (Ledarach, 1997). The key question is will track one and track two diplomacy management in Karamoja lead achievement of peace? Ledarach (1997: 23), observes Track two as critical in resolving and transforming conflict lying outside competency of track one whose, orientation is to a ‘Carrot and Stick’ policy therefore unsuitable for long term resolution of conflict. It lacks key ingredients of managing conflict that are core in examining root causes of conflict. In Karamoja key concern is to take into consideration nature and history of conflict: both Track one and Track two have in various forms within Karamoja context attempted to resolve conflict in search to bring it to an end or manage conflict. The government and its agencies for example ministry to Karamoja ministry of development, security agencies both at local and national are forms of track one. Track two actors include international, national and local organizations. Catholic Church structure and Church of Uganda, secular nongovernmental organizations, community based organizations, community, elders are examples of track two actors in conflict management.
This presents us with a plethora of actors with an array of interests, diversity thus different understanding and approaches in conflict management (Garam, 2005).

Although track two diplomacy of conflict management is not a substitute for track one, Montville (1990) notes that track one nature of interventions as defined as a source of power. Interventions are designed to meet security and uncompromising on its power position within a conflict context (Montville, 1990). Thus in Karamoja, key to policy issues formulations include formulation of a disarmament program.

Key objective of actor intervention in public is to seek peace. But there are factions of interveners whose purpose is well served by conflict and insecurity in the region. Any initiative for conflict management and peace building in Karamojong has the interests of actors and therefore in favor of or in opposition of the peace process. Karamojong community is clan based characterized by sectional loyalties (Otim, 2006). This presents a clear picture of victims of conflict and groups that benefit from the conflict, victims and beneficiaries of conflict. Karamojong conflict presents various interrelated dimensions, local Karamoja dimension, national and regional dimension as a local issue of cattle raiding whether traditional or commercial Bevan (2008). These raids lead to death casualties and decline of face to face inter-clan meetings and cooperation. Subsequently outcome of raids led to internal displacement of people, loss of community wealth (livestock), food insecurity, and collapse of social services, orphaned children and rape of women, local context characterized by mistrust, tension fear and despair (Jabs, 2007).

Uganda government as actor in the management of Uganda conflict views key in conflict as youth, elders and arms merchandisers and political merchants Eaton (1998). Conflict
management efforts have therefore focused on interventions reaching this category of conflict actors. As a national security issue Karamojong compared to other sectors of Uganda has minimal Government presence and abject poverty, infrastructure and services including schools and health facilities are scarce (Fleisher, 1998).

Karamojong intricate clan and sectional loyalties present a threat to management of conflict whereas solution to the problem at all levels of continuum is necessary. Consensus of actors on how to build lasting peace is a measure of long lasting impact of intervention. Different actors present different interests and approach to management of conflict (Cohen, 2008). Net effect is opposition and even. Just like the conflict long intricate clan system alliance, interventions have curved themselves on alliances long level of intervention continuum (Mkutu, 2008). Although there is widespread agreement to resolve conflict in Karamoja, there is disharmony among actors on causes of insecurity and conflict. What it leads to is competing actors initiatives.

The nature of conflict in Karamoja has periodically been changing. The Karamojong did not always fight among themselves, lineage along clan alliances shifted. Intra clan alliances of Karamojong and Tepeth against Pokot of Uganda (Upe) shifted to the Tepeth being allied to Pokot. Formerly perceived enemies became friends whereas friends became enemies (Michad, 2003). In the same way perceptions is a key function in understanding cause and effect on nature of conflict so is on conflict management interventions. Actors have an agreement on a number of factors emphasis is different. Local interventions led by Karamojong are influenced by the perception that an enemy (the enemy) is an outsider. Mistrust of outsiders affect how conflict management initiative is embraced. Karamojong blame the government for the situation and underdevelopment. Actually the government is
seen as an oppressor especially with disarmament process Ng’orok, (1990) Similar to other pastoralists way of life, the Karamojong culture pause a difficult scenario to both government actors in conflict management. Raiding is a way of life for Karamojong. Cows are the main source of livelihood and wealth. With precision it was a symbol of life for the Karamojong community, synonymous to life and Karamojong identity. Livestock especially cattle is the basis of social life. Respect for clans was carved depending on number of cattle offered as bride price and bravery of clan warriors on wealth earned from raids.

2.4 Karamoja Cluster Within East Africa Conflict System

There are three distinct factors that define historical aspects of Karamojong conflict. First, are the socio-cultural practices of Karamojong community and it’s neighbors. Second is economic and political agenda of Uganda, Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia. Third is Geographical placement of Karamoja in a conflict system within Horn and East African countries as observed by Gray, Sundal Wiebusch Little, Leslie and Pike (2003). As a political and traditional community livestock was the economic and social factor for existence of this community.

Karamojong culture brings us to the interplay conflict systems. Karamojong culture has been in contact with other pastoral communities across South Sudan and East Africa. However the persistence and severity of Karamojong conflict in mainstream political social and economic front is from colonial to post independence Uganda is a cause for concern (Twaddle, 1996) Uganda is part of East Africa conflict system with spill over effects. Insecurity in the region takes many forms: There is a pervasive climate of lawlessness as evidenced by increasing levels of piracy off the Somali coast, cross border smuggling between Kenya and Sudan, and between Kenya and Somalia. There is a general increase in violent crimes in all the cities: burglary, hijacking, poaching in the game parks, banditry/robbery and cattle rustling in the
rural areas; Ethnic tensions which are inter ethnic violence; Porous and insecure borders all around especially along Kenya – Somali and Kenya –Ethiopia serve as fertile ground for organized crime. Entry and exit points amongst the countries occur through the two main ways; Refugees are a mobile community that creates community and regional threats. The region has about four million Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and over 600 000 refugees. Child soldiers; lack of access to clean water; abuse of the rule of law. Issues of injustice are intractable mainly because people are unwilling to compromise on what justice means for them (Alusala, 2007)

2.5 Conclusion

Karamoja conflict manifests itself in the form of raids that was a traditional way of life. Time factor has determined nature and intensity of raids and violence over a continuum. For example availability of guns and modern cattle market increases raiding incidences and affected community relationships. As time evolves, so does the nature of conflict for Karamoja conflict. Evolving nature of conflict is a key dynamic for actors in management of conflict to consider.

There is a relationship between issues and actors in the management of Karamoja conflict and East Africa conflict system. Communities have been affected by long-term marginalization and small arms circulation. All countries had effect of colonialism affecting population. For example borders between the countries meant borders among ethnic communities. Three types of actors can be identified in Karamoja conflict; 1) Actors affected by conflict, 2) Actors who benefit from the conflict 3) Actors in management of Karamoja conflict.

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To resolve Karamoja conflict, two factors need to be accounted for. The need for dynamic processes at all levels national and local, reinforcing each other to reach solutions. Secondly high level policy and interventions of conflict resolution and management need to converge.

The distinction cause and effect of conflict is blurred and so is the focus of interventions. Although there is a general agreement on factors behind the persistent conflict and insecurity in Karamoja, different actors have different emphasis on causes of conflict (Lyman, 2001).
CHAPTER THREE: MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICTS IN THE EAST AFRICA

3.1 Introduction

Regional conflict analysis provides a bird’s eye view into nature and complexity of conflicts and different methods and approaches to its management. This chapter explores and provides an experience of East Africa’s conflict and explores some of the management approaches from arbitration and litigation to demobilization traditional methods, early warning and response mechanism of conflict management. Examples drawn are cognizant of issues in Karamoja conflict evolving history and as part of East Africa conflict system. The chapter will dwelve on 1) Proxy or surrogate wars, 2) Politically Instigated and Election Related Conflicts, 3) Ethnic Related Conflict and 4) Resource based conflicts.

3.2 Conflicts within East Africa Conflict System

Half a decade after independence of East African countries, a myriad of conflicts still haunt the region. These conflicts range from proxy wars to ethnic, politically instigated and resource based (scarcity conflicts).

3.2.1 Management of Proxy / Surrogated Wars

Uganda has been an example of proxy/surrogate wars. Guerilla warfare involving Tito Basil Okello, Zaire as an anti Ugandan base Zaire/Congo has been a playing ground for Sudan’s and Uganda undeclared war Pruner (2004) Further led to Khartoum-Kampala proxy war involving Rwanda Zaire Congo and Central African Republic from 1996 in various phases to 2003 after Sirte agreement Pruner (2004). A key lesson to learn from this conflict is interplay between transnational factors and national politics or countries foreign policy are precipitators to internal conflicts and cross boarder conflicts.
Proxy wars did not end with Sirte agreement, collapse of USSR marking end of communism, ending of Rwanda genocide in 1994 and entry of South Sudan splitting from Sudan in 2011. Rather discovery of Africa’s potential of holding a reservoir of scarce resources is a major factor in this equation. Current scholarly debate has focused on Africa in shaping foreign policies of super power and emerging economic giants Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The asymmetric nature of future conflict over African resources means defense acquisitions must focus on equipping and training military as well as civilian foreign internal defense teams. Both military and civilian doctrine must be altered to allow robust and effective intelligence actions to meet the challenges of proxy conflict that will span the continuum of war from security forces assistance, counterinsurgency, information and combat operations to peace enforcement and post conflict stability efforts Yeisley (2011: 15)

Could this be the case in East Africa? How has the invasion of Ethiopia into Somalia served the interest of Ethiopian nationals? Both countries share ethnic, cultural and religious identities of its nation’s citizens. Emergence of states in scramble and partition of Africa on one hand led to the current states but also split ethnic nationalities. In this case Somalis in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. Although one can argue that Kenya by sharing a border with Somalia and its national security warrants entry invasion into Somali, others dismiss this argument.

### 3.2.2 Politically Instigated and Election Related Conflicts

Theory of greed and grievances provides an analytical basis to understanding politically instigated conflict in Africa. Whereas Collier and Hoeffler (2000) debate point towards confirming that countries with minerals have been prevalent to conflict as a source of self enrichment, countries like. Kenya economic control of any perceived resources and power positions is a major contention. Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) party held realm since
independence in 1963. Entry of KANU ushered in single party politics, perceived economic downturn and a restrictive environment for vibrant and freedom from everything and Kenyan citizens. Consequently entrenchment of structural violence and politics marginalization, political historical events point towards a history of politically instigated conflict including 1982 coup d’eta, 1992 and 1997 clashes. Within this period of economic bog down with massive corruption, the gap between rich and poor increased, few elites versus majority poor became even poorer. Political events and seasons were marred by violence. Though unique in its own way, Kenya shares a few of these historical moments with other East Africa countries. Uganda in early 1970’s till the entry of Museveni in 1986 had vast experience coup d’eta’s.

Boone (2011) contends that majoritarian politics, lowering stakes of elections and protecting fundamental rights are a precipitate to the kind of regimes that manifest in countries such as Kenya. Kenyan politics since independence centre value has is the nature of prevailing constitution and grievances emanating from desire to change it. Amadi (2009: 148) adds that independence constitution was fairly desirable.

The post independence constitution provided for a parliamentary system with safety valves; including a bi-cameral legislature, multi-party system, quasi-federal system as majimbo. Constriction of the same through constitutional changes amendments has led to impunity and cause/source of chain of electoral violence since 1990s till 2007/2008 Amadi (2009:148).

Kenyan election violence is based on valuable political resources whose key objective was about controlling state. These political resources include language of territory, ethnicity and nationalism. Uganda on the other hand has not been spared of dictatorships and militarized elections.
3.2.3 Ethnic related conflicts

Kenya’s election conflicts bring a classic example of nationalized ethnic violence especially with a series of 2007/2008 conflict. Ethnic violence and conflict is a new nexus whose key transcend is about social capital and social cohesion in post independence Africa. East Africa countries especially Rwanda is a classic example of these more recent phenomena. McDoom (2014) agrees with Amadi (2009) and Boone (1990) in dissecting conflict, it presents a model of elite competition and ethnic segregation. McDoom (2014:42) presents two causal logic to analyze the struggle for state control hence a key cause to intractable conflict. First an inter-elite contest for control between pro-violence extremes and anti-violence moderates will rise in weakly controlled areas and it will take time for this power struggle to resolve. Secondly well integrated communities are more socially cohesive and resist extremist attempts to overcome interethnic bonds of trust and to destroy social capital. While we can rely on McDoom’s model it is rather a predictive model. There are several factors that can explain occurrence of ethnic conflict rather than just predicting with classic example of Rwanda. Rwanda’s ethnic conflict had a profound lasting impact on East Africa and Great Lakes region.

In Kenya politically instigated violence is experienced through both physical similar to 2007/2008 as well as use of media and technology. Increase in use of technology, particularly use of social media to express dissatisfaction, provide and shape opinion. Unlike 2007 campaign period and 2008 post election where rallies and political leaders speeches were opium’s of the masses, 2013 ethnic hate speech was played on face book and blogs and twitter Kaberia (2013 July 11). Use of technology precipitates that conflict related is not just physical violence psychological. Social media platforms are quickly becoming psychological battlefronts in Kenya.
McDoom (2014:43) synthesizes various hypotheses to conceptualize a model where by function of elite competition for control of state and ethnic segregation (survival strategy) is a recipe for ethnic related conflict. Survival strategy or a calculation response to threat posed to ruling class and elites or those aspiring to be. Survival strategy relies on three ingredients for ethnic violence; prefectural and communal political control, military control power and segregation along ethnic lines are profound for ethnic conflict as noted in the case for Rwanda conflict that ended up in genocide McDoom (2014:40). Distribution of power, wealth and ethnicity in times of scarcity increases tension. This is a case for Kenya where distribution of national cake and opportunities is always perceived from ethnic lens.

3.2.4 Resource based conflicts

Contemporary Africa including Karamoja area has experienced various three types of factors leading to conflict. Communal resources such as pasture and water, climate change effect on resources extractives related resources. 2006 international studies association conference noted that Karamoja cluster conflict over water and pasture resulted in more than 600 human deaths and loss of over 40000 livestock⁹. Raleigh (2010) argues that political marginalization and economic marginalization are key factors to pastoralists conflict. Environmental and climate change effects are just catalysts. Salehyan (2008) adds that political and social variables rather than effect of climate change and resultant resource scarcity are factors in resource based pastoralist conflict. It is important to recognize the central role of state in reconfiguring contemporary pastoral conflicts in Karamoja cluster and larger East Africa. Borrowing from a pre-modialist and environmental conflict theories of pastoral violence there is effect of state building and communities places

such as Karamoja. Mulugate *et al* (2008) notes that there are multiple impacts on resource, governance, land tenure system, peacemaking, customary authorities and competition over state resources. Political and government decentralization process in Uganda relates to politicization of kinship relations and group identities. In effect enhances the struggle for scarce resources in the region.

One of the key threats in east African conflict in pastoral region is circulation of small arms and weapons with both internal and external sources. Protracted conflict in Sudan from 1970’s to 2011 and Somalia and Kenyan shifita war in early 1970’s and South Ethiopia conflict formed an arms corridor of arms circulation in and out of Karamoja. Internal sources of weapons are official insecure weapons stockpile. Karamojong community acquired arms by raiding an army barrack during Idd Amin’s era. Current exploration of oil and gas pose a major danger to armed conflict within the region. Perhaps it is an issue for continued scholarly and policy debate.

3.2.5 Religious fundamentalism and threat of terrorism within the region.

International relations and debates are posed with challenge of analysis factoring in the interaction between religion and politics, state building and predicting conflict. This is contrary to modernization theory whose main tenet is that societies would industrialize as they shake off religious and cultural fundamentalism (secularize). Half a decade after the popular Harvey Cox book *The secularity: secularization and urbanization (A theological perspective)* mobilization factor in political discourse. East African community’s identity is not just cultural but religious affiliated.

Quincy Wright (2005) rejected moncausal explanations for conflict by acknowledging complexities of international politics. Mark Davis (1996) in criticizing Wright’s and other
perspectives narrows political power and economic factors as determinants in international stability. This analysis limits focus on external factors to war and peace without consideration to internal conflicts within states such as religious fundamentalism and terrorism.

Business monitor index\textsuperscript{10} reports East African countries such as Uganda at moderate risk of experiencing major terrorist attacks with susceptibility to criminal activity. Al Shabaab an Islamist insurgency has caused a great challenge to achieving internal political legitimacy efforts by Somali’s transitional government and international community including Ethiopia’s 2006 invasion and ending council of Islamic courts.

According to Pham (2011) Council of Islamic Courts was the bedrock for Al Shabaab however with its end, Al Shabaab metamorphosised from just a local outfit to an international agenda. Reaching out to Somali Diasporas in East Africa to recruit more and seek sympathy. A manifest of it through bomb attacks in major cities of; Kenya 1998 Nairobi city, 2011 Kikambala, Mombasa, threats of public incidents to date; Uganda in 2012 and continuous threats of attacks. African mission in Somalia peace keepers have not been spared of the wrath of Al-Shabaab. Instability will remain a challenge to Horn and East Africa security structure.

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states have been the victims of terrorism and remain vulnerable. A 2005 IGAD assessment revealed region’s vulnerable due to state fragility and failure in Somalia, the high levels of political instability and intolerance between governments and their opposition groups. Questions on why contemporary states with superior resources fail to overcome the resistance of traditional local power centres continue to be asked by theoreticians and practitioners. Over time, it has become clear that, in fragmented societies, the very act of trying to forcibly consolidate

\textsuperscript{10} Business Monitor Index Provides Country Risks and specific industry research based on the prevailing risks.
power over points of local control is what causes leaders to lose it hence the term elusive power.

3.3 Methods and Approaches to conflict management.

East African conflict system has experienced a plethora of conflicts that we can draw lessons on methods and approaches to conflict management. Each conflict is unique with its issues, causes and actors. Therefore even within the same conflict system same conflicts warrants review of appropriate management. Scholarly debates use different terminologies and discourses on similar issues within the subject useful in delineating and converging thoughts. This study relates conflict management to any effort by third party at preventing a conflict from getting worse and to distinguish conflict resolution that involves transformative aspiration and focus on causes of social strife.

Various approaches and methods and their strategies have been used in management of conflict in East Africa (Machozi 2009). Multiparty elections, institutionalization of inner party democracy constitutional reform for a new social contract, demilitarization disarmament and resettlement, repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, clearing of landmines, banning military supplies from external sources, participation of civil society, rebuilding of local communities as democratic societies basic unit, power sharing, equitable distribution of resources and income creation of institutions of accountability to promote share values, individual and collective rights and the role of international assistance Machozi (2009: 140). This study explores use of litigation and arbitration processes, informal/traditional processes, disarmament, and role of regional bodies in management of conflict.
3.3.1 Litigation and arbitration in Management of conflicts in East Africa

Some of the methods of conflict management include international arbitration, litigation and mediation. Some scholars such as Butler (2009) have explored the relevance of peace keeping, mediation, peace enforcement and adjudication. International law and pragmatic philosophy has shaped the methods of third party involvement in conflict management. Article 33 of UN charter states the use of enquiry, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial statement as peaceful methods of conflict management Kseinya (2014).

Thus there are two ways of third party engagement. First normal interaction of actors in a conflict should enhance peaceful means of conflict. Secondly, it’s a truism that conflict management should lead to peace as conflict is endemic; peace should counter violence Galtung (1996)

These peaceful methods of conflict management can be coercive and non coercive, adjudicatory and non adjudicatory Bercovich et al (2008:340). East Africa has employed all varied classifications in prevention and management of conflict. Recourse to regional judicial mechanism of managing conflict has evolved. Tanzania and Malawi’s lake boundary dispute was presented to International Court of Justice. The court proposed that a median line forms boundary to demarcate water body to Tanzania and Malawi to end long standing dispute. Recently East African court of justice made a ruling in which Republic of Burundi was sued by citizen over land dispute. In addition a second case the court decided construction of a road in Serengeti as unlawful (The East African Standard July 20-26: 22).

Third parties, apart from providing an enabling environment to reach a settlement as reflected in the above cases have other roles. Some of these roles include financing, providing a safe haven to rebels, hosting and supporting mediation processes and specific interventions in conflict contexts. One key question would be what if the Karamoja conflict parties used
judicial means to settle pastoral protracted conflicts experienced over a long time? Ogiek and Endorois communities chose to approach conflict management by dispute resolution mechanism rather than take up arms or form rebellions to address their issues. Kenya’s Ogiek conflict and Endorois people’s cases presented a test for African Commission on Human and People’s Rights. Lynch (2011) argues that the court’s decision had implications on international jurisprudence, national politics and local strategies touching on socio economic and inter-communal relations. In the first ruling of February 2010 of an international tribunal to find a violation of the right to development. The Africa commission on human and peoples’ rights found that eviction, with minimal compensation, violated the Endoroise rights as an indigenous people to property, health, culture, religion and natural resources. It ordered Kenya to restore to Endorois their historic land and compensate them. It’s the first ruling to determine who indigenous people in Africa are and what their rights are. This case’s ruling has definitely had an impact on human rights community in Africa, where state policies and political elites continue to systematically alienate communities leading to structural violence. Centre For Minority Rights (CEMIRIDE) and Minority Rights Group international presented the case as a nongovernmental organization on behalf of Endorois community Lynch (2011: 26).

Can Karamoja community manage conflict in this way? Parties to conflict for Ogiek and Endorois conflict in Kenya are different from Karamoja in Uganda. The Kenya case parties are communities marginalized by subsequent governments from colonial to post independent Kenya. For Karamoja parties to conflict are different pastoral community groups across Uganda and spilling over to Kenya and Uganda. One common denominator is that Karamojong, Ogiek and Endorois have suffered historical marginalization due to government policies and directions that have not recognized them. As such one can conclude that all these
communities have suffered historical injustice and structural violence. May be Karamoja cluster communities have a ground to stand up to their government and question this marginalization. However these are examples of how adjudicatory methods of conflict management have worked for conflicts in east Africa.

Litigation and arbitration processes have involved track one actors. The courts at regional and state level are institutions and functions of state. In the case of Ogiek and Endorois, Centre For Minority Rights and Minority International Group are an example of track two entities whose role was facilitation of party to conflict resolution process. These are Examples of involvement of track two entities in track one process. These presents an alternative to traditional mechanism to settling protracted scores affecting traditional African communities where community tackles state injustice Lynch (2011: 44).

3.3.2 Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration in East Africa context.

Government’s intervention in Karamoja conflict was through a disarmament process. It is noted that the paramount reason why Karamojong got guns was to protect themselves against government forces Odhiambo (2003: 40).

United Nations define disarmament as the collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within a conflict zone Annan (2000:2). East Africa governments of Kenya and Uganda resolved to use of disarmament in 2006 as a measure to resolving and preventing conflict Knighton (2010). Disarmament was characterized by both use of force and voluntary means. This involved amnesty for community members who volunteer to give guns to military and police operations in villages. Kenyan government initiated branding of cattle whereas Uganda introduced use of communal Kraal (Kraal means a place for keeping a herd
of livestock in Karamojong community) as a communal livestock safekeeping (East Africa Standard 16/3/07).

Due to lack of simultaneous disarmament leads to ethnic groups’ migration across borders. In 2006 disarmament, Pokot moved from West Pokot in Kenya to Moroto District. Uganda The main objective for disarmament was to recover illegal guns and ammunition (Standard newspaper 2013 May). In Karamoja the initial phase recovered about 10,000 weapons voluntarily (Interview with Fr. Paul N’goleAugust 11th 2014). Although at national level this portrayed a success picture for national efforts and peaceful gun recovery, most of the guns returned were obsolete. Further only extremely landlocked communities especially the Bokora, Jie and Matheniko unlike Pokot of Kenya, Tepeth and Dodoth of Uganda, returned the guns Adol (2002).

Mkutu (2008, 5) notes that gun possession in Karamoja was based on socio-economic factors. The gun was also a tool for barter trade for goods and livestock. Disarmament process did not consider root causes of conflict. If conflict itself remains demand for arms is sustained and arms market thrives (Mkutu 2008, 17)

As disarmament continued in Karamoja attacks and raiding continued in neighboring countries of Kenya and Sudan. A successful and permanent solution lies with sustained, coordinated and permanent solution lies across this conflict system. Disarmament should be accompanied by reconstruction efforts Wepundi (2011). Conflict is dynamic, so should disarmament process. For example political raiding as a new form other than use of guns to raid and restock political patrons instigated and play a key role in cattle raiding as leaders of their communities Eaton (2006).
3.3.3 Traditional methods of resolving conflicts

It is vital for policy makers and actors to appreciate the complexity of issues and dynamics and causes of conflict in the region. This study appreciates that traditional mechanisms exist and still viable conflict management approach. In modern time’s reference to written and prescribed western concept of order are organized to maintain peace and stability in pursuit of public and private goals.

Some of the traditional mechanisms for conflict management across East Africa conflict systems can be clustered as arbitration and mediation, social events of song and dance, ridicule, duels, gossip, religious events of supernatural acts, and social organizations such as kinship. Time modernization has had effect on these mechanisms. Some have metamorphosis into either positive or negative aspects of managing conflict. Kinship in some areas in Kenya has changed to vigilante groups taking the identity of both traditional and modern function of security

Traditional lives of pastoralists and other traditional groups across East Africa are about composition, opinion, interests, goals, values and norms. Traditional life recognizes diversity. To African culture war was sacred and not everyone could initiate and or take part, conflict management process therefore took a moral approach. Are our methods and approaches sensitive to this fact? According to Azam (2002) African conflict management mechanisms included five aspects rules governing the use of violence. 1) Choice of weapons 2) When to use violence 3) Type of attack, 4) Do’s and Don’t’s in the battle field for example women were not attacked 5) Commissioning an attack was the preserve of community leaders and elders. The structure of society for conflict prevention and management existed. Special friendship arrangements, ritual process and the use of safe havens and arbitration and mediation still do exist in pastoral communities.
Some ways in which traditional approaches to management of conflict has taken shape in East Africa is through dialogue and peace meetings, participation by leaders, local chiefs, local leaders and opinion shapers (Londongukwe 2014). The raiders themselves do not attend the meetings to deliberate. May be this is one of the reasons for persistent raiding incidences? Some dialogue meetings have lead to community peace pacts. For instance in year 2011 revival of 1973 Lokiriama peace pact in Karamoja cluster. Dialogue meetings of Karamoja took place between six communities Matheniko and Jie of Uganda, Turkana and Pokot of Kenya, Toposa of Sudan and Nyangatom of Ethiopia. This process brought together government representatives and non-governmental organizations Practical Action (2011) dialogue meetings and peace meetings have since become a model of managing inter-communal and clan conflict in East and Horn of Africa. This models bedrock is customary institutions and personality such as council of elders where local values, customs, language and symbols are upheld. One key lesson we can learn is that dialogue and peace meeting approach has enabled to institutionalise and legitimise traditional conflict management processes in modern conflict management systems Pkalya et al (2004). Perhaps an acknowledgement of this bottom up approach in management of Somalia conflict instead of efforts towards a centralised government we would have better outcomes than currently experienced.

3.3.4 The Role of international organisations and regional bodies in management of conflict in East Africa.

Chapter 8 of UN charter mandates regional organisations to intervene and defines conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy and mediation as its core work where regional and mutual issues are of concern. Issues of concern for regional organisations in East Africa included
political affairs, security, conflict management, and development and co-operation among member states.

Policy formulation has been a key agenda for peace building in East Africa. East Africa’s conflict system falls into an interaction of various sub regional organisations and bodies under African union. Close home is the East Africa community five countries Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Kenya. Some of the members are members of Intergovernmental Authority on Development including Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan. Both bodies have stressed on regional peace and security for political stability and economic development. There are various initiatives for example in 2012 East Africa community launched its protocol on peace and security and one of the organs is Court of Justice. The protocol makes commitment to twelve issues (1)Prevention and management of conflict (2) Prevention of genocide (3) Combating terrorism (4)Combating and suppressing piracy (5) Peace support operations (6) Disaster management and crisis response (7) Management of refugees (8) Control of proliferation of arms (9)Combating transitional and cross border crimes (10) Preventing and combating cattle rustling (11) Cooperation in exchange, detention, custody and rehabilitation of prisoners and offenders (12)Institutional arrangements and relationship with international organization.

Africa Union’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development can be said to have matched up to the three tenets of regional organisation. The three tenets as advanced by Churchill and noted in Meyers (1974) as; First, regional organisations will relieve international organisations the burden of conflict management. Secondly that regional organizational are best suitable to provide local solutions in comparison to more complex global ones, and that similarities of interests, problems and loyalties found regionally make it likely that attempts to regional conflict settlement will be forthcoming and more effective.
3.3.4.1 IGAD’S Conflict early warning and response mechanisms in East Africa.

Conflict early warning and response has emerged as a model for conflict prevention in Africa Union region. Soursa and Handy (2013) note that there have been tremendous steps by African Union in setting up early warning and response mechanism within the region some advanced picking up or nonexistent especially for North Africa. Continental Early Warning at Africa Union has linked West Africa’s Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN), Horn and East African Response Mechanism, Economies of West African States Central African Early warning System and common market for East and Southern Africa conflict early warning and response mechanisms.

3.4 Conclusion

Karamoja lies within two conflict systems IGAD conflict system and East Africa conflict system. These two conflicts link with Great Lakes regional system. The regional dimension of conflict and its management emerge from the fact that Karamojong is one community of Kenya, Ethiopia and South Sudan. More circulation of arms and communication across these countries is an issue within the whole conflict system in Horn and East Africa Eaton, (2008). Karamojong culture brings us to the interplay of conflict systems. Issues and nature of conflict presents different levels of continuum and relationships call for dual approach to conflict management.

Karamojong culture has been in contact with other pastoral communities across South Sudan and East Africa. National actors and conflict issues affect Karamoja. There is a similarity of other conflicts in IGAD and East Africa region especially as it concerns ethnic and resource based conflicts.
CHAPTER FOUR: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF DUAL APPROACH TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

4.1 Introduction

This study examined roles and cooperation of track one as state centric approach to conflict management processes, and track two as non-state actors approach in management of Karamoja cluster conflict. This chapter presents data analysis and findings from 50 key informants and two focused group discussions. Findings are clustered under four sections: Findings on causes, sources, issues and actors in Karamoja conflict; approaches and institutions of conflict management processes in Karamoja, analysis of actors in track one & track two and their capacity to deal with the conflict, and finally, identify the key challenges in strategies adopted in conflict management in Karamoja.

4.1.1 General Information on data collection

Of the total 50 respondents 39% were female while males 61%. The age group with highest number of respondents was 30-40 years with 47.4% of the total sample, 21-30 years 28.9%, 41-50 years with 21.1% The least is 61 years at 2.6%. 28.6% work for national NGOs, 25.7% work for international organisations, 22.9% from local NGOs, local and central government 11.4% each. 52.8% had worked in the area for 5 years and below, 6-10 years 27.8%, 11-15 years and 16-20 years each at 8.3% and over 20 years at 2.8%. Most of the respondents, 74%, had college/university degree, masters’ degree at 21%. The least number of respondents were those with high school education at 5%. None of the respondents indicated to have another different level of education aside the above.
4.2 Findings

4.2.1 Assessment of Causes, Issues and Actors in Karamoja Conflict

4.2.1.1 Causes and Sources of conflict

To assess actors understanding of causes issues and actors four variables were selected; marginalisation, arms circulation, culture & tradition, time (modern or ancient time) and poor forms of governance. Study revealed that all these causes affect the existence of conflict in Karamoja. Time factor is perceived not have a major effect on existence of conflict in Karamoja. Small arms circulation in Karamoja and neighbouring communities is a strong driver of conflict. Availability of arms across the boundaries sustains their availability and creates a strong supply and demand relationship among neighbours. Culture and tradition influence on raiding culture is entrenched within the community. For example it was noted that raids enabled wealth creation for livelihood, pay dowry and meet familial obligations. Marginalisation and poor forms of governance provides a conducive environment for conflict to thrive. Poor infrastructure and limited formal economic activities enforce cycle of conflict, poverty and under development.

Marginalisation as a source of conflict: 55.6% of the respondents agree and strongly agree that continued marginalisation of Karamoja from colonial to contemporary regimes affect the existence of conflict in Karamoja. 19.5% strongly disagree and disagree with the statement. 25% didn’t take side 78.3% of the respondents agree and strongly agree that arms circulation has an effected Karamoja conflict. 8.1% strongly disagree and disagree with the statement. 13.5% remained neutral on their statement. 75.6% of the respondents agree and strongly agree that culture and tradition affect existence of conflict in Karamoja. 10.8% strongly disagree and disagree with the statement. 13.5% remained neutral. 37.1% of the respondents are neutral if time has an effect on existence of conflict in Karamoja. 22.8% agree and strongly agree...
with the statement while 40% strongly disagree and disagree with the statement (see tables 1-4, Appendix IV).

Poor forms of governance; 84% indicate that there are forms of poor governance from the authorities in control. 73%, agree that these poor governance issues are a source of conflict in Karamoja area (see figure 1 Appendix 1). Poor governance issues affecting conflict according to respondents include: Civic incompetence resulting from lack of access to relevant information. This has led to low participation and engagement of community, inadequate social accountability and massive corruption hampers development of Karamoja and poor service of basic services further marginalises the region. Most respondents who mentioned inadequate social accountability related it to Isolation of the Karamajong people by subsequent of governments in power. Land ownership and acquisition was also highlighted Land wrangles have escalated in communities especially between land owners and investors.

4.2.1.2 Actors in Karamoja

Karamoja conflict has a plethora of actors. To analyze actors in Karamoja conflict respondents scored rate of influence as High, Moderately influential, or Not influential for warriors, elders, politicians, women, neighboring community, security agents business women and men and children. All actors except children were noted to have some level of influence. Perceived traditional actors in conflict ranked high with elders and warriors high on the list government officers, security agents and politicians ranked highly as well as actors in Karamoja conflict. Though not as significant as elders or security officers, neighboring communities, women and youth were perceived to have moderate influence as actors in conflict. Their role as conflict actors can therefore not be disregarded by conflict management interventions. Elders were rated to be highly influential at 75%, warriors at 59.5%, politicians, and security agents (see tables 6- 15, appendix iv) Study findings deducts the
need for conflict management interventions to counter the effect of highly influential actors in Karamoja conflict. Other actors were rated to have moderate influence in management of conflict include youth 61.5%, government officers 53.8%, women 35.9 % and business men and women 46% (see tables 6-15, appendix iv). The fact that children are rated as not influential by 82.1% is an indication of their vulnerability in the conflict and need for protection.

Contemporary issues affecting persistence of Karamoja conflict include triggers such as food insecurity; cattle rustling that still existent in some of these communities, struggle for grazing land and shifting tribal alliances. Water and climate change issues. Drought as a result unfavourable weather patterns, lack of alternative means of livelihoods coupled with abject poverty. Political campaigns and political camps usually split communities from within. The overriding principle for actors in management of conflict to consider is an understanding of sources, causes, issues and dynamics of conflict. This understanding will inform actors interventions, actors role and expected outcome of the conflict.

This study reveals that there is a causal link between actors’ source and causes of conflict to. Where arms and are concerned they have link not only to warriors but also security agents. Role of politicians and government officers in conflict is associated with poor forms of governance that most respondents echoed to. This calls for rethinking if some of these actors in conflict are as well involved in its manager. Study findings suggest terming such actors as bi polar. On one end they are (perceived) actors in conflict, on the other actors in management of conflict. This presents a complex scenario in understanding a conflict context that requires observing conflict sensitivity in an intervention, cooperation and coordination.
These findings reveal that all segments of the community population involvement in conflict management processes is paramount.

4.2.2 Assessment of Approaches and Methods in Management of Karamoja Conflict

Karamoja conflict presents us with a plethora of conflict management approaches and methods. Study findings point out that traditional courts, traditional blessing and cursing, building community relationships, special traditional occasions, dialogue and peace meetings, connector projects, disarmament demobilisation rehabilitation and integration process community peace meetings, Baraza’s, led either government and nongovernmental organisations and community, early warning and response mechanism are examples. 83.3% of the respondents strongly agree and agree with traditional courts as an effective solutions to the conflict in Karamoja. 69.4% strongly agree and agree that community relationships are effective solutions to conflict. 89.5% strongly agree and agree with dialogue and peace meeting as effective solution to conflict. 75% agree and strongly agree that disarmament demobilisation rehabilitation and integration are effective solutions to conflict. 81% strongly agree that other development projects are effective solution to conflict 81% strongly agree and agree that community peace agreements are effective solution to conflict. 70.2% agree and strongly agree that early warning and response by government community and NGOs are effective solution to conflict (see tables 15-25, appendix iv). 84% agree that there are efforts by the community to resolve and manage this conflict (see figure 2, appendix 1). 97% agree that traditional/customary conflict management processes exist in Karamoja (see figure 3, appendix 1).

Importance of council of elders was echoed by respondents with the following reasons. Elders are part of council of traditional leaders and therefore respected and connected to
people and issues. Consulted on brokering peace among people and are able to easily mobilize communities towards making of peace. They form part of communities system of regulation of community rules led by a council of elders; in Karamoja, the Akiriket. Elders are the custodians of community ethos; they exercise ultimate control of the youth (warriors). Elders have set by laws that were constituted for ages ago and they always have references of conflict. In the Karamoja context, the elders bless the Karachuna (warriors) when going to raid. The council of elders has quasi jurisdictional powers to resolve any conflicts in the community.

4.2.3 Assessment of Government and Nongovernmental organisations Role in Management of Karamoja Conflict

Findings revealed presence of both track one (government) and track two (non governmental agencies in management of Karamoja conflict, need for periodical mapping out actors to establish what they do, coverage and gaps in current intervention. Various actors have employed a mixture of approaches and methods in management of conflict. The study sampled government agencies and its department, church, community and non governmental agencies. 97.4% each equally agree that council of elders; church, local NGOs have a role in management of conflict. This is followed by local government at 92.1%, community at 91.95, and national NGOs at 88.9% and lastly international NGOs at 88.9% (see table 26 appendix iv).

Findings deduced examples of mandate and roles of different actors. The church has moral authority and trust of the community and advocates for peaceful co-existence. It’s a strong mobilization institution that reaches out to communities. It is where people gather in large numbers and can be used for sensitizing people. Supports service provision in education,
health and feeding among other social welfare issues. Their role would be act as agents of behaviour change, and also in mitigating the effects of conflicts. The church has played a very significant role as far as conflict resolution and peace building and development is concerned in Karamoja.

Study revealed that the community as an actor in management of conflict; community is at the receiving end and affected by conflict therefore main actors in conflict and its management. Community structures especially the justice and peace committees have been formed at community level. These are constituted by women, men and youth and are charged with the responsibility of ensuring peace.

Study found out that actors have a good understanding of Karamoja conflict. 89% the NGOs understand conflict in Karamoja. Study interrogated whether government has the sole responsibility in the management of Karamoja conflict. 57% of the respondents agree that the government has a sole responsibility in the Karamoja conflict management (see figure 4, appendix iv). Whether government understands the conflict in Karamoja, 74% think government understands conflict in Karamoja. Some the reasons listed by respondents include; Government is the community’s immediate service provider. Formulates and implements laws. The local government has structures in place assigned with the responsibility of settling disputes with in communities for example via local councillor’s office. Local government also has a responsibility to coordinate all peace building initiatives in the district through the security sector like Office of Resident District Commissioner (RDC) and District Security Office.

Findings confirmed that nongovernmental organisations facilitate development projects that induce behaviour change through alternative means of earning livelihood. Local NGOs have
been active in negotiating for peace among the conflicting communities in Karamoja even before disarmament process by government. Provide services to local communities and providing development projects to reduce poverty which is one of the major sources of conflicts and community dialogues. Quite influential in mitigating the conflicts custodians of resources both financial and expertise and armed with resources are capable of providing the necessary logistics to communities. Are sources of and have a wealth of knowledge.

Study revealed that there is some level of cooperation and coordination within one type of actor at different levels of operation. Over 70% agree that there is coordination within one type of actor from local to national and regional levels (see figures 5 and 6, appendix IV). 86.1% of respondents agree there’s cooperation and coordination within national and local government agencies and their departments. 81.6% agree that there is cooperation and coordination of NGOs at district level. Only 80% agree that there is no coordination between NGOs at national and regional level. 78.9% agree that there is cooperation and coordination of local government agencies in a district or a region. 78.8% of respondents agree that there is cooperation and coordination of government agencies at national level. 78.4% agree that there is coordination of NGOs at district, national and regional level. 75.8% agree that there is cooperation and coordination of NGOs at district national and regional level. 73.5% agree that there is cooperation and coordination of NGOs at district and national level. 70.6% agree that there is cooperation and coordination of NGOs at national level (see table 27, appendix iv).

4.2.4 Assessment of the Coordination of government and nongovernmental Organisations in Management of Karamoja Conflict.

Whether there is cooperation and coordination among more than one type of actor. 97.3% of the respondents say it is important for government and NGOs to work in
cooperation/collaboration, 94.9% say it is important for government and NGOs to work in a coordinated manner. 89.2% say there is cooperation/collaboration between govt and NGOs while 85.7% say there is coordination between government and NGOs (see table 28, appendix iv).

Whether structures and mechanisms exist for cooperation/collaboration and coordination of actors exist. 90.9% each agree that stakeholder meetings, coordination meetings structures exist for cooperation/collaboration and coordination of actors. 72.7% say joint review meetings exist, 54.5% say joint projects do exist as well as joint assessments and conflict analysis exist while 40.6% say joint reporting do exist.

On cooperation/collaboration respondents and focussed group discussions also highlighted the following: Important for information sharing and problem solving enhance transparency and accountability. Minimise duplication of activities, resources and pull synergies. It creates good working environment, anticipate various conflict and peace reconciliation mechanisms to be jointly followed during community dialogues. Avoid impact of conflict of interests. NGOs follow national development plan. Through collaboration government and nongovernmental organisations can use collected information and develop effective response strategies. To enhance sharing of information and improved the implementation process (see table 29, appendix iv).

Whether there is a collective understanding of conflict by actors involved in management of Karamoja conflict. 59% of respondents agree that all actors have a common understanding of Karamoja conflict compared to 41% who disagree (see figure, appendix iv).
To justify if there is cooperation and coordination between government and nongovernmental organisations, respondents listed the following. Both have structures and from grassroots. Government plays a key role in defining social and development agenda. Government coordinates initiatives at district level. There are joint initiatives, discussions, consultations and reviews. A few respondents noted that there is some co-operation between the two. However, there exists a trust deficit (lack of actor confidence) hampering successful cooperation due to competing interests.

On why it is important to ensure cooperation and coordination, Respondents listed the following reasons. All target the same beneficiaries and also have the same objective to achieve that is sustainable peace and development in the region. Avoid duplication of resources. Widen the scope of operation and coverage. Ensure comprehensive process. Necessary as the causes of conflict are multi-dimensional. Avoid duplication of resources and supplement each other in terms of resources and capacity. For efficiency and effectively carry out activities.

Actor’s efforts in management of Karamoja conflict need to be synergized. A myriad of sources and causes and different actors calls for strategic coordination. Coordination and cooperation will prevent duplication of interventions and resource wastage, enhance efficiency and effectiveness

Respondents rated against eight factors that enhance cooperation/collaboration or coordination between government and nongovernmental institutions in management of conflict 1) communication, 2) shared tasks, 3) shared partnerships, 4) coherence of approach or methodology, 5) common understanding of conflict, 6) perception of issues, 7) mandate, 8) resources both finance, assets and human.
76.9% agree and strongly agree that communication enhance cooperation/collaboration 61.5% agree and strongly agree and agree that shared tasks, 61.5% agree and strongly agree to partnership/shared partnership 61.6% agree and strongly agree to coherence in approach/methods conflict management 69.2% agree and strongly agree to common understanding of conflict 51.2% strongly agree and agree that perception of issues and solution to the conflict 48.7% strongly agree and agree that same or different mandates of government and NGOs, 61.6% strongly agree and agree that resources availability including human finance, assets help in enhancing cooperation/collaboration or coordination between government and non governmental institutions in management of conflict( see 30-37, appendix iv).

This study has noted the following challenges to proper coordination and cooperation. 1) Lack of common understanding and different approaches. 2) Bureaucracy in government process. 3) Different mandates mean different focus or area of emphasis for both government and nongovernment agencies. Divergent vested interests and policies between government and NGOs brings about competition. It is not easy to harmonise budget lines of NGOs and government. Most government officials prefer to attend meetings when there are allowances, hence allowances become priority. The government sometimes assumes that the NGOs are taking their roles. Lack of political will from the Government to end the conflicts in the region so even the collaboration efforts of the NGO alone is a waste 4) Ineffective communication structures between various actors/agencies. Information sharing is inadequate and not sharing of reports. 5) Inadequate financial resources hamper coordination and collaboration. 6) Number of nongovernmental agencies working in Karamoja is high; Karamoja region is vast this reduces ability by government personnel to meaningfully engage them. 7) Lack of transparency and corruption is affecting coordination and collaboration.
Misappropriation of public funds by corrupt leaders both in government and NGOs although NGOs view government officials as being more corrupt so conduct their activities solely. non-disclosure of resources meant to enable them intervene in conflict

4.2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has featured four key findings 1) Actors understand conflict in Karamoja conflict 2) There are community based, state led and third parties (non state actors) approaches and methods employed in management of Karamoja conflict 3) Three types of actors exist in management of Karamoja conflict. All actors play different roles for one goal to peacefully resolve and manage conflict. 4) Whether there is cooperation and coordination of nongovernmental organisations. Cooperation and coordination of track one (government actors) and track two (nongovernmental actors) exists in management of Karamoja conflict. Some challenges have also been noted including different mandates of the both track one and track two, changing nature of conflict and inadequate resources for proper coordination and cooperation.
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this study was to determine roles and cooperation of track one as state centric approach to conflict management processes, and track two as non-state actors approach in managing Karamoja cluster conflict. This chapter deduces conclusions based on the findings from analysis of the data collected from the respondents and develops insights into the results based on the research objectives. The study aimed to examine the role of track one and track two approaches of conflict management in contemporary Africa. Therefore, this chapter provides the major findings and results of the study and discusses them against the theoretical background provided in the literature review. The chapter is ordered as: discussion of findings; conclusions and recommendations for improvement and further research.

5.2 Discussion

Summary of research

This study examined roles and cooperation of track one as state centric approach to conflict management processes, and track two as non-state actors approach in management of Karamoja cluster conflict. 1) To examine approaches and institutions of conflict management processes, 2) To analyze actors in track one & track two and their capacity to deal with the conflict, and 3) To identify the key challenges in strategies adopted in conflict management in Karamoja.

Descriptive research design was used in this study. The target population of this study was 50. The population included staff from government and nongovernmental organisations involved in management of Karamoja conflict. Data was collected using a questionnaire. Probability sampling technique was used so that the chance for each case being selected from the population was equal for all cases. Stratified random was used to select the sample size.
The population was categorized into two: local, national and regional respondents. Stratified sampling made it easier to ensure respondents from government and nongovernmental organisations from local, national and regional levels were involved. The appropriate number of respondents was determined based on duties performed by each category. Two focused group discussions were carried out each comprising of 12 persons. One for Southern Karamoja covering Moroto and Nakapiripirit and Northern Karamoja covered Kotido, Kaabong and Abim districts. Discussion is clustered under three sections approaches and institutions of conflict management processes in Karamoja, analysis actors in track one & track two and their capacity to deal with the conflict, and finally, identify the key challenges in strategies adopted to manage Karamoja conflict. Fifty questionnaires were administered and they all responded representing 100% return rate. The data collected was analyzed using descriptive statistics and presented using tables and charts. Focussed group discussion data was clustered under major themes complimenting questions in key informant questionnaire.

5.2.1 Causes, Issues and Actors in Karamoja Conflict

Actors have a common understanding of conflict in Karamoja region. Three major causes of conflict that respondents strongly agree with are arms circulation at 48.6%, Marginalisation 30.6%, culture and tradition 29.7%. These factors are not an end in themselves rather intertwined and interact with other factors. Time is a linking factor of factors at play in realising conflict. Time here refers to history or period and time of the year/seasons. Respondents noted modern time there are emerging issues and factors at play. Emerging sources and causes of conflict include land and political leaders/poor forms of governance. Conflict is not just experienced in form of violent and forceful raids but new forms of violence such as gender based violence is experienced in Karamoja.
An overwhelming 84% of respondents agreed that poor governance exist. 73% of these respondents agree that poor governance is a source of conflict. Politicians and government were rated as highly influential and moderately influential actors in Karamoja conflict. Other highly influential are elders and youth in general at 75% and 61.5% respectively. Focussed group discussion highlighted a growing trend of political leaders’ role to influence violence around political periods like elections.

However focussed group discussions noted emerging issues that actors need to be cognisant of in Karamoja conflict context for example resettlement of community has changed communal ownership of resources especially land. Land can lead to a new conflict type in the region

Various approaches have emerged in management of Karamoja conflict. 84% of respondents agree that there are community led efforts in management of conflict. 97% agreed that there are traditional and customary conflict management exist in Karamoja. This implies that Karamoja community itself is an actor in management of Karamoja conflict. State and non state actors ought to recognise community as an actor in management of conflict. However this approaches need to be harmonised at local, national and regional level for sustained management of conflict.

Although 92.4% agree local government, 89.2% agree that national governments have a role in management of Karamoja conflict, majority 89% agree that nongovernmental actors understand Karamoja conflict. This is more than 74% who agree government as actors understand Karamoja conflict.

Some of the approaches recognised in order of priority (rated as strongly agree with) include Dialogue and peace meetings at 55.3, Disarmament, traditional courts, building and existing
community relationships at 50% Community peace agreements at 43.2%. Other approaches Barazas led by government/nongovernmental organisations at 40.5%, connector projects at 36.1% and early warning led by government at 32.4%.

5.2.2 Government and Nongovernmental organisations Role in Management of Karamoja Conflict

On interrogating whether government had the sole responsibility in management of Karamoja conflict only 57% agreed, 43% recognise that there are other actors in management of Karamoja conflict. This study concludes some of the reasons why government is not the only actor with sole responsibility as 1) Local community have responsibility in ensuring a peaceful environment. 2) Government is embedded in the community system and therefore players in conflict. Embedded in the community, they cannot absolutely manage conflict “without an outside eye” third parties referring to support and expertise and financial support that goes hand in hand with monitoring government processes 3) All actors have a role and resources to contribute to management of conflict.

Other reasons why government has a sole responsibility as enumerated include 1) Mandate to maintain peace and security 2) People belong to the government so they are government 3) Has a national responsibility 4) Has security infrastructure

5.2.3 Cooperation and Coordination of government and nongovernmental Organisations in Management of Karamoja Conflict.

This study assessed coordination and coordination at two levels within one type of actor at different local, national and regional international level. Whether government agencies and departments cooperate and are well coordinated. Whether nongovernment agencies and
departments cooperate and are well coordinated. Secondly whether government and non
government actors cooperate with each other and are coordinated at all levels.
Cooperation and coordination is important. 97.3% of the respondents agreed it is important
for government and NGOs to work in cooperation and collaboration, 94.9% agreed it is
important for government and NGOs to work in a coordinated manner. 89.2% agreed there is
cooperation and collaboration between government and NGOs while 85.7% agreed there is
coordination between Government and NGOs.
To gauge factors that enhance cooperation and coordination of actors in management of
conflict, eight factors were presented for respondents to agree or disagree with. Further
analysis of this rating indicates that respondents value common understanding of conflict by
all actors to be important in management of conflict at 48.7%. Other factors are
communication at 35.9% Coherence of conflict management approaches and methods
Resources availability at 38.5 %. Least factors were partnership and shared tasks at 35.9%
same or different actor mandates and perception of issues scored 20.5%.
Interventions need to encompass all population segments are involved in seeking resolution
and take cognisant of emerging issues. A mixture of the following ingredients for
interventions is vital 1) Community awareness and involvement in conflict management and
development, 2) Improving property rights; enhancing beneficial social values and traditions
by promoting community trust and confidence building careful to ensure age and gender
appropriateness 3) Recognising empowering and supporting customary institutions of conflict
management . Linkage of these customary systems of conflict management to formal police,
court and government agencies is vital 4) Improving customary and formal governance by
enhancing local security initiatives sensitive to all ethnic groups and minorities. More police
posts with adequate personnel 5) Rehabilitation of warriors and youth through formal education and alternative livelihood 6) Changing context calls for long term development interventions. All sector development need to go in tandem agriculture both livestock and crop, education, infrastructure and markets. 7) Sustain community early warning response. Common and regional cross border policy and response on disarmament to curtail illicit proliferation of small arms in the supply chain from local to international levels is imperative. 8) Poor forms of governance for example corruption hinders realisation of community benefits in development and conflict resolution processes.

5.3 Conclusion

5.3.1 Causes, Issues and Actors in Karamoja Conflict

Arms calculation and disarmament process has two missing links. It is vital to undertake coordinated, sustained and simultaneous disarmament efforts across all the countries in the conflict system. Secondly, there is no literature that linked local disarmament efforts to international disarmament of arms with a focus on supplier. Respondents and focussed group discussion seemed to have little to say on this discussion. As much as disarmament has been carried out and continuously being done, disarmament is two loop process of supply and demand.

This study has also found out that communities ought to be recognised not just as actors in conflict but key and central actors in management of conflict.

5.3.2 Approaches and Methods in Management of Karamoja Conflict.

There is no cast stone for one appropriate approach and method to management of Karamoja conflict. Critical factor is for all actors to understand conflict causes issues and triggers and call for coordinated and joint intervention that make building blocks for management of the
conflict. A combination of traditional/customary and modern methods and approaches are valid. Institutionalised conflict management process needs to include both traditional and modern approaches. For Karamoja, the role of community elders is still important. A dual approach to model in management of conflict brings on board all actors community as an actor, government and non government actors. This agrees with Butler’s reference to conflict management as a public collective security Butler (2008). Hence interests of all actors are considered for a desired outcome for a sustainable and peaceful process. Sustained conflict management efforts in Karamoja should involve intensive poverty eradication/ development efforts.

5.3.3 Cooperation and Coordination of government and nongovernmental Organisations in Management of Karamoja Conflict.

Cooperation and Coordination within one type of actor at local, national and regional level is important. For example, state actors within a conflict system ought to be coordinated in themselves before cooperation and coordination with other actors.

Cooperation and coordination of track one and track two actors in management of conflict is important for a holistic and sustainable outcome in management of Karamoja conflict. However cooperation and coordination experiences some challenges. Some of the solutions could be: 1) Harmonizing conflict approaches. Joint planning, implementation and reporting Shared vision of how to end conflict. It is important to manage actor interests other than the common interest of the locals. 2) Pooling of resources together and increased funding for local coordination and cooperation infrastructure. Government should allocate money for peace building. 3) Coordination structures for example a Peace building steering committee comprising of community, government and nongovernmental actors can be established. Peace building steering committee to enable cooperation and coordination for effective
communication, networking. A steering committee is a cost effective method to collaboration of governmental and nongovernmental actors. For example all actors will have a shared and agreed responsibility in rolling out initiatives or interventions, meet and share information frequently. 4) Institutional accountability mechanisms should be adopted by both government and nongovernmental actors. This will enable actor social accountability to itself and other actors and build confidence in conflict management process. Cooperation and coordination 1) Enhances proper utilisation of resources among conflict management actors 2) Increases prospective for achieving conflict management objectives 3) Enhances the process of conflict management as neither track one nor track two individually provide suitable context for conflict management 4) Coordination can be one the criteria for measuring the success of conflict management process while cooperation can lead to partnership.

5.4 Recommendations

At policy level development of guidelines of actor coordination at different levels specific to a context will be useful. In practice partnership model of operation may ensure proper cooperation and coordination through consistent joint initiatives among actors For further study, a study on emerging and changing nature of Karamoja conflict, linking external local or regional conflict management efforts to approaches and strategies addressing external factors to conflict is imperative. For example identifying sources of arms manufacturing and supply chain as well as interrogating motivation of actors in this chain while linking it to a conflict zone.

Both government and nongovernmental actors need to periodically review of changing nature of conflict in Karamoja. Disarmament is sustained and livestock herding through government managed communal Kraals in Karamoja region, community lifestyle is changing. Conflict
management in Karamoja is enabling communities to get settled leading to changing land use. This brings a new dynamic leading to a new type of conflict, land related conflict. Other issues that need further interrogation include role of politics and leadership, corruption and gender based violence in management of Karamoja conflict.
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Appendix 1 Map of Karamoja
APPENDICES

Appendix I: Karamoja Map
Appendix 11: KI Questionnaire: Government and Non Governmental Organisations

Respondents

This questionnaire seeks to gather information on cooperation and coordination of state, the traditional structures and non-state agencies have contributed to sustainable peace in your district. Kindly respond to all the questions herein

Section A. Respondent’s Information

Kindly indicate the appropriate description of yourself

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A1</th>
<th>Name of the key informant (Optional)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>Contact details of the key informant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3</td>
<td>Gender of the KI 1=Male 2=Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4</td>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Below 21 but not under 18 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>81–21 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21–30 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30–40 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41–50 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51–60 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61 and above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A5</td>
<td>Place of work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Nongovernmental organisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Nongovernmental organisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A6 How Long how you worked</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 – 5 Years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 – 10 Years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 – 15 Years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16- 20 Years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 20 Years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A7 Education levels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below Primary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A – Level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College / University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters Degree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Section B: CONFLICT CAUSATION**

B1. On a scale of 1-5, where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree, indicate the degree to which you agree with each of the following causes affect existence of conflict in Karamoja.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Rating Scale</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Continued marginalisation of Karamoja from colonial to contemporary regimes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Arms circulation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Culture and direction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B2**

Are there any forms of poor governance issues from the authorities that are in control of this area? 0=No
1=Yes

What are these forms of poor governance experienced by the people?
If Yes above, is this poor governance a source of conflict in this area? 0=No 1=Yes

Describe how it is causing conflict.

What are the triggers and trends of conflicts in this area? Fill the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Rating scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Influential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1  Warriors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  Elders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Politicians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  Business men and women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  Government officers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  Security agents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7  Neighbouring communities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B.6. On a scale of 1-5, where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree, indicate the degree to which you agree with each of the following as effective solutions to the conflict in Karamoja.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Rating Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Traditional courts to arbitrate and litigation process</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Traditional blessing and cursing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Community relationships e.g marriage, age sets e.tc</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Community relationships e.g marriage, age sets e.tc</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Observing special traditional occasions and rituals</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B.7. On a scale of 1-5, where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree, indicate the degree to which you agree with each of the following as effective solutions to the conflict in Karamoja.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Rating Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dialogue and peace meetings</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connector projects</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and integration</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other development projects</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baraza’s led by government /NGO/Community itself</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community peace agreements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Warning and response by government, community and NGO’s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Approaches (What is being done to manage conflict and how)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B8</th>
<th>Are there any efforts by the community to resolve and manage this conflict? (Without the support of government and non-governmental agencies)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0=No 1=Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B9</th>
<th>Do traditional/customary Conflict Management processes exist in Karamoja?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0=No 1=Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Institutions (Which institution is managing and how)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B10</th>
<th>Do You agree that the following have a role in management of conflict?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B10.1</th>
<th>Council of elders traditional not government appointed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0=No 1=Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B10.2</th>
<th>Church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0=No 1=Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B10.3</td>
<td>Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0=No 1=Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B10.4</th>
<th>Local NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0=No 1=Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B10.5</th>
<th>National/Central government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0=No 1=Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B10.6</th>
<th>International NGO’s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0=No 1=Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B10.7</th>
<th>Community ( means men women youth and children other than council of elders )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0=No 1=Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B10.8</th>
<th>Do you agree that the government has</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

the sole responsibility in the management of Karamoja conflict?  
\[ 0 = \text{No} \quad 1 = \text{Yes} \]

**Explain**

| B10.9 | Do you think the Government understands the conflict in Karamoja?  
\[ 0 = \text{No} \quad 1 = \text{Yes} \]  
**Explain**

| B10.10 | Do you think Non-governmental actors understand conflict in Karamoja?  
\[ 0 = \text{No} \quad 1 = \text{Yes} \]  
**Explain**

### SECTION C: Collaboration/Cooperation and Coordination

*Coordination and cooperation WITHIN ONE TYPE conflict management actors*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cl</th>
<th>Is there cooperation and coordination WITHIN one type of actor? Kindly answer below questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1.1</td>
<td>Local government departments/agencies in a district or region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0=No 1=Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C1.2</strong> National/Central departments/agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0=No 1=Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National/Central departments/agencies AND Local government departments/agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0=No 1=Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C1.3</strong> NGO’s at District/Regional level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0=No 1=Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C1.4</strong> NGO’s at National level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0=No 1=Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C1.5</strong> NGO’s at District/Regional level AND NGO’s at National level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0=No 1=Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C1.6</strong> NGO’s at District/Regional AND NGO’s at International</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0=No 1=Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C1.7</strong> NGO’s at National AND NGO’s at International</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0=No 1=Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C1.8</strong> NGO’s at District/Regional level AND NGO’s at National level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Cb: Coordination and cooperation among more than one type conflict management actors

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AND NGO’s at International</strong></td>
<td>0=No 1=Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**C2** Is there cooperation and coordination among more than one type of actor? Kindly answer below questions.

- **C2.1** Is it **important** for government and non governmental organizations to work in **cooperation/collaboration** (means joint efforts/ there is relationship/ partnership for a special purpose)?

  0=No 1=Yes

  Explain

- **C2.2** Is **there Cooperation/Collaboration** between Government and Nongovernmental Organizations?

  0=No 1=Yes

  Explain
| C2.3 | **Is it important** for government and non-governmental organizations to work in a **coordinated** manner?  
0=No 1=Yes |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| C2.4 | **Is there Coordination** (To work together so as to increase **effectiveness and efficiency**) between Government and Nongovernmental organizations  
0=No 1=Yes |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| C.4 | Do the following structures and Mechanisms exist for cooperation/collaboration and coordination of actors  
Joint funding of projects  
0=No 1=Yes |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Reporting</td>
<td></td>
<td>No 1=Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Review meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td>No 1=Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint assessments and conflict analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td>No 1=Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td>No 1=Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td>No 1=Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION D: Challenges**

D.1 Do you think all actors in management of conflict have a common understanding

*Conflict in Karamoja (Causes, Issues and parties to conflict)* 0=No 1=Yes

Explain
D.2 On a scale of 1-5, where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree, indicate the degree to which you agree with each of following statements in enhancing cooperation/collaboration or coordination between government and none governmental institutions in management of conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Rating Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Communication</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Shared tasks</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Partnership/shared partnership</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Coherence in approach/methods conflict management</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Common understanding of conflict in Karamoja</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Perception of Issues and solution to the conflict</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Same or Different mandates of government and non governmental organisations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D.3 What are some of the challenges you experience in collaboration between government and nongovernmental agencies?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

D.4 What are some of the solutions you can make to mitigate the challenges?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

D.5 What are some of the changes you would recommend for collaboration and coordination of efforts?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
Appendix 11: FOCUSED GROUP DISCUSSION for Community

This questionnaire seeks to gather information on cooperation and coordination of state, the traditional structures and non-state agencies have contributed to sustainable peace in your district. Kindly respond to all the questions herein.

SECTION A: INTRODUCTION

Region; ........................................... ....

District;

Date; ..................................................

Group Composition; ................................ Key exclusive/inclusive of men women youth children

SECTION B: Conflict (Causes, Issues and parties to conflict) AND Management approaches

In your opinion - Probe for 3 to 4 elaborate points to be noted

1. Who are involved in conflict issues in Karamoja, what it is all about and persisted for many years?

2. What are the different types and causes of conflict experienced in Karamoja?

3. Which cause has the widest and most frequent impact on the people?

4. Why has conflict in Karamoja?
5. What are the triggers to conflict?

Approaches (What and how is being done to manage conflict)

1. How can these causes of conflict be overcome or reduced?

2. Who holds the responsibility in managing conflicts? Please list them

3. How is this conflict being managed? What is being done by:

   a) Council of elders i.e. traditional not government appointed
   b) Church
   c) Local Government
   d) Central Government
   e) Local NGOS
   f) International NGO’s
   g) Community itself i.e men women youth children but not council of elders
   h) List others

Institutions (Which institution /who is managing and how)
1. What is the role of a) Council of elders i.e. traditional not government appointed b) Church c) Local Government d) Central Government e) Local NGOS f) International NGO’s g) Community itself List others.

2. What has been the responsibility of government in reducing conflict?

   A) National Government
   B) Local government

3. What has been the role of nongovernmental organisations
   a. National Government
   b. Local government

SECTION C: To analyze actors in track one & track two and their capacity to deal with the conflict, and

1. Do you think the following understand the conflict in Karamoja? Probe for explanation
   a) Council of elders
   b) Church
   c) Local Government
   d) Central Government
   e) Local NGOS
   f) International NGO’s
   g) Community men women youth children but not council of elders
2. Are the functions of government and nongovernmental same or similar in management of Karamoja conflict? If Yes how are they similar, If No how are they different

3. Do you think the following are doing enough to manage the conflict **Probe for explanation and examples**

   a) Council of elders
   b) Church
   c) Local Government
   d) Central Government
   e) Local NGOS
   f) International NGO’s
   g) Community men women youth children but not council of elders

4. Do you think the following are working jointly **Probe for examples**, if the joint work is effective/better? if is it necessary the reasons why they should work jointly.

   a) Council of elders
   b) Church
   c) Local Government
   d) Central Government
   e) Local NGOS
   f) International NGO’s
   g) Community men women youth children but not council of elders
5. Is there a relationship between what the above actors are undertaking?

6. What suggestions would you make to enable them work in a cooperative and coordinated way?

SECTION D: Challenges

Do you experience any challenges when engaging Local Government in Management of Conflict?

List the challenges
Suggestions of solution and recommendation to these challenges

Do you experience any challenges when engaging Central Government in Management of Conflict?

List the challenges
Suggestions of solution and recommendation to these challenges

Do you experience any challenges when engaging Council of elders

List the challenges
Suggestions of solution and recommendation to these challenges

Do you experience any challenges when engaging Church

List the challenges
Suggestions of solution and recommendation to these challenges
Do you experience any challenges when engaging Local NGOs
List the challenges
Suggestions of solution and recommendation to these challenges

Do you experience any challenges when engaging International NGO’s
List the challenges
Suggestions of solution and recommendation to these challenges

Do you experience any challenges as communities (Men, women, youth children) when engaging in conflict management process?
List the challenges
Suggestions of solution and recommendation to these challenges

Do you experience any challenges when engaging List others
List the challenges
Suggestions of solution and recommendation to these challenges
Appendix IV: Findings Tables and Figures

4.2 Findings

4.2.1 Assessment of Causes, Issues and Actors in Karamoja Conflict

55.6% of the respondents agree and strongly agree that continued marginalisation of Karamoja from colonial to contemporary regimes affect the existence of conflict in Karamoja. 19.5% strongly disagree and disagree with the statement. 25% didn’t take side.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marginalisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

78.3% of the respondents agree and strongly agree that arms circulation has an effected Karamoja conflict. 8.1% strongly disagree and disagree with the statement. 13.5% remained neutral on their statement.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arms Circulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

98
75.6% of the respondents agree and strongly agree that culture and direction affect existence of conflict in Karamoja. 10.8% strongly disagree and disagree with the statement. 13.5% remained neutral.

**Table 4**

37.1% of the respondents are neutral if time has an effect on existence of conflict in Karamoja. 22.8% agree and strongly agree with the statement while 40% strongly disagree and disagree with the statement.

Most of the respondents, 84% indicate that there are forms of poor governance from the authorities in control. Most of the respondents, 73%, agree that these poor governance issues are a source of conflict in Karamoja area.
To analyze actors in Karamoja conflict respondents scored rate of influence as High, Moderately influential, or Not influential for warriors, elders, politicians, women, neighboring community, security agents and children.

59.5% rate warriors as highly influential, 35.1% rate it as moderately influential while 5.4% view warriors as not influential at all.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warriors</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly influential</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately influential</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not influential</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

75%, a majority of the respondents, rate elders as highly influential, 16.7% rate it as moderately influential while 5.6% rate it as not influential.
Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not influential</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

51.3% rate the politicians as highly influential, 38.5% rate elders as moderately influential while 10.3% did not rate it.

Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motorly influential</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly influential</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not rate</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

46.2% of the respondents rate politicians as moderately influential, 23.1% rate it as highly influential, 23.1% rate it as not influential while 7.7% didn’t rate.
Table 8

Government officers are rated as moderately influential by 53.8%, highly influential by 20.5%, 17.9% rate it as not influential while 7.7% didn’t rate.

Table 9

48.7% rate the security agents as highly influential, 35.9% rate it as moderately influential, and 7.7% rate it as not influential while 7.7% didn’t rate it.

Table 10

Neighbouring communities are rated as moderately influential by 56.4%, highly influential by 33.3% not influential by 2.6% while 7.7% didn’t rate it.
Table 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighbouring communities</th>
<th>Didn't rate</th>
<th>Moderately Influential</th>
<th>Highly influential</th>
<th>Not Influential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

61.5% rated youth in general as moderately influential, 15.4 indicate youth as not influential, only 12.8% agree that youth are highly influential.

Table 12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth in general</th>
<th>Didn't rate</th>
<th>Moderately Influential</th>
<th>Highly influential</th>
<th>Not Influential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Women are rated as moderately influential by 35.9%, highly influential by 33.3%, not influential by 23.1% while 7.7% didn’t rate it.
Table 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Didn’t rate</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly influential</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately influential</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not influential</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Majority of the respondents rate children as not influential by 82.1% while 10.3% rate it as moderately influential as 7.7% didn’t rate it.

Table 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not Influential</td>
<td>82.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Influential</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didn’t rate</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.2 Assessment of Approaches and Methods in Management of Karamoja Conflict

83.3% of the respondents strongly agree and agree with traditional courts as effective solutions to the conflict in Karamoja. 11.2% strongly disagree and disagree with the statement as 5.6% were neutral.
Table 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27% strongly disagree and disagree that the traditional blessings and cursing are an effective solutions to conflict. 54% strongly agree and agree with the statement as 18.9% are neutral.

Table 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

69.4% strongly agree and agree that community relationships are effective solutions to conflict. 11.1% disagree and strongly disagree as 19.4% are neutral.
Table 17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community relationships</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

48.6% agree and strongly agree that special traditional occasions are effective solution to conflict, 32.4% disagree and strongly disagree as 18.9% are neutral.

Table 18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special traditional occasions</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

89.5% strongly agree and agree with dialogue and peace meeting as effective solution to conflict while 2.6% strongly disagree as 7.9% are neutral. None just disagree.
80.5% agree and strongly agree that connector projects are effective solution to conflict while 2.8% disagree as 16.7% are neutral.

75% agree and strongly agree that disarmament demobilisation rehabilitation and integration are effective solutions to conflict as 11.1% strongly disagree while 13.9% are neutral.
Table 21

Disarmament demobilisation rehabilitation and integration

- Strongly Agree: 50.0%
- Agree: 25.0%
- Neutral: 13.9%
- Strongly Disagree: 11.1%

81% strongly agree that other development projects are effective solution to conflict, 16.2% are neutral as 2.7% disagree.

Table 22

Other development projects

- Strongly Agree: 37.8%
- Agree: 43.2%
- Neutral: 16.2%
- Disagree: 2.7%

72.9% agree that barazas are effective solution to conflict, 5.4% strongly agree and disagree while 21.6% are neutral.
Table 23

Barazas led by government /NGO /community itself

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

81% strongly agree and agree that community peace agreements are effective solution to conflict, 5.4% disagree and strongly disagree as 13.5% are neutral.

Table 24

Community peace agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

70.2% agree and strongly agree that early warning and response by government community and NGOs are effective solution to conflict, 2.7% disagree while 27% are neutral.
Are there any efforts by the community to resolve and manage this conflict? (Without the support of government and non governmental agencies) 84% agree that there are efforts by the community to resolve and manage this conflict.

Figure 2

If traditional /customary Conflict Management processes exist in Karamoja. 97% agree that traditional/customary conflict management processes exist in Karamoja.
4.2.3 Assessment of Government and Nongovernmental organisations Role in Management of Karamoja Conflict

97.4% each equally agree that council of elders; church, local NGOs have a role in management of conflict. This is followed by local government at 92.1%, community at 91.95, and national NGOs at 88.9% and lastly international NGOs at 88.9%.

Table 26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you agree that the following have a role in management of conflict?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community (other than council of elders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National/central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of elders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Whether Non-governmental actors understand conflict in Karamoja, 89% say the NGOs understand conflict in Karamoja. Over 70% agree that there is coordination within one type of actor from local to national and regional levels.

86.1% of respondents agree there’s cooperation and coordination within national and local government agencies and their departments. 81.6% agree that there is cooperation and coordination of NGOs at district level. Only 80% agree that there is no coordination between NGOs at national and regional level. 78.9% agree that there is cooperation and coordination of local government agencies in a district or a region. 78.8% of respondents agree that there is
cooperation and coordination of government agencies at national level. 78.4% agree that there is coordination of NGOs at district, national and regional level. 75.8% agree that there is cooperation and coordination of NGOs at district national and regional level. 73.5% agree that there is cooperation and coordination of NGOs at district and national level. 70.6% agree that there is cooperation and coordination of NGOs at national level.

**Table 27**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation and Coordination Within One Type of Actors</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGOs at district/regional level and NGOs at national level &amp; NGOs at international level</td>
<td>75.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs at national &amp; NGOs at international level</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs at district/regional &amp; NGOs at international level</td>
<td>78.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs at district/regional level &amp; NGOs at national level</td>
<td>73.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs at national level</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs at district/regional level</td>
<td>81.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National and local govt agencies/departments</td>
<td>86.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National/central govt departments/agencies</td>
<td>78.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government departments/agencies/ in a district/region</td>
<td>78.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

97.3% of the respondents say it is important for government and NGOs to work in cooperation/collaboration, 94.9% say it is important for government and NGOs to work in a coordinated manner. 89.2% say there is cooperation/collaboration between govt and NGOs while 85.7% say there is coordination between government and NGOs.
Table 28

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordination and Cooperation of NGOs and government.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is there Coordination btwn Govt and Ngos</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is it important for govt &amp; ngos to work in</td>
<td>94.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coordinated manner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there Cooperation/Collaboration btwn</td>
<td>89.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt and ngos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is it important for gvt &amp; ngos to work in</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperation/collaboration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

90.9% each agree that stakeholder meetings, coordination meetings structures exist for cooperation/collaboration and coordination of actors. 72.7% say joint review meetings exist, 54.5% say joint projects do exist as well as joint assessments and conflict analysis exist while 40.6% say joint reporting do exist.

Table 29

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do the following structures and mechanisms exist for cooperation/collaboration and coordination of actors</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder meetings</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination meetings</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint assessments and conflict analysis</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint review meetings</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint reporting</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint funding projects</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whether there is a collective understanding of conflict by actors involved in management of Karamoja conflict. 59% of respondents agree that all actors have a common understanding of Karamoja conflict compared to 41% who disagree.
4.2.4 Assessment of the Coordination of government and nongovernmental Organisations in Management of Karamoja Conflict.

76.9% agree and strongly agree that communication enhance cooperation/collaboration while 10.3% neutral as 12.8% didn’t rate.

Table 30

61.5% agree and strongly agree and agree that shared tasks help in enhancing cooperation/collaboration or coordination between government and non governmental institutions in management of conflict.25.6% are neutral as 12.8% didn’t rate.
61.5% agree and strongly agree that partnership/shared partnership help in enhancing cooperation/collaboration or coordination between government and non governmental institutions in management of conflict. 20.5% are neutral while 17.9% didn’t rate.

Table 32

61.6% agree and strongly agree that coherence in approach/methods conflict management helps in enhancing cooperation/collaboration or coordination between government and non governmental institutions in management of conflict.15.4% disagree, 5.1% are neutral while 17.9% didn’t rate.
69.2% agree and strongly agree that common understanding of conflict helps in enhancing cooperation/collaboration or coordination between government and non governmental institutions in management of conflict.18% disagree and strongly disagree while 12.8% didn’t rate.

Table 34

51.2% strongly agree and agree that perception of issues and solution to the conflict helps in enhancing cooperation/collaboration or coordination between government and non governmental institutions in management of conflict.23.1% are neutral, 5.1% disagree while 20.5% didn’t rate.
### Table 35

**Perception of issues and solution to the conflict**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Didn't rate</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

48.7% strongly agree and agree that same or different mandates of government and NGOs help in enhancing cooperation/collaboration or coordination between government and non-governmental institutions in management of conflict. 23.1% are neutral, 12.9% strongly disagree while 15.4% didn’t rate.

### Table 36

**Same or different mandates of government and NGOs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Didn't rate</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 37

**Resources availability including human finance, assets**

<table>
<thead>
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61.6% strongly agree and agree that resources availability including human finance, assets help in enhancing cooperation/collaboration or coordination between government and non governmental institutions in management of conflict. 15.4% strongly disagree while 7.7% didn’t rate.
Appendix v: Qualitative data from Key informant interviews.

1. What are these forms of poor governance experienced by the people?

Land management is a becoming a problem in Karmoja. Changing land use Poor governance in regard to land management and ownership

Civic incompetence resulting from lack of access to relevant information which would have been important to address local governance related challenges. Lack of civic education. Coupled with high illiteracy levels. Lack of knowledge on governance issues hence less participation rigging elections, political leaders deceiving communities.

Poor leadership, lack of citizen engagement, Leaders who are not interested in supporting the community in post conflict context. They are part of the conflict.

Corruption and lack of transparency in service delivery highlighted as a form of poor governance contributing to conflict.

Inadequate social accountability coupled with low participation. Respondents indicated the following: Isolation of the Karamujong people by most regimes in power, dictatorship of governments on power. Leaders who are not interested in supporting the community come out the conflict. They are part of the conflict. Nepotism and majority of officials in the area are non-residents, hence suffer from prejudice/bias. There was a mention of funds allocated for peace is not used in a right way

Poor service delivery for the community sited as a key hindrance to management of conflict in Karamoja. Respondents included the following areas of poor service delivery; health, education and roads. Destocking of Karachunas (youth) from market areas was unplanned

2. Describe how it is causing conflict.
Conflicts come in due to the struggle for the scarce resources. Factors like lack of schools have resulted into high illiteracy causing poor planning for livelihood intervention hence leading into blame and high prevalence of gender based violence.

Lack of transparency and corruption is leading inability to address the general needs of the people. One of the explanations is incompetent and corrupt leaders leading to poor service delivery and poor allocation of resources further leads to infrastructural and resource based conflict.

It does not cause, but perpetuates the conflict. Some of the explanations include; when people feel deprived this often causes conflict. When wrong doers go unpunished, the people affected always take the law in their hands hence conflicts issues are not being solved.

Land wrangles have escalated in communities especially between land owners and the investors. Poor service delivery to the communities as result of poor accountability to the masses has also contribute.

Community rights not being observed. People's rights have been abused, democracy is not real democracy and people are conflicting amongst themselves.

Political arm does not address the civilized issues of conflict but basically deal on assumptions. Some leaders are not willing to support initiatives to end the conflict like peace.

The people are not given knowledge on their rights and responsibilities. Therefore undermines peaceful resolution.

3. **What are the triggers and trends of conflicts in this area**

Disarmament forcing karachunas to buy expensive. Disorganising karachunos at market places.

Cultural practices and ceremonies. Marriage, polygamy, cultural practices.
During election times people conflict every time. Ethnic groups raid other every year at least sometimes on monthly basis. During elections the disarmament programme unfair, return of cows raided (biased disarmament in the region).

Gender based violence.

Land issues especially on resettlements areas where UWA normally torture people in those areas by biting them and also blocking water source like borehole with stones.

Triggers of conflict in this area include food insecurity; cattle rustling that are still existent in some of these communities, struggle for grazing land and shifting tribal alliances. Water and climate change issues. Drought base on different weather patterns, Lack of alternative means of livelihoods coupled with abject poverty. Political campaigns and political camps usually split and conflict the communities from within.

Why council of elders have a role in management of conflict.

Importance of council of elders was cited by respondents with the following reasons. Elders are part of council of traditional leaders and therefore respected and connected to people and issues. Consulted on brokering peace among people and are able to easily mobilize communities towards making of peace. They form part of communities system of regulation of community rules led by a council of elders; in Karamoja, the Akiriket. Elders are the custodians of community ethos; they exercise ultimate control of the youth (warriors). Elders have set by laws that were constituted for ages ago and they always have references of conflict. In the karamoja context, the elders bless the Karachuna (warriors) when going to raid. The council of elders has a quasi jurisdictional powers to resolve any conflicts in the community disciplining and holding wrong doers accountable. They are key opinion shapers amongst the people. They are trusted by community. They bless or curse the process. They make decisions and are consulted.

Why church has a role in management of conflict.
The Church has moral authority and trust of the community and advocates for peaceful coexistence. A strong mobilization institution that reaches out to the communities. It is where people gather in large numbers and it can be used for sensitizing people. Supports service provision in education, health and feeding among other social welfare issues. Their role would be act as agents of behaviour change, and also in mitigating the effects of conflicts. The church has played a very significant role as far as conflict resolution and peace building and development is concerned in Karamoja.

*Why local government has a role in management of conflict.*

It is the community’s immediate service provider. Represents national government Implement laws. The local government has structures in place assigned with the responsibility of settling disputes with in communities e.g. the local councillors. Coordinate all peace building initiatives in the district through the security sector like Office of Resident District Commissioner (RDC), District Security Office

Local Government leaders, in most cases, tend to defend their communities, who happen to be their electorates, against other communities irrespective of which community may be on the wrong.

Mandate to protect Provide security.

*Why local NGOs have a role in management of conflict.*
Facilitate development projects that will induce behaviour change through alternative means of earning livelihood. Local NGOs have been active in negotiating for peace among the conflicting communities in Karamoja even before disarmament. Provide services to local communities and providing development projects to reduce poverty which is one of the major sources of conflicts and community dialogues. Quite influential in mitigating the conflicts custodians of resources both financial and expertise and armed with resources are capable of providing the necessary logistics to communities. Are sources of and have a wealth of knowledge.

They have a great role in management of conflict as evidenced by their great work and approaches in community peace and reconciliation initiatives.

Why national/central government has a role in conflict management.

- Mandate to provide security, protect citizens and provide services, law enforcers
- By good national policies and proposes decentralisation of social services
- It has the necessary mechanisms as per the structure and its mandate

Why international NGOs have a role in conflict management

Same as local NGOs.

Why community has a role to play in conflict management
They are the ones affected by conflict therefore main actors in conflict and its management. Community structures especially the justice and peace committees have been formed at community level. These are constituted by women, men and youth and are charged with the responsibility of ensuring peace.

- Council of elders are part of the community in that they are older/elderly men/women
- Discouraging warriors from cattle raids and destruction attitude like theft, rape and defilement
- They are the main actors and it is them who will need to solve
- They are the perpetrators and affects them too
- They are victims and parties to conflict

4. Do you agree that the government has the sole responsibility in the management of Karamoja conflict?

- Same as local NGOs.

5. Do you think the Government Understands the conflict in Karamoja?

They are part of context of conflict. But conflict in Karamoja need combined effort to address the root causes. The govt understands the problem that is why it has come up with several initiatives to solve the conflict; the problem lies with implementation. They are aware of the conflict but they are too slow to act on.

6. Do you think Non-governmental actors understand conflict in Karamoja?
Because they closely engage the community in understanding the dynamics of conflict at a broader level. Non-governmental actors understand conflict in Karamoja because they are based on the ground and are in touch with the local people.

- They study the situation

- Working together with the communities

7. Is there cooperation and coordination among more than one type of actor?

Important for information sharing and problem solving, enhance transparency and accountability. Minimise duplication of activities, resources and pull synergies. It creates good working environment, anticipate various conflict and peace reconciliation mechanisms to be jointly followed during community dialogues. Avoid impact of conflict of interests. NGOs follow national development plan. Through collaboration government and nongovernmental organisations can use collected information and develop effective response strategies. To enhance sharing of information and improved the implementation process

Yes it’s important in that govt alone cannot mange to handle issues independently. It requires support from ngos. If it is initiatives are to have impact for instance in disarmament, government can use force.

Qualitative findings for is there Cooperation/Collaboration between Government and Nongovernmental Organizations?
Both have structures and from grassroots. Government plays a key role in defining social and development agenda. Government coordinates initiatives at district level. There are joint
initiatives, discussions, consultations and reviews. A few respondents noted that there is some co-operation between the two. However, there exists a trust deficit hampering successful co-operation due to competing interests.

Qualitative findings for is it important for government and nongovernmental organizations to work in a coordinated manner?

All target the same beneficiaries and also have the same objective to achieve that is sustainable peace and development in the region. Avoid duplication of resources. Widen the scope of operation and coverage. Ensure comprehensive process. Necessary as the causes of conflict are multi-dimensional. Avoid duplication of resources and supplement each other in terms of resources and capacity. For efficiency and effectively carry out activities

Qualitative findings for is there Coordination (To work together so as to increase effectiveness and efficiency) between Government and Nongovernmental organizations

- Adequate collaboration
- Because of fear to be intimidated by the government on bringing true facts out
- Both the government and the nongovernmental organizations coordinate especially during the sharing of work plans, joint monitoring of the activities meant to improve the lives of the communities.
- By use of joint monitoring
- Can do this by having meetings
- Coordination between governments and nongovernment organisations does exist but is not effective. This could be because it is not informed by need but convenience
● District stakeholder meetings

● Each actor performs what it is best at and also duplication is avoided as each knows what the other is doing and the population targeted by each is also known.

● Each appear to be pursuing their own interests.

● Government have the arm to react to conflict and protect those affected.

● It helps in resource mobilisation.

● Joint plans and activities and consultations.

● Meetings for planning, learning sharing at district and national level.

● Most of the findings of the NGO's are being undermined by government as criticism which is not the case.

● No proper coordination because no duplicate their work in some counties.

● Problem identification and solving is always done jointly.

● Riamiriam civil society network calls for joint security meetings that are chaired by the office of the resident district commissioner (RDC).

● Scope of work has increased in terms of coverage, air and just means of treating suspects have also improved during operations especially disarmament.

● The lowest local govt structure coordinate with the CBOS and translate issues to local govt headquarter than to the central government share experience and change policies at hand.

● The programmes are availed in time and joint meetings done incorporating all relevant authorities.

● There are coordination meetings in general sector meetings.

● They work together.

● This applies to similar organisations that are supported by the same founder.
• Through joint monitoring of ngo programmes
• Through the civil society national ngo forum which has been created in almost all
  district to coordinate the government and other ngos
• To ease the engagement of the local communities
• Without each other’s the prevailing small peace would not exist

8. Do you think all actors in management of conflict have a common understanding

Conflict in Karamoja (Causes, Issues and parties to conflict)

• Actors of conflict management lack a common understanding of conflict in
  karamoja and this can be attributed to various issues including: project locations,
  capacity, limitation in ability to respond
• All actors come together with peace dialogue meetings
• All have had input in seeking peace for region
• Because for karamojong issues is very critical and karamoja issues are very fragile
• Because information on the issues is available and all parties to these issues are
  cooperating
• Due to nature of the conflict, there is great understanding/comprehension of the
  root cause
• Each and every organisation comes up with its format without consulting the
  present organisations on the ground
• Government and most non-governmental agencies used the top-down programme,
  or project, design approach, which excludes the direct beneficiaries from direct
  involvement, and mostly makes it difficult f
I am not sure

In the way they are supporting the communities to come out of the situations that they are in. They have developed interventions to support the community towards peace building and reconstruction.

It is clearly evidenced that many development parties do not understand peace meeting beneficiaries are local govt officials not communities. Some address conflict triggers and symptoms but not the root causes.

Karamoja main cause of conflict derives from illiteracy, resources which is all common as seen by all actors but approaches differ.

Many think conflicts is only about different ethnic groups in cattle rustling yet in Karamoja there might be many other conflicts between the local people with government. Land conflict between the jie and ladoric

Most do not all in terms of needs of priority actions and areas

Most of them are addressing not the root causes because they do not know the background

Most of them understand conflict differently according to their settings.

No not all have a common understanding. Most of them have only narrowed to guns leaving aside other cause, issues and parties.

Some actors are new in kulu and do not understand conflict

The conflict in Karamoja is most times blamed on the karamojong themselves yet government also has a stake in the karamoja conflict due to the negligence of the region right from colonial time which l

There are consultations among them

There are some who understand and some seem not to understand
They are joint initiatives
They implement different programmes not related to conflict
They perceive conflict differently and so this brings in differences in approaches to conflicts
This is based on the expertise, experience and the interest of different organisations which sometimes are not match
This is because they shame a lot like during coordinates meetings
Through coordination meetings they share experiences and come up with a common understanding of conflicts.
Through joint coordinating meetings
Yes, both actors have a common understanding of conflict but what makes it difficult is the community members

D.3 what are some of the challenges you experience in collaboration between government and nongovernmental agencies?

1) Lack of common understanding and Different approaches. 2) Bureaucracy in government process. 3) Different mandates mean different focus or area of emphasis for both government and Non Government agencies. Divergent vested interests and policies between government and NGOs brings about competition. It is not easy budget lines of NGOs and government. Most government officials prefer to attend meetings when there allowances, hence allowances become priority. The government sometimes assumes that the NGOs are taking their roles. Lack of political will from the Government to end the conflicts in the region so
even the collaboration efforts of the NGO alone is a waste 4) Ineffective communication structures between various actors/agencies. Information sharing is inadequate and not sharing of reports. 5) Inadequate financial resources hamper coordination and collaboration. 6) The number of nongovernmental agencies working in Karamoja is high; this reduces the ability by government Personnel to meaningfully engage them. 7) Lack of transparency and corruption is affecting coordination and collaboration. Misappropriation of public funds by corrupt leaders both in government and NGOs although NGOs view government officials as being more corrupt so conduct their activities solely. NON-disclosure of resources meant to enable them intervene in conflict

D.4 what are some of the solutions you can make to mitigate the challenges?

Cooperation and coordination of track one and track two actors in management of conflict are important for a holistic and sustainable outcome in management of Karamoja conflict. However cooperation and coordination experiences some challenges. Some of the solutions could be: 1) Harmonizing conflict approaches. Joint planning, implementation and reporting Shared vision of how to end conflict. It is important to manage actor interests other than the common interest of the locals. 2) Pooling of resources together and increased funding for local general infrastructure. Government should allocate money for peace building. 3) Coordination structures for example a Peace building steering committee comprising of community, government and nongovernmental actors. Peace building steering committee to enable cooperation and coordination for effective communication, networking. A steering committee is a cost effective method to collaboration of governmental and nongovernmental actors. For example all actors will have a shared and agreed responsibility in rolling out initiatives, meet and share information frequently. 4) Institutional accountability mechanisms
should be adopted by both government and nongovernmental actors. To solve corruption all parties involved in every stage should be included at every stage.

D.5 what are some of the changes you would recommend for collaboration and coordination of efforts?

Meetings and sharing

- Every actor should share data or information with actors
- Facilitate cooperation agreement.
- To form networks.

Consensus building meetings and inclusion of all actors at every stage

Review of collaboration and coordination mechanism. This will encourage partnership and information sharing.

- Regular coordination monitoring and evaluation. Members have to meet regularly in order to identify challenges and design a response mechanism together

International peace and justice, committee from other parts of the world be the observers among the collaborators and contributors of conflict resolution. Where unjust is being experienced then peace and justice activities come together to share their approaches and experiences on conflict resolutions and later forge way forward for harmonized conflict resolutions strategies.
There has to be effective communication and coordination of members of NGO and government

**Joint initiatives should be a model of operation activities**

- Putting in place committees
- Joint research
- Joint monitoring
- Peace building conflict resolution strategy cooperation
- Formation of joint Coordination committee
- Having joint monitoring of activities
- Improve coordination and communication between the actors and the Government
- Development of specific strategies and plans that encourage collaborated response to conflict
- Improve coordination and communication between the actors and the Government
- Involve locals in the programs right from inception to implementation in order to tailor them to the needs of the locals;
- Prepare calendar of events and use of resources.
- The government should have NGOs to do their activities freely without interference most especially on security issues.
- Cooperation, transparency in whatever is done by both government and NGOs.
- Mapping all the actors dealing with peace then harmonizes the work plans, areas of operation.
- Need to implement action oriented activities to address conflict issues e.g. IGA.
- Sustained efforts.
- Task should be reverse and output should be monitored.
• The government should find proper ways of fighting corruption in this country otherwise the country is running abroad for ideas.

Dialogue
• Continuous dialogue, sensitization of the community, civic education and use of both the traditional systems and government (formal).
• Continuous teachings, sensitizations on the harmful traditional beliefs and promote conflict and enhancing change in attitude.

Empowerment
• Income generating activities.
• More government involvement- In good faith.
• Government to support livelihood programs
• All actor involved should lobby for funds.
• Strengthening of the council; of elders, invite women
• Institute structured bodies to harmonies the process - with well defined reporting channels.
• Involvement for both men and youth in peace activities.